UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ CHARLES KEITH JACKSON, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. JASON BRYANT, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 18-7047 (D.C. No. 6:17-CV -00385-RAW-KEW) (E.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , HARTZ , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Charles Jackson seek s a certificate of app ealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We d eny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
I Jackson was convicted by a jury i n Oklahoma state court of firs t degree manslaughter. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed his conviction on direct appeal on Au gust 27, 2015. Jackson’s conv iction became final on November 25, 2015, when his d eadline to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court passed.

* This order is not binding preced ent, except under the doctrine s of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 10, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 On July 12, 2016, Jackson filed a brief in support of an applic ation for postconviction relief with the stat e district court. The brief was not accompanied by a complete application for post-c onviction relief and therefore d id not comply with Oklahoma procedural requirement s. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1081. The state district court denied his brief on Augu st 15, 2016, because it was not p roperly filed. Jackson received a copy of the denial in August 2016, but did not recti fy the error. On February 24, 2017, Jackson file d a proper post-c onviction appli cation with the state district court, which was denie d in May 2017. The OCCA affirme d the denial on September 8, 2017. In October 2017, Jackson filed a § 2254 petition in federal dis trict court, which ultimately denied the petition as time-barred and declined to g rant a COA. Jackson now seeks a COA from this court.
II A petitioner may not appeal the d enial of habeas relief under § 2254 without a COA. § 2253(c)(1). We may iss ue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the den ial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, Jackson must dem onstrate “that reasonable juris ts could debate whether (or, for that matter, a gree that) the petition should h ave been resolved in a different manner or that the issu es presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to pro ceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted).3 The Antiterrorism and Effective D eath Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) imp oses a one-year limitations period on habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. § 2244(d). This period generally runs from the date a conviction became fi nal. See § 2244(d)(1). Absent tolling, Jac kson’s AEDPA limitations peri od expired on November 26, 2016. AEDPA’s limitation period is tolle d while a properly filed appl ication for state post-conviction relief is pending. § 2244(d)(2). “Proper fili ng” occurs when the application’s “delivery and acce ptance are in com pliance with t he applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Ar tuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). Whether an application for state post-convi ction relief is “properly filed ” is a matter of state procedural law. Garcia v. Sha nks, 351 F.3d 468 , 471 (10th Cir. 2003). Careful review of Jackson’s brie f, the record, and the district court’s order fails to “raise a debatable issu e as to whether his petition wa s improperly dismissed as time-barred.” May v. Workman , 339 F.3d 1236, 1237 (10th Cir . 2003). Jackson did not properly file an appli cation for state post-conviction relief under Oklahoma law within the one-year AEDPA lim itations period. Therefore, h e is not entitled to statutory tolling. See Clark v . Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 714 (1 0th Cir. 2006) (state post-conviction proceedings toll AEDPA statute of limitations o nly when “filed within the one year allowed by AEDPA”). Jackson argues that his limitatio ns period should be equitably tolled, based on either his good faith attempts to comply with the statute of li mitations or his proclaimed actual innocence. E quitable tolling “is only availa ble when an inmate4 diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumst ances beyond his control.” Mar sh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Because Jackson had notice o f his failure to comply with the filing requireme nts prior to the expiration of the AEDPA limitations period, his failure to correct t he errors cannot be considered an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control. Equitable tolling is also appropr iate “when a prisoner is actua lly innocent.” Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799 , 808 (10th Cir. 2000). Jackson claims that he should have been found guilty only of neg ligent homicide because his i ntoxication at the time of the crime was by physicia n-prescribed back medication. To meet the actual innocence exception, however, a pe titioner must demonstrate tha t “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juro r would have convicted him” bas ed upon new reliable evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (quotation omitted). There is nothing in Jackson’s brief that constitutes new, reliable evide nce that he is actually innocent of first degree manslaughter.
III For the foregoing reasons, we DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge