[Cite as In re Disqualification of Hunter, 137 Ohio St.3d 1201, 2013-Ohio-4467.] 

IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF HUNTER. 

IN RE T.M. 

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Hunter, 137 Ohio St.3d 1201, 

2013-Ohio-4467.] 

Judges—Affidavit of disqualification—Standing to file affidavit of 

disqualification—For purposes of R.C. 2701.03, certain media entities 

shall be considered the equivalent to a party in closure proceedings. 

(No. 13-AP-083—Decided September 26, 2013.) 

ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Hamilton County Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case Nos. 12-7285, 12-7305, 12-7308, 12-7279, 

12-7288, 12-7306, 12-7278, and 12-7307. 

____________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} Counsel for the Cincinnati Enquirer has filed the affidavit of 

Jennifer Baker, a reporter for the Enquirer, with the clerk of this court under R.C. 

2701.03 seeking to disqualify Judge Tracie M. Hunter from hearing and deciding 

motions to close the above-captioned delinquency proceedings to the public. 

{¶ 2} In her affidavit, Baker claims that a May 2013 e-mail from Judge 

Hunter to the Hamilton County prosecuting attorney demonstrates the judge’s 

belief that Baker “illegally forged” the judge’s name on court forms. The e-mail, 

according to Baker, “demonstrates bias and prejudice” and requires the judge’s 

disqualification from hearing the closure motions. 

{¶ 3} Judge Hunter has responded in writing to the allegations in Baker’s 

affidavit, asserting that neither Baker nor the Cincinnati Enquirer has standing 

under R.C. 2701.03 to request the judge’s disqualification. The judge also 

disclaims any bias towards Baker or the Enquirer. 
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{¶ 4} For the reasons explained below, no basis has been established to 

order the disqualification of Judge Hunter. 

The Enquirer’s standing to file an affidavit of disqualification 

{¶ 5} Under R.C. 2701.03, “any party to the proceeding or the party’s 

counsel” may file an affidavit of disqualification. In previous affidavit-ofdisqualification proceedings, the chief justice has strictly enforced this statutory 

requirement and has consistently found that individuals who do not qualify as a 

party or party’s counsel do not have standing to file an affidavit of 

disqualification. See, e.g., In re Disqualification of Cleary, 74 Ohio St.3d 1225, 

657 N.E.2d 1337 (1990); In re Disqualification of Haas, 74 Ohio St.3d 1217, 657 

N.E.2d 1331 (1990). 

{¶ 6} The circumstances here, however, are unique because the media 

and the public play an important role—and have certain rights—regarding the 

closure of juvenile-court proceedings. See, e.g., State ex rel. Plain Dealer 

Publishing Co. v. Floyd, 111 Ohio St.3d 56, 2006-Ohio-4437, 855 N.E.2d 35, 

¶ 46 (“We have held that the press and the general public have standing to contest 

the closure of a juvenile court proceeding”); id. (“under the current version of 

Juv.R. 27(A)(1), persons—including the public and the press—have a right to 

present evidence at a closure hearing to show a ‘countervailing right to be 

present’ at a juvenile court proceeding”); id. at ¶ 47 (“ ‘representatives of the 

press and general public “must be given the opportunity to be heard on the 

question of exclusion” ’ ”), quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for 

Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 609, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982), fn. 25, 

quoting Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 

L.Ed.2d 608 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. 

Geer, 114 Ohio St.3d 511, 2007-Ohio-4643, 873 N.E.2d 314, ¶ 20 (prohibiting 

enforcement of a juvenile-court judge’s media restriction that was issued “without 
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allowing all parties affected to have the opportunity to respond to the possibility 

of a restriction”). 

{¶ 7} Given this precedent—along with the fact that the Enquirer has 

filed objections to the pending closure motions and has entered an appearance for 

the hearing—the Enquirer and other similarly situated media entities shall be 

considered the equivalent to a party in the closure proceedings for purposes of 

R.C. 2701.03. Therefore, the Enquirer has standing to file an affidavit of 

disqualification under these limited circumstances. 

Merits of the affidavit of disqualification 

{¶ 8} R.C. 2701.03(B)(1) requires an affiant to set forth “specific 

allegations on which the claim of interest, bias, prejudice, or disqualification is 

based and the facts to support each of those allegations.” See also In re 

Disqualification of Mitrovich, 101 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-7358, 803 N.E.2d 

816, ¶ 4 (“An affidavit must describe with specificity and particularity those facts 

alleged to support the claim of bias or prejudice”). The Enquirer has set forth 

only one specific allegation of bias: that “Judge Hunter’s May 1 e-mail 

demonstrates that she has concluded [that Baker] illegally forged [the judge’s] 

name, despite clear evidence to the contrary,” which “demonstrates bias and 

prejudice such that Judge Hunter should be disqualified from presiding over the 

hearings on the Closure Motions.” 

{¶ 9} “The term ‘bias or prejudice’ ‘implies a hostile feeling or spirit of 

ill-will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his 

attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the 

judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed 

by the law and the facts.’ ” In re Disqualification of O’Neill, 100 Ohio St.3d 

1232, 2002-Ohio-7479, 798 N.E.2d 17, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. 

Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 469, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956). In addition, a 

“presumption of impartiality” is “accorded all judges” in affidavit-of-
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disqualification proceedings. In re Disqualification of Celebrezze, 101 Ohio St.3d 

1224, 2003-Ohio-7352, 803 N.E.2d 823, ¶ 7. 

{¶ 10} Here, Baker claims that while she was completing the juvenile 

court’s media-access application, an unidentified court employee advised her to 

write the name of the judge on the form. As a result, Baker printed Judge 

Hunter’s name on the signature line of three applications. Judge Hunter later emailed the prosecutor, accusing Baker of forgery, even though Baker claims that 

there was “clear evidence to the contrary.” In response, Judge Hunter asserts that 

she reported Baker to the prosecutor “not due to bias, but due to her judiciary 

obligation to report conduct of concern regarding Ms. Baker’s affixing Judge 

Hunter’s name to the signature line of the media application.” According to 

Judge Hunter, “no other reporter or any other media outlet, including the 

Cincinnati Enquirer” affixed names to the judge’s signature line on the 

application form. Judge Hunter further avers that she does not personally know 

Baker, that she did not vigorously pursue Baker’s prosecution, that she has not 

demonstrated any bias against Baker or the Enquirer, and that she will treat all 

litigants fairly and impartially. 

{¶ 11} On this record, the Enquirer has not conclusively established that 

Judge Hunter’s e-mail demonstrates bias or prejudice against Baker or the 

Enquirer. Specifically, the record reveals that Judge Hunter discovered Baker’s 

applications on May 1, 2013, and that the judge e-mailed the prosecutor the same 

day. While Baker alleges that Judge Hunter accused her of forgery “despite clear 

evidence to the contrary,” Baker has not further explained the nature of this “clear 

evidence” or how the judge was allegedly aware of this “clear evidence” at the 

time she e-mailed the prosecutor. “[V]ague, unsubstantiated allegations of the 

affidavit are insufficient on their face for a finding of bias or prejudice.” In re 

Disqualification of Walker, 36 Ohio St.3d 606, 522 N.E.2d 460 (1988); see also 

In re Disqualification of Flanagan, 127 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2009-Ohio-7199, 937 
January Term, 2013 

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N.E.2d 1023, ¶ 4 (“Allegations that are based solely on hearsay, innuendo, and 

speculation—such as those alleged here—are insufficient to establish bias or 

prejudice”). 

{¶ 12} In conclusion, “[t]he statutory right to seek disqualification of a 

judge is an extraordinary remedy. * * * A judge is presumed to follow the law 

and not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling 

to overcome these presumptions.” In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio 

St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5. The record does not include 

sufficiently compelling evidence to overcome these presumptions. 

{¶ 13} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 

denied. The cases may proceed before Judge Hunter. 

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