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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re K. C. SCRUGGS, Minor. January 10, 2017 

No. 332542 

Wayne Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 16-521761-NA 

 

Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and MARKEY and STEPHENS, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to the minor child 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent’s act caused physical injury or physical or sexual abuse to 

child); (g) (parent failed to provide proper care and custody); (j) (reasonable likelihood that child 

will be harmed if returned to parent); and (k)(ix) (parent sexually abused the child). We affirm. 

 The trial court must find the existence of at least one statutory ground for termination by 

clear and convincing evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). If the 

trial court determines that clear and convincing evidence supports a statutory ground for 

termination, the trial court shall order termination of parental rights if the court also finds by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the 

child. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90; In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 129; 

777 NW2d 728 (2009). “This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and 

ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination.” In re White, 303 Mich App 

701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). This Court also reviews for clear error the trial court’s bestinterest determination. Id. at 713. 

 Termination of respondent’s parental rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), 

(g), (j), and (k)(ix). Respondent admitted to sexually abusing the two-week-old child by twice 

placing his penis in her mouth. Furthermore, respondent’s mental health issues prevented her 

from being able to provide proper care of the child. Respondent was diagnosed with 

schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). 

Respondent’s mental health issues dated back to when she was 16 years old and were serious 

enough to require at least six hospitalizations. Respondent argues that she was now stable and 

taking medication. Although she was unable to take prescribed psychiatric medication while she 

was pregnant with the child, the evidence showed that she was prescribed Seroquel right after the 

child was born but was not taking it as directed when she sexually assaulted the baby because it 

made her “woozy.” This was not the first time respondent had stopped taking prescribed 
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medication. In the past she experienced suicidal ideation when she stopped taking prescribed 

medication. Thus, although she may have achieved more stability once she began taking 

medication again, her stability was not reliable given her history of taking herself off prescribed 

medication. Moreover, her low affect at the time she was interviewed by the caseworker 

suggested that her mental stability was still questionable even though she was receiving mental 

health treatment. 

 Respondent was also repeatedly inconsistent about her desire to parent the child. The 

testimony showed that shortly after respondent sexually assaulted her son and called for help, she 

was found throwing away his baby supplies and stated that she could not care for him any longer. 

 Respondent argues that the harm in this case was insufficient to constitute aggravating 

circumstances because there was no injury to the child other than a speculative future injury, and 

she could overcome her bad judgment. This argument is unpersuasive. Respondent’s sexual 

assault on the child could have caused him emotional harm. “Harm” for purposes of MCL 

712A.19b(3)(j) includes not only physical harm, but emotional harm as well. In re Hudson, 294 

Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). Moreover, respondent’s treatment of the child is 

indicative of how she will treat him in the future. The fact that respondent sexually assaulted 

him more than once shows the severity of her issues. 

 Respondent also contends that she should have been afforded reasonable efforts at 

reunification. “Generally, when a child is removed from the parents’ custody, the petitioner is 

required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused the child’s removal by 

adopting a service plan.” In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 462; 781 NW2d 105 (2009); see also 

MCL 712A.18f. However, petitioner is not required to provide reunification efforts when the 

parent sexually abused that child. In re HRC, 286 Mich App at 463; see also MCL 722.638(1) 

and (2). Accordingly, petitioner was not required to provide respondent with reunification 

efforts as she claims. 

 Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred in its best-interest finding. This claim 

is unpersuasive. The trial court specifically found that respondent struggled with mental health 

issues for the past 11 years and had been unable to achieve significant stability. The record 

shows that respondent admitted that she sexually abused her son and it was not in the child’s best 

interests to be raised by a caregiver who might abuse him. Respondent argues that the child’s 

placement with a family member should have negated the need for petitioner to file for 

permanent custody as a child’s placement with relatives weighs against termination. The trial 

court is required to “explicitly address each child’s placement with relatives at the time of the 

termination hearing if applicable.” In re Olive/Metts, Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 44; 823 NW2d 

144 (2012). Here the trial court explicitly found that termination of respondent’s parental rights 

was appropriate even though the child was placed with a relative. The trial court found that the 

risk of harm was too high to work toward reunification even though there was a relative 

placement. 

 Respondent also argues that the trial court did not adequately consider and weigh the 

bond between herself and the child. This argument is unsupported by the record. The testimony 

showed that there was not a strong bond between respondent and the child, who was removed 

from respondent’s care when he was two weeks old. Regardless, even if there was a strong 
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bond, no bond would be more important than the child’s emotional and physical safety. Thus, 

the trial court did not clearly err in its best-interest determination. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens