Rel: May 19, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 

Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 

300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 

errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

_________________________

SC-2022-0821

_________________________

Ammons Properties, LLC

v. 

Andrew William Spraggins

Appeal from Madison Circuit Court

(CV-20-901102)

MITCHELL, Justice.

Andrew William Spraggins's driveway crossed a neighboring tract 

of land owned by Ammons Properties, LLC ("Ammons"). After a dispute 
SC-2022-0821

2

arose between Spraggins and Ammons, Spraggins filed a complaint

asking the Madison Circuit Court to enter a judgment declaring that he

had an easement for the portion of his driveway that crossed Ammons's

property. Ammons filed a counterclaim alleging that Spraggins was 

liable for several tortious acts. Following a bench trial, the circuit court 

ruled that Spraggins had an easement across Ammons's property and 

denied Ammons's counterclaims. Ammons appealed. We affirm the 

judgment. 

Facts and Procedural History

In 1991, Billy R. Webster ("Billy") acquired 7.51 acres of land ("the 

Webster property") on the west side of Bell Factory Road, a public road

in Madison County. The Webster property consisted of three contiguous 

tracts: a southern tract, a middle tract, and a northern tract. Four years 

later, Billy died.

In the ensuing years, Billy's estate distributed the tracts to various 

members of the Webster family. Charles B. Webster ("Charles") acquired 

the middle tract in 2009. He took out a loan secured by a mortgage on 

the property that same year. Two years later, Charles's sons acquired 

the southern and northern tracts.
SC-2022-0821

3

In 2017, Charles defaulted on the loan for the middle tract, and the 

tract was sold to Spraggins at a foreclosure sale. Before purchasing the 

middle tract, Spraggins inspected and obtained a survey of the entire 

Webster property. The survey included a note stating: "These three 

tracts all belonged to [Billy] Webster and the driveways served multiple 

houses. [The middle tract] uses the drive that crosses [the northern 

tract]." The driveway across the northern tract was paved; the southern 

tract contained a gravel driveway that also accessed the house that sat 

on the middle tract. 

Two years after the foreclosure sale, Ammons purchased the 

southern and northern tracts from members of the Webster family. The 

sole member of Ammons, Scott Ammons ("Scott"), testified that, soon 

after purchasing the land, he began clearing the southern tract for 

development and placed a chain across the gravel driveway located on 

the southern tract. He had the property surveyed and began 

construction.

In August 2020, Spraggins filed a complaint in the Madison Circuit 

Court asking the court to "establish and declare the right-of-way 

easements over and across the property of the Defendant, Ammons 
SC-2022-0821

4

Properties, LLC, ... as being, alternatively, an easement of necessity or 

an easement by implication, having existed and then utilized by parties 

occupying the property of the Plaintiff." Ammons counterclaimed for 

damages based on theories of trespass, private nuisance, and outrage.

After a bench trial, the circuit court entered a judgment holding that 

Spraggins had "an easement for ingress and egress over and across the 

property belonging to [Ammons] described as and referred to during trial 

as Tract 2, being the northern most property and currently containing an 

asphalt driveway." The circuit court denied "[a]ll claims not specifically 

addressed" in the judgment, including Ammons's counterclaims. 

Ammons filed a "Motion for Reconsideration, and to Alter, Amend, or 

Vacate" the judgment, which was deemed denied because the circuit 

court did not rule on it within 90 days. See Rules 59(e) and 59.1, Ala. R. 

Civ. P. Ammons appealed. 

Standard of Review

"'"When a judge in a nonjury case hears oral testimony, a judgment 

based on findings of fact based on that testimony will be presumed correct 

and will not be disturbed on appeal except for a plain and palpable 

error." '" Kennedy v. Boles Invs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 60, 67-68 (Ala. 2010) 
SC-2022-0821

5

(citations omitted). But "'that presumption [of correctness] has no 

application when the trial court is shown to have improperly applied the 

law to the facts.'" Id. at 68 (citation omitted). 

Analysis

Ammons raises what he says are three grounds for reversal: (1) the 

circuit court did not have jurisdiction to grant an easement to Spraggins,

and, if it did, Ammons was owed compensation for the easement; (2) the 

evidence at trial did not support an easement in favor of Spraggins; and 

(3) the circuit court erred by declining to award damages to Ammons on 

its counterclaims against Spraggins. Because Ammons does not

demonstrate reversible error on any of these grounds, we affirm. 

A. The Circuit Court Had Jurisdiction and Ammons Is Not Due 

Compensation

Ammons first argues that the judgment of the Madison Circuit 

Court is void because Spraggins did not initiate the action in the Madison 

Probate Court. Ammons notes that a landowner seeking to condemn a 

right-of-way over neighboring land must apply "to the probate court of 

the county in which the lands over which such right-of-way is desired." § 

18-3-3, Ala. Code 1975. Because § 18-3-3 does not give the circuit court
SC-2022-0821

6

jurisdiction to condemn a right-of-way over neighboring property, 

Ammons argues, the circuit court's order is void. 

Ammons is correct that, in the absence of an existing right-of-way

to a public road, the owner of a landlocked tract may petition the county 

probate court to condemn a right-of-way across a neighboring tract. 

§ 18-3-1 and § 18-3-3. But that is not the only way a landowner without 

access to a public road can obtain it. Relevant here, an easement by 

necessity may be implied when the owner of two tracts of land, one of 

which requires the use of an existing right-of-way over the other, conveys 

the tract that benefits from the right-of-way. See Burrow v. Miller, 340 

So. 2d 779, 780 (Ala. 1976) (explaining that an easement can arise even 

when a conveyance is "not an express conveyance of the easement in 

question but the deed to the property to be served by the claimed 

easement" because a landowner who conveys property "'also conveys 

whatever is necessary to its beneficial use'" (citation omitted)). 

In his complaint, Spraggins asked the circuit court to "establish and 

declare the right-of-way easements over and across the property of the 

Defendant," either as "an easement by necessity or an easement by 

implication, having existed and then utilized by parties occupying the 
SC-2022-0821

7

property of the Plaintiff." Because Spraggins sought legal recognition of 

an existing easement and not the condemnation of a new right-of-way, § 

18-3-3 did not restrict jurisdiction over the action to the probate court. 

Accordingly, Ammons has not shown that the circuit court's judgment is 

void for want of jurisdiction.

In the alternative, Ammons argues that "[t]he trial court was 

additionally in error for awarding such an easement without due 

compensation to Ammons." Ammons's brief at 27. Ammons notes that a 

person seeking to condemn a "'right-of-way must pay the owner of the 

land across which the right-of-way is taken "the value of the land taken 

and compensation for damages to the land."'" Id. at 24 (quoting Ally 

Windsor Howell, Tilley's Alabama Equity § 17:4 (5th ed. 2012)). But, as 

explained above, Spraggins asked the circuit court to declare an existing 

easement, not to condemn Ammons's property. Therefore, Ammons was 

not owed compensation. 

B. Ammons Has Not Shown that Declaring an Easement Was 

Erroneous

Ammons next argues that there was insufficient evidence for the 

circuit court to declare the existence of an easement. An easement is a 

nonpossessory interest in land that can be created in several ways, 
SC-2022-0821

8

including by (1) deed, (2) prescription, (3) adverse use for a statutory 

period, (4) express conveyance, (5) reservation or exception, (6) 

implication, (7) necessity, (8) contract, or (9) reference to boundaries or 

maps. Cleek v. Povia, 515 So. 2d 1246, 1247 (Ala. 1987). In his 

complaint, Spraggins asked the circuit court to declare an easement by 

necessity or by implication. The circuit court issued a judgment declaring 

an easement in favor of Spraggins, but it did not specify which type of 

easement -- by necessity or by implication -- Spraggins had. Because

Ammons fails to show that the circuit court's judgment implicitly

declaring an easement by necessity was plainly and palpably wrong, we 

can affirm on that basis. We address each of Ammons's evidentiary 

arguments below. 

1. The Driveway

Ammons first argues that Spraggins could not have an easement by 

necessity because "Spraggins had the ability to construct his own 

driveway on [the middle tract], but chose not to do so." Ammons's brief 

at 32. In making this argument, Ammons contends that, because it built 

a driveway over land on the southern tract that was virtually identical to 
SC-2022-0821

9

an adjacent portion of the middle tract, Spraggins had no real need for a 

right-of-way over Ammons's property. 

When a landowner conveys a tract of land, an easement by 

necessity arises on the adjacent tract when (1) the conveyor owned both 

tracts immediately before the conveyance and (2) a right-of-way over the 

adjacent tract is the sole practical means of ingress and egress for the 

tract conveyed. See Burrow, 340 So. 2d at 780. Consequently, as 

Ammons notes, "[i]f there are other reasonably practical ways of ingress 

and egress over complainant's property, then no easement over the 

defendants' lots may be implied. That it might be more convenient or 

less expensive does not serve to raise the implication of such quasi 

easement." Crawford v. Tucker, 258 Ala. 658, 661, 64 So. 2d 411, 413-14 

(1952). 

At trial, Spraggins's expert testified that, based on his assessment 

of two areas of the middle tract, Spraggins could not safely construct a 

driveway to Bell Factory Road. But, as Ammons points out, Spraggins's

expert did not assess the portion of the middle tract adjacent to Ammons's 

driveway on the southern tract. Nor, Ammons notes, did Spraggins 

present evidence of the cost of a driveway. Accordingly, Ammons reasons 
SC-2022-0821

10

that Spraggins failed to show that he could not reasonably construct his 

own driveway for ingress and egress over the middle tract. 

But Spraggins's expert, after viewing a video of Scott driving his 

vehicle on the driveway Ammons had built, also testified that Ammons's

driveway was unsafely steep. Therefore, the circuit court could have 

reasoned that a similar driveway over the adjacent part of the middle 

tract would likewise be unsafe. For that reason, it was not plainly and 

palpably wrong for the circuit court to accept the expert's testimony that 

there was no safe way for Spraggins to build a driveway over the middle 

tract. 

2. The Effect of the Prior Foreclosure on the Middle Tract

Ammons next argues that any easement benefiting the middle tract

was extinguished when the middle tract was foreclosed on in 2017.

Ammons points out that Charles mortgaged the middle tract in 2009. 

Ammons also maintains that, assuming there was an easement by 

necessity, such easement could have arisen only when Charles's sons 

acquired the southern and northern tracts in 2011. Because Charles 

mortgaged the middle tract two years before Ammons says any easement 
SC-2022-0821

11

could have arisen, Ammons contends that the 2017 foreclosure 

necessarily extinguished the easement. 

Ammons supports this argument by citing Alabama Historical 

Commission v. City of Birmingham, 769 So. 2d 317, 320 (Ala. Civ. App. 

2000). In that case, an easement encumbered a tract of land that had 

previously been mortgaged. Id. The Court of Civil Appeals held that 

foreclosure of the mortgage extinguished the easement because the 

easement was established after the tract had been mortgaged. Id. 

Indeed, "the general rule is that the foreclosure of a mortgage terminates 

an easement that is recorded after the mortgage, subject only to the 

junior easement holder's right to redeem under § 6-5-248, Ala. Code 

1975." Id. 

But an easement encumbers the servient, not the dominant,

tenement. See Oates v. Town of Headland, 154 Ala. 503, 505, 45 So. 910, 

911 (1908) ("'An easement is an interest in land ... conferring a right 

upon the owner thereof to some profit, benefit, dominion, or lawful use 

out of or from the estate of another.'" (citation omitted)). Accordingly, for

a foreclosure to extinguish an easement, the foreclosed property must be 

the servient tenement. Here, the easement consisted of a right-of-way 
SC-2022-0821

12

over the northern tract, which was thus the servient tenement. 

Therefore, foreclosure of the mortgage on the middle tract did not 

extinguish the easement. 

3. Whether Spraggins Knew of an Easement

Ammons further contends that an easement by necessity could not 

have arisen because "Spraggins knew an easement did not exist based on 

his inspection and his survey." Ammons's brief at 29; cf. Crawford, 258 

Ala. at 661, 64 So. 2d at 414 (holding that a landowner did not have an 

easement over his neighbor's land when "[t]he driveway was open and 

visible when complainant purchased his property; he knew his 

conveyance did not grant any right of way or easement over the 

remainder of the property, and accepted it without any reservation or 

grant of an easement"). Ammons points to several pieces of evidence to 

support its position. 

First, Spraggins inspected the Webster property and had it 

surveyed. Ammons contends that a note in the survey containing the 

statement that "[t]hese three tracts all belonged to [Billy] Webster and 

the driveways served multiple houses" put "Spraggins on notice that the 

driveways existed for the sole owner of the [Webster property], not him." 
SC-2022-0821

13

Ammons's brief at 31. But, after the excerpt quoted by Ammons, the 

survey note continues: "[The middle tract] uses the drive that crosses [the 

northern tract]." The full note, therefore, could reasonably indicate that 

the driveway over the northern tract was for the benefit of the middle 

tract regardless of who its owner was. Thus, the circuit court could 

properly have found that the survey note supports the existence of an 

easement for the benefit of the middle tract.

Second, Ammons argues that Spraggins was on notice that there 

was no easement because, though he knew of the driveway over the 

northern tract, he "never raised any questions about how he was going to 

get to the property when he bought it." Id. But Ammons points to no 

authority showing that the existence of an easement by necessity 

depends on an inquiry by the purchaser of the dominant tenement. 

Indeed, Spraggins's failure to ask this question could indicate that 

Spraggins had no reason to doubt that an easement existed. Accordingly, 

this fact does not establish a lack of knowledge on Spraggins's part. 

Nor do the other pieces of evidence highlighted by Ammons, many 

of which show only that Spraggins did not have an express easement. 

For instance, Ammons points to (1) the lack of a "grant in the deed from 
SC-2022-0821

14

the adjacent property of use of the driveway"; (2) testimony that the 

owners of the northern tract never offered or issued Spraggins an 

easement; (3) Spraggins's failure to offer to buy an easement; and (4) 

testimony that Spraggins's use of the driveway crossing the northern 

tract would have been without permission. Id. at 31-32. None of this 

evidence indicates that the circuit court was plainly and palpably wrong

about the existence of an easement by necessity -- which is implied, not 

express. Ammons thus does not prevail on this issue. 

4. Landlocked Property

Ammons also disputes the circuit court's judgment on the ground 

that "an owner who has a way of access through his own land cannot 

impose a way of necessity across the lands of a neighbor unless his own 

way is not reasonably adequate, or the use of it is prohibitively costly." 

Ammons's brief at 24 (citing 1 Jesse P. Evans III, Alabama Property 

Rights and Remedies § 40.12, at 795 (2d ed. 1999)). Ammons notes that 

"'a landlocked owner is not entitled to condemn a right-of-way across 

adjoining land, if the landlocked landowner has an existing, reasonably 

adequate means of access to his land, or if he could construct such an 

access without prohibitive expense.'" Id. (quoting Tilly's Alabama Equity
SC-2022-0821

15

§ 17.4) (emphasis omitted). Because the middle tract abutted Bell 

Factory Road, Ammons argues that the middle tract was not landlocked 

and, thus, that Spraggins had reasonably adequate access to his 

property. 

But, in making this argument, Ammons again confuses an action to 

declare an existing easement with an action to condemn a new right-ofway. Spraggins sought neither to impose nor to condemn a new right-ofway; yet Ammons relies on treatises addressing only those 

circumstances. Because Ammons fails to demonstrate that an easement 

by necessity can arise only when the dominant tenement is landlocked,

Ammons has not shown that the circuit court erred by holding that

Spraggins had that type of easement. Therefore, the circuit court's 

judgment is not due to be reversed on this issue. 

C. Ammons Did Not Prove Its Counterclaims

Ammons finally argues that the circuit court erred by denying its

counterclaims alleging trespass, private nuisance, and outrage. We 

disagree.
SC-2022-0821

16

1. Trespass

"[T]o be liable to another for trespass, the person must intentionally 

enter upon land in the possession of another or the person must 

intentionally cause some 'substance' or 'thing' to enter upon another's

land." Born v. Exxon Corp., 388 So. 2d 933, 934 (Ala. 1980). A plaintiff 

may recover compensatory damages by showing harm "'caused by any 

act alone, activity carried on, or condition created by the trespasser, 

irrespective of whether his conduct is such as would subject him to 

liability were he not a trespasser.'" Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc., 

293 Ala. 56, 62, 300 So. 2d 94, 100 (1974) (citation omitted). 

Ammons first argues that the circuit court should have awarded it

damages because "Spraggins admitted to breaking a chain so Spraggins 

could drive through [the southern tract] to his house" and because

"Spraggins also admitted to pulling up construction survey stakes so that 

he could freely cross [Ammons's] property as he pleased." Ammons's brief 

at 36. Ammons states that the circuit court "heard testimony from [Scott] 

that the home construction surveyors had to come to the property on 

three (3) occasions." Id. Scott testified that the additional surveys cost 

"about six hundred dollars."
SC-2022-0821

17

But, in its opening brief, Ammons never states which alleged act of 

trespass -- breaking the chain or pulling up the stakes -- required the 

survey to be repeated. Indeed, additional surveying could have been 

required for a host of reasons that would not impose legal liability on 

Spraggins -- for instance, survey errors or lost documentation. And the 

sole evidence Ammons presented to support its claim for trespass 

damages was Scott's testimony, which the judge as fact-finder need not 

have credited. Cf. Tutor v. Sines, [Ms. 1210037, Feb. 17, 2023] ___ So. 3d 

___, ___ (Ala. 2023) ("[T]he jury would have been justified in discounting 

Tutor's testimony as self-serving."). Consequently, Ammons has not 

shown that its alleged injury was caused by trespass.

Ammons also argues that the circuit court should have awarded 

damages for trespass because "Spraggins admitted that his actions broke 

the windshield of [Ammons's] 1989 Buick, which was a custom 

windshield which cannot be replaced." Ammons's brief at 40. Although 

Ammons acknowledges that proving trespass requires showing that the 

defendant "'intentionally entered'" another's property without the 

owner's consent, he fails to point to any evidence showing that Spraggins 

intentionally entered Ammons's property when he broke Scott's 
SC-2022-0821

18

windshield. Id. at 35 (quoting 2 Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions --

Civil, Instruction 31A.00 (3d ed. 2019)). To the contrary, Spraggins gave 

unrebutted testimony that he broke the windshield unintentionally 

when, while he was "turning [his] long van in that driveway," the van 

kicked up a loose rock that hit the windshield of Scott's vehicle, which 

was parked on the northern tract. The circuit court could have 

reasonably found that Spraggins's reference to "that driveway" was to the 

asphalt driveway over which Spraggins had an easement because the 

asphalt driveway crossed the northern tract. Therefore, Ammons has 

failed to demonstrate reversible error on its counterclaim for trespass. 

2. Private Nuisance and Outrage

Ammons faces a similar causation issue with its claims of private 

nuisance and outrage. Ammons argues that several of Spraggins's

actions "constituted a nuisance" and were an "outrage," including (1) 

"engag[ing] in confrontational acts" with Scott; (2) parking "numerous 

vehicles on [the southern tract] to prevent [Scott] from accessing the 

property"; and (3) "threaten[ing Scott] should he not be able to trespass 

across [the northern tract] and use Ammons's asphalt driveway." 

Ammons's brief at 38-39. Ammons asserts that these actions "caused 
SC-2022-0821

19

considerable construction delays to Ammons," during which time the 

price of lumber rose "from $4,000 to $28,000." Id. at 39-40. But Ammons 

does not point to any evidence showing a causal link between the alleged 

acts and the construction delays. Therefore, Ammons has failed to show 

that the circuit court made a reversible error when it denied Ammons's

claims of private nuisance and outrage.

Conclusion

Because Ammons has not demonstrated that the circuit court erred 

by granting Spraggins an easement or denying Ammons's counterclaims,

we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.

Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.