REVISED February 27, 2008

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-30886

WALK HAYDEL & ASSOCIATES INC

Plaintiff

v.

COASTAL POWER PRODUCTION COMPANY; ET AL

Defendants

LATIN AMERICAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT INC, doing business as

DELASA

Third-Party Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

Third-Party Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Before REAVLEY, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 6, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-30886

1 Although other parties were originally part of the suit, Delasa and W&S are the only

remaining parties. 

Latin American Energy Development, Inc. d/b/a Delasa (“Delasa”), a

Louisiana corporation, alleged claims against Winston & Strawn, LLC (“W&S”),

a Chicago-based law firm, for fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary

duty.1 The suit arises out of an attempt by Delasa and others to acquire a

contract to build a power plant in El Salvador, with W&S allegedly providing

legal representation for the joint venturers, including Delasa. Delasa claims

that W&S was supposed to be representing its interests, but in fact enabled

another of its clients, Tenneco Gas, Inc., to obtain the project and extinguish

Delasa’s rights in it. In response to W&S’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction,the district court held a hearing and granted the motion, dismissing

Delasa’s case. We reverse and remand because Delasa established a prima facie

case for specific personal jurisdiction, and the district court’s evidentiary hearing

was inadequate to require more.

I. Factual Background

In January 1994, co-developers and partners Delasa, La Casa Castro,

United Thermal Development Corporation (“UTDC”), and Independent Energy

Corporation (“IEC”) submitted a successful bid for the right to develop and

operate a power plant in El Salvador. Winning the bid gave the partners the

exclusive right to negotiate and execute a power purchase agreement with El

Salvador’s national power utility. 

UTDC’s main role was to provide project funding. It had a 75% interest

in the project, while Delasa’s interest was 10%. UTDC agreed to pay the

project’s development expenses, including the retention of legal counsel. Jim

Abromitis,then-president of UTDC, retained Paul Abramson, a New York-based

partner with W&S. Abramson agreed to draft documents related to the project,

including the power purchase agreement and a joint-venture agreement among

the co-developers. John Wheelock, Delasa’s then president, maintains in his
No. 06-30886

3

affidavit that Abromitis said that W&S would represent all four parties,

including Delasa, in negotiations with third parties. When Trigen Energy

Corporation subsequently acquired UTDC, it continued to retain W&S and

Abramson in conjunction with the project. 

In February 1994, Abromitis advised the other partners that Trigen was

no longer interested in participating in the project. But he stated that Trigen

would honor and fulfill all of its obligations with respect to the bid and

negotiations, and that Trigen would help the other partners find a replacement

investor for the project. Abromitis says that he contacted several developers,

includingTenneco, as potential replacements. At that time, W&S and Abramson

represented Tenneco with respect to unrelated projects in Latin America.

Abramson had also been helping Tenneco develop a profile of projects for

investment in Latin America. Abramson introduced a Tenneco executive to

Abromitis because he knew that Abromitis was interested in finding another

investor to take over all or part of Trigen’s interests in the project.

On March 6, 1994, Floyd Lewis, a former attorney and a consultant to

Delasa on the project, faxed a message to Abramson entitled, “Agreement Among

Joint Venture Participants.” The first paragraph of the fax states: “We trust

that with respect to the subject document, which you have said will be delivered

‘in New Orleans’ . . . your intent is to function as counsel to all of the parties and

not just as lawyer for UTC [Trigen] and IEC against the others. If we are in

error in this assumption, please make it clear to us so that appropriate legal

counsel can be engaged to look after our interests.” The New Orleans reference

is to a conference where there was a meeting involving the joint venturers,

Tenneco, and Abramson, which is discussed below. Abramson responded via fax

the next day: 

As for your comments on the agreement among the parties, as

you know there may be legal conflicts among the positions of the
No. 06-30886

4

four parties, and Winston & Strawn will represent UTC [Trigen]

[insofar] as there are any such conflicts.

Naturally, Winston & Strawn believes it has been

engaged to represent all four parties in their negotiations

with others. We trust that one of the principals will advise us if

this is in error.

(emphasis added). Wheelock concluded that this fax confirmed that W&S was

representing the joint venturers in the negotiations with third parties, including

those parties who would be recruited to assume Trigen’s role in funding the

project.

On March 9, 1994, the joint venturers traveled to New Orleans to attend

the 9th Annual Cogeneration and Development Power Conference. In

connection with the events in New Orleans, Abramson said he would deliver the

Joint Venture Agreement to the partners. The project partners and Abramson

were also to meet with potential investors to find a party to replace Trigen or to

assist Trigen in funding the project. Delasa was aware that several potential

investors would be present atthe conference. Wheelock and Lewis state that the

parties and W&S understood that the joint venturers would have to disclose

proprietary and confidential information about the project, including the

“financial performer models,” to potential investors. For this reason, they say

that Abramson was instructed to draft and deliver a confidentiality agreement

to Tenneco prior to the meeting in New Orleans, which he never did. 

Delasa met with Tenneco at the conference to discuss its potential

involvement in the project. According to Wheelock, prior to the conference

Abramson stated that all four parties should meet with Tenneco in New Orleans

and indicated that Tenneco had an interest in taking all or part of Trigen’s

interest in the project. Delasa representatives met with Tenneco during a golf

tournament and lunch hosted by W&S. Based on the March 7 fax, which

confirmed W&S’s representation of the project partners vis-à-vis third parties,
No. 06-30886

5

Wheelock and Lewis say that Delasa felt comfortable divulging sensitive and

propriety information concerning the project to one of W&S’s contacts, Tenneco.

But while Delasa’s representatives knew that W&S had represented Tenneco in

the past, they say that they did not know that Abramson was then representing

Tenneco in its efforts to develop a profile of projects in Latin America. 

After the New Orleans meeting with Tenneco, there was correspondence

and a series of meetings between the joint venturers and Tenneco, where they

discussed the possibility of Tenneco replacing Trigen. Eventually, Tenneco and

the joint venturers agreed that Tenneco would be brought into the deal.

Delasa worked with W&S from its base in Louisiana during the

negotiations with Tenneco. In fact, during the course of W&S’s alleged

representation of the parties, there were over a hundred contacts between

Delasa and W&S in the form of telephone calls, correspondence, and faxes.

These contacts generated over 3,400 pages of documents, many of which were

sent from W&S’s offices to Delasa in Louisiana. 

In April 1994,the partners signed the joint-venture agreement, which was

now known as the Three Party Agreement because only Delasa, Trigen, and La

Casa Castro remained involved, with IEC dropping out of the project. The

agreement had a provision for the intended transfer of Trigen’s interest to

Tenneco. W&S was heavily involved in the writing of the document and

corresponded frequently with all the parties, including Delasa in Louisiana,

during the drafting process. 

On May 17, 1994, the parties flew to El Salvador to execute the power

purchase agreement. All parties understood that Trigen would be the only joint

venturer to sign the agreement. But just prior to executing it, Trigen informed

the parties that it wanted to withdraw completely from the project. This was on

the last day of the time period for executing the agreement. As a last-minute

solution, Trigen transferred its 75% interest to Tenneco. Delasa and La Casa
No. 06-30886

6

Castro then were asked to sign a hand-written release with Trigen in which

Delasa and La Casa Castro released Trigen “from any and all obligations to each

of them whatsoever” in exchange for Trigen signing the agreement. 

Wheelock says that when all this was occurring he asked Abramson if

signing the release would affect Delasa’s interest in the project, and Abramson

assured him that it would not and advised him to sign the release. According to

Wheelock and Abromitis, all those present, including Abramson, told Wheelock

that the release would not affect Delasa’s ownership interest in the project. 

But Tenneco relied on the release to claim 100% ownership of the project

and to deny Delasa’s interest in it. After Tenneco acquired Trigen’s interests in

the project, W&S assumed the representation of Tenneco in the project and

provided legal services to Tenneco in connection with Tenneco’s sale of its rights

in the power purchase agreement to Coastal Power and Production Company.

Delasa contends that Abramson counseled Tenneco in its efforts to claim 100%

ownership of the plant.

II. Procedural History

Litigation related to the El Salvador project was commenced in Louisiana

state court against Delasa and others. Delasa added W&S to the suit by thirdparty demand, claiming that Abramson enabledTenneco to obtain the project for

itself and to unfairly extinguish Delasa’s interest in it through a series of

misrepresentations and failures to disclose material information. W&S removed

the suit and moved for dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction and

insufficiency of process. Delasa moved for jurisdictional discovery on the issues

of specific and general jurisdiction and said that depending on responses to

interrogatories and admissions, it might need to depose Abramson and other

parties essential to its jurisdictional case. The district court granted the motion

only as to a document request for correspondence in W&S’s possession that was

directed from W&S to Delasa in Louisiana. The court denied discovery on
No. 06-30886

2 Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1999).

3 Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985).

7

general jurisdiction. Later, Delasa moved for oral argument and live testimony

in connection with the evidentiary hearing, which the district court denied.

The district court eventually held that W&S was not subject to the

jurisdiction of a Louisiana court. The district court did not state the legal

standard it was applying to W&S’s motion, only saying that“[b]ecause the Court

is now deciding the personal jurisdiction issue following an evidentiary hearing,

Delasa is no longer entitled to rely upon a prima facie showing of jurisdiction

grounded on unsupported allegations.” Delasa’s suit was dismissed.

Delasa appeals. Its contention that discovery should have been allowed

on general jurisdiction is rejected because the denial was within the court’s

discretion. We reverse the court’s judgment denying specific jurisdiction. 

III. Discussion

A. Standard Applicable to W&S’s Motion to Dismiss

We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that W&S is not subject

to the jurisdiction of a Louisiana court.2 The first step in our review is to

determine the legal standard the district court should have applied to W&S’s

motion to dismiss despite an initial holding that Delasa made out a prima facie

case for personal jurisdiction. 

When the defendant disputes the factual bases for jurisdiction, as W&S

does here, the court may receive interrogatories, depositions, or “any

combination of the recognized methods of discovery” to help it resolve the

jurisdictional issue.3 The court has discretion as to the type and amount of

discovery to allow. But even if the court receives discovery materials, unless

there is a full and fair hearing, it should not act as a fact finder and must

construe all disputed facts in the plaintiff’s favor and consider them along with
No. 06-30886

4 Guidry, 188 F.3d at 625; Thompson, 755 F.2d at 1165; DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc.,

711 F.2d 1260, 1270–71 (5th Cir. 1983). 

5

Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 1989);

Thompson, 755 F.2d at 1165.

6 Data Disc, Inc., v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)

(footnote omitted). 

7 Brown v. Slenker, 220 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2000). 

8 See id. (holding that because the personal jurisdiction issue erroneously decided as a

matter of law by the district court was intertwined with the merits, “on remand both [had to

be] decided at a new trial, based on valid jury findings”).

9 Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1285–86 n.2; cf. McBeath v. Inter-Am. Citizens for Decency

Comm., 374 F.2d 359, 363 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that “where the factual and jurisdictional

issues are completely intermeshed, the jurisdictional issues should be referred to the merits,

8

the undisputed facts.4 Moreover, at this stage the plaintiff is required to present

only a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction.5 The Ninth Circuit has

explained why:

If the court determines that it will receive only affidavits or

affidavits plus discovery materials, these very limitations dictate

that a plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing of

jurisdictional facts through the submitted materials in order to

avoid a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Any greater burden such as

proof by a preponderance of the evidence would permit a defendant

to obtain a dismissal simply by controverting the facts established

by a plaintiff through his own affidavit and supporting materials.6

Ultimately, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence

that jurisdiction is proper.7 Often, the determination of whether this standard

is met is resolved at trial along with the merits. This is especially likely when

the jurisdictional issue is intertwined with the merits and therefore can be

determined based on jury fact findings.8In this situation, it is often “preferable

that [the jurisdictional] determination be made at trial, where a plaintiff may

present his case in a coherent, orderly fashion and without the risk of

prejudicing his case on the merits.”9 But this court has said that after a pretrial
No. 06-30886

for it is impossible to decide one without the other”).

10 Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA DE CV, 92 F.3d 320, 326–327 (5th Cir. 1996);

Travelers Imdem. Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 826, 831 (5th Cir. 1986). Other circuits

allow district courts to hold pretrial evidentiary hearings on personal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588–89 (9th Cir. 1996); Ball v.

Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990).

11 557 F.2d at 1285.

9

evidentiary hearing confined to the jurisdictional issue, where both sides have

the opportunity to presenttheir cases fully,the district court can decide whether

the plaintiff has established jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.10

The district court relied on these cases and required Delasa to establish more

than a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction because, in its estimation, it was

deciding the jurisdictional issue following an evidentiary hearing. This was

error.

The hearing in this case was inadequate to justify raising Delasa’s burden

above the prima facie level. A pretrial evidentiary hearing is intended to serve

as a substitute for the resolution of factual and legal disputes relevant to

jurisdiction at trial. As such, both parties must be allowed to submit affidavits

and to employ all forms of discovery, subjectto the district court’s discretion and

as long as the discovery pertains to the personal-jurisdiction issue.

Furthermore, if requested by the parties,the district court often should convene

a hearing where it entertains live testimony. In Data Disc the Ninth Circuit

held that at a hearing where a court requires more than a prima facie case it

should allow the plaintiff “to go[] beyond the written materials.”11

The district court only partially granted Delasa’s motion for jurisdictional

discovery. Delasa asked for written discovery in the form of interrogatories,

requests for production, and requests for admissions from W&S, but the district

court granted Delasa discovery only as to a document requestfor correspondence
No. 06-30886

12 Access Telecom., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 716 (5th Cir. 1999).

13 A&L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 791 So. 2d 1266, 1270 (La. 2001). 

10

in W&S’s possession that was directed to Delasa in Louisiana. By substantially

curtailing the amount of discovery that could be obtained, the court erred in

requiring more than a prima facie showing of jurisdiction from Delasa.

Significantly, the district court did not allow Delasa to take any depositions of

parties essential to its jurisdictional case, including Abramson. W&S argues

that this was not required because Abramson was deposed in related litigation.

But in that litigation personal jurisdiction over W&S in Louisiana was not at

issue. The deposition of Abramson in the related litigation was not a substitute

for a deposition in this case as to personal jurisdiction. The court also denied

Delasa’s request for live testimony. Without live testimony in this case—where

examination of Abramson and other relevant witnesses, such as Wheelock and

Lewis, would help resolve factual disputes dispositive of the jurisdictional

question—the court could not require more than a prima facie case from Delasa.

Because the district court did not conduct a full-blown evidentiary hearing, it

should have required Delasa to establish only a prima facie case for personal

jurisdiction. Therefore, our review is restricted to determining whether Delasa

met this burden. 

B. Specific Jurisdiction

Delasa has established a prima facie case for specific personal jurisdiction.

A federal district court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

to the same extent as a state court in the state in which the district court is

located—in this case, Louisiana.12 The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that

the limits of the Louisiana long-arm statute are coextensive with constitutional

due process limits.13 Therefore, we must determine whether jurisdiction over

W&S comports with federal constitutional guarantees. Exercising personal
No. 06-30886

14 Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 867 (5th Cir.

2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

15 Id. at 868 (internal quotation marks omitted).

16 195 F.3d 208, 212–13 (5th Cir. 1999); see Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Myers & Assocs., Ltd.,

41 F.3d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that personal jurisdiction over nonresident attorneys

was proper where the “essence of [the plaintiff’s] complaint is that its own lawyers counseled

its competitor in bringing adverse litigation”).

11

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is compatible with due process when

“(1) th[e] defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and

protections of the forum state by establishing minimum contacts with the forum

state, and (2) exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”14 Specific jurisdiction

applies when a nonresident defendant “has purposefully directed its activities

at the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out

of or relate to those activities.”15

W&S’s purposeful contacts with Louisiana, in combination with the

foreseeable harmful effects in Louisiana of its allegedly illegal activity, makes

specific jurisdiction proper. W&S’s supposed formation of an attorney-client

relationship with Delasa, a Louisiana corporation, standing alone does not confer

specific personal jurisdiction. But asserting specific jurisdiction over W&S is

consistent with Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, where we held that a German

attorney’s misrepresentations and omissions directed toward Texas, while

limited, were sufficient contacts to confer personal jurisdiction over him in a

Texas court.16

Here, Delasa has provided evidence through the March 7 fax that

Abramson assured Delasa it was legally representing its interests, as a member

of the joint venture, in their negotiations with potential replacement investors.

W&S argues that the fax does not confirm that W&S was to represent Delasa’s

individual interests. It says that the reference to others was limited solely to
No. 06-30886

12

representation vis-à-vis the El Salvadorean Government. But given that in the

fax Abramson clarified W&S’s representation of Trigen in negotiations with the

other joint venturers separately from his confirmation that W&S “has been

engaged to represent all four parties in their negotiations with others,” a fair

reading of Abramson’s statements suggests that W&S was affirming that it

would represent the four parties, including Delasa, in their negotiations with

third parties such as Tenneco. Indeed, the district court even found that “[i]t is

undisputed that W&S represented a joint venture of which Delasa was a

participating entity. If Abramson did in fact counsel Tenneco in its efforts to

take a position contrary to Delasa’s interests then Abramson might very well

have breached a duty owed to Delasa.” 

If W&S breached its duty to Delasa by simultaneously representing

Tenneco contrary to Delasa’s interests and ultimately aiding Tenneco in

excluding Delasa from the project, the litigation relates to activities and

omissions directed at Louisiana sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction. W&S

arranged for a meeting between Delasa’s group and Tenneco during the Power

Conference in New Orleans while Abramson was “helping Tenneco develop a

profile of projects” in Latin America. But Abramson did not disclose this to

Delasa even while Delasa was meeting with Tenneco in New Orleans to see if

Tenneco was an appropriate investor for the project. Had he disclosed this

conflict of interest, Delasa says that it would not have candidly discussed the

project with Tenneco, disclosed confidential information to Tenneco that helped

it obtain full ownership of the project, or trusted Abramson’s representation,

and, at a minimum, it would have more carefully scrutinized Tenneco’s

suitability as an investor. Delasa might also have thought twice before taking

Abramson’s advice and signing the release freeing Trigen from any obligations

to Delasa—a release that Tenneco eventually used, under Abramson’s counsel,

to deny Delasa an interest in the project.
No. 06-30886

17 195 F.3d at 212.

18 954 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1992)

19 See 195 F.3d at 215.

13

W&S argues that the importance of the New Orleans meeting to Delasa’s

claim is overstated. It argues that while W&S told Delasa about the golf

tournament in New Orleans, it was Trigen’s Abromitis that specifically invited

Delasa to talk with Tenneco. But Delasa has presented credible evidence that

W&S told Delasa about the meeting in New Orleans and that Abramson was

there when Delasa was discussing the project with Tenneco. Therefore, we must

accept Delasa’s plausible version of the events at this stage of the litigation. 

W&S also argues that the meeting in New Orleans cannot be used to

invoke jurisdiction because most of the meetings between Tenneco and Delasa

during the spring of 1994 were in Texas and El Salvador. But even if there were

other important meetings with W&S outside of Texas,the New Orleans trip was

a first contact where Delasa and Tenneco were puttogether to discuss the power

plant project. We held in Wien Air that a single act by a nonresident defendant

attorney towards the forum state can support a finding of minimum contacts,

and the failure of W&S to discuss its conflict of interest at the New Orleans

meeting could have been such a contact.17 It is difficult to know without full

development of the facts. 

The factual scenario in this case is analogous to the Third Circuit’s

decision in Carteret Savings Bank v. Shushan,

18 a case cited with approval in

Wien Air.

19 Like this case, Cateret involved a visit by an attorney to the forum

state in connection with a construction project in another state—specifically, to

review closing documents with the bank financing the project. Similar to what

occurred here,the attorney in Cateretfailed to disclose a conflict of interest while

in the forum state, giving rise to the cause of action for fraudulent
No. 06-30886

20 Cateret, 954 F.3d at 145–50.

21 195 F.3d at 213 (citing Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir.

1990)).

14

misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. Most of the relevant activity,

including preparation ofthe closing documents, occurred in the non-forum state.

But the court found personal jurisdiction appropriate because the conduct that

did occur in the forum state—i.e., the failure of the attorney to disclose his prior

and continued representation of another participant in the project—gave rise to

the cause of action.20 Delasa alleges that the same thing occurred here, with

W&S failing to disclose at the New Orleans meeting its ongoing representation

of Tenneco during its efforts to develop a profile of projects in Latin America.

In addition to the New Orleans meeting, there are other Louisiana

contacts supporting Delasa’s prima facie case. In connection with its alleged

attorney-client relationship, including preparation for Trigen’s assignment to

Tenneco of its interests in the project, Delasa and W&S exchanged over a

hundred contacts in the form oftelephone calls, faxes, and letters concerning the

project, generating over 3,400 pages of documents, many of which were sent from

W&S’s offices to Delasa in Louisiana. These contacts included W&S’s delivery

intoLouisiana ofthe Joint Venture Agreement, which perfected Delasa’s interest

in the project and which Delasa executed in New Orleans. Through all of these

communications, Delasa maintains that Abramson failed to disclose W&S’s close

relationship with Tenneco and its apparent conflict of interest. In Wien Air, this

court specifically stated that “when the claim [against a lawyer] arises from a

breach of a fiduciary duty based on a failure to disclose material information,the

factthatthe lawyer continually communicated with the forum while steadfastly

failing to disclose material information shows the purposeful direction of

material omissions to the forum state.”21 W&S’s failure to disclose the extent of
No. 06-30886

22 Wien Air, 195 F.3d at 212.

23 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

24 Id. at 215.

25 Id.

15

its relationship with Tenneco during these communications indicates “the

purposeful direction of material omissions to [Louisiana].” 

We also consider the foreseeable harmful effects in Louisiana of W&S’s

alleged intentional tort.22 While generally insufficient alone to confer

jurisdiction,“the foreseeable effects of a tort” should be considered “as part ofthe

analysis of the defendant’s relevant contacts with the forum.”23 According to

Delasa, W&S performed severaltortious activities outside of Louisiana that had

foreseeable effects in the forum. These contacts include the myriad

communications with Delasa in Louisiana in which W&S failed to disclose the

extent of its relationship with Tenneco, all the while allegedly providing legal

counsel to Delasa and the other joint venturers in their efforts to bring a

replacement investor into the project. These tortious activities, if proved by

Delasa attrial, had foreseeable effects in Louisiana, Delasa’s base of operations.

Based on the foregoing, Delasa has made out a prima facie case of minimum

contacts by W&S with Louisiana sufficient to confer specific personal

jurisdiction. 

“Once a plaintiff has established minimum contacts, the burden shifts to

the defendant to show that the assertion of jurisdiction would be unfair.”24 As

in Wien Air, the assertion of jurisdiction is fair. We have held that in a case like

this, where a cause of action for fraud committed against a resident of the forum

is directly related to the tortious activities giving rise to personal jurisdiction,

the exercise of that jurisdiction will be considered fair.25 We have also

recognized that the forum state has a substantial interest in protecting its
No. 06-30886

26 Trinity Industries, 41 F.3d at 232.

16

residents from a breach of the attorney-client relationship.26 Nor would it be

unduly burdensome to require W&S, an international law firm with over 900

attorneys, to litigate the case in Louisiana. 

The judgment is REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.