F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

APR 24 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

VICTOR MANUEL GALINDOGONZALES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 96-2239

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Mexico

(D.C. No. CR-96-55-JP)

Albert B. Lassen, Lassen and Jaffe, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Defendant -

Appellant.

Charles L. Barth, Assistant United States Attorney (John J. Kelly, United States Attorney,

with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Plaintiff - Appellee.

Before TACHA, HENRY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

HENRY, Circuit Judge.
2

Victor Manuel Galindo-Gonzales appeals the district court’s order denying his

motion to suppress evidence discovered after his vehicle was stopped at a roadblock. Mr.

Galindo-Gonzales argues that the initial stop of his vehicle and his subsequent detention

were unreasonable seizures that violated the Fourth Amendment. We disagree and affirm

the district court’s decision. 

I. BACKGROUND 

At about two o’clock in the afternoon on January 11, 1996, Mr. Galindo-Gonzales

was driving his Chevrolet Blazer north on I-25 near Las Vegas, New Mexico. He

approached a roadblock on the highway and was ordered to stop. The roadblock had been

established by the New Mexico State Police to ensure that motorists had valid driver’s

licenses, vehicle registrations, and proof of insurance. It was manned by six or seven

officers.

When Mr. Galindo-Gonzales stopped, Officer Norman Martinez approached the

vehicle and asked for a driver’s license and vehicle registration. Mr. Galindo-Gonzales,

who is a resident alien, produced a valid Kansas driver’s license but told Officer Martinez

that he did not have his registration with him. Following standard procedure, Officer

Martinez ordered Mr. Galindo-Gonzales to move his vehicle to a secondary area on the

highway shoulder so that the registration could be verified without blocking other
3

vehicles approaching the roadblock. Because Mr. Galindo-Gonzales professed to speak

little English, the conversation took place in Spanish.

At the time Officer Martinez ordered Mr. Galindo-Gonzales to the highway

shoulder, he had already formed the impression that the four passengers he saw in the

vehicle might be undocumented Mexican aliens. He observed that the men were speaking

in Spanish and had black hair and dark complexions. Rec. vol. II at 20, 34, 43 (Motion to

Suppress Hr’g, dated April 10, 1996). Also, Officer Martinez had encountered four or

five groups of undocumented aliens in the previous year, half of these at roadblock stops. 

See id. at 17. Although the roadblock was set up for the purpose of checking that

motorists and their vehicles were properly licensed, Officer Martinez admitted that during

stops officers look for other suspicious activity, including evidence of persons

transporting undocumented aliens. See id. at 16.

Officer Martinez walked over to the shoulder where the Blazer had stopped. 

Before calling in the license plate number in order to determine registration information,

he asked Mr. Galindo-Gonzales two questions: who the passengers were, and, when Mr.

Galindo-Gonzales did not respond, whether any of the passengers had identification. Mr.

Galindo-Gonzales replied that they did not. Officer Martinez admitted that his interest in

the questions was in part investigatory and in part for safety concerns, because there were

many persons in the vehicle. Nevertheless, Officer Martinez allowed the men to remain

in the vehicle while he called in the license plate number and driver’s license numbers. 
4

Approximately two minutes elapsed from the time Officer Martinez began his

questioning at the secondary area to the time he called in the license information. Within

a few minutes, the report came back that the vehicle was indeed registered to Mr.

Galindo-Gonzales. Up to this point, the encounter had lasted about ten minutes.

Although the checkpoint's initial purpose had been fulfilled once Officer Martinez

confirmed that Mr. Galindo-Gonzales's documents were in order, the officer detained the

party further. He requested that the passengers exit the vehicle. He then learned that

rather than the four passengers he had observed in the Blazer, there were in fact six

passengers, two of whom exited from the vehicle’s storage area. He asked them for their

names, birth dates and social security numbers. None of the passengers could provide a

social security number. After further investigation, Officer Martinez's suspicions

blossomed into a determination that all six were undocumented aliens, illegally in the

United States. Mr. Galindo-Gonzales was arrested and charged with transporting illegal

aliens and aiding and abetting, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

Mr. Galindo-Gonzales then moved to suppress evidence obtained at the roadblock

encounter, arguing that his detention violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court

held a hearing at which Officer Martinez testified. Thereafter it issued a written order in

which it denied the suppression motion. As to the initial stop, the court noted that Mr.

Galindo-Gonzales had conceded that it was “a routine roadblock to check license and

registration.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 31, at 7 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed July 11, 1996). As a result,
5

the court concluded, the initial stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As to

the subsequent questioning of Mr. Galindo-Gonzales, the court stated that Officer

Martinez was not required to have had a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing in order to

ask Mr. Galindo-Gonzales about his passengers’ identity. 

Alternatively, the court reasoned, even if reasonable suspicion was required, it was

present when Officer Martinez began questioning Mr. Galindo-Gonzales about the

passengers’ identity. The court cited the following factors supporting a finding of

reasonable suspicion: (1) I-25 is the only north-south interstate highway in New Mexico;

(2) I-25 provides the most direct continuous route from the southern part of the state near

the Mexican border to Colorado and other states to the north: (3) Mr. Galindo-Gonzales’s

truck had dark tinted windows and was capable of carrying numerous passengers; (4)

Officer Martinez noticed four male passengers with dark hair and skin who spoke

Spanish; (5) Mr. Galindo-Gonzales failed to respond to Officer Martinez’s first question

about the passengers; and (6) Mr. Galindo-Gonzales had observed the transportation of

illegal aliens at roadblock stops on several prior occasions.

 After his suppression motion was denied, Mr. Galindo-Gonzales entered a

conditional guilty plea, and the district court sentenced him to three years’ probation.
6

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. Galindo Gonzales argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress. Although his argument is somewhat unfocused, we read his appellate

brief to challenge three phases of his encounter with Officer Martinez: (1) the initial stop

at the checkpoint on I-25; (2) Officer Martinez’s questioning of him at the secondary area

before calling the dispatcher to obtain registration information; and (3) the further

detention after Officer Martinez discovered that the Chevy Blazer was registered to Mr.

Galindo-Gonzales. “In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the

factual findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v.

Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997). We review de novo the ultimate question of

whether a search or seizure is reasonable, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the district court’s determination. See id.

A. Fourth Amendment Requirements for 

Checkpoint Stops and Subsequent Detentions

 

The stop of a vehicle at a fixed checkpoint constitutes a “seizure” to which the

Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness applies. See Michigan Dep’t of

State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990); United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914

F.2d 200, 202-03 (10th Cir. 1990). Even in the absence of individualized suspicion, a

brief seizure at a checkpoint may be reasonable if conducted in a neutral manner for the
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purpose of effectuating important governmental purposes. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450-55

(concluding that a twenty-five second detention at a checkpoint for purpose of

determining drivers’ sobriety was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).

In concluding that these fixed checkpoint stops do not violate the Fourth

Amendment, the Supreme Court has focused on the lack of discretion afforded the

individual officers, the standardized procedures employed, and the minimal intrusion

imposed on motorists. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453. This circuit has applied these decisions

in concluding that a brief stop at a highway roadblock for the limited purpose of verifying

a driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance is a reasonable intrusion into the

lives of drivers and their passengers even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that an

individual passenger or motorist is engaged in illegal activity. See Morales-Zamora, 914

F.2d 200, 202-03 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Assuming that the initial stop of the defendants was

for the valid purpose of checking drivers’ licenses, vehicle registrations, and proofs of

insurance, we hold that the defendants’ initial detention at the roadblock was not an

unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment.”). 

When an officer seeks to expand the investigation of a motorist beyond the reasons

stated for the checkpoint, he or she must have “a particularized and objective basis for

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Bloom,

975 F.2d 1447, 1456 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (“Detention of

particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing [after an initial stop at a
8

checkpoint] may require satisfaction of an individualized reasonable suspicion

standard.”). “[T]he existence of objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity does

not depend on any one factor, but on the totality of the circumstances.” Wood, 106 F.3d

at 946. While common sense and human experience are to be employed, see United

States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 1994), inchoate suspicions and

unparticularized hunches do not provide reasonable suspicion, see United States v.

Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1994). Requiring an individualized, reasonable

suspicion as a prerequisite to expanding the scope of detentions at fixed checkpoints

protects motorists and passengers from random stops involving the “kind of standardless

and unconstrained discretion [that] is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous

cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least

to some extent.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). 

Accordingly, in order to evaluate the reasonableness of the detention of a motorist

after the purpose of the initial stop has been satisfied, we conduct a two part-inquiry.

First, we determine whether the detention was justified in its inception. Second, we

consider whether the officer’s actions were reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances that justified the detention in the first place. Wood, 106 F.3d at 945 (citing

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). The detention must be temporary, lasting no longer

than is necessary to effectuate its purpose. Id. Its scope must be carefully tailored to its

underlying justification. Id.
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B. The Initial Stop

In summarizing his argument on appeal, Mr. Galindo-Gonzales states that “the

real reason Officer Martinez was stopping cars was not to check documents, but to look

for aliens.” Aplt’s Br. at 4. Although that statement suggests that Mr. Galindo-Gonzales

is now challenging the initial stop of his vehicle at the checkpoint, he did not do so in the

district court proceedings. There, he acknowledged that Officer Martinez and his fellow

officers had “limited authority” to stop northbound vehicles on I-25 to check for licenses,

registration, and insurance verification, see Rec. vol. II at 5, and he proceeded to

challenge only the subsequent questioning by Officer Martinez at the secondary area.

In any event, Mr. Galindo-Gonzales cites no evidence in the record to support this

new contention that the initial stop was merely a pretext to search for illegal aliens. As

noted above, Officer Martinez testified that the decision to establish the roadblock was

made by one of his supervisors and that every northbound vehicle was stopped in order to

check drivers’ licenses, registration papers, and insurance. See id. at 13-18. Although

Officer Martinez did acknowledge that, during the course of these kind of roadblocks,

officers also look for evidence that drivers are under the influence of alcohol or drugs,

transporting illegal narcotics, or violating the immigration laws, see id. at 16, that

admission does not render the initial checkpoint stop unlawful. Officers properly

investigating one kind of offense are not required to ignore suspicious circumstances

suggesting the commission of other kinds of offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Jones,
10

44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir. 1995) (suspicious circumstances observed during a traffic

stop justified officer’s questions about transporting contraband); United States v. Arango,

912 F.2d 441, 446-47 (10th Cir. 1990) (same). Because the brief detention of motorists

to inspect license, registration, and insurance information at an established checkpoint

comports with the Fourth Amendment, see Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d at 202-03, we

conclude that the initial stop of Mr. Galindo-Gonzales’s vehicle at the checkpoint was

reasonable.

C. Additional Questioning at the Secondary Area 

Mr. Galindo-Gonzales next challenges Officer Martinez’s questioning him about

his passengers’ identity at the secondary area. He argues that in order to detain him for

the purpose of investigating matters other than licensing, vehicle registration, and

insurance, Officer Martinez was required to have had a reasonable suspicion that Mr.

Galindo-Gonzales was engaged in illegal activity According to Mr. Galindo-Gonzales,

Officer Martinez lacked such a reasonable suspicion. Therefore, he contends, by asking

him about his passengers’ identity in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of a violation

of the immigration laws, Officer Martinez violated the Fourth Amendment.

As noted, the district court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, it said,

Officer Martinez did not need a reasonable suspicion to ask questions about the

passengers’ identity. The court characterized these questions as “more akin to brief and
11

casual conversation that is permissible after an officer makes a legitimate stop of a

vehicle than to an interrogation that prolonged the detention.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 31 at 12. 

Second, the court said, even if reasonable suspicion was required, Officer Martinez had

the requisite reasonable suspicion when he asked the questions. Id. Consideration of the

grounds given by the district court requires a closer examination of our precedent. 

We begin with the district court’s conclusion that Officer Martinez did not need

reasonable suspicion when he asked the questions about the passenger’s identity. In

characterizing the questions as “brief and casual conversation” not requiring a reasonable,

individualized suspicion of illegal activity before they could be asked, the court cited this

circuit’s decisions in United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261 (10th Cir. 1989) and United

States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1984). 

In Rivera, a traffic stop case in which the scope of the officer’s questioning was

not at issue, we stated that after observing illegal driving conduct, a police officer “could

legitimately ask questions relating to the identity and travel plans of [the driver and

passenger] and the ownership of the car . . . regardless of [the officer’s] underlying

motivation.” Rivera, 867 F.2d at 1263. Thus, Rivera involved a traffic stop based on

reasonable suspicion, not a checkpoint stop during which an officer allegedly expands the

questioning beyond what is required to satisfy the purposes of the checkpoint. 

In Salinas-Calderon, which also involved an initial stop based on reasonable

suspicion, we stated that a state trooper who had made a traffic stop after observing
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erratic driving had “general investigative authority to inquire into possible immigration

violations.” Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d at 1301 n.3. We also concluded that the

trooper’s questioning about a green card was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. 

The court in Salinas-Calderon did not hold that reasonable suspicion was not required in

order to ask questions pertaining to possible immigration violations, but said that the

questioning was reasonable under the particular circumstances at issue in the case. 

Neither Rivera nor Salinas-Calderon addresses the particular question at issue here--

whether and to what extent an officer may ask questions about passengers’ identity during

initial questioning at a checkpoint stop.

The district court’s alternative conclusion-- that, when he asked the questions

about the passengers’ identity, Officer Martinez had a reasonable suspicion that Mr.

Galindo-Gonzales had violated the immigration laws--is not supported by our prior

decisions. According to Officer Martinez, at the time that he ordered Mr. Galindo

Gonzales to the secondary area, the only factors on which he based his suspicion of an

immigration violation were the passengers’ dark hair and dark complexions and the fact

that they were speaking Spanish. See Rec. vol. II at 43. In our view, a person’s racial

characteristics are insufficient to establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a

detention after a checkpoint stop conducted a substantial distance from the Mexican
1 The government agreed that the Las Vegas checkpoint was more than a

hundred miles from the Mexican border. See Rec. vol. II at 55; cf. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2)

(defining “reasonable distance” from the border under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) as “within

100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States or any shorter distance

which may be fixed by the district director.”).

13

border.1 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 n.17 (1976) (noting

that officers may rely on the appearance of Mexican ancestry in referring individuals to a

secondary detention area at a checkpoint near the Mexican border but stating that

“[d]ifferent considerations would arise if, for example, reliance were put on apparent

Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint located near the Canadian border.”); United States v.

Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994). (“[T]he overwhelming number of

Hispanics in this country are United States citizens, not illegal aliens.”). Although the

fact that the passengers were speaking Spanish may be relevant, it too is insufficient by

itself to create reasonable suspicion under the circumstances. Officer Martinez, himself a

Spanish speaker, admitted that many persons legally in the United States have dark hair

and complexions and speak Spanish. In fact, under questioning from the court, Officer

Martinez appeared to concede that his impression that the passengers were Mexican

nationals was no more than a hunch. See Rec. vol. II at 43-44. 

 Nevertheless, we believe that in considering the justification for questioning Mr.

Galindo-Gonzales about the passengers’ identity, the district court ignored an important

factor. As noted, when stopped at the checkpoint, Mr. Galindo-Gonzales was unable to

produce any vehicle registration document demonstrating either ownership or the right to
14

operate the Chevy Blazer. In United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1994),

Chief Judge Seymour observed that “a defining characteristic of our traffic stop

jurisprudence is [that] the defendant’s lack of a valid registration, license, bill of sale, or

some other indicia of proof to lawfully operate and possess the vehicle in question . . . 

giv[es] rise to objectively reasonable suspicion that the vehicle may be stolen.” 

Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 879-80 (collecting cases). Although the failure to produce such a

proof of ownership authorizes an officer to detain a motorist while he runs a computer

check to determine to whom the vehicle is registered, see United States v. Rutherford,

824 F.2d 831, 834 (10th Cir. 1987), the running of such a computer check is not the only

reasonable means of investigating a possible car theft. Instead, we have concluded that

officers confronted with a motorist who cannot produce proof of ownership may ask

questions about the identity and travel plans of the driver and passengers.

For example, in United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 1996), a police

officer stopped a van for speeding. When the driver was unable to produce registration

papers or proof of insurance, the officer asked the driver a series of questions, including

who owned the van and where he was going. When the driver said that he was traveling

to Kansas to see his ex-wife, bring a present to his daughter, and help the passenger find a

job, the officer asked how long he had known the passenger. See Miller, 84 F.3d at 1248. 

This circuit rejected the driver’s argument that the officer’s questioning violated the

Fourth Amendment. See id. at 1250-51 (“The initial questioning while [the driver] was in
15

the car presents no Fourth Amendment problem.”). We reasoned that in light of the

driver’s failure to produce registration papers or proof of insurance, the officer “had

reasonable suspicion the van might be stolen, which justified further investigation.” Id. at

1251. 

The questions asked by the officer in Miller resemble the questions asked by

Officer Martinez in the instant case. Just as the Miller driver’s failure to produce

registration papers justified further investigation that included questions about the

passenger’s identity, so Mr. Galindo-Gonzales’s failure to produce registration papers

justified further questioning by Officer Martinez. We acknowledge that our decisions do

not set forth a definitive list of particular questions that an officer may ask a motorist

when he has a reasonable suspicion that a vehicle is stolen. However, the questions asked

by Officer Martinez here--who the men in the Chevy Blazer were and, after Mr. GalindoGonzales did not answer that question, whether the men had identification--are both

sufficiently related to determining ownership of the vehicle such that it was reasonable

for Officer Martinez to ask them.

We note that in his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Officer Martinez did not

invoke Mr. Galindo-Gonzales’s failure to produce registration papers as a justification for

asking questions about the passengers’ identity. Instead, he said that he asked the

questions because he suspected that the men were illegal aliens and because he was

concerned about his safety. See Rec. vol. II at 35. Nevertheless, our analysis of the
16

reasonableness of Officer Martinez’s questions under the Fourth Amendment is not

limited by his own account of his motivation in asking them. In Whren v. United States,

116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996), the Supreme Court explained that “[n]ot only have we never held,

outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection . . . that an officer’s

motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we

have repeatedly held and asserted to the contrary.” Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774 (citing

United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983); United States v.

Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973); Scott v.

United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978)). “[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state

of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the

officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed

objectively, justify that action.” Scott, 436 U.S. at 138. 

Accordingly, even though Officer Martinez did not characterize his questioning

about the passengers as part of an investigation of a possible car theft, the fact that Mr.

Galindo-Gonzales failed to produce registration papers provided an objective justification

for the questions that he actually asked. We therefore conclude that Officer Martinez had

the necessary reasonable suspicion to question Mr. Galindo-Gonzales about the

passengers and that, as a result, the detention of Mr. Galindo-Gonzales at the secondary

area before Officer Martinez ran the computer check was reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment.
17

 

D. Detention after the Computer Check

Finally, Mr. Galindo-Gonzales argues that, after the computer check revealed that

the Chevy Blazer was registered to Mr. Galindo-Gonzales, Officer Martinez lacked the

reasonable suspicion necessary to detain him any further. As a result, Mr. GalindoGonzales says, his subsequent detention while Officer Martinez questioned the

passengers also violated the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Galindo-Gonzales cites cases

holding that “once it is determined that the driver possesses a valid license and is entitled

to operate the vehicle, the driver must be free to leave.” Aplt’s Br. at 6 (citing United

States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d

1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988)). 

We are not persuaded by this argument. To be sure, the computer check

established that the Blazer was registered to Mr. Galindo-Gonzales. Thus, after

receiving that information, Officer Martinez no longer had a reasonable suspicion that the

vehicle was stolen. However, Officer Martinez was still confronted with circumstances

suggesting that Mr. Galindo-Gonzales might be transporting illegal aliens. In particular,

Officer Martinez had observed a group of men who spoke Spanish exclusively, whose

identity Mr. Galindo-Gonzales refused to disclose, and who, according to Mr. GalindoGonzales, did not have any identification papers themselves. Given the totality of

circumstances, we conclude that Officer Martinez had the reasonable suspicion necessary
18

to continue to detain Mr. Galindo-Gonzales in order to investigate a possible violation of

the immigration laws. See United States v. 1982 Ford Pickup VIN

1FTDX15G7CKA31957, 873 F.2d 947, 949 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding reasonable suspicion

justifying detention after an immigration official had observed that a group of men and

women stopped by the side of a highway and noting that “none of the men or women

spoke English, but that each [of them] spoke Spanish with a recognizable Salvadorean

accent[, that t]hey . . .wore . . . the typical dress of Central American natives[, that t]he

vehicles used to transport these individuals had Texas license plates[,]” and that the

individuals reported that they were going to work in a town in which illegal aliens had

recently been discovered).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the decision of the

district court denying Mr. Galindo-Gonzales’s motion to suppress.