UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

v.

Airman First Class SEANDALE J. CHAMBLEE

United States Air Force

ACM 38453

17 June 2014

Sentence adjudged 14 August 2013 by GCM convened at McConnell

Air Force Base, Kansas. Military Judge: Natalie D. Richardson (sitting 

alone).

Approved Sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 22 months, 

forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Colonel Randall G. Snow.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Gerald R. Bruce, Esquire.

Before

MARKSTEINER, MITCHELL, and WEBER

Appellate Military Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

This opinion is subject to editorial correction before final release.

MITCHELL, Judge:

A general court-martial composed of a military judge convicted the appellant,

pursuant to his pleas, of desertion, false official statement, wrongful use of marijuana,

and aggravated sexual assault in violation of Articles 85, 107, 112a, and 120, UCMJ, 

10 U.S.C. §§ 885, 907, 912a, 920. The adjudged and approved sentence consisted of a 

bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 22 months, total forfeiture of all pay and 

allowances, and reduction to E-1.
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Background

By the time of his court-martial, the appellant was a 20-year-old Airman who had 

been in the Air Force for slightly more than 2 years. Around February 2011, when the 

appellant was a senior in high school, he met Ms. SA through Facebook. They met for 

the first time in person in June 2011 and began a dating relationship. The appellant 

enlisted in the Air Force and entered active duty on 12 July 2011. Throughout basic 

training and technical school training, the appellant kept in contact with Ms. SA. In 

June 2012, the appellant took leave and returned home. While home, he and Ms. SA 

decided to celebrate their one-year anniversary by engaging in sexual intercourse. 

Ms. SA did not turn 16 until the following month, July 2012. Later that summer, their 

relationship ended when the appellant became involved with another female. Ms. SA did 

not report the event to law enforcement.

The appellant was granted leave from 7–16 February 2013. He again returned 

home and met up with a friend, Mr. MC. Mr. MC was a college student and lived in the 

dorms at the nearby college. The appellant smoked marijuana with Mr. MC on several 

occasions. By the time his leave ended, the appellant decided not to return to 

McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, and instead planned to move in with Mr. MC and 

enroll in college. He moved his belongings out of his mother’s apartment and moved in 

with Mr. MC.

When the appellant did not return for his next duty day, his supervisor called his 

cellphone and spoke to him. The appellant falsely told his supervisor that he was 

currently driving back to base. While he remained away, the appellant posted a video on 

Facebook in which he is asking Mr. MC about a “blunt.” The appellant’s page was 

public so members of his squadron, his commander, and others were able to see that post 

and other status updates that described his partying instead of being at work. The 

appellant did not voluntarily return to military control. On 25 February 2013, Air Force 

law enforcement agents apprehended the appellant. He was subsequently placed in 

pretrial confinement. In the course of investigating the appellant’s desertion and his 

connections to his home community, the law enforcement agents interviewed Ms. SA and 

learned about their sexual relationship while she was under the age of consent.

The appellant pled guilty to all charges and specifications—including the 

Article 120, UCMJ, charge with Ms. SA as the victim—pursuant to a pretrial agreement. 

The military judge properly ensured that the appellant was advised of the sex offender 

registration requirements. See United States v. Riley, 72 M.J. 115 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

The appellant submitted statements from Ms. SA and her father during the 

sentencing proceeding. Those statements explained that Ms. SA had saved every letter 

that the appellant sent her during his training. Ms. SA wrote about their relationship, 

stating that she loved the appellant and was praying that he would be able to overcome 
3 ACM 38453

this obstacle. She stated that she still had a good relationship with the appellant’s mother. 

Her father, a reverend, wrote that in the beginning he closely supervised the relationship 

between the appellant and his daughter, an honor student. The appellant had respected 

his rules, and he allowed them to date—which included going to the movies together. He 

wrote: “I still think [the appellant] is a good and fair young man. I just think that he 

made a left turn instead of turning right.”

The staff judge advocate obtained a “victim impact letter” from Ms. SA and 

included it as an attachment to the staff judge advocate’s recommendation to the 

convening authority. Ms. SA wrote that she understood “the law is the law” but asked 

the convening authority to grant some clemency. She described the appellant as a good 

person who made mistakes and had learned his lesson. She described the impact thusly:

“I believe that the most stressful and over-whelming impact that [the appellant’s] ‘crime’ 

had on my life was having to answer questions and talk to attorneys often, and knowing 

that [he] was confined. I really wish that we would have waited so that maybe all of this 

could have been avoided, but everything happens for a reason.”

The convening authority did not grant any clemency.

Sentence Appropriateness

While this case was submitted on the merits, we elect to address the 

appropriateness of the appellant’s sentence. This Court “may affirm only . . . the 

sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and 

determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved.” Article 66(c), UCMJ, 

10 U.S.C. § 866(c). We review sentence appropriateness de novo, employing “a 

sweeping congressional mandate” to ensure “a fair and just punishment for every 

accused.” United States v. Baier, 60 M.J. 382, 384 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citations omitted). 

We assess sentence appropriateness by considering the particular appellant, the nature 

and seriousness of the offense, the appellant’s record of service, and all matters contained 

in the record of trial. See United States v. Bare, 63 M.J. 707, 714 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 

2006), aff’d, 65 M.J. 35 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

The appellant’s plea to all the offenses was provident. The convening authority 

was able to consider all the evidence as well as the victim impact statement prior to 

acting on clemency. With respect to the Article 120, UCMJ, charge, it was the convening 

authority’s decision to determine whether the appellant’s conduct warranted a conviction 

that will likely result in sex offender registration. The convening authority was able to 

consider that the sexual intercourse occurred when the appellant was 19 years old, with a

girl he had dated for a year before he entered the Air Force, who was 15 years and 11 

months old at the time, who wrote letters on the appellant’s behalf, who expressed that 

the only victim impact came from the workings of the military justice process, and whose 

own father wrote a letter on the appellant’s behalf. 
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We have a great deal of discretion in determining whether a particular sentence is 

appropriate, but we are not authorized to engage in exercises of clemency, United States 

v. Healy, 26 M.J. 395, 395-96 (C.M.A. 1988). In the absence of any error or other legal 

rationale, a decision to set aside a legal and factually sufficient plea would be an exercise 

in clemency. See United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138 (C.A.A.F. 2010). Having 

reviewed the entire record to include the matters submitted post-trial, we have determined 

that the sentence as adjudged and approved is appropriate for the appellant’s crimes.

Conclusion

The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error 

materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant occurred. Articles 59(a) 

and 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c); United States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 41 

(C.A.A.F. 2000). Accordingly, the approved findings and sentence are

AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT

STEVEN LUCAS

Clerk of the Court