[Cite as State v. Hoskinson, 2012-Ohio-3138.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

MORGAN COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsSTEPHANIE J. HOSKINSON 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P. J. 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

Case No. 11 AP 0003 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 10 CR 0029 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 10, 2012 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

MARK HOWDYSHELL SUSAN J. MONTGOMERY MCDONALD 

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY GOTTLIEB, JOHNSTON, BEAM 

19 East Main Street & DAL PONTE 

Mcconnelsville, Ohio 43756 320 Main Street, Post Office Box 190 

 Zanesville, Ohio 43702-0190 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 2

Wise, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Stephanie J. Hoskinson appeals her convictions and sentences, 

in the Morgan County Court of Common Pleas, for aggravated murder, murder, 

aggravated arson, and aggravated robbery. Appellee is the State of Ohio. The relevant 

facts leading to this appeal are as follows. 

{¶2} On September 24, 2008, appellant, Christopher Clark, and Christopher 

Border went to the home of Clark’s acquaintance Rodney Spencer in McConnelsville, 

Ohio, to purchase marijuana. Appellant, Clark, and Border had all been drinking and 

using drugs that day. Tr. at 372. At some point, Spencer was physically assaulted by 

the group. Some of the blows came from the use of a hammer. Spencer was knocked 

unconscious, and was thereafter fatally injured by a fire that consumed his home. 

According to Border, appellant started the fire with a lighter and some gasoline Clark 

found in a can on the porch. Tr. at 380. 

{¶3} On September 22, 2010, the Morgan County Grand Jury indicted 

appellant on one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, two 

counts of aggravated arson, one count of aggravated murder during the commission of 

aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated murder during the commission of 

aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated murder during the commission of 

aggravated arson. 

{¶4} On October 27, 2010, a competency evaluation was authorized by the trial 

court. On March 29, 2011, appellant was found competent to stand trial. 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 3

{¶5} Appellant additionally filed a motion to suppress evidence, focusing on 

statements she made to law enforcement. Following a suppression hearing on June 30, 

2011, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress. 

{¶6} The case proceeded to a jury trial on July 18 and 19, 2011. After hearing 

the evidence and arguments, the jury convicted appellant on the following five counts: 

{¶7} Count 2: Aggravated Robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01 (A)(3), a felony 

of the first degree; 

{¶8} Count 3: Aggravated Arson, in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(1), a felony of 

the first degree; 

{¶9} Count 4: Aggravated Arson, in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(2), a felony of 

the second degree; 

{¶10} Count 6: Murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), a felony subject to the 

penalties set forth in R.C. 2929.02; and 

{¶11} Count 7: Aggravated Murder during the Commission of Aggravated Arson, 

in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B), a felony subject to the penalties set forth in R.C. 

2929.03. 

{¶12} The trial court sentenced appellant on August 2, 2011 to life imprisonment 

with parole eligibility after forty years. Specifically, appellant was sentenced to three 

years for aggravated robbery, seven years for aggravated arson (R.C. 2909.02(A)(1)), 

five years for aggravated arson (R.C. 2909.02(A)(2)), fifteen years to life for murder, and 

life imprisonment with parole eligibility after thirty years for aggravated murder during 

the commission of aggravated arson. 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 4

{¶13} Appellant filed a notice of appeal on August 24, 2011. She herein raises 

the following four Assignments of Error: 

{¶14} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE APPELLANT TO 

CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS BY NOT ‘ENGAGING IN THE ANALYSIS’ 

REQUIRED BY ORC §2929.14(E)(4). 

{¶15} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING 

THE APPELLANT CONSIDERING THE FACTORS IN ORC §2929.12 BY NOT 

IMPOSING A SENTENCE CONSISTENT WITH SENTENCES IMPOSED FOR 

SIMILAR CRIMES COMMITTED BY SIMILAR OFFENDERS UNDER ORC 

§2929.11(B). 

{¶16} “III. APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL. 

{¶17} “IV. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE NUMEROUS ERRORS 

DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF A FAIR TRIAL.” 

I. 

{¶18} In her First Assignment of Error, appellant contends the trial court erred in 

imposing consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(E)(4). We disagree. 

