J. S73012/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

LEONARD JAMES FORBES, : No. 1951 WDA 2015

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, November 13, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County

Criminal Division at Nos. CP-05-CR-0000307-2013,

CP-05-CR-0000315-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS AND JENKINS, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 31, 2016

Leonard James Forbes appeals from the November 13, 2015 order 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County that dismissed his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546 (“PCRA”). We affirm.

The PCRA court set forth the following:

On October 29, 2013, [appellant] pled no contest to 

two counts of Burglary and two counts of Terroristic 

Threats,[1] in exchange for a firm bargain of 5 to 

10 years to be served in State Prison. We sentenced 

[appellant] on the same day of entering his plea. 

Nearly a year later, through appointed counsel, 

[appellant] filed an Amended Petition for Post 

Conviction Collateral Relief. In his petition, 

[appellant] advanced the claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective and that [appellant] was prejudiced by 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(1) and 2706(a)(1)(ii), respectively. 
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such ineffectiveness in that his plea was not 

voluntary, intelligent, and knowing. We held 

evidentiary hearings on May 11, 2015 and July 2, 

2015 and September 3, 2015. On November 13, 

2015, we denied [appellant’s] petition in its entirety. 

This appeal follows.

PCRA court opinion, 2/5/16 at 1 (italics in original).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

A. Whether or not the [PCRA] Court erred in 

finding that the record did not establish beyond 

a preponderance of the evidence that 

[appellant] received inaccurate advice that 

prejudiced him and made his plea unknowing, 

misinformed, and involuntary[?]

B. Whether or not the record clearly established 

that [appellant] should be allowed to withdraw 

his plea because the record demonstrates that 

he did not understand the facts and 

circumstances surrounding his case to such a 

deep extent and was so confused regarding 

Counsel’s advice that his plea could not have 

been knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

given[?]

Appellant’s brief at 5.

In PCRA appeals, our scope of review “is limited to the findings of the 

PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA court’s hearing, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” 

Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 573 (Pa. 2008) (internal quotation 

omitted). Because most PCRA appeals involve questions of fact and law, we 

employ a mixed standard of review. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 

875, 878 (Pa. 2009). We defer to the PCRA court’s factual findings and 
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credibility determinations supported by the record. Commonwealth v. 

Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc). In contrast, we 

review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.

Here, appellant asserts ineffective assistance of plea counsel.

In evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, we presume that counsel is effective. 

Commonwealth v. Rollins, 558 Pa. 532, 738 A.2d 

435, 441 (Pa. 1999). To overcome this 

presumption, Appellant must establish three factors. 

First, that the underlying claim has arguable merit. 

See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 

661 A.2d 352, 356 (Pa. 1995). Second, that counsel 

had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction. 

Id. In determining whether counsel’s action was 

reasonable, we do not question whether there were 

other more logical courses of action which counsel 

could have pursued; rather, we must examine 

whether counsel’s decisions had any reasonable 

basis. See Rollins, 738 A.2d at 441; 

Commonwealth v. (Charles) Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 

527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). Finally, “Appellant 

must establish that he has been prejudiced by 

counsel’s ineffectiveness; in order to meet this 

burden, he must show that ‘but for the act or 

omission in question, the outcome of the proceedings

would have been different.’” See Rollins, 738 A.2d 

at 441 (quoting Travaglia, 661 A.2d at 357). A 

claim of ineffectiveness may be denied by a showing 

that the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet any of 

these prongs. Commonwealth v. (Michael) 

Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 221-22 (Pa. 

2001); Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 

744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (Pa. 2000); 

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 

693, 701 (Pa. 1998) (“If it is clear that Appellant has 

not demonstrated that counsel’s act or omission 

adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings, 

the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone and 

the court need not first determine whether the first 

and second prongs have been met.”).
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Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007).

In the context of a plea, a claim of ineffectiveness may provide relief 

only if the alleged ineffectiveness caused an involuntary or unknowing plea. 

See Commonwealth v. Mendoza, 730 A.2d 503, 505 (Pa.Super. 1999). 

“[A] defendant is bound by the statements which he makes during his plea 

colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163, 1167 (Pa. 1997) 

(citations omitted). As such, a defendant may not assert grounds for 

withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he entered the 

plea. Id. (citation omitted).

Here, both of appellant’s issues challenge the PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations. Specifically, appellant complains that his testimony at the 

PCRA evidentiary hearing established that his plea was unknowing and 

involuntary. Where the record supports the PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations and factual findings, however, we defer to the PCRA court. 

See Henkel, 90 A.3d at 20.

In this case, the PCRA court determined that plea counsel testified 

clearly and credibly and that appellant entered his no-contest plea knowingly 

and voluntarily. Our careful review of the record reveals that plea counsel 

testified that he fully informed appellant of the defense theory that counsel 

would have advanced at trial, but that he also informed appellant that the 

jury would ultimately decide the case. (Notes of testimony, 9/3/15 at 16.) 

Counsel also testified that he explained to appellant that just because 
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appellant had some evidence that supported the proposed defense, he would 

not “automatically win.” (Id. at 16-17.) Counsel further testified that he 

explained to appellant that “[t]here were some bad facts,” including the 

likelihood of appellant’s daughter, an eyewitness, testifying against him. 

(Id. at 17.) The record also reflects that plea counsel explained the 

difference between a guilty plea and a no-contest plea to appellant and 

because appellant did not want to admit guilt or have his daughter testify 

against him at trial, appellant chose to plead no contest. (Id. at 24-26.)

Additionally, we note that the record demonstrates that appellant 

executed a plea agreement prior to sentencing. (Plea agreement, 10/29/13; 

Docket #30.) The on-the-record oral sentencing colloquy demonstrates that 

appellant acknowledged the terms of the plea agreement and acknowledged 

that he signed and understood his written plea colloquy. (Notes of 

testimony, 10/29/13 at 4-6). The following exchange then took place:

[THE COURT]: And do you understand you have an 

absolute right to proceed to trial here today; you 

don’t have to plead guilty to anything?

[APPELLANT]: Yes, sir.

[THE COURT]: Is it your own decision and your 

decision alone to plead guilty -- or no contest, I’m 

sorry?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

. . . .
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THE COURT: Okay, now do you have any questions 

about the Plea Agreement or your rights before we 

go any further?

[APPELLANT]: No, sir.

Notes of testimony, 10/29/13 at 8-9.

Appellant cannot recant the representations he made in court when he 

entered his plea. See Barnes, 687 A.2d at 1167. Additionally, the law does 

not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to 

plead guilty. All that is required is that appellant’s decision to enter his plea 

be made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. See Moser, 921 A.2d at 

528-529. Therefore, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, we conclude that appellant has failed to establish that 

plea counsel was ineffective because the record supports the PCRA court’s 

conclusion that appellant entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/31/2016