COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Chafin and AtLee Argued at Lexington, Virginia

PETER ANTHONY DELUCA MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1560-18-3 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR. MAY 21, 2019 TRACIE ONDICH DELUCA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AMHERST COUNTY J. Michael Gamble, Judge Designate Seth C. Weston (Law Office of Set h C. Weston, PLC , on briefs), for appellant. Brian R. Moore (The Moore L aw Firm, PLLC, on brief), for appellee.
Peter Anthony DeLuca (“husband”) appeals the decision of the Ci rcuit Court of Amherst County (“trial court”) that held him in contempt of court for f ailure to pay spousal support to Tracie Ondich DeLuca (“wife”). 1 On appeal, husband assigns twelve errors to the trial court’s ruling. Additionally, wife sets forth three assignments of cro ss-error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in pa rt and reverse in part.
I. B ACKGROUND “[W]e view the evidenc e in the light most favorable to the prev ailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.” Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 258 (2003).

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.

1 We recognize that “former husband” and “former wife” would be more accurate, but we use less cumbersome titles in this memorandum opinion for ease of reference.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Husband and wife married on O ctober 3, 1992. On January 25, 20 08, husband and wife entered into a property settlement agreement (“PSA”). The part ies legally divorced on January 3, 2013, and the PSA was incorpora ted into, but not merged with , the final decree of divorce. Relevant to this appeal, the PSA requires husband to pay the mo rtgage on the marital home, which was to be titled sol ely in wife’s name. Paragraph 4 of the PSA states that “[h]usband shall support [w]ife i n the manner to which she is a ccustomed and is currently being supported, recognizing the need of [w]ife to educate and nurtur e [the child].” Paragraph 6 provides that wife shall receive a fifty-percent ( 50%) share of all of [h]usband’s military retirement pay and benefits. She shall be entitled to her legal share of any and all addi tional pay and benefits due her, having been in the marriage for more than fifteen years of [h]usband’s active-duty service time for retirement. Additionally, the parties agreed that each party would pay his or her own attorney’s fees. A. Events Leading to the First Appeal - DeLuca 1 On May 28, 2013, wife filed a motion to show cause, alleging th at husband had failed to comply with the spousal support obligations in the PSA and a de claratory judgment action asking the trial court to interpret the PSA. Because the PSA did not set a specific dollar amount of spousal support, the trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing to allow it to perform a retrospective analysis to dete rmine whether husband had complie d with the PSA. After hearing the evidence, the t rial court determined that the relevant time period was the year prior to the parties en tering the agreement. During that time, wife received an average of $4,373 each month in support from husband. Thus, the trial court concluded $4,373 was the amount the parties intended as the spousal support obligation u nder the PSA. Husband paid less than that each month fro m May 4, 2010 through April 1, 2014, an d, relying on the numbers in an exhibit presented by wife, the tri al court set the arrearages a t $121,976.- 3 - The trial court asked wife’s attorney to prepare an order consi stent with its ruling. The proposed order stated that husband owed “$4,373.00 net per mont h after taxes” and that husband had failed to meet his support obl igation “in the net amount af ter taxes of $121,976.00.” The trial court informed the partie s that it had cro ssed out “after taxes” in both places. The order stated that it was a final ord er on the issue of support but th at the trial court took the issue of contempt under advisement. Husband appealed to this Cour t. In an unpublished opinion, a p anel of this Court held that the agreement was unamb iguous and the plain meaning of the PSA required husband to pay “a sum certain in monthly spousal support.” 2 DeLuca v. DeLuca, No. 1158-14-3, at *8 (Va. Ct. App. May 19, 2014) (“DeLuca1”). It affirmed the tria l court’s award of $4,373 per month. B. Events Leading to the Second Appeal - DeLuca 2 While DeLuca 1 was pending before this Court, husband voluntari ly retired from his position with the military. He be gan receiving his military re tirement pay, and, as required under the PSA, wife began receivi ng $4,608.25 monthly, her fifty-perc ent share of husband’s pension. Simultaneous with his retiremen t, husband stopped paying spousa l support, leading wife to file her second motion to show cause. Husband argued that he should rec eive a monthly credit against his spousal support obligation each month for the am ount of wife’s share of the pen sion payment. He argued that the spousal support was not supposed t o be a sum certain but rather was intended to support a certain lifestyle. According to husband, the partie s intended that the retirement payment would replace the spousal support to support wi fe in that lifestyle. Wife ar gued that the retirement payment

2 Husband assigned four errors in DeLuca 1. This Court addresse d only the first issue, finding that the other three we re procedurally defaulted.- 4 - was intended as a separate oblig ation that was part of the equi table distribution of marital assets, not spousal support. The trial court initially rul ed in favor of husband, finding th at he was entitled to a credit. The trial court noted that wife’s interpretation w ould result i n wife receiving nearly the entire amount of husband’s retirement pa y, which it deemed a “tortured construction of the agreement.” Wife filed a motion to reconsider . The trial court granted the motion and withdrew its prior ruling, finding that husba nd was not entitled to a credit because the PSA did not contain language linking the two provision s, nor did it use the word “c redit.” The trial c ourt noted that it made the ruling “with great rel uctance” because the “financial impact doesn’t seem right,” but that the court was legally bound to enforce the terms agreed up on by the parties. Additionally, the trial court re calculated the arrearages and s tated that husband was not required to pay the state and fed eral taxes on the spousal supp ort, an issue that arose during the hearing on the motion to reconsid er. As it had before, the tri al court took the issue of whether husband was in contempt under advisement. Husband again appealed the decisi on to this Court. Prior to or al arguments, a panel of this Court asked the parties to pr ovide supplemental briefing o n whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal since the trial cour t did not adjudicate the issue o f contempt. Ultimately, the panel determined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the trial court’s order was not final. The order lacked finality because it took the contempt issue un der advisement and thus did not dispose of the whole case. See DeLuca v. DeLuca, No. 1249-16-3 , *2 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2017) (unpublished order) (“DeLuca 2”). Husband argued that th e order in DeLuca 1 similarly lacked finality, but, since the issue was beyond the scope of t he appeal, this Court declined to address it.- 5 - C. Events Leading to the Current Appeal In response to the ruling in DeL uca 2, husband filed two motion s with the trial court. In the first motion, he asked the trial court to declare DeLuca 1 void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He argued tha t the DeLuca 1 order contain ed the same lack of finality as the order in DeLuca 2. The trial court denied husband’s motion, no ting that DeLuca 2 was unpublished and did not address De Luca 1 and therefore did not require voiding DeLuca 1. Because this Court had addressed the merits in DeLuca 1, the tr ial court determined that it meant either “explicitly or implici tly . . . the Court felt that it h ad jurisdiction in that matter.” Husband’s second motion asked the trial court for leave to file a late motion for declaratory judgment. He argued that the declaratory judgment action was necessary because he would have no way to appeal the PSA interpretation rulings if t he court did not hold him in contempt. Husband contends he did not want to relitigate issue s; he only wanted t he trial court to issue an order incorporating a ll of its prior orders into th e declaratory judgment action. The trial court denied the moti on, deeming it unnecessary to issue an order about orders long since issued. Wife also filed a third motion t o show cause arg uing that husba nd still was not paying spousal support and was also not p aying the entire mortgage pay ment. On October 18, 2017, the trial court ruled on all three mo tions to show cause. The tria l court determined husband was not guilty of contempt on the first motion to show cause because he was unaware of the exact amount of support owed. Nor was he in contempt on the second m otion to show cause because he had a good faith legal argumen t about the retirement pay as a credit against the spousal support and because the opinion in DeLuca 1 had not yet been is sued. The trial court did find husband guilty of contempt on wife’s third motion to show cause . The trial court found that husband’s average monthly income was between $10,000 and $11,00 0 per month. When he did- 6 - not pay spousal support, he ha d $1,100 left over after his othe r expenses. Additionally, husband was paying his attorneys $3,000 pe r month, which could be reduc ed to meet his support obligation. Although husband may not have been able to pay the entire amount, the trial court determined he could have paid at least some of the support obli gation. The trial court sentenced him to thirty days in jail, and it set a hearing to determine h usband’s current financial circumstances, calculate the a rrearages, and establish a paymen t schedule. If husband paid his obligations from October 2017 thr ough the date of the hearing, the trial court would suspend the jail sentence. Husband testified at the hearing that he had worked as a consul tant for various projects. He presented a spreadsheet showing his income from each consult ing job and his retirement pay since 2014. Husband’s attorney a rgued that husband could only afford to pay a few hundred dollars per month towards the a rrearages. During his testimony , however, husband stated that he already owed wife about $7,700 per month, and, when it came to arrearages, “he would ask to try and keep th[e combined total] to something under $8,500 per mon th.” The trial court concluded that husband had earned $135,926 from employment over the past eighteen months, which averaged $7,551 per month. Based on the combination of his ear ned income and retirement pay, the trial court ordered husb and to pay $2,000 per month towards the arrearages. During the hearing, husband pointed out an apparent math error in the calculation of arrearages in the May 22, 2014 orde r. According to him, the arrearage should have been $91,377.01 rather than the $121,976 that the trial court set—a difference of $30,598.99. 3 Husband argued that the trial co urt should use its equitable po wer to apply a credit to the May 22, 2014 arrearage. Wife argued that husband had not objected to the calculation at the time the

3 The trial court’s letter opini on references wife’s exhibit E f rom the 2014 hearing and bases its calculations on the numbers and dates from the that e xhibit. Husband’s attorney used those numbers to point out what he argued was a mathematical error.- 7 - order was entered and that the order was final and had already been affirmed in DeLuca 1. The trial court took that issue under advisement in order to review the documents. Eventually, the trial court dete rmined that it had made a mathe matical error. The trial court awarded husband a credit of $30,598.99 because it was not fair that husband bear the full burden for the miscalculation. But, because husband had not ob jected at the time and out of fairness to wife, the trial cour t awarded the credit to the current arrearage, not to the May 22, 2014 arrearage. Wife could then c ollect interest on the $121,9 76 arrearage pursuant to Code § 20-78.2, while husband ultimately received the credit. Both parties objected. At the hearing, husband also argued t hat interest on the arrear ages requires a final order, and he again argued that the May 22, 2014 order was not a final order. Therefore, interest should only apply to the arrearages afte r the final order of contempt was entered, not from the date the trial court calculated the arre arages in each temporary order. The trial court determined that Code § 20-78.2 allowed interest on th e arrearages in orders set ting out arrearages if the total arrearage was greater than the total of three months of support . Thus, from April 25, 2014 to March 1, 2016, the arrearages of $121,967 would earn interest a t 6%. From March 1, 2016 to October 10, 2017, the updated arrearages of $185,229 would earninterest at 6%. From October 10, 2017 through April 26, 2018, the a rrearages of $272,702 wou ld earn interest at 6%. Finally, the trial court calculated the c urrent arrearages, before apply ing the credit, as $268,080. After subtracting the credit, t he arrearages were $237,481.01, and th ey too would earn interest at 6%. Finally, wife requested attorne y’s fees for her efforts to col lect arrearages. Husband argued that wife was not entitled to them because the PSA provi ded that each party would pay their own attorney’s fees. W ife argued that Code § 20-78.2 all owed for attorney’s fees in attempts to collect arrearages if the arrearages were greater t han three months of support. The- 8 - trial court agreed. Noting the PSA, however, the trial court l imited its ruling to those fees accumulated in preparing for the April 26, 2018 hearing on arre arages and ability to pay. Husband and wife both objected to t he final order. Husband ap pealed to this Court.
II. A NALYSIS A. Husband’s Assignments of Error Husband assigns twelve errors t o the trial court’s ruling. We address each assignment of error in turn before addressing w ife’s assignments of cross-err or. 1. Authority of the Trial Court to Vacate a Court of Appeals Opinion 4 In DeLuca 2, a panel of this C ourt determined it did not have s ubject matter jurisdiction to consider an appeal because the trial court’s order took the issue of contempt under advisement and thus was not a final order. H usband argues that the order in DeLuca 1, which also took the contempt issue under advisement , is likewise not a final order, and, therefore, the trial court erred when it refused to declare our opinion in DeLuca 1 void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “A trial judge is bound by a decisi on and mandate from this Cou rt, unless we have acted outside our jurisdiction.” Rowe v. Rowe, 33 Va. App. 250, 257 (2000). A decision of a court entered without jurisdiction is a complete nullity and may be “ impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any manner.” Sing h v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 52 (2001) (quoting Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705 (1925)). The issue here, however, becomes whether a lower court can determine that a hig her court lacked jurisdiction and then ignore a direct mandate from the higher court. Husban d’s position that the trial court should have declared our opinion void ab initio for lack of subject ma tter jurisdic tion is the

4 Because the issue of whether D eLuca 1 is void for lack of subj ect matter ju risdiction is not properly before us, we will notaddress husband’s assignmen ts of error three through six, as those assignments of error were addressed in DeLuca 1.- 9 - equivalent of saying that we coul d ignore a mandate of the Supr eme Court of Virginia if we determine that it lacked jurisdi ction. The Supreme Court would almost certainly disagree. Although a party may attack an a llegedly void judgment, we cann ot agree that a lower court, in this case the trial court, is the appropriate forum to attack the jurisdiction (and mandate) of a higher court. 5 Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying husband’s m otion. 6
2. Contempt Husband next argues that the t rial court erred by finding him i n contempt because he did not willfully disobey the court order but, instead, he was fina ncially unable to comply. We review the trial court’s ex ercise of its contempt powers for an abuse of discretion. DHRI, Inc. v. Hanback, 288 Va. 249, 254 (2014). “A trial court may hold a support obligor in contempt for failure to pay w here such failure is based on unwi llingness, not inability, to pay.” Barnhill v. Brooks, 15 Va. App. 696, 704 (1993). In Barnhill, the support obligations exceeded the obligor’s inc ome, and, after borrowing money and filing a motion to reduce his obligations, the obligo r stopped paying. 15 Va. App. at 704-05. The trial court did not hol d the obligor in contempt. On review, we determined that, “[a]lthough the trial court could, in its discretion, have rule d that the [obligor] should have paid at least a portion of the suppor t due appellant, it did not so hold.” Id. at 705.

5 We also note that “a trial judge violates his or her oath of o ffice by willfully refusing to abide by the rulings of an appell ate court concerning the very case on appeal from the trial court, regardless of how erroneous the trial judge may consider the ap pellate ruling to be.” Rowe, 33 Va. App. at 258. Given the potential consequences of an incorr ect ruling, trial judges should not be in the position of being asked t o disregard a direct mandate of a higher court.

6 To the extent that husband asks this Court to vacate the opini on in DeLuca 1, we decline to do so because it is beyond the s cope of this appeal. The as signment of error addresses only whether the trial court erre d in refusing to declare DeLuca 1 v oid. Husband argues that the fact that the issue is styled “as an e rror by the trial court is of no moment, as that is how all errors must be styled.” But, “[e]lementary is the rule of appellate p rocedure that the scope of argument on appeal is limited by the assignm ents of error.” Dudley v. E state Life Ins. Co. of Am., 220 Va. 343, 348 (1979). Thus, the finality of the order in DeLuca 1 i s not properly before us.- 10 - Here, despite an average income between $10,000 and $11,000 per month, and a positive balance of $1,100 after all of his expenses (excluding spousal support) were paid, husband failed to pay any spousal support from Mar ch 21, 2016 through October 10, 2017. The trial court also noted that husband paid his a ttorneys $3,000 per month, which c ould be reduced and, in combination with the $1,100 positive balance, used to meet at l east part of his support obligations. The record supports the trial cou rt’s finding tha t husband could have met at least a portion of the support due. As we held in Barnhill, it is with in the trial court ’s discretion to hold that a failure to pay at least some portion of the support due is willful disobedience of a court order. Thus, the trial court did not err.
3. Retirement Pay as a Credit Against Spousal Support Husband argues that wife’s shar e of his retirement pay should b e credited against his spousal support obligation. He al so argues that the contract i s ambiguous and that the Court must consider the evidence pres ented at the hearing to determin e the intent of the parties. We review the trial court’s interpretation of the PSA de novo . Jones v. Gates, 68 Va. App. 100, 105 (2017). A PSA is a c ontract “subject to the same rules of construction that apply to the interp retation of contract s generally.” Id. (quot ing Southerland v. Estate of Southerland, 249 Va. 584, 588 (2017)) . “The question for the c ourt is what did the parties agree to as evidenced by their contra ct.” Schuiling v. Harris, 286 V a. 187, 192 (2013) (quoting Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187 (1984)) . “Where there is no ambi guity in the terms of a contract, we must construe it as written.” Smith v. Smith, 3 Va. App. 51 0, 514 (1986). “Contracts are not rendered ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to th e meaning of the language employed by them in expressing their agreement.” Wilson, 227 V a. at 187.- 11 - Here the terms are clear and unambiguous. 7 The two paragraphs a t issue are entirely separate; they are separately numbered and separately titled. They do not follow immediately after each other, nor do they contai n any language linking them together. Paragraph 4, which provides for spousal support, doe s not contain an end date, ref erence to a credit, or any reference to modification upon retirement or any other circumstance. 8 Paragraph 6, which provides for the distribution of retirement pa y, does not contain any reference or link to paragraph 4. The language of paragraph 6 references wife’s “legal share” and her entitlement based on the length of time she was in the marriag e. This language suggests paragr aph 6 is part of an equitable distribution award rather than a spousal support replacement. Husband relies on McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 252 (199 0), where this Court rejected the argument that a f ederal pension was part of an equ itable distribution award and, as such, could not be considered whe n setting spousal support. Th at case is inapplicable here. In McGuire, the PSA allowed modi fication of spousal support by pro per motion to the court. The statutory factors in Code § 20-107.1( E) specifically direct a t rial court to “consider the needs and financial resources of the pa rties including but not limited to income from all pension, profit sharing or retirement plans.” The PSA here, however, prohibits modification except by

7 Husband argues that the contra ct is ambiguous because the tria l court ruled first one way and then the other. We disa gree. Our opinion in DeLuca 1 was issued on September 11, 2014, one month after the trial cou rt’s initial ruling about th e credit. The trial court later noted that it did not have the record ( including the PSA) back from t his Court at the time it made the ruling and that it should have waited until it could refer to the PSA to make a ruling.

8 Husband argues that paragra ph 4 only required him to support w ife “in the manner to which she is accustomed and is currently being supported,” not a set amount, and that the retirement pay was intended to replace support. Because we do not address the validity of DeLuca 1, the ruling that the PSA intended a set amount of spou sal support stands and is the law of the case. See Miller-Je nkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 276 Va. 19, 26 (2008) (When “there have been two appeals in the same case, betw een the same parties, and the facts are the same, nothing decided on the first appeal can be re-examined on a second appe al.” (quoting Steinman v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 121 Va. 611, 620 (1917))).- 12 - agreement of the parties. The t rial court was not exercising i ts discretion to m odify support, and, unlike in McGuire, its only job w as to interpret the PSA. Ther e was nothing in the PSA that explicitly, or even implicitl y, provided for a credit. Husband points to the trial court’ s initial ruling where it sta ted that it was a “tortured construction” of the agreement f or husband to pay more after re tirement than before. Wife will, in fact, get most of husband’s pens ion. Whatever the subjectiv e fairness of the agreement may be for husband, he agreed to the PSA of his own free will. We will not “relieve one of the consequences of a contract mer ely because it was unwise.” Roge rs v. Yourshaw, 18 Va. App. 816, 823 (1994) (quoting Derby v. Derby, 8 Va. App. 19, 30 (198 9)). Nor can we “rewrite a contract simply because the contract may appear to reach an unf air result.” Id. (quoting Kaufman v. Kaufman, 7 Va. App. 488, 501 (1988)). The parties entered this PSA; th ey chose and agreed to the word s it contained. Now they are bound by them. There was no ref erence to a credit, and we will not read into the PSA language that will change the meaning of the words used by the parties. Wilson, 227 Va. at 187.
4. Application of the Credit to the Current Arrearage Husband assigns error to the tr ial court’s ruling that the $30, 598.99 credit applies to the current arrearage rather tha n to the arrearages in the May 22, 2014 order. On brief, husband incorporates his arguments for a ssignments of error six and nin e. Assignment of error six relates to the trial court’s authority t o award pre-divorce arrearages when there is no specific reservation in the decree. 9 Assignment of error nine relates to the authority to award in terest prior to the

9 Additionally, assignment of error six and its argument are not properly before this Court because, as mentioned above, we do not address whether DeLuca 1 is void ab initio

.- 13 - entry of the final contempt order. 10 These incorporated arguments do not relate to whether the trial court had authority to apply t he credit to an arrearage s et out in a final order, which is the error assigned here. Accordingly, we will not consider them he re. See Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 473 (2007) (ru ling an assignment of error was abandoned because the argument did not relate to the assignment of error). To the extent husband makes an a dditional argument beyond the incorporated arguments, it is a single, conclusory sente nce restating the assignment of error and stating tha t the error is not harmless. This additional se ntence includes no citations o r any legal authority as required by Rule 5A:20. “Such a statement does not constitute an argument in support of the error assigned.” Teleguz, 273 Va. at 473. Accordingl y, this assignment of error is abandoned.
5. Interest on the Arrearages Prior to the Entry of the Final Contempt Order Husband argues that the trial court erred by awarding prejudgme nt interest on the arrearages. He argues that DeLuca 1 was void ab initio and not a valid final order and thus each of the orders setting the arrear ages were temporary orders. Be cause the finality of the order in DeLuca 1 is not properly before us, the trial court’s May 22, 2 014 order remains a final judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not award prejudgment interest as husband argues. 11

10 The argument in assignment of e rror nine mentions that this Co urt determined it did not have subject matter jurisd iction in DeLuca 2. But there is no explanation of how that relates to this assignment of error.

11 Even if the May 22, 2014 order prec eding DeLuca 1 was not a fi nal judgment, there is nothing in Code § 20-78.2, upon which t he trial court relied, t hat requires a final order to award interest on arrearages. Code § 20- 78.2 provides that “an order or decree of support for a spouse . . . shall constitute a final judgment for any sum or sums in arrears.” Thus, Code § 20-78.2 provides a mechanism for treati ng an order that s ets arrearages as a final judgment for interest purposes. Both the divorce d ecree and the May 22, 2014 order c ould be treated as an order allowing interest under this c ode section. Further, Virginia l aw consistently views support obligations as final judgment s by operation of law when they be come due and go unpaid. Code § 20-107.1(H)(6), 20-60.3(14) (a sup port obligation, child or s pousal, becomes a “judgment by operation of law” when it becomes due and goes unpaid); Alig v. Alig, 220 Va. 80, 85 (1979) (“[T]he general rule is that i n the absence of factors making i t inequitable, interest should be- 14 - 6. Monthly Arrearage Payment Husband argues that the “trial court erred in se tting forth arr earage payment of $2,000 per month as [husband] has shown he ca nnot financially sustain such payments . . . .” We disagree. Issues relating to the trial court’s enforcement of a final de cree’s support provisions are reviewed under an abuse of discre tion standard. See Zedan v. W estheim, 62 Va. App. 39, 44-45 (2013) (applying an abuse of disc retion standard to issues rela ting to the enforcement of child support arrearages). The trial c ourt’s factual findings relati ng to this issue are binding on us unless they are plainly wrong. Milam v. Milam, 65 Va. App. 439 , 462 (2015). Husband contends that the trial court found he has a monthly i ncome of $7,551. He argues that his financial obligation to wife is $7,025.72, and thus he is financially unable to pay an additional $2,000 per month towar ds the arrearages. Husband misinterprets the trial court’s opinion. The trial court det ermined husband’s income from employment over eighteen months was $135,926, and thus his average earned income was $7,551 per month. When the trial court set the arrearages, it consider ed “this earned income along wit h the current monthly income” from his retirement pay (approximately $4,600). Under these numbers, husbands’ average monthly income is closer t o an average above $12,000 per month. These figures come directly from an income spreadsheet husband entered into evidence. Alth ough the spreadsheet does show his income varies month to month, it ranges from a low of $7,33 2.40 up to $22,218.82 per month. Moreover, at the hearing, husba nd testified that he owed wife approximately $7,700 per month and he “would ask [the cour t] to try and keep that to som ething under $8,500 per month” after arrearages were added or he would not be able to pay. Hu sband, by his own testimony,

assessed on unpaid installments of alimony from the date they m ature or become due until the date they are paid.”).- 15 - suggests that he can afford up t o $800 in arrearages payments, which is significantly more than the several hundred dollars per month his attorney suggests he could afford. The trial court is entitled to consider the evide nce, including husband’s credibil ity, and determine the weight to be afforded to each piece of the e vidence. See Parham v. Commonwe alth, 64 Va. App. 560, 565 (2015) (“[D]etermining the credibi lity of the witn esses and the weight afforded to the testimony of those witnesses are matters l eft to the trier of fact.”). G iven the evidence of husband’s income from husband’s own exhibit and his testimony admitting he can p ay more than he argued to the trial court, we cannot say the trial court erred in setting the arrearage payments at $2,000 per month.
7. Denial of an Extension of Time to File Pleadings It is within the broad discreti on of the trial court to determi ne whether to grant an extension of time and permit a late filing. Rule 1:9. “Whethe r such discretion has been properly exercised will, of course, de pend upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Westfall v. Westfall, 196 Va. 97, 103 (1954). “On ly when reasonable jurist s could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurr ed.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 312, 327 (2015) (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)). “I n determining whether a trial court has abused its discr etion by granting or denying leave to file a late pleadi ng, the existence or absence of good cause for the delay, together with other com pelling circumstances, control the determination.” Emrich v. Emrich, 9 Va. App. 288, 292 (1989). The trial court should consider, among other things, the preju dice to opposing party, the good f aith of the moving party, existence of a meritorious clai m or defense, and the extenuatin g circumstances. Id. Husband lists the relevant f actors, but he does not explain howor why each factor weighs in his favor. Our review of the record finds nothing that sugg ests the trial court abused its discretion. The parties had bee n litigating this case for four -and-a-half years at the time of the- 16 - hearing. It had been before this Court twice. The trial court had long since ruled on the contract interpretation issues . An order incorporat ing past orders into a new cause of action adds nothing to the case. Despite husband’s cl aims that the declaratory jud gment action would be necessary to allow appeal of the contract issu es if the trial court did not hold him in contempt, we note that wife’s declaratory judgment ac tion was already before the trial court. Given the circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying husband’s motion.
8. Attorney’s Fees Husband argues that the trial court erred by awarding wife atto rney’s fees because their PSA provided that each party would pay its own fees. We agree. Parties may shift responsibility for attorney’s fees through co ntractual provisions. Jones, 68 Va. App. at 106. Code § 20-109(C) addresses such provisions in divorce cases: In suits for divorce, annulment and separate maintenance . . . if a stipulation or contract signe d by the party to whom such relief might otherwise be awarded is file d before entry of a final dec ree, no decree or order directing the payment of . . . counsel fee .

. . shall be entered except in accordance with that stipulation or contract. If a PSA contains an attorney’s fee provision, the court must f ollow the terms of that agreement. Jones, 68 Va. App. at 106. Paragraph 17 of the PSA provides that “[e]ach party shall pay h is or her attorney’s fees and that parties shall divide equally the costs of any uncontes ted divorce proceedings filed by either [h]usband or [w]ife.” The parties contemplated the issu e of attorney’s fees and determined, as evidenced by the pl ain language of their agreeme nt, that each party shall be responsible for their own attorney’s fees. The parties could h ave, but chose not to, include a provision for attorney’s fees i n the case of enforcement. See, e.g., Jones, 68 Va. App. at 106-07 (including a provision to allow attorney’s fees for successfull y defending an action for enforcement); Pellegrin v. Pellegrin, 31 Va. App. 753, 767-68 ( 2000) (allowing attorney’s fees- 17 - for a motion to show cause as a n “action for enforcement” under the PSA). Nor did they specify that the fee provision was limite d to services pertaining to th e final decree of di vorce. We cannot add language for them. See Wilson, 227 Va. at 187. Therefore, the trial court is reversed and the award of attorney’s fees to wife is vacated. B. Wife’s Assignments of Cross-Error
1. State and Federal Tax Issues Wife argues that the trial court improperly addressed the issue of whether husband was required to pay state and federal taxes because the issue was n ot properly before the court. She also contends that the trial court modified its May 22, 2014 ru ling, which, she argues, ordered husband to pay the taxes. We disagree. Although the issue of tax liabili ty was not expressly raised in the pleadings, 12 all three of wife’s motions to show cause put at issue the amount husband ow ed wife in arrearages. The May 22, 2014 order required husband to pay wife “$4,373.00 net per month.” Throughout the proceedings, including in wife’s motion to reconsider, which wa s before the trial court at the time the tax issue arose, wife emphasized the use of the word “ net.” Thus, in order for the trial court to properly calculate arre arages, specifically whether hu sband was required to pay more than the $4,373 in order to cover the tax liability, it was nec essary for the trial court to address the issue. Furthermore, the trial court di d not modify a prior order. Rat her it interpre ted its May 22, 2014 order, and it is a “well-esta blished principle in our juri sprudence . . . that circuit courts have the authority to interpret the ir own orders.” Roe v. Commonwea lth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006).

12 We also note that the September 29, 2016 order, which dealt wi th the issues from the August 11, 2015 hearing, lists a motion “requesting the [trial c]ourt issue a Rule to Show Cause and hold [wife] in contempt of cour t for claiming certain feder al and state tax credits.” While it does not appear that the trial c ourt issued the rule to show cause, it does show that the issue was before the court and necessaryto the arrearage issue.- 18 - “We defer to the trial court’s interpretation of its own order, ” Leitao v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 435, 438 (2002), though that inte rpretation must be re asonable, Roe, 271 Va. at 458. The May 22, 2014 order was prepared by wife. The proposed orde r stated husband must pay “$4,373.00 net per month after t axes.” Regarding arrearage s, the order stated husband had failed to pay “in the net amount after taxes of $121,976.00.” Prior to entering the order, the trial court specifically crossed out “after taxes” in both places and clearly and specifically informed both parties it had done so. 13 These edits demonstrate the trial court di d not, in fact, ord er husband to pay the taxes on the spousal support. Wife contends that the word “net” must mean something. We agree, but by cross ing out “after taxes,” the tr ial court has told us what it does not mean. Moreover, during the hearing on the amount of spousa l support, wife expressly asked the trial court for a higher amount of support in order to cove r the taxes, and the trial court refused. Thus, the trial court did not improperly modify its M ay 22, 2014 order.
2. Arrearage Correction Wife argues the trial court erred by giving husband a credit of $30,598.99 for a mathematical error because hus band did not object to the miscal culation when it was made and that the order with the alleged e rror is a final order that was affirmed on appeal. We disagree. “Although the finality impose d by Rule 1:1 generally governs, there are circumstances in which a trial court may exercis e limited jurisdiction beyond th e twenty-one-day period.” Minor v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 728, 740 ( 2016). One such example is the exception in Code § 8.01-428(B), which allows the tria l court to correct clerical errors. Furthermore, as the Supreme Cour t has recognized, a trial court has “the inherent power, indepe ndent of statutory authority, to correct errors in the record so a s to cause its acts and procee dings to be set forth correctly. In s hort, the court has the inheren t power,

13 The order ultimately entered by the trial court is the order p resented by husband. The trial court’s edits are handwritten on the order.- 19 - independent of the statute, upon any c ompetent evidence, to mak e the record ‘speak the truth.’” Minor, 66 Va. App. at 741 (quoting Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 14 1, 149 (1996)). “Scrivener’s or similar errors in the record, whi ch are demonstrably contradict ed by all other documents, are clerical mistakes.” Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va. App. 126, 133 (2002). The trial court is restricted “to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action that actual ly has been taken,” and may not do that which it should have done. Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 136, 140 (2005). We recognize that a math error wh ile calculating arrearages may not always be a clear case of clerical error. Often, t he trial court is weighing con flicting evidence in order to determine what a party actually paid, and it may not be evident exactly which amounts it uses or what evidence it relies on. Thi s case, however, falls well within the definiti on of a clerical mistake. The trial court’s M ay 22, 2014 order, which contains the error, specifically incorporates its letter opinion of April 25, 2014. In the letter opinion, t he trial court states exactly which exhibit it used to make its calcu lations. It states the specif ic dates it used, which match the listed exhibit, and it explains the cal culations made. The referenced exhibit plainly show s that the trial court’s error is demonstrably c ontradicted by the exhibit. See Zhou, 38 Va. App. at 140. Thus, the trial court did not err in cor recting a clerical error and awarding husband a credit.
III. C ONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we reve rse and vacate the trial court’s award of a ttorney’s fees to wife. The trial court is affirmed on all other issues. Affirmed in part , reversed in part.