IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

HARRY W. ANDERSON, § 

 § No. 505, 2013 

 Defendant Below, § 

 Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court of 

 § the State of Delaware in and for 

 v. § New Castle County 

 § 

STATE OF DELAWARE, § 

 § 

 Plaintiff Below, § Cr. ID No. 1206018361 

 Appellee. § 

Submitted: May 2, 2014 

Decided: July 14, 2014 

Before STRINE, Chief Justice, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 

O R D E R 

 This 14th day of July 2014, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 

and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 

(1) This is a direct appeal in a Superior Court criminal case. On 

February 14, 2014, the appellant, Harry W. Anderson, was granted leave to 

proceed pro se on appeal. Because Anderson’s claims on appeal are related 

to two Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”) criminal cases in which he was 

involved in 2012 and 2013, the Court has taken judicial notice of those cases 

and briefly summarized them below. 
2 

(2) In the 2012 CCP case, Anderson was arrested on June 8, 2012 

on charges of Resisting Arrest and Criminal Trespass in the Third Degree.1

 

Anderson pled guilty to Resisting Arrest on September 13, 2012, but was 

allowed to withdraw the plea on December 4, 2012. On February 21, 2013, 

the case was dismissed, and on June 6, 2013, a cell phone and other property 

seized from Anderson incident to his arrest were returned to him.2

 In the 

2013 CCP case, Anderson was arrested on August 6, 2013 on charges of 

Burglary in the Third Degree, Possession of a Burglary Tool, Misdemeanor 

Theft, and Criminal Mischief.3

 The case was dismissed on September 23, 

2013.4

 

(3) In the Superior Court case from which this appeal arises, 

Anderson was arrested on June 22, 2012, and was indicted on September 24, 

2012, on multiple counts of Felony Theft, Burglary in the Third Degree, and 

Criminal Mischief. On January 24, 2013, after an extended colloguy, 

Anderson pled guilty to two counts of Burglary in the Third Degree. In 

exchange the State dismissed the balance of the indictment, agreed to seek 

habitual offender sentencing on only one count, and recommend no more 

 

1 See docket, State v. Anderson, Del. Com. Pl., Cr. ID No. 1206005682. 

2 Id.

3 See docket, State v. Anderson, Del. Com. Pl., Cr. ID No. 1301012923. 

4 Id.
3 

than six years at Level V on that count. The parties further agreed to a 

presentence investigation. 

(4) Thereafter, between April 10, 2013 and September 9, 2013, 

subsequent to his guilty plea but prior to his sentencing, Anderson filed a 

series of pro se letters, motions, and a habeas corpus petition. Generally, 

Anderson’s pro se submissions sought a dismissal of the Superior Court 

charges because, according to Anderson, the evidence against him was the 

same evidence that, according to Anderson, was illegally seized in his 2012 

and 2013 CCP cases.5

 

(5) Anderson’s sentencing was held on September 20, 2013. At the 

outset of the sentencing proceeding, the Superior Court allowed Anderson to 

make an oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. When asked to give his 

reasons for withdrawing the plea, Anderson asserted that he “was totally 

under duress” at the January 24, 2013 guilty plea proceeding because his 

 

5

 Anderson’s April 10, 2013 “motion to suppress by use of the exclusionary Rule and to 

dismiss” was referred to his defense counsel. Anderson’s April 23, 2013 motion to 

suppress was referred to a Superior Court judge, who returned the motion with a “notice 

of noncompliance” indicating that an application for a postconviction remedy must be 

filed using a prescribed form, which was also provided. In letters filed on June 13 and 

June 19, 2013, Anderson complained that his defense counsel’s refusal to file a motion to 

suppress and to take other action had left Anderson with no choice but to plead guilty. 

Anderson’s June 2013 letters were followed by his unsuccessful habeas corpus petition 

on August 12, 2013, which sought a dismissal of the charges “for failure to indict in a 

timely fashion.” Finally, on September 9, 2013, Anderson submitted another letter, 

which summarized, reiterated and expanded upon the issues raised in his prior letters, 

motions, and petition. 
4 

defense counsel had refused to file a motion to suppress and to take other 

action in support of his defense.6

 Anderson also asserted that withdrawal of 

the guilty plea was justified because his defense counsel had a conflict of 

interest.7

 After hearing from Anderson and his defense counsel, the Superior 

Court found that Anderson had given the guilty plea knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily on January 24, 2013, and denied the motion to 

withdraw the guilty plea.8

 

(6) The Superior Court sentenced Anderson in accordance with the 

plea agreement. On one count of Burglary in the Third Degree, Anderson 

was declared a habitual offender and was sentenced to six years at Level V. 

On the other count of Burglary in the Third Degree, Anderson was sentenced 

to three years at Level V suspended for eighteen months at Level III 

probation. This appeal followed. 

(7) On appeal, Anderson argues that the Superior Court’s denial of 

his motion to withdraw the guilty plea was an abuse of discretion. Anderson 

argues that withdrawal of the plea was justified because he was not indicted 

within forty-five days of his arrest, and because the evidence relied upon 

was derived from the 2012 CCP case, which was dismissed. Anderson also 

 

6

 H’rg Tr. at 7 (Sept. 20, 2013). 

7 Id. at 10. 

8 Id. at 9-10. 
5 

argues that the plea agreement was invalid because it was improperly altered 

to include restitution related to a burglary charge in the 2013 CCP case, 

which was also dismissed. Finally, Anderson contends that the guilty plea 

was involuntary because he was coerced into pleading guilty by his defense 

counsel, who had a conflict of interest. 

(8) We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for 

abuse of discretion.9

 Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d), a defendant 

has the burden of showing a “fair and just reason” to withdraw a guilty 

plea.10 The Superior Court should permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea 

only if the court determines that “the plea was not voluntarily entered or was 

entered because of misapprehension or mistake of defendant as to his legal 

rights.”11 

(9) In this case, we have carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and 

the Superior Court record, including the transcripts of the guilty plea 

proceeding on January 24, 2013, and the hearing on the motion to withdraw 

the guilty plea on September 20, 2013. The transcript of the guilty plea 

proceeding reflects that Anderson clearly and unequivocally admitted that he 

 

9 Chavous v. State, 953 A.2d 282, 285 (Del. 2008). 

10 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32(d). 

11 Scarborough v. State, 938 A.2d 644, 650 (Del. 2007) (quoting State v. Insley, 141 A.2d 

619, 622 (Del. 1958)). 
6 

committed the offenses of Burglary in the Third Degree.12 Anderson that he 

had discussed his plea agreement and the truth-in-sentencing guilty plea 

form with his defense counsel, and that his defense counsel had answered all 

of his questions and had advised him of his legal rights.13 Anderson also 

said that he was satisfied with his defense counsel’s representation.14 

Finally, Anderson said he was entering into the plea agreement of his own 

free will,15 and said that no one had threatened or coerced him to accept the 

plea.16 

(10) From our review of the record, we can discern no basis upon 

which to conclude that Anderson’s guilty plea was not voluntarily entered or 

was entered because of Anderson’s misapprehension or mistake as to his 

legal rights. Moreover, because a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives 

any defenses a defendant might have had, we conclude that Anderson’s 

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the legality of the search, and 

the timeliness of the indictment are without merit. 17 

 

12 Hr’g Tr. at 12 (Jan. 24, 2013). 

13 Id. at 9-10. 

14 Id. at 14.

15 Id. at 13. 

16 Id.

17 See Powell v. State, 2010 WL 572129 (Del. Feb. 18, 2010) (citing Miller v. State, 840 

A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003)). 
7 

(11) Anderson’s claims that his defense counsel had a conflict of 

interest and that he was improperly required to pay restitution on a burglary 

charge in the 2013 CCP case are also without merit. Those claims, and the 

others raised in Anderson’s numerous pro se letters, motions and petition, 

suggest that, as his 2012 and 2013 CCP cases evolved, Anderson began to 

have second thoughts about his decision to plead guilty in his Superior Court 

case on January 24, 2013. Having second thoughts about accepting a plea 

agreement, however, does not constitute a “fair and just reason” for 

withdrawing a guilty plea.18 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 

Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 

 BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Henry duPont Ridgely

 Justice 

 

18 Russell v. State, 1999 WL 507303 (Del. June 2, 1999).