2021 IL App (4th) 180794-U 

NO. 4-18-0794 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

WILLIAM D. JENKINS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Adams County 

No. 13CF702 

Honorable

Diane M. Lagoski, 

Judge Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s postconviction counsel satisfied the requirements set forth in Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) and did not fail to provide defendant 

with a reasonable level of assistance during postconviction proceedings. 

¶ 2 Defendant, William D. Jenkins, appeals the circuit court’s denial of his 

postconviction petition following a third-stage evidentiary hearing. On appeal, he argues his 

postconviction counsel failed to provide reasonable assistance in violation of Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) by failing to properly shape or support his pro se 

postconviction arguments that (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not using police 

reports to impeach the credibility of the State’s occurrence witnesses and (2) appellate counsel 

provided ineffective assistance on direct appeal by failing to raise meritorious issues that were 

apparent from the record. We affirm. 

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

May 24, 2021

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 In December 2013, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment against 

defendant, charging him with attempt (armed robbery) (count I) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 18-2(a)(4)

(West 2012)), aggravated battery with a firearm (count II) (id. § 12-3.05(e)(1)), and aggravated 

discharge of a firearm (count III) (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2)). The charges were based on allegations that 

defendant shot the victim, James Gallaher, in the leg while attempting to take property from him. 

¶ 5 In April 2014, defendant’s jury trial was conducted. The State’s evidence showed 

that on the evening of October 29, 2013, Gallaher was shot in the leg outside his residence, a 

second-floor apartment located on 11th Street in Quincy, Illinois. Gallaher testified he was visited 

that day by friends named “Maya” and Ella Epperson. Later, after those individuals left, Gallaher 

was at home with his two roommates, Josh McVey and Jordan McColez, and some friends, 

including Kristin Tucker, Shelby Perkins, and Kourtni Shankland. Gallaher admitted the group 

was “hanging out” and smoking marijuana. He also admitted that he sold marijuana to pay his bills 

while residing in the 11th Street apartment. Inside the apartment, the police found drug 

paraphernalia, a digital scale, and marijuana. 

¶ 6 At some point during the evening, Gallaher left his apartment and walked down a 

stairwell to talk on the phone with his girlfriend, Casey Ringerberg. At approximately 11 p.m., 

while he was speaking on the phone, Gallaher was approached by a “younger” African American

man, whom he did not know and who asked for a “light.” Gallaher testified he ended his phone 

call with Ringerberg and conversed with the man. Ultimately, the man “pulled out a gun,” grabbed 

a bat that Gallaher had been holding, and directed Gallaher to go upstairs. When they reached the 

door to Gallaher’s apartment, the man told Gallaher, “ ‘You’re going to put your stuff and your 

[PlayStation 3] in my bag.’ ” Gallaher stated he refused to enter his apartment and the man shot 
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him in the leg. After being shot, Gallaher entered his apartment and was assisted by the individuals 

inside until he could be taken to the hospital for treatment. 

¶ 7 On cross-examination, Gallaher testified he had a baseball bat with him at the time 

of the shooting “[b]ecause there was an incident that night in [his apartment] where friends had 

brought people over that were trying to fight us.” He stated he wanted to be “prepared” because 

that “same friend” called him to tell him “they were going to come back.” He further acknowledged 

that at the time of the shooting, he sold cannabis because he did not have a job. 

¶ 8 Gallaher’s roommates, friends, and girlfriend also testified for the State. They 

corroborated Gallaher’s testimony regarding what occurred prior to and immediately after the 

shooting, including that individuals in the group had smoked marijuana. Aside from Gallaher, none 

of the witnesses observed the shooter. 

¶ 9 The State’s evidence showed defendant became a suspect in the case after the police 

spoke with three individuals—Ella Epperson, Maya Blankenship (also identified in the record as 

Amaya), and Madison Burton. Thereafter, a photo array was prepared that included defendant’s 

photograph, and it was shown to Gallaher. Gallaher identified defendant as the person who shot 

him from the photo array. He also identified defendant as the shooter at trial. 

¶ 10 The record reflects 17-year-old Epperson, 13-year-old Blankenship, and 

14-year-old Burton all testified for the State that on the evening of October 29, 2013, they were 

riding in a car driven by Epperson. During that evening, they picked up an individual named “Illy,” 

whom each witness identified as defendant. According to Blankenship, the group picked defendant 

up after dropping off Brandon Cain and Kaden Schmidt, who had been riding with them. When 

defendant got in the car, Epperson asked “if he was ready to rob somebody.” Defendant responded 

that he had to pick something up first and Epperson drove to “a different house.” Defendant went
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inside and returned with a bag or a jacket. At approximately 10:45 p.m., Epperson took 

Blankenship home. Blankenship did not know where the group went after she was dropped off. 

¶ 11 On cross-examination, Blankenship testified Epperson picked defendant up at 

about 10:30 p.m. When defendant stated he had to pick something up, Epperson drove him to a 

house “[a] couple of blocks down from where [they] picked him up.” Upon questioning by defense 

counsel, Blankenship acknowledged providing a statement to the police and telling them Epperson 

picked up “Illy” before dropping Cain and Schmidt off instead of after. 

¶ 12 Burton testified she knew Epperson from school and met Blankenship through 

Gallaher. She stated that after defendant joined the group in the car, Epperson asked him “[i]f he 

wanted to rob [Gallaher].” Defendant responded that he did and “went back inside *** the house.” 

He returned with a “jacket or a bookbag or something” and stated he had “a banger,” which Burton 

took to mean “a gun or something.” Epperson then dropped Blankenship off at home. At 10:45 or 

11 p.m., she took Burton home. Burton did not know what Epperson and defendant did after she 

went home. 

¶ 13 On cross-examination, Burton testified she did not know whether Cain and Schmidt 

were also in the car when defendant first joined the group. Further, she acknowledged that she did 

not see the item defendant described as “a banger.” 

¶ 14 Epperson testified she was familiar with Gallaher’s residence. After dropping 

Blankenship and Burton off at home, she dropped defendant off at approximately 10:30 or 11 p.m.

in an area located approximately one block from Gallaher’s residence. Epperson testified she 

turned her vehicle around to park on the right side of the street. Defendant was out of her sight for 

“[a] minute” before returning to the car. Epperson stated she was not paying attention to what 

defendant was doing when he left the car but she thought they “were going to get weed” from 
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“James” who was the only person she knew in that area. After defendant got back in the car, 

Epperson dropped him off by a Burger King and went home. 

¶ 15 On cross-examination, Epperson testified that after picking defendant up, she took 

Blankenship and Burton home and did not “go anywhere else” before taking defendant to the area 

near Gallaher’s apartment. She described the conversation in the car as “[n]othing abnormal.” 

¶ 16 After the State rested its case, defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the 

circuit court denied. Defendant then rested his case without presenting any evidence. Ultimately, 

the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of 

a firearm but not guilty of attempt (armed robbery). In June 2014, the court sentenced him to 14 

years in prison for aggravated battery with a firearm and ordered him to pay restitution totaling 

$16,175.54. 

¶ 17 Defendant filed a direct appeal, arguing (1) the State deprived him of a fair trial by 

improperly shifting the burden of proof, (2) the circuit court erred by failing to conduct a Krankel

inquiry (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984)) after he stated at

sentencing that he “had an inadequate defense,” and (3) he was entitled to two additional days of 

sentence credit for time spent in pretrial custody. People v. Jenkins, 2016 IL App (4th) 140533-U, 

¶ 3. On review, we agreed with defendant’s sentence-credit claim but otherwise affirmed the 

circuit court’s judgment. Id. ¶ 45. Defendant then filed a petition for leave to appeal to the supreme 

court, which it denied. See People v. Jenkins, No. 121596 (January 25, 2017). 

¶ 18 In June 2017, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. He alleged 

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure “to impeach *** State 

witnesses with their prior statements,” submit certain jury instructions, and raise objections to the 

State’s questioning of witnesses and its presentation of evidence and argument; (2) a violation of 
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his right to conflict-free representation based on trial counsel representing him while having “an 

application pending to work for the *** State’s Attorney[’s] Office”; and (3) ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel for failing to argue on direct appeal his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness as set 

forth in his postconviction petition. 

¶ 19 Regarding his contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to impeach 

*** State witnesses,” defendant pointed to testimony from witnesses including Gallaher, 

Epperson, Blankenship, Burton, and Gallaher’s two roommates, McVey and McColez. He argued 

his trial counsel should have explored why Gallaher was never charged with a drug-related offense 

and elicited testimony regarding a previous robbery attempt against Gallaher. Defendant asserted 

that Epperson should have been questioned about prior inconsistent statements she made to the 

police concerning her and defendant’s actions on the night of the shooting and previous visits she 

made to Gallaher’s residence. Defendant also argued that his trial counsel should have elicited 

testimony about statements Blankenship and Burton made, indicating they had previous plans with 

Epperson and others to rob Gallaher for money and marijuana. Finally, he argued Gallaher’s 

roommates should have been cross-examined about a physical altercation Gallaher had on the day 

of the shooting with someone who was trying to rob him and that McColez should have been 

questioned about a telephone conversation he had with Blankenship on the day of the shooting, 

during which she stated, “they will be back.” 

¶ 20 To support his claims, defendant attached to his pro se petition police reports 

containing statements from the witnesses at issue. According to those reports, Epperson, 

Blankenship, and Burton had been to Gallaher’s residence twice on October 29, 2013, prior to the 

shooting. On one occasion, Epperson inquired if Gallaher had “an ounce of pot” that Cain wanted 

to buy. During a second visit, Epperson, Blankenship, and Burton were accompanied by Cain and 
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Schmidt. Witnesses acknowledged that a physical altercation occurred between Schmidt and 

Gallaher, during which Schmidt knocked Gallaher over, knocked Gallaher’s hat off, and looked 

for “a blunt” behind Gallaher’s ear. The witnesses further reported that a verbal altercation 

occurred between Cain and one of Gallaher’s roommates. 

¶ 21 The police reports also showed Epperson, Blankenship, and Burton acknowledged 

knowing about, or being involved in, a plan to take property from Gallaher. Specifically, Epperson 

stated she knew about a plan that Cain and Schmidt had to take something from Gallaher. When 

discussing the shooting incident, Blankenship indicated she was involved with “a first attempted 

theft” along with Epperson, Burton, Schmidt, and Cain. After the altercation between Schmidt and 

Gallaher, Blankenship called to warn Gallaher that Epperson stated “they” would “go back over 

and try to get the stuff from” Gallaher. She also reported that Epperson stated she was going to 

pick up “Illy,” Cain, Schmidt, and others “to go get the stuff from” Gallaher. Later, Epperson told 

Blankenship “that if [Blankenship] didn’t stop telling people that Illy was involved, he would come 

shoot her or have some of his people beat her up.” The reports show Burton stated she went to 

Gallaher’s apartment with Epperson, Blankenship, Cain, and Schmidt, and that the group had a 

plan to rob Gallaher of marijuana and money. 

¶ 22 Finally, according to the police reports, defendant’s roommates stated they believed 

that Schmidt was attempting to take marijuana and money from Gallaher at the time of their 

physical altercation. McColez also acknowledged getting into a verbal argument with Cain and 

Schmidt outside of the apartment and stated, after those individuals left, he received a phone call 

from Blankenship who told him “ ‘they will be back.’ ” 

¶ 23 The record reflects the circuit court reviewed defendant’s pro se postconviction 

petition, appointed counsel to represent him, and set the matter for further hearing. In November 
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2017, defendant’s attorney, Amber Davis, filed a certificate of compliance pursuant to Rule 651(c),

stating as follows: 

“1. I have consulted with [defendant] by mail, in person, and by telephone 

to ascertain [defendant’s] contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights.

2. I have examined the trial court file and record of proceedings at the trial 

and posttrial motion and sentencing hearing and the appellate court briefs and 

opinion and have made any amendments to the petition necessary for adequate 

representation of [defendant’s] contentions.” 

Ultimately, the record reflects Davis did not amend defendant’s pro se petition. In January 2018, 

the State filed a response to defendant’s petition, denying each of his claims of error. 

¶ 24 In October 2018, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing in the matter. 

Defendant testified on his own behalf and, consistent with the allegations of his pro se petition, 

described the ways in which he believed his trial counsel was ineffective. Neither party presented 

any further evidence. Following the parties’ arguments, the court denied defendant’s petition. In 

ruling on the petition, the court indicated it had considered defendant’s testimony, the parties’ 

arguments on the petition, the pleadings, and what occurred at trial. In fact, it stated it had “a fairly 

good recollection of [defendant’s] trial,” over which it had presided. Relevant to the issues 

presented on review, the court found the decisions made by defendant’s appellate counsel on direct 

appeal did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. It also determined that 

defendant’s contention that his trial counsel should have impeached witnesses with prior 

statements involved matters of possible trial strategy and also did not fall below an objective 

standard of reasonableness. 

¶ 25 This appeal followed.
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¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 27 On appeal, defendant argues his postconviction counsel violated Rule 651(c) by 

failing to properly shape and support his pro se arguments alleging ineffective assistance of both 

his trial and appellate counsel. He contends his pro se postconviction petition included meritorious 

claims that (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to use “police reports to 

impeach the credibility of the State’s occurrence witnesses” and (2) appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise meritorious issues apparent from the record on direct appeal. 

¶ 28 A. Postconviction Procedures and 

Reasonable Assistance of Postconviction Counsel 

¶ 29 “The Post-Conviction Hearing Act [(Act)] provides a procedural mechanism 

through which criminal defendants can assert that their federal or state constitutional rights were 

substantially violated in their original trials or sentencing hearings.” People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 

122327, ¶ 12, 137 N.E.3d 763 (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2014)). Proceedings under the 

Act are divided into the following three stages:

“At the first stage, the circuit court determines whether the petition is frivolous or 

is patently without merit. [Citation.] If the petition is not dismissed at the first stage, 

it advances to the second stage, where the court may appoint counsel for an indigent 

defendant and the State may file responsive pleadings. [Citations.] If the petition 

makes a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, the petition proceeds to 

the third stage, where the court conducts an evidentiary hearing.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 45 (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2), 122-4, 122-5, 

122-6 (West 2014)). 

¶ 30 The sixth amendment right to counsel does not extend to postconviction petitioners. 
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People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 30, 155 N.E.3d 374. Thus, they have “no constitutional right 

to counsel, effective or otherwise.” Id. Instead, postconviction petitioners are “entitled to only the 

level of assistance guaranteed by the Act,” which “has been judicially deemed to be a ‘reasonable 

level,’ a standard that is significantly lower than the one mandated at trial by our state and federal 

constitutions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 

¶ 31 More specifically, defendants are entitled to a reasonable level of assistance at both 

the second and third postconviction stages. People v. Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶ 16, 123 N.E.3d 

1083. To help ensure that level of assistance, Rule 651(c) sets forth the following obligations for 

postconviction counsel: (1) consult with the petitioner to ascertain his contentions of deprivation 

of constitutional rights; (2) examine the record of proceedings at trial; and (3) make any 

amendments to the pro se petition that are necessary for an adequate presentation of the petitioner’s 

contentions. Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

¶ 32 “The filing of a facially valid Rule 651(c) certificate creates a rebuttable 

presumption that counsel acted reasonably and complied with the rule.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) People v. Beasley, 2017 IL App (4th) 150291, ¶ 39, 85 N.E.3d 568. Further, 

“[f]ulfillment of the third obligation under Rule 651(c) does not require postconviction counsel to 

advance frivolous or spurious claims on [the] defendant’s behalf.” People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 

192, 205, 817 N.E.2d 511, 519 (2004). “If amendments to a pro se post[ ]conviction petition would 

only further a frivolous or patently nonmeritorious claim, they are not ‘necessary’ within the 

meaning of the rule.” Id.

¶ 33 B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

for Failing to Impeach State Witnesses

¶ 34 In his pro se postconviction petition, defendant argued ineffective assistance of 
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counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to impeach State witnesses with their prior statements. 

To support his claims, he attached police reports to his petition, containing the witnesses’

statements. On appeal, defendant first argues his postconviction counsel did not provide a 

reasonable level of assistance because she failed to properly shape and support that contention. 

Specifically, defendant argues the police reports demonstrated that all of the State’s witnesses had 

a motive to lie about the events leading up to the shooting because all “were involved in illegal 

drug-related activities at Gallaher’s apartment on the same evening that [Gallaher] was shot.” He 

maintains competent postconviction counsel would have amended his pro se petition to state that 

specific claim and presented evidence to support it, including testimony from trial counsel and the 

occurrence witnesses at issue. Defendant complains that, instead, postconviction counsel presented 

only his testimony “without adequate preparation.” 

¶ 35 We note defendant’s argument on appeal essentially amounts to a claim that his 

postconviction counsel failed to comply with the third obligation set forth in Rule 651(c), requiring 

counsel to amend a defendant’s pro se petition as necessary for an adequate presentation of the 

defendant’s contentions. However, as discussed, postconviction counsel is not required to amend 

a pro se petition to further a frivolous or patently nonmeritorious claim. In this instance, we find 

the specific claim raised by defendant on appeal fits that description. Accordingly, amendment of 

defendant’s pro se postconviction petition to add the claim asserted on appeal was not necessary 

within the meaning of Rule 651(c). 

¶ 36 Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are governed by the standard set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires that a defendant “show both that 

counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 
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(2009). Further, a claim is frivolous and patently without merit if it has “no arguable basis either 

in law or in fact, relying instead on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual 

allegation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Boykins, 2017 IL 121365, ¶ 9, 93 N.E.3d 

504. “An example of an indisputably meritless legal theory is one which is completely contradicted 

by the record.” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. Also, “[f]anciful factual allegations include those which 

are fantastic or delusional.” Id. at 17. 

¶ 37 First, to the extent defendant asserts his trial counsel should have used the police 

reports themselves to impeach the State’s witnesses, we find it is not arguable that his counsel’s 

performance was deficient. “In general, police reports may be used for impeachment purposes but 

are inadmissible as substantive evidence.” People v. Gagliani, 210 Ill. App. 3d 617, 629, 569 

N.E.2d 534, 542 (1991). Further, “[police] reports can only be used to impeach the officer who 

actually wrote the report.” Id.; see also People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 430, 548 N.E.2d 1003, 

1015 (1989) (stating the “[d]efendant’s attempt to impeach [a witness] with a written statement of 

[another] was improper”); People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133, 153, 673 N.E.2d 258, 267 (1996)

(“Defense counsel could not attempt to impeach [a witness] with [a] detective’s written 

statement.”). As none of the witnesses identified by defendant authored the police reports at issue, 

the reports could not have been used to impeach those witnesses. 

¶ 38 Second, even construing defendant’s claim as one of ineffective assistance based 

on his trial counsel’s failure to elicit testimony and cross-examine witnesses regarding the 

drug-related activities described in the police reports, his claim is still without arguable merit. 

Initially, we note that there was an abundance of evidence presented at defendant’s trial 

establishing the occurrence of drug-related activities at Gallaher’s apartment. Gallaher 

acknowledged smoking marijuana on the day of the shooting and that, while residing in the 11th 
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Street apartment, he was unemployed and sold marijuana. Evidence was also presented that drugs 

and drug paraphernalia were found inside the residence and that the witnesses present at the time 

of the shooting—McVey, McColez, Tucker, Perkins, and Shankland—had also been smoking 

marijuana. Given this evidence, there is no arguable basis in law or fact for defendant’s assertion 

on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit testimony regarding the drugrelated activities of Gallaher, his roommates, or the other witnesses who were inside Gallaher’s 

apartment when the shooting occurred. 

¶ 39 Next, defendant raises the same contentions as to Epperson, Blankenship, and 

Burton, asserting the police reports show the witnesses “were involved in illegal drug-related 

activities at Gallaher’s apartment” on the day of the shooting. Significantly, however, he fails to 

identify precisely what information contained in those reports his counsel should have elicited to 

challenge the witnesses’ credibility. We note a defendant’s failure to present a fully developed and 

reasoned argument on appeal forfeits review of his claimed error. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. 

May 25, 2018) (stating an appellant’s argument must “contain the contentions of the appellant and 

the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on” and 

“[p]oints not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on 

petition for rehearing”). In this instance, defendant’s argument fails to contain a sufficiently

reasoned analysis of the issue presented.

¶ 40 Further, even setting aside the deficiencies in defendant’s brief, his claim lacks 

arguable merit. The police reports indicate Epperson, Blankenship, and Burton visited Gallaher’s 

residence prior to the shooting. As to drug-related activities, the reports reflect Epperson inquired 

whether Gallaher had marijuana that another individual wanted to buy and that the witnesses 

observed others with marijuana or smoking marijuana. No information in the police reports 
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indicates Epperson, Blankenship, and Burton actually purchased or used drugs at Gallaher’s 

residence on the day of the shooting or otherwise. We fail to see how eliciting or impeaching the 

witnesses with the above information would have negatively impacted their credibility, established 

their motive to lie about the shooting, or affected the outcome of defendant’s trial. 

¶ 41 Finally, the decision of whether to cross-examine or impeach a witness is generally 

a matter of trial strategy and will not support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. People v. 

Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 326, 677 N.E.2d 875, 891 (1997). Here, although the police reports 

contained minimal information regarding drug-related activities engaged in by Epperson, 

Blankenship, and Burton, they did contain several statements indicating those witnesses’ 

involvement in, or knowledge of, a prior and ongoing plan to rob Gallaher, as well as statements 

further linking defendant to both the witnesses and the plan. Thus, it would have been objectively 

reasonable for defendant’s counsel, as a matter of trial strategy, to avoid eliciting testimony 

regarding the activities at Gallaher’s residence prior to the shooting because those activities were 

connected with the ongoing robbery plan and might have more firmly established defendant’s tie

to the witnesses who testified against him, Gallaher, and the charged offenses. 

¶ 42 In this case, defendant has failed to establish an arguable basis in law or fact for the 

specific ineffective-assistance claim he raises on appeal. Accordingly, because his claim was 

frivolous or patently without merit, his postconviction counsel was not required under Rule 651(c)

to amend the pro se postconviction petition to include it. In so holding, we note defendant also 

argues his postconviction counsel failed to provide a reasonable level of assistance by not arguing 

at the evidentiary hearing the merits of his claim that the State’s witnesses should have been 

impeached with police reports showing their drug-related activities. However, where 

postconviction counsel was not required to amend the pro se petition to include that specific 
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argument, counsel was also not required to argue the merits of the issue. 

¶ 43 C. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

¶ 44 On appeal, defendant also argues his postconviction counsel failed to provide a 

reasonable level of assistance because she did not properly shape and support his pro se contention 

that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise meritorious issues apparent from the 

record on direct appeal. Specifically, he contends postconviction counsel should have amended his 

pro se petition to include claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) include a 

Krankel issue in his petition for leave to appeal to the supreme court, (2) challenge the circuit

court’s restitution order, and (3) challenge his prison sentence. 

¶ 45 However, during postconviction proceedings, postconviction “counsel is only 

required to investigate and properly present the petitioner’s claims.” (Emphasis in original.) 

People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 164, 619 N.E.2d 750, 758 (1993). “In that regard, Rule 651(c) 

only requires postconviction counsel to examine as much of the record ‘as is necessary to 

adequately present and support those constitutional claims raised by the petitioner.’ ” People v. 

Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 475-76, 861 N.E.2d 999, 1009 (2006) (quoting Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 

164). “While postconviction counsel may conduct a broader examination of the record [citation], 

and may raise additional issues if he or she so chooses, there is no obligation to do so.” (Emphasis 

in original.) Id. at 476.

¶ 46 Here, although defendant’s pro se postconviction petition contained an allegation 

that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues apparent from the record, that 

claim was based solely on appellate counsel’s failure to argue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for

failing to (1) properly impeach State witnesses with prior statements, (2) submit certain jury 

instructions, and (3) raise objections to the State’s questioning of witnesses and its presentation of 
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evidence and argument. Defendant did not include any claim in his pro se filing that was based on, 

or related to, the circuit court’s failure to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry, the failure to 

include any issue within his petition for leave to appeal to the supreme court, or any portion of the 

sentence he received. Because none of those specific claims was raised by defendant in his pro se

filing, postconviction counsel was not required to investigate those claims or raise them in an 

amended postconviction petition. Accordingly, we find no failure to comply with Rule 651(c) by 

defendant’s postconviction counsel and no merit to defendant’s claim that his counsel failed to 

provide him with a reasonable level of assistance. 

¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 48 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 49 Affirmed.