alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-2448

GIL W. JONES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 97-2449

GIL W. JONES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

RITCHIE AUTOMOTIVE,

Defendant - Appellee.
2

No. 97-2450

GIL W. JONES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, District Judge.

(CA-97-2876-WMN, CA-97-2877-WMN, CA-97-2878-WMN)

Submitted: January 22, 1998 Decided: February 3, 1998

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gil W. Jones, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
3

PER CURIAM:

Appellant filed untimely notices of appeal. We dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal

are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are "mandatory and

jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434

U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S.

220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have thirty days within

which to file in the district court notices of appeal from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only exceptions

to the appeal period are when the district court extends the time

to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal

period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

The district court entered its orders on August 29, 1997;

Appellant's notices of appeal were filed on October 10, 1997, which

is beyond the thirty-day appeal period. Appellant's failure to note

a timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leaves

this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant's appeals. We therefore dismiss the appeals. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
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| (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|     |                                                                                                                                                         |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant. |

|                      |
|----------------------|
|                      |  |  |
| /s/ ROBERT A. HAMWEE |   |
|                 |   |
| Name:                | Robert A. Hamwee |   |
| Date:                | May 6, 2020 |   |
#### J. *W.*Clelland & Co., Appellant, *vs.*L. J. Shaw, Respondent.

1. *Practice*— Supreme *Court*— Appeal—Affidavit.—Where the record fails to show that the appellant has filed the affidavit for an appeal required by the statute, the appeal will be dismissed.

*Appeal from Vernon Circuit Court.*

*Johnson and*Wright, for Appellant.

*S. A. Wright and Meigs*Jackson, for Respondent.

Adams, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant raises the objection that the appeal in this ease was improperly allowed by the Circuit Court. There was no affidavit made for the appeal as required by law. (See W. S., 1059, § 11.) This section provides that no appeal shall be allowed unless the appellant or his agent shall, during the term, file in the court his affidavit “ stating that such appeal is not made for vexation or delay, but because the affiant believes that the appellant is aggrieved by the judgment or decision of the court.” As no such affidavit appears in the record, the appeal is ordered to be dismissed.

The other judges concur.
#### John Parke ALLEN, Sr., Appellant, v. Carolyn M. GRANDUCCI, Appellee.

No. 1463.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

March 28, 1969.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; James F. Minnet, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3615 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3615

 To amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to require Federal Deposit 
 Insurance Corporation approval for conversions of insured banks from 
           mutual form to stock form, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 22, 1993

 Mr. Gonzalez (for himself, Mr. Neal of North Carolina, and Mr. Leach) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                   Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to require Federal Deposit 
 Insurance Corporation approval for conversions of insured banks from 
           mutual form to stock form, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Mutual Bank Conversion Act''.

SEC. 2. FDIC REGULATION OF MUTUAL BANK CONVERSIONS.

    (a) In General.--Section 18 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
(12 U.S.C. 1828) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection:
    ``(q) Mutual Bank Conversions.--
            ``(1) Approval required.--No insured State bank may convert 
        from the mutual form to the stock form on or after November 22, 
        1993, except in accordance with regulations which the 
        Corporation shall prescribe.
            ``(2) Regulations.--The regulations prescribed by the 
        Corporation pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be substantially 
        similar to the regulations prescribed by the Director of the 
        Office of Thrift Supervision under section 5(i)(2) of the Home 
        Owners' Loan Act.''.
    (b) Effective Date of Regulations.--The regulations required to be 
prescribed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation pursuant to the 
amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on or before the end 
of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this 
Act.

                                 <all>
```
* Pursua nt to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

September 30, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-41521

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

FRANK DAVIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(C-03-CR-94-1)

Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Frank Davis appeals his convictions for possession with intent

to distribute approximately 47 ki lograms of marijuana and

conspiracy to posse ss with intent to distribute more than 50

kilograms of marijuana. Davis contends the district court erred by

denying his pre-trial motion to suppress his inculpatory

statements. Davis asserts he made those statements without counsel

present after his request that counsel be present before he spoke2

with law enforcement officers regarding this matter. The motion

was denied, after a hearing, immediately prior to trial.

Our court will accept a district court’s factual find ings

based on live testimony at a suppression hearing “unless [they are]

clearly erroneous or influenced by an incorrect view of the law”.

United States v. Alv arez

, 6 F.3d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1993 )

, cert.

denied

, 511 U.S. 1010 (1994). When a suppression motion is denied,

the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the

Government. E.g., United States v. Garza

, 118 F.3d 278, 282-83

(5th Cir. 1997).

Davis requested that counsel be present during his first

meeting with Drug Enforcement Agency Agents regarding this matter,

but he did not make any inculpatory statements at that time. Davis

initiated his next conversation with DEA Agents, was in formed of

his Miranda rights prior to making any statements, and signed a

Miranda waiver. Because Davis initiated the conversation during

which he made the inculpatory statements, his right to counsel was

not violated, even though he had previously requested counsel. See

Edwards v. Arizona

, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); Mann v. Scott

, 41

F.3d 968, 975-76 (5th Cir. 1994).

AFFIRMED
251 La. 682

#### BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF the PORT OF NEW ORLEANS v. Alvin P. LICHTENTAG et al.

No. 49049.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 17, 1968.

In re: Alvin P. Lichtentag applying for writs of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus.

The application is denied. There appears no error of law in the ruling complained of.
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Billy Wayne SINCLAIR v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 53078.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 25, 1973.

In re: Billy Wayne Sinclair applying for writ of habeas corpus.

Writ denied. The record of appeal in this case demonstrates adequate representation by competent counsel. See State v. Sinclair, 258 La. 84, 245 So.2d 365. (1971).

BARHAM, DIXON and CALOGERO, JJ., are of the opinion an evidentiary hearing is required under State law on the factual allegations of inadequate counsel. C.Cr.P. Art. 354.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA F OURTH D ISTRICT

TAJ M. COLLIER , Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA , Appellee

.

No. 4D 19

- 99

[ April 30, 2020 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Thomas J. Coleman

, Judge; L.T. Case No. 06

- 004699

- CF10D

.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Logan T. Mohs, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley M oody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale Surber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.
Affirmed

.

L EVINE , C.J., G ROSS and C IKLIN , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED MARCH 3, 2023

NO. 03-22-00783-CV

Phillip G. Scott, Appellant

v.

District Courts of Comal County, Texas, Appellees

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURTS OF COMAL COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES BAKER, KELLY, AND SMITH

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION -- OPINION BY JUSTICE BAKER

This is an appeal from the district courts of Comal County, Texas. Having reviewed the record, 

it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. Therefore, the Court dismisses the 

appeal for want of jurisdiction. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no 

adjudication of costs is made.
# C_2014334EN.01000401.xml

| 25.9.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 334/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 334/4

---

Final Report of the Hearing Officer (1)

1

Power Exchanges

(AT.39952)

(2014/C 334/05)

On 22 March 2013, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (2) against the spot power exchanges EPEX Spot (‘EPEX’) and Nord Pool Spot AS (‘NPS’) (together ‘the parties’).

2

Following settlement discussions and settlement submissions in accordance with Article 10a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 (3), the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections (‘SO’) on 11 December 2013, addressed to EPEX and NPS, stating that they had participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. The SO alleged that the parties had engaged in a non-competition arrangement which included an allocation of territories, with the object of restricting competition between them, in connection with their spot electricity trading services.

3

In their replies to the SO, both EPEX and NPS confirmed that the SO reflected the content of their settlement submissions.

Pursuant to Article 16 of Decision 2011/695/EU, I have examined whether the draft decision addressed to EPEX and NPS deals only with objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views, and I have come to a positive conclusion.

In view of the above, I consider that the effective exercise of their procedural rights in this case has been respected.

Brussels, 3 March 2014.

Wouter WILS

---

(1)  Pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 275, 20.10.2011, p. 29) (Decision 2011/695/EU).

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).

2

(3)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18).

3

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Corey Arthur, Appellant.

[738 NYS2d 15]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Marcy Kahn, J.), rendered December 10, 1998, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and two counts of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 25 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied. Defendant did not establish standing to assert a violation of *Payton v New York*(445 US 573) and the court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s request to reopen the hearing in an attempt to do so. In any event, there was no *Payton*violation when the police, without making any threats, directed defendant to come out of an apartment and arrested him in the doorway *(see, People v Minley,*68 NY2d 952).

There is no basis for suppression of a spontaneous incriminating statement made by defendant in the presence of a crowd of news media reporters and photographers as he was being moved from one police station to another. The police did not arrange for the presence, on a public street, of the journalists, who were present on their own accord because of the notoriety of the case, and there was no police conduct that could be viewed as the functional equivalent of interrogation *(see, Rhode Island v Innis,*446 US 291, 300-301; *compare, People v Ferro,*63 NY2d 316).

The court properly exercised its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of the police officers as to whether they *388searched the codefendant’s car and home, or applied for warrants to do so. Such searches, had they been conducted, would not have resulted in any exculpatory evidence since even if the police had recovered the murder weapon in the codefendant’s possession after the shooting, this would not been inconsistent with defendant’s guilt. Moreover, the proffered cross-examination would have invited speculation as to whether the search would have produced something productive, and would also have delved into the legal requirements for the issuance of search warrants and the officers’ knowledge thereof, which had the potential to confuse or mislead the jury *(see, People v Martinez,*214 AD2d 429, *lv denied*86 NY2d 738). Concur — Tom, J.P., Sullivan, Rosenberger, Wallach and Buckley, JJ.
# C_2015269EN.01000501.xml

| 15.8.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 269/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 269/5

---

Notice concerning a request pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 2004/17/EC

Request made by a contracting entity

(2015/C 269/07)

On 28 July 2015 the Commission received a request in accordance with Article 30 of Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (1). The first working day following receipt of the request is 29 July 2015.

1

Until repealed (2), Directive 2004/17/EC applies to the award of contracts for the pursuit of, i. a., exploration for oil and gas, unless this activity is exempted pursuant to Article 30 of that Directive. From a procedural point of view, however, the provisions of the Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) apply to requests for exemption, as the material conditions for granting an exemption remain unchanged as to substance.

2

3

This request, made by ENI Portugal BV, concerns exploration for oil and gas in Portugal. Article 30 of Directive 2004/17/EC Directive provides that the later Directive is not applicable when the relevant activity is directly exposed to competition in markets to which access is not restricted. These conditions are evaluated solely for the purposes of Directive 2004/17/EC and are without prejudice to the application of competition rules.

In case an exemption would be granted, its effect would expire on the date of transposition of Directive 2014/25/EC into national legislation or, at the latest, when Directive 2004/17/EC is repealed, given that the activity of exploration for oil and gas will no longer be covered by the provisions of Directive 2014/25/EU; hence no exemption will be needed.

Pursuant to letter (a) of first paragraph, of point 1 of Annex IV of Directive 2014/25/EU, the Commission is allowed a period of 90 working days to take a decision on this request, commencing on the working day referred to above. The period therefore expires on 2 December 2015.

---

(1)  OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

1

(2)  With effect from 18 April 2016.

2

(3)  It entered into force on 18 April 2014.

3

---
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-83,722-01

EX PARTE KEITH ALLEN GOLDEN II, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 15-01-00374-CR-(1) IN THE 410 DISTRICT COURT TH

FROM MONTGOMERY COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). In count one of this cause, Applicant was

convicted of possession of a controlled substance in an amount of more than one gram but less than

four grams, and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction. 

Applicant contends that his plea was involuntary and that his conviction violates due process

because after he entered his plea, the evidence in his case was tested and found to weigh less than

one gram. 
2

The parties have entered agreed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the trial court

has determined that Applicant’s decision to plead guilty in this case was not a voluntary and

intelligent choice. Applicant is entitled to relief. Ex parte Mable, 443 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014).

Relief is granted. Count one of the judgment in Cause No. 15-01-00374-CR in the 410th

District Court of Montgomery County is set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the

Sheriff of Montgomery County to answer the charges as set out in the indictment. The trial court

shall issue any necessary bench warrant within 10 days after the mandate of this Court issues.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department ofCriminal Justice–Correctional

Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Delivered: December 16, 2015

Do not publish
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 164 (Thursday, August 23, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 42696]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-18266]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. DEA-392]


Importer of Controlled Substances Registration

ACTION: Notice of registration.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Registrants listed below have applied for and been granted 
registration by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as importers 
of various classes of schedule I or II controlled substances.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The companies listed below applied to be 
registered as importers of various basic classes of controlled 
substances. Information on previously published notices is listed in 
the table below. No comments or objections were submitted and no 
requests for hearing were submitted for these notices.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Company                    FR docket          Published
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fisher Clinical Services, Inc....  83 FR 28663.......  June 20, 2018.
Unither Manufacturing LLC........  83 FR 29136.......  June 22, 2018.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has considered the 
factors in 21 U.S.C. 823, 952(a) and 958(a) and determined that the 
registration of the listed registrants to import the applicable basic 
classes of schedule I or II controlled substances is consistent with 
the public interest and with United States obligations under 
international treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on May 1, 
1971. The DEA investigated each company's maintenance of effective 
controls against diversion by inspecting and testing each company's 
physical security systems, verifying each company's compliance with 
state and local laws, and reviewing each company's background and 
history.
    Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 952(a) and 958(a), and in 
accordance with 21 CFR 1301.34, the DEA has granted a registration as 
an importer for schedule I or II controlled substances to the above 
listed companies.

    Dated: August 17, 2018.
John J. Martin,
Assistant Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2018-18266 Filed 8-22-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P