This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 34,409 4 JOSHUA BEGAY, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 7 Karen L. Townsend, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 12 Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 ZAMORA, Judge. 17
{1} Defendant appeals the district court’s de nial of his motion to suppress evidence 18 supporting his conviction for driving whileunder the influence (DWI), following a 19 conditional plea entered in magistrate court. We issued a notice of proposed 202 disposition proposing to affirm, and Defendant has responded with a memorandum 1 in opposition. Having carefully considered the arguments raised in the memorandum 2 in opposition, we continue to believe that affirmance is appropriate. Therefore, for the 3 reasons stated below and in our notice of proposed disposition, we affirm. 4
{2} Defendant’s motion to suppress was based on his contention that the arresting 5 officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for DWI. The officer had probable cause 6 to arrest for DWI if it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that 7 Defendant had been driving while he wa s impaired to the slightest degree. See State 8 v. Granillo–Macias , 2008-NMCA-021, ¶ 9, 143 N.M. 455, 176 P.3d 1187. In the 9 notice of proposed disposition we pointed out the evidence favoring the district court’s 10 determination that such probable cause exis ted: (1) the arresting deputy noted the odor 11 of alcohol on Defendant’s breath, as well as the fact that his eyes were bloodshot and 12 glassy; (2) Defendant admitted he had consumed three shots of Jagermeister; (3) 13 Defendant exhibited four out of a possi ble six “clues” on the HGN test; and (4) 14 Defendant exhibited two of a possible ei ght “clues” on the walk-and-turn test. 15
{3} In the memorandum in opposition Defendant challenges our reliance on the 16 above evidence. He points out that a differe nt officer, who encountered Defendant just 17 before the arresting officer did, testified that he did not observe an odor of alcohol 18 emitting from Defendant, and said nothing about glassy or bloodshot eyes. [MIO 2] 193 He also emphasizes the fact that he told the arresting officer he had consumed the 1 three shots of Jagermeister three hours befo re he was stopped. [MIO 6] In addition, 2 he notes that the arresting officer admitted that although she administered field3 sobriety tests (FSTs) such as the HGN test and the walk-and-turn test, she did not 4 really understand how the FSTs work. [MIO 6] Finally, he points to the second 5 officer’s testimony that the officer did not observe any “bad” driving on Defendant’s 6 part. [MIO 6] In sum, Defendant conte nds that the conflicting testimony of the 7 officers, as well as the arresting officer’s admission that she lacked an understanding 8 of how the FSTs work, rendered the arrest unconstitutional as not supported by 9 probable cause. 10
{4} As we discussed in the notice of proposed disposition, on appeal from a 11 suppression decision we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district 12 court’s decision. State v. Peterson , 2014-NMCA-008, ¶ 4, 315 P.3d 354. This means 13 we disregard any conflicting evidence and draw all inferences from the evidence in 14 favor of the district court’s determination. Id. Defendant’s arguments concerning the 15 conflicting testimony provided by the officers, therefore, are to no avail; the district 16 court was entitled to believe that the arresting officer smelled alcohol on Defendant’s 17 breath and observed glassy and bloodshot eyes , and in this appeal we must accept the 18 court’s finding to that effect as fact. Similarly, even though the arresting officer did 194 not understand the science underlying the FST s, this does not mean she necessarily 1 failed to administer the tests correctly, and the district court was entitled to accept her 2 testimony that Defendant exhibited “clues” i ndicating that he failed certain aspects of 3 the FSTs. Finally, the district court was en titled to disbelieve De fendant’s assertion 4 that it had been three hours since his last shot of Jagermeister. 5
{5} In sum, this is simply a case of conf licting evidence that was up to the district 6 court to resolve. The court determined th at the facts known to the arresting officer 7 were sufficient to provide probable cause to arrest Defendant for driving under the 8 influence, and viewing the evidence in th e light most favorable to the court’s 9 determination, we agree. See State v. Sanchez , 2001-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 8, 12, 131 N.M. 10 355, 36 P.3d 446 (holding that the officer had probable cause for arrest where the 11 defendant smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot and watery eyes , and refused to take the 12 FSTs). 13
{6} Based on the foregoing discussion as well as the analysis set out in the notice 14 of proposed disposition, we affirm. 15
{7} IT IS SO ORDERED. 16

17 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 18 WE CONCUR: 195 1 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 2

3 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 4