DLD
- 012 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 11

- 2932

___________ THURMAN MEARIN ,

Appellant

v. PETE VIDONISH, Unit Manager; SUPERINTENDENT LOUIS S. FOLINO; MARLENE STEWART, Coord inator P.R.C.; ROBERT MCCOMBIE, Activities; LAUREL HARRY, Unit Manager; CARLA SWARTZ, Unit Manager; TIMOTHY I. MARK, Deputy Chief Counsel for Hearing & Appeals; BRIAN COLEMAN, Deputy; MARK CAPOZZA, Major of the Guard; DAVID SACKS, Employee; CINDY WATSON, Chief Grieva nce Officer;

DORENA VARNER, Chief Grievance Officer

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 08

- cv - 00597 ) District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose

__ __________________________________ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 October 14, 2011
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : November 3, 2011 )

_________________ OPINION

_________________ PER CURIAM2

Thurman Mearin , proceeding pro se, appeals from the an order of the United
States District Court for the Weste rn District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
Mearin is currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corre ctions (“DOC”) at the State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI

- Greene”). Prior to his
transfer to SCI

- Greene in July 2005, Mearin was housed at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (“SCI

- Graterford”). Mearin alleges that he suffered ret aliation at
SCI

- Greene after prison officials became aware that he wa s pursuing a lawsuit against
SCI

- Graterford Security Captain Thomas Dohman. Mearin claims that some of his personal items were stolen and destroyed, and that documents were falsified so that he could be placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“ RHU ”) for a period of 256 days , beginning in February 2006

. 1 After his release , Mearin was again placed in the RHU for a period 343 days , beginning in November 2006, after it was determined that he was a danger to himself or others. Mearin believes that his second placement in administrative custody was also in retaliation for his having filed a lawsuit against Thomas Dohman. In November 2008, Mearin filed a second amended complaint pursuant to

1 We note that Mearin did not actually file his lawsuit until Oct ober 30, 2006.3

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming violations of his First an d Fourteenth Amendment ri ghts. 2
Named as defendants were the following DOC employees : SCI

- Greene Superintendent
Louis Folino ; Deputy Brian Coleman; Deputy Chief Timothy Mark; Major Mark Capozza; unit m anag er s Pete Vidonish , Laurel Harry , Robert McCombie , and Carla
Swartz ; grievance o fficers Dorena Varner and Cindy G. Watson ; c oordinator Marle ne Stewart; and David Sacks.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursua nt to Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On December 29,
2009 , the District Court entered an order granting in part, and denying in part, the motion
to dismiss. Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation , t he District Court
d etermined that Mearin failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted with respect to his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, but had adequately alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim against the defendants. At the close of discovery, t he
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted

. Mearin filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, and may summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment if the appeal presents no subst antial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. “We review district court decisions regarding

2 Mearin filed a supplement to that amended complaint in December 2008, which the District Court also considered.4

both summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim under the sa me de novo standard of review.” Barefoot Architec t, Inc. v. Bunge , 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausi ble on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment is granted when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law

. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Beers

- Capitol v. Whetzel , 256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001). We may affirm the District Court for any reason support ed by the record. United States v. Agnew , 407 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2005).
III.
Mearin first alleged that his due process rights were violated by two separate periods of administrative detention in the RHU

. 3 The District Court conclude d that
Mearin failed to state a claim for relief because he did not identify a cognizable liberty
interest. A prisoner’ s p rocedural due process rights are violated when he is deprived of a legally cognizable liberty interest , which occurs when the prison “ imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ord inary incidents of prison life.”

3 The first period of detention was approximately eight months, and the second was approximately eleven months.5

Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). When considering whether an inmate’s placement in segregated housing triggers a legally cognizable liberty interest, courts must
consider: (1) the amount of time spent in segregation ; and (2) whether the conditions of
seg regation were significantly more restrictive than those imposed o n other inmates in segregation. Shoats v. Horn , 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Sandin , 515 U.S. at 486). We agree with the District Court that neither of Mearin’s placement s in
ad ministrative custody trigger ed a constitutionally protected liberty interest

. See , e.g. , Griffin v. Vaughn , 112 F. 3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997) (confinement in administrative custody for fifteen months not atypical or significant deprivation). Likewise, we agree with the District Court that the RHU conditions of which Mearin complained did not expose him to atypical and significant deprivations

. Shoats , 213 F.3d at 142

- 43

. We also agree with the District Court that there is no genuine issue of material f act regarding Mearin’s retaliation claims. As mentioned, Mearin claims that d efendants retaliated against him , in various ways, for filing a lawsuit against a security captain at SCI

- Graterford

. To prove retaliation, a prisoner must demonstrate that he w as engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, that prison officials caused him to suffer “adverse action,” and that his constitutionally protected conduct was a motivating factor in the officials’ decision to discipline him. Carter v. McGrady , 292 F.3 d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Rauser v. Horn , 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)). Prison officials may6

prevail by proving that they would have made the same decision even if th e prisoner was not engaging in cons titutionally protected conduct. Id.
I ndeed, the filing of grievances and lawsuits against prison officials constitutes

cons titutionally protected activity. Milhouse v. Carlson , 652 F.2d 371, 373

- 74 (3d Cir. 1981) . However, the District Court correctly determined that Mearin failed to set fo rth any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that his constitutionally protected activity was a motivating factor in any of defendants’ decision s
. The
defendants , on the other hand, sub m itted affidavits stating that they had no knowledge of Mearin’s preparation or filing of his lawsuit during the time that he suffered the alleged
adverse actions. Without any evidenc e to support a finding of a caus al connection, we
conclude that Mearin failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation

. 4 Summary judgment was therefore appropriate

. 5 As this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court. See T hird Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.

4 To the ex tent that Mearin additionally alleged that he was retaliated against for having filed grievances, w e agree with the District Court the defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on this claim because Mearin failed to adequately identify the grievanc es at issue , or which actions were allegedly taken in ret aliation for his having filed them.

5 Having concluded that Mearin was unable to demonstrate causation , we need not determine whether certain of Mearin’s retaliation claims were also time

- barred.