UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

In re Vincent L. WILLIAMS ) Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-11

 Petitioner )

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) ORDER

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) Panel 1

Petitioner seeks extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of error coram 

nobis. He asks us to set aside the punitive discharge from his 2007 court-martial under the theories that his confrontation rights were violated and he did 

not receive the benefit of his pretrial agreement. Petitioner has raised variations of these same claims both on direct appeal and through habeas corpus 

petitions.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2007, Petitioner was convicted by a general court-martial, consistent 

with his pleas and pursuant to a pretrial agreement, of carnal knowledge and 

indecent acts with his stepdaughter in violation of Articles 120 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 934.1 Petitioner had 

been charged with raping his stepdaughter, but the Government—under the 

terms of the pretrial agreement—did not proceed on that greater charge, leaving Petitioner convicted of the lesser included offense of carnal knowledge. He 

was sentenced by a panel of members to a dishonorable discharge, 18 years 

and 4 months of confinement, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1. In accordance with the pretrial agreement, the convening authority reduced Petitioner’s confinement to 15 years, but otherwise 

approved the adjudged sentence.

Among other provisions in the pretrial agreement, Petitioner agreed to enter into a stipulation of expected testimony with respect to the victim, his stepdaughter. In general, the stipulation described severe and repeated abuse she 

1 See generally United States v. Williams, No. ACM 36996, 2009 CCA LEXIS 256 (A.F. 

Ct. Crim. App. 15 Jul. 2009) (unpub. op.) (discussing Petitioner’s charges and his courtmartial).
In re Williams, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-11

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suffered at Petitioner’s hands and highlighted her initial attempts to resist Petitioner’s advances. During sentencing, trial counsel argued the nonconsensual 

aspect of Petitioner’s offenses, while trial defense counsel told the members 

that Petitioner had not been convicted of raping his stepdaughter and should 

not be sentenced as if he had.2

In his direct appeal of his case, Petitioner argued, inter alia, that trial counsel’s argument amounted to plain error because the pretrial agreement prohibited the Government from proceeding on the rape charge. We rejected this 

claim as being without merit. United States v. Williams, No. ACM 36996, 2009 

CCA LEXIS 256, at *28–29 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 15 Jul. 2009) (unpub. op.). The 

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) subsequently 

denied review. United States v. Williams, 69 M.J. 190 (C.A.A.F. 2010). Petitioner’s dishonorable discharge was then ordered to be executed on 19 July 

2010, rendering his case final under Article 76, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 876. See

United States v. Williams, Misc. Dkt. No. 2011-05, 2011 CCA LEXIS 893, at *3

(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 26 Oct. 2011) (order).

In 2011, we responded to a petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of 

a writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner raised various issues with respect 

to the stipulation and the Government’s use of it during presentencing proceedings. Id. at *1. Concluding Petitioner had presented “nothing more than a 

rehash of claims [he had] already raised unsuccessfully on direct judicial review,” we denied relief. Id. at *4–5. In 2015, Petitioner sought a second writ of 

habeas corpus, which we denied for lack of jurisdiction. Williams v. United 

States, Misc. Dkt. No. 2015-01, 2016 CCA LEXIS 216, at *2–3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. 

App. 4 Apr. 2016) (unpub. op.).

Petitioner now returns to this court seeking extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis. He asserts the stipulation of expected testimony never should have been admitted at his court-martial, under the theory 

it violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment.3 Relatedly, 

Petitioner asserts he did not receive the benefit of his pretrial agreement inasmuch as trial counsel argued the victim did not consent to Petitioner’s acts,

despite the fact the Government was not going forward with the greater offense 

of rape.

2 Under the versions of Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920, in effect at the time of 

Petitioner’s offenses, rape required proof of both force and lack of consent. Carnal 

knowledge, however, involved sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 16, 

irrespective of consent.

3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In re Williams, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-11

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II. LAW

The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), grants this court authority to issue 

extraordinary writs. Loving v. United States, 62 M.J. 235, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2005) 

(citing Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534 (1999)). As explained by the 

United States Supreme Court, “[t]he writ of coram nobis is an ancient commonlaw remedy designed ‘to correct errors of fact.’” United States v. Denedo, 556 

U.S. 904, 910 (2009) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507 

(1954)). Appellate military courts have jurisdiction over petitions for coram 

nobis relief “to consider allegations that an earlier judgment of conviction was 

flawed in a fundamental respect.” Id. at 917. The writ of error coram nobis is 

an extraordinary writ and an extraordinary remedy. Id. (citation omitted). As 

the Supreme Court has explained: “Continuation of litigation after final judgment and exhaustion or waiver of any statutory right of review should be allowed through this extraordinary remedy only under circumstances compelling 

such action to achieve justice.” Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511.4

In order to be entitled to a writ of error coram nobis, the CAAF has held 

that a petitioner must meet the following threshold requirements:

(1) the alleged error is of the most fundamental character; (2) no 

remedy other than coram nobis is available to rectify the consequences of the error; (3) valid reasons exist for not seeking relief 

earlier; (4) the new information presented in the petition could 

not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to the original judgment; (5) the writ does not seek 

to reevaluate previously considered evidence or legal issues; and 

(6) the sentence has been served, but the consequences of the 

erroneous conviction persist.

4 One initial question is whether we have coram nobis jurisdiction at all over a case 

which is final. The CAAF recently held that once a case is final under Article 76, 

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 876, that court has no jurisdiction to hear a petitioner’s plea for 

coram nobis relief. See United States v. Gray, 77 M.J. 5, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (per curiam).

This conclusion, however, is difficult to square with the United States Supreme Court’s 

holding in Denedo, 556 U.S. at 914–15, that the military appellate courts had coram 

nobis jurisdiction over the petition before the Court. As was the case in Gray, the petitioner’s case in Denedo had been final for some time before coram nobis relief was 

sought. See Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114, 136–37 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (Ryan, J., 

dissenting). At least one of our sister service Courts of Criminal Appeals has limited 

the Gray holding to the facts of that capital case in which an execution date had been 

set. See In re Trujillo, No. 9100502, 2021 CCA LEXIS 374, at *4 n.6 (N.M. Ct. Crim. 

App. 28 Jul. 2021) (per curiam) (unpub. op.). We do the same and conclude we have 

jurisdiction over the petition at issue here.
In re Williams, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-11

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Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114, 126 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citations omitted), 

aff’d and remanded, 556 U.S. 904 (2009). Only once a petitioner meets those 

threshold requirements would we consider the substantive issues being raised. 

III. DISCUSSION

At a minimum, Petitioner has failed to meet the first, third, fourth, and 

fifth Denedo requirements, articulated by the CAAF, for his alleged errors. Petitioner has repeatedly assailed the stipulation of expected testimony, yet it 

was Petitioner who explicitly agreed to enter into that stipulation in exchange 

for a 15-year limit on his potential confinement and to preclude the Government from proceeding to trial on the greater offense of rape. Petitioner was 

within his rights to waive his confrontation rights with respect to this stipulation. See, e.g., United States v. Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154, 157 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (explaining that confrontation rights may be waived in support of a sound trial 

strategy). Regardless of the question of waiver, however, this matter has been 

known to Petitioner since his court-martial, and his post-trial claims regarding 

the stipulation evince little more than him second-guessing the wisdom of 

agreeing to the stipulation in the first place.

Petitioner has presented his base contentions both during his direct appeal 

and in petitions for extraordinary relief—namely, that the stipulation of expected testimony alleged nonconsensual conduct and trial counsel made use of 

that fact during the Government’s sentencing argument. Although Petitioner’s

legal theories have shifted over the years, he has failed to show a valid reason 

for not advancing those theories earlier; that he possesses any new information; or that he is seeking evaluation of new evidence or legal issues. Moreover, he has not demonstrated how any error was fundamental in the face of 

the fact that Petitioner himself paved the way for the stipulation’s use at his 

court-martial.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude Petitioner has not carried his burden 

to demonstrate that his case warrants extraordinary relief in the form of a writ 

of error coram nobis.

Accordingly, it is by the court on this 16th day of November, 2022,
In re Williams, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-11

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ORDERED:

The Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Error Coram Nobis is DENIED. 

FOR THE COURT

CAROL K. JOYCE

Clerk of the Court