UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-5095

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KELVIN DEMETRIUS WALKER, a/k/a Tweet, a/k/a Tweety, a/k/a 

Derek Fenty,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior

District Judge. (5:92-cr-00053-F-9)

Submitted: September 30, 2010 Decided: November 2, 2010

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne 

M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Kelvin Demetrius Walker appeals the twenty-four-month 

sentence imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised 

release. Walker argues on appeal that his sentence is 

procedurally unreasonable because the district court improperly 

considered factors not permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006).

We affirm.

We will not disturb a sentence imposed after 

revocation of supervised release that is within the prescribed 

statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States 

v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). In making this 

determination, we first consider whether the sentence is 

unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry takes a more 

deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the 

exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for guidelines 

sentences.” United States v. Moulden

The district court’s discretion is not unlimited, 

however. 

, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th 

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 

2010). For instance, the district court commits procedural 

error by failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence or by 

not providing an individualized assessment based on the facts. 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Although “[a] 

court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a 
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revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a postconviction sentence, . . . it still must provide a statement of 

reasons for the sentence imposed. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judge also 

must “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he 

has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis 

for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” United 

States v. Carter

Although a district court “ultimately has broad 

discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of 

imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” 

, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 

439 (internal quotation marks omitted), the court must consider 

the Chapter Seven policy statements in the federal sentencing 

guidelines manual, as well as the statutory requirements and 

factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006). Chapter Seven provides, “at 

revocation, the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s 

breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, 

the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal 

history of the violator.” USSG ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b). Section 

3583 approves consideration of a majority of the factors listed 

in § 3553(a), omitting only two. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Among 

the omitted factors is the need “to reflect the seriousness of 
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the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 

punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).

In this case, the district court offered several 

reasons for imposing a twenty-four-month sentence, an upward 

departure from the policy statement range of six to ten months. 

It considered Walker’s two sentence reductions from his original

sentence, Walker’s criminal history, and the circumstances under 

which Walker violated the terms of his supervised release, which 

included committing property and drug-related crimes, fleeing 

from justice, and resisting arrest. While the court said that 

the upward departure reflected the seriousness of Walker’s 

revocation conduct, the grounds cited by the district court were 

relevant to other required considerations, including the nature 

and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), 

(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). Reviewing the court’s explanation in its 

entirety, we find the court’s consideration of the stated 

factors did not render Walker’s sentence procedurally 

unreasonable.

Accordingly we conclude that Walker’s sentence is not 

plainly unreasonable. We therefore affirm the judgment of the 

district court. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED