-1- 

### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

NATIONAL CHURCH RESIDENCES INC., JAMES RIVER CASUALTY CO., and,

MADISON HEIGHTS WIN LIMITED

DIVIDEND HOUSING ASSOCIATION LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, UNPUBLISHED June 20, 2017

v No. 332200
Oakland Circuit Court SHERYLE R. PORTER, LC No. 2015-146847-NZ

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M ARKEY , P.J., and M ETER and S HAPIRO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Defendant, Sheryle Porter, appe als as of right from the March 11, 2016 final order of the trial court granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary dispositionunder MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact ) and granting plaintiffs injunct ive relief. We affirm.

The present action arises out of a long running dispute betwee n Porter and the owners and managers of her former apartment complex, plaintiffs Nation al Church Residences Inc. (National Church) and Madison Heights Win Limited Dividend Hous ing Association (Madison Heights), as well as the apartment complex’s insurer, plaintiff James River Casualty Co. (James River). The dispute appears to have its genesis in June of 201 3 when the toilet in Porter’s apartment experienced a leak a nd, according to Porter, either w as not repaired by maintenance or was negligently repaired resul ting in her apartment flooding. Porter contends that this flooding caused her to develop a toe fungus for which plaintiffs owe her damages. Porter submitted claims to James River but, after an investigation by its adjust er, James River denied the claim. National Church’s own investigation was unable to confirm Porte r’s allegations of flooding and

determined that Porter was not entitled to any damages. Porter then filed complaints with several state agencies and began litigati on in federal court. Followin g the dismissal of those actions by the relevant state agencies and the federal district court, Por ter executed and filed a Notice of Lis Pendens and Claim of Lien with the Oakland County Register of D eeds Office claiming to have a lien against the apartment complex.-2- Porter then filed a complaint in the Oakland Circuit Court all eging that she was lawfully entitled to possession of the apartment complex and requesting a court appointed receiver. The complaint was filed by Porter on a pro se basis, and while diff icult to discern, it appears to allege that Porter is entitled to posse ssion of the apartment complex for plaintiffs’ refusal to pay her damages from her leaky toilet and subsequent toe fungus. The c omplaint was ultimately dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim). Ho wever, during the pendency of that action, Porter filed numerous deeds with the Oakland Count y Register of Deeds Office transferring the property to herself. Porter signed the deeds as both the receiving party and the transferring party. Plaintiffs then commenced this suit seekin g equitable relief to enjoin Porter from further attempts to transfer the property and from further attempts to sue plaintiffs. After this action was commenced, Porte r filed documents with the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office, the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, and th e Michigan Department of Attorney General attempting to dissolve National Church and Mad ison Heights as legal entities and attempting to cancel their certificates to conduct business . Porter has at numerous times asserted to various governing entities in the numerous deeds an d documents that she filed that she is a trustee of plaintiffs , a co-owner of plaintiffs, and a judgment creditor of plaintiffs.

The trial court entered preliminary orders granting plaintiffs a preliminary injunction and granting them summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) on Port ers counterclaims. The trial court entered its final order on March 11, 2016 granting plaint iffs summary disposition on their complaint and ordering that the liens Porter filed against the property and the deeds she filed purporting to transfer the propert y to herself all “be stripped from the chain of title against the Property.” The trial court also ordered that the documents Por ter filed attempting to dissolve plaintiffs and cancel their ability to conduct business be decl ared null and void, ordered that Porter be enjoined from having contact with plaintiffs, ordered that she be enjoined from taking any action on behalf of plaintiffs, ordered that Madison Height s and National Church were not dissolved, and ordered that Porter be enjoined from filing any legal claim against plaintiffs

outside of the confines “of t he above-captioned matter.”

Upon review of the record, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects. 1 Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged claims for abuse of process, slan der of title, quiet title, and for a bill of peace. 2 “To recover upon a theory of abuse of process, [plaintiffs] m ust plead and prove (1) an ulterior purpose and (2) an act in the use of process which is improper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding.” Friedman v Dozorc , 412 Mich 1, 30; 312 NW2d 585 (1981).

1 We review the trial court’s gra nt of summary disposition “de n ovo to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden v Rozwood , 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). We review a tri al court’s grant of injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion. Mich Coalition of State Employee Unions v Mich Civil Serv Comm’n , 465 Mich 212, 217; 634 NW2d 692 (2001). A trial court abuses its discretion when it c hooses an outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co , 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).

2 Plaintiffs also included a count for malicious prosecution, bu t the trial court’s dismissed that count, and plaintiffs have not appe aled that portion of the tri al court’s order.-3- “To establish slander of title . . . [plaintiffs] must show fal sity, malice, and special damages, i.e., that the defendant maliciously published false statements that disparaged [their] right in property, causing special damages.” B & B Investment Group v Gitler , 229 Mich App 1, 8; 581 NW2d 17 (1997). Special damages can include litigation costs. Id. at 9. A quiet title claim may be brought to remove a cloud on title. Adams v Adams , 276 Mich App 704, 712, 712 n 2; 742 NW2d 399 (2007), and s ee MCL 600.2932 (a person who claims an i nterest in land may bring an action against anyone claiming an inconsistent interest in that land). “[A] bill of peace is a proper remedy to prevent the vexatious recurrence of litigation . A bill of peace will lie, after repeated trials at law and satisfactory verdicts, to have an in junction against furt her litigation.” Hooker Chems & Plastic Corp v Attorney General , 100 Mich App 203, 208; 298 NW2d 710 (1980) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Plaintiffs have sufficiently in troduced evidence establishing all the elements to each of their claims, and Porter has not come forth with any evidence t o challenge plaintiffs’ proofs. Concerning plaintiffs’ claim for abuse of process, plaintiffs p ut forth evidence that Porter filed liens and claims against their property for the purpose of atte mpting to transfer it to herself as an effort to get plaintiffs to pay her damages before any judgment or court order determining that she had the right to those damages. Additionally, plaintiffs p rovided numerous false and fraudulent deeds that Porter filed with the Oakland County Regi ster of Deeds office and submitted the affidavit of their attorney stating that they hav e incurred over $15,000 in litigation

costs on account of Porter’s actions. This established evidenc e of plaintiffs’ slander of title claim. Regarding the claim for quiet title, plaintiffs put for th evidence that the rightful owner of the real property was Madison He ights and that Porter clouded t itle to the property through the filing of various false and fraudul ent deeds. In regards to th e request for a bill of peace, plaintiffs put forth evidence of multiple actions that Porter filed agains t them in federal court, state court, and with state agencies, all of w hich were dismissed. Plaintif fs’ evidence was unrebutted. Porter

has not been able to articulate an argument, let alone produce evidence, as to why plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief reque sted, therefore, failing to sho w the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact. See Quinto v Cross & Peters Co , 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996) (stating that after the moving party comes forward with evidenc e to support its position the burden shifts to the nonmoving part y to establish that a genuin e factual dispute exists).

We also agree with the trial cou rt that equitable relief was a ppropriate in this case and affirm the award fashioned by the trial court. Equitable relie f is generally appropriate “when (1) justice requires it, (2) there i s no adequate remedy at law, an d (3) there exists a real and imminent danger of irreparable injury.” Head v Phillips Camper Sales & Rental Inc , 234 Mich App 94, 110; 593 NW2d 595 (1999) ( internal quotations and citat ion omitted). Both plaintiffs and the general public have a strong interest in ensuring that an improper cloud of title is not made over the affected property and that plaintiffs’ ability to conduct business as legal entities is not eliminated by Porter’s fraudulent conduct. Money damages w ould be insufficient to remove the cloud of title over plaintiffs’ property or to correct the harm caused by Porter’s attempts to dissolve plaintiffs’ legal status or rescind their ability to l awfully conduct busine ss in this state.

The trial court also did not err in granting plaintiffs summar y disposition on the claims in Porter’s counter-complaint. Por ter labeled her counterclaims a s: ex contractu, ex delicto, trustee ex maleficio, constructive fra ud, and failure to perform offici al duty. However, she did not provide any explanation or articulate a factual basis for her c laims beyond mere conclusory-4- statements. “[C]onclusory statements that are unsupported by a llegations of fact on which they may be based will not suffice to state a cause of action.” State v CVS Caremark Corp , 496 Mich 45, 63; 852 NW2d 103 (2014). Porter’s counter-complaint, like all her pleadings in this and related matters, are difficult to follow, and, although they co ntain well known legal phrases, are often incomprehensible. At no point has Porter articulated any discernable legal theory as to how or why she is en titled to relief.

Finally, to the extent Porter challenges the trial court’s gra nt of plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the issu e is moot. An issue becomes mo ot when “a judgment, if entered, cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the exis ting controversy.” GMC v Dep’t of Treasury , 290 Mich App 355, 386; 803 NW2d 698 (2010). The trial court’ s final order granted plaintiffs a permanent injuncti on, so any decision we were to m ake on whether plaintiffs should have been granted a preliminary injunction cannot have a practi cal legal effect on this controversy. Therefore, we dec line to consider any issue relat ed to that order. King v Mich State Police Dep’t , 303 Mich App 162, 192; 841 NW2d 914 (2013) (stating that this Court does not generally address moot questions).

Affirmed.

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Patrick M. Meter /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro