### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 22, 200 4

JAM ES D AV ID A LDE R v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for F ranklin County No. 12714 Bud dy D. P err y, Judge

No. M2003- 02767-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Dece m ber 16, 2004

The pe titioner, J ames Da vid Alder, wa s found g uilty by a jury of agg ravated assault, kidnapping, and unlawful possession of a

wea pon. As a re sult, he rece ived an eff ective sentence of twenty

(20) y ear s as a multiple offe nder. The judgme nts were aff irmed on appe al. See State v. James David Alder , No. M200 0 -0 1 8 0 4 -C C A- R 3 -C D, 2 0 0 1 W L 1 2 8 5 9 4 5 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. atNa s h v i l l e, Oc t

. 2 5 , 2001). I n this post-c onviction proce eding , the petitioner a lleg es that for various re asons his trial counsel was inef fec tive. For

the following rea sons, we af firm the dismiss al of the post-conviction petition.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.
Mickey Hall, Winchester, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, J ames Da vid Alder.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Ric ha rdH. Du na va nt, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; J. Mic ha e l T a y lor , Di stric t Attorne y Ge ne ra l; a ndSte ve Str a in, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

Fa ctual B ackg round

I n the summer of 1998, the petitioner’s then wife, Casey Alder ( now Casey Davidson), lef

t him. She spent a few day s at the Sequatchie County home of the victim, Ma rie Austin. O n J uly

16, 1998, afte r Ms. Davidson lef t the Austin r esidenc e to live w ith her mother, the pe titioner came to the home of Ms. Austin, who was ta lking on the te lephone at the time with a friend. U pon seeing the petitioner, Ms. Austin instructed her friend to c all 911 if anything ha ppened. T he petitioner stuck his head inside the door asked w here his wife wa s. When Ms. Austin t old the petitioner his wife w asT h is he a rin g c o m b ine d two p o st-co n v ic tio n p e tit io n s, o n e re la ting to a la te r c a s e i n v o lvin g the p e tit io n e r’s 1

con v i ct i on for a t t empt ed mu r der of t h e pet i t i on er ’ s w i fe, a n d t h i s c as e. T h e dec i si o n to d i s mi s s t h e pos t

- con v i ct i on pet i t i on i n t h e s ec on d c as e wa s af f i r med by t h i s Cour t on appe al

. Se e Ja mes D av i d Al der v

. St at e, N o. M 2003- 02766- C C A -R 3 -P C , 2 0 0 4 W L 2 3 0 9 1 3 7 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . at N a sh v ill e , O c t. 1 3 , 2 0 0 4 ).
-2- not pres en t , h e k i ck ed the door ope n, enter ed, and put a shotgun up to the Ms. Austin’s hea d threatening to kill her.

After hang ing up the phone, Ms. Aus t i n showed the pe titioner a note that his wife had written. I n it, Ms. Davidson stated that she wa s g oing to he r mother’ s house. The pe titioner pressed the sh otg un a g a ins t Ms . A us tin ’s sto ma c h a ndor de re d h e r to t e le ph on e Ms. Da vid so n. Whe n M s. Davidson came to the phone, Ms. Austin asked h er t o co m e back to the victim’s house. The pe tit ion e r h e ld thesh otg un to Ms. Au sti n’ s st oma c h d uring the ph on e c a ll. Ev e n th ou g h M s. Davidson sense d that the petitioner wa s there and asked w hether he had a g un, M s

. Austin never acknow ledg ed the pe titioner’s arme d prese nce. The pe titioner told Ms. Austi n that when his wife
arrived he planne d to shoot Ms. Austin so that his wife could watch her die. The pe titioner said he also intended to shoot himself.

The police arrived af

ter the pe titioner had held Ms. Austin at g unpoint for appr ox imately 25 to 30 minutes. An officer entere d the house a nd Ms. Austin fled into the rea r of the house wher e her y oung daug hter was sleeping

. The pe titioner was subdued and the offic er w ho enter ed the r esidenc e manag ed to wre stled t h e s hotgun a way from the pe titioner and hand it to another office r. The shotgun pr oved to be loade d, and the of fice rs found six m ore twe lve-g aug e shells in the petitioner’s po c ke t.

The trial of

the matter took place in Fr anklin County , wher e a jury convicted the petitioner of ag g ravated assault, kidnapping , and unlawf ul possession of a we apon. The trial court se ntence d the petitioner to an e ffe ctive sente nce of twenty (20) y ear s as a multiple offe nder.

Th is C ou rt

a ff ir me d th e pe tit ion e r’ s c on vic tio ns on dir e c t app e a l. S e e State v. Jame s D a vid Al de r, No . M 20 00 -0 18 04 -C CA -R 3- CD , 2 00 1 WL 12 85 94 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. a t N a sh vil le , O c t. 25, 2001). The pe titioner subsequently filed a pr o se petition fo r p o s t -c onviction relief, a lleg ing various inconsistencie s at trial that he c ontended justified re lief. Th e p et i t ioner wa s appointed counsel a nd filed an amended pe tition for pos t -c o n v i ction relief alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistanc e of counsel at trial. A post-conviction evide ntiary hearing w as held on Septembe r 24, 2003. 1
At the post-conviction hea ring , the petitioner testified a s to his version of t h e ev en ts and raised questions a s to w hether his tria l attorney had adequately prepa red f or and ma de sound tac tical de c isi on s th ro ug ho ut the tr ia l. Th e pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t he ha d b e e n o ut h un tin g a nde nte re d M s. Austin’s residenc e to inquire a bout some of hi s belong ings that wer e mi ssing after his wifemoved out. The petitioner a dmitted that an arg ument ensued, but he denied kidnapping Ms. Austin. The pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d that his tr ia l c ou ns e l c on vin c e d h im n ot t o te sti fy on his ow n b e ha lf . A lon g tho se
sa me lin e s, the pe tit ion e r c la ime d th a t tria l c ou ns e l f a ile d to r e qu e st a

he ari ng in a c c or da nc e wi th-3-

Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 609 to determine w hether the petit i o n er ’s prior convictions could be
us e d to imp e a c h his te sti mon y . T he pe tit ion e r a lso a lle g e d th a t hi s tria l c ou ns e l me t w ithhim on ly
a fe w tim e s a nd that e a c h me e tin g wa s sh ort. Th e pe tit ion e r state d th a t hi s tria l c ou ns e l r e fu se d to pr e se nt e vid e nc e of the pe tit ion e r’ s me nta l he a lth pr ob le ms a nd that tr ia l c ou ns e l’ s cros sexamination of witnesses was inade quate.

The State a

rg ued at the post-c onviction heari n g that trial counsel ha d provided e ffe ctive counsel to the pe titioner. The State contende d that the petitioner’s fate could have potentially been worse ha d the evidenc e of his mental history been introduced, or if

he had te stified on his own be ha lf

. Tria l c ou ns e l te sti fi e d th a t he ha d b e e n p ra c tic ing la w s inc e 19 86 , c ri min a l la w e xclu siv e ly sin c e 19 92 , h a d p art ic ipate d inov e r 1 00 tria ls and was cert ifie d inTe nn e sse e fo r a pp oin tme nt t o capital c ases. The State also introduced a letter written by

the petitio n er a fter his trial to his trial counsel, whic h stated:
[Y]ou ar e a g o o d la w y e r

. . . . I w o n ’ t [s ic ] y o u to k n o w th a t I a m n o t ma d at y ou
cause [ s ic] y ou did a g ood job so thank y ou and take car e and ke ep on doing g ood work y ou are doing and i f I ever need a lawy er y ou would be the one I would won’t [si c] to take my

case

.
At the conc lusion of the hearing, the tri al court dismissed the petition for post-convic tion relief . On appe al, the petitioner c halleng es the trial c ourt’s dismissal of the petition.

Post-Convi ction Standard of Re view
To sustain a petition for post-co n v i ct i o n relief , a def endant must prove his or he r fa ctual alleg ations by

clea r and convincing evidenc e at an evidentiary hearing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 3 0 -1 1 0 (f ); M o m o n v

. S t at e, 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d 1 5 2 , 1 5 6 (T en n

. 1 9 9 9 ). T h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs of fa c t are c on c lus ive on app e a l un le ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s oth e rw ise . Se e State v. B urns , 6 S.W.3 d 45 3 , 4 6 1 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 9 )

. D u r i n g o u r r e v i e w o f

t h e i s s u e r a i s e d , w e w i l l a f f o r d t h o se finding s of fa ct the we ight of a jury verdic t, and this court is bound by the court’s finding s unless the evidenc e in t he record preponde rate s ag ainst those finding s. See He nley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997) ; Alley

v. State, 958 S.W .2d 138, 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . This Court may
no t r e we ig h o r r e -e va lu ate the e vid e nc e , n or su bs tit ute its inf e re nc e s f or tho se dr a wn by

thepo stconviction court. See Stat e v

. Ho ney cutt, 54 S.W .3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2001) . All questions
conce rning the cr edibilityof the witnesse s, the weig ht and value to be g iven their testimony , and the fa c tua l is su e s r a isedby

the e vid e nc e are to b e re so lve d b y the tria l ju dg e , n ot the app e llate c ou rt s. See Mom on, 1 8 S. W. 3 d a t 1 5 6 ; H e n le y , 9 6 0 S. W. 2 d a t 5 7 8

- 7 9

. H o w e v e r , th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti on court’s c onclusions o f l aw a re r eviewe d under a

purely de novo standa

rd with no presumption of
corr ectne ss. See Fie lds v. St ate, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

I neff ective A ssistance of Counsel-4-

Th e pe tit ion e r a

rg ue s th a t he wa s d e nie d e ff e c tive a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l. B oththe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constituti on and Article I , section 9 of t he Te nnessee Constit ution g uarantee a

criminal def

endant the right to represe ntation by counsel. S ee B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 461; Ba x ter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). When a petiti oner seeks post-convic tion relief on the basis of inef

fec tive assistance of counsel, the petitioner bear s the burden of showing that (a) the servic es re ndere d by

trial counsel we re de ficient a nd (b) t hat the def icient per formanc e wa s pr e jud ic ia l. S e e Pow e rs v. State , 9 42 S.W. 2d55 1, 55 8 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 1996 ). I n o rd e r t o demonstrate de ficient perf ormanc e, the petitioner must show that the servic es re ndere d or the a dvice g iven was below “the rang e of c ompetencedemande d of attorne y s in criminal case s.” B axter, 523 S.W. 2da t 93 6. I n o rd e r t o d e mon str a te pr e jud ic e , th e pe tit ion e r mus t sh ow that the reis a re a so na ble probability

that, but for co u n s el ’s defic ient perf ormanc e, the r esult of the proc eeding would have be e n dif fe re nt. Se e Stric kland v. Was hin g ton , 46 6 U .S. 66 8, 69 4 ( 19 84 ). “ B e c aus e a pe tit ion e r mus t
e sta bli sh bo th p ro ng s o f the te st to pre va il o n a c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l, f

a ilu re to prove e ither def

icient per form an ce o r resulting pre judice provide s a suffic ient basis to deny relief on the claim.” H enley , 960 S.W .2d at 580.

As no te d a

bo ve , th is C ou rt

wi ll a ff or d th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s a presumption of cor

rec tness, rende ring them conclusive on a ppeal unless t h e rec ord pre ponderates ag ainst the court’ s findings. See id. at 578. Howeve r, our supreme court has “de termined that issues of def icient per formanc e by

counsel a nd possible prejudice to the defe nse ar e mix ed questions of law and f a c t

. . . ; th u s , [ap p e ll a te ] r e v ie w o f [th e s e is s u e s ] is d e n o v o ” w ith n o p r esumption of
corr ectne ss. Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461.

F urthe rm or e , o n c la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l, the pe tit ion e r is no t e nti tle d to the bene fit of hi ndsight. S ee A dkins v. St ate, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. 1994). This Court may not second-g uess a r easona bly -base d trial strateg y , and we cannot gr ant relief based on a sound, but
unsucce ssful, tactica l decision made during the course of t he procee dings. See id. However, suc h defe renc e to the tac tical dec isions of counsel applies only if counsel m akes those de cisions after adequate prepa

ration for the case

. See Cooper v. State, 847 S.W .2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Cri m

. App. 1992).
On appe al, the petitioner complains that his tria l c ounsel was ineffe ctive beca use he failed to: (1) ade quately prepa

re a defe nse by

meeting with the petitioner only a handf ul of times; (2) ensure that the petit ioner’s version of events and his history of m ental il lness was int roduce d as promised during opening statements; (3) a llow the petitioner t o testify by convincing him that he should not testify ; (4) ensur e that the tria l court held a hearing in a ccor dance with Tennesse e Rule of Evide nce 609 to determine if the petit ioner’s previous convictions could be use d to impeach his testimony ; (5) ad eq u at el y

cr o s s -e x am i n e w i t n es s es re gar d i n g d i s cr ep an ci es i n their testimony ; and (6) provide proof of the history

of petit i o n er ’s m ental illness. The State c ounters that the r ecor d supports the trial court’s c onclusion that the trial counse l provided ef fec tive repr esentation.

I nadequate pre paration-5-

The pe titioner asserte d at the post-convic tion hearing that his tria l attorney met with him at the jail a fe w times in the b ooking r oom prior to trial. He f urther c laimed that the mee tings we re short and wer e not f

ocused on developing a def ense. Thepetitioner cla imed that he intended to hire his own attorney , but “didn’t have time” and, the d ay o f t ri al “w as told . . . [he] couldn’t” by the judge . Howeve r, other e vidence reve als that trial counsel or c olleag ues fr om his office me t with or telephoned the petitioner no less than fourteen times to discuss his two ongoing criminal ca ses. The petitioner met with both trial counsel, a nother attorney from th e P u b l i c De fende r’s Of fice and an investigator conc erning the facts of t he ca se and possible de fense s. The def ense te am also obtained and re viewed the petitioner’s menta l health re cords. The trial court conclude d that trial counsel’ s p re p ar at i o n wa s m o re th an ad eq u at e s t at i n g, “I do n ’t s ee h o w i n t h i s ca s e a n y ad d i t i o n al m ee t i n gs or long er me eting s would have ma de any differ ence in reg ard to the c ase.”
The pe titio n er ar gues in his brief that the T ennesse e Supreme Court set forth a thre e-pa rt “standa rd of pr epar ation” in B axter v. Rose, 523 W.S .2d at 930, of whic h t h e p etitioner’s trial counsel fa i l ed t o meet the f irst part: “Counsel should confe r with his client without delay and as of te n a s n e c e ssa

ry

. . . .” I d. a t 93 2- 33 . T he pe tit ion e r m a de thi s samearg ume nt i n h is p os tconviction appe al from the attempted second de g ree murder c onviction. This Court discounted the p et i t i o n er ’s ar gu m en tt h er ei n , s t at i n g:
[W ]e do not see this pa

rtial quote from Ba x ter a s the controlling standard. Rather, the c le ar s ta nd ardin T e nn e sse e fo r i ne f f e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l, i nc lud ing c la ims of inade quate pr epar ation, is the two part de ficienc y and pre judice standa

rd of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, and B urns, 6. S.W.3d at 461.
Alder, 2004 WL 2309137, at *3. The same analy sis a pplies here in. After apply ing an ob j ec tive standard of

rea sonablene ss, we conc lude that there was no de ficien t re p re s entation base d on the evidenc e pre sented a s to the quantity and quality

of attorney

/client meeting s. Moreove r, we ag ree with the trial court that the pe titioner was in no way prejudice d b y t h e number or leng th of the attorney -client mee tings. Thus, we determine that the petitioner failed to prove by clear and
c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that hi s tria l a tto rn e y pr ov ide d in e ff

e c tiv e a ss is tan ce of

c ou ns e l du e to inadequate trial pre paration.
Persuasion of Petitioner Not to Testify
The pe titioner next arg ues that bec ause tria l counsel failed to call him to testify on his own be ha lf, tria l c ou ns e l’ s repres ent ation w a s in e ff e c tiv e . T he pe tit ion e r m a int a ins that on ly he c ou ld pr e s e n t h is v e r s io n o f w h a t h ap p e n e d d u r in g th e ti me h e w a s in th e v ic ti m’ s r e s id e nce. T he pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t on ly hec ou ld g ive a n a c c ou nt o f h is r e la tio ns hip wi th the vic tim a ndthat hi s testimonywould ref

ute the proof

offe red by

the State.

The State noted that the petitioner testified be fore the trial court reg arding his decision not to testify and esse ntially

assure d the court that his de cision was voluntary

. The State a lso presente d testimonythat trial counsel ne ver c oerc ed the pe titioner not to testify , but rather advis ed him thatIn a re la te d a rg u m e n t, the p e tit io n e r c la im s tha t t ria l co u n se l fa iled to ha v e a h e a r in g i n a c c o rd a n c e w ith 2
T enness ee R ul e o f

E vi d ence 6 0 9 t o de t erm i ne t he ad m i ss i b ili ty o f t he p et i t i o ner’ s p ri o r convi ct i o ns fo r i m p eachm ent p urpo ses

. A t t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n he ari ng, tr i al c o unsel a d m i t t ed that he d i d no t remem b er why t here was no such heari ng hel d but t hat he was unawa r e o f how he coul d exc l ude t he bur gl ar y and agg r ava t ed bur gl ar y conv i ct i ons i f t he pet i t i oner t es t i f i ed. T he t r ans cr i pt of

t he t r i al i ndi cat es t hat t r i al coun s el di s cus s ed t he po s s i bi l i t y of a T enn es s ee R ul e o f

E vi dence 6 0 9 heari ng, but t hat t he t ri al co urt wanted t o wait t o have t he heari ng unt i l t he p et i t i o ner dec i d ed whet her he was go i ng to tes tif y a t t ria l. P re su m a b ly, o n c e the p e tit io n e r d e c id e d no t t o tes tif y, no he a rin g w a s n e c e ssa ry.

In fact , t he p et i t i o ner t est i f i ed a t the p o st

- co nvi ct i o n he ari ng that he w as p repa red t o t el l t he jur y t hat he and 3
the vic tim “sm o k e d a jo int” the d a y o f t h e inc id e n t.
-6- do ing so wo uldlik e ly

do mor e ha

rm than g oo d c on sid e ri ng the c ir c ums ta nc e s. Th e e vid e nc e re ve a ls t h ath ad th e p et i t i o n ert es t i fi ed , i two u l d h a v e l i k el y o p en ed t h e d o o r t o h i s i m p ea ch m en tt h ro u gh prior convic tions of burg lary and agg ravated burglary

. Furthermore , trial counsel testified that he 2

was c oncerned about the possibility of the pe titioner’s testimony con cerning drug use, prior 3 convictions, and his g ener ally “obtuse” demea nor.

The trial c ourt ag ree d with the S tate that trial counsel’s tactica l decision to advise his client

n o tt o t ak e t h e w i t n es s s t an d wa s b as ed o n s o u n d j u d gm en t , s t at i n g:

Yo u know, that ce rtainly g ets down to cre dibilit y but I think I can dr aw the conclusions, having tried these c ases, that the jury would have a lmos t o u t of hand reje cted his cr edibility

. . . .
Both the State and the petit ioner rely on State v. Z immermen, 823 S.W.2d 220, 227 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ), wh ic h s ta te d inpa rt , “ the failu reof

a de fe ns e a tto rn e y

to ca ll the de fe nd a nt i s often a key fac tor on the issue of ineffe ctive assistance .” Whil e we a g ree with that statement of the law in Z immerman, we ag ree with the State that the fa cts in Z immerman ar e distinguishable from the c a se he re in. I n Z imm e rm a n, the de fe ns e c ou ns e l plann e d a de fe ns e wh e re the de fe nd a nt w ou ld testify , informed the j u ry t o s u ch a strateg y , then fa iled to actually call the de fendant to the stand. Th is C ou rt

fo un d d e fe ns e c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n inZ immerm a n in e ff e c tiv e ba se d o n h is “per emptory abandonme nt of the pre- established and rea sonably sound defe nse strate g y . . . .” 823 S.W .2d at 224. I n the ca se her ein, trial counse l advised the petitioner fr om the outset not to take the stand as a trial strateg y . Trial counse l’s decision does not amount to def icient re prese ntation. Further, the pe titioner failed to demonstrate that pre judice re sulted from trial counse l’s advice

.
Pr omi se of

De fe ns e in O pe nin g State me nt
The pe tit ioner a lso claims that trial counsel made promises to the jury during opening state me nts that th e y

wo uldhe ar the pe tit ion e r’ s v e rs ionof the e ve nts a ndthat th e de fe ns e wo uld prese nt an insanity

defe nse and that trial counsel was ineffe ctive for failing to present suc h evidenc e as promised. The State arg ues that the pe titioner was not pre judiced by

trial counsel’ s actions.-7-

The re cord r evea ls that during opening statements, t rial counse l informed the jury that “ther e may be some proof

coming out” that, on the day of the incident, the petitioner ha d been hunting for a snake to make a belt, that he st opped by the vi ctim’s residenc e, and that an ar g ument develope d when the pe titioner saw some of his possessions at the r esidenc e. Trial counse l also told the jury that some of the State’ s witnesses would testify to the p et i t ioner’s bizarr e beha vior, that the petitioner attempted suicide in jail, that the petitioner was taken to “Moca ssin Bend,” and that the pe titioner was not taking his medication at the time of the inc ident.

I n support of his arg ument that trial counsel’s statements amounted to ineffe ctive assistanc e of counse l, the petitioner ag ain re lies on Z immerman. The pe titioner claims that he wa s prejudice d by trial counse l’ s f

a ilu re to p ro vid e the “ pr omi se d d e fe ns e s” to the jury . A g a in, thi s c a se is dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om Z imm e rm a n. I n Z imm e rm a n, de fe ns e c ou ns e l pr omi se d inop e nin g state me nts that the def

endant would testify

and that a me ntal health prof essional would testify favor ably for the de fe ns e . 8 23 S .W .2 d at 22 1- 22 . E ve n th ou g h n e ith e r the de fe nd a nt n or the me nta l he a lth profe ssional ultim ately

testified, this Court d i d n o t proclaim that such a ction in and of itself wa s sufficie nt for g ranting a new trial but r ather part of a larg er course of conduct that nece ssitated a new trial. I d. at 226-28. In the ca se herein, trial counse l did not promise witnesses that did not appear

. I n fac t, trial counsel wa s able to in t ro d u ce muc h of what he promised to the jury during opening statements throug h the cr oss-examination of the State’s witnesses. The p o s t -convic tion court conclude d that trial counsel’ s statements wer e a “ lawy ering issue” and the fac ts presente d a situation wh er e “ s t i rr i n g t h e m i x ” m i gh t we l l b e t h e b es t s tra t egy

. T h e p et i t i o n er h as fa i l ed t o p ro v e t h ro u gh clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that trial c ounsel’s ac tions rose to the level of de ficient re prese ntation or pre judiced the pe titioner.

I nadequate Cross-examination of Wit nesses Next, the petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to properly cross-e x amine the testimony of one of t he key witnesses, Officer L ockhart. Specifica lly , the petitioner a rg ues that trial counse l failed to point out that there w ere discrepancies be tween O ffice r L ockhart’s preliminary hearing testimonyand trial testimony . The e vidence at trial reve als that Offic er L ockhart testified that upon his arriva l to the victim’s r esidenc e, he saw two people inside. Offic er L ockhart then testified that he burst throug h the door without knocking and save d the victim. The petitioner c laims that Office r L ockhart testified at the pre liminar y hearing that he knocke d on the door prior to entering the vic tim ’s re sid e nc e a ndthat O ff ic e r L oc kh art ’s pr e lim ina ry he ari ng te sti mon y

wa s c on sis te nt w ith the petitioner’s ve rsion of the e vents.

I nitially , we note that there is no transcript fr om the preliminary hearing in the r ecor d on
app e a l. I t is the du ty

of the pe tit ion e r to pr e pa

re a n a de qu a te re c or d fo r app e llate re vie w. Te nn . R. App. P. 24(b). “When a party seeks a ppellate re v i ew there is a duty to prepa re a rec ord which convey s a fair, acc urate and complete acc ount of what transpire d with respec t to the issues forming the basis of the appea l.” State v. Ba llard, 855 S.W .2d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993) . Further, the pe titioner ha s f a i l e d t o c i t e au t h o r i t y i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s ar g u m e n t

. S e e T e n n

. R

. A p p

. R

. 2 7 ( a ) ( 7 ) ; T e n n. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). This issue is waived.-8- Hi sto ry of Me nta l I lln e ss The pe titioner nex t asserts that trial counsel wa s deficie nt in that he failed to fur ther investigate and util ize a mental condition defe nse at trial. The evidence shows that during opening state me nts a t the tr ia l, tr ia l c ou ns e l raise d the iss ue of the pe tit ion e r’ s me nta l heal th proble ms. During closing arg uments, the State reminded the jury that the defense had prese nted no evidence in support of the alleged m ental illness. During his testimonyat the post-convic tion hearing , the petitioner claimed that he repeatedly asked trial counsel to i nform the jury of his history

of mental illness. The petitioner cla imed that he suff ere d from mental illness since “ the middle ‘70s” and had
a re cord of

“suicide attempts, overdoses, and stuff l i k e t h at .” The re is evide nce in the r ecor d indicating that the petit i o n er h as had conta ct with mental hea lth professionals spora dically since 1992.
At the post-conviction hea ring , the Sta t e pre sented e vidence that the petitioner’s me dical
re c or ds didno t su pp ort a c la im of men tal ill ne ss that w ou ld h a ve a mou nte d to a de fe ns e to h is
a c tio ns . T he State po int e d o ut that th e pe tit ion e r ha d a n in -p a tie nt m e nta l he a lthe va luatio n a ft e r h is
arr est and wa s decla

red competent to sta nd trial. Trial counse l claimed that he thor oug hly revie wed the petitioner’s me dical re cords a nd made the tactica l de cision not to introduce them at trial. Tria l counsel fe lt that even though some of the inf ormation reg arding the petitioner’s me ntal condition would have be en fa vorable , the re cords a lso contained info rm ation which would have been de tr ime nta l to the pe tit ion e r’ s c a se . In p art ic ula r, tr ial c ou ns e l w a s c on c e rn e d a bo ut the mul tip le
re fe re nc e s to the so ur c e of the pe tit ion e r’ s me ntal health p ro ble ms a s p oly -s ub stanc e abu se , a nti

social beha vior and “ malinger i n g” mental illness. The mental he alth rec ords also would have
reve aled the pe titioner’s habitual drug use to the j ury . The pe titioner was first diag nosed with mental illness in 1 9 9 2 , b u t t h at di ag nosis was attributed to maling ering . The pe titioner had two suicide
a tte mpt s, bo th o c c ur

ri ng wh ile he wa s in jail fo r oth e r crime s. Th e pe tit ion e r h a d a lso thr e a te ne d h is wife w ith a knife in 1998.
The post-c onviction court determined that the evidenc e of the petitioner’s menta l health was

m o re d et ri m en t al t o h i s d ef en s e t h an h el p fu l , s t at i n g:
[ H ] e ’ s c o m p l a i n i n g t h a t h i s m e n t a l h e a l t h w a s n o t c a l l e d t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e j u r y, beca use no doctors were called to provide that. Well, I think the re cord spe aks for itself on that issue. I

think the detriment, i f y ou g o back to this standard of whe ther the def iciency would prejudice the def

ense, c erta inly

no prejudice by

not doing that in this p ar ti c u la

r c a s e

. I n f

a c t, it p r o b ab ly b e n e f it s h im th a t th a t p r o o f

w a s not offe red.

On app e a l, the pe tit ion e r c la ims that tria l c ou ns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e be c aus e he me e ts a t le a st two prong s of the three -prong g uideline sug g ested by this Court in Wilcoxs on v. State, 22 S.W .3d 28 9 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 99 ), wh ic h s ta te s:-9-

Where c ounsel (1) makes some exploration of t he mental history of the a ppellant but fails to take a n obvious and ea silyavailable step whi ch woul d have ma de such a defe nse viable, ( 2) does not produc e re asonable t ac t i ca l reasons for not pursuing furthe r i nvestig ation, and (3) raises no othe r plausible def ense, c ourts may

find ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l.

I d. a t 31 5 ( c iti ng Smith v . St a te , N o. 02 C01 -9 80 1- CR- 00 01 8, 19 98 WL 89 93 62 , at *2 2 ( Te nn . Crim. App. at Na shville, Dec. 28, 1998) ) (holding counsel’s failure to r aise issue of def endant’ s claim of diminis hed ca

pacity was not ineff

ective a ssistance of co u n sel). Howe ver, w e dete rmine that the petitioner fa iled to prove by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that trial c ounsel failed to mee t any of the Wilcox son require ments. The re cord shows that trial counsel thoroug hly investi gated the petitioner’s menta l history and concluded after that r eview that introducing those rec ords would not b e b e n e f i c i a l t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r

. T h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s m e n t a l h e a l t h d i a g n o s e s o f m a l i n g e r i n g , p o l ysubstance a

buse, and anti-social beha vior would not have be en particularly benef icial to his defense

. We conclude that the petitioner has fai led to demonstrate that trial counsel’s f ailure to pre sent additional evidenc e of the pet i t i oner’ s mental history either r ose to the leve l of defic ient repr esentation or prejudice d the petitioner.

Conclusion
The post-c onviction court in d ividually addre ssed ea ch of the petitioner’s c omplaints with t he repr esentation and found that none of them had merit, ulti mately dete rm i n i n g that trial counsel p ro v i d ed co n s t i tu t i o n al l y ad eq u at e r ep re s en t at i o n

. T h e r ec o rd fu l l y s u p p o rt s t h atfi n d i n g. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the judg ment of the post-c onviction court.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE