alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3243 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3243

 To suspend temporarily the duties on sumatriptan succinate (bulk and 
                             dosage forms).

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 7, 1993

Mr. Price of North Carolina (for himself, Mr. Hoagland, Mr. Lancaster, 
and Mr. Valentine) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To suspend temporarily the duties on sumatriptan succinate (bulk and 
                             dosage forms).

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SUMATRIPTAN SUCCINATE (BULK AND DOSAGE FORMS).

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new headings:
      

       ``  9902.31.12  3-[2-(dimethylamino)ethyl]-N-                   No change    No change    On or          
                        methyl-1H-indole-5-                                                       before 12/    
                        methanesulphonamide (1:1)                                                 31/95         
                        succinate (sumatriptan succinate-                                                       
                        bulk form) (provided for in                                                             
                        subheading 2935.00.46)..........  Free                                                  
           9902.31.13  3-[2-(dimethylamino)ethyl]-N-                   No change    No change    On or          
                        methyl-1H-indole-5-                                                       before 12/  ''
                        methanesulphonamide (1:1)                                                 31/95        .
                        succinate (sumatriptan succinate-                                                       
                        dosage form) (provided for in                                                           
                        subheading 3004.90.60)..........  Free                                                  

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.

                                 <all>
```
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation of
our report dated February 29, 1996, on the December 31, 1995 consolidated
financial statements, included in this Form 10-K, into the
Company's previously filed Registration Statement File Numbers 33-18187,
33-30522, 33-43131, 2-88509, 33-54842, 33-54844, 33-54846, 33-54848, 33-54850,
33-62253, 33-63215, 33-80068, 33-84076 and 33-84074.




/s/ ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP
    Arthur Andersen LLP



    Houston, Texas
    March 20, 1996
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

        Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18
U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted), Gary J. Sbona, Chief Executive Officer of
Verity, Inc. (the "Company"), and Todd K. Yamami, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, each hereby certify that, to the best of their knowledge:


     1. The Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended August
     31, 2002, and to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 99.1 (the
     "PERIODIC REPORT"), fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
     or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and


     2. The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.

        IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have set their hands hereto as of
the 15th day of October, 2002.

/s/ GARY J. SBONA
--------------------------
Gary J. Sbona, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


/s/ TODD K. YAMAMI
--------------------------
Todd K. Yamami, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
No. 11125.

#### Doelfs et al. *v.*The Star Oil & Gas Co. et al.

Decided December 14, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court of Knox county.

*Mr. W. M. Koons & Sons,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Mr. F. O. Levering*and *Mr. L. B. Houck,*for defendants in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Summers, 'Davis and Price, JJ., concur.
#### Helen D. LAUCK, Appellant, v. William F. LAUCK, Appellee.

No. 70-980.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 18, 1971.

John J. O’Day, Jr., for appellant.

William John Mason, Miami, for appel-lee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL, J. and ADAMS, ALTO, Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal for the plaintiff-wife from a final judgment of divorce awarded the defendant-husband. The appellant brought a complaint for separate maintenance and the husband counter-claimed for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty.

The first point presented in this appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment upon the grounds of extreme cruelty. We find the statement of fact which has been used in lieu of a record to be sufficient to support the judgment. Windham v. Windham, 144 Fla. 563, 198 So. 202 (1940); Dowda v. Dowda, Fla.App.1969, 225 So.2d 592.

The second point urges that the trial judge erred in failing to apply the doctrine of recrimination and therefore denying the divorce. We hold that recrimination is not applicable as a matter of law to the facts of this case because the trial court necessarily found that the husband’s desertion was a direct consequence of the cruelty proved. Harmon v. Harmon, Fla.App.1961, 128 So.2d 164; Benson v. Benson, Fla.App.1958, 102 So.2d 748.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-K
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL INFORMATION.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             NOV-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1998
<CASH>                                             191
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,791
<ALLOWANCES>                                        81
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                              32
<DEPRECIATION>                                      15
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   6,866
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                          2,099
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           113
<OTHER-SE>                                         806
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     6,866
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   887
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      112
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    46
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 368
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    234
<INCOME-TAX>                                        82
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                151
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       151
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                          39,751
<SECURITIES>                                    20,827
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,170
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (990)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                72,321
<PP&E>                                          31,420
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (9,795)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 768,886
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           24,835
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           883
<OTHER-SE>                                     741,518
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   768,886
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               107,921
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  199,917
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (1,066)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (93,062)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       865
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (93,927)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (93,927)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.09)


</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 165 (Friday, August 24, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 42963-42964]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-18090]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration #15644 and #15645; Colorado Disaster Number CO-
00100]


Administrative Declaration of a Disaster for the State of 
Colorado

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is a notice of an Administrative declaration of a 
disaster for the State of COLORADO dated 08/10/2018.

[[Page 42964]]

    Incident: Westminster Apartment Fire.
    Incident Period: 07/22/2018.

DATES: Issued on 08/10/2018.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 10/09/2018.
    Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: 05/10/2019.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street SW, 
Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416, (202) 205-6734.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of 
the Administrator's disaster declaration, applications for disaster 
loans may be filed at the address listed above or other locally 
announced locations. The following areas have been determined to be 
adversely affected by the disaster:
Primary Counties: Adams
Contiguous Counties:
    Colorado: Arapahoe, Broomfield, Denver, Jefferson, Morgan, 
Washington, Weld
    The Interest Rates are:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Physical Damage:
  Homeowners With Credit Available Elsewhere.................      3.875
  Homeowners Without Credit Available Elsewhere..............      1.938
  Businesses With Credit Available Elsewhere.................      7.220
  Businesses Without Credit Available Elsewhere..............      3.610
  Non-Profit Organizations With Credit Available Elsewhere...      2.500
  Non-Profit Organizations Without Credit Available Elsewhere      2.500
For Economic Injury:
  Businesses & Small Agricultural Cooperatives Without Credit      3.610
   Available Elsewhere.......................................
  Non-Profit Organizations Without Credit Available Elsewhere      2.500
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The number assigned to this disaster for physical damage is 15644 5 
and for economic injury is 15645 0.
    The States which received an EIDL Declaration # are Colorado

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008)

Linda E. McMahon,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2018-18090 Filed 8-23-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
#### Robert Charles LEGGETT, Appellant, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Appellees.

No. K-340.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.

April 8, 1969.

Sistrunk & Kaler, Jacksonville, for appellant.

George D. Gabel, Jr., of Kurz, Toole, Taylor & Moseley, Jacksonville, for ap-pellees.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff has appealed an order granting defendant a new trial on the ground that the verdict rendered in plaintiff’s favor is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

Plaintiff sued defendant for personal injuries sustained when a motor vehicle which he was operating was negligently struck by defendant’s switch engine at a railroad crossing in the City of Jacksonville. To the complaint defendant interposed the defenses of general denial and contributory negligence. It was upon the issues thus drawn by these pleadings that the jury rendered its verdict in plaintiff’s favor.

We have carefully reviewed the record before us and find therein a sub*17stantial basis for the trial court’s conclusion that the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The order granting a new trial was rendered in the exercise of a sound, broad discretion and will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. As held by our Supreme Court in Cloud v. Fallis: 1

> “The burden to make error clearly appear is on the appellant. Although when such an attempt is made the record must be examined by the appellate court, the assailant cannot content himself simply to submit the record and expect the order to be upset if the reviewing body finds, in cold type without benefit of any of the circumstances known to the trial judge, and never to be known to the appellate court, that there appears to be some ‘substantial competent evidence’ supporting the verdict.”

The holding in Cloud v. Fallis has been respected and followed by this court in decisions subsequently rendered by it.2

In support of his position for reversal of the order appealed, appellant places reliance on the decisions rendered by this court reversing orders granting new trials in the cases of Cobb v. Brew 3 and Dailey v. Hendricks.4 We are unable to agree with appellant that the record in the case sub judice justifies placing it in the same evidentiary posture as that found to exist in Cobb and Dailey, supra. In those cases an examination of the record failed to disclose any basis which could be said to support the trial court’s order granting a new trial, and the manifest weight of the evidence, if any, in those cases preponderated more strongly in favor of the verdict than against it.

For the foregoing reasons the order appealed is affirmed,

WIGGINTON, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., and RAWLS, JJ., concur,

1

. Cloud v. Fallis, (Fla.1959) 110 So.2d 669, 673.

2

. Glisson v. North Florida Telephone Company, (Fla.App.1988) 210 So.2d 25; Spearman Distributing Company v. Boyette, (Fla.App.1968) 205 So.2d 690.

3

. Cobb v. Brew, (Fla.App.1963) 155 So.2d 814.

4

. Dailey v. Hendricks, (Fla.App.1968) 213 So.2d 600.
# C_2014408EN.01000201.xml

| 15.11.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 408/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.11.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 408/2

---

THE OFFICE OF THE BODY OF EUROPEAN REGULATORS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

Publication of the final accounts for the financial year 2013

2014/C 408/02

The complete version of the final accounts may be found at the following address:

http://www.berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec_office/budget_of_the_office/final_accounts/4371-final-accounts-2013

---
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk March 4, 2013

s0225 

# Order

March 4, 2013

146189

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 146189

COA: 305354

Wayne CC: 11

- 003430

- FH

CHARLES THEO TILLMAN,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 20, 2012

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

V IVIANO

, J., not participating.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-60420

Summary Calendar

Edgar Dodany Reyes Padilla, 

Petitioner,

versus

William P. Barr, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A201 143 975

Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Edgar Dodany Reyes Padilla, a native and citizen of Honduras,

petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his 

application for withholding of removal, which he sought based on, inter alia,

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 27, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 19-60420 Document: 00515617341 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/27/2020
No. 19-60420

2

his membership in a particular social group. Reyes Padilla does not brief and 

thus has abandoned any challenge to the BIA’s additional rulings concerning 

his applications for withholding of removal based on his political opinion and 

for relief under the Convention Against Torture. See Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 

F.3d 588, 593 n.10 (5th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, his failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies as to his CAT claim is a jurisdictional bar to our 

consideration of the issue. See Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 318-19 (5th Cir. 

2009). 

In this court, Reyes Padilla argues that he showed his eligibility for 

withholding of removal because he established his membership in a particular 

social group recognized by the IJ and the BIA, namely the Reyes family, and 

members of the group have suffered persecution. He contends that the 

persecution of other members of the Reyes family entitles him to a rebuttable 

presumption that he would suffer persecution if he is returned to Honduras. 

Alternatively, Reyes contends that he showed a clear probability of future 

persecution based on the persecution of other members of the Reyes family.

It is undisputed that Reyes Padilla has never suffered any physical 

harm. Given Reyes Padilla’s testimony that, notwithstanding threats,

members of his family have remained in Honduras unharmed for years, the 

denial of his application for withholding of removal was supported by 

substantial evidence, and he has not demonstrated that the evidence compels 

a contrary conclusion. See Zhu, 493 F.3d at 596-97; see also Martinez-Lopez v. 

Barr, 943 F.3d 766, 771 (5th Cir. 2019); Gonzalez-Soto v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 682, 

683-84 (5th Cir. 2016); Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677, 680-82 (5th Cir. 2007).

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for review is DENIED in part 

and is DISMISSED in part.

Case: 19-60420 Document: 00515617341 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/27/2020
#### Tommy Lee MILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 68-18.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

Sept. 18, 1968.

Robert E. Jagger, Public Defender, and Carleton L. Weidemeyer, Asst. Public Defender, Clearwater, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and William D. Roth, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant is appealing a judgment and sentence entered upon his plea of guilty to the charge of manslaughter. The defendant was charged with second degree murder. On the day of trial, defendant appeared with counsel and plead guilty to the crime of manslaughter. The trial judge, after an investigation of defendant’s background and of the facts of the case, sentenced defendant to twenty years imprisonment. Furthermore, the judge stated that defendant would not receive credit for time served in jail prior to entry of judgment and sentence. Under § 782.07, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the maximum term of detention that can be imposed for the crime of manslaughter is twenty years. The defendant contends that this maximum was erroneously exceeded due to the trial court’s • failure to credit him for time spent in jail prior to entry of judgment and sentence.

Florida Statute § 921.161(1), F.S.A. provides :

> “No court, officer, or agency shall have any authority to cause a sentence to imprisonment to begin running at any time prior to the date it is imposed. However, a judge imposing such a sentence may allow the defendant credit thereon for all or any part of the time spent by him in the county jail prior to sentence, provided that any such allowance must be for a specified length of time and it may be provided for in the sentence or by order thereafter made during the same *102term of court at which the sentence is imposed.”

A reading of the above quoted statute discloses that the decision concerning credit for jail time is one of judicial discretion and the defendant is not entitled, as a matter of right, to credit for such time. See 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1995(5). The statute further discloses that the sentence of imprisonment cannot “begin running at any time prior to the date it is imposed.” Therefore, defendant’s term of imprisonment begins upon sentencing and time spent by defendant in jail prior to sentencing is not a part of that sentence unless credit is expressly given by the trial judge.

The defendant’s other contention has been considered and found to be without merit.

The judgment and sentence are affirmed.

LILES, C. J., and ALLEN and HOB-SON, JJ., concur.