1The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 99-3475

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United States of America,

Appellee,

 v.

Julianne K. Sample,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

Western District of Missouri.

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Submitted: February 15, 2000

 Filed: May 31, 2000

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Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD,

Circuit Judges. 

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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Following her plea of guilty to one count of credit card fraud, the district court1

sentenced Julianne K. Sample to 30 months in prison. Sample appeals her sentence.

We affirm. 
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I.

Facts and Background

From 1995 to 1997, Sample engaged in an elaborate financial fraud and identity

theft scheme in the greater Kansas City, Missouri, metropolitan area. Sample

perpetrated her scheme by procuring personal information about her roommates, casual

acquaintances, visitors, and individuals whom she met through other friends. Sample

also worked in tandem with her boyfriend, Thomas Melton. Melton, a former

employee of Builders Square in Kansas City, often forwarded personal information

obtained from his customers to Sample. The information that Sample acquired, either

on her own or in combination with Melton, included social security numbers, dates of

birth, addresses, and physical descriptions. Once Sample purloined this information

from her unsuspecting victims, she began the process of stealing their identities.

Sample used the personal information to open various bank accounts, secure credit

cards, and even establish false driver's licenses in the names of her victims. Sample

then utilized the credit cards to make multiple purchases in her victims' names. She

also wrote checks and withdrew money from her fraudulent bank accounts. In one

instance, Sample, posing as Missouri resident Keri Shirk, visited a regional health

center in Independence, Missouri. While at the health center, Sample altered Shirk's

medical records and obtained a prescription in Shirk's name.

Law enforcement officers eventually discovered Sample's scheme and

apprehended her. Sample pleaded guilty in a Kansas state court to one count of forgery

and two counts of felony theft. A Kansas state court judge sentenced Sample to serve

18 months in prison. While incarcerated in Kansas, Sample admitted to an agent of the

United States Secret Service that she orchestrated an extensive identity takeover

scheme and stole thousands of dollars from various unsuspecting victims in western

Missouri and Kansas. Sample "guesstimated" that she either caused or intended to

cause her victims to lose a combined amount in excess of $70,000. 

 
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Following her interview with the Secret Service, a federal grand jury indicted

Sample in the Western District of Missouri for one count of credit card fraud. See 18

U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2). Sample entered into a plea agreement with the government.

Pursuant to the agreement, Sample pledged to plead guilty to the charge contained in

the indictment. The government agreed that the total amount of actual and intended

loss to Sample's victims fell between $40,000 and $70,000. The parties acknowledged

in the agreement, however, that the district court retained discretion with regard to all

sentencing decisions.

Prior to Sample's sentencing hearing, the United States Probation Office

prepared a presentence investigation report (PSIR). The PSIR concluded that contrary

to Sample's plea agreement with the government, the total amount of actual and

intended loss in this case was greater than $70,000 but less than $120,000. The PSIR

also stated that an upward departure from the sentencing range prescribed in the United

States Sentencing Guidelines might be warranted in this case based upon the factors

delineated in United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2F1.1 (Application Notes

11 and 12.) The PSIR, however, did not affirmatively recommend an upward

departure. (See PSIR at 24.) Sample objected to the inclusion of the upward departure

information. She stated that no grounds existed to support such a departure. The

probation officer declined to retract the information. 

The district court sentenced Sample on September 10, 1999. During Sample's

sentencing hearing, the district court held that an upward departure was warranted in

this case. The district court based its departure decision on the degree of psychological

harm that Sample inflicted upon her victims. The district court also rejected the

amount of loss stated in the plea agreement and adopted an amount consistent with

Sample's statement to the Secret Service. The district court then sentenced Sample to

30 months in prison. Sample appeals her sentence to this court. 
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II.

Discussion

A. Upward Departure: Adequacy of Notice

Sample challenges the district court's decision to impose an upward departure

in this case. Sample contends that the district court failed to afford her proper notice

that it was considering a departure from the applicable sentencing range. Sample failed

to raise her lack of notice argument during the sentencing hearing. Hence, we must

review the adequacy of notice issue for plain error. See United States v. McCarthy, 97

F.3d 1562, 1580 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1139 and 520 U.S. 1133

(1997).

Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a district court to

provide a defendant notice if it intends to depart upward from a defendant's prescribed

sentencing range. See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1991). Inclusion

in a PSIR of the specific grounds that may form the basis for an upward departure

satisfies Rule 32's notice requirement. See id. In this case, the PSIR indicated that a

departure may be warranted pursuant to USSG § 2F1.1. Sample contends that the

PSIR failed to state the specific departure grounds later relied upon by the district

court.

Sample argues that the district court departed on the basis of extreme

psychological injury as stated in USSG § 5K2.3. Section 5K2.3 authorizes an upward

departure "[i]f a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much more serious than

that normally resulting from commission of the offense." USSG § 5K2.3. Sample

contends that the district court based its departure decision on the factors delineated in

§ 5K2.3 rather than the factors listed in § 2F1.1. Hence, argues Sample, she received

insufficient notice of the departure. We disagree.
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Application Notes 11 and 12 to USSG § 2F1.1 both authorize a district court to

depart upward if the court finds that the loss does not reflect the seriousness of the

defendant's conduct. Note 11(c) specifically permits a departure if "the offense caused

reasonably foreseeable, physical or psychological harm or severe emotional trauma."

At Sample's sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it was "departing upward

in this matter because of the extreme complications and emotional distress that you

have placed on your victims . . . [W]hile you may not have understood all of the details

of how you were going to affect their lives, I think you had a substantial understanding

of the confusion that you would create." (Sent. Tr. at 61.) 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court based its departure

decision on the factors outlined in Application Notes 11 and 12 to USSG § 2F1.1. The

district court identified emotional harm as the reason for the departure and stated that

such harm was reasonably foreseeable. Such a departure basis is consonant with the

factors outlined in Application Note 11. The PSIR plainly stated that the Application

Note 11 factors may serve as a possible basis for a departure, and the probation officer

provided a copy of the PSIR to Sample. As the district court's departure decision

directly correlates with the PSIR's plain language, we must reject Sample's lack of

notice argument. 

B. Upward Departure: Sufficiency of the Basis/Reasonableness of the Extent

Sample next argues that the district court erred when it decided to upwardly

depart in this case. Sample challenges the district court's decision to impose an upward

departure as well as the reasonableness of the extent of the departure. We review a

district court's departure decisions under a unitary abuse of discretion standard. See

United States v. Goings, 200 F.3d 539, 542 (8th Cir. 2000). We note that departure

is appropriate only in extraordinary cases where there exists an "aggravating or

mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into

consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3553(b); see also United States v. Sharma, 85 F.3d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1996). We

first determine whether the district court is basing its departure decision on a factor that

is specifically encouraged, discouraged, or forbidden by the Sentencing Guidelines.

See United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 657 (8th Cir. 1998). If the factor is

encouraged as a basis for departure by the Sentencing Commission, the district court

may depart, provided that the applicable Guideline does not already take the factor into

account. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996); United States v.

Washington, 109 F.3d 459, 462 (8th Cir. 1997). In conducting our review, we "defer

to the [district] court on the critical issue of whether a given factor is present to a

degree not adequately considered by the [United States Sentencing] Commission."

United States v. Coon, 187 F.3d 888, 899-900 (8th Cir. 1999)(internal citations and

quotations omitted), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1417 (2000). 

Section 2F1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines specifically encourages an

upward departure whenever the amount of loss fails to capture the harmfulness and

seriousness of the conduct. See USSG § 2F1.1, comment (n.11(c), 12). The amount

of loss fails to capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the defendant's conduct when

the conduct causes reasonably foreseeable physical or psychological harm, or severe

emotional distress, to the victim of the crime. See Coon, 187 F.3d at 900; USSG §

2F1.1, comment (n.11(c)). The basis for the district court's departure, therefore, is an

encouraged factor not taken into account by an applicable Guideline. Accordingly, we

will uphold the district court's departure decision, as long as the factual record contains

sufficient evidence to support the basis of the departure decision. 

In this case, the record is replete with evidence that Sample caused her victims

to suffer severe emotional trauma. Two of Sample's victims, Shirk and Paula Jensen,

testified at Sample's sentencing hearing regarding the degree of disruption and turmoil

wrought upon their lives as a result of Sample's deceptions. Jensen testified as follows:
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Once I learned of this crime committed against me, I was terrified to be

alone, fearful that someone may steal my children, frightened that

someone may be following me, afraid to write a check, horrified that

someone was out there destroying my good name and credit, and there

wasn't anything I could do about it . . . Try to imagine the time and

frustration and the endless hours spent on the phone and going in person

to places in an effort to prove my real identity. All the time I was being

treated like a criminal. No one believed me . . .

I cannot even begin to explain the embarrassment and the humiliation that

I feel when I'm rejected (sic) credit or when stores refuse to accept my

checks because of the criminal actions of Ms. Sample. Try to imagine

how demoralizing it is to be treated like a criminal for a crime committed

against you. Emotionally, it's very degrading.

Probably the most serious and traumatic situation involved me almost

being arrested after a minor traffic accident because warrants listed under

my [s]ocial [s]ecurity number came up because I'm an alias of her. I now

have to carry this legal statement with me at all times to prove my real

identity . . .

The anger, fear, and anxiety that this has caused is going to leave me

scarred forever. It will never be over for me. I have a difficult time

trusting people because now, of course, I'm suspicious of what someone

is going to do to me. The time I've had to spend towards getting this mess

straightened out has taken me away from my children. I'll never be able

to get that back.

I've had two missed days off (sic) work trying to get different problems

straightened out, and the frustration of the many phone calls that I've had

to deal with while I've been at work that relate to this case has been

overwhelming and distracting. I'm an elementary school teacher, and it

has been extremely difficult for me to deal with these phone calls and then

immediately step back into my classroom emotionally ready to meet the

educational needs of my students. 

(Sent. Tr. at 33-35.) Shirk offered similar testimony.
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Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that more than enough

evidence exists for the district court to find that Sample caused her victims to suffer

severe emotional distress and trauma. While Sample may not have been able to

apprehend the precise effects of the harm caused by her actions, she undoubtedly could

foresee the level of personal upheaval likely to result from an identity theft scheme.

Consequently, we hold that the district court committed no error when it decided to

depart upwardly in this case.

Sample argues that even if the district court had the discretion to issue an upward

departure, it erred when it sentenced Sample to 30 months in prison. Absent the

departure, Sample's sentencing range would have been 15 to 21 months in prison.

Sample contends that an upward departure from a 15- to 21-month sentencing range

to 30 months is unreasonable. Sample's argument lacks merit.

We review for abuse of discretion the reasonableness of the extent of an upward

departure. See United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 958 (8th Cir. 1995). In

conducting our review, we are mindful that the "district court's decision on this matter

is quintessentially a judgment call and we respect the district court's superior feel for

the case." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The district court's judgment

call is, of course, inexorably linked with the facts and circumstances of the particular

crime at issue. 

In the instant case, Sample's identity theft scheme exhibits a degree of

callousness sufficient to justify a nine-month upward departure. In fact, we believe that

the district court's decision to issue an upward departure of nine months was more than

reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Sample's challenge to the

reasonableness of the extent of the upward departure therefore fails. 

 
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C. The Amount of Loss

Sample challenges the district court's determination of her base offense level

under the Sentencing Guidelines. Sample argues that the district court erred when it

rejected the amount of loss stipulation contained in her plea agreement with the

government. The plea agreement provided that the total amount of actual and intended

loss caused by Sample's identity theft scheme fell between $40,000 and $70,000. The

district court found instead that the total amount of loss in this case was less than

$120,000 but greater than the $70,000 maximum figure provided in the plea agreement.

We review the district court's factual findings regarding the amount of loss for clear

error. See United States v. Roggy, 76 F.3d 189, 192 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S.

1200 (1996). We review a district court's application of the guidelines to the facts de

novo. See United States v. Molina, 172 F.3d 1048, 1058 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 120

S. Ct. 221 (1999). 

The government bears the burden of proving the amount of loss by a

preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Jackson, 155 F.3d 942, 948 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1059 (1998). In this case, however, the government

offered no testimonial evidence regarding either the actual or intended amount of loss.

Sample testified that the total amount of both actual and intended loss fell between

$40,000 and $70,000. She told the court that her earlier statements to the Secret

Service agent were mere guesstimates. The district court rejected Sample's $40,000

to $70,000 calculation. Instead, the district court relied upon the amount of loss

guesstimate conveyed by Sample to the Secret Service, which was enumerated within

the PSIR. 

In arriving at its finding regarding the amount of loss, the district court noted that

Sample "was able to remember a number of details about the debriefing that she gave

to the Secret Service agent . . . [a]nd [she] is sufficiently sophisticated in the criminal

justice system to understand the consequences of talking to the police about any matter.
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And I think, especially given the nature of these kinds of crimes, it is very difficult for

law enforcement to exactly identify what has been lost, and the person who really is in

the best position to do that is, in fact, the defendant." (Sent. Tr. at 60.) Hence, the

district court found that the detailed statements that Sample gave to the Secret Service

were more credible than the statement of loss that Sample provided during the

sentencing hearing. The district court's decision, in essence, was based on witness

credibility. Questions of witness credibility are committed squarely to the domain of

the sentencing court and are virtually unreviewable on appeal. See United States v.

Hernandez, 187 F.3d 806, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we must conclude that

the district court did not clearly err in its findings regarding the amount of loss.

Consequently, Sample's challenge to the district court's determination of her base

offense level fails. 

III. 

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.