Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A04-1703-JT-496 | September 6, 2017 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Steven Knecht

Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C.

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of T.L. & C.S. (Children) and 

M.L. (Mother);

M.L. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

September 6, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

12A04-1703-JT-496

Appeal from the Clinton Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Bradley K. Mohler, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

12C01-1608-JT-242

12C01-1608-JT-243
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May, Judge.

[1] M.L. (“Mother”) appeals the denial of her Motion for Relief from Judgment 

under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother1 had two children, T.L., born August 15, 2011, and C.S., born February 

7, 2014 (collectively, “Children”). On June 4, 2015, the Department of Child 

Services (“DCS”) removed Children from Mother’s care “due to Mother’s drug 

usage and instability in housing.” (App. Vol. II at 9.) Each child was 

adjudicated a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) on July 10, 2015.

[3] On August 23, 2016, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to Children. The trial court held a hearing on November 7, 

2016, and Mother appeared at the hearing with counsel. At that hearing, she 

filed a form voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights to Children. Mother 

also participated in dialogue with the trial court regarding her decision to do so.

[4] On November 30, 2016, Mother filed, pro se, a “Motion to Appeal,” (id. at 23), 

stating she wished to “appeal these 2 decisions in cases. I was under the 

influence of controlled substances and wasn’t understanding what I was doing 

and the outcome.” (Id.) (errors in original). The trial court subsequently 

 

1 T.L. and C.S. have different fathers. Their respective fathers voluntarily relinquished their parental rights 

and do not participate in this appeal.
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considered Mother’s request a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana 

Trial Rule 60(B) and held a hearing on the matter on February 7, 2017. On 

February 10, 2017, the trial court denied Mother’s motion.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion 

for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) because the underlying 

termination orders were void due to lack of proper advisement of Mother’s 

rights by the court. As an initial matter, we note, and both parties 

acknowledge, Mother did not present this argument before the trial court,2 and 

therefore it is waived. See Hite v. Vanderburgh Cty. Office of Family & Children, 845 

N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (failure to present an issue before the trial 

court waives the issue for appellate consideration).

[6] To avoid waiver, Mother argues the trial court committed fundamental error

because it did not properly advise Mother of her rights before she voluntarily 

relinquished her parental rights to Children. 

The fundamental error doctrine applies to egregious trial errors. 

In order for this court to overturn a trial court ruling based on 

fundamental error, the error must have been ‘a clearly blatant 

violation of basic and elementary principles, and the harm or 

 

2 In her post-judgment motion, Mother asserted her consent to the termination of her parental rights was 

invalid because she was under the influence of controlled substances when she consented at the hearing. 

Mother has not raised that argument on appeal. 
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potential for harm therefrom must be substantial and appear 

clearly and prospectively.’

S.M. v. Elkhart Cty. Office of Family & Children, 706 N.E.2d 596, 600 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1999) (quoting Reynolds v. State, 460 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ind. 1984)). 

Specifically, Mother argues she “was not advised, either in writing or verbally 

by the court, that her consent could not be based on a promise regarding having 

contact with her children after her rights were voluntarily terminated.” (Br. of 

Appellant at 14.)

[7] Under Indiana Code section 31-35-1-12, the trial court must advise a parent 

who consents to the voluntary termination of their parental rights that:

(1) their consent is permanent and cannot be revoked or set aside 

unless it was obtained by fraud or duress or unless the parent is 

incompetent;

(2) when the court terminates the parent-child relationship:

(A) all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and 

obligations, including any rights to custody, control, 

parenting time, or support pertaining to the relationship, 

are permanently terminated; and

(B) their consent to the child’s adoption is not required;

(3) the parents have a right to the:

(A) care;
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(B) custody; and

(C) control;

of their child as long as the parents fulfill their parental 

obligations;

(4) the parents have a right to a judicial determination of any 

alleged failure to fulfill their parental obligations in a proceeding 

to adjudicate their child a delinquent child or a child in need of 

services;

(5) the parents have a right to assistance in fulfilling their parental 

obligations after a court has determined that the parents are not 

doing so;

(6) proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship against 

the will of the parents can be initiated only after:

(A) the child has been adjudicated a delinquent child or a 

child in need of services and removed from their custody 

following the adjudication; or

(B) a parent has been convicted and imprisoned for an 

offense listed in IC 31-35-3-4 (or has been convicted and 

imprisoned for an offense listed in IC 31-6-5-4.2(a) before 

its repeal), the child has been removed from the custody of 

the parents under a dispositional decree, and the child has 

been removed from the custody of the parents for six (6) 

months under a court order;

(7) the parents are entitled to representation by counsel, provided 

by the state if necessary, throughout any proceedings to terminate 

the parent-child relationship against the will of the parents;
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(8) the parents will receive notice of the hearing, unless notice is 

waived under section 5(b) of this chapter, at which the court will 

decide if their consent was voluntary, and the parents may 

appear at the hearing and allege that the consent was not 

voluntary; and

(9) the parents’ consent cannot be based upon a promise 

regarding the child’s adoption or contact of any type with the 

child after the parents voluntarily relinquish their parental rights 

of the child after entry of an order under this chapter terminating 

the parent-child relationship.

[8] Before the hearing regarding Mother’s consent to voluntary termination of her 

parental rights, Mother received, reviewed, and signed a document titled 

“Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights,” (App. Vol. II at 13), which 

included the terms: “That when the court terminates the parent-child 

relationship, all rights powers, privileges, immunities duties, and obligations 

(including any rights to custody, control, visitation, or support) pertaining to 

that relationship are permanently terminated and my consent to the child’s 

adoption is not required.” (Id.)

[9] At the beginning of hearing regarding Mother’s consent to voluntary 

termination of her parental rights, the trial court stated:

[Court]: I do wanna [sic] advise you of your rights and the 

contents of the documents. The documents indicate that uh, you 

understand that any consent uh, that you would be giving would 

be permanent and cannot be revoked or set aside unless it was 

obtained by fraud or duress or unless you were found to be 

incompetent or unless the Court finds other reason to set it aside. 

When the court terminates a parent/child relationship all rights, 
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power, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations pertaining 

to that relationship are permanently terminated and then a 

consent to any future adoption would not be required. As a 

parent you do have the right to the care, custody, and control of 

your child as long as you fulfill your parental obligations. You 

have a right to have a judicial determination of any alleged 

failure to fulfill your parental obligations in a proceeding, uh, 

what’s [sic] called a child in need of services. [sic] And that 

would be the prior case that we’ve been going through. As a 

parent you have a right to assistance in fulfilling your parental 

obligations after a Court has determined that you’re not doing so. 

That would be any of the services or programs that were offered, 

uh, as part of the CHINS case. Proceedings to terminate a 

parent/child relationship against your will could only be initiated 

after the child has been adjudicated a child in need of services 

and then removed from your custody following that adjudication. 

Uh, and it has to be a -- a child has been removed for a period of 

least six months under court order. You’re additionally entitled 

to representation by an attorney. We have provided counsel for 

you both through the CHINS case and this termination case. 

Uh, additionally uh, you’d be waiving notice of any future 

hearings in this case and/or any notice of the adoption uh, of the 

children. Uh, [Mother] those are the terms that are outlined in 

the uh, document. Do you understand those terms?

[Mother]: Yes.

(Tr. at 4-6.) The trial court repeated these stipulations throughout the hearing 

and Mother indicated she understood them each time. During Mother’s 

testimony, the trial court asked, “[H]as anyone promised you anything, 

threatened you in any way or forced you into signing the document or making 

this decision?” (Id. at 10.) Mother answered, “No.” (Id.)
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[10] Mother has not argued on appeal she was promised contact with Children after 

her voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights, instead she focuses on the 

fact the trial court did not use the exact language of Indiana Code section 31-35-

1-12(9) to ensure she understood her rights and waiver thereof prior to 

relinquishing her parental rights to Children. The trial court advised Mother 

multiple times of the rights she relinquished when she voluntarily terminated 

her rights to Children. She was advised multiple times she would no longer be 

permitted to have contact with Children and her consent would not be required 

for any subsequent adoption. She denied being promised “anything,” (id. at 

10), in exchange for voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights. 

[11] Therefore, we conclude the advisements as a whole were sufficient and Mother 

has not demonstrated fundamental error. See Matter of Snyder, 418 N.E.2d 1171, 

1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (“A parent who executes a voluntary relinquishment 

of parental rights is bound by the consequences of such action, unless the 

relinquishment was procured by fraud, undue influence, duress, or other 

consent-vitiating factors.”). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying Mother’s motion for relief from judgment.

Conclusion

[12] The trial court’s advisement of Mother’s rights and waivers thereof was 

sufficient under Indiana Code section 31-35-1-12, and thus, she has not 

demonstrated fundamental error that could justify relief from judgment. We 

affirm.
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[13] Affirmed.

Barnes, J., and Bradford, J., concur.