This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A13-2037

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

LaQuinn Jamul Williams, 

Appellant.

Filed September 2, 2014

Affirmed

Smith, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-CR-12-9837

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kaarin Long, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, 

Minnesota (for respondent)

Julie Loftus Nelson, Nelson Criminal Defense & Appeals, P.L.L.C., Minneapolis, 

Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Smith, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SMITH, Judge

We affirm appellant’s convictions for second-degree assault because the district 

court did not err by admitting family relationship evidence or by denying appellant’s 
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motion to admit a victim’s criminal convictions. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying appellant’s motion for a downward-dispositional departure 

sentence.

FACTS

Appellant LaQuinn Williams went to an apartment complex where his exgirlfriend, F.G., lived to pick up his 18-month-old child for parenting time. F.G. brought 

out the child accompanied by her fiancé, E.S., because, based on a history of conflicts

with Williams during parenting-time exchanges, she preferred to avoid meeting him 

alone. After learning that F.G. had had the child’s hair cut, Williams became “enraged” 

and began threatening to harm F.G. E.S. attempted to intervene in the argument.

F.G. noticed that Williams was carrying a gun, and she attempted to pull E.S. 

towards the apartment building while Williams was strapping the child into a car seat. 

But Williams jumped out of the car and fired shots into the air. F.G. and E.S. began 

running towards the building, and F.G. heard more shots “coming towards [them].” She 

looked back and saw that Williams had lowered his arm and was shooting directly at 

them. She ran to her apartment and called the police. 

The state charged Williams with two counts of second-degree assault and two 

counts of attempted second-degree murder. Before trial, the state moved the district court 

to admit evidence of three prior incidents where Williams had assaulted family members, 

including two assaults on F.G and one on Williams’ estranged wife. Over Williams’ 

objection, the district court admitted the evidence, citing Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2012 & 

Supp. 2013). 
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Williams moved to admit evidence of E.S.’s prior criminal convictions for 

impeachment purposes, including a conviction for robbery in 2000, a conviction for 

aggravated robbery in 2001, a conviction for possession of burglary tools in 2007, and a

conviction for providing false information to police in 2008. The district court admitted 

the evidence of the 2007 and 2008 convictions for impeachment purposes, but it barred 

the evidence of the 2000 and 2001 convictions under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 609. It 

also opined that, because Williams could impeach E.S.’s credibility with the 2007 and 

2008 convictions, evidence of the 2000 and 2001 convictions would be unnecessarily 

cumulative. 

During his testimony, Williams admitted previously assaulting F.G., 

characterizing it as a necessary response after she threatened him with a box cutter. 

During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Williams whether he had also previously 

assaulted his estranged wife, and Williams denied it. The district court cautioned the jury 

that any evidence of previous domestic assaults “was admitted for the limited purpose of 

demonstrating the nature and extent of the relationships between [Williams] and [F.G.] 

and [Williams’s estranged wife],” and it instructed the jury “not to convict [Williams] on 

the basis of similar conduct from” the previous assaults. During his closing argument, 

the prosecutor referenced the district court’s cautionary instruction, stating that “just 

because those [previous assaults] happened, doesn’t mean you hold that against 

[Williams] and find him guilty on this . . . case.” 

 The jury found Williams not guilty of the second-degree attempted murder 

charges and guilty of the second-degree assault charges. Citing his amenability to 
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probation, his claim of a self-defense motive, and his health problems, Williams moved 

the district court to impose a downward-dispositional-departure sentence. The district 

court sentenced him within the presumptive sentencing guidelines to consecutive 

sentences of 36 months’ incarceration on each second-degree assault conviction, stating 

that it was imposing consecutive sentences because Williams’s offenses involved “two 

distinct victims.” 

D E C I S I O N

I.

Williams contends that the district court erred by admitting testimony regarding 

Williams’s previous assault on his estranged wife. “Evidentiary rulings rest within the 

sound discretion of the [district] court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of 

discretion. On appeal, the appellant has the burden of establishing that the [district] court 

abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby prejudiced.” State v. Amos, 658 

N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003) (citation omitted).

