Filed 4/12/22 P. v. Williams CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ARTHUR LEON WILLIAMS, III,

Defendant and Appellant.

B313049

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. KA122091)

APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Mike Camacho, Judge. Conditionally reversed 

in part and remanded with directions.

Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

_________________________________
2

Defendant Arthur Leon Williams III appeals from a final 

judgment entered after a no contest plea to misdemeanor 

possession of a controlled substance under Health and Safety 

Code section 11377, subdivision (a), for which he was placed on

one year summary probation, subject to credit for one day time 

served, narcotics conditions, and minimum fines. His sole 

contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his

discovery motion filed pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043 

and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (a Pitchess

motion), in advance of his motion to suppress evidence. We 

agree, conditionally reverse the judgment, and remand for 

further proceedings as set forth herein.

BACKGROUND

Officer Rodney Cavanaugh and his partner, Officer 

Gribben, were patrolling the area around Willie White Park in 

Pomona late one night in May of 2019 when they encountered a 

parked car with three men inside. Officer Cavanaugh used the 

spotlight mounted on the exterior of his police cruiser to 

illuminate the inside of the car. The men in the car were 

Williams, Anthony Tucker, and a third man. Officer Cavanaugh 

testified that he immediately recognized Tucker from prior 

contacts and knew that he was on probation for a weapons 

violation and subject to a search condition.

1 On this basis, he and 

his partner exited their cruiser to conduct a probation search of 

the car. 

1 There is no dispute as to whether Tucker was on probation 

for a weapons violation and subject to a search condition. 

As discussed in detail below, Williams does dispute that Officer 

Cavanaugh immediately recognized Tucker.
3

The officers removed the men from the car and then asked 

them whether there was any contraband inside. Williams told

Officer Cavanaugh that PCP was hidden in a child seat in the 

rear of the car. Officer Cavanaugh asked Williams to retrieve 

that PCP and Williams complied. Officer Cavanaugh then asked 

whether there was any more PCP in the car and Williams told 

him that there was more in the trunk, which Officer Cavanaugh 

located. Williams was arrested and charged with felony 

violations of Health and Safety Code sections 11378.5 and 

11379.5, subdivision (a). 

In October of 2020, Williams filed his Pitchess motion, 

seeking information from Officer Cavanaugh’s personnel records

pertaining to his “characters for honesty and integrity,” including 

accusations of, among other things, “filing false police reports.” 

In support of the motion, Williams’s counsel averred that Officer 

Cavanaugh’s report of the incident contained four false 

statements as follows: (a) contrary to the report that Officer 

Cavanaugh’s body camera was on “throughout the duration of the 

investigation,” it was activated only at some point after the initial 

encounter ; (b) contrary to the report that Williams’s car was 

parked on the east side of the park, it was actually on the street 

bordering the park to the east on the side of the street opposite 

the park ; (c) contrary to the report that Williams or the other 

occupants of the car were smoking cigarettes, they were not ; and 

(d) contrary to the report that Officer Cavanaugh immediately 

recognized Tucker, Officer Cavanaugh “could not have 

immediately observed Mr. Tucker from his position.” 
4

Counsel’s affidavit purported to attach the police report but 

apparently failed to do so. However, at the hearing, the trial 

court2 elicited further information from Williams’s counsel and 

the deputy district attorney concerning the contents of the police 

report and the circumstances surrounding the arrest. 

Importantly, counsel provided additional information about the 

relative positioning of Williams’s car and the police cruiser and 

where Williams and Tucker were seated in Williams’s car. She 

further explained the relevance of this information to her theory 

that Officer Cavanaugh detained Williams without reasonable 

suspicion.

The trial court denied the motion. In its view, the 

misstatements alleged were not material to establish a defense to 

the charged conduct and Williams failed to lay a plausible factual 

foundation for his defense. 

In March of 2021, Williams filed a motion to suppress 

evidence, which the trial court heard in May. At the hearing the 

trial court indicated that at least a portion of the evidence 

against Williams would be admissible. Thereafter, the parties 

reached an agreement whereby the People added a misdemeanor 

charge for violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377 to 

which Williams pleaded no contest. The trial court suspended 

any sentence, placed Williams on a one-year summary probation, 

and dismissed the original felony charges against him. 

This appeal followed.

2 The Pitchess hearing was conducted by Judge Steven D. 

Blades.
5

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction to Consider Appeal

“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not 

appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is 

expressly made appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper (2015) 60 

Cal.4th 1155, 1159.)

Ordinarily, a certificate of probable cause is required to 

take an appeal after a plea of guilty or no contest. (Pen. Code,

§ 1237.5.) However, a defendant that pleads guilty may obtain 

appellate review of the validity of a search or seizure if, at some 

point prior to the conviction, the defendant moved for the return 

or suppression of evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m).)

Here, Williams asserts that we have jurisdiction to review

denial of his Pitchess motion pursuant to People v. Collins (2004) 

115 Cal.App.4th 137, 151 (Collins), which holds that a Pitchess

motion that is intertwined with litigating the legality of a search 

may be appealed pursuant to section 1538.5, subdivision (m). 

Williams notes that he filed his Pitchess motion in October 2020 

and a motion to suppress in March 2021 and that “[b]oth motions 

make clear that Officer Cavanaugh’s credibility was central to 

the defense argument that the detention in this case violated the 

Fourth Amendment.” 

The People do not dispute that Williams’s appeal is proper 

under Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m) and Collins. 

But “[b]ecause an appealable judgment or order is essential to 

appellate jurisdiction, the appellate court must consider the 

question of appealability sua sponte, and dismiss the appeal if 

the judgment or order is found to be nonappealable.” (People v. 

Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 254.)
6

In Collins, the defendant’s Pitchess motion sought

information concerning officers’ “ ‘illegal activities, improper

tactics, dishonesty, planting evidence, improper search and

seizure, and harassment’ ” because the defendant contended the

officers “ ‘failed to follow search procedures[,] . . . tamper[ed] with

evidence[,] acting without probable cause on an unreliable and

bogus confidential letter that was destroyed by design.’ ” 

(Collins, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 149–150.) On this basis

the appellate court found that the Pitchess motion was

sufficiently intertwined with the defendant’s motion to suppress

evidence to permit review pursuant to section 1538.5, 

subdivision (m). (See Collins, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 151.)

Here, Williams’s Pitchess motion makes no mention of a

planned motion to suppress. Instead, it states that Williams 

intends to use information sought in order to impeach Officer

Cavanaugh “at trial.” However, it does seek information

pertaining to Officer Cavanaugh’s “honesty and integrity,” does

recite the circumstances surrounding the search, and contends

that Officer Cavanaugh was untruthful in his police report in

reciting certain aspects of the detention leading to the search. 

With the context of Williams’s counsel’s additional

arguments at the Pitchess hearing, we conclude that the Pitchess

motion was sufficiently related to the motion to suppress to

support our jurisdiction. The motion to suppress questioned

whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Williams,

and Officer Cavanaugh testified at the hearing on the motion to

suppress about the grounds for the detention. Thus, had the

Pitchess motion been successful and yielded evidence, the

evidence so obtained could have been relevant to the motion to

suppress.
7

B. Pitchess Motion Procedure and Standard of

Appellate Review

While California law makes police personnel records

presumptively confidential (Pen. Code, § 832.7), a defendant may

request access to such records pursuant to section 1043 of the

Evidence Code, part of the statutory scheme codifying the

Supreme Court’s ruling in Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531. 

Section 1043 requires a written motion and supporting affidavit

establishing, inter alia, “good cause” for the discovery sought and

materiality to the subject matter in the pending litigation. 

(Evid. Code, § 1043, subds. (a), (b)(3).) The affidavit may be made

by defense counsel on information and belief. (City of Santa Cruz

v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 89.) If good cause is

shown, the trial court must undertake an in-chambers review of

the officer’s personnel records for material responsive to

defendant’s request. (Evid. Code, § 1045.) If responsive 

materials are present, they shall be disclosed to the defendant 

subject to conditions allowed and appropriate under, or required 

by, Evidence Code section 1045. (Warrick v. Superior Court

(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019 (Warrick).)

We review a trial court’s ruling on a Pitchess motion for

abuse of discretion. (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 

970, 992.)

C. Discussion

A defendant seeking to establish “good cause” for the 

purposes of Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (b)(3), must 

show “both ‘ “materiality” to the subject matter of the pending 

litigation and a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type 

of information sought.’ [Citation.]” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at

p. 1016.)
8

To show materiality, the defense counsel’s affidavit must 

“propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges,” and

“articulate how the discovery sought may lead to relevant 

evidence or may itself be admissible direct or impeachment 

evidence [citations] that would support those proposed defenses.” 

(Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1024.) The affidavit must 

further “describe a factual scenario supporting the claimed officer 

misconduct.” (Ibid.) “That factual scenario, depending on the 

circumstances of the case, may consist of a denial of the facts 

asserted in the police report.” (Id. at pp. 1024–1025.)

At a hearing on a Pitchess motion, the trial court may 

consider the affidavit in context with other pertinent documents 

before it, including the police report and witness statements. 

(Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1025.) The court then must 

determine whether the affidavit and other supporting documents 

“suffice to ‘establish a plausible factual foundation’ for the alleged 

officer misconduct and to ‘articulate a valid theory as to how the 

information sought might be admissible’ [in the proceedings at 

hand]. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

“[A] plausible scenario of officer misconduct is one that 

might or could have occurred. Such a scenario is plausible 

because it presents an assertion of specific police misconduct that 

is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to 

the charges.” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1026.)

The trial court here abused its discretion in denying 

Williams’s Pitchess motion. First, the trial court misinterpreted 

case law surrounding Pitchess motions as requiring that they 

seek evidence relevant to a substantive defense to the charged 

crime. Specifically, it faulted Williams for failing to deny 

involvement in the possession of narcotics or offer a non-culpable 
9

explanation of his presence or conduct at the time of his 

detention, and noted that portions of the police report claimed as 

false were “not germane to a defense such as this as to being 

charged with possession of narcotics.” Case law is clear that 

impeachment evidence is a proper target of a Pitchess motion. 

(People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410, 416 (Hustead)).

Second, and relatedly, the trial court failed to apprehend 

the significance of the information requested to Williams’s efforts 

to show that he was detained without reasonable suspicion. 

At the hearing, the trial court acknowledged that the only proper 

grounds for detaining Williams was the presence in the car of 

Tucker, a probationer subject to search conditions. Williams’s 

counsel further elaborated on claims in her affidavit that Officer 

Cavanaugh could not see Tucker from the police cruiser, despite 

his contrary assertion in the police report. Specifically, she 

explained that when the cruiser pulled up parallel to Williams’s 

parked car on the driver’s side, Williams would have blocked 

Cavanaugh’s view of Tucker because Williams was in the driver’s 

seat and Tucker was in the passenger’s seat. To this, the trial 

court responded “there’s no way to disprove Cavanaugh’s claim 

that from 15 feet away, shining a spotlight inside the car, that he 

couldn’t see [Tucker].” However, it would not be Williams’s 

burden in a later hearing to prove Officer Cavanaugh did not see 

Tucker. Rather, it would be the prosecution’s burden to prove he 

did. (People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638, 644 [prosecution 

bears the burden to prove existence of reasonable suspicion].)3 

3 People v. Bower, supra, 24 Cal.3d 638, was abrogated on 

other grounds by constitutional amendment, as stated in People 

v. Lloyd (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 724, 732–733.
10

Since only Officer Cavanaugh could testify as to what he actually 

saw under the circumstances, impeachment evidence impugning 

his credibility would be both admissible and critical to Williams 

in mounting a defense. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (e).)

Third, and finally, the trial court held Williams to a higher 

standard than plausibility in denying his Pitchess motion. By the 

end of the hearing, the court understood Williams’s position that 

his detention was pretextual and the police report contained false 

information to justify it, but denied the motion because it was 

unpersuaded that Officer Cavanaugh’s statements were 

untruthful. The court acknowledged that Williams “might” have 

“a viable defense,” but because Tucker was actually in the car, 

Cavanaugh’s statement that he saw Tucker was not manifestly 

false. Had Tucker not in fact been in the car, the court explained, 

“that would be a different story.” At the point the trial court 

acknowledged that Williams articulated a potentially viable 

defense (suppression of the evidence) based on a factual scenario 

that contradicted that set forth in the police report, Williams had 

carried his burden to show that specific police misconduct—filing 

a false police report—might have (i.e., “plausibly”) occurred. 

Personnel records concerning Officer Cavanaugh’s honesty and 

integrity are plainly material to establishing this defense and 

would be potential impeachment evidence.
11

For these reasons, the trial court should have granted 

Williams’s motion and conducted an in camera review of Officer 

Cavanaugh’s personnel records.4 

DISPOSITION 

Accordingly, we order a limited remand pursuant to the 

procedures outlined in Hustead, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at page

423. Specifically, we reverse the judgment conditionally and 

remand to the trial court to conduct an in camera hearing on the 

Pitchess motion as to all records of incidents bearing on Officer 

Cavanaugh’s honesty and integrity, including accusations of 

lying, filing false police reports, fabricating admissions,

confessions or other evidence, perjury, theft, fraud, 

misrepresentations, illegal coverups, or malfeasance. If there is 

no discoverable information in the file, then the trial court is 

ordered to reinstate the original judgment and sentence, and the 

judgment is ordered affirmed. If, however, there is relevant 

discoverable information in Officer Cavanaugh’s file, Williams

should be given an opportunity to determine if the information 

would have led to any relevant, admissible evidence that he could

have presented in support of the suppression motion or at trial.

If Williams demonstrates that he was prejudiced by the denial of 

4 We acknowledge that the trial court’s job was made more 

difficult in this instance because the actual police report 

containing the allegedly false statements was not attached to 

Williams’s motion. In addition, key information—both factual 

(e.g., positioning of the vehicles) and argumentative (e.g., that 

detention was pretextual)—was presented for the first time at 

oral argument. The trial court’s willingness to expand the record 

at the hearing contributed substantially to creating an adequate 

record for our review and decision.
12

the discovery, the trial court should permit Williams to renew his 

suppression motion, with a backup trial if denied. If he does not

demonstrate prejudice, then his conviction is ordered reinstated 

and the judgment is ordered affirmed.

HARUTUNIAN, J.*

We concur:

STRATTON, Acting P. J.

WILEY, J.

* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.