[Cite as State v. Elliot, 2019-Ohio-4411.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwinn, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 : Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

JOHNDRELL ELLIOT : Case No. 18 CA 22 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas Case No. 17-CR-202 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 23, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

JASON R. FARLEY JAMES R. WILLIS 

66704 Toland Drive 1144 Rockefeller Building 

Cambridge, OH 43725 614 West Superior Avenue 

 Cleveland, OH 44113 
Guernsey County, Case No. 18 CA 22 2 

Wise, Earle, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Johndrell Elliot appeals the March 20, 2018 decision 

of the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas which denied his motion to suppress. 

Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} On May 18, 2017, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Brian Hawkins and 

his canine officer were working routine patrol on Interstate 77. At 2:00 p.m, he spotted 

appellant driving southbound in a vehicle which the trooper believed had illegal window 

tint. Hawkins initiated a traffic stop and ran the plate on the vehicle which came back to a 

female. He then approached the vehicle. 

{¶ 3} Hawkins found appellant driving the car. Appellant provided Hawkins his 

operator's license and registration, but no proof of insurance. Appellant was very nervous 

and visibly shaking. His passenger, Herve Johnson, appeared calm, but refused to make 

eye contact with Hawkins. 

{¶ 4} Asked where they were coming from, appellant said "the house." Asked 

where they were going, appellant looked to Johnson for an answer. Johnson replied 

"casino" while continuing to stare forward at his phone and listen to music. 

{¶ 5} Hawkins advised appellant that he had pulled him over for a window tint 

violation. Legal tint is 50 percent or higher. Appellant stated he believed his was 50 

percent. Hawkins used a meter to check the tint which was actually 35.6 percent. 

{¶ 6} Hawkins returned to his cruiser and asked dispatch to check for warrants 

and to check the criminal history of both men. Dispatch subsequently advised neither had 
Guernsey County, Case No. 18 CA 22 3 

any active warrants, but both did have extensive criminal histories involving drug 

offenses. 

{¶ 7} While Hawkins was reviewing the records of both men, Trooper Roe arrived 

to back up Hawkins. Hawkins had begun to write a warning for appellant, but had not yet 

completed it when he decided, based on his observations of the occupants of the vehicle 

and information from dispatch, to walk his canine around appellant's vehicle. Both men 

were asked to exit the vehicle while this took place. The canine alerted on the right front 

door seam. During the subsequent search, a large amount of cocaine was located in the 

engine compartment of the vehicle. 

{¶ 8} From stop to dog sniff, the stop took 16 minutes and 35 seconds. 

{¶ 9} On May 18, the Guernsey County Grand Jury returned an indictment 

charging appellant with one count of possession of cocaine, a felony of the first degree. 

This count contained a major drug offender specification. Appellant was further charged 

with one count of trafficking in cocaine, a felony of the first degree. 

{¶ 10} Appellant filed a motion to suppress, and a hearing was held on the matter 

on March 9, 2018. On May 1, 2018, the trial court issued its judgment entry denying 

appellant's motion. 

{¶ 11} On August 3, 2018, appellant entered a plea of no contest to an amended 

count of possession of cocaine, a felony of the first degree. The state dismissed the 

balance of the indictment. The trial court accepted appellant's plea, convicted appellant, 

and sentenced him to 4 years incarceration. Appellant's sentence was stayed, however, 

pending the outcome of this appeal. 

{¶ 12} Appellant raises two assignments of error: 
Guernsey County, Case No. 18 CA 22 4 

I 

{¶ 13} "THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE APPELLANT'S MOTION 

TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED IN THE WAKE OF THE OFFICERS' VIOLATION 

OF HIS FOURTH, FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS." 

II 

{¶ 14} "THE COURT ERRED WHEN IRRESPECTIVE OF ARIZONA V. GANT, 

556 U.S. 332 (2008), THE OFFICERS SUBJECTED THIS VEHICLE TO A 

WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHEN FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES HE WAS 

ELSEWHERE" 

{¶ 15} We address appellant's assignments of error together. In his first 

assignment of error appellant argues the traffic stop was illegally extended to permit the 

canine sniff. In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that even assuming the 

use of the canine was proper, troopers were required to obtain a warrant before searching 

his vehicle. We disagree. 

{¶ 16} As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 

165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 12: 

"Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question 

of law and fact." State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. In ruling on a motion to suppress, "the trial 
Guernsey County, Case No. 18 CA 22 5 

court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best 

position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of 

witnesses." Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 

N.E.2d 972 (1992). On appeal, we "must accept the trial court's 

findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible 

evidence." Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 

N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accepting those facts as true, we must then 

"independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to 

the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the 

applicable legal standard." Id.

{¶ 17} As the United States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 

116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 94 (1996), "...as a general matter determinations of 

reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal." 

{¶ 18} First, as to appellant's contention that a search warrant was required before 

troopers could search his car, the use of a narcotics dog to detect the odor of drugs does 

not constitute a “search” and an officer is not required, prior to a dog sniff, to establish 

either probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that drugs are concealed in a vehicle. 

See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 838, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005); 

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2645, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); 

State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 594, 657 N.E.2d 591 (9th Dist.1995); United 

States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1106 (5th Cir.1993). 
Guernsey County, Case No. 18 CA 22 6 

{¶ 19} Further, it is well established that the automobile exception to the warrant 

requirement allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable 

cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband. State v. Ortiz, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 

00CA38, 2001WL520976 (May 11, 2001) citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 367, 

528 N.E.2d 972 (1992). When a narcotics dog alerts to the odor of drugs from a lawfully 

detained vehicle, an officer has probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband. See 

State v. Woodson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2007-CA-00151, 2008-Ohio-670, ¶ 20. 

{¶ 20} The parties agree appellant's vehicle was lawfully stopped. Because 

appellant's vehicle was lawfully detained when Trooper Hawkins' narcotics dog alerted to 

the odor of drugs coming from appellant's car, we find no warrant was required prior to 

Hawkins' search of appellant's car. 

{¶ 21} Next, as to appellant's argument that the traffic stop was illegally extended, 

“ ‘when detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a 

time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.’ ” State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 

403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Keathley, 55 Ohio App.3d 

130, 131, 562 N.E.2d 932 (2nd Dist. Miami 1988). “This measure includes the period of 

time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver's license, registration, and vehicle 

plates.” Id., citing State v. Bolden, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2003-03-007, 2004-Ohio-184, 

¶ 17, citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660(1979). 

Additionally, “ ‘[i]n determining if an officer completed these tasks within a reasonable 

length of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the totality of the 

circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently conducted the investigation.’ ” 

Id., quoting State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 598-599, 657 N.E.2d 591(9th Dist. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 18 CA 22 7 

Medina 1995), citing State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521-522, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992), 

and United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). See 

also State v. Whitman, 184 Ohio App.3d 740, 2009-Ohio-5647, 922 N.E.2d 293 (5th 

Dist.Holmes); State v. Woodson, 5th Dist. Stark No.2007-CA-00151, 2008-Ohio-670, ¶ 

21. 

{¶ 22} In overruling appellant's motion to suppress, the trial court found our opinion 

in State v. Whitman, 184 Ohio App.3d, 2009-Ohio-5647, 922 N.E.2d 293 (5th Dist.) 

(Edwards dissenting), "on point." In that matter, as is the case here, the parties agreed 

that the appellant was legally stopped for a traffic infraction. The question in Whitman was 

identical to the question here - whether appellant's lawful detention became unlawful 

when the Trooper decided to deploy his narcotics dog, which was already on the scene, 

to sniff around the exterior of appellant's car. In Whitman we explained: 

* * * The officer needs no suspicion or cause to “run the dog around” 

the stopped vehicle if he does it contemporaneously with the 

legitimate activities associated with the traffic violation. See 

Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 

(upholding constitutionality of dog sniff conducted by an officer-

“[w]hile [a second officer] was in the process of writing a warning 

ticket, [the second officer] walked his dog around [Caballes's] car”-

and stating that the use of the dog during Caballes's traffic stop “[did] 

not implicate legitimate privacy interests” because “the dog sniff was 
Guernsey County, Case No. 18 CA 22 8 

performed on the exterior of [Caballes's] car while he was lawfully 

seized for a traffic violation”). (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 23} Here, the purpose of the traffic stop had yet to be fulfilled when Trooper 

Hawkins made the decision to walk his canine around appellant's car. Hawkins testified 

State Highway Patrol policy requires two troopers on the scene before he may deploy his 

canine. He summonsed Roe to the scene before he began writing the warning ticket, and 

while he was still reviewing information from dispatch. When Roe arrived, Hawkins had 

just begun writing the warning ticket. He had not completed the same, nor delivered it to 

appellant before he walked the dog around appellant's car. The entire process took a little 

over 16 minutes. Hawkins testified a routine traffic stop takes 10-20 minutes to complete. 

{¶ 24} To support his argument that the traffic stop here was illegally extended, 

appellant relies upon Rodriguez v. U.S., 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). 

Rodriguez, however, is factually distinguishable. In that matter, the officer had completed 

the purpose for the traffic stop, and had issued Rodriguez a citation. Only then did the 

officer request permission from Rodriguez to walk his dog around Rodriguez's vehicle. 

When Rodriguez declined, the officer further detained Rodriguez, directed him to exit the 

vehicle and stand in front of it until a second officer arrived on the scene. The dog sniff in 

Rodriguez was not conducted contemporaneously with the legitimate activities of the 

traffic stop. 

{¶ 25} We are not presented with the same fact pattern here. Because appellant 

was lawfully detained, and the purpose of the traffic stop had not yet been fulfilled, we 

find no Fourth Amendment violation in Hawkins' decision to walk his dog around 
Guernsey County, Case No. 18 CA 22 9 

appellant's car. State v. Latona, 5th Dist. Richland App. No. 2010-CA-0072, 2011-Ohio1253, ¶ 25, citing State v. Guckert, 4th Dist. Washington App. No. 99CA49, 2000-Ohio1958 (Dec. 20, 2000). 

{¶ 26} Appellant's first and second assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶ 27} The judgment of the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By Wise, Earle, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Delaney, J. concur. 

EEW/rw