NO. 07-02-0016 -CR IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L E DECEM BER 6, 2 002

______________________________ TOMMY LYNN PARRISH, Appellant
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE 411 TH DISTRICT COURT OF POLK COUNTY; NO. 15,994; HON. ROBERT HILL TRAPP, PRESIDING

_______________________________ Before QUINN and REAVIS, J.J., and BOYD, S.J. To mmyLynn Parrish (appellant) appeals from a judgm ent under which he was convict ed for se xual assault of a child and tw o counts of indecency w ith a child. The
con viction s fo llowed h is plea of no contest to theoffenses and a trial to the court on the mat ter of punishment. Via one i ssue, appell ant co ntends that the judgm ent should be reversed because the trial court failed to properly admonish him in accordance w ith art. 26.13 of the Texas Code of Crim inal Procedure. That is, reversal is allegedly mandated because the trial court 1) informed him of the incorrect range of punishm ent, T EX . C ODE2

C R IM . P ROC
. A NN . art. 26.13(a)(1) (Vernon S upp. 2002) (requiring an admonishm ent on the range of punishm ent), 2) failed to admo nish him about the requirement to register asa sex offende r, id. at art. 26.13(a)(5) (requiring sam e), 3) failed to determine w hether his counsel advised him of t he obligation to register as a sex o ffender, id. at art. 26.13(h), and 4) failed to have him sign a sta tem ent indicating that he understood the adm onishmentsand was
awa re of the consequences of his plea. Id. at art. 26.13(d) (requiring sam e). We
ov er ru l e t he i ss ue an d a ff i rm. Range of Puni

shment As to the adm onishment a bout the range of punishm ent, the record illustrates that ap pe ll an t was to ld th e t wo indecency counts w ere third degree felonies carrying a range of impr isonment of

two to ten years and a fine up to $10, 000. All concede that th e offenses were act ually second degree felonies carrying a range of punishm ent from two to twenty years. Furtherm ore, the trial court ultimately sente nced appel lant to ei ght years. Of not e is that appellant does not contend tha t th e incorrect adm onis hm ent

har m ed h im in any way or otherwise i nduced him to plead gu ilty. Authorityholds that when the trial court informs one of an incorrect rang e of punishment

but the sentence ultim ately levied falls within both the actual and m isstated maxi mum, then it has substantially com plied with art. 26.13(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Martinez

v. State , 981 S.W.2d 195, 19 7 ( Te x. Crim. A pp. 1998). Furtherm ore, when the co urthas substantially com plied with the statutory directive, it is incum bent upon the defendant or appellant to “affirm ativel y show [] t hat he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harm ed by the adm onishment o f the3

court.” T EX . C ODE
. C R IM . P ROC
. A NN . art. 26.13(c). H ere, the record i llust rates that the tri al court i nformed appella nt of the incor rect range of punishm ent. Yet, the sentence levied fell within both the correct range and th e range m ent ione d by

the cou rt. Thu s, t he t rial c our t su bst ant ially

com pl ied with art. 26.13(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A nd, as alluded to above, appellant neither argues or refers us to anything of record illustrating that he was not aw are of the consequences of his plea or otherwise m isled or harmed by th e adm onishment. Nor does
our own review

of the record uncover s uch evidence. So, the m istake does not constitute reversible error. Complia nce wi

th art. 26.13(d) Next, a trial court is obligated to receive from one pleading gu ilty or no contest a written statem ent signed by the defendant an d his attorney “that he understan ds the admon itions and is aware of the consequences of his plea.” T EX . C ODE C R IM . P ROC
. A NN . art

. 26.13(d). Wi thin the appellate record at bar appears a docum ent en title d “Adm onishment

of No Contest Plea” and which appell ant si gned. Contained in that docum ent is 1) a paragraph addressing appellant’s right to a trial by jury and his waiver of sam e, 2) a stipulation of evidence, and 3) the adm onishmentsrequired by art. 26.13 of the Code o f Crim inal Proced ure, sa ve for t hose relat ing to regist ration as a sex offend er. Also fou nd in itis a sta tem ent , si gne d by app ellan t’s

cou nse l, w her

ein appellant’s counsel represents tha t he “explained all of the foregoing waivers, request s, stipulations, and admon ishmentsto the [appellant] and he [the appellant] has intelli gently signed the sam e.” Thus, w e ha ve b efo re u s a w ritt en d ocu m ent sign ed b y ap pella nt a nd h is c oun sel w her ein4

counsel eff

ect ively tells u s not only that ap pell ant was aware of the “waivers, requests, stipulations and a dmonishm ents” (other than those relating to registration as a sex offende r) but also that appellant “intelli gently signed” those “wai vers, requests, stipul ations, and adm onis hm ent s.” An d, w hile this doc um ent

doe s no t ex pre ssl y state that appellant “und er stands the adm onitions and is aware of the co nsequences of his plea,”
see T EX . C ODE C R IM . P ROC
. A NN . art. 26.13(d), that particular subj ect m atter is addressed in a way clearly ill ustrating that appellant understood the adm onishmentsand was awa re of the consequences of his plea. Thus, we cannot say thatthe trial court fail ed to receive from appellant and his counsel a signed, writt en stat em ent com plying w ith art. 2 6.13(d).

Remaini ng Defaults Assum ing arguendo that the trial court failed to com ply with art. 26.13(a)(5) and (h) of the Code of C riminal Procedure, the error mus t be harmf ul before we can rev erse the conviction. Burnett v. S tate , No. 860-01, 200 2 W L 314243 14 at *3 (Tex . Crim. App. October 30, 2002) (involving the failure to comply w ith art 26.13); Cain v . State , 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 199 7 ) (involving the same); Thompson v. State , 59 S.W.3d 802, 805-807 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d). Further mor e, when t he error is non- constitutional, such as that involved at bar, harmarises only when i t has a substantial influence on the outcom e of theproceed ing or the review ing court has “‘grave doubt’ thatthe result wasfree from the su bstant ial influence of the erro r.” Burnett v. S tate , No. 860-01, WL 31424314 at *3. W ith the foregoing standa rd in m ind, w e perusethe rec ord and b riefs bef ore us for5

evidence of harm . Upon doing so, w e again note the absence of an y allegation or citation to evidence sugg esting that th e defaults af fected, in an y way, his decision to enter the plea he entered . Inst ead, app ellant m erely im plies that t he errorsare not subj ect to a harm analysis, though Ca in and Burnett clearly hold otherwise. Nordo we find any ev idence indicating appell ant was unaware of t he d uty t o register as a se x of

fender. See Lopez

v. State , 71 S.W.3d 511, 516 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (finding no h arm because, am ong other things, no evidence indicated that the appellant was unaware of the duty to register as a s ex offender). Nor does appellant allege that hewas

unaware of the require ment. This is of import because on e may have kn own of the requirement des pite the trial court’s failure to address it. See Grays v. State , 888 S.W.2d 876, 87 8 (Tex . App. –Dallas 199 4, no pe t.) ( ac kn owl edging as m uch). Sim ilarly absent is evidence or allegation that appellant would not have entered th e plea had he been adm onished by the court per ar t. 26.13(a)( 5); this too i s a factor indicative of no harm

. See Lopez

v. State , 71 S.W.3d at 516. Next, we find reference tothe need to register in the pre-sentence report ordered by the trial court. Counsel represented to the trial court (im mediately prior to the hearing
on punishment ) that both he and appellant reviewed the report. Finally, no one sought, at that t i me, to w ithdraw or other wise avoid the pl ea of no contest for an y reason, much less upon the basis that it w ould not have been entered had appellant been adm onished of the requiremen t. In sum , the record fails to show that the defaults in question substantially influenced the out com e of thecase. This leads u s to co nclude th at the p urported errors w ere6

harmless. Accordingly, the j udgme nt is affirmed.

Brian Quinn Justice Do not publish.