IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs September 4, 2019

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROY BRANDON

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 15-02733 Chris Craft, Judge

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No. W2018-01608-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant, Roy Brandon, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of 

possession with intent to sell heroin, a Class B felony; possession with intent to deliver 

heroin, a Class B felony; two counts of simple possession of Alprazolam, Class A 

misdemeanors; and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a 

dangerous felony, Class D felonies, and was sentenced to an effective term of twenty-two 

years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial 

court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and that the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial 

court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY,

JR., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Jessica L. Gillentine (on appeal), Bartlett, Tennessee, and Latonya Burrow (at trial), 

Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Roy Brandon.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Jose Leon, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

01/31/2020
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The Defendant and a co-defendant were indicted for possession with intent to sell 

heroin; possession with intent to deliver heroin; possession with intent to sell 

Alprazolam; possession with intent to deliver Alprazolam; and four counts of possession 

of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following an unsuccessful 

motion to suppress, the case proceeded to trial, but after the jury was selected, the trial 

court granted a motion for mistrial by the Defendant and co-defendant. Several weeks 

later, the case went to trial before a new jury, and the Defendant was convicted as 

charged of possession of heroin with intent to sell and deliver in Counts One and Two, 

the lesser-included offenses of simple possession of Alprazolam in Counts Three and 

Four, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as 

charged in Counts Five and Six. He was acquitted in Counts Seven and Eight. 

Motion to Suppress

Before trial, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging that 

officers illegally seized the motel room and its occupants, the officers’ assertions about 

items in “plain view” were “dubious at best,” and there were conflicting dates regarding 

the search warrant. 

At the suppression hearing, the Defendant testified to establish his standing to seek 

suppression of evidence found in Room 210 at America’s Best Value Inn on Springbrook 

Avenue in Memphis. He said that on January 23, 2015, he was at the location and had a 

key to and lawful permission to be in that room. He had clothing in the room and had 

been there for “[a]bout a week, seven days at the most.” A lady named Renita Scott had 

rented the room and given him a key. 

The co-defendant, Nicholas Jones, testified that he was also in Room 210 at 

America’s Best Value Inn on that date. He said that the police knocked on the door 

around 8:00 or 9:00 that morning. They knocked for two or three minutes, and then the 

Defendant opened the door. Mr. Jones recalled that he had spent one night in the room, 

did not have a key to the room, and did not have any “stuff” there. 

On the issue of standing, the trial court found that the Defendant and Mr. Jones 

each had an expectation of privacy in the motel room and “allow[ed the case] to go 

forward as to each defendant.” 

Officer Hardy Savage of the Memphis Police Department (“MPD”) testified that 

on January 23, 2015, he received a warrant tip that the Defendant was in a room at 

America’s Best Value Inn on Springbrook Avenue. Based on that tip, Officer Savage 

went to the motel to “conduct what we call a knock and talk.” When he arrived at the 

motel, he saw “a red Monte Carlo, that was known to belong to [the Defendant.]” He 
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then went to the room to conduct the “knock and talk, they basically knock on the door 

and see who comes to the door.”

Officer Savage explained that America’s Best Value Inn is a two-story motel with 

approximately sixty rooms on each floor. To get to the Defendant’s room, “[y]ou just 

walk up to the door, there’s no entry to a foyer, or anything.” Officer Savage said that 

the Defendant answered the door after he knocked on it, and then he explained:

Well, immediately I take him into custody, or detain him, because 

when I see his face I recognize him as being the one that we’re looking for. 

. . . Officer Burk was standing next to me as we were detaining him[.] [O]ut 

of the corner of my eye I see somebody in the far back of the room, stick 

their head around the corner. Not knowing who he is, we detain that 

individual, as well. 

Officer Savage stated that as he was detaining the Defendant, Officer Burk went 

into the room to detain the other individual and saw a table with a plate and a razor blade 

with a white powdery substance. The officers took the two men to their patrol car, 

verified the warrant for the Defendant and tried to identify the other man. They called 

their lieutenant and told him what they observed in the motel room. The lieutenant came 

to the scene and asked if the men would consent to a search of the room, but they refused. 

The lieutenant called the Organized Crime Unit (“OCU”) to the scene, and then officers 

from OCU and Officer Burk went to obtain a search warrant. Once the warrant was 

obtained, officers searched the motel room. 

Officer Savage recalled that they had first received a tip a few days earlier that the 

Defendant was staying at the motel but did not have a room number. They learned from 

a front desk employee that a room was not registered in the Defendant’s name. 

Thereafter, they received another tip that included the room number. Outside the motel, 

they saw a red Monte Carlo, which was registered to the Defendant, and proceeded to the 

room number from the tip. Officer Savage relayed:

Officer Burk initially knocked several times, no answer. I am 

standing, for security purposes, over to the right, he’s standing to the left of 

the door frame. There’s a window on the right, so I am standing off to the 

window, knocks, no answer, knocks again, no answer, but then the blinds 

move. So the air-conditioner is at the bottom and the air-conditioner isn’t 

on, but I see the blind moving.

So I tell Burk, I say, look I’m fixing to go. And as I’m starting to 

leave, he says, “Savage” and I turn around and that’s when the [D]efendant 

was standing in the door.
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Officer Savage said that they announced, “Memphis Police Department, open the door,” 

when they knocked on the door. 

On cross-examination, Officer Savage recalled that the door opened into the motel 

room, and the hinges were on the left-hand side of the door. Officer Savage 

acknowledged that Officer Burk went into the room to get the other individual before a 

warrant was obtained. He also acknowledged that he patted down the Defendant for 

officer safety. He found no drugs or guns on the Defendant but did find $409 cash, made 

up of three $100 bills, four $20 bills, two $10 bills, and nine $1 bills.

Officer Savage testified that there was only one door into and out of the room. He 

recalled that when Officer Burk called him back to the doorway, the door was open and 

the Defendant was standing in the doorway. The door was “open [wide] enough for an 

individual to stand in the doorway.” Asked why he “went further” after detaining the 

Defendant as a known subject of an outstanding warrant, Officer Savage explained that 

they did not know who the other subject was in the room and “for officer’s safety 

purposes, when we are in a room we are going to detain all individuals in that room.” He 

recalled that he was still at the door with the Defendant while Officer Burk was detaining 

the other individual, and he “look[ed] over and s[aw] a plate with something that 

appear[ed] to be contraband.” He described the contraband as “the plate with the razor 

blade on it and the white powdery residue on it.” He recalled that the contraband was on 

a dresser or TV stand on the left-hand side of the room. He noted that when Officer Burk 

entered the room to detain the other man, the door into the room opened wide. He said 

that the dresser with the contraband was not behind the door but instead in the space next 

to the wide-open door. 

Officer Steven Burk with the MPD went to the America’s Best Value Inn on 

January 23, 2015, because he had learned that the Defendant, “a wanted party,” was 

possibly staying there. The tip also mentioned that the Defendant “would be operating a 

red Chevrolet Monte Carlo and that he would be, possibly, selling drugs out of the 

[m]otel.” Officer Burk and Officer Savage approached the motel staff to see if the 

Defendant was staying there and were directed to Room 210. Officer Burk knocked on 

the door for “three to four minutes” and then the Defendant opened the door. At that 

point, the Defendant and Mr. Jones, were detained. The detainees were placed in the 

officers’ squad cars, and Officer Burk notified his lieutenant, who called OCU to the 

scene. 

Officer Burk said that when he and Officer Savage took the two men into custody, 

they “saw, in plain view, a razor blade with some white powdery substance in its 

vicinity.” He affirmed that they were able to see the razor blade and white substance 
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from the doorway. He informed the OCU officers of what he and Officer Savage had 

seen, and they obtained a search warrant. 

Officer Burk was referred to his affidavit in support of the search warrant, from 

which he read: “While taking them into custody your affiant noticed in plain view on the 

table an open safe that contained a bag of a white powdery substance consistent with 

powder cocaine, or a cocaine cutting agent and razor blades that had a white residue on 

it.” He said that he did not go into the motel room to detain the two individuals; they 

both came to the door and were detained at that point. 

Detective Brandon Evans with the OCU of the MPD responded to the America’s 

Best Value Inn to assist uniform patrol. He prepared a search warrant application based 

on information provided by Officers Savage and Burk, as well as his personal experience 

as a narcotics detective. Detective Evans participated in the execution of the warrant 

after it was issued. 

Sergeant Darryl Dotson with the OCU of the MPD also responded to the scene. 

Sergeant Dotson recalled that during the search of the room, he collected a ninemillimeter handgun with approximately eight live rounds, two clear plastic bags with 

Alprazolam pills, and thirty-nine bags of heroin. Counsel for the Defendant asked 

Sergeant Dotson about the layout of the room:

Q: If you open the door –

A: If you open the door you still can see the dresser and the table.

Q: Okay. If you open it about a foot, what would you see?

A: You wouldn’t even have to open a foot, even if you cracked the door 

you can see the dresser on your left.

Q: On your left, behind the door?

A: It wasn’t behind the door, ma’am. It was – when the door opened 

you still could see, so the dresser was long enough to where it wasn’t 

completely behind the door. It wasn’t hidden behind the door.

Officer William Vrooman with the MPD also responded to the scene. He verified 

that the pills recovered in the motel room were Alprazolam. 
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Evan Clower, an investigator with Inquisitor, Incorporated, was hired by the 

Defendant to conduct an investigation in his case. As part of her investigation, Ms. 

Clower took photographs of Room 210 at America’s Best Value Inn on October 17, 

2016, which she identified and were admitted into evidence. Ms. Clower said that if a 

person was standing outside the door to Room 210, the door hinge “would be on the left[-

]hand side.” She said that if the door to the room was slightly opened, a person standing 

at the door would not be able to see the dresser and table on the left side of the room or 

the sink and mirror that were straight across from the door. 

On cross-examination, Ms. Clower conceded that she took the photographs of 

Room 210 more than a year and a half after the police detained the men and searched the 

room in January 2015. She could not say that her photographs correctly depicted what 

the room looked like the day the Defendant was apprehended.

The Defendant presented proof that the affidavit for the search warrant showed 

that the warrant was issued on the wrong date, January 23, 2014, not 2015.

Following the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to 

suppress.

Trial

Officer Savage testified at trial consistently to his testimony at the suppression 

hearing. Officer Savage said that he and Officer Burk knocked on the motel room door 

for approximately five to seven minutes when he saw the blinds move. He announced 

that he was “going to get the key” loud enough for whoever was inside the room to hear 

him. The individual opened the door, at which point Officer Savage could see into the 

room past the individual. Officer Savage recalled that “behind him on a table or a dresser 

. . . was a . . . white powdery substance, and then further on in the back of the room was 

the individual sitting over to the right.” He elaborated that as he was placing handcuffs 

on the Defendant, a “second individual kind of peeked around the corner [and] Officer 

Burk immediately saw him and detained him as well.” Officer Savage noted that Officer 

Burk went into the room to detain the second individual. Officer Savage said that they

detained the individuals “[t]o preserve the evidence and for further investigation” because 

the evidence appeared to be cocaine. After detaining the two men, the officers called 

their lieutenant, who came to the scene and then called OCU. When Officer Savage 

patted down the Defendant, he found $409 on his person. 

Officer Burk also testified at trial consistently to his testimony at the suppression 

hearing. He said that they waited at the door to the motel room for “a few minutes at 

least” before the Defendant opened the door. Officer Savage detained the Defendant, 
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while Officer Burk detained the other individual in the room—the co-defendant. In the 

room, Officer Burk saw “a plate with a razor blade on it with a white powdery residue, 

and also in the vicinity of that plate, there was a clear plastic bag with some sort of white 

powder[,]” which gave him “reasonable suspicion to believe that there was illegal activity 

going on in that area.” The officers removed the two men from the room and called their 

lieutenant, who came to the scene and then called OCU. Officer Burk went with an 

officer from the OCU “to type up a warrant.” They obtained a search warrant and 

returned to the motel. When Officer Burk conducted a pat-down of the co-defendant, he 

found just over $100 on his person in various smaller denominations. The co-defendant 

gave Officer Burk “an incorrect identity.” 

Detective Evans testified that he responded to the scene as a member of the OCU. 

They obtained a search warrant for the motel room based on information relayed to them 

by uniform patrol and returned to the motel to execute it. Detective Evans recalled that 

coming into the room, there was a television and dresser on the left, and there was an

open, small black safe on the dresser. He remembered:

There was a large clear bag tied in a knot with a white substance, 

powdery substance consistent with cocaine. There was also a plate next to 

that with a razor blade on it. Other things that we found [we]re a silver 

compressor, which is used to compress either cocaine or heroin. We found 

a marijuana grinder, heroin, a weapon, a handgun, individual scale as well.

Detective Evans looked at photographs taken inside the motel room and pointed out 

packages of marijuana, Alprazolam pills, and individual packages of heroin. He said that 

they did not find any syringes, rubber bands, or belts to indicate that the occupants were 

using the heroin. Instead, what he found was “consistent with the distribution and selling 

of narcotics.” He elaborated:

It’s individually packaged. The small white wrappers of heroin 

would go for $20, which is a tenth of a gram of heroin. It’s not consistent 

with somebody who . . . uses heroin. Somebody who uses heroin usually 

has a very small minute amount. They have a syringe, most of the time it’s 

already been injected into them.

Sergeant Dotson also responded to the scene as a member of the OCU. He 

recalled that once a warrant was obtained, they performed a systematic search of the 

motel room. They found a digital scale, a grinder, a compressor, cutting agent, a ninemillimeter handgun, 10 Alprazolam pills, and 39 packs of heroin. The gun was found 

inside a brown bag under the sink. The Alprazolam and heroin were found in a black 

suitcase under a clothes rack. The total weight of the heroin was 9.3 grams; a typical user 
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amount is 0.1-0.2 grams. The evidence was taken to police headquarters and logged into 

the property and evidence room. 

Detective Donna Boykin with the MPD’s OCU picked up the recovered drugs

from the property and evidence room and delivered them to the Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation (“TBI”) for analysis. 

Special Agent Rachel Strandquist, a forensic scientist with the TBI, performed 

chemical analysis on the materials submitted in this case. She concluded that the 10 pills 

were Alprazolam, and a tan powder and a “rock-like substance” were heroin. A white 

powder was not identified as a controlled substance, although testing indicated that it had 

come in contact with a controlled substance at some point. 

ANALYSIS

I. Suppression

The Defendant argues that “[t]he trial court erred when it did not suppress the 

evidence found as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure.” 

When this court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, “[q]uestions 

of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of 

conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” State 

v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The party prevailing at the suppression 

hearing is afforded the “strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable and 

legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 

861, 864 (Tenn. 1998). The findings of a trial court in a suppression hearing are upheld 

unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. See id. However, the 

application of the law to the facts found by the trial court is a question of law and is 

reviewed de novo. State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Crutcher, 

989 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches 

and seizures. See U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. “These constitutional 

provisions are designed to ‘safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 

arbitrary invasions of government officials.’” Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 865 (quoting Camara 

v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). “[T]he general rule is that a warrantless 

search or seizure is presumed unreasonable and any evidence discovered is subject to 

suppression.” State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277 (Tenn. 2012). Under the “fruit of 

the poisonous tree” doctrine, evidence obtained by exploitation of an unconstitutional 
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search and seizure may also be suppressed. See State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746,760 

(Tenn. 2011) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 372 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).

The Defendant asserts that the officers’ actions exceeded the scope of a consensual 

“knock and talk.” 

Courts have generally recognized the right of police officers to enter portions of a 

person’s property that are implicitly open to the public for purposes of seeking consent to 

perform a search. State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). The 

“knock and talk” procedure is considered to be a consensual encounter with the police. 

Id. In explaining the procedure and reasoning for it, this court has quoted with approval 

the following: 

Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible 

trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal 

per se, or a condemned invasion of the person’s right of privacy, for anyone 

openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the 

front door of any man’s “castle” with the honest intent of asking questions 

of the occupant thereof-whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or 

an officer of the law.

Id. at 521 (quoting United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000)).

However, as opposed to a typical “knock and talk” situation, in this case, the 

police officers approached the motel room where they believed the Defendant to be with 

a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer 

Savage testified that he received a warrant tip that the Defendant was in a room at 

America’s Best Value Inn on Springbrook Avenue and that he was driving a red Monte 

Carlo. When officers arrived at the motel, there was a red Monte Carlo in the parking lot. 

Officer Savage noted that they had received a warrant tip a few days earlier that the 

Defendant was staying at the motel but did not have a room number. Thereafter, they 

received another tip that included the room number. When the police knocked on the 

door, they had a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest and reason to believe that he was 

inside. The United States Supreme Court has held that police in possession of a valid 

arrest warrant can properly enter a defendant’s residence where they reasonably believe 

the defendant to be: 

If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to 

persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally 

reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the law. Thus, 

for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable 
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cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in 

which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is 

within.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980). 

The officers’ authority in this case to approach the motel room exceeded that 

associated with an ordinary “knock and talk.” Based on the arrest warrant, the presence 

of a red Monte Carlo the Defendant was known to drive, and the warrant tip indicating 

the specific room in which the Defendant was staying, the officers had “limited authority 

to enter [the] dwelling in which the suspect” was staying. Once the Defendant opened 

the door and Officer Savage recognized him to be the subject of the arrest warrant, the 

police were justified in entering the room to apprehend him. 

We note that the officers’ recollections vary from three to seven minutes with 

regard to how long they knocked on the motel room door before the Defendant answered 

it. Thus, the Defendant asserts that “[t]he officers did not ‘knock promptly, wait briefly 

to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave[,]” as would be 

appropriate in a consensual “knock and talk.” Relying on the United States Supreme 

Court’s decision in Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), and this court’s decision in 

State v. Holly N. Hilliard, No. E2015-00967-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3738470 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2017), the Defendant claims that the officers’ actions “served to 

convey a feeling in the listener that he had no choice but to open the door.” However, the 

police in the present case had a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest and reason to believe 

he was in the motel room, which distinguishes this case from Jardines and Holly N. 

Hilliard. The officers were not limited to the scope of a consensual “knock and talk.”

The Defendant also claims that the officers did not have a legal right to be in the 

motel room when they viewed the evidence that was the basis for the search warrant and 

that the contraband could not have been observed from any spot the officers were legally 

entitled to be. As explained above, the officers had a legal right to enter the room based 

on the warrant for the Defendant’s arrest and reason to believe he was in the room. When 

the Defendant opened the door and officers identified him as the subject of the arrest 

warrant and detained him, “the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without 

probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately 

adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” 

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). The officers acted within the scope of 

permissible action in detaining the co-defendant inside the room as a matter of officer 

safety. As Officer Savage provided the rationale: “We didn’t know who that other 

individual was and for officer’s safety purposes, when we are in a room we are going to 

detain all individuals in that room.” The officers were then legally in the room when they 
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observed, in plain view, a plate and a razor blade with a white powdery substance. The 

Defendant contests whether the officers could have seen the razor blade and white 

powdery substance without entering the room, however, there was testimony indicating 

that the items could have been viewed without entering the room. Moreover, in any 

event, there is no dispute that the items were in plain view within the room, and the 

officers’ entry into the room was legal as a matter of officer safety. 

II. Sufficiency

The Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, 

asserting that “no evidence exists to support a finding that [he] ‘knowingly’ possessed the 

controlled substances nor the handgun.” 

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the 

reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or 

jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of 

fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 

(Tenn. 1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All 

questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the 

evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754 

S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by 

the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all 

conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 

1973). Our supreme court has stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the 

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their 

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be 

given to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 

523 (1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a 

defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a 

convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.”

State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).
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A criminal offense may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence. State 

v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn. 2010). In addition, the State does not have the 

duty to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant’s guilt in 

order to obtain a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence. See State v.

Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 380-81 (Tenn. 2011) (adopting the federal standard of review 

for cases in which the evidence is entirely circumstantial). The jury as the trier of fact 

must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses’

testimony, and reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 

331, 335 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1978)). Moreover, the jury determines the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, 

the inferences to be drawn from such evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances 

are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence are questions primarily for the 

jury. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 

2006)).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417(a)(4) provides, in pertinent, that it is 

an offense for a defendant to knowingly possess a controlled substance with intent to sell 

or deliver it. In addition, it is an offense to possess a firearm during the commission of or 

attempt to commit a dangerous felony, which includes during a felony involving the 

possession with intent to sell or distribute a controlled substance. Id. § 39-17-1324(a), 

(i)(1)(L). Possession may be constructive as well as actual. State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 

900, 903 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Transou, 928 S.W.2d 949, 955-56 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1996); State v. Cooper, 736 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “Constructive 

possession requires that a person knowingly have the power and the intention at a given 

time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others. In 

essence, constructive possession is the ability to reduce an object to actual possession.” 

State v. Copeland, 677 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (citation omitted). An 

individual’s mere presence in an area in which drugs are found, or association with 

another individual in possession of drugs, is not, alone, sufficient to establish constructive 

possession. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d at 903 (citing State v. Patterson, 966 S.W.2d 435, 445 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); Cooper, 736 S.W.2d at 129). 

The Defendant asserts that there was no evidence of possession in this case. He 

points out that nothing was found on his person, and the room was not registered to him 

or the co-defendant. He notes that the contraband was found under the sink in a paper 

bag, in a black suitcase, and in a small safe, and that the “record is void of any evidence 

establishing his possession or interest in the heroin, [A]lprazolam and the gun seized.” 

However, in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence to 

establish that the Defendant constructively possessed the drugs and gun. The officers that 
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responded to the scene testified that there was men’s clothing and men’s shoes laying 

around the room. The beds were disheveled and there was a lot of baggage in the room. 

There was no evidence of items belonging to a woman in the room. A defendant’s

“possession of and residence in the motel room is strong evidence of his ‘ability to reduce 

[the drugs] to actual possession[.]’” State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 846 (Tenn. 2001) 

(quoting Transou, 928 S.W.2d at 956). The evidence is sufficient to establish that the 

Defendant constructively possessed the drugs and gun. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgments of the 

trial court. 

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 ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE