F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

L ATI S HA M ARI E B A BB ,

Petitioner-Appellee ,

v.
J EN N I FER L O ZOWSKY and E. K. M C D ANI EL , Re

sp on de nts -A

pp e lla nts

. No. 11-16784

D.C. No. 2:05-cv-00061- P M P

- R JJ

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Neva da Phili p M. Pro, District J udg e, Presiding Argued and Submitted July 20 , 2 01 2— San F ra

nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia Filed January

11, 2013
Be fore : A. Wallace Ta shima, Richard R. Clifton,
and Mary H. Murguia , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. Op ini on by Judg e MurguiaB A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY

2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no par t of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Hab e as Co r pus
T h e p anel reve rsed the district c ourt’s g rant of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas c orpus petition c halleng ing a murde r and robber

y conviction, due to a

n unconstitutiona l j u ry instruction give n pursuant to Kaz aly n v . S tate , 825 P.2d 578 (Ne v. 1992).
Whil e p et i tioner B abb’s dire ct appe al was pe nding, the Neva da Supreme Court invalidated the Kazalyn ins tr uc tio n in By for d v . S tate , 994 P.2d 700 (Ne v. 2000), which hel dt hat the Kazalyn ins tr

uc tio n b lur

re d th e thr e e e le me nts of fi rs t deg ree murder – willfulness, deliberation a nd preme ditation – and r el ieved the state of its burden of provingeac h element of the c ri me
. Al tho ug h thi s Court g ra nte d ha be a s relief

in Polk v. Sandov al , 503 F.3d 903 ( 9th Cir. 2007) , b as ed on a Kazalyn ins tr

uc tio n, the Ne va da Sup re me Court su bs e qu e ntl y clar ified in Nik

a v . S tate , 198 P.3d 839 (Nev

. 2008), that By for d announce d a new

interpre tation of the state murde r statute that cha

ng ed the law , as opposed to cla rifying it. The district court dete rmined that it was bound by this Court’s decision in Po lk

and g rante d habea s relief to Ba bb.
The panel first held that the Neva da s t at e court unre a so na

bly a pp lie d e sta

bli sh e d f e de ra l la w e xpre sse d in B u n kl ey v. Florida , 5 3 8 U

. S. 8 3 5 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ( p e r c ur ia m) , and
v i o l at edBa

b b ’s d u e p ro ce s s ri gh t s b y

n o tap p l yi n g By

for d

. Th e pa ne l e xpla ine d th at Po lk

did not control the outcome ofB A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 3

this case be cause Nik

a un de rm ine d th is C ourt ’s ho ldi ngin Po lk as to t h e constitutionalit y of the Kazalyn instruction. Th e pa ne l f ur the r e xplai ned that By

for d applied to B abb’s
case beca use new ly

decla red c onstitut ional rules must be appl i ed to convictions that we re not y et final at the time the
c ha ng e oc c ur s.
Th e pa ne l ne xt he ld t

hat th e e rr or

wa s h armle ss b e c a

us e the panel was reasona

bly cer tain that no juror convic ted B abb based on the theory

of pre meditation, give n overwhelming evidenc e supportingthe fe l o n y murder the ory and the pr os e c uto r’ s f

oc us on that th e or

y duri ngc los ingargume nt. The pa nel re m anded f

or the district cour

t to consider Ba bb’s other c laims , which we re not a ddresse d when the district court g rante d relief

.

CO UN SEL
L isa A. Rasmussen, L as Ve gas , Neva da, forPetitionerAppellee

. Adam L . Woodrum and Victor-H ug o Sch u l z e, I I , Offic e of the Nev ada A ttorney

Gene ral, L as Ve g as, Ne vada, f or Re sp on de nt- Ap pe lla

nt.B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY

4
OP IN ION
MURGUIA, Circuit J udg e: Appellants– R es p o n d en t s J en n i fe r Lozowsky , the Warden, and the Ne vada A ttorney Gene ral (“ the State”) appea l the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f a wr it o f hab eas c or

pu s to Appellee –Petitioner L atisha M. B ab b pursuant to the Antiterror ism and Effe ctive De ath Penalty Act of 1996 (“ AE DPA ” ), 28 U. S.C. § 22 54

. B a bb wa s c onvic te d o f f

ir st deg ree murder w ith a deadly wea pon, and robbery with a deadly wea pon, by a jury in Nevada state court for

the murder of cab driver J ohn Castro in c onnection with a robber y
. The district court g rante d habea s relief , concludingthat one of the instructions for first degree murder g iven i n Ba b b’s ca se, known as the Kazalyn ins tr uc tio n, vio late d he r d

ue pr oc e ss ri g hts and that the imp ro pe r ins tr uc tio n did no t co ns tit

ute harmless e rror
. We RE VE RSE

. Bac kgr ound
On O c to b e r 2 6 , 1 9 9 7 , c a

b dr iv e r Jo h n Ca s tr o w as found sh ot i n th e he a d in

Was ho e County , N e va da . H e ult imate ly died from the w ound.
Whil e investig ating another s h o o ting, police obtained
war rants to sea

rch the home and ve hicle of B abb’s
c od e fe nd ant a

nd liv e -i n b oy fr ie nd , Sh awn Ha rt e . A t th e tim e the police stopped H arte in his car , Ba bb was with him. The po li ce fo un d a

.2 2 c a lib e r p ist ol, a

sp otl ig ht, a

ha nd -h e ld radio, a mag azine, and ammunition in the car . A shell ca sing had bee n found inside the victim’s tax i c ab. For ensic testingB A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 5

rev e a le d th a t t h e s h e ll c a s in g h a d

b e e nf ir e d f r o m t h e g un found in Har

te’s ca r.
Information obtained f

rom Har te led police to que s t ion Ba b b ’s other c o-def

endant, Weston Sirex (“Sirex ”), who
wo rk e d at a Re no ta xi co mpa ny . Si re x told

the inv e sti g a tor s:
that it star ted out a s a robbe ry , that they wer e northbound on Cold Springs Road, that he [S irex] was look ing out the w indow, that he [S irex] turned a

round just i n t i me to hear a sh ot a nd se e the fl a sh of a we a

po n, and tha t it wasn’t supposed to happen that wa y , or that he [Si rex] didn’t know it was g oing to ha ppen th a tw ay.
Sir e x als o a dmi tte d to be ingpa rty to disc us sio ns tha

t a robber y and a killing would take place , althoug h he said that the c a b d ri ve r w a s n ot t o b e kil le d, un le ss a bsol ut e ly
nece ssary . Ba

bb, Har te, and Sirex were t ri ed tog ether , and Sirex ’s statements to police we re r ead to t h e j ury duringthe tr ia l.
Ha rt e a lso e ve ntu a lly ma de state me nts to p oli c e , w he re in he admitted to sh o oting Castro in the he ad. In addition, he confe ssed to beingthe shooter in a le tter to a woma n he had dated. He wrote:
So this c a

b d ri ve r i s ju st s purt ingof f h is mouth about ho w h e g ot ‘ripped of f’ $1000
c a she arl ie r, bla

h b lah b lah. No w what c ou ld that all have be en about? Drug s. . . . I t’s beca use of pe ople like him that Idon’t have a son or daug hter. . . .B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY

6
Ichambe red a ro und. . . . Point bl ank. An inc h a bo ve the e ar and tw o be hin d. Boom. That sim p l e. That ea sy . No re morse. H o n e s t l y.
Ijumped up and let the c ab coa st right in fr ont of a dr ugde a le r’ s h ou se in C old S pri ng s. Perfe ct. Windows wer e up, so it was
no ise le ss.
. . . We le ft . We nt t o Ci rc us Cir c us
. Play ed som e g ames, g ambled – continued our g ood time. Went to Taco Bel l

. And ate. W e n t h o m e
. S i mp l e
. N o th i n g t o i t . Just another chore , like takingout the trash, except easie r. And funne r.
The letter and Har

te’s statements to the police wer e also rea d t o th e j ur y.
Har te and Sirex did not t estify at trial , and they

did not mention Ba

bb’s involvement in the ir statements to the police. When B a b b w a s inte r

v ie w e d b y a n e w s p a p e r r e p o rte r a fter her a rre st, however , she made the following statements to the
r e p o rt e r a dm i t t i n g h e r

i n v o l v e m e n ti nth e r o b b e r y:
Iwas the dr iver.

I t was m ay

be a 15- minute plan. We were n’t out to ge t this specific per son.
Ijok ing ly sa id, “ L e t’ s r ob a

c a b. I t’ s e a sy enoug h.” So we did.B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 7

Ididn’t hear

the gunshot. Ididn’t even know he wa s shot until I pulled up along side the ca r an d h ea rdh i m[ th e d ri v er ] b re at h i n g.
The c ab stopped in Cold Springs, and I pulled in f ro nt o f i t.
Iloo ke d and saw h im i n th e fr on t se a t w ithhis head r olled back.
When Ithought a

bout it lat er , Ikept hea

ring his breath.

Ithought may

be someone else woul d rob a cab an d they ’d think he did it. Iwas broke and I h ad just lost my

job. Ineede d the
mon e y to p ay my bil ls. Ihav e a lo t of d e bt. For the money

we g ot, that man’s life was n’t wo rt h it

. Ho w d o you

te ll p e op le y ou we re inv olv e d in
a mur de r? Ho w w ill Ite ll my mom ?
Iacknow ledg e this happene d and I fee l bad. Ihave nothingto hide. What’s done is done. This is foreve r, nobody

wil l fo rg et. You see it on TV and you know that y ou did t h at. I did n’ t w ant a ny of thi s.
Ba bb also did not testify

at trial, but h erstatements to the
r e p o rt e r w e r e r e a d

t o th e j ur y.B A BB V

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8
Ba bb was c harg ed w i t h robbingand murde ringJ ohn Ca str o. Th e jur

y wa s g ive n th e fo llo wi ngins tr uc tio n f or fi rs t deg ree murder:
As it a pp lie s to thi s case Murd e r o f t he F ir st De g re e is: a) Mur der which is any kind of wi ll f

u l, de libe r at e and pr e m e dit at e d kill ing : or b) M ur de r whic h is c om mi tt e d in t he pe r pe t r a t io n o f a R o bber y . Murder in the Second De g ree is all other kinds of Murder

. Instruction 18 (empha ses adde d). The jury instructio n s als o included the f ollowing i n s t ru ction for f

irst deg ree murder, some times refe rre d to as the K azalyn ins tr

uc tio n, name d f

or the Ne va da

Sup re me Court decision which a

pproved it, Kaz aly n v . S

tate , 825 P.2d 578 (Ne v. 1992):
the unlawf

ul killi ng must b e accompanie d wi th d e lib e rate and

c le ar i nte nt to t ake lif

e in order to constitute Murder of t he First Deg ree
. The intent to kill must be the result of deliberate pre meditation.

Pr e me dit atio n is a

de sign, a dete rm inatio n to kill, dis tinctly

formed in the mind at a ny m o m en tb ef

o re o r a tth e t i m e o f t h e k i l l i n g.
Premeditation need not be for a day , an hour
or even a minute. I t may

be instantane ous asB A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 9

succe ssive thoughts of

the mind. F orif t he jury believes from the evidence t hat the act constituting the kil ling h a s been prece ded by and h a s b ee n th e result of pr e m e dit at ion , no m at te r how r api dlyth e prem editation is f

ollow ed by the act c ons ti tu ti ng t he kill ing , it is wil lful, deliberate and prem editated m urder

. Instructio n 2 3 (empha sis added). The judge also instructed the jury to appl y t h i s definition of first degree murder “[u] nless felony

murder a pplies.” The jury was g iven t h e following instruction for fe lony murder:
Whenever

death occurs dur ing the perpe tration of ce rtain fe lonies , including Robbery , NRS 200.030 define s this as Murder in the Fi rs t Deg ree . This is known as the “fe lony murder r ule.”
There fore , an unl aw ful killing of a human being , whether

intentional , unintentional or
acc idental, which is co mmitt ed in the perpe tration of a Robbe ry , is Murder in the First De g ree if ther e wa s in the mind of the def en dants the spec ific intent to commit the
c r i m e o f R o b b e r y.B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY

10

T he jury was al so i nst ruct ed regardi ng f i rs t de gree murd er on an ai d i ng 1
an d a bet t i n g t h eor y
. T h i s i n s t r u ct i on pe r mi t t ed t h e j u r y t o f i n d B abb gui l t y of f

i rs t de gree murd er i f

s he ai d ed and ab et t ed H art e i n co m m i t t i ng f i rs t de gree murd er:

I n or der t o f

i n d La t i s h a M ar i e B abb

. . . g u i l t y of t he cri m e o f

m urder, as charged i n C o u n t I of t he In d ic tm e n t, yo u m u st b e sa tisf ie d b e yo n d a re a so n a b le d o u b t t h a t:

1. T he cri m es o f

M urde r a n d Robbery were commi t t ed;

2. Lat i s ha M ar i e B abb .

. . ai ded and abet t ed s uch crim es.
3

. S h a w n R u sse ll H a rte , a c o -p rin c ip a l,
co m m i t t ed t he cri m es of M urder and R o b b ery , and

4

. T h e c rim e o f

M urder was a nat ural and pr ob a bl e c on s e qu e n c e of t h e c om mi s s i on of

t h e cr i me o f R o b b e ry.

I n s t r u ct i on 22. T h e s p e c i f

i c i n t e n tt o c o m m i tR o b b e r y mu st be pr ov e n b y

the state be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.
Instruction 20. 1
Th e jur y fo un d B a

bb gu ilty of ro bb e ry wi th a de a dly
we a po n a nd fi rs t de g re e mur de r wi th a de a dly we a po n. Th is
was a g ener al ver dict, howeve r, and did not specify under which theor

y the jury found B abb guilty

of first degree murder. B abb wa s sent ence d to two consec utive lifeB A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 11

W hen B abb p ar t i ci pat ed i n Cas t r o’ s m urd er, N eva da l aw r equi r ed 2
cour t s t o i mp ose a s econd, cons ecu t i ve s ent enc e o n a def endan t wh o us ed a deadl y wea po n i n t he com mi s s i on of a c r i me; t he s econd s ent enc e wa s to b e o f t h e sa m e len g th a s the fi rs t. See N ev. R ev. Stat

. § 1 9 3

. 1 6 5 (19 9 7 ). sentenc es without parole for the murder conviction. She was 2
a lso se nte nc e d to two co ns e c uti ve te rm s of 72– 18 0 mont hs in pr iso n f or the ro bb e ry c onvic tio n, ru nn ingc on c ur

re ntl y wi th the murder

sentenc e.
The Ne v ad a Supreme Court af firmed B abb’s c onviction and sentence on direc t appea l. On May 27, 2009, Ba

bb filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Ha beas Corpus in the United States District Court , Di s t rict of Ne vada. G round tw e lve of the pe tit ion a lle g e d that B a bb wa s d e nie d h e r F if

th and F ourtee nth Amendment rig hts to due proce ss and trial by an impartial jury beca

use the state trial cour

t failed to instruct the jury proper ly reg ardingpreme ditation and deliberation. In the last re asoned de cision by the state c ourt, the Ne vada Supreme Court held: Appellant[] also cha lleng e[s] the g iving of Instruction 23, the “

Kazalyn instruction,” which wa s ultim ately

cri t icized in Byford v. Sta te . Appellant[] argue[s] th at the instruction improperly me r g e s th e conce pts of preme ditation and deliberation and, ther efor e, re du c e s th e State ’s b urde n o f p ro of in viol at i o n of due pr ocess. . . . As w e have recently held, the g iving of

the Ka z alyn instru ct ion in cases like this one, whic h prec eded the By

for d decision, constitu tes neither pla in nor constitutional error

.B A BB V

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12
Ba bb v . S

tate , No. 34195 (Ne v. J uly 10, 2 0 0 1 ) (f

ootnotes omitted).
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nte d r e lie f o n B a

bb ’s F ourt eenth Am e ndme nt c la im o n th e ba sis that: 1) the Ni nth Cir c uit he ld in Polk v. Sandov al , 5 0 3 F. 3 d903 (9th Cir. 2007), that the Kazalyn instruction wa s unconstitutional because it blurred the eleme nts of preme ditation and deliberation, thereby relievingthe State of the bur den of p ro v i n g eac h element of
a cr ime, as require d by Supreme Court pr ece dent; and 2) due pr oc e ss r e qu ir e d th at By

for d v. S ta te , 994 P.2d 700 (Nev. 2000), which na

rrowe d the categor y of ca ses that could be considere d murder, be applied to Babb, whose c onviction was not final when Byford was de cided.
The district cour

t also conducte d a har mle ss error analy sis. The court de termined that, be ca u s e t he jury was prese nted with multipl e theor ies of first de gree murder and delivere d a g ener al ver dict, the impact of the improper instruction was uncle ar. B eca use the co u rt had g rave doubt about whethe r all jurors a g ree d that fe l o ny murder w as the theory by which they

found B abb guilty , t h e er ror wa s not harmless. The district court di d not rea ch any of B abb’s other claims for r elief.
The S tate appe als the district court’ s judgme nt gr anting the wr it.
Stand ard of Review
Th is Court re vie ws de no vo a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on

to g rant or de ny

a petition for the writ of ha b ea s corpus unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Cooper v. Nev en , 6 41 F .3 d 3 22 , 3 26 (9 th Cir. 2011). The Court re views findings of fa ct for c lear err or.B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 13

Id

. Mix ed questions of

law and f act involving constitutional issues are revie wed de novo. Id

. Under AEDP A, a habeas petitio n er cannot obtain relief ba sed on a c laim adjudicated on the merits in state cour t unless the adjudication of the claim “r esulted in a decision that was c ontrary to, or involved
an unre asonable applica tion of, clea rly established F eder al law, as d e te r

mi n e d b y th e Su p r e me Co urt o f

th e U n it ed State s. ” 28 U.S.C . § 22 54 (d ). Un de r A ED PA, “ c le arl y e sta bli sh e d F e de ra l la

w” re fe rs to t

he ho ldi ng s, a s o pp os e d to the dicta, of

the Supreme Court’s de cisions as of t he ti me of th e relevant state cour

t decision. Lockye r v. Andrade , 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003).
Ana lys is
I. Bac kgr ound o f Ne va da’ s Kazalyn Instruction
Th e Ne va da

statut e s d efi ne fi rs t de g re e mur de r, in
re le va nt p art , a s murd e r p e rp e tr ate d b y “ wi llf ul , d e lib e rate and preme ditated killing.” Nev. Rev. Stat

. § 200.030(1)( a). In Kazalyn , the Neva da Supreme Court ap proved the instruction for first de g ree mur d er t hat is at the ce nter of B a bb ’s ha be a s c la im:

Pr e me dit atio n is a desi g n, a de te rm inatio n to kill, dis tinctly

formed in the mind at a ny m o m en tb ef

o re o r a tth e t i m e o f t h e k i l l i n g.
Premeditation nee d not be for a day , an hour
or even a mi nute. I t may be as instantaneous
as succ essive thoug hts o f t he mind. If t he jury believes from the evid ence that the act constituting t he kill ing has be en prece ded by an d h a s b ee n th e re sult ofB A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY

14

T he new i ns t r uct i ons provi de: 3

M u rd e r o f t h e fi rs t d e g re e is m u rd e r w h ic h is perpet r at ed by means o f any ki nd o f

wi l l f ul , del i bera t e, pr e m e dit at ion , no m at te r how r api dlyth e prem editation is f

ollow ed by the act c ons ti tu ti ng t he kill ing , it is willful, deliberate and prem editated m urder

. 825 P.2d at 583 (emphasis adde d). Eig ht y ear s later, in Byfo rd , the Neva da Supreme Court de termined that the Kazalyn ins tr uc tio n w a s d e fi c ie nt b e c a

us e it de fined only preme ditation, a nd failed to pr ovide an independe nt definition for deliber ation. 994 P.2d at 713. The Neva da Supreme Court in Byford noted that in its pri or decisions, the ter

ms preme ditated, deliberate and willful were
c on sid e re d a

sin g le phra se rathe r tha

n inde pe nd e nt e le me nts of the mens rea for first deg ree murder. Id

. (c i t i n g Gree ne v. Sta te , 9 31 P.2 d 5 4, 61 (N e v. 19 97 ); Po we ll v . S tate , 838 P.2d 921, 926–27 (Ne v. 1992), vacate d on other grounds by 511 U.S. 79 (1994); and Sc ott v . S tate , 554 P.2d 735, 737 n.2 (Ne v
. 1 9 7 6 ) )

. T h e c o urt d e te r mi n e d th at, b y f

a il in g to treat th e te r ms a s in d e p e n d e n t e le me n ts , th e K azalyn instruction improperly

blurred the distinction b etween first and se cond deg ree murder. Id . at 71 3. Th e Ne va da Sup re me Court

a lso
no te d that “ [i]t is c le ar fr om the statut e that all three
e le me nts , w ill fu lne ss, de lib e ratio n, and pr e me dit a tio n, mus t be prove n beyond a re asonable doubt before an ac cused c an be convicted of fir st deg ree murder.” Id . at 713–14 (interna l citations and quotation mark s omitted). Byford set out instr uc tio ns pr ov idi ngse pa

rate de fi nit ion s f

or wi llf uln e ss, deliberation and preme ditatio n. The Byford court did not 3B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 15

an d p r em ed i t ated kil l i ng
. A l l t hre e e l em en t s – wi l l f u l n es s , de l i ber at i on a n d pr eme di t at i o n – mu s t be proven bey ond a r eas onabl e doubt be f o re an acc us ed can b e co nvi ct ed of f

i rs t de gree murd er.
W i l f ul ness i s t he i nt ent t o ki l l

. T h e re n eed be no ap p reci ab l e space o f ti m e b et ween f o rma t i o n of t he i nt ent t o ki l l and t he act of ki l l i ng.

D e l i b erat i o n i s t he p roce ss o f d et erm i ni ng up o n a co urs e o f

act i o n t o ki l l as a res ul t o f t ho ught , i ncl ud i ng weighi ng t he reasons f o r and agains t t he a c tio n and
co nsi d eri ng t he co nsequenc es of t he act i o n.
A de l i b erat e d et erm i nat i o n m ay b e arr i ved at i n a s h or t pe r i od of

t i me. B u t i n a l l c as es t h e det er mi n at i on mu s t n ot be f

or med i n pa s s i on , or i f

f or med i n pa s s i on i t m ust be ca rr ie d o ut af t er t here has b een t i m e f o r t he p ass i o n t o s ub si d e an d d e lib erat i o n t o oc cur. A m ere un cons i dere d an d ra s h i mp ul s e i s not del i bera t e, ev en tho u g h it inc lud e s the inte n t t o kill.

P re m e d itatio n is a d e sig n , a d e te rm ina tio n to kill, d i st i nct l y f

o rme d i n t he m i nd b y the t i m e o f the ki l l i ng.
Pre medi t at i on n ee d n o t b e f or a da y , a n h ou r or eve n a mi nu t e. I t may be as i ns t ant an eo us as success i ve t ho ught s o f th e m i nd

. Fo r i f t he jur y b el i eves f

rom the evidence t hat the act co nst i t ut i ng t he k i l l i n g h as be en pr ec ede d by an d h as bee n t h e r es u l t of premedi t at i on, no mat t er how r api dl y t he act f ol l ows t h e pr eme di t at i on , i t i s pr eme di t at ed.

T h e l aw doe s n ot u n der t ak e t o m ea s u r e i n un i t s of t i m e t he l engt h of t he p eri o d d uri ng whi ch t he t ho ught
m u st b e p o n d e r e d b e fo re it c a n rip e n into a n inte n t t o ki l l whi ch i s t rul y de l i b erat e and prem ed i t a te d . T he t i me wi l l va r y wi t h di f f eren t i ndi vi dual s an d under
va ryi ng circum st an ce s.B A BB V

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16

T he t r ue t es t i s not t he dur at i on of t i me, but r at her t he ext ent o f

t he r ef

l ect i on. A col d, ca l cul at ed judgm ent a n d de ci si o n m ay b e arri ved at i n a s ho rt p erio d o f t im e, b ut a m ere unc o nsid ere d an d rash i mpu l s e, ev en t h ou g h i t i n cl u des a n i n t en t t o k i l l , i s n ot d el i b erat i o n and pre m e d i t at i o n as wi l l f i x an unl awf

ul ki l l i ng as mur der of

t he f i r s t degr ee.

B yfo rd , 994 P. 2d a t 714–15. cite any constitutional basis for its ruling. Id . at 714–15.
After By for d , the Nevada Supreme Court held in Garner
v . S tate , 6 P.3d 1013, 1025 (N ev
. 2 0 00), overruled on othe r gr o u n d s b yS h a rm a v

. S

tate , 5 6 P.3d (Nev. 2002), that the
ne w fi rs t de g re e mur de r ins tr uc tio ns wo uld no t be a

pp lie d to
case s wh ose appe als wer e pendingon direc t reviewat the time By fo rd was de cided. The Ga rn e r court noted that althoug h newly decla

red constitutional rule s had to be a pplied t o case s pendingon direc t appea l, Byford h ad no constitutional basis. Id

. at1 0 2 5 (c i t i n g Griffit h v. Kentuck y , 479 U.S. 314 (1987)).

In 2007, thi s Court gr anted ha beas c orpus re lief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to a Nevada inmate who cla imed that the Kazalyn instruction violate d his r ight to a f air trial unde r the Fifth and Four

teenth Amendments. Po lk , 503 F.3d at 913. The Polk Court

no te d th at, a lth ou g h th e Neva da Sup re me Court in By

for d had not addr essed the c onstitut ional implications of its decision, the Kazalyn instruction violated fede ral due proce ss beca

use it relieve d the state of the burden of pr ov ing a ll e le me nts of the c ri me by pe rm itt ingthe jur

y to find willful, deliberate, an dpreme ditated murder so long a s it f o un d p r e me d it ati o n. Id . a t 91 0. Th e Court

sp e c if ic a lly qu o te d la n g u a g e in Byfo rd

stating that it was clea

r fr om theB A BB V

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statute that all thre e el ements had to be proved be y ond a
rea sonable doubt. I

d. This Court thus concluded that by relievingthe State of the bur den of pr oving e ach e lement b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b le d o u b t, the Kazalyn instruction violated
es t ab l i s h edfe d er al l aw , i n cl u d i n g In reW ins hip , 3 97 U. S. 358, 364 (1970), Fran c is v. Fr an k lin , 471 U.S. 307 (1985) and Sandstrom v. Montana , 442 U.S. 510 (1979). Id. at 911.
Sub se qu e ntl y , ho we ve r, the Ne va da Sup re me Court he ld in Nik a v . S tate , 198 P.3d 839, 849 (Nev. 2008), that the Byford de c isi on

wa s n ot a

c lari fi c atio n o f the mur de r s tatut e – that is, Byford had n o t rig hted prior de cisions’ incorr ect interpre tations of Nevada’ s murder statute. Rather, the Nika court e x plained, Byford had announce d a new in terpre tation of the murder statute, which chang ed the law. Id . The Nika court de clar ed that any

langu age in Byford and Garner su gg e sti ngthat Byford w a s a c la r if ic ati o n r a th e r th an a

new rule wa s dicta. Id . at 849–50. Acc ordingto Nika , this Court in Polk was wr ong in concludingthat the Kazalyn instruction
wa s a viol ation of due pr ocess be cause the instruction
acc urate ly

repr esente d the elements of first degree murder up
un til Byford was decided. Thus, before Byford was de cided, the Kazalyn ins tr

uc tio n d id n ot i mpr op e rl y re lie ve the State of the burde n of provingall the eleme nts of first deg ree murder. Id . at 850.
The Nika court a lso determin ed, however, that its prior decision in Ga rn e r wrong ly held that the fe dera l Consti tution did not require a

pplication of t he new rule to convic tions that
wer e not y et final at the time Byford was de cided. The Nika d e c i s i o ne x p l a i n e d th atb e c a u s e th e c h an g e e f

f e c t e d b y By for d
na rro wed the sc op e of

the c ri min a l st atut e , it

sh ou ld, a s a matter of due proce ss, apply to any one whose conviction wasB A BB V

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not final at the time Byford was de cided. Id

. (c i t i n g Bunkley v. Florida , 538 U.S. 835, 841–42 (2003) (pe r cur iam)).
II. Babb ’s claim for hab eas re lief
A. B a b b ’s claim that the Kazalyn i nst r uc ti on i s uncons titutional b ecause it om its an e lem ent of prem editated m urder.
The district cour

t held that beca

use the Kazalyn instruction failed to provide a defin i tion of deliberation that was indepe ndent of pre meditation, the instru ct i o n was unconstitutional. The district court thus conc luded that it was bound by this Court’s holdi ng in Polk, despite the Ne vada Supreme Court’s subs eq u ent hol ding in Nika tha t By for d repr esente d a chang e in, r ather than a clar ification of, the la w. On appeal, t he S tate argues t hat after the Nika decision, Po lk does not control the outcome of this ca se. We ag ree with the State.
The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Nika made c lear that under pr e- By

for d law, pre meditat i o n , deliberation and wi lf uln e ss w e re no t dis tin c t and ind e pe nd e nt e le me nts of

fi rs t de g re e mur de r, and

tha t By for d ’s de c isi on

re qu ir ingse pa

ra te definitions for these ter m s represente d a cha ng e in, rather than a clarifica

tion of, the law. The re is an importa nt distinction between de cisions that clarify the law and d e c i s i o n s th a t c h an g e th e l aw
. A c l ar i f i c at i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y a “cor rec tion” that provides the pr oper inter pretat i on of a statute, wh er ea s a cha

ng e in the law is a

new c ourt-cr eate d rule. Fi or e v . W

hite , 531 U.S. 225, 228 (2001). Fe dera l due proce ss require s that a state vacate a conviction, even a final conviction t hat has be en af firmed on a

ppeal, whe re a clar ification reve als that a defe ndant was convicted “forB A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 19

c on du c t th a t [th e state ’s ] cr imi na l st atut e, as p ro pe rl y interpre ted, does not prohibit.” Id

. There was l an gu age in Byford sug g esting that the decision re prese nted a c larifica tion of the law. The By

fo rd
cou rt state d, fo r i ns tanc e , th at “ [i]t is c le ar f ro m th e statut e that all thr e e e le me nts , willfulness, d el iberation, and preme ditation, must be prove n beyond a re as o n ab le doubt befor e an a ccuse d can be convicted of first deg ree murder.” 994 P.2d at 713–14 (internal q u o t ation marks and c itation omitted ). T h ere are also portions of By for d , howeve r, that indicate that the te rm s preme ditated and de liberate wer e not distinct elements. Id . (noting that “deliber ate” and “pre medi tated” w ere previously both included in jury instructions without being individually defi n ed and c iting Gree ne , 931 P.2d at 61, which said “the terms pre meditated, de lib e rate and wi llf

ul we re a sin g le phra se , me ani ng simply that the a c tor

int e nd e d to c omm it the a c t and int e nd e d d e a th
as a r esult of the ac t”). Nika m a d e c l e ar th a t Byfo rd
re pr e se nte d a

c ha ng e in t he law, and

that any langua g e in Byford sug g esting it was a c larifica tion was dicta . 198 P.3d at 850. Whether a pa

rticular de cision repr esents a c hang e in, or clarification of, the lawis a matter of state law. See Fi or e , 531 U.S. at 228 (noting uncer tainty reg ardingwhether decision re prese n t ed clar ification or c hang e in law a nd
c e rt if ying qu e sti on to Penns ylva nia Sup re me Court ); se e als o Bunkley , 538 U.S at 842 (noting state cour t decision
re pr e se nte d c ha

ng e in s tate law and c e rt if yingqu e sti on

to Florida Supreme Court re g ardingwhen c hang e occ urre d).
The Nika de c isi on

e xpla ini ngthat Byford repr es ented a chang e in, rather than a clarification of, lawundermines the basis of this Court’s hol d i n g in Po lk with reg ard to the constit utionality

of the Kazalyn instruction. Polk wasB A BB V

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C ha m ber s v. M cD an i el , 54 9 F. 3d 11 91 ( 9t h Ci r
. 200 8), wh i ch hel d t hat 4 t he Kaz al

yn i nst ru ct i o n was unconst i t ut i o nal , ci t i ng P o lk , was deci ded bef ore N i ka , an d s o i s al s o not cont r ol l i ng he r e. pr e mis e d on the un de rs tand ing that the Ne va da mur de r s tatut e mandated s ep ar ate de finitions of deliberation and preme ditation. 5 0 3 F. 3d at 910 (c iting portion of Nika stat in g, “[i]t is c le ar f

ro m th e statut e tha

t all thr e e e le me nts , willfulness, deliberation, and preme ditation, must be prove n beyond a re asonable doubt before an ac cused can be convicted of

first d egre e murde r”) . “[W ]here the r easoning
or the or y of our p ri or c ir c uit a uth or ity is c le arl y

ir re c on c ila ble
w i th th e r e a s o n i n g o r th e o r y o f i n t e r v e n i n g h i g h e r

a u th o r i ty, a three -judg e panel should c onsider itself bound by the l ater and c on tr oll inga

uth or ity , a

nd sh ou ld r e je c t th e pr ior

c ir c uit opinion as havingbeen e ffe ctiv el y o v err uled.” Miller v. Ga mm ie , 3 3 5 F

. 3 d

8 8 9 , 8 9 3 ( 9 th

Ci r
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( e nb anc). B e c a us e the Ne va da Supr e me Court , w hic h is the ult imate authority in interpretingand dec iding que s t ions of Neva da state law, e x plained in Nika that Byford was a chang e in, rathe r than a clar ification of, the la w conc erningpreme ditated murder, Po lk ’s ho ldi ngha s b e e n d isapprove d ( e ff e c tiv e ly
o v e r r u l e d b y Nika ) and the ref

ore doe s not gove rn the outcome of this ca se. Cf. Un ite d S tates v . F

lor e s- Me ja , 4 68 7 F .3 d 1 21 3, 12 15 (9 th Cir . 201 2) (c on c lud ingthat be c a us e Ca lif or nia Sup re me Court

de c isi on did no t chang e e le me nts of robbe ry , Ninth Circuit prece dent still gover ned).

B a bb argue s th at Po lk ’s ho ldi ngsurv ive s Nika and that by faili n g t o provide a

n independe nt definition of deliberation, the Ka zalyn i nstruction violated her due proc ess rig hts even if Byford was a

chang e in the l aw. W e disag ree . TheB A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 21

B y way o f

ex am p l e, f

ed era l l aw , l i ke t he N ev ad a m urd er statut e, also 5 def i nes f i r s t degr ee murder as an y ki l l i ng t hat i s “ wi l l f ul , del i berat e, m al i ci o us and p re m e d i t at ed

. ” 1 8 U

. S.C

. § 1 1 1 1

. M o d el f ed eral jur y i ns t r uct i ons , l i ke t he Kaz al yn i n s t r u ct i on , c on f

l at e t h e def

i n i t i on s of p re m e d itatio n a n d d e lib e ra tio n , statin g “P re m e d itatio n m e a n s w ith pl ann i ng or del i bera t i on. ” K evi n F. O ’ M al l ey , et

. al

. , Feder al Ju r y P r ac. a n d In str. § 4 5 .0 3 (6 th e d .); a cc o rd N i nt h C i r. M o d el C ri m ina l Jury Kazalyn instructi o n did not treat deliber ation and pr e me dit a tion a s d ist inc t e le me nts of the me ns re a

fo r f ir st deg ree murder r equiringindepende nt definitions because , as Nika explained, they

wer e not sepa

rate elements unde r Nev a da law unti l By

for d

. A lt h o u g h th e Su

p r e me Co urt ha s he ld t hat jury ins tr uc tio ns omi tti ngan e le me nt o f the c ri me unconstitutionally

diminis h the state’s bur den, see, e. g. , Un ite d Sta tes v . G au din , 515 U.S. 506, 509–10, 522–23 (1 99 5) ; Neder v. U

nited States , 5 2 7 U.S. 11–13 (1999), whether a ter m in a statute constitutes a distinct elemen t of the c ri me wi th an ind e pe nd e nt de fi nit ion is a qu e sti on of state law. See Sc had v. Arizona , 5 0 1 U

. S

. 6 2 4 , 6 3 6 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ( “ In case s, like this one, involving state crimi nal statutes . . . we
are no t f re e to s ub sti tut e our o wn int e rp re tat ion

of state statutes for those of a State’s courts. I f a State’ s courts have deter mined that cer

tain statutory

alternatives are mere means of committing a

single offe nse, rather than inde pendent el em ents of the c rime, we simply are not at liberty

to ignor e that de te rm inatio n a

nd c on c lud e tha

t th e a lte rn a tiv e s ar e , in fac t, independent e lements under state law.” ); see a lso Ev an c hyk v. Ste war t , 340 F.3d 933, 936 ( 9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the Arizona Supreme C o u r t r esponded to c ertified question that intent to kil l i s an essential ele ment of the offe nse of conspirac y to c ommit first deg ree murder)

. There is no constitutionally mandated definition of pre meditation or de lib e ratio n, and

wh e the r t

he se are ind e pe nd e nt e le me nts with disti nct meaning s is a question of state law

. 5B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY

22

In stru c tio n s 8 .1 0 7 (M u rd e r– F irst D e g re e ); see a lso Uni t ed St at es v. A go f s ky , 5 1 6 F .3 d 2 8 0 , 2 8 2 n. 2 (5 th C ir

. 2 0 0 8 ) (“ a killing is

‘ p rem ed i t at ed ’ when i t i s t he res ul t of p l anni ng or d el i b erat i o n”).

T h e di s t r i ct c ou r t a l s o c i t ed N i ka ’ s hol di ng t hat t he Byf or d i n s t r u ct i on 6 f o r prem e d itat ed m urder shoul d be ap p l i ed t o cases who se app eal s were not f i nal at t he t i me Byf

or d w as d ec i d ed . 1 9 8 P .3d at 8 5 0

. U nless N i ka ’s ho l d i ng was prem i sed o n cl earl y est ab l i shed f ed eral l aw, i t wo ul d no t f o rm a b a s i s f o r h a b e a s r e l i e f

u n d e r A EDPA
. See Br adl ey v

. D uncan , 315 F. 3d 1 0 9 1 , 1 1 0 0 (9 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) (no t i ng t ha t i t i s a f ed era l d u e p ro ce ss Polk did not hold, and could not have he l d , t h at wher e a statut e inc lud e s b oth

pr e me dit ation and de lib e ratio n in its de fi nit ion of the me ns re a

fo r firs t de g re e mur de r, it i s a violation of due proce ss if the jury instruction fails to provide independe nt definitions for eac h of those terms. Afte r Nika , Ba bb’s claim that the Kazalyn instruction violated h erdue proce ss rig hts beca

use i t did not provide a distinct definition fo r d e lib e ratio n mu st f

a il.
B. Babb ’s c lai m th at th e c hang e in By fo rd sho uld be appl ie d t o he r be c aus e it n arrowe d t he defi nition o f p rem editated m urder before Babb ’s c onv ic ti on be c am e final
. The district cour

t al s o deter

mined that, beca

use the
c h an g e in th e la

w an n o un c e d in B

yfor d occur

red be fore Ba bb’s conviction bec ame f inal, it was a violation of her due proce ss rig hts not to apply the new instruc tion (which
narr owed the sc ope of c onduct that could be de fi n ed as preme ditated murder) to he r case
. We ag ree with the district
c ourt

. The district c ourt cited Fiore and Bunkley as the ba ses for its decision. In Fi or e , the Supreme Court invalidate d a

6B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 23

vi ol at i o n, “ not t he s t at e l aw e r r or, ” t hat t r i gg er s ha beas r el i ef )

. T he f act t hat t he N evad a Sup rem e C o urt h e ld i n Ni ka t hat t he B yfo rd i n s t r u ct i on shoul d be ap p l i ed t o cases s uch as B ab b ’ s i nvo l vi ng co nvi ct i o ns t hat were not f i nal at t he t i me Byf

or d w a s d e c i d e d , i s n o t d i s p o s i t i v e u n d e r A EDPA becau s e N eva da l aw i s not cl ear l y es t abl i s hed f eder al l aw

. See E s t el l e v

. M cG u i re , 50 2 U

. S. 62 , 67 (19 9 1 ) ( ci t i ng L ew i s v. Jeff ers , 497 U

. S. 764 (1 9 9 0 ) (“ [F ]e d e ra l h a b e a s c o rp u s re lief d o e s n o t l ie fo r e rr o rs o f state la w .” ))

. conviction base d on a cla rification of s t ate law. 531 U.S. at 227. The pe titioner in Fiore had bee n convic t ed under a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited ope ratinga hazar d ous waste f acility without a permit. Id

. Al though F iore in fa ct had a pe rmit, he deviate d so far from the pe rmit’s terms that h e was found to have violated the statute. Id

. a t 226–27. Af te r h is c onvic tio n be c ame fi na l, t he Pe nn sylva

nia Sup re me Court hel d th a t on e wh o d e viate s f ro m hi s p e rm it’ s te rm s do e s n ot l a c k a

pe rm it a nd c ou ld no t be fo un d to be in violation o f t h e st atute. Id . at 227. Subsequently , Fiore petitioned for f

eder al habe as cor

pus relief

. The Supreme Court gr an t ed certiorar i, in part, to decide when or whether the fede ral Due Process Clause r equire s the
re tr oa c tiv e a

pp lic atio n o f a

ne w i nte rp re tati on of

a state criminal statute. Id. In o rd er to de termine if that que stion was in fa ct pre sented, the Supreme Court ce rtified a que stion to t he Pe nn sylva

nia Sup re me Court , a sk ingwh ethe r i ts decision that someone w ith a permit cou ld not violate the statute prohibiting operating a machine without a permit was
a new interpre tation (i.e. a c hange i n t he law) or a c lari fi c a tio n ( i.e . a

c or re c t st ate men t of the l aw at th e tim e Fiore’s convic tion became final). Id. T h e P e n n s ylvania Sup r e me Co urt r e s p o n d e d th at t h e inte r p r e tati o n“ d id

not ann ounc e a

ne w r ule of law ” but r athe r “ c lari fi e d th e pla in languag e of the statute

. . . furnish[ing] the proper statementB A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY

24
of law at the date Fi o re ’s conviction bec ame f inal.” Id . at 228. The Supreme Court held t hat, given that P ennsylvania’s
ne w ru lin g wa s no t ne w law, the qu e sti on was “si mply whether Pennsylvania can, consistently with the fede ral Due Process Clause, c onvict Fi o re for conduc t that its criminal statute, as prope rly

interpre t ed , d o es not prohibit.” Id. The Sup reme Court held that Fiore ’s conviction and c ontinued incar cer ation violated due pr ocess, c iting the rule that the State mus t pro ve the e le me nts of a c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt. Id

. (c i t i n g J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S

. 3 0 7 , 316 (1979), a nd In reW

ins hip , 397 U.S. at 364).
Be caus e ther e had be en a c larifica tion in the law, the Supreme Court i n Fiore did not de cide whe ther or unde r what c ir c ums tanc e s a

c ha ng e in state l aw s ho uld

be a pp lie d to inv a lid a te a

pr ior c onvic tio n. The Sup re me Court did subsequently addre ss this iss ue, howe ver, in Bunkley . A s in Fi or e , the Supreme Court in Bunkley co n s i d ered the impact of a c hang e in the interpr etation of a state statute on a conviction. 538 U.S. at 838. The pe titioner in Bunkley had been convicted of burg lary in the first deg ree
. Bu n kley
re ce i v eda l i fe s en t en ce b ec au s e h e w a s ca rryi n g a pocketknife with a 2.5 to 3-inch blade at t h e time of the crime, which the jury conclude d was a deadly wea pon. Id . at 836–37. Although the statute created a n exception for the “common pocketknife ,” the term was undefine d. Id. at 837. I f t he po c ke tkn if

e e xce pti on

ha d a pp lie d, B unkle y c ou ld o nly have be en convic ted of burg lary in the third deg ree , which had a maxi mum sentenc e of f ive y ear s. Id. After

Bunkle y ’s con v i cti on beca

me final, the F lorida Supreme Court de te rm ine d th a t a kn if

e wi th a bla de of

3. 75 inc he s p la inl y

fe ll within the exception. Id. Bunkle y soug ht state habe as re lief, but the Florida Supreme Court declined, statingthat its rulingB A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 25

T he Sup rem e C o urt h a s a ls o hel d t hat due pro cess requi res t he 7
r et r oac t i v e appl i ca t i on of s u bs t an t i v e ch an g es i n f ede r al l aw t h at n ar r ow t he scop e o f

a cri m i nal s t at ut e, and t h a t th is even ext end s t o co nvi ct i o ns tha t a re fina l at the ti m e o f t h e c h a n g e
. B ou s l ey v. Uni t ed St at es , 523 U

. S. 6 1 4 (1 9 9 8 ). W h e the r th is p rin c ip le o f re tro a c tivity e x te n d s to c h a n g e s in st at e l aw i s t he q uest io n t hat was expli ci t l y l ef t op en i n bo t h F i ore and B un kl ey
. w a s an“ e v o luti o n ar

y r e f in e me n t i nth e law,” id. at 838, which did not apply

retroa ctively

under F lorida law.
On fe dera l habea s revie w, t he S upreme Court cer tified a question to the Florida Supreme Court, a sking whether , at the time Bunkley ’s conviction b ec ame f inal in 1989, his 2.5–3 inc h p oc ke tkn if

e wa s a we a

po n un de r t

he law at th a t st a g e in its evolution. The Court understood that t h e Fl orida ruling repr esente d a ch an g e in state law , and noted the importa nce of whe n the cha

ng e occ urre d. T h e Supreme Court said that “I f B unkley ’s pocke tknife fit within the ‘common pocketknife exception [ ] i n 1989 [when his c o n v i cti on beca me final], then Bunkle

y was convic ted of a crime for which he cannot beguilty

. . . .” Id . at 841 (e mphasis added)

. T h e S u p r e m e C o urtthu s i n d i c at e d th atf a i l i n g t o a

p p l y a potentially

exoneratingchang e in t h e l aw to a conviction which was not final at the t ime of t he cha ng e would have the
same e ff e ct as fai lin g to a

pp ly a c lari fi c atio n o f t

he law; it would permit the state to convic t some one without proving the e le me nts of

the c ri me in v iol atio n of t he Du e Pr oc e ss Clause. Id

. The ruling s in Bunkley and Fiore confirm that the Supreme Court’s holdingin G r if fi th v

. Ke n tucky , 4 79 U. S. 314 (1987) – that newly decla red constituti onal rules must be ap plied to convictions that were not y et final at the time the chang e occurs – extends to some chang es in state law. One 7B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY

26

p ri n ci p l e u n d er l yi n g Griffit h is that i t i s a violation of due proce ss to a ffirm a conviction “whe n the new r uling wa s that a trial c ourt lacke d authority to c onvict a cr iminal defenda nt i nth e f i rs t p l a c e
. ” 4 7 9 U. S

. at3 2 4 (c i t i n g United States v. Johnson , 4 57 U. S. 5 37 , 550 (1 98 2) ). Th is p ri nc ipl e wo uld
ne c e ssa ri ly a pp ly to a c ha ng e in t he de fi nit ion

of the e le me nts of m ens rea for first deg ree murder. “New e lements alter the
ra ng e of co nd

uc t th e statut e punis he s, re nd e ri ngso me former ly unlawful conduct lawful or vic e ver sa.” Schriro v. Su mm e rli n , 542 U.S. 348, 354 (2004).
Whil e Griffit h a lon e wo uld no t be su ff

ic ie nt t o inva lid a te Ba b b ’s co n v i ct i o nb ec au s e t h e c h an ge ati s s u e w as a c h an ge in s tate la w, see Mu rti

sh aw v . W

oo dfo rd , 255 F.3d 926, 955–56 (9th Cir. 20 0 1 ), Bunkley c on fi rm e d th a t it

is a vio latio n o f due pr oc e ss n ot t o a pp ly c ha ng e s in state law t o a petit io n e r ’ s c o n v ic ti o n th at w a s n o t f in a l a t th e ti me the chang e occ urre d. 538 U.S. at 841 (“I f B unkley ’s pocke tknife fi t w ith in t

he ‘c omm on

po c ke tkn if

e ’ e xce pti on

[be fo re his conviction bec ame f

inal], t hen B unkley wa s co nvicted of a crime f or which he cannot be g uilty .”).
The State argue s th at Bunkley is me r e ly p e r s u a sive authority , beca

use the Supreme Court in that case did not
a c tua lly ho ld that du e pr oc e ss r e qu ir e s th a t c ha ng e s in state law be a pp lie d to c onvic tio ns that are no t y e t f ina l, b ut o nly
ce rt i fi eda qu es t i o nt o th e Fl o ri d a S u p re m e C o urt

. Al th o u gh the Sup re me Court

sto pp e d s ho rt of hold ingthat c ha ng e s in state law m

us t be a pp lie d to c onvic tio ns that are no t y e t f ina l, Bunkley c on fi rm e d th at f

a ilingto a pp ly su c h c ha ng e s w ou ld have the same e ffe ct as failingto give retroa ctive application to a clar ification; it would permit the state to convic t ind ivi du a ls who are no t guil ty of a c ri me un de r t

he a pp lic a ble law. Thus, afte r the Supreme Court’s decision in Bunkley , itB A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 27

was anun r e a s o n a

b le a p p li c ati o no f

e s ta b li s h e d f e d e r a l l aw and a violation of B abb’s due proce s s ri gh ts for the Ne vada court not to apply

the cha ng e in By for d , which nar

rowe d the cate g ory conduct that c an be considere d criminal, to her c ase. Whil e it does not constitute an express holding , Bunkley made
c le ar t hat Gr iff ith ’s ho ldi ng , r e qu ir ingne w r ule s to a pp ly to c onvic tio ns that are no t y e t f ina l, e xten ds to c ha

ng e s in state law that nar

row the c ateg ory

of co n d u ct t hat ca

n be considere d cri minal. See W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000) ( noting that “a st ate- court decision also involves
an unr e a so na

ble a pp lic atio n o f [the Sup re me Court ’s ] prec edent if the state cour t

. . . unrea sonably

ref uses to extend that principle to a ne w context where it should apply ”). By for d , w hich nar

ro we d th e sc op e of

c on du c t th a t c ou ld qualify as first degree murder by expanding and sepa

rating de fi nit ion s o f p re me dit atio n, de lib e ratio n a nd wi llfu lnes s, should be applied to B abb’s c onviction, which was not final at the time Byford was de cided.
III. Harm less Error Although the Neva da state court unrea sonably applied
e sta bli sh e d f e de ra l la w whe n it fa ile d to a

pp ly the c ha ng e in Byford to B abb, “a

court must assess the pr ejudicial impact of constitut i o n al err or in a state c ourt criminal trial.” Fry v. Pliler , 551 U.S. 112, 121 (2007). We must ask whether ther e is a rea sonable pro b ab i l ity the er ror “ ‘had substantial a

nd injurious effe ct or influenc e in d etermining the jury ’s verdic t.’” Brecht v . Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (q u o t i n g Kotteak

o s v. United States , 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1 94 6) ). “ [W]he re the re c ord is so e ve nly ba lanc e d th a t a c on sc ie nti ou s jud g e is i n g ra ve do ub t a s to the ha

rm le ssn e ss o f an error,” the petitioner must win. O’Neal v. M cAninch , 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995).B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY

28

B abb a r g u es t h at t h e g ov er n men t wai v ed t h e h ar ml es s er r or def en s e by 8 f ai l i ng t o rai se i t be f

o re t he d i st ri ct co urt

. B ecause t h e d i st ri ct co urt
a d d res sed t he i ss ue, how ever, and be cause t he p art i es t ho roughly
a d d re sse d it i n t h e ir b rie fs b e fo re this C o u rt, w e c o n sid e r it. Sel am v. W a rm S p rin g s T rib a l C o rr. F a c ili ty , 1 3 4 F

. 3 d 9 4 8 , 9 5 2 ( 9 t h Ci r
. 1 9 98) (ci t i ng Wi l l a rd v. C a l i

f o rn ia , 81 2 F.2d 46 1 , 46 5 (9t h C i r. 19 8 7 ), and ad d res si ng an i ss ue no t rai sed b y p art i es b ecause i t was add res sed b y t he d istric t co u rt); see a lso Lot tv. M uel l er , 304 F. 3d 918, 925 ( 9t h Ci r
. 2002) (noti ng t hat co urt s m ay ad d res s i ss ues no t rai sed b ef o re t he d i st ri ct co urt
w here “t he i ss ue p res ent ed i s p urel y o ne o f l aw and t he o p p o si n g p a rty wi l l s uf f er no p rejudi ce as a r esul t of t he f ai l ure t o rai se th e iss u e in t he t ri al co urt ”). T h e d is tr ic t c o urt i nth is c a s e c o n c lu d e d th a t t h e g e n e r al verdic t preve nted it from deter mining whe ther the e rrone ous Kazalyn instruction had influenc ed the jury in Ba bb’s ca se, and said that it harbor ed “g rave doubts” conc erningthe harmlessne ss of the er

ror. The State c laims that rather than 8 apply the Br e c ht standard to assess the ef fec t and influenc e of the er roneous instruction, the district c ourt essentially treated the e rr or he re a s a str

uc tur a l e rr or , thu s vio latin g the Sup re me Court’s rec ent holding in Hedgpe th v. Pulido , 555 U.S. 57 (2008), that instructional err ors occ urringin the context of a g ener al ver dict must sti ll be revie wed f or har mless error

. Instructional errors are ge nera lly subject t o harmless e rror revie w. Neder , 5 27 U. S. at 7; Calif ornia v. Roy , 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996) ( per c uriam); Po pev . I lli no is , 481 U.S. 497, 501 (1 98 7) . G e ne ra l ve rd ic ts, ho we ve r, wh ic h p erm it a jur y to convict base d on differ ent possib l e theor ies – without specify ing the theory

that forms the basis of the ve rdict – ca n complicate this ana ly sis. “A conviction ba sed on a g ener al verdic t is subject to challeng e if the jury was i n structed on
a lte rn a tiv e the or ie s o f guil t and may have re lie d on an inva lid one.” He dg

pe th , 5 5 5 U. S

. at5 8 (c i t i n g Stro mberg v

.B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 29

Cal ifo rn ia , 283 U.S. 359 (1931) and Y a t es v. U nited States , 354 U.S. 298 (1 9 5 7)). Eve n in the context of a g ener al verdic t, however , instructional err ors must sti ll be subjected to harmless er

ror r eview. Id

. In He dg pe th , the Supreme Court re verse d a dec ision by this Court t hat a c onviction based on a gene ral ve rdict constituted structural e rror
. 555 U.S. at 62. The instructions incl ud e d a

n unc on sti tut ion a l e rr or

tha t pe rm itt e d th e jur

y to c onvic t ba se d o n a

n inva lid the or y of g uil t. T his Court

he ld that beca use it could not be “a

bsolutely cer

tain” that the jury had re lied on a valid g round, such convictions wer e exempted
as a wh o le from ha

rmless err or re view. Id . (quoting Pulido v. Chrones , 4 87 F .3 d 6 69 , 6 76 (9 th C ir . 2 00 7) ). Th e Sup re me Court expl ained that f

ollowing its decision in Chapman v. Cal ifo rn ia , 386 US. 18 (1967), constitut ional err ors, such a s instructional err ors occ urringin the cont ex t of a g ener al verdic t, should not be tre ated a s structural e rror s. The Court explained that substantial and injurious eff ects should not be presumed simply

beca use a g ener al ver dict form had be en used, an d rema

nded the c ase f

or har mless error

revie w. 555 U.S. at 62. The Supreme Court in He dg pe th provided no guidance reg ardinghow to assess the impact of a n err oneous i n s tr u c t i o n i n t h e c o n t e x to f

a g e n e r a l v e r d i c t

. G e n e r a l l y, howeve r, whe n consideringwhether err oneous instructions
c on sti tut e ha

rm le ss e rr or , c ourt s a sk wh e the r i t is re a so na bly probable that the jury

would still have convicted the petitione r on t he prope r instructions. Be lm on te s v . B ro wn , 4 1 4 F. 3 d 1 0 9 4 , 1 1 3 9 (9 thC i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( co n s tru i n g Brecht to require “a r easona

ble proba bility ” that the jury

would have
rea ched a differ ent ver dict), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Aye rs v. Belmonte

s , 549 U.S. 7 (2006).B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY

30

T h er e i s , of

c ou r s e, n o w ay t o be a bs ol u t el y ce r t ai n w h at l ea ds a j u r or 9 t o a p art i cul ar d eci si o n. A s t he Sup rem e C o urt em p hasi zed i n H e d g p e th , “ abs ol ut e cer t ai nt y ” i s not t he s t andar d f or a cour t cons i deri ng wh et her an He re , howeve r, we ne e d n ot i nq uir e int o th e pr ob a

bil ity that the jury , if g iven the prope r instruction on pr emeditated murder, w ould have c onvicted B abb on tha t th e or y , b e c a us e althoug h the trial court ga ve an e rrone ous instruction on pr e me dit a tio n, we c an d is cern wi th r e a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity that the jury instead convicted Ba bb on a valid fe lony

murder theory . In order to c onvict Ba bb based on the felony

murder theory , t h e jury

only had to find that she wa s g uilty of robber y , and that Castro was killed duringthe per petration of the robber

y
. The jury found Ba

bb g uilty of robbe ry , and the fa c ts in th is c a se le ave no do ub t th at Ca str o w a s k ill e d in perpe tration of the r obbery . I n ad d i tion, during c losing argument, the prosec utor focuse d almost ex clus ively on the fe lon y mur d e r

th e o r y w i thr e g ar d

t o B a b b

. Inl i g h to f

this
o v e r w h e l m i n g e v i d e n c e s u

p p o rt i n g th e f

e l o n y mur d e r

th e o r y, we c an be r easona

bly cer tain that n o j uror c onvicted B abb ba se d o n p re me dit atio n b e c a us e the jur

y wa s sp e c if

ic a lly instructed to only

consider pr emeditat ed m urder if felony murder did not apply

. See, e .g. , United States v. Ha s t ings , 134 F.3d 235, 242 ( 4th Cir. 1998) (if t h e evidenc e that the jury “nec essar ily

cre dited in order to co n vict the def endant
un de r t he ins tr uc tio ns g ive n .
. . is su c h th a t th e jur y mus t have c onvicted the defe ndant on the leg ally adequate g round . . . instead of th e l egally

inadequate g round, the c onviction may be af firmed” ). Unde r these ci rcumstances, despite the g ener al ver dict, the er roneous instructions constituted harmless e rror , and the district court err ed in conc luding otherwise. 9B A BB V

. L O ZOWSKY 31

e rr o r w a s h a rm le ss, a n d e m p lo ying su c h a sta n d a rd is t a n ta m o u n t t o d e te rm inin g tha t a ll ins tru c tio n a l er ro rs o c c u rr ing in the c o n te x t o f a g en er al v er di ct a r e s t r u ct u r al e r r or s
. 555 U. S. a t 62. We emphasize that the issue is not simply whether we c an b e r e a s o n a

b l y c e rt a i nth atth e j ur

y could have convicted B abb based on the valid theory of fel o n y m u rder

. See Kotteak

os , 328 U.S. at 765 ( “The inquiry cannot be mere ly

whether there
was e noug h to support th e re sult.”). The Supre me Court’s point in He dg

pe th , that a combination of g o o d an dbad instructions should not be c onsidered mor e per nicious than a single improper i n s t ruction, 555 U.S. at 61, is well taken. When r eviewing convictions, howeve r, this Court i s limit ed in i t s a b i l i ty t o d e c i p h e r

a v e r d i c t , an d

c an n o ts i mpl y substitut e its judg ment for that of the fac t f ind er
. Gene ral verdic t forms ca

n further

blur an a l ready

opaque decisionmakingproce ss, leaving u s wi th the sort of g rave doubt tha t p reve nts us from concludingan er ror wa s harmless. O’Neal , 513 U.S. at 437. Her e, howe ver, w e ca n be reasonably

cer tain, based on the particula r circ umstances an d i n s t ru c t i o n s i nth i s c a s e , th atth e j ur y did convict B abb b ased on the valid felony murder the ory

and that the preme ditation inst ruction did not have a substantial impact on the jury ’s dec ision.
Bab b ra i s ed other

claims in her pe tition which were not a dd re sse d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

. We t

hu s r e mand

the c a se to g ive the dis tr ic t c ourt

the op po rt

un ity to co ns ide r t

he se c la ims

. REVERSED an d REMANDED.