NO. 07-10-0043-CV 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL C 

 AUGUST 17, 2011 

UNITED SUPERMARKETS, L.L.C., APPELLANT 

v. 

SANDRA RAMIREZ, APPELLEE 

 FROM THE 99TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY; 

NO. 2005-545,560; HONORABLE WILLIAM C. SOWDER, JUDGE 

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Appellant, United Supermarkets, L.L.C., appeals the trial court's order denying its 

application to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award in favor of Appellee, 

Sandra Ramirez. In a single issue, United asserts the trial court erred in entering an 

award premised on the finding by Arbitrator Frank E. Murchison that United was liable 

for Ramirez's injuries under a premises liability theory without also finding United had 

actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition. We affirm. 
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Background 

In December 2008, Ramirez filed her original petition asserting United was liable 

for injuries she sustained when she slipped on ice while stocking a freezer. Thereafter, 

Ramirez and United agreed to arbitration. 

 In November 2009, an arbitration proceeding was held, and in December, the 

Arbitrator issued his report and award. The Arbitrator found in Ramirez's favor and 

awarded damages to Ramirez because United was negligent (1) under a business 

invitee premises liability theory and (2) in failing to provide Ramirez a safe place to work 

in connection with the risk of slipping on ice buildup in the walk-in freezer. 

 In January 2010, United filed an application to vacate, modify or correct the 

Arbitrator's award. In its application, United only asserted that the Arbitrator's award 

was contrary to Texas law asserting that actual or constructive knowledge is necessary 

to support Ramirez's claim of negligence under a premises liability theory. The trial 

court denied United's application and this appeal followed. 

Analysis 

Rule 33.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires, among other 

things, that the record show that the trial court "ruled on [a] request, objection, or 

motion, either expressly or implicitly" before a complaint may be presented for appellate 

review. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A). If an argument is presented for the first time on 

appeal, it is waived. See Marine Transport Corp. v. Methodist Hospital, 221 S.W.3d 

138, 147 n.3 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Because United's 
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application did not challenge the Arbitrator's determination that United was negligent in 

failing to provide Ramirez a safe place to work in connection with the risk of slipping on 

ice buildup in the walk-in freezer, this issue was not preserved our review. 

 Because the trial court's denial of United's application, as well as the Arbitrator's 

award, may have been based upon a single ground not specifically challenged by 

United before the trial court and, therefore, waived on appeal, the trial court's order must 

stand. See Malooly Brothers, Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970); Reese 

v. Beaumont Bank, N.A., 790 S.W.2d 801, 804-05 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1990, no pet.); 

Rodriguez v. Morgan, 584 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 

Accordingly, United's single issue is overruled.

Conclusion

 The trial court's denial of United's application is affirmed. 

 

Patrick A. Pirtle 

 Justice