J-S70024-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WAYNE MICHAEL GLASS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 763 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgments of Sentence May 1, 2017, and May 4, 2017,

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-01-CR-0000103-2014, 

CP-01-CR-0000543-2014, CP-01-CR-0000639-2016, 

CP-01-MD-0000980-2015, CP-01-MD-0001151-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 05, 2018

Wayne Michael Glass, (“Appellant”), appeals from the judgments of 

sentence entered at trial court docket number CP-01-CR-0000639-2016 on 

May 1, 2017 and trial court docket numbers CP-01-CR-0000103-2014, CP01-CR-0000543-2014, CP-01-MD-0000980-2015, and CP-01-MD-0001151-

2014 on May 4, 2017. We affirm.

Following a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of terroristic threats, 

stalking, and harassment at docket number CP-01-CR-0000639-201.

1

 On 

May 1, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of incarceration of 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1(a)(2), 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(3), 

respectively.
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eighteen to sixty months on the stalking conviction and six to sixty months

on the terroristic threat conviction, to run concurrently with one another but 

consecutive to other sentences Appellant was serving.2 

Following Appellant’s convictions and sentence at docket number CP01-CR-0000639-2016, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation at

docket numbers CP-01-CR-0000103-2014, CP-01-CR-0000543-2014, CP-01-

MD-0000980-2015, and CP-01-MD-0001151-2014 and sentenced Appellant 

to incarceration for an aggregate term of fifty-four to one hundred thirty-two 

months. Appellant filed a single notice of appeal on May 18, 2017, wherein 

he listed all of the above docket numbers. 

Before we address the merits of Appellant’s appeal, we must dispose 

of this Court’s June 7, 2017 order directing Appellant to show cause why his 

appeal should not be quashed for failure to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 341, note.

That note states, “Where, however, one or more orders resolves issues 

arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, 

separate notices of appeal must be filed.” In response to our order, 

Appellant filed a motion for leave to consolidate the appeals and argued that 

his appeal should not be quashed because the only issues presented for 

appeal stem from docket number CP-01-CR-0000639-2016, which contains 

the most recent convictions for harassment, stalking, and terroristic threats. 

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2 The trial court did not impose a sentence on the summary harassment 

charge.
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Preliminarily, we note that the filing of one notice of appeal from 

orders entered at different docket numbers “has long been discouraged.” 20 

G. Ronald Darlington, et al., Pennsylvania Appellate Practice § 341:3.1.02 

(Dec. 2017 Update) (footnote omitted). See also Commonwealth v. 

C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quashing appeal taken by single 

notice of appeal filed by codefendendants, who were convicted of different 

crimes and given different sentences). Despite this policy, which is codified 

in the note to Pa.R.A.P. 341, our courts have not automatically quashed such 

an appeal. Indeed, our Supreme Court has stated the following:

Taking one appeal from several judgments is not acceptable 

practice and is discouraged. It has been held that a single 

appeal is incapable of bringing on for review more than one final 

order, judgment or decree. When circumstances have 

permitted, however, we have refrained from quashing the whole 

appeal, but this Court has quashed such appeals where no 

meaningful choice could be made.

General Electric Credit Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 263 A.2d 

448, 452–453 (Pa. 1970). 

Although the filing of one notice of appeal from multiple docket 

numbers is discouraged, we note that “appellate courts have not generally 

quashed such appeals, provided the issues involved are nearly identical, no 

objection to the appeal has been raised, and the period for the appeal has 

expired.” In Interest of P.S., 158 A.3d 643, 648 (Pa. Super. 2017). In 

P.S., this Court declined to quash a single appeal from two orders, one 

which adjudicated the appellant delinquent of three crimes and a subsequent 
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dispositional order, following the revocation of his probation. Id. at 645. 

This Court looked to the fact that the appellant “presents intertwined issues 

related to his new adjudications and revocation disposition,” as well as the 

facts that the Commonwealth did not object and the appeal period had

expired. Id. at 648. 

In this case, we note that Appellant is appealing the judgment of 

sentence entered at docket number CP-01-CR-0000639-2016. The four 

other appeals are relevant to our adjudication of the instant case only 

because the sentencing court revoked Appellant’s probation at those dockets

numbers following his convictions of harassment, stalking, and terroristic 

threats at docket number CP-01-CR-0000639-2016. Indeed, this is not a 

situation where this Court must address factually distinct convictions or

sentences handed down to one or more appellants. Further, we note that 

the Commonwealth has not objected, and the time for appeal has passed. 

Our examination of the above facts and relevant case law compels the 

conclusion that circumstances allow us to exercise our discretion and permit 

the appeals.3

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3

In Appellant’s response to our June 7, 2017 per curiam order, he filed a 

motion for leave to consolidate. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513, this Court may 

order consolidation where “the same question is involved in two or more 

appeals in different cases.” Appellant’s appeal is based entirely on the 

adjudication of one of the docket numbers, CP-01-CR-0000639-2016, from 

which he has appealed and we GRANT Appellant’s motion to consolidate 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Turning to the merits of the appeal, a review of the facts of this case 

makes it clear that Appellant has a long and protracted criminal history 

involving the victim, his former paramour, Ms. Glass. Indeed, Appellant has 

at least twelve prior convictions involving Ms. Glass and has been subject to 

numerous revocations in the past due to contacts with and threats against 

Ms. Glass in violation of the order she obtained pursuant to the Protection 

From Abuse Act (“PFA”), 23 Pa.C.S. § 6101 et seq. Order, 5/17/17, at 1. 

This case involves a letter Appellant sent to two employees of South 

Central Community Action Programs (“SCCAP”), a homeless shelter which 

had provided Appellant services in the past. The letter, written by Appellant, 

was addressed to Zelona Wagner and Sharon Bechtel, both employees at 

SCCAP. The letter was several pages long and included the following 

passage: 

I do know if [Ms. Glass] keeps me in here again like she did the 

last time because she said she doesn’t feel comfortable with me 

getting out. I will max out and then when I get out there is NO 

place on this God’s green earth she can hide that I will not hunt 

her down like a blood hound and show her what true “Emotional 

Distress” is all about. BLOW both her knee caps off and put her 

in a wheel chair for the rest of her life, that should do it. Death 

would be way to [sic] easy for her...

N.T., 1/17/17, Exhibit A. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

docket numbers CP-01-CR-0000103-2014, CP-01-CR-0000543-2014, CP-01-

MD-0000980-2015, and CP-01-MD-0001151-2014 with this appeal.
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During the nonjury trial, one of the women to whom the letter was

addressed, Zelona Wagner, testified that she became familiar with Appellant 

when he stayed at the homeless shelter and that their families were friends. 

N.T., 1/17/17, at 8. After opening the letter and reading the above passage, 

she immediately gave it to her supervisor, Sharon Bechtel. Id. at 11. Ms. 

Wagner testified she was concerned that had she not informed her 

supervisor and Appellant made good on his threats, she would “have that on 

my mind forever.” Id. Ms. Wagner did not personally know Ms. Glass, 

although she was familiar with her and Appellant’s tumultuous relationship 

and was aware that Appellant was “obsessed” with Ms. Glass. Id. at 12, 17. 

Sharon Bechtel testified that she was “quite disturbed” upon reading

the letter. Id. at 22. She further testified that she had known Appellant for 

seven or eight years and that her ex-husband and Appellant worked 

together approximately six years prior. Id. at 19, 24. Ms. Bechtel also 

testified that she became acquainted with Ms. Glass during that period,

spoke with her “quite frequently” over the telephone, and that Appellant and 

Ms. Glass had gone on a double date with Ms. Bechtel and her husband. Id. 

at 24. They later fell out of contact and Ms. Bechtel had not spoken with 

Ms. Glass since 2012, except for a single occasion when Ms. Glass, who 

works as a mail carrier, delivered mail to Ms. Bechtel’s home. Id. at 25. 

Ms. Becthel further testified that after she read the threats contained in 

Appellant’s letter, she informed a victim witness assistance program and a 
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detective about the letter to determine how she should proceed. Id. at 22. 

Ms. Bechtel ultimately told Ms. Glass about Appellant’s threats when Ms. 

Glass called the shelter seeking services for one of her children. Id. at 23. 

Appellant also testified and admitted that he wrote the letter 

containing the threats to Ms. Glass. Id. at 36–37. He stated that he wrote 

the letter to Ms. Wagner and Ms. Becthel to inform them how “frustrated he 

was with [Ms. Glass] for not cooperating.” Id. at 41. He further testified:

I was hearing rumors of different things [Ms. Glass] is saying 

and I’m very frustrated, and I just wanted to show how 

frustrated I was. I sought parole [in] 2015. I got a negative 

recommendation. I got a nine month hit. May 3rd it will be five 

years I’ve been down for PFA violations and I was frustrated and 

I wanted to show them how frustrated I was. [Ms. Glass] is 

saying about her emotional distress. Well, I have emotional 

distress also. 

Id. at 35–36. Following a nonjury trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty 

of harassment, stalking, and terroristic threats, as discussed supra. 

In support of his appeal, Appellant raises the following questions for 

our review:

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth to convict Appellant of Terroristic Threats?

2. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth to convict Appellant of Stalking?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (issues numbered for clarity). 

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law, 

requiring a plenary scope of review. Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 837 
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A.2d 480, 484 (Pa. Super. 2003). We employ the following standard of 

review:

The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence is to determine whether, when viewed in a light most 

favorable to the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom is sufficient for the trier of fact 

to find that each element of the crimes charged is established 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence.

The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubt 

raised as to the accused's guilt is to be resolved by the factfinder. As an appellate court, we do not assess credibility nor do 

we assign weight to any of the testimony of record. Therefore, 

we will not disturb the verdict unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact 

may be drawn from the combined circumstances

Commonwealth v. Wanner, 158 A.3d 714, 717–718 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717, 719 (Pa. Super. 

2014)). 

In support of his first issue, Appellant argues that there was 

insufficient evidence to convict him of terroristic threats because he did not 

have the required intent to terrorize the victim.

4

 In order for a defendant to 

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4 Appellant has relied on a number of this Court’s unpublished memoranda in 

his brief. This practice is expressly prohibited by Superior Court Operating 

Procedure § 65.37(A), which states, “An unpublished memorandum decision 

shall not be relied upon by a Court or a party in any other action or 

proceeding, except such that a memorandum decision may be relied upon or 

cited (1) when it is relevant under the doctrine of the law of the case, res 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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be convicted of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706, terroristic threats, “the Commonwealth 

must prove that 1) the defendant made a threat to commit a crime of 

violence, and 2) the threat was communicated with the intent to terrorize 

another or with reckless disregard for risk of causing terror.” 

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 138 A.3d 39, 46 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Tizer, 684 A.2d 597, 600 (1996)). Neither the ability 

to carry out the threat or the victim’s belief in the same is an element of the 

offense. Beasley, 138 A.3d at 46. As Appellant asserts, the purpose of 

section 2706 “is to impose criminal liability on persons who make threats 

which seriously impair personal security or public convenience. It is not 

intended by this section to penalize mere spur-of-the-moment threats which 

result from anger.” Appellant’s Brief at 11 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706, cmt.). 

In support of his appeal, Appellant avers that he lacked the required 

intent to terrorize Ms. Glass because there was no active relationship 

between Ms. Glass and the third parties to whom he communicated the 

threat and Appellant did not make any statements that the threat should be 

relayed to the victim. Appellant’s Brief at 11. Although Appellant concedes 

that a threat was made, he argues that his intent was not to terrorize Ms. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

judicata, or collateral estoppel, and (2) when the memorandum is relevant 

to a criminal action or proceeding because it recites issues raised and 

reasons for a decision affecting the same defendant in a prior action or 

proceeding.” The exceptions do not apply here, and we will disregard those 

citations in the instant case.
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Glass. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Instead, Appellant asserts that, looking at 

the totality of the circumstances, he lacked the intent to terrorize the victim 

because of the relationship among the parties. Id. at 13. Specifically, 

Appellant argues that he was friends with both Ms. Wagner and Ms. Bechtel 

and his intent was to relay the message to them; he believed that neither 

person would relay the message to Ms. Glass “because of their lack of a 

relationship to her.” Id. at 13. 

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant has a long and protracted 

history of contacting and threatening Ms. Glass in letters he sent directly to 

her or other individuals, despite the fact that Ms. Glass obtained a PFA

against him. Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. Indeed, Appellant sent letters to 

his mother, his children, his grandchildren, the mother of Ms. Glass, a close 

friend of Ms. Glass, and Ms. Glass’s employer. Id. He also had a male 

acquaintance leave Ms. Glass a voicemail message. Id. After each attempt 

to circumvent the no-contact provision of the PFA, Appellant was convicted 

of indirect criminal contempt and warned by the trial court. Id. at 8. The 

Commonwealth further avers that Appellant’s contact with Ms. Bechtel (who 

is an acquaintance of Ms. Glass) and Ms. Wagner is simply another attempt 

by Appellant to communicate his feelings to her, specifically his message 

that he will hurt her if she opposes his parole. Id. 

The trial court ultimately found that Appellant’s intent to terrorize Ms. 

Glass could be inferred from the contents of the letter as well as the fact 
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that Appellant testified that he wrote the letter after he heard “rumors of 

different things [Ms. Glass] is saying and I’m very frustrated, and I just 

wanted to show how frustrated I was....” Id. (citing N.T. 1/23/17, at 35–

36). In its opinion, the trial court noted:

A state of mind by its very nature is subjective; a person’s mind 

cannot be opened so that his or her intent can be observed. In 

the absence of a declaration disclosing a person’s intent, 

therefore, one can only look to the conduct and circumstances 

surrounding it to determine the mental state which occasioned it. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/17, at 15 (quoting Commonwealth v. Crawford, 

24 A.3d 396, 405 (Pa. Super. 2011)). The trial court also found that 

Appellant acted in reckless disregard for the risk of causing terror because 

Appellant was aware that Ms. Bechtel and Ms. Glass knew each other, and

therefore, he was aware of the possibility that the threat would be relayed to 

Ms. Glass. Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/17, at 18.

Given Appellant’s long and convoluted history with Ms. Glass, the 

content of the letter, the relationship between the parties, and Appellant’s 

testimony, we conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to find Appellant guilty of 

making terroristic threats. 

In his second issue, Appellant complains that the evidence was not 

sufficient to sustain his conviction for stalking. Appellant’s Brief at 17. 

Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1(a)(2), a person is guilty of stalking when 

the person “engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly communicates to 
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another person under circumstances which demonstrate or communicate 

either an intent to place such a person in reasonable fear of bodily injury or 

cause substantial emotional distress to such other person.” 

We note that Appellant’s supporting argument consists of 

approximately half a page of text and incorporates the arguments he made 

regarding his conviction for terroristic threats. Appellant’s Brief at 17. 

Specifically, Appellant asserts that there was no intent to communicate the 

threat to Ms. Glass; thus, the evidence was not sufficient to find him guilty 

of terroristic threats and stalking. Id. Appellant acknowledges that the 

letter he sent to Ms. Bechtel and Ms. Wagner form the basis of both the 

stalking and the terroristic threats convictions. Id. Appellant further admits 

that “there was sufficient previous conduct that if the threat was a terroristic 

threat then it would also qualify as stalking.” Id. 

The trial court, after reviewing all of the stipulations and evidence, 

found that

the prior history between Appellant and the victim, his numerous 

criminal convictions and PFA violations involving this same 

victim, as well as the content of the current letter, all establish a 

course of conduct which evidenced Appellant’s intent to cause 

the victim substantial emotional distress or place her in 

reasonable fear of bodily injury. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/17, at 15 (footnote omitted). We agree with the 

trial court’s assessment and find that the evidence was sufficient to sustain 

Appellant’s conviction for stalking. 

Judgments of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/05/2018