IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-30751

Summary Calendar

ELISE ADAMS,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

RECOVERY SCHOOL DISTRICT, through the State of Louisiana, Department

of Education,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

No. 2:10-cv-01080-JCZ-SS

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-appellant Elise Adams challenges the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to defendant-appellee. Finding no error, we affirm.

Adams was employed by the Orleans Parish Recovery School District

(“RSD”), and served as the principal of the Booker T. Washington school during

the 2009-2010 school year. She did not have a contract with RSD, and on

January 25, 2010 was terminated from her position. Claiming this was

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 27, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 11-30751

wrongful, Adams filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985, and under

Louisiana state law. Specifically, she claimed that RSD violated her equal

protection rights by failing to give her a contract, even though all other RSD

principals were employed under contract, and violated her due process rights by

failing to observe remedial steps required under state law. The lawsuit was

removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Although Adams originally sued RSD, she amended her complaintto name

the Louisiana Department of Education as the defendant. The State of

Louisiana, through the Department of Education, then moved for summary

judgment. The district court granted that motion in part on the grounds that the

Department of Education is an arm of the state of Louisiana and therefore not

a “person” who can be sued under § 1983. It dismissed Adams’s § 1981 claims

because they were properly construed as § 1983 claims, and also dismissed her

§ 1985 claims because Adams failed to make any allegations in support of those

claims. Because the only remaining claims were state law allegations, the

district court remanded the lawsuit to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

On appeal, Adams challenges the district court’s grant of summary

judgment dismissing her § 1983 claims with prejudice. “We review a district 1

court’s order granting summary judgment de novo.” Summary judgment is 2

appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”3

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any “person” who deprives

another person of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Adams does not present any argument challenging the district court’s dismissal of her 1

42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985 claims, or its decision to remand her state law claims pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). She therefore has waived any objection to those portions of the

judgment. See United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 611 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000). 

LeMaire v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. and Development, 480 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2

2007). 

 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

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Constitution and laws” of the United while acting “under color” of state law.4

For purposes of § 1983, states and arms of a state are not “persons,” and a § 1983

claim may therefore not be brought against those entities or their officials acting

in an official capacity.5

Adams originally filed suit against RSD. However, because RSD is not an

entity that can sue or be sued, she requested leave to file an amended complaint 6

“in order to name the proper party as a defendant in this matter” “in place of the

[RSD].” The court granted leave, and Adams’s amended complaint named the

Louisiana Department of Education as the defendant, stating that “[t]he DOE

[Department of Education] is a juridicial [sic] entity capable of suing and being

sued and is the proper defendant in cases against the Orleans Parish Recovery

School District.” At the time of summary judgment, the defendant was therefore

the Department of Education. That Department is an arm of the state of

Louisiana, and does not qualify as a “person” who may be sued under § 1983.7

Recognizing this, the district court properly dismissed Adams’s §1983 claims,

and remanded her state law claims to the state court.8

 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 (1989) (holding that the 5

plaintiff could not sue the state of Michigan through its Department of State Police or the

Director of State Police in his official capacity because “neither a State nor its officials acting

in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.”).

See LSA-R.S. § 17: 1990; Tankerson v. Vallas, 34 So. 3d 355, 358 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2010) 6

(“We conclude that the RSD...is not a body corporate capable of being sued or suing directly. 

The proper party in any claim by or against the RSD is the [Department of Education].”)

See Will, 491 U.S. at 64; see also Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586, 587–88 (5th Cir. 7

1974) (“It is well established that states and their political subdivisions are not ‘persons’

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The same can be said of the various arms of state

government such as the Department of Highways.”); Irwin v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Public

Schools, 398 Fed.Appx. 503, at *3 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Florida Department of

Education is a state agency and therefore not a “person” who can be sued under § 1983). 

Adams does not contest that the Department of Education is an arm of the State of Louisiana.

Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods, Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 601–02 (5th Cir. 8

2009).

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In her brief, Adams argues that summary judgment was inappropriate

because RSD is a person under § 1983, and because RSD should not receive

immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. RSD, however, was no

longer the actual defendant at the time of summary judgment. Adams’s

arguments are therefore unavailing, and provide no basis for relief.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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