NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WARREN OSCAR JOHN 

ABRAHAMSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-35005 

D.C. No. 4:16-cv-00103-JTJ 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

John T. Johnston, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 1, 2020**

Portland, Oregon

Before: BERZON, COLLINS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Warren Abrahamson appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social 

Security Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits. The district court had 

jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as 

provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 20 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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§ 1291, and because the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial 

evidence, we affirm. 

We review the district court’s judgment “de novo to ensure the 

Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and a correct 

application of the law.” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal alterations omitted). “This is a highly deferential standard 

of review,” id., “and if evidence exists to support more than one rational 

interpretation, we must defer to the Commissioner’s decision.” Batson v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 

1. The ALJ found that Abrahamson’s degenerative disc disease, asthma, and 

obesity were severe impairments under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that his myofascial pain syndrome,

depression, and anxiety did not qualify as additional severe impairments. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1). Abrahamson was never actually diagnosed with 

myofascial pain syndrome, and the ALJ reasonably weighed the evidence under the 

proper functional limitations criteria, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3), in concluding

that his mental impairments “do not cause more than minimal limitation in the 

claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work activities.”1 

1 Abrahamson argues the ALJ erred by not considering the findings of a nurse practitioner who 

monitored and treated his mental impairments, including what she described as his chronic history 
3 

2. The ALJ afforded appropriate weight to the opinions of Abrahamson’s

treating physician, Dr. Medina. Dr. Medina offered different opinions at different 

times as to whether Abrahamson could work full-time. Dr. Medina’s 2012 and 2014 

opinions, which indicate the most limitations, also differ from other medical sources’ 

opinions that Abrahamson could do “light work” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1567(b). 

Due to these inconsistencies, the ALJ needed only to identify specific and 

legitimate reasons for affording less weight to Dr. Medina’s 2012 and 2014 opinions. 

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). She did so. First, the ALJ 

noted that Dr. Medina’s 2012 and 2014 opinions lacked adequate supporting 

explanations. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ 

need not accept the opinion of ... a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, 

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.”). Second, the ALJ 

concluded that Dr. Medina’s 2012 and 2014 opinions run counter to the objective 

medical evidence and other physicians’ opinions, which consistently describe

Abrahamson’s limitations as mild. These reasons for disregarding Dr. Medina’s 

of depression. But the ALJ properly considered the nurse practitioner’s findings, noting 

specifically the range of Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores she assigned to 

Abrahamson. The ALJ assigned these opinions little weight, however, because GAF scores aren’t

particularly relevant to whether the claimant’s mental impairments pose long-term disabling 

limitations. The ALJ remarked that, if anything, the GAF scores revealed mild to moderate 

limitations that improved over time. Moreover, Mr. Abrahamson’s claims of debilitating 

depression and anxiety are also belied by the reports of his treating physician, the opinions of two 

state agency psychologists, and his own testimony.
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opinions are specific and legitimate, Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216, so we defer to the 

ALJ’s reasonable interpretation of the evidence. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. 

3. The ALJ reasonably concluded that Abrahamson’s pain testimony was not 

entirely credible. Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, an ALJ may “only 

find an applicant not credible by making specific findings as to credibility and stating 

clear and convincing reasons for each.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880,

883 (9th Cir. 2006).

The ALJ adequately determined the medical evidence did not support 

Abrahamson’s claimed symptoms. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (“[L]ack of medical evidence ... is a factor that the ALJ can consider in 

his credibility analysis.”). After expressly disclaiming chronic back pain in July 

2010, Abrahamson began complaining of extreme back pain in 2011. But a 

December 2011 lumbar spine x-ray showed normal spinal conditions with “no signs 

of trauma or arthropathy,” and a 2012 MRI and CT myelogram revealed only mild 

degenerative disc disease. Abrahamson has also remained “consistently 

neurologically grossly intact” throughout the treatment period. Moreover, a 

physician’s assistant after careful examination concluded Abrahamson’s “mild” 

back condition did not warrant surgery as a necessary treatment option, and instead 

recommended back injections and increased exercise. 

The ALJ also noted that Abrahamson’s sporadic adherence to prescribed 
5 

treatment (specifically his failure to exercise and supplement his medication as 

directed) further undermined his pain testimony. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113–14 

(quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).

The incongruity between Abrahamson’s testimony and the medical evidence, 

as well as his sporadic adherence to prescribed treatment are clear and convincing 

reasons for the ALJ to conclude Abrahamson’s testimony overstated his symptoms 

and limitations. 

4. The ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert “contained all of the 

limitations that the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in the 

record.” Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217. Because we believe the ALJ’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, her hypothetical was reasonable. 

AFFIRMED.