# C_2017399EN.01017801.xml

| 24.11.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 399/178 |
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24.11.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 399/178

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P8_TA(2015)0472

Arms export: implementation of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2015 on arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2015/2114(INI))

(2017/C 399/21)

The European Parliament,

The European Parliament

| — | having regard to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (hereinafter ‘the Common Position’) (1), |
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having regard to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (hereinafter ‘the Common Position’) (1),

1

| — | having regard to the review of the Common Position conducted by the EU Council Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM), |
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having regard to the review of the Common Position conducted by the EU Council Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM),

| — | having regard to the Council’s Sixteenth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (2), |
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having regard to the Council’s Sixteenth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (2),

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| — | having regard to Council Decision 2012/711/CFSP of 19 November 2012 on support for EU activities in order to promote the control of arms exports and the principles and criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP among third countries, |
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having regard to Council Decision 2012/711/CFSP of 19 November 2012 on support for EU activities in order to promote the control of arms exports and the principles and criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP among third countries,

| — | having regard to the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction of 9 December 2003, |
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having regard to the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction of 9 December 2003,

| — | having regard to the European Security Strategy ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003, |
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having regard to the European Security Strategy ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,

| — | having regard to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013 (3), |
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having regard to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013 (3),

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| — | having regard to its resolution of 5 February 2014 on the ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty (4), |
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having regard to its resolution of 5 February 2014 on the ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty (4),

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| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 May 2015 on the impact of developments in European defence markets on the security and defence capabilities in Europe (5), in particular paragraphs 4, 10, 18, 19, 20, and 21, |
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having regard to its resolution of 21 May 2015 on the impact of developments in European defence markets on the security and defence capabilities in Europe (5), in particular paragraphs 4, 10, 18, 19, 20, and 21,

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| — | having regard to Council Decision 2013/768/CFSP of 16 December 2013 on EU activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty in the framework of the European Security Strategy (6), |
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having regard to Council Decision 2013/768/CFSP of 16 December 2013 on EU activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty in the framework of the European Security Strategy (6),

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| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (7), as amended by Regulation (EU) No 599/2014, and to the list of dual-use goods and technology in its Annex I, |
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having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (7), as amended by Regulation (EU) No 599/2014, and to the list of dual-use goods and technology in its Annex I,

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| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 April 2014 to the Council and the European Parliament entitled ‘The Review of export control policy: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world’ (COM(2014)0244), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 24 April 2014 to the Council and the European Parliament entitled ‘The Review of export control policy: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world’ (COM(2014)0244),

| — | having regard to the Joint Statement of 12 June 2014 by Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the review of the dual-use export control system, |
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having regard to the Joint Statement of 12 June 2014 by Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the review of the dual-use export control system,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions on the review of the export control policy of 21 November 2014, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions on the review of the export control policy of 21 November 2014,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on ‘Human rights and technology: the impact of intrusion and surveillance systems on human rights in third countries’ (8), |
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having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on ‘Human rights and technology: the impact of intrusion and surveillance systems on human rights in third countries’ (8),

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| — | having regard to Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (9), |
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having regard to Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (9),

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| — | having regard to the EU strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, adopted on 15-16 December 2005 by the European Council, and to the Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002 on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP, |
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having regard to the EU strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, adopted on 15-16 December 2005 by the European Council, and to the Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002 on the European Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP,

| — | having regard to Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP of 23 June 2003 on the control of arms brokering (10), |
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having regard to Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP of 23 June 2003 on the control of arms brokering (10),

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| — | having regard to the updated Common Military List of the European Union adopted by the Council on 9 February 2015, |
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having regard to the updated Common Military List of the European Union adopted by the Council on 9 February 2015,

| — | having regard to the User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, |
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having regard to the User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment,

| — | having regard to the Wassenaar Arrangement of 12 May 1996 on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, together with the lists, updated in 2015, of these goods and technologies and munitions (11), |
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having regard to the Wassenaar Arrangement of 12 May 1996 on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, together with the lists, updated in 2015, of these goods and technologies and munitions (11),

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| — | having regard to the decisions of the 19th Plenary Meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, held in Vienna on 3-4 December 2013, |
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having regard to the decisions of the 19th Plenary Meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, held in Vienna on 3-4 December 2013,

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, |
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having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 28 April 2015 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Agenda on Security (COM(2015)0185), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 28 April 2015 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Agenda on Security (COM(2015)0185),

| — | having regard to the European Consensus on Development, adopted on 24 February 2006, |
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having regard to the European Consensus on Development, adopted on 24 February 2006,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 13 October 2011 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘Increasing the impact of the EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change’ (COM(2011)0637), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 13 October 2011 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘Increasing the impact of the EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change’ (COM(2011)0637),

| — | having regard to the Sustainable Developments Goals, in particular goal 16: target 16.4, which calls for states to significantly reduce illicit arms flows; |
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having regard to the Sustainable Developments Goals, in particular goal 16: target 16.4, which calls for states to significantly reduce illicit arms flows;

| — | having regard to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, |
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having regard to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine,

| — | having regard to Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |
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having regard to Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

| — | having regard to the UN Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, |
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having regard to the UN Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014,

| — | having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution 24/35 of 8 October 2013 on the impact of arms transfer on human rights in armed conflicts (12), |
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having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution 24/35 of 8 October 2013 on the impact of arms transfer on human rights in armed conflicts (12),

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| — | having regard to Rules 52 and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rules 52 and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0338/2015), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0338/2015),

| A. | whereas the global security environment around the EU has dramatically changed, especially in its southern and eastern neighbourhood; |
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A.

whereas the global security environment around the EU has dramatically changed, especially in its southern and eastern neighbourhood;

| B. | whereas there is an inherent right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter; |
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B.

whereas there is an inherent right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter;

| C. | whereas in the interests of international stability it is important to provide means for deterrence on the basis of a case-by-case assessment, in full compliance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and Criterion Four of the Common Position on the preservation of regional peace, security and stability; |
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C.

whereas in the interests of international stability it is important to provide means for deterrence on the basis of a case-by-case assessment, in full compliance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and Criterion Four of the Common Position on the preservation of regional peace, security and stability;

| D. | whereas the uncontrolled spread of weapons constitutes a serious risk for peace and security, human rights and sustainable development; whereas every minute somewhere in the world a person dies because of armed violence and 15 new weapons are manufactured; |
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D.

whereas the uncontrolled spread of weapons constitutes a serious risk for peace and security, human rights and sustainable development; whereas every minute somewhere in the world a person dies because of armed violence and 15 new weapons are manufactured;

| E. | whereas regulating the international arms trade is by definition a global ambition; whereas the EU must ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, in order to promote democracy and the rule of law, prevent conflicts, eradicate poverty, foster intercultural dialogue, and maintain international stability and security; whereas over the period 2010-2014 EU Member States were responsible for 25,4 % of volumes of actual deliveries (13) of major conventional weapons worldwide; |
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E.

whereas regulating the international arms trade is by definition a global ambition; whereas the EU must ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, in order to promote democracy and the rule of law, prevent conflicts, eradicate poverty, foster intercultural dialogue, and maintain international stability and security; whereas over the period 2010-2014 EU Member States were responsible for 25,4 % of volumes of actual deliveries (13) of major conventional weapons worldwide;

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| F. | whereas, pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty, poverty eradication is the primary objective of EU development policy, and whereas it is also one of the priorities for EU external action to build a more stable and prosperous world; whereas supplying weapons to countries in conflict not only increases the likelihood of the violence escalating but also has a negative impact on those countries’ development potential, as is made clear in reports by humanitarian organisations that have quantified that impact (14); |
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F.

whereas, pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty, poverty eradication is the primary objective of EU development policy, and whereas it is also one of the priorities for EU external action to build a more stable and prosperous world; whereas supplying weapons to countries in conflict not only increases the likelihood of the violence escalating but also has a negative impact on those countries’ development potential, as is made clear in reports by humanitarian organisations that have quantified that impact (14);

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| G. | whereas EU Member States exported arms with a total value of EUR 36,7 billion in 2013, including EUR 26 billion to third countries; whereas, by way of comparison, the overall budget for the European Neighbourhood Instrument for 2014-2020 is EUR 15,4 billion; whereas EU Member States accounted for 30 % of overall arms exports to third countries; and it can hardly be claimed that these trade flows are in the direct security interests of the EU; |
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G.

whereas EU Member States exported arms with a total value of EUR 36,7 billion in 2013, including EUR 26 billion to third countries; whereas, by way of comparison, the overall budget for the European Neighbourhood Instrument for 2014-2020 is EUR 15,4 billion; whereas EU Member States accounted for 30 % of overall arms exports to third countries; and it can hardly be claimed that these trade flows are in the direct security interests of the EU;

| H. | whereas Common Position 2008/944/CFSP is a legally binding framework laying down eight criteria for the export of conventional arms to be applied by EU Member States to their licensing decisions; whereas due account of this Common Position should be taken specifically in the context of the development of a European defence market and a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base; |
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H.

whereas Common Position 2008/944/CFSP is a legally binding framework laying down eight criteria for the export of conventional arms to be applied by EU Member States to their licensing decisions; whereas due account of this Common Position should be taken specifically in the context of the development of a European defence market and a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base;

| I. | whereas the third countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Canada, Montenegro and Norway have officially aligned themselves with the Common Position’s criteria and principles; |
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I.

whereas the third countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Canada, Montenegro and Norway have officially aligned themselves with the Common Position’s criteria and principles;

Global security environment and arms exports

Global security environment and arms exports

| 1. | Is deeply concerned at the spread of armed conflicts, notably those in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen as well as all international conflicts, which, in an increasingly globalised world, are a threat to world stability and security and have determined a less stable and less secure neighbourhood for the EU; notes that arms transfers to states in conflict may have contributed to these conflicts; |
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1.

Is deeply concerned at the spread of armed conflicts, notably those in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen as well as all international conflicts, which, in an increasingly globalised world, are a threat to world stability and security and have determined a less stable and less secure neighbourhood for the EU; notes that arms transfers to states in conflict may have contributed to these conflicts;

| 2. | Finds it regrettable that developments in the last two years have shown that weapons sometimes end up in the hands of terrorists or repressive regimes or of countries where children might be recruited or used in hostilities, or of regimes which have dubious relations with international terrorism or an aggressive domestic and foreign policy, and believes it is therefore necessary to adopt effective arms export control regimes; condemns the use of arms with the aim of fuelling insecurity and armed conflicts internally and externally or of supporting internal repression, regional conflicts or grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms; also finds it regrettable that the illicit trade in arms continues to be a big and profitable business; |
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2.

Finds it regrettable that developments in the last two years have shown that weapons sometimes end up in the hands of terrorists or repressive regimes or of countries where children might be recruited or used in hostilities, or of regimes which have dubious relations with international terrorism or an aggressive domestic and foreign policy, and believes it is therefore necessary to adopt effective arms export control regimes; condemns the use of arms with the aim of fuelling insecurity and armed conflicts internally and externally or of supporting internal repression, regional conflicts or grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms; also finds it regrettable that the illicit trade in arms continues to be a big and profitable business;

| 3. | Deplores the fact that around half a million (15) people die every year as a result of armed violence, both in armed conflicts and in connection with criminal activity; |
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3.

Deplores the fact that around half a million (15) people die every year as a result of armed violence, both in armed conflicts and in connection with criminal activity;

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| 4. | Reasserts that adherence to the Common Position is fundamental to the fulfilment of the EU’s principles and values, particularly in the fields of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and of its responsibilities in its own right in terms of regional and global security; |
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4.

Reasserts that adherence to the Common Position is fundamental to the fulfilment of the EU’s principles and values, particularly in the fields of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and of its responsibilities in its own right in terms of regional and global security;

| 5. | Notes that EU Member States are major global arms exporters, accounting in 2013 for EUR 36,711 billion in exports worldwide, of which EUR 10,735 between Member States and EUR 25,976 billion to third countries, according to the 16th Annual Report; reiterates that Article 10 of the Common Position states that considerations of economic, commercial and industrial interests by Member States shall not affect the application of the eight criteria regulating arms exports; |
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5.

Notes that EU Member States are major global arms exporters, accounting in 2013 for EUR 36,711 billion in exports worldwide, of which EUR 10,735 between Member States and EUR 25,976 billion to third countries, according to the 16th Annual Report; reiterates that Article 10 of the Common Position states that considerations of economic, commercial and industrial interests by Member States shall not affect the application of the eight criteria regulating arms exports;

| 6. | Regrets, however, that Article 10 is often overlooked, especially since European defence companies are increasingly compensating for their reduced turnover in Europe through extra-EU exports; is seriously concerned at the consequences for the security and defence of the EU caused by the transfer of sensitive knowledge and technology to third countries, which represents an increased risk of dependency on third countries with diverging strategic interests such as Russia; |
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6.

Regrets, however, that Article 10 is often overlooked, especially since European defence companies are increasingly compensating for their reduced turnover in Europe through extra-EU exports; is seriously concerned at the consequences for the security and defence of the EU caused by the transfer of sensitive knowledge and technology to third countries, which represents an increased risk of dependency on third countries with diverging strategic interests such as Russia;

| 7. | Recalls that the defence industry should serve as an instrument for implementing the defence and security of the Member States, ensuring a security of supply regime in the EU while also contributing towards the implementation of a strengthened CFSP and CSDP, given that this is important in helping ensure global stability and security; recognises that arms exports have been instrumental in terms of strengthening and further developing the industrial and technological base of European defence, which has been important in a wide range of innovation and technological development; |
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7.

Recalls that the defence industry should serve as an instrument for implementing the defence and security of the Member States, ensuring a security of supply regime in the EU while also contributing towards the implementation of a strengthened CFSP and CSDP, given that this is important in helping ensure global stability and security; recognises that arms exports have been instrumental in terms of strengthening and further developing the industrial and technological base of European defence, which has been important in a wide range of innovation and technological development;

| 8. | Acknowledges the legitimacy of exports that fully meet the criteria laid down in Article 4(c) of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and are carried out in response to a request made to the EU in accordance with the right to self-defence; supports the supply of defensive arms in case of legitimate self-defence; notes the decision of some Member States to supply defensive arms to the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan and to Ukraine; notes that in this respect Member States are not coordinating with each other; |
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8.

Acknowledges the legitimacy of exports that fully meet the criteria laid down in Article 4(c) of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and are carried out in response to a request made to the EU in accordance with the right to self-defence; supports the supply of defensive arms in case of legitimate self-defence; notes the decision of some Member States to supply defensive arms to the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan and to Ukraine; notes that in this respect Member States are not coordinating with each other;

| 9. | Points out that, while denials and suspensions of licences following embargos or conflicts are a positive sign, they indicate that EU export policy is merely reactive in character; considers that according to the Common Position a more thorough assessment of the specific risks associated with recipient countries and of the EU’s security interests would be necessary before licensing; |
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9.

Points out that, while denials and suspensions of licences following embargos or conflicts are a positive sign, they indicate that EU export policy is merely reactive in character; considers that according to the Common Position a more thorough assessment of the specific risks associated with recipient countries and of the EU’s security interests would be necessary before licensing;

| 10. | Notes that the risks deriving from the diversion, smuggling and stockpiling of arms and explosives are increasing and remain a challenge to be addressed; stresses the risks that arms from third countries which have high levels of corruption might be introduced into Europe owing to increased arms smuggling and trafficking and the lack of inspections at points of entry, such as ports, thus compromising the security of citizens as was highlighted in a recent Europol report (16); |
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10.

Notes that the risks deriving from the diversion, smuggling and stockpiling of arms and explosives are increasing and remain a challenge to be addressed; stresses the risks that arms from third countries which have high levels of corruption might be introduced into Europe owing to increased arms smuggling and trafficking and the lack of inspections at points of entry, such as ports, thus compromising the security of citizens as was highlighted in a recent Europol report (16);

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| 11. | Stresses that arms export controls are an integral part of EU foreign and security policy and must be guided by the principles enshrined in Article 21 TEU, notably the promotion of democracy and the rule of law and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security; recalls that it is crucial to ensure coherence between arms exports and the credibility of the EU as a global human rights advocate; is deeply convinced that a more effective implementation of the eight criteria of the Common Position would represent an important contribution to the development of both the CFSP and the CSDP; calls for the new EU global strategy on foreign and security policy to properly consider arms exports issues in view of the changed security environment and associated risks and threats to European security interests; |
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11.

Stresses that arms export controls are an integral part of EU foreign and security policy and must be guided by the principles enshrined in Article 21 TEU, notably the promotion of democracy and the rule of law and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security; recalls that it is crucial to ensure coherence between arms exports and the credibility of the EU as a global human rights advocate; is deeply convinced that a more effective implementation of the eight criteria of the Common Position would represent an important contribution to the development of both the CFSP and the CSDP; calls for the new EU global strategy on foreign and security policy to properly consider arms exports issues in view of the changed security environment and associated risks and threats to European security interests;

| 12. | Deplores the fact that illegitimate, illicit and unregulated arms transfers continue to undermine political stability and hinder democratic social and/or economic development in certain parts of the world; recognises that the coherent interpretation and effective implementation of Criterion Eight of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP would be a decisive contribution to the EU’s Policy Coherence on Development objectives; calls for continued attention to Criterion Eight in order to assess the possible negative impact of arms spending on the development prospects of poorer recipient countries; |
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12.

Deplores the fact that illegitimate, illicit and unregulated arms transfers continue to undermine political stability and hinder democratic social and/or economic development in certain parts of the world; recognises that the coherent interpretation and effective implementation of Criterion Eight of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP would be a decisive contribution to the EU’s Policy Coherence on Development objectives; calls for continued attention to Criterion Eight in order to assess the possible negative impact of arms spending on the development prospects of poorer recipient countries;

The Arms Trade Treaty

The Arms Trade Treaty

| 13. | Welcomes the entry into force of the ATT; welcomes the outreach activities undertaken by the EU to promote universal ratification and implementation of the ATT, and calls for sustained efforts in this regard, notably with countries that are major arms traders; urges those Member States which have not yet ratified the ATT to do so at the earliest opportunity; recognises that the ATT, while representing a positive achievement, still has its limitations and ambiguities (unclear concepts, exception to reporting obligations, lack of sanctioning regime); |
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13.

Welcomes the entry into force of the ATT; welcomes the outreach activities undertaken by the EU to promote universal ratification and implementation of the ATT, and calls for sustained efforts in this regard, notably with countries that are major arms traders; urges those Member States which have not yet ratified the ATT to do so at the earliest opportunity; recognises that the ATT, while representing a positive achievement, still has its limitations and ambiguities (unclear concepts, exception to reporting obligations, lack of sanctioning regime);

| 14. | Welcomes the success of the first Conference of States Parties held in Cancún from 24 to 27 August 2015, but points out that no agreement was reached on the template to be used for the annual reports; believes that the Treaty will be genuinely successful only if steps are taken to make it universally applicable and if binding or punitive mechanisms are established, to be used in case of failure to apply the rules; |
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14.

Welcomes the success of the first Conference of States Parties held in Cancún from 24 to 27 August 2015, but points out that no agreement was reached on the template to be used for the annual reports; believes that the Treaty will be genuinely successful only if steps are taken to make it universally applicable and if binding or punitive mechanisms are established, to be used in case of failure to apply the rules;

| 15. | Welcomes the requirement that states parties to the ATT take into account in the licence decision-making process the risk that the weapons to be transferred may be used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children; calls on the Member States to strengthen the language of the Common Position with regard to gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children; |
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15.

Welcomes the requirement that states parties to the ATT take into account in the licence decision-making process the risk that the weapons to be transferred may be used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children; calls on the Member States to strengthen the language of the Common Position with regard to gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children;

| 16. | Commends the fact that the EU has a legally binding framework, unique in the world, through which arms export control is being enforced, including in crisis regions and countries with questionable human rights records; welcomes the fact, in this connection, that several European and third countries have joined the arms exports control system on the basis of the Common Position; |
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16.

Commends the fact that the EU has a legally binding framework, unique in the world, through which arms export control is being enforced, including in crisis regions and countries with questionable human rights records; welcomes the fact, in this connection, that several European and third countries have joined the arms exports control system on the basis of the Common Position;

| 17. | Welcomes the fact that Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Norway have aligned themselves with the criteria and principles of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP; notes that a special information exchange system between the EU and the aligned third countries has been in place since 2012; |
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17.

Welcomes the fact that Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Norway have aligned themselves with the criteria and principles of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP; notes that a special information exchange system between the EU and the aligned third countries has been in place since 2012;

The Common Position

The Common Position

| 18. | Recalls that the Common Position should lead to a coordinated approach to the arms trade which does not affect the right of Member States to operate more restrictive national policies as stated in Article 3 of the Common Position; further recalls that in any case refusal to transfer any military technology or arms remains the exclusive competence of the Member States and that the common standards set by the Common Position are to be regarded as the minimum standard for the management of transfers of military technology according to recital 3; points out that harmonisation at European level should not be used as a pretext for watering down stricter national rules; |
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18.

Recalls that the Common Position should lead to a coordinated approach to the arms trade which does not affect the right of Member States to operate more restrictive national policies as stated in Article 3 of the Common Position; further recalls that in any case refusal to transfer any military technology or arms remains the exclusive competence of the Member States and that the common standards set by the Common Position are to be regarded as the minimum standard for the management of transfers of military technology according to recital 3; points out that harmonisation at European level should not be used as a pretext for watering down stricter national rules;

| 19. | Calls on the Member States to coherently interpret and rigorously apply the Common Position criteria in all cases, not letting political and economic considerations override a decision-making process; further calls on Member States to cancel already agreed contracts where as a result of a sharply changed situation the deal breaches the Common Position; |
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19.

Calls on the Member States to coherently interpret and rigorously apply the Common Position criteria in all cases, not letting political and economic considerations override a decision-making process; further calls on Member States to cancel already agreed contracts where as a result of a sharply changed situation the deal breaches the Common Position;

| 20. | Takes the view that the real problem is that the Common Position is being applied loosely and interpreted inconsistently by the Member States, and therefore considers it crucial that a consistent and ambitious application of the eight criteria be pursued; points out in this regard that there are no penalties in case of infringement of the criteria, and considers it advisable to make arrangements for conducting independent checks and for penalties in case of infringement of the Common Position; |
| --- | --- |

20.

Takes the view that the real problem is that the Common Position is being applied loosely and interpreted inconsistently by the Member States, and therefore considers it crucial that a consistent and ambitious application of the eight criteria be pursued; points out in this regard that there are no penalties in case of infringement of the criteria, and considers it advisable to make arrangements for conducting independent checks and for penalties in case of infringement of the Common Position;

| 21. | Notes COARM’s review of Common Position 2008/944/CSFP and the conclusion that it properly serves the objectives set by the Council and is in line with the ATT; notes that no change was introduced despite the grave situation in Syria and Iraq, the increase in terrorist activity, and conflict and instability which are widespread across the Middle East and North Africa and could, in turn, affect the security of the Union itself; |
| --- | --- |

21.

Notes COARM’s review of Common Position 2008/944/CSFP and the conclusion that it properly serves the objectives set by the Council and is in line with the ATT; notes that no change was introduced despite the grave situation in Syria and Iraq, the increase in terrorist activity, and conflict and instability which are widespread across the Middle East and North Africa and could, in turn, affect the security of the Union itself;

| 22. | Takes note of the update of the User’s Guide to the Council Common Position and of the EU Military List; looks forward to the adoption of a new online information-sharing mechanism by COARM; welcomes the new references made to aspects of the ATT which are not yet included in the Common Position and the changes to the elaborative guidance to Criterion Seven; calls for efforts to be made in particular in respect to guidance on implementing Criterion Eight in an effective way; |
| --- | --- |

22.

Takes note of the update of the User’s Guide to the Council Common Position and of the EU Military List; looks forward to the adoption of a new online information-sharing mechanism by COARM; welcomes the new references made to aspects of the ATT which are not yet included in the Common Position and the changes to the elaborative guidance to Criterion Seven; calls for efforts to be made in particular in respect to guidance on implementing Criterion Eight in an effective way;

| 23. | Calls on the Member States to ensure a stricter application of the eight criteria; believes that Member States, including at European level in COARM, should broaden their assessments to include a focus on the situation in the country of destination as well as on the specific military technology in question; encourages Member States to apply stricter national criteria; |
| --- | --- |

23.

Calls on the Member States to ensure a stricter application of the eight criteria; believes that Member States, including at European level in COARM, should broaden their assessments to include a focus on the situation in the country of destination as well as on the specific military technology in question; encourages Member States to apply stricter national criteria;

| 24. | Is concerned at the effect that threats of legal action by companies in some Member States, whether real or perceived, might be having on the consideration of export licence applications; reminds Member States that rigorous and scrupulous application of the eight criteria creates the necessary grounds for licence refusals; |
| --- | --- |

24.

Is concerned at the effect that threats of legal action by companies in some Member States, whether real or perceived, might be having on the consideration of export licence applications; reminds Member States that rigorous and scrupulous application of the eight criteria creates the necessary grounds for licence refusals;

| 25. | Takes note that Criterion Two requires Member States to deny an export licence only if there is a ‘clear risk’ that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used for internal repression; considering that this criterion leaves room for an incoherent application of the common rules; calls for liaising with representatives of the Council of Europe, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and human rights organisations in order to further clarify Criterion Two; |
| --- | --- |

25.

Takes note that Criterion Two requires Member States to deny an export licence only if there is a ‘clear risk’ that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used for internal repression; considering that this criterion leaves room for an incoherent application of the common rules; calls for liaising with representatives of the Council of Europe, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and human rights organisations in order to further clarify Criterion Two;

| 26. | Is critical of the frequent violations of the eight criteria by various Member States; regrets that there are no mechanisms for sanctions for violation of the eight criteria by a Member State and that there are no plans to that effect; takes the view that ways and means of carrying out independent verification and mechanisms for sanctions for violations of the Common Position should be provided for; |
| --- | --- |

26.

Is critical of the frequent violations of the eight criteria by various Member States; regrets that there are no mechanisms for sanctions for violation of the eight criteria by a Member State and that there are no plans to that effect; takes the view that ways and means of carrying out independent verification and mechanisms for sanctions for violations of the Common Position should be provided for;

| 27. | Urges every Member State to treat the concept of risk in arms transfer licensing processes on a precautionary basis, as is standard when addressing other areas such as terrorism, money laundering and environmental concerns; |
| --- | --- |

27.

Urges every Member State to treat the concept of risk in arms transfer licensing processes on a precautionary basis, as is standard when addressing other areas such as terrorism, money laundering and environmental concerns;

| 28. | Stresses the need to ensure a more coherent policy on embargos and to apply them with immediate effect; calls on Member States to clarify the national and international provisions relating to the export of ‘military’ and ‘non-military’ arms, which could lead to small arms transfers being able to circumvent regulation systems by being described as ‘non-military’; |
| --- | --- |

28.

Stresses the need to ensure a more coherent policy on embargos and to apply them with immediate effect; calls on Member States to clarify the national and international provisions relating to the export of ‘military’ and ‘non-military’ arms, which could lead to small arms transfers being able to circumvent regulation systems by being described as ‘non-military’;

| 29. | Recalls that Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council implementing Article 10 of the UN Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms is intended to ensure effective control of transfers of firearms for civilian use; acknowledges the legitimacy of exports for hunting and sporting weapons for civilian use under that Regulation; welcomes the review of the EU legislation on firearms (including on deactivation, administrative sanctions and signal weapons) and the intention to strengthen police cooperation with neighbouring countries on arms smuggling; calls, accordingly, on the Commission to enhance Europol’s capabilities; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Recalls that Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council implementing Article 10 of the UN Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms is intended to ensure effective control of transfers of firearms for civilian use; acknowledges the legitimacy of exports for hunting and sporting weapons for civilian use under that Regulation; welcomes the review of the EU legislation on firearms (including on deactivation, administrative sanctions and signal weapons) and the intention to strengthen police cooperation with neighbouring countries on arms smuggling; calls, accordingly, on the Commission to enhance Europol’s capabilities;

| 30. | Calls on Member States to include a mechanism in the Common Position that would automatically freeze existing export licences for arms to countries against which a European weapons embargo has been established after the export control license was granted; |
| --- | --- |

30.

Calls on Member States to include a mechanism in the Common Position that would automatically freeze existing export licences for arms to countries against which a European weapons embargo has been established after the export control license was granted;

| 31. | Suggests exploring the possibility of applying and extending the eight criteria, also to the transfer of arms-export-related services such as consultancy and to activities of EU — based private military companies in third countries; calls for a unified EU approach to the issue of floating armouries; |
| --- | --- |

31.

Suggests exploring the possibility of applying and extending the eight criteria, also to the transfer of arms-export-related services such as consultancy and to activities of EU — based private military companies in third countries; calls for a unified EU approach to the issue of floating armouries;

| 32. | Calls on all Member States that are not yet in full compliance with Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP of 23 June 2003 on the control of arms brokering to explain why they are not in compliance and what steps they propose to take and when, in order to honour their obligations under the Common Position; encourages Member States to include arms transporting and arms financing services into their arms brokering legislation; |
| --- | --- |

32.

Calls on all Member States that are not yet in full compliance with Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP of 23 June 2003 on the control of arms brokering to explain why they are not in compliance and what steps they propose to take and when, in order to honour their obligations under the Common Position; encourages Member States to include arms transporting and arms financing services into their arms brokering legislation;

| 33. | Is concerned over possible diversions of exports, and calls on Member States to establish an effective control system (monitoring systems, non-misuse clause in end-user certificates, and on-site inspections of end users) including reinforcement of staff dedicated to this purpose; believes that there should be enhanced cooperation among Member States and between Member States and Europol and Eurojust, as well as with third countries, to facilitate the prosecution of brokers and smugglers for illegal arms transfers; calls on the Council to better align Criterion Seven to Article 11 of the ATT; |
| --- | --- |

33.

Is concerned over possible diversions of exports, and calls on Member States to establish an effective control system (monitoring systems, non-misuse clause in end-user certificates, and on-site inspections of end users) including reinforcement of staff dedicated to this purpose; believes that there should be enhanced cooperation among Member States and between Member States and Europol and Eurojust, as well as with third countries, to facilitate the prosecution of brokers and smugglers for illegal arms transfers; calls on the Council to better align Criterion Seven to Article 11 of the ATT;

| 34. | Is deeply concerned at the possible circumvention of EU export controls through licensed production in third countries or through overseas subsidiaries of EU-based companies; urges COARM to consider this issue in depth in its next annual report; |
| --- | --- |

34.

Is deeply concerned at the possible circumvention of EU export controls through licensed production in third countries or through overseas subsidiaries of EU-based companies; urges COARM to consider this issue in depth in its next annual report;

| 35. | Calls for increased coordination at working level within the Council and the EEAS in order to ensure that aspects related to conflict prevention, development and human rights are duly taken into account; calls for regular consultations between COARM and COHOM as well as for COARM to liaise with all relevant EU actors such as Intcen, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the EU Delegations, in order to better improve coherence and share information that might be relevant to arms transfer licensing decisions, in particular with regard to risks in proposed recipient countries, so as to improve the quality of decisions made in the context of the Common Position; |
| --- | --- |

35.

Calls for increased coordination at working level within the Council and the EEAS in order to ensure that aspects related to conflict prevention, development and human rights are duly taken into account; calls for regular consultations between COARM and COHOM as well as for COARM to liaise with all relevant EU actors such as Intcen, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the EU Delegations, in order to better improve coherence and share information that might be relevant to arms transfer licensing decisions, in particular with regard to risks in proposed recipient countries, so as to improve the quality of decisions made in the context of the Common Position;

Transparency

Transparency

| 36. | Regrets the late adoption of the Sixteenth Annual Report, making it the most delayed ever; |
| --- | --- |

36.

Regrets the late adoption of the Sixteenth Annual Report, making it the most delayed ever;

| 37. | Notes that full submission means data on the financial value of both arms export licences issued and actual exports, broken down by both destination and EU Military List category; calls on the remaining Member States to fulfil their obligation to submit an annual report and to provide data, for the 16th Annual Report retrospectively and for the forthcoming Annual Reports in due time; |
| --- | --- |

37.

Notes that full submission means data on the financial value of both arms export licences issued and actual exports, broken down by both destination and EU Military List category; calls on the remaining Member States to fulfil their obligation to submit an annual report and to provide data, for the 16th Annual Report retrospectively and for the forthcoming Annual Reports in due time;

| 38. | Notes that the report includes standardised information on issued export licences, but does not include comprehensive information on real arms exports; urges the Council and the VP/HR to look at ways of improving compliance with the reporting obligation and increasing the transparency and public scrutiny of the export control framework, in particular ensuring that Member States report all arms exports; calls for this shortcoming to be remedied and for provision be made accordingly for an annual report that highlights the real export data, disaggregated by type and destination; |
| --- | --- |

38.

Notes that the report includes standardised information on issued export licences, but does not include comprehensive information on real arms exports; urges the Council and the VP/HR to look at ways of improving compliance with the reporting obligation and increasing the transparency and public scrutiny of the export control framework, in particular ensuring that Member States report all arms exports; calls for this shortcoming to be remedied and for provision be made accordingly for an annual report that highlights the real export data, disaggregated by type and destination;

| 39. | Calls for the introduction of a standardised reporting and submission procedure, including a deadline, for information on actual exports and licence data, to be applied and complied with uniformly in all Member States; calls on the Member States to report fully on licences denied, including licence-specific information regarding recipient state and specific authority, description and quantity of items to be transferred with regard to the subcategories of the Military List, together with the precise reason for the denial; proposes that the format of the annual report be changed and that the report be relaunched as a public, interactive and searchable online database; |
| --- | --- |

39.

Calls for the introduction of a standardised reporting and submission procedure, including a deadline, for information on actual exports and licence data, to be applied and complied with uniformly in all Member States; calls on the Member States to report fully on licences denied, including licence-specific information regarding recipient state and specific authority, description and quantity of items to be transferred with regard to the subcategories of the Military List, together with the precise reason for the denial; proposes that the format of the annual report be changed and that the report be relaunched as a public, interactive and searchable online database;

| 40. | Calls for enhanced consultations between Member States with regard to transfers to fragile and unstable regions or countries, in particular those that are acting aggressively in their neighbourhood; calls for a deep and systematic verification of implementation of the EU sanctions regime against Russia in arms exports and sales of dual-use technologies; calls on the Member States to establish a list of persons (including entities and individuals) that have been convicted of violating arms export-related legislation and of cases of identified diversion and persons who have not been convicted by a court but are known to be involved in illegal arms trading or in activities that pose a threat to international security; calls on the Member States to provide detailed information on procedures for the revocation or suspension of granted licences with regard to countries subject to an embargo; |
| --- | --- |

40.

Calls for enhanced consultations between Member States with regard to transfers to fragile and unstable regions or countries, in particular those that are acting aggressively in their neighbourhood; calls for a deep and systematic verification of implementation of the EU sanctions regime against Russia in arms exports and sales of dual-use technologies; calls on the Member States to establish a list of persons (including entities and individuals) that have been convicted of violating arms export-related legislation and of cases of identified diversion and persons who have not been convicted by a court but are known to be involved in illegal arms trading or in activities that pose a threat to international security; calls on the Member States to provide detailed information on procedures for the revocation or suspension of granted licences with regard to countries subject to an embargo;

| 41. | Considers it vital that countries which are candidates for accession to the EU should comply with EU positions and principles regarding arms exports and the arms trade; |
| --- | --- |

41.

Considers it vital that countries which are candidates for accession to the EU should comply with EU positions and principles regarding arms exports and the arms trade;

| 42. | Calls for monitoring of and cooperation on illegal arms trafficking, through cooperation procedures involving police forces and border authorities based on the exchange of information and databases, to minimise security risks for the EU and its citizens; |
| --- | --- |

42.

Calls for monitoring of and cooperation on illegal arms trafficking, through cooperation procedures involving police forces and border authorities based on the exchange of information and databases, to minimise security risks for the EU and its citizens;

Public scrutiny

Public scrutiny

| 43. | Recalls that governments bear the political responsibility of whether or not to export military or dual-use goods; calls on the Member States to provide detailed information on each of the licences issued, so as to make it possible for checks to be carried out at EU level in order to ensure that countries do not fail to meet the common position criteria out of economic, political or personal interests; calls for the EEAS/COARM to take on the task of scrutinising licenses that are thought not to meet the common position criteria; |
| --- | --- |

43.

Recalls that governments bear the political responsibility of whether or not to export military or dual-use goods; calls on the Member States to provide detailed information on each of the licences issued, so as to make it possible for checks to be carried out at EU level in order to ensure that countries do not fail to meet the common position criteria out of economic, political or personal interests; calls for the EEAS/COARM to take on the task of scrutinising licenses that are thought not to meet the common position criteria;

| 44. | Strongly believes that citizens and parliaments have the right to be informed in detail about the arms export decisions of their governments, given that they affect the security and wellbeing of their nation and of countries abroad, and in line with the interests of transparency and greater public scrutiny; calls for the reports to be kept public; |
| --- | --- |

44.

Strongly believes that citizens and parliaments have the right to be informed in detail about the arms export decisions of their governments, given that they affect the security and wellbeing of their nation and of countries abroad, and in line with the interests of transparency and greater public scrutiny; calls for the reports to be kept public;

| 45. | Calls on the Council and the EEAS to also improve access to information regarding EU sanctions and arms embargos, since this information is often not up-to-date or presented in an easily accessible form; |
| --- | --- |

45.

Calls on the Council and the EEAS to also improve access to information regarding EU sanctions and arms embargos, since this information is often not up-to-date or presented in an easily accessible form;

| 46. | Calls for parliamentary oversight to be strengthened at both national and European level by means of annual reports to parliaments; calls for European arms exports and European industrial defence policy to be discussed at the next interparliamentary conference on the CFSP/CSDP; |
| --- | --- |

46.

Calls for parliamentary oversight to be strengthened at both national and European level by means of annual reports to parliaments; calls for European arms exports and European industrial defence policy to be discussed at the next interparliamentary conference on the CFSP/CSDP;

| 47. | Welcomes regular consultations with civil society as increasing transparency; calls on the Commission and the EEAS/COARM to continue this dialogue with civil society, NGOs and thinktanks; encourages civil society and academia to exercise independent scrutiny of the arms trade; |
| --- | --- |

47.

Welcomes regular consultations with civil society as increasing transparency; calls on the Commission and the EEAS/COARM to continue this dialogue with civil society, NGOs and thinktanks; encourages civil society and academia to exercise independent scrutiny of the arms trade;

New technologies and the issue of dual-use goods

New technologies and the issue of dual-use goods

| 48. | Considers that technological developments make it increasingly difficult to distinguish between pure military and pure civilian use, and that special attention should therefore be paid to the Dual Use List in the light of the Wassenaar Arrangement; calls on the VP/HR, the Member States and the Commission to ensure that there are no loopholes at the level of the Wassenaar Arrangement or between the Military List and the annexes to the Dual Use Regulation, and to pay particular attention to new technologies of strategic importance, such as Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, applied robotics and surveillance technology; |
| --- | --- |

48.

Considers that technological developments make it increasingly difficult to distinguish between pure military and pure civilian use, and that special attention should therefore be paid to the Dual Use List in the light of the Wassenaar Arrangement; calls on the VP/HR, the Member States and the Commission to ensure that there are no loopholes at the level of the Wassenaar Arrangement or between the Military List and the annexes to the Dual Use Regulation, and to pay particular attention to new technologies of strategic importance, such as Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, applied robotics and surveillance technology;

| 49. | Recalls that the proliferation of certain surveillance and intrusion technologies around the world cannot only be detrimental to human rights but might also pose a significant threat to European strategic interests and our digital infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

49.

Recalls that the proliferation of certain surveillance and intrusion technologies around the world cannot only be detrimental to human rights but might also pose a significant threat to European strategic interests and our digital infrastructure;

| 50. | Welcomes the ongoing initiative of the Commission to modernise EU dual-use export controls and its intention to present a new legislative proposal in the first half of 2016 for smart and effective policies to regulate commercial exports of services related to the implementation and use of dual-use technologies, while including effective safeguards in order to prevent such export controls harming scientific and IT security research; underlines that the proposal should also aim to improve coherence and transparency of the export control regime and fully take into account the changing nature of security challenges and the speed of technological development, especially with regard to surveillance and intrusion software equipment; welcomes the agreement reached on 4 December 2013 by the participating states in the Wassenaar Arrangement to adopt controls in the areas of surveillance, law enforcement and intelligence- gathering tools and network surveillance systems; recalls the urgent need to address potentially harmful exports of ICT products and services that can be used in connection with human rights violations in certain third countries, as agreed in the Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of April 2014; |
| --- | --- |

50.

Welcomes the ongoing initiative of the Commission to modernise EU dual-use export controls and its intention to present a new legislative proposal in the first half of 2016 for smart and effective policies to regulate commercial exports of services related to the implementation and use of dual-use technologies, while including effective safeguards in order to prevent such export controls harming scientific and IT security research; underlines that the proposal should also aim to improve coherence and transparency of the export control regime and fully take into account the changing nature of security challenges and the speed of technological development, especially with regard to surveillance and intrusion software equipment; welcomes the agreement reached on 4 December 2013 by the participating states in the Wassenaar Arrangement to adopt controls in the areas of surveillance, law enforcement and intelligence- gathering tools and network surveillance systems; recalls the urgent need to address potentially harmful exports of ICT products and services that can be used in connection with human rights violations in certain third countries, as agreed in the Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of April 2014;

| 51. | Calls on the Member States to make sufficient resources available to effectively implement and enforce dual-use export, brokering and transit controls; welcomes the ongoing EU-funded capacity-building programmes in support of third countries’ dual-use export control systems; calls on the Member States to mobilise training capacities within the EU as well; |
| --- | --- |

51.

Calls on the Member States to make sufficient resources available to effectively implement and enforce dual-use export, brokering and transit controls; welcomes the ongoing EU-funded capacity-building programmes in support of third countries’ dual-use export control systems; calls on the Member States to mobilise training capacities within the EU as well;

| 52. | Stresses that the Commission should swiftly be able to provide companies that are in doubt as to whether to apply for an export licence with accurate and up-to-date information on the legality or potentially harmful effects of potential transactions; |
| --- | --- |

52.

Stresses that the Commission should swiftly be able to provide companies that are in doubt as to whether to apply for an export licence with accurate and up-to-date information on the legality or potentially harmful effects of potential transactions;

| 53. | Calls on the Commission to submit proposals for a review of how EU standards on ICTs could be used to prevent the potentially harmful impacts of the export of such technologies or other services to third countries where concepts such as ‘lawful interception’ cannot be considered equivalent to those of the EU, or, for example, that have a poor record on human rights or where the rule of law does not exist; |
| --- | --- |

53.

Calls on the Commission to submit proposals for a review of how EU standards on ICTs could be used to prevent the potentially harmful impacts of the export of such technologies or other services to third countries where concepts such as ‘lawful interception’ cannot be considered equivalent to those of the EU, or, for example, that have a poor record on human rights or where the rule of law does not exist;

| 54. | Reaffirms that EU standards, and particularly those laid down in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, should prevail over other considerations in assessments of incidents involving dual-use technologies used in ways that may restrict human rights; |
| --- | --- |

54.

Reaffirms that EU standards, and particularly those laid down in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, should prevail over other considerations in assessments of incidents involving dual-use technologies used in ways that may restrict human rights;

| 55. | Deplores the active cooperation of certain European companies, as well as of international companies trading in dual-use technologies, in circumstances where they are aware of the detrimental effects on human rights involved in trading with regimes whose actions violate human rights; |
| --- | --- |

55.

Deplores the active cooperation of certain European companies, as well as of international companies trading in dual-use technologies, in circumstances where they are aware of the detrimental effects on human rights involved in trading with regimes whose actions violate human rights;

| 56. | Urges the Commission publicly to exclude companies engaging in such activities from EU procurement procedures, from research and development funding and from any other form of financial support; |
| --- | --- |

56.

Urges the Commission publicly to exclude companies engaging in such activities from EU procurement procedures, from research and development funding and from any other form of financial support;

o

o o

| 57. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President/High Representative and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

57.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President/High Representative and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

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(1)  OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99.

1

(2)  OJ C 103, 27.3.2015, p. 1.

2

(3)  Arms Trade Treaty, UN, 13-27217.

3

(4)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2014)0081.

4

(5)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0215.

5

(6)  OJ L 341, 18.12.2013, p. 56.

6

(7)  OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, p. 1.

7

(8)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0288.

8

(9)  OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 1.

9

(10)  OJ L 156, 25.6.2003, p. 79.

10

(11)  http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/, ‘list of dual-use goods and technologies and munitions list’ — the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, 25 March 2015.

11

‘list of dual-use goods and technologies and munitions list’

(12)  A/HRC/RES/24/35.

12

(13)  ‘Trends in international arms transfers’, 2014, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2015.

13

(14)  IANSA, Oxfam International and Saferworld, ‘Africa’s missing billions — International arms flows and the cost of conflict’, 2007.

14

(15)  ‘Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Body Counts’ — report of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.

15

(16)  ‘Exploring Tomorrow’s Organised Crime’, Europol (2015).

16

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