# FILED July 23, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRI MINAL APPEA LS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVI LLE JANUARY SESSION , 1997
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9601-CR-00013 ) Appell ee, ) ) ) SUMN ER COUN TY VS. ) ) HON. JANE WHEATCRAFT JO HN L. G OO DW IN, III, ) JUDGE ) Ap pella nt. ) (Sentencing & Habeas Co rpus)

ON AP PEA L FROM THE J UDGMENTS OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF SUM NER COU NTY
FOR THE APP ELLA NT : FOR THE APPELLEE : JO HN L. G OO DW IN, III. JOHN KNOX W ALKUP Pro Se - Habeas Corpus Attor ney General and Reporter JOHN R. PHI LLI PS, JR. KATHY MORA NTE Attor ney - Sent encing Assist ant Attor ney General 117 East Mai n Street 450 James Robertson Par kway Gallat in, TN 37066 Nashvil le, TN 37243 LAWREN CE RAY WHITLEY Dist ri ct Attor ney General DEE GAY Assist ant Di str ictAtto rney Gener al 113 W est Mai n Street Gallat in, TN 37066

OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFI RMED DAVI D H. WELLES, JUD GE1 The Defendant was cha rged wi th offenses enumerated i n the cr iminal code under t he Criminal Sentenci ng Reform Act of 1982; for secon d-degree burgl ary , Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 3- 403 , and for as sau lt with inten t to co m m it rape, T enn . Co de A nn. § 39-2 -608 (a). -2- 

# OPINION

Th is is an appeal as of r ightpursuantto Rul e 3, Tennessee Rul es of Ap pella te Procedure. The Defendant app eals bot h his s en t ence and the tr ial co urt’s denial ofhis p etitio n fo r writ o f ha be as cor pu s. T he se sep ara te a pp ea ls were consol idat ed by t he tr ial courtand f il ed wit h one appell ate r ecord. The Defendantraises the following issu es re ga rdi ng his s entence: (1) That the tri al co urt e rred in classi fyi ng the Defendant as a Range II off ender; (2) thatthe t ri al court im pro pe rly se nt en ce d h i m t o c on se cu t i ve t er ms forhis two convi cti ons; ( 3) thatthe t ri al court misappl ied sent ence enhancement f actors; and ( 4) t hat t he tr ial court erred by i mposing a longer sentence upon remand. The Defendant also rai ses the fol lowi ng iss ues pro- se regarding hi s peti ti on for habeas corpu s: ( 1) That the t ri al court was bi ased again st t he Defendant ; ( 2) t hat the t ri al courterred by ref usi ng t o cor rectperj ured tes ti mony and t hat hisdue process ri ghtswe r e vi olat ed bythe St ate’ s fai lur e to produce excul patory evi dence; and ( 3) t hat t he tri al cou rt err ed by d en ying his p etit ion w hen th e attorney s invol ved in hi s case had for med a conspiracy t o depri ve t he De fe ndant ofhis l iberty. W e aff ir m the judg m ents of the trial cou rt.

The Defendantwas convi cted bya Sumner County j ury on December 12, 1989, of se co nd -de gre e b urg lary a nd ass au lt wit h int ent t o commit rape. 1 He was sentenced to eightyears on each cou nt, t o be serv ed consecut iv ely . The Defendantini ti all y wai ved an appeal , butfi led a pos t-c onvi cti on peti ti on and was-3-

grant ed a delay ed appeal to this C ourt. Sta te v. G oo dw in , 909 S. W .2d 35 ( Tenn. Cr i m. App. 1995) . Hi s convi cti ons were affi rmed, butthe cas e was remanded for res en ten cin g because t he record did notref lectthatthe t ri al court consi dered both the 1982 and 1989 sentenc ing acts in c onsiderati on o f t he ex pos t facto provi sions ofthe U nited State s an d T enn ess ee c ons titutions
. Id. at 45
. W e also remanded for t he tri al courtto place on t he record it s c onside rat ion of enhancement factors as well as i ts decisi on to impose consecutive sentences. Id. at 45 -46. On remand, the tri al courtsentenced the Def endant under the 1982 act as an especi all y aggravated offenderto cons ecutive nine- year s entences for the burgl ary and the attempted rape. The Defendant now a ppeals hi s sentenc es imposed upon r esentenci ng.

Prior to t he heari ng for

resent encing, the Def endant submi tt ed a pe titi on forhabeas corpu s rel ief . Atthe resentenc ing he arin g on August 22, 1995, t he tri al court deni ed the pet it ion wi thouta heari ng. The Defendantfi led an appeal to this Court. Alt hough represented by counsel on the sentenci ng iss u es, t he Defendant present s thi s appeal, on his habeas corpuspeti ti on, pro-se.

We first address the D efend ant’s pe tition for habea s corp us re lief. He all eges that re lief is pro per b ase d on the fo llowing argu m ents
. First, he contends thatthe t ri al court f ail ed to grant a he ari ng on his pet it ion f or habeas cor pus because the trial ju dg e, a s w ell as the Sumner County gov ernment, was bias ed againsthim because he had sued the governm ent in a ci vil matter and because he sent l ett ers t o the j urorswho had presi ded at hi s tr ial . Next , he argues thatthe Sta te faile d to pro vide him with po ten tia lly exc ulp ato ry ev ide nc e co nta ine d in state m ents made by the victi m in this c ase, t her efo re d ep riving him of h is-4-

consti tut ional rightto cr oss-e xa mine the wi tnesses againsthim. Thi rd, he contends thatthe prosecutors, t he publi c defender , and hi s pri vate att orney co nspir ed aga inst him, res ulting in wha t appe ars to be a claim of ineffective assistance of couns el. The tri al court deni ed the pet it ion, fi nd ing th at i t was rendered moot aft er t he Defendantwas resent enced. We agree thatthe pet it ion wa s pro perly d enie d, bu t for a d ifferen t reas on.
Habeas corpus reli efis avai labl e onlywhen itappears on t he face of the judgmentthata convi cti on is void or when the pet it ioner 's t erm of i mprisonment has expi red. Tenn. Code An n. § 2 9-21 -101 ; State v. Archer , 851 S. W .2d 157, 164 (Te nn. 1 993 ). It is well se ttled th at w he re a jud gm en t is no t void , bu t is
m erel y voi dable, such j udgment may not be c oll ater all y attacked i n a suitfor habeas corp us re lief. Pa ssa rella v. S tate , 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 ( Tenn. Cri m. App. 199 4); Archer , 851 S.W .2d at 163. In the pr esent ca se, the pet it ioner has not all eged that he i s being held upon an expired se nt ence or t hat t he judgment against him isvoi d, and t hus, t he we aff ir m the tr ial court ’s di smissal ofth e peti ti on.

We note that the trial court could h ave t reat ed the habeascorpus pet it ion as a post- convi cti on rel iefpeti ti on, Te nn. C ode Ann . § 40-30 -205 (c ), howe ver, any petition for po st-co nviction relief w ould be prematur e, consi deri ng thatthe Defendanthas not exhausted his appeals. See Te nn. C ode An n. § 40-30 -202(a ). Therefore, the trial c ou rt's d ism issa l of th e p etitio n w itho ut c on sid erin g it as one for po st-co nviction relief wa s en tirely pro per.-5- We now turn to t he iss ues regarding t he Defendant ’s resentenci ng. When an accused chal lenges t he lengt h, range, or t he manner of ser vi ce of a s entence, this cou rt has a du ty to co ndu ct a de novo revi ew of t he sentenc e wit h a presumpti on thatthe d et er mi nati ons made by the t ri al court ar e corr ect. Tenn. Code Ann . § 40-35 -401(d ). This pr esumption i s "condi ti oned upon the affirmative showing in t he record thatthe t ri al court consi dered t he sentenci ng pri ncipl es and all releva nt f acts and c ircum stan ces ." State v. Ashby , 823 S. W .2d 166, 169 (Ten n. 199 1).

In conducti ng a de novo revi ew of a sent ence, t his co urtmust consi der: (a) the evi dence, i f any , re ceiv ed at t he tr ial and the s entenci ng heari ng; ( b) t he presentence report; (c) the pr inc iples of se nten cing and argu m ents as to sentenci ng alt ernat iv es; ( d) t he nature and charact eri sti cs ofthe criminal conduct inv olv ed; (e) any stat utory mit igat ing or enhancement f actors; ( f) any st atement thatthe def endant made on hi s own behalf ; and ( g) t he potent ial or l ack of potent ial for reh abilitatio n or tre atm ent. T enn . Co de A nn. §§ 40-35- 102, - 103, and -210 ; see Sta te v. Sm ith , 735 S .W .2d 85 9, 863 (Ten n. Crim . App. 1 987 ).

Ifour r evi ew ref lect s thatthe t ri al court f oll owed the st atut ory s entenci ng procedur e, imposed a lawf ul sentence aft er havi ng giv en due consi derat ion and properweightto t he fact ors and pr inci pals s et outunderthe sent encing law, and thatthe tr ial court 's f indi ngs of fact are adequatel y supported bythe record, then we may not modify th e sentence even ifwe wo uld hav e pref erred a differ ent resu lt. State v. Fl etcher , 805 S .W .2d 78 5, 789 (Ten n. Crim . App. 1 991 ).-6- As an ini ti al ma tter, we wil l br ief lyrecountthe f acts i n the cas e sub judice as descri bed in t h e opinion on the Defendant’ s fi rst appeal and wi ll discuss ad ditio na l oth er fa cts wh en rele van t to th e iss ue s in th is ap pe al.
On Aug ust 3, 1989, t he vict im returned f rom work to her home, i n Hendersonvi ll e, Tennessee, between 3:30 an d 4 :00 in the after noon. She we nt b ac k to he r be dro om to lie down. While she was lying dow n, she h eard a door sl am. Thinki ng itwas her daught er orhus ban d, wh om she was expe cting , the victim go t up to se e w ho it was. Upon opening t he door t o her bedroom, she saw the Def endant standi ng in her

hall way. She tol d hi m to ge t out o f herhouse, buthe grabbed her bythe ar ms and pu shed her into t he adjacent guest be droo m. The victi m stated attr ial thatthe Defendantrepeat ed, " You know you wantit ," sever al t imes. The v ict im att empt ed to f ightthe Defendantoff. He p ushe d her o nto the b ed, rippe d her b louse, tore her bra and pul led off herpanty hose. As the victim an d De fenda nt were fi ghti ng, t hey heard her hu sb an d's tr uck in the dr iv eway. The Defendant gotup and att empted to leav e the house, but t he vi cti m's husband grabbed him as he was try ing to wal k outthe door . The vi cti m calle d the pol ice, an d th e vic tim 's husband gotthe D efendant 's name and l icense plat e number to " buy so me ti me" until the police cou ld ge t there
. W he n th e vic tim 's hu sb an d thoughtthe pol ice sh ould al most be at t he house, he letthe Defendant go. An off icer

arri ved , radi oed the l icense plat e number to a bac k-up officer and the b ack -up o fficer pic ked up th e D efen dan t. Sta te v. G oo dw in , 909 S .W .2d 35 , 38 (Te nn.C rim.Ap p. 199 5).

The Defendant ass ert s thatthe t ri al courterred by det ermini ng thathe was a Ra nge II offend er. T his iss ue is inte rt wine d wi th the deter mination of whi ch sentenci ng act to fo llow in s ente ncin g the De fend ant. We art icul ated t his problem in his first a ppe al:
The Defendantcommitted the cr ime in Augustof 1989. He was convi cted in December of1989. He was sentenced February 8, 1990, underthe 1989 Sent encing Actas a Range II off enderto eight yea rs on both cou nts to run c ons ecu tively to each other for an effect ive sentence ofsixtee n yea rs. The 1989 Sentenci ng Act wentint o eff ect November 1, 1989. The t ri al courtwas able to sent ence the Def endant under the2The 19 82 act provides for ten (10) enh ancem ent factors unde r § 40-3 5-11 1. T he c urre nt version of the 1989 ac t under § 40-35-1 14 contai ns twenty- one (21) enhancement fact ors. -7- new sentenci ng act bec ause, Tennessee Cod e Annotat ed secti on 40-35-11 7 stat es, " Unless prohibi ted bythe U nit ed S tat es or Tennessee consti tut ion , anyperson sent enced on or afterNovember 1, 1989, f oran offe ns e co m m itted be twe en July 1, 1982 and November 1, 1989, shal l be sen tenced un der th e pro vision s of this cha pter." Te nn.C ode Ann . § 40-35 -117(b ). The Se nte nc ing Co m m is sio n Comm ents f oll owing Tennessee Code Annotat ed secti on 40-35- 117 stat e "[ b]ecause o f t he expos t facto provi sions of the Te nne sse e an d U nited State s co nstitutio ns, a d efendant sen tenced afterNovember 1, 1989, foran off ense committ ed between July 1 , 198 2, and No vember 1, 1989, may notrecei ve a great erpunishmentthan he woul d have r eceiv ed under t he pri orlaw."
G oo dw in , 909 S. W .2d at45.

On remand, t he tr ial courtconsi dered bot h sentenci ng ac ts, but det ermined that, because the 1989 act cont ains s entence enhanc ement fact ors t hat are not presentin t he 1982 act, thei r use could subjectthe De fen da nt to pu nis hm en t in vi olat ion of the ex po st facto prov isions
. See Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 40 -35-114; Tenn. Code Ann . § 40-35 -111 (re pea led). 2 Ou r su pre m e co urt h as he ld thatthe tri al court m ust com pute the Defe nda nt's sente nces unde r both th e 1989 sentenci ng act and t he pre- 1989 sentenc ing actin t his si tuat ion. State v. Pearson , 858 S.W .2d 87 9, 884 (Ten n.199 3). Ra the r tha n co ns ide ring spe cific el eme nts use d in cal culat ing a se ntence, the t ri al court “ must cal culat e the app ropr iate sen tenc e[s] u nde r both the 1982 s tat ute and t he 1989 statu te, in th eir entire ty , and the n imp ose the lesser se ntenc e of the two .” Id.

Underthe 1982 act, t he sentence for a ssa ult wit h int ent t o commit rape for a Range I offenderis 2 to 6 years and for a Range II offender is 6 to 10 years.-8-

Tenn. Code Ann . § 39- 2-608(a) ; §§ 40- 35-109(a ), (b) ( repeal ed). Seconddegree burgl ary c arri es 3 to 9 years fora Range I offenderand 9 to 15 yearsfor Range II . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-3- 403 (b )(1); § 40-3 5-109 (a), (b) (repea led). Underthe 1989 act, assaul t wit h intentto commit rape is aClass C fel ony and has a sentence of 3 t o 6 years fora range I off ender and 6 t o 10 years for Range II. Ten n. Co de A nn. § 4 0-35-1 18; § 4 0-35-1 11(b)(3 ); §§ 40-35 -112(a )(3), (b)(3). Sec ond -degre e burg lary is a Clas s C felon y, punish able w ith 3 to 6 ye ars for Range I and 6 t o 10 years for Range II. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-118; § 40-35- 11(b)(3 ); §§ 40-3 5-112 (a)(3), (b)(3).

We fi rstconsi der t he Defendant ’s sen tences i n accordanc e wit h the 1982 act. Under the act, a defendantmust be sent enced as a Range II off ender upon proofof an esp ecial lyaggravat ed off ense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-107; § 40- 35-109(c) (repea led). An especi all y aggravated offense i s “ a f elonyres ultin g in dea th or bodi lyinj ury or inv olv ing t he thr eat ofdeath or bodil y i njury toanother person w here t he d efendanthas prev iousl y been conv ict ed of a f elonythat resul ted in de ath o r bod ily injury.” T enn . Co de A nn. § 40-35- 107 (repe aled ). In the case at b ar, th e D efe nd an t wa s co nvic ted of b urg lary a nd rap e in 1981. The victim submitt ed a stat ement of t he inci dent i n which t he Defenda nt and two others stopped her

car and robbed her. She stat ed thatthe Defendant hi t her about the f ace and pul led he r ha irto f orce her to compl y wi th hi s demands, t hen forc ibly raped her

in t he car. The inves ti gati ng off icer test if ied t hat he observ ed red marks on th e vi cti m’s fac e. The t ri al court f ound thi s to be s uff ici ent proof of bo dily inj ury i n the pre vio us in cide nt. Ind eed , bod ily injury m ay inc lude “a cu t, abrasi on, brui se, bur n, ordisf igur ement; phy sical pa in; il lne ss or i mpairment of the funct ion of a bodi lymember, organ or mental faculty.”Tenn. Code Ann. § 40--9-

35- 107( 5)(A) (repea led). W e believe the red marks on the vict im’s face suffice to show she sust ained bodi lyinj ury when t he Defendanthither
. See State v. W alt erR. Call ahan , C.C. A. No. 03C01-9 303-CR-00085, Hamilt on County ( Tenn. Crim . App., K noxville, June 27, 19 94).

As for the curre nt co nviction s, t he vic ti m testi fi ed thatshe sust ained scrat ches on her backin t he for m of red marks where the De fen da nt h ad forc ibly pull ed off her bra. Agai n, we agree with the trial c ou rt tha t this con stitu tes bo dily injury. See State v. Locke , 771 S. W .2d 1 32, 135 (Te nn. C rim. A pp. 1 988 ). Therefore, thi s amply suppo rtsthe f indi ng thatthe a t t emp ted rape was an e spec ially agg rava ted o ffens e m eriting the im pos ition of R ang e II sen tenc ing. Acc ordingly, Ran ge II sen tencing of 6 to 10 years for the ass ault w ith inten t to commit rape and 9 to 15 y ears f or t he burgl ary c onvi cti on is ap propri ate.

We now consi der t he appli cabl e enh ance me nt factors. T he trial court found no miti gati ng fact ors and t he Defendantis notchall enging t his co nclusi on. The tr ial courtappli ed two enhancementfact ors t o each off ense; f actor (10), that the defendant had no hesitat ion about committi ng a cr i m e wh ere th e risk to human li fe was high, and f act or (6) the personal inj uri es inf li cted upon or the amount of dam age to prope rty sustaine d by the victim was particularly gre at
. Te nn. C ode Ann . §§ 40 -35-11 1(6), (10) (rep ealed ).
Regarding fact or (6) , t here i s evi dence thatthe victim underwentemotional t r au ma and engaged i n ongoing c ounseli ng beginni ng short lyaft erthe inc iden t. "Personal inj ury" as ex pressed in enhancement factor (6) enco mpasse s emotional and psychol ogical inj uri es as wel l as physi cal i njur ies sustai ned by t he-10-

vi ct i m. State v. H oyt , 928 S. W .2d 935, 948 ( Tenn . C r im. A pp. 1 995 ); State v. Me lvin , 913 S.W.2d 195 (Tenn. Cri m. App. 1995)(ci ti ng Sta te v. Sm ith , 891 S.W .2d 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994 )). However, befor e thi s fact or may be appli ed, the St ate has t he burden of establi shing t hat t he emotional inj uri es and psychol ogical scarr ing are "partic ularly g reat." Id. Here, t here i s test imony i n the record tha t the victim ’s life w as sev ere ly dis rup ted . Sh e w as un ab le to retu rn to live in her home because ofthe i ncidentand lat er sol d the house because ofher emotional impa irmen t. W e believe that such severe consequences f or t he victim consti tut ed injuries that we re “particularly gre at.” See St at e v . Wil l i ams , 920 S.W .2d 247 , 259 -60 (T enn . Crim . App . 199 5). T he tr ial courtproper lyappli ed this enhancement factor to both t he burglary and attempted rape convict ions.

Ne xt, the t ri al court appl ied enhanc ement fact or (10 ), thatthe def e ndant had no hesit ati on about committi ng a cri me when the r isk to human li fe was hi gh. The Defen da ntf ol l ow ed t he v i ct i m f r om t hi r t y t o f i f t y mi les f rom her pl ace of business in Br entwood t o her home in Hendersonvi ll e. He observed t he vic tim enterher home and he ent ered t he hou se knowing she, and possiblyothers, were insi de. Thi s has bee n suff ici ent proof t o enhance a bur glary convi cti on using facto r (10). See Sta te v. Jimmy Ray Pott er , C .C. A. No. 01C0 1- 930 1- CC00021, Fent ress County, (Tenn. Cri m. App, Nas hville, Mar. 17, 1 994 ); cf. Sta te
v. Avery , 818 S. W .2d 365, 369 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). In addi ti on, we al so fi nd this fact or appl icabl e to t he att empted rape. Even though t he vi cti m infor med the Defendantthat h er hu sba nd w ould arrive, w hich he d id, th e De fendantignored this and c ontinue d to pu rsue the assa ult upon the victim. T here was a great ri sk thata co nfro nta tion an d in jurie s co uld have r esult ed. Therefore, fact or(10) was appropri atel y appl ied.-11- The Defendant is subjectto a 6 to 10 y ear sent ence for the attempted rape and 9 to 15 y ears f or second- degree bur glary. The tri al cou rt se nte nc ed him to nine yearsforeach off ense based on cla ssifying the D efen dan t as a Ra nge II offende r. W e a gre e th at th e re co rd s up po rts th e im po sitio n o f nin e ye ars for th e att empted r ape an d burgl ary c onvi cti ons as a Range II off ender because the De fenda nt can b e class ified as an espe cially aggrava ted offen der.
Yet, thi s does notend our i nquiry. W e must al so consi der t he sentenc es underthe 1989 sentencing act. In order t o establi sh the Defendant as a Range II offende r, the St ate must p rove hi m to be a multi ple offender . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 106. Thi s requi res t hat a def endanthave “[ a] mini mum of two (2) b ut not mo re tha n fo ur (4 ) prio r felo ny c on victio ns with in th e co nvic tion cla ss, a higher class, or w ithin the ne xt two (2) lowe r felony class es.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 106 (a)(1). Ho we ver, “[c]o nviction s for m ultiple fe lonie s co m m itt e d as part o f a sin gle cours e of con duct w ithin twenty-four (2 4) hou rs, consti tut e one (1) convi cti on for the purp ose of de term ining prior c onv ictions ; how eve r, act s resul ti ng in bodily injury or threa tened bodily i njury to th e vic tim or vic tim s sh all not be const rued to be a sing le co urse of co ndu ct.” T enn . Co de A nn. § 40-35-10 6.

The Defendantwas convi cted i n 19 81 of ra pe, a Cl ass B fel ony, and robb ery, a C lass C fe lony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-118 ( class if icat ion of pri orfelon y offen ses ). Both occurred duri ng the same course of co nduct, but t he rape involved bo dily injury , whi ch would ordinar il y sat isfy a f indi ng thatthe Defendantis a m ultip le offende r. How ever, this C ourt ha s held tha t the twen tyfourhourmerger ru le ex cepti on requi res “ more than one previ ous act inv olv ing-12-

bo dily injury or th rea ten ed bo dily injury.” State v. Horton , 880 S. W .2d 732, 736 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1 994 ). W e believe that in add ition to the bod ily injurysuff ered by the v ict im duri ng the rape, t here was a threat o f bodily injury in per petr ati on of the robbe ry. The victim was d rivi ng h er c ar w he n th e D efe nd an t an d h is accompli ces approached i n thei r vehi cle. They bumped the vi cti m’s car s everal times, then bl ocked the road t o make her st op. Int enti onall y col li ding wi th anot her veh icle from behind and f orci ng a confrontat ion byblock ing the road provi des a disti nct t hrea t of bodil y i njury. Therefore, we agree thatthe Def endant may pro pe rly be clas sifie d a s a R an ge II offe nd er. T his subjects hi m to a sent ence of 6 to 10 years each f or t he burgl ary and att empted rape. W e have dis cusse d two enhancement factors, whi ch al so ex is t un der t he 1989 act , an d we concl ude that theyare ap plica ble to th e o ffen se s in q ue stio n. A s a r es ult, w e fin d the re cord support s sentenc es of ni ne yearsforeach convi cti on.

Our calcu lat ions ofboth t he 1982 and 1989 sent encing acts reveal thatthe tri al courtwas permitted t o sentence under the 1989 act wit hout i mplicat ing t he ex post fact o provi sions. W e note t hat t he appropr iat e sentence range f or t he as sa ult wit h int ent t o commit rape as a Range II off ender i s 6 to 10 years under both acts . Ho we ver, se con d-de gree burg lary ca rries a 9 to 15 yearsentence as Range II under t he 1982 and 6 t o 10 years as Range II un der th e 19 89 a ct. Thus, because t he Defendantis notexposed t o a great er puni shment under t he 1989 provi sions, sentenci ng under t his act i s requi red. Tenn.Code Ann . § 40-35 -117(b ). Ther efor e, we concl ude that , al though t he tr ial judge er red by sentenci ng the Def endant under the 1982, the er ror washarmless. The nineyearsentence s w ere within the senten cing ran ge un der the 1989 act and are-13-

support ed by the reco rd. Therefore, we affi rm the sent ence imposed by t he tr ial cou rt.

In a rel ated issue , t he Defendantassert s thatthe t ri al court er red by basing its resent encing dec isi on upon proofbasic all y th e same as thatoff ered i n th e previ ous sentenci ng h ea ri ng. He not es thatthi s Court vacated t hat pr evi ous sentence. How eve r, we rem and ed be caus e the trial cou rt (1) did not co mp are the 1982 and 19 89 senten cing acts; and (2) did notadequatel y pl ace on the record th e basi s for

enhancing the Def endant’ s sentenc e and for imposi ng cons ecutive sentences . Thi s does notequ ate w ith the p roof b eing insu fficient to supp ort t he tr ial court ’s dec isi ons, butthatthe record was i nsuff ici ent t o all ow revi ew ofthe sent ence. However , we do ack nowledge t he Defendant ’s argument thatthe tr ial judge on resentencing f ound fewer enhancem ent fact ors but sentenced him to an increased sent ence. He cont ends thata presumpti on of vindi ctiveness may ari se when the same sent encing aut hori ty i mposes a higher sentence on remand from a successful appeal, t hus implicat ing due process concerns. No rth Caroli na v. Pearce , 395 U. S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed.2d 656 (196 9); Sta te v. R us se ll , 800 S. W .2d 169, 174 (Te nn. 1 990 ). Our su pr eme court has addressed t he vi ndict iv eness i ssue, c it ing Alab am a v. S m ith , 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S .Ct. 220 1, 104 L.Ed.2 d 865 (1989 ): As we expl ained i n Texas v. McCullough , “the evil the [ Pearce ] Cou rt soughtto prevent”was not t he imposi ti on of “ enlarged sentenc es aft er a ne w t rial ” but “vindi ctiv eness of a sentencing j udge.” . . . Such circumstances are those in which t here i s a “r easonable li keli hood,”that the incr ea se in se nte nc e is the product ofactual v indict iveness on the part of the sent en cin g a uth ority. W he re th ere is no suc h re as on ab le li keli hood, the burden r emains upon t he defendantto prove act ual vindi ctiveness. Ru sse ll , 800 S .W .2d at 17 4. (citations om itted).-14- In the cas e sub judice , a reaso nab le likeliho od th at Ju dge W hea tcraft, upon res en ten cin g th is ca se , ha d a vind ictive m otive is not e viden t. W e no te fi rst thata differe nt jud ge, Jud ge Kell y, p resi ded at t he ori ginal sentenci ng heari ng, and thus, any ri sk of v indi cti veness bythattr ial judge being confronted by resent encing is non existe nt. Ab sen t evide nce that a li kelihood of vindi ctiveness is prese nt by Jud ge W hea tcraft, the De fenda nt mu st dem onstra te a ctual vindi ctiveness. A tri al j udge is vest ed wit h disc ret ion when f ix ing a sentenc e for an offense and whe n a differ ent j udge presi des in anew proceedi ng, di ff eri ng resu lts ma y reaso nab ly occur. W e find no thing in the re cord that su gge sts actual vindi ctiveness from the tr ial judge presidi ng at the resent encing hearing. Thus, we cannot c onclude t hat t he Defendant ’s due process ri ghts hav e been vi olat ed. Th is issu e is w ithou t me rit.
Finally, the D efen dan t arg ue s th at th e tria l cou rt err ed in se nte nc ing him to consecut iv e ter ms. The tr ial court f ound that the Defendant was a dangerous offende r, which requires thatan off ender’ s “behav iorindi cates l ittl e or no regard forhum an li fe, an d no hes itation a bou t com m itting a c rime in wh ich the risk to human li fe i s high. ” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 115(b)( 4). Beyond t his, itmust be shown that“an extended sent ence isnecessaryto protectthe publ ic against fu rth ercri minal c onduct bythe def endant and t hat t he consecut iv e senten ce s must reaso nab ly r elat e to t he se verity of the offens es co mm itted.” State v. W il kerson , 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Te nn. 1 995 ); see State v. Tay lor , 739 S.W .2d 227 , 230 (Te nn. 1 987 ); Gra y v. Sta te , 538 S .W .2d 39 1, 393 (Ten n. 197 6).

The trial court found t hat t he Defendantwas a dangerousoff ender, stat ing thathe had a history of m ental illness a nd ho spitalizations, a h istory of vi olence-15-

s uch as beati ng people up , and admits he isful l ofrage. The tri al jud ge als o noted thatthe Def endantlied to oth ers an d lied to th e co urt a bo ut h is educati on. He demonstrated no remorse forthe offenses c omm itted i n 1981 and 1989 and showed little ch an ce of re ha bilita tion . He ha d a po or m ili tary and employment record, neverholdi ng down a job for l ong and also being terminated f rom his last job fo r inap prop riate b eha vior tow ard a fem ale e m ploye e.

The trial court also found that the circu ms tance s of the offen se we re aggravated because the Defen dant premeditated t he crime by fol lowing t he vict i m across the Na sh ville area to he r hom e in a rem ote subdiv isi on. I n addit ion, when he was arr ested, he had a “h it list” o f ten wo m en , so m e w ith a ste risk s by the ir names, and he c ould not s ubs tantia te a leg itima te pu rpos e for s uch a list. The tri al judge al so found t he mental ang uish suf fer ed by t he vi cti m aggravat ed the off ense. As a result, sh e dete rm ine d th at th e se nte nc es im po se d re as on ab ly rel ated to the seriou snes s of the offen ses a nd tha t the previou s factors demon st rat ed thatsocie ty n eeded to be protect ed from the Defendant ’s behav ior
.
We believe tha t the trial court carefu lly conside red the atte nd an t fac ts in addit ion to proof ofthe dangerousness of t he Defendant ’s behav iorand thatthey justify a ne ed to prote ct so ciety fr om his fu tur e acti ons. Ther efor e, we cannot con clud e tha t the trial c ourt e rred in con sec utively s ente ncin g the De fend ant.

Ac cord ingly, w e affirm the jud gm ent o f the trial c ourt.-16- ____________________________________ DAVI D H. WELLES, JUD GE

CONCUR:

___________________________________ JOHN H. PEAY , JUD GE

___________________________________ JOE G. RI LEY , JUD GE