SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0078-16T3

BRENDA MILLER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v. 

STATE-OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT

OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, ESSEX

COUNTY,

Respondent-Respondent.

________________________________

Argued February 5, 2018 – Decided July 27, 2018

Before Judges Vernoia and DeAlmeida.

On appeal from the Commissioner of Education,

Agency Docket No. 301-10/14.

William P. Hannan argued the cause for 

appellant (Oxfeld Cohen, PC, attorneys;

William P. Hannan, of counsel and on the 

brief).

Shana T. Don argued the cause for respondent 

Newark Public School District (Scarinci &

Hollenbeck, LLC, attorneys; Ramon E. Rivera,

of counsel; Jason T. Mushnick and Shana T. 

Don, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent New Jersey Commissioner of 

Education (Nicole T. Castiglione, Deputy 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0078-16T3

Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of 

brief).

PER CURIAM 

Plaintiff Brenda Miller appeals from the New Jersey 

Commissioner of Education's final agency decisions dismissing her

claims that her employment with the State Operated School District 

of the City of Newark (the District) was terminated in violation

of her tenure rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, and the termination 

was void because it was effectuated without the proper delegation 

of authority by the District's superintendent. Because we conclude 

the termination of plaintiff's employment violated her tenure 

rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, we reverse. 

I.

The relevant facts are not disputed. Plaintiff was hired by 

the District on May 4, 1998, and held various provisional titles 

until her permanent appointment to the title of Senior Clerk on 

April 1, 2004. She held that position until her transfer to the 

title of Secretarial Assistant, Typing on July 23, 2007. Effective 

June 16, 2012, her title was renamed Secretarial Assistant. The 

parties agree that all of the foregoing positions were classified 

titles under the Civil Service Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to 

12-6. 
3 A-0078-16T3

Effective July 2012, the District reclassified plaintiff's 

position to the unclassified title of Confidential Assistant. In 

a letter to plaintiff sent almost seventeen months later, the 

District confirmed plaintiff's July 2, 2012 reassignment to the 

Confidential Assistant position, and advised the new position was 

"unaffiliated" and therefore no longer governed by the Act. The 

letter explained that plaintiff's employment record would reflect 

she resigned from her Civil Service title effective June 30, 2012,

and would "no longer be afforded Civil Service rights." The letter 

further informed plaintiff she could "request consideration for 

reemployment in [her] prior Civil Service title" with the District 

"by indicating [her] availability within three (3) years of the 

date of [her] resignation." Plaintiff did not appeal her transfer 

to the unclassified position, or the District's confirmation of 

her resignation from the classified position, to the Civil Service 

Commission. 

More than two years later, on August 15, 2014, the District's 

Chief Talent Officer, Vanessa Rodriguez, sent plaintiff a letter 

terminating her employment. Plaintiff appealed to the Civil

Service Commission, arguing the termination violated the Act 

because she was entitled to return to the permanent classified 

position she held prior to the 2012 transfer. The Civil Service 

Commission dismissed her appeal, finding plaintiff acquiesced to 
4 A-0078-16T3

the 2012 transfer and effectively resigned from her classified 

position at that time. The Commission concluded plaintiff was 

terminated from her classified position in 2012, and had no right 

to challenge the 2014 termination from her unclassified position 

under the Act. There is no record showing plaintiff appealed the 

Commission's decision.

Plaintiff also appealed her termination to the Commissioner 

of Education. She alleged her termination was unlawful because 

she had tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 in her position as a 

Confidential Assistant, and Rodriguez lacked the authority to 

terminate her. In a December 9, 2015 decision, an Administrative 

Law Judge (ALJ) granted summary disposition in plaintiff's favor 

finding plaintiff had tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 because she 

had been employed by the District in secretarial positions for 

more than three consecutive years. The ALJ concluded plaintiff's 

termination violated her tenure rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2,

and recommended plaintiff's reinstatement. 

The District filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision, and the 

Commissioner rejected the ALJ's recommended decision. The 

Commissioner determined plaintiff did not earn tenure under 

N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 while she served in classified positions under 

the Act because N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 provides that "[n]o person, who 

is in the classified service of the civil service of the state 
5 A-0078-16T3

pursuant to Title 11, Civil Service . . . , shall be affected by 

any provisions of this chapter."

1 The Commissioner concluded 

plaintiff accrued credit toward tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 

only during the period following her 2012 transfer to the 

unclassified position, and that because she had not served in that 

position for three consecutive years prior to her termination, she 

did not have tenure rights under the statute. The Commissioner 

dismissed plaintiff's claim that her termination violated her 

tenure rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, and remanded for the ALJ 

to consider plaintiff's remaining claim – that Rodriguez lacked 

the authority to terminate her employment. 

On remand before the ALJ, the parties relied solely on written 

submissions. The ALJ considered a certification from Larisa 

Shambaugh, who stated she was "fully familiar with the facts and 

circumstances associated with [plaintiff's] case," and was 

appointed the District's Interim Chief Talent Officer following 

Rodriguez's resignation in January 2016. Shambaugh stated the 

State-appointed Superintendent has responsibility for the hiring 

 

1 We note that although N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 expressly references 

Title 11, "[i]n 1986, the Legislature passed the current Civil 

Service Act, repealing Title 11 and establishing Title 11A of the 

New Jersey Statues." In re Reallocation of Prob. Officer, 441 

N.J. Super. 434, 444 (App. Div. 2015); L. 1986, c. 112. We 

construe N.J.S.A. 18A:18-2's reference to Title 11 to include 

Title 11A.
6 A-0078-16T3

and firing of District employees and "delegates to the Chief Talent 

Officer the responsibility to communicate with District employees 

regarding their employment." Attached to Shambaugh's 

certification is a job description for the District Chief Talent 

Officer, the position Rodriguez held when she sent the August 2014 

letter terminating plaintiff's employment.

The District also submitted a certification from Christopher 

Cerf, who replaced Cami Anderson as the District Superintendent 

in July 2016. Cerf stated that Anderson delegated the authority 

to hire and fire the District's "non-civil service employees" to 

Rodriguez, and that upon his appointment as Superintendent, he 

continued that delegation of authority to Rodriguez and, following 

her resignation, to Shambaugh. 

The ALJ found the certifications convincing. He determined 

N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-42(a)(3) authorized the Superintendent to 

"delegate to subordinate officers or employees in the district any 

of his powers or duties as he may deem desirable to be exercised 

under his supervision and direction," and concluded the 

certifications and Chief Talent Officer's job description 

established Rodriguez had the delegated authority to terminate 

plaintiff's employment in 2014. The ALJ also found it 

"inconceivable" that in a District "consist[ing] of seventy-four 

schools serving 39,440 students," the Superintendent "would micro-
7 A-0078-16T3

manage every personnel decision," and "logical" that decisions 

concerning the duty to hire and fire unclassified employees would 

be delegated to the Chief Talent Officer whose job description 

required "leadership in all matters related to talent management."

The ALJ also found plaintiff had the burden of establishing 

by a preponderance of the evidence that Rodriguez lacked the 

requisite delegated authority, and she failed to sustain her burden 

because she offered nothing more than "a bald assertion that the 

State-Appointed Superintendent did not delegate the authority" to 

Rodriguez. The ALJ noted that plaintiff failed to present any 

evidence refuting the Shambaugh and Cerf certifications, and 

concluded the "unrefuted evidence supports [a finding] of proper 

delegation of authority." The ALJ recommended dismissal of 

plaintiff's claim Rodriguez lacked the authority to terminate her 

employment.

The Commissioner adopted the ALJ's findings and 

recommendation, and determined that in 2014 the Superintendent 

delegated her authority to terminate plaintiff's employment to 

Rodriguez in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-42(b). The 

Commissioner, relying on the Shambaugh and Cerf certifications and 

the lack of any evidence from plaintiff refuting them, concluded 

plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of showing Rodriguez lacked 

the authority to terminate her employment.
8 A-0078-16T3

On appeal, plaintiff challenges the Commissioner's decisions,

and presents the following arguments:

POINT I

STANDARD OF REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISION.

