### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 12-30026 Summary Calendar

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Plaintiff-Appellee
v. ROBERT NAMER Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

CV No. 89-1740

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and ELROD, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Robert Namer appeal s t he judgment of the district court approving the renewal of the United Sta t e ’ s judgment liens created in this matter under the provisions of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act, 28 U.S. C

. § 3201(c)(2)(B). Namer argues that the money judgment dated November 8, 1991 became invalid and unenforceable ten years later on November 8, 2001, as it was U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D July 26, 2 012 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Pursua nt to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm inedt hat this op inion s houldnot * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 12-30026 Document: 00511935224 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/26/2012No. 12-30026

never revived within ten years after it was rendered as required by Louis i ana Civil Code Article 3501. This argument is without merit. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1 ) p rovi d e s th at th e f e d eral government ' s e nf

o rcement by writ of execution "must accord with the procedures of the state where the court is located," that Rule goes on t o p r o vide that notwithstanding this directiv e , "a federal statute governs to the extent it applies." Fed R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). The Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990 ("FDCPA") is such a statute. The FDCPA provides that, w i t h the exception of conflicting federal law, it "provides the exclusive civil procedures for the United States to

. . . recover a judgment on a debt." 28 U.S.C. § 3001. T he judgment liens at issue in this case are “debts” within the meaning of the FDCPA. Federal Trade Commission v. National Business Consultants, Inc. , 376 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 2004) (an earlier proceeding in this case). The FDCPA further Provides that it "shall preempt State law to the extent such law is inconsistent." 28 U.S.C. § 3003(d). The Louisiana state law N a m e r relies on, Louisiana Civil Code Article 3501, clearly conflicts with th e p r o vi sions of the FDCPA. It provides that a money judgment “i s p r e s c ribed by the lapse of ten years from its signing” although any party having an interest in the judgment ma y h ave it revived before it prescribes, as provided in Article 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Id. In contrast, the FDCPA provides for the duration of liens as follows: (c) Duration of lien; renewal. ( 1 ) E x c e p t as provided in paragr a p h ( 2 ) , a l i e n c r e a t e d u n d e r subsection (a) is effective, unless satisfied, for a period of 20 years
.

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(2) Such lien may be renewed for one additional period of 20 years upon filing a notice of renewal in the same manner as the judgment is filed and shall relate back to the date the judgment is filed if– (A) the notice of renewal is filed before the expiration of the 20-year period to prevent the expiration of the lien; and (B) the court approves the renewal of su c h lien under this paragraph.
28 U.S.C. § 32 0 1 (emphasis added). Louisiana Civil Code Article 3501, which would preclude enforcement of the judgment after ten ye a r s from the entry of that judgment u n l e s s t imely revived, is such an inconsistent state law and is, therefore, preempted. The FDCPA allows twenty years for r e newal of judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 3201. Further, because the purpose of the FDCPA "is to create a comprehensive statutory framework for the collection of debts owed to the United States government [and to] improve the efficiency and speed in collecting those debts," H.R. Rep. No. 101-736, at 32 (1990), a state law limiting such collection is inconsistent with the purpose of the act and is, therefore, preempted.
United States v. Gianelli , 543 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 2008) (dealing with California law precluding enforcement of a judgment when 10 years has passed since the judgment was entered). We agree with Gianelli on the following point as well. Although not binding upon us, the reasoning of United St a t e s v. Pierce , 231 B.R. 890, 893 (E.D.N.C. 1998) supports our conclusion. In Pierc e, the district court rejected the argument that where the government proceeded to enf o r c e a judgment under the FDCPA, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) incorporate d a s tate law limitation prohibiting enforcement after ten years. Id

. That court reasoned that, in light of the legislative history u n d erlying the

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FDCPA and the la n guage of the statute itself, binding the federal government to state law lim i t ations on enforcement "would completely thwa r t t h e FDCPA's stated purpose of the creation of uniform federal procedures for the collection of debts to the federal government." Id

. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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