AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed May 7, 2024 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-23-00488-CR 

No. 05-23-00491-CR 

JACQUES DSHAWN SMITH, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 196th District Court 

Hunt County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause Nos. 34630CR; 36631CR 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Garcia, Breedlove, and Kennedy 

Opinion by Justice Breedlove 

 We withdraw the opinion of April 30, 2024. The following is now the 

opinion of this Court. 

Jacques Dshawn Smith appeals his convictions for murder. Appellant pleaded 

guilty pursuant to a plea bargain and was sentenced to life imprisonment in Cause 

No. 34630CR and thirty-five years’ imprisonment in Cause No. 34631CR. 

Appellant brings one issue on appeal contending the trial court erred by denying 

appellant’s motion to suppress statements elicited in a custodial interrogation by law 
 –2– 

enforcement. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2)(A) (in plea-bargain case, a defendant 

may appeal “those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on 

before trial”). Appellant asserts on appeal that he was prevented from making a 

knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights due to an intellectual disability. 

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

38.22. We affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On June 13, 2022, appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress statements 

made to law enforcement during a custodial interrogation on the basis that 

appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated because appellant did not 

knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights because of an intellectual 

disability. 

On January 6, 2023, and January 20, 2023, the trial court conducted hearings 

on the suppression motion. Haley Blackwood, Ph.D. testified for appellant. Dr. 

Blackwood testified as an expert on individuals with disabilities and their ability to 

understand Miranda warnings. Dr. Blackwood tested appellant to determine, based 

upon appellant’s specific intellectual disabilities, whether he would be capable of 

understanding oral and written Miranda warnings. Although Dr. Blackwood had 

testified before as an expert witness in other courts, she had not previously testified 

regarding a defendant’s ability to comprehend Miranda warnings because the issue 

does not come up often. Dr. Blackwood further testified that to understand the oral 
 –3– 

and written Miranda warnings administered to appellant in this case, one would need 

to have the ability to understand approximately an eighth grade level. 

Dr. Blackwood testified that she had reviewed numerous records of appellant, 

including educational records and previous testing done on appellant. Dr. 

Blackwood affirmed that appellant has a longstanding history of an intellectual 

disability. She testified that the testing administered by her is the “gold standard” in 

determining a person’s ability to understand Miranda warnings. Dr. Blackwood 

stated the purpose of the test was to evaluate appellant’s “understanding of the nature 

of the right and the consequences being abandoned.” After testing, Dr. Blackwood 

determined that appellant’s reading and listening comprehension were 

approximately the level of a second grade child. Dr. Blackwood opined that given 

appellant’s well-documented history of mental impairment, the manner the oral 

warnings were administered to appellant, the fact that the warnings require someone 

to have at least an eighth grade level of verbal and oral comprehension to fully 

understand them, that appellant did not possess the ability to knowingly and 

intelligently waive his rights. 

During cross-examination by the State, Dr. Blackwood conceded that this 

testing protocol was fairly new, and she was not aware of any court having accepted 

this test. She also conceded that this was her first time to testify as an expert about 

this subject. Dr. Blackwood testified that appellant did have prior involvement with 

law enforcement, but that research suggested that prior experience with law 
 –4– 

enforcement did not improve an individual’s ability to comprehend Miranda

warnings. 

Dr. Blackwood reviewed the videos of the interrogation of appellant and 

admitted that during the questioning, appellant responded appropriately to the topic 

of discussion. At the conclusion of her testimony, Dr. Blackwood agreed to provide 

to the trial court and the State citations to the peer review studies that accept as valid 

the tests she administered to appellant. 

The trial court continued the suppression hearing on January 20, 2023. The 

only witness to testify for the State was Ranger Chad Matlock. Matlock was the lead 

investigator on the murders for which appellant is accused. Matlock interviewed 

appellant on two separate occasions. Matlock testified that in both interviews, 

appellant responded appropriately to the questions asked and that Matlock never 

doubted that appellant understood what he was communicating and that appellant’s 

responses to the questions were appropriate and logical. Matlock stated he has 

interviewed “a significant amount of people” during his career, has encountered 

defendants who did not appropriately respond to questions due to intoxication or 

mental defect, and that he never felt during questioning that appellant fell into one 

of those two categories. Matlock further testified that after he questioned appellant, 

detectives from Mississippi attempted to interview appellant and that appellant 

refused to speak with them. 
 –5– 

On cross examination, Matlock admitted that during his interviews with 

appellant, he said more than once that he did not think appellant was understanding 

what he was saying. He admitted he has not had any training in identifying people 

with developmental disabilities. He also admitted that during his interview with 

appellant, appellant stated approximately thirteen times that he did not wish to speak 

with Matlock. 

The trial court denied the suppression motion and issued findings of fact and 

conclusions of law on April 4, 2023. The trial court’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law signed April 3, 2023 included the following: 

 The Defendant stated “I don't want to talk about that” when asked 

questions about an aggravated robbery. 

 The Defendant was then asked questions regarding the instant 

offense. 

 The Defendant answered preliminary questions regarding the 

instant offense without asserting his Miranda rights. 

 The Defendant said several times during the February 5, 2020 

interview that he did not want to talk about the instant offense, 

but continued to answer questions on other topics. 

 The Defendant was again interviewed on February 7, 2020 by 

Ranger Matlock. 

 The Defendant was again read his MirC1ndC1 rights by Ranger 

Matlock. 

 The Defendant stated that he understood his Miranda rights. 

 The Defendant then answered background questions without 

invoking his Miranda rights. 
 –6– 

On May 18, 2023, appellant entered a plea of guilty in each case pursuant to 

a plea bargain. The trial court accepted the plea bargains and sentence appellant in 

accordance with the plea bargains. The trial court certified that appellant had the 

right to appeal from the denial of the suppression motion. On May 23, 2023, the trial 

court submitted additional findings of fact and conclusions of law on the suppression 

motion. 

In one issue, appellant complains that the trial court erred and abused its 

discretion in denying the motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement due 

to his documented intellectual disability and inability to make a knowing and 

intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. In response, the State argues that the law, 

both state and federal, does not support the position that just because someone has 

low IQ, they cannot make knowing and intelligent waivers of their Miranda rights. 

The State also argues that it presented ample evidence supporting the trial court’s 

findings and conclusions that appellant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of 

his Miranda rights. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated 

standard of review. E.g., Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 78–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2012) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). We 

afford almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on questions of fact and 

questions involving the application of law to fact that turn upon a witness’s 
 –7– 

credibility and demeanor. Id. at 79. We review de novo the trial court’s rulings on 

pure questions of law and questions involving the application of law to facts that do 

not turn upon a witness’s credibility and demeanor. Id. “As the sole trier of fact 

during a suppression hearing, a trial court may believe or disbelieve all or any part 

of a witness’s testimony.” See State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2013); Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). An 

appellate court examines the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

ruling. See id. A trial court will abuse its discretion only if it refuses to suppress 

evidence that is obtained in violation of the law and that is inadmissible under Texas 

Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23. See id.

When, as here, the trial court has made express findings of fact, an appellate 

court views the evidence in the light most favorable to those findings and determines 

whether the evidence supports the fact findings. See State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 

1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010). “We will sustain the trial court’s ruling if that ruling is ‘reasonably 

supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.’” 

Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447–48. 

III. APPLICABLE LAW 

The United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment provides suspects in 

custody a privilege against self-incrimination and a right to interrogation counsel. 

Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 74–75. Miranda and article 38.22 require that a defendant be 
 –8– 

given specific warnings in order for statements resulting from custodial interrogation 

to be admissible. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

38.22. The purpose of Miranda warnings is to “guard against abridgement of the 

suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights.” McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499, 506 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Article 38.22 section 3 provides that an oral statement is 

admissible against a defendant in a criminal proceeding if, among other things, 

(1) the statement was electronically recorded; (2) the defendant was given the 

warnings set out in article 38.22 section 2(a) prior to the statement but during the 

recording; and (3) the defendant “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” waived 

the rights set out in the warnings. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3(a). 

“The warnings provided in Section 2(a) are virtually identical to the Miranda

warnings, with one exception—the warning that an accused ‘has the right to 

terminate the interview at any time’ as set out in Section 2(a)(5) is not required by 

Miranda.” Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citations 

omitted); see also Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 527 n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005) (observing that article 38.22 “requires a slightly more elaborate set of 

warnings than Miranda and adds the requirements of either a written, signed 

statement or an audio or video recording of custodial interrogations by law 

enforcement”). 

 The State bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence 

that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights under 
 –9– 

Miranda and article 38.22. Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2011); Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In determining 

whether a valid waiver occurred, we consider whether (1) the relinquishment of the 

right was voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice 

rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception; and (2) the waiver was made with 

full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences 

of the decision to abandon it. Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at 25. Only if the “totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and 

the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that a defendant 

waived his rights. Id. The “totality-of-the-circumstances approach” requires the 

consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” including the 

defendant’s experience, background, and conduct. Id. 

While not alone determinative, evidence of mental impairment is a factor to be 

considered by the factfinder in evaluating voluntariness. Oursbourn v. State, 259 

S.W.3d 159, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Umana v. State, 447 S.W.3d 346, 350 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). A confession is involuntary if 

the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the confessor did not make the 

decision to confess of his own free will. Id. at 351. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Appellant asserts that his waiver of Miranda rights was not knowing and 

voluntary because he was limited by his intellectual disability. Although appellant’s 
 –10– 

motion to suppress alleged that the officers engaged in “forms of behavior akin to 

bribery,” appellant does not argue on appeal that his waiver was involuntary due to 

coercive police conduct. Thus, appellant’s contention that his Miranda and/or Due 

Process rights were violated is foreclosed. A confession is involuntary “only when 

there is police overreaching.” Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 169; Umana, 447 S.W.3d 

at 350. “Absent police misconduct causally related to the confession, there is no 

deprivation of due process of law by a state actor and therefore no violation of the 

Due Process Clause.” Cevantes-Guervara v. State, 532 S.W.3d 827, 833 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 170; 

Umana, 447 S.W.3d at 350). Likewise, Miranda protects against government 

coercion to surrender Fifth Amendment rights. Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 170; 

Umana, 447 S.W.3d at 350. However, even if appellant had argued the issue of 

coercion on appeal, the record before us is devoid of any evidence of police coercion. 

Unlike a claim of involuntariness under Miranda, appellant’s claim that his 

waiver of rights under article 38.22 was involuntary need not be predicated on 

evidence of police overreaching. See Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 352. Under the totality of 

the circumstances test, many factors, including intellectual disability, may be 

relevant in determining whether a defendant’s waiver of rights under Article 38.22 

was voluntary—the product of his free and deliberate choice. See Oursbourn, 259 

S.W.3d at 172–73; Williams v. State, 502 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d). “[T]he waiver must be made with a full awareness both 
 –11– 

of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 

abandon it.” Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 349 (internal citations omitted). 

The question is whether the accused’s mental impairment is so severe that he 

is incapable of understanding the meaning and effect of his confession. See Casias 

v. State, 452 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). A defendant’s mental 

condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, will never require 

a conclusion of involuntariness. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 

(1986). Thus, while not alone determinative, mental impairment or intellectual 

disability is a factor in ascertaining the voluntariness of a confession. See Penry v. 

State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 

It is undisputed that Matlock advised appellant of his Miranda and statutory 

rights. Appellant expressly waives his rights on the video recording. It also is 

undisputed that during the recording, appellant makes incriminating statements 

regarding his role in various crimes. 

At the suppression hearing, Dr. Blackwood testified as to appellant’s mental 

impairment. She discussed the results of her testing of appellant and opined that 

appellant’s reading and listening comprehension were approximately the level of a 

second grade child.1

1

 In his brief, appellant argues this Court should hold the trial court erred in refusing to accept Dr. 

Blackwood’s assessment based on her testing because the State offered no competing evidence, regardless 

of the fact that no other courts have yet accepted the methodology used by Dr. Blackwood to determine 

appellant’s comprehension skills. However, because the trial court, as the finder of fact, is the sole judge of 
 –12– 

Appellant’s evidence does not establish a mental impairment so severe that he 

was incapable of understanding the meaning and effect of his confession. The court 

of criminal appeals has routinely upheld the voluntariness of confessions given by 

defendants with mental deficiencies more severe than those of appellant. See Penry, 

903 S.W.2d at 746 (admitting confession of mentally retarded defendant who could 

not read or write and had IQ ranging from forties to seventies); Casias, 452 S.W.2d 

at 488 (admitting confession of mentally retarded defendant who could not read or 

write and had IQ of 68 and mental age of eight to ten years). Here, there was evidence 

from Matlock that appellant appeared to understand and respond appropriately, 

evidence that appellant actually exercised his right to remain silent in at least one 

other case, and the trial court’s own ability to observe the demeanor and responses 

of appellant. Further, appellant never testified that he had any issues understanding 

his rights. Aside from the testimony of Dr. Blackwood that suggested that appellant’s 

comprehension level was below that of the level required to understand the Miranda

warnings, appellant provides no evidence that he did not understand the meaning of 

the warnings and the effect of his confession. 

Appellant’s counsel presents the argument that because Dr. Blackwood 

opined that appellant has the oral and reading comprehension skills of a child whose 

age would preclude criminal prosecution under the laws of this state that he should 

the witnesses’ credibility, we need not determine whether the trial court erred in failing to accept Dr. 

Blackwood’s methodology. See Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273; Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 458. 
 –13– 

be found incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights. This 

argument is problematic for several reasons. Even if the court were to accept as true 

Dr. Blackwood’s opinion, a person’s reading and listening comprehension skill level 

is no indication of one’s actual maturity or knowledge, especially when considering 

a person’s prior encounters with law enforcement, a fact that the trial court was 

permitted to consider. Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at 25. Appellant has provided no case 

law, and this Court has found none, that would require courts to treat adult offenders 

with comprehension deficits as if they were juveniles. 

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s 

motion to suppress as there is support in the record for the trial court’s 

determinations of voluntariness. We must give deference to the trial court’s factual 

finding that appellant’s waiver of his rights during the recorded statement was the 

“free will” or “free choice” of appellant. The evidence does not reflect any 

overreaching or misconduct on the part of the police, and appellant does not argue 

that any occurred. See Umana, 447 S.W.3d at 356. The evidence shows that Matlock 

advised appellant of his Miranda rights and article 38.22 statutory rights; appellant 

had the basic reasoning skills to understand them, and voluntarily waived them; 

appellant did not give any indication that his educational background or mental 

capabilities prevented him from understanding Matlock’s questions. 

Accordingly, we conclude the totality of the circumstances here support the 

trial court’s determination that any alleged mental impairment of appellant did not 
 –14– 

render him incapable of understanding the meaning and effect of his waiver and 

confession and, thus, that both were voluntarily made. See Umana, 447 S.W.3d at 

351. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s 

motion to suppress and admitting appellant’s recorded statement. 

V. CONCLUSION 

We affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 

230488F.U05 

 

/Maricela Breedlove/

MARICELA BREEDLOVE 

JUSTICE 
 –15– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

JACQUES DSHAWN SMITH, 

Appellant 

No. 05-23-00488-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 196th District 

Court, Hunt County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 34630CR. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Breedlove. Justices Garcia and 

Kennedy participating. 

 We VACATE the judgment of April 30, 2024. The following is now the 

judgment of the Court. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of 

the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered May 7, 2024 

 
 –16– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

JACQUES DSHAWN SMITH, 

Appellant 

No. 05-23-00491-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 196th District 

Court, Hunt County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 34631CR. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Breedlove. Justices Garcia and 

Kennedy participating. 

 We VACATE the judgment of April 30, 2024. The following is now the 

judgment of the Court. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of 

the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered May 7, 2024