N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
FR ED KENNETH M AC DONALD, Plaintiff - Appe lla nt,
v. UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A; e t a l., De fe nda

nts - Appe lle e s. No. 12-55949 D.C . No. 3:11-c v-01088-IEG-KSC
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Southe rn Distric t of C a lifornia Irm a E. Gonz a le z , Se nior Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d a nd Subm itte d Fe brua

ry 7, 2014 Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia B e fore : PREGER SON, M U RPHY ** , a nd B ER ZON, C i rc uit Judge s. Appe lla nt Fre d Ke nne th M a c Dona l d volunta rily dism isse d his c a se without pre j udic e a fte r the distric t c o urt dismisse d som e of his c la im s ba se d on m otions of the g ove rnm e nt a

n d the individual de fe nda nts. On a ppe a l, he se e ks re vie wof the



# FIL ED JUN 10 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S
. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The Honora

ble M ic ha e l R . M urphy , Se n ior C irc uit Judgefor the U.S. C ourt of Appe a ls for the Te nth C irc uit, sitting by de signa t ion.distric t c o urt’ s orde rs re g arding thosem otions to dism iss. W e la c k jurisdic tion
ove r his a ppe a l.

“ Unde r the fina l judgm e nt rule e m bodie d in 28 U.S.C . § 1291, thec o urts of
a ppe a l ha ve jurisdic tion ove r ‘ a

ppe a ls from

a ll fina l de c i sions of thedistric t c ourts of the Unite d State s.’ ” C ouc h v . Te le

sc opeInc
. , 611 F.3d 629, 632 (9th C i r. 2010). In ge ne ra l, “ [a ] distric t c ourt orde r is . . . not a p pe a la ble unle ss it dispose s of a ll
c la im s a s to a ll pa

rtie s or unle ss judgm e nt is e nte re d in c om plia nc e with Fe de ra l R ule of C ivil Proc e dure 54(b).” Romoland Sc h. Dist. v
. Inland Empire Ene rgy C tr. , 548 F.3d 738, 747 (9th C ir. 2008)
. And a “ volunta ry dism issa l without pre j udic e is ordina

rily not a fina l judgm e nt from whic h the pla intiff m ay a p pe a l.” C onc ha v . London , 62 F.3d 1493, 1507 (9th C i r. 1995) (e m pha sis omitte d). W e have re c o gniz e d two e xc e ptions to this ge ne ra l rule
. Se e J

a me s v . Pric e Ste r n Sloan, Inc
. , 283 F.3d 1064, 1066-69 (9th C ir. 2002); Romoland , 548 F.3d a

t 750-51. M a c Dona ld’ s a

ppe a l fa lls into ne ithe r one . 1. Unde r the first e x c e ption, in c e rta in limite d c irc um sta nc e s we m ay

re vie w a judgm e nt e nte re d by

a distric t c ourt a fte r “ a

pa rty tha t ha s suffe re d a

n a dve rse pa rtia l judgm e nt subse q

ue ntly dism isse s re m a ining c la im s without pre judic e .” J ame s , 283 F.3d a

t 1070. The J

ame s e xc e ption is not a

va i la ble he re , for a

num be r of re a sons. 2First, M a c Dona l d did not dism iss only the “ re m a ining c la im s ” tha t survive d the d istric t c o urt’ s orde rs; inste a d, he e xplic itly sought dism

issa l of his e ntire c a se . C f. id. at 1065. Se c ond, in J

a me s , the a ppe lla nt sought a

n a ppe a l a ble judgm e nt,
and the distric t c ourt e nte re d a “ fina l judgm e nt” on the c la i m s on a ppe a l, inte nding to gra nt a fina l, a ppe a la ble judgm e nt. Id. at 1068. Tha t the distric t

c o urt m a de tha

t de te rm i nation de m onstra

te d tha t it de e m e d “ its a d

judic ation of those

c l a im s wa s ripe for re vie w,” ba sic a lly the func tiona l e q

u iva le nt of a

pa rtia l judgm e nt unde r R ule 54(b). Id. at 1068-69. No such de te rm ination wa s m a de he re , a nd no judgm e nt wa s e nte re d. Inste a d, the distric t c o urt be lie v e d

tha t the c la im s we re not ripe for re vie w, a

nd de nie d M a c Dona ld’ s re que st for c e rtific ation of a n inte rloc utory

a ppe a l unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1292(b). Furthe r, in c ontra st to J

ame s , M a c Dona ld’ s a c tions provide e v ide nc e tha

t he sought to c irc um

ve nt the distric t c ourt’ s ga te ke e ping role s unde r Fe de ra l R ule of C ivil Proc e dure 54(b) a

nd § 1292(b) a

nd the re by

to m anufa c ture a

p pe lla te jurisdic tion im

prope rly
. Id. at 1066-69. M a c D ona ld first m a d e a §1292(b) m otion,
and only volunta

rily dism isse d his e ntire c a se a fte r it wa s de nie d. Wh e n doing so, he did not make c l e ar to the distric t c ourt tha t he pla nne d to a ppe a l a ny portion of the c a se . Inste a d, his re que st to dism iss thee ntire c a se c om

m unic ate d tha

t he did not inte nd to proc e e d with any of his c la im s. As a

re sult, thedistric t c o urt’ s 3de c ision to al low the volunta ry dism issa l “ did not im

ply its intent to gra

nt . . . a fina l a p pe a la ble judgm e nt,” sim ila

r to the grant of a

R ule 54(b) m otion, unlike

in J ame s . Am. State

s Ins. C o. v . Dastar C

orp. , 318 F.3d 881, 888-89 (9th C ir. 2003) (quoting J

ame s , 283 F.3d a

t 1068) (inte rna l quota

tion m arks om i tte d). It wa s only im

m e diate ly afte r t

he distric t c ourt dismisse d the c a se in its
e ntire t y tha t M a c Dona l d inform e d the c ourt tha t he inte nde d to “ sta

nd on the Se c ond Am e nde d C om

pla int” and ta

ke an im m e diate a ppe a l . At tha

t point, ha ving
a lre a dy dism isse d

the c a se without pre

judic e , the distric t

c ourt c ould no longer c onside r whe the r to issuea fina l a ppe a la ble judgm e nt, a

nd did not. M ore ove r, it is unlike ly tha t the c ourt would ha

ve issue d any suc h judgm e nt, in light of its de nia l of the § 1292(b) re que st a n d the c lose re lationship betwe e n the dism isse d a nd
una djudic ate d c la im s. In short, unlike in J

ame s , M a c Dona ld’ s volunta

ry dism issa l did not allow the d istric t c o urt to e x e rc ise its disc re tion a s to whe the r to gra nt the func tiona l
e quiva le nt of a

pa rtia l judgm e nt unde r R

ule 54(b). 2. M a c Dona l d’ s a

ppe a l a lso doe s not fa ll into the se c ond e x c e p tion, whic h pe rm its us in lim

ite d c i rc um sta

nc e s to tre at

a dism issa l without pre

judic e a s one with pre judic e , whe re tha

t de s igna tion is c o nsiste nt with the c l e ar, c onsiste nt inte nt

4of the c ourt a nd the pa rtie s. Se eRomoland

, 548 F.3d a

t 750; C onc h a , 62 F.3d a

t 1508-09. He re , the re wa s no c le ar, c onsiste nt inte nt tha t the volunta

ry dism i ssa l be with pre judic e . Afte r M a c Dona ld re que ste d dismissa l, the gove rnm e nt a rgue d to the d istric t c o urt tha

t M a c D o na ld should be

re q uire d to pa y its fe e s a nd c osts if the
c a se we re dism isse d without pre judic e , or a l te rnative ly the dism issa l should be with pre judic e . The distric t c ourt e xplic itly grante d M a c Dona ld’ s re q

ue st for dism issa l without pre

judic e ove r the gove rnm e nt’ s obje c tion. So M a c Dona ld ha d
re a s on to se e k dismi s sa l without pre judic e , an d the distric t

c o urt’ s inte nt wa s to grant tha t va rie ty of dism issa l. In c ontra s t, in R omoland

, the pla intiffs sought dism issa l of the ir c la i m s a ga inst onede fe n d ant, dire c tly te lling thedistric t c ourt it sought “ fina l judgm e nt for purpose s of a

ppe a l,” but theorde r of dism issa l wa s sile nt a s to whe the r the dism issa l wa s with pre

judic e . 548 F.3d a

t 740. And in C

onc ha , both pa

rtie s unde rstood tha

t dismissa l wa s sought in order to pe rm it a n a ppe a l, whic h c ould only be e ffe c t uat e d through a

dism issa l with pre

judic e . 62 F.3d a

t 1508-09. Furthe r, M a c Dona ld’ s be havior a fte r the dism issa l c onfirm s tha t he ha d not
at the tim e of its e ntry

inte nde d the dism issa l to be with pre judic e , a nd tha t he be lie ve d the re m a ining c la im s c ould be re vive d . Unlike in Romoland , 5M a c Dona ld’ s dism i ssa l wa s not only of una djudic ate d c la im s, but ra the r of the
e ntire c a se , inc luding theFifth Am e ndm e nt c la im for whic h he ha d suc c e ssfully oppose d dismissa l. Afte r his suc c e ssful de fe nse of it, it would ha ve se e m e d unlike ly tha t he inte nde d to dismiss tha t c la im with pre judic e . Furthe r, on a

p pe a l , M a c D ona ld c o ntinue d to tre at the Fifth Am e ndm e nt c la im , whic h the distric t c o urt ha d de c l ine d to dismiss, a s pa rt of his c a se . He
argue d its m e rits in his a

p pe lla te brie fs. He a lso a

rgue d tha t the unse rve d de fe nda nts should be

m a inta ine d in thea

ppe a l . Although M a c Dona ld sugge ste d at ora l argum e nt, onc e it be c a m e e vide nt tha

t the pa ne l wa s c onc e rne d a

bout its jurisdic tion, tha

t he would now bewilling to a ba ndon theFifth Am e ndm e nt c la im , that turna bout c am e too la

te , give n wha

t ha d c om e be fore ; the re l e va nt issueis whe the r the dism issa l wa s with or without pre judic e whe n a

pprove d by

the distric t c ourt. In Romoland

, in c ontra st, the a

ppe lla nts’ filings a

nd ora l re pre se ntations
c onsiste ntly

showe d the inte nt to dism i ss with pre

judic e be fore the distric t c ourt
and throughout the

a ppe a l, inc luding a

t ora l argum e nt. 548 F.3d a t 750. Ac c ordingly , we dism iss M a c Dona ld’ s a ppe a l for la c k of a

ppe l late jurisdic tion. DISM ISSED.

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