1

Filed 5/21/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

Conservatorship of the Person and 

Estate of J.Y.

PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF CONTRA 

COSTA COUNTY,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

J.Y.,

Objector and Appellant. 

 A157323

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. P0400120)

Appellant J.Y. appeals from the trial court’s order reappointing 

respondent Contra Costa County Public Guardian conservator of her person 

pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS) Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 5000 et seq.).1 On appeal, appellant contends that compelling her to testify 

as a witness against herself at the trial for reappointment of respondent as 

her conservator violated her state and federal equal protection rights, given 

that the right to refuse to testify has been statutorily granted to persons 

found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) in proceedings to extend their 

civil commitment. We agree with appellant that LPS conservatees are 

similarly situated to NGI’s, as well as individuals subject to other involuntary 

civil commitments, for purposes of the right against compelled testimony, 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code unless otherwise indicated. 
2

considering the serious liberty interests at stake in all such involuntary civil 

commitments. We also find that respondent has not yet offered a compelling 

reason why LPS conservatees’ procedural protections should not include the 

right against compelled testimony. However, because appellant’s one-year 

conservatorship has terminated, we will dismiss the appeal as moot. 

BACKGROUND

Respondent was first appointed temporary conservator of appellant’s 

person on February 6, 2004. Thereafter, an order appointing respondent as 

conservator of appellant’s person was entered on January 13, 2005, and an 

order continuing her conservatorship was entered on March 21, 2005. 

Orders reappointing respondent conservator of appellant’s person were 

entered 12 times between January 2006 and December 2017. 

In the present matter, respondent filed a petition for reappointment as 

conservator of appellant’s person on November 13, 2018. Appellant objected 

to the reappointment and requested a jury trial. Appellant further objected 

to respondent calling her as a witness at trial, arguing that such compelled 

testimony would violate her due process and equal protection rights. The 

court overruled the objection, finding that Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 

153 Cal.App.3d 542, “clearly indicates that, number one, these are civil 

proceedings not criminal. There is not a Fifth Amendment right as in 

criminal proceedings. That’s part of what the trier of fact has to observe, that 

is, the physical and also mental presentation that the proposed conservatee, 

respondent, exhibits [sic]. So that is something that has to be considered by 

the trier of fact.” The court further stated, however, “that does not prevent 

the assertion of a Fifth Amendment right if a question calls for something 

that could incriminate [appellant] in a criminal proceeding.”
3

A jury trial was held in April 2019, at which appellant testified in 

respondent’s case in chief. Two other witnesses also testified for respondent. 

Psychiatrist Michael Levin, who had interviewed appellant twice, testified as 

an expert in the areas of psychiatry and grave disability. Dr. Levin opined 

that appellant suffered from schizophrenia and was gravely disabled. 

Andrew Smith, a licensed psychologist and deputy conservator who had 

worked with appellant since February 2018, testified as an expert in the area 

of grave disability. Dr. Smith also opined that appellant was gravely 

disabled. 

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found that appellant was gravely 

disabled due to a mental disorder, and the court entered an order 

reappointing respondent as conservator of appellant’s person. The court then 

imposed special disabilities depriving appellant of the rights to (1) refuse 

treatment related to her grave disability or general health, (2) enter into 

contracts, and (3) possess or own firearms. The court also designated 

appellant’s current placement in a skilled nursing facility, where she had 

lived for 10 years, as the least restrictive alternative placement. 

On May 13, 2019, appellant filed a notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends that compelling her to testify as a witness against 

herself at the trial for reappointment of respondent as her conservator 

violated her state and federal equal protection rights, given that the right to 

refuse to testify has been statutorily granted to NGI’s in proceedings to 

extend their civil commitment. 

I. Mootness

As a preliminary matter, appellant observes that because her one-year 

conservatorship terminated on December 15, 2019, while this appeal was 
4

pending, her appeal is now technically moot. At our request, the parties have 

submitted recent documents from the trial court record that were not in the 

record on appeal, showing that on December 19, 2019, respondent filed a 

petition for reappointment as conservator; on January 28, 2020, the parties 

stipulated to a continuance until February 18, 2020; and that on February 

18, 2020, the trial court continued the matter for one month, until March 17, 

2020, stating that “the proposed conservatee is not accepting the 

reappointment and wants to wait on the outcome of the appeal on the

disposition of the prior petition.”2

Appellant asks that we exercise our discretion to address the equal 

protection issue she raises, based on the continuing public importance of the 

issue, its likely continuing impact on her, as well as the inherent difficulty of 

resolving such an appeal before the expiration of a one-year conservatorship. 

For the reasons stated by appellant, we will exercise our discretion to address 

the issue on the merits. (See People v. Alsafar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 880, 883 

(Alsafar) [finding equal protection issue moot, but addressing it on merits 

because it “is a legal issue of continuing public importance . . . and is a 

question capable of repetition, yet evading review”]; People v. Dunley (2016) 

247 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445 (Dunley) [same].)3 However, because a reversal 

2 On our own motion, after affording the parties the opportunity to 

comment at oral argument, we take judicial notice of the documents from the 

trial court record—the ongoing case report and a January 28, 2020 minute 

order—that the parties have submitted. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 

459.) 

3 We observe that two appellate courts have recently published opinions 

addressing the identical equal protection issue appellant raises here. (See 

Conservatorship of E.B. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 986, 988 (E.B.); 

Conservatorship of Bryan S. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 190, 195 (Bryan S.), 

review den. Mar. 11, 2020.) Because the courts in these two cases have 
5

would have no practical effect on the present appeal, we will dismiss it as 

moot. (See Alsafar, at p. 883; Dunley, at p. 1445.) 

II. The LPS Act

The LPS Act affirms that “[p]ersons with mental illness have the same 

legal rights and responsibilities guaranteed all other persons by the Federal 

Constitution and laws and the Constitution of the State of California, unless 

specifically limited by federal or state law or regulations.” (§ 5325.1.) 

Moreover, “[n]o person may be presumed to be incompetent because he or she 

has been evaluated or treated for mental disorder . . . , regardless of whether 

such evaluation or treatment was voluntarily or involuntarily received.” 

(§ 5331; see In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 17 [“ ‘one of the cardinal 

principles of LPS,’ [is] ‘that mental patients may not be presumed 

incompetent solely because of their hospitalization’ ”; see also § 5000; 

Conservatorship of Early (1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 253].) 

Under the LPS Act, a conservator may be appointed “for a person who 

is gravely disabled as a result of a mental health disorder . . . . (§ 5350.) 

“Gravely disabled” is defined as, inter alia, “[a] condition in which a person, 

as a result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide for his or her 

basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).)4 

reached opposite conclusions on the equal protection question, we believe it is 

valuable to address the merits in this case, regardless of mootness. 

4 A person found gravely disabled under section 5008, subdivision 

(h)(1)(A), must be placed “in the least restrictive alternative placement, as 

designated by the court.” (§ 5358, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The conservatorship 

“shall automatically terminate one year after the appointment of the 

conservator,” although, if the conservator determines that an additional 

period of conservatorship is still required, he or she may petition the trial 

court for reappointment as conservator for a succeeding one-year period. 

(§ 5361.)
6

Under section 5350, subdivision (e)(1), “a person is not ‘gravely disabled’ if 

that person can survive safely without involuntary detention with the help of 

responsible family, friends, or others who are both willing and able to help 

provide for the person’s basic needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” 

III. Equal Protection

“ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal 

protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that 

affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” 

[Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated 

for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the 

law challenged.” ’ [Citation.] In other words, we ask at the threshold 

whether two classes that are different in some respects are sufficiently 

similar with respect to the laws in question to require the government to 

justify its differential treatment of these classes under those laws.” (People v.

McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1202 (McKee).) 

“The second step is determining whether there is a sufficient 

justification for the unequal treatment. The level of justification needed is 

based on the right implicated. When the disparity implicates a suspect class 

or a fundamental right, strict scrutiny applies. [Citation.] When no suspect 

class or fundamental right is involved, the challenger must demonstrate that 

the law is not rationally related to any legitimate government purpose. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Flint (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 983, 990, citing People v.

Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836.) 

Decisions by our Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court 

“have used the equal protection clause to police civil commitment statutes to 

ensure that a particular group of civil committees is not unfairly or 
7

arbitrarily subjected to greater burdens. [Citations.]” (McKee, supra, 47 

Cal.4th at p. 1199 [citing cases].) 

A. Disparate Treatment

“Under both the United States and California Constitutions, a person 

has the right to refuse to answer potentially incriminating questions put to 

him or her in any proceeding; in addition, the defendant in a criminal 

proceeding enjoys the right to refuse to testify at all.” (Dunley, supra, 247 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1446.) Commitment proceedings are civil in nature. (Ibid.) 

Although there is no constitutional right to refuse to testify in civil 

proceedings, including LPS commitment proceedings (see Conservatorship of 

Baber, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 550), in Hudec v. Superior Court (2015) 60 

Cal.4th 815, 830, 832 (Hudec), the California Supreme Court held that NGI’s 

have a statutory right, pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision 

(b)(7), to refuse to testify in civil commitment extension proceedings. The 

court explained that this right not to testify “does not take its very meaning 

from the criminal context, nor does applying it when the prosecution seeks to 

compel the respondent’s testimony in an NGI commitment extension hearing 

present any logical difficulty. . . . ‘The right not to be compelled to testify 

against oneself is clearly and relevantly implicated when a person is called by 

the state to testify in a proceeding to recommit him or her even if what is said 

on the witness stand is not per se incriminating.’ [Citation.]” (Hudec, at 

p. 830, quoting People v. Haynie (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1230.) 

After Hudec, a number of courts have found that mentally disordered 

offenders (MDO) and sexually violent predators (SVP) are similarly situated 

to NGI’s under the equal protection clause for purposes of the right against 

compelled testimony. (See People v. Flint, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 989 

[Div. Four of First District found SVP’s are similarly situated to NGI’s]; 
8

Alsafar, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 887 [Div. Three of Fourth District found 

MDO’s are similarly situated to NGI’s]; People v. Field (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 

174, 194 [Div. One of Fourth District found SVP’s are similarly situated to 

NGI’s and MDO’s]; Dunley, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450 [Div. Two of 

Fourth District found MDO’s are similarly situated to NGI’s and SVP’s]; 

People v. Landau (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 850, 864 [Div. Three of Fourth 

District found SVP’s are similarly situated to NGI’s]; People v. Curlee (2015) 

237 Cal.App.4th 709,720 (Curlee) [Div. Four of First District found SVP’s are 

similarly situated to NGI’s].) 

In this case, appellant argues that LPS conservatees, while different 

from NGI’s in many ways, are similarly situated for purposes of whether they 

may be compelled to testify in conservatorship proceedings. Two recent cases 

from this District have addressed this precise question, reaching quite 

different conclusions. 

First, in Bryan S., supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at page 195, Division One of 

this District rejected the argument that LPS conservatees are similarly 

situated to NGI’s for purposes of the right not to testify against oneself. 

While acknowledging that LPS conservatees, NGI’s, SVP’s, and MDO’s are all 

“subject to involuntary civil commitment as a result of their mental health,” 

the court found more meaningful the fact that “LPS Act conservatees, unlike 

those facing NGI, SVP, or MDO commitment proceedings, need not have been 

found to have committed a crime or be a danger to others.” (Id. at p. 196.) 

The court found these differences “fatal” to the LPS conservatee’s equal 

protection claim: “As our Supreme Court has explained, there is ‘no 

similarity between the aims and objectives of the [LPS Act] and those of the 

criminal law. . . . “The commitment is not initiated in response, or 

necessarily related, to any criminal acts.” ’ [Citations.] Again, the purpose of 
9

civil commitments for NGI’s, SVP’s, and MDO’s is to protect the public from 

people who have been found to be dangerous to others and who need 

treatment for a mental disorder. [Citation.] By contrast, the primary 

purposes of the LPS Act are to provide prompt evaluation and treatment of 

persons with mental health disorders; to provide such people with 

individualized treatment, supervision, and placement services; and to 

encourage the use of all resources to accomplish these objectives. [Citations.] 

‘We cannot overemphasize the importance of recognizing that a prospective 

conservatee is not a criminal defendant but, in many cases, a person in dire 

need of the state’s assistance.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 197, citing inter alia, 

Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1015, 1019–1020 & 

Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 543.) 

Second, and even more recently, in E.B., supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 

page 988, Division Five of this District held that “LPS conservatees are 

similarly situated with NGI’s and with individuals subject to other 

involuntary civil commitments for purposes of the right against compelled 

testimony.” The court reasoned that, “[a]lthough the LPS statute focuses on 

the prompt evaluation and treatment of person with serious mental disorders 

without respect to their criminal activities [citation], this does not change the 

nature of the confinement under its provisions and the resulting deprivation 

of liberty.” (Id. at p. 993.) 

In this case, we agree with Bryan S. that there are differences between 

LPS conservatees and individuals subject to other involuntary civil 

commitments, with the latter group having necessarily committed a crime 

and been found to be dangerous to others. However, we are also mindful that 

the crucial question for equal protection purposes is whether “two classes 

that are different in some respects are sufficiently similar with respect to the 
10

laws in question to require the government to justify its differential 

treatment of these classes under those laws.” (McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at 

p. 1202.) In examining this question, we, like the court in E.B., conclude that 

LPS conservatees are similarly situated to NGI’s and individuals subject to 

other involuntary civil commitments with respect to the right against 

compelled testimony, considering that all of these civil committees have in 

common a potentially lifetime deprivation of liberty. (See E.B., supra,

45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003.) 

In Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 225–226 (Roulet), 

which held that the state must prove grave disability beyond a reasonable 

doubt in LPS conservatorship proceedings, our Supreme Court discussed the 

“extent to which liberty is at stake” for an LPS conservatee “by reviewing 

exactly what awaits an individual subjected to a grave disability proceeding” 

under the LPS Act, and concluding that the applicable “statutes assure in 

many cases an unbroken and indefinite period of state-sanctioned 

confinement. ‘The theoretical maximum period of detention is life as 

successive petitions may be filed . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Roulet, at pp. 223–224, 

230, fn. omitted [further noting unfair stigma and special threats to 

reputation attached to grave disability proceedings];5 cf. Riese v. St. Mary’s 

Hospital & Medical Center (1987) 209 Cal.App.3d 1303, 1314 [rights granted 

LPS conservatees include “ ‘right to dignity’ ” ]; see also E.B., supra, 45 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1003.)

5 The court in Roulet also observed that the “gravely disabled person for 

whom a conservatorship has been established faces the loss of many other 

liberties in addition to the loss of his or her freedom from physical restraint,”

including numerous statutory disabilities, such as those imposed in this case: 

the rights to refuse or consent to treatment, possess or own firearms, or enter 

into contracts. (Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 228.) 
11

Because we find the analysis in E.B. extremely well-reasoned and 

relevant here, we will quote from it at length in this opinion. In E.B., the 

court discussed the similarities between LPS conservatorships and other 

involuntary civil commitments, explaining that an LPS conservatee “faces an 

involuntary commitment similar to NGI’s (and MDO’s and SVP’s) even if the 

reason behind that commitment is more benevolent. The reasons underlying 

an LPS commitment, while not identical to civil commitment schemes 

applicable to those who have been convicted of crimes, overlap with them. 

The primary purpose of NGI extension proceedings and MDO and SVP 

commitments is to protect the public from people found dangerous to others 

and who need treatment for a mental disorder, but an ancillary purpose is to 

provide mental health treatment for the disorder. [Citations.] And, while an 

LPS conservatee need not be proved dangerous to the public in all 

circumstances, one purpose of the LPS Act is to ‘guarantee and protect public 

safety.’ (§ 5001, subd. (c).) . . . 

“Moreover, many of the same procedural protections apply in a trial to 

declare someone an LPS conservatee as apply in other proceedings to 

establish involuntary commitments. As with NGI extension proceedings, 

MDO proceedings, and SVP proceedings, a proceeding to declare a 

conservatorship under the LPS statute requires that the government bear the 

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the subject of the 

petition have the right to a jury trial and a unanimous verdict. [Citations.]” 

(E.B., supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 994–995, fn. omitted.) 

The E.B. court then focused specifically on the right against compelled 

testimony, stating: “It is not a reasonable distinction to say that individuals 

who have not engaged in criminal conduct can be required to testify against 

themselves in a trial to determine whether they might be committed against 
12

their will when a person whose commitment is linked to his criminal conduct 

can elect to remain silent. At least, the nature of the commitment requires a 

finding that the groups are similarly situated for purposes of requiring the 

state to justify this disparate treatment. 

“The primary benefit of allowing compelled testimony in a case 

involving involuntary commitments is that it produces a more accurate 

verdict by allowing the trier of fact to observe firsthand the demeanor of the 

person the state seeks to commit. [Citations.] This interest in an accurate 

verdict exists in all involuntary commitment schemes—indeed, it might be 

argued that the interest is even greater when the mental illness results in 

the person being a danger to others.” (E.B., supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 996–997.) 

The E.B. court emphasized that the constitutional right with which it 

was concerned was “equal protection, not the right against compelled 

testimony. We in no way suggest that the Constitution would preclude an 

LPS conservatee from taking the stand under protest. But the state has 

determined to extend the privilege against self-incrimination to persons 

subject to an NGI extension proceeding, and SVP’s and MDO’s have been 

deemed by the courts to be similarly situated. ‘MDO, NGI, and LPS 

proceedings have the same underlying goal—protecting the public and 

treating severely mentally ill persons. [Citations.] In the LPS context, 

“ ‘[t]he destruction of an individual’s personal freedoms effected by civil 

commitment is scarcely less total than that effected by confinement in a 

penitentiary.’ ” [Citation.] “[T]he gravely disabled person for whom a 

conservatorship has been established faces the loss of many other liberties in 

addition to the loss of his or her freedom from physical restraint.” [Citation.] 

“Indeed, a conservatee may be subjected to greater control of his or her life 
13

than one convicted of a crime.” ’ [Citations.]” (E.B., supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 996, quoting Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 

383 & Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 232; see also Conservatorship of Kevin A.

(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249–1250.) 

Finally, the court in E.B. concluded: “While NGI’s, SVP’s, and MDO’s 

may have been found guilty of a crime, the purpose underlying those civil 

commitment schemes is not punishment, but treatment for a mental health 

condition. [Citations.] LPS conservatees may have a different criminal 

history than NGI’s, MDO’s, and SVP’s, but at root, like those groups, they are 

committed against their will for mental health treatment—possibly for the 

rest of their lives. . . . [B]efore they are asked to be ‘agents of their own 

incarceration,’ the state should be required to justify its decision to treat LPS 

conservatees differently with respect to compelled testimony.” (E.B., supra,

45 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.) 

We likewise conclude that, like MDO’s and SVP’s, LPS conservatees are 

similarly situated to NGI’s for purposes of the right against compelled 

testimony because they too are subject to the possibility of “an unbroken and 

indefinite period of state-sanctioned confinement.” (Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d 

at p. 224.) 

B. Justification for the Disparate Treatment

When two groups are found to be similarly situated, the next question 

is whether the state can justify the disparate treatment. (Dunley, supra, 247 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1450.) “One of two tests applies in a given case: either the 

rational basis test or the strict scrutiny test.” (Ibid.) 

Respondent concedes that strict scrutiny is applicable in involuntary 

civil commitment cases, and that the state must establish “that it has a 

compelling interest that justifies the law.” (See Dunley, supra, 247 
14

Cal.App.4th at p. 1451 [“The California Supreme Court has long held that 

under California law, equal protection challenges to involuntary civil 

commitment schemes are reviewed under the strict scrutiny test because 

such schemes affect the committed person’s fundamental interest in 

liberty”].) Respondent nonetheless argues that the state has a compelling 

interest justifying the compelled testimony in LPS conservatorship 

proceedings, and the distinctions or disparate treatment are necessary to 

further this purpose: “ ‘the custodial care, diagnosis, treatment and 

protection of persons who are unable to take care of themselves and who for 

their own well being and the safety of others cannot be left adrift in the 

community’. [Citation.]” (Quoting Baber, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 549.) 

This argument, however, does not distinguish between the need for 

truth in LPS conservatorship proceedings and proceedings involving NGI’s, 

MDO’s, and SVP’s. Indeed, as the court in E.B. observed, the interest in an 

accurate verdict is arguably greater when a committee’s mental illness 

results in the person being a danger to others. (E.B., supra, 45 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 996, 997 [finding that “the public guardian made no showing that 

appellant’s compelled testimony was any more necessary in the proceeding to 

declare appellant an LPS conservatee than it would have been in other types 

of civil commitment proceedings”].) Thus, while we do not disagree that LPS 

conservatees differ in some ways from those subject to involuntary civil 

commitments due to their criminal history and dangerousness, respondent

has not yet offered a compelling reason why LPS conservatees’ procedural 

protections should not include the right against compelled testimony. 

Normally, we would remand the matter to the trial court for an 

evidentiary hearing to give respondent the opportunity to establish a factual 

basis justifying the disparate treatment of LPS conservatees and other 
15

similarly situated groups subject to involuntary civil commitment. (See 

Dunley, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1453, fn. 14, citing McKee, supra, 47 

Cal.4th at pp. 1208–1211 & Curlee, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 722–723.) 

Because we are dismissing the appeal as moot, however, a remand to the trial 

court on that issue is not appropriate at present. (See Dunley, at p. 1453, 

fn. 14.)6 

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. 

6 In light of our dismissal of the appeal, we also will not address 

respondent’s assertion that any error in compelling appellant to testify in its 

case in chief was harmless under any standard, considering the other 

competent evidence introduced at trial demonstrating that appellant is 

gravely disabled. 
16

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Richman, J.

_________________________

Miller, J.

Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of J.Y. (A157323)
17

Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Honorable Susan M. Fenstermacher

Attorney for Appellant: By appointment of the Court of Appeal Under

the First District Appellate Project

Jeremy T. Price

Attorneys for Respondent: Office of the County Counsel

Sharon L. Anderson

County Counsel

Nina F. Dong

Deputy County Counsel