UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4382

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DESHAWN X. HOLLAND,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:11-cr-00208-JAG-1)

Submitted: May 31, 2013 Decided: June 6, 2013

Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles D. Lewis, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. 

MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael A. Jagels, Special 

Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Deshawn X. Holland appeals his convictions following 

his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute cocaine 

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and to 

possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (2006), and his convictions following a bench trial 

of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and possession of a firearm 

in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006). On appeal, Holland argues that the 

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 

found subsequent to an allegedly illegal seizure. Finding no 

error, we affirm. 

Holland did not appear to be engaged in illegal 

activity when Detective Bridges and Officer Custer of the 

Richmond City Police Department observed him walking on the 

sidewalk of North 26th Street. The officers began following 

Holland, known to them as a felon, on foot and asked him 

questions. Holland did not respond and continued to walk away 

from the officers into an alley and eventually into the backyard 

of 908 North 27th Street. Officer Custer followed Holland into 

the backyard, and Detective Bridges remained in the alley. 

Holland began walking to the front yard, towards North 27th 

Street, but returned to the backyard upon seeing two other 
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police officers pull their vehicle to the side on North 27th 

Street and one of those officers walk into the backyard of 908 

North 27th Street. 

Holland next jumped a fence out of the backyard of 908 

North 27th Street and fell to the ground. As Holland pushed 

himself off of the ground, Officer Custer observed in Holland’s 

jacket a heavy object, which he believed to be a firearm based 

on his training and experience. Officer Custer yelled out “he 

has got it,” and Holland began running. Holland initially ran 

toward Detective Bridges in the alley, Bridges yelled “Mr. 

Holland” or “don’t,” and Holland began running in the other 

direction. Detective Bridges chased Holland and saw him drop a 

firearm. Detective Bridges ultimately apprehended Holland, and 

the officers retrieved the firearm and found approximately eight 

grams of cocaine base and $188 in cash on Holland. 

The district court denied Holland’s motion to 

suppress, explaining that, while there were multiple officers 

around Holland when he was in the backyard of 908 North 27th 

Street, none of the officers told Holland that he had to stop or 

that he was under arrest. The district court concluded that 

Holland was not seized until he was apprehended by Detective 

Bridges, which occurred after Holland dropped the firearm. 

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Holland pled 
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guilty to, and was convicted of, the drug and firearms offenses

charged in the indictment. 

On appeal, Holland argues that, when the officers 

followed him into the backyard of 908 North 27th Street while 

continually asking him questions and positioning themselves 

around him to prevent his escape, a reasonable person would not 

have felt free to leave and that he was unlawfully seized in the 

backyard. When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, 

we review the district court’s legal determinations de novo and 

its factual determinations for clear error. United States v. 

Black, 707 F.3d 531, 537 (4th Cir. 2013). “[B]ecause the 

district court denied [the defendant’s] motion to suppress, we

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Government on appeal.” United States v. Bumpers, 705 F.3d 168, 

175 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

While “police may approach an individual on a public 

street and ask questions without implicating the Fourth 

Amendment’s protections,” such an encounter “may, . . . at some 

unspecified point, cross the line and become an unconstitutional 

seizure.” United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 

2002). An unconstitutional seizure occurs when a police 

“officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, 

terminates or restrains [an individual’s] freedom of movement.” 

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (internal 
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quotation marks omitted). Such a seizure occurs “only if, in 

view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 

reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 

leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).* 

We consider the totality of the circumstances and look to the 

specific following factors: 

“(i) the number of police officers present at the 

scene; (ii) whether the police officers were in 

uniform; (iii) whether the police officers displayed 

their weapons; (iv) whether they touched the defendant 

or made any attempt to physically block his departure 

or restrain his movement; (v) the use of language or 

tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 

officer’s request might be compelled; (vi) whether the 

officers informed the defendant that they suspected 

him of illegal activity rather than treating the 

encounter as routine in nature; and (vii) whether, if 

the officer requested from the defendant . . . some 

form of official identification, the officer promptly 

returned it.” 

Black, 707 F.3d at 537-38 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In considering the totality of the circumstances, we 

conclude that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Holland was 

 * The Government argues that, in determining whether a 

seizure occurred, we should apply the “force or submission” 

standard set forth in Hodari D. v. California, 499 U.S. 621, 626 

(1991) (holding that “[a]n arrest requires either physical force 

. . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of 

authority”). The Government contends that, because Holland 

never submitted to a show of authority, there was no seizure. 

However, because we conclude that the officers’ actions here did 

not demonstrate an “unambiguous intent to restrain” Holland, 

Mendenhall, as opposed to Hodari D., applies. See Black, 707 

F.3d at 537-38 n.3 (detailing standard for determining whether 

to apply Mendenhall or Hodari D.). 
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not seized in the backyard of 908 North 27th Street. First, the 

officers did not physically touch Holland and, contrary to 

Holland’s assertions on appeal, did not physically restrain his 

movement. When the officers began following Holland on North 

26th Street, they maintained a distance of ten to thirty feet,

and, when Holland entered the alley, they maintained a distance 

of twenty to thirty feet. Further, when Holland jumped the 

fence out of the backyard of 908 North 27th Street, Officer 

Custer was ten to twenty feet away from Holland. See generally

United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 323 (4th Cir. 1989) 

(finding no seizure when officers “made [no] attempt to restrain 

[the suspect’s] movement, but instead walked with him as he 

moved through the airport towards the exit”). Additionally, 

there was no evidence demonstrating that the other officers 

restrained Holland’s movement when they pulled their marked 

vehicle to the side of North 27th Street as Holland was 

approaching the front yard of 908 North 27th Street. To the 

contrary, the additional officers were there “to have eyes on 

[Holland]” and were not there to “contain” Holland. See 

generally Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988) 

(finding no seizure of pedestrian when there was no evidence 

that police “operated the car in an aggressive manner to block 

respondent’s course or otherwise control the direction or speed 

of his movement”).
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As the district court noted, the officers neither

directed Holland to stop nor stated that he was under arrest. 

Rather, the officers asked Holland conversational questions, to 

which Holland did not respond, such as whether they could speak 

with him, how he was doing, where he had been, when he got back 

to town, and whether he lived in the area. The only question 

that indicated the officers suspected Holland of criminal 

activity was whether he was carrying any firearms. However, 

there was nothing in the record demonstrating that the officers’ 

questions or tone of voice indicated that Holland had to stop 

and respond to the officers. While Detective Bridges testified 

that he talked “somewhat loud[ly],” he also testified that he 

did so “[i]n order to be heard” and that, at the time, he was 

thirty feet away from Holland, who continued walking away from 

the officers. Cf. United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 123 

(4th Cir. 1991) (holding that seizure occurred when “officer’s 

prolonged and persistent questioning after the suspect had 

conveyed an unequivocal unwillingness to engage in further 

conversation with the officer”).

Turning to the remaining Mendenhall factors, the 

officers never requested any identification from Holland. 

Additionally, Detective Bridges and Officer Custer were in 

uniform and in a marked vehicle, and two additional police 

officers later came to the scene on North 27th Street in a 
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marked vehicle. However, there is nothing in the record to 

indicate that any of the officers displayed their weapons, 

activated their sirens, or commanded Holland to stop. 

Accordingly, looking to the totality of the circumstances, we 

conclude that a reasonable person would have felt free to 

continue in their normal course of movement. Further, we 

conclude that the district court properly determined that, once 

Detective Bridges observed Holland, a known felon, drop the

firearm, the officers had probable cause to arrest Holland. See

United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 657-58 (4th Cir. 2004) 

(stating that probable cause to arrest exists when officer has 

“reasonable ground for belief of guilt that was particularized 

with respect to the person to be . . . seized”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, the district court properly denied the 

motion to suppress, and we affirm the court’s judgment. We deny 

Holland’s motion to file a pro se supplemental brief and

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED