COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Annunziata and 

 Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

SHIRLEY D. SHOCKEY 

v. Record No. 1358-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

J. DONALD SHOCKEY, JR. MARCH 5, 1996 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FREDERICK COUNTY 

Perry W. Sarver, Judge 

 P. Kay Adrian (Chasler, Adrian & Bowman, 

P.C., on briefs), for appellant. 

 Marcia M. Maddox (Heather A. Dipoma, Law 

Office of Marcia M. Maddox, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Shirley D. Shockey appeals the judgment of contempt against 

her for failure to endorse tax refund checks as required by the 

separation and property settlement agreement that was 

incorporated into the final decree of divorce. Mrs. Shockey 

argues that the provision requiring her to endorse the checks 

should be severed from the agreement because Mr. Shockey did not 

adequately disclose the nature and amount of the tax refunds 

before the agreement was signed. We hold that Mrs. Shockey's 

appeal is not properly before this Court because she did not 

object to or appeal from entry of the final decree. That decree 

became the final order of the court, and could not be 

collaterally attacked in the contempt proceeding. We therefore 

affirm the court's finding of contempt against Mrs. Shockey, and 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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reverse the trial court's denial of attorney's fees to Mr. 

Shockey. 

 After their separation, Mr. and Mrs. Shockey negotiated a 

separation and property settlement agreement. The agreement 

provided, inter alia, that amended tax returns and refund claims 

for prior years were being prepared. Mrs. Shockey agreed to sign 

the amended returns and to promptly endorse any refund checks, 

which would then be paid to Mr. Shockey's Subchapter S 

corporations. The agreement also provided that the parties had 

made full disclosure of the extent of their assets. 

 The amended returns were prepared between the signing of the 

agreement and entry of the final decree. Due to losses sustained 

by the Subchapter S corporations as well as adjustments made due 

to an IRS audit, the refunds due were in excess of $400,000. 

Mrs. Shockey claims that when she saw the amended returns, she 

learned for the first time that the refunds were substantial and 

that they were the parties' personal refunds. She failed to 

object to the final decree, which incorporated the settlement 

agreement, and it was entered on December 14, 1994. Mrs. Shockey 

did not appeal at that time. 

 Shortly after entry of the final decree, the refund checks 

began to come in. Mrs. Shockey refused to endorse them. Mr. 

Shockey commenced contempt proceedings against Mrs. Shockey in 

January 1995. Between that time and the contempt hearing on 

April 5, he paid the alimony into "escrow" with his attorney. 

Mrs. Shockey defended the rule to show cause on the ground that 
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Mr. Shockey had misrepresented the amount and nature of the tax 

refunds, thus inducing her to agree to sign them over to him 

under the agreement, and had failed to disclose the nature and 

value of the refunds in violation of the provision on full 

disclosure. 

 The trial court found that Mr. Shockey had made no 

misrepresentation and that he disclosed all of his assets. The 

trial court found both parties in contempt, ordered both parties 

to pay interest on the funds withheld, and denied attorney's fees 

to both parties. 

 Although Mrs. Shockey knew all relevant facts concerning Mr. 

Shockey's alleged misrepresentation before the final decree was 

entered, she waited until the contempt proceedings to raise her 

claims concerning Mr. Shockey's failure to disclose. When a 

separation and property settlement agreement, incorporated into 

the final decree of divorce, is attacked in the context of a 

contempt proceeding, this constitutes an attack on the decree 

itself. Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 94, 353 S.E.2d 756, 757 

(1987). Under Rule 1:1, the trial court retains jurisdiction 

over a final decree for twenty-one days after its entry. After 

that, absent a perfected appeal, the judgment is final and 

conclusive and cannot be collaterally attacked in a contempt 

proceeding. Id. at 95, 353 S.E.2d at 758. 

 A judgment that is void may be attacked at any time, 

including through a contempt proceeding. Id.; Peet v. Peet, 16 

Va. App. 323, 326, 429 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1993). A judgment 
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procured through extrinsic fraud is void, while a judgment 

procured through intrinsic fraud is merely voidable. Peet, 16 

Va. App. at 326, 429 S.E.2d at 490. 

 Mrs. Shockey's counsel stated at oral argument that she does 

not claim that the judgment was procured by fraud. Even if she 

did so claim, a judgment procured by intrinsic fraud can only be 

challenged on direct appeal or by a direct attack in an 

independent proceeding. Id. Mrs. Shockey employed neither of 

these methods. And, even if her claim is one of extrinsic fraud, 

she must prove a misrepresentation. Peet, 16 Va. App. at 327, 

429 S.E.2d at 490. The trial court found that she failed to do 

so, and this finding is not clearly erroneous. Mrs. Shockey 

therefore has no basis to challenge the validity of the agreement 

as incorporated into the final decree of divorce, and the 

judgment of contempt is affirmed. 

 Mr. Shockey asks us to reverse the trial court's denial of 

attorney's fees. The separation and property settlement 

agreement provided that in the event of default, the defaulting 

party would indemnify the other party for all reasonable expenses 

and costs, including attorney's fees, incurred in successfully 

enforcing the terms of the agreement. Under the terms of the 

agreement, Mr. Shockey is entitled to the fees and costs he 

incurred in requiring Mrs. Shockey to sign the tax returns, less 

any sums incurred by Mrs. Shockey in requiring him to pay 

support. See Sanford v. Sanford, 19 Va. App. 241, 249-250, 450 

S.E.2d 185 (1994). We therefore reverse the denial of attorney's 
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fees to Mr. Shockey and remand the case to the trial court for a 

determination of reasonable attorney's fees including those 

incurred upon appeal. 

 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 

and remanded.