Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 3, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-17-00327-CR

BILLY SHAWN CHAUNCEY, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 180th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 1546433 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

A jury convicted appellant Billy Shawn Chauncey of aggravated assault with 

a deadly weapon. The trial court assessed punishment and sentenced appellant to 

confinement for twenty years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department 

of Criminal Justice. From that judgment, appellant timely brought this appeal. We 

affirm. 
2

In two issues, appellant complains the trial court erred by refusing to allow 

him to question Justin Brown, a State’s witness, about the fact that Brown was on 

deferred adjudication community supervision, referred to as “probation” by 

appellant, for offenses committed in the same transaction for which appellant was 

on trial.1 The record reflects that before opening arguments, the State made an oral 

motion in limine regarding the punishment Brown received. The following exchange 

then occurred:

 [Defense Counsel]: And, Judge, I have no problem of the jury 

not knowing he is on probation, but I think it is very pertinent and 

relevant to know that -- I mean, he’s still got a foot in the flames here 

that the State could file to further incarcerate him should they deem that 

appropriate; not obviously for the testimony he gives, but that he’s not 

completely out of the woods. He has an incentive to cooperate fully 

with the State. 

 THE COURT: Can you further articulate that? 

 [Defense Counsel]: Well, Judge, let me think of the best way to 

say it is. I think a jury could make a reasonable inference that if he 

suddenly were to turn against the State and say things that were not 

favorable to the State’s case that they could find technical reasons to 

file on him for violations. And so there is a very big incentive for that 

defendant to cooperate and give evidence favorable to the State. 

 THE COURT: What is your response to that? 

 [Prosecution 1:] State has offered nothing to the defendant to 

testify at any point and the same statements that he made during his 

P.S.I. is the same thing that he said to me when I talked to him in person. 

And I relayed that to Defense Counsel. There has been no promises of 

any leniency in any future anything for the defendant. And I would 

object to getting into that in front of the jury. 

 [Prosecution 2]: And it is my understanding from what 

[Prosecution 1] told me, that he told [Prosecution 1] that he just feels 

bad about his part in it and wants to, you know, a chance kind of to be 

 

1 Because appellant’s issues do not necessitate a full recitation of the facts of the offense, 

we omit any discussion of them.
3

heard, not -- but, you know, [Prosecution 1] didn’t threaten him with 

anything with regard to his deferred. 

 [Defense Counsel]: And for the record, I am not saying that the 

Prosecution has done that. And please don’t think that I did say that. 

However, I think that that is a reasonable inference that would go 

unspoken to the credibility of this witness and motive to say -- I don’t 

even care if they know that he’s on probation. 

The trial court tabled the issue until the next day when Brown was to testify. 

Prior to Brown’s testimony, the matter was again addressed: 

 THE COURT: We are on the record outside the presence of the 

jury, coming back for consideration on an issue raised yesterday by 

Defense regarding the State’s upcoming witness Justin Lee Brown who 

was charged as a co-defendant in this case and pled to a P.S.I. hearing 

in front of this Court last summer.

 [Defense counsel], why don’t you go ahead and put your 

argument on the record.

 [Defense Counsel]: Yes, Judge. I think that the fact that the codefendant is on probation out of the same court for the same offense is

relevant. I think it goes to show that he is in a vulnerable relationship 

with the State in this matter.

 I believe that the case that the State is relying on, Irby v. State, is 

factually different than this case. That was dealing with juvenile records 

out of a separate transaction. And so that, I believe that the fact that 

there is bias should be -- the fact of whether or not there is bias should

be a question for the jury to decide and not for the Court.

 THE COURT: And going to your point about vulnerable status, 

how is he any more vulnerable than any other person giving sworn

testimony while on a deferred?

 [Defense Counsel]: Judge, I don’t believe that he is more 

vulnerable than anybody on a deferred, but I believe the facts are such 

that being on a deferred or having pending criminal charges does, in 

fact, make individuals have a vulnerable relationship with the State.

 THE COURT: Okay. And is there, State, any agreement with this 

witness?
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 [Prosecution 2]: No, there has been no agreement with this 

witness.

THE COURT: Is there even any pending situation where there 

could arguably be some want of something by this witness from the 

State?

 [Prosecution 2]: No, there isn’t. There were no discussions prior 

to his plea about him testifying. I don’t think there was any

consideration of him testifying until last week, long after he had already 

pled to the P.S.I.

 THE COURT: I am taking judicial notice of court records 

regarding the plea of Justin Lee Brown. There was a plea without 

agreed recommendation to a presentence investigation hearing. There 

is an along-with stipulation on there that witness, the defendant at the 

time, Justin Lee Brown, swore to. I do not see on the plea papers

anywhere, any type of agreement that the State would waive jury and 

let it go without agreed recommendation in exchange for truthful 

testimony. So nothing on the face of the papers indicates that that was 

the case.

 [Defense counsel], you don’t have anything to the contrary on 

that, do you? 

 [Defense Counsel]: No, Judge, I don’t.

 THE COURT: State, anything else you would like to put on 

regarding this and the legal situation on it?

 [Prosecution 2]: Well, I think Irby states just because somebody 

has a probation or a pending charge it isn’t a cloud over them that 

always proves motive or bias. There has to be some demonstrated

connection. And I don’t believe that’s been made in this case.

 THE COURT: Okay. What I see with respect to this particular 

witness is that he is vulnerable, the way lots of witnesses are vulnerable,

in that they are currently on a deferred, which means that picking up a 

new law violation places them in a different status than somebody who 

just picks up a new law violation. But I don’t see that as special or 

enhanced in some way because he is a co-defendant on the case. I don’t 

see that there is any quid pro quo anticipated before the plea or I have 

no evidence that there has ever been any quid pro quo on it.
5

 He did make a sworn statement during the course of his plea 

regarding his involvement with this defendant on trial, Mr. Chauncey, 

in this case and so he has already made a sworn statement subject to the 

penalties of perjury, which was abundantly clear to him at the time he 

made that sworn statement.

 So I don’t see that he is in any particularly vulnerable position 

relative to anybody else who is on deferred. So I don’t see that showing

has been made at this time. I am not going to allow Defense to get into 

the status of deferred.

At the conclusion of Brown’s testimony, appellant made a bill of exception, 

set forth in its entirety below: 

 [Defense Counsel] Sir, did you -- are you currently on deferred 

probation out of this court out of this transaction?

 [Brown] Yes.

 [Defense Counsel] And are you aware that if the State, the

Prosecution, found a technical reason to violate your probation, they 

could file a motion with the Court and ultimately attempt to get you 

sent to prison for this?

 [Brown] No, I was not aware of that.

 [Defense Counsel] You are not aware that they can file a motion 

to revoke your probation?

 [Brown] No.

 [Defense Counsel]: I guess I got nothing else then, Judge.

In his first issue, appellant asserts that he was denied the right to effectively 

cross-examine Brown. Issue two claims appellant was denied the constitutional right 

to effectively confront Brown. 

An argument that evidence should have been admitted because it was offered 

to attack the credibility of the complainant may involve both the Confrontation 

Clause and the Rules of Evidence. Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 909 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2014). In this case, appellant failed to preserve error based on the 
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Confrontation Clause. Generally, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a 

party must have presented the trial court with a timely request, objection, or motion 

stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Cockrell 

v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 88–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Even constitutional error 

may be waived without proper preservation. See Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 536 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A failure to specifically object under 

the Confrontation Clause at trial waives the argument on appeal. Id.; see also

Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 752 & n. 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Walker v. 

State, 180 S.W.3d 829, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The 

discussions before Brown testified and the bill of exception failed to apprise the trial 

court of appellant’s claim that the evidence was admissible pursuant to the 

Confrontation Clause. Because it was not preserved for our review, we overrule issue 

two.

Our consideration of issue one is therefore limited to whether the trial court 

erred in failing to admit the evidence in question. We review a trial judge’s decision 

on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Tillman v. 

State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A trial judge abuses his 

discretion when his decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.

Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). If the trial court’s 

evidentiary ruling is correct under any applicable theory of law, it will not be 

disturbed even if the trial court gave a wrong or insufficient reason for the ruling. De 

la Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

To be admissible, appellant was required to establish a causal connection or 

logical relationship between the evidence that Brown had received deferred 

adjudication community supervision and his testimony at trial. See Molina v. State, 

450 S.W.3d 540, 551 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) 
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(citing Carpenter v. State, 979 S.W.2d 633, 634–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). 

Appellant is not required to show actual bias, but must make a showing of Brown’s 

potential for bias. Id. (citing Carpenter, 979 S.W.2d at 634 n. 4.) 

The purported bias presented to the trial court was the State’s ability to 

“revoke” Brown’s community supervision.2

 Brown, however, stated that he was 

unaware of that possibility. Even so, “a ‘vulnerable relationship’ based on a 

witness’s pending charges or probationary status does not hover cloud-like in the air, 

ready to rain down as impeachment evidence upon any and all such witnesses. There 

must be some logical connection between that ‘vulnerable relationship’ and the 

witness’s potential motive for testifying as he does.” Irby v. State, 327 S.W.3d 138, 

147–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).3

 

As in Carpenter, there are no additional facts of a deal between Brown and 

the State. 979 S.W.2d at 634. Thus there is no logical connection between Brown’s 

deferred adjudication and his possible motive to curry favor with the prosecution. 

See id. Defense counsel failed to show a logical connection between the fact or 

condition that could give rise to a potential bias or motive, the deferred adjudication,

and the existence of any bias or motive to testify. See id. The deferred adjudication 

was therefore irrelevant. See id. The mere fact that a witness is a probationer whose 

guilt has not yet been adjudicated does not make evidence of that fact “always 

automatically relevant to show a witness’s possible bias and motive to testify 

favorably for the State.” Irby, 327 S.W.3d at 148. We therefore conclude the trial 

judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding evidence that Brown was on deferred 

 

2

In actuality, the State would file a motion to proceed with adjudication of guilt. 

3 We reject appellant’s argument that Irby is not applicable to the case at bar. While the 

facts in that case vary from those in the instant case, Irby’s discussion of the requisite connection 

between the alleged vulnerable relationship and the witness’s potential motive for testifying is 

clearly not limited to any particular set of facts.
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adjudication community supervision. Issue one is overruled and the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed. 

 /s/ John Donovan

 Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Donovan and Jewell.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).