SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2240-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

KWABENA OHENE-BONSU, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

__________________________

Submitted January 18, 2024 – Decided February 13, 2024 

Before Judges Currier and Vanek. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 20-01-0140.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Rochelle Mareka Amelia Watson, First 

Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on

the brief). 

Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for 

respondent (William P. Miller, Assistant Prosecutor, of

counsel and on the brief; Catherine A. Foddai, Legal 

Assistant, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2240-21

Defendant Kwabena Ohene-Bonsu appeals from a November 5, 2021 

conviction for fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license 

suspension in violation of N.J.S.A 2C:40-26(b). We reject defendant's 

assertions that his conviction should be vacated because it was predicated on an 

unconstitutional motor vehicle stop and affirm the trial court's December 10, 

2020 denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 

 We derive the material facts from the December 10, 2020 evidentiary 

hearing at which Fort Lee Police Officer Nicole Busanic and Palisades Interstate 

Parkway (PIP) Sergeant Gregory Kimbro testified. 

On October 15, 2019,1 around 7:58 a.m., Busanic was monitoring traffic 

conditions near the George Washington Bridge and observed defendant's vehicle 

"riding the shoulder" in what she believed was an attempt to avoid traffic. 

Busanic activated the patrol car's lights and initiated a motor vehicle stop. Upon 

approaching the vehicle, Busanic requested defendant's driver's license, 

registration, and insurance card. Defendant produced a New Jersey driver's 

license bearing the name Kwabena Osei-Bonsu. Busanic issued a summons to 

1

 We note that defendant's brief indicates the events in question took place on 

October 19, 2019. We use the date set forth in the judgment of conviction. 
3 A-2240-21

Kwabena Osei-Bonsu for improper passing and advised defendant he was free 

to leave. 

Approximately thirty minutes later, Kimbro was driving a marked police 

vehicle and observed defendant's car "drive over the solid line on the right 

shoulder and then continue to drive on the solid – over the solid line on the 

shoulder." He also saw that the license plate frame on the vehicle obstructed the 

writing on the plate. Kimbro slowed down to allow defendant's car to pass him 

in order to determine how many passengers were in his vehicle, activated his 

overhead lights to alert defendant to pull over, positioned his vehicle behind 

defendant's and then stopped. Although Kimbro's patrol vehicle was equipped 

with a dashboard camera, the system did not begin recording until Kimbro 

turned on the vehicle's patrol lights and ordered defendant to pull his car over to 

the side of the roadway. 

When both vehicles were stopped, Kimbro approached and asked 

defendant for his license, registration, and insurance card. While waiting for the 

documents, Kimbro detected an odor of suspected burnt marijuana emanating 

from inside the vehicle. Defendant handed Kimbro a driver's license bearing the 

name Kwabena Osei-Bonsu with a birthdate of March 7, 1989. According to 

Kimbro, when he asked defendant to step out of the vehicle, he "reeked of weed" 
4 A-2240-21

and had a work identification and two summonses from Fort Lee in his hand that 

he tried to give Kimbro. 

Based upon the smell of suspected marijuana, Kimbro searched the 

vehicle and found what he believed to be a mostly burnt, hand-rolled marijuana 

cigar as well as loose marijuana. The second PIP officer who arrived at the 

scene to provide back-up support observed a wallet in plain view on the front 

passenger-side seat which, upon examination, contained a second New Jersey 

driver's license, credit cards, a college identification, a blood center card, and a 

benefits card all bearing the name Kwabena Ohene-Bonsu. 

Defendant asserted the second driver's license found in the wallet 

belonged to his twin brother. However, the second driver's license had 

defendant's birthdate listed as January 1, 1991, making it impossible that the two 

licenses were those of twins, since the birthdate differed from the first driver's 

license produced. Additionally, Kimbro testified that the photograph on the 

license defendant first gave him did not resemble defendant "in any way, shape, 

or form" and the photograph on the second license looked like defendant. 

Kimbro gave defendant a PIP personal information form to fill out to 

accurately identify himself. After being handed the form and prior to 

completing it, defendant told Kimbro, "Officer, I f---ed up. Can I talk to you?" 
5 A-2240-21

The officer told defendant to continue filling the form out. Defendant wrote on 

the form that his last name was Kwabena, first name Bonsu and initially listed 

his date of birth as March 7, 1989, though he subsequently crossed out March 

and wrote January before orally reverting to March when he went over the form 

with Kimbro. 

When Kimbro entered the information defendant provided on the form 

into the computer for a records check, no record came back. However, when 

Kimbro called headquarters and provided the information on both driver's 

licenses, one for Kwabena Osei-Bonsu and the other for Kwabena Ohene-Bonsu, 

Kimbro was advised that defendant, Kwabena Ohene-Bonsu, had a suspended 

license for driving while intoxicated. Kimbro then placed defendant under 

arrest. 

 Under indictment No. 20-01-0140, defendant was charged with fourthdegree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension, N.J.S.A. 

2C:40-26(b), and fourth-degree obtaining the personal identifying information 

of another to assume that person's identity without authorization and with the 

purpose to avoid prosecution for a crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17(a)(4). Defendant 

also received summonses for violating PIP regulations 411.1(k) and 411.1(w), 

as well as possession of a controlled substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4); 
6 A-2240-21

possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2; and 

two counts of hindering apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4). 

 Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the charges, 

claiming the second motor vehicle stop was unlawful. After the December 10, 

2020 evidentiary hearing,2 the court ruled orally and found Kimbro "had a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that [defendant] had committed 

a motor vehicle offense and that the stop was proper." The court found Kimbro's 

testimony that defendant was "going into the shoulder and driving over the line 

into the shoulder and continuing to drive in the shoulder" was credible. The 

court further found although defendant's alleged driving infraction was not 

captured on Kimbro's dashboard recording system, the lack of video was legally 

irrelevant in light of Kimbro's testimony. 

The court concluded Kimbro's stop of the vehicle was lawful based upon 

Kimbro's observation of defendant's vehicle driving over the solid line onto the 

shoulder of the roadway. The court also determined the officers had probable 

cause to search defendant's vehicle based upon the smell of suspected marijuana 

emanating from the vehicle and from defendant's person when he exited the 

2

 By consent of the parties, the evidentiary hearing also addressed the 

voluntariness of defendant's statements during the motor vehicle stop. No 

appeal was filed as to the admissibility of defendant's statements. 
7 A-2240-21

vehicle. The trial court found that it was reasonable to search defendant's wallet, 

which was in plain view, to determine whether he had any controlled dangerous 

substances inside. Thus, the court entered a memorializing written order 

denying defendant's motion to suppress. 

At the conclusion of the November 3 and November 5, 2021 trial, the jury 

found defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle during a period of license 

suspension and not guilty of obtaining the personal identifying information of 

another. On February 3, 2022, the court sentenced defendant to the mandatory 

minimum term required by N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) of 180 days incarceration, in 

addition to required fines and penalties. 

 Defendant appeals, raising only one argument: 

THE MOTOR VEHICLE STOP WAS UNLAWFUL 

BECAUSE THE PIP REGULATION ON WHICH THE 

STOP WAS BASED IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 

OVERBROAD. 

 Our review of a trial court's decision regarding a motion to suppress is 

limited. State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021). "Generally, on appellate 

review, a trial court's factual findings in support of granting or denying a motion 

to suppress must be upheld when 'those findings are supported by sufficient 

credible evidence in the record.'" State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017) 

(quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)). 
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The reviewing court "ordinarily will not disturb the trial court's factual 

findings unless they are 'so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand 

intervention and correction.'" State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022) 

(quoting Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, 

legal conclusions drawn from those facts are reviewed de novo. State v. Radel, 

249 N.J. 469, 493 (2022). 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect the right of individuals from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, 

¶ 7. The reasonable suspicion required to make a stop under the Fourth 

Amendment "is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a 

showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, [but] the Fourth 

Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for 

making the stop." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Additionally, 

"[t]he officer must be able to articulate more than an 'inchoate and 

unparticularized suspicion or "hunch"' of criminal activity." Id. at 123-24 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). 

Similarly, the New Jersey Constitution requires "something less than the 

probable cause standard needed to support an arrest." State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 
9 A-2240-21

673, 678 (1988); State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279 (1998). The officer must 

"'point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' the intrusion." Thomas, 110 

N.J. at 678 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). This is an objective standard. Ibid. 

We are compelled to highlight at the outset that defendant does not dispute 

the lawfulness of the first stop accomplished by Busanic on October 15, 2019. 

Defendant was charged with driving with a suspended license in connection with 

both stops. Therefore, even if we were to find the second stop of defendant's 

vehicle by Kimbro did not comport with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 

conviction for driving with a suspended license would not be constitutionally 

infirm based upon the lawfulness of the first motor vehicle stop. 

Nonetheless, we turn to defendant's sole argument in his amended brief 

that the motion to suppress evidence obtained by Kimbro during the second stop 

should have been granted because PIP 411.1(k) is unconstitutionally overbroad. 

The State posits on appeal that defendant was stopped for and charged with 

violating both PIP 411.1(k) and (w). 411.1(k) provides that "no person shall 

cause or permit a motor vehicle to cross a solid longitudinal traffic line, except 

when directed to do so by an employee of the commission." Under 411.1(w), 

"no person shall drive a vehicle carelessly, or without due caution and 
10 A-2240-21

circumspection, in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger, a person 

or property." 

Defendant for the first time on appeal argues the trial court improperly 

failed to consider the constitutionality of the second stop through the lens of the 

overbroad application of PIP 411.1(k). We consider issues raised for the first 

time on appeal only if plain error is established. R. 2:10-2. Based upon our 

careful review of the proofs at the December 10, 2020 evidentiary hearing in 

tandem with prevailing law, we conclude defendant has failed to demonstrate 

plain error. 

The proofs at the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, 

at which defendant did not testify, established that Kimbro had reasonable and 

articulable suspicion that defendant had violated PIP regulation 411.1(k) and 

(w), with which he was charged. Among the trial court's factual findings were 

that Kimbro testified credibly as to his observation of defendant's vehicle 

driving over the solid line on the right shoulder of the roadway and continuing 

to drive on the shoulder until he moved back into a driving lane. We decline to 

disturb the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations as they 

are supported by the record at the evidentiary hearing. 
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Kimbro's testimony supports the conclusion that the stop was lawful since 

he had reasonable suspicion defendant had committed a traffic infraction based 

on his personal observation of defendant's vehicle crossing the solid yellow line 

and continuing to drive on the shoulder in violation of both PIP regulations. 

Observation of traffic violations can form the basis of reasonable and articulable 

suspicion to stop a vehicle. State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017). 

Defendant criticizes the lack of detail in Kimbro's testimony as to 

precisely how long the defendant was driving over the solid yellow line and 

argues that PIP regulation 411.1(k) was unconstitutionally applied to defendant 

based upon a "de minimis" violation. We conclude Kimbro's observation, 

deemed credible by the trial court, that defendant drove over the line and 

continued to do so constitutes sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion of 

a violation of PIP regulations 411.1(k) and (w). 

Ultimately, we reject defendant's argument that the stop was violative of 

the Fourth Amendment because the regulation which formed the basis for the 

stop was unconstitutionally overbroad. Kimbro's testimony establishes he had 

reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that defendant was in violation 

of PIP 411.1(k) and (w) when he initiated the motor vehicle stop. The stop was, 

therefore, consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the trial court 
12 A-2240-21

did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence garnered from 

the resulting search. 

Affirmed.