Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Claypool, 2014 IL App (3d) 120468

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

TERRANCE D. CLAYPOOL, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-12-0468

Rule 23 Order filed

Motion to publish

allowed

Opinion filed

October 2, 2014

October 30, 2014

October 30, 2014

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

The denial of defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine discovered 

following a Terry stop and frisk was affirmed on appeal, where a 

police officer observed defendant just before 1 a.m. in an area where 

burglaries were not uncommon, the man was trying the handles of a 

vehicle parked on the street, and during the struggle that ensued when 

the officer confronted him, the man ran away, but after the officer 

alerted other officers and caught the man, he spit a white object out of 

his mouth and pushed it into a storm drain, and after the object was 

recovered, it was identified as cocaine, and under those circumstances, 

it was reasonable for the officer to believe defendant had committed or 

was about to commit a burglary and to suspect that he was in danger of 

attack.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County, No. 11-CF-64; 

the Hon. Clark E. Erickson, Judge, presiding.
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Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier and Kieran M. Wiberg (argued), both of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Jamie J. Boyd, State’s Attorney, of Kankakee (Thomas D. Arado 

(argued), of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of 

counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justice Holdridge specially concurred, with opinion.

Justice Schmidt specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Terrance D. Claypool, appeals from the circuit court’s order denying his 

motion to suppress. Defendant argues his motion to suppress should have been granted 

because the police officer “lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him and order him to submit to 

a pat-down search.” We affirm.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 Defendant was seized by Chris Benoit of the Kankakee police department in the early 

morning (12:48 a.m.) of January 30, 2011. Benoit ordered defendant to submit to a pat-down 

search and a struggle ensued. When defendant was taken into custody a short time later, police 

found 7.8 grams of cocaine in a nearby storm drain, which Benoit testified defendant spit out of 

his mouth and pushed into the drain. As a result of this encounter, defendant was charged with 

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Defendant was convicted and 

sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 4 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress. Defendant and Benoit both testified at 

the hearing on defendant’s motion. Both parties acknowledge, however, here on appeal that 

Benoit’s testimony is the only reliable testimony due to the fact that defendant previously 

admitted that he perjured himself with regard to his testimony at the suppression hearing. Thus, 

our discussion is limited to Benoit’s testimony. 

¶ 5 Benoit testified that he was in his squad car when he saw a man, approximately a block 

ahead of him, who appeared confused. Benoit identified defendant as that man. Defendant was 

standing in the street looking into the driver’s side of a parked vehicle and trying the handles of 

the vehicle. Benoit thought defendant was attempting to access the vehicle but he did not 

believe defendant’s behavior was suspicious because he thought defendant might be locked 

out of the vehicle. There were no other vehicles parked in the immediate area.
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¶ 6 After attempting to gain access to the vehicle’s trunk, defendant made no effort, with or 

without tools, to forcibly enter the car. Instead, he simply walked away from the vehicle. He 

did not, however, go into the residence directly north of where the car was parked but, rather, 

continued walking. Once defendant passed the house, Benoit became suspicious as car 

burglaries were not uncommon in the area.

¶ 7 Benoit began to follow defendant and saw him turn and look in his direction, at which point 

defendant appeared to slightly change direction and walk down an alley. Benoit stopped his 

squad, stepped out and called out for defendant to “hold on a second.” Defendant turned and 

leaned forward, as if to run, and fell down.

¶ 8 Benoit jogged over to defendant and helped him stand. Benoit testified that when he 

approached defendant he believed defendant had been “attempting to illegally gain entry to the 

vehicle.” Benoit asked defendant if he was trying to run and defendant responded that he had 

just slipped on some ice. Benoit testified this explanation was “plausible.” Benoit did not 

inquire as to defendant’s actions regarding the vehicle he saw defendant attempting to access. 

Instead, Benoit “escorted” defendant to the squad car and ordered him to place both hands on 

the hood of the car so that Benoit could pat him down for “[w]eapons or possibly burglary 

tools.” Benoit stated that it would not be unexpected to find people who break into cars having 

some burglary tools or screwdrivers that could be used as a weapon.

¶ 9 Defendant put his right hand on the hood of the squad car but kept his left hand near his 

waist. Benoit again ordered defendant to place both hands on the hood of the squad. Instead of 

complying, defendant began to move his right hand off the squad and toward his waist. Benoit 

thought defendant was reaching for a gun in his waistband. A struggle ensued, during which 

defendant slipped out of his jacket and ran away. Benoit testified there was not much time 

between when he helped defendant up in the alley and when defendant fled. Benoit alerted 

other officers, then caught up with defendant and took him into custody. As he did so, he saw 

defendant spit a whitish object out of his mouth and push it into a nearby storm drain. Such an 

object was recovered by another officer and was ultimately identified as 7.8 grams of cocaine.

¶ 10 On cross-examination, Benoit indicated he did not demand an explanation of defendant’s 

attempts to access the vehicle because there was not time between helping defendant up and 

escorting him to the squad car. Benoit stated that “based on all the actions that I had observed, 

I thought he might possibly have burglary tools or possibly a weapon or something that could 

be used as a weapon.”

¶ 11 Defendant was not charged with attempted burglary and no burglary tools or other possible 

weapons were found in his possession. He was instead charged with drug possession with 

intent to deliver. He moved to suppress the drugs found as a result of the Terry stop and frisk–a 

motion that the circuit court ultimately denied. The matter proceeded to trial and defendant was 

convicted and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals the denial of his 

motion to suppress.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Defendant argues his motion to suppress should have been granted because “Benoit lacked 

reasonable suspicion to seize him and order him to submit to a pat-down search.” We disagree.

¶ 14 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to a two-part 

test. People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 82 (2011). First, we will uphold the court’s factual 
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findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d at 82. 

Second, we assess the established facts in relation to the issues presented and review the 

ultimate legal question of whether suppression is warranted de novo. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d at 82.

¶ 15 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court provided an exception to the 

warrant and probable cause requirements. “Under Terry, a police officer may conduct a brief, 

investigatory stop of a person where the officer reasonably believes that the person has 

committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2010). In 

Illinois, the “Terry stop” has been codified under section 107-14 of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure of 1963 (Code), as follows:

“A peace officer, after having identified himself as a peace officer, may stop any 

person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably 

infers from the circumstances that the person is committing, is about to commit or has 

committed an offense *** and may demand the name and address of the person and an 

explanation of his actions. Such detention and temporary questioning will be 

conducted in the vicinity of where the person was stopped.” 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (West 

2010).

¶ 16 Additionally, under Terry, “if the officer reasonably believes that the person questioned 

may be armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a limited pat down search for weapons, 

commonly called a frisk.” People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 275 (2002). The “Terry frisk” has 

also been codified in Illinois under section 108-1.01 of the Code, as follows:

“When a peace officer has stopped a person for temporary questioning pursuant to 

Section 107-14 of this Code and reasonably suspects that he or another is in danger of 

attack, he may search the person for weapons.” 725 ILCS 5/108-1.01 (West 2010).

¶ 17 The only questions before us are: (1) whether it was reasonable for Benoit to infer that 

defendant had committed or was about to commit a burglary; and, if so, (2) whether it was 

reasonable for Benoit to suspect that he was in danger of attack upon stopping defendant.

¶ 18 We believe it was reasonable for Benoit to infer that defendant had committed or was about 

to commit a burglary. Benoit observed defendant attempting to gain access to a vehicle at 

12:48 a.m. in an area where burglaries were not uncommon. Defendant checked the door 

handles of the vehicle, stepped back, looked around, and then checked the handles again, along 

with the vehicle’s trunk handle. No other vehicles were in the area. Although Benoit initially 

thought defendant may have been locked out of the vehicle, his suspicions were heightened 

when defendant walked past the residence where the vehicle was parked. When defendant saw 

Benoit, defendant changed direction and headed down an alley. While defendant may have 

simply fallen on ice when Benoit subsequently told him to “hold on a second,” it is just as 

“plausible” that defendant was in fact attempting to run. Benoit expressly testified that when he 

approached defendant he believed defendant had been “attempting to illegally gain entry to the 

vehicle.” Based on the totality of the circumstances, a Terry investigatory stop was justified.

¶ 19 We also believe it was reasonable for Benoit to suspect that he was in danger of attack upon 

stopping defendant. Benoit testified he conducted a “Terry frisk” for “[w]eapons or possibly 

burglary tools.” Benoit explained that it would not be unexpected to find people who break into 

cars having some burglary tools or screwdrivers that could be used as a weapon. Likewise, it is 

also not unreasonable to suspect that a burglar could have a knife or firearm concealed on his 

person. While defendant argues that Benoit could have simply asked defendant what he was 

doing at the vehicle, as opposed to “escorting” him back to the squad car, we note that Benoit 
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testified there was not much time between when he helped defendant up and when defendant 

fled. We do not believe Benoit unreasonably prolonged the stop. Moreover, because the belief 

that defendant may have been armed was reasonable, Benoit had the right to conduct a “Terry

frisk.” Benoit’s right to conduct such a frisk does not stem from any potential discussion with 

defendant. Instead, it stems from the fact that the totality of the circumstances created a 

reasonable inference that defendant may have been involved in a burglary and therefore may 

have been carrying knife, firearm or other burglary tool that could have been used as a weapon.

