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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED

In re K. C. SCRUGGS, Minor. January 10, 2017

No. 332542 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 16-521761-NA

Before: S ERVITTO , P.J., and M ARKEY and S TEPHENS , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating her paren tal rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)( i ) (parent’s act caused physical injury or physical or sexual ab use to child); (g) (parent failed to provide proper care and custody); (j) (reasonable likelihood that child

will be harmed if return ed to parent); and (k)( ix ) (parent sexually abused the child). We affirm.

The trial court must find the existence of at least one statut ory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). If the trial court determines that clear and convincing evidence suppo rts a statutory ground for termination, the trial court shall order termination of parenta l rights if the court also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental righ ts is in the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss , 301 Mich App at 90; In re Jones , 286 Mich App 126, 129; 777 NW2d 728 (2009). “This Court reviews for clear error the t rial court’s factual findings and ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for terminatio n.” In re White , 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). This Court also reviews for clea r error the trial court’s bestinterest determination. Id. at 713.

Termination of respondent’s parental rights was proper under M CL 712A.19b(3)(b)( i ), (g), (j), and (k)( ix ). Respondent admitted to sexually abusing the two-week-old ch ild by twice placing his penis in her mouth. Furthermore, respondent’s ment al health issues prevented her from being able to provide proper care of the child. Responden t was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipola r disorder, and obsessive-compu lsive disorder (OCD). Respondent’s mental health issues dated back to when she was 16 years old and were serious enough to require at least six hospitalizations. Respondent ar gues that she was now stable and taking medication. Although she was unable to take prescribed psychiatric medication while she was pregnant with the child, the evidence showed that she was p rescribed Seroquel right after the child was born but was not taking it as directed when she sexua lly assaulted the baby because it made her “woozy.” This was not the first time respondent had s topped taking prescribed-2- medication. In the past she experienced suicidal ideation when she stopped taking prescribed medication. Thus, although she may have achieved more stabilit y once she began taking medication again, her stability was not reliable given her hist ory of taking herself off prescribed medication. Moreover, her low affect at the time she was inter viewed by the caseworker suggested that her mental stab ility was still questionable even though she was receiving mental

health treatment.

Respondent was also repeatedly i nconsistent about her desire t o parent the child. The testimony showed that shortly a fter respondent sexually assault ed her son and calle d for help, she was found throwing away his baby s upplies and stated that she c ould not care for him any longer.

Respondent argues that the harm in this case was insufficient to constitute aggravating circumstances because there was no injury to the child other th an a speculative future injury, and she could overcome her bad judgment. This argument is unpersua sive. Respondent’s sexual

assault on the child could have caused him emotional harm. “Ha rm” for purposes of MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) includes not only physical harm, but emotional h arm as well. In re Hudson , 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). Moreover, respondent’s treatment of the child is

indicative of how she will treat him in the future. The fact t hat respondent sexually assaulted him more than once shows the severity of her issues.

Respondent also contends that she should have been afforded re asonable efforts at reunification. “Generally, when a child is removed from the pa rents’ custody, the petitioner is required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions t hat caused the child’s removal by adopting a service plan.” In re HRC , 286 Mich App 444, 462; 781 NW2d 105 (2009); see also MCL 712A.18f. However, petitioner is not required to provide r eunification efforts when the parent sexually abused that child. In re HRC , 286 Mich App at 463; see also MCL 722.638(1) and (2). Accordingly, petitioner was not required to provide r espondent with reunification

efforts as she claims.

Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred in its b est-interest finding. This claim is unpersuasive. The trial court specifically found that respo ndent struggled with mental health issues for the past 11 years and had been unable to achieve sig nificant stability. The record shows that respondent admitted that she sexually abused her son and it was not in the child’s best interests to be raised by a ca regiver who might abuse him. Res pondent argues that the child’s placement with a family member should have negated the need for petitioner to file for permanent custody as a child’s placement with relatives weighs against termination. The trial court is required to “explicitly address each child’s placement with relatives at the time of the termination hearing if applicable.” In re Olive/Metts, Minors , 297 Mich App 35, 44; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). Here the trial court explicitly found that termina tion of respondent’s parental rights was appropriate even though the child was placed with a relativ e. The trial court found that the risk of harm was too high to wor k toward reunification even tho ugh there was a relative placement.

Respondent also argues that the trial court did not adequately consider and weigh the bond between herself and the child. This argument is unsupport ed by the record. The testimony showed that there was not a strong bond between respondent and the child, who was removed from respondent’s care when he wa s two weeks old. Regardless, even if there was a strong-3- bond, no bond would be more important than the child’s emotiona l and physical safety. Thus, the trial court did not clearly e rr in its best-interest determ ination.

Affirmed.

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto /s/ Jane E. Markey /s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens