UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 00-1888
J A COB W ANN ER , A PP EL L ANT ,

AND No. 01-1012
K I NG L. W R I GHT , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(Argued August 27, 2002 Decide d Fe bruar y 12, 2003 )

Ro na ld L . S

mi th , w ithwh om J

. M ar c Bu rg ess was on the br iefs, both of Washing ton, D.C., for the a ppellants.
Mark M . McNabb , w ithwh om Tim S. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un se l; J oa n E . M or iar ty , Acting Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Mary Ann Fly nn , Depu t y As s i s tant Gene ral Counsel, all of Washington, D. C

. , wer e on the br ief in ca se 01-1012, f or the a ppellee. Tim S. Mc Cla in , Gene ral Couns e l; R. Ra nd

yCam pb e ll , A c ting As sis tant G e ne ra l Co un se l; Darryl A. Joe , A c tin g De pu ty Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Er ic a M . D or nb ur g , a ll of Was hin g ton , D. C., we re on the br ie f i n No. 00-1888 for

the appe llee.
Be fore I VERS, STEI

NB ERG, and GREENE, Judges

. STEI NB ERG, Judge : Appellant King L . Wright appe als a F ebrua ry 2 0 , 2001, Boa

rd of Veter ans' Appea ls (BV A or B oard) decision that denied, inter alia, se parate 10% ratings (e ffe ctive June 10 , 1 99 9) fo r ea c h ear fo r his De pa rtme nt of Ve te ra

ns Af fa ir s ( VA ) s e rv ic e -c on ne c te d ti nn itu s. W right Record [here inafter W

ri. R

. ] at 2 , 5

. (T i n n i tu s i s "a n o i s e i nt h e e a r s , s u c h a s ri n gi n g, buzz ing, roar ing or clicking ". D OR L AND ' S I L L US TR ATED M ED I CA L D I C TI ONAR Y (D OR L AND ' S ) 17142

(28th ed

. 1 9 9 4 ))

. Ap pellant J acob Wanne r appe als a June 7, 2000, BVA decision that denie d a compensa ble rating e ffe ctive ear lier than June 10, 1999, for his VA ser vice- connec ted tinnitus and denied a rating g reater than 10% (ef fec tive J une 10, 1999) f

or that c o n d i t i o n. W

anner Record [hereinaf ter W an. R.] at 2.

I. Re le va nt Bac kgr ound A. W rig ht Ap pe lla nt Wr ig ht s e rv e d o n a c tiv e du ty in t he U. S. A rmy fro m Dec e mbe r 1 94 2 unti l Dec ember

1945, including se rvice in World W ar I I

. W ri. R. at 12. I n Marc h 1947, a VA r eg ional office (RO) a

war ded ser

vice c onnection and a ssigne d a noncompensa ble rating for "impair

ment of auditory acuity ", e ffe ctive fr om Dece mber 21, 1945, the day following his date of dischar g e. W ri. R. at 15. At the time of the 1947 VARO decision, the examining audiolog ist re po rt ed t h at t he veter an cla im e d

th a t h e w a s " s u

b je c te d to n o is e s s u c h a s ma c h in e g u n s , e xp lo s io nr if le s , mo rta r
s h el l s [ , ] an d

ai rc ra ft en gi n es " d

u ri n g W o rl d

W ar I I ; th e a u d i o l o gi s tco n cl u d edt h at t h e v et er an 's "tinnitus [was] consistent with the history of noise exposure"

. W

ri. R. at 16. I n a Jul y

1985 decision, the RO noted that, upon examination at the vetera n' s separ ation from ser

vice, he had 15/15 hea

ring bilatera lly , with 12/15 in his rig ht ear and 15/15 in his left ear. W ri. R. at 18. The RO also re corde d that "[t]he vetera

n g ave a history of exposure to loud noises in service and now co m p l ai ned of a

s qu e a ky r in g in g in

his ears"

. W

ri. R. at 18. The RO g rante d service connec tion for tinnitus and

co n t i n u edt h e p ri o r n o n co mp en s ab l e r at i n g, b u tre fe rr edt o h i s co n d i t i o nas "d ef ec t i v e h ea ri n g, bilatera l with tinni tus". W ri. R. at 19. I n a Jul y 1986 VA tinnitus-examination report, an audiolog ist re corde d that the veter an wa s
s u ff er i n g fr o m "a m i l d

t o m o d er at e s en s o ri n eu ra l h ea ri n g l o s s b i l at er al l y " an d t h at "t h e p at i e n t 's tinnitu s is a mo d e r a te an n o y an c e , an d d o e s p r e s e n t a d is tu r b an c e to th e v e te r an ' s s le e p and interper sonal communication"

. W ri. R. at 77. Ba sed on a f inding that t h e v et er an ' s hear ing ha d

wo rs e ne d s inc e his se pa

ratio n f ro m se rv ic e , in J uly

19 88 the RO a ssi g ne d a 20 % r a tin g fo r h is service -conne cted bilater al hea ring loss with ti nnitus, ef fe ct i v e J une 29, 1987, the date that a VA medical ex amination confirme d the veteran ha d an incr ease d hear ing loss. W ri. R. a t 23 . T he RO3

also commented: " Claimed tinnit us does not war rant separate compensable eva luation as it is not sh own in ser vi ce or

as t he re su lt of d efi ni te a cou st ic t raum a." Ibid. I n response to the veteran' s April 1999 claim for an increase d rating for his bi latera l hear ing los s wi th t inn itu s ( W

ri. R. at 38), the RO c ontinued the 20% rating in Oc tober 1999. W ri. R at 44. Th e RO c omm e nte d: " Al tho ug h th e ve te ra n' s h e ari ng lo ss do e s n ot m e e t th e c ur re nt c ri te ri a

to

su pp or t th e 20 [%] eva luatio n, thi s e va luatio n is c on tin ue d a s it wa s a ssi g ne d und e r o ld r a tin g c ri te ri a previously

in e ffe ct for evaluating he aringloss. Highe r eva luations are a ssigne d for g reater loss of hear in g." W

ri. R. at 45. On appe al to the B oard ( W ri. R. at 63), the vete ran a rg ued, inter a lia, that he should rec eive a

separ ate 10% tinnitus rating for e ach e ar. W ri. R. at 73. Specifica lly , he ar g ued that Diag nostic Code (DC) 6260 (in 38 C.F .R. § 4.87a) is ambig uous b ec au se it does not specify "w hether rec urre nt tinnit us must be present in both ea rs in or der to w arr ant the [10%] rating , whether

rec urre nt tinnit us in e ither ear alone will wa rra nt the [10%] rating , or whe ther such bilate ral tinnitus

war rants sepa

rate [10%] rating s". W

ri. R

. at 7 5. On a Nove mber 1991 stateme nt-in-support-ofclaim form, the ve tera

n stated that he is " partly

deaf ", his " ear s ring all the time", a nd his condition keeps him aw ake " most of the night"

. W ri. R. at 92-93. I n the Fe bruar

y 2000 BV A dec ision here on a ppeal, the B oard de nied a r ating g reater than 20% for the appe llant's bilate ral he aringloss with ti nnitus and ass i gn ed a se parate 10% rating f or tinnitus eff

ective a s of J une 10, 1999. W ri. R. at 2. I n deter

mining the pr oper r ating and ef fec tive date fo r t he tinnit us c la im, the B oa

rd state d: At the time the veter an wa s g rante d s er vice c onnection for tinnitus and prior to June 10, 1999, the only [DC] to ad d re ss tinnit us was [DC] 6 2 5 0 [si c], which allowed a compensa

ble (10%) rating for t i n n i tu s o n l y i f

i tw a s p e r s i s t e n tan d

r e s u l t e d f r o m a h e a d

i n j u r y, concussion, or a coustic trauma

. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.87a, [ DC ] 6260, eff ective prior to June 10, 1999. On J une 10, 1999, [DC] 6260 was amende d to provide that ser vice- connec ted tinnitus would be r ated a s 10% disabling if rec urre nt. See38 C.F.R. § 4

. 8 7 , [DC] 6260, e ff e c tiv e on and a ft e r Jun e 10, 1 99 9. Th e c ur re nt [D C] 62 60 a lso noted that a se parate eva luation for tinnitus may be combined w ith an evaluation unde r [DCs ] 6100, 6200, 6204 or other [DC s ] , ex cept wher e tinnitus supports an evaluation unde r one of those [DCs]

. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.87 [DC] 6260, eff ective a s of J une 10, 1999.4

W ri. R. at 4. The B oard the n rea soned that, althoug h Karnas v. Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 308, 313 (1991), r equire d that the B oard a pply the more favora

ble l aw, under 38 U.S.C. § 5110(g ) t he B oard may apply the amende d regulation only "to rate the veter an' s disability for periods from and a fter the eff ective date of the a

mendment" ; the Boa

rd conc luded, t here fore , that it could awar d a 10% r ating for tinnitus only eff

ective as of June 10, 1999. W ri. R. at 5 (citing VA Ge n. Coun. Prec. (G .C. Prec.) 03-00 (Apr . 10, 2000)). I n response to the appellant' s argu m en t that he should rec eive, unde r DC 6260, two 10%

ratin g s f or tinnit us , o ne fo r e a c h e ar, the B oa rd re a so ne d: Whil e the ra

tin g sc he du le do e s pr ov ide [] f or ra tin g e a c h e ar f

or oti tis medi a , o ti ti s e xte r

n a , an d e ar n e o p la s ms , it s p e c if ic a ll y d o e s not a dd re ss t he "bi lat era l" c on dit ion

in [D C] 62 60 fo r t inn itu s. [Th os e thr e e c ondit ion s] are a ll c on dit ion s th a t ma y a ff e c t on ly on e or bo th e ars and may have se pa

rate c omp lic a tio ns wh e n b ilate ra l. T inn itu s, on the other hand, is a condition that is defined as " a ring ing, buzzing n o is e in the ea r s
. [" ] [D OR L AND ' S ] 1725 (27th ed. 1988)[] . I n other words, it is a diffuse pe rce ption of sound , ra t h er than an a ctual ph y sic a l c on dit ion . T hu s, the Boa rd fi nd s th a t e ith e r t inn itu s is pr e se nt o r i t is n't, it is a n a ll- or -n on e ph e no me no n, and a sin g le e va luatio n is a

pp ro pr ia te wh e the r i t is pe rc e ive d a s b e ingbil a te ra l, unilatera l, or somewher e in betwee n. Thus, the Board c oncludes that [DC] 62 60 provides for a maximum 10[%] rating for r ecur rent tinnitus , whether

perc eived a s unilateral or bilatera l.

W ri. R. at 5. B. Wann er Appellant Wanner

serve d honorably , including w artime ser vice, in the U.S. Mar i ne Corps from F ebrua

ry 1946 to J une 1948. W

an. R. at 33, 4 0

. W h i l e in service , the veter an deve loped tub e rc ulo sis ( W

an. R. at 28-29), for

which he was treated with an ototox ic medication, streptomy cin, ( W an. R. at 3) . F oll ow inghis July 19 48 a pp lic a ti on for be ne fi ts ( W an. R. at 36), an RO g rante d service connec tion for his tuberculosis in November 1949 ( W an. R. at 39)

. I n April 1982, he filed, int e r a lia , a

c la im f or se rv ic e c on ne c tio n for his bil a te ra l hea ri ng los s, wh ic h he state d wa s " du e to medication"

. W

an. R. at 42. I n May

1982, a private audiolog ist ex amined him and conc luded that h e h a d " a mi ld h ig h [- ]f

r e qu e n c y h e ar in g lo s s c o n s is te n t w it h h is h is to r

y o f o to to xic medication" ( W an. R. at 4 6), andin S ept emb er 19 82 he w as di agnos ed wit h "tin ni tu s au ri um , rec urr ent " ( W an.5

R. at 50). The RO de nied his claim for se rvice connec tion in November 1982 a nd issued a Statement of the Ca se (S OC ) in Apr il 198 3 an d a Supp le me nta l SOC in Se pte mbe r 198 3 re ite ratin g that de nia l. W an. R. at 52 -5 4, 66 , 8 1- 82 . In a Se pte mbe r 1 98 4 h e ari ng a t the RO , th e ve te ra n te sti fi e d und e r o a th that he had not e x perie nced a ny ring ing in his ear s befor e he be g an takingtuberc ulosis medication. W an. R. at 9 0. He fu rt her t est if ied th at he had serv ed wit h an art il ler y un it and"di d a l ot of f

ir in g", which also c aused his ea

rs to ring

. W

an. R. at 90. I n Aug ust 1985, based on sever al medical opinions that the veter an' s tinnitus resulted f rom the streptomy cin medication, the Boa rd aw ar d ed s ervic e conne ction for tinnitus as "the result of t reatment for a se rvice -conne cted disability ". W an. R. a t 1 1 5

- 1 7

. T h e RO assig ned a

noncom p en s ab l e rating f or the c ondition, effec tive from Apr il 15, 1982, the date on which the

v et er an h ad fi l ed his claim. W an. R. a t 1 2 2

. O n Se p te mb e r 2 3 , 1 9 9 8 , h e f il e d a c la im f

or an i n c r e a s e d r a t i n g , b a s e d o n t h e a s s e rt i o n t h a th i s b i l a t e r a l h e ar i n g l o s s h a d i n c r e a s e d i ns e v e r i t y ( W

an. R. at 125), and he underw ent a VA audiologica l examination in November 1998 ( W an. R. at 136-39). The e x ami n i n g phy sician conc luded that the vete ran " does indee d have a signific ant bilatera l

se ns or ine ur a l he ari nglos s" and state d: [ T ] h e ti n n i tu s wa s n o t p re s en t ea rl y o n wh en h e s u ff er edan y d am age due to the streptomy cin. I t would be har d to argue that the str e pto my c in h e too k f

or his tub e rc ulo sis pr ob a

bly c a us e d s ome of

his hear ing loss [sic] . The e x act pe rce ntag e of that [ loss] cannot be deter mined, but it is probably a fa ctor. The tinnitus is probably more re la te d to a g ing , a

nd the tinnit

us do e s no t se e m to be that bo the rs ome t o h i m an d

d o es n o ti n t er fe re wi t hh i s fu n ct i o n i n g. W an. R. at 138. I n J anuar

y 1999, the RO incre ased the veter an' s rating for high- fre quency hear ing loss, bilateral, to 20%, but denied a compensa ble rating for tinnitus beca use t he record did not show "pe rsistent tinnitus as a sy mptom of head injury , concussion, or a coustic trauma ". W an. R. at 143. On appe al to the B oard, the veter an cha lleng ed only the noncompensab l e ra t ing f or his service

connec ted tinnitus. W

an. R. at 161, 167. I n the B VA dec ision here on a ppeal, the B oard denied a compensable r ating eff ective e arlier than J une 10, 1999, for the veter an' s service -conne cted tinnitus but awar ded a 10% rating as of that date. W an. R. at 2. As in t

he B oa rd ' s W right decision, t h e Board her e found that, although unde r Karnas , su

pra , the more favor able law must apply , DC 6260 (1999) is ef fec tive as of June 10, 1999,6

an d t h e reg ulation does not permit retroa ctive application. W an. R. a t 5

- 6

. I n a

p p ly ing the pr e -Jun e 10 , 19 99 , DC 62 60 [he re ina ft e r " pr e -1 99 9 DC 62 60 " ], the B oa rd c on c lud e d that e ve n if

it

wer e to de termine that the veter an' s tinnit us was per sistent, "ther e is no indication of re cord ( nor does the veter an contend) t hat it was a sy mptom of head injury , concussion, or a coustic trauma ". W an. R. at 6. I n examining DC 6260 as ef fec tive on J une 10, 1999 [hereina fter D C 6260 (1999) or DC 6260 (2002)], the Boa

rd conc luded that a 10% evaluation was war ranted for the ve tera

n' s tinnit us beca use it was " rec urre nt", oc cu rr i n g fo ur to five times daily , and that that rating " rema ins the maxi mum disabili ty

rating available under this [DC] ". W an. R. at 6.

II. Contentions on Appeal Eac h appellant se eks re versa l of his respec tive Boa rd dec ision and the ass i gn m en t o f t wo separ ate 10% tinnitus rating s, one for eac h ear ; appellant W rig ht seeks an e ffe ctive date of April 8, 1 9 9 9 (t h e d at e o f h i s cl ai m fo r a ni n cr ea s edra t i n g ( W ri. R. a t 3 8 ) ) ; a

p p e ll an t W an n e r

s e e k s an ef fe ct i v e d at e o f S ep t em b er 2 3 , 1 9 8 8 (t h e d at e o f h i s cl ai m fo r an i n cr ea s edra t i n g ( W an. R. at 125)). W ri . B ri e f ( B r. ) a

t 13 ; W an. Br

. at 25. I n their principa l and re ply briefs, the appellants make many of the same arguments in support of their g ener al ar g uments that the Boa rd er red by failing to awar d (1) two se parate 10% ratings for the ea ch appellant' s tinnitus , one for eac h ear , and (2) an ef fec tive date pr ior to J une 10, 1999, for the appe llants' 10% tinnitus rating s. A. Separate Tinn itus Ratin gs First, both appe llants arg ue that the Boa rd misinterprete d DC 6260 when it failed to a war d two separ ate 10% tinnitus rating s, one for eac h ear

. W

ri. B r. a t 9; W

an. Br . at 12. Specific ally , the appellants a

rg ue that 38 C.F.R. § 4.25 re quires that the a p p ell ants' tinnitus disabiliti es be r ated

se pa rate ly be c a us e " e a c h se rv ic e -c on ne c te d dis a bil ity sh a ll be se pa

rate ly ra te d and the ra

tin g s [sh a ll b e ] combined"

. W

ri . Br . at 9 (c iting 38 C.F.R. § 4.25, Colay on g v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 524, 531 (1999), a nd Es te ba n v . B ro wn , 6 V e t.A pp . 2 59 , 2 62 (1 99 4) ); W

ri. Re ply a t 1- 2; W an. Reply at 8-9. Th e a pp e lla nts a lso argue tha

t be c a us e that D C do e s not s pe c if y wh e the r t

he 10 % r a tin g a va ila

ble for tinnitus may

be aw arde d for e ach e ar or whether 10% i s the maxi mum rating for both unilater al and bilater al tinnitus, t hat ambig uity must be resolved in f

avor of the veter an, par

ticularly in light of the fa ct that in other DCs the Sec reta ry has expli citly specifie d that other disabilities that may be7

experience d bilatera lly

may rec eive only

one rating whe ther the condition involved is unilateral or bilatera l. W

ri. B r. a t 10 -1 1 ( c iti ng 38 C.F .R. §§ 4. 87 a , DC 620 7 ( pr ov idi ng se pa rate ra tin g fo r " los s of both" and for

"loss of one " a

uricle) ; 4.84a, DC 6011 (providing one rating for sc ars of the re tina, whe th er "un il ate ral or b il ate ral ), DC 60 19 (pr ov id in g one ra ti ng for "[ p] to si s, un il ate ral or b il ate ral ", DC 6023 (providing one rating f or loss of ey ebrow s, whether "unilate ral or bilate ral" ), DC 6024 (providing one rating f

or loss of ey elashe s, whether "unilate ral or bilateral" , and DC 6029 (pr oviding

one rating f

or apha kia, whethe r "[b]il ater al or unilatera l") ; a nd 4.97, DC 6520 (providing one rating fo r s te no sis of

lary nx, w he the r " un ilate ra l or bil a te ra l" )) ; W

an. Br . at 12-14 (c iti n g DC 6 2 07 for proposition that where single rating is intended, Secre tary has spec ifically

so provided). The Sec reta

ry argued initially

in W r ight that th e a

pp e lla nt' s in c re a se d- ra

tin g c la im f

or his service -conne cted he aringloss has been a bandoned on appea l. Secre tary ' s Br

. in r esponse to W ri

. Br

. [ h er ei n af

t er Br

. # 2 ] at 6 -7 (c i t i n g Sm ith ( De nn is) v . W

est , 11 Vet.App. 56, 57 ( 1998), Myk les v. Br own , 7 Vet.App. 372, 373 ( 1995), and Bu c k lin ge r v . B ro wn , 5 Vet.App. 435, 436 ( 1993)). The Court ag ree s. See F

ord v. Gobe r , 10 Vet.App. 531, 535- 36 (1997); De gm e tic h v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 208, 209 (1995), a

ff 'd , 104 F.3d 1328 ( Fe d. Cir. 1997). I n W anner , initially the S ecr etar y argued at le ng th t hat th e a pp e lla nt h a s fa ile d to e xha

us t his a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s be c a us e he did

no t r a ise the sepa rate -tinnitus-rating s issue befor e VA or the Boa rd (Sec reta

ry ' s Br . in response to W an . B r
. [h e r e in a f

te r B r
. # 1 ] a t 5

- 9 ) ; th e a

p p e ll an t o b

je c te d to th a t ar g u me n t in h is r e p ly b r ief ( W an. Reply at 1-9), and the Secre tary later moved, in lig ht of the Court' s consolidation order, to withdra w that portion of the brie f (Motion at 1-2) . The Court will g rant that motion. As to the merits of the appellants' separ ate- tinnitus -ratings a rg uments, the Secre tary

counter s that th e rati ng sc he du le is n ot a mbi g uo us and

that it " e xplic itl y

pr oh ibi ts p y

ra mid ingof dis a bil ity evaluations" under 38 C.F.R. § 4.14 (2000). B r. #1 at 9; B r. #2 at 7. The Secre tary argues that he has provided f

or sepa rate ratings fo r "like org ans" when he intended to and that, ha d he intended separ ate r ating s in the case of bilatera l tinnit us, he would have provided for it. Br. #1 at 9; Br . #2 at 7 (both citing DC 6207; 38 C.F.R. § 4.115b, DC 7523 (providing se parate ratings f o r at ro phy

of "[o]ne" testis and "[b] oth" testes) and DC 7524 (providing separ ate rating s for re moval of " [o] ne" testis and "[b]oth" testes); and 38 C.F .R. § 4.116, DC 7626 (providing separ ate rating s for surg ery on "[o]ne" br east a

nd on "[b]oth" brea sts)). The Sec reta ry further asser ts t h at (1) " VA conside rs8

ti nn it us a si ngle d is abi li ty , wh eth er he ard i n o ne ear , b ot h ear s, or s om ewh ere u nd efi ned in th e head "; (2) no matter wher e the condition is manifested, " the ave rag e impairment on e arningcapa city is the

same " ; a nd (3 ) t he re fo re , und e r 3 8 U .S. C. § 11 15 and 38 C.F .R. § 4 .1 (2 00 0) , th e ratin g sc he du le assig ns a single rating for tinnitus beca use rating s are based in la rg e par t on impairment of ea

rning capa city . Br . #1 at 9-10; B r. #2 at 7-8. I n reply to the Secre t ar y ' s briefs, both appe llants arg ue that the Court should reje ct the Secre tary ' s "post[] hoc rationaliz ation[] " that "V A considers tinnitus a single disability " be cause VA

never adopted this position before the Secre tary filed t he brief and that the Court should thus g ive

no defe renc e to this position beca use i t was " ' fashioned f

or the purpose s of litigation' ". W ri. Reply at 2- 3; W an. R ep l y at 9 -1 1 (q u o t i n g Alaniz v. OPM , 728 F.2d 1460, 1465 ( Fe d. Cir. 1984)). B. Earl ier Effec tive Date (

EED) A p p e ll an t W r ig h t a s s e rts th a t t h e B o ar d mi s inte r p r e te d p r e - 1 9 9 9 D C 6 2 6 0 w h e nit h e ld , " d e [] fa c to" , th a t th e fr e qu e nc y

of his tinnit us wa s n ot " pe rs ist e nt" wi thi n th e me anin g of the pr e -1 99 9 D C, des pi te t he fa ct t hat "th e ti nn it us is con st ant in nat ure" ( W right B r. a t 6, 12 -1 3 (c iti ng 38 C.F .R. § 4.87a, DC 6260 (1998) and W ri. R. at 32 -3 3, 77 , 7 9, 87 , 9 0, 95 )) and , th e re fo re , it is " pe rs ist e nt" under the plain meaningof the pre -1999 re g ulation. W ri. Br . at 12-13. F urthermor e, the a ppellant asserts that the "B oard' s unexpl ained ips e dix it th a t th e v e te r an ' s ti n n it u s is [o n ly ] ' r e c u r

r e nt[ ]' . . . sh ou ldbe re vers ed b y

th e C ou rt ." W

right Br

. at 1 3 (c i t i n g W

ri. R. at 2, 5). The Sec reta ry counter s that th e de te rm inatio n o f a pr op e r ef fe c tiv e date is a

qu e sti on of fa c t and is the re fo re re vie wa

ble on ly

u n d er t h e "cl ea rl y erro n eo u s " s t an d ar d u n d er 3 8 U. S

. C

. § 7 2 6 1 (a )( 4 ). Br

. # 2 at 9 (c i t i n g Hanson v. Br own , 9 Vet.App 29, 32 (1996), and Sc ott v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 184, 188 ( 1994)). The Secre tary argues that the Court should aff irm the Boa

rd dec ision becau s e ther e is " a ' plausible basis' in the

rec ord" for the Boa

rd' s deter mination that the a

ppellant is not entitled to a separ ate r ating for tinnitus p ri o r t o J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 9 9

. Br

. # 2 at 9 (q u o t i n g Gilbert v. De rwinski , 1 V e t

. A p p
. 4 9 , 5 3 ( 1 9 9 0 ) )

. In response to a

ppellant Wright' s asser

tion that "' tinnitus descr ibed as constant is per sistent within t he

mea ni ng of t he [ pre- 19 99 ] regul ati on '", th e S ecret ary st ate s t hat he "do es n ot di sp ut e th at s tat eme nt "; i n s t e a d , h e ar g u e s t h a t , a s t h e B o ar d d e t e r m i n e d , t h e c o n d i t i o nd i d

n o t" r e s u l t [ ] f

r o m a h e a d i n j u r y,
co n cu s s i o n [ , ] o r a co u s t i c t ra u m a". Br

. # 2 at 9 -1 0 (q u o t i n g W ri . B r. a t 12 -1 3) ; se e W

ri . Reply at 6.9

Both a p p el l an t s also argue that they are entitled to an ef

fec tive date e arlier

than J une 10, 1999, beca

use the require ment contained in the pre- 1999 DC 6260 that the disability be a sy mptom of " he a d in jur y , c o n c u s s i o n [, ] o r

a c o u s t i c t r a uma " [he re ina ft e r " the tr a

uma re qu ir e me nt" ] is unla

wf ul; the appe llants contend that the DC conf l i ct s wi t h 3 8 U.S.C. § 1110 by denying c ompensation for tinnitus that was not a cquire d from tra uma. W an . Br

. at 1 5 -1 9 (c i t i n g Brown v. Gardner , 5 13 U. S. 115, 117-18 (1994) , and Al le n v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 439, 446 ( 1995) (e n banc) , for pr oposition t hat it i s " c on tr ary to law " f

or VAto l imi t st a tut e " the re by na rr ow ing[its] s c op e
. . . a

nd c on str uin g it

a g a ins t ve te ra

ns " ); W ri . Reply at 4-8 (sa me). B oth appellants asse rt that the Court has jurisdiction to hold that pre- 1999 DC 6260 conflicts with s ection 1110, bec ause suc h a holding is not the review of the rating sc hedule that is prohibited by 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b). W an . Br . at 15 (c itin g V

i l l a no v. Br own , 10 Vet.App. 248, 249- 50 (1997)) ; W ri . Reply at 5 (same ). Appellant Wanner

asser ts that the scope of

the Cou rt 's re v i ew include s the revie w of

r e g u l a t i o n s t h a tt h e C o u rt f i n d s t o b e " c o n t r ar

y t o c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i g h t , p o w e r , p r i v i l e g e , o r i m m u n i t y" under se ction 7261(a) (3)( B)

. W an. Br . at 19-22 (c iting 38 U.S.C

. § 7252(a) , H.R. R EP
. N O . 100-963, at 3 0 (1988), re

pr int e d in 19 88 U. S.C. C.A .N . 5 78 2, 58 12 ); see 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3) (B ). He argues that the Secre tary has cre ated "unc onstitut ional classifications", having no rational ba sis for the distinction, by

providing for tinnitus benefits under pre- 1999 DC 6260 only for those ve tera ns who meet the tr auma r equire m en t ; ap pellant Wanner a sserts that those vete rans not mee ting the

nece ssary qualifications are ther efor e denie d equal pr otection of the law under the Fifth Ame ndment of the U.S. Constitut ion (as it includes, at least in part, protec tions under the F ourtee nth Amendment ag ainst fede ral gove rnment ac tion, Bolling v. Sharpe , 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). W anner Br . at 22- 23 . F ur the rm or e , a

pp e lla nt Wa nn e r a g re e s w ith

the Se c re tary

that th e " de g re e of

imp a ir me nt" in

ear ning c apac ity

under se ction 38 U.S.C. § 1155 determines the amount of a c ompensation awa rd, but he contends that pre-1999 D C 6260 inti mates " no relationship between the ma nner in whic h tinnitus was a cquire d and its eff ect on e arningcapa city ". W an. B r. a t 24 -2 5. Ap pe lla

nt Wr ig ht a lso sets forth, less extensively , an equa l-protec tion-violation arg ument. W ri. Reply at 4. The Sec reta

ry first counter s appellant Wanner ' s equal-pr otection ar g uments by challeng ing the Court' s jurisdiction t o en t er t ain s uch ar g uments. The Secr etar y argues that sec tion 7252(b) pr oh ibi ts C ourt

re vie w o f t

he ratin g sc he du le and

re qu ir e s n o in te rp re ta tio n or, the re fo re , r e c ours e10

t o l egi s l at i v e h i s t o ry t o d i v i n e co n gre s s i o n al i n t en t

. Br

. # 1 at 1 3 (c i t i n g Ho od v . B ro wn , 4 Vet.App. 3 0 1 , 3 0 4 (1 9 9 3 ), f

o r t h e p ro p o s i t i o nt h at "C o u rt [ i s ] p re cl u d edfr o m re v i ew i n g t h e [ ra t i n g]

sc he du le " ). Th e Se c re tary a lso argue s th a t th e a

pp e lla nt " ra ise s h is c on sti tut iona l argume nt a s a means of by

passing the statutory

provisi o n s go v erning the a ssignment of an ef fec tive date f

or p ay m en to f c o mp en s at i o n b as ed o n a l i b er al i z i n g ch an ge o f l aw ". Br

. # 1 at 1 4 (c i t i n g Buck linger , 5 V e t.A pp . at 44 1; Do rwa rd

v . W est , 13 Vet

. Ap p
. 2 9 5 (2 000) (pe r cur iam order )). Althoug h the Secre tary makes no direc t a

rg ument for a

ny rational ba sis for this classification base d on trauma, he does state that " the Secr etar y ' s rating cover ed the comm on for ms of ti nn it us fro m in ju ry or d is ease ". W an. Br . at 17 (e mphasis added)

.

III . A nal ys is The Court will addre ss in turn the following issues: (1) Whether DC 6260 provides f or two separ ate r ating s for bilater al tinnitus, i .e., one r ating for each ear , and (2) whether the appe llants are

e lig ibl e fo r a

n E ED , to inc lud e the jur isd ic tio n a nd me ri ts i ssu e s inv olv e d in

de te rm ini ngthe va lid ity of the tra uma re quirement. A. DC 6260: Unilat eral or Bilat

eral? I n 1998 and until J une 10, 1999, DC 6260 prov i d ed a 1 0% rating f or tinnitus where the condition was " [p] ersistent as a sy mptom of head injury , concussion, or a coustic trauma ". DC 6260 (1998). On June 10, 1999, an amendment to DC 6260 went into ef fe ct ; that amendment c ontains the same te xt a s the c ur

re nt re g ulatio n an d pro vid e s for a 10 % ratin g fo r " [t]inn itu s, re c ur re nt" , w ith the following note: "N ote: A sepa rate evaluation for tinnitus m ay be combined w ith an evaluation under [DCs] 6100, 6200, 6204, or other D C, ex cept whe n tinnitus supports an evaluation under one of t hose DCs ." 3 8 C. F

. R. § 4

. 8 7 , D C 6 2 6 0 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; 6 4 F e d

. Re g
. 2 5 2 0 0 , 2 5 2 0 2 , 2 5 2 0 6 ( M a y 1 1, 1999). Th e B oa

rd is r e qu ir e d to con sid e r al l evi de nc e of re c or d a nd to c on sid e r, and

dis c us s in

its decision, all " potentially applicable " pr ovisions of law and re g ulation. Cha r l es v. Principi , 16 Ve t.A pp . 3 70 , 3 73 (2 00 2) ; Schafrath v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 589, 593 ( 1991); see 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( a ); W

eave r v. Principi , 1 4 V e t.A pp . 3 01 , 3 02 (2 00 1) (p e r c ur iam or de r) ; Sanden v. D erwinski , 2 Vet.App. 97, 100 (1992). The Boa rd is also requir ed to include in its decision a wr itten statement11

of the re asons or ba ses for its finding s and conc lusions on al l m at er i al issues of fa ct and law prese nted on the r ec o rd ; t h at s tatement must be ade quate to ena ble an a ppellant to understand the prec ise basis for the Boa

rd' s deci s i o n , as we l l as t o fac ilitate reviewin this C ourt. See 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( d) (1 ); Al lda

yv . B ro wn , 7 Ve t.A

pp . 5 17 , 5 27 (1 99 5) ; Gi lbe rt , 1 Vet.App. at 56-57. To comply wi t h this requireme nt, the Boa rd must analy

ze the cre dibilit y

and probative value of

the evidenc e, ac count for the evidenc e that it finds persua sive or unpersua sive, and provide the re asons for its reje ction of any

materia l evidence favor able to the claimant. Se e Cal uz a v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'

d p er curiam , 7 8 F .3 d 6 04 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 6) (t a ble ); Ga br ie lso n v . B ro wn , 7 V e t.A pp . 3 6, 39 -4 0 ( 19 94 ); Gi lbe rt , su pra . The appellants argue that 38 C .F.R. § 4.25(b) require s the assig nment of two sepa rate tinnitus

ratin g s, on e fo r ea c h ear. Th e B oa rd de c isi on , h ow e ve r, fa ile d to a dd re ss § 4. 25 (b ), wh ic h s ta te s in pe rt ine nt p a rt : " Exc e pt a s oth e rw ise pr ov ide d in thi s sc he du le , the dis a bil iti e s ari sin g fr om a

sin g le disease e ntity , e.g ., arthritis, multipl e scle rosis, cer ebrova scular a ccide nce, e tc., a re t o be rated separ ately [,] as ar e all other disabling conditions, if any ." 38 C.F.R. § 4.25(b) ( 2002). Ther efor e, the B oa rd ' s st a te me nts of

re a so ns or ba se s we re ina de qu a te be c a us e the B oa

rd fa ile d to dis c us s th is "pote ntially

applicable " r eg ul ati on and its impact on the appe llants' c laims for sepa rate tinnitus rating s for e ach e ar unde r DC 6260. These claims must thus be remande d for r eadjudication in li g ht of this regulation under both the pre-1999 (in view of our holding in par t I I .B.2.c ., below) a

nd the

curr ent DC. Th e Court

no te s tha t it

is unc le ar w he the r t

he " a ll o the r d isa

bli ngc on dit ion s" langua g e in § 4 .2 5( b) re fe rs to " a ll" su c h d isa bli ng c on dit ion s g e ne ra lly or if that phr a se is inte nd e d to r e fe r t o

" dis a bil iti e s ari sin g fr om a

sin g le dis e a se e nti ty " . T he B oa rd sh ou ld a lso c on sid e r t his ma tte r i n
rea djudicating the appellant' s claims. Additionally , the Court note s that the Secre tary rec ently has pr op os e d to a dd to the ratin g sc he du le a No te , wh ic h wo uld pr ov ide : " No te (2 ): As sig n o nly a sin g le evaluation f

or rec urre nt tinnitus, whether the sound is pe rce ived in one ea r, both ea rs, or in the he ad." 67 Fe d. Reg . 59033, 59034 (Sept. 19, 2002). I n the ac company ing Supplementa

ry I nformation, the Se c r e ta r y e xp la in e d

th a t t h e r e g u lati o n is p r o p o s e d

" [t ]o a v o id

an y p o s s ib le mi s u n d e r s ta

n d in g " , " [t ]o

assure that tinnitus is c onsistently and corr ectly evaluated" , and "to definitively state that re curr ent tinnitus is assigne d o n l y o n e evaluation whether it is perc eived in one e ar, both e ars, or an12

indeterminate site in the head" ; t h e S ec re t ary stated that the " amendment involves no substantive chang e and is c onsistent with current pr actice ". 67 F ed. Reg

. at 5 9 0 3 3

. Ne ither the propose d

re g ulatio n n or

the Sup ple me nta

ry I nf or ma tio n sta te a pr op os e d ef fe c tiv e da te or e xpre ss a n in te nt t o g ive the re g ulatio n a

ny re tr oa c tiv e e ff

e c t. B. E ff e c tiv eDa te 1. Jurisd ic tio n Th e a pp e lla nts c ha lle ng e on

bo th c on sti tut ion a l and

statut or y g ro un ds the re g ulator

y tr a uma
re qu ir e me nt c on ta ine d in DC 62 60 (1 99 8) . T he Co urt 's juri sd ic tio n is de sc ri be d in 38 U. S.C. § 7252(b): R ev i ew i nt h e C o u rt s h al l b e o n t h e re co rdo f p ro ce ed i n gs

befor e the Secre tary and the Boa rd. The ex tent of t he review shall be limit ed to the scope provided in section 7261 of t his title. The Court may not revie w t he schedule of rating s for disabilities adopted unde r section 1155 of this title or any action of the Secre tary in adopting or revising that schedule

. 38 U. S.C. § 7 25 2( b) ; se e als o 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (authorizing Secr etar y to a dopt sc hedule for r ating dis a bil iti e s)

. Al tho ug h the Se c re tary c on c e de d a t or a l argume nt that the c on sti tut ion a l is su e fa lls wi thi n th e sc op e of

the Court ' s r e vie w, he c on te sts the a pp e lla nt' s a ssertion

that th e law a lso empower s the Court to review the DC for its compliance with the statute. As to t h e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l ar g u m e n t , i t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t t h e C o u rt p o s s e s s e s j u r i s d i c t i o nto

re vie w c on sti tut ion a l argume nts genera lly ; se c tio n 7 26 1( c )( 2) pr ov ide s th a t th e Court may " ho ld unlawful a

nd set aside" regulations that are, inter alia " contra

ry t o const itutional right, powe r, privileg e, or immunit y ". 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c)(2) (B ); Ro bin so n v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 398, 399- 400 (1996) ( reiter ating holding that Court is " empower ed t o m ake determinations re g ardingthe interpre tation and application of reg ulations and constit utional claims" ). I t is also well settled that any exclusion of jurisdiction i n courts to r eview constitutional c ontentions reg ardingbenef its under title 38 of the U.S. Code will be disfavore d. See J ohnson v. Robison , 415 U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974) (holding that 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970) did not bar judicial revie w of c onstitut ional questions arising

un de r t itl e 38 , U .S. Cod e ); see also Traynor v. Tur nage , 4 8 5 U. S

. 5 3 5 , 5 4 2 -4 5 (e x t en d i n g Robison ho ldi ng" that th e fe de ra l c ourt s c [an ] en ter tain c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e s to ve te ra ns ' be ne fi ts13

leg islation" and c oncluding that "the question whether a Ve tera ns' Administration r e g

u la ti o n v io la te s the Rehabilitation Act is not forec losed from judicial re view by [section] 211(a) ")

. R ec en t l y , the U.S. Court of Appea ls for the F eder al C i rc u i t co ncluded that the pr ohibition i n 38 U.S.C. § 502 (substantially

simil ar to the se ction 7252(b)( 2) prohibition) a g ainst revie wing a revision to the rating sche d u le does not pre clude that c ourt' s review of the c onstitut ionality

of such a revision. Ny e ho lt v. Principi , 289 F.3d 1350, 1352- 53 (F ed. Cir. 2 0 0 2 ). Furthermore , it is also a well-established pr inc ipl e of

c on sti tut ion a l li tig ati on th a t a Cou rt wi ll " ' a vo id r e a c hin g c on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on s in advanc e of the nece ssity

of dec iding them' ", and will f irst de termine whe ther the c ase ma y be dec ided on statutory

g rounds. Buck

linger , 5 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 4 4 1 (q u o t i n g Ly ng v . No rth west I

nd ian Ce me te ry ProtectiveAssoc. , 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1998))

. There fore , althoug h as in Buck linger , 5 Vet.App. at 4 4 0 , t h e i n s t an tc a s e r a i s e s a s e r i o u s c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i s s u e ( e s p e c i a l l y i nl i g h to f o u r e n s u i n g s t a tu t o r

yc on fl i c t h o l d i n g i n p art I I I

. B

. 2

. c
. , b e l o w , an d i n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e S e c r e t ar

y f a i ls t o a sse rta rational ba sis for providing benef its to veter ans with tinnitus who satisfy the trauma

require ment and denying be nefits to those with tinnit us who do not), we w ill not reach that issue beca use the Court will invalidate that part of the DC at issue, on statutory g rounds. See part I I I .2.c., inf ra . As to the Court' s jurisdiction to review the a ppellants' statutory

arg u me nt, th e is sue is whether the Court' s examination of DC 6260 (1998) for c onsistency with section 1110 constitutes the " revie w [of ] the [ratin g ] sc he du le " tha t se c tio n 7 25 2( b) pr oh ibi ts o r, rathe r, wh e the r s uc h an iss ue is w ith in th e s c o p e o f th e Co u rt' s revie w power s. I n Villano , the Court held that it could "r eview . . . the schedule of ratings" for the " limit ed" purpose of deter mining "whethe r a pa

rticular [DC] i s contrar

y to law"

. Villano , 10 Vet.App. at 250. As in Ho od v . B ro wn , here "[t]he Court is not review ing the schedule or percenta g e ratings or the per centa g es pre scribed by that schedule ". Hood , 4 Vet.App. 301, 304 (1993). Althoug h Court review is prec luded as to intrasche dular conflict, what should be considere d a disability , and the a ppropriate rating for any disability , that sort of re view is not now befor e the Court; hence , we conclude, as in Villano , su pra , that the Court ma

y revie w whethe r the regulation complies with the statutory authorit y u n d er which disability compensation is paid, 38 U.S.C. § 1110. M o re o v er , as i s re fe re n ce d i ns ec t i o n7 2 5 2 (b ), s ec t i o n 7 2 6 1 s et s fo rt h t h e s co p e o f t h e C o u rt 's revie w; section 7261(a )(1) and (3) expli citly allow the re view soug ht by the appellants in the instant14

case . Section 7261(a) (3) pe rmits the Court to "hold unlawful a nd set aside" regulations that a re, inter

a lia , " no t in

a c c or da nc e wi th l aw" or

" in e xce ss o f s ta tutory

. . . a uth or ity [] or

lim itatio ns , o r i n violation of a statutory

rig ht". 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) (1), (3). The Secre tary asser ts that the appellant misreads the w ords of sec tion 7261(a) by failing to rec og nize its introductory lang uag e, which provides that the sc ope as de fined ther ein is limit ed "to the ex tent nece ssary to its decision and when prese nted" , 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a); the Sec reta ry argues that this l an g uag e bar s the Court from addre ssing this issue bec ause " revie w of the r ating provisions at issue in this case ar e neither

' nece ssary ' to the Court's de cision nor prope rly ' prese nted' for judicial r eview" . Br . #1 at 14. To the

e xten t t hat the Se c re tary

is a rguin g that th e iss ue is n ot p ro pe rl y " ' pr e se nte d' " , it

a pp e ars that he is ref err ing to his ar g ument that the appe llant failed to e x haust his a dminist rative reme dies (B r. #1 at 5-9); howe ver, the Secre tary has moved to withdraw

that po rt i o n of his brief ( Motion at 1-2), see Maggi tt v. W

est , 202 F.3d 1370, 1378- 79 (F ed. Cir. 2000) (holdingthat Court "did not lack jur i s d i ct i o nt o co n s i d er

M aggi t t 's co n s t i tu t i o n al an d statutory arg uments", e ven though administrative

reme dies wer e not exhausted). To the e x tent t h at the Secr etar y is arg uing that the issue is not

"' nece ssary ' to the Court's de cision", the Court rejec ts that arg ument as er roneous be cause the ver

y iss ue be fo re the Court

is w he the r the a

pp e lla nt is e nti tle d to an E ED ba se d o n th e a sse rt e d inva lid ity of the pre- 1999 DC. Moreove r, Congr ess is presumed to leg islate with knowledg e of c asela w that sets forth princ iples of statutory construction, see M

cNary v. H

aitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. , 49 8 U .S. 479, 496 (1991), including the "' fundame ntal and long-standing principle of judicial restra int . . . that

cou rt s av oi d rea chi ng con st it ut io nal qu est io ns in ad v a n c e o f th e nece ss it y

of d eci di ng th em'", Buck linger , su pra (q u o t i n g Lyng , su

pra ); henc e, to dec ide that Cong ress prohibited the Court f rom decidinga case on statutory g rounds and direc ted i nstead that a constit utional question be conf ronted that might other

wis e b e avoide d would be to impute to Congre ss, when ena cting section 7252(b) , the abr og ation by

silence of

a funda mental statutory -construc tion principle. There fore , f

o r a ll th e r e a s o n s d is c u s s e d a b o v e , w e h o ld

th a t t h e Co u rt h a s ju

r is d ic ti o n, pursuant to sec tion 7261(a)( 3)(C), to dete rmine wh et h er a DC regulation is "in violation of a statut or y ri g ht" and , p ur su ant t o s e c tio n 72 61 (a) (3 )( A) , to de te rm ine wh e the r a DC re g ulatio n is

" arb itr ary , c a

pr ic iou s, an ab us e of dis c re tio n, or oth e rw ise no t in a c c or da nc e wi th law" . 38 U .S. C. § 7261(a) (3)( C), (B ).15 2. Me rit s As appe llant Wanner and the Secre tary both contend, the va lidity of DC 6260 (1998) is a

n issue of law. W

an. Br . at 10, B r. # 1 at 1

. Henc e, we will ex amine the issue unde r the de novo standard of

revie w pursuant to sec tion 7261(a)( 1) and ( 3).

a. App lic ab le

DC : Karnas instructs: "Wher e the law or r eg ulation chang es af ter a claim has been f iled or re opened b u t b ef

o re the administrative . . . proc ess has be en conc luded, the ver sion

m o [ r e ] f a v o r a b l e t o t h e a

p p e l l an ts h o u l d

an d w e s o h o l d

w i l l a p p l y u n l es s C o n gre ss p ro v i d ed otherwise or pe rmitte d the [S e c re tar y ] to do oth e rwi

se and the Se c re tar

y did so ." Karnas , su

pr a (empha sis added)

. As the appellants point out , the Secr etar y specific ally

provided that the c urre nt regulation, which does not conta in the trauma require ment, is not applicable prior to June 10, 1999. 64 Fe d. Reg . 25,200, 25,202 (May 11, 1999) (spe cify

ing e ffe ctive date ). I n appellant W rig ht's case, the Boa rd cited Karnas and conc luded that it was constra ined by 38 U.S.C. § 5110(g) not to apply the more f

avora ble re g ulation in DC 6260 (1999) pr ior to its J une 10, 1999, eff

ective da te. W ri. R. at 4- 5; see W

an . R. a t 4- 5. Se c tio n 5 11 0( g ) p ro vid e s: Subject to the provisions of section 5101 of this t i t l e, whe re compensation, dependenc y and indemnity

compensation, or pension is awar ded or inc rea sed pursua nt to any Act or a dminist rative issue, the e ff e c tive dat e of

su c h a wa rd or inc re a se sh a ll b e fi xed in acc ordanc e with the fa cts found bu t sha ll no t be e ar lie r tha n the e ff e c tiv eda te

of the Ac t or ad ministrativ eiss ue . In n o e vent sha ll such aw ard or incre ase be retroa ctive for more than one y ear

from the date of application ther efor

or th e date of administrative deter mination of entitlement, whicheve r is ear lier. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(g) (empha sis added). The Court held in DeSousa v . Gober t h at s ec t i o n5 1 1 0 (g) "pr eclude s an ef

fec tive date e arlier

than the ef

fec tive date of the liberalizing . . . regulation", but the B oa rd mus t, n on e the le ss, sti ll a dju dic a te wh e the r a c la ima nt "wou ld r e c e ive a

mor e fa vo ra ble

o utcome, i.e., something more than a denial of be nefits, under the prior

law a nd re g ulatio n". De So us a , 10 Vet.App. 461, 467 ( 1997). Ac cordin gl y , the B oard ha d the duty to adjudicate the appellant' s claims under the pre- 1999 DC for any period prior to June 10, 1999, as well as under the new DC for

the per iod beg inning on June 10, 1999. Se e De So us a and Karnas , both su pra .16

b. App e lla nt Wrigh t's EED Cla im: Re as ons or Bas es: I n the W

r ig ht ca se, the B oard

corr ectly pointed out the require ments of Karnas and section 5110(g ) i n terms of a djudicating the appellant' s claim under the appropr iate DC. Howe ver, the Boa rd abr uptly and incor rec tly conclude d i t s an al y s i s t h er e: "A cc o rd i n gl y , t h e Bo ar d s h o u l d ap p l y t h e am en d edre gu l at i o nt o ra t e t h e v et er an 's d i s a b i l i t y fo r period

s fro m and

af te r the e ff e c tiv eda te

of the amend ment ." W ri . R. a t 5 ( c iti ngG. C. Prec. 03- 00). Unde r De So us a , a s w e ll a s G .C. Pr e c 03 -0 0, wh ic h wa s cit ed by the B oa rd , th is analy sis is i ncomplete; G.C. Prec

. 03-00 plainly holds that in a circumstanc e such a s this, "the B oard should apply

the amende d regulation to rate the ve tera n' s d i s ability

for pe riods from and a fter the

e f f e c t i v e d a t e o f

t h e a m e n d m e n t [ , an d

t ] h e B o ar d

s h o u l d a p p l y the prior version of th e regulation to rate th e vetera n's d

isa bil ity fo r a ny pe rio d p re c e din

g th ee ff e c tiv eda te

of the amend ment ". G. C. Pr e c . 0 3- 00 ; se e De So us a , supra. The Boa rd was bound to follow G.C. 03-00, see 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( c ); Herlehy

v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 33, 34 (2001) (per curiam order) ; instead, howeve r, the B oa rd sim ply ins e rt e d th e fo llo wi ngsu mma ry c on c lus ion

in the fi na l pa

ra g ra phof the pa rt of its decision en t i t l ed "Hea

ring L oss" ( perta ining to the a ppellant' s claim for a

n incre ased r ating for bilatera l hear ing loss): " How ev er , t h e p reponde ranc e of the evidenc e is ag ainst the claim for a compensa ble eva luation f

or tinnitus under the prior rating criter ia in e ffe ct during the pende ncy of th is app eal pri or t o J un e 10 , 1 99 9. " W ri

. R. at 6, 9. Be cause the B oard f ailed (1) to discuss the pre1 9 9 9 D C 6 2 6 0 , a

" p o t e n t i a l l y

a p p l i c a b l e " r e g u l a t i o n( w h i c h t h e C o u rth o l d s is ap pl icab le under De So us a ), Sc ha

fra th , su pra (c on str

uin g 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( a )) , ( 2) to p ro vid e an e xplanatio n f or its decision that would enable an appellant to understand the prec ise basis for the Boa rd' s decision, s ee 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( d) (1 ); Allday and Gi lbe rt , both su pra ; a nd (3 ) t o a c c ount f

or the e vid e nc e that it finds persua sive or unper suasive, see Caluza and Gabrielson , both su pra , the Court holds that the B oa rd ' s st a te me nt o f r e a so ns or ba se s wa s ina de qu a te

. On re mand , the B oa rd mus t a dju dic a te fu lly the appe llant's c laim in compliance with these require ments. Of c ourse, in re adjudicatingappellant Wright' s claim, the B oard is also bound by t h is opinion's holding in pa rt I I I .B.2.c , below, that the trauma r equire ment in pre-1999 D C 6260 is invalid. Mo re ov e r, a s to the a

pp e lla nt' s a rgume nt r e g ard ing the B oa rd ' s " de [] fa c to" ho ldi ngthat hi s ti nn it us is on ly

"recurr ent " but no t "p ers is ten t" ( W ri . Br

. at 6 , 12-13), the B oard doe s make two refere nces t o t h e app ell ant 's ti nn it us as b ein g "recurren t" ( W ri. R. at 2, 5) , b ut b oth

of the se17

ref ere nces a ppear to pertain to the e valuation o f t h e ap p ell ant' s tinnit us under r evised DC 6260 (1999) , in wh ic h " re c ur

re nt" is the c ri te ri on of fr e qu e nc y . As s ta te d a bo ve , th e B oa

rd did no t a c tua lly evaluate the appe llant's c ondition u nder pr e-1999 D C 6260, and, furthe rmore, the Boa rd dec ision does not appe ar to c ontain any discussion or application of the "pe rsistent" c riterion in pre -1999 DC 6260 in terms of the appe llant's c laim. Se e W ri . R. at 1-10. There fore , on rema nd, the B oard must adjudicate this iss u e (1 ) i n light of the Secre tary ' s conce ssion that "' tinnitus descr ibed as ["]co n s t an t[ "] is [ "]persistent["] within the meaning of the re g ulation'" (B r. #2 at 9-10 ( quoting langua g e fr om W

ri . Br . at 12-13 a

nd stating, " [t ]he Secreta

ry does not dispute that statement" ); and (2) takinginto account the r ecor d on appea l (ROA); and ( 3) providing an ade quate statement of

rea sons or bases f

or its decision. See 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( a ), (d )( 1) ; W ri. R. at 32-33, 77, 79, 87, 90, 95. Th e Court

no te s th a t th e fi rs t men tio n of the a pp e lla nt' s tinn itu s is f

ound in t he July 19 85 RO decision, whe re it g rante d "[servic e connec tion] for tinnitus" but found that the r equire ments for a compensa ble rating we re not met. W ri . R. at 18. I n the summa ry section listing the se rvice

connec ted disabilities in that decision, however , the RO did not separate out the appe llant's tinnitus

as a s ep ar at e n o n co mp en s ab l e r at i n g; i n s t ea d , t h e R O l i s t edt h e c o n d i t i o nas "d ef ec t i v e h ea ri n g, bilatera l with tinni tus" a

nd listed the 0% rating e ffe ctive fr om December 21, 1945. W ri . R. at 19. There fore , althoug h the R O determined that a separate noncompensa ble rating wa s appropr iate, the eff ective date of th at rating is not clea r fr om the rec ord. See W ri . R. at 18-19. On the r emand order ed her ein, the B oard should conside r t his matter in deter mining whe ther the a

ppellant meets the criter ia under

DC 6260 (1998) for

the per iod prior to J une 10, 1999.

c . App e lla nt Wa nne r's EED Cla im: V ali dit y of Trauma Re qui

re ment: As stated in par

t I I I .B .1 ., a bo ve , th e Court

may " ho ld u

nla wf ul a nd se t a sid e " re g ulatio ns that are , in te r a lia , " no t in

acc ordanc e wi th law" or " in excess of statutory . . . authority [] or limitations, or in vi olation of a statut or y ri g ht ". 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 1( a )( 3) (A ), (C ). Ap pe lla nt Wa nn e r a rgue s th a t th e Court

sh ou ld invalidate that portion o f p re -1999 DC 6260 t hat imposes a tra uma re quirement for

service

c on ne c tio n f

or tinnit us , b e c a us e it v iol a te s se c tio n 1 11 0, wh ic h s ta te s: For disability

resulting from per sonal injury suffe red or disease c ontrac ted in line of duty , or for ag g ravation of a pre exis ting injury suffe red or

disease c ontrac ted in l i n e o f dut y , in the active18 milit ary , naval, or ai r s ervic e, duringa per iod of war , the United States will pay to any veteran thus di sabled and who was discha rg ed or re lease d under c onditions other than dishonorable f rom the per iod of ser vice in which sa id injury or disease w as incurr ed, or pr eexisti ng injury or disease was a g g ravated, c ompe nsa tio n as pr ov ide d in this subchapter , b ut n o c omp e ns a tio n s ha ll be pai d if the dis a bil ity is a result of the person' s own willful misconduc t or abuse of alcohol or drug s. 38 U. S.C. § 1 11 0 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . B e c a us e se c tio n 111 0 st ates th a t th e " Un ite d St a te s will pay [d is a b il it y c o mp e n s a ti o n ] to a ny

veter an thus disabled" and the Sec reta ry has p ro m u l gated a

r e g u l a t i o nt h a ta l l o w s p aym e n tt o o n l y s o me of the ve tera

ns "so disable d", a s descr ibed in section 11 10 , th a t r e g ulator

y pr ov isi on is inc on sis te nt wit

h the pla in m e anin g of

se c tio n 1 11 0 a

nd thu s is " in vi ol ati on of a s tat ut ory

ri ght", 38 U.S .C . § 72 61 (a)(3 )(C ), an d "no t i n acco rdan ce wi th l aw", 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3) (A). Section 7261(a) also direc ts the Court to "hold unlaw ful and set a side dec isions" that ar e, inter alia, " arbitra

ry , capr icious, [or] an abuse of discre tion". 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) (3)( A). The Court notes that the par

ties have pr ovided no re cord, including r eg ulatory history , with respec t to DC 6260 that explains why there was orig inally a tra uma re quirement or w hy

in 1999 that require ment was

re mov e d. B e c a

us e the Court

c an f ind no ba sis fo r that disti nc tio n, the on ly c on c lus ion a va ila ble is that it constitutes "a

rbitrar y and capricious" rulemaking to exclude cer tain veter ans fr om rec eiving compensation bas ed o n t he wa y in which they

incurre d their ser

vice- connec ted disabilities. See Gi lbe rt , 1 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 5 8 (c i t i n g Mo tor Ve hic le s Mfr s. As s'n of the U. S. v . S

tat e Fa rm Mu t. A uto . I

ns
. Co. , 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983), for proposition that decision denying be nefits would not be subjec t to r e ve rs a l u nd er th e " arb itr ary , c a pr ic iou s, [or ] an

a bu se of dis c re tio n" sta

nd ard wh e n d e c isi on

is "pr em i s ed u p on a rational basis and supported by appropr iate and r eleva

nt favors w hich wer e pr op e rl y art ic ulate d" ). Ac c or din g ly , the tr a uma re qu ir e me nt co nta ine d in DC 62 60 (1 99 8) is i nv a lid on this basis a s well. The Court note s that it is aware of no other V A re g ulatory provision in which the Secr etar

y has attempted to e x clude c erta in vetera ns in a similar manner. I n view of the fore g oing a naly sis, the Court will i n validate that pa rt of the pr e-1999 regulation that contained a trauma r equire ment; as a re sult, t h e s o l e criterion re maining in that regulation will be "[p]ersistent". 38 C.F.R. § 4.87a, D C 6260 (1998).19

Ap pe lla nt Wa nn e r r e c e ive d h is o ri g ina l g ra nt o f s e rv ic e c on ne c tion for tinni tus in Aug ust 1985. W

an. R. 117. I n September 1985, he was awa rded a 0% rating for t h at co n d i t ion, eff ective April 15, 1982. W

an. R. 122. At that time, DC 6260 contained the tra uma re quirement a

nd th e s am e l anguag e as it did in the pre- 1999 version. 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.84b, DC 6260 (1982) ; 4.87a, DC 62 60 (1 99 8) . B e c a

us e the Court

no w h old s th a t the tr a

uma re qu ir e me nt is inva lid , th e Cou rt wi ll

vacate the B VA dec ision a nd rema nd the matter for the Boa

rd to r eadjudicate the EED issue under the sole cr iterion rema ining unde r prior la w, " persistent"

.

IV. Conclusion Upon consider atio n o f t he ROA, the pa rties' pleading s, oral ar g ument, and the f oreg oing analy s i s , the Court vacates the B oard' s Fe bruar y 2001 W right decision and June 2000 W anner decision and r emands the matters for expeditious rea djudication consistent with this opi nion. Upon

rea djudication, the B oard must provide e x peditious further de velopment and i s s u an ce of a

rea djudi ca t ed d ec i sion supported by an ade quate state ment of re asons or ba ses, see 38 U. S.C. §§ 11 10 , 5 10 3( a ), 51 03 A, 71 04 (a ), (d ); 38 C.F .R. §§ 4. 25 (b ), 4. 87 , D C 62 60 (2 00 2) ; 38 C.F .R. § 4 .8 7a , D C 62 60 (1 99 8) ; 38 C.F .R. § 4 .2 5( b) ; De So us a , su pra ; Fletche r v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 39 4, 39 7 ( 19 91 ) –

a ll c on sis te nt w iththi s o pin ion and in ac c or da

nc e wi th s e c tio n 3 02 of

the Ve te ra

ns ' Be nefits I mprovements Ac t o f 1994, Pub. L . No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (found at 38 U. S.C. § 5 10 1 n ote ) ( re qu ir ingSe c re tary to p ro vid e fo r " e xpe dit iou s tr e a tme nt" fo r c la ims

rema nded by BV A or the Court). See A llday , 7 Ve t.A pp . at 533 -3 4. F ur

the rm or e , the Court

g ra nts the Se c re tary ' s mo tio n to wi thd ra w that po rt ion

of his W anner brief r eg ardingexhaustion of

reme dies. Br . #1 at 5-9. The Court also invalidates 38 C.F.R. § 4.87a, DC 6260 (1998) to the e x tent that it is i nc on sis te nt wit

h 38 U.S. C. § 1110 a s her e in int e rp re te d. On re mand , th e a

pp e lla nts wi ll be fr e e t o s u

b m i ta d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e an d ar g u m e n to nt h e r e m an d e d c l a i m i na c c o r d an c e wi th Kut sc he ro us k yv . W est , 1 2 Ve t .App. 369, 372-73 (1999) (per curiam order) (conc luding that a n
a pp e lla nt i s e nti tle d, un til 90 da y s a ft e r B oa

rd ma ils po str e mand

no tic e to a

pp e lla nt, to s ub mit additional evidenc e and argument or to r equest hear ing on appea l at w hich appellant may submit new evidenc e), a

nd such evide nce a

nd argument must be considere d on rema nd, Kay v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 529, 534 ( 2002). The Court notes that a re mand by this Court and by

the Board c onfer s20

on an appe llant the rig ht to VA compliance with the terms of the remand order and imposes on the Secre tary a conc omitant duty

to ensure c ompliance wi t h those terms. Se e Ste ga ll v . W

est , 11 Vet.App. 268, 271 (1998). A final de cision by the B oard f

ollowing the r emand he rein orde red will constitut e a new decision that, if adver se, may be appe aled to this Court only upon the filing of

a new Notice of Appea l w ith the Court not later than 120 da y s after the date on w hich notice of the new f inal Boa rd dec ision is m ailed to the ap p el l ant. Se e Ma rsh v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 468, 472 (1998). VACATED A

ND REMANDED

.