IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

July 21, 2020 Session

FATMA ADEL SEKIK v. NEHAD ABDELNABI ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County

No. 126002 Gregory S. McMillan, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2019-01302-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the court’s failure to grant a continuance, the 

child support and alimony obligation imposed, and certain provisions of the parenting plan 

prohibiting contact with his children and revoking the parental rights set forth in Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(3)(B). This proceeding also involved allegations of a 

conspiracy to defraud Wife of funds resulting from a sale of marital property in Gaza during 

the pendency of the divorce by Husband, his brother, and his brother’s wife; those nonspousal parties challenge the court’s jurisdiction over them and over the property in Gaza, 

as well as the court’s valuation of that property. They also challenge the court’s rulings 

that they engaged in a civil conspiracy and whether the judgment imposed against them is 

supported by the pleadings and the evidence. Upon our review of the issues raised, we 

discern no reversible error in the rulings of the court and accordingly affirm it in all 

respects.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J. W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B.

GOLDIN and CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JJ., joined.

Matthew D. Barocas, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Nahed Abdulnabi and Rewa 

Gharbawe.

Nehad Abdelnabi, Only, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Wanda G. Sobieski, Diane M. Messer, Caitlin Elledge, Zachary T. Powers, and Laura E. 

Wyrick, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Fatma Adel Sekik.

11/18/2020
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OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal arises out of a divorce proceeding. Fatma Adel Sekik (“Wife” or 

“Mother”) and Nehad Abdelnabi (“Husband” or “Father”) are from the Middle East; Wife 

is from Cairo, Egypt, and Husband is from Palestine. The parties were married in 1996 in 

Egypt and moved to the United States shortly thereafter, where they resided in Knoxville, 

Tennessee. The parties have four children. Their third child, Hamza, was born in 2002 and 

has special needs. Husband is an “electronics technician” and owned an electronics 

business in Knoxville. He also oversaw the financial aspects of family life, including the 

buying and selling of real property during the marriage, such as the real property located 

in the Gaza Strip that is the subject of many issues raised in this appeal. Wife primarily 

took care of the parties’ home and four children. Wife also works part-time from home, 

translating Arabic conversations by phone, for which she is paid by the minute. 

Their home was not entirely a happy one, as Wife and her two daughters testified 

about the emotional and physical abuse Husband inflicted on the family members. The 

breakdown of the marital relationship accelerated in February 2012, when Husband 

kidnapped and assaulted a man named Naser Ferwanah, with whom he believed Wife was 

having an affair. He was indicted for these offenses on September 18, 2012, and in 2016, 

he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 17 years in the Tennessee Department of 

Correction for the felony offenses of aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated 

kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated assault.

1

 

Wife filed a complaint for divorce on September 7, 2012, on the basis of 

irreconcilable differences and Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. She sought to be 

named primary residential parent of the parties’ children and sought “reasonable spousal 

support,” both during the pendency of the divorce and after entry of the decree. The 

complaint contained the automatic mandatory injunctions set forth at Tennessee Code 

 

1 The judgments of conviction entered into the record in this divorce proceeding reflect that 

Husband was convicted by a jury on January 28, 2016 of the following crimes: aggravated kidnapping, a B 

felony, for which he was sentenced in May 2016 to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction;

especially aggravated kidnapping, an A felony, for which he was sentenced to seventeen years; aggravated 

assault, a C felony, to which he was sentenced to six years, to run concurrently with his seventeen year 

sentence; and another count of aggravated assault, a C felony, to which he was sentenced to six years. 

Husband appealed his convictions, which were affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal; 

that Court observed that “[t]he trial court merged the Defendant’s conviction in count one into count two

and merged count four into count three and ordered that he serve the sentences concurrently, for a total 

effective sentence of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) at 100% release 

eligibility.” State v. Abdelnabi, No. E2017-00237-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3148003, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. June 26, 2018), appeal denied (Nov. 15, 2018).
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Annotated section 36-4-106(d).2 On September 8, a temporary parenting plan was entered, 

granting Husband weekend visitation every week, setting his child support obligation at 

$2,000 per month, and requiring him to pay the premiums of health, dental, and life 

insurance policies for Wife and the children, as well as “for all Hamza’s medical, dental, 

visual [expenses] and all Hamza’s therapy[.]” 

On September 27, 2012, Wife filed a Notice of Filing of Related Order to which she 

attached an order of protection that had been entered by agreement of Husband and Wife

in Knox County Circuit Court case number 126003. In that order, Husband agreed to not 

come about Wife or contact her, directly or indirectly. He also agreed to pay for the 

household expenses, including the mortgage, utilities, phone and internet, credit cards, 

health insurance, medical bills, automobile insurance, and others, as well as $2,000 per 

month in child support. Husband and Wife subsequently reconciled, and by an agreed

Amended Order of Protection entered December 5, 2012, they were permitted to have 

contact. All other terms of the prior agreed order of protection pertaining to Husband’s 

payments of household expenses and child support remained in effect.

In September 2016, Wife moved for a default judgment due to Husband’s failure 

to answer the complaint for divorce. In that motion, she alleged that Husband’s “refusal to 

respond or cooperate with the process has left [Wife] and the parties’ four (4) children in 

desperate financial straits unable to make the arrangements necessary to keep their home 

or property.” She also alleged that Husband “has sent the largest share of the parties’

financial resources to the Gaza Strip where it is essentially beyond the reach of his wife 

and children for their support” and sought a default judgment “so that she can begin the 

process of making arrangements with the bank to possibly save the home from foreclosure 

for the children and herself.” 

Husband responded by filing an answer as well as a Response to the motion for 

default judgment on October 6; in his response, Husband asserted:

The default judgment sought, in which Mr. Abdelnabi is deprived of all of 

his constitutional parental rights while being ordered to pay the extravagant 

sum of $3,200.00 per month in child support for life—unsupported by the 

Child Support Guidelines—and in which Plaintiff is awarded all of the 

marital estate and potential personal property, including unidentified, 

unspecified, and likely fictional property in the Gaza Strip, is unreasonable, 

 

2 Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-106(d) provides that certain temporary injunctions are 

in effect upon the filing of a petition for divorce and service (or waiver and acceptance of service) of the 

petition. In pertinent part to the issues raised in this appeal, the complaint stated: “The parties are restrained 

and enjoined from transferring, assigning, borrowing against, concealing, or in any way dissipating or 

disposing, without the consent of the other party or an order of the court, of any marital property.” This 

language tracks that of section 36-4-106(d)(1)(A).
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inequitable, and unjust under the circumstances and should not be awarded 

to Plaintiff.

In his answer, Husband admitted that irreconcilable differences had arisen between 

the parties but denied that he was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. He also admitted 

that Wife was a fit and proper person to be primary residential parent of the parties’ minor 

children but averred “that he is also a fit and proper person to be the primary residential 

parent for the parties’ minor children upon his release from incarceration.” 

On December 8, 2016, Wife filed a Motion for Interim Relief in which she alleged 

details of Husband’s abusive and controlling behavior, reiterated her belief that he had 

“sent the largest share of the parties’ financial resources to the Gaza Strip where it is 

essentially beyond the reach of his wife and children for their support,” and that she feared 

Husband’s brother, who had “recently gone to the Gaza Strip,” “may be carrying with him 

a Power of Attorney to transfer the Gaza Strip property out of [Husband] and into his family 

over there.” On that basis, she asked the court to divest Husband of all real property he held 

in the United States and in the Gaza Strip and vest it in her “so that she may try to find a 

way to use it to support the children.” She also requested that the court grant her a divorce 

“now” and reserve any other issues. 

The trial court held a hearing and granted Wife’s motion for relief by order entered 

March 20, 2017, in which it, inter alia, “ordered and empowered [Wife] to investigate all 

monies and properties in Defendant’s name or in which Defendant may have or has had an 

interest, wherever located, including, but not limited to, the Gaza Strip” as well as all debts, 

claims, liens, and contracts relating to those properties. The trial court also ordered 

Husband to instruct all persons receiving funds “from any property in which he has or had 

an interest (including, but not limited to the Gaza Strip properties) to pay only the 

reasonable and necessary expenses related to the property and forward to [Wife] all net 

revenues for the next sixty (60) days (starting February 22, 2017).” After that time, Wife 

was “empowered to take control of all properties to which [Husband] holds title or in which 

[he] has or has had an interest.” The order also provided that “[a]ll income related to the 

properties, including, but not limited to, the properties in the Gaza Strip, shall be paid to or 

retained by [Wife] to be used for the reasonable support of the family and the marital estate 

and for which [Wife] shall account to this Court.” She was also ordered to “collect, marshal, 

and take custody, control and possession of all funds, accounts, mail, and other assets of 

[Husband], or under the possession or control of [Husband] or assets traceable to assets 

owned or controlled by [him] wherever situated (except as set forth in Paragraph 4 

regarding the sixty (60) day period for transfer of control in the Gaza Strip)” but that she 

was not to “alienate, transfer, sell or dispose of such property without court approval.” The 

trial court also ordered Husband to “execute any document, release, power of attorney or 

other required authorization to allow [Wife] to investigate the real property.” 

Wife attempted to comply with the court’s order but filed a Motion for Emergency 
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Relief on June 13, 2017, in which she alleged that Husband and his counsel had not 

responded to her requests to execute the power of attorney and release documents she 

needed in order to investigate Husband’s real property holdings. She also alleged that she 

had sent the court’s order to be “entered by the Palestinian Embassy and forwarded to 

Gaza.” In her motion, she alleged that Husband’s brother “is attempting the sale [of] 1 1/2 

dunom (approximately 1 1/2 acre) of the subject property and has reportedly shown 

multiple people that he has a General Power of Attorney from Defendant which allows the 

sale and was signed by Defendant May 18 or 19, 2017,” and that she “fears that Defendant’s 

brother may succeed in transferring the property before she can get the Order enforced.”

 

The trial court held a hearing on Wife’s motion for emergency relief and entered an 

order on June 30 “for the purpose of maintaining the status quo so far as possible as it 

relates to the parties’ marital property until final disposition can occur, based on the 

allegations in [Wife]’s Motion for Emergency Relief because of immediate risk of 

irreparable harm to the marital estate.” The order required Husband “to execute a 

Quitclaim Deed (or other such document as may be required in Gaza to transfer title) to the 

property or properties previously referred to by the parties and the court as the ‘chalet 

property’ and the adjoining tract(s) of land in which [Husband] has or has had an interest 

to [Wife],” who would have no power to transfer or sell the property or to grant a power of 

attorney to others, without further order of the court.

In July 2017, Wife sought to amend her complaint pursuant to Rules 15.01, 19 and 

20 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, to include additional grounds and to add two 

parties, Husband’s brother, Nahed Abdulnabi (“Brother”) and sister-in-law, Rewa 

Gharbawe (“Sister-in-Law”), as defendants. In the proposed amended complaint, Wife 

alleged that Husband “has knowingly worked with his brother, Nahed Abdulnabi . . . and 

sister-in-law, Rewa Gharbawe, to control the marital funds and to deprive [Wife] and the 

children of the funds and property” and that they “have conspired to defeat the orders of 

this Court and the rights of [Husband]’s wife and children.” The court held a hearing on 

August 11, and over Husband’s objection, granted Wife’s motion to amend the complaint; 

an order was subsequently entered memorializing the oral ruling and holding that joinder 

was appropriate “pursuant to Rules 19 and 20” of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 

because “Plaintiff cannot obtain complete relief without the two additional Defendants and 

because the conspiracy alleged presents common fact questions and questions of law.” The 

amended complaint was filed on August 15, 2017. Wife mailed copies of the Amended 

Complaint to Brother and Sister-in-Law at their Georgia address and also attempted to 

serve the complaint through the Tennessee Secretary of State as well as by personal service. 

In April 2018, Wife sought a default judgment against Brother and Sister-in-Law

for their failure to file an answer and sought a judgment “in the amount of cash they 

received from the illicit sale of a portion of the property in Gaza (Four Hundred Fifty 

Thousand Dollars ($450,000.00), and for any and all rents and receipts received from the 
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maintenance and operation of Gaza property after February 22, 2017.”3 After a hearing at 

which both Brother and Sister-in-Law appeared and testified, the trial court stated on the 

record that Sister-in-Law attempted to evade service and orally granted a default judgment 

against her; an order memorializing the default judgment against Sister-in-Law was 

subsequently entered on August 7, 2018.

Brother had been served with the amended complaint while at the courthouse for 

the hearing during which the default judgment was entered against his wife. Despite the 

default judgment, Sister-in-Law joined in Brother’s answer, filed on June 11, 2018, in 

which they denied that they engaged in a civil conspiracy against Wife. In their answer, 

they admitted that “[Husband] has executed a power of attorney for [Brother] related to 

property in the Gaza Strip.” They also asserted a counter/cross-claim against Husband and 

Wife for Husband’s fraud, misrepresentation, constructive fraud, and unjust enrichment 

stemming from their business dealings “prior to the year 2000,” various real estate 

transfers, and expenses and losses incurred while acting as Husband’s agent in Gaza. 

Brother and Sister-in-Law sought “actual, compensatory, incidental damages, 

consequential damages, and/or punitive damages” from Husband and Wife. Wife duly filed 

an answer to the counter complaint raised against her; though Brother and Sister-in-Law 

filed a motion for default judgment against Husband, the record does not contain an answer 

to the cross-claims raised against him.

Wife filed a motion to bifurcate the issues of the grounds for the divorce from the 

remaining issues in the divorce; after a hearing, the trial court entered an order on January 

31, 2019, awarding Wife a divorce on the basis of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct 

“in the form of physical and emotional abuse” and his felony conviction, for which he had 

been sentenced to serve seventeen years in the penitentiary. 

On February 6, 2019, Husband’s counsel filed a motion to be relieved as counsel on 

the basis that Husband had filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel, and thus he could no longer effectively represent Husband in the 

divorce proceedings. The court granted the motion on February 8 permitting Husband’s 

counsel to withdraw and ordered that “[t]his matter continues to be set for trial on February 

25–27, 2019, and March 4, 2019”; that “[t]he relieving of Mr. Jolley as counsel will not 

continue this trial date”; and that Husband “shall obtain new counsel or represent himself.”

Meanwhile, Brother and Sister-in-Law fired their attorney and hired another one, 

who filed a motion to continue the trial “until such time as the undersigned has adequate 

time to prepare the defense of his client”; that motion was denied. They also filed another 

 

3 February 22, 2017 was the date imposed by the trial court’s March 20 order that required Husband 

to instruct all persons receiving funds “from any property in which he has or had an interest (including, but 

not limited to the Gaza Strip properties) to pay only the reasonable and necessary expenses related to the 

property and forward to [Wife] all net revenues for the next sixty (60) days (starting February 22, 2017).” 
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motion seeking the trial court’s permission to appeal the court’s “subject matter jurisdiction 

over the plaintiff’s claims.”4 No order was entered on the motion for interlocutory appeal, 

and Brother and Sister-in-Law did not seek permission in this Court to pursue an 

extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

A trial on the remaining issues, namely child support, the division of the marital 

property, alimony, and Brother’s cross/counter-claims, was held on February 25, 26, and 

27, 2019. During the trial, Wife, the parties’ two daughters, Sister-in-Law, Husband, and 

Brother testified. 

By order entered June 25, 2019 (“the June 25 order”), the trial court dismissed 

Brother’s claims as being “without merit and not supported by any competent evidence.” 

The trial court also made an adverse credibility finding: “Brother, [Husband], and [Sisterin-Law] have no credibility given their actions and testimony during this pendency of this 

case.” 

The trial court set Husband’s child support obligation at $1,000 per month for the 

two children who were still under the age of majority and continued child support 

indefinitely for the couple’s youngest child, who is disabled, at a rate of $500 per month.

The court also awarded Wife a $76,500.00 judgment for child support arrearages since 

February 2016, when the couple stopped living together due to Husband’s incarceration. 

The order stated that the Court adopted the residential, co-parenting, and decision making 

 

4 The court, in a hearing on Brother and Sister-in-Law’s motion to continue on February 19, had 

stated:

THE COURT: Okay. I realize that I can’t order land sold or do stuff with it that I 

could if it were in Tennessee, but I absolutely have personal jurisdiction over people here, 

and have exercised long-arm and subject-matter jurisdiction over your clients without any 

objection in nearly a year and a half. That would tell me I’m capable of telling them that 

they need to do the following with the property or the proceeds or whatever else. 

So I’m not sure that there is a subject-matter jurisdiction issue with regard to the 

land itself when I have jurisdiction over the people.

The substance of Brother and Sister-in-Law’s argument in the motion requesting the trial court’s permission 

to seek interlocutory appeal was:

The property in question is real property wholly located in “Gaza”. . . . This 

Honorable Court would have no power to force the nullification of a conveyance which 

occurred in a location/territory that has no duty or willingness to give full faith and credit 

to the judgment(s) of this Honorable Court. Further, and subject to further proof in this 

action, your movant assumes that this Court would lack both personal and subject matter 

jurisdiction over the transferees of said property, should it be shown that the purchasers of 

said property were natives of Gaza or some other foreign land. As such, this Court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over this action for the purpose of the remedies sought by the 

Plaintiff[.]
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provisions of Wife’s proposed plan and that Wife’s counsel was to submit a parenting plan, 

containing Wife’s proposed provisions and the Court’s child support rulings, to the Court 

for entry. 

The court also found that Wife was a candidate for alimony in futuro, given her need 

of $3,000.00 per month, lack of education and earning ability, and inability to work full 

time given her status as the sole caretaker for the parties’ severely disabled son, rendering

her “not capable of pursuing the education and training necessary to use her foreign degree 

in education.” However, given Husband’s incarceration, the court found that he “has no 

ability to pay alimony at this time” and ordered alimony in futuro in the amount of $100.00

per month until he is released from incarceration and a determination could be made as to 

the parties’ circumstances. The court also awarded Wife her attorney’s fees incurred prior 

to trial, in the amount of $94,724.00. Wife was awarded a judgment of $131,472.00 for 

pendente lite expenses that Husband failed to pay.

The trial court adopted Wife’s valuations of the various marital assets and divided 

the marital assets and debts. Exhibit 1 to the final divorce contains the court’s assigned 

values and division of the marital assets and debts, which reflect that Husband received 

assets and debts amounting to a net total of $1,012,012.00 and Wife receiving $891,236.75. 

The trial court also found that Husband had dissipated the marital estate during the 

pendency of the divorce “through the sale of four apartments in Gaza,” by paying $45,000 

to purchase a car wash, and by not accounting “for $46,000 that is missing from funds 

related to Brother’s sale of various pieces of Gaza property.” With respect to the 

conspiracy to dispose of marital property in Gaza by Husband, Brother, and Sister-in-Law, 

the court set forth in great specificity the property transfers and communications that took 

place and held:

7. Between the time of [Husband]’s arrest in February 2012 and his 

conviction in 2016, he engaged in a series of actions the Court finds are 

designed to prevent [Wife] from sharing in the marital estate and prevent this 

Court from exercising jurisdiction over it. . . .

* * *

[Husband], Brother, and [Sister-in-Law] jointly conspired to violate 

this Court’s orders, dispose of marital property in such a fashion as to 

defeat [Wife]’s rightful claim to an equitable division of the marital 

estate.

The judgment ultimately awarded to Wife reads:

10. Father, Brother and [Sister-in-Law] are hereby ordered to place for sale 

all of the Gaza property remaining titled in Father’s name. The parties shall 
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use their best efforts to accomplish a commercially reasonable sale for a fair 

market price given the values the parties testified to in open court and the 

Court’s valuation found herein. In addition, they are ordered to place for sale 

the two pieces of property held in Brother’s name. From the proceeds of the 

sale, Mother shall be paid the sum of $690,357.00 (See Exhibit 1 Line 8). 

From Father’s portion of the proceeds, Mother shall be paid an additional 

$529,475.47 for the judgments awarded to her herein against Father, Brother, 

and [Sister-in-Law] jointly and severally. The judgment includes $76,500.00 

for child support arrearages, $131,472.00 for pendente lite support 

arrearages, $110,443.37 for one-half of the amount due for the sale of 1,250

square meters of Gaza property, $116,336.00 for one-half of the 590 square 

meters of property Brother transferred to himself, and $94,724.00 for Wife’s 

pre-trial attorney’s fees. In the event that the sale does not suffice to pay the 

full amount awarded to Mother herein, the funds shall first be applied to 

Father’s outstanding obligations to Mother and then to the joint and several 

judgements against Father and his coconspirators. Any unpaid amount shall 

remain a judgment and earn interest at the maximum statutory rate for 

judgments commencing upon this Order becoming final.

Husband filed a motion for a new trial, asserting, inter alia, that the court abused its 

discretion by denying a “request for a continuance to allow him sufficient time in which to 

locate counsel to represent him.” Husband also asserted that the court “judicially interfered 

with the prenuptial agreement and erred in refusing to allow or even consider the prenuptial 

agreement to be entered into the record by the defendant.” He also contended that the court 

“erred in assessing an excessive amount of child support and alimony in light of the 

prenuptial agreement that the defendant was prevented from entering into evidence.” No 

exhibits, affidavits, or other materials were attached to the motion. The trial court construed 

the motion as one to alter or amend the judgment and denied it. 

Meanwhile, Brother and Sister-in-Law had filed their notice of appeal. After entry 

of the court’s order denying Husband’s motion for a new trial, Husband also appealed.

On October 10, 2019, the court entered a permanent parenting plan naming Wife as 

primary residential parent and awarding Husband zero days of parenting time. The plan 

contained the following “special provisions” in section J:

There shall be no physical contact with the children due to 

[Husband]’s convictions for violent felonies and seventeen (17) year 

sentence, no visits at prison, no Facetime or its equivalent. [Husband] is 

hereby restrained and enjoined from giving personal information about his 

children to other prisoners and/or encouraging other inmates to contact the 

children now or upon release.
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The order set Husband’s gross monthly income at $3,336.00 and Wife’s at $864.00. 

Husband’s child support order was set at $1,000 per month, which was to “change to 

$500.00 per month when Omar ages out or graduates from high school, whichever is last.” 

With respect to the parties’ other child, the order provided that a “500.00 child support 

[obligation] shall continue indefinitely because of Hamza’s special needs. This will be 

needed for Hamza’s lifetime, and shall be modifiable.” The order also struck through the 

boilerplate list of parents’ rights, as set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-

101, “[i]n light of Father’s history of violent felonies.”

With the entry of the parenting plan, this Court, by order entered October 22, 2019, 

deemed the premature notices of appeal filed by Brother and Sister-in-Law and Husband 

to be filed after entry of the parenting plan, which represented the final judgment.

ISSUES PRESENTED

This divorce appeal is unusual in that no party is challenging the court’s 

classification or division of marital assets or the designation of primary residential parent. 

Instead, Brother and Sister-in-Law challenge the court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the 

conspiracy to defraud claim levied against them and the judgment it ultimately entered by 

raising the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in asserting in rem subject matter jurisdiction 

over real property located in the Gaza Strip and assuming supplemental 

and/or pendent jurisdiction over non-spousal parties in a divorce case.

2. Whether the trial court erred in imposing liability for damages against 

nonspousal parties for civil conspiracy to dissipate marital assets in a divorce 

case.[5]

3. Whether the trial court erred in assigning $1,380,714.00 as the value of 

marital property located in the Gaza Strip without competent and reliable 

testimony, and without explanation.

4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that Defendants 

Nahed Abdulnabi and Rewa Gharbawe engaged in a civil conspiracy with 

Nehad Abdelnabi (Husband) to dissipate marital assets.

5. Whether dissipation of marital assets sufficiently constitutes a predicate tort 

necessary for a plaintiff to sustain a claim for civil conspiracy where no 

predicate tort and requisite culpable mental state is pled or established by the 

evidence at trial.

6. Whether the Court erred in awarding judgment for relief which was not 

 

5 This issue is not addressed in the argument section of their brief, which normally would constitute 

a waiver of the issue. Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). However, their arguments 

pertaining to Issues 4, 5, and 6 appear to also address this issue, and thus we will effectively resolve Issue 

2 in our treatment of those issues in sections C and E, infra.
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requested in the Complaint and all subsequent iterations of same.

7. Whether the total amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff was contrary 

to the law and evidence and unjustifiably excessive, and whether the trial 

court erred because it did not articulate the legal and factual basis supporting 

its decision.

We note that a default judgment was entered against Sister-in-Law, which has not 

been appealed. “A judgment for default impliedly constitutes an admission of all the 

properly pleaded material allegations of fact contained in the complaint, except the 

plaintiff’s unliquidated damages.” Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 495 (Tenn. 

2012) (citing Patterson v. Rockwell Int’l, 665 S.W.2d 96, 101 (Tenn. 1984); State ex rel. 

Jones v. Looper, 86 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)). Accordingly, Sister-in-Law

has no basis for raising Issues 2, 3, 4, and 5. However, given that Brother did not have a 

default judgment entered against him, we will still consider all of the issues raised by these 

parties.

Husband also appeals, raising the following issues for our review:

1. [Whether t]he trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s request for a continuance 

to allow new counsel time to prepare for trial;

2. [Whether t]he trial court erred in assessing an excessive amount of child support 

and alimony; and, 

3. [Whether t]he trial court erred in adopting the Plaintiff’s proposed parenting plan 

over the Defendant’s objection.

Husband has been a zealous advocate for himself on appeal and has filed numerous 

motions, none of which directly bear on the resolution of the issues raised in this appeal.

One remains pending, which we have addressed in a separate order, denying the sanctions 

he seeks.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case was tried by the trial court sitting without a jury. Accordingly, we review 

the case de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness regarding the trial 

court’s findings of fact and will affirm the trial court’s findings unless the preponderance 

of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Cannon v. Loudon Cty., 199 S.W.3d 

239, 241 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 

87, 91 (Tenn. 1993)). In order for the evidence to preponderate against a particular finding 

of fact, it must support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect. Ingram v. 

Wasson, 379 S.W.3d 227, 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). “[W]hen the 

resolution of the issues in a case depends upon the truthfulness of witnesses, the trial judge 

who has the opportunity to observe the witnesses in their manner and demeanor while 

testifying is in a far better position than this Court to decide those issues.” Riggs v. Riggs, 
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250 S.W.3d 453, 456 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 910 S.W.2d 

412, 415 (Tenn. Workers Comp. Panel, 1995); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 957 S.W.2d 834, 

837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). As such, we give great weight to the credibility accorded to a 

witness by the trial court. Id. (citations omitted). No presumption of correctness, however, 

attaches to the trial court’s conclusions of law and our review is de novo. Bowden v. Ward,

27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000).

ANALYSIS

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Brother and Sister-in-Law argue that “[t]he Tennessee Constitution, the General 

Assembly, or the common law have not conferred on divorce courts the power to adjudicate 

cases of this nature, [t]o wit, cases seeking to set aside real property transactions in the 

Gaza Strip, a foreign land under terrorist control.” Thus, they argue, “the trial court lacked 

in rem subject matter jurisdiction over real property located wholly within the Gaza Strip.” 

In Tennessee, circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the chancery courts to 

grant divorces. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-10-108. By virtue of Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 36-4-121, a court trying a divorce case is empowered to “equitably divide, 

distribute or assign the marital property” and “to effectuate its decree by divesting and reinvesting title to such and, where deemed necessary, to order a sale of such property and 

to order the proceeds divided between the parties.” Knobler v. Knobler, 697 S.W.2d 583, 

585 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). While “a court of one state is without jurisdiction to pass title 

to lands lying wholly in another state” and, thus, that “[t]he local court cannot by its decree 

bind [such] land,” it is well-settled that, “in a proper case, with the necessary parties before 

the court, a decree in personam may be properly passed requiring a party defendant holding 

the legal title in trust, or otherwise, to transfer such title in accordance with the decree of 

the court.” Cory v. Olmstead, 154 Tenn. 513, 290 S.W. 31, 32 (Tenn. 1926). 

Brother and Sister-in-Law’s brief does not acknowledge the foregoing authority. 

Instead, they rely on the test set forth in Staats v. McKinnon6to argue that “[t]he nature or 

 

6

In Staats, this Court explained:

The existence of subject matter jurisdiction depends on the nature of the cause of 

action and the relief sought. Thus, when a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is questioned, 

it must first ascertain the nature or gravamen of the case. The court must then determine 

whether the Tennessee Constitution, the General Assembly, or the common law have 

conferred on it the power to adjudicate cases of that sort. Both determinations present 

questions of law which this court reviews de novo without a presumption of correctness.

206 S.W.3d 532, 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted).
- 13 -

gravamen of the instant case against [Brother] and [Sister-in-Law] is [the] supplemental 

claim for allegedly engaging in a civil conspiracy to dissipate marital assets.”

We respectfully disagree. The Amended Complaint first fully incorporated the 

initial complaint for divorce, and Wife’s addition of a conspiracy to defraud claim was an 

attempt to hold Husband, Brother, and Sister-in-Law liable for transferring marital assets 

outside the marital estate that was intertwined with the divorce proceedings.

7 We conclude 

that the gravamen of the complaint is a divorce matter. 

As to relief, while Wife requested in the Amended Complaint “[t]hat all transfers of 

property from [Husband] and/or [Brother] and/or [Sister-in-Law] be declared null and void 

and the property be disgorged and restored to the marital estate,” she alternatively 

requested “that judgment enter against all the Defendants jointly and severally for all funds 

received that relate to the property and losses associated with their actions or inactions.”

The court’s June 25 order does not attempt to set aside the transactions relating to 

the real property in the Gaza Strip or transfer legal title to the Gaza Strip properties, as 

 

7

In the Amended Complaint, Wife alleged: 

8. Original Defendant has knowingly worked with his brother, Nahed Abdulnabi, 

and sister-in-law, Rewa Gharbawe, to control the martial funds and to deprive Ms. Sekik 

and the children of the funds and property. 

* * *

10. In April 2017, Rewa Gharbawe arranged for Samir Farhat, a Florida notary to 

notarize an illegal Power of Attorney for Defendants. 

11. Original Defendant’s brother, Nahed, is, on information and belief, in Gaza at 

this time attempting to sell the property. Nahed has an executed Power of Attorney 

(attached hereto as Exhibit B), that appears to have been notarized by a Florida notary on 

April 24, 2017, some three (3) months after this Court’s admonition that the property be 

held for the benefit of the family pending the final divorce. Nahed has told friends and 

relatives that he is doing as his brother, Original Defendant, directs.

12. Original Defendant, his brother and sister-in-law have conspired to defeat the 

orders of this Court and the rights of Original Defendant's wife and children.

13. This Honorable Court has already assumed jurisdiction over Nehad Abdelnabi. 

Personal jurisdiction is proper over Nahed Abdulnabi and Rewa Gharbawe under the civil 

conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction as articulated by the Tennessee Supreme Court 

and Chenault v. Walker, 365 S.W. 3d 45 (Tenn. 2001). The Defendants have jointly and 

fraudulently acted to attempt to convey the parties’ property and to sequester the funds 

arising therefrom. These acts while the divorce is pending constitute a civil conspiracy as 

well as contempt of the statutory injunctions and Order of this Court.
- 14 -

Brother and Sister-in-Law argue; rather, it sought to compel Husband, Brother, and Sisterin-Law to convey the land so as to realize Wife’s marital share of the assets transferred 

during the pendency of the divorce by awarding Wife a “judgment, jointly and severally 

against [Husband], Brother, and [Sister-in-Law] for $116,336.00 for her one-half interest 

in the property transferred to Brother in violation of this Court’s orders” and ordered 

Husband, Brother, and Sister-in-Law “to place for sale all of the Gaza property remaining 

titled in [Husband]’s name . . . and the two pieces of property held in Brother’s name.” 

From the proceeds of that sale, Wife was to be paid for her share of the real property in 

Gaza, which no party disputes was a marital asset subject to division. 

We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction over this divorce action and thus

properly exercised its jurisdiction to order the land sold and equitably divide and distribute 

the proceeds from the sale of marital property located in the Gaza Strip. 

B. Jurisdiction over Non-Spousal Parties

Brother and Sister-in-Law argue that the trial court “improperly exercised pendent 

and supplemental jurisdiction over claims against non-spousal parties in a divorce case.” 

Brother and Sister-in-Law’s articulation of this issue is imprecisely worded and 

incorrectly refers to a federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction over State law claims, which 

is not applicable in this case. We perceive that they are in fact challenging the court’s 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over them, in light of this further contention in their brief:

Plaintiff charged non-spousal parties Nahed Abdulnabi and Rewa 

Gharbawe with conspiracy to dissipate marital assets, which is not authorized 

by the divorce statutes, the Tennessee Constitution, the General Assembly or 

the common law. The trial court’s permissive joinder of non-spousal parties 

as additional defendants in a divorce case for allegedly engaging in a civil 

conspiracy with Husband to dissipate marital assets is plain error and an 

abuse of discretion. This case must be dismissed on the basis that the trial 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over non-spousal parties in a divorce 

case.

As a general matter, we perceive no conflict with “the divorce statues, the Tennessee 

Constitution, or the General Assembly” in the joinder of non-spousal parties who were

alleged to be involved in the transfer of marital assets so as to put them outside the marital 

estate.8 To the extent Brother and Sister-in-Law intend to argue that the trial court abused 

 

8 For example, in Kilgore v. Kilgore, a husband, with wife’s acquiescence, had attempted to convey 

two parcels of real property to their son to defraud the IRS. No. M2006-00495-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 

2254568, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2007). The Wife filed an answer to the husband’s subsequent 

complaint for divorce and then filed a third-party complaint against their son and another relative to whom 

he had deeded part of the property that the wife contended was actually part of the marital estate. Id. This 
- 15 -

its discretion in joining them as parties to the lawsuit, their arguments on appeal fail to 

make an argument demonstrating how the court erred in this regard and have thus waived 

the issue. Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that “an issue 

is waived where it is simply raised without any argument regarding its merits”) 

(citing Blair v. Badenhope, 940 S.W.2d 575, 576–577 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Bank of 

Crockett v. Cullipher, 752 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988))

“[A] decision regarding the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant 

involves a question of law to which de novo review applies.” Turner v. Turner, 473 

S.W.3d 257, 268 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting Gordon v. Greenview Hosp., Inc., 300 S.W.3d 

635, 645 (Tenn. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[P]ersonal jurisdiction recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest that flows 

from the Due Process Clause and requires that maintenance of the suit “not offend 

‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 

257, 270 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 

Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, (1982)). “It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a 

matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.” Turner, 473 at 270 (quoting

Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703). “Because the requirement 

of personal jurisdiction functions to protect an individual right, it can, like other such 

rights, be waived.” Id. Further, a defendant waives his right to contest the court’s 

jurisdiction over him by recognizing “the proper pendency of the cause by making a motion 

that goes to the merits or by filing an answer, without 

challenging personal jurisdiction.” First Century Bank v. Duyos, No. E2019-01441-COAR3-CV, 2020 WL 3258457, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2020) (quoting Landers v. 

Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tenn. 1994)). “[A] defendant is permitted to raise the defense 

of lack of personal jurisdiction at the same time other defenses are raised. Waiver occurs 

only if there is no objection to personal jurisdiction in the first filing, either a Rule 

12 motion or an answer.” Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tenn. 1994). 

In order for a state to have personal jurisdiction over a non-resident party, such as 

Brother and Sister-in-Law, who live in Georgia, the state must achieve service of process 

and must also have minimum contacts with the individual. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of 

Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Masada 

Investment Corp. v. Allen, 697 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tenn. 1985). Generally, these contacts 

must be such that the party “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in that 

state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 

(1980); Masada, 697 S.W.2d at 334. The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that 

Tennessee courts can exercise “conspiracy theory personal jurisdiction” over non-resident 

 

Court was not called upon to decide whether the joinder of the third-party defendants was proper but 

proceeded to adjudicate the issues they and Husband raised on appeal, holding that the transfer of land was 

void ab initio and that the Husband and Wife retained ownership of the parcels, such that they were properly 

subject to division. Id. at *6–7.
- 16 -

defendants when:

(1) two or more individuals conspire to do something,

(2) that they could reasonably expect to lead to consequences in a particular 

forum, if

(3) one co-conspirator commits overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, 

and

(4) those acts are of a type which, if committed by a non-resident, would 

subject the non-resident to personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute 

of the forum state,

then those overt acts are attributable to the other co-conspirators, who thus 

become subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum, even if they have no 

direct contacts with the forum.

Chenault v. Walker, 36 S.W.3d 45, 53 (Tenn. 2001). The relevant portion of the Tennessee 

long-arm statute reads:

(a) Persons who are nonresidents of Tennessee and residents of Tennessee 

who are outside the state and cannot be personally served with process 

within the state are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as 

to any action or claim for relief arising from:

* * *

(2) Any tortious act or omission within the state;

* * *

(6) Any basis not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or of the 

United States.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-2-214.

In this case, the Amended Complaint alleged that Husband “has both dissipated 

marital assets and engaged in a civil conspiracy with his brother . . . and sister-in-law . . . 

with the intent to fraudulently defeat [Wife]’s claim for equitable division and this Court’s 

ability to award such properties to [Wife].” Specifically, the amended complaint alleged 

that Husband, Brother, and Sister-in-Law “have jointly and fraudulently acted to attempt 

to convey the parties’ property and to sequester the funds arising therefrom[, and t]hese 

acts while the divorce is pending constitute a civil conspiracy as well as contempt of the 

statutory injunctions and Order of this Court.” Moreover, it is undisputed that not only did 

Brother and Sister-in-Law appear in court to defend these allegations, they filed a 
- 17 -

counter/cross-claim against Husband and Wife, thus availing themselves of the jurisdiction 

of the court. Most importantly, in answering the amended complaint, they did not raise 

personal jurisdiction as a defense or otherwise object to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction 

over them. They have thus waived the issue. Landers, 872 S.W.2d at 676. We hold that 

the court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Brother and Sister-in-Law.

C. Conspiracy

In the second, fourth, and fifth issues they raise, Brother and Sister-in-Law

challenge the court’s imposition of liability against them, as “non-spousal parties [to the 

divorce] for engaging in a civil conspiracy with Husband to dissipate marital assets.” They 

argue that “there is no private cause of action for dissipation of marital assets against nonspousal parties in a divorce case in the State of Tennessee.” 

At the outset of our consideration of these issues, we must clarify that Wife did not 

allege that Brother and Sister-in-Law dissipated marital assets but that they conspired to 

convey marital property and keep the funds resulting from that sale away from Wife. 

Dissipation of marital assets is to be considered in the context of dividing the marital estate, 

and no party to this appeal is challenging the court’s division.9 Brother and Sister-in-Law’s

 

9 Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c)(5)(B) defines “dissipation of assets” as “wasteful 

expenditures which reduce the marital property available for equitable distributions and which are made for

a purpose contrary to the marriage either before or after a complaint for divorce or legal separation has been 

filed.” This Court has held that “[d]issipation of marital property occurs when one spouse uses marital 

property, frivolously and without justification, for a purpose unrelated to the marriage and at a time when 

the marriage is breaking down.” Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 681–82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) 

(citations omitted). It involves “intentional or purposeful conduct . . . that has the effect of reducing the 

funds available for equitable distribution.” Id. at 682. An “allegedly improper or wasteful expenditure or

transaction must be considered in the context of the marriage as a whole, and it must be weighed along with 

all the other relevant factors in the case.” Id. (citing Kittredge v. Kittredge, 803 N.E.2d 306, 316 (Mass. 

2004)). In determining whether a transaction amounts to dissipation, the court is to consider the following 

factors:

(1) whether the expenditure benefitted the marriage or was made for a purpose entirely 

unrelated to the marriage; (2) whether the expenditure or transaction occurred when the 

parties were experiencing marital difficulties or were contemplating divorce; (3) whether 

the expenditure was excessive or de minimis; and (4) whether the dissipating party intended 

to hide, deplete, or divert a marital asset.

Id. (footnote omitted). In Melvin v. Johnson-Melvin, Judge Koch observed in his concurring opinion:

Parties who dissipate marital assets should not be permitted to benefit from their conduct. 

However, the remedy for dissipation is not found in adjusting the value of the marital assets 

but rather in the allocation of the marital estate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5) 

specifically instructs courts to consider the dissipation of marital property when dividing 

marital property. Accordingly, the courts may appropriately reduce the share of the marital 

estate a party receives if the court finds that the party has dissipated marital assets.
- 18 -

argument is long on the law of dissipation but short on any explanation as to why they 

believe their actions do not amount to conspiracy with Husband to defraud Wife of a 

portion of the marital estate, which is the allegation that the court found was substantiated 

by the proof. Nor do they include any citations to the record illustrating any relevant facts 

that would warrant reversal of the trial court’s findings in this regard. 

The tort of conspiracy to defraud “is defined as a ‘combination between two or more 

persons to accomplish by concert an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a purpose not in 

itself unlawful by unlawful means.’” Brown v. Birman Managed Care, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 

62, 67 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Chenault, 36 S.W.3d 45). In Brown, we further explained:

Each conspirator must have the intent to accomplish this common 

purpose, and each must know of the other’s intent. Dale [v. Thomas H. 

Temple Co.], 186 Tenn. [69] at 90, 208 S.W.2d [344] at 353–54 [(Tenn. 

1948)]. The agreement “need not be formal, the understanding may be a tacit 

one, and it is not essential that each conspirator have knowledge of the details 

of the conspiracy.” Id. Finally, “it is [a] basic principle that each conspirator 

is responsible for everything done by his confederate which the execution of 

the common design makes probable as a consequence”; in other words, each 

conspirator is liable for the damage caused by the other. Id. 186 Tenn. at 90–

91, 208 S.W.2d at 354; accord Huckeby [v. Spangler], 521 S.W.2d [568] at 

573–74 [(Tenn. 1974)].

Id. This Court has previously explained the concept of conspiracy to defraud in Taylor v. 

George:

As defined in Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 

344 (Tenn. 1948), “[a] ‘conspiracy to defraud’ on the part of two or more 

persons means a common purpose, supported by a concerted action to 

defraud, that each has the intent to do it, and that it is common to each of 

them, and that each has the understanding that the other has that 

purpose.” 208 S.W.2d at 353–354. . . .

