19472 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 65 / Tuesday, April 5, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2016–07–08 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–18453; Docket No. 

FAA–2016–5036; Directorate Identifier 

2015–NM–180–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective April 20, 2016. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

Model DC–9–83 (MD–83) airplane, fuselage 

number 2155 (variable number 80E718, serial 

number 53192), certificated in any category. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28: Fuel. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by fuel system 

reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent the potential 

of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, 

in combination with flammable fuel vapors, 

could result in fuel tank explosions and 

consequent loss of the airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Fuse Installation 

Within 60 months after the effective date 

of this AD, install fuel level float and 

pressure switch in-line fuses, and do 

applicable wiring changes, on the left, right, 

and center wing forward spars, forward 

auxiliary fuel tank, and aft auxiliary fuel 

tank. Do the actions in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Service Bulletin MD80–28–226, Revision 1, 

dated March 6, 2015. 

(h) Credit for Previous Actions 

This paragraph provides credit for the 

actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD, 

if those actions were performed before the 

effective date of this AD using Boeing Service 

Bulletin MD80–28–226, dated April 14, 2010, 

which is incorporated by reference in AD 

2011–01–16, Amendment 39–16573 (76 FR 

1993, January 12, 2011). 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the Los Angeles ACO, send 

it to the attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (j)(1) of this AD. Information may 

be emailed to: 9-ANM-LAACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair, 

modification, or alteration required by this 

AD if it is approved by the Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes Organization 

Designation Authorization (ODA) that has 

been authorized by the Manager, Los Angeles 

ACO, to make those findings. To be 

approved, the repair method, modification 

deviation, or alteration deviation must meet 

the certification basis of the airplane, and the 

approval must specifically refer to this AD. 

(j) Related Information 

(1) For more information about this AD, 

contact Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA, Los 

Angeles ACO, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 

Lakewood, CA 90712–4137; phone: 562–627– 

5262; fax: 562–627–5210; email: samuel.lee@

faa.gov. 

(2) Service information identified in this 

AD that is not incorporated by reference is 

available at the addresses specified in 

paragraphs (k)(3) and (k)(4) of this AD. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Boeing Service Bulletin MD80–28–226, 

Revision 1, dated March 6, 2015. 

(ii) Reserved. 

(3) For Boeing service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & 

Services Management, 3855 Lakewood 

Boulevard, MC D800–0019, Long Beach, CA 

90846–0001; telephone 206–544–5000, 

extension 2; fax 206–766–5683; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 

22, 2016. 

Michael Kaszycki, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–07230 Filed 4–4–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0187; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–NM–094–AD; Amendment 

39–18452; AD 2016–07–07] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model 757 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by 

fuel system reviews conducted by the 

manufacturer. This AD requires 

modifying the fuel quantity indication 

system (FQIS) wiring to prevent 

development of an ignition source 

inside the center fuel tank. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent ignition 

sources inside the center fuel tank, 

which, in combination with flammable 

fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank 

explosion and consequent loss of the 

airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective May 10, 

2016. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of May 10, 2016. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 65 / Tuesday, April 5, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 19473 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this final rule, contact 

Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 

Attention: Data & Services Management, 

P. O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, Seattle, WA 

98124–2207; telephone 206–544–5000, 

extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You 

may view this referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, WA. For information on 

the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. It is also 

available on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2012– 

0187. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2012– 

0187; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Docket Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jon 

Regimbal, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office 

(ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

WA 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6506; 

fax: 425–917–6590; email: 

jon.regimbal@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) to 

amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD 

that would apply to certain The Boeing 

Company Model 757 airplanes. The 

SNPRM published in the Federal 

Register on February 23, 2015 (80 FR 

9400) (‘‘the SNPRM’’). We preceded the 

SNPRM with a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) that published in 

the Federal Register on March 1, 2012 

(77 FR 12506). The NPRM proposed to 

require modifying the fuel quantity 

indication system (FQIS) wiring or fuel 

tank systems to prevent development of 

an ignition source inside the center fuel 

tank. The NPRM was prompted by fuel 

system reviews conducted by the 

manufacturer. The SNPRM proposed to 

revise the applicability, including 

alternative actions for cargo airplanes, 

and extend the compliance time. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent ignition 

sources inside the center fuel tank, 

which, in combination with flammable 

fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank 

explosions and consequent loss of the 

airplane. 

Record of Ex Parte Communication 

In preparation of AD actions such as 

NPRMs and immediately adopted rules, 

it is the practice of the FAA to obtain 

technical information and information 

on the operational and economic impact 

from design approval holders and 

aircraft operators. We discussed certain 

issues related to this final rule in a 

meeting held December 1, 2015, with 

Airlines for America (A4A) and other 

members of the aviation industry. This 

final rule addresses the issues discussed 

during that meeting that are relevant to 

this final rule. A summary of this 

meeting can be found in the rulemaking 

docket at http://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2012–0187. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the SNPRM and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: New 

Certification Requirements for 

Flammability Reduction Means (FRM) 

Unwarranted 

A4A, representing U.S. cargo 

operators, stated that the FAA intends to 

issue rulemaking requiring U.S. cargo 

operators to do additional fuel safety 

modifications to meet the latest aircraft 

certification requirements. 

We infer that A4A considers that 

requiring airplanes to meet the latest 

certification requirements is not 

warranted and that the SNPRM should 

therefore be withdrawn. We assume that 

by ‘‘the latest aircraft certification 

requirements,’’ A4A is referring to the 

relatively new requirements for FRM 

contained in 14 CFR part 125. 

We do not agree that the SNPRM 

should be withdrawn. This AD is not 

specifically intended to require that the 

affected airplanes meet the flammability 

requirements of 14 CFR part 125. It is 

instead intended to address an unsafe 

condition as required by 14 CFR part 39 

identified by the FAA under the policy 

contained in the FAA’s Special Federal 

Aviation Regulation No. 88 (14 CFR part 

21, SFAR 88) AD decision policy (Policy 

Memorandum ANM–100–2003–112–15) 

(http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_

Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/

DC94C3A46396950386256

D5E006AED11?OpenDocument&High

light=anm-100-2003-112-15), dated 

February 25, 2003, and the FAA’s 

Transport Airplane Risk Assessment 

Methodology (TARAM) (Policy 

Statement PS–ANM–25–05) (http://

rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_

Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/4E5AE8707164

674A862579510061F96B?Open

Document&Highlight=ps-anm-25-05). 

The FAA determined that installing 

FRM that meets 14 CFR part 125 would 

be one acceptable way to address the 

identified unsafe condition, so airplanes 

on which such a modification was 

incorporated were excluded from the 

applicability of the SNPRM. Other 

modifications identified later in this 

discussion are available as alternative 

actions to installing FRM for certain 

operations. We have determined it is 

necessary to proceed with issuance of 

this final rule. 

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: 

Intrusive, Expensive, Unnecessary 

A4A stated that Airbus and Boeing 

have indicated to them that the service 

bulletins for the wire separation 

modification that is part of the cargo 

airplane alternative actions will be 

intrusive and expensive and will not 

significantly improve safety. A4A stated 

that the safety analyses performed by 

the aircraft manufacturers do not 

classify the proposed modifications as 

safety critical. A4A noted that those 

service bulletins will not be issued as 

‘‘Alert’’ service bulletins. Additionally, 

A4A stated that foreign regulatory 

authorities, aircraft manufacturers, and 

airlines do not support that a safety 

issue remains. 

We infer that A4A is requesting that 

we withdraw the SNPRM because the 

airplane manufacturers have determined 

that an unsafe condition does not exist 

and the SNPRM will not significantly 

improve safety. We do not agree that the 

SNPRM should be withdrawn. We 

acknowledge that Boeing does not 

consider the condition associated with 

FQIS on these airplanes to be unsafe. 

We disagree with Boeing’s assertions, 

for the reasons discussed extensively in 

our response to Boeing’s similar 

comment in the SNPRM, under 

‘‘Request to Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012): Unjustified by 

Risk.’’ We have determined that it is 

necessary to proceed with issuance of 

this final rule. 


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Request To Withdraw SNPRM: Global 

Economic Disadvantage to U.S. 

Operators 

A4A does not expect that foreign 

regulators will require modification of 

affected foreign-registered aircraft, and 

stated that the competitive position of 

U.S. cargo operators will be harmed as 

a result. A4A stated that foreign 

regulatory agencies did not mandate 

retrofit of FRM for cargo airplanes, and 

therefore A4A did not expect that those 

authorities will mandate FQIS changes 

for their operators. A4A’s comment 

made reference to documents published 

by the European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), the Civil Aviation Authority of 

China (CAAC), and the Japan Civil 

Aviation Bureau (JCAB) as evidence that 

those agencies are not planning action 

to address any unsafe condition 

associated with FQIS. 

We infer that A4A is requesting that 

we withdraw the NPRM because other 

foreign regulatory agencies have 

determined that an unsafe condition 

does not exist with regard to FQIS as 

addressed by the proposed AD. 

We were unable to examine the EASA 

document A4A attempted to reference 

because the reference number was 

incomplete. We do not agree that the 

CAAC and JCAB documents indicate a 

position on the unsafe condition 

addressed by the SNPRM. Both of those 

documents simply state a requirement 

for existing type certificate holders to 

review fuel tank designs that is similar 

to the FAA’s SFAR 88. Those 

documents do not state positions on any 

unsafe conditions or AD proposals 

identified by the FAA, the CAAC, or the 

JCAB. 

A4A stated that the U.S. air cargo 

industry is currently in an extremely 

competitive global market. Additional 

lower deck capacity on passenger 

aircraft, especially through Middle East 

hubs, has significantly increased the 

need for cargo industry capacity. 

Several cargo carriers have ceased 

operations, and many others have 

parked some aircraft. U.S. carriers 

compete directly with foreign cargo 

operators. A4A stated that any 

additional costs on U.S. cargo operators 

that are not incurred by foreign 

operators will make U.S. operators less 

competitive and will lead to the loss of 

jobs in the U.S. 

We infer that A4A is requesting that 

we withdraw the proposal to require 

corrective action on cargo airplanes 

because non-U.S. cargo operators will 

not be required to make similar 

modifications, and the FAA AD action 

would harm the competitive position of 

U.S. cargo operators, resulting in the 

loss of U.S. jobs. 

We do not agree to withdraw the 

SNPRM for corrective action on cargo 

airplanes. As part of the AD 

development process, the FAA works 

with the affected manufacturer to 

develop a cost estimate for the 

corrective actions in a proposed AD. 

The FAA considers all possible 

corrective actions proposed by a 

manufacturer in an attempt to minimize 

the cost burden on operators. In some 

cases the FAA even makes a specific 

suggestion to a manufacturer for a less 

costly alternative. In the end, the 

manufacturer is responsible for 

development of an appropriate 

corrective action. 

While the FAA attempts to minimize 

the costs associated with a required 

corrective action for a U.S. product, 

ultimately the FAA has the 

responsibility as the civil aviation 

authority (CAA) of the state of design to 

address unsafe conditions through AD 

action. Other CAAs overseeing foreign 

operators will typically apply the FAA 

AD or develop a similar AD for U.S. 

products operated under each CAA’s 

jurisdiction. Other CAAs rely heavily on 

the knowledge and judgment of the 

CAA of the state of design to identify 

unsafe conditions and appropriate 

corrective actions for products of that 

state. The FAA is not aware at this time 

of any affected CAAs that do not plan 

to issue a corresponding mandate to 

address the unsafe condition associated 

with FQIS identified in the proposed 

AD. Even if such a situation occurs, the 

FAA would not use a foreign CAA’s 

position as a justification for not 

addressing an unsafe condition 

identified by the FAA. While we 

acknowledge such a situation could 

harm the competitive position of a U.S. 

operator, we are still obligated by U.S. 

law and by international treaties to 

address the identified unsafe condition. 

We have determined that it is necessary 

to proceed with issuance of this final 

rule. 

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: Costs of 

Compliance 

A4A stated that the proposed 

modifications are very costly, and noted 

that United Parcel Service (UPS) has 

estimated a total cost of $16 million for 

its fleet of four aircraft types that are 

potentially affected by the SNPRM and 

other similar planned ADs. A4A pointed 

out that U.S. cargo operators have 

already spent tens of millions of dollars 

on fuel tank safety improvements. UPS 

alone has spent $35.5 million to comply 

with 51 SFAR 88 ADs on the four fleet 

types potentially affected. A4A noted 

that cargo operators already have 

recurring expenses for Enhanced 

Airworthiness Program for Airplane 

Safety (EAPAS) maintenance program 

tasks that continue to help ensure fuel 

tank safety. A4A added that cargo 

operators have already invested in 

improved and more expensive fuel tank 

component repair and overhaul 

processes. 

We infer that A4A is requesting that 

we withdraw the SNPRM because the 

costs of addressing previously identified 

fuel tank unsafe conditions has been 

high, and that the additional cost to 

address the FQIS latent-plus-one issue 

will also be high, with very little safety 

benefit. 

We do not agree to withdraw the 

SNPRM. We acknowledge that the total 

industry cost to address other fuel tank 

system unsafe conditions has been high. 

The SFAR 88 studies for Boeing 

airplanes identified several basic design 

deficiencies in lightning protection that 

could cause an ignition source in a fuel 

tank in the event of a lightning strike, 

and several issues with fuel pump 

systems and fuel valve systems where a 

single failure could result in an ignition 

source in a fuel tank. Fuel pump issues 

are suspected to have caused several 

fuel tank ignition events, so these issues 

were considered to be the highest 

priority for the development of 

corrective actions and related AD 

actions. The FAA considers the cost of 

addressing those issues to be clearly 

justified. Deficiencies in maintenance 

programs and inappropriate component 

repair actions that could lead to 

inadvertent significant increases in the 

risk of an ignition source in a fuel tank 

were also identified, and the cost of 

airworthiness limitations to address 

those issues is also considered to be 

justified. 

The SFAR 88 studies and the FAA’s 

subsequent decision-making process 

identified FQIS vulnerability of Model 

707, 727, 737, 747, 757, 767, and 777 

airplanes as an unsafe condition 

requiring corrective action. While the 

more recently designed of these airplane 

models have significant improvements 

in FQIS design details, they all have 

similar FQIS design architecture with 

respect to the identified failure scenario. 

That architecture is vulnerable to a 

combination of a latent in-tank wiring 

failure and a subsequent wiring failure 

outside of the tank that connects a high 

power source to the FQIS tank circuit 

creating an ignition source in a fuel 

tank. This failure combination was 

determined by the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to 

have been the most likely cause of the 

Model 747 fuel tank explosion accident 


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off Long Island in 1996. NTSB Safety 

Recommendation A–98–038 (http://

www.ntsb.gov/about/employment/_

layouts/ntsb.recsearch/

Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-98-038) 

recommended that the FAA require that 

FQIS wiring on all airplane models that 

have similar wiring installations be 

separated and shielded to the maximum 

extent possible. 

The FAA issued AD 98–20–40, 

Amendment 39–10808 (63 FR 52147, 

September 30, 1998); and AD 99–03–04, 

Amendment 39–11018 (64 FR 4959, 

February 2, 1999); to address this issue 

on early Model 747 and Model 737 

airplanes, respectively, which used the 

same FQIS as the accident airplane. The 

FAA subsequently (in 2003) determined 

that this same architectural 

vulnerability was an unsafe condition 

for high flammability fuel tanks on all 

Boeing jet transports existing at that 

time. This determination was consistent 

with the published FAA policy for 

SFAR 88 corrective actions and with the 

current FAA TARAM guidelines for 

identification of unsafe conditions on 

transport airplanes. 

The FAA deferred acting on this 

unsafe condition until after the FRM 

rulemaking activity was complete 

because introduction of FRM had the 

potential to change the classification of 

many of the affected fuel tanks to low 

flammability. When the final decision 

for the FRM rule did not include a 

requirement for FRM on all airplanes, 

the FAA resumed the planned actions to 

address the identified FQIS unsafe 

condition on the airplanes that were not 

required to have FRM. 

The FAA considers the safety benefit 

of the SNPRM to be significant for both 

passenger and cargo airplanes. We 

estimate that the installation of 

compliant FRM will provide 

approximately an order of magnitude 

reduction in the risk of a fuel tank 

explosion on anticipated flights with a 

latent failure of an FQIS circuit in the 

center fuel tank. We estimate that the 

periodic BITE checks in the cargo 

airplane alternative actions will result 

in a 75- to 90-percent reduction in the 

number of flights that operate with a 

latent in-tank failure that makes them 

vulnerable to a single additional wiring 

hot short failure creating an ignition 

source in the center fuel tank. We 

estimate that the proposed wire 

separation modification in the cargo 

airplane alternative actions will reduce 

the risk of a hot short (and a resultant 

ignition source) on flights that have a 

latent in-tank failure by 50 to 75 

percent. This estimated reduction in the 

risk on anticipated flights with a latent 

in-tank failure is sufficient to reduce the 

risk below the FAA’s TARAM 

individual flight risk guideline level for 

urgent action. As discussed below in 

our response to ‘‘Request to Remove 

Alternative Actions for Cargo 

Airplanes,’’ we determined that further 

changes to further reduce the risk below 

the TARAM individual flight risk 

corrective action guideline of 1 in 10 

million per flight hour would 

significantly increase the costs of 

compliance and are not necessary to 

adequately address the unsafe 

condition. We have determined that it is 

necessary to proceed with issuance of 

this final rule. 

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: Unsafe 

Condition Addressed by Previous 

Requirements 

A4A stated that there have been no 

fuel tank ignition incidents since the 

previously issued fuel tank safety ADs 

were implemented. A4A stated that this 

provides direct evidence that FAA 

projections for additional incidents 

were overstated and that SFAR 88 

changes have worked. They further 

stated that no unsafe condition exists, 

asserting that service experience has 

shown that the fuel tank safety issues 

have been sufficiently addressed with 

significant previous modifications, 

recurring maintenance, controlled 

overhaul processes and repair processes, 

and maintenance program tasks. 

We infer that A4A is requesting that 

we withdraw the SNPRM because 

previously required actions have 

adequately addressed the need for 

improvements in fuel tank safety. 

We do not agree to withdraw the 

SNPRM. Until recently, fuel tank 

ignition incidents on U.S.- and 

European-manufactured transport 

airplanes have occurred roughly once 

every five to six years, with the most 

recent event in May 2006 (a Model 727 

airplane in India in 2006, a Model 737 

airplane in Thailand in 2001, a Model 

747 airplane near New York in 1996, 

and a Model 737 airplane in the 

Philippines in 1991). It has now been 

ten years since the most recent event. 

We agree that a significant 

improvement in fuel tank safety has 

occurred due to actions that have 

reduced the potential for ignition 

sources associated with single failures 

of fuel pumps and fuel pump power 

systems. That improvement alone 

would be expected to increase the 

average interval between fuel tank 

ignition incidents to more than ten 

years. However, the fact that no 

incidents have occurred since 2006 is 

not statistically significant, and is not 

sufficient to predict that additional 

events will not occur. In addition, even 

assuming the average interval between 

events is significantly improved to the 

extent that the overall fleet risk is 

considered acceptable, we would still 

address unsafe conditions identified 

based on the published FAA policy for 

SFAR 88 corrective actions and the 

current FAA guidelines for 

identification of unsafe conditions on 

transport airplanes when the individual 

flight safety risk exceeds our guidelines, 

as in this case. We have determined that 

it is necessary to proceed with issuance 

of this final rule. 

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: All 

Related NTSB Safety Recommendations 

Closed 

A4A stated that the NTSB previously 

issued the following safety 

recommendations related to 

flammability, wiring, and wiring 

maintenance: 

• A–96–174—Preclude flammable 

fuel air mixtures in fuel tanks. Closed— 

Acceptable Action: FRM Rulemaking. 

Safety Recommendation A–96–174 can 

be found at http://www.ntsb.gov/_

layouts/ntsb.recsearch/

Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-96-174. 

• A–98–038—Separation of FQIS 

wires to the max extent possible. 

Closed—Acceptable Action: SFAR 88 

Rulemaking. 

• A–98–039—Require surge 

protection systems for FQIS wires. 

Closed—Acceptable Action: SFAR 88 

Rulemaking. Safety Recommendation 

A–98–039 can be found at http://

www.ntsb.gov/about/employment/_

layouts/ntsb.recsearch/

Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-98-039. 

• A–00–106—Assess wiring 

criticality and separation. Closed— 

Acceptable Action: EAPAS/FTS 

Rulemaking. Safety Recommendation 

A–00–106 can be found at (http://

www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/

Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-00-106. 

• A–00–108—Repair of potentially 

unsafe wiring conditions. Closed— 

Acceptable Action: EAPAS/FTS 

Rulemaking. Safety Recommendation 

A–00–108 can be found at http://

www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/

Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-00-108. 

A4A noted that all applicable NTSB 

safety recommendations are closed with 

acceptable actions taken by the FAA. 

A4A stated that none of the NTSB safety 

recommendations called for the FAA to 

address wire separation for the FQIS. 

We infer that A4A is requesting that 

we withdraw the SNPRM because the 

NTSB considers the overall fuel tank 

safety issue to be adequately addressed 

by previous actions. 

We do not agree to withdraw the 

SNPRM. A4A appears to have 


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misunderstood NTSB Safety 

Recommendation A–98–038 and the 

NTSB’s acceptance of the FAA’s 

response to that safety recommendation. 

NTSB Safety Recommendation A–98– 

038 specifically called for the FAA to 

require, in ‘‘airplanes with fuel quantity 

indication system (FQIS) wire 

installations that are co-routed with 

wires that may be powered, the physical 

separation and electrical shielding of 

FQIS wires to the maximum extent 

possible.’’ The NTSB classified that 

recommendation as ‘‘closed, acceptable 

action’’ after the FAA stated that it 

would issue ADs to mandate FQIS 

protection on the high flammability 

tanks of aircraft on which the 

installation of FRM is not required by 

the Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction 

(FTFR) rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 

2008). The communications between the 

NTSB and the FAA on Safety 

Recommendation A–98–038 can be 

viewed at http://www.ntsb.gov/about/

employment/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/

Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-98-038. 

We have determined that it is necessary 

to proceed with issuance of this final 

rule. 

Request To Withdraw SNPRM: 

Unjustified by Risk Assessment 

A4A stated that the original 

equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and 

other regulatory agencies are having 

difficulty calculating the true safety 

value associated with the proposed 

FQIS AD. A4A stated that its position is 

that all the unsafe conditions have been 

mitigated, operationally and across 

industry, and all previous rules have 

been effective. A4A added that, in light 

of the operators’ financial and technical 

investment to mitigate the unsafe 

conditions in all areas, the SNPRM is 

difficult to understand technically 

relative to the amount of mitigation that 

would be required, in light of a true risk 

assessment. A4A stated that the FAA is 

alone in believing that a safety issue still 

exists. 

We infer that A4A is requesting that 

we withdraw the SNPRM because it has 

not been justified by a risk assessment 

and because previously required actions 

have adequately addressed the need for 

improvements in fuel tank safety. 

We do not agree to withdraw the 

SNPRM. We provided a detailed 

response to similar comments and 

described the FAA’s risk assessment in 

the SNPRM in the sections ‘‘Request to 

Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 

1, 2012): Unjustified by Risk,’’ ‘‘Request 

to Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012): Not Supported by Risk 

Analysis,’’ and ‘‘Request to Withdraw 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012): No 

Unsafe Condition,’’ as well as in earlier 

paragraphs in this discussion. We have 

determined that it is necessary to 

proceed with issuance of this final rule. 

Request To Remove Requirement for 

Corrective Actions for Cargo Airplanes 

A4A stated that the alternative wire 

separation modifications allowed for 

cargo airplanes would not meet the 

‘‘new design criteria.’’ (We assume that 

A4A is referring to the wire separation 

requirements for repairs and 

modifications that are included in the 

fuel tank system airworthiness 

limitations required by recent ADs for 

the various Boeing models.) A4A stated 

that in the Model 757 service bulletin 

under development by Boeing, only 

about ‘‘5 percent’’ of FQIS wires can be 

separated from other systems by a 

distance of 2 inches, and that the 

majority of the wire bundle relocation 

will achieve only up to 0.5-inch 

spacing. A4A stated that because the 

wire separation requirements are not 

met, partial exemptions from the 

requirements of 14 CFR 25.981 are 

required to allow approval of these wire 

separation service bulletins. Based on 

the reduced separation distance and the 

need for exemptions, A4A considered 

the proposed wire separation 

requirements included in the cargo 

airplane alternative actions to be a 

symbolic gesture with no significant 

safety benefit, while at the same time 

being expensive and intrusive. A4A 

further stated that operators have 

reviewed the associated draft service 

bulletins and are concerned about the 

lack of a design target or adequate 

rationale for the actions proposed by the 

FAA. Finally, A4A stated that Boeing 

had stated to them that Boeing does not 

understand what design changes the 

FAA wants or why the FAA considers 

there to be a safety issue. 

We infer that A4A is requesting that 

we remove the alternative actions for a 

wire separation modification on cargo 

airplanes because A4A believes the wire 

separation actions associated with the 

cargo airplane alternative actions in the 

SNPRM would have no significant 

safety benefit since inadequate physical 

wire separation is provided. 

We do not agree to withdraw the 

SNPRM. A4A appears to have 

misunderstood the intent of the FQIS 

wire separation requirements added to 

the airworthiness limitations as a 

critical design configuration control 

limitation (CDCCL). The FQIS wire 

separation CDCCL provides a set of wire 

separation requirements that are 

intended to be used as a default when 

modifying or repairing an aircraft to 

ensure that the intended level of 

separation of the FQIS wiring from other 

wiring is maintained. The Model 757 

CDCCL (28–AWL–05) contains a simple 

2-inch separation requirement as 

originally proposed by Boeing. While 

Boeing has not proposed changes to the 

Model 757 FQIS wire separation 

CDCCL, the corresponding CDCCL (28– 

AWL–05) for Model 737–700, –800, and 

–900 airplanes has numerous additional 

provisions approving other design 

approaches (typically combinations of 

wire sleeving and smaller separation 

distances) that Boeing or operators 

proposed and that the FAA approved. 

Each time wire separation configuration 

options were approved for Boeing, 

alternative CDCCL wording was 

approved as an AMOC with the AD that 

required the addition of the CDCCLs to 

operators’ maintenance programs. A 

similar AMOC will be granted for the 

approved modifications to the FQIS for 

Model 757 airplanes. 

A4A also appears to have 

misunderstood the reason that 

exemptions would be required to allow 

approval of the cargo airplane wire 

separation modification. Lack of a full 2 

inches of wire separation in all of the 

changed areas is not the reason an 

exemption is required. Rather, an 

exemption is required because the 

overall FQIS will not comply with 14 

CFR 25.901(c) and 25.981(a)(3) due to 

the existing noncompliance of the 

unchanged areas of the system. Because 

those rules require a system-level safety 

analysis, we cannot find the changes to 

the system compliant if a 

noncompliance exists in the unchanged 

areas of the system. 

The proposed Boeing design uses 

sleeving over the wire bundles and 

extensive retention features to provide a 

level of wire protection similar to the 

protection that would be provided by a 

greater separation distance. The design 

measures are consistent with those 

previously approved by the FAA in the 

Model 737–700/800/900 CDCCL 

mentioned previously. 

We consider the safety benefit 

provided by the proposed cargo airplane 

alternative actions to be significant. The 

unsafe condition determination and the 

rationale and estimated safety benefit 

for the cargo airplane alternative actions 

were discussed extensively with Boeing 

in several meetings, and we consider 

that Boeing fully understands the FAA’s 

position on each of those aspects of the 

proposal. The proposed requirement for 

a periodic check through the built-in 

test equipment (BITE) of the FQIS 

processor is intended to identify and 

result in corrective actions for the 

detectable fault conditions in the FQIS 

in-tank wiring. We estimated that this 


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proposed requirement will result in a 

75- to 90-percent reduction in the 

number of flights that operate with a 

latent in-tank failure that makes them 

vulnerable to a single additional wiring 

hot short failure creating an ignition 

source in the center fuel tank. The 

proposed FQIS wire separation 

modification is intended to reduce the 

risk of a hot short of power onto center 

tank FQIS circuits by physically 

isolating the portions of those circuits 

that are outside of the tank in the areas 

where those circuits are most vulnerable 

to damage and most easily separated. 

We did not propose to require 

modifications of the wiring in the 

electrical racks or in the cockpit areas 

because of the difficulty involved in 

accessing and achieving additional wire 

separation in those areas, and in 

recognition that the FQIS processor 

provides some beneficial circuit 

isolation to protect against hot shorts in 

those areas. We estimated that the 

proposed wire separation modification 

would reduce the risk of a hot short on 

flights that have a latent in-tank failure 

by 50 to 75 percent. Those estimates 

were reviewed with Boeing, and Boeing 

did not disagree with those estimates. 

We have determined it is necessary to 

proceed with issuance of this final rule. 

Request To Remove Alternative Actions 

for Cargo Airplanes 

Colin Edwards and an anonymous 

commenter made no explicit request to 

change the SNPRM, but objected to the 

proposed addition of alternative actions 

for cargo airplanes that would allow a 

design change that does not fully 

comply with the fuel tank system safety 

requirements of 14 CFR part 25 (14 CFR 

25.981(a)(3)) to be used to address the 

unsafe condition. The commenters 

stated that it should not be acceptable 

to allow greater risk to exist on cargo 

airplanes than that allowed for 

passenger airplanes. 

We infer that the commenters propose 

the elimination of the proposed 

alternative corrective action for cargo 

airplanes. We disagree with this request. 

We determined that an acceptable level 

of safety would be provided for the 

affected cargo airplanes, and explained 

our position in depth in response to 

similar comments in the SNPRM. 

However, we will attempt to address the 

commenters’ concerns by expanding on 

the explanation of our safety 

determination. 

When assessing potential unsafe 

conditions on transport airplanes to 

determine if corrective action is 

necessary, the FAA assesses the total 

risk to the affected fleet of airplanes 

exposed to the condition, and assesses 

the level of risk on individual airplanes 

within the fleet. The FAA’s guidelines 

for assessing the total fleet risk related 

to the unsafe condition are slightly 

different for cargo and passenger 

airplanes due to operational usage 

differences. In this case, however, the 

total risk to the affected fleet is lower 

than the unsafe condition risk 

guidelines for both passenger and cargo 

airplanes. Total fleet risk is therefore not 

the risk assessment element driving the 

proposed actions. 

When assessing the level of risk on 

individual airplanes, the FAA considers 

the risk on the worst reasonably 

anticipated flights to ensure that the 

level of safety on each flight is 

acceptable. Our individual flight risk 

unsafe condition threshold is 1 × 10E– 

7 events (or a 1-in-10-million chance of 

a catastrophic event) per flight hour. In 

addition, the worst reasonably 

anticipated flights should not be 

vulnerable to a single failure that causes 

a fatal event, regardless of probability. 

There is no difference in the individual 

flight risk unsafe condition criteria for 

cargo airplanes and passenger airplanes 

because the operational differences are 

not considered in this risk calculation. 

In this case, we are concerned about 

a latent failure inside the fuel tank that, 

in combination with an electrical short 

circuit in FQIS wiring outside of the 

tank, could result in an electrical spark 

or arc in the tank. An electrical arc or 

spark in the fuel tank combined with 

flammable conditions in the fuel tank 

could result in a fuel tank explosion. 

The worst reasonably anticipated flights 

in this case are those that have both the 

latent failure and flammable conditions 

in the tank. The manufacturer’s analysis 

indicates that a significant number of 

flights would be expected to occur with 

these conditions in the life of the 

affected fleet if no corrective action is 

taken. For those flights, one additional 

failure—a short circuit between FQIS 

wiring and power wiring—could cause 

a fuel tank explosion. Also, the 

probability of an explosion is between 1 

in a million and 1 in 10 million, per 

flight hour, which slightly exceeds the 

numerical unsafe condition guideline 

for individual flight risk discussed 

above. 

An issue that violates one or more of 

the individual flight risk guidelines 

would normally require corrective 

action that reduces the risk to a level 

that is below the unsafe condition 

guidelines. However, in this case the 

FAA acknowledged that the cost of 

corrective action is high, and that the 

available corrective action (fuel tank 

FRM systems) would reduce, but not 

eliminate, the number of expected 

flights with the condition we are 

concerned about (a latent failure plus 

flammable conditions inside the tank). 

The alternative actions for cargo 

airplanes would also reduce the number 

of expected flights with the condition 

we are concerned about, but to a lesser 

degree. The FAA has determined that 

allowing a moderate number of cargo 

flights per year (on average) with this 

condition provides an acceptable level 

of safety. As part of making this 

determination, we noted that the level 

of risk on the worst reasonably 

anticipated flights is similar to the level 

of risk for private and commercial pilots 

flying normal category airplanes. 

We have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Require FQIS Modification 

in all Fuel Tanks 

National Air Traffic Controllers 

Association (NATCA) requested that we 

require changes to the FQIS to address 

the potential ‘‘latent-plus-one-failure 

scenario’’ in all fuel tanks, not just in 

the center fuel tank. 

NATCA stated that the failure 

condition that is the subject of the 

SNPRM should be classified as a 

‘‘known’’ latent-plus-one-failure 

condition when applying the FAA 

Transport Airplane Directorate Policy 

Memorandum 2003–112–15, ‘‘SFAR 

88—Mandatory Action Decision 

Criteria,’’ dated February 25, 2015 

(http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_

Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/

dc94c3a46396950386256d5e006aed11/

$FILE/Feb2503.pdf). NATCA stated that 

this would have the effect of classifying 

the failure condition as an unsafe 

condition requiring corrective action in 

all affected fuel tanks regardless of 

flammability level. 

NATCA considered the combination 

of a latent in-tank failure with electrical 

energy transmitted into the fuel tank via 

the FQIS wiring due to an additional 

failure outside of the tank to be a 

‘‘known’’ failure condition because that 

failure condition was considered to be 

the most likely cause of the TWA Flight 

800 Model 747 accident. (That accident 

occurred on July 17, 1996, shortly after 

takeoff from John F. Kennedy 

International Airport in Jamaica, New 

York.) NATCA concluded that because 

the Model 757 FQIS is similar to that of 

the Model 747, both models are 

vulnerable to the same failure scenario. 

NATCA cited the unsafe condition 

statement for the SNPRM as evidence 

that the scenario should be classified as 

‘‘known.’’ NATCA pointed out that the 

FAA issued AD 98–20–40, Amendment 

39–10808 (63 FR 52147, September 30, 

1998), to address this issue for Model 


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747 airplanes, and pointed out that the 

FAA TARAM Handbook specifically 

states that Policy Memorandum 2003– 

112–15 should be followed in 

determining whether corrective action 

should be required for fuel tank safety 

concerns identified through SFAR 88. 

We disagree with the request to 

require modification of the FQIS in all 

fuel tanks. We have determined that, 

under the policy contained in the policy 

memorandum, this failure condition for 

the Model 757 FQIS should not be 

classified as ‘‘known.’’ The memo 

defines ‘‘known’’ failure conditions as 

follows: 

[T]hose conditions which have occurred 

in-service and are likely to occur on other 

products of the same or similar type design, 

and conditions which have been subject to 

mandatory corrective actions, following inservice findings, on products with a similar 

design of fuel system. 

We agree that the Model 757 FQIS has 

the same high-level system architecture 

and operating principles as those of the 

Model 747 FQIS, resulting in 

vulnerability to the same theoretical 

latent-plus-one-failure scenario. There 

are, however, significant differences in 

the details of the Model 757 FQIS 

design that reduce the likelihood of the 

individual contributing failures. Those 

differences include the following: 

• Improved FQIS probe terminal 

connector block design; 

• The use of wiring that is not silver 

plated and therefore does not create 

silver sulfide deposits on the terminal 

blocks; 

• The use of improved wire types and 

wiring installation practices outside of 

the fuel tanks; and 

• The use of a system processor that 

provides significant isolation of the tank 

probe circuits from the indication and 

power circuits of the FQIS. 

We therefore did not consider that the 

FQIS designs for the Model 747 and 

Model 757 were so similar that the 

Model 757 FQIS design should be 

considered to have a ‘‘known’’ latentplus-one-failure condition vulnerability 

as defined in the policy memorandum. 

The provisions in the above definition 

for classifying a failure condition as 

‘‘known’’ based on the existence of a 

similar design were intended to allow 

the FAA to evaluate the degree of 

similarity in the design, and to make 

discretionary judgments in determining 

that a failure condition that is believed 

to have occurred (and/or was addressed 

by AD action) in one specific design 

should be classified as ‘‘known’’ in a 

different specific design. The 

application of that discretion would be 

expected to involve evaluation of design 

detail differences and the effects of 

those differences on failure modes and 

failure probability. Based on our 

determination that sufficient design 

differences exist between the Model 757 

and Model 747 FQIS designs to not 

classify the Model 757 FQIS latent-plusone-failure condition as ‘‘known,’’ 

under the direction contained in the 

policy memorandum, this AD addresses 

that failure condition vulnerability only 

for the center fuel tank, which is the 

only high-flammability fuel tank on the 

Model 757. 

NATCA expressed a concern that the 

FAA did not understand NATCA’s 

previous comment on this matter, and 

stated that the FAA had not considered 

the requirements of ‘‘Element 2.a)’’ from 

Policy Memorandum 2003–112–15, 

dated February 25, 2015. In fact, we had 

addressed the requirements of ‘‘Element 

2.a)’’ in the response to the comments 

under ‘‘Request to Revise Proposed AD 

Requirements to Apply to All Fuel 

Tanks’’ of the SNPRM. The FAA 

understood the earlier comment and 

understands the more recent comment, 

but has reached a different conclusion 

about the classification of the failure 

condition under the guidance in the 

policy memorandum. We classified the 

Model 757 FQIS latent-plus-one-failure 

scenario as a theoretical vulnerability 

rather than a ‘‘known’’ combination of 

failures. Policy Memorandum 2003– 

112–15, dated February 25, 2015, calls 

for corrective action for theoretical 

latent-plus-one-failure conditions only 

in high-flammability fuel tanks. 

Contrary to the assertion in the NATCA 

comment, the acknowledgement of the 

scenario as theoretically possible and 

the consequent AD proposal to address 

the scenario in the high flammability 

center fuel tank do not automatically 

drive classification of the failure as 

‘‘known’’ under the policy 

memorandum. We have not changed 

this final rule regarding this issue. 

Request To Address Unsafe Condition 

in All Fuel Tanks, With or Without 

FRM 

NATCA requested that we require 

design changes to the FQIS to address 

the potential latent-plus-one-failure 

scenario in all fuel tanks of all Model 

757 airplanes, regardless whether FRM 

is installed. NATCA stated that the 

minimum performance standards for 

FRM contained in 14 CFR part 25 allow 

flights to occur with flammable 

conditions in tanks that are required to 

incorporate FRM due to system 

performance as designed and due to 

system failures. In addition, timelimited dispatch with an inoperative 

FRM has been allowed in the master 

minimum equipment list (MMEL) for 

affected airplanes. Flights with 

flammable conditions and a pre-existing 

latent in-tank FQIS failure are 

reasonably anticipated to occur in the 

life of the affected fleet. For those 

flights, a fuel tank explosion could 

occur due to a single additional failure 

(hot short of power onto FQIS tank 

probe circuits). NATCA notes that four 

fuel tank explosion events have 

occurred in fuel tanks that are classified 

as low flammability. 

We disagree with the request. We 

have determined that the proposed 

corrective actions (either installation of 

FRM or specific FQIS changes limited to 

the center fuel tank) represent a 

reasonable, cost-effective method to 

achieve a meaningful reduction in the 

risk of an accident due to potential FQIS 

fuel tank ignition sources. 

The service history of conventional 

unheated aluminum wing tanks that 

contain Jet A fuel indicates that there 

would be little safety benefit by further 

limiting the flammability of these tanks. 

While NATCA expressed concern 

because fuel vapor ignition events have 

occurred in wing fuel tanks, NATCA did 

not differentiate service experience 

based on fuel type used (JP–4 versus Jet 

A fuel). 

Our review of the nine wing tank 

ignition events we know to have 

occurred on turbine-engine-powered 

transport airplanes shows that five of 

the nine airplanes were using JP–4 fuel, 

and this type of fuel is no longer used 

except on an emergency basis in the 

U.S. Use of JP–4 fuel in other parts of 

the world is also relatively rare, and is 

normally limited to areas with 

extremely cold airport conditions. Three 

of the remaining four events were 

caused by external heating of the wing 

by engine fires, and the remaining event 

occurred on the ground during 

maintenance. To date, there have been 

no fuel tank explosions in conventional 

unheated aluminum wing tanks fueled 

with Jet A fuel that have resulted in any 

fatalities. 

The flammability characteristics of 

JP–4 fuel results in the fuel tanks being 

flammable a significant portion of the 

time when an airplane is in flight. This 

is not the case for wing tanks containing 

Jet A fuel. Therefore, based on the low 

fleet average flammability of the Model 

757 wing fuel tanks and on the specific 

features of the Model 757 FQIS design, 

we have determined that the latent-plusone vulnerability that exists in the 

Model 757 wing tank FQIS is not an 

unsafe condition requiring corrective 

action on in-service airplanes. 

We have not changed this final rule 

regarding this issue. 


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Request To Require Design Changes for 

Full Compliance with Airworthiness 

Regulations 

NATCA requested that we require 

design changes to the FQIS that would 

bring that system into full compliance 

with the applicable airworthiness 

regulations. NATCA stated that the 

failure condition that is the subject of 

the SNPRM represents a noncompliance 

of the type design with the requirements 

of 14 CFR 25.901(c) and 25.981(a)(3), 

even for low-flammability fuel tanks. 

NATCA stated that the proposed 

corrective actions would not bring the 

airplane design into compliance with 

those regulations ‘‘as required by SFAR 

88 and SFAR 88 Policy published by the 

FAA as Mandatory Corrective Action 

criteria in FAA Policy Statement No. 

2003–112–15.’’ NATCA added that the 

proposed alternative corrective actions 

for cargo airplanes do not comply with 

those regulations because the alternative 

actions do not fully eliminate the 

potential for the failure condition that is 

addressed by the SNPRM. 

We disagree with the request. SFAR 

88, as modified by Amendment 21–82, 

and Policy Memorandum 2003–112–15, 

dated February 25, 2003, do not 

specifically require noncompliant 

designs discovered through SFAR 88 to 

be brought into compliance. As 

originally issued, SFAR 88 required 

design approval holders to develop the 

corrective actions necessary to bring any 

noncompliant design fuel system 

features into compliance. However, 

SFAR 88 did not dictate that the FAA 

require a given corrective action. In fact, 

the FAA later published Amendment 

21–82, ‘‘Equivalent Safety Provisions for 

Fuel Tank System Fault Tolerance 

Evaluations (SFAR 88),’’ to clarify that 

the FAA would accept SFAR 88 reports 

that do not provide corrective actions 

that directly comply with 14 CFR 

25.981(a)(3) provided any aspects that 

do not comply are compensated for by 

factors that provide an equivalent level 

of safety. The FAA used the 

introduction of flammability reduction 

in place of corrective action for a 

specific ignition source as an example of 

a potentially acceptable compensating 

factor. 

Also, while the normal certification 

process requires proposed design 

changes to be compliant with the 

applicable regulations, applicants are 

permitted under 14 CFR part 11 to 

petition for an exemption from any FAA 

regulatory requirement. Policy 

Memorandum 2003–112–15, dated 

February 25, 2003, did not state that the 

FAA would not consider a petition for 

exemption from an airworthiness 

requirement for a proposed design 

intended as corrective action for an 

SFAR 88 issue. We therefore consider 

that the applicant may petition for an 

exemption and propose a noncompliant 

design change, and the FAA may 

approve and issue an AD to require a 

noncompliant design change. Boeing’s 

FRM design change for the Model 757 

was approved some time ago. We have 

determined that for Model 757 

airplanes, installation of FRM, instead 

of FQIS design changes, represents a 

reasonable, cost-effective method to 

achieve a meaningful overall reduction 

in the risk of an accident due to fuel 

tank ignition events. We therefore 

excluded airplanes with FRM installed 

from the applicability of this AD. 

Request To Mandate Compliance with 

Airworthiness Regulations for Newly 

Produced Airplanes 

NATCA requested that we require 

newly produced airplanes to be in 

compliance with 14 CFR 25.901, 

25.981(a), and 25.981(b). NATCA 

expressed concern that nearly 20 years 

after the TWA Flight 800 accident, 

manufacturers have been allowed to 

continue production of airplanes 

without making changes to eliminate 

the FQIS latent-plus-one-failure 

scenario, and that the FAA has granted 

exemptions to approve certain design 

changes without fully addressing the 

issue. 

We disagree with the request. This AD 

applies only to certain Model 757 series 

airplanes, and the Model 757 is out of 

production. The comment is therefore 

outside of the scope of this AD. We have 

not changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Allow Alternative 

Procedure for BITE Check 

FedEx proposed that we revise 

paragraph (h)(1) of the SNPRM to allow 

use of the FQIS BITE check procedure 

in its airplane maintenance manual 

(AMM) as an alternative to the 

procedure in Boeing Service Bulletin 

757–28–0136, dated June 5, 2014, which 

does not apply to FedEx’s fleet. We 

assume this is because FedEx operates 

some airplanes that were converted to a 

cargo configuration using a non-Boeing 

supplemental type certificate. 

We disagree with the request. FedEx’s 

comment did not provide adequate 

information to show that its AMM 

procedure is equivalent to the procedure 

described in Boeing Service Bulletin 

757–28–0136, dated June 5, 2014. 

FedEx’s comment also did not identify 

the fault conditions for which dispatch 

would be prohibited. We therefore do 

not have sufficient information at this 

time to allow FedEx’s proposed 

alternative procedure. However, under 

the provisions of paragraph (i) of this 

AD, we will consider requests for 

approval of alternative procedures, if 

sufficient data are submitted to 

substantiate that the change would 

provide an acceptable level of safety. 

We have not changed this final rule 

regarding this request. 

Request To Reduce Compliance Time 

NATCA requested that we reduce the 

compliance time to 5 years or less. 

NATCA noted that the proposed 72- 

month compliance time would result in 

a corrective action deadline that is 

approximately 27 years after the TWA 

Flight 800 accident. NATCA stated that 

such a long delay in action is not in the 

public interest. 

We disagree with the request to 

reduce the compliance time, which we 

have determined is necessary to give 

operators adequate time to prepare for 

and perform the required modifications 

without excessive disruption of 

operations. We had initially proposed 

60 months, but extended that to 72 

months in response to operator 

comments, which included extension 

requests of up to 108 months. NATCA 

made a similar comment to the NPRM 

(77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012), 

requesting a reduction in the 

compliance time to 36 months, and the 

FAA provided its response in the 

SNPRM under ‘‘Request to Reduce 

Compliance Time.’’ We have not 

changed this final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Statement Regarding Compliance Time 

for Wire Separation 

FedEx stated that without service 

information for the wire separation, it 

cannot effectively determine whether 

the proposed 72-month compliance time 

is acceptable. 

We had previously determined, as 

specified in the SNPRM, that the work 

involved for the cargo airplane wire 

separation modification would take 230 

work-hours, and a compliance time of 

72 months would be adequate for 

operators to perform the modification 

on their affected fleets. Boeing has since 

provided an updated estimate of 74 

work-hours for the alternative 

modification for cargo airplanes. We 

have revised the cost estimate 

accordingly in this final rule, but since 

this change reduces the work-hour 

estimate, it is not necessary to adjust the 

compliance time to accommodate the 

workload for this action for cargo 

operators. 


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Request To Remove Reference to ‘‘Fuel 

Tank Systems’’ 

Paragraph (g) of the SNPRM would 

have required modification of ‘‘the FQIS 

wiring or fuel tank systems.’’ Boeing 

asked that we remove reference to ‘‘fuel 

tank systems’’ in this proposed 

requirement because a fuel tank system 

modification could be done as an 

AMOC. 

We agree with the commenter’s 

request and rationale. We have removed 

the references to ‘‘fuel tank systems’’ 

throughout the preamble and in 

paragraph (g) of this AD. 

Request To Clarify Condition Requiring 

Repair 

Boeing requested that we revise 

paragraph (h)(1) of the SNPRM to 

specify that repair is required for any 

‘‘nondispatchable’’ fault code recorded 

before or as a result of the BITE check. 

(The SNPRM would have required 

repair for any fault code.) Boeing 

requested this change to make the repair 

requirement consistent with the BITE 

check service information referenced in 

the SNPRM (Boeing Service Bulletin 

757–28–0136, dated June 5, 2014). 

We agree with the request. The intent 

of the SNPRM was to require correction 

only of faults identified as 

‘‘nondispatchable.’’ The SNPRM used 

the terminology ‘‘as applicable’’ to 

indicate this intent, but we agree that 

further clarification is appropriate. We 

have revised paragraph (h)(1) in this AD 

as requested by the commenter. 

Request To Clarify End Point for FQIS 

Wire Separation 

Paragraph (h)(2) of the SNPRM 

specified that the FQIS wiring 

separation was to be done on the wiring 

that runs between the FQIS processor 

and the center fuel tank. Boeing 

requested that we change ‘‘the center 

fuel tank’’ to ‘‘the center fuel tank wall 

penetrations.’’ Boeing requested this 

change to clarify the end point for the 

FQIS wire separation. 

We agree with the request. Boeing’s 

suggestion is consistent with the intent 

of this AD, and improves the clarity of 

the requirement. We have revised 

paragraph (h)(2) in this AD to 

incorporate Boeing’s request. 

Request To Delay Final Rule Pending 

New Service Information 

Boeing requested that we delay 

issuance of the final rule pending 

issuance of new service information that 

would specifically define an acceptable 

wiring configuration that complies with 

the proposed requirements. 

We disagree with the request because 

the referenced service information was 

not available at the time we were ready 

to publish the final rule, and we cannot 

reliably predict the time that service 

information will be issued by Boeing. 

We do not consider it in the public 

interest to further delay this rulemaking. 

We have determined that it is necessary 

to proceed with issuing the final rule as 

proposed. Operators may, however, 

request approval under the provisions of 

paragraph (i) of this AD to use a future 

approved service bulletin, if developed, 

as an AMOC with the requirements of 

this AD, or we may approve the service 

bulletin as a global AMOC. 

Statement Regarding Unsafe Condition 

Boeing stated that it has accepted the 

FAA’s requirement to provide service 

information defining an acceptable wire 

separation modification, but, based on 

previously provided analysis, 

maintained that the risk level is less 

than extremely improbable. As asserted 

in earlier comments, Boeing considers 

the design of the affected airplanes safe 

and the proposed requirements 

therefore unnecessary. 

We disagree with Boeing’s assertions 

for the reasons discussed extensively in 

our response to Boeing’s similar 

comment in the SNPRM. The FAA’s 

response to Boeing’s assertion is 

covered in the response to comments in 

the SNPRM under ‘‘Request to 

Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 

1, 2012): Unjustified by Risk.’’ 

Additional Change Made to This AD 

We have revised the introductory text 

to paragraph (h) of this AD to clarify 

that the alternative modification for 

cargo airplanes must be accompanied by 

periodic BITE checks started within 6 

months after the effective date of this 

AD. And, for airplanes converted to an 

all-cargo configuration more than 6 

months after the effective date of this 

AD, operators must perform the first 

BITE check before flight after the 

conversion. In reviewing the proposed 

requirements after publication of the 

SNPRM, we recognized that operators 

might interpret the requirements as 

allowing a delay in the decision to 

exercise the cargo airplane alternative 

until late in the compliance period. That 

is not the literal meaning of the 

proposed language of the requirement, 

and was not the FAA’s intent. However, 

we determined that we should clarify 

the language of paragraph (h) of this AD 

regarding the required timing for the 

first BITE check if an operator chooses 

to exercise the cargo airplane 

alternative. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting this AD 

with the changes described previously 

and minor editorial changes. We have 

determined that these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the SNPRM for 

correcting the unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the SNPRM. 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of this AD. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

We have reviewed Boeing Service 

Bulletin 757–28–0136, dated June 5, 

2014, which describes procedures for a 

BITE check (check of built-in test 

equipment). This service information is 

reasonably available because the 

interested parties have access to it 

through their normal course of business 

or by the means identified in the 

ADDRESSES section. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 167 

airplanes of U.S. registry. This estimate 

includes 148 cargo airplanes and 19 

non-air-carrier passenger airplanes. We 

estimate the following costs to comply 

with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS: BASIC REQUIREMENT FOR ALL AIRPLANES

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product 

Fully correct FQIS vulnerability to latent-plus-onefailure conditions.1,200 work-hours × $85 per hour = $102,000 .......... $200,000 $302,000 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 65 / Tuesday, April 5, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 19481 

ESTIMATED COSTS: BASIC REQUIREMENT FOR ALL AIRPLANES—Continued 

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product 

Estimated Costs: Alternative Actions for All Airplanes 

Install FRM ................................................................. 720 work-hours × $85 per hour = $61,200 ............... 323,000 $384,200. 

Estimated Costs: Alternative Actions for Cargo Airplanes 

Wire separation .......................................................... 74 work-hours × $85 per hour = $6,290 ................... 10,000 $16,290. 

FQIS BITE check (required with wire separation alternative actions).1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ............................ 0 $85 per check 

(4 checks 

per year). 

Existing regulations already require 

that air-carrier passenger airplanes be 

equipped with FRM by December 26, 

2017. We therefore assume that the FRM 

installation specified in paragraph (g) of 

this AD will be done on only the 19 

affected non-air-carrier passenger 

airplanes, for an estimated passenger 

fleet cost of $7,299,800. We also assume 

that the operators of the 148 affected 

cargo airplanes would choose the less 

costly actions specified in paragraph (h) 

of this AD, at an estimated cost of 

$2,410,920 for the wire separation 

modification, plus $50,320 annually for 

the BITE checks. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2016–07–07 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–18452; Docket No. 

FAA–2012–0187; Directorate Identifier 

2011–NM–094–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective May 10, 2016. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

Model 757–200, –200PF, –200CB, and –300 

series airplanes; certificated in any category; 

except airplanes equipped with a 

flammability reduction means (FRM) 

approved by the FAA as compliant with the 

Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction (FTFR) 

rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008) 

requirements of 14 CFR 25.981(b) or 14 CFR 

26.33(c)(1). 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 7397: Engine fuel system wiring. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by fuel system 

reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent ignition 

sources inside the center fuel tank, which, in 

combination with flammable fuel vapors, 

could result in a fuel tank explosion and 

consequent loss of the airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Modification 

Within 72 months after the effective date 

of this AD, modify the fuel quantity 

indication system (FQIS) wiring to prevent 

development of an ignition source inside the 

center fuel tank, using a method approved in 

accordance with the procedures specified in 

paragraph (i) of this AD. 

(h) Alternative Actions for Cargo Airplanes 

For airplanes used exclusively for cargo 

operations: As an alternative to the 

requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD, do 

the actions specified in paragraphs (h)(1) and 

(h)(2) of this AD, using methods approved in 

accordance with the procedures specified in 

paragraph (i) of this AD. To exercise this 

alternative, operators must perform the first 

inspection required under paragraph (h)(1) of 

this AD within 6 months after the effective 

date of this AD. To exercise this alternative 

for airplanes returned to service after 

conversion of the airplane from a passenger 

configuration to an all-cargo configuration 

more than 6 months after the effective date 

of this AD, operators must perform the first 

inspection required under paragraph (h)(1) of 

this AD prior to further flight after the 

conversion. 

(1) Within 6 months after the effective date 

of this AD, record the existing fault codes 

stored in the FQIS processor and then do a 

BITE check (check of built-in test equipment) 

of the FQIS, in accordance with the 


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19482 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 65 / Tuesday, April 5, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 757–28–0136, dated June 5, 

2014. If any nondispatchable fault code is 

recorded prior to the BITE check or as a 

result of the BITE check, before further flight, 

do all applicable repairs, and repeat the BITE 

check until a successful test is performed 

with no nondispatchable fault found, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 757– 

28–0136, dated June 5, 2014. Repeat these 

actions thereafter at intervals not to exceed 

750 flight hours. 

(2) Within 72 months after the effective 

date of this AD, modify the airplane by 

separating FQIS wiring that runs between the 

FQIS processor and the center fuel tank wall 

penetrations, including any circuits that pass 

through a main fuel tank, from other airplane 

wiring that is not intrinsically safe. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair, 

modification, or alteration required by this 

AD if it is approved by the Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes Organization 

Designation Authorization (ODA) that has 

been authorized by the Manager, Seattle 

ACO, to make those findings. To be 

approved, the repair method, modification 

deviation, or alteration deviation must meet 

the certification basis of the airplane, and the 

approval must specifically refer to this AD. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Jon Regimbal, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

ACO, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6506; fax: 425– 

917–6590; email: jon.regimbal@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Boeing Service Bulletin 757–28–0136, 

dated June 5, 2014. 

(ii) Reserved. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P. O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, WA 98124–2207; telephone 206– 

544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; 

Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to http://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 

21, 2016. 

Michael Kaszycki, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–07150 Filed 4–4–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–6537; Directorate 

Identifier 2014–NM–154–AD; Amendment 

39–18457; AD 2016–07–12] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and 

A321 series airplanes. This AD was 

prompted by reports of cracking of the 

aft fixed fairing (AFF) of the pylons due 

to fatigue damage of the structure. This 

AD requires repetitive inspections for 

damage and cracking of the AFF of the 

pylons, and repair if necessary. We are 

issuing this AD to detect and correct 

damage and cracking of the AFF of the 

pylons, which could result in 

detachment of a pylon and consequent 

reduced structural integrity of the 

airplane. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective May 

10, 2016. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of May 10, 2016. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this final rule, contact 

Airbus, Airworthiness Office—EIAS, 1 

Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 

Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 

61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email 

account.airworth-eas@airbus.com; 

Internet http://www.airbus.com. You 

may view this referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, WA. For information on 

the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. It is also 

available on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2015– 

6537. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2015– 

6537; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Operations office (telephone 

800–647–5527) is Docket Management 

Facility, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Sanjay Ralhan, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; telephone 425–227–1405; 

fax 425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to certain Airbus Model A318, 

A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. 

The NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on November 30, 2015 (80 FR 

74729) (‘‘the NPRM’’). 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Union, has issued EASA Airworthiness 

Directive 2014–0154, dated July 2, 2014 

(referred to after this as the Mandatory 

Continuing Airworthiness Information, 

or ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe 

condition for certain Airbus Model 

A318, A319, A320, and A321 series 

airplanes. The MCAI states: 

On aeroplanes equipped with post-mod 

33844 CFM pylons, several operators have 

reported cracks on the Aft Fixed Fairing 

(AFF). After material analysis, it appears that 


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