United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 18-3718

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Deon Marcell Goldsmith

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Waterloo

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Submitted: December 12, 2019

Filed: February 10, 2020

[Unpublished] 

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Before LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Deon Goldsmith pleaded guilty to two counts of using a communication 

facility1

in the commission of a felony offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), (d)(1). The 

1A “communication facility” is defined as “any and all public and private 

instrumentalities used or useful in the transmission of writing, signs, signals, 
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district court2

sentenced him to 46 months in prison. On appeal, Goldsmith 

challenges the denial of a pretrial suppression motion and argues that his sentence is

substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

Goldsmith did not properly preserve the first of his two challenges. Guilty 

pleas are “presumptively unconditional” and waive any “non-jurisdictional defects 

and defenses” to a conviction. United States v. Limley, 510 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 

2007). There is an exception: a criminal defendant can, “[w]ith the consent of the 

court and the government, . . . reserv[e]” the right to appeal the denial of a “specified 

pretrial motion” in “writing.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). But this case does not fall 

within it.

Goldsmith has a written plea agreement, but it is missing any reference to his 

suppression motion. Rather, in a section of the agreement containing the heading, 

“SENTENCING PROVISIONS,” it says only that

[t]he parties are free to contest or defend any ruling of the Court, unless 

otherwise limited by this agreement, on appeal or in any other postconviction proceeding.

Reserving “any ruling” without “specif[ying]” a single one is the opposite of what 

Rule 11(a)(2) demands, which is precise identification of “what pretrial issues have 

been preserved for appellate review.” Limley, 510 F.3d at 827–28 (quoting Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(a) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment) (holding that a guilty 

plea was unconditional even though the plea agreement stated that the defendant 

“retain[ed] all rights to appeal” his conviction). Because “[n]othing [else] in the 

record” satisfies Rule 11(a)(2)’s specificity requirement, Goldsmith has waived his 

right to appeal the denial of the motion. Id. at 828.

pictures, or sounds of all kinds.” 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Included within this definition 

are “mail, telephone, wire, radio, and all other means of communication.” Id.

2The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern 

District of Iowa.
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Even though Goldsmith retained the right to appeal the length of his sentence, 

there is nothing unreasonable about it. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 

461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (explaining that we review the substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion). The district court 

sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), before 

imposing a bottom-of-the-Guidelines-range sentence of 46 months in prison. See 

United States v. Washington, 893 F.3d 1076, 1080–81 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining 

that a sentence within the Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable). Although 

Goldsmith argues that the court failed to adequately consider several mitigating 

factors, the court simply gave them less weight than he would have liked. This was 

within its discretion to do. See United States v. Nguyen, 829 F.3d 907, 925–26 (8th 

Cir. 2016) (acknowledging the “wide latitude” that district courts have in this area).

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.

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