NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Alex Cerrato

- Maradiaga,

Petitioner,

v. Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. No s
. 21

- 453 21

- 534 Agency No. A029

- 154

- 257

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of Order s of an

Immigration Judge
Submitted February 16, 2023 ** San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, MILLER, and SANCHEZ , Circuit Judges

. Alex Cerrato

- Maradiaga , a native and citizen of Honduras , petitions for review of an immigration judge’s orders denying Cerrato’s motions to reissue a decision affirming an asylum officer’s determination that Cerrato did not have a
reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Honduras. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 , and w e deny the petition s.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 22 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 21

- 453, 21

- 534

“A motion to reissue is treated as a motion to reopen.” Coyt v. Holder , 593 F.3d 902, 904 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chen v. U nited S tates Att’

y Gen. , 502 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam))

. We review the denial of a motion

to reopen for abuse of discretion and u phold the immigration judge’s decision
unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Perez v. Mukasey , 516 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Singh v. INS , 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) )

. 1. In his brief

, Cer r ato does not contest any aspect of the immigration judge’s first decision. He has therefore abandoned any challenge to the denial of
his first motion to reissue. See Nguyen v. Barr , 983 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020)

. 2. Cerrato s ought equitable exceptions to the time and number limits that
would otherwise bar his second motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8
C.F.R . § 1003.23(b)(1)

. The immigra tion judge denied equitable tolling for two reasons. First, the judge saw no authority for granting equitable tolling on account of Cerrato’s alleged incompetency

. Second, the judge observed that Cerrato’s lawyer could have described Cerrato’s incompetency in his first timely motion. Cerrato challenges the first reason but not the second. Because either reason was an independent basis for the decision , Cerrato’s failure to preserve any challenge t o the second ground forecloses his claim. S ee Nguyen , 983 F.3d at 1102.3 21

- 453, 21

- 534

In any event, t he record does not suggest that the vital information bearing on reissuance

— Cerrato’s alleged incompetency during the period for filing a petition

—

was unavailable to Ce rrato’s lawyer despite due diligence or
because of circumstances beyond counsel’s control. See Perez

- Camacho v.
Garland , 54 F.4th 597, 606 (9th Cir. 2022). The immigration judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that “counsel’s failure to investig ate the claimed primary reason for Respondent’s untimely petition” warranted denying equitable tolling.
3. Cerrato asserts that the immigration judge violated his due process rights by overlooking his arguments. To satisfy due process, the immigration judg e need not write a lengthy analysis of every contention but must “consider the issues raised, and announce [the] decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that [the judge] has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Najmabadi v. Holder , 597 F.3d 983, 9 90 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lopez v. Ashcroft , 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004)). The immigration judge’s reasoning satisfied that requirement. First, Cerrato argues that the immigration judge ignored his requests for a finding of incompetency or a competency hearing. To the contrary, the immigration judge grappled with Cerrato’s claim of incompetency at some length. The judge acknowledged that, s tanding alone, Cerrato’s evidence might
have been persuasive but determined that the government’s evidence refuted it. Although the judge did not expressly discuss Cerrato’s request for a hearing, his4 21

- 453, 21

- 534

reasoning shows that he considered a hearing unnecessar y given the evidence against incompetency. Second, Cerrato argues that the immigration judge ignored his declaration
that he was denied medical treatment and was wrongly accused of malingering.
That is incorrect . The immigration judge expressly referenced the declaration
and Cerrato’s statement that “he did not receive treatment” while in immigration custody. The judge sufficiently explained why he discount ed the
declaration : He found more persuasive the medical records showing that Cerrato
received medical attention and did not exhibit signs of psychosis. Third, Cerrato objects to the immigration judge’s observation that Cerrato neglected to submit his untimely petition , which could have support ed his
claim. Cerrato contends that he did not prepare his peti tion by himself, so the petition could not have demonstrated his incompetency. But his declaration says only that he received “help filing the appeal.” It does not indicate whether Cerrato played a role in its drafting. The immigration judge ’s observation did

not misconstrue the record or violate due process.
The motions to stay removal are denied. (Case No. 21

- 453, Dkt. No. 4;
Case No. 21

- 543, Dkt. No. 2). The temporary stay of removal is lifted.
PETITION S DENIED.