[Cite as State v. Seals, 2012-Ohio-509.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF CLARK COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO : 

Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2010CA117 

vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 08CR0828A 

JONATHAN SEALS : 

 

Defendant-Appellant : 

 . . . . . . . . . 

 O P I N I O N

 Rendered on the 10th day of February, 2012. 

 . . . . . . . . . 

Andrew Wilson, Pros. Attorney; Andrew R. Picek, Asst. Pros. 

Attorney, Atty. Reg. No. 0082121, 50 East Columbia Street, 4th 

Floor, Springfield, OH 45502 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Brock A. Schoenlein, Atty. Reg. No. 0084707, 15 West Fourth Street, 

Suite 100, Dayton, OH 45402 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . 

GRADY, P.J.: 

{¶ 1} Defendant, Jonathan Seals, was found guilty following 

a jury trial of aggravated murder, murder, felony murder, tampering 

with evidence, and felonious assault. The trial court sentenced 

Defendant to thirty-three years to life in prison, and indicated 

that with respect to the tampering with evidence offense, Defendant 
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would be subject to five years of mandatory postrelease control. 

{¶ 2} On direct appeal we affirmed Defendant’s convictions 

but vacated his sentence due to an error in the imposition of 

postrelease control. We remanded the matter for resentencing for 

 the trial court to properly inform Defendant that with respect 

to his conviction for tampering with evidence, a third degree 

felony, he is subject to an optional three year term of postrelease 

control under R.C. 2967.28(C), not a mandatory five year term as 

originally stated by the court. State v. Seals, 2nd Dist Clark 

No. 2009CA4, 2010-Ohio-2843. 

{¶ 3} On November 22, 2010, on remand from this court, the 

trial court conducted a resentencing hearing that was limited to 

the proper imposition of postrelease control on the tampering with 

evidence charge. Defendant did not object to the limited scope 

of the resentencing hearing. 

{¶ 4} Defendant timely appealed to this court from his 

resentencing hearing. Defendant’s appellate counsel has filed 

an Anders brief, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 

19 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), stating that he could find no meritorious 

issues for appellate review. We notified Defendant of his 

appellate counsel’s representations and afforded him ample time 

to file a pro se brief. None has been received. This case is 

now before us for our independent review of the record. Penson 
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v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). 

{¶ 5} Defendant’s appellate counsel has identified one 

possible issue for appeal, which states: 

{¶ 6} “THE TRIAL COURT MAY HAVE ERRED IN FAILING TO RESENTENCE 

MR. SEALS DE NOVO.” 

{¶ 7} Defendant argues that he was entitled to a de novo 

resentencing hearing to correct the trial court’s error in failing 

to properly impose postrelease control. That claim lacks arguable 

merit. 

{¶ 8} R.C. 2929.191, effective July 11, 2006, proscribes a 

procedure for trial courts to follow to remedy a sentence that 

fails to properly impose postrelease control. The hearing 

contemplated by R.C. 2929.191(C) and the correction contemplated 

by R.C. 2929.191(A) and (B) pertain only to the flawed imposition 

of postrelease control and do not address the remainder of an 

offender’s sentence. That demonstrates the General Assembly’s 

intent to leave undisturbed any other sanctions imposed that are 

unaffected by the court’s failure to properly impose postrelease 

control at the sentencing hearing. State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio 

St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 24. In deciding 

whether R.C. 2929.191 would apply retroactively or prospectively 

only, the Supreme Court stated in its syllabus in Singleton:

1. For criminal sentences imposed prior to July 
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11, 2006, in which a trial court failed to properly impose 

postrelease control, trial courts shall conduct a de 

novo sentencing hearing in accordance with decisions 

of the Supreme Court of Ohio. 

2. For criminal sentences imposed on and after July 

11, 2006, in which a trial court failed to properly impose 

postrelease control, trial courts shall apply the 

procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191. 

In State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 

N.E.2d 332, the Ohio Supreme Court held that in cases where the 

sentence omits a statutorily mandated term of postrelease control, 

or contains an erroneous provision in that regard, only that part 

of the sentence is void and must be corrected, and the remainder 

of the sentence remains valid. Therefore, a complete de novo 

resentencing is not required. Rather, the resentencing is limited 

to correcting the defect in the postrelease control. Id., at ¶ 

17. This court has held likewise. State v. Jenkins, 2nd Dist. 

Montgomery No. 24117, 2011-Ohio-634, ¶ 7-8. 

{¶ 9} Defendant was originally sentenced on or about January 

9, 2009, after the enactment of R.C. 2929.191. Defendant was 

resentenced on November 22, 2010, pursuant to R.C. 2929.191, to 

correct a defect in the imposition of postrelease control. The 

prevailing law in effect at that time was State v. Singleton, and 
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pursuant to that decision Defendant is clearly not entitled to 

a de novo resentencing hearing to correct an error in the trial 

court’s imposition of postrelease control. Id., at syllabus and 

 ¶ 24. Accord: State v. Fischer. Rather, the resentencing 

hearing was properly limited to correcting the defect in 

postrelease control. R.C. 2929,191; Singleton. Accord: Fischer. 

 This assignment of error lacks arguable merit. 

{¶ 10} In addition to reviewing the possible issues for appeal 

raised by Defendant’s appellate counsel, we have conducted an 

independent review of the trial court’s proceedings and have found 

no error having arguable merit. Accordingly, Defendant’s appeal 

is without merit and the judgment of the trial court will be 

affirmed. 

FROELICH, J., And HALL, J., concur. 

 

Copies mailed to: 

Andrew R. Picek, Esq. 

Brock A. Schoenlein, Esq. 

Jonathan Seals 

Hon. Richard J. O’Neill