Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ANDREW R. FALK

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CORNELIUS HOOTEN, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1204-CR-266

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Linda E. Brown, Judge

The Honorable Steven J. Rubick, Magistrate

Cause No. 49F10-1111-CM-81337

November 7, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
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Case Summary

Cornelius Hooten (“Hooten”) appeals his conviction for Carrying a Handgun Without 

a License, as a Class A misdemeanor.1 Hooten raises one issue for our review, whether the 

trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence a handgun retrieved from his 

person because the arresting officers lacked the reasonable suspicion required to perform a 

Terry stop.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On the afternoon of November 15, 2011, Diandra Gamble (“Gamble”) and Hooten 

were engaged in a domestic dispute at their shared residence in Indianapolis. Hooten began 

to throw furniture, and Gamble called 911 to request that officers remove Hooten from the 

residence. Gamble provided the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) 

dispatcher with Hooten’s name and a description of his appearance. Gamble also informed 

the dispatcher that Hooten owned a handgun.

The dispatcher relayed this information to IMPD Lieutenant Craig Blanton 

(“Lieutenant Blanton”) and Officer Brian McCann (“Officer McCann”), who each responded 

to the call in separate police vehicles. As Lieutenant Blanton approached Gamble’s 

apartment complex, he observed Hooten walking away from the complex along an access 

driveway near a drug store.

Lieutenant Blanton stopped Hooten and confirmed Hooten’s identity. Because 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1(a) & -23(c).
3

dispatch had indicated that Hooten was known to own a firearm, Lieutenant Blanton 

instructed Hooten to raise his arms in the air. When Hooten did so, Lieutenant Blanton 

observed the butt of a handgun in the waist of Hooten’s pants. Lieutenant Blanton then 

secured the handgun.

During thistime period, Officer McCann arrived at Gamble’s apartment, and Gamble 

informed him that Hooten always carried a handgun. Officer McCann then travelled to the 

location where Lieutenant Blanton had stopped Hooten. When asked, Hooten produced an 

Indiana handgun permit. When Officer McCann checked the status of Hooten’s permit in 

state databases, it was determined that Hooten’s permit had been revoked. Hooten was then 

arrested.

On November 15, 2011, Hooten was charged with Carrying a Handgun Without a 

License. On March 9, 2012, a bench trial was conducted, at the conclusion of which the 

court found Hooten guilty as charged, entered judgment of conviction against him, and 

sentenced him to 365 days imprisonment, with 357 days suspended to probation. Upon 

motion by the State, the trial court also ordered the handgun destroyed.

This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

Hooten raises only one issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its 

discretion when it admitted into evidence the handgun Lieutenant Blanton retrieved from 

Hooten. Hooten argues that Lieutenant Blanton lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to 

support a Terry stop and that the trial court erroneously decided to the contrary.
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Hooten couches his appeal as one from the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress 

evidence. Because Hooten appeals following his conviction for the charged offense, 

however, he challenges the admission of the handgun at trial. Cf. Peters v. State, 888 N.E.2d 

274, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. We review a trial court’s admission of evidence 

for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the 

logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.

The Fourth Amendment states, in relevant part, that “[t]he right of the people to be 

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures ... shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s 

protections “extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of 

traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), and United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 

Because the balance between public interest and an individual’s right to personal 

security tilts in favor of a lower standard than probable cause, reasonable suspicion that 

criminal activity “may be afoot” is sufficient to justify such investigatory stops. Id. 

Reasonable suspicion requires that there be “some objective manifestation that the person 

stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417. While 

there is no set of hard-and-fast rules to determine what constitutes reasonable suspicion, 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, a mere “hunch” is insufficient. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.

Thus, when reviewing investigatory stops for reasonable suspicion, we “look at the 

‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 
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‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 

273 (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18). The State must bear the burden of proving that 

reasonable suspicion existed, and we review a trial court’s determination of reasonable 

suspicion de novo, giving due weight to the inferences drawn from the facts presented to the 

trial court. Bannister v. State, 904 N.E.2d 1254, 1255-56 (Ind. 2009).

The testimony before the trial court at the time of admission of Hooten’s handgun into 

evidence indicated that Gamble contacted IMPD dispatch concerning a domestic dispute and 

requested that police remove Hooten from her home, provided a description of Hooten, and 

informed dispatch that he owned a handgun. Dispatch radioed this information to Lieutenant 

Blanton, who saw an individual matching Hooten’s description walking away from Gamble’s 

apartment complex. Lieutenant Blanton stopped Hooten and asked him to identify himself. 

Because dispatch had informed Lieutenant Blanton that Hooten might have a firearm, 

Lieutenant Blanton instructed Hooten to raise his hands. When Hooten complied, Lieutenant 

Blanton recognized the butt of a pistol protruding from the right-side waistband of Hooten’s 

pants, and it was later determined that Hooten’s license to carry a firearm had been revoked.

Given this evidence, we conclude that Lieutenant Blanton had the reasonable 

suspicion necessary to conduct a Terry stop of Hooten, and thus we cannot conclude that the 

trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence the gun Lieutenant Blanton 

retrieved from Hooten. We therefore affirm Hooten’s conviction for Possession of a Firearm 

Without a License.

Affirmed.
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RILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.