FILED

September 9, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLLE

AUGUST SESSION, 1999

JERMAINE LEJUANE HUNTER, *

* No. 01C01-9809-CR-00397

Appellant, *

* DAVIDSON COUNTY

vs. *

* Hon. J. Randall Wyatt, Jr., Judge

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *

* (Post-Conviction)

Appellee. *

For the Appellant: For the Appellee:

Jefre S. Goldtrap Paul G. Summers

Attorney Attorney General and Reporter

207 Third Avenue, North

Post Office Box 190599 Elizabeth T. Ryan

Nashville, TN 37219-0599 Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Justice Division

425 Fifth Avenue North

2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Victor S. (Torry) Johnson III

District Attorney General

Katy N. Miller and Nick Bailey

Asst. District Attorneys General

Washington Square, Suite 500

222 Second Avenue South

Nashville, TN 37201

OPINION FILED: 

AFFIRMED

David G. Hayes, Judge
1

The facts underlying this conviction reveal that, on November 8, 1993, the appellant

murdered his ex-girlfriend approximately two weeks after the termination of their relationship. The

twenty-year o ld victim su ffered m ultiple guns hot wou nds to he r forehe ad, torso , leg and ha nds. 

An eyewitness, who had known the appellant for fifteen years, identified the appellant as the

shoote r. See State v. Jermaine Hunter, No. 01C01-9506-CR-00176 (Tenn. Crim. App. at

Nash ville, Aug. 22, 1 996), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Feb. 3, 1997).

2

OPINION

The appellant, Jermaine LeJuane Hunter, appeals the Davidson County

Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On January 11,

1995, the appellant was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder and received a

life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction.1

 His conviction and

sentence were affirmed by this court on direct appeal. See State v. Jermaine

Hunter, No. 01C01-9506-CR-00176 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Aug. 22, 1996),

perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Feb. 3, 1997). The appellant collaterally attacks his

conviction for first degree murder upon grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was deficient for (1) failing to adequately

prepare for trial and meet with the appellant; (2) failing to fully communicate with the

appellant his vulnerability regarding sentencing; and (3) failing to investigate and

utilize all possible alibi witnesses.

After review of the record, we affirm the lower court’s denial of post-conviction

relief.

Analysis

On December 29, 1997, the appellant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel

and that the State had withheld exculpatory evidence. The post-conviction court

appointed counsel on February 18, 1998. No amended petition was filed. An

evidentiary hearing was subsequently held on May 20, 1998. On July 24, 1998, the
3

post-conviction court entered an order addressing the appellant’s claims and

denying the appellant relief.

In dismissing the petition, the post-conviction court found, in parts pertinent to

this appeal:

The petitioner contends that [counsel] did not have adequate time to

prepare for trial and that he did not conduct a competent pre-trial

investigation. [Counsel] testified that he was appointed to represent

the petitioner approximately six (6) weeks before trial. [Counsel]

indicated that such time ordinarily would have not been sufficient to

prepare for a case of this nature. However, he asserted that the

petitioner’s prior attorneys . . . had already thoroughly prepared the

case at the time he was appointed and that he largely just needed to

review the investigative file and the audio tape of the preliminary

hearing to prepare himself for trial. [footnote omitted]. [Counsel] also

testified that he met with the petitioner and the petitioner’s family on

occasions prior to trial to discuss the case. [Counsel] indicated that he

was ready to proceed on the day of trial and, accordingly, did not seek

a continuance. [footnote omitted]. . . .

. . .

[Counsel] testified that he discussed potential defense strategies with

the petitioner prior to trial and ultimately, with the approval of the

petitioner, pursued an alibi defense. . . . The Court finds no reason to

second-guess the tactical and strategic decisions of counsel. The fact

that the jury apparently did not accredit the alibi defense is not

reflective on counsel’s efforts.

The petitioner also contends that [counsel] failed to call certain

witnesses who could have supported his alibi defense. However, the

Court points out that the defense of alibi had already been introduced

through several family members whom the jury apparently did not find

to be credible. Any additional testimony reiterating the petitioner’s

claim would have been cumulative. Moreover, as [counsel]

acknowledged, the state’s evidence was simply too strong for any

claimed alibi defense. In any event, the petitioner failed to . . . present

any such witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.

In sum, the Court is satisfied that [counsel] handled the petitioner’s

case in a professional manner. The Court is of the opinion that

[counsel] competently represented the petitioner at all stages of the

case. [”Despite claims to the contrary, the Court finds that the

petitioner was well aware of the sentence he would face if convicted of

first degree murder.”] The petitioner could not articulate with any

specificity any credible claims of deficient and prejudicial errors by

counsel, and, accordingly, has failed to carry his evidentiary burden. 

To succeed in a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the

appellant must show, by clear and convincing evidence, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-
4

210(f) (1997), that the services rendered by trial counsel were deficient and that, but

for the deficient performance, the results of the proceeding would have been

different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064

(1984). For purposes of proving ineffective assistance of counsel, proof of deficient

representation by omission requires more than a speculative showing of lost

potential benefit. The post-conviction court found that counsel was not deficient and

that counsel’s action did not prejudice the appellant. When this court undertakes

review of a lower court’s decision on a petition for post-conviction relief, the lower

court’s findings of fact are given the weight of a jury verdict and are conclusive on

appeal absent a finding that the evidence preponderates against the judgment. See

Davis v. State, 912 S.W.2d 689, 697 (Tenn. 1995). After reviewing the record, we

conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the detailed findings

entered by the post-conviction court. 

As a result, we find no error of law requiring reversal. The judgment of the

trial court dismissing the appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.

____________________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, Judge

CONCUR:

_____________________________________

JOE G. RILEY, Judge

_____________________________________

L. T. LAFFERTY, Senior Judge