*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

REVISED July 11, 2008

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-40493

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ODEGREAN FONTENOT,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:05-CR-75-1

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

A jury convicted Odegrean Fontenot of being a felon in possession of a

firearm. Fontenot’s conviction stems from a traffic stop. He argues that the

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence thatled to his

arrest and his ultimate conviction.

On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual findings

for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Nunez-Sanchez,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 8, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-40493

2

478 F.3d 663, 666 (5th Cir. 2007). We view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government,the prevailing party in this case. See United States

v. Alvarez, 451 F.3d 320, 329 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1472 (2008).

All inferences are “indulge[d] . . . in favor of the district court’s denial of the

motion to suppress.” United States v. Polk, 118 F.3d 286, 296 (5th Cir. 1997).

Fontenot’s sole argument on appeal is that the traffic stop was unlawful

at its outset. Whether a traffic stop constitutes a violation of a person’s Fourth

Amendment rights is analyzed under the standard announced in Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968). United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506–07 (5th Cir.

2004) (en banc). This is a two-part inquiry: “Courts first examine whether the

officer’s action was justified at its inception, and then inquire whether the

officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances that justified the stop.” Id. at 506. “For a traffic stop to be

justified atits inception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion

that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about

to occur . . . .” United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005).

In this case, law enforcement officers testified that they observed Fontenot

driving a vehicle that did not display a rear license plate. Upon approaching the

vehicle and shining a spotlight on it, the officers could see a temporary license

plate lying on the rear dashboard but could not read it. Fontenot maintains that

because the temporary license plate was visible from the rear of the vehicle, the

stop was unlawful.

At the time of the stop, the Texas Administrative Code (TAC) required

that temporary, thirty-day cardboard license tags “be displayed in a manner that

is clearly visible and legible when viewed from the rear of the vehicle.” 16 TEX.

ADMIN. CODE § 111.9(b); see 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 17.23(d)(1) (2002). The

Texas Transportation Code, which applies to the operator of the vehicle,

incorporated the TAC regulations on temporary registration tags. TEX. TRANS.

CODE § 503.069 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Because the transportation code requires
No. 07-40493

3

that temporary tags be displayed in accordance with the rules of the

administrative code, the officers’ stop of Fontenot’s vehicle was proper in light

of the fact that the paper registration tag in the rear window was not legible

from the rear of the vehicle as required by Texas law. The distance at which the

tag was legible is irrelevant as both officers testified thatthey could not read the

tag until after the stop.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.