MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 235 Docket: And

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- 131 Argued : September	12,	2017 Decided: December	19,	2017
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER, MEAD , GORMAN ,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.
RONALD P.	CHAMPAGNE

PER	CURIAM [¶1] F ollowing	 a final hearing	 on	 the	 Attorney	 General’s	 complaint alleging	that	Ronald	P.	Champagne	violated	the	Maine	Civil	Rights	Act	(MCRA) , the	Superior	Court	(Androscoggin	County, MG Kennedy,	J. ), entered	a	judgment permanently	 enjoining	 Champagne	 from,	 inter	 alia,	 “threatening	 or	 using physical	force	or	violence	against	any	person	by	reason	of	that	person’s	race, color,	 religion,	 sex,	 ancestry,	 national	 origin,	 physical	 or	mental	 disability	 or

sexu al	orientation.” See 5	M.R.S.	§§ 4681(1) , 4684

- A (2016). Asserting	that	the injunction	was	overbroad,	Champagne	moved	the	court	to	amend	the	judgment
and for	further	findings	of	fact	and	conclusions	of	law. See M.R.	Civ.	P. 52(b) , 59

. The	court	denied the	motions,	and	Champagne	appealed.2 [¶2 ] S uch a comprehensive	injunctive	remedy	must	rest	upon	articulated factual	findings	that	are	supported	by	the	evidence.		Because	the	court	did	not make	the	required	factual	findings	providing	the	basis	for	its	inj unction,	we	do not	have	a	sufficient	record	for	appellate	review. Accordingly ,	we must remand
the	 matter for	 the	 court	 to	 make	 findings	 that	 provide	 the	 reasons	 for	 the issuance	of	the	judgment,	as	required	by Maine	Rule	of	Civil	Procedure	65(d) , which provides,	in	part,	that [e]very	restraining	order	and	every	order	granting	a	preliminary or	permanent	injunction shall	set	forth	the	reasons	for	its	issuance ; shall	be	specific	in	terms;	[and]	shall	describe	in	reasonable	detail, and	not	by	reference	to	th e	complaint	or	other	document,	the	act or	acts	sought	to	be	restrained. (Emphasis	added .) [¶ 3 ]		In Vance	v.	Speakman ,	we	vacated	an	injunction	that	was	issued	in contravention	of	the	Rule	65(d)	requirement	that	a	court	“set	forth	the	reasons” for	 doing	 so ,	 explai ning	 that	 “[t]he	 purpose	 of	 the 65(d )	 requirement	 is	 to
enable an[] appellate	court	to	know	exactly	what	findings	of	fact	and	rulings	of law	 are	 being	 used	 to	 justify	 the	 injunction.” 409	 A.2d	 1307,	 1311	 n.4 (Me. 1979). Here, the	court did	not	ar ticulate the	“findings	of	fact	and	rulings of	 law	 .	 .	 .	 being	 used	 to	 justify	 the	 injunction”	 beyond its	 limited	 finding3 regarding	 Champagne’s	motivations based	 on	 sexual	 orientation. See	 Vance, 409	A.2d	at	1311	n.4;	M.R. Civ.	P.	6 5(d). [¶ 4 ]		Absent	adequ ate findings	and	an	explanation	of	the	court’s	rationale for	 the	 granting of and the	 broad scope	 of	 the	 injunction,	 we	 are	 unable	 to
determine	 whether th e	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 when	 it issued the very broad	 and	 permanent injunction. See Stanton	 v. S trong ,	 2012	 ME	 48,	 ¶	 8,
40 A.3d	 1013	 (“ When	 a	 court	 grants	 a	 permanent	 injunction,	 our	 review	 is
limited	 to	 whet her	 the	 injunction consti tutes	 an	 abuse	 of	 discretion.” (alteration	and	quotation	marks	omitted)). Accordingly ,	we	remand the	matter
for	 the	 court	 to	 make findings	 supporting	 an injunction of	 a	 scope	 that	 it determines	is	warranted	by	the	evidence,	and	to	explain	its	rationale	in	doing

so
. 1 The	entry	is: Remanded	 for	 further	 proceedin gs consistent	with	this	opinion.

1 In	reaching	this	result,	we	do	not	suggest	that	the scope	of the court’s	original	inju nction	is	or	is not	 supportable ;	 we simply hold that	 at	 this	 juncture	 there	 are	 insufficient	 findings to	 permit appellate	review.4 Donald	 S.	 Hornblower,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Lewiston,	 for	 appellant	 Ronald	 P. Champagne Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General , and	Leanne	Robbin,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen. (orally) , Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Androscoggin	County	Superio r	Court	docket	number	CV

- 2012

- 60 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY