2024 IL App (1st) 230247-U

No. 1-23-0247 

Order filed April 17, 2024 

Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

 Respondent-Appellee, 

 v. 

CHARLES PRITCHERD, 

Petitioner-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 08 CR 17050

Honorable 

Joseph M. Claps, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s judgment dismissing petitioner’s petition for postconviction relief 

at the second stage for failing to make a substantial showing of a constitutional 

violation is affirmed.

¶ 2 Petitioner Charles Pritcherd appeals the second-stage dismissal of his petition for 

postconviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act), 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et 

seq. (West 2012). The trial court held that petitioner failed to make a substantial showing of a 
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constitutional violation. He now contends that we should reverse the judgment of the trial court 

because he did not receive the reasonable assistance of counsel.

¶ 3 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.1

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On October 1, 2009, following a bench trial, petitioner Charles Pritcherd was convicted of 

attempted first degree murder, attempted armed robbery, and being an armed habitual criminal. 

Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 35, 15, and 20 years respectively.

¶ 6 The trial testimony established that on August 25, 2008, at about 2:50 p.m., petitioner and 

another man, Kendrick King, entered a store run by Naeil and Kalil Elhaj.2 Petitioner walked to 

the back of the store and opened one of the refrigerators while King walked to the registers. Naeil, 

who was suspicious of both men, confronted petitioner. In response, petitioner drew a gun, pointed 

it at Naeil’s head, and announced a robbery. Petitioner then pointed the gun at Naeil’s stomach 

and pulled the trigger. Naeil heard a pop and smelled smoke, but the gun did not fire.

¶ 7 Naeil and petitioner struggled for the gun, during which the gun fired two more times. 

Neither shot hit Naeil. During this struggle, King jumped over the counter to try to rob the register. 

Kalil retrieved a knife from underneath the counter, ran to petitioner, and stabbed him in the back. 

The impact broke the blade from the grip. 

¶ 8 Petitioner and King fled the store, entered a red minivan, and drove away. Delores Mina, 

the owner of a business across the street, saw part of the van’s license plate. Police responded to 

the nearest hospital and found a red minivan with a license plate consistent with what Mina saw. 

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), 

this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.

2 Because they share a last name, the two victims are hereafter referred to by their first names.
No. 1-23-0247 

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The van was registered to Tamika Thomas, petitioner’s girlfriend, who let petitioner borrow the 

van earlier that day.

¶ 9 Thomas revealed that petitioner returned home at about 4 p.m. the same day as the 

attempted robbery with blood on his shirt and shoe and he told Thomas he had been stabbed and 

shot. Thomas attempted to clean the wound on petitioner’s back, but she believed a wound on his 

foot required medical attention and she drove him to the hospital in her red minivan. When shown 

a picture of King, Thomas identified him by his nickname, “Bear,” because she did not know his 

real name.

¶ 10 Officers recovered a single bullet at the store that had pierced a bottle of bleach. The bullet

from the second gunshot and the gun itself were never found. Kalil identified petitioner from a 

photo array, but Naeil could not identify anyone because his glasses were knocked off during the 

incident. During opening statements and closing arguments, the State argued that petitioner’s 

wound in his foot was the result of petitioner shooting himself in the foot during the struggle for 

the gun.

¶ 11 Following petitioner’s conviction, we affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Pritcherd, 2011 

IL App (1st) 102169-U (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).

¶ 12 On May 5, 2012, petitioner filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. Among other 

claims, petitioner asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because “petitioner 

showed [trial counsel] his feet to dispel the State’s repetitious remarks that the defendant shot 

himself in the foot while trying to kill Naeil Elhaj. Counsel could have offered medical charts to 

refute those claims.” Petitioner did not specify what records or what they would have shown.
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¶ 13 The trial court docketed the petition and appointed postconviction counsel. On June 28, 

2021, postconviction counsel filed a “supplemental exhibit” to the pro se petition, which was an 

affidavit from petitioner which read, “I, Charles Pritcherd, being first duly sworn, state that I have 

read the foregoing petition and that the contents contained therein are true and accurate to the best 

of my knowledge, information and belief.” Counsel also filed a Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. 

July 1, 2017) certificate the same day. That certificate stated that counsel had consulted with 

petitioner about his claims, examined the trial record and trial counsel’s file, and submitted the 

supplemental exhibit because it was “necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s 

contentions.” Counsel did not file an amended postconviction petition.

