J. S02001/19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: L.D.G., JR., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: N.M.W., MOTHER : No. 2386 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 19, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 2018-a9052

IN RE: J.D.G., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: N.M.W., MOTHER : No. 2408 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 19, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 2018-a9053

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 21, 2019

N.M.W (“Mother”) appeals from the July 19, 2018 decrees entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Orphans’ Court Division 

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her dependent children, J.D.G., 

male child, born in October of 2008, and L.D.G., Jr., male child, born in 

September of 2012 (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).

1

 We affirm.

 

1 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513, this court sua sponte consolidated these appeals 

because they involve related parties and issues. (Order of court, 9/6/18.)
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The orphans’ court set forth the following:

[Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services 

Agency (“Agency”)] first received a referral regarding 

this family in September 2010. Between 2010 and 

2013, the Agency provided general protective services 

to the family. In December 2013, dependency 

petitions were filed, and on August 13, 2014 both 

[C]hildren were adjudicated dependent. The Children 

were placed in the legal custody of a maternal aunt 

until September 8, 2014, when an emergency custody 

Order placed the Children in the care of the Agency.

A shelter care hearing was conducted on 

September 15, 2014. The Children were then in the 

care of the Agency for twenty-three (23) consecutive 

months. On August 3, 2016, the Children were 

returned to the care of Mother; however, shortly 

thereafter, on September 13, 2016, the Children were 

returned to the care of the Agency. They have 

remained in the Agency’s care since that time. In 

total, then, the Children have been out of Mother’s 

care for approximately forty-five (45) months of the 

past forty-six (46) months, except for the brief period 

in August and September 2016. 

Unfortunately, Mother has failed to remedy the 

difficult circumstances that originally caused the 

Children to come into the care of the Agency, 

particularly with regard to extremely unsuitable 

housing conditions, and she has failed to adequately 

comply with the Permanency Placement Plans that the 

Agency designed for her. On May 16, 2018, the 

Agency filed the subject Petitions for the Involuntary 

Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights under 

§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8) of the Adoption Act. On 

August 10, 2018, Mother filed a timely appeal in the 
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Superior Court from our July 19, 2018 

Decrees.[Footnote 2][2]

[Footnote 2] Despite this being a fast 

track appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2), the [orphans’ 

c]ourt was delayed in receiving the official 

transcript of this hearing due to 

unexpected medical difficulties suffered 

by th[e orphans’ c]ourt’s stenographer. 

Immediately upon receipt of the 

transcript, the [orphans’ c]ourt promptly 

addressed this appeal.

Orphans’ court opinion, 10/12/18 at 1-2 (citations to notes of testimony 

omitted).

[At the termination of parental rights hearing,] [w]e 

heard the testimony of Ericka Way, the Agency 

caseworker who became involved with this family in 

February 2018.[Footnote 4] Ms. Way testified 

regarding more than twenty (20) visits to Mother’s 

home between 2011 and 2018. The first visit occurred 

on September 28, 2010. That was an unannounced 

visit to the home following the referral that was made 

 

2 The record reflects that Mother simultaneously filed a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). 

Thereafter, the orphans’ court filed its Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion.

We further note that the orphans’ court noted that:

the biological father (“Father”) did not appear at the 

hearing, although his court-appointed counsel was 

present. The Agency has had no contact with Father 

since November 2016. He has not sought assistance 

from the Agency, nor has he been an active resource 

for the Children. Decrees granting the Agency’s 

Petitions to Terminate Father’s Rights as to both 

Children were signed on July 19, 2018. Father has 

not filed an appeal.

Orphans’ court opinion, 10/12/18 at 1 n.1.
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to the Agency about this family. The house was found 

to be “cluttered and filthy,” with no food in the home 

and ants crawling on a high chair. Upon these 

discoveries, the Agency assisted by providing cleaning

supplies.

[Footnote 4] The caseworker formerly 

involved with this family is no longer 

employed by the Agency.

