An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1263

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 15 April 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

J.M.,

A Juvenile.

Sampson County

No. 11 JT 9

Appeal by respondent from orders entered 30 March 2012 by 

Judge Sarah C. Seaton and 24 July 2013 by Judge Leonard W. 

Thagard in Sampson County District Court. Heard in the Court of 

Appeals 31 March 2014.

Warrick and Bradshaw, P.A., by Frank L. Bradshaw, for 

petitioner-appellee Sampson County Department of Social 

Services.

K & L Gates, LLP, by Leah D’Aurora Richardson, for guardian 

ad litem.

Mark Hayes for respondent-appellant.

DAVIS, Judge.
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Respondent-mother (“Respondent”) appeals from the trial 

court’s orders ceasing reunification efforts and terminating her 

parental rights to her child “Jill.”

1 We affirm.

Respondent is the mother of Jill. Jill was born 15 October 

2009 in Cumberland County, North Carolina and is the subject of 

this case. On 10 November 2010, the Sampson County Department 

of Social Services (“DSS”) received a report that Respondent had 

inappropriately disciplined Jill’s sister. The report stemmed 

from an incident in which a school employee discovered a wound 

on Jill’s sister’s buttocks. Pursuant to the investigation, DSS 

asked Respondent about the wound and how it occurred. 

Respondent stated that “she beat the child until the wound got 

sticky.” However, at trial, Respondent stated that the injury 

resulted from her sister spanking the child with a board.

During this investigation, DSS visited Respondent at her 

home and observed that the house was unkempt and in complete 

disarray. As a result of the investigation, DSS placed Jill and 

her sister outside of the home and provided Respondent with a 

case plan. DSS asked Respondent to complete a psychological 

evaluation, attend parenting classes, and attend food and 

nutrition sessions. Respondent completed the psychological 

 

1 The pseudonym “Jill” is used throughout this opinion to protect 

the identity of the child and for ease of reading.
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evaluation which yielded a diagnosis of mild mental retardation 

and depressive disorder. As a result of the evaluation, it was 

recommended that any contact between Respondent and her children 

should be directly supervised and that Respondent attend 

mentoring classes. Respondent failed to complete parenting 

classes, food and nutrition classes, or the mentoring classes.

On 24 January 2011, DSS filed a petition alleging that Jill

was a neglected and dependent juvenile. DSS alleged that 

Respondent had intellectual limitations, demonstrated an 

inability to provide a proper home environment, and had poor

parenting skills. DSS also alleged that Jill’s father was not 

capable of caring for her. DSS obtained nonsecure custody of 

Jill and placed her in the home of P.B., who is the paternal 

grandmother of Jill’s sister.

By order filed 13 July 2011, the trial court adjudicated 

Jill to be neglected and dependent. After holding a disposition 

hearing, the trial court ordered DSS to retain custody of Jill, 

with placement continuing with P.B. The trial court conducted 

subsequent review hearings and, on 30 March 2012, ceased 

reunification efforts.

On 6 June 2013, DSS filed a motion to terminate 

Respondent’s and the father’s parental rights to Jill. DSS 
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alleged that Respondent’s parental rights were subject to 

termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) 

(neglect), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (failure to make 

reasonable progress), and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) 

(dependency). A termination of parental rights hearing was held 

on 23 May 2013, after which the trial court found that all three 

grounds for termination alleged in the petition existed. The 

court determined that termination of Respondent’s parental 

rights was in the best interests of Jill and entered an order 

terminating Respondent’s rights.2 Respondent gave timely notice 

of appeal.

Analysis

I. Cessation of Reunification Efforts

In her first argument on appeal, Respondent contends the 

trial court erred when it ceased reunification efforts without 

making the requisite findings of fact. We disagree.

“This Court reviews an order that ceases reunification 

efforts to determine whether the trial court made appropriate 

findings, whether the findings are based upon credible evidence, 

whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s 

 

2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Jill’s 

father. Because he did not appeal, that portion of the order is 

not before us.
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conclusions, and whether the trial court abused its discretion 

with respect to disposition.” In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 

213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2007). “When a trial court ceases 

reunification efforts with a parent, it is required to make 

findings of fact pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b).” Id.

at 213-14, 644 S.E.2d at 594. “A trial court may cease 

reunification efforts upon making a finding that further efforts 

‘would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s 

health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a 

reasonable period of time[.]’” Id. at 214, 644 S.E.2d at 594 

(quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1)). Though characterized 

as a finding or “ultimate finding[,]” see In re I.R.C., 214 N.C. 

App. 358, 363, 714 S.E.2d 495, 499 (2011), the determination 

that grounds exist to cease reunification efforts under N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1) is, in substance, a conclusion of law 

that must be supported by adequate findings of fact. Id. at 

363, 714 S.E.2d at 498-99.

The trial court made the following pertinent findings of 

fact:

10. That the Juvenile has been in the care 

of the Sampson County Department of Social 

Services or placed outside the removal home 

in excess of twelve (12) months and is 

placed in a structured environment.
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11. That the Respondent Mother has not 

completed her service agreement with the 

Department of Social Services.

12. That the Respondent Mother suffers from 

mild mental retardation.

. . . .

16. That the Respondent Mother relies 

heavily on the oldest Juvenile with caring 

for the siblings.

17. That the Respondent Mother desires to 

live in a home by herself.

. . . .

22. That it is not likely that the Juvenile 

will be returned within the next six (6) 

months.

. . . .

25. That the Department has made reasonable 

efforts in this matter to prevent or 

eliminate the need for placement of the 

Juvenile with the Department and to reunify 

this family.

26. That the Department is no longer 

required to make reasonable efforts in this 

matter to reunify this family pursuant to 

N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-507 as those efforts 

would clearly be futile or would be 

inconsistent with the Juvenile’s health and 

safety, and need for a safe, permanent home 

within a reasonable time. 

27. That the Court finds that the 

conditions which led to the removal of the 

Juvenile from the Juvenile’s home still 

exists and that a return of the Juvenile to 

said home would be contrary to the welfare 
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of the Juvenile.

The trial court concluded:

4. That pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B507, the Sampson County Department of Social 

Services in no longer required to make 

reasonable efforts in this matter to reunify 

this family as those efforts would clearly 

be futile or would be inconsistent with the 

Juvenile’s health and safety, and need for a 

safe, permanent home within a reasonable 

period of time.

In finding of fact 26 and in conclusion of law 4, the trial 

court made the ultimate finding required under section 7B507(b)(1) that reunification efforts “would clearly be futile or 

would be inconsistent with the Juvenile’s health and safety, and 

need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of 

time.”

Respondent challenges the trial court’s ultimate finding on 

the grounds that it did not specify which prong, “futile or 

inconsistent[,]” was the basis for ceasing reunification 

efforts. Respondent argues that the trial court’s failure to 

specify the prong upon which it relied prohibits this Court from 

applying the proper standard of review. Moreover, Respondent 

contends that the trial court’s use of boilerplate language 

lifted directly from the statute results in a failure by the 
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trial court to link any of its findings to the two prongs set 

forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1).

We conclude that unchallenged findings of fact 10 through 

17, 21 and 27 support the trial court’s ultimate finding that

further reunification efforts would be futile and inconsistent 

with Jill’s health and safety and her need for a permanent home 

within a reasonable period of time. The court found that Jill 

has been in DSS custody for over twelve months, she has been in 

a structured environment for this period of time, Respondent

relies on others in caring for Jill, Respondent did not complete 

her services agreement, and Respondent desires to live in a home 

by herself. These findings are uncontested by Respondent and 

are thus binding on appeal. In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 147, 

669 S.E.2d 55, 59 (2008), aff’d per curiam, 363 N.C. 368, 677 

S.E.2d 455 (2009). We conclude that the trial court’s findings 

are sufficient to support its conclusion of law under N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1), and we discern no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s decision to cease reunification efforts under 

these circumstances.

II. Termination of Parental Rights

In her second argument, Respondent asserts that the trial 

court abused its discretion in concluding that the termination 
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of Respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of 

Jill. We disagree.

“After an adjudication that one or more grounds for 

terminating a parent’s rights exist, the court shall determine 

whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s 

best interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). When 

determining whether it is in the juvenile’s best interest for 

the parent’s rights to be terminated, the trial court is 

required to make written findings regarding the relevant factors 

enunciated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). Id.

“We review the trial court's decision to terminate parental 

rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 

94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). Abuse of discretion results 

where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or 

is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a 

reasoned decision. State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 

S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).

Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact 

to support its conclusion that it was in the best interests of 

Jill for Respondent’s parental rights to be terminated:

3. That the Juvenile has been placed with 

[P.B.] since January 24, 2011.

4. That the Juvenile is currently placed 
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in the aforesaid home with the Juvenile’s 

sibling.

5. That the Juvenile has adapted well in 

the current placement.

6. That the Juvenile is thriving in the 

current placement.

7. That the Juvenile is developing 

appropriately for her age.

8. That [P.B.] desires to adopt the 

Juvenile.

9. That [P.B.] and the Juvenile have 

developed a close bond to one another.

10. That there is little to no bond between 

the Juvenile and the Respondent Parents.

11. That [P.B.] understands the legal 

significance and the financial obligation of 

adopting the Juvenile.

12. That the current permanent plan for the 

Juvenile is adoption.

13. That the termination of parental rights 

of the respondents would aid in the 

completion of the current permanent plan for 

the Juvenile.

Respondent asserts finding of fact 10 — that there is 

“little to no bond” between her and Jill — is unsupported by the 

evidence. To support her argument, Respondent relies on 

evidence suggesting that a bond did, in fact, exist between Jill 

and Respondent. Respondent points to her father’s testimony

that Jill and her sister “have a loving relationship with 
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[Respondent]” and that they miss Respondent. Respondent also 

cites Social Worker Dana Sutton’s testimony that (1) Jill knows 

Respondent; (2) Jill and Respondent have a “loving 

relationship”; and (3) DSS was recommending bi-weekly visits 

between Respondent and Jill after termination because P.B. 

“would like for the girls to have contact with their mom.” 

However, Respondent’s argument ignores the well-established 

principle that “[f]indings of fact supported by competent 

evidence are binding on appeal, despite evidence in the record 

that might support a contrary finding.” In re C.I.M., 214 N.C. 

App. 342, 345, 715 S.E.2d 247, 250 (2011).

Here, there is competent record evidence supporting the 

trial court’s finding that there is “little to no bond between 

Juvenile and Respondent.” First, it is the adoptive parent who

has taken the initiative to involve Respondent in Jill’s life by 

taking Jill once a month to Sampson County to visit with

Respondent. Indeed, the fact that Jill – at three years of age 

— only visits with her mother once per month at her adoptive 

parent’s initiative is evidence supporting the trial court’s 

finding that there is little to no bond between Jill and 

Respondent. Moreover, competent evidence shows that Jill has 
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been living with P.B. since she was only one year of age, which 

is more than half of her life.

While Respondent cites other evidence that may have 

supported a finding that there was a bond between mother and 

child, the trial court’s finding of fact 10 is supported by 

competent evidence and is binding on appeal. “It is not the 

function of this Court to reweigh the evidence on appeal.” 

Garrett v. Burris, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 735 S.E.2d 414, 418 

(2012), aff'd per curiam, 366 N.C. 551, 742 S.E.2d 803 (2013).

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that termination of Respondent’s parental rights was 

in Jill’s best interests. See In re S.C.R., 198 N.C. App. 525, 

536, 679 S.E.2d 905, 912 (2009) (holding that trial court's 

findings reflected reasoned decision based upon statutory 

factors listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B–1110(a) and that, 

therefore, trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding termination of mother's parental rights was in best 

interests of child).

Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders 

ceasing reunification efforts and terminating Respondent’s

parental rights.
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AFFIRMED.

Judges HUNTER, JR. and ERVIN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).