F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

NOV 15 2004

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BRIAN MADDOX,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 03-2311

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

(D. Ct. No. CR-02-1592-JP)

Alonzo J. Padilla, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico,

appearing for Appellant.

Norman Cairns, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United

States Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney,

Albuquerque, New Mexico, appearing for Appellee.

Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, HOLLOWAY and LUCERO, Circuit

Judges.

TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Brian Maddox pleaded guilty to one count of being a
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felon in possession of a firearm. A sheriff’s deputy initially detained Mr. Maddox

as an adjunct to a lawful in-house arrest of a third party. At the conclusion of this

half-hour detention, a deputy asked Mr. Maddox if he was armed. When Mr.

Maddox replied that he was, the deputy seized a gun and narcotics. On appeal,

Mr. Maddox challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress this

evidence and his sentencing enhancement. We take jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2) and AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 12, 2002, two federal marshals and a local deputy sheriff, Anthony

Medrano, served an arrest warrant on Rachel Page, a fugitive wanted for narcotics

trafficking. Ms. Page was staying in the mobile home of Richard “Pops” Buhrle

in the sparsely populated westside of Albuquerque, New Mexico. Mr. Buhrle’s

residence is located in a high crime area and known by local law enforcement

officers to be a dangerous place. Because a previous homicide investigation had

taken Deputy Medrano to Mr. Buhrle’s residence, he personally knew of the

dangerousness of the residence prior to Ms. Page’s arrest. He also knew that the

residence had been the location of numerous violent crimes and that several

narcotics traffickers and violent fugitives had been arrested there. 

Deputy Medrano and the federal marshals drove an unmarked car down the

long driveway to the dimly-lit Buhrle residence at dusk (approximately 8:45
1The record is somewhat ambiguous as to whether Mr. Buhrle, Jr. was the

person standing in the driveway or whether he arrived later. 

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p.m.). As Deputy Medrano and the marshals pulled up, they saw Mr. Buhrle’s

adult son, Richard Buhrle, Jr., standing in the driveway.1

 The officers asked if

Ms. Page was in the residence, and Mr. Buhrle, Jr. said that she was. Deputy

Medrano, based upon his knowledge that Mr. Buhrle, Jr. was a homicide suspect

with a violent history, asked him to sit down in the carport area near the mobile

home. At this point, a car pulled up the driveway. The driver exited and

approached Deputy Medrano. Deputy Medrano asked this person to remain seated

in the carport as well. 

The federal marshals then went into the home to serve the warrant; they

remained inside for approximately fifteen minutes. While the marshals were

inside, Deputy Medrano stayed outside to prevent others from entering the

residence and to ensure that the persons in the carport did not interfere with the

arrest. 

While the federal marshals were still inside, a pick-up truck carrying three

people, including Mr. Maddox, pulled into the driveway. As the truck

approached, Deputy Medrano saw Mr. Maddox reach under the seat. Deputy

Medrano could not tell whether Mr. Maddox had put something under the seat or

was retrieving something from there, and thus interpreted the action as “an
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unknown threat.” Deputy Medrano informed the three new arrivals that there

were marshals making an arrest inside and asked them to stay in the carport area. 

Deputy Medrano now had five people under surveillance—three unknown

individuals, one person he knew to be violent, and Mr. Maddox, who had begun to

act erratically; he ignored Deputy Medrano’s instructions and paced in circles

farther and farther away from the carport, and at one point he urinated in the

carport. Nevertheless, Deputy Medrano did not handcuff anyone nor did he

unholster his sidearm. Rather, he asked these people to remain seated in the

carport for the remainder of Ms. Page’s arrest. 

A few minutes later, another vehicle, carrying only a driver, arrived at the

residence. Deputy Medrano asked this person to sit in the carport. When two

more people arrived, Deputy Medrano directed them to the carport as

well—bringing the total number of people detained to eight. During this time,

one person threw an item—later found to be drug paraphernalia—underneath one

of the vehicles in the driveway. At this point, feeling outnumbered by the group,

concerned about his and the marshals’ safety, knowing the violent history

associated with this residence, and considering Mr. Maddox’s threatening

behavior, Deputy Medrano called for backup.

While Deputy Medrano was waiting for backup, the marshals exited the

residence with Ms. Page. Ms. Page, however, could not be taken immediately
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from the premises. Local protocol requires having a female officer pat down a

female suspect during her arrest, and a marked car must be used to take the

suspect away. Because Deputy Medrano and the federal marshals were all male

and had arrived in an unmarked car, Ms. Page’s arrest could not be concluded

until a female officer arrived in a marked car.

Prior to the arrival of the female officer, additional deputies arrived in

response to Deputy Medrano’s call for backup. Deputy Medrano instructed the

arriving officers to pat down the persons in the carport for weapons. Deputy

Medrano informed one of the officers, Deputy McCoy, that Mr. Maddox had been

acting suspiciously and instructed him to separate Mr. Maddox from the group. 

Deputy Medrano testified that he requested the separation of Mr. Maddox from

the group because, at that time, he considered him a critical and deadly threat. 

After moving him away from the group, Deputy McCoy asked Mr. Maddox

for identification. Mr. Maddox supplied his name but stated that he had recently

lost his driver’s license. Deputy McCoy then asked Mr. Maddox if he had any

weapons or drugs. Mr. Maddox replied that he was carrying a concealed gun. 

Deputy McCoy, after handcuffing and disarming Mr. Maddox, asked him if he

had drugs. Mr. Maddox responded that he had methamphetamine and a scale. 

Deputy McCoy took possession of these items and arrested Mr. Maddox. The

entire encounter, from the arrival of Deputy Medrano and the federal marshals to
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Mr. Maddox’s arrest, took approximately a half hour. This encounter occurred

entirely within the period when Deputy Medrano was waiting for a female officer

to arrive and conclude Ms. Page’s arrest.

The Government brought three counts against Mr. Maddox: (1) felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a); (2)

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); and (3) carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drugtrafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Arguing that the deputies

ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution by detaining and

questioning him, Mr. Maddox moved to suppress the gun and methamphetamine

as evidence. After considering the totality of the circumstances, the District

Court denied the motion. 

As a result, in exchange for the Government’s agreement to drop the second

and third counts, Mr. Maddox entered into a conditional plea agreement, reserving

the right to appeal the motion to suppress and any sentencing errors. At

sentencing, the District Court enhanced Mr. Maddox’s sentence pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 924(e) and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.4 (2002)

(“U.S.S.G.”), to account for his previous escape from prison. Mr. Maddox filed a

timely motion of appeal that challenges both the motion to suppress ruling and the

sentencing enhancement.
2Both parties agree that Mr. Maddox was in fact seized for Fourth

Amendment purposes when Deputy Medrano detained him in the carport. Hence,

we assume arguendo that he was seized.

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II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The District Court found that Mr. Maddox was seized for Fourth

Amendment purposes when Deputy Medrano instructed that he remain in the

carport.2

 Nevertheless, it held that given the totality of the circumstances this

seizure was reasonable at its inception and that Mr. Maddox voluntarily answered

Deputy McCoy’s inquiries concerning weapons and narcotics. On appeal, Mr.

Maddox argues that the initial seizure was constitutionally unreasonable and that

he did not voluntarily inform Deputy McCoy that he possessed a gun and

narcotics.

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a suppression motion, “we

accept the district court’s factual findings absent clear error and review de novo

the district court’s determination of reasonableness under the Fourth

Amendment.” United States v. Olguin-Rivera, 168 F.3d 1203, 1204 (10th Cir.

1999). 

B. Reasonableness of the Detention

Mr. Maddox first argues that Deputy Medrano unreasonably detained him

in the carport area. “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s protection against ‘unreasonable
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. . . seizures’ includes seizure of the person.” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.

621, 624 (1991) (citation omitted). Any evidence obtained as a result of an illegal

seizure is subject to the exclusionary rule. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,

398 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule). Mr. Maddox invokes this rule.

The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures; rather,

only unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited. See U.S. Const. amend.

IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .”). Prior to Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968), Fourth Amendment seizures of the person were analyzed in terms

of arrest, and reasonable only if supported by probable cause. Dunaway v. New

York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979). Terry was the first case to recognize that “the

Fourth Amendment governs ‘seizures’ of the person . . . [other than] ‘arrests,’”

Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, and it created a “narrowly drawn” exception to the probable

cause requirement for lesser governmental intrusions into an individual’s liberty,

id. at 27. Thus, in certain narrowly drawn instances, a law enforcement officer

may stop a person without probable cause for arrest if the officer has a reasonable

and articulable suspicion that the person might be involved in criminal activity. 

Id. at 21-22, 30. If the officer has such a reasonable and articulable suspicion, he

may also conduct a protective frisk of the suspect’s outer clothing if he

reasonably believes that the suspect might be armed and dangerous. Id. at 27, 30. 
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In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), the Court applied this so-called

Terry stop rule to “protective sweeps.” A protective sweep allows officers to

conduct a search of a home without probable cause solely for the purpose of

officer protection “as an adjunct to the serious step of taking a person into

custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime.” Id. at 333. Because the

“risk of danger in the context of an arrest in the home is as great as, if not greater

than, it is in an on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter[,]” id., officers

may take “steps to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or

has just been, arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who

could unexpectedly launch an attack[,]” id. The Court stressed that this intrusion

be “no more than necessary to protect the officer from harm[,]” id., and “that the

arresting officers are permitted in such circumstances to take [only] reasonable

steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, the arrest[,]” id. at 334. 

Finally, the Court held that a protective sweep should “last[] no longer than is

necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer

than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.” Id. at 335-36.

The Court then established two sets of criteria for evaluating the

reasonableness of protective sweeps, which are applied depending on the area in

which the search occurs. The Court first held that closets and spaces immediately

adjoining the place of arrest may be searched without probable cause or a
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reasonable suspicion of potential danger. Id. at 334. The Court further held that

with “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from

those facts,” a reasonably prudent officer who believes that the broader area poses

a danger to those on the arrest scene may conduct a protective sweep of the area

surrounding the location of the arrest. Id. 

The Government argues that Buie controls this case. Buie is not directly on

point, however. In Buie, the Court considered the reasonableness of an in-house

search incident to an in-house arrest. Here, we consider the reasonableness of a

detention taking place outside of a house in which an in-house arrest is occurring. 

Thus, we first determine whether Buie applies to both protective searches and

temporary seizures of persons (i.e. “protective detentions”). And if Buie

encompasses both, we then consider whether these protective searches and

detentions are limited to the confines of the house in which the arrest is taking

place or whether they can occur in the area immediately outside of the home.

We hold that Buie applies to both protective searches and protective

detentions because the Court’s reasoning in Buie supports treating protective

sweeps and protective detentions similarly. In authorizing officers to protect

themselves by making a limited search for potentially dangerous individuals, the

Court stated that officers may take “reasonable steps to ensure their safety after,

and while making, the arrest.” Id. Because the ability to search for dangerous
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individuals provides little protection for officers unless it is accompanied by the

ability to temporarily seize any dangerous individuals that are located during the

search, we conclude that detaining potentially dangerous persons for the duration

of the arrest qualifies as a “reasonable step[] to ensure the [officers’] safety.” Id. 

As such, we find that Buie’s two sets of evaluative criteria—one for when the

search is immediately adjoining the place of arrest and one for when the search is

located in the broader area of the arrest scene—apply to protective detentions as

well.

This conclusion—that officer safety may justify protective detentions—is

further supported by our decision in Thompson v. City of Lawrence, 58 F.3d 1511

(10th Cir. 1995). In Thompson , we considered the reasonableness of placing a

bystander in temporary protective detention without a reasonable and articulable

suspicion of danger when this person is in an immediately adjoining area to the

arrestee. Id. at 1517. After balancing the bystander’s Fourth Amendment

interests against the governmental interest in officer safety, we rejected the

Fourth Amendment challenge. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8

(1985)). We reasoned that “ [t]he governmental interest in securing the area

around [the arrestee] and protecting officers from potential danger is sufficient to

justify the temporary detention of [the bystander].” Id.; see also United States v.

Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993) (“A law enforcement agent, faced
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with the possibility of danger, has a right to take reasonable steps to protect

himself. . . .”) (citations omitted). 

Because we hold that Buie applies to both protective searches and

protective detentions, we next consider whether Buie limits protective detentions

to the area inside the home or whether a detention taking place immediately

outside the home falls within Buie ’s scope. In Buie , the Supreme Court described

the area in which a protective sweep can be performed as the “arrest scene.” 

Buie , 494 U.S. at 334. While the protective sweep performed by the officers in

Buie extended only to other areas of the home, the Court’s opinion does not

define the “arrest scene,” and thus does not expressly limit the protective sweep

to areas within the home. 

Here, therefore, we must determine whether the area in which Mr. Maddox

was detained was part of the “arrest scene.” In making this determination we

look to the same concerns that justify protective sweeps and protective detentions. 

The Supreme Court justified permitting protective sweeps of the arrest scene by

noting that such sweeps protect officers from potentially dangerous individuals

that may be present nearby. Id. Consequently, we conclude that it is proper to

consider the reasonable threats posed to the officers when drawing the boundaries

of the arrest scene in an individual case. 

With this standard in mind, we find that the officer-safety interests at issue
3We recognize that by rejecting a bright-line rule that protective sweeps and

detentions are limited to within the house, we open the possibility of the “arrest

scene” being drawn too broadly by an officer in a future case. Today’s ruling,

however, does not open Pandora’s box. Here, we find the inclusion of the area

immediately outside of the Buhrle residence as part of the arrest scene reasonable,

in large part, because of the isolated and dangerous nature of the residence. In

many other settings—for instance, a crowded urban area or an apartment

complex—the arrest scene might properly be drawn much more narrowly.

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in Buie are nearly identical to those in play here. As in Buie , the arrest of Ms.

Page was done inside the residence. As the Court put it, in that instance “[t]he

risk of danger . . . [to law enforcement officers is] as great as, if not greater than,

it is in an on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter. . . .[and puts them] at

the disadvantage of being on [their] adversary’s ‘turf.’ An ambush in a confined

setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more

familiar surroundings.” Id. at 333. Given these similar interests, we hold that the

same reasonableness test employed in Buie for the protective sweep of the broader

arrest area applies to this protective detention. That is to say, we hold that law

enforcement officers may only detain individuals on the scene of the arrest who

are not within the “immediately adjoining” area of the arrest if the officers

“possess a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts[,]” that the

individual poses a danger to them. 3 Id. at 337.

Mr. Maddox attempts to distinguish his case from Buie ; we disagree. He

first contends that this case is not analogous to Buie because he was a mere
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bystander. Relying on Eighth Circuit precedent, he urges that the reasonable

course of action for Deputy Medrano would have been to send him on his way. 

See United States v. Clay , 640 F.2d 157, 162 n.9 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v.

Miller , 546 F.2d 251, 253-54 (8th Cir. 1976) (“if the defendant had been

permitted to leave as requested, no officer’s security problem of any kind would

have been presented”). We find these Eighth Circuit cases distinguishable.

In Clay , the officers were executing a search warrant in a house when the

defendant knocked on the door. The officer who answered the door ordered the

defendant inside, frisked him, and found a gun. In an effort to justify this action,

the officer offered the following as his reasonable, articulable suspicion of

danger: “[defendant’s] ‘hesitation’ in complying with the order to enter the house

and the danger associated with a white officer in a predominantly black

neighborhood placed him in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm.” Clay , 640

F.2d at 159. The court responded, “[a]n experienced police officer should not be

apprehensive about executing a search warrant during the early evening hours in a

predominantly black neighborhood that is not a high crime district.” Id. The

court went on to suppress the evidence of the gun, reasoning, in large part, that

“[p]olice cannot have grounds for suspicion based solely on the race of the

suspect. Although color of skin is an identifying factor, this court has

consistently rejected the use of race in combination with other factors to justify
4Moreover, the Eighth Circuit intimated that on facts similar to those at

issue in this case, the stop and frisk may have been reasonable. Clay, 640 F.2d at

160 (defendant’s conduct “falls far short of those cases dealing with . . .

inexplicable sudden movements toward a pocket or other place where a weapon

could be concealed”).

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investigative searches and seizures.” Id. at 159 (citations and quotations

omitted). In so doing, the Clay court did not, as Mr. Maddox suggests, hold that

an officer may never detain a person who has approached the scene of an arrest. 

Rather, it held that the detainee’s race cannot provide the basis for a reasonable

and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 159, 162. On our facts,

however, racial profiling is simply not an issue. Clay is therefore inapposite. 4

The Miller case is similarly off-point. In Miller , officers were executing a

narcotics search warrant when they conducted a frisk of the defendant “because of

the nature of how he was sitting at the table[, because] . . . he had a shirt on, a

white, bluish print shirt that was hanging over his pants, and because of . . . the

nature of him wanting to get out of there[.]” Miller , 546 F.2d at 252. We

certainly agree with the Eighth Circuit that the failure to tuck in one’s bluish shirt

while sitting at the kitchen table, coupled with a natural desire to leave the scene

of a narcotics investigation, does not meet the reasonable and articulable

suspicion standard. The grounds provided by Deputy Medrano, however, are a far

cry from the mere hunch offered up by the officer in Miller . 

Mr. Maddox next argues that Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), should
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control this case. In Ybarra , the defendant, a patron at a public tavern, was

searched in connection with an arrest warrant being served on the tavern’s

bartender. The Court held that this search was unreasonable because “ a person’s

mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not,

without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.” Id. at 91. Mr.

Maddox argues that he too was searched based on his mere propinquity to a

person independently suspected of criminal activity, Ms. Page, and therefore the

search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Ybarra stands for the proposition that “mere propinquity to others

independently suspected of criminal activity” is insufficient, standing alone, to

create an articulable suspicion to support a Terry frisk. Id. The search and

seizure in Ybarra violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer had no

reason—other than the fact that he was present in a tavern in which narcotics

were being sold—to search Mr. Ybarra . The Court noted that Mr. Ybarra’s

“hands were empty” and that he “gave no indication of possessing a weapon,

made no gestures or other actions indicative of an intent to commit an assault, and

acted generally in a manner that was not threatening.” Id. Based on these facts,

the Court held that “the State is unable to articulate any specific fact that would

have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was

armed and dangerous.” Id. at 93. Ybarra, therefore, would only control in this
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case if we determine that Deputy Medrano did not have a reasonable and

articulable suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous. As we explain

below, Deputy Medrano had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Mr.

Maddox posed a threat. 

Because we find that the risks faced by the officers here are nearly the

same as, if not identical to, those faced by the officers in Buie and therefore apply

the same reasonableness test employed in Buie, the question we face is: Did

Officer Medrano have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Mr. Maddox

posed a threat to the officers on the scene that justifies the detention of Mr.

Maddox in the carport for the duration of Ms. Page’s arrest, an activity that took

approximately half an hour? 

In determining whether Deputy Medrano had reasonable and articulable

suspicion to justify the detention, we consider the totality of the circumstances,

see United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1505 (10th Cir. 1996), and balance

Mr. Maddox’s Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental interest in

officer safety, Thompson, 58 F.3d at 1517. While our reasonableness

determination “ must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about

human behavior[,]” a mere “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’”

cannot satisfy this reasonableness requirement. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.

119, 124-25 (2000). Therefore, a protective detention justified on officer safety
5The Government argues that the “community caretaking” doctrine allows

this detention. We disagree. Our cases specifically limit this doctrine to vehicle

searches. United States v. Thomson, 354 F.3d 1197, 1200 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003)

(“the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement is applicable

only in cases involving automobile searches”) (quotation omitted); United States

v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 535 (10th Cir. 1994) (same). Therefore, we do not consider

community caretaking in our Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.

6

“Indeed, our notion of what is reasonable police conduct has long reflected

the heightened danger and risk of violence posed by cocaine trafficking.” Mays v.

Drug Enforcement Admin., 234 F.3d 1324, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also

Shareef, 100 F.3d at 1506; United States v. Becerra, 97 F.3d 669, 671-72 (2d Cir.

1996) (reasonable to suspect that “drug dealers commonly keep firearms on their

premises as tools of the trade”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); United

States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 36 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (study of drugs and

violence justifies police drawing weapons because “odds [are] too high to require

policemen to play ‘russian roulette’ each time they effect a drug arrest”).

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grounds is “decidedly not ‘automatic,’ but may be conducted only when justified

by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that . . . a person pos[es] a danger to those

on the arrest scene.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 336.

Here, Deputy Medrano’s articulable and reasonable suspicion of potential

danger supports the temporary, protective detention of Mr. Maddox on officer

safety grounds. 5

 First, Deputy Medrano was assisting in the arrest of a narcotics

trafficker. Such arrests are notoriously and routinely dangerous. 6

 Second, Deputy

Medrano knew the Buhrle residence to be a dangerous location because he had

investigated a homicide there, he knew that the residence had been the location of

violent crimes, and he knew that several narcotics traffickers and violent fugitives

had been arrested there. Third, it was getting dark. Fourth, at the time Mr.
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Maddox arrived, Deputy Medrano was outnumbered 5-to-1. And fifth, Deputy

Medrano had observed Mr. Maddox reach under the seat of the pick-up truck as it

pulled up the driveway. We also note that the possibility that Mr. Maddox was

visiting another home or was merely passing by was extremely unlikely as the

Buhrle residence was the only mobile home at the end of the long driveway in a

rural area.

Mr. Maddox argues that many of these factors, when individually

considered, would not justify a protective detention. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.

266, 273 (2000) (suspicion that defendant is armed, standing alone, is insufficient

to justify a Terry stop); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (presence in an

area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a

Terry stop); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) (talking to known drug

addicts, standing alone, is insufficient to support a Terry stop). But we consider

the totality of the circumstances. Hence, even if one factor would be insufficient

standing alone, it may be considered as one of the many factors in determining the

reasonableness of Deputy Medrano’s conduct. 

The Court addressed this very issue just four years ago in Wardlow . 528

U.S. 119 (2000). There, the defendant argued that the officers lacked a

reasonable and articulable justification to perform a Terry stop because fleeing

and propinquity to a high-crime area are insufficient justifications for such a stop
7The Government also argues that United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576

(D.C. Cir. 1993), controls the outcome of this case. In Reid, the court upheld the

Terry stop of an individual leaving the location to be searched for narcotics

simply because the officer said “he felt endangered by [the defendant’s] potential

presence behind the police officers as they . . . execute[d] the search warrant.” Id.

at 1579. The court differentiated Ybarra because “[c]ommon sense suggests that

there is a much greater likelihood that a person found in a small private residence

containing drugs will be involved in the drug activity occurring there than an

(continued...)

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when standing alone. The Court, while agreeing that standing alone these

justifications are insufficient, held that these grounds could be considered in the

overall reasonableness analysis. Id. at 124-25. “[O]fficers are not required to

ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the

circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.” Id. at

124. Moreover, even though “the conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous and

susceptible of an innocent explanation[,]” officers may “detain the individuals to

resolve the ambiguity[.]” Id. at 125; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 

We hold the Court’s Wardlow analysis equally applicable in the protective

detention scenario and find Deputy Medrano’s protective detention of Mr.

Maddox, which is justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion of potential

danger to the federal marshals and himself , reasonable in light of the totality of

the circumstances. While standing alone, many of the rationales Deputy Medrano

relied upon would be insufficient to justify the protective detention, when the

totality of the circumstances are considered, however, his action was reasonable.7
7

(...continued)

individual who happens to be in a public tavern where the bartender is suspected

of possessing drugs.” Id. at 1578-79. The court also differentiated Sibron because

“[t]here is more reason to suspect that an individual who is present in a private

residence containing drugs is involved in illegal drug activity than someone who

merely holds conversations with drug addicts in public places.” Id. at 1579. We

decline to apply the reasoning of Reid to this case because under our totality of

the circumstances precedent, the officers in this case had reasonable and

articulable suspicion that Mr. Maddox posed a threat to the officers as they

arrested Ms. Page.

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We further hold, as a part of our reasonableness analysis, that not only must

the seizure be justified at its inception, but that the scope of seizure employed

must also be reasonable under the circumstances. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (a

seizure must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified

the interference in the first place”). Deputy Medrano, unlike the officers in

Thompson , did not initially handcuff Mr. Maddox, draw his weapon, or treat him

with indignity. Cf. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981) (“ the

detention in this case . . . involve[d] neither the inconvenience nor the indignity

associated with a compelled visit to the police station”). As such, we find that

Deputy Medrano employed no more force than was necessary for officer

protection in temporarily detaining Mr. Maddox.

To be clear, our holding is not a carte blanche for law enforcement officers

to detain any third party, using any means, as an adjunct to a lawful arrest. To
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the contrary, we apply the same limitations as the Court did in Buie. Thus, the

protective detention must be for officer safety purposes only, based upon a

reasonable and articulable suspicion of potential danger to the arresting officers . 

See Buie, 494 U.S. at 333. Further, the protective detention must be “no more

than necessary to protect the officer[s] from harm[,]” id., “tak[ing only]

reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, the arrest[,]” id. at

334. Finally, the protective detention should “last[] no longer than is necessary to

dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes

to complete the arrest and depart the premises.” Id. at 335-36. These conditions

were met here.

C. Reasonableness of Questioning

Mr. Maddox presents two arguments challenging the voluntariness of his

admission to Deputy McCoy that he was armed and carrying methamphetamine. 

First, he urges that because his initial detention was unconstitutional the

subsequent questioning was as well. Because we hold that the initial detention

was constitutional, this argument is unpersuasive. 

Second, Mr. Maddox argues, without citation to legal authority, that

because he observed others being patted down he assumed he would be as well,

regardless of his responses to Deputy McCoy. Thus, he asserts his responses were

involuntary. The Government counters that following a legal detention an officer
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may ask persons being detained if they are armed even when the officer lacks

reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See United States v. Holt , 264 F.3d 1215,

1226 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Ebel, J.) (“Given the dangers inherent in all

traffic stops, we hold that the government’s interest in officer safety outweighs a

motorist’s interest in not being asked about the presence of loaded weapons.”). 

Mr. Maddox retorts that Holt is inapplicable here as it is limited to the

questioning of detained motorists. We need not decide today whether to extend

Holt to the non-vehicle context because deputies Medrano and McCoy had a

reasonable and articulable suspicion that Mr. Maddox was dangerous. 

Under Terry , the reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on “whether

the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably

related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first

place.” 392 U.S. at 20. As we discussed above, the initial detention of Mr.

Maddox was reasonable on officer safety grounds. Deputy Medrano was assisting

in the arrest of a narcotics trafficker at a residence he knew to be dangerous; it

was getting dark; Deputy Medrano was outnumbered 5-to-1; and he had observed

Mr. Maddox reach under the seat of pick-up truck as it pulled up the driveway. 

Further, it was unlikely that Mr. Maddox was merely passing by the residence,

and his behavior after being asked to remain in the carport – incessant pacing,

leaving the carport area, urinating in the carport – reasonably heightened Deputy
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Medrano’s suspicions that Mr. Maddox was dangerous. Given these reasonable

and articulable grounds, the officer could have, consistent with Terry , performed

a protective patdown of Mr. Maddox. Id. at 27, 30. Deputy McCoy, however,

merely asked a question about firearms, which is less intrusive than a frisk, and is

equally justified under these circumstances. 

Based upon many of these same facts, Deputy McCoy also had a reasonable

and articulable suspicion that Mr. Maddox possessed narcotics. See United States

v. Soto-Cervantes, 138 F.3d 1319, 1322-23 (10th Cir. 1998). We hold, therefore,

that Deputy McCoy’s questioning of Mr. Maddox was reasonable given the

totality of the circumstances.

III. SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT

Mr. Maddox also challenges his sentencing enhancement. The District

Court reasoned that Mr. Maddox’s previous failure to return to prison during a

work-release program constituted an escape from prison. Relying on precedent

from this Court, the District Court enhanced the sentence as a “violent felony”

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. Mr. Maddox contends that his

failure to return from the work-release program does not constitute a violent

felony. We review de novo a sentence enhancement under § 924(e) and examine

the entire record and supporting documentation to determine the legitimacy of the

trial court’s sentence. United States v. Adkins, 196 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir.
8Neither of the parties argued whether Blakely v. Washington, — U.S. —,

124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), affects this case and we make no assumptions regarding

this issue. 

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1999). 

Mr. Maddox’s counsel, in accordance with his duty as an officer of the

court, candidly admits that Tenth Circuit precedent forecloses his argument. We

agree. See id.; see also United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir.

1999); United States v. Moudy, 132 F.3d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1998). He raises the

argument here in order to preserve the issue for a possible certiorari petition to

the Supreme Court. Counsel properly preserved the issue.8

IV. CONCLUSION

Because we find, given the totality of the circumstances, that a protective

detention and the questioning of Mr. Maddox were reasonable, and that the

District Court properly enhanced Mr. Maddox’s sentence, we AFFIRM.