FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EMMA C. LIVELY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 04-56682

v. D.C. No. 

W CV-04-00117-RGK ILD OATS MARKETS, INC., a

Delaware corporation, OPINION

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 4, 2006—Pasadena, California

Filed July 27, 2006

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins and Richard A. Paez,

Circuit Judges, and Neil V. Wake,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Paez

*The Honorable Neil V. Wake, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. 

8425
COUNSEL

Richard M. Koep and James A. Rossi, Crandell Wade &

Lowe, Calabasas, California, for the defendant-appellant.

Leonard M. Tavera, Towle, Denison, Smith & Tavera, LLP,

Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellee. 

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge: 

Defendant-Appellant Wild Oats Market, Inc. (“Wild Oats”)

appeals the district court’s order remanding this action to state

court. Wild Oats removed this action to the District Court for

the Central District of California alleging that, because the

parties were completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, diversity jurisdiction existed under

28 U.S.C. § 1332, and therefore removal was proper under 28

U.S.C. § 1441(a).1 Plaintiff-Appellee Emma C. Lively

1

In its notice of removal, Wild Oats stated that “this action may be

removed . . . pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(b).”

8428 LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS
(“Lively”) did not object to the removal. However, after the

case had been pending in the district court for approximately

eight months, the court, acting sua sponte and invoking its

authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), determined that diversity

jurisdiction did not exist because Wild Oats, contrary to the

removal requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), was a citizen of

the state of California. Treating this requirement as a jurisdictional limitation on Wild Oats’ right of removal under

§ 1441(a), the district court remanded Lively’s action to state

court. 

Although Wild Oats does not dispute that it is a citizen of

California and therefore a forum defendant within the meaning of § 1441(b),2

 it argues that its violation of the forum

defendant rule was a procedural defect in the removal process,

which Lively had to raise within the 30 days following

removal as required by § 1447(c). Because Lively did not

object within the 30-day period, Wild Oats argues that Lively

waived the defect and that the district court lacked authority

to remand the case to state court. 

We must decide whether the forum defendant rule contained in § 1441(b) is jurisdictional or procedural, and thus

whether a violation of this rule constitutes a jurisdictional or

procedural defect. This issue has been addressed by nine of

Because Wild Oats’ removal was based on diversity jurisdiction, we

assume that Wild Oats meant to state that removal was proper under

§ 1441(a), not § 1441(b). 

2Section 1441(b) provides: 

Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution,

treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without

regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other

such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the

State in which such action is brought. 

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006). 

LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS 8429
our sister circuits. It is, however, an issue of first impression

in this circuit.3 We join eight of the nine circuits that have

decided this issue and hold that the forum defendant rule is procedural,4

 and therefore a violation of this rule is a waivable

defect in the removal process that cannot form the basis for

a district court’s sua sponte remand order. Because the forum

defendant rule is non-jurisdictional, we further hold that 28

U.S.C. § 1447(d) does not bar appellate review of the district

court’s remand order, which was based on Wild Oats’ violation of the forum defendant rule. 

I. Background

On September 26, 2003, Lively filed a personal injury

action against Wild Oats in state court seeking damages for a

3Although we have not directly addressed the nature of the forum defendant rule, this issue was raised in Spencer v. United States Dist. Court for

the N. Dist. of Cal., 393 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2004). Spencer involved a postremoval joinder of a local, diverse defendant. In determining that the joinder did not necessitate a remand to state court, “[t]he district court determined that the ‘forum defendant’ rule is procedural rather than

jurisdictional.” Id. at 869. We affirmed, holding that the district court did

not err in determining that diversity jurisdiction was not destroyed by the

post-removal joinder. Id. at 868. The basis for our decision was the fact

that the local defendant was joined after the case had been removed to federal court, and, therefore, the defendants did not violate the forum defendant rule at the time of removal. Id. at 871. Notably, we affirmed the

district court’s ruling without expressing disagreement with its characterization of § 1441(b) as a procedural rule. 

4Part of the difficulty with this issue may be attributed to semantics. The

forum defendant rule does not fit neatly within the traditional meaning of

removal procedure—a concept that 28 U.S.C. § 1446 reserves for more

programmatic rules, such as filing deadlines and service requirements.

Perhaps a more accurate descriptor for the forum defendant rule in

§ 1441(b) is one which does not detract from its substantive nature, such

as “non-jurisdictional.” We acknowledge, however, that our sister circuits

often use the term “procedural,” and that there exists a conventional

dichotomy of jurisdiction and procedure in the context of removal proceedings under § 1441(b). We therefore use both “procedural” and “nonjurisdictional” interchangeably to describe the forum defendant rule. 

8430 LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS
slip and fall accident that occurred in one of Wild Oats’ California stores. On January 8, 2004, Wild Oats filed a notice of

removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e), asserting that diversity jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because it

was a citizen of Delaware, its state of incorporation, and Colorado, its principal place of business, and that Lively was a

citizen of New York. Wild Oats also alleged that the amount

in controversy exceeded $75,000. Lively did not object to the

removal. 

On August 25, 2004, after discovery ensued and after Wild

Oats filed a motion for summary judgment, the district court

issued an order to show cause why the case should not be

remanded to state court. According to the district court, “removal appear[ed] to be improper” because Wild Oats’ principal place of business was California, not Colorado. Wild Oats

insisted that removal was proper even if it were a California

citizen because diversity jurisdiction still existed, and therefore the district court could only remand the case to state

court if Lively so moved within the 30-day time limit imposed

by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Because the time limit had expired,

Wild Oats argued that the district court could not order a

remand. 

The district court nonetheless remanded the case to state

court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As noted, the district court determined that removal was improper because

Wild Oats, a California citizen and local defendant, violated

the forum defendant rule contained in § 1441(b). The court

determined that this violation “constitute[d] a jurisdictional

defect” and therefore remand was “timely and proper” pursuant to § 1447(c). Wild Oats timely appealed. 

II. Discussion

Jurisdiction & Standard of Review

Lively argues that we lack jurisdiction to address whether

the forum defendant rule is jurisdictional or procedural

LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS 8431
because § 1447(d) bars appellate review of the district court’s

remand order, which was based on a lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to § 1447(c). We disagree. As explained

below, although § 1447(d) limits appellate review of district

court remand orders, this does not mean that we must simply

turn this case away because the district court asserted that it

lacked jurisdiction and assume that the remand was authorized by § 1447(c). Rather, we must determine whether the

district court correctly applied § 1447(c) by deciding that the

forum defendant rule is a jurisdictional limitation that may be

invoked sua sponte at any time. In so doing, we determine our

own jurisdiction. See Special Invs., Inc. v. Aero Air, Inc., 360

F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We, of course, have jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction.”). 

[1] In addition to one inapplicable exception, § 1447(d)

provides that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court

from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or

otherwise.” The Supreme Court has cabined this broad language by construing § 1447(d)’s bar on appellate review as

applicable only to remand orders issued pursuant to § 1447(c).

See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336,

345-46 (1976) (stating that §§ 1447(d) and (c) “must be construed together . . . . This means that only remand orders

issued under § 1447(c) and invoking grounds specified therein

. . . are immune from review under § 1447(d)”), abrogated on

other grounds in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S.

706 (1996).5 Section 1447(c) provides, in relevant part: 

A motion to remand the case on the basis of any

defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction

must be made within 30 days after the filing of the

5The Supreme Court recently reiterated § 1447(c)’s limitation on the

scope of § 1447(d). Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, ___ U.S. ___, 126

S. Ct. 2145, 2153 (2006) (“In Thermtron, we held that § 1447(d) applies

only to remands based on the grounds specified in § 1447(c), that is, a

defect in removal procedure or lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”). 

8432 LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS
notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any

time before final judgment it appears that the district

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall

be remanded. 

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006). Following the Supreme Court’s

direction, this court has determined that, taken together,

§§ 1447(c) and (d) bar appellate review of a remand order

only if the district court had authority to remand under

§ 1447(c). Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n., Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (“If . . .

the district court had the power to remand sua sponte under

section 1447(c), section 1447(d) would apply, and we would

have no jurisdiction to review even if the remand was erroneous.”). 

[2] Lively is correct that if the district court remanded

under its § 1447(c) authority, we would lack jurisdiction to

review the order. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2004); Hansen

v. Blue Cross of Cal., 891 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1989);

and Kunzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 833 F.2d 1291,

1293 (9th Cir. 1987). Rather than assuming the existence of

this authority, as Lively would have us do, we must determine

its veracity—we must determine whether the district court had

the authority under § 1447(c) to remand. Stated differently,

the question raised on appeal is not whether the district

court’s remand order was correct, but whether the district

court exceeded the scope of its § 1447(c) authority by issuing

the remand order in the first place. Such an inquiry is well

within our jurisdictional bounds—because it “takes aim at the

district court’s authority to issue the remand order, we have

jurisdiction.” In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank, 264 F.3d 952,

965 (9th Cir. 2001); see also N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1038

(9th Cir. 1995) (“[U]nder Thermtron, we have jurisdiction to

decide whether a district court has the power to do what it did

[in issuing a remand order], although we cannot examine

LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS 8433
whether a particular exercise of power was proper.” (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) (second alteration in

original)).6

[3] Therefore, because, as the Third Circuit noted in Korea

Exch. Bank, N.Y. Branch v. Trackwise Sales Corp., 66 F.3d

46, 47 (3d Cir. 1995), our jurisdiction is “inextricably intertwined” with the district court’s remand authority, we must

consider them together. In an effort to determine the district

court’s authority to issue the remand order, we must address

the underlying merits of the district court’s ruling—whether

the forum defendant rule is jurisdictional or procedural in

nature. That is, “[t]his is one of those rare cases in which we

must decide the merits [of the appeal] to decide [the propriety

of our] jurisdiction.” Kelton, 346 F.3d at 1192; see also

Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 300 F.3d 1112, 1118

(9th Cir. 2002) (“In this case, resolution of the substantive

legal question was a necessary predicate to deciding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.”). In sum, we have “jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction,”

7

 and therefore turn to the

merits of the district court’s remand order. Kelton, 346 F.3d

at 1192. 

6Lest there be any confusion, our review of the remand order does not

conflict with this court’s case law that bars review of § 1447(c) remand

orders. In Kunzi, for example, we refused to review a district court’s

remand order because we concluded that it was based on a “jurisdictional

determination that falls within section 1447(c), and is thus unreviewable.”

833 F.2d at 1294 (emphasis added). The basis for the jurisdictional bar in

Kunzi was not the mere fact that the district court cited § 1447(c) in its

remand order, but rather our determination that the district court remanded

based on a jurisdictional ground, within its § 1447(c) authority. This is the

precise determination we must make in the present case. 

7Our jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although the district

court did not enter a final judgment on the merits of Lively’s slip and fall

claim, its remand order had the force of a final order given that it “put the

litigants effectively out of [federal] court.” Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 713

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of

the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 2002). 

8434 LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS
We review de novo a district court’s decision to remand a

removed case and its determination that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. Neb. ex rel. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bentson, 146

F.3d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Peninsula

Commc’ns., Inc., 287 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2002). We also

review de novo a district court’s interpretation and construction of a federal statute. SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 654

(9th Cir. 2003). 

Forum Defendant Rule

[4] Separate and apart from the statute conferring diversity

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, § 1441(b) confines removal on

the basis of diversity jurisdiction to instances where no defendant is a citizen of the forum state. As explained below, we

hold that this additional limitation on diversity-based removal

jurisdiction is a procedural, or non-jurisdictional, rule. Our

holding is compelled by a close analysis of the legislative history of § 1447(c),8

 the policy rationale of § 1441(b), the prevailing law of our sister circuits, and Supreme Court

precedent. 

As originally written, § 1447(c) required the district court

to remand a case to state court “[i]f at any time before final

judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently

and without jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1948)

(emphasis added). Due to the ambiguous nature of the term

“improvidently,” Congress amended the subsection in 1988 to

provide, in relevant part: 

A motion to remand the case on the basis of any

defect in removal procedure must be made within 30

days after the filing of the notice of removal under

§ 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it

8For a comprehensive overview of the history of § 1447(c), see Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1254-59 (11th Cir. 1999). 

LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS 8435
appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. . . . 

Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988,

Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016(c)(1) (emphasis added).

Although the new clause, “defect in removal procedure,” was

an improvement from “improvident,” confusion remained

over what removal defects triggered the 30-day time limit. See

David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1996 Revision of Section

1447(c), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (West Supp. 1988). Removal

defects that were not traditionally categorized as procedural,

but also did not impact subject matter jurisdiction, occupied

a grey area in the law. Until Congress enacted further revisions to § 1447(c) in 1996, some courts placed the forum

defendant rule in this grey area. See Snapper, 171 F.3d at

1258 (“The revised language [of the 1996 Amendments]

would seem to address neatly the issue [regarding § 1441(b)]

that had concerned courts under the 1988 version, suggesting

that removal in violation of § 1441(b) is subject to the 30-day

time limit.”). 

[5] As amended in 1996, a remand motion “on the basis of

any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must

be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of

removal under § 1446(a).” Pub. L. No. 104-219, § 1 (1996)

(emphasis added). We agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s historical analysis of § 1447(c), which concludes that, by substituting “defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction”

for “defect in removal procedure,” Congress sought to ensure

that even the “more substantive” removal defects, such as

§ 1441(b) violations, were subject to the 30-day time limit.

Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1257-58. Therefore, although the forum

defendant rule is not a traditional rule of removal procedure,

as articulated in § 1446, we agree that the 1996 amendments

to § 1447(c) subject § 1441(b) violations to the 30-day time

limit. Id.; see also Siegel, Commentary on 1996 Revision

(“[I]t’s awkward to describe as a defect of ‘procedure’ something that has to do not with mechanics, but with the citizen8436 LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS
ship of a party. The defect . . . is nevertheless subject to the

30-day limit.”). 

[6] The purpose of the forum defendant rule also supports

treating it as a non-jurisdictional requirement. Removal based

on diversity jurisdiction is intended to protect out-of-state

defendants from possible prejudices in state court. See Tosco

Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t., 236 F.3d 495, 502 (9th

Cir. 2001) (“The purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide

a federal forum for out-of-state litigants where they are free

from prejudice in favor of a local litigant.” (internal quotations marks omitted)). The need for such protection is absent,

however, in cases where the defendant is a citizen of the state

in which the case is brought. Within this contextual framework, the forum defendant rule allows the plaintiff to regain

some control over forum selection by requesting that the case

be remanded to state court. A procedural characterization of

this rule honors this purpose because the plaintiff can either

move to remand the case to state court within the 30-day time

limit, or allow the case to remain in federal court by doing

nothing. Either way, the plaintiff exercises control over the

forum. Although a jurisdictional reading of the rule preserves

the plaintiff’s right to remand beyond the 30-day limit, it also

allows the court to remand sua sponte, even if the plaintiff

prefers to remain in federal court. See Skranak v. Castenada,

425 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[J]urisdictional bars

cannot be waived by the parties and may be addressed sua

sponte.”). 

[7] Our interpretation of § 1441(b) comports with eight of

the nine circuits that have addressed this issue. See, e.g., Handelsman v. Bedford Vill. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 48, 50

n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing a violation of the forum defendant rule as a waivable “procedural defect”); Hurley v. Motor

Coach Indus. Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding

that the forum defendant rule “is more a matter of removal

procedure, and hence waivable, than a matter of jurisdiction”); Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 90

LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS 8437
n.3 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing a § 1441(b) violation as a waivable removal defect); Pacheco De Perez v. AT & T Co., 139

F.3d 1368, 1372 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998) (same); In re Shell Oil

Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1523 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); Farm

Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Fudge, 831 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1987)

(holding that a violation of the forum defendant rule did not

strip the district court of its jurisdiction because it was a

“technical” defect that had been waived); Am. Oil Co. v.

McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 1970) (describing

a § 1441(b) violation as a waivable defect in removal proceedings); Handley-Mack Co. v. Godchaux Sugar Co., 2 F.2d

435, 437 (6th Cir. 1924) (describing removal by a forum

defendant as a “technical” violation); but see Hurt v. Dow

Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1146 n.1 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding

that a violation of § 1441(b) is a non-waivable jurisdictional

defect).9

In contrast to the “overwhelming weight of authority . . . on

the ‘nonjurisdictional’ side of the debate,” Hurley, 222 F.3d

at 379, the Eighth Circuit is the sole circuit on the jurisdictional side. See Hurt, 963 F.2d at 1146 n.1. In Hurt, the

Eighth Circuit reasoned that because removal jurisdiction is a

“creature of statute,” a violation of one of its statutory

requirements, e.g. the forum defendant rule, prevents the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at

1145. Thus, although the remand motion in Hurt was

untimely, the court held that remand was proper because

“subject-matter jurisdiction is not a mere procedural irregularity capable of being waived.” Id. at 1146. Like the courts that

have considered Hurt,

10 we reject the Eighth Circuit’s

9Our holding also comports with our case law concerning other statutory removal defects. See, e.g., Vasquez v. N. County Transit Dist., 292

F.3d 1049, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the workmen’s compensation non-removability statute is non-jurisdictional, and therefore a violation of the statute is waivable and does not divest the district court of

jurisdiction). 

10See, e.g., Shapiro v. Logistec USA, Inc., 412 F.3d 307, 313 n.2 (2d

Cir. 2005). 

8438 LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS
approach. In light of § 1447(c)’s legislative history, the purpose of § 1441(b), and the approach used by the majority of

the other circuits, we are not persuaded that the forum defendant rule is a statutory requirement, which, if not met,

deprives the district court of original jurisdiction. 

In addition to citing Hurt, the district court in this case

relied on WRS Motion Picture and Video Lab. v. Post Modern

Edit, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 876 (C.D. Cal. 1999) to conclude

that § 1441(b) imposes a jurisdictional requirement. In so

doing, the district court accepted WRS’s interpretation of the

Supreme Court’s decision in Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit

Corp., 405 U.S. 699 (1972). In WRS, a forum defendant

removed a breach of contract case to federal court on the basis

of diversity jurisdiction. Like the present case, the district

court issued a sua sponte remand order based on a § 1441(b)

violation. In its memorandum remand order, the WRS court

determined that remand was appropriate because § 1441(b)

creates an additional limitation to diversity jurisdiction, and

therefore a violation of this constraint precludes subject matter jurisdiction. 33 F. Supp. 2d at 877 n.1, 878. 

The WRS court recognized that, in Grubbs, the Supreme

Court held that a removal defect similar to a § 1441(b) violation does not defeat jurisdiction. 405 U.S. at 702; see also

Baggs v. Martin, 179 U.S. 206, 209 (1900) and Mackay v.

Uinta Dev. Co., 229 U.S. 173, 176-77 (1913). The WRS court,

however, distinguished the case before it on the basis that it

had not yet been tried. This distinction misunderstands the

import of the Supreme Court’s holding in Grubbs. 

In Grubbs, the Supreme Court held that where a removed

case is tried on the merits without objection and the federal

court enters judgment, the jurisdictional issue on appeal is not

whether removal was proper, but whether the district court

would have had jurisdiction over the case had it been originally filed in federal court.11 405 U.S. at 702. The WRS court

11In addition to a judgment entered after a trial on the merits, we have

held that Grubbs applies to a summary judgment order that disposes of a

LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS 8439
interpreted Grubbs as authorizing a remand based on a

§ 1441(b) violation at any time unless the case proceeded to

a judgment on the merits and the federal court would have

had jurisdiction had the case been originally filed in federal

court. WRS, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 876. 

Although the district court here was persuaded by this

interpretation of Grubbs, the WRS court misconstrued

Grubbs’s holding. Despite noting that the removal in Grubbs

was improper, the Supreme Court held that the district court

retained jurisdiction to enter judgment and the defect “may

not be raised for the first time on appeal.” Grubbs, 405 U.S.

at 700. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however, is a

non-waivable defect and “may be raised at any time.” Hill v.

Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 757 (9th Cir.

1999). Thus, we agree with the Third Circuit that the Supreme

Court, in Grubbs, “clearly suggested, even if it did not

directly hold, that it does not view the removal statute as

imposing independent jurisdictional restrictions on the federal

courts.”

12 Korea Exch., 66 F.3d at 50. Rather, the Supreme

Court distinguished elements of removal procedure, such as

the “manner in which the case was brought or how the attendance of the parties in the United States court was secured,”

from elements of diversity jurisdiction, suggesting that a

§ 1441(b) violation does not strip the district court of jurisdiction. Grubbs, 405 U.S. at 703 (quoting Mackay, 229 U.S. at

176-77); see also Korea Exchange, 66 F.3d at 49 (“The

Mackay Court therefore recognized a clear distinction

case on the merits. See Gould v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 790 F.2d 769,

773 (9th Cir. 1986). 

12In Hurt, the Eighth Circuit deemed Grubbs inapplicable because the

Grubbs plaintiff did not object to removal whereas the plaintiff in Hurt

objected in an untimely fashion. 963 F.2d at 1146. However, if the

removal statute imposes jurisdictional requirements, as Hurt holds, a

plaintiff’s non-objection on the one hand and untimely objection on the

other is a distinction without a difference because either way, the district

court has an obligation to determine if it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

8440 LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS
between the removal ‘process’ [such as ‘which party brought

the case to federal court’] and restrictions on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court over the case.”). For the

foregoing reasons, we conclude that Grubbs does not support

the district court’s determination that a violation of the forum

defendant rule creates a jurisdictional defect that can only be

overcome if the case proceeds to a judgment on the merits and

the federal court would have had jurisdiction had the case

been originally filed in federal court.13

In sum, the legislative history of § 1447(c), the policy rationale of § 1441(b), the result reached by the “overwhelming”

majority of our sister circuits, and Supreme Court precedent

compel our holding. 

III. Conclusion

[8] We hold that the forum defendant rule embodied in

§ 1441(b) is a procedural requirement, and thus a violation of

this rule constitutes a waivable non-jurisdictional defect subject to the 30-day time limit imposed by § 1447(c). In this

case, because Lively failed to object, the district court

exceeded its § 1447(c) authority in ordering a remand. Therefore, we review the district court’s remand order pursuant to

§ 1447(d), and vacate the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

ORDER VACATED and REMANDED.

13The WRS court is not the only district court within the Ninth Circuit

that has addressed the forum defendant rule. The court in Geothermal Res.

Group, Inc. v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1335 n.3

(D. Haw. 2001), was presented with the same issue and determined that

the forum defendant rule was non-jurisdictional. 

LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS 8441