### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 23, 200 8 S es sio n
REG IONS FIN AN CIA L C ORP ORA TION, a Succ essor to UN ION PLANTERS CORPORAT IO N AND SUBSIDI ARIES v. MARSH USA, I NC., ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forShelb y County No. CT-000906-06 R obert L. Childers, Judge

No. W2008-00323-C OA-R3-C V - Filed February 19, 2009

On appe al, Reg ions Financ ial Corporation (“Reg ions”) asserts numerous reasons why the doctrine s of re s judicata and collater al estoppel should not bar its c laim ag ainst the Def endants National Union Fire I nsur ance Company

of Pittsburgh, Pa. (“National Union”) St. P aul Merc ury Insuranc e Company (“ St. Pa ul” ), and Tw in City F ir e I ns ur anc e Com pa ny (“ Tw in C ity” ) ( c oll e c tiv e ly “ De fe nd ant E xce ss I nsurer s”). Reg ions origina lly sued De fenda

nts in feder al cour

t seekingin d em nification pursua nt to i ts i ns ur anc e c on tr a c t, a nd the Di str ic t Co ur

t g ra nte d D e fe nd ant s su mm ary jud g me nt b e c a

us e Re g ion s f a ile d to g ive sim

ult ane ou s n oti c e . Re g io ns ha s n owsu e d D e fe nd ant E xce ss I ns ur e rs in circ uit court for br eac h of the same insurance contra ct. Reg ions claims that during the fe dera l court appea l it dis cover ed new

evidenc e th a

t i t h a d g iven simultaneous notice to Def endant Excess Insurer s throug h their ag ent. Reg ions claims, however , that it could not have disc overe d this evidence ear lier beca use De fenda

nt Ex cess Insurer s conce aled the a g ency re l at ionship. The trial court g rante d De fe nd ant E xce ss I ns ur e rs ’ mot ion s for summa ry jud g me nt on the ba sis of re s ju dic a ta . We a ff ir m.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ff

ir me d; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., joined. John McQuiston, Memphis, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Regions Financial Corporation.

H. Frede rick Humbra cht, Jr., Na shville, Tennessee , for the a ppellee, N ational Union Fire Insurance Company of Pitts burgh, PA.

John R. Ri ddle, Dallas Te xas, Joseph T. Ge tz, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the appellee , The St. Paul Me rc ury I ns ur a nc e Compa ny , a ndMic ha e l G . M c La re n and Vi ckie H ard y J on e s, Me mph is, Tenne ssee, f

or the a ppellee, T win City F ire Insur ance Company.

OP IN IONIt w as act u al l y U n i o n Plant ers th a t c o n t ract ed w i t h M ars h U SA , bu t as o f J u n e 2 9 , 20 0 5 , U n i o n Plant ers 1
C o rp o ra tio n m e rg e d in to R e g io n s F in a n c ia l C o rp o ra tio n . T o a v o id u n n e c e ssa ry c o m p lica tio n , w e w ill sim p ly re fe r to bo t h ent i t i es as “Regi on s

. ”

R eg i o n s also fil ed t h i s su i t ag ain st Jo sep h L am m el, an em p l o y ee at M arsh

. R eg i o n s’ all eg ati o n s ag ain st 2
L am m el g en era l l y m i rro r i t s claim s a g ain st M arsh . T h e d i st i n cti o n b etw ee n th e t w o is n o t si g n i fican t t o t h i s ap p ea l , so
w e w ill re fe r to b o th e n tit ie s a s “ M a rs h .”

Regi ons a nd M ar s h r ene w ed t hi s a gr ee m ent i n Sept em ber 2000, O ct ober 2001, O ct ober 2002, and J une 2003. 3

-2-

Background and Proc edural History Plaintiff/Appellant Reg ions F inancial Corporation (“Reg ions”) filed this law suit in S helby County Circuit Court on Febr

uary 21, 2006 (“Shelby County suit”). The basis of t he sui t was that R egi o n s s o u gh ti n d em n i f i c a t i o nfr o mi t s i n s ure rs fo r s ev er al m o n et ary l o s s es i ts u s t ai n edt h ro u gh mortg ag e fr aud and liability claims. Although Reg ions orig inally sued various differ ent parties, the only Def endants on this appea l are Reg ions’ excess insurers.

A. T h e I n s u ra n ce Cl a i ms Reg ions and Mar sh USA (“Ma rsh”) contra cted on J une 1, 1999, for Ma rsh to compile an 1 2 insurance policy

for Reg ions. Marsh ne g otiated a blende d insurance program that included

3 Continental Casualty

Co. (“CNA” ) as Reg ions’ primary insurer a nd a thre e-tier

ex cess insura

nce prog ram from Def

endant Ex cess I nsurer s. CNA’s primary policy insured Reg ions up to $25 million, and De fe n d an t National Union insured Reg ions for an a dditional $25 mil lion once Reg ions had exhausted its primary

policy (first excess tier). Def

endant St. Paul insured Reg ions for anothe r $25 mil lio n a bo ve the CN A a

nd Natio na l Un ion po lic ie s (s e c on d e xce ss tie r) , a nd De fe nd ant T wi n Ci ty insured Reg ions f

or $25 milli on more above St. Paul’s limit (third excess tier); ea ch excess insuranc e po lic y re qu ir e d Re g ion s to e xha us t th e lim its of

the un de rly in g po lic ie s b e fo re the ins ur e r m us t indemnify Reg ions f

or any loss. National Union and St. Paul also require d Reg ions to give it notice simult aneously with a

ny notice g iven under

the primary

policy , and Twin City ’s policy included a integ ration cla

use that incorpora

ted the underly

ing policies and obligated the insured to g ive notice pursuant to the under ly ing insura nce pr ovisions.

Be t we en 1 9 9 9 an d

2 0 0 1 , R egi o n s ex t en d eda r un n i n g l i n e o f cr ed i tt o Gr ea t s t o n e, a m o rt gage bankingcompany . After Gre atstone def

aulted on its loans in 2001, Reg ions discovere d that Gre atstone had f

org ed many

of the borr o we r’ s s i g nature s to procure advanc es and G reatstone’s principals had per m an en t ly reloc ated to Costa Rica with those adva nces ( “the Gr eatstone loss”)

. Reg ions claims that, to rec oup its loss, it g ave notice t o CNA on September 20, 2001, a nd filed a formal c omplaint with CNA around Febr uary 15, 2002. Reg ions also claims that it gave De fenda nt Ex cess Insurer s notice and proof of loss through its ag ent, Marsh. Reg ions alleg es that Mar sh sent a letter to Defe ndant Excess I nsurer s g iving notice on Marc h 12, 2002; Defe ndant Excess I nsurer s all deny rec eiving that letter. CNA denied Regions’ claim around March 19, 2002, and in Novembe r 2002 Reg ions filed suit in federa l district court.-3-

Reg ions also seeks indemnification for three other insura nce claims that it claims should be
cover ed by

its policies with Def

endant Ex cess I nsurer s. These three claims, which R eg ions dubs the “Ea st Main Ba

ptist C hurch li t i gat ion,” the “Conne rs suit” and “ the SBU litig ation,” ar ise from separ ate loan losses that arose dur ing the policy period. Reg ion s al l ege s that it advised Marsh of the se po te nti a l c la ims , r e qu e ste d th a t Ma rs h g ive CN A n oti c e of

the c la ims , a

nd so ug ht t o k

no w i f the excess insurer s must also be notified. In its complaint, Regions alleg es that it notified Marsh of the ong oing E ast Main Ba ptist C hurch litig ation on J uly 13, 2000, the Conners suit on Fe bruar y 23, 2001, and of the SBU litigation on August 24, 2000.

B. Th e Lawsu its

Fr om the issues raised on a ppeal it is appar ent that Reg ions filed multipl e suits re sulting fr om its Greatstone loss. In May 2002, Regi o n s fi l ed sui t ag ainst its primary insurer, CNA, in f

eder al court in the Western D istrict of Tenne ssee ( “District Court”)

. Final judgme nt was ente red w ith the Di str ic t Co ur

t in Au g us t 2004

. Whil e po st- jud g me nt m oti on s w e re pe nd ingwi th t he Di str ic t Co ur

t, the State of Ne w York f

iled a complaint in a New York state cour t ag ainst Marsh alleg ing that it was
secr etly rec eiving pay

ments from the pa

rent c ompanies of De fe n d an ts. Marsh and the N ew Yor k Attor ne y Gen eral re a c he d a

se ttl e me nt o n Jan

ua ry 30 , 2 00 5, and

Mars h p a id Unio n Pl ante rs , Reg ions’ prede cessor , $190,108.80 pursuant to this settlement in September 2005. Meanwhile, the Di str ic t Co ur

t di sp os e d o f t

he pa rt ie s’ po st-

jud g me nt m oti on s o n June 6, 20 05 , a nd Un ion Plante rs , Reg ions’ prede cessor , immediately filed notice of

appea l to the Si x t h C i rcuit. I n Fe bruar y 2006, while the fe dera l proce eding s were pendingin the Six th Circuit, Regions then f iled the Shelby County Sui t f ro m w hic h th is a

pp e a l pr oc e e ds . A y e ar late r, on F e br ua ry 27 , 200 7, the Sixth C ir c uit aff irmed t h e Di s trict Court. Subsequently , the trial cour t gr anted De fenda

nt Ex cess Insurer s summary judgme nt in the Shelby

County suit on the basis of res judicata and c ollatera l estoppel.

i. DistrictCourt P roce edings

We r e vie w e a c h o f t

he se pr oc e e din g s c hr on olo g ic a lly , b e g inn ingwi th R e g ion s’ law su it i n the fe dera l court. Reg ions first filed sui t in the W estern District of Tenne ssee a g ainst CNA claiming diversity jurisdiction and alleg ing that the Greatstone los s was covere d in Section E of t he par ty ’s
c on tr a c t a s a los s re su lti ngfr om f ra ud and that CN A w a s in

br e a c h o f t

he ir c on tr a c t by

re fu sin g to ind e mni fy

Re g ion s f

or that lo ss. Re g ion s th e n ame nd e d its co mpl a int on Oc tob e r 11, 20 02 , to joi n Def endant Excess Insurer s as par ties and alleg e that its agen t , M arsh, g ave notice to Defe ndant Ex cess I nsurer s, entitling it to indemnification under the e x cess policies if its loss exceede d CNA’s policy limit s. I n both complaints, R egions soug ht a judg ment decla ring its rights and oblig ations under the contra ct and e nforc ement of the contra ct in the form of a monetar

y judgme nt.
The District Court ente red a n order on August 25, 2004, gr anting Re gi o n s ’ m o tion for
s u m mary judgme nt ag ainst CNA and g rantingDef endant Excess Insurer s’ motions for summary judgme nt ag ai n s t Reg ions. The District Court found that Reg ions ga ve CNA notice of the Gre atstone loss on September 20, 2001 a nd submitt ed for

mal do cu m en t ati on of its claim to CNA
on F e br ua ry 15 , 2 00 2. Re g ion s c la ime d th a t it s a g e nt, Ma rs h, g ave no tic e to D e fe nd ant E xce ssT h e D i st ri ct C o u rt al so n o t ed t h at D efen d an t E x cess Insurers d en i ed recei v i n g t h i s l et t er. 4

-4- I nsurer s via letter on March 12, 2002. Viewing the facts in the l ight most favor able to R eg ions, the 4 District Court acc epted Reg ions’ argument that it g ave CNAnotice on F ebrua ry 15th and that it ga

ve De fe nd ant E xce ss I

ns ur e rs no tic e on

Marc h 1 2th ; th e Di str ic t Co ur t st ill he ld, ho we ve r, that a twenty -five da

y delay was not simultaneous notice. Be cause simult aneous notice wa s a condition pr e c e de nt o f R e g ion s’ ins ur anc e c on tr a c ts w ithDe fe nd ant Ex cess I nsur e rs and Re g ion s f

a ile d to g ive that notice, the D istrict Court held t h at De fenda nt Ex cess Insurer s were entitled to summary jud g me nt. On September

8, 2004, Reg ions filed a post-judg ment motion to alter or amend the District Court’s judgme nt pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 59 or, in the a lternative, f or re lief fr om judgme nt pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 60. Essentially , Reg ions argued for the District Court to alter or

amend its dec ision that there wa s not simul taneous notice as an e rror of law or as be ing ma

nifestly unjust, and Reg ions r equeste d that the District Court c ertify the issue to the Tenne ssee Supre me Court. The District Court, howe ver, de nied both req u es t s o n J une 9, 2005. Reg ions filed notice of a

ppeal to the Six th Circuit on J uly 6, 2005.

ii. New York Law suits

I n the meantime, the State of New Y ork was investigating Marsh’s relationship with various ins ur anc e c omp anie s. I n an e nti re ly unre late d pr oc e e din g , Ne w Y or k’ s A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l f ile d s uit ag ainst Marsh in October 2004 alleg ing fra udulent business prac tices, antitrust violations, securities fra ud, unjust enrichment, and common law fraud. The essenc e of the Attorney Gene ral’s c omplaint
wa s th a t M ar s h c o n t r a c t e d w i t h c l i e n t s t o p r o c ur e i n s ur an c e p o l i c i e s f o r th e m , c l a i m i n g th a t it
a dv o c a t e d

o nt h e c l i e n t ’ s b e h a l f an d n o t r e p r e s e n t i n g i n s ur an c e c o mp an i e s , w h i l e , s i m u l t an e o u s l y, Marsh re ceive d conting ent commissions from the insuranc e compa nies and stee red its clients towar d
cer tain companies based on those c ommissi ons. Marsh settled with the Attorne y Gene ral on January 30 , 2 00 5. Pur su ant t o th is a g re e me nt, Ma rsh was to p ay

$8 50 ,0 00 ,0 00 .0 0, pr op or tio nate ly , to its policy holders and unde rtake various business ref orms. As one of Ma

rsh’s policy

holders, Reg ions
rec eived $190,108.80 f

rom the settlement ac count. Reg ions c laims that it only lear ned in September 2 0 0 5 , when it re ceive d pay ment pursuant to Marsh’ s settlement ag ree ment with the Attorney Gene ral, that De fenda

nt Ex cess Insurer s paid Marsh c ontinge nt commissions

.

iii. S ixth Circuit Appeal

After filing its notice of

appea l, Reg ions filed a mot ion with the Six th Circuit requestingthat it c e rt if y to t he Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court the le g a l qu e sti on

wh e ther a

n in sura nc e c omp any

mus t sh ow tha t itw a s a c tu a l l y

p r e j u d i c e d b y l a t e n o t i c e i no r d e r

t o d e f e a tc o v e r a g e

. T h e S i xthC i r c u it denied that motion on Fe bruar y 1, 2006. The parties argued before the Six th Circuit on Dece mber 5, 2006, and the Six th Circuit affirme d on Fe b ru ary 27, 2007. Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Continental C

as. Co. , 478 F.3d 759 (6th Cir. 2007). The Sixt h Circuit upheld the District Court’s deter mination that Reg ions could not enforc e its insurance contra cts with Defe ndant Excess I nsurer s-5-

beca use it failed to meet the c ondition prece dents of the c ontrac ts– namely , a twenty -five da y delay did not constitut e simultaneous notice to t h e ex ce ss insurers. The Six th Circuit also ag ree d that Te nn e sse e law wo uld no t excu se no nc omp lia nc e wi th the no tic e pr ov isi on e ve n if De fe nd ant E xce ss In s u r e r s w e r e n o tp r e

j u d i c e d b y t h e d e l ay.
iv. She lbyCo unt y Sui t Although Re g ions filed its S helby County suit i n Fe b ruar

y 2006 while its appea l was pendingwith the Six th Circ uit, the trial court did not issue any order s on the matter until afte r the Six th Circuit render ed its decision. In the Shelby C ounty suit, Regions alleg ed in its origina l complaint that Marsh bre ache d its contract with Reg ions, was profe ssionally neg lige nt in monit oring Reg ions’ losses and providingnotice ther eof, a nd neg li gen t l y m i srepr esente d that it had g iven Def endant E xc e s s I n s u r e r s n o ti c e

. I nit s f o urth c la im f o r r e li e f , Re g io n s a ll e g e d

th a t D e f endant E x ce s s I n s u re rs b re ac h edt h ei r c o n t ra ct s wi thR egi o n s b y “f ai l i n g an d re fu s i n g t o p ro v i d e c o v er age t o [ R egi o n s ]

. ” A l t h o u ghR egi o n s fi l edan Am en d ed C o mp l ai n ti nFe b ru ary 2 0 0 6 , i td i d

n o tal l ege any new c auses of

action.

On Au g us t 24 , 2 00 7, Re g ion s f ile d a mot ion to a me nd the ame nd e d co mp lai nt an d f ir st alleg es that De fenda

nt E x cess I nsurer s induced Marsh to brea ch its contrac t with Regions. Reg ions
a lso a lle g e d in

its mot ion

tha t Ma rs h w a s b oth it s agent and De fe nd ant E xce ss I

ns ur e rs ’ a g e nt, so when Reg ions gav e M arsh notice of the Gr eatstone c laims that also constituted notice to the Def endant Excess Insurer s. On September 4, 2007, Re g ions actually fi l ed No t i ce of its Proposed Amendment to the First Amended Compl aint in the S helby County suit. Reg ions formally alleg ed that Def endant Ma

rsh bre ache d its fiduc iary duty of loy alty to Re g ions by acting as an undisclose d, paid ag ent of Def

endant Ex cess I nsurer s. Reg ions a lso a sserted that Def endant Ex cess I n s u rer s ind uc e d M ars h to br e a c h it s c on tr a c tua l f idu c iary ob lig a tio n to Re g ion s. Re g ion s r e qu e ste d tr e ble damag es and attorney

fee s ag ainst Defe ndant Excess Insurer s pursuant to Tenne ssee c ommon law, Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 47-50-109, and Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 47- 18-101 et. seq., a s an unfair or dece ptive prac tice. Four months late r, Reg ions f iled a revised notice of the p ro posed
ame ndme nt t o it s f

ir st a me nd e d c omp la int

lim iti ngits ind

uc e me nt to br e a c h of co ntr a c t c la im s ole ly ag ainst Defe ndant National Union a nd abandoning i ts Consum er Protec tion Act argument
c omp le te ly . Re g ion s fi le d a se c on d re vis e d no tic e on Janu ary 15 , 20 08 , f ur the r a rt ic ulatin g the same claims that it alleg ed in its first revised notice

. The trial c ourt denied Reg ions’ Motion to Am en dits Amended Complaint and g rante d De fe nd ants ’ p e nd ingmot ion s f or summa ry jud g me nt. Th e tr ia l cou

rt fo un d th a t th e same iss ue s in this case we re pr eviously

asser ted in the District Court, and that Reg ions’ claim ag ainst Defe ndant National Union for

the Greatstone los s was barre d by res judicata and that the doctrine of collate ral
e sto pp e l ba

rr e d Re g ion s’ thr e e a dd iti on a l c la ims fo r c ov e ra g e

. Th e tr ia l c ourt the n c e rt if ie d th e c a se a s a fi na l ju dg me nt p ur su ant t o T e nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 54 .0 2. F ro m th is j ud g me nt, Re g ion s f ile d ti me ly

no tic e of a pp e a l to thi s Co ur

t.

Issues-6-

Reg ions raises only

one issue on appe al: it asserts that the tri al co urt err ed by g ranting Def endants’ Motions for Summary J udg ment on the basis of re s judicata a nd collater al estoppel. As state d v e rb a timin i ts b ri e f, Re g ion s p re se nts the iss ue a s f oll ow s:
Whether De fenda

nts Ex cess Insurer s have car ried their bur den of pr oof to establish, based on the prior ca se of Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Continuental Cas ualty Co., 478 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2007), the defe nses of res judicata and/or c ollatera l estoppel to the claims made in the c omplaint and the proposed a mendments to the complaint in this case, such that the trial court’ s g rantingof the De fendan t s ’ M o tions for Summary J udg ment was prope r?
Reg ion s ar g u e s th a t r e s ju d ic a ta an d c o ll a te r a l e s to p p e l d o n o t p r e c lu d e th e ir c la im s f o r s ever al
rea sons. I n support of this one issue, Reg ions makes sever al differ ent arguments. Fi rs t , R egi ons asser ts that c oncea led fac ts c reate a new cause of action that was not a nd could not have be en at issue in the fede ral c ase. Seco n d , R egions argues that the District Court’s stateme nts reg ardingthe liability of De fenda

nt Ex cess I nsurer s was dicta beca use each underlying insurance policy had not been exhausted. Third, Reg ions c laims that the re is no pre clusive ef fec t beca use the District Court’s de te rm ina ti o nt h a ts i m u l t an e o u s n o t i c e w a s n o tp r o v i d e d t o D e f e n d an tE xc e s s In s ur e r s d e a l tw i th
a dif fe re nt se c tio n of the ins ur anc e po lic y tha n at is su e in t

his c a se and

wa s a de c larator

y jud g me nt. F ourt h, Re g ion s argue s th a t th is s itu a tio n w arr ants an e xce pti on to general pr e c lus ion

ru le s b oth beca use it was not a f

air a nd full adjudication, violates public policy , and is nece ssary to avoid the inequitable administration of the law. Finally , Reg ions a rgues that pursuant to T ennesse e Rule of Civil Procedur e 56.04, the tria l court should not have g rante d summary ju d g ment until P laintiffs obtained discove ry

from De fenda

nt Ex cess Insurer s. Defe ndant Excess Insurer s raise the additional iss ue that Re g ion s sh ou ld b e jud ic ia lly e sto pp e d f ro m c la imi ngthat Ma

rs h w a s D e fe nd ant E xce ss I nsurer s’ ag ent bec ause it cla imed that Marsh wa s its age nt in the previous litigation.

Stand ard of Review
Reg ions a ppeals the trial court' s awa rd of s u m m ar

y judgme nt to Def

endant Excess Insurer s arguing that re s j udicata a nd collater al estoppel do not bar its claims. W e re view an a war d of
summa ry jud g me nt de novo, aff

ording no presumption of corr ectne ss to the conclusions of the trial court. Guy v . Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 7 9 S. W. 3 d 5 2 8 , 5 3 4 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 2 )

. A n awa rd of summary jud gme nt i s a

pp ro pria te if the pl ea d ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and a dmissions on file, together w ith the affida vits, if any, show that there is n o g en u i n e i s sue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving part is entitled to a judgment as a matter of la w.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. To support a motion for s u m m ar y judgme nt, the movant m u s t d o m ore tha n asser t, in a conclusory

fashion, that the non- movant has no evidenc e. Hannan v. Alltell Publ’g Co. , 270 S.W .3dThe onl y i ns t anc e w her e t he U ni t ed St at es Supr em e Cour t s ays i t w oul d not a ppl y t hi s r ul e i s “ i n s i t uat i ons 5
i n w hi ch t he s t at e l aw i s i ncom pat i bl e w i t h fe dera l i nt er es t s

. ” Semt ec k Int ’ l I nc. v
. Loc khe ed M ar t i n Cor p. , 531 U

. S. 497, 509 ( 2001)

. The exa m pl e gi ven i s w her e a s t at e does not pr ec l ude t he di s m i s s al of a c as e f or w i l l ful vi ol at i on of d isc o v e ry o rd e rs . T h e re is n o th in g in th e p re se n t ca se to in d ic a te th a t t h is e x c e p tio n w o u ld a p p ly h e re

. -7- 1, 4 (Tenn. 2008) . I nstead, the mova nt “must either af

firmatively

neg ate a n essential ele ment of the nonmoving party ' s claim or e stablish an aff irmative def

ense.” Id. at *5 (c itations omi tted). When a par ty has submitted a prope rly supported motion for s u m m ar y judgme nt, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the exis tence of disputed mater ial fac ts. Id

. In deter mining whe ther to awar d s u m m ar

y jud g me nt, the tr ia l c ourt mus t vi e w t

he e vid e nce in the lig ht m os t f avo ra ble to the nonmoving pa

rty and dra w all re asonable infere nces in that pa rty ' s favor

. St ap les v. CBL & Assocs., 15 S.W .3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000). The c ourt should awar d s u m m ar y judgme nt only

when a
rea sonable pe rson could re ach only one conclusion based on the fac ts a nd the infer ence s drawn f

rom those fac ts. Id. S u m m ar

y judgme nt is not appropriate if there is any doubt about whether

a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t exi sts. McCarley v. W est Quality Food Serv
., 960 S.W

. 2 d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998).

Choice of Law

Th e pa rt ie s d o n ot d isp ute the mate ri a l fa c ts of thi s ca se ; the so le qu e sti on is wh e the r, a s a matte r o f l aw, re s ju dic a ta or c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l ba rs Re g ion s’ c la ims

. B e c a

us e the iss ue in t

his c a se is the prec lusive eff

ect of a fe dera l court judg ment, we a lso review whether st at e o r fe d er al l aw a pp lie s. Th e g e ne ra l r

ule is that a

c ourt g ive s a judg me nt the same pr e c lus ive e ff e c t a s th e c ourt

in which the pr ior judg ment was re ndere d. Mitrano v. Houser , 240 S.W .3d 854, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 07 ); se e als o J ames Wm. Moore, 18 Moore’ s Fe dera l Practice § 130.21 (Matthew B ender 3d ed.). F e de ra l la

w, the re fo re , g ov e rn s w hat e ff e c t th e pr ior

fe de ra l c ourt

jud g me nt h a s o n th e se proce eding s. See Semtec k Int’l Inc. v. Lockhee d Martin Corp. , 531 U.S. 497, 507–08 (2001). The United States Supreme Court has pronounce d, howeve r, that in dive rsity case s, the prec lusive eff

ect of a f eder al judg ment is ge nera lly the same as that attache d to a state c ourt judg ment from the f orum in wh ic h that re nd e ri ng fe de ra l court sit s. Id. at 508. In this case, the D istrict Court for the Western 5 District of Tennessee rende red the orig inal judgme nt; it is for this rea son that we apply Tenne ssee law to deter

mine whether

the fe dera l court judg ment bars the c ase at hand.

Ana lys is

Duringthe proc eeding s befor e the tria l court, Reg ions made severa l d i ffe rent a lleg ations
a g a ins t D e fe nd ant E xce ss I ns ur e rs . In it s or ig ina l c omp la int , fi le d F e br ua ry 21 , 20 06 , the on ly

c la im for r elief that Reg ions sought ag ainst Defe ndant Excess I nsurer s wa s fo r breach of contra ct “by failing and ref

using to pr ovide cover ag e to [Reg ions] .” On August 24, 2007, Reg ions f iled a motion to a me nd the ame nd e d c omp la int

and fi rs t a lle g e s th a t D e fe nd ant E xce ss I ns ur e rs ind uc e d M ars h to brea ch its contrac t with Regions. R eg ions also alleg ed in its moti on that Marsh wa s both its age nt-8-

and De fe nd ant E xce ss I

ns ur e rs ’ ag e nt, so wh e n Re g ion s g ave Mars h n oti c e of the Gr e a tst on e c la ims that a lso c on sti tut e d n oti c e to t he De fe nd ant E xce ss I

ns ur e rs

.
We note, as an initial matter, that Reg ions does not raise a n issue with the trial court’s or der denying its motion to amend the ame nded complaint in its St atement of the I ssues. We ma

y consider an is sue wa ived wher e it is argued in the brie f but not desig nated a s an issue. Ch il d ress v. Union Realty Co. , 97 S.W .3d 573, 578 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). L ikewise, where a party fails to addre ss an issue in its argument section of the br ief, we consider the issue to be waive d. Id. The trial c ourt’s de nia l of the mot ion to ame nd wa s wi thi n its so un d d isc re tio n, and we wo uld

no t r e ve rs e a

bs e nt a showing that the trial cour t abused its discretion. Ha wk ins v . H ar t , 8 6 S. W.3 d 5 22 , 5 32 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 2001). Reg ions does not raise a n y er ro r re gar ding its denie d Motion to Amend in the State me nt o f t

he I ssu e s, and

it d oe s n ot a

rgue in i ts b ri e f t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt a

bu se d its dis c re tio n in denying Re g ions’ Motion to Amend. I n its re ply brief, Reg ions a sserts that it did assert that the trial
c ourt e rr e d in de ny ingits Mo tio n to Am e nd

and state s that if it wa s n e c e ssa ry to h ave that pr e c ise
wo rd ing , it

a sse rt e d th e c la im at th a t ti me . H ow e ve r, “ it i s n ot t he office of a repl y

br ie f t o r a ise issues on appea l.” Ge ntr

yv . G e ntr y , No. E2000-02714-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 839714, at *4 n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)( no perm. app. filed ). Acc ording ly , we de cline to addr ess Reg ions’ alleg ations that res judicata does not bar the fra ud and induce ment to brea ch contr act c auses of ac tions that Reg ions alleg ed in its Motion to Amend the Ame nded Complaint. The basis upon which Reg ions
c an c la im on a

pp e a l that it ha s a ne w c a

us e of a c tio n, the re fo re , r e sts so le ly up on the a lle g a tio ns in its ame nd e d c omp la int

fi le d o n F e br

ua ry 24 , 2 00 6, and the inc or

po ra te d ori g ina l com

pla int . The se pleading s solely alleg e that Defenda nt Ex cess Insurer s brea ched the ir contra ct to provide insura nce c ov e ra g e to R e g ion s.

I. Claim P rec lusi on-Same Cause of Action

Reg ions argues that the judg ment in the fede ral court does not pr ohibit its brea ch of contra ct claim in state cour

t beca use newfac ts have a ltered the parties’ leg al rig hts an d i t co u ld not have
ra ise d th is i ssu e be fo re the Di str ic t Co ur t. T he ne w f

a c t th a t Re g ion s a sse rt s c ha ng e s it s le g a l r ig hts is the e vid e nc e that D e fe nd ant E xce ss I ns ur e rs pa id M ars h to pr oc ur e in su ranc e con tr a c ts f or it. Fr om this evidence, Reg ions argues that Mar sh acte d as De fenda nt Ex cess Insurer s’ ag ent, notice to Marsh that R egi o n s was seeking cover ag e for the Gre atstone loss was imputed to Def endant Ex cess Insurer s, Defe ndant Excess I nsurer s, there fore , rec eived simultaneous notice a s was re quired by the insuranc e contr acts, and Def endant Excess Insurer s brea ched the insurance contra cts by not ind e mni fy

ingRe g ion s. Re g ion s r e lie s u po n the se a lle g e dly ne w fa c ts to a lso argue that r e s ju dic a ta does not apply

to bar its claim because it could not have ra ised this argument in the District Court pleading s beca

use De fenda

nt Ex cess Insurer s conce aled its relationship wit h Marsh.

Although the parties a rgu e t h e merits of this case employing the terms re s judicata a nd
c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l, we no te that “ re s ju dic a ta ” br oa dly re fe rs to “ [a]n

iss ue tha t ha s b e e n d e fi nit ive ly
se ttl e d b y ju di cia l dec isi on .” B la c k’ s L aw D ic tio na ry 13 36 –3 7 ( 8th

e d. 20 04 ); see Ric hardson v.-9-

Te nn . B d. of D e nti

str y , 913 S.W .2d 446, 459 n. 11 (Tenn. 1995). This br oad def inition, however, lumps togethe r two diffe rent pre clusion doctrines. Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary 1336–37 (8th ed. 2004). Res judicata, as it has come to be understood in a nar row sense is a claim pre clusion doctrine that “bar s a sec ond suit between the same pa rties or their privies on the same cause of ac tion with respect to all issues which we re o r co u l d h ave been r aised in the for mer suit.” State ex. re l. Cihl ar v. Cra wfo rd , 39 S.W .3d 172, 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2 0 0 0 ). T o avoid conf usion, we have adopted the terminolog y

of the Resta t em ent (S econd) of Judgments and re fer to the traditionally

narr ow definitio n o f res judicata as “ claim pre clusion.” In re Bridgestone /Firestone , No. W2006-02550- CO A- R3- CV , 200 8 WL 42 53 51 6, a t *5 n. 8 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 8) . L ike wi se , c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l is an issue pre clusion doctrine, Sta te e x . r e l. Cihl

ar v . Crawf or d , 39 S.W .3d 172, 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 00 ), and

we wi ll r e fe r t o it

a s “ iss ue pr e c lus ion. ” W e on ly emp loy the te rm re s ju dic a ta

a s it broadly applies t o both prec lusion doctrines. Bridgestone/Firestone , 2008 WL 4253516, at *5 n.8.

A. Discove ry of New Fac ts

Claim preclusion bars multiple lawsuits betwee n the same pa rties on ca

uses o f ac t i o n that
we re or cou ld have be e n li tig a te d in the fi rs t la

ws uit . T he pa

rt y a sse rt ingthe de fe ns e of

c la im prec l u sion has the burde n of proving1) that the unde rlying judg ment was re ndere d by a cour t of
c omp e te nt j ur isd ic tio n, 2) that th e same pa rt ie s w e re inv olv e d in

bo th l aws uit s, 3) tha

t th e same c a us e of a c tio n w a s invo lve d in

bo th s uit s, and

4) that th e un de rl yingjud g me nt w a s o n th e me ri ts. Le e v . H all , 790 S.W .2d 293, 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Re g ions conce des that the District Court
and Sixth C ir c uit

are c ourt s o f co mpe te nt jur isd ic tio n an d th a t th e same pa rt ie s w e re inv olv e d in

bo th
su its

.

On

a pp e a l, Re g ion s fir st al le g e s that De fe nd ant Exce ss I ns ur e rs fa ile d to pr ov e tha t th e same cause of ac tion was involved in both s u i t s

. T h er e is no question, however , that both the Shelby County su it a nd the fe de ra l su it p le a din g s a lle g e a br e a c h of con tr act cla im. Re g ion s b a se s it s argume nt, ho we ve r, up on the state me nt t

hat

[a] p r io r ju d g me n t o r d e c r e e d o e s n o t p r o h ib it th e late r c o n s id e r a ti o n o f r ig hts that ha d n ot a c c ru e d a

t th e tim e of the e arl ie r pr oc e e din g or the re e xami natio n o f t

he same question betwe en the same par ties when the f

acts have cha

ng ed or ne w fa cts have
oc c ur re d th a t ha

ve a lte re d th e pa

rt ie s’ le g a l r ig hts and

re latio ns

.

Lein v

. Co uch , 9 9 3 S

. W

. 2 d 5 3 , 5 6 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 8 )( ci t i n g W hite v. W hite, 876 S.W .2d 837, 83 9–40 (T e nn

. 19 94 ))

. Re g ion s argue s that e vid e nc e that D e fe nd ant E xce ss I ns ur e rs pa id M ars h to procur e insuranc e contr acts for them was not a “ fac t at issue” in t he fe dera l proce eding s and Reg ions should, theref

ore, be able to re -examine the same que stion ag ain.-10-

The Te nnessee Suprem e C o u rt articulated in 1944 that “[a] plea of re s judicata is not available mere ly

beca use the subject matter of two suits i s the same. The cause of ac tion in the two suits mus t be the same .” Copeland v. Copeland , 1 7 7 S

. W

. 2 d 5 5 5 , 5 5 5 (T en n

. 1 9 4 4 ). T h e l an gu age that Reg ions relies upon distinguishes se parate ca uses of action reg arding the same subjec t matter. I n W hite , a wife soug ht an adjudication that her husband w as dec ease d; a jury found, howe ver, that wife ha d not established by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e th at h er h u sband had die d. W hite v. W hite , 8 76 S.W. 2d

83 7, 83 8– 39 (T e nn . 1 99 4) . N e arl y fi ve y e ars late r, Wif

e fi le d a no the r s uit

a g a ins t the same de fenda

nts seekingessentially

th e s ame r elief a

nd alleg ing the same fa cts as in her prior
su it . Id. at 839. When the defendants asserted res judicata, the T ennesse e Supreme Court held that
re s j u d i ca t a di d n o t b ar wi fe ’s cl ai m

. As p arto f i t s an al y s i s , t h e S u p re m e C o urt s ai d

t h at t h e p as s age of time since wife’s first suit was ne w evidenc e and the cause of ac tion in the first case w as whe ther Husband ha d died by

the time of t rial whil e the issue in the se cond ca se wa s whether Husband ha d die d b y the tim e that th e ins ur anc e po lic y ha d e xpir e d, wh ic h wa s nea rl y a y e ar a ft e r t

he fi rs t tr ia l. Id. at 840. Ther efor e, the Court re asoned that neither th e is sue to be de termined nor the evidenc e wa s th e same a s in

wi fe ’s fi rs t su it.

The differe nce be tween the Supreme Court’s a naly sis in W

hite and Reg ions’ argument here is t hat W hite and the c a se s th a t c ite to i t c on sid e r n e w f a c ts a nd e vid e nc e that oc c ur

re d a ft e r t he fi rs t adjudication. F acts oc curr ing a fter a n adjudication may

g ive rise to a new cause of action that may be on the same subject matter as the first ac tion but would not be barre d by res judicata. See, e .g., Copeland v. Copeland , 1 77 S.W. 2d 55 5 ( Te nn . 1 94 4); Banks v. B anks , 7 7 S. W.2 d 7 4 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p

. 1 9 3 4 )

. Re g io n s , h o w e v e r , is ar g u in g th a t t h is s ame p r in c ip le a

p p li e s to f

a c ts th a t i t a lleg es oc c ur re d b e fo re it f

ile d s uit in D istri c t Co ur

t but w hi ch it c la ims it h a d n ot d isc ov e re d unti l it appea led t o t h e S ix th Circuit. Two months after the T ennesse e Supreme Court issued W hite , th is Court a ddresse d a similar ar g ument in Sh or t v . S ho rt

. Sh or t v . S

ho rt , No. 03A01-9402- CH-00065, 19 94 WL31 59 02 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 99 4) . T his Court c omm e nte d th a t

[w] e must be ca

ref ul to dist inguish be tween a “chang e in fac ts” or “new fa cts [which] have oc c ur

re d a ft e r t he or ig ina l jud g me nt” and “ ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e .” Ne wl y discovere d evidenc e i s simply evidenc e of f

acts a s they

exis ted at the time of the orig inal trial and c annot be sa id to be a “c hang e in fa cts” or “ new f acts.”

Id. at *4. As we articulated in Sh or t , the Tennessee Supreme C ourt’s l anguag e that res judicata does not bar fa cts that have ch an ged or new fa cts does not extend to newly discovere d evidenc e. Id. Def endant Ex cess I nsurer s paid M arsh to procur e ins uranc e contracts with Reg ions befor e Reg ions fi le d it s D is tr ict Co ur

t su it; the e vid e nc e that Re g ion s w ish e s to no w i ntr od uc e is m e re ly

ne wl y discovere d and is insufficient to demonstrate that Reg ions has a new cause of ac tion.

B. Issu e Could Not Have Been RaisedFeder al Ru l e o f C i vi l P r ocedu r e 6 0(b) p r ov i des rel i ef fr om a j ud gm ent o r o r der even aft er t he t i m e has pas s ed 6

t o fi l e a m o t i o n fo r a n ew t rial o r t o alt er o r am en d a ju d g m en t

. T h e re l ev an t p ro v i si o n s are as fo l l o w s:

( b) G rou nds f or R el i ef f rom a Fi nal Judgm en t , O rd er , or Proc ee di ng . O n m o t i o n a n d ju st t erm s, t he cour t m ay r el i eve a pa r t y or i t s l ega l r epr es ent at i ve f r o m a fi nal j udgm ent , or der , or pr oce edi ng f or t he fo l l o w i n g rea so n s:

(1 ) m istak e , i n a d v e rte n c e , su rp rise , o r e x c u sa b le n e g le c t; ( 2 ) n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e t h a t , w i t h r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e , c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n d i s c o v e r e d i n t i me t o m o v e for a ne w t ri al un d er r u l e 5 9 (b);

( 3) f r aud (w het her previ ou s l y cal l ed i nt r i nsi c or ext r i nsi c) , m i s r epre s ent at i on , or m i s cond uct by an oppos i ng pa r t y;

( 4) t he j udgm ent i s voi d; ( 5) t he j ud gm ent has been s at i s f i ed, r el eas ed or di s char ged; i t i s bas ed on an ear l i er j ud gm ent t hat has bee n r eve r s ed or va ca t ed; or a ppl yi ng i t pr os pec t i vel y i s no l onger e qui t abl e; or

(6) an y other reas o n t h at j u st i fi es r el i ef. ( c) Ti m i ng and Eff ec t of t he M ot i on

. (1) Ti m i ng. A m o t i o n un d er R u l e 6 0 (b) m u st be m ad e w i t h i n a reas o n ab l e t i m e— an d for r eason s (1), ( 2) , a nd ( 3) [unde r R ul e 60( b) ] no m or e t han a yea r aft er t he e nt r y of t he j udgm ent or or der or t he dat e of t he pr oce edi ng.

(2) E f f ect on F i na l i t

y. The m ot i on doe s not a f f ec t t he j udgm ent ’ s fi nal i t y or s us pend i t s ope r at i on ( d) O t her Po w ers t o G rant R el i ef

. Thi s r ul e does not l i m i t a c our t ’ s pow er t o: ( 1) e nt er t ai n a n i ndepe ndent a ct i on t o r el i eve a pa r t y f r om a j udgm ent , or der , or pr oce edi ng; ( 2) gr ant r el i ef under 28 U

. S. C. § 1655 t o a defenda nt w ho w as not per s onal l y not i f i ed of t he ac t i on;
o r (3 ) se t as id e a ju d g m e n t fo r fr a u d o n th e c o u rt.
-11- I n a similar ar g ument, Reg ions a lso a sserts that it could not have ra ised its ag ency argument to t he Di str ic t Co ur

t be c a us e it d id n ot k

no w whe n it

fi le d it s c omp la int

that D e fenda

nt E xce ss I nsure r s p a id M ar s h f

o r p r o c u r in g in s ur an c e c o n tr a c ts

. Re g io n s c la im s th a t it o n ly b e c ame awa re on Se pte mbe r 1 6, 20 05 , w he n Re g ion s r e c e ive d p ay me nt f ro m Ma rs h p ur su ant t o th e te rm s of its
se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt w i t

h t h e N e w Y o r k A tt o r n e y Ge ne ra l, t hat D e fe nd ant E xce ss I

ns ur e rs we re a lso paying Ma

rsh; this was s ev eral months after the D istrict Court disposed of the parties’ post-trial mot i o n s an d af

t er Regions ha d filed its appea l to the Six th Circuit. The trial cour t found that the fa c ts su rr ound ingDe fe nd ant E xce ss I ns ur e rs ’ p ay

me nts to M ars h w e re “ kn ow n b e fo re the [Sixth Circuit] ruled a

nd there was plenty

of time to raise or prese nt those fac ts to either the District Court
o r th e [S ixt hCi r c u it

. ]”

On this appea l, Reg ions argues that the trial court err ed in f inding that Reg ions could have raised the ag ency

issue befor e the District Court pursua nt to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (“Rule 60( b)”) beca

use consider ation of the ne w fa cts was purely discretionar y

. Reg ions’ argument 6 cente rs ar ound the principle that claim prec lusion onl y b ar s a s ec o nd suit “on the same c ause of action with re spect to all issues which wer e or could have been raised in the f ormer suit.” State ex.
re l. Cihl ar v . Crawf

or d , 39 S.W .3d 172, 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Re g ions argues that an issue
on ly “ c ou ld h ave be e n ra ise d” if the mov ing pa rt y ha d an un fe tte re d ri g ht to ra ise it. As it is w ith in a trial c ourt’s discre tion to relieve a party from a judg ment pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion, R eg ions
no w a rgue s that it did no t have thi s un fe tte re d ri g ht and that it sh ou ld, the re fo re , b e pe rm itt e d to fi le its claim as an indepe ndent ac tion.-12-

Cla im p re c lus ion

“ ‘b ars a se c on d su it be tw e e n the same pa rt ie s o r t he ir pr ivi e s o n th e same cause of ac tion with respect to all issues which wer e or could havebeen litigated in the former

suit.’” Patton v

. Estate o

f Upchurch , 2 4 2 S

. W

. 3 d

7 8 1 , 7 9 0 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Y oung v. Barrow , 13 0 S.W. 3d 59 , 64 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 03 ))

. Th is C ourt te sts wh e the r a

c a us e of a c tio n is the same by

consideringwhether

the primary

rig ht and duty

or wrongare the same in e ach c ase. Id. (q u o t i n g Gerbe r v. Holcom b , 219 S.W .3d 914, 917–18 (Tenn. C t

. App. 2006)). B eca use the complaints in both the feder al suit and the Shelby County suit alleg e that De fenda

nt Ex cess Insurer s brea ched the same c ontrac t in the same manne r, it is clea r t hat t hey involve the same c ause of action.

The public policy

underlying the doctrine of res judicata is to “promote fina lity in liti g ation in o rd e r t o c on se rv e jud ic ia l r e so ur c e s and to r e lie ve lit ig ants fr om t

he c os t and

ve xati on of mul tip le lawsuits.” Cra wfo rd , 39 S.W .3d at 178. Unlike issue prec lusion, claim preclusion bar s relitigation of the same cause of ac tion not only as to matters ac t u al l y deter mined, but “also to other matter s which in the exerc ise of due diligenc e could have be en pre sented in the prior action.” Gerbe r , 219 S.W. 3d a t 91 8; see also Jordan v . Johns , 79 S.W .2d 798 (Tenn. 1935) . Be cause Reg ions admits that it learne d o f Defendant Excess Insurer s’ re lationship with Marsh before the fe dera l court ente red
a c on c lus ive jud g me nt, the re is no qu esti on that it c ou ld h ave , w ithdu e dil ig e nc e , p re se nte d th is issue in a Rule 60(b) motion. There fore , without addre ssing whe ther it could have been r aised be fore the Dis trict Court at any point ear lier t han R eg ions discovere d it, we find that claim pre clusion does bar this issue.

Re g ion s ar g u e s t h a t “ [i ]t i s e s t a b l i s h e d l a w th a t i f th e m a t t e r w a s o n e th a t th e C o urt , inits dis c re tio n, mig ht h ave a llo we d o r not , this do e s not me e t the ‘c ou ld h ave be e n r a ise d’ te st. ” B e c a us e the trial cour

t has the di scre tion to g rant a Rule 60(b) moti on, Reg ions claims that it could not have raised its new ly -discover ed issue in that manner . Reg ions, however , fa i l s to cite any Tenne ssee authority , and we find none, that re s judicata only bars issues a

nd fac ts over which the trial court ha s no discretion. In support of this proposition, R eg ions cites to fede ral c ase la w that a plaintiff is not require d to amend an e x isting lawsuit to add a claim that arose afte r it filed the first suit. In applying this rule, ho we ver, Reg ions ag ain pre supposes that its curre nt brea ch of c ontrac t claim arose afte r it filed its brea ch of contra ct claim in fede ral court; as we have alrea dy discussed, t hat i s not the ca se.

We f ind the fa c ts i n th is c a se ana log ou s to a dif fe re nt lin e of c a se s. In bo th t he fe de ra l c a se and this state court case , Reg ions argues t hat i t g ave Defe ndant Ex cess I nsurer s simult aneous notice ; the on ly ne w issu e that Re g ion s a sse rt s is how i tg av e D e f e n d an tE x c e s s In s ur e r s n o t i c e

. G e n e r a l l y,

[t ]hi s Court cannot ac cept the a rgument . . . that, by disclaiming or failing to present a par ticular fa ct or theor

y supporting his action, a plainti ff may there by rese rve a nd prese rve the disclaimed and unpr esente d fac t or theory as an “ ace in the hole” to be used as a g round for a second lawsuit based on such g round. To assent to plaintiff’s insistence would be to c ondone piece meal prese ntation of suits and defe nses at the whim of the par

ties. Such is not the policy of our law

.-13-

McKinney

v. W idner , 746 S.W .2d 699, 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). F urther, w e have held that, “[t] he estoppel of a judgme nt or decr ee extends to all matters materia l to the decision of the c ause which the par ties exercising rea sonable dilig ence might have broug ht forwa rd at the t ime.” Id . at 705, (c i t i n g State ex. re l. French v . French , 18 8 S.W. 2d 60 3 (1 94 5) ). Th is Court ha s sp e c if ic a lly he ld that claim pre clusion barr ed a second suit a g ainst a defe ndant employ er wher e its e mploy ee le arne d new f acts in a subsequent lawsuit that reve aled that defe ndant was employ ee’ s rea l employ er. Boyd v. Bruce , No. M2000-03211-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 1346264, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. F eb. 11, 2002). In Boyd , th is C ourt state d th a t

Appellants ar gu e that facts re veale d in subsequent lawsuits reg ardingwho was the
rea l employ er a

nd the dec isions of the court ther eo n have c hang ed the c ause of action. We disag ree . A cha ng e in Ap p el l an t ’s t heory of liability

does not cre ate a
ne w c a us e of a c tio n. Te nn e sse e law is c le ar that re s jud ic a ta ba rs the lit ig a tio n o f a ll iss ue s th a t c ou ld h ave be e n li tig a te d and a ll fa c ts pe rt a ini ng to t ho se iss ue that c ou ld have be en broug ht forwa

rd.

Id. We find the basic f

acts of this ca se to be sig nificantly analog ous to those in Boyd and, ther efor e, fi nd that Re g ion s’ the or

y a s to ho w D e fe nd ant E xce ss Ins ur e rs re c e ive d simult ane ou s no tic e of its claims for the Gre atstone loss cou l d h av e b ee n raised in the D istrict Court procee dings a nd are , there fore barr ed by

claim pre clusion.

C. Separate Contrac t P rovision

Reg ions also argues that its brea ch of contra ct action in this case is a diffe rent c ause of action than inthe fe d e r a l c a s e b e c a u s e i t n o w s e e k s c o v e r a g e p ur s u an t t o S e c t i o n s A , B , C , an d D o f its insurance contra ct , while the District Court only adjudicate d its rights under Section E of the
c on t r a c t

. R e g i o n s ’ ar g u m e n t , h o w e v e r , f a i l s b e c a u s e R e g i o n s i s e s s e n t i a l l y ar g u i n g th a tit s ho uld be per mitted to spl it its claim.

Cla im p re c lus ion

pr oh ibi ts p art ie s f

ro m sp littin g the ir

c a us e of a c tio n; it re qu ir e s p art ie s “ to rais e in a s in g le la

w s u it a ll th e g r o u n d s f

o r r e c o v e r

y ar is in g f

r o m a s in g le tr an s a c ti o n o r s e r ie s of transac tio n s t h at can be broug ht toge ther.” In re Orde r to Encapsulate Native Ame rican Indian Grav esites in Con c re te an d P av e Ov e r wi th A sp ha lt , 250 S.W .3d 873, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (c i t i n g Bio-Technology G en. Corp. v. Gene tech, I nc. , 80 F.3d 1553, 1563 ( Fe d. Cir. 1996)). As we have pr e vio us ly

dis c ussed , Re g ion s a dju dic a te d th e Gr e a tst on e c a us e of a c tio n in fe de ra l c ourt

. Where a plai n t i ff brings two se parate bre ach of contra ct ac tions based upon the same wrongbut argues liability

pursuant to a diff

ere nt contrac t in the second case the sec ond action is barr ed by the doctrine of cla im preclusion. Trew v. W ayne- Gossard Corp. , 694 S.W .2d 956, 958 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); Fede rico v . A lad

din In du s. , N o. M2 00 4- 01 69 3- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 6 WL 55 88 97 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 2006), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. Aug . 21, 2006).-14-

As for the three additional insurance claims for which Reg ions now seeks indemnification, the se are a lso ba

rr e d b y c la im p re c lus ion . Cl a im p re c lus ion a pp lie s to a ll i ssu e s th a t w e re or c ou ld have be en ra ised reg ardingthe same c ause of action. Sta te e

x . r e l. Cihl

ar v . Crawf or d , 39 S.W .3d 17 2, 17 8 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) . T he same c a us e of a c tio n in

bo th t his c a se and

the fe de ra l c a se is Def endant Excess Insurer s’ re fusal to indemnify Reg ions pursuant to its ins u ra n ce claims. See Trustmark Ins. Co. v. ESLU, Inc. , 299 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002) (Althoug h plaintiff alleg ed 42 se pa rate wr on g s n ot b ro ug ht i n th e pr ior laws uit , b oth

laws uit s invo lve d b re a c hes o f t he same c on tract com mi tte d b y

the same pa

rt ie s invo lvi ngthe same g e ne ra l ty pe of c on du c t, a

nd c la im p r e c l u s i o n , t h u s , b ar

r e d t h e c l a i m s m a d e i nt h e s e c o n d s u i t ) ; E l l i s v. A me

x L ife Ins. Co. , 211 F.3d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 2000) (Where insurer de nied bene fits under same insurance policy , plaintiff’s two
su its bo th a

ro se out of

the same tr ans a c tio n)

. Re g ion s’ argume nt t hat it may no w r e c ov e r i ts l ia

bil ity in the East Main Ba

ptist Church litigation, the Conners suit and the SB U litigation bec ause it see ks ind e mni ty

purs ua nt t o d if fe re nt s e c tio ns of

its ins ur anc e c on tr a c t doe s not o ve rc ome the fa c t th a t it sp lit its or ig ina l a c tio n; R e g ion s sh ou ld h ave br ou g ht the se c la ims be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt wh e n it
su e d D e fe nd ant E xce ss I

ns ur e rs fo r t

he Gr e a tst on e los s, and the se c la ims are no w b arr e d b y c la im prec lusion.

II. Dicta

Reg ions asserts that at the time the district court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of De fe nd ant E xce ss I

ns u r e r s , c o v e r a g e h a d

n o t y e t be e n im

pli c a te d und e r t

he e xce ss i ns ur anc e po lic ie s. I t claims, theref

ore, that it had no rig ht to sue Defe ndant Excess I nsurer s in that action, and a ny statement made by the fede ral courts reg arding the excess policies is dicta. See F ite v. W ood , 250 S.W .2d 543, 312–14 (Tenn. 1952) . Be cause res judicata does not apply to dicta, R eg ions claims that the Six th Circuit’s determination has no preclusive effe ct. W e strong ly disag ree ; the district court g ra nte d summa

ry jud g me nt to De fe nd ant Exc e ss Ins ur e rs on the ba sis that Re g ion s f

a ile d to me t a condition prec edent of

the insuranc e policies unde r which Reg ions sought cove rag e.

Reg ardle ss of Reg ions’ alleg ations befor e this Court that it m ay h av e i m p roper ly joined De fe nd ant E xce ss I

ns ur e rs , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

dis mis se d th os e c la ims purs ua nt t o D e fe nd ant E xce ss I nsurer s’ motions for summary judgme nt. As the Tenne ssee Supre me Court noted in Fi te , the ver y de fi nit ion of the te rm dic ta ind ic a te s th a t it

“ ha s n o be ari ng on the dir e c t route or de c isi on of the c a se but is made aside or

on the way

and is, there fore , not a controllingstatement to co urts when the question rises ag ain that has be en commente d on.” Id. at 314. A motion for summary judgme nt, on the other ha

nd “g oes direc tly

to the merits of t h e l i t i gat i on.” Anderson v. Ray ner , No. W2004- 00485-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3543682, at *5–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) ( no perm. app. filed ) (q u o t i n g By rd

v . H all , 847 S.W .2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993) ). We do not find that the district court’s deter mination was dicta, a

nd we, ther efor e, find no m er i t to Reg ions’ argument that it has no pr e c lus ive e ff

e c t.

III . D e c lar at or y J udgm e nt-15-

Reg ions also asserts that dec laratory judgme nts are only

conclu s i v e wi th respec t to the prec ise issues actua lly

and nece ssarily

deter mined in the action. See E mpire Fire &Marine Ins. Co. v. J. Transp., Inc

. , 880 F .2 d 129 1, 12 96 (1 1th Cir. 1989). Be cause Reg ions sought a de clar ation of rig hts and obligations of the parties unde r var ious insurance contra cts in fede ral c ourt, it claims that the district court a ction was simply a dec laratory

judgme nt. I n addition, Reg ions asserts that the fe de ra l c ourt

on ly a dju dic a ted th os e con tr a c t r ig hts un de r S e c tio n E of the ins ur anc e po lic y , s o liability claims pursuant to Sections A,B ,C, and D of the policie s wer e n ev er p recisely and
nece ssarily

deter mined. Reg ions, th er ef

ore, a sserts that its claims are not barre d by res judicata.

We, however , simply

cannot a g ree that Reg ions merely soug ht a dec laratory judgme nt in the fede ral c ourt. As the Tenne ssee Supreme Court r ece ntly reiter ated, “ ‘[d] ecla

ratory judgme nts’ are so named be cause they

procla im the rig hts of the litigants without order ing e x ecution or perf ormanc e. The ir purpose is to settl e i m p o rt ant questions of law be fore the controve rsy has
rea ched a more c ritical stag e.” Co lonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan , 263 S.W .3d 827, 837 (Tenn. 2008)(c itations omi tted). In its amended complaint filed with the district court, Reg ions requeste d that “should the [c]ourt determine that [Regions’] cover ed loss exceeds Continental’s limit of liability under the Policy , then [R eg ions] is e ntitled to indemnification of its loss under one or mor e of the policies issued by

National Union, St. Paul, and Twin City . Reg ions clear ly soug ht more than simply a de c la

r a ti o no f r igh ts ; i t s o u g h t e n f

o r c e me n t o f

it s in d e mn if

ic a ti o nr igh ts p ur s u an t t o the contra ct. B eca

use we find that the fe dera l court determination was more tha n a dec laratory jud g me nt, Re g ion s’ argume nt o n th is m a tte r m us t f a il.

IV. Exceptions to Res Judicata

Reg ions a lso a

rgues that in this case we should a dopt a nd apply sever al exceptions to res jud i cata that are found in the Restateme nt (Second) of J udg ments § 28. Section 28, titl ed as Ex ceptions to the Ge nera l Rule of I ssue Prec lusion, states that

Al tho ug h a

n is su e is a c tua lly

lit ig a te d a

nd de te rm ine d b y

a va lid and fi na l ju dg me nt, and the de termi n at i o n is essential to the judg ment, relitig ation of the issue in a subsequent ac tion b et ween the par ties is not precluded in the f ollowing circ umstances.

. . . . (2) The issue is one of law a nd (a) the two ac tions invol ve cla ims that are substantially

unrelat ed , o r (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take
ac c ou nt o f an inte rv e ning c ha nge in t heap pli c ab le le

ga l c onte x t or oth e rwi seto
av oid ine qu ita blead

mi nis tra tio n o

f th e law s

. . .

. . . .R e sta te m e n t (S e c o n d ) o f Ju d g m e n ts § 2 6 (1 )( f) sta te s th e fo llo w in g : 7

(c o n tin u e d ...)
-16- (5) There is a clear and c onvincing nee d for a new determination of the issue ( a) be c au seof t

hepo te nti al a dv e rse im

pa c t of the de te rm ina tio n o n th e pu bli c inte re st
or th e in ter e sts of

pe rs on no t th e mse lve s p art ie s in the ini tia l a c tio n, (b ) b e c a us e it
wa s n ot s uf

fi c ie ntl y fo re se e a

ble a t th e tim e of

the ini tia l a c tio n th a t th e iss ue wo uld arise in the c ont ex t o f a s u b sequent a ction, or ( c) becausethe party sought to be pr e c lud e d, as a r esu lt o

f th e c on du c t of

his ad v e rsa ry or oth e r sp e c ial

c irc um sta nc es, did no t ha v e an ad

e qu ateop

po rtu nit yor inc e nti v e to ob ta in a full a nd fai r adjudication in the init ial action

.

Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of

Judg me nts § 2 8 ( 19 82 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . Re g ion s a rgue s, a c c or din g to the Restatement, that this Court sho u l d n o t b ar its claims on t he basis of r es judicata for thre e separ ate r easons: (1) there was a lack of fair a nd full adjudication in the prior c ase, ( 2) there is a clea r and convinc i ng need f

or a ne w deter

mination of the issue bec ause of the potential adve rse impac t of t he determination on the publ ic i ntere st, and (3) to avoid t he inequitable administration of t he law.
Although the Restatement (Sec ond) of J udg ments § 28 ref ers to issue pre clusion, our discussion, thus far, has be en that cla im preclusion bar s Reg ions’ suit. I n addition, we note that the Restatement itself discoura g es applying e x ceptions to res judicata:

There are instances in which the interests supporting a new deter mination of an issue alre ady deter mined outweig h t h e re sulting burde n on the other pa rty and on the courts. B ut such instances must be the r are exception, a nd litigation to e stablish an
e xce pti on in a pa rt ic ular cas e sh ou ld n ot b e e nc oura g e d. Thus it i s im po rt ant t o a dmi t an e xce pti on

on ly wh e n th e ne e d f

or a re de termi nation

of the iss ue is a compelling one.

Restatement (Sec ond) of Judgments § 28 cmt. g(1982).

Reg ions argues that we should not apply res judicata in this case beca use it did not ha

ve an adequate opportunity or incentive to obta in a full and fa ir adjudication. I n support of this positi on, Re g ion s c ite s Re state me nt (S e c on d) of Judg me nts § 28 , c omm e nt j wh ic h dis c us se s wh e n the re is
a la c k o f f a ir op po rt un it y to l iti g a te an is su e in t

he ini tia l a c tio n a

nd state s th a t “ [i]n an a c tio n in which an issue is litigated and de termined, one party may conce al from the other infor mation that
wo uld mate ri a lly

a ff e c t th e outc ome of

the c a se . Su c h c on c e a lme nt may be of pa rt ic ula r c on c e rn if the re is a fi du c iary re latio ns hip be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. ” Re state me nt (S e c on d) of Judg me nts § 2 8 c mt. j ( 19 82 ). Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of Judg me nts § 26 e xpla ins that thi s e xce pti on may a lso a pp ly to 7(

. . . cont i nued) 7
W h e n a n y o f th e fo llo w in g c irc u m sta n c e s e x ists, th e g e n e ra l ru le o f [c la im p re c lu sio n ] d o e s n o t ap p ly t o e xt i ngui s h t he cl ai m , a nd pa r t or a l l of t he cl ai m s ubs i s t s a s a pos s i bl e bas i s f or a s ec ond a ct i on by t he pl ai nt i f f aga i ns t t he defenda nt : ( f ) I t i s cl ea r l y and convi nci ngl y s how n t hat t he pol i ci es f avor i ng pr ec l us i on of

a s ec ond a ct i on a r e over com e for a n e xt r aor di nar y r ea s on, s uch as t he appa r ent i n v al i d i t y of a co n t i n u i n g res t rai n t o r co n d i t i o n h av i n g a v i t al rel at i o n t o pe rs o n al l i b ert y or t h e fai l u re of t he pr i or l i t i gat i on t o yi el d a c oher ent di s pos i t i on of t he cont r over s y.

R est at em en t (Seco n d ) of J u d g m en t s § 26 (1)(f ) ( 1 9 8 2 ).

R estatem en t (S ec o n d ) o f Ju d g m en t s § 2 6 co m m en t j st ates: 8

A def endan t ca nn ot j ust l y ob j ect t o bei ng sued on a par t or ph as e of a c l ai m t hat t he pl ai nt i f f f ai l ed t o i ncl ud e i n an ear l i er ac t i on becaus e of t he defe nd ant ’ s ow n fr aud. Th us, w hen t he defe nd ant t akes

s eve r al a r t i cl es a t one t i m e and on be i ng a s ked by t he pl ai nt i ff frau d u l en t l y de ni es t aki ng s om e of t hem a nd s ui t i s br ought f or t he r em ai nder , a j udgm ent i n t hat ac t i on does not ba r t he pl ai nt i f f f r om
su b se q u e n tly m a in ta in in g a n a c tio n fo r th o se a rtic le s n o t i n c lu d e d in th e first a c tio n

.
R est at em en t (Seco n d ) of J u d g m en t s § 26 co m m en t j (19 8 2 ).

I n i t s br i ef , Regi ons ci t es t o S t a t e e x re l C i h l a r v. C ra w f o rd , 39 S. W

. 3d 172 ( Tenn. C t

. A pp. 2001) f or t he 9
p ro p o sitio n th a t T e n n e sse e h a s a d o p te d th is e x c e p tio n

. In th a t c a se , h o w e v e r, n o w Ju stice K o c h , w h ile sittin g fo r th is Cour t , a ppl i ed Res t at eme n t ( Se con d of J u dg men t s ) § 28( 2) ( b) f o r th e p ro p o sitio n th a t i s s ue pr ec l us i on m i g h t no t ba r a
n e w d e te rm in a tio n w h e r e t h e re h a s b e e n a n in te rv e n in g c h a n g e in th e a p p lica b le law

. C ra w f o rd , 39 S. W

. 3d a t 179. R e g io n s d o e s n o t c ite t o a n y T e n n e sse e c a se , n o r d o w e fin d a n y , w h e re a c o u rt fa iled to a p p ly c la im p re c lu sio n to a v o id (c o n tin u e d ...)
-17- claim pre clusion. Restatement (Sec ond) of Judgments § 26(1) (f) . Section 26, comment j states that Section 26(1)( f) may be applicable wher e a plaintiff can show by clea r and convincing evidenc e that its failure t o i n cl ude par t of its claim in the ear lier ac tion was ca used by defe ndants’ fr aud,
conce alment, or misrepr esentation. 8

Reg ions also argues that this Court should allow re litigation of this claim to avoid violation of pu bli c po lic y

or manif e st i nju sti c e . Re g ion s’ a lle g e d in jus tic e is t

hat it be bo und b y

the Sixth Circuit determination, which it cla ims is wr o n g an d v iolates Tenne ssee public policy . Reg ions
argue s th a t th e Di str ic t Co ur t and Sixth C ir c uit

e rr on e ou sly

dis tin guis hed its c la im f ro m th e c a se Alcazar v. H

a yes , 9 82 SW.2 d 8 45 (T e nn . 1 99 8) , w he re the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt , o n p ub lic policy g rounds, re quired a

n insurer t o d emons trate pr ejudice f rom an insure d’s fa ilure to provide notice bef ore the insured for feited c overa g e. Alcazar , 982 S.W .2d at 849–53. Additionally , Reg ions br oa dly argue s th a t th e qu e sti on

wh e the r an ins ur e r mus t be p re jud ic e d b y

late no tic e un de r a

c la ims

made insura

nce policy is a

n issue of first impression that public policy require s that the Tenne ssee Sup re me Court

a dd re ss.

The final exception that Reg ions advocates that we should apply in this case is Restatement (S e c on d) of

Judg me nts § 2 8(2 )( b) , w hic h c la ims that a ne w d e te rm inatio n o f a

n is su e of law i s wa rr ante d to avo id the ine qu ita ble a dmi nis tr a tio n of laws

. B a se d on its pre sumpt ion that the Sixth 9(

. . . cont i nued) 9

t he “i nequ i t abl e a dm i ni s t r at i on of l aw s

. ”
-18- Circuit erre d, Reg ions argues that bar ring its claim would b e an i n eq uitable application of law b e c a u s e R e g i o n s w o u l d

s o m e h o w b e b o un d

b y a d i f f e r e n tl aw th anan y o th e r

p arty i n s ur e d

b y a claims-base d policy

.

We b e lie ve , ho we ve r, that Te nn e sse e ha s a lon g -s tand ingtr a dit ion

in u ph old ingjud g me nts

. We, the re fo re , de c lin e Re g ion s’ inv itatio n to a do pt a nd a pp ly any of the se thr e e e xce pti on s to c la im prec lusion. As the Tennesse e Supreme Court has stated,

[t ]he policy

rationale in support of Res J udicata is not base d upon any presumption that the final judg ment was rig ht or just. Rather, it is just ifiable on the br oad g rounds of public policy

which re quires an eve n t u al end to litigation. Akin to st atutes of limit ations, the doctrine of Res judicata is a ‘ rule of r est’ and ‘ private pe ace ’. . . .

. . . . I t is not m ater ial on this point whether the finding of the jury was Rig ht or not in the former

suit. That cannot be que stioned any more be tween the same pa rties or their privies. Right or wrong the questi on was finally closed, unless a new trial had been obta ined in the same suit. Th i s rule is not alone f or the be nefit of the pa

rties lit ig ant, to put an en d to stri fe and c on te nti on

be tw e e n th e m, a

nd pr od uc e c e rt a int

y as to in d ividual rig hts, but it is also intended to g ive dig nity and re spect to judicial pr oc e e din g s, and

re lie ve so c ie ty fr om the e xpe ns e and ann oy anc e of

ind e te rm ina

ble litigation about the same matter.

Moulton v. Ford Motor Co. , 533 S.W .2d 295, 296 (Tenn. 1976) (interna l citations omi t ted).

V. Discove ry

Reg ions’ final arg ument is that the t rial court should not have g rante d Summary J udg ment befor e Reg ions conducted discove ry . I n its Motion to Compel Discovery Reg ions requeste d rec ords of the de aling s betwe en M ar sh and the e x cess c arr iers. As we have pr eviously discussed, whe n a party submits a properly

supported motion for summary judgme nt, the b u rden shifts to the nonmoving party to e stablish the exis tence of disputed mater ial fac ts. Rains v. Bend of Rive r , 124 S.W .3d 580, 587–88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

[No nmo vin g ] part ie s ma

y de flect a summa

ry jud g me nt m oti on

c ha lle ng ingthe ir ability to prove a

n essential element of t heir case by (1) pointi ng to evidenc e either overlooke d or ig nored by th e moving pa

rty that cre ates a

fac tual dispute, (2)-19-

re h a b il it a ti n g e v id e n c e c h a ll e n g e d b y th e mo v in g p arty , ( 3 ) p r o d u c in g a d d itional
e vid e nc e tha

t c re a te s a

mate ri a l f

a c tua l di sp ute , o r (4 ) su bmi tti ngan a ff ida vit in
acc ordanc e with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07 requestingadditional time for discove ry

.

Id. (c i t i n g Staples v. CBL & Assoc., Inc

. , 15 S.W .3d 83, 88-89 (Tenn. 2000) and Mc Car le yv . W est Quality Food Serv. , 960 S.W .2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998) ). Where, as here , a par ty seeks to continue a motion for summary

judgme nt pursuant to Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 56.07, we r eview the trial court’s ref

usal to grant a continuance for an abuse of discre tion. Gilchrist v. Aristorenas , No. W2007-01919-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4981103, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) ( no perm. app. filed ).

This Court has stated that “a trial court’ s decision involving discovery must be viewed in the
c on te xt of the iss ue s b e ingtr ie d a

nd the po sture of the c a se a t th e tim e the re qu e st f or dis c ov e ry

is made.” Price v . Merc ury Supply Co. , 682 S.W .2d 924, 935 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). We, ther efor e, consider whether

the re quested discove ry would have a ssisted Regions in re sponding to De fenda nt Ex cess I nsurer ’s motion for summary judgme nt. S ee S immons v. State Farm G en. Ins. Co. , No. W2003-02643-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2715341, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) ( no perm. app. filed ). Reg ions’ reque st to discover re cords of the dealings between Ma rsh and De fenda

nt Ex cess Insurer s re l at es s o l el y

t o wh et h er

R egi o n s gav e s i mu l t an eo u s n o t i ce t o De fe n d an t E x c e s s In s ure rs t h ro u gh Marsh as a dual ag ent. As we ha ve discussed throughout this opinion, however , Marsh’s status a s a dual a gent, has no be aring upon the r es judicata eff ect of the fe dera l court ac tion. Because the
re qu e ste d d isc ov e ry , th e re fo re wo uldno t ha ve a ide d Re gio ns in op posin g D e fe nd a nt E xc e ss In su re rs ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary judgm e nt, we fi ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt a c te d w ith in i ts d isc re tio n in ruling on the motion for summary judgment befor e compe lling dis covery.

VI . J udic ial Est oppe l

De fe nd a nt E xc e ss I ns ur e rs a sse rt s a n a ddit io nal iss ue : th a t Re gio ns sh ou ld b e jud ic ia lly estopped fr om claiming that Marsh wa s Defe ndant Exce ss I nsurer s’ agent. In fe dera l court Regions claimed that Ma

rsh was its agen t

. Def

endant Exc ess Insure rs asserts that it i s inconsistent and contra dictory for

Regions to now claim that Marsh wa s Defe ndant Exce ss Insurer s’ age nt.

Th e do c tr ine of

jud ic ia l e sto pp e l pr ov ide s th a t

a pa rt y w ill no t be pe rm itt e d to oc c up y in c on sis te nt p os iti on s o r t o ta ke a po sit ion in
re ga rd to a m a tte r w hic h is dir e c tly c on tr ary to, or inc on sis te nt w ith , o ne pr e vio us ly assumed by him, at least whe re he had or w as cha rgea ble with, full knowledge of the fac ts, and another

will be prejudice d by this action.-20-

Ob ion Cou nty v . M

c Kin nis , 3 64 S.W .2 d 3 56 , 3 57 (T e nn . 1 96 2) . Re gio ns do e s n ot a sse rt in this c a se that Ma rs h w a s no t its a ge nt; rathe r, Re gio ns a sse rt s th a t Ma rs h w a s b othit a ndDe fe nd a nt E xc e ss Insure rs’ a gent. Tennessee recogniz es t hat a person can be a dual a gent. See J ohnson v. LeBonheur Chi ldr e n’ s M e d. Ctr

. , 74 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Tenn. 2002) . We do not f ind that Regions’ argument that Marsh wa s Defe ndant Exce ss In s u rer s’ age nt is contrary or inconsistent with its assertion in the District Court that Marsh wa s its agent.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of t he trial court. Costs of this appea l are taxed to the Appellant, R egions Financial C orporation, and its surety, for whic h exec ution may issue if nec essary.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER , JUDGE