UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-2437

KIMBERLY SIPES, as Administrator of the Estate of M.B.S.,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHNNY D. COOPER, individually and officially,

Defendant – Appellant,

and

MICHAEL FERRARO, individually and officially; CITY OF MORGANTON,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, 

District Judge. (1:12-cv-00269-MR-DLH)

Submitted: July 31, 2014 Decided: August 21, 2014

Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James P. Cooney, III, Scott D. MacLatchie, WOMBLE CARLYLE 

SANDRIDGE & RICE, LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Charles McB. Sasser, THE SASSER LAW FIRM, P.A., Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. 
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

On the night of August 29, 2010, seventeen-year-old 

Michael Blake Sipes was shot and killed on the front porch of 

his trailer by Morganton, North Carolina Public Safety 

Department Officer Johnny D. Cooper, who was responding to a 

noise complaint. Michael’s mother, Kimberly Sipes, as the 

administrator of Michael’s estate, filed a wrongful death action 

against Cooper, Michael Ferraro, and the City of Morganton (“the 

City”), asserting three state law claims and a claim pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Defendants moved for summary judgment 

on the grounds of qualified immunity and public official 

immunity. The district court granted summary judgment in favor 

of Ferraro, but denied it with respect to Cooper and the City of

Morganton. Cooper appealed.*

This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final 

decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory 

and collateral orders. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 

(1949). A final decision is one that “ends the litigation on 

the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute 

the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 

(1945). Although interlocutory orders generally are not 

 * The City did not join in the appeal.
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appealable, an order denying a defendant’s claim of qualified 

immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order 

doctrine “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); Iko v. Shreve, 

535 F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 2008). However, a district court’s 

determination that a genuine issue of material fact exists that 

precludes summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not 

immediately appealable. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-20 

(1995); Culosi v. Bullock, 596 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Thus, this court has “no jurisdiction over a claim that a 

plaintiff has not presented enough evidence to prove that the 

plaintiff’s version of the events actually occurred, but [the 

court has] jurisdiction over a claim that there was no violation 

of clearly established law accepting the facts as the district 

court viewed them.” Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 530 (4th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

Because the qualified immunity determination in this 

matter ultimately turns on presently unresolved questions of 

fact rather than on an evaluation of the legal significance of 

undisputed facts, we do not possess jurisdiction over this 

appeal. Therefore, we dismiss. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 
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in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process. 

DISMISSED