Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed March 6, 2024. 

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 

________________

No. 3D22-1580 

Lower Tribunal No. 20-19570

________________

Ornella Pianezza and Andrea Artioli, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

MIA Collection Services LLC, 

Appellee.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade 

County, Barbara Areces, Judge. 

Nelson Mullins, and Jonathan Etra, and Ryan K. Todd; Nelson Mullins, 

and Christina Lehm (Fort Lauderdale), for appellants. 

Mitrani, Rynor, Adamsky & Toland, P.A., and Isaac J. Mitrani, Pamela 

A. Chamberlin, and Daniel S. Bitran, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and SCALES and GORDO, JJ. 

LOGUE, C.J.
2

Ornella Pianezza and Andrea Artioli appeal the trial court’s denial of 

their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction.1

Because the complaint sufficiently alleged that Pianezza and Artioli engaged 

in tortious conduct within Florida, we conclude that both parties are subject 

to jurisdiction in Florida.

BACKGROUND

The underlying lawsuit was brought by MIA Collection Services LLC 

against Hyba General Trading LLC, Mattia Asti Brun, Pianezza, and Artioli. 

Hyba is a limited liability company located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. 

Pianezza and Artioli work for Hyba and are European citizens who reside in 

Europe and Dubai.

MIA Collection alleged that its predecessor in interest2 paid Hyba for 

genuine brand-named handbags, citing four separate invoices, but received 

counterfeit handbags instead. It brought claims against Pianezza and Artioli 

for fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, breach of express 

warranty, and conspiracy.

1 Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) (“Appeals to the district courts of appeal of 

non-final orders are limited to those that . . . determine . . . the jurisdiction of 

the person.”).

2 MIA Collection and its predecessor in interest will hereinafter be referred to 

collectively as “MIA Collection.”
3

The operative Second Amended Complaint alleged Artioli (1) was a 

principal of Hyba; (2) was aware of the sales; (3) specifically made 

misrepresentations about the authenticity of the handbags and from where 

they were sourced; (4) actively participated in the sales; and (5) knew or 

should have known that the representations he made, and authorized and 

directed his employees and agents to make, were false. The complaint 

further alleged Pianezza and Artioli “committed tortious acts in Florida by, 

among other things, sending and/or directing telephonic and electronic 

communications into Florida,” which were the direct and proximate cause of 

injuries in Florida.

MIA Collection alleged Pianezza and Artioli falsely represented that 

Hyba had a relationship with Hermès, a high-end, luxury goods brand. It 

alleged Pianezza was copied on many emails containing such 

misrepresentations and later sent many such emails herself. MIA Collection 

also alleged Pianezza sent emails to its employee in Florida referencing the 

brand, specific models of handbags, and other details regarding the 

merchandise. MIA Collection contends Pianezza was copied on emails and 

did not correct misrepresentations, knew or should have known the 

misrepresentations made were false, and, with Artioli’s approval, directed 

that such misrepresentations be made to MIA Collection. MIA Collection also 
4

alleged Pianezza and Artioli met with its executive officer in Singapore in 

May 2019 and discussed the high-end, luxury handbags and expanding the 

parties’ business.

Pianezza and Artioli filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action. They argued MIA 

Collection’s entire theory of personal jurisdiction was based on five total 

emails and text messages, which were sent only by Pianezza and only while 

acting as an employee of Hyba. Pianezza and Artioli argued the corporate 

shield doctrine precluded personal jurisdiction and further argued MIA 

Collection failed to sufficiently plead an intentional tort. Pianezza and Artioli 

contended the sworn evidence submitted with their motion to dismiss refuted 

MIA Collection’s allegations and further argued that a handful of emails and 

text messages did not establish sufficient minimum contacts with the forum 

to satisfy constitutional due process.

In support of their motion to dismiss, Pianezza and Artioli submitted 

Artioli’s declaration; Pianezza’s declaration; Artioli’s declaration as 

Corporate Representative of Hyba; Artioli’s deposition; and Pianezza’s

deposition.

In his deposition, Artioli testified he was aware that Pianezza was 

working with MIA Collection on the sale of “Hermès bags” and “other 
5

products.” While he was circumspect regarding the extent of his knowledge, 

involvement, and authorization concerning the sales, Artioli did testify that 

“[Pianezza] . . . keeps me informed on the activities that she carries out on 

behalf of Hyba.” Artioli also testified he became aware “at a certain point” in 

2018, while the transaction between the two companies was ongoing, that 

MIA Collection was in Florida.

During the deposition, Artioli was instructed by his counsel not to 

answer when asked directly whether he (1) authorized Pianezza to 

misrepresent that Hyba could sell genuine Hermès bags; (2) collaborated 

with Pianezza and Asti Brun to misrepresent to MIA Collection that Hyba

could sell legitimate Hermès bags; (3) was aware that MIA Collection relied 

on the misrepresentations of Hyba, Artioli, and Pianezza that the bags were 

genuine; (4) conspired with Asti Brun to defraud MIA Collection; (5) 

monitored and approved of Pianezza’s misrepresentations to Asti Brun and 

MIA Collection regarding the legitimacy of the Hermès bags; (6) knew and in 

fact advised Pianezza to misrepresent to MIA Collection that the Hermès 

bags were legitimate; and (6) instructed Pianezza to tell MIA Collection that 

he was acquiring the bags directly from Hermès, which he knew was false.

Pianezza testified at her own deposition that in April 2018 she was 

provided with a Florida address for MIA Collection. Pianezza testified Hyba
6

did not solicit business in Florida and was not initially aware that MIA 

Collection was in Florida. Pianezza denied directing phone calls, text 

messages or emails to anyone in Florida, but then admitted to 

communicating with an employee of MIA Collection, Joe Colon, via 

WhatsApp messages and calls. She also admitted exchanging emails with 

Colon. Pianezza further testified that Artioli “knew of” the relationship 

between Hyba and MIA Collection and of the sales taking place. On 

instruction of her counsel, Pianezza did not answer any questions regarding 

the genuineness of the Hermès bags at issue, what MIA Collection knew or 

understood about the genuineness of the bags, and what she knew and 

represented to them regarding same.

Pianezza also continued to challenge whether she knew MIA 

Collection was headquartered in Miami, Florida. She acknowledged 

receiving an address to send bills to in Miami, but argued this was 

inconclusive. She denied knowing whether Joe Colon was in Miami when 

they spoke. She did, subsequently, seemingly admit that she became aware 

the bags were shipped to Florida “when Joe Colon communicated the 

address to me.”

Both Artioli and Pianezza also submitted declarations denying that they 

“directed a phone call, text message, or e-mail to anyone in the state of 
7

Florida” on their own behalf. Artioli also submitted a declaration as corporate 

representative on behalf of Hyba, stating that Hyba (1) “did not breach any 

alleged agreement” with MIA Collection “by allegedly providing counterfeit 

products”; (2) “did not make fraudulent misrepresentations” to MIA 

Collection; (3) “did not make false statements, regarding the genuine nature 

of the handbags”; and (4) “did not breach any alleged warranties” to MIA 

Collection “by selling it handbags that were allegedly not authentic.”

MIA Collection filed a written response in opposition to the motion to 

dismiss. They maintained there was personal jurisdiction over Pianezza and 

Artioli because “they committed intentional torts by both sending and 

directing communications into Florida, which caused injury in Florida[.]” MIA 

Collection further argued Pianezza’s and Artioli’s self-serving testimony, 

denials, and legal conclusions did “not even rise to [the] required level to shift 

the burden back to MIA [Collection] to demonstrate that personal jurisdiction 

over [Pianezza and Artioli was] proper.” Nevertheless, in support of their 

response in opposition, MIA Collection submitted the declaration of its trial 

counsel, the declaration of its executive officer, the declaration of Joe Colon, 

and Artioli’s deposition, including several exhibits from the deposition.

The trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on Pianezza and Artioli’s 

motion to dismiss on August 8, 2022. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
8

trial court ruled that the Second Amended Complaint was sufficiently pled,

and that jurisdiction was “also fine.” On August 20, 2022, the trial court issued 

its order denying Pianezza and Artioli’s motion to dismiss. This appeal timely 

followed.

ANALYSIS

A trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction is subject to de novo review. Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 

1256 (Fla. 2002). The facts are to be derived “from the affidavits in support 

of the motion to dismiss, and the transcripts and records submitted in 

opposition to the motion to dismiss.” Id. at 1254.

Pianezza and Artioli argue the trial court erred in exercising personal 

jurisdiction over them because MIA Collection’s Second Amended Complaint 

failed to set forth sufficient facts to bring the action within the ambit of 

Florida’s long-arm statute. Pianezza and Artioli further argue that, even if 

MIA Collection had sufficiently pled a jurisdictional basis under the long-arm 

statute, they put forth evidence refuting MIA Collection’s allegations of an 

intentional tort and MIA Collection failed to rebut their evidentiary 

submissions with evidence of its own. Pianezza and Artioli argue they also 

lack the necessary minimum contacts with Florida.
9

Florida courts conduct a two-step inquiry to determine whether a court 

has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See Belz Investco 

Ltd. P'ship v. Groupo Immobiliano Cababie, S.A., 721 So. 2d 787, 789 (Fla. 

3d DCA 1998) (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 

502 (Fla. 1989)).

First, it must be determined that the complaint 

alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the 

action within the ambit of the statute; and if it does, 

the next inquiry is whether sufficient “minimum 

contacts” are demonstrated to satisfy due process 

requirements.

The first prong—i.e., the statutory prong—of the 

Venetian Salami standard is governed by Florida's 

long-arm statute and bestows broad jurisdiction on 

Florida courts. A court can exercise personal 

jurisdiction, inter alia, whenever a foreign corporation 

commits a “tortious act” on Florida soil. The second 

prong—i.e., the constitutional prong—is controlled by 

United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting 

the Due Process Clause and imposes a more 

restrictive requirement. A court can exercise 

personal jurisdiction only if the foreign corporation 

maintains “certain minimum contacts with [the forum 

state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not 

offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.’”

Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1257 (quoting Execu–Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji 

Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000)).
10

I. Long-Arm Statute

MIA Collection relies on the portion of Florida’s long-arm statute that 

provides for personal jurisdiction over persons “[c]ommitting a tortious act 

within this state.” § 48.193(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. Artioli and Pianezza contend, 

however, that they were acting solely in their capacity as employees on 

behalf of Hyba. As such, they argue the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction 

over them pursuant to the corporate shield doctrine.

In Kitroser v. Hurt, 85 So. 3d 1084, 1088 (Fla. 2012), the Florida 

Supreme Court explained that the corporate shield doctrine “provides that 

acts performed by a person exclusively in his corporate capacity not in 

Florida but in a foreign state may not form the predicate for the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction over the employee in the forum state.” (emphasis 

omitted). The rationale behind the doctrine, the Florida Supreme Court 

explained, was that “it may be unfair to force an individual to defend an action 

filed against him personally in a forum with which his only relevant contacts 

are acts performed totally outside the forum state and not for his own benefit 

but for the exclusive benefit of his employer.” Id.

Kitroser recognized, however, that an exception exists limiting the 

doctrine’s protection where a corporate officer commits fraud or other 

intentional misconduct outside of Florida. Id. at 1088 n.3 (citing Doe v. 
11

Thompson, 620 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 1993); Oesterle v. Farish, 887 So. 

2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)). Kitroser also holds that the corporate shield 

doctrine will not operate to bar personal jurisdiction in Florida over an 

individual defendant that commits a tortious act in Florida, regardless of 

whether it was on behalf of a corporate employer. 85 So. 3d at 1089-90.

Here, MIA Collection alleged a claim for fraudulent inducement against 

Artioli and Pianezza that would preclude application of the corporate shield 

doctrine. The threshold question raised, therefore, is whether the complaint 

sufficiently states a cause of action for this intentional tort. See LaFreniere v. 

Craig-Myers, 264 So. 3d 232, 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). It does.

The operative Second Amended Complaint alleged that (1) Artioli 

directed his employees and agents to make misrepresentations about the 

authenticity of the handbags and from where they were sourced; (2) Artioli 

and Pianezza made these misrepresentations to MIA Collection; (3) they 

knew these representations were false; (4) they intended to induce MIA 

Collection to purchase the counterfeit bags based on these 

misrepresentations; and (5) MIA Collection purchased the handbags based 

on these misrepresentations. These allegations sufficiently set forth a cause 

of action for the intentional tort of fraudulent inducement. See Moriber v. 

Dreiling, 194 So. 3d 369, 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (setting forth elements for 
12

fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement); Thorpe v. 

Gelbwaks, 953 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (explaining that when 

deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, “[t]he trial court's 

focus should have been on whether the tort, as alleged, occurred in Florida, 

and not whether the [plaintiffs] proved that [the defendant] had actually 

committed a tort in Florida.”).

Additionally, the Second Amended Complaint also alleged Artioli and 

Pianezza “committed tortious acts in Florida by, among other things, sending 

and/or directing telephonic and electronic communications into Florida, 

which caused injury in Florida.” It was alleged Pianezza sent emails to MIA 

Collection’s employee in Florida, Joe Colon, referencing the Hermès brand, 

specific models of the handbags, and other details regarding the 

merchandise. MIA Collection contends Pianezza was also copied on emails 

and did not correct misrepresentations in these emails, knew or should have 

known the misrepresentations made were false, and, with Artioli’s approval, 

directed that such misrepresentations be made to MIA Collection.

These allegations are sufficient to allege that Artioli and Pianezza

committed a tortious act within this state by making telephone calls and 

sending emails containing fraudulent misrepresentations into Florida. See

Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1260 (“‘[C]ommitting a tortious act’ in Florida under 
13

section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's 

telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida . . . [but] the 

cause of action must arise from the communications.”).

Artioli and Pianezza submitted affidavits and deposition testimony in 

support of their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; however, 

these were insufficient to shift the burden to MIA Collection to demonstrate 

why jurisdiction was proper. See, e.g., Acquadro v. Bergeron, 851 So. 2d 

665, 671 (Fla. 2003) (“[P]etitioners contend that after they filed affidavits 

contesting personal jurisdiction, the burden should have shifted to [plaintiff] 

to demonstrate why jurisdiction was proper in this case. However, . . . 

petitioners' contention only has merit assuming that the affidavits were 

legally sufficient to shift the burden.”).

Pianezza, for her part, does not deny exchanging telephone calls and 

emails with Joe Colon. See OSI Indus., Inc. v. Carter, 834 So. 2d 362, 368 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“On the issue of whether the tort, as alleged, occurred 

in Florida, Carter's affidavits alleged that it did in the form of a telephone 

conversation. Lavin's affidavit did not deny the possibility that the telephone 

conversation occurred. Thus, the affidavits could be harmonized on the issue 

of whether the tort, as alleged, occurred in Florida. It was not necessary to 

harmonize the affidavits or conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 
14

whether the tortious statements were actually made. Accordingly, the trial 

court's analysis on the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction was correct.”)

(internal citation omitted). Nor does she deny being aware that MIA 

Collection was in Florida. 

Pianezza did try to obfuscate these facts during her deposition by 

insisting that she did not know where Colon was located when they 

exchanged telephone calls and emails, and further insisted that simply 

because she was provided an address in Florida to send bills did not mean 

the company was in Florida. To the extent these allegations might be 

considered sufficient to shift the burden, MIA Collections sufficiently met its 

burden by providing the affidavit of Colon. In it, Colon attested that he 

received catalogues and invoices from Pianezza in Miami, Florida, he had 

telephone calls with Pianezza while he was in Miami, Florida, and the 

handbags were delivered to Miami, Florida. 

Artioli also acknowledged in his deposition he was aware that MIA 

Collection was in Florida. He further testified he was aware that Pianezza

was working with MIA Collection on the sale of “Herm[è]s bags” and “other 

products.” While he was circumspect regarding the extent of his knowledge, 

involvement, and authorization concerning the sale of the bags, Artioli did 

testify that Pianezza kept him “informed on the activities that she carrie[d] 
15

out on behalf of Hyba.” Artioli never expressly denies the complaint’s 

allegations that he specifically made misrepresentations about the 

authenticity of the handbags and from where they were sourced, or that he

knew or should have known the representations he made and authorized 

and directed his employees and agents to make were false. Indeed, neither 

Artioli nor Pianezza responded to questions during their depositions 

regarding the allegations of tortious conduct contained in the complaint.

Although both Artioli and Pianezza denied in their declarations that 

they “directed a phone call, text message, or e-mail to anyone in the state of 

Florida,” they qualified these statements by stating they never did so on their 

own behalf. This qualification fails to negate MIA Collection’s allegation that 

they “committed tortious acts in Florida by . . . sending and/or directing 

telephonic and electronic communications into Florida,” as it leaves open the 

inference that they did direct phone calls, text messages, and/or emails into 

Florida in their capacity as employees of Hyba, which is in line with their 

corporate shield defense. However, this ignores the fact that “a corporate 

officer committing fraud or other intentional misconduct can be subject to 

personal jurisdiction,” regardless of whether the acts were committed in their 

corporate capacity. XL Vision, LLC. v. Holloway, 856 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Fla. 
16

5th DCA 2003) (citing Doe, 620 So. 2d at 1006 n.1). See also Kitroser, 85 

So. 3d at 1088-90.

And Artioli’s declaration as corporate representative on behalf of Hyba 

contained nothing more than legal conclusions, which MIA Collection was 

not required to refute. See Edelstein v. Marlene D'Arcy, Inc., 961 So. 2d 368, 

371 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“[T]he defendant's affidavits submitted in support 

of a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction ‘must contain 

something more than the assertion of legal conclusions.’” (quoting Radcliffe 

v. Gyves, 902 So. 2d 968, 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005))); Thorpe, 953 So. 2d at 

610 (“[Defendants’] denials of any wrongdoing, as set forth in paragraph four 

of his affidavit, constitute mere legal conclusions, not assertions of fact. 

Therefore, the [plaintiffs] were not required to file an affidavit refuting these 

conclusionary statements.” (citing Acquadro, 851 So. 2d at 672–73)).

Accordingly, MIA Collection’s complaint sufficiently alleged Artioli and 

Pianezza committed a tortious act within this state by directing telephonic 

and electronic communications into Florida in which they allegedly 

fraudulently misrepresented the authenticity of Hermès handbags sold to 

MIA Collection. Artioli and Pianezza did not deny the possibility that such 

communications took place. Thus, the first jurisdictional test under Venetian 

Salami is met.
17

II. Constitutional Due Process

As to minimum contacts, the trial court properly concluded that 

minimum contacts were shown. The test is whether “the defendant's conduct 

and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably 

anticipate being haled into court there.” World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

In Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), a California plaintiff sued a 

Florida newspaper and two of its employees in California state court based 

on an article about the plaintiff. In affirming a California court’s finding of 

personal jurisdiction over the employees, the Supreme Court noted that the 

nonresident employees’ actions were not “untargeted negligence,” but rather 

were “intentional[ ] and allegedly tortious[ ] actions” expressly aimed at the 

plaintiff in the forum state. Id. at 789. The defendants knew their actions 

would have potentially devastating impacts on the California plaintiff and that 

the brunt of their actions would be felt in California. Id. at 789-90. The Court 

concluded that jurisdiction in California was therefore proper because the 

nonresident employees “must [have] reasonably anticipate[d] being haled 

into court there” as a result of those actions. Id. at 790 (citations omitted).

Here, the intentional tort of fraudulent inducement was aimed at MIA 

Collection, a Florida resident. Artioli and Pianezza both acknowledged they 
18

knew MIA Collection was in Florida. While they both denied initially knowing 

the company was in Florida and denied seeking out business in Florida, the 

fact is they became aware of the company’s location in Florida and chose to 

continue with the business transaction rather than discontinuing the business 

relationship. Indeed, Artioli expressed a desire to continue building the 

business relationship between the two companies, testifying: “We wanted to 

acquire new customers. [MIA Collection] was new so we were happy to 

acquire an important company like [MIA Collection]. We were happy [they] 

wanted to deal with us.” 

As such, Artioli and Pianezza must have “reasonably anticipated being 

haled into court” in Florida based on the business transaction. See Allerton 

v. State Dep’t of Ins., 635 So. 2d 36, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“Allerton is 

alleged to have committed numerous intentional torts over the course of 

several years aimed at a Florida resident, GLS. The quality and nature of his 

actions were not so ‘random, fortuitous or attenuated’ that Allerton could not 

reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Florida. We therefore 

conclude that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case comports with 

the requirements of due process.”). For this reason, again, the corporate 

shield doctrine also does not apply as the corporate officers themselves are 

alleged to have committed intentional torts expressly aimed at Florida. Id.
19

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Artioli and 

Pianezza’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. MIA 

Collection’s complaint sufficiently alleged Artioli and Pianezza committed a 

tortious act within this state by directing telephonic and electronic 

communications into Florida in which they allegedly fraudulently 

misrepresented the authenticity of Hermès handbags sold to MIA Collection, 

and Artioli and Pianezza did not sufficiently deny the possibility that such 

communications took place.

Furthermore, sufficient minimum contacts existed because Artioli and 

Pianezza knew MIA Collection was in Florida and, therefore, they knew their 

alleged misrepresentations would impact a Florida resident and would cause 

injuries in Florida. Such intentional and allegedly tortious actions expressly 

aimed at the forum state, along with knowledge that the out-of-state actions 

would have potentially devastating impact in the forum state and that the 

brunt of the actions would be felt in that state, allow the conclusion that the 

nonresident “must [have] reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court 

there” regarding those actions. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790 (citations omitted).

Affirmed.