NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 16-3089

___________

JOSEPH M. KEHOE,

 Appellant

v.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES 

LOCAL 21; INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THEATRICAL STAGE 

EMPLOYEES; MATTHEW LOEB; MICHAEL STAS; JOHN SEUBERT; STANLEY 

GUTOWSKI; SANFORD OXFELD; PULSE LIGHTING; ROBERT SUCHOCHI

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-07805)

District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 10, 2017

Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 13, 2017)

___________

OPINION*

___________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

PER CURIAM

Joseph Kehoe appeals pro se from the District Court’s May 20, 2016 order 

granting summary judgment against him with respect to his claims brought pursuant to 

the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. § 401 et 

seq. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

I.

Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background 

of this case, we discuss that background only briefly. Kehoe is a former member of the 

International Association of Theatrical Stage Employees, Local 21 (“Local 21”). In 

December 2013, Kehoe filed a pro se complaint in the District Court against Local 21, 

Local 21’s attorney, some of Local 21’s leadership (its president, secretary, and business 

manager), and other individuals and entities. Accompanying the complaint were a 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a motion for appointment of counsel. 

On January 9, 2014, the District Court granted the IFP motion, denied the counsel motion 

without prejudice, dismissed some of the claims from the complaint pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and dismissed a subset of the remaining claims without prejudice 

to Kehoe’s ability to cure them within 30 days. Shortly thereafter, Kehoe filed an 

amended complaint. That amended pleading, which raised 25 claims and sought relief 

under the LMRDA,1stemmed largely from two incidents for which Kehoe was 

 

1 Kehoe’s pleadings in the District Court also sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. However, the 
3

disciplined while a member of Local 21.

In June 2015, Kehoe filed another motion for appointment of counsel. On July 17, 

2015, the Magistrate Judge who was assigned to the case granted that motion in part, 

explaining that counsel would be appointed for settlement purposes only. When the 

settlement discussions that followed proved unsuccessful, the Magistrate Judge set a 

briefing schedule for dispositive motions. Certain defendants then moved for summary 

judgment; Kehoe opposed those motions. On May 20, 2016, the District Court granted 

those summary judgment motions, dismissed Kehoe’s claims with prejudice as to all of 

the defendants that remained in the case,2and directed the District Court Clerk to close 

the case. This timely appeal followed.

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise 

plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. See Lomando v. 

United States, 667 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when 

“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although the non-

 

District Court rejected his efforts to obtain that relief in orders that preceded its May 20, 

2016 order. Kehoe does not challenge those earlier rulings or otherwise argue on appeal 

that he is entitled to relief under § 1983 or the LMRA. Accordingly, we deem those 

issues waived. See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 

26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994).

2 The District Court had previously dismissed Kehoe’s claims against defendants 

Matthew Loeb and the International Association of Theatrical Stage Employees.
4

movant’s evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 

favor in determining whether a genuine factual question exists,” summary judgment 

should be granted “unless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the 

nonmovant.” Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Enacted in 1959, the LMRDA “was an attempt to respond to abuses within the 

organized labor movement while minimizing governmental interference with the internal 

affairs of labor organizations.” Morris v. Hoffa, 361 F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 2004) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Title I of the LMRDA sets forth a bill of rights for 

members of labor organizations, see 29 U.S.C. § 411; Morris, 361 F.3d at 191 n.23, and 

includes, as relevant here, the right to freedom of speech and safeguards against improper 

disciplinary action, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(2), (5). If a member’s rights are violated, he 

may bring a civil action in federal court. See 29 U.S.C. § 412. To the extent that a 

member seeks relief under the LMRDA based on alleged violations of his union’s 

constitution, he must show that “the constitution is being applied in such a way as to 

deprive [him] of [his] secured rights.” Martire v. Laborers’ Local Union 1058, 410 F.2d 

32, 36 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1969) (quoting Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512, 516 n.6 (2d Cir. 

1967)).

In this case, the District Court concluded, in a 49-page opinion, that each of 

Kehoe’s 25 claims was “lacking sufficient evidence to establish necessary elements 

 
5

[under the LMRDA], and [that] no reasonable jury could find in Kehoe’s favor based on 

the record before the [District] Court.” (Dist. Ct. Op. entered May 20, 2016, at 25.) For 

substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court’s thorough and cogent opinion, we 

agree with that conclusion and find no error in the District Court’s decision to grant 

summary judgment against Kehoe on all of his LMRDA claims. To the extent that he 

now alleges that the District Court’s resolution of those claims via summary judgment 

somehow violated his due process rights, we see no such violation. We have considered 

his remaining arguments and conclude that none warrants relief here.3

In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s May 20, 2016 order 

granting summary judgment against Kehoe.

 

3 Kehoe alleges that “[t]he court erred in finding that I was capable of representing 

myself without any legal background or formal training.” (Addendum to Appellant’s Br. 

18.) To the extent that this allegation seeks to challenge the District Court’s January 9, 

2014 order denying his first motion to appoint counsel, we have jurisdiction to review 

that order despite the fact that Kehoe did not specifically refer to it in his notice of appeal. 

See Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 776-77 (3d Cir. 1999). However, he has not 

demonstrated that the District Court abused its discretion in denying that motion. See

Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that we review an order 

denying appointment of counsel under an abuse of discretion standard); see also Parkell 

v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 340 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Appointing counsel for an indigent civil 

litigant is usually only granted upon a showing of special circumstances indicating the 

likelihood of substantial prejudice to him . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). To 

the extent that Kehoe seeks to challenge the Magistrate Judge’s July 17, 2015 order 

limiting the grant of his second counsel motion to settlement discussions, we lack 

jurisdiction to review that order because Kehoe did not appeal it to the District Judge in 

the first instance. See Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983).