54798 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 173 / Thursday, September 6, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–1065; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–NM–007–AD; Amendment 

39–17175; AD 2012–17–12] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model 747–400 

series airplanes. This AD was prompted 

by reports of water leaking into 

electrical and electronic equipment in 

the main equipment center (MEC). This 

AD requires modifying the floor panels; 

removing drains; installing floor 

supports, floor drain trough doublers, 

drain troughs, and drains; and sealing 

and taping the floor panels. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent water from 

entering the MEC, which could result in 

an electrical short and potential loss of 

several functions essential for safe 

flight. 

DATES: This AD is effective October 11, 

2012. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of October 11, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124– 

2207; phone: 206–544–5000, extension 

1; fax: 206–766–5680; Internet: https:// 

www.myboeingfleet.com. You may 

review copies of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, Washington. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Francis Smith, Aerospace Engineer, 

Cabin Safety & Environmental Systems 

Branch, ANM–150S, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6596; fax: 

425–917–6590; email: 

Francis.Smith@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on October 11, 2011 (76 FR 

62667). That NPRM proposed to require 

modifying the floor panels; removing 

drains; installing floor supports, floor 

drain trough doublers, drain troughs, 

and drains; and sealing and taping the 

floor panels. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comment 

received on the proposal (76 FR 62667, 

October 11, 2011) and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Concurrence With NPRM (76 FR 62667, 

October 11, 2011) 

Boeing stated that it has reviewed the 

NPRM (76 FR 62667, October 11, 2011) 

and concurs with the contents of the 

proposed rule. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (76 FR 

62667, October 11, 2011): Unsafe 

Condition Already Addressed 

UPS stated it believes the NPRM (76 

FR 62667, October 11, 2011) is 

unnecessary and increases the economic 

burden on operators because the unsafe 

condition of water leaking into the MEC 

is already addressed in AD 2011–16–06, 

Amendment 39–16764 (76 FR 47427, 

August 5, 2011). UPS noted that an 

intact MEC drip shield should prevent 

water from leaking onto the electronic 

and electrical equipment, thereby 

eliminating the need for additional 

rulemaking. 

UPS also noted that it finds the NPRM 

(76 FR 62667, October 11, 2011) 

problematic because it establishes an 

AD-mandated configuration for floor 

panel sealing in the nose section of 

Model 747–400BCF and 747–400F 

airplanes that is different from the floor 

sealing criteria for the center and aft 

sections of the same airplanes. 

We do not agree with the request to 

withdraw the NPRM (76 FR 62667, 

October 11, 2011). While we recognize 

that most of the airplanes affected by 

this AD are also affected by AD 2011– 

16–06, Amendment 39–16764 (76 FR 

47427, August 5, 2011), water intrusion 

into the MEC addressed by the NPRM is 

in locations and by means different than 

those addressed by AD 2011–16–06. AD 

2011–16–06 addresses water intrusion 

that migrates through cracked drip 

shields into the exhaust plenum and the 

MEC, and affects stations 117 and 118 

for certain Model 747–400BCF and 747– 

400F airplanes. The NPRM addresses 

water intrusion through main deck 

panels, fasteners and floor fittings, and 

affects stations 210 and 530 for certain 

Model 747–400BCF and –400F 

airplanes. 

We found the safety risk to be 

sufficient enough to require a specific 

floor sealing criteria to the affected 

areas. While a possible loss of uniform 

floor sealing criteria throughout the 

airplane may result, this AD action is 

necessary to adequately address the 

stated unsafe condition to the 

vulnerable areas. Operators seeking to 

establish more uniform floor panel 

sealing criteria may submit a request for 

an alternative method of compliance 

(AMOC) as specified in paragraph (h) of 

the AD. We have not changed the final 

rule in this regard. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (76 FR 

62667, October 11, 2011): Low Risk of 

Water Intrusion 

In addition, UPS stated that the 

probability for water intrusion on the 

forward section of Model 747–400BCF 

airplanes is overstated because these 

models do not have a nose cargo door 

like Model 747–400F airplanes. 

Therefore, Model 747–400BCF airplanes 

are not as susceptible to moisture 

entering the forward area of the main 

deck cargo compartment during cargo 

loading in adverse weather conditions. 

We do not agree. Both water intrusion 

safety concerns were studied separately 

based on reports submitted from 

multiple operators. The data were 

reviewed based on the location and 

causes of the water intrusion. Based on 

the frequency of reported failures, 

severity of outcome, and airplane usage, 

both studies showed an unacceptable 

and unsafe condition if left uncorrected. 

Addressing only one source of water 

intrusion neither precludes nor 

diminishes the probability of the other. 

We have not changed the final rule in 

this regard. 


TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 173 / Thursday, September 6, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 54799 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (76 FR 

62667, October 11, 2011): Revise 

Operational Procedures 

UPS also stated that proper ground 

operational procedures will 

significantly reduce water accumulation 

in the nose area, either through the main 

entry door or on pallets or containers. 

We infer that UPS requested 

withdrawal of the NPRM (76 FR 62667, 

October 11, 2011) in favor of revised 

ground operational procedures. We do 

not agree that revising operational 

procedures to avoid the identified 

unsafe condition is a consistent or 

reliable method in precluding what is 

inherently a safety risk through design. 

In determining a corrective action, 

Boeing and the FAA agreed that a 

design solution, instead of an 

operational solution, provides the best 

method to address the identified unsafe 

condition. No change to the final rule is 

necessary. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (76 FR 

62667, October 11, 2011): Conflict With 

Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 

UPS also stated that Figures 18 and 23 

of Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 747–25–3586, dated November 

12, 2010, specify that different materials 

be used in lieu of those called out in 

Section 53–21–02 of the Boeing Model 

747–400 AMM. UPS stated that by not 

allowing operators to use the AMM, the 

NPRM (76 FR 62667, October 11, 2011) 

would put the UPS mechanics in an 

untenable situation. Mechanics 

following AMM procedures in the nose 

area of these two airplanes would 

unknowingly be altering an ADmandated configuration. 

We do not agree because an ADmandated configuration always takes 

precedence over AMMs. When there is 

a conflict between an AD requirement 

and service document, the operator 

must always comply with the 

requirements of the AD, as explicitly 

stated in the requirements of Federal 

Aviation Regulations 14 CFR 39.27. We 

have not changed the final rule in this 

regard. 

Request To Allow Alternative Floor 

Sealing Procedures 

UPS noted that it and other operators 

have developed improved alternative 

floor panel sealing procedures based on 

years of operational experience with 

cargo aircraft. UPS stated that the NPRM 

(76 FR 62667, October 11, 2011) would 

mandate a Boeing floor sealing 

procedure that appears optimized for 

passenger aircraft flooring, which is not 

as effective as the procedures UPS uses 

today. UPS noted that this situation 

creates more of a regulatory problem 

with maintaining an AD-mandated 

condition than a safety of flight 

condition, as there are many ways to 

adequately seal the floor panels to 

prevent moisture intrusion. UPS noted 

that obtaining an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) approval for a floor 

sealing procedure presents another 

undue regulatory burden on operators. 

We recognize the different methods 

operators currently use for floor panel 

sealing procedures to mitigate this 

safety concern. However, the frequency 

of failures reported when using these 

different methods underscores the 

importance of providing an acceptable 

method for operators to follow in 

reducing the safety risk. Under the 

provisions of paragraph (h) of the final 

rule, we will consider requests for 

approval of an AMOC if sufficient data 

are submitted to substantiate that 

alternative method of sealing floor 

panels to prevent moisture intrusion 

would provide an acceptable level of 

safety. We have not changed the final 

rule in this regard. 

Request for Revised Service 

Information 

UPS submitted the following list of 

technical errors found in Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 747–25– 

3586, dated November 12, 2010, and 

requested that a revision to this service 

information be issued to address them. 

• The fastener quantities specified in 

the fastener table in figure 7 are 

incorrect. 

• Figure 17 specifies installing the 

modified floor panels with new 

fasteners, followed by figure 18, which 

specifies removing and reinstalling all 

floor panels between station 140 and 

station 640. Figure 18 should specify 

excluding those floor panels installed as 

shown in figure 17. 

• Figure 8, Detail G, and figure 14, 

Detail K, should show the doubler and 

the support, not just the doubler. 

We acknowledge and agree that there 

are certain technical errors identified in 

the figures of Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 747–25–3586, dated 

November 12, 2010. We have contacted 

Boeing and it has acknowledged the list 

of technical issues identified. We 

consider Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 747–25–3586, dated 

November 12, 2010, adequate to address 

the identified unsafe condition; and this 

service information was validated by 

Boeing on an airplane. Different 

operators may see different numbers of 

necessary fasteners and will have to 

submit an AMOC if their configuration 

deviates from Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 747–25–3586, dated 

November 12, 2010, instructions. Boeing 

stated it will address the issues in a 

Boeing service bulletin revision or other 

service document to provide clarity in 

the work steps. We have not changed 

the final rule in this regard. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

as proposed. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 12 

airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. operators 

Floor panel reworking and sealing; installing drains, drain trough doublers, and drain troughs.Up to 644 work-hours × $85 per hour 

= $54,740.

$64,033 Up to $118,773 .......... Up to $1,425,276. 

According to the manufacturer, some 

of the costs of this AD may be covered 

under warranty, thereby reducing the 

cost impact on affected individuals. We 

do not control warranty coverage for 

affected individuals. As a result, we 

have included all costs in our cost 

estimate. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 


TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
54800 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 173 / Thursday, September 6, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2012–17–12 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–17175; Docket No. 

FAA–2011–1065; Directorate Identifier 

2011–NM–007–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective October 11, 2012. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

Model 747–400 series airplanes, certificated 

in any category, as identified in Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 747–25– 

3586, dated November 12, 2010. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/ 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America 

Code 25, Equipment and Furnishings. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports of water 

leaking into electrical and electronic 

equipment in the main equipment center. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent water from 

entering the main equipment center, which 

could result in an electrical short and 

potential loss of several functions essential 

for safe flight. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Floor Panel Sealing 

Within 24 months after the effective date 

of this AD: Modify the floor panels; remove 

drains; install floor supports, floor drain 

trough doublers, drain troughs, and drains; 

and seal and tape the floor panels; at the 

applicable locations; in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 747–25– 

3586, dated November 12, 2010. 

(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in the 

Related Information section of this AD. 

Information may be emailed to: 9-ANMSeattle-ACO–AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(i) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Francis Smith, Aerospace Engineer, 

Cabin Safety & Environmental Systems 

Branch, ANM–150S, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 

3356; phone: 425–917–6596; fax: 425–917– 

6590; email: Francis.Smith@faa.gov. 

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 747–25–3586, dated November 12, 

2010. 

(ii) Reserved. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P. O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; phone: 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax: 206–766– 

5680; Internet: https:// 

www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(4) You may review copies of the 

referenced service information at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

(5) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/ 

cfr/ibr-locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 

22, 2012. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–21289 Filed 9–5–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0633; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–CE–018–AD; Amendment 

39–17170; AD 2012–17–07] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Diamond 

Aircraft Industries GmbH Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Diamond Aircraft Industries GmbH 

Models DA 42, DA 42 NG, and DA 42 

M–NG airplanes. This AD results from 

mandatory continuing airworthiness 

information (MCAI) issued by an 

aviation authority of another country to 

identify and correct an unsafe condition 

on an aviation product. The MCAI 

describes the unsafe condition as 

excessive voids in the adhesive joint 

between the center wing spars and the 


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