Affirmed and Opinion filed June 20, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00110-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF K.F., K.A.F., R.S.H., AND R.G.H., JR., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 314th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2011-04832J

O P I N I O N

This appeal is from a judgment terminating the parent rights of Alana

Harrison to K.F., K.A.F, R.S.H., and R.G.H, Jr.1 Harrison claims the evidence is 

legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. 

 

1

The trial court’s order also terminated the parental rights of alleged father Robert 

Havies, alleged father Keldan Dontae Frank, and an unknown father, none of whom is a party to 

this appeal.
2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under 

section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, the petitioner must establish by clear 

and convincing evidence one or more acts or omissions enumerated under 

subsection (1) of 161.001 and that termination is in the best interest of the child 

under subsection (2). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2012); In re 

J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex.2005); In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tex.App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). Clear and convincing evidence is that 

measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm 

belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. In re 

C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex.2002).

In a legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have 

formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In the Interest of 

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002). This means we must assume the factfinder 

resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. 

Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or 

found to have been incredible, but we do not disregard undisputed facts, regardless 

of whether they support the finding. Id. If we determine no reasonable factfinder 

could form a firm belief or conviction the matter to be proven is true, we must 

conclude the evidence is legally insufficient. Id.

In a factual sufficiency review, we give due consideration to evidence the 

factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. Id. Our inquiry 

is whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm 

belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations. Id. We consider 

whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have 
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resolved that evidence in favor of its finding. Id. If, in light of the entire record, the 

disputed evidence is so significant that the factfinder could not reasonably have 

formed a firm belief or conviction, we must find the evidence is factually 

insufficient. Id.

THE EVIDENCE

Caseworker Anna Scott testified the Texas Department of Family and 

Protective Services removed the children from their home after responding to a 

report of domestic violence in 2011. The investigator found Harrison and Robert 

Havies, the alleged father of R.S.H and R.G.H., Jr., in the middle of the street 

having a domestic dispute with the police. Havies has an extensive criminal 

record, involving drugs, theft, and domestic violence, in Texas and Louisiana. 

Scott testified that incidents of violence have occurred in front of the children. In 

2011, Havies put a gun to Harrison’s head in front of the children. Harrison 

admitted that incident ocurred, but claimed there were no bullets in the gun. 

Instances of domestic violence in front of the children also occurred between 

Havies and Harrison’s mother and Harrison’s sister. Scott testified Havies 

engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical and emotional health 

and their safety. 

According to Scott, Harrison has attempted to cover up or protect Havies.

When law enforcement responded to a 2010 domestic violence call, Harrison 

pulled out a knife and threatened to kill herself if Havies were arrested. Scott 

testified the concern for domestic violence has not been eliminated because 

Harrison did not attend her domestic violence classes as specified. 

Harrison admitted that she allowed the children to see her fighting with 

Havies. She denied that she tried to stop the arrest of Havies or threatened to kill 

herself, but admitted to grabbing a knife. Harrison agreed there was domestic 
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violence with Havies, but she was “no longer in that relationship ever since they 

took my kids from me.” She testified she finished her domestic violence classes 

and would continue to stay away from Havies. Harrison said she had not talked to 

him throughout the case but did talk to his family. 

K.F., Harrison’s oldest child, alleged Havies sexually abused her. K.F. 

made an outcry to Scott and other professionals involved in the case. According to 

Scott, Harrison refused to believe K.F. and claims that sexual abuse could not have 

happened because she never left K.H. alone. Scott believes if the children were 

returned to Harrison, sexual abuse would be a danger. 

Harrison testified she did not know about the sexual abuse. She denied ever 

saying she disbelieved K.F.; she said she “just wanted to get to the bottom of it.” 

Harrison denied receiving a schedule of sexual abuse training classes from the 

Department. Her recollection is that caseworkers were to give her a schedule after 

the trial and not “right away.” 

Harrison testified that she signed the service plan and understood it. The 

service plan ordered Harrison to stay in touch with the Department, but Scott has 

not always been able to reach her. There was a consecutive period of at least two 

or three months that Harrison’s phone was not connected. Some certified letters 

sent to Harrison were unclaimed at the address she provided. The service plan

ordered Harrison to cooperate with the Department, but Scott feels she is evasive, 

confrontational, uncooperative and dishonest. Harrison testified she has been 

cooperating. The only time she was out of touch with the Department was when 

her phone was disconnected, during which time the Department had her mother’s 

number. 

Harrison began individual counseling and family therapy and completed 

parenting classes. Scott testified that, despite being given extra time by the judge,
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Harrison has not completed her individual therapy, has not completed her family 

therapy, has not obtained stable employment, and is not cooperative with the 

therapist or with the Department. Harrison sees the same therapist for both 

individual and family therapy. She admitted that she did not finish her individual 

and family therapy due to her therapist’s schedule. 

Harrison admitted that in July she was told to stay in touch with her 

caseworker. Harrison acknowledged Scott was trying to reach her in August, 

September, and October to start her therapy. She knew therapy was set up in 

August but claimed Scott did not give her an authorization code necessary to 

attend. Harrison admitted that she has known since January 2012 that she needed 

to complete these services but they still were not completed in January 2013. 

Scott testified Harrison is unstable, has not appropriately parented her 

children and three children are not bonded to her. Harrison is in and out of 

different relationships and has been dishonest with the Department about her 

current relationship. According to Scott, this is the same pattern of behavior 

exhibited when the children initially were removed, except that Havies reports he 

is no longer in her life. 

The date before trial, Harrison told Scott that she had recently started dating 

her current boyfriend and his mother is caring for her youngest child. Scott is 

uncertain of the kind of relationship Harrison has with her new boyfriend, Ashton

Davis, because Harrison refused to provide that information. Davis’s mother 

would not provide Scott any identifying information because she did not want to be 

involved. Scott learned only that she is the new caregiver for the baby and her 

other son, seventeen years old, lives in the home. Scott has been able to reach 

Harrison recently only at Davis’s mother’s home and believes Harrison may be 
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residing there. At trial, Harrison denied being in any other relationships or having 

a boyfriend and described Davis as a friend. 

Sharone Robinson testified Harrison had been living with her since 

September 2011. Harrison pays no rent. Alice Verbois, the Child Advocate, 

testified Robinson’s home was suitable and an appropriate place for the children to 

visit Harrison. Robinson is interested in having R.S.H. and R.G.H., Jr. placed in 

her home. Robinson testified Harrison is a good mother and very responsible. 

Harrison’s interactions with the children were always positive. Robinson thought it 

was in the best interest of the children to continue to see their mother and that if 

Harrison’s rights were not terminated, she would like them to be placed with either 

her or Harrison. Robinson testified that Harrison was capable of protecting them 

from any other domestic violence, “[i]f she’s in my residence.” When asked if 

Harrison would be able to protect the children from a new boyfriend or husband, 

Robinson answered, “If she got a boyfriend or a husband and was not in my 

residence then I can’t answer for that.” Robinson saw the children two or three 

times a month, at their grandmother’s house. Robinson testified that their 

placement was a positive one for K.F. and K.A.F. Robinson has not seen R.S.H. or

R.G.H, Jr. since the removal. 

Harrison testified her current work hours are from 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. If 

she needs to place the children with a sitter, it would be Robinson’s mother. 

Harrison testified there was an extra bedroom for the children at Robinson’s home. 

If the children did not come home with her, Harrison wanted them placed with 

Robinson. Harrison testified she was able to provide a stable home environment. 

During her investigation, Scott discovered the maternal grandmother, 

Angela Harrison, was taking care of the new baby. Angela has a history with the 

Department and has been arrested for prostitution and theft and been involved with 
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drugs. Both Scott and Verbois testified they had been threatened by Angela. 

According to Verbois, a threat was made after she conveyed to Harrison that she 

was recommending termination. Angela denied making any threats. 

On August 11, 2011, Harrison tested positive for cocaine. The week before 

trial, Scott told Harrison that she needed to take a drug test on Friday. Harrison 

said she would go, but never showed up. The day before trial, Scott again told 

Harrison she needed to take a drug test that day but Harrison again failed to show 

up. Scott testified there are other tests Harrison has missed. Harrison testified she 

completed the substance abuse assessment and did not use drugs. According to 

Harrison, she has taken all her drug tests except one and the tests were negative. 

Harrison has not provided support to either the Department or Shaundra 

Lomas, the paternal grandmother caring for of K.F. and K.A.F. In the six months 

prior to the trial, Scott was aware of Harrison having at least five jobs, which Scott 

did not consider stable employment. Harrison had never filed for child support 

from Havies. She does not receive public assistance except benefits for R.G.H., 

Jr., who does not live in her home. 

Since the status hearing, Harrison worked for a day care center and for Total 

Health Care Concept. Harrison had started a new job the week before trial. 

Harrison admitted she has not brought any clothes or provisions to the Department 

for the oldest two children. She claimed she brought them food and snacks and 

was waiting for them to come home to give them clothes and toys. Harrison does 

not feel it would be in her children’s best interest to be adopted and said she would 

never expose them to a dangerous situation. Harrison testified her youngest, 

R.G.H, Jr., is more distant but that R.S.H. wants to live with her. Havies testified 

Harrison is a good mother and it would be in his children’s best interest to go home 

with her. 
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Verbois recommended all the parents’ rights be terminated and K.F. and 

K.A.F. be placed with Lomas. Verbois testified Harrison failed to comply with the 

court-ordered services, has not completed individual therapy or family therapy and 

was not able to verify stable employment. Verbois does not feel the concerns that 

resulted in removal of the children have been eliminated and agreed that it would 

impose a danger to the children if they were returned to Harrison. Verbois did not 

believe Harrison would be able to protect the children or properly care for them. 

Verbois believes Harrison engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children 

with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional 

well being and believed it would be in the best interest of the children for 

Harrison’s rights to be terminated. All four children were doing well in their 

respective placements. 

ANALYSIS

The trial court found that (1) Harrison knowingly placed or knowingly 

allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered 

their physical or emotional wellbeing; (2) Harrison engaged in conduct or 

knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that 

endangered their physical or emotional well-being; (3) Harrison failed to support 

the children in accordance with her ability; (4) Harrison failed to comply with 

court-ordered provisions that established the actions necessary for her to obtain the 

return of the children; and (5) termination was in the best interest of the children. 

Tex. Fam. Code §§ 161.001(1)(D), (E), (F), (O) and 161.001(2). In four issues, 

Harrison argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support these 

findings.
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Judicial Notice of Existence of Court Order 

Setting Out Family Service Plan

Appellant’s third issue claims the evidence fails to support a termination 

finding under section 161.001(O) because the record does not contain a court order 

specifically establishing the actions necessary for Harrison to obtain the return of 

the children. Tex. Fam. Code §§ 161.001(1)(O). A termination finding under 

subsection (O) cannot be upheld where there is no court order that specifically 

establishes the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child. In 

the Interest of B.L.R.P., 269 S.W.3d 707, 709-11 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2008, no 

pet.). Appellant asserts that, although an order is in the clerk’s record, it 

constitutes no evidence because it was not admitted at trial and the trial court did 

not take judicial notice of it. See In the Interest of C.L., 304 S.W.3d 512, 514, 516

(Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.) (holding the trial court did not take judicial 

notice of prior orders in its file where the Department did not ask the trial court to 

take judicial notice of them; the court did not announce in open court that it was 

taking judicial notice; nor did trial court recite in the termination decree that it had 

taken judicial notice). We presume the trial court took judicial notice of its record 

without any request being made and without any announcement that it has done so. 

See In re A.W.B., No. 14–11–00926–CV, 2012 WL 1048640, at *3 (Tex.App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 27, 2012, no pet.) (mem.op.) (presuming trial court took 

judicial notice of order adopting family service plan). In the Interest of C.M.C., 

14-12-00186-CV, 2012 WL 3871359 (Tex. App.—Aug. 30, 2012, pet. denied)

(mem. op.).

Appellant claims In the Interest of A.W.B. and In the Interest of C.M.C.

conflict with this Court’s decision in Nat'l Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hood, 693 

S.W.2d 638 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ). We disagree. Hood
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was an appeal from a summary judgment regarding escrowed funds wherein the 

appellant claimed insufficient evidence. The appellee asserted that, in addition to 

her affidavits, the trial court had taken judicial notice of court records from her 

divorce, a lawsuit involving her ex-husband and a garnishment action. We held in 

Hood that a court may not judicially notice records of another court. Id. at 639 

(citations omitted). A trial court may take judicial notice of the records in its own 

court filed in the same case, with or without the request of a party. See Cognata v. 

Down Hole Injection, Inc., 375 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2012, pet. denied)(presuming the trial court took notice of its contempt order).

Hood is not inconsistent.

Harrison further argues that Hood and Rule 201(e) of the Texas Rules of 

Evidence required the trial court to notify the parties that it was taking judicial 

notice of the order and give them an opportunity to challenge its decision, which 

was not done in this case. In Hood, we noted that Rule 201 does not state whether 

court records can be judicially noticed and said:

Even if the records could be properly noticed under Rule 201 there is 

nothing in the record indicating the court did so. There is also no indication 

that appellant was afforded an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of 

taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed, as provided in the 

rule.

See Hood at 639; Tex. R. Evid. 201(e). Hood and Rule 201(e) pertain to 

adjudicative facts rather than the mere existence of a document in a court’s record. 

The trial court in Hood needed to know not merely that a divorce petition existed; 

he needed to know whether appellant had a claim against the escrowed funds. A 

trial court may take judicial notice of its own files, but it may not take judicial 

notice of the truth of factual statements and allegations contained in the documents 

contained therein. Guyton v. Monteau, 332 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). The trial court here was not required to ascertain 
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adjudicative facts. We presume it merely took judicial notice of the existence of 

the order.2 Neither Hood nor Rule 201(e) applies in this case.

Because we may presume the trial court took judicial notice of its own 

records, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support a finding that the 

Department proved there is an order that specifically established the actions 

necessary for Harrison to obtain the return of her children. Issue three is

overruled.

In issues one and two, Harrison challenges the legal and factual sufficiency 

of the evidence to support termination of her parental rights under sections

161.001(1)(D), (E) and (F). Having found sufficient evidence to support the trial 

court’s finding under subsection (O), it is unnecessary to address these issues.

Best Interests

In her final issue, Harrison challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the trial court’s finding termination of her parental rights is in 

the best interest of K.F., K.A.F., R.S.H., and R.H., Jr. There is a strong 

presumption that the best interest of the child is served by keeping the child with 

its natural parent and the burden is on the petitioner to rebut that presumption. In re 

U.P., 105 S.W.3d at 230.

In deciding whether termination is in the best interest of K.F., K.A.F., 

R.S.H., and R.H., Jr., we examine several factors for each child, including (1) the 

desires of the child, (2) the present and future physical and emotional needs of the 

child, (3) the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child, (4) the 

 

2

In order for the trial court to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts noted in its files, 

the procedures specified in Rule 201(e) may need to be followed. Rios v. Texas Dep’t of Family 

& Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00565-CV, 2012 WL 2989237, at *7 n.5 (Tex. App.—Austin 

July 11, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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parental abilities of the persons seeking custody, (5) the programs available to 

assist those persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child, (6) 

the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody, (7) the 

stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) acts or omissions of the parent 

which may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate, and (9) 

any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 

372 (Tex.1976). This list is not exhaustive, nor is evidence on all nine factors 

required to support terminating a parent’s rights. Id. The same evidence of acts or 

omissions that support termination under section 161.001(1) may be probative in 

determining a child’s best interest. In re A.A.A., 265 S.W.3d 507, 516 (Tex. App.-

Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).

The only testimony regarding the desires of the child came from Harrison. 

She testified that one of the children, R.S.H., wants to live with her. There was no 

testimony regarding the desires of the other three children. The first factor 

therefore weighs neither for nor against the trial court’s finding.

Harrison is not able to provide for the present and future physical and 

emotional needs of her children and she continues to pose a present and future 

emotional and physical danger to the children. There is no evidence that Harrison 

can provide a stable home or stable employment. Harrison has not attempted to 

obtain child support from any of the alleged fathers of her children. There was 

testimony that she is not bonded to three of her children. She continued in a 

relationship that exposed the children to domestic violence. Harrison has left the 

baby in Angela’s care without informing the Department. There was evidence 

from which the trial court could find Harrison has been untruthful with the 

Department regarding her current boyfriend and living arrangements. Thus, the 

second and third factors weigh in favor of the trial court’s finding.
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Robinson’s testimony provides some evidence that Harrison is a good 

parent. Robinson, however, did not know whether Harrison could protect her 

children unless living in Robinson’s home. Havies also testified that Harrison is a 

good mother, but the trial court could have weighed Havies’ credibility in 

determining the weight to be given his opinion. The testimony of Scott and 

Verbois contradicts those opinions. The evidence regarding Harrison’s parenting 

skills establishes that the fourth factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s finding.

Harrison was given an extension of time but has not complied with her 

current plan of service. Therefore, the fifth factor also weighs in favor of the trial 

court’s finding.

All four children are doing well in their respective placements. The only 

home Harrison can provide is a room in Robinson’s home. The sixth and seventh 

factors weigh in favor of the trial court’s finding.

Finally, we consider the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate 

the existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate and any excuses for those 

acts or omissions. Although given an extension of time to do so, Harrison failed to 

complete court-ordered services to secure the return of her children. Her excuse

was that Scott failed to provide an authorization code. The trial court, as the 

factfinder, was entitled to believe Scott that Harrison could not be reached during 

that time. There was testimony Harrison did not believe her daughter was sexually 

abused and Harrison failed to attend sexual abuse classes to help her daughter. Her 

excuse was that those suggesting classes did not say to take them “right away.” 

Harrison wielded a knife when confronted by officers trying to arrest Havies. 

Harrison excused Havies’ putting a gun to her head because there were no bullets.

The eighth and ninth factors also weigh in favor of the trial court’s finding.
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After reviewing this evidence, we conclude the trial court’s determination 

that terminating appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of K.F., K.A.F., 

R.S.H., and R.H., Jr., is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. We 

overrule appellant’s fourth issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled all of appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Busby.