# EUR-Lex - 52015JC0002 - EN

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# 52015JC0002

**JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat /* JOIN/2015/0002 final */**

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Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and
Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat

Summary

On
20 October 2014, the Foreign Affairs Council expressed the EU's resolve to
tackle in a comprehensive and coordinated manner the crises in Syria and Iraq and
the threat posed by Da'esh[1].
To this end, it called on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission to
develop an EU comprehensive regional strategy.

The
purpose of this Joint Communication is to outline actions that the EU and its
Member States will undertake to help restore peace and security in Syria and
Iraq. The actions are based on in-depth analyses of the situations in both
countries and the contributing factors to the current crises which include
repressive dictatorial rule, armed conflicts, exclusionist and corrupt
governance, human rights abuses, sectarian divisions, a sense of
disenfranchisement of sections of the Sunni population as well as tensions
between regional powers with their negative impact on the internal affairs of Syria
and Iraq.

The
EU response outlined here builds on the existing analyses and strategies[2],
and seeks to:

- 
Identify
EU interests and set out the EU contribution to the broader international
effort to achieve lasting peace and security in Syria, Iraq and the wider
region as well as counter the Da'esh  threat;

- 
Achieve
complementarity between the action of the EU and EU Member States, through
joint ownership of the strategy and the identification of common goals;

- 
 Address
the commonalities of the crises in Iraq and Syria (principally the terrorist
threat and the serious humanitarian implications that these crises have
provoked) as well as their specificities;

- 
Encourage
the countries of the region to take particular responsibility for ending the crises
and tackling Da'esh's and other terrorist groups' violent extremism which threatens
them in the first place, and offer appropriate EU support to their efforts;

- 
Recognise
the inherent limitations of security and counter-terrorism intervention,
however necessary military action may be in the short term. The EU's response
therefore emphasises the need for a sustained and comprehensive engagement to
address the underlying dynamics of the conflict through diplomatic engagement
and long-term support for political reforms, socio-economic development and
ethno-sectarian reconciliation.

The
actions presented in this joint communication are mutually reinforcing and
therefore must to be carried out broadly in parallel. The detailed order of
priority of different actions proposed will need to be determined dynamically
in the course of the implementation of this strategy, as the EU must respond to
evolving circumstances on the ground and seek complementarity with the efforts
of the international community.

In order to achieve its objectives
and ensure the effectiveness of its response, the EU must secure sustainable
and predictable funding commensurate to the unprecedented level of needs in the
region. The Commission therefore proposes an aid package of  EUR 1
billion from the EU budget for years 2015 and 2016. The details of this
proposal are set out in the Financial Statement annexed to this communication.

1-
CONTEXT

The need for a comprehensive EU
policy framework for Syria and Iraq

The
Middle-East is currently experiencing a profound crisis. The conflicts in Syria
and Iraq are both a reflection and a driver of this crisis, with the growing potential
to destabilise neighbouring countries and the wider region. These crises have
created a humanitarian disaster affecting more than 13.5 million people forced
to flee their homes (3.8 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries -with
UNHCR predicting 4.3 million by the end of 2015- and 7.6 million internally
displaced persons in Syria alone), and more than 17 million people in need of
humanitarian aid (12.2 in Syria and 5.2 in Iraq).

Following
more than four years of brutal conflict in Syria, Da'esh's declared endeavour
to act as an alternative, ideologically radical state has proven appealing to
extremists in the region and beyond, particularly in areas, in Syria and Iraq,
where state authority has collapsed and where a feeling of political and
socio-economic marginalisation prevailed.

As
an important actor in the region, the EU has a responsibility to ensure that it
uses its influence and its numerous instruments effectively and coherently to defend
human lives, human dignity and rights, and help resolve these crises, in close
coordination with regional and international partners. In particular, this
strategy will draw on and complement the EU counter-terrorism/foreign
fighters strategy and the Joint Communication: Towards a comprehensive
EU approach to the Syrian crisis. In addition, there are compelling reasons
of self-interest for the EU to increase its engagement in Syria, Iraq and the
neighbouring countries. These include: the breach of universally recognized
values and rights that are at the heart of the European foreign policy; the
risk of a breakdown of public authority and political chaos in overstretched
refugee-hosting countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, adding to the migratory
pressures resulting from population displacement and related trafficking in
human beings; Da'esh's control of territory spanning two states; the risk of
contagion of Da'esh's brand of terrorism to other countries and further
destabilisation of the region; the threat to the EU's security posed by EU
nationals (and others) who have joined terrorist groups as foreign terrorist
fighters; the opportunity cost of losing Syria and Iraq as partners for a
lasting Middle East peace, as trade partners and energy providers; and the loss
of cultural heritage.

Background

Syria
experienced a period of repressive stability and inter-confessional coexistence
since a military coup in 1966 introduced the autocratic Baath party’s rule.
Bashar al-Assad came to power following his father's death in 2000 with
promises of political and gradual economic reform that were insufficiently fulfilled.
The opening of Syria’s economy and the growth of the private sector that ensued,
unveiled large social imbalances. Necessary structural reforms, which the EU
encouraged by offering Syria the prospect of an Association Agreement[3], were never
fully carried out. Liberalisation of the national economy led to an economic
growth which largely benefited the elites associated to the regime and its
security apparatus and did not translate into sustained and equitable development.

In
2011, Syrian peaceful protest movements with democratic aspirations, inspired
by 'Arab Spring' movements in other countries and driven by a sense of frustration
with the prevailing non inclusive political and economic order, were brutally
repressed by the Assad regime. This pushed a portion of the Syrian population
into armed rebellion. The Assad regime's brutal repression
of protest and insurgency, massive human rights violations and systematic
obstruction of democratic reforms, and the continuation of the conflict without
a clear end in sight have led gradually to the increased power of extremist
groups at the cost of the moderate opposition. The warring parties received
support from external powers, further exacerbating the situation. Jabhat
al-Nusra, the official arm of al-Qaeda in Syria, and
then Da'esh, enhanced their attractiveness and capabilities. In 2014, Da'esh in
particular managed to extend its control over oil and gas-rich
areas in
eastern Syria, western Iraq and border crossings along the
Syria-Turkey border that it previously disputed with other armed
groups.

In
Iraq, the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 was followed by instability,
sectarian strife and terrorist violence that were met by intensive efforts by
the international community, including the EU, to support Iraq's transition. In
2012, the EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Iraq. But
while a democratic constitution was put in place, oil production rose and macroeconomic
stability improved, Iraq's transition was hampered by continuing violence, political
instability, authoritarian rule, exclusionist government policies, high
corruption and lack of structural economic reforms.

These
negative trends accelerated following the departure of US troops at the end of
2011. In particular, many Sunnis felt increasingly
alienated from the post-2003 political settlement due to: marginalisation from
political decision making; economic and social underdevelopment of Sunni areas
leading to inadequate provision of basic services; arbitrary application of 'de-Baathification'
legislation; exclusion of Saddam-era military staff from the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF); heavy-handed policing of Sunni areas, including the
documented killing of Sunni citizens; a poor human
rights framework; and widespread corruption and nepotism. At the same time the
Shia community was finding its feet in the new order after years of
Sunni-dominated oppression, with the Shia-dominated government never gaining
full acceptance across the country. Sunni terrorist attacks against the Shia
population contributed to deepening the sectarian divide. Starting in 2013 portions
of the Sunni population rebelled against the federal government, opening the
door for the resurgence of al-Qaeda inspired terrorist groups, in particular Da'esh
and neo-Baathist groups which in June 2014 took over large swathes of territory
in western and northern Iraq.

Da'esh
has thus harnessed and exploited the discontent of parts of the Sunni
population in both Syria and Iraq to further its objectives.

The threat posed by Da'esh to Syria,
Iraq and neighbouring countries

Da'esh
and other terrorist groups pose a new kind of threat for Syria, Iraq, the
broader region and the international community as a whole.

· 
Da'esh
is a cross-border phenomenon spanning two sovereign states, with the intent to
act as a state (control of territory, organisation of revenues to finance a
central budget, imposition of taxes, provision of basic services, etc.). Its
highly visible terrorist and criminal actions in Syria and Iraq are coupled
with military actions that resemble an insurgency. It has received pledges of
allegiance and support from like-minded organisations in several Arab, African
and Asian countries.

· 
Da'esh
cynically exploits images of the Golden Age of Islamic political history. The
Caliphate is presented as the embodiment of aspirations for political and
cultural unity. It has declared ambitions to widen its territory to
neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Gulf countries. Its
territorial ambitions, capabilities, forms of outreach and networking, in
particular thanks to a sophisticated use of the social media, are unprecedented.
Its actions have appeal with other groups in the region, in North and
Sub-Saharan Africa, and in Asia. Some of these have expressed allegiance to Da'esh.
The announcement of the so-called 'Caliphate', followed by the launch of an
international military action to tackle this terrorist threat, have drawn a
significant flow of foreign terrorist fighters joining the group in Syria and
Iraq.

· 
As
part of a deliberate tactic to enforce its authority in areas where the state
authority has collapsed, Da'esh is perpetrating egregious abuses of human
rights that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, including mass
murder of civilians, slavery, torture, arbitrary executions and widespread
sexual and gender-based violence, targeting ethnic and religious minorities but
also members of the Sunni communities perceived as a threat. This has already
led to considerable population displacements in the region, caused significant
trauma to displaced persons, in particular women and children, caused massive
influx of refugees to neighbouring countries and also increased migration
pressure on the EU.

· 
Da'esh
encourages illicit excavations of archaeological and cultural objects and uses
humanity heritage sites, including World Heritage properties, for military
purposes, leading to their gradual destruction.

· 
It
may now be a self-financing terrorist organisation with its revenues from sources
such as the illegal sale of oil and other commodities, imposition of taxes, trafficking
in human beings, illicit trafficking in cultural goods, kidnapping for ransom
and looting (including bank robbery), thus removing its reliance on donations
from regional sponsors.

The Kurdish question

The
upsurge of violence has encouraged Kurdish communities to reinforce self-rule,
or to seek independence, with concomitant implications for the integrity, and
potentially the long term stability, of both countries.

In
Iraq, differences between the Kurdistan region and the federal government that
have been left unresolved for a number of years, such as the adoption of a
permanent mechanism for revenue sharing (hydrocarbons law) and the status of
the disputed territories, are now adding to the overall burden of tasks that
the Iraqi government needs to tackle urgently in addition to the efforts it is
making to defeat Da'esh.

Kurds
in Syria were coerced by the Syrian regime to stay out of the Syrian uprising
since early 2011 in exchange for de facto autonomy in the mainly Kurdish-populated
regions of the northeast of Syria. Since the emergence of Da’esh, Syrian Kurds have
been in the front-line of the fight against Da'esh, together with Kurds from
neighbouring countries. First, they defended mainly Kurd-populated areas in
Syria (2013) and in Iraq (Mount Sinjar in 2014) and access from Syria to the
rest of the Iraq's Kurdistan region. Subsequently, they also defended the
besieged city of Kobani and other mainly Kurdish-populated self-proclaimed 'autonomous
cantons'.

Any
EU support for Kurdish armed resistance to Da'esh must be accompanied by strong
assurances to the states of the region of continued EU respect for their
territorial integrity.

The
risk of a spill-over to neighbouring countries

Lebanon

The conflict in Syria and the high
number of registered and unregistered refugees in Lebanon (approximately 1.2
million in January 2015, representing more than 25% of the Lebanese population)
is exacerbating existing tensions within Lebanese society, institutions and
communities and it is also placing a strain on scarce natural resources. While
the Lebanese Government opted for the so-called 'disassociation policy' from
the conflict in Syria, based on the Baabda Declaration of June 2012, Hezbollah
and Sunni terrorist groups have gradually enhanced their direct participation
in the conflict. Clashes between the Lebanese security forces and Syrian armed
groups in and around Arsal in eastern Bekaa in August 2014 and repeated clashes
in Tripoli highlighted the threat posed to northern Lebanon in particular.

Jordan

Jordan
has a far more homogeneous population than Lebanon, at least insofar as
religious affiliation is concerned. But the presence of more than 600,000
Syrian refugees in the country is placing strain on service delivery and on
scarce natural resources, in particular water. As in Lebanon, the issue of
access to education and work opportunities entails risks for the future and
needs to be addressed.

Turkey

With
more than 1.65 million Syrian refugees on Turkish soil (government figures),
Turkey is now hosting the largest refugee community from Syria. It has also
been providing significant humanitarian assistance (more than 4 billion dollars
since 2011 according to government estimates). Turkey is calling for enhanced international
support to deal with the consequences of the crisis.

2- OBJECTIVES

The
overall objectives of this strategy is to counter the threat posed by Da'esh and
other terrorist groups to regional and international stability, and
simultaneously to create the conditions for an inclusive political transition
in Syria and lasting stability in Syria and Iraq as well as in refugee-hosting
countries in the region, while alleviating the human suffering caused by the
ongoing violence and displacement.

The strategy foresees a mix of political-level
and official-level diplomatic engagement, communication work and practical
support measures. In order to achieve its objectives and ensure the
effectiveness of its response, the EU must secure sustainable and predictable
funding commensurate to the unprecedented level of needs in the region. The
Commission therefore proposes an aid package of  EUR 1 billion from the
EU budget for years 2015 and 2016. The details of this proposal are set out in
the Financial Statement annexed to this communication.

An
important requirement for the success of the EU's strategy is the achievement
of synergy and complementarity between EU and EU Member State actions both at
political and operational levels. At political level, this strategy should
provide the framework for better aligning EU and Member States diplomatic
efforts. At operational level in particular, the strategy should provide an
overall framework to increase funding as well as EU donor co-ordination and
joint programming (including through the EU regional Trust Fund in response to
the Syrian crisis, the ‘Madad fund’). Member States are urged to continue to
mobilise assistance at bilateral level in order to ensure that their collective
response at least matches the effort made through the EU budget.

Humanitarian
aid will continue to be delivered to vulnerable populations on the basis of
needs and in full respect of the internationally recognised humanitarian
principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.

2.1
      OBJECTIVES COMMON TO SYRIA, IRAQ AND OTHER AFFECTED COUNTRIES

2.1.1    Promote
regional engagement in support of security and long-term peace

Sustained
EU high level diplomacy in the region is crucial to contribute to the necessary
changes. Countries of the region, notably the Gulf States, Egypt, Turkey and
Iran, are in many ways directly concerned and better placed, in the view of
public opinion in the Middle East, to contribute to the fight against Da'esh
than those of the broader international community. They also have an interest
in doing so, since any spill-over of the crises in Syria and Iraq threatens
them in the first place. Furthermore, rivalries between key regional actors are
among the drivers of violence and sectarian tensions in Syria, Iraq and other
affected countries upon which Da'esh thrives. For all these reasons, regional
actors must be actively encouraged by the EU to take special responsibility for
addressing the Da'esh threat and promoting peace in the region, focussing on
areas where their interests converge. The EU also needs to encourage and
strengthen moderate voices in the region and promote an alternative vision to that
of terrorist groups.

Means
of EU engagement:

Focused
political and diplomatic engagement with the countries of the region
bilaterally and collectively through the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation
Council and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, as well as with other
supporting countries and organisations. Beyond a clear condemnation of Da'esh,
this should include dialogue on cultural diversity, religion and ideology with
a view to countering violent extremism, support for science diplomacy and other
forms of people-to-people contacts, and efforts to reduce misapprehensions
within the EU on developments in the region.

2.1.2    Isolate
and defeat Da'esh as a military force and as a terrorist organisation and
counter its ideological influence

o Support
and strengthen the anti-Da'esh  forces

The military
response of the Global Coalition to counter Da'esh[4] foresees
air strikes against Da'esh forces as well as the supply of lethal and
non-lethal equipment, training and intelligence support to Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF), Kurdish Peshmerga and, insofar as this is practicable, to the
moderate opposition in Syria. The Council has not adopted any decision to
engage at the level of the EU in military operations to this effect. Nor has the
EU been tasked with coordinating, or acting as a clearing house for information
about the supply of arms or other military assistance, although this could be
envisaged. In addition, the EU needs to ensure that its own lines of effort
remain appropriately flexible and responsive to the unfolding military
operations.

o Stem
the influx of foreign terrorist fighters, funds, and arms to Da'esh

Pursuant to the EU
counter-terrorism/foreign fighters strategy, which is part of this
comprehensive regional strategy, the EU will step up efforts to isolate Da'esh and
prevent the flow of resources it requires for its operations, in accordance with
relevant UNSC Resolutions and in full respect to EU and international human
rights standards. This requires open and enhanced political dialogue with
Turkey and the Gulf States, coordinated with other partners (including the US).
Such a dialogue would be linked with practical capacity building support in
order to ensure that the countries in the region are able to handle the foreign
fighters threat effectively and also that sanctions and other measures against Da'esh
are effectively applied, through enhancement of border controls. An associated
aim of these measures is to track down individuals involved in crimes against
humanity and war crimes, tackle corruption and smuggling which is benefiting
Da'esh and take legal action against those involved. Furthermore, enhanced
control of financial flows through financial institutions as well as
traditional financial networks will be required.

The EU will also
seek to prevent violent extremism in the countries of the region, de-radicalisation
programmes and radicalisation prevention. EU capacity building support in the
field of counter-terrorism/foreign fighters will need to be provided as a
matter of priority taking into consideration the partner countries' capacity to
meet benchmarks on human rights and civil and political freedoms. A key area of
reform which the EU should support is the reform of counter terrorism laws in
countries of the region.

For the
credibility of the counter terrorist effort, it is essential to distinguish
between Da'esh and other terrorist organisations on the one hand and groups
espousing non-violent forms of political Islam on the other. An objective of EU
diplomacy must be to warn against the risk that suppression of such groups can
lead to their radicalisation. It is important to ensure that partner countries'
law enforcement measures are necessary and proportionate, and do not reduce
minimum standards of protection of human rights.

Means
of EU engagement: The EU's
engagement in this domain will be made up of Member State and EU actions, based
on the assessment of their feasibility and evolving priorities. It should
include political and expert-level engagement with the relevant
institutions of the countries of the region; EU Member States contributions; and
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), European
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and CFSP financing where appropriate.
EU actions must be implemented in compliance with the EU Charter of fundamental
rights.

Foreign fighters

- 
Actions
aiming to stem the flow of foreign fighters to Syria/Iraq and deal with
returnees (to be defined in more detail in early 2015 according to the
objectives set in the EU counter-terrorism/foreign fighters strategy).

- 
Support
to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan to enhance border security.

- 
Capacity-building
in the region to implement UNSCR 2178, as well as in the area of border
management and security, including explosive trace detection and expertise on
airport infrastructure and layout.

- 
Reinforcement
of police and judiciary international cooperation to: support investigations
and prosecutions of foreign fighters; track and record movements of foreign
fighters, including through the adoption of EU legislation on exchanges of
Passenger Name Records with the EU's main partners in accordance with the
principles of proportionality as regards any restrictions on the rights to data
protection; identify criminal sources of financing including trafficking in human
beings; disrupt illicit weapons/ammunitions supply channels; and prevent the
criminal use of internet for terrorist recruitment and dissemination of
terrorist practices.

- 
Development
of a joint internal and external security approach and related experts networks
to address evolving Da'esh communication and propaganda methodologies.

- 
Cooperation
with the International Criminal Court, including collection of evidence,
identification of criminals and collection of testimonies given by witnesses.

Counter-narrative
and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

- 
Support
to communication campaigns carried out by relevant actors in Syria, Iraq and in
the region (including in countries of origin of foreign fighters) to discredit Da'esh's
ideology and denounce its violations of human rights and to counter violent
extremism and hate speech linked to other groups in the region.

- 
Support
to countering violent extremism projects in Lebanon and Jordan and possibly other
countries in the region, targeting the most exposed segments of the
populations, in particular the youth.

- 
Preventing
radicalisation in prisons through an integrated programme of reintegration or
disengagement for detained or returning members of terrorist groups, in the
region and in the EU.

- 
Encouragement
to the governments and relevant societal actors in the region to take targeted measures
to prevent and curb radicalisation and incitement in public places (including
universities).

Terrorist
financing/sanctions

- 
Support
UN sanctions, including designations and measures targeting Da'esh's finances. Proper
implementation and monitoring (through international consultations).

- 
Capacity-building
support for neighbouring countries to counter terrorist financing and related
corruption.

- 
Encouragement
of listing requests to the UN's al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee for its consideration
of additional designations of individuals and entities supporting Da'esh  in
line with UNSC Resolution 2170, for example middlemen in the black market for oil
in Syria and Iraq.

- 
If
needed, the EU could create an autonomous sanctions regime to supplement the UN
al-Qaeda sanction regime. Any such sanctions regime must comply with the EU
Charter of fundamental rights and the Kadi jurisprudence of the Court of
Justice of the EU[5].

- 
Encourage
criminal investigations and judicial cooperation aimed at prosecuting foreign
fighters and terrorist recruiting organisations and the confiscation of their
criminal assets and tools.

Continued
EU support to conflict-affected, refugee and displaced populations (livelihood
and education in particular) and endeavours to build community resilience while
addressing basic needs can also constitute effective means to reduce the
attractiveness of terrorist groups.

2.1.3    Prevent
regional spill-overs and enhance border security

It
will be crucial to prevent Da'esh from gaining a covert or overt presence in
neighbouring countries. Lebanon in particular has suffered terrorist attacks
orchestrated by Da'esh associates in the country. Jordan has managed to contain
any form of violence despite localised minor demonstrations of popular sympathy
for Da'esh. Turkey, which is engaged in a delicate peace process with the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), has received criticism that it is giving
insufficient priority to the fight against Da'esh. Turkey also faces the risk
of terrorist infiltration. Preventing regional spill-overs of the Syrian and
Iraqi crisis will require a substantial increase in the level of assistance
provided to neighbouring countries to help them cope with the refugee influx
(see 2.1.5).

Support
to Lebanon and Jordan is required in the field of security and border management.
A Dialogue on migration, mobility and security with Lebanon started in December
2014 while a Mobility Partnership with Jordan was signed in October 2014. In
addition the following should be envisaged:

- 
continued
EU and Member States support to Lebanon's security sector
reform and the implementation of EU support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
in areas such as civil-military cooperation, maritime security, border
security, counter terrorism and military training and education;

- 
further
support, as appropriate, aimed at (i) enhancing capacity to plan and conduct
operations; (ii) enhancing LAF's logistical system; (iii) setting up a training
cycle for the LAF; (iv) assisting the LAF with Border Management and Border
Security; (v) development of a future-oriented LAF border forces security
concept; (vi) improvement of LAF role in counter-terrorism with a focus on
legislative, strategic and institutional aspects; and (vii) reviewing the LAF
education and training system; and

- 
establishment
of a security dialogue with Jordan to review the security situation in the
region and help pave the way for enhanced security and counter-terrorism
cooperation. Assessment of the needs of the Jordan security forces (including
Land Border Regiments) in that context and consideration of options to
complement the support that Jordan will receive as part of the NATO's Defence
Capacity Building Initiative.

As
for Turkey, the following are envisaged:

- 
continued
support to Turkey for the implementation of its National Action Plan for the
establishment of Integrated Border Management, including through the reform and
modernisation of surveillance techniques along its land borders and controls at
border crossing points; and

- 
the
already ongoing EU-Turkey dialogue on counter-terrorism may contribute to
identify areas where specific EU support could be offered to Turkish
authorities with the aim of strengthening their capacity to control the flow of
persons and materials across their borders and to identify and detect persons
requiring close surveillance, firearms, explosives and other dangerous
substances.

Means
of EU engagement: IcSP, ENI, IPA and Member States
contributions.

2.1.4    Provide
life-saving humanitarian aid and international protection

The
EU has been the leading international donor in response to the Syrian crisis
with more than EUR 3.3 billion - including more than EUR 2 billion in
humanitarian assistance - allocated to the affected populations in Syria, Iraq
and neighbouring countries (most notably Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt).
While needs are growing further, the EU and its Member States should continue to
provide humanitarian assistance and international protection to affected Syrians
and Iraqis, including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), for a
prolonged period within Syria and Iraq as well as in neighbouring countries and
EU countries. It is also essential to link the humanitarian efforts better with
displaced persons' mid to long term assistance to displaced people, in
particular children and young people, as means to promote resilience, recovery
and post-conflict reintegration and development, and to counter potential
radicalisation amongst refugee populations. Given the severe limitations on the
EU budget, additional innovative ways of funding have to be jointly explored
with EU Member States.

Means
of EU engagement:

Coordination:

Continue to
provide support to the UN-led coordination system, in accordance with the EU
consensus on Humanitarian Aid and International Humanitarian Law.

Access:

- 
Use
of all possible models of delivery (including cross-border and cross-line
assistance) to ensure access to all people in need including those in
hard-to-reach areas (4.8 million people in Syria, 3.6 million across Iraq by
mid-January 2015).

- 
Proactive
engagement with all parties to the conflict to increase the humanitarian space
in Syria and Iraq and access to all people in need.

- 
Reinforce
the UN's capacity to negotiate access, in particular in Syria and Iraq through
OCHA, and ensure better coordination, in particular between cross-border and
cross-line operations.

- 
Strengthen
capacity-building of local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to deliver
assistance.

Protection:

- 
Ensure
the protection of affected populations; promote international, refugee and humanitarian
law.

- 
Insist
with the authorities of affected countries that government policies must comply
with International Humanitarian Law, so as to prevent refoulement or the
creation of informal unprotected camps in non-man’s land zones, guarantee that
proper registration and documentation mechanisms for IDPs and refugees are set
up, and that vulnerable displaced persons and refugees, women and children in
particular, have access to legal advice and adequate protection. Furthermore
support the UNHCR's and other actors' efforts to ensure government policies
meet these standards.

- 
Continue
to advocate for the safety and protection of humanitarian aid workers and the
inviolability of health and educational facilities.

Civil/military
relations

- 
Reinforce
UN-led civil/military coordination and liaison to ensure compliance with  International
Humanitarian Law and the respect of humanitarian principles while mitigating
risks for the security of humanitarian actors and improving access to
populations in need.

Country-specific
approaches

- 
Encourage
the UN to pursue non-discriminatory and all-inclusive country-specific
approaches ("Whole of Syria" and "All of Iraq").

- 
Continue
to advocate for integrated and prioritised humanitarian and development appeals
and joint gap analysis, as well as the implementation of the 3RPs (Regional
Refugee and Resilience Plan) through national response plans in neighbouring
countries.

Rapid
Response Capacity and monitoring

- 
Strengthen
a country wide and multi-sectoral early warning system.

- 
Scale-up
preparedness and rapid response capacities by integrating greater flexibility
into existing agreements with partners, in order to respond better to emerging
needs, establish contingency stock arrangements, and considering contributions
to existing emergency response funds.

Public
diplomacy and visibility of aid

- 
Enhance
communication about EU humanitarian and development assistance both in the
region and in the EU, if needed on the basis of reviewed
communication/visibility guidelines.

Cater
to displaced persons longer-term development needs

- 
Focus
part of the EU's development assistance in Syria and Iraq as well as in
neighbouring countries on displaced persons' needs, in particular education for
children and vocational training or retraining for adults focusing on the jobs
needed in a post conflict environment. Such vocational training should include
training for women in order to boost their economic and social role in
post-conflict reconstruction.

Resettlement
and asylum

- 
Continue
to support the long term capacity of host states to address refugee flows in
particular through the Regional Development and Protection Programmes (RDPPs)
in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, and by helping Turkey to provide humanitarian
assistance to Syrian refugees and supporting it in the establishment and
operation of a modern and stable asylum system.

- 
Continue
to offer resettlement prospects to Syrian refugees (and where appropriate
Iraqis) in the EU. While UNHCR made a call to the international community for the
resettlement/humanitarian admission of at least 130,000 Syrians, in particular
the most vulnerable individuals. EU Member States have pledged some 36,000
places, making it the largest pledge in the history of EU resettlement efforts.
The Commission supports resettlement efforts under the Asylum, Migration and
Integration Fund.

2.1.5 
Strengthen
local resilience capacities in Syria, Iraq and the affected neighbouring
countries

To
prevent more recruitment by Da'esh, as well as future violence in and between displaced
populations and host communities, assistance and perspectives for a better
future for these populations are essential. Humanitarian efforts must be linked
with the affected person's longer term development needs as a means to promote
post-conflict reintegration and development and to counter potential extremism
amongst refugee populations and host communities. Basic rule of law, provision
of basic services and economic activities should be re-established quickly in
areas freed from Da’esh both in Syria and Iraq, to avoid Da’esh gaining any further
appeal and to create minimum conditions for the voluntary return of IDPs and
refugees in safety and dignity.

These
actions should aim at supporting the resilience of individuals, communities and
institutions in coping with the effects of the crisis.

In
parallel to this assistance, high-level political dialogue both collectively
and bilaterally with the countries hosting Syrian refugees is needed to ensure
that protection and perspectives can be offered to refugees (notably on access
to education, labour market, etc.).

Means
of EU engagement:

Resilience/recovery
assistance and support to local communities and social actors in Syria, Iraq
and the neighbouring countries through the ‘Madad fund’, IcSP,
and direct Member States contributions, in particular:

- 
build
upon existing joint humanitarian aid/development frameworks in the field and
establish joint programming in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey;

- 
use
the ‘Madad
fund’ for stabilisation and resilience aid to refugee and host communities in
Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt. This needs to be achieved in a
holistic way, in coordination with existing funding mechanisms and in line with
current national government planning and the UN 3RP approach;

- 
support
governments of the region to pursue policies conducive to enhanced economic
resilience among refugee and host communities, promote prospects for young
people and respect gender equality; and

- 
implement
the programme of additional assistance to Turkey announced following the Kobani
crisis, aimed at supporting the effort of Turkish authorities to provide
long-term hospitality and assistance to the Syrian refugees sheltered in
Turkey.

More generally, engagement with
relevant diaspora organisations in Europe should be envisaged to enhance the
EU's outreach and boost the effectiveness of its actions.

2.2       COUNTRY-SPECIFIC
OBJECTIVES - SYRIA

2.2.1    Work
towards a political transition

In
coherence with the objectives and actions set out in the Joint Communication 'Towards
a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis',  the EU will continue to
explore all ways and means of resuming the political process in coordination
with regional and international partners in order to achieve a Syrian-led
transition. More particularly, it should:

- 
fully
support UN Special Envoy de Mistura's efforts to achieve a strategic
de-escalation of violence as a basis for a broader sustainable political
process; support concretely the development of his proposals, in particular the
proposal to build on local freezes of hostility in accordance with
international humanitarian law; within this approach, principled humanitarian
and resilience action should remain distinct and separate from political and
security negotiations;

- 
support
local and international mediation and dialogue efforts, including initiatives
promoting local-level agreements and other local peacebuilding initiatives that
may include cross-line cooperation with due consideration to the participation
of women;

- 
seek
international consensus at the level of the UNSC and seek regional consensus
(shared interests include our resolve to protect the unity, territorial
integrity and sovereignty of Syria and to fight against terrorism) and regional
support for a Syrian led political process leading to a transition, in
accordance with relevant UNSC Resolutions and the Geneva Communique of 30 June
2012; and

- 
encourage
the establishment of a support group for the efforts of the UNSG or the Special
Envoy in Syria to forge a broader consensus in favour of a national political
process in that spirit.

Means
of EU engagement: Political and diplomatic
engagement with the countries of the region and international partners with the
objective to de-escalate the regional tensions on the one hand and the war
between the Assad regime and the armed opposition on the other while
incentivising a Syrian broad based transition on the basis of the Geneva
Communique. Increase pressure on the Assad regime, notably through further targeted
sanctions and other appropriate restrictive measures with limited impact on the
civilian population. Enforce robustly EU oil sanctions against Syria and lobby
third countries to do so. Increase dialogue with partners, especially in the
region.

Reinforce
the political staff of the EU Delegation for Syria (which will remain hosted by
the EU Delegation in Beirut). As long as conditions for the reopening of the EU
Delegation in Damascus are not met, regular visits to Syria will continue to
take place.

2.2.2    Strengthen
the moderate opposition and civil society actors

- 
Continue
to support the moderate opposition, including the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary
and Opposition Forces (SOC), but not excluding any other constructive domestic
civil society or political forces, with a view to fostering its inclusivity
(including religious and ethnic minorities), efficiency and equal opportunities.
There will not be lasting peace in Syria if the specific grievances of all
ethnic and religious groups are not equally addressed and the country's
multi-ethnic and multi-religious character is not maintained.

- 
Continue
to explore and support where appropriate track 2 and track 3 initiatives that
could help shape eventually a transition model based on the inclusion of
credible opponents in a new transition Government, and a stabilisation process at
local and national levels. Special attention will be given to the participation
of women in these initiatives.

- 
Continue
to support the capacity-building of Syrian civil society organizations.

Means
of EU engagement: continued support
to peace-building and mediation efforts with a focus on building the capacities
of internal civil society actors and resilience activities through the IcSP and
ENI.

2.2.3    Provide
basic services and contribute to rebuilding an administration in areas of
reduced violence

- 
Enhance
the level of cross-border and cross-lines provision of non-humanitarian
assistance in Syria.

- 
Help
the moderate opposition and civil-society entities re-establish an
administration and public services (including civil protection, health,
education), as well as overall economic activity, in areas of reduced violence,
in areas previously occupied by Da'esh, and in the mainly Syrian Kurdish populated
regions of the north of Syria.

- 
Support
the delivery of basic services in key areas, based on the principles of inclusivity,
good governance and community consultation, and support resilience activities,
including sustainable management and protection of natural resources.

Means
of EU engagement:

Reinforced
resilience / recovery assistance such as targeted EU or Member State funded
activities supporting local communities and social actors (including operations
managed from Gaziantep with the participation of several Member States),
supported through the ‘Madad fund’, IcSP or ENI.

In the short-term, EU civil
society projects funded through the ENI (17 million euros) and the IcSP (12
million euros) will contribute to the capacity-building of Syrian civil society
organisations, provision of basic services, rule of law measures and the
development of an inclusive, participatory political environment at local
level. Targeted programmes for minorities could also be explored in order to
ensure the safety of all ethnic and religious communities, ensure an inclusive
transition, meet special needs and support their reintegration in society.

2.2.4    Promote
human rights/international humanitarian law and ensure accountability

- 
Continue
to investigate and document war crimes and crimes against humanity, in
particular in support of possible future criminal accountability.

- 
Work
with partners in support of the UN Commission of Inquiry and other
accountability initiatives to prepare for an accountability process and to
challenge the culture of impunity.

- 
Continue
to support the activities of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in particular the verification mission
and the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and production facilities.

- 
Continue
to seek ways to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) and support complementary accountability mechanisms, including at
national level.

Means
of EU engagement: Diplomatic
engagement, including at the level of the UNSC and practical support to human
rights defenders through the IcSP and the European Instrument for Democracy
and Human Rights (EIDHR), judicial cooperation.

2.2.5    Prepare
for the 'day after'

- 
Continue
to plan for long term recovery and the reconstruction of Syria and pave the way
for the return and re-integration of refugees and internally displaced persons,
notably through regular damage and needs assessments in Syria.

- 
Continue
building the capacities of Syrian citizens and Syrian civil society, including
organisations that promote gender equality and empowerment, to allow ordinary
Syrians to play an active role in Syria’s reconstruction.

- 
Explore
further opportunities for Syrian students and researchers through scholarships
in Europe and vocational training opportunities in the region.

- 
Continue
to identify opportunities for building capacity and skills of Syrians to steer
the transition (in areas such as media regulation, decentralisation,
administration of municipalities, constitution drafting, etc.) with due
consideration to women's needs and role.

- 
Continue
to carefully plan for a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process
as part of a security sector reform.

- 
Continue
to assess regularly whether the current conditions permit the preparation for
and implementation of transitional justice measures designed to promote
reconciliation, foster trust and strengthen the rule of law.

- 
Carefully
pave the ground for constitution and electoral reform, including the political
party laws.

- 
Reflect
on means to protect the remaining cultural heritage and to promote cultural
diversity, in particular through educational and sensitisation campaigns.

- 
Maintain
the EU's leading role in donor coordination in order to enhance coherence,
coordination and predictability of the international assistance to the
reconstruction of Syria.

- 
Fully
use the potential of the Erasmus+ programme which finances scholarships for the
mobility of Syrian students and cooperation projects involving Syrian higher
education institutions aiming at their modernisation. Explore further
possibilities to support neighbouring countries and universities in providing
higher education services to Syrian students.

The
EU will pursue those efforts, bearing in mind that the collapse of State
institutions in Syria must be avoided.

Means
of EU engagement: ENI, ‘Madad fund’,
IcSP ("Tahdir programme: Preparing for Transition in Syria"), trilateral
agreement between the UN, the World Bank and the EU on Post-Conflict Needs
Assessments, Erasmus+.

2.3       COUNTRY-SPECIFIC
OBJECTIVES - IRAQ

2.3.1    Support
the Iraqi government in making inclusiveness a reality

The
main objective for the EU in Iraq must be to support an inclusive Iraqi
government in its efforts to address Iraqi citizens' legitimate grievances and
to promote a long-term process of state building and national reconciliation,
based on the provisions of the Iraqi Constitution. The government’s programme
(2014-2018) and the Iraqi National Development Plan (2014-2017) are a good
basis for this, and the EU-Iraq PCA, parts of which are already being applied
on a provisional basis, provides a framework for cooperation on a wide range of
issues. Whilst Sunni grievances need to be addressed, the rise of sectarianism
and radicalisation across most Iraqi communities needs to be tackled
comprehensively and across the whole country. The EU will seek to cooperate
with UNAMI and UN agencies operating in Iraq as closely as possible.

o 
Engage
with moderate marginalised Sunni groups

The Iraqi
government should be supported in engaging with all components of Iraqi
society, especially moderate religious and political groups, in order to give
them a stake in Iraq's future. However, particular attention needs to be given
to the Sunni community in order to disengage the Sunni population from any
support to Da'esh. This should be a step taken in parallel to any requests to
these groups to resist and take up arms against Da'esh. Engagement with the
Sunni community should spell out measures to address known grievances and
promote reconciliation, to ensure the safety of the population (particularly groups
that join in the fight against Da'esh) and to provide guarantees of future
consultation on policy making. At the same time moderate Shia communities and
civil society groups need to be supported to counter the stigmatisation and
backlash against the Sunni community.

o 
Engage
with the Kurdistan region of Iraq

The resolution
of the federal government's disputes with the government of the Kurdistan
region, including a final, lasting settlement on the transfer of oil revenues
and the disputed territories, is a major priority and would significantly
improve the political climate in Iraq. The EU should encourage the federal
government and the Kurdistan regional government to agree a clear roadmap with
timelines for the resolution of the disputes on the basis of constitutional
provisions.

o Consolidate
democratically run state institutions and support political and legislative
reform

The EU and its
Member States should support the Iraqi government in its efforts to launch a
thorough administrative reform programme to boost the capacity of civilian
government entities based on modern principles of administration and financial
management. Fundamental principles of such a reform should be the separation of
political and administrative positions, the creation of an independent civil
service, and application of a non-sectarian equal opportunities policy based on
qualifications and competence.

Support for
initiatives for political and legislative reform, put forward by the government,
civil society and other parties, within the framework of the Iraqi constitution
should be considered, provided they advance national reconciliation and
development.

o Restructure
the security sector

Security sector
reform covers a broad number of activities, ranging from support to military forces
to reforms of the legal framework. Any future EU activity in this area needs to
take into account the activities of the Global Coalition to counter Da'esh and
the EU Member States' bilateral efforts in order to achieve complementarity. EU
Member States are currently engaged in efforts to restructure and train the ISF.
A corollary of the ISF’s weakness has been the re-emergence of irregular
militia who, whilst bolstering the efforts of the ISF, are also responsible for
a number of atrocities and human rights violations. The progressive demobilisation
of Shia militias and other armed groups, and their replacement by competent
cross-sectarian Iraqi security forces is crucial to national reconciliation. The
Iraqi government has a duty of care to ensure that it will be the only weapons
holder, and will ban any armed formation outside the government framework, in
line with the Iraq Constitution. At the same time the presence and competences
of civilian police forces need to be strengthened.

o Judicial
reforms and mainstreaming respect for human rights

Failures in rule
of law lie at the heart of the crisis in Iraq. The EU and its Member States should
consider enhancing their support to the Iraqi government in the introduction of
measures strengthening the rule of law and the protection of human rights in
all areas of Iraqi public life. This must include the reform of existing
controversial legislation and its implementation, which have been drivers of
radicalisation and resistance to the Iraqi government. A determined effort must
be made to strengthen the independence of institutions, especially the
judiciary. Human rights training needs to be incorporated and mainstreamed in
the curricula of civilian and military security forces, and cooperation of the
security forces with legal institutions, as well as police oversight bodies,
should be improved. The status and capacity of the Human Rights Commission
should be enhanced. Greater respect for human rights in the penitentiary system
will contribute to countering radicalisation. Judicial
capacities to deal with terrorist organisations should be enhanced. The EU should encourage Iraq's accession to the Rome
Statute with a view to enabling international prosecutions in the future. In
all these endeavours it essential to learn the lessons from the EU's past support
for justice reform efforts under the EUJUSTLEX mission. In the longer term,
Iraq should be encouraged to set out a plan for the phasing out of the death
penalty given its ineffectiveness and potential role in radicalisation.

o Strengthening
regional and local administration

The Iraqi
constitution foresees the possibility of greater regional and local autonomy
with the Iraqi government itself indicating in its programme that decentralisation
would be a possibility. Greater political and financial autonomy in the running
of provincial and local affairs, including local control of the local security
apparatus, as well as greater proximity to the decision making process, can
help address local grievances. This must, however, be coupled with a system to
support the fair distribution of resources amongst the localities and
cross-sectarian confidence-building measures between entities, for example
through regional infrastructure and other cooperation projects.

Means
of EU engagement:

Institutional
issues

- 
Political
and official-level contacts, notably in the framework of the PCA. In this
regard, the speedy ratification of the PCA by EU Member States would send a
strong signal of EU commitment.

- 
Given
the Kurdistan region’s key role in the fight against Da’esh and in the
resolution of Iraq’s political crisis, the EU will seek to increase its
presence in Erbil, in full respect of Iraq’s constitutional order. Subject to
the agreement of the central government and to budgetary constraints, an
antenna of the EU Delegation to Iraq will be established in Erbil. The EU will
seek to facilitate the flow of information between Baghdad and Erbil. As
appropriate, it will also promote the involvement of the Government of the
Kurdistan Region (KRG) in the implementation of the EU-Iraq PCA.

- 
The
possibility of supporting Iraqi-driven diplomacy to reach out to countries in
the region and beyond, building on the experience and know-how gained by Iraq
in its international rehabilitation efforts between 2003 and 2010, should be
examined.

- 
The
EU Delegation in Iraq should be strengthened, inter alia with security experts
from the Member States.

Technical
assistance

- 
The
EU can mobilise expertise available in the Member States to train and advise Iraqi
state institutions in areas such as public administration reform, security
sector reform, human rights compliant counter-terrorism measures, border
security/Integrated Border Management (IBM), building on the provisions of the
EU-Iraq PCA, and in particular the provisions on cooperation set out under Title
III, which are applicable provisionally.

- 
In
the security sector, EU support could help build Iraqi capacity to contain
Da'esh. The use of EU instruments will be further explored accordingly. In
order to avoid duplication of efforts, it is important, however, to recall
Member States' existing engagement in providing military support to Iraq
primarily through the Global Coalition to counter Da'esh and its working
groups, as well as through NATO which is considering supporting the Iraqi
Security Forces in the framework of the Defence Capacity Building Initiative. In
order to facilitate the return of IDPs to territories retaken from Da’esh,
technical assistance for de-mining operations and for the neutralisation of
explosive devices planted by Da’esh could be made available.

- 
CT
capacity building support (civilian aspects) will be provided, in harmony with
the efforts of the Global Coalition and its working groups to encourage the
Iraqi government to adopt a new, comprehensive approach to CT, based on respect
for human rights and focused on prevention. Possible areas of support include: capacity
building; intelligence gathering, analysis, sharing and protection; and the
fight against financing of terrorism.

- 
EU
efforts to foster institutional and legal reforms and the mainstreaming of human
rights can build on the EU's ongoing Development Cooperation Instrument
(DCI) project in support of Rule of Law, future support measures in the
framework of the DCI Multi-annual Indicative Programming for 2014-2017, and
lessons learnt from the EU JUSTLEX mission.

- 
Upon
the request of the Iraqi government, and provided Member States can fund these
operations, the EU can draw on a multitude of models within the EU and experts
both at national and EU level (Committee of the Regions) in order to advise the
Iraqi government on how to best implement devolution in practice.

- 
It
will be important to reach out to the Iraqi Council of Representatives. The
European Parliament and national parliaments are encouraged to play a prominent
role.

- 
The
EU will set out contingency plans for the delivery of quick support to the
government of Iraq in its efforts to restore and boost basic services in areas
liberated from Da'esh, in order to encourage the earliest possible voluntary,
safe and dignified return of IDPs to their homes and with the provision that
minimum protection guarantees are in place.

2.3.2    Support
basic services, economic development and fight corruption

Stability
in Iraq can only be sustainable if its huge wealth is harnessed for the benefit
of all citizens. Weak public financial management in general and pervasive
corruption have led to inefficient budget implementation and poor service
delivery, as well as, in some areas, to the degradation of the environment and
natural resources. As a consequence of the security crisis, the economy is
shrinking and, in the wake of the declining oil price, public revenue and
foreign reserves are decreasing. Prudent economic and fiscal policy reforms
will be necessary to ensure the fiscal sustainability that is essential to meet
the increased costs of social needs and security.

In
terms of its "Doing Business" environment, for over a decade Iraq's
performance has been far below the region's average with access to credit being
one of the worst obstacles for private sector development. A determined fight
against corruption and an improvement of Iraq's administrative capacity is
required. The provision of basic social services (education, medicine) and
infrastructure (electricity, transport) must also be improved urgently. The strengthening
of the private sector and the promotion of an investment-friendly climate will
be needed to ensure that economic progress is sustainable.

A
major challenge for Iraq will be to link sustainable development with
humanitarian aid, while mobilising the necessary resources to deliver basic
services for displaced persons and facilitating the return and re-integration
of IDPs. This implies the provision of basic services such as water, energy,
housing, school education and higher education (Erasmus+ capacity building
action newly available to Iraq), security, and access to finance (e.g., SME
finance and microfinance), with due consideration given to the empowerment of
women, and protection of natural resources.

Means
of EU engagement:

Key
aims of cooperation under the EU-Iraq PCA are macroeconomic stability, debt
sustainability and public expenditure effectiveness. To this end the
cooperation could accompany economic and business environment reforms, in
particular within the sub-committees on trade and economic issues and on energy
and transport. The parties could explore: a) macroeconomic developments b)
general economic and fiscal policies (governance of natural resource revenue, scaling
down subsidies and support to state-owned enterprises, investments into
electricity distribution, promotion of renewable energy development and energy
efficiency measures, increasing oil exports and facilitation of future gas
exports - the EU-Iraq Energy Centre and related support measures of the EU and
the Iraqi government are expected to contribute to that aim) c) financial
sector development (deepening of the financial market, easing access to private
credit, and increasing financial inclusion) and d) provision of information and
technical expertise to help improve agricultural production. Cooperation to
minimise the longer-term impact of the energy sector on the environment and
climate change will also be envisaged.

Technical
assistance can be offered through the DCI and other instruments to improve Public
Finance Management (in the framework of a concerted engagement by the IMF,
World Bank and EU) and through advice on economic reforms.

The
‘Madad fund' and IcSP could provide seed money in the effort to link development
with humanitarian assistance. Such linkages need to build on existing support
and be widened as soon as possible to support conditions of protracted
displacement and in preparation for the IDPs return to their homes, in order to
lay the foundations for stability and sustainable economic growth.

Once
a Framework Agreement is in place, the EIB – the EU Bank – can consider
starting operations in Iraq with a main focus on supporting economic and social
infrastructure development. The EIB could make available its technical
expertise by providing upstream advisory services for the identification and
preparation of key projects. It could further support such projects by
providing financing, either through risk capital or through loans and blending.
Building on its experience in post-conflict areas, the EIB could also
investigate the possibility of setting up and managing dedicated trust-funds.

2.3.3    Support
peace building, national reconciliation and transitional justice

Beyond
political reforms, Iraq should be encouraged on a path of national
reconciliation and cross sectarian dialogue with the objective of developing a
sense of citizenship separate from sectarian and ethnic identity and promoting
the richness of Iraq's cultural diversity. Iraqi civil society groups have a
key role to play in peace-building, promoting Iraqi national identity,
countering sectarian propaganda, protecting cultural heritage and diversity, as
well as in advocacy on these key themes vis-à-vis the government.

On
the question of justice and redress, the Iraqi government will need to make
difficult choices, for example through a national 'truth and reconciliation'
process that would have to be cross-sectarian and address crimes committed not
just by Da'esh
and members of the Sunni community but also by Shia militia and Iraqi security
forces. Such a process may be essential to reinforce Iraqi citizenship.

There
may be a need to provide international support for policing/peace-keeping
operations in areas where communities remain in conflict with each other.

Means
of EU engagement: Support for judicial and parliamentary
bodies, as well as civil society organisations, in support of peace building and
transitional justice activities should be considered under the EIDHR
and/or the ‘Madad fund’.

As
serious war crimes and human rights violations have been committed, addressing
these will be important for reconciliation. The EU should support the efforts
of public bodies, NGOs and the ICC in this context.

3
– ASSUMPTIONS, TIMEFRAME AND REVIEW

The
EU's ability to deliver on the objectives and actions set out above will be
heavily dependent on the evolving situation on the ground, including the fight
against Da'esh  as well as the willingness of national and regional players to
act in accordance with the stated objectives.

Ideally
Da'esh and other terrorist groups should be defeated in both Iraq and Syria,
and the countries' political problems solved concurrently. The fulfilment of
all objectives in either Syria or Iraq alone without matching progress in the
other country could jeopardise lasting stability and economic development in
the region.

The
present framework has a multiannual horizon. To remain relevant, it will
require a high degree of flexibility to adapt to developments on the ground. It
is proposed to establish an annual review process in order to assess the impact
of the EU's policies. This should include a review of the perception of the EU's
policies amongst its primary beneficiaries in Syria, Iraq and the wider region,
in order to ensure the necessary, continued buy-in of the local population to
the EU's engagement.

The
EU needs to ensure that it communicates its strategic engagement in the most
effective way, both to the EU citizens', in view of the impact of the crises in
Syria and Iraq on the EU and the financial commitments being made, and to the
local population in those countries and the wider region.

Annex

FINANCIAL STATEMENT

1. 
FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE 
1.1. 
Title of the proposal/initiative

Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative
for Foreign and Security Policy: “Elements for an EU regiona strategy for Syria
and Iraq as well as the Da' esh threat”

1.2. 
Policy area(s) concerned in the ABM/ABB
structure[6]

Heading 4 – Global Europe

TITLE 19 — FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS

TITLE 21 — DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION

TITLE 22 — ENLARGEMENT

TITLE 23 — HUMANITARIAN AID AND CIVIL PROTECTION

1.3. 
Nature of the proposal/initiative

 ̈ The
proposal/initiative relates to a new action

 ̈ The
proposal/initiative relates to a new action following a pilot
project/preparatory action[7]

X The proposal/initiative relates to the extension of an existing
action

 ̈ The
proposal/initiative relates to an action redirected towards a new action

1.4. 
Objective(s)

1.4.1.     The Commission's
multiannual strategic objective(s) targeted by the proposal/initiative

Global Europe: A stronger global actor

The
Middle-East is currently experiencing a profound crisis. The conflicts in Syria
and Iraq are both a reflection and a driver of this crisis, with the growing
potential to destabilise neighbouring countries (including the EU candidate
country Turkey) and the wider region. These crises have created a humanitarian
disaster affecting more than 13.5 million people forced to flee their homes,
and more than 17 million people in need of humanitarian aid (12.2 in Syria and
5.2 in Iraq).

Following
more than four years of brutal conflict in Syria, Da'esh's declared endeavour
to act as an alternative, ideologically radical state has proven appealing to
extremists in the region and beyond, particularly in areas in Syria and Iraq
where state authority has collapsed and where a feeling of political and
socio-economic marginalisation prevailed.

As
an important actor in the region, the EU has a responsibility to ensure that it
uses its influence and its numerous instruments effectively and coherently to
defend human lives, human dignity and rights, and help resolve these crises, in
close coordination with regional and international partners. In addition, there
are compelling reasons of self-interest for the EU to increase its engagement
in Syria, Iraq and the neighbouring countries.

1.4.2.     Specific objective(s) and ABM/ABB
activity(ies) concerned

ABM/ABB activity (ies) concerned:

19.02 - Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace - Crisis
response, conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness

21.02 – Development Cooperation Instrument

21.03 - European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)

21.04 – EIDHR

22.02 - Enlargement process and strategy

23.02 - Humanitarian aid, food aid and disaster preparedness

Specific objectives relating to the ABM activity – 19.02

In a siutation of crisis or emerging crisis, to contribute swiftly
to stability by providing an effective response designed to help, establish or
re-establish the conditions essential to the propoer implementation of the
Union's external policies and actions in accordance with Article 31 TUE.

Specific objectives relating to the ABM activity - 21.02

Fostering the sustainable and inclusive development in partner
countries and regions and the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, good
governance and respect for human rights, as foreseen in the TEU, with the
primary aim of eradicating poverty.

Specific objectives relating to the ABM activity - 21.03

Promoting confidence building and other measures contributing to
security and the prevention and settlement of conflicts.

Specific objective relating to the ABM activity – 21.04

Enhancing the respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms,

Specific objective relating to the ABM activity – 22.02

Support for economic, social and territorial development

Specific objectives relating to the ABM activity – 23.02

Provide life-saving humanitarian aid and international protection

All those instruments shall provide actions in support of the
objectives as set out in the Communication as regards:

Objectives common to Syria, Iraq and other affected countries

1. Promote regional engagement in support of security and long-term
peace

2. Isolate and defeat Da'esh as a military
force and as a terrorist organisation and counter its ideological influence

3. Prevent regional spill-overs and enhance border security

4. Provide life-saving humanitarian aid and
international protection

5. Strengthen local resilience capacities in
Syria, Iraq and the affected neighbouring countries

In Syria:

1. Work toward a political transition

2. Strengthen the moderate opposition and civil society actors

3. Provide basic services and contribute to rebuilding an
administration in areas of reduced violence

4. Promote human rights / international humanitarian law and ensure
accountability

5. Prepare for the 'day after'

In Iraq:

1. Support the Iraqi government in making inclusiveness a reality

2. Support basic services, economic development and fight corruption

3. Support peace building, national reconciliation and transitional
justice

1.5. 
Grounds for the proposal/initiative

1.5.1.     Requirement(s) to be met in
the short or long term

The EU must secure sustainable and predictable funding commensurate
to the unprecedented level of needs in the region.

1.5.2.     Added value of EU
involvement

The EU is already at the forefront of international efforts in
support of the people of Syria in particular. The proposed strategy will draw
on and complement the EU counter-terrorism/foreign fighters strategy
and the Joint Communication: Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the
Syrian crisis

1.5.3.     Lessons learned from
similar experiences in the past

Several instruments shall be used to tackle the crisis from
different angles and to avoid spill over effects to neighbouring countries,
along the lines of the Joint Communication: Towards a comprehensive EU approach
to the Syrian crisis. Effective coordination of the response is essential.

1.5.4.     Compatibility and possible
synergy with other appropriate instruments

The proposal considers a combination of different instruments.
Activities are mutually
reinforcing and therefore must to be carried out broadly in parallel.

1.6. 
Duration and financial impact

X Proposal/initiative
of limited duration

– 
X  Proposal/initiative in effect in 2015 and 2016

– 
X Financial impact in 2015 and 2016

1.7. 
Management mode(s) planned[8]

X Direct
management by the Commission

– 
X  by its departments, including by its staff in
the Union delegations;

– 
X  by the executive agencies

X Indirect
management by entrusting budget implementation
tasks to:

– 
X third countries or the bodies they have
designated;

– 
X international organisations and their agencies
(to be specified);

– 
 ̈the EIB and the European Investment Fund;

– 
 ̈ bodies referred to in Articles 208 and 209 of the Financial
Regulation;

– 
X public law bodies;

– 
X bodies governed by private law with a public
service mission to the extent that they provide adequate financial guarantees;

– 
 ̈ bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the implementation of a public-private partnership and that
provide adequate financial guarantees;

– 
 ̈ persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in
the CFSP pursuant to Title V of the TEU, and identified in the relevant basic
act.

– If more than one management mode is
indicated, please provide details in the ‘Comments’ section.

Comments

Management modes will be decided according to the
stipulations of the relevant instruments through the respective Financing
Decisions.

2. 
MANAGEMENT MEASURES 
2.1. 
Monitoring and reporting rules

Specify frequency
and conditions.

The monitoring and reporting rules as laid down in the relevant
legal bases will be applied.

2.2. 
Management and control system

2.2.1.     Risk(s) identified

1) The lack of political and administrative stability in partner
countries may lead to difficulties in designing programmes, delays in
disbursing funds and loss of effectiveness;

2) The lack of circulation of information may hamper the resolution
of problematic issues related to aid management.

2.2.2.     Information concerning the
internal control system set up

The control methods envisaged comply with the internal control
standards of the Commission as set out in the Management Plans of the relevant
services.

In the area of humanitarian aid, there is an effective control
system based on the use of external experts undertaking ex-ante assesments of
projects and monitoring, as well as evaluations. The humanitarian projects are
subject to external audit.

2.3. 
Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities

Specify existing or
envisaged prevention and protection measures.

The protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the
fight against fraud and irregularities form an integral part of the relevant
legal bases. Administrative monitoring of contracts and payments will be the
responsibility of the relevant Authorising Officer, whereas for humanitarian
aid the responsibilty lies with the Headquarters assited by the ECHO experts in
the field. Particular attention will be paid to the nature of expenditure
(eligibility of expenditure), to respect for budgets (actual expenditure) and
to verify supporting information and relevant documentation (evidence of
expenditure).

3. 
ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE
PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE 
3.1. 
Heading(s) of the multiannual financial
framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected

· Existing budget lines

In order of
multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.

Heading of multiannual financial framework || Budget line || Type of expenditure || Contribution

Number [Heading.............................................] || Diff./Non-diff.[9] || from EFTA countries[10] || from candidate countries[11] || from third countries || within the meaning of Article 21(2)(b) of the Financial Regulation

4 || 23.02.01 HUMA- Humanitarian aid || Diff./Non-diff. || NO || NO || NO || NO

|| || || || || ||

3.2. 
Estimated impact on expenditure

3.2.1.     Summary of estimated impact
on expenditure

EUR million (to three decimal places)

Heading of multiannual financial framework || Number || Heading 4, Global Europe

DG: ECHO || || || Year N[12] || Year N+1 || Year N+2 || Year N+3 || Enter as many years as necessary to show the duration of the impact (see point 1.6) || TOTAL

Ÿ Operational appropriations || || || || || || || ||

23.02.01  Delivery of rapid, effective and needs-based humanitarian aid || Commitments || (1) || 50 || || || || || || || 50

Payments || (2) || 50 || || || || || || || 50

Payments || (2a) || || || || || || || ||

Appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope of specific programmes[13] || N/A || || || || || || ||

TOTAL appropriations for DG ECHO || Commitments || =1+1a +3 || 50 || || || || || || || 50

Payments || =2+2a +3 || 50 || || || || || || || 50

Ÿ TOTAL operational appropriations || Commitments || (4) || 50 || || || || || || || 50

Payments || (5) || 50 || || || || || || || 50

Ÿ TOTAL appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope for specific programmes || (6) || N/A || || || || || || ||

TOTAL appropriations under HEADING 4 of the multiannual financial framework || Commitments || =4+ 6 || 50 || || || || || || || 50

Payments || =5+ 6 || 50 || || || || || || || 50

3.2.2.     Estimated impact on
appropriations of an administrative nature

3.2.1.1. 
Summary

– 
X The proposal/initiative does not require the
use of appropriations of an administrative nature

3.2.1.2. 
Estimated requirements of human resources

– 
X  The proposal/initiative does not require any additional
human resources.

3.2.3.     Compatibility with the
current multiannual financial framework

– 
X The proposal/initiative is compatible with the
current multiannual financial framework.

– 
X The proposal/initiative will entail
reprogramming of the relevant heading in the multiannual financial framework.

The additional funding for the activities identified in this
statement will be totally financed through redeployment and reprogramming of
the envelopes of the external relations instruments which are part of Heading 4
of the Multi-annual financial framework. The Commission will propose a transfer
from the Emergency Aid Reserve to Humanitarian Aid in 2015, and any
reallocation of commitments needed in 2016 will be settled in the framework of
the 2016 budgetary procedure.

The sources of funding are described in the table below.

Package for the crisis in Syria and
neighbouring countries over 2 years (2015-2016)

(Commitment appropriations)

DG || Financial Instruments H4 || 2015 EUR million || 2016 EUR million || 2015-2016 EUR million

ECHO || HUMA - HIP Syria Iraq || 200 || 200 || 400

NEAR || ENI – Syria crisis || 72 || 72 || 144

IPA - Turkey || 78 || 78 || 156

DEVCO || DCI || 50 || 50 || 100

FPI || IcSP || 35 || 35 || 70

DEVCO || EIDHR || 7 || 8 || 15

ECFIN || Loan Guarantee* || || 65 || 65

EAR || Emergency Aid Reserve* || 50 || || 50

Total || || 492 || 508 || 1,000

- These
appropriations will be proposed for transfer (in 2015) or reallocation (in the
2016 Draft Budget) to the relevant instruments for implementation.

3.2.4.     Third-party contributions

– 
The proposal/initiative does not provide for
co-financing by third parties.

3.3. 
Estimated impact on revenue

– 
X  The proposal/initiative has no financial
impact on revenue.

[1] The
so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, whose acronym  in Arabic is Da’esh.

[2] Communication 
JOIN(2013)22 of 24 June 2013 'Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the
Syrian crisis'; ‘EU
Counter-terrorism/foreign fighters strategy' adopted by Foreign
Affairs Council of  20
October 2014,
ref 14451/14

[3] The Association Agreement was negotiated between
1997 and 2004 and revisited in 2008 but never signed.

[4] The Global Coalition was launched in
September 2014 and has the support of over 60 countries, including key
countries in the region. The EU supports the efforts of this coalition,
including military action in accordance with international law.

[5] See in particular 'Kadi II' judgement of
18 July 2013 (Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10P)

[6]               ABM: activity-based management; ABB: activity-based
budgeting.

[7]               As referred to in Article 54(2)(a) or (b) of the
Financial Regulation.

[8]               Details of management modes and references to the
Financial Regulation may be found on the BudgWeb site: http://www.cc.cec/budg/man/budgmanag/budgmanag_en.html

[9]               Diff. = Differentiated appropriations / Non-diff. =
Non-differentiated appropriations.

[10]             EFTA: European Free Trade Association.

[11]             Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential
candidate countries from the Western Balkans.

[12]             Year N is the year in which implementation of the
proposal/initiative starts.

[13]             Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure
in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former ‘BA’
lines), indirect research, direct research.