Under Rule 25(d)(1) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure, A dminist rator K are n 1 G. Mills has been substituted for for mer Administrator Steven Pre ston. F ED . R. C IV . P. 25(d). De fe nd ant a lso re qu e sts a c ontin ua nc e of the tr ia l w hic h is no w s c he du le d to 2 beg in on J anuar

y 13, 2010. I t is quit e cle ar to this Court, however , that the Court of F eder al Claims has no 3 jurisdiction over the Title VI Iclaims. See Ha nsson v. Norton, 411 F.3d 231, 236 ( D.C. Cir. UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

___________________________________________ ) RI CHARD AMERI CA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Ci vi l A cti onNo. 03 -18 07 (P L F) ) KAREN G. MI L L S, ) Administrator, Small Business Administration, ) ) De fe nd ant. )

1 ___________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON AND ORDER This matter is befor e the Court on the de fenda nt’s rene wed motion to dismi ss the

case on the g round that this Court is wit hout jurisdiction to determine whethe r the de fenda nt brea ched a

settlement ag ree ment betwee n plaintiff and de fenda nt — a deter

mination that de fe nd ant m a int a ins mus t be ma de be fo re pla int if f m ay pr oc e e d to tr ia l on

his un de rl yingTi tle VI Iclaims. Def

endant a rgues that the que stion of whether the settlement agree ment was 2 b r e a c h e d i s w i th i nth e e x c l u s i v e j ur i s d i c t i o no f th e C o urto f

F e d e r a l C l a i m s . A c c o r d i n g l y, de fe nd ant a

rgue s, thi s Co ur

t e ith e r m us t di smi ss t

he c a se or tr ans fe r i t to the Cla ims Court to de te rm ine tha

t c ontr a c t qu e sti on

be fo re e ith e r t

hat Co ur t or thi s o ne may

c on sid e r p la int if

f’ s T itl e VI Ic la ims

. 32005) (c ollectingcase s); Munoz v. England, Civil Action No. 05-2472, 2006 WL3361509 at *5

(D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2006) ; Westover v. United States, 71 Fe d. Cl. 635, 640-41 (Fe d. Cl. 2006); id. at 640 (“ This court is unable to re instate the Title VI Iclaim, let alone e valuate that claim . . . Reinstatement of the discr imination claim comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district c ourt .” ); Sc hn e lle v. Un ite d St ate s, 69 F e d. Cl. 46 3, 46 6- 67 (F e d. Cl. 20 06 ). Th e re fo re , if de fe nd ant’ s argume nt i s c or re c t, t wo se pa rate c ourt s e a c h w ou ld h ave to a dju dic ate a pa rt of thi s case for it to be fina lly

resolved. 2 The Court hea

rd ora l argument on the motion to dis miss on Decembe r 23, 2009. Def endant a rgued in its papers a

nd at ora l argument that its posit ion is compelled by the dec ision of the D.C. Circuit in Br own v. United States, 389 F .3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and its prog eny . At the ur g ingof

c ouns e l f or the de fe nd ant, the Court

ha s r e -r e a d th e D. C. C ir c uit ’s op ini on in Br own, J udg e Colly er’ s opinion for the district court in B rown, a nd ever y post-Br own dec ision cited in def

endant’ s brief. U

pon revie w of the c ase la

w, the Court is more convinc ed than e ver that — despite the vig or and pe rsistence of def endant’ s counsel — the de fenda nt is flat-out wrongin its readingof the c ase la w. Def endant a rgues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide whe ther the settlement agree ment (a c ontrac t) was br eac hed, bec ause only the Court of F eder al Claims has jurisdiction to consider suits claiming br eac h of contra ct ag ainst the g overnme nt. Defe ndant made this same a

rgument in briefingits original motion to dismi ss; its Notice of Supplemental Authority cited B rown for

the proposition that “jurisdiction to decide whe ther a n ag ency brea ched a

settlement ag ree ment [i n a Title VI Icase wher e dama g es soug ht exceed $10,000] lies exclusively

in the Court of Fe dera l Claims.” Notice of Supplemental Authority at 1. The Court denied de fenda

nt’s motion to di smiss on Decembe r 27, 2006, Amer ica v. Pre ston, 468 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D.D.C. 2006), a

nd its mot ion to reconsider on Fe bruar

y 12, 2007. See Amer ica v. Preston, Civil Action No. 03-1807, O rder , Dkt. No. 29 (D.D .C. Feb. 12, 2007)

.Contr ary to d e fe nd ant’ s a sse rt ion , Jud g e Col ly e r d id n ot d ir e c t or or de r p la int if

f i n 4 Br own to add a br eac h of contra ct claim; she “ offe red Ms. B rown a n opportunity

to amend her complaint,” and Ms. B rown a cce pted the off er by filing a n amende d complaint. See B rown v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 228. 3

As defe ndant cor

rec tly points out, t he Tuc ker A ct provides that the Court of Fe dera l Claims has ex clusive jurisdiction to render judgme nt on any

claim ag ainst the United States for more than $10,000 that is founded on a n express or implied contrac t with the United State s. 28 U. S.C. §§ 13 46 (a ), 14 91 (a )( 1) . Se e Gr e e nh ill v. Spe lli ng s, 48 2 F .3 d 5 69 , 5 75 (D .C. Cir. 2007); Hansson v. Norton, 411 F .3d at 232. In this case, howe ver, pla intiff has not asser ted any brea ch of c ontrac t claim nor soug ht money damag es for

any such bre ach of

contra ct. The question whether

the settlement agree ment was bre ache d arises solely beca use (a s defe ndant

argue s) pla int if

f i s n ot e nti tle d to purs ue his Ti tle VI Ic la ims in t he a bs e nc e of a br e a c h. I t is a pr e dic ate qu e sti on

that mu st b e de c ide d e ith e r b y thi s Co ur t or by the Court of F e de ra l Cla ims

. Br own was quite diff

ere nt. I t was a c ase in whic h the plaintiff expressly alleg ed a brea ch of c ontrac t, a settlement agree ment of a discr imination claim, as a basis for monetary relief . As J udg e Colly er note d: I t is true that the Settlement Ag ree ment did not contain a total waiver of Ms. Br own’s right to sue in feder al cour t. In the eve nt of a bre ach, it wa s provided that Ms. B rown may reque st either enfor ceme nt of the terms of the settlement or re instatement of the orig inal EEO cha

rg e. Having ame nded her c omplaint to all ege a breach of the Se ttlement Agree ment, Ms. Brown has made he r elec tion and cannot reinstate the 1994 allegations. Br own v. United States, 271 F . Supp. 2d 225, 228-29 (D.D.C. 2003) ( emphasis adde d). Since 4 Ms. Brown elec ted to add a c laim for re lief expressly based on a

n alleg ed bre ach of

contra ct and soug ht money

damag es of more than $10,000, the D.C. Circuit conc luded that the Court of4

F e de ra l Cla ims ha d e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n o ve r t hat c ontr a c t c la im: Br own alleg es the United States De partment of A g riculture br e a c he d th e te rm s o f i ts s e ttl e me nt a g re e me nt w ithhe r a nd tha t it s brea ch entitles her bo th to damag es in excess of $10,000 and to the reinstateme nt of her a dminist rative c omplaint alleg ing discrimination and re taliation in violation of Titl e VI I . The Gover nment points out

, a nd Brown no w ag

re es wi th resp e c t to Count III, this case should havebeen brought in the Court of Fe de ra l Cla im s purs ua

nt t o th e Tu c ke r A c t be c a us e sh e a dv anc e s a contra ct claim ag ainst the United States in excess of $10,000. Br own v. United States, 389 F .3d at 1297 (e mphasis added)

.

The c ourt of appe als rea ched the conclusion that the Court of F eder al Claims had jurisdiction not

beca use Ms. Br own had to first prove that the g overnme nt brea ched the settlement agree ment as a pr edicate to seekingrelief under Title VI I , but “bec ause the contra ct question arises in a suit ag ainst the United States for mor e than $10,000 in dama g es.” B rown v. Un ite d St ate s, 38 9 F .3 d at 12 97 ; se e a lso B ro wn v. Un ite d St ate s, 84 F e d. Cl. 40 0, 40 3 ( F e d. Cl. 20 08 ) ( jur isd ic tio n in

Court of F e de ra l Cla ims be c a

us e B ro wn

a dv anc e d c ontr a c t c la im a g a ins t United States g overnme nt for more than $10,000). Plaintiff has br oug ht no brea ch of c ontrac t claim in this case, a

nd so jurisdiction does not lie ex clusively in the Court of Fe dera l Claims. C f. Gre enhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d at 573 (“Jurisdiction i s determined by looking to the c omplaint. I f G re e nh ill e xplic itl y

or in e sse nc e se e ks mon e y

dama g e s in

e xce ss o f $ 10 ,0 00 , ju

ri sd ic tio n r e sts exclusively

with the Court of Fe dera l Claims.”); see also Ha nsson v. Norton, 411 F.3d a t 232, 234; Keith v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd., Civil Action No 02-1054, 2006 WL2085389 at *5 (D.D.C. Jul y

25, 2006). By contra st, in S aksena singh v. Sec reta ry of Education, 126 F.3d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the plaintiff did not see k to rec over f or bre ach of

the Title VI Isettlement agree ment, butWhil e in this case, de fenda nt does not raise the settlement agree ment as an 5 aff irmative def

ense, it does insist that the question of the settlement a g ree ment’s bre ach must be resolved be fore the Title VI Iclaims ca n proce ed to trial. As for que stions reg ardingwhether there was a

brea ch of the settlement agree ment 6 be c a us e te ste rs we re inv olv e d o r whe the r t he br e a c h o f t

he se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt w a s mate ri a l, 5 — as plaintiff ha s done her e — brought only claims of substantive Title VI Iviolations. I t was the de fe nd ant t

hat r a ise d th e pr ior

se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt a s a de fe ns e . T he pla int if

f i n Saksenasing h argued that she c ould repudiate the settlement bec ause of the def endant’ s brea ch, and that if a

brea ch wa s found, she c ould pursue her underly ing c laims in thi s Court. The cour t of appe als agree d, concludingthat the district court ha d jurisdiction to decide the br eac h issue:

Where a party raises a settlement agree ment as a de fense , the District Court must factually deter mine the issues surrounding the agree ment. See B owden v. U.S., 323 U.S. App. D.C. 164, 106 F.3d 433, 439 ( D.C. Cir. 1997) (District Court resolve s fac tual iss ue s r e g ard ingTi tle VI Ise ttl e me nt a g re e me nt) . F a c e d w ith Saksenasing h’s asser

tion of her or igina l discrimination complaint and the De partment’s de fense that the settlement agree ment barr ed the suit, the judge or jury in the District Court, dependingupon the circ umstances, should have deter mined, as a thre shold matter, whether in fac t the Depa

rtment had bre ache d the settlement ag ree ment. . . On re mand, if it is found that the Depa rtment brea ched, then the settlement a g ree ment cannot ba r Saksena singh’ s orig inal claim. Howe ver, if it is found that the De partment did not brea ch the agree ment, then the settlement will bar Sakse nasing h from pr oc e e din gwi th h e r o ri g ina l c la im. Saksenasing h v. Secre tary of Education, 126 F.3d at 350; see id. at 351 (“The defe nse that the

se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt b ars Saks e na sin g h’ s su it i s su bs tanti ve , n ot j ur isd ic tio na l.” ). Th at is prec isely the situation presente d here

. The D.C. Circuit dec ision in S aksena singh the ref ore 5 controls this case. 6the Court has alre ady decide d those questions, twice re jectingdefe ndant’s ar guments. The Court will not vis it these issues ag ain. 6

Acc ording ly , for the r easons state d above, it is here by ORDERED that def

endant’ s rene wed motion to dismi ss [ Docke t 65] is DENI ED;

and it i s FURTHE R ORDERED that the parties sha ll, in their J oint Pretrial Statement, due to be filed on January

8, 2010, addre ss the followingquestions: (1) how and when to re solve the brea ch of c ontrac t issue; (2) whethe r and howto bifurcate the trial of the issues in this case; and (3) whe ther to postpone all or a portion of the trial now sc heduled to commenc e on Janaury 13, 2010. SO ORDERED. /s/________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: De cembe r 30, 2009