J-S60017-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.R.S.C., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.C., MOTHER

No. 1091 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered March 24, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Orphans' Court at No(s): AD-2014-0051

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2015

S.C. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights1to her minor son, D.R.S.C (born 11/2003). 

Mother’s counsel has also filed an application to withdraw pursuant to In Re: 

Adoption of V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992). After careful review, 

we affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

Chester County Department of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) 

removed D.R.S.C. from Mother and Father’s2care for two relevant periods, 

____________________________________________

1 We review a trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate parental rights 

for an abuse of discretion or error of law. In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 563 

(Pa. Super. 2003). Our scope of review is limited to determining whether 

the trial court’s order is supported by competent evidence. Id. Therefore, 

even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess 

the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment. 

In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

2

Father’s parental rights to D.R.S.C. have also been involuntarily 

terminated. However, he is not a party to this appeal.
J-S60017-15

- 2 -

November 2010-August 2011 and April 20133-present.4 D.R.S.C.’s removal 

was a result of unsafe housing conditions and poor parental judgment. 

Specifically, Mother has a history of mental health problems, including 

emotional instability, and had been the victim of domestic violence at the 

hands of Father. CYF provided Mother numerous services to address the 

concerns that led to D.R.S.C.’s placement, including in-home services, family 

preservation and intervention services, housing assistance, life skill services, 

counseling, and family group decision making courses. 

While Mother did attend all supervised visits with D.R.S.C., she made 

minimal to no progress toward her initial goal of reunification and, as a 

result, CYF filed its petition to terminate her parental rights on July 10, 

2014. After two days of termination hearings held on February 12, 2015 

and March 17, 2015, the trial court involuntarily terminated Mother’s 

parental rights to D.R.S.C. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 

(8), and (b). Specifically, the court determined that: (1) Mother had made 

minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances that led to D.R.S.C.’s 

____________________________________________

3 Removal from the home was precipitated by Mother being evicted and 

having to live in her truck, as well as D.R.S.C. not being properly cared for. 

N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/12/15, at 22-23, 51.

4 CYF has been involved with Mother and Father and their other children, 

T.F.C., III (age 17), and C.C (age 15), continuously since November 2009 –

years before D.R.S.C. was even born. Father’s history of substance abuse, 

domestic violence and poor judgment combined with Mother’s history of 

mental instability and inadequate parenting caused CYF to place T.F.C., III, 

and C.C. in foster care.
J-S60017-15

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placement; and (2) termination would best serve the needs and welfare of 

D.R.S.C. Although the court recognized that Mother and D.R.S.C. have a 

bond, testimony revealed that the bond was unhealthy and that the damage 

of leaving the bond intact would cause more harm to D.R.S.C. than if the 

bond were severed. N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/12/15, at 66. Finally, and 

most impactful on the court, was Mother’s “continuing lack of insight after all 

this time . . . as to why her parental rights should be terminated.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 3/23/15, at 8.

This timely appeal follows, in which counsel seeks to withdraw from 

representation. In V.E., supra, our Court held:

Counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first 

appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating his or her 

parental rights, may, after a conscientious and thorough review 

of the record, petition the court for leave to withdraw 

representation if he or she can find no issues of arguable merit 

on which to base the appeal. Given the less stringent standard 

of proof required and the quasi-adversarial nature of a 

termination proceeding in which a parent is not guaranteed the 

same procedural and evidentiary rights as a criminal defendant, 

appointed counsel seeking to withdraw representation must 

submit an advocate's brief.

611 A.2d at 1275. In In re Adoption of V.G., 751 A.2d 1174 (Pa. Super. 

2000), our court reiterated the requirements counsel must satisfy before 

being permitted to withdraw in termination appeals: (1) petition the court 

for leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination 

of the record and interviewing the defendant, counsel has determined the 

appeal would be frivolous, (2) file a brief referring to any issues in the record 

of arguable merit; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to defendant and 
J-S60017-15

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advise him of his right to retain new counsel or raise any additional points he 

deems worthy of this Court’s review. Id. at 1176.

Instantly, counsel has complied with the three prongs outlined in V.G. 

While counsel’s brief is somewhat sparse in argument and case law,5it does 

reference issues6of arguable merit. Therefore, we find it substantially 

complies with the withdrawal requirements. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 

934 A.2d 1287 (Pa. Super. 2007) (substantial compliance is sufficient to 

satisfy withdrawal on appeal). 

Moreover, based on our own independent review of the record, 

including the notes of testimony from the termination hearings, relevant 

case law and the trial court opinion, we agree with counsel’s assessment 

that any appeal would be frivolous. We rely upon the decision authored by 

the Honorable Mark L. Tunnell to affirm the order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to D.R.S.C. under sections 2511(a) and (b) and advise the 

____________________________________________

5 We recognize that counsel’s brief is an advocate’s brief, as opposed to 

counsel’s brief in V.G., which our court deemed “wholly inadequate” as it 

resembled a “no-merit” letter. 751 A.2d at 1177. Notably, however, our 

Court in V.G. did not remand for counsel to file a proper advocate’s brief 

where “our independent review of the record indicate[d] that, in fact, 

appellant ha[d] no issues of arguable merit on which she c[ould] base an 

appeal.” Id.

6 Specifically, those arguably meritorious issues include the demonstrated 

bond between Mother and D.R.S.C. and the lack of a formal bonding 

assessment as it relates to a section 2511(b) analysis and Mother having 

obtained appropriate housing and maintained stable employment, in addition 

to several other completed services, in compliance with CYF’s service plan.
J-S60017-15

- 5 -

parties to attach a copy of Judge Tunnell’s decision in the event of further 

proceedings in the matter.

Order affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/14/2015
c 

which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and 

services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions 

parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time. The 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, and the 

the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six (6) months, 

The court further finds that the child has been removed from the care of the parent by 

said parent pursuantto 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511 (a)(2); and 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

care, control or subsistence necessary for the child's physical and mental well-being and the 

the said Stephanie Corum has caused the said minor child to be without essential parental 

The court further finds that the repeated and continued incapacity, neglect or refusal of 

has refused or failed to perform parental duties pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. §251 l(a)(l); and 

six (6) months, has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the child, or 

The court finds that Stephanie Corum, by conduct continuing for a period of at least \ 

and hearing had thereon, 

AND NOW, to wit, th.is 23rd day of March, 2015, upon consideration of the Petition 

FINAL DECREE 

FILE NO. AD-I 4-005 I 

IN RE: D.R.S.C. 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CHESTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 

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Mark L. Tunnell, 

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CERTIFIED 

From the 'Record · 

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BY THE COURT: 

natural parent could exercise. 

make educational decisions· and to exercise such other authority concerning the child as a 

have the authority, inter alia, to consent to major medical, psychiatric and surgical treatment, 

Children, Youth and Families shall stand in loco parent is to the child and in such capacity shall 

aforesaid parent. Further, pending finalization of adoption, the Chester County Department of 

said child and adoption of said child may be decreed without further consent of or notice to the 

Children, Youth and Families which is hereby authorized to give consent to the adoption of 

Stephanie Corum in respect to D.R.S.C. is hereby awarded to Chester County Department of 

Corum, the natural mother of D.R.S.C., is granted, and that all parental rights and duties of 

Department of Children, Youth and Families for the termination of parental rights of Stephanie 

IT IS .ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Petition of Chester County 

welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. §25 l l(a)(8). 

child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

/ 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, twelve months or more have lapsed from 

The court further finds that the child has been removed from the care of the parent by a 

to 23 Pa. C.S.A. §251 l(a)(S); and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child pursuant 

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2. D.R.S.C. 's parents are S.D.C. ("Mother") and T.F.C., Jr. ("Father"). 

old. 

I. D.R.S.C. is a male minor child, born November 7, 2003; he is eleven (11) years 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

The court will terminate the parental rights of both parents, based on the following: 

What the Supreme Court calls "the clock of childhood" is ticking. 

child's best interests to terminate. parental rights. 

D.R.S.C .. and his mother and, to some extent, his father, and argued that it would not be in the 

had not met its burden of proof. Alternatively, they offered evidence of a strong bond between 

of D.R.S.C.'s mother and father. The parents contested these proceedings, asserting that CYF 

On July 10, 2014, CYF started this case, filing petitions to terminate the parental rights 

permanent living arrangement. 

review hearing CYF sought and was granted a goal change from reunification to a new 

Children, Youth and Families ("~YF") has worked intensively with his parents, but at a recent 

has been in foster care for the nearly two (2) years since then. Chester County Department of 

D.R.S.C. was adjudicated dependent in Juvenile Dependency Court in April 2013 and 

DECISION 

FILE NO. AD-14-0051 

IN RE: D.R.S.C. 

fN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CHESTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 

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2 

3. D.R.S.C. has two siblings, T.F.C., III (age 17) and C.C. (age 15). 

4. Although CYF has been involved with this family since 1999, D.R.S.C. has 

been in foster care through CYF for two blocks of time; from November 22, 2010, to August 

18, 2011, and from April 11, 2013, to the present. 

5. D.R.S.C.'s two siblings are also in CYF foster care, although the dates of their 

placements do not exactly correspond to D.R.S.C.'s dates of placement. 

6. Mother has a history of mental health problems, including emotional instability 

and issues with domestic violence, inadequate parenting, household management and housing. 

7. Father has a history of substance abuse, unemployment, domestic violence, 

criminal violations, poor judgment and housing issues. 

8. These problems caused D.R.S.C. and his two brothers to be placed in CYF 

foster care, most recently in April 2013. 

9. For years CYF has provided Mother and Father with numerous services to 

address the issues that led to D.R.S.C.'s placement in foster care, including but not limited to, 

in-home services, family preservation services, family intervention services, life skills services, 

individual counseling, family group decision making, housing assistance, and family finding 

services, as well as regular contact with caseworkers from CYF and affiliated contract service 

providers. 

I 0. Despite these services, Mother and Father have made minimal progress towards 

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the child's placement. 

11. D.R.S.C. has been adjudicated dependent in proceedings m the Juvenile 

Dependency Court at #CP-15-51-2010. 

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3 

not a healthy bond. 

17. There is a bond between D.R.S.C. and both Mother and Father; however, it is 

influence charge and is awaiting sentencing. (Ex. CYF-1 (Docket No. 3604-2014).) 

influence. He pled guilty on January 13, 2015, to at least his second driving under the 

16. Father was arrested on or about October 20, 2014, for driving under the 

care. 

any real progress toward alleviating the conditions which led to D.R.S.C. 's placement in foster 

15. Two caseworkers from CYF gave evidence in this case that neither parent made 

(Ex. Child"! (Opinion of 6/16/14 at pp. 6-7}.) 

Mother has no insight as to how her behavior affects her children 

even after years of intensive services and weekly therapy. Mother 

avers she has made progress toward alleviating the conditions that 

first necessitated placement but even though she has consistently 

engaged in long-term weekly therapy and recovery programs there 

has been no improvement in her toxic behavior that causes 

emotional and psychological harm to her children. 

2014, the Honorable Anne Marie Wheatcraft, Juvenile Court judge, found that: 

(since discontinued by Mother). In_ an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), dated June 16, 

14. In 2014, Mother appealed an order of the Juvenile Court to the Superior Court 

"minimal" progress toward the initial goal of reunification with D.R.S.C. (Id) 

13. The Juvenile Court determined that Mother and Father have made "no" or 

family services plans, as well as through the various hearings and orders of the Juvenile 

out and explained to Mother and Father by CYF caseworkers through, inter alia, periodic 

12. What Mother and Father needed to do to regain custody of D.R.S.C. was spelled 

Dependency Court. See (Ex: CYF"2.) 

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4 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by 

the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a 

. . 

* * * 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent. 

( l) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidence a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a 

child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. 

(a) General Rule - The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

Section 251.1. Grounds for involuntary termination 

Act, 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2101, et seq. CYF seeks termination based on the following: 

The grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are set forth in the Adoption 

DISCUSSION 

Conclusions of Law filed by CYF. 

21. His court appointed counsel adopts the proposed Findings of Fact and 

20. D.R.S.C. is an adoptable child. 

have been ameliorated. 

19. D.R.S.C. has thrived in his foster home, and his earlier aggression and acting out 

parental rights will do less harm to D.R.S.C. than maintaining them. 

18. Severing the bonds between D.R.S.C. and his parents through termination of 

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5 

the needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa. C.S. §2511 (b ). Judicial inquiry is thus to be centered 

parental rights. A court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to 

of the circumstances, clearly warrants permitting the involuntary termination of said parents' 

and any explanation offered by the parents to determine if that evidence, in light of the totality 

terminating parental rights. Instead, the court must then examine the individual circumstances 

period in excess of six (6) months, such a finding does not in and of itself support an order 

convincing. Even when it is established that a parent has failed to perform parental duties for a 

Parental rights may not be terminated in the absence of evidence which is clear and 

must exert himself or herself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's life. Id. 

requires affirmative performance. In re Bums, 474 Pa. 615, 379 A.2d 535 (1977). A parent 

needs love, protection, guidance and support.. The parental obligation is a positive duty which 

"parental duties». Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that there is no simple or easy definition of 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by 

the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 

months or more have elapsed from the date of· removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

* * * 

period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent 

cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of 

time· and termination of the parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child. 

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6 

This family has been involved with CYF continuously since 

November 2009 and had previously received CYF services and 

then had been closed. The current case was initially opened in 

2009 due to reports of Timothy Corum, Sr. ("Father") being 

intoxicated, threatening suicide, and choking Mother in presence of 

the children. Extensive in-home services were provided to the 

family but the children continued to be in an unsafe environment 

and were placed in foster care in November 2010. CYF worked 

with the family intensively and reunification occurred in August 

2011. In April 2013 the children were taken from the home again 

due to issues -of on-going violence in the home, Father's continued 

alcoholism, Mother's lack of housing, and her inability to keep the 

children safe. 

succinctly as foJlows: 

amply supported by the orders in the dependency proceedings. Judge Wheatcraft summed up 

issues, and the negative impact they had on D.R.S.C. The· testimony of the caseworkers is 

Those behaviors ebbed and flowed. The court listened to testimony about the parents' 

1999, four (4) years before D.R.S.C. was even born. 

sordid behaviors of Mother and Father that brought them into contact with CYF going back to 

Caseworkers familiar with D.R.S.C. and his family testified about the long and rather 

re Adoption of Hamilton, 379 Pa. Super. 274, 549 A.2d 1291 (1988). 

importantly the court assesses the effect of termination on the needs and welfare of the child. In 

evaluates ay post-abandonment contact between the parent and child, and lastly and most 

assesses any explanation or extenuating circumstances made by the parent. Next, the court 

' 

determines if the statutory requirements in §251 l(a) have been satisfied. If they have, the court 

In summary, in Pennsylvania when involuntary termination is sought the court first 

Pa. 590, 515 A.2d 883 (1986). 

on the best interests of the child rather than the fault of the parent. In re Adoption of J.J, 511 

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7 

orders. 

her behavior has been as "impactful" on her children as described in various dependency 

children are still in placement", that she has "lost everything", and that she doesn't know why 

Towards the end of her testimony in court, Mother stated that she "doesn't know why her 

service plans. Unfortunately, no measurable progress towards reunification could be seen. 

Mother points out the numerous ways in which she feels she has been compliant with 

arguments. 

understands that recovering alcoholics do "slip", this· conduct belies the Father's current 

these proceedings had begun, has pleaded guilty and is awaiting sentencing. While the court 

behavior and his commitment to recovery. On the other hand, he was arrested for DUI after 

with his sponsors. Both sponsors testified in court about the marked improvement in Father's 

"appropriately" with him. In recent months, Father has attended AA meetings and is working 

For example, Mother and Father attended all visits with D.R.S.C. -and acted 

them. 

accomplish, and then for those reasons urge the court that CYF has not proven its case against 

Mother and Father counter by pointing out the items that they did manage to · 

(Ex. Child-1 (Opinion of 6/16/14 at pp. 6- 7).) 

In this matter, CYF petitioned to change the goal from reunification with Mother 

to another planned permanent living arrangement as none of the other 

permanency options are currently feasible for these children. We agreed a 

change in goal. 'Yas appropriate and the petition was granted. Of course that 

change is not made lightly, but the long and intensive history of this case makes 

it appropriate. 

* * * 

.·,.: 

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8 

The court was amazed. Mother's continuing lack of insight after all this time is a chief 

factor in the court's mind as to why her parental rights should be terminated. 

Although not contained in the packet of dependency orders presented to the court and 

admitted as Ex. CYF~2, this court has taken judicial notice of the most recent Permanency 

Review Order dated February 5, 2015 concerning D.R.S.C. Judge Wheatcraft found that there 

was "minimal compliance" b)' the Mother and Father with regard to a permanency plan and "no 

progress" by Mother and Father «towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated 

D.R.S.C.'s original placement." 

D.R.S.C. has an emotional bond with Mother. He is worried about her, even "scared" 

for her. The court was asked to watch a videotape of D.R.S.C. made over a year ago wherein 

he cries that he misses her. Frankly, the court faults the Mother for the derelictions that put her 

son in this pathetic and unhealthy position. 

D.R.~.C. does not want to be adopted. He seems happy and ·healthy in his foster home. 

Where an agency is petitioning for termination of parental rights it is not necessary for 

the agency to demonstrate a pending adoption nor that a person with a present intention to 

· adopt exists. 23 Pa. C.S.A. §25 l 2(b ). 

Perpetuating the birth parents' involvement despite their inability to care for a child 

could in fact foreclose any hope for adoption. In the Matter ofTD.,.949 A.2d 910, (Pa. Super. 

2008). The parents argue here as they did in Juvenile Court that D.R.S.C. maintains a bond 

with mother. They urge that the court should consider this pursuant to §2511 (b) of the 

Adoption Act which requires courts to give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child when considering a termination petition. 

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9 

T.S.Atf. 620 Pa. at 631. 

In weighing the difficult factors discussed above, courts must keep 

the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young 

for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to 

their healthy development quickly. 

Court went on to observe in T.S.M that: 

parent against the damage that the bond may cause if the bond is left intact. The Supreme 

Ultimately, the court must weigh the injury of breaking a child's bond to a biological 

cannot, he said, be misconstrued as "bonding." Id at 535. 

The failure to correct parenting and behavioral disorders which are harming the children 

most abused of children "will often harbor some positive emotion towards the abusive parent." 

decision, Judge Tamilia observed that it was "an immutable psychological truth" that even the 

parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition. In the Superior Court 

A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008), recognizing that the mere existence of a bond of a child to a 

with theseproblems, It cited with approval a Superior Court decision in In Re: K.K.R.-S., 958 

to the child. The Supreme Court in In Re T.S.Atf., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251 (2013), grappled 

child, she should not be heard to say that the bond should be preserved lest further harm result 

Where the mother's abusive or neglectful parenting has created a pathological bond in the 

abusive or neglectful parent most certainly does not serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

permanent living arrangement on account of an unhealthy or even pathological bond with an 

The court is concerned that keeping a child unavailable for adoption or another 

considerations, nor does it mention the word "bond." · 

The statute does not provide any guidance as to how the court is supposed to evaluate those 

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10 

3. Both parents were represented by counsel throughout this matter. 

4. This Court has jurisdicti_on in this matter and venue is proper. 

5. Both parents have failed to perform parental duties relative to D.R.S.C. for more 

than six (6) months immediately preceding the filing of the Petitions in this matter. 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a)(l ). 

6. Both parents have repeatedly and continually demonstrated an incapacity to 

parent D.R.S.C. and, therefore, the child is without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being, and the conditions and causes of 

that incapacity cannot or will not be remedied by the parents. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a)(2): 

7. D.R.S.C. has been removed from the care of Mother and Father by the Juvenile 

Court for a period in excess of six (6) months, the conditions which led to the removal or 

2014. 

1. CYF filed Petitions to Terminate Parental Rights as to Mother and Father on 

July 10, 2014. 

2. Mother and Father were served with the Petitions by constable on August 14, 

CONCLUSIONS OF LA \1\1 

In T.S.M, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court that denied the 

petition for termination because such denial "merely prolonged and, indeed, exacerbated the 

harm suffered by the children." Id. at 633. The Supreme Court concluded "without hesitation 

that it best serves their needs and welfare to sever their bond with Mother permanently in order 

to permit them to be placed forthwith into healthy, permanent homes." Id. at 634. This court 

believes no Jess is true at bar. 

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11 

Mark L. Tunnell, 

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BY THE COURT: 

An appropriate order follows. 

other permanent living arrangement are appropriate in the circumstances of this case. 

11. Termination of parental rights and, therefore, freeing D.R.S.C. for adoption or 

Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a) and (b). 

10. CYF has met its burden of clear and convincing evidence relative to 23 

be best served by termination of parental rights. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (b ). 

9. The developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of D.R.S.C. will 

serves the needs and.welfare of D.R.S.C. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(8). 

the removal and placement ofD.R.S.C. continue to exist and termination of parental rights best 

Court, more than twelve (12) months have passed since removal, the conditions which led to 

8. D.R.S.C. has been removed from the care of Mother and Father by the Juvenile 

rights best serves the needs and welfare of D.R.S.C. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(5). 

and placement of D.R.S.C. for twenty-three consecutive months, and termination of parental 

remedied and will not remedy within a reasonable time the conditions which led to the removal 

within a reasonable period of time, the services and assistance provided to the parents have not 

placement of the child continue to exist, the parents cannot or will not remedy those conditions 

. ' Circulated 10/05/2015 01:30 PM