Filed 7/18/23 In re Y.D. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re Y.D. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.D. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 D081754

 (Super. Ct. No. EJ4727A,B)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Mark 

T. Cumba, Judge. Affirmed.

Christine E. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant R.D.

Terence M. Chucas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant M.O.
Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

minors Y.D. and G.D.

Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

I

INTRODUCTION

R.D. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s March 6, 2023 orders 

denying his Welfare & Institutions Code1 section 388 petition and 

terminating his and M.O.’s (Mother’s) parental rights to their minor children, 

Y.D. and G.D. He contends the juvenile court erred by denying him courtappointed counsel. Mother also appeals and joins Father’s arguments. 

Because we conclude there was no error and that regardless, any such error 

was harmless, we affirm. 

II

BACKGROUND

A

Dependency Proceedings Before Father Was Relieved of Counsel

In December 2021, the Agency filed dependency petitions for then oneyear-old Y.D. and one-month-old G.D. (children) because of domestic violence 

between Mother and Father. The Agency alleged that during one incident, 

Father grabbed Mother’s phone out of her hands and the phone struck 

newborn G.D.’s head. Mother then ran from Father while still holding G.D. 

Mother and Father had a history of domestic violence, including another

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code unless otherwise specified.
incident approximately 12 months earlier during which Mother was arrested 

for hitting Father. 

At Father’s request, the juvenile court appointed an attorney, J.B., to 

represent him. Although J.B. appeared for Father at the continued detention 

hearing and relayed Father’s position to the court, Father repeatedly 

interrupted the hearing to argue that the dependency proceeding documents 

were “falsified” and to lodge his own objections. The court made prima facie 

findings on the Agency’s petitions and detained the children in out-of-home 

care. 

Father began attending weekly supervised visits with the children, and 

the Agency referred him to a domestic violence group. Through its 

investigation, the Agency learned that the parents’ history of domestic 

violence dated back to at least January 2021. Father also had a child welfare 

history and domestic violence history with another woman in Colorado from 

2010 to 2017, and he was a convicted sex offender. Father’s criminal history

included convictions for domestic battery, contempt of court, and obstructing 

a peace officer. 

During the January 20222 hearing to set trial, Father interrupted the 

court to say that he had been unable to speak with J.B. But when the court 

and J.B. suggested pausing the hearing so that he could talk with J.B., 

Father instead continued to speak directly to the court. He continued to 

interject throughout the remainder of the hearing. 

In late January and early February, Father began independently filing 

documents in pro per. These filings included section 388 petitions asking the 

juvenile court to terminate its jurisdiction and alleging that the Agency had 

2 All further date references occurred in 2022, unless otherwise specified.
kidnapped the children, as well as other documents expressing similar 

sentiments.3 

At the February contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, Father 

appeared by phone and again repeatedly interrupted the court and counsel. 

He expressed that he had never agreed to J.B.’s representation, “had to file 

paperwork on [his] own,” and was representing himself. J.B. asked the court 

to relieve him as Father’s counsel because he and Father had been unable to 

communicate, Father had refused to help J.B. in his defense, and Father had 

indicated a desire to represent himself by filing motions and other documents 

directly with the court. The court denied J.B.’s request, finding that Father’s 

statements indicated he did not understand the law and was incapable of 

representing himself. After Father continued to interrupt the hearing, 

including interrupting closing arguments, the court muted his line. The 

court proceeded with the hearing and found the children’s petitions true, 

removed them from Mother and Father’s care, and placed them in a licensed 

foster home.4

Father continued to attend supervised visits with the children over the 

following months but frequently yelled and shouted at Agency staff. At one

visit, a social worker had to physically prevent Father from leaving with Y.D. 

During another incident, Father followed one of the Agency’s security guards

3 The juvenile court denied both section 388 petitions without a hearing 

because it had not yet made a jurisdictional finding. 

4 Father previously appealed this order, contending only that the Agency 

did not comply with its inquiry duties under the federal Indian Child Welfare 

Act and section 224.2. We accepted the Agency’s concession and stipulation 

for the immediate issuance of the remittitur, which issued on May 6, 2022. 

(In re Y.D. (May 6, 2022, D080004) [nonpub. opn.].) 
by car onto the freeway and into a Walmart parking lot. Y.D.’s speech 

therapist also expressed concerns about working with Father due to his angry

interactions with her. Meanwhile, Y.D.’s foster mother reported that after 

Father’s visits, Y.D. had been clingier than usual, struggled to regulate her 

emotions, and had increasingly frequent and severe tantrums. 

At a May special hearing, J.B. again asked to be relieved as Father’s 

counsel, but the court denied his request. The court additionally held a 

Marsden5 hearing and denied Father’s Marsden motion.

In June, the Agency filed a section 388 petition asking to suspend 

Father’s in-person visitation with the children because he had attempted to 

flee with them during a recent supervised visit. Security had retrieved the 

children just before Father crossed a busy street with them. In an addendum 

report, the Agency also reported that after a prior supervised visit, Father 

had walked to the staff building, yelled and shouted, and looked into office 

windows before security eventually intervened. Meanwhile, Father’s 

domestic violence group terminated his services because of his “language,” 

after he verbally “[went] after” a counselor. 

During a June 3, 2022 hearing, J.B. renewed his request to be relieved 

as Father’s counsel, contending that he was unable to communicate with 

Father as needed to effectively represent him. The juvenile court denied the

request, noting that “absolute chaos” would ensue if Father was allowed to 

represent himself. Father—who appeared remotely—interrupted that the 

court would “pay for this,” that the judge was “treasonous” and “should be 

hung at high noon,” and to express that he wished to hire his “own attorney.” 

The court told Father he was entitled to hire his own attorney. When Father 

again interrupted to call the judge “a fucking piece of shit,” the court muted 

5 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
his line. The court continued the adjudication of the Agency’s section 388 

petition to allow time for Father to retain his own counsel, and it temporarily 

suspended Father’s visitation until the continued hearing date. After the 

hearing, Father filed two additional section 388 petitions in pro per 

demanding the children’s return. 

At a hearing less than a week later, Mother6 made her first appearance 

and was appointed counsel. The children’s counsel asked the juvenile court

to conduct a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) inquiry with Father. The court 

conducted the inquiry and declined to appoint a GAL, finding that Father 

disagreed with the proceedings but understood them and chose not to work 

with J.B. When Father interjected that he was “firing” J.B, the court held 

another Marsden hearing and again denied Father’s Marsden motion.

During later hearings in June, Father continued to interrupt court 

hearings. He also continued to file various documents in pro per, including a 

special hearing request, a petition for extraordinary writ, a notice of intent to 

file a writ petition, and court forms expressing his opinion about the case. At 

these hearings, J.B. reiterated his and Father’s inability to communicate and 

renewed his requests to be relieved as Father’s counsel, which the court 

denied. The same month, Father was arrested for causing a disturbance at 

the courthouse. 

During a July hearing, Father repeatedly interrupted the court, lodged 

his own objections to evidence, and objected during closing arguments. He 

stated, “I don’t want to be appointed any counsel because I don’t believe that 

counsel is in my best interest,” and expressed his belief that J.B. was not 

6 Because Mother’s contention on appeal is limited to joining Father’s 

arguments regarding his lack of representation, we discuss her only as 

needed.
“representing” him in the proceedings but was instead “misrepresenting” 

him. J.B., meanwhile, asked the court on Father’s behalf to deny the 

Agency’s section 388 petition and to deny the children’s request for a

restraining order against Father. The juvenile court granted the section 388 

petition, suspended in-person visitation between Father and the children, 

and granted the children’s restraining order with the exception that Father 

could visit the children pursuant to juvenile court orders. 

In August, the Agency re-referred Father to a domestic violence group. 

After enrolling in early September, he was discharged from the group less 

than a week later with a recommendation that he address mental health and 

domestic violence individually with a domestic violence therapist. The 

following month, both Mother and Father were briefly incarcerated after they 

tried to flee with the children. Father was also charged with failing to 

register as a sex offender.

At a hearing in September, Father continued to interrupt the court and 

counsel, deny that J.B. represented him, lodge his own objections, and argue 

directly to the trial court. The court terminated reunification services and set 

a section 366.26 hearing. The following month, Father again filed various 

documents in pro per in which he objected to the initiation and continuation 

of the dependency proceedings. 

Father interrupted the beginning of a January 2023 hearing to request 

a continuance from the court, stating that he was “going to be working with 

another attorney.” He told the court that J.B. “ha[d] requested four times to 

be relieved,” and Father did not want J.B. “to represent [him] at all.” 

Although the court granted Father’s request for a continuance, he repeatedly 

interrupted the remainder of the hearing to state, “You’re all going to burn in 

hell for doing this to people,” and to “pray to Christ all your hearts stop from 
beating.” The court told Father that if he hired his own attorney, the 

attorney could appear before the continued pretrial conference or on that 

date. Father nonetheless continued interrupting the hearing, including 

calling the court a “baby-napping piece of shit.”

B

Hearing At Which Father Was Relieved of Counsel

At the February 8, 2023 pretrial conference, Father reiterated that he 

did not want J.B. to represent him, and J.B. renewed his request to be 

relieved as counsel, reporting that Father wished to represent himself. The 

court explained to Father his right to have an attorney specializing in 

dependency law, that J.B. specialized in dependency law, and that Father 

had the right to represent himself. Father clarified that he wanted counsel 

but did not want to be represented by J.B. J.B. reported that Father refused 

to communicate with him and that Father’s only option was to represent 

himself. The court took judicial notice of the prior Marsden hearings during 

which it declined to relieve J.B. as Father’s counsel, and it found that Father 

understood his rights. The court agreed to grant Father’s request to relieve 

J.B. as counsel, stating: 

“[I]f you don’t want [J.B.] to represent you, I can respect that and 

I will grant that request as long as you understand that one, you 

have the right to an attorney, you have the right to selfrepresentation, you also have certain expectations by the Court if 

you do represent yourself, and that you are not going to get 

special treatment just because you’re representing yourself. ¶ Do 

you understand that, and do you still want to . . . have [J.B.] 

relieved as your attorney, having had the Court advise you of 

those rights; yes or no? ¶ Do you want [J.B.] relieved?”

 

Father responded, “Yes,” stating, “And I don’t want special treatment . . .” 

The court then relieved J.B. as Father’s counsel. The court overruled the 

children’s counsel’s objection to Father representing himself, and explained
the section 366.26 hearing trial procedures and processes to Father and the 

other parties. Father lodged objections and made additional statements to 

the court, after which the court set a deadline for the parties to file witness 

lists and other trial-related items. 

C

Dependency Proceedings After Father Was Relieved of Counsel

The following week, Father—who was now representing himself—filed 

several additional documents with the court, including a notice of appeal, two 

section 388 petitions, a special hearing request, and a notice of intent to file a 

writ petition. On February 22, 2023, he filed a witness list, proof of service, 

special hearing request, letter to the California governor, letter from his 

support person, and documents showing his participation and completion of 

52-hour and 16-hour domestic violence classes, among other filings. 

At the March 3, 2023 contested section 366.26 hearing, Mother asked to 

continue the hearing because of her counsel’s unavailability. The court 

granted the continuance over Father’s objection. Throughout the hearing, 

Father interrupted the court to express his feelings about the case. He also

told the court that he had repeatedly asked for an attorney other than J.B. 

The court responded that Father had asked to represent himself, and Father 

stated that he had requested different court-appointed counsel. The court

then asked Father three separate times if he wanted counsel to be appointed, 

but Father either did not respond or stated that he did not want J.B. to 

represent him. The court told Father he could not “handpick” his attorney 

without hiring one himself.
D

Combined Section 388 and Section 366.26 Hearing

At the March 6, 2023 continued contested section 366.26 hearing, the 

Agency asked the court to reappoint counsel for Father. The court asked 

Father twice if he wanted J.B.’s office reappointed to represent him. Father 

responded that he “would not mind representation” but did not want 

representation from J.B.’s office. The court found that Father had previously 

knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and it denied the 

Agency’s request to reappoint counsel. The court also asked J.B., who was 

present at the section 366.26 hearing, to remain available until the hearing’s 

conclusion should it become necessary to reappoint him. 

The court proceeded with the hearing, and Father gave an opening 

statement. The juvenile court construed Father’s February 2023 filings and 

the other documents he identified at the hearing—which included 

documentation showing his completion of and/or participation in various 

domestic violence and parenting classes—as a section 388 petition. After 

hearing argument, the court denied Father’s section 388 petition for failure to 

make a prima facie showing. 

The court next turned to the section 366.26 hearing. Over Father’s 

objection, the court received into evidence several of the Agency’s reports7

and the social worker’s curriculum vitae. 

The Agency’s section 366.26 report recommended that the juvenile 

court terminate parental rights and designate adoption as the children’s 

7 These included the Agency’s section 366.26 report, detention report, 

September 27, 2022 addendum report, and six-month review report.
permanent plan.8 The social worker opined in the report that neither parent 

had a beneficial parent-child relationship with either child. Father’s 

domestic violence challenges and mental health had impeded his ability to 

maintain a relationship with the children during the case. For example, after 

Father tried to flee with the children, a restraining order issued prohibiting 

further in-person visits. The report noted as another example that, at the 

beginning of a December 27, 2022 visit, Y.D. began crying and was 

inconsolable. When Father became frustrated and began accusing the 

Agency of kidnapping the children and being “evil,” the Agency had to end his 

visit. 

According to the Agency’s report, the children’s behavior at visits did 

not indicate any significant bond to Father. During Father’s virtual visits 

between November 2022 and January 2023, Y.D. sometimes spoke to Father, 

showed him things, and called him “Dad,” but more often than not, she 

moved or played away from the computer screen or turned her back to the 

screen. Y.D. had continued to have tantrums and emotional dysregulation 

after visits with Father, which lessened once visits became virtual rather 

than in-person. G.D., on the other hand, would generally play during visits 

without acknowledging Father. G.D. did not recognize Father as a friend or 

parent and transitioned to and from visits without any emotional response,

either positive or negative. 

The report further noted that Y.D. had been participating in weekly 

therapy since June and had met most of her treatment goals by January 

2023. And both children looked to their caregivers for assistance, 

8 The report also attached two documents on Father’s behalf: a certificate 

of completion for a parenting program and a domestic violence court progress 

report, which reflected that he had completed 13 out of the 52 weeks of the 

program.
reassurance, and comfort. The report also stated that the sibling exception to 

adoption did not apply because the children had never lived with or shared 

any common experiences with their six paternal half-siblings. 

The court gave Father an opportunity to cross-examine the social 

worker—which he implicitly declined—and to present evidence. Father also 

testified, answered the court’s questions about the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception and sibling exception to adoption, and gave a closing 

argument.

After hearing argument and evidence from the parties and conducting 

further inquiries with Father, the court found the children were generally 

and specifically adoptable. The court emphasized the parents’ ongoing 

domestic violence and turbulent contact with the Agency, which sometimes 

endangered the children. It noted Y.D.’s emotional dysregulation after visits 

and lack of engagement with video visits. The court acknowledged Father’s 

emphasis at the hearing on Y.D.’s statement that she wanted to go home with 

him, but it found this was not sufficient evidence of a beneficial parent-child 

relationship on its own. 

The court further found the children would not suffer detriment if 

parental rights were terminated and that the benefits of adoption outweighed 

the children’s continued legal relationship with the parents. It also found

that the sibling exception to adoption did not apply, noting that there was no 

evidence of any shared common experiences between the children and their 

six paternal half-siblings. The court then terminated parental rights and 

designated adoption as the children’s permanent plan. Father appealed.
III

DISCUSSION

Father contends the juvenile court erred by denying him appointed 

counsel. He asserts that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive 

counsel and that, even after being relieved of counsel, he repeatedly 

requested it. The Agency and children respond, and we agree, that Father 

knowingly and intelligently waived this right. Accordingly, there was no 

error. Moreover, even assuming error, we conclude it was harmless. 

A

In dependency proceedings where a child has been placed in out-ofhome care, an indigent parent has a statutory right to appointed counsel 

unless the court finds the parent has made “a knowing and intelligent waiver 

of counsel.” (See § 317, subd. (b); In re Al.J. (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 652, 668 

(Al.J.). A knowing and intelligent waiver does not require a full Farettatype9 admonition and inquiry by the juvenile court, and “[a] parent may 

waive counsel at any point.” (In re Angel W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1074, 

1083, 1084 (Angel W.); see also Janet O. v. Superior Court (1996) 42 

Cal.App.4th 1058, 1064 [construing section 317 to permit relieving counsel 

from appointment once parent no longer desires counsel].) At the same time,

parents also have “a statutory right to self-representation in a proceeding to 

terminate parental rights.” (Angel W., at p. 1082; § 317, subd. (b).) Thus, 

“the court must respect the right of the parent to represent him- or herself as 

a matter of individual autonomy and avoid forcing the mentally competent 

parent to proceed with appointed counsel in the guise of protecting a person 

who is unskilled in the law and courtroom procedure.” (Angel W., at p. 1084.) 

9 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.
Here, we have little trouble concluding that Father knowingly and 

intelligently waived counsel. At the February 8, 2023 hearing, he stated, “I 

don’t want [J.B.] to represent me.” The court responded by explaining to 

Father his right to have an attorney specializing in dependency law, that J.B. 

specialized in dependency law, and that Father had the right to represent 

himself. After further discussion, the court acknowledged that Father 

understood his rights and that he still wanted J.B. relieved as his attorney. 

The court then repeated for Father the realities of self-representation, 

stating: 

“[I]f you don’t want [J.B.] to represent you, I can respect that and 

I will grant that request as long as you understand that one, you 

have the right to an attorney, you have the right to selfrepresentation, you also have certain expectations by the Court if 

you do represent yourself, and that you are not going to get 

special treatment just because you’re representing yourself. ¶ Do 

you understand that, and do you still want to . . . have [J.B.] 

relieved as your attorney, having had the Court advise you of 

those rights; yes or no? Do you want [J.B.] relieved?” 

Not only did Father respond, “Yes,” but he also further confirmed his 

understanding that he was requesting to represent himself, stating, “And I 

don’t want special treatment . . .” 

Our examination of the remainder of the record, and particularly 

Father’s conduct, only further confirms the validity of this waiver. (See 

People v. Fox (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 424, 428 [“On appeal, we independently 

examine the entire record to determine whether Fox’s waiver of his right to 

counsel was valid.”].) Even before the court relieved Father of counsel at the 

February 8, 2023 hearing, he had demanded that J.B. be relieved numerous 

times at numerous hearings. Indeed, as early as the February 9, 2022 

hearing—only six weeks after J.B.’s appointment—Father expressed that he 

had never agreed to J.B.’s representation, “had to file paperwork on [his] 
own,” had “been doing so [him]self,” and was representing himself. During 

hearings between June and September 2022, Father stated that he was 

“firing” J.B. and repeatedly stated that J.B. did not represent him and that 

Father represented himself. And during a July 2022 hearing, Father stated 

he did not “want to be appointed any counsel because [he] d[id]n’t believe 

that counsel [wa]s in [his] best interest.” Moreover, from the outset of the 

dependency proceedings and despite being represented, Father made 

countless filings in pro per, including filing various writs and section 388 

petitions. And at nearly every hearing before he was relieved of counsel,

Father argued directly to the court, often arguing the merits of his case, 

lodging his own objections, and requesting his own continuances.

We are unpersuaded by Father’s additional contention that his conduct 

after the court relieved him of counsel invalidated this waiver. At the 

subsequent March 3, 2023 hearing, for example, Father complained that he 

wanted an attorney appointed but “not [J.B.].” The court responded that 

Father had previously requested self-representation and explained that if 

Father wanted an attorney appointed, the court would reappoint J.B. Yet, 

when the court expressly asked Father if he wanted an attorney appointed, 

“yes or no,” Father responded, “Not [J.B.].” The court correctly explained that 

Father could not “handpick” his attorney unless he hired his own. 

Again, at the March 6, 2023 contested section 366.26 and section 388 

combined hearing, the court asked Father if he wanted J.B.’s office 

reappointed for the proceeding, “yes” or “no.” Father responded that he 

“would not mind representation” but repeatedly voiced that he did not want 

J.B. or his office to represent him. Although the court asked J.B. to remain 

available until the hearing’s conclusion should it become necessary to 

reappoint him, Father never re-invoked his right to counsel. Instead, he
proceeded with representing himself at the hearing, including offering and 

objecting to evidence, testifying on his own behalf, making opening and 

closing arguments, and answering the court’s questions. 

Father further contends that the juvenile court should have appointed 

him different counsel or ordered his appointed counsel, J.B., to continue to 

represent him. We again disagree on both points. First, Father does not 

allege that J.B. failed to adequately represent him. Nor does he challenge 

the court’s prior Marsden findings denying his requests for new appointed 

counsel. Accordingly, on this record, he did not have a right to a second 

court-appointed attorney. (See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123

[“ ‘A defendant’s right to a court-appointed counsel does not include the right 

to require the court to appoint more than one counsel, except in a situation 

where the record clearly shows that the first appointed counsel is not 

adequately representing the accused.’ ”].) As the juvenile court aptly 

observed, court-appointed counsel “isn’t a shopping spree” and Father could 

not “handpick whatever attorney [he] want[e]d,” unless he hired his own 

attorney. (See ibid.) 

Regardless, we are hard pressed to believe on this record that any 

attorney could have satisfied Father. The record is replete with evidence 

that, even from the outset of the dependency proceedings, Father refused to 

work with or communicate with J.B. and that he was wholly unwilling to 

assist J.B. in his defense. To the extent Father suggests that counsel should 

not have been relieved because Father’s self-representation would unduly 

disrupt the dependency proceedings, the record shows the opposite—that

Father was uncontrollable regardless of his representation status. Indeed, 

even while represented and despite the court’s repeated warnings, Father 

nonetheless interrupted hearings to speak for himself, yelled and screamed 
during hearings, cursed the court and parties with profanities and allegations 

of treason, argued that the presiding judge should be hung at high noon, and 

was arrested twice for his conduct at court. Thus, the court did not abuse its 

discretion by granting Father’s request for self-representation. (Cf. In re 

A.M. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 914, 927–928 (A.M.) [court did not abuse 

discretion by denying parent’s self-representation request where ample 

evidence showed that granting the request would unduly delay the 

dependency proceeding]; see also Angel W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085

[“The possibility of disruption or delay, however, exists to some degree with 

virtually all pro se litigants. . . . Only when the pro se litigant ‘is and will 

remain’ so disruptive as to significantly delay the proceedings or render them 

meaningless . . . may the court exercise its discretion to deny selfrepresentation.”].) 

As to Father’s position that the court erred by failing to order J.B. to 

continue representing Father against his wishes, he is incorrect for the same 

reasons discussed previously. Specifically, Father knowingly and 

intelligently waived his right to court-appointed counsel and invoked his 

right to self-representation.10 Moreover, considering the juvenile court’s 

request of J.B. to remain available during the full section 366.26 hearing, 

Father easily could have requested his reappointment at any time. Yet, he 

did not. 

10 Had the court ordered J.B. to continue representing Father despite 

Father’s request, we suspect that Father would likely instead be contending 

that the court violated his right to self-representation. (See e.g., A.M., supra, 

164 Cal.App.4th 914 [reviewing juvenile court’s decision to deny parent’s 

request to self-represent]; Angel W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 1074 [same].) 
B

Even assuming there was a violation of Father’s right to counsel, any 

error was harmless.11 Tellingly, Father does not attempt to argue how his 

lack of representation prejudiced him. Nor does the record support such a 

conclusion.12 As to Father’s denied section 388 petition, the record does not 

show the requisite change in circumstances, despite Father’s seeming 

contention that his participation in parenting and domestic violence classes

should suffice. (See e.g., In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223

[“substantial” change in circumstances required to warrant granting of § 388 

petition]; see also In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [petitioning 

parent must show change of circumstance and that proposed modification is 

in child’s best interests].) Rather, the record shows that Father’s violent and 

aggressive behavior only continued throughout the dependency proceedings. 

11 We reject Father’s contention that the purported error here is 

structural and requires automatic reversal. In In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 

Cal.5th 1063 (Christopher L.), our Supreme Court rejected the argument that 

denial of a parent’s right to counsel constitutes per se reversible error. 

(Id. at p. 1069.) Instead, where—as is the case here—a court can engage in a 

prejudice analysis “ ‘responsibly’ ” and without relying on “ ‘inferences that 

really amount to guesswork,’ ” a harmless error inquiry is appropriate.

(Id. at p. 1082.) 

12 The Christopher L. court declined to resolve whether, in performing a 

harmless error inquiry, we should apply the standard for state law error 

(see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson)) or the more stringent 

federal constitutional error standard (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 

U.S. 18 (Chapman)). (Christopher L., supra, at p. 1083.) We need not resolve 

that question, however, because the record here permits us to conclude

without “guesswork” that no prejudice resulted from Father’s lack of 

representation—even under Chapman’s more stringent “harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt” standard. (Chapman, at p. 24.)
As only a few examples of many, we observe that Father kidnapped and 

physically assaulted Mother in August 2022, repeatedly yelled and shouted 

during visits with the children and during court dependency proceedings at 

which he also directed profanities at the court, and lost his Agency-approved 

domestic violence services for verbally attacking a counselor. 

Regarding the juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s parental 

rights, the record overwhelmingly shows that the children were adoptable

and that neither the beneficial parent-child relationship exception13 or

sibling relationship exception14 applied to preclude adoption. For example, 

Father does not explain how he could show a beneficial relationship existed 

where Y.D. generally avoided interacting with him during visits, G.D. did not

even acknowledge him, and the children were not distressed or sad when 

Father’s visits ended. Moreover, he does not identify any evidence that

terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the children or that such 

detriment would outweigh the benefits of adoption. (See § 366.26, subd. 

(c)(1)(B)(i).) Thus, considering the facts from the Agency’s reports—none of 

which Father contests—any additional evidence or argument made by an 

13 For the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption to 

apply, the parent must show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) regular 

visitation and contact with the child; (2) a beneficial parent-child 

relationship; and (3) that terminating the relationship would be detrimental 

to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, 

adoptive home. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.).) 

14 Father admitted at the section 366.26 hearing that the children had 

never met their six paternal half-siblings, and the record shows the children 

had never lived with them or shared any common experiences with them. 

(Cf. § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v) [sibling exception applies where court finds 

that interference with child’s sibling relationship is “compelling reason” to 

conclude adoption would be detrimental to the child when considering nature 

and extent of sibling relationship].)
attorney at the section 366.26 hearing would not have produced a different 

outcome. (See In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350, italics 

added, disapproved on another ground by Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at

p. 636, fn. 5 [“Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court 

has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only in 

an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail 

over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.”].) 

IV

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s March 6, 2023 orders are affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, J.

RUBIN, J.