United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

WILLOWOOD, LLC, WILLOWOOD USA, LLC, 

WILLOWOOD AZOXYSTROBIN, LLC, WILLOWOOD 

LIMITED,

Defendants-Cross-Appellants

______________________

2018-1614, 2018-2044

______________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Middle District of North Carolina in No. 1:15-cv-00274-

CCE-JEP, Judge Catherine C. Eagles.

______________________

Decided: December 18, 2019

______________________

RUSSELL EVAN LEVINE, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, 

IL, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

HARI SANTHANAM, MEREDITH ZINANNI. 

 STEVEN EDWARD TILLER, Whiteford, Taylor & Preston 

LLP, Baltimore, MD, argued for defendants-cross-appellants. Also represented by PETER JAMES DAVIS; BARRY S.

NEUMAN, Washington, DC; ALAN DUNCAN, LESLIE COOPER 

HARRELL, Mullins Duncan Harrell & Russell PLLC, 

Greensboro, NC.
2 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

 MEGAN BARBERO, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for amicus curiae United States. Also represented by 

MARK R. FREEMAN, JOSEPH H. HUNT; MATTHEW G.T.

MARTIN, The United States Attorney’s Office, Middle District of North Carolina, United States Department of Justice, Greensboro, NC.

 MELVIN C. GARNER, Leason Ellis LLP, White Plains, 

NY, for amicus curiae New York Intellectual Property Law 

Association. Also represented by LAUREN BETH EMERSON,

ROBERT M. ISACKSON, MARTIN SCHWIMMER.

 JAMES PETER RATHVON, Paley Rothman, Bethesda, 

MD, for amici curiae Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 

Aceto Corporation, AgLogic Chemical, LLC, Agro-Gor 

Corp., Albaugh, LLC, Argite, LLC, Atticus, LLC, Axss 

Technical Holdings, LLC, Chemstarr, LLC, Consus Chemicals, Inc., Decco US Post-Harvest, Inc., Drexel Chemical 

Company, Ensystex, Inc., Ensystex II, Inc., Ensystex III, 

Inc., Ensystex IV, Inc., Extremis, LLC, GeneraTec, LLC, 

Gharda Chemicals International, Inc., Helm Agro US, Inc., 

LG Chem, Ltd., MEY Corporation, PBI Gordon Corp., 

Promika, LLC, Raymat Crop Science, Inc., Raymat Materials, Inc., RedEagle International, LLC, RiceCo, LLC, Rotam Agrochemical Company, Ltd., Rotam Ltd., Rotam 

North America Inc., Sharda CropChem Ltd., Sharda USA, 

LLC, Summit Agro US, LLC, Summit Agro North America 

Holding Corporation, Tacoma AG, LLC, Tide International 

USA, Inc., Troy Corporation, United Phosphorus, Inc., UPL 

Delaware Inc., Woodstream Corporation. 

 

 JEFFREY PAUL KUSHAN, Sidley Austin LLP, for amici 

curiae Biotechnology Innovation Organization, CropLife 

International. Also represented by KATHI A. COVER, iBiquity Digital Corporation, Columbia, MD.

 ______________________
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 3

Before REYNA, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

REYNA, Circuit Judge.

Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC, sued Willowood, LLC, 

Willowood USA, LLC, Willowood Azoxystrobin, LLC, and 

Willowood Limited in the U.S. District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina for copyright infringement and 

patent infringement, asserting four patents directed to a 

fungicide compound and its manufacturing processes. 

Prior to trial, the district court dismissed the copyright infringement claims, determining them to be precluded by 

the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. 

The district court granted-in-part and denied-in-part Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC’s summary judgment motion

with respect to patent infringement. The district court also 

denied-in-part the defendants’ motion to exclude expert 

testimony on damages.

After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment 

in favor of Willowood Limited on all patent infringement 

claims; in favor of all defendants on infringement of one 

patent at issue; and against Willowood, LLC, and Willowood USA, LLC, on infringement of the remaining three 

patents. The district court denied Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC’s motions for judgment as a matter of law. Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC, appeals the district court’s 

denials of its motions for judgment as a matter of law and 

its final judgment. Defendants conditionally cross-appeal 

the district court’s partial denial of their motion to exclude

expert testimony on damages. For the reasons explained 

below, we affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, vacate-in-part, 

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

BACKGROUND

I. The Asserted Patents

Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC, (“Syngenta”) is the assignee of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,602,076 (“the ’076 patent”), 
4 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

5,633,256 (“the ’256 patent”), 5,847,138 (“the ’138 patent”), 

and 8,124,761 (“the ’761 patent”). The ’076 patent is entitled “Certain Fungicides, Pesticides and Plant Growth Regulants.” The ’256 patent is entitled “Certain 

Pyrimidinyloxy-phenyl Acrylates, Derivatives Thereof and 

Their Fungicidal Use.” The ’076 and ’256 patents (collectively, “the Compound Patents”) expired on February 11, 

2014. The Compound Patents are directed to a group of 

chemical compounds, including azoxystrobin, a fungicide 

commonly used in agriculture to control fungal growth on 

crops. J.A. 7; Appellant’s Br. 9. 

The ’138 patent is entitled “Chemical Process” and expired on December 8, 2015. The ’138 patent is directed to 

a two-step process for manufacturing azoxystrobin that includes an etherification step followed by a condensation 

step. Appellant’s Br. 12; J.A. 6672. The etherification step 

produces an intermediate compound that is then used in 

the condensation step to produce azoxystrobin. J.A. 6672.

The ’761 patent is entitled “Processes for the Preparation of Azoxystrobin Using DABCO as a Catalyst and Novel 

Intermediates Used in the Processes” and does not expire 

until April 15, 2029. The ’761 patent is directed to a process of using the chemical catalyst 1,4-diazabicyclo[2.2.2]octane (“DABCO”) during the condensation step

to manufacture azoxystrobin. ’761 patent col. 1 ll. 20–25; 

J.A. 6682–83. Each claim of the ’761 patent requires at 

least “the presence of between 0.1 and 2 mol % of

[DABCO].” ’761 patent col. 20 ll. 1–2, 25–26.

II. The Asserted Copyrights

Syngenta uses azoxystrobin as an active ingredient in 

formulating its fungicide end-use products. Appellant’s 

Br. 7. Syngenta markets and sells these end-use products 

under several brand names, including QUADRIS® and 

QUILT XCEL®. Id. Both products are sold with detailed 

labels that provide directions for use, storage, and disposal, 

as well as first-aid instructions and environmental, 
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 5

physical, and chemical hazard warnings. Id. at 19. The 

QUADRIS® label comprises fifty-four pages of small-type 

text and charts. J.A. 276; 424–77. The QUILT XCEL® label comprises twenty-nine pages of small-type text and 

charts. J.A. 276; 481–509. Syngenta registered these two

labels with the U.S. Copyright Office on March 25, 2015. 

Appellant’s Br. 19; J.A. 276–77, 479. 

III. District Court Proceedings

On March 27, 2015, Syngenta brought suit against Willowood, LLC (“Willowood LLC”), Willowood USA, LLC

(“Willowood USA”), and Willowood Limited (“Willowood 

China”) (collectively, “Willowood”)1 for patent and copyright infringement. Willowood China is a Hong Kong company that contracts for the manufacture of azoxystrobin in 

China and sells the fungicide to Willowood USA, its Oregon-based affiliate. Willowood USA and Willowood LLC 

contract with third parties to formulate azoxystrobin into 

Willowood’s generic end-use fungicide products, and market and sell azoxystrobin and those end-use products in the 

United States. Shortly before the expiration of the Compound Patents, Willowood filed applications with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to register its Azoxy 

2SC and AzoxyProp Xtra generic products, which correspond in composition and labeling to Syngenta’s 

QUADRIS® and QUILT XCEL® fungicides, respectively. 

J.A. 278, 714; Appellant’s Br. 19.

Syngenta asserted in its suit that Willowood’s Azoxy 

2SC and AzoxyProp Xtra products infringed claims 1–4 

and 12–14 of the ’076 patent, claims 1–3, 5, and 7 of the 

’256 patent, claims 6 and 12–14 of the ’138 patent, and 

claims 1, 3–5, and 9–10 of the ’761 patent. J.A. 1617–

 

1 Syngenta also sued Willowood Azoxystrobin, LLC, 

but does not appeal the district court’s rulings concerning 

this entity. Appellant’s Br. 6 n.1.
6 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

1619, 1627. Syngenta also asserted that Willowood infringed Syngenta’s registered copyrights in its QUADRIS®

and QUILT XCEL® labels by copying those labels for Willowood’s Azoxy 2SC and AzoxyProp Xtra product labels. 

J.A. 289–91.

A. Pre-Trial Motions

On October 31, 2016, both parties filed motions for 

summary judgment. Syngenta moved for summary judgment that all asserted claims of the four patents were infringed by Willowood. Willowood cross-moved for 

summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Syngenta’s copyright claims and its claim of infringement of the ’761 patent.

1. Patent Infringement Claims

The district court granted summary judgment against 

Willowood USA for direct infringement of the Compound 

Patents on the basis of Willowood’s concession that Willowood USA imported five kilograms of azoxystrobin into 

the United States in 2013, prior to the Compound Patents’ 

expiration. Syngenta Crop Prot., LLC v. Willowood, LLC, 

No. 1:15-CV-274, 2017 WL 1133378, at *2 (M.D.N.C. 

Mar. 24, 2017) (“Summary Judgment Order”); see also J.A. 

1617–18. The district court also granted summary judgment against Willowood LLC for induced infringement of 

the Compound Patents on the basis of Willowood’s concession that Willowood LLC contributed to and induced the 

formulation and testing of Willowood’s Azoxy 2SC and 

AzoxyProp Xtra products by third parties using the same 

imported five kilograms of azoxystrobin. Summary Judgment Order, 2017 WL 1133378, at *2–3; see also J.A. 1618. 

The district court, however, denied summary judgment 

against Willowood China for direct infringement of the 

Compound Patents. Summary Judgment Order, 2017 WL 

1133378, at *2. The district court found a genuine dispute

of material fact as to whether Willowood China’s sale of five 

kilograms of azoxystrobin to Willowood USA took place in 
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 7

China or within the United States as required under 35 

U.S.C. § 271(a). Id. 

The district court next denied summary judgment as to 

infringement of the ’138 patent. Id. at *5. The district 

court found that it was undisputed that Willowood China

purchases azoxystrobin from its Chinese supplier, Yangcheng Tai He Chemicals Corp. (“Tai He”), and sells it to 

Willowood USA, which then imports the azoxystrobin into 

the United States. Id. at *4; see also J.A. 1619. The district 

court found that it was also undisputed that the 

azoxystrobin in question was manufactured in China by 

performing both steps of the process claimed in the ’138 patent. Summary Judgment Order, 2017 WL 1133378, at *4. 

Relying on our decision in Akamai Technologies., Inc. v. 

Limelight Networks, Inc., the district court determined 

that 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) requires that all steps of a claimed 

process be performed by or attributable to a single entity. 

Id. at *5 (citing 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). On 

this basis, the district court found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Tai He performed both steps of the 

process claimed by the ’138 patent during its manufacture 

of azoxystrobin or whether Willowood directed Tai He and 

others to practice the claimed process. Id. at *4–5.

With respect to the ’761 patent, both parties agreed 

that the issue of infringement turned on whether the 

azoxystrobin that Willowood China purchases and Willowood USA imports was manufactured using DABCO at 

concentrations within the claimed range of 0.1 and 2 

mol %. Summary Judgment Order, 2017 WL 1133378, 

at *6; J.A. 1627. The district court denied summary judgment on this issue, finding a genuine dispute of material 

fact as to whether Willowood’s suppliers used DABCO 

within the claimed range in the manufacturing process. 

See Summary Judgment Order, 2017 WL 1133378, at *7. 

The district court next granted Syngenta’s motion to 

shift the burden of proof to Willowood under 35 U.S.C. 
8 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

§ 295 on the claim of infringement of the ’761 patent. The 

district court found that Syngenta demonstrated a substantial likelihood of infringement, rejecting Willowood’s 

argument that neither Tai He nor any of its intermediaries 

manufacture azoxystrobin using DABCO within the 

claimed range. Id. at *7–8. The district court credited the 

testimony of Syngenta’s expert, who testified that it would 

not be commercially reasonable to manufacture 

azoxystrobin using DABCO outside the claimed range. Id.

at *8. The district court noted that Willowood’s expert did 

not rebut this testimony, and Willowood’s only rebuttal 

witness, the president of Tai He, had “credibility issues.” 

Id. The district court also determined that Willowood did 

not produce any manufacturing records demonstrating 

that DABCO was not used or describing what process was 

used instead. Id. at *8, *10. The district court further 

found that Syngenta made reasonable efforts to discover 

Tai He’s actual manufacturing process, but was unsuccessful because of Willowood’s failure to cooperate. Id. at *9–

10. Finding both elements of § 295 satisfied, the district 

court shifted the burden to Willowood to prove non-infringement of the ’761 patent. Id. at *11.

2. Copyright Infringement Claims

In its cross-motion for summary judgment, Willowood 

argued that Syngenta’s copyright claims should be dismissed because the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) precludes copyright protection for 

Syngenta’s labels. J.A. 730–37. Willowood asserted that 

FIFRA requires generic fungicide products to have labels 

that are “identical or substantially similar” to brand-name 

labels. J.A. 730–31. Willowood further contended that because much of its labels’ text comprises instructions and 

warnings mandated by FIFRA and EPA regulations, and 

only limited means of expressing such information exist, 

extending copyright protection to Syngenta’s labels “would 

make subsequent labeling practically impossible.” J.A. 731 

& n.14, 733–35 (citing SmithKline Beecham Consumer 
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 9

Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharm. Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 23 (2d 

Cir. 2000)). 

Willowood also argued that any language that is not 

required by the EPA is nonetheless uncopyrightable because it is so “basic” and “commonplace in the industry,” 

that it merges with the ideas the language is meant to convey. J.A. 732. In the alternative, Willowood argued that 

its use of some of the language from Syngenta labels constituted permissible fair use. J.A. 737–40.

In response, Syngenta argued that nothing in FIFRA 

or EPA regulations authorizes or requires Willowood to 

copy verbatim Syngenta’s labels. J.A. 2806. Syngenta asserted that pursuant to FIFRA’s legislative scheme, the 

EPA requires only generic products—not label language—

to be identical or substantially similar to their brand-name 

counterparts, and then only to the extent that a generic applicant seeks expedited review by the EPA. Id. In support 

of its arguments, Syngenta relied heavily on FMC Corp. v. 

Control Solutions., Inc., a decision from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which held that FIFRA does not preclude copyright protection for pesticide labels because 

“verbatim or nearly wholesale copying of another registrant’s label is unnecessary to obtain expedited review by 

the EPA of a label.” 369 F. Supp. 2d 539, 553–60 (E.D. Pa. 

2005); see J.A. 2806.

The United States filed a statement of interest on this 

issue, presenting four arguments in support of Willowood’s 

position. J.A. 2969–3005. First, according to the government, FIFRA “endorses” copying by generic applicants and 

furthers Congress’s intent of expediting market access for 

generic fungicide manufacturers. J.A. 2970, 2983–91. Second, the government asserted that Syngenta granted Willowood an implied license to copy its labels by participating 

in FIFRA’s labeling scheme. J.A. 2970, 2991–94. Third, 

the government argued that Willowood’s labels are protected under the doctrine of merger, which permits copying 
10 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

of material that can only be expressed in a limited number 

of ways. J.A. 2971, 2994–98. Lastly, the government argued that Willowood’s labels are also protected under the 

doctrine of fair use. J.A. 2971, 2998–3005.

The district court agreed with Willowood and the 

United States, and issued a short order granting summary 

judgment against Syngenta and dismissing its copyright 

infringement claims. J.A. 33–34. The district court stated 

that it found the analysis in FMC “unconvincing,” and determined that “[e]ven with some changes, use of the original pesticide label as a ‘go by’ for the new label will result 

in copyright infringement.” Id. The district court concluded that because FIFRA contemplates copying by a generic applicant “in ways that would otherwise infringe a 

copyright, . . . Congress intended a narrow exception to 

copyright protection for the required elements” of fungicide 

labels. Id. The district court did not otherwise address the 

arguments presented on this issue.

3. Willowood’s Motion to Exclude

On April 10, 2017, Willowood filed a motion to exclude 

the testimony of Syngenta’s damages expert. J.A. 3838–

67; see also J.A. 37. Willowood did not object to the expert’s 

methodology; rather, Willowood contended that the expert’s choice of benchmarks was based on unreliable facts 

or data. J.A. 44. Willowood argued that the expert’s damages calculation was speculative and unreliable because he

based his analysis on products unrelated to azoxystrobin 

and Syngenta’s “wildly inaccurate” budgets. J.A. 48; see 

also J.A. 3851–3861. Willowood also argued that Syngenta’s expert did not properly apportion damages for infringement of the ’761 patent because the expert relied on 

the same methodology that he used to calculate damages 

for infringement of the ’138 patent, even though the ’138 

patent claims two steps of the manufacturing process 

(etherification and condensation) while the ’761 patent 

claims only one step (condensation). J.A. 3861–3865.
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 11

The district court denied Willowood’s motion to exclude 

with respect to the Compound Patents, determining that 

Syngenta’s expert relied on “sufficient facts and data applied using a reasonable method in a justifiable manner” 

based on a hypothetical non-infringing market with a similar product as a benchmark. J.A. 35. The district court 

approved the expert’s choice of using an herbicide product 

as a benchmark, explaining that both products created 

similar barriers to generic access to the markets, were sold 

in similar markets, protected the same crops, had comparable life cycles, and were both leading products for Syngenta. J.A. 47, 50. With respect to using Syngenta’s 

budgets as benchmarks, the district court found that the 

expert accounted for any errors in budgeting, and explained that any inaccuracies went to the weight of the evidence instead of its admissibility. J.A. 49.

The district court, however, granted Willowood’s motion to exclude Syngenta’s expert’s testimony with respect 

to the ’138 and ’761 patents, finding that the expert did not 

provide an adequate explanation for his choice of benchmarks. The district court found that in contrast to the 

benchmarks chosen for the Compound Patents, the expert 

provided “scant analysis for why non-azoxystrobin fungicides” were a proper benchmark and no evidence of similarities between the products and their markets. J.A. 53–

54. The district court also excluded testimony on lost profits with respect to the ’761 patent, explaining that the expert failed to address but-for causation or account for 

existing non-infringing alternatives in his calculations. 

J.A. 55–58.

B. Trial and Post-Trial Motions

The district court held a seven-day trial beginning on 

September 5, 2017. With respect to the Compound Patents, the only issues at trial were whether Willowood 

China imported into the United States or sold to Willowood 

USA within the United States the five-kilogram sample of 
12 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

azoxystrobin. Syngenta argued that Willowood China imported azoxystrobin into the United States by arranging for

its entry into the country. J.A. 6961. Syngenta also argued 

that Willowood China’s sale of the azoxystrobin necessarily 

occurred within the United States because Willowood USA

is located within the United States. Id. Willowood argued 

in response that Willowood China did not infringe the Compound Patents because the shipment of five-kilogram sample of azoxystrobin was marked “f.o.b. China,”2 meaning 

that title to the azoxystrobin passed from Willowood China

to Willowood USA overseas. J.A. 6961. After presenting 

its case, Syngenta moved for a judgment as a matter of law 

(“JMOL”) on this issue.

The district court denied Syngenta’s JMOL motion, 

and the jury returned a specific verdict in favor of Willowood China, finding that Syngenta did not prove that 

Willowood China imported azoxystrobin into the United 

States or sold azoxystrobin within the United States. 

J.A. 266. The jury awarded Syngenta $75,600 in damages 

for infringement of the Compound Patents by Willowood 

USA and Willowood LLC. Syngenta renewed its motion for 

JMOL after the verdict, which the district court again denied. J.A. 6523; Appellant’s Br. 12.

With respect to the ’138 patent, the only issue at trial 

was whether both steps of the claimed process were performed by a single entity or attributable to Willowood as 

the directing or controlling entity. J.A. 240–241; 266; Appellant’s Br. 13. Syngenta presented evidence that Willowood directed or controlled Tai He’s manufacturing

process, and that Tai He performed both claimed steps. 

 

2 “F.o.b” stands for “free on board” and designates a 

method of shipment whereby legal title passes from the 

seller to the buyer once goods are delivered at a designated 

location. Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prod., Inc., 523 F.3d 

1353, 1358 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 13

Appellant’s Br. 13–15. In rebuttal, Willowood presented 

evidence that Tai He did not perform the etherification step

when manufacturing Willowood’s azoxystrobin. See

J.A. 8232–8241; J.A. 7682 at 63:22–64:11; Appellant’s Br. 

15. The jury returned a specific verdict in favor of Willowood with respect to the ’138 patent, finding that Syngenta did not prove that both steps of the claimed process 

were performed by or attributable to a single entity. J.A. 

266. 

With respect to the ’761 patent, the only issue at trial 

was whether during manufacture of Willowood’s

azoxystrobin, the condensation step was performed using

the DABCO catalyst within the range claimed by the ’761 

patent. J.A. 248–50; Appellant’s Br. 17. The burden of 

proof was on Willowood pursuant to the district court’s order under 35 U.S.C. § 295. Summary Judgment Order, 

2017 WL 1133378, at *11. After presenting its case, Syngenta moved for JMOL on this issue, which the district 

court denied. J.A. 7045; Appellant’s Br. 18. After trial, the 

jury returned a specific verdict in favor of Syngenta that 

“the Defendants” did not prove that DABCO was not used 

as claimed. J.A. 267. The jury awarded $900,000 in damages to Syngenta for infringement of the ’761 patent “by the 

Defendants.” Id.

After trial, the parties submitted proposed final judgments to the district court. J.A. 6489. At that point, a dispute arose between the parties as to whether the jury found 

that Willowood China infringed the ’761 patent. In resolving the dispute, the district court noted that the jury found 

with respect to the Compound Patents that Willowood 

China did not import azoxystrobin into the United States 

or sell azoxystrobin within the United States. Id. The district court explained that “[n]either party asked the court 

to submit a separate issue as to Willowood China’s infringement of the ’138 patent or the ’761 patent,” and concluded that “the parties implicitly agreed to resolve 

Willowood China’s liability for the [’138 and ’761 patents] 
14 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

based on the answer to the importation question which was 

first on the verdict sheet.” Id. The district court concluded

that “[t]here is no evidentiary basis” for finding that Willowood China infringed the ’761 patent. Id.

On November 20, 2017, the district court entered final 

judgment. The district court entered judgment in favor of 

Willowood China on “all claims” and in favor of all Willowood defendants on the claim of infringement of the ’138

patent. J.A. 3. The district court entered judgment against 

Willowood USA and Willowood LLC on the claims of infringement of the Compound Patents and the ’761 patent. 

Id. After the district court entered final judgment, Syngenta renewed its JMOL motion with respect to Willowood 

China’s infringement. J.A. 6522–6523; Appellant’s Br. 18. 

Syngenta contended that Willowood waived its argument

that Willowood China did not infringe the ’761 patent by 

not objecting to the wording of the jury verdict form. 

J.A. 6522. The district court denied Syngenta’s renewed 

JMOL motion. J.A. 91.

Syngenta appeals the district court’s dismissal of its 

copyright claims, the district court’s conclusion that 

§ 271(g) requires every step of a claimed process to be performed by or attributable to a single entity, the jury’s verdict that Willowood did not infringe the ’138 patent even 

with the single entity requirement imposed on § 271(g), 

and the district court’s judgment that Willowood China did 

not infringe any of the asserted patents. Willowood conditionally cross-appeals the district court’s partial denial of 

its motion to exclude the testimony of Syngenta’s damages 

expert. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s decisions on motions for 

summary judgment and JMOL under the law of the regional circuit, in this case the Fourth Circuit. Supernus 
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 15

Pharm., Inc. v. Iancu, 913 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2019); 

Mohsenzadeh v. Lee, 790 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

The Fourth Circuit reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, viewing all evidence in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. Amdocs (Israel) 

Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 761 F.3d 1329, 1337–38 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014) (citing Ramos v. S. Maryland Elec. Co–op., Inc., 

996 F.2d 52, 53 (4th Cir. 1993)). The Fourth Circuit reviews a district court’s post-verdict JMOL decisions de 

novo, determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported 

by substantial evidence. LifeNet Health v. LifeCell Corp., 

837 F.3d 1316, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Carolina 

Trucks & Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., 492 F.3d 

484, 488 (4th Cir. 2007)). The Fourth Circuit reviews a district court’s pre-verdict grant of JMOL de novo, viewing all 

evidence in light most favorable to the non-moving party 

and considering whether a reasonable jury could find for 

the non-moving party. ActiveVideo, 694 F.3d at 1319 (citing Brown v. CSX Transp., 18 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 

1994)).

We review questions of patent law under Federal Circuit law. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 

1214 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We review a jury’s findings on questions of fact, such as infringement and damages, for substantial evidence. Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild 

Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 

2013). We review a district court’s decisions concerning 

damages methodologies for abuse of discretion. ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 

1312, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. 

Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).

We apply copyright law as interpreted by the regional 

circuit. Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 

F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Interpretation of the 

rights granted by the Copyright Act is a question of law 

that the Fourth Circuit reviews de novo. See Rosciszewski 

v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1993).
16 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

We also review a district court’s rulings on admission 

of expert testimony under the law of the regional circuit. 

ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 516 

(Fed. Cir. 2012). The Fourth Circuit reviews such evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Kopf v. 

Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 378 (4th Cir. 1993)).

We review questions of statutory interpretation de 

novo. Mohsenzadeh, 790 F.3d at 1381 (citing AD Global 

Fund, LLC v. United States, 481 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir.

2007)). If two statutory provisions are “capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed 

congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as 

effective.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 

1018 (1984) (quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act 

Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133-34 (1974)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

II. Syngenta’s Copyright Claims

Syngenta challenges the district court’s summary judgment order dismissing its copyright claims in their entirety. The dismissal was based on the court’s holding that 

FIFRA “precludes copyright protection for the required elements of pesticide labels as against the labels of me-too 

[i.e. generic3] registrants.” J.A. 33. We conclude that this 

determination was premature. Because the text of FIFRA 

does not, on its face, require a me-too registrant to copy the 

label of a registered product, the statute only conflicts with 

the Copyright Act to the extent that some particular element of Syngenta’s label is both protected under existing 

 

3 Consistent with terminology used by the EPA, the 

parties and the district court use the term “me-too” to refer 

to applications requesting registration of generic pesticide 

products pursuant to FIFRA’s criteria for expedited review. 

See EPA, PRIA Glossary, https://www.epa.gov/priafees/pria-glossary (last visited December 9, 2019).
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 17

copyright doctrines and necessary for the expedited approval of Willowood’s generic pesticide product. This determination requires this court to review the merits of 

Syngenta’s copyright claims, which the district court did 

not reach. Thus, we remand for the court to do so in the 

first instance. 

When evaluating the “alleged preclusion of a cause of 

action under one federal statute by the provisions of another federal statute,” we rely on traditional rules of statutory interpretation. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 

573 U.S. 102, 111 (2014). Among these principles is the 

presumption that a later-enacted statute does not impliedly repeal, even in part, an earlier one. Id. (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009)). Thus, where the 

later-enacted statute does not cover the whole subject of 

the earlier one and is not “clearly intended as a substitute,” 

an implied repeal will only be found where provisions in 

the two statutes are in “irreconcilable conflict”—a stringent standard that renders implicit repeals a “rarity.” 

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 

644, 662-63 (2007); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer HiBred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001). In the absence of 

such conflict, statutory provisions acting upon the same 

subject should be interpreted and applied in a way that 

“gives effect to each” and “preserves the purposes of both.” 

United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939); Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. 

Cir. 1999). 

Here, the Copyright Act prohibits parties from reproducing the protected elements of a valid copyright without 

authorization, except where such actions would constitute 

fair use. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985); Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. 

Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 2001); 

Ale House Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 

137, 143 (4th Cir. 2000). At the same time, FIFRA provides 

for expedited EPA review of applications for generic 
18 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

pesticide products when the proposed “me-too” product, as 

compared to the currently registered product, (1) “would be 

identical or substantially similar in composition and labeling” or (2) would “differ in composition and labeling” "only 

in ways that would not significantly increase the risk of unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.” 7 U.S.C. 

§ 136a(c)(3)(B)(i)(I) (emphasis added). 

In finding that FIFRA precluded copyright claims 

against me-too applicants, the district court relied on its 

understanding that “FIFRA contemplates that a ‘me-too’ 

applicant will copy from the original pesticide label in ways 

that would otherwise infringe a copyright.” J.A. 33. But 

while use of FIFRA’s expedited generic pathway is premised on similarity to a registered product, the text of § 136 

does not require a me-too applicant to ensure that its product label is identical to a registered label; nor does it require applicants to otherwise derive the elements of its 

label from that of the registered label. Rather, the statute 

provides for expedited review so long as any differences between the proposed and registered products “would not significantly increase the risk of unreasonable adverse effects 

on the environment”—a substantive criterion evaluated by 

the EPA under its technical expertise. 7 U.S.C. 

§ 136a(c)(3)(B)(i)(I).

This is significant because copyright infringement requires, at a minimum, some copying of protected elements

from the copyrighted work, which does not include “any 

idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery” embodied by the work. 17 

U.S.C. § 102(b); Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 801. FIFRA’s 

similarity requirement does not foreclose expedited review 

for an independently composed label that relies solely on 

unprotected facts, concepts, and methods derived from the 

registered label. 

In this respect, the asserted conflict between the Copyright Act and FIFRA differs from the conflict between the 
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 19

Copyright Act and the Hatch-Waxman Act that was addressed in SmithKline, a decision cited by the district court 

and Willowood. SmithKline Beecham Consumer 

Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d 

Cir. 2000). There, the Second Circuit found that the HatchWaxman Act “not only permit[s] but require[s] producers of 

generic drugs to use the same labeling as was approved for, 

and is used in, the sale of the pioneer drug.”4 Id. at 25 (emphasis added). In these circumstances, the court concluded 

that generic applicants faced a double-bind: “if [the plaintiff’s] copyright claim has merit, then [the defendant] cannot realistically use the ANDA process to sell its [generic 

product] because it will either have to change the label and 

lose FDA approval or be enjoined from using a label that 

infringes [the plaintiff’s] copyright.” Id. at 27. Thus, the 

court found it “obvious” that Congress intended for the 

Hatch-Waxman Act to “trump the copyright laws.” Id. at 

29. Here, in contrast, FIFRA’s express allowance for differences between the proposed and registered labels allows

me-too applicants to avoid this conflict by using an independently created label. 

Willowood and 41 Companies Holding Generic EPA 

Pesticide Registrations (“Generics Amici”) counter that 

there are nonetheless practical and regulatory constraints 

that frustrate their reasonable attempts to comply with the 

requirements of both the Copyright Act and expedited review under FIFRA. We disagree that these concerns alone 

warrant preclusion. To begin with, Generics Amici contend 

 

4 The Hatch-Waxman Act requires that, except for 

changes related to the manufacturer name or approved difference in the drug, “[a]n abbreviated application for a new 

drug shall contain . . . (v) information to show that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling 

approved for the listed drug . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)

(emphases added).
20 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

there are “only so many ways to express the same instructions and warnings” contained in many portions of these 

pesticide labels, such that any attempt to capture the pertinent information will inevitably require using substantially the same expressions. Generics Amici Br. at 8

(emphasis in original); see also Appellee’s Br. at 23-25. But 

this is precisely the type of problem addressed by the traditional copyright doctrine of merger, under which courts 

have declined to protect against copying when an underlying fact, procedure, or idea can be expressed in so few ways 

that “protection of the expression would effectively accord 

protection to the idea itself.” Kregos v. Associated Press, 

937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Morrissey v. 

Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) 

(“When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, 

so that the topic necessarily requires, if not only one form 

of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities 

of future use of the substance.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Thus, copyright law has its own 

solution for the constraints inherent in the expression of 

certain information contained in pesticide labels. 

Willowood raises a more difficult problem with respect 

to portions of a registered label for which the EPA has allegedly required me-too applicants to copy otherwise protectable elements from the registered label on the grounds 

that any differences may adversely affect the environment 

by confusing users.5 For example, Willowood contends that 

when it sought to revise the directions for use in its own 

 

5 This is distinct from portions of the registered label 

where the language was originally mandated or suggested 

by the EPA. Syngenta has disclaimed any copyright protection over those label elements. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 

11.
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 21

label from the four-column table format used by Syngenta 

to a narrative form, the EPA required Willowood to reinstate the information in a table, essentially requiring Willowood to copy Syngenta’s format. Appellee’s Br. at 24

(citing J.A. 3129-3200 (Azoxy 2.08 SC Label); J.A. 3201-

3339 (AzoxProp Xtra label)). But this is a predicament appropriately addressed, at least in the first instance, under 

copyright law’s own “equitable rule of reason”: the fair use 

doctrine. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 

464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (quoting H. Rep. No. 94–1476, at

65–66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679). Under 

that established framework, the district court can assess, 

based on factors such as the character of the allegedly creative elements, their substantiality in the context of the labels as a whole, and the nature and effect of their use by 

Willowood, whether the presence of those elements in Willowood’s generic labels would fairly constitute infringement in violation of the Copyright Act.6 

Thus, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment on Syngenta’s copyright claims and remand for 

further consideration. On remand, the district court 

should first discern whether the Copyright Act, as interpreted under existing copyright doctrines, would prohibit 

Willowood’s use of any portion of Syngenta’s label. The district court should, for instance, consider whether the fairuse doctrine or limits on copyrightable subject matter, such 

as the merger doctrine, would eliminate infringement. 

 

6 The Copyright Act expressly identifies the following non-exhaustive factors to be considered in assessing 

fair use: “(1) the purpose and character of the use . . . ; (2) 

the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 

substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon 

the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”

17 U.S.C. § 107.
22 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

Only if the district court concludes that the Copyright Act 

would in fact prohibit Willowood’s conduct in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of FIFRA should it revisit the 

question of whether and to what extent FIFRA precludes 

Syngenta’s copyright claims for any part of its pesticide labels. It is possible that after a full assessment of the requirements of copyright law and FIFRA as applied in this 

case, there may come to light a truly irreconcilable conflict 

between Copyright Act liability and implementation of 

FIFRA. In the absence of a clear facial conflict, however, 

we decline to wield the blunt tool of preclusion before the 

full factual and legal contours of any latent problem have 

been examined. 

III. Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)

Syngenta next challenges the district court’s interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). The district court interpreted 

§ 271(g) to require that all steps of a patented process be 

performed by or at the direction or control of a single entity 

before infringement liability under that section can attach. 

Summary Judgment Order, 2017 WL 1133378, at *5. Syngenta contends that the district court’s interpretation of 

§ 271(g) is contrary to the plain language of the statute and 

Congress’s intent expressed in the legislative history. Appellant’s Br. 41–46. The amici add to this argument by asserting that the district court’s interpretation is 

inconsistent with the broader context of the statute as a 

whole and the purpose behind § 271(g), and creates an impossible evidentiary burden on the patent owner. See Amicus NYPLA Br. 10–14; Amici Biotechnology & CropLife Br. 

8–14; 17–23. This is an issue of first impression. We conclude that the district court erred by imposing a single-entity requirement under § 271(g).

“As in all statutory construction cases, we begin with 

the language of the statute.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 

534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002). The meaning of statutory language “is determined by reference to the language itself, 
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 23

the specific context in which that language is used, and the 

broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. 

Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). If the statutory 

language does not clearly resolve the disputed issue, we 

also consider the legislative history to determine Congressional intent. Burlington N. R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax 

Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 

1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Timex V.I. v. United 

States, 157 F.3d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and Deluxe Corp. 

v. United States, 885 F.2d 848, 850 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).

The resolution of this issue turns on the nature of the 

infringing acts covered by § 271(g). Section 271(g) provides 

in relevant part that “[w]hoever without authority imports 

into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within 

the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer.” 

35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2012). This language makes clear that 

the acts that give rise to liability under § 271(g) are the importation, offer for sale, sale, or use within this country of 

a product that was made by a process patented in the 

United States. Id. Nothing in this statutory language suggests that liability arises from practicing the patented process abroad. Rather, the focus is only on acts with respect 

to products resulting from the patented process. Thus, because the statutory language as a whole is clear that practicing a patented process abroad cannot create liability

under § 271(g), whether that process is practiced by a single entity is immaterial to the infringement analysis under 

that section.

The context of the statute as a whole also supports our 

conclusion. Section 271(a) states that “whoever without 

authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 

invention, within the United States or imports into the 

United States any patented invention during the term of 

the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. 

§ 271(a). Derived from this statutory language is the single-entity requirement under § 271(a), which limits direct 
24 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

infringement liability only to circumstances “where all 

steps of a claimed method are performed by or attributable 

to a single entity.” Akamai Techs., 797 F.3d at 1022; BMC 

Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379–81 

(Fed. Cir. 2007). 

On the basis of this court’s § 271(a) jurisprudence, the 

district court concluded that § 271(g) similarly imposes a 

single-entity requirement on the performance of a patented 

process. Summary Judgment Order, 2017 WL 1133378, 

at *5 (citing Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1022). This conclusion 

was erroneous because infringement liability under the 

two sections is distinct. In contrast to § 271(g), the act that 

gives rise to liability under § 271(a) occurs when “a 

party . . . make[s], use[s], sell[s], or offer[s] to sell the patented invention, meaning the entire patented invention.” 

BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380. Under this precedent, direct infringement under § 271(a) of a process patent occurs only 

when a single party practices every step of the claimed process. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (infringement occurs 

when “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, 

or sells . . . or imports . . . any patented invention” (emphasis added)). As discussed above, however, liability under 

§ 271(g) is not predicated on practicing the claimed process, 

but rather on importing, offering for sale, selling, or using

a product. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (infringement occurs 

when “whoever without authority imports . . . or offers to 

sell, sells, or uses . . . a product” (emphasis added)). Thus, 

the single-entity requirement, which is necessary for direct 

infringement liability under § 271(a), has no application to 

acts that do not constitute infringement under § 271(g).

On the same basis we reject Willowood’s argument that 

the Supreme Court’s Limelight decision requires us to apply the single-entity rule to § 271(g). Willowood asserts 

that the Court in that case applied “the single entity rule 

to allegations of both direct and indirect infringement under [§] 271(a) and (b).” Appellee’s Br. 29 (citing Limelight 

Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 921–
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 25

22 (2014)). Willowood argues that because “§ 271(g) is 

simply another form of direct infringement,” we are bound 

by the Limelight decision to apply the single-entity rule to 

§ 271(g). Id. We disagree.

Willowood fundamentally misunderstands the nature 

of the act that gives rise to liability under § 271(g). Although § 271(g) may involve a form of direct liability, that 

liability does not arise from practicing a patented process 

abroad. Limelight is further inapposite because the statute 

at issue in Limelight—§ 271(b)—predicates induced infringement liability on the existence of direct infringement. 

35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement

of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” (emphasis 

added)); Limelight, 572 U.S. at 921. Because direct infringement under § 271(a) requires a single entity to perform all of the claimed steps, the Supreme Court explained 

that where “performance of all the patent’s steps is not attributable to any one person[,] . . . . there has been no direct 

infringement,” and consequently “no inducement of infringement under § 271(b).” Id. at 922. By contrast, infringement liability under § 271(g) is not predicated on 

direct infringement of the patented process, and we will 

“not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions 

which the legislature has not expressed.” Diamond v. 

Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting Diamond v. 

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).

Section 271(f) reinforces our conclusion. Section 271(f) 

creates liability for induced infringement when a party 

“supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United 

States all or a substantial portion of the components of a 

patented invention . . . in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the 

United States in a manner that would infringe the patent

if such combination occurred within the United States.” 35 

U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). If Congress intended to limit liability under § 271(g) to instances where 

the patented process was practiced in a manner that would 
26 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

infringe the patent if such practice occurred within the 

United States—such as it did by requiring a single entity 

to perform the entire process under § 271(a)—it “kn[ew] 

precisely how to do so.” Limelight, 572 U.S. at 923. Congress, however, did not do so, even though § 271(g) was enacted four years after § 271(f). See Microsoft Corp. v. 

AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007); Kinik Co. v. Int’l 

Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same 

Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 

Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525 (1987) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). The 

Supreme Court has warned that “courts should not create 

liability for . . . non-infringing conduct where Congress has 

elected not to extend that concept.” Limelight, 572 U.S. 

923. We heed this warning.

Willowood asserts that the inclusion of the phrase “if 

such combination occurred within the United States” in 

§ 271(f) but not in § 271(g) demonstrates that Congress did 

not intend for § 271(g) to extend the scope of patent protection outside the United States to include conduct that 

would not constitute direct infringement domestically—

such as the divided practice of a patented process by more 

than one entity. Appellee’s Br. 41–42. We agree with this 

proposition but reject Willowood’s conclusion that the absence of that phrase necessitates the application of the single-entity requirement to § 271(g). As explained above, 

practicing a patented process abroad does not give rise to 

infringement liability under § 271(g). Thus, our conclusion 

that a single entity need not perform every step of a patented process abroad under § 271(g) does not extend patent protection to cover extraterritorial conduct that would 

not otherwise trigger liability within the United States. 

Rather, it is Willowood who asks us to impermissibly apply 
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 27

§ 271(g) to extraterritorial conduct by attempting to shift 

the focus of the statute from domestic acts of importation, 

offer for sale, sale, or use of a product to cover a foreign act 

of practicing a patented process. See WesternGeco LLC v. 

ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2137 (2018) (“If 

the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus . . . . occurred in 

another country, ‘then the case involves an impermissible 

extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct 

that occurred in U.S. territory.’” (quoting RJR Nabisco, 

Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2094 (2016))). We 

are not inclined to do so.

Other sections of Title 35 add support to our conclusion 

that infringement under § 271(g) is not predicated on a single entity practicing a patented process abroad. For example, § 287(b), which limits available damages under 

§ 271(g), states that “[t]he modifications of remedies provided in this subsection shall not be available to any [infringer under § 271(g)] who . . . had knowledge before the 

infringement that a patented process was used to make the 

product the importation, use, offer for sale, or sale of which 

constitutes the infringement.” 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(1)(C)

(2012) (emphasis added). This language makes clear that 

the act of infringement under § 271(g) occurs after a patented process has already been used. Thus, because practicing a patented process does not trigger liability under 

§ 271(g), it is immaterial whether that process is practiced 

by more than a single entity. Additionally, § 287(b) limits 

available remedies under § 271(g) in certain circumstances 

where the manufacturer of a product made by a patented 

process “is not known.” See 35 U.S.C. §§ 287(b)(3)(B)(iii); 

287(b)(4)(A)(iii); 287(b)(5)(C)(i) (2012). It would not have 

made sense for Congress to make infringement liability under § 271(g) contingent on a single entity practicing a patented process while expressly providing limitations on 

that liability where it is unknown which manufacturer—or 

how many—practiced the process.
28 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

The legislative history is instructive. A Senate Report 

accompanying the Process Patents Amendments Act of 

1987, the bill that enacted § 271(g), states that the purpose 

of the statute is to provide a remedy “when someone, without authorization, uses or sells in the United States, or imports into the United States a product made by their 

patented process.” S. Rep. 100-83, at 29 (1987). The Report 

makes clear that § 271(g) was enacted to “extend protection 

to the products” resulting from practicing a patented process and to “prevent circumvention of a U.S. process patentee’s rights through manufacture abroad and

subsequent importation into the United States of products

made by the patented process.” Id. at 46, 48 (emphasis 

added); see also id. at 30 (stating that § 271(g) would “protect against the entry into the U.S. marketplace of goods 

made abroad without authorization from the inventor”). 

Even Willowood concedes that the legislative history’s

clear “focus is on the importation of products,” rather than 

on the use of a patented process. Appellee’s Br. 31 The 

Report also clarifies that § 271(g) “does not attempt to prevent the use of the process in another country.” S. Rep. 100-

83, at 30 (emphasis added); see also id. at 48. The Report 

explains that a “U.S. process patentholder [that] has not 

obtained a similar patent in the other country . . . has no 

right by virtue of his U.S. patent to prevent anyone from 

using the process in that country.” S. Rep. 100-83, at 30. 

Thus, because simply practicing a patented process abroad 

does not come within the ambit of § 271(g), that there may 

be several entities involved in practicing the process is immaterial to the infringement analysis under § 271(g).

Willowood argues that in enacting § 271(g), Congress 

intended to provide patentees with “the same protection 

against overse[a]s infringers as they already enjoyed 

against domestic entities.” Appellee’s Br. 30 (quoting Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1318 

(Fed. Cir. 2001), judgment vacated on other grounds, 535 

U.S. 1109 (2002)) (emphasis removed). On this basis, 
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 29

Willowood contends that because direct infringement of a 

process patent under § 271(a) requires the same entity to 

perform all of the claimed steps, the same must be true under § 271(g). Id. at 30–31. We disagree.

The statutory language and legislative history described above make clear that practicing a patented process abroad does not trigger liability under § 271(g) in the 

same manner that practicing a patented process domestically does under § 271(a). Section 271(a) covers all patented processes, whether or not they result in a product. 

Infringement under § 271(g) instead requires importation, 

sale, offer for sale, or use within the United States of a 

product made by a patented process. The different scope of 

protection offered under § 271(a) and § 271(g) demonstrates that there is no inconsistency between the two sections. The legislative history further demonstrates that 

Congress did not enact § 271(g) to provide for identical 

rights to those enjoyed by patentees under § 271(a) with 

respect to process patents. Rather, Congress made clear 

that § 271(g) “is prompted by the use of patented processes 

in other countries followed by the importation of the resulting products into this country,” and simply “extend[s] protection to the products” made by such processes. S. Rep. 

100-83 at 46.

Lastly, applying a single-entity requirement to the 

practice of a patented process under § 271(g) would impose 

an undue evidentiary burden on patentees that is contrary 

to the intent of Congress. Congress recognized “the great 

difficulties a patentee may have in proving that the patented process was used in the manufacture of the product 

in question” where the manufacture occurred abroad. Id.

at 57. As a solution, Congress provided for a rebuttable 

presumption in § 295 that shifted the burden to the accused infringer to prove that the patented process was not 

used in manufacturing the accused products. See 35 U.S.C. 

§ 295. Congress would not have on the one hand recognized the difficulty in determining how a product was 
30 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

manufactured, and on the other hand concluded that determining who manufactured the product would be an easy 

exercise so as to require patentees to prove that a single 

manufacturer practiced the claimed process.

We hold that in light of the plain language of the statute, the broader context of the statutory scheme as a whole, 

and the legislative history, § 271(g) does not require a single entity to perform all of the steps of a patented process 

for infringement liability to arise from the importation into 

the United States or offer to sell, sale, or use within the 

United States of a product made by a process patented in 

the United States.

It is undisputed that Willowood USA imported into the 

United States an azoxystrobin compound that was manufactured abroad using the process patented by the ’138 patent. Summary Judgment Order, 2017 WL 1133378, at *5.

We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment that Willowood USA did not infringe the ’138 patent under § 271(g). 

The jury found, however, that Willowood China did not import into the United States or sell or offer for sale in the 

United States the azoxystrobin compound at issue, and as 

discussed below, substantial evidence supports this finding. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment that 

Willowood China did not infringe the ’138 patent under 

§ 271(g). Because neither the jury nor the district court 

made any findings concerning Willowood LLC’s role, if any, 

with respect to the azoxystrobin compound made using the 

process claimed in the ’138 patent, we vacate the district 

court’s judgement that Willowood LLC did not infringe the 

’138 patent under § 271(g) and remand for further proceedings. 

IV. Infringement by Willowood China

Syngenta argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by denying its JMOL motion and entering judgment in favor of Willowood China on the issues of 

infringement of the Compound Patents and the ’761 
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 31

patent.7 Syngenta contends that substantial evidence does 

not support the jury’s verdict that Willowood China did not 

sell or import azoxystrobin within the United States. Syngenta points to evidence it presented that Willowood China

“agreed to be ‘the exclusive seller’” of Tai He’s azoxystrobin 

within the United States and continued to sell azoxystrobin 

to Willowood USA after 2013. Appellant’s Br. 63. Syngenta argues that the fact that Willowood China’s sale of 

azoxystrobin to Willowood USA was made “f.o.b. China” is 

not determinative, because “a sale can take place in more 

than one location.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 36. Syngenta 

also contends that Willowood China imported azoxystrobin 

into the United States, pointing to evidence in the record 

that Willowood China coordinates the shipping from China 

to the United States, pays freight charges, and makes delivery arrangements. Appellant’s Br. 63; Appellant’s Reply 

Br. 34–35. We are not persuaded by Syngenta’s arguments.

The question before us is not whether substantial evidence supports Syngenta’s position but whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. See Regents of 

Univ. of California v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1294 

(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We do not reweigh the evidence. It is not 

our role to ask whether substantial evidence supports factfindings not made . . . , but instead whether such evidence 

 

7 On the issue of Willowood China’s alleged infringement of the Compound Patents, Syngenta appeals both the 

district court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment 

and its post-verdict motion for JMOL. See Appellant’s Br. 

58–68. A district court’s denial of summary judgment is 

not appealable after a trial on the merits. Ortiz v. Jordan, 

562 U.S. 180, 183–84 (2011); Function Media, L.L.C. v. 

Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013). We 

therefore limit our review to Syngenta’s appeal of the district court’s denial of JMOL.
32 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

supports the findings that were in fact made.”). Here, the 

jury heard evidence that because the shipment of 

azoxystrobin was marked “f.o.b. China,” legal title passed 

from Willowood China to Willowood USA in Hong Kong. 

See J.A. 6794. The jury also heard evidence that Willowood 

USA is responsible for clearing the shipments of 

azoxystrobin through customs in United States and for registering the fungicide with the EPA. J.A. 6795. In addition, Willowood presented testimony that Willowood USA

reimburses Willowood China for the freight charges, and 

the jury saw Willowood’s invoices stating that Willowood 

USA assumes the entire liability for the shipment of 

azoxystrobin from China to the United States. See id.; J.A. 

8225–27.8 We conclude that this is substantial evidence 

that supports the jury’s findings that Willowood China did 

not infringe the Compound Patents because it sold 

azoxystrobin in China and did not import azoxystrobin into 

the United States. 

Syngenta also contends that even if Willowood China

did not infringe the Compound Patents, the jury found that 

Willowood China infringed the ’761 patent. Syngenta 

points to the jury’s finding that “the Defendants” did not 

prove that Willowood’s azoxystrobin was not manufactured 

using DABCO within the range claimed by the ’761 patent

and the jury’s award of damages for infringement of the 

’761 patent by “the Defendants.” Appellant’s Br. 68 (citing 

J.A. 267). Syngenta asserts that “the Defendants” referred 

to all Willowood entities collectively, including Willowood 

 

8 Willowood’s counsel confirmed at Oral Argument 

that Willowood USA is the importer of record and assumes 

the risk of shipment. Oral Arg. at 22:29–22:31, 

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2018-1614.mp3 (“The importer of record is 

Willowood USA.”); id. at 23:16–23:19 (“Willowood USA assumes liability.”).
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC 33

China, and contends that Willowood waived any argument 

to the contrary by failing to object to the wording of the jury 

verdict form. Id. at 68, 71–72; see also Appellant’s Reply 

Br. 39–42. Syngenta argues that the question on the jury 

verdict form regarding Willowood China’s importation or 

sale of azoxystrobin applied only to the issue of infringement of the Compound Patents, not the ’761 patent, and 

the district court erred by linking the two issues. Appellant’s Br. 69–72; Appellant’s Reply Br. 39–42.

We disagree.9 As we discussed above, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Willowood China did 

not import azoxystrobin into the United States or sell or 

offer for sale azoxystrobin within the United States. The 

district court was thus correct to find that Willowood China

did not infringe the ’761 patent. J.A. 6489. To the extent 

there was any ambiguity in the jury verdict form, we have 

held that district courts enjoy “broad discretion to interpret 

an ambiguous verdict form, because district courts witness 

and participate directly in the jury trial process.” Telcordia 

Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010); see also Prism Techs. LLC v. Sprint Spectrum 

L.P., 849 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the district 

court did not err by denying Syngenta’s JMOL motion with 

respect to infringement of the Compound Patents and the 

’761 patent and entering judgment in favor of Willowood 

China on these issues.

 

9 We reject Syngenta’s waiver argument because we 

“have the discretion to consider issues not raised below ‘as 

justice may require.’” Ninestar Tech. Co. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 667 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 555–59 (1941)).
34 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC v. WILLOWOOD, LLC

V. Willowood’s Cross-Appeal

Willowood conditionally cross-appeals the district 

court’s denial of its motion to exclude the testimony of Syngenta’s expert concerning damages for infringement of the 

Compound Patents. Cross-Appellant’s Br. 56–66. Syngenta responds that Willowood’s cross-appeal is procedurally improper because it does not seek to expand the scope 

of the judgment below. Appellant’s Resp. Br. 49–51. We 

need not decide these issues because Willowood’s cross-appeal is conditional on our reversal of the judgment concerning the Compound Patents, and we affirm the district court

in that respect.

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. We conclude that the district 

court did not provide an adequate analysis of the potential 

conflict between FIFRA and the Copyright Act for us to determine whether such a conflict truly exists. We also conclude that the district court erred by imposing a singleentity requirement on the performance of a patented process under § 271(g). We agree with the district court in all 

other respects. We therefore affirm-in-part, reverse-inpart, vacate-in-part, and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART,

VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.