alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1890 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1890

To ensure that decisions by the Secretary of Education to award grants 
  or other assistance to States or local educational agencies are not 
    contingent upon the adoption of specific educational curricula.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           December 20, 2013

  Mr. Cochran introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
  referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To ensure that decisions by the Secretary of Education to award grants 
  or other assistance to States or local educational agencies are not 
    contingent upon the adoption of specific educational curricula.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Preserving Education Access and 
Autonomy Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON REQUIRING THE ADOPTION OF SPECIFIC CURRICULA.

    (a) Definition of Education Grant or Assistance.--In this section, 
the term ``education grant or assistance''--
            (1) means any grant, contract, cooperative agreement, or 
        other assistance provided through a program administered by the 
        Secretary of Education; and
            (2) includes any waiver of a statutory or regulatory 
        requirement of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
        1965 (20 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.) granted by the Secretary of 
        Education under the authority provided under section 9401 of 
        such Act (20 U.S.C. 7861).
    (b) No Requirement for Specific Curricula.--Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, the Secretary of Education shall not require, 
as a condition of any education grant or assistance, that a State or 
local educational agency adopt a specific elementary school or 
secondary school curriculum.
    (c) No Priority for Specific Curricula.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the Secretary of Education shall select recipients 
for any education grant or assistance without providing any priority, 
preference, or special consideration to a State or local educational 
agency based on the adoption by the State or local educational agency 
of a specific elementary school or secondary school curriculum.
                                 <all>
```
Countries Ranked by Population Size: 2011, 2025, and 2050

(in millions)

2011 2025 2050

Rank Country Population Country Population Country Population

1 China 1,337 India 1,396 India 1,657

2 India 1,189 China 1,395 China 1,304

3 United States 311 United States 351 United States 423

4 Indonesia 246 Indonesia 279 Nigeria 402

5 Brazil 203 Nigeria 234 Indonesia 313

6 Pakistan 187 Brazil 232 Pakistan 291

7 Nigeria 166 Pakistan 228 Ethiopia 278

8 Bangladesh 159 Bangladesh 198 Brazil 261

9 Russia 139 Ethiopia 140 Bangladesh 250

10 Japan 127 Mexico 130 Philippines 172

Mexico (11) 114 Philippines (11) 129 Mexico (11) 148

Philippines (12) 102 Russia (12) 128 Russia (16) 109

Ethiopia (13) 91 Japan (13) 123 Japan (17) 107

Note - Table shows all countries projected to be in top 10 during the interval 2011-2050 and their ranking in each 

year.
#### Harold L. BRISCOE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Industrial Relations Commission et al., Respondents.

No. 42460.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 28, 1972.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, .ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
#### Leonard E. WEISS and Al-Len Associates, Inc., Appellants, v. Otto P. CIPRA, Individually and d/b/a American Assurance Agency, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 72-999.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. *15,*1972.

Paul C. Mueller, Ft. Lauderdale, for appellants.

Robert E. Rutledge, Jr., South Miami, and Laurence C. Rice, Coral Gables, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, HENDRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed upon authority of the rule as to venue stated in Firstamerica Development Corporation v. Daytona Beach News-Journal Corporation, Fla.1966, 196 So.2d 97.
Table 4.  Estimates of the Total Housing Inventory for the         
          United States:  Fourth Quarter 1994 
                                                  
(Estimates are in thousands and may not add to total, due to rounding)  
                                                   
                                                 Fourth Quarter 1994         
                                                                        
                                                      Standard   
          Type                                        error on        Percent
                                        Estimate      estimate   Distribution

All housing units....................... 111,806           231            100

  Occupied..............................  99,593           237             89
    Owner occupied......................  63,947           229             57
    Renter occupied.....................  35,646           191             32
            
  Vacant................................  12,213           121             11
    Year-round vacant...................   9,368           107              8
      For rent..........................   2,864            60              3
      For sale only.....................   1,076            37              1
      Rented or sold,           
      awaiting occupancy................     727            30              1
      Held off market...................   4,701            77              4
        For occasional use..............   1,641            46              1
        Temporarily occupied        
        by persons with                     
        usual residence elsewhere.......     813            32              1
        For other reasons...............   2,247            53              2

    Seasonal vacant.....................   2,845            60              3

Note:  The revised housing inventory estimates for 1993 are available upon 
       request. 

Source: U.S. Census Bureau
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dynamic Health Products, Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10-QSB for the three months ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Mandeep K. Taneja, Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                      |  | 
|------------------------------------- |  | 
|/s/ Mandeep K. Taneja                 |  | 
|Mandeep K. Taneja                     |  | 
|Chief Executive Officer and President |  | 
|February 13, 2007                     |  |
#### Elsie Davis STEWART v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 45495.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 6, 1969.

Clyde W. Mullins, Cecil Gill Smith, Jr., Natchez, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

ETHRIDGE, Chief Justice.

Elsie Davis Stewart, appellant, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Adams County for shooting Lucille Chatman with intent to kill. Appellant admitted the shooting, but interposed a plea of self-defense. She and Chatman were the only eye witnesses to the incident who testified, and their accounts of the incident conflicted sharply. Accordingly, the key issue before the jury was whether appellant had acted with the specific intent required for this offense. *912The State obtained the following instruction :

> The *Court*instructs *the*jury for *the State*that malice aforethought mentioned in the indictment may be presumed from the unlawful and deliberate use of a deadly weapon.

 In a long line of cases, this Court has held that an instruction on an asserted presumption of malice from the use of a deadly weapon is proper only where the testimony has failed to establish the circumstances of the use of the weapon. Where the facts have been set forth in the evidence, as here on conflicting testimony, the question of malice should be left for the consideration of the jury, and the granting of such an instruction is error. Chinn v. State, 210 So.2d 666 (Miss.1968) ; Hydrick v. State, 246 Miss. 448, 150 So.2d 423 (1963). An instruction of this type can be very misleading to a jury. It certainly constitutes an unfair reference to a nonexistent presumption, because when all of the evidence is in, there is no presumption. Moreover, an instruction on a presumption in this posture of a case is a manifest attempt to bolster the state’s evidence. Where the testimony has shown the circumstances of the use of the weapon, the district attorney should not request and the circuit court should not grant an instruction on a presumption of malice from the use of a deadly weapon. It was reversible error to give this instruction in this case.

 Since the case is to be tried anew, a brief comment on other assignments of error is appropriate. The circuit court did not err in excluding evidence of previous threats and provocations by the prosecuting witness toward the appellant, which occurred six months before the shooting. The court’s reason for the exclusion was that the prior difficulty was too remote in time. The determination of whether evidence is too *remote to*be relevant is ordinarily left to the discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not be reversed in the absence of a clear proof of abuse of that discretion. R. Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, § 149 (12th ed. 1955). We cannot say that there was an abuse of discretion in this instance. For that reason also, the trial court was not in error in denying the instruction requested by appellant as to justification for carrying a concealed weapon.

Reversed and remanded.

RODGERS, JONES, BRADY and INZER, JJ., concur.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-1484-15

PHILLIP DEVON DEEN, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ORDER REGARDING REPRESENTATION

TAYLOR COUNTY

This order was delivered per curiam.

O R D E R

Appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine in cause number 9902-D in the 350th

District Court of Taylor County. Appellant was sentenced to confinement for 4 years. The court of

appeals affirmed, as modified, the judgment of the trial court. Deen v. State, No. 11-13-00271-CR,

(Tex. App. — Eastland, delivered October 15, 2015). The State’s petition for discretionary review

was granted by this Court on March 2, 2016. Appellant is entitled to representation before this

Court at this time. See Article 1.051(a)(d)(2), V.A.C.C.P. It appears that Appellant is without
DEEN -2

representation in this court. Accordingly, the trial court is ordered to determine if Appellant is

currently represented by counsel, and if so, to inform this court who represents Appellant. If

Appellant is not currently represented by counsel and desires counsel, the trial court must first

determine whether Appellant is indigent. If the trial court finds Appellant is indigent, that court shall

appoint an attorney to represent Appellant before this court in regard to PDR No. PD-1484-15, in

accord with the provisions of Articles 1.051 and 26.04, V.A.C.C.P. Anyhearing conducted pursuant

to this order shall be held within 30 days of the date of this order. The trial court's order appointing

counsel, any findings of fact, affidavits, or transcription of the court reporter's notes and any other

supplementation of the record shall be returned to this court within 45 days of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 2 DAY OF MARCH, 2016 nd

DO NOT PUBLISH
# C_2014014EN.01000102.xml

| 18.1.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 14/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.1.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 14/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.6817 — Allianz/Axa/Covéa/Generali/CSCA/Netproassur)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2014/C 14/02

On 8 January 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in French and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32014M6817. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32014M6817. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          26,289
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                49,772
<PP&E>                                         112,772
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 211,213
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           39,278
<BONDS>                                        123,238
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       143,178
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   211,213
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                34,344
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   42,385
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 7,336
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,078
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (15,693)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (15,693)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (15,693)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.99)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.99)


</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 24, 2018

s1017 

# Order

Clerk October 24, 2018

157234

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 157234

COA: 335383

Iosco CC: 15

- 009390

- FC

CHAD MICHAEL CARPENTER,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 9, 2018

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ENRIQUE MACIAS-VALENZUELA;

MARIA TERESA MACIAS,

 Petitioners,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

Nos. 08-71319

 08-74828

Agency Nos. A096-052-290

 A096-052-291

MEMORANDUM*

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 15, 2011 ** 

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

In these consolidated petitions for review, Enrique Macias-Valenzuela and

Maria Teresa Macias, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) orders dismissing their appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying their applications for cancellation of

FILED

MAR 07 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-74828

removal, and denying their motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to

reopen and review de novo questions of law. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d

785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petitions for review.

The BIA acted within its broad discretion in determining that the new

hardship evidence was insufficient to warrant reopening. See Singh v. INS, 295

F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (The BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen shall be

reversed only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”). 

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to

reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel because petitioners presented

insufficient evidence to establish prejudice. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 793

(petitioner must demonstrate prejudice to prevail on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim). 

Petitioners have waived any challenge to the BIA’s February 28, 2008,

order. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996).

PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.
### NUMBER 13
- 1 8
- 00 616
- C V

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

- EDINBURG

ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant,

v.
FERNANDO R. RODRIGUEZ AND GW ENDLE GARZA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND S OF DRAVEN RODRIGUEZ AND JOL I VIE RODRIGUEZ , MINOR CHILDREN , Appellee s
.

On appeal from the 24 th District Court of Victoria County , Texas.



### ORDER OF ABATEMENT

Before Justices Hinojosa , Perkes , and Tijerina Order Per Curi a m The Supreme Court of Texas has requested briefing on the merits in response to
a petition for review filed in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Irwin
, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 04

- 18

- 00293

-2 CV, 2019 WL 3937281 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Aug. 21, 2019, pet. filed) . A petition for

review has also been filed in Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Inclan
, No. 13

- 19

- 00026

- CV,
2020 WL 373061, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg Jan. 23, 2020, pet. filed)
(mem. op.). Both cases concern issues raised in the instant appeal. Judicial eco nomy dictates that we should abate the instant appeal pending the potential guidance that the
supreme court’s disposition of Irwin and Inclan may provide. The parties are assured that
upon reinstatement they will be afforded an opportunity to brief what impact, if any, these
two cases have on the instant appeal. Accordingly, t his appeal is ABATED and removed

from the Court’s active docket pendi ng further order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the 21 s t day of August, 2020.
EXHIBIT 23

                     CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

Consent of Independent Accountants

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements of
Datamarine International, Inc. and Subsidiaries on Form S-8 (File No. 2-68937)
pertaining to the Employee Stock Purchase Plan, on Form S-8 (File No. 33-48532)
pertaining to the 1991 Stock Option Plan, and on Form S-8 (File No. 333-06927)
pertaining to the 1995 Stock Option Plan for Non-employee Directors of our
reports dated December 11, 1997, except for the fourth and fifth paragraphs of
Note 1, the last sentence in the first paragraph of Note 6, the last sentence 
of Note 7, the last sentence in the third paragraph of Note 8, and Note 14 to 
the financial statements as to which the date is March 2, 1998, on our audits
of the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of 
Datamarine International, Inc. and Subsidiaries as of September 27, 1997 and 
September 28, 1996, and for the years ended September 27, 1997, September 28, 
1996 and September 30, 1995 which reports are included in this Annual Report 
on Form 10-K.


/s/:COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P

Seattle, Washington
March 2, 1998
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

                            C E R T I F I C A T I O N

      I, Earl L. Powers, certify that:

1.    I have reviewed the annual report on Form 10-K/A Equivalent (Amendment No.
      1) and this Form 10-K/A Equivalent (Amendment No. 2) of Birds Eye Foods,
      Inc.; and

2.    Based on my knowledge, these reports do not contain any untrue statement
      of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
      statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
      were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by these
      reports.

Dated: March 29, 2006             /s/ Earl L. Powers
                                  -----------------------------
                                  Executive Vice President and
                                  Chief Financial Officer and
                                  Secretary
                                  (Principal Financial Officer)

                                      10
#### James Thomas NOLAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2330.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Sept. 13, 1968.

Appeal from Court of Record, Broward County; John G. Ferris, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.