J-S09025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RONALD CALLOWAY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 655 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 5, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-26-CR-0001065-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: June 28, 2023

Ronald Calloway appeals from the judgment of sentence of forty to 120 

months of incarceration, followed by twelve months of mandatory state reentry supervision, imposed after a jury found him guilty of failure to verify his

address pursuant to his sexual offender registration requirements. We affirm.

By way of background, Appellant pled guilty in 2007 to one count of 

indecent assault as a misdemeanor of the first degree for an act occurring in 

2006. He was sentenced to a period of incarceration of six to twelve months 

and ordered to comply with the conditions of parole. One of those conditions 

was compliance with Megan’s Law registration. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 

1 (Appellant’s Parole Minimum Summary, 9/7/11, at 1). Although it is unclear 

from the record, it appears that Appellant remained incarcerated following the 

expiration of the twelve-month maximum he received for the indecent assault 
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conviction.1 Regardless, his Megan’s Law paperwork listed his registration 

start date as October 17, 2012, and his registration end date as October 17, 

2022. See e.g., Exhibit 2 (Appellant’s Sexual Offender Registration, 

11/12/20).

Before discussing the conduct underlying Appellant’s failure to verify his 

address, we take a brief detour into the pertinent amendments to sexual 

offender registration in Pennsylvania. At the time Appellant was sentenced in 

2007, he was subject to a ten-year registration term pursuant to Megan’s Law 

III. Megan’s Law III remained the relevant statute on the books at the time 

he began his registration in October 2012. 

Later that year, however, our legislature replaced Megan’s Law III with 

Megan’s Law IV, more commonly known as the Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (“SORNA”). See Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 173 A.3d 

____________________________________________

1

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court indicates that “Appellant’s 

registration period was tolled because the Appellant was incarcerated. The 

fact that that the Appellant was incarcerated was inadmissible because it was 

more prejudicial than probative.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/22, at 2. Notably, 

the record is devoid of any argument or decision related to the admissibility

of any periods of incarceration. However, we note with displeasure that the 

transcript references several sidebar conferences, including the resolution of 

objections, that were held off the record. It is possible that discussions 

relevant to the issues discussed infra were held during those sidebar 

conferences, but by virtue of Appellant’s failure to ensure their inclusion in the 

certified record, this Court cannot consider anything that may have been 

discussed therein in rendering our decision. See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 

57 A.3d 74, 82 (Pa.Super. 2012) (noting that “it is an appellant’s duty to 

ensure that the certified record is complete for purposes of review” and 

whenever “portions of a proceeding are unrecorded, appellant’s burden to 

supply a record may be satisfied through the statement in absence of 

transcript procedures” (cleaned up)).
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723, 725 (Pa. 2017). After that, our Supreme Court held that Megan’s Law 

III was unconstitutional in its entirety because its enactment had violated the 

Pennsylvania Constitution’s single-subject rule. See Commonwealth v. 

Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013). Our High Court stayed its decision “to 

provide a reasonable amount of time for the General Assembly to consider 

appropriate remedial measures, or to allow for a smooth transition period” for 

those registrants, like Appellant, whose offenses had been committed when 

Megan’s Law III was in effect. Id. at 616. In response, the legislature 

modified SORNA “to clarify that persons who were required to register with 

the state police at any time before SORNA’s effective date, and whose 

registration period had not expired, were still obligated to register with the 

state police as provided in Section 9799.15[.]” Derhammer, supra at 726.

Meanwhile, in 2017, our Supreme Court held the retroactive application 

of SORNA upon defendants, like Appellant, whose crimes had been committed 

before the passage of SORNA was unconstitutional pursuant to the ex post 

facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Commonwealth v. 

Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1193 (Pa. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. Hart, 

174 A.3d 660, 667 n.9 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“[T]he binding precedent emerging 

from Muniz is confined to the determination that SORNA’s registration 

requirement is punishment that runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution when applied retroactively.”). In February 2018, 

our legislature overhauled SORNA in response to Muniz. Of relevance here, 
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individuals whose offenses were committed “on or after April 22, 1996, but 

before December 20, 2012” fell under the provisions of Subchapter I. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.52(1). Thus, as of 2018, Appellant has been required to 

register pursuant to Subchapter I.2

Pertinent to this appeal, Subchapter I required Appellant to, inter alia,

inform the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) within three business days of a 

change in residence and to report annually to verify his residence. See 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.56(a)(2)(i) (notification regarding change of residence), 

9799.60 (b) (annual verification of residence). In compliance therewith, 

Appellant registered a new address at Edgemont Drive in Uniontown, 

Pennsylvania in November 2020. The home was owned by Appellant’s thengirlfriend, Klarissa Hollins, and Appellant lived there with her until April 5, 

2021, when he moved out as a result of a Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) order 

Ms. Hollins obtained against him. Despite having changed his residence, 

Appellant did not update his address with PSP within the requisite three days. 

Additionally, when he reported to PSP on April 26, 2021, for the annual 

verification of his residence, he continued to list the Edgemont Drive address. 

____________________________________________

2 We note that SORNA initially enlarged Appellant’s registration period to 

fifteen years. However, Subchapter I reverted Appellant’s registration period 

to the original ten-year period. 
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Due to this failure to update his address, Appellant was charged as indicated 

hereinabove.3 

On May 2, 2022, Appellant proceeded to a two-day jury trial. Of 

relevance to the instant appeal, the Commonwealth presented testimony from

PSP Trooper Jessica Zangla, as well as the above-cited Exhibits 1 and 2, to 

establish that Appellant’s ten-year period of registration ran from October 17, 

2012, to October 17, 2022. Appellant argued, among other things, that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove why the registration start date was tolled until 

October 2012, and therefore failed to establish that Appellant was subject to 

registration in 2021. See N.T. Trial, 5/2/22, at 76. At the conclusion of the 

trial, the jury found Appellant guilty.

On May 5, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant as indicated 

hereinabove. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court 

have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises the following issues for 

our review:

1. Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient 

evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] 

was subject to Megan’s Law registration at the time of the 

alleged offense, and thus failed to prove that [Appellant] 

violated 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(2).

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3 Although the Commonwealth initially charged Appellant for failure to comply 

with Subchapter H’s registration requirements, the trial court permitted the 

Commonwealth to amend the information to a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 4915.2, which relates to failure to comply with Subchapter I’s registration 

requirements. See N.T. Trial, 5/2/22, at 14 (noting the court’s approval of 

the amendment).
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2. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth 

to offer the Megan’s Law file as a business record under Pa.R.E. 

803(6) or 902 where the documents were not properly 

authenticated?

3. Whether [Appellant] was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 

confront witnesses against him where the Commonwealth was 

permitted to rely upon the unauthenticated Megan’s Law firm 

[sic] and Trooper Zangla’s hearsay testimony regarding 

Appellant’s registration start and end dates?

Appellant’s brief at 5 (reordered for ease of disposition).

We first address Appellant’s sufficiency challenge “[b]ecause a 

successful sufficiency of the evidence claim warrants discharge on the 

pertinent crime[.]” Commonwealth v. Toritto, 67 A.3d 29, 33 (Pa.Super. 

2013) (cleaned up). We consider this claim mindful of our well-settled 

standard of review:

When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we face a 

question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo.

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, and we draw all reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the Commonwealth’s favor. Through this 

lens, we must ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved all of 

the elements of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, we may not weigh the 

evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. Any 

doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the 

factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, 

as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances. Critically, the jury, when ruling on the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
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Commonwealth v. Roberts, ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 2358844, at *1 

(Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up). Appellant was charged with failure to verify 

his address, which is defined in relevant part as follows:

(a) Offense defined.--An individual who is subject to 

registration under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55(a), (a.1) or (b) (relating 

to registration) or who was subject to registration under former 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9793 (relating to registration of certain offenders for 

ten years) commits an offense if the individual knowingly fails to:

. . . . 

(2) verify the individual’s residence or be photographed as 

required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.60 (relating to verification 

of residence)[.]

. . . . 

(f) Applicability.--This section applies to:

(1) An individual who committed an offense set forth in 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.55 on or after April 22, 1996, but before 

December 20, 2012, and whose period of registration under 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55 has not expired.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2.

Appellant does not challenge the elements of the offense, but rather 

whether the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

Appellant’s ten-year registration for his 2007 conviction had not expired as of 

April 2021, where the Commonwealth did not present evidence of why his 

start date did not begin until 2012. See Appellant’s brief at 20-21. In other 

words, Appellant contests the statute’s applicability. According to Appellant, 

“the jury could not reasonably infer that certain periods of time were tolled as 

there was no evidence presented as to any tolling.” Id. at 21. 
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At trial, Trooper Zangla testified that, based upon Appellant’s Megan’s 

Law file, he is classified as a ten-year registrant whose active registration 

began on October 17, 2012. See N.T. Trial, 5/2/22, at 40-41, 47. 

Additionally, the Commonwealth introduced Appellant’s sexual offender 

registration from November 2020, which he signed, and which states that his 

ten-year registration period ran from October 17, 2012 to October 17, 2022. 

See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2 (Appellant’s Sexual Offender Registration, 

11/12/20). Based on the foregoing, the evidence was sufficient for the jury 

to determine that Appellant was subject to sexual offender registration when 

he neglected to update his address in April 2021. See Roberts, supra at *3 

(finding evidence sufficient to establish that defendant was a lifetime 

registrant where the trooper “flatly told the jury that Roberts was a lifetime 

registrant, and the jury believed him”). It was squarely within the jury’s 

purview to find Trooper Zangla and Appellant’s November 2020 registration 

form credible in determining Appellant’s registration period. The 

Commonwealth bore the burden of establishing that Appellant was subject to 

registration at the time he failed to update his address, it was not required to 

explain why. Accordingly, Appellant’s first claim lacks merit. 

Appellant’s next issue attacks the trial court’s decision to permit Trooper 

Zangla’s testimony about Appellant’s registration start and end dates based 

upon hearsay evidence from an unauthenticated Megan’s Law file. See

Appellant’s brief at 17-18. Specifically, Appellant challenges the admission of 
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Exhibit 1 (Appellant’s Parole Minimum Summary, 9/7/11) and Exhibit 2

(Appellant’s Sexual Offender Registration, 11/12/20). 

We consider this claim mindful of the following legal principles. 

Evidentiary rulings lie within the sound discretion of the trial court and will 

only be overturned where the court has abused its discretion. See 

Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 265 A.3d 290, 297-98 (Pa. 2021). “An 

appellant cannot meet this burden by simply persuading an appellate court 

that it may have reached a different conclusion than that reached by the trial 

court; rather, to overcome this heavy burden, the appellant must demonstrate 

that the trial court actually abused its discretionary power.” Id. at 298

(cleaned up). This Court has explained that an abuse of discretion is “not 

merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of 

the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of 

record.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 749 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(cleaned up). Finally, an abuse of discretion based upon a disagreement with 

the trial court’s decision is improper, as this Court is not permitted to 

“substitute [our] own judgment for that of the trial court.” DiStefano, supra

at 298 (cleaned up). 

With respect to the admissibility of hearsay evidence, “Pennsylvania 

Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as an out-of-court statement made by 

a declarant, which is offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
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asserted. This type of evidence is generally inadmissible at trial unless it falls 

into an exception to the hearsay rule.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 289 

A.3d 894, 895 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up). The relevant exception in this appeal 

is the business records exception, which provides as follows:

A record (which includes a memorandum, report, or data 

compilation in any form) of an act, event or condition if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by--or from 

information transmitted by--someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly 

conducted activity of a “business”, which term includes 

business, institution, association, profession, occupation, 

and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for 

profit;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the 

custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification 

that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute 

permitting certification; and

(E) the opponent does not show that the source of 

information or other circumstances indicate a lack of 

trustworthiness.

Pa.R.E. 803(6).

In considering this issue, we find persuasive this Court’s recent decision 

in Commonwealth v. Fornah, 285 A.3d 900 (Pa.Super. 2022) (nonprecedential decision). Therein, the defendant was charged with failing to 

comply with Subchapter I’s registration requirements. Fornah was a lifetime 

registrant under Subchapter I based upon a 1989 conviction for rape in 

Washington state. In responding to a disturbance at Fornah’s residence, an 
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officer learned that Fornah had an outstanding warrant in Washington for a 

Megan’s Law violation. The officer conveyed this information to the police 

department’s Megan’s Law liaison, Detective Heather Halstead. Detective 

Halstead, in turn, confirmed Fornah’s triggering conviction, corresponding

registration requirements, and outstanding warrant with officials in 

Washington State, who supplied her with certified copies of the relevant court 

records. When Detective Halstead informed Fornah that he was required to 

register in Pennsylvania pursuant to SORNA, he disagreed, claiming he was 

innocent of the underlying offense. Upon learning from the PSP that Fornah 

had failed to register as a sexual offender, she obtained a warrant for his

arrest. 

At Fornah’s trial, PSP Trooper Chad Roberts testified that he was the 

liaison for the Megan’s Law unit in Harrisburg and detailed, among other 

things, the PSP SORNA checklist used with regard to Fornah’s registration 

status. Fornah’s counsel objected to the testimony regarding the PSP checklist 

as violative of Fornah’s right to confrontation and because it constituted 

inadmissible hearsay. With respect to the hearsay challenge, the trial court 

determined, over Fornah’s objection, that Trooper Roberts qualified as a 

custodian for the PSP checklist:

In his testimony, Trooper Roberts stated that as part of his 

professional duties he worked with the PSP Megan’s Law unit in 

Harrisburg, responsible for determining if an individual needs to 

register based on their past convictions. PSP maintains the statewide registry of all persons convicted of sex offenses, including 

out-of-state offenders who were required to register in 
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Pennsylvania. Trooper Roberts had access to all of the records 

kept by the Megan’s Law Unit in Harrisburg, and those records 

were maintained under the care and custody of PSP in their 

regular course of business. Trooper Roberts stated that “we would 

obtain the actual records from the Megan’s Law Unit and be a 

keeper of those records to present in court testimony like we are 

here today.”

Id. (non-precedential decision at 13) (cleaned up). Pursuant to Rule 803(6), 

this Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

that Trooper Roberts qualified as a custodian for the PSP checklist.

Here, Trooper Zangla testified that she was a Megan’s Law liaison for 

the PSP. See N.T., 5/2/22, at 34. She explained to the jury the basic purpose 

of Megan’s Law, that the PSP is tasked with maintaining Pennsylvania’s sexual

offender registry, and that the PSP works with other jurisdictions and state 

agencies to monitor registration. Id. at 35. Additionally, Trooper Zangla 

testified generally as to how offenders are notified of the need to register 

initially and annually, where they go to register, and the time frame for 

updating a change in address arising outside the annual reporting 

requirement. Id. at 36-39. With respect to Appellant, Trooper Zangla brought 

Appellant’s Megan’s Law file, which included “all of his registration and court 

documentation, everything for Megan’s Law.” Id. at 40. Exhibits 1 and 2 

were contained within that file and specifically pulled out as exhibits. Based 

in part upon those exhibits, Trooper Zangla testified as to Appellant’s ten-year 

period of registration and the attendant reporting requirements. 
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Considering the foregoing, the trial court determined that Trooper 

Zangla, as a Megan’s Law liaison, was a custodian of the Megan’s Law file. 

Further, it concluded that the file, which included Exhibits 1 and 2, was kept 

in the regular course of the PSP’s activities. See N.T. Trial, 5/2/22, at 58-59; 

N.T. Trial, 5/3/22, at 9-10. Upon review of the certified record, we discern no 

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusions.

Appellant makes one final attempt at assailing the Commonwealth’s 

evidence regarding the start date for his sexual offender registration. 

Specifically, he argues that “Trooper Zangla’s hearsay testimony and the 

documents contained in the Megan’s Law file were clearly testimonial in 

nature, and thus [Appellant] was denied his right to cross-examine witnesses 

who claimed his registration start date began on October 17, 2012, when he 

was convicted of the underlying charge [in] 2007.” Appellant’s brief at 14. 

We consider this final argument within the following framework. 

“Whether a defendant has been denied his right to confront a witness is a 

question of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of 

review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 284 A.3d 465, 470 

(Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). Our Supreme Court has explained the 

Confrontation Clause as follows:

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made 

applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, provides 

that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 

to be confronted with the witnesses against him. [The U.S. 

Supreme] Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a 

defendant’s right to confront those who bear testimony against 
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him, and defined testimony as a solemn declaration or affirmation 

made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. The 

Confrontation Clause, the High Court explained, prohibits out-ofcourt testimonial statements by a witness unless the witness is 

unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.

Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 530–31 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).

To determine whether a statement is testimonial, “and, therefore, 

subject to the protections of the Confrontation Clause . . ., a court must review 

the statement itself in order to determine whether the primary purpose of the 

evidence was to establish or prove past events relevant to a later criminal 

prosecution.” Id. (cleaned up). Notably, “even if a record falls within the 

business record exception, its admission may still violate the Confrontation 

Clause of the Sixth Amendment of United States Constitution.” 

Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Pa. 2007) (cleaned up). 

Once again, we find instructive this Court’s decision in Fornah. The 

Fornah Court held that the “PSP’s worksheet was not testimonial and 

therefore its admission through Trooper Roberts’[s] testimony did not violate 

the Confrontation Clause.” Fornah, supra (non-precedential decision at 15). 

In so holding, this Court observed that “the PSP worksheet was not created 

for an evidentiary purpose and the PSP did not create the worksheet ‘under 

circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 

that the [document] would be available for use at a later trial.’” Id. (nonprecedential decision at 15) (quoting Yohe, supra at 537 (citation omitted)). 

Rather, we concluded that “the report’s primary purpose was to determine 
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whether Fornah had to register under SORNA, and the PSP had a statutory 

duty to maintain a sex offender database. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.67.” 

Fornah, supra (non-precedential decision at 15-16) (cleaned up).

Here, Appellant challenges the admission of Trooper Zangla’s testimony 

and Exhibits 1 and 2. We begin with Trooper Zangla’s testimony. Plainly, 

Appellant’s right to confront Trooper Zangla was not violated as there were no 

out-of-court statements made by Trooper Zangla admitted at trial. Even if

there had been, she was clearly available and subject to cross-examination 

and two rounds of re-cross-examination. As to Appellant’s argument that 

Trooper Zangla’s testimony regarding his registration start and end dates 

based upon documents contained in the Megan’s Law file violated his right to 

confrontation, our review of the record confirms that Appellant not only had 

ample opportunity to attack her reliance on those documents and the 

credibility of any testimony based thereon, but in fact did so. See N.T. Trial, 

5/2/22, at 49-50 (“Your testimony that you been giving today is that you have 

a bunch of documents that you went through and you are telling us what these 

documents say; is that correct?”), 69-70 (highlighting that Trooper Zangla 

was relying on parole documents while not being connected to the parole 

board in any way). Accordingly, it is wholly apparent that Appellant was not 

denied his right to confrontation with respect to Trooper Zangla’s testimony.

We now turn to the documentary evidence. Upon review of the certified 

record, we conclude that Exhibits 1 and 2 are similar to the PSP worksheet
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discussed in Fornah. To wit, Appellant’s Megan’s Law file was required to be 

maintained pursuant to § 9799.67, which outlines the duties of the PSP 

regarding the creation and maintenance of a statewide sexual offender 

registry. The file was created to determine whether Appellant had to register, 

not for an evidentiary purpose or in a manner that would lead an objective 

individual to reasonably believe that the file would be used at a later trial. The 

same holds true for the individually admitted documents contained therein, 

i.e., Appellant’s parole summary and Appellant’s November 2020 sexual 

offender registration. Since the contested documents are not testimonial, the 

Confrontation Clause is not implicated and Appellant’s argument fails.

To summarize, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to sustain 

Appellant’s conviction, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting Exhibits 1 and 2 pursuant to the business record exception, and the 

admission of evidence regarding Appellant’s registration period did not violate 

his right to confrontation. Thus, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/28/2023