1

Filed 10/20/23 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

YERBA BUENA NEIGHBORHOOD 

CONSORTIUM, LLC, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,

 Defendants and Respondents;

 A166091

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG21090517)

PARNASSUS NEIGHBORHOOD 

COALITION et al., 

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,

 Defendants and Respondents;

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG21088939)

SAN FRANCISCANS FOR 

BALANCED AND LIVABLE 

COMMUNITIES, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al., 

Defendants and Respondents.

 A166094

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG21089332)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION; 

AND DENYING PETITIONS 

FOR REHEARING AND 

PUBLICATION

 [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this 

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of sections IV through

VII, IX, and XI of the Discussion.
2

BY THE COURT:*

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on September 20, 2023, be 

modified as follows:

1) On page 30, at the end of the last sentence of the first full 

paragraph, which reads, “And the final EIR explains that new transit riders 

will be distributed among four transit routes in the immediate vicinity of the 

campus, with no ‘requirement of additional or expanded transit 

infrastructure . . . identified based on these new riders,’ ” add as footnote 5 

the following footnote: 

The final EIR goes on to state that the Plan “is not responsible for 

analyzing the potential effects of Muni operational issues or changes, 

and Muni is expected to adjust operations accordingly in response to 

changes in demand on a citywide basis over the thirty-year 

implementation of the [Plan].” We disagree with Petitioners YB who 

assert, in a petition for rehearing, that this sentence addressing 

operational issues vitiates the preceding sentence about the adequacy 

of infrastructure, but in any event, our analysis does not turn on this 

portion of the final EIR. 

The subsequent footnotes are renumbered as appropriate.

2) On page 43, the second to the last sentence in the first paragraph, 

which reads, “But in any event, we note that only the Research and Academic 

Building is anticipated to produce significant operational TAC emissions,” is 

modified to read:

But in any event we note that, among the initial-phase projects whose 

operational TAC emissions were considered on a project level, only the 

Research and Academic Building is anticipated to produce significant 

operational emissions.

* Tucher, P.J., Fujisaki, J., and Rodríguez, J. participated in the decision.
3

The petition for rehearing filed by petitioners in No. A166091 on 

October 5, 2023, is denied.

The request for publication of certain portions of the opinion submitted 

on behalf of the California Building Industry Association on October 6, 2023, 

is denied.

There is no change in the judgment.

TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.

RODRÍGUEZ, J.
4

Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Frank Roesch

Counsel: Soluri Meserve, Patrick M. Soluri, Osha R. Meserve, and 

James C. Crowder for Plaintiffs and Appellants Yerba 

Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC and Parnassus 

Neighborhood Coalition et al.

Thomas N. Lippe for Plaintiff and Appellant San 

Franciscans for Balanced and Livable Communities

The University of California Office of General Counsel,

Anagha Dandekar Clifford; Lubin Olson & 

Niewiadomski, Charles R. Olson, Philip J. Sciranka, 

Carolyn J. Lee; Monchamp Meldrum, Amanda J. 

Monchamp, and Hope Schmeltzer for Defendants and 

Respondents 

Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC et al. v. Regents of the University of California/San Franciscans for Balanced 

and Livable Communities v. Regents of the University of California (A166091/A166094)
1

Filed 9/20/23

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

YERBA BUENA NEIGHBORHOOD 

CONSORTIUM, LLC, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

 A166091

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG21090517)

PARNASSUS NEIGHBORHOOD 

COALITION et al., 

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

 

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG21088939)

SAN FRANCISCANS FOR 

BALANCED AND LIVABLE 

COMMUNITIES, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

 A166094

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG21089332)

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this 

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of sections IV through

VII, IX, and XI of the Discussion.
2

Petitioners in these consolidated appeals challenge the adequacy of an 

environmental impact report (EIR) prepared in connection with the 

Comprehensive Parnassus Heights Plan (Plan), a long-range planning 

document intended to guide future development of a campus of the 

University of California, San Francisco (UCSF or university). The Plan 

stirred controversy because it anticipates considerably more intensive 

development on that campus than was projected in the university’s existing 

long-range development plan, which was prepared only a few years prior.

Petitioners contend that, for a variety of reasons, the EIR fails to 

comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. 

Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.).

1 The trial court found the EIR compliant 

and entered judgment for the Regents of the University of California 

(Regents). 

We will affirm. In the published portions of this opinion, we hold (1) 

the EIR considers a reasonable range of alternatives to the Plan and need not 

have considered in detail an alternative that placed some of the anticipated 

development off campus; (2) the EIR improperly declines to analyze the 

impact of the Plan on public transit, but the error is not prejudicial because 

the EIR adequately informs the public and decisionmakers regarding that 

impact; (3) we need not scrutinize the EIR’s analysis of visual impacts 

because section 21099, subdivision (d)(1) directs that aesthetic effects of an

“employment center project on an infill site within a transit priority area” be

deemed not significant; (4) the EIR is not required to adopt a mitigation

measure preserving certain historically significant buildings merely because

it is possible to restore and repurpose the buildings; and (5) the EIR’s

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Public Resources Code, 

unless indicated otherwise.
3

mitigation measure for wind impacts establishes a sufficiently specific

performance standard that the mitigation will achieve and adequately

identifies the type of actions to be taken to achieve that standard. In the 

unpublished portions of the opinion, we address and reject petitioners’ 

remaining claims.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

UCSF is a world-renowned medical complex, research center, and 

professional school. Its Parnassus Heights campus (Parnassus campus), the 

university’s first home, is a 107-acre site in the Inner Sunset neighborhood of 

San Francisco, south of Golden Gate Park. The Parnassus campus currently 

accommodates two hospitals, a variety of medical clinics, four professional 

schools, a graduate program, and space for research, student housing, 

parking, and other support uses. Over half of its hilly site is dedicated as 

public open space. 

In 2014, UCSF prepared a long-range development plan (2014 LRDP) 

for the university as a whole, which consists of campuses at Parnassus 

Heights, Mission Bay, Mount Zion, Mission Center, and Laurel Heights, as 

well as assorted smaller sites and buildings around San Francisco. (See Ed. 

Code, § 67504, subd. (a)(1) [requiring such plans].) Consistent with a 

preexisting policy, the 2014 LRDP was structured to “[a]ccommodate the 

majority of UCSF’s growth” through 2035 at the Mission Bay campus. That 

policy arose from long-standing concerns that “the size of [the Parnassus 

campus] was beginning to overwhelm” its neighborhood. As long ago as 1976, 

these concerns had induced the Regents to adopt a resolution capping 

building space at the Parnassus campus at 3.55 million gross square feet 

(gsf). The 2014 LRDP reaffirmed this policy, while amending it to exclude all 

on-campus housing from the ceiling. Acknowledging that the buildings on 
4

campus already exceeded the resolution’s cap, the 2014 LRDP adopted a plan 

for development that would have resulted in a net reduction. 

The primary changes slated for the Parnassus campus under the 2014

LRDP were the construction of a new addition to one of its two hospitals, the 

demolition of a series of older buildings, and the conversion of other buildings 

to accommodate student and faculty housing. The smaller of the two existing 

hospitals, Moffitt Hospital, does not comply with seismic standards for 

inpatient hospitals that take effect in 2030. (See Sen. Bill No. 1953 (1993–

1994 Reg. Sess.) § 1.) Rather than attempt to bring Moffitt into compliance, 

the 2014 LRDP proposed to build an addition to Long Hospital and repurpose 

Moffitt for outpatient and hospital support services. The net result would 

have been a small reduction in inpatient beds at the Parnassus campus, from 

475 to 439.

The university thereafter had a change of heart. According to the EIR, 

UCSF concluded it had neglected the Parnassus campus while focusing on 

development at Mission Bay, leaving the Parnassus campus in need of 

“substantial renewal and investment.”2 In 2020, UCSF undertook the 

Comprehensive Parnassus Heights Plan with the objective “to re-envision 

and revitalize” the Parnassus campus, so that UCSF would “remain a leading 

health science institution both nationally and internationally.” The Plan was 

intended “to meet projected space needs for critical programs in research, 

patient care, and education at the Parnassus Heights campus site while 

improving the functional and aesthetic design of the campus environment” 

2 The Plan evolved as the environmental review process proceeded. 

Unless otherwise noted, references to “the EIR” are to the final draft version 

of the UCSF Comprehensive Parnassus Heights Plan Environmental Impact 

Report, dated January 2021.
5

and providing “much-needed on-campus housing.” The Plan amends the 

2014 LRDP with respect to development on the Parnassus campus. 

In general, the Plan presents a thorough rethinking of the design of the 

Parnassus campus. At its heart, the Plan is a catalog of proposed new 

buildings, the identification of places on campus to put them and the 

infrastructure necessary to support them, and a general timeline for their 

construction, extending to year 2050. As an organizing principle, the Plan 

divides the campus into six geographic districts, each projected to contain 

buildings serving a particular function. The initial phase of redevelopment, 

slated for completion by 2030, calls for enhancement of the campus entrance, 

construction of two major new buildings, replacement of some student 

housing, and upgrades to campus infrastructure, including a tunnel and 

bridge connecting buildings on either side of Parnassus Avenue. The two 

major buildings are a large new hospital, called “New Hospital,” and an 

eight-story Research and Academic Building. Construction of other buildings 

and infrastructure enhancements are proposed to occur after 2030. Eight 

significant existing structures, including current or potential historic 

resources, and a series of smaller housing units are identified as candidates 

for demolition. 

In total, the Plan anticipates a 50 percent net increase in building 

space on the Parnassus campus over the next 30 years—from approximately

four million to six million gsf. The centerpiece is the New Hospital, which 

would replace the 150 beds in Moffitt Hospital and add more than 200 

additional beds, increasing the campus’s hospital capacity to 675 beds. The 

New Hospital building, anticipated to be 16 stories tall, would provide nearly 

1 million gsf of space. The university explained the Plan’s proposal to raise 

the space ceiling adopted in 1976 by an anticipated 1.5 million gsf, or 42 
6

percent, as “recognition of the tremendous need for program space at the 

campus site in order for UCSF to retain its leadership position in patient 

care, research, and education.” 

With regard to hospital space, for example, the EIR describes existing 

capacity as woefully insufficient. Not only are the campus’s two hospitals 

consistently full, but they have been turning away thousands of patient 

transfer requests annually for lack of space. Between 2017 and 2019, UCSF 

turned away about 40 percent of “requested medically necessary transfers,” 

and the university anticipates the number of requests will increase 

significantly in the future, particularly for the complex cases in which the 

Parnassus campus specializes. Such patients require longer hospital stays, 

further increasing the demand for beds. 

Pursuant to CEQA, the Regents prepared and certified an EIR for the 

Plan. The EIR serves as a project EIR for the construction proposed to occur 

in the initial phase of the Plan, with the exception of the New Hospital. A 

project EIR, the most common type of EIR, examines the environmental

impacts of all phases of a specific development project, including planning,

construction, and operation. (Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 14, § 15161;3 In re BayDelta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143, 1169 (Bay-Delta).) The EIR serves as a 

program EIR with respect to the Plan as a whole and its remaining 

individual components, including the New Hospital. A program EIR is

generally prepared for a series of actions that can together be characterized

3 We will cite and refer to CEQA’s implementing regulations, codified at 

title 14, division 6, chapter 3 of the California Code of Regulations, as the 

“Guidelines.” As the California Supreme Court explains, the CEQA 

Guidelines are given “great weight in interpreting CEQA, except where they 

are clearly unauthorized or erroneous.” (Center for Biological Diversity v.

Dept. of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, 217, fn. 4.)
7

as one large project, and it may be used before specific components of a

project are ready for approval; these may then require follow-on

environmental review. (See Guidelines, § 15168, subds. (a)–(c); Center for

Biological Diversity v. Dept. of Conservation, etc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 210,

230.) 

The primary significant and unavoidable adverse impacts of the Plan, 

as found by the EIR, are (1) the creation of wind hazards in public areas on 

campus, largely associated with the bulky New Hospital building, (2) an 

increase in air pollutants resulting from more intensive use of the campus, 

(3) the demolition of historically significant structures, and (4) an increase in

ambient noise levels during construction. 

Petitioners filed three separate challenges to the adequacy of the EIR 

and stipulated to joint briefing and hearing of their petitions. The trial court 

denied each of the petitions in three identical orders. 

Petitioner San Franciscans for Balanced and Livable Communities 

(petitioner SF) filed an appeal from the judgment in its action, while 

petitioners Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC, and Parnassus 

Neighborhood Coalition, et al. (jointly, petitioners YB) filed a joint appeal 

from the judgments in their respective actions. The two sets of petitioners 

raise different issues, although they also incorporate each other’s arguments

by reference. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).) We issued an order 

consolidating the two appeals for briefing and hearing, and we address below 

first the arguments raised by petitioners YB (sections II through VI), then 

the arguments of petitioner SF (sections VII through XII).4

4 We note that the parties have filed several requests for judicial 

notice. The Regents filed requests in No. A166094 on April 2 and August 25, 

2023; petitioners YB filed a request in No. A166091 on April 24, 2023; and 

petitioner SF filed a request in No. A166094 on August 25, 2023. Requests 
8

DISCUSSION

I. Governing Law

A. CEQA

CEQA “require[s] state and local governmental entities to perform their

duties ‘so that major consideration is given to preventing environmental

damage.’ ” (Friends of the Eel River v. North Coast Railroad Authority (2017)

3 Cal.5th 677, 711–712.) The beating heart of CEQA is its EIR. (Bay-Delta,

supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1162.)

Whenever a public agency proposes to undertake a project that

may have a significant impact on the environment, CEQA requires the

agency to prepare and certify an EIR. (§ 21100, subd. (a); Union of Medical

Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1187

(San Diego).) “The [EIR] must include a description of the proposed project 

and its environmental setting and discussions of (1) the possible 

environmental effects of the project, (2) feasible measures to mitigate any 

significant, adverse environmental effects of the project, (3) the comparative 

environmental effects of a range of reasonable alternatives to the proposed 

for judicial notice are rarely appropriate in CEQA cases. As the Supreme 

Court explained in Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 

9 Cal.4th 559, 573, footnote 4, “it would never be proper to take judicial notice 

of evidence that (1) is absent from the administrative record, and (2) was not 

before the agency at the time it made its decision. This is so because only 

relevant evidence is subject to judicial notice [citations], and the only 

evidence that is relevant to the question of whether there was substantial 

evidence to support a quasi-legislative administrative decision under Public 

Resources Code section 21168.5 is that which was before the agency at the 

time it made its decision.” With that understanding, we have reviewed the 

information of which the parties seek judicial notice, and we deny all 

requests. To the extent material was proffered for some purpose other than 

to bolster substantial evidence supporting the EIR’s conclusions, we conclude

the material is not relevant to our consideration of dispositive issues.
9

project, including a ‘no project’ alternative, and (4) the cumulative impact of 

the project’s various environmental effects.” (County of Butte v. Department 

of Water Resources (2022) 13 Cal.5th 612, 627 (Butte County).) In this way, 

an EIR serves “to identify the significant effects on the environment of a

project, to identify alternatives to the project, and to indicate the manner in

which those significant effects can be mitigated or avoided.” (§ 21002.1,

subd. (a).) The EIR “inform[s] the public and its responsible officials of the

environmental consequences of their decisions before they are made.” 

(Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 564

(Goleta Valley).)

The EIR’s alternatives analysis must consider “a range of reasonable 

alternatives to the project . . . which would feasibly attain most of the basic 

objectives of the project but would avoid or substantially lessen any of the 

significant effects of the project.” (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a).) 

Accordingly, “an EIR should not exclude an alternative from detailed 

consideration merely because it ‘would impede to some degree the attainment 

of the project objectives.’ ” (Bay-Delta, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1165;

Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (b); see Watsonville Pilots Assn. v. City of 

Watsonville (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1087.) The lead agency is 

responsible for selecting the alternatives to be examined and need not 

consider alternatives that “fail[] to meet most of the basic project objectives” 

or that are infeasible. (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subds. (a) & (c).)

When an EIR concludes that a project, as proposed, will have a

significant effect on the environment, the EIR must propose mitigation

measures. These are “modifications of the proposed design and 

implementation of a project . . . to reduce the project’s adverse environmental 

effects.” (Butte County, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 627; Guidelines, § 15126.4, 
10

subd. (a)(1)(A).) With respect to a public project, such as the Plan, mitigation 

measures, once identified, must be made “fully enforceable” through 

“incorporat[ion] into the plan, policy, regulation, or project design.” 

(Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(2); Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018)

6 Cal.5th 502, 524–525 (Sierra Club) [agencies are required to implement all

feasible mitigation measures].)

If an agency concludes that a proposed project will result in an 

environmental effect that cannot be reduced below the level of significance 

through the application of feasible mitigation measures, the project may not 

be approved unless the agency makes an express finding that “specific 

overriding economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits of the 

project outweigh the significant effects on the environment.” (§ 21081, 

subd. (b); Butte County, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 627–628.) But even when a 

project’s benefits are found to outweigh its significant environmental effects, 

“agencies are still required to implement all mitigation measures unless 

those measures are truly infeasible.” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 

pp. 524–525.) 

B. Standard of Review

“In general, judicial review of agency actions for CEQA compliance

extends to ‘whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.’ ” (Protecting

Our Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10

Cal.5th 479, 495 (County of Stanislaus).) “ ‘[A]n agency may abuse its

discretion under CEQA either by failing to proceed in the manner

CEQA provides or by reaching factual conclusions unsupported by

substantial evidence. [Citation.] Judicial review of these two types of error

differs significantly: While we determine de novo whether the agency has

employed the correct procedure, “scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively
11

mandated CEQA requirements” [citation], we accord greater deference to the

agency’s substantive factual conclusions,’ ” asking only whether they are

supported by substantial evidence. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 512.) 

For example, in determining whether an EIR appropriately considers

alternatives, we independently review whether the EIR’s alternatives

analysis complies with CEQA’s procedural mandates, and then decide

whether substantial evidence supports the decisions made. (Save Our

Capitol! v. Department of General Services (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 655, 703

(Save Our Capitol!).)

A violation of CEQA’s procedural requirements “is deemed prejudicial if 

it deprived the public and decision makers of substantial relevant 

information about the project’s likely adverse impacts.” (Neighbors for Smart

Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439,

463 (Smart Rail).) An agency’s failure to disclose required information “may

be prejudicial ‘regardless of whether a different outcome would have resulted

if the public agency had complied’ with the law,” but “[i]nsubstantial or

merely technical omissions are not grounds for relief.” (Ibid.; see Rominger v.

City of Colusa (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 690, 709, disapproved on other

grounds, San Diego, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1194 & fn. 10 [“we cannot conclude 

that [petitioners] are entitled to relief simply because the county failed to 

comply with CEQA. . . . Instead, we must look at the nature of the county’s 

noncompliance to determine if it was of the sort that ‘ “preclude[d] informed 

decisionmaking and informed public participation” ’ ”].)

We “ ‘review[] the agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision.’ ” 

(County of Stanislaus, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 495.)
12

II. An Offsite Alternative for New Hospital

Petitioners YB contend that the EIR fails to consider a reasonable 

range of alternatives to the project because it does not include an alternative 

locating the New Hospital somewhere other than the Parnassus campus.

Petitioners suggest a new hospital could be built instead at UCSF’s Mission 

Bay or Mount Zion campuses, or on a university-owned parcel in the Hunter’s 

Point neighborhood. But it is not our role—or petitioners’—to decide where 

UCSF should build its next hospital. UCSF has devised the Plan, and 

because we conclude the EIR considers a reasonable range of alternatives to 

the Plan, we will reject this challenge to it.

A. Alternatives in the EIR

In advocating for an alternative that places the New Hospital

somewhere other than Parnassus Heights, petitioners YB neglect to address

the alternatives the Regents actually analyzed. The EIR considers several in 

detail: two “No Project” alternatives—one consisting of no new development 

on campus and one with development according to the 2014 LRDP; a 

“Reduced Project” alternative; and two alternatives that hew closer to the 

Plan’s proposal. In order to assess whether this range of alternatives is 

reasonable, we begin by looking more closely at each of the analyzed 

alternatives. (See Goleta Valley, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 566 [“[e]ach case must

be evaluated on its facts, which in turn must be reviewed in light of the

statutory purpose”].)

The “No Project—No Development” alternative assumes no further 

development on campus. Although this alternative would preserve 

historically significant structures and avoid the environmental harms 

associated with development, it would also result in the loss of almost half of 

the campus’s hospital beds, with the legally necessary decommissioning of 
13

Moffitt Hospital for inpatient use. The EIR concludes that this nodevelopment alternative “would not achieve . . . any of [the] proposed [Plan’s] 

objectives,” and is accordingly “both unrealistic and infeasible.” 

The “No Project—Development under 2014 LRDP” alternative 

anticipates build-out of the remaining development planned in the 2014 

LRDP. Instead of the Plan’s 2.04 million gsf of additional space, this 

alternative adds only .47 million gsf, so it has correspondingly smaller 

impacts on environmental and historical resources. This alternative would 

preserve the campus’s hospital capacity at close to current levels through the 

expansion of Long Hospital, but the EIR concludes it would not satisfy the 

demand for “more beds to meet the demand for inpatient care for a growing 

and aging Bay Area population,” and it would fail to meet certain other plan 

objectives. 

The Reduced Project alternative allows three quarters as much 

development as the Plan (i.e., 1.53 million gsf of additional space). This 

alternative includes a smaller, although still large, New Hospital building, 

and seismic upgrades to Moffitt Hospital to allow its continued use as a 

hospital after 2030. The total number of hospital beds under the Reduced 

Project alternative is the same as under the Plan, once the Moffitt retrofit is 

complete. The Reduced Project alternative preserves all of the 

architecturally significant buildings that would be demolished under the 

Plan, but it omits the Plan’s Research and Academic Building and four 

housing structures, as these would otherwise occupy the footprints of the 

preserved structures. With 25 percent less development than the Plan, this 

alternative would also diminish, if not eliminate, other significant impacts,

such as wind hazards generated by large new buildings and a deterioration in

air quality due to hazardous emissions and increased traffic. The EIR 
14

concludes the Reduced Project alternative would not “fully” meet the Plan’s 

objectives for several reasons: Moffitt Hospital would “continue to be 

outdated, undersized, and inflexible;” the Research and Academic Building

would not be built; and there would be less new housing. But the EIR 

identifies the Reduced Project alternative as the environmentally superior 

alternative, other than the no-project alternatives. 

The two other alternatives analyzed in the EIR are both smaller 

deviations from the Plan. One features a taller, 19-story New Hospital with a 

smaller footprint. The other is a phased option that divides the New Hospital 

into two smaller buildings, one of which would be built only after Moffitt 

Hospital is torn down. Both of these alternatives have environmental 

impacts almost the same as those of the Plan, except that the alternatives 

“could result in incrementally lower wind speeds near the northeast corner of 

the New Hospital,” and would have slightly less impact on historical 

resources. 

The EIR also contains summary descriptions of three alternatives that 

were considered for full analysis but rejected as failing to satisfy Plan 

objectives. The first of the dismissed alternatives involves building no New 

Hospital but upgrading the existing hospitals at the Parnassus campus and 

“continu[ing] to advance” plans under the 2014 LRDP for a new hospital at 

the Mission Bay campus. The EIR rejects this alternative because it would 

result in 284 fewer hospital beds at the Parnassus campus, “and hence at 

UCSF campus-wide,” as compared to the Plan. 

The second dismissed alternative involves siting the New Hospital 

where the Plan proposes to build the Research and Academic Building. The 

EIR rejects this alternative for several reasons, including operational 
15

problems associated with locating the New Hospital across campus from the 

existing hospitals. 

The third dismissed alternative involves building a New Hospital on 

UCSF’s Mount Zion campus, “as previously studied in the 2002 UCSF Mount 

Zion Master Planning Study.” The EIR rejects this alternative because it 

would be “inefficient” for UCSF to operate hospitals at three different 

campuses (Parnassus Heights, Mission Bay, and Mount Zion), and because 

building the hospital somewhere other than the Parnassus campus “would 

not help to achieve the benefits that can be realized through interdisciplinary 

collaboration and convergence between clinical care, research and education.”

Like the other screened-out alternatives, this one fails to satisfy most of the 

Plan’s objectives, according to the EIR. 

The final EIR reports that most comments on the draft EIR’s slate of 

alternatives focused on options that would locate the New Hospital 

somewhere other than the Parnassus campus. The final EIR defends the 

range of alternatives explored and explains that, in addition to failing to meet 

the need to increase hospital capacity at the Parnassus campus and locate

hospital facilities near the university’s professional schools, building the New 

Hospital elsewhere would shift the environmental consequences of a new

hospital to a different site in the city, rather than eliminating them. 

B. Analysis

When reviewing a challenge to an EIR’s consideration of alternatives, 

courts apply a rule of reason: “ ‘the EIR [must] set forth only those 

alternatives necessary to permit a reasoned choice.’ ” (Bay-Delta, supra, 43 

Cal.4th at p. 1163, quoting Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (f).) Necessarily, an

EIR is not required to consider “every conceivable alternative to a project.” 

(Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a); Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito County
16

(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 503, 521.) Rather, petitioners YB must show that the 

alternatives the EIR considers “ ‘are manifestly unreasonable and that they 

do not contribute to a reasonable range of alternatives.’ ” (Save Our Capitol!,

supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 703.)

We begin by noting that the EIR evaluates alternatives that provide a 

range of different amounts of new development: none in the no-development 

alternative, a little in the 2014 LRDP alternative, a medium amount in the 

Reduced Project alternative, and a large amount in the remaining 

alternatives. But a reasonable range of alternatives requires more than just 

quantitative variety. “ ‘[T]he key to the selection of the range of alternatives 

is to identify alternatives that meet most of the project’s objectives but have a 

reduced level of environmental impacts.’ ” (Save Our Capitol!, supra, 87

Cal.App.5th at p. 704.) We, accordingly, review the project’s objectives and

its environmental impacts.

The project has multiple objectives, but most are variants of a central

theme: the need to “[r]evitalize the aging Parnassus Heights campus to

enhance its place as a premier educational, research, and clinical institution.” 

The EIR’s list of objectives goes on for three pages and includes some carried

over from the 2014 LRDP, such as these: that the Parnassus campus remain

the central location for classroom instruction and that it provide space “to

foster collaboration and to facilitate the interdependence and connectivity . . .

of instruction, clinical, research and support uses in close physical proximity

to each other.” The list of objectives also includes some specific to aspects of

the new Plan. Among these are to “[s]ite and develop a new inpatient facility

in a way that optimizes operational activities with other clinical facilities at

Parnassus Heights,” and to “[i]ncrease inpatient beds at Parnassus Heights

to address severe constraints on capacity and access to care.”
17

The Plan’s environmental impacts are primarily of two kinds: those

associated with building a particularly large building, and those associated

with increasing the overall level of development on campus. In the first

category are “wind hazards in publicly accessible areas of substantial

pedestrian use.” The EIR determines that the Plan will have significant and

unavoidable impacts of this kind because the New Hospital will be taller than

the buildings around it. In the second category are impacts like construction

noise, which will accompany each new building project; harm to historical

resources, which will occur when older buildings of significance are torn down

to make room for new ones; and harms to air quality, which will accompany

more intensive use of the campus. These are significant and unavoidable

environmental effects of the Plan, and CEQA requires the EIR to consider

alternatives that would substantially lessen or avoid them, if that can be

done while “attain[ing] most of the basic objectives of the project.” 

(Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a).)

The alternatives evaluated in the EIR address these environmental

harms. Most dramatically with regard to historical resources, all of the

architecturally significant buildings are preserved under the Reduced Project

alternative. With regard to wind hazards, there are options for reducing

these by reducing the size of the New Hospital building (e.g., the Reduced

Project alternative) and by changing its configuration (e.g., the smaller

footprint and phased alternatives). Air quality and construction noise effects

were also reduced in the Reduced Project alternative. And, of course, all of

the environmental effects were improved in the low-growth 2014 LRDP

alternative.

We are persuaded that, taken together, this represents a reasonable

range of alternatives. The 2014 LRDP alternative and the Reduced Project
18

alternative, in their differing ways, would substantially reduce the significant

and unmitigable environmental impacts of the project. But, as the EIR

understandably concludes, these lower-growth alternatives fail to meet the

objectives of the Plan, which is intended to upgrade aging facilities and

expand the space available to house students and faculty and treat a growing

population of patients requiring inpatient care. Meeting the Plan’s

objectives, in other words, necessarily requires considerable new development

on campus. Rounding out this slate of alternatives, the two options with

different designs for the New Hospital (the smaller footprint and phased

alternatives) demonstrate the possibility of minor improvements in

environmental effects, although each has its own drawbacks. We conclude

that the considerable variation among these alternatives and their differing

approaches to addressing environmental harms are sufficient to foster 

informed decisionmaking and public participation, as required by CEQA. 

(Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a).) The EIR’s alternatives analysis thus

complies with CEQA’s procedural mandate.

Petitioners YB fault the EIR for failing to analyze an offsite alternative

for New Hospital, but the Regents were under no legal duty to consider that

type of alternative. CEQA Guidelines section 15126.6, subdivision (a), which 

prescribes the scope of an alternatives analysis, states that an agency must 

“describe a range of reasonable alternatives to the project, or to the location 

of the project.” (Italics added.) The guideline anticipates that a different 

location can constitute one of a range of reasonable alternatives, but it does 

not require such an alternative. (Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of 

Oceanside (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 477, 491 [“an agency may evaluate on-site 

alternatives, off-site alternatives, or both”].) Further, petitioners do not 

propose an alternative location for the project, but only for one component of 
19

the project. The project is a plan for the development of the Parnassus 

campus. Development elsewhere is, in a sense, beyond the scope of the 

project. Although the Regents could have considered an alternative that 

placed some of the Plan’s anticipated development off campus, if such an 

alternative could meet most of the Plan’s basic objectives, nothing compelled 

them to consider such an alternative.

In fact, the EIR did briefly address the option of placing the New 

Hospital at Mount Zion, before rejecting that alternative as inconsistent with 

the Plan’s objectives. We conclude that substantial evidence supports that 

decision, given the importance the Plan’s objectives place on collaboration 

among those involved in clinical care, research, and education. UCSF placed 

great emphasis on maintaining these activities together at the Parnassus 

campus, apparently concerned that relocating inpatient care to a cross-town 

facility would complicate the critical use of the hospital’s patients for 

teaching, as well as separate clinicians at the hospital from ready contact 

with the researchers supporting their work. In this way, relocating the New 

Hospital would frustrate the overall objective of allowing the campus to 

“remain a leading health science institution both nationally and 

internationally.” (See Jones v. Regents of University of California (2010) 183 

Cal.App.4th 818, 829 [“substantial evidence supports the determination that 

the offsite alternative would not achieve the Lab’s objectives of creating a 

more campus-like setting with the goal of enhancing collaboration, 

productivity, and efficiency”].) “[A]n EIR need not study in detail an

alternative that . . . the lead agency has reasonably determined cannot

achieve the project’s underlying fundamental purpose.” (Bay-Delta, supra, 43

Cal.4th at p. 1165.)
20

Petitioners YB protest that this EIR has no “fundamental purpose” of

the sort discussed in Bay-Delta. Certainly, the EIR does not label any of its

many objectives as the “fundamental purpose” of the Plan, but any

reasonable reader reviewing the Plan’s multiple objectives will recognize that

co-locating clinical, teaching, and research personnel at the Parnassus

campus is fundamental to the Plan’s purpose. As our Supreme Court has

explained, “if the purpose of the project is to build an oceanfront resort hotel

[citation] or a waterfront aquarium [citation], a lead agency need not consider

inland locations.” (Bay-Delta, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1166.) So, here, where

the purpose is to revitalize the Parnassus campus, including by expanding its

capacity to treat patients in state-of-the-art hospital facilities, the Regents

need not have considered off-campus alternatives.

We find guidance in California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa 

Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957 (Native Plant Society). In that case, the

court considered an EIR prepared for a master plan for a large open-space

property owned by a city. (Id. at pp. 967–968.) The key objectives of the Plan

were the preservation of certain wild habitats, particularly those supporting

the Santa Cruz tarplant, and the creation of a system of pedestrian-only and

multi-use trails, the latter designed for use by pedestrians, bicycles, 

wheelchairs, and leashed dogs. (Id. at p. 970.) In addition to a no-project

alternative, the EIR considered three alternatives that differed only in their

proposed trail systems; each reduced access by, for example, omitting paved

trails. (Id. at pp. 972–973.) The EIR did not consider any offsite alternatives

for the multi-use paths. (Id. at p. 988.) 

The petitioners contended that the EIR should have considered an

alternative locating a particular bicycle path offsite because this would

“ ‘completely avoid significant and unavoidable impacts to the Santa Cruz 
21

tarplant.’ ” (Native Plant Society, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) The

final EIR responded by citing the nature of the project as a master plan for

the property, not for other locations in the city, and environmental

evaluations undertaken prior to the EIR that had considered offsite trail

alternatives. (Ibid.) The court found the final EIR had “adequately informed 

the public and the decisionmaking body about the existence of offsite 

alternatives for the [bicycle path] and the reasons for excluding them from 

the analysis.” (Ibid.) The court further rejected the petitioners’ challenge on

three grounds. First, CEQA does not require consideration of an offsite

alternative in every case. (Id. at p. 993.) Second, the requirement that an

EIR describe alternatives to the proposed project “is ‘applicable only to the 

project as a whole, not to the various facets thereof.’ ” (Ibid.) CEQA does not 

compel consideration of alternatives to a component of a project, the court

held. (Ibid.) Third, the court found substantial evidence in the

administrative record to support the decision to exclude offsite trail

alternatives in the “extensive prior consideration” given to such trails. (Id. at

p. 994.) 

We conclude that the omission of an alternative placing the New

Hospital at a location off campus does not violate CEQA for essentially the

same reasons. Nothing in CEQA required the Regents to discuss an offsite

alternative, let alone an offsite location for one component of the Plan. The

Regents satisfied their informational obligations by disclosing a previously

studied option to build a new hospital at Mount Zion and explaining why they

rejected this option as infeasible. Finally, as we have explained, substantial

evidence in the record supports the Regents’ conclusion that such an

alternative would not adequately meet the project’s objectives. Petitioners

YB have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating “that the alternatives 
22

‘are manifestly unreasonable and that they do not contribute to a reasonable 

range of alternatives.’ ” (Save Our Capitol!, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 703.)

III. Public Transit

Petitioners YB contend that the EIR improperly fails to analyze the

Plan’s impact on public transit in San Francisco. We agree that substantial

evidence supports an argument that the Plan might have a significant impact

on public transit, requiring its discussion in the EIR. The EIR incorrectly

asserts that project-induced changes to transit operations, including effects 

on transit ridership, capacity, and delays, are “outside the scope of the CEQA 

analysis,” and it discusses the project’s effects on transit operations only

briefly, in an appendix and “for informational purposes only.” In light of the

requirement that an EIR discuss any potentially significant environmental

effects, this was error. We conclude, however, that the error was not

prejudicial because the EIR and the appendix, taken together, contain

sufficient information about transit impacts to serve the EIR’s function as an

informational document, especially in light of CEQA guidance regarding the

transportation impacts of infill development near major transit stops.

A. Background

Although the EIR declines to analyze the Plan’s impact on public

transit operations, it fulsomely describes existing public transit serving the

campus, as part of a chapter looking broadly at the Plan’s transportation

impacts. The same chapter also describes UCSF’s Transportation Demand

Management program, which includes incentives for people to use public

transit, and a UCSF-operated shuttle system connecting the Parnassus

campus to regional public transit and other UCSF sites. Most importantly,

the EIR’s transportation chapter analyzes the projected effects of the Plan on

travel demand—the number of trips to or from the campus expected daily
23

and during the evening rush hour—and travel mode—whether travel is by

public transit, solo driver, UCSF shuttle, passenger drop off, etc. The chapter

concludes that the number of persons using the campus and the number of

trips they take will increase by 50 to 55 percent under the Plan, and that the

proportion of these trips occurring on public transportation will remain

approximately the same as it is today. The EIR also looks at where people

are traveling to or from, and at how the Plan will affect demand for parking

and loading spaces. It reports, for example, that when the Plan is fully

implemented “45 passenger loading instances would occur simultaneously

during the peak minute of the peak hour,” a 240 percent increase over

current conditions. And all of the numbers characterizing travel demand are

broken out separately for regular commuters (faculty, staff, and students),

patients and other visitors, and on-campus residents.

When it comes to assessing the impacts of the Plan on transportation,

the EIR chooses significance criteria that address public transit only at a

bureaucratic or programmatic level. Specifically, the first criterion is

whether implementation of the Plan would conflict with a public law or policy

addressing transportation. To assess this, the EIR measures the Plan

against the 2014 LRDP, the University of California’s Sustainable Practices

Policy, and various policies the City and County of San Francisco (the City)

has adopted under the rubrics of its Transit First Policy, Better Streets Plan,

and Bicycle Strategy. The EIR concludes the Plan would not conflict with

any of these plans and policies. 

The second transportation-related significance criterion is whether

implementation of the Plan would be consistent with CEQA Guidelines

section 15064.3, subdivision (b), which establishes criteria for analyzing

transportation impacts. But this guideline is primarily directed at vehicle
24

miles traveled (VMT), a measure of traffic volume not directly related to

public transit. Guidelines section 15064.3 provides that VMT “exceeding an

applicable threshold of significance may indicate a significant impact.”

(Guidelines, §15064.3, subd. (b)(1).) In assessing the project’s effect on VMT,

the EIR assumes that the number of parking stalls available on campus will

decrease by 17 percent under the Plan and that many people who currently

drive alone will instead be dropped off, including by taxis and rideshare

services. As a result, the EIR forecasts a near doubling of daily vehicle trips

to and from the Parnassus campus by the end of the Plan period. But the

EIR again finds the impact on transportation to be less than significant, since

the daily VMT will remain well below regional averages.

An appendix to the EIR analyzes the localized effects of increased

traffic congestion around campus. The analysis includes detailed

quantitative modeling of traffic forecast for different times of day and

resulting in different amounts of expected delay at each of 17 intersections

around campus. The appendix also discusses how this traffic slow-down will

likely affect public transit. It anticipates that drivers queuing or circling for

parking “may periodically” delay public transit along Parnassus Avenue and

Irving Street and may block transit stops. This is particularly likely during

“peak passenger travel periods,” when demand for passenger loading space

may be greater than supply in certain locations. Neither the EIR nor the

appendix evaluates quantitatively the impact of increased traffic on the

transit system, and the EIR identifies no significance criterion against which

any such delays should be assessed.

In a general response to comments questioning the EIR’s failure fully to

analyze impacts on public transit, the final EIR explains that (1) Appendix G

to the CEQA Guidelines does not include a question related to public transit
25

and (2) under CEQA Guidelines section 15064.3, a project’s effect on

automobile traffic delays does not constitute an environmental impact. The

final EIR also notes that the City monitors transit ridership and would be

expected to modify its service to the extent necessary to accommodate

demand over the 30-year time horizon of the Plan. The Regents’ defense on

appeal relies on similar arguments.

B. Analysis of Failure to Address Public Transit Impacts

“Under CEQA, an agency must determine what, if any, effect on the 

environment a proposed project may have.” (CREED-21 v. City of San Diego

(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 488, 504.) To that end, the EIR “must identify and 

discuss ‘all significant effects on the environment’ of a proposed project.” 

(Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v. County of Orange (2005) 131 

Cal.App.4th 777, 792; Guidelines, § 15126, subd. (a).) The term 

“ ‘[s]ignificant effect on the environment’ ” is defined as “a substantial, or 

potentially substantial, adverse change in the environment.” (§ 21068; 

Guidelines, § 15382.) Because a particular environmental effect can only be 

identified as significant after careful consideration, an EIR is required to 

discuss and analyze a possible impact of the project if there is a fair 

argument that it constitutes a significant effect on the environment. (Visalia 

Retail, LP v. City of Visalia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 (Visalia Retail); see 

Butte County, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 627 [EIR must discuss “the possible 

environmental effects of the project”].) 

“An agency must find a ‘fair argument’ if there is any substantial 

evidence to support that conclusion, even if there is competing substantial 

evidence in the record that the project will not have a significant 

environmental effect.” (World Business Academy v. State Lands Com. (2018) 

24 Cal.App.5th 476, 499 (World Business Academy).) And we review the 
26

agency decision “ ‘de novo, with a preference for resolving doubts in favor of

environmental review.’ ” (Taxpayers for Accountable School Bond Spending v. 

San Diego Unified School Dist. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1035.)

Here, substantial evidence supports the proposition that the Plan could 

cause “a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change” (Guidelines, 

§ 15382) in public transit service near the campus. The number of persons

visiting the campus is projected to increase by over 50 percent, and for

regular commuters, almost a third of these trips will continue to occur by

public transit. Taken at face value, this suggests the potential for a

significant increase in the use of public transit serving the campus. Although

this does not necessarily imply that the Plan will cause public transit delays,

it raises that possibility. Indeed, the Regents were informed by the UCSF

president, in a memorandum prepared in connection with certification of the

EIR, that “[t]he plan would increase traffic and demand for . . . public transit 

service.” 

The Regents offer no adequate reason for failing fully to analyze the 

Plan’s impact on public transit. The final EIR’s initial reason for declining to 

address the impact on public transit, that Appendix G of the CEQA 

Guidelines does not include a question related to public transit, cannot justify

the failure. Appendix G is an “ ‘Environmental Checklist Form’ that may be 

used in determining whether a project could have a significant effect on the 

environment and whether it is necessary to prepare a negative declaration or 

an EIR.” (Oakland Heritage Alliance v. City of Oakland (2011) 195 

Cal.App.4th 884, 896, fn. 5; see Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (f).) The appendix 

is not, and does not purport to be, a comprehensive listing of possible 

significant impacts. To the contrary, Appendix G expressly informs users 

that it is “a sample form that may be tailored to . . . project circumstances,” 
27

and that “potential impacts that are not listed on this form must also be 

considered.” (Guidelines, Appendix G: Environmental Checklist Form, at 

p. 1.) Given this limited role, the failure of Appendix G to mention a 

particular impact does not justify the failure to discuss it. (Save Our Access

etc. v. Watershed Conservation Authority (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 8, 27

[although Appendix G contains no reference to impact on parking, the

discussion of “parking as an environmental factor is dependent ‘on the project 

and its setting’ ”].)

The second reason provided by the final EIR, that under CEQA

Guidelines section 15064.3, subdivision (a), a project’s impact on vehicle

traffic delays does not constitute a significant impact, is equally unavailing. 

Although traffic and transit delays are often connected—that is, traffic delays

may lead to transit delays—a project can adversely affect public transit in

ways other than by causing a delay, for example, by increasing the demand

for transit infrastructure. Confirming the independence of these topics, the

Guideline subdivision on which the Regents rely directs that “the effects of 

the project on transit” should be discussed when relevant. (Guidelines,

§ 15064.3, subd. (a).) And a “Technical Advisory on Evaluating 

Transportation Impacts in CEQA” published by the Governor’s Office of 

Planning and Research (OPR) is unequivocal: “lead agencies should consider 

project impacts to transit systems.” (OPR, Technical Advisory on Evaluating 

Transportation Impacts in CEQA (Dec. 2018) p. 19 (Technical Advisory) 

<http://www. opr.ca.gov/docs/20190122-743_Technical_Advisory.pdf> [as of 

Sept. 20, 2023]; see also § 21099, subd. (b)(1) [tasking OPR with proposing 

relevant guidelines].) If there were any remaining question, the state statute

from which the Guideline’s exemption of traffic delays is derived, Public 

Resources Code section 21099, instructs that “[t]his subdivision does not 
28

relieve a public agency of the requirement to analyze . . . any other impact 

associated with transportation.” (§ 21099, subd. (b)(3).)

The final EIR also suggests, without expressly stating, that the Plan’s

effect on public transit need not have been discussed because “UCSF does not

control the provision of public transit service” in San Francisco, which

operates under the authority of the San Francisco Municipal Transportation

Agency (Muni). We are unaware of any authority suggesting that an EIR is

excused from discussing an environmental impact merely because another

agency will share responsibility for addressing that impact. An important

function of the EIR is to provide information about the anticipated

environmental effects of a project, not only to decisionmakers and the public

but also to other interested governmental entities. (See California Building

Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th

369, 383 (Building Industry) [CEQA statute “focus[es] on informed 

decisionmaking and self-government”].) Reflecting its understandable 

interest in this issue, the City submitted a comment on the draft EIR 

questioning its failure to discuss “the plan’s impact on Muni service and 

transit delay.” As a tacit acknowledgment that implementing the Plan will 

indeed affect public transit, the Regents then negotiated with the City a 

Memorandum of Understanding committing the university to pay $20 million 

toward transit improvements “to address . . . transit impacts near the 

campus.” With this and other “generous community benefits” secured, the 

City endorsed adoption of the Plan. Appropriately, the Regents worked with 

the City to address the transit impacts of the Plan, even though they failed 

adequately to discuss them in the EIR. (See Technical Advisory, supra, at 

p. 19 [“Lead agencies should consult with transit agencies as early as 

possible”].)
29

Finally, the Regents argue before this court that they were entitled to

presume that the Plan’s effect on public transit was not significant on the

authority of Guidelines section 15064.3, subdivision (b), which states in

connection with land use projects: “Generally, projects within one-half mile

of either an existing major transit stop or a stop along an existing high

quality transit corridor should be presumed to cause a less than significant

transportation impact.” Although reliance on the guideline might permit the

Regents to conclude that the project’s impact on public transit is not

significant, nothing suggests that this presumption was intended to excuse

CEQA’s requirement to discuss potentially significant environmental effects. 

The guideline sets forth a standard for significance, but it does not govern the

initial choice of environmental effects to be discussed. There is independent

value in the discussion, regardless of the ultimate determination of

significance. (See Protect Historic Amador Waterways v. Amador Water

Agency (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1108–1109 (Amador Waterways)

[“notwithstanding compliance with a pertinent threshold of significance, the

agency must still consider any fair argument that a certain environmental

effect may be significant”].) Further, and in any event, Guidelines section

15064.3, subdivision (b), does not create a conclusive presumption of 

significance. As the Guideline states, it is “[g]enerally,” not invariably, 

applicable. 

In sum, we reject the Regent’s assertion that project-generated effects

on transit ridership, capacity, and delay are “outside the scope of the CEQA

analysis.” The EIR should have discussed these transit impacts and

addressed whether they were significant. (Amador Waterways, supra, 116

Cal.App.4th at p. 1109.) If the Regents found transit impacts not to be

significant, the EIR should have briefly stated the reasons for so finding.
30

(Ibid.; § 21100, subd. (c).) If transit impacts were found to be significant, the

EIR should have discussed mitigation measures to minimize the impacts. 

(§ 21100, subd. (b)(3).) That no such discussion is found in the EIR, at least

not in any organized, transit-focused section of the document, means the

Regents fell short of their legal obligation to “proceed in the manner CEQA

provides,” an abuse of their discretion. (See Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at

p. 512.)

We conclude, however, that the error was not prejudicial because the

EIR, taken as a whole, includes sufficient information to inform “the public

and decision makers of substantial relevant information about the project’s 

likely adverse impacts” on public transit. (Smart Rail, supra, 57 Cal.4th at

p. 463.) The body of the EIR describes baseline conditions in a manner that

includes transit; it describes project-induced changes to the number and type

of trips expected to and from the campus, and changes to the availability of

parking and loading spaces; and it discusses how the Plan is consistent with

various transit policies. The transportation appendix to the EIR quantifies

expected traffic congestion and discusses qualitatively the possibility that

this congestion will lead to transit delays during periods of peak travel. And

the final EIR explains that new transit riders will be distributed among four

transit routes in the immediate vicinity of the campus, with no “requirement

of additional or expanded transit infrastructure . . . identified based on these

new riders.”

Focusing on transit delays, petitioners YB fault the EIR for failing to

set forth a significance standard, assess impacts with reference to that

standard, and propose feasible mitigation measures in the event projectinduced transit delays are found to be significant. Although we acknowledge

the centrality of a determination of significance in an EIR’s discussion of
31

environmental impacts, we find the EIR’s failure to engage in such an

analysis to be harmless here, for reasons peculiar to the assessment of transit

impacts in “transit priority areas.” (§ 21099, subd. (b)(1).) These are areas

“within one-half mile of a major transit stop” (§ 21099, subd. (a)(7)), which

includes the Parnassus campus.

To encourage “transit-oriented infill development consistent with the

goal of reducing greenhouse gases,” the Legislature enacted section 21099. 

(Covina Residents for Responsible Development v. City of Covina (2018) 21

Cal.App.5th 712, 725 (Covina Residents).) This legislation calls on OPR to

propose revisions to CEQA guidelines that “establish[] criteria for

determining the significance of transportation impacts of projects within

transit priority areas.” (§ 21099, subd. (b)(1).) Pursuant to this mandate,

OPR issued extensive guidance on evaluating transportation impacts,

making three main points: (1) lead agencies should consider whether a

project blocks access to a transit stop or otherwise interferes with transit

functions, and should promptly consult with transit agencies; (2) “lead

agencies generally should not treat the addition of new transit users as an

adverse impact,” since adding riders to a transit system may slow transit

vehicles but may also enhance transit availability and regional vehicle flow;

and (3) the cumulative effects of increased demand may require new transit

infrastructure, the costs of which may be allocated across a region.5 

(Technical Advisory, supra, at p. 19.)

5 We set forth here the entirety of OPR’s guidance on assessing CEQA 

“Impacts to Transit”:

“Because criteria for determining the significance of transportation 

impacts must promote ‘the development of multimodal transportation 

networks’ pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21099, 

subd. (b)(1), lead agencies should consider project impacts to transit 
32

In light of OPR’s guidance, we conclude that the EIR’s truncated

discussion of transit impacts meets the minimum requirement for an

informational document, even without a detailed analysis of transit delays. 

First, the EIR’s transit appendix is evidence that the Regents did consider

whether the Plan would result in blocking access to transit stops or otherwise

interfering with transit; it reports, based on traffic modeling, that congestion

may periodically block access to transit stops or delay transit vehicles. But

the Legislature has directed that “a project’s effect on automobile delay shall

not constitute a significant environmental impact” (Guidelines, § 15064.3,

subd. (a)), and transit delays resulting from automobile delays may

systems and bicycle and pedestrian networks. For example, a project 

that blocks access to a transit stop or blocks a transit route itself may 

interfere with transit functions. Lead agencies should consult with 

transit agencies as early as possible in the development process, 

particularly for projects that are located within one half mile of transit 

stops. 

“When evaluating impacts to multimodal transportation networks, lead 

agencies generally should not treat the addition of new transit users as 

an adverse impact. An infill development may add riders to transit 

systems and the additional boarding and alighting may slow transit 

vehicles, but it also adds destinations, improving proximity and 

accessibility. Such development also improves regional vehicle flow by 

adding less vehicle travel onto the regional network.

“Increased demand throughout a region may, however, cause a 

cumulative impact by requiring new or additional transit 

infrastructure. Such impacts may be adequately addressed through a 

fee program that fairly allocates the cost of improvements not just to 

projects that happen to locate near transit, but rather across a region to 

all projects that impose burdens on the entire transportation system, 

since transit can broadly improve the function of the transportation 

system.” 

(Technical Advisory, supra, at p. 19.)
33

reasonably be seen as falling within the ambit of this rule. Second, OPR

directs that new transit users generally should not be considered an adverse

impact. Similarly, Guideline section 15064.3, subdivision (b) instructs that

projects near transit stops generally “should be presumed to cause a less than

significant transportation impact.” These authoritative interpretations of

CEQA excuse the Regents’ decision not to quantify transit delays, as such

delays would be, almost by definition, less than significant. And third, the

final EIR discloses, in the form of a comment letter from the City, that if the

university were a private developer with a project of this scope, it would be

assessed a Transit Sustainability Fee of about $30 million as its contribution

toward the cost of increased transit infrastructure and service. This is a

measure of the cumulative effects of increased transit demand, and the fact

that the City was able to calculate the amount based on information provided

in the draft EIR demonstrates that the EIR adequately served its role as an

informational document.

The EIR’s discussion of transit impacts is spartan, a result of the

Regents’ mistaken conclusion that transit operations were beyond the scope

of a proper CEQA analysis. But in light of the approach to analyzing transit

impacts in a transit priority area that the Legislature, the Guidelines, and

OPR’s Technical Advisory prescribe, we conclude that the EIR’s discussion is

adequate, and the Regents’ error was not prejudicial. (Smart Rail, supra, 57

Cal.4th at pp. 464–465 [agency’s failure to analyze effects on traffic

congestion and air quality “did not deprive agency decision makers or the

public of substantial information relevant to approving the project, and is

therefore not a ground for setting that decision aside”].)
34

C. Analysis of Effect of Transit Delay on VMT

Petitioners YB also argue that the EIR’s discussion of the Plan’s impact

on VMT is inadequate because it “fails to analyze transit delay’s indirect

impact on VMT.” This argument relies on the speculative assumption that

implementation of the Plan will lead to the transit system being

overwhelmed and transit users will resort to private automobiles instead.

We find substantial evidence in the record supporting the EIR’s contrary

conclusion, that the percentage of trips that regular users of the campus will

take on public transit will remain largely unchanged under the Plan. 

Specifically, the transit delay forecast in the EIR’s appendix results from

traffic delays on major thoroughfares near campus, which means commuters

frustrated at the pace of public transit will have little incentive to abandon

transit for also slow-moving private vehicles. And, as the OPR Technical

Advisory points out, adding riders to transit systems can actually result in

improving public transit service. (Technical Advisory, supra, at p. 19.) 

Finally, we note that even if the EIR is wrong about transit retaining its

share of trips, that would not make the Plan’s effects on VMT significant. If a

displacement effect were to cause some additional increase in VMT at the

expense of transit, VMT impacts would remain less than significant under

the Plan because VMT as forecast in the EIR falls far short of the threshold of

significance; there is plenty of margin for error.

IV. Noise

Petitioners YB fault the EIR’s analysis and mitigation of the noise that

will be created by construction activities on campus. Specifically, petitioners

contend (1) the EIR’s discussion of noise impacts fails to correlate

construction noise with impacts on human health, and (2) details of a noise
35

mitigation measure are improperly deferred. We find no CEQA violation in

the EIR’s treatment of noise impacts.

A. Discussion of Noise Impacts on Health

Petitioners YB’s criticism that the EIR fails to correlate noise impacts

to human health relies on Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 520. Sierra

Club considered a program EIR for a planned development community, and

the question was whether the EIR’s discussion of air quality effects was

adequate. (Id. at p. 507.) The EIR discussed the health impacts of various

air pollutants. For ozone, it identified concentrations, expressed in parts per

million, at which listed symptoms were triggered by pollutants. (Id. at p.

519.) But the EIR did not describe the quantity of ozone generated by the

project in parts per million; it instead disclosed the tons per year emitted of

two precursor pollutants that together, when reacting with sunlight, form

ozone. (Id. at p. 520.) As a result, the information provided by the EIR did

not permit a reader to connect the ozone emissions of the project to their

likely health impact. And the EIR was even less informative for other

pollutants whose triggering concentrations were not disclosed at all. As

Sierra Club summarized its holding, “CEQA requires that the EIR have 

made a reasonable effort to discuss relevant specifics regarding the 

connection between two segments of information already contained in the 

EIR, the general health effects associated with a particular pollutant and the 

estimated amount of that pollutant the project will likely produce . . . . 

Because the EIR as written makes it impossible for the public to translate 

the bare numbers provided into adverse health impacts . . . the EIR’s 

discussion of air quality impacts in this case was inadequate.” (Id. at p. 521.) 

In Sierra Club, the EIR failed the ultimate test of providing “enough detail ‘to 

enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to 
36

consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed project.’ ” (Id. at

p. 516.)

We find no similar flaw in this EIR’s discussion of noise impacts. As an

outline for development on campus, the Plan necessarily anticipates a series

of noisy construction projects. The EIR’s discussion of construction noise

begins with an explanation of the measurement and physics of noise,

including a table quantifying the intensity of noise generated by various

sources—from rustling leaves to a jet engine—as measured in decibels 50 feet

from the source. It then describes the health effects of environmental noise,

reports on current levels of ambient noise on campus, and identifies the

location of “sensitive receptors,” such as schools and homes, near the planned

construction. The discussion of health effects describes in general terms the

impact of noise at various decibel levels, including thresholds at which noise

disturbs sleep, “seriously annoy[s]” those who are awake, interferes with

human speech, or damages hearing.

In analyzing the environmental impact of the Plan’s construction noise,

the EIR describes the noise level to be expected from typical types of

construction equipment, measured at distances of both 50 and 100 feet. It

then maps this information into an extensive table listing the daytime noise

levels to be expected at various locations from construction anticipated in the

initial phase of the Plan, with the exception of the New Hospital. Despite the

adoption of various noise control practices as mitigation measures, the EIR

finds that the Plan would generate “a substantial temporary increase in

ambient noise levels in the vicinity of the construction project in excess of

standards established” by the City and, for that reason, concludes that the

impact of noise would be significant and unavoidable, despite the

implementation of proposed mitigation measures.
37

As this summary suggests, the EIR contains a wealth of information

about the daytime noise levels to be expected from the Plan’s projects,

expressed in decibels perceived at a specified distance from the source. 

Because noise levels decrease with distance, this is an appropriate and

meaningful means of presenting such information. The EIR also discusses

various health effects that can occur as a result of different levels of noise,

again expressing several of these in decibels. On the basis of this

information, possible effects of any given source of noise can be determined,

once the relative locations of the source and the receptor are known. While

more could always have been written, this information provides “enough 

detail ‘to enable those who did not participate in [the EIR’s] preparation to 

understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed 

project.’ ” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516; see Sierra Watch v. County

of Placer (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 86, 107–108 [finding similar discussion of

noise impacts adequate].) Because the health impact of noise pollution is

highly dependent on the precise location and nature of the receptor, it would

be unreasonable to require more.

B. Deferral of Mitigation Details

Petitioners YB also contend that a measure adopted to mitigate the

impact of noise from construction activities is unenforceable and constitutes

“impermissibly deferred mitigation.” We disagree.

The EIR’s mitigation measure for construction noise is in three parts. 

Two of these seek to reduce noise by regulating the equipment used and the

location of noise-generating activities. The challenged part, Mitigation 

Measure NOI-1b, limits the hours of construction. Measure NOI-1b allows

work to be performed between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekdays, unless

the project manager gives advance notice to the UCSF Community and
38

Governmental Relations office, in which case work can continue until 8:00

p.m. on weekdays and occur between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekends. 

This schedule is further constrained for noisy work—that generating more

than 80 decibels at 100 feet. But in “rare circumstances” when work “need[s]

to occur outside of these work hour limits,” Mitigation Measure NOI-1b

allows it.

Petitioners YB’s concern is that the “rare circumstances” that will

permit work outside the permitted hours are not specified in the mitigation

measure. However, that the mitigation measure lacks specificity in one

regard does not mean that its details have been deferred. Perfection in the

formulation of mitigation measures is not required. (San Franciscans

Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City & County of San Francisco (2002) 102

Cal.App.4th 656, 696 (Downtown Plan).) The EIR specifies that

circumstances justifying the exception will be “rare,” only when work “need[s]

to occur outside of” specified hours, suggesting a requirement of good cause

intrinsic to the nature of the construction activity. This is sufficient to give

the university, the construction contractors, and the public a basis for

implementing the mitigation measure. 

Petitioners rely on King & Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern

(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814 (King & Gardiner) in contending that the

mitigation measure is inadequate, but the circumstances of that case bear

little resemblance to the university’s noise mitigation measure. The

mitigation measure in King & Gardiner stated, “ ‘Applicant shall increase the 

re-use of produced water and shall reduce its use of municipal and industrial 

quality ground or surface water to the extent feasible,’ ” which the court found 

too vague to satisfy CEQA. (Id. at pp. 855, 858.) Mitigation Measure NOI1b, in contrast, specifies authorized hours of construction. Even the language 
39

allowing an exception in “rare circumstances” establishes a clearer standard 

than the relative terms “increase” and “reduce,” found in the King &

Gardiner mitigation measure.

V. Toxic Air Contaminants

Petitioners YB contend that the EIR understates the significance of the

Plan’s health risks from the emission of toxic air contaminants (TACs),

arguing that the EIR “piecemeals various emission sources and thereby fails

to identify the overall cancer risk . . . resulting from the combined emissions

from all Project emissions.” Stated differently, petitioners YB contend that

the EIR avoids finding that the environmental impact of the Plan’s TAC

emissions is significant by improperly applying the thresholds of significance. 

We are unpersuaded.

The EIR’s chosen thresholds of significance for TAC emissions are

based on the emissions’ likely health impact. TACs are a class of air

pollutants subject to local, rather than federal, regulation by the Bay Area

Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD). The EIR adopts significance

thresholds set by BAAQMD’s guidelines, under which TAC emissions are

deemed significant if (1) an individual project would result in 10 or more

cancer cases per one million persons exposed over a lifetime, or

(2) cumulative TACs impacts would result in 100 cancer cases per million

exposed persons. (See BAAQMD CEQA Air Quality Guidelines (May 2017)

§ 2 & Table 2-1, at p. 2-2 (BAAQMD 2017 CEQA).)

In assessing emissions against these thresholds, the EIR analyzes

three separate sources of TAC emissions: (1) emissions from construction

activities anticipated in the initial phase of the Plan, (2) operational

emissions from buildings other than the New Hospital constructed in the

initial phase of the Plan, and (3) operational emissions from the New
40

Hospital and all emissions from remaining activities of the Plan. The EIR

concludes that TAC emissions from the construction of each of the initialphase projects would be significant, and it proposes measures to reduce these

emissions below the threshold of 10 cancer cases per million. In evaluating

TAC emissions from the operation of initial-phase buildings excluding the

New Hospital, the EIR considers only the Research and Academic Building

because operation of the remaining buildings will not generate significant

TACs. The EIR finds cancer risks from these operations to be minimal and

not significant. TAC emissions from operation of the New Hospital and

construction and operation of the remaining development anticipated by the

Plan are analyzed only as cumulative impacts. Assuming implementation of

the proposed mitigation measures, the EIR finds cumulative impacts to be

less than significant when judged against the BAAQMD’s standard of 100

new cancer cases per million exposed persons.

When the CEQA statute and Guidelines do not establish a threshold for 

significance of an environmental impact, “it is the responsibility of lead 

agencies to choose the thresholds of significance to be applied.” (King &

Gardiner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 884.) The Guidelines “recognize that 

an agency’s adoption of a threshold of significance requires an exercise of 

reasoned judgment” and an agency’s choice “will be upheld if founded on

substantial evidence.” (Mission Bay Alliance v. Office of Community

Investment & Infrastructure (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 160, 206 (Mission Bay).)

Petitioners YB first contend that the EIR’s conclusion that mitigated

TAC emissions from construction of the initial-phase projects will not be

significant was erroneous because the analysis did not include all TAC

emissions. The claim, however, is premised on a misunderstanding of the

EIR’s application of the BAAQMD threshold for significance. In making their
41

argument that mitigated TAC emissions are “very close to the applicable

significance standard of ten,” petitioners sum the TAC emissions from all four

of the initial-phase projects, assuming that the threshold applies to the

projects jointly. The BAAQMD threshold of significance of 10 cases per

million persons, however, is intended to be applied to an “Individual Project.” 

(BAAQMD 2017 CEQA, supra, § 2 & Table 2-1, at p. 2-2.) That phrase is

ambiguous because it could refer either to a CEQA “Project,” that is, the

subject of an EIR, or more generally to an individual construction project. 

The EIR elects to apply the threshold individually to each of the four initialphase construction projects. Applying the threshold in this manner was well

within the Regents’ discretion and is supported by substantial evidence. 

(Mission Bay, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.) These are discrete

construction projects. One of the four is the New Hospital. Two others are

the Research and Academic Building and the new housing. We see no reason

all of these, plus the fourth project, must be considered as a single project,

especially since the largest contribution comes from the New Hospital, which

will be the subject of a separate project-level EIR.

With that understanding, the individual excess cancer risks to an

“Offsite Receptor” from TAC emissions during construction for the four

projects are 0.67, 1.17, 2.91, and 4.72. Each of these is less than half of the

project threshold of 10, and petitioners provide no evidence to suggest that

the purportedly omitted sources of TACs would raise the risk of any of these

projects to 10 or above. Petitioners therefore provide no reason to doubt the

EIR’s conclusion that mitigated TAC emissions from construction of the

initial-phase projects will not cause a significant environmental effect.

Petitioners YB argue that applying the significance threshold to the

buildings individually was improper because “nowhere does UC claim that
42

these various construction activities have independent utility.” “Independent

utility,” like the concept of “piecemealing” also invoked by petitioners, is a

term of art used in connection with an applicant’s decision to engage in

CEQA analysis of a particular project in isolation, rather than as part of a

larger plan of which it is a part. (See Planning & Conservation League v.

Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 237.) In general, two

activities must be analyzed in the same EIR, as part of the same CEQA

project, if they are “linked in a way that logically makes them one project, not 

two.” (Make UC A Good Neighbor v. Regents of the University of California

(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 656, 683 (Good Neighbor), review granted, May 17,

2023, S279242.)6 “But two projects may be kept separate when, although the 

projects are related in some ways, they serve different purposes or can be 

implemented independently”—i.e., have independent utility. (Good

Neighbor, at p. 684.) As this explanation makes clear, the concept of 

independent utility has no direct application to the adoption and application 

of thresholds of significance. Whether two activities should be analyzed in 

the same EIR is a distinct issue from how the significance of their

environmental impact should be assessed. But in any event, we have no 

trouble discerning independent utility in a hospital, a research building, and 

a housing project. We thus find no error in the Regents’ application of the 

BAAQMD thresholds separately to each of four initial-phase construction 

projects.

6 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115, subdivision (e)(1), 

a published Court of Appeal case pending Supreme Court review “has no 

binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive 

value only.” We cite Good Neighbor, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th 656 for its 

persuasive value here.
43

Petitioners YB raise a similar claim with respect to operational TAC

emissions from the initial-phase projects, contending that the impact of TAC

emissions should have been found significant because (1) the EIR was

required to combine construction and operational emissions in applying the

threshold and (2) operational emissions should have included TAC emissions

resulting from the additional vehicle trips that will result from persons using

the new buildings. As to the first argument, we note the BAAQMD

thresholds independently address emissions during construction and

operation, and we are skeptical of petitioners’ argument since construction

and operation of any one building will not occur at the same time. But in any

event, we note that only the Research and Academic Building is anticipated

to produce significant operational TAC emissions. Summing its construction

and operational risks results in an excess cancer risk of 3.17, far short of the

significance threshold of 10. Combining construction and operational TAC

emissions therefore would not have changed the EIR’s finding that mitigated

TAC emissions are not significant. 

As to the second argument, we agree with petitioners YB that the

calculation of risks from operational TAC emissions should have included

emissions resulting from additional vehicle trips that will be generated by the

Plan, but we are not persuaded that including these emissions would have

pushed new cancer cases beyond the threshold of significance. The EIR

estimates that the Plan will result in 28,800 additional daily vehicle trips. 

Only a portion of those trips will be attributable to initial-phase projects

other than the New Hospital—that is, to the portion of the Plan’s anticipated

development for which the EIR analyzes operational emissions. Sixty

percent of the new trips are by patients and visitors; most of these are

presumably persons using the New Hospital, the primary new clinical
44

building. The remaining 12,300 anticipated new trips are mostly taken by

faculty, staff, and students, though some are by residents. We find in the

EIR no evidence directly addressing the health impact of these trips, but the

EIR does provide evidence that allows us to understand the order of

magnitude for the increased cancer risk they cause. The EIR estimates that

traffic on Parnassus Avenue, which bears more than 10,000 vehicles a day, is

responsible for an increased cancer risk of 0.9 per one million persons. Even

if we generously assume that all 12,300 of the new trips not associated with

patients and visitors are associated with the initial-phase project that

already entails the highest increase in cancer risk from operations, the

Research and Academic Building, they do not cause the increased cancer risk

from this building project to exceed the 10 per one million threshold. One can

double or triple (or even double and then triple) 0.9 per one million and add it

to the increased cancer risk of 0.26 associated with operations at the

Research and Academic Building, and the result still leaves the risk well

below 10 per one million. This is true even if, as petitioners contend is

appropriate, the operational and constructional risks are combined. Thus,

the omission of new vehicle trips from the EIR’s analysis of TACs did not

affect the EIR’s conclusion that such impacts are not significant.

We further find no error in the EIR’s decision to analyze the remaining

TAC emissions only as cumulative impacts. These emissions are associated

with future projects that will, at an appropriate time, be the subject of

individual project EIRs. Given the uncertainty surrounding the precise

nature of their impacts and the university’s obligation to evaluate them

under the project EIR standard in the future, we find the Regents’ decision to

evaluate them only as cumulative impacts and to apply the significance

threshold applicable to such impacts to be supported by substantial evidence.
45

VI. Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Petitioners YB contend that a measure providing for the purchase of

carbon offset credits to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is

unenforceable, and its details improperly deferred. Petitioners rely largely on

Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th

467 (Golden Door II), which considered a less effective mitigation measure. 

We conclude the challenged mitigation measure here is adequate.

Over time, the Plan will increase consumption of carbon-based energy

on campus, potentially resulting in a substantial increase in GHG emissions. 

Given the incremental contribution of all GHG sources to climate change, the

EIR concludes that the Plan would have a significant environmental effect if

it causes any net increase in the campus’s GHG emissions. To avoid this

result, the EIR adopts three mitigation measures. The first two specify

operational measures to reduce GHG emissions. The third, Mitigation

Measure GHG-1c, requires the university to monitor campus GHG emissions

and, if other measures fail to hold GHG emissions below net zero, to purchase

carbon offset credits (offsets) to the extent emissions “exceed the . . . campus’s

baseline emissions . . . in 2018.” Although the purchase of offsets is expressly

authorized as a means of mitigating GHG emissions under CEQA

(Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (c)(3)), the ephemeral nature of offsets can

create problems of enforcement. 

The concept of offsets grew out of the cap-and-trade system for limiting

GHG emissions, under which each GHG emitter is granted an emissions

allowance. (Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 485.) An emitter

that does not use its entire allowance may sell the excess to an emitter that

would otherwise exceed its cap. In this way, “GHG emitters may comply with 

the cap by purchasing GHG reductions that others achieve, called 
46

offsets.” (Ibid.) Offsets are effective in mitigating GHG emissions, however,

only if the offsets reflect genuine reductions in GHG emissions. As Golden

Door II explained, “ ‘[U]nlike the produce at the farmer’s market, we can’t 

examine the [GHG offset] product to determine its value. Not only are 

emission reductions invisible, they actually didn’t happen. So to have 

confidence in their value, we need a reliable and accurate picture of what 

would have happened, as well as what actually happened.’ ” (Id. at p. 507.) 

That confidence is provided by “ ‘[p]rotocols,’ ” which are “ ‘formalized 

procedures for accounting for credits that ensure the credits are an accurate 

and reliable representation of emission reductions that actually occurred.’ ” 

(Id. at pp. 507–508.)

The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is responsible for

“monitoring and regulating sources of emissions of greenhouse gases . . . in 

order to reduce emissions.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 38510.) In that role, 

CARB has developed offset protocols for use in the state’s cap-and-trade 

program. To qualify, offsets must satisfy regulations designed to ensure that 

the “emission reduction achieved is ‘real, permanent, quantifiable, 

verifiable, enforceable, and additional to any GHG emission reduction 

otherwise required by law or regulation, and any other GHG emission 

reduction that otherwise would occur.’ ” (Golden Door II, supra, 50

Cal.App.5th at p. 506, quoting Health & Saf. Code, § 38562, subds. (d)(1)

& (2).) The CARB protocol regulations are the gold standard for ensuring 

offsets constitute genuine GHG mitigation.

CEQA mitigation measures must be “fully enforceable.” (Guidelines, 

§ 15126.4, subd. (a)(2).) Golden Door II considered whether a mitigation 

measure the County of San Diego adopted for controlling GHGs met this 

requirement. The measure was part of the county’s climate action plan and
47

called for the purchase of offsets. (Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at

p. 482.) The county contended the mitigation measure was comparable to

CARB-issued offset credits, but the court concluded it fell short of CARB

standards in three respects that rendered it unenforceable. (Id. at pp. 506–

507.) First, although the measure set standards for the registries from which

offsets could be purchased, it did not also require that those registries use

protocols that CARB had approved. (Id. at pp. 511–512.) Second, where

CARB requires government approval of any offset credits generated outside

California, the mitigation measure contained no similar safeguard for out-ofstate, in particular internationally sourced, offsets. (Id. at pp. 512–513.) 

Finally, CARB requires offsets to reflect GHG reductions that are

“additional” to those otherwise required by law or generated in the ordinary

course, and the mitigation measure contained no requirement of

additionality. (Id. at pp. 513–515.) On the basis of these departures from

CARB standards, the court found the GHG mitigation measure

unenforceable. Petitioners YB raise similar concerns about the provisions of

Mitigation Measure GHG-1c.

Mitigation Measure GHG-1c is in two sections. The first section

requires UCSF to purchase CARB-approved offset credits as part of its

participation in California’s cap-and-trade program. Although this aspect

satisfies Golden Door II, it applies only to emissions from the university’s

utility plant, and allows only a small fraction of these to be addressed

through offset purchases. To the extent meeting the Plan’s net zero goal

requires additional offsets, the second section of the mitigation measure

requires carbon offsets purchased in the “voluntary carbon offset market.” 

These purchases will be pursuant to “internal guidelines” the Carbon

Neutrality Initiative of the University of California has developed to ensure
48

offsets “result in additional, verified GHG emissions.” Consistent with these

internal guidelines, offsets will be “verified by a major registry recognized by

CARB.” Out-of-state offsets will be purchased only if sufficient local and instate offsets are unavailable, and there is no provision for international

offsets. Further, “[t]he protocols of each registry, and UC[’s] own internal 

screens, shall be used to demonstrate that the carbon offset credits provided 

are real, permanent, additional, and have been independently verified as 

adhering to its applicable project protocols.” 

This measure does not suffer from the same deficiencies as the

mitigation measure in Golden Door II. At least some of the offsets purchased

here will be directly governed by CARB cap-and-trade regulations. The

remainder will be purchased according to preexisting University of California

guidelines that, like CARB’s cap-and-trade regulations, are designed to

ensure the offsets are “real, permanent, [and] additional.” Although the 

protocols for these offsets will not necessarily have been approved by CARB, 

the EIR expressly states that the protocols will be examined to ensure the 

validity of the offsets. Out-of-state offsets will be used only as a last resort, 

and offsets will not be sourced internationally. In short, this mitigation

measure addresses the concerns of the Golden Door II court.

Petitioners YB object that Mitigation Measure GHG-1c does not meet

the “same enforceability standard as CARB’s cap and trade program.” But

CEQA does not require that all GHG mitigation measures satisfy CARB

standards. Golden Door II relied on CARB standards as exemplary, but did

not purport to require them. Golden Door II applied CARB’s cap-and-trade 

standards in that case because the mitigation measure before it “self-imposes 

these requirements.” (Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 507,

fn. 21.) For us to impose the same standards would, in the absence of a
49

statutory or administrative requirement, be inconsistent with our standard of

review: “We review the EIR’s discussion of mitigation measures by the 

traditional substantial evidence standard. It is not our task to determine 

whether adverse effects could be better mitigated.” (Downtown Plan, supra,

102 Cal.App.4th at p. 696.) 

Petitioners YB also contend that the details of Mitigation Measure 

GHG-1c are impermissibly deferred, again relying on Golden Door II. The 

mitigation measure before us, however, contains none of the subjective or 

absent standards on which the Golden Door II court relied in finding 

improper deferral. (Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 518–525.) 

Petitioners fault the EIR for ostensibly failing to describe the internal

University of California guidelines that will be used in purchasing offsets,

but petitioners ignore specifics about the guidelines that the EIR sets forth. 

We are not persuaded that a fuller account was necessary. The guidelines

already exist, they implement a larger UC policy, and substantial evidence

thus supports the conclusion that UCSF’s implementation of this measure is

not left to the unconfined discretion of university officials.

VII. Marine Water Quality

The EIR discusses the Plan’s impact on stormwater runoff and

adopts—in response to petitioner SF’s comments on the draft EIR—a

mitigation measure intended to limit stormwater discharges. Unwilling to

settle for this victory, petitioner SF here contends the EIR should have more

fully discussed the environmental effects of stormwater discharges into the

marine waters surrounding San Francisco, and that the new material in the

final EIR fails to cure the problem. We disagree.

The draft EIR discusses the Plan’s impact on hydrology and water

quality, describing the City’s system for collecting and treating sewage and
50

stormwater, as well as the federal, state, and local regulation of wastewater

discharge. The discussion notes, in brief, that stormwater from the campus is

collected by the university and discharged to the City’s sewer system. The

system conveys both sewage and stormwater runoff to two wastewater

treatment plants. Because the City is “covered in impermeable surfaces,” the

treatment plants “can be overwhelmed” during storms, resulting in the

discharge of minimally treated wastewater into San Francisco Bay.

With respect to stormwater, the EIR’s water quality analysis states

that 86 percent of the campus “core” already consists of impermeable

surfaces, and development anticipated by the Plan would add about 4 percent

to this total. The draft EIR concluded that this increment “would not

substantively change” treatment of runoff, and that “site design measures” to

minimize the increase in impervious surfaces would help limit “the offsite

discharge of stormwater pollutants.” Concluding the Plan would not

“substantially degrade surface or groundwater quality,” the draft EIR found

no significant impact. 

Petitioner SF’s comments on the draft EIR caused the Regents to

change course. Petitioner pointed out that the City’s sewage treatment

system had a long history of violations due to stormwater discharges,

resulting in bacterial contamination of coastal waters and harming “beach

water quality.” In response, the final EIR acknowledges that “existing water

quality in the Bay and the Ocean is negatively affected by wet weather

discharges, and that condition is part of the CEQA baseline for evaluation of

impacts.” The EIR now states that the Plan would have potentially

significant impact on water quality because “increases in stormwater

volumes and wastewater volumes under the [Plan] could increase the volume

or frequency of overflow events . . . in wet weather.” 
51

To address these potential impacts, the final EIR adopts Mitigation

Measure HYD-1. This measure requires the university to reduce stormwater

discharges from the campus “by an amount sufficient to offset flows from any

increase in impervious surfaces and any increases in wastewater discharges

as a result of the [Plan].” In short, the university commits to no new net flow

during wet weather. There is an exception, “if modeling demonstrates there

is sufficient storage, pumping, and treatment capacity in the City’s [system]

to avoid increased discharges” into marine waters. And there are details, for

example, about the required modeling, timing, and funding for any capacity

improvements. With the adoption of this measure, the final EIR assesses the

Plan’s effects on water quality as less than significant.

A. Discussion of Water Quality

Petitioner SF first contends that the EIR’s discussion of the Plan’s

potential impact on beach water quality is inadequate because it fails to

describe (1) “San Francisco’s degraded beach water quality” and (2) “the

dysfunctional regulatory system governing San Francisco’s sewage treatment

plants.” 

In reviewing the adequacy of an EIR’s discussion of environmental 

impacts, “[t]he ultimate inquiry . . . is whether the EIR includes enough 

detail ‘to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to 

understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed 

project.’ ” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516; see Guidelines, § 15151.) 

“[W]e do not require technical perfection.” (Sierra Club, at p. 515.) We are

persuaded that the EIR’s discussion of stormwater impacts contains

sufficient information to meet CEQA standards. 

The EIR discusses the circumstances under which stormwater

discharges into coastal waters, and it addresses the risk that changes
52

anticipated by the Plan might increase these discharges. The EIR recognizes

that stormwater during construction could contain “oil, grease, gasoline, 

brake fluid, antifreeze, or other vehicle-related fluids and pollutants,” while 

stormwater from operations could “contain pollutants common in urban 

runoff, including metals, oils and grease, pesticides, herbicides, nutrients, pet 

waste, and garbage/litter.” The threat posed by the untreated release of

these materials into the sea is clear. More information about the specific

nature of the pollution of coastal waters was unnecessary to an

understanding of the problem. 

Petitioner SF characterizes the regulatory system governing operation

of the City’s sewage treatment as “dysfunctional,” but this contention relates

less to the nature of the system than to the City’s failure to satisfy its

obligations under it. The EIR’s general description of the regulatory system

governing wastewater is thorough, and details of the City’s past

noncompliance are not necessary “ ‘to understand and to consider 

meaningfully the issues raised by’ ” changes in water quality resulting from 

the Plan. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516.)

Petitioner SF also contends that the draft EIR improperly relies on 

“ratio theory,” apparently referring to the draft EIR’s conclusion that the 

Plan’s small increase in impervious surfaces precludes a significant impact on 

water quality. The draft EIR does not expressly draw the conclusion 

suggested by petitioner, but in any event, the final EIR’s acknowledgment of 

a potentially significant impact on water quality effectively moots this 

contention. 

B. Recirculation

Petitioner SF argues that the Regents’ revision of the EIR in response

to comments required its recirculation. “An EIR must be recirculated if
53

‘significant new information’ is added after issuance of the draft EIR.” (East

Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1226,

1265 (East Oakland).) And if an agency decides not to recirculate, that

decision must be supported by substantial evidence. (See Ibid.; Guidelines,

§ 15088.5, subd. (e).)

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Regents’ decision

not to recirculate here. The primary changes to the discussion of hydrology

and water quality are the reclassification of the Plan’s impact from not

significant to potentially significant and the adoption of a mitigation measure

requiring the university to ensure there is no net increase in stormwater

discharges. Guidelines section 15088.5, subdivision (a), states that new

information is not significant “unless” the change deprives the public of an

opportunity to comment upon a “substantial adverse environmental effect of

the project or a feasible way to mitigate or avoid such an effect . . . that the

project’s proponents have declined to implement.” (Id., subd. (a).) The Plan

was not changed in a manner that increased its environmental impact, and

no new environmental impact, let alone a substantial impact, was disclosed. 

On the contrary, the information relating to the environmental effect was

included in the original EIR, thereby permitting the public (including

petitioner SF) to comment on it. Nor did the Regents decline to implement a

proposed mitigation measure. The Regents were simply persuaded that the

impact of the Plan’s increase in sewage flow and impermeable surface, which

they originally found not significant, should be considered potentially

significant and deserving of mitigation.

Petitioner SF urges us to review de novo the Regent’s decision not to

recirculate, contending the “draft EIR was so fundamentally and basically

inadequate and conclusory” as to deprive the public of the opportunity to
54

comment. (Guidelines, § 15088.5, subd. (a).) But we would reject the factual

premise of this argument under any standard of review, and thus need not

entertain this novel argument.

The parties have cited us to a variety of prior decisions; we find the

Supreme Court’s decision in Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of

the University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, most closely applicable. In

that decision, which concerned the construction of the university’s Laurel

Heights campus, the draft EIR did not include a discussion of the potential

impact of the campus buildings’ lights after dark. In response to comments,

the Regents included a discussion of the issue in the final EIR, concluded the

lighting would not cause a significant impact because it would add “ ‘only

incrementally’ ” to existing night lighting conditions, and adopted a

mitigation measure nonetheless. (Id. at p. 1140.) The court rejected the

claim that the effect was potentially significant and required recirculation,

concluding the change was “an insignificant modification to the EIR that does 

not disclose a new adverse environmental impact.” (Ibid.) The court noted 

the mitigation measure would not cause any additional adverse 

environmental effects, and that the Regents did not decline to adopt any 

suggested measures. (Id. at p. 1141.) Accordingly, “[n]one of the purposes of 

CEQA will be served by solicitation of further public comment on this subject; 

only needless delay will result.” (Ibid.) The same is true here with respect to 

the Plan’s impact on hydrology and water quality.

C. Deferred Mitigation

Petitioner SF contends that Mitigation Measure HYD-1 constitutes an

improper deferral of the details of mitigation. Under the Guidelines, an

agency may not defer “[f]ormulation” of mitigation measures. (Guidelines,

§ 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) “The specific details of a mitigation measure, 
55

however, may be developed after project approval when it is impractical or 

infeasible to include those details during the project’s environmental review 

provided that the agency (1) commits itself to the mitigation, (2) adopts 

specific performance standards the mitigation will achieve, and (3) identifies 

the type(s) of potential action(s) that can feasibly achieve that performance 

standard and that will [be] considered, analyzed, and potentially 

incorporated in the mitigation measure.” (Ibid.; see East Oakland, supra, 89

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1254–1255.)

Petitioner SF contends Mitigation Measure HYD-1 improperly defers

mitigation “because setting a goal, even a no net increase goal, unsupported 

by evidence that it is feasible to achieve the goal is not a ‘performance 

standard.’ ” The decision on which petitioner relies for that principle, POET,

LLC v. State Air Resources Bd. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 681, featured a 

distinctly different mitigation measure. The POET court concluded that a

state agency’s commitment to test biodiesel fuels and then engage in

“ ‘rulemaking to establish specifications to ensure there is no increase in 

NOx’ ” failed to articulate a specific performance criterion. (Id. at p. 739.) It 

was unclear, the POET court explained, “what tests will be performed and 

what measurements will be taken to determine that biodiesel use is not 

increasing NOx emissions.” (Id. at p. 740.) 

Mitigation Measure HYD-1 suffers no such infirmities. It sets forth the 

specific model to be used in assessing stormwater flows, clarifies that 

improvements constructed off-campus or in public rights of way must be 

included in the calculations, and establishes a schedule for baseline and 

regular follow-up testing. Further, it specifies several means to achieve any 

necessary reductions. We will, accordingly, follow East Oakland in 

concluding that this “net-zero” goal is a satisfactory performance standard
56

and quite “[u]nlike the proposed regulations in POET.” (East Oakland,

supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1257, 1259 [approving mitigation measure to 

ensure no increase in GHG emissions].)

Petitioner SF also contends the mitigation measure is unenforceable 

because it has no “reporting processes providing a basis for enforcement 

review or enforcement action by anyone outside of UCSF.” CEQA does not, 

however, require that enforcement of a mitigation measure be vested in a 

third party when a public agency is the project sponsor. On the contrary, 

although Guideline section 15126.4, subdivision (a)(2) states that mitigation 

measures must be “fully enforceable,” it recognizes that “[i]n the case of the 

adoption of a plan . . . or other public project, mitigation measures can be

incorporated into the plan, policy, regulation, or project design.”

Petitioner also argues that there is no evidence the mitigation measure 

is feasible, citing the failure of current City efforts to prevent pollution by 

stormwaters. However, the “feasibility” standard is not addressed to 

mitigation of the underlying problem of ocean water contamination, but to 

the feasibility of meeting the performance standard established in the 

mitigation measure. The university is neither required nor expected to cure 

the city-wide problem of stormwater pollution.

VIII. Historic Buildings

Petitioner SF contends that the EIR improperly concludes it is not

“feasible” to avoid the demolition of several historic buildings on campus. We 

are unpersuaded. 

The Plan anticipates the demolition of at least eight structures. 

Several of these are eligible for listing in the state and/or national registers of 

historical resources. The buildings are considered historical resources not 

only because of their age, but also for their historical roles, architectural 
57

significance, and artwork. The EIR considers a Reduced Project alternative 

that would have preserved all of the architecturally significant buildings on 

the campus, but this alternative did not “fully achieve” the objectives of the 

Plan and ultimately was not chosen.

The EIR acknowledges that demolition of historically significant

structures would be “ ‘a substantial adverse change’ ” that it judges to be both 

significant and unavoidable under the Plan, even with mitigation. The EIR 

proposes mitigation measures that would create a digital record of the 

buildings but would not preserve the structures themselves. 

Relying on the general principle that a lead agency may not “approve 

the project as proposed if there are feasible alternatives or mitigation 

measures that would avoid or substantially lessen the adverse environmental 

effects” (Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton (2010) 48 

Cal.4th 481, 498; see § 21002), petitioner SF asserts that “the EIR’s 

conclusion that it is infeasible to avoid demolishing” the buildings “is based 

on errors of law and is not supported by substantial evidence.” Petitioner

appears to be arguing that it is “feasible” to avoid demolishing the buildings

because a use was found for them in the 2014 LRDP; that is, preserving the

buildings is feasible because they are not beyond repair. 

The argument takes too narrow a view of the concept of “feasibility.” 

Petitioner SF ignores that the Plan’s purpose in demolishing these historic 

buildings is to make room for new structures. As the final EIR points out in 

responding to a comment raising this issue, this EIR “evaluates a different

project than the 2014 LRDP EIR, with different objectives and different

component parts.” We find that a sufficient response.

CEQA “defines a ‘ “[f]easible” ’ mitigation measure as one that is 

‘capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable 
58

period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, social, and 

technological factors.’ ” (City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California 

State University (2006) 39 Cal.4th 341, 363.) Given this broad definition, 

feasibility is ultimately a policy judgment, not a narrowly technical 

assessment, and one we must review with deference. (See, e.g., Native Plant 

Society, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001.) An EIR is not required to adopt a 

mitigation measure or alternative simply because doing so would reduce a 

significant impact. After all, it is always possible to eliminate a project’s 

significant environmental effects by cancelling whatever aspect of the project 

causes that environmental effect. 

Here, the impact on historic buildings could be eliminated by canceling 

the portions of the Plan that require their demolition. But, “an alternative 

that ‘is impractical or undesirable from a policy standpoint’ may be rejected 

as infeasible.’ ” (Native Plant Society, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001.) As 

the Regents demonstrated in rejecting the Reduced Project alternative and 

adopting a statement of overriding considerations with respect to the 

significant, unmitigated impact on cultural resources that will result from 

the Plan’s demolition of these buildings, the Regents deem the erection of 

buildings better suited to the demands of modern medical research and 

treatment to outweigh the cultural impact of the loss of the older buildings. 

Setting that priority is, of course, the Regents prerogative under CEQA. (Id. 

at p. 982 [“Under CEQA, ‘a public agency is not required to favor 

environmental protection over other considerations’ ”].)

IX. Toxic Air Contaminants—Thresholds of Significance

Petitioner SF argues the EIR errs in using thresholds for significance

for impacts to air quality that (1) the Regents did not adopt through a formal
59

rule-making process and (2) consider only new cases of cancer, not existing

cancer risk. We find no merit to either contention.

A. BAAQMD Thresholds

As discussed in Section V. above, the EIR adopts thresholds for air

quality impacts from CEQA Guidelines published by the BAAQMD. The EIR

notes that “[t]hese thresholds are based on substantial evidence identified in

Appendix D” to the BAAQMD Guidelines, a document that, in turn,

references analysis by the United States Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA).

Petitioner SF contends, citing Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of

San Diego (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 892, 903 (Golden Door I), that the EIR’s

adoption of the BAAQMD significance thresholds was invalid because a lead

agency must adopt such a threshold “by a public rule-making process, and

must show in that process that the thresholds are supported by substantial

evidence.”

Petitioner is mistaken. The CEQA Guidelines permit a lead agency to

use thresholds established by other agencies: “When adopting or using 

thresholds of significance, a lead agency may consider thresholds of 

significance previously adopted or recommended by other public agencies 

. . . , provided the decision of the lead agency to adopt such thresholds is 

supported by substantial evidence.” (Guidelines, § 15064.7, subd. (c).) 

Petitioner does not argue that the adoption of the BAAQMD standard was 

not adequately supported.

Golden Door I, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 892, is not to the contrary

because it addresses a different situation. The lead agency in Golden Door I, 

a county, had established a threshold for significance of GHG emissions to be 

used generally in EIRs prepared by the county. Adoption by a lead agency of 
60

a threshold for general use—that is, for use in all EIRs for which the agency 

acts as a lead agency—is governed by Guidelines section 15064.7 and does 

require an “ordinance, resolution, rule, or regulation . . . developed through a 

public review process.” (Guidelines, § 15064.7, subd. (b); see Golden Door I,

at pp. 897–898.) The same subdivision, however, recognizes that “[l]ead 

agencies may also use thresholds on a case-by-case basis” (Guidelines, 

§ 15064.7, subd. (b)) and does not require a formal process for adoption of 

such thresholds. Recognizing the difference, Golden Door I expressly 

distinguishes a case, Save Cuyama Valley v. County of Santa Barbara (2013) 

213 Cal.App.4th 1059, that approved a threshold adopted through a case-bycase approach. (Golden Door I, at p. 903; see Cuyama Valley, at p. 1068 

[“CEQA only requires that a threshold be formally adopted if it is for ‘general

use’—that is, for use in evaluating significance in all future projects”].) 

Petitioner suggests that the Regents adopted the BAAQMD standard for

general use but provide no basis for the claim, and nothing in the EIR

indicates that the Regents require the use of the BAAQMD threshold in all

EIRs prepared by the University of California. Accordingly, the Regents were

not required to engage in a formal rule-making process.

Petitioner SF argues alternatively that when a lead agency adopts a 

threshold established by another body under Guidelines section 15064.7, 

subdivision (c), that body must have adopted the threshold through a public 

process. Petitioner cites no authority for the claim, which is inconsistent 

with the authorization in section 15064.7, subdivision (c) for a lead agency to 

consider thresholds of significance “previously adopted or recommended by 

other public agencies or recommended by experts.” (Italics added.)
61

B. Description of Baseline Cancer Risk

In its discussion of air quality impacts, the EIR attempts to estimate

the existing level of cancer risk from TACs in the neighborhood surrounding

the campus. The EIR first presents estimates based on the levels of certain

TACs measured by BAAQMD and CARB in San Francisco. Because this data

does not include cancer from exposure to diesel particulate matter, another

recognized TAC, the EIR also uses CARB estimates of cancer risk from

exposure to diesel emissions in the Bay Area as of the year 2000. 

Petitioner SF faults the EIR for failing to provide a more recent

estimate of baseline cancer risk from diesel particulate matter. “Generally,

the lead agency should describe physical environmental conditions as they

exist at the time the notice of preparation is published.” (Guidelines,

§ 15125, subd. (a)(1).) But this is not an inflexible rule and must be read in

light of the teaching that “in reviewing an EIR’s discussion, we do not require 

technical perfection or scientific certainty: ‘ “ ‘[T]he courts have looked not for 

an exhaustive analysis but for adequacy, completeness and a good-faith 

effort at full disclosure.’ ” ’ ” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 515.) The

draft EIR discloses that CARB estimates the statewide cancer risk from

diesel admissions to have declined about 10 percent between 1995 and 2012,

and the final EIR shows an even steeper decline by 2020 and quantifies

cancer risk in the Bay Area from diesel particulate matter in 2020. In light of

this downward trajectory and the information in the final EIR, we are

satisfied that the EIR’s description of rates of cancer risk associated with

diesel particulate matter more than met this standard of good faith.

C. Failure to Consider Baseline Cancer Risk

Petitioner SF also faults the EIR for adopting a threshold for

significance based on the incremental cancer risk added by the Plan, rather
62

than basing significance on the total local cancer risk once the Plan is

implemented. Petitioner cites no decision or regulation adopting that

position, and we find no merit in petitioner’s various arguments in support of

it. We also recall that “ ‘CEQA grants agencies discretion to develop their

own thresholds of significance’ and an agency’s choice of a significance

threshold will be upheld if founded on substantial evidence.” (Mission Bay,

supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.)

A primary purpose of an EIR is to evaluate a project’s impact on the

environment. Necessarily, that impact is determined by the environmental

change the project will bring about. (See Building Industry, supra, 62

Cal.4th at p. 388 [“CEQA calls upon an agency to evaluate” “a project’s

potentially significant exacerbating effects on existing environmental

hazards”].) A threshold of significance can be used to determine whether that

change should be considered “significant,” as the term is used by CEQA. As

described above, the Regents’ chosen threshold for significance does just that.

Petitioner protests that “under CEQA, an EIR analyzes the

environmental impacts of the proposed project on the environmental setting.” 

But that is exactly what the chosen threshold of significance does—measure

the change in cancer risk created by the Plan. Petitioner also objects that

this threshold “is a policy judgment, not a finding of fact based on evidence.” 

But determinations of significance necessarily involve such judgments. 

Estimates of a project’s likely impact must be based on evidence; the

determination of whether that impact is “significant” comes from comparing

the likely impacts against criteria for when an impact is significant. That a

decision is ultimately one of policy does not mean it is not also grounded in

evidence.
63

A hypothetical proposed in petitioner SF’s reply brief highlights the

fallacy in its argument. Petitioner posits two regions, one with a baseline

risk of 50 cancers per million and one with a baseline risk of 30 per million. 

Petitioner further posits two projects in the respective regions, each of which

raises the local risk to 55 cancers per million. By the Regents’ threshold, the

first impact would not be significant because the increase was only five

cancers per million, while the second would be because the increase would be

25 cancers per million. Petitioner contends this is necessarily error because

the resulting risk of cancer is the same in both cases. But a project’s

environmental impact is determined by the change brought about by the

project, not by the absolute value of the resulting conditions. Because the

environmental impact of the second hypothesized project is five times greater

than the first (i.e., 25 instead of five cancer deaths), it would not be

unreasonable to find one impact significant, but not the other. The baseline

level of risk may influence the choice of a threshold for significance, but the

impact of a project is appropriately measured by the change the project

induces.

D. Significance of Cumulative Air Quality Impacts

Petitioner SF contends that the EIR fails properly to apply its chosen

threshold for the significance of cumulative air quality impacts. “ ‘The 

cumulative impact from several projects is the change in the environment 

which results from the incremental impact of the project when added to other 

closely related past, present, and reasonably foreseeable probable future 

projects.’ [Citation.] It is an impact ‘which is created as a result of the 

combination of the project evaluated in the EIR together with other projects 

causing related impacts.’ ” (League to Save Lake Tahoe v. County of Placer

(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 63, 147–148.)
64

As noted, the EIR adopts the BAAQMD cumulative impacts standard of

an increase of more than 100 cancer cases per one million persons. 

(BAAQMD 2017 CEQA, supra, § 2 & Table 2-1, at p. 2-2.) As the draft EIR

explains, the EPA considers this “within the ‘acceptable’ range of cancer risk. 

A cumulative cancer risk of 100 in one million is also used by the City of San 

Francisco.” The final EIR is even more specific: “[a]ccording to BAAQMD, a 

project’s cumulative cancer risk would be significant if the increase in cancer 

risk from the project, when combined with the risk from other sources within 

1,000 feet of the project, exceeds 100 in a million.” 

Petitioner SF first contends that the EIR’s application of the threshold 

is confusing because of inconsistencies in the EIR’s explanation of its 

threshold. What petitioner purports to find confusing is that the EIR does 

not sum ambient TAC concentrations with TAC emissions resulting from the 

project and other identified local sources. But petitioner raised this concern

in commenting on the draft EIR, and the university’s response provides the 

necessary clarity: Cumulative cancer risk, the final EIR explained, is 

assessed by summing emissions from the project and all other sources within 

1,000 feet, not by adding these numbers to regional or background risk levels. 

As articulated in the final EIR, we find the description of the cumulative 

threshold sufficiently clear.

Petitioner SF also contends that the cumulative threshold “suffer[s

from] the same legal defect” discussed above, that it is “applied without

regard to the baseline cancer risk.” But whether individual or cumulative,

the environmental impact of a project is the change in the environment

brought about by the project. A threshold for determining the significance of

such a change may properly be based on the magnitude of that change,

without regard for baseline conditions. (Building Industry, supra, 62 Cal.4th
65

at p. 388.) In some circumstances an agency might appropriately consider

baseline conditions in setting a threshold of significance, but this is not

required (ibid.), and substantial evidence supports the EIR’s decision to

employ the BAAQMD cumulative threshold, in which significance is based

exclusively on the increase in cancer cases attributable to sources within

1,000 feet of the project.

The cases petitioner cites for its contention that “the severity of

existing conditions is always a factor in determining significance of project

impacts” do not so hold. In the primary case, Kings County Farm Bureau v.

City of Hanford (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 692, the agency discounted a project’s

ozone impact as insignificant because it was small in comparison with the

baseline level of ozone. The court faulted this conclusion because “[t]he EIR’s 

analysis uses the magnitude of the current ozone problem in the air basin in 

order to trivialize the project’s impact. In simple terms, the EIR reasons the 

air is already bad, so even though emissions from the project will make it 

worse, the impact is insignificant.” (Id. at p. 718.) While Kings County 

certainly holds that a high baseline level cannot be used to minimize the 

significance of a project’s contribution, it does not hold that every threshold 

for significance must incorporate baseline conditions. The other case 

petitioner cites, Communities for a Better Environment v. California 

Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 118, disapproved on other 

grounds, Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 

1086, 1109 and footnote 3, merely follows Kings County.

Petitioner SF lobs a few additional criticisms at the EIR’s adoption of 

the BAAQMD cumulative threshold, but we need not address these

individually. We must affirm the Regents’ adoption of a threshold if it is

supported by substantial evidence (Mission Bay, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at
66

p. 206), and we find such evidence in the BAAQMD’s discussion of its

rationale.

X. Aesthetics

Petitioner SF contends that the EIR’s analysis of visual impacts is

inadequate because the EIR fails to consider views from surrounding

residential neighborhoods and mistakenly finds the visual impact of the

proposed New Hospital not significant. We need not address these claims

because we agree with the Regents that the Plan qualifies under a CEQA

provision declaring that the aesthetic impacts of certain projects may not be

considered significant.

The EIR contains an extensive analysis of the visual impacts of the

Plan but explains at the outset that this is for informational purposes only

because, under section 21099, subdivision (d)(1) (section 21099(d)(1)), any

aesthetic effect of the Plan must not be considered significant. 

Section 21099(d)(1) states, “Aesthetic and parking impacts of a 

residential, mixed-use residential, or employment center project on an infill 

site within a transit priority area shall not be considered significant impacts 

on the environment.” As relevant here, the statute defines an infill site as “a 

lot located within an urban area that has been previously developed” 

(§ 21099, subd. (a)(4)) and a “ ‘[t]ransit priority area’ ” as “an area within onehalf mile of a major transit stop that is existing or planned” (§ 21099,

subd. (a)(7)). “[R]esidential” and “mixed-use residential” projects are not 

defined in section 21099, but an employment center project is “a project 

located on property zoned for commercial uses with a floor area ratio of no 

less than 0.75.” (§ 21099, subd. (a)(1).) “ ‘Floor area ratio’ ” is further

defined; it is a measure of how much of the useable portion of a lot is covered

by a building. (§ 21099, subds. (a)(2), (a)(5), & (a)(6).)
67

Section 21099 “was enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 743 (2013–2014 

Reg. Sess.) to further the Legislature’s strategy of encouraging transitoriented, infill development.” (Covina Residents, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at

p. 725.) “[T]he Legislature has charted a course of long-term sustainability 

based on denser infill development, reduced reliance on individual vehicles 

and improved mass transit, all with the goal of reducing greenhouse gas 

emissions. Section 21099 is part of that strategy.” (Covina Residents, at 

pp. 729–730.)

Petitioner SF does not dispute that the Plan calls for infill development

in a transit priority area but maintains that section 21099(d)(1) does not

apply because the Plan is not a residential, mixed-use residential, or 

employment-center project. Specifically, the campus is not “located on 

property zoned for commercial uses,” as required by the statutory definition 

of an employment center project, petitioner urges. (§ 21099, subd. (a)(1).) 

Because this dispute turns on an issue of statutory construction, our review is

de novo.

According to the EIR, the campus is primarily zoned “P (Public).” 

Petitioner notes that a portion of the campus is zoned “Residential House

District, Two-Family,” but this designation applies only to residential areas

along Third and Fifth Avenues, on the margins of campus; the portions of

campus affected by the Plan are zoned P-Public. The university’s use of its 

property, however, is not subject to local zoning regulations. (Oakland 

Raiders v. City of Berkeley (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 623, 626 [“the University of 

California is not subject to local regulations with regard to its use or 

management of the property held by the Regents in public trust”].) The 

P zoning district anticipates this regulatory independence. Although P

zoning allows for a variety of public uses, it also expressly authorizes
68

“[s]tructures and uses of governmental agencies not subject to regulation by 

this Code.” (S.F. Planning Code, § 211.1, subd. (a).) In other words, the 

City’s zoning for the campus essentially defers to the university with respect 

to land uses permitted on the site. 

As explained in the 2014 LRDP, the University of California applies to 

its properties its own version of zoning, referred to as “functional zones.” The 

functional zones applicable to the developed portion of the campus authorize 

a variety of essentially commercial uses, including instruction, clinical 

medical care, laboratory research, offices, food services, retail, and recreation 

and fitness. There seems little doubt that this zoning equivalent permits 

commercial development.

Petitioner SF argues that the campus “is not zoned at all” because it is 

not governed by the City’s zoning ordinance, and that section 21099(d)(1) 

should not apply because the university has not “subject[ed] itself to the 

regulatory burdens of the Planning and Zoning Law.” But the City does zone

the campus, albeit in a manner that appropriately defers to the university’s

land-use planning. (San Francisco Planning Code, § 211.1, subd. (a).) And 

the university has authorized commercial development in the areas where 

the Plan proposes to build. The dispositive fact is that the property in 

question is zoned in a manner that allows “commercial uses.” (§ 21099, 

subd. (a)(1).)

We see no basis for construing the statute to require more. In 

particular, nothing in the language of the statute requires that applicable

zoning allow only commercial uses. And we detect no suggestion in section 

21099 that the provision was intended not to reach landowners, such as the 

university, that are exempt from local government’s land use regulation. 

Rather, the requirement in subdivision (a)(1) that a project be zoned to allow 
69

“commercial uses” appears intended simply to ensure that the property can

lawfully be used for commercial purposes, consistent with its designation as 

an “[e]mployment center.” Our task is “to discern and give effect to the 

legislative intent” behind section 21099 (Summers v. Newman (1999) 20 

Cal.4th 1021, 1026), and we see no reason the Legislature would have wanted 

to carve out university-owned property from the incentives it was 

establishing to promote infill development.

Applying section 21099(d)(1), the EIR properly concluded the aesthetic 

effects of the Plan may not be considered significant environmental impacts. 

We accordingly do not reach petitioner SF’s contentions that the EIR 

improperly analyzed visual impacts. (Protect Telegraph Hill v. City and 

County of San Francisco (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 261, 272.)

XI. Shadows

Petitioner SF contends that the EIR improperly fails to analyze the

impact on the neighborhoods surrounding the campus of shadows created by

the Plan’s new buildings. The EIR does, in fact, analyze the impact of

shadows cast by the proposed new buildings, but it assesses their impact only

on “publicly accessible open spaces and recreation facilities near the project

site.” The EIR finds that the Plan’s new development would cast shadows on

parks and open spaces in the vicinity of campus, but that the impact is not

significant because the shadows “would reach these spaces during the time of

day when usage is expected to be lowest.” We find no fault with the EIR’s

discussion of shadows.

As explained in the final EIR’s response to comments, the EIR chose to

analyze shadows cast on public open spaces because City ordinances prohibit

the issuance of a building permit for a proposed structure if its shadows will

have “any adverse impact” on the use of City parks, “unless it is determined 
70

that the impact would be insignificant.” (S.F. Planning Code, § 295, 

subd. (b).) Although the university is not bound by City ordinances, it 

“ ‘strives to be substantially consistent with local policies where feasible.’ ” 

The EIR asserts that it did not analyze the impact of shadows on city streets

and buildings because this impact was outside its criterion for significance,

which address only the impact on public open spaces. The final EIR notes,

however, that the diagrams developed for the shadow analysis, which

demonstrate “the extent of net new shadow that would fall on all locations

throughout the Parnassus campus vicinity,” reveal that “for the most part,

areas one block or more distant from the campus site would be subject to only

occasional shadow during the course of a year,” generally in early morning or

late afternoon.

Petitioner SF contends that the EIR should have analyzed the impact

of shadows cast by proposed buildings on surrounding neighborhoods because

there is a fair argument that these shadows might constitute a significant

environmental impact. We reject this contention for two reasons. First, it

ignores that the EIR does analyze the impact of shadows on surrounding

neighborhoods, albeit against a significance threshold that petitioner

considers insufficient. Second, we find no fair argument—no substantial

evidence to support the conclusion—that the project will have a potentially

substantial adverse effect on the environment in this regard. (See Visalia 

Retail, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 13; World Business Academy, supra, 24 

Cal.App.5th at p. 499; Guidelines, § 15382.) Shadows are by nature fleeting; 

the campus is located in a densely urbanized city where streets and yards are

already subject to the shadows cast by neighboring buildings; and shadows

present no threat to health. Even if the shadows cast by new buildings on

the campus add, at particular times of day or in some seasons, to the shadows
71

already present in the neighborhoods on its borders, there is no reason to

believe that the effect will be so predominant or pervasive as to cause a

substantial adverse change in the environment. 

Petitioner SF does not point to any substantial evidence of a possible

significant impact. Petitioner places primary reliance on the comments of an

urban planner who, while acknowledging that the campus’s surrounding

neighborhoods “currently receive shadows from existing structures,” was 

concerned “that the increased height of [certain buildings proposed in the 

Plan] will further increase the time and frequency of the shadows.” The mere 

fact that the project will cause a change in the environment, however, does 

not mean that the change will be a significant environmental impact. We 

agree with the Regents that the planner’s comments fall short of suggesting 

the possibility of a substantial adverse change in the environment. The EIR’s 

shadow studies confirmed as much, demonstrating the lack of any significant 

shadow impact on surrounding neighborhoods.

XII. Wind

Petitioner SF argues that the EIR’s mitigation of wind impacts is

improper because details of the mitigation are deferred unnecessarily, and

without requiring future compliance with a specific performance standard. 

We consider the first issue almost frivolous and the second close, but

ultimately find the EIR adequate.

Surrounded on three sides by the Pacific Ocean and San Francisco Bay,

the City is a windy place. As the EIR recognizes, winds confronting

pedestrians can be intensified by the presence of buildings that are

“considerably taller than surrounding structures, particularly where such

taller buildings present large planar surfaces towards the prevailing winds.” 

Buildings that are less than 80 feet taller than surrounding buildings,
72

however, tend not to increase wind effects significantly. The EIR recognizes

that City ordinances have established a “wind hazard criterion” for judging

the significance of wind impacts: the creation of winds sustained at a speed

of 26 miles per hour for one full hour of the year. (S.F. Planning Code, § 148,

subd. (a).) The EIR adopts this as a criterion for significance, to the extent

the project “[c]reate[s] wind hazards in publicly accessible areas of

substantial pedestrian use.” The EIR observes that the City has also

established a “pedestrian comfort criterion” of 11 miles per hour for

pedestrian areas but, although the EIR assesses wind impacts against this

threshold, it does not purport to adopt this lower threshold as a standard of

significance.

The EIR’s discussion of wind impacts recognizes that some of the

buildings proposed in the Plan, particularly the New Hospital, have the

potential to create substantial wind effects. Computer modeling based on

simple massing suggests that the Plan’s buildings could result in winds

exceeding at least the pedestrian comfort criterion in several areas on and

around campus. More precise modeling, relying on wind-tunnel testing to

evaluate the specific design and siting of a building, was not performed

because building designs were not yet available. In the absence of more

precise information, the EIR predicts the New Hospital could, in some areas,

create conditions exceeding “the wind hazard criterion,” and it therefore

assumes that the New Hospital would cause a significant wind impact that

would be unavoidable with mitigation.

As required when a significant impact is found, the EIR adopts a

mitigation measure to minimize pedestrian wind impacts. The mitigation

measure requires wind-tunnel testing of the design of any new building

higher than 80 feet, evaluated under conditions representative of anticipated
73

Plan buildout. If the testing indicates the building would “increase the hours

of wind hazard exceedance or the number of test points subject to hazardous

winds, compared to then-existing conditions,” the university is required to

“work with the wind consultant to identify feasible mitigation strategies,

including design changes (e.g., setbacks, rounded/chamfered building corners,

stepped facades, etc.), to eliminate or reduce wind hazards to the maximum

feasible extent. If UCSF finds that these changes or other wind speed

reduction strategies are not feasible as they would unduly restrict the

proposed building’s space program, result in operational inefficiencies, and/or

[impose] substantially higher costs, the building(s) may nonetheless be

approved provided that the project incorporates wind speed reduction

strategies to the maximum feasible extent, as determined by UCSF in

consultation with the wind consultant. Wind speed reduction strategies could

also include features such as landscaping, localized installation of

porous/solid screens, installation of canopies along building frontages, and

the like.”

As discussed infra, an agency may not defer “[f]ormulation” of

mitigation measures but may defer “specific details . . . when it is impractical

or infeasible to include those details during the project’s environmental

review.” (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Petitioner SF disputes that

any such deferral was necessary, contending that designs for the new

buildings, including the New Hospital were, or could have been, available for

wind-tunnel testing while the EIR was being prepared. But petitioner points

to no persuasive evidence that this is true, and substantial evidence proves

otherwise, as the EIR makes clear that planning for the New Hospital was

still in process, which is why it would require a subsequent, project-level EIR. 

Even at the time of the Plan’s final EIR, the specific design of New Hospital
74

was still “being developed.” Since any concept design for the building was

necessarily subject to change and petitioner does not dispute that a final

building design is necessary for wind-tunnel testing, this aspect of its

challenge is without merit.

As for the second aspect of petitioner SF’s challenge, an EIR may defer

details of a mitigation measure only if “the agency (1) commits itself to the

mitigation, (2) adopts specific performance standards the mitigation will

achieve, and (3) identifies the type(s) of potential action(s) that can feasibly

achieve that performance standard and that will [be] considered, analyzed,

and potentially incorporated in the mitigation measure.” (Guidelines,

§ 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).; see East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 1254–1255.) Petitioner acknowledges that the mitigation measure

identifies a specific performance criterion—new exceedances of the 26 miles

per hour standard in pedestrian areas—but contends it does not require this

criterion to be met. 

At the outset, we observe that the mitigation measure need not require

full compliance with the City’s 26 miles per hour wind hazard criterion. 

CEQA does not require that all environmental impacts of a project be reduced

below the level of significance. A lead agency may approve a project with

unmitigable significant impacts if it adopts a statement of overriding

considerations (§ 21081, subd (b); Butte County, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 627–

628), as the Regents did here. The question is whether this mitigation

measure articulates a sufficiently specific performance standard that the

mitigation efforts must meet. (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) We

conclude that the measure’s requirement to “reduce wind hazards to the

maximum feasible extent” passes the test because the measure defines
75

feasibility with reference to “the proposed building’s space program, . . .

operational inefficiencies, and/or substantially higher costs.”

But we acknowledge that petitioner SF’s argument finds some support

in the recent East Oakland decision, which reached a contrary conclusion

regarding a similar mitigation measure. The project there was a new

professional baseball park, situated in a sizable proposed commercial

development that would feature several other large new buildings. (East

Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1237.) Because the size, design, and

location of buildings other than the ballpark had not yet been determined,

the project sponsor was unable to determine wind impacts with precision but

anticipated they would be significant and unavoidable. (Id. at p. 1273.) The

mitigation measure in East Oakland required wind-tunnel analysis for any

building exceeding 100 feet in height, and defined a significant wind impact

as winds over 36 miles per hour for an hour. (Ibid.) If wind-tunnel analysis

determined that a building’s design would cause an increase in significant

wind impacts, the project sponsor was required to “ ‘work with the wind

consultant to identify feasible mitigation strategies, including design changes

(e.g., setbacks, rounded/chamfered building corners, or stepped facades), to

eliminate or reduce wind hazards to the maximum feasible extent without

unduly restricting development potential. Wind reduction strategies could

also include features such as landscaping and/or installation of canopies

along building frontages, and the like.’ ” (Ibid.) The East Oakland court held

that for two reasons this mitigation measure failed to satisfy Guidelines

section 15126.4, subdivision (a)(1)(B). (Id. at pp. 1273–1274.)

First, the performance standard was not “ ‘specific’ ” because it

required “a reduction in wind impacts ‘to the maximum feasible

extent without unduly restricting development potential.’ ” (East Oakland,
76

supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1273–1274.) As the East Oakland court

explained, “[e]ven assuming that a mitigation measure may, in appropriate

circumstances, strike a balance between the reduction of environmental

impacts and commercial functionality, the mitigation measure must inform

the public where that balance has been struck. Mitigation measures ‘need

not include precise quantitative performance standards’ [citation],

but [Guidelines, s]ection 15126.4’s reference to ‘specific’ performance

standards implies a reasonably clear and objective measure of compliance.” 

(Id. at p. 1274.) The East Oakland mitigation measure failed this test

because “the point at which a restriction on development potential becomes

‘undue’ depends entirely on the value placed on reducing wind impacts by the

agency charged with overseeing compliance with the mitigation measure,”

and because the EIR failed “to explain the concept of ‘development

potential.’ ” (Ibid.)

Second, the East Oakland court held that the mitigation measure did

not sufficiently identify types of potential action that could feasibly achieve

the proposed performance standard and would be considered in implementing

it. “The wind mitigation measure merely mentions three possible design

changes in a parenthetical, combined with a final mention of ‘landscaping

and/or installation of canopies along building frontages, and the like.’ There

is no indication whether more significant changes in overall building size or

location may be considered or, if not, why more substantial changes are

deemed infeasible.” (East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1274–1275.)

Although the performance standard articulated in the Regent’s

mitigation measure is similar, we are persuaded that it differs enough to

articulate a “reasonably clear and objective measure of compliance” and

adequately inform the public where the balance between wind mitigation and
77

commercial functionality has been struck. (East Oakland, supra, 89

Cal.App.5th at p. 1274.) Our conclusion is influenced by the nature of wind

impacts and their mitigation. As noted above, significant wind impacts are

caused primarily by building size, particularly building height. The best way

to reduce wind impacts is to reduce the size of the building causing the

impact. Reducing building size, however, risks frustrating the project

sponsor’s objectives. Other types of mitigation are less effective but also have

less impact on the building’s utility.

Under the EIR’s wind mitigation measure, the university must

“identify feasible mitigation strategies . . . to eliminate or reduce wind

hazards to the maximum feasible extent.” The word “feasible” is key. “If

UCSF finds that . . . wind speed reduction strategies are not feasible as they

would unduly restrict the proposed building’s space program, result in

operational inefficiencies, and/or [impose] substantially higher costs, the

building(s) may nonetheless be approved. . . .” In other words, the university

is required to apply the modest mitigation strategies identified by the

measure—“design changes” such as “setbacks, rounded/chamfered building

corners, stepped facades, etc.” and “landscaping, localized installation of

porous/solid screens, installation of canopies along building frontages, and

the like”—to the extent those measures can be successfully employed to

reduce the wind impact of the offending building, but the university will not

be required to implement these or other measures to the extent they would

reduce the project’s “space program,” which we understand to mean

requirements for a building’s floor space, or impose “operational inefficiencies

and/or substantially higher costs.” The EIR discusses in several places the

Plan’s requirements for new space and the concepts of space utilization and

operational inefficiencies, putting some meat on the bones of those phrases. 
78

For example, the EIR assesses the reduced footprint alternative with a 19-

story New Hospital as suffering from “operational inefficiencies” because its

“irregularly-shaped footprint . . . would result in inefficient floor plates for

patient rooms, surgery suites, diagnostics and testing, labs and other hospital

functions.” Against the backdrop of this discussion, the standard expressed

in this mitigation measure is more specific than the standard at issue in East

Oakland of “unduly restricting development potential.” (East Oakland,

supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1274.) The Regent’s standard requires the

university to implement the identified type of wind mitigation measures, but

only to the extent those measures would not significantly change the size or

interfere with the operation of the proposed buildings.7

Petitioner SF objects that this is not a true standard, arguing that the

EIR was required to adopt as a performance standard its threshold of

significance for wind impacts. We might agree if the Regents were required

to mitigate wind impacts below the level of significance, as is ordinarily the

case. In that event, the mitigation measure would be required to describe, in

a reasonably clear and objective manner, the threshold for significance and

adopt that threshold as a performance standard. The Regents, however,

adopted a statement of overriding considerations with respect to wind

7 When, at oral argument, counsel for petitioner SF was asked what 

language petitioner would propose to make the mitigation measure’s 

performance standard more specific, he suggested only use of the word 

“feasible.” When it was pointed out that the measure already uses that term 

repeatedly, counsel responded that the mitigation measure’s definition of the 

term was not consistent with CEQA, ignoring that CEQA’s concept of 

feasibility includes the consideration of policy objectives. (See California 

Native Plant Society, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001 [“an alternative that 

‘is impractical or undesirable from a policy standpoint’ may be rejected as 

infeasible’ ”].) The wind mitigation measure’s use of the term properly takes 

into account such objectives.
79

impacts. Although we agree with East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1275, that the adoption of such a statement does not exempt an agency

from the obligation to establish a specific performance standard, its adoption

can change the nature of the standard required. By adopting a statement of

overriding considerations, the Regents expressed their view that the

environmental benefits of wind reduction measures do not justify impeding

the economic, technological, and other benefits of the Plan by reducing

building size, creating operational inefficiencies, or imposing substantially

higher costs. (§ 21081, subd. (b); see Butte County, supra, 13 Cal.5th at

pp. 627–628.) Given the Regents’ acceptance of significant wind impacts, the

performance standard was not required to specify an inflexible goal, but

rather to describe in a reasonably clear and objective manner what the

university will and will not do to reduce the wind impacts of the Plan’s

buildings. We are satisfied that the wind mitigation measure satisfies this

requirement.8

We acknowledge that the list of proposed actions to mitigate wind

impacts in the EIR is little different from list of actions found inadequate in

East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pages 1274–1275, adding only

“localized installation porous/solid screens.” The mitigation measure

recognizes, however, that these are merely illustrative examples of the design

and landscaping features that may be used to reduce wind impacts, adding

8 King & Gardiner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814, cited by counsel at oral 

argument, is not to the contrary. King & Gardiner properly observes that the 

adoption of a statement of overriding considerations “does not negate the 

statutory obligation to implement feasible mitigation measures.” (Id. at 

p. 852.) But the case does not address the issue presented here: whether the 

adoption of such a statement can influence the nature of a performance 

standard adopted to guide future mitigation.
80

“etc.” and “and the like” to its two lists of proposed actions. And unlike in

East Oakland, there is no question here that “significant changes in overall

building size” are not among the mitigation strategies that will be considered. 

(East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1274–1275.) Given the nature of

the EIR’s performance standard, we find the list of proposed actions in

mitigation sufficient.9

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s judgment in each of the three Superior Court actions is 

affirmed. 

TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.

RODRÍGUEZ, J.

9 At the court’s request, the parties provided supplemental briefing 

addressing whether petitioner SF’s wind-related challenge to the EIR was 

moot in light of the subsequent certification of a project-level EIR for the New 

Hospital (or any other recent event). Having reviewed the parties’ 

submissions, we decline to resolve the issue on mootness grounds because, as 

petitioner points out, the mitigation measure also applies to building projects 

other than the New Hospital, including to the Research and Academic 

Building, which may also cause significant wind impacts. 
81

Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Frank Roesch

Counsel: Soluri Meserve, Patrick M. Soluri, Osha R. Meserve, and 

James C. Crowder for Plaintiffs and Appellants Yerba 

Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC and Parnassus 

Neighborhood Coalition et al.

Thomas N. Lippe for Plaintiff and Appellant San 

Franciscans for Balanced and Livable Communities

The University of California Office of General Counsel,

Anagha Dandekar Clifford; Lubin Olson & 

Niewiadomski, Charles R. Olson, Philip J. Sciranka, 

Carolyn J. Lee; Monchamp Meldrum, Amanda J. 

Monchamp, and Hope Schmeltzer for Defendants and 

Respondents 

Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC et al. v. Regents of the University of California/San Franciscans for Balanced 

and Livable Communities v. Regents of the University of California (A166091/A166094)