United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-2462

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jeremy Logwood

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

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Submitted: April 16, 2021

Filed: July 14, 2021 

[Unpublished]

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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM. 

A federal grand jury charged Jeremy Logwood with conspiracy to distribute 

methamphetamine and distribution of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846. Prior to trial, Logwood filed a motion in limine to 
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exclude four videos of two controlled buys, which the district court1 denied. At trial, 

Logwood asked the district court to include a theory-of-defense jury instruction, 

which the district court also denied. The jury found Logwood guilty of both counts, 

and the district court sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment. Logwood 

appeals the district court’s denial of his motion in limine to exclude the videos and 

the district court’s refusal to include his proffered jury instruction. We affirm.

We begin by addressing Logwood’s argument that the videos should have 

been excluded. We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Dean, 823 F.3d 422, 426 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). 

The evidence at issue here consists of two videos of a controlled buy from 

April 27, which were labeled M5 and M7, and two videos of a controlled buy from 

May 5, which were also labeled M5 and M7. Logwood’s expert witness, Robert 

Gray, testified in a pretrial hearing that two of the videos—M5 from April 27 and 

M7 from May 5—contained dropped frames, meaning that tiny segments of the 

video were not recorded by the device throughout the course of the video. The 

dropped frames caused the audios to lag behind their respective videos. Gray also 

testified that the dropped frames caused the two videos from April 27, which 

recorded the same event, to be asynchronous with each other. When started at the 

same point and allowed to run for about an hour, one video showed events happening 

approximately fifteen seconds ahead of when the same events occurred in the other 

video. A similar thing happened with the two videos from May 5, only to a greater 

extent. When started at the same point and allowed to run at the same time, one 

video showed events happening approximately ten minutes ahead of when the same 

events occurred in the other video. But despite these issues, Gray testified that while 

it was theoretically possible that the videos had been manipulated, he “did not find 

any evidence” of manipulation. Logwood argues that this video evidence should 

have been excluded for two reasons. We disagree. 

1

The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern 

District of Arkansas. 
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First, Logwood argues that the videos should have been excluded under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because they were unreliable. Under Rule 403, a 

district court may “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a danger of,” among other things, “unfair prejudice, confusing the 

issues, [or] misleading the jury.” Logwood does not explain what about the tapes 

made them unfairly prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or misleading other than by 

pointing out that they had dropped frames, meaning that some content was lost. But

Logwood’s own expert testified that the lost content was in “tiny pieces” throughout 

the course of the video rather than in one ten-minute or fifteen-second “chunk.” 

Additionally, Logwood does not dispute that he was “free to address the quality . . . 

of the [videos] in [his] jury arguments.” See United States v. Martinez, 951 F.2d 

887, 888-89 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming the admission of poor-quality tapes in 

analogous circumstances). 

Second, Logwood contends that the videos were inadmissible because the 

devices that recorded them were incapable of recording. See United States v. Roach, 

28 F.3d 729, 733 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that one “foundational guideline[] for the 

admission of electronic tape recordings” is that “the recording device was capable 

of recording the events offered in evidence” (citing United States v. McMillan, 508 

F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1974))). But, as we have held, the capacity to record is 

proven by the fact that the recordings exist. See United States v. McCowan, 706 

F.2d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). This factor turns on whether the device 

can record, not whether the subsequent recording is perfect. See id. Because the 

recordings exist, the devices that recorded them were capable of recording. 

For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

the videos despite their imperfections. 

Next, we turn to Logwood’s argument that the district court should have given

his proffered theory-of-defense jury instruction. We review a district court’s 

rejection of a defendant’s proposed theory-of-defense instruction for an abuse of 
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discretion, recognizing that district courts have broad discretion in formulating jury 

instructions. See United States v. Gilmore, 968 F.3d 883, 886-87 (8th Cir. 2020); 

United States v. Thunder, 745 F.3d 870, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2014).2

 

Logwood’s proffered instruction stated his position that he did not have an 

agreement with anyone regarding possession or distribution of methamphetamine, 

that he did not deliver methamphetamine to anyone, and that the Government’s 

witnesses were not reliable or credible due to ulterior motives. It also stated that the

Government bore the burden of proof and that, if the evidence supporting 

Logwood’s position created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the jury must find him 

not guilty. 

Generally, “[d]efendants are entitled to a theory of defense instruction if it is 

timely requested, is supported by the evidence, and is a correct statement of the law.” 

Thunder, 745 F.3d at 874. However, a district court does not abuse its discretion in 

refusing the defendant’s proposed theory of defense “if the instructions as a whole, 

by adequately setting forth the law, afford counsel an opportunity to argue the 

defense theory and reasonably ensure that the jury appropriately considers it.” Id.; 

see also Gilmore, 968 F.3d at 886. 

Here, even assuming that Logwood’s instruction was timely requested, 

supported by the evidence, and a correct statement of the law, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion by declining to include it in the jury instructions because the 

2

Logwood argues that we should review the district court’s denial of his 

proposed instruction de novo. “We review a district court’s formulation of jury 

instructions for an abuse of discretion, but if the court’s refusal of a proffered 

instruction simultaneously denies a legal defense, the correct standard of review is 

de novo.” United States v. Glinn, 863 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, because Logwood’s instruction “essentially 

amount[s] to an assertion that he did not commit the crimes charged,” Logwood has 

not been denied a legal defense, and therefore we review the district court’s rejection 

of his instruction for an abuse of discretion. See Thunder, 745 F.3d at 873-74; see 

also Gilmore, 968 F.3d at 886-87.
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instructions as a whole fairly and adequately submitted the issues to the jury. The 

district court properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof, the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard, and the importance of assessing witness credibility—

including by considering each witness’s motives. See Thunder, 745 F.3d at 874. 

Logwood’s counsel also had the opportunity to argue to the jury Logwood’s theory 

that he had no agreement to distribute methamphetamine, that he did not deliver 

methamphetamine, and that the Government’s witnesses were not reliable. See id. 

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to submit 

Logwood’s proffered instruction to the jury. See id. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.3

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3

To the extent Logwood’s letter to this court dated June 12, 2021 moves for 

appointment of new counsel and for this court to send him various files pertaining 

to his case, we deny that motion.