IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-30026

Summary Calendar

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ROBERT NAMER

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana 

CV No. 89-1740

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Robert Namer appeals the judgment of the district court approving the

renewal of the United State’s judgment liens created in this matter under the

provisions of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act, 28 U.S.C. §

3201(c)(2)(B). Namer argues that the money judgment dated November 8, 1991

became invalid and unenforceable ten years later on November 8, 2001, as it was

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 26, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 12-30026

never revived within ten years after it was rendered as required by Louisiana

Civil Code Article 3501. This argument is without merit. 

Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) provides thatthe federal

government's enforcement by writ of execution "must accord with the procedures

of the state where the court is located," that Rule goes on to provide that

notwithstanding this directive, "a federal statute governs to the extent it

applies." Fed R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). The Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of

1990 ("FDCPA") is such a statute. The FDCPA provides that, with the

exception of conflicting federal law, it "provides the exclusive civil procedures for

the United States to . . . recover a judgment on a debt." 28 U.S.C. § 3001. The

judgment liens at issue in this case are “debts” within the meaning of the

FDCPA. Federal Trade Commission v. National Business Consultants, Inc., 376

F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 2004) (an earlier proceeding in this case). The FDCPA further

Provides that it "shall preempt State law to the extent such law is inconsistent."

28 U.S.C. § 3003(d).

The Louisiana state law Namer relies on, Louisiana Civil Code Article

3501, clearly conflicts with the provisions of the FDCPA. It provides that a 

money judgment “is prescribed by the lapse of ten years from its signing”

although any party having an interest in the judgment may have it revived

before it prescribes, as provided in Article 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 

Id. In contrast, the FDCPA provides for the duration of liens as follows: 

(c) Duration of lien; renewal.

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a lien created under

subsection (a) is effective, unless satisfied, for a period of 20 years.

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(2) Such lien may be renewed for one additional period of 20 years

upon filing a notice of renewal in the same manner as the judgment

is filed and shall relate back to the date the judgment is filed if–

(A) the notice of renewal is filed before the expiration of the

20-year period to prevent the expiration of the lien; and

(B) the court approves the renewal of such lien under this

paragraph.

28 U.S.C. § 3201 (emphasis added). Louisiana Civil Code Article 3501, which

would preclude enforcement of the judgment after ten years from the entry of

that judgment unless timely revived, is such an inconsistent state law and is,

therefore, preempted. The FDCPA allows twenty years for renewal of

judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 3201. 

Further, because the purpose of the FDCPA "is to create a

comprehensive statutory framework for the collection of debts owed

to the United States government [and to] improve the efficiency and

speed in collecting those debts," H.R. Rep. No. 101-736, at 32 (1990),

a state law limiting such collection is inconsistent with the purpose

of the act and is, therefore, preempted.

United States v. Gianelli, 543 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 2008) (dealing with

California law precluding enforcement of a judgment when 10 years has passed

since the judgment was entered). We agree with Gianelli on the following point

as well. 

Although not binding upon us, the reasoning of United States v.

Pierce, 231 B.R. 890, 893 (E.D.N.C. 1998) supports our conclusion.

In Pierce, the district court rejected the argument that where the

government proceeded to enforce a judgment under the FDCPA,

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) incorporated a state law

limitation prohibiting enforcement after ten years. Id. That court

reasoned that, in light of the legislative history underlying the

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FDCPA and the language of the statute itself, binding the federal

government to state law limitations on enforcement "would

completely thwart the FDCPA's stated purpose of the creation of

uniform federal procedures for the collection of debts to the federal

government." Id.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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