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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Docket No. 47408

STATE OF IDAHO,

 Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TOMAS DANIEL GARCIA-ONGAY,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Boise, May 2021 Term

Opinion Filed: June 28, 2021

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Elmore County. Nancy Baskin, District Judge. 

The decision of the district court is reversed and remanded.

Eric D. Frederickson, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. 

Justin M. Curtis argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. John C. 

McKinney argued.

_______________________

BURDICK, Justice.

This case concerns whether a criminal defendant should have been permitted to conduct 

an investigation into the racial animus of a juror following a credible report that, prior to voir 

dire, the juror expressed an intention to convict on the basis of race. Tomas Daniel Garcia-Ongay 

appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. 

After Garcia-Ongay’s conviction, the Elmore County Jury Commissioner informed the district 

court of his concerns that a juror in the trial had expressed clear racial bias when he was 

summoned for jury duty. In light of this information, Garcia-Ongay moved for a new trial and 

requested that the district court grant permission for him to investigate whether racial animus 

tainted the jury’s deliberations. The district court denied the motion and the accompanying

request. On appeal, Garcia-Ongay contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying 

his request for further investigation, arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in 
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Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), permits such an inquiry. For the reasons 

below, we reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 9, 2017, a jury convicted Garcia-Ongay of lewd and lascivious conduct with a 

minor under sixteen years of age. The following day, the Elmore County Jury Commissioner 

emailed the district court, bringing to its attention pretrial statements made by a juror in GarciaOngay’s trial. Specifically, the email stated:

This morning I realized that there may be an issue regarding one of the 

impaneled jurors on the Garcia-Ongay trial, [Juror #9].1

A while back when he 

received his summons he contacted me saying that he was a convicted felon. As it 

turns out he was successfully discharged from probation without any issues, and 

therefore a qualified juror in Idaho. Needless to say that was not what he wanted 

to hear, and he responded with something to the effect of “I hope I get put on a 

trial with a Mexican so I can find them guilty, and I hope that Trump builds that 

wall.”

I often get jurors that say things similar to this, and I generally just assume 

that they’re trying to get out of jury duty and I doubt they genuinely feel this way. 

However, the fact that the defendant was Hispanic and he was found guilty is 

concerning. Additionally, I didn’t listen to the entirety of voir dire, and don’t 

know for certain whether or not he mentioned his conviction. I thought I should 

bring this to your attention. 

Based on this email, Garcia-Ongay moved for a new trial, arguing that the reported 

statements by Juror #9 called into question the validity of his conviction under the U.S. Supreme 

Court’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez. The district court heard oral argument on the motion on 

February 12, 2018. At that time, Garcia-Ongay’s defense counsel clarified his position with 

respect to the motion for a new trial, stating that a new trial is “the eventual outcome of what we 

want[,] [b]ut before we get there . . . my desire would be to . . . interview the jurors or have them 

interviewed by an investigator or brought before the court for an in-camera interview about this 

bias.” Defense counsel conceded that there was not yet evidence of any prejudicial remarks made 

during deliberations but argued that under Peña-Rodriguez he should be permitted to “interview 

these jurors and find out what, if anything, may have been said in deliberations.”

The district court took the matter under advisement and issued a written decision and 

order denying Garcia-Ongay’s motion and request for further investigation on September 6, 

2018. The district court reasoned that Juror #9’s comments did not necessitate an investigation of 

 1 Although the Jury Commissioner identified the juror as juror number five in his email, we refer to the juror by the 

number assigned during voir dire. 
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jury deliberations because the statement was unsworn and occurred more than a month before 

trial. Further, the district court noted that Juror #9 did not make any statements during voir dire 

indicating racial bias, nor did any other jurors come forward after trial to indicate that Juror #9 

made racist statements during deliberations. As a result, the district court denied Garcia-Ongay’s 

motion for a new trial and oral motion for an investigation into potential racial animus in the 

jury’s deliberations.

Garcia-Ongay timely appealed. 

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. What standard applies to a post-verdict request for juror contact to investigate potential 

racial animus? 

2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Garcia-Ongay to conduct an 

investigation into racial animus in the jury’s deliberations?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s decision to permit post-verdict discovery of jurors is reviewed according to 

an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 45, 253 P.3d 716, 719 

(2011). Under that standard, this Court asks “whether the district court ‘(1) correctly perceived 

the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted 

consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) 

reached its decision by the exercise of reason.’” State v. Hess, 166 Idaho 707, 709, 462 P.3d 

1171, 1173 (2020) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 873, 421 P.3d 187, 204 

(2018)). 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Garcia-Ongay must demonstrate good cause to believe that racial animus tainted the 

jury’s deliberations to conduct a post-verdict investigation of any juror misconduct. 

As a preliminary matter, we address the appropriate standard to apply to Garcia-Ongay’s 

request for an investigation into racial animus in the jury’s deliberations. The district court 

appears to have applied the two-part test for whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial based 

on juror misconduct from State v. Seiber, 117 Idaho 637, 791 P.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1989). That test 

requires (1) the defendant prove by clear and convincing evidence that juror misconduct 

occurred and (2) the trial court is convinced the “misconduct reasonably could have prejudiced 

the defendant.” Id. at 640, 791 P.2d at 21. In contrast, Garcia-Ongay requests that this Court 

apply the “good cause” standard from Hall to his request to interview jurors after the trial. That 
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standard permits questioning the jury where good cause exists, suggesting that juror misconduct 

occurred. Id. at 50, 253 P.3d at 724. In its briefing, the State appears to take both positions,

arguing that “Garcia-Ongay failed to meet his burden of showing ‘good cause’” for the 

investigation, while also incorporating by reference the district court’s analysis with respect to 

the two-part test for a new trial based on juror misconduct. During the oral argument on appeal, 

however, the State conceded that the district court applied the wrong test and argued under the 

good cause standard. 

We hold that the good cause test from Hall is the appropriate standard to apply in ruling 

upon motions such as the motion being appealed in this case. After the Jury Commissioner’s

email, Garcia-Ongay made two discrete requests of the district court: (1) that the district court 

grant permission to interview or otherwise investigate whether there was racial animus in the 

jury’s deliberations, and (2) that the district court grant Garcia-Ongay’s motion for a new trial 

based on a juror’s improper racial animus. The district court applied the standard appropriate for 

the second request, but it is the denial of the first request that forms the basis of this appeal. 

Accordingly, the proper inquiry is whether Garcia-Ongay demonstrated good cause to suggest 

the jury’s deliberations were tainted by impermissible racial prejudice. See Hall, 151 Idaho at 50, 

253 P.3d at 724.

B. The district court abused its discretion in denying Garcia-Ongay’s request for an 

investigation into racial animus in the jury’s deliberations. 

To begin, we discuss the precise nature of the question before this Court. Clearly defining 

that question informs the scope of our analysis and the focus of our inquiry. To that end, we have 

not been asked, nor do we decide, whether Garcia-Ongay has presented evidence entitling him to 

a new trial. Rather, we have only been asked to determine whether the district court abused its 

discretion in denying Garcia-Ongay’s motion for post-verdict juror contact to investigate 

potential racial prejudice in the jury’s deliberations. 

As to that question, both parties agree that Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b) is the starting 

point of our analysis. Rule 606(b)2 provides, in pertinent part:

(1) . . . During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror 

may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the 

 2 Garcia-Ongay made his motion for a new trial and accompanying request for an investigation after the adoption of 

a revision to I.R.E. 606(b) but before the effective date of the revised rule. The district court issued its decision and 

order after the effective date of the revision and used the new version of the rule in its analysis. We cite to the 

current version of the rule because the substantive portions of the rule applicable to this case are unchanged. 
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jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; 

or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.

The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on 

these matters.

(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:

(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s 

attention;

(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or

(C) the jury determined any issue by resort to chance . . . . 

I.R.E. 606(b). This is Idaho’s embodiment of the common law “no impeachment rule,” which 

bars jurors from calling into question the validity of a verdict with testimony about their 

deliberations. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863–65 (discussing the common law origins of 

the no impeachment rule and the various jurisdictional approaches to that rule).

In Peña-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court examined whether the no impeachment rule, as 

embodied in Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b), prevented a trial court from considering two 

juror affidavits that another juror made racist statements during deliberations. 137 S. Ct. at 862–

63. The Supreme Court weighed the history and purposes of the no impeachment rule against its 

jurisprudence seeking to eliminate racial discrimination from the administration of justice. Id. at 

868. On one hand, the Supreme Court reasoned that the no impeachment rule promoted full and 

free deliberations among jurors because of the assurance that they would not be haled back into 

court to discuss their deliberations after being discharged. Id. at 865. Moreover, the Supreme 

Court emphasized the importance of the no impeachment rule in providing not only finality for 

jurors, but finality for verdicts as well. Id. On the other hand, the Supreme Court recognized that 

even the perception of race-based animus in the jury system “damages . . . the jury’s role as ‘a 

vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State.’” Id. at 868 (quoting Powers v. 

Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)). Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the no impeachment 

rule has a constitutional exception, rooted in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, which 

allows a trial court to consider evidence of racial animus in jury deliberations “where a juror 

makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict 

a criminal defendant.” Id. at 869.

In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that the traditional safeguards 

against juror misconduct, such as voir dire and jurors’ reports of misconduct, were not always
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effective at rooting out racial animus. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868–69. For instance, it

noted that it is unlikely that general questions concerning bias asked during voir dire would 

expose racial prejudice, and targeted, specific questions may only inflame such bias without 

revealing it. Id. at 869. In other words, the likelihood that a prospective juror would openly admit 

in front of his peers that he is bigoted is slim, and asking each juror specifically about racial bias 

may only deepen feelings of racial animus without exposing them. Similarly, the Supreme Court

expressed doubt at the potential for juror reports of misconduct to effectively combat racial 

animus because such reports, while useful, may be self-censored by concerned jurors due to the 

social stigma that attends calling another juror a racist. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court buttressed its

holding, reasoning that additional precautions are necessary to engender confidence in the jury 

system by eliminating actual and perceived racial bias in deliberations. Id.

We have not had the occasion to apply Peña-Rodriguez to Idaho law. We have, however, 

emphasized the importance of purging racial discrimination from the jury system in other 

contexts. See State v. Ish, 166 Idaho 492, 500, 461 P.3d 774, 782 (2020) (“The Equal Protection 

Clause requires a criminal trial free from racial discrimination in the jury-selection process.”). 

Accordingly, we approach the issue in this case mindful of “[t]he unmistakable principle . . . that 

discrimination on the basis of race, ‘odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the 

administration of justice’” Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 

545, 555 (1979)). 

Here, unlike Peña-Rodriguez, the question before us does not concern whether the district 

court could properly consider evidence of racial animus in the jury’s deliberations despite the no 

impeachment rule set forth in I.R.E. 606(b). Instead, we are asked to decide whether I.R.E. 

606(b) proscribes contacting jurors after the verdict to obtain evidence of potential racial animus 

in the jury’s deliberations. In other words, does I.R.E. 606(b) prohibit post-verdict juror contact 

to discover potential race-based misconduct?

To that end, we have already answered a similar question in Hall. There, we considered 

whether a district court abused its discretion in denying a defendant’s motion for a post-verdict 

juror interview seeking to investigate juror misconduct during his trial. Hall, 151 Idaho at 48–49, 

253 P.3d at 722–23. The district court limited its review of the defendant’s motion to whether the 

defendant would be able to discover admissible testimony under I.R.E. 606(b). Id. at 50–51, 253 

P.3d at 724–25. Ultimately, the district court concluded there was no evidence that the defendant 
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would be able to discover testimony admissible under I.R.E. 606(b) and denied the motion. Id. 

This Court concluded that limiting the scope of a motion for juror contact to only those topics on 

which a juror could permissibly testify under I.R.E. 606(b) was erroneous. Id. at 51, 253 P.3d at 

725. We reasoned that “[t]he goal in limiting contact with the jury is not to unduly restrict the 

discovery of evidence suggesting juror misconduct, but rather to protect jurors from unwanted 

contact and potential harassment.” Id. at 50–51, 253 P.3d at 724–25. Accordingly, we held that 

“[t]he appropriate test is whether . . . there was good cause to believe that juror misconduct had

occurred . . . [and] [i]f such a showing was made the court should have permitted juror contact, 

limited to the subject of such misconduct, irrespective of whether that contact would lead to 

admissible juror testimony.” Id. at 51, 253 P.3d at 725. 

Viewing the above as a whole, we recognize that in cases like this one there are multiple 

standards that may be employed sequentially where a credible allegation of potential racial 

animus in the jury’s deliberations has been made. Therefore, a trial court must be cognizant of 

the multiple steps that could attend a defendant’s motion for a new trial in order to apply the 

correct standard at the correct time. 

First, where a defendant learns that a juror made pretrial statements exhibiting racial 

animus, as is the case here, he may request the trial court to permit a post-verdict investigation to 

gather evidence in support of a motion for a new trial. Indeed, Peña-Rodriguez contemplates the 

ability of a defendant to conduct such investigations subject to a local standard, stating “[t]he 

practical mechanics of acquiring and presenting” evidence of race-based discrimination in 

deliberations are “shaped and guided” by local rules limiting post-trial contact of jurors. 137 S. 

Ct. at 869. As to those local rules, in Idaho the Hall standard is the appropriate test for a trial 

court to apply when considering a defendant’s request for post-verdict juror contact for the 

purpose of gathering evidence of juror misconduct. Under that standard, a defendant must 

demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence good cause to believe that such misconduct 

occurred in order to conduct a post-verdict investigation. However, a post-verdict investigation is 

not a requirement, and the need for such an investigation may not arise if the defendant already 

has evidence of racial animus in the jury’s deliberations. See Peña-Rodriguez, 861–62 (defendant 

presented trial court with juror affidavits alleging race-based misconduct without a prior 

investigation into deliberations).
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Next, when weighing whether to grant a defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the 

evidence presented of juror misconduct, the trial court must apply the standard articulated in

Seiber, which requires a defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that racial 

prejudice tainted jury deliberations and that such misconduct “reasonably could have prejudiced 

the defendant.” 117 Idaho at 640, 791 P.2d at 21. In applying that standard, the trial court will 

almost certainly be asked to consider evidence that could be excluded by the no-impeachment 

rule articulated in Rule 606(b). It is in this context that application of the Peña-Rodriguez

standard comes to the fore. Under these circumstances, a defendant may bring an as-applied 

constitutional challenge to Rule 606(b) on the basis of the constitutional exception to the noimpeachment rule described in Peña-Rodriguez. Thus, if the issue is raised to the trial court, it 

must consider whether the evidence presented is merely an “offhand comment indicating racial 

bias,” which may be excluded, or “a clear statement that indicates [a juror] relied on racial 

stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant,” in which case Rule 606(b) must yield to 

the constitutional considerations discussed in Peña-Rodriguez.

To summarize, the Hall standard controls whether and when a defendant may contact 

jurors to investigate potential racial animus in jury deliberations and the standard described in 

Seiber governs a trial court’s determination with respect to a motion for a new trial based on 

juror misconduct. In applying the latter standard, a trial court must consider evidence that could 

be excluded under Rule 606(b). However, a defendant may challenge the exclusion of that 

evidence under Peña-Rodriguez, which augers a constitutional exception into Rule 606(b) in

certain factual circumstances.

In light of the above framework, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in 

denying Garcia-Ongay’s motion to interview the jurors because it applied the wrong standard to 

the question before it. The district court recognized the issue was one of discretion, indicating, “it 

is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether racial animus motivated a decision.” In 

addition, the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion, considering and ruling 

only on the motions before it. Also, the district court reached its conclusion through the exercise 

of reason, thoroughly discussing the facts and legal issues before it. Nevertheless, we conclude 

the district court did not act consistently with applicable legal principles because it prematurely 

applied the standard for a motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. The district court’s 

analysis was based on the second step discussed above, set forth in Seiber, as opposed to the first
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step, set forth in Hall. That is, the district court determined that there was no clear and 

convincing evidence of juror misconduct and that the allegations of prejudiced statements from 

Juror #9 did not satisfy the standard from Peña-Rodriguez. While we agree with the district 

court’s reasoning that a single unsworn statement months before trial likely does not satisfy the 

Peña-Rodriguez standard, nor rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence of juror 

misconduct, the proper inquiry is whether the Jury Commissioner’s email gave good cause to 

believe that race-based misconduct occurred during deliberations.

As to whether Garcia-Ongay carried his burden under the Hall standard, we hold good 

cause existed to indicate race-based juror misconduct might have occurred. First, the report of 

Juror #9’s statement came from a highly credible source, the Elmore County Jury Commissioner, 

and was a clear indication of intent to convict on the basis of race. Second, the target of the racial 

animus demonstrated from Juror #9’s statement coincides with the race of the defendant. Of 

course, the impact of this isolated statement is somewhat mitigated by the lack of any statement 

of bias during the limited voir dire of Juror #9, and that no juror stepped forward to allege that 

racial animus tainted deliberations. That being said, we are cognizant that these are the specific 

factors the Supreme Court indicated were of limited efficacy in rooting out racial bias in the 

administration of justice. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868–69. In any event, the good cause 

standard is a lower bar than the Peña-Rodriguez standard as it only concerns whether there is 

sufficient reason to believe that evidence which could satisfy the Peña-Rodriguez standard 

exists. Under these facts, we conclude that the benefit of the doubt cannot be given to Juror #9’s 

alleged statement of intent to convict on the basis of race, and confidence in the administration of 

justice demands an investigation into whether Juror #9 made good on his promise. We commend 

the Jury Commissioner who, while under no legal or professional duty to report Juror #9’s 

statements, saw fit to raise this troubling information with the district court. The Jury 

Commissioner’s report served the Judiciary’s mission to provide access to justice through the 

timely, fair, and impartial resolution of cases. 

Inasmuch as we have concluded that good cause existed to justify an investigation into 

potential racial bias in the jury’s deliberations, we must next discuss the proper scope of the

investigation on remand. First, we hold that Garcia-Ongay may interview Juror #9 to determine 

if he relied on racial stereotypes or animus in reaching his guilty vote. Next, following that 

interview, we hold that it is within the sound discretion of the district court to determine how and 
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if Garcia-Ongay may contact other jurors in the case to investigate whether potential racial 

animus was present during their deliberations. In setting the scope of this investigation, the 

district court must “balance its legitimate goal of juror protection with the court’s primary duty 

of ensuring that justice is done and that defendants receive fair trials.” Hall, 151 Idaho at 51, 253 

P.3d at 725. If this investigation yields evidence of racial animus in the jury’s deliberations, and 

Garcia-Ongay renews his motion for a new trial, the district court may then properly apply Rule 

606(b) and Peña-Rodriguez to decide if the evidence may be factored into its determination of 

whether a new trial should be ordered based on juror misconduct.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying 

Garcia-Ongay’s request for post-trial juror contact because good cause existed to suggest that 

racial animus could have tainted the jury’s deliberations. Accordingly, we remand the matter to 

allow Garcia-Ongay to interview Juror #9 and, in the discretion of the district court, contact the 

other jurors to investigate whether racial prejudice infected their deliberations. 

Chief Justice BEVAN and Justices BRODY, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.