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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 11-CF-755

TROY D. RICHARDSON, APPELLANT,

v.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court 

of the District of Columbia

(CF1-11069-09)

(Hon. Gerald I. Fisher, Trial Judge)

(Argued December 5, 2013 Decided August 28, 2014)

Edward F.C. Gain, Jr. for appellant.

Peter S. Smith, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Elizabeth H. Danello,

Laura Bach, and Melinda Williams, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the 

brief, for appellee.

Before FISHER and BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Associate Judges, and BELSON, 

Senior Judge.

BELSON, Senior Judge: Troy Richardson appeals from a judgment of 

conviction of voluntary manslaughter while armed and carrying a dangerous 
2

weapon (prior felon) (CDW).

1

 He contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

both in excluding evidence that supported his self-defense claim and in admitting 

evidence that, in the months and years before the stabbing, he regularly used PCP, 

and that the drug caused him to behave bizarrely. We agree that the trial court 

erroneously exercised its discretion in excluding certain evidence that supported 

Richardson‘s self-defense claim, that the error was not harmless, and that reversal 

is therefore required. Richardson does not mention the CDW conviction in his 

appeal brief, but because a finding that Richardson acted in self-defense would 

control the resolution of the CDW conviction,2we conclude that a new trial on 

both charges is appropriate. 

The trial that we order today will be Richardson‘s third on these two 

charges. On January 8, 2010, Richardson was charged by indictment with first-

 

1

 D.C. Code §§ 22-2105, -4502, -4504 (a) (2012 Repl.).

2 D.C. Code § 22-4504 (a) (2001). Self-defense is a defense to a CDW 

charge for a person who is not carrying the weapon before the danger arises. See, 

e.g., Mack v. United States, 6 A.3d 1224, 1229-30 (D.C. 2010) (―[We have] long 

recognized that one is not guilty of carrying an unlicensed gun during the period it 

is actually used in self-defense. However, this doctrine is inapplicable where one 

anticipating harm carries a pistol in public for a period of time before the actual 

danger arises.‖ (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
3

degree murder while armed3and CDW in the May 17, 2009, stabbing of Tyrone 

Wheaton. On September 17, 2010, a jury found Richardson not guilty of firstdegree and second-degree murder while armed, but was unable to reach a verdict 

on the charges of voluntary manslaughter while armed and carrying a dangerous 

weapon, and the court declared a mistrial. On April 6, 2011, a second jury found 

Richardson guilty of those charges. As we will explain, the first jury heard 

evidence that Richardson had ―snitched‖ on Wheaton and his family, and that 

Richardson believed that Wheaton knew that he had done so. The trial court did 

not allow Richardson to present most of this evidence to the second jury, ruling 

that Richardson‘s speculation about what Wheaton believed was not relevant.

4

 

Because Richardson‘s self-defense claim was premised substantially on his own 

reasonable perceptions about what was happening between Wheaton and him, and 

because evidence that Richardson snitched on Wheaton and his family was

relevant to whether his fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm at Wheaton‘s 

 

3

 D.C. Code § 22-2101 (2012 Repl.).

4

The first jury heard this ―snitch‖ evidence, but only because the 

government ―opened the door‖ to it during the first trial by asking Richardson why 

he didn‘t tell the police that Wheaton‘s brother had given him drugs that morning, 

allowing him to explain that he had already told police that Wheaton‘s family was 

selling drugs from their apartment. Although the jury heard this evidence, trial 

counsel did not argue or explain its relevance at closing.
4

hands was reasonable, Richardson should have been permitted to present this 

evidence to the jury.

I.

In the early evening of May 17, 2009, police responded to a 911 call from 

2424 Elvans Road in Southeast, D.C., and found Tyrone Wheaton lying motionless 

and nonresponsive in the doorway to apartment 203, where he lived. The Chief 

Medical Examiner for the District of Columbia, who performed an autopsy on 

Wheaton, testified that he died from acute blood loss from a stabbing that 

punctured his aorta and left a wound seven to eight inches deep. 

Earlier that afternoon, Wheaton had brought his girlfriend and their two 

sons, then twelve and thirteen, to dinner at his apartment, where he had lived for 

some years with his mother, Deborah Sparks, and two siblings. Appellant 

Richardson, another long-time resident, lived across the hall in apartment 202. 

According to Deontrae Ingram, a sixteen year-old neighbor, Richardson was 

outside on the porch in front of 2424 Elvans Road that afternoon smoking a 

―dipper‖ (a tobacco or marijuana cigarette dipped in PCP) when Wheaton 
5

approached him. The two fought,5and a crowd gathered to watch. Ingram, the 

only member of that crowd to testify, said that after the fight Wheaton returned to 

his apartment, and Richardson ran up the stairs after him, yelling, ―I‘m a kill you 

bitch, I‘m a kill you.‖ 

Ingram continued inside to an inner stairwell which gave him a view of the 

landing between Richardson‘s and Wheaton‘s apartments. He said that while 

Wheaton was standing in the hallway between apartments 202 and 203 talking to 

his mother, Richardson ―peeked‖ out of his door, then stepped out into the hallway 

and punched Wheaton. 

Deborah Sparks, Wheaton‘s mother, had been inside apartment 203 that 

afternoon preparing dinner, and she testified that Wheaton went outside the 

building briefly and returned a few minutes later, appearing upset, and then went 

into the hallway. Hearing a commotion in the hall, she went to her apartment

doorway. She heard Richardson say, ―call the police, call the ambulance, because 

he‘s about to die.‖ She then saw Richardson emerge from his apartment, stab

 

5

Testimony left it unclear who started the fight. 
6

Wheaton, and quickly return to his apartment.6 Wheaton‘s sister, Jessica Sparks, 

who also lived in apartment 203, said that she was returning home when she heard 

about the stabbing from a neighbor, at which point she ran up the stairs, retrieved a 

yellow and black crowbar that the family kept in the living room, and banged on 

Richardson‘s door with it. 

Wheaton‘s sons were called by the defense. They saw the events from the 

living room of apartment 203, which gave them a partial view into the hallway.

7

 

At trial, one son testified that after Richardson, unarmed, took a swing at Wheaton, 

Wheaton entered apartment 203, grabbed a yellow and black crowbar from the 

living room, and returned to the hallway. Richardson, then armed with a knife, 

swung at Wheaton and missed, and Wheaton swung the crowbar at Richardson. He

did not see whether Wheaton hit Richardson with the crowbar. Richardson then 

backed up and took a third swing at Wheaton with the knife. The other son

testified that he saw Wheaton, angry and yelling, grab the crowbar from behind the 

TV in the living room, and return to the hallway. He said that Richardson stabbed

his father twice, and his father then walked back into apartment 203. 

 

6

 Another witness, a neighbor, gave a similar account of the events.

7

Their view of the hallway was obscured by a partial wall, and by their 

mother and grandmother who were standing in the doorway. 
7

Richardson testified at trial, saying that Wheaton approached him when he 

was sitting on the porch outside 2424 Elvans Road that afternoon.

8

 He said that 

Wheaton ―came up the steps, stood over top of me. And I looked up and he said 

 ̳You snitch-ass bitch.‘‖ Then Wheaton attacked him. Seeking safety, he went 

upstairs to his apartment. He said he was unlocking his apartment door when he 

heard a woman‘s voice say, ―kill his ass, kill his ass,‖ and he then felt ―something 

hard hit my back.‖9 Richardson said he grabbed a knife that was sitting on a ―halfwall‖ or a ledge by his door as Wheaton was trying to force his way into 

Richardson‘s apartment. He admitted to stabbing Wheaton with it. Afterward, 

Richardson said he returned to his apartment, locked the door, and stayed there for 

several hours. During that time, according to Officer Kelan Edwards who 

responded to the 911 call, Richardson was listening to music and popping popcorn. 

Edwards testified that he banged on Richardson‘s door with his fist and with a 

baton, and identified himself as a police officer, only to hear a man‘s voice say, 

 

8 Richardson said that he used cocaine and marijuana that day, but denied 

smoking a ―dipper.‖ He did admit to regular PCP use. 

9 Richardson also said that Wheaton ―grabbed me and slammed me on the 

ground, pinned me down, began to choke me, smacked me, picked me up and try 

to throw me down the steps‖ outside, but officers who responded to the 911 call 

noticed no signs that Richardson had been injured, even though they asked him to 

turn around and lift his shirt. Nor did he claim to be injured. 
8

―get the fuck away from my door.‖ Richardson finally emerged only after police 

cut the power supply to his apartment. 

II.

As the jury in Richardson‘s first trial learned, but the jury in the trial before 

us did not, the Sparks-Wheaton family occasionally sold drugs out of apartment 

203, and Richardson, a longstanding drug addict, was a regular buyer. 

Approximately six months before he stabbed Wheaton in May of 2009, Richardson 

informed police about drug sales from apartment 203. He spoke several times with

Sergeant Yurell Washington of the Metropolitan Police Department, providing 

Wheaton‘s name and the make and license plate number of the car Wheaton drove.

According to Richardson, after he spoke with Sergeant Washington, but well 

before the stabbing, police executed a search warrant at apartment 203 and arrested 

at least one family member for drug crimes on the basis of that search.10 

In the first trial, Richardson called as a witness Sergeant Washington, who 

confirmed that he spoke to Richardson several times by phone, and sent 

undercover investigators to the area based on Richardson‘s information, but that 

 

10 In the first trial, Richardson indicated that apartment 203 was searched in 

November 2008, and the government also indicated in colloquy with the court 

during the second trial that there was a search of the apartment that fall.
9

information never ―panned out.‖ Sergeant Washington testified that he did not 

execute a warrant on apartment 203, and he heard about the executed warrant only 

from Richardson himself. 

This evidence came in during Richardson‘s first trial when his counsel asked 

him why he did not tell the police that he stabbed Wheaton in self-defense. He 

explained,

I didn‘t feel comfortable with the two detectives . . . 

because I gave the police information—the Narcotic 

Division about narcotics being sold out apartment 203 

and when I first spoke with the Narcotic Detective I 

didn‘t want to give out my name because I didn‘t want 

my name leaked out because once you‘re known in the 

neighborhood as being a snitch its repercussions behind 

it.

Richardson also explained that he never met with Sergeant Washington in 

person, because ―I didn‘t want to sign no papers to be—like I explained to you, 

your name gets leaked in the community as a snitch. Once you give information 

up, somehow, some way people find out that you‘re giving information up.‖ 

At the outset of the second trial, the government moved to exclude as 

irrelevant Richardson‘s statements that he spoke to Sergeant Washington about 
10

drug sales from apartment 203 months before the stabbing, that he believed that the 

search subsequently executed on that apartment was based on information he 

provided, and that Wheaton‘s brother sold him drugs the morning of the stabbing. 

Richardson opposed the motion, saying that the point of introducing the evidence

was ―to just go with the whole idea that he was still trying to help the police and 

that his theory of why Tyrone Wheaton was coming after him was because the 

family had decided he was a snitch.‖ The court responded as follows: 

[Court]: But what would be your evidence of that?

[Defense Counsel]: This was Mr. Richardson‘s –

[Court]: That doesn‘t matter, though. That‘s not relevant 

on that issue, that he thought that they believed he was a 

snitch. I don‘t see how that has anything to do with who 

sold him the drugs or anything of that nature. 

. . .

[Defense Counsel]: Well, very well, you know, I‘ll keep 

away from that on direct, . . .

[Court]: . . . And what about the search warrant issue, 

which is a little bit related to this?

[Defense Counsel]: It‘s the same thing. It‘s related in 

Mr. Richardson‘s mind that he got – this attack was 

happening because of him cooperating with the police. 

We‘re not going to go into that. I won‘t go into it on 

direct.

[Court]: Right, but Mr. Richardson needs to know that 

unless specific approval has been given for that subject 

matter, he can‘t testify. Even if you don‘t ask the 
11

question, Mr. Richardson can‘t testify about that because 

it‘s not relevant without more.

[Defense Counsel]: Very well.

The court then went on to address Richardson directly, and in doing so 

expanded the scope of its ruling. 

[Court]: Mr. Richardson, . . . what you think people may 

have thought about you, just that view without more, is 

not relevant. If you think somebody was doing 

something because you believe they had a particular 

thought, that‘s not relevant unless you can prove that, in 

fact, they did have that thought. . .

. . .

[Defendant]: But that‘s part of the theory of my defense–

[Court]: . . . [B]ut just because you think something was 

happening doesn‘t necessarily mean that you get to 

testify about it just because you want to make that part of 

your theory.

Later, before he testified, Richardson asked the court directly whether he 

could explain why he thought Wheaton had attacked him. The court said that 

Richardson could testify that Wheaton called him a ―snitch-ass bitch‖ when they 

fought that afternoon, but he could not present his ―speculation about what Mr. 

Wheaton, why he might have been angry at you or what was going on in his mind 
12

as opposed to what he said or did. And so what you might think he was thinking is 

not a proper topic for you to testify about.‖ The court explained that, 

[Court]: Well, but you see the problem with that, Mr. 

Richardson, is . . . you have to show a link between that 

and these events. Not that you think there‘s a link, but 

that there actually is a link. 

[Defendant]: Well, actually from the incident and me 

speaking with the police. Giving the police information 

about —

[Court]: But that‘s not a sufficient link, in my view, . . .

Thus, the trial court allowed Richardson to say that Wheaton called him a 

―snitch-ass bitch‖ that afternoon, but it excluded (1) evidence that Richardson 

obtained drugs from Wheaton‘s brother the morning of the stabbing; (2) evidence 

that, months before the stabbing, Richardson spoke to police about drug sales from 

apartment 203 and that police executed a search warrant there; and (3) testimony 

by Richardson that he believed that Wheaton knew that he actually talked to the 

police. 

III.

The trial court excluded this evidence (the ―snitch‖ evidence) as irrelevant. 

A trial court has broad discretion to make evidentiary rulings because of its 
13

familiarity with the details of the case and expertise in evidentiary matters, and we 

review that ruling for abuse of discretion. (Markus) Johnson v. United States, 960 

A.2d 281, 294 (D.C. 2008). When we review for abuse of discretion, we apply a 

five-part test in which we consider: ―(1) whether the decision at issue was 

committed to the trial court‘s discretion; (2) whether the trial court recognized that 

it had discretion and whether it purported to exercise it; (3) whether the record 

reveals sufficient facts upon which the trial court‘s determination was based . . . ; 

(4) whether the trial court . . . failed to consider a relevant factor [or] relied upon 

an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the 

conclusion; and (5) whether the error, if any, was harmless.‖ Dawkins v. United 

States, 41 A.3d 1265, 1270 (D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Johnson, 960 A.2d at 295).

Relevant evidence is evidence that ―tend[s] to make the existence or 

nonexistence of a fact more or less probable than would be the case without that 

evidence.‖ In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 297 & n.21 (D.C. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks, brackets, and citation omitted); accord Campos-Alvarez v. United States, 16 

A.3d 954, 959-60 (D.C. 2011). The trial court enjoys particularly broad discretion 

in determining the relevance of a piece of evidence because the inquiry is factspecific and proceeds under a flexible standard. United States v. Mosby, 495 A.2d 
14

304, 305 (D.C. 1985) (citing United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170, 171 n.1 (D.C. 

Cir. 1969)).

 

Our general rule is to grant broad deference to the trial court‘s determination 

of relevance, but we do not regard relevance as a particularly high bar for the 

proponent of the evidence to clear, see Street v. United States, 602 A.2d 141, 143 

(D.C. 1992), and we are more searching in our review of a ruling that a piece of 

evidence is irrelevant if the appellant makes a showing that it was central to his or 

her defense. Riddick v. United States, 995 A.2d 212, 216 (D.C. 2010) (―An 

evidentiary ruling . . . is a highly discretionary ruling that will be upset on appeal 

only upon a showing of grave abuse. But such discretion does not extend to the 

exclusion of crucial relevant evidence establishing a valid defense.‖ (quoting Price 

v. United States, 697 A.2d 808, 818 (D.C. 1997) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted))). 

It is undisputed that the trial court recognized and exercised its discretion. 

The trial court granted the government‘s specific requests to exclude Richardson‘s 

testimony that he acquired drugs from a member of Wheaton‘s family earlier that 

day, and that police had executed a search warrant at apartment 203 in the fall of 

2008. After granting those requests, the court extended its ruling to exclude 
15

Richardson from testifying that he informed police about drug sales from 

apartment 203. The trial court explained that evidence that Richardson informed 

on Wheaton cannot bridge the gap to establish, or even support, any factual 

conclusion about what Wheaton actually knew, and that absent any additional 

independent evidence about what Wheaton actually knew or believed, 

Richardson‘s speculation about what he believed would be deemed by the court to 

be irrelevant. 

We next consider whether the trial court‘s ruling was based on a sufficient 

factual foundation in the record, and whether the trial court considered every 

proper factor and no improper factors, and whether the court‘s reasoning actually 

supports its ruling. We conclude that the trial court required Richardson to prove 

too much. The trial court said that the ―snitch‖ evidence could not bridge the gap 

between what Richardson believed about what Wheaton thought and what 

Wheaton actually thought. However, in order to raise self-defense in this case, 

Richardson did not have to show that his beliefs underlying his self-defense claim 

were true, only that they were reasonable and honestly held. Swann v. United 

States, 648 A.2d 928, 930 (D.C. 1994).
16

As this court has observed, the standards for making a self-defense claim in 

a homicide case are exacting: Richardson was entitled to an acquittal on that basis 

only if the jury concluded (1) that he honestly believed that, when he stabbed 

Wheaton, he was in imminent danger of serious bodily harm or death, and that he 

had to use lethal force to save himself from that harm; and (2) that both beliefs 

were objectively reasonable. Id. (citing cases and the Criminal Jury Instructions 

for the District of Columbia, Nos. 5.12, 5.13 (4th ed. 1993)).11 Furthermore, the 

first aggressor in a conflict cannot claim self-defense. Martin v. United States, 452

A.2d 360, 363 (D.C. 1982). In excluding the ―snitch‖ evidence for irrelevance, the 

trial court implicitly concluded that the proffered evidence was not relevant to any 

part of Richardson‘s self-defense claim.

 

11 Once the defendant has established sufficient evidence to justify giving 

the jury a self-defense instruction, the burden shifts to the government to disprove 

beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant‘s self-defense claim by showing that 

these conditions are not met. See Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 41 & n.17 

(D.C. 1990). As this court has explained, see id. at 41, self-defense claims fall into 

two categories: ―perfect‖ and ―imperfect.‖ To make out a ―perfect‖ self-defense 

claim, the defendant‘s beliefs that that lethal force was required to prevent 

imminent death or serious bodily harm must be objectively reasonable. If they are 

objectively unreasonable but honestly held, then the claim is ―imperfect.‖ Here, 

because Richardson is facing a voluntary manslaughter charge, he must make out a 

―perfect‖ self-defense claim to be entitled to an acquittal. See generally id. at 37-

40 (explaining the two types of self-defense claims and their interaction with the 

various types of homicide charges). 
17

A person‘s right of self-defense, and especially the degree of force the 

victim is permitted to use to prevent bodily harm, is premised substantially on the 

victim‘s own reasonable perceptions of what is happening. Fersner v. United 

States, 482 A.2d 387, 391 (D.C. 1984); see also Johnson, 960 A.2d at 297. The 

court‘s self-defense instruction put at issue Richardson‘s beliefs about what was 

happening and the objective reasonableness of these beliefs. 

Here the trial court concluded, in effect, that the ―snitch‖ evidence was not 

relevant to what Wheaton actually believed. However, it is Richardson‘s beliefs, 

rather than Wheaton‘s, and the objective reasonableness of those beliefs, that are at 

issue in his self-defense claim; the trial court‘s failure to consider this factor was 

error.

The ―snitch‖ evidence was relevant to Richardson‘s self-defense claim in 

several ways. First, Richardson said he believed that people who become known 

as ―snitches‖ in the community face repercussions, and that he therefore tried to 

hide his dealings with the police. He was reluctant to meet Sergeant Washington 

in person, because he feared that it would get ―leaked‖ to the community, and 

―once you give information up, somehow, some way people find out that you‘re 

giving information up.‖ Richardson gave police specific information about 
18

Wheaton, and the police subsequently searched Wheaton‘s apartment and arrested 

at least one family member. Because Richardson indicated that he believed that 

people would somehow learn what he did, the jury could find that Richardson 

honestly believed that Wheaton knew what he had done, and that he therefore 

feared ―repercussions‖ from Wheaton, in the form of serious bodily harm or death, 

and that the lethal force he actually used was necessary to prevent that harm. 

Second, the ―snitch‖ evidence is relevant to Richardson‘s credibility, in that 

it supports and explains Richardson‘s testimony that Wheaton called him a ―snitchass bitch‖ when they fought outside. A jury that heard the other ―snitch‖ evidence

might be more inclined to credit that piece of Richardson‘s testimony, which might 

otherwise appear to be an isolated and perhaps not credible attempt on 

Richardson‘s part to fabricate a motive and impute it to the deceased Wheaton, 

who is not in a position to contradict his testimony. The fact that Richardson 

actually had talked to the police about Wheaton could be viewed as explaining to 

the jury why Wheaton might indeed have made that remark.

 

The ―snitch‖ evidence is also relevant to the objective reasonableness of 

Richardson‘s beliefs. First, it provides context for Wheaton‘s ―snitch-ass bitch‖ 

remark that makes that remark seem more ominous and threatening. Even if the 
19

jury credited Richardson‘s statement that Wheaton called him a ―snitch-ass bitch‖ 

that afternoon, the jury might find it speculative to conclude from that evidence 

alone that Richardson reasonably believed that Wheaton thought that Richardson 

had spoken to the police and had given them information about Wheaton and his 

family. The other ―snitch‖ evidence gives the jury at least a tentative basis from 

which to draw that inference and a context that makes it more plausible. It also ties 

in with Richardson‘s testimony that he felt ―something hard‖ hit his back when he 

and Wheaton were in the hallway. The snitch evidence is relevant to what 

Richardson believed was happening in that moment. Although the objective 

reasonableness of Richardson‘s beliefs is a jury question, the factual backgrounds

of some of our cases demonstrate that the consequences of being perceived as a 

―snitch‖ can be serious indeed. See, e.g., Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1, 3 

(D.C. 1996) (en banc) (victim survived being abducted, stabbed, shot, and left for 

dead in the woods only to be fatally shot on the street weeks later because she cooperated with the government in its investigation of an armed robbery). 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court failed to take into 

account certain factors that it should have considered in deciding whether the 
20

―snitch‖ evidence was relevant. 12 Its ruling was therefore an erroneous exercise of 

discretion.

IV.

Because the court erroneously exercised its discretion in excluding the 

―snitch‖ evidence described above, we consider whether the error was harmless—

the fifth part of the five part test we apply in order to determine whether the court 

abused its discretion. The government urges that we apply harmless error review 

and affirm if ―we can say,  ̳with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened 

and without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was 

not substantially swayed by the error.‘‖ Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76, 84 

(D.C. 1996) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946))

(internal alterations omitted). Richardson argues that we should instead apply the 

more stringent constitutional harmless error test of Chapman v. California, and 

affirm only if we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was 

 

12 We have recognized that the victim‘s beliefs are also relevant to a selfdefense claim. See, e.g., Riddick, 995 A.2d at 217 (―[W]here the defendant in a 

murder case admits killing the victim but has asserted a complete defense such as 

accident or self-defense, the victim‘s mind is of particular concern to the jury.‖ 

(citing (David) Clark v. United States, 412 A.2d 21, 25 (D.C. 1980)); Hairston v. 

United States, 500 A.2d 994, 997-98 (D.C. 1985); Hill v. United States, 600 A.2d 

58, 61 n. 3 (D.C. 1991)). 
21

harmless. Clark, 639 A.2d at 81 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 

(1967)). Review of the error under the Chapman standard is appropriate if the 

exclusion of evidence prevented Richardson from presenting a complete defense. 

We conclude that under the circumstances reversal is required under either 

Kotteakos or Chapman. As we will explain, we reach that conclusion by applying 

the test for reversible error set forth in Heath v. United States, 26 A.3d 266 (D.C. 

2011).

Defendants have a constitutional right to present a complete defense. See 

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). Our interpretation and application 

of the rules governing admissibility of evidence must therefore accommodate that

right. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (―[W]here 

constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the 

hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.‖). 

While this principle applies to our interpretation of the rules governing relevance, 

those rules do not mutate to accommodate theories of defense. However, even 

where a defendant‘s constitutional right to present a complete defense is not at 

stake, ―[i]t is well settled that if the evidence offered conduces in any reasonable 

degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in controversy, it 

should go to the jury. It would be a narrow rule, and not conducive to the ends of 
22

justice, to exclude it on the ground that it did not afford full proof of the nonexistence of the disputed fact.‖ Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 438, 

440 (1870). 

Over the past two decades our case law has refined the contours of the 

concept of the complete defense that a defendant has a right to present. Defendants 

do not have an unfettered right to present any evidence whatsoever. See, e.g., 

Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 327 (D.C. 1990) (exclusion of evidence 

about the appearance of sexual assault victim‘s genitals did not prevent defendant 

from presenting a complete defense when defendant could not articulate a 

legitimate basis for its admission). Rather, defendants have a right to present

―crucial relevant evidence establishing a valid defense.‖ Price v. United States, 

697 A.2d 808, 813 (D.C. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Not all 

relevant evidence meets this bar. For instance, in Riddick, 995 A.2d at 216, the 

trial court excluded the victim‘s handwritten note revealing her distress that 

appellant was ―pulling away . . . more and more.‖ The defendant wanted to use the 

note to establish that the victim‘s distress could have led her to react aggressively 

toward him, but he was able to present other more persuasive evidence of the 

victim‘s anger and jealousy toward him in the months before her death. Id. at 220. 

In Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76, 81 (D.C. 1993), the trial court excluded 
23

from evidence a photo array from which a witness identified appellant. The 

defendant wanted to use the photo array to undermine the government‘s assertion 

that he reason the witness was hesitant about her identification of the defendant 

was that the photos in the array looked so similar. Id. at 82. We affirmed in both 

Riddick and Clark, having concluded that neither exclusion prevented the 

defendant from presenting a complete defense because the defendant had ample 

opportunity to present other evidence supporting those defenses. Id. 

Generally, our inquiry into whether an exclusion of evidence prevented a 

defendant from presenting a complete defense is highly fact-specific. We have 

found, for instance, that exclusions of relevant evidence have constitutional 

implications when they limit the defendant‘s ability to explain a witness‘s potential 

biases to the jury. See, e.g., Scull v. United States, 564 A.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. 

1989) (limits imposed on appellant‘s cross examination prevented appellant from 

presenting complete defense when ―there was a realistic chance that the proposed 

cross-examination had an impact on the outcome of the trial [because] it might 

have led the jury to doubt dispositive testimony against appellant . . . .‖); Bassil v. 

United States, 517 A.2d 714, 716 (D.C. 1986) (exclusion of evidence about 

witness‘s reputation for untruthfulness prevented appellant from presenting 

complete defense). The right to present a complete defense also entitles the 
24

defendant to present fully its theory of the case. See, e.g., McDonald v. United 

States, 904 A.2d 377, 382 (D.C. 2006) (exclusion of evidence of extent of 

appellant‘s injuries sustained during arrest deprived appellant of right to present 

complete defense where defendant‘s theory was that police fabricated charges 

against him to cover up their use of excessive force); Howard v. United States, 656 

A.2d 1106, 1118 (D.C. 1995) (exclusion of testimony from appellant and another 

witness that victim had previously threatened appellant with a gun and fired a shot 

at appellant deprived appellant of ―meaningful opportunity‖ to present evidence on 

provocation defense and therefore violated defendant‘s right to present complete 

defense).

Until the time this court issued its opinion in Heath, 26 A.3d 266, there 

remained the question how the court should determine whether excluded evidence 

was so critical to the defense that its exclusion violated a defendant‘s constitutional 

right to present a defense. In Heath, we adopted a modified version of an objective 

materiality test that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

borrowing from the materiality standard set forth in United States v. Agurs, 427 

U.S. 97 (1976), had adopted in Justice v. Hoke, 90 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). In 

Heath, we wrote, 
25

[W]hether an erroneous exclusion of defense evidence 

violates the defendant‘s constitutional right to present a 

defense depends upon whether there exists a reasonable 

probability that the omitted evidence, evaluated in the 

context of the entire record, would have led the jury to 

entertain a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. 

Heath, 26 A.3d at 281 (emphasis in original to indicate the difference between this 

rule and the Second Circuit‘s rule articulated in Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 

705 (2d Cir. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 529 U.S. 61 (2000)).

13

In Heath, we observed that we reach the same result under Kotteakos or 

Chapman whenever exclusion of evidence reaches reversible error of constitutional 

magnitude. Heath, 26 A.3d at 281.14 The evidence that a defendant is 

constitutionally entitled to present is precisely that evidence that, in the context of 

the entire record, stands a reasonable chance of turning the trial. And where that is 

the case, when we turn to harmlessness review of either stripe, we will be unable to 

say with fair assurance that the exclusion of such evidence did not substantially 

 

13 Because Heath was decided on July 21, 2011, several months after 

Richardson‘s trial, the trial judge in this case did not have the benefit of this 

decision when trying this case.

14

 We observe that ―commission of a constitutional error at trial alone does 

not entitle a defendant to automatic reversal.‖ Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 

218 (2006) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).
26

sway the outcome, and or that its exclusion was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

We apply the Heath test to determine whether the trial court‘s exclusion of 

the ―snitch‖ evidence restricted Richardson from presenting a complete defense. 

Richardson‘s defense was, in part, that he feared that Wheaton knew that he had 

given police information about drug sales from apartment 203, and that that is why 

Wheaton attacked him on the porch, and also why, when the fight continued inside 

the apartment building, he reasonably believed that Wheaton might kill or inflict 

serious bodily harm on him, and that lethal force was required to prevent that. The 

court prevented Richardson from presenting certain evidence that would have 

helped him explain to the jury why these fears were reasonable. Although 

Richardson was allowed to testify that Wheaton called him a ―snitch-ass bitch‖ 

when they fought outside their apartment complex, this single piece of evidence 

did not go far in explaining why Richardson might reasonably have feared that 

Wheaton knew that he had given police information about Wheaton‘s drug sales. 

See Howard, 656 A.2d at 1118 (appellant‘s single statement that the victim had 

shot at him in the past was ―so cryptic [and] so devoid of details‖ that appellant 

was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to present a provocation defense). That 

isolated piece of testimony would not have given the jury adequate reason to 
27

believe that Richardson feared that Wheaton knew what he had done and sought to 

retaliate, and no context from which to consider whether that fear was a reasonable 

one.

15

 The excluded evidence also has the potential to make Richardson‘s 

testimony that Wheaton called him a ―snitch-ass bitch‖ more credible. 

Furthermore, the government‘s evidence against Richardson was not 

overwhelming, and this matters when we consider what effect the additional 

excluded evidence could have had on the outcome. There was already evidence in 

the record that Wheaton hit Richardson with a crowbar, and the ―snitch‖ evidence 

could have led the jury to re-evaluate the relevance and credibility of that 

testimony. The excluded evidence would have provided the jury with additional 

reasons to credit parts of Richardson‘s testimony and that of other defense 

witnesses, and it would have provided evidence that Richardson honestly and 

reasonably feared imminent death or serious bodily harm at Wheaton‘s hands, and 

that he honestly and reasonably believed that lethal force was necessary to prevent 

 

15 We note that appellant‘s argument that the ―snitch‖ evidence was crucial 

to the defense is undercut somewhat by the fact that at the first trial defense 

counsel did not mention the admitted evidence about snitching in his closing 

argument, yet won acquittal on the murder charge. We also note, however, that in 

the first trial, appellant was able to assert a defense of imperfect self-defense to the 

charges of first-degree and second-degree murder, but not to the lesser-included 

offense of manslaughter. To succeed with a self-defense theory as to manslaughter 

appellant had to make a showing that his fear of death or serious bodily harm was 

objectively reasonable, and the ―snitch‖ evidence could have helped establish this. 
28

that harm. We therefore conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the 

omitted evidence, evaluated in the context of the entire record, would have led the 

jury to entertain a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, and that the 

exclusion therefore prevented Richardson from presenting a complete defense in 

violation of his constitutional rights. See Heath, 26 A.3d at 281. For these same 

reasons, we are not convinced that the trial court‘s erroneous exercise of discretion 

in excluding the ―snitch‖ evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Reversal of these convictions is therefore required.16

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons we reverse Richardson‘s convictions 

for voluntary manslaughter while armed and carrying a dangerous weapon and 

remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 

 

16 As Richardson‘s convictions are being reversed and the case will most 

likely be tried again, the trial court will be called upon again to make the highly 

discretionary rulings concerning the evidence of past crimes and other bad acts 

attributed to Richardson. The rulings will be made on the basis of the record at 

that trial. While we will comment that the rulings that admitted evidence of 

Richardson‘s acts on the day of the homicide appear well within the court‘s 

discretion, we remark that rulings on appellant‘s use of PCP on the days and 

months before the homicide, and his behavior after such use, may present more 

difficult questions. Accordingly, the trial court should state the basis of its rulings, 

applying the principles regarding such matters in Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 

85 (D.C. Cir. 1964); (William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087 (D.C. 

1996) (en banc); United States v. Morton, 50 A.3d 476 (D.C. 2012); Harrison v. 

United States, 30 A.3d 169 (D.C. 2011), and other cases. 
29

So ordered.