AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed March 22, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-01550-CV 

JOHN GUANDOLO AND SAINT GEORGE’S ALLIES, INC. D/B/A 

UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, Appellant 

V. 

RICHARD STANEK, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-14892 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Molberg, Nowell, and Goldstein 

Opinion by Justice Goldstein 

This is an appeal from a final judgment in a jury trial involving cross-claims 

for assault and associated torts. In a pre-trial ruling, the trial court partially granted 

appellee’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment. In one issue, appellants 

complain that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment against them on 

their affirmative defenses of self-defense and justification and thereby failing to 
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submit jury questions on those defenses.1

 We affirm. Because all issues in this appeal 

are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. 

BACKGROUND 

Appellee Stanek was at all relevant times the elected sheriff of Hennepin 

County, Minnesota, the county seat of which is Minneapolis. Stanek was also an 

executive board member of the National Sheriff’s Association (NSA). In late-June 

2017, Stanek attended the semiannual meeting of the NSA in Reno, Nevada. 

Also present at the NSA meeting was appellant Guandolo, a former Marine 

and FBI agent. Guandolo is the founder and president of appellant Saint George’s 

Allies, Inc. d/b/a Understanding the Threat (UTT), a Texas corporation. UTT 

provides law enforcement training and engages in public advocacy related to Islamic 

terrorism. UTT’s advocacy is, according to Stanek, controversial and incendiary. A 

few months before the NSA meeting, Guandolo published an article on the UTT 

website titled “In this War Minnesota’s Twin Cities are Lost,” which contained 

allegedly defamatory statements about Stanek. 

On June 20, 2017, Stanek met with Guandolo to discuss the article. Also 

present were Chris Gaubatz and Stephanie Ameiss, both UTT employees, and Peter 

1

 Appellants requested and we have received a partial reporter’s record of the proceedings below. In 

their request, appellants included a statement of issues they intended to raise on appeal. We presume the 

record before us constitutes the entire record for purposes of the issues raised and omitted evidence 

presumed irrelevant to this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.5, 34.6(c); Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 

53 S.W.3d 375, 377 (Tex. 2001). 
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Dietzman, a major at the Hennepin County Sheriff’s office. The conversation 

became heated, and an altercation ensued, memorialized by video and audio 

recordings of the incident.2

Appellee initiated this lawsuit against appellants on October 30, 2017, 

asserting claims for assault, assault by offensive contact, battery, and intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. Stanek alleged Guandolo was acting on UTT’s 

behalf, contending that UTT was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat 

superior. Appellants answered the lawsuit and filed counterclaims for assault, 

battery, and tortious interference with prospective business relations. Appellants also 

asserted several affirmative defenses, including justification and self-defense. 

On July 1, 2019, Stanek filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, 

asserting appellants had no evidence to support the elements of several of their 

claims and affirmative defenses. Relevant here, the trial court partially granted the 

motion against appellants on their affirmative defenses of justification and selfdefense. 

The jury trial commenced on September 9, 2019. On September 17, appellants 

filed their proposed jury instructions, which included a question of whether 

Guandolo acted in self-defense. The next day, appellants filed a motion to reconsider 

2

 Ameiss recorded audio of the meeting and a hotel surveillance camera captured video. Our record 

contains a digital file in which the surveillance footage has been overlaid with the audio recording. The 

recordings were admitted into evidence for the jury’s consideration. 
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summary judgment on their affirmative defenses. At the formal charge conference, 

the trial court denied the motion to reconsider and refused the question as to 

Guandolo’s self-defense. The charge submitted to the jury thus included assault 

questions as to both parties but a self-defense question only as to Stanek. On 

September 20, the jury returned its verdict in favor of Stanek. The jury found that 

Guandolo assaulted Stanek, Stanek did not assault Guandolo, and Stanek was acting 

in self-defense. The jury also found Guandolo 51% responsible of causing or 

contributing to the cause of the altercation and awarded damages to Stanek. The trial 

court entered judgment in Stanek’s favor, and this appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. JLB Builders, 

L.L.C. v. Hernandez, 622 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. 2021). No-evidence summary 

judgments are reviewed under the same legal sufficiency standard as directed 

verdicts. Arana v. Figueroa, 559 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no 

pet.). The non-movant must present evidence that raises a genuine issue of material 

fact on the challenged elements of the claim. See id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); 

S.W. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002)). A no-evidence 

challenge will be sustained when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a 

vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight 
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to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a 

vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes 

the opposite of the vital fact. Id. (citing Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 

244, 248 (Tex. 2013)). 

II. ANALYSIS

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting no-evidence summary 

judgment against them on their affirmative defenses of self-defense and justification. 

Appellee counters that summary judgment was proper because appellants’ response 

to the motion was deficient for failing to connect the evidence to the specific 

elements of their affirmative defenses. Appellee further argues that, to the extent the 

trial court erred in granting summary judgment, we must affirm because the error 

was harmless and appellants failed to meet their burden to show harm. In their reply 

brief, appellants argue that they were harmed by the trial court’s failure to include 

questions regarding self-defense and justifications in the jury charge. 

A. Justification 

Appellants contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on 

their affirmative defense of justification. We disagree. “Justification” is not in itself 

an affirmative defense, but rather an umbrella term for a category of defenses. See 

Alonzo v. State, 353 S.W.3d 778, 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“Chapter 9 of the 

Penal Code recognizes certain justifications that, under Section 2.03, are defenses to 
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prosecution.”). Included among these defenses are self-defense, defense of third 

person, and protection of one’s own property. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31, 

9.33, 9.41. We have been cited no Texas cases, nor have we found any, recognizing 

justification as a stand-alone affirmative defense, let alone identifying the elements 

thereof. A trial court does not err in granting summary judgment on a claim or 

defense that is not recognized under Texas law. See Methodist Hosp. v. Zurich Am. 

Ins. Co., 329 S.W.3d 510, 526 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); 

Cerda v. RJL Entm’t, Inc., 443 S.W.3d 221, 233 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, 

pet. denied). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting 

summary judgment on appellants’ affirmative defense of justification. 

B. Self-defense 

Appellants also contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 

as to the claimed self-defense. Self-defense is an affirmative defense to a civil assault 

claim. See Gibbins v. Berlin, 162 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, 

no pet.) (citing Price v. Short, 931 S.W.2d 677, 687 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, no 

writ)). The elements of self-defense are the same in civil and criminal cases. See id.

at 340. With certain exceptions not applicable here, “a person is justified in using 

force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force 

is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use 

of unlawful force.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a). The Penal Code defines 
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“unlawful” as “criminal or tortious or both and includes what would be criminal or 

tortious but for a defense not amounting to justification or privilege.” See id. 

§ 1.07(a)(48). The “criminal or tortious” conduct which justifies the use of force 

includes assault, which a person commits by, among other things, “intentionally, 

knowingly, or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another” or “intentionally or 

knowingly caus[ing] physical contact with another when the person knows or should 

reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.” 

See id. § 22.01(a)(1), (3). 

The “reasonably believes” language of the self-defense statute “contains 

subjective and objective components.” Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 32 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2021). “A defendant must subjectively believe that another person used 

or attempted to use unlawful force . . . against the defendant and that the defendant’s 

use of unlawful or deadly force in response was immediately necessary.” Id. 

Additionally, the defendant’s subjective belief must be objectively reasonable. Id. A 

reasonable belief is one held by an “ordinary and prudent man in the same 

circumstances as the actor.” Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(42)). 

Here, appellee moved for no-evidence summary judgment on both appellants’ 

claim of assault and their affirmative defense of self-defense. With respect to selfdefense, appellee asserted there was no evidence that: (1) appellee used or attempted 

to use force, (2) appellee’s use of force was unlawful, (3) appellants believed the use 
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of force was immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm, or (4) appellants’ belief 

was reasonable.3

 In their response to the motion, appellants discussed their assault 

claim and their affirmative defense of self-defense under one heading. That section 

of the response states, in full: 

Plaintiff’s verbally and physically aggressive behavior toward 

Guandolo is more than sufficient to sustain Defendants’ assault and 

battery claims, as well as the affirmative defenses of self-defense and 

justification. 

A person commits an assault under Nevada law4

 by “(1) [u]nlawfully 

attempting to use physical force against another person; or 

(2) Intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of 

immediate bodily harm.” A battery is any willful and unlawful use of 

force or violence upon the person of another. 

Here, Plaintiff repeatedly cursed at Guandolo, mocked his service 

record, moved into Guandolo’s personal space while verbally urging a 

fight, bumped chests with Guandolo, and then grabbed Guandolo’s tie 

so tight it was strangling Guandolo. It was only after all of these things 

3

 Although the first, third, and fourth elements identified by Stanek are correct, the second is not. As 

the Court explained in Lozano, self-defense does not require that the plaintiff’s use of force be unlawful, 

but rather that the defendant reasonably believe it to be unlawful. See Lozano, 636 S.W.3d at 32. Thus, 

lawfulness of Stanek’s conduct could not have formed the basis of the trial court’s summary judgment on 

appellants’ affirmative defense of self-defense. See IE.Com, Ltd. v. Peeler, No. 05-19-00496-CV, 2020 WL 

3424913, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (no-evidence summary judgment 

improper where based on elements identified by the movant that are not elements of the non-movant’s 

claim). We therefore limit our analysis to the remaining elements identified by Stanek. See Merriman, 407 

S.W.3d at 248 (where trial court does not state the basis of its summary-judgment ruling, appellate court 

must affirm on any valid ground raised in the motion).

4

 The trial court’s docket sheet reflects that on September 5, 2019, two days after filing this summaryjudgment response, appellants filed an opposed motion urging the trial court to apply Nevada law. The trial 

court entered an order on September 9. Our record does not include the motion, appellee’s response, or the 

trial court’s order. Appellee asserts in his brief that the trial court denied the motion, but that is not evident 

from the record. Nevertheless, appellants do not raise any conflicts of law in this appeal. In the absence of 

a contention that another state’s laws differ from Texas law, we presume the laws of that state “are the same 

as ours.” Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 679 (Tex. 2006). 
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that Guandolo attempted to defend himself and hit Plaintiff in the face 

once. 

There is no dispute that Plaintiff “touched” Guandolo during the 

Altercation by grabbing his tie. Grabbing an individual by the tie and 

twisting it so tightly that it is strangling a person most certainly qualifies 

as “offensive.” Furthermore, Guandolo’s response to Plaintiff’s 

aggression, i.e. one punch to the face, was reasonable in order to avoid 

imminent harm by Plaintiff and certainly justified to protect his life. 

Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs no evidence motion 

for summary judgment because Defendants have produced more than a 

scintilla of evidence supporting their assault and battery claims, as well 

as the defenses of justification and self-defense. 

Stanek argues this response was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact on every challenged element of self-defense because it fails to connect 

the evidence to the individual elements of self-defense. We agree. When a party files 

a proper no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the 

opposing party to “sufficiently respond” by producing more than a scintilla of 

evidence on each challenged element of the claim or defense. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

166a(i); De La Cruz v. Kailer, 526 S.W.3d 588, 593 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, pet. 

denied). To meet that burden, the non-movant “must do more than itemize the 

evidence and then, in a section totally separate from the recitation of the evidence, 

offer general conclusions that the above evidence creates a genuine issue of material 

fact.” See De La Cruz, 526 S.W.3d at 593. Rather, the non-movant must “point out 

with specificity where in his filings there was evidence on each of the challenged 

elements of his claims.” Id.; see also Chambers v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 05-15-
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01076-CV, 2016 WL 3208710, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 9, 2016, pet. denied) 

(mem. op.) (“The issue is whether the trial court must search through all of the nonmovant’s evidence to determine if a fact issue exists without any guidance 

concerning what evidence creates an issue on a particular element.”). The Rules of 

Civil Procedure require that “the party seeking to avoid the effects of a well-pleaded 

no-evidence motion for summary judgment bears the burden to file a written 

response that raises issues preventing summary judgment, and that points to 

evidence supporting those issues.” Chambers, 2016 WL 3208710, at *12. The trial 

court is not required to supply the deficiency, but instead must grant the motion 

where the non-movant fails to meet that burden. Id. 

Appellants’ summary judgment response contained neither references to, nor 

arguments regarding, the mental-state elements of self-defense. Appellants argue in 

their reply brief that they met their burden by including footnote references to the 

summary judgment record and to the facts section of the response, which further 

included citations to the summary judgment evidence, such as Guandolo’s affidavit, 

the video of the altercation, witness statements, deposition testimony from Stanek 

and other witnesses, and police reports.5

 We disagree. The issue is not whether there 

is something in this list of evidence that creates a fact issue on the elements of self5

 We note that appellants’ response was twelve pages in length with 268 pages of exhibits comprised 

primarily of deposition transcripts. 
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defense, but rather whether appellants sufficiently explained how the evidence 

supports each element. See Chambers, 2016 WL 3208710, at *12; De La Cruz, 526 

S.W.3d at 593. The response shows they did not. There is no mention of Guandolo’s 

subjective belief that use of force was immediately necessary or the objective 

reasonableness of that belief,6

 let alone a citation to any evidence supporting either 

element. 

Appellants argue that they presented more than a scintilla of evidence of 

Guandolo’s reasonable belief of harm through Guandolo’s affidavit. Appellee 

counters that the affidavit is not properly before us. In an order dated September 18, 

2019, the trial court sustained Stanek’s objection to, and struck, Guandolo’s affidavit 

on hearsay grounds. Appellants did not challenge that order on appeal. After appellee 

identified the order in his response brief, appellants argued for the first time in reply 

that the affidavit was properly before the trial court because the order striking it was 

signed nine days after the order granting summary judgment, which expressly stated 

that the trial court considered the responses and evidence on file. A party may not 

raise a new issue for the first time in a reply brief. See Private Mini Storage Realty, 

6

 Appellants argue they addressed the reasonableness element with this sentence: “Furthermore, 

Guandolo’s response to Plaintiff’s aggression, i.e. one punch to the face, was reasonable in order to avoid 

imminent harm by Plaintiff and certainly justified to protect his life.” We disagree. There is no footnote or 

record citation following this sentence. Moreover, the sentence misconstrues the reasonableness element of 

self-defense by arguing that Guandolo’s conduct—“one punch to the face”—was reasonable. The objective 

element of self-defense, however, requires evidence of the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief, not his 

conduct. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a). 
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L.P. v. Larry F. Smith, Inc., 304 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). 

We determine this issue is not properly before us. 

We conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on 

appellants’ affirmative defense of self-defense. 

CONCLUSION 

We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting no-evidence summary 

judgment on appellants’ affirmative defenses of justification and self-defense. We 

overrule appellants’ sole issue. Accordingly, we do not reach the parties’ arguments 

regarding whether appellants were harmed by the granting of summary judgment in 

not submitting the question to the jury. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

 

 

191550F.P05 

 

/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/

BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

JOHN GUANDOLO AND SAINT 

GEORGE’S ALLIES, INC. D/B/A 

UNDERSTANDING THE 

THREAT, Appellants 

No. 05-19-01550-CV V. 

RICHARD STANEK, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-14892. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Goldstein. Justices Molberg and 

Nowell participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee RICHARD STANEK recover his costs of this 

appeal from appellants JOHN GUANDOLO AND SAINT GEORGE’S ALLIES, 

INC. D/B/A UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT. 

Judgment entered March 22, 2022.