J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.W., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: R.W. No. 1079 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order entered June 16, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Family Court, at No(s): CP-02-DP-0002407-2013 

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.W., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: R.W. No. 1446 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order entered August 21, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Family Court, at No(s): JV-13-2407 

IN RE: J.W., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: J.W., BIOLOGICAL FATHER No. 1080 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order entered June 16, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Family Court, at No(s): DP-2407-2013 

 JV-13-2407 

IN RE: J.W., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: J.W., BIOLOGICAL FATHER No. 1450 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order entered August 21, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Family Court, at No(s): JV-13-2407 

 No. DP-2407-2013 

 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 2 - 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PANELLA, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 02, 2016 

 R.W. (“Mother”) and J.W. (“Father”) appeal from the orders entered on 

June 16, 2015, and August 21, 2015, with regard to their minor child, J.W., 

(“Child”), a male born in November 2013. In the June 16, 2015 order, the 

trial court adjudicated Child dependent pursuant to § 6302(1) of the Juvenile 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A § 6301, et seq., and placed him in the care of his maternal 

grandmother, N.K. (“MGG”), in his own home. That order further permitted 

Mother and Father to remain in the home, with the provision that MGG 

supervise all of their contact with the minor child and directed the parents to 

have mental health evaluations. In the August 21, 2015 order, the trial court 

found that Child continues to be dependent under the Juvenile Act and found 

that, despite the parents’ substantial compliance with the permanency plan, 

Child’s safety continues to be at risk because neither parent has been able to 

address the circumstances that led to the June 16, 2015 dependency 

adjudication. The trial court further found that the parents’ mental health 

evaluation was not helpful in determining a manner in which Child will be 

safe in his parents’ unsupervised care. Therefore, the trial court directed the 

parents to undergo individual counseling and couples counseling, to assist 

the parents in “opening up” about the circumstances of Child’s injuries. 

After careful review, we affirm both orders. 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 3 - 

 In its August 17, 2015 opinion, the trial court set forth the following 

factual background and procedural history regarding this appeal, which we 

incorporate herein, as follows.1

I. First Dependency Adjudication 

 This appeal is from a second adjudication of dependency. 

However, the facts surrounding the first adjudication are 

relevant to the present case. On December 19, 2013, Mother 

took J.W. to the emergency room at Children’s Hospital of 

Pittsburgh (“Children’s Hospital”) due to unexplained marks that 

she discovered on his face and body. See Testimony of 

Transcript (“T.T.”), dated January 31 & February 4, 2014, at 12-

13. Mother testified that she had been at home with J.W. since 

Father had left for work on the morning of December 19, 2013. 

Id. at 229. Father returned to the home around midnight, from a 

work engagement, at which time [m]other went to shower as 

she had not been able to do so while Father was at work. Id. at 

231. Following an approximate seven[-]minute shower, Mother 

noticed what she believed to be a red rash on J.W.’s face. Id. at 

233. After contacting J.W.’s pediatrician’s office, Mother 

examined the remainder of J.W.’s body and discovered “small 

irregular marks on his lower abdomen.” Id. at 235. Not knowing 

how he obtained the “marks” on his body, Mother took J.W. to 

the Children’s Hospital emergency room. 

 The emergency room physician contacted Dr. Jennifer 

Wolford, an attending physician in the Children’s Hospital Child 

Advocacy Center, to further examine J.W. See [i]d. at 9. During 

her examination of J.W., Dr. Wolford discovered additional 

markings on J.W.’s back; she diagnosed the marks on J.W.’s 

back, abdomen and face as bruises that could not have been 

self-inflicted. See T.T., dated January 31 & February 4, 2014, at 

12, 19. Following Dr. Wolford's examination, J.W. had a skeletal 

survey, which initially2 did not reveal any fractures. Id. at 18. 

However, a referral was subsequently made to the Office of 

Children, Youth and Families (CYF). Id. at 139. 

 

1

 We note that the trial court made an apparent clerical error in its opinion 

when it stated that the appeal was from its February 16, 2015 order. See

Trial Court Opinion, 8/17/15 at 1. 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 4 - 

 CYF caseworker Nicholas Zdral was appointed to 

investigate the circumstances of J.W.’s injuries and interviewed 

Dr. Wolford as well as both parents. Id. Following Mr. Zdral’s 

interview with the parents, CYF “decided to obtain an emergency 

court order to remove” J.W. from the home. Id. at 159. 

Following a shelter hearing on January 2, 2014, J.W. was placed 

with his maternal great aunt and uncle. Id. 

 J.W.’s follow-up skeletal survey at Children’s Hospital 

revealed a healing fracture in his right radius.3 See T.T., dated 

January 31 & February 4, 2014, at 20. Dr. Wolford testified that 

such an injury would have only resulted from an amount of force 

being applied to the bone and was consistent with abuse. 

 At the adjudicatory hearing on January 31, 2014, I found 

J.W. dependent due to the unexplained injuries that he 

sustained, which could not have happened without an adult’s 

knowledge. J.W. was subsequently placed in the physical custody 

of his parents; however, all contact with Mother and Father was 

to be supervised. J.W.’s dependency case was ultimately closed, 

and court supervision terminated, on August 8, 2014, when 

Mother and Father completed all of their family service plan 

goals. 

Il. Current Dependency Adjudication 

 On April 25, 2015, the family returned to Children’s 

Hospital due to injuries that J.W. sustained from an alleged 

accidental fall in the home. See T.T., dated June 3, 2015, at 39. 

According to Mother, while she was carrying J.W. in her arms 

that morning, she missed a step and fell down the stairs of her 

home. See T.T., dated June 16, 2015, at 57. Upon realizing that 

J.W. was favoring his left leg, Mother contacted the pediatrician 

to schedule an appointment for J.W. later that morning. Id. at 

58. After meeting with J.W.’s primary care physician, Dr. Brad 

Kramer, Mother and Father took J.W. to have x-rays conducted 

at the Cranberry Township site of UPMC Passavant. Id. at 64. 

After reviewing the x-ray results, Dr. Kramer informed Mother 

that J.W. had fractured his right tibia and would need to see a 

pediatric orthopedic surgeon at Children’s Hospital. Id. Upon 

learning that they would have to take J,W. to Children’s Hospital, 

Mother and Father demonstrated discontent with having to 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 5 - 

return to Children’s Hospital by contacting their attorney, Wendy 

Williams, and their families, prior to actually taking J.W. to the 

hospital. Id. at 64, 93. After being convinced that taking J.W. to 

Children’s Hospital was in his best interest, Mother and Father 

took J.W. to meet with a pediatric orthopedic surgeon. Id. 

 Prior to seeing pediatric orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Timothy 

Ward, J.W. was first examined by the emergency room

physicians. See T.T., dated June 16, 2015, at 142. Although the 

emergency room physician assistant recommended that J.W. 

receive a skeletal survey, the parents initially refused such 

treatment. See T.T., dated June 3, 2015, at 39. Due to the 

parents’ reluctance and the nature of J.W.’s injuries[,] the 

physician assistant contacted Dr. Wolford[,] who then 

recommended that the skeletal survey be completed due to 

J.W.’s past injuries, and the fact that the 2014 skeletal survey 

revealed J.W.’s previous right radial fracture. Id. at 40. Mother 

and Father did not inform the physician assistant of J.W.’s prior 

injuries or the fact that J.W.’s previous right radial fracture, in 

connection with the prior dependency case, had been revealed 

pursuant to a skeletal survey. See T.T., dated June 16, 2015, at 

149. 

 Following a great deal of back and forth between the 

parents, their attorney and the emergency room staff, Mother 

and Father ultimately agreed to the skeletal survey under the 

condition that they were permitted to observe the procedure. 

Id. at 65. Following the completion of the skeletal survey, a 

second fracture was revealed in J.W.’s left radius. See T.T., 

dated June 3, 2015, at 40. After the emergency room physicians 

finished treating J.W. for his two fractures, the family met with 

Dr. Ward, the pediatric orthopedic surgeon to whom Dr. Kramer 

had referred them. See T.T., dated June 16, 2015, at 11. 

 During their consult with Dr. Ward, the parents failed to 

accurately characterize J.W.’s prior involvement with Children’s 

Hospital and CYF. Id. at 11-12. Despite the fact that J.W. was 

previously admitted in 2013 for bruises on his face and body, the 

parents told Dr. Ward that J.W. was treated for a wrist fracture 

and implied that CYF’s involvement in the case was rather brief. 

Id. During the June 16, 2015 hearing, Dr. Ward testified that 

although he found J.W.’s contralateral fractures unusual, he 

“allowed the appearance of the family” and his short interaction 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 6 - 

with the family to “considerably” affect his opinion.5Id. at 9, 11. 

After speaking with Dr. Wolford and receiving J.W.’s complete 

medical history, Dr. Ward amended his initial medical opinion, 

that J.W.’s injuries were not due to abuse. Id. at 15-16. Due to 

J.W.’s previously unexplained bruises, the parents’ “failure to be 

forthright” regarding their involvement with CYF, the parents’ 

misrepresentation regarding the discovery of J.W.’s 2013 right 

radial fracture on the skeletal survey, and their lack of candor to 

the emergency room physicians, Dr. Ward later concluded that 

J.W.’s injuries were the result of abuse. Id. at 30. 

 On April 30, 2015, CYF received a child line report for J.W. 

See T.T., dated June 3, 2015, at 149. Following an interview 

with both parents and an evaluation of their home, CYF 

caseworker Robert Banks filed a petition for dependency on May 

07, 2015. A two-day adjudicatory hearing was held on June 3 

and June 16, 2015 on CYF’s dependency petition, after which 

[the trial court] entered the Order that is the subject of this 

appeal. 

___________________________________________________

1

 Father testified that when asked about the marks on J.W.’s 

body, he told Mother that he was unaware as to how J.W. came 

to have the marks on his face or body. See T.T., dated January 

31 & February 4, 2014, at 318. 

2

 A subsequent skeletal survey was scheduled for January 2, 

2014. Dr. Wolford testified that it is hospital protocol to conduct 

a subsequent skeletal survey as healing fractures “show up 

better” than acute fractures on the x-rays. See T.T., dated 

January 31 & February 4, 2014, at 20. 

3

 Pediatric radiologist, Dr. Stefano Bartoletti, stated that he was 

able to later identify the healing fracture on the initial skeletal xrays after identifying the fracture on the subsequent skeletal 

survey x-rays. See T.T., dated January 31 & February 4, 2014, 

at 125, 127. 

4

 The parents alleged that J.W.’s injuries in connection with the 

prior adjudication were caused by hospital personnel in 

performing the skeletal survey. See T.T., dated January 31 & 

February 4, 2014, at 266-269. [The trial court] did not adopt 

this theory in connection with the past case. 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 7 - 

5

 At the hearing on June 3, 2015, Dr. Wolford testified that the 

fact that J.W. had a fracture on his right leg and left arm, as a 

result of this accident, was "highly concerning" for abuse. See

T.T., dated June 3, 2015, at 42 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/17/15, at 1-6 (unpaginated; footnotes in original). 

 In the June 16, 2015 order, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent 

pursuant to the Juvenile Act and placed him in the care of MGG, in his own 

home, permitting Mother and Father to remain in the home, with the 

provision that MGG supervise all of their contact with the minor child. The 

order also directed the parents to have mental health evaluations. 

 The trial court continued the factual background and procedural history 

of the case in its opinion entered on October 30, 2015, as follows. 

 On August 21, 2015, following a permanency review 

hearing on the above-captioned matter at which all parties were 

represented by counsel, [the trial court] found that the minor 

child, J.W., continues to be a Dependent Child pursuant to the 

Pennsylvania Juvenile Act (See 42 Pa.C.S. §6302(1)). Despite 

the parents’ substantial compliance with the permanency plan, 

the [trial court] found that J.W.’s safety continues to be at risk 

because neither parent has been able to address the

circumstances which led to the June 16, 2015 dependency 

adjudication. [The trial court] further found that the mental 

health evaluation was not helpful in determining a manner in 

which J.W. will be safe in his parents' unsupervised care. . . . 

 

 Following the adjudicatory hearing, [the trial court] 

scheduled a permanency review hearing for August 21, 2015, 

and [the trial court] ordered the parents to attend mental health 

evaluations to determine if there were any mental health issues 

that they could address which would insure J.W.’s safety. At the 

August 21, 2015 Permanency review hearing[,] the mental 

health evaluator, Dr. Patricia Pepe, testified that, 

notwithstanding their “faking good” scores on the child abuse 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 8 - 

potential inventory, neither Mother nor Father had any mental 

health issues.2 Because the mental health evaluation was not 

helpful in determining what was necessary for J.W. to be in his 

parents’ unsupervised care, [the trial court] ordered Mother and 

Father to enter into individual therapy, followed by couples 

therapy, with the hope that either party would be more 

forthcoming once he or she is protected by confidentiality. 

Thereafter, couples therapy could perhaps be more productive. 

________________________________________________ 

2

 Dr. Pepe also indicated that the parents told her that [the trial 

court] had concluded that the injury which resulted in the 

current dependency adjudication was “accidental.” [The trial 

court] made no such finding. [The trial court] simply noted that 

the medical evidence alone (without consideration of the history 

or the parents’ conduct) would not provide clear and convincing 

evidence of dependency. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/15, at 1-2 (unpaginated; footnote omitted; 

footnote in original).2

 On July 16, 2015, Mother and Father timely filed notices of appeal, 

along with concise statements, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) from the 

trial court’s June 16, 2015 order at Docket Nos. 1446 WDA 2015 and 1450 

WDA 2015, respectively. On September 21, 2015, Mother and Father timely 

filed notices of appeal, along with concise statements, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

 

2

 The August 21, 2015 order permitted Child to be placed with his parents, 

as long as the maternal grandparents or paternal grandparents supervised 

the contact between the parents and Child. Further, the order directed that 

the parents would have separate counselors. 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 9 - 

1925(a)(2)(i) from the trial court’s August 21, 2015 orders, at Docket Nos. 

1779 and 1780, respectively.3

 Mother’s Appeals at Docket Nos. 1079 WDA 2015 and 1446 WDA 2015 

 In her brief on appeal, Mother raises the following issues. 

I. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its 

discretion by making an adjudication of dependency with regard 

to the minor child, J.W., when the adjudication was not 

supported by clear and convincing evidence, as the trial court 

based its finding upon an unspecified harm that could occur in 

the future, despite evidence showing that J.W. received proper 

care at all times? 

II. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused 

its discretion in finding that J.W. was without proper parental 

care or control when it based its dependency upon information 

from a past dependency case involving J.W., even though 

[Mother] was providing proper care for J.W. at the time the 

current action was filed? 

III. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused 

its discretion by making a dependency finding based on 

allegations that were outside of the scope of the dependency 

petition, and also where the Appellant [Mother] did not have 

advance notice of those allegations, in violation of the 

Appellant’s [Mother’s] rights to due process and fundamental 

fairness? 

IV. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused 

its discretion when, after a permanency hearing, it found that 

J.W. continued to be a dependent child solely due to its concern 

that neither parent was forthcoming about J.W.’s unexplained 

injuries in a prior dependency case, even though the parents 

 

3

 In an order entered on October 16, 2015, this Court, acting sua sponte, 

consolidated Mother’s two appeals and Father’s two appeals, and directed 

that Father’s appeal be listed consecutively to Mother’s appeals. We address 

both Mother’s and Father’s appeals in one Memorandum for ease of 

disposition. 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 10 - 

satisfactorily completed all of their requirements in the current 

case? 

V. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused 

its discretion by requiring Appellant [Mother] to participate in 

individual therapy and in couples therapy, in violation of 

Appellant [Mother’s] right to privacy? 

Mother’s Brief, at 8-9. 

 Mother asserts that we should reverse the dependency finding and 

disposition in the June 16, 2015 adjudication and order, because CYF failed 

to satisfy its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. She alleges 

that the trial court committed an error of law and abused discretion by not 

basing its decision upon current circumstances and facts of record. Rather, 

the trial court relied on information from a prior closed dependency case, 

speculating that Child may not receive proper medical care in the future, 

which is contrary to the weight of the evidence. See Mother’s Brief, at 15-

16. 

 Mother further contends that she was deprived of due process and 

fundamental fairness, as she did not have sufficient notice of the allegations 

that the trial court used as a basis for its decision. Mother states: 

 At issue in this case were the injuries sustained by the 

child when Mother fell down the stairs, while holding the child, 

on April 25, 2015. [T]he court acknowledged that the medical 

evidence on its own does not establish dependency, and the 

parents were never provided with any notice that a hypothetical 

failure to obtain medical care in the future, or J.W.’s unexplained 

injuries in the past, would be at issue in the current proceeding. 

The medical experts agreed that the child could have sustained 

his injuries as a result of Mother’s fall. The trial court therefore 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 11 - 

erred in basing a finding of dependency upon the speculation or 

possibility that the child may be denied medical care in the 

future, when the facts of record established that the child did in 

fact receive proper medical care. Such speculations cannot be 

used to justify a dependency finding, particularly when the 

finding required a state agency to intervene into the privacy of 

family life[,] and also deprived Child’s parents of their custodial 

rights. 

Mother’s Brief, at 16. 

 Mother also argues that there is no evidence, in the record in this 

case, that shows that the parents are currently incapable of providing proper 

care and control to Child, which is essential to a dependency finding. Thus, 

Mother maintains that the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

discretion by making a dependency finding without clear and convincing 

evidence of each component necessary to support the finding. Accordingly, 

Mother urges that this Court should reverse the June 16, 2015 adjudication 

and order. 

 Additionally, with regard to the August 21, 2015 order, Mother asserts 

that the trial court acknowledged that the parents had completed all of the 

requirements the court and CYF had imposed, which included cooperating 

with CYF and participating in a psychological evaluation. Nevertheless, the 

trial court imposed a new requirement for the parents to attend individual 

therapy and couples therapy, although the psychological evaluation showed 

that there were no mental health concerns. Mother contends that the trial 

court’s position, that it could not close the current dependency case until the 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 12 - 

parents acknowledged responsibility for Child’s injuries, was unsupported by 

statutory and case law. Moreover, Mother argues that a requirement to 

accept responsibilities for past, unexplained injuries should not be 

determinative in a dependency action, particularly when the injuries in 

question arose during a prior dependency case and were completely 

unrelated to the injuries in the current case. Accordingly, Mother requests 

this Court to vacate the permanency review order entered on August 21, 

2015. See Mother’s Brief, at 17-18. 

Father’s appeal at Docket Nos. 1980 WDA 2015 and 1450 WDA 2015 

 Father raises the following issues. 

1. Was the [t]rial [c]ourt’s dependency finding against the 

weight of the evidence given the testimony in the case 

supporting the Appellant’s [Father’s] contention that the child’s 

injuries were accidentally sustained in a fall? 

2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion in placing undue 

weight on the parents’ alleged failure to inform emergency 

department staff about their son’s prior wrist fracture and 

reluctance to agree to a skeletal survey? 

3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion in giving undue 

weight to the child’s prior involvement with CYF? 

4. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion in finding that the 

parents did not take responsibility for the child’s wrist fracture? 

5. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in making the inconsistent findings 

that [Child] continues to be a dependent child and, at the same 

time, finding that the Parents have completed all tasks required 

of them and substantially complied with the Permanency Plan 

put into place for their family? 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 13 - 

6. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding that the child remains a 

dependent when it failed to set forth specific and attainable goals 

for the child’s Permanency Plan including failing to state the 

likely date on which the child’s placement goals may be 

achieved? 

7. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in ordering the Parents to enter into 

individual and couple’s therapy? 

8. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in entering a disposition contrary to 

the child’s best interests? 

Father’s Brief at Docket Nos. 1080 WDA 2015 and 1450 WDA 2015, at 2-3. 

 Father asserts that Child broke his wrist and then CYF became 

involved and imposed a set of goals on the parents. He further alleges that 

the parents met all obligations given to them, and the case was terminated. 

Father states that, in April 2015, Mother fell down the stairs while holding 

Child and both Mother and Child were injured. Father claims that the parents 

promptly took Child to the pediatrician, then for x-rays, then to Children’s 

Hospital, where staff again contacted CYF. Father argues that the trial 

court’s findings, that the parents had not taken full responsibility for Child’s 

previous injury, and had “nearly” prevented Child from receiving necessary 

medical care, are unsupported by the record. 

Father states that the trial court did not find that one of the parents 

had abused child. Nevertheless, the trial court found Child dependent and 

imposed multiple conditions on the parents. Father contends that the trial 

court abused its discretion in making the findings and that the second 

adjudication of dependency is against the weight of the evidence. 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 14 - 

Accordingly, Father requests this Court to reverse the trial court adjudication 

of dependency/disposition and permanency review orders entered on June 

16, 2015 and August 21, 2015. See Father’s Brief, at 6. 

 Our standard of review in a dependency case as follows. 

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the 

lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. We review for 

abuse of discretion[.] 

 

In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015) (citation and quotation marks 

mitted). 

 The Juvenile Act defines a “dependent child” as 

[a] child who: 

(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, 

education as required by law, or other care or control necessary 

for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A 

determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or 

control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent, 

guardian or other custodian that places the health, safety or 

welfare of the child at risk[.] 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1). 

 This Court clarified the definition of “dependent child” further. 

The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care or 

control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two discrete 

questions: whether the child presently is without proper parental 

care and control, and if so, whether such care and control are 

immediately available. 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 15 - 

In re G.T., 845 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). See also In re J.C., 5 A.3d 284, 289 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Additionally, we note that “[t]he burden of proof in a dependency proceeding 

is on the petitioner to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a 

child meets that statutory definition of dependency.” G.T., 845 A.2d at 872 

(citation omitted). 

 This Court has explained that 

a court is empowered by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a) and (c) to make 

a finding that a child is dependent if the child meets the 

statutory definition by clear and convincing evidence. If the court 

finds that the child is dependent, then the court may make an 

appropriate disposition of the child to protect the child's physical, 

mental and moral welfare, including allowing the child to remain 

with the parents subject to supervision, transferring temporary 

legal custody to a relative or public agency, or transferring 

custody to the juvenile court of another state. 42 Pa.C.S. § 

6351(a). 

In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 617 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc).

The Juvenile Act defines “Aggravated circumstances” as including the 

following circumstances: 

 (2) The child or another child of the parent has been the victim 

of physical abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, sexual 

violence or aggravated physical neglect by the parent. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(2). 

 The Juvenile Act defines “serious bodily injury” as “bodily injury which 

creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 16 - 

disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 

member or organ.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. 

 The Juvenile Act, in turn, defines “aggravated physical neglect” as, 

“Any omission in the care of a child which results in a life-threatening 

condition or seriously impairs the child’s functioning.” Id. 

 Upon a determination that aggravated circumstances exist, the 

Juvenile Act states the following. 

(c.1) Aggravated circumstances.— If the county agency or 

the child’s attorney alleges the existence of aggravated 

circumstances and the court determines that the child is 

dependent, the court shall also determine if aggravated 

circumstances exist. If the court finds from clear and convincing 

evidence that aggravated circumstances exist, the court shall 

determine whether or not reasonable efforts to prevent or 

eliminate the need for removing the child from the home or to 

preserve and reunify the family shall be made or continue to be 

made and schedule a hearing as required in section 6351(e)(3) 

(relating to disposition of dependent child). 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(c.1). 

Regarding the disposition of a dependent child, subsections (e), (f), 

(f.1), and (g) of § 6351 of the Juvenile Act provides the trial court with the 

criteria for its permanency plan for the subject child. Pursuant to those 

subsections, the trial court is to determine the disposition that is best suited 

to the safety and protection and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the 

child. 

The Juvenile Act further provides in pertinent part: 

(e) Permanency hearings.— 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 17 - 

(1) [t]he court shall conduct a permanency hearing for 

the purpose of determining or reviewing the permanency 

plan of the child, the date by which the goal of 

permanency for the child might be achieved and whether 

placement continues to be best suited to the safety, 

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the 

child. In any permanency hearing held with respect to the 

child, the court shall consult with the child regarding the 

child’s permanency plan in a manner appropriate to the 

child's age and maturity. . . . 

(2) If the county agency or the child’s attorney alleges 

the existence of aggravated circumstances and the court 

determines that the child has been adjudicated 

dependent, the court shall then determine if aggravated 

circumstances exist. If the court finds from clear and 

convincing evidence that aggravated circumstances exist, 

the court shall determine whether or not reasonable

efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the 

child from the child's parent, guardian or custodian or to 

preserve and reunify the family shall be made or continue 

to be made and schedule a hearing as provided in 

paragraph (3). 

* * * 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(e)(1)-(2).

 Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act prescribes the pertinent inquiry for 

the reviewing court: 

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.- 

 At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of 

the following: 

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness 

of the placement. 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 18 - 

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of 

compliance with the permanency plan developed for the 

child. 

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating 

the circumstances which necessitated the original 

placement. 

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child. 

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for

the child might be achieved. 

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize 

the permanency plan in effect. 

(6) Whether the child is safe. 

(7) If the child has been placed outside the 

Commonwealth, whether the placement continues to be

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental 

and moral welfare of the child. 

* * * 

 

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of 

the last 22 months or the court has determined that

aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable 

efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the 

child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to 

preserve and reunify the family need not be made or

continue to be made, whether the county agency has filed 

or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights 

and to identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified 

family to adopt the child unless: 

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best

suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of

the child; 

(ii) the county agency has documented a 

compelling reason for determining that filing a 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 19 - 

petition to terminate parental rights would not 

serve the needs and welfare of the child; or 

(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with

necessary services to achieve the safe return to 

the child’s parent, guardian or custodian within the 

time frames set forth in the permanency plan. 

* * * 

(f.1) Additional determination. — Based upon the 

determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant 

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one 

of the following: 

(1) If and when the child will be returned to the child’s 

parent, guardian or custodian in cases where the return 

of the child is best suited to the safety, protection and 

physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. 

(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and 

the county agency will file for termination of parental 

rights in cases where return to the child’s parent,

guardian or custodian is not best suited to the safety, 

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the 

child. 

(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal 

custodian in cases where return to the child’s parent, 

guardian or custodian or being placed for adoption is not 

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental 

and moral welfare of the child. 

(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit and 

willing relative in cases where return to the child’s parent, 

guardian or custodian, being placed for adoption or being 

placed with a legal custodian is not best suited to the 

safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare 

of the child. 

(5) If and when the child will be placed in another living 

arrangement intended to be permanent in nature which is 

approved by the court in cases where the county agency 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 20 - 

has documented a compelling reason that it would not be 

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental 

and moral welfare of the child to be returned to the 

child’s parent, guardian or custodian, to be placed for 

adoption, to be placed with a legal custodian or to be 

placed with a fit and wiling relative. 

(f.2) Evidence. – Evidence of conduct by the parent that places 

the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including 

evidence of the use of alcohol or a controlled substance that 

places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, shall be 

presented to the court by the county agency or any other party 

at any disposition or permanency hearing whether or not the 

conduct was the basis for the determination of dependency. 

(g) Court order.— On the basis of the determination made under 

subsection (f.1), the court shall order the continuation, 

modification or termination of placement or other disposition 

which is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, 

mental and moral welfare of the child.

* * * 

 In its August 17, 2015 opinion, the trial court provided the following 

discussion of Mother’s and Father’s issues: 

 Mother’s and Father’s first three issues on appeal concern 

[the trial court’s] finding that both parents have failed to 

acknowledge responsibility for the child’s previous injuries that 

led to the February, 2014 dependency finding. Therefore, it is 

necessary to address the issue of the previous dependency 

adjudication and the responses thereto. 

 At the outset[,] it must be recognized that the previous 

dependency finding in 2014 was based on the fact that J.W. 

sustained injuries that could not have resulted without the 

knowledge of an adult. Thus, while [the court] did not make the 

specific finding that J.W. was the victim of inflicted abuse by an 

identified perpetrator, [the court] certainly found the parents to 

be responsible for these injuries.6 My ruling at that time 

contemplated a situation where these[ ] injuries to the child 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 21 - 

were the result of some type of accident within the knowledge of 

one of the parents. This failure of the parents to take 

responsibility for the prior injuries became a significant issue in 

the current adjudication, where J.W. sustained two additional 

fractures, as noted in the adjudicatory order of June 16, 2015. 

 These injuries cannot be considered in a vacuum. 

Appellate cases have upheld adjudications solely based upon 

prognostic evidence. See In re E.B., 83 A.2d 426, 433 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (holding, “it is well-settled that ‘a finding of 

dependency can be made on the basis of prognostic evidence 

and such evidence is sufficient to meet the strict burden of proof 

necessary to declare a child dependent.” (citing In re R.W.J., 

826 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. Super. 2003))) [sic]. Certainly, in this 

case, where this previously dependent young child has suffered 

two additional fractures, the continued insistence of the parents 

that they are not responsible for the first incident establishes 

dependency by clear and convincing evidence.7

 Furthermore, this failure to take responsibility for the prior 

injuries has had an effect on J.W.’s medical treatment. Upon 

learning from Dr. Kramer that J.W. would need to be taken to 

Children’s Hospital to see a pediatric orthopedic surgeon, Mother 

and Father appeared to be less concerned with J.W.’s safety and 

more preoccupied with whether he would be removed from their 

care. Despite just learning that their son had suffered a tibia 

fracture, Mother and Father expressed their aversion to taking 

the child to Children’s Hospital, only choosing to do so after 

being informed that it was the only place that the minor child 

would receive the necessary treatment for a broken bone on a 

Saturday. See Testimony of Transcript, (“T.T”), dated June 16, 

2015, at 93. 

 Moreover, once arriving at Children’s Hospital, Mother and 

Father demonstrated further reluctance to have J.W.

appropriately treated by initially refusing to allow the medical 

staff to perform a skeletal survey. Although the 2014 skeletal 

survey revealed a radial fracture of which the parents were 

unaware, both Mother and Father did not want the hospital staff 

to perform a skeletal survey, as they believed it was solely based 

on the prior allegations of abuse. Id. at 122. The parents’ 

objection to the skeletal survey demonstrates a lack of 

responsibility for the safety of their son[,] and shows that 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 22 - 

Mother and Father were more worried that they 

“were going down the same path” and that J.W. “would be taken 

from them again.” Id. at 144, 152. Yet, were it not for the most 

recent skeletal survey, J.W.’s second radial fracture would not 

have been discovered or treated. 

 The testimony of the emergency room physician, Dr.

Farrell, demonstrates that Mother and Father were not 

forthcoming with information about J.W.’s previous injuries, 

which were relevant to his most recent treatment. Although both 

the orthopedic resident and physician’s assistant questioned 

Mother and Father regarding J.W.’s previous medical history, 

Mother and Father did not disclose his previous fracture or 

bruises. Only after learning that the treating physicians wanted 

to complete a skeletal [scan] did Mother and Father disclose the 

minor child’s previous injuries. See Testimony of Transcript 

(“T.T.”), dated June 16, 2015, at 53. Were it not for the 

information provided to Dr. Farrell by Dr. Kramer and Dr. 

Wolford, the skeletal survey, which revealed the second radial 

fracture, may not have been conducted. 

 Moreover, the orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Ward, testified that 

the parents’ failure to (1) provide a complete medical history for 

the minor child and (2) accurately represent CYF’s past 

involvement with the family caused him to prematurely conclude 

that J.W.’s injuries were not indicative of abuse. Dr. Ward 

testified that Mother and Father never informed him of the 

previous bruises that J.W. sustained. Additionally, Dr. Ward 

stated that Mother and Father implied that their previous 

involvement with CYF was “brief” and “quickly set,” which it 

most certainly was not. Id. at 21. Even if Mother and Father did 

not explicitly state that their involvement with CYF was brief, 

their failure to adequately characterize CYF’s involvement in 

2014 caused Dr. Ward to prematurely render a medical opinion 

that J.W.’s injuries were attributable to the accidental falling. 

Although initially believing the child’s injuries to be unusual, Dr. 

Ward’s medical opinion was swayed due to the incomplete and 

partially inaccurate medical history that Mother and Father 

provided 

 Therefore, it is clear that in refusing to provide both Dr. 

Farrell, the emergency room physician, and Dr. Ward, the 

orthopedic surgeon, with a complete medical and factual history 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 23 - 

regarding J.W.’s previous injuries, Mother and Father 

demonstrated not only their inability to accept responsibility for 

the his [sic] prior injuries, as discussed supra, but also, their 

current inability to provide J.W. with adequate care or control. 

The parents’ reluctance in cooperating with the medical 

professionals at Children’s Hospital would not be so alarming if 

their reluctance did not pose a danger to the child’s physical 

health. [The trial court] cannot overlook the fact that Mother and 

Father’s lack of candor could have thwarted the very treatment 

that led to the discovery of an additional fracture. 

 In the concise statements, Mother and Father 

mischaracterize [the trial court’s] prior adjudicatory findings. 

[The court] must emphasize that the absence of a finding of 

abuse in the first dependency hearing does not in itself establish 

a finding that no abuse took place. [The trial court’s] previous 

dependency finding did not hinge on whether or not Mother or 

Father inflicted the trauma, but on the fact that the child 

sustained trauma, which the medical evidence confirmed could 

have not have [sic] resulted without an adult’s knowledge. The 

record of the February 2014 adjudicatory hearing reflects [the 

trial court’s] finding that a child of that age is not in a position to 

cause the injuries he sustained[,] and that some adult had 

knowledge of how J.W. sustained his injuries. Although [the trial 

court] did not identify a perpetrator or state that the minor child 

had been abused, [the court] did not make an alternative finding 

that the trauma was not inflicted. Therefore, the parents’ 

arguments that [the court] made a finding that J.W. was not 

abused are unsupported by the record. 

 The [trial court] further noted that the fact that the 

previous dependency case was closed after Mother and Father 

met all of their goals is not indicative of the parents’ 

acknowledgement of responsibility for the minor child’s prior 

injuries. As stated in [the trial court’s] June 16, 2015 findings of 

fact, it is the parents’ most recent conduct with respect to the 

prior incident that demonstrates their failure to accept 

responsibility for the accuracy of the prior finding. At most, 

Mother’s and Father’s completion of their previous dependency 

goals demonstrates a propensity to cooperate with court orders; 

it does not, however, demonstrate their acceptance of the 

accuracy of the prior finding, or their willingness to accept 

responsibility for J.W.’s prior injuries.8 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 24 - 

The parents’ [next] issue on appeal avers that [the trial 

court] erred and abused [its] discretion in adjudicating the child 

dependent where the medical evidence on its own does not 

establish dependency and there was no evidence that parent 

failed to obtain proper medical attention for J.W. With respect to 

the parents’ first argument, [the trial court] did not base [its] 

findings or the dependency adjudication solely on the medical 

evidence. As noted, [the medical evidence] is concerning, but 

alone does not establish clear and convincing evidence. What 

[the trial court] did find, by clear and convincing evidence, was 

that it became evident in this adjudication that the parents failed 

to acknowledge responsibility for the prior injuries, and[,] 

therefore, J.W. is at risk for medical professionals not receiving 

all of the information necessary to treat him and to assess 

whether he is in danger. There is ample evidence in the record 

that Mother and Father were not candid or forthcoming with 

information regarding the child’s previous history. Multiple 

witnesses, including Mother and Father, testified to the parents’ 

reluctance to not only have the minor child treated at Children’s 

Hospital, but also to submit to the skeletal survey, without which 

the second fracture would not have been discovered. Therefore, 

the parents’ arguments with respect to [this] issue on appeal 

should be dismissed. 

___________________________________________________

6

 While the parents cooperated with services and did what was 

asked of them by CYF, resulting in the closure of the prior case 

closed [sic] after approximately eight months, it is clear that the 

parents never acknowledged responsibility for the injury. 

7

 As stated in [the trial court’s] adjudicatory order, [the trial 

court], as well as other professionals in this case, very well may 

have been influenced by the fact that the parents appear to be 

such nice, respectable people who have a nice home and plenty 

of resources. 

8

 In retrospect, the case should not have been closed without 

such an acknowledgement. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/17/16, at 7-12 (unpaginated; footnotes and emphasis 

in original). 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 25 - 

 In the October 30, 2015 opinion, the trial court explained: 

 Both Mother and Father appeal [the] August 21, 2015 

Order of Court.1

* * * 

 In their concise statements, Mother and Father both assert 

9 matters complained of, which can be grouped into three basic 

issues, specifically: 

1. That [the trial court] committed an error of law and an 

abuse of discretion in finding that J.W. continues to be 

dependent because parents were not forthcoming about 

what happened to this child when he was an infant, 

despite the parents’ substantial compliance with the 

permanency plan. See Mother’s and Father’s Concise 

Statement of Matters, at paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8. 

2. That [the trial court] committed an error of law and an 

abuse of discretion in failing to set forth appropriate goals 

for J.W.’s permanency plan or a likely date on which the 

permanency goals maybe achieved. See Mother’s and 

Father’s Concise Statement of Matters, at paragraphs 4 

and 5. 

3. That [the trial court] committed an error of law and an 

abuse of discretion in ordering the parents to attend both 

individual therapy and ultimately couples therapy, and 

requiring the parents’ contact with J.W. to continue to be 

supervised at all times by either the paternal 

grandparents or maternal grandparents. See Mother’s 

and Father’s Concise Statement of Matters, at paragraphs 

7 and 9. 

 Ultimately, Mother’s and Father’s issues on appeal, (which 

are not addressed in the Opinion in support of the adjudication) 

(August, 17, 2014) stem from [the trial court’s] finding that J.W. 

continues to be a dependent child despite the fact that both 

parents have substantially complied with the permanency plan. 

However, compliance with the permanency plan does not equal 

progress. The mental health evaluations were ordered in order 

to assess whether a mental health issue was the reason why the 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 26 - 

parents were unwilling to acknowledge their responsibility for the 

injuries to the child as an infant and their resulting reluctance to 

cooperate with medical providers, with respect to the recent 

fractures. Had the mental health evaluations revealed a mental 

health condition, which caused the parents to place the child at 

risk, then appropriate mental health goals could be identified so 

that this condition could be addressed. 

 Both parents deny responsibility for J.W.’s injuries as an 

infant, despite [the trial court’s] finding that an adult was aware 

of the cause of the injuries. Instead, there appears to be a 

“circling of the wagons” or a “conspiracy of silence.” See In Re 

L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164 (Pa. 2015). Dr. Pepe’s testimony that the 

parents do not have mental health issues may have ruled out 

one potential explanation as to why the parents have been 

unable to address the circumstances that led to the dependency 

adjudication. 

 However, without an explanation for the parents’ behavior, 

the conditions cannot be remedied[,] and J.W. cannot safely be 

placed in the parents[’] care without supervision. As a result, [the 

trial court] ordered both parents to seek individual counseling 

with the hope that either Mother or Father will be forthcoming 

with information regarding the circumstances of J.W.’s previous 

injuries, so that the parents may then work towards remedying 

the conditions that led to the most recent dependency 

adjudication. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the August 21, 2015 Order of 

Court should be affirmed. 

______________________________________________ 

1

 Currently pending before the Court are Mother’s and Father’s 

appeals of the June 16, 2015 dependency adjudication at docket 

numbers at 1079 WDA 2015 and 1080 WDA 2015. As the 

present matter has been consolidated with the pending appeals, 

this opinion will only address facts and issues which were not 

addressed in the prior opinion. For more detail, see the Trial 

Court Opinion, dated August 17, 2015. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/15, at 2-4 (footnote in original). 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 27 - 

 In In re L.Z., our Supreme Court considered the question of whether 

this Court, sitting en banc, improperly reversed the determination of the trial 

court that the child at issue suffered child abuse, and, through the 

application of the presumption of prima facie evidence of abuse set forth at 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6381(d), that the abuse was perpetrated by his mother. 

 There, a twenty-month-old male infant was brought to an emergency 

room by his mother and his maternal aunt, to be treated for a deep cut 

nearly halfway around the base of his penis. The physicians at the hospital 

noted bruising to the child’s cheeks, severe diaper rash, and a yeast 

infection on the front of his body. Both women cared for the child together. 

The physicians suspected child abuse, as the women’s explanations for the 

injuries to the child were consistent with abuse, and the injuries were 

inconsistent with the women’s explanations. The physicians also suspected 

that the injuries were non-accidental. 

 The physician who treated the child at the hospital testified at the 

dependency adjudication hearing as an expert in pediatric medicine. When 

the doctor was asked whether the dark bruising to child’s cheeks would 

“cause a child severe pain,” she responded, “I am sure it couldn’t have been 

very comfortable.” 111 A.3d at 1168. The doctor testified that the injuries 

(the penile laceration, cheek bruises and diaper rash/yeast infection) were 

“consistent with a pattern of suspected child abuse,” and that the child was a 

“victim of child abuse.” Id. 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 28 - 

 The trial court found that the child was a victim of child abuse as 

defined at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303, and that the mother was the perpetrator of 

the abuse. See 111 A.3d at 1168-1169. The court transferred temporary 

legal custody of the child to the county agency, and placed the child in his 

maternal grandfather’s physical custody, with his parents receiving 

supervised weekly visitation. The trial court also entered an order finding 

that aggravated circumstances existed because the child was “the victim of 

physical abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, sexual violence, or 

aggravated neglect by the parent; proven as to Mother.” Id. at at 1169. 

The trial court concluded that the county agency did not need to make 

further efforts to reunify the child with his mother. 

 The mother filed an appeal to this Court. Sitting en banc, the majority 

of the Court affirmed the dependency adjudication but vacated the abuse 

determination. The dissent, authored by this jurist, and joined by Judge 

Bender and then-Judge, now Justice, Wecht, took the position that the 

majority improperly limited the evidentiary presumption of § 6381(d) to find 

prima facie evidence of an abuser’s identity only when the abuser was 

proven to be present at the time of the injuries. See id. at 1171. 

 The guardian ad litem filed an appeal with our Supreme Court, which 

held that the presumption set forth in § 6381(d) was applicable to the case, 

and that the mother offered no testimony to rebut it. See id. at 1186. The 

Court concluded that the trial court properly found that the mother 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 29 - 

perpetrated the abuse on the child either by inflicting the injuries, or by 

failing to protect the child from his maternal aunt. Accordingly, the Supreme 

Court reversed this Court’s en banc decision, and reinstated the trial court’s 

order. See id. 

 The Supreme Court stated: 

 [C]hild abuse cases often involve a child presenting to a 

hospital with significant injuries that are entirely consistent with 

common types of child abuse and entirely inconsistent with the 

implausible explanations concocted by the parents and 

responsible persons to avoid allegations of child abuse. As noted, 

in cases where multiple caregivers are involved, the individuals 

frequently “circle the wagons” or alternatively point fingers at 

each other. As the children may be too young or fearful to 

describe the abuse, CYS agencies are left to prove their case 

with only the physical evidence of injuries that would not 

ordinarily be sustained but for the action of the parents or 

responsible persons and the implausible statements of the 

parents and responsible persons. Thus, while they can prove the 

existence of abuse rather easily, they have no ability to assign 

responsibility for the heinous act among the responsible adults. 

As Judge Tamilia observed in 1993, “the Legislature deemed it 

wise and necessary to establish a different evidentiary standard” 

by enacting Section 6381’s(d)’s presumption to avoid this 

evidentiary conundrum and protect children from future abuse. 

[In the Interest of J.R.W., 631 A.2d 1019, 1023 (Pa. Super. 

1993)]. . . . We emphasize that, when a child is in the care of 

multiple parents or other persons responsible for care, those 

individuals are accountable for the care and protection of the 

child whether they actually inflicted the injury or failed in their 

duty to protect the child. 

 Moreover, the Legislature balanced the presumption of 

Section 6381(d) by making it rebuttable as it merely establishes 

“prima facie evidence” that the parent perpetrated the abuse. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d). As commonly understood, prima facie

evidence is “[s]uch evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is 

sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts 

constituting the party’s claim or defense, and which if not 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 30 - 

rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary 825 (6th ed. Abridged 1991). Accordingly, evidence 

that a child suffered injury that would not ordinarily be sustained 

but for acts or omissions of the parent or responsible person is 

sufficient to establish that the parent or responsible person 

perpetrated that abuse unless the parent or responsible person 

rebuts the presumption. The parent or responsible person may 

present evidence demonstrating that they did not inflict the 

abuse, potentially by testifying that they gave responsibility for 

the child to another person about whom they had no reason to 

fear or perhaps that the injuries were accidental rather than 

abusive. The evaluation of the validity of the presumption would 

then rest with the trial court evaluating the credibility of the 

prima facie evidence presented by the CYS agency and the 

rebuttal of the parent or responsible person. 

 Applying Section 6381(d) as set forth above to the case at 

bar, we affirm the trial court’s determination that [the mother] 

perpetrated the abuse in the form of the laceration, the cheek 

bruising, and the severe diaper rash and yeast infection. First, 

because the medical evidence presented by [the agency] 

demonstrated that [the child’s] injuries were neither accidental 

nor self-inflicted and because [the child] was only in the care of 

[his mother and aunt], the injuries were shown to be “of such a 

nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by 

reason of the acts or omissions of the parent or other person 

responsible for the welfare of the child[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d). 

Ergo, either [the aunt or mother] or both inflicted the abuse [the 

child] suffered or failed to protect him from the other’s abuse. 

[The mother] failed to rebut the presumption by presenting 

evidence or testimony from her, [the aunt] or her boyfriend 

establishing that [the child] was not in her care when the injuries 

were suffered and that she had no reason to question her 

decision to leave [the child] in [his aunt’s] care. Likewise, 

neither [the aunt] nor anyone on her behalf testified. [The 

mother and aunt’s] self-serving claims made at the hospital were 

neither under oath nor subject to cross-examination. They were 

outside-the-record and do not constitute rebuttal evidence.25

 Instead, ample, uncontested, unrebutted evidence existed 

for the trial court to presume that [the mother] perpetrated the 

abuse on [the child]. . . . 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 31 - 

 Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

discrediting [the mother’s] implausible out-of-court explanation 

and instead crediting the treating doctor’s testimonial 

determination that the cheek bruising was classic child abuse. 

The court found Dr. Silver credible given the pattern of bruises 

showing that someone squeezed [the child’s] face between her 

thumb and fingers, bruising which could have occurred during 

the window of time [the mother] acknowledged having control of 

[the child] and bruising that the doctor testified would have 

cause [the child] severe pain. Moreover, even assuming [the 

mother] did not inflict the penile laceration or the cheek bruising, 

she is still responsible for [the child’s] injuries by failing to 

protect him from [the aunt], absent rebuttal from [the mother] 

that she had no reason to fear leaving [the child] with [the 

aunt]. 

 We conclude that the presumption of Section 6381(d) is 

applicable to this case and that [the mother] offered no 

testimony to rebut it. Thus, the trial court properly found [the 

mother] perpetrated the abuse on [the child] either by inflicting 

the injuries or failing to protect [the child] from [the aunt]. 

 ____________________________________________________ 

25 Moreover, we would not fault a trial court for failing to credit 

any explanations that would have been given considering the 

implausibility of the other assertions provided at the hospital 

regarding [the child’s] injuries. 

Id. at 1185-1186 (footnote in original; footnote omitted). 

 Multiple caretaker child abuse situations are rife with credibility 

determinations for the trial court, and call for the trial court to make 

credibility determinations as to the plausible and implausible explanations 

for the child’s injuries. See id. at 1186 n.25. 

 After a careful review of the record in this matter, we find the trial 

court’s credibility findings are supported by competent evidence in the 

record. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. We also find no deprivation of 
J-A10012-16 

J-A10013-16 

- 32 - 

Mother’s and Father’s constitutional guarantees to due process of law, for 

the reasons expressed by the trial court in its opinion, quoted above. We 

find no error of law or abuse of the trial court’s discretion in ordering, in the 

August 21, 2015 order, the parties to undergo individual and couples 

therapy, after the psychological evaluation, in order to reach a determination 

of the identity of the perpetrator of the abuse on Child. We, therefore, find 

Mother’s and Father’s appeals lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the June 16, 

2015 and August 21, 2015 orders of the trial court.

 Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/2/2016