### F OR P UBLICATION



## UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

M A R I A 

### G. F L O R

E S 

### , Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v.

C O U N T Y O F 

### L O S 

### A

N G E L E S 

### and L E E 

### B A C A 

### , D efendants-Appellees

. No. 12-56623

D.C. No. 2:12-cv-03021-R-SH

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Manuel L . Real, District J u dg e, Presiding

Submitted March 7, 2014 * 

### Pasadena, California

F iled J uly 14, 2014

B efore: J ay

S. B y bee, Carlos T. B ea, and Sandra S. I kuta, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e B ea

* T h e p an el u n a n i m o u sl y co n clu d es th is case is su itab le f o r d ecisio n

w ith o u t o ral arg u

m en t. S ee Fed . R. A pp . P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).

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### . C O U

N T Y O F 

### L O S 

### A

N G E L E S 

### 2

SUMMARY * *



### Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s d i s missal of an action broug h t pursuant to 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983 a ga i nst L os Ang eles County and Sheriff L ee Ba ca by a plaintiff w ho alleg ed that she was sex ually assaulted by an unidentified deputy sheriff at a vehicle inspection cite.

The p anel h eld that plaintiff’s alleg ations did n o t establish that the County or B a c a w e r e deliberately indifferent to the risk o f sex ual assa u l t by deputies on members o f the public,

nor that the assault on plaintiff was a known or obvious
consequence of the alleg ed lack of tr a i n i n g of deputies. F urther, the p anel held that in view of the p e n a l c ode o f California, which already prohibited such assault, a nd which law the deputies were sworn to uphold, and in the a bsence o f
any p attern o f sex ual assaults by d eputies, plaintiff has also failed to alleg e facts sufficient to state a claim, plausible on its face, that the alleg ed failure to train officers not to commit

sex ual assault constituted deliberate indifference.

COUNSEL

L uis A. Carillo, L aw O ffices of L u is A. Carillo, South Pasadena, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.

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Thomas C. H urrell and Melinda Cantrall, H u r re ll Cantrall L L P, L os Ang eles, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OP INION

B EA, Circuit J udg e:

Plaintiff Maria F lores alleg e s that after she r e ceived a traffic ticket, she drove to a L os An ge l es County vehicle inspection site to clear the ticket. There, she alleg es, she was

sex ua l l y assaulted by a deputy sheriff, who is to date

u n identified. She now sues the County and its sheri f f L e e Baca, claiming the assault was a prox imate r esult o f t h ei r failure properly to train deputy sheriffs “t o ensure that Sheriff’s [ d] eputies do not sex ual l y a ssault women that [ d] eputies c ome in contact with.” This failure to trai n i s alleg ed to be a violation of p l aintiff’s constitutional rig hts,

a c tionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed F lores’s claims for failure to state a claim for relief, and she appeals.

F lores’s alleg ations d o not establish that the County o r B aca were deliberately indifferent to the risk of sex u al assault by deputies on members of the public, nor that the assault on F lores was a known or obvious consequence of the alleg ed lack of traini n g of deputies. F u rther, in view of the penal

c o d e of California, 1 

### which already prohibited such assaul t ,

1 Calif o r n ia Pen al Co d e § 2 4 3.4 (e)(1 ) p ro v id es th at an y “ p erso n w h o to u ch es an in t im ate p art o f an o th er p erso n , if th e to u ch in g i s ag ain st th e

w ill o f th e p erso n t o u ch ed

, an d i s f o r th e sp ecif

ic p u rp o s e o f sex u al

aro u sal, sex u al g ra t i fi c a t i o n , o r sex u al ab u se, i s g u ilty o f m isd em ean or

sex u al b attery .”

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and which law the deputies w ere sworn to uphold, and in the absence of any pattern of sex ual assaults by deputies, F lores has als o f

a i l e d to alleg e facts sufficient to state a c laim, plausible on its face, that the alleg ed f ailure to train officers
not to commit sex ual assault constituted deliberate indifference. F or these reasons, we affirm.

F actual and P rocedural History 2



### O n J anuary 20, 2011, plaintiff Maria F lores went to t h e Vehicle I nspection Area at Metropolitan Court House in L os Ang eles in c onnect ion with a traffic ticket. An unknown deputy

, w hom F lores names Deputy Doe 1, was tasked with “sig ning off” on h e r ticket. According to F lores’s complaint, Deputy Doe 1 touched and fondled F lores’s b ody without her
consent. 3 

### Id

.

F lores timely broug h t suit in federal di s t r i ct court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ag ainst the County of L o s Ang eles (the “County ”) a

nd Sheriff L ee B aca. 4 

### F lores also broug ht state

2 T h e f acts w e relate are d raw

n f ro m t h e alleg ati o ns o f F l o r e s’ s

co m plain t. B ecau se Flo res’ s co m p lain t w as d ism issed u n d er F ed eral Ru le

o f Civ il Pro ced u re 1 2 (b )(6 ), w e tak e h er f actu al alleg atio n s as tru e f o r th e p u rp o s es o f o u r rev ie w

. D a h l i a v. Ro drig u ez , 7 3 5 F.3 d 1 0 6 0
, 10 6 3 n .1 (9 th Cir. 2 01 3 ).

3 T h e r e are n o alleg atio n s th at t h e n atu re o f th e law en f

o rcem en t w ork
p erf o rm e d at v eh icle i n sp ectio n areas req u ires dep u ties to to u ch peo p le

w ith w h o m th ey in teract.

4 Flo res alleg ed v i o latio n s o f th e Fo u rth

, Fif th

, Eig h th

, an d F o u

rteen th A m en d m en ts, bu t b rief

s o n ap peal o n l y h er Fo u rth A m en d m en t claim

. Ho w ev er, Flo res’ s alleg ed Fo u rth A m en d m en t v io latio n m u st b e p rem i s ed

o n th e F o u rteen t

h A m en d m en t’ s in co rp o ratio n o f th e Fo u rth A m en d m en t ag ain st th e s tates. T h eref o re, f or t h e p u rp o se o f o u r a n a ly sis, an d b ased

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law n egl i g ence claims ag ainst the County
, B aca, and the fictitiously n amed Deputies Doe 1–10, assault and battery a nd intentional infliction of emoti o n al d istress claims ag ainst Deputy Doe 1, and a res p o n d ea t superior claim ag ainst the County

. Deputy Doe 1 has not been served with process a nd is not a party to the action. The district c ourt dismissed with prejudice F lores’s state-law based neg lig ence claims ag ainst the County and B aca, and h er r espondeat superior claim
ag ainst the County

. F lores does not appeal the dismissal o f these state-law based claims.

I n support of her § 1 983 c laims, 5 

### F lores’s F irst Amended Complaint (“F AC”) alleg ed that defendants “ failed t o implement proper training to p rot ect women to ensure that Sheriff’s [d] eputies do n o t sex ually assault women that

. . . [ they ] come into contact with at the Vehicle I nspection Area.” The F AC also alleg e d that the def en d ants were on notice, following a different deputy sheriff’s 2 0 0 6 c onviction for three sex ual assaults which took place in 2004 and 2005, 6 

### “that since 2004 the training o f Sheriff’s [ d] eputies h ad deteriorated, was defective, and need e d improvement[ ,] a nd th at failure to implement proper training for Sheriff’s [ d] eputies was r eckless and d ang ero u s

. . . especially for women who would g o to the Vehicle I nspection Area.” The F AC alleg ed that the “failure to properly tr a i n S heriff’s

o n h er alleg atio n s, w e w il l assu m e th at Flo res attem

p ted to alleg e a d ep riv atio n

o f h er rig h ts u

n der th e Fo u rth an d Fo u rteen th A m en d m en ts.

5 Flo res bro u g h t t

h e § 1 9 8 3 claim at i ssu e ag ain s t th e Co u n ty u n der Mo n ell v

. D e

p ’ t o f S o c. S erv. o f th e City o

f New Yo r

k

, 4 36 U.S. 6 5 8 (1 9 7 8).

6 Flo res d o es n o t alleg e th at th e 2 0 0 4 an d 2 0 05 assau lts to o k p lace at th e Veh icle In sp ectio n

A rea w h ere sh e w as alleg ed l y assau lted

.

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[ d] eputies reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by the [ County ] and [ B aca]
, and said failure to train can be properly characteriz ed as a

n actionable [County ] ‘policy .’” 7 

### T o support the arg ument that the failure to include sex ual assault training a mounts to a deliberate or conscious choice, F lo res proposed additions to the Sheriff’s Department Manua l that would instruct deputies that they “shall not sex ually harass o r

sex ual l y attack women with whom they come into contact.”

Defendants moved the court to dismiss the F AC f o r failure to state a claim f o r r e l i e f under F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On that motion, the court found tha t Fl o re s h ad failed to a lleg e facts to show t h e e x i s tence of a policy

, practice, or custom sufficient to state a claim a g ainst t h e County u nder Monell 8 

### and that F lores “fails to alleg e facts

7 T h e FA C also i n co rp o rated alleg atio n s f ro m th e co m

p lain t th at th e Co u n ty an d B aca “ in ten t io n ally an d d elib erately

. . . ig n ore th e b ack g ro u n d an d ev alu atio n o f p ro sp ectiv e d ep u ties[;] ig n o r[e] th e pro per

su p erv isio n o f [d ]ep u t ies; i g n o r[e] recu rren t co m p lain ts ab o u t sex u ally

assau ltiv e co n d u ct . . . ; f

ail[] to rem ed i ate sex u ally assau ltiv e co n d u ct[;]

an d f ail[] to d i scip l in e, rep rim an d

, re- train o r d isch arg e [d ]ep u t i es or

em p l o y ees o f

th e L o s A n g eles Co u

n t y Sh erif f ’ s Dep artm en t f

o r sex u ally

assau ltiv e c o n d u ct co m

m itted w h ile em p lo y ed ” b y th e C o u n ty

. T h ese claim s w ere n o t b rief

ed o n ap p eal, an d are co n sid ered ab an d o n ed

. Co llin s v. City o f S an Dieg o , 8 4 1 F.2 d 3 3 7 , 3 3 9 (9 t h Cir. 1 9 8 8 ).

8 Un d er City o

f Ca nto n v. H

a rris
, “ [o ]n ly w

h ere a m u n icip ality ’ s f

ailu re to train its em

p lo y ees i n a rel e v a n t resp ect ev id en ces a d elib erate in d if f eren ce to th e rig h ts o f i ts in h ab i tan ts can su ch a sh o rtco m in g b e p ro p erly th o u g h t o f as a city p o licy o r cu sto m u n d er § 19 8 3 .” 4 8 9 U .S. 3 7 8
, 3 8 9 (1 9 8 9 ). W h ere d elib erate in d if f eren ce is p ro v e d

, “f

ailu re to p ro v id e p ro p er train in g m ay f airly b e said to rep resen t a p o licy f o r w h ich th e city is resp o n sib le, an d f o r w h ich th e c i t y m ay b e h eld liab le if i t actu ally cau ses in

j u ry .” Id

. at 3 9 0

. A p lain tif f alleg in g Mo n ell l i ab ility f or f ailu re to train m

u st “e v i n ce[] th e d elib erate i n d if f eren ce th at [ City o

f Ca n t o n ] req u ires f

o r a f ree- s tan din g f

ailu re- to

- train claim to su cceed ,” an d

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showing that there was a sufficient c ausal connection betw e en the wrong f

ul conduct and the constitutional violation” to support her § 198 3 c l a im ag ainst B aca in h is individual capacity

. T he court d ismissed the Monell and § 1983 c laims
ag ainst the County and B aca without leave to amend. 9 

### F lores timely appealed. On appeal, F lores arg ues that the d i s t rict
court erred because F lores alleg ed facts sufficient to state a claim f o r relief, plausible on its face, as to the County ’s a nd B aca’s failure to train sheriff’s deputies.

Standard of

Review

This court reviews de novo a district court’s dismissal o f

an action fo r f

a i l ure to state a c laim under F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). W

ood v. City o

f San Die g o , 678 F .3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012).

h av in g d on e so su f

f ices to m ak e ou t a f

ree- stan d in g claim f

o r f ailu re to train ag ain st a m

u n i cip ality

. Price v. S e r

y , 5 1 3 F.3 d 9 6 2
, 9 7 3 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ).

9 T h e o r d e r d i s m i s sin g th e co u n ts ag ain s t B aca an d th e Co u n ty o f L o s An g e l e s m ad e n o m en tio n of th e state claim s ag ain st Dep u ty Do es 1 th ro u g h 1 0

. T h e d istrict co u rt h as sin ce en tered a m in u te o rd er term i n atin g th e case an d statin g th at t h e case sh o u ld h av e b een clo s ed A u g u s t 2 0
, 2 0 1 2

. W h en an “ actio n is d ism i ssed as to all o f th e def en d an ts

w h o h av e b een serv ed an d on ly u n serv ed def en d an ts rem ai n , th e d istrict

co u rt’ s o rd er m ay b e co n s id ered f in al u n d er sectio n 1 2 9 1 f

o r th e p u rp ose

o f p erf ectin g th e ap p eal. In su ch c i r c u m s t a n ces th ere is n o reaso n to

assu m e t h at th ere w ill b e an y f

u rth er ad j u dicatio n o f th e actio n .” Pa tch i ck

v. Ken sin g to n Pu b

. C

o r p

. , 7 4 3 F.2 d 6 7 5
, 67 7 (9 th C ir. 1 9 84 ) (in tern al citatio n s o m i tted ).

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Analysis

Under 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983, “[ e ] very person who, under color of any s tatute

. . . custom, or usag e of any State

. . . subjects, or c auses to be subjected, a ny

. . . person within the jurisdiction of [ the Un i ted States] to the deprivation of any rig hts, privileg es or immunities secured by the C o n s titution and laws, shall be liable to the party i n j u r e d in an a ction at law.” Neither st a t e o f ficials n or municipalities a re vicariously liable for the deprivation of constitutional rig hts by employ ees. M

o n e l l

, 436 U.S. at 694. Rather, as to a municipality

, “the inadequacy o f police training may serve a s the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure t o train

a m o u nts to deliberate indifference to the rig hts of perso n s with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v

. Harris
, 489 U.S. at 388. 1 0 

### T his means that F lores must “must

10 In City o f Ca n to n , p lain tif

f Harris w as arrested an d d etain ed at a p olice statio n

. 4 89 U.S. at 3 8 1

. Du rin g h e r t r a n s p o rt to th e statio n an d at th e statio n , Harris rep eated ly slu m p ed o v er, an d sh e resp o n d ed in co h eren tly
to t h e q u estio n w

h eth er sh e n eed ed m e dical atten tio n

. Id

. A f ter h er release, Harris’ s f

am ily to o k h er to a h o s pital w h ere it w as d eterm in ed sh e

w as su f f erin g f ro m sev ere em otio n al ailm en t s an d sh e w as h o sp italized f or

a w eek

. Id

. Harris b ro u g h t su it u n der 4 2 U.S.C. § 1 9 8 3
, alleg in g th e city

v io lated h er d u e p ro cess rig h ts b y f ailin g to p ro v id e m ed ical atten tio n

. Id

. at 3 8 2

. A j u ry f

o u n d in f av or o f Harris, an d th e m u n icip al d ef

en d an t ap p ealed

. Id

. T h e Six th Circu it h eld th at a m u n icip ality co u l d b e liab le f o r f ailu re to train , b u t rev ersed b ecau s e th e j u ry in stru ctio n s m ig h t h av e led th e j u ry t o b e l i e v e it co u ld f in d f o r Harris on a resp on d eat su p erio r th eo ry rath er th an

a f ailu re to train th eo ry

. Id

. at 3 8 2

– 8 3

. T h e Su p rem e Co u rt rev ersed an d rem an d ed

, h o ld in g th at f ailu re to train p olice o f

f icers i s a b asis f

o r § 1 9 8 3 liab ility w

h ere t h at f ailu re am o u n ts to delib er a t e in d if f eren c e to th e rig h ts o f p erso n s w ith w h o m th e p o lice f

o rce co m es in to co n tact. Id

. at 3 8 8

. T h e C o u rt “ rej ect[ed ] [th e] co n ten tio n th at o n ly

u n co n stitu

tio n al p o licies are actio n ab le u n der th e statu te.” Id

. at 3 8 7

. Delib erate i n d if

f eren ce is “ a s trin g en t stan d ard o f f au lt, req u irin g p ro of th at a m u n icip al acto r d isreg ard ed a k n ow n or o b v io u s co n seq u en ce o f h is

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demonstrate a ‘co n s ci ous’ or ‘deliberate’ choice on the part of a municipality in order to prevail on a failure to train

c l aim.” P rice
, 513 F .3d at 973. As to an official in h i s individual capacity

, the same standard applies—F lores must

s h ow that B aca was deliberately indifferent to the ne e d t o train subordinates, and the lack of training actually c aused the constitutional harm or d ep r i v a t i on of rig h ts. Connick v

. Thompson , 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1358 (2011).

Under this standard, F lores must alleg e facts to show that the County and B aca “disreg arded th e k n o wn or obvious
consequence that a p a rticular omission in their training
prog r am w ould cause [ municipal] e mploy e es to viol a te citiz ens’ constitutional rig hts.” Id

. a t 1360 (internal quotation marks omitted).

To this end, F lores arg ues that following the earlier arrest and conviction of a different L os A ng eles deputy she riff for

sex ual assaults, who F lores d o es not al l e g e w orked at the

same installation, the County and B aca w ere on notice that the training of deputies was “inadeq u a t e , ” and that “proper training and procedures were n ot in p l a c e

. . . to protect

women [ and] ensure that Sheriff’s [ d] eputies do not sex ually assault women that Sheriff’s deputies come in contact w ith on

a daily basis.” 1 1 

### However, F lores does not a lleg e a pattern o f

actio n .” Co n n ick v. Th o mp so n , 1 31 S

. C t

. 1 3 5 0
, 1 3 6 0 (2 0 1 1 ) (in tern al citatio n s o m i tted ).

11 F l o res req u ests th is co u rt to tak e j u d i c ial n otice of tw o n ew s sto ries
reg ard in g th e 2 0 1 3 arrest f o r rap e o f y et an o th er d if f eren t L os A

n g eles d ep u ty sh erif

f

. Ev en assu

m in g th at t

h e co n ten t o f th ese s to ries w ere alleg ed in th e co m

p lain t, f u rth er alleg atio n s o f

, o r co n v ictio n s f o r, sex u al

assau lt b y s h erif

f ’ s d ep u ties w

h ich o ccu rred af

ter Flo res’ s claim ed in

j u ry

w o u ld n o t ch an g e o u r an aly sis. T h e 2 01 3 in cid en ts o ccu rred af t er Flo res’ s

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sex ual assaults perpetrated by L os Ang eles sheriff’s deputies before he r al l eg ed assault in 2011. 1 2 

### The sex u al assaults in 2004 resulted in convictions ag ainst the sole offender.

A “ pattern of similar c o nst i t utional violations b y untrained employ ees is ordinarily necessary to demon s t r a te deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to t r a in,” thoug h there e x ists a “narrow rang e of circumstances [ in which] a pattern of similar violations mig ht not be necessary to show d e liberate indifference.” I d

. at 1360, 1361 (int ernal citations and quotation marks omitt e d ). T he isolated incidents of criminal wrong doin g b y o ne deputy other than Deputy Doe 1 do not s u f f i c e t o put the County o r B aca on “notice that a course of training is d eficient i n a particular

r e s pect,” nor that the absence of such a course “will c a u s e violations of c onstitutional r ig hts.” Id

. Neither B aca nor the County was f

aced with a pattern o f s i m i l ar constitutional violations by untrained employ ees. Id . at 1360.

Nor does F lores’s failure to train c laim f a l l within the “narrow ra ng e o f circumstances [in which] a p attern o f similar v iolations mig ht not be necessary to show deliberate indifference.” Id

. at 1 361 (internal citations omitted). I n City of Canton
, the “Court posed the h y pothetica l e x a m p le of a city that ar m s its police force with firearms and deploy s the

arme d o fficers into the public to capture fleeing felons without training the officers in the constitutional limitation on

alleg ed assau lt in 2 0 1 1
, an d can n o t im p u te to th e d ef

en d an ts a k

n o w led g e

o f risk as o f 2 0 1 1 . W e d en y

th e req u est to tak e su ch j u dicial n o tice.

12 Flo res’ s co n clu so ry alleg atio n s b elo w as to d elib erate an d in ten tio n al f ailu re to ev alu ate ap p lican ts, an d f ailu re to p u n ish d ep u ty p erp etrato rs of

sex u al assau lts, h av e b een ab an d o n ed o n ap p eal. S

ee su p r a , n . 7

.

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the use of deadly force.” Id

. at 1361 ( i n t e rnal citations a nd quotation marks omitt e d )

. I n its hy pothetical, the Court “soug ht not to to foreclose the possibility

, however rare, that the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could be

so patently obvious that a city c ould be liable under § 1983 without proof o f a pre-ex isting pattern of violations.” I d

. A s the Court observed, this hy pothetical recog n iz es that “[ t] here is no reason to assume that p o l i c e academy applicants a re familiar with the constitutional c onstraints of t he use o f deadly force.” Id

. There is, however, every r eason to a ssume that police academy applicants a re familiar with the criminal prohibition on sex ual assault, as every one is presumed to know the law. United States v

. Budd

, 144 U.S. 154, 163 (1892). There is no basis from which to con c l u d e t h a t the unconstitutional consequenc e s o f failing to train police officers not to commit sex ual assault a re so patently obvious that the County

or B aca were deliberately indifferent.

F inally , F lores’s claim for failure to train fails because it is not plausible o n its face. Ashcroft v. I qbal

, 556 U.S. 662, 678 ( 2009). F lores’s sole factual a l l e ga t ion reg arding the alleg ed failure to train consists in the a bsence of lang uag e in the Sheriff’s Department Manual that would instruct deputies
not to sex ually harass or sex u ally attack w o m e n with whom they come into co n t act. “W here the proper response

. . . is obvious to all w ithout training or supervision, then the failure
to train or supervise is g enerally not ‘ so likely ’ t o p r o duce a wrong decision as to support an i n f erence of deliberate indifference by city policy makers to the n eed to t rain o r supervise.” W

al k e r v

. City of New Y

ork

, 9 74 F

. 2d 293, 299–300 (2d Cir. 1993); see also S ewell v

. Town o

f Lake Hamilton

, 117 F .3d 488, 4 90 (11th Cir. 1997). Given that the penal c ode prohib i t s s e x ual battery

, it is not plausible that inclusion in the Manual of the lang uag e that F lores proposes

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would have p revented the assault on F lores. 1 3 

### I f the threat o f prison time does not sufficiently deter sex ual assault, it is not plausible to assume that a specific instruction not to commit

s e x ual a ssault will provide such deterrence, and there f o r e failure to include such ins t ruction does not constitute deliberate indifference absent a long standing pattern of such criminal behavior. W e ag ree with our sister c ircuits that “[ i] n lig ht of the reg ular law enforcement dutie s of a police officer” there is not “a pate n tly obvious need for the city [ ] specifically [ to] train officers not to rape y ou n g women.” Andrews v. Fowler

, 98 F .3d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Barney v. Pul

sipher

, 143 F

. 3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Specific or ex tensive training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that sex ually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior”).

According ly

, w e hold that F lores has f ailed to a lleg e sufficiently that the failure to tra i n s heriff’s deputies n ot to commit sex ual assault constitutes deliberate indifference to

13 A s th e T en th C i r c ui t h a s ex p lain ed reg ard i n g th e train in g of

co rrectio n s o f

f icers, it d o es n o t a p p e a r th at “ a p lain ly o b v io u s

co n seq u en ce o f a d ef

icien t t rain in g p ro g ram w o u ld be th e sex u al assau l t

o f in m ates.” Ba rn ey v. Pu l sip h er , 1 43 F.3 d 1 2 9 9
, 1 3 0 8 (1 0 th Cir. 1 9 9 8 ). In Ba rn ey , p lain tif

f s w ere t w o w o m en w

h o , o n sep arate o ccasio n s, w ere

serv in g 4 8

- h o u r sen ten ces f o r m in o r of

f en ses w h e n t h ey w ere sex u ally

assau lted b y a j ailer. Id

. at 1 3 0 3

. P lain tif f s b ro u g h t su it ag ain s t th e j ailer, th e co u n ty , th e sh erif

f

, an d th e co u n ty co m

m i ssio n er u n d er 4 2 U.S.C. § 1 9 8 3
, alleg i n g v io latio n s o f th e i r First, Eig h t h

, Nin th

, an d F o u

rteen th A m en d m en t rig h ts. Id

. T h e d istrict co u rt g ran ted th e co u n t y ’ s, s h erif f ’ s,

an d co u n ty co m

m issio n ers’ m otio n f

o r su m m ary j u d g m en t, an d th e Eig h th Circu it af f irm e d

, h o ld in g th at u n der City o f Ca n to n , p lain tif

f s h ad n o t alleg ed th e ex isten ce o f a p attern o f to rtio u s co n d u c t su f f icien t to sh o w d elib erate in d i f

f eren ce n or th at sex u al assau lt w as a h ig h ly p red ictab le or p lain ly o b v i o u s co n seq u en ce o f th e m u n icip ality ’ s actio n o r in actio n

. Id

. at 1 3 0 7

– 08

.

### F L O R E S V



### . C O U

N T Y O F 

### L O S 

### A

N G E L E S 

### 13

the risk of such assault by a deputy

. G iven the absence of any pattern of sex ual assaults and the c l e a r criminality of the conduct, we also hold that instructions in an e m p l o y ment manual not to sex ually h a rass or sex ually assault w omen cannot plausibly be considered an effective means to prevent

sex ual assault, when the employ e e s are peace o fficers sworn to uphold the law which prohibits such assaults.

Conclusion

F lores has not alleg ed facts sufficient to state a claim
ag ai n s t t h e County or B aca, and the district court properly dismissed th e a c t ion for failure to state a claim. The judg ment of the district court is AF F IRMED

.