[Cite as Johnson v. St. Claire, 2018-Ohio-2510.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ALICIA JOHNSON, ET AL. 

 Plaintiff-Appellees 

-vsBRIDGETTE ST. CLAIRE 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. 

Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

Case No. 17CA77 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland Common Pleas 

Court, Case No. 2015 CV 1083 

JUDGMENT: Dismissed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 21, 2018 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellees For Defendant-Appellant 

NO BRIEF FILED NICHOLAS D. ATTERHOLT 

 Weldon, Huston & Keyser, L.L.P. 

 76 North Mulberry Street 

 Mansfield, Ohio 44902 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA77 2

Hoffman, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant Bridgette St. Claire appeals the judgment entered by the Richland 

County Common Pleas Court awarding Appellees Alicia and Robert Johnson damages 

in the amount of $48,385.11 on their claim for breach of contract. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1

{¶2} On August 28, 2015, Appellees filed the instant action against Appellant, 

setting fourth six counts in their complaint: Count One, breach of an oral promise to repay 

money; Count Two, unjust enrichment; Count Three, assault; Count Four, defamation; 

Count Five, forgery; and Count Six, intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

{¶3} The case proceeded to bench trial in the Richland County Common Pleas 

Court on July 20, 2017. Following bench trial, the trial court issued a judgment in favor 

of Appellees on their claim for breach of an oral promise to repay money loaned to 

Appellant, and awarded damages in the amount of $48,385.11. The court did not rule on 

the remaining counts set forth in the complaint. 

{¶4} It is from the August 17, 2017 Judgment Entry, Appellant prosecutes this 

appeal, assigning as error: 

 “I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 

DETERMINING THAT THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DID NOT BAR ANY 

ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT. 

 

1 A recitation of the facts is unnecessary for our disposition of this appeal. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA77 3

 “II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 

DETERMINING THAT A VALID ORAL AGREEMENT EXISTED BETWEEN 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AND DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IN REGARDS 

TO ANY MONIES ALLEGEDLY LOANED. 

 “III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 

DETERMINING THAT A VALID ORAL AGREEMENT EXISTED IN 

REGARDS TO THE GIFT FROM PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE TO 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF A KUBOTA TRACTOR AND A FOUR 

WHEELER. 

 “IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S CALCULATION DETERMINATION OF 

DAMAGES FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AGAINST DEFENDANTAPPELLANT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE.” 

{¶5} As a preliminary matter, we must first determine whether the order under 

review is a final appealable order. If an order is not final and appealable, then we have 

no jurisdiction to review the matter and must dismiss it. See Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. 

of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989). In the event the parties to the 

appeal do not raise this jurisdictional issue, we must raise it sua sponte. See Chef Italiano 

Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 541 N.E.2d 64 (1989), syllabus. 

{¶6} To be final and appealable, an order must comply with R.C. 2505.02 and 

Civ.R. 54(B), if applicable. 

{¶7} R.C. 2505.02(B) provides, in pertinent part: 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA77 4

 (B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, 

or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following: 

 (1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect 

determines the action and prevents a judgment; 

 (2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special 

proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment. 

{¶8} Civ.R. 54(B) provides: 

 When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether 

as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and whether 

arising out of the same or separate transactions, or when multiple parties 

are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer 

than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that 

there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there 

is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, however 

designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 

liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to 

any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject 

to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 

claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA77 5

{¶9} Therefore, to qualify as final and appealable, the trial court's order must 

satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2505.02, and if the action involves multiple claims and/or 

multiple parties and the order does not enter a judgment on all the claims and/or as to all 

parties; as is the case here, the order must also satisfy Civ. R. 54(B) by including express 

language “there is no just reason for delay.” Internatl. Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 

Union No. 8 v. Vaughn Indus., L.L.C., 116 Ohio St.3d 335, 2007–Ohio–6439, 879 N.E.2d 

187, ¶ 7, citing State ex rel. Scruggs v. Sadler, 97 Ohio St.3d 78, 2002–Ohio–5315, 776 

N.E.2d 101, ¶ 5–7. We note, “the mere incantation of the required language does not turn 

an otherwise non-final order into a final appealable order.” Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 

92, 96, 540 N.E.2d 1381, (1989). To be final and appealable, the judgment entry must 

also comply with R.C. 2505.02. Id. 

{¶10} The entry in the instant case does not dispose of the claims set forth in 

counts two through six of the complaint, and does not include Civ. R. 54(B) language 

“there is no just cause for delay.”2 We find the August 17, 2017 judgment appealed from 

is not a final, appealable order, and we therefore do not have jurisdiction over this appeal. 

 

2 We are not determining whether the inclusion of Civ.R. 54(B) language in this matter 

would have rendered the judgment a final appealable order. 
Richland County, Case No. 17CA77 6

{¶11} The appeal is dismissed. 

By: Hoffman, P.J. 

Baldwin, J. and 

Wise, Earle, J. concur