2021 UT App 100

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF D.D.,

A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

D.D.,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20200223-CA

Filed September 30, 2021

Seventh District Juvenile Court, Spanish Fork Department

The Honorable F. Richards Smith III

Seventh District Juvenile Court, Monticello Department

The Honorable Mary L. Manley

No. 1160560

Kyler Ovard, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Jeffrey S. Gray, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER

concurred.

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 D.D.,1 a teenager with high-functioning autism spectrum 

disorder, was adjudicated delinquent on two counts of child 

 

1. These are not the juvenile defendant’s actual initials. Because 

the issues he raises require a discussion of information relating 

(continued...)
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 2 2021 UT App 100

sexual abuse. D.D.’s adjudication was based solely on the 

strength of his multiple confessions to inappropriately touching 

the genitalia of his niece and nephew. D.D. appeals, challenging 

the juvenile court’s determination2that his confessions were 

sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted into evidence. D.D. also 

contends that the confessions are insufficient, on their own, to 

sustain an adjudication of delinquency beyond a reasonable 

doubt. We affirm.

 

(...continued)

to his health, we refer to him by these initials to protect his 

privacy.

2. The underlying events that led the State to bring this 

delinquency action occurred in Utah County, but the juvenile 

defendant resides in San Juan County. The State thus initiated 

the delinquency proceedings in the Seventh District Juvenile 

Court, but the case was transferred to the Fourth District 

Juvenile Court for the actual adjudication. See Utah Code Ann. 

§ 78A-6-350(1)–(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021) (allowing juvenile 

court proceedings to be commenced either in the district where 

“the minor is living or is found, or in which an alleged violation 

of law or ordinance occurred,” and allowing the original court to 

then “transfer the case to the district where the minor resides or 

to the district where the violation of law or ordinance is alleged 

to have occurred”). While the case was ultimately transferred 

back to the Seventh District for final disposition and remains 

pending there, all of the decisions at issue in this appeal were 

made in the Fourth District.
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 3 2021 UT App 100

BACKGROUND3

¶2 D.D. has a history of mental health conditions affecting 

his ability to interact with others. His teachers started noticing 

behavioral issues in elementary school, and he has been 

receiving some form of special education assistance since then. 

D.D. generally “struggles with social interaction,” and at various 

points during his adolescence he was diagnosed with depression 

and Asperger syndrome, a condition on the autism spectrum. 

¶3 One summer weekend in 2018, D.D.’s older brother 

(Brother) and sister-in-law (Sister-in-law) invited D.D. to their 

house to “spend some good time” together. They planned to 

“devote all the time that [they could] to him that weekend” 

because D.D. was out of school for the summer and he was 

spending a lot of time at home alone while his parents worked. 

Brother and Sister-in-law have two young children (Niece and 

Nephew), and they live several hours away from D.D.’s 

hometown. D.D. and Brother had a “close relationship.”

¶4 During the visit, while Sister-in-law was outside with 

Niece and Nephew, Brother had a conversation with D.D. about 

pornography. Brother was aware that D.D. “had had some 

involvement” with pornography, and Brother wanted to see if he 

could help D.D. with something their family considered immoral 

under their religious views. To aid the discussion, Brother used 

an interactive book designed to help parents talk to children 

about their potential exposure to pornography and how to avoid 

it. As Brother went through the book with D.D., D.D. told him 

that he had been “looking at pornography basically on a daily 

 

3. “In an appeal from a bench trial in juvenile court, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s 

ruling, and we recite the facts here with that standard in mind.” 

In re J.R.H., 2020 UT App 155, n.1, 478 P.3d 56 (cleaned up).
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 4 2021 UT App 100

basis” and wanted to stop. Brother then discussed some 

strategies with D.D. on how to resist the urge to look at 

pornography. 

¶5 Later that night, Brother told Sister-in-law about his 

conversation with D.D. After Brother explained that D.D. was 

afraid to tell his parents about his pornography habit, Sister-inlaw suggested that because she and D.D. had a “good 

relationship,” he could “build up his confidence” to tell his 

parents by confiding in her. Accordingly, at Brother’s urging, 

D.D. approached Sister-in-law the next day and said that he 

needed to tell her something. After walking her into the living 

room where Brother was already sitting, D.D. disclosed that he 

was “looking at pornography every day for several hours 

sometimes.” Sister-in-law reassured D.D. that she still loved him 

and said that she and Brother would “help him in any way” they 

could. At that point, D.D. “got more comfortable” and went into 

further detail, revealing that he had been looking at 

pornography of “young girls” and “babies.” Sister-in-law asked, 

“[W]hen you say babies, what does that mean?” D.D. elaborated 

that he meant “babies like that can’t talk.” 

¶6 Brother and Sister-in-law were both shocked by D.D.’s 

revelation, and Sister-in-law, while expressing appreciation for 

D.D.’s honesty, told him that this was “really serious” and that 

those were images he could “never look at.” Brother and Sisterin-law again brainstormed with D.D. how he could avoid the 

temptation to look at pornography, at which point Sister-in-law 

suggested that because D.D.’s mother (Mother) was coming to 

the house that afternoon, D.D. could tell her about the 

pornography issue while Brother and Sister-in-law were there 

for support. 

¶7 When Mother arrived, D.D. told her everything he had 

just revealed to Brother and Sister-in-law, including that he was 

viewing child pornography. Mother was upset at first, but after 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 5 2021 UT App 100

calming down she asked D.D. questions while “letting him 

express everything.” 

¶8 The next day, while Sister-in-law was at work, she began 

to more fully process her conversations with D.D. She called her 

aunt for advice, who expressed her view that it would be in 

everyone’s “best interest” if D.D. reported himself to police, and 

she also suggested that “a lot of times when kids are looking at 

that type of pornography, they’ll act out on it.” Sister-in-law 

relayed the advice to Brother, and they both resolved to convince

Mother that D.D. needed to report to police that he was viewing

child pornography.

¶9 After Brother and Sister-in-law arrived home from work, 

Brother began speaking with Mother about D.D. reporting 

himself to police. Meanwhile, Sister-in-law and D.D. sat on the 

porch talking; D.D. was trying to convince Sister-in-law to allow 

him to live with them full-time, while Sister-in-law was 

brainstorming potential places D.D. could get a job back in his 

hometown. As they were talking, Sister-in-law recalled what her 

aunt had told her about viewers of child pornography acting out 

on their desires, “[a]nd all of a sudden it clicked for [her]” that if 

D.D. was looking at child pornography, her own children could 

be at risk. She waited for D.D. to finish what he was saying, and 

said, “[D.D.], I need to ask you have you ever touched my kids?” 

D.D. looked away from her and “kind of shrugged his shoulders 

and . . . did a little giggle like oh well.” Troubled by his reaction, 

Sister-in-law asked D.D. to look at her and she again inquired, 

“[H]ave you ever touched my kids?” D.D. answered that he had, 

which prompted Sister-in-law to ask, “[W]hen?” D.D. responded 

that he had done it “every time” he had come to their house or 

the family had visited his house. At that point Sister-in-law 

“couldn’t talk” and was “bawling,” but D.D. continued, “I wait 

until they are asleep. And I go into the rooms that they are in. I 

make sure to make noise on the wall or I hit things to make sure 

that they are asleep.” With regard to Niece, he further explained 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 6 2021 UT App 100

that he would “tap her to make sure she [was] asleep,” then 

proceed to take off the covers, “bring her panties down to her 

knees,” “run his finger around her genitalia,” and sometimes 

“touch[] inside her genitalia.” 

¶10 Before D.D. could say more, Sister-in-law left to find 

Brother and tell him what D.D. had just told her. She “collapsed 

several times” on the way, and could not articulate what the 

matter was when she approached Mother and Brother. Mother 

saw this behavior and uttered, “[D]on’t tell me he touched one of 

your kids.” Sister-in-law nodded in affirmation, prompting 

Brother to leave the room to deal with his emotions. Once 

Brother had regained his composure, he confronted D.D. with 

similar questions to those asked by Sister-in-law, and D.D. 

“admitted [it] again to him.” In this opinion, we refer to D.D.’s 

admissions to Sister-in-law and Brother as the Initial 

Confessions.

¶11 At that point, Brother and Sister-in-law called the police. 

Upon arriving at the house, one of the responding officers 

(Officer) gathered statements from Brother and Sister-in-law and 

then located D.D., who was “curled in a ball under the dash” of 

a vehicle parked out front. Officer advised D.D. of his Miranda 

rights and “simply asked him if he knew why [the police 

officers] were there.” D.D. responded that it was “because he 

had inappropriately touched his niece,” and volunteered that the 

touching had occurred while she was sleeping and that “he had 

penetrated her with his fingers.” Officer then stopped D.D. from 

speaking further because Officer had gathered enough to know 

that the case would need to be referred to detectives for full 

investigation. In this opinion, we refer to D.D.’s admissions to 

Officer as the Vehicle Confession.

¶12 After being taken to the local police station, D.D. was 

interviewed by two detectives. With Mother present, D.D. was 

read his Miranda rights and “[h]e waived them and he spoke 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 7 2021 UT App 100

freely.” One of the detectives asked D.D. why he was there and 

D.D. responded that it was because he had “sexually abused his 

niece.” When asked what he meant by that, D.D. stated that he 

had “touched her private areas”; on being asked what he 

thought private areas were, he specified that he was talking 

about “her butt and her vagina.” He described that the first 

touching had occurred approximately two years prior—when 

Niece would have been four or five years old—during a family 

visit to Brother and Sister-in-law’s house. On that occasion, he 

“lifted [Niece]’s underwear up and he touched it”; when asked 

what “it” meant, he stated that it was her vagina.

¶13 When asked how many times this had happened, D.D. 

said it had occurred three times. The second touching occurred 

on an unspecified date when Brother’s family was visiting D.D. 

and his parents at their home, and the third touching was during 

another visit to Brother’s house; both of these instances also 

occurred while Niece was sleeping.

¶14 D.D. was then asked “if this ha[d] happened to anyone 

else,” and he stated that on one occasion, while Brother and 

Sister-in-law were changing Nephew’s diaper, D.D. “touched the 

tip of [Nephew’s] penis” when his parents were not looking. 

Although this incident occurred at an unspecified time, Nephew 

was three years old at the time D.D. was being interviewed. One 

of the interviewing detectives later offered his view that, taken in 

context, D.D. was describing a touching that was 

“inappropriate[] because [Sister-in-law and Brother] were 

changing [Nephew]’s diaper,” and D.D. did it “when they 

weren’t looking.” In this opinion, we refer to D.D.’s admissions 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 8 2021 UT App 100

to the detectives during their interview as the Police Station 

Confession.4

¶15 The next day, Brother and Sister-in-law brought Niece 

and Nephew to the Children’s Justice Center to be interviewed 

about any potential abuse. At the interview, Niece—who was six 

years old at the time—was “engage[d]” and would answer 

questions when prompted. Nephew—who was three years old 

at the time—showed little interest in being interviewed. Neither 

child reported any touching whatsoever. However, this was not 

necessarily inconsistent with D.D.’s narrative, because Nephew 

was still in diapers when the touching allegedly occurred. And 

Niece—who, according to D.D., was asleep when the touchings 

occurred—was a notoriously deep sleeper, with Brother 

describing how, once she was asleep, “you could honestly pick 

her up, throw her on the couch and she wouldn’t even know.”

¶16 Based on D.D.’s several confessions, the State charged 

him with two delinquency counts—one for each victim—of 

sexual abuse of a child under fourteen, a second-degree felony if 

committed by an adult. Shortly after the initial pretrial 

conference, D.D.’s trial counsel moved to stay the proceedings to 

allow D.D. to undergo a competency evaluation. The juvenile 

court granted the motion and an evaluation was conducted by a 

licensed psychologist (Evaluator 1). In his report, Evaluator 1 

opined that although D.D. possessed “a rational and factual 

understanding of the proceedings against him” and the 

applicable punishment, he did not have “the capacity to 

adequately consult with his counsel and to participate in the 

proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding.” In support of his opinion, Evaluator 1 cited 

D.D.’s diagnoses of unspecified depressive disorder and autism 

 

4. D.D. also indicated to the detectives during this interview that 

he had been viewing child pornography.
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 9 2021 UT App 100

spectrum disorder, and observed that this and his other 

diagnosed disorders caused “mild-to-moderate impairment in 

his capacity to reason, to consider consequences, and to make 

judgments.” (Cleaned up.) Evaluator 1 also noted how D.D.’s 

thought content was “somewhat slow but [showed] no evidence 

of hallucinations, delusions or paranoia,” and observed that 

“with prompts he typically recalled information.” After hearing 

evidence on D.D.’s competency, including Evaluator 1’s 

opinions, the juvenile court concluded that D.D. was “not 

competent to proceed,” but that competency would be 

“attainable,” and ordered that a competency attainment plan be 

completed.

¶17 A few months later (about six months after the Initial 

Confessions), D.D. sent Brother several text messages “out of 

nowhere, [with] no prompting whatsoever.” In the first message 

D.D. lamented that Brother and Sister-in-law had not been in 

contact with the rest of the family. In a second message he 

stated:

I’d really appre[ci]ate it if you’d drop the co[u]rt 

s[t]uff, if you can. I learned my lesson. I now know 

what happens when I do stuff like that. I’m soooo 

sooo sooo very sorry about what I did to your kids. 

I just wish I could go back in time or have a do 

over and stop my[]self from ever doing that and 

never do that. I just wish I never would have done 

those things in the first place to begin with. When I 

first touched [Nephew] and [Niece], I didn’t know 

that all of this would have happened. If I would 

have known that all of this would have happened, 

I NEVER would have touched [Nephew] and 

[Niece], like that in the first place.
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 10 2021 UT App 100

In this opinion, we refer to the content of these text messages 

from D.D. to Brother collectively as the First Text Message 

Confession.

¶18 After D.D. had participated in attainment services for 

about six months, Evaluator 1 conducted a second competency 

evaluation. Evaluator 1 again opined that D.D. was not 

competent to stand trial for the same reasons articulated in his 

original report. The juvenile court held a hearing to consider 

Evaluator 1’s opinions, after which it ordered that “a new 

updated evaluation [be conducted] by an independent 

evaluator.” A new psychologist (Evaluator 2) then evaluated 

D.D. and determined that the “attainment services were 

successful” and that D.D. had been “restored to competence to 

stand trial.” (Cleaned up.) Specifically, Evaluator 2 noted how 

D.D. “appear[ed] capable of providing . . . information regarding 

his alleged offense, his involvement in the alleged offense, . . .

and his state of mind at the time of the alleged offense,” and that 

“[h]e seemed to have adequate recall of the events leading up to 

his arrests.” Thus, based on testing and direct observations, 

Evaluator 2 concluded, among other things, that D.D. appeared 

to be capable of understanding the charges against him, was 

capable of providing his attorney relevant information regarding 

his involvement in the alleged crimes, and would be able to 

cooperate with his attorney and participate in his own defense. 

¶19 As D.D.’s case proceeded, his attorney filed a motion in 

limine seeking to exclude D.D.’s confessions from being 

presented at trial, arguing that they could not meet the 

trustworthiness standard articulated in State v. Mauchley, 2003 

UT 10, 67 P.3d 477,5 because there was “no independent 

evidence” of the charged crimes. After hearing argument on the 

motion, the court determined that the matter should proceed to 

 

5. See infra ¶¶ 29–33.
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 11 2021 UT App 100

an adjudication because “[t]he State ha[d] not yet had the 

opportunity to present its corroborating evidence to establish the 

trustworthiness of [D.D.’s] confessions.” But the court also ruled 

that, before any confessions could be admitted into evidence, the 

State would first have to “present evidence regarding the 

trustworthiness of [D.D.’s] alleged confessions,” and the court 

would have to determine that each confession met the 

trustworthiness standard by a preponderance of the evidence. 

The court then set the case for trial.

¶20 About six weeks before trial, D.D. again texted Brother, 

apparently unprompted. The message read:

[Brother] I want [yo]u to know that I’m so very 

sorry for what[] I did to your kids. . . . You didn’t 

need to tell [our sister] all of that stuff. How would 

you have felt if all of that stuff happen[ed] while 

you were on your mission and [our sister] told you 

that I touched her kids like that. . . . Inste[a]d of 

calling the police on me you should have took a 

second to breath[e]. . . . I WASN’T saying that I was 

planning on doing that to [our sister’s] kids, 

because I wasn’t[.] I learned my lesson from doing 

that.

D.D. then sent another message the same day which read, in 

relevant part, “I know that way deep down you know that if 

mom knew that I was mast[u]rbating [she] wouldn’t let me keep 

doing it and the same with me touching [Niece] and [Nephew] 

the way I did.” In this opinion, we refer to the content of these 

text messages from D.D. to Brother collectively as the Second 

Text Message Confession.

¶21 A one-day bench trial was held in August 2019, at which 

the State, as part of its case-in-chief, presented testimony from 

Brother, Sister-in-law, Officer, and one of the detectives who 

interviewed D.D. While being examined on redirect with respect 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 12 2021 UT App 100

to her portion of the Initial Confessions, Sister-in-law was asked 

by the prosecutor whether she had been “providing cues or clues 

or direction” to D.D. when she initially asked D.D. whether he 

had touched her children, which would have potentially 

indicated to him that he could “please” her by answering a 

certain way. Sister-in-law responded,

No, not at all. . . . I mean it was a yes or no 

question, . . . [and] there [were] no additional 

questions. He answered my question and then he 

continued to tell me more and more details about 

[the abuse]. . . . It was him telling a story and 

telling me exactly what had occurred with my 

daughter.

Sister-in-law also offered her view that D.D. “has always been 

honest . . . to a point where . . . sometimes [it] gets him in 

trouble,” and that “when he does lie, it’s very obvious.”

¶22 During the State’s presentation of evidence, the defense 

renewed its objection that D.D.’s confessions did not meet the 

Mauchley standard. With regard to the Initial Confessions, the 

court determined that they were trustworthy, observing that 

D.D.’s admissions were “spontaneous” because “[n]othing was 

coerced or forced,” and that D.D. was a “young man who 

typically is honest about things.” The court likewise concluded 

that the Vehicle Confession was “clearly spontaneous,” finding 

that there was “[n]othing to indicate that anything was forced or 

coerced.” And finally, it admitted into evidence testimony about 

the Police Station Confession and screenshots of the First and 

Second Text Message Confessions.6

 

6. Defense counsel expressly renewed his objection to the Initial 

Confessions and the juvenile court entered specific findings 

regarding their trustworthiness. Although defense counsel did 

(continued...)
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 13 2021 UT App 100

¶23 Following presentation of the State’s case-in-chief, D.D.’s 

counsel moved for directed verdict, asserting that, even if the 

confessions had been trustworthy enough to be admitted into 

evidence, they were not enough—on their own—to sustain a 

delinquency adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt. The court 

denied the motion.

¶24 D.D. then presented his case-in-chief, during which 

Evaluator 1 testified that in examining individuals with autism 

spectrum disorder, he likes to ask misleading questions “to see 

how they acquiesce” to an “authority figure.” In evaluating D.D., 

he observed that some of his answers were “credible and 

accurate and verified by collateral sources,” but that “he seemed 

to acquiesce to authority figures . . . when [Evaluator 1] asked 

him a misleading question.” But on cross and on redirect, 

Evaluator 1 clarified that he did not necessarily hold a view that 

the fleeting deference to authority figures he observed in D.D. 

impacted D.D.’s decision to confess the charged conduct to 

multiple people, but rather that D.D.’s responses indicated a risk 

that he might “occasionally” acquiesce to an authority figure if 

one were to ask him “leading questions.”

¶25 After closing arguments, the juvenile court took the 

matter under advisement and a few weeks later issued its ruling, 

finding D.D. delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt on both 

charges. D.D. appeals.

 

(...continued)

not expressly renew his objection to the Vehicle Confession, the 

court entered specific findings on its trustworthiness at the 

conclusion of Officer’s testimony. With regard to the remaining 

confessions, no express objection was made and no findings 

were entered, although evidence of each confession was 

admitted.
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 14 2021 UT App 100

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶26 D.D. raises two issues on appeal. He first argues that the 

juvenile court erred by admitting all of his out-of-court 

confessions, asserting that they were insufficiently trustworthy 

to be admitted into evidence. A lower court’s determination that 

a confession is sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted into 

evidence is a legal determination. See State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 

10, ¶ 61, 67 P.3d 477 (“[T]he trial judge must determine as a 

matter of law that the confession is trustworthy before it may be 

admitted.”). Thus, it is a decision we review for correctness. State 

v. Bran, 2021 UT App 62, ¶ 9, 492 P.3d 147 (“We review the legal 

determinations leading to an admissibility ruling for 

correctness.” (cleaned up)).

¶27 Second, D.D. asserts that the court erred in adjudicating 

him delinquent because the State presented insufficient evidence 

to sustain such a decision beyond a reasonable doubt. “When 

reviewing a juvenile court’s decision for sufficiency of the 

evidence, an appellate court must consider all the facts, and all 

reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, in a light 

most favorable to the juvenile court’s determination, and we 

reverse only when it is against the clear weight of the evidence, 

or if [we] otherwise reach[] a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been made.” In re J.R.H., 2020 UT App 155, ¶ 9, 478 

P.3d 56 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶28 We begin with D.D.’s challenge to the juvenile court’s 

decision to admit his confessions, in which he argues that they 

were insufficiently corroborated under State v. Mauchley, 2003 

UT 10, 67 P.3d 477. We then address D.D.’s argument that the 

confessions were insufficient on their own to support a finding 

of delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt.
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 15 2021 UT App 100

I

¶29 In Utah, a criminal “defendant may not be convicted 

unless there exists independent evidence of the crime, a 

corroborated confession, or a combination of both that furnishes 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of 

the crime charged.” State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ¶ 61, 67 P.3d 

477 (cleaned up). This is because “no defendant can be convicted 

solely on the basis of an uncorroborated out-of-court 

confession.” Id. ¶ 50 (cleaned up). But before a defendant’s 

confession may be considered by the factfinder, the trial court 

takes on a “gatekeeping function,” in which it seeks to 

corroborate the confession “as a matter of law” by determining 

whether the confession is “trustworthy” based on the “totality of 

the circumstances” surrounding the confession. See id. ¶ 58 

& n.6. Thus, a confession may be corroborated and admitted into 

evidence only after it is “deemed trustworthy by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Id. ¶ 58. Neither side suggests 

that a different standard applies to juvenile court delinquency 

proceedings, and we have no reason to assume otherwise. Cf. In 

re P.G., 2015 UT App 14, ¶¶ 24–25, 343 P.3d 297 (discussing 

contours of the Mauchley trustworthiness standard and implying 

that it applies to admissibility of juvenile confessions, although 

declining to address the juvenile defendant’s Mauchley-based 

arguments on the merits for lack of preservation). 

¶30 D.D. contends that all of his confessions were 

inadmissible simply because “there was no independent 

evidence that the crime occurred,” and that the juvenile court 

misapplied Mauchley in concluding otherwise. But D.D. appears 

to harbor a fundamental misunderstanding of our supreme 

court’s holding in Mauchley.

¶31 D.D. is correct that to establish the trustworthiness of a 

confession, “the State must introduce substantial independent 

evidence” which “strengthen[s] and add[s] weight or credibility 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 16 2021 UT App 100

to the confession, so as to produce a confidence in the truth of 

the confession.” Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ¶ 50 (cleaned up). 

Importantly, however, “[s]ubstantial independent evidence 

supporting the trustworthiness of a confession need not

necessarily include independent evidence of the crime” itself. Id. 

¶ 51 (emphasis added). In other words, the State may elect to 

corroborate the confession with independent evidence of the 

crime, but the confession may also be corroborated—and 

therefore admitted—without it. See id. ¶ 49 (noting that “the 

State does not have to provide independent evidence that a harm 

or injury occurred by criminal act before a confession may be 

admitted to help establish guilt” (emphasis added)); see also id. 

¶¶ 51–56 (describing the different corroboration standards for 

establishing trustworthiness when there is no independent 

evidence that a crime occurred versus when there is independent 

evidence that a crime occurred). Thus, “in cases such as this one, 

where there is no evidence of a crime independent of the 

confession, the State may . . . establish the trustworthiness of the 

confession with other evidence typically used to bolster the 

credibility and reliability of an out-of-court statement.”

7

Id. ¶ 51 

(cleaned up).

¶32 The context of our supreme court’s decision in Mauchley 

helps draw this important distinction. Prior to Mauchley, Utah 

adhered to the corpus delicti rule, which required a defendant’s 

 

7. D.D.’s confusion may stem from the term “corroborated 

confession,” which arguably suggests on its face that the 

confession must be corroborated by other evidence of the crime. 

But as Mauchley makes clear, a corroborated confession does not 

require independent evidence of the crime; rather, a 

corroborated confession is a trustworthy confession as 

established by the evidence of the circumstances surrounding 

the confession itself. See State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ¶¶ 49, 51–

53, 67 P.3d 477.
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 17 2021 UT App 100

confession to be corroborated through the State producing 

“evidence that the specified offense occurred.”8Id. ¶¶ 14–15 

(cleaned up). But in Mauchley, the court joined “the federal 

courts and a growing number of state courts” in abandoning the 

corpus delicti rule in favor of the “new version of the 

corroboration rule,” which “requires corroboration of the 

confession itself rather than corroboration that a crime was 

committed.” Id. ¶¶ 19, 48. In so doing, our supreme court 

recognized the limitations of the corpus delicti rule in modern 

criminal law. See generally id. ¶¶ 21–33, 41–47. For example, the 

court explained that “[b]ecause inappropriate sexual contact 

often produces no tangible injury,” and may lack independent 

proof particularly where young children are involved, “applying 

the corpus delicti rule to such situations seems especially 

troublesome.” Id. ¶ 29. But the court added that “[a]lthough [it 

was] overturn[ing] the corpus delicti rule, [it was] not 

eliminating the corroboration rule because . . . the need still 

exists to prevent errors in convictions based upon untrue 

confessions alone.” See id. ¶ 47 (cleaned up). The court therefore 

adopted the trustworthiness standard, which focuses on 

“whether a defendant’s confession is sufficiently trustworthy or 

reliable to be admitted into evidence.” Id. ¶ 19.

 

8. The corpus delicti rule is so termed because the “orthodox 

version of the rule requires corroboration of the corpus delicti,” a 

Latin term meaning the “body of the crime.” Id. ¶ 15 (cleaned 

up). The rule originated in the English common law and 

developed to “prevent innocent persons from being convicted 

when they falsely confess to committing a crime that was never 

committed or was committed by someone else.” Id. ¶¶ 12–14 

(cleaned up). Under Utah’s corpus delicti rule, the State was 

required to corroborate a defendant’s confession by putting on 

some other evidence “that a harm or injury occurred by criminal 

act,” but it was not required to show that “the defendant was the 

perpetrator.” Id. ¶ 16.
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 18 2021 UT App 100

¶33 In adopting and discussing the contours of the 

trustworthiness standard, the Mauchley court identified a nonexclusive list of “factors” that “have applicability in determining 

the trustworthiness of confessions,” including: “evidence as to 

the spontaneity of the statement; the absence of deception, trick, 

threats, or promises to obtain the statement; the defendant’s 

positive physical and mental condition, including age, 

education, and experience; and the presence of an attorney when 

the statement is given.” Id. ¶ 52. The court also emphasized that, 

as a general matter, “the overall facts and circumstances related 

in the confession must be consistent with facts otherwise known 

or established.” Id. ¶ 53 (cleaned up). 

¶34 At the outset, we observe that no attorney was present 

during any of D.D.’s confessions; thus, the fourth factor 

identified by the Mauchley court weighs against a 

trustworthiness determination.9 But since the trustworthiness 

standard is adjudged based on the “totality of the 

circumstances,” id. ¶ 58, this fact alone does not end the analysis. 

¶35 Next, as to the spontaneity of the statements during each 

confession—the first Mauchley factor—D.D. asserts that his 

confessions were “never spontaneous.” But we do 

not view the circumstances surrounding his confessions 

as yielding such a straightforward pronouncement on 

spontaneity. For starters, “spontaneous” can take on subtly 

 

9. D.D. frames his challenge to the court’s decision to admit his 

confessions generally by asserting that his confessions were 

collectively untrustworthy, without delineating a Mauchley

factor-based analysis for each confession individually. 

Accordingly, we analyze the applicability of each Mauchley 

factor to D.D.’s confessions as a whole, as opposed to, for 

instance, analyzing the factors present with respect to each 

confession.
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 19 2021 UT App 100

different definitions, depending on how the word is used.10

See Spontaneous, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/spontaneous [https://perma.cc/EFM6-

FT67]. For instance, it is sometimes defined as something 

“developing or occurring without apparent external influence, 

force, cause or treatment,” or “arising from a momentary 

impulse.” Id. Applying this definition, the First and Second Text 

Message Confessions qualify as spontaneous. They appeared to 

be impulsive and without any apparent external influences, as 

D.D. sent them to Brother via completely unsolicited text 

messages. Indeed, Brother noted how the texts came “basically 

out of nowhere,” with “no prompting whatsoever,” after Brother 

and his family had no contact with D.D. for several months.

¶36 The Initial Confessions, on the other hand, were in 

response to Sister-in-law directly asking D.D. whether he had 

“ever touched [her] kids,” and Brother’s similar questioning. 

And the Vehicle and Police Station Confessions were prompted 

by questions that, while more generic, were still apparent 

external influences which, in some sense, led him to confess. 

D.D.’s affirmative answers in response to such direct questioning 

for each of these in-person confessions thus would not qualify as 

impulse-driven utterances without external influences. 

Nevertheless, as mentioned, “spontaneous” has multiple 

 

10. Indeed, other jurisdictions that apply a factor-based 

trustworthiness analysis appear to consider the word to mean 

different things depending on the context. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 

610 A.2d 800, 806 (N.H. 1992) (suggesting that a spontaneous 

inculpatory statement is one that is “volunteered in response to a 

question that was neither leading or suggestive”); United States v. 

Camacho, 163 F. Supp. 2d 287, 305–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (collecting 

cases and applying principle of spontaneity in the context of 

making a statement to a friend or close acquaintance, as opposed 

to confessing to law enforcement). 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 20 2021 UT App 100

definitions; it can also mean “controlled and directed internally” 

or “not apparently contrived or manipulated.” See id. Applying 

these definitions, the Initial, Vehicle, and Police Station 

Confessions appear more spontaneous because, while the initial 

questions posed certainly were the stimuli that got D.D. talking, 

he volunteered the detailed information about touching Niece 

and Nephew without any cajoling. Thus, these confessions can 

also be considered spontaneous based on the level of detail that 

D.D. volunteered without being pressed or manipulated into 

doing so. Indeed, the juvenile court appears to have applied 

such a definition of the word when it found that the Initial 

Confessions were spontaneous because “[n]othing was coerced 

or forced,” and that the Vehicle Confession was “clearly 

spontaneous,” because there was “[n]othing to indicate that 

anything was forced or coerced.” Thus, while the spontaneity 

factor yields more nuanced results among the in-person 

confessions depending on the definition of spontaneous used, 

this factor weighs heavily in favor of the First and Second Text 

Message Confessions’ trustworthiness. 

¶37 As to the second trustworthiness factor, D.D. concedes 

that “there was no deception, trick, threats or promises explicitly 

used to obtain the . . . confessions,” but he nevertheless argues 

that his confessions are unreliable because he was “faced with a 

deceptive environment that prompted him to answer ‘yes’ to all 

of the questions asked by both [Brother] and [Sister-in-law].” 

Specifically, D.D. points to his “sense of religious duty,” 

Brother’s initiation of the pornography discussion, and D.D.’s 

close relationship with Brother and Sister-in-law, all of which 

would have supposedly caused D.D. to “want[] to please them 

in any way he could.” Yet in so arguing, D.D. does not explain 

how these alleged pressures would compel a false confession. 

For example, while it may be that a person might confess to 

wrongdoing based on a moral commitment to tell the truth, we 

are not persuaded that D.D. would lie about touching Niece and 

Nephew out of religious obligation. Similarly, we are not 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 21 2021 UT App 100

persuaded that the pornography discussion created a deceptive 

environment that would cause D.D. to confess to something he 

did not do. Brother and Sister-in-law simply provided a safe 

environment for D.D. to discuss his pornography habit; they did 

not pressure him, they did not trick him, and they did not make 

promises to him that might have led him to falsely confess. 

Finally, D.D. has not articulated how his desire to “please” his 

Brother and Sister-in-law would compel him to confess to 

sexually abusing their children if it were untrue—especially 

when considering that the context of his confession to Sister-inlaw was in the midst of trying to convince her to let him move in 

with them. If D.D. had wanted to please his Brother and Sisterin-law while advancing his own objective, he presumably would 

have denied touching their children. We therefore reject D.D.’s 

suggestion that the environment in which D.D. confessed 

undermined the trustworthiness of his confessions. 

¶38 Furthermore, applying the second factor to the 

confessions where it would traditionally be relevant—namely 

the Vehicle and Police Station Confessions—supports a 

determination of trustworthiness because both Officer and the 

interviewing detective asked D.D. very straightforward, openended questions, to which D.D. responded with lengthy 

narratives and explanations—a far cry from the type of situation 

that would implicate a contrary finding under the second factor. 

Cf. In re P.G., 2015 UT App 14, ¶¶ 2–14, 343 P.3d 297 (upholding 

a juvenile defendant’s confession as voluntary after “[l]ooking at 

the totality of the circumstances,” even though his police 

interview lasted forty minutes, involved “persistent . . . 

interrogation techniques,” and neither the juvenile’s parents nor 

his attorney were present). And finally, our review of the 

screenshots admitted into evidence reveals no degree of 

deception or threat present in either of the Text Message 

Confessions, as D.D. appears to have initiated those 

communications completely unsolicited. Accordingly, we are 

unable to discern any degree of deception present with any of 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 22 2021 UT App 100

D.D.’s confessions, meaning that the second factor weighs in 

favor of all the confessions being deemed trustworthy. 

¶39 D.D. relies heavily on the third factor—“the defendant’s 

positive physical and mental condition, including age, 

education, and experience,” see Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ¶ 52—in 

arguing that his confessions are untrustworthy. He asserts that 

this factor “overwhelmingly cuts in his favor” based on “his 

disability, his diminished ability to track and recall conversation, 

and his tendency to acquiesce to authority.” The State, on the 

other hand, contends that the record does not provide “a basis to 

believe that D.D.’s [diagnosis with autism spectrum disorder] 

undermined the credibility of his confessions.” We agree with 

the State. 

¶40 Based on our review of the record, it is apparent that 

D.D.’s autism spectrum disorder affects his interactions with 

others. For example, during Evaluator 2’s investigation, D.D.’s 

father described how there are “countless examples” in D.D.’s 

life of him “‘not getting it’ when it comes to normal social 

interactions.” His father described how D.D. “does not 

understand sarcasm” and, when he was younger, “he never 

played with [other] kids he just played ‘by kids’”—behavior 

Evaluator 2 described as “parallel play.” D.D.’s father also 

offered his view that D.D. “didn’t seem to understand the 

gravity” of going to court and being the subject of a delinquency 

adjudication—a concern that was echoed by Evaluator 1 in his

competency evaluations. However, diagnosis with a mental 

disorder, without more, “does not necessarily mean a person is 

unusually susceptible to emotional distress or unable to 

participate in an investigation.” See Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 

823, 836 (7th Cir. 2016). Indeed, we have previously rejected the 

argument (albeit in a different context) that “all mental disorders 

affect a person’s credibility,” because not “all mental disorders 

affect [the] ability to perceive, recall, and relate events.” See State 

v. Stewart, 925 P.2d 598, 600 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Instead, to be 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 23 2021 UT App 100

relevant to the trustworthiness analysis, D.D.’s condition must 

relate to his ability to tell the truth. See Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, 

¶ 50 (discussing that, to meet the trustworthiness standard, 

“independent evidence must strengthen and add weight or 

credibility to the confession . . . so as to produce a confidence in 

the truth of the confession” (cleaned up)). And based on the 

totality of the evidence, there is no indication that D.D.’s mental 

disorder affected the trustworthiness of his confessions. D.D. 

was repeatedly described by Sister-in-law as an “honest” 

person—sometimes “to a fault.” Evaluator 1 noted how D.D.’s 

thought content was “somewhat slow but [showed] no evidence 

of hallucinations, delusions or paranoia,” and observed that 

“with prompts he typically recalled information.” And Evaluator 

2 considered D.D.’s behavior to be indicative of “someone with 

high-functioning autism.” Indeed, Evaluator 2 noted how D.D. 

“appear[ed] capable of providing . . . information regarding his 

alleged offense, his involvement in the alleged offense, . . . and

his state of mind at the time of the alleged offense,” and that 

“[h]e seemed to have adequate recall of the events leading up to 

his arrest[].” Thus, based on the record before us, we are not 

persuaded that D.D.’s diagnosed mental condition affects his 

ability to tell the truth. 

¶41 D.D. resists this conclusion, pointing to the fact that he 

was declared incompetent to stand trial for roughly a year. But 

the basis that led to this declaration was Evaluator 1’s concern 

that D.D. was mildly to moderately impaired in his capacity to 

reason, consider consequences, or exercise judgment—not that 

he struggled in his ability to relate facts or to tell the truth. 

Indeed, Evaluator 1 clarified during his trial testimony that he 

did not even necessarily hold a view that D.D.’s fleeting 

deference to authority compelled D.D. to confess the charged 

conduct to multiple people; rather, he believed that D.D. might 

“occasionally” acquiesce to an authority figure if one were to ask 

him “leading questions.” But D.D. was not asked leading 

questions that would have put him at risk in any of the 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 24 2021 UT App 100

circumstances leading to his confessions. Instead, D.D. confessed 

to multiple individuals in response to open-ended or yes-no 

questions, and he volunteered details about the abuse without 

any prompting and without any suggestion from others about 

how he had touched Niece and Nephew. Accordingly, we do not 

conclude that, based on the totality of the circumstances, D.D.’s 

mental condition negatively impacted the trustworthiness of his 

confessions, and therefore the third factor weighs in favor of 

corroborating D.D.’s confessions. 

¶42 Finally, in addition to the four trustworthiness factors 

named in Mauchley, we must also consider whether “the overall 

facts and circumstances related in the confession [are] consistent 

with facts otherwise known or established.” See 2003 UT 10, ¶ 53 

(cleaned up). An anecdote included in Mauchley exemplifies this 

broad yet critical underlying rule, and offers parallel reasoning 

for the facts at issue in this case: “if a man spontaneously 

confesses that he fondled a child, but the evidence demonstrates 

he was never in physical proximity with the child, his confession 

is likely untrustworthy because the facts related in the 

confession are inconsistent with otherwise known or established 

facts.” See id. The exact opposite is the case with D.D.’s 

confessions, bolstering our confidence that the confessions are

trustworthy. 

¶43 The testimony at trial established that D.D. was 

repeatedly in “physical proximity with the child[ren]” during 

the times that he stated the touchings occurred. Both Brother and 

Sister-in-law described how D.D. would visit them periodically 

and spend the night at their house, and that they would do the 

same and spend the night at his house, tracking with D.D.’s 

narrative that the instances of abuse occurred “every time” he 

had come to their house or the family had visited his house. And 

Brother described how Niece was a notoriously deep sleeper, a 

fact which would be consistent with D.D. being able to touch 

Niece without waking her up. Furthermore, the details included 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 25 2021 UT App 100

in each confession are generally consistent with one another—a 

factor that other jurisdictions applying the trustworthiness 

standard often include alongside the four factors identified in 

Mauchley. See, e.g., State v. Dern, 362 P.3d 566, 583 (Kan. 2015) 

(stating that a “determination of trustworthiness will depend on 

the totality of the circumstances and may include a 

consideration” of several “nonexclusive factors,” including close 

variants of the factors identified in Mauchley, as well as “the 

number of times the confession was made and the consistency or 

lack thereof between different versions of the confession”); see 

also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973) (“The sheer 

number of independent confessions provided additional 

corroboration for each.”). These additional characteristics 

present across all of D.D.’s confessions are thus further indicia 

that the confessions were trustworthy. 

¶44 Based on the foregoing analysis considering each of the 

factors articulated in Mauchley, as well as the overarching 

direction to consider the “overall facts and circumstances related 

in the confession” and their correlation to “facts otherwise 

known or established,” see 2003 UT 10, ¶¶ 52–53 (cleaned up), 

we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in determining 

that all of D.D.’s confessions were trustworthy as a matter of 

law. 

II

¶45 D.D. next argues that, even if the confessions were 

sufficiently corroborated to be admitted into evidence, they were 

insufficient on their own to support a finding of delinquency 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Because in Utah corroborated 

confessions are sufficient to sustain a finding of delinquency on 

their own, we reject this argument and conclude that the juvenile 

court did not err in adjudicating D.D. delinquent. 

¶46 Even after a court has found that a defendant’s confession 

satisfies the trustworthiness standard and may be admitted into 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 26 2021 UT App 100

evidence, the State must still meet its burden of “establish[ing] 

all elements of the offense” in order to prove to the factfinder 

that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State 

v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ¶¶ 49, 61, 67 P.3d 477 (cleaned up). And 

although the various rules on admissibility “do not specify what 

evidence is required to sustain a conviction” on appeal, 

“sufficiency of the evidence rules do address what evidence is 

required.” Id. ¶ 71. “In order to overturn the juvenile court’s 

decision as to the sufficiency of the evidence, the result must be 

against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate 

court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been 

made.” In re J.H., 2012 UT App 195, ¶ 2, 283 P.3d 971 (per 

curiam) (cleaned up). This is because “[t]he juvenile court is in 

the best position to weigh conflicting testimony, to assess 

credibility, and from such determinations, render findings of 

fact.” Id. Furthermore, “corroboration of the confession itself is 

sufficient to sustain” a finding of delinquency on appeal, 

because a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may be 

supported by “independent evidence of the crime, a 

corroborated confession, or a combination of both.” See Mauchley, 

2003 UT 10, ¶¶ 61, 76 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 77–78 

(noting how “the corroboration rule” and its “trustworthiness 

standard pertains not just to the admissibility, but also to the 

sufficiency of the evidence”).

¶47 D.D. nevertheless argues generally that the confessions, 

on their own, are not enough to sustain the juvenile court’s 

finding of delinquency. In so doing, he cites Mauchley and 

largely parrots the same arguments he made with regard to the 

confessions’ trustworthiness, asserting again that the State was 

required to produce independent evidence before the 

confessions could be corroborated and relied upon as evidence 

in support of a delinquency finding. He also contends that the 

juvenile court “incorrectly coalesced” the corroboration analysis 

and its factfinding role. Here again, D.D. appears to 

misunderstand the holding of Mauchley; as noted, our supreme 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 27 2021 UT App 100

court made clear in that case that a corroborated confession is 

itself sufficient to sustain a finding of delinquency on appeal. See 

id. ¶¶ 61, 76. And in D.D.’s case there is not only one 

corroborated confession but multiple corroborated confessions, 

all of which are factually consistent with one another. 

¶48 As to his other argument regarding the juvenile court’s 

role as evidentiary gatekeeper and factfinder, D.D. is correct to 

note that, after a confession has been corroborated, the factfinder 

“may nevertheless still consider for itself the weight it wishes to 

give to the confession.” (Quoting Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ¶ 61.) 

But D.D. has not shown that the factfinder failed to do so in his 

case. The juvenile court initially ruled on the trustworthiness of 

the confessions during the trial and admitted them into 

evidence, then took the matter under advisement and issued its 

ruling a few weeks later finding D.D. delinquent beyond a 

reasonable doubt. On our review of the record, the court appears 

to have taken great care in its dual role as evidentiary gatekeeper 

during the trial, and then as factfinder from the conclusion of 

trial until the day it made its ruling. The court had the full ability 

to consider the weight it wished to give to D.D.’s multiple 

confessions in reaching its ultimate determination, and we see 

no indication in the record that it improperly conflated the 

corroboration analysis with its factual consideration of whether 

D.D. was delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt based on these 

corroborated confessions. 

¶49 Finally, D.D. asserts that, aside from these perceived 

errors on the part of the court, the State presented “insufficient

evidence . . . to find D.D. delinquent without entertaining a 

reasonable doubt of his guilt.” We disagree. 

¶50 The State put on evidence of at least six confessions, with 

varying degrees of detail given in each. In the Initial 

Confessions, D.D. described in painstaking detail how he would 

enter Niece’s room, make sure she was asleep, “bring her panties 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 28 2021 UT App 100

down to her knees,” “run his finger around her genitalia,” and 

sometimes “touch[] the inside of her genitalia.” And in the Police 

Station Confession, he gave similarly detailed admissions with 

respect to Niece, as well as describing how he had 

“inappropriately” “touched the tip of [Nephew’s] penis” during 

a diaper change, when Brother and Sister-in-law “weren’t 

looking.” In the Vehicle Confession, he again admitted that “he 

had inappropriately touched his niece.” In addition, the two Text 

Message Confessions contained several admissions that, when 

viewed in concert with the other confessions, further support a 

finding that the State met its evidentiary burden. Namely, D.D.’s 

statement in the First Text Message Confession, “If I would have 

known that all of this would have happened, I NEVER would 

have touched [Nephew] and [Niece] like that in the first place,” 

followed by similarly contrite statements in the Second Text 

Message Confession acknowledging that he had inappropriately 

“touched” Niece and Nephew. Finally, none of the details given 

in any of the confessions conflict with one another, and there are 

several common threads throughout, including that the 

touchings of Niece occurred at night while she was asleep, his 

detailing the parts of her body he touched, and his general 

admissions in each confession that he had inappropriately 

touched Niece, Nephew, or both. 

¶51 In sum, we cannot conclude that an adjudication of 

delinquency is “against the clear weight of the evidence,” and 

we do not possess a “firm and definite conviction that a mistake 

has been made” in this case. See In re J.H., 2012 UT App 195, ¶ 2 

(cleaned up). Accordingly, we reject D.D.’s argument that there 

was insufficent evidence to support a finding that he was 

delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt on both charged counts.

CONCLUSION

¶52 The juvenile court did not erroneously apply Mauchley in 

deciding that all of D.D.’s confessions were sufficiently 
In re D.D.

20200223-CA 29 2021 UT App 100

trustworthy to be corroborated and admitted into evidence. And 

based on these corroborated confessions, as well as other 

evidence in the record, there is sufficient evidence to support a 

finding of delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, 

we affirm the juvenile court’s ruling.