UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

LIND, KRAUSS, and BORGERDING 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private E2 STEVEN R. THOMPSON 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20111069 

Headquarters, III Corps and Fort Hood 

James L. Varley, Military Judge 

Colonel Stuart W. Risch, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Kevin Boyle, JA; Major Amy E. Nieman, JA; Captain 

Robert N. Michaels, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA; Captain Daniel M. Goldberg, JA; 

Captain Michael J. Frank, JA (on brief). 

30 July 2014 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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LIND, Senior Judge: 

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of absence without leave terminated by 

apprehension, one specification of willful disobedience of a superior commissioned 

officer, three specifications of rape by force, two specifications of wrongful sexual 

contact, and one specification of forcible sodomy in violation of Articles 86, 90, 

120, and 125, Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. 

§§ 886, 890, 920, 925 (2006 and Supp. I 2008). The military judge sentenced 

appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 114 months, forfeiture of all 

pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority 

approved the adjudged sentence and credited appellant with 149 days against the 

sentence to confinement. 

This case is before the court for review under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant 

assigns one error – dilatory post trial processing. The government concedes that the 
THOMPSON — ARMY 20111069 

2

processing in this case was slow and asks this court to grant appellant relief under 

Article 66(c), UCMJ, by reducing appellant’s sentence by one month of confinement. 

We accept the government’s concession and will grant relief in our decretal 

paragraph.1

In reviewing issues of excessive post-trial delay, we first look to the length of 

the delay. United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 135-36 (C.A.A.F. 2006). In this 

case, there was a 377-day delay from sentence (29 November 2011) to action 

(10 December 2012) for the 410-page record of trial, which is facially unreasonable 

and triggers our analysis of the remaining Moreno factors. Id. at 142-43 

(recognizing “a presumption of unreasonable delay . . . . where the action of the 

convening authority is not taken within 120 days of the completion of trial”). We 

also note that it took the government 36 days from action until this court received 

the record, which is 6 days past the standard set by our superior court. Id. at 142 

(applying “a similar presumption of unreasonable delay for [cases] . . . where the 

record of trial is not docketed by the service Court of Criminal Appeals within thirty 

days of the convening authority’s action”). 

In the light most favorable to the government, excluding defense delay of 

120 days, there was at least a 257-day delay between sentence and action. Turning 

to the reasons for this delay, the record contains and the government provides no 

explanation for the delay.2

 Id. at 136-38. 

Reviewing the third factor, appellant belatedly asserted his right to timely 

post-trial review in his Rule for Courts-Martial 1105 matters submitted eight days 

prior to action. Id. at 138. 

Finally, appellant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the posttrial delay nor that “in balancing the other three factors, the delay [was] so egregious 

that tolerating it would adversely affect the public’s perception of the fairness and 

integrity of the military justice system.” United States v. Canchola, 64 M.J. 245, 

247 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 

362 (C.A.A.F. 2006)); see also Moreno, 63 M.J. at 138-41. Thus, we find there was 

no due process violation in this case. 

 

1

 We have also considered those matters personally raised by appellant pursuant to 

United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), and find they are without 

merit. 

2

 The record contains a chronology, not an explanation, for delay. 
THOMPSON — ARMY 20111069 

3

Though we find no prejudice as a result of the excessive delay, the court must 

still review the appropriateness of the sentence in light of the unexplained dilatory 

post-trial processing. UCMJ art. 66(c); United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 224 

(C.A.A.F. 2002) (“[Pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, service courts are] required to 

determine what findings and sentence ‘should be approved,’ based on all the facts 

and circumstances reflected in the record, including the unexplained and 

unreasonable post-trial delay.”). See generally Toohey, 63 M.J. at 362-63. Upon 

review of the entire record to include the unexplained lengthy dilatory post-trial 

processing of appellant’s case and the government’s request that we grant appellant 

relief, we find it appropriate to set aside one month of appellant’s confinement. 

CONCLUSION 

The findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. After considering the entire record, 

the court affirms only so much of the sentence as provides for a dishonorable 

discharge, confinement for 113 months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 

reduction to the grade of E-1. All rights, privileges, and property, of which 

appellant has been deprived by virtue of that portion of the sentence set aside by this 

decision, are ordered restored. See UCMJ art. 75(a). 

Judge KRAUSS and Judge BORGERDING concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: