1

Filed 1/25/22 Marriage of Stupp and Schilders CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of STEVEN 

STUPP and ANNEMARIE 

SCHILDERS.

STEVEN STUPP,

Respondent,

v.

ANNEMARIE SCHILDERS,

Appellant;

ESTER ADUT,

Appellant.

 A161177, A161576, A162373

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. FAM 0110799)

Ester Adut is the attorney for Annemarie Schilders, who is a party to a 

long-running marital dissolution. In these consolidated appeals, Adut 

challenges the family court’s order that she pay $1,050 in sanctions under 

section 177.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure for violating a lawful court order. 

The sanctions were imposed after Adut sought a writ of execution for the 

payment of a discovery sanction against Steven Stupp, the petitioner below,

knowing full well that the discovery sanction, which was still being 

adjudicated, was subject to a stay, and representing under penalty of perjury 

in the application for writ that no stay of execution of the discovery sanction 
2

had been granted. The trial court did not err in ordering the sanctions 

against Adut, and we shall affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2010, Steven Stupp filed a petition to dissolve his marriage to 

Schilders. A stipulated judgment of dissolution was entered in March 2014, 

and since then the case has been intensively litigated in the trial court, where 

several different trial court judges have presided over the matter. The 

history of the litigation is confusing and chaotic, as reflected in the register of 

actions, which is over 180 pages long; the hearing transcripts included in the 

record on appeal; and the description in appellant’s brief of the procedural 

history of the issue before us.1 

The three appeals before us arise from the imposition of sanctions 

against Adut under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 for violating an 

order made at a hearing on December 19, 2019 (December 2019 hearing).

2

 

Adut was present at that hearing, during which the trial court (Judge Sean 

P. Dabel) addressed a number of issues. As relevant here, the court stayed 

an April 23, 2019 discovery sanction in Schilders’s favor (April 2019 order) 

pending the adjudication of Stupp’s challenges to that sanction. There was 

no ambiguity about the stay: after hearing extensive argument, Judge Dabel 

stated that, based on the contents of Stupp’s challenges and the history of the 

September 2015 motion that led to the April 2019 order, he was “going to stay 

1 The underlying case has also been intensively litigated in this court, 

where 24 appeals have been initiated and 7 writ petitions filed by Schilders 

or Adut. 

2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure

unless otherwise stated.
3

now any prior discovery sanction pending further adjudication.” 3(Italics 

added.) Adut does not suggest or argue that she failed to hear or understand 

the trial court’s statement. The court instructed Stupp’s attorney to prepare 

an order after hearing. All of this is reflected in the court’s December 19, 

2019 minute order, which states, “The court will stay prior discovery 

sanctions pending adjudication. [¶] Petitioner’s counsel to prepare order.” 

On January 21, 2020, Stupp’s counsel served Adut with a letter “re 

[Proposed] Findings and Order After Hearing for Proceeding Heard on 

12/19/2019.”4 We do not know the contents of that letter; Adut later told the 

court that she “did not attend to” it. 

On January 27, before the adjudication of Stupp’s challenges and before 

the entry of any further written order regarding the stay, Adut applied for 

3 This is an abbreviated history of the April 2019 order, as best we can 

tell from the record. It had been issued by Judge Elizabeth Hill, who later 

recused herself. The order required Stupp to pay $27,433 in discovery 

sanctions for failing to provide code-compliant responses to discovery, and 

offset from the sanction amount any unpaid amount due from a $6,316 

sanction that the court had previously ordered Schilders to pay to Stupp. In 

an order signed in March 2020, Judge Dabel found that the April 2019 order 

was not just or equitable under the circumstances and granted Stupp’s 

motion to set it aside. Judge Dabel found that in making the April 2019 

order, Judge Hill had not considered a July 27, 2015 order staying discovery 

that had been made by Judge Susan Greenberg, who was then presiding over 

the case, and who had recused herself by the time Judge Hill took over the 

case. One reason Judge Hill did not consider the earlier order is that Adut 

and a former attorney for Schilders failed to prepare a written order after the 

July 27, 2015 hearing, despite being instructed by Judge Greenberg to do so. 

Then, even though discovery had been stayed by the July 2015 order, 

Schilders filed a motion to compel, which led to the imposition of sanctions 

against Stupp for responses that had been served on July 30, 2015, while 

discovery had been stayed. 

4 Subsequent dates are in 2020 unless otherwise stated.
4

issuance of a writ of execution for the April 2019 order, and stated under 

penalty of perjury that the sanctions order was not subject to a stay of 

execution.

On February 3, the court denied the application for issuance of writ of 

execution. Ten days later the court issued an order to show cause why Adut 

should not be sanctioned under section 177.5 for applying for a writ of 

execution of the April 2019 order in the face of the court’s December 19, 2019 

order. The order to show cause was scheduled to be heard in April, but the 

hearing was delayed until July as a result of the court’s emergency pandemic 

orders. The hearing was further continued at Adut’s request, and the issue 

was eventually heard on September 3, along with other issues in the 

underlying case. 

On September 23, the court signed written findings and orders after 

the September 3 hearing. As to the sanctions issue, the court stated that 

after notice and an opportunity to be heard, Adut was sanctioned $1,050 

pursuant to section 177.5; that a separate written order concerning the 

sanctions would be prepared by the court; and that the court would notify the 

California State Bar of the sanctions. 

As it happens, the separate order concerning the sanctions was not 

entered until February 2021. The trial court explained the delay: shortly 

after the September 3 hearing, Adut filed three statements of disqualification 

against Judge Dabel under section 170.3, and “[i]n the interest of justice and 

fairness to Ms. Adut,” the court had not published the order or reported the 

imposition of sanctions to the California State Bar while the issue of his 

disqualification was pending. 

The February 2021 order described the sanctionable conduct in detail, 

explaining that the stay of enforcement announced at the December 2019 
5

hearing was memorialized in a minute order; that “the attorneys retrieved a 

transcript [of the hearing] in the process of meeting and conferring about the 

preparation of the Finding and Order After Hearing”; and that upon receiving 

Adut’s application for writ of execution with its representation that no stay 

had been issued, the court “had to spend significant time retrieving a 

transcript to ensure its orders were clear, and sifting through the lengthy 

trial and appellate case history to confirm its impression that this particular 

discovery sanction had been stayed—despite the attorney’s representation.” 

Adut appealed.5 Stupp did not file a respondent’s brief, and oral 

argument was waived, so we decide the appeal on the record and appellant’s 

opening brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Section 177.5 authorizes a judicial officer to impose monetary sanctions 

“for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause 

or substantial justification.” The statute defines “person” to include a party’s 

attorney, but sanctions may not be imposed for “advocacy of counsel before 

the court.” (§ 177.5.) Sanctions under section 177.5 are payable to the court,

may not exceed $1,500, and may be imposed only after notice and an 

opportunity to be heard. (Ibid.) The sanctions order must be in writing, and 

must “recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.” 

(Ibid.) The purpose of section 177.5 “is to punish and deter violations of 

lawful court orders [citation], and to compensate the judicial system for the 

5 Appeal A161177 challenges the minute order from the September 3, 

2020 hearing; appeal A161576 challenges the written order signed later that 

month, and appeal A162373 challenges the detailed written order entered in 

February 2021. We granted Adut’s unopposed motions to consolidate the 

appeals. 
6

cost of unnecessary hearings [citation].” (People v. Landers (2019) 31 

Cal.App.5th 288, 303 (Landers).)

We review an order imposing sanctions under section 177.5 for abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Hooper (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 685, 691 (Hooper).) “The 

trial court must exercise its discretion in a ‘reasonable manner with one of 

the statutorily authorized purposes in mind and must be guided by existing 

legal standards.’ ” (Ibid.) We will not disturb the trial court’s exercise of 

discretion unless the record shows that the court exceeded the bounds of 

reason, contravened uncontradicted evidence, failed to follow the proper 

procedure, or applied the wrong legal standard. (Landers, supra, 31 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 303-304.) We review questions of law de novo. (Hooper, 

supra, at p. 692.) 

B. Analysis 

Adut offers three arguments for reversing the trial court’s order. We 

find none of them persuasive. 

