J-S12021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES WATSON

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1048 MDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-08-CR-0000449-2001

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 6, 2023

James Watson (Appellant), appeals pro se from the order entered in the 

Bradford County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing as untimely his third Post 

Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. We note Appellant was found guilty in 

2002 of first-degree murder, conspiracy, kidnapping,2 and related offenses. 

The underlying petition raised several claims of Brady violations,3including 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), 903(a), 2901, respectively.

3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A Brady violation claim avers: 

the Commonwealth suppressed evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, that 

was favorable to the accused, either because it was exculpatory or 

impeaching, and prejudice ensued. Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 

11, 25-26 (Pa. 2019).
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that the Commonwealth failed to provide: DNA test results, the audio 

recordings and transcripts of Appellant’s police interview, as well as the police 

interviews of co-conspirators and defendants. We affirm.

We briefly summarize the underlying facts adduced at trial:

[On] April 17, 2001, an argument developed between Jason Ryans 

(Victim) and the Watson brothers (Kenny Watson and Appellant) 

at Kenny Watson’s home in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The 

Watsons believed [Victim stole] a handgun and a safe containing 

marijuana and money. . . . Kenny Watson punched [Victim]. In 

an ensuing struggle, Appellant grabbed a knife and inflicted 

multiple wounds to [Victim’s] hands and arms. [Victim] was also 

punched and kicked repeatedly by the Watsons. The Watsons 

then bound the wrists of [Victim], either [to stop] his bleeding or 

to prevent his escape, or both. [Victim] was then placed in a 

vehicle and transported to a rural area near the Village of 

Camptown in Bradford County. There, [Victim] was taken from 

the vehicle and shot twice in the back of the head by Appellant. 

[Victim] apparently died immediately.

The evidence against Appellant and Kenny Watson diverged with 

respect to their criminal culpability following the altercation in 

Wilkes-Barre. After [Victim] was bound, the Watsons then 

informed others at the house that they would [take Victim] to a 

hospital, but would seek a rural hospital. The evidence revealed 

that Appellant was in fact simply looking for a secluded place to 

murder [Victim], but the evidence also suggested that Kenny 

Watson, among others, was duped into accompanying Appellant 

to Bradford County. . . .

Commonwealth v. Watson, 1884 MDA 2002 (unpub. memo. at 1-2) (Pa. 

Super. Aug. 20, 2004) (record citation and some punctuation omitted), appeal 

denied, 884 MAL 2004 (Pa. Apr. 18, 2005). 

Appellant and his brother Kenny were jointly tried before a jury. On 

September 12, 2002, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder, 
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conspiracy, kidnapping,4 and related offenses. We note the jury found Kenny 

not guilty of all charges of homicide and conspiracy to commit homicide.

The trial court imposed a sentence of life without parole for first-degree 

murder, as well an aggregate term of 46 to 92 years, to run consecutive to 

the life sentence.

Appellant appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence 

on August 20, 2004. Our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on April 

18, 2005. Watson, 1884 MDA 2002, appeal denied, 884 MAL 2004.

Appellant filed a timely first PCRA petition, and subsequently a second 

PCRA petition. Both were denied, and on appeal, this Court ultimately

affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 202 MDA 2011 (unpub. memo.) 

(Pa. Super. Jun. 1, 2012) (affirming in part and remanding in part denial of 

first PCRA petition), appeal denied, 136 MAL 2013 (Pa. Jul. 31, 2013); 

Commonwealth v. Watson, 216 MDA 2015 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. 

Jan. 15, 2016) (affirming denial of first PCRA petition after remand); 

Commonwealth v. Watson, 1332 MDA 2020 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. 

Jan. 20, 2022) (affirming denial of second PCRA petition).

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4 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 2901.

5 Following this Court’s affirmance of the denial of his second PCRA petition, 

Appellant filed a petition with our Supreme Court for leave to file a nunc pro 

tunc petition for allowance of appeal. This petition was denied on June 22, 

2022. Commonwealth v. Watson, 33 MM 2022 (order) (Pa. June 22, 2022).
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On May 6, 2022, Appellant filed the underlying pro se PCRA petition, as 

well as a “Motion for Leave of Court to Compel/Conduct PCRA Discovery and/or 

Motion for Sanctions for Violation of Duty to Disclose.”

6

 Appellant alleged the 

investigating state troopers and/or the Commonwealth violated Brady, as well 

as the trial court’s discovery orders, when they intentionally suppressed: (1)

the audio recordings and transcripts of his police interviews, where his 

“confession to murder” was read aloud at trial; (2) the audio recordings and 

transcripts of the police interviews of “co-conspirators/defendants-turnedwitnesses;” (3) “exculpatory scientific evidence,” where there was partial or 

insufficient DNA and gun shot residue testing on a “ziploc bag found next to 

the murder weapon[, which contained 11] live rounds of ammunition [and a] 

pair of latex rubber gloves;” and (4) all the “promises made, understandings, 

[or] agreements” with respect to leniency given to co-conspirators and codefendants.7

 Appellant’s Motion for Leave of Court to Compel/Conduct PCRA 

Discovery and/or Motion for Sanctions for Violation of Duty to Disclose (Motion 

for Discovery), 5/6/22, at 1-4, 8 (some punctuation omitted). Appellant 

concluded he was unlawfully arrested, unfairly tried, and falsely convicted. 

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6 Appellant also filed an 87-page memorandum of law.

7 On appeal, Appellant avers his “nephew, Rodney [W]atson, was an alleged 

Co-conspirator-turned-key-Prosecution witness,” and gave “false 

testimony . . . based upon self-serving quid pro quo . . . Consideration 

Agreements worked out behind the scenes[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 34-35.
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Id. at 1. We note Appellant did not refer to the timeliness of his petition under 

the PCRA, but briefly argued: the above “governmental interference [was] the 

sole cause for all unjustifiable procedural defaults;”

8 and he and his prior 

counsel have exercised due diligence in attempting to retrieve “impeachment 

evidence.” Id. at 6 (quotation marks omitted). 

On June 7, 2022, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of 

intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. The court reasoned 

Appellant’s petition was untimely filed, and thus the court lacked jurisdiction 

to review it. Appellant filed pro se responses, but the court issued the 

underlying order, on July 8th, dismissing the petition.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial 

court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on 

appeal.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the Commonwealth violated [Appellant’s] rights to 

due process of law under the [P]ennsylvania and United States 

Constitutions by subjecting [Appellant] to a known Miscarriage of 

Justice, through the suppression of exculpatory evidence, coupled 

with the intentional fabrication of inculpatory evidence, to 

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8 On the pre-printed PCRA petition form, Appellant checked the box indicating 

he should be entitled to relief because of “[t]he improper obstruction by 

government officials of [his] right of appeal where a meritorious appealable 

issue existed and was properly preserved in the trial court.” Appellant’s 

Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief, 5/6/22, at 2 (emphasis added). 

This provision, however, specifically refers to interference with one’s right of 

appeal, and Appellant did not present any argument relevant thereto. Indeed, 

we note this Court disposed of his direct appeal on the merits. 
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perpetrate a fraud on the Court & jury, in order to gain a known 

false conviction[?]

B. Whether Appellant’s Petition was timely, because any delay was 

a product of the due process violation[?]

C. Whether Appellant’s Petition was timely because it was based 

on facts demonstrating these violations that were unknown to 

Appellant right before the filing of his PCRA Petition on May 6, 

2022, despite his exercise of due [diligence?]

Appellant’s Brief at 1 (some punctuation omitted).

“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA 

court’s determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal error.” 

Natividad, 200 A.3d at 25.

The PCRA’s time requirements are “jurisdictional, and a court may not 

ignore it and reach the merits of an untimely PCRA claim.” Commonwealth 

v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130, 1134 (Pa. Super. 2023). A PCRA petition, “including 

a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves”

one of the enumerated exceptions. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Pertinently, the 

government-interference exception may provide relief where: “the failure to 

raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government 

officials with the presentation of the claim[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i). 

“Any petition invoking an exception . . . shall be filed within one year of the 

date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

“It is well-settled a Brady violation may fall within the governmental 

interference exception.” Natividad, 200 A.3d at 28. Nevertheless, 
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“[a]lthough a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference 

exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to previously raise 

the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the 

information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due 

diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008)

(citation omitted).

Previously, this Court determined that for PCRA purposes, Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence became final on July 17, 2005 (at the expiration of time 

to file, on direct appeal, a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme 

Court). Watson, 1332 MDA 2020 (unpub. memo. at 5). The general oneyear deadline to file a PCRA petition thus fell on July 17, 2006. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1). The instant petition, filed more than 15 years later, on May 6, 

2022, was therefore patently untimely.

The PCRA court observed that in the underlying petition, Appellant 

“seemingly relies” on the governmental-interference exception. PCRA Ct. Op., 

8/6/22 at 2. The court reasoned:

Appellant indeed pleads that government official, to wit: police 

and prosecutors[ ] acted in violation of his rights, but the actions 

of which he complains all relate to his arrest and prosecution more 

than two decades ago.

He does not plead that any government official interfered with 

his ability to pursue his present claims at any time post trial, on 

direct appeal, or in either his first or second PCRA petition, nor 

does his petition suggest that he learned of the alleged 

governmental interference within one year prior to the filing of his 

new petition. His petition therefore fails to meet the PCRA’s 

requirement that an exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time 
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bar must be pleaded within one year of the date the petitioner 

learns of the exception. 42 Pa.C.S.[ §] 9545(b)(2).

Appellant has not pleaded facts establishing an exception to 

the PCRA’s one-year time limit. This court therefore lacked 

jurisdiction to consider his claims. . . .

Id. at 2-3.

Although Appellant objects to this reasoning, we agree with the PCRA 

court.9 See Appellant’s Brief at 73, quoting PCRA Ct. Op. at 2. 

Appellant misconstrues the exception. While his petition complained 

that alleged misconduct by the investigating state troopers was the 

governmental interference, which in itself merited relief, a proper Subsection 

9545(b)(1)(i) claim would be that present governmental officials prevented 

Appellant from bringing a PCRA claim — separate from the purported 

governmental interference by the police. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i) (“the 

failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by 

government officials”). Furthermore, as the PCRA court reasoned, Appellant 

failed to explain when he learned of his new, potential claim, nor how 

governmental officials interfered with his ability to bring it previously. See 

id.

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9 Furthermore, we disagree with Appellant’s summation that the PCRA court 

“openly agree[d] to appearances of government interference by way of Police 

[and] prosecutorial Misconduct from ‘more than two decades ago.’” See

Appellant’s Brief at 73. Instead, the PCRA court was merely summarizing 

Appellant’s position; it did not agree with or endorse it. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 

2.
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Appellant continues to advance these claims on appeal. He again avers 

it is the alleged pre-trial “fabrication of evidence,” Brady violations, and 

improper DNA testing that amount to governmental interference, which in 

itself warrants relief. Appellant’s Brief at 33, 64. See also id. at 59-60

(arguing Appellant’s false arrest, illegal detainment, and wrongful convictions 

were based on the “intentional fabrication of false evidence [and] willful[ ] 

suppression of exculpatory evidence, by way of known ‘government 

interference’”).

Finally, we note that on appeal, Appellant refers to the newly discovered 

evidence exception. See Appellant’s Brief at 72. As this exception was not 

pled before the PCRA court, any present reliance on it is waived for appellate 

review. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 

1216 (Pa. Super. 2008).

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the PCRA court’s 

determination that the underlying PCRA petition was untimely filed. See 

Natividad, 200 A.3d at 25. We thus affirm the dismissal order.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/6/2023
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