United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 8, 2022 Decided August 12, 2022

No. 21-1140

CHEVRON U.S.A. INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Action

of the Environmental Protection Agency

Catherine E. Stetson argued the cause for petitioner. With 

her on the briefs were Ashley C. Parrish, Ilana Saltzbart, 

Marcella Burke, I. Cason Hewgley IV, Sean Marotta, and 

Danielle Desaulniers Stempel.

Andrew R. Varcoe, Stephanie A. Maloney, Thomas A. 

Lorenzen, and Elizabeth B. Dawson were on the brief for 

amicus curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the United States 

of America in support of petitioner.

Phillip R. Dupré, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
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Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, TATEL and PILLARD, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SRINIVASAN.

SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge: Chevron U.S.A. Inc. intends to 

decommission two oil platforms located off the coast of 

California. The activity of those platforms is generally subject 

to the Clean Air Act. Chevron asked the Environmental 

Protection Agency for guidance on whether, as the process of 

decommissioning the two oil platforms moves forward, the 

platforms will cease to qualify as regulated sources under the 

Clean Air Act. EPA responded in a letter to Chevron. 

Unsatisfied with the views set out in EPA’s letter, Chevron

now seeks judicial review of EPA’s response.

We do not reach the merits of Chevron’s petition for 

review. In the circumstances of this case, the Clean Air Act’s 

venue provision allows for judicial review in this court only if 

EPA’s challenged action is “nationally applicable,” as opposed 

to “locally or regionally applicable.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). 

We conclude that EPA’s response letter is locally or regionally 

applicable, and that venue over Chevron’s challenge lies 

exclusively in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit. We therefore dismiss Chevron’s petition for review.



Judge Tatel, who assumed senior status after this case was 

argued and before the date of this opinion, recused himself from the 

case after oral argument. 
3

I.

A.

The Clean Air Act requires the EPA Administrator “to 

control air pollution from Outer Continental Shelf sources 

located offshore of the States” along much of the nation’s 

coastline, including the Pacific Coast. 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a)(1). 

The “Outer Continental Shelf” (OCS) refers to “all submerged 

lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath 

navigable waters . . . and of which the subsoil and seabed 

appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction 

and control.” 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a). OCS “sources” subject to 

the Clean Air Act “include any equipment, activity, or facility” 

that “emits or has the potential to emit any air pollutant,” 

including “platform and drill ship exploration, construction, 

development, production, processing, and transportation.” 42 

U.S.C. § 7627(a)(4)(C).

States adjacent to OCS sources may assume delegated 

authority for implementing and enforcing Clean Air Act 

requirements applicable to OCS sources. See id. § 7627(a)(3). 

If the Administrator determines that a State’s proposed 

regulations are adequate, “the Administrator shall delegate to 

that State any authority the Administrator has . . . to implement 

and enforce such requirements.” Id.

In 1994, the Ventura County Air Pollution Control District 

requested the delegated authority to implement and enforce 

OCS regulations within 25 miles of California’s seaward 

boundary. EPA approved the request, and the District and EPA 

entered into an agreement governing the delegation. Under the 

delegation agreement, the District issues the required OCS 

permits to operators. EPA may review the permits for 

consistency with federal regulations. The agreement also 
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provides that the District will request EPA guidance on certain 

matters involving the interpretation of the Clean Air Act. 

B.

Petitioner Chevron U.S.A. Inc. formerly operated two oil 

and gas platforms—the Gail and Grace platforms—located on 

the OCS within 25 miles of Ventura County, California. 

Chevron sold the Gail and Grace platforms to another operator 

in 1999. The successor abandoned the lease without

decommissioning the platforms. The Department of Interior’s 

Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement then

directed Chevron to decommission the platforms. 

Decommissioning is the process of ending oil and gas 

operations at a platform and removing associated equipment. 

See 30 C.F.R. § 250.1700(a). Given the size of oil platforms 

and the scale of their operations, decommissioning proceeds in 

several stages and can take years to complete. The first phases 

are known as Pre-Abandonment and Abandonment, and they 

consist in part of plugging the platform’s oil and gas wells and 

preparing the topside (the portion of the platform above the 

water) for removal. The next two phases involve removal of 

the topside and then of the jacket (the portion of the platform 

that formerly held the topside and is positioned on the ocean 

floor). The final phases entail removal of debris and processing 

and disposal of platform components onshore. 

The Gail and Grace platforms are OCS sources and thus 

are subject to operating permits issued by the District under 

Title V of the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a)(4)(C); 

40 C.F.R. § 55.6. In September 2020, as part of its 

decommissioning preparation, Chevron requested guidance 

from EPA. Chevron inquired whether, following the 

completion of the Pre-Abandonment and Abandonment 
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phases, the platforms would continue to qualify as OCS sources 

subject to permitting requirements. Letter from Walid Masri,

Program Dir., W. Coast Decommissioning Program, Chevron 

U.S.A. Inc., to Anne Austin, Principal Deputy Assistant Adm’r

for the Office of Air and Radiation, Env’t Protection Agency 

(Sept. 8, 2020), J.A. 112–20 [Chevron Ltr.]. Chevron 

contended that, following Pre-Abandonment and 

Abandonment, the platforms would no longer emit or have the 

potential to emit any air pollutant and thus should no longer

qualify as OCS sources. Id. at 2, J.A. 113.

In January 2021, EPA sent an initial letter responding to 

Chevron. Letter from Karl Moor, Deputy Assistant Adm’r for 

the Office of Air and Radiation, Env’t Protection Agency, to 

Walid Masri, Program Dir., W. Coast Decommissioning 

Program, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (Jan. 19, 2021), J.A. 121–26 

[Jan. Ltr.]. EPA stated that the Gail and Grace platforms “will 

cease to be [OCS] sources following the completion of the PreAbandonment and Abandonment phases of the 

decommissioning process” described by Chevron. Id. at 1, J.A. 

121. The agency reasoned that, once the platforms no longer 

emitted or had the potential to emit pollutants per Chevron’s 

representation, the platforms would no longer meet the OCS 

source definition. Id. at 4–5, J.A. 124–25. 

In April 2021, EPA sent a second letter to Chevron

revising the position taken in the January letter. Letter from 

Joseph Goffman, Acting Assistant Adm’r, Env’t Protection 

Agency, to Walid Masri, Program Dir., W. Coast 

Decommissioning Program, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (Apr. 20, 

2021), J.A. 127–30 [Apr. Ltr.]. The agency explained that the 

January letter “did not sufficiently evaluate the possibility that 

additional activity conducted at the site or equipment used to

dismantle the Platforms after the Pre-Abandonment and 

Abandonment phases may be classified as an ‘OCS source’
6

under certain conditions.” Id. at 2, J.A. 128. Whether Chevron 

would require an OCS permit for the platforms at that time thus 

would depend “on whether other equipment or facilities 

brought to the site (e.g., vessels or barges) or new activities 

conducted at the site qualify as an OCS source for some period 

after the completion of” those phases. Id. EPA further noted 

that the dismantling, demolition, or deconstruction of a 

platform could be “viewed to be similar” to the non-exclusive 

list of activities included in the statutory definition of OCS 

source—platform and drill ship exploration, construction, 

development, production, processing, and transportation. Id. at 

3, J.A. 129.

The agency also emphasized that it had “failed to 

recognize” in the January letter “that the delegated OCS 

permitting authority for the Platforms, the Ventura County Air 

Pollution Control District . . . is the appropriate authority to 

make an applicability determination in this case, in 

consultation with EPA, after a more detailed evaluation of the 

activities to be conducted and equipment to be used at the site 

after the Pre-Abandonment and Abandonment phases [are] 

completed.” Id. at 2, J.A. 128. “Given the importance of these 

facts to this determination,” EPA explained, it “encourage[d] 

[Chevron] to provide detailed information to the District about 

Chevron’s proposed decommissioning activities so that the

District can take such information into account” in determining 

the applicability of OCS requirements. Id. at 3, J.A. 129.

Chevron filed a petition for review of the April letter in 

this court. Chevron challenges the interpretation advanced by 

EPA in its April letter as inconsistent with the terms of the 

Clean Air Act. EPA defends the interpretation in the April 

letter on the merits, but also first raises various threshold 

grounds for dismissing Chevron’s petition, including that the

letter was not final agency action and that venue for this action 
7

lies only in the Ninth Circuit. Chevron, anticipating the venue 

objection, filed a protective petition for review in the Ninth 

Circuit at the same time it filed its petition for review in this 

court. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, No. 21-71132 (9th Cir. 

