17-3984 

Gao v. Barr 

BIA 

Vomacka, IJ 

A206 289 438

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 27th day of January, two thousand twenty. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

Chief Judge,

PETER W. HALL, 

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

YUSEN GAO, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 17-3984 

 NAC 

WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Mouren Wu, New York, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 

General; Nancy E. Friedman, Senior 

Litigation Counsel; Sharon M. 

Clay, Trial Attorney, Office of 
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Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC. 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Yusen Gao, a native and citizen of the 

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 27, 

2017, decision of the BIA affirming a March 2, 2017, decision 

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Gao’s application for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yusen Gao, No. A

206 289 438 (B.I.A. Nov. 27, 2017), aff’g No. A 206 289 438

(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 2, 2017). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 

in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). 

The applicable standards of review are well established. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 

196 (2d Cir. 2009); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 

(2d Cir. 2009). 
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 “The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to 

sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but 

only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the 

applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers 

to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the 

applicant is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see 

also Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 196-97. “In determining whether 

the applicant has met [his] burden, the trier of fact may 

weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of 

record. Where the trier of fact determines that the 

applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise 

credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the 

applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably 

obtain the evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). The 

agency did not err in determining that Gao failed to 

corroborate his claim. 

 Although the BIA assumed credibility, the agency may 

require corroboration of even credible testimony. Id. And 

the agency properly identified the missing evidence. See 

Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 198–99. The agency noted that Gao 

failed to document his testimony that he received medical 

treatment at a clinic for injuries sustained in detention, he 

could have presented letters from his parents or friends in 
4

China to corroborate that he attended a Catholic church in 

China or had problems with the government, and he did not 

present evidence or call witnesses to confirm his church 

attendance in the United States. 

 Gao did not establish that the evidence was unavailable. 

See id. at 198; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (“No court 

shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with 

respect to the availability of corroborating evidence . . . 

unless . . . a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to 

conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”). 

The IJ was not required to accept Gao’s explanation that he 

could not obtain a report from a clinic in China because Gao 

made no attempt to obtain such evidence. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4); cf. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d 

Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible 

explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; 

he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be 

compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted)). Furthermore, Gao admitted that he 

was able to obtain letters from his parents and a friend and 

that his father could have written a letter earlier. Gao 

also testified that he had friends, with whom he attended 

church, but except for stating he wanted his priest as a 
5

witness, he did not explain why his friends did not provide 

letters or testify on his behalf. 

 Gao did not present any documentary evidence other than 

identity documents, news articles and reports about 

conditions in China, and a U.S. tax return. These documents 

did not corroborate that he was a practicing Catholic or that 

he was detained and harmed in China. 

 Accordingly, because a reasonable fact-finder would not 

be compelled to conclude that Gao was unable to obtain 

evidence that he was detained and harmed by the Chinese 

government and that he attended Catholic churches in China 

and the United States, the agency did not err in denying 

relief on this basis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); 

Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 196–98. This finding was dispositive 

of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection because 

all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. 

See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court