{¶19} As an initial matter, we note appellant concedes that the statutory 

amendments under H.B. 86, effective 9-30-2011, took effect after the sentencing date in 

the case sub judice. See Appellant’s Brief at 5. We therefore herein rely on the Ohio 

Supreme Court's Foster decision [109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006–Ohio–856], which holds that 

judicial fact finding is not required before a court imposes non-minimum, maximum or 

consecutive prison terms. See, e.g., State v. Williams, Muskingum App. No. CT2009–
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 5

0006, 2009–Ohio–5296, ¶ 19, citing State v. Hanning, Licking App.No. 2007CA00004, 

2007–Ohio–5547, ¶ 9. Subsequent to Foster, in a plurality opinion, the Ohio Supreme 

Court established a two-step procedure for reviewing a felony sentence. State v. Kalish,

120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008–Ohio–4912, 896 N.E.2d 124. The first step is to “examine the 

sentencing court's compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the 

sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.” 

Kalish at ¶ 4. If this first step is satisfied, the second step requires the trial court's 

decision be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id.

{¶20} In the case sub judice, the trial court stated in its written entry and on the 

record that it had considered the purposes of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 

the seriousness and recidivism factors found in R.C. 2929.12. See Sentencing Entry, 

August 2, 2011 at 2; Sentencing Tr. at 12-17. As noted in our recitation of facts, 

appellant was sentenced to three years for aggravated robbery and was sentenced to 

seven years for the offense of aggravated arson in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(1). 

These were within the range of prison terms for felonies of the first degree, which range 

from three to ten years. Appellant was also sentenced to five years for the offense of 

aggravated arson in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(2) and fined $10,000.00. This was 

within the range of prison terms for a felony of the second degree, which ranges from 

two to eight years and carries a maximum fine of $15,000.00. In regard to the murder 

count, the prison term for murder during the commission of aggravated robbery is for an 

indefinite term of fifteen years to life as mandated by R.C. 2929.02(B)(1). Appellant was 

sentenced to that term. In regard to aggravated murder, the prison term for aggravated 

murder during the commission of aggravated arson is either life without parole or life 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 6

with parole eligibility after serving a range of twenty to thirty full years as mandated by 

R.C. 2929.03(A)(1). Appellant was sentenced for the aggravated murder of Rodney 

Spencer to life with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment. 

{¶21} The two aggravated arson counts were merged, as were the aggravated 

murder and murder counts. The aggravated robbery, aggravated murder, and 

aggravated arson sentences were ordered served consecutively. See Judgment Entry 

of Sentencing at 4.1

{¶22} Based on our review of the record, and pursuant to Foster and Kalish, we 

do not find the trial court acted clearly and convincingly contrary to law or abused its 

discretion in rendering consecutive sentences under the facts and circumstances of this 

case. 

{¶23} Appellant's First Assignment of Error is therefore overruled. 

II. 

{¶24} In her Second Assignment of Error, appellant argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion in sentencing her in light of the seriousness and recidivism factors 

under R.C. 2929.12(B) and (D) and the consistency considerations under R.C. 

2929.11(B). We disagree. 

Seriousness and Recidivism Factors

{¶25} R.C. 2929.12(B) states as follows: 

{¶26} “The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply 

regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors, as 

 

1

 Appellant’s brief fails to include a copy of the sentencing entry under appeal. See 

Loc.App.R. 9(A). We have reviewed the original entry in the trial court’s file. 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 7

indicating that the offender's conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting 

the offense: 

{¶27} “(1) The physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of the offense due 

to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physical or mental 

condition or age of the victim. 

{¶28} “(2) The victim of the offense suffered serious physical, psychological, or 

economic harm as a result of the offense. 

{¶29} “(3) The offender held a public office or position of trust in the community, 

and the offense related to that office or position. 

{¶30} “(4) The offender's occupation, elected office, or profession obliged the 

offender to prevent the offense or bring others committing it to justice. 

{¶31} “(5) The offender's professional reputation or occupation, elected office, or 

profession was used to facilitate the offense or is likely to influence the future conduct of 

others. 

{¶32} “(6) The offender's relationship with the victim facilitated the offense. 

{¶33} “(7) The offender committed the offense for hire or as a part of an 

organized criminal activity. 

{¶34} “(8) In committing the offense, the offender was motivated by prejudice 

based on race, ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation, or religion. 

{¶35} “(9) If the offense is a violation of section 2919.25 or a violation of section 

2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised Code involving a person who was a family 

or household member at the time of the violation, the offender committed the offense in 

the vicinity of one or more children who are not victims of the offense, and the offender 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 8

or the victim of the offense is a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of 

one or more of those children.” 

{¶36} In turn, R.C. 2929.12(D) states as follows: 

{¶37} “The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply 

regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors indicating that the 

offender is likely to commit future crimes: 

{¶38} “(1) At the time of committing the offense, the offender was under release 

from confinement before trial or sentencing, under a sanction imposed pursuant to 

section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or under post-release 

control pursuant to section 2967.28 or any other provision of the Revised Code for an 

earlier offense or had been unfavorably terminated from post-release control for a prior 

offense pursuant to division (B) of section 2967.16 or section 2929.141 of the Revised 

Code. 

{¶39} “(2) The offender previously was adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant 

to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or pursuant to Chapter 

2152. of the Revised Code, or the offender has a history of criminal convictions. 

{¶40} “(3) The offender has not been rehabilitated to a satisfactory degree after 

previously being adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant to Chapter 2151. of the 

Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or pursuant to Chapter 2152. of the Revised 

Code, or the offender has not responded favorably to sanctions previously imposed for 

criminal convictions. 

{¶41} “(4) The offender has demonstrated a pattern of drug or alcohol abuse that 

is related to the offense, and the offender refuses to acknowledge that the offender has 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 9

demonstrated that pattern, or the offender refuses treatment for the drug or alcohol 

abuse. 

{¶42} “(5) The offender shows no genuine remorse for the offense.” 

{¶43} There is no requirement in R.C. 2929.12 that the trial court must state on 

the record that it has considered the statutory criteria concerning seriousness and 

recidivism or even discussed them. State v. Hobby, Ashland App.No. 11 COA 41, 2012-

Ohio-2420, ¶ 35, citing State v. Polick (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 428, 431, 655 N.E.2d 

820 (additional citations omitted). Nonetheless, we have recognized that “[w]here the 

record lacks sufficient data to justify the sentence, the court may well abuse its 

discretion by imposing that sentence without a suitable explanation.” State v. 

Firouzmandi, Licking App.No. 2006-CA-41, 2006-Ohio-5823, ¶ 52. 

{¶44} In the case sub judice, although not required to explain its analysis on the 

record, the trial court stated that it had considered, inter alia, that the victim, Rodney 

Spencer, suffered physical, psychological, or economic harm because of appellant’s 

acts, and that appellant had committed the offenses for hire or as part of an organized 

criminal activity. Sentencing Entry at 2. See 2929.12(B)(2) and (7), supra. The court 

also noted that appellant had prior criminal convictions, that she had not favorably 

responded to previous sanctions, and that she demonstrated a pattern of drug or 

alcohol abuse. Id. See R.C. 2929.12(D), supra. Although appellant takes issue with the 

trial court’s emphases on these factors and the conclusions drawn from the same, and 

further argues that the offenses are not likely to recur (R.C. 2929.12(E)(4)), we are 

unable to conclude that the court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably, or 

that the court violated her right to due process in its sentencing determinations. 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 10

Consistency

{¶45} R.C. 2929.11(B) reads in pertinent part as follows: “A sentence imposed 

for a felony shall be * * * consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes 

committed by similar offenders.” As a general rule, our review on appeal is limited to 

those materials in the record that were before the trial court. In re McClain, Licking App. 

No. 01CA92, 2002-Ohio-2467, 2002 WL 710434, citing State v. Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio 

St.2d 402, 8 O.O.3d 405, 377 N.E.2d 500. Clearly, “[a]n obstacle to appellate review for 

consistency of individual sentences under the Ohio plan is the current lack of 

acceptable sentencing data and records from which to determine the mainstream 

sentencing range for specific offenses.” State v. Ryan, Hamilton App. No. C-020283, 

2003-Ohio-1188, 2003 WL 1094003, quoting Griffin and Katz, Sentencing Consistency: 

Basic Principles Instead of Numerical Grids: The Ohio Plan (2002), 53 Case W.R.L.Rev. 

14, 57. In addition, “[c]onsistency * * * does not necessarily mean uniformity.” Ryan,

supra, quoting Griffin and Katz at 12. 

{¶46} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G), a reviewing court will not disturb a 

defendant's sentence unless it finds, “by clear and convincing evidence, that the record 

does not support the sentence or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State 

v. Torres, Lake App.No. 2001-L-122, 2003-Ohio-1878. Appellant herein chiefly contrasts 

her sentence to co-defendants Clark and Border, who entered pleas and purportedly 

each received life sentences with the possibility of parole after eighteen years.2

 

Appellant, also referencing the $10,000.00 fine she received, maintains that she has 

essentially suffered a “trial tax” based on her decision not to enter a plea. See

 

2

 Appellant does not specify if Clark’s sentence information is in the record before us. 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 11

Appellant’s Brief at 15. However, upon review of the record, we find appellant's 

contention that she has suffered prejudicial error from inconsistent sentencing to be 

without merit. 

{¶47} Appellant's Second Assignment of Error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶48} In her Third Assignment of Error, appellant maintains she was deprived of 

the effective assistance of trial counsel. We disagree. 

{¶49} Our standard of review for ineffective assistance claims is set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Ohio 

adopted this standard in the case of State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 

N.E.2d 373. These cases require a two-pronged analysis: First, we must determine 

whether counsel's assistance was ineffective; whether counsel's performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonable representation and was violative of any of his 

essential duties to the client. If we find ineffective assistance of counsel, we must then 

determine whether or not the defense was actually prejudiced by counsel's 

ineffectiveness such that the reliability of the outcome of the trial is suspect. This 

requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's 

unprofessional error, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. Trial counsel 

is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675, 693 

N.E.2d 267. 

{¶50} Appellant, noting that one of her co-defendants, Border, testified about 

appellant’s partying lifestyle, (Tr. at 363), first challenges defense counsel’s decision not 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 12

to call Tony Harris (appellant’s cousin), Dawn White (appellant’s friend since high 

school), and Carrie Mayle (appellant’s best friend) as additional character witnesses.3

Appellant also notes that Valerie McKibben, one of her co-workers, could have been 

utilized as an alibi witness. We note, however, that such an argument relies heavily on 

speculation, as from the present record we cannot ascertain the effect of these 

proposed witnesses on the jury. “ ‘[C]omplaints of uncalled witnesses are not favored, 

because the presentation of testimonial evidence is a matter of trial strategy and 

because allegations of what a witness would have testified are largely speculative.’ ” 

State v. Phillips, Stark App.No. 2010CA00338, 2011-Ohio-6569, ¶ 26, quoting Buckelew 

v. United States (5th Cir.1978), 575 F.2d 515, 521. In this instance, we find appellant 

has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonable representation and violated any essential duties to the client on 

the basis of uncalled witnesses. 

{¶51} Appellant secondly directs us to what she calls “nervous blunders” made 

by defense counsel during voir dire, which appellant claims gave the impression to the 

jury that defense counsel was inexperienced. In the first instance, trial counsel drew an 

analogy to making a decision beyond a reasonable doubt to making an important 

personal medical decision: 

{¶52} “[DEFENSE COUNSEL] MR. MOOREHEAD: And [the doctor] is going to 

tell you that. Are you going to just take his word for it, say - - 

{¶53} “[JUROR] AMANDA D. WRIGHT: No. 

 

3

 Defense counsel nonetheless did call no less than four witnesses who testified in part 

as to appellant’s character. See Tr. at 498 et seq., 507 et seq., 524 et seq., and 532 et 

seq. This group included Carrie Mayle. 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 13

{¶54} “MR. MOOREHEAD: What are you going to want? 

{¶55} “AMANDA D. WRIGHT: I guess I would want at least a reason why. 

{¶56} “MR. MOOREHEAD: Yeah. Would you want to research that doctor’s 

background, for instance - - 

{¶57} “AMANDA D. WRIGHT: Yeah. 

{¶58} “MR. MOOREHEAD: - - to see his credentials? 

{¶59} “AMANDA D. WRIGHT: Um-huh. 

{¶60} “MR. MOOREHEAD: Maybe get a second opinion? 

{¶61} “AMANDA D. WRIGHT: Um-huh. 

{¶62} “MR. MOOREHEAD: I mean, maybe do some research on your own. In 

this case, I shouldn’t have said do some research on your own. You’re all going to be 

told not to do you (sic) own research. I shouldn’t have even said that.” 

{¶63} Tr. at 47-48. 

{¶64} In the second instance, trial counsel discussed the burden on the State to 

prove its case: 

{¶65} “I understand that the burden is on them. I understand that they have to 

prove their case, each and every element of the crimes that they’re charging her with 

beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. It’s the most - - in my mind, it’s 

the most important role we, as citizens, can have. You never get that much 

participation.” 

{¶66} Tr. at 61. 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 14

{¶67} The prosecutor thereafter pointed out that defense counsel had used the 

expression “to the exclusion of” any or every reasonable doubt. See Tr. at 70. Defense 

counsel subsequently corrected himself as follows: 

{¶68} “MR. MOOREHEAD: We - - we’re here on the defense. It’s not our duty 

to prove our story beyond a reasonable doubt. I didn’t say beyond - - beyond and 

excluding a reasonable doubt to confuse anybody. In my mind, it’s beyond a 

reasonable doubt. There is no doubt - - or reasonable doubt. There is no reasonable 

doubt, and so it would exclude all reasonable doubt. I wasn’t trying to trick anybody.” 

{¶69} Tr. at 84. 

{¶70} Although appellant has not presently raised a sufficiency or manifest 

weight of the evidence claim, our review of the overall trial transcript, particularly the 

testimony of the various law enforcement and fire investigators and Christopher Border, 

does not persuade us that appellant’s case was prejudiced by her trial counsel’s selfcorrected comments during the voir dire process. 

{¶71} Appellant's Third Assignment of Error is overruled. 

IV. 

{¶72} In her Fourth Assignment of Error, appellant argues she was deprived of a 

fair trial based on the existence of cumulative error. We disagree. 

{¶73} The doctrine of cumulative error provides that a conviction will be reversed 

where the cumulative effect of evidentiary errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the 

constitutional right to a fair trial even though each of numerous instances of trial court 

error does not singularly constitute cause for reversal. State v. DeMarco (1987), 31 

Ohio St.3d 191, 509 N .E.2d 1256, paragraph two of the syllabus. The doctrine has 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 15

been expanded to include the cumulative effect of all errors, not just evidentiary errors. 

See State v. Neal, Champaign App.Nos. 2000–CA–16, 2000–CA–18, 2002-Ohio-6786, 

¶ 101, citing State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 656 N.E.2d 623, 1995–Ohio–168. 

Nonetheless, the doctrine is not applicable to cases where the court has not found 

multiple instances of harmless error. State v. Skerness, Coshocton App.No. 09-CA-28, 

2011-Ohio-188, ¶ 77, citing Garner at 64. 

{¶74} In support of her argument, appellant redirects us to the issues referenced 

earlier in her brief, i.e., those pertaining to sentencing and ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. Notwithstanding this Court's past reluctance to embrace cumulative error as 

grounds for reversal (see State v. Mascarella (July 6, 1995), Tuscarawas App.No. 

94AP100075), upon review we find reversible error has not been demonstrated on this 

basis. 

{¶75} Appellant's Fourth Assignment of Error is overruled. 

{¶76} For the reasons stated in the foregoing, the decision of the Court of 

Common Pleas, Morgan County, is hereby affirmed. 

By: Wise, J. 

Gwin, P. J., and 

Hoffman, J., concur. 

 ___________________________________ 

 ___________________________________ 

 ___________________________________ 

 JUDGES 

JWW/d 0621 
Morgan County, Case No. 11 AP 0003 16

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MORGAN COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

STEPHANIE J. HOSKINSON : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 11 AP 0003 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the 

judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Morgan County, Ohio, is affirmed. 

 Costs assessed to appellant. 

 ___________________________________ 

 ___________________________________ 

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 JUDGES