12-1963-cv

Barani v. Dep’t of Defense, et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or 

after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 

this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a 

party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary 

order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by 

counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 7

th

day of May, two thousand thirteen.

PRESENT:

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

J. CLIFFORD WALLACE,

1

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

DANIEL BARANI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 12-1963-cv

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

_____________________________________

 

1 The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
2

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Daniel Barani, pro se, New York, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Sarah Sheive Normand, Leslie A.

Ramirez-Fisher, for Preet Bharara, 

United States Attorney, United States 

Attorney’s Office for the Southern

District of New York, New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (J. Paul Oetken, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the District Court’s April 27, 2012 judgment is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-appellant Daniel Barani, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s 

dismissal of his complaint with prejudice, which alleged various violations of the United States 

Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and other federal statutes. We assume the parties’ familiarity with 

the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 

12(b)(6). See Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997). Dismissing a case 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is proper “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional 

power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). To survive a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009).

We have reviewed all of Barani’s arguments on appeal and hold each of them to be without 

merit. Substantially for the reasons stated in the District Court’s April 26, 2012 Memorandum and 

Order, we conclude that Barani’s claims were properly dismissed. 

We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, see Williams v. Citigroup, 

Inc., 659 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 2011), by implicitly denying Barani’s request for leave to amend his 

complaint, see Fielding v. Tollaksen, 510 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that “when a district 

judge enters an order disposing of a case without expressly ruling on a pending objection . . . the 

judgment entered pursuant to that order functions as a final order overruling the objection”). 

Although district courts generally should not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting the plaintiff 
3

leave to amend, granting leave to amend is not necessary when amending the complaint would be 

futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, allowing Barani to amend his 

complaint would be futile as the barriers to relief for his claims cannot be surmounted by reframing 

the complaint.

Accordingly, the April 27, 2012 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk