Filed 1/19/22 In re Matthew B. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re MATTHEW B. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY 

SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F083035

(Super. Ct. Nos. JVDP-20-000179, 

JVDP-20-000180 & JVDP-20-000181)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ann Q. 

Ameral, Judge.

Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Sophia Ahmad, Deputy County Counsel, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and DeSantos, J.
2.

Dependency jurisdiction was taken over mother C.S.’s four children, then

15-year-old Matthew B., then 11-year-old M.B., then two-year-old M.S.,

1 and then

nine-month-old Joshua S. (Welf. & Inst. Code,

2 § 300, subd. (b)(1)). At the time of the 

disposition hearing, mother was incarcerated, and the court declined to order 

reunification services based on its finding such services would be detrimental to the 

children pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1).3 A six-month review hearing was 

set, as Joshua’s father was granted reunification services, and Matthew and M.B.’s 

father’s whereabouts were then unknown. Prior to the hearing, the Stanislaus County 

Community Services Agency (agency) recommended that a section 366.26 hearing be set 

for Matthew and M.B. and that reunification services be continued as to Joshua’s father. 

Mother filed a section 388 petition prior to the hearing requesting the court order her to 

be provided with reunification services and that the children be returned to her. The court 

conducted a hearing to determine whether mother had made the requisite showing 

affording her an evidentiary hearing on her petition. Following the hearing, the court 

denied mother’s petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, mother 

contends the court erred by summarily denying her petition, as to Joshua only. Finding 

no error, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On or about August 29, 2020, law enforcement stopped mother for driving with 

Joshua and M.S. without having them secured in car seats. As a result, mother arranged 

for her friend to care for the children. Upon driving mother back to her residence, 

1 At the dispositional hearing, a section 366.26 hearing was set for M.S., putting 

M.S. on a different procedural trajectory to the other children. M.S. is not a subject of 

this appeal. 

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

3 Section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) provides that when a parent is incarcerated, the 

juvenile court “shall order reasonable services unless the court determines, by clear and 

convincing evidence, those services would be detrimental to the child.”
3.

mother’s friend observed the front door of the residence was open, old food on the floor, 

spoiled milk, dirty diapers with feces in the bathroom sink within reach of M.S., minimal 

food, and a strong odor. Mother’s friend also observed mother was acting strangely and 

may have been under the influence of methamphetamine. The friend reported to law 

enforcement the condition of the home. Law enforcement subsequently made a referral 

to the agency based on their observations of the condition of the home and that mother 

appeared to be under the influence of “something.” 

Two days later, the emergency response social worker visited mother’s home and 

observed it to be clean with no visible hazardous conditions, though the couch was on the 

public sidewalk outside of the home, and mother had abrasions on her forehead, open 

wounds on her lips, and severe bruising near both of her calves. The social worker 

observed that mother appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine based on 

her observations that mother had an “inability to stay on topic, mood swings, paranoia, 

erratic behaviors, and disheveled appearance” and made unconnected and tangential 

statements. The social worker also believed that mother seemed to be more concerned 

about the cost of her traffic ticket than with the safety of the children. Mother stated her 

ticket was for “erratic and loopy driving” and justified not having car seats for the 

children because they were “dirty.” Mother told the social worker she was injured 

because she had been in a car accident while under the influence of Vicodin. 

Mother reported she was not taking medication for any mental health diagnosis but 

had previously reported during past child welfare referrals she had been diagnosed with 

posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety. Mother agreed to drug 

test, but after 10 minutes, stated she could not urinate because of her car accident and did 

not agree to take a hair follicle test. Mother called the maternal grandfather, who 

subsequently arrived at the residence and agreed to be interviewed. 

The maternal grandfather told the social worker he was concerned about the 

children being in mother’s care and suspected she was using drugs again. He reported 
4.

mother does well for short periods of time but then goes back to her “old ways,” which he 

described as drug use, bad choices in men, and poor decision-making. A few days prior, 

he had given mother supplies, which she in turn sold for “dope,” and she was unable to 

hold a coherent conversation with him. He stated that mother self-medicated with 

methamphetamine and did not take her bipolar medication. 

Mother did not sign the safety plan the social worker created, which stated the 

children would stay with her friend until the Team Decision Making (TDM) meeting, but 

did agree to participate in the TDM meeting. 

The social worker visited the home of Joshua’s older half siblings, Matthew and 

M.B., where they lived with a relative caregiver. Matthew and M.B. were in a legal 

guardianship with the maternal grandfather from 2016 to mid-2019, and had been in their 

current home for approximately a month and a half. Matthew and M.B. reported negative 

feelings toward mother. Matthew reported mother would not “recover” and M.B. 

reported mother was “better off homeless” because she took advantage of the home 

where she lived. M.B. expressed she wanted a stay away order from mother. Matthew 

reported not feeling safe unless the agency removed them from mother’s care. 

At the TDM meeting on September 1, 2020, it was observed that mother lacked 

insight and minimized the agency’s safety concerns. Mother “presented with an inability 

to emotionally regulate and continued to interrupt, had labile mood swings, and did not 

sound entirely coherent throughout the meeting.” Mother also blurted out random 

statements and appeared to be having conversations with herself. The social worker 

noted it was “difficult to have a meaningful discussion regarding the safety of her 

children.” 

Later that day, the social worker spoke with Joshua’s father who expressed he 

wanted to be part of Joshua’s life. He reported mother had told him a few days prior that 

she had relapsed on methamphetamine. He further reported mother had told him two to 
5.

three months prior that she had crushed an adult melatonin pill, dissolved it in water, and 

forced Joshua to drink it because he was not sleeping. 

The children were placed into protective custody. When the social worker served 

mother with the warrant, she blamed Joshua’s father for the removal and “displayed 

irregular, emotional mood swings, a flat affect, and disconnected [sic].” Joshua and M.S. 

were placed in foster care, and Matthew and M.B. were to stay with their relative 

caregiver.

Mother had a history of child welfare referrals dating back to 2010. In December 

2010, a mandated reporting party reported that Matthew, then five years old, was 

wandering around an apartment complex at night with no shoes in 54 degree weather. 

Law enforcement was dispatched and eventually mother arrived at the apartment; she 

stated she had gone out to get food for Matthew because he “had been giving her 

trouble,” but the officer smelled alcohol on her breath and observed she had tall cans of 

beer and a pack of cigarettes in a brown paper bag. The maternal grandfather told law 

enforcement he would stay with her that night though the referral for general neglect was 

substantiated. 

In April 2016, mother told a mandated reporting party that she was prostituting 

herself out of her home, at times with her children present. Mother reported that she 

screened the men, and they were safe. Mother also reported hearing voices. When the 

agency investigated the referral, mother “appear[ed] to flip in and out of different 

personalities” during the conversation and reported “people take care of her and not 

everybody can see them.” The referral was evaluated out. 

In April 2017, the agency received a referral from a mandated reporting party 

reporting that mother was schizophrenic and off medication. Mother was observed 

digging in the trash and yelling, saying she was going to be evicted. The referral for 

general neglect was substantiated. 
6.

In May 2017, M.B., then eight years old, reported mother forced her to “smoke 

from a tube and ball at the end” and was exposed to mother doing “sexual stuff.” M.B. 

reported mother “forced” her and Matthew to run away three times. The referral for 

general neglect was substantiated.

In March 2018, a mandated reporting party reported that Matthew disclosed when 

he was about 11 years old, mother would “drug” him to make him very sleepy and “make 

him have sex with prostitutes.” The referral was substantiated for general neglect and 

deemed inconclusive for exploitation. 

In September 2018, a mandated reporting party reported mother had just given 

birth to M.S. and “hospital staff [were] having issues with [mother] due to her erratic 

behavior.” Mother initially did not allow anyone to touch the baby until after having 

several conversations with hospital social workers. It was reported that mother was 

noncompliant with her bipolar medication. It was further reported mother tested positive 

for methamphetamine, heroin, and THC during early prenatal care but went into rehab 

and tested negative at delivery. The referral for general neglect was deemed 

inconclusive. 

In December 2018, mother was detained by the police for active warrants for 

robbery and stolen property. A petition was filed alleging then three-month-old M.S. 

came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1)

(failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support) due to mother’s substance abuse 

history, mental health issues, and the arrest for outstanding warrants that left M.S. 

without a caregiver. Mother was granted reunification services, successfully reunified 

with M.S., and dependency was dismissed with sole legal and physical custody being 

awarded to mother. 

In June 2020, a mandated reporting party reported then 11-year-old M.B. called 

them because mother had kicked her out of the car, and she was stuck by herself. M.B. 

had to call her grandfather to pick her up. M.B. reported earlier in the day mother tried to 
7.

get her to strip for her dad’s friend because they needed money, but she would not do it. 

M.B. was so upset that the mandated reporting party called 911 so an officer could go 

check on her. The referral was substantiated for general neglect and deemed inconclusive 

for exploitation.

Mother had a criminal history dating back to 2000, including various misdemeanor 

offenses such as drug possession, driving under the influence, petty theft, and elder 

cruelty.

On September 3, 2020, the agency filed a petition on behalf of Joshua, Matthew, 

M.B., and M.S., contending they came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect). It was alleged the children had 

suffered or were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness resulting 

from mother’s inability to protect them due to substance abuse issues, mental health 

issues, domestic violence issues with Joshua’s father, and failure to provide an 

appropriate home. As to Joshua, Matthew, and M.B., it was further alleged they came 

within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j) (abuse of 

sibling) based on mother’s previous dependency case involving M.S.

At the detention hearing on September 4, 2020, the juvenile court ordered the 

children detained from mother. That day, the social worker provided mother with 

referrals for parenting, individual counseling, and clinical assessments for mental health 

and medication and substance use disorders. 

The agency’s combined jurisdictional/dispositional report contained a social 

history of mother that was conducted in January 2019. Mother reported first using 

methamphetamine when she was 17 years old. She had previously undergone a mental 

health assessment, and the clinician informed her she had PTSD and bipolar disorder that 

may be substance induced. Mother further reported she was prescribed medication for 

depression through another clinician.
8.

After the detention hearing, mother did not attempt to engage in the referred 

services and did not schedule visitation with the children. On October 1, 2020, mother 

was arrested and placed into custody. Mother had reportedly prevented a neighbor from 

leaving her home for a period of six hours, during which she threw things at him and 

struck him with a broom on the head approximately 12 times. She also reportedly 

damaged plants in the neighbor’s front yard. Mother was charged with assault with a 

deadly weapon, false imprisonment, elder abuse, and vandalism. 

M.S. and Joshua had been initially placed with the same caregivers M.S. lived 

with during his previous dependency case, and the caregivers noticed a marked difference 

in M.S. The caregivers reported M.S. shook when his diaper was changed, panicked 

when adult males were near or when anyone left the room, and frequently flinched. The 

social worker also noticed a difference in M.S. The social worker observed both M.S. 

and Joshua cried when they were looked at or if they looked at the social worker. 

Matthew and M.B. reported they were happy with their current caregivers and continued 

expressing negative feelings toward mother. Before the combined jurisdictional/

dispositional hearing, Joshua and M.S. were placed together with Matthew and M.B. with 

their relative caregivers. 

The combined contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was conducted on 

November 19, 2020. The juvenile court found the petition true and adjudged the children 

dependents of the court. Joshua’s father was ordered to receive reunification services, 

and mother was denied services because the court concluded that mother receiving 

services would be detrimental to the children pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision 

(e)(1). In support of its conclusion, the court noted Matthew and M.B. did not want a 

relationship with mother and that none of the children appeared to have a strong bond 

with her. The court further noted the length of mother’s sentence was unknown and the 

nature of the charges were concerning. The court went on to say there did not appear to 

be any detriment to the children if services were not offered to mother as Joshua and 
9.

M.S., based on their actions, appeared to have been “severely traumatized” and the older 

children did not want to see mother. Finally, the court stated there had been no evidence 

shown that providing reunification services to mother would be in the children’s best 

interest. At the time of the hearing, Matthew and M.B.’s father’s whereabouts were 

unknown. As for M.S., the court set a section 366.26 hearing. 

Mother appealed the dispositional order denying her services arguing that, as a 

matter of law, the bypass provision of section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) did not apply to 

her because she had not been convicted of a crime. In In re Joshua S. (June 14, 2021, 

F082100) [2021 Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 3854, review denied Sept. 29, 2021, S269868], 

this court affirmed the judgment, finding section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) did not exclude 

parents who had not been convicted but were incarcerated awaiting trial. 

The agency’s six-month status review report dated April 28, 2021, indicated the 

children were all doing well in their placement. The care provider wished to adopt 

Matthew and M.B. and Joshua as well, if he were unable to reunify with his father. 

Joshua’s father was actively participating in and making progress with his reunification 

services. The social worker recommended that Matthew and M.B. continue as 

dependents of the court with a permanent plan of adoption with their current caregivers 

and to set a section 366.26 hearing. As to Joshua, it was recommended that his father’s

reunification services be continued and the court grant the agency discretion to begin 

overnight visits that may lead to a trial visit. The six-month review hearing was 

originally scheduled for May 10, 2021, but was continued a number of times because 

Matthew and M.B.’s father had been located and needed time to discuss matters with his 

attorney. 

