PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 1 6 - 4663

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appell ee ,
v. GEOFFREY THOMAS GATTIS , Defendant

- Appell ant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. Louise W. Flanagan , District Judge. ( 5:16

- cr - 00106

- FL

- 1 )

Argued: October 2 6 , 2017 Decided: December 4, 2017

Before N IEMEYER , KING, and FLOYD , Circuit Judge s .
Affirmed by published opinion

. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Floyd joined.

ARGUED: Jennifer Claire Leisten, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Phillip Anthony Rubin, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defen der, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May

- Parker, First Assistant United States Attorney, Seth M. Wood,2 Assi s tant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UN ITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.3 NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge : After Geoffrey Gattis pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) , the district court sentenced him to 70 months’ imp risonment , at the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range that it had calculated

. In calculating that range , the court applied a n enhanced base offense level under U

. S

. S

. G

. § 2K2.1(a)(4) (A) , b ased on its conclusion that Gattis had a previous felony conviction f or a crime of violence . A nd it increased that level b ased , among other things, on its findings that the offense involved 3 to 7 firearms and that Gattis had possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense. On appeal, Gattis chal lenges thes e Guidelines decisi ons. He argues that his previous North Carolina felony conviction for common law robbery does not qualify as a conviction for a “ crime of violence ” under the definition in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) and that the government’s evidenc e was insufficient to support the other tw o enhancements. We affirm, concluding that Gattis’ s North Carolina common law robbery conviction categorically qualified as a felony conviction for a crime of violence, as provided in § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and defined i n § 4B1.2(a)

. We also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court’s additional enhancements.

I On January 7, 2016, a resident of Oxford, North Carolina, called the Granville County Sheriff’s Department to report that his home had been burglarized. Among the items stolen were six firearms

— including a 9

- millimeter Glock semiautomatic handgun,4 a .22 caliber Marlin semiautomatic long rifle, and two assault rifles

— as well as s everal fully loaded large capacity magazines and a Kindle Fire tablet in a purple case. A few days later, on January 11, 2016, a woman named Ms. Watson, who resided just outside Henderson, in Vance County North Carolina, filed a police report stating that on January 8 she had heard automatic weapon fire and looked out her door to see two

men whom she knew

— Geoffrey Gattis and Orrie Williams

— shooting at a sign at the end of her dead

- end street. According to a federal law enforcement agent, Watson stated that she was “very familiar” with Gattis because he stayed with her “on regular occasions ” and that she was “ concerned ” both about the shooting as well as the fact that Gattis and Williams “ were using the street as a dump site for household items and furniture.” The next day, on January 12, 2016, off icers with the Henderson Police Department were conducting a driver’s license checkpoint when they observed a blue sedan turn around in an apparent effort to evade the checkpoint. They stopped the vehicle

— which was driven by Williams and in which Gattis was a passenger

— and after an officer asked both men to step out of the car, Gattis attempted to flee on foot before struggl ing with the officers who apprehended him. After he was apprehended, the officers recovered a loaded 9

- millimeter Glock handgun f rom his person

— the same Glock handgun that had been stolen from the Oxford residen ce on January 7, five days earlier. On January 13, 2016, t he day following Gattis ’s arrest , police officers searched Watson’s residence and property with her consent, as well as the adjoining area where she had reported seeing Gattis and Williams firing weapons. During the search, the5 officers recovered a .22 caliber Marlin rifle, 15 fully loa ded large capacity magazines, and a Kindle Fire tablet in a purple c ase

— property match ing the description of items that, among others, had been taken during the January 7 burglary in Oxford

. Officers also recovered two other firearms, several other tabl ets and phones, a laptop, a pair of sneakers, a valuable coin collection, a sterling silver tennis bracelet, a diamond sapphire ring, and assorted papers and documents. Several of these items had been reported as stolen during the burglary of another Oxfo rd home on November 13, 2015, and othe r items had been reported as stolen in Vance, Warren, and Franklin Counties. Gattis was indicted for the possession , as a felon, of the 9

- millimeter Glock handgun recovered from him during the January 12, 2016 traff ic stop, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 , and he pleaded guilty to the charge without a plea agreement
. In preparation for sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence report , which noted that Gattis had a prior North Carolina fe lony conviction for common law robbery ; that a number of state felony charges were pending against Gattis in Vance, Warren, and Franklin Counties stemming from four burglaries that had occurred between November 2015 and January 2016 ; and th at felony charge s filed in Granville County stemming from t wo burglaries had been dismissed

. (Defense c ounsel later acknowledged that those charges, which stemmed from the November 13, 2015 and January 7, 2016 burglaries in Oxford , ha d been “dismissed in favor of federal prosecution” ). C alculating Gattis’s advisory sentencing range , the presentence report began with an enhanced base offense level of 22 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3), which applies, inter6 alia , “if (A) the offense involved a . . . semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine . . . and (B) the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of vi olence or a controlled substance offense.” It then recommended that Gattis receive (1) a 2

- level increase under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) on the ground that the offense involved 3 to 7 firearms; (2) a 2

- level increase under § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) on the ground that the offense involved a stolen firearm; (3) a 4

- level increase under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) on the ground that Gattis had used or possessed a firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; and (4) a 3

- level reduction under § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility, for a total offense level of 27. This offense level, combined with Gattis’s Criminal History Category III, yielded a recommended sentencing range of 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment. Gattis objected to several aspects of the presentence r eport
. W ith respect to the report’s application of an enhanced base offense level under § 2K2.1(a)(3), he maintain ed that his offense did not involve a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine and that his prior North Carolina common law robbery conviction was not a conviction for a “crime of violence

. ” And with respect to the additional enhancements, he challenged the report ’ s conclusion that he was accountable for 3 to 7 firearms and that he had possessed a firearm or ammunit ion in connection with another felony offense. At the sentencing hearing, the government stated that it was not prepared to offer evidence to show that Gattis’s offense had involved a semiautomatic firearm capable of7 accepting a large capacity magazine, noting that while several large capacity magazines had been recovered, no corresponding weapons had been found with them. The district court accordingly sustained Gattis’s objection on that issue but rejected Gattis’s argument that his prior North Caroli na common law robbery conviction did not qualify as a conviction for a crime of violence under the Guidelines. Thus, the court began with an enhanced base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a)(4) , instead of the enhanced base offense level of 22 under § 2K 2.1(a)(3) that w as recommended by the presentence report. The court also overruled Gattis’s objections to the two other enhancements , finding it “clear” that Gattis’s offense had involved at least 3 firearms and also finding, “based on the preponderance o f the evidence, including the specific items taken from the residence, that it’s more likely than not that the defendant committed the offense in connection with another felony offense. ” Based on these rulings, Gattis ’s total offense level became 25, which, when combined with Criminal History Category III, resulted in an advisory sentencing range of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment. After considering the sentencing factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court imposed a term of imprisonment of 70

m onths

. From the district court’s judgment dated October 6, 2016, Gattis filed this appeal, challenging only the district court’s calculation of his advisory sentencing range

. O n August 10, 2017, while this appeal was pending, the Chief of the Federal B ureau of Prisons’ Designation and Sentence Computation Center sent a letter to the district court indicating that on February 16, 2017, Gattis had been sentenced in a North Carolina court to an 8

- to

- 19

- month term of imprisonment for possessing stolen prope rty8 and inquir ing whether his federal sentence should run concurrently or consecutively with the state sentence. In response, the district court filed an amended judgment on September 5, 2017 , ordering that Gattis’s federal sentence run concurrently with his “imprisonment pursuant to the judgment in Franklin County.”

II The primary issue presented is whether the district court erred by applying an enhanced base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)

— rather than a base offense level of 14 under § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A)

— based on its determination that Gattis’s prior North Carolina felony conviction for common law robbery qualified as a felony conviction for a “crime of violence,” as th at term is defined in § 4B1.2(a)

. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1 (prov iding that, “[f]or the purpose s of this guideline,” the term “‘ crime of violence ’ has the meaning given . . . in § 4B1.2(a) and Application Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2”). In August 2016, t he Sentencing Commission revised § 4B1.2’s definition of

“ crime of violence , ” see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Supp. to App. C, Amend. 798 (eff. Aug. 1, 2016), and the new definition was in effect and applied to Gattis when he was sentenced in October 2016

. The new definition provides that “[t]he term ‘cri me of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that” either satisfies the “force clause” ( i.e. , “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”) or is included in a list of enumerated crimes. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The9 enumerated offenses are “murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, . . . arson, extortion, . . . the use or unlawful possession of [certain types of firearms or explosive material,]” and

— as most relevant here

—

“ robbery .” Id

. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (emphasis added). While § 4B1.2’s c ommentary defines a few of the enumerated offenses, it leaves “robbery” undefined. See id. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. I n United States v. Gardner , 823 F.3d 793, 801

– 04 (4th Cir. 2016), we concluded that North Carolina common law robbery does not qualify as a “vio lent felony” under the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) , 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), which is identical to and applied t he same as the force clause in § 4B1.2(a)(1) , s ee , e.g. , United States v. King , 673 F.3d 274, 279 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2012). We explained in Gardner that “North Carolina common law robbery does not necessarily [require] the use, attempted use, or threatened use of ‘force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person,’ as required by the force clause

. ” 82 3 F.3d at 804 (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. United States , 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)) . This was so because the Supreme Court of North Carolina had held that common law robbery could be committed by using a lesser degree of force

— namely , force “ suf ficient to compel the victim to part with his property,” id. at 803 (quoting State v. Sawyer , 29 S.E.2d 34, 37 (N.C. 1944))

— and the North Carolina Court of Appeals had upheld robbery convictions where, for example, the defendant had taken property by pushing the victim’s hand or shoulder, id. at 803

– 04 (citing State v. Chance , 662 S.E.2d 405, 2008 WL 2415981 , at *3

– 4 (N.C. Ct. App. June 17, 2008) (unpublished) and State v. Eldridge , 677 S.E.2d 14 , 2009 WL 1525333 (N.C. Ct. App. June 2, 2009) (unpublished)).10 Rather than relying on the force clause of § 4B1.2(a)(1), t he government has
argue d in this case that North Carolina comm on law robbery qualif ies as a crime of violence under the enumerated offenses clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) because it is “robbery

. ” S ince the Guidelines do not provide a definition of robbery, the question of whether North Carolina common law robbery qualifies as the enumerated offense of “robbery” depends on “the generic, contemporary meaning” of robbery

. Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)

. R elying on Gardner , Gattis contends that North Carolina common law robbery does not qualify as generic robbery because the North Carolina version of the offense “can be committed with only minimal force

. ” Drawing from the Model Penal Code and its commentary, he argues that we should define generic robbery as requiring a theft from a victim who either susta ins an injury or is threatened with or put in fear of being injured

. H e argues alternatively that even under the definition of robbery provided by LaFave’s Substantive Criminal Law treatise, for a robbery to be accomplished by means of force, the offender must use at least more than the minim al force necessary to take an item from the victim’s grasp. But b ecause, according to Gattis, “the offense of North Carolina common law robber y encompasses a theft during which the offender uses only de minimis force , ” North Carolina’s common law robbery offense is “overbroad ” as compared to generic robbery and “more closely resembles the generic offense of larceny from the person

. ” The gover nment, in contrast, contends that North Carolina common law robbery “fits within the generic definition of robbery” because a robbery conviction in North11 Carolina requires proof that property was “taken from a person or a person’s presence by means of forc e or putting in fear.” To determine robbery’s generic definition, it urges that, like other courts of appeals to have considered the issue, we should rely on LaFave’s treatise, rather than the Model Penal Code

. And when r elying on the contemporary meanin g of robbery identified by LaFave as the generic definition, the government submits, it becomes clear that North Carolina defines its common law robbery offense in a manner consistent with th e generic definition

. We agree with the government that North Carolina common law robbery categorically qualifies as “robbery,” as that term is used within § 4B1.2(a)(2), and therefore conclude that the district court properly applied an enhanced base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) when calculating Gat tis’s advisory sentencing range. When comparing a potential predicate offense to an enumerated crime, we must first ascertain the “generally accepted contemporary meaning” of the enumerated crime, Taylor , 495 U.S. at 596, giving the offense a “uniform d efinition independent of the labels employed by the various States’ criminal codes,” id. at 592. While the historical meaning of the crime at common law often provides the offense’s “core,” it is the “contemporary usage of the term” that controls. Id

. W e thus must endeavor to determine “the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States,” looking to sources like LaFave’s treatise and the Model Penal Code as appropriate. Id. at 598 & n.8; see also United States v. Flores

- Granados , 783 F.3d 487, 490

– 91 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Peterson , 629 F.3d 432, 436 (4th Cir. 2011).12 F or determining the most widely accepted , contemporary meaning of robbery , LaFave’s treatise proves to be much more helpful than the Model Pe nal Code. This is so because the Model Penal Code’s definition of robbery

— which requires proof that, “in the course of committing a theft,” the defendant “inflict[ed] serious bodily injury ,” “threaten[ed] another with or purposefully put[] him in fear o f immediate serious bodily injury ,” or “commit[ted] or threaten[ed] immediately to commit any felony of the first or second degree,” Model Penal Code § 222.1

— has not been widely adopted. Se e, e.g. , Model Penal Code & Commentaries, Part II § 222.1 cmt. 3(a), at 106 (Am. Law Inst. 1980) (“Nearly all current statutes disagree with the Model Code on this point and permit a robbery prosecution on the basis of any degree of force or fear”). Thus, unlike when determining the generic definitions o f other crimes, the Model Penal Code does not provide much assistance in determining robbery’s generic definition, at least with respect to the minimum amount of force sufficient to commit the crime. Cf. Peterson, 629 F.3d at 436 (concluding with respect to manslaughter “that the Model Penal Code provides the best generic, contemporary, and modern definition, particularly because it has been widely adopted ” (emphasis added)). Therefore, rather than rely on the Model Penal Code’s definition of robbery, w e conclude , as supported by LaFave, that generic robbery is defined as the “misappropriation of property under circumstances involving [immediate] danger to the person.” 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 20.3, at 173 (2d ed. 2003); see also id

. § 20.3(d)(2), at 187 (“[I]t is the immediacy of the threats that escalates the theft from extortion to robbery” (emphasis added) ); accord United States v. Yates , 866 F.3d13 723, 734 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. House , 825 F.3d 381, 387 (8th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Becerril

- Lopez , 541 F.3d 881, 891 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Santiesteban

- Hernandez , 469 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Rodriguez , 711 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2013). And we conclude furth er that the “immediate danger” element in that definition is categorically satisfied by the taking of property “from a person or a person’s presence by means of force or putting in fear.” Santiesteban

- Hernandez , 469 F.3d at 380 ; see also id . at 380 & nn.5

– 6 (explaining that “[t]he immediate danger element . . . has been implemented by the states in two main ways,” with “[t]he majority of states requir[ing] property to be taken from a person or a person’s presence by means of force or putting in fear,” whil e eleven states “define the immediate danger in terms of bodily injury”)

. The distinct crime of “ larceny from the person ” thus becomes “ robbery ” in the generic sense only when the offender takes property by using force or by threatening immediate physical harm. See LaFave, supra , § 20.3(d), at 181. With respect to threatening harm, s uch a threat may be express or implicit, but it must be sufficient to induce the victim to part with the property

. See i d. § 20.3(d)(2), at 185

– 87. As for the amount of force that converts the crime of larceny from the person into robbery, we find LaFave’s treatise particularly instructive. It is clear, for example, that the act of pickpocketing is larceny from the person, rather than robbery, because “[t]aking the owner’s property by stealthily picking his pocket” does not involve the requisite degree of force against the owner . LaFave, supra , § 20.3(d)(1), at 182. “[B]ut if the pickpocket or his confederate jostles the owner, or if the owne r, catching the pickpocket in the act,14 struggles unsuccessfully to keep possession, the pickpocket’s crime becomes robbery.” Id. § 20.3(d)(1), at 182

– 83 (emphasis added). In the same way, we can distinguish between larceny from the person by the sudden snatching of property and robb ery . According to LaFave, “[t]he great weight of authority . . . supports the view that there is not sufficient force to constitute robbery when the thief snatches property from the owner’s grasp so suddenly that the owner

c annot offer any resistance to the taking .” LaFave, supra , § 20.3(d)(1), at 181

– 82 (emphasis added). But “when the owner, aware of an impending snatching, resists it, or when, the thief’s first attempt being ineffective to separate the owner from his prop erty, a struggle for the property is necessary before the thief can get possession thereof, there is enough force to make the taking robbery.” Id . § 20.3(d)(1), at 182. In other words, in a snatching case, if the defendant uses force to overcome the vict im’s resistance or force more than necessary to simply remove an item from the victim’s grasp, then the crime constitutes generic robbery. See id. § 20.3(d)(1), at 182

– 83 nn.43

– 44, 48 (citing, e.g. , Robinson v. State , 692 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997) (“[I] n order for the snatching of property from another to amount to robbery, the perpetrator must employ more than the force necessary to remove the property from the person”); State v. Curley , 939 P.2d 1103, 1106 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (“[I]t would be robbery, not larceny, if the resistance afforded is the wearing of a necklace around one’s neck that is broken by the force used to remove it and the person to whom the necklace is attached is aware that it is being ripped from her neck”); People v. Patton , 389 N.E .2d 1174, 1175 (Ill. 1979) (purse snatching did not constitute robbery where “the purse was gone before [the victim] realized what had15 happened,” even though the defendant’s act of grabbing the purse from the victim’s “fingertips” had “throw[n] her arm bac k ‘a little bit’”); Lear v. State , 6 P.2d 426, 427 (Ariz. 1931) (noting that while merely snatching is not a taking by force, “if there be a struggle to keep it, or any violence, or disruption, the taking is robbery” (quoting Z. Francis Wharton, A Treatise on Criminal Law § 1098, at 1297 (11th ed. 1912) )). When c omparing this generic, contemporary meaning of robbery to North Carolina common law robbery , we find a clean match. As noted, robbery in its generic sense is the misappropriation of property under circumstances involving immediate danger to the person, and one such circumstance is when property is taken from a person or his presence by means of force or putting in fear. Tracking this generic definition, North Carolina defines robbery as the “felon ious, non

- consensual taking of money or personal property from the person or presence of another by means of violence or fear.” State v. Smith , 292 S.E.2d 264, 270 (N.C. 1982); see also State v. Robertson , 531 S.E.2d 490, 492 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“Common law robbery requires proof of four elements: (1) felonious, non

- consensual taking of (2) money or other personal property (3) from the person or presence of another (4) by means of force , ” whether “actual or constructive” ). North Carolina common law robb ery is thus subsumed within

— and is a categorical match with

— generic robbery. Gattis’s only argument as to why North Carolina common law robbery is broader than the definition of generic robbery that we have adopted is his contention that robbery
may be committed in North Carolina using less force than is necessary to commit generic robbery by force . In this regard, he p oint s to Gardner , which suggested that robbery can16 be committed in North Carolina with “even de minimis contact.” 823 F.3d at 803. But
t he issue in Gardner was whether , under ACCA’s force clause, North Carolina common law robbery necessarily involve d the use, attempted use, or threatened use of “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person ,” Johnson , 559 U.S. at 140, and it was only in this context that we observed that North Carolina common law robbery can be committed through the use of a relatively minor degree of force

— that is, an amount of force incapable of causing physical pain or injury

. G ardner , 823 F.3d at 803

– 04. Yet , as the LaFave treatise makes clear, to commit generic robbery by taking property through the use of force, the defendant need not use a level of force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person. Rather, it is sufficient if the defendant “jostles the owner” or uses only that force which is sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance

. LaFave, supra , § 20.3(d)(1), at 182

– 83. North Carolina case law demonstrates that North Carolina ’s version of common law robbery hews precisely to the same line. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized that to commit a robbery through actual force (as opposed to constructive force), the defendant must use a “degree of force . . . sufficie nt to compel the victim to part with his property.” Sawyer , 29 S.E.2d at 37 (emphasis added) . The actual force used “must be of such a nature as to show that it was intended to overpower the party robbed or prevent his resisting, and not merely to get po ssession of the property stolen .” Robertson , 531 S.E.2d at 493 (some emphasis omitt ed) (quoting State v. John , 50 N.C. 163, 169 (5 Jones) (1857)). “In short, the victim must be induced to part with her property as a result of the violence.” Id.17 Consi stent with these principles, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that a “typical purse

- snatching incident”

— where “the only force used by [the] defendant was that sufficient to remove [a] purse from [the victim’s] shoulder”

— constitutes “larceny , not robbery,” Robertson , 531 S.E.2d at 4 9 3 , relying on “[t]he rule prevailing in most jurisdictions . . . that the mere snatching or sudden taking of property from the person of another does not in itself involve such force, violence, or putting in fear as will constitute robbery,” id. (emphasis added) (quoting Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Purse Snatching as Robbery or Theft , 42 A.L.R. 3d 1381, 1383 (1972)); see also State v. Edwards , 646 S.E.2d 442, 2007 WL 1892498, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. July 3, 2007) (unpublished) (recognizing that North Carolina “courts have repeatedly held that mere
purse - snatching constitutes larceny, not robbery ” ). *
In contrast, in Chance

— one of the primary authorities on which Gat tis relies

— the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s common law robbery

* Ignoring the North Carolina Court of Appeals’ published decision in Robertson , Gattis contends that State v. Smith , 709 S.E.2d 602, 2011 WL 532316 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2011) (unpublished), shows that North Carolina permits a common law robbery conviction where the defendant snatched a purse that lay on a table next to the victim. But the holding in Smith does not rest on the minimum degree of fo rce necessary to commit robbery through the use of actual force. The defendant there had pleaded guilty to common law robbery before challenging whether there was a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea. In upholding the conviction, the cou rt noted that defense counsel’s statement during the plea hearing that the victim’s purse had been sitting on the table beside her “merely indicates his position that actual force was not used, but does not address, or dispute, the existence of constructiv e force

. ” Id. at *2 (emphasis added) . The court thus concluded that defense counsel’s statement did “not raise any serious question as to whether the force element o f robbery was satisfied. ” Id

.18 conviction based on evidence that the defendant had not only grabbed a box of cigarettes out of the victim’s hand, but had also “pushed [the victim’s] hand off the box

. . . in order to get possession of it,” emphasizing the victim’s testimony that the defendant had “grabbed [the box] with one hand and pushed [her] hand with the other.” 2008 WL 2415981, at *3

– 4. Similarly, in State v. Harris , 650 S.E.2d 845, 847

– 4 8 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), the court “look[ed] to other jurisdictions for guidance” before concluding that the act of snatching a gold necklace from a victim’s neck “involves sufficient actual force to constitute robbery” since “a necklace is attached to a pe rson in such a way that it offers resistance to anyone who would try to pull it from the person’s neck.” T hese cases highlight that Gattis is simply incorrect when he asserts that “a robbery conviction [in North Carolina] is possible even where the off ender uses only the de minimis force necessary to take an item from the victim’s possession.” (Emphasis added). Instead, just like generic robbery committed through the use of force, to commit robbery by force in North Carolina, the defendant must do mor e than stealthily pickpocket or suddenly snatch ; he must direct a degree of force towards the victim beyond the minimum necessary to remove the item from the victim’s grasp. North Carolina case law also demonstrates why Gattis’s reliance on the Sixth Ci rcuit’s recent decision in Yates is misplaced. Th e Yates court h e ld that an Ohio robbery statute criminalizing the commission of a theft by “us[ing] or threaten[ing] the immediate use of force against another , ” 866 F.3d at 727 ( quo ting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2911.02(A)(3) ) , did not qualify as generic robbery because Ohio courts had recognized that “the act of forcibly removing a purse from an individual’s shoulder [was] sufficient”19 to violate the statute, id

. at 734 (quoting State v. Juhasz , No. 14

- 1208, 2 015 WL 5515826, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept

. 18, 2015 ) ). In contrast, North Carolina law is quite clear that a mere purse snatching constitutes larceny from the person and that the act only becomes robbery if a struggle between the offender and the victim e nsues, see Edwards , 2007 WL 1892498, at *2, or if the defendant otherwise uses more than the minimum amount of force necessary to grab a purse from a person’s shoulder, se e Robertson , 531 S.E.2d at 509; see also State v. Watson , 196 S.E.2d 212, 213

– 14 (N.C . 1973) ( find ing that sufficient force existed to support a conviction for robbery where the defendant’s act of snatching the victim’s purse from her arm broke the purse’s strap and dislocated the victim’s arm). In sum , we conclude that North Carolina c ommon law robbery qualifies as “robbery,” as that term is used in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), and that the district court therefore properly applied an enhanced base offense level under § 2K2.1 (a)(4)(A) on the ground that Gattis had a prior felony conviction f or a crime of violence.

III Gattis also challenges the 2

- level enhancement based on the number of weapons involved in the offense, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), and the 4

- level enhancement based on the district court’s finding that he had “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense,” id. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) . He argues that “[t]he government offered insufficient evidence to show” that either enhancement applied

. We disagree.20 First, the district co urt applied a 2

- level enhancement based on its finding , by a preponderance of the evidence, that Gattis’s offense involved 3 to 7 firearms. This enhancement is r ea d ily supported by the evidence showing that Gattis not only had actual possession of the 9

- m illimeter Glock handgun that was recovered from his person during the January 12, 2016 traffic stop, but that he also had constructi ve possession of the three firearms that were recovered during the search of Watson’s property the next day. Gattis contend s that “the evidence failed to show that [he] exercised actual or constructive possession over these items, or that he even knew that they were there,” asserting that because “[t]he firearms were discovered outside, near an unsecured building on Watson’s l and,” “the area was accessible to anyone.” In making this argument, however , he ignores the record evidence of his connection to the stolen property recovered from Watson’s land

. For example, there was evidence showing that Gattis stayed at Watson’s hous e “on regular occasions” and that when Watson called the police on January 11 to complain that Gattis and Williams had been shooting automatic weapons at the end of her dead

- end street, she had also told the police that “ they were using the street as a dum p site for household items and furniture

. ” ( E mphasis added). Moreover, the trove of stolen goods found during the January 13 search included several items matching the specific description of property that was stolen during the January 7 burglary of an Ox ford home

— the same burglary during which the 9

- millimeter Glock handgun recovered from Gattis’s person was stolen. Thus , n ot only was there ample evidence supporting the district court’s finding that Gattis illegally possessed both the 9

- millimeter Gloc k and the three additional firearms that were recovered from Watson’s property , but some of this21 same evidence also showed that Gattis’s unlawful possession of these three additional firearms was “part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan ” as his offense of conviction

. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)

. In short, based on the evidence before it,
t he district court properly applied a 2

- level enhancement on the ground that Gattis’s offense involved 3 to 7 firearms. Gattis’s challenge to the distri ct court’s application of the 4

- level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) also fails. Again, as relevant here, that enhancement applies if the defendant “ used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense,” U.S.S.G. § 2K2 .1(b)(6)(B) (emphasis added), and an application note indicates that the “in connection with” requirement is satisfied “if the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating , another felony offense,” id. cmt. n.14(A) (emphasis added). Another application note provides, as an example, that the enhancement would apply to a defendant who had found and taken a firearm “during the course of a burglary . . . even if the defendant did not engage in any other co nduct with that firearm during the course of the burglary” because, in such a case, “the presence of the firearm ha[d] the potential of facilitating another felony offense.” Id. cmt. n.14(B). So too here. The government’s evidence was sufficient to sho w, by a preponderance, that from at least the middle of November 2015 through Gattis’s arrest on January 12, 2016, Gattis and Williams were engaged in an ongoing felony conspiracy either to commit burglary or, at minimum , to receive valuable stolen propert y. Specifically, in addition to the evidence just not ed, the record indicates that when police searched Watson’s residence and property on January 13, 2016, they recovered thousands22 of dollars worth of items that had been stolen during at least six differ ent burglaries in four different counties between November 13, 2015, and January 7, 2016 . Th e record thus showed sufficiently both that Gattis had committed at least one other felony offense

— namely , an ongoing felony conspiracy

— and that he possessed a firearm “ in connection” with that felony offense , as the handgun that he was carrying at the time of his January 12 arrest clearly “had the potential of facilitating” the ongoing conspiracy by serving as a potential means of protecting the stolen goods. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) & cmt. n.14(A).

* * * For the reasons given , we conclude that the district court properly calculated Gattis’s sentencing range and accordingly affirm its judgment. AFFIRMED