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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

February 24, 2020

2020 CO 15

No. 18SC326, Howard v. People—Sentencing—Juvenile Law—Crimes of 

Violence—Probation.

In this case, the supreme court considers whether the differences in 

sentencing guidance in the direct-file statute, § 19-2-517, C.R.S. (2019), and the 

transfer statute, § 19-2-518, C.R.S. (2019), implicate a juvenile’s right to equal 

protection. Specifically, the supreme court considers whether a juvenile who is 

subject to the direct-file statute and convicted of a crime of violence is eligible for 

probation when a juvenile who is subject to the transfer statute and convicted of 

the same crime of violence would not be eligible for probation. The supreme court 

holds that under these facts, there is no equal protection violation because the 

district court did not apply the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the 

crime of violence statute and neither direct-filed juveniles nor transferred juveniles 

convicted of crimes of violence are eligible for probation. Accordingly, the 

judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed on different grounds. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado

2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

2020 CO 15

Supreme Court Case No. 18SC326

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Case No. 15CA629

Petitioner:

Nevik Dean Howard,

v.

Respondent:

The People of the State of Colorado.

Judgment Affirmed

en banc

February 24, 2020

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Megan A. Ring, Public Defender

John Plimpton, Deputy Public Defender

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General

William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Juvenile Defender Center, Colorado 

Criminal Defense Bar, and Office of Alternate Defense Counsel:

Law Offices of Ann M. Roan, LLC

Ann M. Roan

Boulder, Colorado

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
2

¶1 There are two ways that a juvenile can be charged as an adult in district 

court. First, the juvenile can be charged directly in district court under section 

19-2-517, C.R.S. (2019) (the “direct-file statute”). Second, the juvenile can be 

transferred to the district court from the juvenile court under section 19-2-518, 

C.R.S. (2019) (the “transfer statute”). This case concerns the sentencing options 

available for direct-filed juveniles as compared to transferred juveniles who are 

both convicted of crimes of violence as defined in section 18-1.3-406, C.R.S. (2019)

(the “crime of violence statute”).

¶2 Nevik Howard, a sixteen-year-old, was convicted of first-degree assault (a 

crime of violence) and first-degree criminal trespass after his case was transferred 

from juvenile court to district court. During the sentencing hearing, Howard 

argued that he was subject to a more severe penalty for a crime of violence 

conviction under the transfer statute than he would be if this were a direct-file case 

because direct-filed juveniles are exempted “from the mandatory minimum 

sentencing provisions in [the crime of violence statute],” whereas transferred 

juveniles are not. Thus, he argued that his equal protection rights were violated. 

To address that equal protection concern, the district court determined that the 

mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute would 

not apply in this transfer proceeding, just as they would not apply in a direct-file 

proceeding. The court further determined, however, that this ruling did not make 
3

Howard eligible for probation. Instead, the court concluded that the statutory 

scheme only allowed either (1) a youth offender services (“YOS”) sentence with a 

suspended Department of Corrections (“DOC”) sentence, or (2) a DOC sentence. 

The court ultimately sentenced Howard to six years in YOS with a suspended 

fifteen-year DOC sentence.

¶3 Howard appealed, arguing that the district court violated his equal 

protection rights by concluding that he was not eligible for probation under the 

transfer statute when he would have been under the direct-file statute. The court 

of appeals affirmed Howard’s sentence, holding that “equal protection [did] not 

apply” because “Howard [was] not similarly situated to direct file eligible

juveniles.” People v. Howard, No. 15CA629, ¶ 35 (Mar. 22, 2018).

¶4 We granted certiorari1 and affirm the court of appeals on different grounds. 

We hold that, under these facts, there is no equal protection violation because 

neither direct-filed juveniles nor transferred juveniles convicted of crimes of 

violence are eligible for probation, and the district court did not apply the 

mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute. 

1 We granted certiorari to review the following issue:

Whether the disparate sentencing guidance in the transfer statute, 

§ 19-2-518, C.R.S. (2018), and the direct file statute, § 19-2-517, C.R.S. 

(2018), implicates a juvenile’s right to equal protection.
4

Hence, Howard was treated the same as a direct-filed juvenile would have been

with regard to probation and the applicable sentencing range. As a result, there is 

no equal protection problem under the facts here.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶5 Following a car break-in and stabbing, Howard, who was sixteen at the time, 

was charged with first-degree assault (a crime of violence) and first-degree 

criminal trespass in juvenile court. After filing a delinquency petition in juvenile 

court, the People then moved to transfer Howard’s case to district court. 

Following a transfer hearing, the case was transferred to the adult court, and 

Howard was treated accordingly.

¶6 Early in the district court proceedings, Howard noted a disparity in the 

sentencing options under the direct-file and transfer statutes. Under the direct-file 

statute, a juvenile convicted of a crime of violence shall be sentenced “[a]s an 

adult,” except that the “juvenile is excluded from the mandatory minimum 

sentencing provisions in section 18-1.3-406 [the crime of violence statute].” 

§ 19-2-517(6)(a)(I).2 The transfer statute, however, does not contain the same 

2 The General Assembly amended the direct-file statute in 2012 to add this 

mandatory minimum exemption. See Ch. 128, sec. 1, § 19-2-517, 2012 Colo. Sess. 

Laws 439, 444. Broadly speaking, the 2012 amendments limited the district 

attorney’s discretion to direct-file against juveniles in district court, reserving the 

use of the direct-file statute for more serious offenders and offenses. Id. at 439–44.
5

exclusion from mandatory minimum sentencing. Instead, a transferred juvenile 

who is convicted of a crime of violence “shall [be] sentence[ed] . . . pursuant to the

provisions of section 18-1.3-401,” which provides the presumptive penalties and 

sentences in criminal cases. § 19-2-518(1)(d)(I); see also § 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2019). 

Howard argued that this sentencing disparity violated his right to equal protection 

because it subjected him to mandatory incarceration and a mandatory minimum 

sentence, whereas direct-filed juveniles convicted of the same offense would be 

eligible for probation and would be excluded from the mandatory minimum 

sentencing provisions despite having worse criminal histories.

3 The district court 

initially denied Howard’s request on ripeness grounds, noting that the issue was 

not properly before the court unless or until Howard was convicted of first-degree 

assault and subject to sentencing.

¶7 Ultimately, the jury found Howard guilty as charged. At the sentencing 

hearing, Howard renewed his equal protection argument, asserting that the 

“excluded from the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions” language in the 

3 For example, to be direct-file eligible, a juvenile charged with the same crime of 

violence as Howard would also need to have a prior adjudicated felony offense. 

See § 19-2-517(1)(a)(III)(A)–(B). In such a scenario, the juvenile eligible for direct 

filing would have a more serious criminal history than Howard, who did not have

a prior adjudicated felony. 
6

direct-file statute made direct-filed juveniles eligible for probation, whereas he, as 

a transferred juvenile, would face the mandatory minimum sentencing that would 

subject him to a ten- to thirty-two-year sentence in the DOC and would render him 

ineligible for probation. He thus contended that it would violate equal protection 

if probation was not also an option under the transfer statute. To address the equal 

protection argument, the district court determined that “mandatory minimums 

don’t apply” here. It further concluded, however, that Howard was not eligible 

for probation. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the sentencing 

options were a YOS sentence with a suspended DOC sentence or a DOC sentence 

with a range of zero to thirty-two years.4 Ultimately, the court sentenced Howard

to six years in YOS, with a suspended fifteen-year DOC sentence.

¶8 Howard appealed. A division of the court of appeals concluded that “equal 

protection [did] not apply” because “Howard [was] not similarly situated to direct 

file eligible juveniles.” Howard, ¶ 35. The division reasoned that Howard was not 

4 In practical terms, if Howard was not subject to the mandatory minimum 

sentence, he would face a presumptive sentencing range of four to thirty-two 

years. See § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A); § 18-1.3-401(10)(a); § 18-1.3-406(1)(a). While 

the district court concluded that without the mandatory minimums, the 

sentencing range was zero to thirty-two years, we need not determine if that is 

correct because the court did not sentence Howard to less than four years. 

Therefore, we express no opinion on this issue as it is not before us today.
7

similarly situated because he did not have the same criminal history as a directfile-eligible juvenile. Id. The division further reasoned that “even assuming that 

the direct file statute is more lenient than the transfer statute, Howard was not 

subject to it” and thus could not sustain a challenge to it. Id. at ¶ 36. Accordingly, 

the division affirmed Howard’s sentence. Id. at ¶ 37.

¶9 We granted certiorari.

II. Analysis

¶10 We begin by outlining the appropriate standard of review. We then review 

the relevant equal protection law and applicable rules of statutory construction. 

Next, we detail the relevant sentencing ranges under the direct-file, transfer, and 

crime of violence statutes. After doing so, we hold that, under these facts, there is 

no equal protection violation because neither direct-filed juveniles nor transferred 

juveniles convicted of crimes of violence are eligible for probation, and the court 

did not subject Howard to the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the 

crime of violence statute. Hence, Howard was treated the same under the transfer 

statute as juveniles charged under the direct-file statute with regard to probation
8

and the applicable sentencing range. We therefore affirm the judgment of the 

court of appeals on different grounds.

5

A. Standard of Review

¶11 We review equal protection claims de novo. Dean v. People, 2016 CO 14, ¶ 8, 

366 P.3d 593, 596. Likewise, we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. 

McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389.

B. General Law

1. Equal Protection

¶12 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that 

no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 

the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. While the Colorado Constitution contains 

no similar clause, “we have construed the due process clause of the Colorado 

Constitution to imply a similar guarantee.” Dean, ¶ 11, 366 P.3d at 596; see also 

Colo. Const. art. II, § 25. “Equal protection of the laws assures the like treatment 

of all persons who are similarly situated.” Dean, ¶ 11, 366 P.3d at 596. We have 

explained, for example, “that Colorado’s guarantee of equal protection is violated 

where two criminal statutes proscribe identical conduct, yet one punishes that 

5 Because we conclude that there is no equal protection problem on these facts, we 

do not address the court of appeals’ “similarly situated” analysis.
9

conduct more harshly.” Id. at ¶ 14, 366 P.3d at 597; see also People v. Nguyen, 

900 P.2d 37, 38–40 (Colo. 1995) (explaining that equal protection is violated when 

two statutes proscribe similar conduct, yet a harsher penalty is imposed for the

less serious criminal conduct).

2. Rules of Statutory Construction

¶13 When interpreting a statute, “our goal is to give effect to [the] legislative 

intent.” People v. Hoskin, 2016 CO 63, ¶ 7, 380 P.3d 130, 133. To do so, we look to 

the statute’s plain language and “give its words and phrases their ordinary and 

commonly accepted meaning.” Id. When the statutory language is clear, “we 

apply it as written” and need not resort to other rules of statutory construction. 

Munoz v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 CO 68, ¶ 9, 425 P.3d 1128, 1130. We 

“disfavor a reading of a statute that would render other statutory provisions 

superfluous or without practical effect.” Roberts v. Bruce, 2018 CO 58, ¶ 9, 420 P.3d 

284, 286.

C. The Direct-File, Transfer, and Crime of Violence

Statutes

¶14 Howard’s equal protection claim rests on the premise that juveniles 

convicted of crimes of violence under the transfer statute must be sentenced to 

incarceration and are subject to mandatory minimum sentencing, whereas 

juveniles subject to the direct-file statute who are convicted of the same crime of 

violence are eligible for probation and not subject to mandatory minimum
10

sentencing. Accordingly, before turning to the specifics of Howard’s claim, we 

begin by unpacking (1) the sentencing schemes for juveniles charged as adults 

under both the direct-file statute and the transfer statute, and (2) the general 

sentencing scheme for defendants convicted of crimes of violence. 

1. The Direct-File Statute (§ 19-2-517) and the Transfer 

Statute (§ 19-2-518)

¶15 There are two ways that a juvenile may be tried as an adult in district court. 

The first way is to charge the juvenile directly in district court under the direct-file 

statute. § 19-2-517. Direct filing is limited to juvenile offenders who are at least 

sixteen years old at the time of the offense and (1) are alleged to have committed a 

class 1 or 2 felony, (2) are alleged to have committed certain sex offenses, (3) are 

alleged to have committed a crime of violence and have a prior felony offense, or 

(4) have previously been subject to proceedings in district court under the transfer 

or direct-file statutes. § 19-2-517(1)(a)(I)–(IV).

¶16 If a direct-filed juvenile is convicted of a crime of violence, then the directfile statute’s sentencing guidelines provide that the “district judge shall sentence 

the juvenile either:” (1) “[a]s an adult; except that a juvenile is excluded from the 

mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in section 18-1.3-406 [the crime of violence 
11

statute]”; or (2) to YOS. § 19-2-517(6)(a)(I)–(II) (emphases added).

6 The decision 

to direct-file a juvenile in district court is made by the district attorney.7 Howard 

did not fall under any of these provisions and was thus ineligible for direct filing. 

If a juvenile is not direct-file eligible, the district attorney then has a second option 

to try the juvenile in district court.

¶17 The second option, as utilized in the case here, is that the People can file a 

delinquency petition in juvenile court and then move to transfer the case to district 

court under the transfer statute. § 19-2-518.8 Transfer was available here because

Howard was (1) sixteen years old at the time of the alleged offense and (2) charged 

with a felony that constituted a crime of violence. See § 19-2-518(1)(a)(I).9 

6 If the court chooses to sentence a juvenile offender to YOS, the court must also 

impose a suspended DOC sentence. See § 18-1.3-407(2)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2019). The 

sentence imposed in this case provides an example of a combination of YOS and 

DOC, as the district court imposed a six-year YOS sentence with a suspended 

fifteen-year DOC sentence.

7 Under section 19-2-517(3)(a), a juvenile can file a motion requesting that the case 

be transferred from the district court to the juvenile court. Upon receipt of said

motion, the district court must conduct a “reverse-transfer hearing” to determine 

whether the juvenile and community would be better served by having the case 

proceed in district court or juvenile court. § 19-2-517(3)(a)–(b). 

8 Before transferring the case, the district court must conduct a transfer hearing,

where it considers fourteen statutory factors and then decides whether to waive 

the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the juvenile. See § 19-2-518(4).

9 We note that there are several additional reasons that make juveniles eligible to 

be transferred to the district court under the transfer statute. See § 19-2-518(1)(a)(I). 
12

¶18 If a transferred juvenile is ultimately convicted of a crime of violence, then

the transfer statute provides that the “district court shall sentence the juvenile 

pursuant to the provisions of section 18-1.3-401,” the general adult sentencing 

statute. § 19-2-518(1)(d)(I). That statute provides the presumptive penalties for 

adults convicted of any felony. Under the general adult sentencing scheme, if the 

defendant is convicted of a crime of violence, then “the court shall sentence the 

defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 18-1.3-406,” the crime of 

violence statute. § 18-1.3-401(13)(c). The transfer statute also gives the court 

discretion to sentence the transferred juvenile to YOS, unless the juvenile is 

convicted of a class 1 felony or certain sexual offenses. § 19-2-518(1)(d)(II). 

Significantly, the transfer statute, unlike the direct-file statute, does not exclude 

juveniles from the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of section 

18-1.3-406. Thus, transferred juveniles are subject to the mandatory minimum 

sentencing range for a crime of violence—a term “of at least the midpoint in . . . the 

presumptive range”—and must be sentenced to incarceration, or to YOS with a 

suspended DOC sentence.

We do not discuss these additional reasons here because they are not relevant to 

this case. 
13

2. The Crime of Violence Statute (§ 18-1.3-406)

¶19 Because Howard’s equal protection argument hinges on the different 

treatment of direct-filed juveniles and transferred juveniles convicted of a crime of 

violence, we turn to the crime of violence statute specifically. As previously 

referenced, adult defendants convicted of crimes of violence are subject to 

mandatory sentences to the DOC that require the sentence to be at least the 

midpoint and up to double the normal maximum sentence in the presumptive 

range:

Any person convicted of a crime of violence shall be sentenced pursuant 

to the provisions of section 18-1.3-401(8) to the department of corrections 

for a term of incarceration of at least the midpoint in, but not more than 

twice the maximum of, the presumptive range provided for such offense 

in section 18-1.3-401(1)(a), . . . except that, . . . the court, in a case which 

it considers to be exceptional and to involve unusual and extenuating 

circumstances, may thereupon modify the sentence, effective not 

earlier than one hundred nineteen days after his or her placement in 

the custody of the department. Such modification may include 

probation if the person is otherwise eligible therefor.

§ 18-1.3-406(1)(a) (emphases added). The plain and ordinary reading of this 

statute dictates that defendants subject to the mandatory minimum sentencing 

enhancement, which includes transferred juveniles, face a mandatory prison 

sentence of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range. Conversely, directfiled juvenile defendants are exempted from the mandatory minimum provisions,

meaning those juveniles could receive a prison sentence that is less than the 

midpoint in the presumptive range.
14

¶20 This case provides an opportunity to compare sentencing ranges for 

juveniles who are convicted of the same crimes of violence under the direct-file 

and transfer statutes described above. Start with our present case: At the time of 

the offense, Howard did not have any prior felony adjudications or convictions. 

He was charged with first-degree assault, first-degree criminal trespass, and two 

counts of crime of violence as a juvenile. Because Howard did not have any prior 

felony adjudications or convictions, the only option that was available when the 

district attorney determined that Howard should be treated as an adult was to try 

and transfer Howard pursuant to section 19-2-518. After the required hearing, 

Howard was transferred to the adult court and was ultimately convicted of firstdegree assault (a class 3 felony), the crime of violence, and first-degree criminal 

trespass (a class 5 felony). Because he was subject to the crime of violence 

sentencing statute and had been transferred, Howard was subject to the 

mandatory minimum provisions, which carried a sentencing range of at least ten, 

but not more than thirty-two, years in the DOC.10 Next, we compare Howard’s 

10 Class 3 felonies carry a presumptive sentence of four to twelve years. See 

§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A). However, because first-degree assault is a crime of 

violence, the maximum sentence here was enhanced by four years, so the 

presumptive sentence was four to sixteen years. See § 18-1.3-401(10)(a). And 

because the crime of violence statute directs the court to impose a sentence “of at 

least the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive 
15

actual facts to a hypothetical. If Howard had a prior felony adjudication at the 

time he committed the assault, then he would have been subject to the direct-file 

statute. Thus, the district attorney could have directly filed Howard’s case in the 

adult court. Under that scenario, if Howard had been charged under the directfile statute and was convicted of the exact same offenses, then he would have been 

exempt from the mandatory minimum provisions and would not be subject to the 

ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. As a result, a juvenile being treated as an 

adult with a felony record at the time of the offense would be subject to less time 

in prison than a juvenile who had a clean record even though they were convicted 

of the exact same offenses.

¶21 This demonstrates that there is an inequity in sentencing ranges under the 

direct-file and transfer statutes. And Howard points to this inequity in his equal 

protection argument. Under the facts here, however, we need not resolve whether 

that inequity creates an equal protection violation because the district court gave 

Howard the benefit of the direct-file statute’s sentencing range, declining to apply 

mandatory minimums.11 Thus, any equal protection violation regarding the 

range,” Howard’s applicable sentencing range under the transfer statute was ten 

to thirty-two years. See § 18-1.3-406(1)(a).

11 The district attorney did not appeal that decision.
16

length of a prison sentence caused by the different mandatory minimum sentences 

in the two statutes is not before us. Instead, the issue in Howard’s case is whether 

probation is an option for juvenile defendants convicted of crimes of violence 

under the direct-file statute but not under the transfer statute.

D. Probation Under the Direct-File Statute and the 

Transfer Statute

¶22 We now turn to the specifics of Howard’s claim. As explained above, the

direct-file statute provides that a juvenile shall be sentenced “[a]s an adult; except 

that a juvenile is excluded from the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in 

section 18-1.3-406 [the crime of violence statute].” § 19-2-517(6)(a)(I). Howard 

argues that “if not for the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in 

18-1.3-406, defendants convicted of first-degree assault would be eligible for 

probation.” Howard thus asserts that direct-filed juveniles are probation eligible; 

conversely, transferred juveniles like himself are not excluded from the mandatory 

minimum sentencing provisions and thus are not eligible for probation.

12 Howard 

contends that this unequal sentencing constitutes an equal protection violation. 

The People, on the other hand, argue that this exclusion only encompasses the 

12 Both parties agree that probation is not an option for transferred juveniles 

convicted of crimes of violence. The initial sentencing options are either a YOS

sentence with a suspended DOC sentence, or a DOC sentence.
17

mandatory sentencing range. In other words, the People contend that although 

this exclusion allows the court to sentence a direct-filed juvenile to a lesser prison 

sentence than the mandatory minimum would otherwise require, the court must 

still impose a YOS sentence or a prison sentence in some form. We agree with the 

People. Looking at the plain language of the direct-file and crime of violence 

statutes and our maxim to not render statutory provisions superfluous, we 

conclude that probation is not an option in the first instance.

¶23 To begin, Howard’s reading misapprehends the two effects that the crime 

of violence statute has on defendants who are subject to it. First, the statute 

enhances the possible prison sentence to “at least the midpoint in, but not more 

than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range.” § 18-1.3-406(1)(a). Second, 

and more importantly here, the crime of violence statute itself makes defendants 

subject to it ineligible for probation. Indeed, in other contexts, we have concluded 

that probation is not an option for defendants who are subject to the crime of 

violence statute. See, e.g., Chavez v. People, 2015 CO 62, ¶ 19, 359 P.3d 1040, 1044 

(explaining that a sex offender was “not probation-eligible because he is also 

subject to the mandatory crime-of-violence enhancement”). This is so because the 

statute dictates that probation is not an option outside of one specifically 

contemplated exception. 
18

¶24 That exception permits a mandatory prison sentence to be modified in 

“exceptional” circumstances and provides that “[s]uch modification may include 

probation.” § 18-1.3-406(1)(a). This modification, however, may only occur 119 

days from when the person was placed in DOC to serve the original sentence. Id. 

Logically, if probation was available at the initial sentencing, then the legislature 

would not have included this modification provision for cases the court finds “to 

be exceptional and to involve unusual and extenuating circumstances.” Id. Hence, 

the need to wait 119 days would be unnecessary, and the exception would be 

superfluous. See, e.g., Indus. Claim Appeals Office v. Ortho, 965 P.2d 1246, 1254 

(Colo. 1998) (explaining that “we should avoid a construction that renders any 

[statutory] provision superfluous or a nullity”). The crime of violence statute does 

not contemplate probation outside of this modification provision.

¶25 Because the crime of violence statute dictates that defendants subject to it 

are not originally probation eligible, we must next determine whether Howard is 

correct in his argument that the legislature, in excluding direct-filed juveniles from 

the “mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in [the crime of violence 

statute],” intended to make those juveniles eligible for probation. We conclude 

that such an interpretation would expand the direct-file statute’s exclusion beyond 

the plain and ordinary language of the statute. 
19

¶26 While the direct-file statute does not specify which mandatory minimum

provisions juveniles are excluded from, a review of the crime of violence statute 

as a whole leads to only one conclusion: The legislature was excluding juveniles 

from the two portions of the crime of violence statute that impose the mandatory 

minimum floor of “at least the midpoint” in the presumptive range. Specifically, 

sections 18-1.3-406(1)(a) and 18-1.3-406(1)(b) are the only two sections in the crime 

of violence statute that require mandatory minimum sentencing. Section 

18-1.3-406(1)(a) provides, in relevant part, that the person convicted of a crime of 

violence shall face a mandatory minimum of “at least the midpoint in . . . the 

presumptive range.” Similarly, section 18-1.3-406(1)(b) specifies that the 

mandatory minimum for certain sex offenses is “at least the midpoint in the 

presumptive range.” And in excluding juveniles “from the mandatory minimum 

sentencing provisions in [the crime of violence statute]” in the direct-file statute,

see § 19-2-517(6)(a)(I), the legislature was only referring to these two portions of 

the crime of violence statute. Importantly, it was not excluding direct-filed 

juveniles convicted of crimes of violence from mandatory incarceration. The 

direct-file statute says nothing of that kind. If that was the legislature’s intent, then 

it would have said so. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Colborne Foodbotics, LLC, 2013 CO 33 

¶ 16, 302 P.3d 263, 267 (finding that the legislature did not create a remedy that 

was not present in a statute because had the legislature intended to, it “could have 
20

done so”). Instead, the legislature chose to exclude these juveniles from part of the 

crime of violence statute—specifically, the mandatory minimum floor of “at least 

the midpoint” in the presumptive range.

¶27 Furthermore, we note that the direct-file statute does not even mention 

probation as a sentencing option. If the legislature intended for probation to be an 

option under the direct-file statute, it could have pointed to the probation sections 

in the Criminal Code. See, e.g., § 18-1.3-201, C.R.S. (2019). The direct-file statute 

makes no such reference, and we will “not read into a statute language that is not 

there.” Marsh v. People, 2017 CO 10M, ¶ 62, 389 P.3d 100, 113.

¶28 Accordingly, we conclude that in excluding direct-filed juveniles from the 

mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute, the 

legislature intended to exclude juveniles from the mandatory minimum 

sentencing floor in that statute. In so doing, the legislature gave district courts 

more discretion to choose the appropriate prison sentence given the specific facts 

of a juvenile’s case. Under this interpretation, the court, using its discretion, could 

sentence a direct-filed juvenile to the minimum in the presumptive range to up to 

twice the maximum, but it is no longer required to sentence that juvenile to at least 

the midpoint of the presumptive range. In other words, the district court has wide 

discretion to choose the appropriate sentence. Hence, the exclusion allows the 

court to sentence a juvenile to a lesser prison sentence than the mandatory 
21

minimum, but it still does not make probation an option for direct-filed juveniles 

convicted of crimes of violence. As a result, with regard to probation, the directfile and transfer statutes treat juveniles the same—neither are eligible for 

probation.13

¶29 Applying this conclusion here means that Howard was not treated 

differently under the transfer statute than he would have been under the directfile statute with regard to probation. Accordingly, there is no equal protection 

violation on these facts. 

III. Conclusion

¶30 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on 

different grounds.

13 We note that both direct-filed juveniles and transferred juveniles, just like adult 

defendants, could still have their sentence modified to probation based on the

crime of violence statute’s exception that allows sentence modification in cases 

involving “exceptional,” “unusual,” and “extenuating” circumstances. See

§ 18-1.3-406(1)(a).