United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

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No. 21-40592

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United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Reginald Stanly Strother, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:19-CR-84-1

______________________________

Before Wiener, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

*

While Reginald Stanly Strother was serving a life sentence for a drug 

offense, he attempted to file fraudulent retaliatory liens against the judge who 

sentenced him and enlisted his elderly mother for help. A jury convicted 

Strother of filing false retaliatory liens against a federal judge, mail fraud, and

related counts. He now appeals.

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 8, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Strother also has a pending motion for leave to file attachments to his 

reply brief. We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and DENY the 

motion.

I

In 2008, Strother was convicted of a drug-trafficking offense for which 

he is serving a life sentence. United States Federal District Judge Marcia 

Crone presided over his case. We affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. 

United States v. Strother, 387 F. App’x 508 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

In 2013, the Jefferson County Clerk’s Office received a suspicious 

document titled “Claim of Lien” via certified mail. It listed Marcia A. Crone 

as the debtor and Reginald Stanly Strother as the requestor. Clerk’s Deputy 

Theresa Goodness reviewed the document and noticed several red flags.

First, she knew Marcia Crone was a federal judge. And although the 

document claimed to be a “voluntary agreement,” it did not have Judge 

Crone’s notarized signature, which Goodness testified would be present if 

Judge Crone consented to the lien. Second, the document claimed that the 

lien arose out of Judge Crone’s “violation of oath of office and unlawful acts 

committed against the liberty interest of Reginald S. Strother” and that it was 

filed under the California Civil Code and “the fundamental commercial law 

that has existed nearly 2000 years.” Additionally, for the alleged violations, 

Strother sought a total of $50 million, an unusually large amount. Third, and 

finally, nothing suggested that a court issued the lien or that the lien arose 

from a judgment. 

The clerk’s office also received a second document from Strother, 

titled “Notice of Default.” The document said that Strother served Marcia 

Crone, debtor, with notice of her unconstitutional acts and that she had thirty 

days to remedy the $50 million default. Strother was listed as the sender. His 

return address was a P.O. Box in Pollock, Louisiana, where he was then 

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incarcerated. Strother’s handwritten notes, which instructed his mother on 

filing his lien, were also included with the documents he sent to the clerk’s 

office. After noticing the irregularities in Strother’s documents, the clerk’s 

office contacted the FBI.

Strother attempted to file the liens three times. Each time, the clerk’s 

office declined to file them. As a result, Strother filed three lawsuits against 

the clerk’s office employees. He filed one suit against Goodness and two 

against Carolyn Guidry, another employee.

On June 5, 2019, the Government indicted Strother for conspiring and 

attempting to file a false and retaliatory lien against Judge Crone’s residence,

conspiring to commit mail fraud, and mail fraud. 

Trial began on September 29, 2020. Strother did not present a 

defense. A jury convicted him on all counts. He timely appealed and is 

proceeding pro se, as he did at trial. Accordingly, we construe his arguments 

liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); 

McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

II

Strother makes five arguments on appeal: (1) that his Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) that the district court 

failed to correct the trial record; (3) that the district court improperly 

admitted witness testimony; (4) that the evidence of his fraudulent lawsuits 

was legally insufficient to convict him of mail fraud; and (5) that the 

indictment was constructively amended by the evidence at trial. None have 

merit. 

A

First, Strother’s Sixth Amendment claim. Strother contends the 

Government violated his right to a speedy trial because its delay resulted in 

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the faded memory of his only witness. Strotherraises this constitutional claim 

for the first time on appeal, so we review it for plain error.1 See United States 

v. Reagan, 725 F.3d 471, 487 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Puckett v. United States, 

556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 

To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a 

speedy trial, we evaluate four factors set out by Barker v. Wingo: “(1) the 

length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of 

his right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Goodrum v. 

Quarterman, 547 F.3d 249, 257 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 

U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).

“The first factor ‘is a triggering mechanism for determining whether 

the court is required to balance the remaining three Barker factors.’” United 

States v. Scully, 951 F.3d 656, 669 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting United States v. Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 230 (5th 

Cir. 2003)). To trigger a speedy trial analysis, Strother “‘must allege that the 

interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold’ that 

separates ordinary delay from ‘presumptively prejudicial delay.’” Amos v. 

Thornton, 646 F.3d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Doggett v. 

United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992)).

Because more than one year elapsed between Strother’s indictment 

and his trial, we analyze all three factors. See id. (“The bare minimum 

required to trigger a Barker analysis is one year.”). But the delay was only 

fifteen months, so this factor does not strongly favor Strother. Id. at 206–07

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1

In the district court, Strother moved to dismiss his indictment under the Speedy 

Trial Act. The district court denied this motion, but Strother does not challenge that denial 

on appeal. See United States v. Molina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 304 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A 

claim under the Speedy Trial Act differs in some significant ways from a claim under the 

Sixth Amendment speedy trial clause.” (alterations omitted) (citation omitted)).

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(“A delay must persist for at least eighteen months over and above that bare 

minimum for this factor to strongly favor the accused.”).

We next consider the reasons for the delay. We assign different 

weights to different reasons. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. “A deliberate 

attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense [is] weighted heavily 

against the government.” Id. Neutral reasons, such as court overcrowding, 

are “weighted less heavily.” Id. “Valid reasons . . . justify the delay and will 

not be weighed against the government.” United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 

210 (5th Cir. 2007); Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.

Here, the delay resulted from Strother’s competency evaluation,

COVID-19 court closures, and Strother’s numerous pretrial motions. The 

COVID-19 continuance is a neutral reason that weighs in Strother’s favor, 

but not heavily. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. The other two reasons do not 

weigh in his favor. As to the competency proceedings, Strother merely 

asserts that the competency evaluation was “absurd” and “foolish.” The 

record does not support this conclusory argument and does not show that the 

magistrate judge abused his discretion in ordering the competency 

evaluation. United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 1995)(“Whether 

‘reasonable cause’ exists to put the court on notice that the defendant might 

be mentally incompetent is left to the sound discretion of the district 

court.”). After determining that Strother was competent to stand trial, the 

magistrate judge noted that, as of July 16, 2020, Strother had filed over forty 

pro se pretrial motions that sought relief ranging from discovery to 

substantive challenges to the indictment. So this reason does not weigh in his 

favor. See United States v. Wyers, 546 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1977).

As to the third factor, because Strother asserted his right to a speedy 

trial in a motion for dismissal, this factor does not weigh in hisfavor. See Frye, 

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489 F.3d at 211–12 (“A motion for dismissal is not evidence that the 

defendant wants to be tried promptly.”); Barker, 407 U.S. at 534–35.

Finally, prejudice. Because the first three factors, on the whole, do not 

heavily favor Strother, he has the burden of showing actual prejudice. See 

Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d at 230–31 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658).

“‘Actual prejudice’ is assessed in light of the three following interests of the 

defendant: (1) ‘to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration’; (2) ‘to 

minimize anxiety and concern of the accused’; and (3) ‘to limit the possibility 

that the defense will be impaired.’” Amos, 646 F.3d at 208 (quoting United 

States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 433 (5th Cir. 2009)). Strother contends that

he met this burden because his only witness’s memory was impaired by the 

passage of time, thus impairing his defense. His argument is unavailing.

“[W]hile ‘faded memory may result in prejudice . . . . to constitute a 

speedy trial violation, the faded memory must substantially relate to a 

material issue.” United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1079 (5th Cir. 1983)

(alteration in original) (quoting Jamerson v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.

1982)). Here, it does not. Strother attempted to call FBI Special Agent Olivia 

Alley as his sole witness. The Government objected to her testimony, arguing 

that she had no knowledge of the lien. The court allowed herto testify outside 

the presence of the jury. Special Agent Alley’s brief testimony confirmed she 

knew nothing about the liens. Although she testified that she interviewed

Strother in 2015 to ask him to stop filing the liens, she was not investigating 

the liens and knew nothing about their contents. 

Strother’s prejudice argument rests on one question he was not 

allowed to ask Special Agent Alley: “Do you remember me asking you if you 

had any evidence that the lien was false at that time?” The district court 

upheld the Government’s objection to this question, ruling that Strother was 

trying to get his own statement into evidence without taking the stand 

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himself. Strother said he had no further questions and agreed that Special 

Agent Alley could be excused. Thus, even if Special Agent Alley knew the 

answer to Strother’s question, her testimony would not have been 

admissible. Strother has not shown actual prejudice.

We conclude that Strother has not shown that he was denied his Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial.

B

In a related challenge, Strother alleges that the district court erred by 

failing to correct the trial record under Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 10(e). 

