#### GULF CENTRAL WAREHOUSE CENTER, INC., Petitioner, v. William H. BEVIS et al., Respondents (two cases).

Nos. 42867, 42868.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 21, 1973.

Rehearing Denied May 17, 1973.

*596Ronald C. Laface, Miami, for petitioner.

Prentice P. Pruitt and Jerry M. Johns, Tallahassee, Florida Public Service Commission, for respondents.

Lawrence D. Fay, Jacksonville, M. Craig Massey, Lakeland, James Wharton, Orlando, and Norman J. Bolinger, Jacksonville, for intervenors-respondents.

PER CURIAM.

By petitions for writ of certiorari, we review the Florida Public Service Commission’s orders denying both a “for-hire” and “common carrier” permit to the petitioner.

F.S. § 323.05, F.S.A., relating to “for-hire” permits, basically limits such transportation to a casual, single and non-recurring basis.

Sub judice, the application for a “for-hire” permit (predicated upon petitioner’s business of warehousing) essentially sought the right for petitioner to transport the items stored in its warehouse to the retailers and/or customers of these goods.

Petitioner’s applications were heard with similar and numerous other applications from different areas of the state. In petitioner’s instance the evidence as a whole clearly established that (1) the “for-hire” permit would involve single, casual and non-recurring events, (2) public convenience and necessity needed it, and (3) no adverse effect would be visited upon transportation facilities as a whole.

Additionally, the record reflects that petitioner’s warehouse customers have a need for such a “for-hire” service, stimulated by such factors as specific time deliveries and tailgating, with foreseeable seasonal fluctuations. Existing facilities apparently have failed to perform from fifteen to twenty percent of the required transportation.

In arriving at ultimate disposition of this cause we are mindful that the word “necessity” in determining public convenience and necessity, has never been construed to mean “absolute necessity” or “indispensable necessity”. Contrariwise, its meaning implies a “reasonable” necessity to meet the needs occasioned by the problem of transportation. Seaboard Air Line *597Railway v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1027, 130 So. 587 (1930).

Equally important for consideration is the fact that foreseeable seasonal fluctuations requiring transportation are needs which should be anticipated and reasonably provided for by carriers. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commissioners, 63 Fla. 491, 58 So. 543 (1912); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Mayo, Fla.1971, 255 So.2d 516.

Likewise, in determining whether to grant a “for-hire” permit, the anticipation of more than one trip being made to fulfill the needs of a customer should not result in a conclusively prohibitory finding. Travis v. Fry, 139 Fla. 522, 190 So. 793 (1939); Blair Contracting Company v. Mason, Fla.1968, 211 So.2d 15; Greyhound Lines, Inc. et al. v. Yarborough, opinion filed March 7, 1973, Fla., 275 So.2d 1; B & G Horse Transportation et al. v. Yarborough, Fla.1972, 261 So.2d 159. Then see Public Service Commission Orders No. 8892, 8901, 8902, 8903 and 8963 granting “for-hire” permits for transportation of warehouse and freight products.

Obviously, there is no absolute preclusion to the type of limited special service sought here and the record supports our conclusion of an abuse of the discretionary duty and responsibility by the Public Service Commission in not authorizing it.

Having fully reviewed the records before us, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted in Case No. 42,867 and the Public Service Commission Orders No. 10225 and 10227 are quashed, with this cause being remanded with directions to grant petitioner’s request for a “for-hire” permit. In Case No. 42,868, involving petitioner’s claim for a common carrier permit, the writ of certiorari is discharged.

It is so ordered.

CARLTON, C. J„ and ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ„ concur.

ON REHEARING

In this Court’s opinion filed March 21, 1973, we referred to certain earlier Public Service Commission Orders granting “for-hire” permits to other commercial warehouses similar to that of the petitioner herein.

This reference is not to be construed that our Court will or does condone the unbridled and indiscriminate awards of “for-hire” permits to those persons or firms who by subterfuge or artifice “go into” and/or use the warehouse approach method to circumvent our carrier laws.

These laws are designed for the convenience and necessity of the commonalty, a proposition to which this Court is dedicated, and upon the experience, expertise and presentation of supporting evidence by the applicant, all of which are inextricably interwoven. Certainly, any application suggestive of destruction of regulated transportation in this State would be subject to deprecatory treatment.

Petitioner’s years of experience coupled with the record before us demonstrated in only his case that degree of reasonable necessity for issuance of the “for-hire” permit in question.

Accordngly, the petitions for rehearing filed herein are denied.

CARLTON, C. J., and ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.