* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Summary Calendar

No. 08-30566

BRAMMER ENGINEERING, INC

Plaintiff - Appellant 

v.

EAST WRIGHT MOUNTAIN LTD PARTNERSHIP; 

EAST WRIGHT MOUNTAIN LLC

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:07-cv-01112

Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Brammer Engineering, Inc. (“Brammer”) appeals from the district

court’s dismissal of its claims without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The district court

concluded that defendants East Wright Mount Ltd. Partnership (“the

Partnership”) and East Wright Mountain, LLC (“EWM LLC”) did not have

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 22, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-30566

2

sufficient contacts with the state of Louisiana to supportthe exercise of personal

jurisdiction over them. We affirm for the reasons stated below.

BACKGROUND

The parties do not dispute that the Partnership and EWM LLC are

residents of Texas. In December 2003, the Partnership, of which EMW LLC is

general partner, entered into a Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”) with EnSight

Energy Management, LLC (“EnSight”) concerning the operation of an energy

prospect in Smith County, Texas. Ensight is a Texas corporation and the JOA

gave Ensight the right to operate certain wells on the prospect. The JOA

includes Texas choice-of-law and forum selection provisions. Ensight in turn

executed an operating contract with Brammer, a Louisiana corporation based in

Shreveport, for Brammer to act as contract operator for wells operated by

Ensight in Smith County. Neither the Partnership nor EMW LLC was party to

the contract between Ensight and Brammer. 

Brammer subsequently brought the instant suit in the Louisiana state

courts against the Partnership and EMW LLC, alleging they are liable for

amounts owed to Brammer for drilling a well on the prospect. Brammer alleges

its right to payment from defendants arises from Brammer’s purported

subrogation to Ensight’s rights in the JOA. Brammer further alleges it

interacted with the Partnership both before and after completing the well, and

that the Partnership -- despite being given the option not to complete the well --

elected to have Brammer finish the well. 

Defendants removed to the United States District Court for the Western

District of Louisiana claiming diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

They subsequently moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of

personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion without an

evidentiary hearing, relying on our decision in Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v Harvey,
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801F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1986), and dismissed Brammer’s claims without prejudice.

Brammer timely appealed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. Alpine

View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 214 (5th Cir. 2000). “When, as here,

the district court conducted no evidentiary hearing, the party seeking to assert

jurisdiction must present sufficient facts as to make out only a prima facie case

supporting jurisdiction.” Id. at 215. “We must accept as true that party’s

uncontroverted allegations, and resolve in its favor all conflicts between the facts

contained the parties’ affidavits and other documentation.” Id.

DISCUSSION

As a federal court sitting in diversity, the district court may exercise

personal jurisdiction over defendants if the Louisiana long-arm statute confers

personal jurisdiction over them and the exercise of personal jurisdiction

comports with due process under the United States Constitution. See Latshaw

v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999). Because the Louisiana long-arm

statute extends to the limits of due process, we collapse the usual two-step

inquiry into a single question: whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over

the defendants is permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Alpine View, 205 F.3d at 215. 

The Due Process Clause permits exercising personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant if: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself of

the protections and benefits of the forum state by establishing “minimum

contacts” with that state, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with “fair

play and substantial justice.” Alpine View, 205 F.3d at 214-15. These minimum

contacts may be established through contacts sufficient to support “specific

jurisdiction,” or contacts so systematic and continuous as to support “general

jurisdiction” over the defendant. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
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462, 472 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.

408, 414-16 (1984). Brammer does not claim that defendants’ contacts with

Louisiana are sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction, arguing

only that due process permits the exercise of specific jurisdiction. “Specific

jurisdiction exists when the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum

state arise from, or are directly related to, the cause of action.” Mink v. AAAA

Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999). 

Brammer argues thatthePartnership established sufficient contacts with

Louisiana by: (1) entering into a JOA knowing thattwelve ofthe fourteen parties

to the agreement were Louisiana residents and that Ensight had an office in

Shreveport; and (2) having dealings with Brammer that necessarily connected

with Louisiana, in that there were specific agreements between the Partnership

and Brammer, the Partnership required that Brammer provide certain records,

and the Partnership required that Brammer conduct an audit of records

regarding the well. As the district court correctly held, these alleged contacts

are not sufficient to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over

defendants. 

A forum state may only exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who has

“purposefully directed” his activities toward that state. Burger King, 471 U.S.

at 476. First, the mere contracting with a resident of the forum state is not in

itself sufficient to establish minimum contacts such that the forum state may

exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 479. Thus, the fact that

defendants may have been parties to contracts with Louisiana residents,

including Brammer, does not give rise to jurisdiction. Second, this court has

held that personal jurisdiction does not exist if the defendant’s contacts result

from “the mere fortuity that the plaintiff happens to be a resident of the forum.”

Pattersvon v. Dietze, Inc., 764 F.2d 1145, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1985). Brammer’s

allegations that defendants sent communications to it in Louisiana, and
No. 08-30566

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requested that Brammer “provide records” or conduct an audit of its records are

the type of merely fortuitous contacts that cannot support personal jurisdiction

(i.e., they are contacts resulting from the mere factthatthe plaintiff is a resident

of the forum state and not from any purposeful act of the defendants directed

towards the forum state). 

The district court correctly analogized the instant case to our decision in

Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1986), where we held on

similar facts that the defendant did not have sufficient contacts to support the

exercise of personal jurisdiction. Holt was a resident of Texas; the defendant,

Harvey, was a resident of Oklahoma. Holt and Harvey entered into a JOA for

the drilling of an energy prospect in Oklahoma, with Holt performing the drilling

services and Harvey agreeing to pay a share of the drilling costs. When a

dispute arose concerning the drilling of a well, Holtfiled suitin the Texas federal

district court attempting to claim the unpaid portion of the drilling costs. The

district court denied Harvey’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,

finding specific jurisdiction over the defendant, and this court affirmed but only

because Harvey had sufficient contacts with the forum state to give rise to

general jurisdiction. See id. at 776, 778.

In support of specific jurisdiction, Holt argued that Harvey had sufficient

contacts because he entered into a contract with Holt, a Texas resident; sent a

final revised JOA from Oklahoma to Holt in Texas; sent three checks from

Oklahoma to Texas “in partial performance of [his] contractual obligations”; and

engaged in “extensive” communications with Holt. This court concluded that

those contacts could not give rise to specific personal jurisdiction in the forum

state. Merely contracting with a resident of the forum state is not sufficient to

support personal jurisdiction, and we saw significance in the contract’s

Oklahoma choice-of-law provision and the fact that“performance ofthe contract

was centered in Oklahoma rather than Texas.” Finally, Harvey’s mailing
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payments or sending communications to the forum state did not support

jurisdiction because they did not amount to his “purposeful availment of the

benefits and protections of Texas law.” Id. at 777-78.

As in Holt, the performance of the contract in this case was not centered

in the forum state. Instead, the performance of this contract was centered in

Texas, where the energy prospect is located and Brammer drilled the well.

Moreover, like the contractin Holt,the JOA in this case contains a Texas choiceof-law provision, as well as a Texas forum selection clause. Finally, defendants’

alleged contacts with Louisiana involving records and audits were, at most,

merely incidental to performance of the Texas-centered contract and resulted

only from the coincidence that Brammer is a Louisiana resident. Such

incidental requests, like the communications in Holt, do not evidence defendants’

purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of Louisiana law. 

Brammer attempts to distinguish Holt because “there is no indication that

the plaintiff in Holt contended that significant performance under the JOA was

rendered in the forum state.” However, we are not persuaded by Brammer’s

argumentthat significant performance under the JOA in this case was rendered

in the forum state. Here, the JOA dealt with the operation of an energy prospect

in Texas, involved the drilling of wells in Texas, called for Texas law to be the

governing law, and chose Texas courts as the forum for resolving disputes

arising from the contract. 

Accordingly, the district court properly granted defendants’ motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because, even accepting Brammer’s

uncontroverted allegations as true and viewing the affidavits in the light most

favorable to exercising jurisdiction, Brammer failed to establish a prima facie

case supporting jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 
No. 08-30566

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AFFIRMED.