### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on

Briefs S eptem

ber 23, 200 3
JAMIE DEWAYNE R

EED v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cocke County No. 27, 889 - III Rex Henry Ogle, Judge

No. E2 003-0 0942- CCA-R3 -PC October 3, 2003

The Defendant, Jam ie Deway ne Reed, filed for

post-con viction re lief. The trial cou rt summar

ily deniedrelief on the basis that the petition was time-barred. The Def endant now appe als. We affirm the judg ment of the

trial cou rt. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

D AV ID H. W ELLES , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J AMES C URWOOD W ITT , J R . and R OBER T W. W EDEMEYER , JJ., joined. Jamie Dewayne Reed, Manchester, Kentucky , Pro Se.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and Al C. Schumtzer, Jr., District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION

The Defendant, Jamie Deway ne Reed , pled guilty in 1996 to one count of misdeme anor assault and one c ount of fe

lo ny van dal is m. He r ece iv ed a n effec ti ve s ent enc e of two years . In September

2002, the

Defend ant filed

for post- convicti on relief, all eging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with hi s guilt y plea. The State r

esponded, contending that the Defendant’s petition was barred by the one-ye ar statute of limitations. The trial court agreed with the St

ate and s ummarily

dismissed t

he petitio n. The De

fendant now appe als, cl ai mi ng hi s a ct ua l i nn oc en ce of th e c ri me s t o w hi ch he pl ed gu il ty.

We agree with the trial court that the Def endant’ s p etition is time-bar red. ThePostConviction Procedu

re Act pr ovides tha

t petitionsmust

be filed“within one (1) ye ar of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which a n appe al is take

n or, if no

appeal i s taken, within one (1) yea

r of the date on which the judgment became final, or consideration of such pet ition shall be barred.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a). The Def endant to ok no appe al f

ro m his judgment of

conviction, and that judgment therefore beca me final in 1996. The instant petition-2-

was not filed until 2002. The Defendant’s petition does not satisfy any of the

statutory exceptions to application of the one-y ear limitations period. See id. § 40-30-202(b). Nor has the Defendant set forth any basis for tolling

the limitations period on due process grounds. Accordingly , the Defendant’s petition is barred by the one-yea r statute of limitations, and the trial court was therefore correct in summarily

dismissing the Defendant’s petition.

The Defendant argues that he ha s evidence obtained subsequent to his guilty plea that pr oves his actual innocence. This evidence is in the nature of recanted

testimony. Thus, the Defenda nt’s pleading is in the na

ture of a petition f or a writ of error coram nobis. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26- 105. However, such petition s must be filed within one year of the date on which the petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final in the trial court. See State v. Mixo n , 983 S.W .2d 661, 670 (Tenn. 1999). Asset forth above, th at date

has long si nce pass ed. Acc ordingl y, t he Defe ndant is time-bar red fro m pursuing

that ave nue of re lief, as w ell.

The trial court correctly

dismissed the Defendant’s claim for relief, and wetherefore affirm the judg ment of the

trial cou rt.

___________________________________

DAVID H. WEL

LES, JUDGE