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*********************************************** 
IN RE P. T.-W.*

(AC 45944)

Suarez, Clark and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father filed a motion to open the judgment rendered by the

trial court terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor

daughter, P. In his motion, the father alleged that, although he had

consented to the termination of his parental rights, he had recently

discovered information that indicated that the mother of P and the

mother’s attorney had committed fraud by failing to provide certain

vital information to the court and, that if he had known that information,

he would not have voluntarily given up his parental rights. The mother

filed a motion to dismiss the father’s motion to open. Eight days prior

to the scheduled hearing on the father’s motion, the father’s parent

called the court clerk’s office and stated that the father, who was incarcerated in the state of Washington, would not be able to make it to

court. The record contained notes from a clerk indicating that a call

was placed to the correctional facility in Washington and that the clerk

was told that, although the prison had access to Microsoft Teams, the

collaborative meeting software used by the Connecticut Judicial Branch

for remote hearings, it was only used for internal purposes, and that

the prison ‘‘[did] not do virtual for inmates.’’ The scheduled hearing on

the father’s motion to open took place even though the father was not

present. The court thereafter dismissed the father’s motion. The father

appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the court erred in dismissing his motion to open by proceeding with the hearing in his absence

and without giving him a chance to participate remotely. Held that

the trial court violated the respondent father’s due process rights in

conducting the hearing on his motion to open without giving him a

meaningful opportunity to be heard on his motion: it was undisputed

that the father was not present and was not afforded an opportunity

to participate remotely, either by telephone or a video conferencing

platform, at the hearing on his motion to open the judgment terminating

his parental rights, and there was nothing in the transcript of that hearing

that indicated that steps had been taken to provide the father with a

meaningful opportunity to participate and be heard at the hearing, as

the transcript simply reflected that counsel for the mother told the court

that the father was incarcerated in the state of Washington; moreover,

even though the court’s written order dismissing the father’s motion

stated that the clerk’s office had previously attempted to have the father

participate remotely from the correctional facility but that the facility

indicated that they used a platform other than Microsoft Teams, that

was not the only means by which the father could have participated,

as he could have participated via telephone or the hearing could have

been rescheduled to a future date at which the father’s participation

could be secured; accordingly, the case was remanded for a new hearing

on the motion to open, at which the father was to be provided with a

meaningful opportunity to be heard on the motion.

Argued November 9, 2023—officially released January 31, 2024**

Procedural History

Petition to terminate the respondent father’s parental

rights with respect to his minor child, brought to the

Probate Court in the district of Stamford and transferred to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Juvenile Matters, where the respondent father consented to the termination of his parental

rights; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Maronich, J.; judgment terminating the respondent father’s

parental rights; subsequently, the court, E. Richards,
J., dismissed the respondent father’s motion to open

the judgment, and the respondent father appealed to

this court. Reversed; further proceedings.

Michael W., self-represented, the appellant (respondent father).
Opinion

SEELEY, J. The self-represented respondent father,1

Michael W., appeals from the judgment of the trial court

dismissing his motion to open a judgment previously

rendered by the court terminating his parental rights

with respect to his minor daughter, P. T.-W. (P). In

his motion to open, the respondent alleged that the

judgment terminating his parental rights had been procured by fraud. On appeal, the respondent claims, inter

alia, that the court improperly dismissed his motion to

open the judgment terminating his parental rights at a

hearing at which he was not present due to his incarceration in the state of Washington and was not given an

opportunity to participate remotely, such as by telephone. We agree and reverse the judgment.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. Melissa T. became pregnant after

she and the respondent commenced an intimate relationship in October, 2014. The respondent and Melissa

T. moved to Connecticut in January, 2015, and P was

born in July, 2015. Melissa T. and the respondent were

never married but resided together until April, 2017.

When they resided together, Melissa T. observed certain

conduct by the respondent, including controlling behavior, that caused her to be concerned about the stability

of his mental health and, ultimately, to end the relationship.

On April 10, 2017, Melissa T. filed an application for

relief from abuse seeking a restraining order against

the respondent, in which she alleged that she had ‘‘been

subjected to a continuous threat of present physical

pain or physical injury, stalking or a pattern of threatening . . . .’’2 That same day, the court issued an ex parte

restraining order, which remained in effect until the

matter was heard at a hearing on April 21, 2017, at

which the court determined that the evidence was

legally insufficient to demonstrate that Melissa T. had

met her burden of proof to justify the issuance of a

restraining order.

Thereafter, the parties became involved in a contentious battle for custody of P. Two days after Melissa T.

filed her application for relief from abuse, the respondent petitioned the court for sole legal and physical

custody of P. The parties thereafter stipulated to joint

legal and shared physical custody. They subsequently

filed numerous motions pertaining to custody and visitation of P that were resolved by a second stipulation

dated July 31, 2017, which was approved by the court

and provided for ‘‘a ‘rotating 2-2-3 parental responsibility plan’ but made no change to the prior agreement of

joint legal custody.’’ After Melissa T. filed an emergency

motion for custody in August, 2017, the court granted

the motion, awarded sole legal and physical custody

of P to Melissa T., and ordered that the respondent’s
parenting time with P be supervised. Following competing motions to modify custody, the parties entered into

another stipulation, which was submitted for court

approval on March 19, 2018. That stipulation granted

decision-making authority to Melissa T. and changed

the custody arrangement from shared parenting and

visitation time to primary residence with Melissa T.,

with a more limited visitation schedule with the respondent. Melissa T. filed a second emergency motion for

custody in September, 2018, claiming that ‘‘ ‘there [was]

an immediate and present physical and psychological

danger’ ’’ to P, and the parties entered into an agreement. The parties continued to file numerous motions

relating to the custody of P, most of which were

resolved following a trial that began in January, 2019,

and concluded in May, 2019, that resulted in the court

issuing a lengthy memorandum of decision in which it

made numerous orders, including awarding sole legal

and physical custody of P to Melissa T., suspending

visitation with the respondent and ordering the respondent, inter alia, to participate in a program of intensive

psychotherapy.

In 2018, Melissa T. sought and obtained a restraining

order against the respondent that was extended to

2019.3 The respondent violated that order when, on

November 24, 2019, he attempted to break into Melissa

T.’s residence while she and P were in that residence.4

As a result, the respondent was charged with criminal

violation of a restraining order, burglary in the first

degree, and attempt to commit risk of injury to a child.

At a hearing before the court on October 28, 2020,

the respondent entered a guilty plea to the charges

of burglary in the first degree, criminal violation of a

restraining order, and attempt to commit risk of injury

to a child, with a proposed total effective sentence of

ten years, execution suspended after a minimum period

of one year and a maximum period of three years, with

that effective term being determined by the court at

sentencing, and five years of probation. As an additional

condition of the plea, the prosecutor asked the court

to issue three full no contact protective orders for the

protection of Melissa T., her husband, and P. At that

hearing, the prosecutor specifically stated that the

period of those protective orders would be ‘‘forty years

for [Melissa T.] and her husband and until the child’s

eighteenth birthday for [P].’’ The respondent’s counsel

indicated that the respondent, who was present at that

hearing, ‘‘[was] in agreement with those conditions.’’

At the respondent’s sentencing hearing on December

30, 2020, at which the respondent was present, the court

sentenced the respondent, in accordance with the plea

agreement, to a total effective sentence of ten years,

execution suspended after one year, with five years of

probation. The court also specifically recounted the

conditions of its standing criminal protective orders

and their duration, stating that the orders pertaining to
Melissa T. and her husband would expire on December

30, 2060, and that the one pertaining to P would expire

in July, 2033, on her eighteenth birthday. The court also

made clear to the respondent that, with respect to those

protective orders, he has to ‘‘stay away from the home

of the protected person, wherever that person may

reside,’’ ‘‘have no form of contact with the protected

person, including any written, electronic or telephonic

contact, and . . . not contact the protected person’s

home or place of others with whom the contact will

be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the protected

person or persons.’’ The respondent also was ordered

to stay 100 yards away from all three protected persons.

Those same conditions apply to all three protective

orders. At that hearing, Melissa T.’s attorney was asked

if he had anything to say, to which he remarked that

he wanted the respondent to know that the criminal

protective orders that were being put in place at that

hearing as part of the criminal disposition supersede

the restraining order that previously had been in place.5

On March 5, 2021, Melissa T. filed a petition in the

Probate Court seeking to terminate the respondent’s

parental rights with respect to P on the grounds that

(1) P had been abandoned by the respondent, (2) P had

been denied the care, guidance or control necessary

for her physical, educational, moral or emotional wellbeing by reason of acts or parental commission or omission, namely, the respondent had pleaded guilty to

attempting to commit risk of injury to a child, for which

a criminal protective order was issued that precluded

the respondent from having any contact with P for the

next fourteen years, (3) there was no ongoing parentchild relationship between P and the respondent, and

(4) P had been found in a prior proceeding by the

Probate Court to have been neglected and the respondent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a

reasonable time and considering the age and needs of

P, the respondent could assume a responsible position

in P’s life. The matter was subsequently transferred to

the juvenile division of the Superior Court.

On August 30, 2021, the respondent executed and

signed an affidavit consenting to the termination of his

parental rights. Thereafter, on October 21, 2021, the

court rendered judgment terminating the respondent’s

parental rights pursuant to its findings, by clear and

convincing evidence, that the respondent had voluntarily consented to the termination of his parental rights

and that such termination was in P’s best interest.

On June 10, 2022, the respondent filed a motion to

open the judgment terminating his parental rights. In

that motion, the respondent alleged, inter alia, that, in

the preliminary meetings leading to the termination of

his parental rights, Melissa T. and her attorney committed fraud by failing to provide vital information to the
court. Specifically, he alleged that information pertaining to Melissa T.’s health was ‘‘hidden from the

court,’’ that he had just discovered the ‘‘horrible news’’

a few weeks prior, and that if he had known such information, he would not have voluntarily given up his

parental rights and, instead, would have proceeded with

a hearing on the termination petition.

A hearing on the respondent’s motion to open was

initially scheduled for July 5, 2022, but that date was

continued to September 6, 2022, at the request of

Melissa T.’s attorney, who had a conflict. On July 25,

2022, P was adopted by Melissa T.’s husband. Subsequently, on September 2, 2022, Melissa T. filed a motion

to dismiss the respondent’s motion to open the judgment terminating his parental rights. In her motion to

dismiss, Melissa T. argued that the respondent’s motion

to open was not timely filed and, thus, was barred by

the statute of limitations. She also asserted that a final

judgment of stepparent adoption had been rendered

with respect to her husband, who is now P’s sole father.

In her motion, Melissa T. also noted that, on December

30, 2020, the respondent had pleaded guilty to criminal

violation of a protective order, burglary in the first

degree, and attempt to commit risk of injury to a child,

and was sentenced to ten years of incarceration, execution suspended after one year, followed by five years of

probation. Melissa T. further noted that ‘‘[a] protective

order was issued against [the respondent] preventing

him from having any contact with [P] until she [is]

eighteen years old.’’

On September 6, 2022, the respondent sought a continuance of the September hearing date on his motion

to open on the ground that his attorney ‘‘ ‘quit’ ’’ and

he needed more time to prepare for the hearing as a

self-represented party. A continuance was granted, and

a hearing was set for October 6, 2022. On September

28, 2022, the respondent’s father called the court clerk’s

office and stated that the respondent, who was incarcerated in the state of Washington at the time, would not

be able to make it to court for the October 6, 2022

hearing. The record contains notes from a clerk dated

September 29, 2022, indicating that a call was placed

to the correctional facility in Washington and that the

clerk was told that, ‘‘while the prison had access to

[Microsoft Teams],6

it was only used for internal purposes,’’ and that the prison ‘‘[does] not do virtual for

inmates.’’ (Footnote added.)

The scheduled hearing on the respondent’s motion

to open took place on October 6, 2022, despite the fact

that the respondent was not present at the hearing due

to his incarceration in Washington. After counsel for

the parties identified themselves at the hearing, the

following colloquy took place between the court and

Frank Bevilaqua, the attorney for Melissa T.:

‘‘The Court: All right. . . . Is the [respondent] here
today or?

‘‘[Attorney Bevilacqua]: . . . I provided [this] [court]

with information. [The respondent] is currently incarcerated in Washington state waiting for extradition for

violating . . . the standing protective orders that were

in [place] on file with my client, Melissa T., and her

current husband. So, I don’t know if there’s going to

be a Zoom or not. I gave the—the clerk’s office all of

the information of where . . . [the respondent] is currently residing. I hate using the term residing but

being held.

‘‘The Court: All right. Anything else? Was it down for

dismissal today or what was the? Okay. All right. So,

do we know where the father is? Has there been any

attempt to contact him in Washington state or has there

been service in that regard, do we know?

* * *

‘‘The Court: And so, the motion [to open] is by the

[respondent], correct me if I am wrong, he is not here.

‘‘[Attorney Bevilacqua]: Correct. . . .

‘‘The Court: He’s incarcerated in . . . the far west,

Washington state.

‘‘[Attorney Bevilacqua]: Correct.

‘‘The Court: All right.

‘‘[Attorney Bevilacqua]: Based on his violation of the

protective order[s] and terms of his release where the

protective order[s] w[ere] imposed against him in criminal court by Judge White.

‘‘The Court: Yes.

‘‘[Attorney Bevilacqua]: And as in [Melissa T.],

[Melissa T.’s husband], and . . . [P] [were] the recipients of the standing protective order[s].

‘‘The Court: The [respondent’s] rights were previously terminated, is that correct?

‘‘[Attorney Bevilacqua]: Correct, Your Honor. By

this court.

‘‘The Court: All right.

‘‘[Attorney Bevilacqua]: In this jurisdiction. . . .

‘‘The Court: There’s a full permanent protective order

in effect [enjoining] the [respondent] from having contact with the child. Is that correct?

‘‘[Attorney Bevilacqua]: Correct, Your Honor. For the

next nineteen years, seventeen to nineteen years. . . .

‘‘The Court: All right. Anything else?

‘‘[Attorney Bevilacqua]: No, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: I’m going to dismiss the matter. . . .

Just so the record is clear, there is a full protective

order [enjoining] the respondent . . . from having any
contact with the child . . . . He can’t have contact

with that child by order of Judge White by order of the

Stamford court. In light of those factors, to have any

relitigation of the motion would . . . in my mind, violate the best interest rule of the child . . . .

‘‘So, with that end in mind, while I understand it is

a bit of a stretch to, I don’t want to say bit of a stretch,

but it—I don’t like to have a motion to dismiss without

all the parties present. In view of the fact that the father

filed this motion. The child is in, has been adopted, is

in the custody of another individual. Apparently, the

reason for that, at least part of the reason for that

termination of parental rights and the custodial change,

was the [respondent’s] violence against the child, who

[the respondent] now wishes to have contact with, yield

the fact that there is a full protective order. . . . The

court is going to find that it is in the best interest . . .

of the child to dismiss the . . . [respondent’s motion

to open] at this time.’’

The court thereafter issued a written order, consistent with its oral decision, dismissing the motion to

open. The order stated: ‘‘[The respondent], [whose

parental rights previously were terminated], has filed

a motion to [open] alleging fraud. [The respondent] is

incarcerated in Washington state. There is a permanent

protective order in effect, which was previously ordered

by the Stamford criminal court against the [respondent].

[The respondent] is not present today. [The] clerk’s

office previously attempted to have the [respondent]

participate remotely from jail, but [the] correctional

facility indicated that they use a different platform,

other than [Microsoft] Teams. Since [the respondent] is

not present today, and because a permanent protective

order is in effect against [the respondent], the court

enters a dismissal as to [the respondent’s] motion to

[open].’’ The respondent subsequently filed a timely

appeal challenging the dismissal of his motion to open

and seeking a new hearing thereon.

Thereafter, pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5, the

respondent filed a motion for articulation, seeking to

have the court articulate, inter alia, the legal and factual

basis for its dismissal of his motion to open. In an

articulation dated January 24, 2023, the court set forth

the factual and procedural history of the case and

stated: ‘‘On the basis of the statute of limitations alone,

the [respondent’s] motion to [open] [the] judgment is

time barred. But, in the event that the [respondent]

meets the initial threshold to open [the] judgment, it is

the trial court’s opinion that, on the basis of the previously mentioned case history, including the [respondent’s] plea to the aforementioned felony charges and

the subsequent adoption of the child on July 25, 2022,

it would be disruptive to and not in the best interest

of the child to [open] the judgment.’’7

On appeal, the respondent claims that the court erred
in dismissing his motion to open by proceeding with

the hearing on the motion in his absence and without

giving him a chance to participate remotely. Specifically, he claims that he had a right to be heard on his

motion and to participate in the proceeding. He asserts

that the court was aware that he would not be able to

make it to court for the proceeding, as his father had

called the clerk’s office eight days prior to the proceeding and informed the clerk of his incarceration in Washington. He also notes that the hearing had been rescheduled previously and that it, again, should have been

rescheduled to enable his participation. We agree with

the respondent.

The following legal principles are relevant to the

respondent’s claim. ‘‘[F]or more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear:

Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to

be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right

they must first be notified. . . . It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be

heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner. . . . Due process, unlike some

legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed

content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.

. . . Instead, due process is a flexible principle that

calls for such procedural protections as the particular

situation demands. . . . [T]hese principles require that

a [party] have . . . an effective opportunity to defend

by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting

his own arguments and evidence orally.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner of

Correction, 198 Conn. App. 320, 332, 232 A.3d 1229

(2020). ‘‘It is the settled rule of this jurisdiction, if indeed

it may not be safely called an established principle of

general jurisprudence, that no court will proceed to the

adjudication of a matter involving conflicting rights and

interests, until all persons directly concerned in the

event have been actually or constructively notified of

the pendency of the proceeding, and given reasonable

opportunity to appear and be heard. . . . Hasbrouck

v. Hasbrouck, 195 Conn. 558, 559–60, 489 A.2d 1022

(1985). It is a fundamental premise of due process that

a court cannot adjudicate a matter until the persons

directly concerned have been notified of its pendency

and have been given a reasonable opportunity to be

heard in sufficient time to prepare their positions on the

issues involved.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Egan v. Egan, 83 Conn. App. 514, 518, 850 A.2d 251

(2004); see also Davis v. Davis, 200 Conn. App. 180,

190, 238 A.3d 46, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 977, 241 A.3d

130 (2020).

‘‘It is a fundamental tenet of due process of law as

guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United

States constitution and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution that persons whose . . . rights will

be affected by a court’s decision are entitled to be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. . . .

Whe[n] a party is not afforded an opportunity to subject

the factual determinations underlying the trial court’s

decision to the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing, an order cannot be sustained.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Ill v. Manzo-Ill, 210 Conn. App. 364,

376–77, 270 A.3d 108, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 909, 273

A.3d 696 (2022). ‘‘In exercising its statutory authority

to inquire into the best interests of the child, the court

. . . must . . . exercise that authority in a manner

consistent with the due process requirements of fair

notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Petrov v. Gueorguieva,

167 Conn. App. 505, 515, 146 A.3d 26 (2016). ‘‘Whether

a party was deprived of his [or her] due process rights

is a question of law to which appellate courts grant

plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Coleman v. Bembridge, 207 Conn. App. 28, 45, 263 A.3d

403 (2021).

Moreover, ‘‘[i]t is undisputed that [t]he right of a

parent to raise his or her children has been recognized

as a basic constitutional right. Stanley v. Illinois, 405

U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972).

Accordingly, a parent has a right to due process under

the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution when a state seeks to terminate the relationship

between parent and child. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d

640 (1981).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Egypt E., 322 Conn. 231, 244, 140 A.3d 210 (2016); see

also McDuffee v. McDuffee, 39 Conn. App. 412, 415–16,

664 A.2d 1164 (1995) (‘‘natural parent has a protected

liberty interest in a relationship with [his or] her child

and, therefore, has a constitutional right to be present

and to be heard at hearings affecting that relationship’’).

In the present case, the court held a hearing, without

any participation by the respondent, on his motion seeking to open and to reverse the judgment terminating

his parental rights with respect to P, which clearly implicates his constitutional right to parent his child and the

attendant due process protections afforded to parents.

In In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn. 709, 726, 275 A.3d

1181 (2022), our Supreme Court noted that ‘‘trial courts

have an obligation to ensure that parties have the ability

to meaningfully participate . . . .’’ In that case, the

court declined the party’s invitation to invoke its ‘‘supervisory authority to create a rule requiring that a trial

court, before conducting a virtual trial in a child protection case, ensure that the parties either appear by twoway videoconferencing technology or waive the right

to do so, after a brief canvass.’’ Id., 726–27. Nevertheless, the court took the ‘‘opportunity to emphasize the

importance of ensuring equal access to justice’’ in the

contexts of virtual hearings. Id., 727. Relevant to the

present case, the court stated that, ‘‘[i]n situations in

which parties or witnesses express an inability to partic-
ipate in virtual proceedings, it is imperative that our

courts either provide alternative means of accessing

the technology needed to participate . . . or continue

the proceeding until it can be conducted in person or

until such time as the party or witness has secured the

necessary technology to meaningfully participate in the

proceeding. Courts must also be mindful of ensuring

that parties have equal access to the same technological

means to participate in the virtual trial, such as ensuring

that both parties participate by either video and audio

or audio only.’’ Id., 729–30.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the respondent was not present and was not afforded an opportunity to participate remotely, either by telephone or a

video conferencing platform, at the hearing on his

motion to open the judgment terminating his parental

rights. There is nothing in the transcript of that hearing

indicating that steps were taken to provide the respondent with a meaningful opportunity to participate and

be heard at the hearing. Instead, the transcript simply

reflects that counsel told the court that the respondent

was incarcerated in the state of Washington. Moreover,

even though the court’s written order states that the

‘‘clerk’s office previously attempted to have the [respondent] participate remotely from jail, but [the] correctional facility indicated that they use a different platform, other than [Microsoft] Teams,’’ that is not the

only means by which he could have participated. For

example, in In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155),

187 Conn. 431, 434, 446 A.2d 808 (1982), the trial court

denied a request for a continuance in which the respondent father, who was incarcerated in California, sought

a continuance until his expected release from prison

so that he could be physically present at the termination

of his parental rights trial. Our Supreme Court concluded that the father was not denied due process,

especially given the unusual measures taken by the

court to secure the father’s long-distance participation

following its denial of his motion for a continuance.

Id., 435–41. Specifically, on the initial day of hearings,

the state’s principal witness testified and was crossexamined by the father’s counsel, and a complete transcript of that hearing was sent to the father, who was

given time to discuss the witness’ testimony with his

counsel by telephone. Id., 436–37. At the second session,

a speaker was attached to a telephone at the court

in Connecticut and the father testified and was crossexamined from his California prison. Id., 437. As a result

of these measures, the court determined that the

father’s telephonic testimony adequately protected his

due process rights. Id., 435–41; see also In re Aisjaha

N., supra, 343 Conn. 723 n.6.

In contrast to the procedures followed in cases such

as In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155) and In re

Aisjaha N., the record in the present case does not

demonstrate that the respondent was given a meaning-
ful opportunity to be heard at the hearing on his motion

to open.8 See Egan v. Egan, supra, 83 Conn. App. 518–19

(court, which proceeded with hearing on motion to

terminate child support in plaintiff’s absence, denied

plaintiff due process by failing to provide plaintiff with

notice of hearing on motion to terminate child support

and meaningful opportunity to be present and be heard

on motion). If there was a problem with the video conferencing platform used by the correctional facility in

Washington, the respondent could have participated

via telephone; see In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No.

10155), supra, 187 Conn. 436–37 (father who was incarcerated in California participated at termination of

parental rights hearing in Connecticut via telephone);

In re Takie O., 215 Conn. App. 580, 584, 282 A.3d 1279

(on first day of trial on termination of parental rights

petition, respondent father joined proceeding by telephone), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 922, 284 A.3d 982 (2022);

or the hearing could have been rescheduled to a future

date at which the respondent’s participation could be

secured. See In re Aisjaha N., supra, 343 Conn. 729–30.

Accordingly, because the hearing was conducted in violation of the respondent’s due process rights, the court’s

dismissal of his motion to open cannot stand. For that

reason, the case must be remanded for a new hearing

on the motion to open,9 at which the respondent must

be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the

motion.10

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the court.

Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)

(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization

Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to

identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection

order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied

for, or others through whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.

** January 31, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The minor child’s mother, Melissa T., filed a petition in the Probate Court

seeking to terminate the respondent father’s parental rights with respect to

their minor child. Thereafter, the matter was transferred to the Superior

Court. The respondent father subsequently consented to the termination

of his parental rights, and the court rendered judgment terminating his

parental rights.

Melissa T. did not file a brief and is not otherwise involved in this appeal

and, as a result, this court issued an order on September 6, 2023, stating

that the appeal will ‘‘be considered on the basis of the [respondent’s] brief

and, if applicable, the appendix, the record, as defined by Practice Book

[§] 60-4, and oral argument . . . .’’ Furthermore, the attorney for the minor

child, who had anticipated adopting the position of Melissa T. in this matter

but could not do so when no appellee brief was filed, filed a letter dated

October 19, 2023, stating that it is the minor child’s position that the court

properly dismissed the respondent’s motion to open and that, if the respondent were to prevail, it would ‘‘cause direct harm to the child’s wishes and

best interests.’’

2

In her affidavit in support of her application, Melissa T. alleged, inter
alia, that the respondent had exhibited erratic, manipulative, and hostile

behavior toward her, which made her fear for her safety, that the respondent

had been taking her prescription pain medications for recreational use,

and that one night his behavior escalated when he restrained her to grab

her phone.

3 Specifically, in her affidavit in support of her 2018 application for relief

from abuse, Melissa T. alleged that she was in ‘‘imminent fear for [her]

physical safety and [her] daughter’s well-being caused by behavior and

communication of [the respondent].’’ She further alleged that the respondent’s actions were ‘‘abusive, angry, full of hatred and escalating in both

rage and frequency,’’ and that he had been engaging in a pattern of stalking.

On September 26, 2018, the court, Heller, J., issued a full, no contact

restraining order against the respondent as to Melissa T. and P. On October

16, 2018, the court extended the order for one year with respect to Melissa

T. but lifted it as to P.

4 Specifically, at the respondent’s plea hearing, the state asserted that,

‘‘[a]t approximately 2:04 and 2:13 in the morning, the [respondent] illegally

entered a dwelling unit at [a particular address where Melissa T. resided]

without consent after sunset at night and attempted to make entry into

[Melissa T.’s] unit. Inside the unit was [Melissa T.’s] minor child. The defendant at the time had made a number of statements indicating his intent to

take custody of the child to quote, unquote, rescue her from [Melissa T.].

It is the state’s allegation that that is what he was trying to accomplish on

the night in question.’’

5

In his appellate brief and at oral argument before this court, the respondent challenges the existence of the condition of the protective order precluding him from having any contact with P until she reaches eighteen years

of age that was issued by the court at the time of sentencing. For example,

at oral argument before this court he stated that it is ‘‘not true’’ that he

cannot talk to his daughter until she is eighteen. In his appellate brief, he

further asserts: ‘‘One of the most important false statements in the motion

to dismiss came with an exhibit attached. The information presented to

the court stated, ‘a protective order was issued against [the respondent]

preventing him from having any contact with the minor child until age

eighteen years old.’ This is an untrue fact.’’ We disagree. We have carefully

reviewed the transcripts of the respondent’s plea and sentencing hearings

in the criminal proceeding, at which the court clearly and explicitly stated

the terms of the standing criminal protective order related to P. Under those

terms, the protective order remains in place until P reaches eighteen years

old, and the respondent is ‘‘to have no form of contact with the protected

person, including any written, electronic or telephonic contact . . . .’’ The

respondent bases his assertion on a clerk’s notation on a criminal docket

sheet, dated the same day as the sentencing hearing, stating that the respondent is to have no contact with Melissa T. or P ‘‘other than through [M]y

[F]amily [W]izard.’’ The clerk’s note, however, was not signed by the judge

and contains a scrivener’s error. See RCN Capital, LLC v. Sunford Properties & Development, LLC, 196 Conn. App. 823, 835 and n.6, 231 A.3d 201

(2020). The actual orders of protection signed by the judge include the

condition that the respondent have no contact with the protected persons

‘‘in any manner, including by written, electronic or telephonic contact,’’

and make no reference to contact through ‘‘[M]y [F]amily [W]izard,’’ which

clearly would contradict the no contact order imposed by the court. (Emphasis added.)

6 Microsoft Teams is ‘‘collaborative meeting [computer software] with

video, audio, and screen sharing features.’’ Connecticut Judicial Branch,

Connecticut Guide to Remote Hearings for Attorneys and Self-Represented

Parties (January 17, 2024), p. 5, available at https://jud.ct.gov/HomePDFs/

ConnecticutGuideRemoteHearings.pdf (last visited January 31, 2024).

7 On April 5, 2023, the respondent filed a motion for review of the trial

court’s articulation. On April 26, 2023, this court granted the motion for

review but denied the relief requested therein.

8 The respondent does not claim on appeal that he lacked adequate notice

of the hearing.

9 We note that the record is ambiguous as to whether the hearing on

October 6, 2022, also concerned Melissa T.’s motion to dismiss. The summons

ordering Melissa T. to appear on October 6, 2022, indicates that the scheduled

hearing pertained to the respondent’s motion to open, and the record does

not contain any notice for a hearing on Melissa T.’s motion to dismiss. The

court’s written order containing its judgment of October 6, 2022, however,

indicates that the order pertains to both the motion to dismiss and the
motion to open, and judgment was rendered dismissing the respondent’s

motion to open. Moreover, the transcript of the hearing of October 6, 2022,

does little to clarify this issue, as the court did not state clearly what motion

or motions were before it, and it referenced both the motion to dismiss

and the motion to open. Nevertheless, regardless of whether the hearing

concerned the motion to dismiss in addition to the motion to open, we have

determined that the October 6 hearing was improper in that it took place

in violation of the respondent’s due process rights; accordingly, the judgment

rendered at that hearing dismissing the respondent’s motion to open cannot

stand. We remand for a new hearing on the motion to open only, as requested

by the respondent in his appellate brief. On remand, however, Melissa T.

is free to renew her motion to dismiss or to file a new one and seek a

hearing thereon, should she choose to do so.

10 In light of our determination that a new hearing on the motion to open

is necessary, we need not address the respondent’s claim that the court

improperly based its decision dismissing his motion to open on hearsay and

otherwise inadmissible testimony. Moreover, the respondent, in his appellate

brief, makes a number of arguments that relate to the substance and merits

of his motion to open. For example, he discusses the circumstances of his

consent to the termination of his parental rights, first disputing that he ever

consented and next arguing that he did so under duress. He also argues in

his appellate brief that the court-appointed attorney who represented him

during the termination of parental rights proceeding did not act in the best

interests of the respondent or P, and that the court erred in determining

that his motion to open was time barred because it was filed beyond the

four month period in which motions to open must be filed. See General

Statutes § 52-212a; Practice Book § 17-4. In light of our determination that

it was improper for the court to proceed with the hearing on his motion to

open without providing the respondent with a meaningful opportunity to

be heard at the hearing, we need not address these arguments, as the merits

of the motion to open will be litigated at a new hearing on the motion. Our

decision, therefore, in no way reflects an opinion by this court concerning

the merits of the motion to open. We simply hold that the court’s judgment

issued after the hearing held on October 6, 2022, must be reversed because

the respondent had a right to be heard on his motion.