(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2009 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08–6925. Argued October 6, 2009—Decided March 2, 2010 

Petitioner Johnson pleaded guilty to possession of ammunition by a 

convicted felon. 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). The Government sought sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, which authorizes an

enhanced penalty for a person who violates §922(g) and who “has 

three previous convictions” for “a violent felony,” §924(e)(1), defined 

as, inter alia, an offense that “has as an element the use . . . of physical force against the person of another,” §924(e)(2)(B)(i). Among the 

three prior felony convictions the Government proffered was Johnson’s 2003 Florida conviction for simple battery, which ordinarily is a

first-degree misdemeanor, Fla. Stat. §784.03(1)(b), but was a felony

conviction for Johnson because he had previously been convicted of 

another battery, Fla. Stat. §784.03(2). Under Florida law, a battery

occurs when a person either “[a]ctually and intentionally touches or

strikes another person against [his] will,” or “[i]ntentionally causes 

bodily harm to another person.” §784.03(1)(a). Nothing in the record

permitted the District Court to conclude that Johnson’s 2003 conviction rested upon the “strik[ing]” or “[i]ntentionally caus[ing] bodily

harm” elements of the offense. Accordingly, his conviction was a 

predicate conviction for a “violent felony” under the Armed Career

Criminal Act only if “[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]” another 

constitutes the use of “physical force” under §924(e)(2)(B)(i). Concluding it does, the District Court enhanced Johnson’s sentence under §924(e)(1), sentencing him to a term of 15 years and 5 months.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 

Held: The Florida felony offense of battery by “[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]” another person does not have “as an element the use

. . . of physical force against the person of another,” §924(e)(2)(B)(i),

and thus does not constitute a “violent felony” under §924(e)(1). 
2 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

Pp. 3–12.

(a) In interpreting the phrase “physical force” in §924(e)(2)(B)(i),

the Court is not bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion in 

State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 218, that, under Florida’s statutory 

equivalent to the Armed Career Criminal Act, Fla. Stat. §775.084,

the offense of battery does not “involve the use . . . of physical force or 

violence against any individual,” Fla. Stat. §776.08. The meaning of 

“physical force” in §924(e)(2)(B)(i) is a question of federal law, not 

state law. The Court is bound, however, by the Florida Supreme

Court’s interpretation of the elements of the state law offense, including the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that §784.03(1)(a)’s element

of “[a]ctually and intentionally touching” another person is satisfied

by any intentional physical contact, no matter how slight. Pp. 3–4.

(b) Because §924(e)(2)(B)(i) does not define “physical force,” the 

Court gives the phrase its ordinary meaning. Bailey v. United States, 

516 U. S. 137, 144–145. The adjective “physical” is clear. The noun 

“force,” however, has a number of meanings. Its ordinary meaning

refers to the application of strength, power, and violence—in this context, against another person. Pp. 4–5.

(c) The Government suggests that “force” in §924(e)(2)(B)(i)’s definition of “violent felony” is a legal term of art describing one of the 

elements of the common-law crime of battery. At common law, that 

element was satisfied by even the slightest offensive touching. Although a common-law term of art should be given its established

common-law meaning, the Court does not ascribe to a statutory term

a common-law meaning where that meaning does not fit. Here 

“physical force” is used in defining not the crime of battery, but

rather the statutory category of “violent felony.” §924(e)(2)(B)(i). In 

that context, “physical force” means violent force—i.e., force capable 

of causing physical pain or injury to another person. Cf. Leocal v. 

Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 11. Moreover, it is significant that the meaning 

the Government seeks to impute to the term “force” derives from the 

elements of a common-law misdemeanor. Nothing in the text of

§924(e)(2)(B)(i) suggests that “force” in the definition of a “violent felony” should be regarded as a common-law term of art used to define

the contours of a misdemeanor. Nor can any negative inference

about the amount of “force” required by §924(e)(2)(B)(i) be drawn

from §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and §922(g)(8)(C)(ii). Pp. 5–9.

(d) There is no force to the Government’s prediction that this decision will undermine its ability to enforce §922(g)(9)’s firearm disability against a person previously convicted of a misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence that has as an element the “use . . . of physical

force,” §921(a)(33)(A)(ii). The Court interprets the phrase “physical

force” only in the context of a statutory definition of “violent felony,” 
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 3 

Syllabus 

and does not decide whether the same meaning applies in the context 

of defining the scope of misdemeanor offenses. Similarly misplaced is 

the Government’s assertion that it will now be more difficult to obtain sentencing enhancements for individuals convicted under generic felony-battery statutes that cover both violent force and unwanted physical contact, and to remove an alien convicted of a 

nonviolent battery conviction under the statutory provision for an

alien convicted of a “crime of domestic violence,” 8 U. S. C. 

§1227(a)(2)(E). See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 555 U. S. ___, 

___; Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 13, 26. Pp. 9–11.

(e) Before the District Court the Government disclaimed any reliance upon the so-called “residual clause” of the definition of “violent 

felony” in §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), which covers an offense that “involves

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another.” Accordingly, the Court declines to remand for consideration whether Johnson’s 2003 battery conviction qualifies as a “violent

felony” under that provision. Pp. 11–12. 

528 F. 3d 1318, reversed and remanded. 

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., 

joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., 

joined. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 08–6925 

CURTIS DARNELL JOHNSON, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[March 2, 2010] 

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 

We decide whether the Florida felony offense of battery

by “[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]” another person, Fla. Stat. §784.03(1)(a), (2) (2003), “has as an element 

the use . . . of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i), and thus constitutes a

“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act,

§924(e)(1). 

I 

Curtis Johnson pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing

ammunition after having been convicted of a felony, in 

violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). The Government 

sought an enhanced penalty under §924(e), which provides 

that a person who violates §922(g) and who “has three

previous convictions” for “a violent felony” “committed on

occasions different from one another” shall be imprisoned

for a minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life. A 

“violent felony” is defined as “any crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that: 

“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of 
2 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

another; or 

“(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” §924(e)(2)(B). 

Johnson’s indictment specified five prior felony convictions. The Government contended that three of those 

convictions—for aggravated battery and for burglary of a 

dwelling in October 1986, and for battery in May 2003—

rendered Johnson eligible for sentencing under §924(e)(1).

At the sentencing hearing, Johnson did not dispute that 

the two 1986 convictions were for “violent felon[ies],” but 

he objected to counting his 2003 battery conviction. That 

conviction was for simple battery under Florida law, which 

ordinarily is a first-degree misdemeanor, Fla. Stat. 

§784.03(1)(b), but is a third-degree felony for a defendant 

who (like Johnson) has been convicted of battery (even 

simple battery) before, §784.03(2).

Under §784.03(1)(a), a battery occurs when a person

either “1. [a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes 

another person against the will of the other,” or 

“2. [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person.” 

Because the elements of the offense are disjunctive, the

prosecution can prove a battery in one of three ways. 

State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 218 (Fla. 2007). It can 

prove that the defendant “[i]ntentionally caus[ed] bodily 

harm,” that he “intentionally str[uck]” the victim, or that 

he merely “[a]ctually and intentionally touche[d]” the

victim. 

Since nothing in the record of Johnson’s 2003 battery 

conviction permitted the District Court to conclude that it 

rested upon anything more than the least of these acts, see 

Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 13, 26 (2005) (plurality opinion), his conviction was a predicate conviction for a

“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act only 
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

if “[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]” another person 

constitutes the use of “physical force” within the meaning 

of §924(e)(2)(B)(i). The District Court concluded that it 

does, and accordingly sentenced Johnson under §924(e)(1) 

to a prison term of 15 years and 5 months.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 528 F. 3d 1318 (2008).

We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. ___ (2009). 

II 

Florida has a statute similar to the Armed Career 

Criminal Act that imposes mandatory-minimum sentences 

upon “violent career criminal[s],” Fla. Stat. §775.084(4)(d) 

(2007), defined to mean persons who have three convictions for certain felonies, including any “forcible felony,”

§775.084(1)(d)(1)(a). “[F]orcible felony” is defined to include a list of enumerated felonies—including murder,

manslaughter, sexual battery, carjacking, aggravated

assault, and aggravated battery—and also “any other 

felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or

violence against any individual.” §776.08. In Hearns, the 

Florida Supreme Court held that the felony offense of

battery on a law enforcement officer, §784.07(2)(b)—which 

requires the same conduct (directed against a law enforcement officer) as misdemeanor battery under 

§784.03(1)(a)—was not a forcible felony. See 961 So. 2d, at 

219. It said that since §784.03(1)(a) requires proof of only 

the slightest unwanted physical touch, “the use . . . of 

physical force” was not an element of the offense. Id., at 

219. 

Johnson argues that in deciding whether any unwanted

physical touching constitutes “physical force” under 18

U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i), we are bound by the Florida 

Supreme Court’s conclusion in Hearns that it does not 

constitute “physical force.” That is not so. The meaning of 

“physical force” in §924(e)(2)(B)(i) is a question of federal

law, not state law. And in answering that question we are 
4 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

not bound by a state court’s interpretation of a similar—or

even identical—state statute. 

We are, however, bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s

interpretation of state law, including its determination of 

the elements of Fla. Stat. §784.03(2). See Johnson v. 

Fankell, 520 U. S. 911, 916 (1997). The Florida Supreme

Court has held that the element of “actually and intentionally touching” under Florida’s battery law is satisfied 

by any intentional physical contact, “no matter how 

slight.” Hearns, 961 So. 2d, at 218. The most “nominal 

contact,” such as a “ta[p] . . . on the shoulder without

consent,” id., at 219, establishes a violation. We apply 

“th[is] substantive elemen[t] of the criminal offense,” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 324, n. 16 (1979), in

determining whether a felony conviction for battery under 

Fla. Stat. §784.03(2) meets the definition of “violent felony” in 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i). 

III 

Section 924(e)(2)(B)(i) does not define “physical force,”

and we therefore give the phrase its ordinary meaning. 

Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 144–145 (1995).

The adjective “physical” is clear in meaning but not of 

much help to our inquiry. It plainly refers to force exerted 

by and through concrete bodies—distinguishing physical

force from, for example, intellectual force or emotional

force. It is the noun that poses the difficulty; “force” has a

number of meanings. For present purposes we can exclude its specialized meaning in the field of physics: a

cause of the acceleration of mass. Webster’s New International Dictionary 986 (2d ed. 1954) (hereinafter Webster’s 

Second). In more general usage it means “[s]trength or

energy; active power; vigor; often an unusual degree of

strength or energy,” “[p]ower to affect strongly in physical

relations,” or “[p]ower, violence, compulsion, or constraint

exerted upon a person.” Id., at 985. Black’s Law Diction-
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

ary 717 (9th ed. 2009) (hereinafter Black’s) defines “force” 

as “[p]ower, violence, or pressure directed against a person

or thing.” And it defines “physical force” as “[f]orce consisting in a physical act, esp. a violent act directed against 

a robbery victim.” Ibid. All of these definitions suggest a 

degree of power that would not be satisfied by the merest

touching.

There is, however, a more specialized legal usage of the 

word “force”: its use in describing one of the elements of 

the common-law crime of battery, which consisted of the 

intentional application of unlawful force against the person of another. See 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive 

Criminal Law §7.15(a), p. 301 (1986 and Supp. 2003); 

accord, Black’s 173. The common law held this element of 

“force” to be satisfied by even the slightest offensive touching. See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 

England 120 (1768) (hereinafter Blackstone); Lynch v. 

Commonwealth, 131 Va. 762, 765, 109 S. E. 427, 428 

(1921); see also 2 LaFave & Scott, supra, §7.15(a). The 

question is whether the term “force” in 18 U. S. C.

§924(e)(2)(B)(i) has the specialized meaning that it bore in

the common-law definition of battery. The Government 

asserts that it does. We disagree.

Although a common-law term of art should be given its 

established common-law meaning, United States v. Turley, 

352 U. S. 407, 411 (1957), we do not assume that a statutory word is used as a term of art where that meaning

does not fit. Ultimately, context determines meaning, 

Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961),

and we “do not force term-of-art definitions into contexts 

where they plainly do not fit and produce nonsense,” 

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 282 (2006) (SCALIA, J., 

dissenting). Here we are interpreting the phrase “physical 

force” as used in defining not the crime of battery, but

rather the statutory category of “violent felon[ies],”

§924(e)(2)(B). In Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1 (2004), we 
6 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

interpreted the statutory definition of “crime of violence”

in 18 U. S. C. §16. That provision is very similar to 

§924(e)(2)(B)(i), in that it includes any felony offense 

which “has as an element the use . . . of physical force 

against the person or property of another,” §16(a). We 

stated: 

“In construing both parts of §16, we cannot forget

that we ultimately are determining the meaning of

the term ‘crime of violence.’ The ordinary meaning of 

this term, combined with §16’s emphasis on the use of

physical force against another person (or the risk of

having to use such force in committing a crime), suggests a category of violent, active crimes . . . .” 543 

U. S., at 11. 

Just so here. We think it clear that in the context of a 

statutory definition of “violent felony,” the phrase “physical force” means violent force—that is, force capable of

causing physical pain or injury to another person. See 

Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F. 3d 666, 672 (CA7 2003) (Easterbrook, J.). Even by itself, the word “violent” in 

§924(e)(2)(B) connotes a substantial degree of force. Webster’s Second 2846 (defining “violent” as “[m]oving, acting,

or characterized, by physical force, esp. by extreme and 

sudden or by unjust or improper force; furious; severe; 

vehement . . .”); 19 Oxford English Dictionary 656 (2d ed.

1989) (“[c]haracterized by the exertion of great physical

force or strength”); Black’s 1706 (“[o]f, relating to, or characterized by strong physical force”). When the adjective

“violent” is attached to the noun “felony,” its connotation 

of strong physical force is even clearer. See id., at 1188 

(defining “violent felony” as “[a] crime characterized by

extreme physical force, such as murder, forcible rape, and

assault and battery with a dangerous weapon”); see also 

United States v. Doe, 960 F. 2d 221, 225 (CA1 1992)

(Breyer, C. J.) (“[T]he term to be defined, ‘violent felony,’ 
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

. . . calls to mind a tradition of crimes that involve the 

possibility of more closely related, active violence”). 

It is significant, moreover, that the meaning of “physical

force” the Government would seek to import into this

definition of “violent felony” is a meaning derived from a

common-law misdemeanor. At common law, battery—all 

battery, and not merely battery by the merest touching—

was a misdemeanor, not a felony. See 4 Blackstone 216– 

218 (1769); see also 1 LaFave & Scott, supra, §2.1(b), at 

90; ALI, Model Penal Code §211.1, Comment, p. 175 

(1980). As the dissent points out, post, at 5–6 (opinion of 

ALITO, J.), the dividing line between misdemeanors and 

felonies has shifted over time. But even today a simple

battery—whether of the mere-touching or bodily-injury

variety—generally is punishable as a misdemeanor.1 See, 

e.g., 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §16.1(b) (2d 

ed. 2003 and Supp. 2009–2010); Cal. Penal Code Ann.

§§242 and 243 (West 2008); Fla. Stat. §784.03(1)(b); Ill. 

Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §5/12–3(b) (West 2009); Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. §22.01(b) (West Supp. 2008). It is unlikely that

Congress would select as a term of art defining “violent 

felony” a phrase that the common law gave peculiar meaning only in its definition of a misdemeanor. Of course 

“physical force” can be given its common-law misdemeanor 

meaning by artful language, but here the only text that 

can be claimed to accomplish that is the phrase “physical

force” itself. Since, as we have seen, that is as readily 

—————— 

1The dissent notes, post, at 5–6, that, around the time the Armed 

Career Criminal Act became law, in “quite a few States” it was a felony

offense to commit an unwanted physical touching of certain victims,

such as police officers. That would be relevant for determining whether 

a conviction under one of those statutes meets the 18 U. S. C. 

§924(e)(2)(B) requirement of being a “felony” conviction. But it has no 

bearing upon whether the substantive element of those offenses—

making unwanted physical contact with certain special categories of

individuals—involves the use of “force” within the meaning of 

§924(e)(2)(B)(i), a statute applicable to all victims. 
8 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

(indeed, much more readily) taken to describe violent 

force, there is no reason to define “violent felony” by reference to a nonviolent misdemeanor. 

The Government argues that we cannot construe 18

U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i) to reach only offenses that have as 

an element the use of violent force, because there is no 

modifier in §924(e)(2)(B)(i) that specifies the degree of 

“physical force” required. As we have discussed, however, 

the term “physical force” itself normally connotes force

strong enough to constitute “power”—and all the more so

when it is contained in a definition of “violent felony.” Nor 

is there any merit to the dissent’s contention, post, at 4, 

that the term “force” in §924(e)(2)(B)(i) cannot be read to

require violent force, because Congress specifically named 

“burglary” and “extortion” as “violent felon[ies]” in 

§924(e)(2)(B)(ii) notwithstanding that those offenses can

be committed without violence. The point would have

force (so to speak) if burglary and extortion were listed in

§924(e)(2)(B)(i), as felonies that have “as an element the

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” 

In fact, however, they are listed in §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), as

examples of felonies that “presen[t] a serious potential risk 

of physical injury to another.” The Government has not 

argued that intentional, unwanted touching qualifies 

under this latter provision. What the dissent’s argument

comes down to, then, is the contention that, since felonies 

that create a serious risk of physical injury qualify as

violent felonies under subparagraph (B)(ii), felonies that 

involve a mere unwanted touching must involve the use of

physical force and qualify as violent felonies under subparagraph (B)(i). That obviously does not follow. 2 

—————— 

2Even further afield is the dissent’s argument, post, at 2–3, that since 

§924(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires conduct that “presents a serious potential risk

of physical injury to another,” §924(e)(2)(B)(i) must not. That is rather 

like saying a provision which includes (i) apples and (ii) overripe 

oranges must exclude overripe apples. It does not follow. 
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

The Government also asks us to draw a negative inference from the presence of the “bodily injury” specification 

added to the phrase “physical force” in §922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

That provision forbids the possession of firearms by a 

person subject to a court order explicitly prohibiting the 

“use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against [an] intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.” Ibid. The absence 

of such language in §924(e)(2)(B)(i), the Government 

contends, proves that the merest touch suffices. Even as a 

matter of logic that does not follow. Specifying that

“physical force” must rise to the level of bodily injury does 

not suggest that without the qualification “physical force” 

would consist of the merest touch. It might consist, for

example, of only that degree of force necessary to inflict 

pain—a slap in the face, for example. Moreover, this is 

not a case where Congress has “include[d] particular

language in one section of a statute but omit[ted] it in 

another section of the same Act,” Russello v. United States, 

464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted;

emphasis added). Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) was enacted into 

law in 1994—eight years after enactment of the language 

in §924(e)(2)(B)(i). Compare Pub. L. 103–322, §110401,

108 Stat. 2015 (1994), with Pub. L. 99–570, §1402, 100 

Stat. 3207–39 (1986). 

IV 

The Government contends that interpreting 18 U. S. C.

§924(e)(2)(B)(i) to require violent force will undermine its

ability to enforce the firearm disability in §922(g)(9) for 

persons who previously have been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” which is defined to 

include certain misdemeanor offenses that have, “as an 

element, the use or attempted use of physical force . . . ,” 

§921(a)(33)(A)(ii). The prediction is unfounded. We have 

interpreted the phrase “physical force” only in the context 
10 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

of a statutory definition of “violent felony.” We do not 

decide that the phrase has the same meaning in the context of defining a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 

The issue is not before us, so we do not decide it. 

In a similar vein, the Government asserts that our 

interpretation will make it more difficult to remove, pursuant to 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(E), an alien convicted of a 

“crime of domestic violence.” That phrase is defined to

mean “any crime of violence (as defined in [18 U. S. C.

§16])” committed by certain persons, including spouses,

former spouses, and parents. §1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The Government contends it will be harder to obtain removal 

based upon battery convictions that, like those in Florida, 

do not require the use of violent physical force. The dissent likewise anticipates that in the States it has identified, post, at 6–7, and n. 3, as having generic felonybattery statutes that cover both violent force and unwanted physical contact, our decision will render convictions under those statutes “outside the scope of [the

Armed Career Criminal Act],” post, at 8. 

This exaggerates the practical effect of our decision. 

When the law under which the defendant has been convicted contains statutory phrases that cover several different generic crimes, some of which require violent force and

some of which do not, the “‘modified categorical approach’” 

that we have approved, Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U. S. ___, 

___ (2009) (slip op., at 10), permits a court to determine 

which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction by

consulting the trial record—including charging documents, plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies,

findings of fact and conclusions of law from a bench trial,

and jury instructions and verdict forms. See Chambers v. 

United States, 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 4); 

Shepard, 544 U. S., at 26 (plurality opinion); Taylor v. 

United States, 495 U. S. 575, 602 (1990). Indeed, the 

Government has in the past obtained convictions under 
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

the Armed Career Criminal Act in precisely this manner.

See, e.g., United States v. Simms, 441 F. 3d 313, 316–317 

(CA4 2006) (Maryland battery); cf. United States v. 

Robledo-Leyva, 307 Fed. Appx. 859, 862 (CA5) (Florida

battery), cert. denied, 558 U. S. ___ (2009); United States 

v. Luque-Barahona, 272 Fed. Appx. 521, 524–525 (CA7 

2008) (same).

It may well be true, as the Government contends,

that in many cases state and local records from 

battery convictions will be incomplete. But absence of 

records will often frustrate application of the modified 

categorical approach—not just to battery but to many

other crimes as well. See, e.g., Shepard, supra, at 22–23 

(burglary). It is implausible that avoiding that commonenough consequence with respect to the single crime of

battery, under the single statute that is the Armed Career 

Criminal Act, caused Congress to import a term of art

that is a comical misfit with the defined term “violent 

felony.” 

* * * 

The Government asks us to remand to the Eleventh 

Circuit for its consideration of whether Johnson’s 2003 

battery conviction is a “violent felony” within the meaning 

of the so-called “residual clause” in 18 U. S. C. 

§924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We decline to do so. The Government 

did not keep this option alive because it disclaimed at 

sentencing any reliance upon the residual clause. App.

44–45. Moreover, the parties briefed the §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

issue to the Eleventh Circuit, which nonetheless reasoned 

that if Johnson’s conviction under Fla. Stat. §784.03(2) 

satisfied §924(e)(2)(B)(i), then it was a predicate “violent 

felony” under §924(e)(1); but “if not, then not.” 528 F. 3d, 

at 1320. 

We reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, set

aside Johnson’s sentence, and remand the case for further 
12 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 1 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 08–6925 

CURTIS DARNELL JOHNSON, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[March 2, 2010] 

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS, joins,

dissenting. 

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) defines a “violent felony” to mean, among other things, “any crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year

. . . that . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of 

another.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). 

The classic definition of the crime of battery is the “intentional application of unlawful force against the person of

another.” Ante, at 5 (citing 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §7.15, p. 301 (1986 and Supp.

2003); Black’s Law Dictionary 173 (9th ed. 2009)). Thus, 

the crime of battery, as traditionally defined, falls 

squarely within the plain language of ACCA. Because I 

believe that ACCA was meant to incorporate this traditional definition, I would affirm the decision of the Court 

of Appeals. 

I 

The Court starts out in the right direction by noting

that the critical statutory language—“the use, attempted 

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person 

of another,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i)—may mean either 

(a) the use of violent force or (b) the use of force that is 
2 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

sufficient to satisfy the traditional definition of a battery. 

See ante, at 4–5. The Court veers off course, however, by

concluding that the statutory language reaches only violent force. 

The term “force,” as the Court correctly notes, had a 

well-established meaning at common law that included 

even the “slightest offensive touching.” Ante, at 5. See 

also Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111, 114 (O. T.

Phila. 1784) (“[T]hough no great bodily pain is suffered by 

a blow on the palm of the hand, or the skirt of the coat, yet 

these are clearly within the legal d[e]finition of Assault 

and Battery. . .”); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the

Laws of England 120, 218 (1768) (hereinafter Blackstone). 

This approach recognized that an offensive but nonviolent 

touching (for example, unwanted sexual contact) may be

even more injurious than the use of force that is sufficient 

to inflict physical pain or injury (for example, a sharp slap 

in the face).

When Congress selects statutory language with a wellknown common-law meaning, we generally presume that

Congress intended to adopt that meaning. See, e.g., 

United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407, 411 (1957) (“We

recognize that where a federal criminal statute uses a 

common-law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is to give that term

its common-law meaning”); Morissette v. United States, 

342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952); United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 

611, 612–613 (1882). And here, I see nothing to suggest

that Congress meant the phrase “use of physical force” in

ACCA to depart from that phrase’s meaning at common 

law. 

On the contrary, other standard canons of statutory 

interpretation point to the same conclusion. “[W]here

Congress includes particular language in one section of a 

statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it 

is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 3 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 

Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In 18 U. S. C. 

§924(e)(2)(B)(ii)—the clause immediately following the 

clause at issue in this case—the term “violent felony” is 

defined as including any crime that “involves conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” (Emphasis added.) Because Congress did not 

include a similar limitation in §924(e)(2)(B)(i), we should

presume that it did not intend for such a limitation to

apply.

The language used by Congress in §922(g)(8)(C)(ii) 

further illustrates this point. This provision criminalizes, 

among other things, the possession of a firearm by a person who is subject to a court order that “explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against [an] intimate partner or child that would 

reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.” (Emphasis

added.) Although §922(g)(8)(C)(ii) was not enacted until 

eight years after §924(e)(2)(B)(i), see ante, at 9, the former 

provision is nevertheless instructive. If Congress had

wanted to include in §924(e)(2)(B)(i) a limitation similar to

those in §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and §922(g)(8)(C)(ii), Congress

could have easily done so expressly. 

II 

The Court provides two reasons for refusing to interpret

18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i) in accordance with the common-law understanding, but neither is persuasive. 

A 

The Court first argues that §924(e)(2)(B)(i) must be read

to refer to “violent” force because that provision defines

the term “violent felony.” Ante, at 6. But it is apparent

that ACCA uses “violent felony” as a term of art with a

wider meaning than the phrase may convey in ordinary 
4 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

usage. ACCA specifically provides that burglary and

extortion are “violent felon[ies],” §924(e)(2)(B),(ii), and we

have held that ACCA also reaches the crime of attempted 

burglary, James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192 (2007).

All of these offenses may be committed without violent 

force,1 and it is therefore clear that the use of such force is 

not a requirement under ACCA. Instead, ACCA classifies 

crimes like burglary and extortion as violent felonies

because they often lead to violence. As we have put it,

these crimes create “significant risks of . . . confrontation 

that might result in bodily injury,” id., at 199, and offensive touching creates just such a risk. For example, when

one bar patron spits on another, violence is a likely consequence. See United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F. 3d 

418, 422 (CA5 1996) (“If burglary, with its tendency to 

cause alarm and to provoke physical confrontation, is 

considered a violent crime under 18 U. S. C. §16(b), then

surely the same is true of the far greater intrusion that

occurs when a child is sexually molested”); United States 

v. Wood, 52 F. 3d 272, 276 (CA9 1995) (same). 

—————— 

1For the purposes of ACCA, burglary is defined as “an unlawful or 

unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, 

with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 

598 (1990). See also James, 550 U. S., at 197, 198, 202–203 (attempted

burglary under Florida law requires “overt conduct directed toward 

unlawfully entering or remaining in a dwelling, with the intent to

commit a felony therein” and that the “defendant fail in the perpetration or be intercepted or prevented in the execution of the underlying 

offense” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although we have not

defined extortion under ACCA, the Hobbs Act defines it as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use 

of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official 

right.” 18 U. S. C. §1951(b)(2) (emphasis added); see also James, supra, 

at 223–224 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (defining extortion in ACCA as “the 

obtaining of something of value from another, with his consent, induced

by the wrongful use or threatened use of force against the person or 

property of another” (emphasis added)). 
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 5 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

B 

The Court’s only other reason for rejecting the commonlaw definition is the fact that battery at common law was 

a misdemeanor. The Court reasons that “[i]t is unlikely 

that Congress would select as a term of art defining ‘violent felony’ a phrase that the common law gave peculiar 

meaning only in its definition of a misdemeanor.” Ante, at 

7 (citing 4 Blackstone 216–218 (1769), and ALI, Model 

Penal Code §211.1, Comment, p. 175 (1980)). The Court 

does not spell out why Congress’ selection of this term

would be unlikely, but I assume that the Court’s point is

that Congress is unlikely to have decided to treat as a

violent felony an offense that was regarded at common law 

as a mere misdemeanor. This argument overlooks the 

significance of the misdemeanor label at common law, the

subsequent evolution of battery statutes, and the limitation imposed by 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B). 

At common law, the terms “felony” and “misdemeanor”

did not have the same meaning as they do today. At that 

time, imprisonment as a form of punishment was rare, see 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 480, n. 7 (2000);

most felonies were punishable by death, see Tennessee v. 

Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 13 (1985); and many very serious 

crimes, such as kidnaping and assault with the intent to

murder or rape, were categorized as misdemeanors. See 

United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 439–440 (1976) 

(Marshall, J., dissenting). Since that time, however, the 

term “felony” has come to mean any offense punishable by 

a lengthy term of imprisonment (commonly more than one 

year, see Burgess v. United States, 553 U. S. 124, 130 

(2008)); the term “misdemeanor” has been reserved for 

minor offenses; and many crimes that were misdemeanors

at common law have been reclassified as felonies. And 

when the relevant language in ACCA was enacted, quite a 

few States had felony battery statutes that retained the 

common-law definition of “force.” See Fla. Stat. 
6 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

§784.07(2)(b) (1987) (making simple battery of a police

officer a felony); Idaho Code §18–915(c) (Lexis 1987)

(same); Ill. Crim. Code §12–4(b)(6) (1988) (same); La. Stat.

Ann. §§14:33, 14:43.1 (West 1986) (sexual battery punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment); N. M. Stat.

Ann. §40A–22–23 (1972) (battery of a police officer a felony); see also Kansas Stat. Ann. §21–3413(b) (Supp. 1994) 

(simple battery of corrections officers a felony).2 

ACCA’s mechanism for identifying the battery convictions that merit treatment as “violent felon[ies]” is contained in 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B), which provides that 

an offense committed by an adult is not a “violent felony” 

unless it is “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Consequently, while all convictions 

under battery statutes that track the common-law definition of the offense satisfy the requirements of 

§924(e)(2)(B)(i)—because they have “as an element the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another”—not all battery convictions

qualify as convictions for a violent felony because 

§924(e)(2)(B) excludes any battery conviction that was not 

regarded by the jurisdiction of conviction as being sufficiently serious to be punishable by imprisonment for more

than one year. There is nothing extraordinary or unlikely 

about this approach. 

III 

The Court’s interpretation will have untoward consequences. Almost half of the States have statutes that 

reach both the use of violent force and force that is not 

—————— 

2These state statutes show that Congress, by using a term of art, 

“force,” did not adopt a meaning “peculiar . . . [to the] definition of a 

misdemeanor,” see ante, at 7, and, therefore, they are relevant in 

determining whether touching involves the use of force under ACCA. 

See ante, at 7, n. 1. 
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 7 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

violent but is unlawful and offensive.3 Many of the States

classify these batteries as felonies or make them punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.4 Although

the great majority of convictions under these statutes are, 

—————— 

3Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–1203(A) (West 2001); Cal. Penal Code 

Ann. §242 (West 2008); People v. Pinholster, 1 Cal. 4th 865, 961, 824 

P. 2d 571, 622 (1992); D. C. Code §22–404(a) (2001); Ray v. United 

States, 575 A. 2d 1196, 1199 (D. C. 1990); Fla. Stat. Ann. §784.03(1)(a)

(2007); Ga. Code Ann. §16–5–23(a) (2007); Idaho Code §18–903 (Lexis

2004); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §5/12–3(a) (West 2009); Ind. Code §35–

42–2–1(a) (2004); Iowa Code §708.1 (West 2009); Kan. Stat. Ann. §21–

3412(a) (2007); La. Stat. Ann. §14:33 (West 2007); State v. Schenck, 513 

So. 2d 1159, 1165 (La. 1987); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §207(1)(A) 

(2006); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §§3–201(b), 3–203(a) (Lexis Supp.

