IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

December 4, 2019 Session

150 4TH AVE N. TENANT, LLC DBA WEWORK v. THE METROPOLITAN 

NASHVILLE BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 17-1287-I Claudia Bonnyman, Chancellor

___________________________________

No. M2019-00732-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

This dispute arose from the issuance of a skyline sign permit to a high-rise officebuilding tenant. The permit allowed the tenant to erect two 495-square-foot signs on the 

building’s northwest and southeast facades. Another tenant with skyline signs on the 

northeast and southwest facades appealed the issuance of the permit by filing an 

application with the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) for interpretation against the 

zoning administrator. The complaining tenant contended, inter alia, that its brand was 

harmed because the juxtaposition of the new and existing signs would blur the 

relationship between the two tenants and asserted that the new signs caused the building 

to exceed the maximum signage permitted under the zoning code. The BZA determined

that the new signs violated the zoning code and revoked the permit. On a Petition for 

Writ of Certiorari, the Davidson County Chancery Court held that the BZA erred by 

relying on a zoning map rather than the code’s plain language and found the new signs 

complied with the code’s requirements. This appeal followed. We have determined the 

complaining tenant failed to establish standing because it failed to demonstrate that it was 

aggrieved by the issuance of the permit. There is no competent evidence to show that the 

signs’ juxtaposition would create public confusion about or signal a business relationship 

between the two tenants. Accordingly, the record fails to demonstrate that the 

complaining tenant’s alleged injury “falls within the zone of interests protected or 

regulated by the [law] in question.” See City of Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning 

Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49, 55–56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Further, based on the facts of this 

case, the BZA lacked the ability to provide meaningful redress. For these and other 

reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, albeit on different grounds, and 

remand with instructions for the trial court to order the BZA to dismiss the complaining 

tenant’s application and to reinstate the new sign permit as issued in June of 2017. As for

a separate issue that a neighboring homeowners’ association attempted to raise during the 

BZA hearing—whether the northwest sign exceeded brightness standards—that issue was 

not properly before the BZA or the trial court. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s decision 

to remand the brightness issue to the BZA.

03/17/2020
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Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded

FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which RICHARD 

H. DINKINS, J., joined. W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., filed a separate opinion in which he 

concurs in part and dissents in part. 

Junaid Adetayo Odubeko and James L. Murphy, III, Nashville, Tennessee, for the 

appellant, Regions Bank Corp.

Douglas Berry and Robert F. Parsley, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, 150 4th Ave 

N Tenant, LLC, d/b/a WeWork.

Lora Barkenbus Fox and Jonathan Barrett Cooper, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, 

Board of Zoning Appeals of Nashville & Davidson Co.

OPINION

A. Background

One Nashville Place, a.k.a., the “R2-D2 Building,”1enriched the Nashville skyline 

in 1985. The 25-story octagonal building sits in the heart of downtown Nashville on a lot

that abuts Fourth Avenue North, Commerce Street, and the south end of Printers Alley.

In 2010, the Metropolitan Planning Commission codified a set of development 

standards for several sub-districts in downtown Nashville, including the area where One 

Nashville Place is located. See Zoning Code for Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson 

County § 17.37 (“Downtown Code”). Section V of the Downtown Code includes two 

design standards related to the width and area of “skyline” signs. First, a skyline sign 

 

1 When viewed from a distance, the architectural shape of the building resembles the iconic and 

loveable Droid named R2-D2, a character from “a galaxy far, far away” in the Star Wars franchise 

created by George Lucas. The creative design of R2-D2 was influenced by Akira Kurosawa’s 1958 

feature film The Hidden Fortress, particularly Tahei and Matashichi, the two comic relief characters that 

serve as sidekicks to General Makabe. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R2-D2. Legend has it that the 

name R2-D2 derives from when Lucas was making one of his earlier films, American Graffiti. Id. Sound 

editor Walter Murch states that he is responsible for the utterance that sparked the name for the droid. Id.

Murch asked for Reel 2, Dialog Track 2, in the abbreviated form “R-2-D-2.” Id. Lucas, who was in the 

room and had dozed off while working on the script for Star Wars, momentarily woke when he heard the 

request and, after asking for clarification, stated that it was a “great name” before going back to writing 

his script. Id. (citations omitted).
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cannot exceed 60% of the building width. Id. § V, at 117. Second, the maximum area of 

all skyline signs on a building is determined by the number and type of abutting streets.

Id. 109, 117.

In 2013, Regions Bank Corp. (“Regions”) moved its headquarters to One 

Nashville Place. Shortly thereafter, Regions applied for and obtained a permit to install 

two 495-square-foot skyline signs, one on the northeast facade and one on the southwest 

facade. The Regions signs were installed, and they remain on the building to this day.

In January 2017, 150 4th Ave N Tenant, LLC, a workspace provider doing 

business as WeWork (“WeWork”), became a tenant of One Nashville Place. On 

February 12, 2017, WeWork applied for a permit to install two 45-foot-long skyline 

signs, one on the northwest facade and one on the southeast facade.

The Zoning Administrator for the Metropolitan Department of Codes initially 

denied the application based on a determination that the width of each sign exceeded 60% 

of the facade to which it was to be attached, and the sign needed the approval of the 

Downtown Code Design Review Committee (“the DRC”) because of the sub-district 

where the building was located.

2

Thus, WeWork made the requisite application to the 

DRC. Following a review, the DRC construed the octagonal building as effectively 

having four longer facades rather than eight shorter ones and determined that the signs 

were within the 60% limit. Based upon the DRC’s determinations and approval, the

Zoning Administrator approved WeWork’s application and issued the permit in June of 

2017. WeWork completed the installation of the signs in August of 2017.

B. Board of Zoning Appeals

Shortly after the WeWork signs were installed, Regions appealed the issuance of 

the permit by filing an application with the BZA for interpretation against the Zoning 

Administrator. Regions asserted that WeWork’s signs would damage Regions’ brand and, 

when combined with Regions’ signs, exceed the maximum area permitted by the 

Downtown Code:

[T]he juxtaposition of the existing Regions Signage and the approved 

WeWork Signage on the Subject Property will create public confusion 

 

2

In the event the approval of the signage design is required or a modification or variance from 

the applicable standards is needed, applicants must submit a request to the Planning Department and the 

Downtown Code DRC. See Downtown Code § I, at 14, and § V, at 104. When the subject property is 

within a “redevelopment district” designated by the Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency 

(“MDHA”)—as in this case—the MDHA’s Design Review Committee fulfills the role of the Downtown 

Code DRC. Id. § I, at 14.
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about the relationship between Regions and WeWork. To the public, the 

Co-branding of the Subject Property with skyline signs of the same size 

will signal a business relationship between Regions and WeWork that, at 

best, would be misleading and, at worst, would be damaging to Regions’

brand. In the worst case scenario, Regions’ significant investment in its 

public brand would be diminished.

. . .

. . . . [T]he [Sign Standards] Map reveals that the portion of Printer’s Alley 

abutting the Subject Property is not considered qualifying street frontage 

for purposes of calculating maximum allowable skyline signage. . . . [T]he 

maximum allowable skyline signage on the Subject Property is 1,440 

square feet (720 square feet per Pedestrian Street multiplied by two 

qualifying Pedestrian Streets). . . .

The Regions Signage currently utilizes 990 of the permitted square feet, 

which means that only 450 square feet of additional skyline signage is 

available for future use at the Subject Property. As shown in the Permit,

each of the WeWork signs is 45' by 11', or 495 square feet. Therefore, the 

WeWork Signage, as approved, will exceed the maximum allowable 

skyline signage at the Subject Property pursuant to Section V of the 

[Downtown Code].

At the BZA hearing on September 21, 2017, Regions clarified that its objection 

was “all about size,” and it would not oppose one “slightly smaller” sign instead of two 

equally sized signs. Regions acknowledged that the Downtown Code’s sign standards 

included a street type titled “Printers Alley” but relied on the Sign Standards Map, which 

identified only the portion of Printers Alley between Church Street and Commerce Street 

as the “Printers Alley” street type. The remainder of Printers Alley and every other alley 

in downtown was unlabeled.

In addition, the homeowners’ association for the Viridian, a residential tower 

across the street from One Nashville Place, submitted a letter in support of Regions’

appeal. Although the Viridian homeowners’ association did not file an appeal or 

application for interpretation against the Zoning Administrator, several Viridian residents 

attended the hearing. The president of the homeowners’ association advocated for the 

revocation of WeWork’s permit, asserting the northwest sign exceeded the Downtown 

Code’s brightness standards.

In response to the foregoing arguments, Calvin Lee, corporate counsel for 

WeWork, argued that the DRC had already determined that the signs complied with the 

Downtown Code. Mr. Lee engaged in the following colloquy with Board Chairman 

David Ewing and Vice Chairman David Taylor:
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Mr. Lee: Well, [counsel for Regions] said that this is all about 

size and if that is the case then . . . this is not the venue 

or the forum to discuss that. The Design Review 

Committee was the authority that looked at that and—

Chairman Ewing: Let me stop you there because you went to law school, 

as I went to law school, and I said earlier it’s kind of 

Marbury versus Madison. It’s here, you’re here, and 

you shouldn’t assume that we don’t have jurisdiction.

Mr. Lee: We understand. And we stand by the MDHA Review 

Committee’s interpretation that this is a 4-sided 

building. I have their approval of our sign right here. It 

was conditioned that there are no other signs to be put 

up on that building. They’re only allowing four signs

because they are finding it as a four-sided building.

Mr. Taylor: I guess that the opposition, I don’t think they’re 

contesting that at all. They said, in terms of the 

percentage of facade that can be covered, they’re 

saying that this is 60 percent. I mean they’re not

contesting that is what he said. So, their only argument 

to us was that it exceeds the maximum allowed square 

footage of signage for that building, which I think 

deals with Printer’s Alley and whether that’s a street or 

not. . . .

Mr. Lee: I understand. And the Design Review Committee 

considered that fact also, and we made a presentation 

at that meeting. And they decided that they accepted 

our argument that there were three streets to calculate 

the amount of signage on that building.

Mr. Taylor: I’m sorry, so what are you basing the three streets on? 

What is your argument on it being three streets?

Mr. Lee: I don’t have that information in front of us. That was a 

presentation that our signage consultant and our 

designers sat with the Design Review Committee to 

work out. We know that we are new to your

neighborhood and we don’t want to be intrusive. We, 

in early December, reached out to the different 

planning departments here. We were working with

Mr. Herbert’s department very closely; they advised us 
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on the process; we went through the process in good 

faith. . . .

Chairman Ewing: Let’s talk about the brightness. How many foot candles 

is that sign?

Mr. Lee: That I’m not sure as well.

. . .

You know, and so it’s a little frustrating to not have an 

argument about the street, which is apparently what 

allows the building to have the amount of signage that 

it does. . . .

After the public hearing was closed, Board Member David Harper moved for the 

BZA to find that the Zoning Administrator erred by issuing the permit based on the 

square footage calculation:

Mr. Harper: [T]here’s one specific piece in the Code that was in 

this presentation and it’s a calculation, how much 

signage is allowed on a building? I don’t care from 

where it’s calculated or how you calculate what a 

facade is, what is in a facade, there’s a total number 

and they’re over it. And when that number was 

surpassed, that’s when the error occurred. When that 

number added up to be more than the maximum 

number, an error occurred.

. . .

I will move that we find . . . that the Zoning 

Administrator did err in issuing the permit for the 

reasons I mentioned, the square footage calculations.3

The Board voted unanimously to revoke WeWork’s sign permit.

In October 2017, the Board entered a formal order, finding “that the Zoning 

Administrator erred in [the] application of law with this issuance of the subject permit.”

 

3

Chairman Ewing also stated in his motion: “And I would like to add that it is also an error of the 

Downtown Sign Code with the brightness as it reflects to a close-by residential building.”
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C. Chancery Court Decision

On December 1, 2017, WeWork timely filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the 

Davidson County Chancery Court, arguing that the BZA erred, inter alia, by exceeding 

its jurisdiction and basing its interpretation solely on the “illustrative maps” in the 

Downtown Code.

After hearing argument from counsel for both WeWork and Regions, the trial 

court concluded that the Downtown Code unambiguously treated the entirety of Printers 

Alley as a street:

The Court must find that the Board erred when it relied upon the colorcoded map of the street types to determine the size of the skyline signs 

allowed on the property under the petitioner’s permit. The map is in 

conflict with the text in the Downtown Code. Specifically, the text in 

Chapter 17.37 Section V, Sign Standards, Allocation by Street Type, 

allocates 720 square feet for the Printer’s Alley type street. The text of the 

Downtown Code also states that Printer’s Alley will not be treated as an 

ordinary alley, but will be treated differently, that is unconventionally. 

Neither the parties nor the Court found text in the Downtown Code which 

would remove part of Printer’s Alley from serving as street frontage. 

Relying on unambiguous text in the Downtown Code at just this quoted 

section, Printer’s Alley is treated as any other street frontage and it is

treated as a whole in its entirety and not in parts.

The Zoning Ordinance in Title 17 has its own rule of construction, which 

states that text shall prevail over illustrations. Metro Government 

anticipated that its numerous illustrations could on occasion cause conflict 

between the text of the Downtown Code and the numerous illustrations. 

Such a rule of construction is completely consistent with the common law 

rules of statutory interpretation, which recognize and help resolve 

ambiguity in the text, that is, the language of the statute or ordinance. Such 

an ambiguity is not present here, because the text is clear. The problem is 

caused by the illustration. Consequently, the property is allocated 2,160

square feet for skyline signage, because there’s no dispute at all that the 

other two frontages, that is, Commerce Street and Fourth Avenue North are 

pedestrian street frontages and they each also get, are assigned or allocated, 

720 square feet for the skyline signage.

Although it ruled in favor of WeWork on the square footage issue, the trial court 

found it necessary to remand to the Board the issue regarding the brightness of the 

northwest sign because the Board did not articulate which standard it relied on in

determining that WeWork’s northwest sign violated the brightness standards of the 

Downtown Code. This appeal followed.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of a decision by a board of zoning appeals “is limited to 

determining whether the board exceeded its jurisdiction, followed an unlawful procedure, 

acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or acted without material evidence to support 

its decision.” Harding Acad. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 222 S.W.3d 

359, 363 (Tenn. 2007). “In proceedings involving a common law writ of certiorari, 

illegal, arbitrary, or fraudulent actions include: 1) the failure to follow the minimum 

standards of due process; 2) the misrepresentation or misapplication of legal standards; 3) 

basing a decision on ulterior motives; and 4) violating applicable constitutional 

standards.” Id. Additionally, “[c]ourts must not ‘reweigh the evidence’ or ‘scrutinize the 

intrinsic correctness of the decision,’ but independently review the record to ‘determine 

whether it contains “such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a rational conclusion.”’” Venture Holdings, LLC v. Metro. Gov’t of 

Nashville & Davidson Cty., 585 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Gulley 

v. Robertson Cty. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, No. M2015-00734-COA-R3-CV, 

2016 WL 2898478, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2016)), appeal denied (Sept. 18, 

2019). “If ‘any possible reason’ exists justifying the action, it will be upheld.” McCallen 

v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d 633, 641 (Tenn. 1990).

Under a codified version of this standard, we have recognized a three-step 

analysis:

The court must first determine whether the agency has identified the 

appropriate legal principles applicable to the case. Then, the court must 

examine the agency’s factual findings to determine whether they are 

supported by substantial and material evidence. Finally, the reviewing court 

must examine how the agency applied the law to the facts. This step is, of 

course, a highly judgmental process involving mixed questions of law and 

fact, and great deference must be accorded to the agency. At this stage, the 

court must determine whether a reasoning mind could reasonably have 

reached the conclusion reached by the agency, consistent with a proper 

application of the controlling legal principles.

McEwen v. Tennessee Dep’t of Safety, 173 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) 

(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

The parties have raised several issues for our consideration, but we have 

determined the dispositive issue is whether Regions had standing to challenge the Zoning 
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Administrator’s issuance of the sign permit to WeWork. We have also determined that 

the illumination issue purportedly presented by the Viridian homeowners’ association

was not properly before the BZA or the trial court.4

I. STANDING

Both parties addressed this issue in their briefs. WeWork raised the issue in its 

Appellee’s Brief, and Regions addressed the issue in its Reply Brief.5 WeWork’s 

position on this issue is stated as follows:

The Court should reinstate WeWork’s permit for another reason. Regions 

lacks standing to assert its challenge. Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-206(b) 

provides that “[a]ppeals to the board of [zoning] appeals may be taken by 

any person aggrieved . . . by any grant or refusal of a building permit or 

other act or decision of the building commissioner of the municipality or 

other administrative official. . . .” “The sort of distinct and palpable injury 

that will create standing must be an injury to a recognized legal right or 

interest. In many cases, this right or interest may be created or defined by 

statute.” City of Brentwood, 149 S.W.3d at 56. That is so here. Because 

Regions “is seeking to vindicate a statutory right of interest, the doctrine of 

standing requires [Regions] to demonstrate that its claim falls within the 

zone of interests protected or regulated by the statute in question.” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 13-7-206(b). 

For its part, Regions contends that WeWork’s standing argument fails “because 

Tennessee law favors interpreting standing broadly in zoning cases, such as the instant 

matter.” Also relying on this court’s decision in City of Brentwood, 149 S.W.3d at 57, 

Regions notes that “the extension of authority to appeal and to seek judicial review to all 

persons who are ‘aggrieved’ reflects an intention to ease the strict application of the 

customary standing principles.”

When a statute creates a cause of action and designates who may bring suit, 

standing is interwoven with subject matter jurisdiction and “becomes a jurisdictional 

 

4

Our determination pretermits all other issues raised by the parties.

5

The Metropolitan Government filed a brief that states in its entirety: “The Metropolitan 

Government joins the Brief of Regions Bank, particularly the portion crediting the BZA’s treatment 

of Printer’s Alley (a distinctive and unique street downtown). On this basis, Metro submits that the 

BZA’s decision is supported by material evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious, and should be 

affirmed.” (Emphasis added). Thus, it did not address nor take a position concerning the issue of standing.
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prerequisite.” In re Estate of Smallman, 398 S.W.3d 134, 149 (Tenn. 2013). “Subject 

matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s ‘lawful authority to adjudicate a controversy 

brought before it’ and is conferred on a court by statute or the constitution.” Griffin v. 

Campbell Clinic, P.A., 439 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tenn. 2014). The issue of subject matter 

jurisdiction “is non-waivable and must be considered by an appellate court.” In re Estate 

of Smallman, 398 S.W.3d at 148. “The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is so 

fundamental that it requires dismissal whenever it is raised and demonstrated.” First Am. 

Trust Co. v. Franklin-Murray Dev. Co., L.P., 59 S.W.3d 135, 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 13-7-206(b) and 27-8-101, respectively, empower 

“aggrieved” persons to challenge the acts of zoning officials. Significantly, each statute 

uses the same standard for standing. Section 13-7-206(b) authorizes appeals by persons 

“aggrieved” by an act of a zoning official:

Appeals to the board of appeals may be taken by any person 

aggrieved . . . by any grant or refusal of a building permit or other act or 

decision of the building commissioner of the municipality or other 

administrative official based in whole or part upon this ordinance enacted 

under this part and part 3 of this chapter.

(Emphasis added). Similarly, § 27-9-101 authorizes appeals by persons “aggrieved” by 

the final judgment of a board of zoning appeals:

Anyone who may be aggrieved by any final order or judgment of any 

board or commission functioning under the laws of this state may have the 

order or judgment reviewed by the courts, where not otherwise specifically 

provided, in the manner provided by this chapter.

(emphasis added); see Fallin v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 656 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tenn. 

1983) (recognizing that a writ of certiorari under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 is “the 

proper remedy for one who seeks to overturn the determination of a Board of Zoning 

Appeals”).

“For the purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101, to be ‘aggrieved,’ a party must 

be able to show a special interest in the agency’s final decision or that it is subject to a 

special injury not common to the public generally.” Wood v. Metro. Nashville & 

Davidson Cty. Gov’t, 196 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

In its application to the BZA, Regions asserted that the size and location of

WeWork’s signs would blur the relationship between Regions and WeWork and tarnish

Regions’ brand:

As an active, longtime partner in Nashville’s development, Regions is 

aggrieved by the approved issuance of the Permit authorizing the placement 
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of the WeWork Signage on the Subject Property. There is no relationship 

between Regions and WeWork besides being co-tenants at the Subject 

Property. However, the juxtaposition of the existing Regions Signage and 

the approved WeWork Signage on the Subject Property will create public 

confusion about the relationship between Regions and WeWork. To the 

public, the co-branding of the Subject Property with skyline signs of the 

same size will signal a business relationship between Regions and 

WeWork that, at best, would be misleading and, at worst, would be 

damaging to Regions’ brand. In the worst case scenario, Regions’

significant investment in its public brand would be diminished.

Regions maintains that it met the requirements of § 13-7-206(b) by alleging “injury to its 

brand resulting from the approval of the WeWork signs.” 

When interwoven with subject matter jurisdiction, standing is a constitutional

issue. See City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 98 n.8 (Tenn. 2013). 

Constitutional standing “is one of the ‘irreducible . . . minimum’ requirements that a 

party must meet in order to present a justiciable controversy.” Id. at 98 (quoting Lujan v. 

Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 

Establishing constitutional standing requires a plaintiff to satisfy three elements:

First, a party must show an injury that is “distinct and palpable”; injuries 

that are conjectural, hypothetical, or predicated upon an interest that a 

litigant shares in common with the general citizenry are insufficient in this 

regard. [Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v. Darnell, 195 

S.W.3d 612, 620 (Tenn. 2006)]. Second, a party must demonstrate a causal 

connection between the alleged injury and the challenged conduct. Id.

(citing Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2001)). . . . The third and final element is that the injury must be capable of 

being redressed by a favorable decision of the court. Id.

Id. The plaintiff must establish these elements “by the same degree of evidence at each 

stage of litigation as other matters on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.” Petty 

v. Daimler/Chrysler Corp., 91 S.W.3d 765, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 560). We have determined that Regions failed to satisfy its burden of proof on the 

first and third of these elements.

We shall first address whether Regions has shown an injury that is “distinct and 

palpable” and not predicated upon an interest it shares in common with the general 

citizenry. Indeed, brand dilution and tarnishment are recognized as legal injuries. See 

15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c). However, Regions presented no competent evidence that the 

public was likely to infer a relationship between it and WeWork or that such an inference

was likely to harm the reputation of Regions’ brand.
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The presence of multiple brands on a single building is not unusual. See, e.g., 

Downtown Code § V at 103 (requiring new developments submit a “common signage 

plan,” which “regulates signage for multiple businesses or tenants within one building or 

complex”). The mere fact that Regions now shares the skyline of One Nashville Place 

with WeWork is insufficient to infer a likelihood of injury. Moreover, their signage is not 

on the same facade of the building.

As for the element of redress, the BZA’s ability to provide meaningful redress is 

significantly limited based on the facts of this case. For example, the BZA does not have 

the discretion to deny the permit if WeWork’s signage is within all permissible 

parameters of size and design under the Zoning Code. See Harding Academy, 

222 S.W.3d at 363. This is because the “denial of a zoning permit which meets all the 

requirements of the ordinance when there is no valid ground for denial is arbitrary and 

unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Merritt v. Wilson County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 656 S.W.2d 

846, 854 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)). This limitation becomes even more relevant considering

that Regions stated it would not be opposed to one “slightly smaller” WeWork sign,

instead of two signs, on the skyline of the building. Under Regions’ interpretation of the 

Zoning Ordinance, WeWork would be entitled to at least 450 square feet of skyline 

signage—meaning WeWork could erect a skyline sign that is only 10% smaller than 

Regions’ signs. Thus, we find it implausible that one 450 square-foot sign would be any 

less suggestive of a business relationship, and there is no competent proof in the record to 

the contrary.

Based on the foregoing, we find Regions lacked standing under Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 13-7-206(b) to challenge the Zoning Administrator’s issuance of the sign permit to 

WeWork. Accordingly, Regions’ appeal and application for interpretation against the 

Zoning Administrator to the BZA must be dismissed for lack of standing.

II. THE BRIGHTNESS ISSUE

As noted earlier, the Viridian homeowners’ association attended the hearing and 

requested the BZA to revoke WeWork’s permit based on allegations that the brightness 

of the northwest sign adversely affected the homeowners’ use of their residential 

property. For the reasons explained below, we have determined this issue was not 

properly before the BZA or the trial court. 

The BZA’s Rules of Procedure allow an appellant that files an appeal and 

application for interpretation against the Zoning Administrator’s ruling to present its case, 

which includes presenting testimony from “witnesses in support of the application.” 

R. 8(G). However, the appellant must have previously filed an appeal—that is, an 

application “on a form provided for that purpose by the Department of Codes 

Administration.” R. 3(A). The Viridian homeowners’ association did not file an appeal or 

application for interpretation against the Zoning Administrator regarding the brightness 

of WeWork’s sign or any issue regarding WeWork’s signs. 
- 13 -

Moreover, Regions’ only comment on the brightness issue came after the president 

of the Veridian homeowners’ association addressed the BZA at the hearing. The relevant

and very brief colloquy between Regions’ counsel and the BZA Chairman on the 

brightness issue reads:

Mr. Murphy: Obviously, we’re concerned about [brightness] as well, 

although it affects—my client is in the building so they 

don’t have the brightness problem that the Viridian 

folks do. The Viridian folks really have the brightness 

impact more so than my client.

Chairman Ewing: So, your client, the bank, yeah, that’s not as big a deal. 

Gotcha. But you still think that’s an issue?

Mr. Murphy: Obviously, it is, because it’s having an impact—it’s too much 

signage and, in addition to being too much, it’s also having an 

adverse impact on the surrounding neighborhood. So, I think

those are both issues.

Whether the northwest sign exceeded the brightness standards was not properly 

before the BZA. Therefore, the BZA erred in considering the issue and erred in basing its 

ruling, at least in part, on the brightness of the sign. Because the issue was not properly 

before the BZA, it was not properly before trial court. Therefore, we reverse the trial 

court’s decision to remand this issue back to the Board.

III. THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

In a separate opinion, our colleague concludes that Regions had standing to 

challenge the issuance of the sign permit to WeWork and would hold that the 

Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking the 

WeWork sign permit. While we respectfully disagree with our colleague’s determination 

that Regions had standing to challenge the permit issued to WeWork, we agree with his

conclusion that 

the Downtown Code is clear and that the Printers’ Alley street type includes 

Printers’ Alley, even that portion abutting One Nashville Place. See id. at 

15. Although the “Map of Street Types for Signage Standards” could be 

seen as contradicting the text of the Downtown Code, the Zoning Code 

specifies that text controls over figures in the case “of any difference of 

meaning or implication.” Zoning Code, Chapter 17.04.050(L) (Mar. 2015). 

The portion of Printers’ Alley abutting One Nashville Place may not 

include businesses on the ground floor and upper floors, but the same is 

also true of other portions of Printers’ Alley highlighted in green on the 

“Map of Street Types for Signage Standards.” The character of that portion 
- 14 -

of the alley does not justify ignoring the fact that it is named “Printers’ 

Alley.” 

Thus, if Regions had standing, we would affirm the trial court’s determination that 

the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking 

the WeWork sign permit and remand with instructions to reverse the decision by the 

BZA. 

. 

IN CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part,

6

reversed in part, and this 

matter is remanded with instructions for the trial court to order the BZA to dismiss 

Regions’ appeal of and application for interpretation against the Zoning Administrator’s 

issuance of the sign permit and reinstate the permit as issued to WeWork in June of 2017. 

Costs of appeal are assessed against Regions.

________________________________

 FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.

 

6

The Court of Appeals may affirm a judgment on different grounds than those relied on by the 

trial court when the trial court reached the correct result. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Smith, 720 S.W.2d 48, 50 

(Tenn. 1986); Arnold v. City of Chattanooga, 19 S.W.3d 779, 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Allen v. Nat’l 

Bank of Newport, 839 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Clark v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & 

Davidson Cty., 827 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).