(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. 

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 05–705. Argued October 10, 2006—Decided April 17, 2007 

Under authority of the Communications Act of 1934, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates interstate telephone communications using a traditional regulatory system similar to what 

other commissions have applied when regulating other common carriers. Indeed, Congress largely copied language from the earlier Interstate Commerce Act, which authorized federal railroad regulation,

when it wrote Communications Act §§201(b) and 207, the provisions

at issue. Both Acts authorize their respective commissions to declare

any carrier “charge,” “regulation,” or “practice” in connection with the

carrier’s services to be “unjust or unreasonable”; declare an “unreasonable,” e.g., “charge” to be “unlawful”; authorize an injured person

to recover “damages” for an “unlawful” charge or practice; and state

that, to do so, the person may bring suit in a “court” “of the United 

States.” Interstate Commerce Act §§1, 8, 9; Communications Act

§§201(b), 206, 207. The underlying regulatory problem here arises at

the intersection of traditional regulation and newer, more competitively oriented approaches. Legislation in 1990 required payphone 

operators to allow payphone users to obtain “free” access to the longdistance carrier of their choice, i.e., access without depositing coins.

But recognizing the “free” call would impose a cost upon the payphone operator, Congress required the FCC to promulgate regulations to provide compensation to such operators. Using traditional

ratemaking methods, the FCC ordered carriers to reimburse the operators in a specified amount unless a carrier and an operator agreed 

to a different amount. The FCC subsequently determined that a carrier’s refusal to pay such compensation was an “unreasonable practice” and thus unlawful under §201(b). Respondent payphone opera-
2 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Syllabus 

tor brought a federal lawsuit, claiming that petitioner long-distance

carrier (hereinafter Global Crossing) had violated §201(b) by failing

to pay compensation and that §207 authorized respondent to sue in 

federal court. The District Court agreed that Global Crossing’s refusal to pay violated §201(b), thereby permitting respondent to sue 

under §207. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 

Held: The FCC’s application of §201(b) to the carrier’s refusal to pay

compensation is lawful; and, given the linkage with §207, §207 authorizes this federal-court lawsuit. Pp. 7–19.

(a) The language of §§201(b), 206, and 207 and those sections’ history, including that of their predecessors, Interstate Commerce Act 

§§8 and 9, make clear that §207’s purpose is to allow persons injured

by §201(b) violations to bring federal-court damages actions. The difficult question is whether the FCC regulation at issue lawfully implements §201(b)’s “unreasonable practice” prohibition. Pp. 7–9.

(b) The FCC’s §201(b) “unreasonable practice” determination is reasonable, and thus lawful. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843–844. It easily fits 

within the language of the statutory phrase. Moreover, the underlying regulated activity at issue resembles activity long regulated by

both transportation and communications agencies. Traditionally, the 

FCC, exercising its rate-setting authority, has divided revenues from 

a call among providers of segments of the call. Transportation agencies have similarly divided revenues from a larger transportation

service among providers of segments of the service. The payphone 

operator and long-distance carrier resemble those joint providers of a

communication or transportation service. Differences between the 

present “unreasonable practice” classification and more traditional 

regulatory subject matter do not require a different outcome. When 

Congress revised the telecommunications laws in 1996 to enhance 

the role of competition, creating a system that relies in part upon

competition and in part upon the role of tariffs in regulatory supervision, it left §201(b) in place. In light of the absence of any congressional prohibition, and the similarities with traditional regulatory action, the Court finds nothing unreasonable about the FCC’s §201(b)

determination. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229. 

Pp. 9–12.

(c) Additional arguments made by Global Crossing, its supporting 

amici and the dissents—that §207 does not authorize actions for violations of regulations promulgated to carry out statutory objectives; 

that no §207 action lies for violations of substantive regulations

promulgated by the FCC; that §§201(a) and (b) concern only practices

that harm carrier customers, not carrier suppliers; that the FCC’s 

“unreasonable practice” determination is unlawful because it is in-
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

Syllabus 

adequately reasoned; and that §276 prohibits the FCC’s §201(b) classification—are ultimately unpersuasive. Pp. 12–19. 

423 F. 3d 1056, affirmed. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., 

joined. SCALIA, J., and THOMAS, J., filed dissenting opinions. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–705 

GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

PETITIONER v. METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 17, 2007] 

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Federal Communications Commission (Commission 

or FCC) has established rules that require long-distance 

(and certain other) communications carriers to compensate a payphone operator when a caller uses a payphone to 

obtain free access to the carrier’s lines (by dialing, e.g., a 

1–800 number or other access code). The Commission has 

added that a carrier’s refusal to pay the compensation is a 

“practice . . . that is unjust or unreasonable” within the

terms of the Communications Act of 1934, §201(b), 48

Stat. 1070, 47 U. S. C. §201(b). Communications Act 

language links §201(b) to §207, which authorizes any 

person “damaged” by a violation of §201(b) to bring a

lawsuit to recover damages in federal court. And we must 

here decide whether this linked section, §207, authorizes a 

payphone operator to bring a federal-court lawsuit against

a recalcitrant carrier that refuses to pay the compensation 

that the Commission’s order says it owes. 

In our view, the FCC’s application of §201(b) to the

carrier’s refusal to pay compensation is a reasonable 
2 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court

interpretation of the statute; hence it is lawful. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 

Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843–844, and n. 11 (1984). And, given

the linkage with §207, we also conclude that §207 authorizes this federal-court lawsuit. 

I 

A 

Because regulatory history helps to illuminate the 

proper interpretation and application of §§201(b) and 207, 

we begin with that history. When Congress enacted the 

Communications Act of 1934, it granted the FCC broad 

authority to regulate interstate telephone communications. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U. S. 

355, 360 (1986). The Commission, during the first several 

decades of its history, used this authority to develop a

traditional regulatory system much like the systems other

commissions had applied when regulating railroads, public utilities, and other common carriers. A utility or carrier would file with a commission a tariff containing rates, 

and perhaps other practices, classifications, or regulations 

in connection with its provision of communications services. The commission would examine the rates, etc., and, 

after appropriate proceedings, approve them, set them

aside, or, sometimes, set forth a substitute rate schedule 

or list of approved charges, classifications, or practices

that the carrier or utility must follow. In doing so, the 

commission might determine the utility’s or carrier’s

overall costs (including a reasonable profit), allocate costs

to particular services, examine whether, and how, individual rates would generate revenue that would help cover 

those costs, and, if necessary, provide for a division of 

revenues among several carriers that together provided a 

single service. See 47 U. S. C. §§201(b), 203, 205(a); Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public 

Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 262 U. S. 276, 291–295 (1923) 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

(Brandeis, J., concurring in judgment) (telecommunications); Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U. S. 

467, 478 (2002) (same); Chicago & North Western R. Co. v. 

Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 326, 331 (1967) 

(railroads); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 

761–765, 806–808 (1968) (natural gas field production). 

In authorizing this traditional form of regulation, Congress copied into the 1934 Communications Act language 

from the earlier Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 

379, which (as amended) authorized federal railroad regulation. See American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 222 (1998). 

Indeed, Congress largely copied §§1, 8, and 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act when it wrote the language of Communications Act §§201(b) and 207, the sections at issue

here. The relevant sections (in both statutes) authorize

the commission to declare any carrier “charge,” “regulation,” or “practice” in connection with the carrier’s services 

to be “unjust or unreasonable”; they declare an “unreasonable,” e.g., “charge” to be “unlawful”; they authorize an

injured person to recover “damages” for an “unlawful” 

charge or practice; and they state that, to do so, the person

may bring suit in a “court” “of the United States.” Interstate Commerce Act §§1, 8, 9, 24 Stat. 379, 382; Communications Act §§201(b), 206, 207, 47 U. S. C. §§201(b), 206, 

207. 

Historically speaking, the Interstate Commerce Act

sections changed early, preregulatory common-law ratesupervision procedures. The common law originally permitted a freight shipper to ask a court to determine 

whether a railroad rate was unreasonably high and to

award the shipper damages in the form of “reparations.”

The “new” regulatory law, however, made clear that a

commission, not a court, would determine a rate’s reasonableness. At the same time, that “new” law permitted a 

shipper injured by an unreasonable rate to bring a federal 
4 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court

lawsuit to collect damages. Interstate Commerce Act §§1, 

8–9; Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 

U. S. 370, 383–386 (1932); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 436, 440–441 (1907); 

Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 

162 (1922); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Ohio Valley 

Tie Co., 242 U. S. 288, 290–291 (1916); J. Ely, Railroads 

and American Law 71–72, 226–227 (2001); A. Hoogenboom

& O. Hoogenboom, A History of the ICC 61 (1976). The 

similar language of Communications Act §§201(b) and 207

indicates a roughly similar sharing of agency authority

with federal courts. 

Beginning in the 1970’s, the FCC came to believe that 

communications markets might efficiently support more

than one firm and that competition might supplement (or 

provide a substitute for) traditional regulation. See MCI 

Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 220–221 (1994). The Commission facilitated entry of new telecommunications carriers

into long-distance markets. And in the 1990’s, Congress

amended the 1934 Act while also enacting new telecommunications statutes, in order to encourage (and sometimes to mandate) new competition. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, 47 U. S. C. §609 et seq.

Neither Congress nor the Commission, however, totally 

abandoned traditional regulatory requirements. And the 

new statutes and amendments left many traditional requirements and related statutory provisions, including 

§§201(b) and 207, in place. E.g., National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 

U. S. 967, 975 (2005). 

B 

The regulatory problem that underlies this lawsuit

arises at the intersection of traditional regulation and

newer, more competitively oriented approaches. Compet-
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

ing long-distance carriers seek the business of individual

local callers, including those who wish to make a longdistance call from a local payphone. A payphone operator,

however, controls what is sometimes a necessary channel

for the caller to reach the long-distance carrier. And prior

to 1990, a payphone operator, exploiting this control, 

might require a caller to use a long-distance carrier that

the operator favored while blocking access to the caller’s

preferred carrier. Such a practice substituted the operator’s choice of carrier for the caller’s, and it potentially 

placed disfavored carriers at a competitive disadvantage. 

In 1990, Congress enacted special legislation requiring 

payphone operators to allow a payphone user to obtain

“free” access to the carrier of his or her choice, i.e., access 

from the payphone without depositing coins. Telephone

Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act of 1990, 

104 Stat. 986, codified at 47 U. S. C. §226. (For ease of 

exposition, we often use familiar terms such as “long 

distance” and “free” calls instead of more precise terms 

such as “interexchange” and “coinless” or “dial-around” 

calls.)

At the same time, Congress recognized that the “free”

call would impose a cost upon the payphone operator; and 

it consequently required the FCC to “prescribe regulations

that . . . establish a per call compensation plan to ensure 

that all payphone service providers are fairly compensated 

for each and every completed intrastate and interstate 

call.” §276(b)(1)(A) of the Communications Act of 1934, as

added by §151 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110

Stat. 106, codified at 47 U. S. C. §276(b)(1)(A).

The FCC then considered the compensation problem. 

Using traditional ratemaking methods, it found that the 

(fixed and incremental) costs of a “free” call from a payphone to, say, a long-distance carrier warranted reimbursement of (at the time relevant to this litigation) $0.24

per call. The FCC ordered carriers to reimburse the pay-
6 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court

phone operators in this amount unless a carrier and an

operator agreed upon a different amount. 47 CFR 

§64.1300(d) (2005). At the same time, it left the carriers 

free to pass the cost along to their customers, the payphone callers. Thus, in a typical “free” call, the carrier

will bill the caller and then must share the revenue the 

carrier receives—to the tune of $0.24 per call—with the 

payphone operator that has, together with the carrier, 

furnished a communications service to the caller. The 

FCC subsequently determined that a carrier’s refusal to

pay the compensation ordered amounts to an “unreasonable practice” within the terms of §201(b). (We shall refer 

to these regulations as the Compensation Order and the 

2003 Payphone Order, respectively. See Appendix A, 

infra, for full citations.) See generally P. Huber, M. Kellogg, & J. Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law 

§8.6.3, pp. 710–713 (2d ed. 1999) (hereinafter Huber). 

That determination, it believed, would permit a payphone

operator to bring a federal-court lawsuit under §207, to

collect the compensation owed. 2003 Payphone Order, 18 

FCC Rcd. 19975, 19990, ¶32. 

C 

In 2003, respondent, Metrophones Telecommunications,

Inc., a payphone operator, brought this federal-court 

lawsuit against Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., 

a long-distance carrier. Metrophones sought compensation that it said Global Crossing owed it under the FCC’s 

Compensation Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 2545 (1999). Insofar as 

is relevant here, Metrophones claimed that Global Crossing’s refusal to pay amounted to a violation of §201(b), 

thereby permitting Metrophones to sue in federal court,

under §207, for the compensation owed. The District 

Court agreed. 423 F. 3d 1056, 1061 (CA9 2005). The 

Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s determination. 

Ibid. We granted certiorari to determine whether §207 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

authorizes the lawsuit. 

II 

A 

Section 207 says that “[a]ny person claiming to be damaged by any common carrier . . . may bring suit” against 

the carrier “in any district court of the United States” for

“recovery of the damages for which such common carrier 

may be liable under the provisions of this chapter.” 47 

U. S. C. §207 (emphasis added). This language makes

clear that the lawsuit is proper if the FCC could properly 

hold that a carrier’s failure to pay compensation is an

“unreasonable practice” deemed “unlawful” under §201(b). 

That is because the immediately preceding section, §206, 

says that a common carrier is “liable” for “damages sustained in consequence of” the carrier’s doing “any act, 

matter, or thing in this chapter prohibited or declared to be 

unlawful.” And §201(b) declares “unlawful” any commoncarrier “charge, practice, classification, or regulation that 

is unjust or unreasonable.” (See Appendix B, infra, for full 

text; emphasis added throughout). 

The history of these sections—including that of their 

predecessors, §§8 and 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act—

simply reinforces the language, making clear the purpose

of §207 is to allow persons injured by §201(b) violations to 

bring federal-court damages actions. See, e.g., Arizona 

Grocery Co., 284 U. S., at 384–385 (Interstate Commerce 

Act §§8–9); Part I–A, supra. History also makes clear that

the FCC has long implemented §201(b) through the issuance of rules and regulations. This is obviously so when

the rules take the form of FCC approval or prescription for 

the future of rates that exclusively are “reasonable.” See 

47 U. S. C. §205 (authorizing the FCC to prescribe reasonable rates and practices in order to preclude rates or practices that violate §201(b)); 5 U. S. C. §551(4) (“‘rule’ . . . 

includes the approval or prescription for the future of 
8 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court

rates . . . or practices”). It is also so when the FCC has set 

forth rules that, for example, require certain accounting

methods or insist upon certain carrier practices, while (as 

here) prohibiting others as unjust or unreasonable under

§201(b). See, e.g. (to name a few), Verizon Tel. Cos. v. 

FCC, 453 F. 3d 487, 494 (CADC 2006) (rates unreasonable 

(and hence unlawful) if not adjusted pursuant to accounting rules ordered in FCC regulations); Cable & Wireless 

P. L. C. v. FCC, 166 F. 3d 1224, 1231 (CADC 1999) (failure 

to follow Commission-ordered settlement practices unreasonable); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 59 F. 3d 

1407, 1414 (CADC 1995) (violation of rate-of-return prescription unlawful); In re NOS Communications, Inc., 16 

FCC Rcd. 8133, 8136, ¶6 (2001) (deceptive marketing an 

unreasonable practice); In re Promotion of Competitive 

Networks in Local Telecommunications Markets, 15 FCC 

Rcd. 22983, 23000, ¶35 (2000) (entering into exclusive

contracts with commercial building owners an unreasonable practice).

Insofar as the statute’s language is concerned, to violate 

a regulation that lawfully implements §201(b)’s requirements is to violate the statute. See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp., 59 F. 3d, at 1414 (“We have repeatedly 

held that a rate-of-return prescription has the force of law 

and that the Commission may therefore treat a violation 

of the prescription as a per se violation of the requirement 

of the Communications Act that a common carrier maintain ‘just and reasonable’ rates, see 47 U. S. C. §201(b)”); 

cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 284 (2001) (it is 

“meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to

enforce the regulations apart from the statute”). That is 

why private litigants have long assumed that they may, as

the statute says, bring an action under §207 for violation

of a rule or regulation that lawfully implements §201(b). 

See, e.g., Oh v. AT&T Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 551, 556 (NJ 

1999) (assuming validity of §207 suit alleging violation of 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

§201(b) in carrier’s failure to provide services listed in

FCC-approved tariff); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Allnet 

Communications Servs., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 302, 304–306

(ED Mo. 1992) (assuming validity of §207 suit to enforce

FCC’s determination of reasonable practices related to 

payment of access charges by long-distance carrier to local

exchange carrier); cf., e.g., Chicago & North Western 

Transp. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 609 F. 2d 1221, 

1224–1225 (CA7 1979) (same in respect to Interstate 

Commerce Act equivalents of §§201(b), 207). 

The difficult question, then, is not whether §207 covers 

actions that complain of a violation of §201(b) as lawfully

implemented by an FCC regulation. It plainly does. It 

remains for us to decide whether the particular FCC

regulation before us lawfully implements §201(b)’s “unreasonable practice” prohibition. We now turn to that 

question. 

B 

In our view the FCC’s §201(b) “unreasonable practice” 

determination is a reasonable one; hence it is lawful. See 

Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 467 U. S., at 843–844. The determination easily fits within the language of the statutory

phrase. That is to say, in ordinary English, one can call a

refusal to pay Commission-ordered compensation despite

having received a benefit from the payphone operator a

“practic[e] . . . in connection with [furnishing a] communication service . . . that is . . . unreasonable.” The service 

that the payphone operator provides constitutes an integral part of the total long-distance service the payphone 

operator and the long-distance carrier together provide to 

the caller, with respect to the carriage of his or her particular call. The carrier’s refusal to divide the revenues it 

receives from the caller with its collaborator, the payphone 

operator, despite the FCC’s regulation requiring it to do 

so, can reasonably be called a “practice” “in connection 
10 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. 

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

with” the provision of that service that is “unreasonable.” 

Cf. post, at 1–5 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

Moreover, the underlying regulated activity at issue 

here resembles activity that both transportation and communications agencies have long regulated. Here the 

agency has determined through traditional regulatory

methods the cost of carrying a portion (the payphone 

portion) of a call that begins with a caller and proceeds 

through the payphone, attached wires, local communications loops, and long-distance lines to a distant call recipient. The agency allocates costs among the joint providers 

of the communications service and requires downstream

carriers, in effect, to pay an appropriate share of revenues 

to upstream payphone operators. Traditionally, the FCC

has determined costs of some segments of a call while

requiring providers of other segments to divide related 

revenues. See, e.g., Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 

282 U. S. 133, 148–151 (1930) (communications). And 

traditionally, transportation agencies have determined

costs of providing some segments of a larger transportation service (for example, the cost of providing the San

Francisco–Ogden segment of a San Francisco–New York 

shipment) while requiring providers of other segments to

divide revenues. See, e.g., New England Divisions Case, 

261 U. S. 184 (1923); Chicago & North Western R. Co., 387 

U. S. 326; cf. Cable & Wireless P. L. C., supra, at 1231. In 

all instances an agency allocates costs and provides for a 

related sharing of revenues.

In these more traditional instances, transportation

carriers and communications firms entitled to revenues 

under rate divisions or cost allocations might bring lawsuits under §207, or the equivalent sections of the Interstate Commerce Act, and obtain compensation or damages. See, e.g., Allnet Communication Serv., Inc. v. 

National Exch. Carrier Assn., Inc., 965 F. 2d 1118, 1122 

(CADC 1992) (§207); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra, at 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

305 (same); Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., supra, 

at 1224–1225 (Interstate Commerce Act equivalent of 

§207). Again, the similarities support the reasonableness

of an agency’s bringing about a similar result here. We do 

not suggest that the FCC is required to find carriers’ 

failures to divide revenues to be §201(b) violations in every 

instance. Cf. U. S. Telepacific Corp. v. Tel-America of Salt 

Lake City, Inc., 19 FCC Rcd. 24552, 24555–24556, and n. 

27 (2004) (citing cases). Nor do we suggest that every

violation of FCC regulations is an unjust and unreasonable practice. Here there is an explicit statutory scheme, 

and compensation of payphone operators is necessary to

the proper implementation of that scheme. Under these 

circumstances, the FCC’s finding that the failure to follow

the order is an unreasonable practice is well within its

authority. 

There are, of course, differences between the present

“unreasonable practice” classification and the similar more

traditional regulatory subject matter we have just described. For one thing, the connection between payphone

operators and long-distance carriers is not a traditional

“through route” between carriers. See §201(a). For another, as Global Crossing’s amici point out, the word 

“practice” in §201(b) has traditionally applied to a carrier 

practice that (unlike the present one) is the subject of a 

carrier tariff—i.e., a carrier agency filing that sets forth

the carrier’s rates, classifications, and practices. Brief for 

AT&T et al. as Amici Curiae 8–11. We concede the differences. Indeed, traditionally, the filing of tariffs was “the 

centerpiece” of the “[Communications] Act’s regulatory

scheme.” MCI Telecommunications Corp., 512 U. S., at 

220. But we do not concede that these differences require

a different outcome. Statutory changes enhancing the role

of competition have radically reduced the role that tariffs

play in regulatory supervision of what is now a mixed

communications system—a system that relies in part upon 
12 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. 

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

competition and in part upon more traditional regulation. 

Yet when Congress rewrote the law to bring about these 

changes, it nonetheless left §201(b) in place. That fact 

indicates that the statute permits, indeed it suggests that 

Congress likely expected, the FCC to pour new substantive wine into its old regulatory bottles. See Policy and

Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, 12 FCC Rcd. 15014, 15057, ¶77 (1997) (despite the

absence of tariffs, FCC’s §201 enforcement obligations 

have not diminished); Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F. 3d 

404, 422 (CA7 2002) (same). And this circumstance, by 

indicating that Congress did not forbid the agency to apply 

§201(b) differently in the changed regulatory environment, 

is sufficient to convince us that the FCC’s determination is 

lawful. 

That is because we have made clear that where “Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the 

force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or 

fills a space in the enacted law,” a court “is obliged to

accept the agency’s position if Congress has not previously

spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpretation” (or the manner in which it fills the “gap”) is “reasonable.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229 

(2001); National Cable & Telecommunications Assn., 545 

U. S., at 980; Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 467 U. S., at 843–844. 

Congress, in §201(b), delegated to the agency authority to 

“fill” a “gap,” i.e., to apply §201 through regulations and 

orders with the force of law. National Cable & Telecommunications Assn., supra, at 980–981. The circumstances 

mentioned above make clear the absence of any relevant congressional prohibition. And, in light of the traditional regulatory similarities that we have discussed, we

can find nothing unreasonable about the FCC’s §201(b) 

determination. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 13 

Opinion of the Court

C 

Global Crossing, its supporting amici, and the dissents 

make several additional but ultimately unpersuasive 

arguments. First, Global Crossing claims that §207 authorizes only actions “seeking damages for statutory violations” and not for “violations merely of regulations promulgated to carry out statutory objectives.” Brief for 

Petitioner 12 (emphasis in original). The lawsuit before 

us, however, “seek[s] damages for [a] statutory violatio[n],”

namely, a violation of §201(b)’s prohibition of an “unreasonable practice.” As we have pointed out, supra, at 8, 

§201(b)’s prohibitions have long been thought to extend to 

rates that diverge from FCC prescriptions, as well as rates

or practices that are “unreasonable” in light of their failure to reflect rules embodied in an agency regulation. We 

have found no limitation of the kind Global Crossing 

suggests.

Global Crossing seeks to draw support from Alexander 

v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275 (2001), and Adams Fruit Co. v. 

Barrett, 494 U. S. 638 (1990), which, Global Crossing says, 

hold that an agency cannot determine through regulation

when a private party may bring a federal court action.

Those cases do involve private actions, but they do not 

support Global Crossing. The cases involve different 

statutes and different regulations, and the Court made

clear in each of those cases that its holding relied on the 

specific statute before it. In Sandoval, supra, at 288–289, 

the Court found that an implied right of action to enforce

one statutory provision, 42 U. S. C. §2000d, did not extend 

to regulations implementing another, §2000d–1. In contrast, here we are addressing the FCC’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language in a substantive statutory provision, 47 U. S. C. §201(b), which Congress

expressly linked to the right of action provided in §207.

Nothing in Sandoval requires us to limit our deference to 

the FCC’s reasonable interpretation of §201(b); to the 
14 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. 

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

contrary, as we noted in Sandoval, it is “meaningless to 

talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the regulations apart from the statute. A Congress that intends the

statute to be enforced through a private cause of action 

intends the authoritative interpretation of the statute to

be so enforced as well.” 532 U. S., at 284. In Adams Fruit 

Co., supra, at 646–647, we rejected an agency interpretation of the worker-protection statute at issue as contrary

to “the plain meaning of the statute’s language.” Given 

the differences in statutory language, context, and history,

those two cases are simply beside the point.

Our analysis does not change in this case simply because the practice deemed unreasonable (and hence

unlawful) in the 2003 Payphone Order is violation of an

FCC regulation adopted under authority of a separate 

statutory section, §276. The FCC here, acting under the

authority of §276, has prescribed a particular rate (and a

division of revenues) applicable to a portion of a longdistance service, and it has ordered carriers to reimburse 

payphone operators for the relevant portion of the service 

they jointly provide. But the conclusion that it is “unreasonable” to fail so to reimburse is not a §276 conclusion; it

is a §201(b) conclusion. And courts have treated a carrier’s failure to follow closely analogous agency rate and 

rate-division determinations as we treat the matter at 

issue here. That is to say, the FCC properly implements 

§201(b) when it reasonably finds that the failure to follow 

a Commission, e.g., rate or rate-division determination 

made under a different statutory provision is unjust or 

unreasonable under §201(b). See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp., 59 F. 3d, at 1414 (failure to follow a rate 

promulgated under §205 properly considered unreasonable

under §201(b)); see also Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Alabama 

Great Southern R. Co., 506 F. 2d 1265, 1270 (CADC 1974)

(statutory obligation to provide reasonable rate divisions

is “implemented by orders of the ICC” issued pursuant to a 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

separate statutory provision). Moreover, in resting our 

conclusion upon the analogy with rate setting and rate 

divisions, the traditional, historical subject matter of 

§201(b), we avoid authorizing the FCC to turn §§201(b) 

and 207 into a back-door remedy for violation of FCC 

regulations.

 Second, JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting, says that the “only 

serious issue presented by this case [is] whether a practice

that is not in and of itself unjust or unreasonable can be

rendered such (and thus rendered in violation of the Act 

itself) because it violates a substantive regulation of the

Commission.” Post, at 2–3. He answers this question 

“no,” because, in his view, a “violation of a substantive 

regulation promulgated by the Commission is not a violation of the Act, and thus does not give rise to a private

cause of action.” Post, at 3. We cannot accept either

JUSTICE SCALIA’s statement of the “serious issue” or his 

answer. 

We do not accept his statement of the issue because

whether the practice is “in and of itself” unreasonable is

irrelevant. The FCC has authoritatively ruled that carriers must compensate payphone operators. The only practice before us, then, and the only one we consider, is the

carrier’s violation of that FCC regulation requiring the 

carrier to pay the payphone operator a fair portion of the 

total cost of carrying a call that they jointly carried—each 

supplying a partial portion of the total carriage. A practice of violating the FCC’s order to pay a fair share would

seem fairly characterized in ordinary English as an “unjust practice,” so why should the FCC not call it the same 

under §201(b)?

Nor can we agree with JUSTICE SCALIA’s claim that a 

“violation of a substantive regulation promulgated by the 

Commission is not a violation of” §201(b) of the Act when, 

as here, the Commission has explicitly and reasonably 

ruled that the particular regulatory violation does violate 
16 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. 

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

§201(b). (Emphasis added.) And what has the substantive/interpretive distinction that JUSTICE SCALIA emphasizes, post, at 3, to do with the matter? There is certainly 

no reference to this distinction in §201(b); the text does not 

suggest that, of all violations of regulations, only violations of interpretive regulations can amount to unjust or 

unreasonable practices. Why believe that Congress, which

scarcely knew of this distinction a century ago before the 

blossoming of administrative law, would care which kind

of regulation was at issue? And even if this distinction 

were relevant, the FCC has long set forth what we now

would call “substantive” (or “legislative”) rules under §205. 

Cf. 1 R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §6.4, p. 325 

(4th ed. 2002); post, at 4. And violations of those substantive §205 regulations have clearly been deemed violations 

of §201(b). E.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp., 59 F. 3d, 

at 1414. Conversely, we have found no case at all in which

a private plaintiff was kept out of federal court because

the §201(b) violation it challenged took the form of a “substantive regulation” rather than an “interpretive regulation.” Insofar as JUSTICE SCALIA uses adjectives such as

“traditional” or “textually based” to describe his distinctions, post, at 4, and “novel” or “absurd” to describe ours, 

post, at 5, 2, we would simply note our disagreement.

We concede that JUSTICE SCALIA cites three sources in 

support of his theory. See post, at 3. But, in our view, 

those sources offer him no support. None of those sources 

involved an FCC application of, or an FCC interpretation 

of, the section at issue here, namely §201(b). Nor did any

involve a regulation—substantive or interpretive—

promulgated subsequent to the authority of §201(b). Thus 

none is relevant to the case at hand. See APCC Servs., 

Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co., 418 F. 3d 1238, 1247 

(CADC 2005) (per curiam) (“There was no authoritative

interpretation of §201(b) in this case”); Greene v. Sprint 

Communications Co., 340 F. 3d 1047, 1052 (CA9 2003) 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

(violation of substantive regulation does not violate §276; 

silent as to §201(b)). The single judge who thought that 

the FCC had authoritatively interpreted §201(b) (as has 

occurred in the case before us) would have reached the

same conclusion that we do. APCC Servs., Inc., supra, at 

1254. (D. H. Ginsburg, C. J., dissenting) (finding a private 

cause of action, because there was “clearly an authoritative interpretation of §201(b)” that deemed the practice in

question unlawful). See also Huber §3.14.3, p. 317 (no 

discussion of §201(b)).

Third, JUSTICE THOMAS (who also does not adopt 

JUSTICE SCALIA’s arguments) disagrees with the FCC’s 

interpretation of the term “practice.” He, along with 

Global Crossing, claims instead that §§201(a) and (b) 

concern only practices that harm carrier customers, not 

carrier suppliers. Post, at 2–4 (dissenting opinion); Brief 

for Petitioner 37–38. But that is not what those sections 

say. Nor does history offer this position significant support. A violation of a regulation or order dividing rates 

among railroads, for example, would likely have harmed 

another carrier, not a shipper. See, e.g., Chicago & North 

Western Transp. Co., 609 F. 2d, at 1225–1226 (“Act . . . 

provides for the regulation of inter-carrier relations as a

part of its general rate policy”). Once one takes account of 

this fact, it seems reasonable, not unreasonable, to include 

as a §201(b) (and §207) beneficiary a firm that performs

services roughly analogous to the transportation of one

segment of a longer call. We are not here dealing with a

firm that supplies office supplies or manual labor. Cf., 

e.g., Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. S. 249, 257 

(1931) (“practice” in §1 of the Interstate Commerce Act 

does not encompass employment decisions). The longdistance carrier ordered by the FCC to compensate the

payphone operator is so ordered in its role as a provider of 

communications services, not as a consumer of office supplies or the like. It is precisely because the carrier and the 
18 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. 

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

payphone operator jointly provide a communications 

service to the caller that the carrier is ordered to share 

with the payphone operator the revenue that only the

carrier is permitted to demand from the caller. Cf. Cable 

& Wireless P. L. C., 166 F. 3d, at 1231 (finding that §201(b) 

enables the Commission to regulate not “only the terms on

which U. S. carriers offer telecommunication services to the 

public,” but also “the prices U. S. carriers pay” to foreign

carriers providing the foreign segment of an international

call). 

Fourth, Global Crossing argues that the FCC’s “unreasonable practice” determination is unlawful because it is 

inadequately reasoned. We concede that the FCC’s initial 

opinion simply states that the carrier’s practice is unreasonable under §201(b). But the context and crossreferenced opinions, 2003 Payphone Order, 18 FCC Rcd., 

at 19990, ¶32 (citing American Public Communications 

Council v. FCC, 215 F. 3d 51, 56 (CADC 2000)), make the 

FCC’s rationale obvious, namely, that in light of the history that we set forth supra, at 7–9, it is unreasonable for 

a carrier to violate the FCC’s mandate that it pay compensation. See also In re APCC Servs., Inc. v. NetworkIP, 

LLC, 21 FCC Rcd. 10488, 10493–10495, ¶¶ 13–16 (2006)

(Order) (spelling out the reasoning).

Fifth Global Crossing argues that a different statutory 

provision, §276, see supra, at 5, prohibits the FCC’s

§201(b) classification. Brief for Petitioner 26–28. But 

§276 simply requires the FCC to “take all actions necessary . . . to prescribe regulations that . . . establish a per 

call compensation plan to ensure” that payphone operators

“are fairly compensated.” 47 U. S. C. §276(b)(1). It nowhere forbids the FCC to rely on §201(b). Rather, by

helping to secure enforcement of the mandated regulations

the FCC furthers basic §276 purposes.

Finally, Global Crossing seeks to rest its claim of a §276

prohibition upon the fact that §276 requires regulations 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

that secure compensation for “every completed intrastate,” 

as well as every “interstate” payphone-related call, while

§201(b) (referring to §201(a)) extends only to “interstate or 

foreign” communication. Brief for Petitioner 37. But 

Global Crossing makes too much of too little. We can 

assume (for argument’s sake) that §201(b) may consequently apply only to a portion of the Compensation Order’s requirements. But cf., e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. 

Comm’n, 476 U. S., at 375, n. 4 (suggesting approval of 

FCC authority where it is “not possible to separate the

interstate and the intrastate components”). But even if 

that is so (and we repeat that we do not decide this question), the FCC’s classification will help to achieve a substantial portion of its §276 compensatory mission. And we 

cannot imagine why Congress would have (implicitly in 

this §276 language) wished to forbid the FCC from concluding that an interstate half loaf is better than none. 

For these reasons, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is

affirmed. 

It is so ordered. 
20 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. 

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Appendix B to opinion of the Court 

APPENDIXES TO OPINION OF THE COURT 

A 

In re Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification 

and Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications 

Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd. 2545, 2631–2632, ¶¶190–191

(1999) (Compensation Order). 

In re the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 

FCC Rcd. 19975, 19990, ¶32 (2003) (2003 Payphone Order). 

B 

Communications Act §201: 

“(a) It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire

or radio to furnish such communication service upon 

reasonable request therefor; and, in accordance with

the orders of the Commission, in cases where the 

Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such

action necessary or desirable in the public interest, to 

establish physical connections with other carriers, to

establish through routes and charges applicable

thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to establish and provide facilities and regulations for operating such through routes.

“(b) All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and any 

such charge, practice, classification, or regulation that

is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful: 

Provided, That communications by wire or radio sub-
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 21 

Appendix B to opinion of the Court 

ject to this chapter may be classified into day, night,

repeated, unrepeated, letter, commercial, press, Government, and such other classes as the Commission 

may decide to be just and reasonable, and different 

charges may be made for the different classes of communications: Provided further, That nothing in this

chapter or in any other provision of law shall be construed to prevent a common carrier subject to this

chapter from entering into or operating under any 

contract with any common carrier not subject to this

chapter, for the exchange of their services, if the 

Commission is of the opinion that such contract is not 

contrary to the public interest: Provided further, That 

nothing in this chapter or in any other provision of

law shall prevent a common carrier subject to this

chapter from furnishing reports of positions of ships

at sea to newspapers of general circulation, either at a 

nominal charge or without charge, provided the name 

of such common carrier is displayed along with such

ship position reports. The Commission may prescribe

such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the

public interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” 47 U. S. C. §201. 

Communications Act §206: 

“In case any common carrier shall do, or cause or

permit to be done, any act, matter, or thing in this 

chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall

omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this chapter required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable 

to the person or persons injured thereby for the full 

amount of damages sustained in consequence of any

such violation of the provisions of this chapter, together with a reasonable counsel or attorney’s fee, to 

be fixed by the court in every case of recovery, which

attorney’s fee shall be taxed and collected as part of 
22 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. 

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

Appendix B to opinion of the Court 

the costs in the case.” 47 U. S. C. §206. 

Communications Act §207: 

“Any person claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter

may either make complaint to the Commission as

hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit for the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier

may be liable under the provisions of this chapter, in

any district court of the United States of competent

jurisdiction; but such person shall not have the right

to pursue both such remedies.” 47 U. S. C. §207. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–705 

GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

PETITIONER v. METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 17, 2007] 

JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting. 

Section 276(b)(1)(A) of the Communications Act of 1934, 

as added by the Telecommunication Act of 1996, instructed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC

or Commission) to issue regulations establishing a plan to 

compensate payphone operators, leaving it up to the FCC 

to prescribe who should pay and how much. Pursuant to 

that authority, the FCC promulgated a substantive regulation that required carriers to compensate payphone

operators at a rate of 24 cents per call (the payphonecompensation regulation). The FCC subsequently declared a carrier’s failure to comply with the payphonecompensation regulation to be unlawful under §201(b) of

the Act (which prohibits certain “unjust or unreasonable”

practices) and privately actionable under §206 of the Act 

(which establishes a private cause of action for violations

of the Act). Today’s judgment can be defended only by 

accepting either of two propositions with respect to these 

laws: (1) that a carrier’s failure to pay the prescribed

compensation, in and of itself and apart from the Commission’s payphone-compensation regulation, is an unjust or

unreasonable practice in violation of §201(b); or (2) that a 

carrier’s failure to pay the prescribed compensation is an 

“unjust or unreasonable” practice under §201(b) because it 
2 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

violates the Commission’s payphone-compensation 

regulation.

The Court coyly avoids rejecting the first proposition. 

But make no mistake: that proposition is utterly implausible, which is perhaps why it is nowhere to be found in

the FCC’s opinion. The unjustness or unreasonableness in

this case, if any, consists precisely of violating the FCC’s 

payphone-compensation regulation.1 Absent that regulation, it would be neither unjust nor unreasonable for a

carrier to decline to act as collection agent for payphone

companies. The person using the services of the payphone 

company to obtain access to the carrier’s network is not

the carrier but the caller. It is absurd to suggest some 

natural obligation on the part of the carrier to identify

payphone use, bill its customer for that use, and forward 

the proceeds to the payphone company. As a regulatory

command, that makes sense (though the free-rider problem might have been solved in some other fashion); but, 

absent the Commission’s substantive regulation, it would 

be in no way unjust or unreasonable for the carrier to do 

nothing. Indeed, if a carrier’s failure to pay payphone 

compensation had been unjust or unreasonable in its own

right, the Commission’s payphone-compensation regulation would have been unnecessary, and the payphone 

—————— 

1See In re the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd. 19975, 

19990, ¶32 (2003) (“[F]ailure to pay in accordance with the Commission’s payphone rules, such as the rules expressly requiring such 

payment . . . constitutes . . . an unjust and unreasonable practice in

violation of section 201(b)”); In re APCC Servs., Inc. v. NetworkIP, LLC, 

21 FCC Rcd. 10488, 10493, ¶15 (2006) (“[F]ailure to pay payphone

compensation rises to the level of being ‘unjust and unreasonable’ ” 

because it is “a direct violation of Commission rules”); id., at 10493, 

¶15, and n. 46 (“The fact that a failure to pay payphone compensation

directly violates Commission rules specifically requiring such payment 

distinguishes this situation from other situations where the Commission has repeatedly declined to entertain ‘collection actions’ ”). 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

companies could have sued directly for violation of §201(b).

The only serious issue presented by this case relates to 

the second proposition: whether a practice that is not in 

and of itself unjust or unreasonable can be rendered such 

(and thus rendered in violation of the Act itself) because it

violates a substantive regulation of the Commission. 

Today’s opinion seems to answer that question in the 

affirmative, at least with respect to the particular regulation at issue here. That conclusion, however, conflicts 

with the Communications Act’s carefully delineated remedial scheme. The Act draws a clear distinction between 

private actions to enforce interpretive regulations (by 

which I mean regulations that reasonably and authoritatively construe the statute itself) and private actions to 

enforce substantive regulations (by which I mean regulations promulgated pursuant to an express delegation of 

authority to impose freestanding legal obligations beyond

those created by the statute itself). Section 206 of the Act 

establishes a private cause of action for violations of the 

Act itself—and violation of an FCC regulation authoritatively interpreting the Act is a violation of the Act itself. 

(As the Court explains, when it comes to regulations that

“reasonabl[y] [and] authoritatively construe the statute 

itself,” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 284 (2001), 

“it is ‘meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action 

to enforce the regulations apart from the statute.’” Ante, 

at 8 (quoting Sandoval, supra, at 284).) On the other 

hand, violation of a substantive regulation promulgated by 

the Commission is not a violation of the Act, and thus does 

not give rise to a private cause of action under §206. See, 

e.g., APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co., 418 

F. 3d 1238, 1247 (CADC 2005) (per curiam), cert. pending, 

No. 05–766; Greene v. Sprint Communications Co., 340 

F. 3d 1047, 1052 (CA9 2003), cert. denied, 541 U. S. 988

(2004); P. Huber, M. Kellogg, & J. Thorne, Federal Tele-
4 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

communications Law §3.14.3 (2d ed. 1999).2 That is why

Congress has separately created private rights of action 

for violation of certain substantive regulations. See, e.g., 

47 U. S. C. §227(b)(3) (violation of substantive regulations

prescribed under §227(b) (2000 ed. and Supp. III));

§227(c)(5) (violation of substantive regulations prescribed 

under §227(c)). These do not include the payphonecompensation regulation authorized by §276(b).

There is no doubt that interpretive rules can be issued

pursuant to §201(b)—that is, rules which specify that

certain practices are in and of themselves “unjust or unreasonable.” Orders issued under §205 of the Act, see 

ante, at 14, which authorizes the FCC, upon finding that a 

practice will be unjust and unreasonable, to order the 

carrier to adopt a just and reasonable practice in its place, 

similarly implement the statute’s proscription against

unjust or unreasonable practices. But, as explained above,

the payphone-compensation regulation does not implement §201(b) and is not predicated on a finding of what 

would be unjust and unreasonable absent the regulation. 

The Court naively describes the question posed by this 

case as follows: Since “[a] practice of violating the FCC’s

order to pay a fair share would seem fairly characterized 

in ordinary English as an ‘unjust practice,’ . . . why should

the FCC not call it the same under §201(b)?” Ante, at 15. 

There are at least three reasons why it is not as simple as

that. (1) There has been no FCC “order” in the ordinary 

—————— 

2The Court asserts that “[n]one of th[ese] [cases] involved an FCC 

application of, or an FCC interpretation of, the relevant section, namely

§201(b)[,] nor did any involve a regulation—substantive or interpretive—promulgated subsequent to the authority of §201(b).” Ante, at 16. 

I agree. They involved the payphone-compensation regulation, which 

was not promulgated pursuant to §201(b), but pursuant to §276. The 

relevant point is that violations of substantive regulations are not 

directly actionable under §206. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

sense, see 5 U. S. C. §551(6), but only an FCC regulation.3 

That is to say, the FCC has never determined that petitioner is in violation of its regulation and ordered compliance. Rather, respondent has alleged such a violation and 

has brought that allegation directly to District Court

without prior agency adjudication. (2) The “practice of 

violating” virtually any FCC regulation can be characterized (“in ordinary English”) as an “unjust practice”—or if

not that, then an “unreasonable practice”—so that all FCC 

regulations become subject to private damage actions. 

Thus, the traditional (and textually based) distinction

between private enforceability of interpretive rules, and 

private nonenforceability of substantive rules is effectively 

destroyed. And (3) it is not up to the FCC to “call it” an 

unjust practice or not. If it were, agency discretion might

limit the regulations available for harassing litigation by 

telecommunications competitors. In fact, however, the 

practice of violating one or another substantive rule either 

is or is not an unjust or unreasonable practice under 

§201(b). The Commission is entitled to Chevron deference 

with respect to that determination at the margins, see 

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), but it will always remain

within the power of private parties to go directly to court, 

asserting that a particular violation of a substantive rule 

is (“in ordinary English”) “unjust” or “unreasonable” and 

hence provides the basis for suit under §201(b). 

The Court asks (more naively still) “what has the substantive/interpretive distinction that [this dissent] emphasizes to do with the matter? There is certainly no refer-

—————— 

3The Court’s departure from ordinary usage is made possible by the 

fact that “the FCC commonly adopts rules in opinions called ‘orders.’ ” 

New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Me., 742 F. 2d 1, 

8–9 (CA1 1984) (Breyer, J.). If there had been violation of an FCC 

order in this case, a private action would have been available under 

§407 of the Act. 
6 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

ence to this distinction in §201(b) . . . . Why believe that 

Congress, which scarcely knew of this distinction a century ago before the blossoming of administrative law,

would care which kind of regulation was at issue?” Ante, 

at 15–16 (citation omitted). The answer to these questions 

is obvious. Section 206 (which was enacted at the same

time as §201(b), see 48 Stat. 1070, 1072) does not explicitly

refer to the distinction between interpretive and substantive regulations. And yet the Court acknowledges that, 

while a violation of an interpretive regulation is actionable 

under §206 (as a violation of the statute itself), a violation

of a substantive regulation is not. (Were this not true, the 

Court’s lengthy discussion of §201(b) would be wholly 

unnecessary because violation of the payphonecompensation regulation would be directly actionable

under §206.) The Court evidently believes that Congress

went out of its way to exclude from §206 private actions 

that did not charge violation of the Act itself (or regulations that authoritatively interpret the Act) but was perfectly willing to have those very same private actions 

brought in through the back door of §201(b) as an “interpretation” of “unjust or unreasonable practice.” It does not 

take familiarity with “the blossoming of administrative 

law” to perceive that this would be nonsensical.4 

Seemingly aware that it is in danger of rendering the

limitation upon §206 a nullity, the Court seeks to limit its 

novel approval of private actions for violation of substan-

—————— 

4The Court further asserts that the “the FCC has long set forth what 

we now call ‘substantive’ (or ‘legislative’) rules under §205,” “violations

of [which] . . . have clearly been deemed violations of §201(b),” ante, at 

16. The §205 orders to which the Court refers are not substantive in

the relevant sense because they interpret §201(b)’s prohibition against 

unjust and unreasonable rates or practices. See ante, at 7 (§205 “authoriz[es] the FCC to prescribe reasonable rates and practices in order

to preclude rates or practices that violate §201(b)”). The payphonecompensation regulation, by contrast, does not interpret §201(b) or any

other statutory provision. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

tive rules to substantive rules that are “analog[ous] with 

rate-setting and rate divisions, the traditional, historical 

subject matter of §201(b),” ante, at 14–15 (emphasis 

added). There is absolutely no basis in the statute for 

this distinction (nor is it anywhere to be found in the

FCC’s opinion). As I have described earlier, interpretive

regulations are privately enforceable because to violate 

them is to violate the Act, within the meaning of the private-suit provision of §206. That a substantive regulation 

is analogous to traditional interpretive regulations, in the 

sense of dealing with subjects that those regulations have

traditionally addressed, is supremely irrelevant to 

whether violation of the substantive regulation is a violation of the Act—which is the only pertinent inquiry. The 

only thing to be said for the Court’s inventive distinction is

that it enables its holding to stand without massive damage to the statutory scheme. Better an irrational limitation, I suppose, than no limitation at all; even though it is 

unclear how restrictive that limitation will turn out to be. 

What other substantive regulations are out there, one 

wonders, that can be regarded as “analogous” to actions 

the Commission has traditionally taken through interpretive regulations under §201(b)? 

It is difficult to comprehend what public good the Court

thinks it is achieving by its introduction of an unprincipled exception into what has hitherto been a clearly understood statutory scheme. Even without the availability

of private remedies, the payphone-compensation regulation would hardly go unenforced. The Commission is 

authorized to impose civil forfeiture penalties of up to

$100,000 per violation (or per day, for continuing violations) against common carriers that “willfully or repeatedly fai[l] to comply with . . . any rule, regulation, or order 

issued by the Commission.” 47 U. S. C. §503(b)(1)(B). And 

the Commission can even place enforcement in private

hands by issuing a privately enforceable order forbidding 
8 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

continued violation. See §§154(i), 276(b)(1)(A), 407. Such 

an order, however, would require a prior Commission

adjudication that the regulation had been violated, thus 

leaving that determination in the hands of the agency 

rather than a court, and preventing the unjustified private 

suits that today’s decision allows. 

I would hold that a private action to enforce an FCC 

regulation under §§201(b) and 206 does not lie unless the 

regulated practice is “unjust or unreasonable” in its own 

right and apart from the fact that a substantive regulation 

of the Commission has prohibited it. As the practice

regulated by the payphone-compensation regulation does

not plausibly fit that description, I would reverse the 

judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–705 

GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

PETITIONER v. METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 17, 2007] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. 

The Court holds that failure to pay a payphone operator

for coinless calls is an “unjust or unreasonable” “practice”

under 47 U. S. C. §201(b). Properly understood, however,

§201 does not reach the conduct at issue here. Failing to

pay is not a “practice” under §201 because that section

regulates the activities of telecommunications firms in

their role as providers of telecommunications services. As 

such, §201(b) does not reach the behavior of telecommunication firms in other aspects of their business. I respectfully dissent. 

I 

The meaning of §201(b) of the Communications Act of

1934 becomes clear when read, as it should be, as a part of

the entirety of §201. Subsection (a) sets out the duties and 

broad discretionary powers of a common carrier: 

“It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged

in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon reasonable request therefor; and . . . to establish physical

connections with other carriers, to establish through

routes and charges applicable thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to establish and provide fa-
2 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting

cilities and regulations for operating such through

routes.” 

Immediately following that description of duties and

powers, subsection (b) requires: 

“All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations 

for and in connection with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such

charge, practice, classification, or regulation that

is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be 

unlawful . . . .” 

The “charges, practices, classifications, and regulations”

referred to in subsection (b) are those “establish[ed]” under subsection (a). Having given common carriers discretionary power to set charges and establish regulations in 

subsection (a), Congress required in subsection (b) that the 

exercise of this power be “just and reasonable.” Thus, 

unless failing to pay a payphone operator arises from one 

of the duties under subsection (a), it is not a “practice” 

within the meaning of subsection (b). 

Subsection (a) prescribes a carrier’s duty to render

service either to customers (“furnish[ing] . . . communication service”) or to other carriers (e.g., “establish[ing] 

physical connections”); it does not set out duties related to

the receipt of service from suppliers. Consequently, given

the relationship between subsections (a) and (b), subsection (b) covers only those “practices” connected with the 

provision of service to customers or other carriers. The 

Court embraced this critical limitation in Missouri Pacific 

R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. S. 249 (1931), which held that

the term “practice” means a “‘practice’ in connection with

the fixing of rates to be charged and prescribing of service

to be rendered by the carriers.” Id., at 257. In Norwood, 

the Court interpreted language from the Interstate Commerce Act (as amended by the Mann-Elkins Act) that 

Congress just three years later copied into the Communi-
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

cations Act. Ante, at 3; see §7 of the Mann-Elkins Act of 

1910, 36 Stat. 546. In passing the Communications Act, 

Congress may “be presumed to have had knowledge” and 

to have approved of the Court’s interpretation in Norwood. 

See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 581 (1978). As a 

result, the Supreme Court’s contemporaneous interpretation of “practice” should bear heavily on our analysis.

Other terms in §201 support using Norwood’s restrictive 

interpretation of “practice.” A word “is known by the

company it keeps,” and one should not “ascrib[e] to one 

word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its 

accompanying words.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 

561, 575 (1995). Of the quartet “charges, practices, classifications, and regulations,” the terms “charges,” “classifications,” and “regulations” could apply only to the party

“furnish[ing]” service. “[C]harges” refers to the charges for

physical connections and through routes. 47 U. S. C. 

§§201(a), 202(b). “[R]egulations” relates to the operation

of through routes. §201(a). “[C]lassifications” refers to 

different sorts of communications that carry different

charges. §201(b). These three terms involve either setting 

rules for the provision of service or setting rates for that

provision. In keeping with the meaning of these terms,

the term “practices” must refer to only those practices “in 

connection with the fixing of rates to be charged and prescribing of service to be rendered by the carriers.” Norwood, supra, at 257. 

The statutory provisions surrounding §201 confirm this

interpretation. Section 203 requires that “[e]very common

carrier . . . shall . . . file with the Commission . . . schedules showing all charges for itself and its connecting carriers . . . and showing the classifications, practices, and 

regulations affecting such charges.” See also §§204–205 

(also using the phrase “charge, classification, regulation,

or practice” in the tariff context). The “charges” referred

to are those related to a carrier’s own services. §203 
4 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting

(“charges for itself and its connecting carriers”). The 

“classifications, practices, and regulations” are also limited

to a carrier’s own services. Ibid. (applying only to practices “affecting such charges”). In this context, “practices”

must mean only those “in connection with the fixing of

rates to be charged.” Norwood, 283 U. S., at 257. Section 

202—outside of the tariff context—also supports this

limitation. It forbids discrimination “in charges, practices, 

classifications, regulations, facilities, or services.” Discrimination occurs with respect to a carrier’s provision of

service—not its purchasing of services from others. I am 

unaware of any context in which §§202–205 were applied 

to conduct relating to the service that another party provided to a telecommunications carrier. 

In this case, Global Crossing has not provided any service to Metrophones. Rather, Global Crossing has failed to

pay for a service that Metrophones supplied. The failure 

to pay a supplier is not in any sense a “‘practice’ in connection with the fixing of rates to be charged and prescribing of service to be rendered by the carriers.” Id., at 257. 

Accordingly, Global Crossing has not engaged in a practice 

under subsection (b) because the failure to pay has not

come in connection with its provision of service or setting

of rates within the meaning of subsection (a). On this 

understanding of §201, Global Crossing’s failure to pay 

Metrophones is not a statutory violation. All that remains 

is a regulatory violation, which does not provide Metrophones a private right of action under §207.1 

—————— 

1Other enforcement mechanisms exist to redress Global Crossing’s

failure to pay. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has 

the power to impose fines under 47 U. S. C. §§503(b)(1)(B) and (2)(B). 

In addition, the FCC may have the authority to create an administrative right of action under §276(b)(1) (giving the FCC power to “take all

actions necessary” to “establish a per call compensation plan” that

ensures “all payphone service providers are fairly compensated”). 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

II 

The majority suggests that deference under Chevron 

U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 

467 U. S. 837 (1984), compels its conclusion that a carrier’s refusal to pay a payphone operator is unreasonable. 

But “unjust or unreasonable” is a statutory term, §201(b), 

and a court may not, in the name of deference, abdicate its

responsibility to interpret a statute. Under Chevron, an 

agency is due no deference until the court analyzes the 

statute and determines that Congress did not speak directly to the issue under consideration: 

“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional 

intent. . . . If a court, employing traditional tools of 

statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had 

an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.” Id., at 

843, n. 9. 

The majority spends one short paragraph analyzing the

relevant provisions of the Communications Act to determine whether a refusal to pay is an “‘unjust or unreasonable’” “‘practice.’” Ante, at 7. Its entire statutory analysis

is essentially encompassed in a single sentence in that

paragraph: “That is to say, in ordinary English, one can 

call a refusal to pay Commission-ordered compensation 

despite having received a benefit from the payphone operator a ‘practice . . . in connection with [furnishing a]

communication service . . . that is . . . unreasonable.’” 

Ibid. (omissions and modifications in original). This 

analysis ignores the interaction between §201(a) and 

§201(b), supra, at 1–2; it ignores the three terms surrounding the word “practice” and the context those terms

provide, supra, at 3–4; it ignores the use of the term “practice” in nearby statutory provisions, such as §§202–205, 
6 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.

METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting

supra, at 4; and it ignores the understanding of the term

“practice” at the time Congress enacted the Communications Act, supra, at 2–3. 

After breezing by the text of the statutory provisions at 

issue, the majority cites lower court cases to claim that

“the underlying regulated activity at issue here resembles 

activity that both transportation and communications

agencies have long regulated.” Ante, at 7–8 (citing Allnet 

Communication Serv., Inc. v. National Exch. Carrier 

Assn., Inc., 965 F. 2d 1118 (CADC 1992), and Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Allnet Communications Serv., Inc., 789 

F. Supp. 302 (ED Mo. 1992)). It argues that these cases

demonstrate that “communications firms entitled to revenues under rate divisions or cost allocations might bring

lawsuits under §207 . . . and obtain compensation or damages.” Ante, at 8. But in both cases, the only issue before 

the court was whether the lawsuit should be dismissed 

because the FCC had primary jurisdiction; and in both

cases, the answer was yes. Allnet, supra, at 1120–1123; 

Southwestern Bell, supra, at 304–306. The Court’s reliance on these cases is thus entirely misplaced because

both courts found they lacked jurisdiction; the cases do not

address §201 at all—the interpretation of which is the sole 

question in this case; and both cases assume without 

deciding that §207 applies, thus not grappling with the

point for which the majority claims their support.2 

III 

Finally, independent of the FCC’s interpretation of the 

—————— 

2The majority’s citation to Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. 

Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 609 F. 2d 1221 (CA7 1979), is similarly 

misplaced. There, the Court of Appeals interpreted the meaning of the

statutory requirement to “ ‘establish just, reasonable, and equitable

divisions’ ” under the Interstate Commerce Act. Id., at 1224. It is 

difficult to understand why the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of

different statutory language is relevant to the question we face in this 

case. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

language “unjust or unreasonable” “practice,” the FCC’s 

interpretation is unreasonable because it regulates both

interstate and intrastate calls. The unjust-andunreasonable requirement of §201(b) applies only to “practices . . . in connection with such communication service,” 

and the term “such communication service” refers to “interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio” in

§201(a) (emphasis added). Disregarding this limitation, 

the FCC has applied its rule to both interstate and intrastate calls. 47 CFR §64.1300 (2005). In light of the fact 

that the statute explicitly limits “unjust or unreasonable” 

“practices” to those involving “interstate or foreign communication,” the FCC’s application of §201(b) to intrastate 

calls is plainly an unreasonable interpretation of the 

statute. To make matters worse, the FCC has not even 

bothered to explain its clear misinterpretation. See In re 

Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd. 

19975 (2003).

The majority avoids directly addressing this argument

by stating there is no reason “to forbid the FCC from

concluding that an interstate half loaf is better than

none.” Ante, at 13. But if the FCC’s rule is unreasonable, 

Metrophones should not be able to recover for intrastate

calls in a suit under §207. Because intrastate calls cannot 

be the subject of an “unjust or unreasonable” practice

under §201, there is no private right of action to recover 

for them, and the Court should cut off that half of the loaf. 

By sidestepping this issue, the majority gives the lower 

court no guidance about how to handle intrastate calls on

remand. 

IV 

Because the majority allows the FCC to interpret the

Communications Act in a way that contradicts the unambiguous text, I respectfully dissent.