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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re BAYS, Minor. April 28, 2016

No. 329304 Kalamazoo Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2015-000093-NA

Before: S AWYER , P.J., and M URPHY and R ONAYNE K RAUSE , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent mother appeals as of right the trial court order te rminating her parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ) (parent deserts child for 91 or more days), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), (i) (parent’s rig hts terminated to child’s siblings due to serious and chronic neglect), (j) (child will be harmed if r eturned to parent), and ( l ) (parent’s rights to another child wer e terminated). We affirm.

Respondent argues that she had a fundamental due process right to notice that was violated when the trial court terminated her parental rights un der MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ) because she was provided no notice that her rights could be ter minated under that ground. Because this issue is unpreserved, it is reviewed for plain err or affecting substantial rights. In re Utrera , 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008), citing People v Carines , 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “[A]n error a ffects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Utrera , 281 Mich App at 9, citing Carines , 460 Mich at 763.

Due process requires notice of the nature of the proceedings. Hinky Dinky Supermarket, Inc v Dep’t of Community Health , 261 Mich App 604, 606; 683 NW2d 759 (2004). Here, the only petition in this case list ed MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (j) as the statutory grounds for termination. The trial court ultimately found statutory ground s for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ), (g), (i), (j), and ( l ).

Assuming plain error in regard to the trial court’s finding of a statutory ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ) without respondent’s hav ing notice of that ground, respondent fails to show prejudice . To terminate parental righ ts, a trial court must find the existence of a statutory ground for termination in MCL 712A.19b has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re McIntyre , 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). Only one statutory ground for termination must be established. In re Trejo Minors , 462 Mich 341, 360;-2- 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Here, in addition to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ), the trial court also found statutory grounds under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), (j), and ( l ). Respondent does not challenge or acknowledge these four additiona l statutory grounds on appeal. Of those four additional statutory grounds, bot h MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) an d (j) were specifi cally listed in t he March 6, 2015 petition, and are thus not suscep tible to respondent’s notice a rgument.

Further, reviewing only one of the other grounds of which term ination was ordered, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding a statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) provides that a parent’s ri ghts may be terminated where “[t]here is a reasonable likeli hood, based on the conduct or ca pacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of th e parent.” Here, respondent had a history of substance abuse and sh e had a history of failing to address those issues despite two prior terminations. A trial court may rely on a parent’s histo ry in determining that there was a reasonable likelihood that a child would be harmed if returned to the parent’s home. In re Archer , 277 Mich App 71, 75-76; 744 NW2d 1 (2007). Moreover, MCL 712 A.19b(3)(j) considers both the risk of phys ical and also emotional harm to a child. See In re Hudson , 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). Given respondent’s his tory of substance abuse, there was clear and convincing evidence of a reasonable likelih ood that the minor child would be emotionally harmed if he were returned to respondent’s home. T he trial court did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). MCR 3.977(K); Trejo Minors , 462 Mich at 356-357.

Because only one statutory ground for termination must be esta blished, Trejo Minors
, 462 Mich at 360, and the trial cour t did not clearly err in fin ding clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for term ination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), any error regarding MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ) did not prejudice respondent by affecting the outcome of resp ondent’s termination hearing. Respondent h as not demonstrated plain err or affecting substantial rights as necessary for reversal. Utrera , 281 Mich App at 8.

Finally, while not raised as an issue by respondent, responden t’s history of failing to address substance abuse, the minor child’s lack of a bond with respondent, and the advantages of the child’s foster home each weighed in favor of finding that t ermination was in the child’s best interests. In re Olive/Metts Minors , 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012); In re Jones , 286 Mich App 126, 131; 777 NW2d 728 (2009). The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minor child’s best interests. MCR 3.977(K); Trejo Minors , 462 Mich at 356-357.

Affirmed.

/s/ David H. Sawyer /s/ William B. Murphy /s/ Amy Ronayne Krause