THIRD DIVISION                                             February 5, 1997No. 1-94-3662JAMES T. MORAN,                         )                                        )          Plaintiff-Appellant,          )                                        )     v.                                 )                                        )CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal            )corporation, and SGT. PATRICK GROGAN    )(a/k/a BROGAN), Star No. 812,           )individually and in his capacity as a   )    APPEAL FROM THEpolice officer of the City of Chicago,  )    CIRCUIT COURT OFJOHN DOE, I, individually and in his    )    COOK COUNTY.capacity as a police officer of the     )City of Chicago, JOHN DOE, II,          )individually and in his capacity as a   )police officer of the City of Chicago,  )JOHN DOE, III, individually and in his  )capacity as a police officer of the     )City of Chicago, JOHN DOE, IV,          )individually and in his capacity as a   )police officer of the City of Chicago,  )JOHN DOE, V, individually and in his    )    HONORABLE KENNETHcapacity as a police officer of the     )    L. GILLIS, JUDGECity of Chicago,                        )    PRESIDING.                                        )          Defendants-Appellees,         )                                        )     and                                )                                        )LEROY BAUMAN, individually and in his   )capacity as a police officer of the     )City of Chicago, Star No. 7613,         )                                        )          Defendant.                    )     JUSTICE GORDON DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:     Plaintiff, James T. Moran, brings this appeal pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), from thedismissal of counts IV through VI of his complaint againstdefendants, Sergeant Patrick Brogan, the City of Chicago, andfive John Doe police officers.  Plaintiff's complaint sought torecover for injuries he sustained when Leroy Bauman attacked himwhile he was being questioned by Brogan and the John Doe officersafter they had broken up a physical altercation between theplaintiff and Bauman.  Count IV alleged that the defendants owedthe plaintiff a special duty and that they had acted willfullyand wantonly in failing to protect the plaintiff from Bauman. Counts V and VI alleged that Brogan and the John Doe defendantshad deprived the plaintiff of his federal civil rights,specifically, liberty/personal security and access to the courts,guaranteed under 42 U.S.C. � 1983 (1990).  Pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West1994)), Brogan and the City of Chicago moved to dismissplaintiff's tort claims encompassed in count IV based upon theimmunity provisions of sections 4-102, 2-204, 2-202, 2-109 ofthe Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort ImmunityAct (the Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/4-102, 2-204, 2-202, 2-109 (West 1994)).  In a separate motion, Brogan moved to dismisscounts V and VI pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994)) for failure to state acause of action.  The trial court granted both motions anddismissed counts IV, V and VI.     The issues raised on appeal are:  (1) whether count IV ofthe complaint alleged sufficient facts to establish that Broganand the City of Chicago (hereinafter referred to as the"defendants") owed the plaintiff a special duty; (2) whethercount IV alleged sufficient facts of willful and wanton conduct;(3) whether count V stated a cause of action for violation ofcivil rights under 42 U.S.C. �1983 based upon allegations thatthe defendants deprived the plaintiff of his liberty and personalsecurity rights; and (4) whether count VI stated a cause ofaction for violation of 42 U.S.C. �1983 based upon allegationsthat the plaintiff was denied his constitutional right of accessto the courts.     A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to section 2-615 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994))attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint, whereas a section2-619 motion raises defects, defenses or other affirmative matterwhich appear on the face of the complaint or are established byexternal submissions which act to defeat the plaintiff's claim(735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1994)).  See Illinois Graphics Co. v.Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 639 N.E.2d 1282 (1994); Lawson v. Cityof Chicago, 278 Ill. App. 3d 628, 662 N.E.2d 1377 (1996).  Whilestatutory immunity is affirmative matter that can be raised in asection 2-619 motion, it is better suited as support for asection 2-615 pleading-based motion that challenges the legalsufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint.  See Calloway v.Kinkelaar, 168 Ill. 2d 312, 331-32, 659 N.E.2d 1322, 1331-32(1995) (Freeman, J., specially concurring); Lawson, 278 Ill. App.3d 628, 662 N.E.2d 1377.  Here, since the defendants' section 2-619 motion did not raise any new factual matter, the question onappeal is the same whether defendants' motion is considered to bea section 2-615 or a section 2-619 motion; that is, whether underthe allegations as pleaded in the plaintiff's complaint thedefendants were immune from liability as a matter of law. Calloway, 168 Ill. 2d at 332, 659 N.E.2d at 1332.  See Lawson,278 Ill. App. 3d 628, 662 N.E.2d 1377; Thames v. Board ofEducation, 269 Ill. App. 3d 210, 645 N.E.2d 445 (1994).                             I.  Special Duty      Pursuant to the common law public duty rule, municipalitiesand law enforcement officials owe no duty to protect individualcitizens.  Leone v. City of Chicago, 156 Ill. 2d 33, 619 N.E.2d119 (1993); Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 139 Ill. 2d501, 565 N.E.2d 654 (1990) overruled in part on other grounds,McCuen v. Peoria Park District, 163 Ill. 2d 125, 643 N.E.2d 778(1994).  Similarly, under the Tort Immunity Act, a publicemployee is not liable for acts or omissions occurring within thescope of his employment (745 ILCS 10/2-204 (West 1994)); and thepublic entity is not liable when its employee is not liable (745ILCS 10/2-109 (West 1994)).  With respect to police protection,the Tort Immunity Act provides that neither a public entity norits employee is liable for failure to provide police protectionservice or adequate police protection service or for failure toprevent the commission of crime.  745 ILCS 10/4-102 (West 1994). However, with respect to the latter, the Act further providesthat, while police officers are not liable for injuries caused byacts or omissions in the execution and enforcement of the law,they are liable if their conduct is willful and wanton.  745 ILCS10/2-202 (West 1994).     The special duty doctrine is an exception to the common lawpublic duty rule and to the Tort Immunity Act.  Calloway, 168Ill. 2d 312, 659 N.E.2d 1322; Leone, 156 Ill. 2d 33, 619 N.E.2d119.  But see Calloway, 168 Ill. 2d at 331, 659 N.E.2d at 1331(Freeman, J., specially concurring); Leone, 156 Ill. 2d at 43,619 N.E.2d at 124 (Bilandic, J., dissenting); and Leone, 156 Ill.2d at 49, 619 N.E.2d at 127 (Heiple, J., dissenting) (challengingnotion that special duty doctrine is exception to Tort ImmunityAct).  In accordance with that exception, if circumstances arisewhereby care or custody is exercised over a specific individualby a municipality or public official so that an affirmative dutyto exercise care on behalf of that individual comes intoexistence, the failure to carry out that duty in a non-negligentmanner is actionable.  Thames, 269 Ill. App. 3d 210, 645 N.E.2d445.  To invoke this special duty exception, the plaintiff mustprove the following four elements:  (1) unique awareness of aparticular danger or risk to which the plaintiff was exposed; (2)specific acts or omissions; (3) specific acts that areaffirmative or willful in nature; and (4) injury to the plaintiffwhile under the direct and immediate control of municipalemployees or agents.  E.g., Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374,641 N.E.2d 498 (1994); Leone, 156 Ill. 2d 33, 619 N.E.2d 119;Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 565 N.E.2d 654; Lawson, 278 Ill. App.3d 628, 662 N.E.2d 1377.  Here, as will be discussed below,plaintiff's complaint does not allege sufficient facts toestablish the fourth element of the special duty exception,namely, direct and immediate control.     Generally, the control element is established by allegationsthat the defendants initiated the circumstances which created thedangerous condition or that the defendants called the plaintiffinto a position of peril.  Doe, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 641 N.E.2d 498;Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 565 N.E.2d 654.  The control elementhas been found to exist where police officers ordered plaintiffsto move to or took them to certain areas of danger.  E.g., Leone,156 Ill. 2d 33, 619 N.E.2d 119 (ordering motorist to halt intraffic and directing her to stand in the street); Brooks v.Lundeen, 49 Ill. App. 3d 1, 364 N.E.2d 423 (1977) (orderingmotorist to park next to road block when speeding motoristapproaching); Gardner, 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147(bringing witness to side of highway to identify four suspects).     In the instant case, plaintiff's complaint alleged that atapproximately 3:45 a.m., on August 9, 1989, Leroy Bauman becameinvolved in a physical altercation with a Chicago police officerin a tavern called the Whistle Stop Inn; that the plaintiff, whowas an off-duty Cook County deputy sheriff, entered the WhistleStop Inn to assist the police officer; that physical contact wasmade between Bauman and the plaintiff; and that the altercationcontinued on the public sidewalk outside the inn.  The complaintfurther alleged that Sergeant Brogan and the John Doe defendantsarrived, intervened, separated plaintiff and Bauman, and"surrounded and detained" the plaintiff to investigate anddetermine whether to arrest the plaintiff for battery.  Thecomplaint stated that, while the plaintiff was being"interrogated," Bauman shouted and screamed, demanded that theplaintiff be arrested, threatened to physically attack theplaintiff, and thereupon violently punched him in the face andknocked him to the ground causing injuries to him.     Count IV of plaintiff's complaint purports to raise aspecial duty and willful and wanton conduct.  It alleges that theCity, Brogan and the John Doe defendants had actual knowledgethat Bauman had violent propensities, that Bauman wasintoxicated, and that Bauman was screaming and threatening theplaintiff with physical harm.  It further alleges that, whilepossessed of that knowledge, the defendants "detained andinterrogated the Plaintiff in such proximity to *** Bauman thatthey put the Plaintiff in a position where he was unable tovisually monitor Bauman's conduct and where the Plaintiff wasunable to physically defend himself from the previouslythreatened attacks of Bauman."  It further alleged that thedefendants acted willfully and wantonly by failing to take thenecessary steps to physically restrain Bauman and to prevent himfrom gaining access to the plaintiff and, as a result of thosefailures, the plaintiff sustained injuries.     The plaintiff argues that his allegations establish that thedefendants had direct and immediate control based on the factthat they surrounded, detained and questioned him.  Thedefendants urge, on the other hand, that the control element isabsent because the plaintiff has not alleged that they initiatedthe circumstances which created the condition of peril.  Theyargue that the condition of peril, namely, the physicalaltercation and hostility between Bauman and the plaintiff,existed before they arrived on the scene.  See Doe, 161 Ill. 2d374, 641 N.E.2d 498 (control element absent where condition ofperil existed at the time the police arrived).     In its present posture, the plaintiff's complaint does notallege sufficient facts showing that the defendants initiated thecircumstances which created the dangerous condition or that theycalled the plaintiff into a position of peril.  Here, as in Doe,the defendants arrived on the scene and found the plaintiff andBauman engaged in a physical altercation.  That altercation,which was the dangerous condition, existed when the defendantsarrived.  The plaintiff does not allege that the defendantschanged that condition so as to create a new condition of danger.The plaintiff also does not allege that he was ordered to standat the specific location wherein the subsequent attack by Baumanoccurred or that he was denied all freedom of movement within thelocale of the scene of the occurrence.  Allegations that thedefendants "detained," "surrounded" and "interrogated" theplaintiff do not denote the restraint of all movement.  All thatcan be gleaned from these words is that the officers stopped theplaintiff at the scene of the altercation so that they couldperform their investigatory function.  Those words do not denotethat the police ordered or compelled the plaintiff to stand inthe specific spot wherein the threat of danger existed.  Cf.Anthony v. City of Chicago, 168 Ill. App. 3d 733, 523 N.E.2d 22(1988) (police officer instructed and directed plaintiff to aiddefendant fire fighters in combatting fire); Gardner, 71 Ill.App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (police officers took plaintiff toside of highway to identify suspects); Brooks v. Lundeen, 49 Ill.App. 3d 1, 364 N.E.2d 423 (1977) (police officers set uproadblock and directed decedent motorist to an unsafe placewithin the roadblock).  Under the circumstances of this case, toinvoke the special duty exception would impose a special dutyupon police officers to protect every bystander from whom theofficers elicit information at the scene of an investigation eventhough the police did not create the dangerous condition orsummon the bystander into it.     It is the plaintiff's failure to allege facts showing thathe was placed in a position of peril by the defendants thatdistinguishes this case from Leone, 156 Ill. 2d 33, 619 N.E.2d119, the case upon which the plaintiff relies.  In Leone, thepolice officer created the condition of peril by directing theplaintiff/motorist to an area between his car and hers, exposingher to the risk of serious injury from passing vehicular traffic. Here, the defendants did not create the condition of peril; theymerely pursued their investigation at the scene where thatcondition already existed.  Doe, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 641 N.E.2d 498. While the complaint alleges that the police officers interruptedthe altercation between the plaintiff and his assailant,defendant Bauman, the complaint falls short of alleging that theofficer ordered or compelled the plaintiff to stand in theparticular spot which exposed him to the risk of the assault. Moreover, we also note that in Leone the police officer was foundto have a "heightened awareness" of the nature of the hazardwhich he caused the plaintiff to encounter.  Leone, 235 Ill. App.3d at 599, 601 N.E.2d at 945.  Here, given the fact that theplaintiff engaged in the altercation with Bauman, there is noindication that the police had any "heightened" or disparateknowledge as to the nature and scope of the risk.  See Burdinie,139 Ill. 2d 501, 565 N.E.2d 654.  Under these circumstances, theelement of direct and immediate control cannot be established;and the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead the existenceof a special duty.                    II.  Willful and Wanton Allegations     In addition to seeking to recover on the basis of a specialduty, count IV of the plaintiff's complaint seeks to recover onthe basis of the willful and wanton exception of section 2-202 ofthe Tort Immunity Act.  Although plaintiff's count IV violatesour civil practice rules, which require that each separate causeof action be stated in a separate count (735 ILCS 5/2-603(b)(West 1994)), the defendants made no motion to strike (see 735ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994)).  Moreover, notwithstanding thistechnical defect, the complaint will not be dismissed unless itfails to state any cause of action, even if it is not the causeof action intended by the plaintiff.  See Doe, 161 Ill. 2d at388, 641 N.E.2d at 505.     Willful and wanton conduct is a statutory exception thatdefeats the immunity provided by section 2-202 of the TortImmunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 1994)).  Doe, 161 Ill. 2dat 389-90, 641 N.E.2d at 505; Leone, 156 Ill. 2d at 39, 619N.E.2d at 122; Fatigato v. Village of Olympia Fields, 281 Ill.App. 3d 347, 666 N.E.2d 732 (1996).  Section 2-202 states that a"public employee is not liable for his act or omission in theexecution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omissionconstitutes willful and wanton conduct."  The Act defines willfuland wanton conduct as "a course of action which shows an actualor deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if notintentional, shows an utter indifference to or consciousdisregard for the safety of others or their property."  745 ILCS10/1-210 (West 1994).  Willful and wanton conduct consists ofmore that mere inadvertence, incompetence, or unskillfulness. Geimer v. Chicago Park District, 272 Ill. App. 3d 629, 650 N.E.2d585 (1995).  While the question of whether conduct is "willfuland wanton" is ultimately a question of fact for the jury(Fatigato, 281 Ill. App. 3d 347, 666 N.E.2d 732), the court mustfirst determine as a matter of law whether the plaintiff hasalleged sufficient facts such that a jury question concerning thewillful and wanton nature of the defendants' conduct is created. E.g., Doe, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 641 N.E.2d 498; Geimer, 272 Ill. App.3d 629, 650 N.E.2d 585.     We believe that the plaintiff has not alleged sufficientfacts to present a jury question as to whether the conduct ofBrogan and the John Doe defendants was willful and wanton.  Asnoted above, the allegations of count IV of the complaint, whichmust be taken as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss,alleged that the defendants knew of Bauman's violentpropensities; viewed the physical altercation between Bauman andthe plaintiff when they arrived on the scene; separated Baumanand the plaintiff; heard Bauman's threats of causing physicalharm to the plaintiff; and "detained" the plaintiff andquestioned him while he was standing in an area close to Bauman. These factual allegations show that the defendants knew of therisk of harm posed by Bauman; that notwithstanding thatknowledge, they questioned the plaintiff as he stood in an areain close proximity to Bauman; and that they failed to protect theplaintiff from Bauman's attack.  Even if this alleged conductcould be sufficient to support a contention of negligence, itcannot reasonably support a contention that the defendants actedin utter indifference or conscious disregard for the plaintiff'ssafety.  See 745 ILCS 10/1-210 (West 1994)); Doe, 162 Ill. 2d at390-91, 641 N.E.2d at 506 (willful and wanton conduct alleged ifa rational trier of fact could ever find that the officers'conduct showed an utter indifference or conscious disregard forthe plaintiff's safety).  Here, the defendants were notindifferent to the plaintiff's safety.  They had not abandonedthe plaintiff or left him unprotected.  See Gammon v.Edwardsville Community Unit School District No. 7, 82 Ill. App.3d 586, 403 N.E.2d 43 (1980) (judgement n.o.v. in favor ofdefendant overturned; question of fact for jury existed as towhether school counselor exhibited willful and wanton conduct inreleasing combative student who resumed fight immediatelythereafter).  Rather, immediately prior to the occurrence, thedefendants stopped the altercation, separated the combatants, andattempted to question them.  At the time the plaintiff wasinjured, the defendants were investigating the matter.  Theseactions do not show indifference or willful and wanton conductsuch that the dismissal of plaintiff's action based upon willfuland wanton conduct is affirmed.                         III.  Section 1983 Claims                        A.  Deprivation of Liberty     The plaintiff next argues that his complaint stated asection 1983 cause of action (42 U.S.C. �1983 (1990)) againstBrogan for deprivation of his liberty interests protected by thedue process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (U.S. Const.,amend. XIV).     The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause guarantees aright to be free from unjustified intrusions on personalsecurity.  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74, 51 L. Ed. 2d711, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).  See White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381,387 (7th Cir. 1979) (Tone, J., concurring) stating,     "The right to personal security can hardly consist only     of freedom from direct bodily harm and exclude what     will often be more important, freedom from unnecessary     and unjustified exposure to physical danger or to     injury to health."     Under certain circumstances, the failure of a police officer tointervene and protect a person's personal security renders himculpable under section 1983.  Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282 (7thCir. 1994) (failure to intervene to prevent continued abuse ofarrestee); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989)(failure to provide for the physical security of femaleautomobile passenger after arresting driver and impounding thevehicle); White, 592 F.2d 381 (leaving children unattended in acar parked on the highway after arresting their uncle).  Whilemere negligence or lack of due care by the officer will nottrigger the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment (Daniels v.Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986);Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 88 L. Ed. 2d 677, 106 S. Ct.668 (1986)), a deliberate indifference to a person's interest inpersonal security could trigger those protections.  Zarnes v.Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1995); Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d714 (7th Cir. 1995); Wood, 879 F.2d at 588; Hayes v. City ofChicago, 230 Ill. App. 3d 603, 595 N.E.2d 144 (1992).  Grossnegligence is not sufficient; the conduct must be reckless, thatis, " 'when it reflects complete indifference to risk -- when theactor does not care whether the other person lives or dies,despite knowing that there is a significant risk of death.' " Seibring v. Parcell's Inc., 178 Ill. App. 3d 62, 73, 532 N.E.2d1335, 1342 (1988) quoting Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d1211, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988).  Allegations that a government actor"should have known" are not sufficient to support a due processclaim.  Zarnes, 64 F.3d 285 (dismissing allegations of grossnegligence).  See McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.1991) (to establish due process claim, plaintiff must proveactual knowledge of risks; proof that official should have knownis not enough).     For the reasons we earlier found that the plaintiff hasfailed to allege willful and wanton conduct, we also find that hehas not alleged a deliberate or reckless indifference toplaintiff's liberty and personal security interests.  In count Vof his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Brogan deprived himof his "liberty interests in bodily integrity" without dueprocess of law.  The plaintiff alleged that Brogan knew or shouldhave known of Bauman's violent propensities, knew or should haveknown that Bauman had become involved in a violent altercationwith the plaintiff, and knew or should have known that Bauman wasintoxicated and was continuing to threaten plaintiff withviolence and injury.  As in count IV, the plaintiff alleged incount V that Brogan "detained" the plaintiff and "restricted[his] ability to visually monitor [Bauman]"; "detained andrestricted the Plaintiff in such a manner as to prevent thePlaintiff from physically defending himself in the event of afurther attack"; and "detained Plaintiff and conducted a policeinterrogation in such close proximity to [Bauman] undercircumstances where the Plaintiff was vulnerable to an imminentattach [sic] by Bauman."     Plaintiff's allegations as to what Brogan should have knownare insufficient to support his section 1983 claim.  See Zarnes,64 F.3d 285.  Count V of plaintiff's complaint also isinsufficient because it does not allege any standard of conductexhibited by Brogan nor does it allege facts showing thatBrogan's conduct amounted to a deliberate indifference to therisk of harm posed by Bauman.  Generally, deliberate indifferencehas been established by actions amounting to complete abandonmentor complete failure to intervene or act on behalf of theplaintiff.  See, e.g., Yang, 37 F.3d 282 (failure to intervene toprevent further beating by fellow officers); Wood, 879 F.2d 583(abandonment); White, 592 F.2d 381 (abandonment); Riddle v.Innskeep, 675 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (failure to removeplaintiff's attacker from juvenile rehabilitation program). Here, Brogan is alleged to have been involved in separatingBauman and the plaintiff, detaining the plaintiff forquestioning, and conducting an examination of the plaintiff in anarea in close proximity to Bauman amidst Bauman's threats againstthe plaintiff.  Since we have held that such conduct cannotreasonably be considered to be willful and wanton, which isdefined by the tort immunity statute as an utter indifference orconscious disregard to the safety of another (745 ILCS 10/1-210(West 1994)), we similarly conclude that it cannot support acontention of deliberate indifference as required under section1983.                         B.  Access to the Courts     Plaintiff's final argument on appeal is that count VI of hiscomplaint stated a cause of action against Brogan under section1983 for denial or impairment of his right of access to thecourts.     The right of access to the courts is constitutionallyprotected; and conduct under color of law which interferes withthat right gives rise to a cause of action under section 1983. Vasquez v. Hernandez, 60 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 1995); McKay v.Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984).  See Barrett v. UnitedStates, 798 F.2d 565 (2nd Cir. 1986) (unconstitutionaldeprivation of a cause of action occurs when governmentalofficials thwart vindication of a claim).  When, for example,police officers conceal or obscure important facts about a crimefrom its victim, rendering hollow the right to seek redress,constitutional rights are abridged.  Vasquez, 60 F.3d at 328. Not every act of deception in connection with judicialproceedings is actionable, however.  Bell v. City of Milwaukee,746 F.2d 1205, 1266 (7th Cir. 1984).  To prevail on a claim fordenial of access to the courts, the plaintiff must show that theconcealment concerned crucial and essential information (Hossmanv. Spradlin, 812 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)) and thatthe defendant's actions resulted in some prejudice to pending orcontemplated litigation (Miller v. Fairman, 872 F. Supp. 498(N.D. Ill. 1994); Stone-El v. Fairman, 864 F. Supp. 807 (N.D.Ill. 1994)).  The plaintiff must allege that he was preventedfrom pursuing an action or that the value of such action wasreduced by the concealment.  Vasquez, 60 F.3d at 329.     Here, the plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendantsdeprived him of his right of access to the courts to seekcriminal and civil remedies by:  threatening plaintiff witharrest if he persisted in pressing criminal charges againstBauman; refusing or failing to identify witnesses to Bauman'sattack; refusing or failing to prepare "official police incidentreports"; and refusing to call a higher ranking police officer tothe scene of the occurrence or to the hospital where theplaintiff was taken after the occurrence.  The complaint alsoalleged that Brogan additionally violated plaintiff's right ofaccess by instructing various officers to not file writtenreports or disclose information concerning the incident.     Initially we note that the defendants could not deprive theplaintiff of his right to seek criminal redress against Bauman. It is the State's Attorney, not police officers, who "commence[s]and prosecute[s] all actions, suits, indictments andprosecutions, civil and criminal."  55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(1) (West1994).  With respect to plaintiff's right to seek civil redress,we note that the plaintiff is pursuing those remedies in counts Ithrough III of the instant complaint.  However, the fact that theplaintiff is pursuing his civil remedies against Bauman would notin and of itself require the dismissal of plaintiff's section1983 action.  As noted in Vasquez, the right to seek redress isabridged if police officers conceal or obscure important factsabout a crime.  60 F.3d at 328 ("when police officers conceal orobscure important facts about a crime from its victims [they]render[] hollow the right to seek redress").  See also Bell, 746F.2d 1205 (cover-up and conspiracy by police department indefense of fellow officers during prior civil litigation);Barrett, 798 F.2d 565 (concealment of violations by federalgovernment and officials and inducing false testimony duringprior wrongful death action).  Here, the plaintiff's allegationscreate the inference that a concealment occurred based upondefendants' refusal to identify witnesses to Bauman's attack andrefusal to prepare "incident reports," and based upon Brogan'sinstruction to the officers under his command to not file thosereports or disclose that information.  Missing from thecomplaint, however, is an allegation that the withheldinformation was crucial and essential to plaintiff's litigationagainst Bauman.  Also missing from complaint is an allegationthat the defendants' actions substantially affected plaintiff'sability to recover against Bauman.  See Vasquez, 60 F.3d at 329(dismissal of access to the courts claim where plaintiff did notallege reduction in value). Stone-El, 864 F. Supp. at 809 (toestablish denial of