FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BALBIR SINGH, 

Petitioner, No. 07-73792

v. Agency No.  A70-545-931 ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

October 6, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed January 8, 2010

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Marsha S. Berzon,

Circuit Judges, and Lyle E. Strom,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

*The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, Senior United States District Judge for

the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation. 

701
COUNSEL

Martin Avila Robles, Immigration Practice Group, P.C., San

Francisco, California, for petitioner Balbir Singh.

Eric W. Marsteller, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S.

Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent Eric

H. Holder Jr.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Balbir Singh, a native and citizen of India, was granted

conditional permanent residence in this country when he married a United States citizen but lost that status when his wife

withdrew her support from their joint petition for permanent

residence. Singh now petitions for review of a decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his application for a hardship waiver of the joint petition requirement.

Before considering the merits of Singh’s petition we must

decide whether we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s

determination that Singh’s removal would not result in “extreme hardship.” 

704 SINGH v. HOLDER
We hold that we may review the threshold question

whether an alien has demonstrated “extreme hardship” and is

thus eligible for a waiver of the joint filing requirement to

remove the conditions on residence. Because the BIA did not

err in its hardship determination, we deny Singh’s petition for

review.

I. BACKGROUND

Balbir Singh entered the United States in 1992. Three years

later, he married Lidia Medina, a U.S. citizen, and so was able

to adjust his status to become a conditional permanent resident. To remove the conditional status, Singh and Medina

were required to file a joint petition before the second anniversary of Singh’s obtaining lawful status. See Immigration

and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 216(c)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A), 8

U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A). Such a petition must state

that the marriage is proper and was not entered into for immigration purposes. INA § 216(d)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i).

Singh and Medina timely filed a joint petition. They

appeared for an interview before an Immigration Service officer on August 12, 1998. At the interview, however, Medina

signed a sworn statement declaring the couple had married for

the sole purpose of obtaining immigration benefits and withdrew her signature from the joint petition. The next day, the

INS served Singh with a Notice to Appear, charging that he

was removable under INA § 237(a)(1)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(1)(D)(i), because his conditional permanent resident status had been terminated.1

1The original Notice to Appear alleged that Singh’s “status was terminated on August 12, 1998, because [his] marriage to Lidia Medina was

entered into for the sole purpose of . . . obtaining the status of lawful

admission for permanent residence.” Later, the INS amended the charge,

providing the following reason for termination: “Lidia Medina withdrew

her signature from the Form I-751, Petition to Remove the Conditions on

Residence . . . .” 

SINGH v. HOLDER 705
The following year, Singh filed a second petition, this time

seeking a waiver of the joint filing requirement. The Attorney

General or his designee “may remove the conditional basis of

the permanent resident status for an alien who fails to meet”

the joint filing requirement “if the alien demonstrates that . . .

extreme hardship would result if such alien is removed.” INA

§ 216(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A). The INS district

director denied Singh’s petition in 2002. A third petition, submitted in 2003, again sought a waiver of the joint filing

requirement and again was denied. 

Before the immigration judge (“IJ”), Singh conceded

removability, and the parties stipulated that the only issue for

review was the district director’s denial of the hardship

waiver. The IJ held a merits hearing and issued a decision

denying Singh’s application for a hardship waiver. Although

the IJ found Singh credible, he concluded that Singh had not

demonstrated that extreme hardship would result if he were

removed. 

During the IJ hearing Singh testified that he had no children

and had not divorced Medina. Singh has three sisters, two of

whom live in the United States and are U.S. citizens; the third

is a British citizen who lives in England. At the time of the

hearing Singh lived with one of his sisters and her family,

including her sons, 18 and 20. Singh was close to his nephews

and helped support the family after his brother-in-law underwent heart surgery. 

Singh’s parents are dead. His mother and older brother

were shot and killed by “terrorists” in Punjab, India, in 1991,

and his father died from an infection in 2000. Singh testified

that he “remain[s] depressed” about these deaths, but when he

becomes upset, he sits and talks with his sisters, which helps

him feel better. Singh saw a psychologist several times; the

last consultation took place in 1999. 

As a truck driver, Singh owned his own rig and earned

$90,000-$95,000 annually. In comparison to the $10,000 per

706 SINGH v. HOLDER
month he could earn driving a truck in the United States, he

might earn $200 per month in India. Singh did not own any

real estate in the United States at the time of the hearing; he

and his siblings had inherited their father’s house in India.

Singh had traveled to India five times since he first arrived in

the United States. Although he had no immediate family

remaining in India, a nephew still lived there. 

The IJ summarized Singh’s hardship claim as follows: (1)

in India, Singh lacks a job and would have a lower standard

of living; (2) he would be separated from his family; and (3)

he would face “cultural difficulties,” given the length of time

he has spent in the United States. Because “economic hardship and cultural social uprooting are . . . hardships suffered

by every alien who has spent a considerable period of time in

the United States,” the IJ held, Singh did not meet the extreme

hardship standard. The IJ also noted that Singh was young

and healthy, possessed assets that could be sold to finance his

return to India, spoke the language in India, and had spent

much of his life there. 

Singh appealed to the BIA, which conducted a de novo

review and affirmed the decision of the IJ. Singh timely filed

a petition for review with this court.

II. JURISDICTION

[1] The first question we must answer is whether we have

jurisdiction to review the BIA’s hardship determination. The

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) eliminated our “jurisdiction to review . . .

any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General . . . the

authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in

the discretion of the Attorney General.” INA

§ 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). This provision does not, however, “preclud[e] review of constitutional

claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review

SINGH v. HOLDER 707
filed with an appropriate court of appeals.” INA

§ 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 

[2] Even as to factual issues, § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii)2 precludes

judicial review of a decision made under a particular statute

only when “the language of the statute in question . . . provide[s] the discretionary authority” for the Attorney General’s

action. Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683,

689 (9th Cir. 2003). “For a statutory provision to strip this

court of jurisdiction under [§ 242(a)(2)(B)(ii)], the provision

must specify that ‘the right or power to act is entirely within

[the Attorney General’s] judgment or conscience.’ ” OropezaWong v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Spencer Enters., 345 F.3d at 690). 

The full text of § 216(c)(4), the waiver provision we consider here, provides:

(4) Hardship waiver 

The Attorney General, in the Attorney General’s discretion, may remove the conditional basis of the permanent resident status for an alien who fails to meet

the requirements of paragraph (1) if the alien demonstrates that — 

(A) extreme hardship would result if such

alien is removed, 

(B) the qualifying marriage was entered

into in good faith by the alien spouse, but

the qualifying marriage has been terminated

(other than through the death of the spouse)

and the alien was not at fault in failing to

meet the requirements of paragraph (1), or

2All statutory citations refer to the INA, unless otherwise noted. 

708 SINGH v. HOLDER
(C) the qualifying marriage was entered

into in good faith by the alien spouse and

during the marriage the alien spouse or

child was battered by or was the subject of

extreme cruelty perpetrated by his or her

spouse or citizen or permanent resident parent and the alien was not at fault in failing

to meet the requirements of paragraph (1).

In determining extreme hardship, the Attorney General shall consider circumstances occurring only during the period that the alien was admitted for

permanent residence on a conditional basis. In acting

on applications under this paragraph, the Attorney

General shall consider any credible evidence relevant to the application. The determination of what

evidence is credible and the weight to be given that

evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the

Attorney General. The Attorney General shall, by

regulation, establish measures to protect the confidentiality of information concerning any abused

alien spouse or child, including information regarding the whereabouts of such spouse or child. 

Under this provision, granting a waiver involves two steps:

First, the Attorney General or his designee (here, the BIA)

must determine whether the petitioner has demonstrated that

he meets one of three alternative criteria. See § 216(c)(4)(A)-

(C). Second, if the petitioner has so demonstrated eligibility,

the BIA “may” grant the waiver. § 216(c)(4).

[3] The second-order decision whether to grant a waiver is

unambiguously “left to the discretion of the Attorney General.” Damon v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004).

The statutory text specifies that “[t]he Attorney General, in

the Attorney General’s discretion, may” grant a waiver if the

alien has demonstrated his eligibility. § 216(c)(4). The ultimate decision whether to grant a waiver is therefore unreSINGH v. HOLDER 709
viewable under § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii). See Atsilov v. Gonzales,

468 F.3d 112, 116 (2nd Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 

[4] In contrast, the waiver provision does not specify that

the power to determine whether extreme hardship exists “is

entirely within [the Attorney General’s] judgment or conscience.” Oropeza-Wong, 406 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Spencer

Enters., 345 F.3d at 690). Instead, it provides that the Attorney General may grant a waiver “if the alien demonstrates . . .

that extreme hardship would result.” § 216(c)(4) (emphasis

added). There is no language at all committing to the Attorney

General’s discretion the question whether the alien has successfully demonstrated extreme hardship. 

In addition to making discretionary the ultimate decision

whether to grant a waiver, the statute also provides that “[t]he

determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to

be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of

the Attorney General.” § 216(c)(4).3 Thus, twice in this very

3This case gives us no occasion to consider the extent to which we may

review adverse credibility determinations or weigh evidence under this

provision. Singh is not asking us to reweigh the evidence. Nor does the

government cite this statutory language as barring our review here. 

Oropeza-Wong held that “the second statutory statement regarding the

Attorney General’s discretion does not bar our review of claims involving

credibility determinations in cases regarding statutory waivers under

[§ 216(c)(4)].” 406 F.3d at 1147. That holding has received some criticism. See Contreras-Salinas v. Holder, 585 F.3d 710, 713-14 & n.4 (2d

Cir. 2009) (disagreeing with Oropeza-Wong and holding that credibility

determinations under § 216(c)(4) are unreviewable). Regardless of

whether Oropeza-Wong is correct, we could still review an eligibility

determination for substantial evidence without reweighing the evidence or

revisiting credibility findings. Generally, the INA requires us to apply the

substantial evidence standard in reviewing orders of removal, see INA

§ 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”). We perceive no conflict

between that standard and the “sole discretion” language in § 216(c)(4).

Both the Eighth and First Circuits have reached the same conclusion. See

710 SINGH v. HOLDER
provision Congress did specify that the power to act is in certain regards within the Attorney General’s discretion. It is a

familiar principle of statutory construction that “where Congress includes particular language in one section of the statute

but omits it in another section of the same Act, . . . Congress

acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or

exclusion.” Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir.

2001) (en banc) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.

421, 432 (1987) (alteration omitted)). The absence of any

similar language specifying that the Attorney General has discretion to determine whether extreme hardship exists compels

us to conclude that this determination is not committed to the

Attorney General’s discretion and so is reviewable. This view

of the statutory waiver provision is consistent with our interpretation of the provisions governing the granting of asylum,

as discussed in Spencer Enterprises. See 345 F.3d at 690

(“Despite the fact that there may be many non-discretionary

elements of asylum eligibility, the ultimate authority whether

to grant asylum rests entirely in the discretion of the Attorney

General.”).

Our conclusion also comports with our holding in OropezaWong that “determinations made with respect to statutory

waivers under [§ 216(c)(4)] are not purely discretionary and

Ibrahimi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 758, 764 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that

§ 216(c)(4) “prevent[s] us from exercising jurisdiction to pass upon the

credibility and weight of the evidence that a petitioner has presented in an

attempt to establish eligibility for a waiver of the joint-filing requirement,”

but not “from asserting jurisdiction to make a determination of what constitutes [eligibility] and whether the credited evidence meets that standard”); Cho v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 2005) (comparing “the

‘sole discretion’ provision (narrowly directed to the question of what evidence is credible and how much weight it should be given) and the substantial evidence standard of review . . . which merely looks to whether

an agency determination is reasonably grounded in the administrative

record and has never properly been understood to permit a reviewing court

either to substitute its own credibility findings for those made by the

agency or to weigh the credited evidence itself”). 

