### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Ja nuary4, 200 5 S es sio n

CIT Y OF KNOXVI LLE v. ENT ERTAI NMENT RESO URCES, LLC.

App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Appe als Chancery Court

for Knox County No. 140736-2 Dar yl F ansler, Chancellor

No. E2002-01143-SC-R11- CV - F iled Jun e 29, 2005

We gr anted this appe al to determine the co nstitut ionality of a Knox ville city

ordinanc e re g ulating the location of a dult businesses. The chance ry court upheld the ordinance and enjoined oper ation of the de fendant’s video store a fter f inding that it fit the def

inition of an adu l t b o o k store and w as located w ith in 1
, 0 0 0 f

e e t o f p r o h ib it e d ar e a s a n d th e r e f o r e w a s o p e r a ti n g in v io lati o n o f the

or din a nc e . T he Cou rt

of Ap pe a ls r e ve rs e d o n th e g ro un ds that th e ord inanc e ’s de fi nit ionof a du lt bo ok stores is un consti tut ion a lly va g ue . B e c aus e we ha ve a lso de te rm ine d th a t th e or din a nc e is unconstitutionallyvag ue under the United States and Te nnessee C o n stitut ions, we af firm the decision of the Court of

Appea ls but on the s epar ate gr ounds set forth her ein. We rema nd to the trial court for an asse ssment of th e am o u n t o f damag es incurr ed by the def endant a s a re sult of the chanc ery court’s injunction.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e nt of t he Co ur t o f Appe als Aff irm ed

E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J A N I CE M. H OL DER , and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined. F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III
, C.J ., filed a c oncurring opinion.

Ang ela R. B olton and W. Morris Kiz er, Knox ville, Tennesse e, for the Appellant, City of Knoxvil le.

Phili p N. Elbert a nd W. David Bridg ers, Na shville, Tennessee , and Richar d L

. Gaines, Knox ville, Te nn e sse e , f

or theAp pe lle e , E nte rt a inm e nt R e so ur c e s, LL C.

OP IN ION

I n 1 97 9, the Kn oxvil le City Cou nc il a do pte d a n o rd inanc e re g ulatin g , a mon g oth e r thin g s, the location of “ adult businesses.” At all times r eleva nt to this a ppeal, Knoxvi lle CityCode section 16-468 (“ the ordinanc e”) provided that a dult businesses c ould not be located w ithin 1,000 feet of:

a re sidentially -z o n ed d i s t rict; an a rea devoted to re cre ational ac tivity ; or an e stablishment selling-2-

a lc oh oli c be ve ra g e s. Th e or din a nc e inc lud e d a du lt b oo ks tor e s in its de fi nit ion of a du lt b us ine sse s. An a du lt b oo ks tor e wa s d e fi ne d a s:

a n e sta bli sh me nt h a vin g a s a

su bs ta nti a l or

sig nif ic a nt po rt ionof

its stock and tra de books, mag azines and other pe riodicals, vi d eo t apes
or other elec tronic media which are distinguished or c hara cterized by their emphasis on matter depicting , describing or relating to spec ified

s ex u al activities or spec ified anatomical are as, or an establishment wi th a seg ment or a se ction devoted to the sa le or display of such materia l.

Kn oxvil le Cit y

Cod e § 1 6- 46 8( a ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he pa rt ie s d isp ute wh e the r the ph ra se “substantial or sig nificant portion of its stock and tra de” is impermissibly vag ue under

the United States and Tenne ssee Constitutions

.

Bac kgr ound

Th e City of Kn oxvil le fi le d a complaint in Kn ox Cou nty Chanc e ry Cou rt se e kin g to e njo in the def endant, E n t er t ai n ment Resource s, from oper ating its store in alleg ed violation of the ordinanc e. The following fac ts were develope d befor e the ch an ce ry co urt and stipulated by the parties.

On Aug ust 3, 1998, Entertainment Resources ope ned a store called F antasy Video at 6422 Pape rm ill Roa d inKn oxvil le , T e nn e sse e . E nte rt a inm e nt Re so ur c e s a lso op e rate d tw o s tor e s in Na sh vil le a ndon e in C olu mbi a , T e nn e sse e . I t pla nn e d to ope n two Kn oxvil le sto re s in a dd iti on to Fa ntasy Video.

Fa ntasy Video, like Entertainmen t Resource s’ other store s, rented and sold videotapes for of f- sit e vie wi ng . Wh e n F a nta sy Vi de o o pe ne d, its inv e nto ry c on sis te d o f 8 0% a du lt o r sexua lly expli cit, “X- rate d” videos a nd 20% familyor g ener al videos. Gene ral videos we re display ed in the store’s “ front room.” Adult vide os wer e display ed in the store’s “bac k room,” which wa s restricte d to patrons 18 y ear s of ag e and olde r.

Under the spac ing pr ovisions o f t he Knoxvill e ordina nce, an “adult business” c ould not le g a ll y lo c a tea t th e s it e o f

th e F a n ta s y

V id e o s to r e

. It w a s s ti p u late d th a t th e s it e w a s lo c a te d n e xt door to the Ne w Mexicali Rose restaurant, which sold beer and liquor; within 1,000 feet of a B oy Scouts administrative building, and w ithin 1,000 feet (a s t h e cr ow flies) of a re sidentially

zoned district, although the residential district was separ ated from the store by I nterstate 40. E ntertainment Resource s did not believe that the Boy Scouts building qualified as a building de voted to rec reational activity and did not believe it wa s within 1,000 fe et of a re sidential district. Although Enter tainment Re so ur c e s h a d f

ull kn ow le dg e that th e Ne w M e xica li Ro se re staur a nt s oldbe e r and liq uo r, it c ho se to locate F a n ta s y V id e o o n Pa p e r mi ll Ro a d b e c au s e it s la w y e r h a d a d v is e d th e c o mp a n y th at the Knoxvi lle ordinanc e wa s unconstitutional.-3-

Shortlyafte r F antasy

Video opene d in Aug ust 1998, the Knox ville Poli ce Depa rtment beg an inspecting the store and issuing citations for violation of the ordinanc e on an a lmost dailybasis. The citations al l eged that Fanta sy Video wa s an adult bookstore w ithin the meaning of the ordina nce beca use a substantial or sig nificant portion of its stock and trade constituted videotapes c ontaining materia l within the ambit of the ordinance

.

I n response to the citations
, Entertainment Resources attempted to g ain clarification fr om the police and f

rom the City ’s law direc tor as to w hat constituted a “substantial or sig nificant” portion of stock and tr ade unde r the ordina nce, but no g uidance was provide d.

At a hea ring on some of t he citations in Knoxvi lle CityCourt, three of the offic ers involved in the ins pe c tio ns of

F a nta sy Vi deo te sti fi e d th a t th e y ha d r e c e ive d n o g uid a nc e or tr a ini ng in interpre ting the or dinance . When asked to def ine t h e terms in the ordinance , Serg eant F erg uson testified that he c ould not define “ substantial” other tha n, “substantial means substa n t i al as red

means re d; I know red when I see it, but I can’ t de scribe r ed.” H e further testified that “sig nificant
to me means a

quantity of som ething that, compar ed to something else [sic].” Office r Major te stified that “ su bs ta nti a l is su bs ta nti a l. I do n’ t re a lly ha ve a n opin ion on the de fi nit ionof su bs ta nti a l, i t is

se lf -ex pl anatory .” He fu rthe r e xpla ine d, “ sig nif ic a nt i s ju st l ike su bs ta nti a l, I me a n, sig nif

ic a nt i s signific ant, just a s substantial is substantial.” Offic er Shelton similarly testified that “s u b s t antial means substantial just like the color blue me ans the c olor blue. I can’ t provide any

other [sic].” He also testified that “sig nificant means signific ant.” I t w as stipulated that if called to testify further
, the of fi c e rs wo uldte sti fy that in makin g thee va luatio n o f “ su bs ta nti a l” a nd“ sig nif ic a nt” the y

wo uld look to what appea

red to them to be the “important part of the business.”

B y No ve mbe r 1 99 8, En te rt a inm e nt R e so ur c e s h a d a lte re d th e c omp os iti on of F a nt asy Video’s inventory

. A police inventory on November 17, 1998, reve aled that approximately 57% of the sto c k w a s g e ne ra l f

e a tur e vid e os a ndapp ro xima te ly 43 % of the sto c k w a s a du lt- orie nte d v ide os

. The ba lance was late r adjusted a g ain; the tally from a count on Dec ember 8, 1998, was 70% g ener al feature a nd 30% adult fe ature . Despite these alterations, the Citypolice continued to issue c itations up until the date that the pre liminary injunction wa s enter ed. As of November 1998, Entertainment Resource s had bee n cited and f ound g uiltyof fifty -three separ ate violations of the or dinance . As of No ve mbe r 1 6, 19 98 , at le a st 7 5% of F a nta sy Vi de o’ s r e ve nu e s w e reg e ne rate d b y the “ ba c k r oo m” videos.

The re cord indicates that at l east one other business in Knoxvi lle rents and se lls videos that fa ll wi thi n the pu rv ie w of the or din a nc e

. I t wa s sti pu la te d that Ge mst on e Vi de o Sto re s ha ve se pa rate back r ooms devoted to adult-orie nted videotape s and m ag azines. I t was stipulated that the City takes the position that Gemstone Video Stores ar e not “a d u l t bookstores” w ithin the meaning of the ordinanc e and that the back r oom stock is not a s u b s tantial or sig nificant portion of G emstone Vi de o’ s st ock an d tr a de , b ut the re c or d d oe s n ot s ho w the pe rc e nta g e br e akd ow n b e tw e e n a du lt videos and g ener al videos.-4-

I n s pit e of

the re pe a te d c itatio ns , E nte rt a inm e nt R e so ur c e s c ontinue d to op e rate F a nta sy Video. The ref

ore, on N ovember 4, 1998, the City of Knoxvi lle filed a complaint for injunctive relief

se e kin g to enj oi n En ter ta inm e nt R e so ur c e s f ro m op e ratin g in v iol a tio n o f the or din a nc e . In it s
answe r, Entertainment Resource s aver red numerous defe nses, i ncluding the claim that the ordinanc e is i mpe rm iss ibl y

va g ue un de r the Un ite d St a te s a ndTe nn e sse e Con sti tution s.

On Dec ember

10, 1998, the cha ncery co urt g rante d the City ’s motion for a tempor ary inj un c tio n r e str a ini ng En te rt a inm e nt R e so ur c e s f ro m op e ratin g a n a du lt b oo ks tor e a t the Pape rm ill Roa d lo c a tio n. Th e c ha nc e ry c ou rt re a so ne d th a t a

te mp ora ry inj un c tio n w a s a

pp ro pria te be c aus e En te rt a inm e nt R e so ur c e s h a d o pe ne d t he Fantas y Vi de o s tor e on Pape rm ill Roa d w ithfu ll knowledg e of the ordinanc e, and it wa s not disputed that the a dult videos offer ed for sale a nd renta l
at Fa ntasy Video wer e within the purview of the ordinance. T he chancery court further noted that

ov e r 7 5% of

thesto re ’s r even ue and a t le a st 8 5% of its c us tom e rs we rea ttribu ta ble to the a du lt videos. The c ourt opined that the g ener al video inventory was, “despite its number . . . insig nificant and insubstantial to this busi ness’s stock in trade .”

For two y ear s after

the entry of t h e t em p orary

injunction there wa s litt le movement on the

me ri ts o f the c a se

. F a nta sy Vi de o’ s g e ne ra l vid e o bu sin e ss e ve ntu a lly dw ind le d to the po int that it was only open two hours pe r we ek. In J anuary 2001, Entertainment Resour ces lost its lease on the Papermill Road location and the City moved to dismiss the suit as moot. The chanc ery court g rante d that mo tio n o n July

9, 20 01 , e xce pt w ithre spect to E nte rt a inm e nt R e so ur c e s’ c la im f or da ma g e s. Entertainment Resour ces a rg ued that it was e ntitled to damag es not o n l y as t o the Fantasy Video store, which ha d only operated for four months on Papermill Road prior to e ntry of the injunction, but also as to the two additional stores it had planne d to open in Knoxvi lle.

Nine months later, on April 15, 2002, the chanc ery court e ntere d an or d er u pholding the inj un c t i o n a n d d e n y i n g d a m a g e s

. T h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t b e c au s e E n t e r t a i n m e n t R e s o u r c e s wa s in

“ dir e c t vi olatio n” of

theor din a nc e , it

wa s n ot e nti tle d to c ha lle ng e it a s v a g ue . T he c ou rt a lso he ld that the ordinanc e wa s a constitutional t i m e, place and manne r re striction aimed at combating the

se c on da ry e ff e c ts o f a du lt b us ine sse s.

En te rt a inm e nt R e so ur c e s a pp e a le d. Th e Cou rt

of Ap pe a ls r e ve rs e d th e c ha nc e ry c ou rt , re a so nin g that be c aus e n e ith e r the City no r the e nf

or c ing of fi c e rs c ou ld d e fi ne the te rm s “ su bs ta nti a l” or “sig nificant,” and bec ause the impreci s io no f th e terms prevente d “‘me n of common intellige nce’ ” from un d er s t anding the ordinanc e, the or dinance was “ unconstitutionallyvag ue and, the ref ore, unenfor cea

ble.” The Court of Appeals rema nded to the t rial court for a de termination of dama g es
a nda tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Th e app e llate c ou rt re je c te d the City ’s arg ume nt that E nte rt a inm e nt R e so ur c e s’ damag es as to the Fa ntasy Video store wer e too spe culative for rec overy

. The cour t d eclined, howeve r, to instruct the trial court to a war d damag es for the sec ond and third planne d, but unopened, stores, finding that those damag es we re too spec ulative to permit rec overy . We gr anted r eview and now af firm the Court of Appe als on the sepa rate g rounds set forth below.-5- Ana lys is

Standard of Review

I nterpre tation of statutes and ordina nces is a question of law which we revie w de novo. See State ex rel. Pope v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 145 S.W .3d 529, 533 (Tenn. 2004)

. The Vaguene ss Doctrine

The F ourtee nth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion prohibits st ates fr om “depriv[ ing] any

person of life, liberty , or prope rty , without due process of law .” Article I , section 8 of the Te nnessee Constit ution provides an identica l protection; as we h av e o ft en observe d, “the ‘law of the land’ pr oviso of our constitution is sy nony mous with the ‘due proc ess of law ’ provisions of the fe dera l constituti on.” State ex rel. Ang lin v. Mit chell, 596 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tenn. 1980) (citing Daug herty

v. State, 393 S.W .2d 739 (Tenn. 1965) ).

Due pr ocess of

law re quires, among other thing s, notice of what the law prohibits. L aws must “g ive the person of ordinary intelligenc e a rea sonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,

so that he may act accor dingly .” Gray ned v. City of R ockfor d, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). Criminal statutes “must ‘def

ine the criminal offense wi th sufficient de finiteness that ordinary people c an understand w hat conduc t is prohibited . . . . ’” Da v i s -Kidd B ooksellers, Inc. v. McWherte r, 866 S.W. 2d52 0, 53 2 ( Te nn . 199 3) (q uo tin g Ko le nd e r v. L a ws on , 461 U. S. 352 , 358 (1 98 3) ). A s ta tut e is unconstituti onally

vag ue, ther efor e, if it does not s er v e sufficient notice of w hat is prohibited, forc ing “ ‘men of c ommon intelli g ence [t o] necessarily g uess at its meaning .’” D avis-Kidd, 866 S.W. 2d a t 532 (q uo tin g B ro a dric k v. Okl aho ma , 413 U. S. 601 , 607 (1 97 3) ); se e a lso L e e c h v . A m. Bookse llers Ass’n, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 738, 746 (Tenn. 1979).

I n addition to the require ment of notice, the vag ueness doc trine re quires that statutes provide “minimal guide lines to gove rn law e nforc eme n t

. ” Davis-Kidd, 866 S.W.2d at 532. Be cause “[a] vag ue law impermissibl y deleg ates ba sic policy

matters to policemen, judg es, an d j uries for resolution on an ad hoc and su b j ective ba sis, with the attendant dang ers of arbitra ry and discriminatory

applicatio n , ” Gr ayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, “ the re quirement that a leg islature establish minimal guidelines to g overn la w enf orce ment” is the more i m p o rt ant aspe ct of the vag ueness doc trine. Smith v. Gogue n 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).

Va g ue la ws imp lic a tin g theF ir st A me nd me nt t o th e Un ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on a ndArtic le I , section 19 of the T ennesse e Constituti on are subject to a more stringe nt standard than la ws in other contexts because of

the dang er of

chilling pr otected spe ech. D avis-Kidd, 866 S.W.2d at 531. “Where a s tatu te ’ s li te r a l s c o p e , u n a id e d b y a n arr o w in g s tate c o u r t in te rp r e tati o n , is c ap ab le ofT h e c o n c u rr ing o p inio n su g g e sts tha t t h is is a c a se inv o lvin g a n o v e rb re a d th a n a lysis. T h e issu e b e fo re this 1

C our t , howev er , i s not wh et her t he ordi nan ce r eac hes bot h pr ot ect ed an d unpr ot ect ed conduct
, but wh et her t he ordi nan ce is un c le a r in it s p ro h ib iti o n s. A ltho u g h “v a g u e n e s s a n d o v e rb re a d th [ a re ] lo g ic a lly re la te d a n d sim ilar d o c trine s,” K o le n d e r, 4 6 1 U .S . at 3 5 8 n.8 , t h e y a re d istinc t co n c e p ts. S e e , e.g ., D a v is-K id d , 8 6 6 S .W .2 d a t 5 2 3 -2 9 , 5 3 1 -3 2

.

T he co ncurri ng op i ni o n notes t hat t he C o urt i n Y o ung ref used t o c o nsi d er t he d efend ant s’ vagueness chal l enge 2

b e c a u se the c h a llen g e d o rd ina n c e s “u n q u e stio n a b ly” a p p lied to th e d e fen d a n ts. T h e C o u rt so h e ld , h o w e v e r, o n ly af t er f i r s t c on cl u di n g t h at t h e or di n an ce s a t i s s u e di d n ot c r ea t e a s i g n i f i ca n t de t er r en t ef

fec t an d wer e “ r ea di l y s u bj ec t t o a narrowing co nst ruct i o n b y t he st at e co urt s. ” Y o ung, 4 2 7 U

. S. at 6 0

- 6 1

. T he co ncurri ng o p i ni o n al so no t es th a t t he

o rd ina n c e up h e ld b y the C o u rt in Y o u n g c o n ta ine d th e s a m e “ su b sta n tial o r sig n ifi c a n t” d e finiti o n w ith re g a rd to a d u lt b o o k sto re s a s d o e s the K n o x v ill e o rd ina n c e w e c o n sid e r h e re . H o w e v e r , Y o u n g a d d re sse d a c h a llen g e to a n e n tire ly separat e sect i o n of t he o rdinance, and t he C o urt i n Y o ung did no t pa ss on t he co nst i t ut i o nal i t y of t he d ef i ni t i o n at i ss ue in th is c a se

.
-6- rea ching expression sheltered by the Fir st Amendment, the doctrine demands a g reater de g ree of specific ity

than in other c ontext s.” Smith, 415 U.S . at 573. 1

Withthe se princ ipl e s inmin d, we turn to thequ e sti on of wh e the r the or din a nc e is unconstitutionallyvag ue.
Validity of the Ordinance

The City arg ues that the terms “substantial” and “sig nificant” are familiar terms capa ble of

re a dy un de rs ta nd ing by

pe rs on s o f o rd ina

ry int e lli g e nc e

. Mo reov e r, arg ue s th e City , w e mus t construe “ substantial” and “ signific ant” in the c o n t ex t o f the statute a s a whole. Ente rtainment Re so ur c e s a

rg ue s th a t “ su bs ta nti a l” a nd“ sig nif ic a nt” areun c on sti tut ion a lly va g ue be c aus e the te rm s have no f ix ed meaning.

I n evaluating a law, such as t he Knoxvill e ordina nce, that “af fec ts communication protecte d by the Fir st Amendment,” we may consider a challeng e to its fac ial validity reg ardle ss of whethe r
or no t th e la w i s v a g ue a s a pp lie d to thede fe nd a nt i f “ the statut e ’s de te rr e nt e ff e c t onle g iti ma te expression is . . . both real and substantial and if the statute is [ not] rea dily subject to a na

rrowing construction by

the state c ourts.” Young v. Am. Mini-Theate rs , 4 2 7 U. S. 50, 60 (1976) (interna l quotations omitted); see also U. S. v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975); NAACP v. Button, 371 2 U.S. 415, 432- 33 (1963). Her e, the deter rent eff ect was indee d substantial; Entertainment Resourc es was for ced to c lose its doors and abandon its plans to open a se cond and third store . Moreove r, as
we e x plain below, the ordinanc e is not susceptible to a narr owing construction. For the rea sons that follow, we c onclude that the Knox ville ordinance is vag ue and inva lid on its fac e.

F ir st, theina

bil ity of the of fi c e rs c ha rg e d w ithe nf

or c ing the or din a nc e to d e fi ne its ke y te rm s weig hs heavily

ag ain s t t h eo r d in an c e ’ s c o n s tituti onality . Knoxvi lle Police Offic ers F erg uson, Major, and Shelton a ll testified that they wer e unable to def ine “substantial.” T he off icer s testified that the Cityhad not instructed them a s to w hat constituted a substantial portion of sexually -explicit m aterial bu t th a t th e y , p e rs on a lly , kne w w hat “ su bs ta nti a l” me a nt. As En te rt a inm e nt Re so ur c e s po int s o ut, howeve r, “I

know it whe n I see it” is not a constitutionally -sound standard. Particularly when spe echT he concu r r i ng opi ni on as s er t s t hat “ s ubs t ant i al ” i s ca pabl e of def i ni t i on, not i ng t hat t hi s Co ur t def i ned 3

“sub st an t i al” i n In re V alen t i ne , 7 9 S .W .3d 5 3 9
, 5 4 8

- 4 9 (T en n. 2 0 0 2 ). T he d efi nit i o n o f sub st an t i al o f

fere d i n that ca se

w a s “‘o f re a l wo rth a n d im p o rta n c e .’” Id . at 5 4 8 (q u o ting B la c k ’s L a w D ic tio n a ry 1 4 2 8 (6 e d . 1 9 9 0 )) . It i s d iff ic u lt th

t o s ee how s ubs t i t ut i ng “ of r eal wor t h a nd i mp ort anc e” for “ s ubst ant i al ” woul d cl ar i f y wh at port i on of

adul t

- ori ent ed
sto c k a n d tra d e a b u sin e ss c o u ld c a rr y w itho u t b e ing su b je c t t o the o rd ina n c e

.
-7- is b e ing re g ulate d, the Con sti tut ionde ma nd s th a t g ov e rn me nt b od ie s ma ke a g re a te r attempt t o define what conduc t is prohibited to avoid chilling protec ted spee ch.

As written, the de termination of what constitutes a “substantial or si g nificant portion” of a business’s “stock and trade ” under the ordinance is an entirely subjective one. The ordina nce g ives

no ob je c tiv e g uid a nc e to b us ine sse s r e g ulate d by th e ordinanc e or of fi c ia ls c ha

rg e d w ithits

e nf or c e me nt. “ Ac c or din g ly
, it ne ith e r g ive s no tic e to or din ary pe op le

. . . no r s uf fi c ie nt g uid a nc e to law enf orce ment officia ls to preve nt a rbitrary law enfor ceme nt.” Davis-Kidd, 866 S.W .2d at 532. Th is t ype of

va g ue , “ stand ard le ss” dr a ft ing is p re c isely wha t the Du e Pr oc e ss c laus e pr oh ibi ts, be c aus e it “ a llo ws po lic e me n, prose cut ors, a ndjurie s to pu rs ue the ir pe rs on a l pr e dil e c tio ns

. L eg islatures m ay not so abdicate t heir responsibilit ies for setting t he st andar ds of the criminal law.” Smit h, 415 U.S. at 575.

We note t hat t he C ity objects t o using the testimonyof Off icer s Fe rg uson, Major, and Shelton to d e mon str a te that th e or din a nc e is unc on sti tut ion a lly va g ue . T he City

po int s o ut that th e c on te nt, meaning and application of the ordinanc e is not a matter of fac t to be proven by

witness testimony but is rather a

matter of la w to be construe d by the Court. State ex re l. Pope, 145 S.W.3d at 533; see also Dempsey

v. Correc t Mfg . Corp., 755 S.W .2d 798, 806 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). As the Court of Appea ls corre ctly

held, howeve r, here the witnesses’ te stimonyillust rate s the issue at the ve ry heart of the va g ue ne ss c ha lle ng e : e nf or c e me nt o f the or din a nc e wa s le ft to the “ pe rs on a l pr e dil e c tio ns ” of the po lic e . Smith , 415 U. S. at 575

. Th e of fi c e rs ’ co nf

us ion de mon str a te s tha t the or din a nc e fails to p ro vid e a sc e rt a ina

blestand ard s f

or la w e nf or c e me nt.

Second, the terms as used in the conte x t of the ordinanc e cannot be def ined with any

deg ree of pre cisio n

. I n o u r view, the f act that the te rms “substantial” and “sig nificant” are common and familiar terms does not support the arg ument that they are constitutional a s used in the ordinanc e. The wor ds “big ” and “ small” arecertain l y common and familiar as well, but if used to desc ribe pr oh ibi te d c on du c t, they wou ld no m or e pa ss c on sti tut ion a l mu ste r tha n d o th e te rm s in thi s ordinanc e. F or it is not the words themsel ves that must be ca pable of rea dy understanding by persons of or dinary

intelligenc e, but the conduct that is prohibited that must be re adily understood. 3

To bo lst e r its ar g ume nt that “su bs ta nti a l” a nd “ sig nif ic a nt” arec on sti tut ion a l w he n u se d in statutes, the C ity points out that the t erms appear hundreds of times in state and fe dera l statutes. See 15192 Thirteen Mile Rd., Inc. v. City of Warren, 626 F. Supp. 803, 820 (E.D. Mich. 1985) . As the City its e lf no te s, ho we ve r, w e must r e a d th os e te rm s in thec on te xt of theor din a nc e . T he te rm s “substantial” a nd “sig nificant” in t his ordinance mere ly tell us that if a business has a c erta in, undefine d amount of sexually -explicit material, then it is subject to the location restric tions of the

or din a nc e . Wh a t is “ su bs ta nti a l” or “ sig nif ic a nt” to on e pe rs on ma y

jus t a s e a sil y

be “ un su bs ta nti a l”-8-

or “insig nificant” to another

. The fact that the C ity itself was unsure what a mount of material the
te rm s w e re int e nd e d to re a c h is dem on strate d b othby the City ’s failu reto o ff e r g uid a nc e to Entertainment Resour ces and by the conf usion of the offic ers c harg ed with e nforc ing the ordinanc e.

Th ir d, the City

de c lin e d to g ivea ny

lim iti ng c on str

uc tio n to the or din a nc e , a ndwe areun able to i mpo se a

na rr ow ing de fi nit ion to sa lva g e its c on sti tut ion a lit y . A s th e c on c ur ri ng op ini on no te s, this Court has cautioned that “[c]ourts should consider any limit ing instruc tions of the challeng ed statute that state authorities have prof fer ed.” State v. Bur

khart, 58 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tenn. 2001). I n this case , howeve r, no such i nstruction has been proff ere d, either to Entertainment Resour ces or to this C ourt. Enterta inment Resource s reque sted that th e C i t y tell it how to reapportion its stock in order to c omply

with the ordinanc e. The Cityref used. Entertainment Resour ces the n altere d the

c omp os iti on of

theF a nta sy

Vi de o s toc k f

ro m 80 % a du lt- orien te d mate ri a l to 57 %, a ndfi na lly to 30%. After eac h alteration, the Citycontinued to maintain that Fantasy Video wa s in violation of the ordinanc e. In o u r view, re quiring a party to eng ag e in this sort of g uessing g ame is a c lear vio la tio n o f d ue pr oc e ss. Th e “ abs e nc e of a ny a sc e rt a ina

ble stand ardfo r i nc lus iona nde xclu sio n is prec isely what off ends the Due Process Clause.” Smit h, 415 U.S. at 578.

Th e c on c ur

ri ng op ini on state s th a t w e faile d to “ c on sid e r w hethe r the or din a nc e is r e a dil y susceptible to a n ar rowing construction which w ould alleviate a ny perc eived unc onstitut ional vag ueness.” But in th e ab s en ce o f an y h int from the City , we a re at a loss as to how to impart meaning to the terms “substantial” and “sig nificant” without rewriting the ordinanc e. The

concur ring opinion points out that a si milar Nashville ordinanc e def ines an a dult video store as a n

“ e sta bli sh me nt h a vin g a

ma jority of its sto c k o r a

ma jority of its floo r sp ace de dic a te d to ” a du lt

ma te ri a l. Apr e vio us ve rs ionof that or din a nc e , in va lid a te d a s u nc on sti tut ion a lly va g ue in E llw e st Ste re o T he a te r, I nc . v . B on e r, 71 8 F . Su pp . 1 55 3, 15 81 (M .D . T e nn . 1 98 9) , h a d used the t e rm s “substantial” a nd “sig nificant.” Whil e we ag ree that “majority ” is clea rer than “substantial,” suc h a dra stic revision by this Court would amount to impermissibl e judicial leg islation. “[C ]ourts m ay supply words whe n rea sonably

called f or. Ne verthe less, it is t he prer og ative of the leg islature, and
not the c o u r ts , to a me n d s tatu te s

. ” I n r e Sw a n s o n , 2 S. W. 3 d 1 8 0
, 1 8 6

- 8 7 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 9 ) (citations omitted). I n the Nashvill e case, it was the Nashville C ity Council, a leg islative body , that supplied the na rr ow ing c on str

uc tio n, no t th e c ou rt s.

I t i s d i ff i cu l tt o u n d er s t an d t h e C i t y ’s re l u ct an ce t o fu rt h ercl ar i fyth e o rd i n an ce

. “A l t h o u gh due proc ess does not requireimpossibl e standa rds of c larity , this is not a ca se whe re f urther pr ecision in the statutory

lang uag e is e ither impossibl e or impractica l.” Kolender
, 461 U.S. at 361 (interna l quotation and citation omitted). Surely the Citymust h av e h ad some idea of what amount of sexually -explicit m aterial was tolera ble under the ordin an ce , particula

rly g iven the fa ct that the

r e c o r d s h o w s t h a tt h e C i t y t ak e s t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t G e m s t o n e V i d e o S t o r e s , w h i c h a l s o s t o c k s e x u a l l yexpli cit videotapes, w as not in viola t i o n o f t he ordina nce. See , e.g ., Vill. of Hoffma n Estates v. Flipsid e, Ho ffman E states, I nc., 455 U.S. 489, 503-04 (1982) (ordinanc e re g ulating sa le of drug para pherna lia not vag ue, in part because villag e attorne y issued g uidelines to businesses aff ecte d by ordinanc e).-9-

I n the abse nce of

any articula ble s t an dards f

rom the City , we must conc lude that the

or din a nc e is v a g ue “ no t in the se ns e that it re qu ir e s a pe rs on to c on fo rm his c on du c t to a n impr e c ise bu t c omp re he ns ibl e no rm a tiv e stand ard , b ut rat her in the se ns e that no stand ardof c on du c t is specifie d at all.” Coate s v. Cityof Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).

Finally , the Cityarg ues that Entertai n m en t Resource s may not challeng e the or dinance as fac ially vag ue bec ause the Fa ntasy Video store w as cle arly

within the purview of the ordinanc e. B ur kh art , 5 8 S. W.3 d at 69 9. As we ha ve e xpla ine d, ho we ve r, in s ome c ir c ums ta nc e s e ve n a pa rty who is within the ambit of an ordinanc e may challeng e it as fa cia l l y vag ue if prote cted communication is at issue. Yo u n g, 4 2 7 U. S. at 59-60. Moreove r, the fa cts of this case belie the City ’s insistence that Ente rtainment Resourc es fell within the purview of the ordinanc e, bec ause, a s we ha ve explained, the ordina nce ha s no boundaries. Ent er t ai n m ent R esourc es re duced its stock from 80% a dult videos to 30% without, evidently , lo ca t ing the upper e dg e of w hat constituted an

a ccept abl e po rt io n o f st ockdev ot ed t o ad ul t- ori ent ed m ate ri al. Gi ven th e C it y ’s i nab il it y to art ic ula

te any constitutionally -mea ningf ul standards for

the ordinanc e’s de fin i t i o n of adult bookstores, we conclude that the ordinanc e is unconstitutionallyvag ue and une nforc eable

. Remaining Issues

Having determined that the def inition of “adult bookstores” in Knoxvi lle CityCode section 16-468 i s void for vag ueness, weneed not r eac h the parties’ ar g uments as to the validity of the inj un c tio n en te re d by the tr ia l cou rt . We a lso de c lin e to r e a c h E nte rt a inm e nt R e so ur c e s’ arg ume nts that such an or dinance is not a valid time, place and manner reg ulati o n , t h at i t failed to provide

rea sonable a lternative a venues of communication, that such a n o rd i n an ce may never be justified using the “sec ondary eff

ects” doctrine under Article 1, section 19 of the Te nnessee Constit ution, and that the injunction was an unc onstitut ional prior re straint.

Damages

Be cause the chancery

court he ld that Entertainment Resourc es had been properly enjoined fr om o pe ratin g F a nta sy

Vi de o p ur su a nt t o th e or din a nc e , it did no t addre ss E nte rt a inm e nt R e so ur c e s’ dama ges

. We ag ree with the Court of Appea ls that Entertainment Resourc es is entitled to a determination of damag es as to the Fa ntasy Video Store on Papermill Road, but that it is not entitled to damag es as to the planned, but unope ned, second and third Knoxvil le stores. We re mand to the chanc ery court to asse ss the amount of Entertainment Resource s’ d am age s and to determine the pr op ri e ty of a wa rd ing a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.

Conclusion

Having considere d the re cord and applicable authority , we hold that Knoxvill e City Code

se c tio n 1 6

- 4 6 8 i s v a g u e a n d u n e n f o r c e ab l e u n d e r

th e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d T e n n e s s e e C o n s t i t u t i o n s. We remand to the c hance ry court for a determination of Entertainment Resource s’ damag es flowing-10-

from that court’s injunction. Cost s of the appe al ar e taxed to the appellant, City of Knoxvil le, and i t s s u r e t y, f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ E. RILEY AN DE RSO N, JUSTI CE