(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 04–1203. Argued November 9, 2005—Decided January 10, 2006* 

Goodman, petitioner in No. 04–1236, is a paraplegic who sued respondent state defendants and others, challenging the conditions of his 

confinement in a Georgia prison under, inter alia, 42 U. S. C. §1983 

and Title II of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990. As relevant 

here, the Federal District Court dismissed the §1983 claims because 

Goodman’s allegations were vague, and granted respondents summary judgment on the Title II money damages claims because they 

were barred by state sovereign immunity. The United States, petitioner in No. 04–1203, intervened on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit 

affirmed the District Court’s judgment as to the Title II claims, but 

reversed the §1983 ruling, finding that Goodman had alleged facts 

sufficient to support a limited number of Eighth Amendment claims 

against state agents and should be permitted to amend his complaint. This Court granted certiorari to decide the validity of Title 

II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 

Held: Insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages 

against States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth 

Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. 

Pp. 5–8.

(a) Because this Court assumes that the Eleventh Circuit correctly 

held that Goodman had alleged actual Eighth Amendment violations 

for purposes of §1983, and because respondents do not dispute Goodman’s claim that this same conduct violated Title II, Goodman’s Title 

II money damages claims were evidently based, at least in part, on 

conduct that independently violated §1 of the Fourteenth Amend-

—————— 

* Together with No. 04–1236, Goodman v. Georgia et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 
2 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA 

Syllabus 

ment. No one doubts that §5 grants Congress the power to enforce 

the Fourteenth Amendment’s provisions by creating private remedies 

against the States for actual violations of those provisions. This includes the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity by authorizing private suits for damages against the States. Thus, the Eleventh 

Circuit erred in dismissing those of Goodman’s claims based on conduct that violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 5–7.

(b) Once Goodman’s complaint is amended, the lower courts will be 

best situated to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim 

basis, (1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title 

II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth 

Amendment; and (3) insofar as such conduct violated Title II but did 

not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity in such contexts is nevertheless valid. Pp. 7–8. 

120 Fed. Appx. 785, reversed and remanded. 

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. STEVENS, J., 

filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Nos. 04–1203 and 04–1236 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER 

04–1203 v. 

GEORGIA ET AL. 

TONY GOODMAN, PETITIONER 

04–1236 v. 

GEORGIA ET AL. 

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[January 10, 2006] 

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 

We consider whether a disabled inmate in a state prison 

may sue the State for money damages under Title II of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 

337, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §12131 et seq. (2000 ed. and

Supp. II). 

I 

A 

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual 

with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 

excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 

the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or 

be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” §12132

(2000 ed.). A “ ‘qualified individual with a disability’ ” is 

defined as “an individual with a disability who, with or 
2 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA 

Opinion of the Court 

without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or 

practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or 

transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids 

and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements 

for the receipt of services or the participation in programs

or activities provided by a public entity.” §12131(2). The 

Act defines “ ‘public entity’ ” to include “any State or local 

government” and “any department, agency, . . . or other 

instrumentality of a State,” §12131(1). We have previously held that this term includes state prisons. See 

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 

210 (1998). Title II authorizes suits by private citizens for 

money damages against public entities that violate 

§12132. See 42 U. S. C. §12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U. S. C. §794a).

In enacting the ADA, Congress “invoke[d] the sweep of 

congressional authority, including the power to enforce the 

fourteenth amendment . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §12101(b)(4). 

Moreover, the Act provides that “[a] State shall not be 

immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or

State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this 

chapter.” §12202. We have accepted this latter statement

as an unequivocal expression of Congress’s intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Board of Trustees of 

Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 363–364 (2001). 

B 

Petitioner in No. 04–1236, Tony Goodman, is a paraplegic inmate in the Georgia prison system who, at all relevant times, was housed at the Georgia State Prison in 

Reidsville. After filing numerous administrative grievances in the state prison system, Goodman filed a pro se

complaint in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Georgia challenging the conditions of 

his confinement. He named as defendants the State of 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections (state 

defendants) and several individual prison officials. He 

brought claims under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, 

Title II of the ADA, and other provisions not relevant here, 

seeking both injunctive relief and money damages against 

all defendants. 

 Goodman’s pro se complaint and subsequent filings in 

the District Court included many allegations, both grave 

and trivial, regarding the conditions of his confinement in 

the Reidsville prison. Among his more serious allegations, 

he claimed that he was confined for 23-to-24 hours per day 

in a 12-by-3-foot cell in which he could not turn his wheelchair around. He alleged that the lack of accessible facilities rendered him unable to use the toilet and shower 

without assistance, which was often denied. On multiple 

occasions, he asserted, he had injured himself in attempting to transfer from his wheelchair to the shower or toilet 

on his own, and, on several other occasions, he had been 

forced to sit in his own feces and urine while prison officials refused to assist him in cleaning up the waste. He 

also claimed that he had been denied physical therapy and 

medical treatment, and denied access to virtually all

prison programs and services on account of his disability.

The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation that the allegations in the complaint 

were vague and constituted insufficient notice pleading as 

to Goodman’s §1983 claims. It therefore dismissed the 

§1983 claims against all defendants without providing 

Goodman an opportunity to amend his complaint. The 

District Court also dismissed his Title II claims against all 

individual defendants. Later, after our decision in 

Garrett, the District Court granted summary judgment to 

the state defendants on Goodman’s Title II claims for 

money damages, holding that those claims were barred by 

state sovereign immunity.

Goodman appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
4 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA 

Opinion of the Court 

peals for the Eleventh Circuit. The United States, petitioner in No. 04–1203, intervened to defend the constitutionality of Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the District 

Court had erred in dismissing all of Goodman’s §1983 

claims, because Goodman’s multiple pro se filings in the

District Court alleged facts sufficient to support “a limited 

number of Eighth-Amendment claims under §1983”

against certain individual defendants. App. to Pet. for 

Cert. in No. 04–1236, p. 17a, judgt. order reported at 120 

Fed. Appx. 785 (2004). The Court of Appeals held that the 

District Court should have given Goodman leave to amend 

his complaint to develop three Eighth Amendment claims 

relating to his conditions of confinement: 

“First, Goodman alleges that he is not able to move 

his wheelchair in his cell. If Goodman is to be believed, this effectively amounts to some form of total 

restraint twenty-three to twenty-four hours-a-day 

without penal justification. Second, Goodman has alleged several instances in which he was forced to sit 

in his own bodily waste because prison officials refused to provide assistance. Third, Goodman has alleged sufficient conduct to proceed with a §1983 claim 

based on the prison staff’s supposed ‘deliberate indifference’ to his serious medical condition of being partially paraplegic . . . .” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 

04–1236, pp. 18a–19a (citation and footnote omitted). 

The Court remanded the suit to the District Court to 

permit Goodman to amend his complaint, while cautioning

Goodman not to reassert all the §1983 claims included in 

his initial complaint, “some of which [we]re obviously

frivolous.” Id., at 18a. 

The Eleventh Circuit did not address the sufficiency of 

Goodman’s allegations under Title II. Instead, relying on 

its prior decision in Miller v. King, 384 F. 3d 1248 (2004), 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s holding 

that Goodman’s Title II claims for money damages against 

the State were barred by sovereign immunity. We granted

certiorari to consider whether Title II of the ADA validly 

abrogates state sovereign immunity with respect to the 

claims at issue here. 544 U. S. ___ (2005). 

II 

In reversing the dismissal of Goodman’s §1983 claims, 

the Eleventh Circuit held that Goodman had alleged 

actual violations of the Eighth Amendment by state 

agents on the grounds set forth above. See App. to Pet. for 

Cert. in No. 04–1236, pp. 18a–19a. The State does not 

contest this holding, see Brief for Respondents 41–44, and 

we did not grant certiorari to consider the merits of Goodman’s Eighth Amendment claims; we assume without 

deciding, therefore, that the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment 

of these claims was correct. Moreover, Goodman urges,

and the State does not dispute, that this same conduct 

that violated the Eighth Amendment also violated Title II 

of the ADA. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 04–1236, p. 46; 

Brief for Respondents 41–44. In fact, it is quite plausible 

that the alleged deliberate refusal of prison officials to 

accommodate Goodman’s disability-related needs in such 

fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and 

virtually all other prison programs constituted “exclu[sion] 

from participation in or . . . den[ial of] the benefits of” the 

prison’s “services, programs, or activities.” 42 U. S. C. 

§12132; see also Yeskey, 524 U. S., at 210 (noting that the 

phrase “services, programs, or activities” in §12132 includes recreational, medical, educational, and vocational 

prison programs). Therefore, Goodman’s claims for money 

damages against the State under Title II were evidently 

based, at least in large part, on conduct that independently violated the provisions of §1 of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 
6 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA 

Opinion of the Court 

329 U. S. 459, 463 (1947) (the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment). 

In this respect, Goodman differs from the claimants in our 

other cases addressing Congress’s ability to abrogate 

sovereign immunity pursuant to its §5 powers. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509, 543, n. 4 (2004) (Rehnquist, 

C. J., dissenting) (respondents were not actually denied 

constitutional rights); Nevada Dept. of Human Resources 

v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 752, 755 (2003) (KENNEDY, J., 

dissenting) (Nevada provided family leave “on a genderneutral basis”—“a practice which no one contends suffers 

from a constitutional infirmity”); Garrett, 531 U. S., at 

362, 367–368 (failure to make the special accommodations

requested by disabled respondents was not unconstitutional); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 69– 

70, 83–84 (2000) (most petitioners raised nonconstitutional disparate-impact challenges to the State’s agerelated policies); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 643– 

644, and n. 9 (1999) (Florida satisfied due process by 

providing remedies for patent infringement by state actors); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 512 (1997) 

(church building permit denied under neutral law of general applicability).

While the Members of this Court have disagreed regarding the scope of Congress’s “prophylactic” enforcement 

powers under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., 

Lane, 541 U. S., at 513 (majority opinion of STEVENS, J.); 

id., at 538 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); id., at 554 

(SCALIA, J., dissenting), no one doubts that §5 grants 

Congress the power to “enforce . . . the provisions” of the 

Amendment by creating private remedies against the 

States for actual violations of those provisions. “Section 5 

authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through 

which the citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth Amend-
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

ment rights.” Id., at 559–560 (SCALIA, J., dissenting)

(citing the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 

13); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976) 

(“In [§5] Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce 

. . . the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment” by providing actions for money damages against the 

States (emphasis added)); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 

346 (1880) (“The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States . . . . It is these which 

Congress is empowered to enforce . . .”). This enforcement 

power includes the power to abrogate state sovereign 

immunity by authorizing private suits for damages

against the States. See Fitzpatrick, supra, at 456. Thus, 

insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for 

damages against the States for conduct that actually 

violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit 

erred in dismissing those of Goodman’s Title II claims that 

were based on such unconstitutional conduct. 

From the many allegations in Goodman’s pro se complaint and his subsequent filings in the District Court, it is 

not clear precisely what conduct he intended to allege in 

support of his Title II claims. Because the Eleventh Circuit did not address the issue, it is likewise unclear to 

what extent the conduct underlying Goodman’s constitutional claims also violated Title II. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit ordered that the suit be remanded to the 

District Court to permit Goodman to amend his complaint, 

but instructed him to revise his factual allegations to 

exclude his “frivolous” claims—some of which are quite far

afield from actual constitutional violations (under either 

the Eighth Amendment or some other constitutional provision), or even from Title II violations. See, e.g., App. 50 

(demanding a “steam table” for Goodman’s housing unit).

It is therefore unclear whether Goodman’s amended complaint will assert Title II claims premised on conduct that 
8 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA 

Opinion of the Court 

does not independently violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Once Goodman’s complaint is amended, the lower

courts will be best situated to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the 

State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent 

such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II

but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether 

Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as 

to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid. 

* * * 

The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and 

the suit is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

STEVENS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Nos. 04–1203 and 04–1236 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER 

04–1203 v. 

GEORGIA ET AL. 

TONY GOODMAN, PETITIONER 

04–1236 v. 

GEORGIA ET AL. 

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[January 10, 2006] 

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,

concurring. 

The Court holds that Title II of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990 validly abrogates state sovereign 

immunity at least insofar as it creates a private cause of 

action for damages against States for conduct that violates 

the Constitution. Ante, at 7. And the state defendants 

have correctly chosen not to challenge the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Title II is constitutional insofar as it 

authorizes prospective injunctive relief against the State. 

See Brief for Respondents 6; see also Miller v. King, 384 F. 

3d 1248, 1264 (CA11 2004). Rather than attempting to 

define the outer limits of Title II’s valid abrogation of state 

sovereign immunity on the basis of the present record, the 

Court’s opinion wisely permits the parties, guided by 

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509 (2004), to create a factual 

record that will inform that decision.* I therefore join the 

—————— 

* Such definition is necessary because Title II prohibits “ ‘a somewhat 

broader swath of conduct’ ” than the Constitution itself forbids. Lane, 
2 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA 

STEVENS, J., concurring 

opinion.

It is important to emphasize that although petitioner 

Goodman’s Eighth Amendment claims provide a sufficient 

basis for reversal, our opinion does not suggest that this is 

the only constitutional right applicable in the prison context and therefore relevant to the abrogation issue. As we 

explain, when the District Court and the Court of Appeals 

revisit that issue, they should analyze Goodman’s claims 

to see whether they state “actual constitutional violations 

(under either the Eighth Amendment or some other constitutional provision),” ante, at 7 (emphasis added), and to 

evaluate whether “Congress’s purported abrogation of 

sovereign immunity in such contexts is nevertheless

valid,” ante, at 8. This approach mirrors that taken in 

Lane, which identified a constellation of “basic constitutional guarantees” that Title II seeks to enforce and ultimately evaluated whether Title II was an appropriate

response to the “class of cases” at hand. 541 U. S., at 522– 

523, 531. The Court’s focus on Goodman’s Eighth

Amendment claims arises simply from the fact that those 

are the only constitutional violations the Eleventh Circuit 

found him to have alleged properly. See App. to Pet. for

Cert. in No. 04–1236, pp. 18a–19a.

Moreover, our approach today is fully consistent with 

our recognition that the history of mistreatment leading to 

Congress’ decision to extend Title II’s protections to prison 

inmates was not limited to violations of the Eighth 

—————— 

541 U. S., at 533, n. 24 (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528

U. S. 62, 81 (2000)). While a factual record may not be absolutely 

necessary to our resolution of the question, it will surely aid our understanding of issues such as how, in practice, Title II’s “reasonableness” 

requirement applies in the prison context, cf. Lane, 541 U. S., at 531– 

532 (explaining that Title II requires only “ ‘reasonable modifications’ ”), 

and therefore whether certain of Goodman’s claims are even covered by 

Title II, cf. App. 83 (complaining of lack of access to, among other 

things, “television, phone calls, [and] entertainment”). 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

STEVENS, J., concurring 

Amendment. See Lane, 541 U. S., at 524–525 (describing 

“backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment” leading to 

enactment of Title II); see also, e.g., Board of Trustees of 

Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 391–424 (2001) 

(Appendixes to opinion of BREYER, J., dissenting) (listing 

submissions made to Congress by the Task Force on the 

Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities 

showing, for example, that prisoners with developmental 

disabilities were subject to longer terms of imprisonment 

than other prisoners); 2 House Committee on Education 

and Labor, Legislative History of Public Law 101–336: 

The Americans with Disabilities Act, 101st Cong., 2d 

Sess., p. 1331 (Comm. Print 1990) (stating that persons 

with hearing impairments “have been arrested and held in 

jail over night without ever knowing their rights nor what 

they are being held for”); id., at 1005 (stating that police 

arrested a man with AIDS and “[i]nstead of putting the 

man in jail, the officers locked him inside his car to spend 

the night”); California Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s 

Commission on Disability: Final Report 103 (Dec. 1989) 

(finding that inmates with disabilities were unnecessarily 

“confined to medical units where access to work, job training, recreation and rehabilitation programs is limited”). 

In fact, as the Solicitor General points out in his brief 

arguing that Title II’s damage remedy constitutes appropriate prophylactic legislation in the prison context, the 

record of mistreatment of prison inmates that Congress 

reviewed in its deliberations preceding the enactment of 

Title II was comparable in all relevant respects to the 

record that we recently held sufficient to uphold the application of that title to the entire class of cases implicating

the fundamental right of access to the courts. See Lane, 

541 U. S., at 533–534. And while it is true that cases 

involving inadequate medical care and inhumane conditions of confinement have perhaps been most numerous, 

courts have also reviewed myriad other types of claims by 
4 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA 

STEVENS, J., concurring 

disabled prisoners, such as allegations of the abridgment

of religious liberties, undue censorship, interference with 

access to the judicial process, and procedural due process 

violations. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980) 

(procedural due process); May v. Sheahan, 226 F. 3d 876 

(CA7 2000) (access to judicial process, lawyers, legal materials, and reading materials); Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F. 

2d 729 (CA10 1981) (access to reading and writing materials); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715 (WDNY

1991) (access to law library and religious services).

Indeed, given the constellation of rights applicable in 

the prison context, it is clear that the Eleventh Circuit has 

erred in identifying only the Eighth Amendment right to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment in performing

the first step of the “congruence and proportionality” 

inquiry set forth in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507 

(1997). See Miller, 384 F. 3d, at 1272, and n. 28 (declining 

to entertain United States’ argument that Lane requires

consideration of constitutional rights beyond those provided by the Eighth Amendment); App. to Pet. for Cert. in 

No. 04–1236, p. 19a (relying on Miller to find Goodman’s 

Title II claims for money damages barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment). By reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 

in this case and remanding for further proceedings, we not 

only provide the parties an opportunity to create a more 

substantial factual record, but also provide the District 

Court and the Court of Appeals the opportunity to apply 

the Boerne framework properly. Given these benefits, I 

agree with the Court’s decision to await further proceedings before trying to define the extent to which Title II 

validly abrogates state sovereign immunity in the prison 

context.