alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 526 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 526

   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent the 
special rule for contributions of qualified conservation contributions, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 12, 2013

 Mr. Baucus (for himself and Mr. Hatch) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent the 
special rule for contributions of qualified conservation contributions, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Rural Heritage Conservation 
Extension Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. SPECIAL RULE FOR CONTRIBUTIONS OF QUALIFIED CONSERVATION 
              CONTRIBUTIONS MADE PERMANENT.

    (a) In General.--
            (1) Individuals.--Subparagraph (E) of section 170(b)(1) of 
        the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended by the American 
        Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, is amended by striking clause 
        (vi).
            (2) Corporations.--Subparagraph (B) of section 170(b)(2) of 
        such Code, as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 
        2012, is amended by striking clause (iii).
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to contributions made in taxable years beginning after December 
31, 2013.

SEC. 3. ELIMINATION OF CHARITABLE DEDUCTION FOR EASEMENTS ON GOLF 
              COURSES.

    (a) In General.--Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(7) Exception for easements for golf courses.--For 
        purposes of this section, the term `qualified conservation 
        contribution' shall not include any contribution of an easement 
        for use on, or intended for use on, a golf course.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to contributions made after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**908 TP 16-00260**  PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., LINDLEY, NEMOYER, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF SHAWN AVERY, PETITIONER,

V ORDER

ANTHONY ANNUCCI, ACTING COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, RESPONDENT.

WYOMING COUNTY-ATTICA LEGAL AID BUREAU, WARSAW (LEAH R. NOWOTARSKI OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER.

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (JULIE M. SHERIDAN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department by order of the Supreme Court, Wyoming County [Michael M. Mohun, A.J.], entered February 18, 2016) to review a determination of respondent. The determination found after a tier III hearing that petitioner had violated various inmate rules.
It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed.

Entered: November 10, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eric Hyde, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Albert P. Williams, J.), rendered June 29, 1989, convicting defendant after jury trial of robbery in the first degree and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of from 2 to 6 years imprisonment, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant was identified by the victim, in an after-midnight crime-area showup, as the man who had just robbed her of her purse in a subway station. A "Sprint” transcript of the responding police officer’s "911” transmissions revealed that the armed perpetrator had been described as 5 feet 7 inches, wearing a tweed jacket and dark pants, whereas the testimony of the officer and the victim recalled her description of the assailant as being about her height (5 feet 9 inches) and wearing a leather jacket and tweed pants. The officer’s typewritten complaint report misdescribed the assailant as having worn a "blue jacket [and a] blue and red jacket”, whereas the officer testified the description she received from the victim was that he had been wearing an oversized, grey leather jacket over a blue and red basketball-type jacket. The type*306written report also omitted any check in the box that would indicate use or possession of a weapon during the commission of the crime, although the narrative portion did refer to the fact that the assailant had brandished a gun toward the victim when she had initially attempted to chase him.

Defendant was apprehended on the street, after a chase through the neighborhood, in possession of neither a gun nor the victim’s property.

At the close of evidence, defendant moved for sanctions, citing the prosecution’s failure to produce *Rosario*material in the form of the 911 tape and the police officer’s original handwritten copy of the complaint report (from which an administrative staffer had typed the final report), both of which had been destroyed by the time of trial. The imposition of such sanctions is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is not mandatory unless loss or destruction has been due to lack of due diligence in preserving the evidence, resulting in prejudice to the defendant *(People v Martinez,*71 NY2d 937). Here there was neither lack of due diligence nor prejudice. The information in the officer’s handwritten complaint report was, for the most part, faithfully copied onto a typewritten report, after which the draft was routinely destroyed. Absent a request or other indication that such drafts and 911 tapes should be preserved, routine destruction of such materials will not be viewed as a lack of due diligence *(see, People v Baez,*166 AD2d 256; *People v Figueroa,*156 AD2d 322, *lv denied*76 NY2d 734). What minor discrepancies existed between the draft and final reports, and between the 911 tape and the Sprint transcript, were either easily reconciled or adequately exploited during cross examination of the prosecution witnesses at trial, obviating the necessity of additional emphasis in the form of an adverse inference charge. Concur —Carro, J. P., Milonas, Ellerin, Smith and Rubin, JJ.
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 378

To repeal and prohibit all privileges and gratuities for Members of the

United States House of Representatives.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 5, 1993

Mr. SOLOMON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on House Administration

A BILL

To repeal and prohibit all privileges and gratuities for

Members of the United States House of Representatives.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That from the date of the enactment of this Act it shall

4 be illegal to furnish, at the expense of the United States

5 Government, any Member of the United States House of

6 Representatives any of the following items free or at re7 duced costs: medicine, hospital care, ambulance services,

8 meals, flowers, plants, pictures, picture frames, haircuts,

9 or other items, services, or privileges, except official office

10 expenses, such as office supplies.
2

•HR 378 IH

Æ
#### John Willey PRESTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-1266.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 8, 1973.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender and Mark King Leban, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Peter F. LaPorte, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See: Simpson v. State, Fla.App.1964, 164 So.2d 224.
EXHIBIT 32  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, the undersigned officer of LED Lighting Company (the "Company"), hereby certify to my knowledge that:  The Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2016 of the Company fully complies, in all material respects, with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.  Date: May 17, 2016  /s/ Kevin Kearney Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
NEU-2013.12.31-Exhibit 10.14 Officer Compensation








 Exhibit 10.14


Summary of Compensation of Named Executive Officers
	
				
	Name
	Base Salary

	Thomas E. Gottwald
President and Chief Executive Officer
	$
	945,000
	


	Robert A. Shama
President, Afton Chemical Corporation
	$
	500,000
	


	Stephen M. Edmonds
Vice President and General Counsel
	$
	404,000
	


	Bruce R. Hazelgrove, III
Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer
	$
	404,000
	


	David A. Fiorenza
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
	$
	350,000
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Principal
Financial Officer
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report
of Bridgeway Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended April 30, 2011 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Keri B. Bosch, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Date: June 13, 2011 |                                                         | /s/ Keri B. Bosch
|------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------- | -----------------
|                    | Name: Keri B. Bosch
        Principal Financial Officer
#### In the Matter of Louise Dowsett, Respondent, v Donald K. Dowsett, Appellant.

In a support proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the respondent former husband appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (De Maro, J.), entered August 21, 1989, as denied his objections to so much of an order of the same court (O’Shea, H.E.), entered May 2, 1989, as granted the application of the petitioner for an upward modification of the amount of alimony fixed in a prior judgment of divorce between the parties.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In the proceeding at bar, the Department of Social Services sought an order increasing the amount of alimony the petitioner’s former husband must pay as she is a recipient of public assistance. This application effectively sought to reallocate the burden of support between the Department of Social Services and the former husband.

Upon our review of the record, including the former husband’s financial documents, we find that the Family Court *611properly determined that he was capable of bearing a greater portion of his former wife’s support *(see, Dunn v Dunn,*124 AD2d 309) and that the Department of Social Services, on behalf of the former wife, was entitled to an upward modification of alimony given her status as a recipient of public assistance *(see, Matter of Department of Social Servs. v Caro,*65 AD2d 811, 812).

We note that to the extent the former husband has raised for the first time on appeal constitutional arguments against the increase, those arguments are not properly before us *(see, Melahn v Hearn,*60 NY2d 944, 945; *Matter of Tiffany B.,*111 AD2d 168, *lv denied*65 NY2d 606, *cert denied*474 US 862). Bracken, J. P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
#### Howard M. DANIELS v. Rene James ILLICH et ux.

No. 46975.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Jan. 29, 1973.

Estes & Blackwell, W. Raymond Hunter, Gulfport, for appellant.

Johnston & Johnston, Biloxi, for appel-lees.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Harrison County; William G. Hewes, Chancellor.

Before GILLESPIE, C. J., and SMITH, SUGG, WALKER and BROOM, JJ.

Affirmed.
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please see

Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please

also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other

deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the

filing date. 

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

3 Plaintiff-Appellee,

4 v. No. 31,903

5 JONATHAN GALLEGOS,

6 Defendant-Appellant.

7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

8 William C. Birdsall, District Judge

9 Gary K. King, Attorney General

10 Santa Fe, NM 

11 for Appellee

12 Jacqueline L. Cooper, Chief Public Defender

13 J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender

14 Santa Fe, NM

15 for Appellant

16 MEMORANDUM OPINION

17 VIGIL, Judge.

18 Gallegos appeals an order denying his motion to withdraw his plea. In our

19 notice of proposed summary disposition, we proposed to dismiss Gallegos’s appeal,
2

1 since Gallegos’s notice of appeal was filed late. Gallegos has filed a memorandum

2 in opposition, which we have duly considered. As we are not persuaded by his

3 arguments, we dismiss this appeal for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed

4 summary disposition. To the degree that Gallegos may have a claim of ineffective

5 assistance of counsel based on either (1) his new counsel’s failure to timely file the

6 notice of appeal or (2) his prior counsel’s representation of him in entering the plea,

7 our dismissal of this appeal does not prevent him from seeking to present evidence in

8 support of those arguments in a post-conviction proceeding. 

9 IT IS SO ORDERED.

10 _______________________________

11 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge

12 WE CONCUR:

13 _________________________________

14 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge

15 _________________________________

16 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

                            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
                         CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


The Board of Directors
American Technology Corporation

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Forms S-8 (File No. 333-09265, File No. 333-09269, File No. 333-
23845 and File No. 333-59929) and Forms S-3 (File No. 333-27455, File No. 333-
36003, File No. 333-71351) of our report dated November 5, 1999 relating to the
financial statements of American Technology Corporation appearing in the
Company's Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended September 30, 1999.


                                              /s/ BDO SEIDMAN, LLP
                                             ---------------------
                                                  BDO Seidman, LLP

Denver, Colorado
December 5, 1999
# C_2018035EN.01015501.xml

| 31.1.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 35/155 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.1.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 35/155

---

P8_TA(2016)0028

Eurojust and Ukraine Cooperation agreement *

European Parliament legislative resolution of 2 February 2016 on the draft Council implementing decision approving the conclusion by Eurojust of the Agreement on Cooperation between Eurojust and Ukraine (11592/2015 — C8-0300/2015 — 2015/0810(CNS))

(Consultation)

(2018/C 035/32)

The European Parliament,

The European Parliament

| — | having regard to the Council draft (11592/2015), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council draft (11592/2015),

| — | having regard to Article 39(1) of the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and Article 9 of Protocol No 36 on transitional provisions, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C8-0300/2015), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 39(1) of the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and Article 9 of Protocol No 36 on transitional provisions, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C8-0300/2015),

| — | having regard to Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime (1), in particular Article 26a(2) thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime (1), in particular Article 26a(2) thereof,

1

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedures, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedures,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A8-0007/2016), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A8-0007/2016),

| 1. | Approves the Council draft; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Approves the Council draft;

| 2. | Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

| 3. | Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

| 4. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and Eurojust |
| --- | --- |

4.

Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and Eurojust

---

(1)  OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p. 1.

1

---
#### Classic Hosiery, Inc., et al., Appellants, v Royal Insurance Company of America, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Mercure, J.

Appeal (transferred to this court by order of the Appellate Division, Second Department) from an order of the Supreme Court (Peter Patsalos, J.), entered January 30, 1990 in Orange County, which granted defendant Royal Insurance Company of America’s motion for summary judgment and declared that it was not required to defend plaintiffs in a pending action or to indemnify them against any judgment arising therefrom.

Plaintiff Tuvia Brach is the president of plaintiff Classic Hosiery, Inc. On December 21, 1988, at a time when Brach was using his personal automobile to make deliveries on behalf of Classic Hosiery, he struck a pedestrian, and an action was commenced against plaintiffs to recover for the injuries sustained. Plaintiffs demanded that defendant Royal Insurance Company of America provide excess coverage under *988a general commercial liability policy issued by Royal to Classic Hosiery and, upon Royal’s denial of coverage, commenced this action for judgment, *inter alia,*declaring that Royal is required to provide coverage under its policy. Following joinder of issue, Royal moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court granted the motion and declared that Royal’s policy does not afford coverage in the underlying tort action. Plaintiffs appeal.

We affirm. The policy in question provides "Commercial General Liability Coverage” and by its terms excludes " '[bjodily injury’ or 'property damage’ arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any * * * 'auto’ * * * owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured”. Plaintiffs’ argument that Brach was not an "insured” and that the exclusion did not, therefore, apply to him is disingenuous in view of the policy’s inclusion of "executive officers and directors” of a corporation and "employees, other than * * * executive officers * * * act[ing] within the scope of their employment” as insureds. Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, the policy is clear and unambiguous in its exclusion of injuries arising out of automobile accidents *(see, Ruggerio v Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,*107 AD2d 744).

Order affirmed, with costs. Casey, J. P., Weiss, Mercure, Crew III and Harvey, JJ., concur.
# C_2014414EN.01001001.xml

| 20.11.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 414/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.11.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 414/10

---

Notice concerning the anti-dumping measures in force in respect of imports into the Union of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China: change of the name of a company subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating non-sampled companies

2014/C 414/07

Imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China are subject to a definitive anti-dumping duty, imposed by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011 of 12 September 2011 (1) (‘Regulation (EU) No 917/2011’).

1

Shanghai Cimic Tile Co. Ltd, a company located in the People’s Republic of China, whose exports to the Union of ceramic tiles are subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating non-sampled companies of 30,6 %, informed the Commission that on 4 June 2012 it changed its name to Shanghai CIMIC Holdings Co., Ltd

The company argued that their change of name does not affect their right to benefit from the duty applied to the company under its previous name of Shanghai Cimic Tile Co. Ltd

The Commission has examined the information supplied and concluded that the change of name in no way affects the findings of Regulation (EU) No 917/2011.

Therefore, the reference in Annex I of Regulation (EU) No 917/2011 to:

| | Shanghai Cimic Tile Co. Ltd |
| --- | --- |

Shanghai Cimic Tile Co. Ltd

should be read as:

| | Shanghai CIMIC Holdings Co., Ltd |
| --- | --- |

Shanghai CIMIC Holdings Co., Ltd

The TARIC additional code B214, previously attributed to Shanghai Cimic Tile Co. Ltd, shall apply to Shanghai CIMIC Holdings Co., Ltd

---

(1)  OJ L 238, 15.9.2011, p. 1.

1

---