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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41463

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF 

JOHN DOE AND JOHN DOE I.

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JANE (2013-25) DOE,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

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January 2014 Term

2014 Opinion No. 12

Filed: February 10, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 

Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Cathleen MacGregor-Irby, Magistrate Judge.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Mauk & Burgoyne, Boise, Nate Peterson Law PLLC, Boise, and Lisa Shultz, 

Boise, attorneys for appellant.

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J. JONES, Justice.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for adoption filed by Jane Doe, the 

long-time domestic partner of Jane Doe I. Jane Doe I is the legally recognized parent of the two 

children subject to the adoption: John Doe and John Doe I. The magistrate court dismissed Jane 

Doe’s petition for adoption when there was no opposition to the petition, without inviting legal 

briefing, without notice to the affected parties, and without holding a hearing. Jane Doe filed a 

motion for reconsideration, but before a ruling on that motion was made, I.A.R. 12.2 compelled 

her to file a Notice of Appeal to this Court. 

I. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 30, 2013, Jane Doe filed a petition for adoption. She sought to adopt her longtime partner’s two children, John Doe and John Doe I, as a second parent. Jane Doe and Jane 

Doe I have been in a committed relationship since 1995. They have demonstrated their 

commitment to one another repeatedly—through participating in a Declaration of Commitment 

Ceremony in Boise on May 3, 1997, by obtaining a Civil Union from the state of Vermont on 
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June 19, 2002, and by getting married in California on July 26, 2013.1 Together, Jane Doe and 

Jane Doe I planned and prepared for the birth of John Doe, and later, the adoption of John Doe I. 

John Doe was born to Jane Doe I in 1998, conceived by artificial insemination. In 2002, Jane 

Doe I adopted John Doe I, who was born in 2001 and placed with Jane Doe and Jane Doe I two 

days after being born. Thus, Jane Doe has, along with Jane Doe I, raised these two children since 

their births, for fifteen and twelve years, respectively. 

In conjunction with her petition for adoption, Jane Doe submitted a Pre-Placement Home 

Study (“Home Study”) performed by Certified Adoption Professional Elizabeth Tate. The Home 

Study indicates that Jane Doe has traditionally been the children’s primary caregiver, while Jane 

Doe I has been the family’s primary source of income. Currently though, Jane Doe works as a 

playground supervisor and volunteers as a football coach. She has coached both John Doe and 

John Doe I’s soccer and basketball teams, and has served on the Liberty Elementary PTA board 

for over six years, three of which she served as PTA president. When Ms. Tate asked the 

children their thoughts regarding the adoption, John Doe stated that Jane Doe “is my mom, she’s 

been here my whole life, and I don’t know anything different.” Similarly, John Doe I indicated 

that Jane Doe “has been with me all my life[,]” that he likes adoption because “different people 

can be together as a family[,]” and that he wants Jane Doe to adopt him because she “loves me 

and wants to be with me forever.” In the Home Study, Ms. Tate approved of and recommended 

that Jane Doe be permitted to adopt John Doe and John Doe I, stating:

[Jane Doe] is emotionally, culturally, physically, and financially prepared to adopt 

[the boys]. [Jane Doe and Jane Doe I] appear to have a strong and stable marriage 

and relationship. [Jane Doe] has met the requirements mandated by the State of 

Idaho, in regard to age, health and physical fitness, criminal clearance, education, 

employment, income, and the ability to parent adopted children; additionally, she 

has the full support of extended family members and friends.

On September 19, 2013, however, the magistrate court entered an Order of Dismissal on 

the grounds that “the petitioner must be in a lawfully recognized union, i.e. married to the 

prospective adoptee’s parent, to have legal standing to file a petition to adopt that person’s 

biological or adopted child.” The magistrate dismissed the petition “sua sponte, without any 

motion or opposition to the Petition, without prior notice to any of the affected parties, without 

 1 Jane Doe and Jane Doe I’s marital status is not recognized in Idaho. See Art. III, § 28, Idaho Const. Appellant 

neither disputes that, nor does she seek recognition of their marriage in this appeal.
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inviting legal briefing, without any apparent consideration of the Pre-Adoptive Home Study and 

without hearing.” A Final Judgment was entered the same day.

On September 30, 2013, Jane Doe filed a Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment and/or 

Motion for Reconsideration (“Motion for Reconsideration”). In that motion, Jane Doe argued 

that the magistrate court erred (1) in denying her “petition for adoption without a hearing to 

determine the best interests of the prospective adoptees because Petitioner meets all the statutory 

requirements for adoption” and (2) in its interpretation of the applicable adoption statutes. In 

conjunction with its Motion for Reconsideration, Jane Doe filed the affidavit of her legal 

counsel, which advised the magistrate of the approval of various adoptions by unmarried 

individuals. On October 3, 2013, and before the magistrate ruled on the Motion for 

Reconsideration, Jane Doe filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court, as required by I.A.R. 12.2.2 A 

letter from Deputy Attorney General Steven L. Olsen was filed on October 23, 2013, in which he 

indicated that the State will not be appearing in this case. 

II. 

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the magistrate court err in dismissing the petition for adoption without holding a 

hearing?

II. Do Idaho’s adoption statutes unambiguously allow a second, prospective parent to 

adopt, regardless of marital status?

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Here, the magistrate court dismissed the petition because it determined that Jane Doe

lacked standing. “Jurisdictional issues, such as standing, are questions of law,” over which this 

Court exercises free review. Martin v. Camas Cnty. ex rel. Bd. Comm’rs, 150 Idaho 508, 512, 

248 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2011). Additionally, this Court exercises free review when interpreting the 

meaning of a statute. Stonebrook Const., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 930, 

277 P.3d 374, 377 (2012).

B. The magistrate erred in dismissing Jane Doe’s petition for adoption.

 2 I.A.R. 12.2(a)(1) provides in relevant part: “An appeal from any final judgment . . . granting or denying a petition 

for . . . adoption shall be made only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within 

fourteen (14) days from the date of issuance of the judgment.” I.A.R. 12.2(a)(1).
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As Jane Doe points out, the magistrate’s “Order of Dismissal and [the] Judgment . . . fail 

to identify any statute or civil rule which supports the sua sponte dismissal of an adoption 

petition without allowing the petitioner to present anything except the petition regarding her 

eligibility to adopt.” Instead, the magistrate court characterized its grounds for dismissal as an 

issue of standing. As the following discussion demonstrates, this was in error.

1. The magistrate violated Jane Doe’s right to due process when it dismissed 

her petition without affording her the opportunity to be heard in a 

meaningful manner.

Jane Doe argues that the magistrate deprived her of an opportunity to be heard and thus 

“(1) has deprived the Petitioner of any opportunity to clarify uncertainties and arguable 

deficiencies in the petition and supporting documents, and to enlighten the lower court on 

persuasive points of law like those addressed on this appeal, (2) has evaded any consideration of 

whether the best interests of the children would be promoted by the adoption and (3) has 

needlessly constrained this Court’s fully informed appellate review.”

“Due process requires the right to timely notice and the right to be heard in a meaningful 

forum.” In re Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 556, 887 P.2d 1061, 1063 (1995). In In re Chaney, the 

appellant argued that he was denied due process when the magistrate ruled that he did not have 

standing to contest an adoption. Id. This Court held, however, that the appellant was not deprived 

of due process because he had notice of the adoption, “and the magistrate then allowed [the 

appellant] to testify” and took his testimony into consideration. Id.

Aside from her initial petition for adoption, Jane Doe was given no opportunity to be 

heard. Furthermore, she had no notice that her petition could potentially be dismissed because 

there was no opposition to it. Rather, the magistrate court acted unilaterally in dismissing it. The 

magistrate did not hold a hearing to determine whether the adoption would be in the best 

interests of the children, and she did not invite briefing before summarily dismissing the petition. 

We conclude that the magistrate court deprived Jane Doe of due process because she was not 

given notice and the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.

2. By not holding a hearing, the magistrate court acted contrary to Idaho’s 

statutory adoption scheme.

Idaho Code § 16-1506 mandates that a hearing be held after an adoption petition is filed. 

Section 16-1506 is reproduced in part below:

Proceedings on adoption.
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(1) Proceedings to adopt a child shall be commenced by the filing of a petition 

together with a copy thereof. The petition shall be initiated by the person or 

persons proposing to adopt the child and shall be filed with the district court of 

the county in which said person or persons reside. . . . At the time fixed for 

hearing such petition the person adopting a child, and the child adopted, and the 

spouse of the petitioner if a natural parent of the child, must appear before the 

court of the county wherein the petition was filed. 

I.C. § 16-1506 (emphasis added). 

The phrase “at the time fixed for hearing such petition” contains no qualifiers, 

limitations, or exceptions. It does not, for example, say, “at the time fixed for hearing, if any,” 

nor does the phrase hint that a hearing is optional, or even a judgment call within a court’s 

discretion. The language, by its plain, unambiguous meaning indicates that in the context of 

adoption proceedings in Idaho, a post-petition hearing is required. The magistrate’s summary 

dismissal of Jane Doe’s adoption petition, without first holding a hearing, constitutes a failure to 

comply with I.C. § 16-1506.

C. Idaho’s adoption statutes unambiguously allow a second, prospective parent to 

adopt, regardless of marital status.

On appeal, Jane Doe argues that Idaho’s adoption statutes unambiguously allow her to 

adopt, that she meets all of the statutory requirements to adopt, that a second, prospective parent 

may adopt without terminating the rights of the existing legal parent, and that it is immaterial 

that she is considered unmarried under state law.

The magistrate court acknowledged that I.C. § 16-1501 is the controlling statute, but then 

stated that “the court does not find any provision that allows for the adoption of a person’s 

adopted and/or biological children by that person’s cohabitating, committed partner.” Rather 

than look to the plain language of I.C. § 16-1501, the magistrate skipped right to attempting to 

ascertain legislative intent. In doing so, she cited to the following rule of statutory construction: 

“In interpreting statutes, we are governed by the rule that statutes which relate to the same 

subject matter, or are [in pari materia], must be construed together.” In attempting to apply this 

rule, the magistrate pointed to I.C. § 16-1503 and I.C. § 16-1506(1), both of which discuss 

certain circumstances where a spouse is involved in an adoption. The first provision, I.C. § 16-

1503, indicates that a married person may not adopt without the consent of his or her spouse, 

while the second provision, I.C. § 16-1506(1), states that when a spouse of a petitioner is the 

natural parent of the adoptee, that spouse must appear before the court. See I.C. § 16-1503 and 

I.C. § 16-1506(1). Neither statute applies to the facts of this case because under Idaho law, Jane 
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Doe is not married. Apparently under the impression that statutes regarding marriage and those 

regarding adoption somehow relate to the same subject matter, the magistrate noted that I.C. §§ 

32-201 and 32-202 allow for marriage between a man and a woman only, before concluding:

When considering all of these statutes together, this court concludes that the 

legislature’s intent in relation to adoptions is that the petitioner must be in a 

lawfully recognized union, i.e. married to the prospective adoptee’s parent, to 

have legal standing to file a petition to adopt that person’s biological or adopted 

child.

The magistrate failed to consider that when interpreting statutes, courts apply this wellestablished standard:

Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute’s literal 

words. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give 

effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. Only 

where the language is ambiguous will this Court look to rules of construction for 

guidance and consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations.

Stonebrook Const., 152 Idaho at 931, 277 P.3d at 378 (quoting Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & 

Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 398, 224 P.3d 458, 465 (2008)). The literal words of the statute “must be 

given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; . . . [i]f the statute is not ambiguous, this Court 

does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.” City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint 

Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 (2003). However, a statute “is 

ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to its meaning.” Stonebrook 

Const., 152 Idaho at 931, 277 P.3d at 378. “If the statute is ambiguous, then it must be construed 

to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean.” City of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69, 72 P.3d 

at 909. Legislative intent is determined by examining “the literal words of the statute, . . . the 

reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative 

history.” Id. 

The rule of in pari materia is a “canon of statutory construction” used to effectuate 

legislative intent. Erlenbaugh v. U.S., 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972); City of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 

69, 72 P.3d at 909. It indicates that statutes relating to the same subject—or those that are in pari 

materia—must be construed together. City of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69, 72 P.3d at 909. As a 

rule of statutory construction, it would be inapplicable when a statute is unambiguous, because in 

that case, “the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is 

no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction.” Payette River Property 

Owners Assn. v. Bd. of Commrs. of Valley Cnty., 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999). 
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Here, the magistrate court’s analysis constitutes a deviation from existing law. The 

magistrate skipped the first part of this Court’s well-established standard—examining the 

statute’s literal words—and jumped directly to applying a rule of statutory construction, without

first determining whether the provision is ambiguous. Thus, this Court must first examine 

whether I.C. § 16-1501 is ambiguous.

In doing so, this Court’s analysis necessarily begins with an examination of the statute’s 

literal words. Idaho Code § 16-1501 provides that “[a]ny minor child may be adopted by any 

adult person residing in and having residence in Idaho, in the cases and subject to the rules 

prescribed in this chapter.” I.C. § 16-1501. “Any adult person” is not defined in title 16, nor 

should it be—it is difficult to imagine reasonable minds differing as to its meaning. See I.C. § 

16-103. Jane Doe points out that this Court has recognized that the word “any” means “without 

restriction, exclusion or exception.” See Von Lindern v. Union Pac. R. Co., 94 Idaho 777, 779, 

498 P.2d 345, 347 (1972) (quoting Emmolo v. Southern Pac. Co., 204 P.2d 427, 429 (Cal. 1972) 

(“The word ‘any’ is defined in part as ‘Indicating a person, thing, etc., as one selected without 

restriction or limitation of choice, with the implication that every one is open to selection without 

exception . . .”)). Because “any adult person” is susceptible to only one interpretation—a human 

being over the age of 18—I.C. § 16-1501 is unambiguous. Undoubtedly, “any adult person” 

cannot possibly be construed to mean “any married adult person” as the magistrate ultimately 

determined. And, as an adult person, Jane Doe unequivocally has standing to adopt.

While it is true that I.C. § 16-1501 is “subject to the rules prescribed in this chapter[,]” 

nothing in chapter 15 comes close to requiring that “a petitioner must be in a lawfully recognized 

union, i.e. married to the prospective adoptee’s parent, to have legal standing to file a petition to 

adopt that person’s biological or adopted child[,]” as was held by the magistrate in this case. 

Instead, chapter 15 mentions “spouse” in five separate provisions 3 and “married” in three 

 3 The specific provisions are as follows: (1) § 16-1502 (“[t]he person adopting a child must be at least fifteen (15) 

years older than the person adopted . . . except such age restrictions or requirements shall not apply in cases where 

the adopting parent is a spouse of a natural parent . . . .”); (2) § 16-1504 (“[c]onsent to adoption is required from . . . 

[t]he adoptee’s spouse, if any”); (3) § 16-1505 (“[n]otice of an adoption proceeding shall be served on each of the 

following persons: . . . the petitioner’s spouse, if any”); (4) § 16-1506 (“[a]t the time fixed for hearing . . . the spouse

of the petitioner if a natural parent of the child, must appear before the court . . . .”); and (5) § 16-1509A (“[a]n 

adoption may be dissolved . . . when the adopting parent was the spouse of a natural parent and the marriage of the 

natural parent and adoptive parent was terminated. . . .”) (emphasis added).
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provisions 4—none of these could be reasonably interpreted to mean that Jane Doe must be 

married to Jane Doe I in order to have standing to adopt Jane Doe I’s children.

Moreover, because I.C. § 16-1501 is unambiguous, the magistrate’s application of a rule 

of statutory construction—in pari materia—was in error. It was unnecessary for the magistrate to 

apply a rule of statutory construction in a case where the language in question is unambiguous.

In sum, the magistrate’s interpretation of Idaho law is simply not supported by the plain 

text of the statute. In light of the unambiguous language in I.C. § 16-1501 that allows for “any 

adult person residing in and having residence in Idaho” to adopt “any minor child,” and because 

chapter 15 contains no provisions that limit adoption to those who are married, Idaho’s adoption 

statutes plainly allow Jane Doe to adopt John Doe and John Doe I.

It bears mentioning that this is not a case dealing with same-sex marriage. Rather, it is 

strictly a case dealing with Idaho’s adoption laws. Those laws, including the issue of who may 

adopt, are set by the Idaho Legislature. The Legislature has imposed no restrictions that would 

disqualify Jane Doe from seeking to adopt Jane Doe I’s children, and the Court will not imply 

any such restrictions based upon Idaho’s marital statutes. We emphasize that Jane Doe’s sexual 

orientation was wholly irrelevant to our analysis. Likewise, it is immaterial in determining 

whether Jane Doe satisfies the statutory requirements for adoption outlined in chapter 15, a 

question which must be decided on remand.

IV.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN and W. JONES CONCUR.

HORTON, J., specially concurring.

Although I join in the Court’s decision, I write to highlight a provision that exists in 

Idaho’s adoption statutes that has the potential to negatively affect parents of prospective 

adoptees, particularly those who do not find favor with their judge, without regard to sexual 

 4 The provisions discussing marriage are: (1) § 16-1503 (“[a] married man . . . cannot adopt a child without the 

consent of his wife; nor can a married woman . . . .”); (2) § 16-1505 (“[n]otice of an adoption proceeding shall be 

served on . . . [a]ny person who is married to the child’s mother at the time she executes her consent to the 

adoption”); (3) § 16-1506 (“[i]n those instances where the prospective adoptive parent is married to the birth parent 

. . . such social investigation shall be completed . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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orientation or marital status. Idaho Code § 16-1504 identifies those parties who must consent to 

an adoption. 

16-1504. NECESSARY CONSENT TO ADOPTION. (1) Consent to adoption is 

required from:

. . .

(b) Both parents or the surviving parent of an adoptee who was conceived or born 

within a marriage, unless the adoptee is eighteen (18) years of age or older;

(c) The mother of an adoptee born outside of marriage. . . .

Idaho Code § 16-1506(2), in turn provides that “[a]ny person or persons whose consent is 

required shall execute such consent in writing, in a form consistent with the provisions of section 

16-2005(4). . . .” Significantly, Idaho Code § 16-2005(4) requires that parents consenting to an 

adoption simultaneously consent to the termination of their parental rights.5

Idaho Code § 16-1509 provides that the parental rights of the natural parents are 

terminated “[u]nless the decree of adoption otherwise provides. . . .” Thus, the judge hearing the 

adoption petition may, but is not required to, terminate the parental rights of the parent or parents 

consenting to the adoption. The Legislature has not identified the standards, if any, by which 

 5 Idaho Code § 16-2005(4) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(4) The court may grant an order terminating the relationship where a consent to 

termination in the manner and form prescribed by this chapter has been filed by the parent(s) of 

the child in conjunction with a petition for adoption initiated by the person or persons proposing to 

adopt the child, or where the consent to termination has been filed by a licensed adoption agency, 

no subsequent hearing on the merits of the petition shall be held. Consents required by this chapter 

must be witnessed by a district judge or magistrate of a district court, or equivalent judicial officer 

of the state, where a person consenting resides or is present, whether within or without the county, 

and shall be substantially in the following form:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE.... JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN 

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF....

In the Matter of the termination )

of the parental rights of )

................... )

................... )

I (we), the undersigned, being the.... of...., do hereby give my (our) full and free consent 

to the complete and absolute termination of my (our) parental right(s), to the said...., who was 

born....,...., unto...., hereby relinquishing completely and forever, all legal rights, privileges, duties 

and obligations, including all rights of inheritance to and from the said...., and I (we) do hereby 

expressly waive my (our) right(s) to hearing on the petition to terminate my (our) parental 

relationship with the said...., and respectfully request the petition be granted.

DATED:...., 20..

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(Emphasis added.)
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judges are to exercise their discretion in determining whether to terminate the parental rights of 

natural parents when proceeding with adoptions. 

The takeaway is simply this: parents wishing for a new spouse or domestic partner to 

adopt must offer to consent to the termination of their parental rights and hope that the judge 

doesn’t accept the offer.