alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2012088EN.01001101.xml

| 24.3.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 88/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.3.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 88/11

---

Euro exchange rates (1)

1

23 March 2012

2012/C 88/08

1 euro =

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,3242 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 109,10 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4355 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,83630 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 8,9240 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,2054 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 7,6380 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 24,725 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 294,48 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvian lats | 0,6969 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,1682 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,3723 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,3862 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,2745 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,3263 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 10,2839 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,6300 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,6748 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 504,36 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 10,2241 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 8,3450 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,5235 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 12 127,58 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,0739 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 56,931 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 38,9144 |
| THB | Thai baht | 40,732 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 2,4109 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 17,0186 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 67,8980 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,3242

JPY

Japanese yen

109,10

DKK

Danish krone

7,4355

GBP

Pound sterling

0,83630

SEK

Swedish krona

8,9240

CHF

Swiss franc

1,2054

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

7,6380

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

24,725

HUF

Hungarian forint

294,48

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,4528

LVL

Latvian lats

0,6969

PLN

Polish zloty

4,1682

RON

Romanian leu

4,3723

TRY

Turkish lira

2,3862

AUD

Australian dollar

1,2745

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,3263

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

10,2839

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,6300

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,6748

KRW

South Korean won

1 504,36

ZAR

South African rand

10,2241

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

8,3450

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,5235

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

12 127,58

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,0739

PHP

Philippine peso

56,931

RUB

Russian rouble

38,9144

THB

Thai baht

40,732

BRL

Brazilian real

2,4109

MXN

Mexican peso

17,0186

INR

Indian rupee

67,8980

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

1

Source

---
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

CHARLES CHESTER CHATMAN III,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-16571

D.C. Nos. 3:16-cv-02550-CRB

3:14-cr-00552-CRB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 12, 2018** 

Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Federal prisoner Charles Chester Chatman, III, appeals from the district

court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Reviewing de novo, see United States v.

Reves, 774 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 2014), we affirm. 

FILED

JUN 15 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
In his section 2255 motion, Chatman argued that, in light of Johnson v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), his California conviction for inflicting

corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant is no longer a crime of violence for

purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). The district court denied this claim citing

Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), which, as Chatman concedes,

forecloses this argument. On appeal, Chatman contends that the government’s preBeckles concession that Johnson’s holding applies to the Guidelines steered him

away from raising the additional argument that he is actually innocent of the

sentencing enhancement. He further argues that the district court’s allegedly

premature dismissal of his section 2255 motion prevented him from developing

that alternative argument. 

To the extent the government conceded that Johnson’s holding applies to the

Guidelines, neither the district court nor this court is bound by that concession. 

See United States v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“We are

not bound by a party’s concession as to the meaning of the law[.]”). We disagree

with Chatman that his challenge to the district court’s processing of his section

2255 motion is encompassed within the certificate of appealability and treat his

briefing of this issue as a motion to expand the certificate of appealability. So

2 17-16571
treated, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R. 22-1(e); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d

1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Chatman’s claim that the district court misapprehended that the state court

would impose a concurrent sentence lacks merit. The mere hope that the state

court would consider the length of Chatman’s federal sentence is not a basis for

relief because section 2255 does not extend to “claims based not on any objectively

ascertainable error but on the frustration of the subjective intent of the sentencing

judge.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 187 (1979). 

AFFIRMED. 

3 17-16571
<PAGE>

                                                               Exhibit 4.1



                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

                                       OF

                          CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

                                       OF

                           ELANTEC SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.



         Elantec Semiconductor, Inc., a Delaware corporation, does hereby
certify that the following amendment to the corporation's Certificate of
Incorporation has been duly adopted in accordance with the provisions of
Section 242 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, with the approval of
such amendment by the corporation's stockholders:

         Article IV, Paragraph A of the Certificate of Incorporation,
relating to authorization of shares is amended to read in its entirety as
follows:

         "A.    AUTHORIZATION OF SHARES.

         The corporation has authority to issue Fifty-Five Million
(55,000,000) shares, consisting of two classes: Fifty Million (50,000,000)
shares of Common Stock, par value $0.01 per share; and Five Million
(5,000,000) shares of Preferred Stock, par value $0.01 per share."

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said corporation has caused this Certificate of
Amendment to be signed by its duly authorized officer this 7th day of April
2000 and the foregoing facts stated herein are true and correct.

                                  ELANTEC SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.


                                  By:           /s/ Ephraim Kwok
                                     -------------------------------------------
                                       Ephraim Kwok, Chief Financial Officer
# 332
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-7378

GREGORY LYNN GORDON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:12-cv-00441-RJC)

Submitted: November 2, 2012 Decided: November 6, 2012

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gregory Lynn Gordon, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Gregory Lynn Gordon, a state pretrial detainee, seeks 

to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 

U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) petition. The order is 

not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Gordon has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability, deny Gordon’s motion to 

appoint counsel, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 
3

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
CareView Communications, Inc. 10-Q


 


EXHIBIT 10.1


 


EXTENSION OF MATURITY DATE FOR


PROMISSORY NOTE


 


This Extension of Maturity
Date for Promissory Note (the “Extension”) dated July 1, 2016, is entered into by and between CareView-Hillcrest, LLC,
a Wisconsin limited liability company (“Maker”) and Rockwell Holdings I, LLC (“Holder”) (collectively known
as the “Parties”).


 


WHEREAS, pursuant to
a certain Master Investment Agreement entered into by the Parties on November 16, 2009, Maker issued to Holder a Promissory Note
in the principal amount of $466,372.50 with respect to the Project (as defined in the Master Investment Agreement) for the AHS
Hillcrest Medical Center, LLC d/b/a Hillcrest Medical Center,


 


WHEREAS, the Promissory
Note has a maturity date of three years from the date payments commenced thereunder, which would make the maturity date of the
Promissory Note May 25, 2013,


 


WHEREAS, the maturity
date of the Promissory Note was subsequently extended to December 31, 2013, then to June 30, 2014, then to June 30, 2015, and then
to June 30, 2016,


 


WHEREAS, the Parties
have mutually agreed to extend the maturity date to June 30, 2017,


 


NOW, THEREFORE,
in consideration of the mutual covenants hereinafter set forth, the Parties hereby enter into this Extension as follows:


 


1.       Extension
of Maturity Date for Promissory Note: The Parties agree to extend the maturity date of the Promissory Note to June 30, 2017 (the
“Extended Maturity Date”).


 


2.       Other
Provisions of the Promissory Note: The Parties agree that all other provisions of the Promissory Note will remain in full force
and effect other than the Extended Maturity Date.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
the Parties hereto have executed this Agreement as of the day and year first above written.


 


	CAREVIEW-HILLCREST, LLC	 	ROCKWELL HOLDINGS I, LLC
	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	By:	/s/ Steve Johnson	 	By:	/s/ Matt Bluhm
	 	Steve Johnson	 	 	Matt
Bluhm
	 	Manager	 	 	Managing
Member
```
      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit





No. 98-1396

                       JOHN C. VOTTA, JR.,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

                    KELLY L. SECREST, ET AL.,

                      Defendants, Appellees.



           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

            [Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge]



                              Before

                     Torruella, Chief Judge,
               Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
                                
                                


     John C. Votta, Jr. on brief pro se.
     Sheila E. McCravy and Brian Rogal on brief for appellees Kelly
Secrest and Byron Rizos.
     Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Matthew Q. Berge,
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and Margaret Farmer.




December 30, 1998




                                
                                
      Per Curiam.  Following his conviction in state court on
    speeding and littering charges, plaintiff John Votta filed this
    42 U.S.C. � 1983 action against two members of the state police
    and other defendants, alleging an assortment of constitutional
    and state-law claims.  The district court dismissed the
    complaint in due course under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Having
    reviewed the record in full, we agree that no cognizable � 1983
    claim has been stated.  See, e.g., Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d
    77, 80-81 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
    477 (1994)); Judge v. City of Lowell, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL
    789187, at *6-*7 (1st Cir. 1998) (requiring specific,
    nonconclusory factual allegations in support of claim that
    defendant acted with improper motive); Roche v. John Hancock
    Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256 (1st Cir. 1996)
    (discussing malicious prosecution); Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-
    Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1994) (same); Santiago v.
    Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 388 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing abuse of
    process).
        While the judgment is silent on the matter, we assume that
    the district court intended to dismiss the supplemental state-
    law claims without prejudice for want of jurisdiction.  See,
    e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966);
    Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1990). 
    With that clarification, the order of dismissal is affirmed.  
        Affirmed.  See Loc. R. 27.1.
```
**Exhibit 99.1**

 

# **CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

# **ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of PacificNorthwest Bancorp (the “Company”) for the quarter ending March 31, 2003 asfiled on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Patrick M. Fahey, Presidentand Chief Executive Officer, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

1.                                       The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934; and

 

2.                                       The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultof operations of the Company.

 

 
| Dated:  May  7, 2003 |                                             |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
|                      |                                             |
|                      |                                             |
|                      | /s/ Patrick M.  Fahey                            |   |
|                      | Patrick M. Fahey                                 |
|                      | Chairman,  President and Chief Executive Officer |

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of PacificNorthwest Bancorp (the “Company”) for the quarter ending March 31, 2003 asfiled on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Bette J. Floray, Executive VicePresident and Chief Financial Officer, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

1.                                       The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934; and

 

2.                                       The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultof operations of the Company.

 
| Dated:  May  7, 2003 |                                                  |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
|                      |                                                  |
|                      |                                                  |
|                      | /s/ Bette J.  Floray                                  |   |
|                      | Bette J. Floray                                       |
|                      | Executive Vice  President and Chief Financial Officer |

 

1

----
#### Robert Ephriam ATKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-496.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 31, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 38020

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KENNETH EUGENE WRIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 714

Filed: November 21, 2011

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bonneville County. Hon. Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified life sentence, with a minimum period of 

confinement of ten years, for robbery, affirmed; order denying I.C.R. 35 motion 

for reduction of sentence, affirmed.

Stephen D. Thompson, Ketchum, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Kenneth Eugene Wright was convicted of robbery, Idaho Code §§ 18-6501; 18-112A. 

The district court sentenced Wright to a unified life sentence with ten years determinate. Wright

filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. Wright appeals.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established. 

See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State 

v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 

Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, 
2

we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387,

391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot 

say that the district court abused its discretion.

Next, we review whether the district court erred in denying Wright’s Rule 35 motion. A 

motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to 

the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); 

State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting a Rule 35 

motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional 

information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. State v. 

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In conducting our review of the grant 

or denial of a Rule 35 motion, we consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for 

determining the reasonableness of the original sentence. State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 22, 740 

P.2d 63, 64 (Ct. App. 1987); Lopez, 106 Idaho at 449-51, 680 P.2d at 871-73. Upon review of 

the record, we conclude no abuse of discretion has been shown.

Therefore, Wright’s judgment of conviction and sentence, and the district court’s order 

denying Wright’s Rule 35 motion, are affirmed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Donald LAURENT.

No. 53879.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 24, 1973.

In re: Donald Laurent applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Writ granted. (See Order).

The petition of the relator in the above entitled and numbered case having been duly considered,

It is ordered that a Writ of Certiorari issue herein, directing the Honorable Wallace A. Edwards, Judge of the Twenty-Second Judicial District, Court for the Parish of St. Tammany, to transmit to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, on or before the 3rd day of December, 1973, the record in duplicate, or a certified copy of the record in duplicate, of the proceedings complained of by the relator herein, to the end that the validity of said proceedings may be ascertained.

It is further ordered that the aforesaid Judge of said Court and the respondent through counsel shall show cause, in this court, on the 21st day of January, 1974, at 10 o’clock A.M., why the relief prayed for in the petition of the relator should not be granted.
<PAGE>   1
                                  Exhibit 10.7


Incentive Compensation Arrangement for Stephen W. Moses

The 2000 incentive compensation plan for Stephen W. Moses, approved on December
9, 1999, is as follows:

The target bonus for 2000 is $100,000, which represents 50% of base salary. Each
target is measured and paid independent of achievement of other metrics and is
either achieved or not achieved. The components and breakdown of the bonus plan
are:

$25,000 (25%) based on achievement of Corporate revenue
$25,000 (25%) based on achievement of Division revenue
$20,000 (20%) based on achievement of Corporate operating margin
$20,000 (20%) based on achievement of Division operating margin
$10,000 (10%) based on achievement of Corporate Days sales outstanding (DSO) of
75 days by 12/31/00