J-S06017-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: D.V.M.R., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: L.W., MOTHER

No. 1258 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered June 22, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 3956

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2016

Appellant, L.W. (Mother) appeals from the June 22, 2015 order 

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her minor son, D.V.M.R., 

born in March 2011.1 After careful review, we affirm.2

The orphans’ court summarized the factual history of this matter as 

follows. 

Prior to [D.V.M.R.’s] birth, since October, 2009, 

[Centre County Children and Youth Services (CYS)] 

had been providing services to alleviate personal 

crises [Mother] was experiencing. She was using 

____________________________________________

1 The parental rights of D.V.M.R.’s Father, G.R. (Father), were terminated by 

the same order. The disposition of Father’s appeal is by separate 

memorandum at docket number 1266 MDA 2015. 

2 The Guardian Ad Litem has filed a brief in support of the involuntary 

termination decree.
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illegal drugs and failing to provide appropriate 

supervision for her children. She tested positive in 

multiple drug screens for cocaine, morphine and 

OxyContin without a proper prescription. She was 

charged with driving under the influence on two 

occasions. [Father] is [D.V.M.R.’s] natur[al] father. 

[Mother] and [Father] share another child, [N.R.], 

[D.V.M.R.’s] brother, born [in June] 2008, eight 

years old. [Mother] has an older daughter, [S.], who 

is [D.V.M.R.’s] half-sibling. [S.] was adjudicated 

dependent by Order entered in December, 2014.

CYS was involved with [Mother] and [Father] 

concerning their older son, [N.R.]. [N.R.] was 

adjudicated dependent in October, 2009. [Father] 

was incarcerated at the time [N.R.] was found 

dependent. Family Intervention Cris[i]s Services 

(FICS) was contacted to take reunification steps with 

[N.R.] and the efforts began with [Mother] in 

November, 2009 and for [Father] in March, 2010, 

when he was released from Blair County Correctional 

Facility. The reunification efforts were not successful 

as [Mother] had no housing, did not participate in 

lifestyle checks with FICS, and did not schedule 

sessions with reunification counselors. In August, 

2010, there was no progress in reunification and on 

December 30, 2010, reunification services ended as 

the parents failed to meet the required goals.

When [D.V.M.R.] was born in March, 2011, 

new services were provided by FICS since [D.V.M.R.] 

was in the home with the parents and reunification 

efforts were again commenced for [N.R.] There was 

progress toward reunification and things went 

relatively well. The reunification efforts ended when 

[Mother] was incarcerated in December, 2011. 

[Father] had a warrant out for his arrest at that time 

and his whereabouts were unknown. [Mother] was 

to be incarcerated until February, 2014, and [Father] 

was incarcerated through September, 2012.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/22/15, at 1-2.
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On March 10, 2014, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the 

parental rights of Mother and Father. A termination hearing was held on 

June 9, 2014, July 30, 2014, and October 31, 2014, during which the 

orphans’ court heard the testimony of former CYS caseworker, Lindsay 

Schreffler; D.V.M.R.’s foster father, J.F. (Foster Father); D.V.M.R.’s foster 

mother, M.J.F. (Foster Mother); CYS caseworker, Tammi Eddy; Mother’s 

maternal aunt, M.M.-K.; Mother; Father’s mother, P.K. (Paternal 

Grandmother); and Father. On November 24, 2014, before the orphans’ 

court ruled on the termination petition, CYS filed a petition to reopen the 

record in order to present new evidence concerning ongoing drug use by 

Mother. The orphans’ court granted the petition, and additional testimony 

was heard on January 2, 2015. Specifically, the orphans’ court heard the 

testimony of psychiatrist, Elmer Cupino, M.D.; and CYS caseworker, Brittany 

Werner. On June 22, 2015, the orphans’ court entered its order terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to D.V.M.R. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal 

on July 21, 2015.3

____________________________________________

3 Mother failed to file her concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal until the following day, July 22, 2015, in contravention of 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i). We have accepted 

Mother’s late filing in reliance on our decision in In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 

745, 748 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding that the appellant’s failure to comply 

strictly with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) did not warrant waiver of her claims, as 

there was no prejudice to any party). Additionally, on August 17, 2015, the 

orphans’ court filed an opinion adopting its June 22, 2015 opinion as its Rule 

1925(a) opinion.
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On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review.

1) [Whether t]he [orphans’] court erred in 

terminating the parental rights of Mother: 

Insufficient evidence was presented to demonstrate 

by a clear and convincing standard that the issues 

which prompted [CYS’s] involvement continued to 

exist at the time of the hearing and could not or 

would not be remedied by Mother[?]

2) [Whether t]he [orphans’] court erred in reopening 

the record on January [2], 2015, two months after 

the presentation of evidence had been completed 

and allowing the agency to offer additional evidence 

not within their possession or even in existence at 

the time the Petition to Terminate was filed[?]

3) [Whether t]he [orphans’] court erred in denying 

Mother’s Motion for Psychological Exam of [D.V.M.R.] 

to determine the impact termination would have on 

the child relative to his relationship with and bond to 

an older sibling[?]

4) [Whether t]he [orphans’] court erred in failing to 

consider the impact termination would have on the 

bond between the minor child and his older sibling[?]

5) [Whether t]he [orphans’] court erred in relying on 

the testimony of a caseworker to opine on the 

impact termination would have on the minor child 

relative to his parental bond with Mother[?]

Mother’s Brief at 1-2. 

We consider Mother’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. If the 

factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error 
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of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to 

trial courts that often have first-hand observations of 

the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. 

The party seeking termination must prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with 

the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 
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Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, 

we analyze the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate under Sections 

2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows.

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds:

...

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be without essential

parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

...

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
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We first address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). “The 

grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied 

are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds 

may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” 

In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted). “[A] 

parent’s incarceration is relevant to the section (a)(2) analysis and, 

depending on the circumstances of the case, it may be dispositive of a 

parent’s ability to provide the ‘essential parental care, control or subsistence’ 

that the section contemplates.” In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 

2014), citing In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012).

Instantly, the orphans’ court found that Mother’s incapacity, abuse, 

neglect, or refusal, has caused D.V.M.R. to be without essential parental 

care. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/22/15, at 9. The orphans’ court 

emphasized Mother’s “criminal issues, frequent incarceration, drug abuse, 

and lack of a stable home and employment,” and concluded that she will not 

be able to remedy these problems. Id. 

In her first and second issues on appeal, Mother argues that she is 

presently capable of caring for D.V.M.R., and that none of the issues that 

prevented her from caring for D.V.M.R. in the past continue to exist. 

Mother’s Brief at 6-9. Mother concedes that evidence was presented on 

January 2, 2015, which indicated that she was continuing to use illegal 
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drugs. Id. at 10. However, Mother insists that the orphans’ court erred by 

reopening the record and considering this evidence. Id. at 10-11. 

According to Mother, “[t]o allow [CYS] to re-open the record any time more 

damning evidence is available would place parents in an impossible 

situation, whereby they would be burdened with defending allegations in 

perpetuity.” Id. at 10. 

After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the orphans’ 

court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to D.V.M.R. During the termination hearing, on July 30, 

2014, Mother testified that she was incarcerated from December 9, 2011, 

until February 2, 2014. N.T., 7/30/14, at 29, 43. Mother acknowledged that 

she has a lengthy criminal history, and that she has been incarcerated on 

several prior occasions, including periods of incarceration in 2001, 2002, and 

2010. Id. at 66-74. Since being released from her most recent 

incarceration, Mother reported that has she been working as a housekeeper 

at a hotel, and that she rented a townhouse. Id. at 12, 14. With respect to 

her illegal drug use, Mother admitted that she continued to use heroin until 

she found out that she was pregnant with D.V.M.R. Id. at 48-49. However, 

Mother insisted that she has been drug-free for about four years, and that 

she would like to go back to school and become a drug and alcohol 

counselor. Id. at 14-16. Mother noted that she is on probation, and that 
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she has been drug tested by her probation officer. Id. at 30. Mother 

reported that she has passed all of her drug tests. Id.

On January 2, 2015, CYS presented the testimony of caseworker, 

Brittany Werner. Ms. Werner testified that she received a call on November 

9, 2014, indicating that there was “a child in the ER department that needed 

somewhere to go, someone to stay with because [his] mother, [Mother], 

was going to be admitted to the psychiatric department.” N.T., 1/2/15, at 

55. Ms. Werner spoke with Mother, who indicated that she recently had 

used cocaine, and that she used the cocaine “as an upper since her Adderall 

was a downer for her.” Id. at 56. It was Ms. Werner’s understanding that 

Mother also tested positive for cocaine at that time.4 Id. Ultimately, Mother 

was not admitted to the psychiatric department. Id. at 58. 

Given the foregoing, the record supports the conclusion of the 

orphans’ court that Mother is incapable of providing D.V.M.R. with essential 

parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for D.V.M.R.’s physical or 

mental well-being. Moreover, Mother cannot, or will not, remedy her 

parental incapacity. Despite Mother’s contentions to the contrary, it is clear 

that the circumstances which prevented her from caring for D.V.M.R. 

continue to exist. Mother continues to engage in illegal activity, namely 

____________________________________________

4 CYS presented a copy of Mother’s drug test results, which showed a 

positive screen for cocaine metabolite on November 9, 2014. See

Petitioner’s Exhibit 2, 1/2/15.
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drug use, which both risks the safety of D.V.M.R., and may result in 

additional periods of incarceration. While Mother insists that it was 

somehow unfair or improper for the orphans’ court to reopen the record and 

consider the evidence of her recent drug use, Mother fails to cite any 

authority which supports this proposition. See generally Mother’s Brief at 

10-11. Thus, we deem this claim waived. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 

339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“where an appellate brief fails to provide any 

discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the 

issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is 

waived[]”), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011), quoting In re A.C., 991 

A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010).

We next consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have 

discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of 

parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. As this Court has explained, Section 2511(b)

does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the 

term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case 

law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional 

bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to 

be considered as part of our analysis. While a 

parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a 

major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors 

to be considered by the court when determining 

what is in the best interest of the child.
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[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial 

court can equally emphasize the safety needs 

of the child, and should also consider the 

intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, 

and stability the child might have with the 

foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and 

whether any existing parent-child bond can be 

severed without detrimental effects on the 

child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015), quoting

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court found that terminating the parental rights of 

Mother and Father would best serve the needs and welfare of D.V.M.R. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/22/15, at 10. The orphans’ court explained that it 

considered the bond between D.V.M.R. and his parents, and concluded that 

D.V.M.R. would not suffer emotionally if parental rights are terminated. Id. 

The orphans’ court observed that D.V.M.R. shared a stronger bond with his 

foster parents. Id. Finally, the orphans’ court noted that it would be best 

for D.V.M.R. to continue residing with his foster parents, even though this 

will prevent D.V.M.R. from residing with his brother N.R. Id. at 11. The 

orphans’ court expressed hope that D.V.M.R.’s foster parents would work 

with N.R.’s foster parents and with CYS to foster a relationship between 

D.V.M.R. and N.R. Id. 
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In her third, fourth, and fifth issues on appeal, Mother argues that it 

was improper for the orphans’ court to terminate her parental rights without 

first conducting a bonding evaluation of D.V.M.R. and his brother N.R., and a 

bonding evaluation of D.V.M.R. and Mother. Mother’s Brief at 11-13. 

Mother asserts that there was “no competent testimony” concerning 

D.V.M.R.’s bond with Mother, and that the orphans’ court erred by relying on 

the testimony of the CYS caseworker that D.V.M.R. would not be harmed if 

Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Id. at 12. Mother insists that 

D.V.M.R. is strongly bonded with both her and N.R. Id. at 12-13. 

We again discern no abuse of discretion. CYS caseworker, Tammi 

Eddy, testified that she did not believe that D.V.M.R. would suffer emotional 

harm if the parental rights of Mother and Father were terminated. N.T., 

6/9/14 (Part 2), at 100. Ms. Eddy explained that she has attended 

approximately four visits between D.V.M.R. and his parents. Id. at 116-17. 

In addition, Ms. Eddy has transported D.V.M.R. back from visits. Id. at 95-

96. While being driven back after a visit, D.V.M.R. frequently asks when 

they are going to be home, and says, “I want Mommy [J.], I want my 

mommy,” meaning Foster Mother. Id. at 96. In contrast, Ms. Eddy 

described an incident during which she arrived at the foster home, and 

D.V.M.R. mistakenly believed that she was there to take him to a visit with 

his parents. Id. at 96. D.V.M.R. “ran upstairs screaming [‘]I don’t want to 
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go, I don’t want to go.[’] He then started throwing books at the [foster 

parents’] daughter.”5 Id. at 96-97. 

Concerning D.V.M.R.’s bond with his brother N.R., Foster Mother 

testified that D.V.M.R. and N.R. initially were placed together in her home. 

Id. at 39-40. However, N.R. engaged in numerous inappropriate behaviors, 

including acts of violence against D.V.M.R.. Id. at 41-43. Foster Mother 

and Foster Father struggled to ensure D.V.M.R.’s safety, and Foster Mother 

called CYS asking for assistance. Id. at 40, 42, 52. As a result, N.R. was 

sent to be evaluated at a facility called Kids Peace. Id. at 53-54. During 

N.R.’s time at Kids Peace, it was determined that N.R. should not reside with 

other children. Id. at 56. Thus, N.R. was placed in the care of Paternal 

Grandmother. Id. Foster Mother noted that N.R. was present during some 

of D.V.M.R.’s visits with Mother and Father, and that D.V.M.R. is more willing 

to attend visits if he knows N.R. will be there. Id. at 49-50, 61-62. Foster 

Mother indicated that she would support D.V.M.R. and N.R. maintaining a 

relationship, even after she and Foster Father adopt D.V.M.R.. Id. at 62. 

Thus, the record supports the conclusion of the orphans’ court that it 

would best serve D.V.M.R.’s needs and welfare to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights. D.V.M.R. was removed from Mother’s care in December of 

____________________________________________

5 While describing this incident, Ms. Eddy used N.R.’s first name rather than 

D.V.M.R.’s first name. However, it is clear from the context that she was 

referring to D.V.M.R.. 
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2011, when he was about nine months old. D.V.M.R. was placed with his 

current foster parents in March of 2012, and has resided with them 

continuously since that time. N.T., 6/9/14 (Part 1), at 34, 88. While Mother 

suggests that the orphans’ court should have procured a bonding evaluation, 

it is well-settled that a court in a termination proceeding “is not required by 

statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation be performed by 

an expert.” In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). The orphans’ court was well within its discretion when it relied on 

the testimony of Ms. Eddy, among others, to conclude that D.V.M.R. has no 

significant bond with Mother, and that D.V.M.R. would not suffer emotional 

harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. 

Moreover, it was proper for the orphans’ court to conclude that 

D.V.M.R.’s relationship with N.R. should not prevent Mother’s parental rights 

from being terminated. While Mother suggests that the orphans’ court failed 

to consider the impact that terminating Mother’s parental rights would have 

on this sibling relationship, the orphans’ court’s opinion belies this assertion. 

We agree with the orphans’ court that whatever bond the brothers share is 

outweighed in the instant matter by other concerns, including D.V.M.R.’s 

bond with his foster parents, D.V.M.R.’s need for permanence and stability, 

and Mother’s ongoing drug use. See In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (affirming the orders terminating the appellant’s parental 

rights to two of her children, and changing the permanency goals of two of 
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the appellant’s other children to permanent legal custody, based on the 

unique circumstances of each child). As observed by the orphans’ court, 

Foster Mother indicated during the termination hearing that she would 

support D.V.M.R. and N.R. maintaining a relationship, even after she has 

adopted D.V.M.R..6

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to 

D.V.M.R. See T.S.M., supra. Accordingly, we affirm the June 22, 2015 

order of the orphans’ court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/4/2016

____________________________________________

6 Similarly, Foster Father stated, “I would make sure that those boys stayed 

in contact with each other, seen [sic] each other. I have no problem with 

them communicating with each other.... I assure you that ... they will be in 

contact with each other.” N.T., 6/9/14 (Part 2), at 26.