IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15

- 1045 Filed June 15, 2016

AFSCME IOWA COUNCIL 61

, P etitioner

- Appell ant

,

vs.

IOWA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

RELATIONS BOARD

, Respondent

- Appell ee

.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Dustria A. Relph

,

Judge.

AFSCME appeals the dismissal of its prohibited practice complaint.

AFFIRMED.

Mark T. Hedber g and Sarah M. Wolfe of Hedberg & Boulton, P.C.

, Des

Moines , for appellant.

Diana S. Machir of Iowa Public Employee Relations Board

, Des Moines

,

for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.2

BOWER, Judge.

AFSCME Iowa Council 61 (AS FCME) 1 appeals the Iowa Public Employee

Relation Board’s (PERB) dismissal of its prohibited practice complaint claiming

PERB’s decision was based up on an irrational, illogical

, or wholly unjustifiable

interpretation of law. We disagree and affirm PERB’s dismissal.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

We adopt the district court’ summation of the factual background:

AFSCME filed a prohibited practices complaint against the

St ate of Iowa, Department of Corrections (hereinafter State) in February, 2012, alleging that the Department of Corrections (hereinafter DOC) violated certain provisions of Iowa Code Chapter 20 when they denied AFSCME members the right to wear union pins dep icting a photo of Governor Branstad with th e universal red
“no” symbol across it, and the phrases “ 19 91 or 2011 ” written across the top and “ NOTHING HAS CHANGED ” written across the bottom of the pin. There is nothing on the pin that makes it clear to

the public that the pin is an A SFC ME union pin.

I n a March, 2014 ru ling, an administrative law judge of PERB

found that the DOC ’ s prohibition of the pins was a prohibited practice in violation of Iowa Code Section 20.10(2)(a) (2011)

. The State appealed.

In its October, 2014 decision, the Public Employee Relations

Board concluded that “ special circumstances” existed in this
situation which warranted the DOC ’ s ban of the pins. Based upon that finding, PERB reversed the ALJ’ s decision that the State

committed a prohibited practice in violation of Iowa Code Section 20.10(2)(a).

The district court issued a ruling in June 2015, affirming PERB’s dismissal

of AFSCME’s prohibited practices complaint. AFSCME now appeals.

II. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

Judicial review of an agency ruling is governed by [the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act [IAPA], Iowa Code chapter 17A]. The

district court reviews the agency’ s decision in an appellate capacity.

1 AFSCME is an acronym for the American Federation of State, County

, and Municipal Employees.3

In tur n, we review the district court’ s decision to determine whether it correctly applied the law. We must apply the standards set forth [in the IAPA] and determine whether our application of those standards produces the same result as reached by the district

court.

AFSCME I owa Council 61 v . Iowa Pub. Emp’ t Relations Bd.

, 846 N.W.2d 873,

877

– 78 (Iowa 2014) (citations omitted). If so, we affirm the judgment of the

district court. See id.

PERB notes ASFCME has failed to designate which section of

17A.19(10)

, ground s for judicial relief

, app ly in this appeal. While ASFCME

claims PERB incorrectly interpreted the law, ASFCME’s argument consists of

attempts to demonstrat e PERB incorrectly applied the law to the facts in this

case. Therefore

, we will focus our review on PERB’s application of la w to fact.

See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m) . Even if we also applied section 17A.19(10)( l )

(interpretation of law), given ASFCME’s heavy burden, we would reach the same

conclusion and affirm PERB’s dismissal.

“Because the legislature has now expres sly ve sted PERB with discretion

to a pply chapter 20, we review PERB’ s

. . . application of section 20.8 to

determine if the ruling is ‘irrational, illogi cal, or wholly unjustifiable.’” AFSCME

I owa Council

, 846 N.W.2d at 878 (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10) (m)).

A decision is “irrational” when it is “not governed by or according to

reason.” Webster’ s Third New International Dictionary 1195. A decision is “illogical” when it is “contrary to or devoid of logic.” Id. at

1127. A decision is “unjustifiable” when it has no foundation in fact

or reason. See id. at 2502 (defining “u njustifiable” as “lacking in . . . justice”); id. at 1228 (defining “justice” as “the quality or characteristic of being just, impartial or fair”); id. (defining “just” as “conforming to fa ct and reason”).4

Id. “ ‘The burden of demonstrating

. . . the invalidity of agency action is on the

party asserting invalidity. ’” Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a)).

III. ANALYSIS

ASFCME claims PERB’s decision to apply the “special circumstance”

exception to prohibit DOC employees from wearing the pin was based on an

irrational, illogical or wholly unjust ifiable interpretation of law. See U nited S tates

Dep’t of Justice v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. , 955 F.2d 998, 1003

– 004 (5th Cir.

1992) (defining the “special circumstances test” as “widely applied” by the

National Labor Relations Board ).

On this issue, the district court reasoned:

It is not disputed that union member s have a statutory right to wear union insignia under Iowa Code § 20.8(3). It is also not disputed that an exception to this right exists for special

circumstances. Special circumstances that have been long

recognized as justification for employer infrin gement upon this right include where prohibition of an activity is necessary in order to maintain discipline and ensure safety. Republic Aviation Corp. v.

N.L.R.B.

, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 ( 1945). In this case, at least two union staff members at the Iowa

Medical and Classification Center complained to their warden that they found the pins offensive. Subsequently, the DOC banned the pins because they were deemed disrespectful, did not display appropriate behavior, did not comport with the responsibility o f the DOC to model prosocial behavior to offenders, and were in vio lation of DOC policies. These include policies requiring employees to

conduct themselves in a professional manner which creates and maintains respect for the DOC and to avoid action that m ight adversely affect confidence in the criminal justice system. DOC representatives testified that the pins herein were disrespectful to Governor Branstad, who is at the top of the DOC’ s chain of command, and viewed them as an attack on the DOC from the top
down. The work environment in the present matter is unlike any

other. DOC employees are responsible for the housing, care, rehabilitation, and 24 hour supervision of criminal offenders whose offenses were deemed serious enough to warrant imprisonment.

The volatile nature of the prison setting presents unique needs5

w hi ch require a very high level of control and consistency to avoid

d i s ruption. Maintenance of control and avoidance of disruption in the prison environment are paramount to th e safety of both employees and offenders. If there is any place where it is necessary to maintain discipline, it would be in a prison. Internal security within a correctional facility is central to all other corrections goals. Pell v. Procunier

, 417 U.S . 817, 822

– 23 (1974)

. Though the need to maintain discipline and ensure safety would typically apply to employees, it is reasonable and necessary, within the DOC, to extend that need to the offenders under the emplo yees’ supervision, as well.

These enhan ced needs for control and consistency, along

with the “ paramilitary structur e” of the Department of Corrections were significant factors contributing to PERB’ s finding that special

circumstances exist in this case. This court finds substantial evidence, a s defined above, exists to support that finding. This court further agrees that, given the volatile environment of a prison, the DOC should not be required to wait until correctional staff or inmate safety is actually jeopardized through actual workplace disruption to prove special circumstances. Workplace disruption within the DOC would undermine offender confidence not only in the DOC, but also in the crim inal j ustice system. Disruption and disorder within a prison, be it amongst staff or otherwise, co uld provide an excuse for negative, if not dangerous, offender behaviors. Given the unique work

environment in thi s s ituation, this court agrees that there is sufficient evidence to support a need for immediate action rather than require the DOC to wait until a potentially dangerous situation develops.

We agree with the district court ’s reasoning. AFSCME has been unable to

carry its heavy burden and prove PERB’s decision was “ [b] ased upon an

irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact .” Iowa Code §

17A.19(10)(m). We affirm PERB’s dismissal of AF S CME’s prohibited practice

complaint.

AFFIRMED

.