FILE D U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT MAY 09 , 2 001 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [PUBLIS H]
IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 99- 1278 2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ D
. C. D oc ke t N o. 95- 0276 6- CV -R W S- 1 REBECCA LEWIS, BRENDA HE ATH, et al ., Pl ai nti ff s- Appe lle es , ve rs us DA VI D Mc DA DE , individu ally and in his o fficial c ap a c i t y a s Di s t r i c tAt t o rn e y, D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ (M ay 9 , 200 1) ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(O pin ionA ugus t 14 , 200 0)2

Befo re ANDERSON, Ch ie f Ju dg e, TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES, BARKETT, HUL L, MARCUS, an d WILSON, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. O R D E R : T he Co urt havin g be enpol le d a t the r eque st o f one of the m em be rs of the Co urt and a

m aj or ity of the Ci rc uit

Jud ge s w ho are in re gul ar a ct ive se rv ic e not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, F ederal R ules of Appellate Pr ocedure; Elev en th Cir cu it Ru le 35 -5 ), th e Su gg es ti on of R eh eari ng En Ba nc is DENIED.

/s / R. LANIER ANDERSON CHIEF J UDGEAs in ever y qualified immunity

case , the complete se t of fac ts facingthe 1 defe ndant is of cr itical importance . In this case, f emale e mploy ees dr essed a s prostitutes, gave Def endant a photo album with sex ually char g ed comments a

nd photogr aphs, g ave D efe ndant an 3 E D MO N D SO N a nd D U BIN A , Ci rc uit Jud ge s, c onc ur

ri ng: T he c hie f re as on f

or not takin g th is c as e enbanc is tha t w e ha ve onl y
r e c e n t l y h e a r da n o t h e r

qu a l i f i e di mm u n i t y c a s e e n b a n c : M a r s h v . B u t l e r C o u n t y, 225 F.3d 124 3 (11th Cir. 2000) (reheard en banc 6 Feb. 2001 ). T he Marsh ca se -- uponw hic h w e ar e sti ll w orkin g - - w ill a llo wa ll of the c ourt’ s j udge s am

ple oppo rt uni ty to en ga ge in the int er

play of opi nio ns and i de as on the sub j ec t of qua lif ie d im m uni ty . E n banc r eh eari ngs ar e co stl y to anappe llate c ourt i n te rm s of
co ns um pt io n o f it s al way s l im it edres ou rces of ju di ci al ti m e an d e ne rg y . Re la tiv el y

f ewc as es c anbe he ar d e n banc e ac h y ear. I t se em s be st t o us not to go
enbanc on anothe r qua lif ie d im m uni ty c as e so s oon, but

to inv es t our enbanc ef fo rt s inta ck lin g othe r iss ue s th at the c ourt’ s j udge s have not y et ha d th e occasion to cons ider en banc and to give the new issues the extra attention that en banc r eh eari ngs en ta il. In addition , our e stim ate of the c ase at hand is that it was decided
ac curate ly
. Mate ri al f

ac ts e xis t i n th is c as e tha t are und isp ute d and tha t are not pr es en t i n th e ca se s r el ie d onby the dis se nt: P la int if

fs a ct ive ly

part ic ipa te d in sexual gam es and conduct in the office. 1ice sc ulpture of br easts, and pr epar ed a ta pe re cordingof sexual comments and innuendos for Def endant. At the sa

me time, Plaintiffs praised De fenda nt as a wonde rful employ er. Plaintiffs and the dissent rely on Cross v. Alabama, 49 F .3d 1490 (11th Cir. 2 19 95 ). Of

c ours e , Cr os s w a s d e c ide d a ft e r t he a lle g e d a c ts o f s e xua l ha ra ssm e nt o c c ur

re d. So Cross could not have put De fenda nt on notice in 1994 that his acts might violate the Constit ution. 4 O nly unw an te d se xua l c ondu ct c anbe hara ssi ng c ondu ct . S ee Me ri tor S av . Bank v
. V ins on, 106 S
. Ct
. 239 9, 240 6 ( 1986 ). T he Co nst itu tio n do es not pr ohi bit al l bo or ishor

r ude be ha vio r. S ee F ar ag he r v. Ci ty of Bo ca Raton , 118 S
. Ct
. 227 5, 2283 -84 (1998) (explainin g that federal e m ploym ent law creates no “ general ci vil ity c ode
. ”) ; O nc al e v. S undo w ne r O ff shor es S er

vs. I nc . , 118 S
. Ct
. 998 , 100 3 (1998) (notin g that “ sim

ple teasing” in the workplace insufficient to supp ort
s e x u a l h a r a s s me n tc l a i m)
. G i v e n t h e s e f a c t s a n dt h e c a s e l a wa v a i l ab l e a tt h e t i me of the a lle ge d in ci de nts of

se xua l hara ssm en t, w e cannot say that e ve ry

r ea sona ble 2 dis tr ic t a tto rn ey

w oul d have kno w n th at

D ef en dant’ s be ha vio r, in thi s c ont ex t, vio la te d th e Co nst itu tio n: tha t i s, w oul d have kno w n th at thi s c ondu ct

w as tr uly
unw an te d and, thu s, unl aw fu l. N o party or j udge ha s pr es en te d us w itha
m at er ia lly

sim ilar ca se that w oul d have put D ef en dant o n c le ar

not ic e tha t hi s be ha vio r -- in the li ght

of the f ac t tha t the f

em al e em plo y ee s ( nowP la int if

fs ) willingly participated in the m

utual teasing and j okin g that consti tuted the sexu al conduct in the office -- violated the Constitu tion. When, as her e, the legal5

co nse que nc es of

ase t of f ac ts i s un cl ear unde r the pr ee xis tin g lawa t the ti m e of the e ve nt, qua lif

ie d im m uni ty appl ie s.6

BA RKE T T , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , dis se nti ng: I re spe ct fu lly

dis se nt f ro m the c ourt’ s de nia l of

r eh eari ng e n banc . I n th is case, the panel held that althou gh District A ttorney McD ade “ ran a D A’ s office ri fe w ithge nde r- dis cr im ina tio n, ” qua lif ie d im m uni ty pr ote ct s hi m

f ro m c ivi l liabilitybecause there is no pre-existing case which would have put him on not ice that: (1) berating his fem ale em ploy ees w ith pejorative ter m s such as “ hy sterical fe m al e, ” “ bit ch , ” “ blo nde bom bshe ll, ” “ sm

ur fe tte , ” an d “bim

be tte , ” (2 ) phot ographin g his fem ale em ploy ees’ butto cks, ( 3) throwing coins and o ther obj ec ts d ow n hi s f

em al e em plo y ee s’ blo use s, ( 4) te lli ng a f em al e em plo y ee to
unc ro ss and c ro ss h er

le gs a ga in whil e he w at ch ed , ( 5) statin g th at the onl y thi ng
w om ena re goo d f

or is “ m ak ing ba

bie s, ” (6 ) say ing “ w om endon ’ t have the ba lls to be prosecutors,” and (7) em barrassing his fem ale em ploy ees w ith statem ents such as “ y ou can’ t com e in, R ita doesn’t have her clothes on,” constitut ed sexual hara ssm en t. I be lie ve that this c as e shou ld b e he ar d e n banc not onl y be ca use in 1994 ar ea sona

ble dis tr ic t a tto rn ey , or

a ny oth er r ea sona ble pe rs on, w oul d have known th at

suc h ou tr ag eo us c ondu ct c onst itu te d se xua l hara ssm en t, but a lso be ca use , in fi ndi ng t o th e co ntr ar y , the c ourt i gnor es S upr em e Co urt and E le ve nth Ci rc uit pr ec ed en t, a s w el l a s th e ove rwhe lm ing pr ec ed en t of the oth er Co urts o f Appe al
.In Cross, the hara ssing c onduct included c ommunicating w ith female e mploy ees 1 in an “e x tremely

hostile” and “ very

ang ry , very

ag g ressive” manner , “say [i ng ] derog atory rema rks to them in front of other s,” and throw ing obje cts at fe male employ ees. 49 F .3d at 1494. Th e Cr os s Co ur

t f ound thi s c on du c t to be in v iol atio n o f c le arl y e sta bli sh e d. Th e c le arl y established law upon which it relied wa s the 1979 Supreme Court ca se of Da vis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 2 28 , 2 35 (1 97 9) , h old ingthat se xua l di sc ri min atio n a g a ins t a pu bli c e mpl oye e is unconstitutional.

Th e c ourt ’s op ini on

dis tin g uis he s th is c a se fr om t hat of any oth e r p re -e xistin gc a se 2 ba se d u po n thre e fa c ts: (1 ) o nly

on e of the pla int if

fs e ve r c omp la ine d to Mc Da de a bo ut h is sexually hara ssing be havior; (2) some of the plaintiffs pa rticipated in some of

the behavior; and (3 ) e a c h o f t

he pla int if

fs pr a ise d M c Da de a s a

fr ie nd and an e mpl oye r. Th e se thr e e fa c ts, ho we ve r, have no thi ngto d o w ithwh e the r o r n ot t he ri g ht t o b e fr e e fr om s e xua l ha ra ssm e nt i n the wo rk pla c e wa s c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d in 19 94 . A s to the fi rs t r e a so n, ne ith e r t he law o f t

his Circuit, nor any

other that I

am awa re of , require s the victim of sexual harassment to notify the perpe trator of

the har assment that he is violating her r ights in orde r to establish liability
. L ikewise, the se cond re ason, that some of the plaintiffs alleg edly participated in some of the behavior , g oes to McDa de’s subjec tive intent -- not to the ana ly sis of whether the violation had been c lear ly

established. F inally , the fa ct that the plaintiffs pra ised McDa de as both a friend a nd an employ er a g ain has nothingto do with whether Mc Dade ’s conduc t violated clea rly established law. Indeed, a

plaintiff nee d not prove that a sexually hara ssing e mploy er is a ba d person or a bad employ er in wa

y s wholly unrelated to the har assingconduct in orde r to preva il on her cla im.

7 A lth oughthe c ourt’ s op ini on r ec ogni ze s th at pla int if fs ha ve ar igh t t o be fr ee f ro m unl aw fu l se xua l hara ssm en t and tha t M cD ad e’ s c ondu ct w as sim ilar to tha t f ound to vio la te c le ar ly

e sta bli she d lawin Cr oss v. A la ba m a, 49 F
. 3d 1 490 (1 1thCi r. 199 5) , the c ourt no ne the le ss c onc lud es that “ it w oul d no t be c le ar to a 1 reasonable person acting in McDade’ s posi tion th at his behavio r violated pla int if fs ’ c onst itu tio na l r igh ts” be ca use the f ac ts o f thi s c as e ar e not

suf fi ci en tly sim ilar to any

pre-e xistin g case. In finding that no pre-e xistin g case w as 2 suf fi ci en tly sim ilar, the c ourt t ak es the c le ar ly e sta bli she d in qui ry

to a le ve l of8

spe ci fi ci ty

that r uns af oul of the S upr em e Co urt’ s ho ldi ngs in A nde rs on v . Cr ei ght on, 483 U
. S. 635 , 640 ( 1987 ), a nd U nit ed S ta te s v. L an ie r, 520 U
. S. 267 , 26 9 (1 99 7)
. InA nde rs on, the S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t f or ar igh t t o be c le ar ly
es ta bli she d su chthat a

de fe ndant i s no t e nti tle d to qua lif ie d im m uni ty , “ [t ] he
co nto ur s of

the r igh t m

ust be suf fi ci en tly c le ar that a r ea sona ble of fi ci al w oul d understand th at w hat he is doin g viol ates that right. T hat is not to say that an of fi ci al a ct ionis pr ote ct ed

by qua lif ie d im m uni ty unl es s th e ve ry

a ct ionin questio n has previous ly

been held unlawful .
. ., but it is to say that in ligh t of preexisting lawthe unlawfulness m ust be apparent.” 483 U.S . at 640 (internal citations om itted) (em

phasis add ed). In L anier, the Suprem e Court held that even unde r the standard s ne ce ssary to supp ort a

c ri m ina l c onvi ct ionof

agov er nm en t of fi ci al , pr ec ed en ts i nvol vin g “ fundam en ta lly sim ilar” f

ac ts are not

ne ce ssary

to give state officials fair

warning that th eir conduct contravenes constitu tional ri ght s: Nor have our decisions dem anded precedents that

ap pli ed the r igh t a t i ssu e to a

f ac tua l si tua tio n th at

is “ fundam en ta lly

sim ilar”
. . . . T o th e co ntr ar y , w e ha ve uphe ld c onvi ct ion s un de r § 24 1 or § 24 2 de spi te not ab le fa ct ua l di sti nc tio ns b etw ee n th e pr ec ed en ts r el ie d ona nd the c as es the n be fo re the Co urt, so l ong as the pr ior decisions gave rea sonable warning that the condu ct then9 at iss ue vio la te d c onst itu tio na l r igh ts. Id . at 2 69
. A lth oughm an if

es ta tio ns o f se xua l hara ssm en t m ay dif fe r, it s purp ose a nd int en t i s r ea dil y

dis ce rn ibl e fr om

ar an ge of

a ct s th at ne ed not be e xpl ic itl y
cata log ue d or

it em iz ed in or de r to p ut any

r ea sona ble pe rs on o n no tic e tha t the
co nduc t c onst itu te s se xua l hara ssm en t. F or e xa m ple , in Br ad dy

v. F lor ida De partm ent of L abor and Em ploym ent Security , 133 F. 3d 79 7 (11th Cir. 1998),
we h el dt h at a d ef

en d an twa s n o ten t i t l ed t o qu al i fi ed i m m u n i t y o n t h e p l ai n t i ff

’s
se xua l hara ssm en t c la im

be ca use “ if the j ur y be lie ve s B ra ddy ’ s a lle ga tio ns inc lud ing the a lle ga tio n th at [ the de fe ndant] f

oll ow ed Br ad dy down an of

fi ce ha ll, bul l w hip in hand, a nd s ai d ‘ thi s is m y se xua l f an ta sy f or y ou, ’ the n aj ur

y c oul d
ve ry r ea sona bly f ind that [ the de fe ndant’ s] be ha vio r w as c le ar ly a nd o bvi ousl y

in vio la tio n of

e xis tin g f

ed er al law . ” I d. a t 80 2. I t i s lu dic ro us t o su gge st tha t the Br ad dy c ourt sh oul d no t have f

ound suc h c ondu ct

a ct ion ab le be ca

use abul l w hip scenario had not presented itself in a prior case. It is equally ludicrous to hold th at
a rea so na bl e d is tri ctatt orne y wou ldno t k no w th at , in te r al ia , th ro win g c oi ns do wn his fem ale em

ploy ees blouses and p hoto graphing their buttocks constitu tes sexual harassm ent unless a pre-existing case had found identical conduct
un co ns ti tu ti on al
.The Seve nth Circuit held that by 1993 it was clea

rly established that an instruc tor 3 e mpl oye d b y

the DE A v iol ate d a

fe ma le po lic e of

fi c e r’ s e qu a l pr ote c tio n r ig hts by se xua lly 10 T he c ourt’ s ho ldi ng i n th is c as e not onl y c onf lic ts w ithS upr em e Co urt and E le ve nthCi rc uit

pr ec ed en t, it

c onf lic ts w iththe de ci sio ns o f the oth er Co urts o f Appe al a s w el l. F or

e xa m ple , the F ourth C ir cu it in B eard sle y v. W eb b he ld tha t a de fe ndant w as not

e nti tle d to qua lif

ie d im m uni ty on a se xua l hara ssm en t c la im
an d, in so h old ing , appl ie d th e fo llo w ing a na ly sis :

W ebb’ s conduct o ccurre d during the period from Marc h to Augus t 19 92. W e ha ve a lr ea dy not ed that i n 19 78 the S upr em e Co urt w ro te that the e qua l pr ote ct ion cl au se c onf

er s onapub lic e m

plo y ee af ed er al r igh t t o be f re e fr om ge nde r dis cr im ina tio n, D av is v
. P as sm an , 422 U
. S. a t 23 4- 35, a nd tha t se xua l hara ssm en t ha s lo ng be enr ec ogni ze d to be aty pe of ge nde r dis cr im inatio n. Se e Bo he n v. Ci ty

of E as t C hic ag o, 799 F
. 2d a t 11 85 [( 7thCi r. 198 6) ]
. N o m al e of fi ce r co uld

r ea sona bly ha ve tho ught

that i t w as not

se xua l hara ssm en t t o announ ce that it w as his turn to m ake out with a w om an w ho w as sub

j ec t t o hi s c om

m an d, e spe ci al ly

w he n th e wom an had previousl y

protested his gen der oriented be ha vi or . 30 F
. 3d 5 24, 530 -3 1 ( 4thCi r. 199 4)
. T he re fo re , li ke thi s c ourt i n C ro ss and Br ad dy , oth er

c ir cu its ha ve sug ge ste d th at the pr es en tatio n of

f undam en ta lly sim ilar fa cts in prior caselawis not necessary to put a reasonable person on n otice
re gard ing w ha t c ondu ct

c onst itu te s hara ssm en t. S ee , e . g. , Mark ha m v. Whit e, 172 F. 3d 4 86, 491 -9 2 ( 7thCi r. 199 9) ; Joh nsonv. Mart in, 195 F
. 3d 1 208, 121 6 ( 10th 3ha

ra ssi nghe r a

nd re je c te d th e de fe nd ant’ s a

rgume nt t hat he wa s e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity beca use “ne ither this court nor a ny other ha s ever

dealt with the situation involving a shor t tr a ini ngse min ar c on du c te d f or na rc oti c s o ff

ic e rs .” Ma

rk ham, 1 72 F .3 d at 49 2. Th e Se ve nth Circuit char acte rized that argument as “of no moment,” and noted that “[u] nder the doctrine of qualified immunity , liability is not predicate d upon the exist ence of a pr ior ca se that is direc tly on point.” I d. (interna l citations omit ted).

The Te nth Circuit held that despite the lac k of ca selaw dire ctly addre ssing the 4 iss ue , it wa s c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d b y

19 94 that a

pu bli c of fi c ia l w ho us e d h is p os iti on to s e xua lly ha ra ss a no n- e mpl oye e vio late d th e Con sti tut ion . In r e a c hin gthi s c on c lus ion , th e Te nth Cir c uit cautioned that “the conc ept of c lear ly established law should not be a pplied too literally ,” John so n, 19 5 F .3 d at 12 16 , a nd no te d th at “ [w]e have ne ve r s a id t hat th e re mus t be a

c a se prese nting the e x act f

act situation at hand in orde r to g ive par ties notice of what constitutes actionable conduct. . . . Instead, we mere ly require the par

ties to make a r easona

ble application of existi nglaw to their own circ umstances.” I d.

The Ninth Circuit consider ed and r ejec ted an a pproac h simil ar to that used by the 5 court he re, a

nd held that the rig ht of public employ ee to be fre e fr om sex ual har assment was clea rly established by

1982 based upon the Supreme Court’s de cision in Davis v. Passman. The Third Circ uit held that the rig ht of a public e mploy ee to be fre e fr om sex ual 6 hara ssment “was w ell g rounded in the la w and wide ly

known to the public by

1986.” In rea ching thi s c on c lus ion , th e Th ir d Ci rc uit he ld “ [a]lt

ho ug h th e re may

no t ha ve be e n a ny pr e c e de nts wi th pr e c ise ly ana log ou s f

a c ts i t is su ff

ic ie ntl y c le ar t hat by a llo wi ngthe ha

ra ssm e nt o f [the pla int if

fs ] to continue, and possibly

even pa rticipatingdirec tly

in that hara ssment, a re asonable officia l would understand that what he is doingviolates their rig hts.” Andre ws, 895 F.2d at 1479-80 (interna l citations omit ted). 11 Ci r. 199 9) ; Bator

v. H aw ai i, 39 F
. 3d 1 021, 102 7- 28 ( 9thCi r. 199 4) ; A ndr ew s v. 4 5 City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1479 (3d Cir. 1990 ). 6 G ove rn m en t of

fi ci al s sh oul d, of

c our se , be pr ote ct ed

w he n th ey

a tte m pt t o
co n s t i tu t i o n al l y p er fo rm th ei r d u t i es an dfa i l d es p i t e t h ei r g o o dfa i t h . Th e c o u rt ’s hol din g inthi s c as e, how ev er , e xte nds thi s pr ote ct ionbe y ond tho se gov er nm en t officials w ho m ake an er

roneous judgem ent call because of unclear legal p r e c e d e n t , t o i n c l u d e kn o w i n g a n dd e l i b e r a t e l a wb r e a k e r s a s w e l l
. A tt h e s a meContrary to J udg es Edmondson and Dubina ’s view, I do not believe that Ma

rsh v. 7 Bulter County has any applicability

to this case. More over, r eg ardingthe Plaintiffs participation in some of the alleg ed beha vior, as the district cour

t found, viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht mos t f avo ra ble to t he no n- mov ingpa

rt y , th e re is a

c le ar d e lin e atio n b e tw e e n th e be havio r i n which the Plaintiffs par

ticipated and Mc Dade ’s behavior “that c ould in no way be desc ribed a s se xua l but r athe r a s a

bu siv e and

de ro g ator

y and dir e c te d o nly

at f e ma le s in the of fi c e . T he re is no evidenc e that the Plaintiffs we lcomed the latter conduct.” 12 tim e, the court eviscerate s the rem edies intended b y Congress in enacting Title VI I
an d S ec tio n 19 83. F or

the f or eg oin g r ea sons , thi s c ourt, e n banc , sho uld reconsider, and publ ish, an opinio n in thi s case. 7