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Filed 12/9/22 P. v. Reddick CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANTONIO WAYNE REDDICK,

Defendant and Appellant.

C094388

(Super. Ct. No. 13F07409)

A jury found defendant Antonio Wayne Reddick guilty of two counts of gross 

vehicular manslaughter and causing injury while driving under the influence. The jury 

found true that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury and had two prior 

serious felonies. On direct appeal, this court conditionally reversed the judgment and 

remanded for the trial court to consider defendant’s eligibility for mental health diversion 
2

and whether to strike the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. (People v. 

Reddick (Mar. 6, 2020, C086057) [nonpub. opn.] (Reddick).)1 

On remand, the trial court found defendant ineligible for mental health diversion 

but exercised its discretion to strike the punishment for a prior serious felony conviction. 

As part of imposing the 16 years plus 28-year-to-life prison sentence, the trial court 

sentenced defendant to the six-year midterm, which was doubled pursuant to defendant’s 

prior strike. 

On appeal,2 defendant contends psychological trauma based on mental illness 

qualifies him for the presumptive lower term under Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg.

Sess.). Defendant further contends remand is required because the trial court did not 

conduct a meaningful review of his mental health history to determine whether his mental 

illness was a contributing factor to the crime. We agree and remand for resentencing. 

The parties agree it was error for the trial court to order the California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) to calculate defendant’s credits. On 

remand, we also direct the trial court to calculate defendant’s credits. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I

The 2017 Trial, Verdict, And Sentence

Defendant sideswiped a van, ran multiple red lights, and crashed, killing two 

people and injuring another. (Reddick, supra, C086057.) 

Prior to trial, two clinicians evaluated defendant to determine whether he was 

suitable for a not guilty by reason of insanity defense. The clinicians expressed the 

1 On the court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of our prior unpublished 

opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) 

2 After delays due to multiple extensions of time granted, the case was fully briefed 

on September 13, 2022, and was assigned to this panel on September 15, 2022. 
3

opinion that defendant was malingering, and defendant did not commit the offense 

because of his mental condition, nor were alcohol and drug use a byproduct of 

defendant’s mental illness. 

At trial, the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of gross vehicular 

manslaughter while intoxicated and one count of driving under the influence. The jury 

found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury. 

At sentencing, the trial court relied on the entire record, argument from the parties, 

the presentence report, sentencing objectives, and its notes. The trial court found two 

mitigating factors existed: (1) defendant was remorseful; and (2) defendant had support 

from others. The court did not consider defendant’s mental health in declining to impose 

the lower term. The court found the following factors in aggravation: (1) the crimes 

involved a high degree of callousness; (2) defendant engaged in violent conduct; (3) 

defendant was on parole at the time of the offense; (4) defendant had served prior prison 

terms; and (5) defendant had numerous prior convictions. 

The trial court sentenced defendant to the six-year midterm for the first count of 

vehicular manslaughter, doubled for the prior strike; one-third the midterm or two years 

for the second count of vehicular manslaughter, also doubled for the prior strike; and 

imposed the five-year prior felony enhancement. 

In addition, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life for driving under 

the influence causing injury, plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement, 

which was added to the determinate term, for a total determinate sentence of 24 years in 

state prison and an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life to be served consecutively 

to the determinate prison sentence. 

II

Defendant’s Direct Appeal And Remand

Defendant appealed his conviction, and we conditionally reversed the judgment 

and remanded for the trial court to conduct a mental health diversion eligibility hearing 
4

and exercise its discretion whether to strike the prior serious felony enhancement. 

(Reddick, supra, C086057.) 

At the mental health diversion eligibility hearing, defendant argued the standard 

for findings to support a not guilty by reason of insanity plea was not the same as 

determining whether defendant’s mental health disorder contributed to his criminal 

conduct. The trial court reviewed the pretrial findings of the reviewing clinicians and 

found defendant ineligible for mental health diversion. In making its decision, the trial 

court noted a clinician diagnosed defendant with bipolar disorder, but one reviewing 

clinician expressed the opinion that this diagnosis did not support a finding that 

defendant’s mental disorder was a “primary factor” in the commitment offense. 

On remand, defendant filed a Romero3 motion to dismiss his prior strike. In 

denying the Romero motion, the trial court analyzed defendant’s criminal history, which 

began with carjacking and became increasingly serious and violent over the next 10 

years. The court acknowledged defendant’s mental health history, analyzed defendant’s 

criminality, and considered the danger he posed to the public. 

The trial court reimposed its prior sentence with one exception⸺the court struck 

the prior felony enhancement. Thus, defendant’s prison term consisted of a 16-year 

determinate sentence plus an indeterminate prison sentence of 28 years to life.4 The trial 

court directed the Department to compute defendant’s credits earned while in custody. 

3 People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. 

4 At defendant’s 2017 sentencing, the trial court pronounced sentence as an 

“aggregate determinate sentence of 24 years, followed by an indeterminate sentence of 25 

years to life.” The three-year great bodily injury enhancement was included in 

defendant’s determinate term. However, defendant’s abstract of judgment shows the 

three-year great bodily injury enhancement was added to the indeterminate sentence, 

totaling 28 years to life. At defendant’s 2021 resentencing, the court orally pronounced 

defendant’s indeterminate sentence as 28 years to life, including the three-year 

enhancement for great bodily injury. Defendant’s abstract of judgment from resentencing 
5

DISCUSSION

I

Senate Bill No. 567

Defendant contends the trial court did not conduct a meaningful review of whether 

his bipolar disorder caused psychological trauma that was a contributing factor in the 

offense, a finding that would entitle him to the presumptive lower term. The People 

respond that remand is unnecessary because there is no evidence defendant’s mental 

illness caused psychological trauma or was a contributing factor in defendant committing 

the offense. Alternatively, the People claim the trial court’s exercise of discretion to 

impose the middle term and deny defendant’s Romero motion demonstrates remanding 

for resentencing would result in the trial court imposing the same sentence despite its new 

discretion. We agree with defendant. 

Effective January 1, 2022, amended Penal Code5section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) 

made changes to the trial court’s sentencing discretion. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) As 

relevant here, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) provides that the court shall impose the 

lower term where the person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood 

trauma and it was a contributing factor in the commission of the underlying offense, 

unless the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors such that the lower term 

would be contrary to the interests of justice. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) 

We agree with the parties that amended section 1170 applies retroactively to 

defendant. (People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039.) 

shows the same indeterminate sentence. The court did not make any mention of 

changing the great bodily injury enhancement from the determinate term to the 

indeterminate term. 

5 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
6

The trial court did not have the benefit of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) at the 

time of defendant’s sentencing or resentencing hearing. Although the trial court 

acknowledged defendant’s bipolar disorder, it did not conduct an analysis to determine 

whether defendant’s disorder caused psychological trauma and whether that trauma was a 

contributing factor in the commission of his offenses such that he would be entitled to the 

presumptive lower term of imprisonment. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Defendant thus had no 

incentive to develop a record concerning his bipolar disorder and whether the disorder 

caused psychological trauma, and to demonstrate that trauma was a contributing factor to 

his crime. Similarly, the trial court did not have the benefit of section 1170, 

subdivision (b)(6) directing it to assess whether any attending psychological trauma was a 

contributing factor in the commission of the offense. (See People v. Banner (2022) 

77 Cal.App.5th 226, 242 (Banner), citing People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 637-

638.) 

Despite the unavailability of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) at the time of 

sentencing, the People argue the trial court will undoubtedly impose the same sentence 

because it has already reviewed the clinicians’ findings from the mental health diversion 

evaluation and found defendant’s bipolar disorder was not a factor in committing the 

underlying offense. We reject this argument.6 

In Banner, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at page 241, the court considered a similar 

argument from the People where the defendant was evaluated for mental health diversion 

under section 1001.36. In analyzing sections 1001.36 and 1170, subdivision (b)(6), the 

Banner court observed the former avoids conviction and imprisonment entirely while the 

latter potentially mitigates a sentence. (Banner, at p. 241.) In evaluating the standards 

for the two statutes, the court found “[a] standard resulting in neither conviction nor 

6 The People contend the record shows defendant did not suffer from a mental 

health disorder. The record, as a whole, does not support this conclusion. 
7

imprisonment is properly more onerous than a standard that potentially mitigates a 

sentence.” (Ibid.) Therefore, given the differing outcomes for findings under the 

respective sections, a finding that a mental illness causing psychological trauma was not a 

significant factor in the commission of the crime for purposes of section 1001.36 “does 

not subsume a finding it was a lesser contributing factor” for the purposes of section 

1170, subdivision (b)(6). (Banner, at p. 241, italics omitted; id. at pp. 241-242.) 

We agree with the analysis in Banner and conclude the trial court’s denial of 

mental health diversion does not affect our decision to remand the case. 

Relying on People v. Salazar (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 453 (Salazar),7the People 

also argue we should not remand the case because the trial court denied defendant’s 

Romero motion. In further reliance on Salazar, the People argue that because the court 

chose not to impose the lower term given the applicable aggravating factors and lack of 

mitigating factors, remand is unnecessary because the trial court “would have reached the 

same conclusion.” Again, we disagree. 

In Salazar, defendant trapped his former girlfriend in his motel room, repeatedly 

punched her, and sprayed her with bear spray. (Salazar, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 457.) The probation report identified multiple aggravating factors. (Id. at p. 463.) The 

trial court denied the defendant’s Romero motion to strike his prior felony conviction 

based on his continuing 30-year criminal history and because he committed additional 

crimes after his arrest. (Ibid.) Additionally, the trial court declined the defendant’s 

request to impose concurrent sentences. (Ibid.) Finally, the trial court considered the 

defendant’s conduct aggravated, sadistic, and extended, and imposed a protective order to 

protect the victim. (Id. at p. 464.) Based on that record, the Salazar court concluded

“[a]s a matter of law, (1) the aggravating circumstances [were] overwhelming and 

7 Since the People submitted their brief, our Supreme Court granted review in 

Salazar. (Salazar, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th 453, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275788.) 
8

outweigh[ed] any theoretical mitigating circumstances, and (2) selection of the low term 

would be ‘contrary to the interests of justice.’ ” (Ibid.) Salazar does not apply here. 

In contrast to Salazar, defendant’s crimes were not as aggravated, heinous, 

sadistic, or extended. Also, in addition to the aggravating factors, the trial court found 

two mitigating factors. Based on this record, selection of the lower term would not be 

contrary to the interests of justice as a matter of law. 

Finally, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s Romero motion coupled with 

imposition of the middle term does not demonstrate it would issue the same sentence had 

it known about its available discretion. The trial court analyzed defendant’s criminality 

and potential danger to others and the record is not as extensive as was the case in 

Salazar, nor were there crimes that took place after defendant was arrested. 

In sum, given the lack of statutory guidance and incentive for the defense to build 

a record, we conclude the record does not clearly indicate the trial court would have 

reached the same conclusion if it had been aware of its discretion. (See People v. 

Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [“appropriate remedy is to remand for 

resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached 

the same conclusion” had it been aware of its discretion].) We thus vacate the sentence

and remand to allow the trial court to assess whether defendant’s bipolar disorder caused 

psychological trauma and if that trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of 

the offense. (See Banner, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 242.) On remand, both defendant 

and the People will have the opportunity to present additional evidence to permit the trial 

court to make the necessary findings and exercise the discretion afforded by section 1170, 

subdivision (b). 
9

II

Credit Calculation

The parties agree the trial court erred when it delegated credit calculation to the 

Department. We will provide instructions to the trial court regarding credit calculation 

on remand. 

A trial court errs when it delegates its duty to calculate presentence credits to the 

Department. (See People v. Vargas (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1469, fn. 9.) “It is the 

duty of the sentencing court to determine ‘the total number of days to be credited . . .’ for 

presentence custody.” (People v. Duesler (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 273, 276.) The trial 

court must “calculate the exact number of days the defendant has been in custody ‘prior 

to sentencing,’ add applicable good behavior credits earned pursuant to section 4019, and 

reflect the total in the abstract of judgment.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 

30.) 

At sentencing, the trial court directed the Department to calculate defendant’s 

presentence credits. Calculating credits is one of the sentencing duties of the trial court. 

Accordingly, on remand, we direct the trial court to calculate defendant’s credits and 

include them in the amended abstract of judgment. 
10

DISPOSITION

The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a hearing at which the trial 

court will conduct a full resentencing. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) 

The trial court is directed to calculate defendant’s actual and conduct credits and include 

the presentence custody credits in an amended abstract of judgment. The trial court is 

also directed to send a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

/s/ 

Robie, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/ 

Hoch, J.

/s/ 

Earl, J.