No. 84-565 

IN THE SUPREME3 COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1985 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

ARTHUR E. STAUDT, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

IWRILYN J. STAUDT, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Stillwater, 

The Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Joseph E. Mudd, Bridger, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Parker, Sweeney, Healow & Lee; Mark D. Parker, 

Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 28, 1985 

Decided: 231 1985 

Filed: MAY :! LJ~; 
Mr.- Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Arthur E. Staudt filed a petition for dissolution of 

marriage which was tried on May 3, 1984. The Stillwater 

County District Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and a judgment on August 6, 1984. Marilyn J. 

Staudt appeals from this judgment. We affirm. 

Arthur and Marilyn Staudt were married on June 8, 1957. 

They have two sons, born in 1960 and 1962. Arthur graduated 

with a degree in veterinary medicine in 1960. In 1964, the 

Staudts built a veterinary clinic in Absarokee, Montana, for 

$30,000; $10,000 of that sum was received as a gift from 

Marilyn's grandmother. 

In 1969 the Staudts bought a ranch for $56,000. It was 

purchased on a contract for deed, with the down payment being 

borrowed. In 1972, Arthur retired from the practice of 

veterinary medicine and the Staudts devoted their time to 

raising and selling registered. horses. The Staudts lived 

together on the ranch until 1981 when they separated and 

Marilyn moved from the ranch. They attempted an unsuccessful 

two-month reconciliation in 1982 prior to commencement of 

these proceedings. 

The only asset the Staudts have of any significant value 

is the ranch which has increased in value to approximately 

$450,000. Before trial, the Staudts stipulated that the 

ra.nch was to be sold and the District Court was asked only to 

set the percentage division of the sale proceeds between the 

parties. 

The District Court apportioned the Staudts' property 

approximately evenly. It is from this distribution that 

Marilyn appeals. The specific issues appellant addresses on 

appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the inheritance of the appellant should have 

been the sole property of the wife or included in the marital 

estate. 

2. Whether the court erred in the valuation of the 

stock in question. 

3. Whether the court abused its discretion in dividing 

the real property. 

4. Whether the court erred in requiring that the wife 

pay one-half of the ranch operating debt, existing at date of 

separation. 

5. Whether the District court erred when it failed to 

include, as a marital debt, the indebtedness incurred by the 

wife for the purpose of making the ranch payment. 

6. Whether the court erred in failing to include in the 

distribution of property, the tractor, manure spreader and 

disk. 

7. Whether a new trial should have been granted. 

The Inheritance of Appellant 

In 1975, Marilyn inherited various stocks from her 

grandmother. These stocks were placed in trust in 1975 and 

disbursed in 1979. The stocks have been held at Paine, 

Webber, Jackson & Curtis since 1979 as a stock portfolio. 

They have not been cashed and remain in the same form. 

Income from these stocks has been used in the marriage. 

Since separation of the parties, the income has been used by 

Marilyn alone. 

The District Court treated this stock as a marital asset 

and appellant asserts this is error. Appellant particularly 

takes exception to the District Court finding "[iln that the 

stock was preserved due in good part to Petitioner's contributions of his income, said stock should be considered a 

marital asset." 
Section 40-4-202 (1) , MCA, provides, in part, that in a 

dissolution of marriage, the District Court shall: 

"equitably apportion between the parties 

the property and assets belonging to 

either or both, however and whenever 

acquired and whether the title thereto is 

in the name of the husband or wife or 

both. . . . In dividing . . . property 

acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or 

descent . . . the court shall consider 

those contributions of the other spouse 

to the marriage, including: 

" (a) the nonmonetary contribution of a 

homemaker; 

" (b) the extent to which such contributions have facilitated the maintenance of 

this property; " 

This Court has recognized that inherited assets are 

marital property, but the District Court must consider the 

origin of the assets and the contributions of the divorcing 

parties to its preservation when making an award of assets. 

In re the Marriage of Keepers (Mont. 1984) , 691 P. 2d 810, 41 

St.Rep. 2163. There was no question that Arthur worked hard 

in the marriage. The preservation of the stock in its original form was due, at least in part, to his hard work. It 

never became necessary to sell the stock because the Staudts 

had an income from the ranch. 

The District Court awarded the stock to Marilyn in the 

division of property. We affirm the inclusion of this stock 

in the marital property. 

Valuation of Stocks 

The appellant also contends that the District Court 

erred in its valuation of the stock. The District Court 

valued the inherited stock at $60,500. Both parties submitted affidavits to the court listing their assets and liabilities. Both parties valued the stock in their affidavits at 

$60,000. At trial, appellant testified the stock was worth 

approximately $54,000 to $55,000. In his proposed findings 
of fact, respondent valued the stock at $60,497.45. In a.n 

affidavit submitted to the court after judgment was rendered-, 

appellant stated the stock had declined in value to $48,000. 

