1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 10 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s yllab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s yll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r
. Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s CULL EN, ACTIN G WARDEN v . PINHOLST ER
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 09–1 08 8. Ar g u ed November9, 2010 —Dec ided April 4, 201 1 A Ca liforniajury convi c t e d res p ondentPinhols t e r on t w o count s of firs t

degree murder. At the penal t y phas e before the same jur y , the prose

c u tionpr oduced eigh t w i tn esses, w h o testi f ied abou tPin h o lster ’ s h i s tory of threatening and violent be havior. Pinhols ter’s tria l couns el, who uns u cces s f ully s o ught to exclud e the aggravating e v idence on the grou nd tha tthe pros ecution ha d not given Pinhols ter proper notice under California law, called only Pi nholster’s mother. Counsel did not ca ll aps yc hia t ris t , though theyha d co ns ulted with Dr. S t a lb e rg, who ha d dia gnos e d Pinhols ter with a n t i socia lpers ona l it y dis o rder. The j u ry reco mmended the dea t h penalty, a n d Pinhols ter wa s s e n tenc ed to deat h. Pinholster twic e sought habea s relief in the Califor

niaS u preme Court, a lleging, int er alia, tha this trial couns el ha d failed to ade q uatelyinv e sti g ate and pr es ent mitig a tingev idenc edur

ing the penalty phase. He i n troduc ed additional eviden ce to suppor t his cla i m : s c hool, m e dica l, a n d lega l records ; a n d declara t ions from family mem b e r s, one of his trial at tor n ey s, an d Dr . Woods, a psy c h i a tr ist who diag nosed him with bipola r mood disorder and seizure dis

orders , a n d who crit i cized Dr. S t a lb e rg’s report

. Ea ch tim e , t h e St at e S u preme Cour t una nimous ly a n d s u mma ri ly denied the claim on the merits

. S ub s eq uently, aFedera l Dis t ric tCourt held a nevidentia r y h e ar in gan d gr an ted Pin h olsterfeder a lh abeas r e lie f u n d er28 U. S. C. §2254

. Affir m in g , t h e enban cNi n t hCir c u it c o n s ider ed th e new evidence a dduced in t h e Dis t rict Courthea r ing a n d held t h att h e State Supreme Court’s decision “i nv olv e d anu n r eason able applic a tion of . . . clearly establi s h e d Feder a l law,” §225 4(d)(1). Held : 1. Rev i ew u n d er§2254(d)( 1 ) is li mitedto t h e r e c o r dth atwas befor e th e state c o u r t th at adju dic a t e d th e c l aim onth e mer i ts. Pp. 8–14.2 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Sy llabu s (a) As amende d by the Antiterrorism and Effective Dea t h Pen

altyAc t of 1 996 (AEDPA), §225 4 sets s e v e r a l limit s ona feder a l
c o u r t’ s power to gr an t h abeas r e lief to a state pr ison er
. As r e lev a n t her e , a c l aim that has been “adjudic ated o nthe mer i ts i nState c o ur t pr oc eeding s ,” “shallnot be gr anted .

. . unless the adju dic a tion” “(1)
res u lt ed in a decis i on t h a t wa s cont ra ry t o , or involved a nunrea s o n able app lic ati o nof, c l ear l y establi s h e d Federal law,” or “(2) resulted i nadeci si on tha twa s ba s e d on a nunreasonable de termination of the facts inlight o f the evidence presen ted in the State court proceeding.” §225 4(d). Th i s “diff i c u lt to meet,” Harringtonv. Richter , 562 U. S. ___, ___, and “ ‘highly defe rential st andar d ’ .

. . demand s that s t ate

c o ur t dec i sions be giv e n the benefit of the doubt,” Woodfordv. Vis

ciotti , 537 U. S. 19, 24. Se c t ion 2254( d)(1)’ s bac kwar d-lookin glan

guage—“resul t ed in” and “i nvolved” —requires an examination of th e sta t e-c o ur t dec i sion atthe t i me i twa s m a de. Itfollows thatthe r e cord under re view is a l s olim it ed t othe r e cord in existence at that same time— i. e., t h e s t a t e-courtreco rd. This unders t anding is com pelled by “the broader context of th e statu t e as a whole,” which dem

onstr a tes Con gr e ss’ intent to c h annel pr is oner s’ c l aims fir s t to s t a t e court s
. Robinsonv. Shel l Oil Co. , 519 U. S. 337, 3 41. I tis a l so c o n sistent withthis Cour t’s pr ec edents, which emp h asize that §225 4(d)(1) r e v i ew focu ses onwh at a stat e c o u r t kn ew an d did. See, e.g., Lock ye rv. And rade , 538 U. S. 63, 7 1 –72. M o r eov er , it is c o n s is

tent with Schrirov. Landri gan , 550 U. S. 465, 47 4, wh ic hex plain e d th at a feder a lh abeas c o u r t is “n ot r e qu i r ed to h o ld anev iden tiar y hea r ing” whent h e st at e-courtrecord “ p rec l udes hab e a s relief” under §225 4(d)’s lim itat ions. TheNinth Circui twrongly int e rpreted Wil

liams v. Taylor , 529 U. S. 420, an d Hollandv. Jack so n , 542 U. S. 64 9, as su ppor t in gth e c o n t r a ryview. Pp. 8–12. (b) This holding does not re nd er superfluous § 225 4(e)(2 )—wh ic h limit s the federal habeas courts’ discre tion to take new evidence in an
ev identiar yhear ing

. At a minimum, §2 25 4 ( e)(2 ) s t ill res t rict s t h eir disc r e tion in claim s that wer enot adjudicated on the m e r i ts in stat e c o ur t. Althoughstate pr iso n er s mayso m e times sub m itnew ev idenc e in federal court, AEDPA’s s t atutory sc h e me is de sig n ed to str o n gly disc ou r a g eth em fr om doin g so. Pp. 13–14. (c) Remand for a properly limitedreview is in appropriate here, b e ca us e t h e Nint h Circuitruled, inthe a l ter n ativ e, tha tPinholste r merited habeas relief on the state-court re cord alone. P

. 14.

2

. On t h ere co rd b e fore t h e s t at e c o ur t, Pi nholsterwas not entitled to feder a l h abeas r e lief. Pp. 14‘–31. (a) To satisfy §2254(d)(1)’s “unr easonable application” p r ong, he must show that “ther e was no r e ason able basi s ” forth e State Su

preme Court’s summary decision. Rich ter, supra, at ___. Pp. 15–1 6.3 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Sy llabu s (b) Strick landv. Washi n gto n , 466 U. S. 668, provides th e clearly es t ab l is hed federa l la w here. To overco m et h e st rongpres um pt ion that c o unsel has ac ted c o mpetently , id., at 690, a de fen d an t mu s t show that c o unsel failed to ac t “r easonabl [y] co nsidering all the cir

c u mstanc es,” id., at 688, an d mu st pr ov e th e “r eason ab l e pr obabi lity tha t , b u t for c o uns el’s unpro fes s i ona l errors, the result of the proceed

ing would have b een different,” id., a t 6 9 4

. R e v i e wh e r ei s t h u s “ d o u blydefer e n t ial , ” Knowlesv. Mirzayance , 556 U. S. ___, ___, requiring a “highly defe rential” look at counsel’s performance, S t rick land , su pra, at 68 9, th r o u gh§2254(d) ’ s “defer en tiallen s ,” Mirzayance , sup ra, at ___, n. 2. Pp. 16–1 8. (c) Pinhols ter ha s not s h own th at the State Supreme Co urt’s de

c i sion that he c o uld not demonstr ate def i c i ent per f or manc e byhis trial counsel necessarily involved a nunre a s o nable a pplica t ion of fed

er al law. Pp. 18– 26. (1 ) The s t a t e-courtre cord s u pport s t h e ideat h a this couns el
ac ted str a tegi c a llyto g e t th e pr osec ution’s ag gr av ation witnesses ex

c l uded forlac kof notic e , and if tha tfa iled , to put on his motheras a mitiga tion witness. Billing records show that they spent time inves

tig a tingmit i g a tingev idenc e
. The r e c o r dal so shows thattheyhad an
uns ympa thetic client who h a d b o a s ted about his crimina l history dur

ing the guilt phase, leaving them with li mited mitig a ti on str a tegi es. In addition, when D r . S t alberg co ncluded tha tPinhols ter ha d no s i g nifica nt mental dis o rder or defect , he wa s a w a r e of Pinhol s ter’s medi

ca l a n d s o cia l his t ory. Give n t h es e imped i ments, it wou l d have been
a r e ason ab le p e n a lty

- ph ase s t r a tegy to focus on evoking sympathy for Pinhols ter’s mother. Pinhols ter ha s res p on ded with only aha ndful of post-hocn o n d en ials byon e of h i s lawy er s. Pp. 18–2 3. (2) The Ninth Circuit mis a p p lied Strick land whe nit drew from th is Cou r t’ s r e c e n tc a ses a “c on stit utional duty to invest igate” and a principle that it was prima facie in effec t ive forc o u n s el to aban donan inv e stig ation basedonr u dimen t ary knowledge of Pinholster’s back

grou nd. B e yond t h e genera l req u ir ement of reasonablen ess, “specific guidelines are not appropriate” under Stri ck land. 466 U. S., at 688

. Nor did the Ninth Circuit p r operly apply the strong pre s umption of competence mandated by Strick land

. Pp. 23– 26. (d) Even if his tria l couns el ha d performed deficiently, Pinhols ter also h a s f a iledto sh owth at th e S t a t e S u preme Court mus thave un r e ason ablyc o n c lu ded th at he was n o t pr eju d ic ed. Pp. 26–31. (1) To deter m ine “whether th er e is a r e ason ab le pr ob abil i ty that, absent the errors, the sentence r
. . . would haveco ncluded that” dea t h wa s not wa rra nted, Strick land , sup ra, at 69 5, th e ag gr av atin g ev idenc eis r e weighed “ag a inst the tot a li tyof av ailabl e mitig a ting evidence,” Wi gginsv. Smith , 539 U. S. 5 10, 534. Her e , th e Sta t e pr e -4 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Sy llabu s sented extensi v e aggravating eviden c eat bothth e g u iltan d pen a l t y phases. The mitigating evidence consisted primarily of the penalty

phase te sti m o n yof Pinholster ’ s mother and g u ilt-pha se te sti m ony given b yhis b r other. After cons idering the evidence, the jury re

turned as e ntence of dea t h, whic h the s t a t e tria l court found s u p por t ed ov er whelmin glybythe weigh tof th e ev iden c e
. Pp. 26–2 9. (2) Th er e is n or e ason able pr obabil i tyth at th e addi tio n al ev i

dence presented at P i nholster’s state proceedings would have cha n ged t h ev e rdict

. T h e “new” evidencelargely duplica t ed the miti

gation evidence of his mothe rand brot her at tr ial. To the ex tent that there were ne w factual al le gations or evidence, much of it i s of ques

tionable mi tig a tingv a lue. Dr . Woods’ testimony would have opened the doorto r ebuttal by a state expert; and new e v idence relating to Pinhols ter’s sub s ta nce ab u se, menta lil lness, and crimi nal problem s could lead a j u ry to co nclud ethat he was beyond rehabilita t ion. The rem a ining new m a t e rial in t h e s t at e hab e a s record is spa r s e
. Given what lit tle a d ditionalmit i g a ting evidence Pinholster presented in state habeas, the Court cannot sa y that the State Supreme Court’s deter m in ationwas u n r easonable. Pp. 29–3 0. (3) Bec a use th is Cour t didnot apply AED PA defer e nc e to the question of prejudice in Will iams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362 , an d Rom

pillav. Beard , 5 4 5 U

. S

. 37 4, t h os e ca s e s l a c kthe impor t ant “ d oubly deferential” s t andard of Strick land a n d AEDPA, a n d thus offer no guida n ce withres p ect to whether as t a t e c o urt ha s unre a s o nably de

termined that prejudice is lacking. Pp. 30– 31. 590 F. 3d 65 1, r e v e r s ed.

T HOMAS , J., d e livered the opinion of the Court, in whi c h R OBERTS , C. J., and S CALIA an d K ENN E DY , JJ., joined in full; in which ALIT O , J., j o i n e da s t o a l lb u tP a r tI I ; i nw h i c hB REYER , J., j o i n ed as t o Pa rt s I a n d II; and in which G IN SB U R G an d K AGAN , JJ., j o i n e da s t o P a r tI I

. ALIT O , J ., filed a nopinion con c u rrin gin pa rta n d conc urri ng in t h e j u dgm e nt

. B REYER , J ., filed a nopinion concu rrin ginpa rta n d dis s ent i ng in pa rt. S OTOMAYOR , J., filed adis s e n ting opinion, in which G IN SB U R G an d KAGAN , JJ., joine das to Part II._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt

NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s
. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–1 08 8
VINCE N T CULL EN, ACTIN G WARDEN, P E TITION E R v. SCOTT LYNN PINHOLSTER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Apr il 4, 201 1] J USTICE T HOMA Sdelivered the opinion of the C o urt.* Scott Lynn Pinholster and two accomplices br oke into a house inthe middle of the nigh t and brutally beat a n d stabbed to death two men who happened to interrupt the burglary. A jur y conv icted Pinholster of first

- degree mu rder, and he was sentenced to death. After the California S u preme Court twice u nanimously denied Pinholster habeas relie f, a Federal District Co urt held an evidentiary hearing and granted Pi nholster ha

beas relief under 28 U. S. C. §2254. The District Co urtconcluded that Pinholster’s trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective at the penalt yphase of t r ial. Sittin g en banc, th e Court of Appeals for the NinthCircuit affirmed. Pinholster v. Ayers , 590 F. 3d 651 (2009). Consid

ering the new evidence adducedin the Di strict Cour t hearing, th e Court of Appeals h e ld that th e California Supreme C o urt’s decision “was contrar yto, or involved an unreasonab le application of, clea rly established Federal law.” §2254(d)(1). We granted certiorari and now reverse.

——————

*J US TI CE G IN S B U R Gan d J US TI CE K AGANjoin only Part II.2 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt I A On the eve n ing of January 8, 198 2, Pinholster solicited Art Coronaand Paul David Bro w n to help him rob Michael Kumar, a local drug dealer. On the way, the y stopped at Lisa Tapar’s house, where Pinholster put hi sbuck knife through her front door and scratched a swastika into h e r car aftershe refused to talk t o him. The three men, who were al l armed with buck kni v es, found no one at Kumar’s house, broke in, a n d began ransacking th e home. They came across on ly a small amount of marijuana before Kumar’s friends, Thomas Johnson and Robert Beckett, arrive d and sh outed that they were calling the police. Pinholster and his acc o mplices tried to escap ethrough the rear door, but Joh n son blocked their path. Pinholster backed Johnson onto the patio, demanding drugs an d money and repeatedly striking him in the ch est. Johnson dropped his wallet on the gro und and stopped resisting. Beckett th en came around the corner, and Pinholster attacked him, too, stabbing him repeatedly in the chest. Pinholster forced Beck ett to the ground, took both men’s wallets, an d began kicking Beckett in the head. Mea n while, Brown stabbed Johnson inthe chest, “ ‘bury[ing] hi s knife to the hilt.’ ” 35 Reporter’s Tr. 4947 (h ereinafter Tr.). Johnson an d Beck ett died of their wounds. Corona dro v e the thre e men to P i nholster’s apartment. While in th e car, Pinh olster and Brown exulted, “ ‘We go t ’em, man, we got ’em good.’ ” Ibid. At th e apartment, Pinholster washed his k n ife, and the three split the proceeds of th e robbery: $23 and on e quarter-ounce of ma rijuana. Although Pinholster ins tructed Co rona to “la y low,” Corona turned himself in t o the polic e two weeks later. Id., a t4955. Pin h olster was arrested shortly thereafter and threatened to kill Corona if he did not keep quiet about the burglary andmurders. Corona later became the3 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt State’s pri m ary witness. The pro s ecution brought num erous charges against Pinholster, including two counts of first-degree murder. B The Califor nia trial court appointed Harry Brainard an d Wilbur Dettmar to defend Pi nholster on charges of firstdegree murder, robbery, and bur glary. Bef o re their appointment, Pinholsterhad rejected other attorneys an d insisted onrepresenting himself. During that time, the State had mailed Pin h olster a letter in jail informing him that the pro s ecution pla nned tooffer aggravati n g evidence during the penalty phase of trial to support a sentence of death. The guilt phase of the trial began on February 28, 1984. Pinholster testified onhis own b e half and presented an alibi defen s e. He claimed that he had broken into Kumar’s house alone a taround 8 p.m. on Jan uary 8, 1982, and had s t olen marij uana but denied killing anyone. Pinholster asserted that later that night around 1 a.m., while he was elsewher e, Corona went to Kumar’s house to steal more drugs an d did not return for three hours. Pinholster told the jur ythathe was a “ p rof e ssional robber,” not a murderer. 43 id., at 6204. He boasted of committing hundreds of robberies over the previous six yea r s but insisted that he always used a gun, never a knife. Th e jury convic ted Pinholster on both counts of first-degre e murder. Before the penalty phase, Brainard and Dettmar moved to exclude any aggravating evide n ce on the ground tha t the prosecution had fai l ed to provide notice of the evidence to be introduced, as require d by Cal. Pena l Code Ann. §190.3 (West 2008). At a hearing on April 24, Dettmar argued tha t , in reliance on the lac kof notice, he was “not presently p r epared to o ffer anythin g by wayof mitigation.” 52 Tr. 7250

. He a c kno w ledged, ho wever, tha t the prosecu

­4 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt tor “possibly ha[d] me t the [notic e] requirement.” Ibid. The trial court asked whether a continuance might be helpful, bu t Dettma r declined, explaining that he could not think of a mitigation witness other than Pinholster’s mother and that additional time would not “m ake a great deal of diff erence.” Id., at 7257–7258. Three days later, after hearing testimony, the court found th at Pinholster had received notice wh ile represen ting himself and denie d the motion to exclude. The penalty phase wa s held before the same jury th a t had convicted Pinholster. The pro s ecution produced eight witnesses, who testified about Pinholster’s history of threatening and violent behavior, including resistin g arrest and assaulting police officers, involvement with juvenile gangs, and a substantial prisondisciplina r y record. Defense counsel calle don ly Pinholst e r’s mother, Burnice Brashear. She gave an account of Pinholster’s troubled ch ildhood and adolescent years, discussed Pinholster’s siblings, and described Pinholster as “a perfe c t gentleman at home.” Id., at 7405. Defense counsel did n o t call a psychiatrist, though they had consulted Dr. John Stalberg a tleast six weeks earlier. Dr. Stalberg noted Pinholster’s “psychopa t hic pe rsonality traits,” diagnosed him with a n tisocial persona lity disorder, and concluded that he “wa s not under the influen c e of extreme mental or emotional di sturbance” at the time of the mu rders. App. 131.

After 21⁄2 days of deliberation, the jury unanimously voted for death on each of the two murdercounts. On mandatory appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgme nt. Peoplev. Pinholster , 1 Cal. 4th 865, 824 P. 2d 571 (1992). C In August 1993, Pinh olster filed his first st ate habeas petition. Represented by new cou n sel, Pinholster alleged,5 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt inter ali a , ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial. He alleged tha tBrainard and Dettm a r had failed t oadequately investigate and present mitigating evidence, including evidence of ment al disorders. Pinholster supported t h is claim with school, medical, andlegal records, as well as declarations from family members, Brainard, and Dr. George Woods, a psychiatrist who diagnosed Pinholster with bipolar mood disorder and seizure dis o rders. Dr. Woods c r iticized Dr. Stalberg’s report as incompetent, unreliable, and inaccurate. The California Supreme Court unanimously and summarily 1 denied Pinholster’s penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claim “on the substantive ground that it is wi thout merit.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 302. Pinholster filed a feder a l habeas p e tition in Ap ril 1997. He reiterated his previous allegations about p e nalty-phase ineffective assistance and also added new allegations that his trial co unsel had failed to furnish Dr. Stalberg with adequate background materials. In support of the new allegations, Dr. Stalb e rg provide da declaration stating that in 198 4, Pinholster’s trial counsel had provided hi m with only s o me police reports and a 1978 pro bation report. Dr. Stalberg explained that, ha d he known about th e material that had since been gathered by Pinholster’s habeas cou n sel, he would have conducted “fu rther inquiry” before concluding that Pinho lstersuffered only from a personality disorder. App. to Brief in Opposition 219. He noted that Pinholster’s school reco rds showed evidence of “some degree of brain damage.” Ibid. Dr. Stalberg did not, however, retract his earl ier diagnosis. The parties stipulated that this declaration ha d never been submitted to the California Supre m e Court, and the fed e ral petition

——————

1 Although theCal i fornia Supreme Court initia lly is su ed an order asking the State to respond, it ulti matelywithdr ew that or deras “impr ov iden tlyissu ed.” App. to Pet. forCer t

. 302.6 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt was held in abeyance to allow P i nholster to go back to state court. In August 1 997, Pinholster filed his second state habeas petition, this time including Dr. Stalberg’s declaration and requesting judicial n o tice of th e documents previous ly submitted in support of his first st ate habeas petition. His allegations of penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel mirrored those inhis federa l habeas p e tition. T h e California Supreme Court again unanimously and sum

marily denied the petition “on the substantive ground tha t it is without merit.” 2 App. to Pet. for Cert. 300. Having pre s ented Dr. Stalberg ’s declaration to the state court, Pinh olster retur n ed to the DistrictCo urt. In November 1997, he filed an amende d petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His allegations of penalty-phase ineffective assista n ce of coun sel we re identical to th ose in his second state habeas petition. Both parties moved for summary judgment and Pinhols ter also m o ved, in th e alternative, for an evidentiary hearing. The Distric tCourt concluded that the Antiter r orism and Effective Death Penalty Ac t of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, did n o t apply an d granted an evidentiary hearing. Before the hearing, th e State deposed Dr. Stalberg, who stated that none of th e new material he reviewed altered his original diagnosis. Dr. Stalb e rg disagre e d with Dr. Woods’ conclusion that Pinholster suffers from bipolar disorder. Pinholster did not ca ll Dr. Stalberg to testify at the hearing. H epresented two new medical experts: Dr. Sophia Vinogradov, a psychi atrist who diagnosed Pinholster with organic personality syndrome and ruled ou t antisocial p e rsonality disorder, and Dr. Donald Olson, a

——————

2 A major i tya l so “[s]ep ar at elyand independently” denied sev e r a l claims, including penalty-phase ine ffective assistance of counsel, as u n t imely , su ccessiv e , an d bar r e d by r e s ju dic a ta. Id., at 300. Th e Stat e has not argued that the s e p r oceduralr u ling s c o nstitute adequate and in depen d en t state gr ou n d s th at barfeder a l h abeas r e v i ew.7 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt pediatric neurologist who suggested that Pinholster suf

fers from p a rtial epilepsy and brain injury. The State called Dr. F. David Rudnick, a psychiatrist who, like Dr. Stalberg, di agnosed Pinholster with antisocial personality disorder and rejected a n y diag nosis of bipolar disorder. D The District Court gra n ted habeas relief. Applying pre

AEDPA s t andards, the court gran ted the hab eas petition “for inadequacy of cou n sel by failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence at the penalty hearing.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 262. After Woodfordv. G a rce au , 538 U. S. 202 (2003), clarified that AEDPA applies to cases like Pinholster’s, the court amende d it s order but did not alter its conclusion. Over a dissent, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Nint h Circuit r e versed. Pinholster v. Ayers , 525 F. 3d 742 (2008). On reheari n g en banc, the Court of Appeals vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the District Co urt’s gran tof habeas relief. The en banc court held that the District Court’s evi d entiary hearing was not barred by 28 U. S. C. §2254(e)(2). The court then determined that new evidence from the hearing could be consider ed in assess ing whethe r the Califor nia Supreme Court’s decision “was contrary t o , or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab

lished Federal law” under §2254(d)(1). See 590 F. 3d, at 666 (“Congress did n o t intend to restrict the inquiry under §2254(d)(1) only to th e evidence introduced in the state habeas court”). Takin gthe Di strict Court evidence into account, th e en banc court determined that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickla ndv. Wash

ington , 466 U. S. 668 (1984), in den ying Pinholster’s claim of penalty-phase ineffec t ive assistance of couns el. Three judg es dissented and rej e cted the majority’s conclusion that the District Court hearing was not barred by §2254(e)(2). 590 F. 3d, at 689 (opinion of Kozinski,8 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt C. J.) (characterizing Pinhols ter’s efforts as “habeas-bysandbaggin g”). Limiting its review to the state-court record, the dissent concluded thatthe Califor nia Supreme Court did n o t unreasonably apply Stri ckland

. 590 F. 3d, at 691–723. We granted certiorarito resolve two questions. 560 U. S. ___ (2010). First, whether review under §2254(d)(1) permits consideration of evidence introduced i nan evidentiary heari n g before the fede ral habeas court. Second, whether th e Court of Appeals pro p erly granted Pinholster habeas relief on his claim of penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel. II We first consider the scope of the record for a §2254(d)(1) inquiry. The State argues that review is limited to the record t hat was before the state court tha t adjudicatedthe claim on the merits. Pinholster contend s that evidence presented to the federal habeas court may also be cons idered. We agree with the State. A As amended by AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. §2254 sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grantan application for a writ of hab eas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner. Secti on 2254(a) permits a federal court to enterta i n only those applications alleging that a person is instate custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treati e s of the United States.” Sections 2254(b) and (c) provi d e that a federal court may not grant such applicationsunless, with certain exceptions, the applicant has exhausted state remedies

. If an applic ation includ es aclaim that has been “adjudi

cated on the merits in State court proceedings,” §2254(d), an additional restricti on applies. Unde r § 2254(d), th at application “shall not b e granted with respect to [such a]9 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt claim . . . unless the adjudication of the claim”: “(1) resulted in a deci sion that was contrar yto, orinvolved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or “(2) resulted in a decision that wa s based on an unreasonable determination of the f a cts in ligh tof the evidence presented in th e State court proceeding.” This is a “difficult to meet,” Har r ingto nv. Richter , 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (s lip op., at 1 2 ), and “highly deferen

tial standard for eval uating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisi ons be given th e benef i t of the doubt,” Woodfordv. Visciotti , 537 U. S. 19, 24 (2002) (per cu riam )(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The petitioner carries the burden of proof. Id., at 25

. We now hold that revie wunder §2 254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the stat e court that adjudicate d the claim on the merit s
. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in th e past tense, to a state-c o urt adjudi cation that “resulted in” a decision that was contrary to, or “involved” an unreasonable ap plication of, estab lished law. Thi s backwardlooking language requires an examination of the statecourt decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record unde rreview is l i mited to the record in existence at that same time

⎯i.e. , the record before the st ate court. This understanding of the textis compelled by “th e broader context of the statute as a whole,” which demonstrates Congress’ intent to channel prisoners’ claims first to the state courts. R o binsonv. Shell Oi l Co. , 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1 997). “The federal habeas schem eleaves primary respo n sibility with the state courts .

. . .” Visciotti , supra, at 27

. Section 2 254(b) requires that prisoners mus t ordinarily exhaust state remedies before filin g for federal habeas relief. It would be contrary to that purpose to allow a petitioner to overcome an adverse state-court10 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt decision with new evidence introduced in a fe deral habeas court and reviewed b ythatcou rt in the f i rst instance effectively de novo

. Limiting §2254(d)(1) re view to the state-court record i s consistent with our p r ecedents interpretingthat s t atu

tory provisi o n. Our cases emphasize that review under §2254(d)(1) focuses onwhat a state court knew and di d. State-court decisions are meas ured against this Court’s precedents as of “the ti me the stat e court ren d ers its dec i

sion.” Lockyer v. Andrade , 538 U. S. 63, 71–7 2 (2003). To determine whether a particular decision is “contrar y t o ” then-established law, a federal court m u st conside r whether th e decision “applies a rule that contradic t s [such] law” and how the deci sion “confronts [the] set of facts” tha t were before the state c o urt. Willi amsv. Taylor , 529 U. S. 362, 405, 406 (2000) (Terry Willia ms)

. If the state-court decision “identifie s the correc tgo v e rning legal principle” in existence at the tim e , a federal court mus t assess whether the decision “un r easonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id., at 413. It would be strange to ask federal courts to analyze whethe r a state court’s ad judic a tion resulted in a d e cision that unreasonab ly applied f e deral la w to facts not before the state court. 3

——————

3 J US TI CE S OTO MAYORar g u es th at th er e i s n o th in gstr a n g e abou tallowin gc o n s ider ationof n e w ev iden c e u n d er§2254(d)(1) bec a u s e, inh e r v i ew, it wouldnot be “so dif f er ent” fr om some othertas k s that c o ur ts underta ke. Post , at 13 (dis senting opinion). What m a kes the consid

eration of new evidence st range is not how “different” the task would be, but r a therthe notion t h at ast ate c o ur t c a n be d eemed to hav e unreasonably applied federal law to evidence it did not even kno w exis ted. We ca nnot compre hend ho w exa c tly as t a t e court would hav e any control o v er its appl icati o n of la w to matter s bey o nd its knowledg e. Adopting J US TI CE S OTOMAYOR ’s approach would not take seriousl y AEDPA’s req u irem entt h a tfedera l court s defer to sta t e- c o ur t dec i sions and would eff e ctively treat the st atu t e as n omor eth ana “ ‘m ood’ t h at the Feder a l J u dic i ar ymust r e spec t,” Terry Williams , 529 U. S., at 3 8 611 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt Our recent decision in Schrirov. Landrigan , 550 U. S. 465 (2007), is consisten tas well wi th our holding here. W e explained that “[b]ecause the def e rential sta n dards pre

scribed by §2254 control whethe r to grant habeas relief, a federal court must ta ke into acc o unt those standards i n deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate.” Id., at 474. In practical effect, we went on to note, this means that when the s t ate-court record “precl udes habea s relief” under the limitations of §2254(d), a district court i s “not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id., at 4 7 4 (citing withapproval t h e Ninth C i rcuit’s re cognition tha t “an evidentiary hearin g is not required on issues that ca n be resolved by referenc e to the sta t e court record” (in t erna l quotation marks omit ted)). The Court of Appeals wrongly int e rpreted Williamsv. Taylor , 529 U. S. 420 (2000) (Michael Willi ams) , as supporting th e contraryview. The question there was whether th e lower court had co rrectly det e rmined that §2254(e)(2) barred th e petition er ’s request for a federal evidentiary hearing. 4 Michael Wi lliams did not concern whether ev idence introduced in such a hear ing could b e considered under §2254(d)(1). Infact, only one claim at issue in th at case was even subj ect to §2254(d); the rest had not been adjudicated on the merits in state-court proceedings. See id., at 429 (“Petitioner did not develop, or raise, his claims .

. . until he f iled his fed e ral habeas petition”). 5

—————— (opinion of Stevens, J.).

4 If a prisoner has “fa iled to develo p th e f a c t u a l b a si s o f a c l ai m in Sta t e c o u r t pr oc eedin g s ,” §2254(e)( 2 ) bar s a feder a l c o u r t fr om h o ldin g anev iden tiar yh e ar in g , u n less th e appl i c an t meets c e r t ainst atu t or y requirements.

5 J US TI CE S OTOMAYOR ’s suggestion that Michael Willia ms “rejected” the concl u sion here , see po s t , at 15, is th u s qu ite pu zzlin g
. Inthe passage that she quotes, see ibid. , the Cour t mer e lyex plains tha t §225 4(e)(2) sh ou ld be in ter p r e ted ina w a yth at doe s n o t pr ec lu de a state prisoner, who was dil i gent insta t e h abea s c o u r t an d wh o c a n12 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt If anything , the decision in Michael William s supports our holding

. The lower court in that case had determined that the on e claim subject to §2 254(d)(1) did not satisfy that statutory requirement. In light of that ruling, this Court concluded that it was “un n ecessary t oreach th e question whether §2254(e)(2) would permit a [federal] hearing on th[at] claim.” Id., at 4 44. That conclusion is fully consistent with our holding that evidence later intr oduced in federal court is irre levan tto §2254(d)(1) review. The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Hollandv. Jackson , 542 U. S. 6 49 (2004) (per curiam) , was also mistaken. In Holland , we initially s t ated that “whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable [under §2254(d)(1)] must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it.” Id. , at 652. We then went on to assume for the sake of ar g u ment what some Courts of Appeals had held

⎯ that §2254(d)(1), despite its mandat ory language, simply does not apply when a federal habeas court has admitted n e w evidence that supports a claim pr eviously adjudicated i n state court. 6 Id., at 65 3. There w a s no rea s on to decide that question because regardless, the hearing should hav e been barred by §2254(e)(2). To day, we reject that assumption and h o ld that ev idence introduced in f e deral court has no b e a r ing on §2 254(d)(1) review. If a claim ha s been adjudicated on t h e merits by a sta t e court, a fed

eral habea s petitionermust overcome the limitation of §2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that state court. 7

—————— sati sfy§225 4( d), fr om r e c e ivin ganev iden tiar yh e ar in g.

6 In Bradshaw v. Rich ey , 546 U. S. 74 (20 0 5 ) (per cu riam ) , on w h ic h the Cour t of Appeals al so r e l i ed, we ma de t h e same a ssu mption. Id., at 79– 80 (di s c u ss in gth e State’ s “Hollandargument”).

7 Pinhols ter a n d J US TI CE S OTOMAYORplace great weight on the fact th at §2 25 4(d)( 2 ) in c l u d es th e lan g u a ge “in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding, ” whereas §2254(d)(1) does n o t. See post , at6–7. Th e addi tion al c l ar i t y of §22 54(d)(2) onth is po in t , h o wev e r , does n o t detr ac t fr o mou rv i ew th at § 225 4(d)(1) also is pla i n l y lim it ed t o t h e s t a t e-courtrecord. Th e omission of clarif ying language13 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt B Pinholster’s contention that o u r holding renders §2254(e)(2) superfluous is incorrect. Section 2254(e)(2) imposes alimitation on the discretion of fed e ral habeas courts to take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing. See Landrigan , su pra, at 473 (no t ing tha tdi strict courts, under AEDPA, generally retain the discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing). Like §2254(d)(1), it carries out “AE D PA’s goal of pro m oting com i ty, finality, and federa lism by giving state courts th e first opportunity to review [a] claim, and to correc tany co nstitutional violation in th e first instance.” Jimenez v. Quarterman , 555 U. S. 113, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 Section 2254(e)(2) continues to have force where §2254(d)(1) does not ba r federal habeas relief. For example, not all federal habeas claims by state prisoners fall within the scope of §2254(d), whi c h applies only to clai ms “adjudicate don the me rits in S t at e court proc eedings.” At a minimum, therefore, §2254(e)(2) still restricts the discre

tion of f e deral habea s courts to consider new evidence when decid i ng claims that were not adjudic a ted on th e merits in state court. See, e.g. , Michael Wi lliams , 529 U. S. , at 42 7–429. 9 Although s t ate prisoners may so metimes submit new

—————— fr om §225 4(d) (1) ju st as lik elyr e flec ts Con gr e ss’ belief th at su c hla n guage was unnecessary as it does anything else.

8 J US TI CE S OTO MAYOR ’ s ar g u men tth at §2 2 54(d)(1) mu st be r e ad ina waythat “ac c o mmoda tes” § 225 4(e)(2), see post , at 9, r e sts ona fu n d amen t al misu n d er stan din gof §22 54(e)(2 ). The focus of that section i s not on “pr e serv ingthe o ppor t unity” for he a r ings , post , a t9, bu t r a th er on limiting t h e dis cret i on of federa l dis t rictcou r t s in ho lding hea r ings

. We see no n eed in this case to ad dress the properappl ication of §225 4(e)(2). S ee n
. 20, infra

. But see pos t , a t12 (s ugges t ing t h a tw e have give n §2 254(e)( 2 ) “an unnaturally cra mped reading”).

9 In all events, of course, the requ irements of §§2254(a) through (c ) remain signifi c ant limi t at io ns on th e power of afedera l courtt ogra n t h abeas r e lief.14 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt evidence in federal court, AE DPA’s statuto r y scheme is designed to stronglydiscourag ethem from doing so. Provisions like §§2254(d)(1) and (e)(2) ensure that “[f]ederal courts sitting in habeas are not a nalternative forum for trying facts and issues which a pri s oner made insufficienteffort to pursue in st ate proceedings.” Id., at 437; see also Richter , 562 U. S., at ___ (sli p op., at 13) (“Section 2 254(d) is part of the b a sic structure of federal habeas jurisdiction, designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for assert ing constit u tional challenges to s t ate convictions”); Wa inwri ghtv. Sykes , 433 U. S. 72, 90 (1977) (“[T]he state trial on the m e rits [should be] the ‘main event,’ so to speak, rather thana ‘tryout o n the road’ for what will later be th e determin ative federal habeas hea r ing”). 10 C Accordin gly , we conclude that t h e Court of Appeals erred in considering the DistrictCourt evidence in it s review under §2254(d)(1). Although we might ordinaril y remand for a properly limited review, the Court of Appeals also ruled, in the al ternative, t hat Pinholster merited habeas relief even on the state-court record alone. 590 F. 3d, at 66 9. Remand is therefore inappropriate, and we turn next to a review of the state-court record. III The Court of Appeals’ alternative holding was also
erroneous. Pinholster has fa iled to demonstrate that t h e California Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly establishedfederal la w to his penalty-phase ineffective­

——————

10 Though wedo not decide wher e to dra wthe line between ne w c l aims and c l aims adjudic a ted on the mer i ts, see n. 11, infra , J US T I CE S OTOMAYOR ’s hypothetical involving new evidence of withheld exculp atory witness statements, see post , at 9– 10, maywell pr esen t a n e w cla i m
.15 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt assistance claim on the state-court record. Section 2254(d) prohibits habeas relief. A Section 2254(d) applies to Pinh olster’s claim because that claim was adjudi cated on th e merits in state-court proceedings. No part ydisputes that Pinholster’s federa l petition alleges an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that had been includedin both of Pinholster’s state habeas petitions. The California Supreme Court denied each o f those petitions “on the substantive ground th at it is without merit.” 11 Section 2254(d) applies evenwhere there h a s beena summary denial. See Richter , 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). In these circumstances, Pinholster can satisfy the “unreasonable application” pr ong of §2254(d)(1) only by showing th at “there was no re asonable b a sis” for the California Supreme Court’s decision. Id., at ___ (s lip o p ., at 8)

. “[A] habeas court must determine what arguments or theories .

. . could have supporte[d] the state court’s decision; an d then it m u st ask wh ether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or

——————

11 The State does not contest that the allegedc l aim was adju dic a te d on the merits by the Califor nia Suprem e Cour t, but i ta sser t s tha tso m e of the evidence adduced in the fe deral evidentiary hearing fundament a lly cha n ged Pinhols t e r’s cla i m s o a s to render it effectively una dj udic a ted. See Br ief forPetition er28–31; Rep l yBr ief forPet i tion er4–5; Tr

. of Or al Ar g
. 18. Pin h o lste rdisagr ees and argues that the evidence adduced in the evidentiary hearing si mplysu ppor t s h i s alleg e d c l aim. Br ief forRespon den t33–3 7.

We need not resolve this dispute because, even accepting Pinholster’s position, he i s not entitledto feder a l habea s r e lief. Pinholsterha s failed to show that the Ca lifo r nia Supreme Court unreasonably app lied clea rly es t ab l is hed federa l la w on t h e re co rd b e fore t h a tcourt , inf ra , at 18– 23, 26–3 0, wh ic hbr i n g sou ran aly s is to anen d. Ev enif th e ev i

dence a dducedin t h e Dis t rictCourt addi ti onally supports his clai m, as Pinholster contends, we are precluded fro mconsidering it. See n. 20, infra

.16 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt theories ar e inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id

. , at ___ (slip op., at 12). Aftera thorough r e view of the state-court record, 12we conclud e that Pinholster has failed to meet that high th reshold. B There is n odispute that the clearly establish e d federal law here is Stri cklandv. Wa shing t on
. In Strickland , this Court made clear tha t “the pur p ose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is no t to improve the quality of l e gal representation .

. . [bu t] simply to

——————

12 The pa rt ies a gree t h a tt h e s t at e-courtrecord in clud es b o t ht h e “alleg a tions of [the] habeas c o r p us petition .

. . and

. . . ‘ a nymatterof record pe rt a i ning t ot h e ca s e .’ ” In re Ho ch b erg , 2 Cal. 3d 870, 87 4, n

. 2, 471 P. 2d 1, 3 –4, n

. 2 (19 70) (qu o tin gCal. Ru le of Cou r t 60), r ejec t ed o n another ground byIn re Fields , 51 Cal. 3d 1063, 10 70, n
. 3, 800 P. 2d 862, 8 66, n

. 3 (199 0); see Re plyBr ief for Petition er16

– 17; Tr . of Or al Arg. 45. Und e r California l a w, th e Cal i fo rnia Supreme Court’s summar yden i al of a h abeas petitiononthe mer i ts r e flects that c o ur t’ s deter m inationthat“the c l a i ms made in th[e] petit i on do not s t ate a pr ima fac i e c a se enti tlingthe petit i onerto r e lief.” In re Clark , 5 Cal. 4th7 50, 770, 855 P. 2d72 9, 74 1– 742 (199 3). I tap pear s th a tth e c o ur t g e ner a llyassumes the alleg a t i on s inthe petition t obe tr ue, but does not accept wholly co nclusory allegations, Peoplev. Du v a ll , 9 Cal. 4th 46 4, 4 74, 88 6 P. 2d 125 2, 125 8 (19 95), and will a l so “review the
r e c o r dof the tr ial .

. . to as sess the mer i t s of the peti ti oner ’ s c l aims,” Clark , supra, at 77 0, 855 P. 2d, at 74 2.

The specific co ntents of the s t ate- courtreco rd depend o n whichof t h e two state habeas proceedin g s i s a ti s s u e
. O n e am icus curiaesu g g e sts th at bo th ar e at i ssu e

⎯

thatis, Pinholstermust pr ov e t h at both Cal i

fornia Supre m e Court pro c eedings inv o lv ed anun r e a s on able app lic ationof l a w u n der§2254( d) (1). See Br ie f forCr imin alJu st ic e Leg a l Founda t ion 2 6

. By contra s t , the most favor ab l e a pproa ch for Pinhols ter would be review of only the second state h abeas proceeding, the reco rd of which includes all of the evidencethat Pinholsterev ersubmitted in
s t ate hab e as
. We have not p r evious lyrule d on ho w to proceed in these c i r c u mstanc es, and we neednot do sohere. Even taking the approach most fav o r ab l e to Pinholster , and r e viewing only whethe r the California Supreme Court was objectively un reasonable in the second state hab e a s proceeding, we fi nd tha tPinhols ter ha s fa iled to s a tis f y §225 4(d)(1).17 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.” 46 6 U. S., at 6 89. Thus, “[t]he ben c hmark for judgin g a n y claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so underminedthe proper functioning of th e adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied onas having pro

duced a jus tresult.” Id., at 686 (emphasis added). The Court ackn owledged that “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any gi ven cas e ,” and tha t “[e]ven the best criminal defens e attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” Id., at 689. Recognizingthe “temp t [ ation] for adefendant to secondguess counsel’s assist ance after conviction or adverse sentence,” ibid. , the Court established that counsel shou ld be “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assis

tance and made all si gnificant de cisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment,” id., at 690

. To overcome that presumption, a def e ndant must show that counsel failed to act “reasonabl[y] considering all th e circumstan ces.” Id., at 688. The Court cautioned that “[t]he availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or o f detailed gu idelines fo r its evalu a tion would encourage the pro liferation of ineffectiveness challenges.” Id., at 690. The Court also required that defendants prove prejudice. Id., at 691–692. “The defendant must show th at there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proc eeding would have been different.” Id., at 694. “A reasonable probability is a pro bability sufficient to undermine confidence i n the outcome.” Ibid. That requires a “substantial,” not just “conceivable,” likelihood of a differ e nt result. Richter , 5 62 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22). Our review of the Calif ornia Supreme Court’s decision is thus “doub l y deferent ial.” Knowlesv. Mi rzayance , 5 56 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (s lip op., at 1 1 ) (citing Yarboroughv. Gentry , 540 U. S. 1, 5–6 (2003) (per curi am)). We tak e a18 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt “highly deferential” look at counsel’s performance, Strick

land , supra, at 689, through the “deferential lens of §2254(d),” Mirzayance , supra, at ___, n. 2 (sl i p op., at 9 , n. 2). Pinholster must demons trate that it wa s necessarily unreasonab le for the California Supreme Court to conclude: (1) that he had not overco me the strong presum ption of com p etence; and (2) that he had failed to undermine confidence in the jury’s sente n ce of death. C 1 Pinholster has not shown that th e California Supreme Court’s decision that he co uld not demonstrate deficien t performance by his trial counsel necessarily involved an unreasonab le application of federal law. In arguing to th e state court that his counsel performed deficiently, Pinholster contended that they should have pursued and presented additional evidence about: his family members and their criminal, mental, and substance abuse problems; his schooling; and his m e dical andmental h e alth history, including his epileptic disorder. To support his allegation that his tri al counsel h a d “no reas onable tactical basis” for the approach they took , Pinholster relied on statements his counsel made at trial. App. to Brief in Opposition 14 3. When arguing the motion to exclude the Stat e’s aggrava t

ing evidence at the penalty phase for failur eto comply with Cal. Penal Code Ann. §190.3, Dettmar, one of Pinh olster’s counsel, contended that because the State did not provide notice, he “[was] not presently prepared to offe r anything b yway of mi tigation,” 52 Tr. 7250. In respons e to the trial court’s inq u iry as to whether a continuance might be helpful, Dettmar noted that the on ly mitigation witness he could think of was Pinholster’s mother. Additional time, Dettmar st ated, would not “make a great dea l of difference.” Id., at 7 257–7258. We begin with the p r emise that “under t h e circum­19 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt stances, the challenged action[s] might be considered sound trial strategy. ” Stri ckland , supra, at 6 89 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals dissen t described one possible strategy: “[Pinholster’s attorneys ] were fully awa r e th at the y would have to deal with mi tigation sometime during the course of the trial , did spendconsiderable time and effort investigatin g avenues for mitigation[,] and made a reasoned professional jud g ment that the best way to serv e their client would b eto rely on the fac t that they n e ver got [the required§190.3] notice and hope the judge would bar the state from putting o n their aggra v ation witn esses.” 590 F. 3d, at 701–702 (opinion of Kozinski, C. J.). Further, if their motion was de nied, counsel were pr epared to pr esent only Pinholster’s mother in the penalty phase to create sympathy not for Pinholster, but for his mother. After all, t h e “ ‘family sympathy’ ” mitigation defense was known to the defense bar in California at th e time and had been us ed by other attorneys. Id., at 707

. Rather than displaying neglect, we presum e that Dettmar’s argu ments were part of th is trial st rategy. See Gentry , sup ra, at 8 (“[T]here is a strong pres umption that [counsel took certain actions] for tactical re asons rather than throu gh sheer neglect” (citi n g Strickl a nd , supra, at 690)). The state-court recordsupports the idea that Pinholster’s couns el acted st r a tegically t oget the p r osecution’s aggra v ation witnesses excluded for lack of n o tice, and if that failed, to pu t on Pinholster’s mother. Other s t ate

ments made during th e argument regarding t h e motion t o exclude suggest that d e fense counsel were trying to take advantage of a legal technicality and were not truly surprised. Brainard and Dettmar ack n owledged that the prosecutor had invited them on numerous occasions to20 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt review Pinholster’s state prisonfile but argued that su ch an invitation did not meet with the “strict demands” of §190.3. 52 Tr. 7260. Dettmar a d mitted that the prosecutor, “being as thorough as she is, possibly ha[d] met th e requirement.” Id., at 7250. But if so, he wa nted her “to make that r e presentation to the court.” 13 Ibid. Timesheets indicate that Pinholster’s tria lcounsel investigated mitigating evidence. 14 Long before the guilty verdict, De ttmar tal k ed with Pi nholster’s mother and contacted apsychiatrist. 15 On February 26, two month s before the penalty phase sta rted, he billed six hours for “[p]repa ration argument, death penalty phase.” See Clerk’s Tr. 864. Brain a rd, who m e rely assisted Dettmar for the penalty phase, researched epilepsy and also inter

viewed Pinholster’s mother. 16We k n ow that Brainard likely spent additional time, no t reflected in these entries, preparing Pinholster’s brother, Terry, who provided some mitigation testimony about Pinholster’s background dur­

——————

13 Couns el’s a r gu ment wa s pers ua s ive enou gh to ca us e th e tria l court to h o ld a h e ar in gan d take testi m onybefor edeny i n g the motion to exclude.

14 Bot hpa rt ies a gree t h a tt h es e b i lling reco rds were b e fore t h e Ca lifor n ia Su pr eme Cou r t. See Tr . of Or al Arg

. 45, 48–49.

15 See Cler k’ s Tr. 798 (en t r yonJan . 13 for“ph o n ec a ll to defen d an t’ s motherr emedic a l histor y” ); id., at 864 ( e n t r i es onFeb. 21 for“Pen a l Code res e a rch on ca pit a l punis h m e nt” ; Feb

. 2 3 for “ c onferen c e wit h defendant’s mother re childhood prob lems”; Feb. 25 fo r “Research on Pen

. C. 190.3”; an d Feb. 29 for“ph o toc o py in gr e por t s forappoin ted expert ,” “ P repa ra t i on of Decla r a t ion a n d Order for a ppoint m e ntof ps ychia t ris t ,” “ P repa ra t i on order of vis i ta t i on for inve s t iga t or,” a n d “Fu r th err e sear c honPen

. C. 190.3 ” ). Th e time r e c o rds forDettma r unfortu na tely s t op with Ma r
. 1 4 , s owedo not knoww h a the did du rin g the critical we eks leading up to the penalty phase on May 1.

16 See id., at 86 9 (en t r i es on Feb. 23 for“Con f. withBer n ic e Br ash e r , Pinhols t e r’s m o t h er” ; a n d Feb

. 2 5 for “R es ea rch re; epil eps ya n d conf. with nur se”); id

. , at 1160 (en t r i es onApr

. 11 for“Star tpr ep. forpen a lty pha s e” ; Apr. 25 for “ P rep. pena lt y pha s e and conf. wit h Mrs . Bra s hea r” ; and Apr. 26 for “Prep. pe nalty phase”).21 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt ing the guilt phase. Inf ra , at 28. The recordalso shows that Pin h olster’s counsel confronted a challenging penalty ph ase with a nunsympa thetic client, which limited th eir feasib le mitigati on strategies. By the end of the guilt phase, the jury had observed Pinholster “glor[y]” in“his criminal disposition” and “hundreds of robb eries.” Pi nholster , 1 Cal. 4th, at 945, 907, 824 P. 2d, at 611, 584. During his crossexamination, Pinholst e r laughed or smirked when he told the jury th at his “occupation” was “a crook,” when he was asked whether he had threatened a potential witness, and when he described thwarting police efforts to recover a gun he had once used. 44 Tr. 62 25. He bragged abou t being a “professional r o bber.” 43 id., at 620 4. To support his de fense, Pinh olster claimed that he used only guns

⎯ not knives

⎯ to commit his crimes
. But during cross-examination, Pinholster admitted that h ehad pre viously beenconvicted of using a knife in a kidnapin g. Pinholster also said h ewas a white supremacist and tha t he frequently carved s w astikas in to other pe ople’s property as “a sideline to robbery.” 44 id., at 6246. Trial counsel’s psychiatric expert, Dr. Stal berg, ha d concluded that Pinholster show ed no significant signs or symptoms of mental disorder or defect other than hi s “psychopa t hic personality traits.” App. 131. Dr. Stalberg
was aware of Pinhols ter’s hyperactivity as a youngster,hospitalization at age 14 for incorrigibility, alleged epileptic disorder, and history of drug dependency

. Nevertheless, Dr. Stalberg told counsel that Pinholster did not appear to suffer from brain damage, was not significantly intoxicated or impairedon the nigh t in questi o n, and did not have an impaired ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Given these impedimen t s, it would have been a reasonable pena lty-phase strategy to focus on evok ing sympathy for Pinholster’s mother

. In fac t , s u ch a famil ysympa t hy22 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt defense i s precisely how the State understood defens e counsel’s strategy. The prosecutor carefully opened her cross-examination of Pinholster’s mother with, “I hope you understand I don’t enjoy cross-examining a mother of anybody.” 52 Tr. 7407

. And in h e r closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to unde rcut defense counsel’s strategy by poin ting out, “E ven the most heinous person born, even Adolph Hitler[,] probably had a mother who loved him.” 53 id., at 7452. Pinholster’s only response to this evidence is a series of declarations from Brainard submitted wit hPinholster’s first state habeas pet i tion, seven years after the trial. Brainard d e clares that he has “ n o recollection” of interviewing an y family members (other than Pinholster’s mother) reg a rding pen a lty-phase t e stimony, of attemptin g to secure Pinholster’s school ormedical records, or of interviewing any former teache rs or counselors. Pet. for Writ of Ha beas Corpus in No. S004616 (Cal.), Exh. 3. Brainard a l so declares that Dettmar was primarily responsible for mental health issues in the case, but he has “no recollection” of Dettmar ever having sec u red Pinholster’s medic a l records. Id., Exh. 2. Dettmar neither confirmed nor denied Brainard’s state m ents, as he had died by the time of the first state habeas petition. 590 F. 3d, at 700 (Kozinski, C. J., dissenting). In sum, Brainard and Dettma r made statements suggesting tha tthey wer e not surpr i sed that t h e State intended to put on aggravating e vidence, billing recordsshow that they spent time investigating mitigating evidence, and the record demonstrates that the yrepresent e d a psychotic client who s e performance at tri al hardly e n deared him to the jury. Pinho lster has responded to this evidence with only a handful of post-hocnonde n ials by one of his lawyers. The C a lifornia Su preme Court could have reasonably concluded that Pi nholster had failed to rebut the presumption of competence mandated by S t rickl a n d —23 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt here, that counsel ha d adequately performe d at the pe nalty phase of trial. 2 The Court of Appeals held that the California Supreme Court had unreasonab ly applied Stri ckland because Pin

holster’s attorneys “w[ere] far more deficient than .

. . the attorneys in Terry Wil liams , Wi gg ins [v. Smi t h , 539 U. S. 510 (2003)], and Rompilla [v. Be ard , 545 U. S. 374 (2005)],where in each case the Supreme Court upheld the petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim.” 590 F. 3d, at 671. The court d r ew from t h ose cases a “constitut i onal duty t o investigate,” id., at 674, and the principle that “[i]t is prima facie ineffective assistance for counsel to ‘abandon[ ] their investigation of [the] petitioner’s background afte r having acq u ired only rudimentary knowledge of his history f r om anarrow setof sources,’ ” ibid. (quoting Wi ggin s v. Smith , 5 39 U. S. 510, 524–525 (2003)). T h e court explained that it could not “lightly disregard” a failure to introduce evidence of “ e xcruciatin g life history” or “night

marish childhood.” 59 0 F. 3d, a t 684 (internal quotation marks omit ted). The Court of Appeals misapplied Stri cklandand overlook ed “the constitutionally protected inde pendence of counsel an d .

. . the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.” 466 U. S., at 689. Beyond th e general requirement of reas onableness, “specific guidelines are not appropria t e.” Id., at 688. “No p a rticular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct cansatisfactor ily take ac count of the variety of circumstan ces faced by defense cou n sel or the range of legitimate decisions .

. . .” Id., at 688– 689. Strick landitself rejected the notion that the same investigation will be required in every case. Id., at 691 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reason able investigations orto make a reasonable decision that makes particular inve stigations unnecessary” (emphasis added)). It24 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt is “[r]are” t hat constit u tionally competent representation will require “any one te chnique or approach.” Richter , 56 2 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17). The Court of Appeals erred in attributing strict rules to th is Court’s recen tcase law. 17 Nor did the Court of Appeals properly apply the strong presumption of competence that Stri cklan d mandates. The court dismissed th e dissent’s application of the presumption a s “fabricat[ing] an excuse that the attorneys themselves could not conjure up.” 590 F. 3d, at 673. But Stri ckland specifically commands that a court “must indulge [the] strong presumption” that counsel “made all significant decisions inthe exercise of reas on able professional judgment.” 46 6 U. S. , at 689–690. The Court of Appeals wa s required not simply to “give [th e ] attorney s the benefit of the doubt,” 590 F. 3 d , at 673, b u t to affirm atively entertain the range of possible “reason s Pinholster’s counsel may have ha d for proceeding as the ydid,” id., at 692 (Kozinski, C. J., di ssenting). See also Richter , su pr a , at ___ (slip op., at 20) (“ Strickland

. . . calls for an inquiry into the obj e ctive reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of mind”). J USTICE S O T OMAYORq u estions w h ether it would have been a reasonable professional ju dgment for Pinholster’s trial counsel to adopt a family-sympathym i tigation defense. Post , at 27. She cites n o evidence, however, that such an approach wou l d have been inconsistent with th e standard of profession al compet ence in capital cases that prevailed in Los Angeles in1984

. Indeed, she does n o t contest that, at the time, the defense bar in California had been using that strategy. See supra , at 19; post , at 2 8 , n. 21. J USTICE S OTOMAYORrelies heavily on Wig g ins , bu t

——————

17 Th e Cour t of Appeal s w a s n o t n e c e ssa rily wrong in looking to othe r pr ec edents of this Cour t forg u idanc e , but “the Strick land test ‘ o f
neces s i t yreq u ires aca s e -b y-ca s eexamination of the evid ence.’ ” Te rry Williams , 529 U. S. 362, 39 1 (20 00) ( q u o t i n g Wrightv. West , 505 U. S. 277, 30 8 (19 9 2 ) (K ENNEDY , J

. , con c u rrin ginj u dgm e nt)).Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) 25 Opinion of theCourt in that cas e the defendant’s trial counsel specifically acknowledgeda standar dprac tice for capital ca ses in Mary

land that was inconsistent with what he had done. 53 9 U. S., at 52 4. At bottom, J USTICE S OTOMAYOR ’ s view is grounded in little more than her o w n sense of “prudence,” post , a t26 (internal quotation marks omitte d), and wh at appears to be her belief that the only reasonable mitigation strategy in capital cases is to “help” the jury “und erstand” th e defendant, post, at 35. According to J USTICE S OTOMAYO R , that Pinholster was an unsy m pathetic client “compound[ed], rather thanexcuse[d], counsel’s deficiency” in pursuing fu rther evidence “that co uld explain why Pinholster was the way he was.” Post , a t30. But itcertainly c a n be reasonable for att o rneys to conclude that creatin g sympathy for the defendant’s familyis a better idea because the defendant himself is s i m p ly unsympathetic. J USTICE S OTOMAYOR ’ s approachis flatly inconsistent with Strick land’s recognition that “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assi sta n ce in any given case.” 466 U. S., at 689. Th ere comes a point where a defen s e attorney wi ll reasonably decide that another strategy is in order, thus “mak[ing] parti cular investigations unnecessary.” Id., at 691; cf. 590 F. 3d, at 692 (Kozinski, C. J., dissenting) (“The current infatu ation with‘humanizing’the defendant as the be-all and end-all of mitigation disregards the p o ssibility that this maybe the wrong tacti c in some cases because experience d la wyers concl u de that the jury simply won’t buy it”). Those decisions are due “a heavy mea s ure of deference.” S t rickl a nd , supra, a t69 1. The California Supre m e Court could have reasonably concluded that Pinhols ter’s counsel made suc ha reasoned decision in this case. We have re cently reite r ated tha t “ ‘[s]urmounting S t rick

land’s high bar is never an easy t a sk.’ ” Richter , sup ra , at ___ (slip op. , at 15) (quoting Padill av. K e ntu c ky , 559 U. S.26 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt

___, _ __ (20 10) (slip op., at 14)). The Strickl a ndstandard must be ap plied with “ s crupulous care.” Richter , sup ra , at ___ (s lip op ., at 15). The Court of Appeals did not do so here. D Even if hi s trial cou n sel had performed d e ficiently, Pinholster also has f a iled to s h ow that the California Supreme Court must have unreasonably concluded th at Pinholster was not prej udiced. “[T]he question is whether there is a r e asonabl e p r obability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggra v ating and mitiga ting circum stances did not warrant death.” Strickland , su pra, at 695. We theref ore “reweigh the evidence in aggravation again s t the totality of available mitiga ting evidence.” Wig g in s , supra, a t 534. 1 We turn first to the aggra v atingand mitig a ting evidence that the sentencingjury considered. Se e Stricklan d , supra, at 6 95 (“[A] cou rt hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the tota lity of the e vidence before the jud g e or jury”). Here, the same jury heard both the guilt and penalty phases and was instructed to consider all th e evidence presented. C f

. Visciotti , 537 U. S., at 25 (notin g that the state habeas court had correctly considered mitigating evid ence introduced duringthe guilt phase). The State presented extensiv e aggravating evidence. As we have al ready discu ssed, the jury watche dPinholster revel in his extensive criminal history. Sup ra , at 2 1

. Then, during the penalty phase, the State presented e vidence that Pinholster had thre atened to k i l lthe State’s lead witness, assaulted a man wi th a straigh trazor, an d k i dnaped another person with a k n ife. The S t ate showed that Pinholster had a history of violent outb ursts, including strikingand threatening a bailiff after a court proceed­27 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt ing at age 17, breaking his wife’s j a w, 18resisting arrest by faking seizures, and assaulting and spitting on police officers. The jury also he ard ab out Pinhols ter’s involvement in juvenile gangs and his substantial disciplinary record in bo th count y a n d state jails, where he had th reatened, assau l ted, and thrown urin e at guards , and fough t with other inmates. While injail, Pinholst e r had been segregated for a time due to his propensity for violence and placed on a “special disciplin ary diet” reserved only for the most disruptive inmates. 5 2 Tr. 7305. The mitigating evidence consist e d primarily of the penalty-pha se testimon y of Pi nholster’s mothe r , Brashear, who gave a detailed account of Pinholster’s troubled childhood and a d olescence. Early childhood was quite difficul t

. The family “didn’t ha ve lots of money.” Id., at 7404

. When he was very young, Pinholster suffered two serious head injuries, first at a g e 2 or 3 when he was run over by a car, and again at age 4 or 5 when he went through th e windshield during a ca r accident. When he was 5, Pinholster’s stepfa ther moved in and was abusive, or nearly so. Pinholster always stru ggled in school. He was disruptive in kindergarten and was failin g by first grade. He got in fights and would run out of the classroom. In third grade, Pinholster’s teacher su ggested that he was more than just a“ ‘disruptive child.’ ” Id

. , at 7394. Followin g tests at a clinic, Pinholster was sent to a school for educa

tionally ha ndicapped children where his performance improved. At age 10, psychiatrists recommended that Pinholster be sent to a mental institutio n, although he did not go.Pinholster had continued to initiate fights with his brothers and to act lik e “Robin H ood” around the neighborhood,

——————

18 Pin h o lster ’ s wife w a iv ed h e r spou sal pr ivil ege to testify t othis fact. She acknowle dged that her testi m ony wou l d be u s ed to ar g u e th at h e r husband should be executed.28 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt “[s]tealing f r om the ric hand gi ving to the poor.” Id., at 7395. Brashear had thought then that “[s]o m ething was not workingright.” Id., at 7396. By age 10 or 11, Pinholster was living in boy’s home s and juvenile halls. He spent six months when he was 12 in a state mental institutio n for emotionally handicapped children. B ythe time he was 18, Pinholster was in count y jail, where he was beaten badly. Brashear suspected tha t the beating caused Pinholster’s epilepsy, for which he h a s been prescribed medication. Afte r a stint in state prison, Pinholster returned h o me but acted “unusual” and had trouble readjusting to life. Id., at 7405. Pinholster’s siblings were “basically very good children,” although th ey would g e t into trou b le. Id., at 7401. His brother, Terry, ha d been arrested for drun k driving an d his sister, Tammy, fo r public intoxication. Tammy als o was arrested for drug possessi on and was sel f-destructi ve and “wild.” Ibid. Pinholster’s eldest brother, Alvin, died a fugitive from California authorities. 19 In addition to Brashear’s penalty-phase testimony, Pinholster had previo usly presented mitigating evidence during the guilt phas e from his brother, Terry. Terr y testified that Pinholster was “mo r e or less i ninstitutions all his life,”suffered from epilepsy , and was “more or les s ” drunkon the night of the murders. 42 id., at 6015, 6036. After considering this aggravatin g and mi tigating evidence, the jury retu rn ed a sentence of death. The state

——————

19 J US TI CE S OT OMAYORc r i tic i zes Br ash e ar ’ s test imon yas “ s elfinterested,” po st , at 31, but the whole prem ise of the f a mily-sympathy defense is the family’s int e rest

. She similarly makes much of the fact that the pr ose c utor“belittle [ d]” Br ash e ar ’ s tes t imon yi nc l osin gar gument. Post , at 33. We fai lto see the po int. Any diligent prosecutor would have c h a llenged wh a t ever mi tigating evidence the defense had put on. And, we would certainly no t expect the pros ecutor’s closing
ar g u ment to h av edesc r ibed the ev idenc ein the light mo st f av o r able to Pinholster

. B u t see ibid. , n. 26.29 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt trial court found that the jury’s d e termination was “supported overwhelmingly by the wei ght of the e vidence” and added that “the factors in aggra v a t ion beyond all reasonable doubtoutweigh those in m i tigation.” Clerk ’ s Tr. 1184, 1186. 2 There is no reasonabl e probability that the additionalevidence Pinholster presented in his state habeas proceedings would have changed the jury’s verdict. The “new” evidence la rgely duplicated the mitigation evidence a t trial. School and medical records basically substantiate the testimony of Pinholster’s mother and brot her. Declarations from Pinholst e r’s sibling s support his mother’s testimony that his stepfather wa s abusive and explain that Pinholster was beaten with fists, belt s, and even wooden boa r ds. To the extent the state habeas record includes new factual allegations or evidence, much of it is of questio nable mitiga ting value. If Pinholst e r had called Dr. Woods to testify consistently with his psychiatric report, Pinholster would have opened the d oor to rebuttal by a state expert. See, e.g., Wong v. Belmo n tes , 558 U. S. ___, __

_ (2009) (percuriam) (slip op., at 10 –12) (takin g into account that certai nmitigating evidence would have exposed th e petitioner to further aggravating evidence). The ne w evidence relating to Pinholster’s family

⎯their more serious substa nce abuse, mental illn ess, and criminal prob

lems, see po st , at 22

⎯ is also by no means clearly mitiga ting, as the jury migh t have concluded that Pinholster was simply beyond rehabilitation. Cf. Atkinsv. Virginia , 5 36 U. S. 304, 3 21 (2002) (recognizing that mitigati ng evidence can be a “two-edged s w ord” that juries might find to sh ow future dangerousness). The remaining new material in the state habeas record is sparse. We learn th at Pinholster’s brother Alvin died of30 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of theCourt suicide by drug overdose, and there are passing references to Pinholster’s own dr ug depende n cy. Ac cor d ing to Dr. Stalberg, Pinholster’s “school records” ap parently evidenced “some degree” of brain damage. App. to Brief in Opposition 219. Mostly, there are just a few new details about Pinholster’s childhood. Pinholster appa rently look ed lik ehis biol ogi c al father, whom his grandparents “loathed.” Pet. for Wri tof Habeas Corpus in No. S004616 (Cal.), Exh. 98, p. 1. Accordingly, whenever h i s grandpa rents “spank ed or discip lined” the ki ds, Pinholster “alway s got the wor s t of it.” Ibid. Pinhols ter was mo stly unsupervised and “didn’t get much love,” because his mother and stepfather were alway s workinga n d “were m o re concerned with their o w n lives th an the welfare of their kids.” Id., at 2

. Neither parent seemed concerned about Pinholster’s schooling. Finally, Pinholster’s aunt once saw the childre n mixing flour and wa t e r to make something to eat, although “[m ] ost meals consisted of canned s p aghetti an d foods of tha tilk .” Id., at 1

. Given wha tlittle additional mitigating evide n ce Pinholster presented in state habeas, we cannot say that the California Supreme Court’s determination was unreasonable. Having already heard much of what i s included in the state h abeas record, the jur yreturned asentence of death. Moreover, someof the new testimony would lik ely have undercut the mitigating value of the testimony by Pinholster’s mother. The new material is thus not so significant that, even assuming Pinholster’s trial counsel performed deficiently, it was necessarily unreasonable f o r the California Suprem e Court to conclude that Pinholster had failed t oshow a“s ubstantial” likelihoodof a differen t sentence. Richter , 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22) (citing Stri ckland , 466 U. S., at 693). 3 As with deficiency, the Cou rt of Appeals found this case31 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt to be “materially indistinguishable” from Terry Willi am s and Rompillav. Bea r d , 545 U. S. 374 (2005). 590 F. 3d, at 684. But th is Court did not apply AEDPA deference to the question of prejudice in those case s ; each of them lackthe important “doubly deferential” standard of Strickland an d AEDPA. See Terry Williams , 52 9 U. S., at 395–397 (reviewing a s t ate-court d e cision that did not a p ply the correct legal s t andard); R o mpilla , su pra, at 390 (reviewing Stri ckland prejudice de novo because the state-court dec i

sion did not reach the question). Those cases therefore offer no guidance with respect to whether a state court has unreasonab l ydetermined that prejudice is la cking. We have said time and ag ain that “an unreason a ble application of federal law is different from an incorrec tapplication of federal law.” Ri c h t e r , sup r a , at ___ (slip op., at 11) (internal quotation mark s omitte d). Even if the Court of Appeals might have reached a different conclusion as an initial matter, it was not an unreasonable application of our precedent for the California Supreme Court to co nclude that Pinholster did not establish prejudice. 20 * * * The judgme nt of the United State s Court of Appeals for the Ninth C i rcuit is rev e rsed. It is so orde red.

——————

20 Bec a use Pinholsterhas fai l e d to de monst r ate tha tthe adjudic a t i on of his claim based on the state-cour trecord res u lt ed in adecis i on “c ontr ar yto” or“inv olv [ing] an unr eason able app lic at ion” of feder a l law, a wr it of h abeas c o r p u s “sh a ll n o t be gr an ted” an d ou ran aly s is i s at anen d. 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). We ar e bar r e d fr om con s ider in gth e evidence Pinholster submitted in th e Dis t rictCourtt h a the cont ends a dditiona lly support s his cla i m
. For t h a trea s on, we need notdeci de whether §2254(e)(2) prohibited the Dis t rictCourtf r o mholding t h e evidentiary he aring or whether a dist rictcourtm a y eve rchoos e t o hold anev iden tiar yh e ar in gbefor eit de ter m in es th a t§2 2 54(d) h a s bee n sati sfied._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–1 08 8
VINCE N T CULL EN, ACTIN G WARDEN, P E TITION E R v. SCOTT LYNN PINHOLSTER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Apr il 4, 201 1] J USTICE ALI T O , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Although I concur in t h e Court’s j u dgment, I agree with the conclusion reached in Part I of the dissent, namely, that, whenan evidentiary heari n g is properly held in federal court, review under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1) must take into a ccount the evidence admitted at t hat hearing

. As the dissent points out, refusing t oconsider the evidence received in the hearing in federal court gives §2254(e)( 2 ) an implausib ly narrow scope and will lead either to results that Congr e ss surely did not intend or to the distortion of other provisions of theAnti terrori sm and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, and the la w on “cause and prejudice.” See post , at 9–12 (opinion of S OTOMAYO R , J.). Under AEDPA evide n tiary hearings in federal court should be rare. The petition er generally mu st have ma de a diligent ef fort to produce in state court the new evidence on which h e seeks to rely. See §2254(e)(2); Willi ams v. Taylor , 529 U. S. 420, 4 33–434 (2000). If that requiremen t is not satisfied, the petitioner may establish the factual predicate for a claim in a fed e ral-court hearing only if , among other things, “t he facts underlying th e claim would be sufficient to establish by clear a n d convinci ng evidence that but for constituti onal e rror, no reasonable factfinder2 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of ALIT O , J. would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” §2 254(e)(2)(B). Even when the petitioner does satisfy the diligence standard a d opted in William s v. Taylor , su pra , ahearing should not be held in federal court unless the new evi

dence that the petitioner seeks to introduce was not and could not have been of fered in the state-court proceeding. Section 2254(e)(2) bars a hearing in certain situations, but it does not mean that a hearing is allowed in all other situations. See Schriro v. Landrigan , 550 U. S. 465, 473– 474 (2007). The whole thrust of AEDPA is essentially to reserve federal habeas relief f o r those cases in which the state courts acted un reasonably. See §§2254(d)(1), (2 ), (e)(1). Per m itting a petitioner to obtain f e deral habeas relief onth e basis of evidence that could have been bu t was not offered in state cou rt wouldupset this scheme. In this case, for essentially the reasons set out in the dissent from the Court of Appeals’ en banc decision, see Pinholster v. Ayers , 5 90 F. 3d 6 51, 688–691 (CA9 200 9) (opinion of Kozinski, J.), I would hold that the federal

court hearing should not have been held bec ause respon dent did not diligentl y present his new evidence to the California courts. And I join all but Part II o f the opinion of the Court, as I agree that the de cision of the state court represented a reasonable applic ation of clearly established Supreme C o urt preced ent in light of the state-court record

._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of B RE Y E R , J. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–1 08 8
VINCE N T CULL EN, ACTIN G WARDEN, P E TITION E R v. SCOTT LYNN PINHOLSTER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Apr il 4, 201 1] J USTICE B RE YE R , conc urring in p a rt and dis s enting in part. I join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion. I do not join Part III, fo r I would s e nd this case backto the Court of Appeals so that it can apply the legal standards that Pa rt II announc es to the complex facts of this cas e
. Compare ante , a t14–31 (majority opinion), with post , at 17–4 2 (S OTOMAYO R , J., dissen t ing). Like the Court, I b e lieve that its understanding of 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1) does not leave AEDPA’s hearing section, §2 254(e), without work to do. An offender who believes he is entitled to habeas relief must first present a claim (inclu ding his evidence) to th e state courts. If the state courts reject the claim, then a federal habeas court may review that reject ion onthe basis of the materials considered by the state court. If the federal habeas cou r t finds that the state-court decision fails (d)’s test (or if (d) does not apply), then an (e) hearin g may be needed. For exampl e, if the state-court r ejection assumed the habeas petitioner’s facts (deciding that, evenif those facts were true, f e deral law was not violated), then (after find

ing the sta t e court wro n g on a (d) ground) an(e) hearing might be needed to determine whether the facts alleged were indeed true. Or if the state- court rejec t ion rested on a state ground, which a federal h abeas court found inade

-2 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER Opinion of B RE Y E R , J. quate, then an (e) hearing might b e needed to consider th e petitioner’s (now unblocked) substa ntive federal claim. Or if the state-court rejection rested on only o n e of sever a l related federal grounds ( e.g. , that counsel’s ass i stance was not “inadequate”), then, if the federal court fo und that th e state court’s decision in resp ect to the ground it decided violated (d), an (e) hearing migh t be needed to consider other related parts of t h e whole constitutional claim (e.g. , whether th e counsel’s “inadequate” assistance was al so prejudicial). There may be other situations in which an (e) hearing is needed as well. In this cas e , however, we cannot say wheth e r an (e) hearing is needed unti lwe k n ow whether the state court, in rejectingPinholster’s claim on the basis presented t o that state court, violated (d). (In my view, the lower courts’ anal ysis in respect to this matter is inadequate.) There is no role in (d) analysis for a habeas petitioner to introduce evidence th at was notfirst p r esented to t h e state courts. But tha tdoes not mean that Pinholster is without rec o urse to pr esent new evidence. He can alway s return to s t ate court presenting new evidence not pre v i

ously presented. If the state court again denies reli ef, h e might be a b le to return to feder a l court to make claims related to the latest rejecti on, subject to AE DPA’s limita

tions on suc c essive petitions. See §2244. I am not trying to pr edict the future course of these proceedings. I point out only that, in my view, AEDPA is not designed to take necessa ry remedies from a habeas petitioner but to gi ve t h e State a f i rst opportu nity to con

sider most matters and to insi st that federal courts prop

erly respectstate-court determinations._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–1 08 8
VINCE N T CULL EN, ACTIN G WARDEN, P E TITION E R v. SCOTT LYNN PINHOLSTER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Apr il 4, 201 1] J USTICE S OTOMAYOR , with who mJ USTICE G INSB URG and J USTIC E K AGANjoi nas to Part II, dissenting. Some habeas petitioners are unable to develop the fac

tual basis of their claims in state court thro ugh no fault of their own. Congre ss recognized as much when it en acted the An titerrorism and Effec t ive Death Penalty Ac tof 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, a n d permitte d therein the introduction of new e vidence in federal habeas proceed

ings in certain limited circumstances. See 28 U. S. C. §2254(e)(2). Under the Court’ s novel interpretation of §2254(d)(1), however, federal courts must tu rn a blind eye to new evi d ence in deciding wh ether a petitioner has satisfied §2 254(d)(1)’s threshold ob stacle to federal habea s relief—evenwhen it is clear that the petition er would be entitled to relief in light of that evidence. In reading the statute to “ c ompe[l]” this ha rsh result, ante , at 9 , the Court ignores a key textual difference between §§2254(d)(1) and 2254(d)(2) and discards the previous understanding in our precedents that new evi d ence can, in fact, inform the §2254( d)(1) inquiry. I therefore dissent from the Court’s first h o lding. I also dis a gree with the Court that, even if the §2254(d)(1) analysis is limited to the state-court record, respondent ScottPinholster fa iled to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s decis i on denying his ineffec

-2 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g tive-assistance-of-counsel claimwas an unreason able application of Strickl a ndv. Wa shington , 4 66 U. S. 668 (1984). There is n oreason forthe majority to decide whether th e §2254(d)(1) analysis is limited to the state

court record because Pinholster satisfied §2 254(d)(1) o n either the state- or federal-court re cord. I The Court first holds that, in de termining whether a state-court decisionis an unreasonable a p plication of Supreme Court pre c edent under § 2254(d)(1), “review .

. . is limited to the record t hat was before the state court tha t adjudicatedthe claim on the merits.” Ante , at 9. New evidence a d duced at a federal evidentiary hearing is now irrelevant to dete rmining whether a p e titioner has satisfied §2 254(d)(1). This holdin g is unnecessary to pro

mote AEDPA’s pu rposes, and itis inconsistent with t h e provision’s text, the structu re of the statu t e, and ou r precedents. A To understand the significance of the majority’s holding, it is important to vie wthe issue in context. AE DPA’s entire struc t ure—whic h gives stat e courts the opportunit y to decide factual and legal questions in the fir s t instance— ensures that evidentiary hearings in federal habeas pro

ceedings are very rare. See N. King, F. Cheesman, & B. Ostrom, Fi nal Technical Report: Habeas L i tigation in U. S. Distri ct Courts 35–36 (2007 ) (evidentia ry hearings under AEDPA occur in0.4 percent of noncapit al cases an d 9.5 percent of capital c a ses). Eve nabsent th e new restri c tion created by today’s hold ing, AEDPA erects multiple hurdles to a state prisoner’s ability to introduce new evi

dence in a f e deral habeas proceeding. First, “[u]n d er the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner challenging a state c o nviction must first at

-3 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g tempt to pr esent his claim in state court.” Harrin g tonv. Richter , 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 13); s ee als o §2254(b)(1)(A). With certainnarrow excepti o ns, federa l courts cann ot consider a claim at all, let alon e accept ne w evidence relevant to the claim, if it has not been exhausted in state court. 1 The exhaustion req u irement thus reserves to state co urts the fi rst oppor t u n ity to resolve factua l disputes relevant to a state prisoner’s claim. See O’Sulli vanv. Boerck el , 526 U. S. 838, 845 (1999). Second, the exhaustion requirement is “complement[ed]” by the standards set forth in §22 54(d). Har r ingto n , 56 2 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). Under this provision, a fe d

eral court may not grant habeas relief on an y “claim that was adjudic a ted on the merits in State cour t proceedings ” unless the adjudication “(1) resulted in a deci sion that was contrar yto, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab

lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or “(2) resulted in a decision that wa s based on an un

reasonable determination of the f a cts in ligh tof the evidence presented in th e State court proceeding.” These standards “control whether to grant h abeas relief

. ” Schrirov. Landrigan , 550 U. S. 465, 474 (2007). Acco rd

ingly, we have said, if the factual allegations a petitioner seeks to prove at an e videntiary hearing wo uld not sati sfy these standards, there is no reason for a h e aring. See id. , at 481. In such a case, the district court may exercise its “discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing.” Ibid.; see als o infra , at 13–14. This approach makes eminent sense: If district co urts held evidenti ary hearings without first

——————

1 Relatedly, a state prisoner must, as a general matter, properly ex

ha us t his federa l cla i ms in s t a t e court to av oid having his cla i m de

faulted on pro c edural grounds. See Colemanv. Thompson , 501 U. S. 722, 75 0 (19 9 1 )

.4 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g ask i ng whe t her the evidence the petitioner seek s to pre

sent would satisfy AEDPA’s demanding standards, the y would needlessly prolon g federal habeas proceedings. Third, even when a petitioner se ek s to introduce new evidence that would en title hi m to relief, AEDPA prohibits him from doing so, except in anarrow ra nge of cases, unless he “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the informationavailable a tthe time, to investigate and pur

sue claims in state court.” Willi amsv. Tay lor , 529 U. S. 420, 435 ( 2000) (Michael Willi ams)

. Thus, §2254(e)( 2 ) provides: “If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim i nSta t e cou rt p r oceedings, the co urt shall not hold anevidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that— “(A) the claim relies on— “(i) a new r u le of constitutional law, made retroac

tive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or “(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due dili

gence; and “(B) the facts underlying the claim would be suffi

cient to es tablish by clear and c o nvincing e vidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact

finder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” In Michael William s , we construed the ope n ing clause of this provision—which trigger s the bar on evidentiary hearings—to apply when “there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, at tributable to the pris oner or the prisoner’s counsel.” 2 Id. , at 432. AEDPA thus bars an

——————

2 Sec t ion2254( e)(2) also g o v e r n s anattemp t to obt a inr e li ef “ba s ed on new e v idencewithout an evi d entiary hearing.” Hollandv. Jack son , 5 42 U. S. 649, 653 (200 4) (pe rcu riam) (emph a si s deleted).5 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g evidentiary hearing for a nondiligent petitioner unless the petitioner can satisfy b o th §§2254(e)(2)(A) an d (B), which few petitioners can. Section 2254(e)(2) in this way incen

tivizes state petitioners to develop the factual basis of their claims in state court. To the limited extent that federal evidentiary hearings are available under AEDPA, theyensure that petitioners who diligently developed the factual basis of their claims in state co urt, discovered new e vidence after the state

court proceeding, and cannot retu rn to state court retai n the ability to access the Great Writ. See an te , at 2 (ALITO , J., concurri ng in part and concurri ng in judgment). “When Congress codified new rules governing this previously judicially managed area of law, it did so without los i ng sight of th e fact that the ‘writ of habeas corpus plays a vital role in protectin gconstituti onal rights.’ ” Hollandv. Florida , 560 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 16) (quoting Slackv. McDaniel , 529 U. S. 473, 483 (2000)). Allowing a petitioner to introduce new evide n ce at a he aring in th e limited circumstance permitted by §2254(e)(2) does not upset the balance that Congress struck inAEDPA b e tween the state and federal courts. B yconstrui n g §2254(d)(1) to do the work of other provisions in AEDPA, the majority has subverted Congress’ careful balance of responsibilities. It has alsocreated unnecessarily a brand

new set of procedural complexi ties that lower courts wil l have to confront. 3 B The majority’s interpretation of §2254(d)(1) finds no support in the provision’s text or t h e statute’s structure a s a whole. 1 Section 2254(d)(1) re quires district courts to ask

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3 See, e. g. , nn . 5 , 7, an d 13, inf ra
.6 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g whether a state-court a d judication on the merits “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involv ed an unrea

sonable application of, clearly esta blished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United State s .” Because this provision us es “backward-l ooking lan

guage”— i. e. , past-tense verbs—the majority believes tha t it limits review to the state-courtrecord. An te , a t9. Bu t both §§225 4(d)(1) and 2254(d)(2) use “backward-lookin g language,” and §2254( d)(2)—unlike §2254(d)( 1 )—expressl y directs dist rict courts t obase their review on “the evidence presented i nthe State court proce e ding.” If u s e of thepa st tense were sufficient to indica te Congress’ intent to r e strict analysis to the state-co urt record, the phrase “in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed

ing” in §2254(d)(2) would be superfluous. The majority’s constructio nof §2254( d)(1) fails t o give mea n ing to Con

gress’ decision to include l anguage referring to the evi

dence presented to the state court in §2254(d)(2). Cf. Batesv. Un ited States , 522 U. S. 23, 29–30 (1 997) (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it inanother se ction of the same Act, it is generally presume dthat Con gress acts intentionally and purpos ely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Ignoring our usual “reluctan[ ce] to treatstatu t ory term s as surplusage in any s e tting,” TR W Inc. v. A ndrews , 53 4 U. S. 19, 31 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), the majority ch aracterizes the ph rase appearing in §2254(d)(2) as mere “clarifying language,” an te , at 12, n. 7. It specu

lates that “[t]he omission of cla r ifying lan guage fro m §2254(d)(1) just as likely reflects Congress’ belief that such language was unnecess ary as it do es anything else.” Ante , at 12–13, n

. 7. The ar gument that this phrase is merely “clarifying” might have more fo rce, however, had Congres s included this phrase in §2254(d)(1) but not in §2254(d)(2). As between the two provisions , §2254(d)(2)—which re -7 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g quires review of the state court’s “determination of th e facts”—mor elogically depends on the facts presented t o the state court. Becau s e this provision needs less clarifi

cation on th is point than §2254( d)(1), it is all the m o re telling that Congress i n cluded this phrase in§2254(d)(2 ) but elected to exclude it from §2254(d)(1). Unlike my colleagues in the majority, I refuse to assume that Congress s i mply engaged in sloppy drafting. The inclusion of this phrase in §2254( d)(2)—coupl e d with its omissionfrom §2254(d)(2)’s partner pro vision, §2254(d)(1)—provides strong reason to thin k that Con

gress did not intend for the §2 254(d)(1) analysis to be limited categorically to “the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 2 The “ ‘broader context of the statute as a whole,’ ” ante , at 9 (quoting Robinsonv. Shell OilCo. , 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997)), reinforces this conclusion. In particular, Con

gress’ deci sion to include in AEDPA a provision, §2254(e)(2), that perm its federal evidentiary hearings in certain cir c umstances provides further e vidence th at Congress did not intend to limit the §2254(d)(1) inquiry to the state-court record i nevery cas e
. We have l o ng recognized that some diligent habeas petitioners are unable to develop all of the facts support

ing their claims in state court. 4 As discussed above, in

——————

4 See, e. g. , Mi chael Williams , 529 U. S. 420, 432 (20 00) (n otin gth at diligent efforts to develop the facts m i ght be “thwarted, for example, b y the conduct of a n other orb y ha ppens ta nce”); id. , at 434 (n otin gth at the pr osec ution migh t hav e“c onc e aled the fac t s” suppor t ing“a c l ai m whic h was pursued with diligence”); Town se ndv. Sain , 372 U. S. 293, 31 3 (196 3) (r equ i r i n gfeder a l c o u r ts to gr an tev iden tiar y h e ar in g s wh en , inter alia , “the fact-finding procedureempl oyed by the state court wa s n o t adequ a te t oaffor da fu ll an d fairh e ar i n g” or“th er e is a subst a n t i a l allegationof newly discovered evid ence”), overruled in part onothe r grounds by Ke eneyv. Tamayo-Reyes , 504 U. S. 1, 5 (1992)

.8 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g enacting A E DPA, Con gress gener a lly barredevidentiar y hearings for petitioners who di d not “exercise diligence in pursuing their claims” in state court. Mich ael William s , 529 U. S., at 436; see a l so §225 4(e) (2). Importantly, it did not impose any express limit on evidentiary hearings for petitioners who had been diligent in state cou rt. See id. , at 436 (“[T]he statute does no t eq uate prisoners who exer

cise diligen ce in pursuing their cl aims with those who do not”). For those petitioners, Congress left the decision t o hold a hearing “to the sound dis cretion of district cour ts.” Landrigan , 550 U. S., at 473. Faced with situations in which a diligent petitioner offers additional evidence in federal court, t h e courts of appeals have takentwo approaches to applying §2254(d)(1). Some cou rts have held that wh en a federa l court admits new evidence supporting a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, §2254(d)(1) does not apply a t all and the federal court mayre view the cl aim de novo

. See ante , a t12; Hollandv. Ja ckson , 542 U. S. 649, 65 3 (2004) (per curiam); se e, e.g. , Win s ton v. Ke l l y , 592 F. 3d 535, 555–5 56 (CA4 2010). I agree with the majority’s rejection of this appro a ch. See ant e , at 12. It would u n dermine the comity pr inciples motivating A E D PA to de

cline to defer to a state-court a d judicationof a claim because the state court, th rough no fault of its own, lacked all the relevant evidence. 5

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5 Of c o ur se, §2254(d)( 1 ) on lyapplie s wh ena sta t e c o u r t h a s adju di

c a ted a c l a i m on the mer i t s
. Ther e maybe si tuations in whic h new evidence supp orting a claim adjudicate d on the mer i ts giv e s r i se to an altog e therdiffer e nt c l aim. See, e. g. , ReplyBr ief forPetition er10– 11 (evidence withheld by the prosecutor r e latingto one c l aim maygiv er i se to a sep a r a te c l aim under Bradyv. Maryla nd , 373 U. S. 83 (1 963)). Th e major i tyopini o n does not fo reclose this pos s ibi lity.

I assume thatthe major i tydoes no t intend to sug g e st that r e v i ew is limite dto the sta t e-c o ur t r e cor dwhena pe titioner’s inabi lity to develop the fac t s supp or tinghis c l aim was the fau l t of the s t ate c o ur t itself. S e e generally Tr . o f Oral Arg

. in Bell v. Kelly , O. T. 2008, No . 07–12 23.9 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g Other courts of appeals , including the court below, have struck a mo re considered balance. These courts have held that §2254(d)(1) continues to apply but that new evidence properly presented in a federa l hearing is relevant to the reasonableness of th e state-court decision. S ee Pinholster
v. Ayers , 59 0 F. 3d 651 , 668 (CA9 2009) (en banc) (“If th e evidence is admissible under MichaelWilliam sor §2254(e)(2), and if it does not render the petitioner’s claims unexhausted .

. . , then it is properly considered in evaluating whether th e legal conclusion rea c hed by th e state habeas court was a reas onable application of S u preme Court law”); ac cord, Wilso nv. Mazzuca , 570 F. 3d 490, 500 (CA2 2009); Pecorarov. Walls , 286 F. 3d 439, 4 4 3 (CA7 2002); Valdez v. Cockre ll , 2 74 F. 3d 94 1, 952 (CA5 2001). This approach accommodates the com p eting goals, reflected in §§2254(d) and 2254(e)(2), of acco rding defer

ence to reasonable sta t e-court de cisions and preserving the opportunity for diligent peti tioners to present evidence to the federal court when they were unable to do so in state court. The majority charts a third, novel course that, so far as I am aware, no court of appeals h a s adopted: §2254(d)(1 ) continues to apply wh en a pe titioner has additional evi

dence that he was unable to present to the state court, b u t the district court canno t considerthat evidence in deciding whether th e petitioner has satisfied §2254( d)(1). The problem with this approach is its potential to bar federal habeas reli ef for dilig ent habeas petitioners who cannot present new evidence to a state court. Consider, for example, a petitioner who diligently at

tempted in state cour t to develop the factu al basis of a claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory witness statements in violation of Bradyv. Maryland , 373 U. S. 83 (1963). Th e state cou rt denied relief onthe ground th at the withheld evidence then knowndid not rise to the lev e l of materiality required under Bra d y
. Before the time for10 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g filing a fed e ral habeas petition h a s expired, however, a state courtorders the State to d i sclose additional docu

ments the petitionerhad timely requested under the State’s public records Act. The disc losed documents reveal that the State withheld other exculpatory wi tness state

ments, but state law would not permit the petitioner to present the new evidence in a successive petition. 6 Under our precedent, if the petitio n er had not presented his Bradyclaim to the state court at all, his claim would be deemed defaulted and the petitioner could attempt t o show cause and prejudice to overcome the default. See Michael Wi lliams , 529 U. S., at 4 44; see als on. 1, supra
. If, however, the new evidence merely bolsters a Bra d y claim that was adjudic a ted on the merits in state court, it is unclear how the petitioner can obtain fed e ral habeas relief after today’s holding. What may have been a rea

sonable decisionon th e state- court record may no longer be reasonab le in light of the new evidence. See Kylesv. Whitl e y , 514 U. S. 419, 436 (1995 ) (materiality of Brady evidence is viewed “collectively, n o t item by item”). Be

cause the state court adjudicatedthe petitioner’s Br ady claim on th e merits, §2254(d)(1) would still apply. Yet, under the majority’s interpretati on of §2254(d)(1), a fed

eral court is now prohibited from considering the new evidence in determining the reasonableness of the state

court decision. The majority’s interpretation of §2254(d)(1) thus sug

gests the anomalous result that petitioners with new claims based on newly obtained evidence can obtain fed

eral habeas relief if they can show cause and prejudice for their default but petitioners with newly obtained evidence supporting a claim adj u dicated onthe merits in state cou r t

——————

6 See, e.g
. , id

. , at 3 7

– 38 (s t a temen t byc o u n s el forth e r e spon den t warden that Virginia law b a rs all su c c e ssiv eh abeas ap plic ation s , ev e n in cases wherethe petitioner has new e v idence).11 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g cannot obtain federal habeas relief if theycannot firs t satisfy §2254(d)(1) without the new evidence. That th e majority’s i n terpretati on leads to this anomaly is good reason to c o nclude that its interpretation is wrong. Se e Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes , 504 U. S. 1, 7–8 (19 92) (“[I]t is

. . . irrational to distinguish between failingto properl y assert a federal claimin state court and failing in stat e court to pro p erly develop such a claim”). The majority respond s to this anomaly by suggestin g that my hypothetical petitioner “may well [have] a ne w claim.” 7 An te , at 14, n. 10. This suggestion is puzzling. New evidence does not usually gi ve rise to a new claim; it merely provides additional pr oof of a claim already adjudi

cated on the merits. 8 The majority presumably means to suggest that the p e titioner might be ab le to obtain federal-court review of his ne w evidence if he can show cause and prejudice for his failu re to present the “new” claim to a state court. In that scenario, however, the federal court would rev i ew the purportedly “n ew” claim de
novo
. The majority’s a p proach th us threatens to replace deferential review of new evidence under §22 54(d)(1) with de novoreview of new evidence in the form of “new” claims. 9Because it is unlikely that Congre ss intended de novore view—the result sugg ested by t h e majority’s opinion—itmust hav e intended for district courts t o consider newly discovered evidence in co nducting the §2254(d)(1) analysis.

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7 The major i ty dec lines, howev e r , to pr ov ide anyg u idanc eto the lower courts on ho w to distinguis h cla i ms adjudic a ted on the m e r i ts fr om new cla i m s
.

8 Even if it can fairly be argued th at myhy pothetic al pet i tionerhas a new claim, the majority fa il s to ex plain h o w a diligent petitioner wit h new evidencesupporting an existi ng clai m ca n pres ent his new e vi

dence to a fede ral court.

9 In this v e i n , i tis the major i ty ’ s appr oac h that “would not take ser i

ously AEDPA’s requirement that fede ra l court s defert os t a t e-cour t dec i sion s. ” An te , at 10, n

. 3.12 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g The majority’s reading of §2254(d)(1) appears ultimately to rest on its understanding that state courts must have the first opportunity to adju dicate habeas petitioners ’ claims. S ee ante , at 9–10 (“Itwould be contrary to [AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement] to allow a petitioner to overcome a nadverse state-co urt decision with new evi

dence introduced in a federal habeas court a n d reviewe d by that cou rt in the first instanc e effectively de novo ”). 10 J USTICE B RE YE Rtak e s the same position. S ee ante , at 2 (opinion concurring i npart an d dissenting in part) (AEDPA is designed “t o give the State a fi rst opportuni t y to consider most matters”). I fully agree that habea s petitioners must attempt to pr esent evidence to state courts in the first instance, as does J USTICE ALITO , see ante , at 2. Where I di sagree with the majo rity is in m y understanding that §2254(e)(2) already acco mplishes th is result. By reading §2254(d)(1) to do the work o f §2254(e)(2), the majority gives §2254(e)(2) an unnaturally cramped reading. As a result, t h e majorityeither has foreclosed habeas relief for diligent petitioners who, through no fault of their own, were unable to present exculpatoryevidence to the state court thatadjudicate d their claims or has created a new set of procedural com

plexities for the lower courts to navigate to ensure the availability of the Great Writ for diligent petitioners. 3 These considerations lead me to agree with th e courts o f appeals that have concluded that a federal c o urt should assess the reasonableness of a st ate court’s application of clearly established fed e ral law under §2254(d)(1) in ligh t of evidence properly admitted in a federal evidentiary hearing. There is noth ing “stran g e” about this approach.

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10 Un dermyr e a d in gof §2254( d)(1), of c o u r s e , th e distr i c t c o u r t wou l d review prope r ly admitte d new evidenceth rough the def e rentia l lens of §225 4(d)(1), n o t de no vo
.13 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g Ante , at 10

. Under § 2254(d)(1), federal courts routinely engage in analysis that the state court itself might neve r have conducted or did not conduct. For exam ple, when a state court summarily denies a claim without explanation, as the Calif ornia Supr eme Court did here, di strict court s must deny habeas relief pursuantto §2254(d)(1) so long as “there is any reasonable argument” supportin gthe denial of the petitioner’s clai m. Harrin g ton , 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16). We likewis e ask whether astate-court decision un reasonably applied clearly established federal law when the state court issued a reasoned decision but failed to cit e federal law altogethe r
. See Ear l yv. Pa cker , 537 U. S. 3, 8 (2002) (p er curiam)

. Determining whether a state court could reasonably hav e denied a petitioner relief in light of newly disco v ered evide n ce is not so different than determining wh ether there is any reasonable bas is for a state court’s unre a soned decision. Admittedly, the text of §2254(d)(1), standing alone, does not compel either reading of that provision. But constru

ing §2254(d)(1) to permit consideration of evidence prop

erly introd u ced in federal cou rt best accords with the te xt of §2254(d)(2) and AEDPA’s stru cture as awhole. By interpreting §2254(d)(1) to prevent nondiligentpetition ers from gaming the system—the very purpose of §2254(e)(2)

—the majority potentia lly has put habeas relief out of reach for dili gentpetiti oners with meritorious claims based on new evidence. C The majorit yclaims th at its holding is “consi s tent” wi th our case law. Ante , at 10. Quite the opposite is true: Our cases reflec t our previous unders t anding that evidence properly admitted pursuant to §2254(e)(2) is relevant to the §2254(d)(1) analysis. In Landrigan , J USTIC E T HOMAS , the author of today’s opinion, confirmed this understanding of the interplay14 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g between §§2254(d)(1) and 2254(e)(2). As noted above, we admonished distric tc o urts to co nsider whether a peti

tioner’s allegations, if proved true , would satisfy §2254(d) in determining whether to gr ant a hearing. After high

lighting the deference owed to state courts under §§2254(d) a n d 2254(e)(1), we stated: “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal co urt mustco nsider whet her such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s fac

tual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal h abeas relief

. Because the defer

ential stan dards prescribed by §2 254 control whether to granthabeas relief, a federal court mustta ke into account tho s e standards in deciding whether an evi

dentiary he aring is appropriate.” 550 U. S., a t474 (ci

tation omitted). By instructing district cou rts to consider th e §2254(d) standards i ndeciding whether to grant a hea r ing, we mu st have understood that the evid ence admitted at a hearing could be considered in the §2254(d)(1) analys is. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae9 (“The whole point of Landrigan ’s admonition that the court must decide whet her to hold a hearing with an eye on §2254(d)(1) is that some proffers of evidence will not justify fede ral fact-finding in view of §2254(d)(1), but tha t other proffers of proof will”). 11 In Michael Willi am s , the warden argued that §2254(e)(2) bars an evidentiary hearing whenever a peti

tioner was unable to develop the factual record in state court, “whe ther or notthrough his own faultor neglect. ”

——————

11 The majority overlooks this aspect of Landriga n
. It quo t es Landri

gan ’ s observ ation that“if the r e c o r dr e futes the app lic ant’ s fac t ua l allegation s or otherwise pr ec lu des h abeas r e lief, a distr i c tc o u r t is n o t r e qu ir ed to h o ld anev iden tiar yh e ar in g , ” 55 0 U. S., a t47 4, bu t th at statement has no bearing on the ques tion dec i ded bythe Cour t today

.15 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g 529 U. S., at 430. Un der the wa rden’s argu ment, a peti

tioner who did not develop the rec o rd in state court, wha t

ever the reason, would be barred from presenti ng evidence to the fed e ral court. In reject ing that a r gument, we observed: “A prisoner who developed his claim in state court and can prove t h e state court’s decision was ‘contrar yto, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly es

tablished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ is notbarred from obtain

ing relief b y§2254(d)(1). If the opening clause of §2254(e)(2) covers a request for a nevidentia r y hear

ing on a claim which was pursue d with diligence but remained undeveloped in state co urt because, for in

stance, the prosecution concealed the facts, a prisoner lacking clear andcon vincing evi d ence of innocence could be barred from ahearing on the claim even if he could satisfy §2254(d) .” Id. , at 43 4 (citation omitted; emphasis added). A petitioner in the latt er situation would almost certainly be unable to “satisfy §2254(d)” without introducing the concealed facts in fede ral court. T h is passage thus reflect s our understanding th at, in some circumstances, a peti

tioner might need an e videntiary hearing in federal court to prove the facts necessary to satisfy §2254( d). To avoid foreclosing habeas relief for suchpetitioners, we concluded that §2254(e)(2) could not bear the warden’s “harsh read

ing,” which essentially would have held petitioners strictl y at fault for their inab ility to develop the fa cts in state court. Ibid. The majority today gives an eq ually “harsh reading” to §2254(d)(1) to achieve the result we rejected in Michael Wil liams

. 12

——————

12 The major i tyc l aims th at Michael W illia ms su ppor t s it s r e adin gof §2254(d)(1). With respect to one cl aim asserted by the petitioner, we observ ed that “[t]he Cour t of Appeal s r ejec t ed this c l ai m on the mer i ts16 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g None of the other cases cited by the majorit ysupport s its result. In Williamsv. Taylor , 529 U. S. 362 (2000) (Terry Wil liams) , we interpreted §2254(d)(1) to ask whether th e state-court deci sion “identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that p r inciple to the facts of th e prisoner’s case.” Id. , at 413. However, we ha d no reason to decide whether the §2254(d)(1) inquiry was limited to the state-court recor d , as the Dist rict Cour t did not hold an evidentiary hearing in that case. See id. , a t372. In Hollandv. J a ckson , we sta t ed that “we have made clear that whether a state court’s decision was unreason able must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it.” 542 U. S., at 652. In the next sentence, how

ever, we ob served that the eviden ce at issue “could have been the subject of an evidentiary hearing by the District Court, but only if resp ondent was not at faul t in failing to develop that evidence in state court.” Id. , at 652–653. We proceeded to find that the evidence was not properly ad

mitted under §2254(e)( 2 ) beforeco ncluding th at the Court of Appeals had erred i nits §2254(d)(1) analysis. Id. , at 653; see als o Bradsh a w v. Ri chey , 546 U. S. 74, 79 (2005) (per cu riam )

. In sum, our cases reflect our recog n ition that it is some

times appropriate to considerne w evidence in decidin g whether a petitioner can satisfy §2254(d)(1). In readin g our precedent to requir e the opposite conclusion, the ma

jority disre g ards the c o ncerns that motivatedour decision in MichaelWilliam s : Some petitioners, evenif diligent,

—————— u n d er §2254(d)(1), so it is un n e c e ssar yto r e ac h th e questionwh eth e r §225 4(e)(2) w o u l d per m it ah e ar in gonth e c l aim.” 5 2 9U. S., at4 4 4

. That st ateme n t mer e lyr e flec ts the fac tt h at the Cour t of Appeal s ha d
r ejec t ed th at c l aim u n d er§2254(d)( 1 ) with ou t c o n s ider in gwh eth e rth e petitioner was entitled to a hear ing because the pe ti tioner had not
r e qu ested a h e ar in g onth at c l aim. See Williams v. T a

ylor , 189 F. 3d 421, 42 5, 428

– 429 (C A4 19 99 ).17 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g may be unable to develop the factual record in state court through no fault of their own. We should not interpre t §2254(d)(1) to foreclose these diligent petitioners from accessing the Great Writ when the state court will not consider the new evid ence and could not rea s onably have reached the same conclusion with the new evidence before it. II I also disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Pi nholster had satisfied §2254(d)(1) on the basis of the state-court record. 13 A The majority omits cr itical details relating t o the per

formance of Pinholster’s trial c o unsel, the mitigating evidence they failed todiscover, and the history of these proceedings. I therefore highlight several aspects of the facts and history of this case.

——————

13 I agr ee with the major i tyt h at the st ate- c o ur t r e c o r di nthis c a se c o nsists of “th e ‘ a lleg a tions of [the] habea s c o r p us petiti on .
. . and .

. . a n y m a tt er of record pert a i ning t ot h e ca se.’ ” Ante , at 16, n

. 12 (qu o t

ing In re Ho c h b erg , 2 Cal. 3d 87 0, 874, n
. 2, 471 P. 2d 1, 3– 4, n

. 2 (197 0); some i n ter n al qu otat ionmar k s omi tted).

The major i tydoes not dec i de whic h of the two state-court decisions should be revi ewed. See ante , at 15, n. 1 1

. One amicusar gu es th at Pinholster must prove that bothst ate

- c o u r t dec i sion s inv o lv ed an unreasonable applica t ion of law. S ee Brie f for Criminal Justice Legal Founda t ion a s Am icus Curi ae2 6

. T h i s a r g u m e n ti s b a s e do n amicus ’ unders t a n dingtha t the Ca liforniaS u preme Court rejected the second petitionas su c c e ssiv e an d, alter n ativ ely, on the merits. The State h a s not ar g u ed, howev e r, that the sec o nd ruling rests on a procedural ground. See ante , at 6, n

. 2. Wh ena sta t e c o ur t denies two petitions o n the mer i ts an d the differ e nc e between the petit i ons i s that the sec o nd petition contai ns additional evidencesupp or tingthe petitioner ’ s c l aim, I see no reaso nwhy the petitioner musti n dependentlyshow that the first decision was unreasonable.18 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g 1 After the j u ry return ed a guilt yverdic t, th e court in

structed th e jury to return si x days later for the penalty phase. Th is prompted discussion at sideb a r regardin g whether th e State had provided notice of its intent to offer aggra v atingevidence. Pinholster’s court-appo inted attor

ney, Wilbur Dettmar, argued th at the State should be precluded from offerin gaggravating evidence: “I am not p r esently pr epared to offer anythin g by way of mitigation. If I was going to pro c eed on mitigation, the people would have the right to rebuttal with or without not i ce. “I tookthe position, s i nce the peo p le had notgiven notice, I had not pr epa red any ev i dence by wa y of miti

gation

. I would submit it on that basis.” 52 Re

porter’s Tr. 7250 (hereinafter Tr.) (emphasis a dded). Undoubtedly anticipating that counsel migh t need addi

tional time to prepare an adequate mitigation defense, th e court aske d Dettma rwhethe r a continuance would be helpful in the event it ruled against him. He declined the offer on the spot, stati n g: “I thin k we would probably sti l l go forwar d on Monday. Clearly th e one person that come s to mind is the defendant’s mother. Ho w muchbeyond tha t I don’t know. I don’t think the p a [ss]age of time would make a great deal of difference.” Id. , at 7257– 7258. After hearing testimony, the court de nied Pinholster’s motion to preclude aggravating evidence. At the penalty phase, defenseco unsel call e donly on e witness: Pinholster’s mother, Burnice Brashear. Brashear testified that Pinholster “never really wantedfor anythin g at home too much” and “had everything normally materi

alwise that most people have.” Id. , at 7395. She said that Pinholster was “differ e nt” from his siblings, whom she characteriz e d as “basically very good childr e n.” Id. , at 7401–7402. Pinholster, she said, h a d a “friendly” relation

-19 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g ship with his stepfather, althou gh his stepfather “some

times would lose his temper” wit hPinholster, who “hada mind of his own.” Id. , at 7392–7393; see als o id. , at 729 3 (stating th at his stepfather was “at times” “abusive or near abusive”). Brashear provided bri e f testimon y regarding Pinhol

ster’s childhood. She described two car ac cidents—one when she r an over hi m in the driveway and one when he went throu gh the win d shield. Id. , at 7389–7391. Sh e stated that he started failing school in the first grade and that the school eventu ally “sent him to [an] educationally handicapped class.” Id

. , at 7393 –7394. When Pinholster was 10, a psychologist recommended placing him in a mental institution, but she “didn’t think he was that fa r gone.” Id. , at 7395. A few years later, sh e testified, h e spent six months in a state hospital for emotionally handi

capped chil dren. Id. , a t7402. Accordin g to Brashear, Pinholster had suffered from epilepsy since age 18, when he was beaten in jail. Id. , at 7397. She said that her family doctor, Dr. Dubin, had given him medication to tr eat the epilepsy. Ibid. Brashear al so suggested that Pinh olster did n o t have long to live, stating that h e had “a chip in his head floating around” an d that “the ydon’t thin k—he won’t be here very much longer anywa y.” 14 Ibid. In closing a r gument, th e prosecutor ridiculed Brashear’s testimony. See 53 id. , at 7442 (“She said his stepfather disciplined him. So what? I am sure you have all disci

plined your children. I was disciplined myself ”); ibid. (“He
was run o v er by acar when he was three years old. That’s very unfortunate. There is n o evidence of an y brain dam

age. A lot of children get dropped , fall from their cribs or

——————

14 The judgeinstructed the jury todisregard this testi m ony upon motion bythe pr osec utor , b u t the pr osecutor then di sc u ssed th e tes t i

mony in her cl os ing a r gume nt. S ee inf ra , at 33 –3 4.20 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g whatever”); id. , at 744 4–7445 (“I s ubmit to you that if this defendant truly had epilepsy, .

. . adoctor would have been brought in to tell you that. Medic a l records, something”)

. The prosecutor also highlighted Brashear’s testimony about Pinholster’s stable home environment, arguing, “He came from a good home. You h e ard that he was not a deprived ch ild. Had many things going for him, probably more than many children.” Id. , at 7442. Notwithsta nding the meager mit i gation cas epresented by Pinholster’s counsel, it took the jury t w o da ys to reach a decision to sentence Pinholster to death. His counsel later moved to modify the sentence to life imprisonment. In denying the motion, th e trial judge stated, “The evidence which the defense offered co ncerning the defendant’s extenuation was merely some test imony from his mother that was not persuasiv e. His mot h er did not, in the cour t’s opinion, present any evidence whi c h the court would find to be a moral justification orextenuation for his conduct. No witness supplied such evidence.” 54 id. , at 7514. 2 After his c o nviction and sentence were aff i rmed on appeal, Pinholster fileda habeas petition in the California Supreme Court alleging, among other things, that his counsel had “unreaso nably failed to investi g ate, prepa r e and present available mitigating evidence during penalty phase.” Record ER–10 3. Pinholster’s state-court petition in cluded 121 exhibits. In a series of decla r ations, his trial attorney Ha rry Brainard (who had by then been disbarred) confirmed what Dett mar had forthrightl ytold the trial cou rt: Brainard a n d Dettma rneither expected nor prepared to present mitigation evidence. 15S e e id. , at ER–333 (“Mr.

——————

15 Bythe time of Pinholster ’ s st ate-c o ur t habeas peti tio n , Dettmar was deceas ed.21 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g Dettmar an d I did not prepare a case in mitigation. We felt there would be no penalty phase hearing inasmuch as we did not receive written noti ce of evidencein aggrava

tion pursuant to Penal Code §190.3”). Brain a rd further confirmed what was apparent f r om the mit i gation cas e they eventu ally put on: They cond ucted vir t u a lly no miti

gation investigation. See id. , at ER–182 (“I have no recol

lection of Mr. Dettma rhaving secured or reviewed anyof Scott ’ s medical records, nor did I see any of Scott’s medica l records. S ofar as I recollect, neither Mr. Dettmar no r myself interviewed any of Sco tt’s previous medical provid

ers”); id. , at ER–183 (“I do not recall interviewing or at

tempting to interview Scott ’ s family members or any other persons reg a rding pen a lty phase testimony, except M r s. Brashears [s i c ]

”); ibid. (“I have no recollectionof seeing o r attemptingto secure Scott ’ s school records, juvenile re

cords, medical records, or records of prior placements”); ibid. (“I have no recollection of int e rviewing or attemptin g to interview Scott ’ s former sc hool teachers, counselors, or juvenile officers”). 16 Statements by relatives (none of whom trial co unsel had attempted t o interview rega rding Pinholster’s background) and documentary evid ence revealed that th e picture of Pinholster’s family life painted by his mother at trial was false. Pinh olster was “raised in chaos and p o verty.” Id. , at ER–312. A relative remembered seeing the children mix togeth er flour an d wa ter in an attemptto getsome thing to eat. Pinholster’s stepfather beat him s e veral times a we ek, includi n g atleast once with a two-by- f our board. “There was so much violence in [the] home” tha t Pinholster’s brother “dr e aded coming home each day. ” Id. , at ER–313. Pinholster’s half sister was removed from the home as a r e sult of a beating by his stepfather.

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16 Counsel’s billi ng re cords, which we rebefore the California Supreme Courta s pa rtof t h e t r ia l rec o rd, co nfirm e dBra i na rd’s re collect ion.22 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g Documenta r y evidenc e showed, directly c o ntrary to Brashear’s trial testim ony, that Pinholster’s siblings had very troubled pasts. Pinholster’s elder brot her was a r rested for a r med burglary, robbery, and forcible rape of a 14-year-old with a deadly weapon. While in custody, he was diagnosed as “catatonic-lik e” and “acutely psychotic , probably s u ffering some ty pe of schizophrenia.” Id. , at ER–219, ER–224. He later committed suicide. 17 Pinhol

ster’s half s i ster, a recovering alcoholic, had been made a ward of th e juvenile court for p r ostitution and forcible sexual battery on a 14-year-old. Pinholster’s petition and exhibits described a long his

tory of emotional distu rbance and neurologic al problems. A former schoolteacherstated tha t , as a child, Pinholster “seemed in capable of relating either to his peers or to adults,” that “[i]t was even hard to maintaineye contact with him,” and that“[ h]is hypera ctivitywas so extrem e that [she] formed the opinion it p r obably had an organic base.” Id

. , at ER–231. School r e cords revealed that h e “talk[ed] to self con t inuously,” had “many grimaces,” fought in his sleep, andcould “control self for only 1 hour per day. ” Id. , at ER–2 30, ER–233

. He “show[ed] progres

sive deterioration each seme ster si nce Kindergarten.” Id. , at ER–230. School officials recommended placement in a school for emotionally handicapped students and referra l to a neurologist. At a g e nine, h ehad an ab normal EEG, revealing “an organic basis for his behavior.” Id. , atER– 157, ER–234. Just months before the homicides, a doctor recommended placement in the Hope Psyc hiatric Insti

tute, but th is did not occur. This and o t her eviden ce attachedto the pet i tion was

——————

17 Accordin g to Pinhols ter’s ha lf s i ster, “The dea t h of ourb r other Al

v i n was a sev e r eemotional blow to me an d to Sc ott. I believ e d Sc ott’ s subst a n c e abu se (h er oin) ar ose followin gan d as a resu lt of Alv i n ’ s death.” Record ER–3 14.23 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g summarized in a declaration by Dr. George Woods. Dr. Woods opin ed that Pinholster “suffer[ed] from severe and long standing seizure disorders,” id. , at ER– 156, that his childhood h e ad traumas “may have beenthe precipitating factors for [ h is] seizure disorder,” id. , at ER–1 57, and that he sufferedfrom bipolar mooddisorder. He pointed to trial testimony that i m mediat ely before the burglary on the night o f the homicides, Pinholster announced that h e
“ ‘ha[d] a m e ssage from God’ ”—which Dr. Woods bel i e ved to reflect “ [ a]uditory h a llucinations” and “sev ere psycho

sis.” Id. , at ER–169. He concluded that at the time of the homicides Pinholster “was su ffering from b i polar mood disorder with psychoti c ideation and was suffering a com

plex partial seizure.” Id. , at ER–170. He also observe d that Pinholster’s “grossly dy sfunctional family, the abuse he received as a child, his history of suffering from sub

stantial seizure and mood di sorders, his frequently un

treated psychiatric an d psychological disabilities and his educational handicaps were relevant circumstances which would extenuate the gravity of th e crime.” Id. , at ER–1 71. On the basis of Pinh ol ster’s submission, the California Supreme C o urt denied Pinholster’s ineffective-assistance

of-counsel c l aim. Pinholster then filed a habeas petition in Federal Dis

trict Cour t. He included an ad ditional exhibit: a declara

tion by Dr. John Stalberg, a psychiatrist who had hastily examined Pinholster and produced a two-page report in the middle of the origi nal trial. 18 After reviewing the new material collected by Pinholster ’ s habeas counsel, D r
. Stalberg stated that the av ailable evidenceshowed a

——————

18 Couns el ha d a rra nged fo r D r . S t a lb e rg to exa m ine Pinhols ter in the middle of his original trial. The on ly documents they provided to hi m were police re port s rela t i ng t ot h e ca s ea n d a1 9 7 8prob a t ion report

. I n a two-pag er e por tth at foc u sed pr imar ilyonPin h o lster ’ s men t al s t ate a t the time of t h e offenses, Dr . Stalber gc o nc luded tha tPinholsterha d

“ p s y chopa t hic pers ona lit y t r a i t s
. ” Id. , at E R–1 87.24 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g familialhis t ory of “severe psychiatric disorders,” “a history of seizure disorders of unk nown e t iology,” “repeated head traumas,” “an abnormal EEG,” a n d “evidence of m e ntal disturbance during M r . Pinholster’s childhood and som e degree of b r ain damage.” Id. , at ER–493. He als o opined that “there [was] voluminous mit i gating evidence which includes a childhood of physical abuse, emotional neglec t, and a family history of mental illn ess and criminal behav ior.” Id. , at ER–494. The District Court stayed the federal proceedings while Pinholster sought stat e-court re view of claims the Distric t Court deemed unexhausted. Pinholster’s s e cond habeas submissionto the California Supreme Court include d Stalberg’s declaration. T hat court summarily denied Pinholster’s petition on the merits. Pinholster returned to Fede ral Di strict Courtand filed an amended petition. After an e videntiary hearing, the District Court conclu ded t hat Pinholster had demon

strated defi cient perfor mance and prejudice u n der Strick

land

. 19The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. 590 F. 3d 651. B As the majority notes, Pinholster’s claim arises under Stri cklandv. Wa shing t on
. “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [un d er Stri ckl a nd] must be whether co unsel’s conduct so u n dermined the prop er functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied onas having produced a just result.” 466 U. S.,

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19 The Dis t rictCourtb a s ed its decis i onon the evidence addu ced at an ev iden tiar yhear in g
. Th e Distr i c tCou r t did n o t apply28 U. S. C. §225 4(d) bec a u s e it th ou gh t, er r o n eously, that the Calif ornia Supreme Cour t had not adjudic a ted Pinholster ’ s c l aim on the m e r i ts. App. to Pet

. for Cert

. 2 5 7

. For t h e rea s ons I dis c us s , however, t h e Dis t rict Cou r t c o u l d hav ec o nc lu ded th at Pin h o lste rh a d satisfied§2254(d)( 1 ) on the basi s of the state-court record alone.25 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g at 686. To satisfy this benchmark, a defendant must show both that “counsel’s performance was deficient” and tha t “the deficient performance prejudiced the defe nse.” Id. , at 687. When §225 4(d)(1) applies, the question is whether “ ‘fair

minded jur i sts could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Ha rrin g to n , 562 U. S., at ___ (sli p op., at 11) (quoting Yarboroughv. Alvarado , 5 41 U. S. 652, 664 (2004)). When th e state cou rt rejected a Stricklan d claim on th e pleadin g s assuming the allegations to b e true, as here, see ante , at 16, n. 12, the federal court must ask whether “there is any reasonable argum e nt” support

ing the state court’s conclusion that the petitioner’s alleg a tions did not state a claim, Harri ngton , 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16). This standard is “difficult,” but not im

possible, “tomeet.” Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 12). This case is one in which fairminded jurists co uld not disagree that the state court erred. C Under Strickland , “the defendant must show that coun

sel’s representation fell belo w a nobjective standard of reasonableness,” mea s ured according to “prevailing pro

fessional norms.” 466 U. S., at 688. We “ind ulge a strong presumption that cou n sel’s conduct falls wi thin the wi de range of reasonable professional a ssistance.” Id. , at 689. When §2254(d) applies, federal-court review is “ ‘doubly’ ” deferential. Har r ing t o n , 562 U. S., at ___ (sl i p op., at 16) (quoting Knowlesv. Mi rzayance , 556 U. S. __ _, ___ (2009) (slip op., at11)). Inthe present AEDPA po sture, “[t]he question is whether th ere is any reasonable a r gument th at counsel satisfied Strick land’s deferential standard.” Ha r rington , 562 U. S., at ___ ( s lip op., at 16). Here, there is
none. The majority surmises that counsel decided on a strat

egy “to get the prosecution’s aggravation wi tnesses ex

-26 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g cluded for lack of notic e , and if that failed, to put on Pin

holster’s mother.” An te , at 19. This is the sort of “ ‘ post hocrationalization’ for counsel’s decision making th at contradicts the available evidence of counsel’s actions” that courts cannot indulge. H a rring t o n , 562 U. S., at _

__ (slip op., at20) (quotin g Wig g insv. Smith , 539 U. S. 510, 526–527 (2003)). The majority’s e x planation for counsel’s conduct con tradicts the best available evidence of counsel’ s actions: Dettmar’s fra n k, contem poraneous statement to the trial ju dge that he “had not prepared an y evidence by way of mitigation.” 52 Tr. 7250. The majority’s conjecture that couns el had in fact prepa r ed a mitigation defense, based primarily on isolated entries in coun sel’s billing records, req u ires it to assume that Dettma r was lying t o the trial judge. 20 In any even t, even if Pinholster’s counsel had a strategi c reason for their actions, that would not automatically render their actions reasonable. For example, had counsel decided the i r best opti on was to move to ex clude the a g grava t ing e vidence, it would have been unreasonable to forgo a mitigation investigation on the hope that the mo

tion would be grante d

. With a client’s life at stake, it would “flou[t] prudence, ” Rompillav. Bea r d , 545 U. S. 374,

——————

20 The major i tymisle a dinglycites en tries sh owing that co unsel were pr epar in gBrash e ar ’ s pen a ltyph ase tes t imon y afterc o uns el lea r ned that the St at e intendedto present aggravation evidence. T h e cited entries predating that eve n t show only th at counsel conducted abou t one day’s worth of investigation—cons isting of talking to Brashear and res e a rchinge p ileps y—t w o m o nt hs b e fore the penalty phase. See 3 Cler k’ s Tr . 79 8 (1.5-h ou rph on e c a ll to Br a s h e aronJan

. 13); id. , a t86 4, 869 ( 3 -h ou rmeetin gwithBr ash e arr e g a rdin g“c h ildh ood pr oblem s ” o n Feb. 23); id. , a t869 ( 3 .5 h o u r s for“[r] esear c hr e ; epilepsyan d c o n f

. wit h nurse” on Feb. 25). There is no evidence in t h e record s t h a tcouns el
ac tuallyplanned to pr esent mitig a tingevidence. Indeed , their complete failure to follow up o nany of the info rmation they learned in the i r minimal inv e stig at ion only c o nfir ms that theywer enot planningto present mitigating evidence

. See infra , at 29–3 1.27 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g 389 (2005), for an attorney to rely on the possibility that the court might precl u de aggra v ating evidence pursua nt to a “legal technicality” without an y backup plan in place in case the court denied the motion, ante , at 19. No rea

sonable att o rney would pursue such a risky s trategy. I do not understand the majority to sug g est otherwise. Instead, I understand the majority’s conclu sion that counsel’s actions were reasonable to rest on its belief tha t they did ha ve a backu p plan: a fa mily-sympa thy defense. In reaching this con c lusion, the majoritycommits the same Stri cklanderr o r that we correc t ed, applyi ng §2254(d)(1), in Wiggin s :It holds a purportedly “tactic a l judgment” to be reasonable without assessing “the ade

quacy of the investigatio[n] su pporting [that] judgmen[t],” 539 U. S., at 521. As we stated in Stri ckland: “[S]t r ategicchoices made after thorough investigation of law and facts releva nt to plausible options are vir

tually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made af

ter less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent t hat reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make rea s onable investigations or to make a reasonable decis i on that makes particular investigations u nnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particu lar d e cision not to inves

tigate must be directly assess ed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” 466 U. S., at 690– 691. We have repeatedly applied this principle since Stri ck

land

. See Searsv. Up t o n , 561 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (per curiam)(slip op., at 9); Porterv. McCollum , 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (per cu riam)(slip op., at 10); Wig g in s , 539 U. S.,28 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g at 527; Terry Williams , 529 U. S., at 396. 21 As these cases make clear, the prevailing professional norms at t h e time of Pinholster’s trial requi red his atto r neys to “co nduct a th orough investigation of the defen

dant’s ba ckground,” ibi d

. (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal J u stice 4–4.1 , commentary, p. 4–55 (2d ed. 198 0) (hereinafter ABA Stan dards)), or “to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unneces

sary,” St r i ckla nd , 466 U. S., at 691. 22“In j u dging th e defense’s investigation, as in applying S t rick landgener ally, hindsight is disco unted by pe gging a d equacy to ‘cou n sel’s perspective at the time’ inv e stigative decisions a r e made, and by giving a ‘heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’ ” Rompilla , 545 U. S., at 381 (quot

ing Strickla nd , 466 U. S., at 689, 6 91; citation omitted). In some cases, “reasonably diligent counsel may dra wa line when they have good reason to thi n kfurther investigation would be a waste.” Rompilla , 545 U. S., at 3 83; see, e.g. , Bobbyv. Van H ook , 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2009 ) (per cu ria m ) (slip op., at 8); Bur gerv. Kemp , 483 U. S. 7 76, 794–795 (1987). In other cases, however, Stri cklandrequires fur

ther investigation.

——————

21 I do not doub tthatadec i sio nto pr esenta family -sy m p a t h ymitig a tion defense migh t be c o n s istent“w i t h the standard of professional
com p et ence in ca pit a l ca s e s t h a tpr evailedin Los Angeles in 1 9 8 4” in
some c a se s. Ante , a t2 4

. M yp o i n ti s t h a te v e ni f c o u n s e lm a d ea strategic deci sion to proceed with su c ha defen s e, th at dec i sionwa s unreasonable because it w a s based on an unreasonably incomplete investigation.

22 See also 1 ABA Stan d a r d s 4–4.1, c o mme n t ar y , at 4–55 (“In for m a tion concer ning the defen d a n t’s ba ckground, educati o n, employment
r e c o r d , men t al an d emotion a l st abi lit y, family relation ships, and the like, will be re levant, as will mitiga ting circumstances surrounding the commiss ion of the offense it self”). As we recognized in Strick land , th e ABA Standar d s, thoughnot dispo s it iv e, “are g u ides to determinin g wh at is r e aso n able.” 46 6 U

. S., at 688; se e also Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U. S. 510, 524 (200 3).29 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g Wig g insis illustrative of the competence we have re

quired of c o unsel in a capital cas e
. There, counsel’s in

vestigation was limited to thre e sources: psychological testing, a p r esentencing repo rt, an d Departme n t of Social Services re cords. 539 U. S., at 523–524. The records revealed that the petitioner’s mother was an alcoholic, that he dis p layed emotional diffic u lties infos t er care, that he was frequently absent from school, andthat on one occasion, hi s mother le ft him alon e for days without food. Id. , at 525. In thes e circumstan ces, we concluded, “any reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing these leads was necessary to m a king an in

formed choice among possible d e fenses.” Ib id

. Accord

ingly, we h e ld, the state court’s a ssumption that counsel’s investigation was adeq uate was a nunreasonable applica

tion of Strickland

. 539 U. S., at 52 8. 23 This case is remarkab ly similar to Wi ggins

. A s t h e majority reads the rec o rd, counsel’s mitigati on investiga

tion consisted of talkin g to Pinholster’s mothe r , consulting with Dr. St alberg, and researching epilepsy. 24 Ante , at 20

. What little information counsel gleaned from this “rudi

mentary” i nvestigation, Wiggin s , 539 U. S., at 524, would have led an y reasonable attorney “to investiga t e further,” id. , at 527. Counsel learned from Pinholster’s mother that he attended a class for educationally handicapped chil

dren, that apsychologist had recom m ended placing him i n a mental institution, and that h espent time in a state

——————

23 As the major i tynotes, see ante , a t2 4–25 , Wiggins ’ tr ia l couns el acknowledgedthat the investigat ion he conducted was inconsiste nt withstan d a r dpr ac tic einM a r y lan d

. See 539 U. S., at 524. We in de

pendently concluded, howe ver, that the investigation “w as alsounrea son able inlig h tof wh at c o un sel ac tu a lly discovered in the .

. . record s.” Id. , at 525 (emph a sis ad ded).

24 The major i tyalso po sit s tha tBr ainar dlik elyspent time pr epar ing Pinhols t e r’s brot her Terry. However, Te rry av er red in adecla r a t ion that Pinholste r ’ s attor n ey s “ n ev erasked [him] anyquesti ons r e latingto Sc ott’ s bac kgr o u n dor [th e ir] familyh i stor y . ” Rec o r dER–313.30 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g hospital for emotionally handic apped children. They kne w that Pinholster had been diagnosed with epilepsy. “[A]ny reas onably com p etent attorney would have real

ized that pursuing” th e leads suggested by this informa

tion “was necessary to maki ng an informed choice amon g possible def e nses.” Id. , at 525; see also Penryv. Lynaugh , 492 U. S. 302, 319 (19 89) (“[E]vidence aboutthe defen

dant’s background and character i s relevant b e cause of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants wh o commit cri minal acts that are a t tributable to a disadvan

taged background, or to emotion a l and men t al problem s , may be les s culpable than defendants who have no su ch excuse” (int ernal quotation marks omitted)). Yet counsel made no ef fort to obtain the rea d ily available evidenc e suggested by the information they learned, such as Pin

holster’s schooling or medical records, or to cont act Pinholster’s school authorities

. They did not contact Dr

. Dubin or the many other he alth-care providers who had treated Pin h olster. Pu t simply, co unsel “failed to ac t while potentially powerful mitigating evidence stared them in the face.” Bobby , 558U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (citing Wig g ins , 53 9 U. S., at 5 25). The “impediments” facing counsel, ante , at 2 1 , did no t justify their minimal investigation. It is true that Pinhol

ster was “a n unsympa thetic client.” Ibid. But this fa c t compounds, rather th an excuses, counsel’s deficiency in ignoring th e glaring avenues of investigation that could explain why Pinholster was the way he wa s. See Sears , 561 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (“This evidence might not have made Sears any more likabl e to the jury, but it might well have helped the jury understand Sears, and his hor

rendous acts—especially in light of his purportedly stable upbringing”). Nor ca n Dr. Stal berg’s two-page report, which was based on a very limi t ed record and focused primarily on Pinholst e r’s mental state at the time of the homicides, excuse counsel’s failure to investigate t h e31 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g broader range of potential mitigating circumst ances. “The recordof the actual sentencing proceedings under

scores the unreasonableness of counsel’s conduct by suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly re

sulted from inattention, not re asoned strategicjudgment.” Wig g ins , 53 9 U. S., at 526. Dettmar told the trial judge that he wa s unprepared to present any mitigation evi

dence. The mitigation case that counsel eventually put o n can be desc ribed, at best, as “half h earted.” Ibid. Couns el made no effort to bolster Bras he ar’s self-interested testi

mony with school or medical records, as the prosecutor effectively emphasized in closing argument. And because they did no t pursue ob vious leads, they failed to recogniz e that Brashear’s testimony painting Pinholster as the ba d apple in a n o rmal, nond eprived family was false. In denying Pinholster’s claim, th e California Supreme Court nece ssarily overlook ed Strickland’s clearly estab

lished admonition that “stra te gicchoices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable pr ofessi onal judgments support the limitations.” 466 U. S., at 69 0–691. As i n Wi ggin s , in light of the informationavailable t o Pinholster’s counsel, it is plain tha t“reasonable profession al judgments” could not have supported their woefully inadequate investigation. 25 466 U. S., at 691. Accordingly, the California Supre m e Court could not reasonably hav e concluded th at Pinholster

——————

25 The major i ty c h astise s the Cour t of Appeals for“attr ib utingstr i c t r u les to this C o ur t’ s r e c e nt case l a w.” Ante , at 24. I agr ee th at c o u r ts s h ould notint e rpretou r ca s e s t opres crib es t rictrules rega rdingt h e required scope of mi tigation investigations. See Rompilla v. Beard , 545 U. S. 374, 394(2005) (O’ C on n o r , J., c o n c u r r i n g) (n otin g“ o u rlong stan d

ing ca s e -b y-ca s ea pproa ch to det e rm ining whet her a na t t o rney’s per forma n ce wa s uncons t itutiona lly deficient under Strickland”). The Nint hC i rcuit , howeve r, did no s u ch t h ing. Ita ppr opria t ely gave though tful c o nsider ation to the guid eposts contained in these cases, j u s tas we have previous ly done. S ee, e. g. , Bobby v. Van Hook , 558 U. S. ___, ___ ( 2009) (per c u ri am )(s lip op., at 8).32 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g had failed to allege that his cou n sel’s inves t igation was inadequate under Stri ckland

. D The majority also concludes that the California Supreme Court could reasonably have co ncl u ded that Pinholster did not state a claim of prejudice. Thi s conclusion, in light of the overwhelming miti gating evidence that was not befor e the jury, is wrong. To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there i s a reasonable probability tha t , bu t for counsel’ s unprofessional errors, the resultof the pro

ceeding wo uld have been different.” Id. , at 6 94. When a habeas petitioner challenges a death sentence, “the ques

tion is wh ether there is a rea s onable prob ability that, absent the errors, the sentencer .

. . would ha ve concluded that the b a lance of aggra v ating and mitiga ting circum

stances did not warra n t death.” Id. , at 695. This inquiry requires evaluating “the totality of the available mitiga

tion evidence—both th at addu cedat trial, a n d the evi

dence adduced in the h abeas proceeding—in reweighing it against the evidence in aggra v ation.” Terry Wi lliams , 529 U. S., at 39 7–398. The ultimate question inthis case is whether, ta king into a c count all th e mitigating and a g gr a vating evidence, “there is areason able probab ility that at least one j u ror would have stru ck a different balance.” Wig g ins , 5 39 U. S., a t537; see Cal. Pena l Code An n. §190.4(b) (West 2008) (requiring aunanimous jury verdict to impose a death sentence). 1 Like the majority, I first consider the aggrav ating and mitigating evidence pr esented at trial. B y virtue of it s verdict in the guilt phase, th e jury had alrea dy conclude d that Pinholster had sta bbed and ki lled the victims. As the majority st ates, the j u ry saw P i nholster “r evel” in his history of burglaries during the guilt phase. Ante , at 2 6

.33 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g The jury heard evidence of Pinhols ter’s violent tendencies: He had kidnapped someone witha knife, cut a person in the arm with a razor, and had a history of hitting and kicking peo p le. He threaten ed to kill the State’s lead witness. And he had an extensive disciplina r y record in jail. Brashear offered brief testimony that was apparentl y intended to be mitigat i ng. See supra , a t19 –20; see also ante , at 27–28. 26H o wever, as th e prosecuto rargued, Brashear was not a n e utral witness. See 53 Tr. 7441 (“A mother clearly loves her son, ladies and gentlemen. Clearly not the most unbiased witness in the world”). Notwithsta nding Bras hear’s obvious self- i nterest, counsel failed to offer readilyavailable, objective evidence that would have substantiated and expanded on h e r testimon y. Their failure to do so allowed the prosecutor to belittle he r testimony in closing argument. See supra , a t19–20. An d Brashear’s statement that Pi nholster would not be alive much longer because h ehad “a ch ip in h i s h e ad floatin g around,” 5 2 Tr. 7397, could only have undermined her credibility, as the prosecutor urge d, see 53 id. , at 7447 (“Does she want you to believe sometime bef o re he got to

——————

26 The m a j o rit y m i s c ha ra ct erizes s e vera l a s pect s of Bra s hea r ’s t e s t i

mony
. AlthoughBr asheart e stified th at t h e family“did n’ t hav elots of money , ” she followed up that c o mmentb ystatin gth atPin h o lsterdid not b r ing frien d s to the hous e b e ca us e “it wa s too nice a hous e.” 5 2 Tr. 740 4. Th e pr osec u t ordid n o t u n d er stan d Br ash e arto h av etestifie d that Pinhols te r’s childhood was deprived. See 53 id. , a t74 42 (“You hea r d tha the wa s not adeprived child”). Nor did the California Su

preme Court on direct appeal. Peoplev. Pi nholst e r , 1 Cal

. 4th865, 910, 824 P. 2d 57 1, 587 (1 99 2).

Br asheardid testifytha tPi nholster ’ s step fathertr ied to “disc i pl ine” h i m an d th at h ewas “a t ti m e s” “ abu siv eorn e arabu siv e .” 52 Tr . 739 2 – 739 3. Sh e su g g e sted, h o wev e r , th atPinholsterdeserv ed the “disc i

pline” he receiv ed. See, e. g
. , id. , at 7392 (“ Sc ott was a l way s—h e h a d a mind of his own”). It is u n likely th e jur yun der s tood Br ash e arto be
s u gges t ing th a ther hus b a n d routinely b e a tPinhols ter. The pros ecut or did n o t c o me awaywithth is u n d er stan din g
. See 53 id. , at 744 2.34 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g countryjai lsome doctor looked in a c r ys tal ball and said, ‘In three years you are goin g to die’? That’s ridicu

lous”). The trial judge was thoroughly unimpressed wit h Brashear’s testimony. See supra , at 20. Moreover, the evidencepresented in Pinholst e r’s state

court petiti on revealed that Br ash e ar distorted facts in her testimony in ways tha tundermin e d Pinholster’s mitiga

tion case. As in Sea rs , 561 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3), the prosecutor used Brashear’s testimony that Pinholster came from a good family against him. See 53 Tr. 7442. In sum, counsel presented little in the wayof mitigatin g evidence, and the pro s ecutor effectively use dtheir half

hearted att e mpt to pr esent a mi t i gation case to advocate for the death penalty. The jury nonetheless took two days to reach a decision to impose a death sentence. 2 The additional mitigating evidence presented to th e California Supreme Court “adds up to a mitigation case that bears no relation” to Bras hear’s unsubstantiated testimony. Rompilla , 545 U. S., at 393. Assuming the evidence presented to the California Supreme C o urt to be t r ue, as that court was required t o do, the new mitigatin gevidence presented to that court would have shown tha tPinholster was raised in “chaos and poverty.” Record ER–312. The family home was filled with violence. Pinholster’s siblings had ex t r emely tro u bled pasts. There was substantial eviden ce of “men tal disturbance during M r . Pinholster’s childhood and som e degree of brain damage.” Id. , at ER–493. Dr. Woods concluded that Pinhols ter’s aggressive con

duct resulted from bipolar mood disorder. Just months before the murders, a doctor had recommended that Pin

holster be sent to a psychia tric institute. Dr. Woods also explained that Pinholster’s bizarre behavior before the murders re flected “[a]uditory hal lucinations” and “severe35 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g psychosis.” Id. , at ER–169. The available records con

firmed that Pinholster suffered from longstanding seizure disorders, which may have beencaused by his childhood head injuries. On this rec o rd, I do not see how it can be said that “[ t]he ‘new’ e vidence largely duplicated the mitigation evidence at trial.” An t e , at 29; s ee Arizonav. Fulminante , 499 U. S. 279, 298–2 99 (1991) ( e vidence is not “merely cumulative” if it corroborates other evidence that is “unbelievable” on its own). Brashear’s self-interest e d testimony was not confirmed with objective evidence, as the pro s ecutor high

lighted. The new evidence would have “destroyed the [relatively] benign conception of [P inholster’s] upbringing” presented by his mother. Rompilla , 545 U. S., at 391. The jury heard no testimony at all th at Pinholster likely suf

fered from brain damage or bipolar mood di sorder, and counsel off e red no evidence to help the jury understand the lik ely effect of Pinholster’s head injuries or his bizarre behavior onthe night of the hom i cides. The ju ry heard no testimony recounting the substantial evidence of Pinhol

ster’s lik ely neurological prob lems

. And it he ard no medi

cal evidence that Pinholster suffered from epilepsy. The majority responds that “muc h” of Pinholster’s ne w mitigating evidence “is of questionable mitig a ting value.” Ante , at29. Byprese n ting psy c h i atric testi m ony, it co n tends, “Pin holster would have opened the door to rebutta l by a state expert.” Ibid. But, because the California Supreme Court denied Pinholster’s petition on the plead

ings, it had no reason to know wh at a state e x pert migh t have said. Moreover, given the record evidence, it is rea

sonably probable that at least one juror woul d have cred

ited his expert. In any event, e v en if a re buttal expe rt testified that Pinholster suffered from antisocial personal

ity disorder, this would hardly hav e come as a surprise to the jury. See ante , at 22 (describing Pinholster as a “psy

chotic client whose pe rform ance at trial hardly endeared36 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g him to the jury”). It i s for this r e ason that it was espe

cially important for co unsel to present the available evi

dence to help the jury understand Pinholster. See Sears , 561 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6–7). Had couns el conducted an adequate investigation, the judge and jury would have heard credible evidence show

ing that Pi nholster’s criminal acts and aggressive tenden

cies were “attributable to a disadv antaged ba ckground, or to emotiona l and mental problems .” Pen r y , 492 U. S., a t 319 (internal quotation marks omitted). They would have learned that Pinholster had the “ ‘k ind of troubled histo r y we have declared relevant to a ssessing adefendant’s moral culpability.’ ” Porter , 558 U. S., at ___ (sl i p op., at 12) (quoting Wi ggins , 539 U. S., at 53 5). Applyin g Strickl a n d , we have repeatedly found “a reasonable prob ability,” 466 U. S., at 6 94, that th e sentencerwould have reached a different result had counsel presented similar evidence

. See, e.g. , Porter , 558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12–13) (evi

dence of the defendant’s childhood history of physical abuse, brain abnormality, limited schooling, and heroic military service); Rompilla , 545 U. S., at 392 (evidence of severe abuse and neglect as a child, as well as brain damage); Wig g ins , 53 9 U. S., at 535 (eviden c e of the d e fendant’s “severe privation and ab use” as a c h ild, home

lessness, and “diminished ment al capacities”); Terry William s , 529 U. S., at 398 (evidence of childhood mistreatment and neglect, head in juries, poss ible organic mental impairments, and borderline mental retardation). The majori ty does notdisp ute the similarity between this case and the cited cases. However, it criticizes th e Court of Appeals for relying on Rompillaand Ter r y Wil

liamson the ground that we reviewed the prejudice ques

tion de novoin those cases. See ante , at 31. I do not rea d Terry Willi amsto review the prejudice question de novo

. 27

——————

27 Terry Williamsh e ld th at the state c o u r t’ s dec i sionw a s “u n r eason -37 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g More fundamentally, however, I cannot agree with the premise that “[t]hose cases .

. . offer no guidance with respect to whether a state court has unreasonably deter

mined that prejudice is lacking.” Ante , at 3 1 (emphasis deleted). In each of these cases, we did no t purpor t t o create new law; we simply applied the same clearly estab

lished precedent, Stri ckland , to a differentset of fac t s. Because these cases i lluminate the k i nds of mitigation evidence that suffice to establish prejudice under Stri ck

land , they provide useful, but no t dispositive, guidance for courts to consider when dete rmining whether a state court has unreasonably applied Strickla nd

. In many cases, a state court pres ented with additional mitigation evidence will reason abl y conclude that there is no “reasonab le probability t hat, bu t for counsel’s unprofes

sional errors, the resultof the proceeding would have been different.” Stri ckland , 466 U. S., at 694. This is not such a case. Ad mittedly, Pinhols ter un justifiably stabbed and killed two people, and his hist ory of violent outbursts and burglaries surely did not endear him to the jury. But the homicides did not appear premeditated. And the State’s aggra v ation case was no stronger than in Rompillaand Terry Willi ams
. See 545 U. S., at 378, 383 (the defenda n t committed murder by torture and had a significant history of violent f e lonies, inc l uding a rape); 529 U. S., at 4 1 8 (Rehnquist, C. J., con c urring in part and dissenting in part) (the defendant had a lifetim e of crime, and after the murder he “savagely b e at an elderly woman, ” set a hom e on fire, and stabbed a man (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even on th e trial record, it took the jury t w o days to deci de on a penalty. The c o ntrast bet w een the “n ot

—————— able in at leas t two r e spec ts ”: (1) I t applie d the wrong legal s t andard , see 52 9 U. S., at 39 7, an d (2 ) it “faile d to ac c o r dappr opr i ate weigh tto the body of m i tigation evidenceav ailable to tr ial c o u n s el,” id. , at 398

. We did not pur p or t to c o nduc t denovorevi ew.38 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g persuasive” mitigation case put on by Pinholster’s counsel, 54 Tr. 7514, and the substantial mitigation evidence at their fingertips was st ark. Given these considerations, it is not a fore gone conclusion, as the majorityd eems it, that a juror familiar with his tro ubled background and psychi

atric issues would have reached the same conclusion regarding Pinholster’s culpability. Fairminded jurists could not doubt that, on the record before the California Supreme Court, “there [was] a reasonable probability that at least on e juror would have struck a different balance.” Wig g ins , 53 9 U. S., at 5 37. III The state-court record on its ownwas more than ade

quate to support the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that th e California Supreme Court coul d not reas onably have rejected Pi nholster’s Stri ckland claim. The additional evidence presented in the federal evidentiary hearing only confirms that conclusion. A At the hearing, Pinholster offered many of the same documents that were before the state habea s court. He also offeredhis trial attorney s’ billing records, which were before the s t ate habeas court as pa rt of the tri al record. Of the seven lay wi tnesses who testi f ied at the hearing, six had previou s ly execute ddeclar atio ns in support of Pinhol

ster’s state

- court peti tion. (The seventh, Pinholster’s uncle, provided testimony cumulative of other testimony.) Two experts testified o nPi nholster’s behalf; n e ither had presented declarations to the state habeas court. The first was Dr. Donald Olson, assistan t professor of n e urology and neurological sciences and director of the Pediatric Epilepsy Program at Stanford Un i v ersity Med i cal Center. It appears that Pinholster reta ined Dr. Olson to rebut the testimony of the expert disclosed b ythe State in the fed

-39 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g eral proceeding. See Decl. of Michael D. Abzug in Suppo r t of Stipulated Ex Par t eApplicati o n to Continue Eviden

tiary Heari n g and Dis c overy Cut- Off andto Substitute Counsel in Pinholster v. Cald eron , No. CV 9 5–6240–GLT (CD Cal.), p. 2. Relyi n g in part on Pinholster’s abnorm al EEG, Dr. Olson opined that Pi nholster’s childhood acci

dents “likely result[ed] in brain injury” and that these injuries “conferred a ri sk of epilepsy.” Record ER–699 to ER–700. He concluded that it was reasonably probable that Pinholster had su ffered from partial epilepsy since at least 1968 and had suffered from brain in jury since at least 1964. Id. , at ER–701. Pinholster’s second expert was Dr. Sophia Vi nogradov, associate p r ofessor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Fran cisco. Dr. Vinogradov’s testimony was based o nessentiall y the same facts as Dr. Woods’ and Dr. Stalberg’s state-court de clara t ions. She highlighted Pinholster’s childhood head trau m as, history of epilepsy, abusive and neglected upbringin g , history of substance abuse, and bizarre behavior on th e night of the homicides. She opined that his aggressive behavior resulted from childhood head traumas: “All data i n dicates th at there were severe effects of the two serious head injuries sustained at age 2 and age 3, with evidence for behavioral changes related to dysfunctionof frontal cortex: sev e re attentional and learning problems in c h ildhood, h y peracti vity, aggres

sivity, impulsivity, social-emotional impairment, sei

zure disorder, and explosive dyscontrol.” Id. , at ER– 731. She also op ined that, right before the homicides, Pinhol

ster was in an “appare n tly hallucinatory state [that] wa s likely the result of his intoxication with multiple sub

stances.” Id. , at ER–7 07 The State presented two experts: Dr. Stalberg, the40 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g psychiatrist who had examined Pinholster in the middle of trial, 28and Dr. Da vid Rudnick. Although Dr. Stalberg maintained that Pinholster suffe red from antisocial pe r sonality disorder, which was his original diagnosis in the middle of trial, he again emphasized that th ere was “vo

luminous” and “compe lling” mitigation evidence that had not previously been ma de available to him or presented to the jury. Id. , at ER–926, ER–953. He statedthat conver

sations with Pinholster’s family revealed that he and his siblings were “raised l i ke animals, wild animals,” id. , at ER–948, an d he opined that Pinholster’s upb r inging was a risk factor for antisocial personality disorder

. See ibid. (Pinholster’s upbringing “would speak volumes, looking at it from a mitigation point of view”). And he agreed that the mitigati on evidence presented at trial was “profoundl y misleading. ” Id. , at ER–966. Dr. Rudnick testified that Pinholster s u ffered from antisocial personality disorder. The State a l so introduced into evidence the 1978 proba

tion report that Pinholster’s counsel had in th eir posses

sion at the time of his trial. The r e port demonstrated th a t counsel were aware that Pinholster was i nclasses for educationally handicapped children, that he was commit

ted to astate hospital for emotionally handicapped chil

dren, and that he suffered two “severe head injuries.” Id. , at SER–243

. B Much of the evidence presented at the federal hearing

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28 Befor eth e h e ar in g , Dr . Stalber gh a d opin ed th at Pin h o lsterwa s “subs t anti ally impaired by a bipola r moo d disorder operating synergis

tic a llywith in tox i c a tion anda sei z ur e dis o r d erat the t i me the c r i me wa s com m i tt ed.” Record ER– 5 8 7

. Ata prehea ring depo s i t i on, howeve r, Dr . Stalber grev i sed h i s opi n ionan d state dth at h ec o n t in u e d to believ e that Pinholste r suffered fro mpsychopa thi cper s onalityt r aits. Af terthe deposit i on, Pinholster elected to pr oceed with a different expert, pre

s u m ab l yi nl i gh to f D r
. S t a lb e r g ’ s u n e x p e c t e dc h a n g ei np o s i t i o n
. T h e State then retained Dr. St alber gas its ownex per t

.41 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g was duplicative of the e vidence submitted to the California Supreme Court. The additional evidence presented at the hearing only confirmed that the California Supreme Court could not reasonably have rejected Pinholster’s claim. 29 For example, the probation report presented by the State confirmed that counsel had in their possession in

formation that would h ave le d any reasonable attorney “to investigate further.” Wiggins , 539 U. S., at 52 7. Counsel nevertheles s tookno action to inve stigate these leads. Pinholster’s experts opined that his childhood head traumas likely resulted in braininjury and conferred a riskof epilepsy. Although the State presented testimony that Pinholster had antisocial per s onality dis o rder, it was not clear e rror forth e Distri ctCourt to c o nclude that jurors could have credited Pinho lster’s expert s. Even the

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29 The State argues that the District Cour t was not entitledto r e ly on the evidence adduced at the hearin g b e ca us e Pinhols ter wa s not dili

gent in develo ping his cla i ms in s t a t e court a n d the hea r ing wa s there

for ebar r e d b y28 U. S. C. §225 4(e)(2). Th is ar g u men tis somewh a t imprecise. Pinholster’s all e gation s in his amended f e deral petit i o n wer e“identical” to the al leg a tion s he presented to the Cal i fornia Supreme Court, ante , at 6, and he dilig ently requested a hearing in state court. The State presumablymea n s to ar g u e th at Pinholste r ’ s new ex per ttestimonyc h ang e d “the fac t ual bas is” of his c l aim suc hthat, by the ti me of the evid entiary he a r ing, he no l o nger s a tis f ied §225 4(e)(2). Howev e r, at or al ar g u ment, th e Sta t e su g g e sted th at Pinholsterwa s pr esentinga naltog e thernew c l aim in th e feder a l c o ur t. See Tr . of Or alAr g
. 18. If th at is th e c a se, §225 4(d)(1) do es n o t apply at all, an d th e S t ate sh ou ld be ar g u in g lack of exhaustion or procedural defa ult. I do not unders t a n d Pinhols ter to have pres en ted anew cla i m to the Distr i c tCour t.

In any event, Pinholster satisfied §2 254(e) (2) in this case. He made “a r e asonab le atte mpt, in lig ht of the information available a tthe ti m e , to inv e stig ate an d pu r s u ec l aims ins t ate c o u r t.” Mi chae l Williams , 529 U. S., at 4 35. His ex per t s r e lied on the very same f a cts and evidence. I c a n n o t r e ad § 225 4(e)(2) to i m pose a str i c tr e qu ir emen t th at pe tit i on er s must use the same ex per t s theypr esented to the s t a t e court

. This ru le would result in numero u s practical pr oble ms, for example in the case of the unanticipated death of an expert.42 CULLEN v. PINHOLS T ER
S OTOMAYOR , J., dissen t in g State’s own expert, Dr. Stalbe rg, t e stified to th e “volumi

nous” mitigation evidence in Pinholster’s case. Record ER

– 926. In sum, the evidence confirmed what was already ap

parent from the state-court rec o rd: Pinholster’s counsel failed to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation, and there was a reas onable prob ability that at least on e juror confr o nted withthe “voluminous” mitigating evi

dence counsel shou ld have discovered would have voted to spare Pinholster’s life. Ibid. Accordingly, whether on th e basis of the state- or federal-court record, the courts below correctly co ncluded that Pinholster had shown that th e California Supreme Court’s decision reflected an unrea

sonable app lication of Strickl a nd

. 30 * * * I cannot agree with eith er aspect of the Court’s ruling. I fear the co nsequences of the Court’s novel i n terpretati on of §2254(d)(1) for diligent state habeas peti tioners with compelling evidence supporting their clai ms who were unable, through no fault of their own, to present that evidence to the state c o urt that a d judicated their claims. And the C o urt’s concl u sion that the California Supre m e Court reasonably denied Pinholster’s ineffective

assistance-of-counsel c l aim overlo ok s counsel ’s failure t o investigate obvious ave nues of miti gation and the contrast between the woefullyinadequate mitigation case they presented and the evidence they should and would have discovered. I respectfully dissent.

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30 The State’s c h allenge in this Co ur t is limite dto the questions whet her t h e Federa l Dis t rictCourtwa s entitled to co nsider the ad di

tion al ev iden c einth e §2254(d)(1) an aly s is an d wh et h e rPin h o lster satisfied§2254(d)(1) on the basis of the state-court reco rd. It has not cha llenged t h eDis t rictCourt ’ s ult i ma te conclus i on tha tPinhols ter ha d proved that he was “in custody in vi olatio n of the Const i tution or laws or treaties of the United States.” §2254(a).