J-A13011-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT 

CONSULTANTS, INC.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SEA-Z, INC.

Appellant No. 704 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order February 8, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2011-24556

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: Filed August 4, 2017

Sea-Z, Inc. (“Sea-Z”) appeals from the order granting Appellee’s, 

International Management Consultants, Inc. (“IMC”), post-trial motion to 

mold a jury verdict to include interest, attorneys’ fees and expenses under 

the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (“CASPA”).1 After careful 

review, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

On April 6, 2010, IMC entered into an agreement (“contract”) with 

Sea-Z to provide materials and labor to complete renovations and additions 

to Sea-Z’s King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, warehouse facility and office 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 73 P.S. §§ 501-516.
J-A13011-17

- 2 -

building. The contract price was a lump sum of $1,509,824.00. Under the 

contract, Sea-Z agreed to pay IMC in-progress payments based on written 

“application of payment” as the work progressed. Sea-Z was entitled to 

deduct 10% of the amount approved for payment to be held as “retainage” 

until final payment was due.

The contract required IMC to achieve “substantial completion”2 within 

208 calendar days from the date work commenced. Here, work commenced 

in June 2010 after IMC received the permit. Substantial completion was 

delayed. IMC and Sea-Z each disagree as to which party is responsible for 

the contract delay. IMC contends that substantial completion occurred on or 

around March 17, 2011; Sea-Z contends that IMC abandoned the project 

prior to achieving substantial completion.

On August 26, 2011, IMC filed a complaint against Sea-Z for breach of 

contract, CASPA violations, and unjust enrichment, seeking to recover the 

contract balance due on the project. IMC calculated the balance owed under 

____________________________________________

2 Substantial completion is defined under the contract as:

[T]he stage in the work when the work or designated portions 

thereof is sufficiently complete in accordance with the contract 

documents so that the owner can occupy or utilize the work for 

its intended purpose.

A201 General Conditions, §9.8.1.
J-A13011-17

- 3 -

the contract at $118,923.70,3 which represented the total of two unpaid 

invoices it submitted to Sea-Z in February and April 2011.4 On October 6, 

2011, Sea-Z filed an answer, new matter and counterclaim for breach of 

contract, contractual liquidated damages,5 and attorneys’ fees, interest, and 

penalties, alleging that it had a contractual right to withhold payment as a 

result of IMC’s “failure to perform and/or complete the work” in accordance 

with the parties’ contract.6 See Sea-Z Answer, New Matter & Counterclaim, 

10/6/11, at 14. In its answer, Sea-Z averred that the parties’ original 

contract sum was increased to $1,571,756.00 “based []on mutually agreed 

upon change orders to the Contract,” and that Sea-Z “has paid IMC 

____________________________________________

3

IMC later stated in its answer to Sea-Z’s counterclaim that the balance 

owed under the parties’ contract was $123,897.70, based on the fact that 

the contract sum was later increased from $1,509,824.00 to $1,575,631.00 

by mutually agreed change orders.

4 According to IMC, it submitted invoices to Sea-Z on February 25, 2011, in 

the amount of $75,797.13, and on April 25, 2011, in the amount of 

$43,126.57. IMC Complaint, 8/26/11, at ¶¶ 8-10.

5 Sea-Z sought liquidated damages pursuant to the parties contract, for 

IMC’s failure to achieve substantial compliance in a timely manner, citing the 

parties’ contract to substantiate its entitlement to over $50,000, plus postjudgment interest. In coming to its calculation of liquidated damages, Sea-Z 

computed the damages at $500.00/day for days 1-30 after substantial 

completion date (SCD); $1,000.00/day for days 31-60 after SCD; 

$1,500.00/day for days 61-90 after SCD; and $2,000.00/day for 91 days 

after SCD.

6 Specifically, the counterclaim alleged that the incomplete work consisted of 

54 items. Moreover, Sea-Z also claimed that IMC’s work did not conform to 

the contract with regard to 11 items.
J-A13011-17

- 4 -

$1,451,751.00, leaving a contract balance of $120,005.00.” Id. at ¶¶ 10-

11. Moreover, Sea-Z averred that the cost to complete IMC’s unfinished 

work and to correct non-conforming work will exceed the unpaid contract

balance. Id. at ¶ 16.

From November 2-5, 2015, a trial was held before the Honorable 

Carolyn Tornetta Carluccio. After deliberating, the jury returned the 

following verdict:

 Sea-Z breached its contract with IMC;

 Sea-Z did not have a good faith basis under CASPA to 

withhold payment from IMC; and

 IMC breached its contract with Sea-Z (on Sea-Z’s 

counterclaim).

Jury Verdict, 11/6/15, at 1-2. The jury awarded IMC $124,280.95 in 

damages and Sea-Z $58,000.00 in damages. 

On November 13, 2015, IMC filed post-trial motions to mold the 

verdict to include statutory interest, penalties, and attorneys’ fees and 

expenses under sections 505(d), 509(d) and 512(a) of CASPA, respectively. 

On November 20, 2015, Sea-Z filed a cross-motion for post-trial relief 

seeking vacation of the jury’s finding that it lacked good faith in response to 

interrogatory #2 of the verdict slip, claiming that the response was against 

the weight of the evidence.

On February 8, 2016, the trial court granted IMC’s post-trial motions 

and molded the verdict to $404,036.89, which now included $65,204.88 in 

statutory interest, $65,204.88 in penalties, and $149,346.18 in attorneys’ 
J-A13011-17

- 5 -

fees and expenses under CASPA. On February 11, 2016, the court entered 

judgment on the verdict in the amount of $404,036.89 in favor of IMC and in 

the amount of $58,000 for Sea-Z. On February 19, 2016, Sea-Z filed a 

timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s February 8, 2016 order. Sea-Z 

raises the following issues on appeal:

(1) Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its 

discretion in denying Sea-Z’s cross-motion to set aside the jury’s 

finding that Sea-Z “did not have a good faith basis under 

[CASPA] to withhold payment from IMC . . .”, including the 

following subsidiary questions:

a. Did the trial court err in sustaining the jury’s finding 

that Sea[-]Z lacked a good faith basis in withholding 

payment from IMC where such finding is inconsistent 

with the jury’s award of $58,000 to Sea-Z for breach of 

[c]ontract[?]

b. Did the trial court err in sustaining the jury’s finding 

that Sea-Z did not have a good faith basis to withhold 

final payment where there was un[]contradicted 

evidence of IMC’s failure to satisfy express conditions 

precedent to final payment under the parties[’] 

[c]ontract?

(2) Did the trial court err in molding the [j]ury [v]erdict when it 

assessed interest in favor of IMC under CASPA in the absence of 

any basis in the [j]ury [v]erdict to determine the amount of the 

contract balance due and owing (within the meaning of CASPA § 

505(d)) or the amount held as retainage and subject to the 

special provisions of CASPA § 509(d)?

(3) Did the trial court err in molding the [j]ury [v]erdict when it 

assessed penalties in favor of IMC under [s]ection 512(a) of 

CASPA in the absence of any basis in the [j]ury [v]erdict to 

determine the amount due under the [c]ontract that was 

“wrongfully withheld” within the meaning of that section?

(4) Did the trial court err in molding the [j]ury [v]erdict when it 

computed the amount of interest and penalties [under] 

[s]ections 505(d) and 512(a) of CASPA based on the sum of 
J-A13011-17

- 6 -

$123,879.70, being the entire amount of the contract balance 

claimed by IMC, without deduction or set-off for the jury’s award 

of damages against IMC and in favor of Sea-Z in the amount of 

$58,000?

(5) Did the trial court err in molding the [j]ury [v]erdict when it 

found that IMC was the “substantially prevailing party” and 

awarded IMC the recovery of attorneys’ fees and expenses under 

[s]ection 512(b) of CASPA?

(6) Did the trial court err in molding the [j]ury [v]erdict by 

failing to determine the amount of the reasonable attorney[s’] 

fee[s] allowed under [s]ection 512(b) of CASPA?

(7) Did the trial court err in molding the [j]ury’s [v]erdict when 

it awarded to IMC attorneys’ fees and expenses under [s]ection 

512(b) of CASPA for those fees and expenses incurred by IMC in 

defending Sea-Z’s counterclaim?

Appellant’s Brief, at 11-13 (emphasis in original).

Sea-Z claims that the jury’s determination that Sea-Z lacked a good 

faith basis to withhold paying IMC is inconsistent with its $58,000.00 verdict 

in Sea-Z’s favor.7 Instantly, Sea-Z failed to object at trial, immediately after 

the charge was read to the jury, following deliberations and the verdict, and 

prior to the discharge of the jury. See N.T. Jury Trial, 11/5/15, at 109 

____________________________________________

7 Even if this issue were not waived, IMC suggests that one can reconcile the 

jury’s determination that Sea-Z lacked good faith and recovered $58,000.00 

on its counterclaim based upon IMC’s obligation to repair any defective work 

after substantial completion of the project under the parties’ contract. See

Appellee’s Brief, at 33-34. Moreover, as defense expert, Marline E. Buckley, 

testified on cross-examination, if the jury determined that the nonconforming items were not within the scope of the parties’ contract and that 

IMC had substantially performed under the contract, the estimate for those 

items (which totaled over $631,000.00) would be irrelevant. N.T. Jury Trial, 

11/5/15, at 65-67. Notably, the $58,000.00 recovery is less than 10 

percent of what Sea-Z sought in damages for non-conforming work.
J-A13011-17

- 7 -

(“Counsel, have there been any additions or corrections to the Charge as I 

gave it? No, Your Honor.”); Id. at 111-12 (“As to this verdict just rendered 

. . . [a]ny motions? No, Your Honor.”). We find this claim waived. See

Tyus v. Resta, 476 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. 1984) (where party contended 

trial court incorrectly charged jury as to measure of damages, failure to 

question instruction after judge charged jury waived issue on appeal); see 

also Criswell v. King, 834 A.2d 505 (Pa. 2003) (party's failure to object to 

jury's allegedly inconsistent verdict before jury is dismissed waives issue); 

Rozanc v. Urbany, 664 A.2d 619 (Pa. Super. 1995) (where objection is to 

wording of interrogatory or inconsistent result reached by jury following 

answering of interrogatories, claim is waived if party does not object to 

verdict and permit court to resolve issue).

In its next issue, Sea-Z claims that the jury’s finding that it did not 

have a good faith basis to withhold final payment was against the weight of 

the evidence8 where “there was un[]contradicted evidence of IMC’s failure to 

satisfy express conditions precedent to final payment under the parties’ 

[c]ontract.” Appellant’s Brief, at 34.

____________________________________________

8 We recognize that a post-trial motion alone is sufficient to preserve a claim 

that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, where the verdict is 

not inconsistent or ambiguous and/or where an objection and instruction to 

the jury would not have eliminated the need for a new trial. Criswell, 

supra.
J-A13011-17

- 8 -

At trial, IMC offered evidence to support the jury’s determination that 

Sea-Z acted in bad faith in withholding payment. Specifically, IMC 

presented evidence showing that Sea-Z: failed to seek the architect’s 

review and approval of alleged deficiency items, as is required under the 

parties’ contract; did not timely reply to IMC’s requests for information 

(RFIs); disregarded the architect’s determination that the project was 

substantially complete and retainage should be released; did not make 

timely and complete payments to IMC throughout the project without 

explanation; failed to notify IMC of alleged deficiency items within 7 days of 

receipt of application for payment; preparing an inaccurate list of incomplete 

or non-conforming items at the end of the project to things that were not in 

the scope of the parties’ contract; certified to the bank that all 

improvements had been performed and that all proceeds requested for 

construction costs will be paid to IMC; and deceived IMC by stating the bank 

was withholding funds pending completion of non-conforming items. See

N.T. Jury Trial, 11/2/15, at 47-48, 57, 157-65; N.T. Jury Trial 11/3/15, at 

133-34, 171-73, 177-84; N.T. Jury Trial, 11/4/15, at 144-45, 149-50, 170-

71, 228, 233, 252-54; Defendant’s Trial Exhibits 45-48; and R.R. 638a-38a, 

725a.

The jury was free to believe this testimony and determine that Sea-Z 

did not have a good faith basis to withhold final payment; the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in failing to award a new trial on this claim in spite of 

any evidence presented by Sea-Z to contradict IMC’s case. See Fazio v. 
J-A13011-17

- 9 -

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 62 A.3d 396 (Pa. Super. 2012) (appellate 

review of weight claim is review of exercise of discretion, not of underlying 

question of whether verdict is against weight of the evidence); Mirizio v. 

Joseph, 4 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. Super. 2010) (new trial warranted on 

weight of evidence grounds only in truly extraordinary circumstances, i.e., 

when jury’s verdict is so contrary to evidence that it shocks one’s sense of 

justice and award of new trial is imperative so that right may be given 

another opportunity to prevail).

Several of Sea-Z’s remaining claims focus on the fact that the jury’s 

verdict does not reflect what portion of its award to IMC constitutes: the 

amount “due and owing” under the parties’ contract; the amount of delay 

damages, the amount properly retained under the contract; and the amount 

withheld in bad faith. Without such a breakdown, Sea-Z contends that the 

court could not properly mold the verdict to add section 505(d) interest and 

section 512(a) penalties under CASPA. 

We first recognize that a trial court may mold a jury verdict to include 

interest owed, even when the issue is not submitted to the jury. 

Pittsburgh Constr. Co. v. Griffith, 834 A.2d 572 (Pa. Super. 2003). This 

Court also has the authority to mold the verdict by adding interest that is 

due. See Berkeley Inn, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 422 A.2d 1078 (Pa. 

Super. 1980). Moreover, a trial court may mold a verdict to include 

prejudgment interest even after an appeal has been taken. See 

Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Old Home Manor, Inc., 482 A.2d 1062, 1065 
J-A13011-17

- 10 -

(Pa. Super. 1084); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1). The power to mold or, 

more precisely, amend a jury's verdict is merely a power to “make the 

record accord with the facts, or to cause the verdict to speak the truth,” 6 

Standard Pennsylvania Practice, supra, Ch. 27, § 72 at 568, and not a 

power to enable a judge to invade the province of the jury. House of 

Pasta, Inc. v. Mayo, 449 A.2d 697, 702 (Pa. Super. 1982) (citation 

omitted).

Again, Sea-Z never objected to the issue regarding how the jury award 

was broken down, either after the jury returned its verdict or before the jury 

was dismissed. Sea-Z could have requested a special interrogatory 

delineating exactly what part was considered due and owing under the 

parties’ contract, the amount of delay damages, the amount properly 

retained under the contract, and the amount withheld in bad faith. If it had 

objected prior to dismissal of the jury, the court could have re-instructed the 

jury to state exactly how to apportion the verdict for purposes of sections 

505 and 512 and, thus, enabled the jury to clarify its verdict. Picca, supra; 

Pa.R.C.P, 227.1(b)(1). Thus, despite the fact that Sea-Z later filed post-trial 

motions, the claim is waived. Tyus, supra. 
J-A13011-17

- 11 -

In its next issue, Sea-Z contends that the court erred in molding the 

verdict when it computed interest and penalties9 under CASPA without first 

deducting or setting-off the jury’s award of $58,000.00 in favor of Sea-Z.10

A contractor is entitled to recover statutory interest under CASPA as 

follows:

(d) INTEREST.— Except as otherwise agreed by the parties, if 

any progress or final payment to a contractor is not paid within 

seven days of the due date established in subsection (c), the 

owner shall pay the contractor, beginning on the eighth day, 

interest at the rate of 1% per month or fraction of a month on 

the balance that is at the time due and owing.

73 P.S. § 505(d) (emphasis added). Moreover, section 512 of CASPA 

mandates an award of penalties against an owner who fails to comply with 

the CASPA when:

(a) Penalty for failure to comply with act.--If arbitration or 

litigation is commenced to recover payment due under 

this act and it is determined that an owner, contractor or 

____________________________________________

9 The court calculated the interest and penalties based on the contract 

balance of $123,879.70 at 1% per month from years 2011-2015, at a 12% 

per year interest rate, for a total of 1,601 days, to come to a figure of 

$65,204.88 in interest on past due payments and penalties on the 

wrongfully withheld payments. See IMC’s Post-Trial Motion to Mold Verdict, 

11/13/15, at 6. 

10 The fact of whether a party withholds funds in good faith is relevant to a 

determination of whether a party is entitled to statutory interest and 

penalties under CASPA. Waller Corp. v. Warren Plaza, Inc., 95 A.3d 313 

(Pa. Super. 2014), alloc. granted in part, 108 A.3d 29 (Pa. 2015). CASPA 

mandates the award of a penalty upon a showing that a payment was 

"wrongfully withheld." 73 P.S. § 512(a). Absent good faith withholding, 

interest continues post-award at the statutory rate until payment. 

Zimmerman v. Harrisburg Fudd I, L.P., 984 A.2d 497 (Pa. Super. 2009).
J-A13011-17

- 12 -

subcontractor has failed to comply with the payment terms 

of this act, the arbitrator or court shall award, in addition to 

all other damages due, a penalty equal to 1% per month of 

the amount that was wrongfully withheld. An amount shall 

not be deemed to have been wrongfully withheld to the extent it 

bears a reasonable relation to the value of any claim held in 

good faith by the owner, contractor or subcontractor against 

whom the contractor or subcontractor is seeking to recover 

payment.

73 P.S. § 512(a) (emphasis added).

Pursuant to sections 505(d) and 512(a), IMC is entitled to recover 

interest on the “balance that was due and owing” under the parties contract, 

as well as a penalty on the “amount that was wrongfully withheld.” Here, 

the court did exactly that when it imposed interest and a penalty equal to 

1% per month on $123,897.70, the amount alleged to have been wrongfully 

withheld by Sea-Z. IMC was due the balance under the contract, that was 

not withheld in good faith by Sea-Z, and the interest and penalties should be 

calculated off of that amount. To off-set the $58,000.00 that Sea-Z 

recovered in its non-CASPA breach of contract claim would dilute the intent 

of CASPA’s interest and penalty provisions and provide a benefit to Sea-Z 

where the jury determined that Sea-Z did not withhold the funds in good 

faith.11

____________________________________________

11 In fact, the trial court properly instructed the jury that:

[T]he appropriate measure of plaintiff’s direct damages for 

breach is the reasonable cost of completing the contract and 

correcting any defective work minus the unpaid balance of the 

contract price.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A13011-17

- 13 -

In its final related, three issues, Sea-Z contends that the trial court 

erred in molding the verdict to include attorneys’ fees and expenses under 

CASPA where it: (1) incorrectly found that IMC was the “substantially 

prevailing party”; (2) failed to determine a reasonable amount of fees; and 

(3) included the fees incurred by IMC in defending Sea-Z’s counterclaim.

Under CASPA, a party is entitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses as 

follows:

(b) AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEE AND EXPENSES.—

Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the 

substantially prevailing party in any proceeding to recover any 

payment under this act shall be awarded a reasonable attorney 

fee in an amount to be determined by the court or arbitrator, 

together with expenses.

73 P.S. § 512(b). A “prevailing party” is commonly defined as:

[A] party whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the 

amount of damages awarded. While this definition encompasses 

those situations where a party receives less relief than was 

sought or even nominal relief, its application is still limited to 

those circumstances where the fact finder declares a winner and 

the court enters judgment in that party’s favor.

Zavatchen v. RJF Holdings, Inc., 907 A.2d 607, 610 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(emphasis added) (quoting Profit Wize Mkts. v. Weist, 812 A.2d 1270, 

1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2002) (internal citations omitted). To qualify as a 

substantially prevailing party under CASPA, a party need not only recover on 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

N.T. Non-Jury Trial, at 11/5/15, at 98-99.
J-A13011-17

- 14 -

its claim, but also prove the opposing party, without good faith reason, failed 

to comply with the mandate of prompt payment. Zimmerman, supra. 

See Zavatchen, supra at 609 (“substantially prevailing inquiry does not 

“turn[] on a simple mathematical comparison of the parties’ respective 

recoveries” or “simply because a party won a net judgment.”). 

Here, IMC recovered $124,280.95, relatively the exact amount it 

sought ($123,897.70) under CASPA, representing the unpaid balance of the 

parties’ contract. Moreover, in addition to finding that Sea-Z breached its 

contract with IMC, the jury also determined that Sea-Z did not withhold 

funds in good faith. Cf. LBL Skysystems (USA), Inc. v. APG-America, 

Inc., 514 F. Supp. 2d 704 9E.D. Pa. 2007) (where subcontractor prevailed 

on breach of contract counterclaim against contractor, because contractor 

rightfully withheld over $4,000,000.00 due to pending costs to complete 

project, subcontractor was not “substantially prevailing party” for purposes 

of recovering attorneys’ fees under section 512(b) of CASPA). Therefore, 

the court properly awarded IMC attorneys’ fees under section 512(b) where 

IMC filed suit in “a proceeding to recover” payment under CASPA; the jury 

found that Sea-Z failed to comply with CASPA’s mandate of prompt 

payment. IMC was entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred 

in connection with its CASPA litigation. Lomas v. Kravitz, 130 A.3d 107 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc).

The question still remains, however, whether IMC is also entitled to 

recover attorneys’ fees and expenses associated with defending against Sea-
J-A13011-17

- 15 -

Z’s breach of contract counterclaim, a claim not brought within the ambit of 

CASPA. As both parties acknowledge, Sea-Z could have brought this 

contract claim independent of the current CASPA litigation commenced by 

IMC. See Sea-Z Cross Post-Trial Motion at ¶ 36; IMC Post-Trial Motion, at 

2, 5 (“[T]he amounts awarded to Sea-Z on its independent counterclaim are 

irrelevant for determining the amount of interest and penalties calculated 

under CASPA.”).

In Zimmerman, our Court noted that “CASPA’s underlying objective 

of making an unpaid contractor whole again by awarding him his litigation 

costs when he is the substantially prevailing party is compromised, and, 

indeed, can be gutted, when he is subjected to expensive litigations costs.” 

Id. 984 A.2d at 505. In Zimmerman, the contractor was also saddled with 

costs incurred in a collection-of-fees phase of litigation. Id. However, the 

court concluded that the contractor was entitled to a “reasonable attorney 

fee and expenses for the collection-of-judgment and the collection-of-fees 

periods.” Id. at 506-507.

Here, while IMC is entitled to attorneys’ fees on his successful CASPA 

verdict as a substantially prevailing party, we come to a different conclusion 

with regard to the fees IMC expended in defending Sea-Z’s non-CASPA 

counterclaim. Because the jury determined that IMC breached its contract 

with Sea-Z, it rendered Sea-Z a verdict of $58,000.0. Accordingly, we 

cannot conclude that IMC prevailed, let alone “substantially” prevailed, on 

the counterclaim. As such, Sea-Z is entitled to have the amount of 
J-A13011-17

- 16 -

attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded to IMC offset by the amount of fees 

and expenses paid out to defend against the counterclaim; IMC is not 

entitled to section 512(a) statutory attorneys’ fees on the counterclaim.12 

See Zelenak v. Mikula, 911 A.2d 542, 545 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“The plain 

meaning of ‘prevailing part’ is the party who wins the lawsuit.”). Here, SeaZ was clearly the verdict winner in its breach of contract counterclaim where 

the court found that IMC breached the contract and judgment was entered in 

Sea-Z’s favor. Profit Wize, supra.

Accordingly, we remand for a hearing on the issue of attorneys’ fees 

where the trial court shall determine what a “reasonable” fee is under 

section 512 of CASPA, notwithstanding the fees expended in defending SeaZ’s counterclaim. See 73 P.S. § 512(b). IMC must submit supporting 

documentation to substantiate the reasonable amount of fees incurred solely 

in litigating its CASPA claim. See Ruthrauff, Inc. v. Ravin, Inc., 914 A.2d 

880 (Pa. Super. 2006) (where contractor unreasonably withheld retainage 

under section 509 of CASPA, remand necessary to determine correct amount 

____________________________________________

12 It is well established that costs inherent in a law suit are awarded to and 

should be recoverable by the prevailing party. DeFulvio v. Holst, 362 A.2d 

1098 ((Pa. Super. 1976). Here, IMC cannot be considered a prevailing party 

on Sea-Z’s counterclaim where the jury found that it breached its contract 

with Sea-Z and awarded it damages on the breach. It, then, follows that 

IMC cannot be considered a substantially prevailing party on Sea-Z’s 

counterclaim, an even higher threshold, under CASPA.
J-A13011-17

- 17 -

of attorneys’ fees and costs under section 512 as substantially prevailing 

party).

Order affirmed in part; reversed in part. Case remanded for 

proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/4/2017