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Rules and Regulations Federal Register

60883 

Vol. 77, No. 194 

Friday, October 5, 2012 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 29 

[Docket No. SW022; Special Conditions No. 

29–022A–SC] 

Special Conditions: Eurocopter France 

(ECF) Model EC225LP Helicopter, 

Installation of a Search and Rescue 

(SAR) Automatic Flight Control System 

(AFCS) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Amended final special 

conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions 

amend and supersede those final special 

conditions No. 29–022–SC, for the ECF 

model EC225LP helicopter, which were 

published in the Federal Register on 

November 6, 2008 (73 FR 65968). A 

notice proposing this amendment was 

published December 20, 2010 (75 FR 

79312). This amendment modifies the 

original final special conditions to 

address comments received and to 

clarify the intent of some of the 

requirements. This helicopter, as 

modified by ECF, will have novel or 

unusual design features associated with 

installing an optional SAR AFCS. The 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for these design 

features. These special conditions 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to that established by the 

existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: Effective Date: The effective date 

of these special conditions is November 

5, 2012. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

FAA, Aircraft Certification Service, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and 

Policy Group (ASW–111), Attn: Stephen 

Barbini, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort 

Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 

222–5196; facsimile (817) 222–5961. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background and Discussion 

On March 27, 2006, ECF applied for 

a change to Type Certificate (TC) No. 

H4EU to install an optional SAR AFCS 

in the model EC225LP helicopter. The 

model EC225LP is a transport category 

helicopter certificated to Category A 

requirements when configured for more 

than nine passengers and Category A or 

B requirements when configured for 

nine or less passengers. This helicopter 

is also certificated for instrument flight 

under the requirements of Appendix B 

to 14 CFR part 29, Amendment 29–47. 

The use of dedicated AFCS upper 

modes, in which a fully coupled 

autopilot provides operational SAR 

profiles, is needed for SAR operations 

conducted over water in offshore areas 

clear of obstructions. The SAR modes 

enable the helicopter pilot to fly fully 

coupled maneuvers, to include 

predefined search patterns during cruise 

flight, and to transition from cruise 

flight to a stabilized hover and 

departure (transition from hover to 

cruise flight). The SAR AFCS also 

includes an auxiliary crew control that 

allows another crewmember (such as a 

hoist operator) to have limited authority 

to control the helicopter’s longitudinal 

and lateral position during hover 

operations. 

Flight operations conducted over 

water at night may have an extremely 

limited visual horizon with little visual 

reference to the surface even when 

conducted under Visual Meteorological 

Conditions (VMC). Consequently, the 

certification requirements for SAR 

modes must meet Appendix B to 14 CFR 

part 29. While Appendix B to 14 CFR 

part 29 prescribes airworthiness criteria 

for instrument flight, it does not 

consider operations below instrument 

flight minimum speed (VMINI), whereas 

the SAR modes allow for coupled 

operations at low speed, all-azimuth 

flight to zero airspeed (hover). 

Since SAR operations have 

traditionally been a public use mission, 

the use of SAR modes in civil 

operations requires special 

airworthiness standards (special 

conditions) to ensure that a level of 

safety consistent with Category A and 

Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) 

certification is maintained. In this 

regard, 14 CFR part 29 lacks adequate 

airworthiness standards for AFCS SAR 

mode certification to include flight 

characteristics, performance, and 

installed equipment and systems. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under 14 CFR 21.101, ECF must show 

the EC225LP, as changed, continues to 

meet the applicable provisions of the 

rules incorporated by reference in TC 

No. H4EU or the applicable regulations 

in effect on the date of application for 

the change. The regulations 

incorporated by reference in the TC are 

commonly referred to as the ‘‘original 

type certification basis.’’ The regulations 

incorporated by reference in H4EU are 

as follows: 

a. 14 CFR 21.29. 

b. 14 CFR part 29 Amendments 29–1 

to 29–25; plus § 29.785 through 

Amendment 29–28; plus §§ 29.963, 

29.967, 29.973, 29.975 through 

Amendment 29–34; plus §§ 29.25, 

29.865 through Amendment 29–42; plus 

§§ 29.1, 29.2, 29.49, 29.51, 29.53, 29.55, 

29.59, 29.60, 29.61, 29.62, 29.64, 29.65, 

29.67, 29.73, 29.75, 29.77, 29.79, 29.81, 

29.83, 29.85, 29.87, 29.307, 29.337, 

29.351, 29.361, 29.391, 29.395, 29.397, 

29.401, 29.403, 29.413, 29.427, 29.501, 

29.519, 29.547, 29.549, 29.561(c), 

29.561(d), 29.563, 29.602, 29.610, 

29.613, 29.621, 29.625, 29.629, 29.631, 

29.663, 29.674, 29.727, 29.755, 29.775, 

29.783, 29.787, 29.803, 29.805, 29.807, 

29.809, 29.811, 29.855, 29.861, 29.901, 

29.903, 29.908, 29.917, 29.923, 29.927, 

29.954, 29.961, 29.965, 29.969, 29.971, 

29.991, 29.997, 29.999, 29.1001, 

29.1011, 29.1019, 29.1027, 29.1041, 

29.1043, 29.1045, 29.1047, 29.1093, 

29.1125, 29.1141, 29.1143, 29.1163, 

29.1181, 29.1189, 29.1193, 29.1305, 

29.1309, 29.1323, 29.1329, 29.1337, 

29.1351, 29.1359, 29.1415, 29.1521, 

29.1549, 29.1557, 29.1587, A29, B29, 

C29, D29 through Amendment 29–47; 

plus 29.1317 through Amendment 29– 

49. 

c. 14 CFR part 36 Amendment 21 

(ICAO Annex 16, Volume 1, Chapter 8). 

d. Equivalent Safety Findings: 

(1) TC2899RD–R–F–01; § 29.1303(j), 

Vne aural warning. 

(2) TC2899RD–R–F–02; 

§ 29.1545(b)(4), Airspeed indicators 

markings. 

(3) TC2899RD–R–F–03; § 29.1549(b), 

Powerplant instruments markings. 


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(4) TC2899RD–R–F–05; §§ 29.173, 

29.175, Static Longitudinal Stability. 

(5) TC2899RD–R–F–06; 14 CFR part 

29, Appendix B, paragraph IV; IFR 

Static Longitudinal Stability—Airspeed 

stability. 

(6) TC2899RD–R–A–01; 

§ 29.807(d)(2), Ditching emergency exits 

for passengers. 

(7) TC2899RD–R–P–01; § 29.923(a)(2), 

Rotor drive system and control 

mechanism tests. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness standards and special 

conditions, the ECF model EC225LP 

must comply with the noise certification 

requirements of 14 CFR part 36. 

Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions 

If the Administrator finds the 

applicable airworthiness standards (that 

is, 14 CFR part 29) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the ECF model EC225LP helicopter 

because of a novel or unusual design 

feature, special conditions are 

prescribed under § 21.16. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and 

they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.101. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the TC for that model 

be amended later to include any other 

model that incorporates the same novel 

or unusual design feature, or should any 

other model already included on the 

same TC be modified to incorporate the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

these special conditions would also 

apply to the other model. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The ECF model EC225LP helicopter 

will incorporate the following novel or 

unusual design features: 

The SAR system is composed of a 

navigation computer with SAR modes, 

an AFCS that provides coupled SAR 

functions, hoist operator control, a 

hover speed reference system, and two 

radio altimeters. The AFCS coupled 

SAR functions include: 

(a) Hover hold at selected height 

above the surface. 

(b) Ground speed hold. 

(c) Transition down and hover to a 

waypoint under guidance from the 

navigation computer. 

(d) SAR pattern, transition down, and 

hover near a target over which the 

helicopter has flown. 

(e) Transition up, climb, and capture 

a cruise height. 

(f) Capture and track SAR search 

patterns generated by the navigation 

computer. 

(g) Monitor the preselected hover 

height with automatic increase in 

collective if the aircraft height drops 

below the safe minimum height. 

These SAR modes are intended to be 

used over large bodies of water in areas 

clear of obstructions. Further, use of the 

SAR modes that transition down from 

cruise to hover will include operation at 

airspeeds below VMINI. 

The SAR system only entails 

navigation, flight control, and coupled 

AFCS operation of the helicopter. The 

system does not include the extra 

equipment that may be required for over 

water flight or external loads to meet 

other operational requirements. 

Discussion of Comments 

In response to the final special 

conditions with request for comments, 

No. 29–022–SC, published in the 

Federal Register on November 6, 2008 

(73 FR 65968), we received multiple 

comments from one commenter, 

AgustaWestland (AW). We responded to 

the comments and recommendations in 

the notice of proposed special 

conditions No. 29–022A–SC for the ECF 

model EC225LP helicopter installation 

of a SAR AFCS, published in the 

Federal Register on December 20, 2010 

(75 FR 79312). Because we agreed with 

some of AW’s comments, the notice 

proposed to revise the special 

conditions and clarify the intent of some 

of the requirements. 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

comment on the amendments to the 

special conditions, but no additional 

comments were received in response to 

the notice of special conditions. 

Therefore, the amended special 

conditions are being adopted as 

proposed. 

A summary of the amendments and 

clarification from the original special 

conditions published in No. 29–022–SC 

follows: 

Referring to subparagraph (a)(3), 

which deals with a Go-Around mode, 

we disagree with AW’s interpretation of 

the requirement, however we recognize 

the wording may be unclear. We made 

a change to subparagraph (a)(3) to reflect 

that the required Go-Around mode is 

pilot-selectable and the purpose is to 

interrupt any other coupled mode. We 

also clarified in subparagraph (a)(2) that 

this requirement pertains to normal SAR 

mode sequencing. 

With respect to subparagraphs (b)(3) 

and (b)(4) of the SAR Mode System 

Architecture, we concurred with AW’s 

recommendations, which is consistent 

with the requirement of subparagraph 

(b)(2). Therefore, subparagraphs (b)(3) 

and (b)(4) are revised to additionally 

require the actual groundspeed and 

actual heading to be displayed to the 

pilot. 

In AW’s reference to subparagraph 

(c)(3), we made non-substantive changes 

to improve the intent of the 

requirement. 

Additional wording was added to 

subparagraph (f)(1)(i)(C) that provides 

linkage to the minimum use height 

(MUH) determination made in 

subparagraph (c)(3). This change was 

made for clarification purposes only and 

is not intended to increase or alleviate 

the current requirements. We have also 

defined MUH in subparagraph (c)(3). 

We do not intend for the SAR AFCS to 

decouple automatically if the helicopter 

descends below MUH. 

We made some other minor changes 

to improve and clarify wording, with no 

substantive increase or decrease to the 

current requirements, as follows: 

In subparagraph (a)(1) we added 

‘‘(within the maximum demonstrated 

wind envelope)’’ to highlight that safe 

and controlled flight is required 

throughout the wind envelope. Adding 

this phrase does not change our intent 

of SAR envelope definition. 

We added, ‘‘Pilot-commanded descent 

below the safe minimum height is 

acceptable provided the alerting 

requirements in (b)(7)(i) are sufficient to 

alert the pilot of this encroachment’’ to 

subparagraph (a)(4). This clarifies that 

the SAR AFCS is permitted to descend 

below the stored or pilot-selected safe 

minimum height only when 

commanded by the pilot, provided the 

alerting requirements are sufficient to 

alert the pilot of the descent. 

We modified subparagraph (b)(6) to 

indicate that the AFCS system must 

monitor for all deviations and failures, 

not just those that create a hazard, 

which was our original intent. The 

alerting requirement does not change; a 

pilot alert is still required for all 

deviations and all failures that require 

pilot-corrective action. 

Clarified subparagraph (b)(7) by 

adding subparagraph (iii) for normal 

transitions. This makes the requirement 

more specific. 

We clarified in subparagraph (b)(8) 

that the hoist operator control has 

limited authority. 

Subparagraph (b)(8)(iii) of the current 

special condition contains two 

requirements. We have separated them, 

so subparagraph (b)(8)(iii) only contains 

the hoist operator control 

noninterference requirement and 

subparagraph (b)(8)(iv) contains the 

pilot override criteria for the hoist 

control. 

We modified subparagraph (d)(2) by 

deleting ‘‘danger of’’ from the first 

sentence. This change does not alter the 

intent of this requirement. 


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Subparagraph (d)(3)(iii)(B) was 

modified to incorporate more general 

terms to clarify the requirement. 

We changed subparagraph (b)(10) to 

state a functional hazard assessment 

must address all failure conditions, not 

just those that represent catastrophic 

failure conditions. This change makes 

this SAR special condition requirement 

consistent with the requirements of 

§ 29.1309. 

We changed the second paragraph in 

subparagraph (e)(1)(ii) to a note. This 

‘‘note’’ provides information only and is 

better characterized as a ‘‘note.’’ The 

original wording was always intended 

to stand as a note, but it was not 

previously marked as one. 

We removed the parenthetical from 

subparagraph (g)(4) as it is not needed. 

The intent of this requirement has not 

changed. 

Finally, we clarified subparagraphs 

(g)(4)(i) and (g)(4)(ii), by changing 

‘‘transition,’’ ‘‘hover,’’ and ‘‘cruise’’ to 

‘‘transition modes,’’ ‘‘hover modes,’’ and 

‘‘cruise modes,’’ respectively. This 

general wording allows an applicant 

more flexibility in the use of SAR mode 

terminology. 

Applicability 

These special conditions apply to the 

ECF model EC225LP helicopters. 

Should ECF apply at a later date for a 

change to the TC to include another 

model incorporating the same novel or 

unusual design feature, these special 

conditions would apply to that model as 

well under the provisions of § 21.101(d). 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

of helicopter. It is not a rule of general 

applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29 

Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701– 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the type certification 

basis for Eurocopter France model 

EC225LP helicopter, Type Certificate 

No. H4EU, is amended by removing 

Special Condition No. 29–022–SC from 

Docket No. SW022 (published in 73 FR 

65968, November 6, 2088) and adding 

the following special conditions (No. 

29–022A–SC) to the type certification 

basis when the optional Search and 

Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight Control 

System (AFCS) is installed: 

In addition to the part 29 certification 

requirements for Category A and 

helicopter instrument flight (Appendix 

B), the following additional 

requirements must be met for 

certification of the SAR AFCS: 

(a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled 

SAR flight modes must provide: 

(1) Safe and controlled flight in three 

axes (lateral and longitudinal position/ 

speed and height/vertical speed) at all 

airspeeds from instrument flight 

minimum speed (VMINI) to a hover 

(within the maximum demonstrated 

wind envelope). 

(2) Automatic transition to the 

helicopter instrument flight (Appendix 

B) envelope as part of the normal SAR 

mode sequencing. 

(3) A pilot-selectable Go-Around 

mode that safely interrupts any other 

coupled mode and automatically 

transitions to the helicopter instrument 

flight (Appendix B) envelope. 

(4) A means to prevent unintended 

flight below a safe minimum height. 

Pilot-commanded descent below the 

safe minimum height is acceptable 

provided the alerting requirements in 

(b)(7)(i) are sufficient to alert the pilot 

of this descent below safe minimum 

height. 

(b) SAR Mode System Architecture. 

To support the integrity of the SAR 

modes, the following system 

architecture is required: 

(1) A system for limiting the engine 

power demanded by the AFCS when 

any of the automatic piloting modes are 

engaged, so full authority digital engine 

control (FADEC) power limitations, 

such as torque and temperature, are not 

exceeded. 

(2) A system providing the aircraft 

height above the surface and final pilotselected height at a location on the 

instrument panel in a position 

acceptable to the FAA that will make it 

plainly visible to and usable by any 

pilot at their station. 

(3) A system providing the aircraft 

heading and the pilot-selected heading 

at a location on the instrument panel in 

a position acceptable to the FAA that 

will make it plainly visible to and 

usable by any pilot at their station. 

(4) A system providing the aircraft 

longitudinal and lateral ground speeds 

and the pilot-selected longitudinal and 

lateral ground speeds when used by the 

AFCS in the flight envelope where 

airspeed indications become unreliable. 

This information must be presented at a 

location on the instrument panel in a 

position acceptable to the FAA that is 

plainly visible to and usable by any 

pilot at their station. 

(5) A system providing wind speed 

and wind direction when automatic 

piloting modes are engaged or 

transitioning from one mode to another. 

(6) A system that monitors for flight 

guidance deviations and failures with 

an appropriate alerting function that 

enables the flight crew to take 

appropriate corrective action. 

(7) An alerting system must provide 

visual or aural alerts, or both, to the 

flight crew under any of the following 

conditions: 

(i) When the stored or pilot-selected 

safe minimum height is reached. 

(ii) When a SAR mode system 

malfunction occurs. 

(iii) When the AFCS changes modes 

automatically from one SAR mode to 

another. 

Note: For normal transitions from one SAR 

mode to another, a single visual or aural alert 

may suffice. For a SAR mode malfunction or 

a mode having a time-critical component, the 

flight crew alerting system must activate 

early enough to allow the flight crew to take 

timely and appropriate action. The alerting 

system means must be designed to alert the 

flight crew in order to minimize crew errors 

that could create an additional hazard. 

(8) The SAR system hoist operator 

control is considered a flight control 

with limited authority and must comply 

with the following: 

(i) The hoist operator control must be 

designed and located to provide for 

convenient operation and to prevent 

confusion and inadvertent operation. 

(ii) The helicopter must be safely 

controllable by the hoist operator 

control throughout the range of that 

control. 

(iii) The hoist operator control may 

not interfere with the safe operation of 

the helicopter. 

(iv) Pilot and copilot flight controls 

must be able to smoothly override the 

control authority of the hoist operator 

control, without exceptional piloting 

skill, alertness, or strength, and without 

the danger of exceeding any other 

limitation because of the override. 

(9) The reliability of the AFCS must 

be related to the effects of its failure. 

The occurrence of any failure condition 

that would prevent continued safe flight 

and landing must be extremely 

improbable. For any failure condition of 

the AFCS which is not shown to be 

extremely improbable: 

(i) The helicopter must be safely 

controllable and capable of continued 

safe flight without exceptional piloting 

skill, alertness, or strength. Additional 

unrelated probable failures affecting the 

control system must be evaluated. 

(ii) The AFCS must be designed so 

that it cannot create a hazardous 

deviation in the flight path or produce 

hazardous loads on the helicopter 

during normal operation or in the event 


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of a malfunction or failure, assuming 

corrective action begins within an 

appropriate period of time. Where 

multiple systems are installed, 

subsequent malfunction conditions 

must be evaluated in sequence unless 

their occurrence is shown to be 

improbable. 

(10) A functional hazard assessment 

(FHA) and a system safety assessment 

must be provided to address the failure 

conditions associated with SAR 

operations. For SAR catastrophic failure 

conditions, changes may be required to 

the following: 

(i) System architecture. 

(ii) Software and complex electronic 

hardware design assurance levels. 

(iii) High Intensity Radiated Field 

(HIRF) test levels. 

(iv) Instructions for continued 

airworthiness. 

The assessments must consider all the 

systems required for SAR operations to 

include the AFCS, all associated AFCS 

sensors (for example, radio altimeter), 

and primary flight displays. Electrical 

and electronic systems with SAR 

catastrophic failure conditions (for 

example, AFCS) must comply with the 

§ 29.1317(a)(4) HIRF requirements. 

(c) SAR Mode Performance 

Requirements. 

(1) The SAR modes must be 

demonstrated in the requested flight 

envelope for the following minimum 

sea-state and wind conditions: 

(i) Sea State: Wave height of 2.5 

meters (8.2 feet), considering both short 

and long swells. 

(ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind; 17 

knots for all other azimuths. 

(2) The selected hover height and 

hover velocity must be captured (to 

include the transition from one captured 

mode to another captured mode) 

accurately and smoothly and not exhibit 

any significant overshoot or oscillation. 

(3) For any single failure or any 

combination of failures of the AFCS that 

is not shown to be extremely 

improbable, the recovery must not result 

in a loss of height greater than half of 

the minimum use height (MUH) with a 

minimum margin of 15 feet above the 

surface. MUH is the minimum height at 

which any SAR AFCS mode can be 

engaged. 

(4) The SAR mode system must be 

usable up to the maximum certified 

gross weight of the aircraft or to the 

lower of the following weights: 

(i) Maximum emergency flotation 

weight. 

(ii) Maximum hover Out-of-Ground 

Effect (OGE) weight. 

(iii) Maximum demonstrated weight. 

(d) Flight Characteristics. 

(1) The basic aircraft must meet all the 

part 29 airworthiness criteria for 

helicopter instrument flight (Appendix 

B). 

(2) For SAR mode coupled flight 

below VMINI, at the maximum 

demonstrated winds, the helicopter 

must be able to maintain any required 

flight condition and make a smooth 

transition from any flight condition to 

any other flight condition without 

requiring exceptional piloting skill, 

alertness, or strength, and without 

exceeding the limit load factor. This 

requirement also includes aircraft 

control through the hoist operator’s 

control. 

(3) For SAR modes at airspeeds below 

VMINI, the following requirements of 

Appendix B to part 29 must be met and 

will be used as an extension to the IFR 

certification envelope of the basic 

aircraft: 

(i) Static Longitudinal Stability: The 

requirements of paragraph IV of 

Appendix B are not applicable. 

(ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability: 

The requirements of paragraph V of 

Appendix B are not applicable. 

(iii) Dynamic Stability: The 

requirements of paragraph VI of 

Appendix B are replaced with the 

following two paragraphs: 

(A) Any oscillation must be damped 

and any aperiodic response must not 

double in amplitude in less than 10 

seconds. This requirement must also be 

met with degraded upper mode(s) of the 

AFCS. An ‘‘upper mode’’ is a mode that 

utilizes a fully coupled autopilot to 

provide an operational SAR profile. 

(B) After any upset, the AFCS must 

return the aircraft to the last 

commanded position within 10 seconds 

or less. 

(4) With any of the upper mode(s) of 

the AFCS engaged, the pilot must be 

able to manually recover the aircraft and 

transition to the normal (Appendix B) 

IFR flight profile envelope without 

exceptional skill, alertness, or strength. 

(e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI) 

Performance Information. 

(1) The following performance 

information must be provided in the 

Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement 

(RFMS): 

(i) OEI performance information and 

emergency procedures, providing the 

maximum weight that will provide a 

minimum clearance of 15 feet above the 

surface, following failure of the critical 

engine in a hover. The maximum weight 

must be presented as a function of the 

hover height for the temperature and 

pressure altitude range requested for 

certification. The effects of wind must 

be reflected in the hover performance 

information. 

(ii) Hover OGE performance with the 

critical engine inoperative for OEI 

continuous and time-limited power 

ratings for those weights, altitudes, and 

temperatures for which certification is 

requested. 

Note: These OEI performance requirements 

do not replace performance requirements that 

may be needed to comply with the 

airworthiness or operational standards 

(§ 29.865 or 14 CFR part 133) for external 

loads or human external cargo. 

(f) RFMS. 

(1) The RFMS must contain, at a 

minimum: 

(i) Limitations necessary for safe 

operation of the SAR system to include: 

(A) Minimum crew requirements. 

(B) Maximum SAR weight. 

(C) Engagement criteria for each of the 

SAR modes to include MUH (as 

determined in subparagraph (c)(3)). 

(ii) Normal and emergency procedures 

for operation of the SAR system (to 

include operation of the hoist operator 

control), with AFCS failure modes, 

AFCS degraded modes, and engine 

failures. 

(iii) Performance information: 

(A) OEI performance and height-loss. 

(B) Hover OGE performance 

information, utilizing OEI continuous 

and time-limited power ratings. 

(C) The maximum wind envelope 

demonstrated in flight test. 

(g) Flight Demonstration. 

(1) Before approval of the SAR 

system, an acceptable flight 

demonstration of all the coupled SAR 

modes is required. 

(2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe 

operations during coupled maneuvers. 

The demonstration of fail-safe 

operations must include a pilot 

workload assessment associated with 

manually flying the aircraft to an 

altitude greater than 200 feet above the 

surface and an airspeed of at least the 

best rate of climb airspeed (Vy). 

(3) For any failure condition of the 

SAR system not shown to be extremely 

improbable, the pilot must be able to 

make a smooth transition from one 

flight mode to another without 

exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 

strength. 

(4) Failure conditions that are not 

shown to be extremely improbable must 

be demonstrated by analysis, ground 

testing, or flight testing. For failures 

demonstrated in flight, the following 

normal pilot recovery times are 

acceptable: 

(i) Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/ 

Hover-to-Cruise) and Hover modes: 

Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second. 

(ii) Cruise modes: Normal pilot 

recognition plus 3 seconds. 

(5) All AFCS malfunctions must 

include evaluation at the low-speed and 


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high-power flight conditions typical of 

SAR operations. Additionally, AFCS 

hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory 

malfunctions, particularly in yaw, 

require evaluation. AFCS malfunction 

testing must include a single or a 

combination of failures (for example, 

erroneous data from and loss of the 

radio altimeter, attitude, heading, and 

altitude sensors) which are not shown to 

be extremely improbable. 

(6) The flight demonstration must 

include the following environmental 

conditions: 

(i) Swell into wind. 

(ii) Swell and wind from different 

directions. 

(iii) Cross swell. 

(iv) Swell of different lengths (short 

and long swell). 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on September 

25, 2012. 

Kimberly K. Smith, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–24676 Filed 10–4–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0798; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–CE–023–AD; Amendment 

39–17208; AD 2012–20–02] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Alpha 

Aviation Concept Limited Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for Alpha 

Aviation Concept Limited Model R2160 

Airplanes. This AD results from 

mandatory continuing airworthiness 

information (MCAI) issued by an 

aviation authority of another country to 

identify and correct an unsafe condition 

on an aviation product. The MCAI 

describes the unsafe condition as 

possible installation of non-conforming 

air filter elements that are not fitted 

with metallic mesh and could internally 

collapse resulting in disruption of the 

powerplant operation. We are issuing 

this AD to require actions to address the 

unsafe condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective November 9, 

2012. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of November 9, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Alpha Aviation, 59 

Hautapu Road, RD 1, Cambridge 3493, 

New Zealand; telephone: +64 7 827 

0528; fax: +64 7 929 2878; Internet: 

www.alphaaviation.co.nz/ 

publications.shtml. You may review 

copies of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Small Airplane 

Directorate, 901 Locust, Kansas City, 

Missouri 64106. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call (816) 329–4148. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl 

Schletzbaum, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, 

Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, 

Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; 

telephone: (816) 329–4146; fax: (816) 

329–4090; email: 

karl.schletzbaum@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on July 30, 2012 (77 FR 44511). 

That NPRM proposed to correct an 

unsafe condition for the specified 

products. The MCAI states: 

This emergency AD with the effective date 

11 June 2012 is prompted by a report from 

EASA of finding a non conforming air filter 

fitted to an overseas aircraft during 

maintenance. Investigation revealed that air 

filters with P/N 57.34.00.010 supplied by 

CEAPR between June 2009 and April 2012 

may not have the metallic mesh inside the 

filter. This AD mandates an inspection of air 

filters with P/N 57.34.00.010 to determine if 

a metallic mesh is fitted. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

received no comments on the NPRM or 

on the determination of the cost to the 

public. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

as proposed. We have determined that 

these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM (77 FR 

44511, July 30, 2012) for correcting the 

unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM (77 FR 44511, 

July 30, 2012). 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 

10 products of U.S. registry. We also 

estimate that it will take about .5 workhour per product to comply with the 

basic requirements of this AD. The 

average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. 

Based on these figures, we estimate 

the cost of this AD on U.S. operators to 

be $425, or 42.50 per product. 

In addition, we estimate that any 

necessary follow-on actions will take 

about .5 work-hour and require parts 

costing $100 for a cost of $142.50 per 

product. We have no way of 

determining the number of products 

that may need these actions. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

the DOT Regulatory Policies and 


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