No. 92-382 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1993 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

ANNA RUTH SCOFFIELD, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

LINDSEY DENNIS SCOFFIELD, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Beaverhead, 

The Honorable Frank M. Davis, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Vincent J. Kozakiewicz, Attorney at Law, 

Dillon, Montana 

For Respondent: 

John Warren, Schulz, Davis & Warren, 

Dillon, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: November 19, 1992 

Decided: May 18, 1993 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Lindsey Scoffield appeals from a supplemental decree of 

dissolution entered in the Fifth Judicial District Court, State of 

Montana, on March 20, 1992. Lindsey contends that the ~istrict 

Court abused its discretion when it ordered him to assume all 

marital debts, including debts incurred by his spouse on behalf of 

her children from a prior marriage. Additionally, Lindsey asserts 

that the court erred when it denied his request to modify the 

allocation of proceeds from the sale of the parties1 cattle. We 

affirm. 

The issues on appeal are: 

1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

required appellant to assume all marital debts, including debts 

incurred by respondent on behalf of her children from a prior 

marriage? 

2. Did the District Court err when it denied appellant Is 

request to modify the allocation of proceeds from the sale of the 

parties1 cattle? 

Anna Ruth Scoffield, age 32, and Lindsey Dennis Scoffield, 

age 31, were married in Abilene, Texas, on March 2, 1985. There 

were no children born of this marriage, although Anna has two 

children from a previous marriage. 

On March 13, 1991, Anna filed a petition to have the parties1 

marriage dissolved. A dissolution proceeding was held on May 16, 

1991. At the proceeding, Lindsey expressly agreed to assume all 
marital debts in exchange for the court's denial of maintenance and 

attorney fees to Anna. 

On July 1, 1991, the District Court entered its Findings of 

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution. The court 

ordered the parties to equally divide their marital property. 

Additionally, the court ordered ~indsey to assume and pay all 

existing marital debts, and denied Anna's request for maintenance 

and attorney fees. Finally, the court directed the parties to sell 

the cattle they owned and to divide the proceeds equally. 

In August 1991, the parties entered into an arrangement 

concerning the cattle that differed from the July 1, 1991, 

dissolution decree. Rather than sell the cattle and divide the 

proceeds equally, as required by the decree, the parties agreed 

that Lindsey would pay Anna $4600 for her interest in the cattle. 

Lindsey paid Anna $3000 in cash, and delivered a $1600 promissory 

note, due on April 1, 1992. On January 10, 1992, Lindsey sold the 

cattle to a third party; however, he did not recover the amount per 

head that he anticipated. 

During the year following the July 1, 1991, decree, Lindsey 

refused to pay the majority of the parties existing marital debts. 

Anna responded by moving that the District Court find Lindsey in 

contempt. On March 6, 1992, the court held a hearing on the 

contempt motion. Duringthe hearing, Lindsey made two arguments to 

the District Court concerning the marital property division. 
First, Lindsey acknowledged that he agreed to assume the 

marital debts; however, he asserted that he should not have to pay 

the debts incurred by Anna on behalf of her children from her 

previous marriage because they were not marital debts. 

Second, Lindsey requested the court to modify the allocation 

of the cattle proceeds in light of the actual sale price of the 

cattle. He reminded the court that the dissolution decree required 

an equal division of cattle proceeds; and he explained to the court 

that as a result of a contract concerning the cattle that he made 

with Anna subsequent to the decree, he received less than 50 

percent of the cattle proceeds. 

On March 2 0, 1992, the District Court amended and supplemented 

the July 1, 1991, dissolution decree. In the supplemental decree, 

the court entered a judgment against Lindsey far $1019.16, which 

represented the amount of marital debts. The court specifically 

listed the accounts Lindsey was obligated to assume and limited 

those accounts to debts incurred as of May 16, 1991, the date of 

the parties1 dissolution proceeding. These accounts included debts 

incurred by Anna on behalf of her children from a prior marriage. 

The court stayed the execution of the judgment upon the condition 

that Lindsey pay to Anna monthly installments until the judgment of 

$1019.16 is paid in full. 

In the March 20, 1992, order, the court also denied Lindsey's 

request to modify the allocation of proceeds from the sale of the 

cattle. The court concluded that the parties were bound by their 
own agreement regarding the value of the cattle. ~indsey appeals 

from the March 2 0, 1992, order. 

On appeal, Lindsey contends that (1) the court abused its 

discretion when it required Lindsey to assume responsibility for 

debts incurred by Anna on behalf of her children from a prior 

marriage; and (2) the court erred when it refused to modify the 

allocation of proceeds, in light of the actual sales price of the 

cattle. 

I 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it required 

appellant to assume all marital debts, including debts incurred by 

respondent on behalf of her children from a prior marriage? 

Lindsey acknowledges on appeal that he expressly agreed to 

assume all marital debts; however, he contends that the District 

Court abused its discretion when it required him to assume the 

debts incurred by Anna on behalf of her children from a prior 

marriage. Lindsey asserts that debts incurred on behalf of a 

spouse's children from a previous marriage are not marital debts. 

Because Lindsey expressly agreed to assume Ifall of the marital 

debts" in exchange for the court's denial of maintenance and 

attorney fees to Anna, our analysis need not focus on whether 

Lindsey is statutorily and/or legally obligated to assume the debts 

incurred by his spouse on behalf of her children from a prior 

marriage. Nor is it necessary to ascertain for whose benefit those 

debts were incurred. For purposes of this appeal, we limit our 
analysis to whether the debts at issue are "marital debts." If 

they are, then Lindsey is obligated by his own agreement to pay for 

them. 

The Montana Marriage and Divorce Act, 55 40-1-101 to 40-4-225, 

MCA, neither defines nor refers to the term "marital debt." 

Moreover, few Montana cases, if any, specifically define "marital 

debt." Yet a definition of "marital debt" is essential in a 

dissolution proceeding because in order for trial courts to 

"equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets," 

as courts are statutorily required to do by 5 40-4-202, MCA, courts 

must first ascertain the partiest assets and liabilities prior to 

apportionment. In reMarriageofDimberger (1989) , 237 Mont 398, 401, 773 

P.2d 330, 332. Courts must know the definitional parameters of the 

term "marital debtB1 so that courts can make fair marital property 

divisions. Only by knowing what to include as "marital debt," 

before balancing a partiest assets and liabilities, can a court 

make a fair marital property apportionment. 

Montana is not alone in its lack of a definition for vlmarital 

debt. " Other states have acknowledged that the term "marital debt" 

is not defined in their state code or in court opinions, although 

the word appears regularly in dissolution documents. The Missouri 

Court of Appeals explains in the case In re Marriage of Welch (Mo. App. 

In the debt oriented society now prevailing, the term 

"marital debts" is found in nearly every dissolution case 

filed. The term is found in the pleadings, separation 
agreements, court orders and judgments, and in the 

appellate court decisions. Yet, the term "marital debt" 

never appears in the d dissolution of Marriage Act," 

5 452.300, et seq., and certainly is never defined. 

Although the Missouri Revised Statutes do not define the term 

"marital debt, It they do define its converse, "marital property. 

In Welch, the Missouri Court of Appeals relied on the statutory 

definition of "marital propertyu as a helpful starting point for 

defining "marital debt." According to the Court of Appeals, 

" ' [m] arital property is 'all property acquired by either spouse 

subsequent to the mam'age . . . . I 11 Welch, 795 s.w.2d at 643 

(interpreting Missouri Revised Statutes, S 452.330.2). The Court 

of Appeals held that "it follows, therefore, that 'marital debt' is 

ordinarily 'debt incurred subsequent to the marriage.l8* Welch, 795 

S.W.2d at 643. 

Although Montana's statutory definition of marital property is 

broader than Missouri's, it also includes property acquired by 

either party during the marriage. See 5 40-4-202, MCA. Since the 

definition for marital property in Montana includes all property 

acquired by either party during the marriage, it follows, 

therefore, that "marital debtu may be defined as all debt incurred 

by either party during the marriage. 

The disputed debts in this case were medical debts incurred on 

behalf of Anna's children. They were incurred while Lindsey and 

Anna were married. Specifically, they were incurred during 1990 

and in the spring of 1991, which was subsequent to the date of Anna 
and ~indsey 's marriage on March 2, 1985, and prior to May '16, 1992, 

the date of the parties1 marriage dissolution. Pursuant to our 

definition that marital debt is all debt incurred by either party 

during the marriage, we conclude that the medical debts incurred by 

Anna on behalf of her children during the course of the partiest 

marriage are marital debts. 

Because Lindsey expressly agreed to assume all marital debts, 

and the court accepted Lindseyf s promise in exchange for the denial 

of maintenance and attorney fees to Anna, Lindsey is obligated to 

pay for a11 marital debts, including the debts incurred by Anna on 

behalf of her children from a prior marriage. 

When reviewing a division of marital property case, the 

standard of review employed by this Court is whether the lower 

court abused its discretion when it fashioned the marital property 

distribution, InreMarriageofDanelson (1992), 253 Mont. 310, 317, 833 

P. 2d 215, 220. The lower court is obligated to seek a fair marital 

property division using reasonable judgment and common sense. 

Danehon, 833 P. 2d at 220. When a District Court judgment is based 

upon substantial credible evidence, this Court will not alter that 

judgment unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Dimbe~er 

(19891, 773 P.2d at 332. 

We conclude that the lower court exercised reasonable judgment 

when it balanced the economic consequences of Lindsey's assumption 

of all marital debts against the economic burden of maintenance and 
attorney fees. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse 

its discretion when it ordered Lindsey to assume all marital debts. 

I1 

Did the District Court err when it denied appellant's request 

to modify the allocation of proceeds from the sale of the partiesf 

cattle? 

Lindsey asserts that as a result of the actual sales price of 

the cattle, he received less than 50 percent of the cattle 

proceeds; and that this result was in contravention of the court's 

order to equally divide the proceeds. On appeal, Lindsey contends 

that the District Court erred when it denied his request to modify 

the allocation of cattle proceeds. Contrary to Lindsey's 

assertion, we find no abuse of court discretion. 

Lindsey relies on In re Mamizge of Berthiaume (1977) , 173 Mont . 421, 

567 P.2d 1388. In Berthiaume, we held that a trial court abuses its 

discretion when it makes a finding that property should be divided 

equally and then subsequently makes a disparate award. However, 

unlike the situation in Berthiaume, where the court acted in 

contravention of its findings, the District Court in the present 

case did not act contrary to its finding that the parties should 

divide the cattle proceeds equally, The court ordered the parties 

to sell the cattle and equally divide the proceeds. It was Lindsey 

and Anna who devised their own means for accomplishing their 

obligation to sell and equally divide the cattle proceeds. 
Parties are free to contract with one another, and ~indsey and 

Anna entered into a valid contract regarding the cattle. When 

Lindsey requested the lower court to modify the allocation of 

cattle proceeds in light of the actual sales price of the cattle, 

he was, in effect, asking the court to invalidate the parties1 

contract. This Court has held that a party to an agreement which 

has been performed for some length of time is estopped to deny its 

validity. Iiz re Mam'age of Jensen (1986), 223 Mont. 434, 727 P.2d 512. 

Therefore, we conclude that the lower court did not err when it 

bound the parties to their own agreement and refused to modify the 

allocation of proceeds. 

Lindsey and Anna satisfied their obligation under the decree 

to sell the cattle and equally divide the proceeds when they agreed 

to have Lindsey buy out Anna's interest before selling the cattle 

to a third party. The fact that Lindsey paid Anna for more than 50 

percent of the actual value of the cattle was a result of his own 

agreement with his wife, not the court's decree. Therefore, we 

conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when 

it refused to amend the allocation of cattle proceeds. We affirm 

the District Court decision. 
We concur: