UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. MONTY ENGLEHART, Defendant - Appellant. No. 19-8006 (D.C. No. 2:12-CR-00026-ABJ-1) (D. Wyo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , McKAY , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Appellant Monty Englehart, a convicted sex offender, was charge d with failing to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification A ct (“SORNA”), 34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that SORNA violat ed the constitutional nondelegation doct rine by imprope rly delegating legislative power to the Attorney General. The district court denied the motion, and Mr . Englehart appealed.

* This order and judgment is not b inding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata , and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Proc edure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 25, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 We hold that Mr. Englehart’s non delegation argument is foreclos ed by Gundy v. United States , No. 17-6086, 2019 WL 2527473, at *1 (U.S . June 20, 2019). Ex ercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND In 1997, Mr. Englehart was convi cted of aggravated criminal sex ual abuse. Nine years later, Congress enacted SOR NA, which requires convicted s ex offenders to register in a national sex offender registry. See 34 U.S.C. § 20913(a). Title 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) makes it a felony for an individua l “required to register under [SORNA]” to “travel[] in interstate or foreign commerce” and “knowingly fail[] to regist er or update a registration as required by [SORNA].” SORNA gives the Attorney General “the authority to specify the applicability of the [registration] requirements . . . to sex offenders convicte d before [SORNA’s] enactment . . . and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders.” 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d). E xercising this authority, the Attorney General issued an interim rule in 2007 applying SORNA’s registration requirements “to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense . . . prior to the enact ment of [SORNA].” 72 Fed. Reg. 8894-01 (Feb. 28, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 72. 3). In 2010, it issued a second regulation finalizing SOR NA’s retroactive applicability. 28 C.F.R. § 72.3. Mr. Englehart was charged und er 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for failing to register as required under SORNA and the regul ation. He moved to dismiss t he indictment, arguing that SORNA’s grant of authority t o the Attorney G eneral to spec ify the extent of the Act’s retroactive application vi olated the constitutional nonde legation doctrine. Mr.3 Englehart acknowledged that his a rgument was “currently foreclo sed,” ROA at 18, by
United States v. Nichols , 775 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2014), which held that SORNA does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 1231-32. But because Gundy —a case addressing “this very issue”—was t hen pending before the United States Supreme Court, he “raise[d] this argument to p reserve it for further review.” ROA at 22. The district court denied the m otion to dismiss, and Mr. Engleh art appealed, urging the same arguments.
II. ANALYSIS On June 20, 2019, the S upreme Court decided Gundy . The Court held that Congress did not “make an impermi ssible delegation when it inst ructed the Attorney General to apply SORNA’s registra tion requirements to pre-Act o ffenders,” Gundy , 2019 WL 2527473, at *8, and that the “ delegation easily passes const itutional muster,” id. at *2.
III. CONCLUSION The Supreme Court’s holding in Gundy forecloses Mr. Englehart’s nondelegation argument. Accordingly, we affirm.

Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge