Opinion filed April 3, 2014

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals ____________

No. 11-13-00301-CV

____________

IN THE INTEREST OF L.J.P., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 318th District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. FM 55,417

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The trial court entered an order that terminated the parental rights of both the 

mother and the father of L.J.P. The mother, Appellant, has filed a notice of

appeal.1 In her single issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the finding that termination is in the best interest of L.J.P. We 

affirm. 

Termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2013). To determine on 

appeal if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we review 

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The father did not appeal.
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all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether 

a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding 

was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the 

evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine 

whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 

S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). 

To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in 

Section 161.001(1)(A)–(T) and that termination is in the best interest of the child. 

FAM. § 161.001. In this case, the trial court found that Appellant committed two of 

the acts listed in Section 161.001(1). The trial court found that Appellant had 

knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or 

surroundings that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child and

that Appellant had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons 

who engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s physical or emotional wellbeing. See id. § 161.001(1)(D), (E). Appellant does not challenge the findings 

made pursuant to Section 161.001(1). Either of these unchallenged findings was

sufficient to support termination as long as termination was shown to be in the 

child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001. The trial court also found that termination 

was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(2). 

The question before us is whether the best interest finding is supported by 

legally and factually sufficient evidence. With respect to the best interest of a 

child, no unique set of factors need be proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). But courts may use the non-exhaustive 

Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 

(Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to, (1) the desires of the child, 
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(2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the 

emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental 

abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist 

these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child 

by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home 

or proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate 

that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse 

for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one 

or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating 

that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. 

The Department of Family and Protective Services originally became 

involved with L.J.P. in August 2011, when drug tests taken upon her birth were 

positive for amphetamine and methadone. Appellant admitted that she had used 

heroin about one week prior to L.J.P.’s birth. The Department determined that the 

parents’ home was inappropriate and dangerous. The parents failed to perform the 

family-based safety services and, after the Department initiated an emergency 

removal, absconded with L.J.P. After six months of attempting to locate L.J.P., the

Department dismissed the case.

About one year after the parents absconded with L.J.P., the parents and 

L.J.P. were discovered in a van in a parking lot. Officer Reymundo Tobar was 

directed to the van when he responded to a report of a female staggering with a 

baby in the parking lot. Officer Tobar observed L.J.P.’s parents, unclothed, in the 

driver’s seat of the van, having sex. L.J.P., who was approximately eighteen 

months old, was standing next to her parents while they were engaging in 

intercourse. It was cold and rainy, and L.J.P. was wearing only a diaper. A 

syringe that had no top on it and, thus, had an exposed needle was located on the 

floor of the van “right where the child was standing.” This syringe contained a 
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black substance that was later determined to be heroin. The van contained a total 

of thirty-six syringes; two small bags of bath salts; “old, old food”; and dirty 

clothes. Two more small bags were discovered on the father when he was 

searched at the jail. The father told officers these bags contained speed, bath salts, 

and heroin. Officer Tobar testified that both of L.J.P.’s parents were fidgety and 

sweaty and appeared to be under the influence of some type of substance.

Appellant was incarcerated at the time of the final termination hearing, but 

she participated in the hearing via telephone. The record shows that Appellant had 

been convicted of interference with child custody, possession of a controlled 

substance (twice), and endangering a child. Appellant testified that her projected 

parole date is November 20, 2014. Appellant refuted Officer Tobar’s allegations

regarding the incident in the parking lot. She testified that she was not having 

intercourse in the van; that she was not under the influence of narcotics; that there 

were no syringes on the floor of the van near L.J.P.; and that, to her knowledge, 

there were no drugs in the van.

Prior to L.J.P.’s birth, Appellant had had a son, and her rights to that child 

had been terminated. Shortly after the parents’ arrest in this case, the Department 

placed L.J.P. in the same home as her brother. L.J.P.’s foster parents had adopted 

L.J.P.’s brother and were also interested in adopting L.J.P. L.J.P., who was two 

years old at the time of trial, was doing well in her placement. Two Department 

employees testified that they believed it would be in the best interest of L.J.P. for 

the parents’ rights to be terminated. The child’s guardian ad litem also 

recommended termination and stated that it would be in L.J.P.’s best interest to 

terminate the parental rights of both Appellant and the father and to permit 

adoption by the current foster parents.

The record shows that Appellant had engaged in a course of conduct that 

endangered L.J.P., that Appellant had not demonstrated an ability to meet L.J.P.’s 
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needs, that L.J.P. was doing well in her current placement, that the current 

placement was stable, and that the circumstances in this case were “pretty severe.” 

We cannot hold that the trial court’s best interest finding is not supported by clear 

and convincing evidence; the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief 

or conviction that it would be in L.J.P.’s best interest for Appellant’s parental 

rights to be terminated. The evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to 

support the best interest finding. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue. 

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

JOHN M. BAILEY

JUSTICE

April 3, 2014

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.