Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re Estate of Rodden, 2015 IL App (1st) 140798

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re ESTATE OF ANGUS RODDEN, a Disabled Person (Robert F. 

Harris, Cook County Public Guardian and Plenary Guardian of the 

Estate and Person of Angus Rodden, a disabled person, 

Petitioner-Appellee, v. Audrey Newton, Respondent-Appellant).

District & No. First District, First Division

Docket No. 1-14-0798

Filed January 12, 2015

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

In an action arising from an order entered by the trial court pursuant to

a petition filed by the public guardian finding that respondent had 

breached her fiduciary duty to a disabled person for whom she had 

been granted power of attorney over his health care and personal estate 

by improperly writing checks from his account to herself, the trial 

court properly denied respondent’s motion to vacate the trial court’s 

order, notwithstanding respondent’s contention that the order was 

void for lack of jurisdiction because the public guardian could only 

proceed by issuing a citation pursuant to section 16-1 of the Probate 

Act and a summons under section 2-201 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure, since the “petition” mechanism used by the public 

guardian is a recognized remedy and is the substantive equivalent of a 

citation to discover assets and is the functional equivalent of a 

summons to the extent that it commanded respondent to appear in 

court on a certain date, time and place to account for her actions.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-P-6818; the 

Hon. Kathleen McGury, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
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Counsel on

Appeal

Kienlen & Pietsch, of Wheaton (J. Laurence Kienlen, of counsel), for 

appellant.

Robert F. Harris, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Kass A. Plain and 

Christopher Williams, of counsel), for appellee.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justices Cunningham and Connors concurred in the judgment and 

opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 In his waning years, Angus Rodden, age 93, granted his friend and caretaker, Audrey 

Newton, a power of attorney over his health care and personal estate. Robert Harris, the 

public guardian of Cook County, apparently believing Rodden was not being cared for in an 

optimal manner, filed a petition for guardianship over Rodden in the circuit court of Cook 

County. The court granted that petition. Newton appeared at the hearing on the guardianship 

and resigned as Rodden’s agent under the power of attorney. These resignations were in 

writing and filed with the court below. After acquiring guardianship, the public guardian 

investigated Rodden’s situation and discovered that Newton had written checks from 

Rodden’s account to herself totaling $17,000.

¶ 2 The public guardian then filed a two-count pleading entitled “Petition for Accounting 

under Power of Attorney for Property.” The petition’s prayer for relief asks, among other 

things, that the court order Newton to file an accounting within 21 days, hold a hearing on 

any improper disbursements, and enter a judgment against Newton for any money 

improperly taken. Copies of the checks in question were attached to the petition. 

¶ 3 The petition is largely based on several interrelated provisions of the Illinois Power of 

Attorney Act. 755 ILCS 45/1-1 et seq. (West 2012). The first requires agents to maintain 

records of any disbursements they make on behalf of the principal and to provide copies of 

those records upon request to the principal’s court-appointed guardian. 755 ILCS 45/2-7(c) 

(West 2012). The same law also provides that the public guardian may “petition the court for 

an order” requiring the agent to produce her record of receipts and disbursements. (Emphasis 

added.) 755 ILCS 45/2-7(d) (West 2012). It specifies that if the agent fails to do so and the 

court finds that the agent’s failure to provide her record in a timely manner to the public 

guardian was without good cause, the court may assess costs and attorney fees against the 

agent, and “order such other relief as is appropriate.” Id. Finally, it provides that an agent is 

liable to the principal for the amount required to make the principal whole. 755 ILCS 

45/2-7(f) (West 2012). 

¶ 4 On April 25, 2012, the trial court entered an order granting the public guardian leave to 

file the petition and to serve it upon Newton through a special process server, and setting the 
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case for May 18 for “Audrey Newton to appear and for status.” On May 14, 2012, a special 

process server personally served Newton with a copy of the April 25 order and the petition, 

but not with a summons. Newton does not dispute the validity of this service. After Newton 

did not appear at the May 18, 2012, hearing, the court entered an order directing her to file an 

accounting by June 8 and to appear on June 14. The same day, the public guardian sent 

Newton a letter by regular and certified mail, enclosing a copy of that order. The record 

contains a returned certified mail “green card” for the letter indicating it was delivered on 

May 19 but which bears no recipient’s signature. On June 14, 2012, after Newton twice 

failed to appear in court to respond to the petition, the court entered an order finding that 

Newton had breached her fiduciary duty to Rodden and imposed a judgment against her for 

$17,000. 

¶ 5 Rodden died two weeks later, on June 30, 2012. On October 15, 2013, the trial court 

closed the disabled person’s estate, after the public guardian had accounted for his work on 

the matter and distributed Rodden’s assets to various heirs.

¶ 6 On November 19, 2013, Newton, through counsel, filed a motion to vacate the $17,000 

judgment, alleging that it was void for lack of jurisdiction. Newton alleged that the public 

guardian could only proceed by issuing a citation under section 16-1 of the Illinois Probate 

Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/16-1 (West 2012)) and a summons under section 2-201 of the 

Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-201 (West 2012)). Newton admitted that she 

was physically present at the initial guardianship hearing but noted that she had never filed 

an appearance in the case. The public guardian responded, essentially arguing that: (1) the 

petition was a valid method of proceeding to collect money the agent owed the ward; and (2) 

Newton subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the court by participating in the original 

guardianship hearing. Newton did not testify at the hearing on the motion to vacate, but her 

counsel indicated that Newton did not respond to the court orders or the petition because of 

“contempt” and “bad feelings” she held toward the public guardian’s office. After briefing 

and argument, the trial court denied the motion to vacate. The court stated that the petition 

“does comply with all of the requirements of due process. It notifies the Respondent. It 

notifies Ms. Newton. It gives her an opportunity to appear and defend. It advises her of the 

consequents of not appearing.” This appeal followed.

¶ 7 We begin with several basic principles which our supreme court recently reaffirmed. For 

its judgment to be valid, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and 

jurisdiction over the parties. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, 

¶ 17. A judgment entered by a court without jurisdiction is void and may be challenged at 

any time, either directly or collaterally. Id. We review de novo whether the trial court 

obtained personal jurisdiction. Id. Personal jurisdiction is established either by service of 

process in accordance with statutory requirements or if a party voluntarily submits to the 

court’s jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 18. Here, Newton was personally served with the petition, and she 

does not contest the validity of that service. Accordingly, the trial court had personal 

jurisdiction over her. 

¶ 8 Newton, however, also challenges the manner in which the petition was labeled, 

essentially contending that the public guardian sought the wrong remedy, and she leapfrogs 

that into an argument that the trial court had no jurisdiction. She correctly notes that the 

public guardian could have accomplished a similar result by framing his pleading as a 

citation to recover assets and serving it upon Newton along with a summons. However, the 
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Power of Attorney Act specifically states that a guardian may proceed instead by “petition,” 

and the context of the relevant section makes it clear that the petition is not a new and 

independent proceeding requiring a new case number and judicial assignment, but rather is in 

the nature of a third-party counterclaim brought under the aegis of the existing guardianship 

case. 755 ILCS 45/2-7(d) (West 2012). Section 2-201 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 

also specifies that actions are commenced by “complaint,” unless otherwise expressly 

provided by statute. 735 ILCS 5/2-201 (West 2012). Therefore, the “petition” mechanism 

used by the public guardian is statutorily recognized; the remedies were not as limited as 

Newton contends. More importantly, it is well established that “when analyzing a party’s 

request for relief, courts should look to what the pleading contains, not what it is called.” 

In re Haley D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 67. A plain reading of the petition reveals that it is the 

substantive equivalent of a citation to recover assets. Similarly, the court order accompanying 

the petition was the functional equivalent of a summons. It commanded Newton to appear 

and account before the court on a specified date, time and place. 

¶ 9 Due process requires that before a court deprives someone of property, such as by 

entering a money judgment, the party is entitled to notice and an opportunity for a hearing 

appropriate to the nature of the case. Passalino v. City of Zion, 237 Ill. 2d 118, 124 (2009). 

The various notices issued here more than comport with basic due process requirements. 

¶ 10 The record contains no transcript of the original guardianship hearing at which Newton 

appeared and resigned her agency under the power of attorney. Because we resolve the issues 

presented on the grounds set forth above, we need not address whether Newton’s 

participation at that hearing and any statements she made orally subjected her to the 

jurisdiction of the court. 

¶ 11 For these reasons, we find that the trial court correctly denied the motion to vacate the 

judgment. 

¶ 12 Affirmed.