Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 14-1885 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

YESENIA VALENTIN-ACEVEDO, 

Claimant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Lynch, Thompson, Kayatta 

Circuit Judges 

Anita Hill Adames, on brief for appellant. 

Rosa Emilia Rodriguez-Velez, United States Attorney, with 

whom Nelson-Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney and 

Francisco A. Besosa-Martínez, on brief, for appellee. 

August 28, 2015 
- 2 - 

KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises out of an 

order by the district court rejecting the validity of ValentinAcevedo's claimed interest in property forfeited to the United 

States by Valentin-Acevedo's former husband in connection with his 

guilty plea on charges of an illegal drug conspiracy. Finding 

that Valentin-Acevedo failed to submit to the district court any 

evidence sufficient to support the validity of her claimed 

interest, we affirm. 

I. Background 

The forfeited property at issue in this appeal is the 

real property known as the Rompe Olas Bar. It is undisputed that 

defendant Miguelito Arroyo-Blas acquired the bar in February 2007, 

and that only his name was on the 2007 deed. As part of his plea 

agreement, Arroyo-Blas agreed to forfeit the bar. It is also 

undisputed that the government's interest in Arroyo-Blas's 

interest in the bar vested when the drug conspiracy began in June 

2007. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (government's interest in property 

subject to forfeiture vests "upon commission of the act giving 

rise to forfeiture"). 

When the government asserts ownership of property by 

virtue of forfeiture in connection with a criminal proceeding, 

there is some chance that a person other than the target of the 

criminal charges may possess an ownership interest in the property. 

The principal statute regulating criminal forfeitures, 21 U.S.C. 
- 3 - 

§ 853, recognizes two situations in which the interests of such 

third parties trump those of the government. First, under 

§ 853(n)(6)(A), a third party might establish that, before the 

government interest in the property vested, the third party 

acquired (and has since maintained) a vested interest in the 

property superior to any interest of the criminal defendant. 

Second, under § 853(n)(6)(B), the third party might show that she 

is a bona fide purchaser without cause to believe that the property 

was subject to forfeiture. 

Seeking to assert a protected interest in the bar under 

this statutory scheme, Valentin-Acevedo filed a verified petition 

under § 853(n)(2) asking the court to adjudicate the validity of 

her claimed interest. As her sole ground for claiming a valid 

interest, Valentin-Acevedo declared that she acquired the property 

by deed as the defendant's wife on February 26, 2008. The petition 

made no claim that, as of that date, Valentin-Acevedo had no cause 

to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture as a result 

of the government's interest that vested in June 2007. In other 

words, the verified petition did not set forth facts that would 

justify a ruling in favor of Valentin-Acevedo. 

The district court nevertheless allowed Valentin-Acevedo 

and the government three months of discovery, with motions for 

summary judgment due one month after the end of discovery, and a 

forfeiture hearing to be held afterwards. After discovery ended, 
- 4 - 

the government filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, 

motion for summary judgment. In her opposition to the government's 

motion, Valentin-Acevedo submitted no actual evidence beyond the 

facts she verified in her petition. Instead, she simply argued in 

a brief that, in 2008, the 2007 deed to Arroyo-Blas was amended to 

reflect that Valentin-Acevedo was married to Arroyo-Blas at the 

time of the conveyance. The district court granted the 

government's motion, apparently on two grounds: (1) the thirdparty petition failed to state a claim; and (2) applying the 

summary judgment standard, Valentin-Acevedo did not generate a 

factual dispute because she failed to provide any evidence or 

documentation to back up her allegations. 

Valentin-Acevedo filed a motion to reconsider, claiming 

that the district court must conduct an ancillary proceeding under 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (by which she apparently meant a hearing) to 

give her an opportunity to provide the court with the necessary 

supporting documentation. The district court denied her motion 

without explanation. 

II. Governing Law 

21 U.S.C. § 853(n) provides the only means for third 

parties to claim an interest in property subject to criminal 

forfeiture. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 44 (1995) 

("[T]hird-party claimants can establish their entitlement to 

return of the assets only by means of the hearing afforded under 
- 5 - 

21 U.S.C. § 853(n)."). To trigger the procedure, a third party 

must file a petition signed under penalty of perjury that "set[s] 

forth the nature and extent of the petitioner's right, title, or 

interest in the property, the time and circumstances of the 

petitioner's acquisition of the right, title, or interest in the 

property, any additional facts supporting the petitioner's claim, 

and the relief sought." 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3). To prevail, a 

petitioner must show by a preponderance of evidence that she had 

a valid legal interest in the property so as to satisfy one of the 

two alternatives set out in § 853(n)(6). Section 853(n) sets out 

procedures for conducting a hearing, see id. § 853(n)(2), (4)-(5), 

but is silent on prehearing procedure and dispositive motions. 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) fills that 

gap. Rule 32.2(c)(1) requires the court to conduct an "ancillary 

proceeding" on a third-party non-money judgment claim, but clearly 

contemplates that that proceeding may not require an evidentiary 

hearing. Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A) provides that "the court may, on 

motion, dismiss the petition for lack of standing, for failure to 

state a claim, or for any other lawful reason," taking the facts 

in the petition to be true. In addition, "[a]fter disposing of 

any [motion to dismiss] and before conducting a hearing on the 

petition, the court may permit the parties to conduct discovery in 

accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(B). And, importantly for this appeal, "[w]hen 
- 6 - 

discovery ends, a party may move for summary judgment under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 56." Id. 

III. Analysis 

Valentin-Acevedo's third-party claim is doubly 

deficient. The verified facts, all set forth in her petition, 

reveal that she acquired the property well after the date that the 

government's interest vested, and provided no evidence at all that 

she then had no cause to believe that the property was subject to 

foreclosure. Her claim in her brief that there is a document that 

retroactively amends the February 2007 deed to reflect her interest 

is backed up by no evidence, and in any event fails to establish 

that her interest, even in an amended deed, would have been 

superior to her husband's. 

For these simple reasons the district court properly 

granted the government's motion for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a), (e)(3); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(B). We therefore 

affirm the judgment of the district court.