alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 165 (Friday, August 24, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 42981]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-18381]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service


Art Advisory Panel--Notice of Closed Meeting

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of closed meeting of Art Advisory Panel.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Closed meeting of the Art Advisory Panel will be held in 
Washington, DC.

DATES: The meeting will be held September 13, 2018.

ADDRESSES: The closed meeting of the Art Advisory Panel will be held at 
999 North Capitol Street NE, Washington, DC 20003.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Maricarmen Cuello, AP:SEPR:AAS, 51 SW 
1st Avenue, Room 1014, Miami, FL 33130. Telephone (305) 982-5364 (not a 
toll free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given pursuant to section 
10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App., that a 
closed meeting of the Art Advisory Panel will be held at 999 North 
Capitol Street NE, Washington, DC 20003.
    The agenda will consist of the review and evaluation of the 
acceptability of fair market value appraisals of works of art involved 
in Federal income, estate, or gift tax returns. This will involve the 
discussion of material in individual tax returns made confidential by 
the provisions of 26 U.S.C. 6103.
    A determination as required by section 10(d) of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act has been made that this meeting is concerned 
with matters listed in sections 552b(c)(3), (4), (6), and (7), of the 
Government in the Sunshine Act, and that the meeting will not be open 
to the public.

Donna Hansberry,
Chief, Appeals.
[FR Doc. 2018-18381 Filed 8-23-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
#### Patrick Mills RAMSEY and Rex Allen Radford, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. U-198 and U-201.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 11, 1974.

Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and David J. Busch, Asst. Public Defender, for appellants.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants were adjudicated guilty and sentenced to ten years imprisonment after having pled guilty to charges of false imprisonment.

We have reviewed the record on appeal and the briefs filed herein, the appellants having failed to file their own briefs within the time previously permitted by this Court. Upon our consideration thereof, we are of the view that appellants have failed to demonstrate reversible error in the judgments appealed herein, and the same are therefore affirmed.

SPECTOR, Acting C. J., and JOHNSON and BOYER, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.11

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

The Board of Directors
Hutchison Telephone Company Limited

    We hereby consent to the use in the Prospectus constituting part of this
Registration Statement on Form S-1 of our report dated May 4, 2000 relating to
the financial statements of Hutchison Telephone Company Limited, which appears
in such Prospectus. We also consent to the reference to us under the heading
"Experts" in such Prospectus.

                                           /s/ PriceWaterhouseCoopers


Certified Public Accountants
Hong Kong
September 14, 2000
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOUND
ON PAGES F-3 AND F-4 OF THE COMPANY'S 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           4,200
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  113,850
<ALLOWANCES>                                     8,580
<INVENTORY>                                     30,126
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               162,504
<PP&E>                                         384,419
<DEPRECIATION>                                  87,993
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 749,742
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          193,325
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           186
<OTHER-SE>                                      96,164
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   749,742
<SALES>                                      1,201,860
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,201,860
<CGS>                                          971,789
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  971,789
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               187,106
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   658
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              37,967
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,998
<INCOME-TAX>                                     8,283
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (3,285)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  2,078
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,363)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.29)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.29)
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3683 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3683

 To amend the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 to permit any loan by 
 an insured depository institution the proceeds of which are used for 
the certified rehabilitation of a certified historical structure to be 
taken into account in connection with an assessment of such institution 
                       for purposes of such Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 22, 1993

   Mr. Peterson of Florida introduced the following bill; which was 
    referred to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 to permit any loan by 
 an insured depository institution the proceeds of which are used for 
the certified rehabilitation of a certified historical structure to be 
taken into account in connection with an assessment of such institution 
                       for purposes of such Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Community Reinvestment Credit for 
Historical Preservation''.

SEC. 2. CRA CREDIT FOR CERTAIN HISTORIC TRUST PRESERVATION FINANCING.

    Section 804 of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (12 U.S.C. 
2903) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(c) Historic Trust Preservation Financing.--In assessing and 
taking into account, under subsection (a), the record of a regulated 
financial institution, the appropriate Federal financial supervisory 
agency shall consider loans made by the institution the proceeds of 
which were used for certified rehabilitations of certified historic 
structures (as such terms are defined in section 47(c) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986).''

                                 <all>
```
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph Clayton SEPULVADO.

No. 59680.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 19, 1977.

James B. O’Neill, Many, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., James L. Davis, Dist. Atty., E. L. Edwards, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
# C_2015057EN.01000401.xml

| 17.2.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 57/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.2.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 57/4

---

Notice for the attention of the data subjects to whom the restrictive measures provided for in Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/240 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine applies

(2015/C 57/05)

The attention of data subjects is drawn to the following information in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1):

1

The legal basis for this processing operation is Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (2), as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/240 (3).

2

3

The controller of this processing operation is the Council of the European Union represented by the Director-General of DG C (Foreign Affairs, Enlargement, Civil Protection) of the General Secretariat of the Council and the department entrusted with the processing operation is the Unit 1C of DG C that can be contacted at:

| Council of the European Union |
| --- |
| General Secretariat |
| DG C 1C |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu |

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

DG C 1C

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

The purpose of the processing operation is the establishment and updating of the list of persons subject to restrictive measures in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, as implemented by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/240.

The data subjects are the natural persons who fulfil listing criteria as laid down in that Regulation.

The personal data collected includes data necessary for the correct identification of the person concerned, the Statement of Reasons and any other data related thereto.

The personal data collected may be shared as necessary with the European External Action Service and the Commission.

Without prejudice to restrictions provided for in Article 20(1)(a) and (d) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001, requests for access, as well as requests for rectification or objection will be answered in accordance with section 5 of Council Decision 2004/644/EC (4).

4

Personal data will be retained for 5 years from the moment the data subject has been removed from the list of persons subject to the asset freeze or the validity of the measure has expired, or for the duration of court proceedings in the event they had been started.

Data subjects may have recourse to the European Data Protection Supervisor in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.

---

(1)  OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1.

1

(2)  OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 6.

2

(3)  OJ L 40, 16.2.2015, p. 7.

3

(4)  OJ L 296, 21.9.2004, p. 16.

4

---
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 S.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10-K for the year ended March 26, 2004, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Kelly Tacke,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350,
as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.78m
or 78o(d); and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company. By:
    
    /s/ Kelly TackeKelly Tacke, Chief Financial Officer(Chief Financial and Accounting Officer)May 3, 2004
# C_2014281EN.01000401.xml

| 23.8.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 281/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.8.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 281/4

---

Adoption of Commission Decision on the notification by Finland of a transitional national plan referred to in Article 32 of Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions

2014/C 281/05

On 10 March 2014, the Commission adopted Commission Decision C(2014) 1423 on the notification by the Republic of Finland of a transitional national plan referred to in Article 32 of Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (1).

1

This document is available on the following internet site: https://circabc.europa.eu/w/browse/36205e98-8e7a-47d7-808d-931bc5baf6ee

---

(1)  OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17.

1

---
#### TESTON v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD CO.

No. 37027.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 1968.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 204 So.2d 268.
#### Donald C. Brown, Respondent, v Timothy F. Schultz et al., Appellants.

[735 NYS2d 254]

Cardona, P.J.

Appeal from *628an order of the Supreme Court (Rumsey, J.), entered July 2, 2001 in Cortland County, which denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for personal injuries sustained when he was struck by an automobile driven by defendant Timothy F. Schultz. The accident occurred in the parking lot of a convenience store as plaintiff walked from the gas pumps to the store entrance. Following joinder of issue, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied by Supreme Court prompting this appeal.

We affirm. In support of their motion, defendants submitted, inter alia, the affidavits of Schultz and the store clerk in which each alleged that plaintiff jumped out in front of Schultz’ vehicle. They further offered plaintiff’s deposition testimony indicating that he did not know how the accident happened. This evidence was sufficient to meet defendants’ initial burden on their motion *(see,*CPLR 3212 [b]). In response, plaintiff submitted, inter alia, an affidavit wherein he specifically denied jumping out in front of Schultz’ vehicle. Furthermore, although plaintiff did testify that he did not know how the accident happened, he, nevertheless, stated that he looked both ways before walking towards the store entrance and did not see any approaching vehicles. Moreover, the record contains Schultz’ deposition wherein he testified that he was well aware of the existence of pedestrian traffic from the gas pumps to the store but never saw plaintiff until after the collision. In his report filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles, Schultz stated that his vehicle came around a corner when plaintiff stepped out from behind a parked van and Schultz could not stop.

The evidence raises factual issues, including, inter alia, the manner in which the accident happened and whether Schultz exercised reasonable care as he drove between the gas pumps and the convenience store, an area he knew was frequented by pedestrians. Given the existence of triable issues that cannot be resolved as a matter of law *(see, Persaud v Shark Patrol,*267 AD2d 41), Supreme Court properly denied defendants’ motion.

Mercure, Carpinello, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-29-2000             APR-28-2001
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-25-1999             APR-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1999             JUL-29-2000
<CASH>                                           6,710                   8,379
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   49,845                 100,594
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                     42,741                  56,342
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               105,088                 196,579
<PP&E>                                          69,755                 101,827
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 247,417                 389,163
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           60,477                 192,215
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           36,658                  42,149
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                             1                       1
<OTHER-SE>                                    (48,602)                (82,127)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   247,417                 389,163
<SALES>                                         54,807                 110,753
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0                       0
<CGS>                                           36,116                  83,919
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   19,570                  25,610
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,912                   5,779
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (5,433)                 (4,480)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       381                     810
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,814)                 (5,290)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,814)                 (5,290)
<EPS-BASIC>                                 (6,687.90)              (6,276.08)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0                       0


</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

 

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2014 (the “Report”) of New Mountain Finance Corporation (the “Registrant”), as filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, David M. Cordova, the Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that:

 

(1)                                 The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

(2)                                 The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

 
| /s/ DAVID M. CORDOVA |                  |
|----------------------|-----------------------|
|                 |                  |
| Name:                | David   M. Cordova    |   |
| Date:                | August 6,   2014 |   |

 

----
#### Milton L. HELIN, Appellant, v. Rayonelle M. HELIN, Appellee.

Nos. 70-1132-70-1134.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 5, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Appeals dismissed.
#### Henderson N. Kelley, Defendant in Error, *v.*Hiram Blackledge, Plaintiff in Error.

*Referee*— Report *of set aside, when.*— To authorize a court to set aside a report made by a Referee, there ought to be at least evidence that the finding was unjust, or an affidavit of merits by the party attacking the report.

*Error to Sle. Genevieve Circuit Court.*

*Robbins, Clardy & Cahoon,*for Plaintiff in Error.

Adams, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a suit for settlement of a partnership account between plaintiff and defendant.

The case was referred to a Referee to take the account, who set a time for hearing the case, and being sick adjo'urned it to another day.

The defendant failed to appear at the appointed day, and the Referee proceeded *ex parte,*and reported in favor of plaintiff for several hundred dollars.

The defendant excepted to the report upon the ground that no notice had been given of the appointed day, or of the adjournment, and on the trial of the exceptions evidence was given on both sides in regard to the notice and adjournment.

*114The evidence was contradictory, and the court upon the evidence given, overruled the exceptions. There was no evidence given, or affidavits made, of any meritorious defense against the result found by the Referee. The plaintiff remitted one hundred and twenty-five dollars of the amount found, and the court thereupon confirmed the'report and gave judgment for the balance.

The exceptions seem to have been fairly passed on by the Court, and we see no reason to disturb the judgment. To authorize a court to set aside a report .made hy a Referee, there ought at least to be evidence that the finding was unj ust, or an affidavit of merits by the party attacking the report.

Judgment affirmed.

Judge Wagner concurs. Judge Bliss absent.
#### Joe W. McKINNEY v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 46791.

Supreme Court of Mississipi.

April 3, 1972.

Walter M. O’Barr, Okolona, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Timmie Hancock, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

BRADY, Justice.

After a careful review of the record in this cause and the legal issues presented by the briefs of counsel, we reach the conclusion that the cases of Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971) and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, not only factually but also with reference to the punishment involved. In Tate v. Short there was no provision in the statute permitting imprisonment. The punishment consisted only in the imposition of a fine. In Williams v. Illinois, while fine and imprisonment were permissible under the statute, the limitation as to the maximum time of imprisonment was exceeded. This came about because the appellant was given the maximum time of imprisonment which was then extended because the indigent appellant could not pay the fine and costs. In the case at bar, by the imposition of the fine of $100 the appellant could never be required to remain in jail longer than the statutory maximum period of ninety days.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Chickasaw County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GILLESPIE, C. J., and PATTERSON, SMITH and SUGG, JJ., concur.
Georgia Department of Natural ResourcesCoastal ResourcesEnvironmental ProtectionHistoric PreservationState Parks and Historic SitesSustainabilityWildlife Resources

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