IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1415

Filed July 3, 2019

ANGELA CHAPMAN and KRISTINE FORD,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

vs.

BARBARA BRECHLER,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, Don E. Courtney, 

Judge.

Barbara Brechler appeals from the district court’s summary judgment 

rulings overruling her motion and sustaining the motion of Angela Chapman and 

Kristine Ford, her deceased husband’s daughters. AFFIRMED.

Steven R. Postolka and Stephen F. Avery of Cornwall, Avery, Bjornstad & 

Scott, Spencer, for appellant.

Michael R. Bovee and Jill M. Davis of Montgomery, Barry, Bovee, Steffen 

& Davis, LLP, Spencer, for appellees.

Heard by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.

Carl Brechler owned an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). Pursuant to 

a 2003 decree of dissolution from his wife Donna, he designated his daughters 

Angela Chapman and Kristine Ford as primary beneficiaries of the IRA.

1

 Carl 

married Barbara in 2004. In 2011, he transferred 54% of the IRA to a new IRA. 

He designated his daughters as primary beneficiaries of the new IRA and changed 

the primary beneficiary designation of the original IRA from his daughters to his 

wife Barbara.

Carl’s daughters filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Barbara 

seeking to invalidate and set aside Carl’s designation of Barbara as the primary 

beneficiary of the original IRA. Following a hearing on dueling motions for 

summary judgment, the district court sustained Carl’s daughters’ motion and 

overruled Barbara’s motion, finding the 2003 dissolution decree obligated Carl, by 

way of his and Donna’s voluntary stipulation, to irrevocably designate his 

daughters as equal beneficiaries of the IRA in question. Barbara appeals that 

ruling, arguing Carl was permitted to make withdrawals under the stipulation, which 

was essentially what he did, and Carl’s daughters were only to inherit the balance 

of Carl’s retirement account on the date of his death, which they did. Alternatively, 

Barbara argues Carl’s post-dissolution contributions to his retirement account are 

her and Carl’s marital property, and Carl’s transfer of funds to a new IRA account 

for his daughters honored the provisions of his divorce stipulation. Upon our 

review, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment rulings.

 

1 For the sake of brevity, we will generally refer to Angela and Kristine collectively as Carl’s 

daughters.
3

I. Standard of Review.

“A motion for summary judgment is appropriately granted when ‘there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.’” Behm v. City of Cedar Rapids, 922 N.W.2d 524, 

542 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3)). Our review of a court’s 

summary judgment ruling is for correction of errors at law. See Morris v. Steffes 

Group, Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Iowa 2019).

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The underlying facts are undisputed. In December 2003, the district court 

entered a decree dissolving the marriage of Donna and Carl Brechler. The decree 

accepted and adopted Donna and Carl’s stipulation and property settlement, 

containing the following provision:

Carl is a participant in a 401(K) Plan sponsored by his 

employer, . . . which plan had a balance of $124,164.59 as of June 

5, 2003 (hereinafter “Carl’s 401(K) Plan”).

. . . Carl shall cause the Administrator of Carl’s 401(K) Plan 

to assign to an [IRA] established by Donna (hereinafter “Donna’s 

Rollover IRA”), an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of the balance held 

in Carl’s 401(K) Plan . . . .

Carl and Donna agree that following the assignment of onehalf (1/2) of the balance of Carl’s 401(K) Plan to Donna’s Rollover 

IRA, that Carl shall receive the remaining balance held in Carl’s 

401(K) Plan.

Carl agrees that he will irrevocably designate [his and 

Donna’s adult children, Angela Chapman and Kristine Ford,2] as 

equal beneficiaries of Carl’s 401(K) Plan in the event of Carl’s death.

Other provisions of the stipulation adopted by the district court declared that Carl 

and Donna knew the stipulation’s terms and conditions, executed the stipulation 

 

2 Angela was born in 1962 and Kristine in 1967, making them 41 and 36 at the time of 

entry of the decree.
4

freely and voluntarily, and would execute any additional documents necessary to 

effectuate the terms and conditions of the stipulation.

Sometime thereafter, Carl rolled the remaining balance of his 401(K) Plan 

into an IRA with SEI Private Trust Custody (SEI), account number XXX817. He 

named his daughters as the primary beneficiaries.3

As of February 1, 2011, Carl’s IRA account number XXX817 had a market 

value of approximately $110,000. On February 17, 2011, Carl transferred 54% of 

the account—approximately $60,000—into a new IRA, account number XXX401. 

Account number XXX817 had a remaining amount of about $51,000. Carl 

designated his daughters the primary beneficiaries of the new XXX401 account.

On June 13, 2011, Roger Schulke of Williams & Company Financial 

Services, LLC drafted a “To Whom It May Concern” letter indicating Carl opened 

an IRA with Schulke through SEI on February 16, 2011, and that Carl listed his two 

daughters as equal primary beneficiaries. In September 2011, Carl executed an 

IRA Beneficiary Designation Form changing the primary beneficiary designation of 

account number XXX817 from his daughters to Barbara. Carl’s daughters were 

designated as contingent beneficiaries of account number XXX817.

Carl died in 2016. In 2017, Carl’s daughters filed a petition seeking entry of 

a declaratory judgment setting aside and invalidating Barbara as the beneficiary of 

the IRA account number XXX817.4 They argued designating Barbara as the 

 

3 No one suggests the roll-over of the 401(K) to the IRA violated the decree.

4 The administrator of Carl’s IRA accounts, HK Financial Services, was also named as a 

defendant in the suit. The administrator filed a motion for summary judgment, which was 

not resisted, and the district court granted the administrator’s motion and dismissed it from 

the suit. HK Financial Services is not a party to this appeal.
5

beneficiary was in violation of the terms of the decree, and they requested the court

declare the proceeds of IRA account number XXX817 as their property in equal 

shares. Barbara admitted she had been designated the beneficiary but denied it 

was a violation of the decree.

Barbara and Carl’s daughters filed dueling motions for summary judgment, 

each party arguing that there was no material fact in dispute and they were entitled 

to summary judgment as a matter of law. The daughters argued to the district 

court:

Again, Plaintiffs do not seek to recoup distributions [Carl]

lawfully took during his lifetime. However, when he moved money 

from Account No. [XXX]817 to Account No. [XXX]401, he was not 

taking a distribution, nor was he withdrawing funds. That was a 

transfer of funds, which itself was not a per se violation of the 

Stipulation and Property Settlement. It was the act of changing the

beneficiary designation that triggered the violation. Had [Carl] simply 

designated his daughters as equal beneficiaries of the account, he 

would have been in compliance with the Stipulation and Property 

Settlement.

There is no dispute that [Account number XXX]817 originated 

as the 401(k) plan referenced in Section 10 of the Stipulation and 

Property Settlement, and therefore was acquired during the

marriage. If the account balance grew in value subsequent to the 

divorce, it was either because of contributions made by [Carl], or 

because the account responded positively to the market. If [Carl]

made contributions to that account after his divorce was finalized 

(even if he used marital funds from his second marriage), it was his 

choice to do so. The account was nonetheless acquired during the

[first] marriage. The Stipulation is silent as to how contributions to 

the account after the dissolution of the marriage should be handled. 

Because there is no affirmative provision, there is no authority to 

justify setting those contributions aside for [Carl]’s second wife. Just 

as [the daughters] cannot and do not seek to recoup distributions 

[Carl] took from the account [during his lifetime], they likewise cannot 

be made to account to [Barbara] for the increased value of the 

account. And regardless of whether post-divorce contributions were 

made by [Carl], it does not change the requirement [Carl] voluntarily 

imposed upon himself, to irrevocably designate[] [the daughters] as 

the beneficiaries of that account.
6

The fact remains that [Carl] had no authority to change the 

beneficiary of the account that originated from his 401(k) retirement 

plan sponsored by his former employer . . . . He was simply 

prohibited from doing so by the terms of the Stipulation and Property 

Settlement.

Following a hearing, the district court entered its ruling sustaining Carl’s 

daughters’ summary judgment motion and overruling Barbara’s motion. The court 

first noted:

An IRA does not lend itself to facile labeling. It arguably 

contains elements of a [Pay-on-Death] account, of a multiple-party 

account, of a trust account, and even of a life insurance policy. An 

IRA is a private retirement plan created by Congress in 1974 to allow 

tax-deferred savings, the balance of which becomes payable to the 

depositor at a certain age. The IRA depositor may name a 

beneficiary. The court finds that the scope of the Stipulation 

incorporated into the 2003 dissolution decree was not limited to the 

ownership of the retirement accounts but also governed the legal 

effect upon the designation of beneficiaries to non-probate transfers.

Based upon the language in the dissolution’s stipulation, the district court found

Carl voluntarily agreed to make the terms and conditions of the 

Stipulation mandatory. The Stipulation obligated Carl to irrevocably 

designate his daughters as equal beneficiaries of his IRA. It is 

undisputed that after his divorce to Donna, Carl rolled the proceeds 

of his 401(k) Plan [into IRA account number XXX817] . . . . The 

language . . . of the Stipulation, that Carl irrevocably designated his 

daughters as equal beneficiaries, is dispositive. Black’s Law 

Dictionary defines irrevocable as “[U]nalterable; committed beyond

recall.” Black’s Law Dictionary 835 (7th ed. 1999).

When the owner of an IRA retains the right to change 

beneficiaries, the designated beneficiary’s interest is a revocable 

expectancy vesting only upon the owner’s death. However, when 

the owner of an IRA waives the right to change beneficiaries by an 

appropriate agreement, the designated beneficiary obtains a vested 

contractual right that is not dependent on any community interest, 

and which supersedes another’s community interest. When the 

owner of an IRA ignores a court order or contractual obligation to 

retain an irrevocable beneficiary, that beneficiary is entitled to 

recover the proceeds, even though the newly named beneficiary has 

a community interest in the IRA.

Barbara now appeals.
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III. Discussion.

The district court sustained the daughters’ motion for summary judgment. 

That motion specifically requested the court establish that the changing of the 

beneficiary designation on IRA account number XXX817 from Carl’s daughters to 

Barbara violated the dissolution decree. They requested the proceeds of the 

XXX817 account be declared as their property, in equal shares, as a matter of law, 

and any other relief the court deemed appropriate. Consequently, in sustaining 

their motion for summary judgment, the court declared the proceeds of the XXX817 

account to be the daughters’ property.

On appeal, Barbara asserts the district court erred in two respects. First, 

she argues she was not a proper party to the action and her motion for summary 

judgment should have been granted. Second, she maintains Carl’s actions were 

permissible under the dissolution decree.

A. Proper Party.

“A declaratory judgment is a type of action where the ‘court declares the 

rights, duties, status, or other legal relationships of the parties.’” Zimmer v. Vander 

Waal, 780 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Iowa 2010) (citation omitted).

Any person interested in an oral or written contract, or a will, 

or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by any 

statute, municipal ordinance, rule, regulation, contract or franchise, 

may have any question of the construction or validity thereof or 

arising thereunder determined, and obtain a declaration of rights, 

status or legal relations thereunder.

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1102; see also Sierra Club Iowa Chapter v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 

832 N.W.2d 636, 648 (Iowa 2013). Relief based on a declaratory-judgment petition 

“may be granted wherever necessary or proper,” and, “[i]f the court deems the 
8

petition sufficient, it shall, on such reasonable notice as it prescribes, require any 

adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated to show cause why such relief 

should not be granted.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1106. However, the court cannot 

adjudicate the claim unless there is “a substantial controversy between parties 

having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant a 

declaratory judgment.” Sierra Club, 832 N.W.2d at 648. Still, “[t]he mere denial of 

interest in the case or that a controversy exists will not defeat an action for 

declaratory judgment.” State ex rel. Zimmerer v. Clark, 107 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Iowa 

1961). The ordinary rules of procedure apply. See Dubuque Policemen’s 

Protective Ass’n v. City of Dubuque, 553 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa 1996). Thus:

A party is indispensable if the party’s interest is not severable, and 

the party’s absence will prevent the court from rendering any 

judgment between the parties before it; or if notwithstanding the 

party’s absence the party’s interest would necessarily be inequitably 

affected by a judgment rendered between those before the court.

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.234(2).

Here, it is true that Barbara was not a party to the underlying stipulation that 

the district court adopted in the dissolution decree. Nevertheless, Barbara was 

named as a beneficiary on a retirement account Carl’s daughters sought the court 

to declare was in violation of that decree. Clearly Barbara’s right to be Carl’s 

named beneficiary of the account was in dispute. We find Barbara was a proper 

party to the proceeding. See also generally Zobrist v. Bennison, 486 S.E.2d 815, 

816-17 (Ga. 1997) (permitting “a suit against the beneficiary of a [life insurance] 

policy which replaced a policy which a divorce decree required the insured to 

maintain for the benefit of a child”).
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B. Validity of Carl’s Changed Beneficiary Designation.

Barbara also maintains Carl’s actions were permissible under the decree 

and the law. She argues that Carl’s 2011 transfer from his IRA amounts to nothing 

more than a lifetime withdrawal, which his divorce stipulation allowed him to do. 

Barbara also argues the amount that Carl withdrew from his IRA represented funds 

that he earned after his divorce from Donna and to which the children have no 

claim of right.

“A stipulation and settlement in a dissolution proceeding is a contract 

between the parties.” In re Marriage of Morris, 810 N.W.2d 880, 886 (Iowa 2012) 

(citation omitted). When a stipulation is adopted by the district court in its 

dissolution decree, it is the “decree, not the stipulation, that determines what rights 

the parties have.” Id. It is the court’s intent “that is relevant, not the intent of the 

parties.” Id.

“We interpret court decrees like any other written instrument.” TSB 

Holdings, L.L.C. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 913 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2018). A dissolution 

decree

should be construed in accordance with its evident intention. Indeed 

the determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from 

all parts of the decree. Effect is to be given to that which is clearly 

implied as well as to that which is expressed. Of course, in 

determining this intent, we take the decree by its four corners and try 

to ascertain from it the intent as disclosed by the various provisions 

of the decree.

In re Marriage of Goodman, 690 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted).

The stipulation adopted by the court unambiguously required that Carl 

“irrevocably designate” his daughters as the equal beneficiaries of his remaining 

proceeds of his 401(K) plan. It is undisputed that those funds were rolled over into 
10

his IRA account number XXX817. In 2011, he changed the primary beneficiary 

designation of that account from his daughters to Barbara. This was in violation of 

the stipulation he agreed to and adopted by the court in its dissolution decree, 

wherein his daughters would be irrevocably designated as the equal beneficiaries 

of the retirement account. Therefore, the proceeds of account number XXX817 

belong to the daughters.

Perhaps the result has the appearance of elevating form over substance,

as no one disputes that Carl could have withdrawn the retirement funds during his 

lifetime and used them for whatever purpose he saw fit. Carl could have withdrawn 

the funds and given cash to Barbara. Carl could have deposited his continuing 

post-decree retirement contributions to some other account. He did not. Under 

the terms of the decree to which Carl agreed, his daughters were to be named 

beneficiaries of the retirement account and therefore entitled to whatever funds, if 

any, remained in the account upon his death. Carl’s changing the account’s 

beneficiary designation to Barbara was in violation of the decree. Therefore, the

district court did not error in its summary judgment rulings.

IV. Conclusion.

We affirm the district court’s ruling sustaining Carl’s daughters’ motion for 

summary judgment and overruling Barbara’s motion for summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.