State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: January 19, 2017 521897 

________________________________

In the Matter of ALAN U.,

Appellant,

v

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MANDY V.,

Respondent.

________________________________

Calendar Date: November 14, 2016

Before: McCarthy, J.P., Garry, Rose, Mulvey and Aarons, JJ.

__________

Renee J. Albaugh, Delhi, for appellant.

Jessica C. Eggleston, Johnson City, for respondent.

David T. Spector, Endicott, attorney for children.

__________

Garry, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Broome County

(Connerton, J.), entered September 28, 2015, which, among other

things, partially granted petitioner's application, in a

proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, to modify a prior

order of visitation. 

Petitioner (hereinafter the father) and respondent

(hereinafter the mother) are the parents of two children (born in

2002 and 2007). In 2011, by order of fact-finding and interim

disposition, Family Court found, upon the father's consent

without admission, that the father had sexually abused the older

child, adjudicated both children to be neglected and ordered the

father, among other things, to complete certain classes and

evaluations. The father has not seen either child since 2011. 
-2- 521897 

In 2013, the mother was awarded sole custody of both children and

the father was permitted to apply for visitation after completion

of the requirements set forth within the dispositional order.1

The father commenced this modification proceeding in February

2015, requesting visitation with the younger child.2 Following

Lincoln and fact-finding hearings, Family Court awarded the

father one supervised visit for one hour per month, at a time and

date to be arranged by the supervisor and the mother, with the

potential for some expansion if mutually agreed upon. The father

appeals.

As the party seeking modification, it was the father's

burden to first demonstrate a change in circumstances since the

entry of the prior order "to warrant the court undertaking a best

interests analysis in the first instance" (Matter of David J. v

Leeann K., 140 AD3d 1209, 1210 [2016] [internal quotation marks

and citations omitted]; see Matter of Merwin v Merwin, 138 AD3d

1193, 1194 [2016]). The 2013 order provided, in pertinent part,

that the father was required to comply with the terms of the

dispositional order before visitation with the children could

occur. This order required the father to participate in

parenting classes, sexual abuse evaluations and sexual offender

treatment programs, among other things. In support of his

request, the father cited his compliance with the dispositional

order, consisting of the completion of parenting classes and two

evaluations at a sexual offender treatment program, together with

his participation in counseling a few times each year. In

opposition, the mother contended that the father had failed to

comply with the full terms of that order, as the father's

counseling is not related to sexual abuse, and he was not

recommended for treatment in the sexual offender treatment

program due to his continued denial of problems involving sexual

offending. The attorney for the children concurred with the

1 Family Court entered an order of disposition in 2012,

which, among other things, made the 2011 interim disposition a

final order. 

2 The father's petition included both children, but he

clarified and limited his request at the fact-finding hearing.
-3- 521897 

mother's position. Nonetheless, the record supports the finding

by Family Court that the father had "technically" complied with

the 2011 dispositional order. Thus, the court properly proceeded

with a best interests analysis. 

Although a child and noncustodial parent are entitled to

meaningful visitation (see Matter of Tropea v Tropea, 87 NY2d

727, 738 [1996]), "[t]he propriety of visitation is left to the

sound discretion of Family Court and its findings, guided by the

best interests of the child, will not be disturbed unless they

lack a sound and substantial basis in the record" (Matter of

Kadio v Volino, 126 AD3d 1253, 1254 [2015] [internal citation and

quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Dibble v Valachovic, 141

AD3d 774, 775 [2016]). Generally, visitation with a noncustodial

parent is presumed to be in the best interests of the child and

should not be denied absent "substantial proof that contact would

be harmful to the child's welfare" (Matter of Owens v Chamorro,

114 AD3d 1037, 1039 [2014]; see Matter of Kadio v Volino, 126

AD3d at 1254). 

In addressing the father's history of sexual abuse, Family

Court admonished the father for his failure to take steps "to

enter into meaningful sexual offender treatment concerning his

'inappropriate touching' [of the older child]," and found that

his status as an "untreated sex offender" was relevant in

determining his fitness as a parent (Matter of Sean K., 50 AD3d

1220, 1222 [2008]). The attorney for the child cross-examined

the father relative to his limited efforts at pursuing treatment,

and the father responded to some of the questioning by asserting

his Fifth Amendment privilege. The mother testified that,

following the sexual abuse of the older child by the father, the

younger child required years of therapy and exhibited certain

behaviors such as bedwetting, being withdrawn and inappropriate

play. Weighed against these strong negative factors, however,

the father presented the testimony of an acceptable supervisor

for the proposed visits. This individual testified at the factfinding hearing that she was willing to supervise the father's

visitation in her office for one hour twice per month, with the

potential to increase to three hours if the visits went well. It

was established that the office was a suitable environment. In

view of the record, Family Court's award of supervised visitation
-4- 521897 

with the father for one hour once per month, with the potential

for future increases or modification, was in the best interests

of the child. 

Finally, we reject the father's contention that Family

Court improperly delegated authority to the mother to arrange or

modify visitation (see Matter of Taylor v Jackson, 95 AD3d 1604,

1605 [2012]). Here, the order provides that visitation is to

occur once monthly "at a time and date which is convenient with

[the supervisor] making the arrangements with [the mother]," and

thereafter "the parties may voluntarily continue or expand visits

or either parent may petition for modification of the order." As

the mother has sole custody of the child, it logically follows

that she and the supervisor must arrange visitation. We do not

find an improper delegation of authority to the mother (see e.g.

Matter of MacKenzie v Patrice V., 74 AD3d 1406, 1407 [2010];

compare Matter of Staff v Gelunas, 143 AD3d 1077, 1079 [2016]),

and, upon review, we find no reason to disturb the order.

McCarthy, J.P., Rose, Mulvey and Aarons, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court