NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

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IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., C.R., and K.R.

No. 1 CA

- JV 23

- 0205

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015JD202200092 The Honorable Rick A. Williams
, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL
Harris & Winger
, P

. C

. , Flagstaff By Chad Joshua Winger Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office
, Tucson By Autumn Spritzer C ounsel for Appellee Arizona Department of Child Safety FILED 06-13-2024IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., et al. Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

W I L L I A M S , Judge:

¶1 Michael R. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACT UAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Amanda R. (“Mother”) 1 have three children in

common, born in 2011, 2013, and 2016
, respectively

. ¶3 In June 2022, the Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took tem porary custody of the c hildren and petitioned for dependency due to the parents’ neglect, ongoing substance abuse, and history of domestic violence

. One month later , t he juvenile court adjudicated the c hildren dependent and affirmed their placement in DCS custody

. ¶4 During the dependency, DCS offered the parents

r eunification services , including ca s e management, child and family team meetings, individual counseling, parenting classes, parenting time, substance abuse treatment, drug testing, team decision

- making meetings, and transportation.

¶5 Father minimally engaged in these services. Early in the dependency, DCS referred him to the Arizona Families F.I.R.S.T. (“AFF”) program for substance abuse treatment

. Though h e completed an intake in July 2022, he did not participate further in th e program

. ¶6 DCS also referred Father to Physician Services, Inc. (“ PSI ”) for drug testing

. Father tested twice in July 2022

. His first test was positive for amphetamine
, methamphetamine
, and THC

. His second test was positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. H e did not test again for over a year

.

1 Mother also appealed the juvenile court’s termination order. However,

a fter she failed to file an opening brief, we dismissed her appeal.IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., et al. Decision of the Court

3 ¶7 In August 2022, Father enrolled with Mohave Mental Health Clinic, Inc. (“MMHC”) for substance abuse services. At MMHC, he participated sporadically in drug counseling and group meetings for about six months

. In February 2023, he told a therapist he had a lengthy history of abusing methamphetamine, that he had suffered two heart attacks because of his drug use, and that his longest period of sobriety in the past twenty

- five years was approximately seven days. Father was admitted into a high

- intensity residential t reatment program. But a fter just five days
, he left the program

. Ultimately, the only service Fat he r completed through MMHC was a parenting class, which he finished in April 2023.

¶8 In May 2023, the juvenile court changed the case plan from family reunifica tion to severance and adoption. Two weeks later, DCS

mo ved to terminate Father’s parental rights , alleging two statutory grounds as a basis : (1) the children’s out

- of

- home placement for nine months and (2) Father’s substance abuse. See A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(8)( a )
, (3).

¶9 That same month
, both parents moved to the Phoenix area and enrolled in an out

- patient substance abuse treatment program offered by Frontline Empire , LLC (“Frontline”)

. Father began to attend group therapy at Frontline in June . In July, he started individual counseling and completed a psychiatric evaluation

. ¶10 In August 2023, t he juvenile court held a termination adjudication hearing

. Though the court commended the parents for engaging in substance abuse serv ices “ for approximately three months ” before trial, it also noted the parents “had multiple opportunities during the case to show sobriety and stability
, ” but had not yet done so. The court found that DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to provide the parents with appropriate reunification services and that “neither Mother nor Father ha [d] completed any portion of their case plan with respect to addressing their significant substance abuse hi story.” The court terminat ed both parents’ rights to their children

. ¶11 Father timely appeal ed

. W e have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9
, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8

- 235(A)
, 12

- 120.21(A)(1), and 12

- 2101(A)(1)

.
DISCUSSION

¶12 Before terminat ing parent s ’ rights to their children , a court must find at least one statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B) by clear and convincing evidence
, Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. , 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000)
, and that termination is in the child ren ’s best interests by aIN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., et al. Decision of the Court

4 preponderance of the evidence
, Kent K. v. Bobby M. , 210 Ariz. 279, 288
, ¶ 41 (2005). We will “affirm a termination order unless the juvenile court abuses its discretion or the court’s findings a re not supported by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety , 252 Ariz. 470, 474, ¶ 14 (2022) ; Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety , 255 Ariz. 471, 478 , ¶ 30 (2023). We do not reweigh the evidence, but instead “look only to determine if the re is evidence to sustain the court’s ruling.” Mary Lou C

. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. , 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004)

.

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court ’s Best

- Interests Finding

. ¶13 Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that statutory grounds existed to terminate his parental rights under A.R.S. §§ 8

- 533 (B) ( 3) and ( B)(8)(a)

. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety
, 241 Ariz. 576, 577, ¶ 5 (App. 2017) (finding that by failing to challenge a ground for termination , the parent “abandoned and waived any contention that the court erred in granting severance on that basis”)

. Instead, Father only challenges the juvenile court’s finding that termination of hi s parental rights was in the c hildren’s best interests.

¶14 In determining the children’s best interests, the court must consider the totality of circumstances at the time of the termination adjudication hearing, including the child ren ’s adoptability and the parents ’ rehabilitation. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety , 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018)

. The court must also consider whether the child ren will benefit from the termination or be harmed if the relationship continued. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F. , 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 16 (2016).

A. The Juvenile Court’s Benefit Finding

¶15 Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding the c hildren would benefit from termination of his parental rights merely b ecause they we re “adoptable” and in “ potential adoptive placement [ s ]

. ” Relying on Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety
, Fat he r asserts that adoptability alone is insufficient to establish a benefit from termination and the court must also determine that a child’s adoption is likely

. 244 Ariz. 365, 370

– 71, ¶ 22 (App. 2018).

¶16 The juvenile court may find a child would benefit from termination if there is an adoption plan or if the child is adoptable. Alma S.
, 245 Ariz. at 150

– 51, ¶ 13. The court may also find that a child will benefit from “the stability an adoption would provide[.]” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS

- 501904 , 180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994). Thus, when a prospectiveIN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., et al. Decision of the Court

5 adoptive placement is meeting the child’s needs and the child’s adoption is both legally possible and likely, the court may find that termination of the parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Demetrius L. , 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 12.

¶17 In this case , the record support s the juvenile court’s findi n gs that the c hildren will benefit from the termination of the parent

- child relationship

. T he DCS case manager testified the c hildren a re adoptable
, that they are in adoptive placements, and that one of the placement s i s willing to adopt all three children

. The case ma n ager further testified that,

e ven if the c hildren could not all be adopted by the same placement, the placements a re committed to maintaining the c hildren’s relationship s with each other after the adoptions. This testimony supports the court’s find ing that the c hildren were adoptable and in adoptive placements. From this testimony the court could reasonably infer that the proposed adoption , or adoptions, were legally possible and likely to occur if the paren t

- child relationship s were terminated

. See id. at 3, ¶ 9

. ¶18 Relying on Titus S. , Father contend s a child’s adoptability is irrelevant unless the court finds a “return to [the] parent is unlikely

. ” 244 Ariz. at 370

– 71, ¶ 22. He argues the court could not have found that a return to the parent was “ unlikely ” because DCS never attempted to preserve the family unit and the court did not consider his recent sobriety.

¶19 H is argument fails for several reasons. First , Titus S. does not support hi s contention that the juvenile court must consider whether a “return to parent is unlikely” before concluding a child will benefit from adoption

. 244 Ariz. at 370

– 71, ¶ 22. Second, by failing to challenge grounds for termination , he has conceded the court’s finding that DCS “made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services[.]” Moreover, Fat he r fails to identify any additional reunification services he believes DCS should have offered him , but did not, to preserve th e family

. Third, the
court did not ignore Father’s participation in substance abuse services at the time of the termination adjudication hearing

. To the contrary, the court commended the parents for engaging in treatment

. B ut the court also

cons idered other factors, including the c hildren’s out

- of

- home placement for over a year and evidence that the parents “ had multiple opportunities during the case to show sobriety and stability and yet [had] not done so [.]”

¶20 On this record, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding the c hildren would benefit from termination of the parent

- child relationshi p.IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., et al. Decision of the Court

6 B. The Juvenile Court ’ s Detriment Finding

¶21 Father next challenges the juvenile court’s finding the

c hildren would be harmed if the parent

- child relationship continued. He argues the record showed the c hildren are bonded to him and, therefore, the court erred b y conc luding that an ongoing parent

- child relationship would harm the c hildren

. ¶22 T he juvenile court , however, expressly considered Father’s bond , as well as the c hildren ’s desire to reunify with their parents

. Although a bonded relationship is a factor for the court to consider, it is not dispositive in addressing the children’s best interests. See Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety , 240 Ariz. 96, 9 8

– 9 9, ¶ 12 (App. 2016)

. Against this famil ial bond, the court considered other factors including the fact the

c hildren had “suffered for years” due to Father’s “inability to provide a safe, stable home” and his neglect of their “medical, dental, emotional, and educational needs.” In weighing the evid ence, the court conclude d “the children deserve to have the opportunity to thrive in a safe, sober, and stable environment” and that if t he court were to deny the termination, the

c hildren “will be at risk of future abuse or neglect.”

¶23 Father asserts this finding was error because there is no real risk for further harm or neglect to the c hildren because DCS , as the ir legal custodian, can protect them from harm while he establishe s so briety

. But accepting his contention t hat the c hildren should remain in DCS care until he can show he is sober would leave them in foster care for an indefinite period. Arizona law recognizes that long

- term foster care can be harmful to children. S ee Timothy B. , 252 Ariz. at 476, ¶ 23 ( explaining that “the legislature’s intent to avoid having children linger in foster care echoes throughout other grounds justifying termination in § 8

- 533(B),” including (B)(3) and (B)(8)). And “ a child’s interest in permanency must prevail over a parent’s uncertain battle with drugs.” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety , 240 Ariz. 282, 287
, ¶ 17 (App. 2016)

. ¶24 Additionally, by not challenging the court’s A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(3) finding, Father has conceded he was “unable to discharge [his] parental responsibilities because of

. . . chronic abuse of dangerous drugs
, and alcohol
, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that t he condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding the c hildren would suffer a detriment if they maintained a parent

- child relationship with Father

.IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.R., et al. Decision of the Court

7 C. The Children’s Right to F amilial Integrity

¶25 Father also argues the juvenile court must consider the

c hildren’s fundamental liberty interest in an intact family as part of its best

- interests analysis

. He cites Kent K. for the position that “until a court finds grounds for termination, [the] parent and child ‘share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.’” 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35 ( quoting Stantosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) )

. ¶26 Father offers no legal authority to show he has standing to challenge the children’s fundamental liberty interests once his parental rights were terminated

. See In re O.M. , 254 Ariz. 543 , 545, ¶ 9 ( App. 2023) ( “ A parent lacks standing to challenge a child’s placement once parental rights are terminated.” ). Regardless , t he finding of a statutory ground to terminate parental rights is synonymous to a finding of parental unfitness. Alma S. , 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 9. Thus, in the best

- interests s tage of the analysis
, “[t]he weight of the presumption that the child shares the parent’s interest in preserving the family relationship is greatly reduced by the potential harm to the child from maintaining a relationship with an unfit parent.” Kent K. , 210 Ariz. at 285
, ¶ 31 (citations omitted). T he court’s “foremost concern” then becomes “the child’s interest in stability and security

. ” Jessie D. v. Dep’ t of Child Safety , 251 Ariz. 574, 583, ¶ 27 (2021) ( quotations and citations omitted ). Here, the juve nile court carefully considered the totality of the circumstances

— including evidence of the c hildren’s bond to their parents and their desire to return home

— in determining that termination of parental rights was in the c hildren’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶27 Read as a whole, Father’s arguments on appeal request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Because reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s best

- interests finding
, we affirm the court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights.