In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

____________________ 

No. 20-1259 

HARLAN TEN PAS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

THE LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 18 C 3694 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 1, 2020 — DECIDED APRIL 11, 2022 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and SCUDDER,

Circuit Judges. 

SYKES, Chief Judge. Harlan Ten Pas worked as a tax partner at the accounting firm McGladrey LLP until he suffered 

a cluster of cardiovascular events in 2014.1 He receives total1 McGladrey has since changed its name to “RSM US LLP.” We will refer 

to the firm as “McGladrey.”
2 No. 20-1259 

disability benefits under McGladrey’s group long-term 

disability insurance policy, which The Lincoln National Life 

Insurance Company administers. 

Ten Pas contends that he is entitled to a larger monthly 

benefit under the terms of the policy, so he filed suit against 

Lincoln National under the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The policy

calculates benefits based on a percentage of an employee’s

salary on his “Determination Date”—“the last day worked 

just prior to the date the Disability begins.” Lincoln National 

used Ten Pas’s salary as of August 31, 2014, the date of his

heart attack and the first of several consecutive hospital

stays. Ten Pas argues that his determination date came on or 

after September 1. The short difference matters because Ten 

Pas received a substantial raise from McGladrey on that 

date. The district judge agreed with Ten Pas and entered

summary judgment in his favor.

We reverse. Lincoln National’s benefits determination 

cannot be disturbed unless Ten Pas can show that it was 

arbitrary or capricious. See Hennen v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 

904 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2018). He has not met this demanding standard. Because Lincoln National’s decision rests 

on a reasonable construction of the contract and an evaluation of Ten Pas’s medical records, the company is entitled to 

summary judgment. 

I. Background 

The events underlying Ten Pas’s disability claim began 

over Labor Day weekend in 2014. After working a half day at 

McGladrey’s Chicago office on Sunday, August 31, Ten Pas 

traveled to his lake home in Wisconsin. Shortly after arriving, he was rushed to the emergency room of a local hospital 
No. 20-1259 3 

after experiencing chest pains and shortness of breath. 

Doctors determined that he had suffered a heart attack and 

admitted him to the intensive-care unit. 

The next day (Labor Day) Ten Pas underwent an angioplasty and doctors implanted a stent. He remained in the 

hospital for a second night. As he later explained in an 

affidavit, he reviewed and drafted a handful of emails to 

clients and coworkers while recuperating that evening. For 

instance, in one email Ten Pas informed several colleagues of 

his medical condition and instructed them to “[k]eep the 

ship upright for a day or two.” 

Ten Pas left the hospital on Tuesday, September 2, and 

returned home to the Chicago area. But he was not out of the 

hospital for long. After briefly returning to the office for a 

time on Wednesday, Ten Pas left after feeling unwell and 

was admitted to the hospital that evening and diagnosed 

with an ischemic stroke. He remained hospitalized for two 

nights. As with his first hospital stay, he reviewed and sent 

some emails while recuperating. Ten Pas returned home on 

Friday, September 5, but was rushed to the hospital the next 

day after suffering a serious complication known as a hemorrhagic conversion of infarct—bleeding on the brain secondary to the ischemic stroke. He has not worked for 

McGladrey in any meaningful capacity since. He remained 

in the hospital for another week and then was transferred to 

the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago for a lengthy period 

of inpatient rehabilitation therapy. He was discharged to his 

home on October 24.

In January 2015 McGladrey submitted a total-disability 

claim to Lincoln National on Ten Pas’s behalf. There were 

several layers to Lincoln National’s benefits determination, 
4 No. 20-1259 

but we need only detail the process by which it determined 

the amount of Ten Pas’s monthly benefit. Ten Pas is a 

“Class 1 Insured Employee” under the policy, so the amount 

is set at 60% of his “Basic Monthly Earnings” on his “determination date.” As mentioned, a claimant’s determination 

date is defined as “the last day worked just prior to the date 

the Disability begins.” Because Ten Pas received a raise of 

several thousand dollars per month on September 1, 2014, a 

determination date on or after that date would result in a 

significantly larger monthly benefit. 

McGladrey’s initial submission listed September 5 as Ten 

Pas’s last day of work. But some statements from his treating 

physicians prompted further investigation, with one doctor 

indicating that he was unable to work as early as August 31. 

In the months that followed, Lincoln National worked to 

resolve the discrepancy and sought to pin down a timeline

of when Ten Pas last worked and became disabled. To that 

end, Lincoln National requested documentation from 

McGladrey on Ten Pas’s work during the first week of 

September. McGladrey could not produce any, though it 

noted anecdotally that Ten Pas was physically in the office 

on September 3 and worked remotely for the rest of that 

week. Still, Lincoln National remained skeptical that Ten 

Pas’s determination date fell in September because he had 

not worked a full day after his August 31 heart attack.

As part of its investigation, Lincoln National also gathered information from McGladrey on the scope of Ten Pas’s 

job responsibilities as a “Lead Tax Partner.” This was important because the plan defines the terms “Total Disability”

and “Totally Disabled” as follows: “due to an Injury or 

Sickness[,] the Insured Employee is unable to perform each 

of the Main Duties of his or her Own Occupation.”
No. 20-1259 5 

McGladrey explained that Ten Pas’s job required, among 

other things, that he supervise other tax accountants, review 

tax returns and research memoranda, and win new business 

by pitching work to prospective clients. 

After completing its investigation, Lincoln National notified Ten Pas that it would use his pre-raise basic monthly 

earnings as of August 31, 2014, to calculate his monthly 

benefit. Acknowledging Ten Pas’s limited work during and 

immediately after his first hospital stay, Lincoln National

emphasized that Ten Pas was “inpatient for some portion of 

every day that week.” And because of his hospitalization, 

Lincoln National explained that Ten Pas was “not able to 

perform the full duties of [his] occupation” after his heart 

attack on August 31. 

In November 2015 Ten Pas filed an administrative appeal 

with Lincoln National. He disputed Lincoln National’s 

finding that he was unable to work after August 31 and 

submitted additional evidence to shore up his position. His

primary argument, however, was that his determination 

date could not have been earlier than September 1 because 

he was still “Actively at Work” as defined by the policy. 

The terms “Active Work” and “Actively at Work” are defined by the policy as an employee’s “full-time performance 

of all Main Duties of his or her Own Occupation, for the 

regularly scheduled number of hours.” The definition adds a 

qualifier that takes certain out-of-office time into account. In 

pertinent part, the definition provides: “Unless disabled on 

the prior workday or on the day of absence, an Employee 

will be considered Actively at Work on ... a Saturday, 

Sunday or holiday that is not a scheduled workday ... .”

Importantly, however, the terms “active work” and “actively 
6 No. 20-1259 

at work” appear only in the policy provisions pertaining to 

eligibility for coverage—i.e., the date on which an employee’s coverage first becomes effective and the requirements 

for continuation of coverage during interruptions in service. 

The terms do not appear in the policy provisions governing 

the determination of the amount of a claimant’s benefits. 

Even so, Ten Pas seized on the qualifier because 

August 31 fell on a Sunday and September 1 was a holiday. 

He argued that because he was “actively at work” (as the 

policy defines that term) throughout Labor Day weekend, he 

could not have been disabled until the next business day—

September 2—at the earliest. 

Lincoln National rejected Ten Pas’s administrative appeal 

and upheld its decision to use the August 31 salary to calculate his benefit. It reiterated that although Ten Pas may have 

performed some limited work during his hospital stays, he 

did not “return to full-time performance of all main duties of 

his own occupation[] for the regularly scheduled number of 

hours.” And it rejected Ten Pas’s theory about the applicability of the “active work” definition, finding instead that “he 

was disabled as of 08/31/2014.” 

Ten Pas sought a second-level appeal on the same 

grounds in May 2016. Lincoln National again affirmed its 

initial determination, essentially echoing the reasoning from 

the first-level appeal but adding an acknowledgment that 

Ten Pas was actively at work until his August 31 heart 

attack.

Having exhausted the administrative-appeal process, Ten 

Pas filed suit under § 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA seeking a 

declaratory judgment that Lincoln National erred by using 

his August 31 salary for his benefits determination. As in his 
No. 20-1259 7 

administrative appeals, Ten Pas argued that (1) he was not 

disabled on August 31 because he continued to work during 

the first week of September; and (2) even if his postAugust 31 work did not suffice, he remained actively at 

work as defined in the policy until at least September 2.

