WITHDRAWN 10-12-11

REISSUED 10-12-11

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-11-00089-CV

BEN L. RICHARDSON, SR. AND 

MELBA RICHARDSON, INDIVIDUALLY

AND AS SURVIVING HEIRS OF JOHN 

KENNEDY RICHARDSON AND AS NEXT

FRIENDS OF MINOR CHILDREN, 

SARAH RICHARDSON, JOHN RICHARDSON,

AND JOSHUA RICHARDSON; SUNSHINE

RICHARDSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SURVIVING,

Appellants

v.

MICHAEL LEE CRAWFORD,

Appellee

From the 414th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-2176-5

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, Ben L. Richardson, Melba Richardson, Sarah Richardson, John 

Richardson, Joshua Richardson, Sunshine Richardson, Katelyn Richardson, and the 

estate of John Kennedy Richardson, complain about a summary judgment order in 
Richardson v. Crawford Page 2

favor of appellee, Michael Lee Crawford. In three issues, appellants argue that the trial 

court erred in: (1) granting summary judgment in favor of appellee because material 

fact issues existed as to their negligent entrustment and negligent storage claims; and 

(2) overruling objections to third-party testimony regarding “(a) the killer’s intent to 

steal the handgun, and (b) the intent to kill [the deceased].” We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal stems from the murder of John Kennedy Richardson on June 5, 2005, 

by his wife, Gretchen Williams Richardson. Gretchen admitted to shooting John on a 

Waco highway during the early morning hours of June 5, 2005, with a .38 Smith & 

Wesson snub-nose, five-shot revolver that was owned by appellee.

Gretchen and appellee both worked as real estate agents at Stewart R. Kelly Real 

Estate, Inc. d/b/a Kelly, Realtors (“Kelly Realtors”), a local company specializing in real 

estate transactions. By all accounts, Gretchen and appellee were friends. Gretchen, 

however, did not get along with many of her co-workers, and in fact, many of her coworkers alleged that they were scared of how manipulative, vindictive, hateful, and 

intimidating Gretchen could be.1 Appellee testified that he did not see that side of 

Gretchen. He and Gretchen often had lunch together and shared “off-color” jokes via 

email. Despite rumors to the contrary, appellee denied that he had an affair with 

Gretchen, though several of Gretchen’s colleagues provided statements to police 

 

1 One of Gretchen’s colleagues recalled an instance where Gretchen “forked” someone’s yard. 

“Forking” apparently involves the concealing of forks in the ground with the prongs up so that anyone 

who walks across the yard will be injured by the spikes. In addition, several colleagues recalled that 

Gretchen yelled at John on the phone and often stated that she hated him. However, no evidence in the 

record indicates that appellee was aware of these incidents. 
Richardson v. Crawford Page 3

indicating that Gretchen boasted of having affairs with several men, including several at 

the Kelly Realtors office. Appellee claimed that Gretchen told him that she was 

unhappy with her marriage, but she never indicated that she intended to kill her 

husband. Appellee recommended that Gretchen seek a divorce.

Gretchen testified that her downward spiral began in January 2005, when she 

became depressed during recovery from a hysterectomy. At that time, Gretchen began 

abusing prescription pain pills and staying out during all hours of the night. Several of 

Gretchen’s colleagues observed her asleep at her desk when they arrived at work early 

in the morning. Gretchen acknowledged that she continually worked to obtain more 

prescription pain pills through doctors and other sources.

When Gretchen arrived home just before midnight on June 4, 2005, John 

confronted Gretchen about her drug abuse. Gretchen had been drinking alcohol that 

night, and she had taken some Ambien and five to eight Hydrocodone pills. John told 

Gretchen that he had informed the doctors who had prescribed the pills about her drug 

abuse and requested that they no longer prescribe medications to Gretchen. Enraged, 

Gretchen verbally and physically fought with John until he let her leave the house. 

Gretchen was intent on showing John that he could not stop her from procuring drugs 

whenever she wanted.

After leaving the house, Gretchen went to the Kelly Realtors office. When she 

arrived at the office, it was dark, as it was shortly after midnight on June 5th. Gretchen 

recalled that appellee left a loaded gun in his desk drawer, which was intended to be 

used by women in the office who either came in early or stayed late and were without a 
Richardson v. Crawford Page 4

male escort. Appellee testified that the Compass Bank building next door had recently 

been robbed; he believed that the women in the office could use the protection. 

Gretchen stated that appellee told the women of the office that they could also take the 

gun with them for protection when showing properties to suspicious people or in bad 

parts of town. Gretchen recalled that she took the gun to show properties on four or 

five different occasions. Appellee, however, denied that the women had permission to 

take the gun off the premises of the office. Nevertheless, when Gretchen arrived at the 

office on June 5th, she went to appellee’s office, opened his desk drawer, moved to the 

side the tray that was concealing the gun, and took the gun with her. Gretchen noted 

that she called John after she left the office, but he answered the phone angry and asked 

several questions.

2

Gretchen left the office and went to an apartment complex in Robinson, Texas, to 

buy drugs. She alleged that it was her intent to use the gun taken from appellee’s desk 

for protection during the drug deal, not for the showing of properties. She bought $400 

worth of drugs, which, as Gretchen noted, may have included methamphetamines. 

According to Gretchen, as she was driving on Loop 340 towards her home in 

Lorena, Texas, she realized that John was flashing the lights of his truck while driving 

behind her. They both pulled over to the side of the road and stopped their vehicles. 

Gretchen believed that John had followed her to witness the purchase of the drugs, 

which “really put [her] in a state.” John got out of his truck and approached Gretchen. 

 

2 Gretchen initially testified that she pulled into a strip mall located on Franklin Avenue to call 

John from a pay phone, though she had her cell phone in the car. However, she could not recall exactly 

where the telephone call was made, and she acknowledged that police “[p]robably” discovered when the 

phone call was made by “tracing through cell phone records.”
Richardson v. Crawford Page 5

Appellee’s gun sat in Gretchen’s lap, wrapped in a T-shirt. John yelled at Gretchen as 

he approached, and after she exited the vehicle, she yelled “Just shut up!” while firing a 

warning shot into the air. John continued to argue with Gretchen and instructed her to 

stay away from the couple’s children. Gretchen then shot John several times, including 

once in the leg and twice in the back. Gretchen alleged that she only recalled shooting 

John in the leg and that her next memory was of John’s head in her lap when the police 

arrived. She did remember, however, panicking about the drugs and trying to plant 

them on John so that she would not be charged with drug possession. John died as a 

result of the gunshot wounds inflicted by Gretchen.

When first questioned by police about the incident, Gretchen blamed an 

unknown African-American male for the shooting and claimed that it was a drug deal 

that had gone bad. She later admitted to shooting John and subsequently pleaded 

guilty to the murder of John, which resulted in a forty-year prison sentence for her.

On June 6, 2007, appellants filed their original petition against appellee and 

defendants, Kelly Realtors, Stewart Ragan Kelly, and Trammell Reid Kelly, asserting 

wrongful death and survival claims based upon theories of negligent entrustment and 

“negligent storage of a dangerous instrumentality.”3 Appellee filed a general denial, 

denying all of the allegations contained in appellants’ original petition, and a motion to 

designate Gretchen as a responsible third party—a motion which the trial court granted. 

 

3 In their first amended petition, appellants dropped all of their claims against all defendants 

except appellee.
Richardson v. Crawford Page 6

Appellee later filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, arguing that 

issues of material fact did not exist as to appellants’ causes of action. Appellants filed a 

response to appellee’s summary judgment motion, which included, among other things, 

the full deposition testimony of appellee; Gretchen; Stewart; Trammell; and Tracy A. 

O’Connor, a Lieutenant with the Robinson Police Department who investigated this 

incident; various written statements given by Gretchen’s colleagues at Kelly Realtors; 

and documents pertaining to handgun safety and the procurement of a concealed 

handgun license.

Appellee filed objections to appellants’ summary judgment evidence, all of 

which were denied by the trial court except for: 

the purported testimony of Gretchen Richardson, to the extent that it is 

utilized in a manner contrary to her guilty plea to first[-]degree murder, 

which includes both the intent to commit homicide, as well as a denial of 

any lack of capacity, with respect to pages 68-69 of the Gretchen 

Richardson deposition, Exhibit 1.[4]

The trial court subsequently granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment and 

ordered that appellants take nothing from appellee. This appeal followed.

II. NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT & NEGLIGENT STORAGE OF A FIREARM

In their first issue, appellants argue that Texas courts recognize the tort claim of 

negligent entrustment of a firearm and that the trial court erred in concluding that no 

material fact issue existed as to the elements of appellants’ negligent entrustment claim. 

In their second issue, appellants contend that, even if Gretchen’s use of appellee’s gun 

 

4 On pages 68-69 of her deposition, Gretchen testified that she “definitely didn’t” intentionally 

and knowingly kill John. This testimony contradicted her previously-entered guilty plea, and as such, the 

trial court sustained appellee’s objection to this testimony.
Richardson v. Crawford Page 7

was unauthorized, Texas courts should recognize a claim for negligent storage of a 

firearm and that material fact issues exist as to that claim.

A. Standard of Review

We review the grant or denial of a traditional summary judgment de novo. See 

Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 816 n.7 (Tex. 2005); Provident Life & Accident 

Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215-16 (Tex. 2003). A movant is entitled to summary 

judgment if he demonstrates that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that he is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); see also Sw. Elec. 

Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002). The movant bears the burden of 

proof in a traditional motion for summary judgment, and all doubts about the existence 

of a genuine issue of material fact are resolved against the movant. See Sw. Elec. Power 

Co., 73 S.W.3d at 215. We take as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant, and we 

indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the non-movant’s favor. 

See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).

We will affirm a traditional summary judgment only if the record establishes that 

the movant has conclusively proved its defense as matter of law or if the movant has 

negated at least one essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. IHS Cedars 

Treatment Ctr. of Desoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2004); see Am. 

Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997). A matter is conclusively 

established if reasonable people could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from 

the evidence. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005); see Goodyear Tire & 

Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). Only when the movant has 
Richardson v. Crawford Page 8

produced sufficient evidence to establish its right to summary judgment does the 

burden shift to the non-movant to come forward with competent controverting 

evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the element challenged 

by the defendant. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999).

B. Applicable Law

At the outset of our analysis of appellants’ contentions, we note that this Court 

has not recognized a cause of action for negligent entrustment of a firearm. A few other 

Texas courts, however, have recognized a cause of action for negligent entrustment of a 

firearm. See Prather v. Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, 

pet. denied); Kennedy v. Baird, 682 S.W.2d 377, 378-79 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1984, no writ). 

In recognizing this cause of the action, the courts have analogized negligent 

entrustment of a firearm to negligent entrustment of an automobile. See Prather, 981 

S.W.2d at 806; see also Kennedy, 682 S.W.2d at 378-79.

The Second Restatement of Torts provides that a person who gives a chattel to 

another, knowing the other person, due to youth, inexperience, or other factors, is likely 

to use the chattel in a manner involving unreasonable risk of harm to himself or others, 

may be held liable for harm caused by the use of the chattel. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 

TORTS § 390 (1965); see Prather, 981 S.W.2d at 806 (citing Rodriguez v. Spencer, 902 S.W.2d 

37, 42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ)).

To establish negligent entrustment of an automobile, a plaintiff must prove the 

following elements: (1) the owner entrusted the automobile (2) to a person who was an 

incompetent or reckless driver (3) who the owner knew or should have known was 
Richardson v. Crawford Page 9

incompetent or reckless; (4) the driver was negligent; and (5) the driver’s negligence 

proximately caused the accident and the plaintiff’s injuries. Prather, 981 S.W.2d at 806; 

see Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 758.

C. Negligent Entrustment

Though we have not specifically recognized a cause of action for negligent 

entrustment of a firearm, even if we were to apply the negligent entrustment factors 

articulated in Prather and Mayes, we cannot say that appellants’ summary judgment 

evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact so as to preclude summary judgment.5 

See Prather, 981 S.W.2d at 806; see also Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 758.

In his motion for summary judgment, appellee asserted that: (1) he had no legal 

duty to prevent unforeseeable criminal acts; (2) the evidence did not establish that he 

could have foreseen Gretchen’s intentional act of murdering John; (3) appellants’ 

negligent entrustment claim must fail because there is no evidence that he knew that 

Gretchen was incompetent or reckless in handling guns and because Gretchen engaged 

in an intentional act using the gun; and (4) Gretchen’s criminal act is a superseding 

cause breaking the causation chain.

In her deposition testimony, Gretchen admitted that it was not foreseeable to 

anyone at Kelly Realtors that she would kill John. She did testify that she was 

depressed and abusing drugs, but she hid that from her colleagues at the office, though 

she described herself as a “walking time bomb.” She also admitted that John kept 

 

5 Though we analyze the merits of appellants’ first issue, this should not be interpreted to mean 

that we recognize “negligent entrustment” to include personal property, in general, or of a firearm, in 

particular, as a cause of action.
Richardson v. Crawford Page 10

several guns around the house and that a couple of them were left unsecured 

underneath their bed or in a closet. When asked whether she knew how to use a gun 

“enough to where you could shoot and kill your husband,” Gretchen responded in the 

affirmative. She also recalled going to a gun range and learning how to shoot a gun 

when she was seventeen years old and that she had shot a rifle with her mother-in-law. 

Despite her experience with handling firearms, Gretchen did not believe that she was 

“fit or qualified to use a handgun for off-site self-defense protection.”

Gretchen noted that she only told appellee that she had some family problems, 

but she did not “use him as a sounding board.” She did not recall telling appellee about 

any violence or threats of violence in her home or about her drug use. She did, 

however, tell appellee about affairs that she was having. Gretchen recalled that she 

often joked with other colleagues at Kelly Realtors about killing John by poisoning his 

food6; however, there is no testimony establishing that she informed appellee of her 

intent to kill John. When Gretchen’s trial counsel asked Gretchen whether she would 

have murdered John had appellee not provided the gun, she responded:

We would have argued, and I would have driven off to my 

brother’s house and probably stayed gone for a while, like I did other 

times. . . . If I hadn’t had it with me, there would have been no way to kill 

him, and it was just an instant reaction, just anger and—you know.

Gretchen characterized the scope of appellee’s permission to use the gun as follows:

 

6 Lieutenant O’Connor stated that, based on his investigation, Gretchen’s murder of John was 

premeditated and that, when she spoke to police at the scene of the incident, she was cold, callous, and 

“[n]oncaring.” Lieutenant O’Connor did not believe that Gretchen handled the gun negligently or that 

the gun discharged accidentally. Furthermore, the fact that the gun was wrapped in a T-shirt led 

Lieutenant O’Connor to conclude that Gretchen sought to conceal the gun.
Richardson v. Crawford Page 11

He had said if we were meeting a client that we were leery of, we could 

take it with us, or if—his preference was that clients would meet us at the 

office so that other people could see them and, you know, they would 

know that someone was aware that that’s who we were going to be with, 

but if that wasn’t the case and another male agent was not available, that 

we could use the gun.

Nevertheless, she took the gun for protection while she purchased drugs from a dealer 

at an apartment complex in Robinson. Lieutenant O’Connor described Gretchen’s 

taking of the gun for that purpose as a theft.

Appellee stated that he had no knowledge of the shooting or that Gretchen 

intended to shoot John. At the time of the incident, appellee was on a cruise to Mexico 

with his wife. Appellee denied giving anyone permission to use the gun in the 

commission of a criminal act or to take the gun out of the office, though Gretchen was 

permitted to use the gun “[i]f she had an issue in the office.” Appellee was unaware 

that Gretchen was abusing drugs or that she was depressed. 

As a general rule, “a person has no legal duty to protect another from the 

criminal acts of a third person.” Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996). But, 

in Phan Son Van v. Pena, the Texas Supreme Court noted that:

The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a 

superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the 

actor’s negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an 

opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the 

actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have realized 

the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a third 

person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or 

crime. 

990 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex. 1999) (emphasis in original); see Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 

690 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. 1985) (holding that third-party criminal conduct is a 
Richardson v. Crawford Page 12

superseding cause unless the criminal conduct is a foreseeable result of such 

negligence).

To impose liability on a defendant for negligence in failing to prevent the 

criminal conduct of another, the facts must show more than conduct that 

creates an opportunity to commit crime—they must show both that the 

defendant committed negligent acts and that it knew or should have 

known that, because of its acts, the crime (or one like it) might occur. 

Barton v. Whataburger, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 456, 462 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, 

pet. denied); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965); see also R.K. v. Ramirez, 

887 S.W.2d 836, 846 (Tex. 1994) (Enoch, J., dissenting) (noting that the essence of 

negligent entrustment is an awareness by the entrustor of the propensity of the actor to 

commit the act upon which the negligence claim is based). 

“Foreseeability . . . requires that a person of ordinary intelligence should have 

anticipated the danger created by a negligent act or omission.” Doe v. Boys Club of 

Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995). A danger is foreseeable if its general 

character might reasonably be anticipated, if not its precise manner. Travis v. City of 

Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992). This determination involves a practical inquiry, 

based on common experience applied to human conduct, and asks whether the injury 

might reasonably have been contemplated as a result of the defendant’s conduct. Doe, 

907 S.W.2d at 478. Importantly, “[f]oreseeability requires more than someone, viewing 

the facts in retrospect, theorizing an extraordinary sequence of events whereby the 

defendant’s conduct brings about the injury.” Id.

Here, Gretchen admitted that no one at Kelly Realtors, including appellee, could 

have foreseen that she intended to murder John. In addition, Gretchen stated that she 
Richardson v. Crawford Page 13

wore a “mask” at work to conceal her depression, drug abuse, and the problems she 

was allegedly having at home. Assuming without deciding that appellee was negligent 

in leaving the gun in his desk for others at the office to use, appellants have not 

tendered evidence demonstrating that appellee knew or should have known that 

Gretchen would use his gun to shoot John. In fact, Gretchen testified that she took the 

gun from appellee’s desk to use for protection while she purchased drugs, which was 

also outside the scope of permission provided by appellee. Essentially, Gretchen used 

appellee’s gun in the commission of two separate criminal acts. Though appellee was 

aware that Gretchen was not happy in her marriage to John, appellee had no 

knowledge that Gretchen intended to kill John. Rather, appellee suggested that 

Gretchen file for divorce. As such, we believe that Gretchen’s intentional act of 

shooting John was unforeseeable and would constitute a superseding cause of harm 

which breaks the chain of causation. See Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 

S.W.2d 595, 596-97 (Tex. 1987) (finding, in a negligent entrustment case, no proximate 

cause because the defendant’s entrustment of a truck to a driver did not cause the 

accident, and the defendant’s knowledge about the driver’s record of speeding tickets 

did not lead it to foresee the accident resulting in injury)7; see also Pena, 990 S.W.2d at 

753; Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 478; Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 550; Barton, 276 S.W.3d at 462. 

 

7 Specifically, in Schneider, Esperanza Transmission Company, an oil-field pipeline company, 

provided a pick-up truck to one of its employees for business and personal use. 744 S.W.2d 595, 595 (Tex. 

1987). The employee and a friend of his went to a dance one night. Id. Upon leaving the dance hall, the 

employee stated that he had drank too much and asked his friend to drive the pick-up truck. Id. The 

friend subsequently collided with the rear of a vehicle driven by Schneider. Id.
Richardson v. Crawford Page 14

Because the summary judgment record conclusively negates the proximate 

causation element of appellants’ negligent entrustment cause of action, we cannot say 

that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in appellee’s favor. See Mason, 

143 S.W.3d at 798; Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 425; see also Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 758; Prather, 

981 S.W.2d at 806. And, as a secondary ground supporting the trial court’s summary 

judgment order, we note that the summary judgment record demonstrates that 

Gretchen has experience handling firearms, though she does not have a license to carry 

a firearm; her house contained several unsecured firearms; that she hid her alleged 

emotional instability from her colleagues; and that appellee did not have any inkling 

that Gretchen was mentally unstable or lacked experience handling firearms; thus, the 

record conclusively negates the reckless or incompetent element of appellants’ 

negligent entrustment claim. See Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 758; Prather, 981 S.W.2d at 806; 

see also Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1985) (“[W]hether a 

driver has a license does not determine whether a driver is, in fact, incompetent.”) 

(emphasis in original); Robson v. Gilbreath, 267 S.W.3d 401, 406 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, 

pet. denied) (stating that mere involvement in an accident does not create an inference 

or conclusion that a driver is incompetent or reckless, and evidence that a driver is 

inexperienced, without more, does not permit an inference that a driver lacked 

judgment or perception or was otherwise an incompetent driver). Based on the 

foregoing, we overrule appellants’ first issue.
Richardson v. Crawford Page 15

D. Negligent Storage

With respect to their second issue, appellants acknowledge that no Texas court 

has recognized an independent cause of action for negligent storage of a firearm. 

Nevertheless, appellants direct us to cases from several other states where such a claim 

purportedly exists. See, e.g., Jupin v. Kask, 849 N.E.2d 829, 842 (Mass. 2006); Gallera v. 

Koskovich, 836 A.2d 840, 851 (N.J. 2003); Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 271 (Ind. 2003); 

see also Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent Storage 

of Firearms, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1189 (2000). While the authority cited by appellants from 

other state courts constitutes persuasive authority, none of it is binding on this Court. 

See Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (stating that 

opinions from any federal or state court may be relied on a persuasive authority, but 

Texas appellate courts are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and the United 

States Supreme Court). Given that neither the Texas Supreme Court nor our sister 

courts in Texas have recognized a claim for negligent storage of a firearm, we decline to 

do so at this time.8 Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ second issue.

 

8

It is also noteworthy to mention that one Texas court declined to hold a gun store liable with 

regard to a complaint that is similar to the negligent-storage contention made here. See Ambrosio v. 

Carter’s Shooting Ctr., Inc., 20 S.W.3d 262, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). In 

Ambrosio, a Smith & Wesson handgun was stolen from an unlocked display case at a gun store by a 

customer when the store attendants were helping other customers. Id. at 264. Subsequently, the stolen 

gun was sold to another, who used the gun in several violent crimes, including the murder of a man 

during a carjacking. Id. The family of the man killed during the carjacking filed suit against the gun store 

for negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, and gross negligence. Id. at 263. Specifically, appellants 

asserted that “appellee violated its duty to exercise care in the storage and display of its firearms” and 

that the violation of this duty caused the death of Alek Ambrosio. Id. Appellants also argued that 

appellee’s lax security previously resulted in thefts of other guns from the store. Id. at 269. The Ambrosio

court held that summary judgment was proper because “appellee’s failure to exercise care in the storage 
Richardson v. Crawford Page 16

III.GRETCHEN’S THIRD-PARTY TESTIMONY

Though appellants list, in their issues presented, a third issue pertaining to the 

trial court’s overruling of their objections to Gretchen’s third-party testimony regarding 

her intent to steal appellee’s gun and her intent to kill John, appellants do not provide 

any argument or authority in support of this issue. As a result, we conclude that this 

issue has been inadequately briefed and, therefore, waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) 

(providing that a “brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions 

made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”). We overrule 

appellants’ third issue.

IV.CONCLUSION

Having overruled all of appellants’ issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 17, 2011

[CV06]

 

and display of its firearms is too remote and attenuated from the criminal conduct of the . . . car[]jackers 

to constitute a legal cause of injury to either Alek Ambrosio or his parents.” Id. at 266.