NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-802

JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 345593

vs.

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, John Doe, appeals from a Superior Court 

judgment affirming his final classification by the Sex Offender 

Registry Board (board) as a level two sex offender. He argues 

that the hearing examiner erred by applying factor 2 (repetitive 

and compulsive behavior), the classification decision was 

arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial 

evidence, and given his age and physical condition no public 

safety interest was served by public access to his sex offender 

registry information. Doe also claims that the hearing examiner 

abused her discretion in denying his motion to continue the 

classification hearing to a date closer to his anticipated 

release date which, in turn, led to a premature final 

classification in violation of his right to procedural due 

process. We vacate the judgment.
2

Background. We summarize the facts found by the hearing 

examiner, supplemented where necessary with undisputed facts 

from the record. On August 23, 2011, a jury convicted Doe of 

four counts of rape and abuse of a child under G. L. c. 265 

§ 23, and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child

under G. L. c. 265 § 13B. Doe was sentenced to serve two terms

of ten to fifteen years in prison, to run concurrently, followed 

by two ten-year terms of probation, to run concurrently. The 

offenses occurred over a five-year period between February 2004 

and April 2009. Doe was between forty-three and forty-eight 

years old at the time, and the victim was between five and ten 

years old. Doe was friendly with the victim's mother and often 

babysat the victim and regularly visited the family. The sexual 

misconduct included fondling of the girl's breasts and vagina 

and performing oral sex on her. When the victim disclosed the 

abuse, Doe admitted to some of the incidents, but maintained 

that the victim either acquiesced or asked him to engage in 

sexual conduct with her.

In January 2018, the board notified Doe that it was 

recommending a level three classification. Doe challenged that 

recommendation and requested a de novo hearing, pursuant to 

G. L. c. 6, § 178L, which was held on March 13, 2019. At or 

before the hearing, Doe requested a continuance to a date closer 

to his release date, which was scheduled to occur in 2023. 
3

Alternatively, he requested that the classification decision be 

made provisionally. The hearing examiner denied that request on 

the ground that Doe was scheduled to appear before the parole 

board in August 2019 and, if granted parole, Doe would have been 

released at that time.1

A final decision was issued on May 31, 2019. The hearing 

examiner concluded that Doe presented a moderate risk of 

reoffending and a moderate degree of dangerousness and ordered 

him to register as a level two sex offender. She further 

concluded that the degree of dangerousness posed to the public 

was such that public access to Doe's sex offender registry 

information was warranted.

In reaching her conclusion, the hearing examiner found six 

risk elevating factors applicable, see 803 Code Mass. Regs.

§ 1.33 (2016), including factor 2, repetitive and compulsive 

behavior; factor 3, adult offender with child victim, to which 

she accorded greater weight; factor 7, extrafamilial victim; 

factor 12, behavior while incarcerated, which was accorded 

minimal weight on the ground that the disciplinary reports Doe 

received were limited in number (seven) and severity; factor 18,

extra vulnerable victim; and factor 19, level of physical 

1 At oral argument counsel informed the panel that Doe was denied 

parole in 2019, 2020, and 2021. Doe was released in September 

2022.
4

contact. The hearing examiner also considered the following six 

risk mitigating factors, all of which she found applied: factor 

28, supervision by probation; factor 30, advanced age, Doe was 

fifty-eight at the time of the hearing; factor 31, physical 

condition, Doe's medical records from the Massachusetts 

Treatment Center (treatment center) indicated that he was 

diagnosed with hypertension, skin allergies, stomach problems,

knee and back problems, and issues with his prostate (however,

given the absence of documentation by a physician that addressed 

Doe's prognosis or limitations, the hearing examiner gave this 

factor minimal weight); factor 32, sex offender treatment, to 

which the hearing examiner accorded minimal weight on the ground 

that Doe's participation in treatment tapered off after he was 

transferred to the treatment center in April 2017 and by the 

fall of 2018, his participation vacillated between acceptable,

fair, and unacceptable; factor 33, home situation and support 

systems, Doe was not married and had no children and while he 

has three siblings, he is close to only one sister who wrote to 

the board stating that she and her husband would support Doe 

upon his release; and factor 34, stability in the community,

which was given minimal weight because Doe provided no evidence 

that he would have residential or employment stability upon his 

release. The hearing examiner also considered factor 35,

psychological or psychiatric profiles, noting that evaluations 
5

of Doe from October 2017 indicated he was at an "average" and 

"moderate" risk to reoffend, and by August 2018, those scores 

had not changed.

Doe then sought judicial review of the board's decision in 

the Superior Court and filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. The judge denied Doe's motion and, as we previously 

noted, affirmed the board's decision.

Discussion. "We review a judge's consideration of an 

agency decision de novo." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 

523391 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 89 

(2019). Our review of the board's decision is limited, and we 

will not disturb the board's classification unless "we determine 

that the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is 

arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in 

accordance with law." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800

v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 633 (2011). In 

reviewing the board's decision, we "give due weight to [its] 

experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge." 

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender 

Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 649 (2019), quoting Doe, Sex 

Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

466 Mass. 594, 602 (2013).

1. Application of factor 2. Doe argues, correctly, that 

the hearing examiner misapplied factor 2 because he did not 
6

reoffend after being confronted, discovered, charged, or 

convicted of a sexual offense. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry 

Bd. No. 22188 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 

797, 799 (2022) (Doe No. 22188). The board concedes that factor 

2 does not apply in the circumstances presented. When an 

offender successfully challenges the application of a regulatory 

factor, we must determine whether "the underlying facts of the 

case . . . clearly dictate the appropriate classification level"

(citation omitted). Id. at 804. If they do not, we then "ask 

whether the error may have affected the classification and, if 

so, [we] remand to [the board]." Id.

We conclude that, despite the error, the underlying facts 

of the case "clearly dictate" that a level two classification is 

appropriate (citation omitted). Doe No. 22188, 101 Mass. App. 

Ct. at 804. Doe sexually assaulted and raped a young girl who 

was not a member of his family "more times than [the victim]

could count" over a five-year period. In addition, Doe was not 

fully participating in sex offender treatment at the time of the 

hearing, and there was no evidence that Doe would have 

residential or employment stability upon his release. Given 

these facts, among others, that support the risk elevating 

factors applied by the hearing examiner, we are confident that 

without considering factor 2, Doe was appropriately classified 

as a level two sex offender.
7

2. Substantial evidence. Next, Doe argues that the 

decision to classify him as a level two offender is not 

supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and 

capricious. He claims that the hearing examiner employed a 

mechanical, "checklist" approach, rather than conducting a 

thorough analysis of the applicable regulatory factors. To the 

contrary, our review of the record and the detailed 

classification decision leads us to conclude that the hearing 

examiner engaged in the required qualitative and objective 

review that balanced all the relevant risk and mitigating 

factors. As noted above, the evidence fully supported the 

application of the risk factors on which the hearing examiner 

relied. The age of the victim, the relationship between Doe,

the victim, and her family, Doe's level of contact with the 

victim, Doe's conduct while incarcerated, and his minimal 

participation in sex offender treatment were established by 

clear and convincing evidence. The hearing examiner further 

noted that Doe underwent a comprehensive evaluation on October 

4, 2017, and was deemed to be "a moderate risk" to reoffend and 

that "his risk to reoffend sexually has never been deemed 'low'

at any time during his participation in sex offender treatment." 

Additionally, the hearing examiner properly gave minimal weight 

to the mitigating factor of Doe's physical condition in the 

absence of relevant documentation of his alleged limitations.
8

Further, Doe also had failed to secure housing or employment at 

the time of the final classification hearing. Consequently, the 

classification decision was not arbitrary and capricious and was 

supported by substantial evidence.

3. Public access to Doe's registration information. Doe 

also argues that his sex offender registration information 

should not be made public because the hearing examiner failed to 

make a specific finding that he posed a danger to the public

and, further that public access of his information is not 

warranted in light of his age (then fifty-eight) and current 

physical condition.

The board's decision was issued about two months prior to 

the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Doe, Sex Offender 

Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 

643 (2019) (Doe No. 496501). In that case, the Supreme Judicial 

Court held, in relevant part, that a hearing examiner must 

explicitly determine by clear and convincing evidence that a 

public safety interest is served by Internet publication of the 

sex offender's registration. Id. at 656. However, the court

has since noted that where "'the underlying facts of the case 

. . . so clearly dictate the appropriate classification level,'

[the court] [does] not exercise [its] discretion to remand . . . 

on this element." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 23656, 483 

Mass. 131, 145 (2019) (Doe No. 23656), quoting Doe No. 496501,
9

supra at 657 n.4. Here, as in Doe No. 23656, although the 

hearing examiner did not make separate and explicit findings 

that the public availability of Doe's personal information would 

serve the public interest, we conclude that the facts of the 

case so clearly support a level two classification that it is 

not necessary to remand for further findings. See Doe No. 

23656, supra at 145-146.

As previously discussed, the hearing examiner found that 

Doe committed multiple sexual offenses against a prepubescent

girl, who was not a member of his family. These facts placed 

Doe in a high category for risk and danger because they are

indicative of having a deviant sexual interest. Accordingly,

the record supports the conclusion that publication of Doe's 

personal information would serve the interest of public safety.

4. Due process violation. Doe also claims that the denial 

of his motion to continue the de novo hearing was an abuse of 

discretion and because he was not released until three and onehalf years later, the level two classification was based on 

stale information in violation of the board's regulations and 

his right to procedural due process. As noted, Doe's de novo 

hearing was held on March 13, 2019, the final classification 

decision was issued on May 31, 2019, a parole hearing was 

scheduled for August 2019, and Doe was released from the 

treatment center on September 16, 2022.
10

We turn first to the question whether the denial of Doe's 

motion to continue was an abuse of discretion. It was not. 

While there is no question, as Doe asserts, that a final 

classification hearing must "be held at a reasonable time prior 

to release from incarceration," Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 

No. 6904 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 75,

(2012) (Doe No. 6904), there is no dispute Doe could have been 

released as early as August 2019. Thus, Doe's de novo hearing 

preceded his potential release date by only five months. 

Compare, for example, Doe No. 6904, where we held that holding a 

classification hearing eight months before the sex offender's 

appearance before the parole board was an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 77.

Notwithstanding our conclusion that the hearing examiner 

acted within her discretion in denying Doe's motion, the fact 

remains that Doe was not released until three and one-half years 

later. In Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex 

Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 475, 478 (2015) (Doe No. 7083),

the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that holding a 

classification hearing ten months before the plaintiff's

earliest parole eligibility date and eighteen months before 

their earliest possible release date from the treatment center 

violated the plaintiff's right to procedural due process because 

of the risk that the classification decision was based on 
11

"stale" information. In reliance on Doe No. 7083, Doe contends 

that the classification decision must be vacated, and the matter 

remanded to the board for a new hearing. We acknowledge, as Doe 

asserts, that a final classification must be based on an 

evaluation of the offender's risk of reoffense at a time 

reasonably close to the actual date of release. See Doe No. 

6904, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 75. This did not happen here and,

consequently, Doe's due process rights were not protected.

The board concedes that Doe's procedural due process rights 

were violated but argues that the classification decision should 

not be vacated because Doe is currently eligible to petition the 

board for reclassification.2 Although in such a proceeding, Doe 

would bear the burden of producing evidence that circumstances 

had changed, "the bar for showing changed circumstances is 'very 

low' and . . . the mere passage of time generally qualifies." 

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 6969 v. Sex Offender Registry 

Bd., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 541 n.7 (2021). "Once Doe has met 

his burden, the board would bear the burden of persuasion --

based on 'clear and convincing evidence' –- 'that the 

classification is current and correct'" (citation omitted). 

2 In 2016, one year after the court's decision in Doe No. 7083,

was issued, the board promulgated 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31

(2016), which gives offenders who have been finally classified 

as a level two or three sex offender the right to petition the 

board for reclassification three years after the initial 

classification as long as certain conditions are met.
12

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 22164 v. Sex Offender 

Registry Bd., 103 Mass. App. Ct. 431, 433 (2023). Thus, as the 

board observes, Doe has a remedy nearly equal to the one he 

seeks through this appeal. The problem is that Doe does not 

want this remedy. In response to the panel's questions at oral 

argument, counsel made clear that "[vacating] is our preferable 

course." We are not in a position to force Doe to choose one 

remedy over the other. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated,

and a new judgment shall enter vacating the decision of the 

board and remanding the matter to the board for further 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.

So ordered.

By the Court (Vuono, Singh & 

Englander, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: December 20, 2023.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.