POINT II

THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION ERRED IN FINDING 

THAT [PLAINTIFF] DID NOT HAVE TENURE UNDER 

. . . TITLE 18A AT THE TIME OF HER TERMINATION.

a. The Commissioner's Narrow Application of 

N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 Ignores the LongEstablished Requirement that Tenure Statutes 

Are to be Liberally Construed in Favor of 

Employees and [Plaintiff] Satisfied the 

Express Terms of the Statute.

b. The Commissioner Erred by Applying N.J.S.A. 

18A:28-2 to [Plaintiff] as a Non-Teaching

Staff Member. 

POINT III

THE COMMISSIONER ERRED BY [DISMISSING] COUNT 

TWO OF [PLAINTIFF'S] PETITION BECAUSE THE 

DISTRICT PRESENTED NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO 

DEMONSTRATE THAT THE AUTHORITY TO TERMINATE 

[PLAINTIFF] HAD BEEN PROPERLY DESIGNATED TO 

THE CHIEF TALENT OFFICER PURSUANT TO LAW.

II.

"The scope of appellate review of a final agency decision is 

limited," and we will not overturn an agency's final decision "in 

the absence of a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious or 

unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the evidence." In 
9 A-0078-16T3

re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007) (citations omitted). 

Generally, our review of an agency decision is 

restricted to three inquiries: (1) whether the 

agency's action violates express or implied 

legislative policies, that is, did the agency 

follow the law; (2) whether the record 

contains substantial evidence to support the 

findings on which the agency based its action;

and (3) whether in applying the legislative 

policies to the facts, the agency clearly 

erred in reaching a conclusion that could not 

reasonably have been made on a showing of the 

relevant factors.

[In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch., 216 

N.J. 370, 385 (2013) (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of 

Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).]

The person challenging an agency action has "[t]he burden of 

showing that an action was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious."

McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. 

Div. 2002) (citing Barone v. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Med. 

Assistance & Health Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 

1986)). 

Although "we respect an agency's expertise and will 'defer 

to the specialized or technical expertise of the agency charged 

with administration of a regulatory system,' we are 'in no way 

bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its 

determination of a strictly legal issue.'" DiNapoli v. Bd. of 

Educ. of Twp. of Verona, 434 N.J. Super. 233, 236-37 (App. Div. 

2014) (first quoting In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194
10 A-0078-16T3

N.J. 413, 422 (2008); and then quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau 

of Secs., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). "Statutory interpretation 

involves the examination of legal issues and is, therefore, a 

question of law subject to de novo review." Saccone v. Bd. of 

Trs. of Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 

(citations omitted) (citing McGovern v. Rutgers, 211 N.J. 94, 107-

08 (2012)).

The Commissioner's rejection of plaintiff's claim that her 

termination violated her tenure rights is founded on his 

interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 and N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2. The 

Commissioner recognized that under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2(b), a 

secretary employed by a board of education has tenure after "the 

expiration of a period of employment of three consecutive years,"

and plaintiff was employed in secretarial positions for that period 

of time during her employment by the District. The Commissioner,

however, found plaintiff's years of service in classified 

secretarial positions prior to her 2012 reassignment could not be 

counted toward the time of service requirements for tenure under 

N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, because N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 provides that "[n]o 

person, who is in the classified service of the civil service 

. . . pursuant to Title 11 . . . shall be affected by any provisions 

of this chapter." 
11 A-0078-16T3

An appellate court's primary purpose in construing a statute 

is to "discern the meaning and intent of the Legislature." State 

v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010). "There is no more persuasive 

evidence of legislative intent than the words by which the 

Legislature undertook to express its purpose; therefore, we first 

look to the plain language of the statute." Perez v. Zagami, LLC,

218 N.J. 202, 209-10 (2014). "We ascribe to the statutory words 

their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context 

with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as 

a whole." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (internal 

citation omitted). Where "the plain language leads to a clear and 

unambiguous result, . . . our interpretive process is over." 

Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 

189, 195 (2007). When the statutory language "clearly reveals the 

meaning of the statute, the court's sole function is to enforce 

the statute in accordance with those terms." McCann v. Clerk of 

Jersey City, 167 N.J. 311, 320 (2001) (quoting SASCO 1997 NI, LLC 

v. Zudkewich, 166 N.J. 579, 586 (2001)).

Plaintiff contends she earned tenure in her secretarial 

positions under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, which "defines the conditions 

under which secretarial employees of a board of education are 

entitled to the security of tenure." DiNapoli, 434 N.J. Super. 

at 237. The statute provides that "any person holding any 
12 A-0078-16T3

secretarial or clerical position" has tenure after either "[t]he 

expiration of a period of employment of three consecutive calendar 

years in the district or such shorter period as may be fixed" by 

the board of education, or "[e]mployment for three consecutive 

academic years, together with employment at the beginning of the 

next succeeding academic year." N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2(b)(1) and (2). 

"To acquire the security of tenure, the precise conditions 

enunciated in . . . [N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2] must be met." DiNapoli,

434 N.J. Super. at 237-38. 

It is undisputed that plaintiff held secretarial positions 

following her permanent appointment in 2004 through her 

termination in 2014, and therefore was employed for a sufficient 

period of time to earn tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. The 

Commissioner, however, rejected plaintiff's claim she had tenure 

rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 based on the conclusion plaintiff 

did not accrue credit toward the time in employment requirements 

of the statute during her employment in the classified Civil 

Service positions. 

The Commissioner determined that N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 barred 

consideration of plaintiff's employment in classified Civil 

Service positions in the calculation of the time in employment

requirements for tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. N.J.S.A. 18A:28-

2 provides:
13 A-0078-16T3

No person, who is in the classified service 

of the civil service of the state pursuant to 

Title 11, Civil Service, of the Revised 

Statutes, shall be affected by any provision 

of this chapter.

[(Emphasis added).]

The Commissioner reasoned that because N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 provides 

that "[n]o person" who holds a classified Civil Service title 

"shall be affected by any provision of this chapter," plaintiff's 

employment in her Civil Service position could not be considered 

in determining if she satisfied the time in employment requirements 

for tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. We disagree.

N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 was enacted in 1967, L. 1967, c. 271, and 

included in the chapter of Title 18A entitled "Tenure," which the 

Legislature designated as Chapter 28. N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2's plain 

language makes clear that individuals in classified Civil Service 

positions are not "affected by any provision of" Chapter 28. The 

statute is expressly limited in its applicability — it renders 

Chapter 28's tenure provisions inapplicable to persons holding 

classified Civil Service positions. 

The fatal flaw in the Commissioner's reasoning is that Chapter 

28's tenure provisions are inapplicable to individuals, such as 

plaintiff, holding secretarial positions, and thus are 

inapplicable to the determination of plaintiff's tenure. Chapter 

28 is bereft of any provisions concerning the tenure rights of 
14 A-0078-16T3

secretarial employees. Chapter 28 pertains exclusively to the 

tenure rights of teaching staff members in public school 

districts.2 See, e.g., DiNapoli, 434 N.J. Super. at 240-41

(comparing tenure rights of secretaries under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 

with the rights of teaching staff members under N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6 

and superintendents under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-20.4). 

The plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 exempts persons 

employed in classified Civil Service titles from the "provisions 

of" Chapter 28, but does not exempt employees in classified titles 

from the tenure provisions in other chapters of Title 18A. Thus,

N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 applies only to "teaching staff member[s]" who 

hold classified Civil Service titles because they are the only 

employees "affected by" Chapter 28's tenure provisions. 

Moreover, although N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 was enacted at the same 

time as N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2, L. 1999, c. 271, the Legislature chose 

 

2 N.J.S.A. 18A:28-4 provides that, with defined exceptions,

"teaching staff member[s]" who do not hold "an appropriate 

certificate for such position" may not accrue tenure. N.J.S.A. 

18A:28-5 details the tenure requirements for "teaching staff 

members," N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5.1 provides that certain "tenured 

teaching staff member[s]" may transfer their tenure rights when 

accepting positions in underperforming schools, and N.J.S.A. 

18A:28-6 describes the effects of transfers and promotions on the 

tenure of "teaching staff member[s]." Chapter 28 further provides 

for teaching staff member tenure rights upon discontinuance of 

school, N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6.1, and termination of tenured teaching 

staff members, N.J.S.A. 18A:28-8 to -14, and the effects of a 

change of government on teaching staff members, N.J.S.A. 28:28-

15.
15 A-0078-16T3

not to include in N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 the Civil Service exemption 

set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2. "When the Legislature expressly 

includes a requirement in one section and excludes that same 

requirement in other subsections of the same general statute, we 

need not strain to import that requirement where it is not." In 

re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 492 (2004).

The Commissioner's application of N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 to limit

plaintiff's tenure rights under Chapter 17 ignores that the

statute's application is expressly limited to "this chapter" –

Chapter 28 – of Title 18A. "We cannot assume that the Legislature 

used meaningless language" in a statute, McCann, 167 N.J. at 321 

(quoting Gabin v. Skyline Cabana Club, 54 N.J. 550, 555 (1969)),

and are required to give effect to the words of the law as written,

see Johnson v. Johnson, 204 N.J. 529, 553 (2010) (citation omitted) 

("[C]ourts should adhere to the legislation as written."). 

Applying those principles, any limitations imposed by N.J.S.A. 

18A:28-2 pertain only to tenure rights of teaching staff members

"affected" by Title 28. 

It was therefore error for the Commissioner to conclude 

plaintiff's time employed in classified Civil Service titles could 

not be considered in determining plaintiff's tenure rights under 

N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. By its plain terms, N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 is 
16 A-0078-16T3

limited to "this chapter" — Chapter 28 — of Title 18A. Thus, it

is inapplicable to tenure rights earned under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2.

N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 does not exempt secretarial employees in 

Civil Service positions from its tenure protections, and it was 

error for the Commissioner to apply such an exemption where the 

Legislature chose not to. Neither the Commissioner nor this court 

is "permitted to 'rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the 

Legislature [or] presume that the Legislature intended something 

other than that expressed by way of the plain language,'" or "add 

terms to a statute, lest they usurp the Legislature's authority." 

DiNapoli, 434 N.J. Super. at 238 (alteration in original) (citation 

omitted) (quoting O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002)). 

Because Chapter 17 does not include an exemption from its 

tenure protections for secretarial employees holding classified 

Civil Service titles, we apply the plain language of N.J.S.A. 

18A:17-2 to determine plaintiff's entitlement to tenure. "Tenure 

'arises only by the passage of time fixed by the statute . . . .'" 

Ibid. (quoting Canfield v. Bd. of Educ. of Pine Hill Borough, 97 

N.J. Super. 483, 490 (App. Div. 1967) (Gaulkin, J., dissenting),

rev'd on dissent, 51 N.J. 400 (1968)). It is undisputed that

plaintiff satisfied the tenure requirements of the statute, and 

N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 does not exclude time of employment spent by

secretarial employees in classified Civil Service titles. The 
17 A-0078-16T3

record therefore establishes plaintiff had tenure under N.J.S.A. 

18A:17-2 when she was terminated. 

Although not cited or relied upon by the District or the 

Commissioner, we note that Title 18A includes a provision 

concerning the tenure rights of school employees holding Civil 

Service titles that requires discussion here. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-31 

provides that "[n]othing contained in [Title 18A] shall be 

construed to affect the tenure or civil service rights of any 

person presently existing, or hereafter obtained, under this or 

any other law."

3 The plain language of the statute does not permit 

or require the conclusion that an employee holding a secretarial 

position in the classified service does not accrue time in 

employment credit toward tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. To the 

contrary, the statute provides only that tenure rights granted 

under Title 18A, such as those to which plaintiff is entitled 

under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, do not affect any tenure rights under 

Title 11A. 

 

3 N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(c) also authorizes boards of education to 

"make, amend and repeal rules not inconsistent with [Title 18A] 

. . . for the employment, regulation of conduct and discharge of 

its employees, subject, where applicable, to the provisions of 

Title 11, Civil Service, of the revised statutes." The statute 

has no application here because there are no District rules at 

issue. 
18 A-0078-16T3

We are unpersuaded by the District's reliance on In Re Tenure 

of Fulcomer, 93 N.J. Super. 404, 411 (App. Div. 1967), where we

observed that the tenure provisions of Title 18, the predecessor 

to Title 18A, provided "a comprehensive procedure for the 

resolution of all controversies involving charges against all

tenure employees not subject to Civil Service." The District 

argues our observation means N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 should be 

interpreted to exclude all school district employees in classified 

Civil Service titles from the tenure protections otherwise 

provided under Title 18A. We reject this argument because here 

we interpret a different statute, and note that if the Legislature 

intended to deny tenure protections to all school employees who 

hold classified Civil Service titles, it would not have limited

the exemption for Civil Service employees to only those teaching 

staff members "affected by" Chapter 28 of Title 18A. 

We similarly reject the District's reliance on the 

Commissioner's decision Anderson v. Department of Personnel and 

the State Operated School District, 95 N.J.A.R.2d 66 (Dep't of 

Educ.), where it was noted "that nonprofessional staff protected 

under Title 11 in school districts which have adopted civil service 

laws do not acquire separate tenure rights under Title 18A." We 

defer to the Commissioner's expertise in the administration of the 

Department of Education's regulatory system, but are not bound by 
19 A-0078-16T3

the Commissioner's interpretation of a statute or determination 

of legal issues, DiNapoli, 434 N.J. Super. at 236, and are 

convinced that application of N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 to employees not 

"affected by" Chapter 28 is inconsistent with the statute's plain 

language. 

We also reject the contention that our interpretation of 

N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 and N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 will unfairly and 

illogically provide employees in the classified service who 

otherwise earn tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 with "two bites of 

the apple" through two tenure proceedings – one under the Act and 

the other under Title 18A. We have not decided that issue because 

it is not before us. Plaintiff did not have two bites of the 

apple because she did not have Civil Service tenure rights when 

her employment was terminated, and the Civil Service Commission 

rejected her appeal on that basis. Thus, this case did not present 

a circumstance where an employee with Civil Service tenure rights 

also asserts tenure rights under Title 18A in a proceeding before 

the Commissioner. 

"[S]ince tenure statutes are intended to secure efficient 

public service by protecting public employees in their employment,

'the widest range should be given to the applicability of the 

law.'" Barnes v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 85 N.J. Super. 42, 45 

(App. Div. 1964) (quoting Sullivan v. McOsker, 84 N.J.L. 380, 385 
20 A-0078-16T3

(E. & A. 1913)). Here, we decide only that the Commissioner erred 

by relying on N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 to determine plaintiff's tenure 

rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, there is no statutory bar to 

utilizing time employed in a classified Civil Service position to 

satisfy the time in employment requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2,

and plaintiff satisfied N.J.S.A. 18A-17-2(b)'s requirements and 

had tenure when her employment was terminated. We therefore 

reverse the Commissioner's determination that plaintiff did not 

have tenure rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, and that the District 

did not violate plaintiff's tenure rights by terminating her 

employment. 

Because we determine the District violated plaintiff's tenure 

rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, it is unnecessary to address 

plaintiff's remaining argument that Rodriguez did not have the 

authority to terminate her employment. We note only that 

plaintiff's arguments concerning Rodriguez's purported lack of

authority are otherwise without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), because there 

was sufficient credible evidence in the record supporting the 

Commissioner's determination that Rodriguez was vested with the 

authority to terminate plaintiff's employment as a matter of fact,

see Harris ex rel. Harris v. Bd. of Trus. of Pub. Emps.' Ret.

Sys., 378 N.J. Super. 459, 464 (App. Div. 2005) (finding a 
21 A-0078-16T3

reviewing court will not reverse an agency's findings of fact that 

are supported by sufficient credible evidence), and plaintiff 

otherwise failed to sustain her burden of demonstrating Rodriguez 

lacked the requisite authority, see McGowan, 347 N.J. Super at 

563.

Reversed.