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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KEVIN MYERS

(SC 20563)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,

Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 54-91g), when sentencing a child whose case has been

transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal

docket of the Superior Court and the child has been convicted of a class

A or B felony pursuant to such transfer, the sentencing court is required

to consider certain factors, including the defendant’s age at the time of

the offense and the hallmark features of adolescence.

Pursuant further to statute (§ 54-125a (f) (1)), a person convicted of a crime

or crimes committed while such person was under eighteen years of

age and serving a sentence for that crime or crimes of fifty years of

imprisonment or less shall be eligible for parole after serving 60 percent

of the sentence or twelve years, whichever is greater.

The defendant, who, in two separate cases, had been convicted of numerous

crimes that he committed when he was fifteen years old, appealed from

the trial court’s denial in part and dismissal in part of his motions to

correct an illegal sentence. In 2009, the defendant was sentenced in the

first case to a total effective sentence of eighteen years of imprisonment,

followed by twenty-two years of special parole. In 2011, the defendant

entered a guilty plea in the second case and received a sentence of

fourteen years of imprisonment, followed by six years of special parole,

to run concurrently with the sentence that he already was serving in

connection with the 2009 case. In light of the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama (567 U.S 460) and its progeny, as

well as legislation (P.A. 15-84) enacted in response thereto concerning

sentencing procedures for juvenile offenders, the defendant filed one

motion to correct an illegal sentence in each criminal case. He claimed

that the trial court had failed to consider the hallmark features of adolescence as mitigating factors in sentencing him, in violation of Miller and

its progeny, and in violation of § 54-91g, and sought a resentencing at

which such factors would be considered. The defendant also claimed

that he was being denied a meaningful opportunity for parole because,

when the Board of Pardons and Paroles calculated his parole eligibility

date pursuant to § 54-125a (f) (1), it did so on the basis of his fourteen

year sentence, rather than on the basis of either his eighteen year sentence or the total time served under both sentences, which, due to the

structure of his concurrent sentences, resulted in his parole eligibility

date in 2023 rather than in 2019. The defendant contended that the

board’s incorrect calculation preventing him from receiving any practical

benefit under § 54-125a (f) (1) was contrary to legislative intent, did not

reflect the terms of his plea agreement, in violation of his right to due

process, and violated his right to equal protection under the law. The

trial court dismissed the defendant’s claim that he was entitled to resentencing pursuant to Miller and its progeny, his claim that he was entitled

to resentencing under § 54-91g, his claim that he was denied a meaningful

opportunity for parole under § 54-125a (f) (1), and his equal protection

claim. The court denied the defendant’s claim that his sentences as

imposed violated the understanding of his plea agreement, in violation

of his right to due process, concluding that there was no agreement

with respect to when the defendant would be eligible for parole. On

the defendant’s appeal from the denial of his motions to correct an

illegal sentence, held that the form of the trial court’s judgment was

improper insofar as that court should have denied, rather than dismissed,

the defendant’s claims that he was entitled to be resentenced on the

basis of Miller and its progeny, and § 54-91g, and insofar as it should

have dismissed, rather than denied, the defendant’s claim that his parole

eligibility date did not reflect the terms of his plea agreement, in violation

of his right to due process: because the defendant’s claims that he

was entitled, pursuant to Miller and its progeny, and § 54-91g, to be

resentenced at a hearing at which the sentencing court must consider
the mitigating factors of youth plausibly challenged the defendant’s

sentence, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to address them,

but the defendant’s Miller claim failed on the merits because the defendant was not sentenced to life imprisonment or its functional equivalent

and because he was eligible for parole, rendering Miller inapplicable to

him, and his claim under § 54-91g failed in light of this court’s prior

conclusion that the legislature did not intend for the section of P.A. 15-

84 codifying § 54-91g to apply retroactively; moreover, the defendant’s

claims that his parole eligibility date violated § 54-125a (f) (1) and his

rights to due process and equal protection were jurisdictionally defective

insofar as they did not challenge the defendant’s sentences or the manner

in which the sentencing court imposed his sentences but, instead, arose

from an action, namely, the calculation of his parole eligibility date,

that he concedes was undertaken by the board; furthermore, it was

undisputed that the board was the state actor tasked by the relevant

state regulation (§ 54-125a-3 (b)) with determining the defendant’s earliest parole eligibility date, and, although the record did not reveal how

the board interpreted and applied the relevant statutes in doing so, the

defendant’s claims regarding his parole eligibility date challenged the

board’s act of interpreting and applying the relevant statutes, and the

proper forum for the defendant to raise those claims, following exhaustion of any administrative remedies, is in a habeas proceeding; additionally, the defendant will be eligible for parole regardless of which of his

sentences the board bases its calculation on, just not as soon as he

would prefer, and the mere fact that the board’s interpretation of the

applicable statutes yielded a later parole eligibility date than another

interpretation could have yielded does not, in and of itself, implicate

the legality of the defendant’s sentences for purposes of the trial court’s

jurisdiction over his motions to correct an illegal sentence.

Argued December 16, 2021—officially released May 24, 2022

Procedural History

Substitute information, in the first case, charging the

defendant with two counts each of the crimes of sexual

assault in the first degree and kidnapping in the first

degree, and substitute information, in the second case,

charging the defendant with the crimes of sexual assault

in the first degree and burglary in the second degree,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Hartford, where the first case was tried to the jury

before Mullarkey, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of

one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two

counts of kidnapping in the first degree; thereafter, the

second case was tried to the jury before Schuman, J.;

subsequently, the court declared a mistrial as to the

charge of sexual assault in the first degree, and the

defendant was presented to the court, Alexander, J.,

on a plea of guilty to one count of sexual assault in the

first degree; judgment of guilty in accordance with the

plea; thereafter, the court, Alexander, J., dismissed in

part and denied in part the defendant’s motions to correct an illegal sentence, and the defendant appealed.

Improper form of judgment; affirmed in part; vacated

in part; judgment directed in part.

Tamar R. Birckhead, for the appellant (defendant).

Jonathan M. Sousa, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott,

state’s attorney, Robin D. Krawczyk, senior assistant

state’s attorney, and Jennifer F. Miller, former assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

ROBINSON, C. J. The principal issue in this appeal

is whether a motion to correct an illegal sentence is a

jurisdictionally proper vehicle by which to challenge a

parole eligibility date, as calculated by the Board of Pardons and Paroles (board), in light of the sentences, as

pronounced by the court. The defendant, Kevin Myers,

was convicted in two separate criminal cases for several

offenses that he committed in 2007, when he was fifteen

years old. He now appeals1

from the trial court’s dismissal in part and denial in part of his two motions to

correct an illegal sentence, one filed in each of his two

cases. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial

court incorrectly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction

over the claims in his motions to correct and that (1)

he was entitled to resentencing in both cases because

the sentencing court failed to consider his youth as a

mitigating factor, in violation of Miller v. Alabama, 567

U.S. 460, 476–77, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407

(2012), and General Statutes § 54-91g,2

(2) the structure

of his two sentences deprived him of a meaningful

opportunity for parole because it resulted in a later parole

eligibility date than he otherwise would have been entitled to under General Statutes § 54-125a (f) (1),3 and

(3) his parole eligibility date violated his right to equal

protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United

States constitution and article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution. The defendant further contends that

the trial court improperly denied his claim that his

parole eligibility date, as calculated by the board, violated the terms of his plea agreement, in violation of his

right to due process under the fourteenth amendment

to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 8

and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. We affirm in

part the judgment of the trial court.4

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history. On April 4, 2007, when he was fifteen years old, the defendant sexually assaulted a

woman in her East Hartford apartment. Several months

later, on July 8, 2007, the defendant, who was still fifteen

years old, returned to the same apartment building,

abducted two women, and sexually assaulted one of

them. See State v. Myers, 129 Conn. App. 499, 501–503,

21 A.3d 499, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 918, 27 A.3d 370

(2011). On that same night, a police officer arrested the

defendant, who matched the description of the suspect,

when the officer observed the defendant running across

a street in the same neighborhood where the attack

had occurred. Id., 503.

The state prosecuted the defendant for the April 4

and July 8, 2007 incidents in two separate cases in the

judicial district of Hartford, each with its own docket

number. The prosecution for the July 8, 2007 incident

(July 8 prosecution) proceeded first. In 2009, under

docket number CR-07-0211928-T, following a jury trial,
the defendant was convicted of one count of sexual

assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-70 (a) (1) and two counts of

kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A). Id., 501. On April 29, 2009,

the court sentenced the defendant, with respect to the

July 8 prosecution, to a total effective sentence of eighteen years of imprisonment, followed by twenty-two

years of special parole.5

The prosecution for the April 4, 2007 incident (April

4 prosecution) went to trial in October, 2011, under

docket number CR-07-0212494-T. In the April 4 prosecution, the state charged the defendant with sexual assault

in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev.

to 2007) § 53a-70 (a) (1) and burglary in the second

degree, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007)

§ 53a-102 (a) (2). The jury found the defendant not guilty

of burglary in the second degree but was unable to reach

a verdict on the sexual assault count, leading the trial

court to declare a mistrial as to that count. Subsequently,

on December 8, 2011, the defendant pleaded guilty in

the April 4 prosecution under the Alford6 doctrine to

onecount of sexual assault in the first degree. Pursuant

to the court’s offer during plea negotiations, the defendant

was sentenced to fourteen years of imprisonment, followed by six years of special parole. The court ordered

the sentence in the April 4 prosecution to run concurrently with the eighteen year sentence the defendant

already was serving for his conviction from the July 8

prosecution. The court explained to the defendant, however, that, because he already was serving a sentence in

connection with the July 8 prosecution, he was not entitled to presentence confinement credit toward his fourteen year sentence in the April 4 prosecution.7 As a result

of the approximately four year gap between his convictions and sentences in the two separate cases, the defendant’s eighteen year sentence in the July 8 prosecution,

which commenced in July, 2007, will end in July, 2025,

whereas his fourteen year sentence in the April 4 prosecution, which commenced in December, 2011, will end several months later, in November, 2025.8

Constitutional and statutory changes to juvenile sentencing laws subsequent to the defendant’s sentencing in

connection with the April 4 prosecution prompted him

to file the motions to correct an illegal sentence that are

at issue in this appeal. In order to provide background

for the defendant’s claims, we summarize the relevant

constitutional and statutory changes to juvenile sentencing laws that occurred subsequent to the defendant’s convictions.

In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 460,

the United States Supreme Court held that the eighth

amendment to the United States constitution bars sentencing offenders who were under eighteen years old

when they committed their offenses to a sentence of
mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole. See id., 470. The Supreme Court held that, prior

to sentencing a juvenile offender to life without the possibility of parole, a court must ‘‘take into account how

children are different, and how those differences counsel

against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in

prison.’’ Id., 480. Our subsequent decision in State v.Riley,

315 Conn. 637, 641, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied,

577 U.S. 1202, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016),

concluded that the eighth amendment requires a sentencing court to consider the Miller factors before exercising

its discretion to impose a sentence on a juvenile offender

that is the ‘‘functional equivalent’’ of life without the possibility of parole.

The United States Supreme Court addressed the retroactive effect of Miller in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577

U.S. 190, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016), in

which the court concluded that, although Miller applies

retroactively, that ‘‘retroactive effect . . . does not

require [s]tates to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case [in which] a juvenile offender received

mandatory life without parole. A [s]tate may remedy a

Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders

to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing

them.’’ Id., 212.

In 2015, our legislature responded to the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Miller by enacting §§ 1 and

2 of No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84), which

are codified at §§ 54-125a (f) and 54-91g, respectively.

Public Act 15-84 exceeds the constitutional floor established by Miller, making changes that affect a broader

range of juvenile offenders than just those facing life

sentences or the functional equivalent thereof. Section 1

of P.A. 15-84, codified at § 54-125a (f), established new,

more favorable parole eligibility rules for juvenile offenders who are ‘‘incarcerated on or after October 1, 2015,

and who received a definite sentence or total effective

sentence of more than ten years for such crime or crimes

prior to, on or after October 1, 2015 . . . .’’ See footnote

3 of this opinion. Section 2 of P.A. 15-84, codified at § 54-

91g, requires a sentencing court, when a child has been

convicted following transfer to the regular criminal

docket, to consider the Miller factors when sentencing

the child for a class A or B felony. See footnote 2 of

this opinion.

Relying on these constitutional and statutory changes

to juvenile sentencing laws, the defendant claimed in his

motions to correct that, in both of his criminal cases,

the sentencing court had failed to consider the hallmark

features of adolescence as mitigating factors, in violation

of Miller and its progeny, and § 54-91g. He sought a resentencing at which the court would consider the Miller

factors.

The defendant also claimed that his parole eligibility

date in the July 8 prosecution had been altered by the
imposition of the fourteen year sentence in the April 4

prosecution, thus depriving him of a meaningful opportunity for parole, as intended by the legislature in § 54-125a

(f) (1). The defendant relied on § 54-125a (f) (1) (A),

which, because he was serving a sentence of more than

ten years but less than fifty years, entitled him to ‘‘be

eligible for parole after serving sixty per cent of the sentence or twelve years, whichever is greater . . . .’’ He

claimed that, rather than calculating his new parole eligibility date pursuant to § 54-125a (f) (1) on the basis of

either his eighteen year sentence in the July 8 prosecution,

or on the basis of the total time served under both cases,

the board had improperly relied solely on his fourteen

year sentence in the April 4 prosecution, thus resulting

in a later parole eligibility date than he was entitled to

pursuant to § 54-125a (f) (1).

Specifically, the defendant contended that the board

improperly calculated his parole eligibility date to be

December 2, 2023.9 He claimed that, if the board had

calculated his parole eligibility date on the basis of his

total time served for the two convictions, he would be

eligible for parole more than four years earlier, in July,

2019. The defendant contended that the board’s incorrect

calculation of his parole eligibility date prevented him

from receiving any practical benefit under § 54-125a (f)

(1), contrary to the legislative intent underlying the statute, did not reflect the terms of his plea agreement, in

violation of his right to due process, and violated his right

to equal protection under the law. He claimed that he

was entitled to be resentenced in a manner that would

allow him to be eligible for an earlier parole date. In the

alternative, the defendant requested that the trial court

either adjust his sentence in the April 4 prosecution,

lengthening the term to eighteen years but changing the

commencement of the sentence to coincide roughly with

that of the sentence in the July 8 prosecution, or order

the board to base its calculation of his parole eligibility

date on his eighteen year sentence in the July 8 prosecution.

The trial court dismissed the defendant’s claim that he

was entitled to resentencing pursuant to both Miller and

its progeny, and § 54-91g. As to the defendant’s Miller

claim, the trial court concluded that Miller and its progeny

were inapplicable because the defendant had not been

sentenced to life without parole or its functional equivalent. With respect to the defendant’s statutory claim, the

court relied on this court’s decision in State v. Delgado,

323 Conn. 801, 814, 151 A.3d 345 (2016), which held that

the legislature did not intend § 54-91g to apply retroactively. The court also dismissed the defendant’s claim

that he was denied a meaningful opportunity for parole,

noting that he was ‘‘eligible for parole, just not when

he would prefer . . . to be.’’ The court then denied the

defendant’s claim that his sentences as imposed violated

the understanding of the plea agreement, finding that

there ‘‘was no agreement or understanding with respect
to when the defendant would be eligible for parole.’’ The

court dismissed his equal protection claim on the basis

that it was not within the scope of a motion to correct

an illegal sentence. Finally, the court dismissed the defendant’s claim that the sentence frustrated the purpose of

the plea bargain. The court explained that the doctrine

of frustration of purpose is a civil one and declined to

extend it to this context.10 This appeal followed.

Before we address the defendant’s specific claims in

this appeal, we consider the legal principles governing a

trial court’s jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal

sentence. ‘‘A trial court generally has no authority to

modify a sentence but retains limited subject matter jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence

imposed in an illegal manner. . . . Practice Book § 43-

2211 codifies this common-law rule. . . . Therefore, we

must decide whether the defendant has raised a colorable

claim within the scope of Practice Book § 43-22 . . . .

In the absence of a colorable claim requiring correction,

the trial court has no jurisdiction . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; footnote in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378, 386, 215 A.3d

1154 (2019). We have emphasized, however, that ‘‘[t]he

jurisdictional and merits inquiries are separate; whether

the defendant ultimately succeeds on the merits of his

claim does not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear

it.’’ State v. Evans, 329 Conn. 770, 784, 189 A.3d 1184

(2018), cert. denied, U.S , 139 S. Ct. 1304, 203 L.

Ed. 2d 425 (2019); see State v. Ward, 341 Conn. 142,

152–58, 266 A.3d 807 (2021) (surveying case law discussing concept of colorable claim in context of motion

to correct illegal sentence). In examining whether a claim

is colorable, therefore, ‘‘the jurisdictional inquiry is guided

by the plausibility that the defendant’s claim is a challenge

to his sentence, rather than its ultimate legal correctness.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Evans,

supra, 784.

‘‘[A]n illegal sentence is essentially one [that] . . .

exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates

a defendant’s right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous,

or is internally contradictory. . . . In accordance with

this summary, Connecticut courts have considered four

categories of claims pursuant to [Practice Book] § 43-22.

The first category has addressed whether the sentence

was within the permissible range for the crimes

charged. . . . The second category has considered violations of the prohibition against double jeopardy. . . .

The third category has involved claims pertaining to

the computation of the length of the sentence and the

question of consecutive or concurrent prison time. . . .

The fourth category has involved questions as to which

sentencing statute was applicable.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 779. We have emphasized that, in

order to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court, a

challenge to the legality of a sentence must challenge the

sentencing proceeding itself. Id.
We first address the defendant’s claim that the trial

court improperly dismissed his claims, pursuant to

Miller and its progeny, and § 54-91g, that he was entitled

to resentencing because, in both cases, the sentencing

court failed to consider the mitigating factors of youth.

Because both of these claims plausibly challenge the

defendant’s sentence, we conclude that the trial court

had subject matter jurisdiction to address them. See

id., 784. As we will explain, however, the defendant’s

claims have no merit. Accordingly, we conclude that

the trial court should have denied rather than dismissed

these claims.

Relying on Miller, the defendant contends that, because

he was denied a meaningful opportunity for parole pursuant to § 54-125a (f) (1), he was not provided a remedy

for the alleged Miller violations that occurred during

his sentencing proceedings in both cases. Therefore,

he argues that he is entitled to be resentenced, at which

sentencing proceeding the court must consider the mitigating factors of youth. We disagree. As the state aptly

responds, Miller simply does not apply to the defendant

because he was not sentenced to life imprisonment or

its functional equivalent and because he was eligible

for parole. See Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 480;

see also State v. Delgado, supra, 323 Conn. 811 (‘‘Miller

simply does not apply when a juvenile’s sentence provides an opportunity for parole; that is, a sentencing

court has no constitutionally founded obligation to consider any specific youth related factors under such circumstances’’).

Relying on § 54-91g, the defendant claims that the

trial court incorrectly concluded that the statute does

not apply retroactively under the facts of the present

case. He argues that this court’s conclusion in Delgado—that § 54-91g does not apply retroactively—applies

only to subdivisions (1) and (2) of § 54-91g (a), and that

no court has yet concluded that subsection (c) of § 54-

91g, on which the defendant relies on appeal, applies

only prospectively. Section 54-91g (c) provides: ‘‘Whenever a child is sentenced pursuant to subsection (a) of

this section, the court shall indicate the maximum

period of incarceration that may apply to the child and

whether the child may be eligible to apply for release

on parole pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (f)

of section 54-125a.’’ The defendant claims that, because

§ 54-91g (c) references ‘‘parole,’’ and because he was

denied parole eligibility pursuant to § 54-125a (f) (1),

he has a right, pursuant to § 54-91g (c), to be resentenced on the basis that the sentencing courts in both

cases failed to comply with § 54-91g (a) (1) and (2).

The state responds that neither § 54-91g, in its entirety,

nor § 54-125a (f) (1) applies retroactively.

As the defendant concedes in his brief, we resolved

this question in State v. Delgado, supra, 323 Conn. 814–

15, in which we concluded that the legislature did not
intend P.A. 15-84, § 2, as codified at § 54-91g, to apply

retroactively. Our analysis in that case applied to P.A.

15-84, § 2, in its entirety, which necessarily included

the language later codified at § 54-91g (c). See id., 814

(observing that, contrary to other sections of P.A. 15-

84, ‘‘P.A. 15-84, § 2, provides it is ‘[e]ffective October

1, 2015,’ indicating that the legislature did not intend

for this section to apply retroactively’’).

The defendant’s remaining claims in this appeal, all

of which at their core challenge the board’s determination of his parole eligibility date, share a jurisdictional

defect. Rather than challenging the sentences or the

manner in which the sentencing court imposed his sentences, the defendant’s claims arise from an action that

he concedes was undertaken by the board. That is, the

defendant contends that his parole eligibility date, as

determined by the board, deprived him of a meaningful

opportunity for parole, in violation of § 54-125a (f) (1).

Therefore, he claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that his parole eligibility date violated the terms

of his plea agreement, in violation of his right to due

process under the fourteenth amendment to the United

States constitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the

Connecticut constitution,12 and violated his right to

equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to

the United States constitution and article first, § 20, of

the Connecticut constitution.13

The key fact that deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over all of the defendant’s claims asserting that he

was entitled to an earlier parole eligibility date is that the

board, not a sentencing court, calculates a defendant’s

parole eligibility date. In calculating the defendant’s parole

eligibility date, the board acted in accordance with § 54-

125a-3 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Board . . .

shall make a determination of an inmate’s earliest parole

eligibility date. The Board, in making such determination, shall obtain, on a weekly basis, a list of all inmates

sentenced within the previous week. A criminal history

of the inmate, will be obtained which may include, but

shall not be limited to, a State Police criminal records

check, out of state criminal records check, police reports,

previous parole and probation reports, and any other

information that the Board deems relevant. Criminal

justice data systems will be queried for information regarding the length of sentence for each specific charge. The

Chairman of the Board . . . shall convene a panel of

two or more parole board members to review the information compiled. The panel will determine whether the

inmate must serve 50 [percent] or 85 [percent] of his

or her sentence before becoming eligible for Parole.

The inmate and the Department of Correction will then

be notified of the Board’s determination.’’

The mere fact that the defendant has cast his claims

as challenging his sentence structure does not alter
our conclusion that, in these motions to correct, the

defendant is in actuality challenging an action of the

board. Accordingly, because the claims do not plausibly

challenge his sentence, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over them. See State v. Evans, supra, 329 Conn.

784. Specifically, the defendant’s claims challenging his

parole eligibility date call into question the board’s interpretation and application of the relevant statutes.

Because the defendant’s sentences were imposed in

two separate cases and ordered to run concurrently,

the defendant’s parole eligibility date is governed by

General Statutes §§ 53a-38 (b) (1) and 54-125a (f) (1)

(A), which, together, provide the values for the parole

eligibility calculation.14

The record in the present case does not reveal how

the board interpreted and applied §§ 53a-38 (b) (1) and

54-125a (f) (1) (A) to calculate the defendant’s parole

eligibility date.15 Nor does the record reveal when or

whether the board informed the defendant of his parole

eligibility date. See footnote 9 of this opinion. It is undisputed, however, that the board is the state actor that

would interpret those statutes and apply them to the

defendant. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 54-125a3 (b). Notwithstanding the defendant’s attempts to cast

his claims as challenging the legality of his sentences

or his sentence structure, his dispute is with the board’s

interpretation of the applicable statutes—whatever that

interpretation may be. The defendant consistently has

advocated for either of two particular interpretations

of the applicable statutes. He has argued that they

should be read to require the board to calculate his

parole eligibility date either on the basis of his total

time served under both sentences, or on the basis of his

eighteen year sentence, which he claims is the sentence

that ‘‘has the longest term to run’’ for purposes of § 53a38 (b) (1). The proper forum for the defendant to raise

these claims, following exhaustion of any administrative remedies, is in a habeas proceeding.

At oral argument before this court, the defendant’s

counsel relied on our recent decision in State v. Coltherst, 341 Conn. 97, 266 A.3d 838 (2021), in support of

the defendant’s argument that jurisdiction lies over his

claims challenging his parole eligibility date. Given the

stark contrast between the facts of Coltherst and those

of the present case, a comparison of the two cases

provides further illustration of the nature of the jurisdictional defect suffered by all of the defendant’s challenges to his parole eligibility date. Specifically, the

defendant argues that we should conclude that, when

a juvenile is sentenced in multiple criminal cases to

sentences that are ordered to run concurrently, § 54-

125a (f) (1) requires the board to use the ‘‘total effective

sentence’’—the total time served under the multiple

dockets—as the basis for calculating the juvenile’s

parole eligibility.
Our decision in Coltherst provides an example of

when such a claim implicates the legality of the sentences, rather than solely challenging an action of the

board. In Coltherst, the defendant, who was convicted

in two separate criminal cases for crimes he committed

when he was under eighteen years of age, filed a motion

to correct an illegal sentence in the trial court. See State

v. Coltherst, supra, 341 Conn. 100, 105, 108–109. The

defendant in Coltherst was resentenced in one case to a

total effective sentence of eighty years of imprisonment.

Id., 106. The trial court ordered that sentence to run

consecutively to the sentence in the other case, a total

effective sentence of eighty-five years of imprisonment.

Id., 106–107. Following oral argument before this court,

we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs

addressing, inter alia, whether ‘‘the defendant [is] eligible for parole when he received two distinct total effective sentences of [eighty-five] years and [eighty] years,

respectively, to run consecutively, and, if so, when . . .

he [is] eligible for parole [in connection with] each case

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 101.

The difference between the present case and Coltherst

is significant for purposes of jurisdiction over a motion

to correct an illegal sentence. In Coltherst, we determined that the record was unclear regarding whether

the board would ultimately calculate the defendant’s

parole eligibility on the basis of each of the definite

sentences independently. See id., 110–12. If the board

did so, we explained, ‘‘the defendant’s only opportunity

for parole would be 30 years after he began serving the

80 year sentence in [one case], 115 years after he began

serving the [85 year] sentence [in the other case]. He

would die long before becoming eligible for parole,

rendering the intended remedy of parole eligibility

meaningless—his sentence would effectively be one

without the opportunity for parole. That interpretation

would flout every recent juvenile sentencing decision

of both this court and the United States Supreme Court

and, therefore, would also be inconsistent with the

intent of the legislature in § 54-125a (f) (1).’’ (Emphasis

added.) Id., 111. Accordingly, if the applicable statutes,

§§ 53a-38 (b) (2) and 54-125a (f) (1), required the board

to calculate the defendant’s parole eligibility date on

the basis of each definite sentence independently, he

would have been denied the opportunity for parole.

That conclusion would call into question the legality of

the defendant’s consecutive sentences as pronounced

by the trial court. Consistent with State v. Evans, supra,

329 Conn. 784, therefore, because the issue plausibly

could be understood to challenge the sentence itself,

the court had subject matter jurisdiction over that question in the motion to correct an illegal sentence.

By contrast, in the present case, as the trial court

observed, the defendant will be eligible for parole under

either interpretation of the sentences that he received,
just not as soon as he would prefer. The defendant

has never claimed that his sentences in the two cases

constitutes the functional equivalent of a sentence of

life without the possibility of parole. If the board, as

the defendant suggested before the trial court, has interpreted §§ 53a-38 (b) (1) and 54-125a (f) (1) (A) to yield

a parole eligibility date of December 2, 2023, the defendant will have served approximately sixteen years of

imprisonment when he becomes eligible for parole. The

mere fact that the board’s interpretation of the applicable statutes has yielded a later parole eligibility date

than another interpretation could have yielded does

not, by itself, implicate the legality of the defendant’s

sentences for purposes of the court’s jurisdiction over

the motions to correct an illegal sentence.

The form of the judgment is improper insofar as the

trial court denied the defendant’s claim that his new

parole eligibility date violated the terms of his plea

agreement, in violation of his right to due process, and

insofar as that court dismissed the defendant’s claim

that he was entitled to resentencing on the basis of

Miller, its progeny, and § 54-91g, that portion of the

judgment relating to the trial court’s disposition of those

claims is vacated, and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the defendant’s due

process claim regarding his new parole eligibility date

and denying the defendant’s claim that he was entitled

to resentencing; the judgment is affirmed in all other

respects.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the

Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to

General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

2 General Statutes § 54-91g provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) If the case of a

child, as defined in section 46b-120, is transferred to the regular criminal

docket of the Superior Court pursuant to section 46b-127 and the child is

convicted of a class A or B felony pursuant to such transfer, at the time of

sentencing, the court shall:

‘‘(1) Consider, in addition to any other information relevant to sentencing,

the defendant’s age at the time of the offense, the hallmark features of

adolescence, and any scientific and psychological evidence showing the

differences between a child’s brain development and an adult’s brain development; and

‘‘(2) Consider, if the court proposes to sentence the child to a lengthy

sentence under which it is likely that the child will die while incarcerated,

how the scientific and psychological evidence described in subdivision (1)

of this subsection counsels against such a sentence.

* * *

‘‘(c) Whenever a child is sentenced pursuant to subsection (a) of this

section, the court shall indicate the maximum period of incarceration that

may apply to the child and whether the child may be eligible to apply for

release on parole pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (f) of section

54-125a. . . .’’

3 General Statutes § 54-125a (f) (1) provides: ‘‘Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) to (e), inclusive, of this section, a person convicted

of one or more crimes committed while such person was under eighteen

years of age, who is incarcerated on or after October 1, 2015, and who

received a definite sentence or total effective sentence of more than ten

years for such crime or crimes prior to, on or after October 1, 2015, may

be allowed to go at large on parole in the discretion of the panel of the

Board of Pardons and Paroles for the institution in which such person is

confined, provided (A) if such person is serving a sentence of fifty years
or less, such person shall be eligible for parole after serving sixty per cent

of the sentence or twelve years, whichever is greater, or (B) if such person

is serving a sentence of more than fifty years, such person shall be eligible

for parole after serving thirty years. Nothing in this subsection shall limit

a person’s eligibility for parole release under the provisions of subsections

(a) to (e), inclusive, of this section if such person would be eligible for

parole release at an earlier date under any of such provisions.’’

4 Specifically, we conclude that the trial court should have denied, rather

than dismissed, the defendant’s claims that he is entitled to resentencing

pursuant to Miller and its progeny, and pursuant to § 54-91g, and that the

court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the defendant’s claim that

his parole eligibility date as calculated by the board violated the terms of

his plea agreement. Therefore, the form of the trial court’s judgment is

improper with respect to those claims. Accordingly, as we will indicate in

the rescript of this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the trial court with

respect to those claims and remand the case to the trial court with direction

to deny the defendant’s claims relying on Miller and its progeny, and § 54-

91g, and to dismiss the defendant’s claim that his parole eligibility date

violated his plea agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all

other respects.

5 The judgment of conviction in the July 8 prosecution reflects the jury’s

verdict finding the defendant not guilty on the first charged count in the

information, namely, sexual assault in the first degree. With respect to the

charges on which he was convicted in the July 8 prosecution, the sentencing

court sentenced the defendant as follows: on count two, sexual assault in

the first degree, eight years of incarceration, followed by twelve years of

special parole; on count three, kidnapping in the first degree, ten years

of incarceration, followed by fifteen years of special parole, both to run

consecutively to count two; and, on count four, kidnapping in the first

degree, ten years of incarceration, followed by fifteen years of special parole,

both to run concurrent to counts two and three.

In 2015, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence with

respect to the July 8 prosecution, claiming that the periods of fifteen years

of special parole for each of the kidnapping counts exceeded the statutory

maximum. The trial court granted the motion and reduced his period of

special parole to ten years for each of the kidnapping counts. Because the

special parole periods for the kidnapping counts ran concurrently with each

other, but consecutive to the special parole period for the sexual assault

count, the defendant was ultimately sentenced to a total of twenty-two years

of special parole.

6 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d

162 (1970).

7 The trial court did, however, grant the defendant presentence confinement credit for the fourteen year sentence in the April 4 prosecution for

the time period between the entry of his plea on December 8, 2011, and his

sentencing on January 6, 2012.

8 The record does not reveal the number of days of presentence confinement credited toward the defendant’s sentence in the July 8 prosecution.

During the January 17, 2019 hearing on the motions to correct that are at

issue in this appeal, the defendant represented to the trial court that his

sentence in the July 8 prosecution commenced on July 23, 2007.

9 The state did not challenge the defendant’s representation regarding the

board’s alleged calculation of his parole eligibility date. It is also undisputed

that, as of the date of oral argument before this court, the defendant had

not yet received a parole hearing.

The particular parole eligibility date provided to the defendant by the

board has no bearing on the resolution of the jurisdictional questions presented in this appeal. As we explain in this opinion, the dispositive factor,

for purposes of the trial court’s jurisdiction over the defendant’s motions

to correct, is that the board, rather than the sentencing court, calculates

the parole eligibility dates of inmates.

10 On appeal, although the defendant argues that the doctrine of frustration

of purpose lends support to his arguments in support of his claim that his

parole eligibility date violated the terms of his plea agreement, he does not

challenge the court’s dismissal of his claim that his sentence frustrated the

purpose of the plea bargain on the basis that Connecticut courts have not

extended that doctrine to the criminal context. Accordingly, we need not

consider that issue further.

11 Practice Book § 43-22 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may at any time

correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an

illegal manner.’’

12 In support of his claim that his parole eligibility date violated his plea

agreement, the defendant argues that the order of the sentencing court in

the April 4 prosecution that the two sentences were to run concurrently

reflects an intent by the parties that the sentence in the July 8 prosecution

would be the controlling sentence for parole eligibility purposes. He further

claims that the trial court violated his right to due process by concluding

that it lacked jurisdiction to determine whether his sentence in the April 4

prosecution, by negatively impacting his parole eligibility, prevented the

state from keeping its plea promises. He also argues that any ambiguity to

this effect in the plea agreement should be construed to his benefit. In

response, the state observes that the sentencing court in the April 4 prosecution made it clear that, although the two sentences would run concurrently,

the defendant would receive no presentence confinement credit toward the

fourteen year sentence in the April 4 prosecution for the approximately four

years he already had served in connection with his sentence in the July 8

prosecution. The state argues that, because the sentence for the April 4

prosecution did not begin until four years after the sentence in the July 8

prosecution commenced, the sentence in the April 4 prosecution was the

governing sentence for purposes of parole eligibility. The state further points

out that the defendant was not sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement

with the state but, rather, pursuant to a court offer over the state’s objection.

The state, therefore, was not a party to any plea agreement.

13 In support of his claim that his parole eligibility date violates his right

to equal protection, the defendant contends that, unlike other juvenile

offenders who are similarly situated, he was not afforded parole eligibility

consistent with state law or an opportunity for parole consistent with the

parties’ plea agreement. As examples of juvenile offenders similarly situated

to him, the defendant points to juvenile offenders sentenced to concurrent

sentences in a single case, as opposed to multiple cases. Those juvenile

offenders, he argues, would be entitled to parole eligibility upon serving 60

percent of their total effective sentence or after twelve years, whichever is

greater. The state responds that the trial court properly rejected the defendant’s equal protection claim because it targets an action of the board

in calculating the defendant’s parole eligibility date, not an action of the

sentencing court.

14 As was discussed at oral argument before this court, we note that, under

the facts of the present case, § 53a-38 (b) establishes the length of the

defendant’s sentence for purposes of calculating his parole eligibility date,

providing in relevant part: ‘‘A definite sentence of imprisonment commences

when the prisoner is received in the custody to which he was sentenced.

Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences

shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the

terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the

longest term to run . . . .’’ The resulting sentence is then multiplied by 60

percent pursuant to § 54-125a (f) (1) (A). See footnote 3 of this opinion. If

the resulting value is greater than twelve years, that value is used to calculate

the parole eligibility date. Otherwise, the defendant will be eligible for parole

twelve years after his sentence commenced. If, however, the defendant

would be eligible for parole at an earlier date under subsections (a) through

(e) of § 54-125a, he is entitled to that earlier parole eligibility date. See

General Statutes § 54-125a (f) (1); see also footnote 3 of this opinion.

15 We take no position on whether the board properly interpreted and

applied the relevant statutory provisions to the defendant. See footnote 14

of this opinion. The trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over

the defendant’s motions to correct similarly deprives us of subject matter

jurisdiction over these claims on appeal. See, e.g., Lewis v. Rosen, 149 Conn.

734, 735, 181 A.2d 592 (1962).