NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISION ONE

FLORIN COMAN, Petitioner,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

WILSON ELECTRIC, Respondent Employer,

ARCH INSURANCE CO C/O GALLAGHER BASSET, Respondent Carrier.

No. 1 CA-IC 13-0073

Special Action - Industrial Commission

ICA Claim No. 20121-280096

Carrier Claim No. 002656-001637-WC-01

Deborah A. Nye, Administrative Law Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Florin Coman, Phoenix

Petitioner in Propria Persona

Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, PLLC, Phoenix

By Terrance Kurth

Counsel for Respondent Employer/Carrier
COMAN v. WILSON/ARCH

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.

K E S S L E R, Judge:

¶1 This is a special action review of an Industrial Commission 

of Arizona (the “Commission”) award and decision upon review denying 

benefits without permanent disability to petitioner Florin Coman. Coman 

raises three issues on appeal:

(1) whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in 

adopting the opinion of John Beghin, M.D.;

(2) whether the ALJ misinterpreted the testimony of Abram 

Burgher, M.D.; and

(3) whether reasonable evidence in the record supports the 

ALJ‟s finding that Coman‟s condition is medically 

stationary.

Because we find the ALJ‟s award is legally sufficient and is reasonably 

supported by the evidence, we affirm.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶2 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(2) (2003), 23-951(A) (2012), and 

Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 10.1 In reviewing findings 

and awards of the Commission, we defer to the ALJ‟s factual findings, but 

review questions of law de novo. Young v. Indus. Comm’n, 204 Ariz. 267, 

270, ¶ 14, 63 P.3d 298, 301 (App. 2003). We consider the evidence in the 

light most favorable to upholding the ALJ‟s award. Lovitch v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 202 Ariz. 102, 105, ¶ 16, 41 P.3d 640, 643 (App. 2002).

 

1 We cite the current version of the applicable statutes when no 

revisions material to this decision have since occurred.
COMAN v. WILSON/ARCH

Decision of the Court

3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 In March 2012, Coman, an electrician, sustained a thoracic 

spinal injury while digging a trench for Respondent Employer, Wilson 

Electric. His symptoms include back pain, burning in his spine, pain and 

weakness in his legs, pain around his chest, pain in his arms, and 

headaches. Five weeks after his injury, Coman returned to work in a light 

duty job until he separated from employment in October 2012.

¶4 After litigating the claim, the ALJ found Coman‟s injury to 

be compensable. The award was later affirmed, but supplemented to 

explain that the nature and extent of the injury was reserved for future 

determination. 

¶5 Respondents issued a Notice of Claim Status terminating 

Coman‟s benefits without permanent disability effective July 2012 based 

on the medical report and opinion of Dr. Beghin, a board-certified 

orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Beghin opined there was no objective evidence of 

pathology corresponding with Coman‟s symptoms to warrant further 

treatment, and he was stationary without permanent impairment. Coman 

protested the termination of benefits and requested a hearing. 

¶6 At the hearing, a second ALJ heard testimony from Coman, 

Thomas Blankenbaker, D.C., an Arizona-licensed chiropractor who 

treated Coman with physical rehabilitation, and Dr. Burgher, a boardcertified anesthesiologist and pain specialist who performed surgery on 

Coman‟s spine in April 2013. In addition to the testimony, the ALJ 

considered medical reports, including those generated by Dr. Beghin.

¶7 Based on the hearing evidence, there was a conflict in expert 

medical opinions between Dr. Blankenbaker, whose testimony implied

that Coman‟s continued treatment, including his thoracic surgery, was 

related to his industrial injury, Dr. Burgher, who testified that he could 

not determine whether the surgery was necessitated by the industrial 

injury or degenerative disc disease, and Dr. Beghin, who opined that 

Coman suffered a stress disorder with physical manifestations and 

remains stationary without permanent impairment. 

¶8 The ALJ adopted the opinion of Dr. Beghin and concluded 

that Coman failed to meet his burden of proof. As a result, she found that 

Coman was entitled to benefits from March 2012 through July 2012, when 

his industrial condition became medically stationary without permanent 

impairment. Coman filed a request for review, but the ALJ affirmed the 

termination of benefits, finding the decision was fully supported by the 
COMAN v. WILSON/ARCH

Decision of the Court

4

evidence. Coman next filed a timely petition seeking special action review 

with this Court. 

DISCUSSION

I. The ALJ did not err in adopting the opinion of Dr. Beghin.

¶9 Coman argues that the ALJ erred in adopting the opinion of 

Dr. Beghin. We disagree.

¶10 “In determining the facts, it is the ALJ, not this [C]ourt, who 

has the responsibility of resolving conflicts in expert opinions, and we will 

affirm an ALJ‟s resolution of conflicting opinions absent an abuse of 

discretion.” Kaibab Indus. v. Indus. Comm’n, 196 Ariz. 601, 605, ¶ 10, 2 P.3d 

691, 695 (App. 2000); see also Carousel Snack Bar v. Indus. Comm’n, 156 Ariz. 

43, 46, 749 P.2d 1364, 1367 (1988) (“An award of the Commission will be 

affirmed if it can be supported by any reasonable theory of evidence.”). In 

reviewing the ruling, this Court does not “weigh the evidence but 

considers it in the light most favorable to sustaining the award.” Perry v. 

Indus. Comm’n, 112 Ariz. 397, 398, 542 P.2d 1096, 1097 (1975).

¶11 Here, the ALJ was presented with conflicting expert medical 

opinions and resolved the conflict by adopting the opinion of Dr. Beghin:

The medical evidence between [Coman‟s] own experts[]

conflicts if I infer that Dr. Blankenbaker believes that the 

continued treatment rendered for [Coman] after July 13, 

2012, is related to [Coman‟s] industrial accident. Dr. 

Burgher clearly stated he could not relate the need for 

surgery to the industrial accident. There are additional 

conflicts between Dr. Beghin, who thinks there was no 

pathology to be treated, regardless of causation, and that of 

Dr. Burgher, who at least felt [Coman] should be treated 

even as he could not render an opinion that the treatment 

was due to the industrial accident of March 14, 2012. To 

resolve the conflicts that are present, I adopt the opinion of 

Dr. Beghin as more probably correct. 

¶12 In view of the Commission‟s discretion and the presumption 

favoring its awards, we cannot say that the ALJ‟s resolution of this conflict 

was wholly unreasonable. Dr. Beghin‟s opinions were based on two 

physical examinations of Coman and a review of his medical records. See 

Walters v. Indus. Comm’n, 134 Ariz. 597, 598-99, 658 P.2d 250, 251-52 (App. 

1982) (recognizing that an ALJ is not required to give greater weight to the 
COMAN v. WILSON/ARCH

Decision of the Court

5

testimony of a treating physician over a doctor who has examined the 

claimant only once). Although Coman maintains that his pain is directly 

related to his industrial injury, the ALJ was at liberty to, and did not err in,

adopting Dr. Beghin‟s opinion. See Kaibab Indus., 196 Ariz. at 609, ¶ 25, 2 

P.3d at 699 (“Only if the award is unsupported by any reasonable theory 

of evidence will we reverse.”). 

II. The ALJ did not misinterpret the testimony of Dr. Burgher. 

¶13 Coman argues that the ALJ misinterpreted the testimony of 

Dr. Burgher, whose opinion was sufficient to support an award for 

continuing benefits and/or permanent disability. We disagree.

¶14 At the hearing, Dr. Burgher testified that surgery was 

necessary to provide Coman pain relief and improve his long-term quality 

of life. He also testified, however, that he could not determine whether 

the treatment for his pain was necessitated by the industrial injury or 

degenerative disc disease:

You know, it‟s difficult in a sense that, you know, the 

MRIs are just so difficult to interpret every time I‟m asked 

this question. I‟m sorry for that, but, you know, the findings 

that are seen on his MRI are consistent with normal patterns 

of degeneration that we see in everybody‟s spine as they get 

older. It‟s very difficult to relate a specific degenerative 

pattern like this to an incident or to just a normal process of 

wear and tear.

And oftentimes what we see is that the normal 

process of wear and tear is ongoing and then some sort of 

accident/incident happens that seems to aggravate pain 

associated with normal wear and tear.

So, the nuts and bolts—I can‟t differentiate from the 

MRI whether this is just normal pattern of wear and tear or 

whether there‟s been some injury that‟s caused—whether 

there‟s been some specific injury that‟s caused this pattern in 

here.

¶15 Coman claims that the ALJ incorrectly interpreted Dr. 

Burgher‟s testimony as proof that the cause of the injury was a preexisting 

degenerative condition. This interpretation is not apparent in the record. 

Instead, the ALJ summarized Dr. Burgher‟s testimony, stating that “he 

was unable to causally relate the disc protrusions or the need for surgery 
COMAN v. WILSON/ARCH

Decision of the Court

6

to the industrial accident,” and noting that Coman‟s condition “fit a 

normal pattern of degenerative disc disease.” Ultimately, in comparing 

the conflicting expert testimony, the ALJ explained that Dr. Burgher 

clearly stated he could not render an opinion that any continued treatment 

was due to the industrial accident. The ALJ did not, as Coman claims, 

state that Dr. Burgher affirmatively linked the injury to normal bodily 

wear and tear. Based on our review of the record, we find no error.2 

III. This Court does not reweigh evidence.

¶16 Coman argues that the evidence shows the best explanation 

for his mid-thoracic pain is his industrial injury. He asks this Court to 

reconsider the evidence as a whole and reverse the award and findings in 

opposition to Dr. Beghin‟s opinion. As explained above, “it is the ALJ, not 

this [C]ourt, who has the responsibility of resolving conflicts in expert 

opinions.” Kaibab Indus., 196 Ariz. at 605, ¶ 10, 2 P.3d at 695. We therefore 

decline to reweigh the evidence. See Pacific Fruit Exp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 

153 Ariz. 210, 214, 735 P.2d 820, 824 (1987) (“We do not weigh the 

evidence, but consider it in the light most favorable for sustaining the 

award.”). 

CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Commission‟s 

award.

 

2 Dr. Burgher‟s opinion would not have been sufficient to support an 

award for continuing benefits because it was equivocal. “Testimony is 

„equivocal‟ if it is subject to two or more interpretations or if the expert 

avoided committing to a particular opinion.” Rosarita Mexican Foods v. 

Indus. Comm’n, 199 Ariz. 532, 536, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d 1248, 1252 (App. 2001). 

“„Equivocal‟ medical testimony cannot support a finding that a claimant‟s 

condition is non-stationary.” Id. Additionally, although the ALJ inferred 

from Dr. Blankenbaker‟s testimony that Coman‟s continued treatment was 

related to the industrial accident, Dr. Blankenbaker never actually testified 

as to causation or etiology.