Over the years, the majority of the visits to Mother’s 

home were scheduled visits, yet Ms. Way testified that 

upon entering the home, it was consistently found in 

the same cluttered and filthy condition. Mother was 

repeatedly informed that she needed to clean the 

home. The Agency notes through the years included 

descriptions such as filthy, smelling of human and dog

urine, dog feces in the home, trash on the floors 

throughout the home, food on the floor, ants, and a

fence around a swimming pool that remained 

unrepaired. During an announced visit on 

November 20, 2013, Mother refused to show the 

caseworker where the Children slept. During an 

unannounced visit on August 4, 2015, the caseworker 

discovered the family was sleeping in the basement 

due to oppressive odors upstairs in the home. The 

inability to breathe clean air in the home was always 

of particular concern to the Agency due to both 

Children suffering from asthma.

Ms. Way testified about exposed nails in the home, 

choking hazards on the floor, cleaning products and 

spray paint within reach of the Children, and medicine 

bottles not safely situated. During one visit a 

caseworker had to step outside the home and became 

ill due to the extremely foul odor inside. One week 

later, on September 1, 2016, the caseworker arrived 

for a scheduled visit and observed a basement that 

smelled of urine, no sheets on the beds, debris all over 

the floors, and urine filled bottles into which Mother 

had the Children urinate. Mother refused to allow the 

caseworker to photograph the conditions. The 

caseworker attempted an unannounced visit on 

February 28, 2018. Although no one answered the 
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door, the caseworker recognized a strong smell of 

urine from outside the door.[Footnote 5] Ms. Way 

testified Mother has never informed the Agency that 

she cleaned the home and requested the Agency to 

reassess the living conditions, nor did she inform the 

Agency that she was living elsewhere, in a cleaner and 

safer environment for her and the Children.

[Footnote 5] During this period Mother, 

and when relevant, the Children, lived 

with the maternal grandfather and 

great-grandfather. The Agency 

caseworkers encountered similar 

unacceptable, unsanitary conditions 

wherever Mother resided with her 

Children.

We also heard the testimony of Desiree Mullen, the 

Agency supervisor involved in this case between 

February 2016 and February 2018. Ms. Mullen 

testified that the most significant concern to the 

Agency was that for years, Mother did not have an 

appropriate living environment for the Children, and 

that for many months Mother refused to allow the 

Agency to enter her home. The poor condition of the 

home was so extreme that it was referenced in Agency 

notes as “deplorable.” Ms. Mullen testified that

Mother had discussed obtaining full-time employment 

for herself and new housing for the Children since 

2014, but had accomplished neither.[Footnote 6] 

Despite the Agency repeatedly informing Mother 

during eight (8) years of Agency involvement, that 

she could and should improve the environment in 

which Children lived by cleaning the home, Mother 

failed to do so. Ms. Mullen testified that the only 

explanation Mother shared during the time the 

Children lived in her father’s home, was that no one 

else helped her with housecleaning.

[Footnote 6] Mother gave birth to another 

child in November 2017, about two weeks 

after she had informed the Agency of her 

pregnancy. That child is being cared for 
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by the paternal grandmother and greatgrandmother.

The Agency was concerned that Mother’s conduct may 

have been associated with mental health issues, and 

suggested to Mother as early as 2012 that she should 

pursue a mental health evaluation. Mother failed to 

consistently participate in mental health treatment. 

Mother would provide the Agency a verification of an 

evaluation but then no further proof of treatment. 

Mother refused to sign releases for the Agency to 

access any related mental health information. 

Ms. Mullen testified that twice Mother failed to appear 

for treatment appointments. In June 2014 Mother 

informed the Agency that she was not receiving any 

treatment.

In September 2014, Mother agreed in Dependency 

Court to seek a psychological evaluation. In 2016, 

Mother reported attending counseling, but she would 

not sign a release or inform the caseworker where she 

was allegedly receiving treatment. In 2017, Mother 

informed the Agency that she was not receiving 

counseling, and in February 2018, she reported 

receiving therapy at Penndel Mental Health. Given 

Mother’s unwillingness to comply in this regard, the 

Agency has no better insight today than it did in 2012 

as to whether or not Mother’s mental health status 

impacts her ability to obtain and maintain appropriate

housing.

Ms. Mullen testified about the services the Agency has 

provided Mother at various times during the past 

eight (8) years. Those services included assistance 

with housing, employment, and family services to aid 

in prevention of the Children having to be removed 

from the home.

One example about which Ms. Mullen testified was 

Mother’s noncompliance at a housing group shelter to 

which the Agency had referred Mother in 2013. 

Mother was discharged from that program due to the 

lack of cleanliness of her room which rendered the 

conditions inappropriate and unsafe for the Children. 
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Additionally, Mother had not followed through with 

expectations regarding her own mental health and 

services for the Children.

Mother also failed to effectively engage in parent 

education. Ms. Mullen testified that “most, if not all”

of the parenting referrals for Mother were not 

successfully completed by her, and were terminated 

by the Agency’s contractor due to Mother’s refusal to 

participate. Ms. Mullen observed that Mother 

participated in the LINKS Family Services Association 

program “intermittently.”

Mother has represented to the Agency that she has 

part-time employment. Mother did not provide 

documentation of that employment to the Agency, nor 

has she ever reported full-time employment. 

Ms. Mullen also testified about the family group 

decision making meetings that were conducted in this 

case. She believed at least two meetings occurred 

which were attended by her and the caseworker, 

along with Mother, Mother’s brother and his 

fiancé/wife, and Mother’s father. The causes that 

brought the Children into the care of the Agency, and 

how those circumstances could be improved, were 

discussed. Included were the need for Mother to 

make the home safe for the Children, and for Mother 

to increase her hours of employment. Mother 

understood the tasks she needed to accomplish in 

order for the Children to potentially return to Mother’s 

home in August 2016, and she acknowledged that this 

was an important opportunity for her to exhibit 

improvement. Ms. Mullen recounted the tasks as 

follows: “[t]o keep the house clean and appropriate, 

free of clutter, trash, urine, feces, to increase her work 

hours which were floating around 10 hours a week . . . 

for her to follow through with mental health.” Mother 

was also to enroll L.D.G., Jr. in daycare and J.D.G. in 

school. In anticipation of the Children’s return to 

Mother’s home, the assigned Agency caseworker 

assisted Mother in cleaning the home, disposing of 

trash and clutter, removing unsafe items, and 
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discarding uneaten food that remained around the 

home.

Ms. Mullen testified that the caseworker visited 

Mother’s home shortly after the Children returned 

there in August 2016. Mother had not enrolled the 

Children in school or daycare, despite the Agency 

providing funding for the daycare. Mother had 

returned the Children to wearing pull-ups and 

urinating into bottles, and again there was food and 

garbage strewn about the floors. 

Due to significant concerns regarding the Children’s 

well-being during this six (6) week return to Mother’s 

care, an emergency Order was entered returning the 

Children to the care of the Agency. The Children were 

returned to the foster family with whom they had 

previously resided. The Children’s physical health, 

cleanliness, and social skills had deteriorated during 

their return to Mother’s care. The foster mother had 

to re-educate the Children on properly using a 

bathroom, not throwing trash on the floor, eating 

properly, and using utensils. Additionally, J.D.G. was 

enrolled in school. 

Id. at 7-12 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

Mother frames her issues on appeal as follows:

1. [Did the orphans’] court abuse its discretion 

when it determined that Mother’s failure to 

clean proves incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refuse [sic] so as to cause the children to be 

without essential parental care, control, or 

subsistence necessary for the children’s physical 

or mental well being as required under Section 

2511(a)(2)?

2. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion 

when it determined that termination of parental 

rights best served the needs and welfare of the 

children as required under Section 2511(a)(5) 

and Section 2511(a)(8)? [sic]
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Mother’s brief at 8.

At the outset, we note that Mother fails to specifically challenge the 

orphans’ court’s determination under Section 2511(b) in her statement of 

questions presented. In light of the requisite bifurcated analysis set forth in 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, however, we excuse Mother’s inartfully 

framed issues because that statute requires us to review the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child in termination cases. 

We, therefore, begin our review.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). “If 

the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error of 

law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may 

be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed 

merely because the record would support a different 

result. Id. at 827. We have previously emphasized 

our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to believe 

all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all 

credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 
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855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent 

evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record

could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 

387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

As previously stated, the termination of parental rights is guided by 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis of the 

grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, 

the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to 

terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on 

the conduct of the parent. The party seeking 

termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in 

Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the 

parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her 

parental rights does the court engage in the second 

part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child 

under the standard of best interests of the child. One 

major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child, with close attention paid to 

the effect on the child of permanently severing any 

such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have 

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting 

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).
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In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We have long 

held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only 

agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as

well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to 

Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition 

filed on any of the following grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not 

be remedied by the parent.

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental 

factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect 

to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first 
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initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of 

the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three 

elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015), 

quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are 

required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption 

of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a 

long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of 

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” 

In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted).
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Here, Mother claims that the orphans’ court abused its discretion when 

it terminated her parental rights “for allegations of bad housekeeping and 

poverty related to inability to obtain Agency approved housing for herself and 

the Children.” (Mother’s brief at 16.) Despite Mother’s contention, the 

orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights because it:

found that there was ample evidence to justify the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to the 

Children, pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). The period 

during August-September 2016, when the Children 

returned to Mother’s home, strikingly demonstrated 

Mother’s “incapacity” under (a)(2) as to remedying 

the significant parenting problems that brought the 

family to the Agency’s attention eight (8) years prior, 

in 2010, and which later required the Children to be 

brought into Agency care in 2013. These incapacity 

factors included, most significantly, Mother’s unsafe 

housing, along with her reluctance to obtain full-time

employment, and her failure to address potential 

mental health issues.

Mother failed to cooperate with the many services 

provided by the Agency over many years. 

Additionally, Mother failed to utilize the assistance 

provided by the Agency as a catalyst for improved 

parenting, such as being provided with cleaning 

supplies and the caseworker physically assisting in 

cleaning the home. Unfortunately, shortly thereafter, 

Mother allowed the home to lapse into unsafe and 

unhealthy conditions.

Orphans’ court opinion, 10/12/18 at 12-13.

We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that it supports the 

orphans’ court’s factual findings and that the orphans’ court did not abuse its

discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). 

The record demonstrates that the conditions that existed upon removal 
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establish repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of 

Mother that caused the Children to be without essential parental care, control, 

or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being, the causes of 

which Mother cannot or will not remedy. 

We now turn to whether termination was proper under Section 2511(b). 

As to that section, our supreme court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been 

properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 

A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 620 

A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the 

determination of the child’s “needs and welfare”

requires consideration of the emotional bonds

between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 

53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed below, 

evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy 

task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any 

bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on 

the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 

762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 
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well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Moreover, 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) 

best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of 

many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the 

trial court can equally emphasize the 

safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child 

might have with the foster parent. . . .

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219, quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Our supreme court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that 

courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are in 

a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” 

T.S.M., 73 A.3d at 268. The court directed that, in weighing the bond 

considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking 

clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. court observed, 

“[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation 

to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, 

all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
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In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights favored 

Children’s needs and welfare, the orphans’ court opined:

The court-appointed legal directed counsel for 

Children shared that J.D.G. wanted this Court to be 

aware that he enjoys his visits with Mother and would 

like to see her more. Though legal directed counsel 

expressed that J.D.G. did not seem to appreciate the 

full meaning of termination or adoption, counsel 

stated: “I was able to glean that [J.D.G.] didn’t think

it was particularly a good idea . . . to go home and live 

with Mom at this time.” Counsel expressed that the 

younger child, L.D.G., Jr., did not seem to 

comprehend these proceedings and any impact on his 

future. He did state that he enjoyed living with the 

foster family, but like J.D.G., enjoyed his visits with 

Mother and would enjoy being able to visit more. 

We have no doubt that Mother loves the Children and 

that they love her. Unfortunately, the record contains 

clear and convincing evidence that Mother has not 

made reasonable or responsible strides toward 

adequately being able to parent the Children. The 

evidence presented overwhelmingly suggests that 

Mother, over the course of many years with the 

Agency’s active involvement, has refused or been 

otherwise incapable of providing adequate housing 

and support for herself or the Children.

“[T]he court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability 

to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the 

future.” See M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1276 (“A child’s life

simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the 

parent will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.”) (citations omitted). 

Here, Mother has repeatedly failed to remedy her 

parental incapacities. When these considerations are 

balanced against the Children’s needs for permanence 

and stability, this Court reluctantly but firmly 

concluded that it was in the best interests of L.D.G., 

Jr. and J.D.G. to grant the Agency’s Petition to 

Terminate Mother’s Parental Rights.
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Orphans’ court opinion, 10/12/18 at 16-17 (footnote 9 omitted; record

citations omitted).

Additionally, our review of the record demonstrates that Desiree Mullen, 

the case supervisor from February 2016 to February 2018, testified at the 

termination hearing. (Notes of testimony, 7/17/18 at 9-10.) Ms. Mullen 

testified that after the Children were adjudicated dependent, they were placed 

in the custody of their paternal aunt in August 2014. (Id. at 19-20.) On 

September 8, 2014, an emergency custody order was entered and the 

Children were placed into the Agency’s care. (Id. at 20.) They remained in 

Agency care for 23 months where they spent time in two different foster 

homes. (Id. at 22-24) On August 3, 2016, the Children were returned to 

Mother. (Id.) On September 13, 2016, the Children were returned to Agency 

care, where they have remained. (Id.)

In September 2016, the Children were returned to the foster home that

they had been in prior to being returned to Mother. (Id. at 23-24.) They 

remained in that foster home until approximately June 2017. (Id.) At 

Mother’s suggestion and following vetting, the Children were placed into the 

home of a kinship resource. (Id. at 24-25.) Less than two months later, that 

kinship resource returned the Children to the Agency due to the Children’s 

behavioral issues. (Id. at 26.) The Children were then returned to the prior 

foster home where they remained until June 2018. (Id.) In June 2018, the 

Children were placed in a long-term resource foster home. (Id.)
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Ms. Mullen testified that the Children are flourishing in their current 

foster home and that the foster family is committed to meeting the Children’s 

needs and have expressed their desire to be an adoptive resource. (Id. at 

29, 31-32.) Ms. Mullen further testified that termination of Mother’s parental

rights would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare, as well as solidify 

their relationship with their foster family. (Id. at 32-33.) Ms. Mullen also 

testified that even though the Agency recognizes that the Children have a 

connection to their Mother, the Children have been in Agency care for nearly 

four years and the Agency believes that their need for permanence outweighs 

that connection. (Id. at 35-36.)

The record further reflects that the Children’s legal representative, 

Timothy Barton, Esq., met with the Children individually and together on 

July 11, 2017. (Id. at 142.) J.D.G. stated that he enjoys spending time with 

Mother and that he also enjoys living with his foster family. (Id. at 143.) On 

the basis of the answers J.D.G. provided to Mr. Barton’s questions, Mr. Barton 

concluded that J.D.G. did not believe it was a good idea that he be returned 

to his Mother. (Id. at 143-144.) L.D.G. stated that he “love[s]” to see his 

Mother but that he liked living with his foster family. (Id. at 144.)

In balancing the Children’s needs for permanence and stability against 

Mother’s claims of progress and hopes for the future, the orphans’ court

“reluctantly but firmly” concluded that the Children’s needs and welfare were 
J. S02001/19

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best served by termination of Mother’s parental rights. After carefully 

reviewing the record, we find no abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of 

discretion and conclude that the orphans’ court appropriately terminated

Mother’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/21/19