[Cite as State v. Justice, 2023-Ohio-435.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 22AP-234

(C.P.C. No. 20CR-3470)

v. :

(ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

 :

Monica G. Justice,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

:

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on February 14, 2023

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Taylor M. Mick, for appellee.

On brief: Monica G. Justice, pro se.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

JAMISON, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Monica G. Justice, appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying her pre-trial release on bail. For the 

foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} On July 30, 2020, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellant on four 

counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11, felonies of the first degree, and two 

counts of having a weapon while under disability, in violation of R.C. 2923.13, felonies of 

the third degree. Three-year firearm specifications accompanied each of the four felonious 

assault charges. Seven-year specifications also accompanied those charges based on the fact 

that the victims were police officers. 
No. 22AP-234 2

{¶ 3} On March 21, 2022, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, filed a motion pursuant 

to R.C. 2937.222, seeking an order denying appellant bail. On March 24, 2022, the trial 

court held a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, Special Agent Richard Ward of the 

Bureau of Criminal Investigation testified he was the lead investigator following an incident 

that occurred on July 21, 2020 at appellant's Beulah Road residence. According to Ward, a

Special Weapons and Tactics ("SWAT") team was dispatched to appellant's residence in 

order to serve a warrant issued by the Franklin County Probate Court. Ward testified that 

officers had previously attempted to serve the warrant on July 17, 2020, but appellant was 

not home. According to Ward, appellant had also been involved in a disturbance at a 

medical office on July 17, 2020 which lead to her arrest.1

{¶ 4} Ward told the trial court that approximately one month before the incident 

on July 21, 2020, local authorities unsuccessfully attempted to serve an eviction notice at

the Beulah Road residence. According to Ward, appellant sent numerous threatening 

correspondence to local authorities following the attempted eviction. Appellant also made 

videos which she posted on YouTube containing threats against the same local authorities. 

Ward informed the trial court that appellant had a prior conviction related to an assault on 

a police officer that occurred at the Franklin County Municipal Court. 

{¶ 5} According to Ward, the SWAT team arrived at appellant's residence and 

knocked on the door, but appellant did not answer. The SWAT team subsequently breached 

the door to the front porch and announced their presence. Appellant suddenly "appeared 

and discharged a nine-millimeter Carbine rifle striking two of the deputies." (Mar. 24, 2022 

Tr. at 14.) Ward testified the first shot deflected off a shield at "eye level," but that another 

deputy was hit by a shot in the back as he retreated. (Mar. 24, 2022 Tr. at 14.) Deputy 

Marcus Penwell was struck by three bullets, two in his left calf and one in his waist. Another 

deputy was struck in the left thigh. Appellant received a gunshot wound to her wrist as 

officers returned fire. A standoff lasting several hours subsequently ensued during which 

appellant posted more videos to YouTube evidencing her irrational distrust of government 

and law enforcement. Appellant eventually made her way to the roof of the home after the 

SWAT team employed tear gas. Appellant was then taken into custody. Ward interviewed 

1 Appellant's partner, Rae Justice, submitted an affidavit wherein she averred that appellant was at the medical 

appointment on July 17, 2020 when several individuals from the Franklin County Sheriff's Office arrived at 

the Beulah Road residence attempting service on appellant. 
No. 22AP-234 3

appellant at the hospital after the incident and she told him she knew that law enforcement 

had entered her front porch and that she intended to shoot them.

{¶ 6} Deputy Penwell sustained a permanent injury as a result of being shot by 

appellant and was forced to retire. Penwell submitted a statement, which was read into the 

record, expressing his fear for the safety of any member of the public or law enforcement 

who may encounter appellant if she were freed on bail. 

{¶ 7} The evidence also showed that appellant had lived with her mother at her 

mother's Beulah Road residence for eight years prior to this incident, appellant is selfemployed, and that she provides care for her mother. Appellant's mother, Judy Greer,

testified for appellant at the bail hearing. She told the trial court that appellant is married 

to Rae Justice, but that Rae no longer lives in the Columbus area. Appellant did not testify 

at the bail hearing, but she submitted an unsworn statement pertaining exclusively to her 

arrest at the medical building on July 17, 2020. 

{¶ 8} On March 28, 2022, the trial court granted the state's motion to deny bail 

upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence,that the proof is evident or the presumption 

great that appellant committed the charged offenses, she poses a substantial risk of serious 

physical harm to persons or the community, and no release conditions will reasonably 

assure the safety of any person or the community if she were freed on bail. 

{¶ 9} Appellant timely appealed to this court from the March 28, 2022 judgment.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶ 10} Appellant assigns the following as trial court errors:

[1.] The Ohio Constitution Article I, Section 9 - Bail, which the 

Supreme Court of Ohio decision Dubose v. McGuffey No. 2021-

1403 cited a[n] ORC 2937.222, et al., states its legislative 

language is unconstitutional due to cross referenced section 

Ohio Constitution Article IV Section 5(b), with emphasis lower 

case 'b', being missing, no longer existing, being obfuscated,

vacated by constitutional convention action(s), purportedly. 

[2.] The application of Ohio Constitution Article I Section 9

under ORC 2937.222, et al., which seeks to keep persons 

charged with a felony imprisoned without bail, is 

unconstitutional and not a power granted to the general 

assembly and/or the judicial officers as Administrative Judge 

by the Ohio Constitution regardless of unconstitutional 
No. 22AP-234 4

vacancies created by the constitutional amendment process 

(see error 1), purportedly.

[3.] Under ORC 2937.222, et al., which seek to keep persons 

charged with a [f]elony potentially imprisoned indefinitely 

without bail, bond, owed to determinations that such 

'defendants' pose a substantial risk of serious harm to persons 

or the community violates [f]ederally established positive law,

Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 81 (1977). Cert. denied subnom,

as cited in Lombard v. Cooper, 446 U.S. 984 (1988) and the 

central tenet and maxim of our republic law of one being held 

'innocent until proven guilty' by a jury of ones peers pursuant 

to 'due process of law' (4th, 5th, 6th Amendments) and those 

not subjected to slavery, * * *, and/or punishment until such 

time as one is found guilty of a crime (13th and 14th 

Amendments).

[4.] The application of Ohio Constitution Article I Section 9

under ORC 2937.222, with its added legislative language 

concerning the proof or presumption that 'the accused 

committed' the offense charged and thus allows for a 

determination of 'presumptive guilt' without the benefit of 'due 

process of law', violated the 4th, 5th, [and] 6th Amendment.

[5.] Seizing, suspension of it without proof, pursuant to 'due 

process of law' of an actual breach of a statute is a violation of 

the full faith [and] credit clause of the Federal constitution 

(Article 4 Section 1)(28 USC 1738).

[6.] Facts have been held off the record, either by the Clerk of 

Franklin and/or by the administrative Judge David Young 

which are exculpatory and mandated the discharge of the cause 

of action as early as October of 2021, where the obstruction of 

such evidence, tampering of such evidence has denied Relator 

as:lotus:justice 'due process of law' [and] perpetuated an 

unsubstantiated prosecution and an illegal unlawful 

imprisonment. Additionally such exculpatory evidence is still 

fraudulently being withheld off the record of the case and as 

such presents a fraudulent case record upon appeal which 

interferes with the counsel for Defendants ability to address all 

aspects [and] errors being affected, effected by said established 

facts, as evidence obstructs. 

[7.] The facts as established during the testimony of both State 

and defense witnesses, prove, provided evidence supporting 

2901, et al., and of the unlawful execution of said probate. As 

such, administrative Judge David Young should have denied 
No. 22AP-234 5

the Stat's motion to hold the defendant without bail or bond 

since the facts supported 'self defense', provide that not offense 

punishable by the laws of the State was committed (ORC 

2941.57(A)), as no valid "warrant", and, or 'probate order' can 

be produced by the State substantiating their breach of said 

property by lawful means in compliance with the 4th 

Amendment upon an evidentiary hearing, trial, subpoena, etc..

[8.] In the holding of a propria personam (pro per) litigant 

without bond or bail, that litigant as counsel for the defense, a 

right pursuant to the 6th Amendment [Faretta v. California,

422 U.S. 806] is being obstructed by the conditions of 

imprisonment from the exercise of 'due process of law' where 

in Relator as-lotus:justice and asserted such obstructions and 

unconstitutional conditions orally, multiple times, during 

hearings held prior to May 24 [and] 28, 2022. Knowing that 

any oral request for modification of the bail, bond, order of 

commitment was founded upon such assertions, averments,

when Administrative 'judge' david young did revoke, rescind,

seize the bail, bond and continue the imprisonment of aslotus:justice as counsel for the Defense indefinitely, pending 

the Defenses preparedness for a trial. Defense cannot prepare 

for properly owed to the unconstitutional conditions aslotus:justice is being subjected to; he did knowingly deny the 

relator's due process of law' and oppress obstructions to the 

Relators 6th Amendment willfully and ultimately effected an 

'indefinite detention' sentence upon her in lieu of her inability 

to prepare a proper defense under the conditions of 

commitment without bail she is held under. 

(Sic Passim.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 11} A trial court's order denying bail to a defendant under R.C. 2937.222 is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. De La Cruz, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-516, 2022-

Ohio-4293, ¶ 10, citing State v. Foster, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-523, 2008-Ohio-3525. See also

State v. Henderson, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-870, 2017-Ohio-2678, ¶ 5. An abuse of discretion 

occurs when a court's decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Id. at ¶ 5,

citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶ 12} For purposes of clarity, we shall consider appellant's assignments of error out 

of order.
No. 22AP-234 6

1. Appellant's Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Assignments of Error

{¶ 13} In appellant's third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh assignments of error 

appellant challenges the weight and credibility of the evidence in support of the decision to 

deny bail. Accordingly, we shall consider these assignments of error jointly. 

{¶ 14} The Ohio Constitution provides that "[a]ll persons shall be bailable by 

sufficient sureties, * * * except for a person who is charged with a felony where the proof is 

evident or the presumption great and where the person poses a substantial risk of serious 

physical harm to any person or to the community." De La Cruz at ¶ 12, quoting Ohio 

Constitution, Article I, Section 9. The Constitution requires the General Assembly to set 

standards by law to " 'determine whether a person who is charged with a felony where the 

proof is evident or the presumption great poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm 

to any person or to the community.' " Id., quoting Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9. 

{¶ 15} Pursuant to constitutional authority, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 

2937.222, which provides in relevant part as follows: 

(B) No accused person shall be denied bail pursuant to this 

section unless the judge finds by clear and convincing 

evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great 

that the accused committed the offense described in division 

(A) of this section with which the accused is charged, finds by 

clear and convincing evidence that the accused poses a 

substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to 

the community, and finds by clear and convincing evidence 

that no release conditions will reasonably assure the safety of 

that person and the community.2

2 Crim.R 46 entitled "Pretrial Release and Detention," provides in pertinent part as follows:

(A) Pretrial detention. A defendant may be detained pretrial, pursuant to 

a motion by the prosecutor or the court's own motion, in accordance with the 

standards and procedures set forth in the Revised Code.

(B) Pretrial release. Unless the court orders the defendant detained under 

division (A) of this rule, the court shall release the defendant on the least 

restrictive conditions that, in the discretion of the court, will reasonably 

assure the defendant's appearance in court, the protection or safety of any 

person or the community, and that the defendant will not obstruct the 

criminal justice process.
No. 22AP-234 7

{¶ 16} "Clear and convincing evidence is that 'which will produce in the mind of the 

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.' " Foster at

¶ 6, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶ 17} The first required finding under R.C. 2937.222 is that the proof is evident or 

the presumption great that the accused committed the offenses of violence charged in the 

indictment. Here, appellant's assault on law enforcement was witnessed by numerous 

Sheriff's deputies who were interviewed by Ward, and appellant admitted her intent to 

shoot the deputies when she spoke to Ward at the hospital. Though appellant has alleged 

the shooting was in self-defense, the evidence presented by the state at the bail hearing 

reveals the SWAT team entered onto the premises for the purpose of serving a lawful 

warrant issued by the probate court. See R.C. 2901.05(B)(2) (The presumption of selfdefense arises only "if the person against whom the defensive force is used is in the process 

of unlawfully and without privilege to do so entering, or has unlawfully and without 

privilege to do so entered, the residence * * * occupied by the person using the defensive 

force."). Though appellant asserts that the probate court order was subsequently 

"expunged," she does not deny that such an order existed on July 21, 2020. (Mar. 24, 2022 

Tr. at 84.) In fact, appellant purportedly read from the probate court order as she crossexamined Ward. Concerning appellant's argument that the probate court order was 

obtained illegally, we recognize "the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule when 

officers act in good faith upon a search warrant ultimately found to be invalid." State v. 

Hoffman, 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795, ¶ 42, citing State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 

251 (1986), at paragraph one of syllabus, and State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325 (1989),

paragraph three of the syllabus. Ward testified that his investigation revealed deputies 

acted in good faith on July 21, 2020. 

{¶ 18} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that the state demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, the proof is 

evident or the presumption great that the accused committed the offenses of violence 

charged in the indictment. 

{¶ 19} With regard to the second and third findings required for denial of bail, the 

statute mandates consideration of the following: 
No. 22AP-234 8

The judge, in determining whether the accused person * * *

poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person 

or to the community and whether there are conditions of 

release that will reasonably assure the safety of that person 

and the community, shall consider all available information 

regarding all of the following:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged,

including whether the offense is an offense of violence or 

involves alcohol or a drug of abuse;

(2) The weight of the evidence against the accused;

(3) The history and characteristics of the accused, including,

but not limited to, both of the following:

(a) The character, physical and mental condition, family ties,

employment, financial resources, length of residence in the 

community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to 

drug or alcohol abuse, and criminal history of the accused;

(b) Whether, at the time of the current alleged offense or at 

the time of the arrest of the accused, the accused was on 

probation, parole, post-release control, or other release 

pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence 

for the commission of an offense under the laws of this state,

another state, or the United States or under a municipal 

ordinance.

(4) The nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or 

the community that would be posed by the person's release.

R.C. 2937.222(C).

{¶ 20} The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, appellant poses a 

substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or the community and there are no 

conditions of release that will reasonably assure the safety of any person or the community. 

The evidence presented at the bail hearing and the relevant case law support the trial court's 

finding.

{¶ 21} This district has considered the denial of bail under circumstances similar to 

those presented herein. In Foster, 2008-Ohio-3525, the defendant, Foster, was a suspect 

in an illegal gambling operation when police officers attempted to serve a "knock and 

announce" warrant related to drug activity at that location. Id. at ¶ 11-12. Though Foster

later claimed he did not hear police officers identify themselves before attempting to breach 

the door, others who were gambling with Foster shouted they were being robbed. Id. at ¶ 12. 
No. 22AP-234 9

Foster alleged that one of the other gamblers fired a gun toward the door and police officers 

returned fire. Foster was also armed, and he fired several gunshots toward the door. Id.

{¶ 22} Foster was subsequently charged with felonious assault with firearm 

specifications and additional specifications based on the fact that the victims were police 

officers. The state moved for an order denying bail pursuant to R.C. 2937.222. At the 

evidentiary hearing on the motion, it was revealed that Foster had no prior convictions. The 

trial court nevertheless denied bail upon finding that the state had proven, by clear and 

convincing evidence, each of the requirements of R.C. 2937.222.

{¶ 23} In affirming the denial of bail on appeal, this court noted that Foster was in a 

known gambling house and could be imputed with knowledge that drug dealers also 

frequented the house. Id. at ¶ 18. We also noted Foster was arrested after attempting to flee 

through a basement window. Id. Even though Foster claimed he did not hear the officer's

announcement, this court concluded that evidence Foster fired gunshots at a door through 

which police officers were attempting to enter and serve a search warrant supported the 

trial court's finding that Foster presented a danger to others and the community. We also 

noted that "[t]he fact that the victims were police officers raises serious questions as to the 

safety of officers who would seek to apprehend [Foster]in the future if he did not voluntarily 

appear for trial or sentencing." Id. at ¶ 19.

{¶ 24} Other districts have considered the denial of bail to an offender who has 

discharged a firearm at a police officer and have reached the same conclusion regarding 

bail. For example, in State v. Brown, 6th Dist. No. E-06-025, 2006-Ohio-3377, a detective 

assigned to a county drug force was awakened by a gunshot that came through his bedroom 

window. Brown was subsequently charged with various crimes arising out of the incident,

including complicity to commit felonious assault on an officer in violation of R.C. 2923.03.

The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the evidence supported a great 

presumption that Brown was guilty of the crime because a cell phone was found at the scene 

and witness testimony placed Brown at the officer's house just prior to the shooting. Id. at 

¶ 3. The court of appeals also noted that Brown and his co-defendant had drug convictions 

and/or charges stemming from previous investigations by the victim's law enforcement 

agency, and both were found two blocks from the shooting in a van containing an empty 

holster and gunshot residue. The court of appeals concluded that the denial of bail was 
No. 22AP-234 10

reasonable under circumstances where a perpetrator engages in conduct prohibited by R.C. 

2923.03. The court reasoned that a willingness to discharge a weapon at law enforcement

unquestionably creates a "substantial risk" of harm to the community. Id. at ¶ 23, citing 

R.C. 2901.01(A)(8) (defining "substantial risk"). Based on this evidence, the court of 

appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to deny bail. 

{¶ 25} Similarly, in State v. Nash, 3d Dist. No. 16-22-06, 2023-Ohio-51, witnesses 

testified that the defendant, Nash, stood in the street in his underwear and fired numerous 

gunshots into an occupied residence where the deceased victim was found, and that Nash 

pointed a rifle at a responding police officer and fired a shot before fleeing. The firearm was 

later recovered in a search of Nash's residence after police apprehended him in his front 

yard. Nash was in possession of a firearm and a knife at the time of the arrest, and he was 

subsequently indicted on multiple charges including murder and discharging a firearm at 

a police officer. The trial court denied bail following an evidentiary hearing. The trial court 

noted that it could "envision no release conditions which would assure the safety of officers 

and the community as given the mental health issue of the accused, his willingness to carry,

* * * and fire a weapon at a police officer." Id. at ¶ 4.

{¶ 26} On appeal, Nash contended the evidence did not support the conclusion that 

he posed a substantial risk of harm to the public because his firearms had been confiscated. 

The court of appeals disagreed, noting that Nash could obtain other weapons if freed on 

bail. In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals concluded that Nash's unresolved 

mental health issues, his disturbing behavior on arrest, and the apparent lack of a motive 

for his crimes, permitted a reasonable conclusion that Nash remains a danger to the 

community and that no conditions of release would reasonably assure public safety. 

{¶ 27} Here, the facts developed at the evidentiary hearing are every bit as egregious 

as the facts in Foster, Nash, and Brown. Here, appellant intentionally fired numerous rifle 

shots at sheriff's deputies who were serving a warrant. She then engaged in a standoff with 

the SWAT team lasting several hours and she surrendered to authorities only after being 

forced to the roof of the home when the SWAT team shot tear gas into the residence. 

Appellant also made violent threats to authorities both in writing and in various YouTube 

videos in the days leading up to the July 21, 2020 incident, and during the incident itself. 

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude from the evidence admitted at the hearing that the nature 
No. 22AP-234 11

and circumstances of the offenses of violence charged against appellant and appellant's 

documented hostility toward law enforcement in the recent past weigh heavily against bail. 

{¶ 28} Moreover, in addition to the alleged mental health issues that precipitated 

the probate court order, Ward testified that appellant exhibited an irrational distrust of 

government and police when he interviewed her at the hospital after this incident. In his 

statement, Deputy Penwell opined that "Ms. Justice would be a threat to law enforcement 

and anyone she may encounter if she is released on bond." (Mar. 24, 2022 Tr. at 79.) The 

record further demonstrates that appellant exhibited a disturbing pattern of behavior 

leading up to the incident with the SWAT team, including a recent arrest due to a

disturbance at a medical building and a prior arrest for an assault on a police officer at the 

Municipal Court. The trial court expresses concern that, given appellant's prior interactions 

with the government authorities and police, a SWAT team may need to be dispatched to 

appellant's residence to return her for trial if she were freed on bail. The evidence shows 

the trial court's concerns are well founded as appellant admittedly opened fire on the 

members of the SWAT team on July 21, 2020 with the intention to shoot the deputies, and 

has made recent, well-documented threats of violence against government authorities and 

law enforcement. Thus, the record supports the trial court's determination, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that appellant poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to 

persons and the community, and there are no conditions of release that will reasonably 

assure the safety of any person and the community if she were freed on bail. 

{¶ 29} Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it granted the state's R.C. 2937.222 motion and denied appellant bail. Appellant's 

third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh assignments of error are overruled. 

2. Appellant's First and Second Assignments of Error

{¶ 30} In appellant's first and second assignments of error, appellant argues that 

Article I, Section 9, Ohio Constitution is unenforceable and therefore, R.C. 2937.222 is 

unconstitutional because Article I, Section 9 makes a reference to Ohio Constitution Article 

IV, Section 5(b), which does not currently exist. We disagree.

{¶ 31} Article I, Section 9, Ohio Constitution provides in relevant part as follows: 

All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for a 

person who is charged with a capital offense where the proof 

is evident or the presumption great, and except for a person 
No. 22AP-234 12

who is charged with a felony where the proof is evident or the 

presumption great and where the person poses a substantial 

risk of serious physical harm to any person or to the 

community. Where a person is charged with any offense for 

which the person may be incarcerated, the court may 

determine at any time the type, amount, and conditions of 

bail. * * * The General Assembly shall fix by law standards to 

determine whether a person who is charged with a felony 

where the proof is evident or the presumption great poses a 

substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to 

the community. Procedures for establishing the amount and 

conditions of bail shall be established pursuant to Article IV,

Section 5(b) of the Constitution of the state of Ohio.3

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 32} Appellant did not raise her constitutional argument in the trial court and has 

waived all but plain error for purposes of appeal. State v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 16AP540, 2017-Ohio-5598, ¶ 28, citing State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio4034, ¶ 15-16. Moreover, appellant does not explain how an allegedly erroneous reference 

to Article IV, Section 5(b) would render Article I, Section 9, Ohio Constitution 

unenforceable or make R.C. 2937.222 unconstitutional.

{¶ 33} It is clear that the reference to Article IV, Section 5(b) in Article I, Section 9,

pertains exclusively to the procedural rulemaking authority of the Supreme Court with 

respect to the amount and conditions of bail, not denial of bail. It is also evident that the 

purpose of the preceding language in Article I, Section 9, is to "permit a court to not grant 

bail in certain circumstances to persons who allegedly commit a felony and also pose a

substantial risk of serious physical harm to others or to the community." State ex rel. 

Sylvester v. Neal, 140 Ohio St.3d 47, 2014-Ohio-2926, ¶ 26. Indeed, Article I, Section 9,

effectively authorizes the General Assembly expand the types of offenses and circumstances 

under which bail could be denied. Smith v. Leis, 106 Ohio St.3d 309, 2005-Ohio-5125, ¶ 38,

and Sylvester at ¶ 27. The General Assembly subsequently enacted R.C. 2937.222, "which 

allows the prosecutor or the judge to move for a hearing to determine whether a person 

charged with a felony should be denied bail and specifies the evidence that the judge must 

consider in making that determination." Sylvester at ¶ 27. Consistent with Article I, Section 

3 Though Article IV, Section 5(B) appears to be the correct reference, Article I, Section 9 refers to Article IV,

Section 5(b), with the lower case "b." The last sentence of Article I, Section 9 was removed by amendment 

effective November 8, 2022.
No. 22AP-234 13

9, Crim.R. 46(A) now provides that "[a] defendant may be detained pretrial, pursuant to a 

motion by the prosecutor or the court's own motion, in accordance with the standards and 

procedures set forth in the Revised Code." (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 34} Based on the foregoing, we perceive no merit in appellant's challenge to the 

enforceability of Article I, Section 9, Ohio Constitution or the constitutionality of R.C. 

2937.222. Appellant's first and second assignments of error are overruled. 

3. Appellant's Eighth Assignment of Error

{¶ 35} Appellant's eighth assignment of error appears to challenge the trial court's

order based on alleged due process violations committed by the Franklin County Sheriff's 

Office in connection with appellant's pre-trial confinement. More particularly, appellant 

contends she has been denied meaningful access to the law library and evidentiary 

materials she believes are necessary for her to prepare an adequate defense. We note 

appellant raised these concerns at the outset of the bail hearing, whereupon the trial court 

offered to continue the hearing to allow appellant to better prepare. Appellant declined the 

offer and elected to proceed. Thus, to the extent that alleged due process violations by the 

Franklin County Sheriff's Office have any relationship to the trial court's determination of 

the state's motion to deny bail, appellant expressly waived the alleged violations by failing 

to raise them in the trial court. 

{¶ 36} Accordingly, appellant's eighth assignment of error is overruled. 

V. CONCLUSION

{¶ 37} Having overruled appellant's eighth assignments of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

DORRIAN and MENTEL, JJ., concur.

_____________