NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

TIMOTHY E. BECKETT, AKA Ian, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-36005 

D.C. Nos. 3:16-cv-00082-TMB 

3:02-cr-00007-SLG-2 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 9, 2021**

Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN and BADE, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District 

Judge.

Petitioner Timothy Beckett and accomplices were indicted for participating 

in two completed robberies and one attempted robbery of a motel in Anchorage, 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for 

the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

JAN 4 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Alaska. After trial, a jury found Beckett guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery, 

robbery, and attempted robbery, as well as multiple counts of using a firearm in 

furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 

transferring a firearm knowing that the weapon would be used to commit a crime 

of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(h). After the guilty verdict, Beckett 

entered a sentencing agreement with the government that included a waiver of his 

rights to collaterally attack his convictions and sentence. Beckett was ultimately 

sentenced to 420 months’ imprisonment. Beckett now collaterally attacks his 

§ 924 convictions, arguing they are unconstitutional by virtue of the Supreme 

Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).

A defendant may waive his right to collaterally attack his sentence or 

conviction. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Such a waiver is enforceable if “(1) the language of the waiver encompasses [the 

defendant’s] right to appeal on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly 

and voluntarily made.” United States v. Goodall, — F.4th —, 2021 WL 6132016, 

at *5 (9th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(discussing the closely related topic of appeal waivers).

Beckett’s sentencing agreement contains a broad collateral attack waiver, 

with only two exceptions: ineffective assistance of counsel and “a challenge to the 

voluntariness of his guilty plea.” Beckett nowhere argues that his challenge to his 
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convictions falls outside the waiver provision or within one of its listed exceptions, 

nor does he argue that the waiver was involuntary. Beckett therefore has waived 

his right to collaterally attack his convictions. See Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014.

Beckett argues that his collateral attack waiver is not enforceable in this case 

because he attacks his sentence under the “illegal sentence” exception, which 

allows a petitioner to circumvent a waiver if he argues that his sentence is illegal. 

See United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 2007) (as amended).

This argument fails. Because Beckett attacks the purported illegality of his 

convictions rather than his sentence, his petition does not fall under the illegal 

sentence exception. See Goodall, — F.4th —, 2021 WL 6132016 at *6–8. We 

accordingly affirm the district court’s denial of Beckett’s petition as barred by the 

collateral attack waiver in his sentencing agreement. See id. at *8; Abarca, 985 

F.2d at 1014. 

AFFIRMED.