An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA 13

- 1263 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 15 April 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:
J. M . , A Juvenile. Sampson County No. 11 JT 9

Appeal by respondent from orders entered 30 March 2012 by Judge Sarah C. Seaton and 24 July 2013 by Judge Leonard W. Thagard in Sampson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 March 2014
. Warrick and Bradshaw, P.A., by Frank L. Bradshaw, for petitioner

- appellee Sampson C ounty Department of Social Services.
K & L Gates, LLP, by Leah D’Aurora Richardson, for guardian ad l item.
Mark Hayes for respondent

- appellant.

DAVIS , Judge.- 2
-

Respondent

- mother ( “ R espondent ” ) appeals from the trial court’s orders ceasing reunification efforts and terminating her parental rights to her child “J ill
. ” 1 W e affirm. Respondent is the mo ther of Jill. Jill was born 15 October 2009 in Cumberland County, North Carolina and is the subject of this case
. O n 10 November 2010, the Sampson County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received a report that R espondent had inappropriately disciplined Jill’s sister. The repor t stemmed from an incident in which a school employee discovered a wound on Jill’s sister ’s buttocks. Pursuant to the investigation, DSS asked Respondent about the wound and how it occurred. Respondent stated that “she beat the chi ld until the wound got sticky.” However, at trial, Respondent stated that the i njury resulted from her sister spanking the child wi th a board. During this investigation, DSS visited Respondent at her
home and observed that the house was un kempt and in complete disarray. As a result of the investigation , DSS placed Jill and her sister outside of the home and provided Respondent with a case plan
. DSS asked Respondent to complete a psychological evaluation, attend parenting classes, and attend food and nutrition sess ions. Respondent completed the psychological

1 The pseudonym “J ill ” is used throughout this opinion to protect the identity of the child and for ease of reading.- 3
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evaluation which yielded a diagnosis of mild mental retardation and depressiv e disorder. As a result of the evaluation , it was recommended that any contact between Respondent and her children should be directly supervised and that Respondent attend mentoring classes
. Respondent failed to complete parenting classes, food and nutri tion cla sses, or the mentoring classes.
On 24 January 2011 , DSS filed a petition alleging that J ill

was a n eglected and dependent juvenile
. DSS alleged that
R espondent had intellectual limitations , de monstrated a n inability to provide a proper home environment , and had poor parenting skills. DSS also alleged that J ill’ s father was not capable of caring for h er . DSS obtained nonsecure custody of
J ill and placed her in the home of P.B., who is the paternal grandmother of Jill’s sister
. By order filed 13 July 2011, the trial court adjudicated
J ill to be neglected and dependent. After holding a disposition hearing, t he trial court ordered DSS to retain custody of Jill, with place ment continuing with P.B. The trial court conducted subsequent review hearings and, on 30 March 2012, ceased reunification efforts. On 6 J une 2013, DSS filed a motion to terminate Respondent ’s and the father’s parental rights to J ill
. DSS- 4
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alleged that R espondent ’s parental rights were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 1111(a)(1) (neglect) , N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 1111(a)(2) (failure to make reasonable progress), and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 1111(a)(6) (dependency)
. A termination of parental rights hearing was held

on 2 3 May 201 3 , after which the trial court found that all three grounds for termination alleged in the petition existed
. The court determined that termination of R espondent ’s parental rights was in the best interest s of J ill and entered an order terminating R espondent ’s rights. 2 Respondent gave timely notice of appeal
. Analysis I. Cessation of Reunification Efforts
In h er first argument on appeal, R espondent contends the trial court erred when it ceased reun ification efforts without making the requisite findings of fact . We disagree.

“ This Court reviews an order that ceases reunification efforts to determine whether the trial court made appropriate findings, whether the findings are based upon credible evidence, whether the findings of fact support the trial court’ s

2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Jill’ s father. Because he did not appeal, that portion of the order is not before us.- 5
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conclusions, and whe ther the trial court abused its discreti on with respect to disposition.” In re C.M. , 183 N.C. App. 207, 213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2007). “ When a trial court ceases reunification efforts with a parent, it is required to make findings of fact pursuant t o N .C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 507 (b).” I d. at 213

- 14, 644 S.E.2d at 594
. “ A trial court may cease reunification efforts upon making a finding that further efforts

‘ would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’ s health, safety, and need for a safe, pe rmanent home within a reasonable period of time[.] ’” Id . at 214, 644 S.E.2d at 594 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 507(b)(1))
. Though characterized as a finding or “ultimate finding[,]” see In re I.R.C. , 214 N.C. App. 358, 363, 714 S.E.2d 495, 499 (2011), the determination that grounds exist to cease reunification efforts under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 507(b)(1) is, in substance, a conclusion of law that must be supported by adequate findings of fact. Id. a t 363, 714 S.E.2d at 498

- 99. The trial court made the following pertinent findings of
fact: 10. That the Juvenile has been in the care

of the Sampson County Department of Social Services or placed outside the removal home in excess of twelve (12) months an d is placed in a structured environment.- 6
- 11. That the Respondent Mother has not completed her serv ice agreement with the Department of Social Services. 12. That the Respondent Mother suffers from mild mental retardation.

. . . . 16. That the Respondent Mother relies heavily on the oldest Juvenile with caring for the siblings. 17. That the Respondent Mother desires to live in a home by herself.

. . . . 22. That it is not likely that the Juvenile will be returned within the next six (6) months.

. . . . 25. That the D epartment has made reasonable efforts in this matter to prevent or eliminate the need for placement of the Juvenile with the Department and to reunify this family. 26. That the Department is no longer required to make reasonable efforts in this matter to reunify this family pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B

- 507 as those efforts would clearly be futile or would be inconsistent with the Juvenile’s health and safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable time. 27. That the Court finds that the conditions which led to the removal of the Juvenile from the Juvenile’s home still exists and that a return of the Juvenile to said home would be contrary to the welfa re- 7
- of the Juvenile. The trial court concluded:

4
. That pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

507, the Sampson County Department of Social Services in no longer required to make reasonable efforts in this matter to reunify this family as those efforts would cle arly be futile or would be inconsistent with the Juvenile’s health and safety, and need for a safe, permanent home with in a reasonable period of time. In finding of fact 26 and in conclusion of law 4, the trial court made the ultimate finding required un der section 7B

507(b) (1) that reunification efforts “would clearly be futile or would be inconsistent with the Juvenile’s health and safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.” Respondent challenges the trial court’s ul timate finding on the grounds that it did not specify which prong , “futile or inconsistent [,] ” w as the basis for ceasing reunification efforts. Respondent argues that the trial court’s failure to specify the prong upon which it relied prohibits this C ourt from applying the proper standard of review. Moreover, Respondent contends that the trial court’s use of boilerplate language lifted directly from the statute results in a failure by the- 8
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trial court to link any of its findings to the two prongs set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 507(b)(1). We conclude that unchallenged findings of fact 10 through
17 , 21 and 27 support the trial court’s ultimate finding that
further reunification efforts would be futile and inconsistent with Jill’s health and safety and her need for a permanent home within a reasonable period of time. The court found that Jill ha s been in DSS custody for over twelve months, she has been in a structured enviro nment for this period of time, R espondent relies on others in caring for Jill, R espondent did not comple te her services agreement, and R espondent desires to live in a home by herself
. These findings are uncontested by R espondent and are thus binding on appeal. In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 147, 669 S.E.2d 55, 59 (2008) , aff’d per c uriam, 363 N.C. 368, 677 S.E.2d 455 (2009). W e conclude that the trial court ’s findings are sufficient to support its conclusion of law under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 507(b)(1), and we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court ’ s decision to cease reun ification efforts under these circumstances
. II. Termination of Parental Rights
In her secon d argument, Respondent asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the termination- 9
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of R espondent’s parental rights was in the best interest s of Jill. We disagree. “After an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent’s rights exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 1110(a) (2013 ). When determining whether it is in the juvenile’ s best interest for the parent’s rights to be terminate d , the trial court is required to make written findings regarding the relevant factors enunciated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B

- 1110(a). I d.

“ We review the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights for abuse of discretion. ” In re Anderson , 151 N.C. App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). Abuse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. State v. Hennis , 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988). Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact to support its conclusion that it wa s in the best inte rest s of Jill for R espondent ’s parental rights to be terminated:

3
. That the Juvenile has been placed with [P.B.] since January 24, 2011.
4. That the Juvenile is currently placed- 10
- in the aforesaid home with the Juvenile’s sibling.
5. That the Juvenile has adapted well in the current placement. 6. That the Juvenile is thriving in the current placement. 7. That the Juvenile is developing appropriately for her age. 8. That [ P. B. ] desires t o adopt the Juvenile
. 9
. That [P
. B . ] and the Juvenile have developed a close bond to one another. 10. That there is little to no bond between the Juvenile and the Respondent Parents.
11
. Th at [P.B.] understands the legal significance and the financial oblig ation of adopting the Juvenile. 12. That the current permanent plan for the Juvenile is adoption. 13. That the termination of parental rights of the respondents would aid in the completion of the current p ermanent plan for the Juvenile. Respondent asserts finding of fact 10

— that there is

“ little to no bond ” between he r and Jill

— is unsupported by the evidence
. To support her argument, Respondent relies on evidence suggesting that a bond did , in fact , exist between Jill and Respondent. Respondent points to her father ’s testimony that Jill and her sist er “have a loving relationship with- 11
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[Respondent]” and that they miss Respondent. Respondent also cites Social W orker Dana Su tton’s testimony that (1) Jill knows Respondent ; (2) Jill and Respond ent have a “loving relationship ” ; and (3) DSS was re commending bi

- weekly visits
between Respondent and Jill after termination because P.B. “would like for the girls to have contact with their mom.” However, Respondent’s argument ignores the well

- established principle that “[f]indings of fact supported by competent

e vidence are binding on appeal, despite evidence in the record that might support a contrary finding.” In re C.I.M. , 214 N.C. App. 342, 345, 715 S.E.2d 247, 250 (2011). Here, there is competent record evidence supporting the trial co urt’s finding that ther e is “little to no bond between Juvenile and Respondent.” First, it is the adoptive parent who has taken the initiative to involve R espondent in Jill ’s life by taking Jill once a month to Sampson County to visit with Respondent
. Indeed , t he fact that Jill

– at three years of age

— only visits with her mother once per month at her adoptive parent’s initiative is evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that there is little to no bond between Jill and Respondent
. Moreover, competent evidence shows that Jill has- 12
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been living with P.B. since she was only one year of age, w hich is more than half of her life. While Respondent ci tes other evidence that may have support ed a finding that there was a bond between mother and child, the trial court’s finding o f fact 10 is supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal. “I t is not the function of this Court to reweigh the evidence on appeal.” Garrett v. Burris , ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 735 S.E.2d 414, 418 (2012), aff'd per curiam , 366 N. C. 551, 742 S.E.2d 803 (2013). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of Respondent’s parental rights was in Jill’s best interests. See In re S.C.R. , 198 N.C. App. 525, 536, 679 S.E.2d 905, 912 (2009) (holding that tri al court's findings reflected reasoned decision based upon statutory factors listed in N.C. Gen. S tat . § 7B

– 1110(a) and that, therefore, trial court did not abu se its discretion in concluding termination of mother's parental rights was in best interests of child). Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders ceasing reunifi cation efforts and terminating R espondent ’s parental rights.- 13
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AFFIRMED. Judge s HUN TER , JR. and ERVIN concur. Report per Rule 30(e).