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STATE V. GREE

Cite as 312 Neb. 351

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Christina M. Greer, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 2, 2022. No. S-21-601.

1. Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. Whether a jury instruction is 

correct is a question of law, regarding which an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached 

by the trial court.

2. Trial: Expert Witnesses: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews 

the record de novo to determine whether a trial court has abdicated its 

gatekeeping function when admitting expert testimony.

3. ____: ____: ____. When the trial court has not abdicated its gatekeeping 

function when admitting expert testimony, an appellate court reviews 

the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude the evidence for an abuse 

of discretion.

4. Sentences: Appeal and Error. A sentence imposed within the statutory 

limits will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

5. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists 

only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, 

unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just 

result in matters submitted for disposition.

6. Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. Jury instructions are subject 

to harmless error review, and an erroneous jury instruction requires 

reversal only if the error adversely affects the substantial rights of the 

complaining party.

7. Jury Instructions: Proof: Appeal and Error. In an appeal based upon 

a claim of an erroneous jury instruction, the appellant has the burden 

to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise 

adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

10/21/2022 09:05 AM CDT
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8. Rules of Evidence: Expert Witnesses. Four preliminary questions 

must be answered in order to determine whether an expert’s testimony is admissible: (1) whether the witness qualifies as an expert 

pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-702 (Reissue 2016); (2) whether 

the expert’s testimony is relevant; (3) whether the expert’s testimony 

will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine 

a controverted factual issue; and (4) whether the expert’s testimony, 

even though relevant and admissible, should be excluded in light of 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 2016) because its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or other 

considerations.

9. Trial: Expert Witnesses. A trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure 

the evidentiary relevance and reliability of an expert’s opinion, and this 

gatekeeping function entails a preliminary assessment whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is valid and whether 

that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts 

in issue.

10. ____: ____. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 

579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), does not create a special 

analysis for answering questions about the admissibility of all expert 

testimony. Not every attack on expert testimony amounts to a Daubert

claim. If a witness is not offering opinion testimony, that witness’ testimony is not subject to inquiry pursuant to Daubert.

11. Sentences: Appeal and Error. When sentences imposed within statutory limits are alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate 

court must determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in considering well-established factors and any applicable legal 

principles.

12. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists only 

when a trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable 

or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, 

reason, and evidence.

13. Sentences. When imposing a sentence, a sentencing judge should consider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or 

record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as 

well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the amount of violence 

involved in the commission of the crime.

14. ____. The sentencing court is not limited to any mathematically applied 

set of factors, but the appropriateness of the sentence is necessarily a 

subjective judgment that includes the sentencing judge’s observations 
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of the defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life.

15. ____. It is within the discretion of the trial court to direct that sentences imposed for separate crimes be served consecutively. The test 

of whether consecutive sentences may be imposed under two or more 

counts charging separate offenses, arising out of the same transaction or 

the same chain of events, is whether the offense charged in one count 

involves any different elements than an offense charged in another 

count. The test is whether some additional evidence is required to prove 

one of the other offenses.

Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: George 

A. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.

Thomas P. Strigenz, Sarpy County Public Defender, for 

appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Melissa R. 

Vincent for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Heavican, C.J.

INTRODUCTION

The defendant, Christina M. Greer, was charged with 13 

counts in four separate cases, all relating to allegations of 

sexual assault of a child. Greer was convicted of 11 of those 

counts and sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 64 to 102 

years’ imprisonment. Greer appeals. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Charges Against Greer.

Greer was charged in four separate cases. In the first case, 

she was originally charged with one count of first degree sexual assault of W.F. (also known as A.F.), a 13-year-old boy who 

was friends with Greer’s 11-year-old daughter. That charge was 
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later amended to one count of first degree sexual assault of a 

child and two counts of witness tampering.

In the second case, Greer was charged with three counts of 

first degree sexual assault of a child, J.H., a 13-year-old boy 

who was friends with Greer’s 9-year-old son. In the third case, 

Greer was charged with six counts of intentional child abuse of 

A.F. and J.H.; of Greer’s daughter; and of A.R., A.J., and C.P., 

identified as friends of Greer’s daughter. In the fourth case, 

Greer was charged with child enticement of P.M., a 13-year-old 

boy who attended school with Greer’s daughter.

These four cases were consolidated for trial on January 21, 

2021.

Pretrial Motions.

Greer was first charged in March 2018, but did not come to 

trial until March 2, 2021. Since that time, Greer has had three 

attorneys: appointed counsel; retained counsel; and at trial, the 

Sarpy County public defender, who was appointed on April 2, 

2020, and represents Greer in this appeal.

As relevant to this appeal, the primary reason for the delay 

in Greer’s trial was various motions filed by the State under 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-404 (Reissue 2016) (other bad acts) and 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414 (Reissue 2016) (prior sexual conduct). Generally, the State sought to introduce evidence that 

Greer (1) had engaged in uncharged sex acts with other children, (2) had engaged in uncharged sex acts with already identified victims, and (3) was “grooming” the children through the 

supplying of alcohol and marijuana edibles. In support of its 

contention that evidence relating to Greer’s grooming of children who came to her home, the State offered the testimony of 

Colleen Brazil, the forensic interview program manager at a 

child advocacy center.

The first such motion regarding §§ 27-404 and 27-414 was 

filed on December 26, 2018. At a hearing on February 7, 2019, 

Brazil testified about the concept of “grooming” and the behaviors it encompasses. Greer’s daughter and J.H. testified about 
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Greer’s conduct in the cases wherein each was a named victim. 

The State’s motion was granted on March 1.

On August 6, 2019, Greer sought a motion in limine to 

prevent the State from mentioning or using the term “grooming” without the court’s permission, as it was a “term of art 

that requires expert testimony.” On August 7, the district court 

granted the State’s motion to continue and noted that it would 

take up the motions in limine at a later hearing. The district 

court held a hearing on Greer’s motions in limine on March 3, 

2020, and denied the motions, noting that it had addressed the 

issue in various § 27-404 hearings.

Brazil’s Testimony.

Trial began on March 2, 2021. On March 3, Greer filed 

a motion seeking an order to strike Brazil as an expert witness, as well as to strike her testimony regarding grooming, 

because such theories violated standards set forth in Daubert 

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

 1 and Schafersman v. 

Agland Coop. 2

The State called Brazil to testify on March 4, 2021. Greer 

objected when the State asked Brazil if she was familiar with 

the term “grooming.” The district court initially indicated 

that “grooming” was not an appropriate topic for a Daubert

hearing and that Brazil was an expert in the field of child 

advocacy. But the district court ultimately agreed to hold a 

Daubert hearing.

At that hearing, Brazil once again testified on the concept 

of grooming. Brazil also testified that she knew very little 

about the facts of Greer’s case and that she would not offer 

an opinion as to whether Greer’s alleged victims were, in fact, 

groomed by Greer. The State also offered three court opinions 

and an article about grooming.

1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 

2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).

2 Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001).
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In ruling for the State, the court indicated that it did not 

think Daubert should apply, but that the Nebraska Court of 

Appeals’ opinion in State v. Edwards 3 held that Daubert did 

apply. The district court explicitly noted it believed that the 

difference between the Edwards case and Greer’s situation 

was based on the fact that the expert in Edwards specifically 

opined that the defendant in that case had engaged in grooming. The district court found that Brazil was an expert and 

allowed her to testify, but noted that the State should not 

stray into questions about whether Greer’s actions amounted 

to grooming.

When Greer’s counsel sought to clarify the grounds of the 

court’s ruling, the court explained that it was ruling that Brazil 

was a qualified expert, that grooming was part of her expertise, 

that there was sufficient peer review on the topic of grooming, 

and that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial, but 

that it also believed Daubert did not apply because Brazil was 

not opining on whether Greer’s conduct amounted to grooming. Brazil then testified at trial, subject to Greer’s continuing objection.

The jury ultimately found Greer guilty of counts 1 through 

3 and 5 through 12, and not guilty of counts 4 (sexual assault 

of a child) and 13 (child enticement). Greer was sentenced to 

a total of 64 to 102 years’ imprisonment, or 25 to 40 years’ for 

the three counts of first degree sexual assault of a child, 2 to 3 

years’ imprisonment on the six counts of child abuse, and 1 to 

2 years’ imprisonment on the two counts of witness tampering. 

The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, except 

that the 25-to-40-year sentence on count 6 was ordered to run 

concurrent to Greer’s other sentences.

Jury Instructions.

Prior to closing arguments, the district court instructed the 

jury, then took a brief recess. After the recess, the jury was 

3 State v. Edwards, 28 Neb. App. 893, 949 N.W.2d 799 (2020).
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informed that instruction No. 4, the definition of the term 

“penetration,” while taken from the Nebraska pattern jury 

instructions, 4 was incomplete. As such, over Greer’s objection, 

the instruction was revised to mirror the pattern instruction and 

was read again to the jury.

Greer appeals from her convictions and sentences.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Greer assigns, restated, that the district court erred in (1) the 

procedure utilized in instructing the jury as to the definitions 

included in instruction No. 4, specifically of the term “penetration”; (2) allowing Brazil to testify as an expert on the issue of 

grooming; and (3) imposing excessive sentences.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Whether a jury instruction is correct is a question of 

law, regarding which an appellate court is obligated to reach 

a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the 

trial court. 5

[2,3] An appellate court reviews the record de novo to 

determine whether a trial court has abdicated its gatekeeping 

function when admitting expert testimony. 6 When the trial 

court has not abdicated its gatekeeping function, an appellate 

court reviews the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude the 

evidence for an abuse of discretion. 7

[4,5] A sentence imposed within the statutory limits will 

not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of 

discretion by the trial court. 8 A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge 

are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a 

4 NJI2d Crim. 4.6.

5 State v. Pope, 305 Neb. 912, 943 N.W.2d 294 (2020).

6 See Hemsley v. Langdon, 299 Neb. 464, 909 N.W.2d 59 (2018).

7 See id.

8 State v. Blake, 310 Neb. 769, 969 N.W.2d 399 (2022).
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substantial right and denying a just result in matters sub

mitted for disposition. 9

ANALYSIS

Jury Instructions.

Greer first assigns that the district court erred in instructing the jury when it initially read an incomplete version of 

instruction No. 4, then later read the complete version of that 

same instruction. Greer asserts that the second reading of that 

particular instruction, which included the definition of the term 

“penetration,” was prejudicial to her because it emphasized 

penetration to the jury in a case where she had strongly denied 

committing an act of penetration. Greer suggests that at a minimum, the district court ought to have read again all instructions in order to de-emphasize any one instruction.

[6,7] Jury instructions are subject to harmless error review, 

and an erroneous jury instruction requires reversal only if the 

error adversely affects the substantial rights of the complaining party. 10 In an appeal based upon a claim of an erroneous 

jury instruction, the appellant has the burden to show that the 

questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely 

affected a substantial right of the appellant. 11

We find Greer’s arguments on appeal unpersuasive. We 

first observe that the only instruction in our record relevant 

to this assignment of error is the complete instruction No. 4, 

read to the jury upon the court’s realization that the initial 

instruction No. 4 was incomplete and later sent back with 

the jury for its use during deliberations. Greer had the burden to show that she was prejudiced by the court’s giving of 

the original instruction. Yet Greer has provided no record of 

what that initial, incomplete instruction contained. We cannot determine whether Greer was prejudiced by the second 

9 Id.

10 State v. Dady, 304 Neb. 649, 936 N.W.2d 486 (2019).

11 State v. Bao, 263 Neb. 439, 640 N.W.2d 405 (2002).
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reading of the instruction if we do not know the full contents 

of the first instruction.

And even if we could proceed based on our limited knowledge of the contents of the incomplete instruction, we would 

still conclude that Greer has failed to meet her burden to show 

that the instruction procedure followed was prejudicial. First, 

the cases upon which Greer relies—State v. Abram 12 and State 

v. Claycamp 13—are distinguishable.

In Abram, the written jury instruction, which was not 

objected to by the defendant or the State, read in relevant part 

that “‘[t]he fact that the [d]efendant did not testify must be 

considered by you as an admission of guilt . . . .’” 14 Copies of 

the instruction containing this plainly incorrect language were 

provided to the members of the jury to use while deliberating. 

However, in orally instructing the jury, the court stated that 

“‘[t]he fact that the [d]efendant did not testify must not be 

considered by you as an admission of guilt . . . .’” 15 In other 

words, the correct version of the instruction was read to the 

jury, but the incorrect language was provided to the jury in 

written form.

We held in Abram that this was not structural error, but subject to harmless error analysis. We concluded that even though 

the correct language was actually read to the jury, the error was 

not harmless. In so concluding, we reasoned that the incorrect 

instructions were emphasized by virtue of having been written 

and available to the jury during its deliberations.

In Claycamp, the defendant raised a defense of self-defense 

at trial. At the conclusion of evidence, the court read to the jury 

its instructions. The State and the defense then made closing 

arguments. In response to some comments made by the State 

in its argument, the court admonished the jury that it was 

12 State v. Abram, 284 Neb. 55, 815 N.W.2d 897 (2012).

13 State v. Claycamp, 14 Neb. App. 675, 714 N.W.2d 455 (2006).

14 State v. Abram, supra note 12, 284 Neb. at 60, 815 N.W.2d at 903.

15 Id.
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“‘not to consider any sort of [the victim’s] conduct or the 

consequences of his conduct. This is about the defendant . . 

. .’” 16 The Court of Appeals noted that the admonishment to 

the jury was contradictory to the earlier instructions regarding 

the defendant’s defense of self-defense. The Court of Appeals 

applied a harmless error standard and concluded that the error 

was not harmless and that reversal was warranted.

Unlike Abram and Claycamp, where the instruction provided 

was inconsistent with other instructions, was incorrect, or both, 

here, there is no suggestion that the initial part of instruction 

No. 4 read to the jury was incorrect—only that it was incomplete. This is reflected in the exchange between the court and 

counsel when the court explained that it would be adding to 

the instruction and reading it again. In fact, as we have noted 

above, this record does not even include the language originally read to the jury—whether it be the original instruction the 

court read from or a transcript of the court’s verbal instruction 

as it would appear in the bill of exceptions.

In this case, we apply a harmless error standard and decline 

to find any. First, this court lacks a complete record. Moreover, 

there is no allegation that the initial instruction as read to the 

jury was incorrect, but only that it was incomplete. Nor is there 

any allegation that the final instruction read to the jury and sent 

back with the jury during its deliberations was incorrect. We 

note Greer’s argument that the reading again of the definition 

of penetration emphasized that concept to the jury. However, 

we conclude that it is not possible to determine whether any 

alleged emphasis would have helped or harmed Greer, especially where Greer has directed us to no authority on point.

Greer has failed to meet her burden to show that she was 

prejudiced by the procedure followed by the district court with 

respect to instruction No. 4. As such, we find no merit to this 

assignment of error.

16 State v. Claycamp, supra note 13, 14 Neb. App. at 680, 714 N.W.2d at 

459.
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Brazil’s Testimony.

In Greer’s second assignment of error, she assigns that the 

district court erred in allowing Brazil to testify as an expert 

on the issue of grooming. We construe Greer’s brief to argue 

that the district court did not “adequately demonstrate specific 

findings on the record that it had performed its duty as a gatekeeper to find her as an expert on the issues of grooming.” 17

Greer further asserts that “grooming [was not] a scientifically 

valid methodology.” 18

[8] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-702 (Reissue 2016) provides that 

“[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 

thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Four preliminary questions must be answered in order to determine whether 

an expert’s testimony is admissible: (1) whether the witness 

qualifies as an expert pursuant to § 27-702; (2) whether the 

expert’s testimony is relevant; (3) whether the expert’s testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 

or determine a controverted factual issue; and (4) whether the 

expert’s testimony, even though relevant and admissible, should 

be excluded in light of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 2016) 

because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice or other considerations. 19

[9,10] Under our Daubert 20 and Schafersman 21 jurisprudence, a “trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and reliability of an expert’s opinion,” and 

this gatekeeping function “entails a preliminary assessment 

17 Brief for appellant at 22.

18 Id.

19 City of Lincoln v. Realty Trust Group, 270 Neb. 587, 705 N.W.2d 432 

(2005).

20 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 1.

21 Schafersman v. Agland Coop, supra note 2.
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whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is valid and whether that reasoning or methodology 

properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” 22 Still, “Daubert

does not create a special analysis for answering questions about 

the admissibility of all expert testimony. Not every attack on 

expert testimony amounts to a Daubert claim. If a witness is 

not offering opinion testimony, that witness’ testimony is not 

subject to inquiry pursuant to Daubert.” 23

Finally, we have noted that

courts need not reinvent the wheel each time that specialized evidence is adduced. The proponent need not continuously go through the exercise of re-proving reliability of 

the same evidence in every case. Instead, once a Nebraska 

trial court has actually examined and assessed the reliability of a particular scientific wheel under Daubert, and 

its determination has been affirmed on appeal, then other 

courts may simply take judicial notice and ride behind. 

In such cases, the proponent establishes a prima facie 

case of reliability by relying on precedent, and the burden 

shifts to the opponent to show that recent developments 

raise doubts about the validity of previously relied-upon 

theories or techniques. 24

We find no merit to Greer’s arguments on appeal. First, we 

agree with the district court that Daubert was inapplicable 

in this case. As noted above, our case law is clear that not 

every instance of expert testimony is a Daubert issue. In this 

case, prior to testifying, Brazil indicated that she did not have 

any particular knowledge about Greer or the alleged victims 

in this case and that she was not prepared to testify as to 

whether Greer’s conduct qualified as grooming. And indeed, 

22 State v. Robinson, 272 Neb. 582, 618, 724 N.W.2d 35, 68 (2006), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Thorpe, 280 Neb. 11, 783 N.W.2d 749 

(2010).

23 State v. Schreiner, 276 Neb. 393, 405, 754 N.W.2d 742, 754 (2008).

24 State v. Casillas, 279 Neb. 820, 838, 782 N.W.2d 882, 898 (2010).
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her testimony was in conformity with her testimony at pretrial hearings—at no point did she offer any opinion about 

Greer’s conduct.