1. First Argument

Adut argues that it was error for the court to sanction her for violating 

an order because there was no order for her to violate. She contends that the 

court’s oral pronouncement at the December 2019 hearing is not an order for 

purposes of section 177.5; the minute order from that hearing is not an order 

for purposes of section 177.5 because it requires Stupp’s attorney to prepare a 

written order; and in any case the minute order may not be enforced against 

her because she did not receive or know of it when she filed the application 

for a writ of execution. 

Adut’s argument that the trial court’s pronouncement is not an order 

for purposes of section 177.5 is meritless. It rests entirely on In re Marriage 

of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, a case that stands for the proposition 
7

that a trial court may properly file a written order that differs from its oral 

ruling when the ruling has not been entered in the minutes. (Id. at p. 1170.) 

That is plainly not the situation here. Adut fails to address case law

upholding the issuance of sanctions under section 177.5 for disobeying an oral 

instruction, which is the situation here. (See Seykora v. Superior Court 

(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1078, 1084 [sanction under section 177.5 

properly imposed for disobeying oral instruction that counsel remain in 

courtroom to complete certain business].) 

We find People v. Ward (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1518 (Ward) (another 

case not discussed by Adut) instructive. In Ward, a defense attorney was 

instructed not to use the words “prosecutorial misconduct” or raise the issue 

in front of the jury. (Id. at pp. 1522-1523.) The Court of Appeal concluded 

that sanctions under section 177.5 could appropriately be imposed where the 

attorney in argument to the jury nevertheless “began to suggest that the 

prosecutor did improper things during the course of the trial,” and then 

“blurted out, ‘And that is prosecutorial misconduct’ ” in response to the trial 

court’s effort to stop him. (Id. at pp. 1529-1530.) No written order was 

required for the imposition of sanctions in Ward, nor has Adut explained why 

one is required here.

We conclude that the trial court’s statement at the December 2019 

hearing staying enforcement of the April 2019 order is an order for the 

purposes of section 177.5, and we need not reach Adut’s arguments

concerning the minute order. 

2. Second Argument

Adut argues that the order staying enforcement of the discovery 

sanctions was invalid because the statutory requirements for issuance of a 

stay had not been fulfilled. The argument is equally meritless. Even if Adut 
8

believed that the stay order was issued in error, she should not have 

disobeyed it. (See People v. Chong (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 232, 243 [citing 

Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6068 & 6103 for the proposition that “[a]n attorney 

must not willfully disobey a court’s order and must maintain a respectful 

attitude toward the court”].) Adut had other avenues available, such as 

motions for reconsideration or to set aside the order, or a writ petition or 

appeal.

Further, Adut fails to show that the order was invalid. She notes that 

Schilders never consented to the stay, citing sections 917.1 and 918, which 

require an adverse party to consent to the stay of an order for the payment of 

money if the stay would extend more than 10 days beyond the last day on 

which a notice of appeal of the order could be filed. But Adut makes no 

showing that the stay imposed by the trial court extended for more than 10 

days beyond the last date on which a notice of appeal from the April 2019

order could be filed (§ 918, subd. (b)), or even that the April 2019 order was

ripe for appeal. We do not undertake to make the showings for her. (See

Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [appellate court is 

“not required to examine undeveloped claims or supply arguments for the 

litigants”] (Allen).) 

3. Third Argument

Adut’s final argument is that the court erred in sanctioning her for 

advocacy on behalf of her client. This argument is not supported by any 

authority, and so we reject it. (See Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52. [a 

point not supported by legal argument with citation to authority is treated as 

forfeited and passed without consideration].) 6 

6 Adut concedes that enforcement of the April 2019 order would have 

resulted in a payment to Adut of over $21,000. We note that the trial court 
9

In sum, Adut fails to show error in the trial court’s imposition of 

sanctions against her under section 177.5.7 

DISPOSITION

The challenged orders are affirmed. 

concluded that Adut sought to enforce the monetary sanction in her own selfinterest. 

7 In the conclusion of her appellate brief, Adut asks not only that we 

reverse the sanctions orders, but also seeks an order that a different judge 

preside over the case below going forward. We disregard that additional 

request, as it is not supported by any argument or citation to authority. 

(Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) 
10

_________________________

Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Stewart, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Kline, J.*

A161177, A161576, A162373, Stupp v. Schilders

* Assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.