IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-51150

MICHELLE JEAN BROWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant 

v. 

DANIEL SCHMEDHORST, C/O Warden Vikki Wright; SERGEANT 

ALPHONSO STEVENS; LIEUTENANT DARRELL MANDIGO, C/O Warden 

Vikki Wright; LIEUTENANT GILBERT MARTINEZ, C/O Warden Vikki 

Wright; UNKNOWN FEMALE CORRECTIONAL OFFICER, C/O Warden 

Vikki Wright; OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Defendants-Appellees 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 6:15-CV-229

Before DENNIS, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Michelle Jean Brown, Texas prisoner # 01066458, has filed a motion for 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the dismissal of her 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. The district court denied Brown’s

motion to proceed IFP, certifying that the appeal was not taken in good faith. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 7, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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By moving in this court for leave to proceed IFP on appeal, Brown is 

challenging this certification. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 

1997). 

In her brief, Brown does not address the dismissal of defendants Daniel 

Schmedhorst and unidentified female corrections officer; the dismissal of the 

official capacity monetary claims against defendants Alphonso Stevens, 

Gilbert Martinez, and Darrell Mandigo; or the district court’s grounds for 

denying her motion to amend the complaint. Brown has therefore abandoned 

any challenge to the district court’s certification decision on these grounds. See 

Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 

1987).

Brown’s individual capacity claims against Stevens, Martinez, and 

Mandigo, accepted as true, show only that she experienced a delay in receiving 

treatment, not a denial of treatment, and that her condition was fully treated. 

A delay in medical treatment is not actionable unless the defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need and their indifference 

resulted in substantial harm. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 

1993). Brown’s complaint does not cite facts which meet these requirements. 

See id. Her appeal lacks arguable merit and is therefore frivolous. See Howard 

v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983).

Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. 

Brown’s motion for permission to proceed IFP is DENIED. The dismissal of 

Brown’s complaint and the dismissal of her appeal both count as strikes for 

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Brown v. Megg, 857 F.3d 287, 290-92 (5th 

Cir. 2017); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996). Brown 

is WARNED that if she accumulates a third strike, she will not be allowed to 

proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal while incarcerated or detained in any 

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facility unless she is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See

§ 1915(g).

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