On June 10, 2021, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting the court to 

“reinstate reunification services and return the children to [her] care.” Mother alleged she 

had been released from custody, had returned to her two-bedroom duplex where she 

resided alone, had been free from methamphetamine for eight months, attended regular 
10.

AA/NA meetings, and had sufficient income to care for the children. She alleged the 

order was in the best interest of the children because: “These children are still in 

[reunification] with their fathers with a goal of return[ing] home. Having a mother to 

share custody, co-parent and share in the upbringing is best for any child.” The court 

ordered a hearing on whether it should grant or deny an evidentiary hearing on the 

petition. 

The hearing on whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on mother’s petition was 

held on June 28, 2021, which was also the date set for the six-month review pretrial 

hearing. M.B., who was present at the hearing, told the court she did not want to reunify 

with mother because she did not “want to have to go through another relapse with her.” 

She went on to say that she and Matthew did not want to get hurt again by going through 

another dependency case and risk not being able to get placed with their current care 

providers or be split up. She concluded by saying, “That is not a risk me and my brother 

want to take.” 

Mother’s counsel argued that because the recommendation was for Joshua’s father 

to receive six more months of services, there was “no reason not to” give services to 

mother as well. Mother’s counsel stated mother was actively working on recovery and 

participating in services. He argued it was in Joshua’s best interest because the “only 

reason” she was not granted reunification services was because she was incarcerated and 

she has since been released. Mother’s counsel similarly argued that if the court were to 

order Matthew and M.B.’s father4to be provided reunification services, she should be 

provided with them as well. 

The juvenile court denied an evidentiary hearing on mother’s petition, concluding 

mother’s request was not in the children’s best interests. In so ruling, the court stated, as 

4 Matthew and M.B.’s father was not requesting reunification services, only 

visitation.
11.

for Matthew and M.B.: “I don’t see where reinstating reunification services or return of 

custody of Matthew or M[.B.] to the care of [] mother would be in the children’s best 

interest. They have been clear that they do not wish to return home because they have 

been, I think, disappointed too many times, and I don’t see that it is in their best interest 

to require them to wait for permanency when there is someone who is willing to adopt 

them and they wish to be adopted.” As for Joshua, the court stated: “[S]ervices certainly 

can be limited to a period of six months. Given the posture of this case, [Joshua] doesn’t 

really have a relationship with [] mother and he has been in care since September 1st of 

2020, so going on nine months already, which is almost half of his little life.”5

Mother appealed the court’s denial of her section 388 petition as to Joshua.

DISCUSSION

Mother contends the court erred by denying her section 388 petition without 

holding an evidentiary hearing as to Joshua. We disagree. 

A parent petitioning the court to modify a prior dependency order pursuant to 

section 388 must show the existence of changed circumstances or new evidence and that 

the proposed change is in the best interest of the child. (§ 388; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 

7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) A parent need only make a prima facie showing of these elements to 

trigger the right to a hearing, and courts must liberally construe a section 388 petition in 

favor of its sufficiency. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309–310.) “However, if 

the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of 

changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of 

the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition. [Citations.] The prima facie 

requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at 

the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.” (In re Zachary G. (1999) 

5 At the six-month review hearing held on July 9, 2021, as to Matthew and M.B., 

the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing, and as to Joshua, continued reunification 

services for Joshua’s father and set a 12-month review hearing. 
12.

77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) In determining whether the petition makes the necessary 

showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. 

(In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258.) 

We review the juvenile court’s summary denial of mother’s section 388 petition 

for abuse of discretion. (In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079.) The denial 

must be upheld unless we can determine from the record that the juvenile court’s decision 

“exceeded the bounds of reason by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd 

determination.” (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 642.) When two or more 

inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we have no authority to substitute 

our decision for that of the juvenile court. (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 

1497, 1505.)

Here, mother alleged circumstances had changed in that she: (1) had been 

released from custody; (2) had returned to her duplex and resided alone; (3) had been free 

from methamphetamine use for eight months; (4) attended “regular AA/NA meetings”; 

and (5) had “sufficient income to care for” the children. As for how the order was in the 

children’s best interests, she alleged: “These children are still in [reunification] with their 

fathers with a goal of return[ing] home. Having a mother to share custody, co-parent and 

share in the upbringing is best for any child.” 

Mother contends these facts constituted a prima facie showing sufficient to trigger 

an evidentiary hearing on her petition as to Joshua. In particular, she argues the facts that 

she had been methamphetamine-free for eight months, was attending AA/NA meetings, 

and had been released from custody were sufficient because the reason her children were 

initially removed was her “drug use” and she was denied reunification services because 

she was incarcerated with an unknown release date. As a threshold matter, mother’s

characterization of the reason for the children’s removal and the reason she was denied 

reunification services is an over-simplification of the record and ignores pertinent facts. 
13.

The record, read in its totality, demonstrates the children were removed from 

mother’s care not simply for “drug use,” as she suggests, but for longstanding substance 

abuse which put the children at risk of physical harm. The record also demonstrates 

several other reasons for removal, including mental health issues, domestic violence 

issues, home safety issues, as well as a general disregard for the children’s safety as 

evidenced in part by her failure to secure the children in car seats and subsequent 

ambivalence about the failure. Mother’s assertion she was denied reunification services 

only because she was incarcerated is similarly not entirely accurate. Mother’s 

incarceration simply triggered the court’s consideration of whether services would be 

detrimental to the children. The court ultimately denied services to mother based on its 

finding the services would be detrimental to them, a finding mother notably did not 

challenge on appeal for sufficiency of the evidence. 

This is all to say mother’s allegations that she had been methamphetamine free for 

a period of eight months and had been released from custody were not compelling 

reasons that the proposed order was in the children’s best interests. Mother’s allegation 

she had been sober for a period of eight months, several of which she was in custody, 

carried little weight in light of her long history of substance abuse and multiple periods of 

sobriety and relapse. Mother had reported using methamphetamine since she was 

17 years old. At the time the dependency proceedings were initiated, she was 39 years 

old, which indicates she has struggled for over half of her life and the entirety of her 

adulthood with her addiction. Her relapses had a demonstrable negative effect on her 

children, as evidenced by her history of child welfare referrals, the facts leading to the 

present case, and M.B.’s comments at the section 388 hearing that she did not want to go 

through “another relapse” with mother and she and Matthew did not want to get hurt 

“again.” Further, as the agency points out, mother made no allegations as to whether she 

had begun to or was willing to address her mental health issues or demonstrated disregard 

for the children’s physical safety. 
14.

Further, mother’s allegation that “[h]aving a mother to share custody, co-parent 

and share in the upbringing is best for any child” was a general statement, insufficient to 

make a prima facie showing that her proposed order was in the best interests of the 

children. (See In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 192 [“The presumption 

favoring natural parents by itself does not satisfy the best interests prong of section 

388.”].) Mother made no particularized showing that Joshua would receive benefit from 

her receiving services. Based on the record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude 

it was unlikely she would have succeeded in reunifying with Joshua. Mother had made 

no effort to engage with any services to which she was referred prior to her incarceration. 

She made no effort to visit with the children at any point during the proceedings until 

after she was released—a period of almost nine months. Mother concedes on appeal this 

failure “did not weigh in her favor” as to whether her request was in Joshua’s best 

interests. She further concedes the fact that Joshua had been out of mother’s care for a 

period of 10 months also weighed against the court granting the petition. 

Nonetheless, mother argues she sufficiently alleged her request was in Joshua’s 

best interest because Joshua’s father was likely going to have his reunification services 

continued, summarizing her position by stating “because [m]other’s contact with [Joshua] 

was not detrimental [based on the posture of the case], it was beneficial.” We disagree. 

Mother’s assertion that she sufficiently showed her proposed order was in Joshua’s best 

interest by showing Joshua’s father’s reunification services were likely to be continued 

does not persuade us the juvenile court abused its discretion. To support her position, 

mother relies on two passages from In re Liam L. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1068 (Liam 

L.), where the court noted that the “ ‘ “finding of detriment standard” and the “best 

interest standard” ’ ” (id. at p. 1084) are “ ‘basically two sides of the same coin’ ” and 

that “ ‘[w]hat is in the best interests of the child is essentially the same as that which is 

not detrimental to the child.’ ” (id. at p. 1085). Mother takes the Liam L. passages out of 

context, and as such, her reliance on the case is misplaced. 
15.

The passages cited by mother, read in context, are limited to the specific issue 

before the court in Liam L.,—the showing required for a noncustodial parent’s 

postdisposition request for custody. When a noncustodial parent requests custody of a 

dependent child at the time of disposition, section 361.2 mandates the child be placed 

with the noncustodial parent unless the opposing party can show such placement would 

be detrimental to the child. Applying this concept to a postdisposition request for 

custody, the Liam L. court held that, in order to maintain consistency with section 361.2,

“[a] noncustodial parent ... makes a prima facie case of best interests, under section 388, 

when the noncustodial parent requests custody of the dependent child postdisposition.” 

(Liam L., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085.) The Liam L. court explained, “[t]his 

minimal burden reflects the noncustodial parents’ constitutional right to care and custody 

of the child and the law’s presumption that the child should be placed with his or her 

parents whenever possible.” (Ibid.) The Liam L. court went on to explain that in that 

specific context, the opposing party has the burden to show detriment based on the 

requirements of section 361.2, subdivision (a). (Liam L., at pp. 1085‒1086.) The 

Liam L. court simply extended the presumption that placement with a noncustodial parent 

would be in the child’s best interest to postdisposition requests for custody. Notably, it 

expressly did not consider whether the presumption also applied to noncustodial parents 

who had participated in reunification services, and whose services had been terminated 

due to failure to make progress. (Id. at p. 1086.) 

As such, we find Liam L.’s analysis as limited to its facts and do not find that 

Liam L. stands for the proposition that mother is using it to support—that she was only 

required to show Joshua’s father’s services would be continued in order to show her 

receiving services was in Joshua’s best interests. Mother is not similarly situated to the 

parent in Liam L.; she was not a noncustodial parent at the time of removal and, thus, was 

not entitled to the presumption of section 361.2 that placement with her was in the 

children’s best interests. Rather, she was a custodial, offending parent, and the court had 
16.

already made a detriment finding at the dispositional hearing to justify not ordering 

mother be provided initially with reunification services. As we have stated, mother 

notably did not challenge the trial court’s detriment finding at the time of the disposition 

hearing.6 

In sum, we disagree with mother’s claim she was only required to show that 

Joshua’s father’s services would be continued to show her proposed order was in 

Joshua’s best interest. Further supporting our position is that mother cites no authority to 

support the proposition that a court is required to find services for one parent are in the 

best interest of the child, simply because the other parent is receiving services. To the 

contrary, in cases where a parent has failed to participate in services or make progress 

toward reunification, appellate courts have concluded juvenile courts are not precluded 

from terminating that parent’s services even though the other parent continued to receive 

services. (See In re Jesse W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 49, 64 [“[E]ven when a section 

366.26 hearing is not set, the termination of services previously not utilized or wanted is 

a step toward eliminating uncertainty in the lives of very young children and ultimately 

achieving the stability and permanence the Legislature sought to provide for them.”]; see 

also In re Katelynn Y. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 871.) 

For the reasons we have already discussed, the court did not abuse its discretion by 

concluding mother had not made a prima facie showing that her proposed order was in 

6 As the appellate court stated in In re Jonathan P. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1240: 

“The ‘finding of detriment standard’ and the ‘best interest standard’ are not legal 

equivalents. In general, under the detriment standard, ... the party who is opposing 

placement has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child will be 

harmed if the nonoffending parent is given custody. In contrast, under the section 388 

‘best interest standard,’ the parent seeking to modify the placement order shoulders the 

burden to prove both a change in circumstances and that the modification would be in the 

best interest of the minor.” (Id. at p. 1256.) The Liam L. court agreed that the 

Jonathan P. court was “correct as a general matter,” though it did not find the distinction 

apt “in the context of a noncustodial parent’s request for custody of his or her dependent 

child postdisposition.” (Liam L., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085.)
17.

Joshua’s best interests and, accordingly, summarily denying her section 388 petition. In 

the context of the entire factual and procedural history of the case—the reasons for initial 

removal; mother’s lack of effort before and after her incarceration; the negative effect 

mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues had on her older children and the risk 

they posed to young Joshua; Matthew and M.B.’s expressed desire not to reunify with 

mother; mother’s failure to address her mental health issues and disregard for the 

children’s safety in her section 388 petition; and Joshua not having seen mother for a 

period equal to approximately half his life—the juvenile court could reasonably conclude 

ordering mother to receive reunification services would have had a negative effect on the 

stability Joshua was enjoying at the time mother brought her petition and, thus, was not in 

his best interests. 

We find no error.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s June 28, 2021 order denying mother’s section 388 petition is 

affirmed.