*Judge Luttig was a member of the original panel but did not

participate in this decision. This opinion is filed by quorum of

the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-4897

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MICHAEL DANIEL HAMMONDS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District

Judge. (CR-02-535)

Submitted: April 26, 2006 Decided: June 6, 2006

Before LUTTIG,*

 WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joshua Snow Kendrick, JOSHUA SNOW KENDRICK, P.C., Columbia, South

Carolina, for Appellant. Rose Mary Parham, Assistant United States

Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:

Michael Daniel Hammonds appeals his resentencing

following this court’s remand. See United States v. Hammonds, 139

F. App’x 486 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). For the reasons stated

below, we affirm Hammonds’ 300-month sentence.

Hammonds pled guilty to armed robbery interfering with

interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2 (2000);

armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2000);

and attempted armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2113(a) (2000). Hammonds received two sentences of 240 months’

imprisonment and one sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment, all to

be served concurrently.

Hammonds appealed, alleging claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel, and challenging his four sentencing

enhancements under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). We

affirmed Hammonds’ convictions, but vacated his sentence and

remanded for resentencing because Hammonds’ six-level sentencing

enhancement for use of a firearm violated United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220 (2005). On remand, the district court limited its

reconsideration to the firearm enhancement. The district court,

noting that the sentencing guidelines were advisory, overruled

Hammonds’ objection to the six-level enhancement for use of a

firearm and imposed the identical 300-month sentence, which it

concluded was reasonable.
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Hammonds appealed, and his attorney filed a brief in

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

questioning whether: (1) the mandate rule precludes consideration

of any issues other than Hammonds’ sentencing enhancement for use

of a firearm; and (2) Hammonds’ sentence was reasonable under

Booker. Hammonds was informed of the opportunity to file a pro se

supplemental brief, but declined to do so. The Government did not

file a brief.

The mandate rule “forecloses relitigation of issues

expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court,” as well as

“issues decided by the district court but foregone on appeal.”

United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993). We find the

district court properly limited its decision on remand to

resentencing on the firearm enhancement.

After Booker, courts must calculate the appropriate

guideline range, consider the range in conjunction with other

relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)

(West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and impose a sentence. If the court

imposes a sentence outside the guideline range, it must state its

reasons for doing so. United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546

(4th Cir. 2005) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-61). The sentence

must be “within the statutorily prescribed range and . . .

reasonable.” Id. at 546-47. A sentence imposed within a correctly

calculated guideline range is presumptively reasonable. United
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States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006). At Hammonds’

resentencing, the district court calculated the advisory guidelines

range, made a finding of fact regarding the firearm enhancement,

that was amply supported by the record, noted it had considered the

statutory sentencing factors, and concluded the imposed sentence

was reasonable.

We affirm Hammonds’ sentence, as the reasoning and

decision making by the district court on remand fall well within

the boundaries of reasonableness. As constrained by the mandate

rule, we have, as required by Anders, reviewed the record and have

found no meritorious issues for appeal. This court requires that

counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the

client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes such

a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court

for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must

state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED