Filed 2/13/14 In re A.E. CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re A.E. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. FRESNO COUNTY DE PARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. JOHN E., Defendant and Appellant. F066111
(Super. Ct. Nos. 11CEJ300265-1, 11CEJ300265-2, 11CEJ300265-3, 11CEJ300265-4)

In re D.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. OPINION

FRESNO COUNTY DE PARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. JOHN E., Defendant and Appellant. F067373 (Super. Ct. No. 11CEJ300265-2)

THE COURT * APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Mary Dolas,
Commissioner. Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Cornell, Acting P.J ., Detjen, J. and Franson, J.2 John E. is the grandfather and former le gal guardian of 12-ye ar-old David L., who is a juvenile dependent. John appealed from an October 2012 juvenile court dispositional order, which removed David from John’s custod y as legal guardian and that of David’s mother. During the pendency of John’s first appeal, John as ked the court to terminate the legal guardianship. John no lo nger wished to participate in reunification services or the court proceedings and wished to resign as David’s legal guardian. The court granted John’s request and terminated his legal guard ianship of David. John appealed. This court subsequently consolidated John ’s two appeals. In the first appeal, John’s court-appointed appella te counsel challenged the suffi ciency of the evidence to support the decision to remove David from John’s custody. After reviewing the entire record in John’s second app eal, the same counsel inform ed this court he found no arguable issue to raise. Counsel requested and this court granted leave for John to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist. ( In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 ( Phoenix H. ).)
John has since written us of his cont empt for responde nt Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) a nd his disdain for the juvenile court. In his view, the department was corrupt and the juve nile court was a kangaroo court. He asks this court to give him and his family justice and return David to him. On review, we will dismiss both appeals. John ’s first appeal is moot in light of the juvenile court’s order granting his request to terminate the legal gu ardianship. In his second appeal, John fails to make a good cause showing that an arguable issue of
reversible error exists.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY In December 2011, the department detain ed David, as well as his siblings, and initiated the underlying dependen cy proceedings. In large part , the children were at risk
of harm due to their mother’s substance a buse and her ongoing dome stic violence with John, who provided care for th e children. In addition, as John later submitted in the3 spring of 2012, David and his older brother, both of whom we re John’s wards as well as grandsons, were at substantial risk of suffe ring physical harm by John in that he exposed them to an unsafe environment of ongoing domestic disturbances with their mother. 1 Also John had engaged in dome stic disturbances with th e mother in the children’s presence on numerous occasions. John was quick to particip ate in services offered by the department. He also secured a restraining order protecting him from the mother. On the other hand, the mother was not taking advantage of serv ices provided by the department. By the spring of 2012, John began receiv ing liberal unsupervised visits with the children. However, in August2012, the department learne d from David and his siblings that John was permitting the mother to have contact with the children at his home. This caused the department concern that the child ren would be exposed to violence in the mother’s presence. As a result, John’s visits were once again supervised. The department also required John to enforce the restraining order against the mother and participate in a victim’s group to address do mestic violence issues , among other things. John complied with the department’s requirements le ading up to the October 2012 dispositional hearing. At that hearing, th e juvenile court made the required detriment findings to remove David from both his mothe r’s and John’s custody. It also granted John unsupervised visits with David. John appealed. By the time of the first status review sc heduled for spring of 2013, the mother was still not participating in any co urt-ordered reunification services . John, on the other hand, completed all court-ordered services and ma de significant progress in addressing the
issues that led to David’s out-o f-home placement. In its repor t to the juvenile court, the department recommended that the court termin ate services for the mother and continue services for John. The department di d not recommend that David be returned

1 John’s status as legal gua rdian was later terminated by th e juvenile court, as that child was reunified with his father.4 immediately to John’s custody, as it believe d return would create a substantial risk of detriment to David. Still, the department recommended the court or der an extended visit
between John and David. A hearing on the department’s report and recommendation was set for April 10, 2013. On April 10, John’s trial counsel advised the court she filed that morning a declaration in which John contested certain facts, and “then” John indicated to her that he no longer wished to be involved in the depe ndency case and he wanted to resign his guardianship. He also completed a one-pag e document expressing his wish. According to it, John wished to resign as the legal gua rdian because “the CPS is corrupt and the Dependency Court is a Kangeroo Court,” and he believed “it is in the best interest of [David] that [his] status as legal guardian of [David] be terminated.” John also told the court he no longer wanted any further servi ces or any further court participation. He added he thought David no longer needed a legal guardian; he needed a mother. The juvenile court granted John’s request and, having found it was in David’s best interest to terminate the guardianship, or dered John’s legal guard ianship of David be
terminated.
DISCUSSION Soon after the juvenile court terminated John’s legal guardianship over David, the department asked this court to take judicial notice of the April 2013 termination order and dismiss John’s appeal from the October 20 12 dispositional order as moot. We gave John’s appellate counsel the opp ortunity to respond to the de partment’s requests. After reviewing the briefing, he submitted the matt er “on the briefing currently before this Court,” an apparent reference to appellant’s opening brief recently filed with us. This court later denied the department’s requests in light of John’s June 2013 notice of appeal
from the termination order. At the time of our denial order, this court was unaware the juvenile court issued its guardianship termination order in response to John’s request . The department made no5 mention of that fact in its pleadings and we did not have the reco rd on John’s second appeal. The fact that the juvenile court terminated John’s legal guardianship at his request leads us to revisit the mootness question. That is, whether any effective relief can be granted in John’s first appeal, in which he sought David’s return to his custody as legal guardian, given the later termination of the guardianship at John’s request. ( Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 ( Eye Dog Foundation ).) To resolve this question, we will lo ok first to John’s second appeal. An appealed-from judgment or or der is presumed correct. ( Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is an appella nt’s burden to raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made. If the appellant fails to do so, the appe al should be dismissed. ( In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) In John’s second appeal, as pr eviously mentioned, his counsel found no arguable issue of reversible error. Similarly, John has not raised any clai m of error or other defect against the guardianship termination order from which he has appealed. Instead, John strongly criticizes the department for a case plan, whic h he describes as permanently dividing and removing his family from one an other as well as corrupting Da vid. John also claims the department did everything to undermine his lega l guardianship. As fo r the superior court, John complains, it wa s not following the law and instead gave the department too much discretion. John, however, provides no specifics. Although he remains clearly frustrated that David wa s removed from his custody in October 2012, John fails to identify any error on the cour t’s part when, in April 2013, it granted his request to resign his guardianship over David. The apparent fact that John lost faith in the judicial system and decided he wanted nothing more to do with it at the April 2013 hearing does not ab solve John from his appellate burden to show at least arguable, reversible error by the superior court when it made its April 2013 order.6 ( Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) We also obser ve that “‘[h]e who consents to an act is not wronged by it.’” ( Grunsky v. Field (1905) 1 Cal.App. 623, 626.) Therefore, we dismiss John’s appeal from the April 2013 or der terminating his legal guardianship over David. ( Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.)
This leaves us then with John’s first a ppeal in which he cha llenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s 2012 order removing David from his custody as the child’s legal guardian. It is the duty of an appellate court to decide actual controversies by a judgment, which can be carried into e ffect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to decl are principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the matter in issue in the case before it. ( Eye Dog Foundation , supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 541.) When, during the pendency of an appeal, an event oc curs which renders it impossible for an appellate cour t, should it decide the case in favor of the appellant, to grant any effectual relief, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. ( Ibid .)
There is no effective relief we could grant, assuming for the sake of John’s argument there was insufficien t evidence to support the removal order. The order removing David from John’s custody was ba sed on the fact that John was the child’s legal guardian. (See § 361, subd. (c).) Now, John is no longer the child’s legal guardian
and therefore cannot be awarded custody. We therefore conclu de John’s first appeal on the issue of the removal order is moot. ( Eye Dog Foundation, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 541.) In his first appeal, John al so joined in an appeal brought by David’s mother ( In re Anthony E. et al.; case No. F066110). She raised a singl e issue, disputing a finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not appl y to David and another of his siblings. In that appeal, the department conceded its ICWA-noticing effort was inadequate. This court in turn vacated the juve nile court’s finding and remande d the matter to the juvenile court with directions to comp ly with ICWA’s notice provisi ons. The combination of our7 disposition in the mother’s appeal and the fact that John is no longer David’s legal guardian renders his joinder a moot point.
DISPOSITION The appeals herein are dismissed.