Filed 10/16/13 P. v. Dorado CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSE MANUEL DORADO,

Defendant and Appellant. B244255

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VA119388)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Los Angeles County, Dewey L. Falcon, Judge. Affirmed in pa rt, reversed in part and remanded.

Law Offices of Fred Browne & Associat es and Fred Browne for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant A ttorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell, Supervising Deputy Attorney Ge neral, and Tasha G. Timbadia , Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________ ________________2 A jury convicted defendant and appella nt Jose Manuel Dorado of three counts each of attempted murder (P en. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd . (a) [counts 1, 2, and 4]), 1 assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2) [counts 5, 6, and 8]), and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§245, subd. (b) [counts 9, 10, and 12]) for shooting at Eduardo Herrera, Hector Magana, and Oscar Amaya. As to counts 1, 2, and 4, the jury found true allegations that defendant personally and inte ntionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury. (§ 12 022.53, subd. (d).) As to coun ts 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 12, the jury found true allegations that defenda nt personally inflicted great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a ).) As to counts 9, 10, and 12, the jury found true allegations that defendant personally used a firearm. (§1202 2.5, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 59 years 4 months to life. In his timely appeal, defendant contends (1) his convictions for assault with a firearm in counts 5, 6, and 8 must be reversed because they are lesser included offenses of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, (2 ) the trial court imposed an unauthorized indeterminate sentence on count 1 because the ju ry did not find the attempted murder was committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, (3) the enhancements as to counts 4, 8, and 12 must be reversed be cause there was insuffi cient evidence Amaya suffered great bodily injury, and (4) the atte mpted murder convictions must be reversed because the court erroneously instructed the jury regard ing the “kill zone” concept. The Attorney General conced es (1) the convictions for assault with a firearm are

lesser included offenses of a ssault with a semiau tomatic firearm and must be reversed, and (2) the court imposed an unauthorized se ntence on count 1. The Attorney General also contends, and defendant agrees, the tria l court imposed an un authorized 25-year-tolife enhancement on the assault with a semiauto matic firearm convictions in counts 9, 10, and 12 pursuant to section 1 2022.53, subdivision (d), because the information did not include the required allegations.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.3 We reverse the convictions on counts 5, 6, and 8, and remand for resentencing on counts 1, 9, 10, and 12. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

FACTS 2

Defendant was at the El Rodeo nightclub in Pico Rivera around 2:00 a.m. on December 19, 2010. After a fight took place in the club, security guards intending to escort defendant pushed, grabbed, and struggl ed with defendant until he was outside the

back door to the club. Defe ndant and security guard Amaya struck each other one or two times in the club parking lot. Defendant went to his truck, obtained a gun, and returned to the back door of the club. Herrera, Ma gana, and David Adame, all security guards,

were near the back door. De fendant fired six or seven s hots in quick succession, hitting Herrera in the foot and Magana in the left leg. Defendant ran back to his truck. Amay a and another guard threw their flashlights at defendant’s truck, causing the passenger si de window to break. Amaya was trying to open the driver’s side door when defendant pulled out a gun. Amaya retreated and saw defendant fire a gun towards him at least six times. 3 Amaya tried to chase defendant’s truck as it was leaving the parking lot, but defendant escaped. After defendant left, Amaya noticed a bullet had grazed his wrist. He also had been shot in the right shin. When he lifted up his pant leg, a bullet fell out. Herrera, Magana, and Amaya went to the hospital by ambulance. Seven shell casings were recovered by sheriff’s deputies from the area near the club’s back door. Bullet fragmen ts were recovered on the stairs leading to that door. The casings and bullet fragments, as well as bu llets extracted from Herrera’s foot and Magana’s leg, were linked to a .45-caliber Ruger found in defend ant’s Ford Explorer during a traffic stop on March 28, 2011.

2 We state the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment.

3 Although fewer casings we re recovered, witnesses testified defendant fired six or seven times at the rear door, and six more times at Amaya.4 DISCUSSION

1. Lesser Included Offenses

Defendant contends his convi ctions for assault with a firearm in counts 5, 6, and 8 must be reversed because they are lesser included offenses of his convictions for assault

with a semiautomatic firear m in counts 9, 10, and 12. 4 The Attorney General concedes defendant is correct, and we agree. A greater offense necessarily includes a lesser offense if the defendant cannot

commit the former without al so committing the latter. ( People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 667-668.) “A semiautomatic fi rearm assault cannot be committed without also committing a firearm assault.” ( People v. Martinez (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 197, 199 [reversing firearm assault convictions as lesse r included offenses].) The convictions in counts 5, 6, and 8 must be reversed. ( Ibid. )

2. Unauthorized Sentences

a. Jury Findings Do No t Support an Indeterminate Sentence on Count One

Defendant correctly points out the trial court erroneously sentenced him to a term of “seven years to life” on count one withou t a jury finding the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The A ttorney General concedes the court erred.

A defendant convicted of atte mpted murder is subject to a determinate sentence of five, seven, or nine years unless “it is plea ded and proved that the murder attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” ( People v. Arias (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1009,

4 Defendant’s opening brief mistakenly iden tifies the convictions for assault with a semiautomatic firearm as counts 3, 10, and 12, rather than 9, 10, and 12. The Attorney General suggests that defendant is apparently referring to count 9 in stead of count 3 in connection with the assault w ith a semiautomatic firearm conviction regarding victim Eduardo Herrera. We proceed with the analysis as to c ounts 9, 10, and 12.5 1011, fn. 2; § 664, subd. (a).) A sentence is unauthorized if “it c ould not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.” ( People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) Without a “willful, deliberate, and prem editated” finding by the jury, the court only has discretion to sentence defe ndant to a determinate term of five, seven, or nine years. ( People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, 541; § 664, subd. (a).) The information alleged defendant co mmitted the attempted murders “willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation,” and the tr ial court instructed th e jury to determine whether the allegation was true if they c onvicted defendant of attempted murder. However, the verdict forms inad vertently omitted such a finding. The court only learned of the omission after the jury was discharg ed but before sentencing, and the court correctly concluded there was no remedy for the oversight. The prosecution’s sentencing memorandum sought only determinate sentences for counts 1, 2, and 4, and the trial court im posed determinate sentences for counts 2 and 4 but imposed an indeterminate sentence of “s even years to life” on count 1. Both the minute order and the abstract of judgment re flect a determinate seven-year sentence on

count one. The indeterminat e sentence is unauthorized. When the trial court’s oral pronouncement results in an unaut horized sentence, the error may be corrected at any time. ( People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 854.) We remand so the trial court may correct its oral pronouncement of judgment. Because both the minute order and abstract of judgment al ready reflect a seven-year determinate term,

those documents need not be corrected.6 b. The Information Lacked Allegations to Supp ort Enhancements Under S ection 12022.53 for Co unts 9, 10, and 12

The Attorney General cont ends, and defendant agrees, the trial court imposed an unauthorized enhancement of 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), on

the assault with a semiau tomatic firearm charges in counts 9, 10, and 12. 5 Counts 9, 10, and 12 did not includ e allegations under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Because th e section 12022.53, subdivis ion (d) enhancement was not alleged as to these counts, nor found true by the jury, the co rresponding sentences on counts 9, 10, and 12 were unauthorized. We remand to the trial court for resentencing. (See People v. Irvin (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 180, 192-19 3 [“As a result of the trial court’s imposition of an unauthorized sentence, the appr opriate course of action is to remand this case to the trial court”].)

3. Great Bodily Injury

Defendant contends the enhancement a llegations for discharge of a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury in count 4, and pers onal infliction of great bodily injury in counts 4, 8, and 12 were not sup ported by the evidence because Amaya’s bullet wounds were neither “significant” nor “substantial.” 6 Whether a victim suffered grea t bodily injury is a questi on of fact for the jury to decide. ( People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 64.) We review the jury’s factual finding of great bodily injury under the s ubstantial evidence standard. ( People v. Escobar (1992)

5 The trial court stayed th e enhancements as to count s 9 and 10, and ordered the enhancement for count 12 to run concurrent with the enhanced sentence on counts 1 and 2. The abstract of judg ment incorrectly references count 11 instead of count 10 and incorrectly shows the enhancement on count 12 as stayed. Because the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancemen ts are unauthorized fo r all three counts, they will be removed from the abstra ct of judgment upon resentencing.

6 The trial court properly stayed the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement found true as to count 4 pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (f).7 3 Cal.4th 740, 759 ( Escobar ).) “‘In reviewing a challeng e to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determ ine the facts ourselves. Rather, we “examine the whole record in the light most fa vorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses

substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonabl e, credible and of solid value—such that

a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citations.] We presume in support of the ju dgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Cita tion.] [¶] . . . “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the ju dgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled w ith a contrary finding.” [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or re evaluate a witness’s cr edibility. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” ( People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210.) “Any person who personally inflicts gr eat bodily injury on a ny person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felo ny” is subject to a threeyear sentence enhancement under section 12022. 7, subdivision (a). Great bodily injury is defined as “a significant or subs tantial physical injury.” ( Id ., subd. (f).) Section 12022.53, subdivision (d ) requires a prison term of 25 years to life additional and consecutive to any other term for any person who “in the commission of a [specified] felony . . . personally and intentionally disc harges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury, as defined in Section 12022.7 . . . .” Great bodily injury need on ly be a substantial injury be yond that inherent in the offense itself. ( Escobar

, supra , 3 Cal.4th at pp. 746-747.) Indeed, the victim need not suffer permanent or even prolonged impairment of a bodily function, but “minor, trivial or moderate injuries do not constitute great bodily injury.” (CALJIC No. 17.19.5.) In People v. Martinez (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 727, 735- 736, the court found insufficient evidence of great bodily injury where a defendant wielded a knife and “picked or cut” the victim through two shirts and a heavy coat. Even the prosecutor co nceded the victim’s injury was “almost like a pinpr ick on the knife wound” and re quested to strike the great bodily injury allegation. ( Ibid .) In contrast, evidence that a bullet caused a “mere soft tissue injury” can be suffici ent to support a finding of great bodily injury. ( People v. Le8 (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 54, 58 [bullet traveled through left thigh and lodged in right thigh, victim released from hospital within 24 hours afte r bullet was removed, but had ongoing pain and difficulty walking].) “‘A fine line can divide an injury from being significant or substantial from an injury that does not quite meet the description. . . .’ [Citations.]” ( Escobar, supra , at p. 752.) Defendant’s shots hit Amaya in the leg and on the wrist. Amaya described his wrist injury as feeling “hot,” and when he looked at his wrist, he had “blood all over [his] hand.” He knew his leg was injured and when he rolled up his pant le g, he saw the injury and a bullet fell out. The prosecution entere d into evidence photos showing Amaya’s injuries. The wounds shown in the photos are oozing blood and Amaya’s wrist wound

extends across almost half of his wrist. Am aya was taken to the hospital, although there was no testimony or medical records documentin g the nature of his wounds or required

treatment. Viewing the evidence in th e light most favorable to the judgment, a reasonable trier of fact would conclude that Amaya’s in juries were substantial and significant. Evidence showing that Amaya was shot twice and taken to the hospital is substantial evidence to support a finding of great bodily injury.

4. Kill Zone Instruction

Defendant contends the tria l court erroneously instructed the jury on th e theory of a “kill zone.” Defendant argues the kill zone instruction provided a legally erroneous theory of liability and the r ecord does not demonstrate the jury convicted defendant for attempted murder on a legally correct theory. We disagree. The Attorney General argue s defendant forfeited his challenge to the kill zone instruction by failing to object or request any ch ange to the language of the instruction at trial. ( People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011- 1012 [a party forfeits any challenge to a jury instruction that was correct in law and re sponsive to the evidence if the party fails to object in th e trial court].) The rule of forfeiture does not apply if the9 instruction was an incorrect statement of the law ( id. at p. 1012), or if the instructional

error affected the defendant’s substa ntial rights. (Pen. Code, § 1259; People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087.) If the kill zone in struction was given in error, it arguably affected defendant’s substantial rights. “Ascertaining whether claimed

instructional error affected the substantial ri ghts of the defendant necessarily requires an

examination of the merits of the claim—at le ast to the extent of ascertaining whether the

asserted error would result in prejudice if error it was.” ( People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249.)

We review a claim of inst ructional error de novo. ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210.) We exam ine the instructions to dete rmine whether the trial court “‘fully and fairly instructed on the applicable law . . . .’” ( People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111 ( Martin ), quoting People v. Partlow (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 540, 558.) “‘Instructions should be interpreted, if possible, so as to support the judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonabl y susceptible to such interpretation.’” ( Martin,

supra, at p. 1112, quoting People v. Laskiewicz (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1254, 1258.)

The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of attempted murder (CALJIC No. 8.66) and the kill zone (CAL JIC No. 8.66.1). The court di d not err in giving the kill

zone instruction because the facts of this cas e are appropriate for the instruction and the

evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conviction regardless of whether the jury relied on a kill zone theory of liability. In determining whether an attempted murd er conviction should be sustained, the trial court must analyze defendant’s intent as to each alleged victim and evaluate whether

defendant intended to kill that person rath er than another. ( People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 330-331 ( Bland ).) However, the intent requir ement for attempted murder does not preclude a scenario where defendant in tends to kill a person, but not any specific individual. “[A] person who intends to kill ca n be guilty of attempte d murder even if the person has no specific target in mind.” ( People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 140.) When a defendant fires a “flurry of bullets” at a fleeing car with multiple occupants, the10 facts support a specific intent to kill the dr iver, as well as a reasonable inference of concurrent intent to kill the passengers. ( Bland

, supra , at p. 328.) The facts of this case overwhelmingly support a jury finding that defendant

intended to kill Herrera and Magana, regardless of whether the jury used th e theory of a

kill zone to find intent or not. Defendant saw three security guards near the back door of the club and after a brief verbal exchange, he fired between four and seven shots at them in quick succession, from about five or ten fe et away. Regardless of which of the three guards was defendant’s primary target, the kill zone instruction merely clarified that the jury could find a concurrent intent to kill ot hers who were in the line of fire. Although the instruction allows the jury to find defendant had a primar y target, with a concurrent intent to kill anyone near that target, it does not require a conviction to rest on a theory of concurrent intent. (See Bland

, supra , at p. 331, fn. 6 [the theo ry of concurrent intent “is not a legal doctrine requiring special jury inst ructions, as is the doctrine of transferred intent”].) Nothing in the in struction precluded the jury from finding defendant had a specific intent to kill any one of the guards at the back d oor and fired multiple shots to carry out that intent.11 DISPOSITION

The convictions for assault w ith a firearm in counts 5, 6, and 8 are reversed. The

cause is remanded for resentenci ng on (1) the attempted murd er charge in count 1, and (2) the assault with a semiau tomatic firearm charges in coun ts 9, 10, and 12 to remove the unauthorized 25-year-to-life enhancements imposed pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d). In all other re spects, the judgment is affirmed.

KRIEGLER, J.

We concur:

TURNER, P. J.

KUMAR, J. *

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court assi gned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.