United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 21-1888

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Marcus Alan Jones

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville

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Submitted: January 11, 2022

Filed: February 18, 2022 

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Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Marcus Jones was a courier for a drug-trafficking operation. Jones 

transported large amounts of methamphetamine from California to Arkansas to fill 

the dealer’s orders and large amounts of money back to California to the supplier. 

In January and February of 2019, Jones made at least seven or eight round trips 

transporting drugs and money. He purchased most of the airline tickets himself. 

During one of those trips, Jones was questioned by police at the airport because he 
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was carrying $21,000. In May 2019, Jones was arrested at a bus stop in New Mexico 

with 4.395 kilograms of methamphetamine duct-taped to his body. 

After Jones waived his right to indictment, the Government filed an 

information charging him with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. See 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Jones pleaded guilty. Jones requested a minor-role 

adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), but the district court1 denied his request. It 

considered the unobjected-to facts in the presentence investigation report, explicitly 

compared Jones’s role to that of another courier, noted the § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C) 

factors, and ultimately concluded that he did not meet his burden to show “that he 

was less culpable than the average participant.” Jones appeals. 

We review a district court’s determination that the defendant is not entitled to 

a minor-role reduction under § 3B1.2(b) for clear error. United States v. RamirezMaldonado, 928 F.3d 702, 708 (8th Cir. 2019). The defendant bears “the burden of 

establishing [his] entitlement to a minor-role reduction.” United States v. Durham, 

836 F.3d 903, 911 (8th Cir. 2016). “The Guidelines direct district courts to decrease 

the offense level by two levels ‘[i]f the defendant was a minor participant in any 

criminal activity.’” Ramirez-Maldonado, 928 F.3d at 708 (quoting § 3B1.2(b)). In 

determining whether to apply the reduction, “[t]he district court should consider . . . 

the defendant’s knowledge, planning, authority, responsibility, and benefit from the 

illegal scheme.” United States v. Kearby, 943 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 2019); see

§ 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C); United States v. Waddell, 831 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 2016). 

“The fact that a defendant performs an essential or indispensable role in the criminal 

activity is not determinative.” § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C). The reduction applies to “a 

defendant who plays a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially 

less culpable than the average participant in the criminal activity,” § 3B1.2 cmt. 

n.3(A), even if his “role could not be described as minimal,” § 3B1.2 cmt. n.5.

1

The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Arkansas.
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Jones argues that the district court clearly erred in denying the minor-role 

reduction because the guideline requires the district court to determine whether 

Jones was “substantially less culpable than the average participant in the criminal 

activity,” whereas he argues that the district court considered only the relative 

culpability of Jones and another courier. See § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A) (emphasis added). 

As Jones notes, there were participants in the conspiracy who were not couriers. 

Jones also argues that the denial was clearly erroneous because the district court 

failed to address the factors in § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C). We disagree.

We have previously held that it was not clear error to deny a minor-role 

reduction to a defendant who was involved in a conspiracy “for at least three 

months” and delivered drugs “on at least one if not two occasions.” RamirezMaldonado, 928 F.3d at 708. We have also explained that “merely showing the 

defendant was less culpable than other participants is not enough to entitle the 

defendant to the adjustment if the defendant was deeply involved in the offense.” 

United States v. Cubillos, 474 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also United States v. Deans, 590 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir. 2010); 

United States v. Lopez-Vargas, 457 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 2006). Jones argues that 

the 2015 amendment to § 3B1.2 abrogated Cubillos, Deans, and Lopez-Vargas by 

clarifying that a defendant may receive a minor-role adjustment if he “is 

substantially less culpable than the average participant in the criminal activity,” even 

if he “performs an essential or indispensable role in the criminal activity.” See

U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 794 (effective Nov. 1, 2015). But the reasoning 

in Cubillos, Deans, and Lopez-Vargas does not contradict the amended guideline. 

Someone who is “less culpable” but still “deeply involved,” Cubillos, 474 F.3d at 

1120, is not “substantially less culpable than the average participant in the criminal 

activity,” see § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A) (emphasis added), and just because someone’s 

role is essential does not mean that he is “deeply involved.” See United States v. 

Hernandez Lopez, --- F.4th ---, No. 20-3468, slip op. at 4 (8th Cir. Jan. 31, 2022) 

(reiterating after the 2015 amendment that a defendant “less culpable” than his coconspirators is not entitled to a minor-role reduction if he was nonetheless “deeply 
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involved in the offense”); United States v. Bandstra, 999 F.3d 1099, 1102 (8th Cir. 

2021) (same). 

Jones’s role in the conspiracy was to transport drugs and money between the 

methamphetamine supplier in California and at least one dealer in Arkansas. He 

also had contact with another dealer in Arkansas who received and distributed 

methamphetamine that came from California. Jones was involved in the conspiracy 

for at least five months, making at least seven or eight round trips in January and 

February 2019. Jones claims he was paid only $200 for each trip, which would 

suggest that he received little benefit for his part in the conspiracy. See Kearby, 943 

F.3d at 977-78; § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C). Jones purchased most of his airline tickets 

himself, and he transported $21,000 during one of the trips. In the days leading up 

to Jones’s arrest, he made or received fifty-six phone calls and text messages with 

the supplier. When Jones was arrested in May 2019, he had 4.395 kilograms of 

methamphetamine duct-taped to his body. Compared to two other couriers who 

were involved in the conspiracy, Jones was the only one caught with both money 

and drugs, see Hernandez Lopez, slip op. at 5, he made more trips between California 

and Northwest Arkansas or Tulsa than they did, and he was caught with more than 

twice as many drugs as the other courier who was caught with drugs. 

From these facts, it was not clear error for the district court to find that Jones 

was not entitled to a minor-role reduction. Although the district court explicitly 

compared Jones’s culpability only to another courier and not to the supplier and 

dealers, and it did not discuss every § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C) factor at length, it did not 

need to make extensive findings. See United States v. Nkome, 987 F.3d 1262, 1274 

(10th Cir. 2021). And the district court correctly stated that application of the minorrole reduction “comes down to whether . . . Jones [was] an average participant when 

we compare the . . . relative culpability of all of the other defendants,” not just other 

couriers. Considering “the totality of the circumstances,” see § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C),

it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude that Jones was not 

substantially “less culpable than the average participant” and to deny the minor-role 
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reduction. See § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A); Ramirez-Maldonado, 928 F.3d at 708; Cubillos, 

474 F.3d at 1120.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Jones’s sentence.

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