FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 11-30250

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  4:05-cr-00085-

SEH-1 SCOTT ANDREW BECKER,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 7, 2012*

Seattle, Washington

Filed June 19, 2012

Before: Ronald M.Gould, Jay S. Bybee, and

Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould

*The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

7091
COUNSEL

Anthony R. Gallagher, Federal Defenders of Montana, Great

Falls, Montana, for the defendant-appellant.

7092 UNITED STATES v. BECKER
Michael W. Cotter, United States Attorney, Marcia Hurd,

Assistant United States Attorney, Billings, Montana, for the

plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Scott Andrew Becker (“Becker”) pled guilty to knowingly

taking or receiving obscene matters from an interactive computer service in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462, a crime that

does not categorically constitute a “sex offense” as defined by

the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act

(“SORNA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A). At the change of

plea proceedings, Becker stated, “I believe that I am guilty of

the charges and did download child pornography or possess

child pornography during the time said.” The district court

sentenced Becker to a 60-month custodial term followed by

a 3-year supervised release term. The district court imposed

several conditions of supervised release, including the

requirement that Becker complete a sex offender treatment

program. 

After completing his custodial sentence and beginning

supervised release, Becker violated the terms of his supervised release by, inter alia, not attending sex offender treatment. Becker then appeared before the same district court

judge who had imposed the initial sentence. The district court

revoked Becker’s supervised release, and, along with imposing a 9-month custodial term followed by a new 27-month

supervised release term, ordered Becker to register as a sex

offender pursuant to SORNA.1 Becker now appeals the district court’s imposition of this condition. 

1

42 U.S.C. § 16913(a); see also United States v. Begay, 622 F.3d 1187,

1191 (9th Cir. 2010) (“SORNA’s registration requirements applied immediately and retroactively to all sex offenders regardless of when they were

convicted.”). 

UNITED STATES v. BECKER 7093
Normally, “[w]e review the district court’s imposition of

supervised release conditions for abuse of discretion.” United

States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010). At sentencing, however, Becker, with the assistance of counsel, did

not object to the imposition of the SORNA registration condition. Consequently, we review Becker’s challenge to that condition for plain error. See United States v. Hammons, 558 F.3d

1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009). Plain error is “(1) error, (2) that

is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights. If all three

conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its

discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error

seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S.

625, 631 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Becker argues that the district court committed plain error

by not making findings of fact that he was a sex offender

under SORNA and by not otherwise articulating its reasons

for imposing the SORNA registration requirement. We disagree. 

[1] We have previously applied a modified categorical

approach to classify an underlying offense as a sex offense

under SORNA for the purpose of determining whether

SORNA registration was required. See United States v. Mi

Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 990-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding “that Congress contemplated a non-categorical approach

as to the age of the victim in determining whether a particular

conviction is for a ‘specified offense against a minor,’ ” and

that “the underlying facts of a defendant’s offense are pertinent in determining whether she has committed a ‘specified

offense against a minor’ and is thus a sex offender”).2 Here,

2

In Mi Kyung Byun, we relied on the appellant’s admissions in a plea

agreement about the underlying facts of her offense conduct to conclude

that her crime was a sex offense under SORNA, even though she pled

guilty to an offense that is not categorically a sex offense under SORNA.

Id. at 994. 

7094 UNITED STATES v. BECKER
Becker’s admissions made at his change of plea proceedings

establish that Becker’s crime was a “sex offense” as defined

by SORNA. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(ii) (a “specified

offense against a minor” is a sex offense under SORNA),

(7)(G) (possession, production or distribution of child pornography is a specified offense against a minor); see United

States v. Snellenberger, 548 F.3d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc) (noting that we may rely on a plea colloquy in conducting modified categorical analysis). Because Becker is a sex

offender under SORNA, the district court was required to

impose the registration condition. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

(“The court shall order, as an explicit condition of supervised

release for a person required to register under [SORNA] that

the person comply with the requirements of that Act.”).

[2] Even if the district court were not required to impose

SORNA registration as a mandatory condition of supervised

release, the district court did not commit plain error by imposing registration as a discretionary condition. See id. (authorizing the district court to impose “any other [reasonable]

condition it considers to be appropriate”). We have said that

“the district court ‘need not state at sentencing the reasons for

imposing each condition of supervised release, if it is apparent

from the record.’ ” United States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257,

1261-62 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Blinkinsop,

606 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010), emphasis omitted). We

conclude that it is apparent from the record here that the registration condition was reasonable. Becker has not met his burden of proving the contrary. Moreover, the imposition of the

SORNA registration condition does not impair the fairness,

integrity or reputation of the court, and so we will not exercise

discretion to relieve Becker of this condition. 

AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES v. BECKER 7095