¶ 20 The above conclusion is supported by the holding in People v. McGowan, 69 Ill. 2d 73 

(1977). The McGowan court upheld a “Terry stop” and “Terry frisk” based upon an officer’s 

testimony that he suspected the defendant to have been an armed burglar. The police officer 

saw the defendant and his companion dressed in black, at 12:50 a.m., in a deserted commercial 

and industrial area that had been plagued by burglaries. There was only one establishment open 

in the area and that was a tavern that was due to close at 1 a.m., 10 minutes after the defendant 

and his companion were spotted. These were the only facts analyzed with regard to the 

viability of the stop and frisk. The supreme court held:

“Thus, while it is possible that the defendant and his companion were merely on their 

way to Penn’s Tavern to have a fast drink before closing time, we agree that it was 

much more likely that persons dressed in black, walking in the dead of night through an 

otherwise deserted commercial and industrial area which had been plagued by 

burglaries, had just committed or were about to commit a burglary. Under these 

circumstances, the suspects easily might have eluded the officers had the officers 

attempted to observe the two suspects further rather than stopping them immediately. 

Hence, we agree that [the officer’s] inference of an imminent or recent burglary was 

reasonable, and that stopping the defendant therefore was reasonable under the 

circumstances.” McGowan, 69 Ill. 2d at 78-79.

¶ 21 The court further held:

“We also hold that it was reasonable for [the police officer] to suspect that he and 

his partner were in danger of attack. It is not unlikely that a person engaged in stealing 

another person’s property would arm himself against the possibility that another person 

will appear unexpectedly and object strenuously. Thus, since we find [the officer’s] 

original suspicion to have been reasonable, we also find it reasonable for him to have 

concluded that the defendant was armed. It follows inevitably, we think, that it also was 

reasonable for [the officer] to assume that if the man he stopped were an armed burglar, 

he would not submit peacefully to questioning. Certainly [the officer] was not required 

to risk his life and that of his partner by assuming the contrary. [Citation.] The limited 

weapons search therefore also was reasonable.” McGowan, 69 Ill. 2d at 79.

¶ 22 Lastly, People v. Porter, 2014 IL App (3d) 120338, and People v. Kipfer, 356 Ill. App. 3d 

132 (2005), the cases relied upon by defendant, are distinguishable.

¶ 23 The Porter court determined that a police officer was not permitted to conduct a “Terry 

frisk” because the officer had no reason to believe that the defendant was armed and 

dangerous. Porter, 2014 IL App (3d) 120338, ¶ 16. The officer in Porter received a report of 

an offender wanted for a home invasion. The defendant matched the victim’s description and 

was seen leaving the crime scene. While the Porter court found that the “Terry stop” of 

defendant was valid in light of the above facts, it held the subsequent “Terry frisk” was 

improper because: (1) the officer did not articulate any reasons that would lead a reasonably 
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prudent person to believe his safety was in danger, and (2) the victim of the home invasion 

reported that the suspect had a cell phone, but did not report any weapon. Porter, 2014 IL App 

(3d) 120338, ¶ 16. Unlike the officer in Porter, Benoit specifically testified as to why he 

believed his safety was in danger–“It wouldn’t be unexpected to find some burglary tools or 

screwdrivers, that sort of thing, that could possibly be used as a weapon.” The McGowan court 

expressly upheld this reasoning. McGowan, 69 Ill. 2d at 79.

¶ 24 The Kipfer court found a police officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion for a “Terry

stop” when, at 3:30 a.m., he saw the defendant come out from behind a dumpster and walk 

through the parking lot of an apartment complex. Kipfer, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 140. Unlike the 

instant case, the defendant in Kipfer was not repeatedly attempting to gain access to a vehicle 

while looking around to see if anyone noticed. Moreover, the defendant did not immediately 

change direction and head into an alley when noticing a police presence. Finally, defendant did 

not attempt to possibly run when the officer asked him to stop.

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 26 Affirmed.

¶ 27 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring.

¶ 28 I concur in the judgment and I agree with the majority’s analysis regarding the “Terry

stop.” I write separately to clarify the analysis governing the frisk issue. “[W]hen an officer is 

justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close 

range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others, the officer may conduct a 

pat-down search [or frisk] to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon.” 

People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 432 (2001); see also People v. Porter, 2014 IL App (3d) 

120338, ¶ 15. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue 

is “whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief 

that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 433; see also Porter, 

2014 IL App (3d) 120338, ¶ 15. In determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such 

circumstances, “due weight must be given to the specific reasonable inferences which he is 

entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 433. 

However, the reasonableness of a frisk must be judged by all the particular facts and 

circumstances surrounding it, and “[e]ach case must stand or fall on its own set of concrete 

facts.” People v. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d 153, 173-74 (1989). Accordingly, a frisk may not be 

justified by resort to a blanket legal presumption that all persons reasonably suspected of 

committing a burglary are armed and dangerous. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 173; People v. Flowers, 

179 Ill. 2d 257, 269-70 (1997).1

 

1Although there is language in People v. McGowan, 69 Ill. 2d 73, 79 (1977), that appears to support 

such a legal presumption, our supreme court categorically rejected such a presumption in Galvin. 

Moreover, the supreme court noted that McGowan had to be read in its factual context (which included 

the fact that the suspects were stopped shortly before 1 a.m. in an area that had “suffered a number of 

burglaries” (id. at 75)), and that, “[h]ad the factual context in McGowan been different, the 

reasonableness of the officer's conclusion [that the defendant was armed] might very well have been 

different.” Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 173.
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¶ 29 In this case, Officer Benoit testified that he stopped the defendant shortly before 1 a.m. in 

an area where burglaries were not uncommon. Based on the defendant’s behavior, Benoit 

reasonably suspected that the defendant was attempting to burglarize a parked car. Benoit was 

alone and on foot when he confronted and frisked the defendant. At the suppression hearing, 

Benoit testified that, based on his experience, “it wouldn’t be unexpected to find some burglary 

tools or screwdrivers [on the defendant] *** that could possibly be used as a weapon.” 

Considering all these facts, and giving due weight to the reasonable inferences that Benoit was 

entitled to draw based on his experience, I conclude that a reasonably prudent police officer in 

these circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety was in danger.

¶ 30 Justice McDade correctly observes that this case is distinguishable from Porter, wherein 

there was no police testimony or other evidence to support a reasonable inference that the 

suspect was armed and dangerous. The only evidence that could possibly support such an 

inference in Porter was the fact that the defendant was suspected of committing a home 

invasion. Our supreme court has made clear that such evidence, standing alone, is insufficient 

to justify a Terry frisk. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 173. According to our supreme court, there must 

be additional facts suggesting that the suspect might be armed and dangerous or some other 

evidence suggesting that the police officer reasonably feared for his safety under the 

circumstances. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 437; Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 173-74. Because there was 

no such additional evidence in Porter, binding supreme court precedent required our appellate 

court to hold that the frisk in that case was unlawful. Thus, unlike Justice Schmidt, I believe 

that Porter was correctly decided under the law. However, because there was additional 

evidence in this case suggesting that Benoit reasonably feared for his safety, I agree with the 

majority that the frisk at issue here was legal and justified.

¶ 31 In any event, even if I were to conclude that both the stop and the frisk in this case were 

unlawful, I would still affirm the denial of the defendant’s suppression motion. While Benoit 

attempted to frisk the defendant, the defendant struggled with him, slipped out of his jacket, 

and ran away. As the defendant fled, Benoit saw a whitish object in the defendant’s hand. 

Benoit chased after the defendant and pushed him to the ground. As he did so, he saw the 

defendant spit the whitish object (later identified as cocaine) out of his mouth and push it into a 

nearby storm drain. Thus, Benoit discovered the cocaine during the defendant’s flight, not 

during the initial stop or frisk. The defendant’s flight “ended the seizure,” and “anything 

happening thereafter was, by its very nature, no longer tied to the initial stop.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 37. Put another way, the 

defendant’s flight interrupted the connection between any allegedly improper action by Benoit 

(which could not possibly be characterized as “flagrant”) and the discovery of the cocaine. 

Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 50; see also People v. Keys, 375 Ill. App. 3d 459, 464 (2007) 

(affirming denial of defendant’s motion to suppress drugs discovered during his flight from 

police and reasoning that, even if the initial seizure and attempted pat-down of the defendant 

were unlawful, the drugs were not recovered through exploitation of that initial illegality but 

were discovered as a result of the defendant’s subsequent escape and abandonment of the 

drugs). Thus, even assuming arguendo that the initial stop and frisk were illegal, the defendant 

cannot show that the discovery of the cocaine was the product of those illegal acts (or the “fruit 

of the poisonous tree”) and thereby subject to the exclusionary rule. For this additional reason, 

I would affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress.
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¶ 32 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, specially concurring.

¶ 33 I concur, but write separately simply to point out that I believe Porter was wrongly 

decided.