alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CITY OF BOCA RATON, Florida, a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. WHITEHALL REALTY, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 72-1010.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 28, 1973.

Rehearing Denied March 29, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Shannon *v.*Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, Appellant.

Argued October 25, 1934.

Before Trexuer, P. J., Keller, Cunningham, Baldbige, Stadtfeld, Parker and James, JJ.

*495
      *Jay B. Leopold,*and with him *Bernard J. O’Gormell,*for appellant.

*James P. McCormich,*and with him *Vincent A. Gar-roll,*for appellee.

December 18, 1934:

Per Curiam,

The plaintiff was proceeding on the evening of June 13, 1931 before dark driving his truck south on 39th Street and as he reached Spruce Street he looked in both directions and on the west side he saw a trolley car on Spruce Street west of 39th Street 250 or 300 feet away. He proceeded to cross and when he looked west the second time he was between the east and west bound car tracks and the trolley car was a car length beyond the west houseline or 75 feet away from him. He continued to cross and when he got to the rail of the east bound track the trolley car came along and hit the truck causing the injuries which are the basis of this suit. He could not tell the speed of the trolley car. He said that the trolley car had slackened down to make a stop at 39th Street. No warning or signal had been given.

The appellant argues that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, that he should have stopped to allow the trolley car to pass. We do not think that the nature of the evidence submitted shows that the case was one to be decided by the court as a matter! of law. The duty of the driver of a car approaching a street crossing is to look when he enters the street and as far as possible, under the circumstances, continue to look necessarily not always in the same direction. In this case it certainly showed no carelessness on the part of the driver of the truck in starting across the street when the car was 300 feet away. Ordinarily, under such conditions, there was no question about there being ample time for him to get across before *496the trolley car would be at the intersection. The mere sight of a trolley car in the distance does not prevent the driver from attempting to cross if such distance would appear to afford the opportunity to the ordinary prudent person. When the driver of the truck saw the trolley car 72 feet away slowing down, it would seem that the jury could find that he had a right to conclude that the trolley car was not going to strike him and that he could proceed with safety. It was for the jury to decide as to whether he exercised the reasonable care required under the circumstances. There is no doubt, taking as we must, that his narration is true, the jury could find that there was ample time for the motorman to stop his car when he saw the plaintiff on the track, and the plaintiff had a right to presume, under the facts as presented, that the trolley car when approaching the intersecting street at lessened speed would not collide with the truck he was driving.

We think the case was properly decided.

The judgment is affirmed.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON M OTION FOR R EHEARING

Appellate case name: Michael M. Euler v. Miles Marks and Texas Dow Employees Federal

Credit Union

Appellate case number: 01

- 13

- 00085

- CV

Trial court case number : 11

- 06

- 06132

- CV

Trial court: 9th District Court of Montgomery County

It is ordered that Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing is denied

.

Judge’s signature:

_

/s/ Rebeca Huddle

_________________________ Acting for the Court

Panel consists of: Chief Justice Ra dack and Justices Massengale and Huddle

Date: May 13, 2014
No. 00-7388.

#### Ceniceros *v.*Yearwood, Warden.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 23

                       Consent of Independent Accountants


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement of
Delmarva Power & Light Company on Form S-3 (File No. 333-24059) of our report
dated February 7, 2000, on our audits of the consolidated financial statements
and financial statement schedule of Delmarva Power & Light Company as of
December 31, 1999 and 1998 and for each of the three years in the period ended
December 31, 1999, which report is included in this Form 10-K.


/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
---------------------------------------------
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
March 27, 2000
CONVERSION FACTORS FOR f,. . .~ ,UNIFORM ANNUAL COST, EQUIVALENT FIRST COST. PRESENT WORTH 

'1- & MULTIPLY GIVEN 

GIVEN DESIRED BY 

, --

UNIFORM 

ANNUAL COST 

UNIFORM 

ANNUAL COST 

.;, )) 7~ EQUIVALENT . " I· °FIRST COST 

EQUIVALENT 

FIRST COST 

PRESENT 

WORTH 

UNIFORM 

ANNUAL COST 

1 

(FCR) 

(PWF) 

(FCR) 

EQUIVALENT 

FIRST COST 

PRESENT 

WORTH (FCR) (PWF) 

PRESENT 

WORTH 

UNIFORM 

ANNUAL COST 

1 

(PWF) 

PRESENT 1 

WORTH 

EQUIVALENT 

FIRST COST (PWF) (FCR) 

g 

WHERE: FCR = FIXED UlARGE RATE 

PWF = PRESENT WORTH FACTOR OF A UNIFORM 

ANNUAL SERIES WHERE PWF MAY BE PWFE . OR PWFS . 

A) hL /~!/ 

-I ( 1] ) L L )( Lv 

- 16 -

) 

FFe 

). C1
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Harrell Joseph CLARK.

No. 59634.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 19, 1977.

George M. Papale, Knight, D’Angelo & Knight, Gretna, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leon A. Picou, Jr., Dist. Atty., William E. Woodward, Asst. Dist. Atty., A. Z. Butterworth, Sp. Asst. Dist. Atty., for plain tiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                   EXHIBIT 24(f)


                                POWER OF ATTORNEY

         KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that the undersigned director of United
Dominion Industries Limited hereby constitutes and appoints Richard L. Magee and
William Dries and each of them singly, his true and lawful attorney-in-fact and
agent, with full power of substitution and resubstitution, for him and in his
name, place and stead, in any and all capacities, to sign the Annual Report on
Form 10-K of United Dominion Industries Limited for the year ended December 31,
1999, and any or all amendments and supplements thereto, and to file the same
with all exhibits thereto and other documents in connection therewith, with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York Stock Exchange, the Toronto
Stock Exchange and any Canadian securities commissions, granting unto said
attorney-in-fact and agent full power and authority to do and perform each and
every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and about the
premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do in
person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said attorney-in-fact and agent
may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

  /s/ J. A. Drummond
-----------------------------------
      J. A. Drummond, Director



    February 11, 2000
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 23.2


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             VORISEK & COMPANY, LLC
                   CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS - CONSULTANTS
                3301 Chellington Drive, McHenry, Illinois 60050
                         815-344-9336, fax 815-344-9350
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                      CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the use in this Registration Statement on Form S-1 of our
report dated June 26, 2000 relating to the financial statements of Rogers
International Raw Materials Fund, LP, which appear in such Registration
Statement. We also consent to the reference to us under the headings "Experts"
in such Registration Statement.

Vorisek & Company LLC                   /s/ Vorisek & Company LLC
September 21, 2000
Bullet Points: Educational Attainment in the United States: 2011 

	 In March 2011, for the first time, over 30 percent of the United States’ population 

25 years old and older reported they had a bachelor’s or higher degree. This 

compares with 1998, when less than a quarter of the 25-and-older population had 

attained this level of education. 

	 The number of Hispanics 25 years and over with a bachelor’s or higher degree 

increased by 80 percent over the decade, from 2.1 million in 2001 to 3.8 million 

in 2011. The increase among blacks was 47 percent and among non-Hispanic 

whites, 24 percent. 

	 In 2011, of the 61 million people 25 and over with bachelor’s degrees, 30 million 

were men and 31 million were women. The number of women 25 and over with 

bachelor’s degrees increased 37 percent in the last ten years (since 2001). The 

comparable increase for men was 23 percent. 

	 Twenty-two million, or 11 percent of the population 25 and over, had an 

advanced degree beyond the bachelor’s level in 2011. This includes 16 million 

with master’s degrees and 6 million with professional or doctorate (PhD) degrees. 

	 In 2011, 7.2 million men 25 years old and older had a master’s degree, a 33 

percent increase from 2001 (5.4 million). 

	 In 2011, 8.8 million women had a Master’s degree, a 58 percent increase from 6.5 

million in 2001. 

	 Men 25 years old and over with doctorate degrees increased 24 percent in the last 

decade, from 1.5 million (2001) to 1.9 million (2011). The increase for women 

was 90 percent, from 0.6 million to 1.2 million in the 2001 to 2011 period. 

	 Fifty percent of Asians 25 years and over reported having a bachelor’s degree or 

more in 2011. This level of education was reported by 34 percent of non-Hispanic 

whites, 20 percent of blacks and 14 percent of Hispanics. 

	 Among the employed population with bachelor’s degree or more, 41 percent of 

males and 53 percent of females, were in Professional and related occupations. 

	 Thirty percent of employed men with a bachelor’s degree or more were in 

management, business, and financial occupations, compared with 22 percent of 

women. By contrast, 53 percent of women with bachelor’s degree or more, but 

only 41 percent of men were in professional and related occupations. 

	 People whose highest level completed was high school and had any earnings 

averaged $31,000 in 2010. For those whose highest degree was a bachelor’s 

degree, the average was $58,000. 
	 Among men who completed high school but no higher education, the average 

earnings was $36,000; for women in this category the average earnings was 

$24,000. 

	 At the bachelor’s degree level (no advanced degree) the average earnings for 

males with earnings was $70,000, and for females was $45,000. 

	 Among females 25 years and over in the labor force and employed, 38 percent 

had a bachelor’s degree or more. Thirty-six percent of males in the labor force 

and employed attained a bachelor’s degree or more.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-1899

_____________________________

KRISTINA LEIGHTNER WOOLF,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY M. WOOLF,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Prohibition—Original Jurisdiction.

October 31, 2018

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of prohibition is denied on the merits.

RAY, KELSEY, and JAY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

A. Richard Troell and William L. Ketchersid of Ward & 

Ketchersid, P.A., Destin, for Petitioner.

Anthony M. Woolf, pro se, Respondent.
#### James C. REYNOLDS, Petitioner, v. CIRCUIT COURT OF the FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT FOR JACKSON COUNTY, Florida, Respondent.

No. 40677.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 31, 1971.

James C. Reynolds, in pro. per.

J. Paul Griffith, Asst. State’s Atty., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The Return to the Alternative Writ of Mandamus heretofore issued states that in all cases pending against petitioner, the State has placed nolle prosequi entries into the record. These entries having been made subsequent to issuance of the Alternative Writ, the Writ is hereby discharged and the petition is dismissed.

It is so ordered.

CARLTON, Acting C. J., ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 99.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of North American Scientific, Inc. (“Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the period ending April 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Alan I. Edrick, Senior VicePresident and Chief Financial Officer, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,that to my knowledge:

 

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange of 1934; and

 

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

Date:  May 27, 2003

 
| By:    | /s/ Alan I. Edrick                                 |   |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Alan I. Edrick                                     |
|   | Senior Vice  President and Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
#### Larry James WHITE, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 73-64.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 15, 1973.

Habeas corpus denied.
251 La. 671

#### Louvenia DELGRANDHILE, Wife of/and Zee Y. CHING v. Ronald B. HOTZ and Insurance Company of North America.

No. 49031.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 15, 1968.

In re: Louvenia Delgrandhile, wife of/and Zee Y. Ching applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 204 So.2d 73.

Application not considered. Since the Court of Appeal did not consider relator’s application for a rehearing in that court on the ground that it was not timely filed, this Court is without authority to entertain relator’s application for certiorari under Section 11 of Article VII of the Louisiana Constitution (and see also R.S. 13:4450) as that provision limits our consideration to cases in which an application for a rehearing has been *refused*by the Court of Appeal, excepting final judgments rendered on rehearing.

YARRUT, J., recused.
#### Hayward COLEMAN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-573.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 20, 1973.

Appeal from Court of Record, Broward County; Humes T. Lasher, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED June 21, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-40336 Conference Calendar

JULIUS WARNER MARACALIN, Petitioner-Appellant,

versus MARVIN D. MORRISON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 1:03-CV-631

-------------------- Before STEWART, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Julius Warner Maracalin, federal prisoner # 02617-095, pleaded guilty to multiple counts of conspiracy to possess cocaine base with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine base and was sentenced to 235 months of imprisonment. Maracalin challenges his underlying conviction and sentence by arguing that: (1) he was not advised of the nature of charges against him during the guilty-plea colloquy in violation of FED . R. CRIM . P. 11(c)(1); (2) he was arrested pursuant to aNo. 05-40336 -2- non-existent indictment and thus the prosecutor, arresting officers, and the court committed fraud; (3) he was sentenced in violation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (4) his indictment should be dismissed because it failed to allege that he was being charged pursuant to the penalty provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); (5) the use of judicially-found facts in determining his sentence violates the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 (2005); (6) Apprendi applies retroactively to his case; and (7) his indictment should be dismissed because it failed to charge a drug quantity. Although Maracalin seeks to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 pursuant to the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, he has not shown that the remedy available under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. See Reyes-Requena v. United States , 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001); Pack v. Yusuff , 218 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000) . To the extent Maracalin argues that the Booker or Apprendi lines of authority apply retroactively to cases on collateral review and entitle him to file a § 2241 petition, his argument is unavailing in light of Padilla v. United States , 416 F.3d 424, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 March 23, 2016

p0316

Order 

Clerk

March 23, 2016

153069

In re AWG, Minor. SC: 153069

COA: 327976

Kent CC Family Division:

15-025970-AD

_______________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 29, 2015 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### In re ESTATE of Hugh Caswell DICKINSON, Deceased. Marcella M. Dickinson, Appellant.

No. 71-463.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 27, 1971.

Appeal dismissed.
# C_2016134EN.01000401.xml

| 15.4.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 134/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.4.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 134/4

---

Corrigendum to the explanatory notes to the Combined Nomenclature of the European Union

(
  Official Journal of the European Union C 76 of 4 March 2015
  )

Official Journal of the European Union C 76 of 4 March 2015

(2016/C 134/04)

On page 186, CN Code 3912 20 11‘Collodions and celloidin’:

for:

for:

‘Collodion is by weight a 12 % nitrocellulose solution in a mixture of ether and alcohol.’,

read:

read:

‘Collodion is a solution of nitrocellulose containing 12 % by weight of nitrogen in a mixture of ether and alcohol.’.

---
<PAGE>

                    AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO STANDBY TERM LOAN NOTE

      Reference is made to that $30,000,000.00 Standby Term Loan Note of STAR
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., a Delaware corporation with its chief executive
offices located at 223 East De La Guerra, Santa Barbara, California, 93101
(together with its successors and assigns, the "Maker"), dated June 30, 2000 (as
the same may be amended, modified or supplemented from time to time, including
any extensions, refinancings, refundings or renewals thereof in whole or in
part, collectively, the "Term Note"), payable to MCI WORLDCOM NETWORK SERVICES,
INC., a Delaware corporation with offices located at 6929 N. Lakewood Avenue,
Mail Drop 5.2-510, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74117 (the "Holder"). Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Term Note to the contrary, from and after the date
hereof, unless sooner accelerated, the Term Note shall mature on or before the
earlier to occur of (such date being referred to herein as the "Maturity Date"):
(a) termination of the Agreement and Plan of Merger dated February 11, 2000, by
and between the Maker, STI Merger Co. and World Access, Inc. (the "Merger
Agreement"); (b) consummation of the merger transaction contemplated by the
Merger Agreement; or (c) August 31, 2000, without notice or presentment. Nothing
herein shall be considered or construed to be an agreement by Holder to extend
the Maturity Date beyond August 31, 2000, or to make any Advances (as defined in
the Term Note) to Maker on the Maturity Date or any date after the Maturity
Date.

      When attached to the Term Note, this Amendment No. 1 shall become a part
of the Term Note, and the terms and provisions of the Term Note as modified by
this Amendment No. 1 shall remain in full force and effect.

Dated as of: July ___, 2000

                    [SIGNATURES APPEAR ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE]

                                        1
<PAGE>


ATTEST:                                STAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

By:                                    By:
   -------------------------------        -------------------------------
Name:                                  Name:
     -----------------------------          -----------------------------
Title:                                 Title:
      ----------------------------           ----------------------------

                                       Agreed to and Accepted By:


ATTEST:                                MCI WORLDCOM NETWORK
                                       SERVICES, INC.

By:                                    By:
   -------------------------------        -------------------------------
Name:                                  Name:
     -----------------------------          -----------------------------
Title:                                 Title:
      ----------------------------           ----------------------------


                                       2
#### PALM BEACH COUNTY, Appellant, v. INLET BAY CLUB, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 72-1191.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 6, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 13,1973.

Michael B. Small, County Atty., and H. Adams Weaver, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Sidney A. Stubbs, Jr., of Jones, Paine & Foster, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

WALDEN, Judge.

Palm Beach County undertook to condemn certain land for beach and recreational purposes. The trial court adjudicated a lack of necessity and denied the County’s request for an order of taking. The County appeals. We affirm.

The Legislature in its wisdom per Section 127.01(2), F.S.1971, F.S.A., decided that the necessity of taking in such cases would be an issue to be determined as an issue of fact and law by the trial court. This is to be done as commanded by the Legislature “ * * * without regard to or presumption in favor of any prior determination by the county commissioners or the exercise of discretion by them.” Clearly this means that the decision will be a de novo undertaking with the trial judge empowered to assign such weight to the testimony of the several witnesses as he is advised and to decide the matter just as any other contested issue is decided.

With this frame of reference we have examined the record and reviewed the comprehensive order on appeal. There is testimony one way and the other and, being faced with the presumption of correctness that attends the circuit court decision, we are unable to say that an error has been committed which requires reversal. See Peavy Wilson Lumber Co. v. County of Brevard, Fla.1947, 159 Fla. 311, 31 So.2d 483; Dade County v. Paxson, Fla.App.1972, 270 So.2d 455.

Affirmed.

CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.
No. 00-7389.

#### Clayton *v.*Thompson, Warden.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Chesley Otis BLACKMON, Respondent.

No. 42490.

Supremo Court of Florida.

July 25, 1972.

Certiorari denied. 262 So.2d 264.

ERVIN, Acting C. J., and CARLTON, ADKINS and McCAIN, JJ., concur.

BOYD, J., dissents.