*The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge

for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

 The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

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Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

____________

No. 96-2224

____________

Karen Snow, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota

Ridgeview Medical Center, *

*

Appellee. *

____________

 Submitted: December 12, 1996

 Filed: October 16, 1997

____________

Before McMILLIAN and MAGILL, Circuit Judges, and WEBBER, District

*

Judge.

____________

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Karen Snow (“appellant” or “Snow”) appeals from a final order entered in the

United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granting summary judgment 1
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in favor of Ridgeview Medical Center (“appellee” or “RMC”) on her Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and

state law claims. Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., No. 4-94-13 (D. Minn. Mar. 29,

1996) (memorandum opinion). For reversal, appellant argues that the district court

erred in holding that appellant (1) was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA and

the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”); (2) was not discriminated against based

upon her age; and (3) did not establish a triable dispute in respect of her state law

claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and breach of an implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of

the district court.

I. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1367. Jurisdiction on appeal is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of

appeal was timely filed under Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

II. Background

The following recitation of undisputed facts is based upon the findings of the

district court. Snow was employed by RMC from 1964 until she was terminated in

1992. Snow was hired as a laboratory and radiological technician. In this capacity, she

performed laboratory tests, electrocardiograms, and x-rays.

In 1971, Snow underwent cervical fusion and took a six-week leave of absence

because of an injury that she sustained in a non-work-related accident in 1969. She

returned to work with a recommendation from her physician that she not lift without

assistance. Her physician eliminated this lift restriction approximately six months to

a year after her surgery.
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Around 1972 or 1973, appellant was promoted to Chief Radiology Technician.

Her duties in this new position included performing administrative tasks as well as the

diagnostic services that she performed before her promotion. Snow held this position

until April 1988, at which time she informed appellee that she was experiencing

difficulty lifting as a result of the 1969 accident. Snow then consulted a physician who

recommended that Snow refrain from lifting more than twenty-five (25) pounds, lifting

patients, and pushing heavy equipment. In consideration of these restrictions, appellee

created the position of “radiology services coordinator,” to which appellant was

assigned. This new position conformed with Snow’s medical restrictions and involved

the performance of administrative duties, as well as staff technician duties “as

required.” In 1989, Snow’s physician recommended that Snow observe the same work

restrictions that were in place in 1988. That same year, Snow began performing

mammographies which took approximately one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half hours per

day and suited her physical limitations.

In 1991, RMC began steps to become accredited by the American College of

Radiology (“ACR”). In order for RMC to receive accreditation, all of its technologists

performing mammographies had to be certified by the American Registry of Radiologic

Technologists (“ARRT”). RMC informed Snow that she must become certified in

order to continue performing mammographies at RMC. Snow investigated the

requirements for certification but did not obtain certification prior to her termination,

at least eight months later. 

In 1992, RMC applied for and received accreditation, after which time appellant

was no longer qualified to perform mammographies. RMC sought alternative ways to

employ Snow full-time within her work restrictions and in accordance with its

accreditation requirements. RMC contacted appellant’s physician to determine

appellant’s then-current work restrictions. Her physician recommended the same lifting

restriction as that recommended in 1988 and 1989. Based on this information and in

light of Snow’s lack of certification, RMC determined that there was not a sufficient
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amount of work that Snow could perform to maintain her status as a full-time

coordinator. RMC thus offered Snow an administrative position within the radiology

department at one-tenth full-time status. Later, RMC determined that Snow could not

be utilized and terminated her.

RMC’s employee handbook provides that employees may be terminated for

“just cause.” It further states that RMC deals with its employees “fairly and in good

faith.” At the time appellant was fired, she was forty-nine years old and had worked

for appellee for approximately twenty-nine years.

Appellant brought the underlying suit in federal district court alleging federal

statutory claims under the ADA and the ADEA, state statutory disability and age

discrimination claims under the MHRA, and state common law claims for breach of

contract, promissory estoppel, and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. RMC moved for summary judgment on each of these claims. The district

court entered judgment granting RMC’s motion from which Snow now appeals.

 II. Discussion

 A. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

same standard as the district court and examining the record in the light most favorable

to the nonmovant. Lang v. Star Herald, 107 F.3d 1308, 1311 (8 Cir. 1997) (citing

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Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256, 258 (8 Cir. 1996)), cert. denied,

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No. 96-9275, 1997 WL 336894 (U.S. Oct . 6, 1997)). Summary judgment is

appropriate if the evidence demonstrates “that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106

S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
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574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986). Because discrimination cases often turn

on inferences rather than on direct evidence, we are particularly deferential to the

nonmovant. Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8 Cir. 1994) (Crawford).

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Indeed, we have stated that “summary judgment should seldom be used in employmentdiscrimination cases.” Id. Notwithstanding these considerations, summary judgment

is proper when a plaintiff fails to establish a factual dispute on an essential element of

her case. See Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 59 F.3d 759, 762 (8 Cir. 1995)

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(Bialas).

 B. ADA and MHRA Disability Discrimination Claims 

Snow challenges the district court’s determination that she failed to establish a

prima facie case with respect to her ADA and MHRA claims for disability

discrimination. Specifically, Snow argues that the district court erred in finding that she

had not established that she was disabled within the meaning of the statutes. Second,

Snow maintains that she is a “qualified individual” for whom RMC failed to provide

reasonable accommodation. 

The ADA proscribes discrimination by an employer “against a qualified

individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a). Similarly, the MHRA creates a civil cause of action against employers

who discharge an employee based on that individual’s disability. Minn. Stat. § 363.03

subd. 2(b). The basic burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas), applies to

claims brought under either statute. See, e.g., Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 115

F.3d 613, 616 (8 Cir. 1997) (Helfter) (“Federal courts analyze disability discrimination th

claims by using the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas . .

. .”); Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test to

disability discrimination claim); Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons, Inc., 532 N.W.2d

225, 227 (Minn. 1995) (adopting McDonnell Douglas test to adjudicate cause of action
 At summary judgment, appellant sought to prove her prima facie case by

2

establishing that she had a physical impairment that substantially or materially limited

a major life activity. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence supports the

findings that she has a disability, has a history of disability, and was perceived by RMC

as having a disability. However, in concluding that Snow had failed to establish a

prima facie case under the ADA, the district court relied solely on her argument that

her impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities–the only theory of

disability raised below. Memorandum Opinion at 9-12. The district court, thus, did

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for disability discrimination); Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 808

(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (using McDonnell Douglas analysis for disability discrimination

claim under the MHRA). Under this framework, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie

case by showing that she (1) was “disabled” within the meaning of the statute; (2) was

qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable

accommodation; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances

giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94

F.3d 484 (8 Cir. 1996); Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir.), cert.

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denied, --- U.S. ---, 117 S. Ct. 274 (1996). Once the plaintiff has established her prima

facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.

Ct. at 1824. If the employer successfully makes this showing, the burden of production

shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s proffered reason is a

pretext for unlawful discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

507-08, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747-48 (1993) (Hicks). The ultimate burden of proving

unlawful discrimination always rests with the plaintiff. Id. at 507, 113 S. Ct. at 2747

(citing McDonnell Douglas, at 253, 101 S. Ct. at 1093). 

The district court found that appellant failed to establish that she was disabled

within the meaning of the applicable statutes. A plaintiff may prove disability by

showing that she either (1) has a disability as defined under the ADA, (2) suffers from

a history of such a disability, or (3) is perceived by her employer as having such a

disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). Disability is defined as a physical or 2
 not have an opportunity to consider at summary judgment, appellant’s arguments with

respect to the alternative theories of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C).

Appellant is therefore precluded from arguing either that she had a history of disability

or was perceived by RMC as having a disability. O.R.S. Distilling Co. v.

Brown-Forman Corp., 972 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[A] party may not assert

new arguments on appeal of a motion for summary judgment.”); see also Dorothy J. v.

Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 1993); Felton v. Fayette Sch. Dist.,

875 F.2d 191, 192 (8th Cir. 1989). 

 Major life activities include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, 3

seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.2(i). Sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching are also considered major life

activities. Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 115 F.3d 613, 616 (8 Cir. 1997) (citing th

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)). 

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mental impairment that substantially (ADA) or materially (MHRA) limits one or more

of the plaintiff’s major life activities. Id.; Minn. Stat. § 363.01 subd. 13. Whether an 3

impairment substantially limits a major life activity is a threshold question. See 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8 Cir.

th

1996) (“The threshold requirement for coverage under the ADA is that the plaintiff be

a ‘qualified individual with a disability.’”). To “substantially limit” a major life activity

means to render an individual unable to perform a basic function that the average person

in the general population can perform, or to significantly restrict the condition, manner,

or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as

compared to an average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. §

1630.2(j). “The inability to perform a single particular job does not constitute a

substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” Id. § 1630.2(i). Rather, the

impairment must prevent the appellant from performing an entire class or broad range

of jobs as compared to the average person possessing comparable training, skills, and

abilities. Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid Am., Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8 Cir. 1996)

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(Aucutt) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Finally, the following factors are

considered in determining whether a person is substantially limited in a major life
 Appellant belatedly argues that she has a hearing impairment which constitutes a 4

disability under the ADA and the MHRA. Having not been raised in appellant’s

memoranda opposing summary judgment, this argument has no place before this court

on appeal. See supra note 2; see also Memorandum Opinion at 9 n. 4.

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activity: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or anticipated

duration, and (3) its long- term impact. Id.

Appellant maintains that her physical impairment “affects such activities as

performing manual tasks, hearing, lifting, and working.” (Appellant’s Brief at 14-15). 4

The undisputed facts show that appellant sustained an injury in 1969 to her neck and

spine for which her physician has imposed a lifting restriction since 1988. While

lifting is noted under the regulations as a major life activity, a general lifting restriction

imposed by a physician, without more, is insufficient to constitute a disability within

the meaning of the ADA. See, e.g., Helfter,115 F.3d at 617 (evidence that impairment

limits work-related activities such as lifting does not demonstrate triable dispute

regarding substantial limitation on major life activity); Aucutt, 85 F.3d at 1319 (twentyfive pound lifting restriction, without more, does not constitute a significant restriction

on ability to perform major life activities). Likewise, Snow’s assertion that her ability

to perform manual tasks and work is so impaired that it constitutes a disability is

unconvincing where there is no evidence that she is thereby precluded from performing

a class or broad range of jobs as compared to average persons in the general

population. Helfter, 115 F.3d at 617; Aucutt , 85 F.3d at 1319. Indeed, appellant has

presented no evidence from which to reasonably infer that any of the major life

activities enumerated in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) is substantially or materially limited by

her physical impairment. It is not enough that an impairment affect a major life activity;

the plaintiff must proffer evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that

such activity is substantially or materially limited. E.g., Helfter, 115 F.3d at 616

(conclusory testimony regarding the limitation an impairment places on a major life

activity standing alone is insufficient to defeat motion for summary judgment on a 
 The analysis of disability under both statutes is interchangeable. E.g., Heintzelman 5

v. Runyon, 120 F.3d 143, 145 n.4 (8 Cir. 1997). th

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disability discrimination claim). The facts as determined by the district court and

presented in the parties’ briefs on appeal do not support such an inference.

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that there is no genuine issue of material

fact regarding Snow’s assertion of a disability within the meaning of the ADA or the

MHRA.5

C. ADEA and MHRA Age Discrimination Claims

Snow next argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on

her age discrimination claims brought under the ADEA and the MHRA. Both the

ADEA and the MRHA prohibit an employer from discharging an employee within a

protected age group (40 years old and over) because of that employee’s age. 29 U.S.C.

§§ 623(a)(1), 631(a); Minn. Stat. § 363.03 subd. 1(2)(b). Moreover, like appellant’s

disability claim, her age discrimination claims under both statutes are governed by the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d

603, 613 (8 Cir. 1997) (Bevan) (citing Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85

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F.3d 1328, 1338-39 (8th Cir. 1996); Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d

701, 710 (Minn. 1992)). 

Snow asserts that she established a prima facie case for age discrimination by

showing that (1) she was forty-nine years old when terminated, and thus, a member of

the protected group; (2) she performed competently and satisfactorily for over 28 years,

indicating that she was a qualified individual within the meaning of the statute; and

(3) after her termination, the number of employees in her department increased from

16 to 20 and her duties were assigned to other employees. RMC relied on Snow’s lack

of certification as its nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. On the ultimate

issue of intentional age discrimination, Snow alleged that she was terminated because
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she was the “senior most employee [at RMC], making good money.” (Snow Depo. at

81). In essence, Snow argues that she was terminated because she had been employed

at RMC longer than the other then-current employees, and thus earned a comparatively

higher salary. The district court granted RMC summary judgment in light of the

Supreme Court’s holding in Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701

(1993) (Hazen Paper), and the precedent in this circuit. See Hanebrink v. Brown Shoe

Co., 110 F.3d 644, 647 (8th Cir. 1997) (Hanebrink); Slathar v. Sather Trucking Corp.,

78 F.3d 415, 418 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 117 S. Ct. 179 (1996); Bialas, 59

F.3d at 763. 

In Hazen Paper, the Court held that “there is no disparate treatment under the

ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other than the

employer’s age.” Id. at 1705. The plaintiff in Hazen Paper alleged discrimination on

the ground that his employer fired him because his pension was close to vesting. Id.

The Court held that firing an employee on this basis is not actionable under the ADEA.

The Court reasoned that, “because age and years of service are analytically distinct, an

employer can take account of one while ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to

say that a decision based on years of service is necessarily ‘age-based.’” Id. at 1707.

Under Hazen Paper, the evidence in the instant case is insufficient, as a matter of law,

to show that Snow’s termination was based upon her age. Id. at 1707; see also

Hanebrink, 110 F.3d at 647 (“Employment decisions motivated by characteristics other

than age such as salary and pension benefits, even when such characteristics correlate

with age, do not constitute age discrimination.”).

While we agree with the district court’s conclusion that RMC is entitled to

summary judgment on Snow’s age discrimination claims under Hazen Paper, we also

note that a plaintiff may, in some instances, prove intentional discrimination by relying

on the evidence proffered to establish his or her prima facie case under the burdenshifting method. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S. C t. at 2749 (“[T]he factfinder’s

disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant . . . may, together with the
 If appellant cannot establish that she was discriminated against under the ADEA, 6

she likewise has no claim for age discrimination under the MHRA. See Bevan v.

Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d 603, 613 (8 Cir. 1997) (“[W]e review the MHRA claim

th

under the same standards as we applied to the ADEA claim.”).

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elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”) (emphasis

added). However, appellant has failed to proffer any competent evidence (direct or

indirect) of age discrimination beyond that which is intended to support her prima facie

case, and the evidence proffered in support of Snow’s prima facie case is not sufficient

to create a genuine dispute regarding intentional age discrimination. We therefore

agree with the district court that RMC was entitled to summary judgment on appellant’s

ADEA and MHRA claims. 

6

D. Breach of Contract Claims

Snow asserts that her termination was in breach of a contractual agreement

contained in RMC’s employee handbook. RMC’s employee handbook provides that

employees may be terminated for “just cause” and that RMC deals with its employees

“fairly and in good faith.” Pursuant to Minnesota law, an employee handbook may

form an enforceable agreement if the requisites for a unilateral contract have been met.

Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983) (Mettille).

Moreover, while there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in

employment contracts under Minnesota law, we have held that “the same specificity

required to modify the at-will relationship” may also create an express covenant of

good faith and fair dealing. Poff v. Western Nat’l Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 1189, 1191 (8 Cir. th

1994) (emphasis added). Absent an express contract, however, there is a presumption

of at-will employment. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d at 627. An at-will employee may be

terminated at any time for no reason at all. Id.
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We agree with the district court that appellant was an at-will employee. The

language cited above from the RMC employee handbook lacks the specificity and

definiteness required of a unilateral contract. See, e.g., Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Fed.

Employees Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 856-57 (Minn. 1986). Accordingly,

appellant’s status as an at-will employee was not modified by the employee handbook

nor did the handbook create an express convenant of good faith and fair dealing. We

agree therefore with the district court that RMC is entitled to summary judgment on

appellant’s breach of contract claims.

E. Promissory Estoppel

Finally, appellant claims that as early as 1988, managing personnel at RMC told

her that she would “always have a position with Ridgeview Hospital,” thereby creating

a promise upon which she detrimentally relied. In addition, appellant maintains that the

language in the employee handbook created a promise that she would not be terminated

without just cause. This latter argument is moot for the same reason that it could not

support a claim for breach of contract. Moreover, we agree with the district court that

appellant failed to demonstrate a genuine issue as to essential elements of her

promissory estoppel claim.

In order to assert a claim for promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must establish each

of the following elements: (1) a promise, (2) detrimental reliance, and (3) injustice.

Ruud v. Great Plains Supply, Inc., 526 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 1995). The law is

hesitant to impose on an employer the burdensome obligation of providing permanent

employment in the absence of an explicit promise to that effect. See Degen v. IDS,

Inc., 260 Minn. 424, 428-29, 110 N.W.2d 863, 866- 67 (1963). Moreover, the promise

must be of the kind to reasonably induce forbearance. Grouse v. Group Health Plan,

306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981). 
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The district court held that Snow failed to establish that she detrimentally relied

on RMC’s promise. After carefully reviewing the record in this case, we agree. On

appeal, Snow fails to present any evidence of her reliance except her assertion that she

stayed at RMC for twenty-nine years and did not seek other employment or additional

certification in her field in reliance on RMC’s “promises.” The statements allegedly

made by RMC managers, upon which Snow relies could not reasonably induce such

reliance when Snow was subsequently informed by RMC that she would need to seek

certification in order to maintain her status as a full-time employee at RMC.

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that RMC has entitled to summary

judgment on this claim. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on appellant’s ADA, ADEA, and state law claims. In addition,

appellee’s motion to strike portions of appellant’s brief and appendix is hereby

denied as moot.

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.