J-A14003-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PAUL LAMONT DURHAM 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 351 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 19, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003964-2015

BEFORE: OTT, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 25, 2019

Paul Lamont Durham appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

on December 19, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

following his jury convictions of one count of murder in the second degree, 

two counts of robbery, and one count of criminal conspiracy.

1

 On appeal, 

Durham claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress,

and that his conviction was against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. 

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. 

We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter from 

the trial court’s December 20, 2018 opinion.

At approximately 3:15 pm on October 14, 2014, [Tina] Chapple 

[“Chapple”] was at the residence she shared with her boyfriend, 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 3701(a)(1)(I), and 903, respectively. 
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Leonard Butler, (hereinafter referred to as “Butler”), when he 

asked her to come down from the second floor to the living room. 

When she arrived in the living room, she observed two males with 

guns who had partially covered their faces with masks. One of 

the individuals who Chapple identified as the meaner of the two,

[later identified as co-defendant Derek Lee (“Lee”)], forced Butler 

into the basement while the other male, later determined to be 

Durham, stood in the living room with Chapple. Eventually 

Chapple was forced down into the basement by Durham and was 

forced to get down on her knees next to Butler. Lee was yelling 

at Butler to give up his money and Butler told him that he had no 

money. Wh[en] the defendants did not recover any money from 

Butler, they used a stun gun on him and again demanded money. 

Butler told the defendants to go look through his house stating 

that he did not have anything. At that point[,] Lee pistol-whipped 

Butler on the left side of his head and then took his watch and ran 

up the steps while Durham remained in the basement and stood 

guard over Chapple and Butler. Shortly thereafter, Butler and 

Durham struggled over the gun and one shot was fired which 

struck Butler and Durham then ran up the stairs and out of the 

house. The police were called and after interviewing Chapple they 

began canvassing the neighborhood for witnesses.

Henry Leacock, (hereinafter referred to as “Leacock”), called in 

two reports to the police with respect to suspicious activity in the 

area where the shooting occurred. Leacock was able to provide a 

license plate of a motor vehicle which was determined to be a 

Nissan Altima that had been rented from Hertz Rental by Lee. 

Leacock was also able to provide detailed descriptions of both 

males.

During the course of the police investigation, they developed a 

lead as to who was the shooter that caused the death of Butler 

and then prepared photo arrays which were shown to Chapple who 

identified Durham as the individual who shot Butler.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/2018, at 3-4.

A lengthy jury trial took place in September 2016. On September 26, 

2016, the jury convicted Durham of the aforementioned offenses. On 

December 19, 2016, the trial court sentenced Durham to life imprisonment 
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followed by a consecutive term of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. After 

receiving leave of court, Durham filed a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc. 

The trial court denied the motion on February 9, 2018. The instant, timely 

appeal followed.2 3

In his first issue, Durham argues the trial court erred in failing to 

suppress Ms. Chapple’s identification of him through an unduly suggestive 

photo array. Our standard of review of an order denying a motion to suppress 

is as follows:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may 

reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, 

as here, the appeal of the determination of the suppression court 

turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal 

conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it 

is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

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2 On March 14, 2018, the trial court ordered Durham to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Because of a breakdown in the 

court process, the lower court docket does not show that he filed the Rule 

1925(b) statement. However, on February 22, 2019, the parties filed a 

stipulation in this Court that Durham timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement 

on April 4, 2018. See Stipulation to Supplement Record Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1926(B)(2), 2/22/2019, at 1-2. On December 20, 2018, the trial court filed 

an opinion.

3 The co-defendant, Derek Lee, who the Commonwealth tried jointly with 

Durham, does not have an appeal pending before this panel.
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to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are 

subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Kemp, 195 A.3d 269, 275 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted).

Further,

Whether an out of court identification is to be suppressed as 

unreliable, and therefore violative of due process, is determined 

from the totality of the circumstances. Suggestiveness in the 

identification process is a factor to be considered in determining 

the admissibility of such evidence, but suggestiveness alone does 

not warrant exclusion. Identification evidence will not be 

suppressed unless the facts demonstrate that the identification 

procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a 

very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 

Photographs used in line-ups are not unduly suggestive if the

suspect’s picture does not stand out more than the others, and 

the people depicted all exhibit similar facial characteristics. 

Commonwealth v. Fulmore, 25 A.3d 340, 346 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation 

marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 34 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2011).

Here, Durham argues that the persons in the photo array did not have 

similar facial characteristics to him and that the police placed his photograph

in the same location in the array as they placed co-defendant Lee’s in a photo 

array that Chapple viewed several months earlier. Durham’s Brief, at 24. 

However, Durham waived these claims. 

In his pretrial motion to suppress, Durham did not raise these issues. 

Omnibus Motion, 11/20/2015, at unnumbered pages 3-4. Instead, he argued 

that the police officers made unduly suggestive comments, which influenced 
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Chapple’s selection and that she did not view the photo array in a consistent 

manner.4 See id. 

We have held that, “appellate review of [a ruling on] suppression is 

limited to examination of the precise basis under which suppression initially 

was sought; no new theories of relief may be considered on appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272–1273 (Pa. Super. 2006); 

see also Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 566 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(“When a defendant raises a suppression claim to the trial court and supports 

that claim with a particular argument or arguments, the defendant cannot 

then raise for the first time on appeal different arguments supporting 

suppression.”), appeal denied, 946 A.2d 687 (Pa. 2008). Therefore, because 

Durham did not raise the issues here in his motion to suppress, he waived his 

first claim.5

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4 We note that, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Durham baldly challenged the 

denial of his motion to suppress and did not specify the basis for his challenge. 

See Defendant’s Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal 

Pursuant to Rule Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 4/04/2018, at 1. Because of this, in its 

opinion, the trial court discussed the issues raised in the motion to suppress 

and not the claims that Durham now raises on appeal. See Trial Ct. Op., at 

4-6.

5 Further, even if Durham had raised his claims in the trial court, we note that 

he has failed to ensure that a copy of the photo array, which he argues was 

unduly suggestive, was included in the certified record. “Appellant has the 

duty to ensure that all documents essential to his case are included in the 

certified record.” Commonwealth v. Walker, 878 A.2d 887, 888 (Pa. Super.

2005); see Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 263–264 (Pa. Super.

2009) (“Because we have not been furnished with a copy of the photo array 
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In his second issue, Durham claims that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain the verdict because the evidence did not establish that he was the 

person who committed the crimes. Durham’s Brief at 27-29. Specifically, 

Durham maintains that the identification made by Chapple was “weak and 

inconclusive.” Id. at 28. We disagree.

Our standard of review of a sufficiency claim is well settled:

Our standard for evaluating sufficiency of the evidence is whether 

the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth [as verdict winner], is sufficient to enable a 

reasonable [factfinder] to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. [T]he entire trial record must be evaluated 

and all evidence actually received must be considered, whether or 

not the trial court’s rulings thereon were correct. Moreover, [t]he 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Finally, the trier of fact, while passing 

upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be afforded the 

evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Shull, 148 A.3d 820, 844 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted).

Regarding the sufficiency of evidence of identification, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has instructed:

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the identity of the accused as 

the person who committed the crime is essential to a conviction. 

The evidence of identification, however, needn’t be positive and 

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in question in the record, the issue challenging suppression of the photo array 

is deemed waived.”), appeal denied, 996 A.2d 491 (Pa. 2010). Therefore, 

Durham also waived his challenge to the out-of-court identification based on 

the photo array for this reason.
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certain in order to convict, although any indefiniteness and 

uncertainty in the identification testimony goes to its weight.

Commonwealth v. Hickman, 309 A.2d 564, 566 (Pa. 1973) (citations 

omitted). We have held that a single, positive identification by one eyewitness 

is enough to sustain a conviction. Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 

1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 925 

(Pa. 2014). 

Based on our review, we conclude that Durham’s claim that the evidence 

was insufficient to prove he was the perpetrator warrants no relief. Durham

seeks to have this Court review the evidence in the light most favorable to 

him. However, our standard of review requires us to view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict-winner, the Commonwealth. See Shull, 

supra. Here, Chapple positively identified Durham, both in a photo array and 

at trial, as one of the men who held her at gunpoint and as the man who shot 

Butler. N.T. Trial, 9/08/2016, at 379-380, 410-418. She testified that she 

was 100% certain of her identification of Durham. Id. at 421-424. Moreover, 

as the trial court discussed in its opinion, there was sufficient circumstantial 

evidence to connect Durham to the crime, including Leacock’s description, 

which matched that of Chapple, of the two men he observed behaving 

suspiciously near the scene of the crime and at the time of the crime. See 

Trial Ct. Op., at 8-10. Moreover, the license plate Leacock gave the police of 

the car he observed the men use, matched that of a car rented by co-
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defendant Lee. See id. Accordingly, Durham’s sufficiency claim fails. See 

Trinidad, supra.

In his third issue, Durham contends that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence.6 Durham’s Brief, at 30-36. A weight of the evidence 

claim concedes the sufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 

744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). A weight claim addresses the discretion of the 

trial court. Id. at 752 (citation omitted). On review, the appellate court 

decides whether the trial court abused its discretion when ruling on the weight 

claim; it does not consider the underlying question of whether the verdict was 

against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 753. We will only find an abuse of 

discretion where the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s 

sense of justice. Our review of a challenge to the weight of the evidence

supporting the verdict is settled:

The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder 

of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is 

not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and 

must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the 

credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal 

weight with all the facts is to deny justice. On appeal, our purview 

is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not shock 

its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim consists 

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6 Durham preserved his weight of the evidence claim by filing a post-sentence 

motion. [Durham’s] Nunc Pro Tunc Post-Sentence Motion, 10/04/2017, at 5-

6.
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of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a review 

of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. An appellate court may not reverse a 

verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s 

sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en 

banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 168 A.3d 1237 (Pa. 2017).

Durham’s weight of the evidence claim is largely a restatement of his 

sufficiency challenge, which we discuss supra. He views the evidence in the 

light most favorable to himself, and does not explain how the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying his weight claim. Rather, his argument 

consists of his bald allegations that Chapple’s identification testimony was 

unreliable; that Leacock’s description of the men did not entirely match 

Chapple’s; that the jury should have credited the testimony of defense witness 

Sean Ball; and that they should have credited the testimony of the defense’s 

expert witness on identification. Durham’s Brief, at 30-36. The trial court, in 

its opinion, discusses, in detail, why it did not find that the verdict was against 

the weight of the evidence. Trial Ct. Op., at 12-15. Durham provides us with 

no basis upon which to disagree. Accordingly, his weight claim fails.

For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm Durham’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.
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Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/25/2019