NUMBER 13-11-00494-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

JOHN N. MASTIN, Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL T. JELINEK, M.D., Appellee.

On appeal from the 275th District Court

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza

Appellant John N. Mastin challenges the trial court’s judgment awarding $50,000 

in attorney’s fees, as well as $17,000 in contingent appellate attorney’s fees, to appellee 

Michael T. Jelinek, M.D. Dr. Jelinek raises one issue on cross-appeal. We affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND

Beginning in 2003, Mastin, an attorney, represented the family of Eloisa Casas

and Casas’s estate in a medical negligence lawsuit against Rio Grande Regional 

Hospital, Carlos Garcia-Cantu, M.D., and Dr. Jelinek. Within 180 days of filing suit, 

Mastin served on the defendants a medical expert report contending that Drs. GarciaCantu and Jelinek were negligent in failing to recognize that antibiotic medications were 

not being given to Casas for a period of six days and that this negligence resulted in a 

prolonged hospital stay and increased pain and suffering experienced by Casas. See

Act of May 30, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, 1977 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2039, 2064 (former 

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01), repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th 

Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 TEX. GEN. LAWS 847, 884 (current version at TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2011)).

On March 9, 2004, Dr. Jelinek moved to dismiss the claims against him, alleging 

that the expert report was inadequate in that it “wholly failed to explain any causal 

connection between the alleged deviation from the applicable standard of care and 

[Casas’s] alleged injuries.” The motion requested “sanctions against the Plaintiffs to 

include: (1) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred by this Defendant; (2) 

forfeiture of all applicable cost bonds; and (3) the dismissal of this action against this 

Defendant with prejudice to the re-filing of such claims.” The trial court denied the

motion; however, several months later, the Casases non-suited their claims against 

both individual doctors.

The case against the hospital proceeded to trial and the plaintiffs prevailed. The 

hospital and Dr. Jelinek then each filed appeals. In his appeal, Dr. Jelinek asserted that 

the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss and by failing to award sanctions. 
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We affirmed. Jelinek v. Casas, No. 13-06-00088-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5647, at 

*25–29 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 29, 2008) (mem. op.), rev’d, 328 S.W.3d 526 

(Tex. 2010). The Texas Supreme Court, however, granted Dr. Jelinek’s petition for 

review and a majority of the Court reversed the trial court’s judgment. 328 S.W.3d at 

538–41.1 With respect to Dr. Jelinek, the majority found that the Casases’ expert report 

was “conclusory” as to causation because “[i]t offers no more than a bare assertion that 

Dr. Jelinek’s breach resulted in increased pain and suffering and a prolonged hospital 

stay.” Id. at 540; but see id. at 543 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting) (noting that in other 

cases finding an inadequate medical expert report, “the trial court could not have 

evaluated the claim’s merit without speculating about actions the defendant could have 

taken to prevent injury,” but that “[n]o such speculation is required here” because the 

expert report “states that had the antibiotics been administered from July 17 through 

July 23, Eloisa Casas would have suffered less”). The Court remanded the cause “for 

an award of attorney’s fees and costs under former article 4590i § 13.01(e) against the 

Casases and their counsel.” Id. at 540.

On remand, Dr. Jelinek filed a “Motion to Enter Order in Compliance with 

Mandate” in which he requested that he be awarded “attorney’s fees, costs and a 

dismissal in accordance with the directive of the Supreme Court of Texas.” The trial 

court rendered an order commanding Mastin and his law office to pay attorney’s fees to 

Dr. Jelinek in the amount of $50,000. The order also provided for the following 

appellate attorney’s fees, contingent on Dr. Jelinek’s success at each stage of the 

proceedings: $6,000 for an appeal to this Court; $5,000 if a petition for review is filed 

 

1 We also affirmed the trial court’s award of damages to the Casas family. Jelinek v. Casas, No. 

13-06-00088-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5647, at *10–25 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 29, 2008) 

(mem. op.), rev’d, 328 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. 2010). The Texas Supreme Court reversed that part of the trial 

court’s judgment as well. 328 S.W.3d at 532–38. The Casases are not parties to this appeal.
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with the Texas Supreme Court; and $6,000 if full briefing on the merits is requested by 

the Texas Supreme Court.

This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law 

A trial court’s award of attorney’s fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

Mercier v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 214 S.W.3d 770, 775 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (citing Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); 

Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1990) (per 

curiam)). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably or

without reference to guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, 

Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985).

Section 13.01 of former article 4590i of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes allowed 

a defendant in a medical malpractice suit to seek dismissal of the suit and reasonable 

attorney’s fees, to be assessed against a claimant or a claimant’s attorney, in cases 

where the claimant failed to provide an adequate medical expert report. Act of May 30, 

1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, 1977 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2039, 2064 (repealed 2003).2 A

trial court abuses its discretion if it dismisses a claim under former section 13.01(e) 

without awarding attorney’s fees to the defendant. Abilene Diagnostic Clinic v. 

Downing, 233 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, pet. denied); see Estrello v. 

Elboar, 965 S.W.2d 754, 759 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). While the award of 

 

2

The successor statute to section 13.01, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 

74.351, is applicable only to actions filed on or after September 1, 2003. Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., 

R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 TEX. GEN. LAWS 847, 884, 898–99 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2011)). The prior statute therefore applies to this case. We note that this 

Court has recently concluded that the successor statute “does not allow attorney’s fees and costs to be 

assessed against the claimant’s attorney.” Robinson v. Garcia, No. 13-11-00263-CV, 2012 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 4788, at *12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 14, 2012, pet. filed).
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attorney’s fees is mandatory in the appropriate circumstances, former section 13.01(e) 

gives the trial court the choice of whether to award fees “against the claimant or the 

claimant's attorney.” Act of May 30, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, 1977 TEX. GEN.

LAWS 2039, 2064 (former TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(e)) (repealed 

2003).

B. Analysis

Mastin argues that the trial court erred in its award of attorney’s fees because (1) 

Dr. Jelinek waived his right to seek attorney’s fees from Mastin because he only asked 

for attorney’s fees to be assessed against the Casases, (2) Mastin was not a party to 

the underlying lawsuit, and (3) the relief was not supported by the pleadings or 

evidence.

Mastin first contends that Dr. Jelinek waived his ability to have fees assessed 

against Mastin. Waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment of a known right or 

intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right. Jernigan v. Langley, 111 

S.W.3d 153, 156 (Tex. 2003). Waiver is ordinarily a question of fact, but when the 

surrounding facts and circumstances are undisputed, the question becomes one of law. 

Id. at 156–57.

Dr. Jelinek’s original 2004 motion for sanctions and dismissal asked specifically 

for attorney’s fees to be assessed “against the Plaintiffs.” Mastin argues that this 

constituted a waiver of the right to recover fees from the plaintiff’s attorneys—i.e., from 

him and his law firm. See Gurkoff v. Jersak, No. 02-07-101-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 

2677, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 10, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (finding no 

abuse of discretion where trial court awarded no attorney’s fees, despite “mandatory” 

nature of former section 13.01(e), because defendant requested fees only from 
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plaintiff’s attorneys, not from the plaintiffs themselves, and “the trial court always had 

the discretion to not award fees against” the attorneys).

We disagree that waiver has been demonstrated here. Although the 2004 

motion for sanctions and dismissal did not explicitly request that fees be assessed 

against Mastin, it was replete with references to former section 13.01(e), and it explicitly 

set forth the statute’s provision that fees may be assessed against both the plaintiff and 

plaintiff’s counsel. Moreover, the 2011 “Motion to Enter Order in Compliance with 

Mandate”—which is the motion that was granted by the judgment on appeal here—

requested an award of “attorney’s fees, costs and a dismissal in accordance with the 

directive of the Supreme Court of Texas”; the supreme court’s 2010 mandate directed 

the trial court to “award . . . attorney’s fees and costs consistent with this Court’s 

opinion”; and its opinion, in turn, stated that the cause was to be remanded “for an 

award of attorney’s fees and costs under former article 4590i § 13.01(e) against the 

Casases and their counsel.” Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 540. Finally, we note that “for 

implied waiver to be found through a party’s actions, intent must be clearly 

demonstrated by the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Jernigan, 111 S.W.3d at

156. We cannot say that the record “clearly demonstrate[s]” Dr. Jelinek’s intent to waive 

his right under former section 13.01(e) to collect attorney’s fees from Mastin.3 We also 

reject, on these grounds, Mastin’s argument that the trial court’s award of attorney’s 

fees was unsupported by Dr. Jelinek’s pleadings. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 301.

 

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This contrasts with the fact pattern considered in Gurkoff. See Gurkoff v. Jersak, No. 02-07-

101-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2677 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 10, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In 

that case, the defendant sought attorney’s fees against only the plaintiff’s attorneys—and not against the 

deceased plaintiff’s estate—because the trial court’s jurisdiction over the estate was unclear. See id. at 

*6. Accordingly, unlike here, there was no dispute in Gurkoff as to whether the defendant intended to 

waive his right to collect attorney’s fees against a particular party.
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Mastin next argues that the award of attorney’s fees against him was erroneous 

because he was never made a party to the underlying suit, and “[a] trial court cannot 

enter a binding judgment against a party unless the court has personal jurisdiction over 

that party.” Again, we disagree. The award of attorney’s fees against a plaintiff’s 

attorney under former section 13.01(e) is in the form of a sanction. Act of May 30, 

1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, 1977 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2039, 2064 (former TEX. REV. CIV.

STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(e)) (repealed 2003) (stating that, if the expert report 

requirement is not met, the court must “enter an order as sanctions” dismissing the case 

and granting the defendant its costs and attorney’s fees); see Am. Transitional Care 

Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. 2001). And, it is wellestablished that a trial court possesses the inherent authority to sanction an attorney’s 

behavior. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 732 (Tex. 1997).

Finally, Mastin contends that the trial court’s award was unsupported by the 

evidence. He contends, specifically, that there was no evidence showing that the fees 

should have been assessed against him, rather than against the Casases. Dr. Jelinek 

contends, on the contrary, that there was no evidence showing that the fees should 

have been assessed against the Casases, rather than against Mastin. Our review of 

the record—in particular, the transcript of the March 22, 2011 hearing at which the trial 

court heard arguments on Dr. Jelinek’s motion to enforce the supreme court’s 

mandate—sheds little light on the issue. The bulk of the testimony offered by the 

attorneys concerned the reasonableness of the fees allegedly incurred by Dr. Jelinek. It 

did not concern the issue of who should be ordered to pay the fees. In any event, we 

note that the Texas Supreme Court has indicated that the failure to comply with the 
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medical expert report requirement4is, by and of itself, conduct amenable to sanctions. 

In Palacios, the Court noted that, in enacting former section 13.01(e),

[t]he Legislature has determined that failing to timely file an expert report, 

or filing a report that does not evidence a good-faith effort to comply with 

the definition of an expert report, means that the claim is either frivolous, 

or at best has been brought prematurely. . . . This is exactly the type of 

conduct for which sanctions are appropriate.

46 S.W.3d at 877; see Clinica Santa Maria v. Martinez, No. 13-09-573-CV, 2010 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 4788, at *14, *16 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 24, 2010, pet. denied) 

(mem. op.) (noting that former section 13.01(e) “gave the trial court discretion with 

respect to whom the court should sanction” and stating that “we will not disturb the trial 

court’s ruling with respect to who should pay the fees.”). Under these circumstances, 

we conclude that the trial court’s assessment of attorney’s fees against Mastin, rather 

than against his clients, was supported by the evidence appearing in the record.

We overrule Mastin’s issues.

C. Cross-Appeal

On cross-appeal, Dr. Jelinek contends that the trial court erred in failing to award 

the total amount of attorney’s fees that he requested. He notes that an award of 

attorney’s fees is mandatory under former section 13.01(e) if no adequate medical 

expert report is timely filed. See Act of May 30, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, 1977 

TEX. GEN. LAWS 2039, 2064 (former TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(e))

(repealed 2003). Dr. Jelinek notes that his attorney, Ronald G. Hole, testified that 

$70,786.50 was a reasonable and necessary amount of fees for handling the case up 

 

4 Mastin correctly notes that the trial court, this Court, and three justices of the Texas Supreme 

Court believed that the expert report requirement had, in fact, been satisfied with respect to the Casases’ 

claims against Dr. Jelinek. However, a majority of the Texas Supreme Court concluded otherwise, and 

we are bound by their judgment. See City of Mission v. Cantu, 89 S.W.3d 795, 809 n.21 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (“As an intermediate appellate court, we are bound to follow the expression 

of the law as stated by the Texas Supreme Court.”).
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until the day of the hearing; that $6,000 is a reasonable and necessary amount for an 

appeal to this Court; that $5,000 is a reasonable and necessary amount for a petition for 

review in the Supreme Court; and $6,000 is a reasonable and necessary amount to 

argue the merits in the Supreme Court should a petition for review be granted. Dr. 

Jelinek claims that this testimony was clear and uncontroverted and so must be taken 

as true as a matter of law. See McMillin v. State Farm Lloyds, 180 S.W.3d 183, 210 

(Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (holding that, “where trial counsel’s testimony 

concerning attorney’s fees is clear, positive and direct, and uncontroverted, it is taken 

as true as a matter of law” and “in such instances, appellate courts will reverse a denial 

or minimization of attorney’s fees and render judgment for attorney’s fees in the amount 

proved”).

We cannot conclude that Hole’s testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee 

amounts was uncontroverted. Mastin cross-examined Hole on a range of issues and he 

testified that Hole “has in my opinion abused the discovery process during the course of 

this particular case.” Mastin contends that he “reached out to [Hole] at least five times 

in an attempt to set a mutually agreeable time and date for [Dr.] Jelinek’s deposition”; 

that he received no response from Hole; that he then filed notices of intention to depose 

Dr. Jelinek; and that Hole moved to quash those notices on the grounds that Mastin did

not contact Hole to determine whether Hole was available on the noticed dates. Mastin 

further testified:

I can say during my extensive litigation experience only one other case 

have I ever experienced an attorney that is as obstructive as Mr. Hole. I 

have during the course of handling probably a couple of thousand cases 

collectively have not faced or had as many sanctions filed against my 

clients or myself as in this one particular case that Mr. Hole did. I find his 

conduct abusive. I find it non cooperative. And part of during the course 

of the litigation in this case Mr. Hole did in my opinion everything he could 

to prolong it, extract it, delay it, and to cause cost to all other parties in the 
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case, and cost to his own client in this particular case, or the insurance 

company for the client. . . . Mr. Hole could get the trophy for the person 

who causes the most time and expense and abuses the discovery process 

to my experience . . . .

Considering this testimony, we conclude that the trial court was well within its 

discretion to determine that a reasonable and necessary amount of attorney’s fees in 

this case was less than the amount testified to by Hole. See Mercier, 214 S.W.3d at 

775 (citing Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 41–42 (Tex. 1989))

(noting that, when reviewing matters reserved for the trial court’s discretion, we may not 

substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court); see also Clinica Santa Maria, 

2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 4788, at *12 (“[E]ven if there is no direct testimony to contradict 

the amount testified to, a trial court still has the discretion to award a lesser amount if it 

has any reason to determine that the award was unreasonable or unwarranted.”). Dr. 

Jelinek’s issue on cross-appeal is overruled.

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

_______________________

DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,

Justice

Delivered and filed the

21st day of March, 2013.