SUMMARY 

January 10, 2019 

2019COA4

No. 17CA1678, People in Interest of G.S.S. — Children’s Code 

— Juvenile Court — Delinquency — Bail — Speedy Trial 

In this juvenile delinquency case, a division of the court of 

appeals concludes that under section 19-2-509(4)(b), C.R.S. 2018, a 

court is required to bring a juvenile to trial within sixty days of a 

no-bond order. If the court fails to do so, it violates the juvenile’s 

speedy trial rights. The division further concludes that the remedy 

for this type of speedy trial violation is dismissal of the charges. 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. 
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA4

Court of Appeals No. 17CA1678 

La Plata County District Court No. 17JD15 

Honorable Todd P. Norvell, Judge 

The People of the State of Colorado, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

In the Interest of G.S.S., 

Juvenile-Appellee. 

ORDER AFFIRMED 

Division VII 

Opinion by JUDGE ASHBY 

Harris, J., concurs 

J. Jones, J., dissents 

Announced January 10, 2019 

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Joseph G. Michaels, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellant 

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Ryann S. Hardman, Deputy 

State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellee 
1 

¶ 1 The prosecution appeals from the district court’s order 

dismissing its case against G.S.S. for violating his statutory speedy 

trial rights. The prosecution argues that the sixty-day statutory 

speedy trial period was waived or extended by G.S.S.’s requests for 

continuances, and that if there was a speedy trial violation, 

dismissal is not the proper remedy under section 19-2-509(4)(b), 

C.R.S. 2018. We reject both contentions and affirm. 

I. Background 

¶ 2 G.S.S. was arrested and charged with two delinquent acts for 

threatening to shoot students at his middle school. He was placed 

in secure detention. 

¶ 3 At the initial detention hearing on May 2, 2017, the court 

ordered that G.S.S. be held without bond, pending psychological 

and risk-assessment evaluations and the establishment of a release 

plan. 

¶ 4 Numerous hearings were held over the next several months 

regarding the status of G.S.S.’s release from detention. Then, on 

August 9, 2017, G.S.S.’s counsel requested a hearing to “determine 

and comply with” G.S.S.’s speedy trial rights under section 19-2-

509(4)(b). According to that statute, juveniles are to be brought to 
2 

trial within sixty days of the entry of a no-bond order. Defense 

counsel then moved to dismiss the case for violation of G.S.S.’s 

statutory speedy trial rights. 

¶ 5 After a hearing, the court granted the motion and dismissed 

the case against G.S.S. with prejudice. 

II. Discussion 

¶ 6 Our first task in deciding whether G.S.S. waived or otherwise 

extended his right to a speedy trial is to identify those statutory 

provisions that define G.S.S.’s statutory speedy trial rights. We 

must then construe and apply those statutes, reviewing the district 

court’s interpretation de novo. See Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20, 

¶ 15; People v. Walker, 252 P.3d 551, 552 (Colo. App. 2011). 

¶ 7 When construing a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain 

and give effect to the legislative intent. See People in Interest of T.A., 

91 P.3d 473, 474 (Colo. App. 2004). “In determining legislative 

intent, a reviewing court should look to the language of the statute, 

giving effect to words and phrases according to their plain and 

ordinary meaning.” Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, 

we apply it as written. Id. If, however, the language is reasonably 

susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous and we 
3 

may look to intrinsic and extrinsic aids to guide our interpretation. 

See In re People in Interest of A.A., 2013 CO 65, ¶ 10. 

A. A Juvenile’s Statutory Speedy Trial Rights 

¶ 8 There are several statutes in the Children’s Code that crossreference one another and are relevant to resolving the issue of 

whether G.S.S.’s right to a speedy trial was violated. We first 

describe how these statutes work together. 

¶ 9 Section 19-2-108(2)(d), C.R.S. 2018 (the juvenile speedy trial 

statute), sets forth the timelines within which certain hearings or 

events in a delinquency case must occur and requires that section 

18-1-405, C.R.S. 2018 (the adult speedy trial statute applicable to 

adults), and Crim. P. 48(b) govern a juvenile’s speedy trial rights. 

Specifically, for an adjudicatory trial, section 19-2-108(2)(d) 

incorporates the speedy trial period set forth in section 19-2-708(1), 

C.R.S. 2018, the statute that governs the entry of a plea in a 

delinquency case. Together these two statutes require that a 

juvenile be tried within sixty days of the entry of a not guilty plea 

unless a jury trial has been requested under section 19-2-107, 
4 

C.R.S. 2018, or the juvenile has explicitly or implicitly waived or 

extended the speedy trial period.1 But when a juvenile is held in 

detention due to a no-bond hold order, these generally applicable 

speedy trial statutes are modified. 

¶ 10 Section 19-2-508, C.R.S. 2018, describes how and when the 

court should determine if a juvenile may be released from or placed 

in detention. And, consistent with sections 19-2-108 and -708, 

discussed above, it requires that any juvenile who is detained 

without bail must be tried within sixty days unless a jury trial has 

been requested. See § 19-2-508(3)(a)(IV)(D). If we looked no 

further, we might conclude that unless a jury trial has been 

requested, a juvenile ordered to be held without bond must be tried 

within sixty days of entering a not guilty plea. But we cannot 

ignore section 19-2-509. See A.S. v. People, 2013 CO 63, ¶ 10 

(“When construing a statute, we ascertain and give effect to the 

General Assembly’s intent, reading applicable statutory provisions 

as a whole in order to accord consistent, harmonious, and sensible 

 

1 G.S.S. never requested a jury trial. We discuss the prosecution’s 

waiver argument below. 
5 

effect to all their parts.”). In essence, section 19-2-508 reaffirms the 

sixty-day speedy trial period applicable to all non-jury adjudicatory 

trials. Section 19-2-509(4)(b) (the juvenile bail statute) then 

describes that for those juveniles held without bond, the running of 

the speedy trial clock is triggered by entry of a not guilty plea or a 

no-bond hold order, “whichever date is earlier.” 

¶ 11 Because section 19-2-508 references the general speedy trial 

statutes triggered by the entry of a plea of not guilty, and section 

19-2-509 specifically addresses how the speedy trial clock is 

triggered by either a not guilty plea or a no-bond hold order, the 

statutes seemingly conflict. However, to the extent that the two 

statutes conflict, we should attempt to harmonize them to effectuate 

the legislative intent. See T.A., 91 P.3d at 474. And, generally, the 

more specific statute governs over the more general. § 2-4-205, 

C.R.S. 2018; accord Gessler v. Doty, 2012 COA 4, ¶ 13. Hence, 

because it is the more specific statute, section 19-2-509 governs 

over section 19-2-508. 

¶ 12 Section 19-2-509 does not otherwise modify provisions of the 

generally applicable juvenile speedy trial statutes; therefore, the 

other provisions of those statutes apply. And because section 18-1-
6 

405’s provisions are not inconsistent with the juvenile speedy trial 

statutes, both the tolling and enforcement provisions of the criminal 

speedy trial statute, including whether the speedy trial period has 

been tolled or waived, are applicable. See People in Interest of 

J.M.N., 39 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Colo. App. 2001) (holding that the 

criminal speedy trial statute and related law apply when 

considering whether a juvenile’s right to speedy trial has been 

violated); People in Interest of G.W.R., 943 P.2d 466, 467 (Colo. App. 

1997). With this background, we now turn to the prosecution’s 

arguments that G.S.S.’s or his counsel’s actions extended the 

speedy trial period beyond sixty days. 

¶ 13 The court entered a no-bond hold order at G.S.S.’s initial 

detention hearing on May 2, 2017. Thus, according to the plain 

language of the bail statute, G.S.S. was entitled to a trial within 

sixty days of that date, or July 1, 2017. The court did not hold a 

trial within that sixty-day limit. In fact, at no point did the court 

even set a trial date. But is that attributable to actions taken by 

G.S.S. that extended his speedy trial period? Our answer is “no.” 

¶ 14 The prosecution makes several arguments regarding why 

G.S.S. is at fault for his trial not occurring before his speedy trial 
7 

period ran. First, it argues that a request for a jury trial was 

required to trigger the running of G.S.S.’s speedy trial clock. But 

even when entitled to one, a juvenile is not required to request a 

jury trial. See § 19-2-107 (providing that a juvenile or the district 

attorney may demand a jury trial under certain circumstances, but 

failure to demand a jury trial constitutes a waiver of any such 

right). And a failure to request a jury trial has no bearing on the 

applicable speedy trial period for a non-jury trial. Further, section 

19-2-509, by its explicit terms, does not require that a jury trial be 

requested. 

¶ 15 Second, the prosecution argues that when the tolling 

provisions of section 18-1-405 are applied, the sixty-day speedy 

trial period was either extended or waived when G.S.S.’s counsel 

requested continuances of the various court hearings. But not all 

defense actions that result in a continuance of a hearing date waive, 

toll, or extend a speedy trial period. See Tongish v. Arapahoe Cty. 

Court, 775 P.2d 63 (Colo. App. 1989) (holding that only delays that 

impede the statutory goal of bringing a defendant to trial within the 

statutory speedy trial period are excludable from computation of the 

speedy trial deadline; and procedural interruptions, such as a 
8 

continued pretrial conference, that do not delay a trial beyond the 

applicable speedy trial period are not automatically excludable 

without the defendant’s express waiver of speedy trial rights). 

When we consider the circumstances of each hearing at which 

G.S.S.’s counsel requested a continuance and apply the tolling and 

waiver provisions of section 18-1-405, we agree with the district 

court that G.S.S. did nothing to delay the setting or occurrence of a 

trial within the sixty-day speedy trial period. The failure to timely 

hold the trial was simply the result of the prosecution’s and the 

court’s failure to hear the speedy trial clock ticking. 

¶ 16 G.S.S.’s counsel sought his release from detention at the 

initial detention hearing and every hearing thereafter. Although a 

release plan had been devised by staff from the pretrial release 

program, the pretrial staff, the court, and the prosecution were 

unwilling to implement the plan until a risk assessment and safety 

evaluation of G.S.S. had been completed. The continuances 

requested at each hearing between the initial May 2nd detention 

hearing and July 11, 2017, the date of the first hearing after the 

sixty-day speedy trial period had run, focused on the delays in the 

completion of the risk and mental health assessment and 
9 

evaluation that would facilitate G.S.S.’s release from detention. As 

of that July 11th date when the evaluation was completed, the 

court had consistently held to its position that until the assessment 

and evaluation were completed and reviewed, it would not 

reconsider G.S.S.’s repeated requests for release from detention.2

¶ 17 It is true that while waiting for the risk assessment to be 

completed, the court asked whether plea negotiations were 

occurring and suggested that the pending evaluation might be 

helpful in that regard. G.S.S.’s counsel acknowledged that any 

assessment or evaluation would likely also assist with plea 

negotiations. But counsel was not the driving force behind and did 

not acquiesce in the delays. Instead, she continually focused on the 

 

2 The prosecution argues that the risk and safety assessment that 

the prosecution, pretrial services staff, and the court required in 

order to consider G.S.S.’s release from detention was effectively a 

competency evaluation and the delay in receiving it was therefore 

chargeable to G.S.S. under section 18-1-405(6)(a), C.R.S. 2018. 

But none of the language of that statutory subsection applies here. 

See id. (excluding “[a]ny period during which the defendant is 

incompetent to stand trial, or is unable to appear by reason of 

illness or physical disability, or is under observation or examination 

at any time after the issue of the defendant’s mental condition, 

insanity, incompetency, or impaired mental condition is raised”). 
10 

primary goal of obtaining G.S.S.’s release from detention and did 

not request any delay in setting a trial date or holding a trial. After 

reviewing the record, the district court acknowledged in its 

dismissal order that its prior recollection as to why the hearings 

were continued was in error. It found that the delays were for the 

purpose of getting an assessment and an evaluation to allow G.S.S. 

to be released and that there was no reason why the trial could not 

have been set to occur while the completion of these tasks was 

pending: 

 “It was a little bit different situation than I had originally 

thought, where your attorney was attempting to help you 

get released. And [the District Attorney], I’m sure she’s 

accurate when she says it was designed also to 

potentially help you get a more favorable plea agreement. 

But you didn’t do anything to delay your trial.” 

(Emphasis added.) 

 “[A]nd similarly, under 18-1-405, I have to find that you 

delayed or did something else that caused the trial to go 

beyond the 60 days. I can’t make that finding. You 

didn’t do anything to delay your trial.” 
11 

¶ 18 The prosecution appears to argue that as long as anyone 

referenced the possibility of a negotiated plea, there was no 

obligation to set a trial date. But, as in Tongish, there was no 

impediment to engaging in plea negotiations while the trial date was 

pending. See 775 P.2d at 65. The setting of a trial date is not 

dependent on the parties concluding that resolution of the case 

without a trial is unlikely. And the dispositional hearings set by the 

court and the continued detention hearings are precisely the type of 

“procedural interruptions” that should not be excluded from the 

speedy trial calculation. 

¶ 19 The district court therefore correctly found, with record 

support, that none of the delay in setting a trial date or holding a 

trial within the sixty-day speedy trial deadline was attributable to 

G.S.S. under the provisions of section 18-1-405. The court 

specifically found that counsel’s actions on behalf of G.S.S. were 

designed to get G.S.S. released, not to delay a trial date. Thus, 

G.S.S.’s requested continuances of the detention and dispositional 

hearings did not toll, waive, or extend the speedy trial clock. See 

Tongish, 775 P.2d at 65. 
12 

¶ 20 Finally, the prosecution argues that defense counsel was likely 

aware of the speedy trial issue and had an obligation to alert the 

court and the prosecution to it. We cannot infer from the record 

before us that counsel was aware of the applicable speedy trial 

period before it ran. But, even if true, the obligation to bring G.S.S. 

to trial within the speedy trial period did not fall on counsel for 

G.S.S. It bears repeating that it is the court’s and the prosecutor’s 

duty, not a defendant’s, to ensure that the speedy trial provisions 

are met. See People v. Rogers, 706 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Colo. App. 

1985); cf. G.W.R., 943 P.2d at 467 (holding no violation of speedy 

trial rights where defense counsel affirmatively accepted a trial date 

beyond the speedy trial deadline). 

¶ 21 Accordingly, we conclude that by not holding the adjudicatory 

trial within sixty days of the entry of the no-bond hold order, the 

court violated G.S.S.’s statutory speedy trial rights. 

B. Remedy for a Violation of a Juvenile’s Right to a Speedy Trial 

Under Section 19-2-509(4)(b) 

¶ 22 Having determined that G.S.S.’s speedy trial rights were 

violated, we must now address whether the remedy is dismissal of 

the charges or release from detention. We conclude G.S.S. is 
13 

entitled to dismissal. See, e.g., Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544, 549 

(Colo. 1985); People v. Wolfe, 9 P.3d 1137, 1141 (Colo. App. 1999); 

see also § 18-1-405(1); § 19-2-108. 

¶ 23 We have concluded that section 19-2-509, with its sixty-day 

limit from the date of the no-bond hold or entry of a not guilty plea, 

whichever is earlier, is the governing statute for the timeframe 

within which a juvenile must be tried. But no specific remedy is 

provided in sections 19-2-508 or 19-2-509. To resolve the question 

of the proper remedy for a speedy trial violation in these 

circumstances, it is necessary to understand the broader policies 

and procedures related to juvenile detention and delinquency 

adjudicatory trials. 

¶ 24 We outlined in Part II.A above how the juvenile speedy trial 

and bail statutes relate to one another and to section 18-1-405. 

The prosecution now argues that even though it advocated that we 

should apply all of the waiver and tolling provisions of the criminal 

speedy trial statute to G.S.S., we should not apply the remedy of 

dismissal for the violation of his speedy trial rights provided in that 

same statute because G.S.S.’s speedy trial period was not triggered 

by his entering a not guilty plea. Further, it contends, because 
14 

section 19-2-509 is entitled “Bail,” we should base the remedy for 

violating the juvenile bail statute on the criminal bail statute rather 

than the criminal speedy trial statute. G.S.S.’s remedy, it argues, is 

to have a hearing and have the juvenile court set bail. We see no 

legal basis for denying the dismissal remedy to G.S.S. 

¶ 25 Section 18-1-405(1) provides that, 

[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, 

if a defendant is not brought to trial on the 

issues raised by the complaint, information, or 

indictment within six months from the date of 

the entry of a plea of not guilty, he shall be 

discharged from custody if he has not been 

admitted to bail, and, whether in custody or on 

bail, the pending charges shall be dismissed, 

and the defendant shall not again be indicted, 

informed against, or committed for the same 

offense, or for another offense based upon the 

same act or series of acts arising out of the 

same criminal episode. 

Accord Crim. P. 48(b)(1). 

¶ 26 The criminal bail statute, section 16-4-101(4), C.R.S. 2018, 

provides that 

if a person is denied bail under this section, 

the trial of the person shall be commenced not 

more than ninety-one days after the date on 

which bail is denied. If the trial is not 

commenced within ninety-one days and the 

delay is not attributable to the defense, the 

court shall immediately schedule a bail 
15 

hearing and shall set the amount of the bail for 

the person. 

¶ 27 Thus, the Code of Criminal Procedure identifies that the 

specific remedy for violating a criminal defendant’s rights to trial 

when he or she is held without bail is to hold a hearing to 

determine release, not dismissal of the charges. 

¶ 28 However, in the criminal statutes, the legislature has clearly 

separated the triggers and remedies for speedy trial violations for 

criminal defendants for whom no bond has been set and for those 

defendants who have had bond set but who have not been tried 

within the generally applicable speedy trial period. The remedy for 

a speedy trial violation for a criminal defendant whose speedy trial 

clock is triggered by a not guilty plea is dismissal of the charges. 

On the other hand, the remedy for a violation of the shorter nobond speedy trial period is to hold a hearing and set bail. 

¶ 29 In the applicable juvenile statute, the no-bond speedy trial 

clock for a detained juvenile is triggered by either a no-bond order 

or a not guilty plea. The legislature could have chosen to model its 

juvenile speedy trial statutes in the same way as the adult criminal 

procedure statutes, but it did not. 
16 

¶ 30 And, other than the various related juvenile speedy trial 

statutes incorporating the provisions of section 18-1-405, the 

juvenile bail statute is silent as to the remedy for violating the 

associated rights. Where a statute is silent as to remedy, the 

statute may be considered ambiguous on that point. See People v. 

Mosley, 397 P.3d 1122, 1126 (Colo. App. 2011) (“A statute may be 

ambiguous if it is silent on an issue that would be expected to be 

within its scope.” (quoting People v. Carey, 198 P.3d 1223, 1229 

(Colo. App. 2008))), aff’d, 2017 CO 20. At that point, we may look 

to extrinsic sources to determine the legislature’s intent as to the 

appropriate remedy. 

¶ 31 To discern the legislative intent related to section 19-2-

509(4)(b), we must honor the legislature’s purpose in structuring a 

juvenile delinquency system that is different from the criminal 

system. See A.C. v. People, 16 P.3d 240, 241 (Colo. 2001). It is 

clear that “a delinquency proceeding is not a criminal prosecution,” 

S.G.W. v. People, 752 P.2d 86, 88 (Colo. 1988), and simply using 

criminal statutes as proxies for like provisions in the Children’s 

Code does not honor the differences intended between the juvenile 

delinquency and criminal systems. 
17 

¶ 32 The Children’s Code’s primary goal is to serve the best 

interests of the child and of society. § 19-1-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2018. 

“In service of these goals, the Children’s Code seeks to provide 

informal, simple and speedy judicial procedures.” A.C., 16 P.3d at 

242; see People in Interest of T.M., 742 P.2d 905, 907 (Colo. 1987) 

(“[T]he underlying theme of a delinquency proceeding is to provide 

guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society 

rather than fixing criminal responsibility, guilt, and punishment.”). 

Our supreme court has also noted that, because of the unique 

psychological positioning and sensitivity of juveniles, as compared 

to adult offenders, we must be particularly cognizant of the harm 

caused to children by delays in bringing a juvenile to trial and 

prolonged detention. See P.V. v. Dist. Court, 199 Colo. 357, 360-61, 

609 P.2d 110, 112 (1980). 

¶ 33 With these purposes in mind, we cannot harmonize and give 

effect to the applicable juvenile speedy trial statutory provisions by 

failing to apply the remedy provided by specifically incorporating 

the provisions of the adult criminal speedy trial statute — dismissal 

under section 18-1-405. We are not at liberty to choose to 

incorporate a statute that we think is a better fit. We discern no 
18 

legislative intent to limit application of the dismissal remedy for 

violating a juvenile’s no-bond speedy trial rights to only those 

juveniles who have entered a not guilty plea. 

¶ 34 Further, any ambiguity in the juvenile bail statute must be 

construed in G.S.S.’s favor and in furtherance of the rehabilitative 

purposes of the Children’s Code. See Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 

811 (Colo. 2004) (“[T]he rule of lenity . . . requires courts to resolve 

ambiguities in a penal code in favor of a defendant’s liberty 

interests.”); People in Interest of D.S.L., 134 P.3d 522, 527 (Colo. 

App. 2006) (“[I]t is particularly appropriate to apply the rule of lenity 

in resolving statutory ambiguities in juvenile delinquency 

proceedings . . . .”). 

¶ 35 For these reasons and consistent with the Children’s Code’s 

purpose — to promote rehabilitation and minimize delay and 

prolonged detention — we discern the legislative intent to require 

dismissal when a violation of speedy trial occurs, regardless of 

whether the speedy trial period has been established by a no-bond 

hold order or entry of a not guilty plea. Therefore, we conclude that 

the district court did not err by dismissing G.S.S.’s case based on 

the violation of his speedy trial rights. 
19 

III. Conclusion 

¶ 36 The order is affirmed. 

JUDGE HARRIS concurs. 

JUDGE J. JONES dissents. 
20 

JUDGE J. JONES, dissenting. 

¶ 37 The majority’s decision to affirm the district court’s dismissal 

of the charges against G.S.S. rests on two conclusions. First, the 

majority concludes that the delays caused by defense counsel’s 

multiple requests for continuances to allow time for a mental health 

evaluation of G.S.S. aren’t chargeable to G.S.S. because defense 

counsel was only trying to obtain G.S.S.’s release from detention. 

Second, the majority concludes that the remedy for a failure to try a 

juvenile held without bond within sixty days of a no bond order, as 

required by section 19-2-509(4)(b), C.R.S. 2018, is dismissal of the 

charges under section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. 2018. For reasons I’ll get 

to later, I’m not altogether sold on the majority’s second conclusion. 

But the bigger problem for me is that the majority’s first conclusion 

is belied by the record and contrary to Colorado Supreme Court 

precedent. The record clearly shows, and the district court 

expressly found, that while defense counsel was attempting to 

obtain G.S.S.’s release from detention, counsel was also seeking to 

improve G.S.S.’s plea bargaining position. The supreme court has 

held that delays resulting from defense counsel’s efforts to facilitate 
21 

a plea bargain are chargeable to the defendant. And so I 

respectfully dissent. 

I. The Delays are Chargeable to G.S.S. 

¶ 38 Section 19-2-509(4)(b) provides that a juvenile who remains in 

custody or detention without bail 

must be tried on the charges on which the bail 

is denied . . . within sixty days after the entry 

of such order [denying bond] or within sixty 

days after the juvenile’s entry of a plea, 

whichever date is earlier; except that, if the 

juvenile requests a jury trial pursuant to 

section 19-2-107, the provisions of section 

19-2-107(4) shall apply. 

But the statute is silent on whether certain events may toll the 

sixty-day period.3 The majority assumes, as I do, that delays 

attributable to the defense do so. This is so because it’s 

inconceivable that the General Assembly intended to reward — 

indeed, create a windfall for — a defendant who causes delay. Cf. 

§ 18-1-405(6)(f) (“[t]he period of any delay caused at the instance of 

the defendant” doesn’t count toward section 18-1-405(1)’s sixmonth speedy trial period). 

 

3 G.S.S. has the burden of showing a violation of this provision. See 

Saiz v. Dist. Court, 189 Colo. 555, 557, 542 P.2d 1293, 1295 (1975). 
22 

¶ 39 Of course, this statement begs the question: What sort of 

conduct is attributable to a defendant for this purpose? The 

supreme court has answered that question; broadly stated, “[i]f the 

delay is caused by, agreed to, or created at the instance of the 

defendant, it will be excluded from the speedy-trial calculation 

made by the court.” People v. Bell, 669 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Colo. 

1983); accord Jones v. People, 711 P.2d 1270, 1281 (Colo. 1986); 

Saiz v. Dist. Court, 189 Colo. 555, 558, 542 P.2d 1293, 1295 (1975). 

Put another way, any delay “at the request of or for the benefit of 

the defendant . . . is properly chargeable to the defendant.” People 

v. Luevano, 670 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo. 1983) (quoting People v. Murphy, 

183 Colo. 106, 109, 515 P.2d 107, 109 (1973)). 

¶ 40 It’s undisputed that every delay in this case was caused by 

numerous continuances requested by defense counsel. So it would 

seem that those delays are chargeable to G.S.S. under section 19-2-

509(4)(b), given the supreme court pronouncements just noted. But 

the majority reasons, relying on Tongish v. Arapahoe County Court, 

775 P.2d 63 (Colo. App. 1989), that only continuances affecting the 

trial date count, and that the continuances requested by G.S.S.’s 
23 

attorney concerned only counsel’s efforts to get G.S.S. released from 

detention. 

¶ 41 This is where I part ways with the majority. For even were I to 

accept the premise of Tongish, I don’t accept the majority’s limited 

characterization of the purpose of the delays requested by G.S.S.’s 

counsel. Nor did the district court. And my understanding of 

counsel’s reasons, and the district court’s understanding as 

reflected in the record, brings into play supreme court authority 

requiring that we charge the delays to G.S.S. for purposes of section 

19-2-509(4)(b). 

¶ 42 Defense counsel sought (and paid for) a mental health 

evaluation for G.S.S. by a licensed professional. After trying 

unsuccessfully to arrange evaluations by two professionals (for 

which counsel sought additional delay), defense counsel retained 

such a professional, but couldn’t arrange an examination right 

away due to that person’s schedule. As a result of these efforts, 

defense counsel requested a short extension of the detention 

hearing, see § 19-2-508(2)(a), C.R.S. 2018, and several extensions 

of subsequent dispositional hearings (that is, hearings to determine 
24 

whether there was probable cause for the charges, § 19-2-705, 

C.R.S. 2018). 

¶ 43 The majority correctly points out that one of defense counsel’s 

goals in obtaining such an evaluation may well have been to assist 

in getting G.S.S. released from detention. But that wasn’t the only 

goal. Another goal, expressed repeatedly by defense counsel, was to 

assist counsel with plea negotiations. Counsel hoped to obtain an 

opinion that G.S.S. wasn’t a danger to the community so as to 

improve G.S.S.’s plea bargaining position. 

¶ 44 Plea bargaining considerations, and all parties’ awareness that 

they couldn’t move forward with such discussions, or with a plea, 

until defense counsel was able to digest the mental health 

professional’s evaluation, were discussed at several hearings both 

before and after the sixty-day period would otherwise have expired. 

Both the prosecutor and the defense counsel expressly 

contemplated reaching a plea agreement following receipt of the 

defense-retained professional’s report. And the court monitored the 

progress of those efforts toward a disposition, recognizing even that 

the evaluation would affect G.S.S.’s entry of a plea and any progress 

toward a trial. In ruling on G.S.S.’s motion to dismiss, the district 
25 

court found that the mental health evaluation “was designed also to 

potentially help [G.S.S.] get a more favorable plea agreement.” 

¶ 45 These facts, in my view, distinguish this case from Tongish, in 

which the only continuances were of a pretrial conference. 775 

P.2d at 65. The record shows that the continuances in this case 

were for the purposes of buttressing G.S.S.’s case for release from 

detention, promoting and advancing plea negotiations, enabling 

G.S.S. to enter a more informed plea to the charges, and, 

inferentially, preparing the defense’s case. 

¶ 46 In closely analogous circumstances, the supreme court has 

held that delays for such purposes are attributable to the defense. 

In Maynes v. People, 178 Colo. 88, 495 P.2d 551 (1972), the court 

held: 

The delay which preceded trial was occasioned, 

to a large extent, by the defendant. The 

defendant requested and obtained numerous 

continuances in an attempt to effectuate a plea 

bargain. The prosecution is not chargeable 

with delay that has been caused by the 

defendant. 

Id. at 91, 495 P.2d at 552; see also People v. Howard, 541 P.2d 

1252, 1254 (Colo. App. 1975) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 

35(f)). Similarly, the supreme court has held that delays 
26 

attributable to a defendant’s efforts to meet conditions to qualify for 

a deferred judgment are chargeable to the defendant. Luevano, 670 

P.2d at 3; see also Alley v. Kal, 44 Colo. App. 561, 562-63, 616 P.2d 

191, 192 (1980) (also so holding; the delay was “for the purposes of 

achieving a disposition of [the defendant’s] case without going to 

trial”). And in Jones, 711 P.2d 1270, the supreme court held that 

delays occasioned by defense counsel’s request that the defendant 

undergo a competency evaluation were chargeable to the defense 

because they were “for the benefit of the defendant.” Id. at 1280-

81. 

¶ 47 All of the continuances requested by defense counsel in this 

case were for G.S.S.’s benefit. And all of them were for the obvious 

purpose of avoiding a trial on the charges. So it follows that the 

resulting delays are chargeable to G.S.S., and therefore the district 

court erred in deciding to the contrary.4 

 

4 In the district court’s defense, though the prosecutor argued that 

the delays were attributable to the defense because defense counsel 

was trying to improve G.S.S.’s plea bargaining position, the 

prosecutor didn’t provide the court with the legal authority I’ve cited 

above. 
27 

II. The Proper Remedy for a Violation of Section 19-2-509(4)(b) 

¶ 48 The majority holds that dismissal is the only remedy available 

when a court fails to try the case within sixty days of a no-bond 

order. In so holding, the majority applies section 18-1-405(1) to 

section 19-2-509(4)(b). It’s not clear to me, however, that section 

18-1-405(1) applies to this juvenile statute. 

¶ 49 The case on which the majority relies, People in Interest of 

J.M.N., 39 P.3d 1261 (Colo. App. 2001), concerned speedy trial 

provisions of sections 19-2-108(1) and -708(1), C.R.S. 2018. The 

division held that the juvenile was required to make a speedy trial 

objection before the adjudicatory trial, reasoning that section 

19-2-108(1) expressly incorporates a sixty-day deadline from 

section 19-2-708(1) and also says that “[t]he juvenile’s right to a 

speedy trial shall be governed by section 18-1-405.” 39 P.3d at 

1263. 

¶ 50 But this case doesn’t involve sections 19-2-108 and -708. 

Rather, it involves section 19-2-509, which doesn’t include any 

reference to section 18-1-405. Further, section 19-2-509 is a “bail” 

statute. The most closely analogous statute in the Code of Criminal 

Procedure is section 16-4-101, C.R.S. 2018. Subsection (4) of that 
28 

statute says that if a defendant is denied bail, “the trial of the 

person shall be commenced not more than ninety-one days after the 

date on which bail is denied.” So that bail statute essentially tracks 

the language of the juvenile bail statute, section 19-2-509(4)(b), 

substituting ninety-one days for sixty days. But it doesn’t provide 

for dismissal of charges; rather, it says that “[i]f the trial is not 

commenced within ninety-one days and the delay is not attributable 

to the defense, the court shall immediately schedule a bail hearing 

and shall set the amount of the bail for the person.” § 16-4-101(4). 

¶ 51 The upshot is that in directly analogous circumstances, the 

General Assembly has told us that the remedy is to hold a hearing 

and set bail, not to dismiss the charges. The majority, however, 

reasons that the general purposes of the juvenile system — 

particularly the need for swift adjudication — justify the harsher 

result of dismissal under section 18-1-405. Maybe. But maybe 

not. Perhaps those purposes are adequately accounted for by the 

shorter time periods set forth in the juvenile statutes. 

¶ 52 In any event, I see an ambiguity in section 19-2-509(4)(b) that 

calls for legislative fixing. If the General Assembly decides to take a 

look at that ambiguity, it may also wish to consider whether the 
29 

drastic remedy of dismissal is appropriate for all speedy trial 

violations even when such violations don’t amount to violations of 

the constitutional right to a speedy trial. 

III. Conclusion 

¶ 53 I would reverse the district court’s dismissal of the charges 

against G.S.S. and remand for further proceedings on those 

charges.