2024 IL App (1st) 232125-U

FOURTH DIVISION

Order filed: May 16, 2024

No. 1-23-2125 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

ROBBINS PARK DISTRICT, an Illinois Park District, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

KAREN A. YARBROUGH, in Her Official Capacity as 

Cook County Clerk, RYAN T. BUCKLEY, ANGELIA 

MURPHY-WATTS, and TERRY LEE, 

Defendants 

(Karen A. Yarbrough, in Her Official Capacity as Cook 

County Clerk, Defendant-Appellee).

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 23 COEL 000019

Honorable 

Araceli R. De La Cruz, 

Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction because the dismissal of a claim for 

a declaratory judgment without prejudice is not final and appealable and the 

dismissal of a claim for injunctive relief with prejudice is not appealable without 

an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) finding that there is no just reason to delay 

an appeal.
No. 1-23-2125 

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¶ 2 After it mistakenly requested and approved a ballot that instructed voters to select three 

candidates for an office that had only two available seats, the Robbins Park District (“Robbins”) 

filed a complaint against Karen A. Yarbrough, in her official capacity as Cook County Clerk (“the 

Clerk”), and the three candidates for the office in question, Ryan T. Buckley, Angelia MurphyWatts, and Terry Lee, seeking both (1) a declaratory judgment that Buckley was ineligible for the 

office and (2) an injunction compelling the Clerk to change the election results posted on her 

office’s website to remove Buckley from the list of elected park district commissioners. On the 

Clerk’s motion, the circuit court dismissed the declaratory judgment claim without prejudice and 

dismissed the claim for injunctive relief with prejudice. Robbins now appeals the dismissal of both 

of its claims, and it also contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing its claim for injunctive 

relief with prejudice and without an opportunity to amend. However, we observe that we do not 

have jurisdiction to review any component of Robbins’ appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal. 

¶ 3 Before we consider the merits of an appeal, we must first determine whether we have 

jurisdiction. Artoe v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 483, 484 (1975). Starting with 

Robbins’ request for a declaration that Buckley is ineligible for the office of commissioner and 

that Murphy-Watts and Lee should be awarded the available positions, we do not have jurisdiction 

to review Robbins’ appeal of that claim because it is not final. “By its very terms, our jurisdiction 

under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) is limited to the review of final orders.” Paul H. Schwendener, 

Inc. v. Jupiter Electric Co., Inc., 358 Ill. App. 3d 65, 73 (2005). The circuit court dismissed 

Robbins’ declaratory judgment claim without prejudice, and it is well established that “[a]n order 

dismissing an action ‘without prejudice’ is not deemed final for purposes of appeal.” Paul H. 

Schwendener, Inc. v. Jupiter Elec. Co., Inc., 358 Ill. App. 3d 65, 73 (2005). Even when another 
No. 1-23-2125 

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claim is dismissed with prejudice in the same order, a claim that is dismissed without prejudice 

remains nonfinal and unappealable. See Austin's Rack, Inc. v. Gordon & Glickson, P.C., 145 Ill. 

App. 3d 500, 503 (1986). Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction to review the dismissal 

without prejudice of Robbins’ claim for a declaratory judgment. 

¶ 4 As for Robbins’ appeal of the dismissal of its claim for injunctive relief, we likewise do 

not have jurisdiction over that component of this appeal because, although it was final, the 

dismissal did not dispose of all claims pending between the parties and was not accompanied by 

an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) finding. The Clerk concedes in her brief 

that the dismissal of Robbins’ injunction claim is reviewable under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) as an order denying a request for injunction. However, the Clerk 

misconstrues this issue. “Rule 307(a)(1) applies only to interlocutory injunction orders that merely 

preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits” and “conclude no rights.” Santella v. 

Kolton, 393 Ill. App. 3d 889, 903 (2009) (citing Steel City Bank v. Village of Orland Hills, 224 Ill.

App. 3d 412, 416 (1991)). Rule 307(a)(1) does not apply to final orders. Id. Rather, final orders 

disposing of a claim for injunctive relief are only appealable under Rule 301 or 304(a), if 

applicable. Id.

¶ 5 In this case, because Robbins’ claim for declaratory relief remains pending, Rule 304(a) 

applies. That rule provides that, “if multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an 

action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 

parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just 

reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.” Id. The circuit court issued a final 

judgment as to Robbins’ claim for an injunction but not as to its claim for declaratory relief, so 

Robbins could only appeal from the final judgment if the court made a Rule 304(a) finding that 
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there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal or both. No such finding was made as to the 

injunctive count in this case. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the dismissal of Robbins’ 

claim for injunctive relief. See Santella, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 904 (concluding that the appellate court 

lacked jurisdiction to review a final order issuing a mandatory injunction when other claims 

remained pending in the circuit court and the circuit court had not made a Rule 304(a) finding).

¶ 6 Because we lack jurisdiction over either component of Robbins’ appeal, we dismiss this

appeal in its entirety and remand the matter to the circuit court.

¶ 7 Appeal dismissed, cause remanded.