____________________ 

 * Justice Agee participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme 

Court of Virginia. 

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Humphreys, Agee* and Kelsey 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1727-02-3 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY 

 MARCH 11, 2003 

FARRELL D. REED 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Timothy W. Gresham (J. Jasen Eige; 

 Lisa Frisina Clement; Penn, Stuart & 

Eskridge, on brief), for appellant. 

 Susan D. Oglebay for appellee. 

 The Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission awarded Farrell 

D. Reed medical benefits for coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP) 

pursuant to our decision in Jones v. E.I Dupont de Nemours & Co., 

24 Va. App. 36, 480 S.E.2d 129 (1997). The appellant, Clinchfield 

Coal Company, appeals this award urging us to reverse Jones. 

Short of that, Clinchfield argues that we should limit Jones to 

cases involving asbestosis and not apply it to claimants with CWP. 

Finally, Clinchfield asserts that the medical evidence fails as a 

matter of law to demonstrate that Reed has CWP at this time. 

 We affirm the commission and hold that (i) we have no 

authority to revisit Jones, (ii) both the rationale and the 
holding of Jones govern CWP as well as asbestosis, and (iii) the 

commission did not err in finding that Reed has CWP. 

 I. 

 On appeal, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party" before the commission. Tomes v. James 

City (County Of) Fire, 39 Va. App. 424, 429, 573 S.E.2d 312, 315 

(2002); Grayson County Sch. Bd. v. Cornett, 39 Va. App. 279, 281, 

572 S.E.2d 505, 506 (2002). 

 Dr. Kathleen DePonte diagnosed Reed with CWP (sometimes known 

as black lung disease) on April 6, 2001. "Coal worker's 

pneumoconiosis is a disease of the lung that results from the 

accumulation of coal dust in the lungs." Penley v. Island Creek 

Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 312, 381 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1989). On 

April 13, 2001, Reed filed an occupational disease claim seeking 

benefits for the disease. 

 Clinchfield conceded Dr. DePonte's communication of diagnosis 

and stipulated that Reed was "last injuriously exposed to the 

hazards of coal dust while working" for Clinchfield. Reed, in 

turn, agreed to be bound by the diagnostic findings of The Medical 

College of Virginia Occupational/Pulmonary Committee (the 

"pulmonary committee"). See Va. Work. Comp. R. 10.2 & 10.3. 

 The deputy commissioner found "from the opinion expressed by 

the pulmonary committee that claimant has less than a category one 

level of the disease and is therefore not entitled to weekly 

benefits." The deputy commissioner, however, noted "the pulmonary 

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committee advised that claimant does have evidence of the disease 

and that he has small opacities classified as qq in the four upper 

lung zones with a profusion of 0/1." Since there was "no contrary 

medical opinion of record," the deputy commissioner held, on the 

basis of Jones, that Reed was entitled to a medical award. 

Clinchfield requested review by the full commission, which 

affirmed the deputy commissioner's award. 

 II. 

 Though we defer to the commission in its role as fact finder, 

we "review questions of law de novo," Rusty's Welding Serv., Inc. 

v. Gibson, 29 Va. App. 119, 127, 510 S.E.2d 255, 259 (1999), and 

do not consider ourselves "bound by the legal determinations made 

by the commission." Grayson County Sch. Bd., 39 Va. App. at 281, 

572 S.E.2d at 506 (quoting Robinson v. Salvation Army, 20 Va. App. 

570, 572, 459 S.E.2d 103, 104 (1995)); see also Sturtz v. 

Chesapeake Corp., 38 Va. App. 672, 675, 568 S.E.2d 381, 383 

(2002). Even so, with regard to the commission's interpretation 

of its enabling statutes, "we follow the settled rule that the 

construction accorded a statute by public officials charged with 

its administration is entitled to be given weight by the courts." 

Sturtz, 38 Va. App. at 675, 568 S.E.2d at 383. 

 The Virginia Workers' Compensation Act should be regarded as 

"remedial legislation and should be liberally construed in favor 

of the injured employee." E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. 

Eggleston, 264 Va. 13, 17, 563 S.E.2d 685, 687 (2002) (citing Byrd 

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v. Stonega Coke & Coal Co., 182 Va. 212, 221, 28 S.E.2d 725, 729 

(1944)). That liberality, however, has its limits. We cannot 

"permit a liberal construction to change the meaning of the 

statutory language or the purpose of the Act." American Furniture 

Co. v. Doane, 230 Va. 39, 42, 334 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1985). 

 III. 

 A. 

 Clinchfield first urges us to overrule Jones v. E.I Dupont de 

Nemours & Co., 24 Va. App. 36, 480 S.E.2d 129 (1997). Under our 

rule of interpanel accord, however, we lack the authority to 

revisit Jones. See Commonwealth v. Burns, 240 Va. 171, 174, 395 

S.E.2d 456, 457 (1990) (quoting Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 

233 Va. 260, 265, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1987)). The decision of 

one panel "becomes a predicate for application of the doctrine of 

stare decisis" and cannot be overruled except by the Court of 

Appeals sitting en banc or by the Virginia Supreme Court. Johnson 

v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 425, 430, 478 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1996). 

This principle applies not merely to the literal holding of the 

case, but also to its ratio decidendi —— the essential rationale 

in the case that determines the judgment. For this reason, we 

reject Clinchfield's request that Jones be overruled. 

 B. 

 Clinchfield next argues that Jones does not apply to cases 

involving medical benefits for CWP. On this point, Clinchfield 

appears to divide the fact-specific holding of Jones from its 

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ratio decidendi —— urging that only the former, but not the 

latter, has stare decisis weight. We do not accept this 

segmentation of Jones, finding its rationale and result equally 

applicable to this case. 

Jones addressed the question whether an employee with 

asbestosis was entitled to medical benefits even though the 

disease had not risen to the level of a "permanent loss" under 

Code § 65.2-503. The employer argued that an occupational disease 

which "has not reached a ratable level under Code § 65.2-503 is 

not a compensable occupational disease and renders the claimant 

ineligible for any benefits under the Act." Jones, 24 Va. App. at 

38, 480 S.E.2d at 130. 

Jones rejected the employer's argument, ruling that "[s]imply 

because the disease fails to rise to the level of a permanent loss 

on the schedule of Code § 65.2-503 does not automatically preclude 

an award of medical benefits." Id. Instead, "Code § 65.2-403 

allows an award of medical benefits to employees who have an 

occupational disease covered by the Act." Id. After reviewing 

the "statutory language and the factual findings of the 

commission," Jones found that the employee's condition fell 

"within the definition of an occupational disease." Id. Under 

this analysis, "whether a permanent loss compensable under Code 

§ 65.2-503 accompanies the disease has no impact upon an award 

under Code § 65.2-403." Id. The employee in Jones, therefore, 

was "entitled to medical benefits under Code § 65.2-403." Id. 

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Jones relies on the plain language of Code § 65.2-403(B), 

which states that an "employee who has an occupational disease 

that is covered by this title shall be entitled to the same 

hospital, medical and miscellaneous benefits as an employee who 

has a compensable injury by accident." Jones, 24 Va. App. at 38, 

480 S.E.2d at 130. Nothing in Code § 65.2-403(B) requires that 

the occupational disease qualify for permanent loss or disability 

compensation before medical benefits may be awarded. Under Code 

§ 65.2-403(B), the sole inquiry is whether the disease qualifies 

as an "occupational disease that is covered by this title" —— if 

so, medical benefits may be awarded.1 

Jones equates occupational diseases to injuries by accident 

for purposes of medical benefits. By doing so, Jones recognizes 

that both sets of conditions can give rise to two unique 

 1

 Clinchfield cites dicta in Parris v. Appalachian Power 

Co., 2 Va. App. 219, 343 S.E.2d 455 (1986), to support its 

argument that "occupational diseases are not per se 

compensable." This language was taken from a headnote in Long 

v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 46 O.I.C. 140, 141 (1964), and was 

unnecessary to our decision in Parris regarding whether the 

statute of limitations had run on a workers' compensation claim. 

Moreover, Long, the opinion underlying the Parris dicta, decided 

only the issue whether the claimant was entitled to wage 

compensation —— it made no rulings regarding medical benefits. 

 Clinchfield also cites Merrimac Anthracite Coal Corp. v. 

Showalter, 158 Va. 227, 163 S.E. 73 (1932), for the proposition 

that "in a case of injury by accident, a medical award cannot be 

issued unless the claimant suffered a compensable injury by 

accident." In Merrimac, however, the claimant was denied not 

only medical benefits, but all benefits because the "injury was 

the result of his wilful [sic] misconduct . . . ." The Act, 

therefore, expressly barred the claimant from receiving any 

compensation at all. Merrimac does not distinguish medical 

benefits from wage and disability compensation. 

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categories of benefits. See generally Arthur Larson & Lex K. 

Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 57.10 (1999). The 

first category of benefits consists of "wage loss payments based 

on the concept of disability." Id. The second category consists 

of the "payment of hospital and medical expenses occasioned by any 

work-connected injury, regardless of wage loss or disability." 

Id. (emphasis added).2

 We disagree with Clinchfield that, for purposes of medical 

benefits under Jones, CWP should be treated differently than 

asbestosis. It is true that the Act often distinguishes between 

the two. See, e.g., Code § 65.2-405 (notice provisions); Code 

§ 65.2-406 (limitations); Code §§ 65.2-503 and 65.2-504 (permanent 

loss and disability). But on the critical point —— medical 

benefits —— Code § 65.2-403(B) makes no distinction between them. 

 2

 Our application of Jones to occupational injuries tracks 

similar rulings from other state courts. See, e.g., J.T. Thorp, 

Inc. v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 153 Cal. App. 3d 327, 1984 

Cal. App. LEXIS 1782 (1984) ("[A]n employee suffering from 

asbestosis may obtain reimbursement for predisability medical 

expenses."); Roberson v. Harford Accident & Indem. Co., 234 S.E.2d 

145 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (there is "no inconsistency" in directing 

the payment of medical expenses while denying other compensation 

benefits); Shepherd v. The Gas Serv. Co., 352 P.2d 48 (Kan. 1960) 

("An award providing for the payment of certain medical treatment 

and care . . . is an award of compensation" and employees are 

entitled to such benefit even if the injury does not warrant loss 

of wage or disability compensation.); In re Ryciak, 186 N.E.2d 408 

(N.Y. 1962) (holding that an employee may be awarded costs for 

medical treatment arising from an occupational disease before any 

loss of wages accrues); In re Finch, 761 P.2d 544 (Or. App. 1988) 

(holding that diagnostic medical services are compensable even 

though the occupational disease warrants no other compensation). 

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 Moreover, as the commission noted, "pneumoconiosis is a 

generic term used to describe a chronic fibrous reaction in the 

lungs related to the inhalation of dust, and includes asbestosis, 

silicosis, byssiniosis, coal worker's pneumoconiosis and 

siderosis." As the commission further noted, "Asbestosis is but 

one of the several occupationally-induced pneumoconioses for which 

workers' compensation benefits, including medical benefits, are 

available." Like other pneumoconioses, the Act treats asbestosis 

and CWP substantially alike when measuring the progressive 

"stages" of the diseases. See Code §§ 65.2-503, 65.2-504; Va. 

Work. Comp. R. 11. The rationale of Jones, therefore, applies 

equally to CWP as well as to asbestosis. 

 C. 

 Clinchfield also argues that, even if Code § 65.2-403 

authorizes medical benefits in the absence of a compensable 

occupational disease, the claimant must still prove he has a 

disease in the first place. As Clinchfield sees it, Reed's 

condition cannot be treated as a "disease" because the pulmonary 

committee rated his radiographs as category 0/1 as defined by the 

Guidelines for the Use of ILO International Classification of 

Radiographs of Pneumoconioses, ILO Occup. Safety and Health Ser. 

No. 22 (rev. ed. 1980). That rating, Clinchfield asserts, means 

that no recognizable CWP can exist as a matter of law. 

 Clinchfield bases its argument predominantly on a chart 

contained in a law review article written by a physician. See N. 

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LeRoy Lapp, A Lawyer's Medical Guide to Black Lung Litigation, 83 

W. Va. L. Rev. 721, 729-31 (1981). The chart, reproduced below, 

purports to divide the ILO categories into two diagnostic subsets: 

"No Pneumoconiosis" and "Definite Pneumoconiosis." 

0/- 0/0 0/1 1/0 1/1 1/2 2/1 2/2 2/3 3/2 3/3 3/4 

Category 0 Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 

No 

Pneumoconiosis 

Definite Pneumoconiosis 

We published this chart in Penley, 8 Va. App. at 312, 381 S.E.2d 

at 233, as a part of a general description of the "radiology of 

coal worker's pneumoconiosis." Though we treated the chart as 

informative, neither our holding in Penley nor its rationale 

turned on the line drawn between the "No Pneumoconiosis" and the 

"Definite Pneumoconiosis" subsets separating ILO category 0 from 

categories 1, 2, and 3.3 Whether such a categorical line exists, 

therefore, merits closer scrutiny. 

 3

 In Penley, the claimant appealed the commission's denial 

of permanent partial disability benefits under Code § 65.1-56.1 

(now Code § 65.2-504). Penley analyzed the issue whether the 

disease qualified for disability benefits under Code 

§ 65.2-504's precursor, which expressly required that the 

disease be at least stage one, as opposed to § 65.2-403, which 

contains no such requirement. 

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 Our analysis begins with Code § 65.2-403(B), which Jones held 

authorizes medical benefits when the claimant's disease qualifies 

as an "occupational disease that is covered by this title."4 We 

agree with Clinchfield that the 1980 ILO Guidelines play a 

valuable role in determining whether the disease of CWP exists. 

To be sure, the three statutory "stages" employed by Code 

§§ 65.503(B) and 65.2-504(A) incorporate by reference the 1980 ILO 

Guidelines. See also Va. Work. Comp. R. 11 (table converting 

multiple ILO "categories" to one of three statutory "stages").5 

The principal purpose of the 1980 ILO Guidelines, however, is to 

provide "a means for recording systematically the radiographic 

abnormalities in the chest provoked by the inhalation of dusts." 

1980 ILO Guidelines at 1. The ILO Guidelines do not "define 

pathological entities," id., or serve as an inflexible matrix for 

pinpointing the moment a nascent condition develops into a 

diagnosable lung disease. 

 We reject Clinchfield's argument that, under ILO 

interpretative principles, Reed's 0/1 profusion rating 

 

4

 Code § 65.2-400 defines an "occupational disease" 

generally, but provides no criteria for diagnosing specific 

diseases. 

5

 Under the commission's rating table, the profusion level 

of opacities for any pneumoconiosis must be at least an ILO 

category 1/0 to qualify for any staging level under the Act. 

None of the three statutory stages corresponds to an ILO 

category 0/-, or 0/0, or 0/1. See Va. Work. Comp. R. 11 

(conversion table). 

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disqualifies him as a matter of law from receiving a CWP 

diagnosis.6 That rating does not, standing alone, disprove the 

existence of CWP. Under the ILO Guidelines, if the pulmonary 

committee had concluded that the appearances were "definitely not 

pneumoconiosis," id. at 3, no profusion rating would have been 

assigned at all and the committee would have relied only on the 

Symbols and Comments sections of the ILO Form. Symbols denote 

alternative diagnoses such as cancer, emphysema, fractured ribs, 

tuberculosis, and the like. Id. at 9-10. "Comments must be 

recorded about appearances which are definitely or probably not 

pneumoconiosis." Id. at 12. In addition, the pulmonary committee 

noted that the size and shape of Reed's small, rounded opacities 

fit within the "q" level, denoting sizes between 1.5 and 3 

millimeters. Id. at 6. For these reasons, we hold that the 

commission had before it credible medical evidence that Reed 

suffered from CWP. 

IV. 

 In sum, we have no authority to revisit Jones. Both the 

rationale and the holding of Jones apply to CWP just as much as 

 6

 The 1980 ILO Guidelines set forth four major profusion 

categories (0, 1, 2, and 3), each with three subcategories. They 

thereby create twelve discrete subcategories each containing a 

numerator indicating the actual or final classification and a 

denominator indicating any other category, if any, seriously 

considered by the individual reviewing the radiograph. A category 

"0" profusion level (which includes 0/-, 0/0, and 0/1) can be used 

to indicate that small opacities are "absent" or that small 

opacities exist but are "less profuse than the lower limit of 

category 1." ILO Guidelines at 4. 

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they do to asbestosis. Under Jones, the commission had sufficient 

evidence to conclude that Reed has CWP, an occupational disease 

warranting medical benefits under Code § 65.2-403(B). 

 Affirmed. 

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