If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

KEIR EDWARD HORSFIELD,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

July 6, 2023

v No. 361225

Washtenaw Circuit Court

KIMBERLY SUE HORSFIELD, LC No. 20-001979-DO

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: HOOD, P.J., and SHAPIRO and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Kimberly Horsfield appeals as of right the trial court’s judgment of divorce 

awarding spousal support. Defendant argues that the spousal support award was inadequate and 

that the trial court erred by denying her request for attorney fees. For the reasons stated in this 

opinion, we affirm the denial of attorney fees but reverse the spousal support award and remand 

for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant and plaintiff Keir Horsfield were married in 2000. They had one child during 

the marriage who is now an adult. Defendant had two children prior to the marriage, and plaintiff

helped raised these children as his own. At the time the judgment of divorce was entered, the 

parties were both 49 years old. In December 2020, plaintiff filed a verified complaint for divorce, 

and defendant moved out of the marital home in January 2021. The parties’ daughter, the 

daughter’s boyfriend and their child lived in the marital home with plaintiff, paying $300 monthly 

rent. Plaintiff’s step-son also lived in the marital home and paid $300 monthly rent. In February 

2021, the trial court awarded defendant temporary spousal support in the amount of $1,500 per 

month and also ordered that she receive the $300 in monthly rent her son was paying plaintiff. The 

court reserved defendant’s request for attorney fees.

By the time the bench trial began in December 2021, the parties had agreed on several 

aspects of the property division. Plaintiff would retain the marital home with defendant receiving

one-half of the marital home’s equity value, i.e., $92,651.46. Plaintiff’s retirement accounts, 

which were valued over $800,000, would be divided equally excluding the premarital portions. 
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The primary remaining issues at the bench trial were spousal support and the division of personal 

property. 

Plaintiff has worked as a mechanic at Ford Motor Company since 1992. He earned 

$126,477 in 2018, $111,270 in 2019, and $99,249 in 2020. Plaintiff testified that he has a base 

salary of $95,000 excluding overtime and that he had not been offered overtime since May 2021. 

According to plaintiff, he was left with $180 in discretionary income per month after paying $1500 

in temporary spousal support.

Defendant testified that she and plaintiff agreed that it would be better if she did not work 

and instead stayed home to raise the children, but at some point she began working as a preschool 

teacher. Defendant had a mental health “breakdown” in 2013 after she learned that, prior to the 

marriage while the parties were dating, plaintiff had a sexual relationship with another woman who 

would later be the maid of honor at the parties’ wedding. Plaintiff had previously denied such a 

relationship with this woman, but in 2013 he admitted to defendant that it had in fact occurred. 

Dr. Frank Pavlovcic, defendant’s psychiatrist since 2013, has diagnosed her with post-traumatic 

stress disorder, bipolar II disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. Defendant was hospitalized

again for mental health issues in 2015. She subsequently underwent electroconvulsive therapy 

(ECT) treatments over the course of 2015 and 2016. Defendant returned to work in 2018 as a fulltime employee for U of M Hospital, but soon resigned this position because of stress. Defendant 

found a new job as a part-time resident services associate for an assisted living facility, where she 

worked 16 to 24 hours per week and earned $15.30 per hour.

Defendant testified that she was currently living with her oldest daughter. She planned to 

buy a mobile home with her share of the marital home equity and to start her own retirement 

account with her share of plaintiff’s retirement accounts. Defendant estimated that her anticipated 

monthly bills, not including health insurance or prescription costs, would amount to $3,000 per 

month. Defendant testified that she paid her attorney fees through a loan from her parents that she 

has to pay back. The court also heard testimony from defendant’s psychiatrist, Dr. Pavlovcic, who 

recommended that defendant not work more than 24 hours per week out of concern that this would 

worsen her psychiatric symptoms and erode her current level of functioning. 

Following the bench trial, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions 

of law and informed the court of a significant change of circumstances. Defendant had obtained 

new part-time employment at Chelsea Hospital that offered health insurance, which significantly 

reduced the costs of her prescription medications to $253.30 per month. Her average hourly wage 

at the hospital is $15.70 per hour, and she works 24 hours per week.

The parties relied on a spousal support software to make their recommendations to the 

court. Each party used $19,593 as defendant’s gross income. Defendant used a three-year average 

for plaintiff’s gross income ($114,406), which produced a recommended spousal support award to 

defendant of $2,038 per month for 10 years. In contrast, plaintiff based his recommendations on 

his income being $92,631.1 In addition, it was plaintiff’s position that defendant could work more 

 

1 Plaintiff’s November 30, 2022 paycheck stub showed that he had yearly gross income of 

$84,912.30. According to plaintiff, extrapolated for the entire year, his income would be $92,631.
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than 24 hours per week, and he submitted three proposals based on the number of hours defendant 

worked. The “most equitable solution” according to plaintiff involved defendant working 32 hours 

per week, which resulted in plaintiff paying defendant $1,233 per month.

The trial court issued its findings and conclusions from the bench. The court recounted the 

parties’ property division agreements as noted above. The parties also agreed to equalize their 

credit card debt, which resulted in plaintiff paying defendant $10,905.86 out of the home equity 

loan plaintiff would use to refinance the home. The trial court denied plaintiff’s request for 

attorney fees, noting that the some of defendant’s credit card debt included attorney fees. The 

court then divided the parties’ personal property, awarding multiple vehicles and items to plaintiff 

and one vehicle to defendant. To equalize the personal property division, the trial court ordered 

plaintiff to pay defendant $8,000.

The court made certain findings before addressing spousal support. First, it concluded that 

it would use plaintiff’s “basic full-time wage” as his income without including overtime. The 

court declined to use a three-year average for plaintiff’s income, finding credible plaintiff’s 

testimony that overtime was no longer being offered. The court also found credible Dr. 

Pavlovcic’s testimony that defendant could not work full-time. After addressing the spousal 

support factors, the court then determined that it would award “step down alimony” by which

defendant would receive $2,000 per month for the first two years, $1,500 per month for the next 

two years, and $1,000 per month for the six years thereafter. However, the court explained that 

the initially higher spousal support award was made to account for the $8,000 personal property 

equalization payment and that plaintiff would not be required to pay defendant the $8,000 as a 

lump sum. The court acknowledged that it was going “out a little bit on a limb” by conflating the 

property division and alimony in this manner. The judgment of divorce was entered on April 11, 

2022, and provided that “[t]he personal property equalizer of $8,000 that would be due from 

Plaintiff to Defendant has been added into and considered in the alimony award herein.”

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant makes two arguments regarding her challenge to the spousal support award. 

First, she argues that the trial court’s findings as to the relevant factors were clearly erroneous. 

Second, that the award is inequitable. While we find no reversible error as to the factors, we agree 

that the award is inequitable. 2

A. SPOUSAL SUPPORT FACTORS

In determining a proper spousal support award, the trial court must consider several 

specific factors and the overall equity of the award. “A trial court’s decision to award spousal 

 

2

“Whether to award spousal support is in the trial court’s discretion, and we review the trial court’s 

award for an abuse of discretion.” Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 432; 664 NW2d 231 (2003). 

We review “the trial court’s findings of fact concerning spousal support for clear error.” Id. The 

trial court’s dispositional rulings, including “whether and how much alimony to award,” “should 

be affirmed unless the appellate court is left with a firm conviction that the decision was 

inequitable.” Korth v Korth, 256 Mich App 286, 288; 662 NW2d 111 (2003).
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support is discretionary and should reflect what is just and reasonable under the circumstances of 

the case.” Loutts v Loutts, 298 Mich App 21, 29-30; 826 NW2d 152 (2012). “The main objective 

of alimony is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties in a way that will not impoverish 

either party.” Moore v Moore, 242 Mich App 652, 654; 619 NW2d 723 (2000). The following 

factors are relevant to spousal support determinations: 

(1) the past relations and conduct of the parties, (2) the length of the marriage, (3) 

the abilities of the parties to work, (4) the source and amount of property awarded 

to the parties, (5) the parties’ ages, (6) the abilities of the parties to pay alimony, 

(7) the present situation of the parties, (8) the needs of the parties, (9) the parties’ 

health, (10) the prior standard of living of the parties and whether either is 

responsible for the support of others, (11) contributions of the parties to the joint 

estate, (12) a party’s fault in causing the divorce, (13) the effect of cohabitation on 

a party’s financial status, and (14) general principles of equity. [Olson v Olson, 

256 Mich App 619, 631; 671 NW2d 64 (2003).]

“The trial court should make specific factual findings regarding the factors that are relevant to the 

particular case.” Korth v Korth, 256 Mich App 286, 289; 662 NW2d 111 (2003).

Defendant contends that the trial court failed to justify its finding that plaintiff was favored 

under the first factor, i.e., “the past relations and conduct of the parties.” Olson, 256 Mich App 

at 631. Defendant is correct that the trial court did not offer any elaboration on this factor when it 

found that it favored plaintiff. However, in its preliminary remarks, the trial court noted the

undisputed testimony regarding defendant’s history of opioid use. This refers to defendant’s 

admission that she took money out of a joint account for a year to buy unprescribed Percocet “on 

the street” without telling plaintiff. The court was also concerned that defendant was being spiteful 

by requesting that she either receive the parties’ tractor or that it be sold even though plaintiff still 

needed the tractor and defendant did not. We conclude that the trial court sufficiently justified its 

finding that the first factor favored plaintiff.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by finding that neither party was favored 

under the fourth factor, “the source and amount of property awarded to the parties.” Id. Defendant 

argues that she should be favored under this factor because the trial court awarded more property 

to plaintiff as a result of converting the $8,000 personal property equalizer into the spousal support 

award. But $8,000 represented a relatively small amount of the property division. While more 

will be said about the trial court’s decision to convert the equalization payment into alimony, the 

trial court did not clearly err by finding that this factor was neutral.

Defendant also challenges the trial court’s finding regarding the seventh factor, “the present 

situation of the parties.” Id. The court weighed this factor in plaintiff’s favor because he has more 

expenses relating to their family than defendant considering that two of the parties’ adult children 

live with him. The court also relied on this rationale in finding that plaintiff was favored under 

the tenth factor, “the prior standard of living of the parties and whether either is responsible for the 

support of others.” Id. 

Defendant argues that in weighing these factors the trial court failed to consider that the 

adult children pay plaintiff rent. But when asked whether the $600 in monthly rent paid by the 
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adult children “covers what they cost you,” plaintiff answered: “I don’t know. I just figured these 

kids are all adults. You can’t live anywhere for free or 300 bucks. What does it cover, who knows, 

incidentals, gas in the car, fix a car.” Although plaintiff’s testimony is somewhat vague, a 

reasonable inference is that $600 per month does not cover the added expenses incurred by plaintiff

relating to the adult children staying in his home. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the trial court 

clearly erred by weighing these factors in plaintiff’s favor. For the same reasons, we conclude 

contrary to defendant’s argument that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the thirteenth 

factor, “the effect of cohabitation on a party’s financial status,” id., was neutral and not in 

defendant’s favor. 

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by focusing on the adult children living with 

plaintiff rather than the totality of the circumstances constituting the parties’ present situation. 

However, through the other factors, the trial court considered all the relevant circumstances that 

favored defendant. That is, the court found that the length of the marriage, the parties’ ability to 

work, plaintiff’s ability to pay alimony, the needs of the parties, and the parties’ health all favored 

defendant and an award of spousal support. We are therefore satisfied that the trial court 

considered the totality of the circumstances in weighing the spousal support factors.

Defendant also argues that the trial court incorrectly determined plaintiff’s income. 

Defendant maintains that plaintiff’s income should be determined using a three-year average 

pursuant to the Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF). See 2021MCSF 2.01(E)(4)(d). 

Although it may be permissible for courts to consult the MCSF in calculating spousal support, 

defendant cites no caselaw requiring courts to do so. Indeed, spousal support is determined on a 

case-by-case basis, and “there is no room for the application of any rigid and arbitrary formulas 

when determining the appropriate amount of spousal support . . . .” Myland v Myland, 290 Mich 

App 691, 699-700; 804 NW2d 124 (2010). Further, the trial court did not clearly err by declining 

to average plaintiff’s income. Plaintiff testified that he was no longer receiving overtime and the 

trial court found this testimony credible. While the concern is that plaintiff voluntarily reduced 

his overtime to lower his income, the trial court found that COVID-19 and the state of the economy 

at that time supported the conclusion that overtime was not available. It was therefore reasonable 

for the trial court to not impute overtime income to plaintiff, which would have been the effect of 

averaging his income from the prior years when he received overtime.

B. EQUITIES OF THE AWARD

“If the trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, this Court must then decide whether 

the [support] ruling was fair and equitable in light of the facts.” Moore, 242 Mich App at 654-

655. Accordingly, we will now turn to defendant’s argument that the spousal support award is 

inequitable and that the amount of spousal support awarded is inadequate to meet her needs.

Defendant is specifically concerned about the last six years of the award when she will 

receive $1,000 per month after two years of receiving $2,000 per month followed by two years of 

$1,500 per month. The trial court explained that the higher initial alimony would help “stabilize” 

defendant and that she would have to plan for “that rainy day” when her support is reduced and 

then ultimately ends. But the “rainy day” period referred to by the court seems to include the last 

six years of spousal support when defendant will receive $1,000 per month. An award that 

contemplates lean years lasting the majority of the spousal support duration does not meet the goal 
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of spousal support, which “is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties in a way that will not 

impoverish either party.” Id. Plaintiff emphasizes that defendant was awarded substantial assets 

in the form of half the home equity value and half the marital retirement assets. However, 

defendant planned to use her share of the home equity to purchase a mobile home, and she planned 

to invest the retirement assets for her own retirement. The trial court hoped defendant would not 

have to regularly invade her “nest egg” of marital assets, but this distinct possibility is at odds with 

the well-settled principle that a spouse should not be required to “consume her capital to support 

herself.” Olson, 256 Mich App at 633 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

This case is somewhat analogous to Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 432; 664 NW2d 

231 (2003), where the court awarded the husband $566,608 from the marital estate and the wife 

$570,775. The court also awarded the wife spousal support in the amount of $200 a week for five 

years. Id. at 422. This Court affirmed the property division but reversed the spousal support 

award:

We conclude from these facts that the $200 a week award of spousal support 

was unreasonable, and that in fashioning its spousal support award, the trial court 

placed inordinate weight on the value of property awarded to defendant, and 

insufficient weight on the disparate incomes of the parties and the fact that the 

income-earning potential of the assets awarded to defendant was insufficient to 

offset this disparity. As in Hanaway [v Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 296; 527 

NW2d 792 (1995)], we find that “[g]iven the length of the marriage, the magnitude 

of the marital estate, and [plaintiff’s] capital position and earning potential after the 

divorce, [defendant] should not be expected to consume her capital to support 

herself.” [Gates, 256 Mich App at 437.]

In Gates, the husband’s “gross annual income was at least three times that of [the wife’s] 

gross income.” Id. at 437. Here, plaintiff’s income is about five times what defendant makes. 

This significant disparity in income does not support the trial court’s decision to substantially 

reduce the monthly spousal support amount for the last six years of the 10-year award period.

Plaintiff argues that rehabilitative spousal support is the new norm. But in Sullivan v 

Sullivan, 175 Mich App 508; 438 NW2d 309 (1989), we concluded that a rehabilitative support 

award did not fit the facts of that case. There, the husband had a well-paying job and it was 

expected that his salary would increase; the wife was a stay-at-home mother who had worked as a 

waitress. The wife had “possible mental problems,” including schizophrenia. Id. at 513. The trial 

court “determined that there was an ability on the part of defendant to continue to work as a 

waitress at least part-time and subsequently awarded defendant adjustment alimony to assist her 

in ‘getting things together.’ ” We reversed the “rehabilitative alimony” award of $115 per week 

and held that it was to continue on a permanent basis, reasoning “that there is serious doubt whether 

defendant, in spite of her best efforts, will be able to fully support herself at the end of the fouryear period and that it would be inequitable to eliminate alimony as a source of support in this 

case.” Id. at 514.

Similarly, in this case, it is doubtful that defendant will be in a better position to support 

herself when her spousal support is reduced to $1,000 per month for the last six years of the award. 

Defendant was unable to work full-time in 2018 and while she started nursing school in 2021, she 
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was unable to continue due to stress. Dr. Pavlovcic, who the trial court found credible, was

concerned about defendant’s functioning eroding due to her psychiatric symptoms if she attempted 

to work more than 24 hours per weeks.

3

 Thus, it appears highly unlikely that defendant will be 

able to increase her income. Accordingly, a four-year stabilization or rehabilitation period is not 

applicable to the facts of this case.

Defendant maintains that $1,000 per month is insufficient to meet her needs. At trial, she 

anticipated that her monthly expenses would be about $3,000 aside from medical expenses. 

Following her new employment, she estimates that her medications will cost $253.30 per month. 

Defendant also testified that she “bring[s] home about $1,000 a month.” We acknowledge that the 

trial court was not required to accept defendant’s monthly estimations as true. Nonetheless, even 

if defendant’s expenses are less than what she anticipated, she still may be left with a substantial

monthly shortfall. Further, there is no dispute that plaintiff can pay more than $1,000 in spousal 

support. Considering the length of the marriage, the disparity in income, and defendant’s needs 

and mental health issues, we are left with a firm conviction that the final six years of the spousal 

support award is not just and reasonable.

Our decision to remand for redetermination of spousal support is buttressed by our 

conclusion that the trial court erred in its handling of the $8,000 personal property equalization 

payment, which defendant also challenges on appeal. We would have no serious qualms about the 

trial court’s decision on this matter had the trial court first determined an appropriate amount of 

spousal support and then added $8,000 (apportioned over time) to that award. However, the trial 

court expressly stated that it was not taking this approach, i.e., the court was “not ordering that 

[plaintiff] owes [defendant] that $8,000 spread over two years.” Instead, the court effectively 

negated the $8,000 payment owed to defendant in exchange for four years of higher alimony. In 

doing so, the court never arrived at a baseline figure of spousal support that was based on the 

parties’ incomes and needs. Indeed, the trial court stated that it was awarding four years of higher 

alimony in part to avoid plaintiff having to make another lump-sum payment to defendant. This 

was a valid consideration, but by including the $8,000 in the award before determining the 

necessary amount of support the trial court effectively precluded meaningfully appellate review of

the award, as we are left to wonder how exactly the award was inflated by conversion of the 

equalization payment into spousal support. On remand, the trial court must first determine a proper 

spousal support award under the governing standards before adding the $8,000 to the award if the 

trial court again wishes to avoid plaintiff making a lump sump payment to defendant in that 

amount.

B. ATTORNEY FEES

 

3 The spousal support recommendation offered by the parties that most comports with the trial 

court’s findings was plaintiff’s proposal where defendant worked 24 hours per week and plaintiff’s 

annual income was about $92,000. Under this scenario, the spousal support software 

recommended that defendant receive $1,495 per month for 10 years. This amounts to a total award 

of $179,400, about $23,000 more than the total amount awarded to defendant by the trial court.
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Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for attorney fees 

under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

an award of attorney fees.4

MCR 3.206(D) provides in pertinent part:

(1) A party may, at any time, request that the court order the other party to 

pay all or part of the attorney fees and expenses related to the action or a specific 

proceeding, including a post-judgment proceeding.

(2) A party who requests attorney fees and expenses must allege facts 

sufficient to show that:

(a) the party is unable to bear the expense of the action, including the 

expense of engaging in discovery appropriate for the matter, and that the other party 

is able to pay[.]

“Attorney fees in a divorce action may be awarded when a party needs financial assistance to 

prosecute or defend the suit.” Smith v Smith, 278 Mich App 198, 207; 748 NW2d 258 (2008)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “It is well settled that a party should not be required to 

invade assets to satisfy attorney fees when the party is relying on the same assets for support.” 

Gates, 256 Mich App at 438.

The trial court indicated that it was denying defendant’s request for attorney fees on the 

basis that defendant’s credit card debt included attorney fees and the parties had reached an 

agreement whereby plaintiff would pay defendant $10,905.86 to equalize the parties’ credit card 

debt. Defendant concedes on appeal that some of her credit card debt included attorney fees. It 

therefore follows that, through the credit card equalization payment, plaintiff has in fact paid some 

of defendant’s attorney fees. Defendant asserts that the rest of her attorney fees were paid through 

family loans, but she does not offer a breakdown of how much of the fees were paid through credit 

card versus loans through family members, which may be forgiven or at least not strictly enforced. 

While defendant asserts that she has paid her attorney $19,500 in fees, the only record evidence 

regarding the amount of defendant’s fees was an invoice dated December 1, 2021, showing 

payment of a $10,000 retainer. Given the sparse record on this issue, defendant has not shown that 

the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for attorney fees.

Reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Noah P. Hood 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro 

/s/ Christopher P. Yates 

 

4

“We review a trial court’s decision whether to award attorney fees for an abuse of discretion, the 

trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, and any questions of law de novo.” Loutts, 298 Mich 

App at 24.