Moreover, even if we were to conclude that Daubert was 

applicable, a decision we need not reach here, the record shows 

that the district court held a Daubert hearing. At that hearing, 

Brazil testified to her many years of experience in conducting 

and monitoring forensic interviews of child sexual assault victims, including attending and teaching seminars on that topic. 

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion, set out in the record, that Brazil qualified as an expert and 

that her testimony was admissible.

We note also the confusion that seems to have resulted from 

the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Edwards, which we find distinguishable and inapplicable. 25 The district court concluded 

the factor that made Daubert an issue in Edwards was that 

the pediatrician who testified regarding grooming in that case 

testified the defendant’s actions were, in fact, grooming. The 

distinction noted by the district court is in keeping with our 

case law as set out above and is consistent with our conclusion 

in this case. We further note that to the extent that Edwards

could be read to categorically reject such testimony, it is 

disapproved.

There is no merit to Greer’s assignment of error regarding 

Brazil’s testimony.

Excessive Sentences.

Finally, Greer assigns that the sentences imposed upon her 

were excessive. As an initial matter, we note that all of Greer’s 

sentences were within statutory limits and that the record 

shows the court considered Greer’s presentence investigation 

and all of the relevant factors as set forth in case law.

Instead, Greer primarily takes issue with the consecutive 

nature of her sentences:

25 State v. Edwards, supra note 3.
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The record reflects that counts 7 [through] 12 all arose 

out of the same transactions and series of events. The 

State agrees with this assertion as it filed a motion to 

consolidate stating the same. . . . Because child abuse 

allegations all arose out of the same times as count 1, they 

therefore should be concurrent with each other as well as 

to count 1.

Additionally, counts 5 and 6 should be concurrent with 

one another as they are the same victim and are part of 

the same series and chain of events. Finally, the evidence 

shows that counts 2 and 3 all arose out of the same series 

of transactions.

It is logical that the charges should be served 

concurrently. 26

[11,12] When sentences imposed within statutory limits are 

alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court must 

determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in 

considering well-established factors and any applicable legal 

principles. 27 A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when a 

trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable 

or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence. 28

[13,14] When imposing a sentence, a sentencing judge 

should consider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) 

education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, 

(5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, 

and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature 

of the offense and (8) the amount of violence involved in 

the commission of the crime. 29 The sentencing court is not 

limited to any mathematically applied set of factors, but the 

26 Brief for appellant at 26.

27 State v. Blake, supra note 8.

28 Id.

29 Id.
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appropriateness of the sentence is necessarily a subjective 

judgment that includes the sentencing judge’s observations of 

the defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and 

circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life. 30

[15] It is within the discretion of the trial court to direct 

that sentences imposed for separate crimes be served consecu

tively. 31 The test of whether consecutive sentences may be 

imposed under two or more counts charging separate offenses, 

arising out of the same transaction or the same chain of events, 

is whether the offense charged in one count involves any different elements than an offense charged in another count. The 

test is whether some additional evidence is required to prove 

one of the other offenses. 32

We turn first to Greer’s contention that her sentence on 

count 5 (first degree sexual assault of a child—J.H.) should 

run concurrent to her sentence on count 6 (also first degree 

sexual assault of a child—J.H.). We observe that, in fact, her 

sentence on count 4 was ordered to be served concurrent to 

the remainder of her sentences. As such, there is no merit to 

this assertion.

Greer also argues that the child abuse counts against her all 

arose out of the same transactions and series of events. But 

while they involve the same general conduct on Greer’s part, 

they also involve six different children and the State had to 

separately prove the elements of child abuse as to each of the 

children in order to obtain guilty verdicts.

Greer additionally argues that the child abuse counts arose 

from the same set of facts as count 1 (first degree sexual 

assault of a child—A.F.), and so, the sentences for child abuse 

should run concurrently. But the elements the State had to 

prove for child abuse are distinct from those for first degree 

30 Id.

31 State v. Andersen, 238 Neb. 32, 468 N.W.2d 617 (1991).

32 Id.
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sexual assault of a child. We find no abuse of discretion in the 

district court’s order sentencing Greer consecutively for any of 

these convictions.

Finally, Greer argues that the tampering with a witness 

counts arise from the same series of transactions. Again, as 

to these counts, the State had to prove the elements of those 

crimes as occurring on different occasions, and thus, different 

evidence was required.

Because all of the counts required the proving of different 

elements or different evidence, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentences. There is no merit to this 

assignment of error.

CONCLUSION

The district court’s judgments and convictions are affirmed.

Affirmed.