Rule 10(e)(1) provides that “[i]f any difference arises about whether 

the record truly discloses what occurred in the district court, the difference 

must be submitted to and settled by that court and the record conformed 

accordingly.” Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(1). Strother moved to settle the 

record under Rule 10(e) in the district court, claiming that the transcript 

omitted Special Agent Alley’s response to his question about whether she 

remembered telling him that she did not have any information that his lien 

was false.

After Strother filed his reply brief in this court, the district court 

issued an order denying Strother’s motion to correct the record, stating that 

it had conducted an in camera review of the audio recording from trial and 

found no discrepanciesin the transcript. We take judicial notice of the district 

court’s ruling. United States v. Brandon, 965 F.3d 427, 430 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020)

(“[W]e may take judicial notice of . . . matters of public record.” (alteration 

in original) (citation omitted)). And we find no error in the district court’s 

denial of Strother’s motion. See United States v. Smith, 493 F.2d 906, 907 (5th 

Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (“Rule 10(e) exists to allow the district court to 

conform the record to what happened, not to what did not.”). Although 

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Rule 10(e)(2) allows us to independently correct the record, we find no basis 

to do so.

Strother has moved this court for leave to file exhibits to his reply 

brief, which include the digital audio recordings of the trial. In light of the 

district court’s order, the motion is DENIED. Strother’s motion is also 

DENIED in all other respects. He makes no argument for the only 

attachment that is not already part of the record. 

C

Next, Strother contends that the district court erred in denying his 

motion to exclude Special Agent Michael Collier’s testimony under Federal 

Rules of Evidence 602 and 701. We review the district court’s evidentiary 

rulings for abuse of discretion, subject to harmless-error analysis. United 

States v. Akins, 746 F.3d 590, 598 (5th Cir. 2014). 

Strother argues that, because Special Agent Collier lacked personal 

knowledge about Strother’s 2008 drug case, he could not testify to whether

the claims in Strother’s liens were false. Strother argues that only three 

people could testify about the liens: Robert Strause, the officer who Strother

alleges filed a complaint against him; Magistrate Judge Earl Hines; and Judge 

Crone. This argument is meritless. Under Rule 602, “[a] witness may testify 

to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that 

the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. 

The Government met this burden. Special Agent Collier testified that, in 

2014, he began investigating Strother’s filings, which he received from 

Goodness. His testimony was based on his personal knowledge of his 

investigation of Strother’s criminal conduct. 

Strother next argues that Special Agent Collier’s testimony that the 

documents were “fraudulent” was an impermissible legal conclusion. Under 

Rule 701, a non-expert witness may offer opinion testimony so long as it is 

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“(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly 

understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and 

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within 

the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. Lay witnesses are generally not 

allowed to give legal opinions. See United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 

514 (5th Cir. 2011).

Most of Special Agent Collier’s testimony was based on his own 

perceptions and involvement in the investigation of Strother’s liens. Cf.

Akins, 746 F.3d at 598. But even if we assumed that the district court erred 

in admitting portions of Special Agent Collier’s testimony, his reference to 

the documents as “fraudulent” was harmless because the Government 

presented overwhelming evidence of the documents’ falsity and Strother’s 

guilt. See United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1283 (5th Cir. 1995). 

Judge Crone testified that she never consented to any lien drawn up by 

Strother. Indeed, she had never consented to a lien on her property other 

than her mortgage. No evidence of Judge Crone’s consent to the lien was 

presented at trial. Goodness testified that Judge Crone never came in to 

notarize the documents or told the clerk that she consented. Goodness also 

testified to a number of red flags with Strother’s lien, which prompted her to 

forward it to the FBI. She said that Strother’s documents resembled those

that the FBI warned the clerk’s office to look out for.

D

Next, Strother contends that we must reverse his three convictions 

for mail fraud because each count was based on Strother’s lawsuits. We 

liberally construe his argument as challenging the legal sufficiency of his 

conviction. Strother moved for acquittal after the Government rested, so he 

has preserved this claim. We review this issue de novo. United States v. 

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Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2000) (“We review questions of law and 

application of statutes de novo.”).

Relying on United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1208 (11th Cir. 

2002), Strother argues that filing lawsuits “is an ordinary litigation practice” 

that cannot be criminalized. His conviction, he contends, “undermine[s] the 

policies of access and finality that animate our legal system.” Id. at 1208. In 

Pendergraft, the defendants were charged with mail fraud for attaching false 

affidavits to a motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. The indictment alleged 

that the affidavits and motion were filed in furtherance of a scheme to extort 

a settlement. Id. Although the court expressed a policy concern that 

“prosecuting litigation activities as federal crimes would undermine the 

policies of access and finality that animate our legal system,” it held that the 

false affidavits did not constitute mail fraud because there was no intent to 

deceive or scheme to defraud—the defendants knew the affidavits would not 

deceive the recipient. Id.; see United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 889–91 (11th 

Cir. 2005) (distinguishing Pendergraft and noting its policy concerns “were 

simply dicta”); see also United States v. Cuya, 724 F. App’x 720, 724 (11th 

Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Lee, 427 F.3d at 724).

In Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., we said that in the civilRICO context, absent evidence of corruption or criminal activity, we agreed 

with our sister circuit about the policy concerns underlying the prosecution 

of litigation activities. 833 F.3d 512, 525 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Pendergraft, 

297 F.3d at 1208). But here, there is ample evidence of corruption or criminal 

activity. The Government was required to prove “(1) a scheme to defraud; 

(2) the use of the mails to execute the scheme; and (3) the specific intent to 

defraud.” United States v. Traxler, 764 F.3d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 2014). It was 

undisputed that Strother used the mails. The evidence showed that Strother 

and his mother participated in a scheme to file fraudulent liens against Judge 

Crone in retaliation for his sentence. In furtherance of the scheme, Strother 

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sued the clerk’s office employeesto induce them to file the false liens, seeking 

hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages. The jury determined that these 

documents were mailed with the intent to defraud the clerk’s office into filing 

his fraudulent liens. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain his 

convictions. 

E

Finally, Strother argues that Count Three of the indictment was 

constructively amended at trial by the admission of “evidence of a general 

warranty deed” that was not alleged in the indictment. We review this issue 

de novo.2 United States v. Thompson, 647 F.3d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 2011).

“The Fifth Amendment ‘guarantees criminal defendants a right to be 

tried solely on allegations in an indictment returned by the grand jury.’”

United States v. Chaker, 820 F.3d 204, 210 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); 

Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215–18 (1960). Only the grand jury may 

broaden or modify an indictment. Thompson, 647 F.3d at 184. “Not all 

variations between allegation and proof, however, rise to the level of a 

constructive amendment . . . .” Id. An indictment is constructively amended 

when “the court ‘permits the defendant to be convicted upon a factual basis 

that effectively modifies an essential element of the offense charged’ or upon 

‘a materially different theory or set of facts than that which [the defendant] 

_____________________

2 The Government asserts that Strother did not raise this issue in the district court, 

so plain-error review applies. Strother contends that he raised his argument in a motion to 

suppress evidence relating to the general warranty deed. In his motion, Strother argued that 

the evidence of the general warranty deed was irrelevant to the foreclosure sale and should 

be suppressed “to avoid a possible conviction for an offense not charged in the 

indictment.” The district court denied the motion. We need not resolve this issue because 

his claim fails even under de novo review.

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was charged.’” Chaker, 820 F.3d at 210 (alteration in original) (quoting

United States v. McMillan, 600 F.3d 434, 451 (5th Cir. 2010)).

Count Three of the indictment charged Strother with filing false 

retaliatory liens. It alleged that he attempted to file a “Notice of Foreclosure 

Sale,” which listed Judge Crone as the debtor and stated that her property in 

Beaumont, Texas, would be “sold at auction to the highest bidder on the 

steps of the Los Angeles County Courthouse in California.” At trial, the jury 

heard a recording of a phone call in which Strother instructed his mother to 

file a warranty deed in his name after the foreclosure sale. He contends that 

the mention of the warranty deed was a constructive amendment because the 

deed was not mentioned in the indictment. 

Mention of the general warranty deed neither modified an essential 

element of mail fraud nor allowed the jury to convict Strother on a materially 

different theory or set of facts. See Chaker, 820 F.3d at 210. The evidence

showed that Strother mailed the notice of foreclosure sale to the clerk’s office 

and that Strother instructed his co-conspirator to file the warranty deed in 

his name after the foreclosure sale. Thus, the warranty deed was merely the 

final completion of the foreclosure process, not an amendment to the 

indictment for which the jury convicted Strother on an alternate basis. Cf.

Thompson, 647 F.3d at 184.

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

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