alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2014088EN.01000601.xml

| 27.3.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 88/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.3.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 88/6

---

New national side of euro coins intended for circulation

2014/C 88/03

Image

National side of the new commemorative 2-euro coin intended for circulation and issued by Latvia

National side of the new commemorative 2-euro coin intended for circulation and issued by Latvia

Euro coins intended for circulation have legal tender status throughout the euro area. For the purpose of informing the public and all parties who handle the coins, the Commission publishes a description of the designs of all new coins (1). In accordance with the Council conclusions of 10 February 2009 (2), euro-area Member States and countries that have concluded a monetary agreement with the European Union providing for the issuing of euro coins are allowed to issue commemorative euro coins intended for circulation, provided that certain conditions are met, particularly that only the 2-euro denomination is used. These coins have the same technical characteristics as other 2-euro coins, but their national face features a commemorative design that is highly symbolic in national or European terms.

1

2

Issuing country: Latvia

Subject of commemoration: Riga — European Capital of Culture 2014

Description of the design: The central image of the coin shows the skyline of Riga and the historic centre of the city that has been included in the list of the UNESCO World Heritage Sites. At the top of the image, the inscription ‘EIROPAS KULTURAS GALVASPILSETA’ (European capital of culture) and at the bottom the name of the celebrated city and the year of issuance ‘RIGA — 2014’, and underneath the indication of the issuing country ‘LV’.

The coin’s outer ring depicts the 12 stars of the European flag.

Number of coins to be issued: 1 million

Approximate date of issue: September 2014

---

(1)  See OJ C 373, 28.12.2001, p. 1 for the national faces of all the coins issued in 2002.

1

(2)  See the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 10 February 2009 and the Commission Recommendation of 19 December 2008 on common guidelines for the national sides and the issuance of euro coins intended for circulation (OJ L 9, 14.1.2009, p. 52).

2

---
#### James Edward SMITH, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.

No. U-262.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 20, 1973.

James Edward Smith, pro se.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Michael M. Corin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus initially filed in the Supreme Court. That court issued its writ returnable to this court, and the respondent has filed his return thereto.

Petitioner contends his parole was revoked in a procedure which failed to accord him all of the procedural safeguards pronounced by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).

Our review of the record herein consisting of the allegations of both the petition and the return, as well as the exhibits attached to the return, reveals that petitioner was afforded the necessary safeguards in connection with his parole revocation. The exhibits attached to the return show that a warrant was issued and served upon petitioner charging him with parole violation. He agreed to proceed to hearing after waiving counsel and the Parole Commission entered its order of revocation upon a finding that petitioner absconded from supervision in violation of the terms of his parole. In the circumstances reflected by the record herein, it is our view that the writ heretofore issued should be discharged on authority of our recent opin*669ion in Addison v. Florida Parole Board, 281 So.2d 906.

The writ is hereby discharged.

RAWLS, C. J., and WIGGINTON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Income Opportunity Realty Investors,
Inc. (the "Company"), on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2003, as filed
with Securities Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ronald
E. Kimbrough, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Principal
Financial and Accounting Officer and Acting Principal Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

Date: May 15, 2003                                 /s/ Ronald E. Kimbrough
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             Ronald E. Kimbrough
                                             Executive Vice President
                                             and Chief Financial Officer
                                             (Principal Financial and
                                             Accounting Officer and
                                             Acting Principal Executive Officer)

                                       23
Exhibit 32.2

Section 906 CFO Certification

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE
OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES - OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, the Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating
Officer of FundCore Institutional Income Trust Inc. (the Company), hereby certifies that to his knowledge, on the date hereof:



| | (a) | the Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2011 filed on the date hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section l3(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (b) | information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                   |  |                                                           
|------------------ |  | ----------------------------------------------------------
|Date: May 12, 2011 |  | /s/ Lee J. Taragin                                        
|                   |  | Lee J. Taragin                                            
|                   |  | Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer       
|                   |  | (Principal Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer)
EXHIBIT 32.2




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 USC, SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002






In connection with the Quarterly Report of Heartland Bridge Capital, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Frederick Larcombe, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)           Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated: May 16, 2011

/s/ Frederick LarcombeBy:
Frederick LarcombeChief Financial Officer




A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Heartland Bridge Capital, Inc. and will be retained by Heartland Bridge Capital, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
# C_2012303EN.01000201.xml

| 6.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 303/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 303/2

---

Designation of the Judge replacing the President of the Tribunal as the Judge hearing applications for interim measures

2012/C 303/02

On 19 September 2012, in accordance with Article 103(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal decided that, for the period from 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2014, Judge Rofes i Pujol shall replace the President of the Tribunal if he is absent or prevented from dealing with any application for interim measures.

---
No. 00-7281.

#### Diaz et al. *v.*Snyder et al.

App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

RICKEY DEAN RINKER,

Petitioner,

v .

OP 21-0274

MARK JOHNSON, Facility Administrator,

Butte Detention Center,

Respondent.

FILED

JUN 1 5 2021

Bowen Greertvvood

Clerk of Supreme Court

State of Montana

OR1)F R

Representing himself, Rickey Dean Rinker has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, indicating that his incarceration is illegal because he has been awaiting sentencing

in jail for more than 472 days. Rinker explains that he has been incarcerated since

February 5, 2020, for possession of dangerous drugs and that he pleaded guilty in October

2020. Rinker states that his bond was revoked when he changed his plea to guilty and

asserts that he has "been held 180 days without bond." Rinker offers that he completed a

chemical dependency evaluation, a pre-sentence investigation, and screening for treatment

with the Department of Corrections. He adds he was accepted to Connections Corrections

in December 2020 and that he has been awaiting sentencing for more than six months.

Rinker further states that his sentencing has been continued twice and that his sentencing

is now scheduled for June 10, 2021. Rinker requests his release because he has "served

over one quarter of the maximum sentence [he] can receive on this charge."

Habeas corpus affords an applicant an opportunity to challenge collaterally the

legality of their present incarceration. Section 46-22-101(1), MCA; Lott v. State, 2006 MT

279, ¶ 14, 334 Mont. 270, 150 P.3d 337. His present incarceration is due to a lack of

sentencing, and he is not entitled to release. A petitioner, such as Rinker, may challenge

the lack of bail in a petition for habeas corpus relief. Section 46-22-103, MCA. However,

06/15/2021

Case Number: OP 21-0274
at Rinker's stage of his criminal proceeding, he is not entitled to bail because when Rinker

pled guilty, he "was no longer cloaked with the presumption of innocence[d" Moore v.

McCormick, 260 Mont. 305, 307, 858 P.2d 1254, 1255 (1993). Rinker may have a

conviction, but he does not have a sentence to challenge under this remedy of habeas

corpus. Following sentencing, Rinker may seek an appeal. Lott, ¶ 19. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Rinker's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED and

DISMISSED.

The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to: the Honorable Kurt Krueger,

Butte-Silver Bow County District Court; Tom Powers, Clerk of Court, Butte-Silver Bow

County, under Rinker's pending criminal matter; Eileen Joyce, County Attorney; Jamie

Upham, Defense Counsel; counsel of record, and Rickey Dean Rinker personally.

DATED this I 5 `day of June, 2021.

ChiefJustice

2

1()

Justices
```

[Federal Register: November 29, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 228)]
[Notices]               
[Page 73082]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr29no10-86]                         

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES

 
Notice of Open Meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Export-
Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank)

SUMMARY: The Advisory Committee was established by Public Law 98-181, 
November 30, 1983, to advise the Export-Import Bank on its programs and 
to provide comments for inclusion in the reports of the Export-Import 
Bank of the United States to Congress.

TIME AND PLACE: Tuesday, December 14, 2010 from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. A 
break for lunch will be at the expense of the attendee. Security 
processing will be necessary for reentry into the building. The meeting 
will be held at Ex-Im Bank in the Main Conference Room 1143, 811 
Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20571.

AGENDA: Agenda items include a briefing of the Advisory Committee 
members on challenges for 2011, their roles and responsibilities and an 
ethics briefing.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: The meeting will be open to public participation, 
and the last 10 minutes will be set aside for oral questions or 
comments. Members of the public may also file written statement(s) 
before or after the meeting. If you plan to attend, a photo ID must be 
presented at the guard's desk as part of the clearance process into the 
building, and you may contact Susan Houser to be placed on an attendee 
list. If any person wishes auxiliary aids (such as a sign language 
interpreter) or other special accommodations, please contact, prior to 
December 6, 2010, Susan Houser, Room 1273, 811 Vermont Avenue, NW., 
Washington, DC 20571. Voice: (202) 565-3232.

FURTHER INFORMATION: For further information, contact Susan Houser, 
Room 1273, 811 Vermont Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20571, (202) 565-3232.

Jonathan Cordone,
Senior Vice President and General Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2010-29919 Filed 11-26-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6690-01-M
```
#### Mary Alice Hardy MOSLEY v. Dr. Walter L. MOSLEY.

No. 60529.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 26, 1977.

In re: Mary Alice Hardy Mosley applying for certiorari,' or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Natchitoches, 348 So.2d 225.

Denied.

TATE and DIXON, JJ.,

would grant.
### MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o. 04

- 10

- 00720

- CR Fabi a n Jermerle CYPHERS , Appellant

v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 175th Judicial District Court , Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2008CR4028 Honorable Mary D. Rom á n , Judge Presiding Opinion by: Rebecca Simmons, Justice Sitting: Rebecca S immons , Justice Steven C. Hilbig, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Delivered and Filed: August 10, 2011 AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW IS GRANTED Appellant Fabi a n Jermerle Cyphers was indicted for failing to verify registration as a sex offender. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Cyphers entered a plea of nolo contendere in exchange for five years’ imprisonment. Cyphers’s sentenc e was suspended and he was placed on community supervision for five years. The State thereafter moved to revoke Cyphers’s community supervision. Cyphers entered a plea of true to the State’s allegation that he violated the terms of his community supervis ion by failing to report in person to his supervision officer from the04

- 10

- 00720

- CR

- 2

- months of November 2009 to August 2010. The trial court granted the State’s motion and certified Cyphers’s right to appeal the revocation but not his underlying conviction. Cyphers
fi led a timely notice of appeal, and counsel at the Bexar County Appellate Public Defender’s Office was appointed to represent him. Counsel for Cyphers has filed a brief containing a professional evaluation of the record in accordance with Anders v. Californ ia , 386 U.S. 738 (1967) , and High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), and has concluded that the appeal has no merit and is frivolous

. Counsel provided Cyphers with a copy of the brief and informed him of his right to review the record and fi le his own brief. Cyphers did not file a pro se brief within the time prescribed. After r eviewing the record and counsel’ s brief, we agree that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. We affirm the trial court’s judgment and grant Cyphers’s appellat e counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Nichols v. State , 954 S.W.2d 83, 85

– 86 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1997, no writ). No substitute counsel will be appointed. If Cyphers wishes to seek review of this case by the Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either ret ain an attorney to do so or file a pro

se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that is overruled by this

c ourt. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 68.2 , 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 68.4.

Rebecca Simmons, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 1, 2006

Decided February 1, 2006

Before

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 05-2341

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TOMMIE L. JOHNSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, Hammond Division

No. 2:04 CR 59-01

Rudy Lozano, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Tommie Johnson pleaded guilty in accordance with a plea agreement to one

count of dealing at least five grams of crack, see 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and was

sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment. In the plea agreement, Johnson recites

that “I expressly waive my right to appeal or to contest my conviction and my

sentence or the manner in which my conviction or sentence was determined or

imposed, to any Court on any ground” other than ineffective assistance of counsel

relating to the waiver. Johnson filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel

perceives only frivolous arguments and therefore moves to withdraw under Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We have given Johnson the opportunity to

respond to counsel’s motion, see Cir. R. 51(b), but he has chosen not to, and so we

limit our review to the potential issues counsel identifies in his facially adequate

brief. See United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-2341 Page 2

Counsel informs us that Johnson does not want his guilty plea set aside, so it

is appropriate that counsel refrains from discussing potential challenges to the

conviction and sentence. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir.

2002).

Review is generally foreclosed unless Johnson could successfully challenge

the appeal waiver's validity, which he does not seek to do. See United States v.

Lockwood, 416 F.3d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 2005); United State v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638,

640 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Since Johnson still wants to keep the benefit of the government's concessions in the

plea agreement, any attempt to escape the appeal waiver would be frivolous. See

Lockwood, 416 F.3d at 607 (stating that Rule 11 does not permit piecemeal rejection

of plea agreement provisions); Hare, 269 F.3d at 861 (stating that “a waiver of

appeal is valid, and must be enforced, unless the agreement in which it is contained

is annulled”).

Counsel also assesses whether to argue the only claim left open by the appeal

waiver—ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating the waiver itself. But this

too is unavailable given Johnson’s unwillingness to withdraw his plea, see Knox, 287

F.3d at 671-72, and in any event would be more appropriately considered on

collateral rather than direct review, see Galbraith v. United States, 313 F.3d 1001,

1007-08 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel's motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTINE CORONA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

MICHELE VERDEROSA; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16163

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01473-MCE-AC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 25, 2016**

Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges. 

Christine Corona appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deprivation of her constitutional 

rights in connection with an arrest, search, and seizure. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 3 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-16163 

(9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6)); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 

2004) (dismissal on the basis of judicial immunity). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the claims against defendants Gatie, 

Jones, Vinson, and Montgomery because Corona failed to allege facts sufficient to 

state a plausible § 1983 claim. See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (though pro se 

pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual 

allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the 

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and 

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law.”). 

The district court properly dismissed the claims against defendant Judge 

Verderosa on the ground that the judge was absolutely immune from civil liability, 

see Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (judges are 

absolutely immune from damage actions taken within the jurisdiction of their 

courts), and properly dismissed the claims against defendant Tweddell on the 

ground that she was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, see Curry v. Castillo (In re 
3 15-16163 

Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2002) (individuals who perform functions 

that are judicial in nature, or have a sufficiently close nexus to the adjudicative 

process are entitled to a grant of quasi-judicial immunity).

Corona’s contention regarding alleged judicial bias is unpersuasive.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.
#### Lisha N. GRAY, by her father and next friend, Russell L. Gray, and Russell L. Gray, Individually, Appellants, v. NELSON AND COMPANY, etc., et al., Appellees.

No. 73-1296.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 27, 1973.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Seminole County.

Appeal dismissed.