974 

Pt. 50, App. E 10 CFR Ch. I (1–1–13 Edition) 

1EPZs for power reactors are discussed in 

NUREG–0396; EPA 520/1–78–016, ‘‘Planning 

Basis for the Development of State and 

Local Government Radiological Emergency 

Response Plans in Support of Light Water 

Nuclear Power Plants,’’ December 1978. The 

size of the EPZs for a nuclear power plant 

shall be determined in relation to local 

emergency response needs and capabilities as 

they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, 

access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. 

The size of the EPZs also may be determined 

on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal. Generally, the plume exposure pathway 

EPZ for nuclear power plants with an authorized power level greater than 250 MW 

thermal shall consist of an area about 10 

miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion 

pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 

50 miles (80 km) in radius. 2 Regulatory Guide 2.6 will be used as guidance for the acceptability of research and 

test reactor emergency response plans. 

Commiasion to determine an applicant’s financial qualifications for the license. 

[49 FR 35753, Sept. 12, 1984, as amended at 50 

FR 18853, May 3, 1985; 72 FR 49506, Aug. 28, 

2007] 

APPENDIX D TO PART 50 [RESERVED] 

APPENDIX E TO PART 50—EMERGENCY

PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS FOR

PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

Table of Contents 

I. Introduction 

II. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report 

III. The Final Safety Analysis Report 

IV. Content of Emergency Plans 

V. Implementing Procedures 

VI. Emergency Response Data System 

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Each applicant for a construction permit 

is required by §50.34(a) to include in the preliminary safety analysis report a discussion 

of preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. Each applicant for an operating license is required by §50.34(b) to include in 

the final safety analysis report plans for coping with emergencies. Each applicant for a 

combined license under subpart C of part 52 

of this chapter is required by §52.79 of this 

chapter to include in the application plans 

for coping with emergencies. Each applicant 

for an early site permit under subpart A of 

part 52 of this chapter may submit plans for 

coping with emergencies under §52.17 of this 

chapter. 

2. This appendix establishes minimum requirements for emergency plans for use in 

attaining an acceptable state of emergency 

preparedness. These plans shall be described 

generally in the preliminary safety analysis 

report for a construction permit and submitted as part of the final safety analysis report for an operating license. These plans, or 

major features thereof, may be submitted as 

part of the site safety analysis report for an 

early site permit. 

3. The potential radiological hazards to the 

public associated with the operation of research and test reactors and fuel facilities licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 and 70 involve 

considerations different than those associated with nuclear power reactors. Consequently, the size of Emergency Planning 

Zones1 (EPZs) for facilities other than power 

reactors and the degree to which compliance 

with the requirements of this section and 

sections II, III, IV, and V of this appendix as 

necessary will be determined on a case-bycase basis.2

4. Notwithstanding the above paragraphs, 

in the case of an operating license authorizing only fuel loading and/or low power operations up to 5 percent of rated power, no 

NRC or FEMA review, findings, or determinations concerning the state of offsite 

emergency preparedness or the adequacy of 

and the capability to implement State and 

local offsite emergency plans, as defined in 

this Appendix, are required prior to the 

issuance of such a license. 

5. Each applicant for a combined license or 

early site permit under part 52 of this chapter whose application is docketed before December 23, 2011 may defer compliance with 

any change to emergency preparedness regulations under the final rule issued November 

23, 2011. If that applicant chooses to defer 

compliance, it shall subsequently request to 

amend the combined license or early site 

permit to comply with those changes no 

later than December 31, 2013. An applicant 

that does not receive a combined license or 

early site permit before December 31, 2013, 

shall revise its combined license or early site 

permit application to comply with those 

changes no later than December 31, 2013. 

Notwithstanding any Commission finding 

under 10 CFR 52.103(g) regarding the combined license holder’s facility, the combined 

license holder may not operate the facility 

until the NRC has approved the license 

amendment demonstrating compliance with 

the final rule. 

6. The Tennessee Valley Authority Watts 

Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, holding a construction permit under the provisions of part 

50 of this chapter, shall meet the requirements of the final rule issued November 23, 

2011 as applicable to operating nuclear power 

reactor licensees. 


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II. THE PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS

REPORT

The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report 

shall contain sufficient information to ensure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans for both onsite areas and the 

EPZs, with facility design features, site layout, and site location with respect to such 

considerations as access routes, surrounding 

population distributions, land use, and local 

jurisdictional boundaries for the EPZs in the 

case of nuclear power reactors as well as the 

means by which the standards of §50.47(b) 

will be met. 

As a minimum, the following items shall 

be described: 

A. Onsite and offsite organizations for coping with emergencies and the means for notification, in the event of an emergency, of 

persons assigned to the emergency organizations. 

B. Contacts and arrangements made and 

documented with local, State, and Federal 

governmental agencies with responsibility 

for coping with emergencies, including identification of the principal agencies. 

C. Protective measures to be taken within 

the site boundary and within each EPZ to 

protect health and safety in the event of an 

accident; procedures by which these measures are to be carried out (e.g., in the case of 

an evacuation, who authorizes the evacuation, how the public is to be notified and instructed, how the evacuation is to be carried 

out); and the expected response of offsite 

agencies in the event of an emergency. 

D. Features of the facility to be provided 

for onsite emergency first aid and decontamination and for emergency transportation of onsite individuals to offsite treatment facilities. 

E. Provisions to be made for emergency 

treatment at offsite facilities of individuals 

injured as a result of licensed activities. 

F. Provisions for a training program for 

employees of the licensee, including those 

who are assigned specific authority and responsibility in the event of an emergency, 

and for other persons who are not employees 

of the licensee but whose assistance may be 

needed in the event of a radiological emergency. 

G. A preliminary analysis that projects the 

time and means to be employed in the notification of State and local governments and 

the public in the event of an emergency. A 

nuclear power plant applicant shall perform 

a preliminary analysis of the time required 

to evacuate various sectors and distances 

within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for 

transient and permanent populations, noting 

major impediments to the evacuation or taking of protective actions. 

H. A preliminary analysis reflecting the 

need to include facilities, systems, and 

methods for identifying the degree of seriousness and potential scope of radiological 

consequences of emergency situations within 

and outside the site boundary, including capabilities for dose projection using real-time 

meteorological information and for dispatch 

of radiological monitoring teams within the 

EPZs; and a preliminary analysis reflecting 

the role of the onsite technical support center and the emergency operations facility in 

assessing information, recommending protective action, and disseminating information to the public. 

III. THE FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT; 

SITE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

The final safety analysis report or the site 

safety analysis report for an early site permit that includes complete and integrated 

emergency plans under §52.17(b)(2)(ii) of this 

chapter shall contain the plans for coping 

with emergencies. The plans shall be an expression of the overall concept of operation; 

they shall describe the essential elements of 

advance planning that have been considered 

and the provisions that have been made to 

cope with emergency situations. The plans 

shall incorporate information about the 

emergency response roles of supporting organizations and offsite agencies. That information shall be sufficient to provide assurance 

of coordination among the supporting groups 

and with the licensee. The site safety analysis report for an early site permit which 

proposes major features must address the 

relevant provisions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 

CFR part 50, appendix E, within the scope of 

emergency preparedness matters addressed 

in the major features. 

The plans submitted must include a description of the elements set out in Section 

IV for the emergency planning zones (EPZs) 

to an extent sufficient to demonstrate that 

the plans provide reasonable assurance that 

adequate protective measures can and will 

be taken in the event of an emergency. 

IV. CONTENT OF EMERGENCY PLANS

1. The applicant’s emergency plans shall 

contain, but not necessarily be limited to, 

information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., 

organization for coping with radiological 

emergencies, assessment actions, activation 

of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, 

training, maintaining emergency preparedness, recovery, and onsite protective actions 

during hostile action. In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license under this part, or for an early site 

permit (as applicable) or combined license 

under 10 CFR part 52, shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with 

the standards described in §50.47(b), and they 

will be evaluated against those standards. 


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2. This nuclear power reactor license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the 

time required to evacuate various sectors 

and distances within the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for transient and permanent 

populations, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the date the applicant 

submits its application to the NRC. 

3. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall use 

NRC approved evacuation time estimates 

(ETEs) and updates to the ETEs in the formulation of protective action recommendations and shall provide the ETEs and ETE 

updates to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies. 

4. Within 365 days of the later of the date 

of the availability of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S. Census Bureau or December 23, 2011, nuclear power reactor licensees shall develop an ETE analysis 

using this decennial data and submit it 

under §50.4 to the NRC. These licensees shall 

submit this ETE analysis to the NRC at least 

180 days before using it to form protective 

action recommendations and providing it to 

State and local governmental authorities for 

use in developing offsite protective action 

strategies. 

5. During the years between decennial censuses, nuclear power reactor licensees shall 

estimate EPZ permanent resident population 

changes once a year, but no later than 365 

days from the date of the previous estimate, 

using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau 

annual resident population estimate and 

State/local government population data, if 

available. These licensees shall maintain 

these estimates so that they are available 

for NRC inspection during the period between decennial censuses and shall submit 

these estimates to the NRC with any updated ETE analysis. 

6. If at any time during the decennial period, the EPZ permanent resident population 

increases such that it causes the longest 

ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, 

including all affected Emergency Response 

Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile 

EPZ to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, 

whichever is less, from the nuclear power reactor licensee’s currently NRC approved or 

updated ETE, the licensee shall update the 

ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that 

population increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the NRC 

under §50.4 no later than 365 days after the 

licensee’s determination that the criteria for 

updating the ETE have been met and at least 

180 days before using it to form protective 

action recommendations and providing it to 

State and local governmental authorities for 

use in developing offsite protective action 

strategies. 

7. After an applicant for a combined license 

under part 52 of this chapter receives its license, the licensee shall conduct at least one 

review of any changes in the population of 

its EPZ at least 365 days prior to its scheduled fuel load. The licensee shall estimate 

EPZ permanent resident population changes 

using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau 

annual resident population estimate and 

State/local government population data, if 

available. If the EPZ permanent resident 

population increases such that it causes the 

longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5- 

mile zone, including all affected Emergency 

Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 

10-mile EPZ, to increase by 25 percent or 30 

minutes, whichever is less, from the licensee’s currently approved ETE, the licensee 

shall update the ETE analysis to reflect the 

impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the NRC for review under §50.4 of this 

chapter no later than 365 days before the licensee’s scheduled fuel load. 

A. Organization 

The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to 

the licensee’s emergency organization and 

the means for notification of such individuals in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following shall be included: 

1. A description of the normal plant operating organization. 

2. A description of the onsite emergency 

response organization (ERO) with a detailed 

discussion of: 

a. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties 

of the individual(s) who will take charge during an emergency; 

b. Plant staff emergency assignments; 

c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties 

of an onsite emergency coordinator who 

shall be in charge of the exchange of information with offsite authorities responsible 

for coordinating and implementing offsite 

emergency measures. 

3. A description, by position and function 

to be performed, of the licensee’s headquarters personnel who will be sent to the 

plant site to augment the onsite emergency 

organization. 

4. Identification, by position and function 

to be performed, of persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible 

for making offsite dose projections, and a description of how these projections will be 

made and the results transmitted to State 

and local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental entities. 

5. Identification, by position and function 

to be performed, of other employees of the licensee with special qualifications for coping 

with emergency conditions that may arise. 

Other persons with special qualifications, 

such as consultants, who are not employees 

of the licensee and who may be called upon 

for assistance for emergencies shall also be 


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identified. The special qualifications of these 

persons shall be described. 

6. A description of the local offsite services 

to be provided in support of the licensee’s 

emergency organization. 

7. By June 23, 2014, identification of, and a 

description of the assistance expected from, 

appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with 

emergencies, including hostile action at the 

site. For purposes of this appendix, ‘‘hostile 

action’’ is defined as an act directed toward 

a nuclear power plant or its personnel that 

includes the use of violent force to destroy 

equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate 

the licensee to achieve an end. This includes 

attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. 

8. Identification of the State and/or local 

officials responsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate protective 

actions, including evacuations when necessary. 

9. By December 24, 2012, for nuclear power 

reactor licensees, a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel assigned 

emergency plan implementation functions 

are not assigned responsibilities that would 

prevent the timely performance of their assigned functions as specified in the emergency plan. 

B. Assessment Actions 

1. The means to be used for determining 

the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive 

materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State 

agencies, the Commission, and other Federal 

agencies, and the emergency action levels 

that are to be used for determining when and 

what type of protective measures should be 

considered within and outside the site 

boundary to protect health and safety. The 

emergency action levels shall be based on inplant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. By 

June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include 

hostile action that may adversely affect the 

nuclear power plant. The initial emergency 

action levels shall be discussed and agreed on 

by the applicant or licensee and state and 

local governmental authorities, and approved by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency 

action levels shall be reviewed with the 

State and local governmental authorities on 

an annual basis. 

2. A licensee desiring to change its entire 

emergency action level scheme shall submit 

an application for an amendment to its license and receive NRC approval before implementing the change. Licensees shall follow the change process in §50.54(q) for all 

other emergency action level changes. 

C. Activation of Emergency Organization 

1. The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the alerting or activating 

of progressively larger segments of the total 

emergency organization shall be described. 

The communication steps to be taken to 

alert or activate emergency personnel under 

each class of emergency shall be described. 

Emergency action levels (based not only on 

onsite and offsite radiation monitoring information but also on readings from a number of sensors that indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment 

and the response of the Emergency Core 

Cooling System) for notification of offsite 

agencies shall be described. The existence, 

but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be noted for such agencies. 

The emergency classes defined shall include: 

(1) Notification of unusual events, (2) alert, 

(3) site area emergency, and (4) general 

emergency. These classes are further discussed in NUREG–0654/FEMA–REP–1. 

2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor 

licensees shall establish and maintain the 

capability to assess, classify, and declare an 

emergency condition within 15 minutes after 

the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has 

been exceeded and shall promptly declare the 

emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate 

emergency classification level. Licensees 

shall not construe these criteria as a grace 

period to attempt to restore plant conditions 

to avoid declaring an emergency action due 

to an emergency action level that has been 

exceeded. Licensees shall not construe these 

criteria as preventing implementation of response actions deemed by the licensee to be 

necessary to protect public health and safety 

provided that any delay in declaration does 

not deny the State and local authorities the 

opportunity to implement measures necessary to protect the public health and safety. 

D. Notification Procedures 

1. Administrative and physical means for 

notifying local, State, and Federal officials 

and agencies and agreements reached with 

these officials and agencies for the prompt 

notification of the public and for public 

evacuation or other protective measures, 

should they become necessary, shall be described. This description shall include identification of the appropriate officials, by title 

and agency, of the State and local government agencies within the EPZs. 

2. Provisions shall be described for yearly 

dissemination to the public within the plume 

exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency 

planning information, such as the methods 


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and times required for public notification 

and the protective actions planned if an accident occurs, general information as to the 

nature and effects of radiation, and a listing 

of local broadcast stations that will be used 

for dissemination of information during an 

emergency. Signs or other measures shall 

also be used to disseminate to any transient 

population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate information that would 

be helpful if an accident occurs. 

3. A licensee shall have the capability to 

notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency. The licensee shall 

demonstrate that the appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to 

make a public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to 

initial operation greater than 5 percent of 

rated thermal power of the first reactor at a 

site, each nuclear power reactor licensee 

shall demonstrate that administrative and 

physical means have been established for 

alerting and providing prompt instructions 

to the public within the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ. The design objective of the 

prompt public alert and notification system 

shall be to have the capability to essentially 

complete the initial alerting and initiate notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and notification capability will range from immediate 

alerting and notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and 

local officials are notified that a situation 

exists requiring urgent action) to the more 

likely events where there is substantial time 

available for the appropriate governmental 

authorities to make a judgment whether or 

not to activate the public alert and notification system. The alerting and notification 

capability shall additionally include administrative and physical means for a backup 

method of public alerting and notification 

capable of being used in the event the primary method of alerting and notification is 

unavailable during an emergency to alert or 

notify all or portions of the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ population. The backup method shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ, but does not need to meet the 

15-minute design objective for the primary 

prompt public alert and notification system. 

When there is a decision to activate the alert 

and notification system, the appropriate 

governmental authorities will determine 

whether to activate the entire alert and notification system simultaneously or in a 

graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating such a public alert and 

notification system shall remain with the 

appropriate governmental authorities. 

4. If FEMA has approved a nuclear power 

reactor site’s alert and notification design 

report, including the backup alert and notification capability, as of December 23, 2011, 

then the backup alert and notification capability requirements in Section IV.D.3 must 

be implemented by December 24, 2012. If the 

alert and notification design report does not 

include a backup alert and notification capability or needs revision to ensure adequate 

backup alert and notification capability, 

then a revision of the alert and notification 

design report must be submitted to FEMA 

for review by June 24, 2013, and the FEMAapproved backup alert and notification 

means must be implemented within 365 days 

after FEMA approval. However, the total 

time period to implement a FEMA-approved 

backup alert and notification means must 

not exceed June 22, 2015. 

E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment 

Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency facilities and equipment, including: 

1. Equipment at the site for personnel 

monitoring; 

2. Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for continuously assessing the 

impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment; 

3. Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of onsite individuals; 

4. Facilities and medical supplies at the 

site for appropriate emergency first aid 

treatment; 

5. Arrangements for medical service providers qualified to handle radiological emergencies onsite; 

6. Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured individuals from the site 

to specifically identified treatment facilities 

outside the site boundary; 

7. Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support of licensed activities 

on the site at treatment facilities outside 

the site boundary; 

8.a. (i) A licensee onsite technical support 

center and an emergency operations facility 

from which effective direction can be given 

and effective control can be exercised during 

an emergency; 

(ii) For nuclear power reactor licensees, a 

licensee onsite operational support center; 

b. For a nuclear power reactor licensee’s 

emergency operations facility required by 

paragraph 8.a of this section, either a facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of 

the nuclear power reactor site(s), or a primary facility located less than 10 miles from 

the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a 

backup facility located between 10 miles and 

25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s). 

An emergency operations facility may serve 

more than one nuclear power reactor site. A 

licensee desiring to locate an emergency operations facility more than 25 miles from a 


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nuclear power reactor site shall request prior 

Commission approval by submitting an application for an amendment to its license. 

For an emergency operations facility located 

more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site, provisions must be made for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to 

the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC 

and offsite responders can interact face-toface with emergency response personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor 

site. Provisions for locating NRC and offsite 

responders closer to a nuclear power reactor 

site that is more than 25 miles from the 

emergency operations facility must include 

the following: 

(1) Space for members of an NRC site team 

and Federal, State, and local responders; 

(2) Additional space for conducting briefings with emergency response personnel; 

(3) Communication with other licensee and 

offsite emergency response facilities; 

(4) Access to plant data and radiological 

information; and 

(5) Access to copying equipment and office 

supplies; 

c. By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear power reactor licensee’s emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, 

a facility having the following capabilities: 

(1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor 

site that the facility serves; 

(2) The capability to analyze plant technical information and provide technical 

briefings on event conditions and prognosis 

to licensee and offsite response organizations 

for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor 

site and for each nuclear power reactor site 

that the facility serves; and 

(3) The capability to support response to 

events occurring simultaneously at more 

than one nuclear power reactor site if the 

emergency operations facility serves more 

than one site; and 

d. For nuclear power reactor licensees, an 

alternative facility (or facilities) that would 

be accessible even if the site is under threat 

of or experiencing hostile action, to function 

as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff and collectively having 

the following characteristics: the capability 

for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the capability for engineering 

assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation, for use 

when onsite emergency facilities cannot be 

safely accessed during hostile action. The requirements in this paragraph 8.d must be implemented no later than December 23, 2014, 

with the exception of the capability for staging emergency response organization personnel at the alternative facility (or facilities) and the capability for communications 

with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security, which must be 

implemented no later than June 20, 2012. 

e. A licensee shall not be subject to the requirements of paragraph 8.b of this section 

for an existing emergency operations facility 

approved as of December 23, 2011; 

9. At least one onsite and one offsite communications system; each system shall have 

a backup power source. All communication 

plans shall have arrangements for emergencies, including titles and alternates for 

those in charge at both ends of the communication links and the primary and backup 

means of communication. Where consistent 

with the function of the governmental agency, these arrangements will include: 

a. Provision for communications with contiguous State/local governments within the 

plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such communications shall be tested monthly. 

b. Provision for communications with Federal emergency response organizations. Such 

communications systems shall be tested annually. 

c. Provision for communications among 

the nuclear power reactor control room, the 

onsite technical support center, and the 

emergency operations facility; and among 

the nuclear facility, the principal State and 

local emergency operations centers, and the 

field assessment teams. Such communications systems shall be tested annually. 

d. Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations 

Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the emergency operations facility. 

Such communications shall be tested monthly. 

F. Training 

1. The program to provide for: (a) The 

training of employees and exercising, by 

periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure 

that employees of the licensee are familiar 

with their specific emergency response duties, and (b) The participation in the training and drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiological emergency shall be described. This 

shall include a description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the following 

categories of emergency personnel: 

i. Directors and/or coordinators of the 

plant emergency organization; 

ii. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including control room shift personnel; 

iii Radiological monitoring teams; 

iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades); 

v. Repair and damage control teams; 

vi. First aid and rescue teams; 

vii. Medical support personnel; 


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3 Use of site specific simulators or computers is acceptable for any exercise. 4Full participation when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises 

for a particular site means appropriate offsite local and State authorities and licensee 

personnel physically and actively take part 

in testing their integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at 

a commercial nuclear power plant. Full participation includes testing major observable 

portions of the onsite and offsite emergency 

plans and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario. 

5Partial participation when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate 

offsite authorities shall actively take part in 

the exercise sufficient to test direction and 

control functions; i.e., (a) protective action 

decision making related to emergency action 

levels, and (b) communication capabilities 

among affected State and local authorities 

and the licensee. 

viii. Licensee’s headquarters support personnel; 

ix. Security personnel. 

In addition, a radiological orientation 

training program shall be made available to 

local services personnel; e.g., local emergency services/Civil Defense, local law enforcement personnel, local news media persons. 

2. The plan shall describe provisions for the 

conduct of emergency preparedness exercises 

as follows: Exercises shall test the adequacy 

of timing and content of implementing procedures and methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, test 

the public alert and notification system, and 

ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties.3

a. A full participation4 exercise which 

tests as much of the licensee, State, and 

local emergency plans as is reasonably 

achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted for each site at 

which a power reactor is located. Nuclear 

power reactor licensees shall submit exercise 

scenarios under §50.4 at least 60 days before 

use in a full participation exercise required 

by this paragraph 2.a. 

(i) For an operating license issued under 

this part, this exercise must be conducted 

within two years before the issuance of the 

first operating license for full power (one authorizing operation above 5 percent of rated 

power) of the first reactor and shall include 

participation by each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway 

EPZ and each state within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. If the full participation 

exercise is conducted more than 1 year prior 

to issuance of an operating licensee for full 

power, an exercise which tests the licensee’s 

onsite emergency plans must be conducted 

within one year before issuance of an operating license for full power. This exercise 

need not have State or local government participation. 

(ii) For a combined license issued under 

part 52 of this chapter, this exercise must be 

conducted within two years of the scheduled 

date for initial loading of fuel. If the first 

full participation exercise is conducted more 

than one year before the scheduled date for 

initial loading of fuel, an exercise which 

tests the licensee’s onsite emergency plans 

must be conducted within one year before 

the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. 

This exercise need not have State or local 

government participation. If FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of 

offsite emergency preparedness as the result 

of the first full participation exercise, or if 

the Commission finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective 

measures can and will be taken in the event 

of a radiological emergency, the provisions 

of §50.54(gg) apply. 

(iii) For a combined license issued under 

part 52 of this chapter, if the applicant currently has an operating reactor at the site, 

an exercise, either full or partial participation,5 shall be conducted for each subsequent 

reactor constructed on the site. This exercise 

may be incorporated in the exercise requirements of Sections IV.F.2.b. and c. in this appendix. If FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite emergency 

preparedness as the result of this exercise for 

the new reactor, or if the Commission finds 

that the state of emergency preparedness 

does not provide reasonable assurance that 

adequate protective measures can and will 

be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the provisions of §50.54(gg) apply. 

b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct 

a subsequent exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under §50.4 at least 60 days before use 

in an exercise required by this paragraph 2.b. 

The exercise may be included in the full participation biennial exercise required by paragraph 2.c. of this section. In addition, the licensee shall take actions necessary to ensure 

that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained during the interval between biennial exercises by conducting 

drills, including at least one drill involving a 

combination of some of the principal functional areas of the licensee’s onsite emergency response capabilities. The principal 

functional areas of emergency response include activities such as management and coordination of emergency response, accident 


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Nuclear Regulatory Commission Pt. 50, App. E 

6 Co-located licensees are two different licensees whose licensed facilities are located 

either on the same site or on adjacent, contiguous sites, and that share most of the following emergency planning and siting elements: 

a. Plume exposure and ingestion emergency planning zones; 

b. Offsite governmental authorities; 

c. Offsite emergency response organizations; 

d. Public notification system; and/or 

e. Emergency facilities. 

assessment, event classification, notification 

of offsite authorities, assessment of the onsite and offsite impact of radiological releases, protective action recommendation 

development, protective action decision 

making, plant system repair and mitigative 

action implementation. During these drills, 

activation of all of the licensee’s emergency 

response facilities (Technical Support Center 

(TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and 

the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) 

would not be necessary, licensees would have 

the opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised instruction 

would be permitted, operating staff in all 

participating facilities would have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) 

rather than have controllers intervene, and 

the drills may focus on the onsite exercise 

training objectives. 

c. Offsite plans for each site shall be exercised biennially with full participation by 

each offsite authority having a role under 

the radiological response plan. Where the 

offsite authority has a role under a radiological response plan for more than one site, 

it shall fully participate in one exercise 

every two years and shall, at least, partially 

participate in other offsite plan exercises in 

this period. If two different licensees each 

have licensed facilities located either on the 

same site or on adjacent, contiguous sites, 

and share most of the elements defining colocated licensees,6 then each licensee shall: 

(1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its onsite emergency plan; 

(2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite 

biennial full or partial participation exercise; 

(3) Conduct emergency preparedness activities and interactions in the years between its 

participation in the offsite full or partial 

participation exercise with offsite authorities, to test and maintain interface among 

the affected State and local authorities and 

the licensee. Co-located licensees shall also 

participate in emergency preparedness activities and interaction with offsite authorities for the period between exercises; 

(4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its 

onsite emergency plan in each exercise 

cycle; and 

(5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or 

partial participation hostile action exercise 

in alternating exercise cycles. 

d. Each State with responsibility for nuclear power reactor emergency preparedness 

should fully participate in the ingestion 

pathway portion of exercises at least once 

every exercise cycle. In States with more 

than one nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ, the State should rotate 

this participation from site to site. Each 

State with responsibility for nuclear power 

reactor emergency preparedness should fully 

participate in a hostile action exercise at 

least once every cycle and should fully participate in one hostile action exercise by December 31, 2015. States with more than one 

nuclear power reactor plume exposure pathway EPZ should rotate this participation 

from site to site. 

e. Licensees shall enable any State or local 

government located within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in the licensee’s drills when requested by such State 

or local government. 

f. Remedial exercises will be required if the 

emergency plan is not satisfactorily tested 

during the biennial exercise, such that NRC, 

in consultation with FEMA, cannot (1) find 

reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the 

event of a radiological emergency or (2) determine that the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has maintained key skills 

specific to emergency response. The extent 

of State and local participation in remedial 

exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate corrective measures have been 

taken regarding the elements of the plan not 

properly tested in the previous exercises. 

g. All exercises, drills, and training that 

provide performance opportunities to develop, maintain, or demonstrate key skills 

must provide for formal critiques in order to 

identify weak or deficient areas that need 

correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies 

that are identified in a critique of exercises, 

drills, or training must be corrected. 

h. The participation of State and local governments in an emergency exercise is not required to the extent that the applicant has 

identified those governments as refusing to 

participate further in emergency planning 

activities, pursuant to §50.47(c)(1). In such 

cases, an exercise shall be held with the applicant or licensee and such governmental 

entities as elect to participate in the emergency planning process. 

i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise scenarios that provide reasonable assurance 

that anticipatory responses will not result 

from preconditioning of participants. Such 

scenarios for nuclear power reactor licensees 

must include a wide spectrum of radiological 

releases and events, including hostile action. 

Exercise and drill scenarios as appropriate 


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must emphasize coordination among onsite 

and offsite response organizations. 

j. The exercises conducted under paragraph 

2 of this section by nuclear power reactor licensees must provide the opportunity for the 

ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key 

skills necessary to implement the principal 

functional areas of emergency response identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. Each 

exercise must provide the opportunity for 

the ERO to demonstrate key skills specific 

to emergency response duties in the control 

room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint information 

center. Additionally, in each eight calendar 

year exercise cycle, nuclear power reactor licensees shall vary the content of scenarios 

during exercises conducted under paragraph 

2 of this section to provide the opportunity 

for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in 

the key skills necessary to respond to the 

following scenario elements: hostile action 

directed at the plant site, no radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological 

release that does not require public protective actions, an initial classification of or 

rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or 

General Emergency, implementation of 

strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under §50.54(hh)(2), and integration of 

offsite resources with onsite response. The licensee shall maintain a record of exercises 

conducted during each eight year exercise 

cycle that documents the content of scenarios used to comply with the requirements 

of this paragraph. Each licensee shall conduct a hostile action exercise for each of its 

sites no later than December 31, 2015. The 

first eight-year exercise cycle for a site will 

begin in the calendar year in which the first 

hostile action exercise is conducted. For a 

site licensed under Part 52, the first eightyear exercise cycle begins in the calendar 

year of the initial exercise required by Section IV.F.2.a. 

G. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness 

Provisions to be employed to ensure that 

the emergency plan, its implementing procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are maintained up to date shall be described. 

H. Recovery 

Criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident, reentry of the facility 

would be appropriate or when operation 

could be resumed shall be described. 

I. Onsite Protective Actions During Hostile 

Action 

By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor 

licensees, a range of protective actions to 

protect onsite personnel during hostile action must be developed to ensure the continued ability of the licensee to safely shut 

down the reactor and perform the functions 

of the licensee’s emergency plan. 

V. IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

No less than 180 days before the scheduled 

issuance of an operating license for a nuclear 

power reactor or a license to possess nuclear 

material, or the scheduled date for initial 

loading of fuel for a combined license under 

part 52 of this chapter, the applicant’s or licensee’s detailed implementing procedures 

for its emergency plan shall be submitted to 

the Commission as specified in §50.4. Licensees who are authorized to operate a nuclear 

power facility shall submit any changes to 

the emergency plan or procedures to the 

Commission, as specified in §50.4, within 30 

days of such changes. 

VI. EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM

1. The Emergency Response Data System 

(ERDS) is a direct near real-time electronic 

data link between the licensee’s onsite computer system and the NRC Operations Center 

that provides for the automated transmission of a limited data set of selected parameters. The ERDS supplements the existing voice transmission over the Emergency 

Notification System (ENS) by providing the 

NRC Operations Center with timely and accurate updates of a limited set of parameters 

from the licensee’s installed onsite computer 

system in the event of an emergency. When 

selected plant data are not available on the 

licensee’s onsite computer system, retrofitting of data points is not required. The licensee shall test the ERDS periodically to 

verify system availability and operability. 

The frequency of ERDS testing will be quarterly unless otherwise set by NRC based on 

demonstrated system performance. 

2. Except for Big Rock Point and all nuclear power facilities that are shut down permanently or indefinitely, onsite hardware 

shall be provided at each unit by the licensee 

to interface with the NRC receiving system. 

Software, which will be made available by 

the NRC, will assemble the data to be transmitted and transmit data from each unit via 

an output port on the appropriate data system. The hardware and software must have 

the following characteristics: 

a. Data points, if resident in the in-plant 

computer systems, must be transmitted for 

four selected types of plant conditions: Reactor core and coolant system conditions; reactor containment conditions; radioactivity 

release rates; and plant meteorological 

tower data. A separate data feed is required 

for each reactor unit. While it is recognized 

that ERDS is not a safety system, it is conceivable that a licensee’s ERDS interface 

could communicate with a safety system. In 

this case, appropriate isolation devices 


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Nuclear Regulatory Commission Pt. 50, App. E 

7 See 10 CFR 50.55a(h) Protection Systems. 

8 Guidance is provided in NUREG–1394, Revision 1. 

9 See NUREG–1394, Revision 1, appendix C, 

Data Point Library. 10 See NUREG–1394, Revision 1, section 3. 11 See NUREG–1394, Revision 1. 

would be required at these interfaces. 7 The 

data points, identified in the following parameters will be transmitted: 

(i) For pressurized water reactors (PWRs), 

the selected plant parameters are: (1) Primary coolant system: pressure, temperatures 

(hot leg, cold leg, and core exit 

thermocouples), subcooling margin, pressurizer level, reactor coolant charging/makeup flow, reactor vessel level, reactor coolant 

flow, and reactor power; (2) Secondary coolant system: Steam generator levels and pressures, main feedwater flows, and auxiliary 

and emergency feedwater flows; (3) Safety 

injection: High- and low-pressure safety injection flows, safety injection flows (Westinghouse), and borated water storage tank 

level; (4) Containment: pressure, temperatures, hydrogen concentration, and sump 

levels; (5) Radiation monitoring system: Reactor coolant radioactivity, containment radiation level, condenser air removal radiation level, effluent radiation monitors, and 

process radiation monitor levels; and (6) Meteorological data: wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability. 

(ii) For boiling water reactors (BWRs), the 

selected parameters are: (1) Reactor coolant 

system: Reactor pressure, reactor vessel 

level, feedwater flow, and reactor power; (2) 

Safety injection: Reactor core isolation cooling flow, high-pressure coolant injection/ 

high-pressure core spray flow, core spray 

flow, low-pressure coolant injection flow, 

and condensate storage tank level; (3) Containment: drywell pressure, drywell temperatures, drywell sump levels, hydrogen and 

oxygen concentrations, suppression pool 

temperature, and suppression pool level; (4) 

Radiation monitoring system: Reactor coolant radioactivity level, primary containment radiation level, condenser off-gas radiation level, effluent radiation monitor, and 

process radiation levels; and (5) Meteorological data: Wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability. 

b. The system must be capable of transmitting all available ERDS parameters at time 

intervals of not less than 15 seconds or more 

than 60 seconds. Exceptions to this requirement will be considered on a case by case 

basis. 

c. All link control and data transmission 

must be established in a format compatible 

with the NRC receiving system8 as configured at the time of licensee implementation. 

3. Maintaining Emergency Response Data 

System: 

a. Any hardware and software changes that 

affect the transmitted data points identified 

in the ERDS Data Point Library9 (site specific data base residing on the ERDS computer) must be submitted to the NRC within 

30 days after the changes are completed. 

b. Hardware and software changes, with 

the exception of data point modifications, 

that could affect the transmission format 

and computer communication protocol to 

the ERDS must be provided to the NRC as 

soon as practicable and at least 30 days prior 

to the modification. 

c. In the event of a failure of the NRC supplied onsite modem, a replacement unit will 

be furnished by the NRC for licensee installation. 

4. Implementing the Emergency Response 

Data System Program: 

a. Each licensee shall develop and submit 

an ERDS implementation program plan to 

the NRC by October 28, 1991. To ensure compatibility with the guidance provided for the 

ERDS, the ERDS implementation program 

plan, 10 must include, but not be limited to, 

information on the licensee’s computer system configuration (i.e., hardware and software), interface, and procedures. 

b. Licensees must comply with appendix E 

to part 50, section V. 

c. Licensees that have submitted the required information under the voluntary 

ERDS implementation program will not be 

required to resubmit this information. The 

licensee shall meet the implementation 

schedule of appendix E to part 50, section 

VI.4d. 

d. Each licensee shall complete implementation of the ERDS by February 13, 1993, or 

before initial escalation to full power, whichever comes later. Licensees with currently 

operational ERDS interfaces approved under 

the voluntary ERDS implementation program11 will not be required to submit another implementation plan and will be considered to have met the requirements for 

ERDS under appendix E to part 50, section 

VI.1 and 2 of this part. 

[45 FR 55410, Aug. 19, 1980; 46 FR 28839, May 

29, 1981, as amended at 46 FR 63032, Dec. 30, 

1981; 47 FR 30236, July 13, 1982; 47 FR 57671, 

Dec. 28, 1982; 49 FR 27736, July 6, 1984; 51 FR 

40310, Nov. 6, 1986; 52 FR 16829, May 6, 1987; 52 

FR 42086, Nov. 3, 1987; 56 FR 40185, Aug. 13, 

1991; 59 FR 14090, Mar. 25, 1994; 61 FR 30132, 

June 14, 1996; 72 FR 49506, Aug. 28, 2007; 73 FR 

42674, July 23, 2008; 76 FR 72596, Nov. 23, 2011] 

EDITORIAL NOTE: At 72 FR 49506, Aug. 28, 

2007, Appendix E to part 50 was amended by 

redesignating footnotes 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 as 7, 

8, 9 ,10 ,11, 12; however, the amendment could 


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not be incorporated due to inaccurate 

amendatory instruction. 

APPENDIX F TO PART 50—POLICY RELATING TO THE SITING OF FUEL REPROCESSING PLANTS AND RELATED WASTE

MANAGEMENT FACILITIES

1. Public health and safety considerations 

relating to licensed fuel reprocessing plants 

do not require that such facilities be located 

on land owned and controlled by the Federal 

Government. Such plants, including the facilities for the temporary storage of highlevel radioactive wastes, may be located on 

privately owned property. 

2. A fuel reprocessing plant’s inventory of 

high-level liquid radioactive wastes will be 

limited to that produced in the prior 5 years. 

(For the purpose of this statement of policy, 

‘‘high-level liquid radioactive wastes’’ means 

those aqueous wastes resulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction 

system, or equivalent, and the concentrated 

wastes from subsequent extraction cycles, or 

equivalent, in a facility for reprocessing irradiated reactor fuels.) High-level liquid radioactive wastes shall be converted to a dry 

solid as required to comply with this inventory limitation, and placed in a sealed container prior to transfer to a Federal repository in a shipping cask meeting the requirements of 10 CFR part 71. The dry solid shall 

be chemically, thermally, and radiolytically 

stable to the extent that the equilibrium 

pressure in the sealed container will not exceed the safe operating pressure for that container during the period from canning 

through a minimum of 90 days after receipt 

(transfer of physical custody) at the Federal 

repository. All of these high-level radioactive wastes shall be transferred to a Federal repository no later than 10 years following separation of fission products from 

the irradiated fuel. Upon receipt, the Federal 

repository will assume permanent custody of 

these radioactive waste materials although 

industry will pay the Federal Government a 

charge which together with interest on unexpended balances will be designed to defray 

all costs of disposal and perpetual surveillance. The Department of Energy will take 

title to the radioactive waste material upon 

transfer to a Federal repository. Before retirement of the reprocessing plant from operational status and before termination of licensing pursuant to §50.82, transfer of all 

such wastes to a Federal repository shall be 

completed. Federal repositories, which will 

be limited in number, will be designated 

later by the Commission. 

3. Disposal of high-level radioactive fission 

product waste material will not be permitted 

on any land other than that owned and controlled by the Federal Government. 

4. A design objective for fuel reprocessing 

plants shall be to facilitate decontamination 

and removal of all significant radioactive 

wastes at the time the facility is permanently decommissioned. Criteria for the extent of decontamination to be required upon 

decommissioning and license termination 

will be developed in consultation with competent groups. Opportunity will be afforded 

for public comment before such criteria are 

made effective. 

5. Applicants proposing to operate fuel reprocessing plants, in submitting information 

concerning financial qualifications as required by §50.33(f), shall include information 

enabling the Commission to determine 

whether the applicant is financially qualified, among other things, to provide for the 

removal and disposal of radioactive wastes, 

during operation and upon decommissioning 

of the facility, in accordance with the Commission’s regulations, including the requirements set out in this appendix. 

6. With respect to fuel reprocessing plants 

already licensed, the licenses will be appropriately conditioned to carry out the purposes of the policy stated above with respect 

to high-level radioactive fission product 

wastes generated after installation of new 

equipment for interim storage of liquid 

wastes, or after installation of equipment required for solidification without interim liquid storage. In either case, such equipment 

shall be installed at the earliest practicable 

date, taking into account the time required 

for design, procurement and installation 

thereof. With respect to such plants, the application of the policy stated in this appendix to existing wastes and to wastes generated prior to the installation of such 

equipment, will be the subject of a further 

rulemaking proceeding. 

[35 FR 17533, Nov. 14, 1970, as amended at 36 

FR 5411, Mar. 23, 1971; 42 FR 20139, Apr. 18, 

1977; 45 FR 14201, Mar. 5, 1980; 70 FR 3599, Jan. 

26, 2005] 

APPENDIX G TO PART 50—FRACTURE

TOUGHNESS REQUIREMENTS

I. Introduction and scope. 

II. Definitions. 

III. Fracture toughness tests. 

IV. Fracture toughness requirements. 

I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

This appendix specifies fracture toughness 

requirements for ferritic materials of pressure-retaining components of the reactor 

coolant pressure boundary of light water nuclear power reactors to provide adequate 

margins of safety during any condition of 

normal operation, including anticipated 

operational occurrences and system hydrostatic tests, to which the pressure boundary 

may be subjected over its service lifetime. 

The ASME Code forms the basis for the requirements of this appendix. ‘‘ASME Code’’ 


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