In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

ANN L. NIELSEN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAVID D. DICKERSON, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 C 5909—Charles P. Kocoras, Chief Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 12, 2001—DECIDED OCTOBER 9, 2002

____________

Before CUDAHY, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. After receiving a letter from

attorney David D. Dickerson advising her that the balance on her GM credit card account was past due, plaintiff

Ann L. Nielsen filed a class action suit against Dickerson

and others pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Nielsen asserted

that Dickerson’s letter, which was sent to thousands of

delinquent creditors like her, falsely suggested that an

attorney had become actively involved in GM’s debt collection efforts, when in fact Dickerson had done little more

than lend his name and firm letterhead to the debt collection effort. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(3) and (10), 1692j(a).

After certifying a class comprised of all Illinois residents
2 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

who had received letters from Dickerson’s firm, 1999 WL

350649, Judge Kocoras granted summary judgment in favor

of the plaintiffs, 1999 WL 754566. We affirm.

I.

A.

Household Bank (SB), N.A. (“Household Bank” or the

“Bank”), issued GM credit cards to Nielsen and the other

class members. The Bank’s affiliate, Household Credit

Services, Inc. (“Household”), which operated under the

trade name “GM Card,” serviced the Bank’s credit card

portfolio by, among other activities, maintaining the individual credit accounts and rendering collection services.

Dickerson is licensed to practice law in Virginia and has

done so for more than 30 years. He heads a small firm,

David D. Dickerson & Associates, comprised of himself, two

other attorneys, and some twenty to twenty-five staff assistants. (We shall refer to Dickerson and his firm collectively as “Dickerson.”) For more than 25 years, Dickerson

has provided legal services in connection with debt collection activities, and Dickerson has acquired a certain expertise in debt collection law, including the FDCPA. He

keeps current on the FDCPA, and seeks to ensure that

he and his staff do not violate the statute, by maintaining membership in two debt collection organizations,

attending seminars, and reading monthly publications

concerning state and federal debt collection law. He also

oversees the training of his staff, maintains office manuals

outlining debt collection procedures, has his staff review

a videotaped presentation regarding the FDCPA, conducts regular meetings with his staff, and, on occasion, has

fired employees who deviate from his established collection procedures.

In April 1997, after Dickerson made a presentation to

Household about the FDCPA and the types of legal ser-
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 3

vices his firm could provide, Household engaged Dickerson to aid it in the collection of delinquent GM Card accounts. Dickerson signed a nine-page Legal Collection

Services Agreement pursuant to which he agreed to exercise due diligence and to render legal services consistent

with applicable federal, state, and local laws—including

the FDCPA. Dickerson had provided legal services to other creditors in addition to Household.

The “legal service” that Dickerson provided to Household pursuant to this agreement consisted primarily of

issuing a form “past due” letter—that Dickerson himself

had drafted before he was engaged by Household—to delinquent GM Card holders after the firm had performed

certain checks on the information supplied to it by Household. By the terms of the agreement, Household approved

the initial form of Dickerson’s letter and reserved the

right to approve any changes thereto. Household itself never suggested any changes to the letter, however.

Periodically, Household would forward to Dickerson a

computer disk containing delinquent account data. The data

included each debtor’s account number, name, address, account balance, and the amount past due. After reformatting the data into its own system, the firm pulled the

data up onto a computer screen to check for any obvious

gaps or errors in the data. In the absence of such faults,

the firm then transmitted the data to Contact U.S.A., a

printing and mailing service, which printed a hard copy

of the data and sent the hard copy back to Dickerson.

Upon receipt of the printed copy, someone in Dickerson’s

office would stamp the document with a small checklist

that Dickerson and his staff would initial to reflect completion of the three-level review of the data that they

conducted. Pursuant to that review, the firm made sure

that duplicate letters were not sent to the same debtor

and also flagged any instances in which Household had

provided it with incomplete or inaccurate debtor infor-
4 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

mation. The firm also checked the data against an inhouse database of recent bankruptcy declarations compiled from bankruptcy notices that it received on a regular

basis, in order to stop letters from being sent to debtors

who had declared bankruptcy. The firm’s computer also

checked the data to flag debtors who lived in one of

three “prohibited” states—West Virginia, Colorado, and

Connecticut—to which Dickerson did not send letters;

staff members were also instructed to eyeball the data

for these same states as a safeguard against computer

error. An attorney conducted the final level of this review and sometimes one of the first two levels. Dickerson

himself reviewed nearly all of the printouts of the pertinent data, although his review was admittedly quite

brief. (Dickerson indicated that he spent approximately

two minutes reviewing a page listing the data on forty

overdue accounts, which suggests that he devoted only

a few seconds to each account.) Upon completion of the

tripartite review, an acknowledgment report listing the

debtors to whom a delinquency letter would be sent

was forwarded to Household; a separate report also identified any debtors to whom the firm had decided a letter

should not be sent based on its review of the data. The

firm then waited for at least twenty-four hours before

taking any further action, giving Household the opportunity to make corrections. (If Household flagged a mistake

in the report, a letter would not be sent to that debtor.)

At the expiration of the waiting period, the firm then

forwarded the appropriate data to Contact U.S.A., which

printed and mailed the letters on firm letterhead with

a facsimile of Dickerson’s signature.

Beyond checking the Household account data in the

manner we have just described, Dickerson did not make

an individualized assessment of the status or validity of

the debt or the propriety of sending delinquency letters to

the account debtors referred to him by Household; nor
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 5

was the law firm the only party to perform these checks.

Household selected the accounts that were referred to the

firm for delinquency letters; and before transmitting an

account to Dickerson, Household not only reviewed the

pertinent account information, but screened each account

for deceased or bankrupt debtors and those who lived

in prohibited states. The firm’s own review of the referred

accounts was confined to the information supplied by

Household. Dickerson did periodically review the standard GM Cardmember and Disclosure Agreement; and

he had sufficiently familiarized himself with Household’s

method of handling the GM card portfolio to know generally how long the accounts had been delinquent and

what steps Household had taken to collect on those accounts by the time they were referred to him. But Household did not supply Dickerson with a copy of a debtor’s

file, nor did Dickerson have access to Household’s account

system. Thus, beyond conducting facial checks of the data

he was provided and checking that data to screen out

debtors who were bankrupt or who lived in prohibited

states, Dickerson relied on Household’s judgment as to the

validity and delinquency of the debt. Indeed, Dickerson

never requested additional information from Household

before instructing the mailing service to issue a delinquency letter. Dickerson “assum[ed] that many demands

for payment have been made on the debtor and that legal

action is contemplated if it appears that these debtors

will not pay amicably and have the means to satisfy a

judgment,” he wrote in the standard letter accompanying

the acknowledgment reports he sent to Household. R. 30

Ex. D. “It is understood that these are accurate and valid

claims for the amounts stated and that any information

indicating that the debtors dispute any part(s) of the

debt have been furnished to this office.” Id. After Dickerson’s review of Household’s account data was complete

and the firm had forwarded the data to Contact U.S.A. for

printing and mailing, the mailing service itself performed
6 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

a final computerized check of the data to ensure that

the letters were sent to the correct addresses and reflected

the correct overdue balances and that duplicate letters

were not sent to the same debtor.

The letter that Dickerson sent to delinquent GM Card

holders stated as follows:

DAVID D. DICKERSON AND ASSOCIATES

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW

[Firm Address, Telephone Number, and Fax Number]

[Debtor Name and Address] [Date, Account Number, Balance, and

Past Due Amount]

Dear [Debtor]:

My client, GM Card, has requested that I write to

you concerning your delinquent account.

Unless you dispute the validity of all or part of

the debt within thirty days after receiving this notice,

the debt will be assumed to be valid by us. However, if

you notify us in writing within the thirty day period

that all or part of the debt is disputed, we will obtain

verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment and

mail a copy of such verification or judgment to you.

Also, upon your written request within the thirty day

period, we will provide you with the name and address

of the original creditor, if different from the current

creditor. This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose.

If you do not dispute this debt or any portion thereof,

please do one of the following:

1. Make payment to my client GM Card, or

2. Call GM Card at (800) 557-5620 ext. 3740 to

discuss payment arrangements.
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 7

1 To a very limited extent, certain of these form letters contained

generic “advice” to Household as to how it should handle the debtor’s response. For example, the form letter used for a response

indicating that the debtor had declared bankruptcy reminded

(continued...)

Very truly yours,

David D. Dickerson & Associates

By: [Facsimile signature]

David D. Dickerson, Esq.

R. 11 Ex. A (emphasis in original). A payment coupon addressed to GM Card was attached at the bottom of the

letter.

As the text of Dickerson’s letter reveals, debtors were

advised either to make payment directly to “GM Card”

(Household’s trade name) or, if they wished to discuss

payment arrangements, to call “GM Card” directly at the

indicated 800 number. Calls placed to that number were

taken by Household’s in-house collection personnel, who

were instructed to handle the calls themselves and not

to refer inquiries to Dickerson. Dickerson’s letterhead

naturally included his firm’s telephone number, however,

and the letter did instruct cardholders to notify “us”—

presumably meaning Dickerson—in writing if they disputed part or all of the debt. As a result, Dickerson’s firm

regularly did receive written and telephonic inquires

and responses from cardholders and their attorneys. However, he was not empowered to resolve matters on Household’s behalf and did not do so. Where a written response

was received, a firm employee would generate one of

six form transmittal letters to Household highlighting

the nature of the response (e.g., the debtor’s declaration

of bankruptcy, her inability to pay the debt, her dispute

of the debt, and so on).1

 Dickerson himself reviewed and
8 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

1 (...continued)

Household that federal law required it to cease and desist any

further contact with that debtor. See R. 46 Ex. C (collecting examples of transmittal letters).

2 On occasion, if a particular debtor’s situation was unique,

Dickerson drafted a specific transmittal letter regarding that situation.

3 Dickerson testified that when debtors or their representatives

(including their attorneys) contacted him by telephone, he attempted to answer their questions and to be of assistance to the

extent that he could. The record does not reveal the nature of any

information or assistance that he may have provided, however.

4 Household did not discontinue its own efforts to collect an

overdue account—including phone calls to the debtor to solicit

(continued...)

signed each transmittal letter, which was then sent to

Household with the debtor’s response enclosed.2

 A copy

of the transmittal letter, which indicated that the debtor was to deal with Household directly, was sent to the

debtor as well. Telephone calls to Dickerson’s office were

handled in a similar manner. Such calls were routed to

Dickerson himself or, if he was unavailable, to his voice

mail. In either instance, debtors were advised to submit

a written response. As with the written responses, Dickerson forwarded the telephonic responses to Household for

disposition (often by way of a phone call from Dickerson

to a Household employee).3

 Dickerson took no further action once the responses were handed over to Household.

Household never asked Dickerson to pursue a judgment on

its behalf, although Dickerson routinely did so for other

clients. Household, not Dickerson, handled any requests

for verification of the debt.

Thirty days after Household referred a delinquent account

to Dickerson, the firm returned the account to Household.4

 Household paid Dickerson a flat fee of $2.45 per ac-
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 9

4 (...continued)

payment on the account—while the matter was pending in Dickerson’s office.

count irrespective of the effect (if any) that his letter had

upon the debtor. Dickerson in turn paid Contact U.S.A.

ninety-nine cents per letter for its services. Dickerson

received approximately 2,000 accounts per month from

Household. Dickerson typically spent two to three hours

per day working on Household matters, and he performed

the bulk of the work done by his firm on such matters.

On or about January 7, 1998, Dickerson sent Nielsen

(a Chicago resident) a delinquency letter concerning her

GM Card account. As of that date, the balance on her

account was more than 120 days past due, and she had

not responded to Household’s previous attempts to resolve the delinquency. When Nielsen received and read

Dickerson’s letter, she noted that he was a lawyer and

assumed that she might be sued on her unpaid debt.

Nielsen did not, however, respond to the letter. Four

months after she received it, she declared bankruptcy.

The bankruptcy court discharged her debts on August 28,

1998.

B.

Nielsen subsequently filed this suit on behalf of herself

and other GM Card holders who had received delinquency

letters from Dickerson. Judge Kocoras certified a class

that included every GM cardholder residing at an address

within Illinois to whom Dickerson had sent a letter between September 22, 1997 and July 15, 1999. Informational notices regarding the class suit were sent to some

3,504 individuals. Subsequently, on the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment, Judge Kocoras granted

summary judgment in favor of Nielsen.
10 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

At the outset Judge Kocoras determined that Dickerson

and Household each qualified as a “debt collector” that

could be held liable under the FDCPA for misleading communications with debtors. It was undisputed that Dickerson and his firm regularly engaged in efforts to collect the

debts of others. Dickerson thus satisfied the principal criterion for “debt collector” status. 1999 WL 754566, at *3; see

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Household, by contrast, had not

undertaken to collect anyone’s debts but its own, and so

would not normally constitute a debt collector under the

statute. See id.; e.g., Aubert v. American Gen. Fin., Inc.,

137 F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1998). However, pursuant to

what is known as the “false name” exception to this rule,

a creditor or an affiliate of a creditor who uses someone

else’s name so as to suggest to the debtor that a third

party is involved in the debt collection process, when in

fact that party is not involved, can be treated as a “debt

collector” under the FDCPA. Id.; see Maguire v. Citicorp

Retail Servs., Inc., 147 F.3d 232, 235 (2nd Cir. 1988). Based

on his ultimate determination that Dickerson played no

genuine role as an attorney in Household’s debt collection efforts, Judge Kocoras reasoned that Dickerson’s letter to Nielsen and the other class members was in reality

from Household, and that Household was simply using

Dickerson’s name to suggest that he and his firm were

involved in the attempt to collect Household’s debts. On

that basis, Judge Kocoras found that Household should

also be treated as a “debt collector” that could be held liable

to the extent that Dickerson’s letter was false or misleading. 1999 WL 754566, at *3.

The judge then turned to Dickerson’s letter and considered whether that letter falsely implied that an attorney

had been engaged to help Household collect on the overdue

GM Card accounts, in violation of section 1692e(3). Our

opinion in Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 228-29 (7th Cir.

1996), recognized that a delinquency letter from an attor-
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 11

ney conveys authority and implies that the attorney

supervised or actually controlled the procedures by which

the letter had been sent. Thus, Judge Kocoras reasoned, an

attorney must have direct and personal involvement in the

mailing of the letter—e.g., by reviewing the file to determine whether the letter should be sent, or by approving the mailing based on recommendations of others—in

order for it not to mislead the recipient as to the nature

of his involvement with the debt. 1999 WL 754566, at *3,

citing Avila, 84 F.3d at 228. Dickerson contended that

he was so involved: his firm engaged in a three-level review of the information supplied by Household before each

letter was sent; and, by his own account, Dickerson himself

worked two to three hours each day reviewing the 2,000

accounts that Household referred to him every month.

Judge Kocoras viewed the firm’s “review” as no more than

a deceptive “veneer of compliance” with FDCPA, however.

1999 WL 754566, at *4.

A letter like Dickerson’s suggests that the attorney writing the letter is familiar with the facts of the case and

is prepared to pursue the case himself, the judge pointed

out. Id. In fact, Dickerson lacked this level of involvement

with the debt: Household did not forward debtor files to

Dickerson, but only so much information as Dickerson

needed to complete his form letter to each debtor; that

letter directed the debtor to contact Household, not Dickerson; and Dickerson had not even created the letter specifically for Household, but simply had employed a customizable form created before Household became his client. Id.

Moreover, Dickerson’s “review” of the information supplied by Household was superficial: Dickerson and his

staff merely proofread the data for incorrect amounts and

typographical errors; they did not independently analyze

contracts or any other information regarding the debtor. Id.

In other words, none of the information that Dickerson

reviewed enlightened him as to the particular circum-
12 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

stances of a debtor and his account before he sent a delinquency letter to that debtor. Id. In short, Dickerson was

not exercising “independent, trained legal judgment on

the validity of a claim.” Id.

What happened after Dickerson’s letter was sent likewise indicated to the judge that Dickerson was not meaningfully involved in the effort to collect Household’s debts.

Household did not inform Dickerson whether it received a

response to his letter. Id. n.1. As for the responses that

Dickerson himself received, the judge found that his handling of those responses was insufficient to suggest anything more than “a surface veneer of compliance with the

FDCPA . . . .” Id. at *5. Moreover, Dickerson had never

pursued a judgment on Household’s behalf, nor had Household ever asked him to do so. Id. at *4. “We find this lack

of litigation activity contradicts the impression given to

an unsophisticated consumer; namely, that if she does

not pay, the attorney sending her the collection letter will

pursue a collection suit against her.” Id.

“The key factor, however, is that the letters themselves

are objectionable.” Id. at *5. Dickerson merely sent each

debtor a form letter “modified to reflect the meager information provided to [him] by Household Credit.” Id. Furthermore, Dickerson did not sign the letters before they

were issued; instead, Contract U.S.A. printed the letters,

affixed a facsimile of Dickerson’s signature to them, and

mailed them. In Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1321

(2nd Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit suggested that mass

mailings prepared in this manner will frequently be false

to the extent that they suggest that an attorney was

directly involved in the process by which the letter was

prepared and sent and that she had formed a professional opinion as to how the individual debtor’s case should

be handled. “For this reason, there will be few, if any cases

in which a mass-produced collection letter bearing the

facsimile of an attorney’s signature will comply with the
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 13

restrictions imposed by § 1692e.” Id. This court’s opinion

in Avila cited this passage from Clomon approvingly,

Judge Kocoras noted. 1999 WL 754566, at *5; see Avila,

84 F.3d at 228, quoting Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1321. In conjunction with the “reams” of other evidence of noncompliance with the FDCPA, “[Dickerson’s] letter clearly

demonstrates a lack of involvement and an extraordinary

abdication of legal duties by the Dickerson defendants in

a large-scale, bulk operation.” 1999 WL 754566, at *5.

Judge Kocoras therefore concluded as a matter of law

that Dickerson’s minimal involvement in the process by

which the letter was sent to class members rendered the

letter misleading in violation of section 1692e(3). Although

the letter was prepared on his letterhead and included a

facsimile of his signature, “the letters were not from him

in any meaningful sense of the word.” 1999 WL 754566,

at *5.

Because the letter, in Judge Kocoras’ view, falsely implied

to the debtor that an attorney had become professionally involved in the collection of his or her debt, he believed

that it also violated section 1692e(10)’s proscription of

the use of any false representation or deceptive means

to collect, or attempt to collect, a debt. 1999 WL 754566,

at *6.

Finally, Judge Kocoras determined that Dickerson was

additionally liable under the “flat-rating” provision of the

FDCPA, section 1692j, which renders it unlawful to design,

compile, and furnish any form knowing it would be used to

create a false belief in the debtor that someone other than

the creditor is participating in an effort to collect his

debt, when in fact such person is not participating. The

classic “flat-rater” effectively sells his letterhead to the

creditor, often in exchange for a per-letter fee, so that the

creditor can prepare its own delinquency letters on that

letterhead. See White v. Goodman, 200 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th
14 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

Cir. 2000). Use of a third party’s letterhead gives the

delinquency letters added intimidation value, as it suggests

that a collection agency or some other party is now on the

debtor’s back. See id. Here, of course, Dickerson did not

literally hand over his letterhead to Household. Yet, as

Judge Kocoras had already determined with respect to

section 1692e(3) and (10), Dickerson’s letter to Nielsen and

the other class members was not genuinely from him in the

professional sense. This was sufficient, in the judge’s view,

to render Dickerson additionally liable under section 1692j.

1999 WL 754566, at *6. Judge Kocoras rejected the view of

some courts that a defendant can either be a debt collector

for purposes of liability under section 1692e or a flat-rater

for purposes of section 1692j, but not both. He reasoned

that liability under section 1692j attached when the defendant wrote or otherwise originated the form letter, knowing that it would be used to deceive consumers into believing that a third party had joined forces with the creditor

to collect the delinquent debt. Id. “It is undisputed that

the Dickerson defendants are responsible for creating

the misleading and improper dunning letters at issue,

and thus they are also liable under § 1692j.” Id.

In the wake of the summary judgment ruling on liability,

the parties reached a settlement as to damages, pursuant to which the defendants reserved the right to appeal

the liability ruling. The defendants agreed to pay a total

of $250,000, of which $1,500 was paid to Nielsen as the

named plaintiff, $85,000 was paid to class counsel, and the

remainder was divided pro rata among the other members

of the class. The district court approved the settlement

in an order issued on June 8, 2000. R. 79.

II.

The appellants contend that the district court’s summary

judgment ruling was erroneous in four respects. First, they

dispute Household’s status as a “debt collector.” Contrary
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 15

to the district judge’s finding, they assert that Dickerson

in fact did participate meaningfully in the collection of

Household’s debts. Consequently, they argue, Household

did not falsely employ Dickerson’s name in the effort to

collect its own debts and cannot be treated as a “debt

collector” for purposes of liability under section 1692e(3)

and (10). Second, in the appellants’ view, the facts did not

permit the district court to conclude, as a matter of law,

that Dickerson had no meaningful involvement in the

process by which the delinquency letters were sent to

class members. To the contrary, they see the record as being “replete” with evidence of Dickerson’s involvement, so

much so that the district court should have granted summary judgment in their favor on this point. Third, appellants contend that Dickerson cannot be held liable as a

“flat-rater” under section 1692j. The same party cannot

be both a debt collector and a flat-rater, they reason. That

point aside, they emphasize that Dickerson did more than

print the delinquency letters in exchange for a flat fee.

For that reason, they believe that the court erred in holding Dickerson liable under this provision as a matter of law.

Fourth, the appellants point out that the district court

failed to consider whether Household should escape liability under the bona fide error defense recognized in the

statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Household asserts that

it hired a reputable, independent law firm that in turn

represented and agreed in writing that its procedures

would comply with the FDCPA (and those procedures

were not obviously deficient, in Household’s view). Consequently, Household argues, any error that it made in

securing Dickerson’s involvement in its debt collections

efforts should be excused as a bona fide error.

A. Household’s liability as a “debt collector”

Because the FDCPA defines a “debt collector” as a person

who endeavors to collect the debts owed to “another,” 15

U.S.C. § 1692a(6), creditors who are attempting to col-
16 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

lect their own debts generally are not considered debt

collectors under the statute. Aubert, 137 F.2d at 978.

However, pursuant to the “false name” exception to this

exclusion, a creditor will be deemed a debt collector if “in

the process of collecting his own debts, [the creditor] uses

any name other than his own which would indicate that

a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such

debts.” § 1692a(6). The district court concluded that Household had “used Dickerson’s name and letterhead” to give

Household’s debtors the false impression that someone

other than Household—more particularly, an attorney—had

become involved in the effort to collect the amounts that

these debtors owed to Household. 1999 WL 754566, at *3.

That determination, of course, rests on the court’s threshold finding that Dickerson was not meaningfully involved

in the collection of Household’s debts. See id. Because

we agree, for the reasons we note below, that Dickerson

was not genuinely involved in the effort to collect Household’s debts and that the letter he sent to Household’s

debtors was not truly “from” Dickerson, we also agree that

Household should be treated as a “debt collector” for purposes of liability under section 1692e(3) and (10).

B. Violations of section 1692(e)(3) and (10)

The FDCPA broadly prohibits a debt collector from using

“any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means

in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692e. The statute proceeds to identify sixteen, nonexclusive instances of conduct that would constitute a

violation of this prohibition. Two of these are relevant here:

* * *

(3) The false representation or implication that any

individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.

* * *
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 17

(10) The use of any false representation or deceptive

means to collect or attempt to collect any debt

or to obtain information concerning a consumer.

* * *

15 U.S.C. § 1692e. There is no dispute that Dickerson is

an attorney; the question instead is whether his letter to

Households debtors was genuinely “from” Dickerson. The

district court concluded that it was not, reasoning that

Dickerson, as a legal professional, was not involved in

Household’s debt collection process in any meaningful

sense. 1999 WL 754566, at *5. Based on the undisputed

facts, we agree.

As we recognized in Avila, a debt collection letter that

is issued on an attorney’s letterhead and over his signature conveys the notion that the attorney has “directly

controlled or supervised the process through which the

letter was sent”—i.e., that he has assessed the validity

of the debt, is prepared to take legal action to collect

on that debt, and has, accordingly, decided that a letter

should be sent to the debtor conveying that message. 84

F.3d at 229. “The attorney letter implies that the attorney

has reached a considered, professional judgment that the

debtor is delinquent and is a candidate for legal action.” Id.

It is this implicit message that “get[s] the debtor’s knees

knocking” and makes the attorney letter a particularly

effective method of debt collection. Id. If, however, the letter to the debtor is not the product of the attorney’s professional judgment—if he has not independently determined that the debt is ripe for legal action by reviewing

the debtor’s file, for example; if he has not exercised

discretion in deciding whether and when the letter should

be sent to a given debtor; if he does not see the individual letter before it is sent—then the letter is misleading. Id.

at 228-29. Attorney letters prepared en masse are frequently false for want of such judgment. Id. at 229. In order
18 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

to avoid that falsehood, the attorney must have genuine

involvement in the process through which the letter was

sent to the debtor. Id.

[I]f a debt collector (attorney or otherwise) wants to

take advantage of the special connotation of the word

“attorney” in the minds of delinquent consumer debtors

to better effect collection of the debt, the debt collector

should at the least ensure that an attorney has become professionally involved in the debtor’s file. Any

other result would sanction the wholesale licensing

of an attorney’s name for commercial purposes, in derogation of professional standards . . . .

Id.

The undisputed facts make clear that Dickerson neither

made a “considered, professional judgment” that Nielsen

or any other class member was delinquent on her debt

and a candidate for legal action nor meaningfully involved

himself in the decision to send the dunning letter to any

individual debtor. Consequently, the letters he sent to

class members were not truly “from” him. Dickerson is

therefore liable under 1692e(3) and (10) for the misleading nature of the letters.

First, Dickerson did not make the decision to send a letter to a debtor; Household did. Household regularly forwarded lists of delinquent debtors to Dickerson so that

he might issue delinquency letters to these debtors. As

Judge Kocoras observed, Household provided Dickerson

only so much information about a debtor as Dickerson

required in order to complete the letter. 1999 WL 754566,

at *4, *5. To the extent that Dickerson eliminated some

names from the list of delinquent debtors that Household

provided (based on anything more than obvious gaps or

errors in Household’s information), the record suggests

that he did so based solely on the discovery that the debtor had declared bankruptcy, had already been sent a letter,
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 19

or lived in one of three states which would not permit

a letter of the kind that Dickerson had prepared. As we

note below, this was purely a categorical assessment

rather than one calling for an individualized, discretionary assessment by Dickerson. Finally, Household reserved

the right to sign off on the issuance of Dickerson’s letters. After Dickerson had finalized the list of debtors to

whom letters were to be sent, that list was forwarded to

Household. Dickerson then took no further action for a

period of twenty-four hours, giving Household the chance

to make any changes that it wished. Only then did Dickerson transmit the list to Contact U.S.A. for printing and

mailing.

Second, in no sense did Dickerson “become professionally

involved in the debtor’s file.” Avila, 84 F.3d at 229. Household did not provide Dickerson with debtor files, nor did

it grant Dickerson access to its account system. The only

information that Household provided to Dickerson was

the debtor’s account number, name, address, account balance, and amount past due. Dickerson had familiarized

himself with the GM Cardmember and Disclosure Agreement, had a general understanding of the internal procedures that Household followed in administering the GM

Card portfolio, and knew what steps Household had

taken to collect on overdue accounts and how long those

accounts had been delinquent before they were referred

to him for collection. But Dickerson did not undertake

to make a professional judgment as to the delinquency

and validity of any individual cardholder’s debt before

he issued a letter to that debtor, nor could he have rendered such a judgment based on the limited information

with which Household provided him. As Dickerson himself

stated:

 . . . David D. Dickerson and Associates . . . assume that

many demands for payment have been made on the

debtor and that legal action is contemplated if it
20 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

appears that these debtors will not pay amicably and

have the means to satisfy a judgment.

It is understood that these are accurate and valid

claims for the amounts stated and that any information indicating that the debtors dispute any part(s) of

the debt have been furnished to this office. . . .

R. 30 Ex. D (emphasis added).

Third, Dickerson’s tripartite “review” of the debtor information supplied by Household, even to the extent that it

was performed by an attorney at one or more levels, did not

call for the exercise of professional judgment. The most

substantive aspect of this review involved checking an

internal database to determine whether a debtor had declared bankruptcy and running a computer check (supplemented by eyeball review) to screen out debtors who lived

in certain pre-determined, prohibited states. These were

purely “yes/no” assessments that involved no exercise of

discretion; indeed, Household itself verified that a debtor

had not died or declared bankruptcy and did not live in a

prohibited state before it forwarded the debtor’s name

to Dickerson for issuance of a dunning letter. Aside from

this, Dickerson’s review was aimed at identifying missing data, typographical errors, and debtors whom he had

already sent letters. The ministerial nature of Dickerson’s review is confirmed by his own deposition testimony.

Dickerson testified that in the course of reviewing a list

of 148 delinquent accounts, he spent approximately two

minutes per page of forty accounts—approximately three

seconds per account, in other words. R. 46 Ex. A at 161-62.

The brevity of that review lays bare its cursory nature. See

Boyd v. Wexler, 275 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 71

U.S.L.W. 3116 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2002) (No. 02-98).

Fourth, although Dickerson composed the dunning letter,

it was a form letter that his firm, with the assistance of

Contact U.S.A., prepared and issued en masse. The letter
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 21

was personalized only to the extent that it contained each

debtor’s account number, name, address, account balance,

and the amount of the overdue debt—all information supplied by Household. The letter reflects no individualized

assessment of the individual debtor’s circumstances or

her liability. For that matter, the form itself was not even

one that Dickerson had written for Household; he had

composed the letter before he took on Household as a client.

Our point is not that a form letter rules out the possibility of an attorney’s genuine, professional involvement in

the collection of a debt. But along with the other evidence

we highlight, the numbers (recall that Household referred

Dickerson an average of some 2,000 accounts per month)

and assembly-line fashion in which Dickerson’s letter

was issued betray the purely nominal nature of his participation in the collection process. The fact that he wrote

the form does nothing to prove his professional involvement

in the debtor’s file. We also note that Household approved

the form and reserved the right to approve any modifications to that form.

Fifth, Dickerson played barely more than a ministerial

role in handling the responses to his letter. The letter

instructed the debtor to make payment to GM Card (and

included a payment coupon for that purpose) or to contact

GM Card (via a toll-free number that connected the caller

to Household personnel) in order to discuss payment arrangements. Dickerson’s letterhead did include his firm’s

telephone number and address; the text of the letter also

indicated that the debtor should contact “us” (presumably

Dickerson) if the debtor disputed the validity of the debt

or wished to be provided with the name and address of

the original creditor (if different from GM Card). Consequently, a certain number of debtors did contact Dickerson

rather than Household. When the debtor replied by letter,

Dickerson and his staff categorized the communication

and forwarded it to Household for handling with an appro-
22 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

priate cover letter alerting Household to the type of response the firm had received from the debtor; a copy of

the cover letter was sent to the debtor so as to alert the

debtor that Household would be handling the matter. Phone

calls were handled in essentially the same manner, although according to Dickerson, he attempted to answer

questions and be of help to the extent that he could. But

Dickerson typically could not provide the debtors with any

information about his or her individual account beyond

that included in Dickerson’s letter; nor was the firm authorized to negotiate a payment plan, settle, or otherwise

dispose of the debt. Household itself ultimately handled

all debtor responses to Dickerson’s letter, including those

forwarded to it by way of Dickerson. There is no evidence

that Dickerson ever substantively handled the responses

himself.

Sixth, Household paid Dickerson a flat fee of $2.45 per

letter regardless of the result (if any) that the letter

produced. The fixed and quite modest nature of Dickerson’s remuneration strongly suggests that Household

was paying for the marquee value of Dickerson’s name

rather than his professional assistance in the collection of

its debts.

Seventh, Dickerson never took legal action in pursuit of

Household’s debts. By the terms of the agreement between them, the firm was not authorized to take such

action except upon Household’s direction. Although the

firm took regularly filed suits on behalf of other clients,

Household never asked Dickerson to do so on its behalf.

In sum, although an unsophisticated consumer would

have construed Dickerson’s letter to reflect an attorney’s

professional judgment that her debt was delinquent and

ripe for legal action, see Avila, 84 F.3d at 229, in fact

Dickerson had made no such assessment. Dickerson knew

nothing about the debtor and her potential liability beyond
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 23

what Household had conveyed to him; and Household

provided Dickerson only the bare information that Dickerson required in order to complete the blanks in his form

letter. Here, as in Avila, Dickerson, in his capacity as

an attorney, was not the true source of the letter. 84 F.3d

at 230. The letter thus ran afoul of 1692e(3) and (10).

We acknowledge that Dickerson took some steps that

distinguish his involvement in the process by which letters were sent to debtors from the level of attorney involvement in Avila and similar cases. Dickerson reviewed

the master contract governing GM Card accounts (compare

Sonmore v. CheckRite Recovery Servs., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d

1128, 1135 (D. Minn. 2001), where the attorney did not

review “a single file or document relating to the debt”);

he looked at the minimal information that Household

provided regarding each overdue account, and therefore

knew the identities of debtors who were to receive the

letters (compare Avila, 84 F.3d at 229, Clomon, 988 F.2d

at 1320, and Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand,

103 F.3d 1232, 1235 (5th Cir. 1997), where the attorneys

did not even know to whom their letters were being sent);

he checked the debtor information for typographical errors and to weed out debtors who had already received

a letter from him, had declared bankruptcy, or lived in a

prohibited state (compare Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1320, where

the attorney “played virtually no day-to-day role in the

debt collection process”); and he handled letters and

phone calls received by his firm to the extent of categorizing them and forwarding them to Household (contrast

Laubauch v. Arrow Serv. Bureau, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 625,

631 (N.D. Ill. 1997), finding that company did not qualify

as a “debt collector” where, inter alia, it was not involved

with follow-up to delinquency letter). In these minor respects, Dickerson may have been “more” involved in the

process by which letters were sent to the debtors than his

counterparts in such cases as Avila and Clomon, but his
24 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

involvement still fell markedly short of what those cases

require. His efforts, as Judge Kocoras aptly remarked,

amounted to no more than a “veneer” of compliance with

the FDCPA. Avila’s central requirement is crystal clear:

an attorney must have some professional involvement

with the debtor’s file if a delinquency letter sent under his

name is not to be considered false or misleading in violation of section 1692e(3) and (10). 84 F.3d at 229; see also

Boyd, 275 F.3d at 646. Whatever Dickerson may have done,

he had no such involvement with the file of any debtor

slated to receive his form letter and played no meaningful

role in the decision to send a debtor such a letter. Dickerson

made no independent, professional assessment of the

delinquency and validity of any debt, he did not select

the debtors to whom a letter would be sent, and he did

not make any assessment as to whether a debt was a

candidate for legal action. He “reviewed” printouts of the

debtor information supplied by Household, but only in the

sense of literally looking at the data and checking for

errors. He removed certain debtors from the recipient list,

but not based on any individualized assessment of a

debtor’s delinquency or other pertinent circumstances; he

and his firm simply identified debtors who had declared

bankruptcy, had already received a letter from him, or

who lived in “prohibited” states—a screening process little

different from the checks that Household and Contact

U.S.A. themselves performed. Moreover, contrary to the

impression his letter would have given the unsophisticated

debtor, Dickerson had not been engaged and was not

prepared to take legal action in pursuit of the debt: he had

no authority to negotiate a payment plan, settle, or otherwise dispose of any debt; he did not handle debtor responses to his letter beyond categorizing and forwarding

them to Household; and he was never asked to and did

not take legal action to collect on any debt. The details

of this case may differ in minor respects, but in all material respects this case is on all fours with Avila. Just as
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 25

in Avila, the form letter issued on an attorney’s letterhead and in his name was not “from” the attorney, qua

attorney, in any meaningful sense. The violation of section

1692e(3) and (10) is inescapable.

Having reached that conclusion, the actual source of

the letter is obvious. It was Household that selected the

debtors to whom Dickerson’s letter was to be sent. It

was Household that provided the information that Dickerson needed regarding the identity of the debtor and the

amount of his or her delinquency in order complete the

letter. It was Household on which Dickerson relied for

the determination that the debtor was indeed delinquent

and therefore an appropriate recipient of the letter. It was

Household that reserved the right to approve issuance

of the letters. It was ultimately Household that handled

all responses to Dickerson’s letter. And it was Household

that decided what further action (including legal action)

would be taken in the wake of Dickerson’s letter. For these

and the other reasons we have discussed, Household

was the true source of Dickerson’s letter. Because it issued

that letter under Dickerson’s name, giving debtors the

false impression that a third party (Dickerson) was involved in collecting the debt, Household is a debt collector

pursuant to section 1692a(6), and therefore shares Dickerson’s liability for the violations of section 1692e(3) and (10).

C. Flat-Rating liability under section 1692j

Section 1692j(a) of the FDCPA makes it illegal for a

person to “to design, compile, and furnish any form knowing that such form would be used to create the false belief in a consumer that a person other than the creditor

of such consumer is participating in the collection of or in

an attempt to collect a debt such consumer allegedly owes

such creditor, when in fact such person is not so participating.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692j(a). This provision bars the
26 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

practice commonly known as “flat-rating,” in which an

individual sends a delinquency letter to the debtor portraying himself as a debt collector, when in fact he has no

real involvement in the debt collection effort; in effect, the

individual is lending his name to the creditor for its intimidation value, often in exchange for a “flat” rate per letter.

See White v. Goodman, supra, 200 F.3d at 1017.

We have already concluded that Dickerson did not

meaningfully participate in Household’s debt collection

efforts; he may therefore seem to be a natural candidate

for flat-rating liability pursuant to section 1692j, particularly given the manner in which Household compensated

his firm. There is some question, however, whether the

same party may be held liable both as a “debt collector”

and a “flat-rater”. In order to qualify as a debt collector,

an individual must have some involvement in the effort

to collect another’s debts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The

premise of liability under section 1692j, however, is that

the “flat-rater” is not involved in debt collection. Thus,

some courts have concluded that liability as a debt collector forecloses liability as a flat-rater. E.g., Randle v. GC

Servs. L.P., 48 F. Supp. 2d 835, 841 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Anthes

v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 162, 168 (D. Del.

1991).

It is unnecessary for us to resolve this question. 1692j(b)

provides that a flat-rater “shall be liable to the same extent

and in the same manner as a debt collector . . . .” We have

already sustained Judge Kocoras’ determination that

Dickerson is liable as a debt collector for violations of

section 1692e(3) and (10). An additional finding that

Dickerson is also liable pursuant to 1692j would have

no impact on the judgment against him. See Clomon, 988

F.2d at 1318 (“[a] single violation of § 1692e is sufficient

to establish civil liability under the FDCPA”). Accordingly,

we do not resolve this question.
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 27

D. Household’s Bona Fide Error Defense

Section 1692k(c) provides:

A debt collector may not be held liable in any action

brought under this subchapter if the debt collector

shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona

fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.

Household contends that its own violation of the FDCPA,

if any, was unintentional and resulted from a bona fide

error in its efforts to comply with the statute and the

cases interpreting it. Further,

Household hired an independent and reputable attorney, knowing that he attended seminars on the

FDCPA, subscribed to and read materials to keep

abreast of FDCPA developments, and trained his

employees with internal compliance manuals. Dickerson represented that the system he put in place was

in full compliance with the FDCPA, and the detailed

procedures he used—including a three-part review

process, checks against databases, additional verification, and follow-up debtor communications—gave

every appearance of being . . . in compliance.

Appellants’ Opening Br. at 35-36. In granting summary

judgment in favor of the plaintiff class, the district court

did not address Household’s invocation of section 1692k(c).

Nielsen contends that Household is foreclosed from asserting a bona fide error defense because the mistake

that Household and Dickerson made was one of legal

interpretation; in Nielsen’s view, the statute does not immunize defendants for mistakes of law.

There is a split of authority among the circuits as to

whether the bona fide error defense applies to mistakes

of law. The majority view is that the defense is only avail-
28 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

able for clerical and factual errors. See, e.g., Picht v. Jon R.

Hawks, Ltd., 236 F.3d 446, 451-52 (8th Cir. 2001); Pipiles v.

Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 27 (2nd

Cir. 1989); Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 779 (9th

Cir. 1982); see also Johnson v. Riddle, ___ F.3d ___, 2002

WL 2029304, at *10 n.14 (10th Cir. Sept. 5, 2002) (collecting

cases). The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Baker, the first

appellate precedent on this point, looked principally to

the cases that had uniformly construed the Truth-inLending Act’s (“TILA”) bona fide error provision, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1640(c), not to immunize legal errors. 677 F.2d at 779.

The TILA provision, however, expressly states that “an

error of legal judgment with respect to a person’s obligations under this subchapter is not a bona fide error.”

§ 1640(c) (emphasis supplied). It also includes an illustrative list of errors that would constitute bona fide errors,

including “clerical, calculation, computer malfunction and

programming, and printing errors.” Id. By contrast, the

FDCPA’s provision does not expressly remove legal mistakes from the realm of errors that can be considered bona

fide, nor does it in any other way illustrate what types of

mistakes can or cannot be deemed bona fide. Noting the

distinction between the two statutory provisions, “a growing

minority” of courts, Johnson, 2002 WL 2029304, at *10,

including the Tenth Circuit, have concluded that mistakes

of law can be considered bona fide errors under section

1692k(c). id, at *10-*11 & n.14 (so holding and collecting

cases). Our own opinion in Jenkins v. Heintz, 124 F.3d 824,

832 n.7 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1022, 118 S.

Ct. 1304 (1998), likewise notes that nothing in the language

of the FDCPA bona fide error provision limits the reach of

the defense to clerical errors and other mistakes not involving the exercise of legal judgment. Yet, as Jenkins itself pointed out, there was no evidence that the mistake

at issue in that case actually had involved the exercise

of any legal judgment. Id. at 832. Consequently, we did

not have occasion to further illuminate whether and when
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 29

legal errors constitute bona fide errors under section

1692k(c).

Assuming, consistent with our observations in Jenkins,

that a legal mistake can qualify as a bona fide error under the FDCPA, a second question presents itself. Section 1692k(c) requires the debt collector to prove, inter alia,

that its violation of the FDCPA “was not intentional.” In

this respect, the bona fide error provisions of TILA and

the FDCPA are virtually identical; TILA too requires

proof that “the violation was not intentional.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1640(c). In Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d

1161, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1974), we held that the relevant

intent was the defendant’s intent to commit the act determined to be a violation of TILA, not an intent to commit a violation of the statute. Thus, so long as the act

found to be a violation of TILA is deliberate, the bona fide

error defense is unavailable. Id. If the same holds true

for the FDCPA, the bona fide error defense would likewise be unavailable to Household: Household’s actions

were not inadvertent; rather, it intended to use Dickerson in the very manner that we have found to violate the

FDCPA. See id. Whether or not the FDCPA’s bona fide

error provision should be interpreted in this manner is

open to debate, however. The Sixth Circuit has concluded

that a debt collector may avoid liability via the bona fide

error defense by showing that it did not intend to violate the statute: “The debt collector must only show that

the violation was unintentional, not that the communication itself was unintentional.” Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs.

Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998). And, as Judge Tinder

has pointed out, although the pertinent language of the

two statutes is the same, there are other differences between them that may support differing constructions. See

Frye v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C., 193 F.

Supp. 2d 1070, 1087-88 (S.D. Ind. 2002). This question,

which the parties have not addressed, is not one that
30 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

we need decide here. We shall again assume that Household may avail itself of the bona fide error defense because it had no intent to violate the FDCPA, although its

actions were deliberate.

What dooms Household’s bona fide error defense is that

its actions, along with Dickerson’s, were in plain contravention of our opinion in Avila. See, e.g., Hulshizer v. Global

Credit Servs., Inc., 728 F.2d 1037, 1038 (8th Cir. 1984) (per

curiam) (finding no basis to invoke the bona fide error

defense where “[t]he language of the statute [was] unambiguous and [the creditor’s] disregard of that language [was]

undisputed”); see also Janet Flaccus, Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act: Lawyers and the Bona Fide Error Defense,

2001 ARK. L. NOTES 95 (2001) (arguing that the bona fide

error defense should be available when the law is unsettled, but not when it is reasonably clear). Avila, which was

decided nearly a year before Household retained Dickerson, made clear that an attorney must have some professional involvement with the debtor’s file in order for the

presence of his name on a delinquency not to be misleading. 84 F.3d at 229. Many of the very omissions that we

highlighted in Avila were present here: Neither Dickerson

nor any member of his staff reviewed the debtor’s file, see

id. at 228; Dickerson did not make the decision whether

to send any particular debtor a delinquency letter, id. at

228-29; Dickerson’s letters were mass produced and mechanically signed, id. at 228, 229; and Household never

engaged Dickerson to file suit or take other legal action

in pursuit of a debt, id. at 230. Here, as in Avila, Dickerson made no independent, professional assessment that

the debt was delinquent, that the debt was a candidate

for legal action, and that the debtor should be sent a

delinquency letter. See id. at 228-29. Here, as in Avila,

Dickerson, acting as an attorney, was not the true source

of the letter. Id. at 230. It was Household that selected

debtors for receipt of Dickerson’s letter; it was Household
Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781 31

that supplied the information Dickerson required (and

only such information as he required) to complete the letter; it was Household that had final say over the recipient list; it was Household that handled the responses

to Dickerson’s letter; and it was Household (presumably

with legal assistance that it obtained from a firm other

than Dickerson’s) that took legal action as necessary to

enforce the debt. As we discussed earlier, the minor additional steps that Dickerson took to involve himself in

the process of preparing and sending the letters were,

in Judge Kocoras’ words, a mere “veneer” of compliance

with the FDCPA. Dickerson’s actions complied neither

with the spirit nor the letter of Avila; no reasonable attorney, and for that matter, no reasonable creditor or debt

collector, having read our opinion, could have failed to

appreciate this. Whatever steps Dickerson took to familiarize himself with the law, including precedents like

Avila, obviously were inadequate. Having hired Dickerson,

and having itself participated in a process by which delinquency letters were sent to debtors on Dickerson’s letterhead without his meaningful involvement in the process—

indeed, having signed a contract with Dickerson which

spelled out that very process (see R. 53, Exhibits in Support of Household’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 4

¶ 1)—Household cannot avail itself of the bona fide error

defense.

III.

For the reasons we have discussed, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor

of the plaintiff class.
32 Nos. 00-2780, 00-2781

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—10-9-02