COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

DON RAY HUDGINS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2527-96-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 OCTOBER 28, 1997 

KAREN C. HUDGINS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MATHEWS COUNTY 

John M. Folkes, Judge 

 Samuel R. Brown, II (Samuel R. Brown, II, 

P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 McClanahan Ingles (Martin, Ingles & Ingles, 

Ltd., on brief), for appellee. 

 Don Ray Hudgins (husband) appeals from the trial court's 

adjudication of numerous support, equitable distribution and 

related issues in dispute between husband and his former wife, 

Karen C. Hudgins (wife). Husband contends that the trial court 

erroneously (1) ordered a lawnmower and weedeater returned to 

wife, (2) refused to award him attorney's fees, (3) failed to 

dismiss wife's request for sanctions and award him attorney's 

fees incurred in the defense of such motion, (4) altered spousal 

support fixed in the parties' separation agreement, (5) awarded 

wife more spousal support than recommended by the "special 

master" (master), (6) miscalculated husband's support arrearage, 

and (7) fixed and ordered him to pay fees and costs of the 

master. Finding appellate review of several issues procedurally 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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barred and no merit in husband's remaining arguments, we affirm 

the decree. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

 It is well established that an appellant must have 

previously presented all issues on appeal to the trial court, 

thereby permitting its consideration and appropriate response. 

See Rule 5A:18; Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 514, 404 S.E.2d 736, 

737 (1991) (en banc). Failure to raise timely and sufficient 

objection bars appellate review of any attendant error. See Lee, 

12 Va. App. at 515, 404 S.E.2d at 738. 

 On appeal, the judgment of the trial court "is presumed to 

be correct[,] and the burden is on the appellant to present to us 

a sufficient record from which we can determine whether the lower 

court has erred." Justis v. Young, 202 Va. 631, 632, 119 S.E.2d 

255, 256-57 (1961). When appellant recites in a notice of appeal 

that a transcript will be filed and made a part of the record on 

appeal, "[a]n appellee has a right to rely on . . . [that] 

representation." Twardy v. Twardy, 14 Va. App. 651, 655, 419 

S.E.2d 848, 850 (1992) (en banc). The transcript becomes a part 

of the record on appeal only when filed with the clerk of the 

trial court within 60 days after entry of the final judgment, 

attended by the requisite notice. Rule 5A:8(a). Appellant must 
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also timely file a statement of the questions presented on 

appeal, and omission of an issue precludes our review of such 

question. See Rule 5A:25(d); Wash v. Holland, 166 Va. 45, 53-54, 

183 S.E. 236, 240 (1936). 

Return of Lawn Equipment to Wife

 The record does not establish preservation of this issue for 

appeal. Although husband assigned error to the disputed ruling, 

he failed to sufficiently preserve a related objection in the 

final order. We recognize that a party may also save an 

objection by argument before the trial court, see Lee, 12 Va. 

App. at 515-16, 404 S.E.2d at 738, but a proper transcript of the 

relevant proceedings is not a part of the record before us. See

Rules 5A:8; 5A:18. 

Attorney's Fees

 Husband contends that the trial court erred "in finding that 

[husband] not be awarded any attorney's fees." This issue was 

similarly not properly preserved for appeal. See Rule 5A:18. 

Request for Sanctions and Related Attorney's Fees

 Husband questioned "[w]hether the Court erred in not 

entering an Order dismissing sanctions filed against . . . 

[husband] and his counsel by Plaintiff's counsel and not awarding 

. . . [husband's] counsel attorney's fees for having to respond." 

 However, he argues on brief that the court failed to rule on 

husband's motion for sanctions against wife's counsel, an issue 

not included in the original question presented. See Rule 
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5A:25(d). Moreover, a transcript of the attendant proceeding, 

necessary to consider the issue on appeal, is not properly a part 

of the record. See Rule 5A:8(a). 

II. ISSUES CONSIDERED ON THE MERITS

Spousal Support

 "Jurisdiction in a divorce suit is purely statutory, and 

does not encompass broad equitable powers not conferred by 

statute." Boyd v. Boyd, 2 Va. App. 16, 19, 340 S.E.2d 578, 580 

(1986) (citation omitted). Code § 20-79 provides the court with 

jurisdiction to award spousal support in divorce proceedings 

"when either party . . . so requests." See Code §§ 20-103, 

20-107.1. However, if the parties file a stipulation or contract 

before entry of the final decree, the court may award support 

only in accordance with such agreement. Code § 20-109. When the 

court "affirms, ratifies and incorporates" the agreement into a 

decree, it becomes an enforceable order. Code § 20-109.1; see

Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 1 Va. App. 87, 90, 334 S.E.2d 595, 597 

(1985). 

 Here, the court properly incorporated the stipulation 

agreement of the parties into a decree, thereby ordering husband 

to pay spousal support of $350 per month, and expressly 

permitting "wife [to] petition a court of competent jurisdiction" 

for review of the award upon "a change of circumstances." 

Husband's counsel subsequently agreed to $650 per month, prepared 

a related decree, and presented it for entry by the court, 
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endorsed by both counsel. Clearly, the preparation and 

submission of the draft decree constituted a petition for 

modification pursuant to the agreement, vesting the court with 

jurisdiction to effect the disputed increase. 

Deviation from Master's Recommendation

 Because the transcripts of the hearings on exceptions to the 

master's reports were not properly filed, we review only the 

reports and related orders of the court. The master's 

supplemental report recites changes in the parties' financial 

circumstances since the initial hearing, resulting in a 

recommendation that spousal support be reduced to $385 per month. 

 Despite a confusing reference by the master to a support 

obligation of $500, the record discloses that the trial judge 

correctly interpreted the recommendation. Although not expressly 

acknowledging the inconsistency, the court confirmed the report 

only "in part." It "order[ed] that the said spousal support 

. . . [be] set at . . . [$500] per month . . . commencing June 1, 

1996, but decline[d] to further reduce the said spousal support 

beyond $500.00 per month after considering all factors required 

in the Code of Virginia as well as the equities of this case." 

 Contrary to husband's argument, deviation by the court from 

the master's recommendation was not an abuse of discretion. 

Under settled principles, 

 [w]hile the report of a commissioner in 

chancery does not carry the weight of a 

jury's verdict, Code § 8.01-610, it should be 

sustained unless the trial court concludes 

that the commissioner's findings are not 
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supported by the evidence. This rule applies 

with particular force to a commissioner's 

findings of fact based upon evidence taken in 

his presence, but is not applicable to pure 

conclusions of law contained in the report. 

On appeal, a decree which approves a 

commissioner's report will be affirmed unless 

plainly wrong; but where the chancellor has 

disapproved the commissioner's findings, this 

Court must review the evidence and ascertain 

whether, under a correct application of the 

law, the evidence supports the findings of 

the commissioner or the conclusions of the 

trial court. 

Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 576-77, 318 S.E.2d 292, 296 (1984) 

(citations omitted). 

 In determining spousal support, the trial court must 

consider the factors enumerated in Code § 20-107.1. See, e.g., 

Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va. App. 472, 483, 375 S.E.2d 387, 394 

(1988). Although this requirement 

 implies substantive consideration of the 

evidence presented as it relates to all of 

these factors[,] [t]his does not mean that 

the trial court is required to quantify or 

elaborate exactly what weight or 

consideration it has given to each . . . . 

It does mean, however, that the court's 

findings must have some foundation based on 

the evidence presented. 

Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 

(1986). "When the record discloses that the trial court 

considered all of the statutory factors, the court's ruling will 

not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of 

discretion." Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 574, 421 S.E.2d 

635, 644 (1992). 

 Here, the trial court expressly confirmed consideration of 
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"all factors required in the Code of Virginia [Code § 20-107.1] 

as well as the equities of this case." Our review of the record 

and the award in issue discloses appropriate consideration of the 

statutory factors and attendant evidence by the trial court and 

suggests no abuse of discretion. 

Calculation of Support Arrearage

 Husband contends that the trial court erroneously calculated 

the support arrearage, once noting an arrearage of $5,000, but 

later finding a total of $6,500. Correspondence from the court 

in the record clearly explains that its reference to $5,000 was a 

"misstatement," corrected by subsequent order. 

Order to Pay Fees and Costs of the Master

 Although husband challenges on appeal the order requiring 

him to pay all fees and costs of the master, he raised no timely 

objection to the court's calculation, and review of this issue 

is, therefore, also precluded on appeal. See Rule 5A:18. A 

court of equity has discretion in the award of costs, see Code 

§ 14.1-177; see Smith v. Woodlawn, 235 Va. 424, 431, 368 S.E.2d 

699, 703 (1988), and our review of the record discloses no abuse 

of discretion in requiring husband to pay the disputed fees and 

costs in this instance. 

 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 

decree. 

 Affirmed.