¶ 14 On June 14, 2022, the State moved to dismiss the petition. With respect to petitioner’s 

claim that trial counsel failed to present medical evidence regarding his foot, the State noted that 

the petition contained no medical records as exhibits, thus there was no way to determine whether 

that evidence could have changed the outcome. At a hearing on December 15, 2022, postconviction 

counsel stated that she spoke to petitioner, and that he could not provide her with any additional 

information about his claims, nor did petitioner provide any additional information to prior 

counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition on December 27, 2022, for failing to make a 

substantial showing of a constitutional violation and this appeal followed.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 Petitioner raises only one argument on appeal: that he was denied the reasonable assistance 

of counsel under Rule 651(c) where counsel failed to amend the petition to include factual details 

about his medical treatment and failed to obtain and attach petitioner’s medical records regarding 

his foot.
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¶ 17 The Act provides a mechanism by which a petitioner may raise a collateral attack against 

his or her conviction based on a claim of actual innocence or where there was a substantial denial 

of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States, the State of Illinois, or both. 725 

ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2012). The purpose of postconviction proceedings is to allow inquiry 

into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and sentence that have not been, and 

could not have been, adjudicated previously on appeal. People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 12.

¶ 18 The Act sets out a three-stage process for the adjudication of postconviction petitions. Id. 

at ¶ 45. If the trial court does not dismiss the petition as frivolous or patently without merit at the 

first stage, the petition advances to the second stage. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 245 

(2001). Counsel is appointed to represent the defendant, if necessary, and the State is permitted to 

file responsive pleadings. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 245; 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2012); 725 ILCS 

5/122-5 (West 2012). At the second stage, the trial court must determine whether the petition and 

any accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. 

Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246. All well-pleaded facts not positively rebutted by the trial record are 

construed as true. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006). 

¶ 19 In postconviction cases, there is no constitutional right to counsel. People v. Addison, 2023 

IL 127119, ¶ 19. Instead, the right to counsel is provided by statute, and petitioners are only entitled 

to a “reasonable level of assistance,” which is less than that afforded by the federal and state 

constitutions. Id. This distinction is a rational one because trial counsel plays a different role than 

postconviction counsel. Id. At trial, counsel acts as a shield to protect the accused from being 

stripped of the presumption of innocence. Id. But petitioners in a postconviction posture have 

already been stripped of their presumption of innocence and have generally failed to obtain relief 
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on direct appeal. Id. Thus, postconviction counsel is meant not to protect a petitioner from the 

prosecutorial forces of the State, but to shape petitioners’ claims into the proper legal form and 

present those claims to the court. Id. 

¶ 20 The Act contemplates that the attorney appointed to represent an indigent petitioner would 

consult with him either by mail or in person, ascertain his alleged grievances, examine the record 

of the proceedings at trial, and then amend the pro se petition so that it would adequately present 

the petitioner’s constitutional claims. People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 358-59 (1990). The Act 

cannot serve its purpose properly unless the attorney appointed to represent an indigent petitioner

ascertains the basis of his complaints, shapes those complaints into appropriate legal form and 

presents them to the court. Id. at 359. 

¶ 21 To ensure that individuals receive reasonable assistance of counsel, Rule 651(c) provides:

“The record filed in that court shall contain a showing, which may be made by the 

certificate of petitioner’s attorney, that the attorney has consulted with petitioner by phone, 

mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain his or her contentions of deprivation of 

constitutional rights, has examined the record of the proceedings at the trial, and has made 

any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation 

of petitioner’s contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 22 Compliance with Rule 651(c) is mandatory, but once postconviction counsel files a Rule 

651(c) certificate, a rebuttable presumption of reasonable assistance arises. Addison, 2023 IL 

127119, ¶ 21. The petitioner bears the burden of overcoming that presumption by showing that 

postconviction counsel did not substantially comply with the strictures of the rule. Id. A petitioner

may do so by, among other things, demonstrating that postconviction counsel did not make all the 
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necessary amendments to the pro se petition. Id. We review the dismissal of a second-stage 

petition, and issues concerning the interpretation of a supreme court rule, de novo, affording no 

deference to the trial court. Id. ¶ 17.

¶ 23 Here, postconviction counsel filed a certificate that complied with the requirements of Rule 

651(c), thus creating the rebuttable presumption that she provided reasonable assistance to 

petitioner. Id. ¶ 21. However, petitioner claims that the record rebuts this presumption because 

postconviction counsel did not attach any medical records, nor did she amend the petition to 

include allegations of what those medical records would have shown.

¶ 24 There are instances where the record affirmatively demonstrates that postconviction 

counsel did not attempt to locate the evidence necessary for a claim, such as in People v. Johnson. 

There, the pro se petition identified three witnesses that would have supported an ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claim. People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 242 (1993). At the hearing on 

the State’s motion to dismiss, and through an affidavit, postconviction counsel admitted that he 

did not contact or interview those witnesses. Id. at 242-43. As part of its reasoning for its 

conclusion that postconviction counsel did not provide reasonable assistance, the supreme court 

stated that postconviction counsel had an obligation to attempt to obtain evidentiary support for 

the petition. Id. at 245, 250. 

¶ 25 But those are not the circumstances before us in this case, as the record does not 

affirmatively show that postconviction counsel did not attempt to obtain petitioner’s records. 

Petitioner’s complaint, instead, is that postconviction counsel did not use his medical records. 

However, this argument is circular because it requires us to first assume that there existed useful 

allegations to include and helpful medical records to attach. Petitioner claimed he unsuccessfully 
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attempted to obtain his medical records, and the record gives us no indication of what these medical 

records would show. The pro se petition contains no allegations of what records of petitioner’s 

medical treatment would have shown or how his medical treatment would refute the State’s theory 

that the missing bullet ended up in petitioner’s foot––even though petitioner was obviously present 

for his own medical treatment. For postconviction counsel to provide unreasonable assistance of 

counsel for failing to make necessary amendments, there must first be amendments that are 

necessary to make. Petitioner’s argument begs the question by assuming that the lack of 

amendments to the petition was due to some deficiency in postconviction counsel’s performance 

rather than an inability to substantiate petitioner’s claims. See People v. Bass, 2018 IL App (1st) 

152650, ¶ 16 (noting that not every petition can be amended such that it states a substantial 

constitutional claim).

¶ 26 As support for his argument, petitioner asserts that postconviction counsel “did not explain 

her efforts in locating the documents” and “never indicated whether she made any attempts to 

obtain the records, whether she spoke to trial counsel about them, or whether the trial file contained 

or referenced them.” But Rule 651(c) does not require postconviction counsel to document these 

things, nor could we reasonably expect postconviction counsel to report her findings in open court 

if those findings did not aid petitioner’s claims. Petitioner also does not dispute that postconviction 

counsel complied with her duty to consult with him about his claims. We can only presume that 

what she learned from petitioner during that consultation did not warrant making any additional 

allegations or attaching medical records.

¶ 27 Petitioner likens this case to People v. Turner, where postconviction counsel failed to 

amend the petitioner’s pro se petition to include allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate 
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counsel to avoid waiver of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, and failed to attach any 

affidavits, including one from the petitioner himself. People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 413-14 

(1999). It must also be noted that postconviction counsel in Turner included an exhibit containing 

pages from the trial transcript which “had the effect of utterly refuting counsel’s answer to the 

State’s waiver argument,” and demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the law by 

claiming that the petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing merely because he had alleged 

violations of constitutional rights. Id. at 414-15. 

¶ 28 Here, the issue is not one of postconviction counsel failing to include allegations that would 

have overcome a procedural bar. Including an allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel to avoid waiver is not something that is dependent upon evidence outside the record that 

may or may not exist. As we have already noted, not every claim can be amended to make a 

substantial showing of a constitutional violation. The mere fact that postconviction counsel did not 

allege facts that would have provided support for the claim is not evidence of unreasonable 

assistance unless we assume those facts exist. 

¶ 29 Likewise, failing to include an affidavit from one’s own client that only mirrors the 

allegations that client already made in his own pro se petition is not the same as failing to attach

medical records that may or may not contain useful information. Furthermore, as we noted above,

postconviction counsel’s unreasonable assistance in Turner was the product of multiple different 

errors that went well beyond what petitioner alleges in the instant case. Id. at 413-15. 

¶ 30 Petitioner correctly notes that we may not consider the merits of his petition here. Addison, 

2023 IL 127119, ¶ 33. “[W]hen postconviction counsel does not fulfill his or her duties under Rule 

651(c), remand is required ‘regardless of whether the claims raised in the petition had merit.’ ” 
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Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 47 (2007)). But 

considering whether petitioner’s underlying claims have merit is different from whether the record 

affirmatively rebuts the presumption that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance. 

The record before us gives no indication of what information postconviction counsel should have 

or could have appended to the petition, nor does the record affirmatively indicate that 

postconviction counsel did not investigate this issue. In effect, petitioner’s argument requires us to 

assume his claims have merit by assuming there were helpful amendments to be made to his 

petition. Without anything to rebut the presumption created by the Rule 651(c) certificate, we do 

not find postconviction counsel’s performance was unreasonable.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 33 Affirmed.