C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS
THE W.L . PI CKENS GRANDCHI L DREN’S J OI NT VENTURE, Ap pe lla nt,
v.
D O H O IL C O M P A

N Y , D A V ID H ILL, A N D O RV E L H ILL, Ap pe lle e s. § § § § § § § No . 0 8- 06 -0 03 14 -C V

Appea l from the 14 3r d D istri c t Co ur

t of L ov ingCounty , T e xas ( T C # 0 5
- 0 7
- 7 3 3
- C V L )

O P I N I O N T h i s p r o p e rty

d i s p u t e i n v o l v e s a

o n e - e i g h thm i n e r a l i n t e r e s ti nLo v i n g C o un ty . T h e W
. L. Pickens Gra

ndchildren’ s J oint Venture sue d to invalidate a she riff’ s deed tra nsfer ring title to the min e ra l in te re st t o D OH Oi l Co mpa ny (“ DO H” ). Th e tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt i n DOH’ s favor . There are two issues: (1) DOH did not acquire title through the tax foreclosure
sa le ; and (2 ) t he su it i s n ot b arr e d b y

lim itatio ns . On Oc tob e r 2 1, 19 63 , W. L . Pi c ke ns a c qu ir e d ti tle to a on e -e ig ht i nte re st i n th e min e ra ls under 667.5 a cre s of land in L oving County . The W.L . Pickens J oint Venture ( “Joi nt Venture ”)
was c reated on Dec ember 28, 1976, in order to a cquire , own, and ope rate the venture proper ty for th e b e n e f i to f W
. L
. P i c k e n s ’ d e s c e n d an t s . J o i n t V e n tur e a c qu i r e d

th e m i n e r a l i n t e r e s tb y a quitclaim deed, sig ned by both W.L . and Ruth Gardne r Pickens on the date the entity was
cre ated. B oth deeds we re r ecor ded in the L oving County deed r ecor ds. J oint Venture is located in D a lla s, Te xas.-2-

J oint Venture f

ailed to pay

taxes on the property

in 1994 and 1995. On January 28, 2000, L oving County

and Wink-L oving I

ndepende nt School District filed suit for the unpaid taxes. The Joint Venture was not listed as a pa rty in the tax foreclosure suit. Due to an addr essing err or, the entity never rec eived notice of the suit. The for eclosure defe ndants wer e cited by posting on May 5, 2000. The prope rty

at issue in this case wa s listed under the name, “Pickens Gra ndchildren” in the posted citation. A trial wa s held on Octobe r 3, 2000, duringwhich the “posting defe ndants” we re r epre sented by an attorne y

ad litem. Followinga benc h trial, the pr op e rt y wa s o rd e re d s old

by sh e ri ff ’s sa le . D OH purc ha se d th e min e ra l in te re st b y pu bli c auction on Mar ch 6, 2001. DOH filed the sher iff’s de ed on Jul y 20, 2001. Joint Ve ntu re did no t c ha lle ng e the fo re c los ur e un til July 5, 20 05 , w he n it

fi le d th is action ag ainst DOH to re cover the prope rty . Both pa

rties moved for

summary judgme nt. The Joint Ve ntu re argue d th at D OH ’s de e d w a s v oid a s a matte r o f l aw d

ue to t he ta xinge nti tie s’ fa ilure to n ame it i n th e fo re c los ur e su it, and g ov e rnme nt’ s f

a ilure to s e rv e the re c or d o wn e r w ith
c itatio n. DO H r e sp on de d b y arguin g : ( 1) that Join t V e ntu re ’s c la im w a s a

n im pe rm iss ibl e collater al attac k in the 2000 judgme nt; and (2) that the statute of limitations barred Joint Venture ’s cha lleng e and a llowed DOH to pr esume it had a cquire d superior title at the f orec losure sale. The trial court g rante d summary judgme nt in DOH’s fa

vor. Standard of Review Summary judgme nt is reviewe d de novo
. Va le nc e Op e ra tin g Co . v . D or se tt , 164 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). The r eviewingcourt must take a s true all evide nce f avora ble to the nonmovant, indulge ever

y rea sonable infe renc e, and r esolve a ll doubts i n favor of the nonmovant. Id . When both parties move for summary judgme nt and the trial c ourt g rants one-3-

motion and denies the other , the re viewingcourt must consider the summary judgme nt evidence prese nted by

both sides and deter

mine all the questions prese nted. Se e id . Should the reviewing court de termine the tria l court’s judg ment was e ntere d in error , it will render the judg ment the trial court should have rende red. Se e id .; FM Pr op . O pe ra tin g Co . v . Ci ty

of A us tin , 22 S.W .3d 86 8, 87 2- 73 (T e x. 20 00 ). Whe n th e tr ia l c ourt do e s n ot s pe c if

y the g ro un ds on

wh ic h it re lie d in g ra nti nga summa ry jud g me nt, the re vie wi ngc ourt wi ll a ff ir m if any of the g ro un ds pr e se nte d is meritorious. See H

arwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 896 S.W .2d 170, 173 (Tex. 1995).

Statute of Li mitations We b e g in w ithJoint

Ve ntu re ’s se c on d is su e in whic h th e e nti ty argue s th a t D OH fa ile d to establish, as a matter of law , that the statute of limitations barre d J oint Venture’ s trespass to try tit le a c tio n. A d e fe nd ant m ov ingfo r s umm ary jud g me nt o n a

statut e of lim itatio ns de fe ns e mus t establish as a matter of law : (1) whe n the ca use of a ction acc rued; a

nd (2) ne g ate the disc overy rule if it applies a

nd has bee n otherwise ple ad or r aised. See KPM G Peat Marwick

v. Harrison County Housing Finance Corp. , 988 S.W .2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). The Te x as Tax Code provides the statute of

limit ations for c halleng ing the validity of a tax sale. See T EX .T AX C ODE ANN . §§ 33.54, 34.08(b)( Ver non 2008). Pursuant to Section 33.54: (a ) Exc e pt a s p ro vid e d b y Sub se c tio n ( b) , a

n a c tio n r e latin g to t

he tit le to pr op e rt y may no t be ma int a ine d a g a ins t th e purc ha se r o f t he pr op e rt

y a t a tax s ale unless the a ction is commence d: (1) befor e the f

irst anniversa

ry of the date that the dee d executed to the purcha ser at the tax s ale is filed of rec ord; or (2) befor e the se cond annive rsar y of the date that the dee d is ex ecute d to t he purc ha se r i s f

ile d o f r e c or d, if

on the date that th e su it t o c oll e c t th e de lin qu e nt t a x wa s f ile d th e pr op e rt

y wa s:-4- (A) the re sidence homestead of the owner ; or (B ) land appr aised or e ligible to be a ppraised unde r Subchapte r C or D, Chapter 23. (b) I f a pe rson other tha n the purc haser

at the tax sale or the pe rson’s su c c e sso r i n inte re st p ay s taxes o n th e pr op e rt y duri ngthe a

pp lic a ble limit ations period and until the commenc ement of a n action cha lleng ing the validity

of the tax sale and that pe rson was not ser ved citation in the suit to foreclose the tax l ien, that limitations period doe s not apply to that person. T EX .T AX C ODE ANN . § 33.54. J oint Venture c ontends the trial cour t erre d in gr anting summary judgme nt on DOH’s statute of limitations defense on thre e g rounds. Fir st, J oint Venture a rgues that Section 33.54 does not apply

to an entity

who was not a

party to the underly

ing tax suit. S econd, Joint Venture
asser ts that if the provision does apply , it violates the open cour ts provision of the Texas Constit ution. Finally , J oint Venture a rgues that a g enuine issue of materia l fac t remains pursua nt to the discovery

rule. “Open Courts” Challenge Article I , section 13 of the T exas Const itution provides: “All courts shall be open, a nd
ever y person f or an injury

done him, in his lands, goods, pe rson or re putation, shall have re medy by due cour se of law .” T EX .C O N ST . a rt . I , § 13 . Astatut e that unre a so na bly or arb itr ari ly
a br idg e s a pe rs on ’s ri g ht t o o bta in r e dr e ss f or an in jur y is a vio latio n o f t

he op e n c ourt s provision. Se e Sh ah v . M os s , 67 S.W .3d 836, 842 (Tex. 2001). The pr ovision protects Texans fr om l e g isl a tiv e a c ts that c ut o ff an in div idu a l’ s r ig ht t o s ue be fo re the re is a re a so na ble opportunity

to discover the wrongand bringsuit. Se e id . To establish an ope n courts violation a claimant must show: (1) a c og nizable, common-law c laim that is statutoril y restric ted; and (2)-5-

the re striction is unreasona ble or a rbitrar y when ba lance d ag ainst the statute’s purpose and basis. Y ancy v . United Surgical Partners Intern., Inc

. , 236 S.W .3d 778, 783 (Tex. 2007). Joint Ve ntu re ’s op e n c ourt s c ha lle ng e is two -f old . F ir st, the e nti ty

argue s th a t th e statut e of limitations, vi olates Article I , sec. 13, be cause it denied a pr operty owner a rig ht to be hear d th e r e f o r e v i o l a t i n g th e i n d i v i d

u a l ’ s c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i g h tt o a r e m e dy b y d u e c o ur s e o f

l aw . In
su pp or t of thi s argume nt, Joint

Ve ntu re c ite s Eu sti

s v . Ci ty of H e nr ie tta , 9 0 T e x. 4 6 8 , 3 9 S. W. 567 (1897), f

or the proposition that a proc eedingwhich denie s a prope rty owner the rig ht to be hear d in court denie s that individual the constituti onal rig ht to a leg al re medy
. Se e Eu sti s , 39 S.W . at 569. Howe ver, in so holding , the Court in Eu sti s was c onsideringa hy

pothetical proce edingin which a taxing e ntity could ac quire or r ecove r prope rty on which taxes had not been pa id without the formality of a sa le or c onvey ance . Id . The Court conc luded that such a summary proce eding , “would deny the citizen the rig ht to be hear d in court, re fusing him the constitutional privilege of a r emedy by due cour se of law

for a n injury to his right of pr operty .” Id . The opinion continues, “[i]n pl ain words, his prope rty would be dec lare d forf

eited, and taken from him, without any

judicial investigation.” Id . In the ca se bef ore us, a lthough Joint Venture has cha lleng ed the judg ment, there is no dispute that the tax delinquency was submitted to a cour

t of law. Th e re fo re , th e c on c e rn s r a ise d in Eu sti s are not present he re. The B eaumont Court of Appe als consider ed a similar a rgument ag ainst the application of Section 33.54 ear lier this y ear . Se e J oh n K. Ha rri

so n H old ing s, L.L. C. v . S

tra us s , 221 S.W .3d 785, 788-89 (Te x .App.--B eaumont 2007, pet. de nied). The proper ty at issue in Strau ss was a

lot in Montgomer

y County
. Id . at 787. Taxes wer e not paid betwe en 1986 and 1992. Id . In 1996, the taxing unit obtained a judg ment and sold the prope rty to Strauss’s prede cessor

in interest. Id
.Har rison Holdings a

rgued that the tax sale and de ed did not transfe r title to St rauss’s 1 prede cessor , beca

use: (1) the named de fenda nts in the tax suit did not have a n interest in the proper ty ; (2) the r ecor d owner s of the prope rty wer e not made pa

rties to the tax sui t or notified of the sale; a nd (3) the tax code limitations provisions were unc onstitut ional. Se e Strau ss , 221 S.W .3d at 787. -6- Har rison Holdings f

iled suit ag ainst Strauss in 2003, claiming owne rship of the lot throug h a 2001 quitclaim deed. Id . On the issue of the constitutionalit y of the limitations provision, t he 1 revie wing court de termined that Sec tion 33.54(b) provides, “ a mea ns for a person - - not serve d citation in the suit to foreclose the tax l ien -- to avoid application of the statutory limit ations period by paying the proper

ty taxes during that pe riod and until the commenc ement of a n action challeng ing the validity

of the tax sale.” [I nterna l quotations omi tted]. Id . at 789, quoting T EX .T AX C ODE ANN . § 33.54(b). We ag ree with the analy sis in Strau ss . Re g a rd le ss o f who wa s n ame d a nd se rv e d w ith
c i t a t i o ni nth e t a x s u i t , S e c t i o n3 3
. 5 4 g av e J o i n tV e n tur e th e o p p o rtun i ty t o c h a l l e n g e th e v a l i d i ty of DOH ’s dee d. SeeT EX .T AX C ODE ANN . § 33 .5 4. In a dd iti on , th e statue of lim itatio ns c ou ld have be en tolled to the extent the entity proved it paid taxes on the prope rty during the limitations period, a nd until J uly

2005, when it filed its action cha lleng ing the sale. Se e id . J oint Venture has not attempted to utiliz e Section 33.54(b) in its brief to this C ourt, nor did it argue that the tolling provision applied in the summary judgme nt proce edingbelow. The e ntity

also argues Section 33.54 violates Ar ticle I , sec. 13 be cause the provision,

“ make s it imp os sib le fo r t

he pla int if

f t o e nf or c e its ri g hts du e to a

n a bs e nc e of a re a so na ble tim e in whic h to dis c ov e r t

he e xiste nc e of

the wr on g .” Joint

Ve ntu re do e s n ot e xpla in why

it i s
unrea sonable for

the L eg islature to expect a pr operty owner to exercise its rig ht to challeng e a tax sale within the one- y ear

time limi t, or to continue to pay proper ty taxes (as in a ca se whe re the-7-

proper ty owner is unawar e of the fore closure) , tolling the statute of limitations until an ac tion can b e f i l e d
. In s u m , S e c t i o n3 3
. 5 4 d o e s p r o v i d e a m e c h an i s mf

o r a p r o p e rty o w n e r , i n

j ur e d b y a flawe d tax foreclosure , to rec oup its property
. Se e Strau ss , 221 S.W .3d at 789. J oint Venture ha s n ot e sta

bli sh e d th a t th e on e -ye ar l imi tatio ns pe ri od is unr e a so na

ble or arb itr ary . T he re fo re its open cour ts challeng e must fail. See Yancy , 236 S.W .3d at 783. Di sc ov e r y R ule We now turn to J oint Venture’ s argument that DOH f ailed to neg ate the disc overy rule. The discove ry

rule is a limited exception which tolls the acc rual of a cause of ac tion which applies if, “the nature of the injury incurre d is inherently

undiscovera

ble and the e vidence of the injury is objectively

verifia ble.” Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co. , 211 S.W .3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2006), quoting Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v . Altai, Inc. , 918 S.W .2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1996). J oint Venture has not provided, a nd we ha ve bee n unable to find Te x as pre cede nt applying the discovery rule to the statute of

limit ations at issue here . There fore , our first task is to deter mine whether the exception is applicable. The discove ry

rule is a judicially

cre ated e x ception which, in c erta in limi ted circ umstances, is applied to identify when a cause of ac tion accr

ues. See M

oreno v. Ste rling Drug, Inc. , 787 S.W .2d 348, 353 (Tex. 1990). To a g reat ext ent, the question of whe ther the discovery rule a pplies is a matter of statutory construction. Se e id . As alwa y s, our g oal when construinga statute is to g ive ef fec t to the L eg islature’s intent. Mid-Century I ns. Co. of T

ex. v . Ademaj , 243 S.W .3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2007). We beg in our ana ly sis with the plain meaning of the statutory languag e. Id . When the plain meaningof a statute of limit ations specifie s an eve nt or date a s trigg eringacc rual, the judicia ry does not have the authority to alter that date or e vent by-8-

imposing the discove ry

exception. See M

oreno , 787 S.W .2d at 353. To do so would violate the
se pa ratio n b e tw e e n th e L e g isl a tur e , a s st a tut e -m ake r, and the jud ic iary , w ho se on ly ta sk is t o implement the L eg islature’s intent. See F .F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Due nez , 237 S.W .3d 680, 690 (Tex. 2007), citing McInty re v. Ram irez , 1 09 S.W. 3d 74 1, 74 8 ( Te x. 20 03 ); se e als o Stiles v. Union Carbide Corp. , 520 F.Supp. 865, 867-68 (S.D.Te x . 1981)(whe n the “L eg islature has cle arly

and unequivoc ally

presc ribed that a

cause of ac tion accr

ues on the oc curr ence of a specifie d event, the c ourts are without power to fa shion a diffe rent rule . . . .”). The plain languag e of Sec tion 33.54(a) spe cifica lly identifies, “the date that the dee d executed to the purc haser at the tax sale is filed of re cord;” as trig g eringthe limitations period for
an ac tion to challeng e a tax sale. SeeT EX .T AX C ODE ANN . § 33 .5 4( a )( 1) . T his langua g e is a
c le ar a nd un ambi g uo us state me nt o f t he L e g isl a tur e ’s int e nt t o li mit ta x sal e c ha lle ng e s to tho se broug ht within one y ear

of the date the purc haser files his deed. Joint Venture does not ar g ue otherwise. G iven the spec ific date of ac crua l provided in the statute, we cannot impose the discovery rule to salvag e a tax sale c halleng e brought outside the limi tations period. See Moreno , 7 87 S.W. 2d

a t 35 4- 55 ; Safeway Stores, Inc . v. Certainteed Corp. , 710 S.W .2d 544, 546- 48 (T e x. 19 86 ); Morrison v. Chan , 699 S.W .2d 205, 208 (Tex. 1985). Ther efor e, eve n if we assume that a g enuine issue of materia l fac t remains under the discover

y rule, it would have no impact on DOH’ s rig ht to summ ary judgme nt on its l imitations defe nse bec ause the exception does not apply
. See KPM G Peat Marwick, 988 S.W .2d at 748 (de fenda nt assertingstatute of limit ations defe nse at summary judgme nt must negate discover y rule if it appl ies and has be en plead or otherwise r aised). App lic at ion of Se c ti on 3 3. 54 to P ar tyNo t N am e d in Ta x Sui t-9-

In it s f ina l li mit a tio ns argume nt, Joint Ve ntu re c on te nd s D OH c ann ot e sta bli sha ri g ht t o invoke Section 33.54 bec ause it ca nnot produce evidenc e of a valid transfe r. Ac cordingto J oint Venture , DOH’ s deed a

nd the under lying judg ment, did not have any eff ect on its title to the proper ty beca use the suit was fla

wed without the entity

named a s a par

ty . As we discusse d
a bo ve , r e g ard le ss o f t

he po te nti a l me ri t of

a pr op e rt y ow ne r’ s tax sal e c ha lle ng e that a ta x sal e was invalid, that ar g ument must be exercised within the statute of limitations. See Strau ss , 221 S.W .3d at 791 (judg ment voidable as a g ainst parties not joined in tax foreclosure , but
c ha lle ng ingpa

rt y mus t c omp ly

wi th r e qu ir e me nts in t a x co de , in c lud inglim itatio ns ); Session v. W oods , 206 S.W .3d 772, 778 (Tex.App.--Te x arka na 2006, pet. de nied)(r eg ardle ss of merit of challeng er’ s other ar g uments reg ardingvalidity of tax sale, tax code statute of limitations barred
a c tio n to re c la im p ro pe rt

y ); J or da n v . B us tam an te , 1 58 S.W. 3d 29 , 4 0 ( Te x.Ap p. -- Ho us ton [14t h Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (three -y ear delay in challeng e to validity

of tax sale barr ed suit and p ro v i d edt ax p urc h as er

an d s u cc es s o r i ni n t er es tfu l l t i t l e t o p ro p erty ). Ab s en ta c h al l en ge br ou g ht w ith in t

he statut e of

lim itatio ns inc lud ingits tol lin g pr ov isi on , th e c od e a llo ws a ta x sal e purcha ser to “c onclusively presume that the tax s ale wa s valid” and tra nsfer s to the purcha ser,

“ fu ll t itl e to t

he pr op e rt

y fr e e and c le ar o f t he ri g ht, tit le , a

nd int e re st o f a

ny pe rs on that aro se befor e the tax sale . . . .” SeeT EX .T AX C ODE ANN . § 34.08(b). The statute of

limit ations in this case beg an to run whe n DOH r ecor ded its sheriff ’s dee d to the mineral intere st on J uly 20, 2001. SeeT EX .T AX C ODE ANN . § 33.54. J oint Venture ha d two options to challeng e the sa le. I t could have f iled a lawsuit to invalidate DO H’s dee d befor e J uly 20, 2002, or if it was not aw are of the for eclosure until after the one -y ear limit ations period it could have introduc ed evide nce that it paid the tax es on the prope rty in the y ear s betwee n the-10-

sale a nd the date it filed the suit. SeeT EX .T AX C ODE ANN . § 33 .5 4. Th is s uit wa s n ot f ile d unti l J uly 5, 2005, near ly

three y ear s bey ond the limitations period. Se e id . T he re is n o e vid e nc e in the summary

judgme nt rec ord that Joi nt Venture paid taxes on the proper ty in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, or 2004. Without a timely challeng e, DOH acquir ed g ood title to the property throug h the sheriff ’s dee d. SeeT EX .T AX C ODE ANN . §§ 34.01(n), 34.08( b). I ssue Two is Over ruled. Findingthat the trial cour t did not err by

g rantingsummary

judgme nt on DOH’s statute of limit ations defe nse, we decline to a ddress Joint Venture ’s alter native point of er

ror. The trial court’s judg ment is affirme d.
Aug ust 7, 2008 DAVI D WEL L I NGTONCHEW, C hief Just ice B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d C ar r , JJ.