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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

SAGINAW EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

Respondent-Appellant/CrossAppellee, FOR PUBLICATION May 2, 2017
9:00 a.m.

V No. 329419
MERC KATHY EADY-MISKIEWICZ, LC No. 13-013125

Charging Party-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

Respondent-Appellant/CrossAppellee,

V No. 329425
MERC KATHY EADY-MISKIEWICZ, LC No. 13-013127

Charging Party-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

SAGINAW EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

Respondent-Appellant/CrossAppellee,

V No. 329426
MERC MATT KNAPP, LC No. 13-013128

Charging Party-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,-2-Respondent-Appellant/CrossAppellee,

V No. 329427
MERC MATT KNAPP, LC No. 13-013129

Charging Party-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

SAGINAW EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

Respondent-Appellant/CrossAppellee,

V No. 329428
MERC JASON LAPORTE, LC No. 13-013130

Charging Party-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

Respondent-Appellant/CrossAppellee,

V No. 329429
MERC JASON LAPORTE, LC No. 13-013131

Charging Party-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

SAGINAW EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

Respondent-Appellant/CrossAppellee,

V No. 329430
MERC SUSAN ROMSKA, LC No. 13-013132-3-Charging Party-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

Respondent-Appellant/CrossAppellee,

V No. 329431
MERC SUSAN ROMSKA, LC No. 13-013134

Charging Party-Appellee/CrossAppellant.

STANDISH-STERLING EDUCATIONAL
SUPPORT PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION MEA/NEA,

Respondent-Appellant,

V No. 331398
MERC MARK NORGAN, LC No. 14-002293

Charging Party-Appellee.

GRAND BLANC CLERICAL ASSOCIATION and MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

Respondents-Appellants,

V No. 331762
MERC MARY CARR, LC No. 14-006843

Charging Party-Appellee.

BATTLE CREEK EDUCATIONAL
SECRETARIES ASSOCIATION and MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,-4- Respondents-Appellants,

V No. 331875
MERC ALPHIA SNYDER, LC No. 14-004413

Charging Party-Appellee.

Before: B ECKERING , P.J., and O’C ONNELL and S WARTZLE , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

These consolidated appeals main ly concern the effects of legis lative modifications of the public employment relations act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq. , since 2012—the legislation transforming Michigan into a so- called right-to-work state.

In Docket Nos. 329419, 329425, 329426, 329427, 329428, 329429, 329430, and 329431, respondents, the Michigan Educa tion Association (MEA) and its l ocal affiliate, the Saginaw Education Association, appeal as of right from the September 23 , 2015 decision of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) declaring in violation o f PERA a union rule that allows members to resign only during a one-month window each ye ar, and ordering those respondents to accept resignations the charging parties offered outside that window. The attendant charging parties in turn cross-appeal from that order insofar as it rejected their claim that respondents violated their du ty of fair representation by not more actively informing its members of their resignation rights.

In Docket No. 331398, respondent the Standish-Sterling Educati on Support Personnel Association MEA/NEA appeals from the January 15, 2016 decision of the MERC insofar as it, too, recognized the attendant pa rties’ right to end their union affiliations at will.

In Docket Nos. 331762 and 331875, respondents the MEA and its local affiliates, the
Grand Blanc Clerical Association and the Battle Creek Education al Secretaries Association, appeal as of right from the February 11, 2016 decision of the M ERC insofar as the MERC again held that the charging parties were entitled to end union affil iations at will. The latter union and the MEA additionally contend that the MERC erred in declining t o dismiss the charge underlying Docket No. 331875 as untimely.

For the reasons set forth below , we affirm all of the MERC dec isions at issue.

I. STATUTORY AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. RIGHT-TO-WORK LEGISLATION

Section 9(1)(a) of PERA, MCL 4 23.209(1)(a), establishes that p ublic employees may organize themselves into collective bargaining units. 2012 PA 349, effective March 28, 2013,-5- added § 9(1)(b), establishing that public employees may refrain from such activity. 2012 PA 349 also added subsection (2), which prohibits any person from reso rting to coercion to compel a public employee to become or remain a member of a labor organiz ation, to compel a public employee to refrain from doing s o, or to compel a public employ ee to support such an organization financially. Sec tion 10(1)(a) of PERA, MCL 423.21 0(1)(a), in turn prohibits a public employer from interfering with, restraining, or coercing public employees “in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in s ection 9.” Section 10(2)(a) imp oses the same prohibition on labor organizations while adding that it “does not impair the right o f a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of m embership.” 2012 PA 349 added subsection (3), which, but for exceptions not applicable here, prohibits requiring “an individual . . . as a condition of obtaining or continuing public employme nt” to “[b]ecome or remain a member of a labor organization or bargaining representative,” t o support such an organization financially, or to “[r]efrain or resign from membership in, vol untary affiliation with, or voluntary financial support of a labor organ ization or bargaining represe ntative.” MCL 423.210(3). 2012 PA 53, effective March 16, 2012, amended § 10 to prohibit publi c school employers from using “public school resources to assist a labor organization in coll ecting dues or service fees from wages of public school employees” except in connection with col lective bargaining agreements already in effect when that provision became operative. MCL 42 3.210(1)(b).

B. DOCKET NOS. 329419 AND 329425-329431

The MERC’s decision and order in connection with the eight cas es involving the Saginaw Education Association inc luded a convenient summary of the underlying facts:

[E]ach of the Charging Parties is employed by Saginaw Public Sc hools (Employer) and is part of the bargaining unit represented by th e Respondent Saginaw Education Association (SEA). The SEA is a local affili ate of Respondent Michigan Education Association (MEA), and members of t he SEA are
also members of the MEA and the National Education Association (NEA) due to the organizations’ unifie d membership structure.

Around the time they were hired, each of the Charging Parties signed a “Continuing Membership Applica tion” agreeing to join Respondent s’ unions and authorizing the Employer to deduct union dues from their pay an d transmit those funds to Respondent SEA. Just above the signature line on the application, there are two checkboxes, one for cash payment and one for payroll de duction. The language next to the cash payment checkbox states: “Membership is continued unless I reverse this authorization in writing between August 1 and August 31 of any year.” The language next to the payroll deduction checkbox states: “I authorize my employer to deduct Local, MEA and NEA dues, assess ments and contributions as may be determined from time to time, unless I revoke this authorization in writing be tween August 1 and August 31 of any year.” . . .

Article I of the MEA bylaws provides in relevant part: . . . “Continuing membership in the Association shall be terminated at the reques t of a member when such a request is submitted to the Association in writing, signed by the-6- member and postmarked between August 1 and August 31 of the yea r preceding the designated membership year.” . . .

The collective bargaining agreement between the Employer and R espondent SEA that covered the 1995 to 1998 academic years conta ined a union security agreement and required th e Employer to deduct union du es from employees’ wages when authorized by the respective employees. That contract expired June 30, 1998. The subseque nt collective bargaining ag reements did not contain a union security agreement, but did require the Employe r to deduct union dues from employees’ wages whe n authorized by the respective em ployees. . . .

2012 PA 53 . . . which amended PERA to prohibit public school employers from assisting labor organizations in collecting unio n dues or service fees, became effective March 16, 2012. However, where the publ ic school employer collected dues or service fees pursuant to a collectiv e bargaining agreement that was in effect on the effective date of Act 53, t he prohibition did not apply until the contract expired. The collective bargainin g agreement in place immediately prior to the ma tter at issue expired on June 30, 20 13.

On December 11, 2012, the Michigan Legislature passed 2012 PA 349, which, among other things, expres sly provided that public emplo yees have a right to refrain from union activity and made agency shop illegal for most public employees.

On January 18, 2013, Respondent MEA prepared a letter designed to be provided to members who inquired about resigning from membershi p. The letter indicated that resignation from membership must be submitted in writing and postmarked during the annual August window period.

Pursuant to 2012 PA 53, which prohibited public school employe rs from collecting union dues or services fees from their employees, th e Employer ceased dues deductions after the collective bargaining agreement with Respondent SEA expired on June 30, 2013. Subsequently, Respondents establishe d an e-dues program to allow employees to pay their union dues electronical ly. . . . None of the four Charging Parties signed up for the e-dues program; nor did any of the four pay union dues after the Employer stopped dues deductions.

* * *

In September 2013, [three] Charg ing Parties . . . sent letters to Respondents resigning from the Unions and revoking their dues d eduction authorizations. Respondents informed each of them that their r esignations were not timely in light of the Augus t window period for resignation s. . . .

Also, in September 2013, [the fourth charging party] told an S EA representative that he no longer wanted to pay union dues. On September 11, he received an e-mail from an MEA UniServ director acknowledging h is statement that he was “not interested in paying dues at this time” and as king him to meet-7- with her to discuss his options i n light of that statement. On October 7, [that charging party] sent an e-mail to Respondents explaining that h e had assumed he was no longer a union member if he did not sign up for the e-du es program. . . . In response, Respondents’ agent . . . explained the window peri od, and informed him that failing to sign up for t he e-dues program did not cons titute a resignation
from the Unions.

On October 21, 2013, the charging parties filed unfair labor p ractice charges, alleging violations of MCL 423.209(2)(a) and MCL 423.210(2)(a), as recen tly amended. The following month, they amended their respective charges to allege that res pondents had breached their duties of fair representation fo r having “restrained or coerced Charging Parties in the exercise of their § 9 right to refrain from joining and/or assisting a labo r organization.” Thus, the charging parties alleged that respondent s violated “§ 10(2)(a) of PERA, by refusing to allow Charging Parties to resign their memberships when they attempted to do s o and by threatening to attempt to collect dues they allegedly o wed by hiring a debt collector and/or suing Charging Parties to collect the alleged debt.” The charging parties further allege d that respondents “violated their duty of fair representation under § 10(2)(a) by failing to adeq uately notify them and other teachers of the ‘steps they would need to take to extricate the mselves fully from any financial obligation to the unions.’ ”

The administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the insertio n of right-to-refrain language in § 9 of PERA occasioned a departure from earlier cas elaw regarding “whether the MEA’s August window period vi olates § 10(2)(a) of PERA.” 1 The ALJ then surveyed instructive caselaw and stated that “[i]t is unclear whether a member could, by any means, waive his or her right to resign full membership at any time,” but th at “it is clear . . . that members do not waive their right to resign full membership merely by volun tarily becoming a member of a union that has a rule in its constitution or bylaws restricting the right to resign.” The ALJ elaborated that an employee may waive the right to refrain from continuing financial support of a union after resigning, but that “because this is an agreement t o waive a statutory right, the waiver must be clear, explicit, and unmistakable.” The ALJ opined tha t the charging parties “did not clearly and explicitly waive tha t right either by joining Respo ndents when that organization had a bylaw that restricted when they could resign or by the Continui ng Membership agreements which they signed,” and that respondents’ “continued maintenanc e and enforcement of the August window period . . . violated § 10(2)(a) of PERA because it constituted an unlawful restriction on employees ’ right to resign.”

Respondents objected that the ME RC lacked jurisdiction over wh at respondents characterized as an internal union matter. They argued alterna tively that 2012 PA 349 did not allow union members to resign at will, and that ordering respon dents to refrain from maintaining

1 Specifically, the MERC concluded in West Branch Rose City EA, MEA, 17 MPER 25 (2004), that the MEA’s window period wa s reasonable and organizationall y necessary. However, West
Branch was decided before 2012 PA 349 added the “right to refrain” lan guage to PERA, and the
MERC noted that it would not infer such a right in the absence of clear legislative intent. The passage of 2012 PA 349 adding such language in § 9(1)(b) provid ed such clear legislative intent.-8- and enforcing the policy restricting the timing of resignations would bring about an unconstitutional impairment of res pondents’ contractual relatio n with their members.

The MERC rejected these arguments. Concerning its jurisdictio n, the MERC noted that recent statutory amendments to PERA prohibited unions or employ ers from requiring employees to financially support unions, an d expressly recognized the rig ht of public employees to refrain from joining or supporting labor organizations. Thus, the MERC concluded, “we have jurisdiction to determine whether Respondents’ actions in refus ing to allow Charging Parties to resign from the Unions outside the August window period is an u nlawful restraint on Charging Parties’ right to refra in from union activity.”

The MERC further opined that respondents’ retention of the rig ht to make their own rules concerning the acquisition or ret ention of members under § 10(2 )(a) did not permit them to deny public employees the rights provided by § 9, which now included the right to refrain from union activity. “Accordingly, . . . where employees have a right to refrain from union activity, the union may not make rules interfering with or restraining employ ees in the exercise of that right.” The MERC additionally opined that “as of the effective date of Act 349, Charging Parties had the right to resign their union memberships, subject to any law ful constraints in the parties’ membership contract,” and also tha t “Charging Parties’ membersh ip obligations to Respondents, including the obligation to pay dues, should end at the point C harging Parties provided the Unions with notice of their resignations.” Accordingly, “the U nions’ refusal to allow Charging Parties to resign their union me mberships after Charging Partie s effectively notified Respondent SEA of their respective resignations [constituted] a breach of the duty of fair representation in violation of § 10(2)(a) of PERA.”

Concerning the claim of unconstitutional impairment of contrac t rights, the MERC concluded that “the language of § 10(5) indicates that the Legisla ture intended to make it clear that the changes to PERA in § 10(3) were not to impair existing cont racts.” Additionally, to the
extent that other amendments est ablishing an immediate right to refrain from union affiliation worked a substantial impairment of existing contractual rights, such impairment was justified in light of the “significant and leg itimate public purpose” behind the legislation.

The charging parties asserted that the ALJ erred by concluding that respondents had not failed in any duty to provide its members with “adequate inform ation to make an informed choice during the August window period.” The MERC agreed with the ALJ that the record indicated that respondents had not violated any duty to provide information regarding how the recent legislation affected their members’ resignation opportun ities.

C. DOCKET NO. 331398 The MERC’s summary of the fact s underlying its decision and or der in connection with respondent the Standish-Sterling Educational Support Personnel Association included the following:

Charging Party . . . is employed as a custodian by the Standish -Sterling Community Schools (the Employer) and is part of the bargaining unit represented by the Respondent Standish-Ster ling Educational Support Personn el Association (SSESPA). The SSESPA is a local affiliate of the Michigan Educ ation Association (MEA), and members of the SSESPA are also members of the M EA and the National Education Association (NEA) . . . .-9- On September 14, 2001, the Charging Party signed a “Continuing Membership Application” agreeing to join Respondent and authori zing the Employer to deduct union dues from his pay and transmit those fun ds to Respondent. On the application, . . . language next to the payroll deductio n checkbox states: “I authorize my employer to deduct Local MBA and NEA dues, assessm ents and contributions as may be determined from time to time, unless I revoke this authorization in writing betw een August 1 and August 31 of any year.” Charging Party checked the box for payroll deduction.

* * *

Respondent and the Employer have been party to a series of col lective bargaining agreements each of wh ich contained a provision requi ring members of Respondent’s bargaining unit to a uthorize the Employer to deduc t union membership dues or service fees from their paychecks. . . . The most recent agreement was entered into on November 12, 2012, and expired on June 30, 2015.

* * *

On October 7, 2013, . . . Charging Party sent a letter to the MEA UniServ Director resigning from the Uni on, notifying the Union that he would only pay those dues and fees he could lawfully be compelled to pay as a condition of employment, and revoking his du es deduction authorization. On October 31, 2013, Respondent informed Charging Party that his resignation w as not timely in light of the August window pe riod for resignations.

* * *

Charging Party continued to pay full dues after receiving Resp ondent’s October 31, 2013 letter and, on February 6, 2014, filed the ins tant unfair labor practice charge against Respondent.

As noted, the issues raised in Docket No. 331398 are identical to those raised in the several consolidated appeals discussed above, which the MERC de cided in this case consistently
with its decision in the above cases.

D. DOCKET NOS. 331762 AND 331875

The cases involving respondents the MEA and its local affiliat es the Battle Creek
Educational Secretaries Associat ion (BCESA) and the Grand Blanc Clerical Association (GBCA) also resulted from continuing membership agreements thro ugh which the charging parties authorized their employers, the Battle Creek Schools an d the Grand Blanc Schools, respectively, to deduct union dues from their paychecks. The la st collective bargaining agreement between the Battle Creek Schools and respondent BCESA containing a union security agreement expired before April 2013. The last collective barga ining agreement between the Grand Blanc Schools and the respondent the Grand Blanc Clerical Association that contained a union security agreement and a due s check-off provision expired on June 30, 2013.-10- The MERC summarized the case involving respondents the BCESA a nd the MEA as
follows:

On April 4, 2013, . . . Charging Party . . . sent a letter to the MEA resigning from membership in the Union and revoking her dues de duction authorization. On April 17, 2013, the MEA informed her that he r resignation was not timely because it was not submitted during the August windo w period for resignations. Charging Part y . . . continued to pay dues throu gh June 2013.

On September 17, 2013, after r eceiving a BCESA communication regarding the MEA’s e-dues proces s, [the charging party] sent a n email to the MEA stating that she ha d resigned in April:

I received information regardi ng upcoming dues you are expectin g from me. I would like to remind you that I sent my resignation letter to you last April which was effective immediately. I
understood it would not be effec tive until August of this year and I continued to pay my dues. Please let the appropriate departmen ts know that I will not be paying any more dues since I am no long er a paying member.

On October 9, the MEA . . . again informed [the charging party ] that her resignation was not timely. [Th e charging party] replied on Oc tober 10 as
follows:

I have resigned and that is it. I will no longer be paying uni on dues. . . . [W]hen Michigan passed its Right to Work law, it a lso amended its public-sector labor law to provide employees with a new right to “refrain” from j oining or supporting a union. . .

. Therefore it is illegal now to make restrictions on resignation in Michigan.

On October 31, 2013, [the charging party] received a letter fr om MEA . . .
in which the executive director . . . stated that . . . her res ignation was ineffective because it was not submitted during the MEA’ s August window pe riod.

[The charging party] again emailed the MEA and reiterated her belief that she resigned in April and informed the MEA that she would not b e paying any more dues. On March 18, 2014, [she] filed the unfair labor pra ctice charge involved in this dispute.

In the case involving respondents the GBCA and the MEA, the ch arging party sent a letter to the MEA announcing he r resignation on November 4, 201 3. On December 19, 2013, the MEA replied that, to be effective, her resignation must be subm itted between August 1 and August 31. Respondent continued to demand dues and other asses sments through April 2014. The charging party sent a check covering dues through her Novem ber resignation date, and filed her unfair labor pr actice charge.-11- As noted, the issues raised in these two appeals are identical to those raised in the several consolidated appeals discussed above; the MERC resolved the iss ues consistently with its
decisions in the other cases.

Respondent the BCESA additionally objected that its charging p arty’s March 18, 2014 unfair labor practice charge was not filed within six months of the MEA’s April 2013 refusal to accept her resignation. The MERC rejected that challenge by ca lculating the period of limitations as starting not with t he initial MEA communication refusing to recognize the resignation, but with the MEA’s O ctober 2013 rejection of the c harging party’s efforts in September 2013 to confirm or effectuate her resignation.

II. ANALYSIS

A. JURISDICTION

All respondents challenge the MERC’s jurisdiction to decide wh ether respondent unions’ continued practice of accepting resignations during only limite d windows of opportunity violated PERA, as recently amended.

A tribunal must be vigilant in respecting the limits of its ju risdiction. See Straus v

Governor , 230 Mich App 222, 227; 583 NW2d 520 (1998). The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Etefia v Credit Technologies, Inc , 245 Mich App 466, 472; 628 NW2d 577 (2001). I ssues of statutory interpr etation are also reviewed de

novo. In re Complaint of Rovas , 482 Mich 90, 102; 754 NW2d 259 (2008). A reviewing court should give an administrative agen cy’s interpretation of statut es it is obliged to execute respectful considera tion, but not deference. Id. at 108.

“ ‘The power and authority to be exercised by boards or commissio ns must be conferred by clear and unmistakable language, since a doubtful power does not exist.’ ” Union Carbide Corp v PSC , 431 Mich 135, 151; 428 NW2d 322 (1988) (quotation marks and c itation omitted). Accordingly, “powers specifically conferred on an agency cannot be extended by inference; . . . no other or greater power was given than that specified.” Herrick Dist Library v Library of
Mich , 293 Mich App 571, 582-583; 810 NW2d 110 (quotation marks and citations omitted). However, an administrative agency may exercise such implied aut hority as is “necessary to the due and efficient exercise of the powers expressly granted by t he enabling statute.” Id. at 586 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

MCL 423.201(b) states that “comm ission,” for purposes of PERA, “means the employment relations commissi on . . . .” This Court has noted that “[t]he PERA provides that the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC), the agency created to administer the act, has both exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving [unfair labor practices] and the power, through resort to injunctive relief, to prevent or correct ULPs .” Senior Accountants, Analysts & Appraisers Ass’n v Detroit , 218 Mich App 263, 272; 553 NW2d 679 (1996).

At issue is whether the MERC properly exercised jurisdiction o ver the question of respondents’ resignation windows, given that the issue related to union management with no direct relationship on conditions of employment. In rejecting the jurisdictional challenge, the MERC noted that the recent amendments to PERA prohibited unions or employers from-12- requiring employees to support unions financially, and expressl y recognized the right of public employees to refrain from joini ng or supporting labor organizat ions. Accordingly, the MERC concluded that it had jurisdiction to determine whether unions’ actions in refusing to allow their members to resign from them outside the August window periods w as an unlawful restraint on the members’ rights to refrain from union activity.

Respondents argue that the MERC exceeded its statutory authori ty in reaching the issue of resignation windows, asserting that in doing so it “has inte rpreted out of existence” the provisions of §§ 9(2), 9(3), and 10(3) of PERA. However, MCL 4 23.209(3) merely sets forth the penalty for violations of s ubsection (2), and respondents d o not explain why the MERC’s having decided the issue of resig nation windows is inconsistent with MCL 423.209(2)(a)’s command that no person “force” a public employee to “remain a m ember of a labor organization or bargaining representative or otherwise affiliate with or fin ancially support a labor organization or bargaining representative.” We agree with the reasoning imp licit in the MERC’s decision that restricting the opportunity to re sign from a union to one month out of the year effectively forces continued affiliation for however long it happens to take in a given situation until that time of year arrives.

Respondents emphasize that MCL 423.210(3)(b) sets forth its pr ohibition of requiring a person to “remain a member of a labor organization or bargainin g representative” only where that requirement is imposed “as a condition of obtaining or con tinuing public employment.” However, bearing more directly on the issue is subsection (2)(a ), which, again, prohibits a labor organization from restraining or coercing public employees “in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 9.”

Recent caselaw offers some guidance:

Notably, the Legislature did not change MCL 423.210(2)(a) when it enacted the “Right to Work” law in 2012. We conclude that the plain langua ge of MCL 423.210(2)(a) makes all of the provisions of MCL 423.209, inclu ding MCL 423.209(2)(a), “rights guaranteed in section 9” under MCL 423.2 10(2)(a). Therefore, the violation thereof by defendants alleged by plain tiff is an “unfair labor practice[]” pursuant to MCL 423.216. [ Bank v Mich Ed Ass’n-NEA , 315 Mich App 496, 501-502; ___ NW2d ___ (2016).]

For these reasons, we conclude that the MERC correctly recogni zed its jurisdiction to decide the question of the propr iety of unions’ confining their members’ resignation opportunities to one month each year.

B. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

Respondents contend MERC’s conc lusion that respondents breache d the duty of fair representation by refusing to imm ediately cancel the charging p arties’ memberships or financial obligations upon request was without factual support, and that the duty of fair representation does not apply to the formation or enforcement of membership ag reements that have no direct impact on employment. We hold that, given the recent amendment s to PERA, the MERC-13- committed no substantial or material error of law in concluding that respondents’ resignation windows consisting of one month per year constituted unfair lab or practices under PERA.

“Appellate review of a MERC decision is limited.” Org of Sch Administrators & Supervisors, AFSA, AFL-CIO v Detroit Bd of Ed , 229 Mich App 54, 64; 580 NW2d 905 (1998). The MERC’s “findings of fact are conclusive if they are support ed by competent, material, and
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Grandville Muni Executive Ass’n v City of Grandville , 453 Mich 428, 436; 553 NW2d 917 (1996), citing Const 1963, ar t 6, § 28; see also MCL 423.216(e). “The MERC’s legal determinations may not be disturbed unless they
violate a constitutional or statu tory provision or they are bas ed on a substantial and material error
of law.” Grandville Muni Executive Ass’n , 453 Mich at 436, citing MCL 24.306(1)(a) and (f).

The legislature’s recent enactment of MCL 423.209(2)(a) prohib its a person from forcing a public employee to “remain a member of a labor organization o r bargaining representative or otherwise affiliate with or financially support a labor organiz ation or bargaining representative.” MCL 423.210(1)(a) in turn prohibits a public employer from inte rfering, restrain ing, or coercing public employees “in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section 9.” MCL 423.210(2)(a) imposes the same prohibition on la bor organizations while addin g that it “does not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with r espect to the acquisition or retention of membership.”

Respondents insist that their policy allowing members only a o ne-month window per year to resign falls under MCL 423.210 (2)(a)’s provision preserving a labor organization’s right “to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or rete ntion of membership.” The MERC acknowledged that unions generally retain the right to make rul es governing when an employee may become, or cease to be, a member, where those rules do not affect the members’ employment relationships. The MERC noted, however, that respon dents offered no authoritative support for the proposition that a rule limiting resignation ri ghts to an annual one-month period was permissible under § 10(2)(a) in the face of legislation exp ressly recognizing a union member’s rights to ref rain from union activity.

The MERC additionally took instru ction from the United States Supreme Court’s construction of nearly identical language in 29 USC 158(b)(1)(A ) 2 , where the Court held that “[n]either the [National Labor R elations] Board nor this Court has ever interpreted the proviso as allowing unions to make rules r estricting the right to resign. Rather, the Court has assumed that ‘rules with respect to the . . . re tention of membership’ are t hose that provide for the expulsion of

2 29 USC 158(b)(1)(A) provides th at it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise o f the rights guaranteed in 29 USCA 157, “ Provided , That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor org anization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of m embership therein.”-14- employees from the union.” [3] Pattern Makers’ League of North America , 473 US 95, 107-109; 105 S Ct 3064; 87 L Ed 2d 68 (1985).

Respondents undertake to distinguish Pattern Makers’ on two grounds. First, Pattern
Makers’ concerned the reasonableness of the National Labor Relations B oard’s holding that for a union to fine an employee who resi gns from membership and then returns to work during a strike is to engage in an unfair labor practice. Second, the United S tates Supreme Court reasoned that,
at the time of the enactment of the federal legislation respect ing a union’s right to make its own rules regarding the acquisition or retention of membership, res trictions in union constitutions or bylaws on the right to resign we re generally unknown, and thus, could not have been contemplated by Congress when it enacted the provision. See Pattern Makers’ , 473 US at 102- 103, 110. By contrast, respondents contend, the MERC has recog nized such restrictions since at least 1970, and had earlier appr oved one-month resignation wind ows. Respondents further contend that the pertinent fede ral legislation and caselaw addr essed a history of “abuses” involving union membership as a condition of employment.

In our view, however, the pertinent statutory history is that of our own Legislature’s having enacted the right-to-work amendments to PERA against the historical backdrop that respondents describe. The obvious intent behind MCL 423.209(1) (b) and MCL 423.209(2), whether we agree with it or not, included protecting public emp loyees against barriers to acting on the desire to discontinue union affiliation or support.

For these reasons, the MERC correctly concluded that “the lang uage of § 10(2)(a) relied upon by Respondents does not permit unions to deny a public emp loyee the rights provided by § 9, which now include the right to refrain from union activity,” and, that “where employees have a right to refrain from union activity, the union may not make rules interfering with or restraining

3 In support of this assertion, th e Court referred to legislativ e history of the Taft-Hartley Act
consistent with the Court’s interpretation of the proviso:

Senator Holland, the proviso’s s ponsor, stated that § 8(b)(1)(A ) should not outlaw union rules “which ha[ve] to do with the admission or the expulsion of members.” 93 Cong Rec 4271 (1947) (emphasis added). Senator Taft accepte d the proviso,
for he likewise believed that a union should be free to “refuse [a] man admission to the union, or expel him from the union .” Id . at 4272 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the legislative history of the Labor-Management Re porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 USC § 401 et seq ., confirms that the proviso was intended to protect union rules involving admission and expulsi on. Accordingly, we find no basis for refusing to defer to the [National Labor R elations] Board’s conclusion that League Law 13 is not a “rule with respect to th e retention of membership,” within the meaning of the proviso. [ Pattern Makers , 473 US 95, 109-110; 105 S Ct 3064, 3072-3073; 87 L Ed 2d 68 (1985) (altera tions in the original).]-15- employees in the exercise of that right.” 4 Accordingly, the MERC did not commit a substantial and material error of law when it concluded that, in limiting r esignation opportunities to one month of each year, respondents were stepping beyond establishi ng membership policy and governance as allowed under § 10(2 )(a) and into the substantial forcing of continued union affiliation or support in viola tion of MCL 423.209(2)(a). Sect ion 9(2)(a) commands that no person “force” a public employee to “remain a member of a labor organization or bargaining representative or otherwise affiliate with or financially suppo rt a labor organiz ation or bargaining representative,” and is made a pplicable to labor organizations through MCL 423.210(2)(a).

4 We note that this interpretation of the “right to refrain” lan guage is consistent with relevant case law interpreting “right to refrain” language found in the federal analogue to MCL 423.209(1), 29 USC 157. The National Labor Relations Board opi ned in Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II) , 263 NLRB 984 (1982), enf denied, 725 F2d 1212 (CA 9, 1984), t hat restricting the right to resign for 30 days for union members w ho resigned while a strike was looming or ongoing was reasonable given the competing interests of the union and the would-be resigner. In a seminal concurrence, two members of the Board ( members Van De Water and Hunter) stated that any restraint on the right to resign violated a member’s statutory right to
refrain under 29 USC 157. In Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Ae rospace Workers, Local Lodge 1414, AFL-CIO (Neufeld Porsche-Audi) , 270 NLRB 209 (1984), the Board relied on several
decisions from the United States Supreme Court that, among othe r things, developed the
distinction between internal uni on actions and external matters , to overrule Dalmo Victor II and its progeny and adopted the position of Van De Water and Hunter . It was this position that the United States Supreme Court cited with approval in Pattern Makers , 473 US 105, as consistent with the policy of voluntary unionism. Subsequent to its Pattern Makers decision, the Court granted certiorari for Dalmo Victor and remanded it to the 9 th Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Pattern Makers

. NLRB v Machinists Local 1327, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Work ers, AFL-CIO, Dist Lodge 115 , 473 US 901; 105 S Ct 3517 (Mem); 87 L Ed 2d 646 (1985) (1985).

As the ALJ in the cases at bar pointed out, Pattern Makers and its predecessors discussed voluntary unionism in the context of full union membership rath er than “financial-core” membership. In other words, the cases addressed when a full un ion member could resign and escape the discipline of the union for actions like not support ing a concerted action, rather than when a member whose obligation to the union extended only to fi nancial support could resign.

In Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Wo rkers, Local 2088 (Lockheed Inc) , 302 NLRB 322 (1991), the Board extended the principle of voluntary unionism to allow a financial-core member not subject to a union security agr eement to resign outside the win dow provided by the member’s dues-checkoff authorization agreement. While decisions of the NLRB certainly are not binding, Michigan courts have long recognized that “precedents under the National Relations Act (NLRA), from which the PERA is d erived, are to be persuasively considered.” Lamphere Sch v Lamphere Federation of Teachers , 400 Mich 104, 120; 252 NW2d 818 (1977); Detroit Police Officers Assoc v City of Detroit , 137 Mich App 87, 95; 357 NW2d 816 (1984).-16- C. WAIVER

Respondents argue that the MERC erred in rejecting their argum ent that the charging parties waived the right to discontinue union affiliation at wi ll by voluntarily entering into membership agreements that limited their resignation rights to the specified annual periods. 5 Respondents emphasize that the agreements at issue here were no t the product of collective bargaining, and did not address any condition of employment, an d characterize those agreements
as contracts whose terms the MERC should have enforced.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “many unio n rules” violate members’ statutory rights even t hough otherwise “valid under th e common law of associations.”

Pattern Makers’ , 473 US at 113. The Court simila rly acknowledged the rational e that “a member, by joining the union, enters into a contract, the terms of which are expressed in the union constitution and by-laws,” but held that “union disciplin e cannot be analyzed primarily in terms of the common law of contracts,” because union membership “contemplates a continuing relationship with changing obligations . . . as far removed fro m the main channel of contract law as the relationships created by marriage, the purchase of a sto ck certificate, or the hiring of a

servant.” Id. at 113 n 26 (quotation marks a nd citation omitted). We agree that respondents’
reliance on conventional contract principles in this instance i s inapt.

The MERC distinguished union membership in the sense of formal personal affiliation
from financial-core membership , meaning the obligation to pay union dues or related fees, and it refrained from deciding whether the right to resign union membe rship in the pure sense may be waived while holding that a member may contractually waive the right to disengage from
financial-core commitments a t will if doing so i n clear, explic it, and unmistakable terms. 6

The MERC correctly recognized that waivers of statutory rights must be clear and unambiguous. See Staple v Staple , 241 Mich App 562, 568; 616 NW2d 219 (2000); 51A CJS, Labor Relations, § 330, p 37 (“The contractual waiver of a stat utory right in a labor agreement must be clear and unmistakable or must be established by clear and express contractual language.”). We further agree with the MERC that merely joinin g or remaining a member of a union with a bylaw or constituti onal provision purporting to li mit the right to resign does not constitute a clear, explicit and unmistakable waiver of the sta tutory right to refrain from union
affiliation. The MERC also corre ctly differentiated, for prese nt purposes, memb ership in a union from financial support of a union. See Communications Workers of American v Nat’l Labor

5 Although respondent the Standish-S terling Education Support Pe rsonnel Association joined the other respondents in raising this issue in the cases below, the MERC expressly de clined to decide it in connection with that responde nt on the ground that it was simply satisfied to recognize that the pertinent charging party’s “resignation from the union, tho ugh outside the window period, was sufficient to end his membership.” Where a party has raise d an issue below, the lower
tribunal’s failure to decide it should not be treated as the pa rty’s failure to preserve it. See

Klooster v Charlevoix , 488 Mich 289, 310; 795 NW2d 578 (2011).

6 See, e.g., Lockheed Inc , 302 NLRB 49.-17- Relations Bd , 215 F2d 835, 838 (CA 2, 1954) (“a member of a voluntary assoc iation is free to resign at will, subject of course t o any financial obligations due and owing the association”).

As an initial matter, we note that the charging parties signed their membership agreements before enactment of the right to refrain language in PERA, and when their collective bargaining agreements authorizing their employers’ collection o f dues expired, they attempted in various ways to resign or let their membership lapse. The unio n agreements here at issue did not define “membership” as the obligation to pay dues or fees, or o therwise specify that restrictions set forth on disassociation opportunities were limited to the l atter. For that reason, and because the restrictions on resignati on opportunities as set forth mere ly reflected general union policy, we agree with the MERC that the charging parties below did not cle arly, explicitly, and unambiguously waive their right t o discontinue their financial support of, or other forms of affiliation with, their respective respondent unions.

Accordingly, we conclude that the MERC correctly held that the right to discontinue financially supporting a union may be waived if the waiver is c lear, explicit, and unmistakable, but that the agreements upon which respondents rely did not con stitute such explicit and
unmistakable waivers of the char ging parties’ st atutory right t o refrain fr om union membership at any time.

D. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS

Respondents argue that the MERC’s determinations that the char ging parties did not have to respect respondents’ resigna tion windows intruded on the lat ter’s expressive or associational rights under the federal and state constitutions. See US Const , Am I; Const 1963, art 1, §§ 3, 5. In raising this issue, however, respondents fail to address the question of preservation below, in violation of MCR 7.212(C)(7), or otherwise give any indication that the MERC was asked to
consider it. 7 Although this Court reviews cons titutional questions de novo, In re Ayres , 239 Mich App 8, 10; 608 NW2d 132 (1999), unpreserved issues are rev iewed for plain error affecting substantial rights, Kern v Blethen-Coluni , 240 Mich App 333, 336; 612 NW2d 838 (2000).

Respondents argue that the MERC’s interpretation of the pertin ent statutory scheme, as recently amended, to allow union members to withdraw their unio n support at will infringes upon their associational rights. The obvious retort is that to hold otherwise, such that labor organizations could hold members to financial obligations until the next resignation window came about, would infringe on their members’ associational righ ts. Resolving that tension in
favor of union members’ freedom to disassociate better comports with the right-to-work, or right-to-refrain, policy now e mbodied within the PERA.

7 Respondents remind this Court that the MERC does not have the authority to decide a constitutional claim, but noneth eless has a duty to interpret i ts enabling statutes in ways that avoid raising constitutional issues. See Jackson Co Ed Assoc v Grass Lake Community Sch Bd of Ed , 95 Mich App 635, 641; 291 NW2d 53 (1979).-18- Respondents protest that the MERC’s decision in this regard “a llows . . . individuals who
would otherwise be excluded to e lect Association leaders and sp okespeople and to participate in governance decisions that directly shape the message and priori ties of the Association.” Further, it allows individuals to “take advantage of the member-only ben efits available to them on September 1 and . . . resign on September 2, creating an entire ly new class of free-rider,” and also forces respondents “to conv ey the message that ‘no commitm ent’ ‘free-riders’ are welcome within the Association.” We reje ct the characterization of the MERC’s position concerning resignation windows as compelling respondents to accept the par ticipation of members they would prefer to exclude. If respondents raise a legitimate con cern over members’ accepting a union benefit on one day then ending union support the next, an d if locking members into fixed periods of obligation to provide financial support were the onl y way to avoid such imbalances
between benefits received and c ontributions provided, responden ts’ remedy would be to offer membership agreements that clearly and unmistakably set forth w aivers of the right to discontinue financial support befo re a specified date, as discu ssed above.

To the extent that respondents reiterate for this issue their arguments from contract law,
we reiterate that the United St ates Supreme Court has recognize d that “union discipline cannot be analyzed primarily in terms of the common law of contracts.” Pattern Makers’ , 473 US at
113 n 26.

For these reasons, we conclude that the MERC did not commit a substantial and material error of law, or plain error, when it decided these cases witho ut taking it upon itself to develop and resolve in respondent’s favor arguments relating to constit utional rights of expression and
association.

E. IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT

Respondents argue that the MERC has interpreted 2012 PA 349 in a way that violates the constitutional prohibitions of l egislation that impairs obligat ions of contract. See US Const, art I, § 10, cl 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”); Const 1963, art 1, § 10 (“No . . . law impairing the obligation of contract shall be enacted.”).

Respondents again rely on contra ct principles in support of th eir contention that the charging parties may not resign outside of the month of August in any given year, but this position is likewise foiled by the unsuitability of characteriz ing union membership agreements as
contracts. See Pattern Makers’ , 473 US at 113 n 26. Indeed, the impropriety of trying to analyze an issue of union discipline in accord with ordinary co ntract law is apparent from
consideration of the criteria fo r analyzing a constitutional cl aim of this sort:

A three-pronged test is used to analyze Contract Clause issues . The first prong considers whether the stat e law has operated as a substan tial impairment of a contractual relationship. T he second prong requires that leg islative disruption of contractual expectancies be n ecessary to the public good. The third prong requires that the means chosen by the Legislature to address th e public need be reasonable. . . . [I]f the legislative impairment of a contrac t is severe, then to be upheld, it must be affirmatively shown that (1) there is a sign ificant and legitimate public purpose for the regulation and (2) that the means adopte d to implement the-19- legislation are reasonably related to the public purpose. [ Health Care Ass’n Workers Comp Fund v Dir of Bureau of Worker’s Compensation , 265 Mich App 236, 241; 694 NW2d 761 (2005) (citations omitted).]

Because, as discussed above, the MERC correctly recognized tha t the relationship
between union and union member i s not strictly contractual in n ature, and correctly took the position that the membership agreements on which respondents re ly did not constitute waivers of the right to discontinue financial support for want of clear, e xplicit, and unmistakable statements to that effect, the MERC’s determination that the charging par ties’ right to refrain from union participation included the right to discontinue financial suppo rt at will neither substantially impaired a contractual relationshi p nor disrupted contractual e xpectancies. Concerning whether the Legislature chose a reasona ble means of addressing a public need, we hold that establishing a broad right to refrain from union affiliation is reasonably rel ated to the legislatively identified public need for voluntary unionism.

For these reasons, we conclude that the MERC did not commit a substantial and material error of law in concluding that its recognition of the right to discontinue union support at will, absent a clear, explicit, and unmistakable waiver of that right , did not work a substantial impairment of the obligations of contract.

F. TIMELINESS OF ONE CHARGE

Respondents the BCESA and the MEA argue that the MERC erred by failing to recognize that its charging pa rty in Docket No. 331875 filed he r unfair labor practices charge after the applicable period of limitations had run. We disagre e.

But for an exception relating to persons serving in the armed forces, a person bringing an unfair labor practice charge bef ore the MERC must do so within six months of the act engendering the charge. MCL 423.216(a). T hat limitation period “comme nces when the person knows of the act which caused his injury and has good reason to believe that the act was improper or done in an improper manner.” Huntington Woods v Wines , 122 Mich App 650, 652; 332 NW2d 557 (1983). “[I]t it not necessary that the person recognize that he has suffered invasion of a legal right.” Id.

Not in dispute in this case is that the charging party e-maile d a letter in April 2013 to respondent announcing her resignation from the union and revoca tion of her authorization for a dues deduction, that the MEA’s representative informed her by e -mail on April 17, 2013 that her resignation was untimely and would not be accepted, that she se nt an e-mail on September 17, 2013 asserting that she had indeed resigned in April, and that on October 9, 2013 the MEA’s representative again informed he r that her resignation was not timely. The charging party then filed her unfair labor practice charge over the matter on March 18, 2014. The timeliness of that charge, then, depends on whethe r one calculates the period of l imitations from the April 17, 2013 e-mail of the MEA’s representative, or from that representative ’s e-mail of October 9, 2013 in response to the charging party’ s efforts in September 2013 to e nsure that her membership had ended. The MERC deemed the charge timely on the ground that th e October communication of the MEA’s representative “consti tuted a separate, independent u nfair labor practice in violation of §10(2)(a).”-20- Respondents protest that the MER C thus improperly afforded the charging party the benefit of the continuing wrongs doctrine, according to which “ the period of limitations does not begin to run on the occurrence of the first wrongful act; rathe r, the period of limitations will not begin to run until the continuing wrong is abated.” Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club , 283 Mich App 264, 280; 769 NW2d 234 (2009). We agree with respondents that application of the continuing wrongs doctrine in connection with an unfair labor practices charge would be inapt. See Blazer Foods, Inc v Restaurant Props, Inc , 259 Mich App 241, 247; 673 NW2d 805 (2003) (rec ognizing application of the d octrine only in connection with actions in trespass, nuisance, and civil rights); Garg v Macomb Co Community Mental Health

Servs , 472 Mich 263, 290; 696 NW2d 646 (2005) (“the ‘continuing viol ations’ doctrine . . . has no continued place in the jurisprudence of this state”), amende d on unrelated grounds on denial of rehearing 473 Mich 1205 (2005). But the MERC did not invoke the doctrine, having properly
treated the MEA’s October 2013 co mmunication to the charging pa rty not as a mere reiteration of its April 2013 comm unication, but as a separate and independ ent unfair labor practice.

The charging party made clear in her September 2013 communicat ion that, at that time, she accepted respondents’ assertion that her April 2013 resigna tion would not be effective until the following August, and that she had continued to pay her due s, but that when August came she expected respondents to accept her resignation without furt her action on her part. Accordingly, the MEA’s represent ative’s indication of a refusal , as communicated in October 2013, to honor the charging party’s April resignation on any te rms, including the charging party’s expectation that it would become effective in August, w as an adverse action in connection with a substantially new controversy. The MERC thus committed no legal error in treating the charge filed in Ma rch 2014 as timely relating to a grievance originating with the
MEA’s October 2013 communication.

G. DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

On cross-appeal, the charging parties in the cases involving r espondents the Saginaw Education Association and the MEA argue that the MERC erred in rejecting their contention that
those unions violated their dut y of fair representation by fail ing to provide sufficient information to their members on applicable r esignation procedures. We agre e with the MERC that the Legislature signaled that it di d not intend for unions to sprea d information a bout 2012 PA 349 by having included within the legis lation an appropriation to the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs to respond to public inquiries, and to infor m public employers, employees, and attendant labor organizati ons concerning their rights and r esponsibilities, regarding the legislation. See MCL 423.210(7)(a) and (c).

“It is clear that a labor organization has a duty, imposed by various labor law statutes, to fairly represent its members.” Goolsby v Detroit , 419 Mich 651, 660; 358 NW2d 856 (1984), citing PERA, along with the Natio nal Labor Relations Act, 29 US C 151 et eq. , and the labor mediation act, MCL 423.1 et seq. “Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent’s statutory authori ty to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statut ory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct .” Goolsby , 419 Mich at 661. However, the cross-appealing charging parties cite no authority that stands for the proposition that a union’s duty of fair representation extends to such acti vity antagonistic to the union goal of-21- promoting the mutual benefit of its membership as actively publ icizing the procedures for disassociating from it.

We thus agree with the MERC that the Legislature recognized th at the duty of fair representation did not include a duty to take active responsibi lity for disseminating information about the new options for disassociation from union activities under 2012 PA 349 by assigning that responsibility to the Depart ment of Licensing and Regulato ry Affairs.

Further, it is not as if the respondents at issue wholly faile d to provide such information
to their members. The MERC summarized the situation as follows , the factual particulars of which the cross-appealing cha rging parties do not dispute:

Charging Parties’ membership in the Unions was voluntary. . . . At the time each of them joined the Unions, they signed a Continuing Membership Application that provided their membership would continue unless they revoked th e membership authorization in writing betw een August 1 and August 31 of any year. . . . That document put them on notice that they had the right to terminat e both their membership and their obligation to pay union dues upon submitti ng written notice during August of any given year. . . . Charging Parties have n ot denied that they received a copy of the Continuing Membership Application. Moreo ver, the MEA bylaws contain language describi ng the procedure for resignatio n from membership. Those bylaws are posted on the MEA website and are available to the general public.

. . . There is no evidence that Charging Parties requested inf ormation about the procedure for resigning before they submitted letters of resignation. After receiving Charging Parti es’ letters of resignation, Respo ndent informed them that, because they did not submit their resignations durin g the August window period, they could not resign at that time. Respondents provided each of the Charging Parties with information about resigning after the y attempted to resign.

While Respondents did not activ ely publicize the procedure forresignation, there is no evidence that either Respondent declined to p rovide the necessary information about resignation to any requesting union member. Indeed, the record indicates that the information was provided to any union member who requested it.

The MERC thus well identified enough avenues that respondents m ade available for their members to discover pertinent resignation procedures to put to rest the allegation that respondents engaged in some kind of campaign to exploit its mem bers’ ignorance in that regard.

For these reasons, we conclude that the MERC correctly conclud ed that respondents did not fall short of their duty of f air representation by declinin g to take the initiative to provide
information to their members on a pplicable resignation procedur es.-22- III. CONCLUSION

To summarize, we hold that estab lishing a broad right to refra in from union affiliation is reasonably related to the legis latively identified public need for voluntary unionism. We conclude that, in a proper exerc ise of jurisdiction, the MERC c ommitted no substantial or material error of law in concluding that respondents’ resignati on windows of one month per year constituted unfair labor practices under PERA as recently amend ed, and that such windows exceeded matters of internal union policy and governance. We f urther conclude that the MERC did not commit a substantial and material error of law, or plai n error, when it decided these cases without taking it upon itself to d evelop and resolve in respond ent’s favor arguments relating to constitutional rights of expres sion and association, when it co ncluded that the right of a union member to resign union membership at will, absent a clear, expl icit, and unmistakable waiver of that right, did not work a substa ntial impairment of the obliga tions of contract. Finally, we conclude that MERC committed no legal error in treating the cha rge filed in March 2014 (Docket No. 331875) as timely rela ting to a grievance originati ng with the MEA’s October 2013
communication.

Affirmed.

/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle