### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00661- CV

LaT ondr a A ske w d/b/a P r ofe ssi ona l C ar e F ac ili tyII, App e lla nt

v. State of Texas, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. GV300291 , HO NORAB LE DAVID CAV E, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
L aTondra Askew, doing business as Professional Car e F acility I I , appea ls from the perma nent injunction a

nd judgme nt a g ainst her. The district court enjoined he r fr om operating a n assisted living fa cility

without a license, as s es s ed civil pena lties of $15,000 for ope ratingsuch a fac ility without a license, and aw arde d attorney ’s fe es to the State. Askew contends on a

ppeal that the cour t erre d by ref using to e mpanel a jur

y , denying he r re quest to develop a bill of ex ception, and
ru lin g be fo re a llo wi nghe r t o p re se nt h e r c a se . We wi ll a ff ir m th e inj un c tio n a

nd jud g me nt.An “a ssisted livi ng fac ility ” is an e stablishment t h at: “(A ) fur nishes, in one or more 1 fac iliti es, food a

nd shelter to four

or more pe rsons who ar e unre lated t o t h e proprietor of the establishment; and (B ) provides personal c are service s.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 247.002(1) ( West S upp. 2004-05). 2 BACK GR OUND Askew ope rat es P ro fe ssional Care F acility I I(“F acility

I I ”) a s an assisted living fa c ili ty
. She a

pp lie d f or a lic e ns e to do so in 1 99 9. Whil e that a pp lic a tio n w a s p e nd ing , th e State 1 investigated and f

ound that she was illega lly providing assistance with medications and a ctivities of daily living to four r esidents at F acility I Iwithout a license. Conseque ntly , the State denied he r lic e ns e a pp lic a tio n in Nov e mbe r 200 2. I n D e c e mbe r 2 00 2, a state ins pe c tio n s ho we d th a t, d e sp ite
no t be inglic e ns e d, As ke w w a s c ari ngfo r f ive re sid e nts
. The State soug ht an injunction to prevent Aske w from ope ratingan assis t ed living fac ility without a license. I n J une 2003, the district court he ld a hea ring on the State’s re quest for perma nent injunction. I t proce eded without a jury beca use t he dis trict court found that Askew f iled her r equest for

jury trial six day s late. Askew te stified that, at ti m e o f trial, she ha d licenses to run two a ssisted livi ng fac iliti es—Profe ssional Care F acility Ibeg inning in 1996 and Fa cility I Ibeg inning in 1999. When she opened Fa cility I I , she did not have a license, but she w as ca

ring for only

two clients—below the threshold of four

at which lice nsing is re quired. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 247.002, 24 7. 02 1 (We st 200 1 & Sup p. 20 04 -0 5)
. I n 200 1, ho we ve r, sh e pr ov ide d a ssi sta nc e a t F a c ili ty

I Ito at least four

clients knowing that she needed a license to do so lega lly . She testified that some of the clients at F acility

I Ion the date of

one of the in s p ec t i o n s wer e only there temporar ily . Diana Cawthorn, a fac iliti es survey or for the S tate, confirmed that F acility I Ihad four

patients when A skew3

did not have a license for the facility
. She conce ded that she sa w no problems with the fa cility , but state d th a t sh e wa s th e re to a sse ss i ts s tatus a s a n a ssi ste d li vin g fa c ili ty , not to ins pe c t th e qu a lity of ca re pr ovided.

The c ourt g rante d the injunction preve nting Aske w from ope ratingFa cility I Ior any other a ssisted livi ng fac ility wi t h o u t a l i cense. The injunction also bar s her f rom, amongother thi n g s, administering medication to any individuals without a license when one is require d. The
c ourt a sse sse d $ 15 ,0 00 in pe na lti e s a g a ins t As ke w and awa rd e d th e State $7 ,0 00 in atto rn e y ’s fe e s.
DI SCU SSIO N Askew c ontends that the cour t erre d by ref using to e mpanel a jur

y , d en y i n g her reque st to develop a bill of exception, and rulingbefor e allowingher to pre sent her c ase. Jury trial There is no right to a jury trial in a civil case in district court unless a par ty demands and pay s for the jury

in advanc e as pr escr ibed by law. Tex. Const. art. V, § 10. The jury reque st and
a $1 0 fe e are du e no late r tha n thir ty da y s bef or e tr ia l. T e x. R. C iv. P. 2 16 . A n a dd iti on a l $2 0 mu st be pa id n o late r t

ha n 1 0 d ay s b e fo re tr ia l. T e x. Go v’ t Co de Ann
. § 51.6 04 (We st 1 99 8) ; se e als o Universal Print ing Co. v. Prem ier Victorian Homes , Inc. , 73 S.W .3d 283, 292 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) . The c ourt may never theless per

mit a jury trial if to do so would not i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e o r d e r l y h an d l i n g o f t h e c o u rt ’ s d o c k e t , d e l ay t h e t r i a l , o r i n j u r e t h e o p p o s i t e p art y. Universal , 73 S.W .3d at 293. We revie w the trial c ourt’s denia l of a jury demand by

examining the entire r ecor d for an abuse of discretion. Merc edes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne , 925 S.W .2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996). We can f

ind an abuse of discre tio n o n l y wh en the trial cour t’s decision is made4

arbitra rily , unrea sonably , and without r efe renc e to g uiding pr inciples. See Downer v. Aquamarine Op e ra tor s , Inc. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 241-42 (Te x . 1985). Askew did not file he r re quest or fe e timely and did not show h er s el f entitled to a waiver of those re quirements. She filed he r re quest and fe e on June 24, 2003—six day s befor e the tr ia l dat e of J une 30 , 2 00 3. She did no t sh owthe la c k o f d isr up tio n, de lay , o r i nju

ry that w ou ld permit the cour

t to allow a jury trial, nor di d she m ove for a continuance. The only indication in the
rec ord is that the cour

t’s time was limited. The State alleg es in its brief without contravention that the trial involved witnesses who had trave led from Da llas to Austin, occurre d during a non-jury
wee k, and wa s set befor e a visiting judge who was not available at a later time. These c ircumstance s support a conc lusion that gra nting a jury trial would have disrupted the court’s docket a nd delay ed the tr ia l. T he dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n by de nyingAs ke w’ s late re qu e st f or jur y tr ia l.
Bill of exception

As ke w c omp la ins that th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d b y de nyinghe r r e qu e st to ma ke a bil l of exception to prese nt sworn testimony . Th e re p o rt er ’s rec ord re veals that, a fter A skew a nd Cawthorn testified, the State a sked t o re l ease its witnesses. Askew objec ted, contendingthat she wanted to c ross-examine any other fa cilities survey ors who had he lped pre p a r e e xh ibits t hat had be en admitted. The c ourt denied this re quest, stating that the exhibi ts were alre ady admitted and that the tim e a llo tte d f

or the tr ia l had a lr e a dy be e n exce e de d; t he c ourt ini tia lly state d th a t A sk e w c ou ld c a ll one of the witnesses but, afte r continued discussion, deter mined that none of the additional witnesses would provide rele vant evidenc e. The court noted that Askew ha d admitted the ce ntral issue of the5

case —that she had ope rate d Fa cility I I without a license for at least four day s. When Askew aske d to m a ke a bil l of e xce pti on

fo r t he wi tne sse s n ot c a lle d, the c ourt de nie d th e re qu e st. To show er

ror in the e x cl u s i o n of evide nce, the offe ring party must object to the exclusion, have the tria l co u rt overr ule or re fuse to over

rule the obje ction, make a n offe r of pr oof showing the substance of the e x cl u d ed ev i d ence and have its subst antial rig hts be aff ecte d by the
e xclu sio n. Te x. R. E vid . 1 03 (a ); Te x. R. A pp . P. 33 .1 (a ); se e als o P or te r v . Ne mi r , 900 S.W .2d 376, 383 (Tex. Ap p . — Au s t in 1995, no pet.). “To c omplain on appea l about a matter that would not otherwise a

ppear in the rec ord, a party must file a forma l bill of ex ception.” T ex. R . App. P. 33.2. Askew doe s not state in her brie f the names of witnesses she wished t o call. The rec ord includes the name of one witness who was prese nt, excused, and not ca lled, but there is nothing showing what her te stimony

would have be en. Althoug h the cour t made cle ar that it did not have time f or Askew to make a bill of e x ception on the da y of trial, Ask ew h ad u n t il 30 day s after filing the notice of appea l to make a f

ormal, written bill of exception. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.2( e)( 1). Askew did not fi le a fo rm a l bi ll o f e xce pti on sh ow ingwh o s he wo uld

have c a lle d a

nd wh a t th e ir

te sti mony

wo uld have be en. Aske w has not pre serve d this error f or re view. Even if Aske w had shown err or, she has not show n harm a s require d. See Sanc hez

v . B ro wns v ill e Sp or ts Ctr. , Inc. , 51 S.W .3d 643, 664 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. gr anted, jud g m’ t va c a te d w .r .m. ); Ho us ton Lig hti ng & Po we r Co . v . R us so Pr op s. , Inc. , 710 S.W .2d 711, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1986, no writ). The State claimed it pr oved that Aske w oper ated Fa cility I I fo r 48 day s without a license; Aske w admitted only 4 day s. The cour

t was empowe red to a ssess a fine of betwee n $1000 and $10,000 for eac h day of illeg al oper ation. See Tex. Health & S a f e t y C o d e A n n . § 2 4 7
. 0 4 5 ( c ) ( W e s t2 0 0 1 )
. T h e c o u rt a s s e s s e d $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 t o t a l i nf i n e s f o r 4 d ays6

of violation, which amounts to $3750 pe r day . (The c ourt opined ora lly that it would have asse ssed $30,000, but a cce ded to the State’s sug g ested fine .) The c ourt awa rded the State $7000 of the $9000 in atto rn e y ’s fe e s r e qu e ste d. Th e re is n o s ho wi ngthat th e te st im on y fr om t he se wi tne sse s w ou ld have a ffe cted e ither of these amounts or the natur e of the injunctive relief
. Re nde r ing ju dgm e nt with outall owing pr e se nt at ion of de fens e c as e

Askew c omplains that the district court er red by rende ring ju d gm ent bef ore she prese nted her

case . S h e re l i es o n a rule of civil proce dure pr oviding that, a fter the party with the burden of proof introduc es i ts evidence , the adve rse pa rty “shall then introduce his evidence .” See Te x. R. C iv. P. 2 65 . Sh e ur g e s th a t t hi s orde r o f p ro c e e din g s ma nd a te s th a t sh e be a llo we d to introduce e vidence , and that the district cour t erre d by preve nting her from doing so. See Producer’ s Constr. Co. v. Mue

gge , 669 S.W .2d 717, 719 (Tex. 1984). T h i s c a s e i s n o tc o n t r o l l e d b y Muegge , howeve r, because that court found err or in the tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure to a llo w the de fe nd ant to pr e se nt e vid e nc e on its counterc laims
. Se e id . at 718. Askew did not have counter claims. Askew te stified an d cr o s s-examined the other w itness who test if ie d o n th e St a te ’ s c a s e . A s ju s t d is c u s s e d , th e r e c o r d d o e s n o t n a me th e w it n e s ses Askew intended to ca ll or what their t estimony would have been. Nor does she, i n her br ief, name witnesses she intended to c all. At the hea ring , she stated only

that she wa

nted to examine other witnesses who p ar t i cipated in the pr epar ation of exhibit s admitted. The State asse rts without contradiction that Askew had not subpoe naed or disclosed any witnesses she intended to c all. She has not shown er ror or har m from the cour

t rende ring judgme nt when it did.7 CO NC LU SION Havingfound no har

mful err or in the ac tions Askew cha lleng es, we aff irm the district
c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: January

21, 2005