FILED

May 6, 1999

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

NOVEMBER SESSION, 1998

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9712-CR-00564

)

Appellee, )

)

) DAVIDSON COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. CHERYL BLACKBURN

RAYMOND HALE, ) JUDGE

)

Appellant. ) (Direct Appeal - Class C Felony)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

JEFFREY A. DEVASHER JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Assistant Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter

(On Appeal)

DARYL J. BRAND

JOAN A. LAWSON Senior Counsel

Assistant Public Defender 425 Fifth Avenue North

(At Trial) Nashville, TN 37201-1649

1202 Stahlman Building

Nashville, TN 37201 VICTOR S. JOHNSON

District Attorney General

DAN HAMM

SHARON BROX

Assistant District Attorneys

222 Second Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37201-1649

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
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OPINION

The appellant, Raymond A. Hale, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County

jury of one (1) count of robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him

as a Range I offender to five (5) years in community corrections and ordered that

Appellant’s sentence run consecutively to his sentence on an unrelated offense

for which he was on probation at the time the present offense was committed.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

(1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict of

guilt;

(2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the

lesser included offense of attempted theft;

(3) whether the trial court erred in charging the jury with the “truth in

sentencing” instruction; and

(4) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences.

After a thorough review of the record before this Court, we conclude that there

is no reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FACTS

At approximately 8:00 p.m. on December 13, 1996, Delores Butler, her

daughter and her granddaughter left the Walgreens’ drugstore on Gallatin Pike

in Nashville. As they were walking to their car, a man approached Ms. Butler

and demanded that she give him her purse. Butler responded, “no, I’m not.” 

The man reached for her purse, and as Butler stepped away from the man, she

fell backwards. As she fell, Butler dropped her belongings, which scattered

throughout the parking lot. The man reached over Butler, and Butler began
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kicking and screaming. The man then ran away with an object in his hands.

Subsequently, when Butler attempted to collect her belongings in the parking lot,

she was unable to locate her wallet. 

Bystanders in the area heard the victim shouting and came to her

assistance. Several men chased the perpetrator, apprehended him and brought

him back to the Walgreens’ parking lot. Butler identified the man apprehended

by the bystanders as the man who robbed her. The offender was identified at

trial as the Appellant. 

The next morning, Ms. Butler went back to Walgreens’ and found her wallet

in the parking lot. The wallet was found in close proximity to where the incident

occurred. 

The jury found Appellant guilty of robbery, and the trial court sentenced

Appellant to five (5) years, to be served on community corrections. The trial court

further ordered that Appellant’s sentence for robbery would run consecutively to

his sentence on an unrelated offense for which he was on probation at the time

of the present offense. From his conviction and sentence, Appellant now brings

this appeal.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the

convicting evidence. Specifically, he claims that there was insufficient evidence

to establish that Appellant obtained or exercised control over Ms. Butler’s

property. Therefore, he argues that he did not commit a “theft of property” as

required by the robbery statute, and no rational trier of fact could have found him

guilty of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.
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A.

When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court

is obliged to review that challenge according to certain well-settled principles.

Where the sufficiency of the evidence is contested on appeal, the relevant

question for the reviewing court is whether any rational trier of fact could have

found the accused guilty of every element of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992).

On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence

as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom.

State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). In conducting our

evaluation of the convicting evidence, this Court is precluded from reweighing or

reconsidering the evidence. State v. Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1996); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

Moreover, this Court may not substitute its own inferences “for those drawn by

the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence.” State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at

779.

Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value

to be given the evidence as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are

resolved by the trier of fact, not this Court. State v. Tuttle, 914 S.W.2d 926, 932

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). A verdict of guilty by the jury, approved by the trial

judge, accredits the testimony of the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts

in the testimony in favor of the state. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259

(Tenn. 1994); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d at 75. Although an accused is

originally cloaked with a presumption of innocence, a jury verdict rem oves this

presumption and replaces it with one of guilt. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913,
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914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on appeal, the burden of proof rests with Appellant to

demonstrate the insufficiency of the convicting evidence. Id.

B.

Robbery is defined as the “intentional or knowing theft of property from the

person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.” Tenn. Code Ann. §

39-13-401(a). A person commits a theft of property if “with intent to deprive the

owner of property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the

property without the owner’s effective consent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103.

C.

Appellant argues that there is insufficient evidence to establish that he

obtained or exercised control over Ms. Butler’s property, and accordingly, there

is insufficient evidence that he committed a theft. He bases this argument on the

fact that the victim found her wallet in the Walgreens’ parking lot the day after the

incident.

The victim testified that Appellant approached her and demanded that she

give him her purse. Butler declined to turn over her belongings, stepped away

from Appellant and fell backwards. Appellant reached over her, and she and

Appellant struggled. As they were struggling, Appellant grabbed an object and

ran away with what appeared to be her wallet in his hands. An eyewitness to the

incident testified that he saw Appellant grab something before running away.

Another eyewitness stated that Appellant appeared to be clutching an object as

he was running away from the scene. 

Although the victim found her wallet the next day in the general vicinity that

the incident took place, it was a jury question as to whether Appellant obtained

or exercised control over the wallet. The jury could have properly found that

Appellant seized the victim ’s wallet and then dropped the wallet during the
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struggle with Butler or as he fled the scene. This Court may not second-guess

the jury’s findings in this regard. We, therefore, conclude that there is sufficient

evidence for a rational trier of fact to find Appellant guilty of robbery beyond a

reasonable doubt.

This issue has no merit.

LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE - ATTEMPTED THEFT

Appellant contends that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court

refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted theft of

property. He asserts that the evidence presented at trial could have supported

a finding by the jury that Appellant did not obtain control over the victim’s property

and that his actions did not place the victim in fear. Therefore, he claims that the

evidence would support an instruction on attempted theft, and the trial court erred

in failing to so instruct the jury.

In a criminal trial, the accused has a right to a correct and complete charge

of the law applicable to the case. State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1994); State v. Wright, 618 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).

It is well-established that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction “on all lesser

included offenses where ‘any facts . . . are susceptible of inferring guilt of any

lesser included offense.’” State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Tenn. 1996)

(quoting State v. Wright, 618 S.W.2d at 315). Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110(a)

provides:

It is the duty of all judges charging juries in cases of criminal

prosecutions for any felony wherein two (2) or more grades or

classes of offense may be included in the indictment, to charge the

jury as to all of the law of each offense included in the indictm ent,

without any request on the part of the defendant to do so. 
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“An offense is necessarily included in another if the elements of the greater

offense, as those elements are set forth in the indictment, include, but are not

congruent with, all the elements of the lesser.” Howard v. State, 578 S.W.2d 83,

85 (Tenn. 1979); see also State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d at 310-11. In other words,

an offense is considered a lesser included offense “if the elements of the included

offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense” and “the greater

offense cannot be committed without also committing the lesser offense.” State

v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d at 310.

In the case sub judice, the trial court charged the jury with robbery,

attempted robbery and theft of property. Appellant requested that the trial court

instruct the jury on attempted theft, but the trial court declined to do so.

Theft of property is clearly a lesser included offense of robbery as the

elements of theft are a “subset” of the elements of robbery and one must commit

a “theft” in order to commit the offense of robbery. See State v. Trusty, 919

S.W.2d at 310; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-401(a), 39-14-103. Furthermore, at

trial a defense theory was that Appellant did not complete the theft because he

did not obtain or exercise control over the victim’s property. Under these

circumstances, attempted theft was a lesser included offense of the indicted

offense of robbery. “If there is any evidence reasonable minds could accept as

to any such lesser offenses, the accused is entitled to appropriate instructions

regarding the lesser offenses.” State v. Atkins, 681 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1984). Thus, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the

lesser included offense of attempted theft.

However, Appellant is not necessarily entitled to relief as a result of this

error. Our Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s failure to instruct on a

lesser included offense is subject to harmless error analysis. State v. Williams,
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977 S.W.2d 101, 106-08 (Tenn. 1998). In Williams, the defendant was charged

with premeditated first degree murder, and the trial court instructed the jury on

premeditated first degree murder, second degree murder and reckless homicide.

Id. at 104. The trial court rejected a defense request for an instruction on

voluntary manslaughter. Id. While acknowledging that the trial court erred in

refusing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, the Court held such error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 106-08. The Court reasoned:

[b]y convicting the defendant of first degree murder the jury

determined that the proof was sufficient to establish all the elements

of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the killing

was “intentional, deliberate and premeditated.” In other words, by

finding the defendant guilty of the highest offense to the exclusion

of the immediately lesser offense, second degree murder, the jury

necessarily rejected all other lesser offenses, including voluntary

manslaughter. Accordingly, the trial court’s erroneous failure to

charge voluntary manslaughter is harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt because the jury’s verdict of guilt on the greater offense of

first degree murder and its disinclination to consider the lesser

included offense of second degree murder clearly dem onstrates that

it certainly would not have returned a verdict on voluntary

manslaughter.

Id. at 106.

The present case is closely analogous to Williams. The trial court properly

charged the jury with the lesser offenses of attempted robbery and theft, but the

jury returned a guilty verdict on the indicted offense of robbery. By returning a

guilty verdict on the greatest offense to the exclusion of the lesser charged

offenses, the jury “necessarily rejected all other lesser offenses.” Id. As a result,

we must conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

This issue is without merit.
1

 Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b) provides:

(1) In all contested criminal cases, except for capital crimes which are governed by the

procedures contained in §§ 39-13-204 and 39-13-205, upon the motion of either party, filed

with the court prior to the selection of the jury, the court shall charge the possible penalties

for the offense charged and all lesser included offenses.

(2)(A)(I) When a charge as to possible penalties has been requested pursuant to subdivision

(b)(1), the judge shall also include in the instructions for the jury to weigh and consider the

meaning of a sentence of imprisonment for the offense charged and any lesser included

offenses. Such instruction shall include an approximate calculation of the minimum number

of years a person sentenced to imprisonment for the offense charged and lesser included

offenses must serve before reaching such person's earliest release eligibility date. Such

calculation shall include such fa ctors as the releas e eligibility percenta ge esta blished by §

40-35-501, maximum and minimum sentence reduction credits authorized by § 41-21-236

and the governor's power to reduce prison overcrowding pursuant to title 41, chapter 1, part

5, if applicable.

(ii) Such instructions to the jury shall also include a statement that whether a defe ndant is

actu ally released from incarce ration on th e date w hen su ch defe ndant is first eligible for

release is a discretionary decision made by the board of paroles based upon many factors,

and that such board has the authority to require the defendant to serve the entire sentence

impo sed by the court.

(B) On an annua l basis, the department of correction shall provide each judge exercising

criminal trial court jurisd iction with the appr oxim ate calculation required in subdivision (2)(a).

Such calculation shall be broken down to show the effect of each factor used in making such

calculation. If the calculation provided by the dep artme nt to the judges changes because of

a change in the law or correctional policy, court intervention, the governor's prison

overcrowding policy or any other such circumstance, the department shall send a revised

calculation to the judges as such chang es occur.

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“TRUTH IN SENTENCING” JURY INSTRUCTION

In his next issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in instructing

the jury on the minimum number of years he would serve before becoming

eligible for parole. He claims that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b),1

 which

requires that parole eligibility be charged in conjunction with a range of penalties

charge, is unconstitutionally vague, violates due process, deprives a defendant

of a fair and impartial jury and constitutes an unconstitutional attem pt by the

legislature to exercise judicial powers.

A.

The state responds that this issue is controlled by the recent Tennessee

Supreme Court case State v. King, 973 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. 1998), wherein the
2

 Effective May 18, 1998, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b) was amended to provide the following:

In all contested criminal cases, except for capital crimes which are governed by the

procedures contained in §§ 39-13-204 and 39-13-205, and as necessary to comply with the

Constitution of Tennessee, article VI, section 14, and § 40-35-301, the judge shall not instruct

the jury, no r sha ll the attorne ys be p erm itted to com me nt at a ny tim e to th e jury, o n pos sible

penalties for the offense charged nor all lesser included offenses.

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Court held Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b)(2) constitutional.2 In King, the Court

rejected similar challenges to the parole eligibility jury instruction, concluding that

the statute was not impermissibly vague and did not violate the separation of

powers clauses of the Tennessee Constitution. Id. at 588-92. The Court also

noted that the jury instruction did not deprive the defendant of an impartial jury.

Id. at 588, n. 4. Furthermore, the Court determined that the defendant’s due

process rights were not violated by the instruction and observed:

[t]he jurors in this case were properly instructed that the State must

prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. Significantly, they were additionally instructed that they were

not to attempt to fix punishment for the offense and that the

sentencing information was “for your information only.” When the

trial court explains, as it did here, that the sentencing, parole, and

early release information is not to be considered in the

determination of guilt or innocence, then certainly no due process

violation has occurred.

Id. at 592 (emphasis added).

The holding in King was limited, however, to the circumstances of that

particular case. The Court concluded, “[i]n sum, under the circumstances

presented we find that the jury instruction given under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

201(b)(2) did not deprive the appellant of his due process right to a fair trial.” Id.

B.

Subsequent to the release of King, this Court filed its opinion in the case

of State v. Jason M. Weiskopf, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9611-CR-00381, 1998 Tenn.

Crim. App. LEXIS 1228, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed December 4,
3

 The original opinion in Weiskopf was filed on February 4, 1998, wherein this Court held Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-35-201(b) to be unconstitutional as it is violative of the due proces s clause s of the fe deral and state

constitutions. State v. Jason M. Weiskopf, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9611-CR-00381, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS

153, Sh elby Coun ty (Tenn. Crim. App . filed February 4, 1998, at Jackson). The Supreme Court remanded

the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals for reconsideration of the issue in light of the Court’s holding in King.

State v. Jason M. Weiskopf, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1228, at *1.

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1998, at Jackson). 3 Judge Joe G. Riley, writing for the Court, held that the

defendant’s due process rights had been violated by the parole eligibility jury

instruction. The Court distinguished the Supreme Court’s holding in King on the

basis that, unlike in King, the jury in Weiskopf was instructed that they could

“weigh and consider the meaning of a sentence of imprisonment.” Id. at *3-4.

The Court observed that the jury does not determine a defendant’s sentence in

non-capital cases, and therefore, such sentencing information is irrelevant to the

jury’s determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at *4. As a result, the Court

concluded that instructing the jury that they could “weigh and consider”

extraneous, irrelevant information deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id.

C.

In the case sub judice, the trial court instructed the jury that they could

“weigh and consider the meaning of a sentence of imprisonment.” The court

further instructed the jury as to the range of punishment for robbery, attempted

robbery and theft. The jury was instructed that the earliest release eligibility date

for robbery was .36 years (131 days) and the earliest release eligibility date for

attempted robbery was .24 years (87 days). The trial court also instructed the

jury that punishment for theft of property “may be set up to eleven (11) months

and twenty-nine (29) days.”

We agree with the Weiskopf court that instructing the jury to “weigh and

consider the meaning of a sentence of imprisonment” affects an accused’s

constitutional right to a fair trial. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred
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in instructing the jury that they could “weigh and consider” such irrelevant

sentencing information.

D.

Erroneous jury instructions are subject to harmless error review. State v.

Belser, 945 S.W .2d 776, 782 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). However, if the error is

constitutional in nature, there must be a reversal unless the error is harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

In Weiskopf, the Court declined to find harmless error. The Court

observed that the jury was instructed that the earliest release eligibility date for

first degree murder was 25 years; for second degree murder, the earliest release

eligibility date was 1.06 years; and the earliest release eligibility date for voluntary

manslaughter was .21 years. State v. Jason M. Weiskopf, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App.

LEXIS 1228, at *4. The Court stressed the gross discrepancies between the

release eligibility date for first degree murder as opposed to that for second

degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Id. The Court stated,

[w]e know not to what extent, if any, the jury considered the

ridiculously low release eligibility dates for second degree murder

and voluntary manslaughter as compared to the much higher

release eligibility date for first degree murder. Nevertheless, we are

unable to conclude that this information had no impact upon the jury

since the primary issue was the degree of homicide.

Id.

In the present case, the jury was instructed that the earliest release

eligibility date for robbery was .36 years, approximately 4 months, 11 days, and

.24 years, approximately 2 months, 27 days, for attempted robbery. The

distinction between the release eligibility dates is slight and in no way approaches

the glaring discrepancies in release eligibility dates noticed by this Court in

Weiskopf. Furthermore, the jury was not instructed on a minimum release
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eligibility date for theft of property, but was instructed that the sentence “may be

set up to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days.” When read with the

remaining instructions as to sentencing range, this statement gives the

impression that Appellant could be required to serve the entire eleven (11)

months and twenty-nine (29) days, clearly a more lengthy sentence than

approximately 4 months, 11 days or approximately 2 months, 27 days.

“Jury instructions must be read as a whole rather than in isolation.” State

v. Belser, 945 S.W .2d at 782. After reviewing the jury instructions, we are

convinced that the parole eligibility jury instruction does not “affirmatively appear

to have affected the result of the trial on the merits.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a).

The error was, therefore, harmless.

This issue is without merit.

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING

In his final issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ordering

that his sentence for robbery run consecutively to his sentence for a prior offense.

Appellant acknowledges that the trial court properly found that he committed the

present offense while on probation for a previous offense. See Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 40-35-115(b)(6). However, he argues that consecutive sentencing is not

reasonably related to the severity of the offense committed and is not necessary

to protect the public from future criminal acts. See State v. Wilkerson, 905

S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995).

A.

When an appellant challenges the length, range, or manner of service of

a sentence, this Court conducts a de novo review with a presumption that the
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determination of the trial court was correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d).

However, this presumption of correctness is “conditioned upon the affirmative

showing that the trial court in the record considered the sentencing principles and

all relevant facts and circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169

(Tenn. 1991). In the event that the record fails to demonstrate such

consideration, review of the sentence is purely de novo. Id. If appellate review

reflects that the trial court properly considered all relevant factors and its findings

of fact are adequately supported by the record, this Court must affirm the

sentence. State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

In conducting a review, this Court must consider the evidence, the

presentence report, the sentencing principles, the arguments of counsel, the

nature and character of the offense, mitigating and enhancement factors, any

statements made by the defendant, and the potential for rehabilitation or

treatment. State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). The

defendant bears the burden of showing the impropriety of the sentence imposed.

State v. Gregory, 862 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Consecutive sentencing is governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115.

The trial court may order sentences to run consecutively if it finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the required statutory criteria

exist. State v. Black, 924 S.W.2d 912, 917 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Furthermore, the court is required to determine whether the consecutive

sentences (1) are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses committed;

(2) serve to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the offender; and
4

 Currently pending befo re the Suprem e Co urt is th e issu e whethe r a trial court is required to make

Wilkerson findings when consecutive sentencing is based upon criteria other than the “dangerous offender”

standard under Tenn . Code A nn. § 40- 35-115 (b)(4). See State v. David Keith Lane, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9607-

CC-00259, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 566, Bradley County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed June 18, 1997, at

Knoxville), perm. to app. granted (Tenn. February 2, 1998). Nevertheless, under our review of this issue, we

will require Wilkerson findings regardless of the statutory basis for consecutive sentencing.

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(3) are congruent with general principles of sentencing. State v. Wilkerson, 905

S.W.2d at 939.4

B.

The trial court, after considering the enhancement and mitigating factors,

sentenced Appellant as a Range I offender to five (5) years for his robbery

conviction. The court further found that Appellant committed the present offense

while he was on probation for a previous offense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

115(b)(6). After considering the consecutive sentencing factors enunciated in

Wilkerson, the trial court ordered that Appellant’s sentence run consecutively to

his sentence for a prior offense for which he was on probation at the time the

present offense was committed.

C.

Appellant concedes that the present offense was committed while he was

on probation for aggravated burglary. Therefore, consecutive sentencing was

appropriate under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(6). However, Appellant

contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the factors required by

Wilkerson.

The presentence report reflects that Appellant has a criminal history

including convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, assault,

disorderly conduct and harassment. He was on probation for aggravated

burglary and was awaiting trial for harassment at the time the present offense

was committed. Furthermore, he was arrested for driving on a suspended
5

 Accor ding to the p resente nce rep ort, Appellant was arrested for driving on a suspended licens e in

July 1992, but failed to appear in court. In January 1995, he was arrested due to his prior failure to appear

and convicted on the offense of driving on a suspended license.

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license while on probation for assault in 1992, and was subsequently convicted

of that offense.5

Appellant has shown a continuing disregard for the laws of this state. He

has repeatedly violated the terms of release into the community. Moreover, the

severity of his crimes have escalated over time. After considering the general

principles of sentencing, we conclude that consecutive sentences are reasonably

related to the severity of the offense committed and serve to protect the public

from Appellant’s further criminal conduct. See State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d

at 939.

This issue has no merit.

CONCLUSION

After a thorough review of the record before this Court, we find no

reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________

GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE

___________________________________

JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE