### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444
NO. 03-04-00389- CV

K e n P at to n, A ppe lla nt

v. Bobb ie K aye Jones, Indivi dual ly; Barbara Ruth, Ind ividu ally; John Wright, Indi vidu ally; St . J ohn’ s U nit e d M e th odi stChu r c h; Oak Hil l U nit e d M e th odi stChu r c h; The Austin District of the United Met hodi st Church; and S outhw est Texas Conf ere nce of the United Met hodi st Church, Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN304244 , HO NORAB LE C. W. DUNCAN , JR., JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N We gr ant appe llees’ motion for r ehea ring , withdraw our

opinion and judgme nt issued May 11, 2006, and substitute the following in its pl ace .

Appellant Ke n Patton urg es t hat t he trial court erre d in dismiss ing his c ase f or a la ck of subject matter

jurisdiction because t h e First Amendment’s ecc lesiastical abste ntion doctrine, which enc ompasses a ministerial e x ception, does not ba r judicial review of his claims for de famation and tortious interfe renc e with a n employ ment contra ct. Appellee s, Pastor Bobbie K ay e Jones, Pastor2

B arb ara Ruth, Pa sto r John Wri g ht, St. John ’s Un ite d Me tho dis t Churc h, Oa k Hi ll U nit e d M e tho dis t Church, The Austin District of the United Me thodist C hurch, a nd the Southwest Texas Conferenc e of the United Me t hodist Church (collec tively , “The Church”) respond that be cause Patton, as the Direc tor of Youth Ministries for the O ak H ill United Methodist C hurch, w as employ ed in a minist eria l role, the Fi rs t Amendment prohibits judicial review of the Churc h’s ac tions and
c omm un ic a tio ns surr ound ingPa tto n’ s te rm inatio n. We w ill a ff ir m th e dis mis sa l.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A m oti on to d ism iss ba se d o n a

la c k o f s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n is fu nc tio na lly equivalent to a plea to the jurisdiction c halleng ing the trial court’ s authority to determine the subject matter of a

cause of ac tion. Lac

yv . B as se tt , 132 S.W .3d 119, 122 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2 0 0 4 , n o p et
. ) (d i s cu s s i n g d i s m i s s al b as ed o n ec cl es i as t i ca l d o ct ri n e) (c i t i n g Blan d I nd e p. Sc h. Di st. v. Blue , 34 S.W .3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000)). We re view the r ecor d de novo to de termine whe ther the trial court ha d subject matter jur isdiction. M a y h e w v . T

o w n o f S u n n y v ale , 964 S.W .2d 922, 928 (T ex . 1 9 9 8 ). W e c o n s i d er o n l y t h e ev i d en ce p er t i n en t t o t h e j u ri s d i ct i o n al i n qu i ry an d d o n o twe i gh the merits. Cou nty

of C am e ro n v. Br own , 80 S.W .3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). Also, we c onstrue the pleading s in favor of

the plaintiff, ac ceptingall his alleg ations as true. Blan d I nd e p. Sc h. Di

st. , 34 S.W .3d at 555. To pre vail, the def ense m u s t show that, eve n acc epting all of the plaintiff’ s alleg ations as true, a

n incura ble jurisdiction al d ef

ec t rema ins on the fac e of the pleading s that deprive s the trial court of subject matter jur isdiction. Brenham Hous. Auth. v . Davies , 158 S.W .3d 53, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no pet.).The only evidenc e in the record w as off ere d by Patton, consisting of his af fidavit, a c opy 1 of handwritten notes used in the C hurch’ s meeting about P atton’s employ ment, and a le tter fr om the chair woman of the parish committee that decide d to terminate Patton. At the hea ring on the motion to dismi ss, no testimony

was off ere d; only argument by

counsel wa s prese nted. Patton had previously

serve d as the Interim Direc tor of Yout h at S t
. J o h n’s United 2 Methodist Church from August to Dece mber 2001. 3 Construing the a lleg ations in Patton’s pleading s as true, a nd consideringthe uncontested e vidence , we f ind the following undisputed fac ts in the recor d. 1

BACK GR OUND Pa tto n w a s e mpl oy e d b y

Oa k H ill Un ite d Met

ho dis t Chur c h a s th e Di re c tor of Yo uth Ministries from April 2002 until October 31, 2002. I n that position, P atton was re sponsible for “the 2 administration a

n d o r g anizing of r ecr eational e vents for the y outh, such as ca mping outing s and other social g ather ings. .

. . [P atton] coor dinated the transportation, .

. . oversa w the log istics, . . . [ and]
serve d as a c haper one.” He also “mana g ed the budg et for the y outh pr og ram, rec ruited [adult and y outh] p art ic ipa

nts , r e g ist e re d th e a tte nd e e s at ev e nts , [] c oll e c te d p art ic ipatio n f e e s f ro m atte nd e e s, [and] perf ormed fundr aising duties.” On October 24, 2002, appellee J ones (a Pastor at S t. J ohn’s) discussed w ith appellee Wri g ht ( an A sso c iate Pa sto r a t O ak H ill ) whe the r P a tto n s ho uld be te rm inate d f

ro m O a k H ill

. Acc ording to handwritten notes take n by Pastor Wright, Pastor Jones tol d him about alleg ations that Pa tto n h a d u

ps e t c on g re g a tio n me mbe rs by datin g c e rt a in wo me n an d by pu tti nghis arm

aro un d g ir ls at chur ch. Pastor J ones also descr ibed a r umor that Patton had used interne t pornog raphy as being “unsolicited, ane cdotal, [ and] unsubstantiated.” Patton contends that e ach of the rumors a

re f alse.Patton did not s ue the c hairwoma n in her individual ca

pacity but instead named the 3 Con fe re nc e , a sse rt ingthat th e c ha ir wo man a c te d a s it s a g e nt.

4 After this conversation, Pastor W rig ht relayed these rumors to appe lle e Ru th ( a Pa s tor at Oak H ill). Pastor Ruth t hen met with the Staff Par ish Relations Com mittee (“SPRC”) and
re c omm e nd e d th a t Patto n b e te rm inate d f r o m h i s po sit ion

a s O a k H ill ’s Di re c tor

of Yo uth Min istri e s. Pastor Wright informe d Patton of the decision. Shortly befor ehand, Patton had disc overe d Pastor Wright’s ha

ndwritten notes lay

ing on the churc h photocopy machine. I n a subseque nt letter to two conc erne d members of the cong reg ation, the committee chair woman wr ote,
Ple a se kn owthat th is c omm itt e e and y our pa sto rs sh are y our co nc e rn fo r t he y outh prog ram. . . . A sear ch for a new y outh dir ector will be g in a ft er t h e f i rs t o f t he y ear . . . . Be fore any

action wa s taken, the Pastors d i scussed the situation with the District Superintendent a nd soug ht the backingof the SPRC , . . . [which] unanimously

voted to acc ept t he re commendation to support the dec ision reac hed by [Jone s], [Wr ig ht], and

my sel f.

. . . I

c an a ssu re y ou that [we ] ap pr oa c he d th is decision pra

y erf ully and in the best intere sts of the churc h. . . .
Patton also a lleg ed that the chair woman told a member of the cong reg ation who aske d about Patton’s t er m i n at i o n that, “I t is really bad” a nd “We had to g et him out before something ha ppened at our churc h,” and that Pastor Ruth responded to a member’s question by stating, “ [P atton] knows why he wa s fired” and “he wouldn’t want a ny one else to know.” Pa tt o n s u e d th e Ch u r c h , c la im in g

it w a s liable for de famation and tortious interfer ence with an employ

ment contra ct. The Churc h defe ndants filed a joint motion to dismi ss, which was

3 g rante d by

the trial cour

t. This appeal followed. The sole question prese nted on appeal is whether ,5

based o n Fi rs t Amendment princ iples, the trial cour t corre ctly

deter mined that it lacked subjec t matter jurisdiction.
AN AL YSI S Fre eExe rc ise

Cla use The F irst Am en d m ent provides in re levant par t that “Cong ress shall make no law respe cting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the fre e ex erc ise there of.” U .S. Const . amend. I
. The Establishment and F ree Ex erc ise Clauses apply to the states by

incorporation through the Four teenth Amendme nt. Elk GroveUnified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow , 542 U.S. 1, 8 (2004).

Th e Sup re me Court

int e rp re te d th e ba sis of the F re e Exe rc ise Cla us e a t is su e he re in W atson v. Jone

s , 80 U.S. 67 9, 72 8- 33 (1 87 2) . In o ft e n- qu ote d la ngua g e , th e Court

he ld t hat “ c ivi l
c ourt s e xer c ise no jur isd ic tio n . . . wh e re a su bje c t- matte r o f d isp ute [is] st rictly and pure ly
ecc lesiastical in its chara cte r,” such as disputes “c oncer n[i ng ] t heolog ical contr oversy , churc h discipline, ecc lesiastical g overnme nt, or the conf ormity of t he members of t he chur ch to the standa rd of morals re quired.” Id . at 73 3. I ns te a d, c ivi l c ourt s are to a c c e pt “ a s fi na l, and a s b ind ingon

the m” the dec isions of an ec clesiastica l insti tution on such matters. Id

. at 72 8. “ [I ]t wo uld be of va in consent,” the Court he ld, “ if anyone ag g rieve d by one of [an ec clesiastica l insti tution’s] decisions could appea l to the secula r courts and have them reve rsed. I t is of the essenc e of these rel igious unions, and of their r ight to esta blish tribunals for the dec ision of questions arising a mong themselves, that those de cisions should be binding in a ll c ases of ec clesiastica l cog nizance.” Id . at 730. I n part, this is becau s e ec cl esi astical institutions “ar e the be st judge s of what c onstitut es an of fe ns e a g a ins t th e wo rd

of Go d” and “ of matte rs of

fa ith , d isc ipl ine , a

nd do c tr ine ; and

c ivi l c ourt s,Be cause these constitut ional conce pts have been discussed more e x tensively by the fe dera l 4 cour t s , we will look to t he fe dera l opinions t hat ar e “log ically persua sive and we ll-rea soned” f or g uidance , althoug h not binding. Se e Da v e np or t v . G ar c ia , 83 4 S. W.2 d 4 , n .5 3 ( Te x. 19 92 ); se e als o Bell v. Low IncomeW

omen of Tex ., 95 S.W .3d 253, 266 (Tex. 2002). Although the First Amendme nt prohibits ci v i l courts fr om exercising jur isdiction over 5 purely ecc lesiastical matter s involved in church- related disputes, th e Fi rs t Am endment does not forbid civil cour

ts from adjudicating pr operty rig hts of the churc h or its membe rs, so long a s such rig hts can be determined by the application of “neutra l principles of law .” J on es v . W olf , 4 43 U. S. 595, 602-04 (1979) ; Hutchinson v. Thomas , 7 89 F .2 d 3 92 , 3 96 (6 th C ir . 1 98 6) ; Voice of Cornerstone Chu rc h Co rp . v . P izz a Pro p. Pa rtn e rs , 160 S.W .3d 657, 671-73 (Te x . App.—Austin 2005, no pet.); De an v . A lfo rd , 994 S.W .2d 392, 395 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1999, no pet.). 6 if the y sh ou ld b e so unwi se to atte mpt to [d e c ide su c h matte rs ], w ou ld o nly inv olv e the mse lve s in
a sea of unce rtainty

and doubt.” Id . at 732 (c itations omi tted). I n the 135 y ear s since W atson , many

courts have applied these principles—ofte n ref err ed to as the “ec clesiastica l abstention doctrine” —to case s conce rning employ ment decisions by relig ious insti tu t ions. These c ases have consistently held that civil courts lac k subject matter 4 j u ri s d i ct i o nt o d ec i d e s uch contro v er s i es i f t h e e mp l o y m en td ec i s i o nco n ce rn s a m em b er o f t h e c l er gy
or an e mploy ee in a

minist eria l positi on. See , e.g. , Starkman v. Ev ans , 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 19 99 ); Gree n v. United Pe ntecostal Church Int’l , 89 9 S.W. 2d 28 , 3 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 95 , p e t. denied)

. This is known as the “ministerial exception.” See B ryce v. Episcopal Church , 289 F.3d 5 648, 656-57 (10th Cir. 2002) (“ minist eria l exception c ases rely on a long line of Supreme Court
c a se s a ff ir min g the c hurc h a

uto no my do c tr ine , w hic h pro te c ts the fu nd a me nta l r ig ht o f c hurc he s to decide for themse lves matters of c hurch g overnme nt, faith, and doc trine”)

.

The “ ecc lesiastical abste nti o n d o c tr in e ” p r o v id e s a

b r oader analy sis that encompasses the “ministerial exception.” The ecc lesiastical abs t en t i o n doctrine pr events sec ular c ourts from revie wing many

ty pes of disput es that would re quire a n analy sis of “theolog ical contr oversy , churc hSee , e.g. , Lac yv . B as se tt , 132 S.W .3d 119, 124-25 (Te x . App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2004, 6 no pet.) (doc trine used to r esolve issue of whe ther c ong reg ation member ha d rig ht to acce ss churc h fi nan c ia l r e c or ds , n ot i nv olv inge mpl oy me nt d e c isi on ); Nussbaumer v. Florida , 882 So. 2d 1067, 1077 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (doctrine applied in context of clergy communications privileg e). 7 discipline, ecc lesiastical g overnme nt, or the confor mity of the members of the chur ch to the standa rd of morals re quired.” W

atson , 80 U.S. at 733. I n case s relying o n t h e ecclesiastical a bstention 6 doctrine, c ourts consider the substance a nd nature of t he plainti ff’ s claims to determine whether the First Amendment preve nts subjec t matter jurisdiction. See , e.g. , W illiams v. Gleason , 26 S.W .3d 54, 58-60 (Te x . App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2000, pet. denied)

.

More na rrowly , if the cla im challeng es a r elig ious insti tution’s employ ment decision, the sole jurisdictional inquiry is whether the employ ee is a member of t he clerg y or otherw ise serve s a “ministerial” function. See A licea-H ernandez v . Catholi c Bishop of Chicago , 320 F.3d 698, 703- 04 (7 th C ir

. 20 03 ) (d e c lin ing to c on sid e r wh e the r s ub sta nc e of c la im w a s se c ula

r i n n a tur e be c a

us e only rele vant question was char acte rization of job f unction). I f the employ ee is a minister, then the “ministerial exception” applies, pr eventingsecula r re v i ew o f t he employ

ment decision without further question as t o wh et h er the claims are ecc lesiastical in nature

. See R ayburn v. G eneral Con fe re nc e of S

e v e nth -D ay

Ad v e nti sts , 772 F .2 d 1 16 4, 11 67 -6 8 ( 4th Cir . 1 98 5) ; s ee also Combs v

. Central Tex

. Annual Conference of theUnited Me thodist C hurch , 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999) (employ ment claims by

minis t ers “ nece ssarily

intrude into churc h g overna nce in a manner that would be inher ently

coer cive, e ven if the a lleg [ations] [] were pure ly nondoctrinal” ); Abrams v. W atchtower Bible & Tr a ct

Soc’y , 715 N.E.2d 798, 803 (I ll. App. 1999) (re view of e ccle siastical de c isi on s, “ pa

rt ic ula rl y tho se pe rt a in in g t o th e me mbe rs hip or hir ingand

fi ri ngof c le rgy , a re in themselves an ‘ extensive inquiry ’ into relig ious law and pra ctice, a nd there fore , forbidden by the8

F ir st A me ndme nt” ). Th e re a so n f or thi s sp e c ia l r

ule fo r e mpl oy

me nt d e cis io ns a

bo ut m ini ste rs is be c a us e [t ]he relationship betwee n an org anized churc h and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minist er is the c hief instrument by which the ch u rc h seeks to fulfill its purpose. Mat te rs tou c hin g thi s r e latio ns hip mus t ne c e ssa ri ly be re c og nize d a s o f p ri me ecc lesiastical conc ern. . . . [I nquiry into a churc h’s dec ision reg ardingthe] employ ment relationship ex isting be tw e e n [] a

c hurch and

its min ist e r w ou ld r e su lt i n a n e nc ro a c hme nt b y

the State into an are a of r elig ious free dom which it is forbidden to enter by the p rinciples of the fr e e e xer c ise c la

us e of the F ir st A me ndme nt.
McClure v . Salvation Army , 460 F.2d 553, 558- 60 (5th Cir. 1972) (e stablishing ministerial exception based on g ener al principle espoused in W atson , 80 U.S. at 733, that secula r cour ts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review e ccle siastical matters)

.

Thus, in resolving whether the trial cour

t had subj e c t m a

tter jurisdiction over Patton’s claims, we will first addre ss whether Patton’s job function wa s “ministerial.” I f so, then pursua nt to the minist eria l exception, Patton’s claims for defa mation and tortious interfer ence are not subject to secular revie w.
Whe the r P

att on’ s J ob was “M

inis te ria l” Whether an e mploy ee of

a re ligious i nstitut ion is a “minis ter” is a question of law f or the cour t. Starkman , 198 F.3d at 176. The m inisterial exception has not been limi ted to members of the c lerg y . Ra

y bu rn , 772 F.2d at 1169. Rather, it “enc ompasses all employ ees of a re ligious instit ution, whether or dained or not, whose primar

y functions serve its spirit ual and pa sto ral mission.” EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am. , 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

. An employ ee’ s job9

title is not dispositi ve. Alicea-H ernandez , 320 F.3d at 704 n.4. I nst ea d , we m u st consider the
re a lit ie s o f t

he “ fu nc tio n of the po sit ion a t iss ue ” to de te rm ine wh e the r the po sit ion is m ini ste ri a l in nature
. EEOC v. Roman Catho l ic Dioce se of Raleigh , 2 13 F .3 d 7 95 , 8 01 (4 th C ir . 2 00 0) . “ As a g ener al rule,” an employ ee’ s position will be considered “minist eria l” if his or her “primar y duties consist of teac hing, spr eading t h e fa i t h, churc h g overna nce, supe rvision of a re ligious orde r, or supervision or par

ticipation in relig ious ritual and worship” or if th e “p o s i t ion is im portant to the spiritual a nd pastoral mission of the c hurch.” Ra y bu rn , 772 F.2d at 1169. Howeve r, the “ exception would not apply

to employ

ment decisions concerning purely custodial or administrative pe rsonnel . . . [w] here no spiritual function is involved.” Ro ma n Ca tho lic Di oc ese , 213 F.3d at 801.

The F ifth Circuit articulated a three -par t test in Sta rkman v. E vans to determine whether an employ ee’ s primary duties are minist eria l in nature: (1) “whe ther e mploy ment decisions reg ardingthe position at issue are made ‘larg ely on relig ious c riteria,’ ” (2) “whe ther the plaintiff wa s qu a lif ie d a nd a uth or ize d to pe rf

or m th e c e re mon ie s o f t

he Churc h, ” and

(3 ) “ pr ob a

bly mos t important is whether [plaintiff] ‘eng ag ed in ac tiviti es traditionally cons i d ere d ecc lesiastical or relig ious.’” 198 F.3d at 176-77 (citations omitted). The Starkman c ourt he ld that it is “ su ff ic ie nt” to de em an employ ee’ s function “ministerial” if only the third prong

is satisfied. Id . at 177 (c ho ir direc tor was minister bec ause r elig ious “music constitutes a form of prayer that is an integ ral pa rt of worship” ). Many

courts have analy

zed whether

a particular employ ee qualifies as a “minister”

u s in g th e g e n e r a l s ta

n d ar d s s e t f

o rth in Ra yburn and

the “ pr ima

ry dutie s” te st art ic ulate d in Starkman

. Nonethele ss, the parties here have not c ited, nor have we f ound, any case prese nting the exact question at issue in this case—whe ther a Direc tor of Youth Ministries, who does not pre achSee , e.g. , EEOC v. Roman Catholic Dioce se of Raleigh , 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000) 7 (Dire ctor of Music Ministry was minister bec ause “ music is a vital means of e x pressing ” re ligious be lie fs and

e mpl oy e e wa s a

“ vis ibl e . . . le a de r o f t

he c on g re g a tio n” ); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am. , 8 3 F .3 d 4 55 , 4 57 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 6) (n un wa s “ fu nc tio na l e qu iva le nt of a min ist e r” ); Ra y bu rn v . G e ne ra l Co nfe re nc e of S e v e nth -D ay

Ad v e nti sts , 772 F.2d 1164, 1165, 1169 ( 4th Cir. 1985) (“ a sso c iate in p a sto ra l c are int e rn ” wa s min ist e r be c a us e po sit ion

inv olv e d “ e va

ng e lic a l, l iturg ic a l, and c ouns e lin g re sp on sib ili tie s” ); Sm ith v . R ale igh Di st. of N .C. Con fe re nc e of t

heUn ite d M

e tho dis t Church , 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (churc h rec eptionist and secr etar y wer e “se cular , lay e mpl oy e e s w ho pe rf

or me d n on -r e lig iou s, a dmi nis tr a tiv e ta sk s) ; Shirkey v. Eastwind Cmty. Dev. Cor p ., 941 F. Supp. 567, 577 (D. Md. 1996) (“c ommunity develope r ” f

o r non-pr ofit Methodist group was not minister bec ause ta sks of deve loping e conomy , reduc ing une mploy ment, and improving qu a lity of lif e in c omm

un ity we re se c ula

r i n n a tur e ); Turner v. Church of J esus Christ of

Latter-Day Sa int s , 18 S.W .3d 877, 889-96 (Tex

. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied) (“missionary” wa s minist er be c a us e e sse nti a l ta sk s w e re to p re a c h g os pe l and pe rf or m ba pti sms ); Dean , 994 S.W .2d at 395 (B a pti st p a sto r w a s mi ni ster ); Tra n v . F ior e nz a , 9 34 S.W. 2d

74 0, 74 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t Di st. ] 199 6, no pe t.) (C a tho lic pr ie st w a s mi nis te r) ; Gree n v. United Pe ntecostal Church Int’l , 899 S.W. 2d 28 , 30 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 95 , p e t. d e nie d) (P e nte c os ta l r e ve re nd wa s mi nis te r) ; se e als o W e iss ma n v . Co ng

re ga tio n S ha ar e Em e th , 839 F. Supp. 680, 682 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (cla ims by Temple Administrator, whose position was both sec ular a nd relig ious, were barr ed fr om reviewby F ir st Ame ndme nt be c a

us e wo uld re qu ir e re vie w of e c c le sia sti c a l matte rs ); W illiams v. G leason , 26 S.W .3d 54, 59-60 (Te x . App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2000, pet. denied) (chur ch’s discipline of Sunday -school tea che r was ecc lesiastical matter ); Patterson v. Southwest Baptist T heological Se mi na ry , 858 S.W .2d 602, 605 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1993, no writ) (se minary ’s termination of theolog y profe ssor was e ccle siastical matter)

. 10 o r t ea ch b u ti n s t ea d

ad m i n i s t er s an d

o v er s ee s t h e ch u rc h ’s y o u t h -gr o u p ac t i v i t i es an d

fu n dra i s i n g, holds a “ministerial” position. Thus, we r eview the ty pes of e mploy ees who have a nd have not be en de e me d “ min ist e rs ” in o the r c a se s. 7

We f ind pa rt ic ularly ins tr uc tiv e the c a se s invo lvi ngpo sit ion s th a t are pa rt ly

a dmi nis tr a tiv e in n a tur e and do no t r e qu ir e the e mpl oy e e to p art ic ipate in w or sh ip act iv it ies or to te a c h r e lig iou s d oc tr ine (u nli ke po sit ion s tr a dit ion a lly c on sid e re d “ min ist e ri a l,” su c h a s r e ve re nd s,11

p r i e s t s , nu n s , m i s s i o n ar i e s , an d t h e l i k e )

. In Alicea-H

ernandez v. Catholi c Bishop of Chicago , the H i s p an i c C o m m u n i c a t i o n s M an a g e r f o r t h e C a t h o l i c c h u r c h w a s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r “ p r e s s s e c r e t ar

y” duties including: c omposing media rele ases, corre spondence , and chur ch publications; deve loping relationships wit h the Hispanic me dia and c o mm u n it y ; a n d tr a nslating c hurch materials into Spanish. 320 F.3d at 703-04. Her duties did not include participatingin worship activities or re ligious teac hing. Id

. Al tho ug h Al ic e a -H e rn and e z’s dutie s we re fa c ia lly a dmi nis tr a tiv e , th e Se ve nth Cir c uit
c on c lud e d th a t he r p os iti on wa s mi nis te ri a l in

natur e be c a

us e , u lti mate ly , h e r r ole wa s c ri tic a l in disseminating the c hurch’ s messag e, and the “[ d]etermination of whose voice speaks for the churc h is per se a re ligious matter.” Id . at 704 (c itations omi tted).

Simi la rl y , in Pardue v. Ce nter City Consort i u m S ch ools of the Archdioceseof W ashington, Inc. , the principa l of a C atholic s chool was deemed a “minister,” a lthough she claimed to f un c tio n o nly

in a n a dmi nis tr a tiv e c a

pa c ity and wa s n ot r e spon si bl e for le a din g any wo rs hip

a c tiv iti e s o r t e a c hin g re lig iou s c la sse s. 87 5 A .2 d 6 69 , 6 77 (D .C. Ap p. 20 05 ). Th e c ourt he ld t hat, as “c hief a dminist rator . . . she would cer tainly be expected to perf

o rm n u m erous duties—sec ular in appea ranc e—desig ned to meet public licensing require ments and to maintain the s tanding of the i n s t i tu t i o n as a sc h o o l

. Bu ts h e w as al s o . . . an s we rab l e t o t h e r el i gi o u s au t h o ri t i es fo r p ro v i d i n g, in a my riad of w ay s not reducible to a listi ng of tasks, ‘spiritual lea dership in and f or t h e school community .’” Id .; see also Shaliehsabou v. H ebrew Homeof Greater W ash., Inc. , 363 F.3d 299, 309 (4th Circ. 2004) ( “mashg iach,” who was responsible for maintaining kosher kit chen, w as minister “g iven the importanc e of die tary laws to the Jewish religion” ). Patton’s positi on as Dire ctor of Y outh Minist ries un d oubtedly included seve ral ad m i n i s t rative duties, suc h as coor dinating the transportation, logistics, and other trave l12

arr ang ements for

y outh outings and g ather ings. Also, Patton wa s not or dained, and it appear s from his a ffidavit that, as Direc tor of Youth Ministries, Patton di d not participate in worship service s or
cer emon i es , h ad no responsibility for the music or

liturgy , did not assist wit h the conf irmation of y outh, and was not re quired to tea ch re ligious cla sses or have relig ious training.

Ye t, b y his ow n te sti mony , Patto n w a s resp on sib le fo r “ or g anizi ng ” the se e ve nts , me anin g that he ma de de c isi on s on beh alf of the c hurc h a

bo ut what a c tiv iti e s th e me mbe rs of its y outh m ini str

y wo uld pa rt ic ipate in. Th e purp os e of a c hurc h org anizi ng a y outh- g ro up re tr e a t is to br ingpe op le tog e the r i n f e llo ws hip , o ft e n c ou

ple d w ithre ligio us wor sh ip or re fl e c tio n. Ev e n if Pa tto n w a s n ot t e a c hin g the do c tr ine him se lf , h e te sti fi e d th a t he was act iv ely pa rt ic ipatin g a s a chape rone. O rg anizing and c haper oning the se eve nts for the y o uth minis try are activities that further ed the c hurch’ s missi on, which we nt bey ond purely secula r tasks such as booking a cha rtere d bus, collecting pay

ments from the participa

nts, or re servingcabins for a re treat. Furthe rmore, Patton
ave rr e d th a t he “ mana g e d the bu dg e t fo r the y outh p ro g ra m.” Ha d Patto n b e e n r e sp on sib le me re ly for a ccounting , thi s function mig ht be viewe d as solely secula r bec ause he would not have a ny discretion over

the use of c hurch f

unds. But, as the direc tor o f t h e p ro gra m who “mana g ed” the budg et, Patton was authorized to dec ide how the c hurch’ s money was b es t u s ed in furtheranc e of minist ering to its y outh. Be cause Patton was responsible for deciding what ac tiviti es the c hurch’ s y outh gro up wo uld

pa rt ic ipate in a

nd ho w the pr og ra

m’ s mo ne y wo uld be sp e nt, he wa s “ ans we ra ble to t he re lig iou s a

uth or iti e s f

or pr ov idi ng , in

a my ri a d o f w ay s no t red

uc ibl e to a

lis tin g of ta sk s, ‘spiritual leade rship in and for the [y outh minis try ].’” See Pardue , 875 A.2d at 677.

Notably , Patton’s affidavit also states that he “pe rfor med fundra is i n g duties” and

“ re c ru ite d p art ic ipa

nts ” fo r t he pr og ra m. T he re is n o q

ue sti on that a sk ingpe op le to g ive the ir tim eAl tho ug h th e re c or d d oe s n ot d e mon str a te that Patto n w a s “qual if ied a nd a uth or ize d to 8 perf orm the ce remonies of

the Church,” there is no require ment that all three Starkman fac tors be satisfied to deter

mine that an employ ee’ s primary duties are minist eria l. 13 and money

to support a ctivities of the y outh ministry is a function that is “important to the spiritual

and pa sto ra l mi ssi on of the c hurc h, ” e sp e c ia lly in l ig ht o f t he fa c t th a t Patto n w a s a lso re sp on sib le for de ci d i n g h o w t o u s e that money and how to org anize those eve nts. See Ra y bu rn , 772 F.2d at 1169. I n fulfilling these duties, Patton would be dire ctly communicatingthe mission of the prog ram t o i n d i v i d u a l s an d e n c o u r a g i n g t h e mt o p art i c i p a t e e i t h e r f i n an c i a l l y o r

p h ys i c a l l y. Thu s , e v e n a c c e p t i n g P a t t o n ’ s a l l e g a t i o n s a s t r u e , i t i s a p p ar e n t o n t h e f

a c e of his pleading s that he wa s actingboth as the “voic e” o f t h e y o u t h minist ry and ser ving a s a “pr imary ag ent” of the chur ch. See Davies , 158 S.W .3d at 56. “De termin[ing] whose voice spe aks for the
c hurc h is per se a re ligious matter,” Alicea-H ernandez , 32 0 F .3 d at 70 4, and de te rm ini ngwh o w ill
serve as a “ primary

ag ent by which a c hurch se ek s t o fu l fi l its purpose” is prec isely the ty pe of
ecc lesiastical decision that the Fir st Amendment intends to protect. De an v . A lfo rd , 994 S.W .2d 392, 39 5 ( Tex
. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 1 99 9, no pe t.) ; see also W atson , 80 U.S. at 733. Considering the Starkman “primar

y duties” test, then, (1) the chur ch’s e mploy m ent dec ision reg ardingPatton’s po sit ion wo uld be ba se d ‘ larg e ly

on re lig iou s c ri te ri a ,’ and (2 ) Patton ’s or g anizi ng of —a s w e ll a s h is b u d get i n g, fu n dra i s i n g, an d r e c ru i t i n g p ar t i ci p an t s fo r—y o u t hm i n i s t ry ac t i v i t i es ar e t h i n gs “tra ditionally

considere d [t o serve an] ecc lesiastical or r elig ious” purpose. See198 F.3d at 176-77. 8 Ac c or din g ly

we ho ld t

hat, a s D ir e c tor

of the Yo uth

Min istry fo r t he Oa k H ill Uni ted M e tho dis t Church, Patton functioned in a minist eria l capa city

.14

Whether Dism issal of Claim s was Proper

Patton a s s e rte d c la im s a g a in s t t

h e Chu r c hf

o r to rti o u s inte r f

e r e n c e w it

h an
e mpl oy me nt c on tr a c t and

fo r d e fa matio n. Th e tor

tio us int e rf

e re nce cl aim is , w ith out do ub t, inext rica bly intertwined with the Churc h’s dec ision to t erminate Patton from his mi n is te rial position. Be cause “chur ches must be f ree t o decide for themse lves, fre e fr om state interfe renc e, matter s of churc h g overnme nt as well as those of faith and doc trine,” the actions t aken as part the Churc h’s employ ment decision ar e ec clesiastica l matters protected fr om secular revie w by

the “ministerial exception” af

forde d under the Fr ee Ex erc ise Clause. See Combs , 1 7 3 F. 3 d at 3 5 0 (q u o t i n g Mc Clu re , 46 0 F .2 d at 56 0) ; Ra

y bu rn , 772 F.2d at 1169. Thus, the trial court was corr ect to dismiss for a lack of su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n Patto n’ s to rt iou s in te rf e re nc e c la im. The dismissal of the def

amation claims, howe ver, r equire s further analy sis. Patton’s defa mation claims can be divided into two gr oups: (1) those base d on statements made a mong Pastors J ones, Wright, a

nd Ruth and the Staff Parish Relation s Commi ttee duringtheir mee ting reg ardingPatton’s termination, including Wrig ht’s handwr itten notes from this meeting , and (2) tho se ba se d o n s tate me nts m ade by the c omm itt e e c ha ir

wo man a nd by Pa sto r R uth in r e sp on se to questions from member s of the congreg ation who wer e conc erne d about the status of Patton’s employ ment as the Dire ctor of Y outh Minist ries. L ike the tortious interfe renc e cla im, the first g roup of alleg edly

defa matory statements wer e undoubtedly made as p ar t of the Churc h’s employ ment decision and, the ref

ore, w ere proper ly dismiss ed for a lac k of subject matter

jurisdiction. Se e Og le v. Church of God , 1 53 F e d. Ap p. 37 1, 37 3, 37 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 5) (a lle g e dly

de fa mator y state me nts
ma de in r e po rt

by c hurc h c omm itt e e re c omm e nd ingte rm inatio n o f b ish op we re pr ote c te d b y F ir st Am e ndme nt f

ro m se c ula

r r e vie w) ; Higgins v. Maher , 258 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)I n Tilt on , af t er recognizi ng that “re ligious g roups may be held liable in tort for secula r 9 acts,” the cour

t went on to discuss th e o t h erwise broad pr otection af forde d to the actions of a relig ious insti tution by

the eccl es i as tical abstention doctrine

. Se e Tilton v . M ar sh all , 925 S.W .2d 67 2, 67 7- 79 (T e x. 19 96 ) (c itatio n omi tte d) (e va ng e lis t pa sto r’ s pr omi se s that te le vis ion v iew ers ’ prayers would be answe red if the y sent money , even if

insincere , wer e not subject to sec ular re view beca use they involved “stateme nts of relig ious doctrine”)

. Id . at 679. See , e.g. , Hutchison , 789 F.2d at 393, 396 (minister’s defa mation claim based on c hurch’ s 10 statement “that he had become ‘unappointable ’” involved “interna l churc h discipline

. . . g overne d by e c c le sia sti c a l r

ule ” ); Jacobs v . Mallard Creek Pre sbyterian Church, Inc ., 214 F. Supp. 2d 552, 554, 557 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (chur ch’s statement “that alleg ations had bee n broug ht ag ainst [pastor] ,” which was communicated to c ong reg ation afte r pastor had resig ned, wer e protec ted fr o m s ecular revie w bec ause w ould require court “to inquire into the churc h’s dec isions reg ardingits own internal mana g e me nt, and

dis c ipl ine of

its c le rgy ); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop , 683 A.2d 808, 812 (Md. 1996) (i f al l ege d defa mation “occ urs in the context of, or is g erma ne to, a dispute ove r the plaintiff’s fi t n es s o r s u i t abil ity to . . . remain a

part of the cler g y , [] it is di fficult to see how the for bi dd en i nqui ry

[ in to eccl esi ast ica l m att ers ] co uld be a vo ide d” ); Bourne v. Ce nter on Children, Inc

. 838 A.2d 371, 380 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (al l egedly defa matory letter sent to congreg ation members a

bout minis ter, a fter minister ha d been te rminated, prote cted b y First Amendme nt from secul ar rev ie w b e c a

us e it “ re g ard [ed ] ap pe lla nt’ s p e rf or manc e a s a

min ist e r” ); Jae- W

oo Cha v. 15 (bec ause c omplained-of tor ts, including defamation, “occ urre d as i nsepar able parts of a process of divestiture of prie stly

authority ,” cour

t refuse d to “seve r them fr om the privileg ed aur a of . . .
ecc lesiastical exemption”).

Reg ardingthe sec ond g roup of a lleg edly defa matory statements, howeve r, Patton argues that they

do not involve ecc lesiastical matter s beca use they wer e made afte r the e mploy ment decision wa s final. We disag ree . Although w e re cog nize that the “Fr ee E x erc ise Clause has ne ver immuniz ed cler g y or churc hes from all cause s of action alleg ing tortiou s co n d uct,” Tilt on v. Ma rsh all , 9 25 S.W. 2d

67 2, 67 7 ( Te x. 19 96 ), we fi nd ampl e su pp or t f or the c on c lus ion

that a lle g e dly 9 defa matory statements made i n co nnection with a c hurch’ s decision to terminate a minist er’ s emplo y ment are protec ted from se cular revie w, eve n if the statements do not expressly involve relig ious doctrine or a

re not made prior to the chur ch’s de cision. 10Korean Presbyte rian Church , 553 S.E.2d 511, 516 (Va. 2001) (pastor’ s “alleg ations of def amation a g a ins t [ c hurc h] cann ot be c on sid e re d in isolatio n, se pa ra te and a pa rt fr om t he c hurc h’ s d e c isi on

to terminate his employ

ment. . . . [M ] o s t co u rts that have c onsidered the question whether the Fr ee Ex erc ise Clause divests a c ivil cour t of subject matter jur isdiction to consider a pa stor’s def amation claims ag ainst a chur ch and its off icials have answe red that question in the af firmative.” ) (c itations omi tte d) ; see also B r

yc e v. E piscopal Church , 289 F.3d 648, 658 ( 10th Cir. 2002) (chur ch’s state me nts a

bo ut m ini ste r’ s se xua l or ie ntatio n, wh ic h w e re a lle g e d to c on sti tut e se xua l ha ra ssm e nt, althoug h offe nsive and pe rhaps incor rec t, were “n o t actionable” bec ause the y wer e “r elig ious dia logue be tw e e n a

min ist e r a

nd his pa ri sh ion e rs [ab out] an e mploy ee of th e c hurc h s ub je c t to its int e rn a l g ov e rn anc e pr oc e dure s” ); Klags br un v . V a’ ad Ha ra bo nim , 53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 734, 742 (D. N. J. 19 99 ) ( fl y e r d istri bute d to or g anizatio n of ra bb is a bo ut Jew ish pa

ri sh ion e r’ s fa ilure to c omp ly wi th o rt ho do x divo rc e pr oc e dure s n ot a c tio na ble de fa matio n be c a

us e tr uth or fa lsi ty of state me nts wa s g ro un de d in r e lig iou s d oc tr ine ); Schoenhals v . Mains , 504 N.W.2d 233, 236 ( Minn. App. 1993) (def amatory statements made to c ong reg ation about dismiss ed members wer e not a ctionable, e ven though c ontent of statements wa s not ex plicitly relig ious and statements we re ma de af ter dismissal wa s c omp le te ); Ra sm us se n v . B e nn e tt , 741 P.2d 755, 756, 759 (Mont. 1987) (same)

. 16 I n Heard v . Johnson , a Bapt is t c hurc h b e c a me dis satis fi e d w iththe se rv ic e s o f i ts pastor, J ohnson, and attempted to terminate his employ ment. 810 A.2d 871, 875 (D.C. App. 2002)

. When J ohnson ref

used to ce de his position, som e congreg ation members fo rm ed a “Coa lition of Concerne d Members,” which “produc ed an eig hty -five pag e manual documenting t h e gr ievanc es ag ainst J ohnson, the rea sons f or his dismissal as pastor, and the a ttempts the cong reg ation had made to remove Johnson a s pastor.” Id . J ohnson claimed this was de famatory
. Id . I n deter mining that J ohnson’s defa

mation claim was outsi de the court’s subject matter jurisdi ction, the cour t provided a thoug htful analy sis of the curr ent state of the lawon this iss ue. In rele vant par t, the court stated that: I n the spec ific ar ea of the chur ch-minister relationship, other courts have e x panded the un ive rs e of

c la ims that do no t ov e rc ome the F ir st A mendm ent pr ote c tio ns to include . . . a va

riety of common law c laims. . . . Un de r mos t cir c ums tanc e s, de fa matio n is one of tho se c omm on law c la ims that is not compelling enoug h to overc ome First Amendment prote ction surrounding a chur ch’s c hoice of

pastoral lea der. When a

defa mation claim arises entirely out of17

a chur ch’s r elationship with its pa s t o r, t h e claim is almost alway s deeme d to be beyond the re ach of

civil courts bec ause r esolution o f t h e claim would re quire a n impermissible inquiry

into the churc h’s base s for its a ction [compil ing stringcite of rele vant ca ses]. I n mo st o f t

he se c a se s, the a lle g e d d e fa mato ry st ate me nts did

no t ov e rt ly e xpre ss a ny re lig iou s p ri nc ipl e s o r b e lie fs , b ut a ll the a c tio ns re su lte d f ro m c on fl ic ts “conf ined within” the chur ches involved. F urthermor e, the c ourts found that it was imp os sib le to c on sid e r t

he pla int if

fs ’ a lle g a tio ns of de fa

matio n “in

iso latio n, se pa

rate and apa rt from the c hurch[s’] decision to terminate [the plaintiffs’] e m ploy ment.” “Que stions of truth, falsity , malice, a nd the var ious privilege s that exis t often take on a diffe rent hue when e x amined in the lig ht of relig ious prece pts and proce dures that g ener ally perme ate c ontroversie s over who is fit to re p re s en t and speak for the c hurc h. ” Ex amin ingsu c h c on tr ov e rs ie s is pr e c ise ly the kin d o f i nq

uir y that is fo rb idd e n to civi l c ourt s si nc e “ wh os e vo ic e sp e a ks fo r t he c hurc h is per se a relig ious matter.” Th is i s n ot to say that re lig iou s or g anizatio ns are immun e fr om a ll t or t c la ims ar i s i n g o u to f e mp l o ym e n td e c i s i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e i r p a s t o r s . T o rt s s u c ha s b a t t e r y, false imprisonment or c onversion proba bly would fall within the exception to c hurch immunit y set out in Sh e rb e rt

[ v. Ve rner , 37 4 U. S. 39 8, 40 3 (1 96 3) ] be c a us e the y po se a “ su bs tanti a l thre a t to pu

bli c sa fe ty , pe a c e or

or de r. ” I t is a lso c on c e iva ble that to rt s such as defa

mation, inf

liction of emotional distress, and invasion of privac y m i ght be so unusual or e g reg ious as to fall within the Sh e rb e rt exception. . . . I n light of all the fore g oing, w e hold that constitutional protections aff orded by the Free Ex erc ise clause (prohibiting civil court int erf ere nce in disputes betwe en minist ers a

nd churc hes) ex tend t o defa mation claims, when: (1) such a c laim flows entirely from an employ ment dispute betwee n a churc h and its pa stor s o that c on sid e ratio n o f t

he c la im i n is olatio n f

ro m th e c hurc h’ s dec isi on a s to the pa sto r i s not prac tical, (2) the all ege d “publi cation” is c onfined within the chur ch, and ( 3) there are no unusual or egreg ious circumstanc es. This, then, i s the outline of the c on sti tut ion a l sh a do w o n o ur su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r s uc h d e fa matio n c a se s.
Id . at 884-85 (c itations omi tted).

Simi larly , in Y

aggie v. Indiana-Ke ntucky Synod , th e c ourt

de te rm ine d th a t a lle g e dly defa matory statements, much like those at issue in the instant cas e, we re n o t within the court’s subject matter jur isdiction. 860 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (W.D. Ky . 1994). Ya g g ie was a pastor whoSe e als o , infra, c ases discusse d at footnote 10. 11 18 was “advise d” to r esig n by a churc h committee. Id . at 1196. A re port about this decision was g iven to the cong reg ation. Id

. at 1197. I n response to que stions about the committee’s re commendation,

a bis ho p r e s p o n d e d

t o m e mb e r s o f

t h e c h u r c ht h at , “ I tm e an s P a s t o r Y a g g i e ’ s g o i n g t o [g e t] psy chiatric treatment and evaluation.” Id

. Y a g g i e c l a i m e d t h e b i s h o p ’ s r e s p o n s e w a s d e f a m a t o r y. Id . Th e co u rt concluded that, althoug h the “state ments do not ex press a ny relig ious principles or be lie fs ,” the y we re e c c le sia sti c a l matt e rs “ c on c e rn ing the [ch ur c h’ s] emp loy

me nt re latio ns hip of

its min ist e r. . . . I f tr

uth we re a de fe ns e to the de fa matio n cla im, we pr e suma bly c ou ld fa c e inq

uir y int o a dete rmination of the minister’s ef fec tiveness. . .

. [T] his is precisely what the F irst Amendment prohibits.” Id . at 1198-99.

Her e, the c hair wom an of the committee that re commended Patton’s ter mination
e xpre sse d to me mbe rs of

the c on g re g a tio n th a t th e “ de c isi on [wa s a pp roached ] pray e rf

ull y and in the best interests of the c hurch.” She also alleg edly told members that “It is really bad” a nd “We had to g e t hi m out be fo re so methingha pp e ne d at ou

r c hurc h. ” F ur

the rm or e , Pa sto r R

uth is a lle g e d to have r esponded to a

memb er ’s q u es t i o n by

stating, “ [P atton] knows why he wa s fired” and “he
wo uld n’ t w ant a nyon e e lse to k

no w. ” Al tho ug h the latte r state me nts do no t, on the ir fa c e , im pli c a te relig ious doctrine, a de termination of the truth or fa lsity of these statements would requir e an inquiry int o th e c hurc h’ s r e a so ns fo r t e rm inatin g Pa tto n f ro m hi s p os iti on

a s th e Di re c tor

of Yo uth Ministries. As in Heard, 810 A.2d at 884-45, and Y ag gie , 8 60 F . Su

pp . at 11 98 -9 9, thi s is pr e c ise ly 11 the ty pe of inquiry

protec ted from se cular revie w by

the ec clesiastic a

bstention do ctrine. Fur thermore , the three -par

t test set-forth in He ar

d g uid e s o ur

de c isi on be c a us e (1 ) P a tto n’ s c la imAl t h o ug h not a brig ht-line rule, some c ourts have distinguished betwe en def amatory 12 rema rks published to members of the churc h versus c ommunications with thi rd par ties. I n Turner v . Chu rc h of J

esu s Ch ris t of

Lat te r- Da ySa int s , all of t he mi nister’s employ ment-re lated cla ims were deeme d “ec clesiastica l matters” pr otected from review, ex cept for hi s defa mation claim. 18 S.W .3d at 896. Turner

is disti ng uishab l e fr om the instant case be cause , there , the alleg edly defa matory statements wer e made to the minister’s g randpa rents, as oppose d to being internal stateme nts made by the chur ch in conne ction with its employ ment decision. Id . I n Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conferenc e of the United Me thodist C hurch , the cour

t highlig ht ed t h e importance of such a distinction. 663 N.W.2d 404, 406 (I owa 2003) . The c ou rt h eld that the chur ch member ’s def amation claim wa s subject to secula

r re view bec ause the statements had been published to the entire community , noting that th e c la im wo uld no t “ e njo y via bil ity ha d th e matte r b e e n d ivu lg e d s ole ly to t he me mbe rs of

She ll Rock UMC.” Id

. I n Tra n v . F

ior e nz a , the c ourt a c kn ow le dg e d th a t a min ist e r’ s d e fa

matio n c la ims a g a ins t 13 a chur ch may

be subjec t to review i f t h e s t atements “ overstep the bounds of the author ity ’s administrative duties” and “ar e cle arly intended to def

ame or inflict emotional distress.” 934 S.W.2d 7 4 0 , 7 4 4 n . 2 ( T e x. Ap p . — H o u s to n [1 s t D is t. ] 1 9 9 6 , n o p e t. )

. Just as in Tran , howeve r, the de fa matio n c la ims he re are no t t hat ty pe, but in ste a d “ ari se fr om [the ] div e sti tur e of pr ie stl y authority ” and “ are insepara ble from the pr ivilege d aura of ec clesiastica l exempti on.” Id . at 744. 19 “flows entirely

from an e mploy

ment dispute betwee n a chur ch and its pastor so that c onsideration of the claim in isolation from the churc h’s decision as t o the pastor is not prac tical, (2) the alleg ed ‘publ ic a ti o n ’ is c o n f

in e d w it h in th e c h u r c h , an d

( 3 ) th e r e ar e n o u nu s u a l o r e g r e g ious 12

c ir c ums tanc e s” surr ound ingthe state me nts
. See810 A.2d at 845. 13 A ca se dis cu s s ed b y

both parties, Drev low v. Lutheran Church , is disti ng uishable. See991 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1993). In Drev low , a pa sto r’ s f or me r e mpl oy e r ( the Sy

no d) pla c e d a

fa lse document in his file claimingthat Dre vlow’s spouse had been pr eviously marrie d. Id . at 469. The court de termined that Dr evlow’s de famation claim based on this document wa s viable for review beca use i t was not connec ted to the chur ch’s de termination about “his fitness a s a minister.” Id . at 471-72. Patton’s claims, howeve r, arise from st atements directly related t o the Church’ s decision to t e rm inate his e mpl oy

me nt b a se d o n th e Churc h’ s p e rc e pti on that he wa s unf

it.20 Patton’s single issue is over ruled.
CO NC LU SION The tr i al co u rt proper ly

dismiss ed Patton’s claims for tortious interfer ence and defa mation beca

use they arose from actions taken and communications made in c onnection with the Church’s de cision to terminate Patton from a “ minist eria l” position, and the First Amendment prohibits secular r eview of a church’s employ

ment decisions about its minist ers. See Ra y bu rn , 772 F .2 d at 1169
. Ac c or din g ly , be c a us e the tr ia l court

la c ke d s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n to re vie w the se
c la ims , w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s dis mis sa l.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: Jul y

28, 2006