alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 4.1


 


THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON


NEW YORK’S FIRST BANK-FOUNDED 1784 BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON


 


 


2 HANSON PLACE, 12TH FLOOR, BROOKLYN,
N.Y. 11217


 


 


 


November 22, 2016


 


Hennion & Walsh, Inc.


2001 Route 46, Waterview Plaza


Parsippany, New Jersey 07054


 


Smart Trust 280


 


Dear Sirs:


The Bank of New York
Mellon is acting as trustee for the series of Smart Trust set forth above (the “Trust”). We enclosed a list
of the Securities to be deposited in the Trust on the date hereof. The prices indicated therein reflect our evaluation of such
Securities as of close of business on November 21, 2016, in accordance with the valuation method set forth in the Standard Terms
and Conditions of Trust and Trust Agreement. We consent to the reference to The Bank of New York Mellon as the party performing
the evaluations of the Trust Securities in the Registration Statement (No. 333-213793) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
with respect to the registration of the sale of the Trust Units and to the filing of this consent as an exhibit thereto.


 


 


Very truly yours,


 


/s/ GERARDO CIPRIANO                    


Gerardo Cipriano


Vice President
#### Eugenie Murrhee SUTER, Appellant, v. Max SUTER, Appellee.

No. Q-488.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 7, 1973.

Rehearing Denied July 13, 1973.

William H. Maness, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Floyd G. Yeager, Jacksonville, for appel-lee.

JOHNSON, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, modifying a final judgment of divorce entered on February 9, 1972, and an order on rehearing, dated February 25, 1972. In the order of February 9, 1972, alimony to the wife was reduced from $2200.00 per month to $1350.00 per month. The trial court reviewed the facts and circumstances surrounding this case and made findings of fact as to why the reduced alimony was decreed.

In the order on rehearing dated February 25, 1972, the trial court decreed that a review of the financial situations of the parties would be entertained by that court upon proper motion being filed before the court after six months from the date thereof.

We dispose of the latter order, February 25, 1972, by saying that the trial court was correct in authorizing a review of the financial situations of the parties. No error was committed in this regard.

As to the authority of the trial court to reduce the alimony payments, we hold that under the law as it existed prior to the 1971 Act of the Legislature, as well as under the present law, F.S. Section 61.-08 (1971), F.S.A., the trial court was authorized to reduce the alimony payments and also to provide for permanent alimony. We do not find any conflict between this holding and the holding in Thigpen v. Thigpen, Fla.App., 277 So.2d 583, and handed down. by this Court on May 10, 1973. This latter case recognized the fact that the basic nature and purpose of alimony remains today, under the so called “no fault” divorce law, the same as prior thereto. We agree that under the philosophy emanating from the new law the trial court would be more inclined to limit the duration and amount of alimony payments, but this does not mandatorily reduce the exercise of judicial discretion by the trial court.

*326In the case sub judice, it appears to this Court that the trial court was very meticulous in his treatment of evidence submitted by both parties. The fact that the proffered evidence of a trust fund had accrued to the benefit of the appellant-defendant, was not accepted by the trial court does not necessarily render such ruling erroneous. The trial court appears to have taken into consideration all the evidence that was necessary for him to do equity and justice between the parties. F.S. § 61.08(2), F.S.A.

The contention of the appellee that the trial court should have limited the duration of alimony under the presently existing statute is without merit in view of our determination that the new law does not remove the discretion left to the trial court.

For the reasons set forth above, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed.

SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.
#### NATIONAL BANK OF SARASOTA, Appellant, v. Lewis P. MERCER, Appellee.

No. 73-481.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 3, 1974.

L. Norman Vaughan-Birch of Kirk, Pinkerton, Sparrow, McClelland & Savary, Sarasota, for appellant.

David G. Bowman of Burket, Smith & Bowman, Sarasota, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal questions the correctness of a final summary judgment rendered in favor of Lewis P. Mercer, appellee, who personally endorsed a promissory note to appellant/bank. Depositions of the interested parties were taken. Subsequently, on the basis of these depositions and affidavits, both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary final judgment in favor of Mercer. We agree.

The record on appeal demonstrates that there was no genuine issue of material fact existing between the parties under the issues as made by the complaint and answer alleging several affirmative defenses (Rule 1.510, RCP, 31 F.S.A.). From reading the evidence adduced in support of the appel-lee’s motion for summary final judgment, we conclude, as did the trial judge, that the appellant satisfied the mortgage securing the promissory note, which is the basis of this suit, without appellee’s knowledge or consent, either expressed or implied.

HOBSON, A. C. J., and McNULTY and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.

Affirmed.
#### Harry L. E. HOLLAND, Appellant, v. Margaret Myfanwy HOLLAND, Appellee.

No. 73-507.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 3, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION OF
 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
 CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
 PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
  In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Europa Acquisition IV, Inc. for the quarter ending December 31, 2010, I, Peter Reichard, CEO and CFOof Europa Acquisition IV, Inc. hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:
  1. Such quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending December 31, 2010, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  2. The information contained in such quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2010, fairly represents in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Europa Acquisition IV, Inc.
   Date:  February 4, 2011
By:
/s/ Peter ReichardPeter ReichardPresident and Director
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

R. BRIAN SHOBER, INDIVIDUALLY AND

AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ROSALEE MARIE SHOBER, DECEASED,

Petitioner

v.

ST. JOSEPH MEDICAL CENTER; ST. JOSEPH REGIONAL HEALTH NETWORK;

CAROL A. GREENBERG, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT GREENBERG, M.D.; MOHAMED F. SOUMAKIEH, M.D.;

BORNEMANN HEALTH CORPORATION

A/K/A BORNEMANN SURGERY ASSOCIATES, A/K/A BORNEMANN ANESTHESIA,

Respondents :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 277 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 2nd day of December, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
UNANIMOUS WRITTEN CONSENT 


OF THE 


BOARD OF DIRECTORS


OF


METWOOD, INC. 


 


Dated as of June 30, 2013


 


THE UNDERSIGNED,
being all of the Directors of Metwood, Inc., a Nevada corporation (hereinafter called the “Corporation”), acting pursuant
to Sections 78.315 and 78.375 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, hereby waive all notice of the time, place and purposes of a meeting
of the Board of Directors of the Corporation, and does hereby unanimously consent and agree to adopt the resolutions set forth
below, and upon execution of this consent, (the “Consent”), the resolutions set forth below shall be deemed to have
been adopted to the same extent, and to have the same force and effect as those adopted in a formal meeting of the Corporation's
Board of Directors, duly called and held for the purpose of acting upon proposals to adopt such resolutions:


 


RESOLVED, as the
Board of Directors has determined that it is in the best interests of the Corporation to approve the Member Interest Exchange Agreement,
(the “Agreement”), dated June 30, 2013, by and between the Corporation and Global Energy Group LLC, and issue the preferred
shares and common shares of stock to the Members of Global Energy Group LLC, pursuant to the Agreement in exchange for the Corporation’s
acquisition of Ninety Nine (99%) percent of the Member Interests of


Global Energy Group LLC.


 


RESOLVED, FURTHER,
that the Officers of the Corporation, and any Officer of the Corporation each of them acting singly, be and they hereby are authorized,
empowered and directed to take all such further action and to execute, deliver, certify and file all such instruments and documents
in the name of, and on behalf of the Corporation, as in their judgment that shall be necessary or advisable in order to carry out
fully the intent and to accomplish the purposes of the foregoing resolutions.


 


THIS UNANIMOUS
WRITTEN CONSENT of the Board of Directors of METWOOD, INC. may be executed in more then one counterpart, each of which shall
be deemed an original and all of which together shall constitute one instrument.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
the foregoing resolutions were duly adopted by the Board of Directors of the Corporation as of the date first written above.


 


DIRECTORS


 





/s/ Robert M. Callahan


Robert M. Callahan - Director


 





/s/ Shawn A. Callahan


Shawn A. Callahan - Director
#### SNYDER, YOUNG & STERN, Appellant, v. Mary NISI and Archie N. Nisi, Appellees.

No. 67-602.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Nov. 14, 1967.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Filed 11/5/02 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2002 ND 166

Ambrose Joel Whiteman, Petitioner and Appellant

v.

State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee

No. 20020163

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, the Honorable Lawrence A. Leclerc, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Steven D. Mottinger (argued) and Douglas Nesheim (on brief), Fraase, Johnson, Ramstad & Mottinger, 15 9th Street South, Fargo, ND 58103-1830, for petitioner and appellant.

Wade L. Webb, Assistant State’s Attorney, Courthouse, P.O. Box 2806, Fargo, ND 58108-2806, for respondent and appellee.

Whiteman v. State

No. 20020163

Per Curiam.

[¶1]Ambrose Joel Whiteman appealed a trial court judgment dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.  On May 22, 1998, a jury convicted Whiteman of murder.  His trial attorney, Gordon Dexheimer, did not file a notice of appeal.  On June 25, 2001, Whiteman filed an application for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to file a direct appeal.  The trial court summarily dismissed Whiteman’s petition.  On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, concluding Whiteman had raised genuine issues of material fact regarding his instructions to Dexheimer.  See Whiteman v. State, 2002 ND 77, ¶¶ 21-23, 643 N.W.2d 704.  After an evidentiary hearing on June 20, 2002, at which Dexheimer and Whiteman testified, the trial court found Dexheimer’s testimony more credible and determined Dexheimer followed Whiteman’s instructions to not file a direct appeal. 

[¶2]We summarily affirm the trial court judgment under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).

[¶3]Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

Dale V. Sandstrom

William A. Neumann

Mary Muehlen Maring

Carol Ronning Kapsner
# CNMI
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 160 (Friday, August 17, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41138-41139]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-17745]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration #15567 and #15568; HAWAII Disaster Number HI-
00049]


Presidential Declaration Amendment of a Major Disaster for the 
State of Hawaii

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Amendment 1.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a 
major disaster for the State of Hawaii (FEMA-4366-DR), dated 06/14/
2018.
    Incident: Kilauea Volcanic Eruption and Earthquakes.
    Incident Period: 05/03/2018 and continuing.

DATES: Issued on 06/14/2018.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 09/12/2018.
    Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: 03/14/2019.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street SW, 
Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416, (202) 205-6734.

[[Page 41139]]


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of the President's major disaster 
declaration for the State of Hawaii, dated 06/14/2018, is hereby 
amended to extend the deadline for filing applications for physical 
damages as a result of this disaster to 09/12/2018.
    All other information in the original declaration remains 
unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008)

James Rivera,
Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
[FR Doc. 2018-17745 Filed 8-16-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
#### W. B. Morris, Adm’r, &c., Respondent, *vs.*David Thomas, *et*al., Appellant.

1. Whaley vs. Whaley, ante, p. 36, affirmed.

*Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.*

*160
      *J. Q. A. Frictchey,*for Appellant.

*E. B. Shersen,*for Respondent.

Wagner, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The precise question presented in this case was decided at the present term in the case of Whaley vs. Whaley. The only point raised, is, as to who is entitled to the emblements or growing crops'on the farm of a. deceased person at the time of Ms death, the administrator or the widow, and the question must now be regarded as settled in favor of the administrator..

Judgment affirmed.

Judge Adams concurs. Judge Bliss absent.
Filed 10/21/2020 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2020 ND 222

Annette Thiele a/k/a Annette Thiel, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.

Kyle Bousquet and Mitchell's Oil 

Field Services, Inc. Defendants and Appellees

No. 20200146

Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial 

District, the Honorable Paul W. Jacobson, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Annette Thiele, self-represented, Sidney, MT, plaintiff and appellant.

Shea A. Thomas (argued) and Nicholas C. Grant (appeared), Dickinson, ND,

for defendants and appellees.
1

Thiele v. Bousquet

No. 20200146

Per Curiam.

[¶1] Annette Thiele appealed from a summary judgment. Thiele brought this 

negligence action for personal injuries she claims to have suffered as a result 

of a motor vehicle accident involving her and Kyle Bousquet, who was allegedly 

acting within his scope of employment with Mitchell’s Oil Field Services at the 

time of the accident. Bousquet and Mitchell’s Oil Field Services moved for 

summary judgment arguing there is no evidence to establish Bousquet caused 

Thiele’s injuries. Thiele moved for a briefing extension and a trial continuance. 

The court denied her motion. Thiele did not respond to the motion for summary 

judgment, and the district court granted it.

[¶2] On appeal, Thiele argues the district court erred when it granted 

summary judgment. She asserts the court should have allowed her a briefing 

extension and a trial continuance. She also argues the summary judgment 

ruling should be reversed based on evidence that is not in the record. We affirm 

under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1) and (4). See Ihli v. Lazzaretto, 2015 ND 151, 

¶ 21, 864 N.W.2d 483 (“Documents not in the certified record will not be 

considered by this Court on appeal.”). See also Alerus Fin., N.A. v. Lamb, 2003 

ND 158, ¶ 6, 670 N.W.2d 351 (applying abuse of discretion standard to motion 

for continuance of trial); Myers v. Myers, 1999 ND 194, ¶ 5, 601 N.W.2d 264 

(applying abuse of discretion standard to motion for filing extension). We 

award double costs pursuant to N.D.R.App.P. 38.

[¶3] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Gerald W. VandeWalle

Jerod E. Tufte 

Lisa Fair McEvers

Daniel J. Crothers
#### Rufus M. Philips, to use of J. W. Tindall, Respondent, vs. Edward G. Ward, Adm’r. of estate of Geo. E. Ward, deceased.

1. *Trustee*— Suit *by*— Mention *of beneficiary in caption.*— In suit by a trustee, it isnot necessary that the name of the beneficiary should appear in the caption even, where the trust is an express or,e.

2. *Probate Court*— Final *judgment, appeal etc.*— On appeal from proceedings brought in a Probate Court to establish n demand against the estate of the deceased where the Circuit Count merely renders a finding' as to the amount, without entering a final judgment, no appeal will lie.

*Appeal from, Barton Circuit Court.*

*Phelps &*McAfee, for Appellant.

*Sherwood*Young, for Respondent.

Adams, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a proceeding commenced in the Probate Court of Barton County, to establish a demand against the estate of George E. Ward, deceased. That court refused to allow the demand, and the plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court, where the case was tried by the court, by consent of parties, and the court found for the plaintiff the sum of twenty-three hundred and eighty dollars debt, and the further sum of fifteen hundred and twenty-nine dollars and eighty-six cents for damages, and without rendering any final or formal judgment on this finding. The court assuming this finding to be a judgment ordered it to be certified to the Probate Court for classification, and payment out of the assets of said estate.

During the progress of the proceedings, the defendant moved the court to dismiss the proceedings on the alleged ground that there was not a proper party plaintiff, which motion was overruled, and an exception saved, and the defendant also filed amotion in arrest for the same reason and for the reason also, *296that the judgment is simply in the name of Philips, and not in his name to nse of Tindall, and because the action was not brought in the name of the real party in interest. This motion was also overruled and an exception saved, and the de- ^ fendant has brought the case here by appeal. It may be that Philips was trustee of an express trust in favor of Tindall, and if so he could prosecute the suit in his name to the use of Tindall. "Who was the real party interest, is not disclosed by the record. Nor does it appear for what reason Tindall’s name was dropped in heading the proceedings on the final trial. It was not necessary in this case, that it should have appeared at all; even if Philips was the trustee of an *express*trust in his favor. He might sue on this description in the heading of the proceedings or leave it off without affecting the rights ■ of parties.

I see no error on this point. I have said this much to indicate what my opinion would have been if there had been a final judgment rendered. Put there was only a finding of the amount due, and no final judgment rendered. A final judgment may still be entered on the finding of the court, and until that is done no appeal lies to this court and for that reason, the appeal will be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Judge Sherwood not sitting. The other Judges concur.
<PAGE>





                                                                    EXHIBIT 24.5

                                POWER OF ATTORNEY

        KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS: That the undersigned hereby
constitutes and appoints Stig Johansson, Joachim W. Bauer, Kees van Ophem, Neil
E. Craven, Eugene A. Rizzo and Terje Nordahl and each of them (with full power
to act alone) the undersigned's true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent, with
full power of substitution and resubstitution, for and in the name and on behalf
of the undersigned, to execute any and all instruments and documents, and to do
any and all other acts and things, that any such attorney-in-fact and agent may
deem necessary or advisable, in compliance with the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended (the "Securities Act"), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
and any rules, regulations and requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Commission") in respect thereof, in connection with the
registration under the Securities Act of shares of capital of Carrier 1
International S.A. (the "Shares") pursuant to a registration statement (the
"Registration Statement") to be filed with the Commission relating to the
offering from time to time to the public by beneficial holders of Dollar
Warrants and Euro Warrants of Carrier 1 International S.A. and by any other
person named in such Registration Statement of Shares (and any depositary
receipts in respect thereof); including specifically, but without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, the power and authority to execute, for and in the
name and on behalf of the undersigned in any and all capacities, the
Registration Statement, and any and all supplements and amendments (including,
without limitation, any pre-effective and post-effective amendments and any
subsequent registration statements pursuant to Rule 462(b) under the Securities
Act) to such Registration Statement, and any and all other instruments or
documents filed as a part of, or in connection with, such Registration Statement
and supplements and amendments thereto (including, without limitation, if
necessary, a registration statement under the Securities Act of depositary
shares represented by American depositary receipts to be filed on Form F-6); and
the undersigned hereby ratifies and confirms all that such attorneys-in-fact and
agents, or any of them, shall do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

Signed this 2nd day of August, 2000.

                                          /s/ Victor A. Pelson
                                          ------------------------------------
                                          Name: Victor A. Pelson
262 La. 131

#### J. I. ROBERTS DRILLING COMPANY v. DAVIS OIL COMPANY.

No. 52500.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 30, 1972.

In re: Davis Oil Company applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 260 So.2d 735.

Application denied; there is no error of law in the judgment complained of.
#### CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a Florida municipal corporation, et al., Appellants, v. JOHN E. WITHERS TRANSFER & STORAGE CO., Fargo Van & Storage, Inc., Bader Bros., Inc., and Jero Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Jones Miami Beach Express, Appellees.

No. 70-1275.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 3, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.