UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-4287

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

JESSE DOUGLAS ROBERSON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00012-RLV-CH-1) 

Submitted: December 8, 2009 Decided: December 31, 2009 

Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Claire J. Rauscher, Ann L. Hester, Kevin Tate, FEDERAL DEFENDERS 

OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Jesse Douglas Roberson appeals from the sixty-month 

sentence imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a 

written plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy with intent 

to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(b)(1)(A), (C), 846 (2006). Roberson’s counsel filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but 

questioning whether Roberson’s sentence was procedurally and 

substantively reasonable. Roberson was advised of his right to 

file a pro se brief, but has not done so. Finding no reversible 

error, we affirm. 

 Consistent with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 

(2005), the district court is required to follow a multi-step 

process at sentencing. First, it must calculate the proper 

sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); see also United States v. Abu 

Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 260 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 

1312 (2009). It must then consider that range in light of the 

parties’ arguments regarding the appropriate sentence and the 

factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), before imposing 

its sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50; see also Abu Ali, 528 

F.3d at 260. 

2 
 We review the district court’s sentence for abuse of 

discretion. Gall, 552 U.S. at 41. First, we must ensure the 

district court did not commit any “significant procedural 

error,” such as failing to properly calculate the advisory 

Guidelines sentence, consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, 

or adequately explain the sentence. Id. at 51. Once we have 

determined there is no procedural error, we must consider the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account 

the totality of the circumstances. Id. If the sentence imposed 

is within the appropriate Guidelines range, we consider it on 

appeal to be presumptively reasonable. United States v. Go, 517 

F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008). The presumption may be rebutted 

by a showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured 

against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 

445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

 Our review of the record reveals that the district 

court properly calculated Roberson’s applicable Guidelines 

range, taking into account the five-year statutory mandatory 

minimum sentence. Critically, because the Government did not 

move for a downward departure to reflect substantial assistance, 

the district court had no authority to depart below the 

mandatory minimum. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); Melendez v. United 

States, 518 U.S. 120, 125-26 (1996). Furthermore, Roberson’s 

3 
4 

within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable on appeal 

and Roberson has not rebutted that presumption. Therefore, we 

find that the district court committed no reversible error in 

sentencing Roberson to sixty months’ imprisonment. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Roberson, in writing, of his right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Roberson requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Roberson. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED