### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O c t obe r 6, 2005 S e s s i on

S T AT E OF T E NNE S S E E v . J AM E S D. NI CHOL S ON

App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2003-C- 2381 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr ., Judge

No. M2004- 00111-SC-R11- CD - F iled on Ap ril 17, 2006

We g rante d r e vie w t o a dd re ss the fo llo wi ng c e rt if ie d q ue sti on that w a s r e se rv e d b y De fe nd a nt, J ames D. N icholson, following his g uiltyplea to possession of c ocaine for r esale : “whethe r the evidenc e s ei z ed fr o m the defe ndant in this case should have been suppr essed be cause it was

se ize d p ur su a nt t o th e wa rr a ntl e ss arr e st o f the de fe nd a nt f or wh ic h th e po lic e ha d n o p ro ba ble

cause in violation of the 4th Amendment to the United Stat es C o n s t i t ution and Article O ne, Section Seven of the Tenne ssee Constitution as well as the Tenne ssee Supre me Court’s dec ision in State of Tenne ssee v. Per ry Thomas Randolph, 74 S.W .3d 33 0 (T en n

. 2 0 0 2).” A fter be ing instructed to “hold up” by a dete ctive, De fendant turned and r an. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals conc luded t hat Def endant wa s seized when he w as there afte r pursue d and appre hen d ed by

office rs. The intermediate c ourt conc luded that, bec ause the detec tives lacke d

rea sonable suspicion or pr obable c ause to e ffe ctuate suc h a seizure, the e v i d ence flowing there from must be suppre ssed. Afte r ca ref ul revie w o f t h e record and applicable authority , we
concur with the judgme nt rende re d by the Court of Criminal Appea ls. Accor dingly , we a ffirm the j u d gm en t of the Court of Criminal Appea ls, rever se and va cate Def endant’ s conviction and d i s m i ss the char g es. We also emphasize the importanc e of c reating an adequate re cord f or revie w in case s such as this one.
Tenn. R. App . 11 Appeal by Per m ission Judgme nt of th e Court

of Crim inal Ap peals Aff irm ed

C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J
., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON AN D A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J J ., joined. J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., filed a dissenting opinion.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Mic ha e l E . M oo re , So lic it or Ge ne ra l; Eliz abeth B . Marne y , Senior Counsel; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I , District At t o rney Gene ral; and Michae l Rohli ng , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llant, State of Tenne ssee.

J ames O. Ma

rtin, I I I , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, James D. Nicholson.2 OP IN ION

BACK GR OUND

Def endant, J ames D. N icholson, was indicted f or eva ding a

rre st, resisting a

rre st, criminal trespassing , and possessing with i n t en t to sell or deliver .5 g rams or moreof a substanc e cont a in in g c o c a in e

. D e f e n d a n t f il e d a mo ti o n to s u p p r e s s th e e v id e n c e s e iz e d f r o m h im a t the tim e of his arr e st.
The only evidenc e pre sented at the suppressio n h ea ri ng and contained in this recor d is the te sti mon y of De te c tiv e Ry a n L ock wo odof theMe tr op oli ta n N a sh vil le Pol ic e De pa rt me nt. Be cause of the importanc e of the actua l rec ord to the ana ly sis in thi s case , we quote the re levant p o rt i o n o f D e t e c t i v e L o c k w o o d ’ s t e s t i m o n y i n i t s e n t i r e t y: Q. And wer e y ou working at about 11:30, at nig ht, on that date? A. Ye s, I

wa s. Q. On t h at day , did y ou have an occa sion to come in contac t with Mr. J ames Nicholson? A. Yes, I

did. Q. Wil l y ou tell the J udg e how that oc curr ed? A

. O n th e s e v e n th o f Ju ly
, w e w e r e c o n d u c ti n g g a n g in v e s ti g a ti o n s in the John He nry

Ha le Ho us ing Pr oje c ts. Q. And when y ou say “we ,” who do y ou mean? A

. M y s e lf

, o th e r in te ll ig e n c e d iv is io n d e te c ti v e s a n d We s t F le x. TH E CO UR T: Wer e y ou in the I nte lli g e nc e Se c tio n o r the F le x Uni t? THE WI TNESS: I ntellige nce. THE COURT: You -- so y ou’re in I ntellige nce? THE WI TNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay . Fine. A. (B y the Wit ness) We obse rved a larg e crow d of individuals aro u n d t he Henry Place a rea wher e it comes down to Char lotte. At tha t t i m e, we witnessed various hand-to-hand transac tions a mongst the g roup, differ ent people c o ming and g oing. A t that time, the dec i s i o n wa s made to spea k with severa l of the i n d i v i d u a l s , i n a n a t t e m p tt o g a t h e r g a n g i n t e l l i g e n c e

. W h e n w e , f i r s t , i n i t i a l l y, approa ched, se vera l individuals st ruck out running . I , initially-- Q

. A l l t h i s - - w h e n yo u s a y “ ar o u n d H e n r y H a l e , ” i s t h i s o n M D H A p r o p e rt y? A. Ye s, it i s. Q. Ok a y . A ndI

a ssu me the re ’s no tr e sp a ssi ng sig ns ? A. T h at ’s co rr ec t

. On ab o u tev er y b u i l d i n g. Q

. O k a y. A. At that time, I

beg in to give c hase to one s u b j ect on f oot from a distanc e. By t h e t i m e I arrived at the c orner , which, ac tually , put me on Henry Place, that subject had g otten around another corner , out of my sight. At that time, I

had stopped running

. And I looked to my rig ht, in the g ener al vicinity o f w h er e t he initial group w as standing , to see if

-- wh o h ad stay ed. At that time, there was a n i n d i v i d u al
, wh o we l at erfo u n d o u twa s M r. Ni ch o l s o n , wa l k i n g.3 THE COURT: So he’s not the one that ran. THE WI TNESS: Not, ini tially . No, sir. THE COURT: Okay . Okay . So someone ran. THE WI TNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Fr om the scene . And then y o u came back a round thesc e ne , o r w hate ve r i t is

. And th en that’ s w he rey ou sa w this

man. A. (B y

the Witness) Yes, sir. He w as rig ht on -- h e wa s co m i n g j ust a few fee t off of

th e s id e w a lk

o r d o w n to w ar d s H e n r y

Pl a c e a t th a t t im e

. A n d a s I h ad stopped running , I

was taking a fe w more steps. A nd I looked to m y ri gh t where that are a wa s. And at that time, the def endant stopped and looked at me. And I square d more to him and told him to hol d up. I was in a r aid vest that had Metro patc he s a ndins ig nia

on it. An d it was cle arl y vis ibl e . A s so on a s I

sa id t o h old up, he turne d and ran. I , then, g ave c hase and told h i m t o s t op, police. That continued along the sidewa lk that runs para llel to Charlotte Pike until he re ache d a play g round ty

pe of a rea

. At th at ti me, De te c tiv e s D oak a ndWild e r w e reru nn ing pa ra lle l to me , in

a n atte mpt

to h e a d - - the y

were a little bit

ahe a d o f m e , ju st f

urthe r u p th e hil l. And they we re able to come in contact with the de fendant, initi ally . As they approa ched, the y

wer e also y elling, “ stop, polic e. ” Also, in like attire as my self. As they did that, at o n e point , he turne d to square of f, like to fac e them. And t h e r e w a s a

b r i e f s tru g g l e t h e r e

. T h a t ’ s - - a s t h e y w e r e s t i l l f

i g h t i n g i s w h e n I,

a c tua lly , g ot t o th e de fe nd a nt. He wa s st ill str ug g lin g wh e n h e wa s att e mpt ing to be subdued f

rom kicking and strug g ling. And a s this was g oi n g o n, we we re asking him what his name is and what he was doing ther e, i f h e l ived there . At that -- Q. Wou ld h e a ns we r tho se qu e sti on s? A. At that time, he r ef u s ed t o g ive his name. He was saying that he was visiti ng somebody
, but he wouldn’t say who it wa s nor did he know wh er e they

wer e at. He , also, said he didn’t h av e an y i d en tification on his person. At that time, it was a custodial ar rest for trespassing . And – TH E COUR T: He wa s tr e sp a ssi ng in the Pr oje c ts. I s th a t w hat, b as i ca l l y , y o u ’r e s ay i n g? THE WI TNESS: Yes, sir. Q. (B y

Gene ral Rohling) And he wouldn’ t give y ou hi s n ame. And he couldn’t produc e any

identification. A. Th a t’ s c or

re c t. Q. So h e wa s p la c e d u nd e r a rr e st? A. Ye s, he wa s. Q. And was he sear ched? A. Yes, sea

rche d incident to arr est reveal ed 6.1 grams of cra ck coc aine, I believe, in his left poc ket, which f ield t es t ed p o s i t i ve for

cocaine base . And he ha d o ne tho us a ndsixty

do lla rs ($ 1, 06 0. 00 ), in c a sh , inhis ri g ht p oc ke t. Q. Wer e y ou e ve r a

bleto d e te rm inewh o h e wa s?4

A. Yes. It took a wh i l e b ec au s e he r efuse d to cooper ate, but my self and anothe r o f

f ic e r h a d a p r io r in c id e n t in v o lv in g M r

. N ic h o ls o n

. A n d a s s o o n as he

re a lize d th a t I

re c og nize d h im, he re c og nize d th e bo th o f u s. An d w e we reableto deter m i ne his name w as James Davis Nicholson. And he, a lso, had outstanding

war rants at that time. O n c r o s s

- e xa mi n a ti o n , D e te c ti v e L o c k w o o d a d mi tt e d that h e d idn o t i n it ia ll y r e c o g n iz e De fe nd a nt, ha d n ot s e e n D e fe nd ant earl ier that ni g ht, a nddidno t ha ve a ny re po rt s o n D e fe nd a nt. He f urther te stified that Def

endant wa s not eng ag ed in any illega l conduct at the time he saw Def endant.

Up on c on sid e ratio n o f this pr oo f, t he tria l c ou rt de nie d D e fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss. I n its written order f

iled Dec ember

4, 2 0 03, the trial court summarized Detective L ockwood’ s te sti mon y a s f oll ow s: At app ro xima te ly

mid nig ht o n July

7, 20 03 , D e te c tiv e L ock woo d, a lon g wi th other Intellige nce D etec tives, was investig ating alleged g ang activity at the John He n ryHa l e p u b l i c h o u s i n g p ro j ec t s

. W h i l e c o n d u ct i n g s u rv e i l l an ce , a l ar ge g roup of individuals on the prope rty wer e see n eng ag ing in hand-to-hand drug tr a ns a c tio ns

. Detec tive L ockwood and other officers then approa ched the g roup f o r t he purpose of

inquiring as to whethe r they wer e on the Me tropolitan Deve lopment and Housing Ag ency

(MDHA) property

lawfully . Many

individuals in t he g roup, howeve r, fled a s Detec tive L ockwood and the offic ers ne ar ed the sc ene. De te c tiv e L oc kw oo d p urs ued on e of theind ivi du a ls, bu t w a s u ns uc c e ssf ul i n appre hending him. Detective L ockwood then r eturne d to the scene and noticed the Defen d an t walking away . Detec tive L ockwood c alled over to the individual to “hold u p

. ” T h e Defendant, howe ver, did not comply and beg an to run a way from the de tective, a s the other pe rsons had done

. A cha se ensue d, which re sulted in the Defe ndant being stopped. (empha sis added). Thecourt c oncluded:

Th e Cou rt

is o f the op ini on that D e te c tiv e L oc kw oo d’ s in iti a l atte mpt to speak w ith the Def

en d ant di d not constitute a seizure and w as supported by the events that ha d transpire d and the c ircumstance s surrounding those ev en t s

. The Court note s that the detec tive was in the are a of the MDHA proper t yfo r t he purpose of

investigating g ang activity

. De t ec t i v e L ockwood testified that he wi tne sse d a

larg e g ro up of

ind ivi du a ls t og e the r o n th e proper ty a t a bo ut m idn ig ht, and that some of the m were eng ag ing in hand-to-hand d rug transac tions. Many of theind ivi du a ls f

led th e scene w he n th e de te c tiv e app ro a c he d to sp e ak w iththe m. Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, theDe fe nd a nt w a s o bs erv e d at th e sc e ne , a ndbe g a n to wa lk

aw ay as t h e detec tive approa ched. T he Court is of the opinion that the above fac ts and circ umstances pr ovided Dete cti v e L o ckwood with a ba sis to approac h the Defe n d a n t f

o r th e p u rp o s e o f

q u e s ti o n in g h im

a s to w h y

h e w a s o n th e M D HA p r o p e rt y. Th e Cou rt

is a lso of

theop ini on that th e abo ve fa c ts andc ir c ums ta nc e s,
a lon g wi th the De fe nd a nt’ s fl eei ng, pro vid e d D e te c tiv e L oc kw oo d w itha ba sis to pursue and appre hend the De fendant.5

(citations omitted) (empha sis added).
Following t h e denia l of his motion t o suppress, De fendant pleaded g uiltyto possession of over .5 g rams of c o ca i n e for resale but r eserved the right to appe al a c ertified que stion of law challeng ing the constitutionalit y of the seizure le ading to his arre st. The other c ounts were dismiss ed, and the trial court se ntence d Def endant to eig ht y ear s on probation.
On appe al, the Court of Criminal Appea ls re v er s ed t h e trial c ourt’s denia l of the motion to sup p r e s s

. T h e ma

jo r ity o f th e c o u rt c o n c lu d e d th a t D e f e n d a n t w a s s e iz e d w h e n o f f ic e r s beg an pursuing him after heturned a nd ran up o n being instructed to “hold up.” T he majority further conclude d that neither pr obabl e ca use nor r easona

ble suspicion supported the se izure. Di sse nti ng , th e thi rdjud g e of thepa ne l con clu ded that D e fe nd a nt’ s f lig ht, c ou ple d w ithhis prese nce in an are a known f or drug traff

icking , provided the of

fice rs with re as o n able suspicion to p ur su e a ndde ta in h im f or fu rthe r i nq uiry , a ndthat th e of fi c e rs the re a ft e r h a d p ro ba blec aus e to

arr e st h im f

or tr e sp a ssi ng . We g rante d th e State ’s app lic a tio n f or pe rm iss ionto a

pp e a l.

CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW

Up on e ntry

of his g uil ty

ple a , D e fe nd ant re se rv e d a c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of

la w p ur su a nt t o Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re37 (b )( 2) (I ), wh ic h s tate s: An appe al lies from a ny

order or judg men t in a criminal procee ding w here the law provi d es fo r such appeal, a nd from any judgme nt of conviction . . . [u] pon a plea of g u il ty

. . . if

. . . [t ]h e d e f e n d a n t

. . . e xp li c it ly r e s e r v e d w ith th e c o n s e n t of the state a ndof

thec ou rt

theri g ht t o a

pp e a l a c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of

la w th at is dispositi ve of thecase

. . . . I n this case, De fendant’s judgme nt of convi ct i o n ref ers to an a g ree d order

which contains the fo llo wi ng qu e sti onof

la w: whether the evidenc e seized fr om t he def endant in this case should have be en suppressed be cause it was seized pursuant to the war rantless a

rre st of the de fe nd a nt f

or wh ic h th e po lic e ha d n o p ro ba blec aus e in v iol a tio n o f the 4th Amend m en t t o the United States Constitut ion and Article One, Sec tion Seven of theTe nn e sse e Con sti tut iona s w e ll a s th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ’s deci si on in State of Tenne ssee v. Per ry Thomas Randolph, 74 S.W .3d 330 (Tenn. 2002)

. Th is s tate me nt c le arl y

ide nti fi e s “ thesc op e a ndlim its of thele g a l is su e res e rv e d. ” Te nn . R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i)( B) . The a g ree d order also ref lects the e x press c onsent of the tria l judge and the State to the question and a ll parties’ opinion that the question is disposit ive o f t he ca se. I d. at (b )( 2) (i )( C) , ( D) . We fi nd that th e c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of

la w i n th is c a se is d isp os iti ve a ndis properly befor e this Court. See State v. Preston, 759 S.W .2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988)

.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW

A trial court’s finding s of fa ct in a suppre ssion hearing will be upheld unless the evidence pr e po nd e rate s o the rw ise . St a te v. Od om, 92 8 S. W.2 d 1 8, 23 (T e nn . 1 99 6) . T he pr e va ili ng pa rty is entitled to the stronge st l egi t i m ate view of the e vidence adduce d at the suppre ssion hearing as well as a ll reasona

ble and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that e v i d en ce

. I d. TheT h e Fou r t h Amen dmen t i s a ppl i ca bl e t o t h e s t at es t h r ou g h t h e Fou r t ee n t h Amen dmen t

. M app v

. O h i o, 1
3 6 7 U

. S. 64 3
, 65 5 (19 6 1 ).

6 application of the law to the fa cts, h o we v er , i s a q uestion of law whic h this Court reviews de novo. State v. Yea

rg an, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

AN AL YSI S

The F ourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t ]h e ri ght of the people to be se cure in their persons, house s, paper s and ef fec ts, ag ainst unrea sonable sea rche s and seizures, shall not be violated. . . .” Simi larly , article I
, s ec t i o n 7 o f t h e Te nnessee 1 Co n s ti tu ti o n g u ar a n te e s “ [t ]h a t th e p e o p le s h a ll b e s e c u r e in th e ir p e r s o n s , h o u s e s , p ap ers a nd possessions, from unrea sonable sea rche s an d seizures. . . .” The se constitutional protections ar e implicated when a

police off

icer ’s intera ction with a citizen impermissibl y intrudes u pon the privac y or per sonal security

of the c itiz en. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W .3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000)

.
Pol ic e -c iti zenint e ra c tio ns areof thr e e dif fe re nt type s: 1 ) a

fu ll s c a le arr e st w hichmus t be supported by

probable cause ; 2) a brie f investig ato ry s t op which must be supported by

rea sonable suspicion; and 3) a brief police -citi z en enc ounter whic h require s no objective justification. I d. Whil e ar rests and inve stigatory

stops are s ei z ures implicating constitutional protec tion s , consensua l encounter s are not. “‘Only when [a police of

fice r], by means of phy s i ca l fo rce or show of authority , has in some way restrained the liberty

of a c itiz en may

we conclude that a “s ei z u re ” has occurr ed.’” I d. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).

Under both the fede ral a nd st at e constit utions, a warr antless seizure is presume d

unrea sonable, a nd evidenc e dis co v er ed as a r esult thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the seizure was c onducted pur suant to one of the na rro wly define d exceptions to the warr ant re quirement. Ye arg an, 958 S.W.2d at 6 29 (citing Coolidge v. N ew Hamps hir e , 4 03 U. S. 4 43 , 4 54 -5 5 ( 19 71 )) . T herefore , whe n a de fe nd a nt s e e ks to s up pr e ss evidenc e alleg edly

obtained as a

result of a n ill eg al seizure, the State be ars the bur den of pr oving that its warrantless ac t i o n s we re justi fied, i.e., a s a lawf ul investigatory

stop or under some othe r exception to the warr ant re quirement.

Dec isions bythe United States Supreme Court makeit clear th at “a s eizure does not

occur simplybeca

use a police office r appr oache s an individual and asks a few questions.” F lorida v. B os tic k, 50 1 U .S. 42 9, 43 4 ( 19 91 ). Th e ru le ha s b e e n e xpla ine d a s f oll ow s: [L ]aw e nf

or c e ment of

fi c e rs do no t vi olate theF ou rth A me nd me nt b y me re ly

app ro a c hin g a n in div idu a l onthestr e e t or i n ano ther pu bli c pla c e , b y

a sking him if he is willing to answ er some que stion s , by putting questions to him if the pe rson is wi lli ng to l ist e n, or by of fe ri ng in e vid e nc e in a

c ri min a l pr os e c uti on his voluntary answe rs t o s u ch q u est ions. Nor would the fa ct that the off icer identifies hims elf as a police of

fice r, without more, conve rt the enc ounter into a seizure requiring some level of obje ctive justification. T h e person a pproac hed, howe ver, need not answer any

question put to him ; indeed, he may decline to listen to the7

questions at all and may g o on his way . He may not be detaine d even momentarily

wit h o u t rea sonable, objec tive g rounds for doing so; and his refusa l to l ist e n o r ans we r d oe s n ot, wi tho ut m or e , f urnis h th os e g ro un ds

. Florida v. Roy er, 460 U .S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (c itations omi tted).

Under the Tenne ssee Constitution, a seiz ure implicating constitutional protections occ urs
on ly if , in vi e w o f a ll o f the c ir c ums ta nc e s su rr ou nd ing thee nc ou nte r, a re a so na blepe rs on wo uld have be lieved that he or she wa s not free to leave. D aniel, 12 S.W.3d at 425. Fac tors to be considere d when a

pply ing this totality

of the circumstances a naly sis include: 1) the time, place and purpose of the e ncounter ; 2) the word s u s ed by the offic er; 3) the office r’s tone of voice and g ener al demeanor; 4) the of fice r’s stateme nts to others who were pre sent during the enc ounter; 5) the threatening prese nce of sever al offic ers; 6) the display of a w eapon by

an off icer ; and 7) the p h y s i c a l t o u c h i n g o f t h e p e r s o n o f t h e c i t i z e n

. I d

. a t 4 2 5

- 2 6

. T h i s a n a l y s i s “ i s d e s ig ne d to assess the co er ci v e ef

fe ct of police conduct, take n as a w hole, rather than to foc us on particular details of that conduc t in isol ation.” I d. at 426 (quoti ng Michig an v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)) . We rec og nized in Daniel that an enc ounter ty pically become s a seizure if an off icer : (1) pursue s an individual who has attempted to terminate the contac t by departing; (2) continues to interrogate a pe rson who has c learly expressed a desire not to coope rate ; (3) re news interr og ation of a pe rson who has e arlier

re sponded fully

to police inquiries; (4) ve rbally order s a citizen to stop and

answe r questions; (5) re tains a citizen’s identification or othe r pr o p er t y ; (6) phy sically

restrains a citizen or block s the citizen’s path; (7) display s a we apon during the enc ounter. 12 S.W .3d at 426.

I n D a n i e l
, w e c o n c l u d e d t h a t a n o f f i c e r ’ s c o n d u c t i n m e r e l y ap p r o a c h i n g t h e d e f e n d a n tin thepa rking lot of a con ven ien c e sto re , in qu iring wh a t w a s g oin g on , a nda sking to s e e his ide nti f i c a t i o n d i d n o t a m o u n t t o a s e i z u r e

. 1 2 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 2 7

. T h e c o n s e n s u a l e n c o u n t e r be c a me
a se izur e , h ow e ve r, wh e n th e of fi c e r r e ta ine d th e de fe nd a nt’ s id enti fi c a tio n to ru n a wa rr a nts

c he c k. I d. We r e a so ne d th a t “ [w]itho ut h is i de nti fi c a tio n, [the de fe nd a nt] w a s e ff e cti ve ly immobil ized.” I d.
We subsequently

clarified the de finition of seizure in State v. Ran d o l p h
, 7 4 S .W.3d 330 (Tenn. 2002) . I n that case , a police of fice r re sponded to a po s s i b l e b u rglary in prog ress at an automobile parts store. A s the offic er dr ove towar d the location, he noti ce d the def endant riding

a bic y c le tow ardhim . A s th e de fe nd a nt n e are d h im, theof fi c e r a c tiv a te d th e blu e lig hts on his patrol ca r, rolled down his window, and order ed the de fendant to s t o p

. P as sing w ithin three fe et of th e patr ol c ar, thede fe nd a nt l oo ke d at th e of fi c e r b ut k e pt ridi ng . Wh e n th e of fi c e r a g a in asked the defe ndant to stop, the defe ndant incre ased his spee d.
At that point, the office r turned his c ar a round and p ursued the de fendant, appre hending him a short time therea fter. T he o ff i cer subsequently

testified that he wa s not looking for any one while driving t o ward the burg lary location, that there was nothing to alert him that the def endant was involved in the burg lary , and that he stoppe d the def endant on a

“hunch.” I d. at 333.A c lo se re a d ing o f t h e m a jo rity o p inio n issu e d b y the C o u rt o f C rim ina l A p p e a ls re v e a ls tha t t h e m a jo rity 2
d id no t co n c lud e tha t t h e se iz u re o c c u rr e d up o n the o ff ic e r’s u tter ing the w o rd s, “h o ld up ,” b u t up o n the o ff ic e r’s p u rs u it o f D e fen d a n t afte r D e fen d a n t t u rn e d a n d ra n

. 8 Ba sed on these f

acts, we held that “the def en d an t wa s seized when the of fice r ac tivated the blue lig hts on his patrol car, or dere d the def endant to stop, and pur s u ed h i m fo r seve ral blocks.” I d. at 338. We rea soned t h at , al though the office r “did not initially draw a we apon or make phy s i ca l contact,” he seized the de fendant when he “ made a show of authority

by activating the blue lig hts on his patrol car and instructing [the def endant] to stop.” I d.

I n Randolph, 74 S.W .3d at 337, we declined to adopt the holding of California v. H odari D., 499 U.S. 6 2 1 ( 1 9 9 1 )

. I n th e H o d ar i D

. c a s e , a ma jo r ity o f th e U n it e d St a te s Su p r e meCourt limit ed its earlier d ec i s i on in United States v. Mendenha ll, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), and conclude d that a per son is seiz ed for purposes of the Four

th Amendment only

when an office r
us e s p hy si cal forc e to d e ta in a pe rs on or

wh e n a pe rs on su bmi ts o r yie lds to a sh ow of auth ority by theof fi c e r. 49 9 U .S. a t 62 7- 29 . U nd e r the stand ard in Hod ari D. , if a pe rs on fl e e s, he is seized only

when he i s ca u gh t

. I d. at 629. We held in Randolph that article I , section 7 of the Tenne ssee Constitution, as int erpr eted by this Court i n Da n i el as well as other seizure ca ses decide d by

this Court after 1991, c learly require d that we r ejec t the “nar row, oft- criticized standard in Hoda

ri D.” 74 S.W.3d at 33 7

. W e re jected the Hodari D. holding in part on finding its analy sis “flawe d for pr actica l rea sons and . . . subject t o p o t en tial abuse by office rs who pursue a subject without rea sonable suspicion a n d use a f light or r efusa l to submi t to authority as
rea son to execu tea n arr e s t o r s e ar c h

. ” I d

. a t 3 3 6

. T h e r e f o r e , w h e th e r

a p e r s o n h a s b e en phy sically

restrained or ha s stopped or yielded to a show of authority

by the pol ice is not dispositi ve of w hether

there has bee n a seizure unde r the Te nnessee Constit ution. I d

. at 337. I nstead, we apply

the well-e stablished totalityof the c ircumstance s analy sis and the s t an d ar d of whether a re asonable person would ha ve believe d that he or she was not fr ee to lea ve. I d.

The State c ontends t h at Randolph does not support the conc lusion of the Court of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls i n th is c a se that D e fendan t wa s se ize d w he n D e te c tiv e L oc kw oo d to ld h im t o “hold up.” We ag ree that a police of fice r who simply

instructs a pede strian to “hold up” doe s 2

no t, w ith ou t mo re , c omm it a se izur e of

that pe de strian

. Th e ins truc tio n “ ho ld u p” is a re qu e st t o stop. By itself, a re quest to stop, even whe n issued by a uni fo rm ed p o l i ce office r, would not communicate to a

rea sonable pe rson th at h e o r s h e was not fr ee to simply ignor e the of

fice r’s reque st and kee p walking

.
Othe r s tate s th a t, l ikeTe nn e sse e , h a ve re je c te d th e Ho da

ri D. st and ardon state constituti o n al gro u nds, have c oncluded that similar enc ounters do not constitute a seizure. See
, e.g ., Com monwealth v. Stoute, 665 N.E.2d 93, 98 (Ma ss. 1996) (ac knowledg ing no se izure

occur re d wh en o ff

icer initiallyasked de fendant to “hold up a minute”); People v. B ora, 634 N. E. 2 d 1 6 8
, 1 7 0

- 7 1 ( N

. Y

. 1 9 9 4 ) ( h o l d i n g n o s e i z u r e o c c u rr e d w h e n , a f t e r d e f e n d a n tb e g a n to walk aw ay , office r direc ted him to “stop”). While the lang uag e and c onduct expressed b ythe police in initiallyapproa ching a citizen could be so for cef ul and intimidating that , standing

a lon e , it e ff e c tuate s a se izur e , th e simplestate me nt “ ho ld u p” do e s n ot rise to that le ve l.I nas much as D ef endan t f l ed, he was not s ei zed for pur po s es of t he Fourt h Amendm ent un t i l he was 3 ph y s i ca l l y r es t r ai n ed by t h e of f i ce r s

. Se e H odar i D

. , 499 U

. S. a t 629. T h is e x a m ina tio n w ill a lso inc lud e the e v id e n c e intro d u c e d a t t ria l, if the a p p e a l i s n o t he a rd p rio r to trial. 4
Stat e v. H enni ng, 97 5 S.W

. 2 d 29 0
, 29 9 (T enn. 19 9 8 ).
9 We t u r n n o w t o t h e e v e n t s f o l l o w i n g D e t e c t i v e L o c k w o o d ’ s d i r e c t i v e

. U p o n b e i n g t o ld to “hold up,” De fendant turned and r an aw ay fro m t h e detec tive. Detec tive L ockwood i m m ed i ately

g ave c hase, simultaneously issuing the or der, “ stop, police.” Two othe r off icer s joined in the pursuit. The State does no t d i s p u t e that Def endant wa s seized for purpose s of article I
, s ection 7 of the Tenne ssee Constitution when the office rs pursued him y elling “ stop, po lic e .” We mus t, the re fo re , d ete rm ine w he the r this se izur e wa s su pp orte d b y re a so na ble 3 suspicion so as to justi fy

an investig atory

stop.

An offic er c onducting an investig atory stop “must be able to point to specific and

art ic ula blefa c ts w hic h, take n to g e the r w ithra tio na l in fe re nces f

ro m th os e fa c ts, re a so na bly warrant [the] i ntrusion.” Ter ry , 392 U.S. at 21. Whether re asonablesuspicion for an investigatory

stop ex ists mu s t b e ev aluated unde r the totality of the c ircumstance s known to the police at the time of

the stop. See State v. B inette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000).
We take this opportunity to str ess t o every

court c onsidering a motion to suppress the vital importance of

a close and critical examination of the actua l proof adduc ed at the suppress io n h e ar in g

. I n th is c a s e , th e tria l c o u rt’ s o r d e r d e n y in g th e mo ti o n a n d b o tho p inions 4 from the intermediate c ourt re fe r t o Detective L ockwood’ s having observe d hand-to-hand drug transac tions im mediately befor e see ing D efe ndant appro ac h i ng the sce ne. De tective L ockwood testified that h e and his fellow de tectives “ observe d a lar g e cr owd of individuals” and “ witnessed variou s h a n d

- to

- h a n d tr a n s a c ti o n s a mo n g s t th e g r o u p

. ” D e te c ti v e L o c k w o o d n e v e r d e s c r ib ed the se tr a ns a c tio ns a s in vo lvi ng dr ug s, ho we ve r. I nd eed, hete sti fi e d th a t, a ft e r w itn e ssi ng the se tr a n s a c t i o n s , “ t h e d e c i s i o n w a s m a d e t o s p e ak w i t h s e v e r a l o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s , i n a n a tte mptto g ather gang intelligenc e.” ( emphasis adde d). Whatever the transa ctions were , Detec tive L ockwood and his colleag ues appa rently decide d that they

wer e conne cted to some form of g ang activity rathe r than spec ifically

to drug transac tions

. As t h i s C o urt is unfortunately all too awar e, gan g ac t i v i t y

i s n o tl i m i t ed t o i l l ega l d ru g tra ff i ck i n g.
Although D etec tive L ockwood ne ver te stified as to t h e nature of these hand-to-hand tr a ns a c tio ns , th e tria l c ou rt ma de a sp e c if ic fi nd ing in i ts o rd e r d e nying De fe nd ant ’s mo ti on to suppress that “w hile [t he off icer s were ] conducting su rv ei l l an ce, a larg e g roup of individuals on the prope rty

wer e see n eng ag ing in hand-to-hand drug tr a ns a c tio ns .” (e mph asis a dd e d) . L a te r i n its order the tria l court stated, “ Detective L ockwood testified that he witnessed a larg e g roup of ind ivi du a ls t og e the r o n th e pr op e rty a t a bo ut m idn ig ht, a ndthat so me of t hem we ree ng a g ing in hand-to-hand drug tra n s ac t i o n s

. ” ( em p h a s i s a d d e d ). T h e t ri al co u rtre l i ed o n t h es e “ d ru g” tr a ns a c tio ns a s p art

of thec ir c ums ta nc es whi ch “pr ov ide d D e te c tiv e L oc kw oo d w itha ba sis to pursue and appre hend the De fendant,” there by rende ring the seizure constitutionally valid.

B oththema

jority a ndthedis se nti ng op ini on s f ro m th e Cou rt of Cr im in al A pp e a ls r e c ite and re ly upon the trial court’s description of the activity observe d by

the detec tives as “hand-to-10

ha nddr ug tr ans act io ns.” Th e dis se nt, pa rt ic ula rl y , u til ize d th is f

ind ing by thetria l c ou rt

in op in in g th a t D e f

e n d a n t’ s s e iz u r e p a s s e d c o n s ti tu ti o n a l mu s te r

. T h e d is s e n ti n g me mb e r of the C o u rtof Criminal Appea ls additionallychar acte rized the are a whe re the encounte r occ urre d as “known fo r drug tra fficking .” This conc lusion is l ikewise unsupporte d by the proof a dduced at the suppression hea

ring . Ne verthe less, the dissent conclude d: “the enc ounter oc curr ed late at night in an ar ea k n o wn for drug traff icking . Only

moments earlier , Detec tive L ockwood . . . ha d witnessed a numbe r of hand-to-hand dr ug transac tions. . . . It is myopinion that when the defe ndant ra n, the Dete ctive had r easona ble suspicion to pursue and f urther inve stigate.”

Be cause t h e d etermination of the constitutionalit y of a se izure is so fact-intensive, w e cannot ove rstate the importa nce of an ac cu rate assessment of the proof a s drawn f rom the ac tual

e vid e nc e a dd uc e d at th e tria l c ou rt le vel. Th e pro of in th is c a se simply do e s n ot s up po rt

a finding that the detec tives observe d drug transac tions being c o n d u ct ed, or that the are a wa s known for dr

ug traff icking . We must, t here fore , assess De tective L ockwood’ s conduct in lig ht

o f h i s a c t u a l t e s t i m o n y.

As far as the re cord indicat es , Detec tive L ockwood se ized Defe ndant on the basis of three observe d fac ts: 1) Defe ndant’s proximi ty to an ar ea be ing inve stigated for g ang activity ; 2) De fe nd a nt’ s r e fu sa l to “ ho ld u p” wh e n to ld t o d o s o; and3) De fe nd a nt’ s r api d fl ight f ro m hi s
e nc ou nte r w ithDe te c tiv e L oc kw oo d. Withre sp e c t to thefi rst of the se ob se rv e d f

a c ts, we ho ld that a n in div idu a l’ s p ro ximity to an a re a be ing inv e sti g a te d f

or g ang act iv it y

is n ot s uf

fi c ie nt, without more, to justifyan investig atory stop. See Br own v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (holding that defe ndant’s pres en ce i n neig hborhood fr equente d by drug users wa s not, in and of itself, a b as is for conc luding he was e ng ag ed in criminal conduct); State v. L awson, 929 S.W.2d 406, 408-09 (Te nn. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 6 ) (holding that one’s pr esenc e in a hig h crime a rea late at night, without more, w ill not j ustify an investigatory

stop). And, as pre viouslyindicated, an individual’s refusal t o ac cedeto a police of fice r’s re quest to stop and chat will not provide g rou n d s for a

constitutionallyvalid seizure. Thus, we a re le ft with the signif

icanc e of Def endant’ s flight f

rom Dete ctive L ockwood.
Rely ing on Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), the State a rgu es t hat Def

endant’ s flig ht is a pertinent fa ctor in dete rmining r easona ble suspicion. I n W ardlow, the defe ndant fled upon seeing a vehicle containing uniformed police office rs patrolling an ar ea know n for he avy
na rc oti c s tr a ff

ic king. Th e of

fi c e rs c ha se d a ndapp re he nd e d th e de fe nd a nt w ho wa s th e n f ou ndto be in i ll e g a l p o s s e s s io n o f a w e ap o n

. I n u p h o ld in g th e d e f e n d a n t’ s s e iz u r e , th e U n it e d St a te s Supreme Court ac knowledg ed that an individual’s pr esenc e in an a rea of expected c riminal activity , without more, is not enoug h to support a re asonable , particula rized suspicion that the person is committing a

crime. I d

. at 1 24. The Court noted, howe ver, that a location’s char acte ristics are rele vant in determining whe ther the c ircumstance s are sufficie ntly suspicious to warr ant furthe r investig ation, id., and t h at nervous, evasive be havior is also a pe rtinent fac tor in d e te rm ini ng re a so na

blesu sp ic ion . I d. Th e Cou rt e mph a size d th a t “ [h]eadl on g f lig ht – wher ever it occurs – is the c onsum m ate a ct of e vasion: I t is not necessarily indicative of wrong doing, but it is certainly sug g estive of suc h.” I d. Ba sed on the de fe ndant’s unprovoke d flig ht in a high c rime ar ea, th e C o u rt concluded that the offic er w as justified in suspecting that the def endant w as i nvolved in criminal ac tivityand, ther efor e, in investig ating further . I d. at11

125.
We ag ree with the United St at es Supreme Court that a location’s cha

rac teristics may

be rele vant to amassing rea s o n ab l e suspicion. We also ag ree that “nervous, evasive be havior” by someone may

contribute to the c onclusion that fu rt h er inve stigation is warra nted. We further ag ree that “hea dlong f

light” is e vasive be havior in th e extreme. We dec line to conclude, howeve r , th a t f

li g h t f r o m a p o li c e o f

f ic e r ’ s d e man d to “ h o ld u p ” is “ c e rtain ly s u g g e s ti v e” of

wr o n gd o i ng . Rather, wequote with approva l from the majority decision by

the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case: wh ile we do no t w ishto e nc ou ra g e fl ig ht f ro m of fi c e rs .

. . , we re a lize fr om a prac tical standpoint that f light does not a lway s amount to r easona ble s uspicion. I n fa ct , innocent re asons for f light abound in hig h crime a rea s, including: fe ar of retrib u ti o n f

o r s p e ak in g to o f

f ic e r s , u n w il li n g n e s s to a

p p e ar a s w it n e s s e s , a n d f

e ar
o f b e i n g w r o n g f

u l l y ap p r e h e n d e d a s a

g u i l t y p art y. We are particula

rly mindful of the potential for “re tribution for speaking to office rs” in an a rea b e i n g i n v e s t i g a t e d f

o r g a n g a c t i v i t y.

Detec tive L ockwood did not tes t i fy ab o ut the location’s cha rac teristics in this case, other than that it was a public housing are a being investigated for g ang activity . Detec tive L ockwood did not testif

y t h at h e wi tnessed criminal activity immediately

prior to see ing D efe ndant, or that De fe nd a nt w a s b e ha vin g in s omema nn e r i nd ic ativ e of c ri min a l c on du c t. D e fe nd a nt simp ly ha pp e ne d o n th e sc e ne a ft e r D e te c tiv e L oc kw oo d h a d u ns uc c e ssf ull y c ha se d o the r p e rs on s. When Detec tive L ockwood told Def endant to “hold u p , ” De fe ndant turned and ran. A t that p o i n t , D e t e c t i v e L o c k w o o d g a v e c h a s e a n d o r d e r e d
, “ s t o p p o l i c e , ” t h e r e b y s e i z i n g De fe nd a nt. B a se d o n th e pr oo f i n th e re c or d b e fo reus , D e te c tiv e L oc kw oo d s imp ly didno t ha ve a t th a t ti me sp e c if ic a ndart ic ula

blefa c ts s uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a n in fe re nc e of

c ri minali ty and to p ro vid e him with rea sonable suspicion to seize Def endant. The State having fa i l ed t o ca rry its burden of proving that Detective L ockwood’ s seizure of De fendant upon his flight was supported by

rea sonable suspicion, we are constraine d to declar e the se izure invalid.

CO NC LU SION

We h oldthat, b a se d o n th e tot a lit y of thec ir c ums ta nc e s in dic a te d inthere c or d b e fo reus , Det e c ti v e L o c k w o o d ’ s s e iz u r e o f D e f e n d a n t w a s u n r e a s o n ab le u n d e r arti c le I
, s e c ti o n 7 of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion . A c c or din g ly , th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

de nie d D e fe nda nt’ s mo tio n to suppress. We there fore aff irm the judg ment of the Court of Criminal Appea ls. Defe ndant’s conviction is vacated and the c harg es ag ainst him are dismissed.

It appea ring that Def

endant, James D. Ni ch o l s on, is indigent, c osts of this appeal ar e taxed to the St ate of

Tenne ssee.

___________________________________ CO RN ELI A A . CLAR K, JUSTI CE