1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LOUISE TRAUMA CENTER LLC, 

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 21-2371 (JDB)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY, 

 Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Louise Trauma Center LLC (“LTC”) seeks an award of attorney’s fees and costs 

incurred in litigation over several requests for information from the Department of Homeland 

Security (“DHS”) under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. For the 

following reasons, the Court will grant the motion in part and award LTC $43,895 in attorney’s 

fees and costs.

Background 

Louise Trauma Center describes itself as a nonprofit organization “dedicated to raising 

awareness about immigrant women who have suffered from gender-based violence such as female 

genital mutilation (FGM), rape, domestic violence, and forced marriage.” Compl. [ECF No. 1] 

¶ 5. In May and September 2020, the organization filed eleven FOIA requests with DHS. See id. 

¶¶ 7–62. The requests concerned records of training for asylum and FOIA officers, as well as 

information about a DHS asylum research office. See id. DHS acknowledged receipt of the 

requests and assigned them processing numbers. See id. But DHS did not provide any substantive 

response until LTC filed suit under FOIA in September 2021, about twelve to sixteen months after 

the FOIA requests were filed. See id. 
2 

Once the lawsuit was initiated, DHS began conducting searches and releasing records 

responsive to LTC’s requests. See LTC’s Mot. for an Award of Att’y. Fees & Costs [ECF No. 36] 

(“Mot.”), Ex. A [ECF No. 36-1] (“Case Chron.”) at 1–2. Beginning in December 2021, the agency 

produced thousands of pages of records and the parties conferred about the adequacy of searches 

and propriety of DHS’s withholdings. On July 26, 2022, following a joint status conference, the 

Court ordered DHS to produce non-exempt documents responsive to LTC’s remaining requests 

and ordered the parties to further confer about remaining issues. Order [ECF No. 16] at 1. The 

parties subsequently submitted status reports informing the Court of the status of production. See

Docket Sheet. After months of negotiation between the parties, DHS released 11 media files and 

8,779 pages, in whole or in part. See Case Chron. at 3.

In June 2023, the parties advised the Court that they had resolved all requests except for 

one: Request #11, which sought “all records concerning the documentation center maintained by 

the Director of International Affairs.” See Joint Status Rep. [ECF No. 24] at 1. The parties filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment, which the Court resolved in favor of DHS, concluding that 

Request #11 did not “reasonably describe” the records sought, and, therefore, that DHS was not 

required by law to respond. See Mem. Op. [ECF No. 35] at 1, 6. 

On February 28, 2024, LTC filed a motion for attorney’s fees of $89,730, fees on fees of 

$21,934, and costs of $402. Mot. at 1. DHS opposed the motion, conceding that LTC is “eligible 

for fees” but arguing that fees should be denied entirely because LTC is not “entitled” to them or 

because LTC’s demand was outrageous. See Def.’s Mem. in Opp. to Mot. [ECF No. 39] at 4, 19. 

Alternatively, DHS contends that the Court should reduce the award requested substantially, to 

fees of $3,085.56 and fees on fees of $1,830.40. Id. at 29, 31. LTC filed a reply. LTC’s Reply to 

Opp’n [ECF No. 40] (“Reply”). The motion is now fully briefed and ripe for resolution. 
3 

Legal Standard 

FOIA provides for recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees where the requester has 

“substantially prevailed.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). The D.C. Circuit has long applied a two-part 

test to determine whether fees should be awarded. See Brayton v. Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., 641 

F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Under the first part, “eligibility,” a court considers whether the 

requester “may” receive fees because he or she has “substantially prevailed” in the litigation. See

id. A FOIA requester “has substantially prevailed if the complainant has obtained relief through 

either” a court order or “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the

complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii); see Grand Canyon Tr. v. 

Bernhardt, 947 F.3d 94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 

If the requester is “eligible” for a fee award, the court proceeds to the second part: whether 

fees “should” be awarded because the requester is “entitled” to them. See Kwoka v. IRS, 989 F.3d 

1058, 1063–64 (D.C. Cir. 2021). When considering the entitlement prong, courts look to four 

factors: “(1) the public benefit derived from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the plaintiff; 

(3) the nature of the plaintiff's interest in the records; and (4) the reasonableness of the agency’s 

withholding of the requested documents.” Id. at 1063 (quoting Morley v. CIA (“Morley I”), 810 

F.3d 841, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). “[T]he first three factors assist a court in distinguishing between 

requesters who seek documents for public informational purposes and those who seek documents 

for private advantage.” Davy v. CIA, 550 F.3d 1155, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The fourth factor, 

by contrast, considers whether the agency’s position “had a reasonable basis in law,” Tax Analysts

v. DOJ, 965 F.2d 1092, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and asks whether the agency was “recalcitrant in 

its opposition to a valid claim or otherwise engaged in obdurate behavior,” McKinley v. FHFA, 

739 F.3d 707, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2014). While the burden of proving entitlement generally rests with 

the requestor, Weisberg v. DOJ, 745 F.2d 1476, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the agency bears the burden 
4 

of showing that any withholding was reasonable, Davy, 550 F.3d at 1163. “No one factor is 

dispositive” of the entitlement inquiry except that “the court will not assess fees when the agency 

has demonstrated that it had a lawful right to withhold disclosure.” Id. at 1159. 

Finally, the court calculates a “reasonable” fee award. Because FOIA provides only for 

the assessment of “reasonable” attorney’s fees, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), the prevailing party must 

show that counsel’s requested rates reflect prevailing market rates for the type of work performed 

and provide documentation “of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to 

determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended.” 

Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see Louise Trauma Ctr. 

LLC v. DHS, Civ. A. No. 20-1128 (TNM), 2023 WL 3478479, at *3–4 (D.D.C. May 16, 2023). 

Analysis 

Applying the FOIA fees framework to this case, the Court concludes that LTC is “eligible” 

for attorney’s fees because it substantially prevailed in the litigation. Further, LTC is “entitled” to 

fees because the public derived benefit from the requested information and DHS lacked a colorable 

basis for withholding the information prior to the onset of this litigation. However, the Court finds 

that the requested fee award is not reasonable because LTC’s counsel billed time for some 

improper and excessive tasks and many of the time-keeping records lack sufficient detail to assure 

the Court that time was reasonably expended. The Court will reduce the hours-billed figure by 

fifty percent to account for these significant defects and will award LTC $43,895 in fees, costs, 

and fees on fees. 

I. Eligibility and Entitlement 

A. Eligibility

As noted above, the first question when ruling on a request for FOIA attorney’s fees is 

whether the requestor is “eligible” for fees because they have substantially prevailed in the 
5 

litigation. Here, DHS concedes that LTC is eligible for fees. Opp’n at 4. And the Court agrees 

for two reasons. First, the Court issued a production order in this case, which has been held to 

render a requester the prevailing party. Jud. Watch, Inc. v. FBI, 522 F.3d 364, 367–68 (D.C. Cir. 

2008); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DHS (“EPIC v. DHS I”), 218 F. Supp. 3d 27, 39 (D.D.C. 2016). 

Second, DHS’s unexplained failure to produce any documents in the year or more after the requests 

were submitted raises an “inference that the agency forgot about, or sought to ignore, [LTC’s]

request,” and that filing of this lawsuit caused DHS to change its position about responding at all. 

EPIC v. DHS I, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 41 (quoting Harvey v. Lynch, 178 F. Supp. 3d 5, 8 (D.D.C. 

2016)). 

B. Entitlement

Next, the Court applies the D.C. Circuit’s four-factor test to determine whether LTC is 

“entitled” to fees. The first factor is whether the public derived benefit from LTC’s request. DHS 

concedes that this factor of the test is met, and the Court concurs. Under D.C. Circuit precedent, 

this factor is satisfied if it is “plausible ex ante that a request has a decent chance of yielding a 

public benefit.” Morley I, 810 F.3d at 844. That is, “the request must have at least a modest 

probability of generating useful new information about a matter of public concern.” Id. LTC’s 

requests for information about the asylum process concern an important issue in the public 

discourse and satisfy the public benefit factor. See Mot. at 16. 

The second and third factors—commercial benefit to the plaintiff and the nature of the 

plaintiff’s interest in the records—are frequently considered together. These factors evaluate 

whether the requestor would be incentivized to sue for the records absent fee shifting because they

already have a strong commercial or private interest in obtaining the records. Davy, 550 F.3d at 

1160. 
6 

LTC contends that it meets the second and third factors because it is a “non-profit 

organization” whose interests are “not frivolous or purely commercial.” Mot. at 18. It notes that 

the organization “posts documents on a regular basis on its website” and “[i]ts lawyers use the 

materials in articles published on ILW.com and elsewhere.” Id. at 17; see Compl. ¶¶ 4–5 

(describing LTC as a “nonprofit organization” “dedicated to raising awareness about immigrant 

women who have suffered from gender-based violence . . . help[ing] women seek asylum . . . 

publiciz[ing] and educat[ing] . . . [and] set[ting] forth new asylum cases, briefs, reports, and 

analysis on the law surrounding these women and their issues”). 

DHS challenges the veracity of LTC’s self-characterization as a non-profit, noting that 

publicly available information suggests LTC is not registered as a tax-exempt organization with 

the IRS and that LTC is registered as a limited liability corporation with the D.C. government. 

Opp’n at 5; Opp’n, Ex. B [ECF No. 39-2] (“LTC Registration”). DHS further assails LTC’s 

description of itself as “dedicated to raising awareness” and “help[ing] women who seek asylum,” 

noting that LTC’s website is primarily a compilation of links to document files and that the posts 

on ILW.com mostly summarize document requests rather than providing analysis of the law. 

Opp’n at 5–6. Finally, DHS points the Court to LTC’s long history of FOIA litigation against 

DHS and other federal agencies. Id. at 6–7 (citing ten pending and three closed cases in the District 

of Columbia and the District of Maryland). Based on these considerations, DHS argues that “it is 

apparent that Plaintiff seeks records not likely for the purpose of disseminating information about 

the Government to the public[;] its interest in the documents is proprietary or private [in] nature 

and does not support an award of fees.” Id. at 7.

The Court shares some of DHS’s concerns about the lack of support for LTC’s claims 

about its corporate identity and its interests in this case. However, the Court disagrees with DHS 

that it can infer that LTC’s incentive is commercial or otherwise “personal” merely from the lack 
7 

of support for LTC’s claims on its website. Opp’n at 6–7; cf. Davy, 550 F.3d at 1160 (reversing 

district court’s holding that requesting documents to research a book was “clearly commercial”). 

Cases finding a private interest weighing against a fee award typically turn on a specific profit 

motive or a particular requester’s personal interest in the records sought. See STS Energy Partners 

LP v. FERC, 214 F. Supp. 3d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2016) (interest in private litigation campaign); 

Zynovieva v. DOS, Civ. A. No. 19-3445 (RDM), 2023 WL 2755599, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2023)

(interest in preparing for visa interview), aff’d, 2024 WL 1946592 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 2024); see 

also Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 1095–96 (interest in speedily obtaining already public information 

for commercial dissemination). DHS might be insinuating that LTC’s counsel has a private 

interest in obtaining attorney’s fees from FOIA litigation pursued on behalf of an LLC registered 

to an individual who shares counsel’s last name. See LTC Registration at 3; Tax Analysts, 965 

F.2d at 1095 (for purpose of evaluating the interest factor “a motive need not be strictly 

commercial; any private interest will do”). But because DHS neither directly makes nor 

substantiates this argument, the Court will not address it further. 

Moreover, the Court finds that LTC has made some public use of the documents it received, 

including sharing them online and including them in blog posts. LTC may not be very effective

at sharing the information it receives, but there is at least some public interest in LTC’s pursuit

and release of the records. Cf. Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 1094 (weighing limited benefit of sharing 

information with small audience). Ultimately balancing these considerations, the Court finds that 

the second and third factors weigh slightly against a fee award. 

The fourth and final factor is the reasonableness of the agency’s withholding of the 

requested documents. This inquiry includes consideration of “whether the agency has shown that 

it had any colorable or reasonable basis for not disclosing” the relevant material and “whether the 

agency has not been recalcitrant in its opposition to a valid claim or otherwise engaged in obdurate 
8 

behavior.” Davy, 550 F.3d at 1162–63. When a government agency does not provide information 

before a lawsuit is filed, the burden is on the agency to provide an explanation. Id. It is not enough 

for the government to say that “it offered no resistance” after suit. Id. While the bare fact that an 

agency did not produce documents within the statutory timeframe does not automatically satisfy 

this factor, Morley v. CIA (“Morley II”), 894 F.3d 389, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2018), a lengthy, 

unexplained delay has been held to satisfy it, Davy, 550 F.3d at 1163; see STS Energy Partners 

LP, 214 F. Supp. 3d at 72 (finding agency lacked a reasonable basis for withholding documents 

when it stonewalled requests until lawsuit was filed, then promptly made disclosures). Here, DHS 

has offered no explanation for why it failed to do anything more than assign processing numbers 

to LTC’s requests in the twelve to sixteen months between submission of the requests and filing 

of the lawsuit. See Mot. at 19; cf. Morley II, 894 F.3d at 393 (crediting government’s evidence 

that it was swamped with a large backlog of requests and that plaintiff’s request was properly 

proceeding through the queue). Accordingly, DHS has not met its burden to show that it had a 

reasonable basis for its sluggish response to LTC’s request. 

DHS contends that the fourth factor is not satisfied here because “there was no improper 

withholding,” apparently construing “withholding” to refer only narrowly to documents withheld 

for a legal reason, such as an exemption to FOIA. Opp’n at 7–8. DHS argues that the fourth factor 

cuts in its favor because LTC was ultimately satisfied with litigation disclosures and the one 

withholding actually litigated resulted in summary judgment for DHS. But this analysis simply 

ignores Davy, which requires courts to consider the propriety of the agency’s delay in producing 

information, not only the agency’s position on whether the information must be legally disclosed. 

550 F.3d at 1162–63. Indeed, DHS has lost on this same argument before. See EPIC v. DHS I, 

218 F. Supp. 3d at 45–46. And none of the cases cited by DHS support the position that an

agency’s subsequent production of documents can cure a prior failure to respond. 
9 

Once this litigation commenced, DHS appears to have been generally cooperative—not 

“recalcitrant” or “obdurate”—working with LTC over the course of months and revisiting initial 

disclosure decisions to produce further information. Cooperation was needed here, where LTC’s 

requests were in certain cases unclear. That is all to DHS’s credit. However, this late assistance

cannot overcome DHS’s unexplained failure to begin processing the requests for more than a year 

after the requests were filed. Because the first and fourth factors weigh in favor of fees, and the 

second and third factors weigh only slightly against awarding fees, the Court finds that LTC is 

entitled to fees in this case. Cf. Davy, 550 F.3d at 1163 (granting attorney’s fees when first and 

fourth factors weighed in requester’s favor and second and third factors were neutral). 

II. Reasonableness of Fees Requested

Having concluded that LTC is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees, the Court turns to the 

reasonableness of LTC’s request. The parties agree that “[t]he most useful starting point for 

determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the 

litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

The plaintiff bears the “burden of establishing the reasonableness of its fee request, and supporting 

documentation must be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine 

with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended.” Role 

Models Am., 353 F.3d at 245 (cleaned up). Should a prevailing party request “an outrageously 

unreasonable amount,” courts may deny the application for fees in its entirety. Env’t Def. Fund v. 

Reilly, 1 F.3d 1254, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1993). And “[i]n a case of less egregious overbilling, [courts] 

may impose a lesser sanction,” such as reducing the award. Id. Criticizing LTC’s billing practices 

in this case, DHS seeks a blanket denial of fees, or, alternatively, a substantial reduction of the 

award. See Opp’n at 23. 
10 

A. Billing Judgment

DHS contends that the request is outrageous, first, because LTC has not shown “billing 

judgment,” a sort of catch-all term for several issues, which the Court will consider in turn. Off 

the bat, DHS complains that the fee demand here is “facially unreasonable . . . $89,730 in fees—

for a routine FOIA matter” involving “the mere filing of status reports,” in which LTC “achieved 

modest success,” in the form of a single production order for five of eleven requests. Id. at 20. 

Presumably, this argument is intended to cause the Court some sticker shock. While this is 

certainly a high number, it is not particularly shocking considering it results from the hours 

claimed—around ninety—and the attorney’s rate, which LTC claimed as $997 per hour, but which 

even DHS concedes is $700 to $800 (more on that later). The high rate, the result of counsel’s 

years of experience, appears to drive up the fee demand in this case more than the hours expended, 

which equal just over two weeks of full-time work over one and a half years. As an initial matter, 

ninety hours does not seem to the Court patently unreasonable for a case involving eleven requests, 

numerous status reports, and more than 8,500 pages of disclosures, many of which were disputed 

internally between the parties. See Case Chron at 1–3. 

DHS also contends that LTC’s counsel’s billing record is “packed with entries for work 

that is per se non-compensable, excessive, redundant, unnecessary, and apparently irrelevant,” and 

that “many time entries are too vague to explain how the work is compensable.” Opp’n at 20. 

This challenge has more merit. 

To begin, LTC has claimed reimbursement for time spent on non-compensable tasks. For 

example, LTC should not have billed 2.3 hours for time spent drafting unsuccessful oppositions to 

DHS’s motions for extensions of time to respond to the complaint and unsuccessful “appeals” 

relating to the request on which the Court finally granted summary judgment in favor of DHS. 
11 

Mot., Ex. C [ECF No. 36-3] (“Itemization of Hours”) at 31

; see Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DHS

(“EPIC v. DHS II”), 811 F. Supp. 2d 216, 237–38 (D.D.C. 2011). Nor should LTC have billed

attorney’s rates for 0.8 hours of clerical work, 1.2 hours of “wrestling with defective disc,” or 2 

hours of “[u]ntangling the different numbers given to different requests, necessary because USCIS 

and OC created confusion.” Itemization of Hours at 2, 4, 6; see Role Models, 353 F.3d at 973; 

Michigan v. EPA, 254 F.3d 1087, 1096–97 (D.C. Cir. 2001). However, not all of DHS’s 

complaints as to non-compensable tasks are well-taken. The Court disagrees with DHS’s position 

that counsel’s time spent reviewing the file and refamiliarizing himself with the requests and the 

litigation generally are per se inappropriate. Given the high number of requests, and the length of 

the litigation, the Court does not find it unreasonable that LTC’s counsel would bill some time for 

tasks including “review of entire file, organizing, making a summary[,] [and] determining future 

actions.” See Itemization of Hours at 3. Ultimately, it appears counsel billed about four hours on 

similar tasks, which is not, overall, excessive. 

DHS further contends that LTC billed excessive time for compensable tasks, including 

reviewing records, drafting documents, and conducting legal research. Most significantly, DHS 

takes issue with LTC’s demand of 31.5 hours for records review. DHS concedes that some time 

spent reviewing records in a FOIA case is compensable, since the very subject of FOIA litigation 

is whether the agency’s disclosures satisfy the plaintiff’s request and whether the agency’s 

withholdings have a basis in law. See EPIC v. DHS II, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 240–41. As LTC points 

out, more than 8,500 pages were produced during this litigation—a lengthy production requiring 

time to review for completeness and adequacy of disclosures. Moreover, as LTC contends—and 

1 The government provided the Court with a spreadsheet itemizing LTC’s claimed hours in a searchable, 

sortable form, as well as labeling its specific objections therein. See Opp’n, Ex. G [ECF No. 39-7]. The Court relied 

on this spreadsheet, in conjunction with the PDF document submitted by LTC, Itemization of Hours, to review the 

itemized claims.
12 

the status reports support—LTC raised issues with the FOIA disclosures in a more informal 

fashion during the litigation, resulting in resolution of disputed issues between the parties without 

necessitating judicial intervention. See Case Chron. at 1–2. Indeed, on several occasions, DHS 

agreed to re-review documents, reduce its earlier withholdings, and produce further documents to 

the satisfaction of LTC. Id. The Court is, therefore, not convinced that time spent reviewing 

records was obviously excessive here. 

None of the cases cited by DHS support its contrary position that the time spent was 

excessive because “the parties engaged in limited motions practice solely on request number 11, 

on which Plaintiff was unsuccessful.” Opp’n at 27. Indeed, the court in Electronic Privacy

Information Center v. Federal Bureau of Investigation (“EPIC v. FBI”), 72 F. Supp. 3d 338 

(D.D.C. 2014), deemed it reasonable for a requestor to claim fees for reviewing documents 

produced in litigation, even though the plaintiff “did not subsequently challenge any of the FBI’s 

redactions or seek further [c]ourt-ordered relief.” Id. at 351. Likewise, the EPIC v. DHS II court 

did not suggest that successful motions practice was prerequisite to obtaining fees for reviewed 

records. 811 F. Supp. 2d at 233. And Urban Air Initiative, Inc. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 442 F. Supp. 3d 301 (D.D.C. 2020), only approved of a plaintiff’s proposal to limit its 

compensation for records review to 25% of the hours expended; the court did not hold that further 

fees would be inappropriate. Id. at 325. 

DHS further complains that LTC spent excessive time preparing filings in this case, 

including 7.3 hours on the complaint and 22.2 hours on status reports and replies thereto. Opp’n 

at 27, 29. The Court shares some of DHS’s concerns on this front. While the Court appreciates 

LTC’s attention to detail in the complaint, it should have been a quicker matter to draft, considering 

that it follows the same format as a similar complaint the same counsel filed in an earlier action. 

See Michigan, 254 F.3d at 1093 (reducing “unduly high” number of hours spent on briefs). 
13 

Further, the Court does not find it reasonable to fully reimburse LTC’s counsel for time spent 

drafting individual status reports contrary to the Court’s orders that the parties submit joint status 

reports. The Court requires joint status reports for good reasons—to encourage the parties to 

confer, narrow issues of disagreement, and present a clear update to the Court on the status of the 

litigation. Submitting separate status reports was unhelpful, confusing, and wasteful of party and 

court resources. 

DHS also claims that LTC’s fee award should be reduced because counsel has previously 

been the subject of substantial fee reductions. In recent cases, judges in this District have reduced 

counsel’s award by forty and seventy percent. In Abtew v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Civ. A. No. 13-1566 (ABJ), 2016 WL 11897241 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2016), the court reduced the 

fee award by about seventy percent to account for the requester’s limited success in the litigation. 

Id. at *7–8. The Court did not find that LTC’s counsel expended unreasonable time on unnecessary 

tasks, nor that his billing records were insufficient—the primary issues raised in this litigation. 

Louise Trauma Center, 2023 WL 3478479, is more relevant. In that case, the court found that 

LTC’s billing records were “difficult to decipher,” but that “from what the Court can tell, [counsel] 

spent too much time on this case.” Id. at *6; see id. at *6–7. To the extent these issues are repeated 

here—and, as the Court has discussed and will discuss further, some are—that warrants the Court’s 

consideration in determining the appropriate fee award. See Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in 

Washington v. DOJ, (“CREW v. DOJ”), 142 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2015) (reducing fee award, 

in part, because “even in the face of criticism from other judges, [the requester] has chosen to 

perpetuate . . . uncertainty with its [billing] approach”). 

Finally, DHS asserts that discrepancies between the fees enumerated on the time sheet and 

requested in the motion “cast doubt on the precision of counsel’s recordkeeping.” Opp’n at 21. In 

its motion, LTC requests 90 or 90.5 hours for legal work performed from 2021–2022, as well as 
14 

22 hours for legal work performed in 2024 on the fees motion (“fees on fees”). See Mot. at 21–

22, 28–29.2 By contrast, the time records submitted claim 90.5 hours in fees and 22.6 hours in 

fees on fees. Itemization of Hours at 8. But, in fact, when the itemized figures are added up, they 

only amount to 89.2 hours in fees and 22.6 hours in fees on fees. See Fees Spreadsheet. While 

this sloppiness is relevant to the “fees on fees” entitlement, the Court does not find it so problematic 

as to cast significant doubt on the time sheets. Because the time sheet is the only document that 

would enable the Court to determine the amount of time actually expended, the Court will work 

from the figures on the time sheets. Accordingly, the Court understands LTC to be seeking 89.2 

hours in fees and 22.6 hours in fees on fees. 

B. Coherence of Billing Records

DHS also asserts that LTC’s demand is outrageous and should result in an outright denial 

of fees, because the billing records in this case are incoherent—they “lack rhyme or reason.” 

Opp’n at 21. While it is not unusual for an attorney to exclude or write off hours he would consider 

unreasonable, or decline to bill when a task takes a literal minute, the Court does share some of 

DHS’s concerns about LTC’s billing practices. Most significantly, many of LTC’s billing records 

do not adequately describe how counsel’s time was spent. Of specific concern to the Court are the 

entries describing the records review in this case, which often fail to identify what records were 

being reviewed, or for what purpose. Certain entries describe only that counsel “review[ed] 945 

page file page 1-400” or “review[ed] 92 pages- Third country rule.” See Itemization of Hours at 

3–4. From these descriptions, it is difficult for the Court to discern what counsel actually reviewed 

or whether the time was reasonably expended. Further, the pages accounted for in the time sheet 

do not line up precisely with the number of pages received, raising some question about the 

2 LTC (properly) does not request any fees for legal work performed on its unsuccessful summary judgment 

motion in 2023. Mot. at 22.
15 

importance of reviewing records in this case. There may be good reason for counsel’s decisions, 

but the Court cannot comfortably reach that conclusion. Other time entries are similarly illdescribed, stating, for example “Research on ‘Info processing system,’” and “Search for OIP 

requirements.” See id. at 5. Without any explanation of why this work was conducted—for what 

ultimate work product—the Court is unable to conclude with the requisite degree of certainty that 

the time spent was reasonable. Considering that issues with detailed timekeeping have previously 

been raised with respect to LTC’s counsel, the Court expects that he would have improved his 

record-keeping practices. See Louise Trauma Ctr., 2023 WL 3478479, at *6. 

However, the billing records are in some ways not as egregious as many of the examples 

cited by DHS. Unlike in Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Homeland Security (“CREW v. DHS”), Civ. A. No. 08-1046 (JDB), 2010 WL 8971920 (D.D.C. 

Apr. 21, 2010), LTC’s counsel has mostly avoided billing multiple tasks in the same line-item 

entry. Id. at *2; see Role Models Am., 353 F.3d at 971 (chastising attorneys for “lump[ing] 

together multiple tasks, making it impossible to evaluate their reasonableness”). And, unlike in 

CREW v. DHS, while LTC’s entries are somewhat generic and repetitive (e.g., “Receipt and 

Review” or “R&R”), a significant portion do nonetheless tie counsel’s task to the specific record 

reviewed or document drafted and have allowed the Court (and apparently opposing counsel) to 

evaluate whether an appropriate amount of time was spent on the given task. See CREW v. DHS, 

2010 WL 8971920, at *2; cf. Role Models Am., 353 F.3d at 971 (critiquing bill for law clerk who 

spent eight consecutive weekdays “[r]esearch[ing] and writing for appellate brief” (first alteration 

original)). In sum, the Court shares some of DHS’s concerns with the billing practices here but 

does not find them as egregious as the agency contends. 
16 

III. Calculation of the Fee Award

A. Hours Expended in Underlying Litigation

DHS asserts that, for the reasons described above, the Court should deny fees entirely or 

reduce the awarded hours by seventy-five percent after deducting non-compensable time and 

reducing excessive hours, because the demand for fees here is “outrageously unreasonable.” 

Opp’n at 19 (quoting Env’t Def. Fund v. Reilly, 1 F.3d 1254, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). The D.C. 

Circuit has permitted district courts to deny fees entirely when a request is made for an 

“outrageously unreasonable amount, lest claimants feel free to make unreasonable demands, 

knowing that the only unfavorable consequence of such misconduct would be reduction of their 

fee to what they should have asked for in the first place.” Reilly, 1 F.3d at 1258. However, as this 

Court has previously recognized, denial of all fees is “to be reserved for only the most severe of 

situations, and appropriately invoked only in very limited circumstances,” such as “when the party 

seeking fees declines to proffer any substantiation in the form of affidavits, timesheets or the like, 

or when the application is grossly and intolerably exaggerated, or manifestly filed in bad faith.” 

CREW v. DOJ, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (quoting Jordan v. DOJ, 691 F.2d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 

This is not a case where an outright denial of fees is warranted. “[T]he ultimate inquiry is 

whether the total time claimed was reasonable.” Smith v. District of Columbia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 

151, 158 (D.D.C. 2006) (emphasis added). As the Court explained earlier, the attorney’s rate is 

the driving force behind the overall fee award requested in this case. Approximately ninety hours 

expended on a case involving multiple FOIA requests over the course of two years is not a facially

unreasonable amount of time to spend on this case. Moreover, it appears that counsel conducted 

significant amounts of properly billable work, including drafting a complaint, reviewing records 

produced, working with opposing counsel on joint status reports, and preparing for and appearing 

at hearings. Hence, it would be unfair to outright deny fees in this case. 
17 

However, the issues discussed above do warrant a significant reduction. For the following 

reasons, the Court considers a fifty-percent reduction in the time billed as fees to be appropriate. 

First, around eight hours were improperly billed for clerical tasks or motions on which plaintiff 

was ultimately unsuccessful. This included time spent “wrestling with defective disc,” making 

packages to bring to the post office, opposing DHS’s motions for extensions of time, and reviewing 

records relating to the cause of action on which summary judgment was granted to DHS. Second, 

around twenty-five hours were billed for excessive or unnecessary tasks, including some time 

spent drafting the complaint and time spent preparing single-party status reports, or replies to status 

reports submitted by DHS. As the Court explained, such efforts were contrary to the Court’s 

orders, and ultimately less helpful than joint presentation would have been. Third, many of 

counsel’s time entries were not sufficiently detailed to allow the Court to determine with a “high 

degree of certainty” that the hours in this case were reasonably and actually expended. Role 

Models Am., 353 F.3d at 970; see Webster v. DOJ, Civ. A. No. 02-603 (RC), 2021 WL 4243414, 

at *12–13 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2021) (imposing 40% reduction for severely inadequate 

recordkeeping); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 825 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230–31 (D.D.C. 

2011) (37.5% reduction); Boehner v. McDermott, 541 F. Supp. 2d 310, 324–26 (D.D.C. 2008)

(25% reduction). This problem was especially severe with respect to the time entries for the 

records review, which represented a third of the hours billed and which did not specify the request 

for which the records were reviewed or counsel’s intent in reviewing the records. Fourth, counsel 

has previously been chastised by another judge in this District for many of the same issues 

encountered here. See Louise Trauma Ctr., 2023 WL 3478479, at *7 (applying 40% across-theboard reduction to account for counsel’s deficiencies); see also CREW v. DOJ, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 

14 (reducing award in part due to repeat nature of billing issues). Having thoroughly reviewed the 

extent of the deficiencies and taken account of the improperly and excessively billed time, the 
18 

Court is satisfied that a fifty percent reduction in the fee award is warranted. The Court considers 

the resulting figure reasonable to compensate counsel for his work on this case, while taking 

account of the serious deficiencies identified and their repeat nature.

3

B. Hours Expended in Fees-on-Fees Litigation 

Next, the Court must consider what fees should be awarded for work performed on the fee 

litigation in this case. It is well-established that a fee applicant may also seek fees for hours 

expended on preparing and litigating a fee request. See EPIC v. DHS II, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 237. 

Courts have an “obligation to scrutinize the hours spent preparing the fee petitions to insure that 

the total is reasonable and that it does not represent a windfall for the attorneys.” Heard v. District 

of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 02-296 (CKK), 2006 WL 2568013, at *19 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2006) 

(quoting Farris v. Cox, 508 F. Supp. 222, 226 (N.D. Cal. 1981)). Just as in the case of ordinary 

fees, “fees for fee litigation should be excluded to the extent that the applicant ultimately fails to 

prevail in such litigation.” Comm’r, Immigr. and Naturalization Serv. v. Jean (“INS”), 496 U.S. 

154, 163 n.10 (1990). Here, DHS contends that LTC’s request for 22.6 hours of fees on fees 

should be reduced by ninety percent. Opp’n at 31. 

DHS has three reasons for the reduction. First, LTC “presented an outrageous fee 

demand” demonstrating a lack of billing judgment and impermissible, excessive, or unnecessary 

entries. Opp’n at 30. As detailed above, the Court accepted DHS’s points here to some degree, 

although the Court did not consider the bills to be as egregious as suggested. Second, DHS argues 

that LTC should achieve limited success in this fee litigation, which it now has, receiving 

compensation for only fifty percent of the hours billed. And third, according to DHS, counsel’s 

time entries were excessive considering its fee petition in this case was repetitive of a petition filed 

3 LTC also sought reimbursement for $402 in costs. See Mot. at 1, 28–29; Itemization of Hours at 2. DHS 

does not substantively dispute this demand, and the Court considers the issue conceded. 
19 

in earlier actions, and counsel has billed for the preparation of a summary document. The Court 

is not persuaded by this final argument. Even considering the redundancy between the present 

motion and motions filed in earlier cases, it was reasonable to spend 4.9 hours updating the motion 

to reflect the facts of this case and additional recent case law. Further, the Court did find the 

summary document helpful considering the number of requests and the length of the litigation. As 

LTC did not know that DHS would concede that it had “substantially prevailed” in this litigation, 

it was reasonable for LTC to present the Court with a timeline demonstrating the fruits of its efforts.

While the Court does not agree that a ninety percent reduction in fees on fees is warranted 

here, some reduction is warranted. The fees-on-fees petition was only partially successful, 

justifying only 50% of the hours sought. See INS, 496 at 163 n.10. One important reason is that 

the records included in the petition were not sufficiently well-described to provide the Court with 

the requisite certainty that the hours were reasonably expended. Further, the Court is wary of 

permitting the fees-on-fees litigation to become disproportionate in light of the fee award. See

Urban Air Initiative, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 326–27 (reducing fees likely to represent a “windfall” for 

plaintiff’s counsel). The Court accordingly finds that a 50 percent reduction of hours, parallel to 

the reduction ordered in the fees award, is appropriate here. See Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. FBI, 80 

F. Supp. 3d 149, 163 (D.D.C. 2015) (reducing fees-on-fees award to the same extent as the fee 

award). 

C. Reasonable Hourly Rate 

Lastly, the Court considers the reasonable hourly rate. In determining the reasonable 

hourly rate of public interest attorneys, judges in this Circuit typically apply a matrix representing 

a market rate derived from community rates. See, e.g., EPIC v. DHS I, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 47. 

Although the parties initially disputed the appropriate rates to apply, in its reply brief, LTC agreed 

to accept the rate matrix proposed by DHS, known as the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s Fitzpatrick 
20 

Matrix. See Reply at 20 (“Plaintiff acquiesces to the agency, and will accept Fitzpatrick Matrix 

rates.”); see also J.T. v. District of Columbia, 652 F. Supp. 3d 11, 36 (D.D.C. 2023) (adopting 

Fitzpatrick Matrix for complex federal litigation in the District of Columbia). Accordingly, the 

Court considers this issue conceded and will apply the Fitzpatrick rates. See U.S. Att’y’s Off. for 

D.C., The Fitzpatrick Matrix, https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/media/1353286/dl?inline 

[https://perma.cc/9Y3W-TDC9] (“Fitzpatrick Matrix”). Further, the parties appear to be in 

agreement that LTC’s counsel has more than 35 years of experience, placing him in the highest 

paid part of the matrix. See Opp’n at 26; Decl. of David L. Cleveland [ECF No. 36-2] ¶ 22. 

The last disputed issue between the parties is whether the Court should apply the matrix 

rates for 2024 to all fees, as compensation for delay in payment, or the matrix rate applicable 

during the year the bills were incurred. The Court agrees with DHS that the applicable rate is the 

rate in effect during the year that bills were incurred. “[A]bsent an explicit waiver of sovereign 

immunity, attorney’s fees awarded against the federal government must be based on historical 

rates.” Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1988)

(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Libr. of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314 (1986). 

“Because FOIA’s fee-shifting provision does not authorize compensation for delay,” the Court 

may not “grant[] a fee enhancement to compensate counsel for the delay in receiving his fees.” 

Weisberg v. DOJ, 848 F.2d 1265, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by King v. 

Palmer, 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). Accordingly, courts in this 

District generally award fees at the rates applicable during the years they were incurred. See, e.g., 

Hall v. CIA, 115 F. Supp. 3d 24, 32 (D.D.C. 2015); Louise Trauma Ctr., 2023 WL 3478479, at *7 

n.6.4 Hence, the Court will apply the Fitzpatrick Matrix rates corresponding to an attorney with 

4 LTC’s citation to Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), is inapposite. That case held only that courts 

may award current rates as compensation for delay, as authorized by the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act, against a 

defendant state consistent with the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 284. The Jenkins Court distinguished Library of 
21 

more than 35 years of experience in the year in which the work was performed. See Fitzpatrick 

Matrix. 

D. Fee Award

Hence, the appropriate fee award here is as follows:

Time Period

Plaintiff’s 

Claimed 

Hours

Court’s 

Adjusted 

Hours

Fitzpatrick 

Fee Matrix 

Rate

Amount

Earned

2021 13.8 6.9 $736 $5,078

2022 75.4 37.7 $760 $28,652

Fees on Fees (2024) 22.6 11.3 $864 $9,763

Costs $402

Total $43,895

Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the motion in part and award LTC $33,730 

in fees, $9,763 in fees on fees, and $402 in costs. This calculation implements a 50 percent 

reduction in the number of hours billed on an annual basis, multiplied by the Fitzpatrick matrix 

rate during the year the work was performed. Costs were included as billed. An Order consistent 

with this Memorandum Opinion will issue.

 /s/ 

 JOHN D. BATES 

 United States District Judge

Dated: July 1, 2024 

Congress, which “involved an application of the longstanding ‘no-interest rule,’ under which interest cannot be 

awarded against the United States unless it has expressly waived its sovereign immunity.” Id. at 280.