Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-40489

Summary Calendar

DANNY ALLEN

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

COUNTY OF GALVESTON, TEXAS; GEAN LEONARD, Galveston County

Sheriff

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 3:07-CV-341

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Danny Allen claims that he was terminated from his job with the

Galveston County Sheriff’s Office because he is African-American. The district

court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on the basis that

Allen had failed to timely file a charge of employment discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The court held, in the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 5, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 09-40489

2

alternative, that Allen had failed to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination and that the County had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for terminating Allen. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment

because Allen failed to timely file a charge with the EEOC.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.

Settlement Funding, LLC v. TransAmerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 555 F.3d

422, 424 (5th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

A Title VII plaintiff in Texas must file a charge of discrimination with the

EEOC within 300 days after learning of the unlawful employment practice that

is alleged. Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-5(e)(1). This limitation period is not tolled by the pendency of a grievance

or other review process that may take place after the employee is informed of the

adverse employment decision. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,

261 (1980). The date when the employee receives notice of termination, and not

the final date of employment, is the date from which the limitation period begins

to run. Elliott v. Group Medical & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 563 (5th Cir.

1983).

Allen filed his charge with the EEOC on May 17, 2006. According to the

County, he was given notice of termination on July 6, 2005. Because May 17,

2006, was 316 days after July 6, 2005, Allen did not file his charge within the

300-day limitation period if he was given notice on July 6, 2005. But Allen

contends that he was only given notice on July 27, 2005. If that were the correct

date, then Allen would have filed his charge within the limitation period.

The district court did not err in concluding that there was no genuine issue

of material fact as to whether Allen was given notice of termination on July 6,

2005. The record includes a form dated July 6, 2005, informing Allen of his
No. 09-40489

3

termination, which bears Allen’s signature. The record also includes a different

form dated July 27, 2005, also informing Allen of his termination, also bearing

Allen’s signature. Allen claims that the date of July 6 is merely a typographical

error which was corrected by the July 27 form. But the record shows that the

two different notices of termination resulted from two different investigations

into separate allegations of misconduct by Allen. Allen’s bare assertion that the

July 6 date was a typographical error is not enough to create a genuine issue of

material fact. “Summary judgment is appropriate where critical evidence is so

weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in

favor of the nonmovant, or where it is so overwhelming that it mandates

judgment in favor of the movant.” Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 67

(5th Cir. 1993).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.