SINGH v. HOLDER 711
are therefore generally subject to review.”

4

 406 F.3d at 1142.

There, we considered whether we had jurisdiction to review

the threshold determination that a marriage was not “entered

into in good faith.” Id. at 1142-43. We observed that under

§ 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), “[u]nless the disputed determination is

purely discretionary — unless there are no questions of fact

or law at issue — judicial review is not precluded.” Id. at

1142. We concluded that petitions for statutory waivers on the

basis of a good faith marriage “involve legal and factual questions that are not subject to the pure discretion of the IJ or

BIA.” Id. at 1143. We noted as well that decisions made

under the two other listed criteria, extreme hardship and

extreme cruelty, “will usually require factual and legal determinations.” Id. at 1143 n.6 (citing Montero-Martinez v.

Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

[5] Indeed, the BIA’s own practice strongly suggests that

“extreme hardship” is a legal standard. In this case, for example, the BIA order denying Singh’s petition explicitly recognized that “[t]he question of whether the facts in a given case

establish the requisite level of hardship is a matter of law

which we review de novo.” A survey of published BIA decisions likewise reveals that the phrase “extreme hardship”

refers to an ascertainable legal standard. See, e.g., Matter of

Anderson, 16 I. & N. Dec. 596, 598 (BIA 1978) (recognizing,

in the suspension of deportation context, that “most deported

aliens will likely suffer some degree of financial hardship,”

but concluding that the “extreme hardship” standard is met

“only when other factors such as advanced age, severe illness,

family ties, etc. combine with economic detriment to make

deportation extremely hard on the alien . . . .”); Matter of

4Our sister circuits are divided on the question whether courts may

review eligibility determinations under § 216(c)(4). Compare Assaad v.

Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that eligibility determinations are unreviewable), and Urena-Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d

154, 161 (3rd Cir. 2004) (same), with Nguyen v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 853,

854-55 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that eligibility determinations are reviewable), and Cho v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d at 102 (same). 

712 SINGH v. HOLDER
Chumpitazi, 16 I. & N. Dec. 629, 635 (BIA 1978) (explaining,

in the suspension of deportation context, that “[extreme] hardship . . . encompasses more than the mere economic deprivation that might result from an alien’s deportation from the

United States . . . . [T]he readjustment of an alien to life in

his native country after having spent a number of years in the

United States is not the type of hardship that we have characterized as extreme . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). This

court, too, has contributed to the development of the standard.

See, e.g., Davidson v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,

558 F.2d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir. 1977) (“We have previously

held that economic disadvantage alone does not constitute

extreme hardship.”).

[6] Contrary to the government’s assertions, our cases holding that hardship determinations are unreviewable in the contexts of cancellation of removal and suspension of deportation

are not pertinent here. As the government notes, we held in

Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997), that hardship determinations under the IIRIRA transitional provision

covering cases pending before April 1, 1997, are “discretionary” and hence unreviewable. But we did so because “[t]he

language of [the suspension of deportation statute] itself commits the determination to ‘the opinion of the Attorney General.’ ” Id. Thus, the otherwise similar “extreme hardship”

provision in Kalaw differed in a crucial respect from the hardship waiver we consider: it expressly committed the determination of extreme hardship to the Attorney General’s

“opinion,” while the provision with which we are grappling

contains no similar language.

The government’s reliance upon Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2003), fares no better. In

Romero-Torres, we interpreted the provision limiting judicial

review in the cancellation of removal context as “eliminat[-

ing] jurisdiction . . . over decisions by the BIA that involve

the exercise of discretion.” 327 F.3d at 890. We declined to

review determinations of “exceptional and extremely unusual

SINGH v. HOLDER 713
hardship.” Id. at 891. The provision governing review in the

cancellation of removal context, INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), however, provides that “no court

shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding

the granting of relief.” (emphasis added). Thus, unlike the

limitation on judicial review here applicable, the limitation at

issue in Romero-Torres does not require that the statute itself

designate a determination as discretionary. The entirely separate provision here controlling, § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), in contrast,

precludes review only if “the authority . . . is specified under

this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” (emphasis added). Consequently, for the marriage hardship waiver — unlike the cancellation of removal provision

— “jurisdiction [is] precluded not . . . because the decision at

issue [is] discretionary, but [only where] that discretion [is]

specified in . . . the statute in question.” Spencer Enters., 345

F.3d at 690.

[7] In short, Spencer Enterprises dictates the result here.

Because the statute does not specify the hardship eligibility

decision as one committed to agency discretion, judicial

review is available.

[8] For the foregoing reasons, this court has jurisdiction

under INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) to review the BIA’s determination that Singh’s removal would not result in extreme hardship.

III. EXTREME HARDSHIP

Singh contends that the BIA and IJ erred in denying his

waiver petition because: (1) the IJ limited its hardship analysis to Singh and did not consider the hardship to his family in

the United States; (2) the IJ did not define the time period for

which hardship was relevant, and the BIA concluded that the

relevant period ended when Singh’s conditional resident sta714 SINGH v. HOLDER
tus terminated in 1998; and (3) the IJ failed to consider the

hardship factors in the aggregate.5

A. Whose Hardship Is Relevant

Whose hardship an alien must demonstrate to meet the “extreme hardship” standard under § 216(c)(4)(A) is a question

of law we review de novo. The statute itself is silent on the

matter: § 216(c)(4)(A) provides only that an alien is eligible

for a waiver if he demonstrates that “extreme hardship would

result if such alien is removed.”

6

 In at least one publication,

the INS suggested that hardship to the waiver applicant’s

spouse and child could be considered. See “INS Responds to

Marriage Fraud Questions,” question no. 57, reprinted in 67

Interpreter Releases 314, 341 (Mar. 19, 1990); see also 2

Immigr. L. Serv. 2d (West) § 7:225 (2009). 

[9] We need not decide the “whose hardship” question

here. Although it is unclear which family members the IJ considered in his hardship analysis, the BIA conducted a de novo

review and concluded that Singh did not support “his claim of

hardship to any of his cited family members with evidence

sufficient to establish extreme hardship.” (emphasis added).

5We note that Singh’s first two arguments turn on questions of law,

while the third requires us to review the BIA’s findings of fact. As noted,

INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not “preclud[e] review of constitutional

claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an

appropriate court of appeals.” § 242(a)(2)(D). Our jurisdiction over questions of law “extends to questions involving the application of statutes or

regulations to undisputed facts.” Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 650

(9th Cir. 2007). As Singh’s first two arguments fall under the questions of

law category, we could reach those two arguments even if BIA decisions

concerning the marriage hardship waiver were otherwise unreviewable. 

6

In contrast, the cancellation of removal statute requires an alien to

establish, among other things, that “removal would result in exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child,

who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)

(emphasis added). 

SINGH v. HOLDER 715
Where the BIA conducts a de novo review, “[a]ny error committed by the IJ will be rendered harmless by the Board’s

application of the correct legal standard.” Ghaly v. INS, 58

F.3d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Brezilien v. Holder,

569 F.3d 403, 411 (9th Cir. 2009). Because the BIA considered hardship to all the family members discussed in Singh’s

testimony, Singh’s claim of legal error fails.

B. Period of Hardship Considered

The waiver provision instructs the Attorney General, in

determining whether extreme hardship exists, to “consider circumstances occurring only during the period that the alien

was admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis.”

§ 216(c)(4). Singh does not make any argument as to which

circumstances would be relevant assuming his status were terminated; instead, he contends that he remains in conditional

permanent resident status, so the relevant time period extends

to the present. 

[10] The BIA correctly decided that Singh’s status was terminated on August 12, 1998, at the latest. Singh conceded

before the IJ that his status was terminated that day. On

August 12, 1998, the district director issued a Notice of Termination denying Singh’s first petition in the following terms:

“Because Lidia Medina withdrew her signature from the petition, the petition is no longer joint. She is no longer willing

to proceed on the joint petition. Therefore, your petition does

not meet the statutory and regulatory requirements and must

be denied . . . . [Y]our status as a permanent resident is terminated.” 

Alternatively, under BIA precedent, when one party makes

a written withdrawal of support from a joint petition, the petition is considered not to have been filed. See Matter of

Mendes, 20 I. & N. Dec. 833, 838 (BIA 1994). In the case of

an alien who fails to file a joint petition, permanent resident

status is terminated on “the second anniversary of the alien’s

716 SINGH v. HOLDER
lawful admission for permanent residence.” INA

§ 216(c)(2)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(6). The second

anniversary of Singh’s lawful status fell on April 10, 1998. 

[11] Singh could not “extend” his conditional permanent

resident status by filing additional petitions after his status

had been terminated. Because Singh was a former permanent

resident who lacked conditional status when he filed his second and third petitions requesting hardship waivers, he had no

status to extend. See In re Henry Stowers, 22 I. & N. Dec.

605, 611 (BIA 1999) (holding that former conditional permanent residents may apply for a hardship waiver).

C. Substantial Evidence of Extreme Hardship

Finally, Singh asks us to review the IJ’s determination that

he will not suffer “extreme hardship” if removed to India. We

review the IJ’s and BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence. See, e.g., Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th

Cir. 2008); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481

n.1 (1992) (noting that “[t]o reverse the BIA finding we must

find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but

compels it”).

[12] In considering Singh’s hardship claim, the IJ focused

on the following consequences of removal: Singh does not

have a job in India and would have a lower standard of living;

he would be separated from his family; and he would face

“cultural difficulties.” On the other hand, the IJ noted, Singh

has spent most of his life in India, speaks the language, and

has traveled there several times since leaving. Additionally,

Singh is young and healthy, and he has assets he could sell to

finance his return to India. It is somewhat unclear from the

record whether the IJ considered the hardship factors separately or in the aggregate; he never explicitly stated which he

was doing.

[13] The BIA conducted a de novo review and “affirm[ed]

the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that the respondent has

SINGH v. HOLDER 717
not carried his burden of demonstrating the requisite level of

hardship either individually or in the aggregate.” Assuming

the IJ was required to aggregate the evidence, and assuming

he failed to do so, any error was rendered harmless by the

BIA’s de novo review and decision, which explicitly considered the evidence in the aggregate. Nor can we disagree with

the BIA’s conclusion that the evidence presented by Singh

does not establish, even in the aggregate, that “extreme hardship” would result if he were removed. See Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I. & N. Dec. 629, 635 (BIA 1978) (explaining that

“[extreme] hardship . . . encompasses more than the mere economic deprivation that might result from an alien’s deportation from the United States . . . . [T]he readjustment of an

alien to life in his native country after having spent a number

of years in the United States is not the type of hardship that

we have characterized as extreme . . . .”).

We therefore conclude that even if the IJ erred in evaluating the evidence concerning hardship, his errors were rendered harmless by the BIA’s de novo review, and the BIA did

not err.

IV. CONCLUSION

[14] For the reasons given, we hold that we have jurisdiction to review determinations of extreme hardship under INA

§ 216(c)(4)(A). Because the BIA did not err in holding that

Balbir Singh’s removal would not result in extreme hardship,

we deny the petition for review. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

718 SINGH v. HOLDER