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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 38349

MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

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2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 724

Filed: November 15, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bingham County. Hon. Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge. 

Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant. Deborah A. 

Whipple argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. Fleming argued.

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Chief Judge

Michael C. Williams appeals from the district court’s summary dismissal of his petition 

for post-conviction relief. We affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Williams and his brother, Doug, exited a bar to return home. Upon exiting, Doug entered 

into a dispute with some other men, while Williams opened his pickup door and sat down inside. 

After learning of the dispute, one of the men, Chris Adams, broke a beer bottle on the ground 

and began to walk towards Williams. A verbal altercation ensued, and Williams produced a gun 

and shot Adams three times in the chest, killing him. 

Williams was charged with first degree murder, with a deadly weapon enhancement. The 

jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter, Idaho Code § 18-4006(1), with a deadly 

weapon enhancement, I.C. § 19-2520. The district court imposed a unified thirty-year sentence 
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with a twenty-five-year determinate term of confinement. Williams filed an Idaho Criminal 

Rule 35 motion for reduction of the sentence which the district court denied and this Court 

affirmed. State v. Williams, Docket No. 33019 (Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2007) (unpublished).

Williams then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other claims, 

ineffective assistance of defense counsel. Upon the State’s motion for summary dismissal, the 

district court dismissed all claims except one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising 

from defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence that was allegedly obtained through 

a Miranda1 violation. Williams timely appeals, contending that summary dismissal of his postconviction petition was improper. 

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Williams alleges that his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by abandoning 

the theory of self-defense, and thereby conceding his guilt to voluntary manslaughter. The State 

claims the record demonstrates that defense counsel did present self-defense and, therefore, did 

not concede guilt to voluntary manslaughter. 

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding, 

governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 

476, 482 (2008). See also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Like 

plaintiffs in other civil actions, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the 

allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. 

State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 

61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). A petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint 

in an ordinary civil action, however, in that it must contain more than “a short and plain 

statement of the claim” that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). State v. Payne, 

146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008); Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628. The 

petition must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner, 

and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the 

 

1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included. I.C. § 19-4903. In other 

words, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 

allegations, or it will be subject to dismissal. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 

1172 (Ct. App. 2011); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction 

relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court’s own initiative, if “it appears from 

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of facts, 

together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” I.C. § 19-4906(c). When considering 

summary dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, but 

the court is not required to accept either the petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, 

unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s conclusions of law. Payne, 146 Idaho at 

561, 199 P.3d at 136; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. Moreover, because the district 

court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary hearing, the district 

court is not constrained to draw inferences in the petitioner’s favor, but is free to arrive at the 

most probable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 

483; Wolf, 152 Idaho at 67, 266 P.3d at 1172; Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 

714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted 

evidence is sufficient to justify them. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 218, 192 P.3d 1036, 

1042 (2008); Hayes, 146 Idaho at 355, 195 P.2d at 714; Farnsworth v. Dairymen’s Creamery 

Ass’n, 125 Idaho 866, 868, 876 P.2d 148, 150 (1994).

Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly disproven

by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a 

prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner’s allegations do 

not justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 

(2010); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010); DeRushé v. State, 146 

Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 

870, 873 (2007); Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998); Murphy v. State, 

143 Idaho 139, 145, 139 P.3d 741, 747 (Ct. App. 2006); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368, 924 

P.2d 622, 630 (Ct. App. 1996). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is 

appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to 
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relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner’s favor. For this reason, summary 

dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when the State does not 

controvert the petitioner’s evidence. See Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Roman, 125 

Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.

Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege 

facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be 

summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); 

Berg, 131 Idaho at 519, 960 P.2d at 740; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 934, 801 P.2d 1283, 

1285 (1990); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008); Roman, 

125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary 

hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 521, 236 P.3d at 

1281; Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629.

On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by 

the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if 

true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 

929 (2010); Berg, 131 Idaho at 519, 960 P.2d at 740; Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 

923; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. Over questions of law, we exercise free review. 

Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 

367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001); Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 532, 944 P.2d 

127, 129 (Ct. App. 1997).

A claim of ineffective assistance of defense counsel may properly be brought under the 

Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 451, 224 P.3d 515, 

518 (Ct. App. 2009). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of defense counsel claim, the 

defendant must show that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was 

prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hughes, 

148 Idaho at 451, 224 P.3d at 518. To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of 

showing that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Hughes, 148 Idaho at 451, 

224 P.3d at 518. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, 

but for the attorney’s deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 

Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Hughes, 148 Idaho at 451, 224 P.3d at 518. This 
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Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial defense 

counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate 

preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. 

Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994).2

Williams alleges that defense counsel was deficient by failing to present self-defense 

despite his requests to pursue a complete acquittal based on those grounds. The district court 

found no deficiency existed based on the conclusion that the presentation of defenses was a 

tactical and strategic decision. The district court stated: 

 

2 Williams argues for the application of the presumption of prejudice under United States 

v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). He claims that his defense counsel’s deficiency of conceding

guilt to voluntary manslaughter should be subject to the presumption of prejudice. In limited 

circumstances, prejudice from ineffective assistance may be presumed. See Florida v. Nixon,

543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-62. In Cronic, the United States Supreme 

Court explained that prejudice may be presumed in “circumstances that are so likely to prejudice 

the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” Cronic, 466 

U.S. at 658. The Court articulated three such circumstances: (1) where there is a “complete 

denial” of defense counsel at a critical stage of trial; (2) where “counsel entirely fails to subject 

the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing”; and (3) where, “although counsel is 

available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent 

one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is 

appropriate.” Id. at 658-60. See also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 686 (2002); Workman v. State,

144 Idaho 518, 525-26, 164 P.3d 798, 805-06 (2007); Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 713-714, 

274 P.3d 11, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2012). The State alleges that the application of Cronic was not 

raised below, and therefore is not properly before this Court. In his petition, Williams never 

asserted that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be subject to a presumption of 

prejudice. Instead, Williams argued that defense counsel’s ineffective assistance was subject to 

the Strickland two-prong test. Williams’ petition refers to a case for the proposition that: “trial 

counsel abandoned defendant’s only defense which was inherently prejudicial where counsel 

conceded only factual issue . . . deprived petitioner effective assistance of counsel and due 

process, thus no showing of prejudice was necessary” (omission in original). Williams’ petition 

attributes this language as a direct quote from United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 

1991); however, no such quotation is found in that case, though the case does discuss the Cronic 

presumption. Nonetheless, this language is not specifically associated with a claim of 

abandonment of self-defense, but rather a claim that defense counsel failed to physically describe 

the victim and investigate the victim’s violent history. Even if the citation to Swanson were 

sufficient to raise the issue, the issue was never further discussed or argued before the district 

court. Accordingly, when making a ruling on the failure to present self-defense, the district court 

applied Strickland rather than Cronic. There is no ruling from the district court regarding the 

applicability of the Cronic presumption. For these reasons, this Court will not address the 

application of a presumption of prejudice. 
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Williams claims that he requested that [defense counsel] present a theory 

of self-defense. [Defense counsel] did not present this theory; instead she appears 

to have sought to primarily defeat the charges of first and second degree murder, 

which she did successfully.

[Defense counsel’s] decision not to focus on the defense of self-defense 

falls within the area of tactical decisions. Additionally, Williams admitted to the 

police that he was not afraid of Adams. With that admission available to the 

State, it was reasonable for [defense counsel] not to pursue the affirmative 

defense. 

(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Williams argues that the district court made an 

unassailable finding that defense counsel did not present a theory of self-defense. Williams 

relies on the statement of the district court highlighted above to satisfy the deficiency prong. On 

the other hand, the State contends that, notwithstanding the statement by the district court, trial 

counsel did present self-defense. We determine that the statement by the district court “[defense 

counsel] did not present this theory” is not supported by the record. 

The record demonstrates that defense counsel did present the theory of self-defense. 

During opening statements, defense counsel discussed certain facts that could potentially 

establish the elements of self-defense. These facts included: the victim made threatening 

statements; the victim was within wingspan of Williams’ vehicle; and the victim grabbed and 

scratched Williams’ neck. During cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony related 

to self-defense, including that the victim and his friends followed the Williams brothers “with the 

intent of kicking their asses”; that the victim was so close to the vehicle that Williams could not 

shut the door; that Williams might have told the victim, “[y]ou got the wrong guy”; and that 

Williams told one of the officers that he felt threatened when he heard someone shout, “get your 

gun.” On direct examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from Williams that the victim 

threatened to kill him; that he was in fear of death and great bodily harm; that he told the victim 

“you’ve got the wrong guy, please stop”; that the victim said “I’ve got something for you,” and 

lunged towards him; and that even after he was shot, the victim grabbed Williams by the collar.

The district court gave a self-defense instruction. During closing statements, the 

prosecutor went through the self-defense instruction and told the jury that Williams did not act in 

self-defense. Defense counsel did not reread the self-defense instruction during her closing 

statement, but did discuss with the jury that certain of the elements of self-defense were satisfied, 

but it was for the jury to determine whether Williams’ actions were reasonable under the 
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circumstances. Williams specifically argues on appeal that counsel’s failure to tell the jury why 

Williams’ actions were reasonable was deficient performance. However, defense counsel argued 

several times during her closing statement that Williams defended himself: “[u]nfortunately, 

[victim] did get someone who could defend themselves”; “[y]ou’ve got an individual that’s 

approaching another individual threatening to kill him, and another man taking out a weapon to 

protect himself”; “[d]o I run the risk of receiving serious bodily injury or maybe even death for 

myself, or do I defend myself like is [sic] my right under the law”; “[b]ut you put yourself in Mr. 

Williams’ situation, and can you say beyond a reasonable doubt that what Mr. Williams did that 

day in defending himself was wrong? I don’t think you can do that.” These arguments have no 

direct bearing on voluntary manslaughter, which Williams asserts counsel was admitting.

In the district court, Williams argued a whole host of criticisms in regard to counsel’s 

presentation of a self-defense claim. On appeal, Williams specifically relies on seven points to 

demonstrate that self-defense was not presented at trial. We are not persuaded that these seven 

points demonstrate a failure to present self-defense. First, Williams argues that defense counsel 

conceded guilt to voluntary manslaughter during opening and closing statements. During her 

opening statement, defense counsel argued that “the State has not met its burden with regard to 

first-degree murder.” Contrary to Williams’ claim, this statement is not a concession of guilt. 

Opening statements serve to inform the jury of the issues of the case and briefly outline the 

evidence each litigant intends to introduce to support his or her allegations or defenses, as the 

case may be. State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 56, 539 P.2d 604, 608 (1975); State v. Priest, 128 

Idaho 6, 13, 909 P.2d 624, 631 (Ct. App. 1995). Defense counsel’s statement was not a 

concession of Williams’ guilt to voluntary manslaughter or an abandonment of self-defense, but 

was simply a statement to inform the jury that the State would be unable to prove that which it 

sought to prove. During her closing statement, defense counsel argued that Williams’ actions 

were in the “heat of passion and a sudden quarrel,” which do relate to manslaughter. 

Nevertheless, she also argued self-defense as noted above. As defense counsel’s statements do 

not expressly concede guilt to voluntary manslaughter, and as the record demonstrates that selfdefense was in play throughout the trial, Williams’ assertion that self-defense was not presented

is incorrect. Second, Williams argues that defense counsel should have called Doug as a witness 

to corroborate his self-defense claim. The record demonstrates that Doug’s testimony would not 

have contributed any additional evidence to the trial, but instead would have been largely 
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repetitive. Further, any testimony by Doug regarding his fear or his perception of a threat is not 

germane to Williams’ state-of-mind. Third, Williams argues that defense counsel should have 

called Casiko Saunders to the stand to testify that Adams threatened Williams. Williams failed 

to provide an affidavit or any other evidence regarding Saunders’ potential testimony. Fourth, 

Williams argues that defense counsel should have produced evidence that Adams and his friends 

had a history of violence. However, Williams concedes that there is no supporting materials and 

no admissible evidence to demonstrate that Adams and his friends actually had histories of 

violence. Fifth, Williams argues that defense counsel should have produced a toxicology report 

showing Adams’ ethanol level. Williams argued below that such a report would have supported 

his claim that Adams continued to walk towards him after being shot the first and second time. 

Now, Williams argues that the report would have shown that Adams’ aggression and dangerous 

behaviors could have been magnified by his intoxication level. Again, Williams provides no 

evidence, in the form of expert opinion or otherwise, to support his claim. Sixth, Williams 

argues that defense counsel should have impeached Detective Bench’s testimony. The record 

demonstrates that defense counsel impeached Detective Bench’s testimony concerning the threat 

perceived by Williams and the manner in which Williams held the gun. Seventh, Williams 

argues that defense counsel should have objected to the State’s closing argument because it 

contained references to inadmissible evidence. The State’s closing argument included statements

that Williams kept a loaded firearm in his truck and that he was waiting for an opportunity to 

shoot someone albeit in self-defense. The district court found that admissible evidence was 

presented to the jury to support the inferences made by the State. The State presented evidence 

that “Williams kept a loaded firearm in his truck, that he shot Adams though Adams presented 

no serious threat to him, and that he continued to shoot Adams after Adams was not advancing 

on him.” As detailed above, none of these seven points would have materially supported 

Williams’ claim of self-defense. Therefore, defense counsel’s alleged failure to pursue these 

points does not constitute a failure to present self-defense.

Based on the foregoing, we determine that defense counsel presented the theory of selfdefense. As a result of our determination, Williams is unable to establish that defense counsel 

acted deficiently. Therefore, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
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B. Constitutional Rights Claim

Williams alleges that the district court should have analyzed his claim not only as an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but also as a denial of his constitutional rights. He 

alleges that defense counsel’s alleged abandonment of self-defense denied him his fundamental 

constitutional rights to a jury trial, to hold the government to its burden of proof, to present 

evidence in his own defense, and to due process. The State claims that this argument fails 

because: (1) defense counsel did not abandon self-defense; and (2) even if self-defense was 

abandoned, Williams’ petition pled his claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and 

not a direct constitutional violation.

Williams points to two cases--DeRushé and Barcella--to support his claim. He alleges 

that:

[r]eading DeRushé and Barcella together, the lesson is that when a postconviction petitioner alleges errors by counsel in denying the petitioner 

fundamental constitutional rights, such as the right to testify, which counsel 

cannot waive on behalf of the defendant, the District Court must analyze the 

question, upon a motion for summary dismissal, not merely by the Strickland

standard, but also by the standard of whether the fundamental constitutional right 

was improperly denied. 

Williams incorrectly construes the case law. In DeRushé, the petitioner pled that his counsel 

violated his right to testify by not calling him as a witness after he expressed his desire to 

exercise that right. DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). The 

petition never pled ineffective assistance of counsel, yet the district court analyzed the claim as 

such. Id. The Supreme Court held that the district court improperly analyzed the claim as an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim and should have analyzed the claim as a denial of 

constitutional rights. Id. In Barcella, this Court clarified the DeRushé holding as follows:

DeRushé . . . does not stand for the proposition that a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel regarding the right to testify must also be analyzed as a 

direct constitutional violation. It certainly does not stand for the broad 

proposition that any time a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is pled the 

district court must also address any potential underlying constitutional violation 

independently. Rather, . . . the Supreme Court’s concern [was] that the district 

court had not analyzed the claim that was alleged in that case.

Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 476, 224 P.3d 536, 543 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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Here, Williams’ petition included broad allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel 

regarding constitutional rights. His petition for post-conviction relief, objection to motion for 

summary judgment, and responsive brief all frame the asserted abandonment of self-defense as

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The claim was pled and argued consistently in the 

district court as ineffective assistance of counsel, as opposed to a direct constitutional claim. The 

district court appropriately analyzed the claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As 

held in Barcella, the district court need not analyze the claim under both the ineffective 

assistance of counsel standard and the denial of constitutional rights standard. 

C. Dismissal of Williams’ Other Claims

Williams alleges that he raised six claims in his petition that were not addressed by the 

district court. These claims are: (1) whether post-conviction relief should be granted because 

the State withheld exculpatory evidence including a ballistics report and exculpatory witness 

statements, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) whether counsel was ineffective in 

failing to conduct pretrial investigation as to blood splatter and gunpowder residue evidence; 

(3) whether counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the break in the chain of custody of the 

truck impounded by the police; (4) whether counsel was ineffective in not moving for a mistrial 

at several different points throughout the proceedings; (5) whether counsel was ineffective in 

failing to investigate and present evidence that Williams’ truck had been tampered with prior to 

the shooting so as to render it inoperable; and (6) whether counsel was ineffective in failing to 

object to inaccurate information in the PSI. Williams alleges that the matter should be remanded 

to the district court to address these claims. The State alleges that: (1) the district court properly 

dismissed all of Williams’ claims; and (2) Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires a party to 

raise a claim of error arising from lack of specific finding of facts or conclusions of law as to 

dismissed claims by a motion to the district court; therefore, Williams’ failure to make such a 

motion waived his claim.

Williams’ petition, filed pro se, contained twenty-two ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims. His first supplement added an additional ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The 

court then appointed counsel for Williams. Appointed counsel filed an objection to the motion 

for summary disposition and specifically argued sixteen claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. In the district court’s first opinion, the court stated, “The State, in its motion, seeks 

summary disposition of all of Williams’ claims for post-conviction relief. Williams has 
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responded to the motion with supporting argument and affidavit for the following claims only.” 

The court then provided a specific ruling and explanation on the sixteen claims argued by 

Williams in his responsive brief. However, the district court ultimately dismissed all of the 

claims save the one upon which a hearing was held. Thus, each of the sixteen claims was 

dismissed. Any claim of error by failure to set forth more specific grounds for dismissal of the 

claims is precluded by Rule 52(a). 

III.

CONCLUSION

Williams has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s judgment summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. 

Costs awarded to respondent.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.