No. 81453 

FILE 

MAY 2 0 2022 

EL1ZA3 BROOM 

CLERK OF 6U C 

BY 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

SATICOY BAY LLC SERIES 8149 

PALACE MONACO, 

Appellant, 

VS. 

WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR 

THE STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE 

RATE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, 

PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES 

SERIES 2005-11, 

Res • ondent. 

ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND 

This is an appeal from a district court order granting summary 

judgment, certified as final under NRCP 54(b), in an action to quiet title. 

Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Ronald J. Israel, Judge.' 

The district court granted summary judgment for respondent, 

concluding that the first deed of trust survived the HOA's 2013 foreclosure 

sale. As the basis for its conclusion, the district court found that respondent 

produced evidence showing that the former homeowner made payments on 

his outstanding balance and that the HOA's agent allocated those payments 

to the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien, thereby curing the default as 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted in this appeal. 

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to that portion of the lien. Cf. 9352 Cranesbill Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank 

(Cranesbill), N.A., 136 Nev. 76, 78-80, 459 P.3d 227, 230-31 (2020) (holding 

that a homeowner, and not just a first deed of trust beneficiary, can cure a 

superpriority default so long as the homeowner's payments are allocated to 

that portion of the HONs lien). 

Appellant contends that reversal is warranted because (1) 

respondent did not produce sufficient evidence showing that the 

homeowner's payments were allocated to the superpriority portion of the 

HONs lien, (2) appellant was protected as a bona fide purchaser, or (3) 

respondent's 2018 quiet title counterclaim was time-barred. We disagree 

with appellant's first two arguments but conclude that remand is necessary 

to determine whether respondent's counterclaim was timely.2 

With respect to appellant's first argument, respondent contends 

that it produced evidence in the form of "Payoff Allocation Report[s] from 

the HONs agent showing that the agent allocated the homeowner's 

payments to the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien. And to combat 

appellant's sole argument in district court that respondent needed to 

produce evidence directly frorn the HOA showing how the HOA would have 

allocated the payments, respondent relied on the HONs interrogatory 

responses wherein it stated that it in essence deferred to its agent's 

allocation policy. We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to show that 

the HOA chose to allocate the homeowner's payments to the superpriority 

21n light of these conclusions, we need not address the parties' 

remaining arguments. 

2 
portion of the HOA's lien.3 See Cranesbill, 136 Nev. at 80-81, 459 at 231-32 

(recognizing that if the debtor does not choose how to allocate the payments, 

the creditor has the right to choose how to allocate the payments). 

With regard to appellant's second argument that it is a bona 

fide purchaser and that evidence of the payment needed to be recorded, we 

recently reiterated that those arguments are inapposite because satisfying 

the superpriority portion of an HOA's lien preserves a first deed of trust as 

a matter of law and does not constitute a "conveyance" that needs to be 

recorded.4 See Saticoy Bay LLC Series 133 McLaren v. Green Tree Servicing 

LLC, 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 85, 478 P.3d 376, 379 (2020) ("While a court's 

authority to look beyond a foreclosure deed in a quiet title action is an 

inherent equitable power, a valid superpriority tender cures a default 'by 

operation of law'—that is, without regard to equitable considerations." 

(internal citation omitted)); id. (rejecting the argument that evidence of a 

tender needs to be recorded because "Rjendering the superpriority portion 

3For the first time on appeal, appellant contends that the agent's 

allocation contradicted the homeowner's choice regarding how to allocate 

the payments, as is purportedly reflected in a June 2013 "Payment 

Agreemenr between the homeowner and the agent. Even if this argument 

were not waived, .see Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 

981, 983 (1981), it lacks merit because the homeowner's May 2013 payment 

shown on the agent's May 2013 "Payment Allocation Report" preceded the 

June 2013 "Payment Agreemene and was itself sufficient to satisfy the 

superpriority portion of the HOA's lien. 

4To the extent appellant suggests that this holding somehow 

contradicts the foreclosure deed's recital that there was a "default," we note 

that this recital remains accurate even after the superpriority default has 

been cured because the subpriority portion of an HOA's lien remains in 

default. 

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of an HOA lien does not create, alienate, assign, or surrender an interest in 

land" (quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 134 Nev. 604, 

609, 427 P.3d 113, 119 (2018))). Accordingly, the district court correctly 

determined that the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien was satisfied 

before the foreclosure sale. 

With regard to appellant's third argument, we recently held in 

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder Properties, Inc., 138 Nev., 503 P.3d 299 (2022), 

that NRS 11.220s four-year limitations period governs a deed of trust 

beneficiary's quiet title claim in situations such as in this case. We further 

held that an HOA's foreclosure sale itself is not sufficient to trigger the 

limitations period and that, instead, "the statute of limitations should not 

run against a lienholder until it has something closely analogous to 'notice 

of disturbed possession, such as repudiation of the lien." Id. at 306 (quoting 

Berberich v. Bank of Am., N.A., 136 Nev. 93, 97, 460 P.3d 440, 443 (2020)). 

Thus, under Thunder Properties, we are unable to determine as a matter of 

law whether respondent's 2018 counterclaim challenging the effect of the 

HOA's 2013 foreclosure sale was timely. Cf. Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. 

Ctr., 128 Nev. 246, 253, 277 P.3d 458, 463 (2012) (The appropriate accrual 

date for the statute of limitations is a question of law only if the facts are 

uncontroverted." (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted)). 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment in favor of respondent 

and remand for consideration of appellant's statute-of-limitations argument 

in light of Thunder Properties. Consistent with the foregoing, we 

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)1 1947A 4 
Parraguirre 

-16—A , J. 

Hardesty Gibbon;" 

r. J. 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND 

REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with 

this order.5 

cc: Hon. Ronald J. Israel, District Judge 

TRILAW 

Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn, Ltd. 

Troutman Pepper/Atlanta 

Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

5The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

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