An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1183

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 6 May 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Person County

Nos. 13 CRS 329-30

DEZMOND HARDISON SHINE

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 14 June 2013 by 

Judge W. Osmond Smith, III, in Person County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 April 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General 

Christopher McLennan, for the State.

Sue Genrich Berry for defendant-appellant.

ELMORE, Judge.

Defendant appeals from judgments entered upon revocation of 

his probation. Because the trial court entered the necessary 

findings of fact in support of revocation, we affirm.

Defendant pled guilty to four counts of sale of cocaine on 

22 March 2012. The trial court sentenced defendant to two 

consecutive prison terms of ten to twelve months each,
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suspended, and placed defendant on supervised probation for 

thirty-six months.

Violation reports filed on 18 March 2013 charged defendant 

with violating multiple conditions of his probation, including 

the regular condition that he “[c]ommit no criminal offense in 

any jurisdiction.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(1) (2013). 

Specifically, the reports alleged that defendant committed the 

crimes of (1) possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or 

deliver (“PWIMSD”) a Schedule II controlled substance, and (2) 

maintaining a vehicle, dwelling, or place for keeping or selling 

a controlled substance on 5 March 2013, and that the “CHARGES 

ARE PENDING . . . IN PERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT.”

At defendant’s revocation hearing, Roxboro Police Officer 

Ryan Ford testified that he stopped a car driven by defendant on 

the afternoon of 5 March 2013. The passenger seated in the 

front seat had an open container of alcohol. Defendant told the 

officer that the car “was leased to his girlfriend from 

Enterprise.” Officer Ford stated during the hearing that “when 

I asked him if there was anything in the trunk, [defendant] 

immediately . . . became nervous, and he actually approached the 

trunk, and . . . said there was nothing in there[.]” Officer 

Ford searched the trunk and found “25 individual packaged 
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baggies of crack cocaine.” Defendant acknowledged that he did 

not have a driver’s license but disavowed any knowledge of the 

cocaine.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court announced 

as follows:

The Court finds the defendant violated the 

valid conditions of his probation as alleged 

in each case. With regard to paragraph 

number six in one case and f[our] in the 

other case, the Court finds he committed the 

crime of possession with intent to sell and 

deliver a Schedule II controlled substance. 

I do not find, I’m not reasonably satisfied 

he violated the crime of maintaining a 

vehicle to violate the laws.

Based on this finding, the trial court revoked defendant’s 

probation and activated the sentences as originally imposed. 

The trial court credited defendant with the forty-nine days of 

prior confinement. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open 

court.

Defendant claims that the trial court erred in revoking his 

probation for commission of a new criminal offense without

making proper findings of fact to support the revocation. He 

notes that, because he had not been convicted of the pending 

charges alleged in the violation reports, the trial court was 

required to make an independent determination that he had 

committed a new offense in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
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1343(b)(1). Defendant contends that the trial “court fail[ed] 

to find facts to support an independent judgment of 

revocation[.]”

Initially, we note that defendant committed his alleged 

probation violations subsequent to the 1 December 2011 effective 

date of the Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011 (“JRA”). See 2011 

N.C. Sess. Laws 192, § 4.(d); 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 412, § 2.5. 

“[F]or probation violations occurring on or after 1 December 

2011, the JRA limited trial courts’ authority to revoke 

probation to those circumstances in which the probationer: (1) 

commits a new crime in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A1343(b)(1); (2) absconds supervision in violation of N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(3a); or (3) violates any condition of 

probation after serving two prior periods of [confinement in 

response to violation] under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d2).”

State v. Nolen, __ N.C. App. __, __, 743 S.E.2d 729, 730 (2013) 

(citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) (2013)). Therefore, 

although the trial court found additional violations alleged by 

the probation officer, we confine our review to the violation 

that resulted in revocation – defendant’s commission of a new 

crime in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(1).

In order to revoke probation, “[a]ll that is required is 
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that the evidence be sufficient to reasonably satisfy the judge 

in the exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has 

willfully violated a valid condition of probation.” State v. 

White, 129 N.C. App. 52, 58, 496 S.E.2d 842, 846 (1998), aff’d 

in part, disc. review improvidently allowed in part, 350 N.C. 

302, 512 S.E.2d 424 (1999). The trial court is required to make 

findings of fact pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A1345(e)(2013). “The findings of fact by the judge must show 

he exercised his discretion to that effect.” State v. 

Williamson, 61 N.C. App. 531, 534, 301 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1983) 

(citation omitted). Moreover, “[t]he minimum requirements of 

due process in a final probation revocation hearing” require 

written “findings of fact as to the evidence relied on” and the 

“reasons for revoking probation.” Id. at 533-34, 301 S.E.2d at 

425.

We find no merit to defendant’s position. The judgments 

entered by the trial court incorporate the contents of the sworn 

violation reports and include findings “that the defendant 

violated each of the conditions of [his] probation as set forth” 

in the reports’ numbered paragraphs, and that he did so 

“willfully and without valid excuse[.]” See generally State v. 

Duncan, 270 N.C. 241, 246, 154 S.E.2d 53, 58 (1967) (deeming the 
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verified violation report to be competent evidence of probation 

violations). Regarding the allegation that defendant violated 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(1) by committing the new offenses

of PWIMSD a Schedule II controlled substance and maintaining a 

vehicle for keeping or selling a controlled substance, the 

judgments specify that the trial court did “NOT FIND DEFENDANT 

WILLFUL[] OF MAINTAINING A VEHICLE[.]” Finally, the trial court 

found that it was authorized to “revoke defendant’s probation 

for the willful violation of the condition[] that he[] not 

commit any criminal offense, G.S. 15A-1343(b)(1)[.]” These

findings fully support revocation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A1344(a). State v. Henderson, 179 N.C. App. 191, 197, 632 S.E.2d 

818, 822 (2006); State v. Monroe, 83 N.C. App. 143, 146, 349 

S.E.2d 315, 317 (1986).

Although not designated as a separate argument in his 

appellate brief, defendant also suggests that the evidence was 

insufficient to support a finding by the trial court that he 

possessed the cocaine found in the car’s trunk by Officer Ford. 

We do not agree. Given the minimal proof standard that prevails 

at a revocation hearing, the sworn violation reports filed by 

the probation officer and Officer Ford’s hearing testimony were 

more than adequate to support the trial court’s findings. See
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State v. Tisdale, 153 N.C. App. 294, 298, 569 S.E.2d 680, 682 

(2002) (“[W]here contraband material is found in a vehicle under 

the control of an accused, even though the accused is the 

borrower of the vehicle, this fact is sufficient to give rise to 

an inference of knowledge and possession which may be sufficient 

to carry the case to the jury.”) (citations and quotation marks

omitted); see also Duncan, 270 N.C. at 246, 154 S.E.2d at 58.

Affirmed.

Judges McGEE and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).