### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 9, 200 8 S es sio n
ERIC A L IN v. THE M ETR OPO LITA N G OVE RN MEN T OF

NA SHV ILLE A ND DA VID SON CO UN TY
Appeal f rom the Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 05-2605-IVRichard H. Dink ins, Ch ancellor

No. M2008- 00212-COA-R 3-CV - F iled October 10, 2008

Er ic a L in ( “ Pla int if

f” ) b e g an w or

kin g a s a te a c he r fo r Th e Me tr op oli tan Go ve rnme nt of Na sh vil le and Davidson C o u n ty

(“D efe ndant”) in 2002. During her e mploy ment, Plaintiff complained of actions which she believed to be discriminatory based on her race and alleg ed disability . Def endant sent Plaintiff a lett er o n Ap ri l 1, 2006, informing her tha t her e mploy

ment was be ing te rminated
e ff e c tiv e May

26 , 2 00 6. Pla int if

f e ve ntu a lly a

ba nd on e d h e r r a c e and

dis a bil ity dis c ri min a tio n c la ims and proc eede d only

on a cla im for re taliatory disch arg e. De fenda

nt filed a motion for summary judgme nt claiming the undisputed materia l f acts established that Plaintiff was terminate d for poor
wo rk pe rf or manc e . T he Tri a l C o u

rt g ra nte d th e mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, and

Pla int if f a pp e a ls. We conclude that Defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt neither neg ated an essential ele ment of Plaintiff’s cla im n o r conc lusively established an a ffirmative defe nse. Ther efor e, we vacate the
or de r g ra nti ngDe fe nd ant’ s mo tio n f or summa ry jud g me nt a

nd re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Chancery Court

Vacat ed; Case R em anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he cour t, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and S HAR ON G. L EE , S P

. J ., joined.

J ames L . Har

ris, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Erica L in.

J

. Br ooks Fox and Eli zabeth A. S ander s, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, The Metropolitan G o v e r n m e n to f N a s h v i l l e a

n d D a v i d s o nC o u n t y.-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

Th is c a se be g an a s a ra c e and dis a bil ity dis c ri min a tio n law su it an d en de d w ithon ly a cla im for re taliatory

discharg e beingpursued. In 2002, Plaintiff beg an employ ment w ith De fenda

nt
as a p re -ki nderg arte n teac her. A pproxi mately

three y ear s later a

nd while still employ ed by Def endant, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleg ing that she wa s discriminated ag ainst on the basis of her
rac e (A sian) and be cause she was disabled wit h “psy chiatric problems.” Plaintiff also claimed that
s h e w a s r e t a l i a t e d

a g a i n s ta f

t e r m a k i n g c o mp l a i n t s o f i l l e g a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n

. M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y, Plaintiff claimed that duringthe cour se of he r employ ment, she wa s scrutinized mor e close ly than simil arly situated non-Asian e mploy ees a nd, in particular , Afric an Amer ican e mploy ees.
I n her c omplaint, Plaintiff detailed an event which alleg edly occur red on Aug ust 22, 20 05 , w he n s he wa s bitte n “v e ry ba dly” by he r d ogand

sc he du le d a

do c tor a pp oin tme nt f

or 3:0 0 p .m. Plaintiff claimed the sc hool principal, Mr. Ross, refuse d to let her lea ve school at 2:45 p.m. so she could make it to her appointment on time. I nstead, a ccor ding to Plaintiff, Mr. Ross made he r stay at the school until 3:10 p.m., e ven thoug h Plaintiff’s students had bee n dismiss ed fr om school at 2:00 p. m. P la int if

f c la ime d th a t a

pp ro xima te ly

on e we e k late r, a te a c he r, wh o wa s Af ri c an A me ri c an, fe ll in t he ha llw ay

a t th e sc ho ol. No t only

did Mr . Ro ss a llo w that te a c he r t o le a ve and g o to the ho sp ita l, but Mr

. Ross we nt so far

as to drive that e mploy ee to the hospital himself. Plaintiff maintains that she ca lled the B oard of Education to complain about the alleg ed disparate treatment and, there afte r, Mr. Ross beg an attendingher c lasses and monitoring her w hile she worke d.

On April 1, 2006, De fenda nt sent Plaintiff a letter informing her that her e mploy ment would not be re newe d. Acc ording to this l etter:

This constitutes of

f ic ia l n otification that under the terms of Te nnessee Code Annotated 49- 2-302(b) (1)( EE), the D irec tor of Sch ools has approve d y our non-r enew al for the 2006-2007 scho o l y ear . Your employ m ent wit h Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools will be terminated e ffe ctive May 26, 2006.

Af te r r e c e ivi ngthi s le tte r, Pla int if f ame nd ed h e r c omp la int to a sse rt a re ta liator y dis c ha rg e c la im. Pla int if f c la ime d th a t he r e mpl oy

me nt w a s te rm inate d b e c a us e sh e ha d e ng a g e d in

pr ote c te d a c tiv ity and that her termination violated the anti-r etaliation provisions contained in the Te nnessee Human Rights Act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-21- 301(1) ( 2005).

De fe nd ant r e sp on de d to the or ig ina l c om p l a int and the a me nd e d c omp la int , g e ne ra lly de nyingthe pe rt ine nt a lle g a tio ns c on ta ine d the re in. De fe nd ant as se rt e d that the re we re le g iti mate non-discriminatory

rea sons for all of the actions take n with respec t to Pl aintiff’s e mploy ment.-3- Soon after a

nsweringthe amende d complaint, Def endant f iled a motion for summary jud g me nt. Th e c ru x of t

he mot ion

wa s th a t: [P laintiff’s] c ontinued job pe rfor mance problems over the course of four sc hool-y ear s of not pre p ar i n g lesson plans, a lac k of a fundame ntal und er standing of the c entra l conce pts of what she w as teac hing, a

nd not utili zing key

components of the r e quired c urriculum all wer e the basis for he r termination, and [Plaintiff] cannot show that these re asons (whic h are well docum en t ed throughout her employ ment with [ Def

endant]) ar e mer ely

“pre text ual.”

Atta c he d a s e xhibi ts t o D e fe nd ant’ s mo tio n f or summary

jud g me nt w e re e xce rp ts from Plaintiff’s deposition as we ll as her pe rfor mance evaluations that were conducte d throug hout the c ours e of he r e mpl oy

me nt wi th D e fe nd ant. Th e se e xhibi ts s ho w that D e fe nd ant h a d p ro ble ms wi th P la int if

f’ s p e rf or manc e a lmo st fro m the ou tse t of he r e mpl oy

me nt. Ho we ve r, no tic e a bly lackingfrom De fenda

nt’s motion for summary

judgme nt is an aff

idavit or any sworn testimony from a dec ision-maker that Plainti ff’ s poor perf ormanc e was the actua l r eason or basis for her te rmination.

Def endant’ s motion for summary judgme nt was sche duled for a hear ing. A t the beg inning of that hear ing, Plaintiff’s counsel announce d that Plaintiff w as abandoning her r ace and dis a bil ity dis c ri min a tio n c la ims and wo uld pr oc e e d o nly

on the re ta liator

y dis c ha rg e c la im. Following the hea

ring , the Trial Court e ntere d an order g ranting Def endant’ s motion for summary jud g me nt a

nd dis mis sin g Pla int if

f’ s r e ta liatio n c la im. Th e Tr ia l Co ur t’ s o rd e r s tate s:
The Court her eby

finds that, with reg ards to the Plainti ff’s claim of reta liation under t he Tennessee Human Rig hts Act, the Metropolitan Gover nment has ar

ticulated a pr operly -supported le g itimate, nondiscriminatory

rea son for Plaintiff’s e mp loy ment termination (name ly , Plaintiff’s alleg ed per formanc e issues over the cour se of four sc hool-y ear s, invol v i n g the pre paration of lesson plans and an alleg ed fa ilure to utiliz e key components of the re quired c urriculum); and that the Plaintiff, as the non-moving party , has not met her bur den i n response to a prope rly -supported motion for summar y judgme nt and instead relies on the ba re a lleg ations of her

complaint, and has shown no specif

ic fa cts that would support a theor y that the Me tr op oli tan G ov e rnme nt’ s art ic ulate d r e a so ns are me re ly “pre text ual.” Plaintiff appea ls raising the following issue: “Did not the C hance llor err in ruling on matters touchingupon motive, intent, perce ption, and/or cr ed ibilit y in the context of a motion for
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , an d

t h e r e b y i mp e r m i s s i b l y i n v a d e t h e p r o v i n c e o f

t h e f a c t f i n d e r ?”-4- Discussion

I n T et er v. R ep u b l i c P a r

ki n g S ys t em , Inc. , 1 8 1 S

. W

. 3 d

3 3 0 ( T e nn . 2 00 5) , o ur

Sup re me Court rec ently

reiter ated the sta

ndards a pplicable whe n appellate courts ar e re viewing a motion for
summa ry jud g me nt. Th e Court

state d: The purpo s e of summary judgme nt is to resolve controlling issues of law r ather

than to fi n d fa ct s or re solve disputed issues of fac t. Bellamy v . Fed. Ex press Corp. , 749 S.W .2d 3 1 , 3 3 (T enn. 1988). Summary

j u d gm en t is appropriate only when the moving party demonstrat es t h at t here are no g enuine issues of material fa ct and that he or

she is entitled to judgment as a m att er of law. See Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 4; Penley v. Honda M

otor Co. , 31 S.W .3d 181, 18 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; By rd

v . H all , 847 S.W .2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993)

. I n revie wing t he re cord, the appellate court must view all the evidenc e in the li gh t m o st favora ble to the non-moving party and dr awa l l r e a s o n a

b l e i n f e r e n c e s i nf

a v o r o f t h e n o n
- m o v i n g p art y. Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc

. , 15 S.W .3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000) . And beca use this inquiry

involves a question of law only , the standar d of revie w is de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss attache d to the trial court' s conclusions. See M ooney v . Sneed, 30 S.W .3d 304, 306 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995)

. Teter , 181 S.W .3d at 337.

Th e Te nn e sse e Human Ri g hts Ac t pr oh ibi ts, a mon g oth e r t hin g s, re ta liatio n a g a ins t someone who ha s made a char g e or has filed a complaint of discrimination. Accordingto the statute:

I t is a discriminatory

prac tice for

a per so n or for

two (2) or

more persons to: (1) Reta liate or discr iminate in an y m an ner a g ainst a per son beca use such pe rson has opposed a practice de clar ed discriminatory by t his chapter

or bec ause suc h person ha s made a char g e, filed a complaint, t estified, assisted or pa rticipated in a

ny manner in any investigation, procee ding or hear ing unde r this chapter

.... Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 21-301(1) (2005).

I n Allen v. Mc

Phee , 240 S.W .3d 803 (Tenn. 2007) , our Supreme Court se t forth the elements ne cessa

ry to establish a prima fa cie c ase of reta liation pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21- 301(1). The Court stated:-5- Apply ing ... [ Bu rli ng ton N. & Sa nta Fe Ry . Co . v . W hite , 548 U.S. 53 (2006)], we hold that in order to state a prima fac ie case for reta liation under the THRA an e mploy ee must demonstrate: 1) that sh e e ng a g e d in

a c tiv ity pr ote c te d b y

th e TH RA ; 2) that th e e xer c ise of her protec ted rig hts was known to t h e defenda nt; 3) that the defe ndant there afte r took a materia lly adver se action ag ainst her; and 4) there was a

causa l connec tion between the protec ted act i v i t y and the mater ially

adver se ac tion. The burden- shifting a naly s i s that follows the establishment of a prima fa cie c ase r emains uncha ng ed by W hite
. Af

t er an employ ee e stablishes a prima f acie case of
re tal iat io n, the burd e n o f p ro du c tio n s hif ts t o th e de fe nd ant t o art ic ulate a

le g itimate , n on -d isc ri min a tor y re a so n f or the mate ri a lly adver se action. Miller , 1 22 S.W. 3d a t 77 6; se e als o Ca nit ia , 903 F.2d at 1066. I f t he defenda

nt articulates such a reason, the employ ee, who bear s the burden of

persua sion throughout the pr ocess, must prese nt evidenc e demonstrating that the a rticulated r eason is pre text u al and that th e de fendant’ s a c tio n w a s a c tua lly mot ivate d b y

a de sir e to
r e ta li a te a g a in s t th e e mploy ee. Miller , 1 22 S.W. 3d a t 77 6; se e als o Can iti a , 903 F.2d at 1066.

Allen , 240 S.W .3d at 820-21.

The e ntire point of Plaintiff’s brief on appea l is that the rea son for he r termination, i.e., a le gi t imate non-discr iminatory rea son versus illeg al re taliation, nece ssarily involves issues
surr o u n d in g h e r

e mp lo y e r ’ s mo ti v a ti o n

. Pl a in ti f f ar g u e s th a t a

ne mp lo y e r ’ s mo ti v a ti o nn e v e r c an pr op e rl y be the su bje c t of a summa ry jud g me nt m oti on . A c on tr ary ho ldi ng , Plai nti ff c la ims , w ou ld be “ta ntamount to reading the m ind of t he parties” which would be im permissible in the summary judgme nt context.

A more thorough analy sis of Allen r e v e a l s P l a i n t i f f ’ s p o s i t i o ni s w i t h o u tm e r i t

. In Allen , the Supreme Court de termined that the pla int i ff ha d established a pr ima fac ie ca se of reta liation. Neve rtheless, the Court c oncluded that the pla intiff had fa iled to cre ate a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t as to causation when undertaking the burden- shifting a naly sis that follows the establishment of a pr ima fac ie ca se. Ac cordingto Allen :

Al tho ug h w e have c on c lud e d th a t a reas ona ble jur y c ou ld
c on c lud e that A lle n h a s est abli sh e d a pr ima fa c ie c a se , th e State is entitled to summary

judgm en t if it can a

rticulate a

leg itimate,
no n- dis c ri min a tor

y re a so n f or tr ans fe rr ing Al len an d if Al le n is unable to pre sent evidenc e that ra ises a g enuine dispute ove r whe ther the proffere d rea son is pretextual. Se e Y ou ng v . D ill on Cos

. , 468 F.3d 1 2 4 3 , 1 249 (10th Cir. 2006). To mee t its obl iga tion to articulate a le g iti mate , n on -d isc ri min a tor y re a so n for the re a ssi g nme nt, the Sta te-6- c on te nd s th a t it

re a ssi g ne d Alle n to MT SU’ s D e ve lop me nt O ff ic e to protec t her fr om further

hara ssment. Protecting employ ees from
se xua l ha ra ssm e nt i s c le arl y a le g iti mate and no nd isc ri min a tor y g oa l. Prote cting employ ees is, in fa ct, one of the ce ntral purpose s of the THRA. S

ee Ten n. Co de A nn . § 4-2 1-1 01 (a)(1 )-(4 ) (2 00 5). By articulating a

leg itimate, non-discr i m i n atory rea son for the tra

nsfer , the State has prese nted Allen with the burden of producingevidenc e that th e State ’s pr of

fe re d mo tiv e is p re te xtua l.

Allen ca n meet her burden by prese nting evidenc e that: 1) the State’s proff

ere d rea son has no basis in fac t; 2) the proff ere d rea son did not actually motivate the rea ssignment; or 3) the proff ere d rea son is insuff icient to explain the reassig nment. Carter v. Univ. of Toledo , 349 F.3d 269, 274 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ). Allen ha s failed to pre sent such evidenc e. On the contra

ry , the evidenc e in the rec ord supports the State’s asser

tion that Allen was transfe rre d to protect he r fr om further hara s s m ent by

McPhee. While a re asonable person c ould conclude that Allen has be en assig ned to a position that is l es s d esi rable than her previous position, her rea ssignment is c lear ly superior t o t he alternative of re maining in a position i n which she wo u l d be for ced to interac t closely

with her harasser

. We theref ore hold that Allen ha s failed to de monstrate the exis tence of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t
r e g ar d i n g t h e S t a t e ’ s m o t i v a t i o nf o r t h e r e a s s i g n m e n t

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we c on c lud e that the State is e nti tle d to summa ry jud g men t o n this issue.

Allen , 240 S.W .3d at 823.

I n light of Allen , we re

j ec tP l ai n t i ff

’s ar gu m en tan d

co n cl ude that re taliatory

d i s ch ar ge c la ims pr op e rl y

c an b e the ba sis fo r a

su mma ry jud g me nt m oti on. Ade fe nd ant c an b e e nti tle d to
summa ry jud g me nt on a

re ta liator y dis c ha rg e c la im if the require ments of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have otherwise be en met. The question then bec omes whethe r De fenda nt’ s mo ti o n

f o r s u mm ary judgme nt complies with the requir ements of Tenn. R. Civ. P . 56, thus entitli ng Def endant to summary jud g me nt. We c on c lud e that it do e s n ot.

B e fo re w e a d dr e ss D e fe nd ant’ s f a ilure to s a tis fy

the Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 re qu ir e me nts , we f irst will address Defenda

nt’s claim t hat i t was entitl ed to summary judgme nt beca use Plaintiff
wa s una ble to e sta

bli sha pr ima fa c ie c a se of

re ta liatio n. As se t f

or th a bo ve , th e Sup re me Court

in Allen s e tf

o rt h f o u r e l e m e n t s n e c e s s ar

y t o e s t a b l i s ha p r i m a f a c i e c a s e o f

r e t a l i a t i o n

. T h e f

o ur th element is a “ causa l connec tion be tween the protec ted ac tivity and the mate rially

adver se ac tion.” Allen , 240 S.W .3d at 820. I t is this element that Def endant arg ues i s missi ng from Plaintiff’s ca se. As noted by

the Allen Cour

t, “ c los e te mpo ra l pr oximi ty of a c omp la int

and a mate ri a lly

a dv e rs e action ar e sufficient to establish a prima f acie case of ca

usation.” Id . at 823. Def

endant a rg ues that-7-

there is no “close tempor al proxim i t y ” because Plaintiff filed her c omplaint on October 20, 2005, and it was ove r five months later when she was notified of her te rmin ation on April 1, 2006. As discussed in more de pth later in this Opinion, Defe ndant has not filed an a ffidavit fr om the person
or pe rs on s w ho ult imate ly

de c ide d to te rm inate Pla int if f’ s e mpl oy

me nt. Thus , re g ard le ss o f t he date Plaintiff was sent a le tter informingher of her te rmination, we do not whe n that decision ac tually was ma de

. F or a ll this Court kn ow s, the de c isi on c ou ld have be e n mad e the ve ry da y De fe nd ant b e c a me awa re of Plaintiff’s lawsuit or any other protec ted ac tivity , and she simply was not notified of that decision until the end of the sc hool y ear . A plaintiff’s pr ima fac ie burde n is not onerous. Fe nn e ll v. First Step Designs, Ltd. , 83 F.3d 526, 535 ( 1 Cir. 1996). Given that this Court does not know st fr om t he re c or d w he n th e de c isi on to t e rm inate Pla int if

f’ s e mpl oy

me nt w a s ma de , w e are un a ble to
c on c lud e tha

t D e fe nd ant w a s e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt be c a

us e Pla int if

f w a s una ble to e sta bli sh a prima f acie case

. The fina l issue is whether De fenda nt complied with the re q

u ir ements of Te nn. R. Civ. P. 56 and thus was entitl ed to summary judgme nt. I n Mills v. CSX Transp. Inc., No. E2006-01933- COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL2262052 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2007) , no appl. perm. appeal filed , th is Court discussed the summary judgme nt standard in some de t ai l , rely ing he avily on our ea

rlier opinion in Hannan v. Alltel Pub. Co. , N o. E2 00 6- 01 35 3- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 7 WL 20 84 30 (T e nn . Ct

. App. J an. 26, 2007), perm. app. granted J une 18, 2007

. Qu o t i n g Hannan , we state d: [Th e Te nn e sse e ] Sup re me Cou rt c on tin ue s to a dh e re to t

he pr inc ipl e that a def endant se eking summary judgme nt must actua lly neg ate a n essential el em en t of the plaintiff’s c laim or establish an a ffirmative defe nse bef

ore the plaintiff’s burde n to produce evidenc e e stablishing the exist ence of a g enuine issue of m ater ial fac t is trigg ere d. An
asser tion that a plai n tiff ca

nnot prove a

n essential ele ment of her
c la im d oe s n ot c on sti tut e the ne g a tin g of that e le me nt. He nc e , i t is insufficient to support a grant of summar y judgme nt. See, e .g., Lawson v. Edgewater Hotels, Inc. , 1 6 7 S

. W.3d 816, 823-24 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 04 ); Hankins v. Chev co, Inc

. , 90 S.W .3d 254, 261 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Mi lls , 2007 WL 2262052, at * 5.

I n acc ordanc e with the above analy sis, in Mi lls we c oncluded that the tr ial court imp ro pe rl y g ra

nte d summa

ry jud g me nt ba se d on the de fe nd ant’ s argume nt t hat th e pla int if

f w ou ld be unable to prove his claim at tria l. Id. , at *6. Acc ording to Mi lls :

Be cause Def

endant f ailed to affirmatively

neg ate a n essential element of

Plainti f f ’ s claim or to conc lusively establish an af

firmative de fe ns e , Pl a int if

f’ s b ur de n at this summa ry jud g me nt s ta g e to establish the ex istence of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t never

was trig g ere d. Se e Blair , 1 30 S.W. 3d a t 76 7. Whil e Pla int if

f m ay we ll-8- not be able to mee t h i s burden at trial, his burden at this summary judgme nt stag e is far

differ ent. There fore , the Trial Court err ed whe n it gr anted De fenda

nt’s motion for summary

judgme nt. Finally , we note that there is a disa g ree ment betwee n the Easter n Section and the Middle Sec tion of t h i s C o u rt reg ardingthe pr op e r s tand ard

fo r e va luatin g a

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. Th is disag ree ment was ex amined in detail in Hannan , 2007 WL 208430, at *7, 8. I n short, the two sec tions are in disag ree ment over w hether it i s su ff ic ien t, for summa

ry jud g me nt p ur

po se s, to c la im that a plaintiff will be unable to pr ove his or her case at trial. We continue to adher e to our de cision in Hannan that such proof is insufficient
u n d e r t h e s t an d ar d

s e tb y Blair , a

nd we wi ll c on ti nu e to do so un til instructed other

wis e b y t he Te nnessee Supreme Court. We note, ho we ve r, that ou

r S up re me Court

ha s g ra nte d p e rm iss ion

to a pp e a l in the Hannan case , and, hopefully , this disagr eeme nt will be resolved in the near

future.

Mi lls , 2007 WL 2262052, at * 6 (footnote omitted).

The fatal flaw w ith D efendant’s motion for summary judgme nt is the fact that no aff idavit or o t h er fo rm of sworn te stimony was pre sented by

Def endant f rom a re prese ntative of Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools stating the actua l ba sis for Plaintiff’s termination. Ne ither has De fenda

nt cited us to any

thing in the r ecor d nor have we f ound any thi n g in our revie w of the
r e c o r d s tati n g th a t D e f

e n d an t’ s r e a s o n f

o r te r mi n a ti n g Pl a in ti f

f ’ s e mp lo y me n t w a s h e r poor job perf ormanc e. The re is nothing in this record, othe r than c ounsel ’s ar gu m ents and brie fs, which articulates this nondiscriminatory rea son of poor job per formanc e as being the basis for De fenda nt’s termination of Plaintiff’s employ ment. Simpl y

filing Plaintiff’s u nsatisfac tory perf ormanc e evaluations is insufficient. While these employ ment evaluations certainly show that Def

endant ha d pr ob le ms w ithPlain ti ff’s job pe rf or manc e , D e fe nd ant h a s f

ile d n oth inge sta

bli sh ingthat th e se neg ative per formanc e eva luations a ctually impacted the re ason for Plaintiff being terminated, a nd
we c ann ot a ssume tha

t th e y did

. We a lso no te that D e fe nd ant’ s Apr il 1 , 2 00 6, te rm inatio n le tte r t o Plaintiff does not state that the re ason for her te rmination was her

unsatisfac tory

job perfor

mance , and, in fa ct, no reason for the t ermination i s stated i n the l etter. Assuming, without dec iding, that Plaintiff’s job perfor

mance was unsatisfa ctory , that does not nec essar i l y m ea n t hat she wa s fired be c a us e of he r p oo r j ob pe rf

or manc e and

that sh e wa s n ot r e ta liate d a g a ins t.

I n the abse nce of

an af fidavit or any other form of sworn te stimony by the dec isionmaker articulating why Plaintiff was terminated, Defenda nt has failed to ne g ate a

n essential ele ment of Pla int if f’ s c la im o r c on c lus ive ly e sta bli shan a ff

ir mat iv e defe ns e . T hu s, Pla int if f’ s b ur de n to produce evidenc e which c reates a gen uine issue of mate rial fa ct surroundingthe re asons for he r termination neve r wa s trigg ere d. The Tr ial Court, th er efore, er red w hen it g rante d Def

endant’ s motion for summary

judgme nt, and the Tria l Court’s judgment must be va cate d.-9- Conclusion The judg ment of the Tr ial Court is vacate d and this cause is remande d to the Trial C o u rtfor f

urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s Opinion and for c ollection of the c osts below. Costs on appeal are taxed to the Appellee , the Metropolitan Gover nment of Na shville and Davidson County

.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE