alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                               Exhibit 10.1(v)

                                    AMENDMENT
                                     TO THE
                    SAUER INC. 1998 LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN

         1. Paragraph 16.1 of Article 16 of the Sauer Inc. 1998 Long-Term
Incentive Plan (the "Plan") provides that the Plan may be amended by action of
the Board of Directors of Sauer Inc. (the "Company"). In accordance with the
provisions of that paragraph and pursuant to resolutions duly adopted by the
Board of Directors of the Corporation, the Plan is hereby amended as follows:

            (a)           The name of the Plan is hereby changed to the
                     Sauer-Danfoss Inc. 1998 Long-Term Incentive Plan, and
                     wherever the name Sauer Inc. appears in the Plan,
                     there shall be substituted therefor the name
                     "Sauer-Danfoss Inc.".

            (b)           Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2.5 of Article II.
                     Definitions, is amended by adding the following
                     language to such subparagraph immediately following
                     the semicolon and immediately preceding the word "or":

                     "provided, however, that a change in control shall
                     not result from (a) Danfoss A/S, or (b) Klaus
                     Murmann, any member or members of his immediate
                     family or any entity or trust a majority of which is
                     owned by Klaus Murmann or a member or members of his
                     immediate family, acquiring securities of
                     Sauer-Danfoss Inc. from the other, either directly,
                     or indirectly by acquiring voting control of Danfoss
                     Murmann Holding A/S or its successor."

         2. The changes made by this Amendment shall be subject to, and
effective upon, the completion of the combination of the fluid power business of
Danfoss A/S and the Company.

         3. The changes made by this Amendment shall not apply to any Award (as
defined in the Plan) outstanding under the Plan prior to the effective date of
this Amendment.

                                          The above Amendment was
                                          duly adopted by resolutions
                                          passed by the Board of
                                          Directors of the Company at
                                          its meeting held on
                                          March ___, 2000




                                          -----------------------------------
                                          Kenneth D. McCuskey, Secretary of
                                          the Company
#### Herman HANNAH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 77-1225.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 4, 1978.

*1341Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Thomas G. Murray, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Linda Collins Hertz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin D. Davis, II, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before HENDRY and KEHOE, JJ., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant below appeals his conviction of robbery on a jury trial, upon which he was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of ten years with three years probation to follow. Appellant contends he was denied a fair trial by reason of the ruling of the court allowing testimony by a witness of a prior crime of the defendant “not related in time or place or other relevant details to the one for which the defendant was charged”.

The defendant presented evidence in support of a claimed alibi. In rebuttal of testimony submitted on behalf of the defendant that he was out of the State during a certain material time or period, the State presented a witness who, over objection of the defendant, testified that the defendant was one of two men who had robbed his store here on a date within said period.

We hold no reversible error was committed by that ruling, on authority of *Williams v. State,*110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959). In that case, in discussing the effect of evidence of other crimes, the court' held that relevancy was the test and stated: “If found to be relevant for any purpose save that of showing bad character or propensity, then it should be admitted”. Here it was relevant to the defense issue as bearing on the whereabouts of defendant at a material time.

Judgment affirmed.

KEHOE, J., dissents.
### ATTACHMENT 2 CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT

NOTICE OF EXEMPTION

TO: County Clerk County of Ventura
800 South Victoria Avenue Ventura, CA 93009

FROM: Ventura County Air Pollution Control District 669 County Square Drive Ventura, CA 93003

DATE: April 12, 2011

Project Title: Revisions to Rules 2, 23, 33, 33.1, 35 and 76 in o rder to implement U.S. EPA

Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule

Project Location -- Specific: District Wide

Project Location -- City: See above Project Location -- County: Ventura County

Description of Project:

Rule 2 - Definitions, Rule 23 – Exemptions from Per mit, Rule 33 – Part 70 Permits-General,
Rule 33.1 – Part 70 Permits-Definitions, Rule 35 – Elective Emission Limits, and Rule 76 – Federally Enforceable Limits on Potential to Emit, are amended to implement EPA tailoring requirements. GHG applicability thresholds and imp lementation dates are added, and GHGs are added as regulated pollutants. Definitions for GHG s and "CO 2 equivalent" are added and other

definitions are amended. Revisions unrelated to GH Gs are also proposed.

Name of Public Agency Approving Project: Ventura County Air Pollution Control District Date Approved: April 12, 2011

Name of Person or Agency Carrying Out Project: Ventura County Air Pollution Control District

Exempt Status: Revisions are exempt from the requirements of the CEQA under Section 15308 of the CEQA Guidelines, Actions by Regulatory Agencies for Protection of the Environment.

Reasons Why Project Is Exempt: Revisions involve rules and regulations governing the District’s issuance and preparation of Permits to Operate and Authorities to Construct and are administrative in nature. The revised rules will help implement federal GHG permi tting rules and regulations.

Contact Person:
Donald R. Price Ventura County Air Pollution Control District Telephone: (805) 645-1407

Michael Villegas
Air Pollution Control Officer
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 20-40622 

Summary Calendar 

____________ 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Joshua Mason, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 2:19-CR-1285-1 

______________________________ 

Before Wiener, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Defendant-Appellant Joshua Mason appeals his sentence, challenging 

the conditions imposed on supervised release. He contends that, although 

the pre-sentencing report (PSR) referred to the standard conditions of 

supervised release in a general order, the district court failed to sufficiently 

state those conditions at sentencing. 

_____________________ 

*

 This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

August 2, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

Case: 20-40622 Document: 00516843472 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
No. 20-40622 

2 

We review for plain error because Mason did not object to the 

conditions before the district court. See United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 

352 (5th Cir. 2020). Establishing plain error requires a showing of a forfeited 

error that is clear or obvious and that affected Mason’s substantial rights. 

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 

We see no clear or obvious error here because there is no conflict 

between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the conditions of 

supervision included in the written judgment. See United States v. Diggles, 957 

F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc); United States v. Vargas, 23 F.4th 526, 

528 (5th Cir. 2022). Here, the PSR expressly references the Southern 

District of Texas’s General Order 2017-01, and the district court also stated 

that it was imposing the “[s]tandard terms and conditions of supervision.” 

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 

Case: 20-40622 Document: 00516843472 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

 September 30, 2020

No. 04-19-00836-CV

Al SUAREZ, as Mayor of the City of Converse; Jeff Beehler, as Place 5 Member, City Counsel 

of the City of Converse; Kathy Richel as place 1 Member, City Counsel of the City of Converse; 

Shawn Russell, as Place 3 Member, City Counsel of the City of Converse; Marc Gilbert, as Place 

6 Member, City Counsel of the City of Converse; Le Ann Piatt, as City Manager of the City of 

Converse; Holly Nagy, as Secretary of the City of Converse and City of Converse,

Appellants

v.

Katherine SILVAS,

Appellee

From the 438th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CI22419

Honorable Mary Lou Alvarez, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice 

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice 

Irene Rios, Justice

The panel has considered Appellants’ motion for rehearing; the motion is DENIED. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 49.3

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 30th day of September, 2020.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court

FILE COPY
260 La. 1118

#### Garland L. BOURGEOIS, Jr., Individually and for the Use and Benefit of his Minor Son, Garland L. Bourgeois, III, et al., v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, et al.

No. 52161.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 3, 1972.

In re: State of Louisiana, Department of Highways applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, *375Fourth Circuit, Parish of Jefferson. 255 So.2d 861.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal we find no error of law in its judgment.

McCALEB, C. J., and BARHAM, J.,

are of the opinion this writ should he granted to bring up all the issues. See dissent from writ denied in companion writ No. 52,157, 258 So.2d 373 in this same case.
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 317

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow handicapped

individuals a deduction for certain transportation expenses.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 5, 1993

Mr. QUILLEN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow handicapped individuals a deduction for certain transportation

expenses.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That (a) part VII of subchapter B of chapter 1 of the

4 Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to additional

5 itemized deductions for individuals) is amended by redes6 ignating section 220 as section 221 and by inserting after

7 section 219 the following new section:
2

HR 317 IH

1 ‘‘SEC. 220. COMMUTING EXPENSES OF HANDICAPPED INDI2 VIDUALS.

3 ‘‘(a) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION.—In the case of a

4 handicapped individual, there shall be allowed as a deduc5 tion the amount of the commuting expenses paid or in6 curred by such individual during the taxable year.

7 ‘‘(b) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section—

8 ‘‘(1) HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUAL.—The term

9 ‘handicapped individual’ means an individual who,

10 by reason of any medically determinable physical or

11 mental impairment which has lasted or can be ex12 pected to last for a continuous period of not less

13 than 12 months, is not able to operate a vehicle (in14 cluding a vehicle with special equipment) on a high15 way. An individual shall not be considered to be

16 handicapped unless he submits proof of the existence

17 of such status in such form and manner, and at

18 such times, as the Secretary may require.

19 ‘‘(2) COMMUTING EXPENSES.—The term ‘com20 muting expenses’ means amounts paid or incurred

21 by a handicapped individual for transportation be22 tween his residence and his principal place of em23 ployment or self-employment, including any amounts

24 paid or incurred for personal assistance required for

25 such transportation. Such term does not include any
3

HR 317 IH

1 amount allowable as a deduction under any other

2 section of this chapter.

3 ‘‘(c) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall prescribe

4 such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the pur5 poses of this section with respect to the determination of

6 amounts allowable as a deduction under this section.’’

7 (b) Section 62(a) of such Code (defining adjusted

8 gross income) is amended by inserting after paragraph

9 (14) the following new paragraph:

10 ‘‘(15) COMMUTING EXPENSES OF HANDICAPPED

11 INDIVIDUALS.—The deduction allowed by section

12 220.’’

13 (c) The table of sections for part VII of subchapter

14 B of chapter 1 of such Code is amended by striking out

15 the last item and inserting in lieu thereof:

‘‘Sec. 220. Commuting expenses of handicapped individuals.

‘‘Sec. 221. Cross reference.’’

16 SEC. 2. The amendments made by the first section

17 of this Act shall apply to amounts paid or incurred after

18 the date of the enactment of this Act in taxable years end19 ing after such date.

Æ
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3309 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3309

  To terminate the effectiveness of certain amendments to the foreign 
      repair station rules of the Federal Aviation Administration.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 19, 1993

Mr. Mineta (for himself and Ms. Danner) introduced the following bill; 
 which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To terminate the effectiveness of certain amendments to the foreign 
      repair station rules of the Federal Aviation Administration.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the amendments 
published by the Federal Aviation Administration on November 22, 1988 
(43 Fed. Reg. 47375-47376), to parts 135 and 145 of title 14, Code of 
Federal Regulations, shall not be effective after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

                                 <all>
```
Fw: Revised Ch. 7 for OMB 12/16/2011 03:10 PM

From: RobertJ Wayland/RTP/USEPA/US

To: Cortney_Higgins@omb.eop.gov

Cc: Bill Maxwell/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA

Revised Ch 7.

----- Forwarded by RobertJ Wayland/RTP/USEPA/US on 12/16/2011 03:10 PM

----- From: Amanda CurryBrown/RTP/USEPA/US To: RobertJ Wayland/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA Cc: Bryan Hubbell/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Christine Davis/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA,
Amy Lamson/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Ron Evans/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Lydia Wegman/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Neal Fann/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA Date: 12/16/2011 03:07 PM Subject: Revised Ch. 7 for OMB

Hi Bob,

The attached can be sent to OMB - it addresses their comments on Ch. 7 from the call earlier, as well as the ones Cortney sent.

Amanda

Amanda Curry Brown OAQPS/HEID/AEG

919.541.3808 CurryBrown.Amanda@epa.gov

Chapter 7_StatutoryandExecutiveOrderAnalyses_1216 v2.docx
<PAGE>

                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549

                                    FORM 8-K

                                 CURRENT REPORT
                       PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF
                       THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

                         DATE OF REPORT: AUGUST 14, 2000

                                  FINDWHAT.COM
             (EXACT NAME OF REGISTRANT AS SPECIFIED IN ITS CHARTER)

    NEVADA                         0-27331                      88-0348835
(STATE OR OTHER              (COMMISSION FILE NO.)            (IRS EMPLOYER
JURISDICTION OF                                           IDENTIFICATION NUMBER)
INCORPORATION OR
  ORGANIZATION)

                         121 West 27th Street, Suite 903
                            New York, New York 10001
                                 (212) 255-1500
               (ADDRESS, INCLUDING ZIP CODE, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER
                       INCLUDING AREA CODE OF REGISTRANT'S
                          PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICES)

                                 Not Applicable
          (FORMER NAME OR FORMER ADDRESS, IF CHANGED SINCE LAST REPORT)

<PAGE>

ITEM 5.  OTHER EVENTS.

                  On August 14, 2000, FindWhat.com, a Nevada corporation,
announced its second quarter 2000 results. The press release is included as
Exhibit 99 to this Form 8-K and is incorporated herein by this reference.

ITEM 7.   EXHIBITS.

         (C)      EXHIBITS.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
             EXHIBIT NO.                       DESCRIPTION

             <S>                    <C>
                  99                Press Release, dated August 14, 2000,
                                    entitled "FindWhat.com Announces Second
                                    Quarter 2000 Results."
</TABLE>


                                   SIGNATURES

                  Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by
the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

                                       FINDWHAT.COM

Date:  August 14, 2000                 By: /s/ Phillip R. Thune
                                           --------------------
                                           Chief Financial Officer


                                       2
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT INDEX

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
               EXHIBIT NO.                     DESCRIPTION

               <S>                  <C>
                  99                Press Release, dated August 14, 2000,
                                    entitled "FindWhat.com Announces Second
                                    Quarter 2000 Results."
</TABLE>
#### Alvin H. BURGESS and Flora Boatner Burgess v. Arthur L. LOFTIN.

SC 2504.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 22, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1978.

*1389Charles J. Kettler, Jr., Luverne, for appellants.

Wendell W. Mitchell, Luverne, for appel-lee.

BLOODWORTH, Justice.

Appellants, Alvin and Flora Burgess, filed suit seeking to establish a certain wire fence as their true northern boundary. Ap-pellee, Arthur Loftin, the landowner to the north, filed an answer and cross-petition, alleging that an ancient fence line’south of the barn was the boundary. The case was heard, ore tenus, and judgment entered finding and declaring the true boundary line to be as indicated by the survey line rather than the wire fence contended for by the appellants. This survey line closely paralleled the line contended for by appel-lee.

On this appeal, appellants contend: that the survey was improperly carried out, that this is a question of law, and is, therefore, not subject to the “ore tenus” rule; that the trial judge’s judgment is plainly and palpably erroneous; that the decree fails to describe the boundary line with sufficient particularity; that a strong presumption must be indulged in favor of a line marked by an old fence; and, that use of the survey line will destroy the integrity of other property lines in the vicinity. On the other hand, appellee contends the survey line was correct, and he relies on the “ore tenus” rule.

No useful purpose would be served by delineating the evidence in any detail. Suffice it to say that the evidence was in conflict. The issue as to the true and correct boundary line was a factual issue resolved by the judge in appellee’s favor.

The appellants contended for the wire fence — north of the barn. The appellee contended for the line of the ancient fence south of the barn. The surveyor fixed the boundary in accordance with appellants’ deed. The survey appears to have been properly run. We find no error therein nor in the contention that the boundary fixed is not specific enough. Adverse possession is not an issue.

We have carefully considered and reviewed the record and briefs in this cause, and are of the opinion, under the ore tenus rule, that the judgment should be, and is hereby, affirmed.

Of course, as the trial judge states in his judgment, only the parties hereto are bound by the judgment.

AFFIRMED.

TORBERT, C. J., and FAULKNER, AL-MON and EMBRY, JJ., concur.
ex10a.htm


















Exhibit (10)(a)

















Consent of Ernst & Young LLP, Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm












We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in Post-Effective Amendment No. 34 to the 1933 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 333-135039) and Amendment No. 528 to the 1940 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 811-08517), and to the use therein of our reports dated (a) March 31, 2016, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company and (b) April 12, 2016, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln Life Variable Annuity Account N for the interests in a separate account under individual flexible payment deferred variable annuity contracts.







/s/ Ernst & Young LLP














Philadelphia, Pennsylvania


November 16, 2016
Opinion issued March 24, 2015 .

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01 - 14 - 00998 - CV

——————————— JOEL D. MALLORY , Appella nt

V. J.P. MORGAN CHASE BA NK, N.A., CHASE HOME FINANCE, L.L.C.

AND CODILIS & STAWIA RSKI, P.C. , Appe ll e e s On Appeal from the 151st District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 201 0 - 64487

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Joel D. Mallory , seeks to appeal the final judgment of the trial court dated September 15, 2014 . We dismiss the appeal. Gen erally, a notice of appeal is due within thirty days after the judgment is signed. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 26.1 . The deadline to file a notice of appeal is extended2

to 90 days after the date the judgment is signed if, within 30 days after the judgment is signe d, any party timely files a motion for new trial, motion to modify the judgment, motion to reinstate, or, under certain circumstances, a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id .; T EX . R. C IV . P. 329b(a), (g). The time to file a notice o f appeal may also be extended if, within 15 days after the deadline to file the notice of appeal, a party properly files a motion for extension. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 10.5(b), 26.3. A motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant, act ing in good faith, files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by rule 26.1, but within the 15

- day extension period provided by Rule 26.3. See T EX . R. A PP . P . 26.1, 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 617

– 18 (Tex. 1997). Here, the trial court signed the final judgment dismissing Mallory’s action on September 15 , 2014 , making the deadline for filing a notice of appeal October 15, 2014. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 26.1. There is no motion for new trial in the clerk’s record , therefore the deadline to f ile the notice of appeal was not extended

. The Notice of appeal was not filed until December 15, 2014. Without a timely filed notice of appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 25.1

. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal fo r want of jurisdiction. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 42.3( a), (c); 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.3 PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justice s Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.