### COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED April 28, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See W IS . S TAT . § 808.10 and R ULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP1887

- FT Cir. Ct. No. 2019PR84 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV

I N RE THE ESTATE OF M ARION R. R OESLER :
S COTT A USTIN , A PPELLANT ,

V .
R ICKY R OESLER AND A NGELA C AMPBELL ,
R ESPONDENTS .

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Columbia County:
TROY D. CROSS , Judge. Affirmed

.

Before Blanchard, P.J., Kloppenburg, and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in W IS . S TAT . R ULE 809.23(3).No. 2021AP1887

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2 ¶ 1 PER CURIAM

. Marion Roesler executed a will (“the w ill”) directing tha t , upon her death, all of her property be transferred to her husband or, in the event that her husband predeceased her, to her three children. The will also
direct s that , i f any of her three children predeceased Marion and left issue , then “his or her sha re shoul[d] go to the residual heirs, share and share alike.” At the time of Marion’s death , she was predeceased by her husband and one of her
children. Based on a disagreement between Angela Campbell (a/k/a Angela Roesler) , Marion’s daughter, and Scott Austin, Marion’s grandson (the son of Marion’s predeceased child) , regarding the meaning of the phrase “residual heirs” in the context of the will, Marion’s estate (“the estate”) filed a petition with the Columbia County Circuit Court to construe th at phra se

. The circuit court determined that “residual heirs” refer s to Marion’s two surviving children, not the
issue of Marion’s predeceased child. We affirm. 1

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 There is no dispute as to the following material facts.

¶ 3 Marion Roesler executed her will in 1977. The will direct s that upon her death all of Marion’s property be transferred to her husband, Glenn Roesler

. T he will also contain s the following provision ( generally, “ the p rovision”) which

1 In a November 18 , 2021 order, this court placed this matter on the expedited appeals calendar, and the parties have submitted memo briefs. See W IS . S TAT . R ULE 809.17 (2019

- 20). Briefing was complete d on February 7, 2022, and the matter was assigned to this panel on March 9, 2022. We commend the parties to this appeal, and their counsel, for their cooperation in reaching a quick and efficient resolution of this appeal through use of the Expedited Appeals Program. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019

- 20 version unless otherwise noted.No. 2021AP1887

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3 direct s the distribution of Marion’s property in the event that Glenn predeceased
her :
THIRD: In the event that my H usband should

predecease me, I then do hereby give, devise and bequeath all the rest of my property both real and personal and wheresoever situated unt o my children, Kathleen Austin, Ricky Roesler and Angela Roesler, share and share alike. In the event that any of my children should predecease me, leaving issue, then it is my wish and desire that his or her share shoul [d] go to the residual heirs, share and share alike

. ¶ 4 At the time of Marion ’s d eath in 2019, she was predeceased by her husband and her daughter , Kathleen . Kathleen was survived by one child, Scott
Austin. Probate proceedings were commenced in the circuit court. Angela Campbell argued that the provision exclude s Scott as a beneficiary. 2 Scott disagreed, and t he e state filed a petition to construe the will and resolve the meaning of the phrase “residual heirs ” as used in the provision. The e state’s petition explained that the phrase “residual heirs” could , in effect, be interpreted as including Scott as Kathleen’s surviving child , or the phrase could be interpreted to exclud e Scott and refer only to Angela and Ricky , Marion’s surviving children

. ¶ 5 The circuit court held a hearing on the petition. The court reviewed
the wills of Marion and Glenn

. The court also heard testimony from Angela and Scott, as well as from an estate planning attorney presented by Scott as an expert witness and fr om the secretary for the deceased attorney who prepared the wills

. T he court concluded that the phrase “residual heirs” refer s to Marion’s surviving

2 Ricky Roesler , Marion’s other surviving child, did not take a position on this issue in the circuit court and has not filed a brief in this appeal.No. 2021AP1887

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4 children, Angela and Ricky, and does not refer to Scott, the issue of Marion’s predeceased child

. Scott a ppeals.

¶ 6 Additional material facts are discussed later in this opinion.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7 We begin by setting forth our standard of review and governing principles for the interpretation of a will

.

I
. Standard of Review and Governing Principles.

¶ 8 “ The interpretation of a will under undisputed facts presents a legal
issue that is reviewed without deference to the [circuit] court. ” Czaplewski v. Shepherd , 2012 WI App 116, ¶15, 344 Wis. 2d 440, 823 N.W.2d 523

. Here, the material facts are not in dispute.

¶ 9 “ The purpose of will construction is to ascertain the testator’s
intent. ” Lohr v. Viney , 174 Wis. 2d 468, 480, 497 N.W.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Madison Gen. Hosp. Med. & Surgica l Found., Inc. v. Volz , 79 Wis. 2d 180, 186, 255 N.W.2d 483 (1977) ). When interpreting the language of a will,

“ every provision expressed by the testator in his [or her] will [should] be given effect, if reasonably possible, and ... the various provisions of the will should be so construed as to be consistent with one another, rather than to be conflicting. ” Lindsay v. Lindsay , 260 Wis. 19, 22, 49 N.W.2d 736 (1951)

. ¶ 10 Will interpretation begins with “ the language of the will ” because
that is “ the best evid ence of the testator’s intent.” Lohr , 174 Wis. 2d at 480. “[I] f there is no ambigui ty or inconsistency in the will’ s provisions, there is no need for further inquiry into the testator ’ s intent .” Id. Ambiguity exists if the language ofNo. 2021AP1887

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5 the will is susceptible of “ two or more reasonable interpretations, either on its face or as applied to the extrinsic facts to which it refers .” Id. at 480

- 81. “ When determining whether an ambiguity or inconsistency exists in the will ’ s language,

we look at the will not as a group of independent phrases, but rather as an entire
instrument .” Id. at 481.

¶ 11 “[I] f an ambiguity or i nconsistency exists in the will’ s language, we look to the surrounding circumstances at the time of the wil l ’ s execution .” Id. at 480. When examining the surrounding circumstances, we consider the “ facts and circumstances which were (or ought to have been) in the mind of the testator ”
when the testator select ed the words for the will. Gehl v. Reingruber , 39 Wis. 2d 206, 211, 159 N.W.2d 72 (1968) . O ur goal in this inquiry is to “ determine the reasonable meaning of the w ords used, from the testator’ s point of view .” Lohr , 174 Wis. 2d at 484 (citing Gehl , 39 Wis. 2d at 211

- 13 ).

¶ 12 “ If an ambiguity or inconsistency still persists, we may resort to the
rules of will construction and extrinsic evidence .” Id. at 480. W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 854.01(1) defines “extrinsic evidence” in the context of will construction as

“ evidence that would be inadmi ssible under the common law parole evidence rule or a similar doctrine because the evidence is not contained in the governing
instrument to which it relates. ” 3 Sec. 854.01(1).

3 A will is a “governing instrument” under W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.01(2).No. 2021AP1887

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6 II. Marion Intended That Her Predeceased Child’s Share W ould

Pass to Marion’s Surviving Children.

¶ 13 Scott argues that the disputed provision of the will is not ambiguous
and contends that the circuit court err ed because the language of th at provision is sufficient to ascertain Marion’s intent that the share of Mari on’s predeceased
child , Kathleen , pass es to Kathleen’s issue , Scott

. Angela argues that the provision is ambiguous and that the surrounding circumstances and extrinsic
evidence establish that Marion intended that her predeceased child’s share pass es
to Marion’s surviving children , Angela and Ricky

. 4

A. The Language of the Will.

¶ 14 As explained above, our first task is to determine whether the language of the will is ambiguous. Lohr , 174 Wis. 2d at 480. For the following

reasons, w e conclude that it is.

¶ 15 To repeat, a ccording to the applicable provision of the will , if one of Marion’s children predeceases Marion and leaves “ issue, ” then “ his or her share
shoul [ d ] go to the residual heirs, share and share alike .” 5 The will does not define the disputed phrase “residual heirs.” We now consider whether case law or

4 At one point in her briefing in this court, Angela states that “[a]s a whole, there is nothing ambiguous about Marion Roesler’s will.” Scott asserts that this is Angela’s concession t hat the will is unambiguous. However, it is clear from the substance of her briefing in this court that Angela argues that the will is ambiguous.

5 W IS CONSIN S TAT

. chs

. 851 to 882 concern probate proceedings, intestate succession, wills, and transfers at death. W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 851.002 states: “The definitions in [ W IS

. S TAT

. §§] 851.01 to 851.31 apply to chs. 851 to 882. ” Sec. 851.002. W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 851.13 defines “issue” as including “children.” Sec. 851.13. The parties do not dispute that Sco tt is Kathleen’s “issue.”No. 2021AP1887

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7 statutes assist in defining , and resolving ambiguity regarding, that phrase as it is used in the provision.

¶ 16 The parties have not infor med us of any Wisconsin case law precedent that use s the phrase “residual heirs,” and our research has uncovered none. Courts of other states have not interpreted the meaning of the phrase “residual heirs” as used in a will or other testamentary instrumen t. A Pennsylvania opinion on which Angela relies uses the phrase in a discussion of “per capita” and “per stirpes” distributions in the context of an intestate estate, but does not shed any light on the meaning of the phrase as used in Marion’s will. See
Est ate of McCutcheon , 699 A.2d 746, 750 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)

. ¶ 17 Wisconsin courts have not examined the use of the similar phrase “residuary heir” as used in a will or other testamentary instrument, although three Wisconsin opinions have used the phrase “residuary heirs” as shorthand for those persons who receive the “residue” of an estate. See Vierck v. Richardson , 119 Wis. 2d 394, 395, 351 N.W.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1984); Rosnow v. Rosnow , 273 Wis. 438, 440, 78 N.W.2d 750 (1956); O’Brien v. National Sur. Corp. , 246 Wis. 471, 474, 17 N.W.2d 574 (1945). Those opinions do not assist our interpretation of the provision because Marion did not leave a “residue” of her estate to any “heirs.” Similarly, opinions from other states have use d the phrase “residual heirs” to refer generally to the beneficiaries of a “residual clause” in a will, which as noted Marion’s will does not contain. See, e.g. , Admin istration of the C.H. Young Revocable Living Tr. , 2008 SD 43 , ¶¶3, 11, 751 N.W.2d 715.

¶ 18 We next consider the individual term “residual.” As just noted, in
Wisconsin case law the terms “residual,” “residue,” and “residuary” in this context generally refer to the portion of a testator’s estate that is not otherwise explicitl yNo. 2021AP1887

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8 disposed of by a provision in a will. As an example, i n Bradley v. Bradley , 123 Wis. 186, 101 N.W. 393 (1904), our supreme court provided definitions of the term “residue”:

 “All , of which no effectual disposition is made by will other than [by] the

re siduary clause.”

 “All property subject to be be queath ed by her not otherwise effectually disposed of.”
Bradley , 1 23 Wis. at 188

. The meaning of these terms is similar today.
W IS CONSIN S TAT

. § 854.07 states in pertinent part:

(1)

... [I] f an attempted transfer under a governing instrument fails, the attempted transfer becomes part of the residue of the governing instrument. This subsection does not apply if the attempted transfer is itself a residuary transfer. (2)

... [I] f the residue o f a governing instrument is to be transferred to 2 or more persons, the share of a residuary transferee that fails passes to the other residuary transferees in proportion to the interest of each in the remaining part of the residue.

Sec. 854.07 (1)

- (2) ; 6 se e also W IS

. S TAT

. §§ 853.55 and 853.57 (using the phrase “residuary estate” in the context of a basic, statutory form will )

. ¶ 19 In the present case, the use of the term “residual” does not match the meaning of th e same or similar term s as set forth in Bradley and the quoted statutes. More specifically, Marion’s will does not use the term “residual” to refer

6 W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 854.02 states: “ This chapter applies to all statutes and governing instruments that transfer property at death. ”No. 2021AP1887

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9 to property that was not explicitly disposed o f by her will. Rather, her will does dispose of the share of the predeceased child by passing that share to the “residual heirs.”

¶ 20 Case law and statutes do not assist in resolving ambiguity in the provision. We next consider a dictionary definition of the word “residual.” See Frisch v. Howard , 271 Wis. 342, 346, 73 N.W.2d 602 (1955) (holding that , when a will does not provide a plain meaning of a word , this court may consult a dictionary definition); Grochowski v. Larson , 196 Wis. 2d 231, 234

- 35, 538 N.W.2d 802 (Ct. App. 1995) (relying on a dictionary definition to interpret language in a will). In this situation, “residual” must mean “remaining.” See
Residual , B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Of, relating to, or constituting a residue; remaining; left over.”).

¶ 21 We now consider the mean ing of the term “heir.” Neither Angela
nor Scott disputes that Marion’s will uses the term “heirs” in referring to persons
who may receive property pursuant to the provision

. ¶ 22 Therefore, the phrase “residual heirs” as used in Marion’s will is reasonably construed as meaning, in effect, the “remaining heirs.” Of course, this does not answer the question of whose “remaining heirs” are referred to in Marion’s will, and that is a reason the provision is ambiguous. 7

¶ 23 With that in mind, o ne reasonable interpretation of the provision is
that the phrase “residual heirs” refers to the issue of Marion’s predeceased c hild

.

7 Scott presented testimony from an estate planning attorney. The circuit court did not refer to this testimony in its decision. The testimony was , in effect, a summary of Scott’s argument.No. 2021AP1887

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10 Under this interpretation, Kathleen’s share would pass to Scott, her child. However, a no ther reasonab le interpretation is that “residual heirs” refers to Marion’s two surviving children . Under this interpretation, Kathleen’s share would be left to Ricky and Angela, Marion’s surviving children. Neither of these interpretations is inconsistent with the la nguage of the will

. Thus, the phrase “residual heirs” is ambiguous because it is susceptible of “ two or more reasonable interpretations .” See Lohr , 174 Wis. 2d at 480

- 81.

¶ 24 Scott argues that the phrase “residual heirs” is not ambiguous
because Angela’s interpretation

— i.e. , that a predeceased child’s share will pass to Marion’s surviving children

— is not reasonable in that it would impermissibly
make the second sentence of the provision “mere surplusage

. ” 8 Specifically, Scott
contends: If [Marion’s] intent was to provide that a

predeceased child’s share would lapse, regardless of whether that child left issue , then there would have been no point to include the second sentence [of the provision].... Instead, [the attorney who drafted the w ill] could have simply stated that any predeceased child’s share would lapse or stated that the beneficiaries would just be the testator’s surviving children

.

8 We repeat the entire provision for purposes of discussing Scott’s argument:

THIRD: In the event that my H usband should predecease me, I then do hereby g ive, devise and bequeath all the rest of my property both real and personal and wheresoever situated unto my children, Kathleen Austin, Ricky Roesler and Angela Roesler, share and share alike. In the event that any of my children should predecease me, lea ving issue, then it is my wish and desire that his or her share shoul[d] go to the residual heirs, share and share alike.No. 2021AP1887

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11 The necessary premise of Scott’s argument is that, for Angela’s interpretation to succeed, the di sputed provision would have to have be en drafted as he asserts

. But, Scott gives no reasonable basis to conclude that Angela’s interpretation can be correct only if the provision had been drafted as he now contends . In other words, Angela’s interpretatio n of the provision may be correct even though the intent of the provision could have been drafted in one sentence, rather than two, or with different verbiage than is used in Marion’s will.

¶ 25 Thus, we reject Scott’s argument that Angel a’s interpretation of the phrase “residual heirs” is unreasonable and conclude that the disputed provision of
the will is ambiguous.

B. Surrounding Circumstances at the Time of the Will’s Execution.

¶ 26 The next step in our analysis is to examine the surrounding
ci rcumstances at the time of the will ’ s execution

. See id. at 480. The parties primarily focus on testimony provided during the circuit court proceedings

. ¶ 27 Angela testified that Marion viewed h er own children as her responsibility, and viewed her grandchildren as her children’s responsibility. Scott
testified that he never requested financial assistance from Marion for his business
and that Marion never provided him with any financial assistanc e.
¶ 28 Angela asserts that this testimony demonst rates Marion’ s intent that Scott, Marion’s grandchild, would not receive any of Marion’s property under the
will

. Scott responds that Angela’s assertion is “unsupported” because Angela provided only the broad observation that Marion treat ed her grandchildren less favorably than her children

. We agree with Scott and conclude that the testimony regarding Marion’s purported parenting (and grand

- parenting) style does notNo. 2021AP1887

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12 resolve the ambigui ty of the phrase “residual heirs.” Put another way , the broad generalization advanced by Angela does not make manifest Marion’s intent to withhold any portion of her estate from her grandchildren

. 9

C. Extrinsic Evidence.

¶ 29 Because our examination of the language of the will and the surrounding circumstances fail s to resolve the ambiguity in the provision , we now consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain Marion’s intent

. See i d. At this step, t he parties primarily dispute the importance of the language of the will of Glenn, Marion’s husband

. Glenn’s will states in pertinent part :

THIRD: In the event that my wife should predecease me, I then do hereby give, devise and bequeath all the rest of my property both real and personal and wheresoever situated unto my children, Kathleen Austin, Ricky Roesler and Angela Roesler, share and share alike. In the event that any of my children should predecease me, leaving issue, it is my wish and desire that his or her share should go to his or her issue. In the event that he or she leave no issue, then it is my wish and desire that this specific bequest should lapse and the share should go to the residual heirs, share and share alike.[ 10 ]

9 The secretary for the attorney who drafted the will testified that the drafting attorney’s ordinary practice w as to dictate the la nguage of wills for the secretary to type. The secretary stated that the drafting attorney was “very meticulous” and would proofread the wills that she had typed. Th is testimony about th e drafting attorney’s typical drafting procedure for wills also does not illuminate Marion’s intent.

10 As recognized by the circuit court, the copy of Glenn’s will in the record is so blurry that it is difficult, if not impossible, to read some of the text. Nonetheless, Scott provides the full language of the relevant pr ovision in his brief

- in

- chief filed in this court , and Angela does not dispute the accuracy of that language. We remind counsel to provide the most legible copies of exhibits for the record and , when appropriate , also provide explanations as to any portio ns that may be illegible or only faintly legible

.No. 2021AP1887

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13 The parties do not dispute that the wills of Marion a nd Glenn were drafted by the same attorney and were executed on the same day in 1977.

¶ 30 We agree with the circuit court that t he language of Glenn’s will
assist s in the interpretation of the meaning of the phrase “residual heirs” as it was understood by Marion, Glenn, and the drafting attorney. As noted above, Glenn’s
will specifically directs that a predeceased child’s share w ould pass to his or her
issue

. (“In the event that any of my children should predecease me, leaving issue, it is my wish and desire that his or her share should go to his or her issue.”)

. The next sentence of Glenn’s will states that, if the predeceased child leaves no issue,
then tha t child’s share will “lapse” and “go to the residual heirs.” This lan guage clearly indicates that, even though Glenn’s will does not explicitly refer to “the
residual heirs of Glenn , ” the drafting attorney understood the phrase “residual heirs” to mean th e testator’s surviving children, not the issue of a predeceased child. Because the drafting attorney attached this meaning to the phrase “residual heirs” in Glenn’s will, it reasonably follows that the drafting attorney understood that ph rase to have the same meaning when simultaneously drafting Marion’s will

. Therefore, we conclude that the use of the phrase “residual heirs” in these two
will s establishes Marion’s intent that a predeceased child’s share will pass to Marion’s surviving children, Angela an d Ricky, not Kathleen’s issue , Scott

. Scott argues to the contrary, but we reject his contentions.

¶ 31 Scott argues that the wills of Marion and Glenn should be read consistently , such that the disposition of a predeceased child’s share un der Marion’s will is the same as the disposition of a predeceased child’s share under Glenn’s will. Scott asserts that “it would be ‘extremely unusual’ for a husband and wife to have different plans for their children in their respective Wills.” We disag ree. Scott has not provided any evidence in the record, or any plausibleNo. 2021AP1887

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14 argument, that Marion intended that her distribution plan must resemble that of her
husband. In addition, Scott’s argument would result in an entirely different meaning of the phrase “residual heirs” in each of the wills. Scott interpret s “residual heirs” in Glenn’s will as referencing Glenn’s surviving children, but interpret s that same phrase in Marion’s will as referencing a predeceased child’s
issue. For reasons already di scussed, we do not accept that contention.

¶ 32 Scott also argues that the difference in language between the Marion
and Glenn wills could merely be the result of the drafting attorney’s “choice of words during the dictation” rather than an intent to establish different distribution plans in each will. However, Scott points to no evidence in the record to support his contention that the drafting attorney was i nexact in dictating the two wills or that the language used in the provision of Ma rion’s will fail s to express Marion’s
intent

. The “language of the will is the best evidence of the testator’s intent.” See id. at 480. Thus, it reasonably follows that the drafting attorney chose the language for the two wills with the underst anding th at the phrase “residual heirs”
would have the same meaning in each will.

¶ 33 Finally, Scott argues that W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.06, Wisconsin’s

“ A ntilapse S tatute , ” applies to the will

. 11 This statute provides in relevant part
that , if a beneficiary dies before the testator and leaves surviving issue, then that beneficiary’s share passes to the issue “ per stirpes ” unless the testator had “ intent contrary to any provision ” of that statute. Sec. 854.06(3), (4)(bm); see also W IS

.

11 Pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.02, W IS

. S TAT

. ch. 854 “applies to all statutes and governing instruments that transfer property at death.” Sec. 854.02. Further, W IS

. S TAT

. § 853.27 states: “ The rights u nder a will of a beneficiary who predeceases the testator are governed by [ W IS

. S TAT

. §] 854.06. ” Sec. 853.27.No. 2021AP1887

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15 S TAT

. § 854.04(1) (stating that per stirpes distribution , also referred to as “by right of representation , ” requires allocating one share for each surviving child and each deceased child who left issue, with each deceased child’s share passing to his or her issue) . Scott contends that § 854.06(3) applies and supports his position
because in Marion’s will there is no indication of a contrary intent to a per stirpes
distribution

. ¶ 34 We conclude that there is contrary intent to a per stirpes distribution in Marion’s will

. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.06(4)(bm). First, a s explained earlier, the

use s of the phrase “residual heirs” in the will s of Marion and Glenn establishes Marion’s intent that a predeceased child’s share w ould pass to Marion’s surviving children, not to the predeceased child’s issue. This interpretation of “residual heirs” is directly contrary to Scott’s argument that Marion intended a per stirpes
distribution of a predeceased child’s share

. See id

. (“Extrinsic evidence may be used to construe the [contrary] intent.”). Second , the use of phrase “share and share alike” in the provision signals a contrary intent

. As Angela points out, our supreme court has stated that this phrase creates a presumpti on that the testator intended a per capita distribution as opposed to a per stirpes distribution. See Mahon v. Security First Nat’l Bank , 56 Wis. 2d 171, 177, 201 N.W.2d 573 (1972) (noting the “general rule favoring per capita distribution where the wills incorporate the words ‘equally’ or ‘share and share alike.’”); Doheny v. Crawford , 260 Wis. 9, 17, 49 N.W.2d 716 (1951) (“[A] per capita distribution was intended by reason of the use of words such as ‘in equal shares’, or ‘share and share alike’ or any other equivalent words intimating an equal division.”) ; W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.04(4) (“Except as provided in sub. (6), if a statute or governing instrument calls for property to be distributed to a group or class ‘ per capita, ’ the property is divided into as many shares as there are surviving members of the group or class,No. 2021AP1887

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16 and each member is allocated one share. ” ) . In sum, we conclude based on th e tools of interpretation applied above that Marion did not intend for her predeceased child’s share to pass to that child’s issue per stirpes. Accordingly, we
conclude that W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.06(3) does not control our interpretation of the provision

.

CO NCLUSION

¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court is affirmed

. By the Court.

— Order affirmed

. This opinion will not be published. See W IS

. S TAT

. R ULE 809.23(1)(b)5

.