As stated in 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy, § 9:

A mere conspiracy to commit a fraud is never of itself a cause 

of action; it must be proved that there was a conspiracy to 

defraud and a participation in the fraudulent purpose, either in 

 

2006 WL 1132042, at *10 (Koch, P.J., concurring).
- 19 -

the scheme or in its execution, which worked injury as a 

proximate consequence. It is the civil wrong resulting in 

damage and not the conspiracy which constitutes the cause of 

action for conspiracy to defraud.

Pusser v. Gordon, 684 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); see 

also Brown v. Birman Managed Care, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tenn. 2001) 

(recognizing that a conspiracy to defraud claim requires underlying 

demonstration of fraud); Stanfill v. Hardney, No. M2004-02768-COA-R3-

CV, 2007 WL 2827498 at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2007) (holding that a 

conspiracy claim requires showing of commission of tortious or wrongful 

act).

No. E2014-00608-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1218658, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2015). 

Fraud itself is not specifically defined, and this Court has observed that “fraud remains a 

generic term broad enough to encompass ‘all acts, omissions, or concealments which

involve a breach of legal and equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, and are 

injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of 

another.’” Keith v. Murfreesboro Livestock Mkt., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1989) (quoting Smith v. Harrison, 49 Tenn. 230, 243–44 (Tenn. 1870)). Intention to 

defraud is itself a question of fact. Id.

 We turn to a review of the pertinent evidence in the record. Husband testified that 

he owned property in Gaza, some of which had been sold in June 2017, while he was in 

prison, by “ma[king] a power of attorney to [his] brother.” He explained that process, 

which he testified he knew was against the court’s order enjoining him from disposing of 

marital assets, as follows: 

Q. How did you make a power of attorney?

A. Well, by contracting -- by asking my sister to help me find somebody 

where -- in working at the Palestinian embassy to try to make a power of 

attorney and send it to my brother.

Q. Okay. You did that from prison?

A. I called my sister and asked her to help me out -- yes. I called her from 

prison, yes. Correct, sir.

***

Q. Is this the power of attorney that you issued?

A. This is a translation of it.

Q. Translation. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. This is also part of Exhibit 20. Do you recognize this?

A. Yes.

Q. And what is it?
- 20 -

A. This is the power of attorney.

* * *

Q. How did you create this document?

A. I got some people to write it for me, and, in turn, this – I got somebody to 

notarize it for me and sign it.

Q. What, if anything, did you do with this document once it was notarized? 

A. I just wanted to try to find a way where I get it to reach my brother in 

Palestine.

Q. Was that against this court’s order?

A. I believe so. Yes sir.

Brother testified that he “got a call from [Husband] . . . through [Sister-in-Law], that 

[Husband] wanted to execute a power of attorney to sell some of the property, the chalet 

property, to pay off the loan on [the] Gleason Road [property] . . . for the sake of [his] 

kids.” Brother testified that he encouraged Husband “not to really mess with it and just 

leave it alone at this time” and to instead “worry about all of the issues that he had . . . the 

other legal issues that he’s going through, . . . the criminal stuff and . . . problems with his 

wife, and . . . the kids, and a lot more stuff that he really needed to worry about.” Brother 

testified that Husband prevailed on him, so at his brother’s request, he contacted the Red 

Cross in Gaza and the Palestinian consulate, who provided the name of Samir Farhat, an 

attorney who could help them. Brother testified that he paid Mr. Farhat approximately 

$3200.00 to travel to Nashville from Florida, “execute the signature” on a power of 

attorney and a “sworn confession” of Husband, take the documents and “deal with the 

Palestinian consulate, notarize, you know, the documents and finalize everything to make 

it legal, and then he would basically mail them to me in Gaza.” 

Brother also testified that he would not have gotten involved in the situation had he 

known a divorce was pending between Husband and Wife “because it’s not the right thing 

to do and it’s illegal.” He testified that from his own personal experience going through 

divorce, he knew that selling or encumbering marital property during the proceeding of a 

divorce is prohibited. While testifying, he was shown a statement in his Answer and 

Counterclaim that he and Sister-in-Law “were aware that [Wife] and [Husband] had filed 

for divorce back in 2012, but at no time relevant to the facts of this case did they have 

personal knowledge as to the status of the proceedings of that divorce.” He denied that the 

statement was correct and also testified that he “had never seen [that pleading] ever before 

this time, never.” 

Brother denied that he had helped Husband and Wife come to an agreement that 

settled the order of protection matter, but subsequently contradicted his testimony by 

testifying that he served as a mediator between them: 
- 21 -

Q. [Wife]’s never gotten you involved in legal disputes over property?

A. She is now. She is involved me. She knows the whole story.

Q. Excuse me?

A. She really knows more than anybody else that we shouldn’t be really here, 

me and my wife. Because really, our intentions from the beginning up until 

this point to help her, and help her kids, and help her husband to save the 

properties. I almost got killed a few times in Gaza trying to save their 

properties.

Q. But you never made a single mortgage payment on the house the children 

and the wife lived in? 

A. Ask me why.

Q. You never did it?

A. Ask me why. You need to know why because I had the power of attorney 

for my brother and suggested to him to do this, and do that, and do this, and 

do that, and he said, she has a $100,000 worth of gold. If you pay any of that 

stuff, any of that money to her, I’m not going to be responsible for it. You 

put yourself in my shoe, what would you do?

Q. You never made any payments toward the child support obligation?

A. I never really obligated to. I was a mediator to try to just make [Husband]

do the right thing. And she knows, I tried the hardest to really make him do 

the right thing, put all of the personal conflicts between you and her on the 

side. You got kids, you need the kids to feel secure in their home. How many 

times did I tell you that and you, too.

(Emphasis added). 

Husband’s testimony corroborates Brother and Wife’s testimony that Brother 

served as mediator between Husband and Wife when Wife sought an order of protection 

from Husband after the complaint for divorce was filed. It also supports a conclusion that 

Husband directed Brother to not pay “any of that money to [Wife].” 

Husband initially testified that Brother was not aware of the divorce proceedings 

but then changed his testimony to state that Brother was aware of the divorce:

Q. Did you keep it a secret from [Brother] that [Wife] had filed for divorce 

against you?

A. Did I keep it -- No, he knew about it.

Q. He knew that?

A. I believe he did. I believe -- yes. I believe he did. I’m not really sure, 

ma’am. It’s been a while, and I was in the state of the mind -- or a state of 

mind -- I was really drained. 

Q. Let me -- let me see if this will help you remember.

A. Sure, ma’am. Yes.
- 22 -

Q. September 26, 2012?

A. September 26, 2012. Okay.

Q. We were right outside this courtroom in the hallway on the order of 

protection. Do you recall that?

A. Yes, he was on the phone. Yes.

Q. And he was on the phone?

A. Correct.

Q. And what was he doing on the phone with you during that time?

A. He was mediating between me and my ex, yes. Yeah. He was speaking 

with her and speaking with you, I think. Yes. I spoke with him briefly that 

day. Yes, ma’am.

Q. He worked out the agreement for you so that you didn’t have to have a 

hearing that day, the order of protection that you agreed to, correct?

A. I believe so, yes. And we went inside the Court and he signed. Yes.

Q. Including that list of expenses that you obligated yourself to pay for?

A. Correct, ma’am.

Q. Okay. So he had to be aware of the divorce, correct?

A. Yes, ma’am.

The above evidence contradicts Brother’s testimony that he was unaware of the divorce 

proceedings between Husband and Wife. 

Husband testified that he was aware that, as of the time he was served with the 

divorce complaint in 2012, he was under an injunction to not dispose of marital property 

and that he was fully aware of that order when he signed the power of attorney. He also 

testified that he had the power of attorney created so that his “brother [could] try to sell a 

portion of that land” in Gaza, though he believed it was against the court’s order to send 

the power of attorney to his brother in Palestine (Gaza). 

While Sister-in-Law testified that she did not remember the mutual restraining order 

entered in her own divorce proceedings in 2009, which provided that each party was 

“enjoined and restrained from selling, encumbering, trading, contracting to sell, or 

otherwise disposing [of] . . . any of the property belonging to the parties . . . ,” she also 

testified that she knew that if a divorce is filed, the property is not supposed to be sold until 

the divorce is decided. She testified that she had no knowledge of the divorce proceedings 

between Husband and Wife and would not have helped Husband execute the power of 

attorney, had she known. Sister-in-Law testified that she spoke with Samir Farhat, a Florida 

attorney and notary, after Husband called and “was begging” her to help him, saying 

“‘Please, please, please, I want to save my kids, my kids, my business, and this is not mine. 

This is my kids’ money. This is my kids’ living. Please can you help me? . . . I just want to 

do a power of attorney.’” She testified that she did not know about Husband and Wife’s 

divorce though she “kn[e]w they have conflict.” She also testified:
- 23 -

Q. . . . [Y]ou did know that if a divorce was filed that the property is not 

supposed to be sold? Everything’s supposed to be basically frozen until the 

divorce is decided?

A. I know that, yeah.

Q. All right. And that’s why you would have told him not to sign the – not to 

be involved with the power of attorney if you had known about the divorce?

A. But we didn’t know, either me or my husband, we did not know about the 

divorce.

Sister-in-Law testified that she facilitated three-way calls between Husband and 

Brother while Husband was incarcerated and Brother was in Gaza. She also testified that 

after Husband prevailed on her to help him secure a power of attorney, she contacted Samir 

Farhat and connected them via a three-way call. While they “talk together,” she said 

“sometimes I leave the phone because I have a lot to do inside, so sometimes I listen. 

Sometimes I don’t listen to the conversation.” She testified that, given the cost of executing 

the power of attorney documents in person, which Mr. Farhat insisted upon, she and 

Brother waited to get Husband’s approval, which he gave, and then she facilitated Mr. 

Farhat’s payment by telling her son to write him a check because she “do[es]n’t know how 

to write checks.” As to the amount Mr. Farhat was paid, she testified that it was “3200-

something. I’m not sure. Maybe 32, 33. I don’t know. Maybe 40, 50. I’m not sure about 

exact number.”

Wife testified that she spoke to Brother about the order of protection and about the 

divorce and that he encouraged her to drop the divorce proceedings. She testified that when 

Brother visited her in February, March, April, and May after Husband’s sentencing in 2016, 

he kept asking her “why do you need the divorce?”; that Brother asked her what her 

expectations were about the “Gaza land”; and that he told her she “cannot [have] any of 

this.” Wife testified about the family’s financial difficulties, the fact that she did not 

receive any money from the proceeds of renting or selling the property in Gaza, that she 

applied for food stamps in order to feed the family and has received those benefits since 

2016, and that “in the beginning, [she] g[o]t a lot of financial help from the Muslim 

community [when she] appl[ied] . . . for help or charity, and they send [her] money every 

month.” She testified that “[t]he community still help me, send me anonymous envelopes 

that ha[ve] cash or checks.” Wife also testified that she asked Brother if she wanted her “to 

keep begging from the Muslim community to live out of their charity,” when Husband had 

land while she could “barely . . . make the payment on the mortgage.” 

The record also contains the default judgment against Sister-in-Law, which has not 

been appealed and operates as an admission of the properly pleaded material allegations of 

fact contained in the complaint. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d at 495. Further, Brother and Sisterin-Law’s answer (filed after the default judgment was entered against Sister-in-Law) states 

that “they were aware that [Wife] and [Husband] had filed for divorce back in 2012.”
- 24 -

As we consider the above evidence, much of which is contradictory, we are mindful 

of the trial court’s adverse credibility finding with respect to the testimony of Brother, 

Sister-in-Law, and Husband. With respect to this cause of action, the trial court in this case 

held:

The record shows that Brother, despite notice of the January 2017

order, sold one thousand two hundred fifty square meters (1,250 SM) of the 

Chalet property on June 20, 2017, for the sum of Four Hundred Fifty-one 

Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($451,500.00), using the Power of Attorney 

that was certified by the Palestinian Embassy May 19, 2017. [Husband], 

Brother, and [Sister-in-Law] jointly conspired to violate this Court’s orders, 

dispose of marital property in such a fashion as to defeat Mother’s rightful 

claim to an equitable division of the marital estate.

Brother and Sister-in-Law do not cite to evidence in the record that preponderates 

against these findings, and we conclude, based on the evidence we have set forth above, 

that the record supports the trial court’s findings and its ultimate conclusion that Husband, 

Brother, and Sister-in-Law engaged in a conspiracy to defraud. Husband, Brother, and 

Sister-in-Law spent hours on the phone while Brother was in Gaza, and they were actively 

involved in the execution of a power of attorney to permit Brother to sell marital real estate 

in the Gaza Strip. The execution of that document in furtherance of Husband’s goal of 

preventing Wife from benefiting from parts of the marital estate constitutes conspiracy to 

defraud, as it was an act that was taken to effectuate a breach of Husband’s legal and 

equitable duty and was injurious to Wife. Keith, 780 S.W.2d at 754. While proceeds from 

the sale were used to attempt to preserve certain parts of the marital estate, such as the 

property where Husband’s business was located, Brother received funds in excess of the 

amount owed on that property but chose to not pay any of those monies to Wife to assist 

her in making the mortgage payment or helping with household expenses. Wife was 

required to reapply several times to refinance the mortgage on the marital home, to sell 

cars, and to seek public assistance in the form of food stamps as well as charity from the 

Muslim community in order to provide for her and her children’s basic needs. The 

evidence is clear that Husband, Brother, and Sister-in-Law worked together to accomplish 

an unlawful purpose of selling parcels of real property that were marital assets and 

preventing the proceeds from being used to benefit the marital estate, the Wife, or the 

children.

Brother and Sister-in-Law devote section 5 of the argument section of their brief to 

their position that they “cannot be held liable for damages for violating the temporary 

injunction or any restraining order or injunction [against disposing of marital property] 

entered in this case because they did not receive actual notice of any restraining order or 

injunction that is specific in terms and described in reasonable detail.” Given the proof in 

the record that Brother was aware of the pending divorce and his testimony that he knew 

that disposing of marital property while a divorce is pending is “illegal,” we conclude that 
- 25 -

there is little significance in whether Brother and Sister-in-Law received notice of the 

mandatory injunction. This is not a case involving contempt of a trial court’s order, but 

imposing liability for a civil conspiracy to defraud a spouse of the marital property to which 

she was entitled. The evidence simply does not preponderate against the trial court’s 

finding that Brother and Sister-in-Law engaged in this conspiracy knowing that it was 

improper. As such, this issue is respectfully without merit.10

The proof at trial establishes that these three parties procured a power of attorney so 

as to sell certain marital property, the proceeds of which Husband directed should be 

withheld from Wife and was not used to pay for the family’s living expenses. Based on the 

foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial court’s imposition of liability (and its exercise 

of personal jurisdiction via the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction) was fully 

supported by the record. Our conclusion in this regard resolves the second, fourth, and 

fifth issues raised by Brother and Sister-in-Law on appeal.

D. Valuation of Marital Property

The trial court valued the marital property in Gaza at $1,380,714.00 upon its finding 

that “[Wife]’s testimony and the method of valuation she proposed [is] credible and 

therefore adopts without modification her valuation of the various assets awarded to the 

parties.” Brother and Sister-in-Law challenge the court’s valuation of the remaining marital 

portion of the Gaza Strip property and argue that Wife should have submitted “competent 

and reliable expert testimony in support and a reliable appraisal, comparable sales data, or 

other documentary evidence” instead of relying on her own testimony. 

Our review of a trial court’s valuation was set forth in Wallace v. Wallace: 

The value of marital property is a fact question. Thus, a trial court’s decision 

with regard to the value of a marital asset will be given great weight on 

appeal. In accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), the trial court’s decisions 

with regard to the valuation and distribution of marital property will be 

presumed to be correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. 

The value of a marital asset is determined by considering all relevant 

evidence regarding value. The burden is on the parties to produce competent 

evidence of value, and the parties are bound by the evidence they present. 

Thus the trial court, in its discretion, is free to place a value on a marital asset 

that is within the range of the evidence submitted. 

 

10 The fifth issue, as phrased in their Statement of the Issues, was “Whether dissipation of marital 

assets sufficiently constitutes a predicate tort necessary for a plaintiff to sustain a claim for civil conspiracy 

where no predicate tort and requisite culpable mental state is pled or established by the evidence at trial.” 

We have addressed these concerns in our discussion of the tort of conspiracy to defraud.
- 26 -

733 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). The valuation and 

distribution of the marital estate rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the 

trial court’s decisions in this regard, “especially in matters involving the credibility of 

witnesses, should not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.” Melvin v. JohnsonMelvin, No. M2004-02106-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1132042, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 

27, 2006) (citing Ingram v. Ingram, 721 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)).

The parties do not make it abundantly clear in their briefs or the proof presented at 

trial how large “the Gaza property” is. The evidence in the record, specifically the 

testimony of Wife, demonstrates that over the course of three years -- 2004, 2005, and 2006 

-- during the marriage, Husband purchased three adjoining pieces of real property in the 

Sheikh Eglien area of Gaza via a power of attorney he executed in favor of his brother 

Naser. Wife testified that she saw the property during a visit to Gaza in 2010 and described

it as “a big, open land” with “fig tree[s], grapes tree[s].” She also testified that at that time, 

there was just a “small house” with two bedrooms built on the property, but that Husband 

had since had a sizeable chalet, with rooms and a swimming pool, constructed on the 

property; on other parts of the land, an orchard was planted, which someone rented from 

Husband. Wife, Husband, and Brother discussed the 1250 square-meter tract that was sold 

by Brother during the pendency of the divorce using a power of attorney executed in his 

favor by Husband with the assistance of Brother and Sister-in-Law. This parcel contained

the large dwelling and is referred to as “the chalet property.” Brother also testified that he 

transferred 590 square meters of Husband’s property to himself around the same time 

“because [Husband] owes me some money.” When Husband was asked to explain to the 

Court the “so called ‘chalet property’ in Gaza” that he owned, he testified that he still 

owned “a big portion of it[;] some of it has been sold.”

11

 

11 Brother and Sister-in-Law designated as an issue only that the trial court erred in assigning a 

value of $1.380,714.00 to the Gaza Strip property that remained a marital asset. In the body of their brief, 

however, they also argue that the trial court erred in assigning a value to portions of the Gaza Strip property 

that were no longer marital assets, due to Brother’s use of the Power of Attorney. The trial court found that 

the 1250 square meters portion of property in Gaza was worth $492,950.00, but was sold by Brother for

$451,500.00, and that the approximately 590-square meter tract that Brother transferred to himself was 

worth $232,672.00. According to Brother and Sister-in-Law, there was no evidence “whatsoever” to 

support the trial court’s valuation of these properties. The record reflects, however, that Wife testified that 

she calculated the above valuations based on a price of “280 Jordanian dinar per square meter,” an amount 

she arrived at by “call[ing] her relative in Gaza to ask them how much is the average [price] of the square 

meter at the time,” who then “look[ed] at sales and . . . g[a]ve me the information over the phone.” On 

appeal, Brother and Sister-in-Law assert that Wife was not competent to make this valuation. Because the 

trial court’s ruling as to these two pieces of property was not designated as an issue of appeal, however, any 

argument that the trial court erred in relying on Wife’s testimony as to these two pieces of property is 

waived. Childress v. Union Realty Co., 97 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (“We consider an issue 

waived where it is argued in the brief but not designated as an issue.”).
- 27 -

Husband testified that the property he held in Gaza was “worth millions,” 

specifically, “just a little bit more than $2 million.”

12 Wife, in contrast, estimated that the 

marital property in the Gaza Strip was worth approximately $1.3 million.

Counsel for Brother and Sister-in-Law objected to the above evidence of valuation 

by Wife on the basis that “she’s not an owner.”13 The trial court sustained the objection, 

and that ruling is not challenged in this appeal.14 However, the trial court’s June 25 order 

 

12 The colloquy was as follows:

Q. . . . Do you agree that the property that you held in Gaza Strip under your name –

A. Right.

Q. -- before your brother sold part of it and transferred saw of it to himself was worth 

millions of dollars? 

A. It is worth millions. Yes. 

Q. How many millions? 

A. Well, maybe about 2 million. 

Q. About 3 million? 

A. Two.

Q. 2 million. Okay. And that would be for the three strips that we earlier identified that are 

adjoining the orchard and the chalet?

A. Maybe a little bit more than 2 million. Hold on. Yeah, maybe, you know, just a little bit 

more than $2 million. Yes, ma’am.

13 Although Wife was not a record owner, there is no dispute that the property is marital property 

to which she is entitled to an interest upon divorce. 

14 Though an owner of property is deemed qualified to opine as to the value of his property by 

virtue of his ownership, Brown v. Brown, 577 S.W.3d 206, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018), perm. app. 

denied (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2019), Wife asserts that she was qualified by virtue of the fact that she was a part 

owner of the property by virtue of her marriage, regardless of the fact that she was not a record owner. Even 

assuming that Wife did not qualify under the owner rule, however, Wife was not automatically disqualified 

to testify about the value of the property just because she was not the record owner of the property. “A lay 

witness testifying on value must demonstrate sufficient knowledge to the satisfaction of the trial court and 

must also state the facts upon which he bases his opinion.” Garner v. Garner, No. E2019-01420-COA-R3-

CV, 2020 WL 4354918, at *8–9 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2020) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, C.A. No. 

862, 1989 WL 105654, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1989)). In Union Ry. Co. v. Hunton, the Tennessee 

Supreme Court observed:

“Witnesses who are not strictly experts, as well as expert witnesses, may testify as to the 

value of property, real or personal, or as to the value of services in a proper case. They 

must, however, have some knowledge on which to base their opinion. If they have such 

knowledge, the fact that it is slight will go to the weight of their testimony, rather than to 

its competency; but if they are not acquainted with, or have no knowledge of, the matter in 

question, so that their opinion can in no way aid the jury, the court should refuse to permit 

them to give an opinion which would necessarily be a mere guess or conjecture.”

88 S.W. 182, 187 (Tenn. 1905) (quoting 1 Elliott on Evidence, § 685). As no objection was raised as to the 

underlying basis of her opinion of the value of the property, the fact that her opinion was based on the report 

of family members living in the area should have gone to the weight to be afforded her testimony by the 

trial court.
- 28 -

recites that it “finds [Wife]’s testimony and the method of valuation she proposed to [be]

credible and therefore adopts without modification her valuation of the various assets 

awarded to the parties.” The court assigned a value of $1,380,714.00 to the asset identified 

as “Gaza Property,” which was the value submitted by Wife in Trial Exhibit 4, her affidavit 

of income and expenses, which also contained a list of marital property and her proposed 

values. Given these conflicting rulings, the record is not entirely clear as to the trial court’s 

ultimate resolution of the objection to Wife’s testimony. Cf. Wilson v. City of Memphis, 

No. W2014-01822-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 4198769, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2015) 

(citing Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983)) (“[B]ecause of the order’s 

interlocutory nature, it was subject to change by the trial court at any time prior to entry of 

the final judgment.”). Regardless, the other evidence in the record as to the value of this 

property was that of Husband, who testified that the three tracts of land together were worth 

“just a little bit more than $2 million.” Thus, any error in the trial court’s valuation based 

on the testimony offered by Wife is harmless, as the value assigned falls within the realm 

of the value assigned to the property by Husband.15 Accordingly, we affirm the court’s 

valuation of the Gaza property.

E. The Relief Awarded

In their sixth issue raised, Brother and Sister-in-Law assert that the trial court erred 

by awarding injunctive relief that was not requested by Wife. They argue that Wife “did 

not ask the trial court to order [Brother] and [Sister] to place for sale the two pieces of 

property held in Brother’s name, or property remaining titled in Husband’s name” and that 

she cannot recover money damages in excess of the amount sought in the complaint. In 

their seventh issue raised, they argue that the court’s $690,357.00 judgment against them 

in favor of Wife amounted to “an illegal punitive damages award” of which they did not 

receive notice.

Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure addresses Judgments and Costs. 

Rule 54.04 provides:

A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in 

amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except as to a party 

against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall 

grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 

even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings; but 

the court shall not give the successful party relief, though such party may be 

entitled to it, where the propriety of such relief was not litigated and the 

 

15 The trial court’s calculations hew very closely to Husband’s testimony. Specifically, the value of 

the remaining property set by the trial court ($1,380,714.00), plus the values of the two properties sold and 

transferred by Brother ($451,500.00 and $232,672.00, respectively) creates a total valuation of the Gaza 

Strip property at $2,064,886.00, or “little bit more than $2 million.” 
- 29 -

opposing party had no opportunity to assert defenses to such relief.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.03. The policy behind this rule was stated in Holder v. Drake:

It would be fundamentally unfair to have the complaint lead defendant to 

believe that only a certain type and dimension of relief was being sought and 

then, should he attempt to limit the scope and size of the potential judgment 

against him by not appearing or otherwise defaulting, allow the court to give 

a different type of relief or a larger damage award. In a similar vein, unless 

all the parties in interest have appeared and voluntarily litigated an issue not 

within the pleadings, the court should consider only those issues presented 

in the pleadings. In sum, then, a default judgment may not extend to matters 

outside the issues raised by the pleadings or beyond the scope of the relief 

demanded.”

908 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tenn. 1995) (emphasis removed) (quoting Qualls v. Qualls, 589 

S.W.2d 906, 910 (Tenn. 1979)). In Tennison Bros., Inc. v. Thomas, this Court observed:

“[A] plaintiff may obtain a default judgment without a hearing on the 

merits.” Henry v. Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475, 481 (Tenn. 2003). “[U]pon entry 

of a proper default judgment, the subsequent proceedings should be confined 

to the establishment of the amount of damages.” Witter v. Nesbit, 878 

S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). The entry of a default judgment 

“establishes the non-defaulting party’s right to maintain the action and 

recover some damages.” Husk v. Thompson, No. M2016-01481-COA-R3-

CV, 2017 WL 3432686, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2017) (no perm. app. 

filed) (citing Sherick v. Jones, No. 87-351-II, 1988 WL 55028, at *6 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. June 3, 1988)). Although the trial court may immediately enter final 

judgment without a determination by proof when the amount of damages is 

liquidated, the amount of unliquidated damages “remains an open question 

to be determined by proof.” Id.

556 S.W.3d 697, 721–22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). Thus, even with the existence of a default 

judgment entered against Sister-in-Law, the amount of damages owed to Wife was a matter 

to be resolved by the trial court. 

“‘Damages’ are the measure of the loss or harm, generally in the form of pecuniary 

compensation, resulting from an injury suffered by a person because of the unlawful act, 

omission, or negligence of another. It is the word which expresses in dollars and cents the 

injury sustained by a plaintiff.” Newcomb v. Kohler Co., 222 S.W.3d 368, 383 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2006) (quoting 25 C.J.S. Damages § 1 (2002)). Damages “make a plaintiff whole for 

harm that the plaintiff has suffered.” 25 C.J.S. Damages § 2 (2020). Generally, 

“the existence of damages cannot be uncertain, speculative, or remote, but the amount of 
- 30 -

damages may be uncertain if the plaintiff lays a sufficient foundation to allow the trier of 

fact to make a fair and reasonable assessment of damages.” Tennison Bros., 556 S.W.3d 

at 724 (citing Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tenn. 2008) overruled on 

other grounds by Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235 (Tenn. 

2015)). 

While compensatory damages are intended to compensate the plaintiff for injury, 

punitive damages are intended to punish the wrongdoer and deter future misconduct. Goff 

v. Elmo Greer & Sons Const. Co., 297 S.W.3d 175, 187 (Tenn. 2009) As such, punitive 

damages are appropriate only when a “defendant has acted either (1) intentionally, (2) 

fraudulently, (3) maliciously, or (4) recklessly.” Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 

896, 901 (Tenn. 1992) (outlining a variety of considerations that are applicable in the 

punitive damages context).

With those standards in mind as we consider the sixth issue raised, we conclude that 

the Amended Complaint, the court’s June 25 order, and the record as a whole belie Brother 

and Sister-in-Law’s arguments that the relief awarded was beyond the relief requested by 

Wife. In the Amended Complaint, Wife specifically pled allegations of the parties’ 

fraudulent conduct and then requested the following relief:

That all transfers of property from [Husband] and/or [Brother] and/or [Sisterin-Law] be declared null and void and the property be disgorged and restored 

to the mar[it]al estate and/or that judgment enter against all the Defendants 

jointly and severally for all funds received that relate to the property and 

losses associated with their actions or inactions.

Wife also sought her attorney’s fees and costs. In her motion for default judgment against 

Brother and Sister-in-Law, Wife requested a default judgment “in the amount of the cash 

they received from the illicit sale of a portion of the property in Gaza . . . $450,000.00, and 

for any and all rents and receipts received from the maintenance and operation of Gaza 

property after February 22, 2017,” the date on which Wife was supposed to have begun 

receiving all net revenues from Husband’s properties, per its March 20, 2017 order. 

After trial, at which Brother and Sister-in-Law appeared and litigated the issue of 

whether or not they committed conspiracy to defraud, the trial court’s June 25 order made 

the following findings and awarded Wife the following judgment:

7. . . . The parties agree that on June 22, 2017, a portion of the proceeds 

from that sale in the amount of One Hundred Eighty-four Thousand Six 

Hundred Thirteen and 25/100 Dollars ($184,613.25) was sent to the mortgage 

holder to pay off the shop in the United States. Subtracting from the sales price 

the amount applied to the shop’s mortgage and the $46,000.00 assigned 

previously to Father as “dissipated” property because it was unaccounted for 
- 31 -

in Brother’s or Father’s testimony concerning the use of the $451,500.00 sales 

proceeds, leaves a balance from the sales proceeds of $220,886.75. Mother is 

hereby awarded a judgment jointly and severally against Father, and the 

Third-party Defendants (Brother and [Sister-in-Law]) in the amount of 

$110,443.37 (1/2 of $220,886.75).

* * *

Using proceeds from the sale of the portion of Chalet property Brother 

bought other property near the Israeli border in his own name in Gaza, 

consisting of One Thousand Seventeen (1,017) square meters for Eighty-four 

Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($84,500.00) on August 17, 2017. The Court 

acknowledges that it has not reduced the sales proceeds for this portion of 

the sales proceed used by Brother before awarding Mother a one-half interest 

in the balance of the sales proceeds as set forth above. The Court finds that 

Brother’s lawsuit against Father alleging theft, defrauding Brother and/or 

Adel, payment for management of the Gaza property, compensation for 

personal injuries sustained by Brother in Gaza, and the expenses allegedly 

incurred by Brother in Gaza are without merit and not supported by any 

competent evidence. The claims filed by Brother are hereby dismissed. 

Brother, Father and [Sister-in-Law] have no credibility given their actions 

and testimony during this pendency of this case. Brother claims to have 

“repurchased” some inherited property that Husband resold to Adel with 

Sixty Thousand Dollars ($60,000.00) from the proceeds of the sale of the 

portion of the Chalet property even though the proof shows Adel never paid 

for the property. Exhibit 26. There is likewise no proof Brother actually paid 

Sixty Thousand Dollars ($60,000.00) to retrieve the property. This amount 

also was not deducted from the sales proceeds before Mother was awarded a 

judgment.

* * *

On April 10, 2018, Brother registered Five Hundred Ninety (590) 

square meters of the Chalet property to himself using the Power of Attorney. 

This occurred after service using the Secretary of State had been attempted 

for the second time and several more personal service attempts had been 

made. The value of the land transferred by Brother to himself is $232,672.00. 

Mother is awarded judgment, jointly and severally against Father, Brother, 

and [Sister-in-Law] for $116,336.00 for her one-half interest in the property 

transferred to Brother in violation of this Court’s orders.

***
- 32 -

10. Father, Brother and [Sister-in-Law] are hereby ordered to place 

for sale all of the Gaza property remaining titled in Father’s name. The parties 

shall use their best efforts to accomplish a commercially reasonable sale for 

a fair market price given the values the parties testified to in open court and 

the Court’s valuation found herein. In addition, they are ordered to place for 

sale the two pieces of property held in Brother’s name. From the proceeds of 

the sale, Mother shall be paid the sum of $690,357.00 (See Exhibit 1 Line 8). 

From Father’s portion of the proceeds, Mother shall be paid an additional 

$529,475.47 for the judgments awarded to her herein against Father, Brother, 

and [Sister-in-Law] jointly and severally. The judgment includes $76,500.00 

for child support arrearages, $131,472.00 for pendente lite support 

arrearages, $110,443.37 for one-half of the amount due for the sale of 1,250 

square meters of Gaza property, $116,336.00 for one-half of the 590 square 

meters of property Brother transferred to himself, and $94,724.00 for Wife’s 

pre-trial attorney’s fees. In the event that the sale does not suffice to pay the 

full amount awarded to Mother herein, the funds shall first be applied to 

Father’s outstanding obligations to Mother and then to the joint and several 

judgements against Father and his coconspirators. Any unpaid amount shall 

remain a judgment and earn interest at the maximum statutory rate for 

judgments commencing upon this Order becoming final. 

(Emphasis added).

In essence, the court ordered the sale of all property in Gaza that was still owned by 

Husband and awarded Wife a judgment of $690,357, representing half of the marital equity 

in the real property remaining in Gaza and giving effect to its 50-50 division of that asset. 

The judgment of $529,475.47,

16 for which Brother and Sister-in-Law are jointly and 

severally liable, accounts for the funds to which Wife was entitled during the pendency of 

the divorce, including child support and support pendente lite, as well as the funds received 

by Brother related to the real estate in Gaza that he and Sister-in-Law were found liable for 

fraudulently conveying so as to prevent Wife from benefitting from them. This was the 

relief Wife sought in her amended complaint, and the judgment of $529,475.47, for which 

Husband, Brother, and Sister-in-Law are jointly and severally liable, serves to make Wife 

whole for the money she went without during the pendency of this divorce. 

Though discussed in their seventh issue raised, Brother and Sister-in-Law also set 

forth various amounts of money that they spent during the pendency of the divorce which 

they contend render the amount of the judgment “contrary to the evidence.” Several of 

 

16 The amount of the judgment appears to be off by ten cents, likely due to a scrivener’s error. 

Totaling the amounts owed to Wife, as stated in the order and summarized in paragraph 10, results in a total 

of $529,475.37, not $529,475.47. We do not disturb the amount entered, in light of the minute difference 

in value compared to the overall amount of the judgment.
- 33 -

these amounts do not appear to relate to the marital estate but to their cross-claims against 

Husband that were dismissed by the trial court. They do not support these claimed amounts 

with citation to the record, as required by Rule 27(a)(7)(A) of the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. The trial court’s order addresses some of the amounts explicitly,

17 and we do 

not think that their contentions illustrate that the judgment awarded was contrary to the 

evidence. 

We have held earlier in this opinion that the trial court had the authority to order 

that the Defendants sell the land and have also affirmed the trial court’s valuation of the 

Gaza property. The order states the basis for the amount of the judgment, and Brother and 

Sister-in-Law do not cite to evidence that preponderates against it. Moreover, both Brother 

and Sister-in-Law, notwithstanding the default judgment entered against her, actively 

participated in litigating the claim Wife raised against them and thus had the opportunity 

to assert their defenses to such relief. We conclude that the judgment entered by the trial 

court was a proper exercise of its jurisdiction and is supported by the evidence before it.

In Brother and Sister-in-Law’s seventh issue raised, they argue that the amount of 

the $690,357.00 judgment entered against them renders it an “excessive” and “illegal” 

award of punitive damages.

18 Their argument appears to be premised on a misreading of 

 

17 For example, in their brief, Brother and Sister-in-Law argue:

[Brother] testified that he paid $60,000.00 to Adel Nabil Abdulnabi to remove a cloud on 

title to other property wrongfully created by Husband in an unrelated transaction. Husband 

admitted to this transgression in Exhibits 25 and 26 [a translated declaration of Husband 

executed in April 2017 in which he admits to assigning a piece of property to another of 

his brothers and then later selling the same piece of property to an individual named “Adel 

Nabil Abdelnabi”]. The parties testified to other expenditures made for the benefit of the 

spousal parties while Nahed was in Gaza and other marital liabilities.

The trial court’s order states:

Brother claims to have “repurchased” some inherited property that Husband resold 

to Adel with Sixty Thousand Dollars ($60,000.00) from the proceeds of the sale of the 

portion of the Chalet property even though the proof shows Adel never paid for the 

property. Exhibit 26. There is likewise no proof Brother actually paid Sixty Thousand 

Dollars ($60,000.00) to retrieve the property. This amount also was not deducted from the 

sales proceeds before Mother was awarded a judgment.

18 In their Statement of the Case, Brother and Sister-in-Law assert that the judgment is 

“unconstitutionally excessive and violates [their] due process rights under the United States Constitution 

and the Tennessee Constitution.” Though they do not elaborate on that position in their Argument section 

such that we are able to give it consideration, the Tennessee Supreme Court has observed that the U.S. 

Supreme Court “has held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil 

punitive damages awarded between private parties.” Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 900 (citing Browning-Ferris 

Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989)). Additionally, the Tennessee Supreme Court, 
- 34 -

the order, which requires Husband, Brother, and Sister-in-Law to sell all the Gaza property 

that remains in Husband’s name and that Wife shall receive a sum of $690,357.00 from 

that sale. But the order does not state that they are liable for that amount. The order only 

states that they are only jointly and severally liable for the additional $529,475.47 

judgment. Contrary to their assertions regarding the punitive nature of the judgment, the 

court’s June 25 order simply does not contain an award of punitive damages. The judgment 

against them is comprised of specific amounts of money to which the record makes clear 

Wife was entitled, and no findings demonstrate that the trial court intended to award 

additional damages that would be punitive in nature so as to deter their behavior. We deem 

this issue to be without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment entered by the trial 

court.

Having addressed all issues raised by Brother and Sister-in-Law by affirming the 

trial court’s rulings that they challenged, we now turn to the issues raised by Husband.

F. Failure to Grant a Continuance

“Continuances . . . may always be granted by the court, upon good cause shown, in 

any stage of the action.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-7-101. It is within the discretion of the trial 

court to grant or deny a continuance. Howell v. Ryerkerk, 372 S.W.3d 576, 579 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2012). We will not interfere with a court’s decision unless it constitutes an abuse of 

discretion and causes prejudice to the party seeking the continuance. Id. “Decisions 

regarding continuances are fact-specific,” and thus “motions for a continuance should be 

viewed in the context of all the circumstances existing when the motion is 

filed.” Nagarajan v. Terry, 151 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Factors relevant 

to the trial court’s decision include: “(1) the length of time the proceeding has been 

pending, (2) the reason for the continuance, (3) the diligence of the party seeking the 

continuance, and (4) the prejudice to the requesting party if the continuance is not 

granted.” Id. The party seeking a continuance must show that the circumstances justify the 

continuance. Osagie v. Peakload Temporary Services, 91 S.W.3d 326, 329 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2002). In order to meet this burden, the moving party must supply some “strong 

excuse” for postponing the trial date. Barber & McMurry, Inc. v. Top-Flite Development 

Corp. Inc., 720 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tenn. Ct. App.1986) (citing Levitt & Co. v. Kriger, 6 

Tenn.App. 323 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927)). 

Husband argues that his “due process rights were violated” when the court denied 

his request for a continuance to allow new counsel time to prepare for trial. Husband did 

not engage new counsel.

19 He does not cite us to, and our review of the record does not 

 

citing due process concerns, set forth a list of factors and a review process to ensure that an award of 

punitive damages is warranted in Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 900–01.

19 The record does not support Husband’s assertion that he retained new counsel. To the contrary, 

the transcript of the trial reflects that on February 26, an attorney named Mr. Tindell stated on the record 
- 35 -

reveal, a motion or even an oral request for a continuance relating to a need for his new 

counsel to prepare for trial. In fact, the only motion for a continuance of the trial made by 

or on behalf of Husband was filed on May 8, 2018, in which his counsel asserted that 

Husband “is uncooperative about his divorce while he has been in custody . . . [with the

result that] Counsel has been unable to prepare for or present a trial in this matter” and 

accordingly requested “that this trial be continued until [Husband] is out of custody and 

can assist in the preparation for the trial in this matter.” At that time, the trial was set for 

May 21, 2018. The motion to continue was denied by order entered August 7, 2018, on the 

basis that “this Court made clear that with a proper submission of an Order to Transport, 

this Court would ensure [Husband]’s availability for trial preparation and trial.” However, 

in the same order, the trial court concluded that a continuance of the trial to February 25–

27, 2019 was warranted to allow Brother the opportunity to answer the complaint he had 

been served with in court during the May 11 hearing at which Husband’s prior counsel’s 

motion for a continuance was heard.

In an order entered February 8, 2019, which granted Husband’s counsel’s motion to 

withdraw due to Husband’s filing of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his 

criminal case, the trial court stated that “[t]his matter continues to be set for trial on 

February 25-27, 2019, and March 4, 2019. The relieving of Mr. Jolley as counsel will not 

continue this trial date. [Husband] shall obtain new counsel or represent himself.” Though 

Husband contends that this statement constitutes “the trial court’s denial of a continuance 

to allow him to obtain new counsel,” the record contains no such request for a continuance.

Nevertheless, Husband asserted in his motion for a new trial that “this Court’s denial 

of [his] request for a continuance to allow him sufficient time in which to locate counsel to 

represent him in this cause was an abuse of discretion by the Court.” By order entered 

August 29, 2019, the trial court denied Husband’s motion for a new trial; pertinent to this 

purported denial of a continuance, it held:

1. Defendant chose several years ago to utilize the same attorney to 

represent him in his criminal case as well as the divorce case. [Defendant]

 

that he “will not be appearing for Mr. Abdelnabi in this case.” When Mr. Abdelnabi was brought into the 

courtroom, the following colloquy took place:

MR. ABDELNABI: Before I start, Your Honor, I thought -- I had a meeting with the 

counselor this morning, and came and saw me.

MS. SOBIESKI: Your Honor, I’m having trouble hearing.

MR. ABDELNABI: I had a counselor this morning, came and saw me --

JUDGE MCMILLAN: Mr. Tindell has declined to become affiliated with the case. He will 

not be making an appearance on your behalf.

MR. ABDELNABI: Yes, sir. I need just to get my thoughts together for a second.

Husband then began his cross-examination of his daughter, Nesma. 
- 36 -

was convicted and waited nearly an entire year before asserting a claim of 

ineffective counsel against his counsel. During the time that Defendant was 

considering to assert a claim of ineffective counsel and while that claim was 

being prepared, he had time to retain new divorce counsel. The Defendant is 

an educated and skilled businessman. The Court has absolutely no doubt that 

he understood that asserting an ineffective assistance claim against his 

original counsel would require that attorney to withdraw from both matters.

Defendant delayed this case while the criminal matters were pending. 

During that delay and subsequent periods once the case proceeded, 

Defendant disposed of assets and conspired with his family to defeat 

Plaintiffs claim to substantial marital property. Defendant failed to obtain 

new divorce counsel at the time he retained his new post-conviction counsel. 

He is not entitled to a new trial due to not having counsel under these 

circumstances. 

On appeal, Husband takes issue with the above statements made by the court, 

arguing that “he did not contemplate that his post-conviction claims would conflict his 

counsel, requiring his counsel to withdraw from this divorce case.” Regardless of what 

Husband contemplated, the record is devoid of any indication that the trial court was 

presented with an opportunity to grant or deny his motion for a continuance. Given the 

length of time the proceeding has been pending, the fact that trial had already been 

continued once, the fact that Husband was aware of the consequences of not retaining 

counsel (i.e., that he would represent himself), the fact that Husband was not guaranteed 

the assistance of counsel in this civil proceeding, and the lack of any attestations to the 

court of Husband’s diligence in attempting to locate new counsel, we discern no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s decision to proceed with trial despite the withdrawal of 

Husband’s counsel, especially when no motion or request for a continuance was actually 

made. Moreover, Husband was present for each day of the trial, afforded the opportunity 

to be heard when he spoke in court, and cross-examined the witnesses; we discern no 

prejudice resulting from the court’s decision to adhere to the trial schedule it had previously 

set. Accordingly, we deem Husband’s contentions in this regard to be without merit.

G. The Award of Child Support 

Husband challenges the amount of monthly child support ordered by the court as 

well as a judgment for $76,500 entered against him for retroactive child support.

In the June 25 Order, the trial court stated the following with respect to the amount 

of Husband’s child support:

On September 8, 2012, a parenting plan was entered that provided 

Father’s child support for 4 children would be $2,000.00 per month. That 

order has never been modified. Father’s willful and intentional actions that 
- 37 -

resulted in his conviction and incarceration do not relieve him of his existing 

child support obligation. The Court, in absence of evidence to the contrary, 

will reduce the child support pro-rata for the three older children as they 

reached the age of majority. . . Child support shall continue at the rate of 

$1,000.00 per month through at least December 2026 and perhaps through 

May 2027 depending on Omar’s date of graduation from high school. 

Without being reduced to present value, the amount of child support owed 

by Father between July 1, 2019 and December 2026 is $90,000.00. Mother 

shall have a lien upon any assets awarded to Father to secure that amount of 

child support. Upon Father’s child support obligation for Omar terminating 

by operation of law as indicated above, child support for Hamza shall 

continue at the rate of $500.00 per month. Mother’s attorney is directed to 

prepare and submit a Parenting Plan containing the provisions of her 

proposed plan and the Court’s ruling concerning child support set forth 

herein.

In denying Husband’s motion for a new trial, the trial court’s order stated:

4. The Court took into account Defendant’s earning ability prior to 

incarceration and his lifestyle prior to incarceration to determine that the 

amount of child support suggested was appropriate based on Defendant’s 

testimony about the assets he was able to acquire (home, rental 

condominiums, real estate in Gaza worth at least One Million Dollars, and 

vehicles for his daughters and family to drive). Other than an unsupported 

allegation that the Court erred, Plaintiff has shown no basis for a new trial.

The parenting plan entered by the trial court on October 10, 2019, sets Husband’s 

monthly support obligation at $1000 per month and provides, “This amount shall change 

to $500.00 [per month] when Omar ages out or graduates from high school, whichever is 

last. $500.00 [per month in] child support shall continue indefinitely because of Hamza’s 

special needs. This will be needed for Hamza’s lifetime, and shall be modifiable.” 

Setting the amount of child support is a discretionary matter and is reviewed using 

the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard. State ex rel. Vaughn v. Kaatrude, 21 S.W.3d 

244, 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

With respect to the amount of the monthly child support obligation, Husband argues 

that Wife has presented no evidence of either party’s earning capacity, and thus the court 

should have imputed annual gross income at an amount of $37,589 per year for male 

parents and $29,300 for female parents, as set forth in the child support guidelines, which 

he argues would have reduced his support obligation to $784.00 per month.20 

 

20 Husband does not argue either that the imposition of child support for Hamza’s lifetime was 
- 38 -

His arguments are unavailing. First, Wife did offer testimony as to her income. She 

testified that she works as a telephone interpreter “from English to Arabic and Arabic to 

English,” for which she is paid 45 cents per minute, and that her average income is $864 

per month. The permanent parenting plan set Wife’s gross monthly income at $864.00, 

which is supported by the evidence. The plan also set Husband’s gross monthly income at 

$3,336.00, which amounts to $40,032 in annual income, which equates to approximately 

$204 more in income per month than would be attributed to him using the $37,589 annual 

amount he prefers. However, the amount he contends the child support guidelines would 

impute to him are incorrect. The version of the guidelines in effect from August 15, 2008 

through May 9, 2020, i.e., throughout the pendency of this divorce, provide that $43,761 

should be imputed to male parents.

21

 This would result in Husband being attributed a 

 

inappropriate or that the trial court erred in awarding Wife a lien on Husband’s assets to secure the payment 

of future child support. As such, we do not address the propriety of either of these rulings.

21 The Guidelines provide, in pertinent part:

(iv) Imputing Income When There is No Adequate and Reliable Evidence of Income.

(I) When Establishing an Initial Order.

I. If a parent fails to produce adequate and reliable evidence of income 

(such as tax returns for prior years, check stubs, or other information for

determining current ability to support or ability to support in prior years for 

calculating retroactive support); and

II. The tribunal has no adequate and reliable evidence of the parent’s 

income or income potential;

III. Then, in such cases, the tribunal must take into consideration the 

specific circumstances of the parent to the extent known, including, but not limited 

to, the following factors:

A. Assets;

B. Residence;

C. Employment and earnings history;

D. Job skills;

E. Educational attainment;

F. Literacy;

G. Age;

H. Health;

I. Criminal record and other employment barriers;

J. Records of seeking work;

K. The local job market;

L. The availability of employers willing to hire the parents;

M. Prevailing earnings level in the local community; and

N. Other relevant background factors.

IV. If imputation of income is authorized, gross income for the current and 

prior years shall be determined by imputing annual gross income of forty-three 

thousand seven hundred sixty-one dollars ($43,761) for male parents and thirtyfive thousand nine hundred thirty-six dollars ($35,936) for female parents. These 

figures represent the full time, year-round workers’ median gross income, for the 
- 39 -

slightly higher percentage share of income, which would result in him owing $1,009.15 

per month, a slightly higher figure than was imposed by the trial court. By our calculations, 

even using the lower figure urged by Husband does not result in a change in the Percentage 

Share of Income, which is how the child support worksheet, lines 1 – 7, derives the amount 

of the child support obligation owed to the primary parent. 

At any rate, the evidence does not support imputing to Wife an annual income of 

$29,300.00, or $2,441.67 per month, which would be well above the $864 per month that 

Wife testified she actually earns. Ultimately, the child support worksheet set Husband’s 

monthly child support obligation at $999, which effectuates the court’s directive that he

pay $1,000.00 per month in support for the parties’ two children who were still under the 

age of majority. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s imputing income to 

Husband or in imposing the support obligation it did.

With respect to the retroactive child support award of $76,500.00, Husband 

contends that his child support obligation should have been reduced to account for the time 

period from 2012 when the complaint was filed but the parties were still living together up 

to and including the date of his incarceration in 2016, which he argues “is obviously not 

credited to the Defendant.”

His argument in this regard overlooks Wife’s testimony that she was seeking 

$72,000.00 in child support arrearages, but was not seeking child support from the time in 

2012 when they reconciled and he returned to the marital home until he “went to jail” in 

February 2016. It also ignores portions of the court’s June 25 order in which it stated:

On September 8, 2012, a parenting plan was entered that provided 

Father’s child support for 4 children would be $2,000.00 per month. That 

order has never been modified. Father’s willful and intentional actions that 

resulted in his conviction and incarceration do not relieve him of his existing 

child support obligation. The Court, in absence of evidence to the contrary, 

will reduce the child support pro-rata for the three older children as they 

reached the age of majority. As noted by Mother, she seeks an award for the 

arrearages accrued after February 2016 and ongoing child support. By 

February 2016, Father’s child support obligation had ended [for Sherin, who 

turned 18 in March 2015]. He therefore owed $1,500.00 per month through 

the end of June 2018 [when Nesma turned 18]. There is an arrearage accrued 

from February 2016 to the date that Father’s child support obligation for 

Nesma ended of $43,500.00 (29 x $1,500.00). For the period of July 2016 

 

Tennessee population only, from the American Community Survey of 2016 from 

the U.S. Census Bureau.

Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)(2)(iv) (2008).
- 40 -

through the date of this Order, an additional thirty-six months of support at 

the rate of $1,000.00 per month has accrued for an additional obligation of 

$36,000.00. The total child support arrearage is $79,500.00. The parties 

agreed that Father had paid a total of $3,000.00 during the pendency of the 

action. Mother is awarded a judgment against Father in the amount 

$76,500.00 after the credit is applied. Child support shall continue at the rate 

of $1,000.00 per month through at least December 2026 and perhaps through 

May 2027 depending on Omar’s date of graduation from high school. 

Without being reduced to present value, the amount of child support owed 

by Father between July 1, 2019 and December 2026 is $90,000.00. Mother 

shall have a lien upon any assets awarded to Father to secure that amount of 

child support. Upon Father’s child support obligation for Omar terminating 

by operation of law as indicated above, child support for Hamza shall 

continue at the rate of $500.00 per month. Mother’s attorney is directed to 

prepare and submit a Parenting Plan containing the provisions of her 

proposed plan and the Court’s ruling concerning child support set forth 

herein.

(Emphasis added). The court’s calculation of the amount of retroactive support owed by 

Husband started with what he would have owed in February 2016, when only three of the 

parties four children were still minors.

The parenting plan that was ultimately entered recited that Wife was awarded a 

judgment in the amount of $76,500.00 “representing retroactive support” and granted Wife 

“a lien on all [Husband]’s property wheresoever located and all assets awarded in the 

divorce or otherwise acquired for child support from July 1, 2019 through December 31, 

2026, in the amount of $90,000.” 

In light of the above, we deem Husband’s argument to be without merit, as Wife’s 

testimony and the court’s order directly contradict his assertion that the child support 

obligation was still imposed on him from the time in 2012 when the parties resumed living 

together up to the date of his incarceration. We affirm the amount of the trial court’s 

monthly child support obligation as well as the $76,500 judgment as being supported by 

the record in this case.

H. The Award of Alimony 

Husband also asserts in the issues presented section of his brief that the trial court 

ordered an excessive amount of alimony. The trial court did find that Husband has no 

current income due to his incarceration, but ordered a small amount of alimony in futuro 

in the amount of $100.00 per month. “To avoid depriving a spouse of the right to obtain 

spousal support in the future if there is a need for it, many courts have approved the practice 

of awarding a nominal amount of alimony in the final decree in order to retain jurisdiction 
- 41 -

to alter the amount later if the circumstances warrant it.” Justice v. Justice, No. M1998-

00916-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 177060, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2001). Amounts 

characterized as “nominal” range from $1.00 per month obligations up to one case that 

involved a $500.00 per month obligation. See, e.g., Stagner v. Stagner, No. W2009-01749-

COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3717030, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2010) (involving $1.00 

per month); Hunsinger v. Hunsinger, No. M2008-02434-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 

4931345, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2009) (involving $1.00 per month); Eaves v. 

Eaves, No. E2006-02185-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4224715, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 

30, 2007) (involving $10.00 per month); Hicks v. Hicks, No. 01-A-019104CH00126, 1991 

WL 200892, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 1991) (characterizing $500.00 per month as a

“nominal amount”). Although Husband asserts that the amount awarded was excessive, 

Husband fails to devote any argument whatsoever to this position in the argument section 

of his brief. We thus deem this issue waived. Bean, 40 S.W.3d at 56; Childress, 97 S.W.3d 

at 578.

I. The Permanent Parenting Plan 

Husband takes issue with several provisions within the parenting plan. The process for 

crafting an initial parenting plan was explained in Armbrister v. Armbrister:

[E]very final decree in a divorce action in Tennessee involving a minor 

child must incorporate a permanent parenting plan. [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 36-

6-404(a). A “‘[p]ermanent parenting plan’ means a written plan for the 

parenting and best interests of the child, including the allocation of parenting 

responsibilities and the establishment of a residential schedule, as well as an 

award of child support consistent with chapter 5 of this title.” Id. § 36-6-

402(3).

Fashioning permanent parenting plans is one of the most important 

responsibilities courts have. See Massey-Holt, 255 S.W.3d [603] at 607

[(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)]; Boyer v. Heimermann, 238 S.W.3d 249, 255 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Courts performing this task must ensure that 

permanent parenting plans:

(1) Provide for the child’s changing needs as the child grows and matures, 

in a way that minimizes the need for further modifications to the permanent 

parenting plan;

(2) Establish the authority and responsibilities of each parent with respect 

to the child, consistent with the criteria in this part;

(3) Minimize the child’s exposure to harmful parental conflict;

....

(5) Allocate decision-making authority to one (1) or both parties 

regarding the child’s education, health care, extracurricular activities, and 
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religious upbringing. . . .

(6) Provide that each parent may make the day-to-day decisions regarding 

the care of the child while the child is residing with that parent; [and]

(7) Provide that when mutual decision making is designated but cannot 

be achieved, the parties shall make a good-faith effort to resolve the issue 

through the appropriate dispute resolution process....

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404(a)(1)–(9) (2010).

A residential schedule generally must be “consistent with the child’s 

developmental level and the family’s social and economic circumstances,” 

and should “encourage each parent to maintain a loving, stable, and nurturing 

relationship with the child.” Id. § 36-6-404(b).

Before forging a residential schedule, a court must first determine 

whether either parent has engaged in any of the misconduct specified 

in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406 (2010),[22] which 

necessitates limiting the parent’s residential time with the child. Id. § 36-6-

404(b). If section 36-6-406 does not apply, then a court crafting a residential 

schedule must consider fifteen specifically enumerated factors, as well as any 

other factors deemed relevant by the court, in order to determine how much 

time a child should spend with each parent.

Significant overlap exists between the factors a court must consider 

when establishing a residential schedule and the factors a court must consider 

when determining a child’s best interests in the course of making an initial 

custody decision. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404(b), with Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a); see also Burden v. Burden, 250 S.W.3d 899, 908 

n. 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing that the statutory criteria relevant to 

the residential schedule overlap with, and somewhat expand upon, the factors 

set out in section 36-6-106 relevant to determining custody); Dobbs v. 

Dobbs, No. M2011-01523-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3201938, at *1 n. 1 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2012) (“There is little substantive difference between 

the factors applicable to parenting plans, set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-

404(b), and those applicable to custody determinations, set out in Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 36-6-106(a) as far as determining comparative fitness and the best 

interests of the child.”).

414 S.W.3d 685, 696–97 (Tenn. 2013) (one footnote omitted).

 

22 Footnote twelve in Armbrister read: “None of the factors listed in this statute are at issue in this 

case.” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 696 n.12. As discussed infra, that is not the case in the present matter.
- 43 -

Although the section 36-6-406 limitations of a residential schedule were not at issue 

in Armbrister, they are at issue in this case. The statute’s list of factors as they existed 

when this case was filed are as follows:

(a) The permanent parenting plan and the mechanism for approval of the 

permanent parenting plan shall not utilize dispute resolution, and a parent’s 

residential time as provided in the permanent parenting plan or temporary 

parenting plan shall be limited if it is determined by the court, based upon a 

prior order or other reliable evidence, that a parent has engaged in any of the 

following conduct:

(1) Willful abandonment that continues for an extended period of time or 

substantial refusal to perform parenting responsibilities; or

(2) Physical or sexual abuse or a pattern of emotional abuse of the parent, 

child or of another person living with that child as defined in § 36-3-601.

* * *

(d) A parent’s involvement or conduct may have an adverse effect on the 

child’s best interest, and the court may preclude or limit any provisions of a 

parenting plan, if any of the following limiting factors are found to exist after 

a hearing:

(1) A parent’s neglect or substantial nonperformance of parenting 

responsibilities;

(2) An emotional or physical impairment that interferes with the parent’s 

performance of parenting responsibilities as defined in § 36-6-402;

(3) An impairment resulting from drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse that 

interferes with the performance of parenting responsibilities;

(4) The absence or substantial impairment of emotional ties between the 

parent and the child;

(5) The abusive use of conflict by the parent that creates the danger of 

damage to the child’s psychological development;

(6) A parent has withheld from the other parent access to the child for a 

protracted period without good cause;

(7) A parent’s criminal convictions as they relate to such parent’s ability to 

parent or to the welfare of the child; or

(8) Such other factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the 

best interests of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-406(a), (d). In its June 25 order, the court considered both the 

best interest factors found at section 36-6-106, as well as the above factors.

“The details of permanent parenting plans are typically left to the discretion of trial 

courts”; thus, we review the trial court’s order to ensure that it “is made with ‘due regard 
- 44 -

for controlling law and based on the facts proven in the case.’” Maupin v. Maupin, 420 

S.W.3d 761, 770 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting K.B.J. v. T.J., 359 S.W.3d 608, 616 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2011)). “Where the trial court makes specific findings of fact, we presume 

those findings to be correct unless the evidence preponderates against them.” Id. (citing 

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); K.B.J., 359 S.W.3d at 613). “If the trial court does not make

specific factual findings, there is no presumption accorded to the absent findings; we must 

conduct our own review of the record to determine the controlling facts by a preponderance 

of the evidence.” Id. (citing Curtis v. Hill, 215 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)).

The trial court’s June 25 order provides in pertinent part:

5. . . . The girls are now clearly estranged from Father due the actions that 

led to his conviction, his past treatment of Mother, his failure to provide 

financial support for the family since his incarceration, and most recently his 

actions regarding the property located in Gaza. . . . Father stands convicted 

of having kidnapped and battering one of his acquaintances. Father’s sole 

purpose for the kidnapping and battery was to extract a confession from the 

individual that he was inappropriately involved with Mother. The Court finds 

that there is no evidence that Mother was anything but a faithful, loving, and 

supportive wife to Husband. The Court has made previous findings that 

Husband committed violent acts against Mother and awarded her a divorce.

Father has physically injured Mother, engaged in emotional abuse by 

damaging the home in fits of anger. He has broken pieces of furniture. Father 

installed a tracker on Mother’s car and placed cameras in the home and in 

the parties’ bedroom to monitor her activities. Father began threatening to 

divorce Mother in 2013, including taking her to Egypt and leaving her with 

her family with no assets. 

In ruling on Husband’s motion for a new trial and his objection to Wife’s proposed 

parenting plan, the trial court held:

5. The Court’s Order required Plaintiff to submit a Parenting Plan that 

incorporated the Court’s ruling. The Court specifically adopted certain of 

Plaintiff’s proposals and did not accept others. Defendant did not submit a 

proposed parenting plan before trial. At trial, Defendant was afforded the 

opportunity to cross examine Plaintiff about her proposed parenting plan. 

The Court considered the testimony and has ruled. The Court has treated 

Defendant’s objection as a motion to alter or amend (or alternatively a new 

trial). Defendant objects to provisions that the Court finds are necessary for 

the protection of the parties’ minor children and that are consistent with their 

best interests. Defendant’s request is denied.
- 45 -

On appeal, Husband first argues that he objected to the provision labeled paragraph 

J, within Section I, “Residential Parenting Schedule,” which reads:

There shall be no physical contact with the children due to 

[Husband]’s convictions for violent felonies and seventeen (17) year 

sentence, no visits at prison, no Facetime or its equivalent. [Husband] is 

hereby restrained and enjoined from giving personal information about his 

children to other prisoners and/or encouraging other inmates to contact the 

children now or upon release.

His skeletal argument opposing this provision is that he “believes that he should be 

granted all the rights accorded him pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-6-110 

and 36-6-101(a)(3).” Husband raised the same argument in an Objection to [Wife’s] 

Proposed Parenting Plan, which he filed on August 12, 2019. Wife responded, asserting 

that, “As to the parent’s Bill of Rights, Defendant has waived the right to rely on any of 

those by his behavior, his neglect, his financial abandonment and his violence.” As we 

have set forth above, the trial court, in ruling on Husband’s motion for a new trial, held in 

pertinent part:

5. . . . Defendant objects to provisions that the Court finds are 

necessary for the protection of the parties’ minor children and that are 

consistent with their best interests. 

As we consider the provision at issue, we are mindful that Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 36-6-110 provides, “Except when the juvenile court or other appropriate 

court finds it not in the best interests of the affected child, upon petition by a noncustodial, 

biological parent whose parental rights have not been terminated, the court shall grant the 

rights set forth in § 36-6-101(a)(3)(A).” Section 36-6-101(a)(3)(A) similarly provides that 

“[e]xcept when the court finds it not to be in the best interests of the affected child, each 

order pertaining to the custody or possession of a child arising from an action for absolute 

divorce . . . shall grant to each parent the rights listed in subdivisions (a)(3)(B)(i)-(vi) during 

periods when the child is not in that parent’s possession or shall incorporate such rights by 

reference to a prior order.” (Emphasis added). The list set forth at section 36-6-101(a)(3)(B) 

includes a list of nine rights – such as the right to unimpeded telephone conversations, the 

right to receive notice and relevant information of any hospitalization, major illness or 

injury, or death of the child, and the right to be given at least 48 hours’ notice of 

extracurricular school, athletic, or church activities – all of which have been struck through 

in the parenting plan entered by the trial court in this case. The trial court concluded that 

the provisions limiting contact “are necessary for the protection of the parties’ minor 

children and . . . consistent with their best interests.” In light of the evidence in the record 

of Husband’s abusive behavior and lack of concern for the financial, emotional, and 
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physical safety of the children and Wife,23 we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s 

decision to include the language in section I. J. of the parenting plan, ordering that Husband 

shall have no physical contact or video calls or to give out his children’s contact 

information. 

Next, Husband argues:

[Husband] objected to the provision in the Section designated as “III”

in its entirety as being in direct contravention to the prenuptial agreement 

entered into freely, knowledgeably, and in good faith and without exertion 

of duress or undue influence in and between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

Section III of the parenting plan is titled “Financial Support” and contains, among 

other things, the child support obligation that is discussed in section G, supra. Curiously, 

Husband did not address the alleged prenuptial agreement in his arguments on appeal

surrounding his child support obligation. His vague reference to a prenuptial agreement is 

unsupported by citation to a location in the record where such an agreement was entered 

into evidence, an offer of proof was made, or even a reference to its existence was made.

24

 

Our review of the record likewise reveals no evidence of the existence of a prenuptial 

agreement, only Husband’s bald assertion, in his motion for a new trial and his objection 

to the proposed parenting plan, that one existed between the parties in this case and that 

 

23 The parties’ daughter, Nesma, who is the second oldest of their children, testified about a letter 

she received from one of her father’s fellow inmates that made her “very scared.” She testified that she 

found the letter “distressing” and explained that “it made me feel unsafe because I don’t know who now 

has my home address and who is in there and what they will do or whatever. It was just terrifying to know 

that someone I don’t know in that situation has my address.” In the letter, the inmate had told her she had 

better write him back or he was “going to get [her].” The parties’ oldest daughter, Sherin, also testified that 

she received two letters from her father’s fellow inmates, which made her feel “terrified” to have “strangers 

who know my address.” She testified that she contacted the warden to “make sure that did not happen 

again.” Even though Nesma and Sherin are not included in the parenting plan given their age, their

testimony demonstrates the need for the trial court to set forth very strict parameters for Husband’s 

communication with his children.

24 The trial court, in its order denying Husband’s motion to alter or amend, stated:

2. The Court cannot recall Defendant offering into evidence the prenuptial 

agreement and the existence of one was not raised in his pleadings prior to trial. Defendant 

voluntarily agreed to a spousal support and child support award as part of the Order of 

Protection matter. He waived this issue by failure to plead it or to assert it prior to agreeing 

to pay alimony and child support. To the extent that any such prenuptial agreement waived 

child support it would be void as a matter of public policy. Having heard the facts and 

circumstances under which the family lived when Defendant was not supporting the family 

and was reliant solely on Plaintiff to provide support for the family, the Court finds that 

the waiver of alimony would have violated public policy as it would have left Wife a ward 

of the State.
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the child support and alimony obligations imposed by the court conflicted with it. 

Unsupported statements such as his do not comply with Rule 27(a)(7)(A) of the Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. To the extent Husband attempts to attack the child support obligation 

or the remaining portions of Section III (dealing with income tax exemptions, health and 

dental insurance, or life insurance) by a one-sentence argument that it contravenes a 

prenuptial agreement, the existence of which is not supported by the record, we deem his 

contentions to be meritless.

Finally, Husband argues:

[Husband] objects to the provisions in the Section designated as “VI”

wherein the Plaintiff has stricken all of the rights of parents under Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 36-6-101, purportedly “in light of Father’s history of violent felonies, 

. . .” and, in the alternative, would propose that the Father shall be granted all 

the rights accorded him pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-6-110 

and 36-6-101(a)(3)(A).

Husband’s argument, quoted in its totality above, implicates the same analysis we 

employed in addressing his first argument regarding the parenting plan. The court 

concluded that the provisions limiting contact “are necessary for the protection of the 

parties’ minor children and . . . consistent with their best interests,” and, in light of the 

evidence in the record of Husband’s abusive behavior and lack of concern for the financial, 

emotional, and physical safety of the children and Wife, we discern no abuse of discretion 

in the court’s decision to not grant Husband the rights set forth in Section 36-6-

101(a)(3)(B).

J. Frivolous Appeal

In her appellate brief’s conclusion section, Wife contends that Husband’s appeal is

frivolous and thus seeks an award of attorney’s fees, interest, and costs for defending 

against it. Tennessee’s frivolous appeals statute provides:

When it appears to any reviewing court that the appeal from any court of 

record was frivolous or taken solely for delay, the court may, either upon 

motion of a party or of its own motion, award just damages against the 

appellant, which may include but need not be limited to, costs, interest on the 

judgment, and expenses incurred by the appellee as a result of the appeal.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. If the appellate court determines that an appeal is frivolous, 

the appellate court may award attorney’s fees pursuant to this statute, a decision that “rests 

solely in the discretion of th[e appellate] Court.” Chiozza v. Chiozza, 315 S.W.3d 482, 493 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); see also Eberbach v. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467, 475 (Tenn. 2017).

We note, however, that Wife did not raise this as an issue in her statement of the issues. As 
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our Supreme Court has explained:

Appellate review is generally limited to the issues that have been presented 

for review. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b); State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 353 

(Tenn. 2007). Accordingly, the Advisory Commission on the Rules of 

Practice and Procedure has emphasized that briefs should “be oriented 

toward a statement of the issues presented in a case and the arguments in 

support thereof.” Tenn. R. App. P. 27, advisory comm’n cmt.

Hodge, 382 S.W.3d at 334. Because Wife did not raise the issue of this being a frivolous 

appeal or the fact that she sought her attorney’s fees on appeal in her statement of the issues, 

we decline to award attorney’s fees in this appeal.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. 

Costs are taxed equally between the appellants, Nehad Abdelnabi, Nahed Abdulnabi, and 

Rewa Gharbawe.

 

S/ J. Steven Stafford 

 J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE