1 Filed 7/16/14 Meaux v. Springfield CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ORVILLE MEAUX et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. JUAQUIN SPRINGFIELD, Defendant and Respondent. A139840
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG13667731)

Juaquin Springfield prevailed on an anti-SLAPP 1 motion and moved for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civ il Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c). 2 Plaintiffs in the action below, Orville Me aux and his company (c ollectively Meaux), appeal the fee award. We conclude that most of Meaux’s arguments are forfeited by failure to cite relevant legal authority or sp ecific facts in the r ecord, and by raising new arguments for the first time on appeal or in the reply brief. We further find that Meaux
fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the trial court’ s ruling, and consequently we
affirm.
I. B ACKGROUND In February 2013, Meaux, individually and doing business as The Portal Herbal Health Collective, sued Jua quin “Moe” Ramaundy Springfield and Briann Marie Diaz for defamation, fraudulent misrepresentation, interference with prospective economic

1 SLAPP refers to “strategic lawsu it against public participation.” ( Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57 & fn. 1.)

2 All further undesignated statutory referenc es are to the Code of Civil Procedure.2 advantage, breach of fiduciary duty, slander and libel. He alleged that Springfield and Diaz “entered into a concerted action to bring false allegations against Meaux in order to take over [The Portal Herbal Health Collectiv e],” inter alia by maki ng false claims that Meaux had sexually harassed Diaz in a 2012 lawsuit against Meaux (apparently filed in the superior court of Santa Clara County). Springfield moved to strike all but one cause of action against him pursuant to section 425.16. The trial court granted the motion and ruled that Springfield was entitled to recover his reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). Those rulings are not challenged on appeal. Springfield filed a memorandum of costs and a motion for attorney fees supported by billing records. He sought $34, 961.58 in attorney fees and costs, representing 47.36 hours of legal work (39.76 hours on the anti-SLAPP motion and 7.6 hours on the fee motion) at a billing rate of $400 per hour and a contingency risk multiplier of 2.0 (on
the anti-SLAPP motion work but not the fee motion work), plus $113.58 in costs. Springfield later raised his fee and cost request to a total of $39,104.58 based on additional work he performed on a reply brief. Springfield’s counsel, Ian Kelley, averred that he represented Springfie ld on the anti-SLAPP motion on a contingency basis, and that the $400 billing rate was “within the range of rates whic h I charge paying clients in my private practice for non-contingency matter s.” Kelley averred that he had practiced law for 12 years; taught constitutional law fo r 10 years, most recently as an adjunct professor at John F. Kennedy School of Law; argued before the California Supreme Court; and was “versed in the area of anti-SL APP law and brought sp ecialized expertise to this litigation.” He also cited two San Fr ancisco area cases where attorney fees were awarded based on hourly rates of $375 and $650 for attorn eys with 8 and 25 years of experience respectively (an en vironmental enforcement action) and $425 to $450 for attorneys with 11 years of expe rience (a civil rights action). In opposition, Meaux argued “this case does not meet the mini[m]um requirements for a fee enhancement” (withou t citing supporting facts or legal authority) and that the entire fee request should be denied because of alleged misconduct by Springfield and3 Diaz in the instant and 2012 actio ns. “If the Court looks at this case in light of the facts
that occurred in the underlying case, there are reasonable inferences of Mr. Springfield’s duplicity with Diaz in the Santa Clara Case. Neither she nor Springfield responded to discovery in this case. It would be unfair fo r Plaintiffs to bear the entire financial burden of defending themselves in the underlying case a nd in this case. In th e interest of justice,
the Court should not award Defe ndant Springfield ex cessive attorney’s fees and costs in
this case based on reasonable inferences of hi s duplicity with Diaz in the Santa Clara
Case.”
The trial court issued a tentative decisi on awarding Springfield only $18,456.58 in fees and costs, explaining, “[Springfield’s] counsel has claimed an excessive number of hours for drafting the motion and reply brief, and filing an unnecessary surreply.” The
court based the reduced awar d on 25 hours of attorney tim e on the anti-SLAPP motion, calculated at the requested hourly rate of $400 per hour with a mu ltiplier of 1.5, which
the court found was a sufficient enhancement “to provide an incen tive for counsel to represent Defendant and file a motion to stri ke.” In addition, the court compensated
defense counsel for 8.1 hours of work on the fee motion at $400 per hour without a multiplier.
Meaux contested the tentative decisi on, arguing 25 hours on the anti-SLAPP motion was still excessive billing. At the hear ing to contest the tentative decision, he identified two suspect billing entries and argued Springfield had never provided a
detailed breakdown of the billi ng summary. Meaux further ar gued, inter alia, that the multiplier was excessive beca use the anti-SLAPP motion wa s granted only in part. 3 The
court affirmed its tentative decision.
II. D ISCUSSION Under “section 425.16, subdivision (c ), any SLAPP defenda nt who brings a
successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees. . . . [S]ection 425.16

3 In fact, the motion was granted in full but did not dispose of all claims in the complaint.4 permits the use of the so-called lodest ar adjustment method . . . .” ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1 122, 1131; see also id. at p. 1136.) The court “begins with a touchstone or lodestar figur e, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case.’ [Citation.] We [have] expressly approved the use of prevailing hourly rates as a basis for the lodestar . . . . [¶] . . . [The lodestar] may be adjust ed by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill di splayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other em ployment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.]” ( Id. at pp. 1131–1132.) “[A]n aw ard of fees may include not only the fees incurred with resp ect to the underlying claim, but also the fees incurred in enforcing the right to manda tory fees . . . ,” often called “ ‘fees on fees.’ ” ( Id. at p. 1141.) However, because fees are mandato ry under section 425. 16, subdivision (c), litigation over the fees is not contingent so an e nhancement for conti ngent risk is not appropriate for f ees on fees. ( Ketchum v. Moses, at pp. 1141–1142.) “The ‘ “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rende red in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” ’ [Citation.]” ( Id. at p. 1132.) Meaux has forfeited most of his arguments on appeal because he failed to apply the legal principles he cites to the particular facts of Springfield’s fee request, and he fails to support his arguments with citations to specific evidence in the record. (See Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 11 15–1116; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) For example, Meaux argues in his opening brief that, even after the reduction of hours imposed by the trial court, the fee award was still based on duplicative billings for the same work. However, he do es not identify any allegedly duplicative billings until his reply brief, giving Springfi eld no fair opportunity to respond. (See REO Broadcasting Consultants v. Martin (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 500 [refusing to entertain an argument raised fo r the first time in a reply br ief].) Moreover, Meaux did not argue in the trial court that the billing record s were duplicative, mu ch less offer the trial5 court a detailed analysis of the billing su mmary to establish the point. (See Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [argument firs t raised on appeal is not ordinarily considered].) Meaux’s belated argument regarding speci fic billing records is also unpersuasive on the merits. In his analysis, Meaux fails to account for the trial court’s reduction of the hours. He also incorrectly argues that the court should not have awarded fees for work Meaux characterizes as administrative or paralegal work. He cites Gunn v. Dotson (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 262, but in applying a different fee-shifting statute that decision simply holds that a fee award can includ e fees for paralegal work performed by paralegals and is the sort of work routinely billed to legal clients. ( Id. at pp. 269–271) Meaux cites the case for the proposition that pa ralegal work (which in his view includes legal research and citation checking) cannot be performed by attorneys and charged at the attorney’s billing rate. The ca se does not so hold. Thus, we reject Meaux’s contention
that the trial court here should not have awarded attorney fe es for client meetings, legal research and citation checking that was perform ed by Springfield’s attorney just because it theoretically could have been performed by a paralegal or other administrative employee. Meaux also argues the trial court shou ld have adjusted the lodestar amount
downward because of th e simplicity of the anti-SLAPP issue, but he provides no legal or factual analysis to support the argument. The trial court was in the best position to determine the difficulty of the issues, the qua lity of Springfield’s representation, and the extent to which the billing rate did or did not already reflect those factors. (See Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1138–1139 [no ting that billing rate may already encompass these factors].) Meaux has not de monstrated any abuse of discretion by the
trial court. 4 We decline to impose sanctions, as s uggested by Springfield, for Meaux’s filing this appeal. However, as the prevailing pa rty on the fee motion, including this appeal,

4 Meaux suggests that we shoul d review de no vo. We do not.6 Springfield is entitled to recover his appellate attorney fees. ( Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1426.) The amount of those fees shall be determined in the
trial court.
III. D ISPOSITION The attorney fees and cost award is affi rmed. Meaux shall pay Springfield’s costs and fees on appeal.

_ ____________ ____________ Bruiniers, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Jones, P. J.

_____________ ____________ Needham, J.