This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains regulatory documents having general

applicability and legal effect, most of which

are keyed to and codified in the Code of

Federal Regulations, which is published under

50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

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new books are listed in the first FEDERAL

REGISTER issue of each week.

Rules and Regulations Federal Register

6195 

Vol. 78, No. 20 

Wednesday, January 30, 2013 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–1199; Special 

Conditions No. 25–476–SC] 

Special Conditions: Embraer S.A., 

Model EMB–550 Airplanes; Flight 

Envelope Protection: Performance 

Credit for Automatic Takeoff Thrust 

Control System (ATTCS) During GoAround 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Embraer S.A. Model 

EMB–550 airplane. This airplane will 

have a novel or unusual design feature 

associated with the use of an Automatic 

Takeoff Thrust Control System (ATTCS) 

during go-around. The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for this design feature. These special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: Effective Date: March 1, 2013. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe 

Jacobsen, FAA, Airplane and Flight 

Crew Interface Branch, ANM–111, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–2011; facsimile 

425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On May 14, 2009, Embraer S.A. 

applied for a type certificate for their 

new Model EMB–550 airplane. The 

Model EMB–550 airplane is the first of 

a new family of jet airplanes designed 

for corporate flight, fractional, charter, 

and private owner operations. The 

aircraft has a conventional configuration 

with low wing and T-tail empennage. 

The primary structure is metal with 

composite empennage and control 

surfaces. The Model EMB–550 airplane 

is designed for 8 passengers, with a 

maximum of 12 passengers. It is 

equipped with two Honeywell 

HTF7500–E medium bypass ratio 

turbofan engines mounted on aft 

fuselage pylons. Each engine produces 

approximately 6,540 pounds of thrust 

for normal takeoff. The primary flight 

controls consist of hydraulically 

powered fly-by-wire elevators, ailerons 

and rudder, controlled by the pilot or 

copilot sidestick. 

Embraer S.A. has incorporated an 

ATTCS function into the engine of the 

Model EMB–550 airplane. It has a full 

authority digital electronic control 

system architecture. Embraer S.A. 

proposed allowing performance credit 

for this function during go-arounds to 

show compliance with the requirements 

of § 25.121(d) for approach climb 

performance. Since the airworthiness 

requirements do not contain appropriate 

safety standards for approach climb 

performance using ATTCS, special 

conditions are required to establish a 

level of safety equivalent to that of the 

regulations. 

Part 25 appendix I contains standards 

for use of ATTCS during takeoff. These 

special conditions establish standards to 

extend the use of ATTCS to the goaround phase. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of Title 14, Code 

of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17, 

Embraer S.A. must show that the Model 

EMB–550 airplane meets the applicable 

provisions of part 25, as amended by 

Amendments 25–1 through 25–127 

thereto. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Model EMB–550 airplane 

because of a novel or unusual design 

feature, special conditions are 

prescribed under the provisions of 

§ 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Model EMB–550 

airplane must comply with the fuel vent 

and exhaust emission requirements of 

14 CFR part 34 and the noise 

certification requirements of 14 CFR 

part 36 and the FAA must issue a 

finding of regulatory adequacy under 

§ 611 of Public Law 92–574, the ‘‘Noise 

Control Act of 1972.’’ 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type-certification basis under 

§ 21.17(a)(2). 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Embraer S.A. Model EMB–550 

airplane has an ATTCS that is used for 

both takeoff and go-around functions. 

Section 25.904 and part 25 appendix 

I refer to operations of ATTCS only 

during takeoff. The Embraer S.A. Model 

EMB–550 airplane also provides for use 

of ATTCS for go-arounds. As a result, if 

an engine failure occurs during a goaround, the remaining engine 

automatically applies maximum goaround thrust. In addition, in the case 

of an approach with one engine already 

inoperative, if it is necessary to perform 

a go-around, the operating engine 

automatically applies maximum goaround thrust. 

These special conditions are intended 

to ensure that the ATTCS functions 

correctly and meets expected 

performance requirements during goarounds when the airplane is limited by 

weight, altitude, and/or temperature 

during an approach. 

Discussion 

Since current airworthiness 

requirements do not contain safety 

standards to allow credit for ATTCS in 

determining approach climb 

performance, these special conditions 

are required to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to that of the regulations. The 

definition of a critical time interval for 

the approach climb case similar to the 

critical time interval for takeoff defined 

in part 25 appendix I is of primary 

importance. During an approach climb, 

it must be extremely improbable to 

violate a flight path based on the climb 

gradient requirement of § 25.121(d). 


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This climb gradient requirement implies 

a minimum one-engine-inoperative 

flight path capability with the airplane 

in the approach configuration. The 

engine may have been inoperative 

before initiating the go-around, or it may 

become inoperative during the goaround. The definition of the critical 

time interval must consider both 

possibilities. 

The propulsive thrust used to 

determine compliance with the 

approach climb requirements of 

§ 25.121(d) is limited to the lesser of: 

• The thrust provided by the ATTCS, 

or 

• 111% of the thrust resulting from 

the initial thrust setting with the ATTCS 

failing to perform its uptrim function 

and without action by the flightcrew to 

reset thrust. 

This requirement serves to limit the 

adverse performance effects of a 

combined engine and ATTCS failure, 

and ensures adequate performance of an 

all-engines-operating go-around. 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

No. 25–12–06–SC for the Embraer S.A. 

Model EMB–550 airplanes was 

published in the Federal Register on 

November 9, 2012, (77 FR 67309). No 

substantitve comments were received, 

and the special conditions are adopted 

as proposed. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the Embraer 

S.A. Model EMB–550 airplane. Should 

Embraer S.A. apply at a later date for a 

change to the type certificate to include 

another model incorporating the same 

novel or unusual design feature, the 

special conditions would apply to that 

model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

of airplanes. It is not a rule of general 

applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Embraer S.A. 

Model EMB–550 airplanes. 

1. The Model EMB–550 airplane must 

comply with the requirements of 14 CFR 

25.904 and appendix I to 14 CFR part 

25 and the following requirements 

pertaining to the go-around phase of 

flight: 

2. Definitions 

a. Takeoff/go-around (TOGA): 

Throttle lever in takeoff or go-around 

position. 

b. Automatic takeoff thrust control 

system (ATTCS): The ATTCS in Model 

EMB–550 airplanes is defined as the 

entire automatic system available during 

takeoff and in go-around mode, 

including all devices, both mechanical 

and electrical, that sense engine failure, 

transmit signals, actuate fuel controls or 

power levers (or increase engine power 

by other means on operating engines to 

achieve scheduled thrust or power 

increase), and furnish cockpit 

information on system operation. 

c. Critical time interval: The 

definition of the critical time interval in 

14 CFR appendix I 25.2(b) must be 

expanded to include the following: 

(1) When conducting an approach for 

landing using ATTCS, the critical time 

interval is defined as follows: 

(i) The critical time interval begins at 

a point on a 2.5 degree approach glide 

path from which, assuming a 

simultaneous engine and ATTCS 

failure, the resulting approach climb 

flight path intersects a flight path 

originating at a later point on the same 

approach path corresponding that 

corresponds to the 14 CFR part 25 oneengine-inoperative approach climb 

gradient. The period of time from the 

point of simultaneous engine and 

ATTCS failure to the intersection of 

these flight paths must be no shorter 

than the time interval used in evaluating 

the critical time interval for takeoff 

beginning from the point of 

simultaneous engine and ATTCS failure 

and ending upon reaching a height of 

400 feet. 

(ii) The critical time interval ends at 

the point on a minimum performance, 

all-engines-operating go-around flight 

path from which, assuming a 

simultaneous engine and ATTCS 

failure, the resulting minimum 

approach climb flight path intersects a 

flight path corresponding to the 14 CFR 

part 25 minimum one-engineinoperative approach climb gradient. 

The all-engines-operating go-around 

flight path and the 14 CFR part 25 oneengine-inoperative approach climb 

gradient flight path originate from a 

common point on a 2.5 degree approach 

path. The period of time from the point 

of simultaneous engine and ATTCS 

failure to the intersection of these flight 

paths must be no shorter than the time 

interval used in evaluating the critical 

time interval for the takeoff beginning 

from the point of simultaneous engine 

and ATTCS failure and ending upon 

reaching a height of 400 feet. 

(2) The critical time interval must be 

determined at the altitude resulting in 

the longest critical time interval for 

which one-engine-inoperative approach 

climb performance data are presented in 

the airplane flight manual (AFM). 

(3) The critical time interval is 

illustrated in the following figure: 


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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 20 / Wednesday, January 30, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 6197 

3. Performance and system reliability 

requirements: The applicant must 

comply with the performance and 

ATTCS reliability requirements as 

follows: 

a. An ATTCS failure or a combination 

of failures in the ATTCS during the 

critical time interval: 

(1) Must not prevent the insertion of 

the maximum approved go-around 

thrust or power, or must be shown to be 

a remote event. 

(2) Must not result in a significant loss 

or reduction in thrust or power, or must 

be shown to be an extremely improbable 

event. 

b. The concurrent existence of an 

ATTCS failure and an engine failure 

during the critical time interval must be 

shown to be extremely improbable. 

c. All applicable performance 

requirements of 14 CFR part 25 must be 

met with an engine failure occurring at 

the most critical point during go-around 

with the ATTCS functioning. 

d. The probability analysis must 

include consideration of ATTCS failure 

occurring after the time at which the 

flightcrew last verifies that the ATTCS 

is in a condition to operate until the 

beginning of the critical time interval. 

e. The propulsive thrust obtained 

from the operating engine after failure of 

the critical engine during a go-around 

used to show compliance with the oneengine-inoperative climb requirements 

of § 25.121(d) may not be greater than 

the lesser of: 

(1) The actual propulsive thrust 

resulting from the initial setting of 

power or thrust controls with the 

ATTCS functioning; or 

(2) 111% of the propulsive thrust 

resulting from the initial setting of 

power or thrust controls with the 

ATTCS failing to reset thrust or power 

and without any action by the 

flightcrew to reset thrust or power. 

4. Thrust setting 

a. The initial go-around thrust setting 

on each engine at the beginning of the 

go-around phase may not be less than 

any of the following: 

(1) That required to permit normal 

operation of all safety-related systems 

and equipment dependent upon engine 

thrust or power lever position; or 

(2) That shown to be free of hazardous 

engine response characteristics and not 

to result in any unsafe aircraft operating 

or handling characteristics when thrust 

or power is advanced from the initial 

go-around position to the maximum 

approved power setting. 

b. For approval to use an ATTCS for 

go-arounds, the thrust setting procedure 

must be the same for go-arounds 

initiated with all engines operating as 

for go-around initiated with one engine 

inoperative. 

5. Powerplant controls 

a. In addition to the requirements of 

§ 25.1141, no single failure or 

malfunction, or probable combination 

thereof, of the ATTCS, including 

associated systems, may cause the 

failure of any powerplant function 

necessary for safety. 

b. The ATTCS must be designed to: 

(1) Apply thrust or power on the 

operating engine(s), following any oneengine failure during a go-around, to 

achieve the maximum approved goaround thrust without exceeding the 

engine operating limits; 

(2) Permit manual decrease or 

increase in thrust or power up to the 

maximum go-around thrust approved 

for the airplane under the existing 

conditions through the use of the power 

lever. For airplanes equipped with 

limiters that automatically prevent the 

engine operating limits from being 

exceeded under existing ambient 

conditions, other means may be used to 

increase the thrust in the event of an 

ATTCS failure, provided that the means: 

(i) Is located on or forward of the 

power levers; 

(ii) Is easily identified and operated 

under all operating conditions by a 

single action of either pilot with the 

hand that is normally used to actuate 

the power levers; and 

(iii) Meets the requirements of 

§ 25.777(a), (b), and (c). 

(3) Provide a means to verify to the 

flightcrew before beginning an approach 

for landing that the ATTCS is in a 

condition to operate (unless it can be 

demonstrated that an ATTCS failure 

combined with an engine failure during 

an entire flight is extremely 

improbable); and 

(4) Provide a means for the flightcrew 

to deactivate the automatic function. 

This means must be designed to prevent 

inadvertent deactivation. 

6. Powerplant instruments: In 

addition to the requirements of 

§ 25.1305: 

a. A means must be provided to 

indicate when the ATTCS is in the 

armed or ready condition; and 

b. If the inherent flight characteristics 

of the airplane do not provide adequate 

warning that an engine has failed, a 

warning system that is independent of 

the ATTCS must be provided to give the 

pilot a clear warning of any engine 

failure during a go-around. 


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6198 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 20 / Wednesday, January 30, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 

24, 2013. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2013–01928 Filed 1–29–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0699; Special 

Conditions No. 25–474–SC] 

Special Conditions: Airbus, Model 

A318–112 Airplane (S/N 3238); 

Certification of Cooktops 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Airbus Model A318–112 

airplane, serial number (S/N) 3238. This 

airplane, as modified by Fokker Services 

B.V., will have a novel or unusual 

design feature associated with a cooktop 

installation. The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for this design feature. These special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: Effective Date: January 24, 2013. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan 

Jacquet, FAA, Airframe and Cabin 

Safety Branch, ANM–115, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–2676; facsimile 

425–227–1100; email 

daniel.jacquet@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background 

On January 12, 2010, Fokker Services 

B.V. applied for a supplemental type 

certificate for an interior conversion on 

an Airbus Model A318–112 airplane, S/ 

N 3238. The Airbus Model A318–112 

airplane is a large, transport-category 

airplane powered by two CFM56–5B9/P 

engines, with a basic maximum takeoff 

weight of 130,071 pounds. 

At the time of the notice of proposed 

special conditions No. 25–12–02–SC, 

Fokker Services B.V. requested 

certification to convert an Airbus Model 

A318–112 (S/N 3238) to a corporate jet, 

operating for both common carriage and 

private use. As of this publication, 

Fokker Services B.V. requested 

certification for common carriage only. 

The aircraft will now be certified for a 

maximum of 8 crew and 19 passengers 

and limited to common carriage only. 

The aircraft will be subdivided into an 

entrance way, executive lounge, two 

private lounges, and a private bathroom. 

The entry will include the installation 

of two wet galleys. One of the galleys 

will include the installation of two 

combined cooktop pan units. The 

addition of a cooktop to this interior 

conversion can lead to hazards to both 

the occupants and the aircraft. Special 

consideration is needed to address the 

safety standards associated with this 

installation. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of Title 14, Code 

of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.101, 

Fokker Services B.V. must show that the 

Airbus Model A318–112 (S/N 3238) 

airplane, as changed, continues to meet 

the applicable provisions of the 

regulations incorporated by reference in 

Type Certificate No. A28NM or the 

applicable regulations in effect on the 

date of application for the change. The 

regulations incorporated by reference in 

the type certificate are commonly 

referred to as the ‘‘original type 

certification basis.’’ The regulations 

incorporated by reference in Type 

Certificate No. A28NM are 14 CFR part 

25, as amended by Amendments 25–1 

through 25–56, with reversions to 

earlier amendments, voluntary 

compliance to later amendments, 

special conditions, equivalent safety 

findings, and exemptions listed in the 

type certificate data sheet. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Airbus Model A318–112 (S/N 

3238) because of a novel or unusual 

design feature, special conditions are 

prescribed under the provisions of 

§ 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the applicant apply 

for a supplemental type certificate to 

modify any other model included on the 

same type certificate to incorporate the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

the special conditions would also apply 

to the other model under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Airbus Model A318–112 

(S/N 3238) must comply with the fuel 

vent and exhaust emission requirements 

of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise 

certification requirements of 14 CFR 

part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type-certification basis under 

§ 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Airbus Model A318–112 airplane, 

S/N 3238, will incorporate the following 

novel or unusual design feature: 

Cooktops in the passenger cabin. 

Cooktops introduce high heat, smoke, 

and the possibility of fire into the 

passenger cabin environment. The 

current airworthiness standards of part 

25 do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards to protect 

the airplane and its occupants from 

these potential hazards. The applicant’s 

proposed system is considered to be a 

novel or unusual design feature. 

Discussion 

Currently, ovens are the prevailing 

means of heating food on airplanes. 

Ovens are characterized by an enclosure 

that contains both the heat source and 

the food being heated. The hazards 

presented by ovens are thus inherently 

limited and are well understood through 

years of service experience. Cooktops, 

on the other hand, are characterized by 

exposed heat sources and the presence 

of relatively unrestrained hot cookware 

and heated food. These may represent 

unprecedented hazards to both the 

occupants and the airplane. 

Cooktops could have serious 

passenger and aircraft safety 

implications if appropriate requirements 

are not established for their installation 

and use. The requirements identified in 

these proposed special conditions are in 

addition to those considerations 

identified in Advisory Circular (AC) 20– 

168, Certification Guidance for 

Installation of Non-Essential, NonRequired Aircraft Cabin Systems and 

Equipment (CS&E), and those in AC 25– 

17A, Transport Airplane Cabin Interiors 

Crashworthiness Handbook. The intent 

of these proposed special conditions is 

to provide a level of safety that is 

consistent with that on similar aircraft 

without cooktops. 

In similar cooktop installations, the 

FAA has required a deployable cover 

and a means to automatically shut off 

the power when the cover was in use. 

In lieu of these requirements, the 

cooktop installation in this Airbus 

A318–112 (S/N 3238) will have a lid 

and a timer that is not covered by the 

lid. The timer switches the heating 

elements on and off, has a maximum 

time of 20 minutes, and is still 

accessible when the lid is closed. The 


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