1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 09 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### JOHNSON v . UNITE D STAT ES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVE NTH CIRCUI T No. 08–6 92 5. Ar g u ed Oc tober6, 2009 —Dec ided M a r c h2, 2010 Petitioner Joh n son pleaded guilty to possession of ammunition by a c o n v ic ted felon

. 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). T h e Gov e r n ment sou gh tsen tenc ingunder the Ar med C a r eerCr im inal Act, which a u thorizes an enha nced pe n a lty for aper s on wh o violates §922(g) and who“has th r ee pr ev iou s c o n v ic tion s” f o r“a v i olen tf e lon y ,” §924(e )(1), defin e d as, inter alia, anoffen s e th a t“h as a s an el ement the use

. . . of physi

c a l for c eag ai n s t th e per s onof an oth e r , ” §924(e)( 2 )(B)(i). Amon gth e three priorfel o ny convi c tions the Gove rn ment proffere d wa s J o hn

son ’ s 20 03 Flo r ida c o n v ic tionforsimp le b a ttery, which ordinarily is a fir s t-degr ee m i sdeme a n o r , Fla. S t at. § 7 8 4 .03(1)(b ), bu t was afelon y conviction fo r J o hns on b e ca us e he ha d pr evious ly b een convicted of an oth e rbatter y , Fla. Stat. § 784.0 3 (2). Un derFlor ida la w, a batter y occu rs whenapers on either“[a] ctua lly a n d intentiona lly touches o r s t rikes a n ot her pers on a g a i ns t[his ] wil l ,” or “[i]ntentio n ally causes b o dily ha rm t o a n ot her pers on.” §7 84 .0 3 ( 1 ) (a). Not h ing in t h e record per m itted the Distr i c tCour t to c o nc lude that Johnson’ s 200 3 c o nv ic

tion rested upon the “strik[ing]” or“[i]nte n tionally caus[ing] bodily harm” elements of the offense. Ac cordi n gly, his co nvict i on wa s a predicate conviction for a “violentfelony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act only if “[ a]ctually and inten t ionally touch[ing]” another c o n s titu tes th e u s e of “ph y sic a l for c e ” u n d er§924(e)(2)(B)(i). Con

cluding itdoe s , t h e Dis t rictCour t enha n c ed J o hns on’s s e ntence un

der§924(e)(1), sen t en c i n gh i m to a ter mo f 15 y e ar s an d 5 mon t h s . The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Held: The Florida felony offense of ba tter yby“[a]c t uallyand intention

ally touch[ing] ” another person does not ha v e“as an elem ent the use

. . . of phys ical force agains t the person of another,” §924(e)(2)(B)(i) , an d th u s does n o t c o n s titu te a “v iolen tfelon y” un der§924(e)(1).2 JOHNSON v. UNITED STAT ES Sy llabu s Pp. 3–12.

(a) Inin ter p r e tin gth e ph r a se “ph y sic a l f o r c e ” in§924(e)(2)(B)(i), the Cour t is not bound bythe Flor ida Supreme Court’s concl u sion in Statev. Hearns , 961 So. 2d 211, 21 8, that, under Flori d a’s statutory equivalent to the Armed Career Cr imin al Ac t, Fla. St at. §77 5 .08 4 , the offense of battery does not “involvetheuse . . . of physical force or v i olen c eag ainst an yin div i du al,” Fla. Sta t . §776.08. Th e mean in gof “ph y sic a l for c e” in§924(e)( 2 )(B)(i) is a q u estionof feder a l law, n o t state law. T h e Court is bound, howe ve r, by the Florida Supreme Court’s interp retation of the elements of the state law offense, includ

ing the Florida Supr eme Co urt’s holding th at §7 84.03( 1) (a)’ s elemen t of “[a]ctually and intention a lly touc hing” a n other pers on is sa tis f ied by any in ten t ion a l ph y s ic al con t ac t, n omatterh o w sligh t
. Pp. 3–4.

(b) Bec a u s e §924(e)( 2 )(B)(i) does n o t defin e“ph y sic a l for c e ,” th e Cou r t giv e s th e ph r a se it s or din a r ymean in g . Baileyv. U n ited Stat es , 516 U. S. 13 7, 144–14 5. Th e adjec t iv e “p h y sic a l” is c l e a r . Th e n o u n “force,” howe v e r, ha s anumb e r of meaning s . Its or dina r ymeaning refers t ot h e applica t ion of st rengt h , powe r, a n d violence—in t h is con tex t , ag ain s t a n oth e rper s on. Pp. 4–5.

(c ) Th e Gov e rn men tsu g g e s t s th at “for c e ” in§924(e)(2)(B)(i)’ s defi

nition of “violent felony” is a lega l term of art describing one o f the elements of the common-law crime of battery. At comm on law, that element was sati sfied by e v en the s light es t offens ive touchin g . Al

thougha c o mmon-law ter m of ar tshoul dbe giv e n i t s es tablished c o mmon-law meaning , the Cour t does not asc r ibe to a sta t utor yterm a c o mmon-la w meaningwher e that me aningdoes not fit. Her e “phy sic a l for c e ” is used in definingnot the c r i me of ba tter y , but rather the statutory category of “ violentfelon y .” §924(e)(2)(B)(i). In that c o ntex t, “ p hy sic a l for c e” means viole n tforce— i. e . , force ca pab l e of causing physical pa in or in j u ry t oa n ot her pers on. Cf. Leocalv. Ash croft , 543 U. S. 1, 11. M o r eov er, it is s i g n ific an t th atth e mean in g the Gov e rnment seeks to im pute to the ter m“for c e ” der iv e s fr om the elements of ac o mmon-law misde m eanor . Nothingin the tex to f §924(e)( 2 )(B)(i) su g g e sts th a t“for c e ” inth e defin i tionof a“v iolen tfel

ony” should be regarded as a common-lawterm of art u s ed to define t h e cont ours of a m i s d em ea nor. Nor ca n a n y nega tive inference abou tth e am ou n tof “for c e” r e qu ir ed by§924(e)(2)( B)( i) be dr awn fr om §924(e)(2 )(B)(ii) an d §922(g)(8)(C)(ii). Pp. 5–9.

(d) Ther e is no for c eto the Gov e rnment’ s pr edic tion tha tthis dec i

sion will undermine its abi li tyto enforce §922(g)(9)’s fire arm dis abi l

it y a g a i ns t apers on previo us ly convi c t e d of am i s d em ea nor crim eof domest icv i olen c eth at h a s as anel e m ent the “use . . . of physical for c e ,” §921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Th e Cou r t i n ter p r e ts th e phrase “ph y sic a l force” onl yin the context of a statut ory de finition of “vio lent felony,”3 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Sy llabu s and does not d e cide whether the same meaning applies i nthe context of defining the scope of misd emeano r offens es . S i mila rlym i spla ced is the Governme nt’s assert ion that itwill no w be more dif f icult to ob

ta in s e ntencing e nha ncem ents for indivi dua l s convicted underge neric felo ny-b a t t e ry s t a t ut es t h a tcover b o t hviolentforce a n dun wan t ed ph y s ic al c o n t ac t, a n d to r e mov eanalienc o n v ic ted of a nonviolent b a ttery conviction under thes t a t utory provis ion for a n alien convicted of a“cri me of do me stic violence,” 8 U. S. C. §122 7(a)(2)( E)

. See, e.g., Cham b ers v. U n ited Stat es , 555 U. S. ___, ___; Shepa r dv. Un it edSt ates , 544 U. S. 13, 26. Pp. 9–11.

(e) Before t h e Dis t rictCourt t h e Governm e ntdis c la im ed a n y reli

ance upon theso-called “res idual clau se” of the definiti on of “violent felon y” in§924(e)(2)(B)(i i), wh ic h c o v e r sanoffen s e t h at “in v olv e s c o nduc t that pr esents a se r i ous pote ntia l risk of phys ical injury to a n ot her.” Accordingly, t h e Courtdeclines t orem a nd for cons idera

tionwh eth e rJ o h n s on ’ s 2003 bat ter yc o nv ictionqu alifie s as a “v iolen t felon y” u n d er th at pr ov ision

. Pp. 11–12. 528 F. 3d 13 18 , r e v e r s ed an d r e man d ed.

S CALIA , J., delivered the opinion of the Cour t, in whic h R OBERTS , C. J., and S TE VENS , K ENNEDY , G IN SB U R G , B REYER , a n d S OTOMAYOR , JJ., joined. ALITO , J., filed adis s enting opinion, in which T HOMAS , J., join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 08–6 92 5 

### CURTI S DARN ELL J O HNSON, PETITION ER v. UNITE D STATE S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [M ar c h2, 2010] 

### J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### delivered the opini o n of the Co urt. We decide whether th e Florid a felony offense of batter y by “[a]ctually and inte ntionally touch[ing]” a n other per

son, Fla. Stat. §784.03( 1)(a), (2) (2003), “has a s an elemen t the use .

. . of physical force aga i nst the pe rson of an

other,” 18 U. S. C. §92 4 (e)(2)(B)(i), and thus constitutes a “violent felony” under the Ar med Career Criminal Act, §924(e)(1). I Curtis Johnson pleaded guilty to knowingl y possessing ammunition after ha ving been convicted o f a felony, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). The Government sought an e nhanced pe nalty und er §924(e), which provides that a person who violates §922( g) and who “has three previous convictions” f o r “a violent felony” “ c ommitted on occasions di fferent from oneanot h er” shall b e imprison e d for a minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life. A “violent felony” is def i ned as “a ny crime punishable b y imprisonme nt for a term exceeding one year” that: “(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force a g ainst the person of2 JOHNSON v. UNITED STAT ES Opinion of theCourt 

### another; or “(ii) is bur glary, arson, or extortion, involv es use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that pre

sents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an

other.” §924(e)(2)(B). Johnson’s i n dictment specified five prior felony convic

tions. The Government contended that three of those convictions—for aggra v ated ba tte ry and for burglary of a dwelling in October 1986, and forbattery in May 2003— rendered Johnson eligible for sentencing under §924(e)(1). At the sentencing hearing, Johnson did not dispute that the two 1986 convictions were fo r “violent felon[ies],” but he objected to counting his 2003 battery conviction. Th a t conviction was for simple battery under Florida law, whi c h ordinarily is a first-degree misdemeanor, Fla. Stat

. §784.03(1)(b ), but is a third-degree felony for a defendant who (lik e J o hnson) ha s beenconvicted of battery (eve n simple battery) before, §784.03(2). Under §78 4 .03(1)(a), a batteryoccurs whena person either “1. [a]ctually a n d intentionally touches or strikes another person agai nst the will of th e other,” or “2. [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to ano ther person .” Because the elements of the offense are disjunctive, the prosecution can prove a battery in one of three ways. Sta t ev. He arns , 961 So. 2d 211, 2 18 (Fla. 20 07). It can prove that the defendant “[i]nten tionally caus[ed] bodily harm,” that he “intentionally str[uck]” the victim, or that he merely “[a]ctually and intentionally touche[d]” the victim. Since nothing in the record of Johnson’s 20 03 battery conviction permitted t h e Distri ct Court to co nclude thatit rested upon anything more than the least of t h ese acts, see Shepa r dv. United Sta t es , 544 U. S. 13, 26 (2005) (plural

ity opinion), his conviction was a predicate conviction for a “violent felony” under the Arme d Career Criminal Act only3 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### if “[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]” an other person constitutes the use of “ p hysical for c e” within t h e meaning of §924(e)(2 )(B)(i). Th e Distri ct Court concluded that i t does, and a ccordingly s e ntenced Johnson under §924(e)(1) to a prison term of 15 years and 5 months. The Eleven th Circuit affirmed. 528 F. 3d 1 318 (2008). We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. ___ (2009). II Florida ha s a statute similar to the Armed Career Criminal Act that imposes manda t ory-minimum sentences upon “violent career criminal[s],” Fla. Stat. § 775.084(4)(d) (2007), defined to mean persons who have three convic

tions for certain felonies, incl udin g any “forcible f e lony, ” §775.084(1) (d)(1)(a). “[F]orcible felony” is d e fined to in

clude a lis t of enumerated felonies—including murder, manslaughter, sexual battery, carjacking, aggra v ate d assault, an d aggra v ated battery—and also “any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force o r violence against any individual.” §776.08. In Hea r ns , the Florida Supreme Court held that the felony offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, §784.07(2)(b)—which requires the same conduct (di r ected agains t a law en

forcement officer) as misdemeanor batteryunder §784.03(1)( a)—was not a forcible felony. See 961 So. 2d, at 219. It said that since §784.03(1)( a) requires proof of only the slightest unwante dphysical touch, “the use . . . of physical force” was not an elemen t of the offense. Id., at 219. Johnson ar gues that in deciding whether any unwanted physical touching constitutes “physical force” under 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i), we are bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion in Hearnsthat it does not constitute “physical force.” T hat is not so. Th e meaning of “physical force” in §924(e)(2)(B)(i) is a question of feder a l law, not sta t e law. An d in answering that question we are4 JOHNSON v. UNITED STAT ES Opinion of theCourt 

### not bound by a state co urt’s interp retation of a similar—or even identical—state statute. We are, however, bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretati on of state law, including its determination of the elem en ts of Fla. Stat. §784.03(2). See Johnsonv. Fankell , 52 0 U. S. 911, 916 (1997). The Flori d a Supreme Court has held that the elementof “actuall yand inte n tionally touching” under Florida’s battery law is satisfied by any in tentional physical contact, “no matter ho w slight.” He arns , 961 So. 2d, at 21 8. The mo st “nominal contact,” such as a “ t a[p] . . . on the shoulder witho u t consent,” id., at 219, establishes a violation. We ap ply “th[is] substantive el emen[t] of the criminal offens e , ” Jacksonv. Virginia , 4 43 U. S. 307, 324, n. 1 6 (1979), in determining whether a felony conviction for battery un d e r Fla. Stat. §784.03(2) meets the definition of “violent fel

ony” in 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i). III Section 924(e)(2)(B)(i) does no t define “physical force, ” and we therefore give the phrase its ordin a ry meaning. Baileyv. United Sta t es , 516 U. S. 137, 144–145 (1995). The adjecti ve “physica l” is clear in meaning but not of much help to our inquiry. It plainly refers to force exerted by and through concrete bodies—distinguishing physica l force from, for examp l e, intellect ual force or emotional force. It is the noun that poses the difficulty; “ f orce” has a number of meanings. For present purposes we can ex

clude its specialized meaning in the field of physics: a cause of the acceleration of mass. Webster’s New Interna

tional Dicti onary 986 (2d ed. 1954 ) (hereinafter Webster’s Second). In more general usage it means “[s]trength o r energy; active power; vigor; often an unusual degree of strength or energy,” “[ p ] ower to aff e ct stronglyin physical relations,” or “[p]ower, violence, compulsion, or constraint exerted upon a person.” Id. , at 985. Black’s Law Di ction

-5 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### ary 717 (9 th ed. 2009) (hereinafter Black’s) de fines “force” as “[p]ower, violence, or pressure directed agai nst a person or thing.” And it defines “p hysical force” as “[f]orce con

sisting in a physical act, esp. a violent act directed agains t a robbery victim.” Ibid. All of these defin i ti ons suggest a degree of p o wer that would not be satisfied by the merest touching. There is, however, a more specialized legal usage of the word “force ”: its usei ndescribin gone of th e el ements of the common-law crim e of battery, which consisted of the intentional application of unlawful force against the per

son of another. See 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §7.15(a), p. 301 ( 1986 and Supp. 2003 ); accord, Bla c k’s 173. The common law held this elem ent of “force” to be satisfied by eventhe slightest offensive touch

ing. See 3 W. Black s tone, Comm entaries onthe Laws of England 1 20 (1768) (hereinafter Blackston e ); Lynchv. Commonwealth , 131 Va. 762, 7 65, 109 S. E. 427, 42 8 (1921); see also 2 LaF a ve & Scott, supra , §7 .15(a). The question is whether the term “force” in 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)( B)(i) has th e specialized meaning that it bore in the common-law definition of bat tery. The Government asserts that it does. We disagree. Although a common-law term of a rt should b e given its established common-la w meaning, United S t a t esv. T u rley , 352 U. S. 4 07, 411 (1957), we do not assume that astatu

tory word i s used as a term of art where t hat meaning does not fit. Ultimately, context determines meaning, Jareckiv. G. D. Se arl e& Co. , 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961 ), and we “do not force t e rm-of-a rt definitions into contexts where they plainly do not fit and produce nonsense,” Gonzalesv. Oregon , 546 U. S. 243, 282 (2006) (S CALIA 

### , J. , dissenting). Here we are interpret i ng the phrase “physical force” as u s ed in defining not t h e crime of batter y , b u t rather the statutorycategoryof “violent felon[ies],” §924(e)(2)( B). In Leocal v. Ashcroft , 543 U. S. 1 (2004), we6 JOHNSON v. UNITED STAT ES Opinion of theCourt 

### interpretedthe statut ory definition of “crim e of violenc e ” in 18 U. S. C. §16. That provi s ion is very similar to §924(e)(2)( B)(i), in that it includes any felony offen s e which “has as an element the use . . . of physical force against the person or property of another,” §16(a). W e stated: “In constru ing both pa rts of §16, we cannot forge t that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term ‘crime of viole n ce.’ The o r dinary meaning of this term, combined with §16’s emphasis on the use o f physical for c e against another person (or th e risk of having to u s e such force in committing a c r ime), sug

gests a category of violent, active crimes . . . .” 543 U. S., at 11. Just so here. We think it clear t hat in the context of a statutory definition of “ violentfelony,” the ph rase “physi

cal force” means violentforce—that is, force capable of causing ph ysical pain or injury to another person. See Floresv. As hcroft , 350 F. 3d 666, 6 72 (CA7 20 03) (Easter

brook, J.). Even by itself, the word “violent” in §924(e)(2)( B) connotes a substant ial degree of force. Web

ster’s Secon d2846 (defining “vio lent” as “[m]oving, acting, or characte rized, by physicalforce, esp. by extreme and sudden or by unjust or improper force; furious; sever e ; vehement . . .”); 19 Oxford English Dictionary 656 (2d ed. 1989) (“[c]h aracterized by the exertion of great physical force or strength”); Bla c k’s 1706 (“[o]f, relatin gto, or char

acterized b ystron gph ysical force ”). When t h e adjectiv e “violent” is attached to the noun “felony,” its connotation of strong p h ysical forc e is even cl earer. See id. , at 118 8 (defining “violent felony” as “[a] crime cha r acterized by extreme ph ysical force, such as m u rder, forci ble rape, and assault and battery wi th a dange r ous weapon”); see als o United Sta t esv. Doe , 960 F. 2d 221, 225 (CA1 1992) (Breyer, C. J.) (“[T]he term to be defined, ‘violent felony,’7 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt



### . . . calls to mind a tradition of c r imes that involve the possibility of more closely related, active violence”). It is signific ant, moreover, that the meaning of “physica l force” the Government would seek to import into thi s definition of “violent felony” is a meaning derived from a common-law misd eme a nor. At c o mmon law, battery

—all battery, an d not merely batter yb ythe meres ttouching

— was a misdemeanor, n o t a felony. See 4 Bla c kstone 216 – 218 (1769); see a l so 1 LaFave & Scott, sup r a , §2.1(b), at 90; ALI, Model Pen a l Code §2 11.1, Comment, p. 175 (1980). As the dissent points out, post , at 5–6 (opinion of ALITO 

### , J.), the dividing line between misdemeanors a n d feloni es has shifted over time. But even today a simple battery—w hether of t h e mere-touching or bodily-injury variety—generally is p unishable a s a misd em eanor. 1 

### S e e , e.g., 2 W. LaFave, Sub s tantive Criminal Law §16.1(b) (2 d ed. 2003 and Supp. 2 009–2010); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§242 and 243 (West 2008); Fla. Stat. §784.03(1)(b); Ill. Comp. Sta t ., ch. 720, §5/12–3(b) (West 2009); Tex. Pena l Code Ann. §22.01(b) (West Supp. 2008). It is unlikely that Congress would select as a term of art defining “violent felony” a phrase that the common law gave pec u liar mean

ing only inits defin i tion of a mi sdemeanor. Of cours e “physical force” can be given its common-law misdemean o r meaning by artful language, but here the only text th at can be claimed to accomplish that is the phrase “physic a l force” itself. Since, as we have s een, that is as readily

——————

1 Th e dissen tn o tes, post , at5–6, th at, ar ou n d th e time th e Ar med Car eerCr iminal Ac t bec a me law, in “quite a few Sta t es ” i twas afelony offens e to commit a nunw a n ted phys ica ltouching of certa i n victims , s u ch a s police officers

. Tha twould b ereleva ntfor det e rmining whet he r a conviction under one of those statutes meets th e 18 U. S. C. §924(e)( 2 )(B) r e qu ir emen t of bein ga “felon y” c o n v ic tion

. Bu t i th a s n o bearing upon whether the substant ive element of those offenses— makingunwa n ted phy s ic al c o ntac t with c e r t ain spec ial c a teg o r i es of individuals—i n volves the use of “for c e” within the meaningof §924(e)( 2 )(B)(i), a statu t e ap plic able to a ll v i c t ims.8 JOHNSON v. UNITED STAT ES Opinion of theCourt 

### (indeed, much more readily) taken to describe violen t force, there is no reason to de fine “violent felony” by refer

ence to a nonviolent misdemeanor. The Government argues that we cannot construe 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i) to reach on ly offenses t hat have as an elem ent the use of violentforce, because there is no modifier in§924(e)(2)( B)(i) that specifies th e degree of “physical force” required. As we have discussed, however, the term “ p hysical force” itself normally connotes for c e strong enough to constitute “po w er”—and all t h e more so when it is contained in a definitionof “violent felony.” Nor is there any merit to the dissent’s contention, post , at 4, that the term “force” in §924(e)(2) ( B)(i) cannot be read to require violent force, because Con gress specifically named “burglary” and “extortion” as “violent felon[ies]” in §924(e)(2)( B)(ii) notwithstanding that those offenses ca n be committed withoutviolen ce. The point would have force (so to speak) if burglaryand extortion were listed in §924(e)(2)( B)(i), as felonies that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatene duse of physical force.” In fact, however, the yare listed in §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), as examples of felonies that “presen[t] a serious potential risk of physical injury to a n other.” The Government has not argued th at intentional, unwanted touching qualifies under this latter provi s ion. What the dissent’s argument comes down to, then, is the contention that, since felonies that create a serious risk of physical injury qualify as violent felonies under subparagraph (B)(ii), feloni es that involve a mere unwanted touching must involve the use of physical force and qualify as violent felonies under sub

paragraph (B)(i). That obviously does not fo llo w. 2

——————

2 Even fu rther a f ield is the dis s e nt’s a r gument, post , at 2 –3, th a tsin c e §924(e)( 2 )(B)(i i) r e qu ir es c o ndu c t th at “pr e sen t s a ser i ou s poten t ial r i s k of ph y s ic al in ju r yto an oth e r,” §924(e)(2)( B )(i) mu st n o t. Th at is r a th er like saying a provision which includ es (i) apples and (ii) overripe oranges must exclude o v erri pe apples

. It does not follow.9 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### The Govern ment also a s ks us to draw a nega tive infer

ence from t h e presenceof the“bodily injury” specification added to the phrase “physica l force” in §922(g)(8)(C)(ii)

. That provi s ion forbid s the poss essionof f i rearms by a person subject to a co urt order e x plicitly p r ohibiting the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against [an ] intimate partner or child that would reasona

bly be expected to caus e bodily inj u ry.” Ibid. The absenc e of such language in §924(e)(2)(B)(i), the Governme nt contends, proves that the merest touch suffices. Even as a matter of logic that does not follow. Specifying that “physical force” must rise to th e level of b o dil yinjury does not suggestthat witho u t the qualification “physical forc e” would consist of the merest touch. It mightconsist, for example, of only that degree of f o rce necess ary to infli c t pain—a slap in the face, for example. Moreover, this is not a case where Co ngress has “include[d] particula r language in one section of a statute but o m it[ted] it in another section of the same Ac t ,” R u ssellov. U n ited S t ates , 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal q u otation m a rks omitted; emphasis added). Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) was enacted into law in 1994—eight years after enactment of the language in §924(e)(2)(B)(i). Compare Pu b. L. 103–3 22, §110401, 108 Stat. 2 015 (1994), withPub. L. 99–570, §1402, 100 Stat. 3207 –39 (1986). IV The Govern ment contends that interpreting 18 U. S. C

. §924(e)(2)( B)(i) to require violentforce will undermine its ability to enforce the firearm disability in §922(g)(9) for persons who previousl yhave been convicted of a “misde

meanor crime of domestic viol en ce,” which is defined t o include certain misdemeanor off e nses that have, “as a n element, th e use or attempted use of physical force . . . ,” §921(a)(33)(A)(ii). The prediction i s unfounded. We have interpretedthe phrase “physicalf o rce” only i nthe conte x t10 JOHNSON v. UNITED STAT ES Opinion of theCourt 

### of a statutory definition of “v iolent felony.” We do not decide that the phrase has the same meaning in the con

text of defi ning a misd emeanor crime of domestic violence. The issue is not before us, so we do not decide it. In a similar vein, th e Governm e nt asserts that o u r interpretati on will ma ke it mo re difficult to remove, pur

suant to 8 U. S. C. §12 27(a)(2)(E), an alien convicted of a “crime of domestic violence.” That phrase is defined t o mean “any crime of vi olence (as defined in[18 U. S. C. §16])” committed by certain persons, inclu d ing spouses, former spouses, and parents. §1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The Gov

ernment contends it will be harder to obtain removal based upon battery convictions th at, like those in Florida, do not require the use of violent physical force. The dis

sent likewise anticipates that in the States it has identi

fied, post , at 6–7, and n. 3, as having generic felony

battery s t a t utes that cover bothviolent force and u n wanted physical contact, our decis i on will render convic

tions under those statutes “outside the scope of [the Armed Car eer Criminal Act],” post , at 8. This exagg e rates the practical ef fect of our decision. When the law under which the defendant has been con

victed conta i ns statutory phra ses t hat cover several differ

ent generic crimes, some of wh ich require violent force and some of which do not, the “ ‘modified categorica l approach’ ” that we have approved, Nijhawanv. Ho ld er , 557 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at10), permits a court to determine which statu t ory ph rase was the ba sis for the conviction b y consulting the trial record—i ncluding charging docu

ments, plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, findings of fact and co nclusions of law from abench trial , and jur yin structions a n d verdi ct f o rms. See Chambersv. UnitedS t a t es , 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 4); Shepa r d , 544 U. S., at 26 (plurality opinion); Taylor v. UnitedS t a t es , 495 U. S. 575, 60 2 (1990). Indeed, the Government has in th e past obta ined convictions under11 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt 

### the Armed Career Criminal Act i nprecisely this manner. See, e.g., United S t ates v. Simms , 441 F. 3d 313, 316–31 7 (CA4 2006 ) (Marylan d battery); cf. United Sta t esv. Robledo-Leyva , 307 Fed. Appx. 859, 862 (CA5) (Flori da battery), ce rt. denied, 558 U. S. ___ (2009); United S t a t es v. Luque-Barahona , 2 72 Fed. Appx. 521, 52 4–525 (CA7 2008) (same). It may well be true, as the G o vernment contends, that in many cases state and local records from battery convictions will be incom p lete. But absence of records will often fru s trate appl ication of t h e modified categoricalapproach—not just to batter y but to ma ny other crime s as well. See, e.g., She p a r d , sup ra , at 22–23 (burglary). It is impla u sible that avoiding that common

enough consequence with respectto the single crime of battery, un der the single statute that is the Ar med Career Criminal Act, caused Congre ss to import a term of art that is a comical misfit with the defined term “violent felony.” * * * The Government asks us to remand to the Eleventh Circuit fo r its consideration of whether Jo hnson’s 2003 battery conviction is a “viole nt felony” wi thin the meaning of the so-called “residual clause” in 18 U. S. C

. §924(e)(2)( B)(ii). We decline to do so. The Governme nt did not k e ep this option alive because it disclaimed at sentencing any reliance upon the residual clause. App. 44–45. Moreover, the parties briefed the §92 4 (e)(2)(B)(ii) issue to the Eleventh Circuit, which nonetheless reasoned that if Joh n son’s conviction under Fla. Stat. §784.03(2) satisfied §924(e)(2)(B)(i), then it was a predicate “violent felony” under §924(e)(1 ); but “if not, then not. ” 528 F. 3d , at 1320. We reverse the judgm e nt of the Eleventh C i rcuit, set aside Johns on’s senten ce, and remand the case for furthe r12 JOHNSON v. UNITED STAT ES Opinion of theCourt 

### proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 9 U

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# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 08–6 92 5 

### CURTI S DARN ELL J O HNSON, PETITION ER v. UNITE D STATE S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [M ar c h2, 2010] 

### J USTICE 

### ALITO 

### , withwhom J U S TICE 

### T HO MAS 

### , joins, dissenting. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACC A) defines a “vio

lent felony” to mean, among other things, “any crim e punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year

. . . that . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical forceagains t the person of another .” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). The classic definition of the crime of battery is the “inten

tional application of unlawful force against the person of another.” Ante, at 5 (citing 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Sub

stantive Criminal La w §7.15, p

. 301 (198 6 and Supp. 2003); Black’s La w Dictionary 173 (9th ed. 20 09)). Thus, the crime of batter y , as trad i tionally defined, falls squarely within the plain language of ACCA. Becaus e I believe that ACC A wa s meant to incorporate this tradi

tional definition, I would affi rm the decision of the Court of Appeals. I The Court starts out in the rightdirection by noting that the critical statutory langua ge—“the us e, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)( B)(i)—may mean either (a) the use of violent force or (b) the use of force that is2 JOHNSON v. UNITED STAT ES ALITO , J., dis s e nting 

### sufficient to satisfy the traditio nal definition of a battery. See ante , a t4–5. The Court veers off course, however, b y concluding that the statutory language reaches on ly vio

lent force. The term “ f orce,” as the Court c o rrectly no tes, had a well-established meaning at com m on law that included even the “slightest offensive touching.” Ante, at 5. See also Respublica v. De Longchamps , 1 Dall. 111 , 114 (O. T. Phila. 1784) (“[T]hough no great bodily pain is suffered by a blow on the palm of t h e hand, or the skirt of the coat, yet these are clearly within the legal d[e]finitio nof Assault and Battery. . .”); 3 W

. Blackston e , Commen t aries on the Laws of En gland 120, 218 (1768) (hereinafter Blackstone). This approach recognized that an offensive b u t nonviolent touching (for example, unwanted sexual contact) may b e even more injurious than the use of force tha tis sufficient to inflict physical pain or injury (fo r example, a sharp slap in the face). When Congress selects statutory l anguage wi th a well

known common-law meaning, we generally presume tha t Congress intended to adopt tha tmeaning. See, e.g. , United Sta t esv. T u rley , 352 U. S. 407, 411 (1957) (“We recognize that where a federal c r iminal sta t ute uses a common-law term of estab lishedmeaning without oth e r wise defining it, the general pr actice is to give that ter m its common-law meaning”); Moris settev. Un ited S t a t es , 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952); United Sta t es v. Ca rll , 105 U. S. 611, 612–613 (1882). And here, I see nothin g to sugges t that Congress meant the phrase “use of physical force” i n ACC A to depart from that ph rase’s meaning at common law. On the contrary, oth e r standard canons of statutory interpretati on point to the same conclusion. “[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it inanother se ction of the same Act, it is generally presume dthat Con gress acts intentionally3 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### and purposely in the disparate inclusion orexclusion. ” Russello v. United S t ates , 464 U. S. 16, 23 (19 83) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)( B)(ii)—the clause immediately following the clause at issue in this case—the term “violent felony” is defined as including an y crime tha t “involves conduct tha t presents a serious pote ntial risk of physical injury to an

other .” (Emphasis added.) Be cause Congress did not include a si milar limit ation in §9 24(e)(2)(B)(i), we shoul d presume that it did n o t intend for such a limitation to apply. The language used by Congre ss in §922 (g)(8)(C)(ii) further illustrates this point. Thi s provision criminalizes, among other things, th e possess ion of a firea r m by a pe r son who is subject to a court order that “explicitly prohib

its the use , attempted use, or threatened us e of physical force again s t [an] inti mate partn er or child that would reasonably be expec t ed to cause bo dily injury

. ” (Emphasis added.) Although §922(g)(8)(C)(ii) was not enacted until eight years after §924(e)(2)(B)(i), see ante , at 9, the former provision is nevertheless instructive. If C o ngress had wanted to include in §924(e)(2)(B)(i) a limitation similar to those in §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and §922(g)(8)(C)(i i), Congress could have easily done so expressly. II The Court provides two reasons for refusing t o interpret 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i) in accordance with the co m mon-law understanding, but neither is persuasive. A The Court first argues that §924(e)(2)(B)(i) mu st be rea d to refer to “violent” force be cause that pro vision defines the term “v iolent felony.” Ante , a t6. But it is apparent that ACCA uses “violent felony” as a term of art witha wider mea n ing than the phrase may convey in ordinary4 JOHNSON v. UNITED STAT ES ALITO , J., dis s e nting 

### usage. ACCA specif ically provides that burglary an d extortion are “violent felon[ies],” §924(e)(2)(B),(ii), and we have held that ACCA also reaches the crime of attempte d burglary, Ja me sv. Unit e dSt at es , 550 U. S. 192 (2007). All of thes e offense s may be committed without violent force, 1 

### and it is therefore clear that the use of such force is not a requirement under ACCA. I n stead, AC CA classifies crimes like burglary and extorti on as violent felonies because they often lead to violence. As we have put it, these crimes create “significant ri sks of .

. . confrontation that might result in bodily injury,” id ., at 199, and offen

sive touching creates just such a ri sk. For ex ample, when one bar pat r on spits onanother, vi olence is al i k e ly conse

quence. See United S t ates v. Velazquez-Overa , 100 F. 3 d 418, 422 (CA5 1996) (“If burgla r y, withits tendency to cause alarm and to provoke ph ysical confrontation, is considered a violent crime under 18 U. S. C. §16(b), then surely the same is true of the fargreater int r usion that occurs whe na child is sexually molested”); United S t ates v. Wood , 52 F. 3d 272, 276 (CA9 1995) (same).

——————

1 For t h e purpo s es of ACCA, b u rgla ryis defined a s “a n u n la wful or unprivileged e n try into, o rremaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to c o mmit a c r i me.” Taylor v. United States , 495 U. S. 575 , 598 ( 1 9 90). S ee alsoJames , 550 U. S., at 197, 1 98, 2 0 2

– 203 ( a tte mpte d b u rgla ry u n d e r Floridalaw req u ires “ o vertcond uct direct ed t o wa rd unlawfully entering or rem a ining ina dwelling, with the intent t o c o mmit a fe lo nyther ein” and that th e “d efendant fail i nthe perpetra

tion or be intercepted or prevente d in the execution of the underlying offense” (internal quotationmarks om i t t e d) )

. Al t h o u ghw e h av en o t defined ex tortion under ACCA, the Hobbs Act defines it as “the obt a in

ing of propertyfromanothe r, with his co n s ent , induced b ywro n gf ul u s e of actual or threatened force , violence , o r fe a r , o r under color of of ficial r i gh t.” 18 U. S. C. §1951(b)(2 ) (emph a sis ad ded); see alsoJam es, supra, at 22 3– 22 4(S CALIA , J., diss enting) (definingex tortion in ACCA as “t he obtaining of so mething of value from a n ot h e r, wit hhis co ns ent , induced by the wrongf ul use or threateneduse of force against the person or propertyof another” (empha sis adde d)).5 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### B The Court’s only other reason for rejecting the common

law definition is the fact that batt e ry at common law was a misdemeanor. The Court reaso n s that “[i]t is unlikely that Con gress would select as a term of art defining ‘vi o lent felony’ a phrase that th e co mmon law gave peculiar meaning only in its definition of a misdemean o r.” Ante, at 7 (citing 4 Blackston e 216–218 (1769), and ALI, Model Penal Code §211.1, Comment, p. 175 (1980))

. The Court does not spell out why Cong ress’ selection of this ter m would be unlikely, but I assume t hat the Court’s point is that Con gress is unlikely to ha ve decided to treat as a violent felony an offense that was regarded at common law as a mere misdemean o r. This a r gument overlook s the significance of the misdemeanor label at common law, the subsequentevolution of battery s t atutes, and the limita

tion imposed by 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B). At commonlaw, the te rms “felony” and “misd e meanor” did not have the same meaning as they do today. At th at time, imprisonment as a form of p unishment was rare, see Apprendiv. Ne w Jersey , 530 U. S. 466, 480, n. 7 (2000); most felonies were punishable bydeath, see Tennesseev. Garn er , 47 1 U. S. 1, 13 (1985); and many very serious crimes, such as kidnaping and assault with the intent to murder or rape, were catego rized as misdemeanors. See United S t a t esv. Wa ts on , 423 U. S. 411, 439–440 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Since that time, however, th e term “felon y” has come to me anan y offense punishable by a lengthy te rm of imprisonment (commonly more than one year, see Burgessv. United S t ates , 553 U. S. 124, 130 (2008)); the term “misdemeanor” has been reserved fo r minor offenses; and many crimes that were m i sdemeanor s at common law have been reclas sified as felonies. An d when the re levant language in ACCA was enacted, quite a few States had felony battery sta t utes that retained th e common-law definition of “force.” See Fla. Stat.6 JOHNSON v. UNITED STAT ES ALITO , J., dis s e nting 

### §784.07(2)(b ) (1987) ( m aking simple battery of a police officer a felony); Idaho Code §18–915(c) (Lexis 1987) (same); Ill. Crim. Code §12–4(b)(6) (1988) (same); La. Sta t
. Ann. §§14:33, 14:43.1 (West 1986) (sexual battery punish

able by more than one year’s imprisonment); N. M. Stat. Ann. §40A– 22–23 (1972) (battery of a police officer a fel

ony); see also Kansas Stat. Ann. §21–3413(b ) (Supp. 1994) (simple battery of corre ctions officers a felony). 2 

### ACCA’s me chanism for identifyin g the ba tte ry convic

tions that merit treat ment as “violent felon [ ies]” is con

tained in 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B), which provides th at an offense c o mmitted by an adult is not a “violent felony” unless it is “punishable by imprisonment for a term ex

ceeding one year.” Consequent ly, while all convictions under batte ry sta t utes that track the common-law defini

tion of the offense satisfy the requirements of §924(e)(2)( B)(i)—beca use they h a ve “as anelem ent the use, attem p ted use, o rthreatened use of physical force against the person of another”—not all batter yconvictions qualify as convictio n s for aviolent felony because §924(e)(2)( B) excludes any battery conviction that was no t regarded b ythe juris d iction of c o nviction as being suffi

ciently serious to b e p unishable b yimprisonment for m o re than one year. There i s nothing extraordinary or unlikel y about this approach. III The Court’s interpretation will have untoward conse quences. Almost half of the States have statutes th at reach both the use of violent force and force that is not

——————

2 Th ese state s t atu t e s sh ow th at Con gr e ss, byu s in g a ter mof ar t, “force,” did not adopt a me aning “peculiar . . . [to the] definition of a misde m eanor,” see ante , at 7, an d, th er efor e, they are rele vant in determining whether touchingi n v o lv es the use of force under ACCA. See ante , at 7, n . 1.7 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### violent but is unlawful and offensive. 3 

### Many of the States classify these batteries as felonies or mak e them punish

able by imprisonment for more tha none year. 4

### Al t h o u gh the great majority of co nvictions under these statutes are,

——————

3 Ar iz. Rev

. St at. An n . §13

– 120 3(A) (We s t 2 001); Cal. Pen a l Code An n . §242 (W est 2 0 0 8); People v. Pin h ols t er, 1 Cal. 4th865, 961, 824 P. 2d 57 1, 62 2 (1 992); D. C. Code §2 2– 404( a) (2 00 1); Rayv. United States , 575 A. 2d 1196, 11 9 9 (D. C. 1990) ; Fla. Stat. An n . §784.03(1)( a) (200 7); Ga. Code An n . §16–5 –23( a) (20 07); Idah o Code § 18– 90 3 (Lex is 200 4); Ill. Co mp. St at., c h

. 720, §5/ 12– 3(a) (West 2 0 0 9 ); In d. Code §35

– 42– 2– 1(a) (20 04); Iowa Cod e§708.1 (Wes t 200 9); Kan

. Sta t . An n . §21

– 341 2(a) (20 07) ; La. Stat. An n . §14:33 (West 200 7); State v. Sc he nck , 513 So. 2d 1 159, 1 165 (La. 1 9 8 7 ) ; M e . Rev

. Sta t . An n ., Tit. 1 7–A, § 207( 1)(A ) (200 6); M d . Cr im. Law Code An n . §§3–2 01(b), 3

– 2 03(a) (Lex is Su pp. 200 9); Kellum v. State , 223 M d . 80, 8 4–8 5 , 162 A. 2d47 3, 47 6 ( 196 0) ; M a ss. Gen

. Laws, c h . 265, §13A(a) (We s t 20 08); Commonwealth v. Campbell , 35 2 M a ss. 3 87, 397, 2 26 N. E. 2d 2 11, 2 1 8(19 67); M i c h

. Comp. Laws An n . §§750.81 (1), (2) (West 200 4); People v. Nickens , 470 M i c h . 622, 6 27– 62 8, 68 5 N. W. 2d 657, 66 1 (2 00 4); M o . Rev

. Sta t
. §565.0 70( 5) (W est 20 00); M o n t . Code An n . §45– 5– 201( 1) (c ) (200 9); N. H. Rev

. Stat. An n . §631:2– aI(a) (West 20 07) ; N. M

. Stat. An n . §30–3 –4 (Su pp. 200 9); N. C. Gen

. Stat. An n . §14– 33(a) (Lex is 2 007); State v. West , 146 N. C. App. 741, 744, 554 S. E. 2 d837, 840 (2 0 01); Okla. Stat

. An n . , Tit. 21, §642 (West 200 2); Steele v. Stat e , 778 P. 2d 929, 93 1 (Okla. Cr im. App. 19 89); R. I

. Gen

. Laws §1 1–5 –3(a) (Lex i s 2 002); State v. Coni ngfor d , 901 A. 2d 6 2 3 , 630 (R. I. 20 06); S. C. Cod eAn n . §22–3– 560(A) (Su pp. 2009); State v. Mim s , 286 S. C. 55 3, 55 4, 335 S. E. 2d 237 (1 985) (pe rcuriam);Tenn . Code Ann

. §39– 13 –10 1(a)( 3 ) (200 3); Tex

. Pen a l Code An n . §22.01(a) (West Su pp. 2 009); Va. Cod eAn n . §18.2– 57(A) (Lex i s 2 009); Wood v. Commonwe a lth , 149 Va. 4 0 1 , 404, 140 S. E

. 114, 1 15 (1 92 7); Wash . Rev

. Code §9A.36 .011 et seq
. (2 008); State v. Stevens , 158 Wash . 2d30 4, 31 1, 14 3 P. 3 d81 7, 8 21 ( 2 0 06); W. Va. Co de An n . §61–2–9( c ) (Lex is 2005)

.

4 See Iowa Co de §§70 8 .1, 7 08.2(5) ( 2 0 09) ; Kan

. Stat. An n . §§21– 341 2(a), 21

– 341 2a, 34 13 (b), 3448(b) (2007); La. Stat. An n . §§14:34.2( B)(2 ), 14:34.3(C)( 2 ) (Su pp. 2010), 14:34. 5(B )(2); 14:35.3( E) (200 7); M d . Cr im. Law C o de An n . §§3 –20 1(b), 3

– 2 0 3 (a), (b) ( S u p p. 200 9); M a ss. Gen

. Laws, ch . 265, §13 A ( a) (20 08); M i c h . Comp. Laws An n . §750.81( 4) (Wes t 2 0 0 4 ) ; M o . Rev

. Stat. §§5 65.0 70. 1(5), 5 65.07 0. 4 (2000); Okla. S t at. Ann., Tit. 21, §6 42 (W est 2002), §644 (West Supp. 201 0).8 JOHNSON v. UNITED STAT ES ALITO , J., dis s e nting 

### no doubt, based on the use of viole n t force, the effect of the Court’s dec i sion will be to take all these convictions out

side the scope of ACCA—unless the Government is able to produce documents that may pr operly be con s ulted under the modified cate goric a l approac hand tha tconclusively show that the offender’s conduct involved the use of vio

lent force, see ante, a t 10–11. As the Govern ment notes, however, this will oft e n be impossible b e cause, in those States in which the same battery provision governs both the use of violent force and offen s ive touching, chargin g documents frequently simply tra ck the language of th e statute, an d jury instructions often do not require juries to draw distinctions based on the ty pe of force that the de

fendant employed. See Brief for United State s 42–43. In addition, the Co urt’s inte r p retation of the term “physical force” may h o bble at least two fed e ral statutes that contai n this identical ter m . Unde r 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(9), a person convicted of a “misdemea n or crime of domestic violence” may not la wfully possess a firearm, and the term “misdemeanor crime of domesticviolence” is defined as applying only to crimes that “ha[ve], as an element, th e useor attempted useof physical force , or the threatened use of a deadly weapo n .” §921(a)(33)(A) (em

phasis added). As we recent ly explained, Congress recog

nized that “ ‘many people who engage in seriou s spousal or child abuse ultimately are not cha r ged with o rconvicted of felonies,’ ” and Congres s therefore enacted this provision to keep firearms out of the hands of such abusers. United Sta t es v. Hayes , 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 10). Cases of spousal and child abus e are frequently prosecuted under generally applicable as s ault and battery statutes, ibid ., and as noted, the assault and battery statutes of almost half the States apply both to cases involving th e use of violent force and cases inv o lving offen s ive touching. As a resul t , if the C o urt’s inter p retation of the term “physical force” in ACCA is applied to §922( g)(9), a great9 Cite as: 55 9 U

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### many persons convicted for seriou s spousal or child abuse will be all o wed to possess firearm s . Under 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(E), an alienconvicted of a “crime of domestic violence” is subject to removal, and th e term “c rime of domestic viol ence” is defined as an offens e that, among other thi n gs, has “a s an element the use [or] attempted use . . . of physical force.” 18 U. S. C. §16(a). Accordin gly , if the C o urt’s inter p retation of the term “physical f o rce” is applied to this provision, many co n victed spousal and child abusers will escape removal, a result that Congress is unlikely to have intended. * * * For all these reasons, I beli eve that the Court’s decision is incorrect, and I therefore respectfully dissent.