[Cite as State v. Clark, 2018-Ohio-521.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-17-1044 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201603039 

v. 

Marcus L. Clark, Sr DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: February 9, 2018 

* * * * * 

 Julia R. Bates, Prosecuting Attorney, and Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant 

 Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 

 Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

MAYLE, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Marcus Clark Sr., appeals the February 21, 2017 

judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him for a conviction 

of menacing by stalking. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

 
2. 

I. Background and Facts 

{¶ 2} On November 8, 2016, Clark was indicted on one count of menacing by 

stalking, a violation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). The indictment included a penalty 

enhancement under R.C. 2903.211(B)(2)(e) that raised the menacing by stalking charge 

from a first-degree misdemeanor to a fourth-degree felony and required the state to prove 

that “[t]he offender has a history of violence toward the victim or any other person or a 

history of other violent acts toward the victim or any other person.” During discovery, 

the state told Clark’s attorney that it intended to rely on two of Clark’s prior convictions 

to prove the history-of-violence element. The state later learned that the prior convictions 

did not involve B.P., the victim in this case. At a pretrial on January 10, 2017, the state 

told the defense that the prior convictions involved different victims and that it would not 

use the convictions to prove the history-of-violence element. Instead, the state intended 

to rely only on B.P.’s testimony to show that Clark had a history of violence with B.P. 

{¶ 3} On January 17, 2017, Clark filed three motions: a request for a bill of 

particulars, a “motion for notice of intent to use evidence,” and a discovery demand. All 

three motions sought information from the state regarding its ability to prove the historyof-violence element. Clark claimed that he had not been provided with any discovery 

relating to B.P.’s allegations of past violence. In response, the state asked Detective 

Mary Jo Jaggers of the Toledo Police Department, who was the detective assigned to the 

case, to conduct a follow up interview with B.P. Detective Jaggers interviewed B.P. on 

January 19, 2017, and filed her supplemental report memorializing the interview on 

January 20, 2017. The state provided the report to Clark on January 23, 2017. 
3. 

{¶ 4} The court held another pretrial on January 24, 2017, at which Clark moved 

to dismiss the indictment because of the state’s Crim.R. 16 violations, or alternatively, for 

exclusion of B.P.’s testimony regarding Clark’s history of violence with her. The state 

moved for a continuance of the trial scheduled to begin later that day, which the court 

granted over Clark’s objection. The court also ordered the parties to brief the dismissal 

issue by January 26, 2017. 

{¶ 5} On January 25, 2017, the state filed its responses to Clark’s January 17 

motions, including a notice of intent to use evidence that outlined B.P.’s anticipated trial 

testimony. The same day, Clark filed a motion to dismiss that expanded upon the 

arguments he made at the January 24 pretrial. He argued that the state’s failure to 

provide him with evidence to support the history-of-violence element until the day before 

trial violated Crim.R. 16 and that the appropriate sanction was either dismissal of the 

indictment, dismissal of the history-of-violence element of the indictment, or exclusion of 

B.P.’s testimony regarding the history of violence between her and Clark. 

{¶ 6} The state responded on January 26, 2017, arguing that dismissal was not an 

appropriate sanction because any Crim.R. 16 violation it might have committed was not 

willful, Clark suffered only minor prejudice, and a continuance of the trial was the least 

severe remedy for any discovery violation. 

{¶ 7} Also on January 26, the court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. At 

the hearing, the court tentatively set a new trial date for January 31, 2017. The court did 

not rule on Clark’s January 25 motion, prompting Clark to file a second motion to 

 
4. 

dismiss on January 30, 2017. The January 30 motion alleged additional discovery 

violations by the state. Clark again sought sanctions in the form of dismissal of the 

indictment or exclusion of B.P.’s testimony regarding the history of violence between her 

and Clark. 

{¶ 8} The court held another hearing on January 30 (the day before the scheduled 

jury trial) at which it addressed the new motion to dismiss. The court took the issues of 

dismissal and sanctions under advisement and confirmed the January 31 trial date. 

{¶ 9} Prior to trial on January 31, 2017, the court ruled that the state’s conduct was 

not sufficient to justify dismissing the indictment. After confirming with defense counsel 

that he was ready to proceed with trial, the court decided not to issue any sanctions 

against the state. The court also noted its continuance of the January 24 trial date to 

January 31, which provided the defense with additional time to prepare to defend against 

the evidence in the January 20 police report and therefore remedied any prejudice Clark 

might have suffered. 

{¶ 10} At trial, B.P. was the state’s first witness. She testified that she and Clark 

had lived together and had an eight-year relationship that she ended in August 2016. She 

described the relationship as “very violent, abusive. A lot of putdowns, a lot of mental 

abuse.” This included death threats, beatings, and abuse of B.P.’s dogs. B.P. said that 

she stayed in her relationship with Clark for more than eight years because she was 

scared of him and afraid that he would harm her if she left. Although B.P. testified that 

there were numerous incidents of abuse that happened during her relationship with Clark, 

she addressed only four of them in depth. 
5. 

{¶ 11} The first incident happened approximately one month into her relationship 

with Clark. She said that he strangled her, which left a scar on her neck. B.P. did not call 

the police or seek medical care because of this incident because she was afraid and did 

not know what to do. 

{¶ 12} The next incident of violence that she detailed was a beating in July 2007, 

during which Clark gave her a black eye. She also said that she received so many black 

eyes during her relationship with Clark that her left eye looks permanently blackened. 

Once again, B.P. did not report the incident to police or seek medical attention. 

{¶ 13} The third incident happened in April 2009. B.P. testified that Clark 

“stomped my face out” and cut her hand and leg with a knife. B.P.’s injuries were so 

severe that Clark permitted her to go to the hospital for treatment. B.P. claimed that 

Clark told her to report that she was injured when a group of men attacked her as she was 

walking to the store, which she reported to hospital staff. When police officers came to 

the hospital to investigate, B.P. told them the same story. She testified that there was no 

follow-up investigation or prosecution based on her police report. She claimed that she 

did not tell the hospital staff or the police what really happened because Clark had 

threatened to kill her before and she was afraid of him. 

{¶ 14} The final incident B.P. detailed happened later in 2009, shortly after B.P.’s 

mother died. She testified that Clark caused extensive damage to their house one night 

while he was angry. This included destroying some flowers that had belonged to B.P.’s 

mother and throwing her mother’s picture in the dumpster. 
6. 

{¶ 15} After B.P. left Clark in August 2016, she testified that he “continuously” 

made unwanted calls to her work cellphone and sent her unwanted text messages, to the 

point that she obtained a civil protection order (“CPO”) against him to prevent him from 

contacting her. She also blocked his cellphone number so that she would not receive any 

phone calls or text messages sent from his number. She took the threats in the text 

messages very seriously and was “in hiding for months.” Clark repeatedly threatened to 

kill B.P., and she believed that he would follow through on his threats. 

{¶ 16} In the afternoon of October 17, 2016, B.P.’s tires were slashed while her 

car was parked at her office. Her car was the only one in the parking lot that was 

vandalized. There were no witnesses or video that documented who slashed B.P.’s tires, 

but B.P. believed that Clark did it in retaliation for her blocking his cellphone number 

earlier that day. B.P. called the Sylvania Township Police Department (“STPD”) to 

report the damage. Officers responded and took a report, but no charges were filed. B.P. 

testified that she told police when they responded that she was afraid of Clark and that he 

was going to get more violent as a result of her involving police. 

{¶ 17} Beginning the evening of October 17 and continuing through October 31, 

2016, B.P. received multiple text messages on her work cellphone from phone numbers 

that she did not recognize. Despite the messages coming from unknown numbers, B.P. 

attributed them to Clark because she knew his speech patterns and he had made similar 

threats to her before. The messages B.P. received on October 17 included the statements 

“You are so dead bitch” and “The police can’t help you hoe??! [sic].” There was also a 

 
7. 

message telling B.P. not to go to her office because “you are gonna [sic] have it bad * * 

*” and a message that B.P. interpreted as threatening her daughter, grandchildren, and exhusband. B.P. reported the threatening messages to the police around 11:00 p.m. that 

night. She said that she never received threatening text messages before she left Clark 

and has not received any threatening messages since the criminal case against Clark was 

filed. 

{¶ 18} Later, on a Sunday,1

 B.P. received more threatening text messages from the 

unknown phone number. The messages called her a “Dead bitch,” accused her of 

cheating, and threatened death to B.P. and her daughter. 

{¶ 19} The next morning, on Monday, B.P. received messages from the same 

unknown number that said “Thanks for not being there you will get found [sic]” and “We 

goin together you my bitch mine [sic].” She testified that Clark came to her office that 

day, but someone told him that B.P. was not there. She believed that the second message 

meant that Clark was going to kill her and himself. B.P. said she was “petrified” when 

she received the messages because Clark “was off in crazy land again.” 

{¶ 20} On Monday evening, B.P. received six messages from a second phone 

number that she did not recognize. Among other things, the messages said “Call marcus 

or dont go to work tomorrow. u cheating on me. [sic];” “Im already dead im not going 

 

 

1

 Other than the October 17, 2016 messages, the text messages that the state admitted into 

evidence are undated (aside from the labels of “Sunday,” “Monday,” and “Yesterday”) 

and the state did not ask either B.P. or Detective Jaggers to clarify the dates on which 

B.P. received the messages. 
8. 

alone [sic];” and “U wont call so I guess ill c u tomorrow [sic].” She interpreted the 

messages to mean that Clark intended to look for her if she did not call him and that he 

intended to kill her and himself the next day. 

{¶ 21} The final message that B.P. testified about came from a third phone number 

that B.P. did not recognize. It said, “Police can’t help you bitch. Don’t go on Reynolds. 

we both dead soon. End of story. In dead now both of us dead. this is sam bitch 8to5 

[sic].” B.P. thought that Clark was threatening to come to her office, which is on 

Reynolds Road, to kill her and himself. B.P. testified that Clark knew that her work 

schedule was 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. She also said that she knows one person named 

Sam—her son-in-law—but she did not believe that the message came from him because 

he was respectful to her and had never spoken to her using threatening language. 

{¶ 22} B.P. testified that the text messages made her fear for her life. She believed 

that Clark was going to cause her physical harm. As a result of the abuse inflicted by 

Clark, B.P. now attends personal and group counseling sessions. She still feared Clark at 

the time of trial and believed that he would kill her if he ever had the opportunity. 

{¶ 23} On cross-examination, B.P. testified that, prior to the day her tires were 

slashed, she never called 911, filed a police report or pressed charges against Clark, or 

sought help from a domestic violence agency or shelter. She said that she reported the 

text messages because she “had the strength” and thought that Clark would kill her for 

leaving him. She admitted that Clark did not commit any acts of physical violence 

against her from October 17 to 31. She also admitted that she left Clark twice, but 

returned to the relationship because she was not strong enough and did not have the 
9. 

support she needed to stay out of the relationship. She confirmed that she lied to hospital 

staff and police regarding the source of her injuries in April 2009 even though she was 

away from Clark and in the safety of the hospital at the time. 

{¶ 24} Regarding the incident where her tires were slashed, B.P. testified that she 

wanted to file charges against Clark, but the STPD did not pursue the case because the 

police were investigating the text messages and B.P. had already obtained a CPO against 

Clark. 

{¶ 25} Defense counsel also asked B.P. about the text messages that she received 

from unfamiliar phone numbers. She testified that she reported the messages to police 

because of their content and because she thought that 22 messages sent over 15 days was 

an excessive amount of contact. B.P. again said that she believed that Clark sent the 

messages based on her prior communication with him. She also said that Clark 

occasionally referred to himself in the third person while speaking, so B.P. did not find it 

odd that he would refer to himself as “Marcus” in one of the text messages. 

{¶ 26} On cross, B.P. said that she showed Detective Jaggers the text messages 

that were on her phone during Detective Jaggers’s investigation. At the detective’s 

request, B.P. said that she took screenshots of all of the messages she received from 

October 17 to 31 and emailed them to Detective Jaggers. She said that Detective Jaggers 

did not, however, ask her to have her phone forensically examined by the TPD. B.P. 

clarified on redirect that Detective Jaggers looked at the messages on B.P.’s phone and 

made the screenshots of the messages; B.P. just emailed the screenshots to Detective 

Jaggers. 
10. 

{¶ 27} Detective Jaggers was the state’s other witness. She testified that she is a 

domestic violence detective with the TPD. She first received a report about the text 

messages on October 17. The report noted that there was a history of violence between 

the parties and that B.P. started receiving the messages after she broke up with Clark. 

Detective Jaggers did not initially interview B.P. After both the TPD and the STPD 

received more reports from B.P. about threatening text messages, Detective Jaggers 

conducted an investigation. She interviewed B.P. on October 28, 2016, during which 

B.P. was very emotional. B.P. told Detective Jaggers about the incidents of violence that 

B.P. testified to at trial, but Detective Jaggers did not include a description of the events 

in her report. B.P. also showed Detective Jaggers the text messages on her work phone. 

Detective Jaggers took screenshots of the messages to preserve them and had B.P. email 

the screenshots to her; the screenshots that arrived in Detective Jaggers’s email (and were 

admitted into evidence at the trial) were the same screenshots that Detective Jaggers 

made on B.P.’s phone. Detective Jaggers did not ask B.P. to submit the phone for 

forensic testing. 

{¶ 28} Detective Jaggers testified that TPD uses a method of retrieving data from 

cellphones that she referred to as a “phone dump.” The process requires the officer 

conducting the retrieval to download all of the data on the phone; the officer cannot 

download only the data that might have evidentiary value. TPD does not have a policy 

about retrieving cellphone data from victims. Rather, a phone dump is conducted at the 

investigating detective’s discretion and requires the victim to consent to the process. 

Detective Jaggers chose not to ask B.P. to consent to a phone dump. 
11. 

{¶ 29} Detective Jaggers also testified that she requested phone records from the 

cellphone service providers for B.P.’s work phone and the three unknown numbers that 

the text messages came from, but she was not able to obtain them. She said that neither 

phone records nor phone dump data could tell her who was holding the phone that sent 

the messages to B.P. 

{¶ 30} Finally, Detective Jaggers said that, based on her knowledge of and 

experience with domestic violence victims, she did not find it unusual that B.P. did not 

contact police about the abusive behavior or call 911 when she was injured, stayed with 

Clark for many years and returned to the relationship after leaving, and lied about the 

cause of her April 2009 injuries. 

{¶ 31} Clark’s cross-examination mainly focused on the deficiencies that he 

perceived in Detective Jaggers’s investigation. Detective Jaggers admitted that speaking 

to B.P. was the extent of her investigation. She did not interview Clark about the text 

messages either before filing the charges or after Clark was arrested and held in jail, nor 

did she interview B.P.’s daughter, friends, or neighbors. 

{¶ 32} Detective Jaggers confirmed that she learned about the incidents of 

violence to which B.P. testified during her interview with B.P., but she did not put the 

incidents in a written report at that time. Detective Jaggers said that she conducted 

another interview with B.P. on January 19, 2017—11 days before trial—in order to get a 

comprehensive list of violent incidents between Clark and B.P. She confirmed that 

B.P.’s failure to report the abuse or leave Clark was not unusual behavior in a domestic 

 
12. 

violence victim. She also confirmed that her supplemental report did not note any 

incidents of violence after 2009 and that Clark did not commit any acts of violence 

against B.P. from October 17 to 31, 2016. B.P. did not report receiving any threatening 

text messages between the time she left Clark in August 2016 and the time she received 

the first threatening message on October 17, 2016. 

{¶ 33} Regarding her choice not to collect the data from B.P.’s work cellphone, 

Detective Jaggers testified that she opted not to request a phone dump because of 

concerns about the business information on the phone. She believed that preserving the 

text messages in photographs and subpoenaing phone records would be sufficient 

evidence. She also admitted that she did not receive any of the phone records that she 

subpoenaed from the cellphone companies. To follow up on the subpoenas, Detective 

Jaggers called one of the companies to ask about the records and told prosecutors that she 

had not received the records. Detective Jaggers was not called into court for a hearing 

about enforcing the subpoenas. Detective Jaggers said that she did not apply for search 

warrants for B.P.’s work cellphone or for the cellphones associated with the three 

unidentified telephone numbers. Without the phone records, Detective Jaggers was not 

able to identify the people to whom the unknown phone numbers belonged. 

{¶ 34} Detective Jaggers testified that there are programs available that allow 

users to “spoof” phone calls and text messages—i.e., make the calls and messages appear 

to be coming from a phone number different from the number that was actually calling or 

sending the messages. She admitted that there was a possibility that the messages B.P. 

received had been sent from a spoofed number. Although Detective Jaggers said that 
13. 

calling the phone numbers may have provided insight on who they belonged to and 

whether the text messages were from spoofed numbers, she did not call any of them 

during her investigation. 

{¶ 35} After hearing the evidence, the jury found Clark guilty of menacing by 

stalking, including the history-of-violence element. On February 17, 2017, the trial court 

sentenced Clark to 17 months in prison. Clark now appeals the trial court’s judgment, 

raising three assignments of error: 

I. The court committed reversible error when it denied Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss or order sanctions against the State for failure to timely 

provide evidence to be used in the State’s case in chief. 

II. The state failed to provide legally sufficient evidence to sustain 

an indictment or conviction for the enhanced offense of menacing by 

stalking, a felony of the fourth degree. 

III. Appellant’s conviction for menacing by stalking, a felony of the 

fourth degree, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

II. Law and Analysis 

A. The State did not Commit a Discovery Violation 

{¶ 36} In his first assignment of error, Clark contends that the trial court erred 

when it failed to dismiss the indictment or otherwise sanction the state for discovery 

violations. Clark claims that the state violated Crim.R. 16 when it decided to rely on 

evidence to support its case that was different from the evidence it initially disclosed 

without also providing Clark with the new evidence it intended to use. The state, on the 
14. 

other hand, argues that (1) it did not commit any discovery violations and (2) if it did, the 

trial court’s continuance of the jury trial from January 24 to January 31 was the 

appropriate sanction. We agree with the state that no discovery violations occurred. 

{¶ 37} “The trial court may make orders regulating discovery not inconsistent with 

[Crim.R. 16].” Crim.R. 16(L)(1). Generally speaking, when the trial court becomes 

aware that a party has violated Crim.R. 16, the court can order the party to produce the 

evidence, grant a continuance, exclude the undisclosed evidence from trial, or “make 

such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.” Id. Imposition of discovery 

sanctions is discretionary, and we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 

20, 33. Abuse of discretion means that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Askew v. Goldhart, 75 Ohio St.3d 608, 610, 

665 N.E.2d 200 (1996). 

{¶ 38} Under Crim.R. 16(B), the state has a duty to provide the defendant with 

certain items related to the defendant’s case that are “within the possession of, or 

reasonably available to the state * * *.” Crim.R. 16(B). Among the items the state must 

disclose are “[a]ll reports from peace officers * * *” and “[a]ny written or recorded 

statement by a witness in the state’s case-in-chief * * *.” Crim.R. 16(B)(6), (7). A 

writing or recording is a “statement” for purposes of Crim.R. 16 if it is prepared, signed, 

or adopted by the witness, or is a substantially verbatim recital of the witness’s statement 

that is written in narrative form. State v. Inman, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 12CA16, 2013- 

 
15. 

Ohio-3351, ¶ 26. Although the rule requires the state to disclose witnesses’ statements, it 

does not require the state to reduce interviews with potential witnesses to writing. State 

v. Jackson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27739, 2017-Ohio-278, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 39} Here, it is undisputed that the state provided Clark with Detective Jaggers’s 

initial police report from her October 28, 2016 interview with B.P. and that the report 

does not contain descriptions of any incidents of violence between B.P. and Clark. It is 

also undisputed that Clark knew B.P.’s identity and knew that the state planned to call her 

as a witness. Additionally, Detective Jaggers testified that one of the police reports from 

STPD (that is not in the record) noted a history of violence between the parties, albeit 

without detailed descriptions of violent incidents. 

{¶ 40} The state initially—and mistakenly—told Clark that B.P. was the victim of 

Clark’s prior violent crimes and that it intended to use the prior convictions to prove a 

history of violence between him and B.P. The prosecutor disclosed his mistake to Clark 

when he realized that B.P. was not the victim of the prior crimes. Clark takes issue with 

the state’s failure to provide him with any more discovery information at that time. But it 

appears from the record that the state did not have anything else to give Clark; there is no 

evidence that a written or recorded statement by B.P. existed before January 19. When 

Clark made a discovery request for more specific information about B.P.’s testimony, the 

state obtained a statement from B.P. and promptly disclosed it to Clark. 

{¶ 41} In State v. Nelson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25026, 2012-Ohio-5797, a 

case that involved the state’s late disclosure of recently-obtained statements from two 

codefendants, the Second District Court of Appeals found that the state did not commit a 
16. 

discovery violation because “the State could not have disclosed the supplemental [police] 

report prior to [the day before trial], when it was completed * * *.” Id. at ¶ 46. The court 

also noted that the defense attorney did not ask for a continuance, but “indicated that he 

‘absorbed’ the materials provided by the State before [the codefendants] testified, and 

counsel could and did thoroughly cross-examine those witnesses.” Id.

{¶ 42} Like the Second District in Nelson, we find in this case that the state could 

not have provided Clark with discovery that did not exist when he first asked for it. Clark 

does not provide any case law—and we could not find any—supporting the idea that the 

state had a duty to create a witness statement in this case. We also note that the trial court 

continued the trial for a week, which gave Clark’s attorney time to investigate the 

statements and prepare for trial. Moreover, Clark’s attorney said before the trial began 

that he had all of the information that he needed to proceed, and Clark’s attorney was 

able to thoroughly cross-examine B.P. about the incidents of violence, and Detective 

Jaggers about the timing and completeness of her investigation. Under these 

circumstances, we find that the state did not violate Crim.R. 16, and consequently, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to sanction the state. Accordingly, 

Clark’s first assignment of error is not well-taken. 

B. Clark’s Conviction is Supported by Sufficient Evidence 

{¶ 43} In his second assignment of error, Clark argues that his conviction of the 

history-of-violence element is not supported by sufficient evidence because B.P.’s 

testimony about the history of violence should have been excluded and there is no other 

 
17. 

evidence supporting a fourth-degree felony conviction. The state counters that B.P.’s 

testimony was properly admitted and that Clark’s conviction was supported by sufficient 

evidence. 

{¶ 44} In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether “any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 

684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). In making that determination, the appellate court will not weigh 

the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 

2008-Ohio-2762, 890 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 132. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support 

a conviction is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 

N.E.2d 541 (1997). 

{¶ 45} To prove that Clark committed menacing by stalking, the state was 

required to prove that Clark engaged in a pattern of conduct by which he knowingly 

caused B.P. to believe that Clark would cause physical harm to her or her family member 

or he knowingly caused mental distress to B.P. or her family member. R.C. 

2903.211(A)(1). Clark does not argue that the state failed to prove these elements of 

menacing by stalking. Rather, he claims that the state did not prove that he “has a history 

of violence toward the victim or any other person or a history of other violent acts toward 

the victim or any other person,” as required by R.C. 2903.211(B)(2)(e) to make the crime 

a fourth-degree felony. The history-of-violence element can be proven by testimony 

 
18. 

alone. See, e.g., State v. Dean, 146 Ohio St.3d 106, 2015-Ohio-4347, 54 N.E.3d 80, ¶ 

177 (a single witness’s testimony is sufficient to prove a fact even if the testimony is 

contradicted); State v. Neal, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-14-1221, 2016-Ohio-332 (victim’s 

“uncorroborated” testimony provided sufficient evidence to support history-of-violence 

element). 

{¶ 46} We find that the state presented sufficient evidence to prove that Clark has 

a history of violence and violent acts toward B.P. B.P. testified to four separate incidents 

where Clark was violent with her: one where he strangled her, one where he blackened 

her eye, one where he beat her and cut her with a knife, and one where he damaged 

property in their home. Despite Clark’s claims, a victim’s testimony—alone—is enough 

to support a jury’s finding that there is a history of violence or history of violent acts. 

The jury found B.P.’s testimony about the parties’ past history credible, and we will not 

disturb that finding. Further, because we found that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by not striking B.P.’s testimony about the violent incidents, Clark’s argument 

that the state lacked sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction without B.P.’s testimony is 

moot. We find, therefore, that Clark’s second assignment of error not well-taken. 

C. Clark’s Conviction is not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence 

{¶ 47} In his final assignment of error, Clark contends that his conviction is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. 

{¶ 48} When reviewing a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

 
19. 

consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether the jury clearly lost its way 

in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice 

that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 

at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. We do not view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

state. “Instead, we sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and scrutinize ‘the factfinder’s resolution of 

the conflicting testimony.’” State v. Robinson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1369, 2012-

Ohio-6068, ¶ 15, citing Thompkins at 388. Reversal on manifest weight grounds is 

reserved for “the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the 

conviction.” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 

N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). Although under a manifest weight standard we consider the 

credibility of witnesses, we extend special deference to the jury’s credibility 

determinations given that it is the jury that has the benefit of seeing the witnesses testify, 

observing their facial expressions and body language, hearing their voice inflections, and 

discerning qualities such as hesitancy, equivocation, and candor. State v. Fell, 6th Dist. 

Lucas No. L-10-1162, 2012-Ohio-616, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 49} After reviewing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, we are 

not convinced that the evidence weighs heavily against Clark’s conviction. Nor can we 

say that the jury lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice by convicting 

Clark of felony menacing by stalking. We find, therefore, that Clark’s conviction is not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Clark’s third assignment of 

error is not well-taken. 

 
20. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 50} The February 21, 2017 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common 

Pleas is affirmed. Clark is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

_______________________________ 

Christine E. Mayle, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE