In The Matter Of: 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

RECEIVED 

AUG 1 1 2014 

HEARING DOCKET 

Docket No. FAA-2012-0477 

LIBERTY FOUNDATION, INC., 

Case No. 2011-GL-03-0070 

Respondent. 

____________________; 

RESPONDENT'S POST -HEARING CLOSING ARGUMENT 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, STE 380 

MIAMI, FL 33156 

TEL: (305) 670-1222 

FAX: (305) 400-0685 

STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. NATURE OF THE CASE 

A. The Original Complaint 

B. The Amended Complaint 

II. ARGUMENT 

A. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR 43.5(a) 

BY FAILING TO MAKE A MAINTENANCE RECORD 

ENTRY PRIOR TO THE FLIGHT OF JUNE 13, 2011 

B. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR43.9(a) 

RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE LOG ENTRY MADE 

PRIOR TO THE JUNE 13, 2011, FLIGHT 

C. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR 43.9(a) 

RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE LOG ENTRY FOR THE 

FEBRUARY, 2011, MAINTENANCE OR FAR 91.405(b) 

RELATING TO THE JUNE, 2011, OR THE FEBRUARY, 2011 

MAINTENANCE 

D. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR 91.407(a) 

THAT LIBERTY OPERATED N390TH WHEN IT HAD NOT BEEN 

APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE AND A REQUIRED 

MAINTENANCE LOG ENTRY HAD NOT BEEN MADE 

E. FAA DID NOT PROVE THE REPLACEMENT OF THE BLADDER 

FUEL TANKS WITH THE ALUMINUM FUEL TANKS 

CONSTITUTED A MAJOR ALTERATION OF THE FUEL SYSTEM 

(1) Major Alteration As Defined In Appendix A To Part 43 

(2) Major Alteration As Defined In FAR Section 1.1 

F. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR43.9(d) 

BECAUSE THER WAS NO MAJOR ALTERATION OR 

MAJOR REPAIR 

G. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR 43.13(a) 

RELATING TO METHODS, TECHNIQUES, PRACTICES, TOOLS, 

EQUIPMENT, AND TEST APPARATUS 

1 

1 

3 

4 

4 

11 

12 

14 

15 

16 

25 

31 

32 
H. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR 43.13(b) 

RELATING TO THE MANNER OF THE WORK PERFORMED 

AND THE QUALITY OF THE MATERIALS USED 

I. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY OPERATED LIBERTY BELLE 

IN AN UNAIRWORTHY CONDITION IN VIOLATION OF 

FAR 91.7(a) 

). FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY IS RESPONSIBLE 

FOR ANY FAR VIOLATIONS THE COURT MAY FIND 

(1) The Individuals Who Performed The Maintenance Were 

Independent Contractors, Not Agents OfLiberty 

(2) As A Part 91 Operator, Liberty Is Not Responsible For 

Violations Committed By Its Maintenance Personnel In 

The Circumstances of This Case 

K. THE PENALTY SOUGHT BY THE ADMINISTRATOR 

IS INAPPROPRIATE 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

ii 

34 

34 

38 

38 

44 

47 

so 
CASES: 

Aero Continente 

FAA Order 2003-8 (2003) 

Alaska 

FAA Order 2004-8 (2004) 

Bernstein 

NTSB Order No. EA-4120 

Canaveral (Coupon Clearing) 

113 F. 3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1997) 

Doppes 

5 NTSB 50 (1985) 

Empire 

1995 FAALexis 399 (1995) 

Go jet Airlines 

FAA Order 2012-5 (2012) 

Haddock 

TABLE OF CASES 

NTSB Order No. EA-5539 (2010) 

Husky 

FAA Order 2010-8 (2010) 

Kilrain 

FAA Order 1996-18 (1996) 

Longshoremen's 

56 F. 3d 205 (D. C. Cir. 1995) 

Northwest Airlines 

FAA Order 1990-37 (1990) 

Phyllis jones 

FAA Order 1994-18 (1994) 

Smith 

NTSB Order No. EA-5646 (2013) 

USAir 

FAA Order 92-70 (1992) 

Warbelow 

FAA Order 2000-3 (2000) 

Walker 

NTSB Order No. EA-5514 (2010) 

Whitely 

FAA Order 2009-4 (2009) 

Wilson 

NTSB Order No. EA-5646 (2013) 

Yialamas 

NTSB Order No. EA-5111 (2004) 

iii 

PAGES: 

39,40,41,42 

45 

49 

40, 41,42 

35 

49 

34 

35 

40 

35 

40 

48 

48 

35 

44 

47 

35 

35 

49 

48 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

In The Matter Of: 

Docket No. FAA-2012-0477 

LIBERTY FOUNDATION, INC., 

Case No. 2011-GL-03-0070 

Respondent. 

____________________ ; 

RESPONDENT'S POST-HEARING CLOSING ARGUMENT 

Respondent, The Liberty Foundation ("Liberty"), herewith files its Post-Hearing 

Closing Argument in accordance with the Court's Order Adopting The Parties' joint 

Proposed Closing Argument Schedule, served june 17, 2014. 

I. NATURE OF THE CASE 

A. The Original Complaint 

The Complaint ("Original Complaint") was filed on june 21, 2012, and alleged 

Liberty violated three provisions of the Federal Aviation Regulations ("FARs"), as 

follows: 

14 CFR 91.405(b) in that Liberty allegedly did not ensure that maintenance 

personnel made an appropriate entry in the aircraft maintenance records 

indicating the aircraft was approved for return to service. 

14 CFR 91.407(a) in that Liberty allegedly (1) operated the aircraft after 

maintenance when it had not been approved for return to service by a person 

authorized by FAR Part 43; and (2) the maintenance record entry required by 14 

CFR 43.9 or 43.11 had not been made. 

14 CFR 91.7(a) in that Liberty allegedly operated the aircraft when it was not in an 

airworthy condition. 

These legal assertions were based on allegations relating to maintenance in 

February, 2011, and june 2011. As to the February, 2011, maintenance, the allegations 
2 

are: (1) Mr. Schneider removed the aircraft's bladder fuel tanks and replaced them 

with fabricated aluminum fuel tanks; (2) which constituted a major alteration without 

the benefit of approved data, an appropriate field approval and without a 

supplemental type certificate or any other engineering data acceptable to the 

Administrator; (3) the aluminum fuel tanks did not conform to the type design or type 

certificate for the aircraft and rendered the aircraft unairworthy; ( 4) the description in 

the aircraft's log did not describe the work actually performed in that there was no 

description of the fabrication of the aluminum fuel tanks or of the major alteration; and 

(5) Respondent operated the aircraft in this unairworthy condition after the described 

maintenance. 

As to the June, 2011, maintenance, FAA alleged Mr. Schneider performed 

maintenance on a fuel leak in the #1 fuel tank and in doing so (1) failed to use 

methods, techniques, and practices prescribed in the current manufacturer's 

maintenance manual or Instructions for Continued Airworthiness prepared by its 

manufacturer, or other methods, techniques and practices acceptable to the 

Administrator; (2) failed to do the work in such a manner and use materials of such a 

quality that the condition of the aircraft would be at least equal to its original or 

properly altered condition (with regard to structural strength, resistance to vibration 

and deterioration, and other qualities affecting airworthiness); and (3) following this 

maintenance, the aircraft was not in a condition equal to its original or properly 

altered condition and was, therefore, unairworthy. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

T, (30S) 670·1222 p, (305) 400·0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
3 

B. The Amended Complaint 

FAA filed an Amendment To Complaint ("Amended Complaint") on july 31, 

2013, which added five alleged FAR violations, as follows: 

43.5(a) which requires maintenance log entry for return to service after 

maintenance, etc. 

43.9(a) which requires one who performs maintenance, etc., to make an entry 

in the maintenance record of that equipment. 

43.9(d) which requires major alterations and major repairs to be entered on a 

form and the form be disposed of in a manner prescribed in Appendix B of Part 

43. 

43.13(a) which requires each person who performs maintenance, etc., use 

methods, techniques, and practices prescribed in the current manufacturer's 

maintenance manual or Instructions for Continued Airworthiness prepared by 

its manufacturer, or other methods, techniques, and practices acceptable to tbe 

Administrator. 

43.13(b) which requires each person who performs maintenance, etc., to do 

that work in such a manner and use materials of such a quality that the 

condition of the aircraft will be at least equal to its original or properly altered 

condition (with regard to structural strength, resistance to vibration and 

deterioration, and other qualities affecting airworthiness). 

These assertions are based on allegations relating to maintenance in February, 

2011, and june, 2011, to the effect that (1) the aircraft was not in a condition for safe 

operation because tbe june, 2011, fuel leak was caused by a failure of tbe welding 

performed in or about February, 2011; (2) the aircraft was operated without a 

required maintenance record entry following the june, 2011, maintenance because tbe 

log entry was made after the aircraft was operated following this maintenance; (3) 

Liberty is responsible for Mr. Schneider's maintenance violations because Mr. 

Schneider was Respondent's "Director of Maintenance" at the time of the june, 2011, 

maintenance. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MLAMI, FL 33156 

To (305) 670-1222 Fo (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
4 

II. ARGUMENT 

FAA failed to meet its burden of proof that Respondent violated any of the cited 

FARs. FAA's presentation at trial was no more convincing than its Motion For 

Summary judgment with live witnesses, whose testimony and opinions had the same 

infirmities as their affidavits and declarations. 

A. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR43.5(a) BY 

FAILING TO MAKE A MAINTENANCE RECORD ENTRY 

PRIOR TO THE FLIGHT OF JUNE 13, 20111 

FAR 43.5(a) states: 

No person may approve for return to service any aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, 

propeller, or appliance, that has undergone maintenance, preventive maintenance, 

or alteration unless the maintenance record entry required by 43.9 or 43.11, as 

appropriate, has been made. 

FAA proffered no evidence at trial that an appropriate maintenance record 

entry was not made prior to the flight of june 13, 2011. Not a single FAA witness 

testified to this effect and no documentary evidence supports this claim. 

To the contrary, Liberty produced the unrebutted testimony of Mr. Schneider 

that he prepared the maintenance record entry in the aircraft's discrepancy log book, a 

maintenance record, that he signed the entry, and entered his A & P certificate number, 

all as required by FAR 43.9(a). Tr. 4-24-14, p. 157.2 FAR 43.9(a) provides: 

Maintenance record entries. Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this 

section, each person who maintains, performs preventive maintenance, rebuilds, or 

alters an aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or component part 

1 The allegations related to Section 43.5(a) are limited to the June, 2011, maintenance to the #1 fuel tank 

leak See, Order Denying FAA's Motion For Partial Summary judgment, etc., p. 12. 

2 References to the transcript will be Tr. followed by the date and page number(s). 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

To [305) 670-1222 Fo (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
5 

shall make an entry in the maintenance record of that equipment containing the 

following information: 

A description (or reference to data acceptable to the Administrator) of work 

performed. 

The date of completion of the work performed. 

The name of the person performing the work if other than the person specified in 

paragraph (a)(4) of this section. 

If the work performed on the aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or 

component part has been performed satisfactorily, the signature, certificate number, 

and kind of certificate held by the person approving the work. The signature 

constitutes the approval for return to service only for the work performed. 

In addition to Mr. Schneider's unrebutted testimony, Liberty produced the 

unrebutted testimony of Captain john Hess, a Delta Airlines' Captain and the holder of 

not only an Airline Transport Pilot Certificate ("ATP") but also an A & P certificate.3 

Captain Hess was Captain on the Liberty Belle on june 13, 2011, and testified that 

before he flew the aircraft on that day, he personally reviewed the discrepancy log 

entry. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 121. Captain Hess testified Mr. Schneider wrote the discrepancy 

and Mr. Schneider also wrote the sign-off. Tr. 4-24-14, pp. 121-22. Both Mr. Schneider 

and Captain Hess identified Respondent's Exhibit 14 as the discrepancy log form kept 

in the aircraft.4 See also, Captain Hess's Declaration (RX 11) wherein he states he 

personally reviewed the discrepancy log prior to the flight of june 13, 2011, and 

observed Mr. Schneider's entry related to the repair of the #1 fuel tank leaks 

At the hearing, Respondent objected when FAA introduced evidence relating to 

an alleged "major repair" violation for the june, 2011, maintenance. Respondent 

3 Captain Hess is type rated in Boeing 757, 767, 737, and B-17 aircraft. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 103. 

4 References to the exhibits will be CX for FAA's exhibits and RX for Respondent's exhibits. 

5 FAA witness Timothy Bourgoine also confirmed Liberty used a discrepancy log form for writing up 

and clearing discrepancies and RX 14 is that form. Tr. 4-22-14, pp. 146, 150. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

T: (305] 670-1222 F: (305) 400·0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
6 

argued FAA had not alleged in either its Complaint or Amended Complaint that the 

repair performed in june, 2011, to the #1 fuel tank leak was a major repair. The Court 

overruled Respondent's objection. Respondent respectfully renews its objection that 

FAA never charged, in any pleading, that the june, 2011, repair constituted a major 

repair and respectfully requests the Court reconsider its ruling for the following 

reasons. 

In the Original Complaint, only Count III relates to the maintenance performed 

in june, 2011. The relevant paragraphs are 12-17, and only paragraphs 14-16 allege 

regulatory violations. Paragraph 14 alleges Mr. Schneider failed to use the methods, 

techniques, and practices prescribed in the manufacturer's maintenance manual or 

Instructions for Continued Airworthiness or other methods, techniques, and practices 

acceptable to the Administrator. Paragraph 15 alleges Mr. Schneider failed to do the 

work in such a manner and use materials of such a quality that the condition of the 

aircraft would be at least equal to its original or properly altered condition. Paragraph 

16 alleges the aircraft was not in a condition equal to its original or properly altered 

condition and was unairworthy following the june, 2011, maintenance. 

When FAA filed its Amended Complaint, it did so for the express reason that it 

learned certain facts from Mr. Schneider's deposition, namely that the june 13, 2011, 

maintenance entry shown to Mr. Schneider during his deposition (CX 3, p. 8), was not 

made prior to the flight of june 13 and, therefore, FAA alleged no maintenance record 

entry was made prior to that flight. Based only on that assertion and Mr. Schneider's 

status as "Director of Maintenance," FAA alleged "Respondent is responsible not only 

for the operational violations originally charged, but also for the underlying 

STUART A GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

T' (305) 670·1222 p, (305) 400·0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
7 

maintenance violations committed by Mr. Schneider." Amended Complaint, pp. 1-2, 

(emphasis added). 

As set out above, there were no operational violations in the original Complaint 

charging that the june, 2011, maintenance was a major repair. Further, there were no 

"underlying maintenance violations" charged against Mr. Schneider in his case 

asserting the june, 2011, maintenance was a major repair and none were reflected in 

the Withdrawal Of Emergency Order Of Revocation And Replacement With Order Of 

Suspension (Order of Suspension), attached as Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint. 

The only violations related to the june, 2011, maintenance in Mr. Schneider's Order of 

Suspension were 43.13(a) and 43.13(b) which, as described above, relate only to how 

that maintenance was performed, i. e., the use of methods, techniques, practices, and 

materials etc. Neither Section 43.13(a) nor Section 43.13(b) contain the term "major 

repair." 

As further evidence the FAA never charged either Mr. Schneider or Liberty with 

performing a major repair related to the june, 2011, maintenance, the Amended 

Complaint did not even amend paragraph 15 of the Original Complaint, but did amend 

paragraph 16. The amendment to paragraph 16 in its entirety states: "Mr. Schneider 

did not make a maintenance record entry concerning the june 13, 2011, maintenance 

before returning the aircraft to service." Amended Complaint, p. 3 (emphasis added). 

This allegation can only relate to Section 43.5(a) and no reading of this amendment can 

be stretched to include an allegation the june, 2011, maintenance was a major repair. 

To further underscore the fact FAA never intended its Complaint or Amended 

Complaint included a claim the june, 2011, maintenance was a major repair, FAA 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN. P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE. SUITE 380. MIAMI. FL 33156 

T' (305] 670-1222 p, (305] 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
8 

counsel described the june maintenance in his opening statement as a "major 

alteration," not a "major repair." ("You'll also hear from the experts about the repair 

that was performed in june of 2011 and specifically the problems with that. They'll 

opine that it was a major alteration but also some of them will specifically talk about 

the way that it was performed in ways that Mr. Schneider admitted in his deposition 

were not, which has been submitted were not really great.") Tr. 4-22-14, pp. 50-51 

(emphasis added) (Referring to placing the sealant on the outside of the tank). 

Accordingly, because no pleading in this action placed Liberty on notice it had 

to defend an allegation that the june, 2011, maintenance was a "major repair," Liberty 

respectfully renews its objection that any evidence or arguments suggesting the june, 

2011, maintenance was a "major repair" be stricken as not relevant to, and beyond the 

charges, in either the Original or Amended Complaints. 

In the event the Court does not sustain Liberty's renewed objection on the 

"major repair" issue, FAA nevertheless failed to prove the june, 2011, maintenance was 

a "major repair." The FARs have two definitions of"major repair." Section 1.1 states a 

"major repair" is a repair (1) that, if improperly done, might appreciably affect weight, 

balance, structural strength, performance, powerplant operation, flight characteristics, 

or other qualities affecting airworthiness; or (2) that is not done according to accepted 

practices or cannot be done by elementary operations." FAA presented no credible 

evidence that the june, 2011, repair was done improperly or that the repair 

appreciably affected any of the characteristics listed in Section 1.1, or that the repair 

was not done according to accepted practices, or was not done by elementary 

operations. FAA insinuated the sealant should have been packed from the inside, but 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE. SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

T' (305) 670·1222 p, (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
9 

no witness testified it was improper or impermissible to seal the tank from the outside. 

Indeed, FAA's expert, Timothy Bourgoine, testified he could not say packing the sealant 

from the outside was wrong. Tr. 4-22-14, p. 157. Inspector Soerens confirmed there is 

no requirement the sealant be put on inside the tank. Tr. 4-23-14, p. 139. Inspector 

Duellman agreed there is no requirement the sealant be placed inside the tank. Tr. 4-

23-14, p. 211. 

Liberty's evidence consisted of a detailed description by Mr. Schneider of the 

repair which consisted of repairing the crack at the edge of the weld flange by drilling 

out some of the bolt holes that were originally in the tank so fasteners could be 

installed through the flange to help pinch it together and keep the crack from 

spreading. They also packed the crack externally with sealer and put bolts through the 

holes. They then took an aluminum U channel (also called a C channel) extrusion that 

was tight fitting and bolted it to the edge of the seam. They then packed the U channel 

with additional sealer. Thus, there were several layers of protection. Tr. 4-24-14, pp. 

130-32. Mr. Schneider testified specifically that it was not improper to pack the sealer 

on the outside of the tank. I d., p. 132. Mr. Schneider also testified the sealer he used 

was the same sealer he used at Delta Airlines to seal fuel tank leaks. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 

129. 

In addition to Mr. Schneider, there were two other A & P mechanics that 

devised the repair plan- Captain Hess and Chuck Giese. Tr. 4-24-14, pp. 156-57. Thus, 

FAA did not prove the repair was done improperly and it certainly did not prove the 

repair had any effect whatsoever, much less an appreciable effect, on weight, balance, 

structural strength, performance, powerplant operation, flight characteristics, or other 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P.A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

T' (305) 670·1222 p, (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
10 

qualities affecting airworthiness. No FAA witness testified credibly that the repair to 

the leak was not done according to accepted methods, techniques, and practices or that 

the repair was not done by elementary operations. As noted above, Mr. Bourgoine 

testified he could not say packing the sealant from the outside was wrong. FAA 

witness Soerens testified not all methods, techniques, and practices acceptable to the 

Administrator are written in the FARs or anywhere else. Tr. 4-23-14, p. 134. Likewise, 

FAA witness Duellman agreed there was nothing that mandated the leak be sealed 

from inside. Tr. 4-23-14, p. 211. He also agreed not all methods, techniques, and 

practices acceptable to the Administrator are in writing. Therefore, where there is no 

written specification or instruction as to how to perform a particular maintenance 

operation, an A & P certificate holder is necessarily permitted to use his/her judgment, 

skill, and experience to determine appropriate techniques, methods, and practices for 

the job at hand. This is exactly what Mr. Schneider did. He testified the techniques, 

methods, practices, tools, and materials he used to repair the fuel tank leak were 

consistent with the techniques, methods, practices, tools, and materials he had used in 

his experience. Tr. 4-24-14, pp. 170-71. Mr. Schneider's considerable hands-on 

experience consisted of 22+ years as a mechanic at Delta Airlines and his experience 

building his own airplane. Tr. 4-24-14, pp. 127, 142.6 There is no supportable record 

evidence the repair was related to the subsequent fire. 7 

6 Mr. Bourgoine testified he never had reason to complain about the quality of Mr. Schneider's work and 

believed he was a "very capable mechanic." Tr. 4-22-14, p. 183. 

7 FAA's statement at page 9 of its Closing Argument that the aircraft was lost "during the flight" is false 

and misleading. There is no support for that statement in the cited places (CX 17 and Tr. 4-23-14, pp. 

33-34). 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

T' (305) 670·1222 p, (305) 400·0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
11 

The other definition of "major repair" is in Appendix A to Part 43. It states: 

(b) Airframe major repairs. Repairs to the following parts of an airframe and repairs 

of the following types, involving the strengthening, reinforcing, splicing, and 

manufacturing of primary structural members or their replacement, when 

replacement is by fabrication such as riveting or welding, are airframe major repairs. 

(Emphasis added) 

(xxviii) Repairing, including rebottoming, of removable or integral fuel tanks and oil 

tanks. 

It is stipulated in this case that "neither the removable bladder fuel tanks, nor 

the aluminum shells, [are] a structural component of the B-17 aircraft." See, Order 

Denying The FAA's Motion For Partial Summary judgment, etc., paragraph 15. Given 

that the definition of major repairs is applicable only to "primary structural members," 

and that neither the bladder nor aluminum fuel tanks are structural members, primary 

or otherwise, the repair to the fuel tank leak in june, 2011, was necessarily, by 

definition, not a major repair. 

B. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR43.9(a) 

RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE LOG ENTRY MADE 

PRIOR TO THE JUNE 13, 2011, FLIGHT 

This claim is essentially the same claim FAA made regarding Section 43.5(a) 

discussed above. As set forth in the previous section, FAR 43.9(a) delineates the 

requirements for an appropriate log book entry following maintenance, preventive 

maintenance, rebuilding, etc. Those requirements are discussed fully in the previous 

section and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say, because FAA did not prove a 

violation of FAR 43.5(a), it also did not prove a violation of FAR43.9(a). 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 331S6 

T• (305) 670·1222 p, (305) 400·0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
C. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED 43.9(a) RELATING 

TO THE MAINTENANCE LOG ENTRY FOR THE 

FEBRUARY, 2011, MAINTENANCE OR FAR 91.405(b) 

RELATING TO THE JUNE, 2011, OR THE 

FEBRUARY, 2011, MAINTENANCE 

FAR 91.405(b) states: Each owner or operator of an aircraft12 

(b) Shall ensure that maintenance personnel make appropriate entries in the aircraft 

maintenance records indicating the aircraft has been approved for return to service. 

The maintenance record entry following the june, 2011, maintenance made by 

Mr. Schneider and confirmed by him and Captain Hess has been discussed previously 

and need not be repeated here. It is clear from the record Mr. Schneider made an 

appropriate entry in the aircraft's discrepancy log book. There was no evidence 

offered by the FAA suggesting Liberty did not ensure such entry be made. To the 

contrary, both Mr. Schneider and Captain Hess testified it was procedure for such an 

entry to be made. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 157 (Schneider) and Tr. 4-24-14, p. 121 (Hess). See, 

also f/n 5 above. 

To the extent FAA argues the june, 2011, maintenance log entry was not 

"appropriate," the regulations must be read as a whole to make sense. We have 

already shown an "appropriate" log entry is defined or described in Section 43.9(a), 

which requires a description of the work, the date of completion, the name of the 

person performing the work, and his/her signature/certificate number, which 

constitutes approval for return to service. Thus, the record demonstrates the FAA did 

not establish Liberty failed to ensure an "appropriate" log entry was not made. 

As to the maintenance log entry made by Mr. Schneider following the February, 

2011, maintenance, it is likewise clear the FAA did not prove Liberty failed to ensure 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 331S6 

T' (305) 670-1222 p, (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
13 

an appropriate maintenance log entry was made.8 In furtherance, of his effort to make 

an appropriate log entry, Mr. Schneider spoke with two FAA maintenance inspectors 

(David Alderman and David Miller) who were also volunteers for Liberty in their off 

time. Tr. 4-24-14, pp. 160-61. Mr. Schneider, along with Mr. Fowler, spoke to 

Inspectors Alderman and Miller by phone during the period "we were getting ready to 

put the tanks back in the airplane before the airplane was restarted on tour." This 

necessarily was before the date of the log entry, February 24, 2011. !d., p. 161. Mr. 

Schneider wanted to be certain the paperwork for the maintenance was appropriate 

or, as he put it, "wanting to make sure that we had all the ducks in a row as far as 

paperwork goes." !d., p.162. As Mr. Schneider explained (Tr. 4-24-14, pp.162-63): 

A. We were getting close to the end of the tank projects and I was wanting to 

make sure that we had all the ducks in a row as far as paperwork goes. And, so I was 

asking their advice. And, I don't remember which one of them asked me, but it was one 

of the two Daves, asked me to describe what we had done with the tanks and I told him 

that we had removed them, removed the bladder liners, welded up the ends. Installed 

new fittings on them, put them back in the airplane, leak checked them. Our intent was 

to put them back in the airplane leak checked, not when we had them installed yet. 

And, he read back to me what I had said to him and again, I don't know which one of 

the two of them said this, but their answer was, well, that's just a minor repair. Any A 

& P can sign that off the log book entry. And, okay, what is the best way to word this 

log book to make sure that we're covered. 

Q. Who said that? 

A. I asked that question. And, we spent a few more minutes on the phone going 

over how the wording should be, what reference to use, and then I signed off the book 

with their pattern. With their pattern of sign off that they'd suggested. 

Q. Did they suggest to you any of the terms that were in your February 24, 2011 

log book entry? 

8 To a large extent, the determination whether an appropriate log entry was made following the 

February, 2011 maintenance (as opposed to a determination whether Liberty failed to ensure such 

entry be made). will depend on the Court's ruling whether that maintenance was a major alteration of 

the B-17's fuel system. To this end, see Section E below for a full discussion of the major alteration issue. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

To (305) 670-1222 Fo (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
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A. Yeah. We pretty much went over it word for word. How it should be written 

down. 

Q. And you're certain that these conversations occurred prior to February 24, 

2011. 

A. Yes 

This telephone conference was confirmed by Ray Fowler, who testified in his 

deposition that the conferences occurred and they related to the work on the fuel 

tanks. ex 27, pp. 14-16. 

Although there is a disparity between the testimony of Mr. Alderman and Mr. 

Schneider as to the nature and timing of their conversation, Mr. Schneider's testimony 

should be credited since Mr. Alderman never denied the conversation described by Mr. 

Schneider occurred (Tr. 4-23-14, p. 23): 

Q: You don't recall a phone conversation with you and Inspector Miller and 

Mr. Schneider and Ray Fowler? 

A. No, I do not. 

Q. You don't recall it? 

A. No, I do not. 

Q. You don't deny that it occurred, you just don't recall it? 

A. Yeah, I do not deny it. I just don't recall any phone call. 

D. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR 91.407(a) THAT 

LIBERTY OPERATED N390TH WHEN IT HAD NOT BEEN APPROVED FOR 

RETURN TO SERVICE AND A REQUIRED MAINTENANCE LOG 

ENTRY HAD NOT BEEN MADE 

This FAR states: Operation after maintenance, preventive maintenance, 

rebuilding, or alteration. 

(a) No person may operate any aircraft that has undergone maintenance, preventive 

maintenance, rebuilding, or alteration unless -

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

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(1) it has been approved for return to service by a person authorized under Section 

43.7 of this chapter; and 

(2) the maintenance record entry required by Section 43.9 or Section 43.11, as 

applicable, of this chapter has been made. 

As to (1) above as it relates to both the February and June, 2011, log entries, Mr. 

Schneider was at all times relevant an FAA certificated mechanic. FAA has never 

contended Mr. Schneider was not at all relevant times an FAA certificated mechanic. 

He therefore met the requirements of Section 43.7(b) which states "the holder of a 

mechanic certificate or an inspection authorization may approve an aircraft, airframe, 

aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or component part for return to service as 

provided in Part 65 of this chapter." 

As to (2) above, we have previously shown the return-to-service log entry made 

by Mr. Schneider following both the February and June, 2011, maintenance was 

appropriate and met the delineated requirements of Section 43.9. To the extent FAA 

may claim Mr. Schneider was not authorized to make the February 24, 2011, log entry 

because the work constituted a major alteration, please see the discussion regarding 

major alterations in the next section. 

E. FAA DID NOT PROVE THE REPLACEMENT OF THE BLADDER 

FUEL TANKS WITH THE ALUMINUM FUEL TANKS 

CONSTITUTED A MAJOR ALTERATION OF THE FUEL SYSTEM 

The parties agree this is the central issue before the Court because a number of 

the regulatory allegations stem from FAA's assertion that the maintenance work 

performed on the fuel system concluding in February, 2011, constituted a "major 

alteration." FAA claims that because this work was a major alteration, Respondent 

violated several FARs. As set out above, these FARs relate to (1) "appropriate" entries 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 331S6 

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in the aircraft maintenance records - 91.405(b); (2) the manner in which the 

maintenance was performed - 91.407(a), 43.9(d), 43.13(a) and (b); and (3) the 

airworthiness of the aircraft following this maintenance- 91.7(a). As we show below, 

utilizing any definition of "major alteration" results in a finding FAA did not prove the 

fuel tank project constituted a "major alteration." 

(1) Major Alteration As Defined in Appendix A To Part 43 

"Major Alteration" is defined in the FARs in Appendix A to Part 43. Part 43 is 

entitled "Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding, And Alteration." 

Appendix A is entitled "Major Alterations, Major Repairs, And Preventive 

Maintenance." The only definition of an airframe (as opposed to engine) major 

alteration that appears in Part 43 is in Appendix A, and is as follows: 

(a) Major alterations - (1) Airframe major alterations. Alterations of the following 

parts and alterations of the following types, when not listed in the aircraft 

specifications issued by the FAA, are airframe major alterations:, 

(i) Wings 

(ii) Tail surfaces 

(iii) Fuselage 

(iv) Engine mounts 

(v) Control system 

(vi) Landing gear 

(vii) Hull or floats 

(viii) Elements of an airframe including spars, ribs, fittings, shock 

absorbers, bracing, cowling, fairings, and balance weights 

(ix) Hydraulic and electrical actuating system or components 

(x) Rotor blades 

(xi) Changes to the empty weight or empty balance which result in an 

increase in the maximum certificated weight or center of gravity 

limits of the aircraft 

(xii) Changes to the basic design of the fuel, oil, cooling, heating, cabin 

pressurization, electrical, hydraulic, de-icing, or exhaust systems 

( xiii) Changes to the wing or to fixed or movable control surfaces which 

affect flutter and vibration characteristics. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 331S6 

T• (305) 670-1222 F• (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
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Emphasis added. It is clear there are different standards or criteria as to what 

constitutes a major alteration depending on the part of the airframe involved. Any 

alteration to the parts listed in items (i) - (x) is a major alteration. There are no 

modifying criteria for those parts. Thus, any alteration to the wings, tail surfaces, 

fuselage, engine mounts, control system, landing gear, hull/floats, certain elements of 

an airframe, hydraulic and electrical actuating system/ components, and rotor blades, 

is defined as a major alteration. 

The major alterations defined (xi)-(xiii), however, are different, and require 

more than just any alteration, in and of itself, to constitute a "major alteration". For 

example, item (xi) requires that for an alteration to the empty weight or empty balance 

to be a major alteration it must not only be an alteration, but the alteration must also 

"result in an increase in the maximum certificated weight or center of gravity limits of 

the aircraft." If an alteration to the empty weight or empty balance does not result in 

an increase in the maximum certificated weight or center of gravity limits, the 

alteration is not, by FAA regulatory definition, a major alteration. 

Similarly, item (xiii) requires that for an alteration to the wing or fixed or 

movable control surfaces to be a major alteration, it must not only be an alteration, but 

the alteration must also "affect flutter and vibration characteristics." If an alteration to 

a wing or a fixed or movable control surface does not affect flutter and vibration 

characteristics, it is not, by FAA regulatory definition, a major alteration. 

Item (xii), on which FAA's claims center in this case, is written in the same 

manner as items (xi) and (xiii), and very differently from items (i) - (x). Item (xii) 

requires that for an alteration to the fuel, oil, cooling, heating, cabin pressurization, 

STUART A GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

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electrical, hydraulic, de-icing, or exhaust systems, there must be an alteration and that 

alteration must also constitute "changes to the basic design" of the applicable system. 

If alterations to the fuel, oil, cooling, heating, cabin pressurization, electrical, hydraulic, 

de-icing, or exhaust systems are not changes to that system's "basic design," by 

definition they cannot constitute a major alteration of that system. 

Mr. Schneider described the work performed on the fuel system during the 

2010-2011, winter maintenance period. The aluminum tanks were removed from the 

aircraft and the bladders were removed from the aluminum tanks. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 159. 

Upon removing the bladders, the team determined the metal shells were in excellent 

condition. Later, a determination was made, after consultation with a DER (FAA 

Designated Engineering Representative), that the aluminum shells could be used as 

fuel tanks. !d. After the aluminum tanks were removed, they were media blasted to 

remove paint and corrosion - none was found. !d. The aluminum tanks were taken to 

Cobb Industrial Fabricators where the welding was accomplished. After welding, the 

tanks were plumbed, leak checked, and then reinstalled in the aircraft. !d. 

The process of changing the vessels that held the fuel was accomplished by not 

changing the basic design of the fuel system at all. Mr. Schneider described this 

process. Some flexible fuel lines were replaced with identical new fuel lines that had 

the same fuel capacity as the old lines; the same fuel pumps were re-installed; all of the 

original plumbing was re-installed; all of the fittings, electrical connections, and 

plumbing connections were re-installed. !d., p. 166. Where there had been attach 

points on the rubber bladders, these were replaced with duplicated new attach points 

so the same fitting would screw into the aluminum tanks where the old attach points 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

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were located so there was no change at all in the plumbing. I d., p. 167. All of these 

fittings and attachments were in the same exact places as they were when there were 

bladder liners within the tanks. I d. The same fuel sensors (devices that send fuel 

quantity information to the cockpit), were re-installed and had the same functionality. 

Id., p. 168. The vent fuel flow connections in the new system were the same 

equipment taken from the old system and were in the same places. Id., pp. 168-69. 

After the project was completed, the system was checked for leaks, capacity, and 

functionality. I d. In terms of the capacity of the aluminum tanks as compared to the 

bladder liners, Mr. Schneider stated they found a difference of only 2 - 3 gallons in the 

big tank (a 425 gallon tank). The B-17 fuel system in the Liberty Belle held 1700 

gallons, or 10,200 pounds. Id., p. 170.9 

Cullen Underwood further described the fuel tank project. They contacted two 

DERs (Rocky Howard and Terry Bowden), with whom Mr. Underwood personally had 

conversations about the project. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 241. A $500.00 retainer check was 

sent to DER Bowden. I d., p. 242. Mr. Underwood sent certain drawings of the shells 

and their support systems to DER Howard. I d. Ultimately, DER Howard said that since 

B-17s had previous aluminum fuel tanks, he did not have an issue with using the 

aluminum shells as long as they maintained the attach points. I d., pp. 242-43, 246.10 

David Wilkins, owner of Cobb Industrial Fabricators, testified his company 

performed the welding operations on the aluminum tanks. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 193. After 

the tanks were received, they were cleaned and patches were made. Cobb received 

9 The two main tanks hold 425 gallons each; two feeder tanks hold 213 gallons each and two other 

feeder tanks hold 212 gallons each. ex 20, p. 193. A gallon of aviation fuel weights six pounds. 

1° FAA Inspector Duellman testified later model B-17s were manufactured with aluminum fuel tanks. 

ex 33; Tr. 4-23-14, pp. 205-06. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 331S6 

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fittings from Mr. Underwood and welded all the fittings and path plates in place. !d. 

Mr. Wilkins did not personally perform the welding; three welders who each had 

between twenty and forty years of welding experience performed the welding. !d. Mr. 

Wilkins inspected the welding and found it was satisfactorily performed. !d. Mr. 

Wilkins' participation in the project was direct and personal, including supervising the 

welding ofthe various openings on the aluminum fuel tanks. RX 10. Each vent and fuel 

flow connection was welded to the tank using AN bung fittings; the fuel caps, boost 

pumps, and level sensor mounts were welded to the tanks in the appropriate and same 

locations as before. Id. All fittings were made from 6061 aluminum and all welding 

was done using the TIG method and the filler rod was 4043, which is what is 

recommended by all manufacturers for welding these alloys.11 !d. No leaks were 

found and Mr. Wilkins considered the welding normal. !d. 

The testimony of Messers. Schneider, Underwood, and Wilkins established there 

was no change in the "basic design" of the fuel system. They testified that, except for 

the change of the vessels that held the fuel, there were no changes in the basic design 

of the fuel system and the system operated the same before and after the project. As 

described above, all of the hoses, fittings, plumbing, pieces, and parts of the fuel system 

when it had bladder tanks, were the same and in exactly the same places, when the 

fuel-holding vessels were changed to aluminum. FAA's witnesses agreed. Mr. 

Bourgoine said the purpose of the fuel system is to receive and store fuel in a safe 

manner and deliver clean fuel to where it's needed- the engines. Tr. 4-22-14, p. 179. 

The system has fuel selector valves, transfer pumps, etc., to accomplish this purpose. 

11 Mr. Bourgoine agreed TIG welding was appropriate. Tr. 4-22-14, p.162. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

r, (305) 670·1222 p, (305) 400·06BS STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
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Id. Mr. Bourgoine agreed the new system performed these functions. Id. 12 The design 

of a fuel system is, axiomatically, to support its purpose, which is to store and deliver 

clean fuel to the engines. It does this through a series of tanks, fuel lines, fuel pumps, 

carburetors, filters, vent lines, etc. No FAA witness could or did testify this basic design 

was changed or that the project changed the purpose of this fuel system. FAA's 

suggestion at page 3 of its Closing Argument that Liberty should somehow be faulted 

for wanting to save money is ludicrous. Ifthat is truly FAA's position, it needs to have 

some serious conversations with our major airlines. 

Inspector Soerens offered no testimony in support of the FAA's case that the 

basic design of the fuel system had been changed. He agreed the fuel system after the 

project contained fuel as it did before; he did not know if the fuel pumps operated the 

same after the project as before; he agreed the fuel lines operated the same after as 

before; he did not know if the vent lines, fuel sensors, and sumps operated the same 

after as before. Tr. 4-23-14, pp. 121-23. Inspector Soerens either agreed there were 

no changes or he did not know if there were changes. Thus, his testimony was far too 

inclusive to support FAA's claim that the basic design of the fuel system had been 

changed. 

Similarly, Inspector Duellman's testimony revealed he was without sufficient 

knowledge to form an opinion that can be relied upon by the Court, although he did 

agree the purpose of a fuel system is to deliver fuel to the engines and the Liberty 

Belle's fuel system did just that before and after the project. Tr. 4-23-14, p. 195. He 

admitted his conclusion the Liberty Belle was originally manufactured with bladder 

12 Mr. Bourgoine's statement that the system was not the same because it eventually leaked, says 

nothing about its basic design. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN. P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE. SUITE 380. MIAMI. FL 33156 

To (305) 670·1222 Fo (305) 400·0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
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fuel tanks came from speaking with others, i.e, was hearsay. /d., p. 196. His conclusion 

the bladder tanks were 2¥z - 3 inches thick also came from others. Tr. 4-23-14, p. 208. 

His statement the aluminum tanks held about 100 more gallons of fuel than the 

bladder tanks was made up on the stand and was purely a guess. Tr. 4-23-24, pp. 209-

10. Thus, Inspector Duellman's testimony also was too inconclusive and too unreliable 

to support FAA's claims. 

In contrast to Liberty's evidence, FAA produced no witness who testified from 

first-hand knowledge about the project. All of the FAA's "expert" testimony of Mr. 

Bourgoine, Inspector Soerens, and Inspector Duellman as to what was accomplished 

was hearsay, based on what someone else told them. Tr. 4-22-14, pp. 152-53 

Bourgoine; Tr. 4-23-14 pp. 104-05 Soerens; Tr. 217-18 Duellman. None of the FAA's 

witnesses physically observed the work and could only guess and surmise as to what 

was accomplished. Mr. Bourgoine never inspected the fuel tanks. Tr. 4-22-14, p. 181. 

Indeed, all of these witnesses conceded at trial they did not even prepare their 

affidavits/declarations. Mr. Bourgoine testified he did not write his affidavit (Tr. 4-22-

14, p. 164) and it is clear the information came from FAA counsel who inserted his 

arguments and legal conclusions regarding major /minor alterations, etc. Inspector 

Soerens also testified he did not write his affidavit and stated the information in it 

(including the legal conclusions) came from counsel. Tr. 4-23-14, pp. 105-06. He also 

stated some of the information in his affidavit came from Inspector Duellman. Tr. 4-

23.14, p. 107. The information in Inspector Duellman's affidavit (including the legal 

conclusions) came to him by email. Tr. 4-23-14, p. 217. That all of FAA's "expert" 

witnesses formed their opinions after they received affidavits prepared by FAA 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

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counsel or others, denigrates their testimony to the point it cannot be relied upon to 

support FAA's claims. 

In contrast to the inconclusive and unreliable testimony of the FAA's 

witnesses, Liberty produced a true B-17 expert - Gary Norville. Mr. Norville owns and 

operates American Aero Services, a "war bird" restoration and maintenance facility, in 

New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 58. By "warbird," Mr. Norvile means 

former military aircraft, primarily World War II and Korean War vintage aircraft. Jd. 

Mr. Norville has been in the business of restoring and maintaining these warbird 

aircraft for approximately 26 years, since 1986-87. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 59. Mr. Norville has 

an A & P certificate and an Inspection Authorization (lA). Jd. The lA allows Mr. 

Norville to perform annual inspections and sign them off (return the aircraft to 

service) and sign off FAA form 337s (major alterations/major repairs) on behalf of the 

FAA. Jd.13 Mr. Norville performs ground-up restorations of warbird aircraft in his 

business - meaning total disassembly of the aircraft, restoring all of the systems and 

bringing the aircraft back to airworthy flying status. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 60. Mr. Norville 

regularly performs maintenance and preventive maintenance on two B-17s - one 

owned by The Collings Foundation and one owned by The Fighter Factory. Tr. 4-24-

14, p. 62. Mr. Norville has also maintained The Collings Foundation's B-24 aircraft (the 

only one in the world presently flying). Tr. 4-24-14, p. 63. The B-24 is a World War II 

four radial engine heavy bomber. He also maintains or has maintained a B-25 aircraft 

- a World War II two radial engine medium bomber. Jd. The Court qualified Mr. 

13 Mr. Norville's Inspection Authorization is active and on-going, unlike FAA witnesses Soerens and 

Duellman who have not utilized their !As since joining the FAA. Inspector Soerens no longer possesses 

his lA. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

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Norville as an expert in "aviation maintenance and in B-17 maintenance and 

restoration." Tr. 4-24-14, p. 68. 

Mr. Norville testified the purpose of the fuel system in the B-17 is to provide 

fuel to the engines so the engines will run. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 81. This is accomplished 

through fuel tanks, fuel boost pumps, and fuel lines, which send fuel to the carburetors. 

I d. Based on his 28 years of experience maintaining and restoring warbird aircraft, Mr. 

Norville understands the term "major alteration" as it applies to war bird aircraft. Tr. 

4-24-14, p. 86. As it specifically applies to B-17 aircraft, "major alteration" means 

changing of control surfaces, and the gross weight of the aircraft. I d. As it applies to 

the B-17's fuel system, "major alteration" "would be changing the flow of the fuel pump 

to a lessor or higher value, re-routing the fuel lines, and adding extra fuel tanks." I d. As 

it relates to the gross weight of the aircraft, Mr. Norville testified merely changing the 

gross weight of the aircraft in the fuel system would not change the basic design of the 

fuel system. He explained (Tr. 4-24-14, p. 95): 

Because you're still within your still within your allowable gross weight. When I 

said it first, it made it sound like you're changing the gross weight but there's an 

envelope you're allowed in. You're not exceeding your gross weight, you're still within 

your CG envelope so you're not, you're not, you don't have a major alteration. 

Mr. Norville further explained the B-17 has a large and very long CG envelope. Tr. 

4-24-14, p. 98. As B-17s are operated today, they are well within their CG envelope 

and well under their maximum allowable gross weight. Id. In wartime, B-17s would 

go on missions carrying full fuel, 12 fifty caliber machine guns, and 10,000 pounds of 

bombs. They would come back, obviously much lighter since they were much lower on 

fuel, have no bombs and much less ammunition, and still be within their allowable CG 

envelope and weight envelope. Id. Given Mr. Norville's maintenance credentials and 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN. P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

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his extensive experience (22+ years) maintaining and restoring warbird aircraft, 

including regularly maintaining two B-17s, his opinion that the work performed on the 

Liberty Belle was not a major alteration should be preferred over the unsupported 

opinions of FAA's "expert" witnesses.14 

Liberty believes the record amply establishes FAA failed in its burden to prove 

the fuel tank project was a "major alteration" as defined in Appendix A to Part 43 for 

the reasons set out in detail above. However, should the Court rule changing the 

vessels that held the fuel was a change in the basic design of the Liberty Belle's fuel 

system, FAA will still have failed in its burden of proof. Item (a)(xii) requires 

"change~" (emphasis added) to the basic design of the fuel system to constitute a major 

alteration. Changing only the vessels that held the fuel is just one change. FAA 

absolutely failed to prove there were any other changes to the basic design of the 

Liberty Belle's fuel system and Liberty's evidence as set out in detail above establishes 

there were none. 

(2) Major Alteration As Defined In FAR Section 1.1 

FAA also claims the maintenance on the fuel tanks constituted a major alteration 

as that term is defined in FAR Section 1.1, entitled "General Definitions:" 

As used in Subchapters A through K of this chapter, unless the context requires 

otherwise (emphasis added): 

Major alteration means an alteration not listed in the aircraft, aircraft engine, or 

propeller specifications - -

14 One of the more specious claims in FAA's Closing Argument is at page 22 where FAA writes Mr. 

Norville "testified that pretty much any change in the fuel system would be a change in the basic design . 

. . "citing Tr. 4-24-14, pp. 81, 86, 96-7. Mr. Norville said no such thing as the Court will see when it reads 

those pages. This misrepresentation of the record demonstrates FAA's willingness to say or do anything 

to prevail in this case. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI. FL 33156 

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(1) That might appreciably affect weight, balance, structural strength, performance, 

power plant operation, flight characteristics, or other qualities affecting airworthiness; 

or 

(2) That is not done according to accepted practices or cannot be done by elementary 

operations. Emphasis added. 

The very general and undefined terms used in this definition of "major alteration," 

such as "might appreciably affect," "accepted practices," and "elementary operations" 

contrast sharply with the precise definition of "major alteration" in Appendix A to Part 

43 discussed above. Therefore, reading Section 1.1 in context with Appendix A to Part 

43 strongly suggests giving preference to the more detailed and specific definition in 

Appendix A. In further support of this interpretation, the second paragraph of FAR 

43.9(a)(4) states: "In addition to the entry required by this paragraph [relating to 

alterations, etc.], major repairs and major alterations shall be entered on a form, and 

the form disposed of, in the manner prescribed in Appendix B [to Part 43], by the 

person performing the work." Emphasis added. There is no similar reference to 

adherence to Section 1.1.15 

FAA's claim that the work performed on the fuel tanks was a "major alteration" as 

defined in Section 1.1 relies on Mr. Bourgoine's Affidavit and testimony.16 The 

applicable portions of that Affidavit (as well as Mr. Bourgoine's testimony), paragraphs 

20-22, are a series of conjectures, guesses, and hypotheticals which are not sufficient 

to support a plausible expert opinion. 

15 To the same effect, Inspector Soerens testified he prepared FAA's Enforcement Investigative Report 

(EIR) in which, when referencing major alterations, he referenced only Appendix A to Part 43, but made 

no reference whatsoever to Section 1.1. Tr. 4-23-14, pp. 99-100. 16 CX 35. Mr. Bourgoine's testimony mirrored his Affidavit. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

T• (305) 670-1222 F• (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
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In paragraph 20, Mr. Bourgoine opines as a reason the alteration was a major 

alteration, that one of the welds resulted in a crack several months later. This 

reasoning would mean any alteration or repair that subsequently fails, is a major 

alteration. This cannot be the meaning intended by the FARs, especially when read in 

context with Appendix A. It clearly contradicts the more precise definition of major 

alteration in Appendix A to Part 43, discussed above. The two definitions cannot 

logically be read harmoniously together. 

In paragraph 21 of his Affidavit, Mr. Bourgoine further conjectures the removal of 

the bladder tanks "could" have had an appreciable effect on the airworthiness of the 

aircraft and its fuel system. There is no fact-based support in Mr. Bourgoine's Affidavit, 

or in his testimony, which comes even close to establishing this assertion and it is 

directly contradicted by Mr. Norville's testimony. Mr. Bourgoine goes on to conjecture 

that "the alteration increased the fuel capacity of the aircraft." Again, there is zero 

factual support in the record for this claim (other than the 2-3 gallons mentioned by 

Mr. Schneider) and it is contrary to the Declarations and testimony of Mr. Schneider 

and Mr. Underwood who have personal, first-hand knowledge of the work performed. 

Adding conjecture upon conjecture, Mr. Bourgoine stated the increased fuel 

capacity "affec[ted] weight and balance and possible stresses placed on the wing 

structure." Emphasis added. Not only does Mr. Bourgoine not support his claim of an 

increase in fuel capacity, he does not say, because he cannot say, how much fuel 

capacity was increased, nor does he provide engineering or technical support that the 

alleged increase in fuel capacity had any effect whatsoever of stresses on the wing 

structure. These guesses were directly contradicted by Mr. Norville's testimony 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

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discussed above as well as by Inspectors Soerens and Duellman, who conceded this 

aircraft (and all aircraft) have center of gravity (CG) and weight and balance envelopes 

and so long as the aircraft is operated within those envelopes, the aircraft is safe and 

airworthy. Inspector Soerens did not know the difference in weight, if any, resulting 

from the project and did not know if any such difference caused the aircraft to ever 

operate outside its CG or weight and balance envelopes. Tr. 4-23-14, pp. 129-31. Nor 

did he even know the CG numbers for the Liberty Belle. I d. Inspector Duellman agreed 

aircraft can be operated at various weights and still be within their CG and weight 

limits. Tr. 4-23-24, pp. 205-06. 

Mr. Bourgoine then says these added stresses (which he does not support with 

facts) made the aluminum tanks "more susceptible to vibrational stresses in ways that 

a bladder fuel tank was not." This conclusion is given to the Court with absolutely no 

supporting bases in fact and Mr. Bourgoine never offered any evidence regarding 

"vibrational stresses" on bladder vis-a-vis aluminum fuel tanks. If Mr. Bourgoine or the 

FAA had access to data to support these frivolous claims, they would have presented 

that data at the hearing. In the same vein, Mr. Bourgoine asserts "an aluminum fuel 

tank would not respond the same way to the stresses of the in-flight motion of 

thousands of pounds of aviation fuel as a semi-rigid bladder tank would." Mr. 

Bourgoine makes this unsupported claim applicable to all aluminum tanks as he does 

not refer to as the aluminum tanks in N390TH, but to "an" aluminum tankP 

17 In this regard, FAA continued in its unsupported guess that the bladder tanks had baffles within them, 

thus supposedly making them less susceptible to "stresses" of some sort than the aluminum tanks which 

FAA claims did not have baffles. That the bladders did not have baffles was confirmed by Mr. Schneider 

who actually saw that they had no baffles. Tr. 4-24-14, p.l69. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P.A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

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Mr. Bourgoine concedes in his Affidavit the newly fabricated fixtures and 

attachments "may or may not have been of equal quality with the components they 

were replacing." This guess is directly contrary to the direct-knowledge testimony of 

Mr. Schneider and Mr. Underwood that the fixtures, fittings, and other components 

were either the same parts taken out or, in the case of attach points, exact duplicates. 

Assuming they were of equal quality, Mr. Bourgoine goes on to speculate, because they 

were attached to an aluminum tank as opposed to a bladder tank "could impact how 

they responded to stress during flight." Emphasis added. As with all of Mr. 

Bourgoine's assertions in paragraph 21 and in his testimony, FAA failed to provide any 

basis in fact to support its claims, such as engineering data or test results. 

Appropriately, Mr. Bourgoine concludes paragraph 21 emphasizing the nonfoundational bases of his claims: "All ofthese potential issues were ways in which the 

alteration might have affected the qualities affecting the airworthiness of the aircraft .. 

" Emphasis added. 

In paragraph 22 of his Affidavit and in his testimony, Mr. Bourgoine reaches the 

astounding conclusion that "the fabrication of new fuel tanks out of the aluminum 

shells was a major alteration because fabricating components and welding of this 

nature are not an "elementary operation." Neither FAA, nor Mr. Bourgoine, provide a 

definition of "elementary operations" other than Mr. Bourgoine's testimony that the 

welding would not be an elementary operation for most A & Ps. Tr. 4-22-14, p. 122. 

He does not say how the work done on the aluminum tanks was not an elementary 

operation. Moreover, his unsupported conclusion was contradicted by Mr. Wilkins 

who testified the welding was non-complex and simple and that the materials used 

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were appropriate for the project. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 196. Mr. Bourgoine conceded on 

cross examination that it was good the welding was accomplished by professionals ("I 

think it was [a] simple, non-complex job for a professional welding agency"). Tr. 4-22-

14, p. 157. 

To the extent FAA relies on the Affidavit and/or testimony of Inspector Soerens, 

his Affidavit and testimony are filled with the same speculation and lack of 

foundational support as Mr. Bourgoine's Affidavit and testimony such that they cannot 

support FAA's claims. For example, Inspector Soerens is familiar with the fuel tank 

work only in "general terms." Soerens Affidavit, para. 9. He does not, and cannot, 

know the detail of the work as described in Liberty's Declarations and the testimony of 

Mr. Schneider, Mr. Underwood, and Mr. Wilkins. Inspector Soerens goes through the 

same faulty analysis regarding FAR Section 1.1 as does Mr. Bourgoine. Jd., paras. 12-

17. As examples only, he too alleges the fuel tank work "increased the fuel capacity of 

the aircraft" (para. 14 ), but offers zero factual basis for this claim. He too alleges the 

fuel tank work "affect[ed] the weight and balance and possible stresses placed on the 

wing structure" (Id.), but offers zero factual support. He too mistakenly talks about 

baffles in the bladder tanks, despite the fact there were none. 

Inspector Soerens also states the welding "introduc[ed] numerous potential 

weaknesses into the system but can refer to only one crack that occurred four months 

later. Jd. Again "potential weaknesses" do not support FAA's claims in the face of 

Liberty's testimony and Declarations. He too refers to the B-17 Structural Repair 

Handbook's "prohibition of welding aluminum structural members, but admits in the 

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same sentence that fuel tanks are not structural members. !d. Emphasis added. 1B He 

too talks about the welding components onto the aluminum fuel tanks as not being an 

"elementary operation," but, as with Mr. Bourgoine, cannot provide a regulatory 

definition of an "elementary operation" and was contradicted by Mr. Wilkins' expert 

testimony. FAA is required to produce evidence. not guesses, that satisfies the 

evidentiary requirements of the regulations." FAA's attempt to rely on ex 23 (FAA 

Order 8900.1) is misplaced. That document is issued to FAA Inspectors as a guide. is 

not regulatory (Tr. 4-23-14, pp. 112-13), and is certainly not binding on 

owners/ operators. The clear language of Appendix A to Part 43 discussed in detail 

above trumps the inconsistent "guidance" of ex 23.19 

F. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR 43.9(d) 

BECAUSE THERE WAS NO MAJOR ALTERATION OR MAJOR REPAIR 

This FAR states: 

In addition to the entry required by paragraph (a) of this section, major repairs and 

major alterations shall be entered on a form, and the form disposed of, in the manner 

prescribed in Appendix B, by the person performing the work. 

For the reasons detailed in the previous section, FAA did not prove the 

maintenance relating to the fuel tank project was a major alteration and, therefore no 

Form 337 was required. Tr. 4-22-14, p. 187 (Bourgoine). Similarly, because FAA did 

18 Given Inspector Duellman's testimony referred to above relating to B-17s constructed with 

aluminum fuel tanks, and the permission in the Structural Repair Handbook to weld aluminum, 

Inspector Soerens' testimony in this area must be disregarded. 

19 The Order clearly contradicts Appendix A to Part 43 which requires "changes" to the basic design. It 

also contradicts the modifying language in Section 1.1. To give credence to the Order as FAA suggests 

requires re-writing Appendix A and Section 1.1 and eliminating the inconsistent language of 8900.1. 

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not prove the maintenance performed on the fuel tank leak in june, 2011, was a major 

repair, no Form 337 was required. 

G. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR 43.13(a) 

RELATING TO METHODS, TECHNIQUES, PRACTICES, TOOLS, 

EQUIPMENT, AND TEST APPARATUS 

This FAR states: Performance rules (general). 

(a) Each person performing maintenance, alteration, or preventive maintenance on an 

aircraft, engine, propeller, or appliance shall use the methods, techniques, and 

practices prescribed in the current manufacturer's maintenance manual or 

Instructions for Continued Airworthiness prepared by its manufacturer, or other 

methods, techniques, and practices acceptable to the Administrator, except as noted in 

§43.16. He shall use the tools, equipment, and test apparatus necessary to assure 

completion of the work in accordance with accepted industry practices. If special 

equipment or test apparatus is recommended by the manufacturer involved, he must 

use that equipment or apparatus or its equivalent acceptable to the Administrator. 

There are two parts to this FAR. The first deals with methods, techniques, and 

practices and the second deals with tools, equipment and test apparatus. FAA's claim 

under this FAR is that since replacing bladder tanks with aluminum tanks is not 

covered in the "current manufacturer's maintenance manual or Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness" it was in violation of this FAR. The plain language of this 

FAR is much broader than FAA claims. 

As to methods, techniques, and practices, compliance with this FAR is achieved in 

any one of three ways. Using the manufacturer's maintenance manual; using its 

Instructions for Continued Airworthiness; or using unspecified methods, techniques, 

and practices acceptable to the Administrator. Neither the current manufacturer's 

maintenance manual nor its Instructions for Continued Airworthiness cover replacing 

bladder fuel tanks with aluminum fuel tanks. However, welding aluminum parts is 

covered in the B-17 Handbook-Structural Repair Instructions (RX 15). At page 240 of 

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that Exhibit under the heading "WELDING" is the following statement: "The 

succeeding discussion pertains only to steel parts in this airplane, since welding of 

structural aluminum-alloy parts is prohibited." Emphasis added. It is stipulated in this 

case that neither the bladder nor aluminum fuel tanks are structural members. 

The third way to comply with FAR 43.13(a) is to accomplish the work using 

methods, techniques, and practices "acceptable to the Administrator." The FARs do not 

specify what welding methods, techniques, and practices are acceptable. It would be 

impossible for the FAA to be that specific regarding every type of maintenance 

performed on aircraft.20 However, FAA provides guidance in this area in its Advisory 

Circular AC 43.13-18 (RX 21). This AC is entitled "Acceptable Methods, Techniques, 

And Practices - Aircraft Inspection And Repair." Paragraph 4-86d of Section 4 of deals 

with welding and specifically approves TIG welding: 

d. Gas Tungsten Arc Welding (GTAW). This is the form of electric arc welding 

that fills most of the needs in aircraft maintenance. It is more commonly known as 

Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) welding and by the trade names of Heliarc or Heliweld. 

Thus, it is a method, technique, and/ or practice acceptable to the Administrator. This 

is the type of welding referred to by Mr. Schneider, Mr. Underwood, and Mr. Wilkins in 

their Declarations and testimony. Mr. Schneider specifically testified the techniques, 

methods, practices, tools, and equipment that were used to repair the fuel leak were 

consistent with the techniques, methods, practices, tools, and materials he had used in 

his more than two decades of maintenance experience. Tr. 4-24-14, p.170. 

20 As previously noted, FAA's witnesses agreed that not all methods, techniques, and practices 

acceptable to the Administrator are written in the regulations: Tr. 4-23-14, p. 134 (Soerens); Tr. 4-24-

14, p. 212 (Duellman- not in writing anywhere). 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

T: (305] 670-1222 F: (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
This FAR states: 

H. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY VIOLATED FAR43.13{b) 

RELATED TO THE MANNER OF THE WORK PERFORMED 

AND THE QUALITY OF THE MATERIALS USED 

34 

(b) Each person maintaining or altering, or performing preventive maintenance, 

shall do that work in such a manner and use materials of such a quality, that the 

condition of the aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance worked on 

will be at least equal to its original or properly altered condition (with regard to 

aerodynamic function, structural strength, resistance to vibration and deterioration, 

and other qualities affecting airworthiness. 

We have already discussed the quality of the materials used in the subject 

maintenance in both February and June, 2011, including the aluminum fuel tanks that 

were already in the aircraft, the welding materials, and the other parts of the fuel 

system that were used in the conversion from bladder to aluminum. The details are 

also set out in the Declarations of Mr. Schneider, Mr. Underwood, and Mr. Wilkins. The 

opinions of Mr. Schneider and Mr. Norville are that the materials used caused the 

condition of the fuel system to be at least equal to its original or properly altered 

condition. 

I. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY OPERATED LIBERTY BELLE 

IN AN UNAIRWORTHY CONDITION IN VIOLATION 

OF FAR 91.7{a) 

FAR 91.7 states: Civil aircraft airworthiness: 

(a) No person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition. 

The term "airworthy" has been defined by the Administrator and the NTSB in 

several cases. In The Matter Of Go jet Airlines, LLC, FAA Order No. 2012-5, at 6, 2012 

WL2588551 (May 22, 2012) set out the following definition: "The Administrator has 

held that to be airworthy, an aircraft must satisfy both prongs of the following twopronged test: (1) the aircraft must conform to its type design approved under a type 

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certificate or supplemental type certificate and to applicable airworthiness directives; 

and (2) it must be in condition for safe operation."21 Citing, In The Matter Of Whitley, 

FAA Order No. 2009-4 at 12 (January 14, 2009), quoting In The Matter Of Kilrain, FAA 

Order No. 1996-18 at 10 (May 3, 1996), petition for reconsideration denied, FAA v. 

Kilrain, No. 96-3587 (3d Cir. May 1, 1997). NTSB decisions hold to the same definition 

of "airworthiness." Administrator v. Smith, NTSB Order No. 5646, 2013 WL 316198 

(January 16, 2013): "Airworthiness under 91.7(a) requires an aircraft comply with its 

type certificate and be in a condition for safe operation" (emphasis in the original). See 

also, Administrator v. Doppes, 5 NTSB 50, 52 n.6 (1985), Administrator v. Haddock, 

NTSB Order No. EA-5539, at 11 (2010), and Administrator v. Walker, NTSB Order No. 

EA-5514 at 16-17 (2010). 

The B-17 models F and G type certificate (CX 2) is very brief - about one and 

one third pages. In the middle of the first page under the heading "EQUIPMENT" is the 

following statement: "No equipment other than engines and propellers are specified. 

However, the equipment required by Civil Air Regulation Part 43.30 for NC aircraft for 

proper operation of the aircraft must be installed." Therefore, the material out of 

which the fuel tanks are made is not specified in the type certificate ofthe aircraft or in 

the Civil Air Regulations. Because the material out of which the fuel tanks in the B-17 

are made is not specified in the type certificate, FAA cannot, and did not, prove 

N390TH did not conform to its type certificate after the change from bladders to 

aluminum. See, Administrator v. Smith, supra, in which the NTSB held the 

21 FAA has never presented a supplemental type certificate or airworthiness directives applicable in 

this case. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

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Administrator must present all documents necessary to show a failure to comply with 

an aircraft's type certificate. 

FAA witnesses made reference to note 3 of the type certificate as evidence 

Liberty Belle was operated in an unairworthy condition because it was allegedly not in 

conformity with its type certificate. Note 3 states in pertinent part: 

All structural repairs should be made in accordance with Army T.O. No. 01-ZOE-3. If 

any repairs or modifications (other than those covered in the pertinent Army or Navy 

repair manual) are made prior to or subsequent to NL certification, it is the 

responsibility of the owner to furnish sufficient evidence to a Civil Aeronautics 

Administration representative to show that the modified airplane maintains the same 

degree of airworthiness as the original. Emphasis added. 

There are two obvious errors in FAA's argument. First, the parties stipulated 

that neither the bladder nor the aluminum fuel tanks are structural members of the 

aircraft. See, Order Denying The FAA's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, etc., 

paragraph 15. Consequently, note 3 is completely inapplicable to the issues in this 

case. Second, note 3 relates only to repairs. not alterations. All parties agreed the 

work on the fuel tank project was an alteration, the dispute being whether the 

alteration was major or minor. Further, FAA never presented Army T. 0. No. 01-ZOE-3 

and, therefore cannot, and did not, show any non-conformity with that T. 0. For these 

reasons, FAA failed to prove the first prong of the definition of "airworthy," that 

N390TH did not conform to its type certificate. 

FAA also did not prove the second prong of the definition- that N390TH was 

not in condition for safe operation after the project was completed. FAA's only 

evidence on this issue is that a crack developed some four months later in one of the 

welds performed by professional welders of 20 - 40 years experience. If a subsequent 

failure of maintenance is the test for determining that an aircraft is not in condition for 

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safe flight, every subsequent failure of a part or repair would mean previous 

maintenance rendered the aircraft unairworthy from the date of the maintenance or 

repair, despite the fact that the work was performed by professionals with many years 

of experience and signed off accordingly. The test of safe operation as related to 

maintenance must logically be determined at the time the maintenance/repair is 

accomplished, not many months later.2z 

FAA also failed to prove Liberty operated Liberty Belle contrary to the 

requirements of its Special Airworthiness Certificate ("SAC") (RX 17). The Operating 

Limitations ("OL") are referenced in the SAC and are exceedingly brief.23 It requires 

the aircraft be operated in accordance with FAR 91.315 which states in its entirety: 

"No person may operate a limited category aircraft carrying persons or property for 

compensation or hire." As we know, however, FAA specifically authorized Liberty to 

operate its limited category B-17 for compensation or hire pursuant to an Exemption 

dated june 30, 2010. RX 20. The OL also require the aircraft to be "operated at all 

times within the limitations set forth in T. 0. AN01-EG-1." FAA never produced a copy 

of this T. 0. and, therefore, failed to prove the aircraft was not operated in accordance 

with its SAC. 

The Exemption also requires Liberty to operate its B-17 in accordance with (1) 

the maintenance requirements as specified in the appropriate type certificate data 

sheet, as amended; (2) FAA approved maintenance inspection program that meets the 

requirements of 91.409(c), (t)(4) and (g); and (3) the appropriate military technical 

22 The crack appeared on june 11, but the exact date of the welding is not known. We know only that it 

was accomplished some time prior to the date of the log entry- February 24, 2011. 

23 CX 1, the SAC does not include a copy of the OL. 

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manuals. As discussed immediately above, FAA failed to prove Liberty did not operate 

in accordance with its type certificate. As it relates to (2) above, the Exemption 

requires Liberty to have and operate in accordance with an FAA approved 

maintenance inspection program under portions of FAR 91.409. FAA witness 

Bourgoine testified Liberty always adhered strictly to its maintenance inspection 

program. Tr. 4-22-14, p. 145. FAA presented no evidence Liberty did not operate in 

accordance with its maintenance inspection program. As it relates to (3) above, we 

have previously shown Liberty at all times operated in accordance with the applicable 

military technical manuals and, in any event, FAA failed to show Liberty did not 

operate in accordance with those manuals. 

J. FAA DID NOT PROVE LIBERTY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 

ANY FAR VIOLATIONS THE COURT MAY FIND 

(1) The Individuals Who Performed The Maintenance Were Independent 

Contractors, Not Agents Of Liberty 

For all of the reasons set forth above, FAA failed to meet its burden of proof that 

Liberty violated any of the charged FARs. However, should the Court find there were 

regulatory violations, the case law is clear that Liberty is not legally responsible for 

those violations. Mr. Schneider, the A & P mechanic who performed the maintenance 

at issue, and whose license was suspended by the FAA for these violations, was never 

an employee of Liberty. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 128. At the times ofthe alleged violations, Mr. 

Schneider was a full time employee of Delta Airlines. !d., pp. 125-27. He was never an 

officer or director of Liberty. RX 1A, p.45. None of the other A & Ps who worked on the 

February and june projects was an employee of Liberty. Captain john Hess was at all 

times a full time pilot employee of Delta Airlines. !d., p. 101, and had volunteered with 

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7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

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Liberty since 2005. !d., pp. 103-04. Chuck Giese was also a volunteer for Liberty. ld., 

p. 109. Cullen Underwood was at all times an employee and owner of Underwood 

Mold Co., and a volunteer for Liberty. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 204. FAA produced no evidence 

that any of these persons were employees of Liberty. 

Liberty is not responsible for any possible violations that may have been 

committed by Mr. Schneider or any of the other A & Ps (none other than Mr. Schneider 

have ever been charged) because neither Mr. Schneider, nor any of the other A & Ps, 

nor Mr. Underwood, nor Mr. Wilkins, were agents of Liberty such that Liberty would 

have been responsible for those alleged violations. Rather, as the case law holds, these 

volunteers were independent contractors, in the facts and circumstances of this case, 

because Liberty did not have the right to, and did not, control the manner in which 

they performed their maintenance. "It is a fundamental principle of hornbook agency 

law that an agency relationship arises only where the principal has the right to control 

the conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him." In the Matter of: 

Aero Continente, S. A., FAA Order No. 2003-8 (September 12, 2003) (emphasis added). 

Aero Continente was a Peruvian air carrier based in Lima, Peru. It utilized a Florida 

corporation called International Pacific Trading (IPT) to ship aircraft parts on its 

behalf. Pursuant to that arrangement, IPT shipped portable breathing equipment 

(PBE) via Federal Express within the United States. When an air carrier, such as 

Federal Express, transports a package containing a PBE as cargo, it is hazardous 

material. !d. Employees of IPT shipped a PBE on a Federal Express aircraft pursuant 

to authority from Aero Continente to do so. FAA brought a civil penalty action against 

Aero Continente alleging it was legally responsible for IPT's violation of the hazardous 

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materials statute and regulations. The Administrator stated the question at issue as 

follows: 

[W]hether Aero Continente should be held responsible for the actions taken by IPT in 

light of the fact that Aero Continente had delegated authority to secure aircraft parts, 

including this particular device, to !PT. IPT certainly had knowledge of the underlying 

fact that it was shipping a PBE. If IPT was acting as Aero Continente's agent, as the ALJ 

found, then its knowledge of the underlying facts can be imputed to Aero Continente. 

However, if IPT was acting as an independent contractor, then Aero Continente should 

not be held liable for IPT's failure to comply with the [Hazardous Materials 

Regulations] when it shipped the PBE. I d., p. 14. 

In holding Aero Continente not responsible for IPT's Hazmat violations, the 

Administrator found IPT was not an agent of Aero Continente, but was an independent 

contractor because Aero Continente did not have the right to control the conduct of 

!PT. Id. Citing, Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 14 and Longshoremen's Ass'n. 

AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 205 (D. C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub. nom Canaveral Port 

Authority v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 516 U. S. 1158 (1996). I d., p. 16. "If a 

person has the right to control only 'the result of the work [by another person], and not 

the means by which it is accomplished, ... an independent contractor relationship 

exists."' I d. (emphasis added), citing and relying upon In re Coupon Clearing Service, 

Inc., 113 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The Administrator came to the same conclusion in In the Matter of Husky 

Corporation, FAA Order No. 2010-8 (June 16, 2010). Husky was a manufacturer and 

seller of products used in the petroleum industry, including fuel pump nozzles. I d., at 

3. In June, 2006, three Husky employees tested Husky gasoline and diesel fuel nozzles 

at a Circle K service station in North Augusta, S. C. They were assisted by two Circle K 

employees and by a Mr. Hatfield, an employee of a company (Jack Pittman and 

Associates) which distributed products manufactured by Husky as well as by other 

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companies. When the testing was complete, the Husky employees removed the 

nozzles from the pumps, installed new nozzles, and with Hatfield's help, drained the 

residual fuel in the old nozzles. The Husky employees did not follow their usual 

procedure to make sure the old nozzles were completely drained of fuel. Instead, they 

placed the old nozzles in boxes and placed the boxes in Hatfield's car. Id., at 4. Later 

that day, Hatfield tendered two boxes containing 17 nozzles to Federal Express for 

shipment back to Husky's headquarters. The boxes were not labeled as containing 

hazardous materials. The three Husky employees testified they did not give Hatfield 

instructions about how or when to ship the nozzles to Husky's headquarters. 

In overturning the ALJ's decision, the Administrator found Husky "did not give 

Hatfield any direction regarding how to ship the nozzles" and there was no finding 

"showing that Husky had the right to control Hatfield's behavior and conduct, 

regardless of whether its employees asked Hatfield to ship the nozzles to Missouri." 

!d., at 9 (emphasis added). Thus, the Administrator held "if a person has the right to 

control only 'the result of the work [by another person], and not the means by which it 

is accomplished, ... an independent contractor relationship exits." I d., at 10, citing and 

relying upon Aero Continente, S. A., supra and In Re Coupon Clearing Service, supra. 

Accord, Foothill Capital Corp. v. Clare's Food Mkt (In re Coupon Clearing Serv.), 113 F. 3d 

1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1997), supra. 

FAA produced no evidence that Liberty controlled the "means, behavior, or 

conduct" of Mr. Schneider, Mr. Geise, Captain Hess, Mr. Underwood, or Mr. Wilkins. At 

best for the FAA as it relates to the fuel tank replacement project, it showed Liberty 

determined it wanted to replace the bladder fuel tanks because sum ping was becoming 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

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a problem (i. e., the end result) but there is no evidence Liberty instructed anyone or 

dictated to anyone how to do that or what material( s) and tools to use to accomplish 

this end result. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Mr. Schneider testified he did 

not make the decision and did not know who did, but his communications were with 

Mr. Underwood. Tr. 4-24-14, p. 175. He further testified he did not believe Mr. Fowler 

made the decision. Id. Mr. Underwood, in turn, had communications with two DERs 

and ultimately determined, with their guidance, that using the existing aluminum tanks 

was legally permissible. Tr. 4-24-14, pp. 242-43; Tr. 4-25-14, p. 37. There is no 

evidence in this record that either Mr. Fowler or anyone else at Liberty instructed 

anyone how to replace the bladders or what materials to use in the project. Mr. Fowler 

confirmed this when he testified by deposition that he was briefed by Mr. Schneider 

and his group that initially the decision was to fabricate new aluminum tanks. CX 2 7, 

p.12.24 Mr. Fowler was later briefed that the decision to use the existing aluminum 

tanks was made by persons "outside of me and the foundation when we contracted to 

have the work done." !d., p. 14. 

To the same effect, FAA witness Mr. Bourgoine never testified that he was 

instructed how to perform his maintenance tasks. When asked about his 

responsibilities as Director of Maintenance, Mr. Bourgoine testified it was merely to 

"monitor the time that was being put on the airplane and determine when the next 

inspection would be due. To identify if we needed more mechanics at that stop to do 

the inspection and coordinate that with the tour coordinator, Scott Maher, and then go 

and actually perform the inspection on the airplane." Tr. 4-22-14, p. 56 (Emphasis 

24 This group included another lA- Paul White. /d. 

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added). Thus, the record is devoid of evidence that anyone at Liberty ever instructed 

Mr. Bourgoine how to perform maintenance. Mr. Bourgoine elaborated when asked 

how a decision would be reached about whether or not to perform maintenance. He 

testified: "I would get from him (Mr. Maher) the time on the airplane so I knew if the 

twenty-five hour inspection was coming due. Then with that l would say okay, we're 

going to do it in this city, it would time out at that point, we would discuss that and 

then I would tell him what people I would need for that inspection and he would 

provide or he would arrange for them to get there." Id., pp. 59-60 (emphasis added). 

Portions of the inspection program referred to by Mr. Bougoine are in the record as RX 

19. As can be seen from the table of contents and index, tasks are referenced, but there 

is no evidence of instructions how maintenance personnel are to perform those tasks. 

Those decisions are left to the judgment, skill, and experience of maintenance 

personnel. Liberty merely listed, through the inspection program, the end result 

desired, i. e ., that the inspections be performed. The methods, techniques, practices, 

tools, and equipment are left to the judgment and discretion of the A & Ps and !As upon 

whom Liberty relied for their expertise. Therefore, the record is clear that the decision 

how to accomplish the end result - ameliorate the deteriorating bladder tanks - was 

made by Mr. Schneider, Mr. Underwood, Mr. Wilkins, and the DERs that were 

consulted. Those professionals were, therefore, independent contractors and Liberty 

is not responsible for any violations they may have committed. 

The same is true for the june, 2011, fuel tank leak repair. The record is absolutely 

devoid of evidence that anyone at Liberty instructed any of the A & Ps on site how to 

repair the leak. All of the testimony was the decision how to repair the leak was made 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 331S6 

To (30S) 670-1222 Fo (30S) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
44 

by Mr. Schneider, Mr. Underwood, Mr. Giese, and Captain Hess. Although Mr. Fowler 

was briefed on their decision, it was not his or Liberty's decision. Tr. 4-24-14, p; CX 27, 

p. 34 ("they made the decision to make the repair on site with the tank"). ("they 

brought the equipment up to look at the tank and to- and they told me what they were 

planning to do with where the leak was, that one of the welds in the tank, to go through 

to make that repair so they told me what they were planning. Rod did. And again ... 

they just briefed me on it.") Id., p. 35. As detailed above, Mr. Schneider, Mr. 

Underwood, and Captain Hess described how the leak was repaired and the process 

they went through in making their decision (including Mr. Giese). Thus, the record is 

clear that Liberty wanted the leak repaired - the end result - but did not dictate how 

the repair was to be accomplished. Therefore, those that accomplished the leak repair 

were independent contractors and Liberty is not responsible for any violations they 

may have committed. 

(2) As A Part 91 Operator, Liberty Is Not Responsible For Violations Committed 

By Its Maintenance Personnel 

At all times, Liberty operated the Liberty Belle under FAR Part 91. See, Order 

Denying The FAA's Motion For Partial Summary judgment, etc., para. 13. There is a 

great difference between Part 91 operators and Parts 121 and 135 operators in terms 

of maintenance responsibilities. Parts 121 and 135 operators (air carriers) are 

responsible for the FAR violations of their independent contractors because the 

Federal Aviation Act requires air carriers operating under those Parts to perform their 

services with the highest possible degree of safety. In The Matter Of USAIR, Inc., FAA 

Order 92-70 (December 21, 1992), 1992 FAA Lexis 352, p. 2. To the same effect, see In 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

T' (305] 670-1222 p, (305] 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
45 

The Matter Of Alaska Airlines, Inc., FAA Order No. 2004-8 (October 4, 2004), 2004 FAA 

Lexis 905, pp. 4-5.25 Three dockets were combined for disposition, each one involving 

maintenance by an independent maintenance contractor of Airlines. Holding Alaska 

Airlines responsible for the errors of its independent maintenance contractor, the 

Administrator referenced 14 CFR 121.363 ("Responsibility for airworthiness") which 

provides: 

(a) Each certificate holder is primarily responsible for-

(1) The airworthiness of its aircraft, including airframes, aircraft engines, propellers, 

appliances, and parts thereof; and 

(2) The performance of the maintenance, preventive maintenance, and alteration of its 

aircraft, including airframes, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, emergency 

equipment, and parts thereof, in accordance with its manual and the regulations of this 

chapter. 

(b) A certificate holder may make arrangements with another person for the 

performance of any maintenance, preventive maintenance, or alterations. However, 

this does not relieve the certificate holder of the responsibility specified in paragraph 

(a) of this section. 

FAA treats Part 91 operators very differently, and much less stringently, in 

terms of airworthiness responsibility related to aircraft maintenance. FAA Advisory 

Circular 120-16E, Chapter 2 is entitled Airworthiness Responsibility. RX 22. This 

Exhibit details the maintenance responsibility differences between air carriers 

operating under Parts 121 and 135 vis-a-vis Part 91 operators. Paragraphs 200a and b 

state: 

a. Part 119 Certificate Holder Responsibilities. Consistent with sections 121.363 

and 135.413, you, as a part 119 certificate holder, are primarily responsible for (1) the 

airworthiness of your aircraft, and (2) the performance of all of the maintenance or 

alterations on your aircraft. Your air carrier certificate makes you a maintenance 

entity. Under your air carrier certificate, you accomplish your own maintenance, 

preventive maintenance, or alterations, or you can use other persons who are not 

direct employees to accomplish that work. Consistent regulations in sections 121.1(b) 

25 49 U.S.C. 44702(b)(l)(a) 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380. MIAMI, FL 33156 

T: (305) 670-1222 F: (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
46 

and 135.1(a)(2), the part 121 or 135 regulations govern each person that you use or 

that you employ for any maintenance, preventive maintenance, or alteration of your 

aircraft. Each of those persons that you use must be under your direction and control 

and must follow your maintenance program. 

b. Maintenance Responsibilities. For any work done on your aircraft, you retain 

direct and primary responsibility for performing and approving all maintenance and 

alterations, whether you accomplish that work or whether someone else does it for 

you (for example, a maintenance provider such as a repair station). However, you 

always retain primary responsibility for the performance and approval of the 

maintenance done by that maintenance provider. Emphasis added. 

In paragraph 201, the FAA provides a table of the "differences between air 

carrier maintenance programs and part 91 general aviation inspection programs." The 

NOTE: on page 5 of RX 22 states: "The wording in part 91 is deliberately different from 

the wording in 14 CFR parts 121 and 135 and is consistent with the difference between 

air transportation and other air commerce described in 49 U.S.C. 44701." (Emphasis 

added). As they relate to the issues in this case, those differences are stark. Parts 121 

and 135 air carriers are responsible for "determining the method of performing 

maintenance ... ", whereas a Part 91 operator is only responsible for "scheduling of 

aircraft for the inspections, and for ensuring that discrepancies that occur between 

scheduled inspections are repaired."26 (Emphasis added). 

The table of differences goes on to state that Parts 121 and 135 air carriers 

"Must determine what maintenance is required, how to do it [and] when to do it ... ", 

whereas Part 91 operators are only required to "make the airplane available to 

authorized and certificated person( s) who accomplish inspections and other 

maintenance." (Emphasis added). 

26 This is consistent with Mr. Bourgoine's and Mr. Schneider's testimony as to their duties as "Director 

of Maintenance" referenced above. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN,P.A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

r, (305) 670-1222 p, (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLD5TEINPA@ATT.NET 
47 

Further, a Part 121 and Part 135 air carrier is "the primary authority with 

regard to its maintenance program" and "holds the primary responsibility for the 

performance of maintenance in accordance with its maintenance program and manual, 

as well as the airworthiness of its aircraft, including airframes, aircraft engines, 

propellers, appliances, and parts thereof." (Emphasis added). This contrasts sharply 

with what the FAA says is the responsibility of a Part 91 operator: 

The authorized and certificated person(s) has the responsibility to perform the 

maintenance properly in accordance with the manufacturer's manual and to approve 

the aircraft for return to service. The owner /operator does not have this 

responsibility. However, the owner /operator is responsible for ensuring maintenance 

personnel make appropriate entries in the aircraft maintenance records indicating the 

aircraft has received approval for return to service. (Emphasis added). 

K. THE PENALTY SOUGHT BY THE ADMINISTRATOR IS 

INAPPROPRIATE 

It is, of course, Liberty's view that no penalty is appropriate because the 

Administrator failed to meet his burden of proof on any of the alleged violations. If, 

however, the Court finds the Administrator has proven violations and that Liberty is 

legally responsible for those violations, the penalty sought in this matter is far too 

large in the totality of the circumstances. Because it is impossible to know which, if 

any, violations the Court may find, this Section of Liberty's Closing Argument is 

necessarily presented in general terms. 

The case law indicates the computation of a penalty should not be done by 

simply multiplying a sanction for a violation by the number of flights, but rather by 

looking to the totality of the circumstances. In The Matter OfWarbelow"s Air Ventures, 

Inc., FAA Order No. 2000-3, p. 10 (February 3, 2000), 2000 FAA Lexis 300, 

reconsideration denied, FAA Order 2000-14 (June 8, 2000), 2000 FAA Lexis 646. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

T: (305) 670-1222 F: (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
48 

Factors to be considered are the extent and gravity of a violation, the degree of 

culpability, history of prior offenses, and such other matters as justice may require. In 

The Matter Of Phyllis jones Luxemburg, FAA Order No. 1994-18, p. 5 (June 22, 1994). 

The factors set forth in 49 U.S.C. 1471(a) for hazardous materials violations are 

applicable in non-hazardous materials cases. I d., p. 6 and In The Matter Of Northwest 

Airlines, FAA Order No. 1990-37 at 12 n. 9 (November 7, 1990), citing 55 Fed. Reg. 22, 

548, at 27,569 (1990).27 

Applying these factors in this case, it is clear only a minimal penalty is 

appropriate if any violations are found. The facts show beyond any reasonable dispute 

that Liberty is an innocent violator, if violations are found. FAA has produced no 

evidence that Liberty did anything but reasonably rely on volunteer maintenance 

professionals and other experts, such as Cobb Industrial Fabricators. In an oft-cited 

case, NTSB set out the parameters for reasonable reliance. In Administrator v. 

Yialamas, NTSB Order No. EA-5111 at 3 (2004 WL 2125410), a Part 91 operator was 

charged with two violations of operating an unairworthy aircraft because its elevator 

trim cable was damaged. The aircraft was inspected by two A & P mechanics, neither 

of whom advised respondent the aircraft was not airworthy, and who provided 

respondent with return-to-service log entries although they both advised respondent 

the trim cable should be replaced before the aircraft flew again. In reversing the 

suspension upheld by the ALJ, the Board assumed for purposes of its decision the 

aircraft was unairworthy: 

[A]ssuming for our purposes that the airplane was unairworthy as a result of the 

frayed trim cable, we conclude that the Administrator failed to establish that 

27 There is no record evidence of prior violations by Liberty. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

To (305] 670-1222 Fo (305] 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
49 

respondent should be charged with this knowledge. To prove a violation of section 

91.7(a), the Administrator must show that the airman operated an aircraft that he 

knew or reasonably should have known was not airworthy. Administrator v. Bernstein, 

NTSB Order No. EA-4120 at 5 (1994), and cases cited therein. Neither Mr. Adams nor 

Mr. Briglia [the two mechanics] ever told respondent that the airplane was 

unairworthy. Further, we agree with respondent that the signed maintenance entries 

he was given by Mr. Adams and Mr. Briglia could reasonably be relied upon as an 

indication that the airplane was safe to fly. 

NTSB confirmed the rationale of this holding in Administrator v. Wilson, NTSB 

Order No. EA-5646 at 5-6 (2013 WL 316198) describing it as "a long line of precedent." 

In the instant case, Liberty had never been advised the aircraft was unairworthy by 

any of the A & Ps and Als that inspected it or performed work on it, and log entries 

were made for both the tank project and the leak repair. Liberty had no perceivable 

reason to look beyond those return-to-service log entries made by independent, 

professional, maintenance personnel. Liberty, therefore, fits squarely in the 

parameters of the Yialamas, Bernstein, and Wilson decisions and reasonably relied on 

those return-to-service log entries. See also, judge Kolka's Initial Decision in Empire 

Airlines, 1995 FAA Lexis 399 at 5 (March 3, 1995), in which judge Kolka absolved 

Empire Airlines, a Part 121 air carrier, from responsibility for improperly greased 

wheel bearings that were signed off (returned to service) by maintenance personnel 

based on reasonable reliance on the service provider. 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

T' (305) 670·1222 F' (305) 400·0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET 
Respectfully submitted, 

STUART A. GOLDLSTEIN, P. A. 

7300 North Kendall Drive, Suite 380 

Miami, FL 33156 

Tel: (305) 670-1222 

Fax: (305) 400-0685 

Email: stuartgoldsteinpa@ att. net 

ll ' 

J

;'i -01.- r j i) ,. 1 --i/--

By: '· ')J0'fiJ oV If '<)fiVJU·~· Stuart A. Goldstein 

Attorney for Liberty Foundation 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

50 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of August, 2014, I served the above and 

foregoing Respondent's Post-Hearing Closing Argument, as follows: 

Original and one copy to: 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building- Suite 2W1000 

800 Independence Avenue, S. W. 

Washington, D. C. 20591 

Via: Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested 

One copy to: 

Honorable j. E. Sullivan 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New jersey Avenue, SE (E11-310) 

Washington, D. C. 20590 

Via Federal Express 

Stuart A. Goldstein 

STUART A. GOLDSTEIN, P. A. 

One copy to: 

Christopher R. Stevenson, Esq. 

Federal Aviation Administration 

1701 Columbia Avenue 

College Park, GA 30337 

Via Certified Mail, Return 

Receipt Requested 

7300 NORTH KENDALL DRIVE, SUITE 380, MIAMI, FL 33156 

To (305) 670-1222 Fo (305) 400-0685 STUARTGOLDSTEINPA@ATT.NET