IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2014-KA-00319-COA HOUSTON LEE JONES A/K/A HOUSTON JONES APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/22/2013 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT P. KREBS COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ANTHONY N. LAW RENCE III NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF DELIBERATE-DESIGN MURDER AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/23/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ. ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In 2 013, Hous t o n L e e J o n e s was convicted in t he Jackson County Circuit Court of deliberate-design m

urder and s entenced to lif

e im prisonm ent i n t

h e c u s t o d y o f t h e M i s sissippi Departm ent of Corrections (MDOC). Aggrieved, Jones now appeals his conviction on f our grounds: (1) the jury was im properly instructed on deliberate-design m urder; (2) Jones was prejudiced by hearsay testim ony ; (3) the circuit court erred in excluding one o f Jones’sstatem ents to the p olice; a nd (4) the weigh t a n d s u f f iciency of the evidence did not adequately

support the conviction. Finding no error, we af f irm

. S TATEMENT OF FACTS ¶2. Jones, an eighteen-y e ar-old f ather of a new baby girl nam ed R y leigh, was living with h i s s i x t y - fo u r - y e a r - o l d s t e p g r a

ndf ather, Leo Landrum , in 2011. Jones’s parents had s eparated when he was a y oung boy , and his f ather had gained prim ary custody of him

. Nonetheless, prior to h is m other’s s uicide in 2010, Jones lived wi t h e a c h p a rent during various t im e periods. W hen Jones reached h igh-school age, he began living with Landrum

. Landrum was Jones’s m other’s s tepf

a ther until his divorce f

rom Jones’s grandm other. Hence, Jones had been around Landrum

of ten f rom the tim e he was a sm a l l child until Landrum ’s death. ¶3. T h e e v i d e n c e s h o w s t h a t L a n d r u m f inancially supported Jones throughout Jones’s li fe

. Jones even a dm itted that Landrum had alway s s h owered h im with gif ts. By the tim e Jones

was e i g h t e e n , L andrum had purchased f our vehicles f

or him

. At the tim e of Landrum ’s death, Jones was a n unem ploy ed f ather. Hence, in addition t o Landrum pay ing all of Jones’s bills, he also began giving Jones m oney to help support Ry l eigh. However, g iven all of the
expenses Landrum was covering, he was rapidly f alling i nto dire straits f inancially

. Landrum ’ s sister-in-l a w , K atherine L andrum , helped Landrum with his f inances and was even listed on his bank account as an account holder. ¶4. The day bef

ore Landrum was m

urdered, Katherine t estif

ied that Landrum told her that
Jones h ad m axed out all of his credit cards and that he was going to have to stop s u pporting
Jones f inancially

. According to Landrum ’s bank a ccount, he only had a pproxim a tely $2,000

2when he died, despite windf alls totaling alm ost $150,000 f r om various sources over the
y ears. Landrum ’s neighbor and best f riend, Jim m y Spicer, a l so testif ied that he had cof

f ee with Land rum every m orning. He testif ied that while the two of them were visiting the

m orning of Landrum ’s death, Landrum said that Jones had reached h is credit lim it on all of his credit cards. He also testif ied that L andrum said Jones needed to “straighten up and work.” ¶5. Jones asserts that Landrum ’s f inancial support of him was d ue to L andrum ’s alleged

s e x u a l m olestation a nd assault o n Jones f or a num ber of y ears. Jones’s recollection of the abuse is inconsistent. In som e s tatem ents, it appears tha t J o n e s could not rem em ber when the a buse began or the extent of the abuse. In other statem ents, Jones r ecalled the exact age, location, and description of the abuse in vivid detail. ¶6. On May 25, 2011 , J o n e s s h o t a n d killed Landrum

. He then used Landrum ’s cell phone to call his g irlf

riend, who is als o R y leigh’s m other, Tilena W om ack, to ask f or perm ission to visit with f

riends that evening. Af

ter W o m ack gave him perm ission, he went
to a f riend’s house f

or som e tim e . Around 11:30 p.m ., Jones volunteered to drive one of the f riends hom e, a nd several other f riends accom

panied h im i n the car. On the way back, Jones said he needed to stop at Landrum ’ s to retrieve an overnight bag so that he could s tay out that night. ¶7. Upon a rriving at Landrum ’s house, Jones stated that Landrum’ s f r o n t d o o r w a s locked. Ky le Keener, one of the passengers in the vehicle, testif ied that he f

ound this to be unusual since he was under the im p ression that a lock had broken of f in the door y ears earlier

3and, thus, Landrum never locked the f ront door. Regardless, Jones asked Keener a nd the two other passengers in the vehicle to accom pany h im to the back door to enter the hom e. The boy s all c om

plied. T hey s oon discovered that the back door was s tanding open. Af ter calling f or L andrum by nam e w ith no response, Jones asked Keener to go into the h om e f i rst. W hen
Keener entered the house, he and the other boy s f ound Landrum dead i n his recliner f rom a bullet w ound. They im m ediately called 9 11 and w aited f or em ergency r esponders at a nearby church. ¶8. W h en authorities initially questioned Jones about the s hooting, he claim ed he had no involvem e nt and did n ot know any thing about it. However, J ones later a dm itted t hat he shot
L a ndrum af

ter conf r onting him about the alleged sexual abuse. Jones also provide d conf licti n g t estim ony regarding a purported incident wherein Jones c laim e d Landrum touched R

y leigh’s g enital area i nappropriately

. One of Jones’s statem ents i ndicated that he had s een Landrum t ouching Ry leigh’s genitals. However, in another statem ent, Jones said he “suspected” that Landrum m a y have “ done som ething” to Ry leigh’s genital area because it was red and producing an odd-colored d i s c h arge. Nonetheless, W om ack disputed the notion, claim ing that on t he day Jones asserted the abuse to R y l eigh occurred, she was with Jones and Landrum

all day , and that no abuse occurred. ¶9. At trial, t he jury heard testim ony f rom m any witnesses, including Katherine, Spicer, Keener, and W om ack. The jury was also privy to n um erous statem ents f rom Jones given to authorities af

ter he was arrested. Af

ter being instructed as to deliberate-design m urder and heat-of -passion m anslaughter, t

h e j ury returned a g uilty verdict f or deliberate-design m

urder.

4Jones now appeals. DISCUSSION

I. Deliberate-Design-Murder Instruction ¶10. J o n e s f

i r s t a s s e r t s t h at the jury was im properly instructed by the circuit court o n deliberate-design m

urder. The State argues that because Jones’s counsel f a iled to object to the instruction at trial, the issue is procedurally barred. It i s w e l l settled that “an of f ended party ’s f ailure t o object to jury instructions at trial procedurally bars t he issue on a p p eal.” Neal v. State , 15 So. 3d 388, 397 (¶13) (Miss. 2009) (citation om i tted). Accordingly , we are without authority to address this assignm ent of error. II. Introduction of Landrum ’s Statem ent ¶11. Jones next ar g u e s t h a t t he statem ents m ade by Landrum to Katherine and Spicer regarding his intent to stop supporting Jones f inancially were inadm issible hearsay

. He also claim s t ha t since the testim ony highlighted h is f inancial irresponsibility , it served as evidence of his “bad c haracter,” and was, theref ore, inadm issible under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(a). ¶12. Mississippi Rule o f Evidence 803(3) provides that a statem ent is not prohibited by the hears a y rule if it is “[ a] statem ent of the declarant’s then existing state of m ind, em otion, sensation, or phy s ical condition (such as intent, plan, m otive, design, m en tal f eeling, pain, and bodily health)

. . . .” T he S tate asserts that Landrum ’s statem ents w ere introduce d to show his i ntent to cease f i nancial support of Jones and were, theref ore, perm issible. W e agree.

5¶13. W e have p r e v i o u s l y held that “[ s]tatem ents which indicate an intent or plan to do

som ething in the f

uture are a d mi s s i ble to prove t hat the proposed a ct o ccurred.” Bogan v. State , 7 54 So. 2d 1 289, 1293 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Such statem ents inherently create

an alternative m otive f

o r Jones to have killed Landrum a side f rom the allegations of abuse.
W h ile J ones p rovides n um erous distinguishable cases where statem e n t s o f intent were not allowed d ue to t he h earsay rule, it is im p ortant to note t hat the contextual relevancy of each
statem ent reviewed f

o r a d mi s s ibility under the hearsay rule by a c ircuit court dif f ers on a case-by -case basis. Here, Landrum ’s discussions with a f am i ly m e m ber and a close f

riend

on the e ve and m orning of h is death r egarding h is intent t o s t o p f i n ancing his s o on-to-be killer were relevant f

or the jury to review. ¶14. Furtherm ore, Jones’s claim that the statem ents w ere inadm issible under Rule 404(a)

as statem ents of bad character against him is i nvalid. This claim has been r aised f or the f irst tim e on appeal, and, hence, is not reviewable by t his Court. See Tate v. S tate , 912 So. 2d 919, 928 (¶27) (Miss. 2005). Procedural bar notwithstanding, t he issue i s also without m erit. ¶15. Rule 404(a) s pecif ically holds that “[ e ]vidence o f a person’s character or a trait of his character is not adm issible for the purpose of proving t hat h e a cted in conformity therewith

on a particular occasion .” (Em phasis a dded). Here, the statem ents p resented to the jury only sought to establish Landrum ’s intent to stop f inancially supporting Jones, not to prove that
Jones f ailed to support him self

f inancially . The State never put on any evidence or argued
to t h e jury that Jones w as, in f act, f inancially irresponsible. Hence, the statem ents Jones
opposes could n ot h a ve been introduced f or t he purpose of s howing that Jones acted in

6conf

orm i ty with Landrum ’s statem ents and was, in f a ct, f inancially i rresponsible. The issues regarding the introduction of Landrum ’s statem e n ts to Katherine and Spicer are m eritless.
III. Ex c lusion of Jones’s Statem e nt ¶16. Jones’s next issue on a ppeal centers around the third statem ent he m ade to authorities

on J u n e 1 , 2 011, several day s af ter being im

prisoned. His f

irst statem e nt was m ade to Lieutenant Randy Muf

f ley on M ay 25, 2011 , j ust hours af ter Landrum ’ s body was discovered. At that tim e, Jones denied any knowledge of or invol v e m ent i n Landrum ’s

m urder. Two day s later, on May 27, 2011, Jones adm itted t hat he had s h o t a n d killed Landrum

. In that statem ent, he told police that Landrum had m olested him f or m any y ears

as a b oy . However, he could not rem em b er details of the alleged a b use. He also claim ed that he noticed “an abnorm al color discharge” com i ng f r om Ry l eigh’s vagina af

ter Landrum baby sat her shortly bef

ore h i s mu r d e r. Jones claim s h e then suspected that Landrum m ay have touched R y l e i g h i n appropriately

. On the n ight of the m urder, Jones asserted that he conf ronted Landrum about Ry leigh and also about his own abuse. J ones s t a t e d t hat when Landrum ignored him , he shot and killed Landrum

. ¶17. J o n e s w a s a rrested and jailed af ter his May 27 statem e n t t o authorities. Five d a y s later, on June 1, 2011, he gave another statem e nt to police very s i m ilar t o his May 27
statem ent. Nonethele s s , i n the June 1 statem ent, he w ent into f ar m ore detail regarding Landrum ’ s purported abuse of him as a boy

. ¶18. At trial, t he State of f ered both the May 25 and the May 27 statem ents into evidence. The State did not o f

f er the June 1 s tatem ent into evidenc e . H o w e v e r, prior t o calling

7Lieutenant Muf f ley to t he stand to testif

y , the State a dvised the circuit court t hat it believed Jones’s counsel would attem pt to of f er Jones’s June 1 statem ent into evidence on c r o s s exam ination. The State objected to t h e introduction of the s tatem ent on the basis that a def endant is prohibited f

rom introducing an o ut-of -court, s elf

-serving s tatem ent, as well as

a cum ulative s tatem ent, t hat t he State d oes not f irst introduce d

uring i ts case-in-chief

. Af ter hearing argum ents f

r om both sides, the circuit court recesse d t o v i e w the statem ent and

a n a l y ze the applicable caselaw. The circuit court recessed and agreed that the June 1
statem ent was self

-serving and inadm issible. ¶19. In particular, the c ircuit cour t c i t e d S i m m o n s v. State , 8 05 So. 2d 452, 4 89 (Miss. 2001), i n s upport of its decision. In Simmons , the suprem e c ourt noted that as “ a general rule[ ,]

. . . declarations of a party in his own f avor are not adm issible i n his b e h alf .” Id

. at (¶95) (citation om itted). The suprem e court went on to say : A self -serving declaration is excluded because there is nothing to guarantee its trustworthiness. If s uch evidence is adm issible, the door would b e t h r o wn open to obvious abuse: an accused could c r eate evidence f or him s elf by m aking statem ents in his f a v o r f o r subsequent u se a t h is trial to show his innocence. Id . (citation om itted). ¶20. W e agree that J ones’s June 1 statem ent was self

- serving a nd inadm i ssible. Jones had already given two state me n t s t o t he authorities – one of which discussed the abuse Jones alleged Landrum inf

licted on h i m . The J une 1 statem e nt was m erely a rehashing and m ore detailed account o f

the abuse that provided no f urther credible inf

orm ation to the case and could only

have been given to serve him later in his def

ense.

8¶21. Furtherm ore, even if the statem ent had been introduced, it would have contradicted Jones’s testim ony at trial. I n the June 1 statem ent, Jones asserted that the alleged abuse never progressed t o a ctual i ntercourse. However, at trial, Jones testif i e d that L andrum escalated the abuse to intercourse s e veral y ears af ter t he assaults began. Additionally , in the June 1
statem ent, Jones could not rem em ber whe n t h e a l l e g ed abuse began. Conversely , at trial,
Jones t estif

ied as to exact ages, circum stances, and s pecif i c details about t he abuse, including the f i rst attack. Finally , in the June 1 statem ent, J o nes t old authorities h e m e rely s uspected that Landrum m ay have done som ething im proper to Ry leigh. At trial, Jones testif ied that he walked into Landrum ’s hom e and saw him f ondling Ry leigh – a f

act disputed by the June 1 statem ent and by W om ack’s testim ony . Hence, even if the exclusion o f the statem ent was error, it was harm less error at best. Accordingly , this issue is without m erit.
IV. Jones’s Weathersby Claim ¶22. Jones next argues that the circuit cou r t i m p r o p e r ly denied h is request f or a directed

v erdict since he w as the only ey ewitness to the crim e and his story was not substantially contradicted. Jones grounds his claim in the W eatherbsy rule, created b y the suprem e court in W eathersby v. State , 165 Miss. 207, 209, 147 So. 481, 482 (1933), when it stated: [ W ]here t he def

endant or the def

endant’s witnesses are the o nly e y e witnesses to the hom icide, their version, i f reasonable, m ust be a ccepted as true, u nless substantially c ontradicted i n m aterial particulars by a credible witness or w i tnesses f

or the [ S]tate, or by the phy sical f acts or by the f

a cts of com mo n knowledge. However, the suprem e court later c l a r i f ied that “if t he def

endant o r the def

endant’s
ey ewitnesses’ testim ony s a tisf ies all t he elem ents o f m

urder or m anslaughter, the def endant

9would not be entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal, as their testim ony would b e the basis

f or a v alid conviction.” Barfield v. State , 22 So. 3d 1175, 1185 (¶33) (Miss. 2 009) (citation

om itted). S ince Jones adm itted that he shot and killed L a n d r u m, o nly m urder and

m anslaughter were possible convictions. Hence, the W e a thersby rule was not available f or invocation. Additionally , Jones has f ailed to raise this issue previously , a nd, accordingly , it is procedurally

barred. Hence, this issue is both procedurally barred and m eritless.
V. Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶23. In h is f

i nal assignm e nts of error, Jones alleges that the weight and suf f iciency of the evidence do not support his conviction. In considering a claim regarding the weight of the evidence, this Court “will only d isturb a v erdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelm ing weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush v
. State , 895 So. 2d 83 6 , 8 4 4 ( ¶ 1 8 ) ( Miss. 2005). Furtherm ore, with regard to the suf f i ciency o f the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, af ter viewing t he evidence in the light m ost f

avorable to t h e p r o s e cution, a ny rational trier of f act could have f

ound the essential e lem ents of t he crim e b ey ond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 8 4 3 ( ¶16) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979)). ¶24. Here, the jury w as privy t o substanti a l w i t n e s s t e s t i mo ny , including Jones’s own testim o ny , and phy s ical evidence regarding Landrum ’s f inancial c o n d i t i o n, Jones’s

a l l e gations o f abuse, and t he events leading up to, during, and af ter Landrum ’s mu r d e r . W h ile J ones’s def

ense of alleged abuse dif

f ers f rom the State’s theory that his m otive was f inancial, it was within the province of t he jury t o determ ine w hich story t hey believed and,

1 0thus, whether a deliberate-design m urder or heat-of

-passion m anslaughter conviction w as proper. See Nelson v
. State , 10 So. 3d 898, 905 ( ¶29) (Miss. 2 0 09) (holding that a jury determ ines t he w eight and credibility o f witness t estim ony )

. As such, we c annot f ind that either the weight o r the suf f iciency of t he evidence was so lacking as to warrant reversal. This issue is also without m erit. ¶25. T H E J UDGMENT OF THE JACKSON COUNTY C I R C U I T C O U R T O F CONVICTION O F DELIBERATE-DESIGN MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT O F CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COST S O F THIS APPEAL A RE ASSESSED TO JACKSON COUNTY. LEE, C.J., IRVING, P .J., BARNES, ROBERTS, C ARLTON, F AIR AND J A MES, JJ., CONCUR. MAX WELL, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN T H E RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. G RIFFIS, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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