United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

 

01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC., CITRIX ONLINE, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2017-1869

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Ohio in No. 1:06-cv-00253-SL, Judge 

Sara Lioi.

______________________ 

Decided: April 26, 2018 

______________________ 

 THOMAS HARRY SHUNK, Baker & Hostetler LLP, 

Cleveland, OH, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by CHRISTINA J. MOSER; CHARLES C. CARSON,

KENNETH JON SHEEHAN, Washington, DC.

 MARK CHRISTOPHER FLEMING, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by CHRISTOPHER D.

DODGE; INDRANIL MUKERJI, RUFFIN B. CORDELL, Fish & 

Richardson, PC, Washington, DC; GEORGIA YANCHAR, 

Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP, Cleveland, OH.

______________________ 
2 01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

Before NEWMAN, MAYER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

MAYER, Circuit Judge. 

01 Communique Laboratory, Inc. (“Communique”) 

appeals an order of the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Ohio denying its motion for a new 

trial. See 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 

No. 1:06-CV-00253, 2017 WL 1065573 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 

2017) (“District Court Order”). We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Communique owns U.S. Patent No. 6,928,479 (the 

“’479 patent”), which is entitled “System Computer Product and Method for Providing a Private Communication 

Portal.” J.A. 192. The claimed system creates a “private 

communication portal,” ’479 patent, col.3 ll.28–29, which 

allows an individual using a remote computer to access a 

personal computer via the Internet, id. col.3 ll.30–44; see 

also id. col.7 ll.26–48. Specifically, the system uses a 

“location facility” to “creat[e] a communication channel 

between the remote computer and the personal computer.” Id. col.13 l.64–col.14 l.10; see also id. col.16 ll.30–34. 

Claim 24 recites:

A computer program product for use on a server 

computer linked to the Internet and having a static IP address, for providing access to a personal 

computer from a remote computer, the personal 

computer being linked to the Internet, its location 

on the Internet being defined by either (i) a dynamic public IP address (publicly addressable), or 

(ii) a dynamic LAN IP address (publicly unaddressable), the computer program product comprising:

(a) a computer usable medium;

(b) computer readable program code recorded or 

storable in the computer useable medium, the 
01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 3

computer readable program code defining a server 

computer program on the server computer wherein:

(i) the server computer program is operable to enable a connection between the remote computer 

and the server computer; and

(ii) the server computer program includes a location facility and is responsive to a request from 

the remote computer to communicate with the 

personal computer to act as an intermediary between the personal computer and the remote 

computer by creating one or more communication 

sessions there between, said one or more communication sessions being created by the location facility, in response to receipt of the request for 

communication with the personal computer from 

the remote computer, by determining a then current location of the personal computer and creating a communication channel between the remote 

computer and the personal computer, the location 

facility being operable to create such communication channel whether the personal computer is 

linked to the Internet directly (with a publicly addressable) dynamic IP address or indirectly via an 

Internet gateway/proxy (with a publicly unaddressable dynamic LAN IP address).

Id. col.13 l.48–col.14 l.15. 

In February 2006, Communique brought suit against 

Citrix Systems, Inc. and Citrix OnLine, LLC (collectively 

“Citrix”), alleging that Citrix’s GoToMyPC remote computer connection service infringed independent claim 24 

and dependent claim 45 of the ’479 patent. J.A. 115. In 

March 2008, the district court stayed proceedings pending 

resolution of a request for inter partes reexamination filed 

by Citrix. J.A. 3021–22. Before the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), Communique’s expert, Dr. Gregory 
4 01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

Ganger, asserted that the claims of the ’479 patent differed from the prior art because they require that a “location facility” create a communication channel between the 

remote and personal computers. J.A. 7026; see 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. LogMeIn, Inc., 687 F.3d 1292, 1298 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Dr. Ganger opined that in the patented 

invention the location facility creates a communication 

channel between the remote computer and the personal 

computer, and that this ‘create’ limitation would not be 

satisfied by a location facility ‘that is simply used by some 

other component that creates the communication channel.’” (citation omitted)).

On October 29, 2013, the Patent Trial and Appeal 

Board confirmed the patentability of claims 24 and 45 

over various prior art references, including Citrix’s BuddyHelp computer connection service. See Citrix Sys., Inc. 

v. 01 Communique Lab., Inc., No. 2013-004565, 2013 WL 

5866550 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 2013). On appeal, this court 

affirmed. See Citrix Sys., Inc. v. 01 Communique Lab., 

Inc., 581 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

After the parties returned to district court, Citrix filed 

a motion for summary judgment, alleging that claims 24 

and 45 were patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. It 

argued that the claims “only require[] generic software 

operating on a generic computer system to implement the 

abstract idea of connecting two computers, and lack[] 

additional features necessary to find an inventive concept 

and ensure that the claim is not simply a drafting effort 

designed to monopolize an abstract idea.” 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 3d 778, 

794 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted) (“Patent Eligibility Decision”). According 

to Citrix, the claimed “invention could be, and was, performed by humans when telephone operators connected 

one caller to a second caller at the first caller’s request.” 

Id. at 790. The district court rejected this argument, 

however, concluding that the ’479 patent was directed to 
01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 5

patent eligible subject matter because it “provide[s] a 

specific solution to remote access problems that is necessarily rooted in computer technology, and thus constitute[s] an inventive concept.” Id. at 795.* 

During claim construction proceedings, the district 

court construed the phrase “creating a communication 

channel between the remote computer and the personal 

computer,” ’479 patent, col.14 ll.8–10, to mean “making or 

bringing into existence a communication channel between 

the remote computer and the personal computer.” J.A. 15 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 

J.A. 3242–43. The trial court denied Citrix’s motion to 

exclude evidence pertaining to the PTO reexamination 

proceedings related to claims 24 and 45. J.A. 37–39. It 

held that the reexamination record could be used in a 

limited manner at trial, but that Citrix could not be 

identified as the party that requested the reexamination. 

J.A. 37. The court further ordered that the parties should 

“refer to the entirety of the proceedings before the PTO as 

the ‘prosecution history.’” J.A. 38. The court determined 

that “it would be unfairly prejudicial to Citrix to attribute 

the reexamination request to Citrix or to indicate that it 

was Citrix that advanced certain arguments in the reexamination process.” J.A. 37. The court was concerned 

that “[t]he jurors [might] put undue weight on the fact 

that it was Citrix who advanced the arguments which, in 

the end, were rejected by the PTO, even though the PTO 

does not make its decision based upon the same standard 

as used in an infringement/invalidity lawsuit, nor does it 

 

* Because Citrix does not appeal the district court’s 

determination that the ’479 patent is directed to patenteligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, see Patent 

Eligibility Decision, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 794–96, we decline 

to address that issue. 
6 01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

have the benefit of the full array of evidence that [would] 

be presented to a jury for its consideration.” J.A. 37–38.

After the close of evidence, the trial court provided the 

jury with very specific instructions.** It informed the jury 

that “[t]he determination of literal infringement depends 

on the presence of the claim elements in the accused 

product, not on similarities between the accused product 

and the prior art.” J.A. 2821. It further instructed the 

jury that “[t]o determine literal infringement, [it] must 

compare the accused system, GoToMyPC, with each claim 

that [Communique] asserts is infringed.” J.A. 2820. 

Additionally, the court explained that Citrix bore the 

burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing 

evidence, J.A. 2822, 2826, and that “[t]o anticipate a 

claim, each and every element in the claim must be 

present in a single item of prior art and arranged or 

combined in the same way as recited in the claim,” J.A. 

2828.

On January 19, 2016, the jury returned a split verdict. It concluded that Citrix had not established that 

claims 24 and 45 were invalid, but that Communique had 

not established that Citrix’s GoToMyPC product infringed 

those claims. J.A. 174–75.

After judgment was entered, Communique moved for 

JMOL of infringement and a new trial. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 50(b), 59(a). The trial court denied Communique’s 

motion for JMOL of infringement, explaining that it had 

“not even mention[ed] that it sought [JMOL] on infringement in its written or oral [Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)] motions, 

 

** Before the case went to the jury, Communique 

moved for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) of no 

invalidity, J.A. 2666, but the trial court deferred ruling on 

this motion. See District Court Order, 2017 WL 1065573, 

at *1–3; see also J.A. 2802.
01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 7

or provide[d] any specificity regarding the law and facts 

supporting such a judgment.” District Court Order, 2017 

WL 1065573, at *4.

The district court likewise denied Communique’s motion for a new trial. Id. at *5–19. Although Communique 

contended that the jury verdict of non-infringement was 

against the weight of the evidence, the court rejected this 

argument, explaining that “there was more than sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude, among other things, that GoToMyPC does not 

contain a location facility, and/or that the remote and 

personal computers, not the location facility, create[] the 

communication channel in GoToMyPC.” Id. at *12. 

Furthermore, although Communique argued that Citrix 

had improperly compared its accused GoToMyPC product 

to its prior art BuddyHelp product when it presented its 

non-infringement defense, the trial court concluded that 

“Citrix did not make this impermissible comparison.” Id.

at *16. The court stated that “an examination of the trial 

transcript shows that during its defense to literal infringement, Citrix did not improperly compare the prior 

art to the asserted claims of the ’479 patent as a defense 

to literal infringement, but properly compared the accused product—GoToMyPC—to the asserted claims.” Id. 

at *17. In the court’s view, moreover, “any limited prejudice that [might] have resulted from the comparisons of 

[the] prior art to [the GoToMyPC product] during the 

invalidity phase [of the trial] was cured by the Court’s 

specific instruction to the jury regarding their determination of infringement.” Id.

Communique then appealed to this court. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
8 01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial under 

regional circuit law. Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing 

Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In the Sixth 

Circuit, the denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. See Smith v. Rock-Tenn Servs., 

Inc., 813 F.3d 298, 312 (6th Cir. 2016). “[A] new trial is 

warranted when a jury has reached a seriously erroneous 

result as evidenced by: (1) the verdict being against the 

weight of the evidence; (2) the damages being excessive; 

or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party in some 

fashion, i.e., the proceedings being influenced by prejudice 

or bias.” Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 

2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Communique’s Contentions

Communique asserts that it is entitled to a new trial 

on the issues of infringement and damages because Citrix 

resorted to “a well-known defendant’s trick,” known as the 

“practicing the prior art defense.” It contends that the 

jury verdict of non-infringement must be set aside because the trial court improperly permitted Citrix to bypass the required comparison between the asserted claims 

and the accused product and instead to focus on the 

similarities between Citrix’s current GoToMyPC product 

and its prior art BuddyHelp product. According to Communique, Citrix’s reliance on a practicing the prior art 

defense “was improper, misleading, and devastatingly 

prejudicial to the integrity of the trial.” We find this 

argument unpersuasive. As a preliminary matter, we 

reject Communique’s assertion that Citrix’s infringement 

defense eschewed the requisite limitation by limitation 

comparison between the asserted claims and the accused 

product. See, e.g., Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, 

Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Literal infringement exists if each of the limitations of the asserted 
01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 9

claim(s) read on, that is, are found in, the accused device.”). Citrix’s non-infringement defense was straightforward. It argued that GoToMyPC did not meet the 

claim limitation requiring that a “location facility . . . 

creat[e] a communication channel between the remote 

computer and the personal computer,” ’479 patent, col.13 

l.64–col.14 l.10, because in the GoToMyPC system the 

remote and personal computers create the communication 

channel. J.A. 1500–01, 1511–12. Citrix explained that 

there was no infringement because in the patented system a “central location facility” creates the communication channel and “forces its way through the firewall,” but 

in GoToMyPC “there is no location facility that creates” 

such a channel. J.A. 1512. Counsel for Citrix carefully 

explained to the jury that in order to find literal infringement it had to determine that the GoToMyPC product 

met “each and every one of the elements” of claims 24 and 

45. J.A. 1503; see also J.A. 2873.

Dr. Ian Foster, Citrix’s expert, described the limitations of the asserted claims, J.A. 2480–85, and then 

detailed how the GoToMyPC product operates, J.A. 2485–

89. He concluded, based on his review of the operation of 

the GoToMyPC product and its source code, that it did not 

practice the claim limitation requiring that a “location 

facility . . . creat[e] a communication channel between the 

remote computer and the personal computer,” ’479 patent, 

col.13 l.64–col.14 l.10, because in GoToMyPC “it’s the host 

and the client that create [the] channel,” J.A. 2507; see 

also J.A. 2495–506.

Citrix never argued that its accused product did not 

infringe the asserted claims merely because GoToMyPC 

shared the same architecture as the prior art BuddyHelp 

product. To the contrary, as the trial court correctly 

concluded, “Citrix did not improperly compare the prior 

art to the asserted claims of the ’479 patent as a defense 

to literal infringement, but properly compared the ac-
10 01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

cused product—GoToMyPC—to the asserted claims.” 

District Court Order, 2017 WL 1065573, at *17.

C. Citrix’s Invalidity Defense

Citrix’s infringement defense was firmly rooted in a 

limitation by limitation comparison between the asserted 

claims and the GoToMyPC product. But Citrix also 

presented an alternative invalidity defense that focused 

on its prior art BuddyHelp product. It argued that under 

the trial court’s claim construction claims 24 and 45 were 

valid, but not infringed, J.A. 1489–90, 2509, but that if 

Communique attempted to expand the scope of its claims 

to include systems in which a location facility merely 

“directs” other components, such as the end point computers, to create the communication channel, J.A. 1901; see 

also J.A. 1477–81, then the claims would be invalid in 

light of the prior art, J.A. 2509–15; see also J.A. 1518–19, 

2462, 3501–02.

There was nothing improper about this argument. 

We have previously stated that “there is no ‘practicing the 

prior art’ defense to literal infringement.” Tate Access 

Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 

1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Cordance Corp. v. 

Amazon.com, Inc., 658 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 

Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys., Inc., 522 F.3d 

1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Baxter, 49 F.3d at 1583. The 

problem with such a defense is that it can potentially 

allow a defendant to skirt evidentiary hurdles and conflate the infringement and invalidity inquiries. In essence, an accused infringer forsakes any comparison 

between the asserted claims and the accused product, 

relying instead upon purported similarities between the 

accused product and the prior art.

In Tate, for example, we declined to overturn a preliminary injunction barring sales of allegedly infringing 

floor panels where a party’s infringement defense rested 

on its claim that its floor panels could not “literally in-
01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 11

fringe because they merely practice the prior art, or that 

which would have been obvious in light of the prior art.” 

279 F.3d at 1365. We explained that “literal infringement 

is determined by construing the claims and comparing 

them to the accused device, not by comparing the accused 

device to the prior art.” Id. at 1366. We noted, moreover, 

that while the issue of whether asserted claims read on 

the prior art is relevant to the question of invalidity, 

“accused infringers are not free to flout the requirement of 

proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence by 

asserting a ‘practicing [the] prior art’ defense to literal 

infringement under the less stringent preponderance of 

the evidence standard.” Id. at 1367.

We confronted an analogous situation in Zenith. 522 

F.3d at 1363–64. There, an accused infringer asserted 

that it was entitled to JMOL of invalidity even though it 

“provided no evidence whatsoever” that a prior art television met two limitations of the claim at issue. Id. at 1363. 

Instead, the accused infringer “merely argued that to the 

extent the [allegedly infringing television] is considered to 

practice [the two claim limitations], then so did the [prior 

art] television.” Id. (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). We rejected this argument, however, 

explaining that because “[a]nticipation requires a showing 

that each element of the claim at issue, properly construed, is found in a single prior art reference,” simply 

asserting that the prior art is the same as “an allegedly 

infringing product cannot constitute clear and convincing 

evidence of invalidity.” Id.

Cases such as Tate and Zenith make clear that an accused infringer cannot defeat a claim of literal infringement or establish invalidity merely by pointing to 

similarities between an accused product and the prior art. 

Id.; Tate, 279 F.3d at 1365. This does not, however, 

preclude a litigant from arguing that if a claim term must 

be broadly interpreted to read on an accused device, then 

this same broad construction will read on the prior art. 
12 01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

See, e.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d

1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that an infringement plaintiff must “beware of what [it] asks for” since a 

broad claim construction for infringement purposes may 

ultimately result in a determination of patent invalidity 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). To the contrary, as 

we have previously recognized, when an accused product 

and the prior art are closely aligned, it takes exceptional 

linguistic dexterity to simultaneously establish infringement and evade invalidity. See Tate, 279 F.3d at 1367 

(“Where an accused infringer is clearly practicing only 

that which was in the prior art, and nothing more, and 

the patentee’s proffered construction reads on the accused 

device, meeting [the] burden of [establishing invalidity] 

should not prove difficult.”); see also SmithKline Beecham 

Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (“Because Apotex seeks to practice the prior art, 

and because that practice infringes, the next logical 

inquiry involves anticipation. That is, if the prior art 

infringes now, logically the prior art should have anticipated the claim before the filing of the . . . patent.”); 

Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 1363, 1366 

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Although [the accused infringers] bore 

the burden of proving that the cartridges that were the 

subject of the pre-critical date sales anticipated the [asserted] patent, that burden was satisfied by [the patent

owner’s] allegation that the accused cartridges infringe 

the [asserted] patent.”); Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Although [the accused infringer] bore the burden of proving 

that the LT1 engine embodied the patented invention or 

rendered it obvious for purposes of the summary judgment motion, this burden is met by [the patentee’s] allegation, forming the sole basis for the complaint, that the 

LT1 engine infringes.”).

This is the problem Communique faced here. Citrix 

argued that GoToMyPC does not include a “location 
01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 13

facility” that establishes a communication channel between a remote computer and a personal computer, but 

that if Communique relied upon an “overbroad application” of its claims to ensnare GoToMyPC, then the asserted claims would also cover BuddyHelp. J.A. 1355. This 

argument did not rest on an improper “practicing the 

prior art” defense, but instead correctly recognized that 

claim terms must be “construed the same way for both 

invalidity and infringement.” Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst 

Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 

2003); see Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 

239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“A patent may not, 

like a nose of wax, be twisted one way to avoid anticipation and another to find infringement.” (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted)).

D. Prejudice

We also reject Communique’s assertion that the comparisons Citrix made between GoToMyPC and BuddyHelp 

were “devastatingly prejudicial to the integrity of the 

trial.” First, we have never suggested that any comparison between an accused product and the prior art mandates a new trial. See Cordance, 658 F.3d at 1335 

(reinstating a verdict of invalidity where an accused 

infringer asserted that its accused product was substantially the same as its prior art product, but also “mapped 

each element of the asserted claims” to the prior art 

product “in a manner that mirrored [the patentee’s] 

infringement theory”); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky 

Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 

(denying a patentee’s motion for a new trial where an 

accused infringer had purportedly raised a practicing the 

prior art defense because any comparisons between the 

accused product and the prior art “had proper uses or 

were made in response to issues raised by [the patent 

owner]”). Second, “[a]lthough prejudice that affects the 

fairness of a proceeding can certainly be grounds for a 

new trial, when such prejudice is cured by instructions of 
14 01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

the court, the motion for a new trial should be denied.” 

Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1046–47 (6th 

Cir. 1996) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

Here, the trial court’s careful jury instructions were more 

than adequate to remedy any alleged prejudice or confusion resulting from comparisons between GoToMyPC and 

BuddyHelp. See District Court Order, 2017 WL 1065573, 

at *17 (“Given that Citrix did not improperly compare the 

prior art to the asserted claims as part of its infringement 

defense, any limited prejudice that may have resulted 

from the comparisons of [the] prior art to GoToMyPC 

during the invalidity phase [of the trial] was cured by the 

Court’s specific instruction to the jury regarding their 

determination of infringement.”). The district court 

instructed the jury that when resolving the question of 

literal infringement, it was required to compare the 

GoToMyPC product to the limitations set out in claims 24 

and 45 of the ’479 patent. J.A. 2820. Importantly, moreover, the court emphasized that “[t]he determination of 

literal infringement depends on the presence of the claim 

elements in the accused product, not on similarities 

between the accused product and the prior art.” J.A. 2821 

(emphasis added). These instructions made abundantly 

clear that in assessing infringement the jury was not to 

compare GoToMyPC with BuddyHelp. The record contains nothing to suggest that the jury misunderstood the 

trial court’s explicit instructions. See Weeks v. Angelone, 

528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (“A jury is presumed to follow its 

instructions.” (citation omitted)).

E. The Reexamination Record

We conclude, moreover, that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in ruling that while the PTO reexamination record could be used at trial, the jury could not be 

informed that Citrix was the party that requested the 

reexamination. J.A. 37; see Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. 

Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) (“In deference to a 

district court’s familiarity with the details of the case and 
01 COMMUNIQUE LABORATORY, INC v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 15

its greater experience in evidentiary matters, courts of 

appeals afford broad discretion to a district court’s evidentiary rulings.”); Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 

F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The district court did 

not abuse its discretion in concluding that the prejudicial 

nature of evidence concerning the ongoing parallel reexamination proceeding outweighed whatever marginal 

probative or corrective value it might have had in [the] 

case.”). Under the circumstances here, the trial court did 

not err in concluding that the fact that Citrix had requested reexamination was “of very minimal . . . probative 

value,” and that the jury could potentially “put undue 

weight on the fact that it was Citrix who advanced the 

arguments which, in the end, were rejected by the PTO, 

even though the PTO does not make its decision based 

upon the same standard as used in an infringement/invalidity lawsuit.” J.A. 37–38; see United States v. 

Boyd, 640 F.3d 657, 667 (6th Cir. 2011) (“We afford the 

district court very broad discretion in determining whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative 

value of the evidence.” (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted)). We have considered Communique’s 

remaining arguments but do not find them persuasive.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the order of the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Ohio denying Communique’s motion for a new trial is affirmed.

AFFIRMED