[Cite as State v. Lemaster, 2022-Ohio-4157.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MEIGS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

:

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 22CA1

:

v. :

: DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

WILLIAM D. LEMASTER1, : ENTRY

: 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

_____________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

William D. Lemaster, Lima, Ohio, Appellant, Pro Se.

James K. Stanley, Meigs County Prosecuting Attorney, Pomeroy, Ohio, for

Appellee.

_____________________________________________________________

Smith, P.J.

{¶1} William D. Lemaster appeals the December 20, 2021 entry of 

the Meigs County Common Pleas Court which dismissed as untimely his 

petition for postconviction relief. In his petition and upon appeal, Mr. 

Lemaster, “Appellant,” asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings and personal jurisdiction over 

1The Supreme Court of Ohio noted that Appellant’s last name has appeared in court opinions and 

documents with several different spellings. See State ex rel. Lemaster v. Meigs County Court of Common 

Pleas, 161 Ohio St. 3d 14, 2020-Ohio-3776, 160 N.E.3d 713, at fn.1. “Lemaster” is how it appears in his 

current appellate brief and herein. 
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 2

himself. However, upon review, we find no merit to Appellant’s assignment 

of error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶2} In May 1993, a Meigs County jury found Appellant guilty of 

multiple counts of aggravated murder with death penalty specifications, two 

counts of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and 

multiple firearm specifications. The victims were Jeff Halley and his 12-

year-old son, Jeffrey Halley. The common pleas court entered its judgment 

entry on May 25, 1993 and sentenced Appellant to two terms of life 

imprisonment on the aggravated murder convictions and imposed additional 

consecutive sentencing on the other convictions. The underlying factual 

background is not necessary to resolution of this appeal, but is set forth fully 

in State v. LeMasters, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 512, 1994 WL 534883, (Sept. 27, 

1994), at *1 and *2. 

{¶3} On direct appeal, the Fourth District vacated one of Appellant’s

firearm specification sentences as duplicative, but otherwise affirmed his 

convictions and sentence. See State v. Lemasters, supra. Appellant 

unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief. See e.g., State v. Lemasters, 4th 

Dist. Meigs No. 95CA15, 1996 WL 734665 (Dec. 6, 1996) (affirming denial 

of delayed motion for new trial); State v. LeMasters, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 3

97CA15, 1998 WL 668093 (Aug. 26, 1998) (affirming dismissal of 

Appellant’s R.C. 2953.21 petition for postconviction relief); State ex rel. 

Lemaster v. Meigs County Court of Common Pleas, 161 OhioSt.3d 14, 

2020-Ohio-3776, 160 N.E.3d 713, at ¶ 4. In Lemaster v. Meigs County, 

supra, Appellant sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Meigs County 

Court of Common Pleas to enter a final appealable order of conviction. The 

Supreme Court of Ohio held that Appellant’s judgment of conviction 

constituted a final appealable order at the time it was entered. See Id., at ¶

11. 

{¶4} On July 29, 2021, Appellant filed a motion captioned “Motion to 

Challenge the Trial Judge Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter and 

Jurisdiction over the Defendant for Failure to Adhere to Sup.R. 4 and Sup.R. 

36, Making the Accused Conviction and Sentence Void Ab-Inito.” On 

December 20, 2021, the trial court determined the motion to be an untimely 

petition for postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 and dismissed the 

matter.2 This timely appeal followed. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE LACKED 

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECTMATTER AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION 

OVER THE DEFENDANT, FOR FAILURE TO 

2Appellant’s motion was ruled on by Judge D. Dean Evans, sitting by assignment. 
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 4

ADHERE TO SUP.4.01[sic], SUP.R. 36.011 AND 

36.013 MAKING THE ACCUSED CONVICTION 

AND SENTENCE VOID AB-INITIO.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶5} R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a), petition for postconviction relief, 

provides in pertinent part that:

Any person in any of the following categories may file a 

petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the 

grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to 

vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant 

other appropriate relief: (i) Any person who has been 

convicted of a criminal offense * * * and who claims that 

there was such a denial or infringement of the person's 

rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the 

Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States 

* * *.

{¶6} The postconviction relief process is a collateral civil attack on a 

criminal judgment rather than an appeal of the judgment. See State v. Betts, 

4th Dist. Vinton No. 18CA710, 2018-Ohio-2720, at ¶ 11; State v. Calhoun, 

86 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). Postconviction relief is not 

a constitutional right; instead, it is a narrow remedy that gives the petitioner 

no more rights than those granted by statute. Id. It is a means to resolve 

constitutional claims that cannot be addressed on direct appeal because the 

evidence supporting the claims is not contained in the record. See State v. 

McDougald, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3736, 2016-Ohio-5080, ¶ 19-20, 

citing State v. Knauff, 4th Dist. Adams No. 13CA976, 2014-Ohio-308, ¶ 18.
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 5

{¶7} “ ‘[A] trial court's decision granting or denying a postconviction 

relief petition filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 should be upheld absent an 

abuse of discretion; a reviewing court should not overrule the trial court's 

finding on a petition for postconviction relief that is supported by competent 

and credible evidence.’ ” Betts, supra, at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Gondor, 112 

Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 58. A trial court abuses 

its discretion when its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. 

See In re H.V., 138 Ohio St.3d 408, 2014-Ohio-812, 7 N.E.3d 1173, ¶ 8.

{¶8} A petitioner seeking postconviction relief is not automatically 

entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Betts, supra, at ¶ 13, citing State v. 

Black, 4th Dist. Ross No. 15CA3509, 2016-Ohio-3104, ¶ 9, citing State v. 

Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 282, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999); State v. Slagle, 

4th Dist. Highland No. 11CA22, 2012-Ohio-1936, ¶ 13. Rather, before 

granting a hearing on a petition, the trial court must first determine that 

substantive grounds for relief exist. R.C. 2953.21(C). “Substantive grounds 

for relief exist and a hearing is warranted if the petitioner produces sufficient 

credible evidence that demonstrates the petitioner suffered a violation of the 

petitioner's constitutional rights.” In re B.C.S., 4th Dist. Washington No. 

07CA60, 2008-Ohio-5771, ¶ 11. Furthermore, in order to merit a hearing, 
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 6

“the petitioner must demonstrate that the claimed ‘errors resulted in 

prejudice.’ ” Id., quoting Calhoun at 283.

 LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶9} Postconviction petitions are subject to timeliness requirements. 

See State v. Mitchell, 2021-Ohio-4386, 181 N.E. 3d 550, at ¶ 18 (4th Dist.).

Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(2)(a), a petition under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a) must 

be filed no later than 365 days after the date on which the trial transcript is 

filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of 

conviction or adjudication. In this case, Appellant's direct appeal was filed 

in 1993. Appellant’s motion is obviously untimely.3

{¶10} However, Appellant challenges both the exercise of subject 

matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction in his case. Issues relating to a 

court's subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and can never be 

waived. In re R. M., 2013-Ohio-3588, 947 N.E.2d 169, at ¶ 77 (4th Dist.). 

“ ‘Jurisdiction’ means ‘the court’s statutory or constitutional 

power to adjudicate the case.’ (Emphasis omitted). Steel Co. v. 

Citizens for a Better Environment (1998), 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 

S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210; Morrison v. Steiner (1972), 32 

3An exception to the time requirement is contained in R.C. 2953.23. See State v. Sowards, 4th Dist. Gallia 

No. 18CA2, 2018-Ohio-4173, at ¶ 23. A trial court may not entertain a postconviction relief petition unless 

the petitioner first demonstrates one of the following: (1) the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from 

discovering the facts necessary for the claim for relief; or (2) the United States Supreme Court recognized a 

new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner's situation. R.C. 

2953.23(A)(1)(a). If the petitioner demonstrates one of the foregoing threshold findings, the petitioner then 

must establish that but for the constitutional error at trial no reasonable finder of fact would have found him 

guilty. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b); accord State v. Rinehart, 4th Dist. Ross No. 17CA3606, 2018-Ohio-1261, 

at ¶ 14. Appellant has not argued either of these exceptions.
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 7

Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 61 O.O.2d 335, 290 N.E.2d 841, paragraph 

one of the syllabus. The term encompasses jurisdiction over the 

subject matter and over the person. State v. Parker, 95 Ohio 

St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 22 (Cook, J., 

dissenting). Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the 

power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can 

never be waived and may be challenged at any time. United 

States v. Cotton (2002), 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 

L.Ed.2d 860; State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 

Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002.” Pratts v. Hurley, 102 

Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11. “ ‘The 

existence of the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction is a 

question of law that we review de novo.’ ” Barber v. 

Williamson, 4th Dist. No. 11CA3265, 2012-Ohio-4925, 2012 

WL 5289381, ¶ 12, quoting Yazdani–Isfehani v. Yazdani–

Isfehani, 170 Ohio App.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-7105, 865 N.E.2d 924, 

¶ 20; accord In re E.G., 8th Dist. No. 98652, 2013-Ohio-495, 

2013 WL 588756, ¶ 9.

{¶11} Here, Appellant challenges both the subject matter jurisdiction 

and personal jurisdiction of the trial court judge, Fred W. Crow, III. 

Appellant points to a lack of indication in the record that Judge Crow was 

assigned to his case. Appellant directs us to Sup.R. 4.01, Sup.R. 

36.011(B)(4), Sup.R. 36.013, and to a letter Appellant attached as Exhibit C. 

The Exhibit C letter is from the Meigs County Clerk of Courts, indicating 

that upon a diligent search of the records, the clerk was unable to find either 

“a journalized order from the administrative judge assigning Judge Fred W. 

Crow, III” nor an “Assignment Request Form,” documents previously 

requested by Appellant. 
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 8

{¶12} Appellant believes this letter from the Meigs County Clerk of 

Courts establishes that Judge Crow did not make an entrance into the record 

to establish that he accepted subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal 

proceedings or personal jurisdiction over Appellant. Thus, Appellant argues 

that the trial court did not have authority in the matter and was unable to 

render a valid judgment. 

{¶13} While Appellant characterizes his arguments as jurisdictional, 

he is misguided. While case assignments must be free from the appearance 

of impropriety, See Brickman & Sons, Inc. v. Natl. City Bank, 106 Ohio St. 

3d 30, 2005-Ohio-3559, 830 N.E.2d 1151, at ¶ 21, the lack of a formal entry 

or order demonstrating that Judge Crow transferred the case to himself and 

accepted jurisdiction may be more properly characterized in the nature of a 

procedural irregularity. Meigs County Common Pleas Court is a singlejudge court. Judge Crow was the duly elected common pleas court judge in 

Meigs County at the time Appellant was indicted, arraigned, and tried on the 

criminal charges. 

{¶14} Sup.R. 3(A) provides that “[i]n a single-judge court of common 

pleas * * *, the judge shall serve as the presiding judge of the court.” 

Pursuant to Sup.R. 3(A), Judge Crow was the presiding judge of the Meigs 

County Court of Common Pleas. Sup.R. 4(A) provides that a judge of a 
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 9

single-judge court of common pleas “shall serve as the administrative judge 

of that court.” Pursuant to Sup.R. 4(A), Judge Crow was the administrative 

judge as well. At that time, and to the present day, Meigs County had only 

one general division common pleas judge. As such, Judge Crow had 

jurisdiction over all criminal cases filed in Meigs County. 

{¶15} Appellant relies on Sup.R. 4.01(C), which provides that an 

administrative judge shall “[p]ursuant to Sup.R. 36, assign cases to 

individual judges of the court.” However, Sup.R. 36.011, individual 

assignment system, relates to multi-judge common pleas courts. Since 

Meigs County does not have a multi-judge court of common pleas, 

Appellant’s case could not be heard by any judge other than Judge Crow, 

absent the appointment of a special judge due to a conflict. 

{¶16} Sup.R. 36.013, also cited by Appellant, provides that 

“[c]riminal cases in which an indictment or a count in an indictment charges 

the defendant with aggravated murder and contains one or more 

specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in R.C. 2929.04(A) shall 

be assigned to a judge of the court or division who is qualified to hear the 

cases * * *.” The rule further provides the method of assignment. This rule 

is also inapplicable to Appellant’s case. Simply put, none of the rules 

pertaining to multi-judge common pleas courts is relevant here since Judge 
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 10

Crow was the only common pleas judge in Meigs County, and there was no 

other judge that could be assigned the matter.

{¶17} While the lack of an entry indicating Judge Crow’s assignment 

is a procedural irregularity, the longstanding common knowledge when 

Appellant was convicted in 1993 was that Judge Crow was the only common 

pleas judge in a single-judge county. Judge Crow clearly was the only judge 

presiding over the criminal proceedings in Meigs County. In this case, the 

pleadings and docket reflect Judge Crow’s initial and continued involvement 

in Appellant’s case. 

{¶18} Appellant’s arraignment entry dated December 23, 1992 was 

signed by Judge Fred W. Crow, III. The pleadings demonstrate Judge Crow 

scheduled hearings and ruled on motions throughout the criminal 

proceedings. The trial transcript volumes beginning with a date of May 4, 

1993 and continuing to May 20, 1993, all indicate as follows:

Proceedings before the Honorable Fred W. Crow, III,

taken before me, Laurel A. McDaid, Registered 

Professional reporter and Notary Public in and for the 

State of Ohio, at the Meigs County Courthouse.

{¶19} In the volume at the conclusion of trial, dated May 20, 

1993, the court reporter certified as follows:

CERTIFICATE

I, Laurel McDaid, Notary Public in and For the State of Ohio,
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 11

Do Hereby Certify that the Foregoing is a True and Correct

Transcript of the Proceedings Taken by Me in this Matter and

Transcribed by Me. In Witness Whereof, I have

Hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal of office at

Columbus, Ohio on this 27th day of August 1993.

{¶20} In Appellant’s case, the Judgment/Sentencing Entry and 

Warrant to Convey, dated May 25, 1993, is signed by Judge Fred W. Crow, 

III. 

{¶21} Even if the lack of an entry detailing Judge Crow’s selfassignment over the matter can somehow be considered an irregularity, the 

proper assignment of a judge can be waived and, therefore, does not raise an 

issue of subject matter jurisdiction. It is more akin to a matter of personal 

jurisdiction. “Personal jurisdiction is established by ‘the presence of the 

person or thing involved in the litigation within the forum's territorial 

boundaries or the consent [express or implied] of the party.’ ” State v. 

Smith, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2017-0066, 2018-Ohio-5121, quoting 

State v. Haddix, 5th Dist. No. 2018CA00035, 2018-Ohio-2833 ¶ 6, citing 

McBride v. Coble Express, Inc., 92 Ohio App.3d 505, 509, 636 N.E.2d 356, 

359 (3rd Dist. 1993), and Nehls v. Quad-K. Advertising, Inc., 106 Ohio 

App.3d 489, 495, 666 N.E.2d 579, 582 (8th Dist.1995).

{¶22} “Personal jurisdiction can be waived expressly or by failure to 

object.” Id. The Smith court found because Smith never objected, he
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 12

waived the matter of personal jurisdiction. See Safranek v. Safranek, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No.80413, 2002-Ohio-5066, at ¶ 11 (party must object at the 

earliest possible moment to matter of personal jurisdiction). Similarly, the 

Supreme Court of Ohio has held that procedural irregularities involving the 

transfer of a case to a visiting judge rendered the judgment voidable, not 

void. See In re J.J., 111 Ohio St. 3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E. 2d 851, 

at the syllabus (party’s failure to object to the transfer waived issue for 

appeal). See also State v. Sizemore, 12th Dist. Butler No.2005-CA-03-081, 

2006-Ohio-1434 (where appellant never objected to transfer at any point in 

the proceedings held in the trial court, issue was waived for purposes of 

review); and see generally Berger v. Berger, 3 Ohio App.3d 125, 130, 443 

N.E. 2d 1375 (8th Dist. 1981) (any party objecting to the reassignment of a 

case must raise the objection at the earliest opportunity or the issue is 

deemed waived), overruled on other grounds by Brickman & Sons, Inc. v. 

Natl. City Bank, 106 Ohio St. 3d 30, 2005-Ohio-3559, 830 N.E.2d 1151

(when administrative judge’s entry of reassignment under authority of the 

Rules of Superintendence does not state the reason for the transfer but the 

reason is clear from the record, the transfer is proper).

4

4But see White v. Summit County, 138 Ohio App.3d 116, 117, 740 N.E. 2d 688 (“Absent an entry 

indicating proper transfer, ‘the judge assuming to act has no authority and his rulings are voidable 

on timely objection by any party.’ ” Id., quoting Berger v. Berger, supra.) See also Lungaro v. 

Lungaro, 9th Dist. Medina No.09CA0024-M, 2009-Ohio-6372 (because party could not have 
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 13

{¶23} Appellant is arguing a perceived irregularity or technicality. 

The correctness and propriety of Judge Crow’s exercise of subject matter 

jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction is not affected by the lack of an entry 

setting forth Judge Crow’s assignment of the case to himself. The lack of 

such an entry does not raise a jurisdictional issue. Thus, Appellant’s motion 

is rightly construed as an untimely motion for postconviction relief for

which consideration is barred. Appellant’s assignment is without merit and 

is hereby overruled. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

objected prior to receiving the final judgment entry, issue was preserved for review where court 

had no evidence explaining how a subsequent judge came to author the final judgment entry).
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 14

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be 

assessed to Appellant.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing 

the Meigs County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into 

execution.

IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE 

UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL 

COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to 

exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued 

stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an 

application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a 

stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the 

expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice 

of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period 

pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of 

Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior 

to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such 

dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Hess, J. and Wilkin, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

__________________________________

Jason P. Smith

Presiding Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Meigs App. No. 22CA1 15

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from 

the date of filing with the clerk.