FILED

April 24, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

TERRY COMPTON, )

 ) Davidson Chancery

Plaintiff/Appellant, ) No. 96-1782-II

 )

VS. ) Appeal No.

 ) 01A01-9710-CH-00539

DONAL CAMPBELL, COMMISSIONER,)

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTION, )

 )

Defendant/Appellee. )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY

AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

HONORABLE CAROL L. McCOY, CHANCELLOR

Terry Compton, #77594

N.W.C.C.

Route 1, Box 660

Tiptonville, TN 38079

PRO SE/PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Sohnia W. Hong, #17415

Assistant Attorney General

Second Floor, Cordell Hull Building

425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243-0488

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

MODIFIED, AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

HENRY F. TODD

PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION

CONCUR:

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

WALTER W. BUSSART, JUDGE
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TERRY COMPTON, )

 ) Davidson Chancery

Plaintiff/Appellant, ) No. 96-1782-II

 )

VS. ) Appeal No.

 ) 01A01-9710-CH-00539

DONAL CAMPBELL, COMMISSIONER,)

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTION, )

 )

Defendant/Appellee. )

O P I N I O N

This is an action by a prisoner in the custody of the Department of Correction challenging

disciplinary action resulting from his misconduct while in the status of minimum security. He

was transferred to medium security. His complaint is essentially that the Department is not

impartial in implementing its “policies” in regard to transferring prisoners from one “security

status” to another.

The petitioner filed the usual petition for judicial review, and the Department moved to

dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The Trial Court sustained the

motion, stating: 

Petitioner has filed a declaratory judgment action

seeking review of his 36 month medium custody

classification that he received in March of 1996, as a result of

a disciplinary report.

Petitioner alleges in his Complaint that he has been

incarcerated since 1975. In September of 1994, Petitioner

was assigned to the Nashville Community Service Center

(NCSC) in a minimum custody level. In February of 1996,

Petitioner received a Class “B” disciplinary report and was

found guilty of such report in March of 1996. As a result of

such finding, he was reclassified to a medium custody level

pursuant to TDOC Policy 404.07§ VI(K)(1)(b) and

transferred from NCSC to the Northwest Correctional Center.

Petitioner has been informed by Respondent Tennessee

Department of Correction (TDOC) that he will remain at

medium custody level for 36 months. He asserts in his

Complaint that, as long as he does not receive any additional

disciplinaries, he should be reclassified to the minimum

custody level at the expiration of 18 months pursuant to

TDOC Policy Nos. 404.07§§ II&V, 401.05§ V, and 401.06 §

V. He asserts that the TDOC’s reliance on 404.07 §
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VI(K)(1)(b) to extend his medium custody classification to 36

months is arbitrary and capricious, and a denial of his equal

protection and due process rights. He further asserts that

401.06 § VI(K)(1)(b) is “inoperable” because it conflicts with

other TDOC policies.

Respondent Donal Campbell has filed a Motion to

Dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the reasons stated

herein, this Motion will be granted.

First, while the UAPA does provide for declaratory

judgment review over state agency rules pursuant to T.C.A.

§ 4-5-224, this does not include TDOC policies applicable to

inmates only. T.C.A. § 4-5-102(10) defines a rule as follows:

“Rule” means each agency statement of

applicability that implements or prescribeslaw

or policy or describes the procedure or

practice requirements of an agency. “Rule”

includes the amendment or repeal of a prior

rule, but does not include:

(A) Statements concerning only

the internal management of

state government and not

affecting private rights,

privileges, or procedures

available to the public...

Because TDOC prisoner policies do not affect rights and

privileges available to the general public, they are not “rules”

subject to a declaratory action under the UAPA. Mandela v.

Reynolds, No. 01A01-9004-CH-00139 (Tenn. App. Dec. 5,

1990);Na’imv.Reynolds,No. 01A01-9003-CH-00114 (Tenn.

App. June 6, 1990). Accordingly, this Court has no

jurisdiction over the policy Petitioner is challenging.

Petitioner’s amendment to his Complaint to provide that all

references to TDOC policy were “intended to be a reference

to the State of Tennessee Regulation containing any similar

number to that of the policy mentioned and from which the

cited policy was developed” does not save Petitioner’s

Complaint because there are no such regulations.

Even if this Court had jurisdiction over TDOC

policies, Petitioner has failed to state a claim. In order to

prevail on his due process claim, Petitioner must assert that he

has been deprived of a liberty interest entitled to due process

protection. In Sandlin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 132

L.Ed. 2d 418 (1995), the Supreme Court held that only those

administrative actions which impose “a typicaland significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life” are subject to due process scrutiny. A

reclassification to medium custody from minimum custody is

not such a hardship and is therefore not subject to due process

protection.
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Petitioner’s other claims regarding the additional 18

months medium security classification are also without merit.

Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to an automatic reduction

to a minimum custody level at the expiration of 18 months

(absent further disciplinary actions) by virtue of 401.06 § V

which requires that the CAF score be used to determine

custody classification unless there is an “authorized override”

of the CAF score. However, 404.07 § VI(K)(1)(b), which

specifically deals with minimum custody classification and

was adopted after the above referred 401.06 § V CAF score

policy, states that a prisoner is not eligible for minimum

custody classification for 36 months after a Class A or B

disciplinary infraction. Petitioner’s disciplinary action was a

Class B infraction. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to the CAF

derived minimum custody level for at least 36 months.

For the reasons stated above, Respondents Motion to

Dismiss will be granted. Litigation costs are taxed to

Petitioner, and all other costs are waived.

TCA § 4-5-224(a) states that a reviewing court may enter a declaratory judgment if it is

determined that a statute, rule, order or its application interferes with or threatens to impair legal

rights.

TCA §§ 41-21-202 and 504 confer upon the Department the discretion to create and

administer a prisoner classification system. McCloud v. Bradley, Tenn. App. 1986, 724 S.W.2d

362. TCA § 4-5-102(10), quoted by the Trial Judge above, states that a “rule” does not include

(A) statement concerning only the internal management of

state government and not affecting private rights, privileges,

or procedures available to the general public.

The “policies” of the Corrections Department are “statements concerning only the

internal management of the Department” and do not affect private rights, privileges or

procedures available to the general public.

The “Security Status” of prisoners incarcerated in an institution controlled by the

Department of Correction is determined by the “policies” of the Department on a prisoner-byprisoner basis. Each prisoner is an individual, and his “Security Status” is determined by a

determination of the security risk represented by each individual prisoner. Members of the
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general public are not subject to such individual evaluation. Therefore, by statute, the policies

controlling such evaluations of prisons are not rules subject to judicial review.

Such individual evaluation and disciplinary procedures do not involve a liberty interest

of constitutional proportions. Sandin v. Conner, 515 US 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed 2d 418

(1995).

The judgment of the Trial Court is modified to require the petitioner to pay all Trial Court

costs. As modified, the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed

against the appellant. The cause is remanded to the Trial Court for collection of costs accrued

in that Court.

 MODIFIED, AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

___________________________________

HENRY F. TODD

PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION

CONCUR:

_____________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

_____________________________

WALTER W. BUSSART, JUDGE