COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Beales and Senior Judge Clements 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

CARNELL LESTER JACKSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 1256-13-2 JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES 

 OCTOBER 7, 2014 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 

James F. D’Alton, Jr., Judge 

 Steven Brent Novey (Novey and Tomko Law Firm, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Elizabeth C. Kiernan, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 A jury found Carnell Jackson (appellant) guilty of one count of burglary in violation of 

Code § 18.2-91, two counts of robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58, one count of abduction in 

violation of Code § 18.2-47, and one count of first-degree murder in violation of Code § 18.2-32. 

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion to strike Juror 15 for cause. 

We hold that the trial court did not err when it refused to grant appellant’s motion to strike Juror 15 

for cause, and, accordingly, for the following reasons, we affirm each of appellant’s convictions. 

I. BACKGROUND

 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case, and because this 

memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and 

incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of this 

appeal. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
 - 2 - 

 At the outset of voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective jurors a number of questions. 

Their responses indicated that they were not related to appellant or the victims, that they were not 

acquainted with appellant or the victims, that they did not have any interest in the trial or outcome of 

the case, that they had not expressed or formed any opinion about appellant’s guilt or innocence, 

that they understood appellant is presumed to be innocent and that the Commonwealth must prove 

his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that they did not have any bias against appellant or the 

Commonwealth, and that they had no reason to believe they would be unable to give a fair and 

impartial trial to both parties. 

 Next, the prosecutor asked the prospective jurors questions. Those questions pertained to 

their job status; whether they owned a home in the City of Petersburg; whether they had ever been a 

victim of a home invasion robbery; whether anyone important to them had ever been charged with 

burglary or assault; whether they knew any of appellant’s family members; whether they knew or 

recognized any of the witnesses; whether they had had a bad experience with a police officer or 

prosecutor; whether they were familiar with the location of the crime; and whether they had been 

involved in a case that either the prosecutor or defense attorney handled. Some of the prospective 

jurors – but not Juror 15 – responded to some of these questions in the affirmative. The prosecutor 

also asked the prospective jurors whether they understood that voluntary intoxication is not a 

defense to murder; whether they could follow the law based on the evidence; and whether they had 

any moral, philosophical, or religious beliefs that would prevent them from sitting on a jury and 

rendering a decision. All of the prospective jurors indicated that they understood that voluntary 

intoxication is not a defense to murder and that they could follow the law based on the evidence. 

None of the prospective jurors indicated that they had any moral, philosophical, or religious beliefs 

that would prevent them from sitting on the jury and rendering a decision. 
 - 3 - 

 Near the end of his questioning of the prospective jurors, the prosecutor posed the following 

question to the prospective jurors: “Is there any other experience that anyone has today that they 

can think of that would prevent them from sitting as a juror today?” Juror 15, a student, raised her 

hand, at which point the following exchange took place between the prosecutor and Juror 15: 

Juror 15: It’s not an experience, but I actually have class at 12:00, and it’s the 

end of the semester. So it’s a very busy time. I have a project due in that class 

too. 

Prosecutor: I understand. 

Juror 15: So I’m a bit preoccupied. 

Prosecutor: I can appreciate that. I understand that, but that aside, would that 

affect your ability to sit as a fair juror today and just listen? If you are 

required, could you still do that? 

Juror 15: Yes. 

 Defense counsel asked all of the prospective jurors certain questions.1

 He also asked 

follow-up questions of specific jurors, including the following exchange that took place between 

him and Juror 15: 

Defense Counsel: Would it be difficult for you to sit here all two days? I 

think we all know this case is going to go past 12:00 today and will go into 

tomorrow. If you’re chosen to sit here, will you have any problem giving both 

sides, the Commonwealth and my client, a fair trial, not to rush through 

anything to get to the right answer because the right answer is always what 

we’re focusing on. 

Juror 15: I think I would be preoccupied, worried about missing school. 

Defense Counsel: Again, I appreciate your honesty. So the answer would be 

it would be difficult? 

Juror 15: Yes. 

 1

 Defense counsel asked the prospective jurors whether they agreed that the accused is 

presumed innocent; whether they could hold the Commonwealth to its burden to prove guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt; and whether they agreed that an accused’s choice not to testify at all 

does not constitute evidence against the accused. All of the prospective jurors indicated that they 

understood and accepted these concepts. 
 - 4 - 

 Near the conclusion of the voir dire, appellant made a motion to strike Juror 15 for cause. 

Appellant explained, “[n]umber 15 said that she would find it very difficult. She would be 

preoccupied with school, and this case, like any case, is too important to have a juror preoccupied 

with a project when they’re deciding the life and the future of my client.” The trial court denied 

appellant’s motion to strike Juror 15 for cause, stating “I think everybody’s got something else to 

do. She said she would be preoccupied. She’d rather not be here, but I don’t find it’s a basis for 

cause.” 

II. ANALYSIS

 Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when, near the conclusion of 

voir dire, it denied his motion to strike Juror 15 for cause. Appellant contends that Juror 15 

indicated that she would not be able to give her full attention to the trial and, for that reason, should 

have been stricken for cause. 

 “We have stated that a prospective juror ‘must be able to give [the accused] a fair and 

impartial trial.’” Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 115, 546 S.E.2d 446, 451 (2001) (quoting 

Wright v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. 941, 943 (1879)). Therefore, 

[t]he court and counsel for either party shall have the right to examine under 

oath any person who is called as a juror therein and shall have the right to ask 

such person or juror directly any relevant question to ascertain whether he is 

related to either party, or has any interest in the cause, or has expressed or 

formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein; and the 

party objecting to any juror may introduce any competent evidence in support 

of the objection; and if it shall appear to the court that the juror does not stand 

indifferent in the cause, another shall be drawn or called and placed in his 

stead for the trial of that case. 

Code § 8.01-358; see Rule 3A:14(a)(7) (stating that voir dire questioning relates to, inter alia, 

whether the trial judge “[h]as any reason to believe the juror might not give a fair and impartial trial 

to the Commonwealth and the accused based solely on the law and the evidence”). 
 - 5 - 

 “‘On appellate review, this Court must give deference to the circuit court’s determination 

whether to exclude a prospective juror,”’ since the trial judge is ‘“able to see and hear each member 

of the venire respond to questions posed’” during voir dire. Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 

325, 329, 619 S.E.2d 71, 73 (2005) (quoting Green, 262 Va. at 115-16, 546 S.E.2d at 451). The 

trial judge ‘“is in a superior position to determine whether a prospective juror’s responses during 

voir dire indicate that the juror would be prevented from or impaired in performing the duties of a 

juror as required by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.’” Id. Accordingly, the decision to 

retain or exclude a prospective juror “will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been manifest 

error amounting to an abuse of discretion.” Barrett v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 823, 826, 553 

S.E.2d 731, 732 (2001). 

 ‘“Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has 

occurred.”’ Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 847, 861 (2009) (quoting 

Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743, adopted upon reh’g en 

banc, 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 870 (2005)). The highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard 

of appellate review “means that the trial judge’s ruling will not be reversed simply because an 

appellate court disagrees.” Thomas, 44 Va. App. at 753, 607 S.E.2d at 743 (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). That is, “‘we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Rather, 

we consider only whether the record fairly supports the trial court’s action.’” Grattan, 278 Va. at 

620, 685 S.E.2d at 644 (quoting Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 385, 484 S.E.2d 898, 906 

(1997)). A trial court “has a range of choice, and its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays 

within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.” Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 

187, 212, 738 S.E.2d 847, 861 (2013) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 The trial court’s decision to deny appellant’s motion to strike Juror 15 for cause was not 

manifest error resulting in an abuse of discretion. See Barrett, 262 Va. at 826, 553 S.E.2d at 732. 
 - 6 - 

On this record, we cannot say that no reasonable jurist would agree with the trial judge that Juror 15 

was competent to serve as a juror here. See Grattan, 278 Va. at 620, 685 S.E.2d at 644. In making 

our conclusion, we must look to the entire voir dire of Juror 15 – not just her statements indicating 

some preoccupation due to her school work. See Green, 262 Va. at 116, 546 S.E.2d at 451 (noting 

that “[w]e must consider the voir dire as a whole, and not the juror’s isolated statements” (citing 

Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 90, 472 S.E.2d 263, 269 (1996))). 

 Juror 15’s responses during the voir dire indicated that she was not acquainted with any of 

the parties in this case, had not acquired any knowledge of the case through the media, and had not 

been a victim of the crimes being prosecuted.2

 In addition, Juror 15 indicated that she had not 

formed an opinion as to appellant’s guilt or innocence and that she understood that appellant was 

 2

 Appellant argues that Brown v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 199, 510 S.E.2d 751 

(1999), counsels toward reversal of the trial court here. Appellant’s reliance on Brown is 

misplaced, however, as the circumstances there were readily distinguishable. In Brown, this 

Court reversed the trial court’s decision to deny the appellant’s motion to strike two prospective 

jurors for cause. Id. at 202, 510 S.E.2d at 752. This Court reasoned that, because one of the 

prospective jurors in Brown had been a victim of the types of crimes being prosecuted against 

Brown, and because she “expressed numerous reservations about her ability to serve impartially 

on the jury in light of her personal experiences,” there was “reasonable doubt about her fitness as 

a juror.” Id. at 208, 510 S.E.2d at 755. Thus, “[b]ecause all doubts about the fitness of a juror to 

serve must be resolved in favor of the accused,” this Court found that the trial court erred in 

refusing to strike the prospective juror for cause. Id. 

During the voir dire, the second prospective juror in Brown, who was Chief Counsel to 

the United States Secret Service, indicated that he put much credence in the testimony of law 

enforcement officers since he tended to “view things from the law enforcement perspective” and 

that he believed a person charged with a crime likely committed the crime. Id. at 208-09, 510 

S.E.2d at 755-56. This Court found that the second prospective juror’s responses during the voir 

dire also “created a reasonable doubt about his ability to sit impartially on a jury” and that 

because “[a]ll reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused,” the trial court erred 

in refusing to strike the second prospective juror for cause. Id. at 210, 510 S.E.2d at 756. 

Thus, key to this Court’s decision in Brown was the reasonable doubt as to the two 

prospective jurors’ ability to serve impartially on the jury. Here, however, Juror 15’s 

impartiality is not really at issue on appeal. She never indicated an unwillingness or inability to 

be impartial if selected for the jury – simply a desire, given her worries about her schoolwork 

and classes, not to be selected for the jury in the first place. See Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 

Va. 256, 262, 307 S.E.2d 896, 900 (1983) (explaining that an “obvious reluctance to serve as a 

juror was not a basis for disqualification”). 
 - 7 - 

presumed innocent until the Commonwealth could prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Juror 

15 indicated that she understood that an accused’s choice not to testify is not evidence of guilt. She 

indicated that she did not have any moral, philosophical, or religious beliefs that would prevent her 

from sitting on the jury and rendering a decision. Juror 15 also indicated that she would follow the 

law based on the evidence presented at trial, and her doing so enabled the trial judge to infer that she 

would be attentive and listen to the evidence. Finally, when the prosecutor asked Juror 15 if she 

would be able to “sit as a fair juror today and just listen,” Juror 15 responded in the affirmative. 

Juror 15 never indicated that she could not perform her duties as a juror – just a reluctance to serve 

because she was preoccupied with her schoolwork. Viewing Juror 15’s voir dire in its entirety, the 

trial judge – who could actually observe Juror 15’s responses and demeanor through the entire voir 

dire – was not required to conclude that Juror 15 was unable to set aside concerns over her 

schoolwork and serve as a competent and attentive juror. 

III. CONCLUSION

 The trial court did not commit manifest error and abuse its discretion when it denied 

appellant’s motion to strike Juror 15 for cause. Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court’s 

decision on appeal. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm each of appellant’s 

convictions. 

Affirmed.