UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

v.

Staff Sergeant MYRANDA I. DECKER

United States Air Force

ACM S32173

15 October 2014

Sentence adjudged 8 July 2013 by SPCM convened at Keesler Air Force 

Base, Mississippi. Military Judge: Ronald A. Gregory (sitting alone).

Approved Sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 45 days, fine 

of $600.00, and reduction to E-3.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Major Matthew T. King.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Major Roberto Ramírez and 

Gerald R. Bruce, Esquire.

Before

ALLRED, HECKER, and TELLER

Appellate Military Judges

This opinion is subject to editorial correction before final release.

PER CURIAM:

The appellant was convicted, consistent with her pleas, by a military judge sitting 

as a special court-martial, of signing a false official statement, stealing a hunting camera 

from a fellow Airman, and, on divers occasions, stealing over $500.00 from her 

squadron’s “snack fund,” in violation of Articles 107 and 121, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 907, 

921. The adjudged sentence consisted of a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 

45 days, hard labor without confinement for 45 days, a fine of $600.00, and reduction to 

E-3. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged except for the hard 

labor without confinement.
2 ACM S32173

On appeal, the appellant argues the military judge abused his discretion by 

admitting two prosecution exhibits regarding the appellant’s disciplinary record. Finding 

no error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant, we affirm.

Background

At the time of her court-martial, the appellant had been in the Air Force for over 

nine years and was serving as a technical school instructor at Keesler Air Force Base, 

Mississippi. From January to March 2013, the appellant took approximately $600.00 

from her squadron’s Snack and Fundraiser Fund. Although she was not the fund’s 

custodian, she served as a building facility manager and therefore had keys that provided 

her access to the locked room where the money was kept. On multiple occasions, in the 

middle of the night, she would access the room and take $20–$50 in cash. On one of 

these occasions, she discovered a camera in the room that she believed was videotaping 

her larcenous activities. She took the camera from the room and, after a few days, 

delivered it to a local pawn shop, where it was sold before law enforcement could recover 

it.

In March 2013, the appellant went to the base clinic to be seen for a migraine 

headache. After giving her medicine, her doctor told the appellant that she could go 

home if her unit authorized it. Instead of requesting the day off from her unit, the 

appellant drafted a false Quarters Authorization form in order to stay home and 

recuperate.

The military judge conducted a providence inquiry and accepted the appellant’s 

pleas of guilty. During the sentencing phase of the court-martial, the military judge 

admitted two prosecution exhibits over trial defense counsel’s objections. 

First, trial counsel offered a memorandum for record signed by the appellant’s 

commander which stated he had verbally counseled the appellant following the 

appellant’s first fitness test failure (Prosecution Exhibit 5). Trial defense counsel 

objected based on hearsay and relevancy. The military judge determined the record was 

admissible for sentencing, finding it was relevant to the appellant’s performance of duty 

and was “properly certified . . . on the side [of the document] as [having been] maintained 

in the squadron records.” The military judge did note, however, that he would “give it 

whatever weight it deserves.”

Trial counsel next offered an unsigned memorandum for record containing the 

signature block of a noncommissioned officer who verbally counseled the appellant when 

she arrived late to work for the second consecutive day (Prosecution Exhibit 6). Trial 

defense counsel objected that the document was neither relevant nor an administrative 

action. The military judge determined the record was documentation of an oral 
3 ACM S32173

counseling and that, while “it ha[d] very minimal relevance,” it was admissible because it 

was maintained in a squadron personnel information file.

Admission of Sentencing Evidence

The appellant argues the military judge abused his discretion by admitting both 

documents under Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1001(b) as they did not meet the 

requirement for admission under that rule.

We review a military judge’s decision to admit sentencing evidence for an abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Manns, 54 M.J. 164, 166 (C.A.A.F. 2000). Such a review 

implicitly acknowledges a military judge has a range of choices, and we will not overturn 

an action taken within that range. United States v. Lubich, 72 M.J. 170, 173 (C.A.A.F. 

2013). We test the erroneous admission of evidence during the sentencing portion of a 

court-martial to determine if the error substantially influenced the adjudged sentence. 

United States v. Griggs, 61 M.J. 402, 410 (C.A.A.F. 2005). 

Rule for Courts-Martial 1001(b)(2) provides that, during sentencing, trial counsel 

may introduce personal data and information pertaining to the character of the accused’s 

prior service. This rule provides as follows: 

Under regulations of the Secretary concerned, trial counsel 

may obtain and introduce from the personnel records of the 

accused evidence of the accused’s . . . character of prior 

service. Such evidence includes copies of reports reflecting 

the past military efficiency, conduct, performance, and 

history of the accused and evidence of any disciplinary 

actions including punishments under Article 15[, UCMJ].

“Personnel records of the accused” includes any records made 

or maintained in accordance with departmental regulations 

that reflect the past military efficiency, conduct, performance, 

and history of the accused. If the accused objects to a 

particular document as inaccurate or incomplete in a specified 

respect, or as containing matter that is not admissible under 

the Military Rules of Evidence, the matter shall be 

determined by the military judge. Objections not asserted are 

waived.

(Emphasis added.)

In the Air Force, the “regulation[] of the Secretary concerned” is Air Force 

Instruction (AFI) 51-201, Administration of Military Justice (6 June 2013). See United 
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States v. Sheridan, 43 M.J. 682, 685 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (to be admissible under 

R.C.M. 1001(b)(2), reprimand need not comply with regulation governing unfavorable 

information files, but must meet requirements of military justice regulation governing 

presentencing matters). 

In pertinent part, AFI 51-201 sets the following guidelines for admission of 

documents from an accused’s personnel information file:

Section 8E—Pre-sentencing Matters (RCM 1001) 

8.13. Personnel Data and Character of Prior Service. 

“Personnel records of the accused,” as referenced in 

RCM 1001, includes all those records made or maintained in 

accordance with Air Force directives that reflect the past 

military efficiency, conduct, performance, and history of the 

accused, as well as any evidence of disciplinary actions, 

including punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, and previous 

court-martial convictions. 

 8.13.1. Personnel Information File. Relevant material 

contained in an accused’s unit personnel information file 

(PIF) may be admitted pursuant to RCM 1001(b) if: 

 8.13.1.1. Counsel provided a copy of the document or 

made the document available to opposing counsel prior to 

trial; and 

 8.13.1.2. There is some evidence in the document or 

attached to it that: 

 8.13.1.2.1. The accused received a copy of the 

correspondence (a document bearing the signature of the 

accused, or a witnessed statement regarding the accused’s 

refusal to sign, would meet this criterion) and had the 

opportunity to respond to the allegation; and, 

 8.13.1.2.2. The document is not over 5 years old on 

the date the charges were referred to trial.

Applying these requirements to the documents at issue here, we find these two 

exhibits did not comply with the regulation of the Secretary concerned. Prosecution 

Exhibit 5 contained only the signature of the squadron commander, and Prosecution 

Exhibit 6 contained only the signature block of a fellow instructor and staff sergeant, 
5 ACM S32173

without even that individual’s signature. Neither document bears the signature of the 

accused, a witnessed statement regarding the accused’s refusal to sign, nor any other 

evidence the appellant received a copy of either document nor had the opportunity to 

respond to the allegations made therein. See AFI 51-201, ¶ 8.13.1.2.1. Accordingly, 

admission of these exhibits was error.

Turning to the impact of this error, however, we find none. When admitting the 

exhibits, the military judge noted he would give them the weight they deserve. Viewing 

the appellant’s guilty plea as a whole, to include her admitted larceny of a fellow 

Airman’s camera and $600.00 from her squadron’s Snack and Fundraiser fund, and 

several adverse administrative actions properly admitted at trial, we find the record of a 

single fitness failure and a late arrival work to have had little-to-no impact on the 

sentencing decision of a seasoned military judge and thus did not substantially influence 

the adjudged sentence. Particularly in light of the military judge’s express statement that 

he considered the exhibits in question to be of “very minimal relevance,” we find the 

error to be harmless.

Conclusion

The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error 

materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant occurred. Articles 59(a) 

and 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c). Accordingly, the approved findings and 

sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT

STEVEN LUCAS

Clerk of the Court