RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1531-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSE CARRANZA, a/k/a

JOSE LACHIRA,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Argued October 14, 2021 – Decided November 1, 2021

Before Judges Whipple and Geiger.

On appeal from the State of New Jersey, Law Division, 

Essex County, Indictment No. 08-09-2688.

Jose Carranza, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney 

General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex 

County Prosecutor, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat, of 

counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

Internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Jose Carranza appeals from the June 5, 2019, denial of his 

second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant filed his second 

PCR petition in May 2019, more than four years since the court denied his first 

PCR petition in October 2014. Because Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) imposes a one-year 

limitation on second and subsequent PCR petitions, we affirm. 

Defendant raised the following points in this appeal.

POINT I: 

PCR COUNSEL DID NOT ADVANCE THE 

GROUNDS NOR SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS 

GERMANE TO THE SECOND PRO SE PETITION 

INSISTED BY MR. JOSE [CARRANZA] . . . WITH 

SEPARATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL CLAIMS. THUS, THE EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING HELD ON AUGUST 20, 2014 DID NOT 

RESULT IN A COMPLETE ADJUDICATION. 

BECAUSE PCR COUNSEL "INADVERTENTLY 

DID NOT ATTACH[]" . . . THEM TO HIS PCR

BRIEF. AS A RESULT NEITHER THE PCR COURT, 

TRIAL COUNSEL, NOR RESPONDENT [WERE]

ABLE TO REVIEW THE GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 

NOR SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS, SINCE PCR 

COUNSEL [VIOLATED] RULE 3:22-6(d) AND THE 

HOLDING IN RUE AND WEBSTER . . . CAUSING 

NO FINALITY TO THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

HELD ON AUGUST 20, 2014. THUS, "GOOD 

CAUSE," RULE 3:22-6(b) EXIST[S] TO RE-ASSIGN 

AN ATTORNEY FROM THE PUBLIC 

DEFENDER[']S OFFICE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH 

THE SMITH AND WEBSTER HOLDINGS TO 

GRANT REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S PCR 
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ORDER AND REMAND FOR FURTHER 

COLLATERAL EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS.

1

POINT II: 

THE SECOND PETITION WAS SECURED FOR THE 

RECORD SINCE AUGUST 20, 2014, THEREFORE 

IT WAS NOT [UNTIMELY] NOR ARE THERE ANY 

PROCEDURAL BANS THAT APPLY.

POINT III: 

APPELLANT ADOPTS AND INCORPORATES BY 

REFERENCE ALL FACTS, LAW, AND EVIDENCE 

FROM THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT IN 

HIS SUPPLEMENTAL [LETTER] BRIEF AND 

APPENDI[C]ES FILED IN THIS APPEAL.

On September 12, 2008, defendant was indicted for nineteen counts of 

numerous offenses. On February 14, 2012, a jury found defendant guilty of four 

counts of first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, and three counts of 

felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3). Following mergers, the trial court

sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of 155 years subject to the No 

Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. On November 16, 2013, we affirmed 

his convictions and sentence. State v. Carranza, No. A-4139-11T1 (App. Div. 

Nov. 6, 2013) (slip op. at 1-2). 

1 Defendant omitted citations to State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1 (2002); State v. 

Webster, 187 N.J. 254 (2006); State v. Smith, No. A-4371-11 (App. Div. June 

19, 2014). 
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On February 6, 2014, defendant filed his first PCR petition, which the 

court denied on October 22, 2014. We affirmed, State v. Carranza, No. A-2777-

14T2 (App. Div. Apr. 17, 2017) (slip op. at 2), and the Supreme Court denied 

certification, State v. Carranza, 231 N.J. 208 (2017). Defendant filed his second 

PCR petition on May 29, 2019, which the court denied with its order dated June 

5, 2019. This appeal followed. 

"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of 

habeas corpus." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015) (quoting State v. 

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). Post-conviction relief provides "a built-in 

'safeguard that ensures that a defendant was not unjustly convicted.'" State v. 

Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013) (quoting State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 

(1997)). Appellate court "review is necessarily deferential to a PCR court's 

factual findings based on its review of live witness testimony." Nash, 212 N.J. 

at 540. We review the PCR court's interpretation of the law de novo. Id. at 540-

41. 

Rule 3:22-2(e) provides that "[a] petition for post-conviction relief is 

cognizable if based upon . . . [a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based 

on trial counsel's failure to file a direct appeal of the judgment of conviction and 

sentence upon defendant's timely request." "A petitioner is generally barred 
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from presenting a claim on PCR that could have been raised at trial or on direct 

appeal, R. 3:22-4(a), or that has been previously litigated, R. 3:22-5." Nash, 212 

N.J. at 546. A petition for PCR is not a substitute for a direct appeal. State v. 

Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 583-84 (1992). 

But "petitioners are rarely barred from raising ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims on post-conviction review. Such claims may fall within Rule

[3:22-4(a)(3)], which affords post-conviction review for constitutional claims 

that could have been raised earlier, because those claims are grounded in the 

Sixth Amendment and the New Jersey Constitution." Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459-

60. Falling within Rule 3:22-4(a)(3) for claims not raised during the conviction 

proceeding or appeal proceeding will not, however, mean that a petitioner has 

timely filed pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a)'s enumerated exceptions to time 

limitations. 

A first petition for PCR must be filed within five years of the date of entry 

of the judgment of conviction, unless, among other things, the petitioner "alleges 

facts showing that the delay beyond said time was due to defendant's excusable 

neglect and that there is a reasonable probability that if the defendant's factual 

assertions were found to be true enforcement of the time bar would result in a 

fundamental injustice . . . ." R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). 
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A second or subsequent petition must be filed within one year after the 

latest of:

(A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted 

was initially recognized by the United States Supreme 

Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right 

has been newly recognized by either of those Courts 

and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases 

on collateral review; or 

(B) the date on which the factual predicate for the relief 

sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could 

not have been discovered earlier through the exercise 

of reasonable diligence; or 

(C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent 

application for post-conviction relief where ineffective 

assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on 

the first or subsequent application for post-conviction 

relief is being alleged.

[R. 3:22-12(a)(2).]

The time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided in Rule 3-22:12(a). 

In this case, defendant fails to satisfy any condition under Rule 3:22-

12(a)(2) that might permit his second PCR petition. First, defendant fails to 

allege new constitutional rights or factual predicates. Defendant exclusively 

relies on case law and facts that were known at the time of trial in 2012 and at 

the time he filed his first PCR petition in February 2014. Second, defendant 

filed his second PCR petition in May 2019—more than four years after the court 
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denied his first PCR petition in October 2014. This far exceeds the one-year 

limitation set forth in Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). 

Because defendant fails to demonstrate any condition under Rule 3:22-

12(a)(2), we affirm the trial court's denial of his second PCR petition. Further, 

because Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) bars defendant's second PCR petition for 

untimeliness, we decline to address any of defendant's additional arguments. 

Affirmed.