J-S73033-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

JAMES W. HOUSEMAN, III, :

:

Appellant : No. 434 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered on February 27, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County,

Civil Division, No. 2010-SU-0000536

BEFORE: BOWES, WECHT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 31, 2014

James W. Houseman, III (“Houseman”) appeals, pro se, from the 

Order denying his Petition to Set Aside Sheriff’s Sale (hereinafter “Petition to 

Set Aside”) in this mortgage foreclosure action. We affirm.

The trial court judge, the Honorable Thomas R. Campbell (“Judge 

Campbell”), set forth the relevant factual and procedural history underlying 

this appeal as follows:

On March 30, 2010, GMAC Mortgage, LLC [“GMAC”,]

commenced an action in mortgage foreclosure against 

[Houseman] on property located at 485 Basehoar School Road, 

Littlestown, PA 17340 [hereinafter referred to as “the Property”]. 

Judgment was entered against [Houseman] on May 14, 2010. 

Sheriff[’]s sale of the [P]roperty was stayed multiple times. On 

December 1, 2011, the [J]udgment entered on May 14, 2010 

was stricken[,] and on January 10, 2012, [Houseman] filed a

praecipe to substitute verification. Judgment was again entered 

against [Houseman] on July 2, 2012. Thereafter, Sheriff[’]s sale 

of the [P]roperty was stayed several more times upon motion by 

[Houseman].
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On September 17, 2013, [Houseman] filed a pro se

Emergency Motion for Stay of Sheriff[’]s Sale to postpone the 

sale scheduled for September 20, 2013. Th[e trial c]ourt 

ordered that the sale be stayed until November 15, 2013. A 

status conference was held on November 6, 2013, after which 

th[e trial c]ourt entered an [O]rder postponing the Sheriff[’]s 

sale until January 17, 2014[,] and directing that the sheriff “readvertise the date and time of the sale in accordance with 

normal advertising Rules contained in the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Civil Procedure.” (Trial Court Order, 11/06/13 [(hereinafter 

referred to as the “Re-advertisement Order”)]). The [Readvertisement] Order also stated that “[GMAC] shall notify 

[Houseman] of the status of [Houseman’s] HAMP [Home 

Affordable Modification Program] application and any other 

available loan modification opportunities as discussed by the 

parties no later than January 7, 2014.” ([Re-advertisement] 

Order, 11/06/13). On January 15, 2014, [Houseman] filed a pro 

se Emergency Motion for Stay of Sheriff[’]s sale[,] which th[e 

trial c]ourt denied on January 16, 2014. Sale of the [P]roperty 

took place on January 17, 2014.

On January 28, 2014, [Houseman] filed a counseled 

Petition to Set Aside ..., alleging that [GMAC] failed to comply 

with Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 3129.2[1] and 

3129.3.[2] [GMAC] responded with its Answer to [Houseman’s] 

Petition to Set Aside ... on February 18, 2014. A hearing was 

held on the [P]etition [to Set Aside] on February 26, 2014, after 

which th[e trial c]ourt denied the [P]etition and found that 

[Houseman] had notice of the sale, advertising occurred in 

accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the [Readvertisement] Order did not require re-posting of the 

[P]roperty.

 

1 Rule 3129.2 governs the general notice requirements for a Sheriff’s sale, 

and provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Notice of the sale of real 

property shall be given by handbills as provided by subdivision (b), by 

written notice as provided by subdivision (c) to all persons whose names and 

addresses are set forth in the affidavit required by Rule 3129.1, and by 

publication as provided by subdivision (d).” Pa.R.C.P. 3129.2(a). 

2 Rule 3129.3 governs the notice requirements where the scheduled Sheriff’s 

sale is a postponed sale. Rule 3129.3 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

“Except as provided by subdivision (b) or special order of court, new notice 

shall be given as provided by Rule 3129.2 if a sale of real property is stayed, 

continued, postponed or adjourned.” Pa.R.C.P. 3129.3(a).
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[Houseman timely] filed a pro se Notice of Appeal on 

March 6, 2014, followed by a Concise Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal on March 28, 2014.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/14, at 1-2 (footnotes added).

On appeal, Houseman presents the following issues for our review:

1. Was the [Re-advertisement] Order ... too ambiguous to be 

enforceable[?]

2. When the [trial] court chose to use the word “advertise[,]” 

when advertise is not even part of [Pa.R.C.P.] 3129.2 (the 

word “publicize” is)[,] did the court’s [Re-advertisement

O]rder lack the specifics necessary to be enforceable[?]

3. Must a “special order” reflect on the record as a “special” 

order of court to be legally enforceable[?]

4. Did the [trial] court abuse it’s [sic] discretion in denying 

[the Peti]tion to Set Aside [] based on [the] previous 

history of the case[?]

Brief for Appellant at 5 (issues renumbered for ease of disposition, some 

capitalization omitted).3 

Regarding our review of an order denying a petition to set aside a 

Sheriff’s sale, this Court has explained as follows:

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3132 provides: 

Setting Aside Sale

 

3 We note that this Court’s docket reveals that Houseman was still residing 

at the Property when he filed his appellate brief. Additionally, though the 

record is not entirely clear on this point, it appears that Houseman did not 

make any payments toward his mortgage after his final payment in October 

2009, five months prior to GMAC’s filing of its Complaint in mortgage 

foreclosure. Houseman also conceded in his filings that the amount required 

to reinstate his mortgage was $24,500. See Motion for Stay of Sheriff’s 

Sale, 10/20/10, at 5 (unnumbered).
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Upon petition of any party in interest before delivery of ... 

the sheriff’s deed to real property, the court may, upon 

proper cause shown, set aside the sale and order a resale 

or enter any other order which may be just and proper 

under the circumstances.

[Pa.R.C.P. 3132.]

Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether proper cause has 

been shown to set aside the sheriff’s sale. The decision to set 

aside a sheriff’s sale is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court. A petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale is based on 

equitable principles. The burden of proving circumstances 

warranting the exercise of the court’s equitable powers is on the 

petitioner, and the request to set aside a sheriff’s sale may be 

refused due to insufficient proof to support the allegations in the 

petition. Sheriff’s sales have been set aside where the validity of 

the sale proceedings is challenged, a deficiency pertaining to the 

notice of the sale exists, or where misconduct occurs in the 

bidding process. This [C]ourt will not reverse the trial court’s 

decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Irwin Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Famous, 4 A.3d 1099, 1102 (Pa. 

Super. 2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Initially, we observe that the trial court noted in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

Opinion that it could deem all of Houseman’s issues to be waived, stating 

that “[d]ue to the format of [Houseman’s court-ordered Rule 1925(b)] 

Concise Statement[,4] and [Houseman’s] failure to clearly identify the issues 

he seeks to raise, th[e trial c]ourt is unable to ascertain the precise issues 

[Houseman] is pursuing on appeal.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/14, at 2 

(footnote added); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) and (vii) (providing, 

respectively, that “[t]he [Concise] Statement shall concisely identify each 

 

4 Houseman’s pro se Concise Statement is four pages long, and is in 

narrative form. See Concise Statement, 3/28/14.
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ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to 

identify all pertinent issues for the judge[,]” and that “[i]ssues not included 

in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this 

paragraph [] are waived.”). Nevertheless, the trial court declined to find 

waiver on this basis, and we will do likewise.

Moreover, we note that in Houseman’s appellate brief and reply brief, 

he fails to cite to any law whatsoever, aside from the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Civil Procedure discussed above concerning the notice requirements for 

Sheriff’s sales.5 Houseman’s Argument section is also undeveloped.6 We 

caution Houseman that we could also deem his issues waived on this basis. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (mandating that an appellant develop an argument 

with citation to and analysis of relevant legal authority); Umbelina v. 

Adams, 34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that “[w]here an 

appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to 

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful 

fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” (citation omitted)); see 

also Kovalev v. Sowell, 839 A.2d 359, 367 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2003) (stating 

 

5 Houseman states that he “would agree that he has not presented 

supporting citations[,] but only because this is simply a case of common 

sense[,] and by ignoring common sense[,] the trial court has abused its 

discretion and exercised judgment that is manifestly unreasonable.” Reply 

Brief for Appellant at 5. 

6 Although Houseman includes a slightly more developed Summary of 

Argument section in his appellate brief and reply brief, he advances in both 

briefs merely a few sentences of argument. See Brief for Appellant at 9-10; 

Reply Brief for Appellant at 6-7.
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that, while this Court can liberally construe materials filed by a pro se

litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant). 

However, we decline to find waiver and, like the trial court, will briefly 

address the merits of Houseman’s issues.

We address Houseman’s first three issues simultaneously, as they are 

related. Houseman summarizes his argument concerning these issues as 

follows:

Judge Campbell chose to use the word “advertise” in his [Readvertisement O]rder[.] The word “advertise” does not even 

appear in P[a.R.C.P.] 3129.2. [Houseman] interpreted[,] 

through statements made by Judge Campbell [at the status 

conference] on November 6, 2013[,] that to re-advertise was 

all[-]inclusive of all rules of P[a.R.C.P.] 3129.2 and forms of 

notice, posting, publicizing, serving[,] etc. [] [u]nder P[a.R.C.P.] 

3129.2. At the hearing on [Houseman’s Petition] to Set Aside[, 

GMAC] argued[,] and Judge Campbell agreed[,] in hindsight[, 

that the Re-advertisement Order] was in fact a “special order of 

court[,]” although not specified as such at that time. 

[Houseman] would disagree and argue[,] through transcripts of 

November 6, 2013[, that the Re-advertisement O]rder was very 

clear and not a “special” order, that [the Re-advertisement 

O]rder was a response in agreement with [Houseman’s] Motion 

to [S]tay [S]ale ...[,] and that[,] as a result[,] a gross 

miscarriage of justice has occurred[.]

Brief for Appellant at 7 (emphasis in original, some capitalization omitted); 

see also Reply Brief for Appellant at 4-5 (same).

As noted above, Rule 3129.3 governs the required notice procedure 

where, as here, the Sheriff’s sale is a postponed sale, and provides, in 

relevant part, that “[e]xcept as provided by ... special order of court, new 

notice shall be given as provided by Rule 3129.2 if a sale of real property is 

stayed, continued, postponed or adjourned.” Pa.R.C.P. 3129.3(a) (emphasis 
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added); see also Pa.R.C.P. 3129.3 cmt. (providing that “[t]he [special order 

of court] exception ... gives the court discretion to allow postponement of the 

sale without new notice in appropriate cases.”).

Judge Campbell addressed Houseman’s claims in the court’s Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) Opinion as follows:

This [c]ourt’s [Re-advertisement] Order postponing [the] 

Sheriff[’]s sale to January 17, 2014[,] directed that “[t]he Sheriff 

shall re-advertise the date and time of the sale in accordance 

with normal advertising Rules.” ([Re-advertisement] Order, 

11/06/13). In his Petition to Set Aside ..., [Houseman] did not 

contend that the [Re-advertisement O]rder was not a “special 

order” pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 3129.3. Instead, [Houseman], 

through counsel, argued that the meaning of re-advertising 

included the requirement that the sheriff re-post notice of the 

sale at the property. “Issues not raised in the lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Accordingly, [Houseman] has not preserved 

this issue for appeal.

Further, even if the issue had been preserved, it is 

meritless. The exception to the new notice requirement in Rule 

3129.3(a) is applicable where a court order “authorize[s] a 

special notice procedure outside the ambit of the general rule.” 

In re Porovne, 436 B.R. 791, 801 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010).

Because th[e Re-advertisement] Order modified the 

requirements for notice of a Sheriff[’]s sale delineated in 

Pa.R.C.P. 3129.2[,] by requiring only advertisement rather than 

notice to [Houseman] or posting on [the P]roperty, the Order 

functioned as a special order of court.

[Houseman] does not and cannot allege that he did not 

receive actual notice of the Sheriff[’]s sale that took place on 

January 17, 2014. He was present at the November 6, 2013 

status conference[,] during which the Sheriff[’]s sale was 

postponed to the January date. [Houseman] also subsequently 

received th[e Re-advertisement] Order[,] which stated the 

specific date the Sheriff[’]s sale was to take place[,] and 

provided that [GMAC] was to re-advertise the [P]roperty in 

accordance with the rules of civil procedure. Immediately prior 

to the sale date, on January 15, 2014, [Houseman] filed an 
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Emergency Motion for Stay of Sheriff[’]s Sale, indicating that he 

received actual notice of the sale. Accordingly, [Houseman’s] 

ability to protect his interest was not impaired because he was 

fully aware that the Sheriff[’]s sale would take place on January 

17, 2014.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/14, at 5-6. Our review confirms that the trial 

court’s sound rationale is supported by the law and the record.

The trial court’s Re-advertisement Order was a special order of court, 

and there is no merit to Houseman’s claims to the contrary. It is irrelevant 

that the Re-advertisement Order did not contain the word “special,” as 

nowhere in the Rules of Civil Procedure is there such a requirement. The 

Re-advertisement Order governed the notice required for the January 17, 

2014 Sheriff’s sale. Because the Re-advertisement Order constituted a 

special order of court, pursuant to Rule 3129.3(a), the dictates of the 

general notice provision, Rule 3129.2, did not apply,7and the Sheriff was 

authorized to give notice as provided by the Re-advertisement Order.

Houseman also argues that 

the [Re-advertisement O]rder ... required all notices as provided 

in [Rule] 3129.2[,] including but not limited to the posting of 

handbills, by written notice to all persons whose names and 

addresses are set forth in the affidavit required by Rule 3129.1, 

... [and] by posting of the new sale on the [P]roperty .... 

Brief for Appellant at 5. There is no merit to Houseman’s argument, as the 

Re-advertisement Order simply directed the Sheriff to “re-advertise the date 

and time of the sale in accordance with normal advertising Rules.” Re-

 

7 Therefore, contrary to Housman’s assertion, it is wholly irrelevant that Rule 

3129.2 does not contain the word “advertise.”
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advertisement Order, 11/06/13. Pursuant to the Re-advertisement Order 

and the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Sheriff properly advertised the sale of 

the Property by publication.8 If the trial court had intended the Sheriff to 

give the additional forms of notice suggested by Houseman, the court would 

have included such directives in the Re-advertisement Order. See N.T., 

11/6/13, at 6 (wherein Judge Campbell stated, regarding his intention 

concerning the notice required by the Re-advertisement Order, “the Court 

specifically addressed advertising in accordance with the [R]ules [of Civil 

Procedure], not posting or not due notice ....”). Finally, we observe that 

Houseman never raised, in his Petition to Set Aside or otherwise before the 

trial court, his claim on appeal that the Re-advertisement Order lacked the 

requisite specificity to be enforced. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that 

issues not raised in the trial court are waived).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no merit to 

Houseman’s first three allegations of trial court error.

Finally, Houseman argues that 

[t]he [trial] court abuse[d] its discretion in denying [the Peti]tion 

to Set Aside [] based on [the] previous history of the case. 

[Houseman] argues that all prior stays and delays of the sale of 

the [P]roperty were valid and granted by the [trial] court due to 

 

8

In the instant case, the Sheriff advertised the sale of the Property three 

separate times in both the Adams County Legal Journal and Gettysburg 

Times. See Pa.R.C.P. 3129.2(d) (providing that notice shall “be given by 

publication by the sheriff once a week for three successive weeks in one 

newspaper of general circulation in the county and in the legal publication, if 

any, designated by rule of court for publication of notices, the first 

publication to be made not less than twenty-one days before the date of 

sale.”).
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their validity. To argue that the delays were in fact special 

consideration[,] and [Houseman] had run out of special 

consideration[,] represents an abuse of discretion.

Brief for Appellant at 9; see also Reply Brief for Appellant at 6 (same).

The trial court addressed this claim in its Opinion as follows:

[Houseman] claim[s] [] that the [trial c]ourt denied his 

[P]etition [to Set Aside] because [the court] believed [that 

Houseman] had “been given unreasonable leniency by the court 

and basically had enough chances.” (Concise Statement, 

[3/28/14,] p. 2). [Houseman] argues that th[e trial c]ourt 

improperly considered [Houseman’s] many “eleventh hour” 

motions to stay Sheriff[’]s sales. The transcript of the 

proceedings and th[e trial c]ourt’s February 26, 2014 Order 

reveal that [Houseman’s P]etition was denied because [GMAC] 

complied with the requirements in the [Re-advertisement] Order 

postponing the Sheriff[’]s sale[,] and [Houseman] had notice of 

when the sale was to take place. The lengthy case history and 

numerous stays of Sheriff[’]s sale indicated that [Houseman] 

received ample notice of the Sheriff[’]s sale and was aware of 

the status of the case as discussed at the November 6, 2013 

status conference. Such considerations aided th[e trial c]ourt in 

making the equitable determination that the Sheriff[’]s sale 

should not be set aside. Consequently, [Houseman’s] contention 

is meritless.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/14, at 4-5. We agree with the trial court’s sound 

rationale and affirm on this basis with regard to Houseman’s final issue. 

See id.

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly 

exercised its discretion in denying Housman’s Petition to Set Aside, and 

therefore affirm the trial court’s Order dated February 27, 2014.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/31/2014