NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 20-2236

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JUAN DISLA VASQUEZ,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

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On Petition for Review of Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A055-011-649)

Immigration Judge: Leo A. Finston

_______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 29, 2021

Before: MATEY and JORDAN, Circuit Judges, BOLTON*, Senior District Judge.

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OPINION**

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* The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, Senior United States District Judge for the

District of Arizona, sitting by designation. 

** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.
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BOLTON, Senior District Judge

Juan Disla Vasquez (“Vasquez”) petitions for review of a decision by the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“the Board” or “BIA”) denying his application for cancellation of 

removal. The Board reversed an immigration judge’s grant of Vasquez’s application 

based on discretionary grounds. For the reasons given below, we conclude that we have 

no jurisdiction to review the denial by the BIA so we will dismiss Vasquez’s petition. 

Vasquez, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the 

United States as a legal permanent resident on August 17, 2001 as a 17-year old. He has 

never returned to the Dominican Republic in the nearly 20 years he has been in the 

United States and lacks strong family ties to that country. In contrast to his lack of ties to 

the Dominican Republic, Vasquez has many family members who live in the United 

States, including his U.S. citizen wife and son who live in Florida. Since his arrival, 

Vasquez has maintained a fairly consistent employment record and generally paid his 

taxes. 

Vasquez also has three criminal convictions. The first conviction, stemming from 

an incident in 2011 where he exposed his genitalia to a female neighbor from the second 

story of his home, was for endangering the welfare of a child. Although no children were 

apparently present at the time of the incident, Vasquez noted in his plea colloquy that 

children often played in the area. Vasquez was convicted in 2013 and received a sentence 

of three years imprisonment, mandatory registration as a sex offender under Megan’s 

Law, and lifetime parole supervision. Vasquez also has two convictions stemming from 

separate incidents in 2017 for Criminal Mischief-Damage to Property and a DUI. 
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In 2017, DHS initiated removal proceedings against Vasquez based on his 2013 

criminal conviction and charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as 

an alien who had been convicted of a crime of domestic violence, stalking, or child abuse, 

child neglect, or child abandonment. Vasquez contested removability and applied for 

cancellation of removal. In 2019, an immigration judge found Vasquez removable, but 

granted Vasquez’s application, determining that he warranted a positive exercise of 

discretion. That decision was appealed to the Board, which reevaluated the immigration 

judge’s discretionary grant and disagreed with the immigration judge’s assessment of the 

seriousness of Vasquez’s 2013 conviction. The Board reweighed Vasquez’s positive 

equities against the negative factors, denied the application for cancellation, and ordered 

him removed to the Dominican Republic. Vasquez then filed a timely petition for review

with this Court. 

Vasquez challenges the Board’s denial of his application for cancellation of 

removal based solely on the assertion that the Board “seriously erred” in reversing the 

decision of the immigration judge. Vasquez argues that the Board failed to properly 

consider his positive equities and overemphasized his criminal convictions in reaching its 

decision on whether his case warranted a positive exercise of discretion. 

We do not have jurisdiction to review the discretionary decisions of the Attorney 

General regarding denial of applications for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 

(a)(2)(B)(i) (“[N]o court shall have the jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the 

granting of relief under . . . 1229b . . . of this title[.]”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (cancellation 

of removal for legal permanent residents); see Hernandez-Morales v. Att’y Gen. of the 
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United States, 977 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2020) (“We lack jurisdiction to review 

discretionary denials of relief under § 1229b.”). In such cases, we do retain jurisdiction 

over questions of law and constitutional issues. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). However, 

Vasquez has not raised any colorable questions of law or constitutional issues as to the 

denial of his application for cancellation of removal. He does argue that the Board is 

“overemphasizing” his 2013 conviction by failing to take into account the nature, 

recency, and seriousness of that conviction, as it was required to do under binding BIA 

precedent. See Matter of Marin, 16 I.&N. Dec. 581 (BIA 1978); Matter of Wadud, 19 

I.&N. Dec. 182 (BIA 1984). However, even a cursory reading of the Board’s decision 

makes it clear that the Board did take the nature, recency, and seriousness of the 

conviction into account. Vasquez merely disagrees with the Board’s conclusions 

regarding the seriousness of that offense, as well as his entire criminal record. That does 

not rise to the level of a colorable legal question or constitutional claim. See Jarbough v. 

Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Recasting challenges to factual or 

discretionary determinations as due process or other constitutional claims is clearly 

insufficient to give this Court jurisdiction.”). 

Because we lack jurisdiction over the Board’s discretionary decision to deny 

Vasquez’s application for cancellation of removal, we will dismiss the petition for 

review.