Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1371 | December 3, 2020 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Victoria Bailey Casanova

Casanova Legal Services, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Catherine E. Brizzi

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Matthew Powell,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 3, 2020 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

20A-CR-1371 

Appeal from the 

Fayette Superior Court 

The Honorable 

Hubert Branstetter, Jr., Special 

Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

21D01-1904-F3-278 

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] After Matthew Powell (“Powell”) entered an open plea agreement with the

State, the trial court sentenced him to eight years for Level 4 felony dealing in 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1371 | December 3, 2020 Page 2 of 13

methamphetamine1 and enhanced that sentence by seven years because of 

Powell’s habitual offender status,

2 yielding an aggregate sentence of fifteen 

years. Powell raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to cite 

Powell’s guilty plea as a mitigating factor; and

II. Whether Powell’s fifteen-year aggregate sentence is 

inappropriate considering the nature of his offense and his 

character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 15, 2019, an officer observed Powell driving away from a residence. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 41. The officer was aware that Powell was an habitual 

traffic offender, so he alerted other patrol units of Powell’s location and vehicle 

description. Id. Officers located Powell and conducted a traffic stop; they 

searched Powell and his vehicle. Id. Officers located a plastic medication 

container that held two Suboxone pills and 1.5 grams of methamphetamine in 

Powell’s coat pocket. Id. Powell stated, “[T]hat meth isn’t mine. I just picked 

it up and was taking it to somebody.” Id. Officers also found a plastic bottle 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2).

2

See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1).
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that contained nineteen empty niacin capsules, which they believed were used 

to store and transport drugs. Id. 

[4] On April 16, 2019, the State charged Powell with Level 4 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine, Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 5 

felony operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of license for life, and Class A 

misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 36. 

On April 26, 2019, the State amended the information to allege that Powell was 

an habitual offender. Id. at 16. Powell had charges pending in two other cases 

under cause number 21C01-1707-F5-546 (“Cause 546”) and cause number 

21C01-1511-F5-893 (“Cause 893”). Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 53. Under 

Cause 546, Powell had pending charges for Level 5 felony possession of 

methamphetamine, Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance, Class C 

misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and an alleged habitual offender 

status. Id. Under Cause 893, Powell had pending charges for aiding, inducing, 

or causing dealing in a narcotic drug and an alleged habitual offender status. 

Id. 

[5] Powell entered a plea agreement that called for him to plead guilty to Level 4 

felony dealing in methamphetamine and to being an habitual offender and, in 

turn, the State would dismiss Powell’s charges for Level 6 felony possession of 

methamphetamine, Level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of 

license for life, and Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 47. Under the agreement, Powell also pleaded guilty 

to possession of methamphetamine under Cause 546 and aiding, inducing, or 
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causing dealing in a narcotic drug under Cause 893. Id. Thus, the State agreed 

to dismiss the remaining charges in Cause 546 for Level 6 felony maintaining a 

common nuisance, Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and the 

alleged habitual offender status and to dismiss the habitual offender charge in 

Cause 893. Id. The plea agreement left the sentence to the trial court’s 

discretion. Id. 

[6] The trial court accepted the plea agreement. Tr. Vol. II at 26. It imposed an 

eight-year sentence for Level 4 dealing in methamphetamine and enhanced the 

sentence by seven years because of Powell’s habitual offender status, all to be 

served in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). Id. at 26-27. The 

trial court found Powell’s criminal record as an aggravating factor, noting that 

he had “at least 15 prior convictions.” Id. at 26. It found no mitigating factors. 

Id. Powell now appeals. We will provide additional facts as necessary. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Discretion

[7] Powell claims the trial court abused its discretion in failing to cite his guilty plea

as a mitigating factor. Sentencing is left to the discretion of the trial court, and 

an appellate court reviews its decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. 

Singh v. State, 40 N.E.3d 981, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. An abuse 

of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before the trial court. Id. The finding of mitigating 

circumstances falls within the trial court’s discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 
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N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). The trial 

court is not obligated to find a circumstance to be mitigating merely because it 

is advanced by the defendant. Id. at 493. The trial court is also not required to 

give the same weight to mitigating circumstances as does the defendant. Id. at 

494. 

[8] An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor 

requires the defendant to show that the mitigating factor is both significant and 

clearly supported by the evidence. Id. at 493. Further, if the trial court does not 

find the existence of a mitigating factor, is it not obligated to explain why it has 

found that the factor does not exist. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion only 

if “the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits 

reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, 

or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.” Baumholser v. State, 62 

N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490), 

trans. denied. 

[9] Powell is correct that as a general rule, a defendant who pleads guilty is entitled 

to some mitigating weight for the guilty plea:

Our courts have long held that a defendant who pleads guilty 

deserves to have some mitigating weight extended to the guilty 

plea in return. A guilty plea demonstrates a defendant’s

acceptance of responsibility for the crime and at least partially 

confirms the mitigating evidence regarding his character. Scheckel 

v. State, 655 N.E.2d 506, 511 (Ind. 1995); see also Williams v. State, 

430 N.E.2d 759, 764 (Ind.1982) (“[A] defendant who willingly 

enters a plea of guilty has extended a substantial benefit to the 
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state and deserves to have a substantial benefit extended to him 

in return.”).

Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ind. 2005) (some internal citations omitted).

[10] However, whether a trial court should cite a guilty plea as a mitigating factor 

“is necessarily fact sensitive, and not every plea of guilty is a significant

mitigating circumstance that must be credited by a trial court.” Cherry v. State, 

772 N.E.2d 433, 436-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Trueblood v. State, 715 

N.E.2d 1242, 1257 (Ind. 1999)), trans. denied. “For example, a guilty plea may 

not be significantly mitigating when it does not demonstrate the defendant’s 

acceptance of responsibility, or when the defendant receives a substantial benefit in 

return for the plea.” Smith v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1251, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)

(quoting Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221) (emphasis added). 

[11] Powell acknowledges that a guilty plea is not necessarily entitled to mitigating 

weight if a defendant receives a substantial benefit from the guilty plea, but he 

argues that he did not receive a substantial benefit from the guilty plea. First, 

he contends that he received no benefit from the dismissal of the Level 6 felony 

possession of methamphetamine charge because he could not have been 

convicted of both possession of methamphetamine and dealing in 

methamphetamine because the possession offense was a lesser included offense 
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of the dealing charge.

3

 Powell then acknowledges that he received “some 

limited benefit from the plea agreement” but contends this benefit was not 

substantial, so the trial court abused its discretion in not citing his guilty plea as 

a mitigating factor. Appellant’s Br. at 13. 

[12] Here, Powell received a significant benefit from the guilty plea through the 

dismissal of the charges for Level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle after 

forfeiture of license for life and Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled 

substance. As Powell acknowledges, he could have received a sentence 

between two years and eight years for Level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle 

after forfeiture of license for life. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6. He also admits that 

he could have received a one-year sentence for Class A misdemeanor 

possession of a controlled substance. See Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2. What Powell 

fails to acknowledge is that the plea agreement dismissed charges in Cause 546 

and Cause 893, including charges for Level 6 felony maintaining a common 

nuisance and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II at 47. Thus, Powell received a substantial benefit from the plea 

agreement. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to 

cite Powell’s guilty plea as a mitigating factor. 

3 We will assume without deciding that the possession charge was a lesser included offense of the dealing 

charge and that the trial court could not have entered judgment of conviction on both offenses.
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II. Inappropriate Sentence

[13] Powell argues that his sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of his 

offenses and his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise 

a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find the 

sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of the offense and the character 

of the offender. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. The nature of offense compares 

the defendant’s actions with the required showing to sustain a conviction under 

the charged offense, Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008), while 

the character of the offender permits for a broader consideration of the 

defendant’s character. Anderson v. State, 989 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2013), trans. denied. Whether a sentence is inappropriate turns on our sense of 

the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to 

others, and other factors that come to light in a given case. Cardwell, 895 

N.E.2d at 1224.

[14] We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court but 

also any other factors appearing in the record. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 

856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We defer to the trial court’s decision, and our goal is 

to determine whether the appellant’s sentence is inappropriate, not whether 

some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 

864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by 

compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such 

as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s 

character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good 
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character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). When we 

review a sentence, we seek to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived 

correct result. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225.

Nature of Offense

[15] Powell argues that his fifteen-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate because 

he contends “nothing about this offense is remarkable” or merits imposing two 

years more than the advisory sentence for a Level 4 felony. Appellant’s Br. at 15-

16. When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the 

starting point in our analysis. Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011); Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494. A Level 4 felony carries an advisory 

sentence of six years, with a range of two to twelve years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-

5.5. An habitual offender enhancement for a person convicted for a Level 4 

felony ranges between six and twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1). 

[16] The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the 

commission of the offense. Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 

The nature of the offense refers to a defendant’s actions in comparison with the 

elements of the offense. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. When determining 

whether a sentence that exceeds the advisory sentence is inappropriate, “we

consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as 

committed by the defendant that ‘makes it different from the typical offense 

accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.’” Moyer v. 

State, 83 N.E.3d 136, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Holloway, 950 N.E.2d 

at 807), trans. denied.
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[17] Here, the nature of Powell’s sentence does not make his sentence inappropriate. 

Powell decided to drive despite the fact that he was an habitual traffic offender 

and had lost his license for life in 2003 after repeated incidents of operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated and driving with a suspended license. Appellant’s Conf.

App. II at 58-59. Also, it appears Powell was out on bond when he committed 

the instant offenses. See Tr. Vol. II at 17, 25-26. Moreover, regardless of the 

seriousness of his crimes, Powell did not receive the maximum sentences. His 

sentence for dealing in methamphetamine was only two years above the 

advisory sentence, and his habitual offender enhancement was only one year 

above the minimum possible enhancement. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5; Ind. 

Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1). Thus, Powell’s crime did not need to be especially 

egregious to justify the fact that his sentence for Level 4 dealing in 

methamphetamine was only two years above the advisory sentence. Powell’s 

sentence was not inappropriate considering the nature of his offense. 

Character of the Offender

[18] Powell cites a variety of factors in contending his fifteen-year aggregate 

sentence is inappropriate considering his character. First, Powell admits that he 

frequently uses illegal drugs, but he contends this does not reflect poorly on his 

character because he is addicted to drugs. Since the age of fifteen, Powell has 

used heroin and Dilaudid. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 63. He also began using 

alcohol at that age but quit consuming alcohol in 2009. Id. During the last five 

years, Powell has used methamphetamine. Id. Powell explains that although 

he had been incarcerated as a result of drug offenses previously, he had not 
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received treatment for anything other than alcohol abuse. Tr. Vol. II at 11-12,

15. Powell states that he attempted to sign up for treatment programs in DOC’s 

Purposeful Incarceration program during his most recent five-year 

incarceration, but he never reached the top of the selection list because the trial 

court had not issued an order recommending Powell’s placement in that 

program. Id. at 12-13. 

[19] Second, Powell acknowledges that he has an extensive criminal history, but he 

contends this does not reflect poorly on his character because most of his 

convictions were related to traffic offenses or crimes related to his substance 

abuse. He argues that his lack of drug treatment during his thirty years of 

substance abuse “renders his recidivism unsurprising.” Appellant’s Br. at 18. 

Thus, he contends his criminal history should not reflect negatively on his 

character. 

[20] Third, Powell claims his medical problems should persuade us that his fifteenyear aggregate sentence was inappropriate. His health problems include

depression and anxiety, diabetes, degenerative back disorder, hypertension, and 

foot problems. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 62. Since 1996, Powell has had 

ten back surgeries and seventeen surgeries on his feet. Id. 

[21] We reject Powell’s argument that his drug use and addiction do not reflect 

poorly on his character. Powell started abusing alcohol and heroin when he 

was fifteen years old and has been abusing drugs for thirty years. Appellant’s 

Conf. App. Vol. II at 63. Although the court ordered Powell to participate in 
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alcohol counseling in 2002, Powell never sought out treatment for his decadeslong addiction to heroin until he attempted to participate in the DOC’s

Purposeful Incarceration program at some point within the previous five years 

Tr. Vol. II at 11-13. 

[22] We next reject Powell’s efforts to minimize his criminal record by stating that 

most of his convictions were for traffic offenses or offenses related to his 

addiction. We first observe that many of his convictions were for other kinds of 

offenses. These include convictions for robbery, theft, battery resulting in 

bodily injury, criminal mischief, and false informing. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 

II at 56-60. Moreover, we reject Powell’s suggestion that convictions for traffic 

offenses do not reflect poorly on his character. Four of his prior traffic related 

convictions were for operating while intoxicated, an offense that endangers the 

public. Id. at 57-59. While the record supports Powell’s contention that he 

suffers from addictions to heroin and methamphetamine, he could have made 

the prudent decision to not drive while under the influence of illegal drugs or 

alcohol but chose to do so anyway. Powell’s other traffic-related convictions 

include two convictions for operating while an habitual traffic violator and two 

convictions for driving while suspended; such offenses show flagrant disregard 

for the consequences of his prior convictions. Id. at 56-60. In total, Powell’s 

thirty-five-year criminal history includes fifteen convictions (eight for felonies 

and seven for misdemeanors), at least two revocations of probation, and 

multiple arrests. Id. Powell’s criminal record does not speak well to his 

character. 
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[23] Finally, we reject Powell’s argument that his medical problems should persuade 

us that his fifteen-year aggregate sentence was inappropriate. We are not 

required to consider a defendant’s poor health to be a mitigating circumstance. 

Henderson v. State, 848 N.E.2d 341, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Furthermore, 

Powell does not demonstrate or even allege a nexus between his medical 

problems and his lengthy history of criminal misconduct. Thus, we conclude 

that Powell’s sentence was not inappropriate considering his character. And 

because we earlier found that Powell’s sentence was not inappropriate 

considering the nature of his offense, we conclude that Powell is not entitled to 

a sentence reduction pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[24] Affirmed. 

Pyle, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.