United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted October 18, 2019*

Decided October 18, 2019 

Before 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 18-2188 

VALENTINA L. O’CONNOR, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 14-cv-10263 

Sharon Johnson Coleman, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Valentina O’Connor sued her former employer, the Board of Education of the 

City of Chicago, alleging interference with her rights under the Family and Medical 

Leave Act and retaliation. The district court dismissed her case with prejudice under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A) because she intentionally misrepresented information about her 

finances in the financial affidavit accompanying an application to proceed in forma 

pauperis. We affirm. 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 18-2188 Page 2 

When O’Connor filed her original complaint in December 2014, she paid the $400 

filing fee. She simultaneously moved for attorney representation, without a financial 

affidavit, so the district court ordered her to “submit an in forma pauperis application.” 

That application form also contains a financial affidavit. In hers, O’Connor represented, 

among other things, that her husband owned their home, although she did not know its 

value. The court denied her motion, and O’Connor retained an attorney. Counsel 

withdrew just a few months later, and O’Connor filed a second motion for attorney 

representation along with a new IFP application and financial affidavit. In her motion, 

she noted that her financial circumstances had changed since her first request; she had 

been laid off from work and had paid expensive legal fees for her disabled son. She 

represented in the affidavit that no one living at her residence “own[ed] any real estate 

(with or without a mortgage)” and that only her husband had more than $200 in cash or 

in a bank account (he had $300). 

The district court granted O’Connor’s motion for attorney representation and 

recruited counsel for her. The recruited attorney withdrew after nearly a year and a half 

due to “professional and ethical considerations.” The court recruited another attorney, 

who, after about six months, requested an in camera and ex parte meeting with the court, 

citing a local rule mandating that “[i]f assigned counsel discovers ... that the party is 

able to pay for legal services ... counsel shall bring that information to the attention of 

the judge.” N.D. ILL. R. 83.41(a). At this hearing, O’Connor admitted under oath to 

several inaccuracies in her second financial affidavit, including the omission that her 

husband owned their home. She also did not update her affidavit after she began 

receiving social security benefits in 2016. The court struck counsel’s appointment due to 

the inaccuracies but noted that it was not “find[ing] that the misstatements were 

knowingly and willingly done to perpetrate a fraud on the Court.” 

The district court then entered a minute order describing the ex parte hearing and 

permitting counsel to withdraw. At the time, a fully briefed partial motion to dismiss 

was pending. The district court denied it days after the hearing, ruling that O’Connor’s 

FMLA interference claim was timely. Weeks later, the Board moved to dismiss the case 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A), which provides that a district court “shall” dismiss an 

IFP plaintiff’s case if it determines that “the allegation of poverty is untrue.” The Board 

attached a transcript of the ex parte hearing to its motion. 

The district court granted the Board’s motion and dismissed the case with 

prejudice. The court found that O’Connor had misrepresented her financial status with 

the intent to be evasive and mislead the court. First, she did not disclose that her 
No. 18-2188 Page 3 

husband owned their home. Second, she failed to update her affidavit to reflect that she 

began receiving social security benefits in 2016. Third, among the various documents 

she attached to her responses to the motion to dismiss was evidence of two accounts 

that she had not declared in her financial affidavit. A bank statement dated nine days 

after her affidavit reflected a $1,200 balance, and a pension plan statement from 

September 2014 showed a $2,000 balance. The court also rejected her argument that the 

“discrepancies” in the financial affidavit were “mere misunderstandings or innocent 

mistakes.” It found that O’Connor lacked credibility based on her “erratic and 

manipulative disposition” at hearings. Because the misstatements were not inadvertent, 

the district court concluded, dismissal with prejudice was warranted. 

O’Connor appeals. Her briefs are difficult to parse and include numerous 

arguments that are outside the scope of this appeal or were not raised in the district 

court. Focusing on the issue properly before us, we can discern that O’Connor contends 

that the court erred in dismissing her case because her allegations of poverty were 

accurate and any mistakes were inadvertent, and, even if not, dismissal with prejudice 

was unwarranted. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

decision to dismiss the case with prejudice for abuse of discretion. See Thomas v. Gen. 

Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307–08 (7th Cir. 2002). 

 The district court did not clearly err in finding that O’Connor’s second financial 

affidavit contained false assertions of poverty. The record amply supports the 

discrepancies among O’Connor’s affidavit, her statements at the hearing, and the 

documents she attached to her filings. Having identified multiple inaccuracies, the 

district court then appropriately dismissed the case. See Kennedy v. Huibregtse, 831 F.3d 

441, 443 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Further, the court reasonably found that O’Connor’s misrepresentations were 

intentional. We would not easily disturb the district court’s finding, based on 

O’Connor’s demeanor at hearings, that her innocent explanations lacked credibility. See 

Ortiz v. Martinez, 789 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2015). That further supports the dismissal 

with prejudice. See Kennedy, 831 F.3d at 443–44 (affirming dismissal with prejudice for 

failing to disclose $1,400 trust account); Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306–07 (same, for lying and 

failing to update IFP application); Mathis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 546, 547–48 

(7th Cir. 1998) (same, for intentionally omitting that he owned his home, among other 

falsities). O’Connor argues that the court contradicted itself because, at the earlier 

hearing, it had stated that it was not finding that the misstatements “were knowingly 

and willingly done to perpetrate a fraud on the Court.” Nothing barred the court from 
No. 18-2188 Page 4 

revisiting its earlier assessment, however, especially after it was presented with full 

briefing on the issue. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); Galvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581, 587 (7th 

Cir. 2012). O’Connor argues that the “law of the case” doctrine forbade this, but that 

rule does not limit a district court’s ability to revisit its own rulings before a final 

judgment, see id., and in any event, this was simply a preliminary finding of fact, not a 

legal ruling. 

We have considered O’Connor’s other arguments, and none has merit. 

AFFIRMED