alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SCWC-18-0000741

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

STATE OF HAWAII,

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MARK BECKER,

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-18-0000741; CR. NO. 2CPC-17-0000286)

ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.)

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant’s Application for Writ 

of Certiorari, filed on August 6, 2021, is hereby rejected.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, October 6, 2021.

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

/s/ Todd W. Eddins

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-18-0000741

06-OCT-2021

09:04 AM

Dkt. 10 ODAC
258 La. 973

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Becky FISHER.

No. 51481.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 16, 1971.

In re: Becky Fisher applying for writ of review.

Writ refused. The showing made is insufficient to warrant the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALVIN LESLIE WITHERSPOON,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

BERNARD WARNER; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 13-36219

D.C. No. 2:12-cv-05163-JPH

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Robert H. Whaley, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 17, 2015** 

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges. 

Alvin Leslie Witherspoon, a Washington state prisoner, appeals pro se from

the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging

violations of his 8th Amendment rights in connection with his medical treatment. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v.

FILED

FEB 26 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants

because Witherspoon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether defendants were deliberately indifferent in treating his knee condition. 

See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (a difference of

opinion between a prisoner and patient is not sufficient to establish deliberate

indifference); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (to establish

that a difference of medical opinion amounted to deliberate indifference, a prisoner

“must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically

unacceptable under the circumstances” and “that they chose this course in

conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants’ motion

for a protective order. See Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir.

1988) (setting forth the standard of review and noting that “[t]he district court has

wide discretion in controlling discovery”)

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See

Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

2 13-36219
Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 14, 2016 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-00093-CR 

BRANDON KIMON MWANIKI, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 219-81887-2014 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Evans, and Schenck 

Opinion by Justice Bridges 

Brandon Kimon Mwaniki waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery with a 

deadly weapon, a firearm. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a) (West 2011). After finding 

appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at fifteen yeas’ imprisonment. On appeal, 

appellant’s attorney filed a brief in which she concludes the appeal is wholly frivolous and 

without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

The brief presents a professional evaluation of the record showing why, in effect, there are no 

arguable grounds to advance. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 811–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 

[Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel delivered a copy of the brief to appellant. We advised appellant of 

his right to file a pro se response, but he did not file a pro se response. See Kelly v. State, 436 
 –2– 

S.W.3d 313, 319–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (identifying duties of appellate courts and counsel 

in Anders cases). 

 We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 

826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining appellate court’s duty in Anders cases). We agree 

the appeal is frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably 

support the appeal. 

 We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47 

160093F.U05 

 

/David L. Bridges 

DAVID L. BRIDGES 

JUSTICE 
 –3– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

BRANDON KIMON MWANIKI, Appellant

No. 05-16-00093-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District 

Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 219-81887-2014. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. 

Justices Evans and Schenck participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered December 14, 2016.
EXHIBIT 32 
Section 1350 Certifications  STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 The undersigned are the Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of AF Ocean Investment Management Company. This Certification is made pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This Certification accompanies the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of AF Ocean Investment Management Company for the nine months ended September 30, 2011. The undersigned certifies that such 10-Q Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such 10-Q Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of AF Ocean Investment Management Company as of September 30, 2011.  This Certification is executed as of November 14, 2011. AF OCEAN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT COMPANY By:/s/ANDY Z. FANAndy Z. Fan
President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)  By:/s/DIANE J. HARRISONDiane J. Harrison
Secretary, Treasurer, Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to AF Ocean Investment Management Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 23.1

                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

         We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration
statement of The Singing Machine Company, Inc. on Form S-8 (File No. 333-59684)
of our report dated May 18, 2001, with respect to the consolidated financial
statements of The Singing Machine Company, Inc. and subsidiary, for the year
ended March 31, 2001, included in this Annual Report on the Form 10-KSB for the
year ended March 31, 2001.



 /s/ SALBERG & COMPANY, P.A.
Boca Raton, Florida
June 28, 2001
#### William G. WASCOM et al. v. AMERICAN INDEMNITY CORP. et al.

No. 60434.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 28, 1977.

In re: William G. Wascom, et al. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of Tangipahoa, 348 So.2d 128.

Writ denied. Judgment of court of appeal is correct.

TATE, J.,

dissents. The parents are entitled to damages by the death of their unborn children; while the mother in the present case will recover approximately the same damages by way of mental anguish; no reason of law, fact, or equity (in my opinion) should deprive the father of similar tort-caused damages. The dissenting opinion in the court of appeal correctly suggests that this tort-caused damage for which the defendants are liable under C.C. arts. 2315 et seq. should not be defeated by applications of a code article essentially intended to regulate inheritance rights in a manner never intended by the legislature.
# C_2014408EN.01002701.xml

| 15.11.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 408/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.11.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 408/27

---

EUROPEAN FISHERIES CONTROL AGENCY

Publication of the final accounts for the financial year 2013

2014/C 408/27

The complete version of the final accounts may be found at the following address:

http://www.efca.europa.eu/pages/home/annual_accounts_2013.htm

---
I

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3807

To require the Secretary of Commerce to convey to the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts the National Marine Fisheries Service laboratory located

on Emerson Avenue in Gloucester, Massachusetts.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 8, 1994

Mr. STUDDS (for himself and Mr. TORKILDSEN) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries

A BILL

To require the Secretary of Commerce to convey to the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts the National Marine

Fisheries Service laboratory located on Emerson Avenue

in Gloucester, Massachusetts.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CONVEYANCE OF NATIONAL MARINE FISH4 ERIES SERVICE LABORATORY AT GLOUCES5 TER, MASSACHUSETTS.

6 (a) CONVEYANCE REQUIRED.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Commerce

8 shall convey to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
2

•HR 3807 IH

1 all right, title, and interest of the United States in

2 and to the property comprising the National Marine

3 Fisheries Service laboratory located on Emerson

4 Avenue in Gloucester, Massachusetts.

5 (2) TERMS.—A conveyance of property under

6 paragraph (1) shall be made—

7 (A) without payment of consideration; and

8 (B) subject to the terms and conditions

9 specified under subsections (b) and (c).

10 (b) CONDITIONS FOR TRANSFER.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—As a condition of any con12 veyance of property under this section, the Common13 wealth of Massachusetts shall assume full respon14 sibility for maintenance of the property for as long

15 as the Commonwealth retains the rights and title to

16 that property.

17 (2) CONTINUED USE OF PROPERTY BY NMFS.—

18 The Secretary may enter into a memorandum of un19 derstanding with the Commonwealth of Massachu20 setts under which the National Marine Fisheries

21 Service is authorized to occupy existing laboratory

22 space on the property conveyed under this section,

23 if—

24 (A) the term of the memorandum of un25 derstanding is for a period of not longer than
3

•HR 3807 IH

1 5 years beginning on the date of enactment of

2 this Act; and

3 (B) the square footage of the space to be

4 occupied by the National Marine Fisheries

5 Service does not conflict with the needs of, and

6 is agreeable to, the Commonwealth of Massa7 chusetts.

8 (c) REVERSIONARY INTEREST.—All right, title, and

9 interest in and to all property and interests conveyed

10 under this section shall revert to the United States on the

11 date on which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts uses

12 any of the property for any purpose other than the Com13 monwealth of Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries

14 resource management program.

Æ
I

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3766

To prohibit any Federal department or agency from requiring any State,

or political subdivision thereof, to convert highway signs to metric units.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 2, 1994

Mr. ROBERTS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

A BILL

To prohibit any Federal department or agency from requiring

any State, or political subdivision thereof, to convert

highway signs to metric units.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION.

4 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the De5 partment of Transportation or any other Federal depart6 ment, agency, or instrumentality shall take no action re7 quiring, directly or indirectly, any State or political sub8 division thereof, to convert highway signs on any highway,

9 road, or parkway comprising a part of any primary sys10 tem, urban system, secondary system, or Interstate Sys-
2

HR 3766 IH

1 tem (as defined in sections 101 and 103 of title 23, United

2 States Code) within such State to metric units.

3 SEC. 2. APPROPRIATED FUNDS.

4 The Department of Transportation or any other Fed5 eral department, agency, or instrumentality shall use no

6 appropriated funds to require, directly or indirectly, any

7 State, or political subdivision thereof, to convert highway

8 signs on any highway, road, or parkway comprising a part

9 of any primary system, urban system, secondary system,

10 or Interstate System (as defined in sections 101 and 103

11 of title 23, United States Code) within such State to met12 ric units.

Æ
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-14-00110-CR

BRANDON VASH UN HOUSE, Appellant

v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

From the 12th District Court Walker County, Texas Trial Court No. 26,018

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Brandon Vashun House has filed a “Withdrawal of Notice of Appeal”
in which he states that he “respectfully moves this Court to withdraw Defendant’s
Notice of Appeal and to dismiss the appeal .” We have no authority under Rule of
Appellate Procedure 42.2 to “withdraw Defend ant’s Notice of Appeal”; therefore, we

construe House’s motion as a motion to voluntarily dismiss his appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

.
P. 42.2(a). We have not issued a decision in this appeal, and House personally signed
the motion. The motion is grante d, and the appeal is dismissed.House v. State Page 2 REX D. DAVIS Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Appeal dismissed Opinion delivered and filed December 31, 2014 Do not publish [CR25]
### NUMBER 13 - 1 9 - 00 048 - CR 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

JOSE SALVADOR FLORES , A ppellant ,
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, A ppellee

.

On Appeal from the 1 3 8 th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.



## ORDER OF ABATEMENT
Before Justices Benavides , Longoria , and Hinojosa

Order Per Curiam Appellant, Jose Salvador Flores, filed a pro se notice of appeal with this Court from
his conviction in trial court cause number 2018

- DCR

- 528

- B

. Appellant’s appointed
counsel filed a mot ion to withdraw as counsel in th is cause which was granted by the trial
court. New counsel has not been appointed. B ecause it is unclear whether appellant2

is entitled to appointed counsel on appeal, we ABATE and REMAND th is cause as follows. Upon remand, the trial court shall utilize whatever means necessary to make appropriate findings and recommendations concerning the following: (1) whether appellant desir es to prosecute th is appeal; (2) whether appellant has been denied effective assistance of counsel; (3) whether appellant is indigent and enti tled to
court

- appointed counsel; and ( 4 ) if appellant is not indigent , whether appellant has
retained new counsel or waives his right to counsel and elects to proceed pro se

. If the trial court determines that appellant does want to continue th i s appeal and that appellant is indigent and entitled to court

- appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint new counsel to represent appellant in th is appeal. If new counsel is appointed, the name, address, email address, telephone number, and state bar number of said counsel shall be included in an order appointing counsel. The trial court shall cause its finding s and recom mendations, together with any orders it may enter regarding the aforementioned issues, to be included in a supplemental clerk's record. Furthermore, the trial court shall cause a supplemental reporter's record of any proceedings to be prepared. The suppl emental clerk's record and supplemental reporter's record, if any, shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court on or before the expiration of thirty days from the date of this order. It is so ORDERED. PER CURIAM Do not publish. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).3

D elivered and filed this the 12th day of February , 201 9

.
259 La. 930

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Jack L. HARRIS v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 51826.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 28, 1971.

In re: Jack L. Harris applying for writs of mandamus, certiorari and habeas corpus.

As to Issue No. 2 the application is granted. The ruling is reversed and the case remanded to the trial judge for further proceedings in accordance with our decision in State v. Welkner and Tassistro, 259 La. 815, 253 So.2d 192, rehearing refused October 28, 1971.
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 3459

To amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to permit the continued insurance of deposits in minority- and women-owned banks by the Bank

Deposit Financial Assistance Program.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 8, 1993

Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas introduced the following bill; which

was referred to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs

A BILL

To amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to permit the

continued insurance of deposits in minority- and womenowned banks by the Bank Deposit Financial Assistance

Program.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Bank Deposit Insur5 ance Amendments of 1993’’.
2

•HR 3459 IH

1 SEC. 2. AMENDMENT RELATING TO THE INSURANCE OF DE2 POSITS BY THE BANK DEPOSIT FINANCIAL

3 ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

4 Effective December 19, 1994, section 7(i)(1) of the

5 Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(i)(1)) is

6 amended by inserting ‘‘, or pursuant to any revocable trust

7 established under the Bank Deposit Financial Assistance

8 Program of the Department of Energy,’’ after ‘‘written

9 trust agreement’’.

Æ
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 387 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 387

To require random drug testing of Federal judicial branch officers and 
                               employees.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 5, 1993

 Mr. Solomon introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To require random drug testing of Federal judicial branch officers and 
                               employees.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts shall require random drug testing of 
officers and employees within the judicial branch of the Federal 
Government.

                                 <all>
```
I

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3747

To permit marine port authorities to establish guidelines for the shipment

of certain materials in a manner that protects the public health and

safety and the environment.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 26, 1994

Mr. KREIDLER (for himself and Mr. DICKS) introduced the following bill;

which was referred jointly to the Committees on Public Works and Transportation, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Energy and Commerce, and

Education and Labor

A BILL

To permit marine port authorities to establish guidelines

for the shipment of certain materials in a manner that

protects the public health and safety and the environment.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Safe Shipment and

5 Handling Act of 1994’’.
2

HR 3747 IH

1 SEC. 2. GUIDELINES BY MARINE PORT AUTHORITIES TO

2 ENSURE SAFE SHIPMENT OF CERTAIN MATE3 RIAL.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Any port authority may—

5 (1) through a public comment process, establish

6 reasonable guidelines to ensure that the unloading,

7 transfer, and shipment of spent nuclear fuel at or

8 through a port under its jurisdiction is conducted in

9 a manner that protects the public health and safety

10 and the environment at, and in the vicinity of, such

11 marine port;

12 (2) prohibit any such unloading, transfer or

13 shipment that is not in compliance with such guide14 lines.

15 (b) DESCRIPTIONS OF GUIDELINES.—Guidelines

16 which a Port Authority may set include, but are not lim17 ited to:

18 (1) Workers must be properly trained (to the

19 satisfaction of any union representing such workers)

20 in the handling of the material;

21 (2) A comprehensive response plan (including

22 containment in case of fire, spill response, and other

23 contingencies) must be in place before material can

24 enter the port;

25 (3) Local communities must be informed of the

26 shipments, as well as possible consequences; and/or
3

HR 3747 IH

1 (4) Radiation exposure levels for workers may

2 not exceed standards for public exposure as already

3 set by regulation.

4 (c) RELATION TO OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Sub5 section (a) shall apply only to guidelines that are more

6 protective of the public health and safety and the environ7 ment than other applicable requirements established under

8 Federal, State, or local law.

9 SEC. 3. LIABILITY.

10 Nothing in this Act shall affect the liability or indem11 nification of the port in the handling of nuclear materials.

12 SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

13 For purposes of this Act, the terms ‘‘port authority’’

14 and ‘‘marine port authority’’ mean any local, regional,

15 State, or inter-state authority having jurisdiction with re16 spect to the operation of a marine port in the United

17 States.

Æ