The case was submitted on cross-motions for summary 

judgment, with Ten Pas limiting his motion to the argument 

about the active-work definition. The judge endorsed that 

theory and held that Lincoln National unreasonably used his 

pre-raise basic monthly earnings to calculate his benefit. She 

thought that the definition of “active work” was relevant to 

identifying the date on which Ten Pas’s disability began for 

purposes of the benefits determination. In other words, she 

concluded that the phrase “last day worked” in the definition of “determination date” must be read in conjunction 

with the active-work definition. Based on that interpretation 

of the policy, the judge concluded that because Ten Pas was 

considered to be “actively at work” (as the policy defines 

that term) through Labor Day weekend, he could not have 

become disabled until September 2. Accordingly, the judge 

found that Ten Pas’s “last day worked”—and thus his 

determination date—came no earlier than September 1. She 

granted his motion, denied Lincoln National’s, and entered 

judgment for Ten Pas. 

II. Discussion

We review the judge’s summary-judgment order de novo. Lacko v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 926 F.3d 432, 439 

(7th Cir. 2019). Where, as here, the case was resolved on

cross-motions for summary judgment, “our review of the 

record requires that we construe all inferences in favor of the 

party against whom the motion under consideration [was]
8 No. 20-1259 

made.” Hess v. Reg-Ellen Mach. Tool Corp., 423 F.3d 653, 658 

(7th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). 

Though we review the judge’s ruling without deference, 

the same is not true of the underlying benefits determination. When an employee-benefits plan “grants to the administrator the discretionary authority to determine benefits, we 

review the decision of that administrator under the more 

stringent arbitrary and capricious standard.” Lacko, 926 F.3d 

at 439. The plan at issue here clearly grants discretionary 

authority to the claim administrator, triggering deferential 

review. Dragus v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 882 F.3d 667, 

672 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the arbitrary-andcapricious standard applies only when the plan language 

clearly and unequivocally grants discretionary authority to 

the plan administrator). Accordingly, we cannot disturb

Lincoln National’s benefits determination unless it flunks

arbitrary-and-capricious review.2 

That creates a high hurdle for Ten Pas. A plan administrator’s decision survives arbitrary-and-capricious review if

(1) it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence, for a particular 

outcome, (2) the decision is based on a reasonable explanation of relevant plan documents, 

or (3) the administrator has based its decision 

2 Despite the policy’s language, Ten Pas maintains that we should 

instead review Lincoln National’s decision de novo because Lincoln 

National failed to meet the deadline requirements for his first administrative appeal and because Lincoln National’s obligation to pay benefits

creates a conflict of interest for determining what those benefits should 

be. Ten Pas has waived these arguments, however, because he failed to 

raise them in the district court. See Allen v. City of Chicago, 865 F.3d 936, 

943 (7th Cir. 2017). 
No. 20-1259 9 

on a consideration of the relevant factors that 

encompass the important aspects of the problem. 

Estate of Jones v. Child.’s Hosp. & Health Sys. Inc. Pension Plan, 

892 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). 

This deference likewise extends to matters of contract interpretation. Where policy terms are ambiguous, we may not 

“set aside a denial of benefits based on any reasonable 

interpretation of the plan,” even if we would be inclined to 

reach a different result on plenary review. Hess, 423 F.3d at 

658. Put differently, we defer to an administrator’s construction “if it falls within the range of reasonable interpretations” or if it is “compatible with the language and the

structure of the plan document.” Bator v. Dist. Council 4, 

972 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). 

That’s not to say this deference is simply a rubber stamp; if 

the administrator’s construction “defies [the] plan’s plain 

language” or is otherwise patently unreasonable, its decision 

has “fail[ed] the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.” Jones, 

892 F.3d at 923. 

This dispute largely involves an interpretive question

under the policy: Did Ten Pas’s determination date come at 

the end of August or in the first week of September? The 

judge concluded that it was arbitrary and capricious for 

Lincoln National to choose the former. That was error. To 

explain why, we’ll unpack the terms that are—and just as 

importantly, are not—relevant to the determination-date 

decision. 

A. The Active-Work Definition Is Not Relevant 

As explained, the determination date is “the last day 

worked just prior to the date the Disability begins.” By its 
10 No. 20-1259 

terms just two factors are relevant: the date Ten Pas’s disability began and “the last day worked just prior” to that date. 

Rather than zeroing in on these two variables, the judge

injected a third—the “active work” definition—into the 

equation. Ten Pas insists that the judge’s reading of the 

policy was sound when the determination-date provision is 

read in the context of the entire agreement. 

The active-work definition is a red herring. It’s true that 

the relevant policy provisions must be situated in their 

proper context rather than read in isolation. See id. (“Plan 

language is ... given its plain and ordinary meaning, and the 

plan must be read as a whole, considering separate provisions in light of one another and in the context of the entire 

agreement.” (quotation marks omitted)). But context makes 

clear that the policy’s definition of “active work” does not 

carry the weight that Ten Pas says it does. The active-work 

provision appears in an upfront section that defines a list of

terms “[a]s [they are] used throughout the [p]olicy.” But the 

term “active work” is not “used” anywhere in the definition 

of “determination date” or in any other provision that bears 

on the benefits amount. Frankly, the only connection between the active-work and determination-date provisions is 

their proximity in a set of definitions listed in alphabetical 

order. 

More to the point, the term “active work” is “used” only 

in the policy provisions that govern a matter not in dispute: 

Ten Pas’s eligibility for coverage. For example, the “Effective 

Date” provision, which sets forth when an “Employee’s 

initial amount of coverage becomes effective,” lists “the date 

the Employee resumes Active Work, if not Actively at Work 

on the day he or she becomes eligible,” as one of four possible triggers for when an employee’s initial coverage begins. 
No. 20-1259 11 

On the other side of the ledger, “[c]easing Active Work” 

renders an employee ineligible for insurance, though coverage may continue if the employee is “absent due to Total 

Disability.” These provisions pertain to eligibility for and

continuation of coverage. They have no effect on the determination of the amount of the benefit Ten Pas is entitled to 

receive. 

Simply put, we see no role for the active-work definition

in either of the constituent parts of the determination-date

definition. Ten Pas’s argument to the contrary simply misreads the policy. Or at the very least, Lincoln National

reasonably rejected his argument, which at best was based 

on a strained reading of the policy. 

B. Lincoln National Reasonably Identified Ten Pas’s 

Determination Date

Because the active-work provision is irrelevant, resolution of this case is straightforward. Lincoln National reasonably settled on a determination date. 

As noted, the policy terms “Total Disability” and “Totally Disabled” mean that “due to an Injury or Sickness[,] the 

Insured Employee is unable to perform each of the Main 

Duties of his or her Own Occupation.” We see no reason to 

second-guess Lincoln National’s finding that Ten Pas was 

totally disabled as of his heart attack and first hospitalization 

on August 31. It’s true that Ten Pas continued to perform a 

limited amount of work up until his September 6 hemorrhagic conversion, but this consisted mostly of reviewing 

and sending a small amount of email correspondence from 

his hospital bed. He has not shown, either as an interpretive 

or evidentiary matter, that it was unreasonable for Lincoln 
12 No. 20-1259 

National to conclude that he did not perform the full duties 

of his occupation. 

And because Ten Pas’s disability began on August 31, his 

“last day worked just prior” to August 31 could not have 

been September 1 or later. To be sure, Lincoln National has 

been somewhat inconsistent on the date that Ten Pas last 

worked, at times wavering between his last full day in the 

office on August 29 on the one hand and either of his partial 

days on August 30 or 31 on the other. But the critical point is 

that “the last day worked just prior to the date the Disability 

begins” cannot be plausibly understood to be forwardlooking. 

Accordingly, it was not arbitrary or capricious for Lincoln 

National to reject Ten Pas’s argument that his September 1 

raise must be included in its benefits calculation. Seeing no 

other basis to displace the administrator’s determination, we 

reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment for 

Lincoln National. See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brumit

Servs., Inc., 877 F.3d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Where facts are

not disputed, if a district court grants one party’s motion for

summary judgment and denies the other party’s crossmotion, this court can reverse and award summary judgment to the losing party below.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS