[Cite as Amujiogu v. Oko, 2022-Ohio-1323.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

NNAETO AMUJIOGU, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 110922

v. :

MICHAEL OKO, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: DISMISSED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 21, 2022

Civil Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court

Housing Division

Case No. 21 CVG 008945

Appearances:

Michael Oko, pro se. 

CORNELIUS J. O’SULLIVAN, JR., J.:

Defendant-appellant Michael Oko (“appellant”) appeals from the trial 

court’s October 12, 2021 judgment denying his motion for stay filed in this forcible 

entry and detainer action. This appeal is before the court on the accelerated docket 

pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 25. The purpose of an accelerated appeal is 

to allow an appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision. State v. Trone, 
8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 108952 and 108966, 2020-Ohio-384, ¶ 1, citing State v. 

Priest, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100614, 2014-Ohio-1735, ¶ 1. After a thorough review 

of the law and facts, we dismiss this appeal.

Plaintiff-appellee Nnaeto Amujiogu (“appellee”) initiated this eviction 

action against appellant in September 2021. The complaint contained one cause of 

action in which appellee alleged that appellant’s tenancy at the subject premises 

expired on August 31, 2021, and that appellee served appellant with a “three-day 

notice” on August 24, 2021, as required by law. The complaint did not seek money 

damages. 

In an October 7, 2021 decision, the Cleveland Municipal Court granted 

judgment in favor of appellee and stated that appellee could schedule a courtsupervised date for appellant to move out. The following day, October 8, 2021, 

appellant filed a motion to stay and a motion for relief from judgment. The trial 

court denied both motions. Appellant now appeals. In his brief, appellant states 

that he “sought an alternative living place and was not at the [subject] address from 

August 18, 2021 through the present.” Appellee has not filed a brief. We requested 

that appellant show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot. 

Courts will not decide moot cases. In re A.G., 139 Ohio St. 3d 572, 2014-

Ohio-2597, 13 N.E.3d 1146, ¶ 37; Tschantz v. Ferguson, 57 Ohio St.3d 131, 133, 566 

N.E.2d 655 (1991). A case is moot if it “‘seeks to get a judgment on a pretended 

controversy, when in reality there is none, or a decision in advance about a right 

before it has been actually asserted and contested, or a judgment upon some matter 
which, when rendered, for any reason cannot have any practical legal effect upon a 

then-existing controversy.’” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter, 141 Ohio 

St.3d 419, 2014-Ohio-5457, 24 N.E.3d 1170, ¶ 4, quoting In re L.W., 168 Ohio App.3d 

613, 2006-Ohio-644, 861 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). In other words, a case is 

moot when it involves no actual, genuine controversy, the decision of which can 

definitely affect existing legal relations. Hunter at id.; In re L.W. at id. When a case 

becomes moot, dismissal of the case is appropriate because the case no longer 

presents a justiciable controversy. Lund v. Portsmouth Local Air Agency, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 14AP-60, 2014-Ohio-2741, ¶ 6. 

“Under Ohio law, a forcible entry and detainer action decides the right 

to immediate possession of property and ‘nothing else.’” Sheehe v. Demsey, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99965, 2014-Ohio-305, ¶ 7, quoting Seventh Urban, Inc. v. 

Univ. Circle Property Dev., Inc., 67 Ohio St.2d 19, 25, 423 N.E.2d 1070 (1981), fn. 

11. Once possession of the property has been restored to the landowner in a forcible

entry and detainer action, the action becomes moot because “no further relief can 

be granted to the landowner.” Knop v. Davet, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0074, 

2017-Ohio-1416, ¶ 11. If immediate possession is no longer at issue because the 

defendant vacates the premises and possession is restored to the plaintiff, then 

continuation of the forcible entry and detainer action or an appeal of such action is

unnecessary, because there is no further relief that may be granted. Kimberly Office 

Park, LLC v. Williams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15-AP-579, 2015-Ohio-5002, ¶ 6.
Appellant argues in his show cause brief that “[t]here is still a current 

legal dispute with respect to the legal possession of the property where appellant’s 

personal property remains withheld by appellee in violation of appellant’s beneficial 

use of his property.” He further contends that this appeal involves “unresolved 

debatable constitutional issues” that should be reviewed even if the appeal is moot. 

Exceptions do exist to the mootness doctrine, such as when issues are 

“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing 

Co. v. Donaldson, 63 Ohio St.3d 173, 175, 586 N.E.2d 101 (1992). “[T]his exception 

applies only in exceptional circumstances in which the following two factors are both 

present: (1) the challenged action is too short in its duration to be fully litigated 

before its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the 

same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” State ex rel. 

Calvary v. Upper Arlington, 89 Ohio St.3d 229, 231, 729 N.E.2d 1182 (2000); State 

ex rel. White v. Kilbane Koch, 96 Ohio St.3d 395, 2002-Ohio-4848, 775 N.E.2d 508, 

¶ 13. The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized two other exceptions to the 

mootness doctrine: (1) when the issue involves “a matter of great public interest,” 

or (2) when “there remains a debatable constitutional question to resolve.” 

Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 30 Ohio St.3d 28, 505 N.E.2d 966 (1987), 

paragraph one of the syllabus.

Appellant’s claim that his personal property remains in the residence 

does not fall under any of the mootness exceptions. In regard to the duration of the 

action, the procedures for forcible entry and detainer actions detailed in 
R.C. Chapter 1923 ensure that such actions move quickly. Rithy Properties v. 

Cheesman, 2016-Ohio-1602, 63 N.E.3d 752, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). Further, there is 

nothing in the record to indicate that appellant will be subject to this action again. 

The record also does not support a finding that this is a matter of great public 

interest or that a debatable constitutional question to resolve remains. Thus, none 

of the exceptions to mootness apply in this case. 

In addition to the exceptions to mootness, “[a] defendant appealing a 

judgment of forcible entry and detainer may overcome a ruling of mootness by 

obtaining a stay of execution and/or posting a supersedeas bond.” Goldstein v. 

Patel, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 02CA008183 and 02CA008199, 2003-Ohio-4386, ¶ 4. 

If a landowner is successful in a forcible entry and detainer action, however, and the 

“defendant fails to obtain a stay of execution and/or post a supersedeas bond, all 

issues relating to forcible entry and detainer are rendered moot.” Id. 

Appellant sought a stay of the judgment in the trial court. In his 

motion, appellant requested the stay “pending the final ruling on [his] Motion for 

Relief from Judgment.” On October 12, 2021, the trial court denied the motion, 

stating that appellant failed to demonstrate “compelling, unusual or emergency 

circumstances” that would justify a delay of the move-out date. The court further 

noted that the parties “appear to have an extremely contentious relationship,” and 

that Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court issued a civil protection order against 

appellant. The municipal court stated that because the “relationship between the 

parties is volatile and unpredictable, the court-supervised move-out should proceed 
as scheduled.” On October 18, 2021, the municipal court denied appellant’s motion 

for relief from judgment. Appellant sought a stay in this court, and his motion was 

denied.

Appellant was not successful in staying the action, immediate 

possession is no longer an issue, and none of the mootness exceptions apply. This 

appeal therefore is moot. 

Appeal dismissed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________

CORNELIUS J. O’SULLIVAN, JR., JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR