alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 32.1**
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350,****as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**
     In connection with the Form 10-K of DeanHolding Company (the “Company”) for the year endedDecember 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,Gregg L. Engles, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002, that the Report fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information containedin the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ GREGG L. ENGLES      Gregg L. Engles     *Chief Executive Officer*
Date: March 17, 2005
Note: This certification accompanies the Reportpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002and shall not be deemed filed, except to the extent required bythe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, by the Company for purposes ofSection 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended.
```
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

     In  connection  with the Annual  Report of MACC Private  Equities Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the
United  States  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),  I, Travis T.  Prentice,  President and CEO of the Company,  certify,
pursuant  to 18  U.S.C.  ss.  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  ss.  906  of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

                                         /s/ Travis T. Prentice
                                         ----------------------
                                         Travis T. Prentice,
                                         President and CEO

Date: December 19, 2008
```
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-20-00078-CR

RUDY GARZA MOLINA,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 443rd District Court

Ellis County, Texas

Trial Court No. 44633CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Rudy Garza Molina, was charged by indictment with assault family 

violence with a prior family violence conviction, enhanced by two prior felony 

convictions. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(A). A jury found Molina guilty of 

the charged offense. Molina elected for the trial court to assess punishment. At the 

punishment hearing, Molina pleaded “true” to both enhancement allegations. The trial 

court found the enhancement allegations to be “true” and sentenced Molina to forty 
Molina v. State Page 2

years’ incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal 

Justice with no fine.

In two issues on appeal, Molina contends that his forty-year sentence is grossly 

disproportionate to the crime and inappropriate to the offender, thus violating his 

constitutional rights pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. 

VIII; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. We affirm.

Issues One and Two

A disproportionate-sentence claim must be preserved for appellate review. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) 

(noting that constitutional rights, including the right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment, may be waived); Mercado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) 

(en banc); see also Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2007, pet. ref’d) (“[I]n order to preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence 

is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant 

must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific 

grounds for the ruling desired.”).

At the punishment hearing, Molina did not assert his disproportionate-sentence 

claim. Indeed, when asked if there was “any legal reason why sentence should not be 

imposed today for Mr. Molina,” defense counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” Further, 
Molina v. State Page 3

Molina did not raise a disproportionate-sentence claim in his motion for new trial or 

otherwise present a post-trial objection to the imposed sentence. Therefore, Molina’s 

complaints in these two issues are not preserved and are overruled.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

MATT JOHNSON

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Johnson,

and Justice Smith

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed September 29, 2021

Do not publish

[CRPM]
#### Carl F. WHITE, Petitioner, v. Donald G. ALLEN, J. Richard Graves, Jr., George W. Elston, Jr., and Ira McAlpin, Respondents.

No. 39598.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 12, 1970.

William S. Blalock, Orlando, for petitioner.

Gordon B. Johnston, of Mitchell, Sharp & Johnston, Vero Beach, for respondents.

DREW, Justice:

We issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, *636Fourth District,1 because of a conflict with Akey v. Murphy,2 a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal. Since issuing the writ, we have rendered a decision in the *Akey*case3 quashing the decision of the district court and arriving at the same conclusion as did the Fourth District in the decision now presented for review.

Inasmuch as the decision below is in accord with our *Akey*opinion and the conflicting decision of the Second District has been quashed, the writ of certiorari heretofore issued is discharged.

It is so ordered.

ERVIN, C. J., CARLTON and BOYD, JJ-, and LEAVENGOOD, Circuit Judge, concur.

1

. White v. Allen, 232 So.2d 766 (4th Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1970).

2

. 229 So.2d 276 (2nd Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1969).

3

. Akey v. Murphy, 238 So.2d 94 (Fla.1970).
#### Millard WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 42771.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 18, 1972.

Certiorari denied. 266 So.2d 419.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### Willie BROWN, Petitioner, v. LEWIS MANUFACTURING COMPANY and the Florida Industrial Commission, an administrative agency, Respondents.

No. 37996.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 12, 1969.

David Goldman and Jack H. Cohen, Miami, for petitioner.

Rose & Marlow, Miami, Patrick H. Mears and J. Franklin Garner, Tallahassee, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

By petition for a writ of certiorari we have for review an order of the Florida Industrial Commission bearing date Sept. 18, 1968.

We find that oral argument would serve no useful purpose and it is therefore dispensed with pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule 3.10, subd. e, 32 F.S.A.

Our consideration of the petition, the record and briefs leads us to conclude that there has been no deviation from the essential requirements of law.

The petition is therefore denied.

The petitioner’s request for attorneys’ fees is also denied.

DREW, Acting C. J., and THORNAL, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
#### C. T. BUCHANNON, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 69-88.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 23, 1970.

Robert G. Ferrell, III, Public Defender, Cocoa, and Charles M. Rieders, Asst. Public Defender, Cocoa Beach, for petitioner.

*609Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner’s original direct appeal from a judgment and sentence imposed upon conviction of robbery and assault with intent to commit second degree murder was frustrated by an untimely filed notice of appeal by court appointed counsel.

We now grant petitioner a belated review of the judgment and sentence equivalent to a direct appeal by means of this habeas corpus proceeding. Henninger v. State, Fla.1970, 230 So.2d 149.

We have heard and considered oral argument of counsel for the respective parties, examined the briefs and record, and conclude that petitioner has failed to demonstrate reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence is affirmed and habeas corpus denied.

Habeas corpus denied.

CROSS, C. J., McCAIN, J., and FRYE, WILLIAM III, Associate Judge, concur.
250 La. 541

#### In re Interdiction of Mollie Redman LOMM.

No. 48649.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 14, 1967.

In re: Nathan Lomm applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 195 So.2d 416.

Writ refused.

There appears no error of law in the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Exhibit
10.32


 


AMENDMENT
NO. 1


DATED:
JULY 21, 2016


TO
ROUNDTABLE RESEARCH AGREEMENT


EFFECTIVE
June 16, 2016


 


BETWEEN


NANOFLEX
POWER CORPORATION (hereinafter “Sponsor”)


AND


THE
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (hereinafter “University”)


 


Reference:
University of Michigan PG No. NOZ1732


 


WHEREAS
Sponsor and University entered into the above referenced Agreement.


 


WHEREAS
the Sponsor and University wish to change the terms of the Agreement to authorize the performance of Years 2 and 3 of the Project.


 


AND
WHEREAS Article 13 of the Agreement provides that “[a]ny agreement to change the terms of this Agreement in any way shall
be valid only if the change is made in writing signed by the authorized representatives of the parties hereto.”


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, IT IS AGREED that Articles 1.2 and 4.1 shall be deleted in their entirety and replaced with the following language:


 


1.2
“Contract Period” is from May 1, 2016, through April 30, 2019 unless earlier terminated pursuant to this Agreement.


 


4,1
It is agreed that the total costs to Sponsor hereunder shall not exceed Four Hundred Fifty Thousand ($450,000.00) as described
in Appendix A. University may rebudget within this total as reasonable and necessary.


 


All
other terms and conditions shall remain unchanged.


 


	AGREED
    TO:	 	AGREED
    TO:
	 	 	 
	NANOFLEX
    POWER CORPORATION	 	THE
    REGENTS OF THE
	 	 	 	UNIVERSITY
    OF MICHIGAN
	 	 	 	 	 
	By:	/s/
    Mark Tobin	 	By:	/s/
    Peter J. Gerard
	Name
    (Printed):	Mark
    Tobin	 	Name
    (Printed):	Peter
    J. Gerard
	Title: 	Chief
    Financial Officer	 	Title:	Associate
    Director
			 		Grants
    and Contracts
	 	 	 	 	 
	Date:	7/21/2016	 	Date:	7/25/16
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lawrence RILES.

No. 60700.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 26, 1977.

In re: Lawrence Riles, applying for writ of mandamus.

Writ denied. Record lodged in this court on October 17, 1977. Hence, the matter is moot.
#### In the Interest of M. M., a juvenile.

No. 72-1380.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 22, 1973.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Lewis S. Kimler, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and William L. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Linda C. Hertz, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court, juvenile-family division, which adjudicated the appellant child a delinquent and committed him to the Division of Youth Services, State of Florida. The single point raised on appeal urges that the trial court erred in finding the appellant a delinquent because the evidence was circumstantial and did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See Brown v. State, 127 Fla. 225, 172 So. 921 (1937); Wilkerson v. State, Fla.App.1970, 232 So.2d 217. We have reviewed the record in the light of the arguments presented and find that the evidence of the complaining witness completely excluded the hypothesis of innocence relied upon by the appellant. The question before the court was purely one of the credibility of the witnesses. The court recognized the issue and stated in the record that the juvenile’s explanation was incredible in view of the testimony received.

In order to obviate any doubt as to the standard of proof applied in this case by this court, we add that we have reviewed the record in the light of the holding of the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. V. D. B, Fla. 1972, 270 So.2d 6, and find the proof submitted to be sufficient under the test there applied.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
      as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K Equivalent of Birds Eye
Foods, Inc. (the "Company") for the fiscal year ended June 25, 2005, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") on September 23,
2005, and as amended by the Form 10-K/A Equivalent (Amendment No. 1) filed with
the Commission on March 20, 2006 (collectively, the "Report"), I, Dennis M.
Mullen, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge, the Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.

   Date: March 29, 2006        /s/ Dennis M. Mullen
                               -----------------------------------------
                               Principal Executive Officer
                               (as of the date of filing of the original Report)

                                       11
#### Lawrence Thomas VARNOM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1-425.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.

April 27, 1967.

A. K. Black, Lake City, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

RAWLS, Chief Judge.

Appellant Varnom, by an instrument styled “Motion to Clarify Status and to Prevent Probation Supervision Pending Appeal” urges this Court to enter an order directing the Circuit Court and Florida Probation and Parole Commission to cease any supervision of him during the period of time this cause is on appeal.

Information was filed charging Varnom with the crime of robbery, and on the 22nd day of June, 1966, after a full scale trial, a jury returned a verdict of guilty. On December 5, 1966, the trial judge pursuant to the provisions of Section 948.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., withheld an adjudication of guilt and placed Varnom under the supervision of the Florida Probation and Parole Commission for a period of five years, from which order Varnom has prosecuted an appeal to this court. Since judgment pursuant to the verdict of the trial court has not been entered, no bond has been sought or set for Varnom for his remaining at liberty during the pendency of this appeal. In short, the trial judge by withholding sentence, has permitted Varnom to escape incarceration so long as he complies with the order of probation. Now he seeks to escape the compliance with said order upon the theory that the filing of a notice of appeal divested the trial court and the Probation and Parole Commission of any jurisdiction over him during the pendency of his appeal. To use a colloquialism, “He wants his cake and eat it too.”

The subject motion is denied without prejudice for Varnom, if he be so advised, to move this court to relinquish jurisdiction for a short period of time to the trial court for the purpose of his petitioning the trial court for an adjudication of guilt/ imposition of sentence pursuant to the jury verdict, and the setting of an appropriate bond pending this appeal.

JOHNSON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1
 Certification required by Rule 13a-14(b) or
Rule 15d-14(b) and Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.
 BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., TRUSTEE FOR
DOMINION RESOURCES BLACK WARRIOR TRUSTMarch 14, 2008
    By:
    /s/ Ron E. HooperRon E. Hooper,Senior Vice President, Royalty Management
Bank of America, N.A.
<PAGE>



                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CHARTERED
                                   ACCOUNTANTS






We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption "Experts" in the
Registration Statement (Form S-3) and related Prospectus of Global Media Corp.
for the registration of 20,502,808 shares of its common stock and to the
incorporation by reference therein of our audit report dated September 23, 1999,
except for Notes 9[i] and 12[i] which are as at October 19, 1999, with respect
to the consolidated financial statements of Global Media Corp. included in its
Annual Report (Form 10-KSB) for the year ended July 31, 1999, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.




Vancouver, Canada,                                       /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
September 11, 2000                                       Chartered Accountants
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1391

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR 

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2005-OPT2, ASSET 

BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-OPT 2,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

IVY K. INOCENCIO; MARISSA P. GOMEZ; EQUITY TRUSTEES, LLC; 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior

District Judge. (1:15-cv-00015-TSE-MSN)

Submitted: December 29, 2015 Decided: January 7, 2016

Before GREGORY and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

S. Mohsin Reza, Mary C. Zinsner, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Tysons 

Corner, Virginia, for Appellant. Carolina D. Ciraolo, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Clark, Regina S. Mariarty, 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. brought suit in Virginia 

state court seeking rescission of a foreclosure sale that took 

place approximately four years earlier. The United States 

removed the action to district court and moved to dismiss

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). The district court 

granted the motion to dismiss as to the United States, based on 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because there were no 

viable remaining claims as against the remaining defendants, the 

court also dismissed the action in its entirety. We have 

reviewed the parties’ briefs, as well as the record on appeal,

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>   1
                                                                     EXHIBIT 23



                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (No. 33-09679, No. 333-38377, No. 333-41829, No.
333-48953, No. 333-57603, No. 333-65081, No. 333-70721, No. 333-74305 and No.
333-87223) and the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (No. 33-63875, No.
333-10517, No. 333-17517, No. 333-85569 and No. 333-86247) of Veritas DGC Inc.,
of our report dated October 8, 1999, relating to the financial statements, which
appears in this Form 10-K.




PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

Houston, Texas
October 14, 1999
#### Josefa M. CISNERO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 42457.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 12, 1973.

Appeal dismissed.

CARLTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.

DEKLE, J., dissents.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350

(SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002)



I, David A. Fiorentino,
Chief Financial Officer of JWC Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to the best of my knowledge:



(1) the Quarterly Report
on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2012 (the “Report”)
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d));
and



(2) the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Date: July 30, 2012 | /s/ David A. Fiorentino       | 
|------------------- | ----------------------------- | 
|                    | David A. Fiorentino           | 
|                    | Chief Financial Officer       | 
|                    | (principal financial officer) | 



A signed original of
this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of EDUtoons, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q, for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David Godwin, Chief Executive Officer and President of EDUtoons, Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: December 23, 2011
By:
/s/ David GodwinDavid GodwinChief Executive Officer and President

(Principal Executive Officer)
<PAGE>   1

                                                                   EXHIBIT 24(k)


                                POWER OF ATTORNEY

         KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that the undersigned director of United
Dominion Industries Limited hereby constitutes and appoints Richard L. Magee and
William Dries and each of them singly, his true and lawful attorney-in-fact and
agent, with full power of substitution and resubstitution, for him and in his
name, place and stead, in any and all capacities, to sign the Annual Report on
Form 10-K of United Dominion Industries Limited for the year ended December 31,
1999, and any or all amendments and supplements thereto, and to file the same
with all exhibits thereto and other documents in connection therewith, with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York Stock Exchange, the Toronto
Stock Exchange and any Canadian securities commissions, granting unto said
attorney-in-fact and agent full power and authority to do and perform each and
every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and about the
premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do in
person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said attorney-in-fact and agent
may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

  /s/ D. D. Ruffin
-----------------------------------
      D. D. Ruffin, Director



    February 11, 2000