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TOWN OF STRATFORD v. EWDOKIA SOKOL

(AC 35631)

Alvord, Keller and Pellegrino, Js.

Submitted on briefs February 18—officially released June 10, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Hon. Edward F. Stodolink, judge trialreferee.)

Christopher G. Ciancanelli filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The plaintiff, the town of Stratford,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered

after it granted the motion of the defendant, Ewdokia

Sokol, to open a judgment rendered on a municipal

antiblight citation pursuant to General Statutes § 7-

152c.1 The plaintiff claims that the court improperly

granted the motion to open because (1) the motion was

untimely, (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to open the judgment, (3) the plaintiff failed to

demonstrate that the judgment should be opened, and

(4)the court failed to enforce its own orders with regard

to the remediation of the subject property.2 Because

we agree that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the motion to open, we reverse the

judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals that on several occasions in 2010

and 2011, the plaintiff provided notice to the defendant,

who owned real property in Stratford, that she had been

cited for violations of the plaintiff’s antiblight ordinances. Although the defendant requested and was

granted an extension of time in which to remediate her

property, she failed to do so. The plaintiff provided

notice to the defendant that it would assess fines related

to the violations and, from July 1, 2011, until September

23, 2011, the plaintiff assessed fines totaling $17,000

against the defendant. On September 26, 2011, the plaintiff sent the defendant, via certified mail, a notice of

assessment in the amount of $17,000. At no point did

the defendant contest liability by demanding a hearing

before a citation hearing officer; see General Statutes

§ 7-152c (c); or avail herself of her statutory right to

appeal from the assessment. See General Statutes § 7-

152c (g).3

Thereafter, on December 21, 2011, pursuant to § 7-

152c (f), the plaintiff filed a notice of assessment in the

Superior Court for the judicial district of Fairfield. On

December 22, 2012, the court clerk entered judgment

in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the

amount of the assessment.

On March 30, 2012, the defendant, represented by

counsel, filed a motion to open the judgment in the

Superior Court for the judicial district of Fairfield. The

motion stated in relevant part: ‘‘(1) The defendant . . .

is a 93 year old woman with a limited knowledge of

the English language; (2) She never received in hand

service of the complaint, which was allegedly left at

her usual place of abode; (3) Judgment was entered

and a Notice of Assessment was certified to the defendant on December 12, 2011; (4) The defendant has a

good and valid defense . . . .’’ The defendant asked the

court for ‘‘an order reopening judgment.’’ The motion to

open was unaccompanied by a memorandum of law or

citation to any authority whatsoever. By means of a
written objection, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant’s motion to open was an improper collateral attack

upon the judgment after she failed to avail herself of

her right to challenge the assessment pursuant to § 7-

152c (g) and that there was no basis in law for the court

to disturb the assessment or the judgment entered in

the amount of the assessment.

A hearing on the defendant’s motion took place on

September 20, 2012, at which time the court heard arguments from the parties’ attorneys. At the hearing, the

defendant’s attorney advanced arguments of an equitable nature, essentially arguing that the defendant was

entitled to an opportunity to remediate her property

and to avoid the fines that were imposed by the plaintiff

for her violations of Stratford’s antiblight ordinances.

He stated that the plaintiff had assessed ‘‘draconian

fines’’ against the defendant, who was ‘‘[a] poor old

woman [who] didn’t know what was going on . . . .’’

The defendant’s attorney asked the court to give the

defendant a chance to remediate the property and avoid

the plaintiff’s ‘‘ungodly’’ fines. He stated: ‘‘I just want

to take care of everything and set it right.’’ The court

stated: ‘‘I’m going to suspend my decision in this case

for 30 days. And if I am told that everything has been

properly remediated, I will consider [the defendant’s]

motion to open the judgment.’’

On January 8, 2013, the plaintiff filed a ‘‘Supplemental

Objection’’ to the defendant’s motion to open in which

it asserted, inter alia, that the motion to open should

be denied because the defendant had not remediated

the property at issue. At a hearing on February 14,

2013, the plaintiff argued that any remediation efforts

occurred at the expense of other blighted properties

owned by the defendant and her son. The court heard

testimony from the defendant’s son as well as argument

from the plaintiff. The court acknowledged that it

viewed the issue of granting the motion to open as being

related solely to the defendant’s progress in remediating

the various properties at issue. The court continued the

matter for several weeks to permit the defendant to

take necessary remediation measures.

On April 25, 2013, the parties again appeared before

the court. The defendant’s attorney represented that all

of the blight issues that had been discussed at the prior

hearings, including those for which the defendant was

issued a citation, had been remediated by the defendant.

The plaintiff’s attorney represented that the most significant blight issues had been resolved at that time. With

regard to the motion to open before the court, the plaintiff’s attorney stated that the plaintiff had complied with

relevant notice provisions concerning the assessment

and that it properly had obtained a judgment in the

Superior Court pursuant to § 7-152c (f). The court did

not find otherwise. The plaintiff’s attorney argued that

the defendant did not appeal from the entry of the
assessment pursuant to § 7-152c (g) and that the motion

to open was an improper means of appealing from

the assessment.

The court did not address the issues raised by the

plaintiff with regard to the legal propriety of the motion

to open. Instead, the court stated that it would afford

the defendant ‘‘substantial relief’’ by ‘‘reopen[ing] the

citation’’ and reducing the fine to $5000.4 This appeal

followed.

One of the arguments raised by the plaintiff in the

present appeal is that the court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to grant the defendant’s motion to open

because the motion was effectively an appeal from the

assessment, and the defendant did not avail herself

of her right to appeal to the Superior Court from the

assessment as provided in § 7-152c (g). See footnote 1

of this opinion. ‘‘Any party, or the court itself, can raise

the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. It

matters not how or by whom the question of jurisdiction

is raised.’’ Manning v. Feltman, 149 Conn. App. 224,

236, A.3d (2014). ‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction

involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the

type of controversy presented by the action before it.

. . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits

of a case over which it is without jurisdiction.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v.

Windham, 146 Conn. App. 768, 782, 81 A.3d 230 (2013).

‘‘It is fundamental that the legislature . . . establishes the jurisdiction of the Superior Court . . . .’’

Piquet v. Chester, 306 Conn. 173, 188 n.14, 49 A.3d

977 (2012). ‘‘A statutory right to appeal may be taken

advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created. . . . Such provisions are mandatory, and, if not complied with, the

appeal is subject to dismissal.’’ (Emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawson v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 134 Conn. App. 614, 619, 39

A.3d 1174, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 914, 47 A.3d 388

(2012); see also Raines v. Freedom of Information

Commission, 221 Conn. 482, 489–90, 604 A.2d 819

(1992).

By enacting § 7-152c (g), the legislature created a

statutory right by which ‘‘[a] person against whom an

assessment has been entered . . . is entitled to judicial

review by way of appeal.’’ That subsection clearly states

that an appeal ‘‘shall be instituted within thirty days of

the mailing of notice of such assessment by filing a

petition to reopen assessment, together with [the

proper] entry fee . . . .’’ General Statutes § 7-152c (g).

The defendant did not avail herself of this statutory

right within thirty days of the mailing of notice of the

assessment on September 26, 2011. Instead, on March

30, 2012, after the clerk had entered judgment against

the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff in accordance

with § 7-152c (f), the defendant attempted collaterally
to challenge the assessment by means of a ‘‘motion to

open.’’ A review of the equitable arguments on which

the defendant’s attorney relied during the proceedings

related to the motion to open, however, unambiguously

reflects that the defendant utilized the motion merely

as an avenue by which to challenge the fairness of the

assessment. The court, in turn, granted relief to the

defendant solely on the basis of her remediation efforts

involving several blighted properties in Stratford. Having failed to strictly comply with her statutorily created

right to appeal from the assessment, the defendant

failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.

The court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction

to grant the motion and to reduce the amount of the

assessment to benefit the defendant.

In light of our conclusion thatthe court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction, we reverse the judgment of the trial

court and remand the matterto that court with direction

to dismiss the defendant’s motion to open the judgment.

See Sendak v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 7

Conn. App. 238, 242, 508 A.2d 781 (1986) (dismissal of

appeal proper when there exists no statutory authority

for appeal). Accordingly, we need not address the

remaining claims raised by the plaintiff in its brief.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

with direction to dismiss the defendant’s motion to open

the judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 7-152c provides: ‘‘(a) Any municipality as defined in

subsection (a) of section 7-148 may establish by ordinance a citation hearing

procedure in accordance with this section. The Superior Court shall be

authorized to enforce the assessments and judgments provided for under

this section.

‘‘(b) The chief executive officer of any such municipality shall appoint

one or more citation hearing officers, other than police officers or employees

or persons who issue citations, to conduct the hearings authorized by

this section.

‘‘(c) Any such municipality, at any time within twelve months from the

expiration of the final period forthe uncontested payment of fines, penalties,

costs or fees for any citation issued under any ordinance adopted pursuant

to section 7-148 or section 22a-226d, for an alleged violation thereof, shall

send notice to the person cited. Such notice shall inform the person cited:

(1) Of the allegations against him and the amount of the fines, penalties,

costs or fees due; (2) that he may contest his liability before a citation

hearing officer by delivering in person or by mail written notice within ten

days of the date thereof; (3) that if he does not demand such a hearing, an

assessment and judgment shall be entered against him; and (4) that such

judgment may issue without further notice. If the person to whom such

notice is issued is a registrant, the municipality may deliver such notice in

accordance with section 7-148ii, provided nothing in this section shall preclude a municipality from providing notice in another manner permitted by

applicable law.

‘‘(d) If the person who is sent notice pursuant to subsection (c) of this

section wishes to admit liability for any alleged violation, he may, without

requesting a hearing, pay the full amount of the fines, penalties, costs or

fees admitted to in person or by mail to an official designated by such

municipality. Such payment shall be inadmissible in any proceeding, civil

or criminal, to establish the conduct of such person or other person making

the payment. Any person who does not deliver or mail written demand for

a hearing within ten days of the date of the first notice provided for in

subsection (c) of this section shall be deemed to have admitted liability,

and the designated municipal official shall certify such person’s failure to
respond to the hearing officer. The hearing officer shall thereupon enter

and assess the fines, penalties, costs or fees provided for by the applicable

ordinances and shall follow the procedures set forth in subsection (f) of

this section.

‘‘(e) Any person who requests a hearing shall be given written notice of

the date, time and place for the hearing. Such hearing shall be held not less

than fifteen days nor more than thirty days from the date of the mailing of

notice, provided the hearing officer shall grant upon good cause shown any

reasonable request by any interested party for postponement or continuance.

An original or certified copy of the initial notice of violation issued by the

issuing official or policeman shall be filed and retained by the municipality,

and shall be deemed to be a business record within the scope of section

52-180 and evidence of the facts contained therein. The presence of the

issuing official or policeman shall be required at the hearing if such person

so requests. A person wishing to contest his liability shall appear at the

hearing and may present evidence in his behalf. A designated municipal

official, other than the hearing officer, may present evidence on behalf of

the municipality. If such person fails to appear, the hearing officer may

enter an assessment by default against him upon a finding of proper notice

and liability under the applicable statutes or ordinances. The hearing officer

may accept from such person copies of police reports, investigatory and

citation reports, and other official documents by mail and may determine

thereby that the appearance of such person is unnecessary. The hearing

officer shall conduct the hearing in the order and form and with such

methods of proof as he deems fair and appropriate. The rules regarding the

admissibility of evidence shall not be strictly applied, but all testimony shall

be given under oath or affirmation. The hearing officer shall announce his

decision at the end of the hearing. If he determines that the person is not

liable, he shall dismiss the matter and enter his determination in writing

accordingly. If he determines that the person is liable for the violation, he

shall forthwith enter and assess the fines, penalties, costs or fees against

such person as provided by the applicable ordinances of the municipality.

‘‘(f) If such assessment is not paid on the date of its entry, the hearing

officer shall send by first class mail a notice of the assessment to the person

found liable and shall file, not less than thirty days or more than twelve

months after such mailing, a certified copy of the notice of assessment

with the clerk of a superior court facility designated by the Chief Court

Administrator together with an entry fee of eight dollars. The certified copy

of the notice of assessment shall constitute a record of assessment. Within

such twelve-month period, assessments against the same person may be

accrued and filed as one record of assessment. The clerk shall enter judgment, in the amount of such record of assessment and court costs of eight

dollars, against such person in favor of the municipality. Notwithstanding

any provision of the general statutes, the hearing officer’s assessment, when

so entered as a judgment, shall have the effect of a civil money judgment

and a levy of execution on such judgment may issue without further notice

to such person.

‘‘(g) A person against whom an assessment has been entered pursuant

to this section is entitled to judicial review by way of appeal. An appeal shall

be instituted within thirty days of the mailing of notice of such assessment by

filing a petition to reopen assessment, together with an entry fee in an

amount equal to the entry fee for a small claims case pursuant to section 52-

259, at a superior court facility designated by the Chief Court Administrator,

which shall entitle such person to a hearing in accordance with the rules

of the judges of the Superior Court.’’

We note that, effective October 1, 2013, No. 13-132 of the 2013 Public

Acts amended subsection (c) of § 7-152c. That amendment is not germane

to this appeal.

2 The defendant has not filed a brief in this court. Accordingly, we will

consider the appeal solely on the basis of the brief submitted by the plaintiff

and the record.

3 See footnote 1 of this opinion.

4 Although the transcript of the proceeding on April 25, 2013, largely

reflects the arguments of counsel as well as colloquies between the court

and counsel, the court explicitly adopted the entire twelve page transcript

as ‘‘its memorandum of decision’’ for purposes of this appeal. Subsequently,

the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation in which it sought, generally, the

factual and legal basis supporting the court’s decision. The trial court denied

the motion for articulation. The plaintiff did not thereafter file a motion in

this court seeking review of that ruling. Although the trial court did not
explicitly address the jurisdictional issue raised by the plaintiff before the

trial court and before this court, we may address the issue because the

record is adequate to do so, the issue may be raised and considered at any

time, and the issue is purely legal in nature and, thus, one over which we

exercise plenary review.