J-A27027-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DOUGLAS S. TURNER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 56 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 5, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-64-CR-0000308-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 07, 2020

Appellant, Douglas S. Turner, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on July 5, 2018, in the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas. After 

review, we affirm.

On March 9, 2018, Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of involuntary 

deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), one count of statutory sexual assault, one 

count of aggravated indecent assault, and one count of indecent exposure.

1

 

These charges resulted from numerous sexual assaults committed upon a 

fourteen-year-old girl. Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 3/9/18, at 1; Affidavit of 

Probable Cause, 8/31/17. On July 5, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(7), 3122.1(b), 3125(a)(8), and 3127(a), 

respectively. 
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as follows: at count three, IDSI, a term of sixty to 120 months of 

incarceration; at count four, IDSI, sixty to 120 months of incarceration,

consecutive to count three; at count five, statutory sexual assault, twentyfour to forty-eight months of incarceration, concurrent to count three; at count 

seven, aggravated indecent assault, twenty-four to forty-eight months of 

incarceration, consecutive to count four; and at count eight, indecent 

exposure, three to twenty-four months of incarceration, concurrent to count 

three. Sentencing Order, 7/5/18,2 at 1-2. This resulted in an aggregated 

sentence of 144 to 288 months of incarceration in a State Correctional 

Institution. 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion that was denied by 

operation of law on December 11, 2018. This timely appeal followed. Both 

the trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence, and it is well settled that “[t]he right to appellate review of the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. 

Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014). When an appellant challenges 

the discretionary aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a 

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2 The sentencing order was corrected on July 12, 2018. Order, 7/12/18, at 

1-3. The initial order stated that the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term 

of forty-eight to sixty months at count four, and to a term of twenty-four to 

120 months at count five. Order, 7/5/18, at 1-2. 
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petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 

163 (Pa. Super. 2007).

As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. 

Super. 2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 

2006)):

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of 

appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the 

issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has 

a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Id. at 170. Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about 

the appropriateness of a sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-bycase basis. Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super. 

2001).

Here, the first three requirements of the four-part test are met: 

Appellant filed a timely appeal; Appellant preserved the issue in his postsentence motion; and Appellant included a statement raising this issue in his 

brief pursuant to Rule 2119(f). Moury, 992 A.2d at 170. Therefore, we must 

determine whether Appellant raised a substantial question.
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In order to determine whether Appellant has raised a substantial 

question, we examine the Rule 2119(f) statement. Commonwealth v. 

Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886-887 (Pa. Super. 2008). Allowance of appeal will 

be permitted only when the appellate court determines that there is a 

substantial question that the sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code.3 Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 805 (Pa. Super. 2006). A 

substantial question exists where an appellant sets forth a plausible argument 

that the sentence violates a particular provision of the Sentencing Code or is 

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. Id. 

“[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented and the 

prefatory 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question 

exists.” Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2013).

In his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, Appellant recites only the procedural 

history of this case. See Appellant’s Brief at 8. Were we to focus solely on 

this Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, we would conclude that all of Appellant’s 

issues are waived, as this statement fails to allege, much less establish, any 

argument that the sentence violates the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the 

fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. Hartle, 894 A.2d at 

805. 

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3 42 Pa.C.S. § 9701 et seq.
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In Appellant’s Statement of Questions Involved, he alleges that the trial 

court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence at the highest 

end of the Sentencing Guidelines, failed to consider the Sentencing Guidelines 

or the Sentencing Code, failed to state the reasons for the sentence, and failed 

to consider certain factors. Appellant’s Brief at 4. However, the argument 

portion of Appellant’s brief bears no relation to the Statement of Questions 

Involved. Moreover, Appellant failed to divide his argument into sections that 

correspond to the questions presented in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 

Although Appellant’s brief is far from a cogent challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed, we afford Appellant the benefit 

of the doubt; we conclude that Appellant has presented a substantial question 

insofar as he alleged that the aggregate sentence was excessive, the trial 

court failed to consider certain factors, and it failed to provide its reasoning 

for the sentence imposed. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 

769-770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (providing that an allegation that the sentence 

was excessive along with a claim that the court failed to consider certain 

mitigating factors raises a substantial question); see also Commonwealth 

v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 227 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating that a claim that 

sentencing court failed to set forth its reasons for the sentence raises a 

substantial question). However, after review, we conclude that Appellant is 

entitled to no relief.
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Our standard of review for challenges to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing is well settled:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted).

In the argument portion of Appellant’s brief, Appellant first restates his 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Appellant’s Brief at 11-13. He then notes that 

his prior record score was zero and sets forth sentencing ranges, which he 

deems to be in the “standard range.” Id. at 14. We are constrained to point 

out that Appellant appears to misapprehend the calculation and application of 

the Sentencing Guidelines. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a) (Basic Sentencing 

Matrix). The Sentencing Guidelines provide only for the minimum, not the 

maximum sentences. Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 153 (Pa.

Super. 2004). The Legislature establishes the maximum sentences for 

criminal offenses. See e.g., 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 1103-1104 (setting maximum 

terms for felony and misdemeanor offenses). 

As noted above, Appellant has a prior record score of zero. IDSI has an 

offense gravity score (“OGS”) of twelve, statutory sexual assault has an OGS 

of nine, aggravated indecent assault has an OGS of ten, and indecent 
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exposure has an OGS of four. 204 Pa. Code § 303.15. Accordingly, the 

standard range minimum sentences for each of Appellant’s crimes are as 

follows: IDSI, a minimum of between forty-eight to sixty-six months and a 

maximum term of twenty years; statutory sexual assault, a minimum of 

between twenty-four to forty-eight months and a maximum term of twenty

years; aggravated indecent assault, a minimum of between twenty-two to 

thirty-six months and a maximum term of ten years; and indecent exposure, 

a minimum of between restorative sanctions to three months and a maximum 

term of five years. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(7), 3122.1(b), 3125(a)(8), 

3127(a), 1103, 1104, and 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a).4 Thus, all of Appellant’s 

sentences were unquestionably standard-range sentences. 

Appellant then asserts “If the Appellant was sentenced under the 

Standard Range of the Sentencing Guidelines, the aggregate sentence would 

have been 102 months to 146 months.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant is 

incorrect; a sentence with a minimum term of 102 months and a maximum 

term of 146 months would have been illegal. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756(b)(1) 

(“The court shall impose a minimum sentence of confinement which shall not 

exceed one-half of the maximum sentence imposed.”); see also 

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4 This information was set forth correctly by the trial court in its preparation 

of the sentencing forms. Guideline Sentencing Forms, 7/19/18 (Certified 

Record, at #35). Additionally, the sentencing form correctly states the 

sentence imposed at each crime was in the standard range. Id. 
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Commonwealth v. Van Fossen, 749 A.2d 510 (Pa. Super. 2000) (noting 

that a minimum sentence that exceeds one-half of the maximum sentence is 

illegal).5

Appellant next discusses substance abuse. Appellant’s Brief at 16. This 

is a challenge to the trial court’s failure to consider mitigating factors. 

However, the record reflects that the trial court ordered and reviewed a

presentence investigation (“PSI”) report. Order, 3/9/18; Trial Court Opinion, 

4/11/19, at 5.6 In cases where the trial court is informed by a PSI report, it 

is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and 

considerations; where the court has been so informed, its discretion should 

not be disturbed. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 638 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[t]he sentencing judge can 

satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the 

record by indicating that he or she has been informed by the PSI [report,] 

thus properly considering and weighing all relevant factors.” Id. (citation 

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5 The requirement that a minimum sentence cannot exceed one-half of the 

maximum sentence is the general rule; there are some limited exceptions 

provided by statute. Commonwealth v. Postie, 110 A.3d 1034, 1044 n.14 

(Pa. Super. 2015). None of those exceptions applies in the instant case. 

6

In its opinion, the trial court notes that because Appellant failed to properly 

request the notes of testimony, they are not part of the certified record. Trial 

Court Opinion, 4/11/19, at 5. Without the sentencing transcripts, we are 

further hampered in our review, as we are unable to analyze what the trial 

court stated on the record relative to its sentencing considerations.
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omitted). Accordingly, there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that the trial 

court failed to consider Appellant’s substance abuse or any other factor. 

In the second section of Appellant’s argument, he avers there are dueprocess implications to the sentence that the trial court imposed. Appellant’s 

Brief at 18. Appellant then assails inconsistent sentences and cites a number

of federal cases without explaining how or why they are relevant. Id. at 19. 

Appellant concludes this section by asking this Court to reduce the aggregate 

sentence of 144 to 288 months to a term of 102 to 136 months. Id. at 21. 

We reiterate that such a sentence would be illegal. Van Fossen, 749 A.2d at 

510; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756(b)(1).

In the final section of the argument, Appellant baldly claims that the 

sentence of 144 to 288 months “was far greater than the aggravated range 

guideline sentence[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 21. As discussed above, the trial 

court did not impose any sentence in or beyond the aggravated range; the 

trial court sentenced Appellant in the standard range of the Sentencing 

Guidelines on each count. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(7), 3122.1(b), 3125(a)(8), 

3127(a), 1103, 1104, and 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a). Accordingly, this 

assertion is meritless. 

Appellant next claims that the trial court failed to state its reasons for 

deviating “from the [S]entencing [G]uidelines, over and above the aggravated 

range.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. Again, Appellant was not sentenced in the 

aggravated range of the guidelines. Moreover, as we discussed above, the 
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trial court had the benefit of a PSI report and considered all relevant factors 

when it fashioned Appellant’s sentence. To the extent that Appellant is 

unhappy with the duration of the aggregate sentence due to the three 

sentences that run consecutively (counts three, four, and seven), that 

determination is left to the discretion of the trial court. See Commonwealth 

v. Gonzalez–Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. 2010) (42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9721 affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence 

concurrently or consecutively to other sentences) (citation omitted); see also 

Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214 (1995) (explaining that a 

defendant is not entitled to a “volume discount” for his crimes). As we noted 

above, a PSI report was ordered, prepared, and considered by the trial court. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/19, at 5. The trial court also considered the 

Sentencing Guidelines and imposed sentences in the standard range. 

Guideline Sentencing Forms, Certified Record, at #35; 204 Pa. Code 

§ 303.16(a). We will not re-weigh these sentencing factors or impose our 

judgment in place of the sentencing court. Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 

A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Finally, Appellant declares “the proper, total aggravated sentence 

should have been computed to be 132 months to 176 months.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 22. Once more, a sentence with a minimum term of 132 months and 

a maximum term of 176 months would be an illegal sentence. Van Fossen, 
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749 A.2d at 510; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756(b)(1). Accordingly, this specious claim 

warrants no relief.

After review, we conclude that there is no merit to any of Appellant’s 

arguments, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court imposing 

an aggregate sentence of 144 to 288 months of incarceration. Accordingly, 

we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/7/20