[Cite as Internatl. Assn. of Firefighters, Local 136 v. Dayton , 2013-Ohio-2759.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF : FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 136 AND DAVID P. STRAWN : Plaintiffs-Appellees : C.A. CASE NO. 25423

v. : T.C. NO. 12CV2478 THE CITY OF DAYTON : (Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant :

. . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 28th day of June , 2013.

. . . . . . . . . . SUSAN D. JANSEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0039995, 111 W. First Street, Suite 1100, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellees THOMAS M. GREEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0016361, 800 Performance Place, 109 N. Main Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . FROELICH, J. {¶ 1} The City of Dayton appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery2 County Court of Common Pleas, which denied th e City’s motion to vacate an arbitration award in favor of David Strawn and granted the motion of the International Association of Firefighters, Local 136, and Strawn to confir m the arbitration award. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I. {¶ 2} After an evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator found the following facts: {¶ 3} David Strawn was hired by the City of Dayton Fire Department as a paramedic. While employed as a paramedic, Strawn received two commendations, one in 1996 and another in 1998. Strawn became a fu ll-time firefighter with the Dayton Fire Department in 1999. {¶ 4} On March 14, 2008, Strawn fell while figh ting a fire and sustained an injury to his right knee. Pursuant to department polic y, he completed an injury investigation report and submitted it to his supervisor, Lt. Ty Grable, who recommended injury leave, if necessary. The acting fire chief at the time, Herbert Redden II, also recommended leave should it be needed in the future. {¶ 5} Strawn did not miss work in the spri ng of 2008, but he continued to have problems with his right knee. On July 14, 2008, he did not report to work and called off because of problems with that knee. Strawn did not work between July 14 and September 12, 2008. The department request ed, and he submitted, a medical certification form for his absence from work; he was not asked to complete and submit an injury investigation report. Strawn was considered to be on injury leave during this period. After Strawn returned to work on September 18, he did not miss any work for the remainder of that year.[Cite as Internatl. Assn. of Firefighters, Local 136 v. Dayton , 2013-Ohio-2759.] {¶ 6} In January 2009, Strawn had surgery performed on his right knee. As a result, he missed six weeks of work. Upon his return to work, he provided a medical certification form; he was not as ked to provide an injury inve stigation report. The City granted injury leave for the si x-week period he did not work. {¶ 7} Strawn was again unable to report to work due to his knee on July 30 and August 3, 2009. Strawn was seen by his tr eating physician on August 3, and he was released to return to work the following day. He reported for his ne xt scheduled work day on August 6, 2009. Strawn again completed a me dical certification form upon his return to work, and he was granted injury leave for th e two days of work that he missed. Again, Strawn was not asked to complete an inju ry investigation report for these absences. {¶ 8} After returning to work on August 6, 2009, Strawn regularly saw his treating physician for examination and treatment of his right knee. Strawn repeatedly received a series of Synvisc shots, including one on Ap ril 19, that helped lubricate his right knee. {¶ 9} On April 23, 2010, Strawn woke at 5:30 a.m., intending to report to work. As he attempted to get out of bed, he had severe pa in in his right knee. The pain was so severe that he was unable to put any weight on his right leg. Strawn concluded that he would be unable to perform his duties as a fi refighter, and he called the dispatcher and reported that he would not be ab le to report to work. Strawn testified that he did not slip and fall, bump his knee, or otherwise do an ything to cause the pain in his knee. {¶ 10} On April 26, 2010, Strawn was seen by his treating physician and informed that he could return to work on April 27, wit hout restrictions. Stra wn missed two days of work, and returned to his normal schedule on April 29, 2010. Strawn submitted a medical certification form, as he had done in the past.4 {¶ 11} The City asked Strawn to complete an injury investigation report for the absences on April 23 and 26, 2010. Strawn co mpleted the form and submitted it, along with a copy of the injury investigation repor t for the March 2008 injury. The submission of the March 2008 report “was in accordance with [t he City’s] practice and policy for showing that the previous claim for injury leave on April 23 and 26, 2010 was related to the March 14, 2008 injury.” (Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award, p. 6.) {¶ 12} By letter dated May 27, 2010, Strawn was notified that his request for injury leave for April 23 and 26, 2010 was denied. The reason for the denial was that his alleged re-injury on April 23 did not arise out of the sc ope and during the course of his employment. Strawn’s injury leave pay was converted to si ck leave. “Prior to the notification that [Strawn’s] request for injury leave was denie d, [Strawn] was not informed that his Medical Certification form lacked suffi cient information, that more in formation was needed or that he did not establish a basis for granting injury leave. According to the Grievant [Strawn] he went through the same process that he had in the past.” {¶ 13} Strawn filed a timely grievance of the denial of his injury leave request. In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the City of Dayton and the International Association of Fire fighters, Local 136 (“the Union”), the matter was first presented to the assistant chief of fire, who denied the grievance, stating, “Given that the knee pain occurred at home and while sleeping in bed his in jury leave was denied for the cause did not occur in the course of and arising out of employ ment with the City of Dayton.” The grievance was then submitted to the director of fire servi ces. After a “second step hearing,” the grievance was denied by the director. The grievance then proceeded to binding arbitration with the Union5 as Strawn’s representative. (See Article 21 of the Agreement.) {¶ 14} After a hearing, the arbitrator sustained Strawn’s grievance, and ordered the City to grant him two days of injury leave for April 23 and 26, 2010, and to credit him for the two days of sick leave that he was required to use. The arbitrator (and the parties) considered the principal issue to be whether the pain Strawn suffered on April 23, 2010 was the result of the injury incurred on March 14, 2008 while performing his duties as a firefighter for the City. In a lengthy opinion, the arbitrator found that it was. The arbitrator stated that “the history of Grievant’s receiving injury leave and the continuing treatment of the Grievant for the knee injury clearly establishes a causal nexus.” The arbitrat or concluded that the Un ion had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the City ha d violated the provisions of Article 12, Section 1 of the CBA by denying Strawn the right to use injury leave for his absence from work on April 23 and 26, 2010. {¶ 15} The arbitrator rejected the City’s contention that injury leave was properly denied because Strawn’s medical certifi cation form failed to connect th at April 2010 complaint to his March 2008 injury. The arbitrator stated: Contrary to the Employer’s claim that it has no obligation to take the initiative to prove or disprove the cause of an employee’s claim, it is a party to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and as a party it is jointly responsible for its administration in a fair and reasonable manner. If the employer in its discretion needed additional medical information or the information received was incomplete, it should have requested such e ither directly from the trea ting physician or have the Grievant request such. At the very least it should have told the Grievant that the6 Medical Certification form di d not contain sufficient info rmation, or that it needed additional information. The Employer di d not do this. However, the Employer did require the Grievant to produce the In jury Investigation Report (Joint Exhibit #4) which clearly tied his claim for in jury pay on April 23 and 26, 2010 to the March 14, 2008 on the job injury. In the opi nion of the Arbitrator, the Employer waived its right to complain about the inad equacy to the Grievant and/or to either request additional informa tion or have the Grieva nt do so. Based on the testimony of the Deputy Director of Human Resources it certainly had the authority and the capacity to obtain additional medical information from the physician. {¶ 16} The arbitrator considered the following evidence in reaching his conclusions: 1) the history of Strawn’s injury; 2) the City’s gr anting of injury leave on three previous occasions; 3) the circumstances under which th e injury leaves were granted; 4) Strawn’s continued medical treatment for the knee injury; 5) Strawn’s compliance with the requirements for injury leave; 6) the City’s failure to communicate any deficiency on the medical certification form to Strawn or request additional information; a nd, 7) the lack of any evidence that Strawn was a malingerer. {¶ 17} On April 3, 2012, the City filed a motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award in the court of common pleas. The City claimed that the arbitrator had “acted outside the scope of his authority by imposing an extra-contractual obligation on the City not contained in its collective bargaining agreement,” specifically the duty to investigate whether an employee submitted sufficient information before denying injury leave. The City further claimed that the arbitrator exceeded his powers “in determining that the City was required to grant injury leave because all7 conditions precedent were met under Article 12.” The City argued that Article 12 gave the City discretion to grant or deny injury leave reque sts. The Union and Strawn opposed the City’s motion and filed a cross-motion to confirm the arbitrator’s award. {¶ 18} The trial court denied the City’s motion to vacate the arbitration award and granted the Union’s and Strawn’s motion to c onfirm the award. The trial court reasoned: Here, after reviewing the record, the C ourt concludes that the Arbitrator’s decision and award was rati onally related to the CBA. The Employer suggests that the Arbitrator imposed a “draconian” duty on it to seek more information when it was under no contractual or lega l obligation to do so. However, the Arbitrator found that the Employer is a part y to the CBA and as a party it is jointly responsible for its administration in a fa ir and reasonable manner. He further explained that the Employer waived its ri ght to complain about the inadequacy of the Medical Certification by failing to communicate any perceived inadequacy to Strawn. Moreover, the Arbitrator f ound that although the CBA may contain discretionary language, it created a right to injury leave when all conditions precedent were met and the practice has been to grant the leave. The Arbitrator’s interpretation that the CBA may contain di scretionary language, but created a right to injury leave when all conditions preceden t were met, is reasonable. This is buttressed by the seven reasons the Arbitr ator relied on in coming to his decision and award. As such, the Arbitrator’s decision and award is rationally related to the CBA and draws its essence from the CBA. The Arbitrator’s decision is not8 unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious. Thus, the Court must confirm the Arbitrator’s award. {¶ 19} The City appeals from the trial court’s judgment
II. {¶ 20} The City’s sole assignment of error states that “[t]he trial court erred in overruling the City’s motion to vacate the arbitration award and sustaining the Union’s motion to confirm the arbitration award.” {¶ 21} “Appellate review of an arbitration award is confined to an evaluation of the judicial order confirming, modifying, or vacating the award; we do not review the merits of the arbitrator’s award.” Sicor Secs., Inc. v. Albert , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22799, 2010-Ohio-217, citing, e.g. , Warren Educ. Assn. v. Wa rren City Bd. of Educ. , 18 Ohio St.3d 170, 174, 480 N.E.2d 456 (1985). Because arbitration is a creature of private c ontract, courts must ignore errors of fact or law by the arbitrator. Piqua v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. , 185 Ohio App. 3d 496, 2009-Ohio-6591, 924 N.E. 2d 876, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.) Judicial review of arbitration awards is limited in order to encourage parties to resolve their disputes with arbitration. Th is has long been public policy in Ohio. The state and courts encourage arbitra tion because it “provides parties with a relatively speedy and inexpensive met hod of conflict reso lution and has the additional advantage of unbur dening crowded court docke ts.” Appellate courts must ensure that trial courts, the front line of arbitral review, do not exceed the scope of their review authority. Otherw ise, “[a]rbitration, which is intended to avoid litigation, would instead merely beco me a system of ‘junior varsity trial9 courts’ offering the losing party comple te and rigorous de novo review.” Thus, judicial review of an arbitrator’s award is strictly limited, “and where a reviewing court exceeds the permissible scope of revi ew such judgment will be reversed.” (Internal citations omitted.) FOP, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. at ¶ 16. We review the trial court’s order de novo. Id. at ¶ 15; United Ohio Ins. Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co ., 2d Dist. Darke No. 2010 CA 21, 2011-Ohio-2432, ¶ 15. {¶ 22} “The grounds upon which a trial court ma y vacate an arbitrator’s award are few and narrow.” FOP, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. at ¶ 19, citing Dayton v. Internatl. Assoc. of Firefighters, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21681, 2007-Oh io-1337. R.C. 2711.10 identifies four grounds upon which a common pleas court may vacat e an arbitration award: fraud, corruption, misconduct, and the arbitrator exceeded his or he r powers. The City re lies primarily upon R.C. 2711.10(D), which authorizes a common pleas court to vacate an arbitration award when “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted wa s not made.” {¶ 23} The essential function of R.C. 2711.10(D) is “to ensu re that the parties get what they bargained for by keeping the arbitrat or within the bounds of the authority they gave him.” FOP, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. at ¶ 21. As we stated in Piqua v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. , * * * The arbitration agreement generally explains how the arbitrator may resolve the parties’ disputes, which ofte n concern how their agreement, in which the arbitration provision is contained, s hould be understood. In this situation, “the function of the arbitrator is to determine and carry out the mutual intent of the10 parties by interpreting the agreement and applying its provisions to the issues before him or her.” Like arbitral review generally, a tr ial court’s inquiry into whether an arbitrator exceeded his powers under the parties’ agreement is limited. Paragraph (D) is not violated if “the arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and is not unlawful, arbitrary or capricious.” Generally, if the arbitrator’s award is based on the lang uage and requirements of the agreement, the arbitrator has not exceeded his powers.
* * * An arbitrator’s award draws its esse nce from an agreement when (1) the award does not conflict with the express terms of the agreement and (2) the award has rational support or can be rationally derived from the terms of the agreement. (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 21-22, ¶ 24. {¶ 24} It is undisputed that the parties have entered into a collective bargaining agreement, which allows, as the third step of resolving a grievance, that the matter be submitted to binding arbitration. (Joint Exhibit 1.) The arbitrator’s decision is “final and binding” on the parties. (Article 21, S ection 4 of the CBA.) However, the arbitrator “shall have no power to add to or subtract from, change, modify, or amend any of the provisions” of the CBA. The parties agreed at the arbitration hearing that Strawn’s grievance was properly before the arbitrator. {¶ 25} The issue before the arbitrator was wh ether the City properly denied Strawn’s request for injury leave on April 23 and 26, 2010. Article 12, Section 1 of the CBA, which11 concerns the granting of injury l eave, provides, in relevant part: Injury leave is leave of absence with pay for an employee to recover from a job connected occupational illn ess or injury received in the course of and arising out of his/her employment with Manage ment. Leave is not deducted from sick leave credits. Injury leave may be granted provided the injury is reported to the immediate supervisor or designee with in seventy-two (72) hours after the
occurrence * * *. {¶ 26} The City first claims that the documents submitted to the City by Strawn failed to medically link his April 2010 knee pain to his 2008 job-related injury and that the arbitrator impermissibly modified the CBA’s language by granting injury leave to Strawn without a connection between the pain and a job-related injury. As stat ed above, the arbitrator found, based on the evidence, that the Union had estab lished that Strawn’s pa in in April 2010 resulted from the job-connected injury incurred on Ma rch 14, 2008, while Strawn was performing his duties as a firefighter for the City. We cannot re view the correctness of th e arbitrator’s factual finding. {¶ 27} The trial court concluded that the Arb itrator’s opinion and award was rationally related to the CBA and drew its essence from the CBA. Upon review of the record, we agree that the arbitrator did not modify the CBA. Rather, he found, based on the evidence, that Strawn’s pain was due to a job-connected injury that was received in the course of and arose out of his employment with the City as a firefighter. The trial court correctly concluded that the arbitrator’s opinion and award is not contrary to the terms of the CBA a nd is rationally derived12 from the terms of that agreement. {¶ 28} Second, the City contends that the arbitr ator exceeded the scope of his authority by imposing a requirement on the City to seek additional information from employees or their physicians if the documentation in support of the inju ry leave request is defi cient. As the City previously argued to the trial court, the City asserts on appeal that the arbitrator “imposed a draconian duty on the City to seek more inform ation when it was under no contractual or legal obligation to do so.” {¶ 29} We do not read the arbitrator’s opinion as creating an ongoing obligation that the City request supplemental information from an em ployee or the employee’s physician in order to assist an employee in substantiating his or her claim for injury leave. Rather, the arbitrator noted, based on the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing, that if the City believed it needed additional information in this case to rebut Strawn’s claims and evidence, it could have made an appropriate reque st for that information. {¶ 30} As discussed by the arbitrator, the medical certification form submitted by Strawn on April 26, 2010 provided a diagnosis of Rt. Knee 716.56 or 716.86; Brent McKenzie, the acting director of human resources for the C ity, testified that he did not recall reviewing anything in the file that would explain that code . McKenzie had further testified that the City sometimes sends back the medical certification form to the employee or contacts the physician if the City needs additional information. The arb itrator found that the City had not requested additional information in this case, but only asked for an injury investigation report. The injury investigation report submitted by Strawn in May 2010 attached the March 2008 injury investigation report, thus relating his April 2010 pain with hi s original job-connected injury.13 Strawn’s direct supervisor r ecommended allowing injury leave. The arbitrator found that Strawn’s claim for injury leave in April 2010 wa s not for a new injury, but for the continuing recovery from the injury of March 14, 2008. The ar bitrator stated that the City was aware of this, and that “supervisory staff had personal knowledge of [Strawn’ s] injury and the difficulties he had from time to time with his recovery that required time off from work.” The City had previously granted injury leave based on Strawn ’s submission of a medi cal certification form. {¶ 31} Upon review of the administrative r ecord, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by finding that the City had the au thority and capacity to obtain additional medical information and that, under the ci rcumstances of this case, the City should have communicated any perceived inadequacy in the medical certif ication form to Strawn or his physician. {¶ 32} Finally, the City claims that the trial court erred in confirming the award, because the arbitrator exceeded his powers in determining that the City was required to grant injury leave. The City asserts that Article 12 “unambiguously granted the C ity discretion in granting or denying injury leave requests.” The arbitrator concluded that the CBA “may contain discretionary language, but it has created a right to injury leave when all conditions precedent are met and the practice has been to grant the leave. ” The trial court found that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA was reasonable, and we agree. {¶ 33} Article 12 gives the City discretion to deny requests for injury leave, i.e., the City need not grant every request for injury l eave. However, Article 12 specifically creates injury leave as a “leave of absence with pay fo r an employee to recover from a job connected * * * injury received in the course of and arising out of his/her employment with Management.” The arbitrator had further noted th at, as a party to the CBA, the City is responsible for the CBA’s14 administration in a fair and reasonable manner. The arbitrator thus r easonably concluded that Strawn was entitled to injury leave when he esta blished that his April 2010 pain was a recurrence of his March 2008 injury, which was received in the course of and arising out of his employment with the City, and the City’s practice has been to grant injury leave. {¶ 34} The City’s assignment of error is overruled.
III. {¶ 35} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . FAIN, P.J. and WELBAUM, J., concur. Copies mailed to:
Susan D. Jansen Thomas M. Green Hon. Michael W. Krumholtz