[Cite as Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Snyder, 136 Ohio St.3d 320, 2013-Ohio-3688.] 

GEAUGA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. SNYDER.

[Cite as Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Snyder, 136 Ohio St.3d 320, 

2013-Ohio-3688.] 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Failure to advise in writing that client may be entitled to 

refund of flat-fee retainer if lawyer does not complete representation—

Public reprimand. 

(No. 2012-2074—Submitted February 6, 2013—Decided September 4, 2013.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-099. 

____________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Respondent, Timothy Harry Snyder of Burton, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0065926, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1996. In 

an 11-count amended complaint, relator, Geauga County Bar Association, alleged 

that Snyder committed 18 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 

including charging excessive and nonrefundable fees in several client matters, as a 

result of his activities in connection with a paralegal support company and with 

out-of-state counsel. The parties eventually submitted detailed stipulations that 

for the most part state facts. Some of the stipulations, however, specify that the 

parties disagree on certain matters. The stipulations do not include any admitted 

violations. At the start of a hearing conducted before a panel of the Board of 

Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, relator withdrew five alleged 

violations. The remaining allegations were fully heard. 

{¶ 2} Following the hearing, the panel concluded that relator proved 

three violations and recommended dismissal of the remaining alleged violations 

as not proved by clear and convincing evidence. The board agreed with and 
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adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of a 

public reprimand. No objections have been filed. 

{¶ 3} Upon our independent review of the record, we adopt the board’s 

findings of fact and misconduct and agree that the appropriate sanction is a public 

reprimand. 

Misconduct 

{¶ 4} Relator alleged that Snyder charged excessive and nonrefundable 

fees, improperly shared fees with out-of-state counsel, engaged in the 

unauthorized practice of law, failed to supervise nonlawyers in a connected 

paralegal support company, and failed to disclose to his clients his relationship 

with the paralegal support company. At the beginning of the hearing, relator 

withdrew some allegations of violations contained in several counts and withdrew 

two counts in their entirety. 

{¶ 5} The board ultimately found that relator proved that Snyder violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 7.3(c)(3) (requiring a written communication from a lawyer 

soliciting professional employment from a prospective client to conspicuously 

include in its text and on the outside envelope the recital “ADVERTISING 

MATERIAL” or “ADVERTISEMENT ONLY”), 1.5(d)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer 

from charging a fee denominated as “earned upon receipt” or “nonrefundable” 

without simultaneously advising the client in writing that the client may be 

entitled to a refund of all or part of the fee if the lawyer does not complete the 

representation), and 1.5(e) (permitting attorneys who are not in the same firm to 

divide fees only if the fees division is reasonable and proportional to the work 

performed, the client consents to the arrangement in writing after full disclosure, 

and a written closing statement is prepared and signed by the client and each 

lawyer). The panel recommended dismissal of the remaining original allegations 

in addition to those withdrawn at the hearing, and the board adopted that 
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recommendation. We accept the recommendation to dismiss all alleged violations 

except for the three that were found to have merit. 

{¶ 6} The stipulated facts and evidence relevant to the three proven 

violations demonstrate that Snyder, doing business as Snyder Professional Law 

Services (“SPLS”), promoted SPLS as a foreclosure-defense firm with “of 

counsel” relationships with out-of-state attorneys. SPLS’s office letterhead 

reflected these “of counsel” relationships. 

{¶ 7} Snyder shared office space with Performing Investment 

Corporation (“PIC”), a business that provided paralegal and support services for 

Snyder, including interacting with clients on the phone, compiling information, 

and contacting lenders regarding mitigation options. PIC employed a former 

Ohio attorney who had resigned from the practice of law in 2004 with disciplinary 

action pending. One of the stipulations acknowledges both Snyder’s assertion 

that he retained full supervision over the former attorney and relator’s 

disagreement with that assertion. PIC contracted with a marketing firm that 

assisted Snyder in attracting potential clients. Solicitation letters were sent to 

homeowners who were behind in their mortgage payments. Although the 

envelopes conspicuously showed that the enclosed letter was an advertisement, 

the letters themselves did not conspicuously include in their text the capitalized 

recital “ADVERTISING MATERIAL” or “ADVERTISEMENT ONLY.” See

Prof.Cond.R. 7.3(c)(3). 

{¶ 8} As part of his representation, Snyder would enter into a fee 

agreement with the client and SPLS that provided for a flat fee that was deemed 

earned in full upon the opening of the file and provided that no refunds would be 

made. The fee agreement also contained a provision that stated: “Client has the 

right to terminate this Agreement by notifying the SPLS in writing. Fees earned 

shall be retained * * *.” Snyder testified at the disciplinary hearing that the cost 
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to the clients for representation ranged from $1,595 to $2,295. Of the contract fee 

amounts for out-of-state cases, between $200 and $500—depending on the 

state—would be sent to the attorney outside of Ohio who was listed as “of 

counsel” for that particular state. Snyder generally retained $300 for each client, 

with the balance of the client’s payment going to PIC for its services. 

{¶ 9} We adopt the board’s findings and conclusions with regard to 

violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3), 1.5(e), and 7.3(c)(3). 

Sanction 

{¶ 10} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

several relevant factors, including the ethical duties violated, the actual injury 

caused, the existence of any aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD 

Proc.Reg. 10(B), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. 

v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 

N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 

{¶ 11} Snyder’s ethical breaches concerning the deficient solicitation 

letters and fee matters are identified above. The board found as mitigating factors 

Snyder’s absence of a prior disciplinary record, his lack of a dishonest or selfish 

motive, his numerous voluntary refunds to his clients notwithstanding the 

language in the fee agreements, his full and free disclosure and cooperative 

attitude toward the proceedings, and his good character and reputation. See

BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e). The board further found that 

no clients were harmed by Snyder’s misconduct and that he had voluntarily 

terminated his relationship with PIC. 

{¶ 12} The board found as aggravating factors that Snyder engaged in a 

pattern of misconduct and committed multiple offenses. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B)(1)(c) and (d). The board found as additional aggravating factors that 
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Snyder should have recognized that his out-of-state solicitation letters were 

misleading as to his ability to practice in those states and that he should have 

registered with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel his employment, contractual, or 

consulting relationship with a disqualified attorney. See Gov.Bar R. V(8)(G)(3). 

{¶ 13} With regard to the violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3), the board 

cited two cases as precedent for its recommendation of a public reprimand. In 

Akron Bar Assn. v. Freedman, 128 Ohio St.3d 497, 2011-Ohio-1959, 946 N.E.2d 

753, we imposed a public reprimand on an attorney who was found to have 

violated three Professional Conduct Rules, including Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3), 

when he did not execute a written fee agreement and did not advise his clients that 

they might be entitled to a refund of all or part of the fee if he did not complete 

the representation. Id. at ¶ 3. Mitigating factors included no prior disciplinary 

record in almost 30 years of practice, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, 

respondent’s full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board, his expression of 

remorse, and his character and reputation. Id. at ¶ 8. 

{¶ 14} The board additionally cited Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Seibel, 132 

Ohio St.3d 411, 2012-Ohio-3234, 972 N.E.2d 594, in which we also imposed a 

public reprimand, as instructive regarding a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3). 

In that case, the respondent also was found to have violated three other rules when 

he accepted two nonrefundable retainers from his client, failed to deposit those 

retainers into his trust account, failed to return his client’s file and provide an 

accounting after being terminated, and failed to reduce his contingent-fee 

agreement to writing. Id. at ¶ 8. Mitigating factors included lack of a prior 

disciplinary record, acceptance of responsibility, cooperation with the disciplinary 

investigation, and restitution. Id. at ¶ 11, 14. 

{¶ 15} In discussing sanctions for the remaining two violations, the board 

stated that each warranted a sanction “of a low level” primarily because neither 
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violation caused harm to any client, but did not identify any precedent. We have 

not imposed discipline based on a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 7.3(c)(3). As to a 

violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(e), in Toledo Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 121 Ohio St.3d 

226, 2009-Ohio-777, 903 N.E.2d 306, we imposed a six-month suspension, stayed 

on the condition that the attorney commit no further misconduct, for violations of 

DR 2-107(A) (now Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(e)) and three other rules. The attorney in 

that case paid 35 percent of a $9,800 legal fee to another lawyer with whom he 

was not formally associated, on two occasions collected a clearly excessive fee, 

and committed two violations of the Disciplinary Rule requiring a lawyer to 

deposit client funds in a separate identifiable bank account. Id. at ¶ 3-8. Given 

the number of violations and the severity of their nature, the sanction in Johnson

is distinguishable from that appropriate here. 

{¶ 16} A public reprimand here is consistent with our precedent involving 

cases of similar misconduct and aggravating and mitigating factors. Accordingly, 

we accept the board’s recommendation and hereby publicly reprimand Timothy 

Harry Snyder for his violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3), 1.5(e), and 7.3(c)(3). 

Costs are taxed to Snyder. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY,

FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

____________________ 

Todd Petersen and Patricia J. Schraff, for relator. 

Timothy H. Snyder, pro se. 

________________________