Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 14-2073 

UNITED STATES, 

Appellee, 

v. 

ANTONIO RAMOS-ACEVEDO, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Thompson and Barron, Circuit Judges. 

Peter J. Cyr and Law Offices of Peter J. Cyr on brief for 

appellant. 

Susan Jorgensen, Assistant United States Attorney, Nelson 

Pérez Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate 

Division, and Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, 

on brief for appellee. 

June 14, 2016 
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Per curiam. Antonio Ramos-Acevedo ("Ramos") pled guilty 

to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). He appeals his 71-month prison sentence as 

substantively unreasonable. The government makes a good argument 

that Ramos waived appellate review of his sentence by his 

litigation conduct. In any event, the imposed sentence was 

reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Although Ramos and the government bargained for a 

potentially lower sentence, at his sentencing hearing Ramos 

repeatedly agreed to the sentence that the judge ultimately 

imposed. Ordinarily, "[a] party waives a right when he 

intentionally relinquishes or abandons it." United States v. 

Sánchez-Berríos, 424 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). A party may waive a right 

by affirmatively agreeing with a judge's proposed course of action. 

See United States v. DeLeon, 704 F.3d 189, 193 (1st Cir. 2013); 

United States v. Sweeney, 606 F. App'x 588, 591 (1st Cir. 2015) 

(unpublished). 

At sentencing, the district court contemplated applying 

a four-level sentencing enhancement, based on the circumstance 

that the firearm possessed by Ramos had an obliterated serial 

number. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4). That enhancement would have 

raised Ramos's offense level to 25, and his guidelines sentencing 
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range to 70-87 months. However, after considering defense 

counsel's allocution about the possession (counsel asserted that 

Ramos had found the weapon on a beach, in a rusty condition, 

suggesting that the serial number had been obliterated 

previously), as well as mitigating factors relating to Ramos's 

background and health, the court applied only a two-level 

enhancement. This resulted in an offense level of 23 and a 

sentencing range of 57-71 months. The court imposed a sentence of 

71 months. 

The judge explained how he had arrived at the sentence, 

and Ramos's counsel thanked the court repeatedly for its 

"generosity" and acknowledged that the court acted "within [its] 

discretion." The judge also expressly asked Ramos whether the 71-

month sentence was acceptable to him, specifically noting that he 

was imposing a sentence at the high end of the guidelines range, 

to which Ramos replied "yes." Having repeatedly assented to the 

sentence before the district judge, Ramos is hard-pressed to now 

reverse course and claim that the sentence is unreasonable. 

Even reviewing for substantive reasonableness under an 

abuse of discretion standard, see United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 

792 F.3d 223, 228 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 258 (2015), 

we uphold the sentence. "Challenging the substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence is a formidable task, made more 
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burdensome where, as here, the challenged sentence is within a 

properly calculated GSR." United States v. Perretta, 804 F.3d 53, 

58 (1st Cir. 2015). To prevail, "a defendant must adduce fairly 

powerful mitigating reasons and persuade us that the district court 

was unreasonable in balancing the pros and cons." Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We give substantial deference to the 

sentencing court's exercise of discretion, and will uphold a 

sentence so long as the district court's rationale is plausible 

and its result is defensible. See id. at 57-58. 

 Given the severity of the offense and Ramos's 

significant criminal history -- including two prior convictions 

for aggravated assault and a conviction for possessing a bladed 

weapon -- the district court acted within its discretion. Ramos 

contends that the court failed to adequately weigh mitigating 

factors relating to the firearm, his background and health, and 

his acceptance of responsibility. Not so. As noted above, due to 

the mitigating factors relating to the firearm possession and 

Ramos's background and health, the court applied only a two-level, 

rather than the usual four-level, enhancement for the obliterated 

serial number. It also applied a three-level reduction for Ramos's 

acceptance of responsibility. 

Ramos further contends that the sentence was 

unreasonable because it exceeded what the government had 
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recommended. As Ramos was informed in his plea agreement, however, 

the district court "was not bound by the jointly recommended 

sentence." United States v. Reverol-Rivera, 778 F.3d 363, 367 

(1st Cir. 2015). 

In sum, the district court's rationale was plausible and 

its result falls well within the "universe of reasonable 

sentences." Perretta, 804 F.3d at 58. Ramos has not offered 

"fairly powerful mitigating reasons" that convince us to the 

contrary. Id. Accordingly, the sentence is AFFIRMED.