June 21, 2021). Those proceedings have been held in abeyance 

pending resolution of this petition. 

II.

We do not reach the merits of Chevron’s challenge 

because we conclude that venue in this matter lies exclusively 

in the Ninth Circuit. We begin by explaining that we can 

dismiss the petition on venue grounds without first needing to 

decide whether the petition seeks review of a final agency 

action. We then determine that EPA’s challenged action—the 

agency’s April letter to Chevron—is “locally or regionally 

applicable” rather than “nationally applicable,” such that 

Chevron’s challenge belongs in the Ninth Circuit rather than in 

our court. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).

A.

As threshold grounds for dismissing Chevron’s petition for 

review, EPA argues both that the April letter is not final agency 

action and that venue over Chevron’s challenge lies in the 

Ninth Circuit. The Clean Air Act’s requirement of a final 

agency action is jurisdictional. See Valero Energy Corp. v. 

EPA, 927 F.3d 532, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The Clean Air Act’s 

venue requirements, on the other hand, are nonjurisdictional. 

See Sierra Club v. EPA, 926 F.3d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 

The question thus arises whether we can decide this matter on 

a nonjurisdictional venue ground without first resolving 

whether the April letter is final agency action such that we 

would have jurisdiction to review it.
8

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 

(1998), established “that a federal court generally may not rule 

on the merits of a case without first determining that it has 

jurisdiction.” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping 

Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007) (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. 

at 93–102). But, while a court “may not rule on the merits of a 

case” without jurisdiction, it can consider certain threshold, 

non-merits grounds without needing to resolve its jurisdiction. 

Id. at 430–31. In other words, “Steel Co.’s rule of priority does 

not invariably require considering a jurisdictional question 

before any nonjurisdictional issue. Rather, courts may address 

certain nonjurisdictional, threshold issues before examining 

jurisdictional questions.” Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

Here, the question is whether venue is the kind of 

threshold, nonjurisdictional issue that can be addressed without 

first examining jurisdiction. An “issue can qualify as a 

threshold one of that kind only if it can occasion a ‘[d]ismissal 

short of reaching the merits.’” Id. (quoting Sinochem, 549 U.S. 

at 431)). Venue fits squarely in that category. The Supreme 

Court’s decision in Sinochem directly points the way to that 

conclusion.

Sinochem considered “whether forum non conveniens can 

be decided prior to matters of jurisdiction.” 549 U.S. at 428–

29. The Supreme Court answered yes, explaining that a “forum 

non conveniens dismissal denies audience to a case on the 

merits; it is a determination that the merits should be 

adjudicated elsewhere.” Id. at 432 (citation, alteration, and 

quotation marks omitted). The “critical point . . . rendering a 

forum non conveniens determination a threshold, nonmerits 

issue,” the Court reasoned, “is simply this: Resolving a forum 

non conveniens motion does not entail any assumption by the 
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court of substantive law-declaring power.” Id. at 433 

(quotation marks omitted).

All of that is equally true of venue. Venue, like forum non 

conveniens, involves “a determination that the merits should be 

adjudicated elsewhere.” Id. at 432. And when a court disposes 

of a case on grounds of improper venue, the court does not draw 

upon its “substantive law-declaring power.” Id. at 433

(quotation marks omitted). As is the case with forum non 

conveniens, venue involves a “[d]ismissal short of reaching the 

merits,” such that “the court will not proceed at all to an 

adjudication of the cause.” Id. at 431 (quotation marks 

omitted); see Kaplan, 896 F.3d at 513. Indeed, the Supreme 

Court has “characterized forum non conveniens as, essentially, 

a supervening venue provision,” and the general federal 

change-of-venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), codifies the 

“common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens.” Sinochem,

549 U.S. at 429–30 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The close association between forum non conveniens and 

venue cements the conclusion that venue, like forum non 

conveniens, is a threshold, non-merits issue that a court can 

address without first establishing its jurisdiction. Accord ATK 

Launch Sys., Inc. v. EPA, 651 F.3d 1194, 1200 (10th Cir. 

2011); In re LimitNone, LLC, 551 F.3d 572, 576–77 (7th Cir. 

2008).

B.

Having determined that we may dismiss Chevron’s 

petition for review for improper venue without first deciding 

whether EPA’s April letter constituted final agency action, we 

now proceed to address the venue question.

The Clean Air Act’s venue provision states in relevant 

part:
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A petition for review of action of the 

Administrator in promulgating any national 

primary or secondary ambient air quality

standard . . . or any other nationally applicable 

regulations promulgated, or final action taken, 

by the Administrator under this chapter may be 

filed only in the United States Court of Appeals 

for the District of Columbia. A petition for 

review of the Administrator’s action in 

approving or promulgating any implementation 

plan . . . or any other final action of the 

Administrator under this chapter . . . which is 

locally or regionally applicable may be filed 

only in the United States Court of Appeals for 

the appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding the 

preceding sentence a petition for review of any 

action referred to in such sentence may be filed 

only in the United States Court of Appeals for 

the District of Columbia if such action is based 

on a determination of nationwide scope or effect 

and if in taking such action the Administrator 

finds and publishes that such action is based on 

such a determination.

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).

That provision sets out “two routes for venue to be proper 

in this court.” Sierra Club, 926 F.3d at 849. First, EPA’s 

challenged “action may itself be nationally applicable.” Id. 

“Second, EPA’s Administrator may determine that the 

otherwise locally or regionally applicable action has 

nationwide scope or effect and publish his finding.” Id. Here, 

no one contends that the Administrator made the requisite 
11

finding about the April letter for purposes of the second route, 

so the first route is the only one available to Chevron. 

The dispositive question, then, is whether the April letter 

is “nationally applicable” or “locally or regionally applicable.” 

In answering that question, we “look only to the face of the 

agency action, not its practical effects.” Id.; see Dalton 

Trucking, Inc. v. EPA, 808 F.3d 875, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The 

quintessential example of a “nationally applicable” EPA action 

that may be challenged only in this court is a regulation that 

uniformly applies nationwide. See NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 

1224, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1988). At the other end of the spectrum, 

approving or promulgating a State Implementation Plan “is the 

prototypical ‘locally or regionally applicable’ action that may 

be challenged only in the appropriate regional court of

appeals.” Am. Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA, 705 F.3d 

453, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 

The April letter falls comfortably in the category of

“locally or regionally applicable” actions. Our recent decision 

in Sierra Club v. EPA is instructive. There, we held that an 

EPA order denying Sierra Club’s petition for objection to 

renewal of an operating permit was locally or regionally

applicable. See Sierra Club, 926 F.3d at 849. We reasoned 

that the order “denies Sierra Club’s petition for objection to a 

single permit for a single plant located in a single state,” and it 

thus had “immediate effect” only for that power plant. Id. We 

also emphasized that the Administrator confined his “novel 

interpretation of Title V” of the Clean Air Act “to the specific 

circumstances” of the individual power plant in question. Id. 

at 850. 

Under the logic of Sierra Club, the April letter, too, is 

locally or regionally applicable. The letter’s subject line reads: 

“Additional Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Views 
12

on Outer Continental Shelf Decommissioning Activities at 

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. Gail and Grace Platforms.” Apr. Ltr. 1,

J.A. 127. That subject line conveys EPA’s intention to set forth 

views pertaining to the Gail and Grace platforms in particular. 

The letter correspondingly “has immediate effect” only on 

Chevron’s decommissioning activities at those platforms. 

Sierra Club, 926 F.3d at 849. The letter immediately affects

no other platforms in the OCS nor any decommissioning 

activities outside those conducted at Chevron’s two facilities. 

It speaks to decommissioning activities occurring at two 

specific platforms off the coast of Ventura County, California, 

in the Ninth Circuit’s region. 

The April letter reconfirms in numerous ways its focus on 

the specific circumstances of the decommissioning activities at 

the Gail and Grace platforms. The letter references the need to 

evaluate “the activities to be conducted and equipment to be 

used at the site”; to consider “whether other equipment or 

facilities brought to the site (e.g., vessels or barges) or new 

activities conducted at the site qualify as an OCS source”; and 

to understand “Chevron’s proposed decommissioning process 

for the Platforms, including the type of equipment to be used.” 

Apr. Ltr. 2–3, J.A. 128–29 (emphasis added). In those respects, 

the April letter, like EPA’s action in Sierra Club, focuses by its 

terms on “the circumstances presented here” in an “avowedly 

case-specific” analysis. 926 F.3d at 850 (quotation marks 

omitted). And the April letter also emphasizes the central role 

played by the local agency, the “Ventura County Air Pollution 

Control District,” as “the appropriate authority to make an 

applicability determination in this case”—a consideration 

firmly in keeping with a locally applicable determination but

markedly incongruous with a nationally applicable one. Apr. 

Ltr. 2, J.A. 128.
13

It is true that, in the course of the April letter, EPA 

construed and applied nationally applicable provisions of the 

Clean Air Act and their implementing regulations. But many 

locally or regionally applicable actions may require 

interpretation of the Clean Air Act’s statutory terms, and that 

kind of interpretive exercise alone does not transform a locally 

applicable action into a nationally applicable one. We thus 

explained in Sierra Club that if “EPA relies on the statutory 

interpretation set forth in the Order” under review in that case 

“in future adjudications or other final agency action, it will be 

subject to judicial review upon challenge.” 926 F.3d at 849. 

And the fact “[t]hat the interpretative reasoning offered by the 

Administrator in denying Sierra Club’s petition for objection 

has precedential effect in future EPA proceedings is typical of 

adjudicative orders, including regionally and locally 

applicable ones.” Id. at 850 (emphasis added). As a result, that 

a challenged action “applies a broad regulation to a specific 

context” and “may set a precedent for future . . . proceedings” 

does not make it nationally applicable. Am. Rd. & Transp. 

Builders Ass’n, 705 F.3d at 456.

Chevron argues that, because EPA’s April letter displaced 

its previous, January letter, and because the January letter was 

a nationally applicable action, the April letter must be 

nationally applicable as well. Chevron’s challenge is solely to 

the April letter, not the January one. And we do not take as a 

given that a nationally applicable action could be displaced 

only by another nationally applicable action: one could 

imagine situations in which EPA might withdraw a nationally 

applicable resolution in favor of a locally applicable one. At 

any rate, even assuming Chevron is correct that the April letter 

would be considered nationally applicable if the January one 

was too, we disagree with Chevron’s assumption about the 

January letter.
14

As with the April letter, the face of the January letter 

speaks in localized terms. The subject line of the January letter 

reads: “Applicability Determination for Outer Continental 

Shelf Decommissioning Activities at Chevron U.S.A. Inc. Gail 

and Grace Platforms.” Jan. Ltr. 1, J.A. 121. And the letter’s 

immediate effects were correspondingly confined, 

contemplating that Chevron could surrender its OCS permits 

only for those platforms. EPA explicitly stated, moreover, that 

the letter was “predicated on the specific facts described in the 

September 8, 2020 Chevron Letter.” Id. at 2, J.A. 122. And 

the agency added that, “[u]nder the specific circumstances 

described in the Chevron Letter, EPA agrees with Chevron that 

the Platforms would cease to be OCS sources after the PreAbandonment and Abandonment phases described by 

Chevron, and, therefore, would no longer [be] subject to 

requirements applicable to OCS sources.” Id. at 4, J.A. 124 

(emphasis added). EPA similarly emphasized that “under the 

specific circumstances described in the Chevron Letter, EPA 

concludes that associated vessel emissions alone are not 

sufficient to satisfy the potential to emit criteria of the OCS 

source definition.” Id. (emphasis added). 

In short, as it did in the April letter, EPA repeatedly 

confined the January letter to the specific, local circumstances

under which it arose. That bespeaks a locally or regionally 

applicable action, not a nationally applicable one. See Sierra 

Club, 926 F.3d at 850. Venue over a challenge to such an 

action does not lie in our court, but lies exclusively in the 

“appropriate circuit,” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)—here, the Ninth 

Circuit, where Chevron has filed a protective petition for 

review. We thus dismiss Chevron’s petition for review in this 

court, enabling its Ninth Circuit action to proceed.
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* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Chevron’s petition 

for review for lack of venue without reaching the merits.

So ordered.