Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-JV-450 | January 29, 2015 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Matthew D. Anglemeyer 

Marion County Public Defender 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Ian McLean 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

P.A., 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF INDIANA, 

Appellee. 

January 29, 2015 

Court of Appeals Cause No. 

49A02-1407-JV-450 

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court, Juvenile Division 

Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, 

Magistrate 

Cause No. 49D09-1308-JD-002386 

Friedlander, Judge. 

[1] P.A. appeals his delinquency true findings for acts that would constitute two 

counts of class B felony child molesting if committed by an adult. He presents 

one issue for review, which we restate as follows: Did the juvenile court 
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commit fundamental error when it allowed the State to make an offer to prove 

regarding the substance of excluded evidence? 

[2] We affirm. 

[3] P.A. and A.B. are paternal cousins. In the summer of 2012, P.A. stayed the 

night at A.B.’s house for his first and only time. P.A. and A.B. were sixteen 

and eleven years old, respectively. The two, along with one of A.B.’s friends, 

eventually relaxed on the living room floor while they talked and watched 

television together. After the friend fell asleep, P.A. pulled down A.B.’s pajama 

bottoms and placed his penis in her vagina and then in her anus. A.B. did not 

react to her older cousin’s actions. When he was done, P.A. pulled up A.B.’s 

pajama bottoms and turned over. The next morning he asked if she was okay. 

A.B. testified that she did not report the incident immediately because she was 

afraid she would get in trouble. She disclosed the abuse about a year later 

during a conversation with her mother and sisters about “being safe around 

boys”. Transcript at 49. 

[4] The police were called, and A.B.’s disclosures were investigated by Detective 

Justin Hickman of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. After 

taking a report from A.B., Detective Hickman met with P.A. and his mother on 

August 19, 2013. During a video recorded interview, P.A. admitted to having 

had vaginal and anal intercourse with A.B. He was taken into custody, and the 

State filed a petition alleging P.A. was delinquent for having committed acts 
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that would be three counts of child molesting, two class B felonies and one class 

C felony, if committed by an adult. 

[5] A.B. and her mother testified at the denial hearing. Detective Hickman was 

then called by the State. P.A. objected to the admission of the videotaped 

statement due to procedural irregularities. Specifically, after securing signatures 

on a juvenile waiver of rights form, Detective Hickman said, “mom do you 

want to come back out to the waiting room with me right now to wait with 

grandma”, and P.A.’s mother left. Id. at 79. P.A. claimed this was a denial of 

his right to have his mother present during the custodial interrogation. The 

juvenile court agreed and excluded the videotaped statement from evidence. 

[6] The State requested that the court view the initial portion of the video and 

reconsider its ruling. After viewing the portion of the video up to and including 

when the mother left, the court reaffirmed its ruling. Immediately thereafter, 

the State indicated its desire to make an offer to prove, and P.A. did not object. 

The State proceeded to detail what the video would reflect if it were permitted 

into evidence. This included P.A.’s eventual confession as to each of the 

delinquency allegations. 

[7] At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the court entered true findings 

with respect to the two class B felony allegations and a not true finding with 

respect to the class C felony allegation.1

 P.A. now appeals. 

 

1

 The evidence for this allegation would have come exclusively from P.A.’s statement, which was not 

admitted into evidence. 
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[8] P.A. asserts the novel argument that the trial court committed fundamental 

error by allowing the State to make an offer to prove regarding his videotaped 

statement. He claims there was no legally justifiable reason to make the offer of 

proof2

 and the State must have done so to influence the court in a close case. 

[9] It is well established that fundamental error is “an extremely narrow exception 

to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that 

the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to ‘make a fair 

trial impossible.’” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Benson 

v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)). “[F]undamental error is a daunting 

standard that applies ‘only in egregious circumstances.’” Knapp v. State, 9 

N.E.3d 1274, 1281 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 

(Ind. 2003)), cert. denied. 

[10] P.A. has failed to establish fundamental error. First, he makes absolutely no 

effort on appeal to establish that the videotape was in fact inadmissible under 

Indiana law. His argument just assumes this to be so. See, e.g. Appellant’s Brief

at 10 (“[t]he State put inadmissible evidence in front of the trier of fact using a 

procedural process to which it was not entitled to bolster a close case, thereby 

tipping the balance in favor of a true finding”). Moreover, P.A.’s argument that 

he was prejudiced by the alleged error belies the longstanding judicialtemperance presumption in which “[w]e presume that the trial judge is aware of 

 

2

 P.A. contends that the State had no right to appeal the suppression ruling and, moreover, that the details 

of his statement would be irrelevant when reviewing the propriety of the ruling, which was based on 

procedural irregularities. 
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and knows the law and considers only evidence properly before him or her in 

reaching a decision.” Hinesley v. State, 999 N.E.2d 975, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014), trans. denied. See also Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. 2012) 

(“[t]he risk of prejudice is quelled when the evidence is solely before the trial 

court”). 

[11] The juvenile court ruled that the videotaped statement was inadmissible. Upon 

urging from the State, the court reconsidered its ruling but once again excluded 

the evidence. Regardless of the purpose behind the State’s offer to prove, it is 

evident from the record before us that the juvenile court did not consider P.A.’s 

statement when making its findings. We reject P.A.’s groundless invitation to 

presume otherwise and to impugn the integrity of the juvenile court. 

Accordingly, even assuming that the evidence was inadmissible and the offer to 

prove was improper, P.A. has not established prejudice, let alone error “so 

prejudicial to [his] rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’” Ryan v. State, 9 

N.E.3d at 668 (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d at 756). 

Judgment affirmed. 

Kirsch, J., and Crone, J., concur.