NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

RACHEL SIDERS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-10466 

D.C. No. 

2:12-cr-00226-JAM-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 12, 2017**

San Francisco, California

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and REINHARDT and O’MALLEY,*** Circuit 

Judges.

Rachel Siders appeals her jury conviction for bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344), 

making a false statement to a federally insured bank (18 U.S.C. § 1014), and 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Kathleen M. O'Malley, United States Circuit Judge for 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.

FILED

OCT 27 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)), in connection with a mortgage 

fraud/identity theft scheme against two banks. We affirm Siders’s convictions and 

sentence.

I

Because we write only for the parties, we assume familiarity with the facts 

and prior proceedings. On appeal, Siders only raises two challenges to her 

conviction: she contends that the district court erred by admitting allegedly 

fraudulent loan files into evidence as business records under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 803(6), and that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that 

these loan files were admissible based on the corporate custodian certificates 

proffered under Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11). More specifically, Siders 

objects to the admission of the loan files for a home equity line of credit 

(“HELOC”) for certain Highland Park Drive and Mariposa Avenue properties. 

Siders’s conviction was predicated on only the loan files for Highland Park Drive, 

however, as the jury deadlocked on the counts related to Mariposa Avenue. 

Because Siders does not contend that admission of the latter loan files impacted her 

conviction with respect to the Highland Park Drive property—by unduly 

prejudicing the jury or otherwise—any error regarding the Mariposa Drive loan 

files would be harmless. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 993 (9th Cir. 
3 

2003). We therefore only consider Siders’s challenge to admission of the Highland 

Park Drive loan files.

II

The government filed a motion in limine under Rule 902 requesting an early 

ruling from the district court on the admissibility of certain documents in the case, 

including the loan files that contained the allegedly fraudulent documents used to 

obtain the HELOCs at issue. The government offered various Rule 902(11) 

declarations from the corporate custodian of the allegedly fraudulent records in 

support of its claim that the files were business records under Rule 803(6). On the 

first day of trial, the district court granted the motion in limine, concluding that the 

Rule 902(11) certificates properly authenticated the documents as non-hearsay 

business records. Siders appeals this determination.

III

We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence under an exception 

to the hearsay rule for abuse of discretion. United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 

960 (9th Cir. 2009). Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is reviewed de 

novo. See United States v. Urena, 659 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2011). There was 

no reversible error if the records were admissible under any provision. United 

States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1073 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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Rule 803(6) sets forth an exception to the hearsay rule for “business records” 

as follows:

(6) Records of a regularly conducted activity. A record of an act, 

event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information 

transmitted by—someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity 

of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for 

profit;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian 

or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with 

Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and

(E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or the

method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of 

trustworthiness.

Fed. R. Evid. 803. Rule 902 outlines certain items of evidence that are selfauthenticating and do not require the testimony of a foundation witness. Those 

items include: 

The original or a copy of a domestic record that meets the 

requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification of the 

custodian or another qualified person that complies with a federal 

statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court. Before the trial or 

hearing, the proponent must give an adverse party reasonable written 

notice of the intent to offer the record—and must make the record and 

certification available for inspection—so that the party has a fair 

opportunity to challenge them.

Fed. R. Evid. 902(11). 
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IV

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Highland Park 

Drive loan files. These files recorded false statements Siders and her coconspirators made in furtherance of their scheme to commit mortgage fraud and 

identity theft. 

Siders has three objections to the government’s reliance on the loan 

documents: (1) that the Rule 902(11) certifications were by records custodians 

who lacked familiarity with the creation and preservation of the documents; 

(2) that the documents were actually created by her co-conspirators and not 

employees acting in the normal course of business; and (3) because the information 

in the loan files was false information, they lacked the authenticity necessary to 

make them reliable as business records. We reject all three contentions.

As to Siders’s first argument, while Washington Mutual issued the original 

loans, the declaration from JPMorgan Chase’s records custodian sufficed under 

Rule 902(11) because JPMorgan Chase is the corporate successor to Washington 

Mutual. The declaration also satisfied the requirements of Rule 803(6): the 

declaration established that the applications were received in the course of loan 

processing and maintained thereafter, and this occurred in the regular course of 

business. One entity may receive and maintain documents in the regular course of 
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business, even if the documents were created by third parties. United States v. 

Childs, 5 F.3d 1328, 1333–34 (9th Cir. 1993). 

As to Siders’s second point, it is irrelevant that certain documents were 

prepared by Siders’s co-conspirators as long as they were received by those 

processing the mortgages in the regular course of business. Preparation of the 

records was authenticated, moreover, by the individual testimony of the coconspirators themselves, who had first-hand knowledge of their preparation.

Finally, we disagree with Siders’s contention that records containing false 

statements cannot be business records under Rule 803(6). The content of a record 

does not impact the way in which it was received, processed, or maintained. And 

the statements in the records that the government alleges were false were not 

offered for the truth of the matters asserted—they were proffered precisely because

they were false. United States v. Ray, 930 F.2d 1368, 1370 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990)

(“Nonhearsay statements recorded in a business record need not have been made 

under a business duty to be admissible.” (citation omitted)); United States v. 

Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Rule 801(d)(2)(E) applies to 

statements made during the course and in furtherance of any enterprise, whether 

legal or illegal, in which the declarant and the defendant jointly participated.”), 

overruled on other grounds, People of Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 

612 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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V

For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in admitting the 

Highland Park Drive loan records into evidence. As Siders has raised no other 

challenges to her convictions and sentence, those decisions are AFFIRMED.