UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

CHARLES KEITH JACKSON, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

JASON BRYANT, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 18-7047 

(D.C. No. 6:17-CV-00385-RAW-KEW) 

(E.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Charles Jackson seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the 

district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We deny a COA and dismiss 

the appeal. 

I 

Jackson was convicted by a jury in Oklahoma state court of first degree 

manslaughter. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed his 

conviction on direct appeal on August 27, 2015. Jackson’s conviction became final 

on November 25, 2015, when his deadline to file a petition for writ of certiorari with 

the United States Supreme Court passed. 

 * This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 10, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

On July 12, 2016, Jackson filed a brief in support of an application for postconviction relief with the state district court. The brief was not accompanied by a 

complete application for post-conviction relief and therefore did not comply with 

Oklahoma procedural requirements. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1081. The state district 

court denied his brief on August 15, 2016, because it was not properly filed. Jackson 

received a copy of the denial in August 2016, but did not rectify the error. On 

February 24, 2017, Jackson filed a proper post-conviction application with the state 

district court, which was denied in May 2017. The OCCA affirmed the denial on 

September 8, 2017.

In October 2017, Jackson filed a § 2254 petition in federal district court, which 

ultimately denied the petition as time-barred and declined to grant a COA. Jackson 

now seeks a COA from this court. 

II

A petitioner may not appeal the denial of habeas relief under § 2254 without a 

COA. § 2253(c)(1). We may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). To make 

such a showing, Jackson must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) 

(quotations omitted). 
3 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) imposes a 

one-year limitations period on habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. § 2244(d). 

This period generally runs from the date a conviction became final. See 

§ 2244(d)(1). Absent tolling, Jackson’s AEDPA limitations period expired on 

November 26, 2016. 

AEDPA’s limitation period is tolled while a properly filed application for state 

post-conviction relief is pending. § 2244(d)(2). “Proper filing” occurs when the 

application’s “delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws 

and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). Whether an 

application for state post-conviction relief is “properly filed” is a matter of state 

procedural law. Garcia v. Shanks, 351 F.3d 468, 471 (10th Cir. 2003). 

Careful review of Jackson’s brief, the record, and the district court’s order 

fails to “raise a debatable issue as to whether his petition was improperly dismissed 

as time-barred.” May v. Workman, 339 F.3d 1236, 1237 (10th Cir. 2003). Jackson 

did not properly file an application for state post-conviction relief under Oklahoma 

law within the one-year AEDPA limitations period. Therefore, he is not entitled to 

statutory tolling. See Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006) (state 

post-conviction proceedings toll AEDPA statute of limitations only when “filed 

within the one year allowed by AEDPA”). 

Jackson argues that his limitations period should be equitably tolled, based on 

either his good faith attempts to comply with the statute of limitations or his 

proclaimed actual innocence. Equitable tolling “is only available when an inmate 
4 

diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was 

caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.” Marsh v. Soares, 223 

F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Because Jackson had notice of his failure to 

comply with the filing requirements prior to the expiration of the AEDPA limitations 

period, his failure to correct the errors cannot be considered an extraordinary 

circumstance beyond his control. 

Equitable tolling is also appropriate “when a prisoner is actually innocent.” 

Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000). Jackson claims that he should 

have been found guilty only of negligent homicide because his intoxication at the 

time of the crime was by physician-prescribed back medication. To meet the actual 

innocence exception, however, a petitioner must demonstrate that “it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him” based upon new reliable 

evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (quotation omitted). There is 

nothing in Jackson’s brief that constitutes new, reliable evidence that he is actually 

innocent of first degree manslaughter. 

III

 For the foregoing reasons, we DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge