NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued June 4, 2020

Decided June 15, 2020

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3470

THOMAS TROTTIER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United 

States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, 

Hammond Division.

No. 2:18-cv-00304-JVB-JEM

Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, 

Judge.

Order

Thomas Trottier filed an application for Social Security disability benefits on the basis of degenerative disc disease, obesity, and major depressive disorder. An administrative law judge found these conditions to be severe but ruled that Trottier remains able 

to do light work. A district judge affirmed. 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183063 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 

22, 2019). Trottier’s appeal contends that the ALJ did not properly account for limitations on his concentration, persistence, and pace, and failed to accord required weight 

to the opinion of Dr. Dobransky, his treating psychiatrist.
No. 19-3470 Page 2

The district court’s opinion adequately addresses those contentions, and we affirm 

substantially for the reasons the district court gave. We add only a few words about the 

treating-psychiatrist issue.

Dobransky saw Trottier for less than six months in 2015 and 2016 but opined about 

his mental condition in 2011. This led the ALJ to ask whether Dobransky’s views were 

reliable. He wrote (citations to the record omitted):

Dr. Dobransky, the claimant’s psychiatrist, opined the claimant had a number 

of marked limitations in his ability to perform unskilled work. In particular, 

he assessed marked limitations in his ability to understand, remember and 

carry out very short and simple instructions, maintain attention for two-hour 

segments, maintain regular attendance and work in coordination with or 

proximity to others without being unduly distracted. Dr. Dobransky concluded the claimant would have extreme limitation in his ability to complete a 

normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically 

based symptoms and anticipated the claimant would likely be absent from 

work more than four days per month.

I have considered this opinion and assign it little weight, as it is not consistent 

with the record as a whole. In particular, Dr. Dobransky opined that these 

limitations have been in place since January 2011, when he had only been 

treating the claimant since November 2015. Moreover, the assessed marked 

limitations are not supported by the medical evidence of record, which documents the claimant often demonstrated an appropriate affect, adequate attention and concentration and adequate memory. There is no good basis in 

the medical evidence of record or testimony to find that the claimant would 

be off task or absent excessively.

Regulations in force at the time required an ALJ to accept the opinion of a treating physician “[i]f [it] ... is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your 

case record”. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2) (emphasis added). The ALJ found 

that Dobransky’s opinion was not supported by the medical evidence of record.

True enough, the ALJ might have said more, such as that Dobransky expressed his 

opinion by checking boxes rather than explaining how medical evidence supported his 

conclusions—and in particular that Dobransky did not try to explain why he gave an 

opinion looking more than five years into the past. But ALJs’ analyses always could be 
No. 19-3470 Page 3

longer and more detailed. They would not necessarily be better for being fulsome. We 

conclude that the ALJ said enough to satisfy his obligation under the regulations.

AFFIRMED