No. 92-382 

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1993



### IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

### ANNA RUTH SCOFFIELD, Petitioner and Respondent, and LINDSEY DENNIS SCOFFIELD, Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, In and for the County of Beaverhead, The Honorable Frank M. Davis, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Vincent J. Kozakiewicz,Attorney at Law, Dillon, Montana For Respondent: John Warren, Schulz, Davis & Warren, Dillon, Montana

Filed: Submitted on Briefs: November 19, 1992 Decided: May 18, 1993Justice Terry 

### N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the 

### Court. Lindsey Scoffield appeals from a supplemental decree 

### of dissolution entered in the Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Montana, on March 20, 1992. Lindsey contends that the ~istrict Court abused its discretion when it ordered him to assume all marital debts, including debts incurred by his spouse on behalf of her children from a prior marriage. Additionally, Lindsey asserts that the court erred when it denied his request to modify the allocation of proceeds from the sale of the parties1 cattle. We affirm. The issues on appeal are: 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion 

### when it required appellant to assume all marital debts, including debts incurred by respondent on behalf of her children from a prior marriage? 2. Did 

### the District Court err when it denied appellantIs request to modify the allocation of proceeds from the sale of the parties1 cattle? Anna Ruth Scoffield, age 32, and Lindsey Dennis Scoffield, 

### age 31, were married 

### in Abilene, Texas, on 

### March 2, 1985. There

were no children born of this marriage, although Anna has two children from a previous marriage. OnMarch 13, 1991,Anna filed a petition to have theparties1 marriage dissolved. A dissolution proceeding was held on May 16, 1991. At the proceeding, Lindsey expressly agreed to assume allmarital debts in exchange 

### for 

### the court's denial of maintenance and attorney fees to Anna. On July 1, 1991, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution. The court ordered the parties to equally divide their marital property. Additionally, the court ordered ~indseyto assume and pay all existing marital debts, and denied Anna's request for maintenance and attorney fees. Finally, 

### the courtdirected theparties to sell the cattle they owned and to divide the proceeds equally. In August 1991, the parties entered into an arrangement concerning the cattle that differed from the July 1, 1991, dissolution decree. Rather than sell the cattle and divide the proceeds equally, as required by the decree, the parties agreed that Lindsey would pay Anna $4600 for her interest in the cattle. Lindsey paid Anna $3000 in cash, and delivered 

### a $1600 promissory note, due on April 1, 1992. On January 10, 1992,Lindsey sold the 

### cattleto a 

### thirdparty;however, he did 

### not recover 

### the 

### amountper head that he anticipated. During the year following the July 1, 1991, decree, Lindsey refused topay themajority 

### of theparties existing marital debts. Anna responded by moving that the District Court find Lindsey in contempt. On March 6, 1992, the court held 

### a hearing on the contemptmotion. Duringthehearing, Lindsey made two arguments to the District Court concerning the marital property division.First, Lindsey acknowledged that he agreed to assume the marital debts; however,he asserted that he should not have 

### topay the debts incurred by Anna on behalf of her children from her previous marriage because they were not marital debts. Second, Lindsey requested the court to modify the allocation of the cattle proceeds in light of the actual sale price of the cattle. He reminded the court that thedissolutiondecree required

an equal division of cattle proceeds; and he explained to 

### the court that as a result of a contract concerning the cattle that he made with Anna subsequent to the decree, he received less than 50 percent of the cattleproceeds. OnMarch 20, 1992, the

### DistrictCourt amended and supplemented the July 1, 1991,dissolutiondecree. In the supplemental decree, the court entered a judgment against Lindsey 

### far $1019.16, which represented the amount of marital debts. The court specifically listed the accounts Lindsey was obligated to assume and limited those accounts to debts incurred 

### as of May 16, 1991, the date of 

### theparties1dissolutionproceeding. These accounts included debts incurred by Anna on behalf of her children from a prior marriage. The court stayed the execution of the judgment upon the condition that Lindseypay toAnna monthly installments until the 

### judgment of $1019.16 is paid in full. 

### IntheMarch 20, 1992, order, the court also denied Lindsey's request to modify the allocation of proceeds from the sale 

### of the cattle. The court concluded that the parties were bound by theirown agreement regarding thevalue of the cattle. ~indsey appeals from the March 20, 1992, order. On appeal, Lindsey contends that (1) the court abused its discretion when it required Lindsey to assume responsibility for debts incurred by Anna on behalf 

### of her children from a prior marriage; and (2) the court erred when it refused 

### to modify the allocation of proceeds, in light of the actual sales price of the cattle. I Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it required appellant to assume all marital debts, including debts incurredby respondent on behalf of her children from a prior marriage? Lindsey acknowledges on appeal that he expressly agreed to

assume 

### all marital debts; however, he contends that the District Court abused its discretion when it required him to assume the debts incurred by Anna on behalf of 

### her children from 

### a prior marriage. Lindsey asserts that debts incurred on behalf of 

### a spouse's children 

### from aprevious marriage are not marital debts. Because Lindsey expressly agreed toassume Ifallof themarital debts" in exchange for the court's denial of maintenance and attorney fees to Anna, our analysis need not focus on whether Lindsey is statutorilyand/or legallyobligated toassume thedebts incurred 

### by his spouse on behalf of her children from a prior 

### marriage. Nor 

### is it necessary 

### to ascertain forwhose benefit those debts were incurred. For purposes of this appeal, 

### we limit our

### analysis to whether the debts at issue are "marital debts." If they are, then Lindsey is obligatedby his own agreement topay for them.TheMontana Marriage and DivorceAct, 55 

### 40-1-101to 40-4-225, MCA, neither defines nor refers to the term "marital debt." Moreover, fewMontana cases, if any, specificallydefine "marital debt." Yet a definition of "marital debt" is essential in a dissolution proceeding because in order for trial courts to "equitablyapportion between theparties theproperty and assets,"

as courts are statutorilyrequired to doby 5 

### 40-4-202,MCA, courts must first ascertain the partiestassets and liabilitiesprior to apportionment. In

### reMarriageofDimberger 

### (1989)

## , 237

### Mont 398, 401, 773 

### P.2d 330, 332. Courtsmust know thedefinitional parameters of the term "marital debtB1 so that courts canmake fair marital property divisions. Only by knowing what to include as "marital debt," before balancing a partiest assets and liabilities, can a court make a fairmarital property apportionment. Montana is not alone in its lack of a definition for vlmarital debt. " 

### Other stateshave acknowledged that the term "maritaldebt" 

### is not defined in their state code or in court opinions, although theword appears regularly indissolutiondocuments. TheMissouri Court of Appeals explains in the caseIn

### reMarriageof

### Welch (Mo. App.

In the debt oriented society now prevailing, the term "marital debts" is found innearly everydissolutioncase filed. The term is found in the pleadings, separationagreements, court orders and judgments, and in the appellate court decisions. Yet, the term "marital debt" never appears in the 

### d dissolution of Marriage Act," 5 452.300, et seq., and certainly is never defined. Although the Missouri Revised Statutes do not define the term "marital debt,It they do define its converse, "marital property. In Welch, the Missouri Court of Appeals relied on the statutory definition of "marital propertyu as a helpful starting point for defining "marital debt." According to the Court of Appeals, 

### " ' [m]arital property is 'all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the mam'age 

# . . . .I 11 Welch, 795 s.w.2d at 643

(interpreting Missouri Revised Statutes, S 452.330.2). The Court of Appeals held that "it follows, therefore, that 'maritaldebt' is ordinarily 'debtincurred subsequentto themarriage.l8* Welch, 795 S.W.2d at 643. Although Montana's statutory definitionofmarital property is broader than Missouri's, it also includes property acquired by eitherparty during themarriage. See 

### 5 40-4-202,MCA. Since the definition for marital property in Montana includes all property acquired by either party during the marriage, it follows, therefore, that "marital debtumay be defined as all debt incurred by either party during the marriage. Thedisputed debts in this caseweremedical debts incurred on behalf of Anna's children. They were incurred while Lindsey and Anna were married. Specifically, they were incurred during 1990 and in the spring of 1991,which was subsequent to thedate of Annaand ~indsey 's marriage 

### onMarch 2, 1985,andprior 

### toMay '16,1992, the date of the parties1 marriage dissolution. Pursuant to our definition that marital debt is all debt incurred by 

### either 

### party during themarriage,we conclude that themedical debts incurredby Anna on behalf of her children during the course of the partiest marriage are marital debts. Because Lindsey expressly agreed 

### to 

### assume allmarital debts, and the court accepted Lindseyf spromise inexchange forthedenial of maintenance and attorney fees to Anna, Lindsey is obligated 

### to pay for a11marital debts, including the debts incurred

### by Anna on behalf of her children from 

### a prior marriage. When reviewing a division 

### of marital property case, the standard of review employed by this Court is whether the lower court abused 

### its discretion when 

### it fashioned themarital property distribution, InreMarriageofDanelson (1992), 253Mont. 310, 317, 833 

### P.2d 215, 220. The lower court is obligated to seek a fairmarital property division using reasonable judgment and common sense. Danehon, 833 P.2d at 220. When a District 

### Court judgment is based upon substantial credible 

### evidence, this Court will not alter that judgment unless there is a clear abuse 

### of discretion. 

### Dimbe~er (19891, 773 P.2d at 332. We conclude that the lower court exercised reasonablejudgment 

### when 

### itbalanced 

### the economic consequences 

### of Lindsey's assumption of allmarital debtsagainst the economicburden of maintenance andattorney fees. Therefore,we conclude that the courtdid not abuse itsdiscretion when it ordered Lindsey to assume allmarital debts. I1 Did the District Court err when it denied appellant's request tomodify the allocation 

### ofproceeds from the sale of the partiesf cattle? Lindsey asserts that as 

### a result 

### of the actual salesprice of the cattle, he received less than 50 percent of the cattle proceeds; and that this result

### was in contravention of thecourt's order to equally divide theproceeds. On appeal, Lindsey contends that the District Court erredwhen it denied his request tomodify the allocation of cattle proceeds. Contrary to Lindsey's assertion,we find no abuse of court discretion. Lindsey relies on

### InreMamizge

### of

### Berthiaume (1977)

## , 173Mont

# . 421, 567 P.2d 1388. InBerthiaume, we held that 

### a trial court 

### abuses its discretion when it makes a finding that property should be divided equally and then subsequentlymakes a disparate award. However, unlike the situation in 

### Berthiaume, where the court acted in contravention of its findings, the District Court in the present

case did 

### not act contrary to its finding that the parties 

### should divide the cattle proceeds equally, The court ordered the parties to sell the cattle and equallydivide theproceeds. It

### was Lindsey and Anna who devised their own means for accomplishing their obligation to 

### sell and equally divide the cattle proceeds.Partiesare free

### tocontract

### with one another, and ~indsey 

### and Anna entered into a valid contract regarding the cattle. When Lindsey requested the lower court to modify the allocation of cattle proceeds 

### in light of the actual sales price of the cattle, he was, in effect, asking the court to invalidate the parties1 contract. This Court has held that a party to an agreement which has been performed for some length of time is estopped to deny its validity. Iiz

### reMam'ageof

### Jensen (1986), 223 Mont. 434, 727 P.2d 512. Therefore, we conclude that the lower court did not err 

### when it bound the parties to their own agreement and refused tomodify the allocation of proceeds. 

### Lindsey and Anna satisfied their obligation under the decree to sell the cattle 

### and equallydivide theproceeds when they agreed to have Lindsey 

### buy out Anna's interest before selling the cattle to a thirdparty. The fact that Lindseypaid Anna for more 

### than 50 percent of the actual value 

### of the cattle was 

### a result 

### of his own agreement 

### with his 

### wife, not the court's decree. Therefore, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to amend the allocation of cattleproceeds. We affirm the District Court decision.We concur: