If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

In re ALW.

LANCE WORKMAN,

Petitioner-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

July 1, 2021

v No. 355586

Mecosta Probate Court

ALW, LC No. 20-002013-MI

Respondent-Appellant.

Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and BECKERING and O’BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the probate court’s order for involuntary mental health 

treatment.1 We affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent’s father filed a petition for mental health treatment, alleging that respondent 

had a “dual personality” and believed she needed to be “killed by suicide via a person named ‘Karl’

in Chicago.” The petition also alleged that respondent “talks to someone not there.” The day 

before, a physician examined respondent and diagnosed her with “Brief Psychotic Disorder.” The 

next day, Dr. Puneet Singla, a licensed psychiatrist, examined respondent and diagnosed her with 

“Bipolar Disorder, I, Manic with Psychosis.” Both doctors stated that respondent reported she 

wanted to go to Chicago to have assisted suicide through “death soleil.”

At the hearing on the petition for mental health treatment, Dr. Singla testified that 

respondent told him she needed to find a river because that is where the procedure was performed. 

 

1

In light of the sensitive nature of the discussion of respondent’s health information, we do not 

identify her by name.
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Dr. Singla testified that respondent believed she would “go the other side” after the procedure was 

performed and that someone named “Adona” “talks to her and tells her about this.” Dr. Singla 

testified that although he spoke with respondent about why he believed it was important for her to 

take antipsychotic medication, respondent believed she only needed medication to help her sleep. 

Dr. Singla did not believe the sleep medication was helping respondent.

Respondent testified that “Adona” was “the one from seven wonders,” spoke to her 

“through this hole on the other side of the conscious,” and told her to “refer to suicide.” 

Respondent testified that she believed she was already dead and that Chicago was “where people 

go to render themselves over.” Respondent testified that she only needed “sleeping pills.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the probate court found that clear and convincing evidence 

demonstrated that respondent was a person requiring treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)(a), (1)(b), 

and (1)(c). The court ordered that respondent undergo mental health treatment for up to 180 days, 

with up to 60 days of hospitalization. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Respondent argues that the probate court erred by finding that there was clear and 

convincing evidence she was a “person requiring treatment” under MCL 330.1401(1). We 

disagree.

We review for an abuse of discretion a probate court’s dispositional rulings and review for 

clear error the factual findings underlying a probate court’s decision. In re Portus, 325 Mich App 

374, 381; 926 NW2d 33 (2018). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the probate court chooses 

an outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Id. (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “A probate court’s finding is clearly erroneous when a reviewing court is left 

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, even if there is evidence to 

support the finding.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Before a probate court may order an individual to receive involuntary mental health 

treatment, it must find that the individual is a “person requiring treatment” under MCL 

330.1401(1). MCL 330.1401(1) provides:

As used in this chapter, “person requiring treatment” means (a), (b), or (c):

(a) An individual who has mental illness, and who as a result of that mental 

illness can reasonably be expected within the near future to intentionally or 

unintentionally seriously physically injure himself, herself, or another individual, 

and who has engaged in an act or acts or made significant threats that are 

substantially supportive of the expectation.

(b) An individual who has mental illness, and who as a result of that mental 

illness is unable to attend to those of his or her basic physical needs such as food, 

clothing, or shelter that must be attended to in order for the individual to avoid 

serious harm in the near future, and who has demonstrated that inability by failing 

to attend to those basic physical needs.
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(c) An individual who has mental illness, whose judgment is so impaired by 

that mental illness, and whose lack of understanding of the need for treatment has 

caused him or her to demonstrate an unwillingness to voluntarily participate in or 

adhere to treatment that is necessary, on the basis of competent clinical opinion, to 

prevent a relapse or harmful deterioration of his or her condition, and presents a 

substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm to the individual or others.

“ ‘Mental illness’ means a substantial disorder of thought or mood that significantly impairs 

judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of 

life.” MCL 330.1400(g). “A judge . . . shall not find that an individual is a person requiring 

treatment unless that fact has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” MCL 330.1465.

On appeal, respondent does not dispute that she has a mental illness. Rather, she contends 

that clear and convincing evidence was not presented to establish that she was a person requiring 

treatment under MCL 330.1401(a) on the basis that she did not have a “suicide plan.” Dr. Singla 

testified that respondent expressed an interest in going to Chicago to “die.” “She reported that 

she’s trying to get to death soleil, that she –that it’s a suicide way out of soul.” She told Dr. Singla 

that she was trying to get somewhere in Chicago to a person called “Card”2 who she “believes will 

perform this procedure on her, in which she will die, and her death will go to the other side.” She 

also believed that they are doing this procedure in the basement of a local hospital and that “she 

has to die.” She believed that she was already dead, and that her soul had to be rendered through 

this procedure. Respondent correctly notes in her appellate brief that she testified at the hearing 

that she believed someone in Chicago would perform the procedure and that she was already dead. 

Respondent also testified that she wanted to go to Chicago to “render [herself] over” and that 

“Adona” told her to “[r]efer to suicide.” She also discussed “deceasement” and “mercination at 

the end.” The trial court did not clearly err in finding that as a result of her mental illness,

respondent had a suicide plan, although she described it as rendering herself over, and that there 

was clear and convincing evidence to establish that it could reasonably be expected within the near 

future that she could “intentionally or unintentionally seriously physically injure . . . herself” and 

that she “made significant threats that are substantially supportive of the expectation.”

3

 MCL 

330.1401(1)(a).

Affirmed.

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

 

2 Although the hearing transcript identifies the person as “Card,” this presumably refers to the 

person identified as “Karl” in the petition.

3 Because an individual need only qualify as a person requiring treatment under one clause of MCL 

330.1401(1), we need not address respondent’s arguments with respect to the probate court’s 

findings under MCL 330.1401(1)(b) and (c).