1

Filed 4/22/13 In re E.A. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re E.A., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

SAN MATEO COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES AGENCY CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Y.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A136944

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. 82483)

San Mateo County Human Services Agency Children and Family Services (the 

agency) filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) of the Welfare and 

Institutions Code1 on behalf of E.A. The petition alleged that Y.A. (mother) was unable 

to care for E.A. because of mother‘s alcohol abuse. The petition also alleged that E.A.‘s 

father, M.A. (father), lived in Palestine. Father informed the agency that he wanted 

custody of E.A. and at the dispositional hearing the court removed E.A. from mother and 

ordered E.A. to be placed with her father in Palestine. The court stayed the order until 

the necessary documents and arrangements could be made for E.A. to travel to Palestine. 

The court also ordered visitation with mother and E.A. to be arranged by the parents.

 

1 All further unspecified code sections refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

On appeal, mother argues that the visitation order was inadequate because it did 

not specify the amount of visitation or how it would be provided. She also objects to the 

transfer of E.A. to father‘s home in Palestine and the juvenile court‘s denial of her 

request to continue the dispositional hearing. She maintains that the court did not have 

sufficient information regarding E.A.‘s home in Palestine, as there was no home check, 

or the specialized education or services available to E.A.

We agree that the visitation order is insufficiently specific, as it needs to set forth 

the minimum number of hours of visitation per week or month and whether all of the 

visitation will be telephonic. If some of the visits are to be in person rather than by 

telephone or video, the court needs to set forth how such visits will be facilitated and who 

is to be responsible for paying for these visits. We reject mother‘s other challenges to the 

juvenile court‘s orders. We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion 

when it terminated dependency jurisdiction, granted father legal and physical custody of 

E.A., ordered E.A. transferred to Palestine, and issued a stay of the order until E.A. is on 

a plane to Palestine. Accordingly, we reverse the visitation order, but otherwise affirm 

all of the juvenile court‘s orders. 

BACKGROUND

The Petition and Detention

On August 14, 2012, the agency filed a petition pursuant to section 300, 

subdivision (b) on behalf of E.A. The petition alleged that the child was not quite 10 

years old and that mother was unable to provide regular care for her daughter due to 

mother‘s abuse of alcohol. It further alleged that the agency had provided mother with 

voluntary services in the past but she had continued to test positive for various drugs and 

alcohol. On July 4, 2012, the police stopped mother while she was driving and she had a 

0.18 blood alcohol content; mother had prior convictions for driving under the influence. 

Mother had failed to complete an alcohol/drug assessment or enroll in alcohol/treatment 

services and also had failed to secure stable housing or counseling services for her 

daughter. Additionally, mother had pinched E.A., resulting in a bruise on at least one 
3

occasion. On March 21, 2012, mother had been placed on a psychiatric hold due to her 

intoxication and suicidal statements. 

With regard to E.A.‘s father, the petition stated that he resided in Palestine with 

E.A.‘s twin brother. He had been unable to obtain a visa in order to travel to the United 

States to arrange care for E.A. 

The agency filed its detention report on August 14, 2012. Prior to the filing of this 

petition, E.A., according to the report, had been the subject of four referrals since 2010. 

All of the referrals related to mother‘s alcohol abuse and neglect of E.A. 

The report indicated that mother told the social worker that she married father in 

Palestine and father and she ―never technically got divorced.‖ She had not seen father in 

six years. 

A referral to the agency made on June 11, 2012, triggered the filing of the current 

petition. On this date, mother, according to the report, was in the hospital for unknown 

reasons and had not made any arrangements for the care of E.A. The referent told the 

social worker that on June 9, 2012, mother, while drunk, pinched E.A. during a struggle 

between mother and child. The social worker observed a small bruise on the child‘s arm. 

The child, according to the report, asserted that she saw her mother drink from different 

bottles all day and that her mother hurt her by hitting her on the back of her head and 

pinching her. The child expressed a desire to be with her stepfather (mother‘s former 

fiancé) or her maternal grandparents. 

The detention hearing was held on August 15, 2012. Mother‘s counsel stated that 

mother was submitting on detention but was concerned about the placement of E.A. The 

maternal grandmother2 was at the hearing and the court considered placing E.A. with her. 

The maternal grandmother informed the court that she was supposed to leave for 

Palestine but had remained only to make sure that E.A. ―is in good condition, in good, 

safe hands.‖ She stated that she did not want E.A. to be placed in a foster home. After 

 

2 She was mother‘s stepmother and thus, actually, E.A.‘s maternal stepgrandmother. 
4

further discussion, the court adopted the agency‘s recommendation to have E.A. remain 

in the home of Rita R., the mother of mother‘s former fiancé. 

The Jurisdictional/Dispositional Hearing

On August 31, 2012, the agency filed its jurisdictional/dispositional report. The 

social worker spoke to E.A. on August 22, 2012, and she reported that her mother was 

―drunk all of the time.‖ She asserted that her mother pinched her and pulled her hair. 

On August 27, 2012, the social worker made a telephone call to father in Palestine. 

Father confirmed that he knew that mother had been abusing alcohol and not providing 

care for E.A. He reported that he was unable to get his visa to come to the United States 

to get his daughter but that he would ―love to have her.‖ He stated that his green card had 

been revoked in 2010 because he did not know that his visa needed to be renewed every 

six months. 

Mother told the social worker that she moved to Palestine in July 1999 to reside 

with her grandparents. She became engaged in October 1999, and married father in May 

2000. She stated that father ―is extremely well to do and the family owns a factory in 

Palestine.‖ In 2006, mother, father, E.A., and her twin brother, moved to California with 

the hope of establishing a business. After two months, father decided that the business 

was not doing well and that they should return to Palestine. Mother did not want to 

return because of the war there and the ―limitations‖ on her life. Mother remained in the 

United States with both children, and father moved back to Palestine. In 2007, father 

visited the United States and asked if he could take the son back with him; mother said 

that he promised to return the child. Mother stated that he never returned the child. In 

2008, mother tried to go to Palestine to get her son, but she had violated a visa in 1999 

and was unable to enter the county. 

With regard to her drinking, mother said that she began drinking at the age of 24, 

and was a bartender for approximately five years. She stated that her drinking became a 

problem approximately one year ago when she lost her bartending job. Mother 

acknowledged her drinking problem and asserted that she wanted to get better and have 

E.A. returned to her care. On August 29, 2012, mother called the social worker and 
5

maintained that it would be best for E.A. if she went with her father in Palestine and that 

he would take good care of her. 

Father, according to the report, said that he was born in Palestine and that he 

married mother in 2000. They remained in Palestine until 2006, and mother, according to 

father, was an ideal mother while in Palestine. He confirmed that they moved to the 

United States in 2006, and that he wanted to move back to Palestine after about four 

months. He noted that mother wanted to remain in the United States. He claimed that he 

asked to take both children back to Palestine with him but mother would not permit that. 

A year later he returned to the United States for a visit and again requested to take the 

children. Mother, according to father, permitted him to take only their son because she 

―loved the girl more.‖ He proclaimed that he had visited E.A. and had talked to her on

the telephone. He indicated that mother limited his access to E.A. after he expressed 

concern about mother‘s care of E.A. He told the social worker on August 27, 2012, that 

he wanted E.A. to live with him and that he had a four-bedroom home and would be able 

to provide a therapist for her. 

On August 22, 2012, the social worker spoke to E.A. She divulged that she did 

not like living with her mother. She said that it would be hard to pick between her father 

and her mother‘s former fiancé. She also noted that she did not speak Arabic, (i.e., knew 

only one word), and that she had her homework and Netflix in the United States. She 

reported that her father treated her well and that in Palestine she would have her brother, 

father, her room, and her family. She said that she did not want to see her mother 

because she did not treat her well. The report indicated that E.A. was receiving speech 

therapy through the school district and that she was ―slightly developmentally delayed.‖ 

The agency recommended that E.A. be declared a dependent of the court and that 

both mother and father be offered reunification services. The agency also recommended 

that the child be detained in the home of Rita and Rita‘s son, mother‘s former fiancé. 

The agency filed an addendum report on September 17, 2012. The report revealed 

that mother had been residing at the Shelter Network (the shelter) and had participated in 

an alcohol and other drug assessment. The recommendation of the assessment was for 
6

mother to enter and complete a residential treatment program. Mother registered for the 

program but did not enter into the program. 

The social worker supervised a visit between E.A. and mother on September 12, 

2012. Mother was extremely affectionate and hugged and kissed the child throughout the 

visit. Mother was ―extremely encouraging and helpful‖ in having the child complete her 

homework. 

The agency filed a second addendum report on September 19, 2012. The report 

stated that mother mentioned on September 17, 2012, that she was not sure whether she 

would be permitted to remain at the shelter because she had been late on her curfew 

twice. She admitted that she had been drinking alcohol with her boyfriend outside the 

shelter on September 15, 2012, which was reported to the shelter. The shelter conducted 

a breathalyzer test on her; mother failed it. On September 19, 2012, mother confirmed 

that she was no longer allowed to stay at the shelter. 

The social worker contacted the case manager for mother at the shelter. The case 

manager disclosed that mother had been late on three nights and had failed the 

breathalyzer tests. Mother appealed the decision to dismiss her from the shelter and 

indicated that she had obtained employment and potential housing with her boyfriend. 

Mother asked if she could return to the shelter and was permitted to do so. Mother again 

returned later than expected, her breath smelled of alcohol, and she did not pass the 

breathalyzer test. 

In this second addendum report, the agency recommended that E.A. be declared a 

dependent of the court. It stated that both mother and father would be offered 

reunification services. 

On September 20, 2012, the juvenile court held the uncontested jurisdictional 

hearing. Father appeared telephonically and was assisted by an Arabic interpreter. 

Counsel for mother reported that she received a voicemail that morning indicating that 

mother had been taken into custody the night before; thus, mother was not present for the 

hearing. Father‘s counsel indicated that he was going to contest disposition. Father‘s 

attorney stated that the primary issue was placement of the child and mother‘s counsel 
7

commented that the last time she had spoken to mother ―she was in agreement with the 

father‘s request.‖ The attorney for the child interjected that his client ―is pretty opposed 

to the idea. Doesn‘t speak the language. Hasn‘t seen bio dad in a very, very long time. 

It‘s not a relationship.‖ Counsel added that it would be ―ideal‖ if father and daughter 

could get to know each other first. 

E.A. indicated that she did not want to see her father on the computer when talking 

to him, but the court still ruled that Skype should be set up to permit E.A. and father to 

see each other when they talked. The court continued the jurisdictional hearing to be held 

with the contested dispositional hearing. 

The agency filed its third addendum on October 17, 2012. The agency stated that 

E.A. was happy at Rita‘s home and appeared to be doing well. E.A. told the social 

worker on several occasions that she enjoyed residing with Rita; she also told her that she 

would like to go to Palestine to be with her father and brother. E.A. repeated that she did 

not want to live with her mother. According to the teacher and speech pathologist for 

E.A., she had been telling everyone at school that she was moving to Palestine. Both the 

teacher and speech pathologist emphasized that it was important that E.A. continue to 

receive specialized education and speech therapy. E.A. was performing at a 1.6 grade 

level due to her learning disability and speech problem. Additionally, there had been 

―chaos‖ in E.A.‘s prior school year but she was now improving significantly. Mother had 

stated that there were no resources in Palestine to address E.A.‘s needs but father claimed 

that E.A. would attend an American school in Palestine where there was ―an abundance 

of resources available.‖ 

The report indicated that mother continued to struggle with her alcohol addiction 

and continued to be homeless. She was living with her boyfriend in his car. Mother had 

not provided any toxicology tests, and was refusing to get tested. According to the 

agency‘s report, when asked whether she still wanted E.A. to live with her father in 

Palestine, mother responded: ―  ̳No, not anymore. I was planning on going there, but 

now, I am not going to go, so I don‘t want her to go either. . . . If she leaves the country, 

I will never see my daughter again. I can‘t go unless I finish up everything that is going 
8

on here. If she is here, at least I can see her once a week. I want her to know that I am 

her mother.‘ ‖ 

The agency‘s report stated that father had ―been extremely compliant through the 

course of the investigation‖ and consistently confirmed that he wanted E.A. to live with 

him in Palestine. He insisted that he was willing to do whatever was necessary to ensure 

that she would have a nurturing environment. Father stated that E.A.‘s twin brother was 

currently attending an American private school in Palestine and the majority of the 

teachers were English speaking and from the United States. He asserted that if the school 

did not have specialized education services, he would hire a private speech therapist and 

teacher to assist E.A. with her learning disability. 

Father was having difficulty setting up the Skype contact with E.A., but he was 

calling E.A. on the phone. The first Skype contact was on October 10, 2012, and they 

were continuing to Skype multiple times throughout the week. E.A. also had Skype 

contact with her twin brother. Father showed E.A. the house and the bedroom he had 

prepared for her. E.A. told the social worker that she was excited to see her family in 

Palestine. 

The agency also spoke with the maternal grandfather who was living in Palestine. 

He opined that it was essential that E.A. live with father. He maintained that there were 

special schools in Palestine and that father could hire tutors to assist E.A. 

The agency concluded that father had been actively making efforts to have E.A. 

returned to him. The report provided the following: ―Any request that the [social 

worker] has made, the father has immediately responded. The father sent $200 via 

Western Union immediately, he had a document notarized, he established a Skype 

account, the father has contacted the [social worker] many times to ensure that the [social 

worker] received all of the documents [that] were requested. The father has expressed 

concern about [E.A.‘s] emotional health and has asked the [social worker] to not disclose 

information about the mother to [E.A.] which may  ̳hurt her.‘ The father has also 

requested that [E.A.] leave the courtroom when the discussion of the mother is raised. 

The father has stressed the desire of having his daughter return to him and his son.‖ 
9

The agency recommended that physical and legal custody of E.A. be granted 

solely to father pursuant to section 361.2, and that E.A.‘s dependency status be 

terminated. 

On October 19, 2012, the agency filed a second amended petition. The second 

amended dependency petition deleted the jurisdictional allegations against father. 

The juvenile court held the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on October 19, 

2012. Father appeared via video and was assisted by an Arabic interpreter. Before going 

on the record, mother‘s counsel requested a continuance because of the late notice of the 

agency‘s change in position. The court denied this request. 

Mother submitted on the amended petition for jurisdiction and waived her rights. 

The court found the amended petition true. 

Maryam Adalat, the social worker for the agency, testified. She acknowledged 

that the current caregivers of E.A., Rita and her son, were excellent. She stated that 

mother had not been testing, was homeless after being told to leave the shelter, and was 

not willing to go into treatment. Since mother was not making any progress, she was 

concerned that E.A. would not be able to live with mother. 

In addition to mother‘s lack of progress, Adalat stated that the agency changed its 

recommendation to have E.A. live with father in Palestine because father wanted his 

daughter back and had been ―extremely compliant.‖ She admitted that no one from the 

agency had been to father‘s home to check it. She explained that the agency would 

ordinarily have another agency check father‘s home if he were living in another state in 

the United States, but such a check was not mandatory because he was not an offending 

parent. 

Adalat acknowledged that mother was loving and affectionate when she visited 

with E.A. E.A., however, told Adalat that she did not want to be around her mother. 

Adalat admitted that she first did not recommend placement with father because he 

had not been the caregiver for the last six years and had little contact with E.A. That 

condition had not changed, although father was having more contact through Skype. 

Adalat testified that E.A. told her that she was not sure whether she would select her 
10

father or her current placement if given the choice, but she definitely did not want to be 

with her mother. Currently, according to Adalat, E.A. was telling her that she wanted to 

go live with her father in Palestine. She said that she wanted to be with her father, 

brother, and grandfather. Adalat admitted that E.A. could not be removed from father‘s 

home in Palestine if the situation did not go well. She conceded that there was a risk but 

stressed that father was the nonoffending parent. She also agreed that E.A. was doing 

well this year and that she had concerns about removing her from her current setting. 

Adalat testified that the maternal grandmother and maternal grandfather told her 

that the schools were great and father also assured her that he could get a speech therapist 

and a mental health service provider for E.A. if needed. She noted that E.A. was in the 

fifth grade but testing at the 1.6 grade level. Adalat looked at the website for the school 

that E.A. would be attending but she could not find much information about special 

education. Father had not yet had a chance to investigate special services at the school 

because he had been busy trying to obtain E.A.‘s birth certificate. She emphasized that 

father was willing to hire a tutor or a therapist if services at the school were not available. 

Since E.A. had been detained on August 15, 2012, she had spoken to father, 

according to Adalat, more than 10 times but less than 20. In all of the conversations, 

father expressed his desire to have E.A. live with him. Adalat did not have any concerns 

regarding his ability to meet E.A.‘s needs and did not believe that there was any 

detriment in having E.A. live with her father. 

When doing the risk assessment, Adalat spoke to the maternal grandmother, who 

is not Palestinian. The grandmother told Adalat that she believed E.A. would be safe and 

happy in Palestine. She acknowledged that there were cultural differences but the 

grandmother insisted that women were respected. She asserted that within their

community most of the restrictions were related to safety. The grandmother had traveled 

many times to Palestine and had visited father‘s home. Adalat stated that she also talked 

to the maternal grandfather, and he confirmed what the grandmother had said. He said 

that his wife and he would stay in Palestine to help E.A. adjust. 
11

Adalat testified that she also spoke to the current caregivers of E.A., Rita and 

mother‘s former boyfriend, as they had been in contact with father. They declared that he 

had been ―great‖ and had been ―an excellent support‖ for E.A. 

Father testified that he wanted E.A. to come live with him and that he had the 

resources to meet her needs. He informed the court that he had visited the school where 

E.A. would be going and spoke with the principal. Father insisted that the school was 

excellent, that it had 15 American teachers and 15 Arabic teachers, and that there was an 

after-school program to help tutor E.A. in language. If the school could not meet E.A.‘s 

special needs, he stressed that he was prepared to hire a therapist. 

Father revealed his recent marriage and disclosed that his wife was sitting with 

him. He declared that his wife supported E.A.‘s coming to live with them. 

The court then heard argument from counsel. The attorney for E.A. stated that he 

had ―grave concerns.‖ He maintained that even if it were the right answer for E.A. to be 

with her father in Palestine, placing her there now was premature. He believed there was 

a detriment at this point in time to satisfy section 361.2. Counsel expressed concern 

about placing E.A. with the nonoffending parent when the parent was living in a country 

―that we know very little about.‖ He added that father had not ―checked out some things 

regarding what [E.A.] desperately needs, which is special help in every respect . . . . And 

he hasn‘t inquired if there is a special ed[ucation] teacher there, trained to deal with 

children that are delayed. He doesn‘t have a therapist lined up. Hopefully, there are 

therapists nearby. I‘m not convinced of that. It would be great to know that and have 

some communication begun with that person who‘s going to be working with [E.A.].‖ 

He stressed that E.A. was now working with people and she was flourishing and that he 

―would hate to see her move into a situation where she‘s going to stagnate or not have 

that special help that she needs in order to develop into an adult.‖ 

Counsel for E.A. suggested that the court take jurisdiction and continue the case 

for further disposition and then the social workers could visit father‘s home and the 

school in Palestine. During that time, E.A. could study some rudimentary Arabic. He 

also had apprehension over the court‘s learning that father had just married and nothing 
12

was known about father‘s new wife. He concluded: ―But combine that with the fact that 

it‘s been six years since there‘s been contact, there is just a tremendous amount of 

concerns that amount to detriment at this point.‖ 

At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court ruled as follows: ―Nobody likes to 

take away a child from a parent, but I‘m really bound by the presumption, or the clear 

and convincing evidence, that the placement would be detrimental to her safety, 

protection, or physical or emotional well-being. [¶] And while [the attorneys for E.A. 

and mother] have concerns about that, and there are some concerns, but that standard has 

not been met.‖ The court concluded that the concerns did not establish detriment and the 

attorneys‘ concerns were ―sort of speculation.‖ The court found that father ―was a very 

credible witness‖ and observed that he was ―going to be a very loving parent, who [was] 

going to do everything possible for his daughter.‖ The court granted father sole physical 

and legal custody, and stated that dependency would be terminated once E.A. was 

transported to Palestine. The court noted that dependency would remain open until the 

transfer with ―the same supervision and the same living situation‖ that she currently had. 

The court ordered maternal grandfather to transport E.A. to Palestine. 

The minute order of the hearing on October 19, 2012, stated that sole physical and 

legal custody of E.A. was granted to father pursuant to section 361.2. The order provided 

that E.A.‘s dependency status was terminated and that this order was stayed ―until child is 

on the plane to Palestine.‖ 

Notice of Appeal and Motion for Reconsideration

On October 19, 2012, mother filed a notice of appeal from the order of this same 

date, which closed the dependency proceeding and gave custody of E.A. to father. Five 

days later, on October 24, 2012, mother filed a motion for reconsideration and for a stay. 

Father and the agency separately filed opposition to mother‘s motion for reconsideration. 

The agency filed an addendum report on October 25, 2012. The reported 

indicated that mother had missed two supervised visits with E.A. and refused to 

participate in testing. The maternal grandmother told the social worker that she was 

moving to Palestine to help with E.A.‘s transition. She reported that she believed that 
13

father would be ―the best father.‖ She told the social worker that E.A. was ―very happy 

and excited about going to Palestine.‖ 

The juvenile court held a hearing on October 26, 2012.3 Father appeared and 

maternal grandfather acted as the interpreter. Counsel for mother raised various 

arguments but presented no new evidence. Counsel for father asserted that mother had 

presented no new evidence or any change in circumstances. Counsel for E.A. argued that 

the child‘s best interest was the most important consideration and that no investigation 

had been done of father‘s home and father had a brand new wife who had not been 

interviewed. Additionally, there had been an inadequate investigation into the special 

education services and there was the issue that E.A. did not speak Arabic. Counsel 

maintained: ―It is detrimental––all of those things are detrimental to the child if any of 

those things turn out to be problematic and there is nothing we can do about it once she 

leaves.‖ 

At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court stated: ―[I]n my view there is no new 

evidence to the mother‘s benefit that would cause me to want to change my order. But 

even if I could completely reopen the hearing and take in all the evidence, including what 

is known now about the maternal grandmother, mother‘s refusal to test, mother‘s missing 

visits, it is very clear to me that the best interest of this child would be to be with the 

father.‖ The court denied the motion for reconsideration and the request for a stay. 

The court signed the custody order and final judgment on October 26, 2012, which 

stated that E.A. was to live with father and that he had legal and physical custody of E.A. 

The order indicated visitation for mother and that it was to be arranged by the parents. 

On November 13, 2012, mother filed her supplemental notice of appeal. On this 

same date, she also filed a petition for writ of supersedeas and requested a stay. Two 

days later, on November 15, mother filed for temporary orders pending determination of 

the petition for writ of supersedeas and the request for a stay. We granted this application 

for temporary orders. Father applied for permission to file opposition, which we granted. 

 

3 The reporter‘s transcript incorrectly states November 26, 2012. 
14

The agency and father separately filed opposition to mother‘s writ. On November 29, 

2012, we summarily denied mother‘s writ of supersedeas. We denied her second petition 

for writ of supersedeas and request for an immediate stay on April 19, 2013. 

Subsequently, we granted mother‘s unopposed request for judicial notice.

DISCUSSION

I. Visitation

Mother challenges the juvenile court‘s ruling that mother may visit E.A. ―[a]s 

arranged by the parents.‖ She argues that the court should have provided standards for 

how the visitation would be provided given that mother was homeless and without 

resources and that E.A. was being placed with her father in Palestine. 

Section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1) states that the court ―may‖ when ordering the 

nonoffending parent with legal and physical custody of the child ―provide reasonable 

visitation by the noncustodial parent.‖4 If the court ―terminates its jurisdiction,‖ it ―may 

issue . . . an order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.‖ (§ 362.4.) In 

making any custody or visitation order, the juvenile court must always consider the best 

interests of the minor. (In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973, superseded by 

statute on another issue.) Section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court ―  ̳to make custody 

and visitation orders that will be transferred to an existing family court file and remain in 

effect until modified or terminated by the superior court.‘ ‖ (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 

Cal.4th 196, 203.) Such an order is commonly referred to as an ―exit order.‖ (In re John 

W., at p. 970, fn. 13.)

―We review an order setting visitation for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]‖ (In re 

R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1284.) ―  ̳The appropriate test for abuse of discretion 

is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences 

can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to 

 

4 ―[N]oncustodial parent‖ means the parent ―with whom the child was not 

residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the 

provisions of Section 300.‖ (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) 
15

substitute its decision for that of the trial court.‘ [Citations.]‖ (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 

7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) 

On appeal, mother maintains that she did not forfeit her challenge to the visitation 

order because in the lower court she argued that placement with father would deny her 

any real possibility of visitation and she would be essentially without a remedy because 

E.A. would be in Palestine. Mother, however, did not specifically object below on the 

basis that the visitation order was too vague or that it improperly failed to specify the 

frequency or duration of her visits with E.A. 

―In dependency litigation, nonjurisdictional issues must be the subject of objection 

or appropriate motions in the juvenile court; otherwise those arguments have been waived 

and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.‖ (In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 

Cal.App.4th 551, 558.) An appellate court‘s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be 

exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. (In re. S.B. (2004) 

32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, superseded by statute on other grounds.) In dependency cases, 

however, discretion to consider forfeited claims ―must be exercised with special care[,]‖ 

―[b]ecause these proceedings involve the well-being of children[.]‖ (Ibid.) The 

overriding issue should remain consideration of the child‘s best interests. 

Here, the alleged defect in the visitation order is a question of law. When a 

visitation order is inadequate, it could lead to unnecessary conflict between the parents. 

This conflict could ultimately deprive E.A. of continued contact with her mother. Since 

mother raises an important legal issue and the interests of justice weigh in favor of 

consideration, we will exercise our discretion to consider the visitation order. (See In re 

Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1267.) 

A visitation order ―necessarily involves a balancing of the interests of the parent in 

visitation with the best interests of the child. In balancing these interests, the court in the 

exercise of its judicial discretion should determine whether there should be any right to 

visitation and, if so, the frequency and length of visitation.‖ (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 

Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) If a juvenile court ―grants visitation,  ̳it must also ensure that at 

least some visitation at a minimum level determined by the court itself, will in fact 
16

occur.‘ [Citation.]‖ (In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505.) ―[B]y failing 

to mandate any minimum number of monitored visits [within a stated period of time], the 

court‘s abstract recognition of [a parent‘s] right to visitation is illusory . . . .‖ (In re S.H. 

(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 319; see also In re Hunter S., at p. 1505 [a child may not be 

allowed to control whether visitation occurs]; In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 213 

[a juvenile court abuses its discretion when it delegates to a third party the complete 

authority to decide whether visitation takes place].) 

The power to determine the right and extent of visitation by a noncustodial parent 

in a dependency case, including orders issued when the dependency case is terminated, 

resides with the juvenile court and may not be delegated to nonjudicial officials or private 

parties. (In re Donnovan J. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1476.) In In re T.H. (2010) 190 

Cal.App.4th 1119, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction and issued an 

exit order allowing supervised visitation by father ―  ̳to be determined by the parents.‘ ‖ 

(Id. at p. 1122.) In holding that the lower court abused its discretion in issuing this 

visitation order, Division Five of this court explained that the rule of nondelegation

applies to exit orders issued when dependency jurisdiction is terminated. (Id. at p. 1123.) 

A visitation order that states that visitation is ―to be determined by the parents,‖ does 

more than simply delegate ministerial tasks, such as the ―authority to set the  ̳time, place, 

and manner‘ of the visitation—it effectively delegates to mother the power to determine

whether visitation will occur at all.‖ (Ibid.) The appellate court noted that the record 

demonstrated the inability of the parents to get along, suggesting that any agreement 

regarding visitation would be difficult to achieve. (Ibid.) Division Five concluded that 

the lower court abused its discretion by structuring the visitation order in a manner that 

provided the mother with essentially veto power over father‘s right to visitation. (Id. at p. 

1124.) 

Here, similarly to the trial court in In re T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, the 

juvenile court framed the visitation order to give father veto power over mother‘s right to 

visitation; thus her right to visitation is illusory. The order stated that mother‘s visitation 

with E.A. was to occur ―[a]s arranged by the parents.‖ The order does not specify 
17

whether the visits are to be in person or by telephone; it does not set forth a minimum 

number of telephonic and/or in-person visits; and it does not mandate the length of time 

for each visit. Furthermore, if the court intended to require in-person visits, it did not 

provide any information on whether E.A. was to travel to the United States or whether 

mother was to travel to Palestine and whether father should pay for these trips. The court 

could properly leave the details, such as the time or day, to the parents, but it should have 

set forth the minimum number of visits per week or month, the minimum amount of time 

the visits should last, and whether such visitation was to be solely by phone or video. If 

the court rules that the phone visits are to be supplemented with in-person visits, the court 

must detail the number and length of these visits and how they are to be facilitated. 

The agency stresses that when ordering legal and physical custody of the child to 

the nonoffending custodial parent the only requirement under section 361.2, subdivision 

(b)(1) is that the court order ―reasonable‖ visitation to the other parent. Additionally, 

California Rules of Court, rule 5.695(a)(7)(A) provides that a court at a disposition 

hearing may remove physical custody from the parent and ―[a]fter stating on the record or 

in writing the factual basis for the order, order custody to the noncustodial parent, 

terminate jurisdiction, and direct that Custody Order––Juvenile––Final Judgment (form 

JV-200) be prepared and filed under rule 5.700[.]‖ Here, the court ordered visitation 

pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1), and checked the box on the Judicial Council 

form that stated mother may visit the child ―[a]s arranged by the parents.‖ The agency 

argues that the court‘s order was therefore sufficient.

As already discussed, this visitation order was legally inadequate. The court did 

not order ―reasonable‖ visitation as the order of visitation was illusory. The court could 

not delegate to father the power to determine whether any visits would occur and, if so, 

their frequency and duration. (See In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 213-214; In 

re T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1122.) 

The agency also argues that the order was sufficient because father testified that he 

would pay for an airplane ticket for mother to visit E.A. Furthermore, the agency points 
18

out that mother could seek relief in the family court if father fails to cooperate with the 

visitation order. 

Father did indicate that he would consider paying for a plane ticket for mother to 

see E.A., but it is completely unclear whether he would do this one time or multiple 

times. Furthermore, there was no promise from father about having E.A. have telephonic 

contact with mother, which is of paramount importance in a situation where the child is 

moving to a foreign country and the costs and visa restrictions may bar any possible inperson contact. 

We disagree with mother to the extent that she relies on In re Marriage of Condon 

(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 533 (Condon) and In re Karla C., supra, 186 Cal.App.4th 1236 to 

argue that the juvenile court must ensure that visitation will, in fact, occur. In Condon, 

the parents had been temporarily awarded joint legal and physical custody of the two 

children in a dissolution case and the mother wished to return to her native Australia with 

her two children. (Id. at pp. 536-541, 550.) The trial court issued a custody order 

providing that the children would spend the school year with their mother in Australia 

and their vacation periods with their father in California. (Id. at p. 540.) The appellate 

court held that the trial court needed to take steps to ensure its orders would remain 

enforceable in Australia. (Id. at pp. 547-548.) 

Condon, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 533 is clearly distinguishable from the present 

case as it was not a dependency case and the children had not been removed from one 

parent‘s home. Thus, in Condon, ―protective measures were necessary to ensure the 

nonmoving parent‘s continuing custody or visitation rights.‖ (See In re Karla C., supra, 

186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 [distinguishing Condon and other family law custody cases 

involving international relocation from dependency proceedings].) In contrast, here, the 

issue is mother‘s visitation rights once E.A. is in Palestine and the court could have 

issued an order granting mother no visitation. Additionally, dependency was terminated 

and the juvenile court has no continuing authority with regard to visitation.

In re Karla C., supra, 186 Cal.App.4th 1236 is also unavailing. In In re Karla C., 

the juvenile court retained dependency jurisdiction, and was required to take measures to 
19

ensure compliance with its orders while it retained jurisdiction. In the present case, the 

juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and any problem that develops regarding visitation 

can be raised in the family court. If we were to adopt the argument urged by mother, 

juvenile courts would be reluctant to ever offer visitation in situations, like the present, 

where enforcement of the visitation order in the foreign country cannot be assured and 

placement with the nonoffending parent in the foreign country is in the child‘s best 

interest. 

Mother maintains that ―[a]n unenforceable order is no order at all, and thus is 

void.‖ (Condon, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 562.) The visitation order is not 

unenforceable or void in the United States, and the juvenile court is in the best position to 

assess whether it is likely that the nonoffending parent will follow the court‘s orders and 

act in the child‘s best interests. Here, the record supports the juvenile court‘s implied 

finding that father would not prevent mother from visiting E.A. and would act in a 

manner consistent with E.A.‘s best interests. The juvenile court found father to be 

credible and committed to the best interests of E.A. The social worker testified that 

father had complied with all of her requests and had demonstrated a commitment to 

E.A.‘s best interests. Nothing in this record suggests that father would refuse to comply 

with a visitation order. We agree, however, that if the court orders visitation other than 

telephonic visitation, it should address how such visitation should be facilitated. 

Accordingly, we reverse the juvenile court‘s visitation order and remand for the 

juvenile court to specify the minimum number of visits, the minimum duration of the 

visits, and whether the visitation is to be by telephone, in person, or both. If in person, 

the court should set forth how this visitation should be facilitated.

II. Placement with Father

Mother does not contest the order removing E.A. from her custody and does not 

argue that she could reunify with E.A. Instead mother challenges the juvenile court‘s 

decision to terminate jurisdiction and place E.A. with father. 

The juvenile court at the dispositional hearing has broad discretion to make 

custody orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency case. (§ 361.2, subd. (b); 
20

In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318; In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 

1179.) Thus, we review the trial court‘s decision to terminate jurisdiction and issue a 

custody order for abuse of discretion. (Nada, at p. 1179.) 

―When a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall 

first determine whether there is a [noncustodial] parent . . . who desires to assume 

custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with 

the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the 

safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.‖ (§ 361.2, subd. (a), 

italics added.) Section 361.2, subdivision (a), evidences ―the Legislative preference for 

placement with [the noncustodial] parent . . . .‖ (In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 

1124, 1132.)

―[A] nonoffending parent has a constitutionally protected interest in assuming 

physical custody, as well as a statutory right to do so, in the absence of clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent‘s choices will be  ̳detrimental to the safety, 

protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.‘ [Citations.]‖ (In re Isayah 

C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 697.) The juvenile court must make the detriment 

finding by clear and convincing evidence and we review this evidence in the light most 

favorable to the court‘s decision to determine whether substantial evidence supports the 

lower court‘s ruling. (In re John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1569-1570.) 

Section 361.2, subdivision (b) gives the juvenile court three choices once it 

decides to place children with a noncustodial parent. First, as the court did here, it may 

make custody and visitation orders, to be filed in family court, and terminate dependency 

jurisdiction. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).) Second, the court may retain dependency 

jurisdiction and require the agency to conduct a home visit within three months, after 

which the court may proceed pursuant to any of the three options in section 361.2, 

subdivision (b). (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(2).) Third, the court may retain dependency 

jurisdiction and order services for either parent or both parents, and if it orders services 

for both, it may make a custody determination at a review hearing. (§ 361.2, subd. 

(b)(3).)
21

In the present case, the record supported the juvenile court‘s finding that E.A.‘s 

placement with father would not be detrimental to her safety, protection, or physical or 

emotional well-being. When first contacted by the social worker on August 27, 2012,

father stated that he was unable to get his visa to come to the United States but that he 

would ―love to have‖ his daughter. He stated that he wanted E.A. to live with him and 

that he had a four-bedroom home. He also said that he would provide a therapist for her, 

if needed. According to father, he wanted to have both of his children live with him, but 

mother refused to permit E.A. to accompany him back to Palestine. He told the social 

worker that he was willing to do whatever was necessary to ensure that E.A. would have 

a nurturing environment. He maintained that if the American private school in Palestine 

that E.A. was to attend did not have specialized education services, he would hire a 

private speech therapist and teacher to assist E.A. with her learning disability. 

Additionally, father demonstrated a concern for E.A.‘s emotional health. He told 

the social worker not to report to E.A. any information about mother if that information 

could ―hurt her.‖ Father also requested that E.A. leave the courtroom when there was any 

discussion of mother. 

Although E.A. had limited personal contact with her father, she had telephonic 

visits with him. Early in the proceedings, E.A. indicated that she wanted to remain at 

Rita‘s home but, subsequently, she told the social worker on several occasions that she 

would like to go to Palestine to be with her father and brother. 

Additionally, both the maternal grandfather and maternal grandmother asserted 

that father would be a good parent to E.A. and that she should be placed with him. They 

confirmed that they would stay in Palestine to help E.A. adjust. Rita and her son, the 

current caretakers of E.A., also told the social worker that they had been in contact with 

father and that he had provided excellent support for E.A. 

The foregoing evidence amply supported the juvenile court‘s ruling. Mother does 

not argue that the evidence demonstrates that father would not be a good father but 

claims that the inadequate investigation of father‘s home in Palestine established clear 

and convincing evidence of detriment. She maintains that the investigation by the agency 
22

did not comply with the social study report requirements as set forth in sections 16501.1 

and section 358.1. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a) [petitioner must prepare a 

social study of child, which includes a discussion of all matters relevant to disposition].) 

―  ̳The [a]gency has a duty to apprise the court of all relevant facts and 

circumstances when issuing reports. [Citations.] ―At each stage of the dependency 

proceeding, the social services agency is statutorily mandated to prepare social study 

reports and make recommendations to assist the court. [Citations.] In this role, the social 

services agency acts as an impartial arm of the court in assisting the court to carry out the 

Juvenile Court Law.‖ [Citations.]  ̳The duties to furnish child welfare services and to 

provide reports and recommendations to the juvenile court are actually placed by statute 

upon ―the social worker.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 

1011-1012.) Here, the record demonstrates that the agency prepared a disposition report 

and satisfied its duties under the statutes.

Sections 358.1 and 16501.1 do not support mother‘s argument that the 

investigation was inadequate. Section 358.1 simply sets forth the ―factual discussion‖ 

that must be in each social study or evaluation made by the social worker. Here, there is 

no allegation that the social worker did not have a plan required by section 358.1, and this 

section does not require any more information than was provided by Adalat. As courts 

have recognized, section 16501.1 does not create any mandatory duty. Section 16501.1 

contains a recitation of the Legislature‘s findings and a declaration of the goals and 

purpose of case plans for children involved in dependency proceedings. Where an outof-home placement is necessary, this statute provides that selection of the placement must 

be evaluated according to stated criteria, and must be based on an order of priority that 

puts relatives above foster families. (§ 16501.1, subd. (c)(1).) The statute is merely 

declaratory of the Legislature‘s goals for dependent children and ―creates no mandatory 

duties.‖ (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 627, 641; see 

also Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1460.) 

Mother argues that the record demonstrates that the agency did not carry out its 

duty because it did not investigate whether a home study could be done of father‘s home 
23

in Palestine. Mother contends that Adalat was under the impression that no home check 

could be conducted but the record does not show that Adalat attempted to contact Israeli 

authorities or the Palestinian authority to confirm that no welfare check could be 

conducted.5 She stresses that both her attorney and E.A.‘s counsel requested a home visit 

prior to placing E.A. with father in Palestine. She emphasizes that Adalat, the social 

worker, conceded that father‘s home would have been investigated had father lived in this 

country. Mother contends that the social worker improperly delegated the responsibility 

of investigation to the father seeking custody. (See In re John M., supra, 141 

Cal.App.4th 1564.)

Mother maintains that the record demonstrates that a home study was especially 

important in the present case. She stresses that E.A. was being placed in a region where 

there is a war, E.A. has special education needs and not even father was certain that the 

school in Palestine would meet her needs, and E.A. did not speak Arabic. Additionally, 

mother stated that she had ―experienced severe oppression while in the Middle East‖ and 

she also told the social worker that her ―partner‖ also had a drinking problem. There was 

also, mother insists, an inadequate investigation of the other people in the household as 

there was an incident with the maternal grandfather where he pushed mother away from 

E.A. and mother called the police. There was no investigation into father‘s new wife. 

Mother does not cite any authority that requires a home study before placing a 

child in the nonoffending parent‘s home. When placement is with a parent, ―the 

appropriate investigation is a basic one, less rigorous than the investigation necessary for 

placement with a more distant relative such as a cousin.‖ (In re John M., supra, 141 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.) 

Contrary to mother‘s argument, the agency did not simply accept father‘s 

statements about the home situation in Palestine. Adalat did not personally visit the 

school E.A. would be attending in Palestine but she reviewed the information about it on 

 

5 Mother cites to judicially noticed documents that show that Israel is a signatory 

to the Hague Convention on Child Abduction and that Israel has a child welfare system 

with welfare officers. 
24

its web site. She did not have any obligation to contact authorities in Palestine or Israel 

to do a welfare check on father‘s home when the evidence in the record showed that 

father‘s home was safe and that he was committed to ensuring that E.A.‘s needs would be 

met. Rather than simply relying on father‘s statements, the social worker confirmed her 

impressions of father and the veracity of father‘s statements with the maternal 

grandmother, maternal grandfather, and Rita. The maternal grandmother had been to 

Palestine and both she and the maternal grandfather, who was in Palestine during part of 

the proceedings, assured Adalat that the schools were good and father‘s home would be 

good for E.A. Adalat explained that she felt the most reassured by the maternal 

grandmother‘s statements since she was not Palestinian. 

The record also contained sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court‘s 

conclusion that E.A. would be safe in Palestine. Mother argues that the area is ―wartorn‖ but cites no evidence showing that E.A.‘s welfare would be seriously jeopardized if 

she were living with her father and twin brother in Palestine. There is no evidence that 

her twin brother, who is currently living with father, is in danger. Furthermore, maternal 

grandmother insisted that there was not a safety problem where father lived and, although 

there are cultural differences, women are respected. Mother did state that she 

experienced oppression in Palestine but, at one point during the dependency proceedings, 

she favored placing E.A. with father in Palestine and believed such a placement would be 

beneficial for E.A. On August 23, 2012, mother told the social worker that she wanted

E.A. back but less than one week later, on August 29, mother told the social worker that 

she wanted E.A. ―to go with her father in Palestine. I think that this is what would be 

best for her. He will take good care of her and she will be with her brother.‖ At the 

hearing on September 20, 2012, when discussing the placement of E.A., mother‘s counsel 

stated that the last time she spoke to mother ―she was in agreement with father‘s request‖ 

to have E.A. placed with him. 

Mother‘s stated reason for contesting the placement of E.A. with father in 

Palestine was not related to any perceived detriment or danger to E.A. She opposed the 

placement because mother originally was also going to go to Palestine but when she 
25

decided not to go or she learned that she could not go, she did not want E.A. to go. When 

asked on October 10, 2012, by the social worker whether she still wanted E.A. to return 

to her father in Palestine, she responded: ―  ̳No, not anymore. I was planning on going 

there, but now, I am not going to go, so I don‘t want her to go either. . . . If she leaves the 

country, I will never see my daughter again. I can‘t go unless I finish up everything that 

is going on here. If she is here, at least I can see her once a week. I want her to know 

that I am her mother.‘ ‖ 

Thus, the evidence supported a conclusion that mother was not worried about 

E.A.‘s welfare or safety in Palestine. The record also supported the juvenile court‘s 

finding that E.A.‘s home in Palestine was safe. There was no evidence in the record, 

other than mother‘s one statement that her ―partner‖ had a drinking problem, to indicate 

that father had a substance abuse problem or that his home would be unsafe. As already 

noted, the statements of the Rita and her son about their interactions with father, the 

separate declarations of the maternal grandparents, and the promises and actions of father 

demonstrated father‘s concern for E.A.‘s needs and confirmed that he had the resources 

to provide her a home that would meet her needs.

Finally, mother argues that the record did not demonstrate that E.A. could become 

a permanent resident of Palestine. She cites cases that show that sovereign nations 

require approval for entry. We took judicial notice of the documents submitted by 

mother that show that Israel must approve in advance any request for permanent 

residency. She argues that the juvenile court did not have sufficient evidence that E.A. 

could become a permanent resident. 

Mother‘s ―evidence‖ is insufficient. It does not show that E.A. will not be able to 

enter Palestine and it does not show that children of Palestinians have any difficulty 

joining their parents in Palestine. The record is completely devoid of any evidence that 

E.A. will not be able to emigrate or that she will not be able to become a permanent 

resident.

We conclude that the record shows that the juvenile court made a reasonable 

determination that the agency‘s investigation into father‘s situation was sufficient to 
26

determine that E.A.‘s safety and welfare in father‘s custody in Palestine could be assured. 

Mother has not cited to any law that requires a more thorough investigation of father than 

the investigation done. The investigation revealed that E.A. would have a home in 

Palestine where she would have her own bedroom and would be living with her father, 

twin brother, and other relatives. Her maternal grandmother and maternal grandfather, 

with whom she had a relationship, would be there to help her adjust. Her father indicated 

that he would make sure that her schooling was adequate and that she would receive a 

therapist or other personal assistance if necessary. The court found father to be credible 

and the record supported this determination as he complied with all of the agency‘s 

requests and exhibited a commitment to E.A.‘s best interests. We agree with the juvenile 

court‘s finding that the argument that jurisdiction should not be terminated and placement 

postponed until further investigation can be conducted because Palestine or father‘s home 

might not be safe is based on speculation, not evidence. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the record supported the finding of no detriment 

and the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating jurisdiction and placing E.A. with 

father. 

III. Denial of Mother’s Request for a Continuance

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her request 

for a continuance of the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. At the hearing on October 

19, 2012, there was a conference prior to going on the record where mother requested a 

continuance based on the ―late notice of the agency‘s change in position . . . .‖ 

Continuances in juvenile proceedings are disfavored. (See In re Axsana S. (2000) 

78 Cal.App.4th 262, 272, disapproved on another ground in In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 

Cal.4th 588, 624, fn. 12.) When considering a request for a continuance, the juvenile 

court must give substantial weight to the child‘s need for prompt resolution, the need to 

provide the child with a stable environment and the damage to the child resulting from 

prolonged temporary placement. (§ 352, subd. (a).) Further, ―[c]ontinuances shall be 

granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time shown to be 

necessary by the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for the continuance.‖ 
27

(§ 352, subd. (a).) The standard of review on appeal of a denial of a continuance is abuse 

of discretion. (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 180.)

In its second addendum report filed on September 19, 2012, the agency 

recommended that E.A. be declared a dependent of the court and that reunification 

services should be offered to both mother and father. On October 17, 2012, the agency 

filed its report and changed its recommendation. It recommended that the court terminate 

dependency jurisdiction and give legal and physical custody of E.A. solely to father. The 

court held the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing two days later on October 19.

Counsel for mother requested a continuance because of the late notice of the 

agency‘s change in position. The juvenile court denied this request, and mother claims 

the denial of this request constituted structural error. Alternatively, she maintains that the 

denial was an abuse of discretion.

Mother‘s claim of structural error is based on her claim that the agency did not 

comply with California Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(2). This rule states that the agency 

―must submit the social study and copies of it to the clerk at least 48 hours before the 

disposition hearing is set to begin . . . . A continuance within statutory time limits must 

be granted on the request of the party who has not been furnished a copy of the social 

study in accordance with this rule.‖ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(2).)

The hearing on October 19, 2012, began at 9:00 a.m., and the report was filed on 

October 17, 2012, at 10:41 a.m. Mother asserts that the report was thus not filed 48 hours 

before the disposition hearing.

Mother‘s counsel did not object in the juvenile court on the basis of the agency‘s 

failure to comply with the California Rules of Court. Her objection was based on the 

―late notice‖ of the agency‘s change of position. Thus, mother has not preserved an 

objection based on the violation of the rule for appeal. Nevertheless, since there is no 

factual dispute regarding the agency‘s failure to comply with rule 5.690(a)(2) of the 

California Rules of Court, we will exercise our discretion and consider the merits of 

mother‘s argument. 
28

In support of her argument that the denial of her request for a continuance based 

on inadequate notice of the agency‘s report constituted structural error, mother cites 

Judith P. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535 (Judith P.). In Judith P., the 

parent‘s attorney received the report on the morning of the section 366.21 hearing and the 

trial court denied a continuance to permit counsel time to obtain documents countering 

the facts discussed in the report. (Judith P., at pp. 543-544.) The appellate court, relying 

heavily on criminal cases, held that the notice requirement of section 366.21, subdivision 

(c) is mandatory and obligatory and that a failure to comply with the statute was a 

violation of the parent‘s due process rights and per se reversible. (Judith P., at pp. 553-

558.) 

Judith P., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 535 predates the Supreme Court decisions that 

have indicated that orders in dependency proceedings are subject to harmless error 

review. (See In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 915-916; In re Celine R. (2003) 

31 Cal.4th 45, 59-60.) ―These significant differences between criminal proceedings and 

dependency proceedings provide reason to question whether the structural error doctrine 

that has been established for certain errors in criminal proceedings should be imported 

wholesale, or unthinkingly, into the quite different context of dependency cases.‖ (In re 

James F., at pp. 915-916.) In In re James F., the Supreme Court held that, in the 

dependency context, ―[i]f the outcome of a proceeding has not been affected, denial of a 

right to notice and a hearing may be deemed harmless and reversal is not required.‖ (Id. 

at p. 918; see also In re A.D. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1326-1327 [declining to 

apply structural error analysis to claim of failure to give notice of dependency 

proceeding]; In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1419-1420 [same].) 

In the present case, mother submits no argument to suggest how the agency‘s 

filing of the report at 10:41 a.m. on October 17, 2012, rather than at 9:00 a.m., impacted 

the results. As already discussed, mother‘s trial counsel did not object on the basis of 

noncompliance with California Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(2), and thus she presented 

no argument as to how the agency‘s filing the report one hour and 41 minutes earlier 

would have benefitted her. On appeal, mother never addresses this issue. 
29

Rather than explain how the agency‘s filing of the report one hour and 41 minutes 

earlier would have made any difference, mother objects to learning just two days before 

the hearing that the agency had changed its recommendation for dependency jurisdiction 

to a recommendation to terminate jurisdiction and place E.A. with father. This short 

notice, according to mother, deprived her of the opportunity to investigate father‘s home 

and the special educational services available to E.A. in Palestine. Mother, however, 

does not set forth what evidence she expected to garner. 

Mother‘s argument in the trial court and on appeal does not show good cause to 

support a continuance. Mother may have received late notice of the agency‘s decision 

but she had plenty of notice that the agency was considering whether it should place E.A. 

with father. On August 29, 2012, mother stated that it would be best if E.A. were placed 

with father in Palestine and the agency‘s report filed on August 31, 2012, was clear that 

father wanted E.A. to live with him and E.A.‘s twin brother in Palestine. Moreover, at 

the hearing on September 20, 2012, counsel for father stated that the primary issue was 

placement of E.A. and that father was going to contest disposition. Counsel for mother 

stated that as of the last time she spoke to mother, mother agreed that E.A. should be 

placed with father. By the end of August 2012, mother knew that the primary issue to be 

determined was E.A.‘s placement and whether she would be placed with father in 

Palestine. She therefore had sufficient time to investigate father‘s home by the hearing 

on October 19, 2012, or to explain precisely what further information she expected to 

acquire.

Furthermore, even if the court abused its discretion in refusing to continue the 

hearing, mother cannot demonstrate prejudice. Showing an abuse of discretion is not 

enough; mother must show prejudice. (See In re Angela R. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 257, 

265.) Thus, mother must demonstrate the result of the continued hearing would have 

changed in the absence of error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) 

The record in this case is clear that any error in denying the continuance was 

harmless under People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, as a continuance would not have 

resulted in a different dispositional order. On October 26, 2012, the juvenile court held a 
30

hearing on mother‘s motion for reconsideration. Mother offered no new information 

about E.A.‘s placement with father. The agency, however, submitted its report indicating 

that mother had missed two supervised visits with E.A. and had refused to participate in 

testing. The maternal grandmother told the social worker that she was moving to 

Palestine to help with E.A.‘s transition. She reported that she believed father would be 

―the best father‖ and that E.A. was ―very happy and excited about going to Palestine.‖ 

At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court stated: ―[I]n my view there is no new 

evidence to the mother‘s benefit that would cause me to want to change my order. But 

even if I could completely reopen the hearing and take in all the evidence, including what 

is known now about the maternal grandmother, mother‘s refusal to test, mother‘s missing 

visits, it is very clear to me that the best interest of this child would be to be with the 

father.‖ 

Thus, in the present case, mother had an opportunity to present additional evidence 

or a new theory, and failed to do so. Even if the court should have granted the 

continuance, mother has completely failed to establish that the denial of her request 

resulted in any prejudice to her. 

IV. The Delay in Moving E.A. to Palestine

Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering E.A. 

transferred to Palestine without first determining whether E.A. could emigrate to 

Palestine and whether she could become a permanent resident. This argument, although 

under a different heading, is a challenge to the placement of E.A. with father in Palestine. 

Mother‘s focus, here, however, is that the court abused its discretion when terminating 

dependency jurisdiction and then staying that order because the delay in being able to 

move E.A. to Palestine is harmful to E.A.

The juvenile court made it clear that it was not terminating dependency 

jurisdiction until E.A. was transferred to Palestine. The court stated: ―So what I am 

going to do, and I may need some help preparing this order, stating it correctly, that we 

will award custody to the father. That dependency will be terminated once she‘s 

transferred to Palestine. It‘s open until then. And still be the same supervision and the 
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same living situation that she is now.‖ The jurisdictional/dispositional order stated that 

―this order [is] stayed until child is on the plane to Palestine.‖ 

Mother relies on In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243 to argue that the 

delay in acquiring the necessary documents and permission to permit E.A. to emigrate 

places the child in ―legal limbo‖ and therefore the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

ordering the dependency jurisdiction dismissed upon her transfer. In In re Melvin A., the 

juvenile court issued an order terminating parental rights under section 366.26 but stayed 

the order pending completion of an adoptive home study. The home study took eight 

months and the mother claimed that this delay between the issuance of the stay order and 

its execution precluded a timely consideration of her appeal and violated her due process 

right to a speedy trial. (In re Melvin A., at pp. 1247-1248.) The appellate court agreed 

with mother and observed ―that it was error for the trial court to order [the mother‘s] 

parental rights terminated but indefinitely stay that order, leaving [the mother] in limbo as 

to the status of the termination order and her ability to immediately appeal that order. 

This action by the court was inconsistent with the fundamental policy of dependency 

law[,] which seeks to resolve cases expeditiously. [Citation.]‖ (Id. at p. 1248.) Although 

it concluded that the lower court erred in staying the order terminating parental rights 

pending completion of an adoptive home study, the appellate court held that the error was 

harmless. (Id. at pp. 1246, 1250.)

Preliminarily, we note that, here, mother did not object when the juvenile court 

announced that the jurisdictional/dispositional order was stayed until E.A. could be 

transported to Palestine. Thus, she has forfeited any right to challenge it. 

To the extent that mother is arguing that the delay in E.A.‘s placement with her 

father raises the same concerns present in In re Melvin A., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 

we reject her argument. Mother, unlike the parent in In re Melvin A., has suffered no 

prejudice as a result of the stay. Indeed, in the present case, mother‘s opportunity to 

appeal promptly has not been thwarted, as evidenced by this appeal. Furthermore, this 

stay is in E.A.‘s interest. E.A. is not in limbo; she knows she will be going to Palestine 

when the immigration process is completed. As already discussed, mother failed to show 
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a likelihood that E.A. will be unable to relocate to Palestine. While E.A. remains in the 

United States, the juvenile court will continue to have jurisdiction over E.A. and the 

agency will supervise her placement in Rita‘s home. 

For the reasons already discussed, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in 

placing E.A. with father. The court properly stayed its order terminating dependency 

jurisdiction until the necessary documents and approvals are acquired to permit E.A.‘s 

move to Palestine. Mother has not produced any evidence indicating that E.A. will not be 

able to emigrate or that any request for permanent residency will be denied.

DISPOSITION

Other than the visitation order, all orders of the juvenile court, including the 

termination of dependency jurisdiction under section 362.4, the award of legal and 

physical custody solely to father, and the transfer of the minor to Palestine, are affirmed. 

The visitation order is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

_________________________

Lambden, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Haerle, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Richman, J.