alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 22

- 50544 Summary Calendar

**United States of America,**

Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus

**Cecilio Torres**

**- Ibarra,** 

Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:22

- CR

- 239

- 1

Before **Smith, Dennis,**  and **Southwick,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** *

Cecilio Torres

- Ibarra appeals his conviction for illegal reentry and his sentence of 18 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He argues , for the first time on appeal , that his sentence exceeds the statutory

* Pursuant to **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the lim ited circumstances set forth in **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 10, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 22-50544 Document: 00516502083 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/10/2022No. 22

- 50544

2 maximum because the enhanced pe nalty provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are
unconstitutional. He has filed an unopposed motion for summary disposition and a letter brief correctly conceding that this issue is foreclosed by Almendarez

Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998). See United States v. Pervis , 937 F.3d 546, 553

- 54 (5th Cir. 2019). Torres

- Ibarra states that he raised the issue only to preserve it for possible further review. Because summary disposition
is a ppropriate, see Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis , 406 F. 2 d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969), Torres

- Ibarra’s motion is **GRANTED** , and the district court’s judgment is **AFFIRMED**

. Case: 22-50544 Document: 00516502083 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/10/2022
# C_2013310EN.01000101.xml

| 25.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 310/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 310/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.7039 — PGGM/GDF SUEZ/EBN/NOGAT)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 310/01

On 17 October 2013, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M7039. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M7039. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

---
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 12-18

                           THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY
                COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                     Year Ended December 31
                                              2001           2000            1999            1998            1997
                                            ----------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   (Millions, except for ratio)
<S>                                         <C>             <C>            <C>             <C>             <C>
EARNINGS:
    Pretax earnings                         $  320          $  586          $  645          $  678          $  705
    Fixed charges                              314             311             322             311             316
                                            ------          ------          ------          ------          ------
NET EARNINGS                                   634             897             967             989           1,021
                                            ------          ------          ------          ------          ------


FIXED CHARGES:
    Interest expense                           306             277             288             277             282
    Interest factor of rents                     8              34              34              34              34
                                            ------          ------          ------          ------          ------
        Total fixed charges                 $  314          $  311          $  322          $  311          $  316
                                            ------          ------          ------          ------          ------

Ratio of earnings to fixed charges            2.02            2.88            3.00            3.18            3.23
                                            ======          ======          ======          ======          ======

</TABLE>
#### L. C. HARTAGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-1044.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 24, 1972.

Edward M. Kay, of Varon & Stahl, Hollywood, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Andrew I. Friedrich, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

On the basis of the briefs, record, and oral argument, it is the opinion of this court that the appellant has failed to make reversible error appear. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed.

Affirmed.

REED, C. J., and CROSS and OWEN, JJ., concur.
#### Jules TROP and Diane Trop, Appellants, v. CHARLES M. NICHOLS BUILDERS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellees.

No. 71-110.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 13, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed August 10, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-2402

Lower Tribunal No. 11-27645-SP

________________

United Automobile Insurance Company,

Appellant,

vs.

Best American Diagnostic Center, Inc., a/a/o Genoveva 

Rodriguez,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Ayana 

Harris, Judge.

Michael J. Neimand, for appellant.

David B. Pakula, P.A., and David B. Pakula (Pembroke Pines); Marks 

& Fleischer, P.A., and Gary Marks (Ft. Lauderdale), for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and HENDON, and LOBREE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.
2

United Automobile Insurance Company appeals the final judgment 

entered by the trial court after entry of summary judgment on the 

reasonableness of a diagnostic test based on the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel. We reverse and remand consistent with our recent decision in 

United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Millennium Radiology, LLC, 337 So. 3d 

834 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“Millennium's ‘identity’ is not the same in each of 

these cases against United Auto; Millennium draws its identity from its 

assignor from case to case. The identity element of collateral estoppel, 

therefore, is not satisfied.”).

Reversed and remanded.
#### Primio, Appellant, *v.*Haertter.

*565Argued October 18, 1934.

Before Trbxler, P. J., Keller, Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadtfeld and Parker, JJ.

*I. G. G. Forster,*for appellant.

*Jay B. Leopold,*for appellee.

January 4, 1935:

Opinion by

Trbxler, P. J.,

This is an action of trespass for the recovery of damages resulting .from the colliding .of two motor trucks. Plaintiff came to the crossing, looked and saw defendant’s truck Í00 feet away coming at a rate of 30 or 35 miles per hour. He continued to cross the street which was about 35 to 40 feet wide, and when almost across he looked again and saw defendant’s truck 50. feet away. His last look was too late to avoid the collision with the defendant’s truck and the latter struck plaintiff’s vehicle in the extreme rear. Evidently the plaintiff took an obvious risk. He almost escaped, but he misealculáted the distance he would cover before the other truck would.be upon him. Plaintiff .admitted that he could have stopped within six feet. There is no rigid rule as to how far away the approaching vehicle must be to allow another ve*566hide approaching the same crossing from the side to continue to advance without its driver being guilty of negligence. Each case must be determined by the circumstances, but taking the slow advance of the plaintiff, his ability to stop in a short distance, the rapid approach of the defendant’s truck and the distance to be traveled before the paths of the two trucks would intersect, we cannot escape the conclusion that under the undisputed facts in the case the accident was due to plaintiff’s lack of caution. The plaintiff was not so far in advance of the other truck considering all the attending circumstances as to afford reasonable time to clear the crossing. The lower court was right in deciding, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was negligent. See Brayman v. DeWolf, 97 Pa. Superior Ct. 225 and cases therein cited.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### Henry King STANFORD, as President of the University of Miami, a Florida corporation not for profit, Appellant, v. Arthur N. COHEN and George A. Kokus, Appellees.

No. 70-605.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 17, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 18, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
<PAGE>

                                  UNITED STATES

                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                             ----------------------

                                    FORM 8-K

                                 CURRENT REPORT

                     Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
                         Securities Exchange Act of 1934

                        Date of Report: August 14, 2000

                               Sauer-Danfoss Inc.
             ------------------------------------------------------
             (Exact name of Registrant as specified in its charter)

  Delaware                       333-48299                    36-3482074
---------------                 -------------            --------------------
(State or other                 (Commission                (I.R.S. Employer
jurisdiction of                 File Number)              Identification No.)
incorporation)


2800 East 13th Street, Ames, Iowa                                       50010
----------------------------------------                              ---------
(Address of principal executive offices)                              (Zip Code)

Registrants telephone number, including area code:     (515) 239-6000

                             Exhibit Index on Page 3


<PAGE>

                                        2

Item 5.  Other Events.
----------------------

         This Current Report on Form 8-K is being filed for the purpose of
disclosing two press releases filed as Exhibit 99.1 and 99.2 hereto and which
is herein incorporated by reference in its entirety.

<PAGE>

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                  EXHIBIT INDEX
<S>                               <C>
Exhibit
  No.             Description
-------           -----------

  99.1            Press Release, dated August 10, 2000

  99.2            Press Release, dated August 14, 2000
</TABLE>

<PAGE>


                                   SIGNATURES

         Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

                               SAUER-DANFOSS INC.

Date: August 21, 2000

                               By: /s/ Kenneth D. McCuskey
                                   -----------------------------
                                   Name:  Kenneth D. McCuskey
                                   Title: Vice President-Finance and Treasurer
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3502 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3502

To designate the long-term care facility of the Department of Veterans 
 Affairs medical center at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as the Matthew B. 
 Ridgway Division of the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center 
             at University Drive, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 10, 1993

   Mr. Santorum (for himself, Mr. Coyne, Mr. McDade, Mr. Murtha, Mr. 
 Weldon, Mr. Klink, Mr. Ridge, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Clinger, Mr. Kanjorski, 
 Mr. Shuster, Mr. Foglietta, Mr. Goodling, Mr. Borski, Mr. Walker, Mr. 
  McHale, Mr. Greenwood, Ms. Margolies-Mezvinsky, Mr. Blackwell, Mr. 
    Holden, and Mr. Gekas) introduced the following bill; which was 
             referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To designate the long-term care facility of the Department of Veterans 
 Affairs medical center at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as the Matthew B. 
 Ridgway Division of the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center 
             at University Drive, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. NAMING.

    The division of the Department of Veterans Affairs medical center 
at University Drive in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, constituting the 
Aspinwall long-term care facility shall after the date of the enactment 
of this Act be known and designated as the Mathew B. Ridgway Division 
of the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center at University 
Drive, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference to the facility referred to in section 1 in any law, 
regulation, map, document, record, or other paper of the United States 
shall be considered to be a reference to the Mathew B. Ridgway Division 
of the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center at University 
Drive, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>

      EX-24.2

             INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT



                                                                    Exhibit 24.2


     To the Stockholders and Board of Directors
     of Ness Energy International, Inc.

     We consent to the use of our Independent Auditor's Report dated March 23,
2000 and accompanying financial statements of Ness Energy International, Inc.
for the year ended December 31, 1999. This Report will be included in the Form
S-8 which is to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for Ness
Energy International, Inc.


     Weaver and Tidwell, L.L.P.
     Certified Public Accountants
     Ft. Worth, Texas
     August 20, 2000
103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3344

AN ACT

For the relief of Lloyd B. Gamble.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS.

4 (a) PAYMENT.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall

5 pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise ap6 propriated, to Lloyd B. Gamble of Fairfax, Virginia, the

7 sum of $253,488.

8 (b) BASIS.—The payment required by subsection (a)

9 shall be to compensate Lloyd B. Gamble for the injuries

10 sustained by him as a result of the administration to him,

11 without his knowledge, of lysergic acid diethylamide by

12 United States Army personnel in 1957.
2

•HR 3344 EH

1 SEC. 2. SATISFACTION OF CLAIMS.

2 The payment made pursuant to section 1 shall be in

3 full satisfaction of all claims Lloyd B. Gamble may have

4 against the United States for any injury described in such

5 section.

6 SEC. 3. INELIGIBILITY FOR ADDITIONAL BENEFITS.

7 Upon payment of the sum referred to in section 1,

8 Lloyd B. Gamble shall not be eligible for any compensa9 tion or benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs

10 or the Department of Defense for any injury described in

11 such section.

12 SEC. 4. LIMITATION OF AGENTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES.

13 It shall be unlawful for an amount of more than 10

14 percent of the amount paid pursuant to section 1 to be

15 paid to or received by any agent or attorney for any service

16 rendered to Lloyd B. Gamble in connection with the bene17 fits provided by this Act. Any person who violates this sec18 tion shall be guilty of an infraction and shall be subject

19 to a fine in the amount provided in title 18, United States

20 Code.

Passed the House of Representatives October 7,

1994.

Attest:

Clerk.

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3344

AN ACT

For the relief of Lloyd B. Gamble.
#### Clinton Bernard TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-667.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 13, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 5, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 32

                                  CERTIFICATION

         Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Subsections
(a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each
of the undersigned officers of Grupo Iusacell Celular, S.A. de C.V. (the
"Company"), does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge, that:

         The annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2003
(the "Form 20-F") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained
in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the
periods referred to in the Form 20-F.

                                          By: /s/  Gustavo Guzman S.
                                          ---------------------------
                                          Gustavo Guzman Sepulveda
                                          Chief Executive Officer

                                          By: /s/  Jose Luis Riera Kinkel
                                          ---------------------------
                                          Jose Luis Riera Kinkel
                                          Chief Financial Officer

         The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
Section 1350, Chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code). A signed original of
this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company
and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

Dated: June 30, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED
JUNE 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                              15
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   22,803
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        211
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                26,805
<PP&E>                                         437,726
<DEPRECIATION>                                 177,356
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 287,580
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           52,843
<BONDS>                                         42,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           185
<OTHER-SE>                                     187,583
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   287,580
<SALES>                                         47,278
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                47,396
<CGS>                                            7,128
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   29,849
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 344
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 17,203
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,504
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             12,699
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    12,699
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .69
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .68


</TABLE>
#### John Allen JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREER RICE DRYER AND SHOP, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 46669.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 22, 1972.

Robertshaw, Merideth & Swank, J. Murray Akers, Greenville, for plaintiff-appellant.

Daniel, Coker, Horton, Bell & Dukes, Jackson, for defendant-appellee.

PATTERSON, Justice:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Washington County which *420granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence. John Allen Jones instituted this action to recover damages for personal injuries incurred while in the employment of Greer Rice Dryer and Shop, Inc., which resulted from a fall into a revolving auger used to process grain.

The issue presented is whether the trial court correctly decided that the plaintiff’s negligence in voluntarily placing himself in a position of great danger was the sole proximate cause of his injury.

It is the opinion of the Court that all issues presented are controlled by the principle announced in Buckeye Cotton Oil Company v. Saffold, 125 Miss. 407, 87 So. 893 (1921), and Rose v. Pace, 144 Miss. 375, 379-380, 109 So. 861 (1926), wherein we stated in the latter:

> There would have been no danger at all if the plaintiff had caused the machinery to be stopped before he thrust his hand into an obviously dangerous place, which the master had not instructed him to do, but which he did voluntarily. The proximate cause of his injury was his voluntary act, and his imprudently and unwisely thrusting his hand into a place manifestly and obviously dangerous; and, instead of selecting the safe method of uncoiling the knotted rope by stopping the machinery, he adopted voluntarily a highly dangerous method by undertaking to uncoil the rope with the machinery running, and, as a result, was injured. He acted on his own judgment, without an order so to do from the master. .

The appellant was thoroughly familiar with the machinery with which he worked. He placed himself in a position of great danger above the revolving auger. His fall into the auger was the result of his voluntary action which could not have been reasonably foreseen by his employer. We are of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court, which directed a verdict for the defendant at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s testimony, was proper.

Affirmed.

GILLESPIE, C. J., and INZER, SMITH and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.