UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4936

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

TOWANA LAVONE SCOTT, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, 

Senior District Judge. (1:07-cr-00086-WLO) 

Submitted: March 20, 2009 Decided: April 9, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Randolph M. Lee, LAW OFFICES OF RANDOLPH M. LEE, Charlotte, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. David P. Folmar, Jr., Angela 

Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro, 

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Towana Lavone Scott pled guilty pursuant to a plea 

agreement to distribution of crack cocaine in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2006). She received a sentence 

of 262 months’ imprisonment, followed by eight years’ supervised 

release. Scott’s appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal, but arguing that Scott’s 

sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing based 

on Amendment 706, which lowered the offense levels for drug 

offenses involving crack cocaine. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual (“USSG”) § 2D1.1(c) (2007 & Supp. 2008); USSG App. C 

Amend. 706. Additionally, Scott filed a pro se supplemental 

brief, arguing that the district court failed to establish that 

a factual basis existed for her guilty plea and failed to inform 

her of her constitutional rights, and that the medication she 

was taking at the time of sentencing rendered her plea 

involuntary. We affirm. 

 We find that the district court complied with the 

requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when it accepted Scott’s 

guilty plea, ensuring that the plea was knowing and voluntary, 

that Scott understood the rights she was giving up by pleading 

guilty and the sentence she faced, and that she committed the 

offense to which she was pleading guilty. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

2 
11(b). Though the district court did not specifically refer to 

the factual basis of the plea, its adoption of the presentence 

report, which explicitly detailed the offense conduct, was 

sufficient to establish a factual basis for Scott’s guilty plea. 

See United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 531-32 (4th Cir. 

2002) (finding factual basis for plea where court had adopted 

presentence report containing facts supporting charged offenses) 

 We review Scott’s sentence for reasonableness under a 

deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). We may presume a sentence 

within a properly calculated guideline range is reasonable. 

United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). As 

the district court correctly calculated Scott’s advisory 

guideline range, adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) factors, and sentenced Scott at the low end of the 

advisory guidelines range, we find Scott’s sentence to be 

reasonable. 

 Scott contends that because she was sentenced prior to 

enactment of Amendment 706 to the guidelines, which lowered the 

offense levels for drug offenses involving crack cocaine, she is 

eligible to benefit from the retroactive application of the 

amendment. See USSG App. C Amend. 706. However, as Scott 

failed to raise this issue before the district court, it is not 

properly before us on appeal. See United States v. Brewer, 520 

3 
4 

F.3d 367, 373 (4th Cir. 2008) (“It is, however, for the district 

court to first assess whether and to what extent [a] sentence 

may be . . . affected [by Amendment 706].”). Accordingly, we 

decline to address this issue, “without prejudice to [Scott’s] 

right to pursue such relief in the sentencing court.” Id.

(footnote omitted). 

 After reviewing the remaining arguments raised in 

Scott’s pro se supplemental brief, we find them to be without 

merit. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm Scott’s conviction and sentence. 

 This court requires that counsel inform Scott, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Scott requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Scott. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED