IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

SHANE NOEL JONES, A QUALIFIED ELECTOR; VICTORIA CRANFORD,

A QUALIFIED ELECTOR AND RESIDENT OF GRAHAM COUNTY,

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: GRAHAM COUNTY VOTERS & THE 

ARIZONA PUBLIC INTEGRITY ALLIANCE ENCOURAGES A NO VOTE ON MASSIVE 

MARIJUANA EXPANSION IN OUR AREA, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

GEORGE KHALAF, AS ITS CHAIRMAN; WENDY JOHN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY 

AS GRAHAM COUNTY RECORDER; HANNAH DUDERSTADT, IN HER OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS DEPUTY CLERK/ELECTIONS DIRECTOR; DANNY SMITH,

PAUL R. DAVID, AND JOHN HOWARD, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES

AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FOR GRAHAM COUNTY,

Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 2022-0065

Filed August 25, 2022

Appeal from the Superior Court in Graham County

Nos. S0500CV202100076 and S0500CV202100077 (Consolidated)

The Honorable John R. Hannah Jr., Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Herrera Arellano LLP, Phoenix

By Roy Herrera, Daniel A. Arellano, and Jillian L. Andrews

and

Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix

By Colin P. Ahler

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

2

Rose Law Group PC, Scottsdale

By Logan V. Elia and John H. Sud

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

OPINION

Vice Chief Judge Staring authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Chief Judge Vásquez and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.

S T A R I N G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 In this expedited election appeal, Shane Jones and Victoria 

Cranford (collectively, Jones) challenge the trial court’s final judgment in 

favor of Respect the Will of the People: Graham County Voters & The 

Arizona Public Integrity Alliance Encourages a No Vote on Massive 

Marijuana Expansion in Our Area; its chairman, George Khalaf; and 

various Graham County officials (collectively, RWP), denying Jones’s 

request for injunctive relief and permitting referendum petition 

REF-02-2021 to be placed on the November 2022 ballot.1 Jones raises two 

principal issues on appeal: (1) whether the court erred in concluding the 

petition complied with A.R.S. § 19-101(A) by including the title twice and 

the entire text of the zoning measure; and (2) whether the court erred in 

concluding RWP had obtained enough valid signatures to place the 

measure on the ballot. By order dated July 21, 2022, we affirmed the trial 

court’s judgment, indicating that a formal written disposition would 

follow. This opinion is that disposition.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 In June 2021, the Graham County Board of Supervisors 

approved the rezoning of a portion of land from “general use” to 

“unlimited manufacturing” for the purpose of establishing a medical 

marijuana cultivation facility. The following month, RWP filed a 

referendum petition (designated as REF-02-2021) opposing the rezoning 

1Below, Jones “voluntarily dismiss[ed] any allegations of errors or 

omissions on the part of any County Defendant,” and the Graham County 

officials “remain nominal Defendants only to the extent that they are 

necessary to effectuate any injunctive relief granted by the Court.” 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

3

and referring the matter to Graham County voters in the November 2022 

election. Later that month, RWP submitted 2,288 signatures supporting the 

petition. In August 2021, after verifying randomly selected signatures, the 

Graham County Recorder certified the petition for the ballot. 

¶3 Also in August, Jones filed a verified complaint pursuant to 

A.R.S. §§ 19-122(C) and 19-141(D), alleging RWP had failed to obtain a 

sufficient number of valid signatures on the referendum petition. 2 In 

addition, Jones alleged RWP had failed to comply with the petition 

requirements under § 19-101(A) by including “more than the ‘title’ of the 

measure, its number, and the meeting and body at which it was passed,” 

which Jones asserted was “misleading.” Jones requested an injunction 

prohibiting Graham County officials from placing the petition on the 

November 2022 ballot. 

¶4 RWP subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Jones’s 

complaint. First, RWP argued Jones was barred by the statute of limitations 

from challenging the signatures on the referendum petition. Second, 

regarding the allegation that the petition was “misleading,” RWP asserted 

Jones had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

Further, RWP maintained that the petition “strictly complies with the 

relevant statutes” because it included the “entire name of the Rezoning 

Application as described in the Board’s official meeting minutes,” 

consistent with A.R.S. § 19-121(E). The trial court denied the motion to 

dismiss in part, rejecting the statute of limitations argument. The court, 

however, granted the motion to dismiss “to the extent that [Jones] 

challenge[d] the text of the ‘petition for referendum’ section of the subject 

petitions,” finding that the petition was “within the bounds of what is 

permissible.” 

¶5 Shortly thereafter, Jones filed a motion for summary 

judgment on the signature challenge. The parties agreed that RWP needed 

1,064 signatures to place the referendum petition on the ballot and that it 

had collected 2,288 total signatures. Jones, however, maintained that 1,308 

of the signatures were “statutorily deficient,” leaving only 980 that were 

valid. Jones reasoned that 230 signatures were “invalid based on facial 

deficiencies or lack of a corresponding voter registration record [in]

Graham County.” Jones further asserted that 1,077 signatures were 

2Jones and Cranford each filed a separate complaint, but the trial 

court consolidated the matters. 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

4

“deficient” because the circulator who had collected them, Keith Leonard, 

“issued a false circulator affidavit about where he lived.”3 

¶6 After oral argument, the trial court denied the motion for 

summary judgment as to the 1,077 signatures affected by the circulator 

challenge, finding Leonard’s address to be a factual question. The court 

also denied the motion as to ninety-three signatures that had addresses on 

the referendum petition that did not match those in the voter rolls and as to 

six signatures that had a missing year in the date line. But the court granted 

the motion for summary judgment as to eighty-seven signatures not 

appearing in the Graham County voter rolls, thirty-one signatures with 

missing or illegible information, ten signatures that listed a post-office box 

instead of a residential address, three signatures with a date-related 

deficiency, and ten signatures that were duplicative.4 

¶7 In April 2022, the trial court held a bench trial to address the 

remaining issues. After considering the evidence and argument, the court 

found that the address Leonard had listed on the circulator affidavit was 

not his “actual residence” and, therefore, it concluded all the petition sheets 

circulated by Leonard were invalid. 

¶8 The trial court then heard argument concerning the remaining 

signature issues. Jones asserted that, during trial preparations, he had 

discovered an additional twelve signatures that were not in the Graham 

County voter rolls and argued that they should be covered by the court’s 

earlier grant of summary judgment on that issue. According to Jones, 

taking those additional signatures into account would mean RWP had 

failed to meet the 1,064 threshold. The court ordered Jones to file a 

supplemental motion for summary judgment and RWP to respond in order

to give both parties time to review the signatures and the calculation. 

¶9 In that supplemental motion, Jones pointed out that, as part 

of the initial motion for summary judgment, the trial court had struck the 

3Although the motion argued that 1,078 signatures were invalid 

based on the false circulator affidavit, the parties later agreed that the 

correct number was 1,077. 

4Although the court’s minute entry indicated that ninety signatures 

belonged to voters not listed in the voter rolls, in the motion for summary 

judgment, Jones had indicated that this number was eighty-seven, and the 

court later corrected it. 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

5

signatures of eighty-seven individuals who were not registered to vote in 

Graham County when they signed the referendum petition but had 

proceeded to trial on ninety-three signatures for individuals whose 

addresses on the petition did not match the voter records. Jones explained 

that the additional twelve signatures he had discovered during trial 

preparations “were inadvertently included in [his] objection category for a 

‘mismatched address’ when, in fact, they did not appear at all in the 

County’s voter registration records.” Jones therefore reasoned that the 

twelve signatures “cannot be counted.” He also pointed out that, on the 

eve of trial, when counsel had sent RWP an email detailing this discrepancy, 

RWP suggested it would stipulate to the twelve “objections based upon 

signers who do not appear in the precinct register.” Jones argued RWP 

could not “walk . . . back” the stipulation “because it did not anticipate 

losing on the Keith Leonard issue.” And, Jones maintained that subtracting 

all the invalid signatures left RWP with 1,062 signatures, which was two

short of the required 1,064. 

¶10 In response, RWP conceded that the twelve signatures raised 

in the supplemental motion “were not those of registered voters in Graham 

County.”5 But RWP pointed out that of the ten signatures the trial court 

had originally struck as duplicates pursuant to the initial motion for 

summary judgment, seven were duplicative of signatures Leonard had 

obtained. Thus, RWP argued, when the court struck the Leonard 

signatures, “the copies of the 7 signatures that were gathered by other 

circulators and previously eliminated as duplicates [were] now the only 

valid signatures from those voters.” (Emphasis omitted.) Adding those 

seven to the 1,062 Jones had conceded were valid, RWP reasoned there were 

1,069 valid signatures, exceeding the requirement of 1,064. RWP also 

identified an additional twenty-two signatures that had been 

“misrepresented” in the initial motion for summary judgment and should 

not have been disqualified. 

¶11 In reply, Jones argued that RWP was asking “to re-open this 

entire case” by contesting “scores of . . . signature-specific objections that 

have long been disclosed and were squarely raised in [the initial] motion 

for summary judgment.” Jones asserted RWP had “waived any arguments 

5 After supplemental briefing was complete, the parties filed a 

stipulation acknowledging that one of the twelve signatures at issue in fact 

belonged to a registered voter at the time the referendum petition was 

signed. They therefore agreed the supplemental motion for summary 

judgment only concerned eleven signatures. 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

6

concerning signatures already deemed invalid” because it had not 

challenged them as part of the initial motion for summary judgment. Jones 

further asserted that he would suffer “immeasurable prejudice” by having 

to relitigate these issues. As to the seven duplicate signatures, Jones 

explained that the individuals had signed Leonard’s petition first and he 

had sought summary judgment on the “second-in-time signature,” such 

that both signatures should be disqualified. (Emphasis omitted.) 

¶12 In May 2022, the trial court issued its under-advisement 

ruling denying Jones’s request for injunctive relief. The court concluded 

RWP had waived its argument concerning the twenty-two signatures that 

were “misrepresented” in the initial motion for summary judgment. But, 

the court determined that RWP had not waived its argument about the 

seven duplicate signatures because it could not have been raised sooner and 

that there was “no legal basis for disqualifying those signatures.” This 

resulted in 1,070 valid signatures, and the referendum petition qualified for 

the ballot. In June 2022, the court entered a final judgment incorporating 

its prior minute entries and rulings, and this appeal followed. 

Standard of Review

¶13 We review a trial court’s decision on a request for injunctive 

relief for an abuse of discretion. Parker v. City of Tucson, 233 Ariz. 422, ¶ 11 

(App. 2013). However, we review questions of law concerning the 

interpretation and application of referendum statutes de novo. Arrett v. 

Bower, 237 Ariz. 74, ¶ 7 (App. 2015).

¶14 In Arizona, the power of referendum is reserved for qualified 

electors of cities, towns, and counties. Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(8). It 

“permits qualified electors to circulate petitions and refer legislation which 

has been enacted by their elected representatives to a popular vote.” 

Redelsperger v. City of Avondale, 207 Ariz. 430, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). Because this 

power “permits a minority to forestall implementation of enacted 

legislation, it ‘requires strict compliance with [applicable] constitutional 

and statutory requirements.’” Maricopa Citizens Protecting Taxpayers v. Price, 

244 Ariz. 330, ¶ 8 (App. 2017) (alteration in Price) (quoting W. Devcor, Inc. v. 

City of Scottsdale, 168 Ariz. 426, 429 (1991)); see also Comm. for Pres. of 

Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247, ¶ 6 (App. 2006) (“requires 

nearly perfect compliance”); Sklar v. Town of Fountain Hills, 220 Ariz. 449, 

¶ 9 (App. 2008) (strict compliance required).
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

7

Compliance with § 19-101(A)

¶15 Jones first argues the trial court erred in dismissing his

challenge to the text of the referendum petition. Specifically, he maintains 

that RWP’s petition “plainly does not comply” with § 19-101(A)’s 

“straightforward directive to identify” the “county measure” at issue and 

the title of the measure being referred, rather than its entire text. We review 

de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Coleman 

v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, ¶ 7 (2012).

¶16 Section 19-101(A) prescribes “the form for referring to the 

people by referendum petition a measure or item, section or part of a 

measure enacted by the legislature, or by the legislative body of an 

incorporated city, town or county.” As relevant here, it requires the 

following language: 

Petition for Referendum

To the secretary of state (or to the 

corresponding officer for or on local, county, 

city or town measures):

We, the undersigned citizens and 

qualified electors of the state of Arizona, 

respectfully order that the senate (or house) bill 

No. _____ (or other local, county, city or town 

measure) entitled (title of act or ordinance, and 

if the petition is against less than the whole act 

or ordinance then set forth here the item, 

section, or part, of any measure on which the 

referendum is used), passed by the 

_________________ session of the legislature of 

the state of Arizona, at the general (or special, as 

the case may be) session of said legislature, (or 

by a county, city or town legislative body) shall 

be referred to a vote of the qualified electors of 

the state, (county, city or town) for their 

approval or rejection at the next regular general 

election (or county, city or town election) and 

each for himself says . . . .

(Emphasis added.) 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

8

¶17 RWP’s referendum petition stated: 

Petition for Referendum

To the Graham County Election 

Director:6

We, the undersigned citizens and 

qualified electors of the state of Arizona, 

respectfully order that the Zone Map Change 

REZ#832-21 (APN 114-19-008D), entitled 

“Zone Map Change REZ#832-21 (APN 114-19-

008D). Request is to change the present “A” 

(General Land Use) Zone, site 5-6, to “M-X” 

(Unlimited Manufacturing Land Use) Zone for 

the purpose of operating offsite cultivation 

facility for medical marijuana dispensaries 

within existing greenhouse on property. 

Applicant is Heather Dukes. Site address is 

26050 S. NatureSweet Ave., Willcox, AZ.”,

passed by the Graham County Board of 

Supervisors at the June 21, 2021 regular Board 

of Supervisors’ meeting and ratified at the June 

28, 2021 regular Board of Supervisors’ meeting, 

shall be referred to a vote of the qualified 

electors of the county for their approval or 

6Article IV, part 1, § 1(9) of the Arizona Constitution provides: 

“Every initiative or referendum petition shall be addressed to the secretary 

of state in the case of petitions for or on state measures, and to the clerk of 

the board of supervisors, city clerk, or corresponding officer in the case of 

petitions for or on county, city, or town measures.” In contrast, § 19-141(A) 

states, “The duties required of the secretary of state as to state legislation 

shall be performed in connection with such legislation by the city or town 

clerk, county officer in charge of elections or person performing the duties 

as such.” We are aware of no case addressing this discrepancy. See Robson 

Ranch Mountains, L.L.C. v. Pinal County, 203 Ariz. 120, ¶ 26 (App. 2002) 

(identifying conflict). However, because Jones has not challenged the 

petition on this basis and because RWP had a legal basis—§ 19-141(A)—to 

address the petition to the election director, we decline to address the issue 

further. 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

9

rejection at the next regular county election and 

each for himself says . . . . 

(Emphasis added.)

¶18 In granting the motion to dismiss on this issue, the trial court 

explained that § 19-101(A) “calls for the insertion of the title” but “[i]f the 

petition is against less than the whole act or ordinance then it is to set forth 

the item, section, or part of any measure on which the referendum was 

used.” The court reasoned that “[t]he ‘whole act’ in this case was the 

entirety of the Board of Supervisors agenda” and “[t]he petition set forth 

the item, section, or part on which the referendum is used.” The court 

continued, “Even if that is not a technically correct interpretation of the 

statute, the manner of compliance is not subject to the strict construction 

rule.” And, the court concluded, “The manner of compliance here is within 

the bounds of what is permissible in the effort of the defendants to comply 

with the statutes.” 

¶19 On appeal, Jones argues the trial court “misunderstood” § 19-

101(A) and “mistakenly relied on the statute’s directive that, ‘if the petition 

is against less than the whole act or ordinance,’ the description must ‘set 

forth here the item, section, or part, of any measure on which the 

referendum is used.’” Jones reasons, “While the zoning measure was 

approved amid other matters considered by the Graham County Board of 

Supervisors, the zoning measure was certified as its own standalone 

measure.” 

¶20 “Our goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the intent 

of the legislature.” Sell v. Gama, 231 Ariz. 323, ¶ 16 (2013) (quoting Est. of 

Braden ex rel. Gabaldon v. State, 228 Ariz. 323, ¶ 8 (2011)). “If a statute’s 

language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to other 

methods of statutory interpretation.” Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 

268 (1994). Statutes “should be construed together with other related 

statutes,” even if they “contain no reference one to the other.” State ex rel. 

Larson v. Farley, 106 Ariz. 119, 122 (1970). However, “the expression of one 

or more items of a class indicates an intent to exclude all items of the same 

class which are not expressed.” Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 134 

(1982); see also Welch v. Cochise Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 251 Ariz. 519, ¶ 36 

(2021) (applying this canon of construction to conclude legislature 

intentionally excluded remedies).

¶21 Section 19-101(A) plainly prescribes the form of a referendum 

petition. See Direct Sellers Ass’n v. McBrayer, 109 Ariz. 3, 5-6 (1972) (statute 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

10

“prescribes what the petition for referendum shall contain, how it shall be 

signed, and by whom it shall be verified” (quoting AAD Temple Bldg. Ass’n 

v. Duluth, 160 N.W. 682, 684 (Minn. 1916))). It applies to “a measure or item, 

section or part of a measure enacted by the legislature, or by the legislative 

body of an incorporated city, town or county.” § 19-101(A). 

¶22 At issue here was a county measure, specifically, a rezoning 

request, REZ#832-21, which the Graham County Board of Supervisors 

approved in June 2021. See A.R.S. § 19-142(D) (explaining that “a person or 

organization may file a referendum petition against the rezoning of a parcel 

of property” upon approval of rezoning) (emphasis added). And RWP was 

challenging the entire rezoning, not a part thereof. Put another way, the 

measure at issue was not the Board of Supervisors’ agenda, as the trial court 

found. See Grosvenor Holdings L.C. v. City of Peoria, 195 Ariz. 137, ¶ 14 (App. 

1999) (“decision” in minutes is “referable act”). Indeed, RWP seemed to 

recognize as much by designating “Zone Map Change REZ#832-21 (APN 

114-19-008D)” as the “measure” on the petition, without reference to the 

entirety of the Board of Supervisors’ agenda. The court therefore erred in 

its interpretation of § 19-101(A), insofar as it concluded the measure at issue 

was the entire agenda. See Arrett, 237 Ariz. 74, ¶ 7.

¶23 RWP nevertheless argues that when § 19-101(A) is read in 

conjunction with § 19-121(E), the “logical conclusion . . . is that when there 

is not an ordinance resolution to identify a measure, the meeting minutes 

suffice for identification.” Section 19-121(E) provides:

For the purposes of this article and article 

4 of this chapter, the measure to be attached to 

the petition as enacted by the legislative body of 

an incorporated city, town or county means the 

adopted ordinance or resolution signed by the 

mayor or the chairman of the board of 

supervisors, as appropriate, and signed by the 

clerk of the municipality or the clerk of the 

board, as appropriate, or, in the absence of a 

written ordinance or resolution, that portion of 

the minutes of the legislative body that is 

approved by the governing body and filed with 

the clerk of the governing body and that reflects 

the action taken by that body when adopting 

the measure. In the case of zoning measures, the 

measure shall also include a legal description of 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

11

the property and any amendments made to the 

ordinance by the legislative body.

¶24 Even assuming we must construe the two statutes together, 

see Larson, 106 Ariz. at 122; Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. at 134, we find RWP’s 

argument unpersuasive. Section 19-121(E) discusses “the measure to be 

attached to the petition.” See Simpson v. Comm. Against Unconstitutional 

Takings, L.L.C., 193 Ariz. 391, ¶ 13 (App. 1998) (interpreting § 19-121(E) to 

mean: “If the ordinance or resolution has been adopted, attach that to the 

referendum petition; in the absence of a written ordinance or resolution, 

attach the approved minutes.”). Here, by contrast, we are concerned with 

the language describing the measure, including the “title of act or 

ordinance” or “the item, section, or part, of any measure on which the 

referendum is used,” as used in the text of the referendum petition itself. 

§ 19-101(A). Indeed, § 19-101(A) separately requires “the title and text of 

the measure [to be] attached” to the petition. From a practical standpoint, 

it makes sense that the minutes, which can sometimes be lengthy and hard 

to understand, would be attached to but not included in the text of a 

petition. Section 19-121(E) therefore does not support RWP’s position that 

the Graham County Board of Supervisors’ meeting minutes could be used 

as the required language on the petition. 

¶25 Next, Jones asserts that strict compliance with § 19-101(A) 

was necessary. Jones contends the trial court’s conclusion that “the manner 

of compliance is not subject to the strict construction rule” is a “patently 

incorrect statement of [the] law.” He argues the court erroneously relied on 

“Sklar’s discussion of the need to ‘broadly construe’ the terms of 

referendum statutes,” notwithstanding the fact the legislature has 

subsequently made clear in A.R.S. § 19-101.01 that “strict compliance is the 

law, and failure to strictly comply is fatal to the measure.”7 

¶26 In Sklar, which was decided in November 2008, this court 

noted that “[o]ur supreme court has consistently held that a referendum 

petition must ‘comply strictly with applicable constitutional and statutory 

provisions.’” 220 Ariz. 449, ¶ 9 (quoting Sherrill v. City of Peoria, 189 Ariz. 

537, 540 (1997)). But, we also noted that our legislature had expressly 

7RWP suggests that Jones did not raise this argument below but does 

not argue that we should consider the issue waived. Although Jones did 

not apparently argue that Sklar was no longer good law before the trial 

court, he did rely on § 19-101.01 and maintained that strict compliance with 

§ 19-101(A) was required. We decline to find waiver. 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

12

directed, in a note to A.R.S. § 19-111, that referendum requirements should 

be “broadly construed.” Id. ¶ 10 (quoting Sherrill, 189 Ariz. at 540-41). In 

an attempt to harmonize these two standards, this court explained that we 

must strictly construe the statutory requirements but broadly construe the 

terms used in the statutes to identify those requirements. Id. ¶ 11. In 2015, 

after Sklar was decided, our legislature added § 19-101.01, which mandates 

“that the constitutional and statutory requirements for the referendum be 

strictly construed and that persons using the referendum process strictly 

comply with those constitutional and statutory requirements.” See 2015 

Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 285, § 1. 

¶27 As a starting point, we determine whether Sklar’s proposition 

that we must broadly construe the terms used in the referendum statutes 

can coexist with the explicit requirements of § 19-101.01. Section 19-101.01 

requires strict compliance with “the constitutional and statutory 

requirements for the referendum process.” Notably, our caselaw 

established that same proposition even before § 19-101.01 was enacted. 

See Sklar, 220 Ariz. 449, ¶ 9. Section 19-101.01, however, does not address 

how we interpret the terms used in those constitutional and statutory 

requirements to determine their ultimate meaning. 

¶28 That said, the proposition that we broadly interpret terms 

used in the statutory requirements for referendums was based on a prior 

note to § 19-111. See Sklar, 220 Ariz. 449, ¶ 10. But that note was removed,8

and our legislature enacted § 19-101.01, emphasizing the need for strict 

compliance. See State v. Superior Court, 104 Ariz. 440, 442 (1969) (when 

legislature amends existing statute, we presume it was aware of prior 

judicial interpretations of statute); State v. Averyt, 179 Ariz. 123, 128 

8The note was originally included as a statement of purpose with 

legislative amendments to title 19, chapter 1. 1989 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 10, 

§§ 1, 2. It was not numbered and subsequently appeared under the heading 

“Historical and Statutory Notes,” as late as 2015. See, e.g., Sklar, 220 Ariz. 

449, ¶ 10. To the extent this statement of purpose was enacted as part of 

our prior law, the legislature’s subsequent adoption of § 19-101.01 

seemingly repealed it by implication. See Hounshell v. White, 219 Ariz. 381, 

¶ 13 (App. 2008) (repeal by implication results where subsequent statute 

covers same subject matter and earlier statute not explicitly retained); 

see also A.R.S. § 1-245. In any event, we need not resolve the issue here 

because our opinion does not turn on the ongoing validity of that statement 

or the reasoning in Sklar.
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

13

(App. 1994) (“Under the rules of statutory construction, when the 

legislature modifies the language of a statute, there is a presumption that a 

change in the existing law was intended.”). Thus, the proposition that we 

broadly construe the terms in the referendum statutes appears to be no 

longer good law. The trial court therefore erred in concluding that the rule 

of strict compliance does not apply here. See Romer-Pollis v. Ada, 223 Ariz. 

300, ¶ 12 (App. 2009) (court abuses discretion by committing error of law).

¶29 However, we decline to conclude that the presence of any 

surplus information on a referendum petition automatically negates strict 

compliance under § 19-101(A). Nothing in the plain language of 

§ 19-101(A) mandates such a result. Further, in this instance, the surplusage

does not alter the meaning or cause confusion. See Pioneer Tr. Co. of Ariz. v. 

Pima County, 168 Ariz. 61, 67 (1991); see also Sklar, 220 Ariz. 449, ¶ 17 (“The 

purpose of [§ 19-101(A)] is to ensure that the public has immediate and full 

disclosure of the exact public action that may be reversed.”). As our 

supreme court concluded in Pioneer Trust, “Absent constitutional or 

statutory proscription of such surplusage, we choose not to silence the voice 

of the people because of it.” 168 Ariz. at 67.

¶30 RWP’s referendum petition contained the required

information under § 19-101(A). It identified the relevant rezoning request, 

including details of when it had been passed and by whom. Although the 

petition included the title of the rezoning request twice, as well as the entire 

proposal, this additional information did not alter the meaning and “does 

not justify depriving [Graham] County voters of their opportunity to be 

heard.” Pioneer Tr., 168 Ariz. at 67. If anything, this additional information 

served to better inform the signers of the matter at issue. See Sklar, 220 Ariz. 

449, ¶ 17. In addition, although the petition lacked the phrase “county 

measure,” or something similar, it was clear based on the remainder of the 

petition—namely the address of the property and the involvement of the 

Graham County Board of Supervisors—that what was at issue was a county 

matter. 

¶31 In sum, we conclude that the form of a referendum petition 

must strictly comply with § 19-101(A) and that RWP so complied here, 

despite its inclusion of surplus information. Accordingly, the trial court did 

not err in granting the motion to dismiss on this issue. See Coleman, 

230 Ariz. 352, ¶ 7; see also Forszt v. Rodriguez, 212 Ariz. 263, ¶ 9 (App. 2006) 

(we may affirm trial court if legally correct for any reason apparent in 

record).
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

14

Sufficient Valid Signatures

¶32 Jones next contends that the “trial court erred in granting 

post-trial judgment” for RWP on the signature challenge. Specifically, he 

raises three issues: (1) the court “failed to shift the burden of proof to [RWP] 

to prove the validity of signatures containing mismatched addresses”; 

(2) RWP “waived its post-trial argument to revive seven ‘duplicate’

signatures that [it had] conceded, during summary judgment briefing, were 

invalid”; and (3) the court misinterpreted “the duplicate signature 

prohibition in A.R.S. § 19-121.02.” We address each issue in turn. 

¶33 The first issue concerns ninety-three signatures with an 

address on the referendum petition that did not match the signer’s address 

in the voter registration records. Below, Jones presented evidence of these 

mismatched addresses in his motion for summary judgment. In response, 

RWP asserted, in a footnote, that “[i]t is not clear that a failure to update a 

voters’ registration address automatically invalidates their signing of a 

referendum petition.” 

¶34 In denying the motion for summary judgment on these 

signatures, the trial court stated: 

As to the signatures for which the 

addresses do not match the voter registration, 

the court finds that those signatures are 

presumed to be valid. The requirement is that 

those people be qualified electors. By 

identifying those people as being potentially the 

same people, who have simply moved within 

Graham County, the plaintiffs implicitly

concede the likely validity of those signatures. 

Also, the petition calls for the “current 

residence address” of the signers. It’s difficult 

for the court to see how it’s fair to presume a 

signature invalid where the signer provided 

exactly the information the sign[e]r was 

instructed to provide. 

. . . .

. . . [T]he plaintiffs are free to present 

evidence to the court, or argue to the court 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

15

based on the evidence that’s already present in 

the record, that those signatures should not 

count. At this point the court cannot say that 

those 93 signatures are either valid or invalid. 

¶35 On appeal, Jones maintains that his “position is not that a 

signature is invalid simply because an otherwise qualified elector has 

moved after signing.” Rather, he argues, “[I]t is impossible to determine, 

on the face of the petition vis-à-vis voter registration rolls, whether the John 

Smith who signed the petition as a resident of 123 Main Street is a qualified 

elector if no John Smith is registered at that address.” Because “[i]t is 

uncontested that, as to dozens of signers, no voter by the same name 

appeared registered at the address listed on the petition,” Jones reasons that 

this “discrepancy displaced the presumption of validity as to these 

signatures and shifted the burden to [RWP] to re-establish their validity.” 

¶36 In support of his burden-shifting argument, Jones relies on

Jenkins v. Hale, 218 Ariz. 561, ¶ 23 (2008), and McKenna v. Soto, 250 Ariz. 469, 

¶ 18 (2021). But these cases are distinguishable. Procedurally, neither case 

was before the trial court on summary judgment. See Jenkins, 218 Ariz. 561, 

¶ 4; McKenna, 250 Ariz. 469, ¶ 1. Substantively, Jenkins involved signatures 

that listed a post-office box, rather than the required residential address,

218 Ariz. 561, ¶ 18, while McKenna involved signatures with incomplete 

dates, 250 Ariz. 469, ¶ 15. Both cases, therefore, involved issues that were 

facially fatal.

¶37 “In Arizona, a summary judgment motion sets in play shifting 

burdens.” Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Thruston, 218 Ariz. 112, ¶ 12 (App. 2008). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing “there are no genuine 

issues of material fact and it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 

law.” Id. “Only if the moving party satisfies this burden will the party 

opposing the motion be required to come forward with evidence 

establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that must be 

resolved at trial.” Id. The moving party bears the heavy burden of 

persuasion, and that burden does not shift to the non-moving party. 

Id. ¶¶ 16-17. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we must 

determine de novo whether the trial court erred in applying the law. Bothell 

v. Two Point Acres, Inc., 192 Ariz. 313, ¶ 8 (App. 1998).

¶38 As RWP points out, the only evidence Jones presented in 

support of his claim as to these ninety-three signatures was the mismatched 

addresses in the voter rolls. The trial court seemed to suggest that Jones 

had failed to meet his initial burden because the signers listed an address 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

16

that was presumably their “current residence address,” regardless of what 

address they had previously used when registering to vote. We agree that, 

despite different addresses being listed in the voter registration records, 

there is nothing facially fatal about these signatures. See § 19-101(A) 

(requiring signer to provide “[a]ctual address” or description of “residence 

location”); § 19-121.02(A)(1) (county recorder may reject signatures where 

“[n]o residence address or description of residence location is provided”).

And it is not clear from the record what version of the registration records 

Jones used for the address comparison—the current version as of the filing 

of the court action, the version as of the signing of the petition, or something 

else entirely. See § 19-122(B) (most current version of voter registration 

database at time of filing of court action challenging referendum petition

constitutes “official record” to be used to determine eligibility, but if that 

address differs, county recorder must also examine version of database that 

was current as of date signer signed petition). Because Jones failed to show 

there were “no genuine issues of material fact” with regard to his claim that 

the signatures were invalid, the burden of establishing a genuine issue did 

not fall to RWP. Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 218 Ariz. 112, ¶¶ 12, 17. The court 

therefore did not err in denying the motion for summary judgment. 

See Bothell, 192 Ariz. 313, ¶ 8.

¶39 The second and third issues concern seven duplicate 

signatures that were collected by Leonard and a separate circulator. These 

signatures were part of the ten signatures the trial court had disqualified 

under the initial motion for summary judgment. At that time, the court 

denied the motion for summary judgment on Leonard’s circulator affidavit. 

After the court had invalidated all the petition sheets circulated by Leonard 

at trial, and after the court had granted the parties leave to file supplemental 

pleadings on the additional twelve signatures that were not in the voter 

rolls, RWP raised this new issue with respect to the seven duplicate 

signatures. RWP maintained that because the court had invalidated the 

signatures on the Leonard petitions, the duplicate signatures, collected by 

a different circulator, should not be disqualified. 

¶40 The trial court agreed with RWP, explaining that there was 

“no legal basis for disqualifying” the seven signatures after the Leonard 

petitions had been disqualified. The court explained that it was not going 

to treat this argument as waived because it “could not have been made in 

response to the pre-hearing summary judgment motion,” given that the 

Leonard petitions had not yet been struck. The court further determined 

that RWP had timely raised the issue because “no final ruling was made at 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

17

the hearing.” The court further pointed out that Jones had a “full and fair 

opportunity to be heard in response.” 

¶41 On appeal, Jones reurges his argument that RWP waived any 

issue related to these seven signatures. He points to caselaw discussing 

partial summary judgment rulings and “the need for parties to be able to 

rely on those rulings in preparing for trial.” And, Jones maintains he 

focused his “trial preparation and presentation on evidence showing that 

the address that Leonard listed on his petition sheets was not his actual 

residence” and “did not present evidence concerning the 93 signatures 

containing mismatched addresses, as this would have been superfluous.” 

¶42 The rule of waiver “is a rule of prudence, not of jurisdiction.” 

City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, n.9 (2005). When 

good reason exists, a court may entertain waived issues. Jimenez v. Sears, 

Roebuck & Co., 183 Ariz. 399, 406 n.9 (1995). Whether to apply the doctrine 

of waiver is largely a discretionary decision for the court considering it. 

See Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 503 (1987).

¶43 At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial 

court entered its orders in an unsigned minute entry. As the court pointed 

out, its orders were therefore subject to change. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b); 

BCAZ Corp. v. Helgoe, 194 Ariz. 11, ¶ 14 (App. 1998) (interlocutory or 

intermediate order subject to change prior to final judgment); Reilly v. 

Perkins, 6 Ariz. 188, 190 (1899) (until final judgment, proceedings are subject 

to change and modification; interlocutory order or decree “is always under 

the control of the court until the final decision of the suit, and may be 

modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before 

final judgment”). And in light of later events at trial—specifically, the 

disqualification of the petition sheets circulated by Leonard—the court 

determined that its original summary judgment ruling needed to be 

modified. The court therefore had a sound reason—and a legal basis—for 

declining to apply waiver.

¶44 It is significant that Jones was afforded an opportunity to 

respond to RWP’s argument—and in fact did so—through his reply in 

support of his supplemental motion for summary judgment. See Stokes v. 

Stokes, 143 Ariz. 590, 592 (App. 1984) (doctrine of waiver intended to 

prevent surprise). In addition, the trial court allowed Jones to present 

arguably tardy evidence about the additional twelve signatures of 

individuals who were not in the voter rolls that, Jones maintained, should 

be disqualified pursuant to the court’s earlier grant of summary judgment. 

Cf. State v. Ross, 166 Ariz. 579, 584 (App. 1990) (“essential fairness” underlies
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

18

system of justice). We therefore cannot say the court abused its discretion 

in declining to deem this argument waived. See Hawkins, 152 Ariz. at 503.

¶45 The final issue concerns § 19-121.02(A), which provides that, 

after receiving referendum petition signature sheets, the county recorder

“shall determine which signatures of individuals whose names were 

transmitted shall be disqualified.” The statute further provides, in relevant 

part, that “[i]f a petitioner signed more than once, all but one otherwise 

valid signature shall be disqualified.” § 19-121.02(A)(8).

¶46 Below, Jones argued, “[I]f a person signs a referendum 

petition more than once, only the first signature collected by that person 

should be eligible to be counted.” And, according to Jones, with respect to 

the seven signatures, because those individuals signed Leonard’s petition 

first, the first was invalid based on the false circulator affidavit and the 

second was invalid as being a duplicate. The trial court disagreed, 

explaining § 19-121.02(A)(8) “says to count ‘one signature’ that is valid but 

for the fact that it is duplicative.” The court continued, “There is no basis 

in the statute’s text for disqualifying all duplicative signatures.” 

¶47 On appeal, Jones again contends that § 19-121.02(A)(8), when 

“combined with the ‘strict compliance’ standard to which referenda 

signatures are held, . . . logically suggests that only the first signature 

obtained from a duplicate signer should be counted.” (Emphasis omitted.) 

Jones maintains that the trial court’s “alternative interpretation . . . fails to 

recognize the important policy reasons behind eliminating second-in-time 

signatures.” Specifically, Jones asserts that “[f]ailure to eliminate all but the 

first signature incentivizes initiative or referendum sponsors to have 

individuals sign the same petition as many times as possible because if one 

of the earlier-in-time duplicates is eliminated on other grounds, the laterin-time signatures can serve as back-ups.” 

¶48 Section 19-121.02(A)(8) plainly requires the county recorder 

to disqualify “all but one otherwise valid signature” if the person signed 

more than once. It does not specify which signature must be invalidated. 

“[W]e will not read into a statute something which is not within the 

manifest intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself.” City of 

Tempe v. Fleming, 168 Ariz. 454, 457 (App. 1991). “Nor will we ‘inflate, 

expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express 

provisions.’” Id. (quoting City of Phoenix v. Donofrio, 99 Ariz. 130, 133 

(1965)). Accordingly, the trial court correctly interpreted § 19-121.02(A)(8) 

as allowing the disqualification of the first signature. See Arrett, 237 Ariz. 

74, ¶ 7. And we need not resort to Jones’s policy arguments, given that the 
JONES v. RESPECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 

Opinion of the Court

19

language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. See Hayes, 178 Ariz. at 

268. 

Conclusion

¶49 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 

Jones’s request for injunctive relief, permitting referendum petition 

REF-02-2021 to be placed on the November 2022 ballot.