*

  The appellee was not served with process in the district court and is not

participating in this appeal.  After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have

concluded that oral argument is unnecessary.  Thus the appeal is submitted on the

appellant’s brief and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 19, 2008*

Decided March 27, 2008

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

        KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge          

        ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐3622

JOHN W. KELLER, JR.,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

J. DAVID DONAHUE,

Respondent‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:07‐cv‐1250‐JDT‐TAB

John Daniel Tinder,

Judge.

O R D E R

John Keller is an Indiana prison inmate who lost good‐time credits when he was

found guilty in a disciplinary proceeding of possessing an electronic device without

authorization.  Keller filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

claiming that prison officials did not follow the procedures outlined in the disciplinary

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐3622 Page 2

handbook when they put him in segregation pending his hearing and did not give him the

reports and forms the handbook requires.  He also charged that the sanctions against him

were excessive.

The district court summarily dismissed Keller’s petition, concluding that it was

legally insufficient on its face.  See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994); Small v.

Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1993).  The court reasoned that Keller’s petition and

attachments were enough to demonstrate that he received all the process due under Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445 (1985).  The court added that the alleged violations of prison regulations did not

implicate federal law and thus could not support a claim under § 2254.  See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67‐68 (1991); Evans v. McBride, 94 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir. 1996); Del

Vecchio v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1370 (7th Cir. 1994).

On appeal Keller disputes the district court’s reasoning and presses his contention

that prison officials did not follow the guidelines in the handbook.  But, as the district court

recognized, Keller has no cognizable claim arising from the prison’s application of its

regulations.  What matters is the Due Process Clause.  Wolff holds that an inmate cannot be

deprived of a liberty interest through a disciplinary proceeding unless he receives

(1) written notice of the charge at least 24 hours before the hearing, (2) the opportunity to be

heard before an impartial decision‐maker, (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present

evidence, and (4) a written statement from the finder of fact identifying the evidence and

reasoning underlying the disciplinary action.  418 U.S. at 563‐67; Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d

934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007).  In addition, Hill requires that the decision of a prison conduct

board be supported by “some evidence.”  472 U.S. at 454; United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d

672, 675 (7th Cir. 2007).  Keller admits that he waived his rights to a 24‐hour notice period,

to call witnesses, and to have the evidence presented at the hearing.  And he acknowledges

that guards found two prohibited cell phones and battery chargers in his cell.  Instead of

addressing any potential constitutional defect, all of his arguments relate to alleged

departures from procedures outlined in the prison handbook that have no bearing on his

right to due process.

Moreover, Keller’s contention about being placed in segregation while awaiting his

hearing suffers from another flaw.  The choice to house an inmate in segregation rather than

with the general population affects the severity, not the duration, of confinement; an inmate

in segregation is not “in custody” for purposes of § 2254 and cannot use habeas corpus to

challenge the sanction.  See Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 643‐44 (7th Cir. 2001).

AFFIRMED.