2009); Kellum v. State, 223 Md. 80, 84–85, 162 A. 2d 473, 476 (1960); 

Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 265, §13A(a) (West 2008); Commonwealth v. 

Campbell, 352 Mass. 387, 397, 226 N. E. 2d 211, 218 (1967); Mich. 

Comp. Laws Ann. §§750.81(1), (2) (West 2004); People v. Nickens, 470 

Mich. 622, 627–628, 685 N. W. 2d 657, 661 (2004); Mo. Rev. Stat. 

§565.070(5) (West 2000); Mont. Code Ann. §45–5–201(1)(c) (2009); N. H. 

Rev. Stat. Ann. §631:2–aI(a) (West 2007); N. M. Stat. Ann. §30–3–4 

(Supp. 2009); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §14–33(a) (Lexis 2007); State v. 

West, 146 N. C. App. 741, 744, 554 S. E. 2d 837, 840 (2001); Okla. Stat. 

Ann., Tit. 21, §642 (West 2002); Steele v. State, 778 P. 2d 929, 931 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1989); R. I. Gen. Laws §11–5–3(a) (Lexis 2002); State 

v. Coningford, 901 A. 2d 623, 630 (R. I. 2006); S. C. Code Ann. §22–3–

560(A) (Supp. 2009); State v. Mims, 286 S. C. 553, 554, 335 S. E. 2d 

237 (1985) (per curiam); Tenn. Code Ann. §39–13–101(a)(3) (2003); Tex.

Penal Code Ann. §22.01(a) (West Supp. 2009); Va. Code Ann. §18.2–

57(A) (Lexis 2009); Wood v. Commonwealth, 149 Va. 401, 404, 140 S. E. 

114, 115 (1927); Wash. Rev. Code §9A.36.011 et seq. (2008); State v. 

Stevens, 158 Wash. 2d 304, 311, 143 P. 3d 817, 821 (2006); W. Va. Code

Ann. §61–2–9(c) (Lexis 2005). 4See Iowa Code §§708.1, 708.2(5) (2009); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§21–

3412(a), 21–3412a, 3413(b), 3448(b) (2007); La. Stat. Ann. 

§§14:34.2(B)(2), 14:34.3(C)(2) (Supp. 2010), 14:34.5(B)(2); 14:35.3(E)

(2007); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §§3–201(b), 3–203(a), (b) (Supp. 

2009); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 265, §13A(a) (2008); Mich. Comp. Laws

Ann. §750.81(4) (West 2004); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§565.070.1(5), 565.070.4 

(2000); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21, §642 (West 2002), §644 (West Supp.

2010). 
8 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

no doubt, based on the use of violent force, the effect of the 

Court’s decision will be to take all these convictions outside the scope of ACCA—unless the Government is able to

produce documents that may properly be consulted under 

the modified categorical approach and that conclusively 

show that the offender’s conduct involved the use of violent force, see ante, at 10–11. As the Government notes, 

however, this will often be impossible because, in those 

States in which the same battery provision governs both

the use of violent force and offensive touching, charging

documents frequently simply track the language of the 

statute, and jury instructions often do not require juries to 

draw distinctions based on the type of force that the defendant employed. See Brief for United States 42–43. 

In addition, the Court’s interpretation of the term

“physical force” may hobble at least two federal statutes 

that contain this identical term. Under 18 U. S. C. 

§922(g)(9), a person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence” may not lawfully possess a firearm, and 

the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” is 

defined as applying only to crimes that “ha[ve], as an 

element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the 

threatened use of a deadly weapon.” §921(a)(33)(A) (emphasis added). As we recently explained, Congress recognized that “‘many people who engage in serious spousal or 

child abuse ultimately are not charged with or convicted of 

felonies,’” and Congress therefore enacted this provision to

keep firearms out of the hands of such abusers. United 

States v. Hayes, 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 10). 

Cases of spousal and child abuse are frequently prosecuted 

under generally applicable assault and battery statutes, 

ibid., and as noted, the assault and battery statutes of 

almost half the States apply both to cases involving the

use of violent force and cases involving offensive touching.

As a result, if the Court’s interpretation of the term

“physical force” in ACCA is applied to §922(g)(9), a great 
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 9 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

many persons convicted for serious spousal or child abuse 

will be allowed to possess firearms. 

Under 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(E), an alien convicted of a

“crime of domestic violence” is subject to removal, and the 

term “crime of domestic violence” is defined as an offense 

that, among other things, has “as an element the use [or] 

attempted use . . . of physical force.” 18 U. S. C. §16(a). 

Accordingly, if the Court’s interpretation of the term

“physical force” is applied to this provision, many convicted spousal and child abusers will escape removal, a

result that Congress is unlikely to have intended. 

* * * 

For all these reasons, I believe that the Court’s decision 

is incorrect, and I therefore respectfully dissent.