IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-20632

Summary Calendar

VALERI DEVERE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

FORFEITURE SUPPORT ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

U.S.D.C. No. 4:12-cv-03234

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant, Valeri Devere (“Devere”), appeals the district court’s 

summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee, Forfeiture Support 

Associates, L.L.C. (“FSA”), dismissing Devere’s retaliation claim under Title 

VII. Because Devere has failed to establish a genuine dispute of fact regarding

pretext, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 29, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I. BACKGROUND

Devere was employed by FSA, which provides contract staffing and 

support services to the Department of Justice. She began her employment with 

FSA in 2004 and was assigned to the Houston, Texas office of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) as a Records Examiner Analyst. Devere’s daily 

assignments were provided to her by ICE Special Agents (“SA”). These 

assignments included researching assets belonging to targets of ICE 

investigations. William Griffin (“Griffin”) was Devere’s immediate supervisor 

at FSA, although he was stationed in Chicago, Illinois.

From the beginning of Devere’s employment with FSA until November 

2010, ICE Senior Special Agent (“SSA”) Martin Schramm (“Schramm”) 

supervised Devere’s work. During those six years, Devere received exemplary 

performance ratings.

In October 2009, while SSA Schramm was still in charge of Devere’s 

group, Devere alleged that an ICE agent sexually harassed her at work. She 

reported the harassment to ICE officials and FSA’s human resources

department, but not to Griffin. Both ICE and FSA’s human resources

department helped Devere prepare an EEOC complaint in December 2009. 

Devere’s EEOC complaint against the ICE agent was dismissed on December 

8, 2010 following a settlement with ICE.1

In November 2010—before Devere’s EEOC complaint was dismissed but 

after Devere settled her harassment complaint with ICE—SSA Greenwell 

replaced SSA Schramm as the ICE agent in charge of Devere’s group. 

Additionally, SA Kathy Ransbury joined Devere’s group at that time. Devere 

alleges that SSA Greenwell and SA Ransbury were friends with the ICE agent 

 

1 The settlement agreement relocated the alleged harasser’s office, required him to

take sexual harassment training, and instructed him to avoid walking near Devere’s office.

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that harassed Devere. On this basis, she contends that SSA Greenwell and SA 

Ransbury began fabricating performance issues and reporting those 

fraudulent issues to Devere’s FSA supervisor, Griffin, in retaliation for her 

EEOC complaint.

Specifically, SSA Greenwell reported that Devere was reluctant to 

perform certain tasks because she viewed them as “agent’s work” and clerical 

work. Devere often questioned whether the contract between FSA and ICE 

required her to do the requested assignments. SSA Greenwell met with Devere 

about her performance issues, but, according to SSA Greenwell, Devere’s 

complaints continued.

Around this time, Devere talked with Griffin about her concerns that she 

was being asked to perform tasks outside of the contract between FSA and ICE. 

Griffin instructed her to perform the tasks requested by the ICE agents. 

In January 2011, SSA Greenwell told Griffin that Devere’s 

insubordination created a disruption at the office, created more work for the 

other analyst, and caused agents to avoid asking Devere to do certain tasks. 

Griffin contacted Devere to discuss SSA Greenwell’s concerns. He explained 

to Devere that when a new supervisor takes office, such as SSA Greenwell, 

there may be changes to the requested assignments. Griffin then told Devere 

that the requested assignments of which Devere complained were included in 

the contract terms and she was to complete those tasks without objection. 

Griffin was still unaware at this time that Devere had filed an EEOC complaint 

over a year earlier alleging sexual harassment.

A week after their meeting, Devere finally told Griffin about the EEOC 

complaint she filed and her concern that SSA Greenwell was retaliating 

against her by fabricating work performance issues. Devere maintains that 

Griffin did not investigate her concerns about SSA Greenwell.

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In April 2011, Griffin visited the Houston office to address SSA 

Greenwell’s continuing complaints regarding Devere’s work performance. 

Griffin again instructed Devere to cooperate with the agents and respond 

appropriately to requests for assistance. 

On May 25, 2011, SSA Greenwell contacted Griffin and requested that 

Devere be removed from working at ICE. Pursuant to the terms of the 

contract, FSA was required to remove any employee at ICE’s request. Instead 

of transferring Devere to a different client, FSA terminated Devere. Griffin 

testified at his deposition that he did not want to “send the problem somewhere 

else.”

Devere filed a sexual harassment and retaliation claim against FSA. She 

alleges that her termination from FSA was retaliation for her EEOC complaint 

in 2009. FSA counters that it terminated Devere because she continued to 

display poor performance and professionalism. FSA filed a motion for 

summary judgment. In her response to the motion, Devere abandoned her 

claim of sexual harassment and only addressed FSA’s arguments related to her 

retaliation claim.2 The district court granted summary judgment in FSA’s 

favor because Devere failed to produce sufficient evidence of pretext. This 

appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary 

judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” We review a 

district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, viewing the 

 

2 In her brief to this Court, Devere concedes that she has abandoned her sexual 

harassment claim under Title VII.

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evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant.3 

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an 

employee who “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 

manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].”4

Because Devere presents only circumstantial evidence of retaliation, we must 

evaluate her claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.5 

Under McDonnell Douglas, Devere must first establish a prima facie case of 

Title VII retaliation. To do so, Devere must present sufficient evidence “(1)

that she engaged in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse 

employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the 

protected activity and the adverse action.”6 If Devere establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden then shifts to FSA to state a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason 

for its decision.7 If FSA does so, the burden shifts back to Devere to 

demonstrate that her deficient performance—the reason FSA assigned for her 

termination—was actually a pretext for retaliation.8

Devere argues that the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment because she provided sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue 

of fact regarding pretext. Both parties agree that pretext is the sole issue on 

appeal. In support of her argument, Devere asserts that FSA refused to 

investigate SSA Greenwell’s complaints about Devere’s work performance, and 

 

3 Medlock v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 589 F. App’x 707, 708 (5th Cir. 2014).

4 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e3(a).

5 Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty.,, 765 F.3d 480, 489 (5th Cir. 2014).

6 See id. at 489-90 (quoting Ikossi-Anastasiou v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 

579 F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

7 Davis, 765 F.3d at 490.

8 Id.

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therefore FSA lacks a good faith belief in the reason for its termination of 

Devere. Similarly, Devere argues that FSA failed to investigate her complaints 

that SSA Greenwell fabricated Devere’s performance problems as a means of 

retaliation. Finally, Devere argues that a genuine dispute of fact exists 

regarding pretext because FSA failed to follow its own internal policies when 

Griffin counseled Devere about her insubordination instead of placing her in 

FSA’s progressive discipline system.

Our review of the record persuades us that Devere failed to establish a 

genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding pretext—that is, to show the 

real cause for her termination was retaliation and not her performance 

deficiencies. To satisfy her summary judgment burden, Devere must present 

evidence that she would not have been terminated but for her filing the EEOC 

complaint in 2009.9 There is no summary judgment evidence, other than 

Devere’s subjective belief, that the 2009 EEOC complaint was the cause of her 

termination.10 Instead, the summary judgment record makes clear that

Devere objected to her work assignments on a regular basis, and her supervisor 

at FSA terminated her based on her refusal to do her work as supplied by ICE. 

In fact, Griffin, Devere’s immediate supervisor at FSA and the ultimate 

decision-maker, was unaware that Devere had filed the EEOC complaint until 

after he formally counseled Devere on her insubordination.11

 

9 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013).

10 Travis v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys., 122 F.3d 259, 266 (5th Cir. 1997)

(plaintiff’s subjective belief alone is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact).

11 According to the summary judgment record, placing Devere in FSA’s progressive 

discipline program or subjecting her to formal counseling is at the discretion of her 

supervisor. Insubordination is listed in FSA’s employee handbook as conduct that could 

result in immediate termination without the benefit of any progressive discipline.

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Moreover, the temporal proximity between Devere’s filing of the EEOC 

complaint in December 2009 and her termination in May 2011—approximately 

fifteen months apart—does not support an inference of pretext.12

Finally, Devere argues that Griffin had an obligation to investigate both 

the statements made to him by SSA Greenwell and Devere’s allegation that 

ICE officials were retaliating against her. However, Griffin’s termination of 

Devere does not have to be a correct decision, only a non-retaliatory one.13 

Griffin can properly rely upon the reports of Devere’s onsite supervisor, even 

if those reports are incorrect. Thus, Devere’s argument that Griffin had an 

obligation to investigate the accusations of SSA Greenwell before terminating 

her are without merit, especially since Devere admits the validity of these 

assertions, i.e., that she routinely objected to assignments because she believed 

they were outside the terms of the contract between FSA and ICE.

It is undisputed that (1) Griffin was unaware of the protected activity at 

the time Devere’s refusal to do her job was brought to his attention, and (2) 

Devere admits that she routinely objected to work requests from ICE agents. 

The record therefore reflects no genuine dispute that the cause of Devere’s 

termination was performance related and not a pretext for retaliation. 

Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 

FSA. We AFFIRM.

 

12 See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001). Even the temporal 

proximity between Devere informing Griffin of her filing of the EEOC complaint and her 

termination—approximately four months—is insufficient to imply pretext. See Russell v. 

Univ. of Texas, 234 F. App’x 195, 206 (5th Cir. 2007) (four-month gap between the protected 

activity and the adverse employment action cannot support an inference of causation).

13 Medlock, 589 F. App’x at 710 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA 

Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2005)) (“A deficient investigation does not prove pretext for 

retaliation.”).

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