alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Peter M. ENOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-221.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 21, 1972.

Walter N. Colbath, Jr., Public Defender, and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Nelson E. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Kelly v. State, Fla.App.1971, 254 So.2d 22.

REED, C. J., and WALDEN and OWEN, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3343 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3343

 To prohibit the expenditure of Federal funds on metric system highway 
                    signing, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 21, 1993

 Mr. Williams introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Public Works and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit the expenditure of Federal funds on metric system highway 
                    signing, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. METRIC SYSTEM SIGNING.

    (a) Placement of Signs.--The Secretary of Transportation shall 
prohibit the expenditure of Federal funds, and shall not require any 
State to expend other funds, to construct, erect, or otherwise place 
any sign relating to any speed limit, distance, or other measurement on 
any highway if such sign establishes such speed limit, distance, or 
other measurement using the metric system unless Congress, after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, specifically authorizes such 
expenditures.
    (b) Modification of Signs.--The Secretary of Transportation shall 
prohibit the expenditure of Federal funds, and shall not require any 
State to expend other funds, to modify any sign relating to any speed 
limit, any distance, or any other measurement on any highway for the 
conversion of such sign to the metric system unless Congress, after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, specifically authorizes such 
expenditures.
    (c) Definitions.--For purposes of subsections (a) and (b), the 
following definitions apply:
            (1) Highway.--The term ``highway'' has the meaning such 
        term has under section 101 of title 23, United States Code.
            (2) Metric system.--The term ``metric system'' has the 
        meaning the term ``metric system of measurement'' has under 
        section 4 of the Metric Conversion Act of 1975 (15 U.S.C. 
        205c).
    (d) Nonapplicability to Puerto Rico.--This section shall not apply 
to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

                                 <all>
```
#### Willie MIMS, Sr., and Amanda Mims, individually, and as husband and wife, Appellants, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, Appellee.

No. 7212.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

March 10, 1967.

Rehearing Denied April 3, 1967.

Gardner M. Beckett, of Nelson, Beckett & Nelson, St. Petersburg, for appellants.

B. Edwin Johnson, Asst. City Atty., St Petersburg, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Kitchen v. City of Jacksonville (1947), 158 Fla. 621, 29 So.2d 441.

LILES, Acting C. J., and PIERCE and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
251 La. 1030

#### Elin PITRE, Sheriff of Evangeline Parish, and Oscar Sylvester, Jr. v. John B. TALLEY, J. B. Talley Company, Inc., and the Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd.

No. 49114.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 26, 1968.

In re: John B. Talley, J. B. Talley Company, Inc., and The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Vermilion. 205 So.2d 818; 205 So.2d 821.

Writ refused. There is no error in the judgment complained of.
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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1486

WILLIAM NORKUNAS,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

PARK ROAD SHOPPING CENTER, INCORPORATED,

 Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

District Judge. (3:10-cv-00210-FDW-DSC)

Submitted: June 8, 2012 Decided: July 6, 2012

Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas B. Bacon, THOMAS B. BACON, PA, Cooper City, Florida; 

Christopher D. Lane, Clemmons, North Carolina, for Appellant. G. 

Bryan Adams, III, Philip M. Van Hoy, VAN HOY, REUTLINGER, ADAMS 

& DUNN, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

William Norkunas appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing for lack of standing his claims under Title III of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 

(2006). We have carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the 

joint appendix and find no legal or factual basis to reverse the 

district court’s conclusion that Norkunas failed to plead facts 

sufficient to state an actual or imminent injury or to question

in this case the court’s refusal to broaden the bases for 

Article III standing. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons 

stated by the district court. Norkunas v. Park Road Shopping 

Ctr., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-00210-FDW-DSC (W.D.N.C. Apr. 15, 2011). 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>


March 15, 2005                                                      EXHIBIT 18-1

The Detroit Edison Company
2000 Second Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48226

Dear Sirs/Madams:


We have audited the consolidated financial statements of The Detroit Edison
Company and subsidiaries (the "Company") as of December 31, 2004 and 2003, and
for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2004, and the
related financial statement schedule, all included in the Company's Annual
Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004 to the Securities and
Exchange Commission and have issued our report thereon dated March 15, 2005,
which expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph
concerning the Company's change in the method of accounting for asset retirement
obligations in 2003. Note 14 to such financial statements contains a description
of your adoption during the year ended December 31, 2004 of the change in the
measurement date for the Company's pension and other postretirement benefit
plans from December 31 to November 30. In our judgment, such change is to an
alternative accounting principle that is preferable under the circumstances.

Yours truly,

/S/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Detroit, Michigan
#### The KEYES COMPANY, Appellant, v. F. L. FRAZIER, Jr., Dorothy B. Frazier, Robert M. Cornfeld, Judith Cornfeld and Filmore Investors Corp., Appellees.

No. 68-139.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Aug. 13, 1968.

Cassel & Benjamin, Miami, for appellant.

Zemel, Kaufman & Zemel, Walter E. Godbold, Miami Beach, for appellees.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and PEARSON and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, The Keyes Company, appeals from an order which dismissed its second amended complaint with prejudice.

Keyes had sued the various defendants, jointly and severally, on numerous theories of liability set forth in six separate counts in the amended complaint, alleging that they owed it, a real estate commission of $4,200 plus interest and costs.

We reverse the dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff’s claim for alleged damages as to defendants Fraziers. The second amended complaint alleged sufficient ultimate facts to state a cause of action for damages for breach of an express written *277agreement between the Fraziers and appellant. R.C.P. 1.110, 30 F.S.A.

We affirm the dismissal with prejudice of Keyes’ claim against the other defendants. These defendants were not parties to the express written contracts between the Fraziers and The Keyes Company. They never employed Keyes, or agreed to pay Keyes a commission for any services, actual, or implied. See 12 C.J.S. Brokers §§ 59 and 82, 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers § 164.

Briefly, the facts alleged are that Frazier, the landlord, leased certain property to Monique, Inc. with an option given to Monique to purchase. Keyes, under agreements in writing with Frazier was to receive a commission in the event the tenant, Monique, exercised its option and purchased the property. Frazier subsequently conveyed the property to Filmore Investors, who conveyed to Cornfeld, both conveyances “subject to” the lease. Monique exercised its option. Cornfeld then conveyed to Rosenberg and Lewis, officers of Monique. Keyes sued the defendants for its commission.

The original agreement between the landlord Frazier, and The Keyes Company for the payment of a commission in the event the tenant, Monique, Inc., exercised its option to purchase was not a covenant running with the land. It was a personal agreement and does not bind a subsequent purchaser of the property who takes it “subject to” the lease, to the payment of a real estate commission to persons with whom they have never employed or agreed to pay a commission. See Ernest A. Carrere’s Sons v. Levy, 191 So. 747 (La.App.1940); Blasser v. Cass, 158 Tex. 560, 314 S.W.2d 807 (1958); S. L. Nussbaum & Co. v. Atlantic Virginia Realty Corp., 206 Va. 673, 146 S.E.2d 205 (1966); and Restatement, Property § 537 (1944).

The order herein appealed is, therefore, affirmed as to all the defendants except the Fraziers. We reverse and remand for further action as to them.

It is so Ordered.
#### U-HAUL CO., INC., a corporation, et al., Appellants, v. Buster WALKER, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Janie A. Walker, Deceased, Appellee.

No. 72-298.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Oct. 4, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
EX10.2FISCAL2014Q1


Fiscal 2014 Variable Compensation Plan Payout Scale            Exhibit 10.2                


	
																		
	FY14 VCP 1st half and 2nd half

	First Half
	 
	 

	Bonus % Multiplier
	 
	Threshold:

	200
	







[*]
	 
	 
	•    Revenue
	 
	$[*] ([*]% of $[*]M)

	 
	 
	•    Pre-VCP EBITDA
	 
	$[*] ([*]% of $[*]M)

	[*]
	 
	% Multiplier
	Cumulative Bonus $
	Cumulative EBITDA $
	 
	Incremental Bonus $
	Incremental EBITDA $
	Bonus Ratio
	 

	[*]
	 
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 

	 
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 

	[*]
	 
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 
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	[*]
	[*]
	 

	 
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 

	0
	 
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 

	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 

	Pre-VCP EBITDA $M
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 

	Second Half
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 

	Bonus % Multiplier
	 
	Threshold:
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 

	200
	[*]
	 
	 
	•    Revenue
	 
	$[*] ([*]% of $[*]M)
	 

	 
	 
	•    Pre-VCP EBITDA
	 
	$[*] ([*]% of $[*]M)
	 

	[*]
	 
	% Multiplier
	Cumulative Bonus $
	Cumulative EBITDA $
	 
	Incremental Bonus $
	Incremental EBITDA $
	Bonus Ratio
	 

	 
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 
	[*]
	[*]
	[*]
	 

	[*]
	 
	[*]
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	Pre-VCP EBITDA $M
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 

	 




[*] CERTAIN INFORMATION IN THIS EXHIBIT HAS BEEN OMITTED AND FILED SEPARATELY WITH THE COMMISSION.  CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT HAS BEEN REQUESTED WITH RESPECT TO THE OMITTED PORTIONS.
### ORDER OF MULTIDISTRIC T LITIGATION PANEL

Order Pronounced February 13, 2015

THE MOTION TO STAY IN THE FO LLOWING CASE IS GRANTED:

15-0113 IN RE CHESAPEAKE BARNETT ROYALTY LITIGATION

Defendants’ Chesapeake Energy Corporation, et al.’s joint reque st for stay, filed February 11, 2015, is granted. All trial cour t proceedings and disc overy in the cases listed in Appendix A of the Motion to Transfer are stayed until further order of the MDL

Panel.
#### Horace WADE, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Correction, Respondent.

No. 70-821.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 31, 1972.

Walter N. Colbath, Jr., Public Defender, Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Andrew I. Friedrich, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before the court upon a late appeal granted to the appellant, Horace Wade, who, along with others, was charged and convicted of the offense of robbery and aggravated assault. Each was sentenced to life imprisonment for the robbery and to five years, concurrently, for aggravated assault.

The appellant asserts error directed to the ruling of the trial court permitting the state to submit evidence relating to a collateral crime, alleged to have been committed by the defendant. Under the evidence in this case, the trial judge was eminently correct under the authority of Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959).

Appellant further challenges the validity of his sentence imposed relating to the charge of aggravated assault. The record reveals that following the robbery, *379in which Wade employed the use of a pistol, he proceeded to pistol whip his victim about the head and then to kick him in the eye. Such conduct constituted the separate offense of aggravated assault. Kish v. State, 198 So.2d 639 (Fla.App.1967).

Wade further charges prejudicial error relating to the argument of the prosecuting attorney. The argument complained of was fair comment based upon the evidence in this case. One who commits crimes of violence may not in reason expect the prosecuting attorney to he complimentary in his address to the jury.

It follows that the judgments and sentences appealed from are affirmed.

WALDEN and MAGER, JJ„ and MELVIN, WOODROW, M., Associate Judge, concur.
EXHIBIT 32





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES -OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Shang Hide Consultants, Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Marty Weigel the Principal Executive and Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 (including subsections (a) (b) and (c) thereof), as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: November 18, 2011
By:
/s/ Marty WeigelMarty WeigelPrincipal Executive and Financial Officer
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 27, 2011.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

____________

NO. 14-10-00839-CR

____________

LIONEL JAMES BARRETT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 339th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1233841

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant entered a plea of guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. On 

August 17, 2010, the trial court sentenced appellant to confinement for 30 years in the 

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant filed a 

timely notice of appeal.

Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a brief in which she concludes the appeal is 

wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of 
2

the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See 

High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

A copy of counsel’s brief was delivered to appellant. Appellant was advised of the 

right to examine the appellate record and file a pro se response. See Stafford v. State, 813 

S.W.2d 503, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). As of this date, more than forty-five days has 

passed and no pro se response has been filed.

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and agree the appeal is 

wholly frivolous and without merit. Further, we find no reversible error in the record. 

We are not to address the merits of each claim raised in an Anders brief or a pro se response 

when we have determined there are no arguable grounds for review. See Bledsoe v. State, 

178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson and Christopher.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
#### Allan H. APPLESTEIN, Petitioner, v. Evalin GILBERT, Respondent.

No. 66-1077.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

March 14, 1967.

John W. Bellamy, North Miami, for petitioner.

David P. Catsman, Miami, for respondent.

Before HENDRY, C. J., and CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari denied. See Lewis v. Moody, Fla.App.1967, 195 So.2d 260, opinion filed February 21, 1967.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>  5 
                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                     12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                      DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                            614560
<SECURITIES>                      6
<RECEIVABLES>                     307928
<ALLOWANCES>                      0  
<INVENTORY>                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  922494
<PP&E>                            478360  
<DEPRECIATION>                    183870
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                    1230300
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>             7372
<BONDS>                           0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>             0
<PREFERRED>                       0
<COMMON>                          1416908
<OTHER-SE>                        (193980)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>      1230300
<SALES>                           0     
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  131756
<CGS>                             0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                     0  
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  73634  
<LOSS-PROVISION>                  0  
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                0  
<INCOME-PRETAX>                   58122   
<INCOME-TAX>                      20000    
<INCOME-CONTINUING>               38122        
<DISCONTINUED>                    0     
<EXTRAORDINARY>                   0   
<CHANGES>                         0   
<NET-INCOME>                      38122
<EPS-PRIMARY>                     .02  
<EPS-DILUTED>                     .02
         

</TABLE>
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

October 4, 2000 Session

ROBERT CARL COVERT v. KIMBERLY MARIE BRUGGER COVERT

 Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Blount County

No. S-5149

FILED DECEMBER 27, 2000

No. E2000-00864-COA-R3-CV 

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., concurring.

I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s judgment. I agree with the

majority that Father’s severance pay falls within the ambit of the language of Section 15 of the

parties’ MDA. Under the circumstances of this case, I do not believe that Father’s severance pay

should be considered as income for child support purposes. In this regard, I again agree with the

majority; however, I disagree with the suggestion in the majority opinion that even if the severance

pay were considered to be income, there would be a sufficient basis in law for ignoring it when

calculating child support. Cf. Jones v. Jones, 930 S.W.2d 541, 543-546 (Tenn. 1996). While I

believe the trial court reached the right result in setting child support, I disagree with that court’s

reasoning on the deviation issue.

Except as noted in this separate opinion, I concur in the majority opinion.

___________________________________ 

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE