ATTORNEYS FOR HON. JUDGE ATTORNEYS FOR THE COMMISSION ON

L. BENJAMIN PFAFF JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS 

Kevin P. McGoff Meg W. Babcock 

Indianapolis, Indiana David B. Hughes 

Stephen R. Bowers Indianapolis, Indiana 

Elkhart, Indiana 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In the 

Indiana Supreme Court 

_________________________________ 

No. 20S00-0501-JD-14 

IN THE MATTER OF THE HONORABLE

L. BENJAMIN PFAFF, JUDGE OF ELKHART

SUPERIOR COURT NO. 1 

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JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ACTION 

_________________________________ 

December 13, 2005 

Per Curiam. 

In this order, we finalize a judicial disciplinary action brought by the Indiana 

Commission on Judicial Qualifications (“the Commission”) against Respondent, the Honorable 

L. Benjamin Pfaff. At all times relevant to these proceedings, Respondent was the Judge of 

Elkhart Superior Court No. 1. Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution and Indiana 

Admission and Discipline Rule 25 give the Indiana Supreme Court original jurisdiction over this 

matter. 

The Commission’s Notice of the Institution of Formal Proceedings and Statement of 

Charges (“Charges”) averred that Respondent, while in office as an elected judge and member of 

the Indiana Bar, violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaged in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by: (1) entering a private residence without 

invitation while searching for his daughter and forcibly grabbing, restraining, and threatening a 

male at gunpoint while stating something to the effect of, “This M...F... better talk or he’s going 

to die”; and (2) providing false information to a Special Prosecutor’s investigator and to the 

Commission as each investigated the incident. Canon 1 states judges “should participate in 

establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe 

those standards in order to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary.” Ind. 

Judicial Conduct Canon 1(A). Canon 2 states judges “shall respect and comply with the law and 

shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality 

of the judiciary.” Jud. Canon 2(A). 

The present matter was tried before three Indiana trial court judges appointed to serve as 

Masters in this proceeding.1 See Ind. Admission & Discipline Rule 25(VIII)(I)-(K). Following 

the trial, the Masters filed their “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations to 

the Indiana Supreme Court” (hereinafter “Masters’ Report”) with this Court, as provided by 

Admission and Discipline Rule 25(VIII)(N)(1). 

Findings of the Masters

In sum, the Masters found that the following occurred. 

On the evening of Sunday, December 7, 2005, Respondent’s fifteen year old daughter left 

the home where she lived with Respondent’s ex-wife. Respondent and his ex-wife searched for 

her for over twenty-four hours. The search included an incident where Respondent burst into one 

home where Respondent had been told the daughter could be found, shouting accusations of 

wrongdoing at the occupants. Later that evening Respondent was told that the daughter could be 

found at a house occupied by Ashley Snodgrass, a recent high school graduate, her fiancé Shawn 

 

1

 The Masters in this matter were the Honorable Steven David, Judge of the Boone Circuit Court; the 

Honorable Daniel Donahue, Judge of the Clark Circuit Court; and the Honorable Susan Orr Henderson, 

Judge of the Fountain Circuit Court. We express our appreciation and gratitude to these judges for their 

commendable service in this matter. 

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Flores, age 21, 18 year old Bryan Schiltz, and two other males. Respondent and his ex-wife 

went to the house where only Snodgrass was at home. Snodgrass permitted a search of the home 

to satisfy the pair that their daughter was not in the home, and promised to call Respondent if the 

daughter was located. 

Snodgrass then reached Flores by phone at his brother’s home and was told that 

Respondent’s daughter was also there. Snodgrass requested Flores to return with the daughter, 

and called Respondent to report that the daughter would be at her house shortly. Respondent and 

his ex-wife arrived at Snodgrass’s house before Flores returned. In the meantime Flores and 

Schiltz had started to drive the daughter to their home, but the daughter exited the car and ran to 

a house a few streets before they arrived, claiming that she knew its occupants. Flores and 

Schiltz continued to their home, intending to report where the daughter could be found. 

It was at this point that the testimony of Snodgrass, Schiltz, Flores, Respondent’s exwife, and Respondent differed. The evidence is undisputed, however, that Respondent 

confronted Schiltz concerning the whereabouts of Respondent’s daughter, used some degree of 

force to get Schiltz to sit on the loveseat inside the house, and pointed his loaded handgun, which 

he had brought with him, at Schiltz during the confrontation. The major differences in testimony 

were between Respondent, on the one hand, and the other four witnesses, on the other. 

Respondent claimed the gun was produced for only about 3-5 seconds because Respondent, who 

believed Schiltz was under the influence of drugs and claimed the house reeked of marijuana, 

made an aggressive move toward his ex-wife. The others, however, all testified that Schiltz 

made no aggressive move toward anyone, was very compliant and tried to explain to Respondent 

where Respondent’s daughter was, that the house did not smell of marijuana, and that 

Respondent had pointed the gun at Schiltz unprovoked and kept it pointed at Schiltz, possibly 

inches from his face, for a much longer period of time while stating something akin to, “If this 

Mother F----- doesn’t start talking he’s going to die.” 

The Masters, after reviewing the evidence and assessing the credibility of the witnesses, 

found the four Commission witnesses, rather than Respondent, to be more credible. The Masters 

unanimously found in relevant part: 

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The testimony of Ashley Snodgrass, Shawn Flores, Bryan Schiltz, and 

Connie Pfaff differed in some respects, including whether Judge Pfaff first 

confronted Bryan Schiltz on the porch. . . or as he entered his house, when Judge 

Pfaff’s gun was first drawn, how Judge Pfaff maneuvered Bryan Schiltz onto a 

loveseat, and for how long the gun was pointed at Bryan Schiltz and at what 

portion of his body. Those differences not withstanding, Ashley Snodgrass, 

Shawn Flores, Bryan Schiltz, and Connie Pfaff were each credible witnesses to 

the critical events on the evening of December 8, 2003. . . . [Their] accounts 

established clearly and convincingly that when Judge Pfaff encountered Bryan 

Schiltz, he forcibly grabbed and restrained Schiltz and pointed a loaded firearm at 

his head, that Bryan Schiltz was under Judge Pfaff’s control from the initiation of 

the encounter and did not make any threatening moves, that Judge Pfaff pushed 

Bryan Schiltz onto a loveseat and continued pointing his gun at him, that Judge 

Pfaff said to Bryan Schiltz at gunpoint, “This Mother F----- better talk or he’s 

going to die,” or words to that effect, and that Judge Pfaff held Bryan Schiltz at 

gunpoint from a minimum of “thirty to forty seconds” (testimony of Ashley 

Snodgrass) to “a good minute” (testimony of Shawn Flores) to “three and a half or 

four minutes” (testimony of Bryan Schiltz) to “five minutes” (testimony of 

Connie Pfaff). 

(Masters’ Rep. at 40-41.) They also found that Respondent had been untruthful when he 

provided a vastly different account to the Special Prosecutor later assigned to investigate the 

matter and to the Commission when it investigated the judicial complaint lodged against 

Respondent. 

The Masters’ Conclusions and Recommendation 

Based on their findings, the Masters unanimously concluded that Respondent “failed to 

observe high standards of conduct,” “failed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and the 

public’s confidence in its integrity,” “failed to respect and comply with the law,” and “committed 

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,” in violation of Canons 1 and 2 of the 

Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct and of Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 25(III)(A)(6). 

The Masters then determined the sanction to recommend for these violations. As part of 

their assessment, the Masters reviewed aggravating and mitigating factors. 

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In mitigation, the Masters found “that Judge Pfaff had served with distinction as a judge” 

and that 54 attorneys, educators, public servants, executives, and citizens had submitted letters 

on his behalf. They also found, as to Count I, that he had acted on December 8, 2003, as a parent 

out of a legitimate concern for his daughter’s welfare. (Masters’ Rep. at 42.) 

In aggravation, the Masters found, as to both Counts, that Respondent, among other 

things: (1) showed little or no remorse for his misconduct; (2) instigated a confrontation at 

another residence earlier on December 8, 2003, when, despite being asked to remain outside by a 

law enforcement officer, he “barged into another’s home and uttered profanities and disrupted 

the law enforcement officer’s investigation”; (3) was untruthful about the confrontation just 

mentioned; (4) had the opportunity to leave his loaded handgun at his residence before going to 

the Snodgrass residence but chose not to; (4) was untruthful when he stated under oath and to the 

Special Investigator that he believed occupants of the Snodgrass residence had engaged in drug 

use at the residence and that he smelled marijuana therein; (5) failed to “work within the system 

in the search and recovery of his missing daughter, electing instead to take matters into his own 

hands”; (6) was unjustified in his use of his handgun on the night of December 8, 2003; (7) 

demonstrated a pattern on December 8, 2003 of improper activity and showed blatant disregard 

for the privacy rights of others; and (8) failed to remove himself from a situation he had reason to 

believe might be confrontational when he substantiated the whereabouts of his daughter and did 

not allow law enforcement to do its job. (Masters’ Rep. at 42-43.) The Masters’ further found: 

When Judge Pfaff was in the Snodgrass residence, Ashley Snodgrass was 

cooperating with him and his ex-wife. Judge Pfaff knew his daughter was with a 

person or persons voluntarily. Ashley Snodgrass told Judge Pfaff that 

[Respondent’s daughter] had been there just a little while ago. There was no 

emergency. Judge Pfaff was not “saving” his daughter. She was in no immediate 

danger. 

(Masters’ Rep. at 43.) 

After stating these mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the Masters unanimously 

recommended that Respondent be removed from office. 

5
Respondent’s Resignation

Two days after the Masters filed their Report, the Commission filed its Recommendation, 

see Admis. Disc. R. 25(VIII)(O), asking that the Masters’ Report be adopted in its entirety and 

that Respondent be removed from office, deemed permanently ineligible for judicial office, 

suspended from the practice of law pending further order from this Court, and have all costs of 

this proceeding assessed against him. 

Instead of contesting the Masters’ Report and/or the Commission’s Recommendation 

through a Petition For Review, see Admis. Disc. R. 25(VIII)(P), Respondent tendered his 

resignation to this Court. In his resignation, Respondent “apologize[d] to the young people who 

were involved in the events underlying the charges of misconduct which were brought against 

[him],” expressed “deep remorse[] for the negative impact [his] actions . . . had on all those 

directly involved,” expressed “regret [for] the negative reflection of [his] conduct on [his] 

colleagues on the bench and at the bar,” and stated he has “conscientiously performed [his] 

duties as Judge of [the] Elkhart Superior Court and regret[s] that [his] actions of[f] the bench 

have dishonored the office and system [he] value[s] so highly.” 

On November 21, 2005, we accepted Respondent’s resignation by published order. In 

that order, we, among other things: (1) permanently prohibited Respondent from seeking or 

accepting any judicial office and from serving in any judicial capacity in Indiana; (2) assessed 

costs and expenses of this matter against him; (3) ordered that his suspension from the practice of 

law, see Admis. Disc. R. 25(III)(C); Ind. Const. art. 7, § 11, remain in effect until the costs 

assessed against him in this matter2

 are paid in full; and (4) stated that our order constituted a 

finding of professional discipline that would be required to be reported to other jurisdictions in 

which Respondent might seek admission as a lawyer. In re Pfaff, No. 20S00-0501-JD-14 (Ind. 

Nov. 21, 2005) (published order accepting resignation). As indicated in that order, we now issue 

this published opinion to document the circumstances surrounding Respondent’s resignation. 

 

2

 On the same day we issued our order accepting Respondent’s resignation, we also issued an order taxing 

costs against him in the amount of $12,106.75. In re Pfaff, No. 20S00-0501-JD-14 (Ind. Nov. 21, 2005) 

(order taxing costs). 

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SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. 

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