[Cite as State v. Morrar, 2015-Ohio-4234.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

MADISON COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2015-05-018 

 

 : O P I N I O N 

 - vs - 10/13/2015 

 : 

MAHMUD I. MORRAR, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. CRI 20090100 

Stephen J. Pronai, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, Rachel Price, 59 North Main 

Street, London, Ohio 43140, for appellee 

Mahmud I. Morrar, #A616322, London Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 69, London, Ohio 

43140, appellant, pro se 

 RINGLAND, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Mahmud I. Morrar, appeals from a judgment of the 

Madison County Common Pleas Court overruling his motion for post-judgment relief under 

Civ.R. 60(B). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

{¶ 2} In 2009, appellant was convicted of discharging a firearm into a habitation, an 

accompanying firearm specification, and fleeing and eluding, for which he received a 15-year 
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aggregate prison sentence. Appellant's convictions stemmed from his firing a handgun into 

the home of his business associates, and then leading police on a high-speed chase 

afterwards. This court affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State 

v. Morrar, 12th Dist. Madison Nos. CA2009-10-021 and CA2009-10-022, 2010-Ohio-2310. 

{¶ 3} In 2014, appellant filed a motion in the trial court in which he essentially sought 

postconviction relief on the ground that Madison County was not the proper venue for his 

trial. State v. Morrar, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2013-08-027, 2014-Ohio-3663, ¶ 4. The trial 

court found that because appellant had failed to raise this argument previously, the argument 

was barred by res judicata. Id. This court affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. at ¶ 6-14. 

{¶ 4} On May 7, 2015, appellant filed a "Motion for Post Judgment Relief Pursuant to 

Civ.R. 60(B)(5)," in which he again argued that Madison County was not the proper venue for 

his trial. The state filed a "Notice of Opposition" to appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion. On May 

15, 2015, the trial court overruled appellant's motion for post-judgment relief, finding that it 

was barred by res judicata. 

{¶ 5} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following as error: 

{¶ 6} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶ 7} THE TRIAL COURT GAVE BIRTH TO A CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN IT 

PERMITTED THE TRIAL JUDGE TO MAKE A RULING ON THE APPELLANT'S MOTION 

FOR POST JUDGMENT RELIEF, WHEN THE TRIAL COURT WAS RESPECTFULLY 

REQUESTED BY THE APPELLANT NOT TO DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL 

JUDGE WAS THE STATES [sic] PROSECUTOR IN THE PRIOR PROCEEDINGS AND AT 

A JURY TRIAL ON THIS CASE. 

{¶ 8} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶ 9} THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS 

WHEN IT PREMATURELY MADE A RULING ON THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR POST 
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JUDGMENT RELIEF AND BY DOING SO ABUSED IT'S [sic] DISCRETION. 

{¶ 10} Assignment of Error No. 3: 

{¶ 11} THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 

DUE PROCESS OF THE LAW TO BE CHARGED IN THE COUNTY WHERE THE 

ALLEGED CRIME OCCURRED & BE INDICTED [sic]. 

{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in ruling on 

his Civ.R. 60 motion in which he sought to have his 2009 conviction and sentence vacated. 

Appellant notes that the prosecutor in his 2009 trial is now a judge on the Madison County 

Court of Common Pleas. Although his argument is not entirely clear, appellant appears to 

suggest that it was this former prosecutor, now trial judge, who overruled his Civ.R. 60(B) 

motion for post-judgment relief. Appellant contends that he asked the trial court to not allow 

"the presiding judge to make a ruling [in order] to avoid a conflict of interest." He further 

contends that he had "no chance of receiving a fair and impartial ruling" from this [former 

prosecutor, now] trial judge, and therefore his due process rights were violated. 

{¶ 13} The state responds to appellant's argument by acknowledging that the assistant 

prosecutor who tried appellant's case, Eamon P. Costello, is now the judge of the Madison 

County Court of Common Pleas. The state asserts that this is the very reason that Judge 

Costello did not sign the entry overruling appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for post-judgment 

relief. The state notes that the judge who presided at appellant's original trial, Judge Robert 

D. Nichols, has continued to preside over appellant's criminal proceedings, and that it was 

Judge Nichols who signed the entry denying appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for postjudgment relief. The record supports the state's contentions. Accordingly, appellant's first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 14} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court violated his 

due process rights and abused its discretion when it prematurely ruled on his Civ.R. 60(B) 
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motion for post-judgment relief. Specifically, appellant contends that the trial court erred and 

abused its discretion by failing to give him ten days to respond to the state's notice of 

opposition to his Civ.R. 60(B) motion and by failing to hold a hearing on the merits of his 

claims. We disagree with these contentions. 

{¶ 15} The trial court was not required to give appellant ten days to respond to the 

state's notice of opposition to appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Crim.R. 47 states as follows: 

An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A 

motion, other than one made during trial or hearing, shall be in 

writing unless the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state 

with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall set 

forth the relief or order sought. It shall be supported by a 

memorandum containing citations of authority, and may also be 

supported by an affidavit. 

To expedite its business, the court may make provision by rule or 

order for the submission and determination of motions without 

oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support 

and opposition. 

 

{¶ 16} Crim.R. 47 allows a court to "make provision by rule or order for the submission 

and determination of motions without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in 

support and opposition." Here, it is not clear whether the trial court explicitly made "provision 

by rule or order for the submission and determination" of appellant's motion for postjudgment relief. Nevertheless, appellant's motion for post-judgment relief contained a brief 

statement of reasons in support of his motion, and the state filed a notice of opposition that 

contained a brief statement of reasons in opposition to appellant's motion. Nothing in 

Crim.R. 47 requires that the moving party be given an opportunity to file a reply to the 

opposing party's response. Further, the issue contained in appellant's motion for postjudgment relief, i.e., that Madison County was not the proper venue for appellant's trial, 

already had been thoroughly litigated in these proceedings. 

{¶ 17} For this same reason, there was no need for the trial court to hold a hearing on 
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appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion as the issue of venue that was raised in appellant's motion for 

post-judgment relief had been raised earlier in these proceedings, and therefore, appellant 

was barred from raising that same issue again by res judicata. See State v. Davis, 139 Ohio 

St.3d 122, 2014-Ohio-1615, ¶ 28 (final judgment of conviction bars convicted defendant who 

was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal 

from that judgment any defense that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant 

at the trial that resulted in that judgment of conviction or an appeal from that judgment). In 

light of the foregoing, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 18} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues the state failed to prove that 

Madison County was the proper venue for his trial, and therefore, the trial court violated his 

constitutional right to be charged in the county where the alleged crimes occurred. However, 

appellant raised this same argument in his 2014 motion in which he was essentially seeking 

postconviction relief. See Morrar, 2014-Ohio-3663, ¶ 4, 6-13. The trial court found that 

appellant's arguments regarding venue were barred by res judicata, and this court affirmed 

the trial court's ruling. Id. Appellant is barred from raising this same argument in this appeal 

for the same reasons we set forth in Morrar. Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of 

error is overruled. 

{¶ 19} Judgment affirmed. 

S. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.