STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

FILED 

In re T.W.-1 May 14, 2018 

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS No. 18-0060 (Randolph County 2017-JA-051) OF WEST VIRGINIA 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Mother T.W.-2, by counsel J. Brent Easton, appeals the Circuit Court of 

Randolph County’s December 15, 2017, order terminating her parental rights to T.W.-1.1 The 

West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel Brandolyn N. 

Felton-Ernest, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order and a supplemental 

appendix. The guardian ad litem (“guardian”), G. Phillip Davis, filed a response on behalf of the 

child also in support of the circuit court’s order. On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court 

erred in terminating her parental rights without first granting her an improvement period. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Prior to the initiation of the instant proceedings, petitioner had a history of involvement 

in abuse and neglect proceedings. Petitioner was adjudicated of abuse and neglect due to her 

substance abuse in 2009, but ultimately completed an improvement period and the petition 

against her was dismissed. Petitioner was the subject of a second abuse and neglect proceeding 

initiated in 2016, wherein her parental rights to four older children were ultimately involuntarily 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W.Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W.Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W.Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 

W.Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). Additionally, because the child and petitioner share the same 

initials, we will refer to them as T.W.-1 and T.W.-2, respectively, throughout this memorandum 

decision. 

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terminated due to her failure to correct the conditions of abuse, including substance abuse and 

failing to provide the children with a stable home, food, clothing, and other necessities.2 

In June of 2017, a mere six days after her parental rights to her four older children were 

involuntarily terminated, petitioner gave birth to T.W.-1, the only child at issue in this appeal. 

Shortly thereafter, the DHHR filed the instant abuse and neglect petition against petitioner, 

alleging that she tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and marijuana at the 

child’s birth. The DHHR alleged that petitioner denied abusing the drugs and blamed the positive 

test results on over-the-counter medications. The DHHR further alleged that petitioner had a 

history of child abuse and neglect, that aggravated circumstances existed because petitioner’s 

parental rights to four older children were involuntarily terminated, and that no change in 

circumstances occurred since the prior proceeding. 

The circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing in August of 2017. Petitioner stipulated to 

the allegations contained in the petition and requested a post-adjudicatory improvement period. 

The circuit court accepted petitioner’s stipulation, adjudicated her as an abusing parent, and held 

her motion in abeyance until the dispositional hearing. 

In December of 2017, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing wherein it took 

judicial notice of the prior abuse and neglect proceedings and the testimony and evidence 

presented at the prior hearings in the instant matter. The DHHR also requested that the circuit 

court take judicial notice that it had ordered petitioner to submit to a drug screen following the 

adjudicatory hearing and that she failed to do so. Petitioner testified as to her willingness to 

participate in an improvement period and stated that she would comply with any services 

ordered. However, petitioner continued to blame her positive drug screen at the child’s birth on 

over-the-counter medications. After hearing evidence, the circuit court found that petitioner 

failed to demonstrate that she was likely to participate in an improvement period, made no efforts 

to address her substance abuse issues or other conditions of abuse since the prior termination of 

parental rights, and was unable to provide for the child’s needs. Finding that there was no 

reasonable likelihood that petitioner could correct the conditions of abuse in the near future and 

that termination was necessary for the child’s welfare, the circuit court denied petitioner’s 

motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and terminated her parental rights. It is from 

the December 15, 2017, dispositional order that petitioner appeals.3 

The Court has previously established the following standard of review: 

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

2

Petitioner appealed the termination of her parental rights to the four older children and 

this Court affirmed the circuit court’s order by memorandum decision. See In re: CW., R.W., 

N.W., and F.B., No. 17-0718, 2017 WL 5953092 (W.Va. Dec. 1, 2017)(memorandum decision). 

3

The father’s parental rights were also terminated during the proceedings below. The 

child was placed with a relative and the permanency plan is adoption by the relative. 

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facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 

such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a 

reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply 

because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if 

the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record 

viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 

470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W.Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

In her brief on appeal, petitioner states that the circuit court erred in terminating her 

parental rights without first granting her an improvement period. However, she cites to no 

authority requiring circuit courts to grant parents improvement periods before terminating their 

parental rights. In fact, petitioner concedes that this Court has held that “courts are not required 

to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement . . . where it appears that the 

welfare of the child will be seriously threatened . . . .” Syl. Pt. 4, in part, In re Kristin Y., 227 

W.Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011)(quoting Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 

S.E.2d 114 (1980)). Accordingly, we find no error in this regard. 

Moreover, petitioner has failed to present evidence that the circuit court erred in denying 

her an improvement period. The decision to grant or deny an improvement period rests in the 

sound discretion of the circuit court. See In re M.M., 236 W.Va. 108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 

(2015) (“West Virginia law allows the circuit court discretion in deciding whether to grant a 

parent an improvement period”); Syl. Pt. 6, in part, In re Katie S., 198 W.Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 

(1996) (“It is within the court’s discretion to grant an improvement period within the applicable 

statutory requirements”). We have also held that a parent’s “entitlement to an improvement 

period is conditioned upon the ability of the [parent] to demonstrate ‘by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the [parent] is likely to fully participate in the improvement period . . . .’” In re 

Charity H., 215 W.Va. 208, 215, 599 S.E.2d 631, 638 (2004). 

While it is true that petitioner testified to her willingness to participate in the terms and 

conditions of a post-adjudicatory improvement period, the overwhelming evidence supported the 

circuit court’s denial of an improvement period. This is especially true in light of the fact that 

petitioner tested positive for several drugs at the child’s birth, only six days after having her 

parental rights to her older children involuntarily terminated due, in part, to her substance abuse. 

In addition to these aggravated circumstances, petitioner continued to deny that she had a 

substance abuse issue, testifying at the dispositional hearing that her positive drug screen was a 

result of taking over-the-counter medication. We have held that 

[i]n order to remedy the abuse and/or neglect problem, the problem must first be 

acknowledged. Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth 

of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect or the 

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perpetrator of said abuse and neglect, results in making the problem untreatable 

and in making an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child’s 

expense. 

In re Timber M., 231 W.Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoting Charity H., 215 W.Va. 

at 217, 599 S.E.2d at 640). Moreover, petitioner was ordered to provide a drug screen following 

her adjudicatory hearing, but refused to do so. In light of the aggravated circumstances of this 

case and petitioner’s continued failure to acknowledge or address the conditions of abuse, we 

find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for a postadjudicatory improvement period. 

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

December 15, 2017, order is hereby affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: May 14, 2018 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

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