2017 IL App (3d) 150062

Opinion filed September 6, 2017 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2017 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE )

OF ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

BRIAN D. PATTERSON, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

 ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Peoria County, Illinois. 

Appeal No. 3-15-0062 

Circuit No. 13-CF-1080 

Honorable 

Kevin Lyons, 

Judge, Presiding. 

_____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Lytton and Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

_____________________________________________________________________________

 OPINION

¶ 1 The defendant, Brian D. Patterson, appealed his conviction for burglary of an Arby’s. 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 The defendant was charged by indictment with burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (2012)).

The indictment alleged that the defendant knowingly and without authority entered an Arby’s on 

August 25, 2013, with the intent to commit theft. 
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¶ 4 On September 22, 2014, with a second addendum filed on October 9, 2014, the defendant 

filed a motion to preclude the prosecution from introducing evidence of phone calls downloaded 

from the defendant’s cell phone. The State argued that the phone calls were downloaded 

pursuant to a search warrant and by way of a recording application on the defendant’s phone that 

was not placed there by police. The defendant argued that the recording application was not 

placed by the defendant, alleging that it was placed on his phone by the FBI. Defense counsel 

had subpoenaed a witness who would say the FBI had approached her regarding the defendant, 

but the witness did not appear. The trial court set the motion hearing over until the following 

Tuesday, the same day the trial was scheduled to start. On Monday, the defendant filed a motion 

to suppress, arguing that the recording application was placed on his phone by persons in the 

government. On Tuesday, prior to trial, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, based upon 

the proffer of evidence in court and the untimeliness of the motion. The State claimed that it had 

contacted a federal agent, but he was not available on that day to rebut any evidence by the 

defendant. The defense witness again did not appear, but defense counsel said her testimony 

would be about the FBI approaching her and asking her to make a phone call to the defendant so 

the FBI could listen in. Her testimony would not be about the application on the defendant’s 

phone. The defendant did not attempt to subpoena the FBI agent. 

¶ 5 The case proceeded to a jury trial. Ryan Litchfield testified that he arrived for work at 

Arby’s at around 4:50 a.m. on the morning of August 25, 2013. He had a key to get in the 

building, and he thought only two people had keys to the building on that day. He did not look at 

the safe until around 6 a.m., when he let a coworker in, who noticed two holes in the side of the 

safe. Litchfield also noticed metal shavings around the safe but did not see any footprints in the 

shavings. Jessica Appel, the shift manager at Arby’s, testified that she arrived at work that 
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morning around 7:50 a.m. She noticed the holes and opened the safe to find the money from the 

night before was missing. Appel had no personal knowledge of the amount of money in the safe 

because she did not work the night before, but she checked the company’s records and found that 

$400 was missing. Appel called the police. Appel testified that she had a key to the building, and 

she thought that six people had keys, including the manager who had been let go four days 

earlier.

¶ 6 The police investigated at the Arby’s and took photographs of the scene. The police did 

not find any fingerprints or footprints and did not find any signs of a forced entry. After the 

defendant became a suspect, the police obtained a search warrant and searched the defendant’s 

home and his vehicle. The trunk of the defendant’s vehicle contained a drill, an extension cord, 

charger battery, sledge hammers, a chisel-type tool, grinding wheels, drill bits, flashlights, a lock 

pick set, pliers, and cutting shears. There were also gloves, a black backpack, a black duffle bag, 

black pants, and plastic bags. A cell phone was recovered from the defendant’s person, and files 

were downloaded from the phone and placed on a flash drive. Around 100 recorded calls were 

downloaded from the phone. Four recordings were made in the early morning hours of August 

25, 2013, and those four files were renamed by the police but not altered. The testimony was that 

those four calls were made at 2:09 a.m., 2:25 a.m., 2:38 a.m., and 3:28 a.m. on August 25, 2013. 

¶ 7 The defendant testified that he was a senior software engineer and he wrote books on 

computer programming and database design. He testified that on August 25, 2013, he was 

working and hanging out with a friend. He was familiar with the Arby’s but did not go there that 

morning. He testified that he exchanged messages with his girlfriend, Angelique Brachle, in the 

early morning of August 25 and the four recorded phone calls were between him and Brachle.

The defendant testified that he was in his garage for the fourth call and he made a snide remark 
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at the end of the call for the FBI, who he believed had been listening to his calls since May 2013.

That remark is not on the audio of the fourth call. The defendant testified that the fourth call was 

just for the benefit of the FBI, wherein he and Brachle were pretending to commit some sort of 

theft. He did not know who installed the third-party recording application on his phone. He did 

go to the Arby’s a few days after August 25 because he heard it had been broken into. 

¶ 8 Brachle testified that she was probably with the defendant on the morning of August 25, 

and she could not recall if they went to the Arby’s that morning. However, she was currently on 

probation because she had pled guilty to the burglary of the Arby’s. She testified that she went 

with the defendant to the Arby’s one night after dark, but she could not remember the specific 

day. She waited in the car while the defendant went up to the building. He was carrying a 

backpack, and it was after the Arby’s had closed. She saw him go toward the building and later 

come back and get in his own car a few rows down from hers. Brachle testified that the 

defendant was doing research for a book. Brachle thought that the fourth phone call was made 

while they were both at home and the defendant was in the garage, and the conversation about a 

robbery was made up for the FBI. 

¶ 9 The jury returned a verdict of guilty of burglary. The trial court denied the defendant’s 

motion for a new trial. The defendant was sentenced to 21 years in prison, and his motion to 

reconsider sentence was denied. The defendant appealed. 

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a 

continuance, that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court ruled that testimony was 

inadmissible hearsay, that he was denied a fair trial in the giving of two additional jury 

instructions, and that his sentence was excessive. 
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¶ 12 I. Continuance 

¶ 13 The defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to continue a 

hearing on his motion to suppress or continue the trial, after a key witness was unavailable to 

testify regarding the motion to suppress on the morning of trial. The State argues that the 

defendant never asked for a continuance and that the motion to suppress was properly denied. A 

judge’s decision regarding a motion to continue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. 

Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 125 (2009). 

¶ 14 Whether there has been an abuse of discretion in denying a continuance depends upon the 

facts and circumstances in each case, and there is no bright line test for determining when a 

denial in the interests of judicial economy violates the substantive right of the accused to 

properly defend. Id. at 125-26. A trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to continue a case. 

People v. Minter, 2015 IL App (1st) 120958, ¶ 74. On a motion to suppress evidence, the 

defendant bears the burden of proof. People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 23. 

¶ 15 The defendant argues that the cell phone audio files were really the only evidence against 

him and there were discovery delays and technical difficulties that contributed to the delay in 

filing his motion to suppress. Defense counsel had received the audio by September 22, 2014, 

but was unable to play the tape. On October 9, the State’s motion for a continuance was denied, 

and the defendant filed a motion to bar evidence, including the recorded phone calls. At the 

hearing on October 10, defense counsel stated that he wanted to question the officer who 

downloaded the calls but the officer was on vacation and that defense counsel had subpoenaed a 

witness who had been approached by the FBI to have a conversation with the defendant, but she 

was not present in court. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion prior to the start of the 

trial on October 14, 2014. The defense then filed a motion to suppress on October 13. At the 
6 

hearing on October 14, the prosecutor told the judge that the FBI agent alleged to have placed the 

application on the defendant’s phone was involved in training in Washington, DC. Defense 

counsel stated that his witness again did not show up and her testimony would be that the FBI 

approached her and wanted to listen in to a conversation between her and the defendant. The trial 

court denied the motion to suppress, finding that there had already been too many delays and the 

defendant’s witness would not be able to provide any testimony regarding the application. 

¶ 16 The defendant argues that the State asked for the continuance when it stated that the FBI 

witness would not be available. There is no indication that the State asked for such; in fact, its 

own motion had been denied a week earlier. The trial court actually denied the motion to 

suppress on the basis that the defense witness, even if she was to appear, was not expected to 

offer any information regarding the application on the defendant’s cell phone. Of note, the 

defendant did not make an offer of proof about the testimony that was not admitted, and no 

subpoenas were issued by the defendant to secure the FBI agent. We find that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion. 

¶ 17 II. Hearsay

¶ 18 The defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing testimony 

revealing his state of mind when defense counsel asked why the defendant and his girlfriend

would make up a robbery for the benefit of the FBI and would go to this extent and call the FBI 

agent names in the recorded cell phone calls. The defendant argues that this testimony would 

have been the defendant’s explanation why the FBI was listening in on his phone calls. The State 

argues that the defendant did not include this issue in his posttrial motion, so it can only be 

reviewed for plain error, and the defendant failed to make an offer of proof regarding the 

testimony. The State also argues that there was no abuse of discretion, since a trial court’s 
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evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 

(2001). 

¶ 19 The defendant acknowledges the forfeiture and asks for plain error review. A reviewing 

court may consider a forfeited error when the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of 

the error, or if the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Herron, 

215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005). To obtain relief under this rule, a defendant must first show that a 

clear or obvious error occurred. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). 

¶ 20 The hearsay rule generally prohibits the introduction of an out-of-court statement to 

prove the truth of the matter asserted. People v. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d 441, 449 (2007). There 

is an exception to the hearsay rule that allows the statement if it is a statement of the declarant’s 

then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition. Ill. R. Evid. 803(3) (eff. 

Apr. 26, 2012). 

¶ 21 The defendant testified that it was his understanding that the FBI was listening to his 

telephone calls. The defendant’s attorney asked the defendant what the FBI agent had said about 

the defendant that would prompt the defendant to call the FBI agent names on the audio 

recordings. The State objected when the defendant answered “What I heard or what I was told?” 

Defense counsel argued that the testimony was admissible as a state of mind exception to the 

hearsay rule, but the trial court sustained the objection. 

¶ 22 It is unclear what the testimony would have been, but on plain error review, the defendant 

had to show that the evidence was closely balanced. See People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 43 

(2009) (the defendant carries the burden of persuasion under both prongs of the plain error rule). 

The defendant argues that the evidence was closely balanced because he offered a different 

explanation for the audio and that was the only evidence against him. The audio, though, speaks 
8 

for itself, in addition to the tools found in the defendant’s possession. Since the evidence is not 

closely balanced, the defendant cannot prevail on plain error. 

¶ 23 III. Jury Instructions 

¶ 24 The defendant argues that two jury instructions should not have been given because they 

had no application to the case and tended to undermine Brachle’s testimony. The defendant 

acknowledges that both issues were forfeited and argues for plain error review. The State 

contends there was no error or any error was not prejudicial. The first step of plain error review 

is determining whether there was error. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010). 

¶ 25 The jury in this case was instructed that a witness’s credibility could be challenged by 

evidence that the witness made a prior inconsistent statement, and it was further instructed that it 

could consider the prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence if the witness made the 

statement under oath, the statement described an event that the witness had personal knowledge 

of, and the statement was acknowledged under oath by the witness. See Illinois Pattern Jury 

Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.11 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter, IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11). During 

the jury instruction conference, the trial court asked when the prior inconsistent statement 

happened at the trial. The State responded that the instruction was based upon Brachle’s 

admission that she told police that she acted as a lookout for the burglary of the Arby’s. 

Specifically, when the prosecutor asked Brachle if she told police that she acted as the lookout

for the burglary of the Arby’s, she responded “I wasn’t sure exactly what was going on because I 

thought we were doing research. I really didn’t think anything was going on.” The State argues 

that this was an inconsistent statement because Brachle did not deny that she made the statement

that she was the lookout for the Arby’s burglary to the police. The defendant argues that the State 
9 

failed to provide evidence of a prior inconsistent statement and Brachle’s failure to deny making 

the statement to the police was not enough. 

¶ 26 In criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by 

the hearsay rule if it is inconsistent with his testimony at trial and the statement narrates, 

describes, or explains an event or condition of which the witness had personal knowledge and the 

witness acknowledged under oath the making of the statement. 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 

2012). IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11 instructs jurors that they can consider prior inconsistent 

statements substantively if the jurors find that the requirements of section 115-10.1 have been 

met. To be inconsistent, a witness’s prior testimony does not have to directly contradict the 

testimony given at trial but may include evasive answers, silence, or changes in position. People 

v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 87 (1989). Whether the prior testimony is inconsistent with the trial 

testimony is a question left to the discretion of the trial court. Id. at 87-88. In addition, a trial 

court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 66 (2008). 

¶ 27 We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the jury instruction 

because Brachle’s answer regarding whether she was the lookout for the robbery was evasive. 

Brachle did not deny that was the statement that she gave to the police but qualified her answer 

with the fact that she thought they were doing research. Brachle acknowledged telling the police 

that she waited in the car for some time, at night, while the Arby’s was closed, while the 

defendant went to the Arby’s building. Since there was no error in giving the instruction, there 

can be no plain error. 

¶ 28 The defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in giving IPI Criminal 

4th No. 3.17, testimony of an accomplice. “The test for determining whether a witness is an 
10 

accomplice for purposes of the accomplice-witness instruction is whether there is probable cause 

to believe that the witness was guilty of the offense at issue as a principal, or as an accessory 

under an accountability theory.” People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 116 (2001). Thus, if the 

evidence at trial establishes probable cause to believe that a witness participated in the planning 

or commission of the crime, even if the witness denies it, the accomplice-witness instruction 

should be given to a jury. Id. In this case, Brachle testified that she was the lookout, although she 

claimed that she thought she was only acting as such so that the defendant could do research for 

a book. However, she also admitted that she pled guilty to charges in connection with the 

burglary of the Arby’s and that she was on probation for the offense. Thus, we find that the 

evidence established probable cause to believe that Brachle participated in the burglary of the 

Arby’s and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving this instruction. Again, since there 

was no error in giving the instruction, there was no plain error. 

¶ 29 IV. Sentence

¶ 30 Finally, the defendant argues that his 21-year sentence was excessive and should be 

reduced. Alternatively, the defendant argues that the case should be remanded for resentencing 

because the trial court considered an improper factor in aggravation and failed to consider 

applicable mitigation. The imposition of a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 448 (2005). 

¶ 31 The statutory sentence for burglary, a Class 2 felony, is probation or three to seven years’ 

imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35 (West 2012). However, 

due to prior burglary convictions in 1992 and 1994, the defendant was subject to a Class X 

sentence, between 6 and 30 years’ imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a)(West 2012). The 
11 

defendant’s sentence of 21 years was within the statutory range, but the defendant challenges it 

as excessive.

¶ 32 Generally, trial judges have great discretion in sentencing. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 

2d 205, 212 (2010). The defendant argues that the trial judge emphasized the planning element 

of the crime, versus an unsophisticated entry and grab, but that planning was an inherent element 

of burglary and the trial court was wrong to consider it an aggravating factor. This court has 

reviewed the transcript of the sentencing and finds no abuse of discretion. 

¶ 33 CONCLUSION

¶ 34 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed. 

¶ 35 Affirmed.