[Cite as Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Buckeye Lake Marina, Inc., 2011-Ohio-6465.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY 

COMPANY 

 Plaintiff-Appellant 

-vsBUCKEYE LAKE MARINA, INC. 

 Defendant-Appellee 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2011-CA-00027 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Fairfield County Court 

of Common Pleas, Case No. 2010-CV-585 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 8, 2011 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

STEVEN J. ZEEHANDELAR LES CHAMBERS 

Zeehandelar Sabatino & Associates, LLC 825 N. Houlk Road, Ste. 304 

471 E. Broad St., Ste. 1200 Delaware, OH 43015 

Columbus, OH 43215 

 

ALESSANDRO SABATINO, JR. 

Zeehandelar Sabatino & Associates, LLC 

471 E. Broad St., Ste. 1200 

Columbus, OH 43215
[Cite as Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Buckeye Lake Marina, Inc., 2011-Ohio-6465.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Grange Mutual Casualty Company appeals a summary 

judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County, Ohio, entered in favor of 

defendant-appellee Buckeye Lake Marina, Inc. Appellant assigns a single error to the 

trial court: 

{¶ 2} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, BUCKEYE LAKE MARINA, INC., BASED 

SOLELY ON THE EXCULPATORY CLAUSE CONTAINED IN THE WORK ORDER 

PROVIDED BY APPELLEE TO APPELLANT’S INSURED, STANLEY AUGSBURGER.” 

{¶ 3} The trial court found the following facts were undisputed. Grange’s insured, 

Stanley Augsburger, took his boat and towing trailer to the Marina’s premises in August 

2009 for repair work. Augsburger signed a service order which provided: 

{¶ 4} “I hereby authorize the above repair work to be done along with the 

necessary materials. You and your employees may operate the unit herein described 

on any waterways or elsewhere for purposes of testing, inspection, or delivery at my 

risk. An express mechanic’s lien is acknowledged on above the unit to secure the 

amount of repairs thereto. It is also understood that you will not be held responsible for 

loss or damage to the unit (or articles left in or with the unit) in case of fire, theft, 

accident, inclement weather conditions or any other cause beyond your control.” 

{¶ 5} At sometime during the period when the boat and trailer were on the 

Marina’s premises, they were stolen and have not been recovered. The court found the 

Marina’s premises are lighted, but has no security personnel. However, the owner and 

his family irregularly patrol the grounds. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2011-CA-00027 3 

{¶ 6} The service order is a contract between the Marina and Augsburger, and 

the trial court must construe the language as a matter of law. Leber v. Smith, 70 Ohio 

St.3d 548, 553, 1994-Ohio-361, 639 N.E.2d 1159. We review the trial court’s legal 

determinations de novo. Saunders v. Mortensen, 101 Ohio St.3d 86, 2004–Ohio–24, 

801 N.E.2d 452. 

{¶ 7} First, Grange argues the language in the exculpatory clause was vague or 

ambiguous regarding the Marina and its agents’ liability for negligence. Secondly, 

Grange argues the trial court erred in finding the exculpatory clause relieved the Marina 

of all liability for the loss of Augsburger’s boat and trailer. 

{¶ 8} The trial court correctly found this action involves a bailment, and so, when 

the Marina accepted Augsburger’s boat and trailer, it undertook two duties: (1) to 

safeguard the property through the exercise of ordinary care, and (2) to return the 

property undamaged. Judgment Entry at Pg. 3, citing Collins v. Click Camera & Video, 

Inc. (1993), 86 Ohio App. 3d 826, 621 N.E. 2d 1294. The trial court recited the elements 

of a claim against the bailee: (1) the existence of a bailment contract; (2) the delivery of 

the bailed property to the bailee; and (3) failure of the bailee to redeliver the bailed 

property undamaged at the termination of the bailment. Id. 

{¶ 9} The court found Grange had established all three elements of its cause of 

action, and there would be genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Marina 

exercised ordinary care in protecting the property. However, the trial court found the 

contract provision excused the Marina of liability for certain kinds of losses, including 

theft. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2011-CA-00027 4 

{¶ 10} Valid exculpatory clauses or releases constitute express 

assumptions of risk. Anderson v. Ceccardi (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 110, 114, 451 N.E.2d 

780. These clauses are to be strictly construed against the drafter unless the language 

is clear and unambiguous. 

{¶ 11} Grange argues the exculpatory clause does not set forth clearly 

that the Marina would not be liable for its negligence and/or the negligence of its 

employees and agents. Grange maintains the exculpatory clause refers only to causes 

beyond the Marina’s control, but the loss that occurred because of theft was not beyond 

the Marina’s control. Grange argues the boat was not stored in a secured area of the 

facility, but rather in an open lot on its trailer where a thief could easily drive up, hitch 

the property to a vehicle and drive away. 

{¶ 12} The trial court found the exculpatory provision specifically sets out 

various potential causes of loss or damage, including fire, theft, accident, and inclement 

weather, or any other cause beyond the Marina’s control. The trial court noted that 

while these were beyond the Marina’s control, it could take precautions to prevent or 

diminish damages caused by any of the stated factors. The court concluded the 

exculpatory clause excused the Marina from liability for any negligence in failing to take 

precautions to prevent damage or loss to the property. 

{¶ 13} We find the contract language is sufficiently clear and unambiguous 

that the Marina would not be responsible if the boat and trailer were stolen. 

{¶ 14} The assignment of error is overruled. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2011-CA-00027 5 

{¶ 15} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Fairfield County, Ohio, is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Wise, J., and 

Delaney, J., concur 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. JOHN W. WISE 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

 

WSG:clw 1107 

 
[Cite as Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Buckeye Lake Marina, Inc., 2011-Ohio-6465.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY 

COMPANY : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant : 

 : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

BUCKEYE LAKE MARINA, INC. : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee : CASE NO. 2011-CA-00027 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to appellant. 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. JOHN W. WISE 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY