J-A27029-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.W.E., JR., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.E., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1052 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 27, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

2022-0080A

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 7, 2023

T.E. (“Father”) appeals from the decree terminating his parental rights 

as to his minor child, T.W.E., Jr. (“Child”). We affirm.

Child was born in September 2019. A few weeks after Child’s birth, York 

County Office of Children, Youth & Families (“the Agency”) received a referral 

regarding concerns about Child’s mother’s (“Mother”)1 ability to care for Child 

due to mental health issues. Father was incarcerated at that time due to his 

fourth DUI arrest and driving on a suspended license. N.T., 6/27/22, at 27. 

Child was adjudicated dependent on October 1, 2019. Child was placed in the 

custody of the Agency and in the care of his maternal grandmother (“Maternal 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
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Grandmother”). Child has remained in this pre-adoptive home since that time. 

Id. at 32-33, 43, 70. 

Approximately two and one-half years after the adjudication of 

dependency, on April 22, 2022, the Agency filed a petition for involuntary 

termination of Father’s parental rights. The court held a hearing on the petition 

on June 27, 2022. 

The Agency presented the testimony of case worker Heather Sterner. 

Sterner testified that Father’s goals were to maintain stable housing and 

income, comply with random drug testing, complete a parenting capacity 

evaluation, and attend visitation. Id. at 27. She stated that Father was 

incarcerated for approximately one year, from August 30, 2019 to August 29, 

2020, and is currently on parole. Id. at 27-28. Sterner testified that since 

being released from prison, Father has maintained stable housing. Id. at 29. 

Father has also had a few different jobs, although none for long periods of 

time. Id.

Sterner stated that Father’s drug tests have been clean, but the Agency 

had no documentation that Father had attended AA meetings as was 

recommended. Id. at 37. Father also completed a parenting capacity 

evaluation by Dr. Jonathan Gransee in February 2021. Id. at 35. Dr. Gransee’s 

recommendations included continuing to attend therapy to develop skills that 

would improve Father’s self-esteem, assertiveness, and decision-making 

abilities as they relate to caring for Child, and attending couple’s counseling 
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with Mother. Sterner testified that Father has not developed such skills or 

attended couples counseling. Id. at 36.

Sterner testified that since the Agency’s involvement with the family in 

October 2019, Father’s visitation has always been supervised except for a 

period of approximately two months, from October 2021 to December 2021,

when visits became unsupervised. Id. at 31-32. Visits reverted to supervised 

in December 2021 after an incident in which Mother drove with Child while 

intoxicated. Id. at 32. Father did not object to visits being returned to 

supervised.2 Sterner stated that Father was consistent with visitation in 2021 

but was “off and on with his consistency with visits” in 2022. Id. at 30-31. 

Father’s last visit with Child was on April 27, 2022, which was two months 

prior to the termination hearing. Id. at 30. Father has largely not attended

Child’s medical or professional appointments. Id. at 38-40.

Sterner testified that Child has been in care for approximately 33 

months, which is well outside of the time frame for permanent placement. Id.

at 41. Sterner stated that the Agency was willing to give Father more time 

because he was making some progress on his goals. Id. at 41-42. Sterner 

____________________________________________

2 Father contends he made an “implied” objection to visitation reverting to 

supervised at the hearing on December 28, 2021. See Father’s Br. at 12-13. 

However, the record belies Father’s contention and instead reveals he failed 

to make a clear and specific objection. See N.T., 12/28/21, at 5-6. “In order 

to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and 

specific objection at the appropriate stage of the proceedings before the trial 

court. Failure to timely object to a basic and fundamental error will result in 

waiver of that issue.” McManamon v. Washko, 906 A.2d 1259, 1274 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Father has waived this 

argument. 
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also said there were issues due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 42.

However, she testified that after 33 months, Father was still not able to 

provide for the care, protection, safety, and development of Child. Id. at 40. 

Sterner testified that Child is in a safe, pre-adoptive home and has lived 

there since he was one month old. Id. at 32-33, 43. Sterner stated Child has 

a loving bond with Maternal Grandmother and looks to her to have his daily 

needs met. Id. at 33. Sterner explained that Child has a “small type of 

parental bond” with Father, but the bond was more like that of an uncle. Id.

at 34-35. She opined that it was in the best interest of Child for Father’s 

parental rights to be terminated and Child would suffer no detrimental impact. 

Id. at 42-43. 

Father testified that he works at a restaurant and has turned over his 

pay stubs every other week to the Agency. Id. at 55-56. He stated that since 

visits went back to supervised in January 2022, there were times when his 

approved supervisors, who were his sister, niece, and a friend, would go to 

Maternal Grandmother’s house and bring Child back to Father’s house to visit. 

Id. at 56-59. He believed that the Agency was not aware of these visits and 

incorrectly stated that he last visited Child on April 27, 2022. Id. Father 

testified that although he was permitted to visit Child at Maternal 

Grandmother’s house, he did not get along with her and was allergic to her 

cats. Id. at 56, 59. Father said that he recently visited Child a few times at 

Child’s maternal grandfather’s house, who does not live with Maternal 

Grandmother. Id. at 65.
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Child’s counsel indicated that although Child cannot articulate his desires 

due to his age, he is very happy and well-cared for in Maternal Grandmother’s 

home. Id. at 69-70. Childs’s Guardian ad litem concurred with Child’s counsel 

and stated that it was in Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be 

terminated. Id. at 70.

The trial court found that the Agency proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that Father’s parental rights should be terminated under Section 

2511(a)(2) and (8) and Section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act. Father filed a 

notice of appeal and raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding 

that [the Agency] had proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parental rights of [Father] should be 

terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2)[?]

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding 

that [the Agency] had proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parental rights of [Father] should be 

terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(8)[?]

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding 

that [the Agency] had proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parental rights of [Father] should be 

terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b)[?]

Father’s Br. at 4.

We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an 

abuse of discretion. In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 399 (Pa.Super. 2018) 

(citation omitted). In termination cases, we “accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (quoting In re Adoption 
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of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012)). “If the factual findings have support 

in the record, we then determine if the trial court committed an error of law 

or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 

2018). We will reverse a termination order “only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826.

A party seeking to terminate parental rights has the burden of 

establishing grounds for termination by “clear and convincing evidence.” In 

re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d at 473 (citation omitted). Clear and convincing 

evidence means evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as 

to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of 

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 

726, 728-29 (Pa.Super. 2008)).

Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). Under this 

provision, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated analysis prior to 

terminating parental rights:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only 

if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court 

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to 

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of 

the child under the standard of best interests of the child. 

One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 
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concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child, with close attention paid to the 

effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

Id. (citations omitted). To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court 

need only affirm the trial court’s decision as to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).

Father first contends that the court erred in finding termination proper 

under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (8). As only one basis for termination under 

Section 2511(a) is necessary, we will focus our attention on the court’s 

termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), which 

states:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

Section 2511(a)(2) thus requires the moving party to prove three things 

by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; 
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and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa.Super. 2008) 

(citation omitted). “The grounds for termination of parental rights under 

Section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are 

not limited to affirmative misconduct; those grounds may also include acts of 

refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” Id. (citation omitted).

“Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt 

assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 

166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

Moreover, this Court has emphasized:

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with his or her physical and 

emotional needs.

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 759 (citation omitted).

Father argues that the record does not support a finding that he is 

unwilling or incapable of remedying the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal to perform parental duties. Father’s Br. 

at 10. He points out that the allegations that led to the adjudication of Child 

were concerns about Mother and that he was incarcerated at the time of the 

adjudication. Id. Father maintains that once he was released from prison, he 
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worked diligently to complete his reunification goals and the visits had 

progressed to unsupervised in October 2021. Id. at 11. 

The trial court did not err in finding termination proper under Section 

2511(a)(2). Although Father completed some of his single case plan 

objectives, and consistently visited Child for the most part, other evidence 

demonstrated that the reasons that Father has been unable to parent Child 

will not resolve. At the time of the filing of the petition and the termination

hearing, Father’s visits with Child continued to be supervised. Further, Father 

had not availed himself of the opportunity to visit Child at Maternal 

Grandmother’s house. Father was also minimally compliant with the 

recommendations set forth in the parenting capacity evaluation and was not 

actively involved in Child’s medical appointments. Child had been in care for 

almost three years, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to find 

that the Agency established, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father 

had a continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal to discharge parental 

duties, that the incapacity caused Child to be without parental care, control, 

or subsistence, and that the cause for the incapacity cannot or will not be 

remedied.

Father next claims the court erred in finding termination proper under 

Section 2511(b). The focus under Section 2511(b) is not on the parent, but 

on the child. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa.Super. 2006).

Under Section 2511(b), the trial court must consider “the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child” to determine if 
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termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This inquiry involves assessment of “[i]ntangibles such 

as love, comfort, security, and stability[.]” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 

(Pa.Super. 2005). The court must also examine the parent-child bond, “with 

utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” 

Id. However, the “mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

termination of parental rights.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 

2011). Rather, the trial court must consider whether severing the bond “would 

destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. (citation 

omitted). The court must also examine any pre-adoptive home and any bond 

between the child and the foster parents. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

Here, the trial court determined that the Agency had established by clear 

and convincing evidence that termination was proper under Section 2511(b).

The record supports the court’s finding. Sterner testified that Child has a loving 

bond with Maternal Grandmother, with whom he has lived for the majority of 

his young life, and looks to her to have his daily needs met. Although Child 

had a small bond with Father, he views Father as more like an uncle than a 

father. We perceive no reasonable basis on which to challenge the court’s 

conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights would be in Child’s best 

interest. 

Decree affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/07/2023