IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

) 

v. ) Cr. ID. No. 93008966DI

) 

) 

LUTHER DICKSON, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

Submitted: November 3, 2023 

Decided: February 29, 2024 

COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED

Susan Purcell, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 

Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Luther Dickson, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, pro se.

SALOMONE, Commissioner
1

 

This 29th day of February 2024, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion 

for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court as follows: 

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 29, 1993, Defendant Luther Dickson (“Dickson” or the 

“Defendant”) was indicted on the charges of (i) Burglary First Degree, (ii) 

Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree, (iii) Unlawful Sexual Penetration Third 

Degree and (iv) Kidnapping First Degree. On August 30, 1993, he was reindicted 

on these same charges and two additional charges of Robbery First Degree and 

Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Third Degree. The charges arose out of an 

incident that occurred on the night of March 6-7, 1993 in which Dickson forced his 

way into an elderly woman’s home, sexually assaulted her, stole her money, and 

tore her telephone lines from the wall so she would be unable to call for help.

Dickson was tried twice with respect to these charges. The first jury trial in 

this case began on September 13, 1993. At the conclusion of the first trial, the jury 

found Dickson guilty of Unlawful Sexual Penetration Third Degree, Unlawful 

Imprisonment Second Degree (a lesser-included offense of Kidnapping), and 

Robbery First Degree. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the Unlawful 
2

Sexual Intercourse First Degree and Burglary First Degree charges and a mistrial 

was declared as to those counts.1

The second jury trial in this case was conducted on December 12-16, 1993. 

On December 16, 1993, a second jury found Dickson guilty of Unlawful Sexual 

Intercourse in the First Degree and the lesser-included offense of Burglary in the 

Second Degree. The remaining charge of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Third 

Degree was nolle prossed.

2

On February 4, 1994, Dickson was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 

Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree conviction and an additional ten years of 

incarceration on the remaining convictions, followed by probation.

3

 On February

17, 1994, Dickson filed a direct appeal of his convictions to the Delaware Supreme 

Court.4

 The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on November 7, 1994.

5

On April 10, 2010, over fifteen years after the Supreme Court affirmed his 

convictions, Dickson filed his first pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief.6

 In 

this first Motion, Dickson asserted four grounds for relief, which included, inter 

alia, claims that (i) he was unlawfully deprived of DNA testing which could prove 

his innocence and (ii) another person committed the crimes for which he was 

1 State v. Dickson, Delaware Superior Court Criminal Docket, ID No. 93008966DI at 5

(hereinafter, “D.I. __”). 2 D.I. 8-9. 3 D.I. 10. 4 D.I. 12. 5 Dickson v. State, 1994 WL 632533 (Del.).

6 D.I. 30.
3

convicted.7 Despite being procedurally barred from bringing his Motion for 

Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(1) and (3), 

the Court considered his claims and found them all to be without merit.

8

On November 26, 2018, Dickson filed a second pro se Motion for 

Postconviction Relief (the “Second Rule 61 Motion”) and Motion for Appointment 

of counsel.

9 The Second Rule 61 Motion was prompted by a letter, dated 

December 18, 2017, from the United States Department of Justice, which advised 

that the FBI had determined that its expert analyst on microscopic hair comparison 

evidence (“MHC evidence”), Federal Agent Michael Malone, may have overstated 

the results of its examination by testifying to the conclusiveness of microscopic 

hair samples in making an identification.10 Counsel was appointed to represent

Dickson in his Second Rule 61 Motion to determine whether the MHC evidence at 

issue prejudiced Dickson’s case in light of the Department of Justice’s letter 

raising this new revelation.

11

On June 28, 2019, assigned counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as 

Postconviction Counsel pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(7).12 In 

the Motion to Withdraw, Dickson’s Rule 61 counsel represented that he had 

7 Id.

8 D.I. 42, 44. 9 D.I. 46-47. 10 D.I. 46.

11 D.I. 50, 53. 12 D.I. 54-56.
4

thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the proceedings and the record in this case 

and that after undertaking this thorough analysis, counsel determined that Dickson 

did not have any meritorious basis to raise a claim for relief.13

Rule 61 counsel explained that the new MHC revelations were not helpful to 

Dickson because MHC testimony and the report were only admitted at Dickson’s 

first trial. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the Unlawful Sexual 

Intercourse First Degree and Burglary First Degree charges in that first trial. The 

MHC evidence was not used and was not mentioned to the jury in any fashion

during the second trial. The FBI agent, Agent Michael Malone, did not testify at 

Dickson’s second trial nor was the MHC report admitted at the second trial. At the 

second trial, Dickson was convicted of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree,

for which he is serving a life sentence, and was also convicted of Burglary in the 

Second Degree.

Rule 61 counsel concluded that the new evidence that led to the filing of the 

Second Rule 61 Motion, that the FBI overstated the results of its examination of 

microscopic hair samples, played no part whatsoever in Dickson’s conviction of 

Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree. Therefore, the second trial was 

untainted by any alleged FBI misconduct. Accordingly, Rule 61 counsel 

13 See, D.I. 54-56. Rule 61 counsel’s Motion to Withdraw along with the accompanying 

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw and appendix. 
5

concluded that the MHC evidence claims were without merit under the facts and 

circumstances of this case and sought to withdraw as Rule 61 counsel.

Prior to filing the Motion to Withdraw, and again at the time of the filing,

Rule 61 counsel advised Dickson that he had the right to file a response thereto 

within 30 days, if Dickson objected to the Motion to Withdraw.

14 Dickson chose 

not to file a response.

Following a full, thorough and careful review of the Second Rule 61 Motion, 

Rule 61 counsel’s Motion to Withdraw, and the record, a Superior Court 

Commissioner recommended denial of the Second Rule 61 Motion.15 Dickson did 

not file any objections to the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.

16 On 

October 16, 2019, after a de novo review of the record and the Commissioner’s 

Report and Recommendation, the Superior Court entered an Order adopting the 

Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation and denying the Second Rule 61 

Motion.17 Dickson did not appeal the denial of his Second Rule 61 Motion to the 

Delaware Supreme Court.18

14 See D.I. 54 (letter, dated June 28, 2019 from Rule 61 counsel advising Dickson of the Motion 

to Withdraw and having 30 days to file a response thereto). 15 See, State v. Dickson, 2019 WL 473830 (Del.Super.).

16 Pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 512(b) and Rule 62, any objections to the Report needed to be filed 

within 10 days after the filing of the Report.

17 D.I. 59. 

18 Dickson was required to file an appeal within 30 days of the Superior Court’s October 16, 

2019 Order as required by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(k) and Delaware Supreme Court 

Rule 6(a)(iv). He did not appeal within the required time period or at any time thereafter.
6

On September 14, 2020, eleven months after the Court’s Order in his Second 

Rule 61 Motion, Dickson filed a third pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief (the 

“Third Rule 61 Motion”).

19 In the Third Rule 61 Motion, Dickson objected to his 

counsel’s decision to move to withdraw in the Second Rule 61 Motion, and 

objected to and challenged the Court’s decision in the Second Rule 61 Motion that 

the MHC evidence claims were without merit. Dickson did not raise anything new 

or recently discovered in his Third Rule 61 Motion, but rather, belatedly objected

to this Court’s determination in his Second Rule 61 Motion. 

A Superior Court Commissioner recommended that the Third Rule 61 

Motion be summarily dismissed because it failed to meet the pleading 

requirements for second or subsequent postconviction motions in that Dickson 

failed to establish that (i) new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that he 

defendant is actually innocent of the charges for which he is convicted, or (ii) the 

existence of a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral 

review rendered his convictions invalid.20 The Commissioner also found the Third 

Rule 61 Motion to be procedurally barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 

Rule 61(i)(4) since the claims raised in the Third Rule 61 Motion were resolved in 

the Second Rule 61 Motion.

21 Dickson did not object to the Commissioner’s 

19 D.I. 60. 20 Super. Ct. Crim.R. 61(d)(2) & (5); Rule 61(i). 21 D.I. 63.
7

findings with respect to his Third Rule 61 Motion and the Superior Court entered 

an Order adopting the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation and denying

the Third Rule 61 Motion.

22 Dickson did not appeal the denial of his Third Rule 

61 Motion to the Delaware Supreme Court.

DICKSON’S FOURTH RULE 61 MOTION

On October 26, 2023, Dickson filed a fourth pro se Motion for 

Postconviction Relief (the “Fourth Rule 61 Motion”) pursuant to which he asserts

(i) “newly discovered evidence of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellate 

and postconviction counsel” in his initial Rule 61 Motion and (ii) “newly 

discovered evidence of police and prosecutorial misconduct based upon Brady

material violation[s].”23 He claims that both “ground one and ground two [are] 

based on actual innocence.”24

In his Memorandum of Law in Support of his Fourth Rule 61 Motion, 

Dickson contends that trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation into 

certain Brady material within the State’s possession which would have 

demonstrated that Dickson did not commit the crimes for which he was 

convicted.25 Dickson asserts that another individual by the name of Kevin J. 

22 D.I. 64.

23 D.I. 65-66.

24 Id.

25 D.I. 66 at 5-6.
8

Howard (“Howard”) committed the crimes.

26 He contends that a witness told the 

police that she gave a “slip of paper” containing her telephone numbers to the man 

who was repairing her car.

27 That paper was found wedged in the door of the rape 

victim’s home.28 Dickson asserts that he and Howard share similar facial features 

and that the witness mistakenly identified Dickson as the man to whom she gave 

the slip of paper.29 He further contends that Howard is an auto mechanic while he 

is not.

30 Dickson argues that all of this information was contained in the police 

reports and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence at 

Dickson’s trial of the possibility that another suspect committed the crimes 

alleged.31 He claims this evidence, which was not presented to the jury, may show 

his actual innocence. He likewise claims that postconviction counsel was deficient 

for failing to raise trial counsel’s purported ineffectiveness in his Second Rule 61 

Motion.32 Therefore, according to Dickson, he is “entitled to a new trial where he 

can have the benefit of effective assistance of counsel and the newly discovered 

evidence or identified evidence of another suspect that former trial counsel should 

have presented at his original trial.”33

26 Id.

27 Id.

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id.

31 Id. at 7. 32 Id. at 7-10. 33 Id. at 10.
9

Dickson also asserts that he has identified “new evidence of police and 

prosecutorial misconduct based upon the intentional loss or willful destruction of 

DNA testing of the physical evidence that would probably show with a reasonable 

degree of technical certainty that he is actionally [sic] innocent . . .”34 Put more 

simply, Dickson seems to contend that if certain unspecified physical evidence 

from the crime scene had been tested for DNA it would have established his actual 

innocence and proved that Howard committed the crimes. In support of his 

assertion of police and prosecutorial misconduct, Dickson cites a letter, dated 

January 28, 2002, from the Wilmington Police Department to a representative of 

the Innocence Project in which the police state that they no longer have any 

evidence in their possession that is associated with Dickson’s case. He makes the 

leap from this letter that the loss of the evidence was willful and that the State 

violated his due process rights because “the undisclosed physical evidence was 

favorable to him because it was exculpatory and impeaching” and material to his 

defense.35

APPLICABLE LAW FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF

Rule 61 and Procedural Bars to Relief 

Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) governs the procedures by 

which an incarcerated individual may seek to have his conviction set aside on the 

34 Id.

35 Id. at 13.
10

ground that the court lacked jurisdiction or any other ground that is a sufficient 

factual and legal basis for a collateral attack upon the conviction.36 That is, it is a 

means by which the court may correct Constitutional infirmities in a conviction or 

sentence.37 “Rule 61 is intended to correct errors in the trial process, not allow 

defendants unlimited opportunities to relitigate their convictions.”38

Given that intent, before considering the merits of any claims for 

postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether there are any 

procedural bars to the postconviction motion.

39 Rule 61(i) establishes four 

procedural bars to postconviction relief.40 Rule 61(i)(1) prohibits a motion for 

postconviction relief from being filed “more than one year after the judgement of

conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly 

recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than one year after the 

right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States 

Supreme Court.”41 

Rule 61(i)(2) bars successive motions for postconviction relief unless certain 

conditions are met.42 Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3) and (4), any ground for relief that 

was not previously raised is deemed waived, and any claims that were formerly 

36 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1). 37 Harris v. State, 410 A.2d 500 (Del. 1970). 38 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811,820 (Del. 2013). 39 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 40 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4). 41 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).

42 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
11

adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in 

an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus 

proceeding, are thereafter barred.43 

The foregoing bars to relief do not apply to a claim that the court lacked 

jurisdiction or to a claim that satisfies the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2). 

Rule 61(d)(2) provides as follows:

A second or subsequent motion under this rule shall be

summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted 

after a trial and the motion either:

(i) pleads with particularity that new evidence 

exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is 

actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the 

charges of which he was convicted; or

(ii) pleads with particularity a claim that a new 

rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 

collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or 

the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s 

case and renders the conviction or sentence invalid.44

The Delaware Supreme Court recently examined the first prong of Rule

61(d)(2), referred to as the “actual innocence exception,” in Purnell v. State where 

the Court explained what constitutes “new” evidence and a “strong inference” of 

innocence.

To qualify for an exception to Rule 61’s procedural bars 

against untimely, successive motions, [a defendant] must 

43 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) and (4). 44 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
12

identify with particularity new evidence that creates a 

strong inference that he is actually innocent in fact of the 

acts underlying the charges. Stated differently, [a 

defendant] must present additional evidence that was not 

available at trial and would not have been despite his

exercise of due diligence. [The defendant] must also 

convince us that the new evidence, when considered in 

the context of all the relevant evidence by a properly 

instructed jury, is such as will probably change the result 

if a new trial were granted.”45

The Court also found that “satisfying the actual innocence test is, by design, 

a heavy burden, and such meritorious claims are exceedingly rare.”46

This is Dickson’s Fourth Rule 61 Motion and it is procedurally barred.

First, the Fourth Rule 61 Motion was filed nearly 29 years after the judgment of 

conviction became final and should be barred by Rule 61(i)(1) for being untimely. 

Second, the Fourth Rule 61 Motion should be barred by Rule 61(i)(3) because 

Dickson failed to assert any of the instant grounds for relief at trial, on direct 

appeal or in his initial Motion for Postconviction Relief. Third, while Dickson 

makes yeoman efforts to try to couch his claims in terms that meet the pleading 

requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i), he has not presented any new or additional 

evidence of actual innocence that was not available to him at trial or otherwise 

45 Purnell v. State, 254 A. 3d 1053 (Del. 2021), at 1060. 46 Id. (noting that Purnell was the first defendant to be found eligible for the actual innocence 

exception to Rule 61’s procedural bar). In Purnell, the Court found much of the evidence 

presented by the defendant to be “new” because trial counsel’s disabling conflict of interest 

prevented him from investigating or pursuing several key areas of potentially exonerating 

evidence and defensive strategies on behalf of the defendant. No such conflict of interest exists 

in Dickson’s case.
13

exonerates him of the crimes for which he was convicted.

47 Dickson proffers no 

post-trial recantation by a key witness or exculpatory physical evidence that was 

not previously available to the defendant as was the case in Purnell. Rather, what 

Dickson has presented to the Court in his Fourth Rule 61 Motion is merely his

theory and conjecture that another person committed the crimes for which he was 

convicted coupled with supposition that evidence that no longer exists would

exonerate him. Such mere assertions of actual innocence do not suffice under Rule 

61(d)(2)(i).

48 As such, his Fourth Rule 61 Motion should also be barred under 

Rule 61(i)(2). 

Moreover, the Fourth Rule 61 Motion simply restates the same issues raised

by Dickson in his initial Rule 61 Motion in which he asserted, among other things,

that (i) he was deprived of his right to postconviction DNA testing to establish his 

innocence and (ii) Howard committed the crimes for which he was convicted.

49 

Both of these claims were found to be without merit by the Court in 2010 after a 

thorough review of all the evidence in the case.

50 The Commissioner concluded in 

his Report and Recommendation as follows:

47 Nor has he cited to any new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral 

review under Rule 61(d)(2)(ii) or that the Court lacked jurisdiction. 48 See State v. Miller, 2023 WL 2854227, at *5. Having found no “new” evidence, the Court 

need not consider the second “persuasiveness” prong of the Purnell test. 49 D.I. 30.

50 The evidence against Dickson at trial was substantial and included, among other things, (i) a

taped confession by Dickson admitting to being present at the scene of the crime, (ii) victim

testimony that she knew Dickson because he had shoveled her snow on two occasions and she 
14

Two juries found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Defendant seeks evidence which no longer exists 

and asks for that evidence to be tested over 17 years after 

his conviction in a motion that is thirteen years too late. 

Defendant has failed to persuade this Court that his 

theories about another rapist or possible DNA evidence 

warrants this Court to reopen his case and disregard the 

evidence or the jury’s verdict.51

Given the foregoing, Dickson’s current claims in his Fourth Rule 61 Motion 

are also procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4) as they have been previously 

adjudicated by this Court. These claims cannot now be refined, restated or reraised in order to again seek judicial review.

52 

got a “very clear look” at him during the rape and (iii) two witnesses that testified that Dickson 

was near the scene of the crime on the night of the rape. D.I. 42 at 11-12. 

51 Id. at 13.

52 See State v. Clay, 2022 WL 893744, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 25, 2022), aff’d Clay v. State, 

2022 WL 4295417 (Del. Sept. 16, 2022) (finding that where an affidavit asserting the 

defendant’s innocence was formerly adjudicated in a postconviction proceeding, it cannot 

constitute newly discovered evidence in a subsequent postconviction proceeding); see also 

Johnson v. State, 1992 WL 183069, *1 (Del.); Duhadaway v. State, 877 A.2d 52 (Del. 2005). 
15

CONCLUSION

Dickson postconviction claims are procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 

61(i)(1), (3) and (4) and he has failed to meet the strict pleading requirements for 

proceeding with his motion under Rule 61(d)(2)(i) as he has failed to provide any 

newly discovered evidence of his actual innocence. For the foregoing reasons, 

Dickson’s Fourth Motion for Postconviction Relief should be SUMMARILY 

DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

 

 /s/ Janine M. Salomone 

 Commissioner Janine M. Salomone

cc: Prothonotary

Susan Purcell, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General 

Luther Dickson, pro se. (SBI #00173261)