Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed September 30, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D23-275

Lower Tribunal No. 22-13022

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George Buchanan,

Appellant,

vs.

Miami-Dade County, et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto 

Diaz, Judge.

L. Turner Law, P.A., and Lauren N. Peffer (Delray Beach), for 

appellant.

Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Hunter 

R. Pratt, Assistant County Attorney, for appellees.

Before EMAS, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ.

LOBREE, J.

This appeal asks this court to decide whether George Buchanan may 
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seek damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), which 

he suffered when Miami-Dade County Police Officer Adrian Madrigal 

(“Officer Madrigal”) shot and killed his pet dog, Sweetie. The trial court 

dismissed Buchanan’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state an IIED

claim because Buchanan failed to allege that he was present when his pet 

dog was shot. Buchanan asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing his

claim on this basis because his case concerns the “unique considerations” 

that apply in cases concerning dead bodies, and thus he did not have to 

witness the incident to state his claim, relying upon Williams v. City of 

Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Because, within the context 

of an IIED claim, the considerations surrounding “improper behavior toward 

the dead body of a loved one” do not include the conduct at issue, we affirm 

the trial court’s order dismissing Buchanan’s complaint.

BACKGROUND

While in flight from the police, Buchanan’s son jumped a fence abutting 

Buchanan’s property and ran into Buchanan’s home through a sliding glass 

door. Officer Madrigal, who was in pursuit, entered the home’s back yard. 

Buchanan’s dog, Sweetie, then came out of the home and into the back yard. 

Officer Madrigal shot Sweetie twice, killing the dog. Buchanan subsequently 

filed suit claiming negligence against Officer’s Madrigal’s employer, Miami-
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Dade County (the “County”), and IIED against Officer Madrigal. Buchanan 

alleged that the County was vicariously liable for the negligence of Officer 

Madrigal, who was acting within the scope of his employment when he shot 

Sweetie. Concerning Officer Madrigal, Buchanan alleged that he “acted 

recklessly and/or intentionally, and [that] his conduct was extreme and 

outrageous.” Buchanan further alleged that Officer Madrigal’s conduct 

caused him severe emotional distress and mental anguish, including posttraumatic stress disorder.

The County and Officer Madrigal each moved to dismiss Buchanan’s 

complaint with prejudice. Relevant here, Officer Madrigal asserted that he 

was entitled to dismissal of Buchanan’s IIED claim because: (1) Buchanan 

did not allege that he was “present at the time” of the complained of conduct 

(i.e., the shooting), as required by this court’s decision in M.M. v. M.P.S., 556 

So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); and (2) the claim was barred by sovereign 

immunity under section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2020). Buchanan 

responded that under Williams, 575 So. 2d at 683, it was not necessary for 

him to have witnessed Sweetie being shot in order to state a claim for IIED—

merely “seeing [Sweetie’s] dead body” was enough.1

1 Although Buchanan stated in his response to the motions to dismiss that 

Officer Madrigal’s action resulted in his “emotional distress from seeing the 
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After a hearing, the trial court granted the County’s and Madrigal’s 

motions to dismiss. Relying on M.M., 556 So. 2d at 1140–41, the trial court 

found that Buchanan failed to state an IIED claim because he did not allege 

that he was present during the shooting. Because the presence requirement 

disposed of Buchanan’s sole claim against Officer Madrigal, the trial court 

did not reach Officer Madrigal’s alternative argument that Buchanan’s claim 

against him individually was barred by sovereign immunity. As to 

Buchanan’s negligence claim against the County, the trial court found that it 

failed as a matter of law because under section 768.28(9)(a), the County is 

not liable in negligence for the intentional, wanton, and willful acts of its 

employees. The trial court dismissed Buchanan’s complaint with prejudice, 

and this appeal followed.2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a trial court’s order dismissing a complaint with 

prejudice for failure to state a cause of action.” K.R. Exch. Servs., Inc. v. 

dead body,” we note that Buchanan’s complaint makes no factual allegation 

that he saw Sweetie’s dead body.

2 On appeal, Buchanan does not assert that the trial court improperly 

dismissed his complaint with prejudice. Additionally, because Buchanan 

makes no argument directed toward the trial court’s dismissal of his 

negligence claim against the County, the issue is deemed abandoned. See

Doe v. Baptist Primary Care, Inc., 177 So. 3d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
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Fuerst, Humphrey, Ittleman, PL, 48 So. 3d 889, 892 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). 

“In doing so, we assume all of the allegations in the complaint are true,” 

Calderon v. Vazquez, 251 So. 3d 303, 304 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), “as well as 

all reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations,” Broz v. R.E. Reece, 

272 So. 3d 512, 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Buchanan does not challenge the general proposition 

stated in M.M. that in order to state a claim for IIED based on his own 

emotional distress, a plaintiff must be present when the alleged extreme and 

outrageous conduct is directed toward a third party.3 See M.M., 556 So. 2d 

at 1140–41 (applying section 46(2)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts

(1965) and affirming dismissal of parents’ complaint for IIED because 

parents were not present when admitted offensive treatment of their 

daughter occurred). Instead, as below, Buchanan contends that the fact he 

was not present when Sweetie was shot and killed is not dispositive of his 

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 “To prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must show:

(1) The wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless, that is, he intended 

his behavior when he knew or should have known that emotional distress 

would likely result; (2) the conduct was outrageous, that is, as to go beyond 

all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as odious and utterly intolerable 

in a civilized community; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) 

the emotional distress was severe.” Deauville Hotel Mgmt., LLC v. Ward, 

219 So. 3d 949, 954–55 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).
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IIED claim because Williams, 575 So. 2d at 683, established an exception to 

the presence requirement for conduct involving display of pictures of “dead 

bodies.”

In Williams, officers in the City of Minneola Police Department showed 

a videotape and photographs of a minor’s autopsy to people outside of the 

police department. The minor’s mother and sister sued the police 

department and the officers, relevantly alleging a claim for IIED based on the 

display of the pictures. Id. at 686. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed 

the summary judgment granted in favor of the defendants and held that a 

claim for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress “can lie for 

outrageous conduct involving pictures of the dead body of a plaintiff’s 

spouse, child, sibling or parent, even though the plaintiff was not present at 

the display of the pictures.” Id. at 690. The court reasoned that in situations 

involving a dead body, “our society . . . shows a particular solicitude for the 

emotional vulnerability of survivors regarding improper behavior toward the 

dead body of a loved one, and the special deference paid by courts to family 

feelings where rights involving dead bodies are concerned is central to our 

decision.” Id. at 691. The court further explained that the plaintiffs could 

maintain their claim regardless of the fact that they were not present during 

the outrageous acts, distinguishing cases like M.M., because “[t]hose 
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opinions did not concern dead bodies or pictures of dead bodies and so did 

not call into operation the unique considerations which apply in such cases.” 

Id. at 694.

We find Buchanan’s argument that the exception to the presence 

requirement as set forth in Williams applies to the facts at hand

unpersuasive. Buchanan cites to no case extending the holding of Williams

to a plaintiff’s subsequent sighting of the body of a deceased pet, after the 

complained-of outrageous acts or conduct have already occurred, and we 

are unable to do so here. Underpinning our conclusion is the wellestablished principle in Florida’s jurisprudence viewing animals as personal 

property, despite the incontrovertible deep attachment owners feel toward 

their domestic pets. Indeed, “[w]hile a dog may be considered by many to 

be a member of the family, under Florida law animals are considered to be 

personal property.” Kennedy v. Byas, 867 So. 2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2004) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So. 2d 109, 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)); 

see State v. Milewski, 194 So. 3d 376, 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“Florida law 

considers animals to be personal property.”); Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 

329, 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) (noting that “[u]nder the law of Florida, dogs 

are considered subjects of property or ownership”); Harby v. Harby, 331 So. 

3d 814, 821–22 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021); Helmy v. Swigert, 662 So. 2d 395, 397 
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(Fla. 5th DCA 1995); see also Plowright v. Miami Dade County, 102 F.4th 

1358, 1364 (11th Cir 2024) (“Florida law, like the law of most states, is clear 

that domestic animals are their owners’ personal property.”).

Furthermore, to the extent Buchanan argues that La Porte v. 

Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964), stands for the 

proposition that in order to state an IIED claim a pet owner need not be 

present when the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct is directed 

toward the pet, Buchanan’s reliance is again misplaced. In La Porte, the 

Florida Supreme Court held that in an action for the willful and malicious 

killing of a dog, its owner’s damages were not limited to the market value of 

the dog or its special or pecuniary value, but properly included the element 

of its owner’s mental suffering. In reaching its conclusion, the Court 

reasoned that because the defendant’s act in killing the plaintiff’s dog (i.e., 

throwing a trash can at it) was “malicious and demonstrated an extreme 

indifference” to the plaintiff’s rights, “[t]he restriction of the loss of a pet to its 

intrinsic value in circumstances such as the ones before us is a principle we 

cannot accept. . . . [W]e feel that the affection of a master for his dog is a 

very real thing and that the malicious destruction of the pet provides an 

element of damage for which the owner should recover, irrespective of the 

value of the animal . . . .” Id. at 268–69.
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Importantly, La Porte did not concern itself with independent tort of 

IIED, but rather, addressed a claim for the malicious killing of a pet. Indeed, 

the Florida Supreme Court later stated in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. 

McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985), that the issue of whether Florida 

recognized the tort of IIED was “not . . . directly before [it]” in La Porte. In 

any event, La Porte cannot stand for the proposition advanced by Buchanan 

that a dog’s death need not be witnessed by its owner to state a claim for 

IIED because in La Porte the owner was present when the defendant hurled 

a garbage can at her dog, killing it. See Associated Indeps., Inc. v. La Porte, 

158 So. 2d 557, 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); 163 So. 2d at 267–68. Thus, La 

Porte does not assist Buchanan in his IIED claim.

CONCLUSION

Buchanan’s contention that the circumstances here are analogous to

those involving outrageous conduct directed toward the dead body of a close 

human family member, and therefore his presence at the scene of the 

shooting was not required to state a claim for IIED, finds no support in Florida 

law. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that 

Buchanan failed to state a claim for IIED as a matter of law, and we affirm 

the trial court’s dismissal of Buchanan’s complaint with prejudice.

Affirmed.