FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D16-1168

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CURTIS HALL,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Terry Lewis, Judge.

June 4, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Curtis Hall appeals from his convictions and sentences for two 

counts of second-degree murder and two counts of armed robbery

with a firearm, raising three issues for our consideration. Hall

argues in his first issue that the trial court erred when it denied 

his motion to suppress statements made during a police 

interrogation. He argues in his third issue that the Criminal 

Punishment Code is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile 

defendants. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.1

 1 We affirm as to the second issue without further comment.
2

I.

Hall was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and 

two counts of armed robbery with a firearm. It was alleged that 

Hall, who was seventeen years old at the time, robbed and killed 

two brothers who lived together in Hall’s apartment complex. Hall

was interviewed by the police on November 2 and November 15, 

2012, regarding the crimes after witnesses placed him near the 

scene. Prior to trial, Hall moved to suppress statements he made 

to the police during the November 15, 2012, interrogation, 

including a confession to committing the murders, arguing that he

did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Fifth Amendment2

rights. 

The trial court found that Hall understood his rights and 

validly waived them. Hall was found guilty of two counts of the 

lesser-included offense of second-degree murder and two counts of 

armed robbery. The jury made a specific finding that Hall did not 

have actual possession of a firearm during the crimes. Hall’s 

scoresheet indicated a lowest permissible sentence of 369.15 

months in prison and a statutory maximum sentence of life in 

prison. He was sentenced to fifty-five years in prison, to be followed 

by life on probation, with a chance for judicial review after fifteen 

years pursuant to section 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2014).

II.

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, 

"[t]he standard of review for the trial judge's factual findings is 

whether competent substantial evidence supports the judge's 

ruling” and the “standard of review for the trial judge’s application 

of the law to the factual findings is de novo." Butler v. State, 706 

So. 2d 100, 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). This Court gives deference to 

the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations 

based on live testimony but gives less deference when, based on 

the nature of the evidence under review, “the trial court does not 

have a special vantage point.”3 Beckham/Tillman v. Bennett, 118 

 2 U.S. Const. amend. V.

3 The interrogations at the police station were recorded and 

we have reviewed the video of the November 15 interrogation in 
3

So. 3d 896, 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting State v. Sepanik, 110 

So. 3d 977, 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)).

All persons have a constitutional right against selfincrimination in any criminal matter. U.S. Const. amend. V; Art. 

I, § 9, Fla. Const. The Supreme Court determined in Miranda v. 

Arizona that the State “may not use statements, whether 

exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation 

of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 

safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). A defendant may waive 

so-called Miranda rights, but only if the defendant is informed of 

those rights and “the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and 

intelligently.” Id.

To determine whether a defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights 

is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, courts employ a “totality of 

the circumstances” test, which involves evaluation of factors 

including “(1) the manner in which the Miranda rights were 

administered, including any cajoling or trickery; (2) the suspect’s 

age, experience, background and intelligence;” (3) whether the 

suspect’s parents were contacted and the juvenile given an 

opportunity to consult with parents or an attorney before 

questioning; (4) whether the questioning took place in the police 

station; and (5) whether the interrogators secured a written 

Miranda waiver. Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 576 (Fla. 1999)

(citations omitted). Where a confession is obtained after the 

administration of the Miranda warnings, the State bears a “heavy 

burden” to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her 

privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. Id. at 

575. 

By applying the Ramirez factors to Hall’s November 15 

interview, we conclude the trial court properly denied Hall’s 

motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements. As to the manner 

in which his rights were read to him, Hall was interviewed at the 

police station while he was there based on an arrest for unrelated 

charges. Before any questioning occurred, an officer read Hall his 

 

addition to the transcript of the suppression hearing.
4

Miranda rights and Hall executed a written waiver of those rights.

While the record indicates the officer read the rights extremely 

quickly, this was the second time in two weeks that Hall had

waived his Miranda rights and indicated a desire to talk to police

regarding the murders. During the November 2 interview, an 

officer read Hall his Miranda rights and Hall signed a written 

waiver of those rights after informing the officers he had no 

questions about the waiver. During that interrogation, another 

officer reiterated that Hall had the right to refuse to answer

questions. While we do not condone the officer’s cursory review of 

Hall’s Miranda rights during the November 15 interview, we agree 

with the trial court’s assessment that when taken in context, the 

officer’s actions were not coercive, misleading, or deceptive so as to

undermine Hall’s ability to understand the rights he was waiving.

Consideration of Hall’s age, experience, and background 

weigh in favor of finding a voluntary waiver. When the murders

occurred, Hall was within three months of his eighteenth birthday. 

He was also very experienced in the criminal justice system, 

having been arrested at least thirteen times, and as noted, he had 

been read his Miranda rights at least once two weeks prior to his 

November 15 interview. See Carter v. State, 697 So. 2d 529, 534 

(Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (noting that prior experience with the criminal 

justice system is one factor in determining whether a waiver is 

knowing and voluntary). During that November 2 interview, Hall

demonstrated his understanding of his right to terminate the 

interview. Additionally, the State presented evidence that during 

a police interview in an unrelated case in 2009, when Hall was 

thirteen years old, he refused to speak with police until his mother 

was present. At that time he was arrested and read his Miranda

rights as well. There was testimony that he waived his Miranda

rights in at least two other prior cases and decided to talk to police. 

Factors weighing against a finding of a voluntary waiver are 

Hall’s intelligence4 and the fact that he was not able to consult 

with his mother prior to questioning. However, these factors alone 

are not dispositive of a whether a defendant can voluntarily waive 

 4 The record indicates Hall had an IQ well below average and 

read at a level well below his age.
5

his rights. See, e.g., Bevel v. State, 983 So. 2d 505, 516 (Fla. 2008).

This Court has found a valid Miranda waiver where a sixteenyear-old defendant was “borderline mentally retarded” and 

functioned at the level of a child between eight and ten years of 

age. Brookins v. State, 704 So. 2d 576, 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). 

There, we noted that even though the defendant’s mother was 

never contacted and the defendant had a low I.Q., the trial court 

found a knowing waiver after personally observing the defendant 

and evaluating testimony from the officers who questioned him 

and a psychologist who evaluated him. Here, the State introduced 

expert testimony that despite Hall’s lower intelligence, he was 

capable of understanding his Miranda rights. Further, the video of

Hall’s interrogation does not indicate any confusion as to his 

rights. He was able to discuss the case with officers with a calm 

and conversational demeanor and provide relevant facts.

We reject Hall’s contention that he was tricked by detectives 

and gave a confession only because they promised him he could go 

home if he did so. While the officers urged Hall to take control of 

his life and tell his side of the story, they did not promise Hall that 

he could go home if he confessed. To the extent Hall may have 

believed he could go home if he confessed, we agree with the trial 

court that this was due to wishful thinking on his part rather than 

deception or trickery by the officers. Likewise, nothing in the 

record suggests that the absence of Hall’s mother impacted the 

voluntariness of Hall’s waiver of his rights. 

Given the totality of the circumstances, including the lack of 

threats or coercion, Hall’s multiple prior waivers of Miranda in 

other cases, and other evidence that he understood his rights and 

the consequences of abandoning them, we hold that the trial 

court’s finding of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver was 

proper. See Padmore v. State, 743 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)

(holding that a sixteen-year-old defendant knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, although 

he was intellectually slow and police did not attempt to contact his 

mother until more than two hours into the interview; the 

defendant had been read his rights and waived them on previous 

occasions, he was not threatened during the police interview or 

promised anything in exchange for his confession, and his taped 
6

statement demonstrated that he was able to plan, think rationally, 

and relate relevant facts in good detail).

III.

In Hall’s third issue on appeal, he asserts that the Criminal 

Punishment Code (“CPC”) is unconstitutional as applied to 

juvenile offenders. Relying on Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 

(2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and related cases, 

he alleges the CPC scoresheet, which determines the lowest 

permissible sentence that must be imposed absent a downward 

departure, fails to allow a trial court to consider that juveniles are 

constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes.

The calculation of a lowest permissible sentence on the CPC 

scoresheet does not prevent the trial court from taking a juvenile’s 

youth and its attendant characteristics into account when 

imposing a sentence. Under the CPC, the trial court may take any 

constitutionally permissible factor into account when sentencing a 

defendant to any term between the lowest permissible sentence 

and the statutory maximum. Furthermore, in response to Graham

and Miller, the Florida Legislature adopted chapter 2014-220, 

Laws of Florida, which has been codified in sections 

775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, of the Florida Statutes. That 

law provides for individualized sentencing consideration prior to 

the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile offender and for 

judicial review of certain sentences imposed upon juveniles who

commit capital, life, or first-degree felonies punishable by life. The 

record reflects that Hall was provided with an individualized 

sentencing hearing pursuant to section 921.1401, during which the

trial court took into account Hall’s age and the factors listed in 

section 921.1401(2) when imposing a sentence that was less than 

life in prison but well beyond the 369.15-month lowest permissible 

sentence. Finally, as noted, the trial court entered an order that 

Hall would be eligible for review of his sentence after fifteen years 

in prison pursuant to section 921.1402(c), Florida Statutes. At that 

time, the trial court will once again take into account Hall’s “age, 

maturity, and psychological development at the time of the 

offense” when deciding whether to modify the sentence and allow

Hall’s early release. See § 921.1402(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2014). As such, 

the lowest permissible sentence does not impermissibly prohibit 
7

the court from considering Hall’s youth. Cf. Montgomery v. State, 

230 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (twenty-five year mandatory 

minimum sentence imposed on juvenile defendant for discharging 

firearm not unconstitutional if the defendant is granted judicial 

review provided by section 921.1402 after twenty years).

IV.

Given the facts of this case, we conclude based on the totality 

of the circumstances that the record supports the trial court’s 

determination that Hall knowingly and intelligently waived his 

constitutional rights. We also reject Hall’s claim that the Criminal 

Punishment Code is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile 

defendants. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

RAY, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Candice Kaye Brower, Regional Conflict Counsel, Gainesville, and 

Michael J. Titus, Assistant Regional Conflict Counsel, 

Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.