J-A11033-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ELISABETTA ROBERTS

v.

LILY DEVELOPMENT, L.P. & LILY 

CONSTRUCTION, LLC AND LILY 

DEVELOPMENT BAINBRIDGE SOUTH 

COMPANY

APPEAL OF: LILY DEVELOPMENT 

BAINBRIDGE SOUTH COMPANY

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1494 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered June 21, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 160300651

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 3, 2022

Lily Development Bainbridge South Company (“Lily Development”) 

appeals from the order granting a motion to compel post-judgment discovery 

and ordering sanctions on Lily Development and its founder and member 

Robert Volpe. Lily Development argues the court abused its discretion by 

imposing sanctions without holding an evidentiary hearing or oral argument 

and by imposing sanctions against Volpe in his individual capacity. We affirm 

the order compelling discovery and imposing sanctions on Lily Development 

and reverse the order to the extent it imposes sanctions on Volpe.

In March 2016, Elisabetta Roberts filed a Complaint against Lily 

Development, L.P. In May 2018, the parties entered a stipulation dismissing 
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Lily Development, L.P. as a party and substituting Lily Development and Lilly 

Construction, LLC as parties to the action. Volpe is the founder and a member

of Lily Development. N.T., Aug. 15, 2018, at 83. In August 2018, a jury 

returned a verdict in Roberts’ favor on her negligence and nuisance claims. 

After post-trial motions, the court entered a judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict (“JNOV”) as to the negligence claim.1

In January 2019, Roberts filed a praecipe to enter judgment pursuant 

to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.4 and judgment was entered 

against Lily Development and Lily Construction, LLC in the amount of 

$16,062.63 each.

Roberts appealed the trial court’s order granting JNOV as to the 

negligence claim, and in March 2021, this Court reversed and remanded for 

the reinstatement of the verdict on the negligence claim in favor of Roberts.2 

The trial court entered judgment in favor of Roberts and against Lily 

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1 They jury also awarded $175,000 in punitive damages. In ruling on the posttrial motion, the court concluded that, unless Roberts consented to a reduction 

in the punitive damages award to $15,000 per defendant, the court would 

grant a new trial limited to punitive damages on the nuisance claim. Roberts 

filed a notice of election to accept punitive damage remittitur, reducing the 

punitive damages to $15,000 against each defendant.

2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Lily Construction, LLC’s petition for 

allowance of appeal in December 2021.
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Development in the amount of $291,062.62.3 Lily Development has not paid 

the judgment. 

In April 2019, Roberts sent Lily Development post-judgment 

interrogatories in aid of execution and post-judgment requests for production 

of documents. Lily Development did not respond. Roberts filed a motion to 

compel in June 2019. In August, the trial court issued an order granting 

Roberts’ motion to compel discovery responses and requiring Lily 

Development to file an answer to the post-trial interrogatories within 20 days. 

That same month, Lily Development sent Roberts incomplete responses to the 

interrogatories, which excluded relevant information. Roberts’ Second Motion 

to Compel, filed Sept. 16, 2019, at Exh. D. It provided no information prior to 

May 8, 2018, which is when Lily Development became a party to the litigation.

Id.

In August 2019, Roberts sent a notice of asset deposition to Lily 

Development, scheduling the deposition for September 17, 2019, and stating

Roberts would take the deposition of Volpe or “an alternative representative, 

in his/her capacity as an authorized member of [Lily Development].” Roberts’ 

Second Motion to Compel, filed Sept. 16, 2019, at Ex. G. Notice of Asset 

Deposition. Lily Development failed to fully respond to the discovery requests 

or produce Volpe or an alternative representative for deposition. In September 

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3 The court also entered judgment against Lily Construction, LLC, which 

satisfied its portion of the judgment. See Praecipe to Satisfy the Judgment, 

filed Mar. 29, 2019.
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2019, Roberts filed a second motion to compel discovery responses and a 

motion for sanctions. In October, the trial court granted the motion and 

ordered Lily Development to provide full and complete responses, without 

objections, to the discovery requests within 15 days, to produce Volpe or an 

alternative representative for an asset deposition within 15 days, and to pay 

sanctions in the amount of $250.00. Lily Development did not complete 

discovery, produce Volpe or an alternative representative for the deposition, 

or pay the sanction. 

Roberts filed a third motion to compel and motion for sanctions in March

2021. In June 2021, the trial court entered an order granting the motion and 

requiring Lily Development to produce an authorized representative for the 

purposes of discovery of assets within five days. It also imposed sanctions on 

Lily Development and Volpe in the amount of $1,000.00 for failing to comply 

with the court’s prior orders and $250.00 for every day after the five days 

where “they failed to produce an authorized representative for deposition.”

Order, filed June 21, 2021. Lily Development filed this appeal.

Lily Development raises the following issues:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing 

sanctions against Robert Volpe in his individual capacity 

where he was not a party in the case and no previous court 

order was directed at him?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing 

sanctions against [Lily Development] and Robert Volpe 

without holding an evidentiary hearing and/or oral 

argument on [Roberts’] Motion for Sanctions?
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3. Does the Court have jurisdiction to hear this appeal where 

the trial court’s Sanctions Order is related to [Roberts’]

discovery in aid of execution and the trial court has entered 

final judgment in the case?

Lily Development’s Br. at 3.

We will first address Lily Development’s third claim, as it impacts our 

jurisdiction to hear this appeal. In November 2021, this Court issued a rule to 

show cause “as to the finality or appealability of the order.” Order, filed Nov. 

4, 2021. We noted generally an order granting or denying discovery sanctions 

is an interlocutory order, not subject to an appeal. Id. Lily Development filed 

a response, arguing the order was appealable as a final order or, in the 

alternative, as a collateral order. We discharged the rule to show cause but 

advised the parties the Court may revisit the issue. 

Lily Development claims this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 

because the order deals with post-judgment discovery and judgment in the 

case already had been entered. Lily Development argues that although 

discovery orders are usually interlocutory and not appealable, this general rule 

should not apply here. It points out that the final order in this case had already 

been entered and the case arose from post-judgment discovery, where 

sanctions were imposed. Because it is post-judgment, there will be no final 

judgment from which to appeal. It further claims that if the order is not 

appealable as a final order, it is appealable as a collateral order, as it is 

separable from and collateral to the main cause of action, the right involved 

is the imposition of sanctions on a non-party, and there is no other opportunity 

for this Court to address the order.
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Roberts argues this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine this matter 

because it is not an appeal from a final order, it is not an interlocutory order 

as of right, and not a collateral order.

In Kine v. Forman, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quashed the 

appeal from an order requiring a party to answer post-judgment discovery. 

194 A.2d 175, 176-77 (Pa. 1963). There, the discovery request came after 

judgment on a note had been entered. In a footnote, the Court stated that 

“[h]ad the court, upon refusal of the party to answer the questions, imposed 

sanction, the order would have been final and appealable.” Id. at 177 n.2.

After remand, the case returned to this Court after the trial court had imposed 

sanctions for the defendant’s failure to comply with post-judgment discovery. 

Kine v. Forman, 209 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa.Super. 1965). We affirmed the order, 

without discussing whether this Court had jurisdiction. Id. at 2-4.

In Christian v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned 

Claims Plan, 686 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super. 1996), this Court addressed whether an 

order imposing sanctions under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4019(d)4

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4 Rule 4019(d) provides:

If at the trial or hearing, a party who has requested 

admissions as authorized by Rule 4014 proves the matter 

which the other party has failed to admit as requested, the 

court on motion may enter an order taxing as costs against 

the other party the reasonable expenses incurred in making 

such proof, including attorney’s fees, unless the court finds 

that

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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was appealable. Rule 4019(d) “allows the court to enter an order imposing 

sanctions where a party fails to make a requested admission under [Rule] 

4014.” Id. at 4. We noted that “[i]mplicit in subdivision (d) is the requirement 

that a party file a motion for sanctions only after a trial and entry of a verdict 

or decree,” as a party requesting admissions must prove the matters at trial. 

Id. We concluded the order denying sanctions was final and appealable. We

reasoned that “[b]ecause a motion pursuant to Rule 4019(d) occurs after the 

completion of the underlying action, by its very nature, it is essentially a 

discrete proceeding which ends upon the issuance of an Order granting or 

denying sanctions[.]” Id. We noted that at that time “litigation is . . .

concluded and the litigant is out-of-court” and “[t]herefore, the finality of the 

Order denying sanctions is determined not by the entry of judgment, but by 

the language and requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 4019(d).” Id.

Here, Roberts sought discovery under Rule 3117, which provides:

(a) Plaintiff at any time after judgment, before or after the 

issuance of a writ of execution, may, for the purpose of 

discovery of assets of the defendant, take the testimony of 

any person, including a defendant or a garnishee, upon oral 

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(1) the request was or could have been held objectionable 

pursuant to Rule 4014, or

(2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, 

or

(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to 

believe that he or she might prevail on the matter, or

(4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 4019(d).
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examination or written interrogatories as provided by the 

rules relating to Depositions and Discovery. The 

prothonotary of the county in which judgment has been 

entered or of the county within this Commonwealth where 

the deposition is to be taken, shall issue a subpoena to 

testify.

(b) All reasonable expenses in connection with the discovery 

may be taxed against the defendant as costs if it is 

ascertained by the discovery proceedings that the defendant 

has property liable to execution.

Pa.R.C.P. 3117.

Here, as in Christian, under the applicable Rule, the discovery would 

necessarily take place after judgment has been entered and the discrete 

proceeding ended with the issuance of the order imposing sanctions. Further, 

here, the trial court imposed sanctions for failure to comply with postjudgment discovery. The Supreme Court stated in Kine that where, as here, 

the court imposed sanctions for failure to comply with post-judgment 

discovery, it would result in an appealable order. We therefore conclude we 

have jurisdiction over this appeal and turn to the merits of the appeal.

In its first claim, Lily Development argues that this Court should reverse 

and vacate the trial court’s sanction order as to Volpe because the court 

abused its discretion by imposing sanctions against Volpe where he was not a 

party to the action and where the discovery and prior orders were not directed 

to Volpe. Lily Development claims the court references rules and cases that 

give it discretion to regulate the parties’ conduct during discovery but points

out that Volpe is not a party. It argues Volpe was the principal of Lily 

Development before its dissolution, but a corporate entity is separate from 
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individuals who have ownership in the entity. Lily Development argues that 

Volpe was not a party and was not served with a subpoena in his individual 

capacity and therefore the court abused its discretion in sanctioning him. 

Further, Lily Development notes that Roberts directed the discovery to Lily 

Development, not Volpe, and the orders directed Lily Development, not Volpe, 

to produce Volpe or an alternative for deposition. It reasons the trial court 

could not sanction Volpe where it had never directed him to take action. 

Roberts claims the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 

sanctions against Volpe, who is a principal, member, and corporate officer of 

Lily Development, claiming Volpe used his ownership in shell entities as a 

method to limit his liability. Roberts notes the asset discovery sought is the 

deposition of Volpe or an alternate representative and, as principal of Lily 

Development, Volpe failed to produce himself or an alternative representative. 

She argues that Volpe is a member, founder, corporate officer, and designated 

principal of Lily Development and he and Lily Development continually failed 

to comply with the orders directing compliance with discovery requests. 

Roberts points out that Volpe signed the verifications for pleadings and 

submissions. She argues that, because Lily Development seeks to protect and 

shield Volpe from individual liability, the only effective way to get compliance 

was to sanction both Lily Development and Volpe. She also claims Volpe 

committed fraud by requesting that Lily Development be substituted as a 
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party, even though it had been dissolved. She claims that, based on the facts 

of the case, it was proper to pierce the corporate veil.5

The trial court found it properly sanctioned both Lily Development and 

Volpe as its principal for failing to comply with the orders. The court noted it 

was undisputed that Volpe was a corporate officer and the designated principal 

of Lily Development and that Lily Development is a proper party in the action. 

It further found that Volpe and Lily Development willingly failed to comply with 

the prior orders mandating discovery, including the orders to produce Volpe 

or an alternate representative for a deposition. It found that Lily Development

and Volpe did not show any discernible efforts to comply with the discovery 

mandates. It therefore concluded that sanctions against both Lily 

Development and Volpe were appropriate and necessary to ensure 

compliance. The court further stated that sanctions upon both Volpe and Lily 

Development were necessary due to the severity of the discovery violations, 

reasoning the court faced extreme circumstances, as Lily Development

continued to disregard its orders and it was left with no option but to sanction 

appropriate individuals. 

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5 Roberts further claims, in a single paragraph in the brief, that Lily 

Development does not have standing to appeal the order on Volpe’s behalf. 

Roberts’ Br. at 21. However, Roberts did not cite to any authority for the 

contention and did not develop this argument in the brief, and we will not do 

so for her. See Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 371 (Pa.Super. 

2008) (en banc) (finding claim waived where appellant did not develop 

argument and noting this Court “is neither obliged, nor even particularly 

equipped, to develop an argument for a party”).
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“Generally, imposition of sanctions for a party’s failure to comply with

discovery is subject to the discretion of the trial court, as is the severity of the 

sanctions imposed.” Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132, 142 

(Pa.Super. 2010).

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4019(a) governs the imposition of 

sanctions for discovery violations and provides:

(a)(1) The court may, on motion, make an appropriate order 

if

(i) a party fails to serve answers, sufficient answers 

or objections to written interrogatories under Rule 

4005;

(ii) a corporation or other entity fails to make a 

designation under Rule 4004(a)(2) or 4007.1(e);

(iii) a person, including a person designated under 

Rule 4004(a)(2) to be examined, fails to answer, 

answer sufficiently or object to written interrogatories 

under Rule 4004;

(iv) a party or an officer, or managing agent of a party 

or a person designated under Rule 4007.1(e) to be 

examined, after notice under Rule 4007.1, fails to 

appear before the person who is to take the 

deposition;

(v) a party or deponent, or an officer or managing 

agent of a party or deponent, induces a witness not to 

appear;

(vi) a party or an officer, or managing agent of a party 

refuses or induces a person to refuse to obey an order 

of court made under subdivision (b) of this rule 

requiring such party or person to be sworn or to 

answer designated questions or an order of court 

made under Rule 4010;

(vii) a party, in response to a request for production 

or inspection made under Rule 4009, fails to respond 
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that inspection will be permitted as requested or fails 

to permit inspection as requested;

(viii) a party or person otherwise fails to make 

discovery or to obey an order of court respecting 

discovery.

Pa.R.C.P. 4019(a).

Rule 4019 provides for the imposition of sanctions where a party fails to 

comply with discovery requests. Volpe was not a party to the action. Further,

although Rule 4019(a)(iii) mentions a “person,” that reference is to a person 

served with discovery requests. See Pa.R.C.P. 4004(a)(2) (“interrogatories 

shall contain a notice stating . . . the name and address of each person to be 

examined if known, and, if the name is not known, a general description 

sufficient to identify each person to be examined or the particular class or 

group to which each person belongs . . . .”). Roberts directed the discovery 

requests and subpoena to Lily Development, not Volpe, and the requested 

deposition was to be of Volpe or an alternate representative.

The court provided justification for the imposition of sanctions, but it 

failed to justify the imposition of sanctions on Volpe where the court had not 

ordered that he, in his individual capacity, complete any task. See Order, Oct. 

21, 2019 (ordering Lily Development to “provide full and complete responses”

to discovery and to “produce Mr. Robert Volpe, or an alternate representative, 

in his/her capacity as authorized member of” Lily Development); Order, Aug. 

1, 2019 (ordering Lily Development to answer the discovery). Although 

Roberts argues that the court could properly sanction Volpe by piercing the 

corporate veil, the trial court did not find that the veil could be pierced prior 
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to imposing sanctions. We conclude that, because Volpe was not a party to 

the case and no court order directed his individual compliance prior to the 

order imposing sanctions, the court erred. Jones v. Faust, 852 A.2d 1201, 

1204 (Pa.Super. 2004) (finding sanctions not proper where imposed on doctor 

for violating order that did not mention him).

In its second issue, Lily Development argues the trial court abused its 

discretion by granting the motion and imposing sanctions without holding oral 

argument or an evidentiary hearing. Lily Development cites Rule 208.3 and 

local Rule 208.2, which, it claims, require a court to have argument or to 

develop the record on contested discovery motions. It argues its response 

raised issues of fact. It further claims that court-ordered Covid protocols 

required the trial court to set a hearing date. It argues the court abused its 

discretion by granting the motion and imposing sanctions without a hearing.

A party waives any issue not included in its concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

Lily Development raised the following issues in its concise statement:

1. There is no basis to impose sanctions against Robert 

Volpe individually, as [Roberts’] March 18, 2021 motion to 

compel does not request sanctions against Mr. Volpe in his 

individual capacity, nor provide any authority in support of 

such sanctions.

2. The Court[] erred in imposing sanctions against Robert 

Volpe in his individual capacity, as Mr. Volpe is not a party 

to this case.

3. The Court erred in granting [Roberts’] motion to compel 

and for sanctions where [Lily Development] provided full 
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and complete responses to [Roberts’] discovery in aid of 

execution.

4. The Court erred in granting [Roberts’] motion to compel 

and for sanctions where [Lily Development] provided 

[Roberts] with documentation demonstrating that [Lily 

Development] was a single-purpose entity that developed 

an[d] sold its single asset—the real property located at 734-

38 Bainbridge Street, Philadelphia, PA—in November 2017, 

before [Lily Development] was made a party to this case.

5. The Court erred in compelling post-judgment discovery 

from [Lily Development], an entity that has wound down its 

affairs and formally dissolved.

6. The Court erred in imposing sanctions on [Lily 

Development], an entity that has wound down its affairs and 

formally dissolved.

7. The Court erred in compelling post-judgment discovery 

from [Lily Development] concerning [Lily Development’s] 

affairs before being a party to this action.

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, filed Aug. 12, 2021.

Lily Development did not include in this statement a challenge to the 

court’s failure to hold a hearing. It therefore waived the claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii). Accordingly, we affirm the ordering directing Lily 

Development to respond to the discovery requests and produce a

representative for an asset deposition and imposing sanctions on Lily 

Development. However, we reverse the order to the extent it imposes

sanctions on Volpe in his individual capacity. 

Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/03/2022