UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

LAZARITA CHAVEZ, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 15-2201 

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-00452-SCY) 

(D.N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Lazarita Chavez applied for social security disability benefits and 

supplemental security income payments, claiming that physical and mental 

impairments prevented her from working. An administrative law judge (ALJ) 

disagreed, finding that Ms. Chavez retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to 

perform many jobs in the national economy. Later, the Appeals Council denied 

review, and a district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

June 2, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

On appeal, Ms. Chavez raises two claims of error with respect to the ALJ’s 

RFC determination. First, she contends the ALJ failed to give adequate reasons for 

not including certain functional limitations found by an examining psychologist, Dr. 

Owen. Second, she argues the ALJ erred by failing to explain why the RFC didn’t 

include all of the moderate limitations listed in the opinion of a non-examining 

psychologist, Dr. Lev. 

The problem with Ms. Chavez’s first argument is that the ALJ did provide 

reasons and analysis for discounting Dr. Owen’s opinion. See Aplt. App. at 22 (“[I]t 

is inconsistent with the overall record and was a one-time contact with the claimant, 

appearing to be primarily based upon her subjective complaints.”). The ALJ pointed 

to evidence in the record indicating that Ms. Chavez was not as limited as Dr. Owen 

opined. For example, the ALJ discussed Ms. Chavez’s treatment records indicating 

she had “only mild symptoms” and was “generally functioning pretty well” and noted 

the absence of any evidence from Ms. Chavez’s treating physicians that she was 

unable to perform work consistent with her RFC. Id. at 21, 23. The ALJ also 

discounted Ms. Chavez’s subjective complaints, finding that she was not entirely 

credible (a finding that Ms. Chavez does not dispute). Id. at 21. Ms. Chavez simply 

has given us no persuasive reason to conclude that the ALJ gave insufficient or 

illegitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Owen’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c) (outlining the factors used in weighing medical opinions); Chapo v. 

Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1291 (10th Cir. 2012) (“An opinion found to be an examining 

rather than treating [one] may be dismissed or discounted . . . based on an evaluation 
3 

of all of the factors set out in the cited regulations . . . .”); Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 

F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding the ALJ reasonably discounted a nontreating physician’s opinion which was based on a single, subjective report by the 

claimant). 

Turning to her second argument, Ms. Chavez contends that the ALJ didn’t 

explain why the RFC failed to capture two moderate limitations from Dr. Lev’s 

opinion. Specifically, she points to limits on her ability to sustain an ordinary routine 

without special supervision and to accept instructions and respond appropriately to 

criticism from supervisors. The problem Ms. Chavez faces is the ALJ did 

incorporate Dr. Lev’s limitations in the RFC, just as the district court found. While 

the ALJ didn’t parrot Dr. Lev’s exact descriptions of Ms. Chavez’s limitations, the 

ALJ did specifically note his overall assessment that Ms. Chavez “retain[ed] the 

capacity to do simple tasks.” Aplt. App. at 440. And we find it hard to fault the ALJ 

for finding, consistent with Dr. Lev’s opinion, that Ms. Chavez should be “limited to 

simple work-related decisions with few workplace changes,” “no interaction with the 

public, and only occasional and superficial contact with co-workers.” Id. at 20; see 

Smith v. Colvin, __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 2620519, at *3-4 & n.2 (10th Cir. May 9, 

2016). 

Affirmed. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Neil M. Gorsuch 

Circuit Judge