Williams argues that the state lacked a legitimate purpose to offer evidence of his 

previous assault on his estranged wife because she was not a victim or family member of 

a victim in the present case. “Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the 

victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household members, is admissible 

unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2012). The 

scope of the phrase “other family or household members” includes those of the 

defendant, not the victim. See State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 636-37 (Minn. App. 
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2010) (rejecting the appellant’s argument that “other family or household members” 

refers to those of the victim), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). The scope of section 

634.20 includes “former spouses or other girlfriends.” Id. at 637. Williams’s estranged 

wife fits squarely within the scope of Minn. Stat. § 634.20. 

II.

Williams next contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to admit 

evidence of E.S.’s 2000 and 2001 criminal convictions, arguing that the evidence would 

have contributed to Williams’s self-defense argument by establishing that Williams had a 

reasonable basis to fear E.S. Normally, we review a district court’s evidentiary rulings 

for an abuse of discretion. Amos, 658 N.W.2d at 203. But when a party seeks admission 

of evidence on one basis during trial and offers a different theory on appeal, the issue is 

waived. See State v. Carroll, 639 N.W.2d 623, 629 n.3 (Minn. App. 2002) (“A party may 

not obtain [appellate] review by raising the same issue under a different theory.”), review 

denied (Minn. May 15, 2002). At our discretion, however, we may review the district 

court’s evidentiary rulings for plain error. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02 (“Plain error 

affecting a substantial right can be considered by the court . . . on appeal even if it was 

not brought to the [district] court’s attention.”). Here, Williams moved to admit evidence 

of E.S.’s 2000 and 2001 convictions for impeachment purposes, not as part of his selfdefense claim. 

An evidentiary error claimed for the first time on appeal warrants reversal only 

when it was actually an error, the error was plain, and the error affected the defendant’s
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substantial rights. State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2010). When these three 

criteria are met, we may, at our discretion, reverse in order to protect the “fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, 

there is no error that was plain. A district court commits plain error when its ruling 

“contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 

294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Williams identifies no caselaw, rule, or standard of conduct that 

required the district court to admit the evidence of E.S.’s 11- and 12-year-old convictions 

to buttress Williams’s self-defense argument.

More importantly, there is no indication in the record that the district court’s 

exclusion of E.S.’s 2001 and 2000 convictions affected Williams’s substantial rights. 

Although Williams claims that he “was aware of [E.S.’s] past,” he offers no citation to 

the record indicating that he knew of E.S.’s 2000 and 2001 convictions at the time he 

assaulted E.S. and F.G. See, e.g., State v. Linehan, 276 Minn. 349, 358, 150 N.W.2d 203, 

209 (1967). Because there is no indication that Williams was aware of E.S.’s 2000 and 

2001 criminal convictions at the time of the assault, or that such awareness specifically 

motivated his assault, there is no likelihood that the evidence could have buttressed his 

self-defense claim. 

III.

Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion 

for a downward-dispositional departure because it failed to consider mitigating factors. 

“We will affirm the imposition of a presumptive guidelines sentence when the record 

shows that the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information 
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presented before making a determination.” State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 

(Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Sep. 17, 2013). The 

district court must consider mitigating factors, including the defendant’s amenability to 

probation. See State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (listing amenability to 

probation as among factors that may justify a downward departure); State v. Curtiss, 353 

N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn. App. 1984) (requiring the district court to “deliberately 

consider[]” mitigating factors before rejecting a motion for a downward departure). But 

“the district court is not required to explain its reasons for imposing a presumptive 

sentence.” Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 925. “Only the ‘rare case’ will merit reversal based 

on the district court’s refusal to depart.” Id. (quoting State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 

(Minn. 1981)).

Here, Williams offered three arguments in support of his motion for a downwarddispositional departure: his amenability to probation, his purported self-defense motive, 

and his health problems. The district court explicitly considered Williams’s amenabilityto-probation argument when it concluded that his refusal to take responsibility for his 

actions made him unamenable to probation. The district court implicitly rejected 

Williams’s self-defense argument when it instructed him to cease his attempts to address 

the jury’s rejection of that argument. The district court explicitly considered Williams’s 

health problems, stating, “I understand that you have some very serious medical issues.” 

The record reflects that the district court considered Williams’s arguments in favor of a 

downward dispositional departure and, after considering those arguments, imposed a 

presumptive guidelines sentence.
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In sum, the district court did not err by admitting family relationship evidence 

under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, did not abuse its discretion by denying Willaims’s motion to 

admit evidence of the victim’s criminal convictions, and appropriately sentenced 

Williams to the presumptive guidelines sentence.

Affirmed.