Clearly, the value of stock is subject to fluctuation. 

The trial judge is free to select the value he wishes, so 

long as there is substantial credible evidence to support the 

value he selects. In re the Marriage of Glass (Mont. 1985) , 

42 St.Rep. 328. Therefore, the trial judge did not err when 

he adopted the value respondent placed on the stock. 

We affirm the valuation of the inherited stock by the 

trial judge. 

50/50 Division of Property 

Appellant argues that the division of the ranch proceeds 

was an abuse of discretion by the District Court. The main 

thrust of her argument is that she contributed $10,000 to 

build their first veterinary clinic which, when sold, went 

toward the purchase of their ranch. 

Although it is true that one-third of the clinic wa.s 

paid for by the appellant, the remaining two-thirds was paid 

principally by the work and veterinary practice of the respondent. A trial court has far-reaching discretion in 

making property divisions in dissolution proceedings. In re 

the Marriage of Madden (Mont. 1984), 683 P.2d 493, 41 St.Rep. 

1332. FJe see no abuse of that discretion in the equal 

division of the ranch property. We affirm. 

50/50 Split of Ranch Operating Debt 

In 1981, when Marilyn and Arthur separated, the ranch 

operating debt was $29,400. Since the separation the debt 

has increased to $52,416. The District Court found this 

increase was a result of the sole actions of Arthur and he 

should be totally responsible for the debt incurred since the 

separation. The District Court found the debt at the time of 
separation, $29,400, to be a marital debt. Each party was to 

pay one-half of the sum, or $14,700. 

Appellant argues that the court erred by failing to 

offset this debt with the assets it secures, the horses and 

cattle. She contends that since Arthur was awarded the 

horses, he should have to pay the full debt on them. 

It may be true that the debt of $29,400 was mostly 

incurred for the purchase of horses for the ranch. However, 

prior to the sepa.ration, both Marilyn and Arthur worked on 

the ranch and incurred this ranch indebtedness together. The 

debt is a marital debt and the court may order it be borne by 

both parties. 

We affirm the equal allocation of ranch operating debt 

prior to separation. 

Failure to Include Ranch Payment as Debt 

Since the Staudts' separation, two annual contract 

payments on the ranch, for the years 1982 and 1983, have 

become due. The 1982 payment was made by Arthur. In 1983, 

Marilyn received a default notice that the ranch payment of 

$5,188.79 had not been made. She borrowed the money from her 

mother in order to make this payment. 

Appellant argues that it was error for the court not to 

include this debt incurred by her, among the martial debts 

and require repayment thereof. 

The District Court did not discuss this debt extensively, but did indicate awareness of it in its findings of fact 

number 10, when it stated: "Since separation, both have 

participated in making payments on the ranch and both have 

received some income from the ranch." 

It was a burden for Marilyn to have to make this ranch 

payment when she was not even living on the ranch. However, 

the payment was made to protect her equity in a very 
important asset. She, as well as her husband, is responsible 

for preserving the ranch because upon its sale she will 

receive one-half of the proceeds. As with the division of 

property, the District Court is given wide discretion in the 

division of debts. In re the Marriage of Loegering (Mont. 

1984), 689 P.2d 260, 41 St.Rep. 1892. We see no error in the 

District Court's failure to include this ranch payment in 

marital debts. We affirm. 

Failure to Include Farm Equipment 

Appellant argues that the District Court erred in failing to include a tractor, manure spreader and disk as marital 

assets when making the distribution of property. There are 

numerous items on the ranch that the District Court did not 

list specifically. The words "ranch property" were meant to 

include more than just the land and buildings. Since the 

tractor, the manure spreader and the disk were not singled 

out or listed as assets with any specific value, they were 

meant to be included in "ranch property." The District Court 

did not err in failing to name them separately in the distribution of property. 

New Trial 

After judgment had been rendered, appellant made a 

motion to amend judgment, or in the alternative for a new 

trial, on the issue of the value of the horses. Appellant 

testified at trial that the horses were worth at least 

$52,000. Respondent testified the horses were worth about 

$30,000. The District Court placed the value of the horses 

at $40,000. 

Appellant attached a Billings Gazette newspaper article 

to her brief on the motion. The article indicates that the 

horses owned by Arthur Staudt were racing well at Billings. 
Appellant contends this is evidence that the horses are worth 

more than $40,000. 

It may well be that the horses are worth more than 

$40,000 at this time. Clearly, assets will appreciate or 

depreciate. However, a new trial ca.nnot be granted every 

time the value of an asset changes. The value placed on the 

horses by the District Court was within the range of values 

given to the court at trial. A newspaper article is not 

sufficient evidence to mandate a new trial. We affirm. 

We concur: