COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Haley and Powell 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

RODERICK WILLIAMS, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 1018-10-2 JUDGE CLEO E. POWELL 

 MAY 3, 2011 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

Daniel T. Balfour, Judge 

 Samuel P. Simpson, V (Montgomery & Simpson, LLLP, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Jennifer C. Williamson, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. 

Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Roderick Williams, Jr. (“Williams”) was convicted of malicious wounding, in violation 

of Code § 18.2-51. On appeal, Williams argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove 

malicious wounding where the trial court found that the defendant “unluckily” caused felonious 

injury to the defendant and that the defendant’s actions were “malicious with no intent.”1

 For 

the reasons that follow, we agree and reverse Williams’s conviction. 

I. BACKGROUND

Larry William Vaughan has three children in common with Latisha Roy. Their 

relationship ended in early 2009. On the morning of October 13, 2009, Vaughan went to Roy’s 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

1

 Williams literally argues that the trial court erred in its application of Code § 18.2-51 by 

declining to reduce the charge to unlawful wounding after ruling that the defendant “unluckily” 

caused felonious injury to the defendant, and further stating that the defendant’s actions were 

“malicious with no intent.” This is essentially an argument that the evidence is insufficient to 

sustain the conviction under Code § 18.2-51. 
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house to pick up his youngest son to take him to get his hair cut. As he knelt down to zip his 

son’s jacket, Roy’s new boyfriend, Roderick Williams, struck Vaughan in his left eye. Vaughan 

was initially unconscious but as soon as he revived, he ran from the house. Because of the blood 

coming from his eye, his girlfriend, who had been waiting in his truck, drove him to the hospital. 

As a result of the attack, Vaughan lost his left eye and it will eventually be replaced with a 

prosthetic eye. 

At trial, defense counsel argued that there was sufficient evidence to prove “a felonious 

wounding” but not aggravated, malicious wounding. He also argued that one punch is not 

enough to prove the intent to main, disfigure, disable or kill. 

In ruling on Williams’s motion to strike the evidence at the end of the presentation of 

evidence, the trial court stated that 

I think [defense counsel] has got a point, that I have a feeling what 

happened is the man walked out, saw the, from what I’ve heard, 

which is a little skimpy, but I understand you’ve got to put your 

case on what you want me to hear and don’t want me to hear, I 

don’t think that it was intentionally aggravated, malicious, if the 

words in there right, I suspect he came out and he hit him across 

the face and unluckily it hit him in the eye. He thought he would 

have hit him somewhere else. 

And so I don’t think it was an intent to permanently, to put 

out all that language here, but so I’m going to sustain your Motion 

to Strike on the, on that and then leave you all to argue on what’s 

left, which is the [Code § 18].2-51. 

The court also stated “I don’t think he intended to do it, but I think he probably hit him in the 

side of the face.” Finally, the court stated that 

The Court further considers whether or not he think it’s 

malicious or unlawful. The Court notes the case handed to him by 

the Commonwealth2

 in which, in that case, a single blow to the ear 

2

 The case to which the court was referring was Johnson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 

79, 669 S.E.2d 368 (2008), a case in which the appellant was found guilty of malicious 

wounding. 
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ended up being the how offense of intentionally malicious 

wounding. The facts are pretty close to this. But I’ve already 

ruled, and I’m not going to compare to that extent. But I do 

believe that it is malicious with no intent. So, I’ll so find. 

(Footnote added). This appeal follows. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

 Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after 

conviction, it is our duty to consider it in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom. We should affirm the judgment unless it 

appears from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it. 

Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). “This 

principle requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the 

Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and 

all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” James v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 671, 675, 674 

S.E.2d 571, 579 (2009) (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 

759 (1980) (emphasis and citation omitted)). 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Prove Malicious Wounding 

 Code § 18.2-51 states that “[i]f any person maliciously shoot, stab, cut or wound any 

person or by any means cause him bodily injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or 

kill, he shall . . . be guilty of a Class 3 felony.” 

To support a conviction for malicious wounding under Code 

§ 18.2-51, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 

inflicted the victim’s injuries “maliciously and with the intent to 

maim, disfigure, disable or kill.” Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 

Va. App. 476, 483, 405 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991) (en banc). “‘Malice 

inheres in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without just 

cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will. It may be directly 

evidenced by words, or inferred from acts and conduct which 

necessarily result in injury.’” Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 15 

Va. App. 626, 631, 426 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1993) (citations omitted). 
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“Malice is evidenced either when the accused acted with a sedate, 

deliberate mind, and formed design, or committed a purposeful and 

cruel act without any or without great provocation.” Branch v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 841, 419 S.E.2d 422, 426 

(1992). Whether malice existed is a question for the fact finder. 

See id. 

Robertson v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 814, 823, 525 S.E.2d 640, 645 (2000). 

While malice may be proven, Code § 18.2-51 cannot be satisfied unless malice is coupled 

with the requisite intent. “To be guilty under Code § 18.2-51, a person must intend to 

permanently, not merely temporarily, harm another person.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 53 

Va. App. 79, 101, 669 S.E.2d 368, 378 (2008) (citing Campbell, 12 Va. App. at 484, 405 S.E.2d 

at 4); see also Lee v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 572, 578, 115 S.E. 671, 673 (1923). 

 Here, Williams argues that the trial court found no evidence of the intent to maim, 

disable, disfigure or kill based on the trial court’s statements. Specifically, the trial court found 

The Court further considers whether or not he think it’s malicious 

or unlawful. The Court notes the case handed to him by the 

Commonwealth in which, in that case, a single blow to the ear 

ended up being the how offense of intentionally malicious 

wounding. The facts are pretty close to this. But I’ve already 

ruled, and I’m not going to compare to that extent. But I do 

believe that it is malicious with no intent. So, I’ll so find. 

Williams was originally charged with aggravated malicious wounding in violation of 

Code § 18.2-51.2, which requires that one commit the acts proscribed by Code § 18.2-51 and in 

so doing causes the victim “to suffer permanent and significant physical impairments.” The trial 

court reduced the charge from aggravated malicious wounding to malicious wounding and 

convicted Williams of that offense. That conviction is without evidence to support it. It is clear 

that the victim suffered “permanent and significant physical impairments.” Code § 18.2-51.2. 

What is relevant, however, is that the trial court found “I don’t think he intended to do it, but I 

think he probably hit him in the side of the face.” 
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At least four times, the trial court stated that he did not find intent. Specifically, the trial 

court stated: 

1) “I don’t think it was intentionally aggravated, malicious . . . [;]” 

2) “I suspect he came out and he hit him across the face and 

unluckily hit him in the eye . . . [;]” 

3) “And so I don’t think it was an intent to permanently . . . [;]” 

4) “But I do believe that it is malicious with no intent.” 

(Emphasis added). 

 While some of the trial court’s comments made after the motion to strike indicate an 

intent to differentiate between aggravated malicious wounding and malicious wounding, the 

basis for the distinction was that Williams’s acts were not intentionally aggravated. The court 

further stated that the blow was “unluckily” delivered, again indicating a failure to find that the 

blow was delivered with an intent to permanently disfigure. 

 The court reiterated its factual findings when it made its final ruling. The court 

specifically distinguished Johnson3

 stating that while “[t]he facts are pretty close to this[,]” it 

was “not going to compare to that extent.” Johnson was a malicious wounding case, where the 

sole issue was whether a single blow could satisfy the element of intent to maim, disfigure, 

disable or kill. It appears that the trial court was saying that the facts here did not rise to the leve

of those in 

l 

Johnson. Referring to Johnson, the court finally said “[b]ut I do believe that it is 

malicious with no intent.” 

 3

 In Johnson, 53 Va. App. at 99-105, 669 S.E.2d at 378-80, this Court considered whether 

the evidence could be sufficient to prove appellant’s intent to maim, disable, disfigure, or kill 

where the appellant punched the victim once. In that case, the jury found sufficient evidence and 

in giving the proper level of deference to inferences drawn by the fact finder, this Court 

concluded that, while one punch may not always give rise to such an inference, under the facts of 

that case, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer appellant’s intent. Id.
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 Intent to permanently maim, disfigure, disable or kill must be present in order to prove a 

crime of either malicious or unlawful wounding. Because the trial court specifically made the 

factual findings that 1) “I don’t think it was an intent to permanently . . .” and 2) “[b]ut I do 

believe that it is malicious with no intent,” the ruling of the trial court is inconsistent with its 

factual findings and, is therefore, plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 

The Attorney General argues that Williams is fixating on isolated statements of the trial 

court. It is well settled that 

“[a]bsent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment 

of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the 

law was correctly applied to the facts.” Yarborough v. 

Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977); 

Craddock v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 539, 547, 580 S.E.2d 

454, 458 (2003). This means the “judge is presumed to know the 

law and to apply it correctly in each case.” Crest v. 

Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 165, 172 n.3, 578 S.E.2d 88, 91 n.3 

(2003). 

Only “clear evidence to the contrary in the record,” 

Campbell v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 180, 186, 571 S.E.2d 

906, 909 (2002) (citation omitted), suffices to rebut the 

presumption. In reviewing the record, therefore, we will not “fix 

upon isolated statements of the trial judge taken out of the full 

context in which they were made, and use them as a predicate for 

holding the law has been misapplied.” Bullock v. Commonwealth, 

48 Va. App. 359, 368, 631 S.E.2d 334, 339-40 (2006) (citation 

omitted). And a “trial court’s remark is not, in and of itself, the 

full context simply because it represents the only point at which 

the court expressly addressed the issue in dispute.” Parker v. 

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 643, 656-57, 587 S.E.2d 749, 755 

(2003) (citations, internal brackets, and quotation marks omitted). 

Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 57, 61-62, 646 S.E.2d 28, 30-31 (2007). The statements 

made here are more than merely isolated statements in the record. Because the question of intent 

is one for the fact finder and it does not appear that the trial court found the specific intent to 

“maim, disfigure, disable or kill,” the evidence is insufficient to prove intent. 
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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Williams’s conviction and remand the matter to the 

circuit court for a new trial on a charge of assault and battery if the Commonwealth be so 

advised. See Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 576, 667 S.E.2d 763, 766 (2008) (remanding 

for a new trial rather than the imposition of a new sentence on the lesser offense because both 

parties have not consented to that relief). 

Reversed and remanded.