UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ LAZARITA CHAVEZ, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee. No. 15-2201 (D.C. No. 1:14- CV-00452-SCY) (D.N.M.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , O’BRIEN , and GORSUCH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Lazarita Chavez applied for social se curity disability benefits and supplemental security inco me payments, claiming th at physical and mental impairments prevented her from working. An administrative law judge (ALJ) disagreed, finding that Ms. Chavez retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform many jobs in the national economy. Later, the Appeals Council denied review, and a district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This or der and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 2, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 On appeal, Ms. Chavez raises two claims of error with re spect to the ALJ’s RFC determination. First, she contends the ALJ failed to give adequate reasons for not including certain functional limitations found by an examining psychologist, Dr. Owen. Second, she argues the ALJ erred by failing to explain why the RFC didn’t include all of the moderate limitations listed in th e opinion of a non-examining psychologist, Dr. Lev. The problem with Ms. Chav ez’s first argument is th at the ALJ did provide reasons and analysis for disc ounting Dr. Owen’s opinion. See Aplt. App. at 22 (“[I]t is inconsistent with the ove rall record and was a one-tim e contact with the claimant, appearing to be primarily based upon her s ubjective complaints.”). The ALJ pointed to evidence in the re cord indicating that Ms. Chavez was not as limited as Dr. Owen opined. For example, the ALJ discussed Ms. Chavez’s treatmen t records indicating she had “only mild symptoms” and was “gen erally functioning pre tty well” and noted the absence of any eviden ce from Ms. Chavez’s treating physicians that she was unable to perform work consistent with her RFC. Id. at 21, 23. The ALJ also discounted Ms. Chavez’s subjective compla ints, finding that she was not entirely credible (a finding that Ms . Chavez does not dispute). Id. at 21. Ms. Chavez simply has given us no persuasive reason to conc lude that the ALJ gave insufficient or illegitimate reasons for disc ounting Dr. Owen’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (outlining the factors used in weighing medical opinions); Chapo v.
Astrue , 682 F.3d 1285, 1291 (10th Cir. 2012) (“An opinion found to be an examining rather than treating [one] ma y be dismissed or discounted . . . based on an evaluation3 of all of the factors set out in the cited regulations . . . .”); Flaherty v. Astrue , 515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007) (findi ng the ALJ reasonably discounted a nontreating physician’s opinion which was ba sed on a single, subjective report by the claimant). Turning to her second argument, Ms. Chavez contends that the ALJ didn’t explain why the RFC failed to capture two moderate limita tions from Dr. Lev’s opinion. Specifically, she points to limits on her ability to sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision and to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. The probl em Ms. Chavez faces is the ALJ did incorporate Dr. Lev’s limitations in the RFC, just as the district court found. While the ALJ didn’t parrot Dr. Lev’s exact descri ptions of Ms. Chav ez’s limitations, the ALJ did specifically note his overall asse ssment that Ms. Ch avez “retain[ed] the capacity to do simple ta sks.” Aplt. App. at 440. And we find it hard to fault the ALJ for finding, consistent with Dr. Lev’s opini on, that Ms. Chavez should be “limited to simple work-related decisions with few workplace changes, ” “no interaction with the public, and only occasiona l and superficial contact with co-workers.” Id. at 20; see Smith v. Colvin, __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 2620519, at *3-4 & n.2 (10th Cir. May 9, 2016)

. Affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Neil M. Gorsuch Circuit Judge