Interim Decision #1577' 

Mamma OF ARGTROS 

In Section 246 Proceedings 

A-12042020 

Decided by Beccrd April 15, 1986 

Where an alien answered affirmatively when asked by an officer of the Serv-. 

Ice whether she was willing to make a sworn statement and whether she• 

understood that any statement was to be made freely and voluntarily aQ1 

might be used by the Government as evidence in any proceeding, such preliminary sworn statement by the alien was made voluntarily and not under 

duress; is admissible in evidence In rescission proceedings under section 246, 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 CFR 246.3) ; and is not bound by thd 

rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings, since rescission proceeding under section 246 are not within Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 11.8. 478. 

(1964). 

This case is before us on appeal from a decision of a special inquiry officer dated May 10, 1965, rescinding the adjustment of status. 

previously granted to the respondent under section 245 of the immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1255]. . 

The respondent is a 36-year-old female, native and citizen of 

Greece, Who entered the United States as a visitor on March 19,, 

1959. She married Michael Argyros, a :United States citizen, on 

January 25, 1980, and he subsequently filed a visa petition on her 

behalf. This was approved by the Service, and she was accorded_ 

nonquota status. On May 17, 1960, the Service granted the respond- • 

ent's application under 8 U.S.C. 1255, and her immigration status 

was adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 

residence. On February 2, 1965, there was served on the respondent 

a letter dated December 21, 1964 which notified her concerning the 

intention of the Service to rescind, under 8 U.S.C. 1256, the adjustment of her immigration status. At the conclusion of the hearingwhich was thereafter granted, the special inquiry officer found that 

the respondent entered into a sham marriage with Michael Argyros: 

solely for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. He con- _ 

eluded that she had not been eligible for the adjustment of *statu.s 

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- Interim Decision .41571 

granted toiler under 8 U.S.C.. 1255 and entered the above-mentioned 

order of May 10, 1965 rescinding that- action. The issue on this 

appeal -is 'whether the special inquiry officer's action Was correct: 

We have carefully reviewed the entire record. The facts in this 

case are fully set forth in the special inquiry officer's decision. At 

the hearing (Tr. p. 2), the respondent admitted the first seven factual allegations in the letter of the Service dated December 21, 1964 

which related to her alienage, arrival as a visitor, marriage, and the 

adjustment of her immigration status. The one -matter that was not 

admitted was the allegation of the Service that she entered into a 

sham marriage with, Michael Awros solely for the purpose of 

evading the-immigration laws.. 

The respondent was questioned under oath by Investigator Opolion of the Service on November 13, 1963. The stenotypist, Patrick 

J. Killela, was. a witness at the hearing and read the respondent's 

statement-of November 13, 1963 into the record from his original 

stenotype notes (Tr: pp. -139-201). The notes and transcript are 

Exhibits 11 and 16, respectively. Counsel attached to 'his brief a 

list of "31 instances in which were was a. variation between that 

which appears in the transcript ,,and that which appears in the steno- and 

type notes. The special inquiry officer discussed this matter in-his 

decisioh (pp. 41-43). It appears that Mr. Killela, in transcribing 

the notes on the day after the hearing before Mr. Opolion, inserted 

certain matters from memory -which were not actually in his notes. 

The 'special inquiry officer stated that "he would rely on the version 

of the questions and answers as they were read' into the fecOrd of 

the,hearing by Mr. Killela from his original notes rather than on the' 

version contained in the _transcript (Ex. 16). 'We have also used 

the version contained in the record of hearing rather than Exhibit 

16. The differences between the two versions are relatively minor. 

Since the special inquiry officer and this Board have not relied on 

the disputed version contained in Exhibit 16, we wilt disMiss .coupsel's contention concerning this matter. 

Part 246 of 8 CFR contains the regulations relating to rescission 

of adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1256, 8 CFR ..246.3 makes 

applicable certain other regulations including the procedure specified . 

in 8 CFR 242.14(c) which is as follows: "The special inquiry officer 

may receive in evidence any oral or written statement which is 

material and relevant to any issue in the case previously made by the 

respondent or any other person during any investigation, examination, hearing, or trial." Hence, there is specific authority in the 

regulations for the special inquiry officer' to consider, in this resole-. 

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Interim Decision #1577 

sion proceeding, the respondent's testimony on November 18, 1968. 

Counsel has argued vigorously that the testimony of the respondent on November 13, 1963 is a "confession". We are unable to 

perceive why counsel deems this so important, and we gonsider it 

entirely immaterial whether this testimony of the respondent is 

characterized as a "confession" or "testimony" or in some other 

manner. The matter which is of consequence is whether the respondent's testimony on November 13, 1963 was properly' admitted 

in evidence at the hearing. In urging that the respondent's "confession" of November 13, 1963 was inadmissible, counsel contends 

that it was involuntary; that she was not advised of the right to 

counsel; and that she was not advised of her right to remain silent 

(brief, pp. 24-36). 

At the commencement of the forinal examination on November 

13, 1963, the respondent answered affirmatively when she was asked 

by the investigator whether she was willing to make a sworn statement and whether she understood that any statement was to be made 

freely and voluntarily and that it might be. used by the Government 

as evidence against her in. any proceeding. After careful consideration of the respondent's testimony at the hearing concerning the 

taking of the statement and the testimony of the investigators and 

the stenotypist, we are satisfied that the respondent's testimony on 

November 13, 1963 was given voluntarily and not under duress. 

Counsel has placed considerable reliance on Eseobedo v. Illinois, 

378 U.S. 478 (1964). We discussed the same contentions in Matter 

of Pang, Lit. Dec. No. 1479 (1965), and Atulicated why Eseobeclo 

was not controlling in a deportation proceeding. Similarly, we hold 

that Escobedo is not applicable in a rescission proceeding under 8 

U.S.C. 1256. In his brief (p. 26), counsel indicated that any distinction between criminal proceedings and deportation proceedings 

had been "laid to rest with respect to coerced confessions", citing 

Bong Youn Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 612, 647 (9th Cir., 1960). 

Actually, that case did not represent any change in the law since 

it has never been considered that a deportation could be predicated 

on a confession or statement which had not been made freely and 

voluntarily. On the facts in the Bong Youn Choy case, the court 

found that he had been coerced into making the 'admissions; in this 

respondent's case, we have found that her testimony was !riven 

voluntarily and not underr duress. Since the facts in the two cases 

differ, the Bong Youn Choy case is not controlling as to this respondent. 

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Interim Decision #1577 

We have indicated above that counsel contended that., prior to the 

interrogation qii. ovember 13, 1963, the respondent should have 

been advised that she had a right to'counsel and the right to remain 

. silent. 8 CFR 246.1 contains . a specific provision that the notice of 

intention to rescind shall inform the respondent that he [she], maybe represented by counsel. The District Director's letter of..December 21, 1964 (Ex. 1) did inform her concerning such representation. 

However., there was no requirement that she be specifically advised 

to, that effect prior to the preliminary investigation on November 13, 

1963 nor that she be informed that she could refuse to answer any 

questions. Nevertheless, she was advisid that the statement was to be 

made freely and voluntarily which was at least some indication to 

her that she 3.-as not required to make any statement. We dismiss 

these contentions of counsel in accordance. with our decisions in 

Matter of F—, 4 I;& N. Dec. 475 (1951) ; Matter of P—, 5 L & N. 

Dec. 306 (1953); and Matter of Pang, supra. In addition, rules of 

evidence applicable in judicial proceedings need not ,be strictly 

followed in an immigration hearing. United States ex rel. Bilokirmsky v. rod, 263 U.S. 149,157 (1923) ; United States en rel. Ili:pasta& 

v. O'Rourke, 211 F.2d 609 (8th Cir., 1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 827. 

In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the special inquiry officer 

was correct in admitting the respondent's testimony of November 

13, 1963 in evidence. 

Counsel has also contended that the "confession", if admissible, 

Was not corroborated and was insufficient evidence, theiefore, upon 

which to base the decision. In-this connection, he has stated that in 

criminal cases the Govanment must' introduce substantial evidence 

to establish the trustwofthiness of the confession. However, this is 

not a criminal proceeding and it is well settled that an alien's own 

admissions are sufficient to support a deportation order. Unitid States 

etc rel. Bilokuntay V. Tod, supra; &keeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 

391 (9th Cir., 1949), cert. den. 339 U.S. 914. Similarly, we hold 

that the respondent's testimony of November 13, 1968 is a sufficient 

basis for rescinding the adjustment of status. 

We have carefully considered the remaining contentions of counsel. These are without merit and do not require specific discussion. 

When the respondent filed her application for adjustment of status 

under 8 U.S.C. 1255 on April 5, 1960, she stated that she had resided at 736 West 173rd StreetsNew York, New 'York, since January' 

]960. She filed her petition for naturalization, on June 7, 1963 

under 8 t.S.C. 1430(a) which required her to establish that during 

the preceding three years she had been living in marital union with 

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Interim. Decision #1577 

her citizen spouse. On the date the petition for naturalization was 

filed, she testified before the naturalisation examiner that she WOO 

-nesidirg_at 1 West 72nd Street, her place of employment; that she 

.41SO maintained a, sesidence.at l'36 West 273rd-Street with.her hitsband;:_aud -th4 there was no marital rift between them. It seems to 

W.conceded .that - Michael Argyros had livid et736 West 173rd 

Street irior:to the marriage and continuously until 1964; that the 

respondent_never lived at that address; and that, from the time of 

her.arrival in 1959 until some time subsequent to June 7, 1968, she 

had lived at 1 West 72nd•Street. In view of these false statements, 

which were obviously made for the purpose of concealing the fact 

that she and Michael Argyros were not living. together, we do, not 

consider the respondent a credible witness. It is our opinion that 

the respondent's admissions against . interest in her testimony of 

November 13, 1963 constitute the true version of the facts and that 

her testimony at the hearing, insofar as it was to the contrary, must 

be rejected as self-serving statements which were untrue. 

8 U.S.C. 1256 provides for the rescission of the adjustment of 

immigration status if "it shall appear to the satisfaction of the 

Attorney General that the person was not in fact eligible for such 

adjustment of status, * *• *.'! One of the requirements for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 12551s that an immigrant visa must 

be immediately available. The respondent was classified as nonquota and was able to secure adjustment of her immigration status 

only by reason of her marriage. Otherwise, she would have been 

chargeable to the quota of Greece which was greatly oversubscribed 

on May 17, 1960 when her application for adjustment of status was 

granted. 

On November 18, 1963, the respondent testified (Tr. pp. 156-174) 

to:the effect that she met Michael Argyros through a. Mr. Regas•; 

that she agreed to pay Michael Argyros $500 if he would marry 

her; that she secured the money from her employer out of wages 

due her; that she gave the money to Mr. Regas who was to pay 

it to Michael Argyros; that she married Michael Argyros solely in 

order that she might remain in the United States; that she had no 

intention of living with him in a marital relationship; and that 

they never had sexual intercourse. Regas was questioned by invesiigaters ,Of_the Service on November 13. 1963 (Er. 21) and denied 

his involvement, stating that he knew nothing about the payment of 

$500 and did not see the respondent between the time.of his first 

meeting with her in December 1959 and November 1960. On the 

basis of the respondent's own testimony, we believe the Service has 

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Interim Decision #1577 

established that the respondent was not eligible for the adjustment 

of status granted to her on May 17, 1960. 

In addition to the respondent's testimony, the following factors 

are pertinent. At the time of the marriage on January 95, 1960, the 

respondent was 20 years old and her husband was 60. George Spyropoulos, who was a witness at the marriage, testified (Tr. pp. 18=20) 

that $500 was paid to Michael Argyros as the inducement for manying the respondent; that the money was paid in his presence by the 

respondent's "boy friend", a Mr. Regas; and that Michael Argyros 

informed him after the marriage that he had married the respondeneonly so that she could remain in the United States. 

Michael Argyros executed an affidavit (Ex. 8) before an investi- - 

gator of the Service on October 3, 1963 in which he stated that 

Regas introduced him to the respondent; that the respondent agreed 

to pay him (Argyros) $500 for marrying her; that she stated that 

they would not live together and that in a few months she would 

see a lawyer about obtaining a. divorce; and that he (Argyros) was 

paid $500 by Reps which the latter had received from the respondent. The respondent was served with notice of this proceeding on 

February 2, 1965, and Argyros could not be presented as a witness 

since he had died on December 22, 1964. Although we held admissible in evidence en parte affidavits of persons who died prior to 

the deportation hearing in Matter of J—, 6 L & N. Dec. 496, 499 

(1955), we have not relied on the affidavit of Michael Argyros in 

this proceeding. 

During the oral argument, a contention was advanced by •counsel 

for the Services that the respondent's statement of November 13, 

1963 (Ex. 16) was taken in connection with the petition for naturalization which she had filed; that the proper procedure for' the respondent's counsel would have been to take action in the naturalization court to quash the statement if he believed that there was a 

lack of due process; and that the question could not be raised 

collaterally in this rescission" proceeding. Thereafter, both parties 

submitted briefs on this point. At the time of the interrogation. on 

November 13, 1963, the respondent was advised that the proposed 

sworn statement related to her "presence in the United States" and 

nothing was said about her petition for naturalization (Tr. p. 139). 

In any event, we are not convinced that it would have been proper 

to dismiss the objections of the respondent's counsel on the technical 

ground suggested by the Service. We need not reach a definite 

conclusion concerning the matter since we have held above that the 

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Interim Decision *1577 

respondent's' testimony of November 13, 1963 was properly received 

in evidence. 

In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent's marriage to Michael Argyros was merely a sham marriage entered into 

for the sole purpose of enabling her to evade the quota restrictions; 

that she was not eligible for adjustment of her immigration status 

under 8 U.S.C. 1255; and that the special inquiry officer's action in 

rescinding the adjustment of status was correct. Accordingly, the 

respondent's appeal will be dismissed. . 

.ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby 

dismissed. 

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