F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

J O H N W E S L E Y L I W

A N A G C O Q U I C O , P etitioner
,

v

.

L O R E T T A E. L Y

N C H , Attorney General, Respondent

. N o. 09-73867

Ag ency No. A045-903-122

OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals

Arg ued and Submitted October 7, 2014—San F rancisco, California

F iled J une 17, 2015

B efore: Sidney

R. Thomas, Chief J udg e, and Diarmuid F

. O’Scannlain and M. Marg aret McKeown, Circuit Judg e s.

Opinion by J udg e O’ScannlainC O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 2

SUMMARY *

Im m igration

The panel g ranted J ohn Coquico’s p etition for review o f the B oard of I mmig ration Appeals’ decision f inding that his conviction for misdemeanor unla w f ul laser activity

, in violation of California Penal Code § 417.26, is a categ orical crime involving moral turpitude.

The panel concluded that § 417.26 can be viol ated b y conduct which r esembles non-turpitudinous simple assault and has li t t le similarity to turpitudinous terroriz ing threats,

an d held that a violation does not constitute a categ orical CI MT. B ecause the g overnment d id n o t a sk the court to apply the modi f

i ed categ orical approach, the panel considered only whether the categ orical approach was s a tisfied, a nd remanded for further p roceeding s consistent with the opinion.

COUNSEL

H e l i o d oro Moreno, J r., L aw Offices of Robert B

. J obe, San F rancisco, CA, arg ued the cause f or the petitioner. Robert B

. J obe, L aw Offices of Robert B

. J obe, San F rancisco, California, filed the briefs for the petitioner.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.C O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 3

J uria L

. J ones, Office of I mmig ration L itig ation, United States Department of J ustice, W ashing ton, DC, arg ued the

cause for respondent. Tony W est, Assistant Attorney Ge n e ral, U.S. Department of J u stice, Civil D ivision, W a shing ton, DC, filed the briefs for the p etitioner. W ith him

on the briefs were Michelle G. L atour, Assistant Director, a nd Phillip M. Truman
, T r i al A ttorney , U .S. Department o f J ustice, Office of I

mmig ration L itig ation, W ashing ton, DC.

OP INION

O’SCANNL AI

N, Circuit J udg e:

W e must decide whether “unlawful laser activity ” under state law is a crime involving moral turpitude.

I

On September 1, 2 006, J ohn Co q u i c o , a citiz en of the Philippines, was convicted of misdemeanor “unla w f u l laser activity ” in violation o f California Pe nal Code (“Cal. Penal Code”) § 417.26, after using a laser device in the hallway of the A lameda County criminal courthouse. A y ear la t e r , he

was a lso convicted of second de gr e e robbery in violation o f Cal. Penal Code § 211, and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) soug ht his removal under the I mmig r ation and N ationality Act (“ I

NA”) as a

n alien convicted of two o r

more crimes involvin g m oral turpitude (“CI MT”). See I N A § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).

Thoug h a n I mmig ration J udg e (“I J ” ) ag reed w ith the DHS and foun d C o q uico removable, on appeal the B oard o f I mmig r a tion Appeals (“B I A”) f o und the I J ’ s r easoningC O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 4

i n s u f f i cient and remanded the case so she could provide “ a more complete ex planation” of her finding s.

On r emand, the I J ag ain found Coquico removable due to his convictions under Ca l

. Penal Code § 211 and § 417.26. Most relevant h ere, she asserted that “unlawful laser activity ” under § 4 17.26 was a CI MT because it involved the “possession o f weapons w h ich are insidious instruments normally u sed for criminal p u rp o s es,” and that possessing such weapons was “indicative of a readiness to do e vil.” Coquico appealed this decision to the B I A.

On November 24, 2009, the B I A dismissed Coquico’s appeal, c onc l u d i n g h is conviction under § 417.26 was a CI MT b ecause “the c r i m e is committed ag a inst a peace

o fficer a nd the nature of the crime involves using a d e v i c e which g ives the appearance or facade of the use o f a d e a d ly weapon.” The B I A also concluded § 211 was a CI MT.

Coquico d oes not challeng e the c onclusion that the

r obbery is a CI MT. However, he continues to arg ue t h at “unlawful laser activity

” is not morally

turpitudinous.

I I

W h il e w e lack jurisdiction to review “any f inal order o f

r e moval a g ainst an alien who is r emovable by reas o n o f having committed a criminal of f e n s e , ” including a crime o f moral turpit u d e , 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 252(a)(2)(C), 1227(a)(2)(A),

we retain jurisdiction over “constitutional claims or questions of law.” Id. § 125 2 ( a)(2)(D). W h ether a crime involves

m o r a l turpitude is a question of law not subject to t h e jurisdiction-stripping provision of § 1252(a)(2)(C). Uppal v

. Holder , 605 F

. 3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 2010).C O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 5

Determining “whet h e r a conviction under a criminal
statute is c ateg orically a crime of moral turpitude involves
two steps.” Ceron v

. Holder

, 747 F

. 3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 20 1 4) (en banc) (quoting Castrijon-Garcia v

. H older

, 704 F .3d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013) ( internal quotation marks omitted)). “The first step is to identify the elements o f t h e statute o f conviction.” Id

. “The second step i s to compare the el ements of the statute of conviction to the g eneric definition of a crime of moral turpitude and decide whether the conviction meets that definition.” Id

.

A

W e beg in our ex amination of the c onviction under § 4 17.26 by consid er i ng what weig ht to g ive the B I A ’s analy sis of the statute. Thou gh w e r eview the B I A ’s construction of state law de novo, Ceron
, 747 F .3d at 778, we review the B I A’s u n

published interpretation of immig r ation law, including the definition of a CI MT, w ith S k i d more deference. Id. “Under S kidmore

, the m easure of deference

a f f orded to the ag ency varies ‘depend[ ing ] upon t h e thoroug hness evident in its consider a t ion, the validity of its

r e a s o n i n g, i t s c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h e a r l i e r a n d l a t e r pronouncements, and all those factors which g ive it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’” Marmolejo-Campos

v. Holder

, 558 F .3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 200 9 ) (en banc) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
, 3 23 U .S. 134, 1 4 0 (1944)).

1

Here, the B I A’s decision suffers from several defects, the first of which is its inco r rect description of § 417.26 a s requiring the use of “a device which g ives the appearance o r facade of the u se of a deadly weapon.” Not only d oes § 417.2C O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 6

not discuss “deadly weapons,” but its prohibition of the use of any laser pointer

—not just laser targ eting d evices—belies the c laim that it only reg u lates instruments th a t appear deadly

. 1 B y includin g l a s er pointers within its ambit, § 4 1 7

. 26 g oes bey ond the reg ulation of laser targ eting
sy stems that c ould be i n t e g r a ted with deadly firearms. The
statute prohibits aiming or pointing “a laser scope as defined in subdivision (b) o f Section 417.25, or a l a s e r p ointer, a s de fi n e d i n subdivision (c) of that section.” Cal. Penal Code § 417.26 (emphasis added). A l a s er scope, a s defined in § 417.2 5(b), is “ capable of being attached to a firearm a nd

ca p a b l e o f p rojecting a laser lig ht on objects at a distance,” but a “ laser p ointer” is d efined in § 417.25(c) as merely “any hand held laser beam device or demonstration laser product.” Cal. Penal Code § 417.25 (emphasis added). Such handheld laser demonstration devices a re c ertainly not associated with “deadly weapons.”

1 T h e f u ll tex t o f Cal. P en al Co de § 4 1 7 .2 6 states th at:

( a ) A n y p erso n w

h o aim s o r po in ts a laser sco p e as d ef in ed in su b d iv isio n (b ) o f S ectio n 4 17 .2 5
, o r a l aser p o in t er, as d ef

in ed in su b d iv isio n (c) o f th at sectio n , at

a peace o f

f icer w ith th e s p ecif

ic in ten t to cau se t h e

o f f icer ap p reh en sio n o r f

ear o f b od ily h arm an d w h o k n o w s o r reaso n ab l y sh o u l d k n o w t h at th e p erso n at

w h o m h e o r sh e i s aim in g o r p o in tin g is a p eace o f f icer, is g u ilty o f a m isd em ean o r p u n ish ab le b y im p riso n m en t in a co u n ty j ail f o r a term n o t ex ceed in g six m o n th s.

( b ) A n y p erso n w

h o co m m its a seco n d o r su

b seq u en t

v io l atio n of su

b d iv isio n (a) sh all b e p u n ish ed b y i m p riso n m en t in a co u n ty j ail f o r n o t m o re th an o n e y ear.

Cal. P en al Co d e § 4 1 7 .2 6

.C O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 7

2

F urther, thoug h a laser pointer projects a lig ht beam—as laser targ eting sy stems do—California’s leg islature has made clear that laser pointers, a n d the b eams they project

, a re innocuous. Under Cal. Penal Code § 4 17.27, shining a laser pointer “directly or indirectly into the ey e [ ] of a nother person

or into a moving vehicle with the intent t o h arass or annoy ” is pu n i s h e d m e rely b y a f ine of $50 or four hours o f community service. Cal. Penal Code §§ 417.27(c), 417.27(e). F urther, § 417.27 permits the p ossession of laser p ointers on el e m e n t a r y s chool p remises for instructional or school-related
purposes. Cal. Penal Code § 417.27(b). I f t h e C a lifornia leg islature considered laser pointers, and the pointers’ beams,
to g ive “the appearance or f a c a d e of the use of a deadly weapon,” it w ould not have allowed students to take them to school, nor would it have imposed such mi n o r penalties for their use “with the intent to harass or annoy .”

N o t only do other Cal. Penal Code provisions show that using a laser p ointer is not equivalent to terroriz ing someone with a laser targ eting device, b u t § 4 17.26 does not include
any “appears-to-be-a-deadly

- weapon” element. I f California wanted § 417.26 to include such an element, it could have done so, as it did in § 4 17.4, w hich prohibi t s d r a w i ng an “imitation firearm

. . . in such a w ay as to cause a reasonable
person apprehension or fear of bodily harm.” Cal. Penal Code § 417.4. “I mitation firearms” are defined as those “so substantially similar in c oloration and overa ll appearance to

an ex isting firearm as to lead a reasonable person to perceive that the device is a firear m .” Cal. Penal Code § 16700(a) (emphasis added). T h e C al i fornia leg islature could have drafted § 417.26 as an analog ue to § 417.4, and required the laser pointer be used in such a way as to lead reason a bleC O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 8

persons to believe they w ere being targ e ted by a firearm. I t did not.

Therefore, the B I A’s importation o f an “ appearance of a deadly weapon” element into § 417.26 is incorrect.

3

As the B I A has failed to identify the e lements o f the crime correctly

, its CI MT analy sis is not entitled to d eference. Uppal

, 605 F .3d at 715 (“B ecause the B I A failed to identify the e lements o f [ the state crime] correctly

, its CI MT analy sis, in which it c ompares the elements it has iden tified to the
g eneric defi n i tion of moral turpitude, is misdirected and so merits no deference from this Court.”). 2

I I I

H av ing concluded the B I A’s analy sis is inaccurate, we must proceed to analy

z e the CI MT issue de novo. Althoug h the contours of what qualifies as a morally turpitudinous act may be ambig uo u s, we k now that a crime involving moral

2 Fu rth er, t h e B I A’s i n accu rate d escrip tio n o f th e IJ ’ s reaso n in g casts ad d itio n al d o u

b t o n th e B IA ’ s an aly sis. T h e BIA claim ed th at th e “ b u lk

o f th e Im m ig ratio n J u d g e’ s d ecisio n ” d iscu ssed “w h e t h er a co n v ictio n

u n d er []§ 4 17 .2 6 in v o lv es m o ral tu rp itu d e u n der th e an aly sis set f orth in Ma tter o f S ilva -Trevin o .” I n t r ut h

, th e IJ ’ s cu rso ry an aly sis o f § 4 1 7 .2 6

w as lim ited to h er statem en t th at “[ c ] a se l aw h as h eld th at p o ssessio n of

w eap o n s w

h ich are in si d io u s in s tru m en ts n o rm ally u sed f or crim in al
p u rp o s es i s in d i cativ e o f a read in ess to d o ev il,” an d a citatio n to a Calif o rn ia case in v o lv in g illeg al p ossessio n o f a saw ed

- of

f sh o tg u n

. S ee Peo p le v. Ga rrett , 2 4 1 Cal. Rp tr. 1 0 (Cal. C t. A p p

. 19 8 7 ). T h u s, th e B IA ’ s ch aracterizatio n

o f su ch statem en t as a d i scu ssio n o f th e tu rp itu d e

o f § 4 17 .2 6 in lig h t o f M

a tter of S i lva -Trevin o is in accu rate an d calls in to q u estio n its o w n an aly sis o f

§ 4 17 .2 6

.C O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 9

t u r p i t u de is “g enerally a crime that (1) is vile, base, o r depraved and (2) violates accepted moral standards.” Ceron
, 747 F .3d at 779.

A

To provide substance to these broad p r i n c i p les, we look
to the elements of other CI MTs th at we have already identified. Gonzalez-Cervan t e s v. Holder

, 709 F .3d 1265, 1269 (9th Cir. 2013).

Here, a CI MT that serves as a helpful point of comparison is Cal. Penal Code § 422, p rohibiti n g “threats with intent to terroriz e.” See Latter-Singh v. Holder

, 668 F .3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotatio n m arks omitted). L ike § 417.26, § 42 2 p r o h ibits threatening conduct. 3 However, a closer comparison reveals that § 422 prohibits conduct which is far more g rave than that reg ulated by § 417.26.

3 T h e sp ecif

ic elem en ts o f

§ 4 2 2 are:

(1 ) w i llf u lly th reaten in g to co m

m it a crim e t

h at w i l l

resu lt in d eath o r g reat b o d ily i n j u ry to an o th er p erso n ; (2 ) sp ecif

ic i n ten t th at th e s tatem en t b e tak en as a th reat; (3 ) th e t

h reat w as “ o n i t s face an d u n d er th e

c i r c u m s t a n c e s s o u n e q u i v o c a l

, u n c o n d i t i o n a l

, im m ed iate, an d sp ec i fi c as to co n v ey to th e p erso n th reaten ed

, a g rav ity o f p u rp o s e an d an im m ed i ate p ro sp ect o f ex ecu tio n o f t h e t h r eat”; (4 ) th e th reat

“ cau sed th e v ictim to b e in s u s tain ed f ear f o r h i s o r h er

o w n saf ety o r f o r h is o r h er im

m ed iate f am ily ’ s saf

ety ”;

an d (5 ) th e “ v ictim ’ s f

ear w as reaso n ab le u n d er th e circu m s tan ces.”

La tter-S in gh , 6 6 8 F.3 d at 1 1 6 0 (citatio n o m itted ).C O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 10

I ndeed, t h e differences between the statutes are stark. Under § 422 the threat must be of “a crime which will result in deat h o r g r eat bodily injury ,” b ut § 417.26 only requires that the p erpetrator in t end the officer apprehend or fear “bodily harm”; § 422 requires that the victim be “in sustained f ear” while § 417.26 does not require the victim even be

aware the laser was d irected a t him or her; § 422 requires the threat b e so serious that the victim’s f e a r is reasonable, but § 417.26 h as no r equirement that the victim e ven ex perience fear. Cal. Penal Code §§ 417.26(a), 422(a).

B

Such differences a

re c ritical to the CI MT inquiry

, a s evidenced by the analy sis of § 422 employ ed in Latter-Singh

. I n that case, we established t h at § 422 is a CI MT b y contrasting it with a

n Ariz ona “simple assault” statute that we concluded was not

morally turpitudinous in Fernandez-Ruiz

v. Gonzales

, 468 F .3d 1159 (9th Cir. 20 0 6 )

. Latter-Singh

, 668 F .3d at 1161–62. Our decision was based on such contrast, which revealed that § 422 in v o l v e d more turpitudinous conduct than the simple assault statute.

Here, comparing § 422, § 417.26, and Ariz ona’s simple assault statute reveals that § 417.26 has more in common with non-turpitudinous simple assault than with t h e morally turpitudinous “threats with intent to terroriz e” of § 422. See Latter-Singh , 668 F .3d at 1158.

F irst, the threa t i n L atter-Singh had to be of “death o r g reat b odily injury ,” which wa s n ot the case in FernandezRuiz and similarly is not the case in § 417.26. Id

. at 1161 (citing Fernandez-Ruiz , 468 F

. 3d at 1165).C O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 11

Second, the threa t in Latter-Singh required “the threatened person reasonably to be in sustained fear for h is o r her own safety ,” whereas the threat in Fernandez-Ruiz carried

no such “sustained f

ea r ” r eq u irement. 668 F .3d at 1162 (emphasis added). Sectio n 4 1 7.26 also does not require the victim be in “sustained fear”—indeed it does not require that the victim ex peri en ce any fear at all, merely that the perpetrator intend apprehen s ion or fear. Cal. Penal Code § 417.26.

Third, Latter-S i n gh noted that § 422 required an “intent
to i n still g reat fear of seriously bodily injury or death” a nd equated such intent with “the purpose to terroriz e.” 668 F .3d
at 1163 ( internal q

uotation marks o m i t ted). I n contrast, § 4 17.26 requires o n ly the i n t e nt to p lace the victim in “apprehension or fear of bo d ily harm.” Cal. Penal Code § 417.26. This is n o t e q u i v alent to the intent to “terroriz e” that was of “the requi s ite depravity

. . . to satisfy the moral turpitude standard” in Latter-Singh

. S e e 668 F .3d at 1163 (internal quotation marks omitted). 4

4 Ou r p reced en t casts do u

b t on w h eth er an i n ten t to cau se “ ap p reh en sio n

o r f ear,” rath er t h a n in t en t to in ju r e , can ev er b e a CIMT

. In Up p a l

, w e h eld th at “ an assau lt st a t u t e n o t in v o lv in g a sp ecif ic i n ten t to in

j u re o r a sp ecial tru st relatio n sh ip an d n o t req u irin g th at th e assau lt cau se d eath or

ev en serio u s b od ily in

j u ry ca n n o t q u alif

y as a categ o rical CIMT .” 6 0 5 F.3 d at 71 9

. Sim ilarly

, in G a lea n a -Men d o za v. Go n za les , 4 6 5 F.3 d 1 0 5 4 (9 th Cir. 2 00 6 ), w e stated t h at w h en an act can n ot “ b e ch aracterized

as i n h eren tly g rav e, b ase, o r d ep rav ed ,” th en “ [a]d d in g to th ese acts an in ten t to c o m m i t th em d o es n o t ch an g e th at co n clu sio n .” Id

. at 1 0 6 1 (q u o tin g Mei v. Ash cro

ft

, 39 3 F.3 d 7 3 7
, 7 4 1 (9 th Cir. 2 0 04 ), f o r th e p ro p ositio n th at “ if th e crim e is t riv ial, ev en a d elib erate in ten t to co m m i t it w ill n o t dem o n s trate an in ten t s o ‘ ev i l’ as to m ak e th e crim e o n e of

m o ral tu rp itu d e”).C O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 12

The conclusion we must d raw from this comparison is that § 417.26 can be violated by c o nduct that bears a striking resemblance to n on-turpitudinou s s i mple assault, and little similarity to turpitudinous terroriz ing threats.

Thus, o ur decisions in Latter-Singh and Fernandez-Ruiz reveal that a violation of § 417.26 is not c ateg orically a crime involving moral turpitude. 5

I V

“F inally

, where, a s here, the g overnment has not a sked us to apply the modified categ orical approach, w e consider only whether the c ateg orical a pproach is satisfied.” Latu v

.

5 T h e Go v ern m en t also asserts th at § 4 1 7 .2 6 is a CIMT m erely b ecau s e it m u st b e co m

m itted ag ain st a p eace o f

f i cer. Su ch assertio n is in co rrect.

A s ex p lain ed b y t

h e B IA ’ s o w

n preced en tial d ecisio n in Ma tter o f S a n u d o —a d ecisio n it m isap plied in its d ism issal o f Co q u i co ’ s ap p eal—

ev en crim es co m

m itted ag ain st p eace o f

f i cers h av e o n ly b een f

ou n d t o b e

a CIMT w

h en th ey “ req u ire p ro o f of th e actu al in f lictio n o f so m e tan g ib le h a rm o n a v ictim .” M

a tter o f S an u d o , 2 3 I.& N

. Dec. 9 6 8
, 9 7 2 ( B I A 2 0 0 6 ). See Ga r cia -Meza v. Mu ka sey , 5 1 6 F.3 d 5 3 5
, 5 3 7 (7 th Cir. 20 0 8) (ex p lain in g th at th e B IA h as s u g g ested “ th at b attery o f a p o lice o f f icer

w i th o u t cau sin g h arm is n o t a crim e o f m o ral tu rp itu d e,” an d t h a t e ve n

w h en th e v i ctim i s a m em

b er o f t h e sp ecial class o f p eace o f f i cers th at

“ s p ecial statu s alo n e m ay n o t b e en o u g h ”).C O Q U I C O V

. L Y N C H 13

Mukasey

, 547 F .3d 1070, 1076 ( 9 t h Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks o mitted). 6 B ecause the categ orical approach is not satisfied, we g rant the petition. 7

P E T I T I O N F O R R

E V I E W G R

A N T E D ; R

E M A N D E D for further proceeding s consistent with this opinion.

6 B ecau se w e en d o u r an aly sis at th e categ o rical ap p ro ach

, w e n eed n o t d ecid e w h eth er § 4 1 7 .2 6 is d i v isib le u n d er Desca mp s v

. U n i ted Sta tes , 1 3 3 S. Ct. 2 2 7 6 (2 0 1 3 ).

7 T h is is n o t a case w

h ere it is n ecessary to rem an d t o th e BIA f or ap p licatio n o f th e m o d i f

ied categ oric a l ap p ro ach

. No t o n ly h as th e B IA

“ alread y ad dressed

—alb eit u n d er th e categ o rical ap p ro ach

, rath er th an th e

m o d if ied categ o rical ap p ro ach ” w h eth er § 4 1 7 .2 6 in v o l v es m o ral
tu rp itu d e, b u t, m oreo v er, t h is case in v o lv es th e in terp retat i o n o f a state

s t a t u t e , an d th u s “ d o es n o t in v o lv e an issu e th e law co m m its to th e ag en cy ’ s ex

p ertise.” Fern a n d

ez-Ru iz
, 4 6 6 F.3 d at 1 1 3 3– 3 4; see a lso La tu , 5 4 7 F.3 d at 1 07 6

.