DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

ZAHAV REFI LLC; ZAHAV FLORIDA, LLC;

ZAHAV REFI LL LLC; SP POOL 7 ZAHAV FL LLC;

BOG TWELVE ZAHAV FL LLC; and 

POOL7 ZAHAV FLORIDA, LLC,

Appellants,

v.

WHITE HAWK ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Appellee.

No. 2D23-675

December 27, 2023

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for 

Hillsborough County; Melissa M. Polo, Judge.

Dwayne A. Robinson and Eric S. Kay of Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton 

LLP, Miami, for Appellants.

Matthew D. Wolf of Ivanov & Wolf, PLLC, Tampa, for Appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

Appellants (collectively Zahav) appeal the trial court's order 

appointing a receiver over commercial properties pursuant to chapter 

714, Florida Statutes (2022), the Uniform Commercial Real Estate 

Receivership Act (UCRERA). Because the trial court failed to conduct an 
2

evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was a need for the 

receivership under subsections 714.06(1)(b) or (c), we reverse and 

remand with instructions.

I.

In March 2021, White Hawk entered into a contract to purchase 

twenty-three residential properties from Zahav for $3.26 million. 

Delivery of those properties was to occur sixty days from the date of the 

contract. When that delivery did not occur, White Hawk filed an 

amended petition for judicial relief to compel mandatory, binding 

arbitration for breach and specific performance of the contract. The trial 

court granted the petition and ordered the parties to binding arbitration. 

White Hawk prevailed in its claims for specific performance of the 

contract in the arbitration proceedings pursuant to the May 13, 2022, 

final award of arbitrator. 

In August 2022, White Hawk filed a motion for confirmation of the 

Final Award of Arbitrator. That motion was granted, and the trial court 

entered a final judgment confirming the arbitrator's award and directing 

the parties to close the sale "expeditiously." Thereafter, Zahav appealed 

the final judgment, and in turn, White Hawk filed with the trial court a 

motion seeking the appointment of a receiver to manage the subject 

properties.

In the motion, White Hawk sought receivership over the properties 

pursuant to UCRERA, Florida common law, and "other relevant 

statutes." Specifically, the motion stated that the receivership was 

required "in order to preserve nonexempt property pending appeal or for 

equitable ground [sic]. Fla. Stat. [§]714.061(1)(b) and (c)." White Hawk 

argued that a receivership was necessary to preserve the subject 

properties due to (1) protracted litigation as a result of the notice of 
3

appeal filed by Zahav and (2) mismanagement, waste, or foreclosure of 

the subject properties, which were operating at a loss as of January 13, 

2022, referencing a prior evidentiary hearing in which White Hawk 

successfully sought a $3,550,000 bond in the trial court during the 

pendency of the arbitration. Alternatively, White Hawk contended that to 

the extent the subject properties were profitable, there was a need for a 

neutral third party to collect the rents. No affidavits or other exhibits 

were attached or filed contemporaneously with the motion, and Zahav 

was quick to note this in its response to the motion for appointment of 

receiver. In addition to noting that the drastic relief of a receiver should 

not be granted, Zahav alleged further deficiencies—"[White Hawk] offers 

this Court no guidance on how a receivership would be administered . . . 

does not identify a receiver, how it would be paid, or how this Court 

would monitor the receivership." 

The hearing on the motion for appointment of receiver was held on 

February 20, 2023, pursuant to a standard notice of hearing via Zoom, 

and was set for fifteen minutes. There was no indication in the notice of 

hearing that it was set as an evidentiary hearing. On the morning of the 

hearing, White Hawk filed approximately thirty pages of documents, 

including a notice of special set hearing that had occurred on January 

13, 2022, along with correspondence and financial documents that had 

been exchanged between Zahav's and White Hawk's counsel. The 

documents, which were admitted into evidence at that hearing, included 

loan history, rent roll, and income statement records. 

At the February 20, 2023, hearing, Zahav objected to the 

appointment of a receiver and, relevant here, argued that the trial court 

could not appoint a receiver without some evidence to support the 

appointment, which could not fairly include the belatedly filed 
4

documents, and without the hearing being properly noticed as an 

evidentiary hearing. As to the merits of the receivership, Zahav disputed 

the facts argued by White Hawk that the properties were currently 

operating at a loss based upon the evidence received by the trial court at 

the January 13, 2022, hearing, which had occurred more than a year 

before the February 2023 hearing on the motion to appoint receiver. 

White Hawk seemed to concede at the receivership hearing that even if 

those documents established that the properties were being operated at a 

loss then, they did not know if that was still the case as of the hearing on 

the motion for appointment of receiver. After hearing argument, the trial 

court ruled, "The motion's granted. I will appoint a receiver to maintain 

this property and to collect the rent." 

On March 28, 2023, the trial court entered its order granting 

motion for appointment of receiver.1 The trial court made a finding that 

"the subject 23 parcels of rental real property . . . are being subject to or 

are in danger of waste, loss, substantial diminution in value, dissipation, 

or impairment." The order appointed the firm John Burpee & Associates 

as receiver and required the receiver to "file a statement under penalty of 

perjury that the appointed Receiver is not disqualified and post a 

$10,000.00 bond." The order granted the receiver the authority to collect 

the rent and maintain the property and enumerated other duties 

1 Prior to the entry of the order, on March 24, 2023, the trial court's 

judicial assistant sent White Hawk's counsel an email stating that the 

proposed order had not named a receiver. Counsel for White Hawk 

responded on March 28, 2023, naming John Burpee & Associates as the 

receiver. Minutes later, counsel for Zahav sent an email to White Hawk 

and the judicial assistant objecting to the appointment of a receiver 

without "any vetting, or any evidentiary hearing." The order was entered 

without further hearing.
5

consistent therewith. The order also required Zahav to pay the receiver's 

fees and expenses pursuant to section 714.15. This appeal followed. 

II.

"The appointment of a receiver is not a matter of right, but is one 

resting in the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised or withheld, 

according to the circumstances and facts of each particular case." 

Recarey v. Rader, 320 So. 2d 28, 29-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); see also

Yarborough v. Kilbee, 307 So. 2d 223, 229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) ("There is 

authority for the appointment of a receiver even in the case of a 

superseded judgment where it is necessary for the preservation of 

property pending appeal."). "The power to appoint a receiver is always 

one that is inherent in a Court of equity . . . ." Edenfield v. Crisp, 186 So. 

2d 545, 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (citing Armour Fertilizer Works v. First 

Nat'l Bank, 100 So. 362 (Fla. 1924)). "[A]fter the entry of a final 

judgment, the considerations dictating a cautious approach to the 

appointment of a receiver may carry less weight." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. 

Cramer, 113 So. 3d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). Accordingly, "[w]e 

review an order granting or denying a motion for the appointment of a 

receiver for abuse of discretion." Id. at 1022.

III.

UCRERA was enacted by the Florida Legislature effective July 1, 

2020, and provides, from soup to nuts, the necessary steps for obtaining 

a receivership over commercial real estate from the inception of the filing 

of a motion for receivership to the termination of the receivership. Ch. 

2020-106, Laws of Fla. Our research has found only one case citing to 

UCRERA since its enactment, but that case has no application here. See 

Berk-Fialkoff v. Wilmington Tr., N.A., 358 So. 3d 472, 475-76 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2023) (discussing the requirements of an injunction in a 
6

receivership under subsections 714.14(2)-(3)). However, our general 

review of UCRERA reveals that the Act is a codification of Florida's 

substantive common law on receiverships.2

We begin by reviewing the pertinent statutory provisions. Section 

714.03(1) imposes the requirements of notice and opportunity, stating 

that except as otherwise provided in the statute "the court may issue an 

order under this chapter only after notice and opportunity for a hearing 

appropriate under the circumstances." (Emphasis added.)3 The trial 

court's discretion to appoint a receiver is set forth under section 

714.06(1). Section 714.06(1)(a) deals with the appointment of a receiver 

before judgment, while section 714.06(1)(b) addresses the appointment of 

a receiver after judgment—relevant here. White Hawk also sought the 

appointment of a receiver in its motion based upon equitable grounds 

under section 714.06(1)(c), subject to the applicable factors of subsection 

(b) for postjudgment proceedings.

Subsections 714.06(1)(b)-(c) provide in pertinent part:

(1) The court may appoint a receiver:

. . . .

(b) After judgment:

2 Prior to the enactment of UCRERA, "the substantive and 

procedural aspects of receiverships in Florida were governed by a 

combination of decisional law and reference to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610 and 

1.620." See Kendall Coffey and David Freedman, Florida's New 

Commercial Real Estate Receivership Act: A Roadmap for Judges and 

Practitioners, Fla. Bar Journal, Jan./Feb. 2022, at 18. Both sides have 

cited to this article in their briefs.

3 Despite Zahav's contentions to the contrary, Zahav was properly 

noticed that White Hawk sought a receivership pursuant to section 

714.06(1)(b) and (c), as the statute was specifically noted in the Motion 

for Appointment of Receiver referenced on the Notice of Hearing Via 

Zoom. 
7

1. To carry the judgment into effect; or

2. To preserve nonexempt real property pending appeal 

or when an execution has been returned unsatisfied 

and the owner refuses to apply the property in 

satisfaction of the judgment;

(c) In an action in which a receiver for real property may be 

appointed on equitable grounds, subject to the 

requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b).

The threshold issue we must decide here is whether the trial court 

was required to hold an evidentiary hearing before appointing the 

receiver.

Zahav cites a litany of cases in favor of holding an evidentiary 

hearing that stand for the proposition that a trial court cannot appoint a 

receiver without hearing some evidence, either in the form of testimony, 

affidavits, or some other sworn pleading. See Lakeview Townhomes of 

Cal. Club, Inc. v. Coral Gables Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 656 So. 2d 240, 

240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) ("We reverse, as the order was entered 'without 

testimony, sworn pleadings or an affidavit demonstrating a show of 

"waste" which impairs the equity of security.' " (quoting Boyd v. Banc One 

Mortg. Corp., 509 So. 2d 966, 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987))); Chromy v. 

Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Minneapolis, 546 So. 2d 1172, 1173 

(Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (reversing an order appointing receiver where, "[a]fter 

a hearing on the motion at which the court received no testimony or 

affidavit from [the movant], the trial court appointed a receiver"); M.R.D. 

Props., Ltd. v. Shangri-La Resorts II, Inc., 546 So. 2d 35, 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 

1989) ("We reverse the order under review because no sworn proof was 

ever adduced below in support of the . . . motion for the appointment of a 

receiver."); Shops of Sunset, Ltd. v. Cohen, 551 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 1989) ("We hold the trial court erred in appointing a receiver 

without testimony, sworn pleadings or affidavits submitted in support of 
8

appellees' motion."); Polycoat Corp. v. City Nat'l Bank of Mia., 327 So. 2d 

126, 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (reversing an order appointing receiver in 

part because "no testimony was taken supporting the appointment of a 

receiver"). While these cases are resourceful, they fall in the category of 

receiverships entered "before judgment," which is not the case before us.4 

See § 714.06(1)(a).

Not surprisingly, White Hawk responds that Zahav's cases predate 

UCRERA and thus have no application here. Instead, White Hawk 

directs our attention to the text of the statute and argues that neither 

subsection 714.06(1)(b) nor (c) require that the trial court hold an 

evidentiary hearing, much less rely upon any competent evidence to 

support the appointment of a receiver. In other words, White Hawk 

argues that a movant seeking the appointment of a receiver need only 

make conclusory allegations consistent with subsection (1)(b) or (c) in 

order to prevail on a motion for appointment of receiver. Other than 

relying upon the statutory language, White Hawk cites no other legal 

authority for this proposition.

4 In fact, the majority of receivership cases fall in the "before 

judgment" category. The "after judgment" receivership cases are more 

commonly found under section 56.29, Florida Statutes, in proceedings 

supplementary to satisfy a judgment debt. See 212 W. 18 LLC v. Kozel, 

320 So. 3d 849, 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) ("[W]hen a plaintiff has an 

unsatisfied judgment, proceedings supplementary provide the plaintiff 

with an alternate avenue to collect assets owned by the defendant that 

are in the possession of nonparties."); Biel Reo, LLC v. Barefoot Cottages 

Dev. Co., 156 So. 3d 506, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ("Courts have broad 

powers in proceedings supplementary over personal property transferred 

to a third party by a debtor."). Receiverships have long played a role in 

fashioning relief for judgment creditors. Warshall v. Price, 617 So. 2d 

751, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (Stone, J., concurring specially) (citing

Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 (1923)). 
9

White Hawk argues that we should strictly follow the text of the 

statute, which we do not take issue with, and that the trial court 

properly applied all elements of UCRERA when it entered the order 

granting motion for appointment of receiver. However, the order belies 

that the trial court properly applied UCRERA. The trial court entered the 

order granting motion for appointment of receiver prepared by White 

Hawk, which recited the standard described not in subsection (1)(b) or (c) 

but instead subsection (1)(a), which applies to the appointment of a 

receiver "before judgment"—if a party demonstrates an interest in the 

subject property and establishes that the property is at risk of "waste, 

loss, substantial diminution in value, dissipation, or impairment" or 

"[h]as been or is about to be the subject of a voidable transaction." 

Therefore, the order prepared by White Hawk and issued by the trial 

court did not appoint a receiver under the constraints of subsections 

(1)(b) or (c) as requested by White Hawk in its motion. 

IV.

Turning to the language of the statute, unlike the "before judgment" 

subsection in (1)(a), the "after judgment" subsection (1)(b) does not 

provide a list of potential harms that must exist to justify preservation of 

the property. This makes sense given that "the concern about effecting a 

taking of the owner's property before the entry of judgment is eliminated 

or lessened by the entry of the judgment." Cramer, 113 So. 3d at 1024. 

But even with this lessened concern, "there must still be some need to 

protect the property from waste or depreciation before a receiver may be 

appointed postjudgment." Id. 

Zahav argues that we are bound by our precedent to follow Cramer,

which requires a showing of need pursuant to a burden-shifting 

framework, notwithstanding that it predates UCRERA, and we agree.
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In Cramer, U.S. Bank foreclosed its mortgage against real property 

Cramer was operating as an automotive repair shop, automotive sales 

business, and car wash and prevailed in obtaining a final judgment 

against Cramer. 113 So. 3d at 1022. U.S. Bank canceled the foreclosure 

sale and moved for the appointment of a receiver, arguing among other 

things that a receiver was necessary to remediate the environmental 

issues before proceeding to a foreclosure sale. Id. at 1025. In holding 

that U.S. Bank had a "compelling presentation" in support of its motion, 

we reversed the trial court's order denying the receivership:

We conclude that U.S. Bank established a prima facie case 

through [an affidavit] demonstrating the need for the 

appointment of a receiver to complete the necessary 

environmental studies and any required remediation before it 

could proceed to a foreclosure sale. After the movant 

establishes a prima facie case for the appointment of a 

receiver, the burden of proof shifts to the party opposing the 

appointment. 

Id. (emphasis added) (citing Howley v. Sage Shopping Plaza Corp., 336 

So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)). 

Since the close of the briefing in this case, our sister court in Storey 

Mountain, LLC v. Freestone Enterprise, LLC, 368 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2023), addressed a motion for receivership "after judgment" in a 

commercial dispute, albeit not sought under UCRERA. Quoting Cramer

with approval, the court held that "the considerations dictating a 

cautious approach to the appointment of a receiver may carry less weight 

after the entry of final judgment, but nevertheless, "there must still be 

some need to protect the property" before the court can appoint a 

receiver in equity. Id. at 474 (emphasis added) (quoting Cramer, 113 So. 

3d at 1023-24).

While the text of the statute does not explicitly state that the trial 

court must hold an evidentiary hearing, the only way that a need for a 
11

receivership can be established is by way of stipulation by the parties or 

a prima facie showing of some competent evidence. And where the facts 

are in dispute, as was clearly the case here, it is incumbent upon the 

trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing applying the burden-shifting 

framework of Cramer in order to determine first whether the moving 

party has established a prima facie case of need for a receivership. See, 

e.g., Hansen v. Cooper, 733 So. 2d 1144, 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)

("Because essential facts . . . were in conflict, the court was required to 

conduct a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve the disputed facts."); 

Parrish & Yarnell, P.A. v. Spruce River Ventures, LLC, 180 So. 3d 1198, 

1200-01 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (holding, where a motion to strike presented 

"a bona fide issue of fact" and the determination of the motion "turn[ed] 

on several factual questions," the court erred by not conducting an 

evidentiary hearing). Indeed, White Hawk was obviously concerned that 

the trial court would not appoint a receiver without some showing of 

need—as demonstrated by the late filing of documents on the morning of 

the hearing.

Because the facts, as argued by the parties' counsel, were in 

dispute as to whether there was a need for a receivership to "carry the 

judgment into effect" or "preserve nonexempt real property pending 

appeal," the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion for 

appointment of receiver without conducting an evidentiary hearing and 

making the requisite findings. See § 714.06(1)(b)-(c). Moreover, the trial 

court erred in appointing a receiver pursuant to section 714.06(1)(a)—

pertaining to "before judgment" cases. Because we are remanding for the 

trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing, nothing herein shall be 

construed as commenting on the sufficiency of the documents filed by 
12

White Hawk or the merits of White Hawk's motion for appointment of 

receiver. 

V.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to hold an 

evidentiary hearing under Cramer and consistent with UCRERA on the 

motion for appointment of receiver. 

Reversed and remanded. 

VILLANTI and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.