I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 3076

To address the policy of the United States on plutonium use.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 14, 1993

Mr. STARK (for himself, Mr. KENNEDY, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. MARKEY, Mr.

EVANS, Ms. MCKINNEY, Mr. KOPETSKI, Mr. SERRANO, Mr. FILNER, Mr.

ANDREWS of Maine, Mr. TORRES, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. HASTINGS, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. UNDERWOOD,

Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. HINCHEY, Mr. DURBIN, Ms. ESHOO, Mrs.

SCHROEDER, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. SANDERS, Mr. DEFAZIO, Mr. MCCLOSKEY, Ms. FURSE, Mr. HAMBURG, and Mr. FISH), introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To address the policy of the United States on plutonium

use.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. MODIFICATION OF POLICY ON PLUTONIUM

4 USE.

5 (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:

6 (1) All grades of plutonium, irrespective of their

7 designation as civil or military, can be used to make

8 nuclear explosive devices.
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1 (2) The Department of Defense has stated its

2 view that the proliferation risks posed by reprocess3 ing and separated plutonium under international

4 safeguards are unacceptably high.

5 (3) The Deputy Director of the International

6 Atomic Energy Agency stated that the excess of plu7 tonium from civilian nuclear programs poses a major

8 political and security problem worldwide.

9 (4) Reprocessing programs that will produce

10 large stockpiles of civil plutonium in nations not

11 deemed to pose a proliferation risk may encourage

12 or be used to justify such programs in nations and

13 regions that pose a proliferation risk.

14 (5) There are already large surplus stockpiles of

15 separated plutonium in the world.

16 (6) Abundant and inexpensive global sources of

17 uranium and uranium enrichment services have

18 steadily eroded the economic need for the use of plu19 tonium in civilian nuclear reactors.

20 (7) Breeder reactors were once supposed to be

21 the principal consumers of civil plutonium but have

22 now encountered major financial and technical prob23 lems and recently have been abandoned or shut

24 down in Germany, France, and Britain and have

25 suffered major delays in Japan.
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1 (8) Reprocessing was once regarded as an eco2 nomic and efficient approach to nuclear fuel recy3 cling and waste management but is now widely rec4 ognized as extremely costly and posing major envi5 ronmental hazards.

6 (9) The United States has suspended the pro7 duction of military plutonium and has abandoned

8 civil reprocessing and commercial breeder reactor de9 velopment in the United States.

10 (10) The plutonium to be recovered from dis11 mantled United States and Russian warheads will

12 further augment large surplus stockpiles of sepa13 rated plutonium in the world.

14 (11) Russia continues to separate plutonium for

15 both civil and military purposes and has accumu16 lated a surplus of some 30 tons of civil plutonium,

17 for which there is no safe, commercially viable appli18 cation.

19 (12) Much of the world surplus of civil pluto20 nium has resulted from reprocessing in the United

21 Kingdom, France, and Japan of spent fuel derived

22 from United States-origin low enriched uranium,

23 and the United States continues to bear responsibil24 ity for the transfer and disposition of such material
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1 under nuclear cooperation agreements with these

2 countries.

3 (13) Enormous amounts of additional civil plu4 tonium, exceeding the amounts of plutonium now

5 contained in nuclear weapons, may soon be recov6 ered in reprocessing plants that are to be started up

7 or constructed in the United Kingdom, France, and

8 Japan in the near future.

9 (14) Once these new plants start up and be10 come contaminated with radiation, the environ11 mental difficulties of shutdown and clean-up increase

12 dramatically.

13 (15) The new Thermal Oxide Reprocessing

14 Plant (THORP) in the United Kingdom, if operated

15 as proposed, will separate 59 tons of plutonium from

16 spent fuel over the next decade.

17 (16) The President has written to Members of

18 Congress that he has asked for a review of United

19 States nonproliferation policies, including specific at20 tention to the issue of British reprocessing.

21 (17) The Irish government declared on Feb22 ruary 1st that the bringing on stream of THORP

23 represents an additional and unnecessary risk to the

24 health and safety of the Irish population and that
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1 the accumulation of plutonium with no commercial

2 use constitutes a grave proliferation risk.

3 (18) The parties to the 1974 Convention for the

4 Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based

5 Sources agreed on June 16 that a new or revised

6 discharge authorization for radioactive discharges

7 from nuclear reprocessing installations should only

8 be issued by national authorities if special consider9 ation is given to information on the need for spent

10 fuel reprocessing and on other options, a full envi11 ronmental impact statement, and other criteria.

12 (19) The Government of the United Kingdom is

13 currently conducting an internal review, scheduled to

14 be completed this year, to determine if THORP will

15 be allowed to start up or if an independent public in16 quiry into its operation will be held prior to a start17 up determination.

18 (20) In a June 1993 report by the General Ac19 counting Office entitled ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation:

20 Japan’s Shipment of Plutonium Raises Concerns

21 about Reprocessing’’, a British Government official

22 was quoted as stating that the rationale for operat23 ing THORP is no longer valid because THORP can24 not be a financially successful venture, and that

25 without economic justification to engage in commer-
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1 cial reprocessing, the basis for reprocessing in the

2 United Kingdom has collapsed.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that the start-up or continued operation of any plu5 tonium separation plant presents serious environmental

6 hazards and increases the risk of nuclear proliferation and

7 therefore should be suspended until the outstanding pro8 liferation and environmental concerns set forth in sub9 section (a) have been thoroughly addressed and resolved.

10 (c) PRESIDENTIAL ACTION.—The Congress urges the

11 President—

12 (1) to convey the sense of the Congress set

13 forth in subsection (b) to the Governments of the

14 United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Russia; and

15 (2) to address the proliferation and environ16 mental implications of THORP in high-level bilateral

17 discussions with the Government of the United

18 Kingdom before the conclusion of the review de19 scribed in subsection (a)(19).

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