AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed October 6, 2021 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-00934-CR CHRISTOPHER JUSTIN SCARBOROUGH, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 199-82799-2019 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Goldstein, and Smith Opinion by Justice Goldstein The jury convicted Christopher Justin Scarborough of assault against a police officer, a second-degree felony. See T EX

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. § 22.01(b-2). The trial court assessed punishment at three years’ c onfinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Jus tice. In his sole issue on direct appeal, Scarborough argues he was denied his constitu tional right to effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND On June 28, 2018, Plano police officer Robert Cassone initiated a traffic stop of Scarborough’s car for an improperly affi xed paper license plate in a reputed high–2– narcotic and prostitution area. During th e traffic stop, Officer Cassone observed multiple live pistol rounds in plain sight. Scarborough denied having a firearm in his possession but admitted to having a knife. O fficer Cassone directed Scarborough to exit the car, removed Scarborou gh’s knife, placed it on the roof of the car, and asked Scarborough for consent to a search of the car. 1 Scarborough declined to give consent, and Officer Cassone called for a b ackup police officer as well as a K-9 unit. When Officer Cassone advised Scarboroug h that the K-9 unit was en route, Scarborough informed Officer Cassone that he intended to leave. Officer Cassone then advised Scarborough he wa s being detained and unable to leave. At this point, an altercation ensued, with Scarborough and Officer Cassone landing on the ground. While the altercation was ongoing, Officer Lederman arrived on the scene and assisted in subduing Scarborough. Both officers had body cams that recorded the altercation, and the videos, along with other unobjected-to evidence, were introduced to the jury. During the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, all evidence and testimony was presented during the State’s case in chief, s ubject to direct, cross, re-direct and recross examination. The defense rested without introducing evidence or calling

1 In addition to being concerned about the presence of a firearm, Officer Cassone testified he suspected Scarborough might be under the influence of narcotics and have them in the car. He testified that his suspicion was based on: (1) Scarborough moving around in the car and reaching under the seat as Officer Cassone approached; (2) Scarborough lowering his window only slightly, which usually indicates an intent to disguise the smell of drugs; (3) Scarborough explaining that he had just been at a vape shop on his way home from work, despite other answers indicating he was thirty minutes out of the way and Officer Cassone’s knowledge that there were numerous va pe shops near Scarborough’s home and work; and (4) Officer Cassone’s experience that the area was well known for drug trafficking.–3– witnesses. The jury found Scarborough guilty. The cour t received evidence during the punishment phase, including S carborough’s testimony, and assessed punishment. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION The Sixth Amendment to the United Stat es Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. Lopez v. State , 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In his so le issue Scarborough asserts his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the principles established in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and United States v. Cronic , 466 U.S. 648 (1984). To successfully assert a claim under Strickland , Scarborough must show by a preponderance of the evidence bot h that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he suffered prejudice as a result. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687; Perez v. State , 310 S.W.3d 890, 892–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). To demonstrate such prej udice, Scarborough must show “there is a reasonable probability that, but for coun sel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694; Perez , 310 S.W.3d at 893. Ineffective assistance can be presumed prejudicial under Cronic where “counsel entirely fails to subject the pros ecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic , 466 U.S. at 659. For this presumption to apply, counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case must be complete. Id. This exception “is epitomized by–4– the ‘inert’ or ‘potted plant’ lawyer who, although physically and mentally present in the courtroom, fails to provide (or is prevented from providing) any meaningful assistance.” Ex parte McFarland , 163 S.W.3d 743, 752–53 (T ex. Crim. App. 2005). The difference between the Cronic and Strickland standards is thus “not of degree, but of kind.” Rubio v State , 596 S.W.3d 410, 428 (Tex. App—Dallas 2020, pet. granted) (citing Bell v. Cone , 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002)). In other words, the standards distinguish betw een shoddy representation and no defense at all. Id. Addressing the Cronic standard, Scarborough argues that prejudice may be presumed because his counsel was “virtua lly inert” and exerted only a “minimal effort” in his defense. Scarborough misconstrues Cronic , which requires that counsel’s ineffectiveness rise to a level analogous to a complete denial of counsel, not merely virtual inertness or minimal effort. See Cronic , 466 U.S. at 659. Here, the record reveals that Scarborough’s counsel orally argued and filed a written election of punishment, participated in jury sel ection, made an opening statement outlining his theory of the case, cross examined State’s witnesses, a nd made appropriate arguments to the jury. Regardless of whet her Scarborough’s counsel was effective, in each of these pursuits, he was not “inert.” See McFarland , 163 S.W. 3d at 752. As Scarborough received some meaningful assistance, there was no constructive denial of counsel. Cronic does not apply. As for the Strickland claim, there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”–5– Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689; Perez , 310 S.W.3d at 893. If there is no record of trial counsel’s explanation for the conduct in que stion, we “assume a strategic motive if any can be imagined and find counsel’s performance deficient only if the conduct was so outrageous that no competent a ttorney would have engaged in it.” Andrews
v. State , 159 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). For this r eason, a direct appeal—where the record is generally und eveloped on these issues—rarely provides the proper vehicle for asserting a Strickland claim, which must be firmly grounded in and affirmatively demonstrated by the record. Prine v. State , 537 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Goodspeed v. State , 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The record before us is insufficient to fairly evaluate whether either prong could be satisfied. Scarborough complains that his counsel failed to communicate with him before trial, failed to prepare himself or Scarbor ough for trial, and failed to defend Scarborough’s interests during tria l. As evidence, S carborough provides the reporter’s record, which consists of the trial transcript, and a hand-written letter Scarborough wrote to the trial court following his conviction. Scarborough’s unsworn hand-written lette r to the trial court was filed on August 30, 2019, three weeks after the court entered its judgment of conviction. In the letter, he complained thathis trial counsel failed to properly investigate the case, failed to present any evidence in his defens e, failed to prepare Scarborough for trial, advised Scarborough to waive his right to a jury trial for the punishment phase, and–6– declined Scarborough’s request to “p lace [him] in a veteran’s court.” 2 Incompetent evidence cannot be used to meet the preponderance burden imposed by Strickland

. See Weeks v. State , 894 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (concluding that the defendant failed to me et his burden with “competent evidence”). An unsworn letter is not co mpetent evidence and thus cannot sustain a finding of ineffective assistance. See, e.g. , Hughes v. State , No. 05-99-00846-CR, 2000 WL 134691, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dalla s Feb. 7, 2000, pet. ref’d ) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the defenda nt failed to sustain his burden to prove effectiveness because he ha d not “identified any specifi c complaint about his trial counsel’s performance other than alluding to a letter he wrote to the trial court”); Carley v. State , No. 05-96-00089-CR, 1997 WL 348538, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 25, 1997, no pet.) (m em. op., not designated fo r publication) (rejecting defendant’s contention that his hand-written le tter to the trial court was proof of his counsel’s ineffectiveness because the letter “[was] not sworn to and, thus, [could not] be considered evidence”). Accordingly, we do not consider the contents of the letter in our analysis. Scarborough next points to two excha nges between his counsel and the trial court as evidence of unpreparedness reflecte d in the record. In the first exchange,

2 Regarding the reference to “veteran’s court” we believe, without comment, Scarborough references Collin County’s establishment of a statut ory “veterans treatment court program,” see ‘T EX

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. §§ 124.001–.007, that is available to veterans who ar e “arrested for, charged with, convicted of, or placed on deferred adjudication community supervis ion for any misdemeanor or felony offense.” See id. § 124.002(a). Scarborough’s appeal does not address this portion of the letter.–7– which occurred before voir dire, Scarborough’s counsel attempted to make an oral election of punishment and request for community supervision in the event Scarborough was found guilty. In the sec ond exchange, which occurred after both parties rested, Scarborough’s counsel as ked the trial court when the proper time would be to move for directed verdict. Th e trial court responded that the appropriate time was “after [the State] rested and be fore [the defense] rested.” Scarborough argues that these interactions with the tr ial court show that his trial counsel was unprepared for trial, rendering the repres entation constitutionally ineffective. We disagree. The record contai ns no evidence of counsel’s reasoning behind conducting these exchanges. See Jackson v. State , 877 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Absent such evidence, we cannot conc lude that Scarborough has overcome the presumption of reasonable assistance. See id. Nor has Scarborough shown that he was pr ejudiced as a result of his counsel’s apparent lack of familiarity with procedural rules. With respect to the first exchange, the trial court, after a rece ss, allowed Scarborough to ma ke the motions orally and the State did not object. The clerk’s record also indicates that, during the recess, Scarborough’s trial counsel filed a typed a pplication for community supervision and a hand-written election for the court to asse ss punishment. The record shows that the trial court, not the jury, assessed punish ment. After a thorough recitation of the evidence, the trial court concluded that c onfinement was warranted. On this record, we conclude that Scarboroughhas failed to show a reasonable probability that, but–8– for counsel’s lack of familiarity with th e procedural requireme nts at issue, the outcome of trial would have been different. See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694; Perez , 310 S.W.3d at 893. With respect to the second exchange, Scarborough does not explain how his counsel’s lack of familiarity with th e timeliness requirements for a motion for directed verdict resulted in prejudice. A moti on for a directed verdict is construed as a challenge to the suffici ency of the evidence. York v. State , 342 S.W.3d 528, 544 n.93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing McDuff v. State , 939 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). In a criminal trial, it is not necessary to present a motion for a directed verdict in order to challenge the sufficiency of th e evidence on appeal. See Moff v. State , 131 S.W.3d 485, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Rankin v. State , 46 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). The fact thata defense attorney “may or could have moved for the directed verd ict on the possibility of its being granted does not show that trial counsel ’s assistance was ineffective.” McGarity v. State , 5 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). Scarborough has not challenged the sufficiency of th e evidence in this appeal and thus has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that the result of trial w ould have been different but for counsel’s unfamiliarity with directed verdict practice. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694; Perez , 310 S.W.3d at 893. Scarborough finally complains that his counsel did not adequately represent his interests at trial because he failed to lodge any objections to the State’s proffered–9– evidence, conducted “cursory” and “irrelevant” cross-exam inations of the State’s witnesses, and failed to put forth any ev idence or witnesses in Scarborough’s defense. Because the record is silent as to counsel’s reasons for these tactical decisions, we cannot conclude that his conduc t at trial was constitutionally deficient. See Jackson , 877 S.W.2d at 772. Furthermore, Scarborough does not explain how he was prejudiced by these decisions. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694; Perez , 310 S.W.3d
at 893. These complaints encapsula te the reasons courts generally wait to decide ineffectiveness issues until after the parties have engaged in the record-creating work that is the subject of habeas. We can imag ine strategic motives for avoiding each of these topics in the trial. See Andrews , 159 S.W.3d at 101. Because the record does not affirmatively establish both deficien t performance and prejudice, we overrule these complaints. See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687; Perez , 310 S.W.3d at 892–93.

CONCLUSION Scarborough on direct appeal has failed to show that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Accordingly, we overrule Scarborough’s sole issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

DO NOT PUBLISH TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 190934F.U05 /Bonnie Lee Goldstein / BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN JUSTICE–10– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

CHRISTOPHER JUSTIN SCARBOROUGH, Appellant

No. 05-19-00934-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 199-82799- 2019. Opinion delivered by Justice Goldstein. Justices Molberg and Smith participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this da te, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 6th day of October 2021.