allows the district court to appoint counsel if the petitioner is unable to 

comprehend the proceedings and an individual with a language barrier is 

not able to comprehend the proceedings. Petitioner further argues that 

the district court may appoint post-conviction counsel to assist with 

discovery and discovery would be required because of the language 

barrier. See NRS 34.750(1)(c). Petitioner argues that the failure to 

appoint counsel to assist him in filing a petition deprives him of access to 

the courts. 

We decline to exercise our original jurisdiction because 

petitioner has not demonstrated that the district court has exercised its 

discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner. See NRS 34.160; Int? 

Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Din. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 

P.3d 556, 558 (2008). There is no recognized constitutional right to the 

appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings. See Brown v. 

McDaniel, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 60, 331 P.3d 867, 870 (2014); see also 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991). The appointment of postconviction counsel in a non-capital case is governed by NRS 34.750(1). 

NRS 34.750(1) requires that a petition be filed before post-conviction 

counsel can be appointed as the statutory language refers to a "petition" 

and indicates that the district court may appoint counsel when the 

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petition was not going to be summarily dismissed.' NRS 34.750(3) further 

lends support to the requirement that a petition be filed prior to the 

appointment of counsel as post-conviction counsel may file "supplemental" 

pleadings. NRS 34.735 informs a petitioner that if he wants to have 

counsel appointed for the post-conviction proceedings he must complete 

the Affidavit in Support of Request to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. The 

factors set forth in NRS 34.750(1) help guide the district court's discretion 

in whether to appoint counsel after a petition has been filed, but these 

factors do not require the appointment of counsel prior to the filing of a 

petition. 2And the filing of the petition is critical in one other respect—the 

filing date of the petition determines the timeliness of the petition, NRS 

34.726(1); an order appointing counsel would not satisfy the filing 

"NRS 34.745(4) provides that the district court may summarily 

dismiss a second or successive petition when it appears that the petitioner 

has not demonstrated he is entitled to relief based on any of the grounds 

set forth in NRS 34.810(2). 

2We agree that a language barrier may demonstrate that a 

petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings and that the district 

court should, after the filing of a petition, consider the severity of the 

language barrier when deciding whether to appoint post-conviction 

counsel. See generally Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 

2006) (recognizing that equitable tolling in the federal courts requires a 

non-English-speaking petitioner demonstrate that during the time period, 

the petitioner was unable to procure either legal materials in his own 

language or translation assistance despite diligent efforts). We note that 

the factors set forth in NRS 34.750(1) do not require the petitioner to 

demonstrate that the petition is not frivolous as argued by the State 

below. 

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requirement of NRS 34.726(1). We further conclude that petitioner has 

not demonstrated that the alternative relief requested, transcription of 

every document in the record into Spanish, is required in this case. 

Petitioner must file a petition to begin the post-conviction proceedings. 

Prior to the filing of the petition, petitioner's requests for accommodations 

are premature. 

Petitioner has submitted a motion for leave to file an amended 

petition for a writ of mandamus as an emergency petition for writ of 

mandamus; we deny the request. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that 

relief is needed in less than 14 days. 

Petitioner has also submitted a motion to stay the time to file 

a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. 

Petitioner relies upon tolling provisions applicable in civil cases, NRAP 

8(c), and argues that those rules should apply in this case as a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not strictly criminal for 

all purposes and NRS 34.780(1) provides for application of the Rules of 

Civil Procedure in post-conviction proceedings. We deny the motion. The 

rules of civil procedure apply in post-conviction habeas proceedings to the 

extent the rules are not inconsistent with the rules that govern the filing 

of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See NRS 

34.780(1). Petitioner's request, however, is inconsistent with the rules 

that govern the filing of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus. A post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a 

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Gibbons 

J. 

Pickering 

statutory remedy and the Legislature has provided no provision for 

staying the time to file a petition, see NRS 34.726(1); rather, a petitioner 

must file a petition within the statutory deadline or file a late petition and 

demonstrate good cause for his failure to file a timely petition, see id. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 3 

cc: Hon. Carolyn Ellsworth, District Judge 

Rogelio Martinez-Orellano, a/k/a Rogelio Martinorellan 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

3It is unclear why the district court denied the Clark County Public 

Defender's request to withdraw as it appears that their representation has 

come to an end. 

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