RENDERED: OCTOBER 21, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0100-MR

TIMOTHY DON CHAMBERS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. STARK, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CR-00248

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: GOODWINE, MAZE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Timothy Don Chambers appeals a December 23, 2020 order 

of the Graves Circuit Court revoking his probation. Upon review, we affirm.

The relevant background of this matter is as follows. On January 14, 

2019, consistent with his plea of guilty, Chambers was convicted in Graves Circuit 

Court in the underlying matter (17-CR-00248) of possession of a controlled 
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substance in the first degree (methamphetamine), a Class D felony;1and possession 

of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.2 He was sentenced to a concurrent 

term of two years’ imprisonment, probated for a period of five years. Thereafter, 

Chambers was not only on probation due to his conviction in 17-CR-00248; he was 

also on probation regarding a sentence he had previously received as the result of a 

federal criminal proceeding. The appellate record contains no information 

regarding the nature of Chambers’ federal conviction, apart from indicating that it 

was entered in the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, Paducah 

Division, in a proceeding identified as United States v. Timothy Chambers, No. 

5:11-CR-00027-TBR.

On February 8, 2019, while on probation, Chambers was arrested 

again and charged with new felony and misdemeanor offenses for which he was 

later indicted in Graves Circuit Court in a separate proceeding (19-CR-00064). In 

August 2019, he then absconded. On August 16, 2019, due to Chambers 

absconding, the Commonwealth filed a probation violation report and requested 

the revocation of his probation. The circuit court issued a bench warrant for his 

arrest. Chambers was served with the warrant on September 16, 2019. 

1 Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 218A.1415.

2 KRS 218A.500.
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However, when Chambers was served with the warrant, he was

already in federal custody. As indicated in a report of Chambers’ admission to the 

McCracken County Jail, the United States Marshals Service had arrested Chambers 

on September 13, 2019, in relation to 11-CR-00027-001; the report does not 

specify why the marshals arrested Chambers, but the parties agree it was for 

Chambers’ violation of his federal probation – due either to his absconding or the 

new charges he had accrued in 19-CR-00064. A note attached to the executed 

bench warrant also provided, “Federal inmate cannot go to local courts currently.” 

Chambers’ federal probation was revoked shortly thereafter, and Chambers 

remained in federal custody for the next eleven months or so to serve his remaining

federal sentence of imprisonment.

Shortly before October 2020, Chambers completed his federal 

sentence and was released from custody. Shortly thereafter, revocation 

proceedings moved forward regarding Chambers’ probation in 17-CR-00248.

On December 21, 2020, consistent with his plea of guilty in 19-CR00064, Chambers was convicted of possession of a controlled substance in the first 

degree (methamphetamine), and tampering with physical evidence, both of which 

were Class D felonies.

3

 He was sentenced to a concurrent term of one year of 

imprisonment for those offenses. 

3 KRS 524.100.
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On December 23, 2020, the circuit court in 17-CR-00248 revoked 

Chambers’ probation, and for two reasons: (1) Chambers had absconded in August 

2019; and (2) Chambers had pled guilty to and had been convicted of two 

additional felony offenses in 19-CR-00064. The circuit court also denied 

Chambers’ request to run his sentence in 17-CR-00248 concurrently with the 

sentence he had received in 19-CR-00064. This appeal followed.

Chambers’ sole argument on appeal is that the circuit court erred by 

refusing to run his sentence of imprisonment in 17-CR-00248 concurrently – as 

opposed to consecutively – with the sentence he received in 19-CR-00064. In 

support, he cites KRS 533.040(3), which provides: 

A sentence of probation or conditional discharge shall 

run concurrently with any federal or state jail, prison, or 

parole term for another offense to which the defendant is 

or becomes subject during the period, unless the sentence 

of probation or conditional discharge is revoked. The 

revocation shall take place prior to parole under or 

expiration of the sentence of imprisonment or within 

ninety (90) days after the grounds for revocation come to 

the attention of the Department of Corrections, 

whichever occurs first.

In a nutshell, Chambers asserts that KRS 533.040(3) required the 

circuit court to run his sentences concurrently because the revocation of his 

probation did not take place “within ninety (90) days after the grounds for 

revocation” came to the attention of the Department of Corrections.
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That argument however, ignores the interplay between KRS 

533.040(3) and KRS 533.060(2) in circumstances where an individual, such as 

himself, is granted probation for a felony sentence by a Kentucky state court, and 

then incurs a new Kentucky state court felony sentence while on probation. KRS 

533.060(2) provides: 

When a person has been convicted of a felony and is 

committed to a correctional detention facility and 

released on parole or has been released by the court on 

probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge, and 

is convicted or enters a plea of guilty to a felony 

committed while on parole, probation, shock probation, 

or conditional discharge, the person shall not be eligible 

for probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge 

and the period of confinement for that felony shall not 

run concurrently with any other sentence.

Our Supreme Court thoroughly addressed the interplay between these 

two provisions in Commonwealth v. Collinsworth, 628 S.W.3d 82 (Ky. 2021), 

explaining: 

Brewer v. Commonwealth involved identical factual 

circumstances and is clearly binding on our Court of 

Appeals. 922 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1996). In 1992, Brewer 

pled guilty to felony theft charges in Warren County, for 

which he was sentenced to one-year’s incarceration and 

five years of probation. Id. During his probationary 

period, Brewer committed an additional felony in Barren 

County. Id. at 381. On January 15, 1993, Brewer’s 

probation officer notified the Commonwealth’s Attorney 

of the Barren County offense. On May 3, 1993 Brewer 

pled guilty to the Barren County felony. Id. The 

Commonwealth did not move to revoke Brewer’s 

probation for his Warren County conviction until May 
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17, 1993, more than 90 days after receiving notice of 

Brewer’s Barren County offense. Id. Subsequently, 

Brewer’s counsel asserted that KRS 533.040(3) required 

that his Warren and Barren County sentences be run 

concurrently. This Court disagreed, holding that KRS 

533.040(3) and KRS 533.060(2) directly conflicted and 

that the provision in KRS 533.060(2) which forbade 

concurrent sentences for subsequent felonies controlled. 

Id. at 381-82.

This Court confirmed Brewer’s central holding in 

Commonwealth v. Love, in which we stated,

When a Kentucky state court probationer 

incurs a new Kentucky state court felony 

sentence while on probation, parole, shock 

probation or conditional discharge from a 

Kentucky state court, the ninety-day window 

of KRS 533.040(3) does not apply. Instead, 

in those situations, KRS 533.060, which 

mandates consecutive sentencing for 

felonies committed while on probation, 

applies.

334 S.W.3d at 95, n.11.

Moreover, since the Brewer decision, our Court of 

Appeals has applied Brewer time and again without 

incident or confusion. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hines, 

2012-CA-002212-MR, 2014 WL 631689, at *2 (Ky. 

App. Feb. 14, 2014) (stating “[i]n accordance with 

[Brewer] and [Love], we believe the law is clear that 

when a defendant receives a probated sentence in state 

court and is subsequently convicted of another felony, 

KRS 533.060 is applicable and mandates consecutive 

sentences[ ]”); Pitney v. Commonwealth, 2012-CA002043-MR, 2013 WL 6046073 (Ky. App. Nov. 15, 

2013) (reiterating Brewer’s holding that KRS 533.060(2) 

required consecutive sentences in similar factual 

circumstances to the case before us); Dorris v. Kentucky 
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Dep’t of Corrs., 2019-CA-1223-MR, 2021 WL 840332 

(Ky. App. Mar. 5, 2021) (echoing that Brewer controls 

when individuals commit a subsequent felony while on 

parole or probation).

Finally, we note that in 2011 the General 

Assembly directly addressed KRS Chapter 533 in House 

Bill 463 but did not change the operative language at 

issue in this case. 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 4. As we stated in 

Rye v. Weasel, “a strong implication [exists] that the 

legislature agrees with a prior court interpretation of its 

statute when it does not amend the statute interpreted.” 

934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996) (citation omitted).

Id. at 87-88.

Considering the foregoing, the Graves Circuit Court committed no 

error by running Chambers’ sentence in this matter consecutively, rather than 

concurrently. We therefore, AFFIRM.

ALL CONCUR. 

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Karen Shuff Maurer

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Ken W. Riggs

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky