[Cite as State v. Jacks, 2022-Ohio-4374.]

COURT OF APPEALS

MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO

Plaintiff-Appellee

-vsJORDAN JACKS

Defendant-Appellant

JUDGES:

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.

: Hon. John W. Wise, J

:

:

: Case No. CT2022-0013

:

:

: OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Muskingum 

County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

CR2021-0424

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 7, 2022

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

RONALD L. WELCH CHRIS BRIGDON

Prosecuting Attorney 8138 Somerset Road

BY: TAYLOR P. BENNINGTON Thornville, OH 43076

Assistant Prosecutor

27 North Fifth Street, Box 189

Zanesville, OH 43702
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 2

Gwin, P.J.,

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jordan Jacks [“Jacks”] appeals his convictions and 

sentences after a jury trial in the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} The Muskingum County Grand Jury returned an Indictment charging Jacks 

with one count of Domestic Violence, a misdemeanor of the first degree in violation of 

R.C. 2919.24(A), one count of Abduction, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 

2905.02(A)(2), four counts of Kidnapping, felonies of the first degree in violation of R.C. 

2905.01(A)(3), and one count of Felonious Assault, a felony of the second degree in 

violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). The charges were the result of a domestic dispute 

occurring on August 8, 2021.

{¶3} On November 30, 2021, Jacks filed a Motion to Suppress based on a 

violation of his right against self-incrimination. Specifically Jacks argued that he was “in 

custody” when he was questioned by the responding sheriff’s deputy. Jack’s further 

argued that because the deputy failed to read Jacks his rights pursuant to Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966), all of Jack’s 

statements should be suppressed.

{¶4} The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Jack’s motion on 

December 14, 2021. 

The Suppression Hearing

{¶5} Sergeant Wade Kanavel of the Muskingum County Sherriff’s Office testified 

that he was dispatched to a domestic call during the night or early morning hours of 

August 8, 2021. Supp. T. at 6. Deputy Finley arrived a short time later. Id. at 7. After 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 3

observing the couple through a window engaged in a verbal argument, Sergeant Kanavel 

knocked on the door. Sergeant Kanavel shone his flashlight upon himself so the 

occupants would know he was a law enforcement officer. Jacks answered the door. 

Sergeant Kanavel testified that he asked Jacks what was going on and if he would come 

outside to talk to the deputy. Id. at 7. Deputy Finley went inside the residence to speak 

with Jack’s girlfriend. Supp. T. at 8. 

{¶6} Jacks was sitting on the top step of the front porch of the residence. Id. at 

9. Sergeant Kanavel was at the bottom of the steps. Jacks denied doing anything 

physical to his girlfriend. Id. at 8. Jacks never told the Sergeant that he does not wish to 

answer questions, or that he wanted to leave. Sergeant Kanavel testified that he did not 

tell Jacks that he was forbidden from leaving at any time. Id. at 10.

{¶7} Deputy Finley exited the residence and he and Sergeant Kanavel walked 

away from the home toward the street where the police cruiser was parked to confer. Id. 

at 9. After conferring, Sergeant Kanavel again spoke to Jacks to ask him about the 

statements that the girlfriend made to Deputy Finley. Id. at 10. Deputy Finley went back 

inside the residence to speak again with the girlfriend. Id. at 11. 

{¶8} When Deputy Finley exited the residence, he and Sergeant Kanavel again 

walked toward the street to confer. Supp. T. at 11. At this point the decision was made 

to place Jacks under arrest. Jacks was handcuffed and secured in Deputy Finley’s patrol 

car. Id. At no time was Jacks advised of his Miranda rights. Id. 

{¶9} Jacks testified he was ordered to come outside and sit down by Sergeant 

Kanavel. Supp. T. at 29. At one point, Jacks stood up to go and get a cigarette and 

Sergeant Kanavel told him to sit back down. Id. at 33-34. However, Jacks was able to 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 4

walk away to retrieve a cigarette, return to his seat on the steps of the porch, and to 

smoke the cigarette while talking to Sergeant Kanavel. Id. at 34. Jacks testified that he 

was physically intimidated by Sergeant Kanavel, especially when he was told to sit back 

down. Supp. T. at 30. Jacks further testified that he felt he was required to answer the 

Sergeant’s questions. Id. Jacks claimed, “He kept pressing more information from me, 

and I wasn’t wanting to give any more information or wanting to talk anymore, but he just 

kept asking and kept asking.” Id. Jacks testified that Sergeant Kanavel and Deputy Finley 

were 30 feet away when he was told to stay there while they were conferring near the 

police cruiser. Id. at 38. 

{¶10} By Judgment Entry filed December 14, 2021, the trial court overruled Jacks’ 

motion to suppress. 

{¶11} A jury trial was commenced on December 14, 2021 and concluded the 

following day. The jury found Jacks guilty of domestic violence, abduction and felonious 

assault. The jury found Jacks not guilty of four counts of kidnapping. Sentencing was 

deferred pending a Pre-sentence investigation report.

{¶12} A sentencing hearing took place on February 7, 2022. The trial court 

sentenced Jacks to 180 days of jail on the conviction for domestic violence, 30 months 

incarceration on the conviction for abduction and an indefinite term of five years to 7 1⁄2 

years on the felonious assault conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served 

concurrently.

Assignment of Error

{¶13} Jacks raises one Assignment of Error,
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 5

{¶14} “I. THE DETENTION OF THE APPELLANT, BY DEPUTY KANAVEL, WAS 

CUSTODIAL AND THEREFORE THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION WOULD APPLY. SINCE NO MIRANDA WARNING WAS GIVEN, THE 

TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, BASED 

ON THE CUSTODIAL DETENTION, WAS IN ERROR.”

Law and Analysis

{¶15} In his sole Assignment of Error, Jacks argues that Sergeant Kanavel 

subjected him to improper custodial interrogation without advising him of his Miranda

rights. Jacks further contends that the trial court’s comparison of the questioning in this 

case as similar to a traffic stop was error.1

Standard of Appellate Review

{¶16} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law 

and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 

71, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of 

fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness 

credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308,314, 1995-Ohio-243, 652 N.E.2d 988; 

State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing 

court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists 

to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long, 127 Ohio 

App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1(4th Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 

675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist. 1996). However, once this Court has accepted those facts as 

1 Jacks does not raise any assignment of error relating to his jury trial. Jacks confines his 

arguments to the trial court’s ruling upon his motion to suppress. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 6

true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the 

applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio 

App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539(4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu, 534 

U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740(2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 

116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911(1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial 

court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review Ornelas, supra. 

Moreover, due weight should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident 

judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663.

{¶17} “[T]he weights of the evidence and credibility of witnesses are primarily for 

the trier of the facts. * * * This principle is applicable to suppression hearings as well as 

trials.” State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 1 OBR 57, 437 N.E.2d 583(1982). Accord 

State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212(1967), paragraph 

one of the syllabus; State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972(1992).

Issue for appellate review: Whether Jacks was subjected to custodial 

interrogation

Miranda v. Arizona.

{¶18} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that 

“‘[n]o person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,’ 

and that ‘the accused shall * * * have the Assistance of Counsel.’” (Ellipses sic.) Miranda 

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Accord, State v. 

Barker, 149 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2708, 73 N.E.3d 365, ¶21. The inherently coercive 

nature of custodial interrogation heightens the risk that a suspect will be denied the Fifth 

Amendment privilege not to be compelled to incriminate himself because custodial 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 7

interrogation can “‘undermine the individual’s will to resist and * * * compel him to speak 

where he would not otherwise do so freely.’” (Ellipsis sic.) J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 

U.S. 261, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2401, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011), quoting Miranda at 467, 86 

S.Ct. 1602; Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 

405 (2000). 

{¶19} In light of the inherent coercion involved in custodial interrogation, Miranda 

established “a set of prophylactic measures” to safeguard the constitutional privilege 

against self-incrimination. Id. In broad terms, Miranda held that the state may not use a 

defendant’s statements from custodial interrogation “unless it demonstrates the use of 

procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 

Miranda at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Prior to questioning, the police must warn the suspect 

“that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 

evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either 

retained or appointed.” Id. The Supreme Court recognized the importance of a suspect’s 

“real understanding” of his rights and his intelligent decision whether to exercise them. 

Id. at 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602; State v. Barker, 149 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2708, 73 N.E.3d 

365, ¶22. 

{¶20} Miranda conditioned the admissibility at trial of any custodial confession on 

warning a suspect of his rights: failure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver 

of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements 

obtained. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643(2004).

Custody under Miranda.

{¶21} The United States Supreme Court has explained, 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 8

As used in our Miranda case law, “custody” is a term of art that 

specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious 

danger of coercion. In determining whether a person is in custody in this 

sense, the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of “the objective 

circumstances of the interrogation,” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 

322–323, 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam), a 

“reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to 

terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 

99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). And in order to determine 

how a suspect would have “gauge[d]” his “freedom of movement,” courts 

must examine “all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” 

Stansbury, supra, at 322, 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Relevant factors include the location of the questioning, see 

Shatzer, supra, at –––– – ––––, 130 S.Ct., at 1223–1226, its duration, see 

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437–438, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 

317 (1984), statements made during the interview, see Mathiason, supra, 

at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665, 124 S.Ct. 

2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004); Stansbury, supra, at 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 

the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, see 

New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 

(1984), and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning, see 

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122–1123, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 

L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam).
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 9

Determining whether an individual's freedom of movement was 

curtailed, however, is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last. Not 

all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of 

Miranda. We have “decline[d] to accord talismanic power” to the freedomof-movement inquiry, Berkemer, supra, at 437, 104 S.Ct. 3138, and have 

instead asked the additional question whether the relevant environment 

presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station 

house questioning at issue in Miranda. “Our cases make clear ... that the 

freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient 

condition for Miranda custody.” Shatzer, 559 U.S., at ––––, 130 S.Ct. at 

1224.

Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508–09, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012). 

However, the test involves no consideration of the particular suspect's “actual mindset.” 

Yarborough v. California, 541 U.S. 652, 667, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938(1994). 

Accord, State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 153, 1998-Ohio-370, 694 N.E.2d 932(1998); 

State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 429, 1995 Ohio 24, 653 N.E.2d 253(1995).

{¶22} The United States Supreme Court has recognized custodial interrogation is 

not limited to a police stationhouse interrogation. See, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 

1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 38191968) (questioning of defendant by an agent from the 

Internal Revenue Service while defendant was incarcerated); and Orozco v. Texas, 394 

U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311(1969) (questioning of defendant, by the police, 

in defendant’s bedroom). Also, Fifth Amendment protection is not limited to any single 

source of official interrogation. Where a defendant is subject to the inherently compelling 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 10

pressures of a custodial situation, he is entitled to warning before any official interrogation. 

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359(1981) (statements made 

to court-appointed psychiatrist).

{¶23} On the other hand, police are not required to administer Miranda warnings 

to everyone whom they question. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 

714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 (1977). “Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed 

simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the 

questioned person is one whom the police suspect.” Id. Accord, State v. Biros, 78 Ohio 

St.3d 426, 440, 1997-Ohio-204, 678 N.E.2d 891. “General on-the-scene questioning as 

to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding 

process is not affected by our holding.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 

L.Ed.2d 694. Accord, State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 

48, ¶27.

Interrogation requiring Miranda Warnings.

{¶24} In Rhode Island v. Innis, the United States Supreme Court defined 

“interrogation,”

We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever 

a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its 

functional equivalent. That is to say, the term “interrogation” under Miranda 

refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on 

the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 

custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 11

focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent 

of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were 

designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection 

against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the 

underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is 

reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus 

amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held 

accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the 

definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of 

police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit 

an incriminating response.

446 U.S. 291, 300-302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297(1980 (footnotes omitted). The 

Court further noted, “[a]ny knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual 

susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor 

in determining whether the police should have known that their words or actions were 

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” 446 U.S. 302, 100 

S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, n.8.

{¶25} On the other hand, “[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by 

the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.” Miranda, 

384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726. Moreover, there is no requirement 

that officers interrupt a suspect in the course of making a volunteered statement to recite 

the Miranda warnings. State v. Tucker, 81 Ohio St.3d 431, 438, 1998-Ohio-438, 692 

N.E.2d 171. In the context of obtaining a voluntary consent to search, the United States 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 12

Supreme Court observed, “[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact 

that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly 

eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 

104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247(1984); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205, 122 

S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002). Therefore, it can be assumed that no Fifth 

Amendment violation occurs when the police ask an individual to speak with them without 

expressly informing the citizen of his or her right to say no.

Jacks was not in custody for Miranda purposes

{¶26} At the time of his arrival, Sergeant Kanavel was investigating a report of a 

domestic disturbance. Sergeant Kanavel and Deputy Finley questioned the parties in 

separate locations in an effort to determine what had transpired between the parties. 

Jacks was not handcuffed and was interviewed on the front porch of the residence, a 

public place. Jacks admits that he was able to retrieve his cigarettes and to smoke during 

his time with Sergeant Kanavel. Jacks never attempted to leave, nor did he ever express

his desire not to speak with the police to Sergeant Kanavel. 

{¶27} Simply requesting an individual to remain at his home while the officers 

gather information concerning the report of a domestic dispute lacks the inherently 

coercive pressures of interviews occurring in the confines of a police station. Keeping the 

parties separated while investigating allegations of a domestic disturbance is a matter of 

safety of the parties and the officers rather than a restriction on the freedom of movement 

associated with an arrest. The record reveals that Jacks was not subjected to the 

inherently compelling pressures of a custodial situation. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0013 13

{¶28} We find that a reasonable person in Jacks’ position during the interview 

would have understood that, while he could not be in the same room as his girlfriend, 

Jacks was free to move about, walk away, or decline to answer the questions by the 

officers. State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 153-154, 694 N.E.2d 932, 1998-Ohio-370. 

There were no restraints on his freedom of movement to the degree associated with a 

formal arrest. 

{¶29} Because Jacks was not in custody, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings. 

Therefore, the trial court’s analogy of the questioning in this case to a roadside stop is 

inconsequential, and error, if any, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶30} The trial court properly denied Jacks’ motion to suppress.

{¶31} Jacks’ Assignment of Error is overruled. 

{¶32} The judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is 

affirmed.

By: Gwin, P.J.,

Hoffman, J., and

Wise, John, J., concur