J-A05027-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

SUZANNE KEIR YURK IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

GEORGE RUSSELL HUFFMAN III

Appellant No. 1714 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered May 7, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2007-10300

BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 15, 2016

George Russell Huffman, III, (“Father”) appeals from the support 

order, entered on May 7, 2015, which awarded child support to Suzanne Keir 

Yurk (“Mother”).1 On appeal, Father argues the court erred in failing to 

credit him for certain payments which he alleges were Mother’s 

responsibility.2 After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s order.

The trial court set forth the facts and procedural history as follows:

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 Mother did not file a responsive brief in this appeal.

2

 Father raised an additional issue in his appeal. However, as will be 

discussed infra, Father has withdrawn that issue for appellate review. 

Accordingly, we will not address it in our analysis.
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Suzanne Keir Yurk (“Mother”) and George Russell Huffman 

(“Father”) were married on May 9, 1998, and divorced on 

December 15, 2009. They are the natural parents of two minor 

children, M.H. (D.O.B. 1/[]/2003) and R.H. (D.O.B. 11/[]/2004), 

of which Mother has primary custody. Both children participate 

in extra-curricular activities, and M.H., who has autism, receives 

additional therapy. Support for the children was initially 

calculated during arbitration, and additional expenses were 

divided proportionally between Mother and Father according to 

their incomes.1

1

 Mother and Father have had an historically adversarial 

relationship when it comes to many expenses, including 

the treatment of M.H.’s autism and [R.H.]’s education, and 

the record reflects a high number of litigious attempts to 

resolve their disagreements.

On August 12, 2010, as a result of a petition to modify 

support filed by Father, a domestic relations officer entered a 

recommended order. The order divided “additional expenses,”2 

proportionally between the parties, with Father being responsible 

for 70% and Mother for 30% of the costs.3 However, Father’s 

share of childcare was limited to $1,500.00 per month.4 This is 

the first order in the case that deviates from Rule 1910.16-6 of 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that 

additional expenses such as childcare, unreimbursed medical 

expenses, private school tuition, and other needs be allocated 

proportionally according to the parents’ incomes. See Pa. R.C.P. 

1[9]10-16-6. Mother filed exceptions to the order, which she 

later withdrew.

2

 The list included: 1. Summer Activities Including Camp, 

2. Extracurricular Activities, 3. Therapy expenses for the 

children, 4. Tuition, and 5. Childcare expenses.

3

 Mother’s net monthly income was found to be $10,486 

per month (including alimony of $4,257), and Father’s was 

found to be $24,512 (after subtracting alimony of $4,257).

4

 The recommended order reads: “[Father]’s obligation to 

contribute to the child care cost[s] shall be limited to 

$1,500.00 per month. Any costs above that amount shall 

be [Mother]’s obligation.
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After a petition for enforcement of support was filed by 

Mother and a petition for special relief was filed by Father, the 

parties came before the Honorable Carolyn T. Carluccio on 

December 7, 2010. This resulted in an agreed order, issued on 

December 15, 2010, which decreed that

1) [Father]’s child support order shall be increased by 

$1,500 per month effective March 1, 2011. This 

specifically includes child care and unreimbursed medical 

and extraordinary expenses. It shall be paid through 

PASC[D]U.[3]

2) There will be no further payments by either side for 

unreimbursed out of pocket extraordinary expenses.

On October 17, 2011, Mother filed a petition to increase. 

Following a hearing on January 5, 2012, the master issued 

another recommended order on July 3, 2012, which allocated 

80% of the costs of unreimbursed medical expenses and for 

private school tuition to Father and 20% to Mother, but also 

allocated “Child care plus unreimbursed medical and 

extraordinary expenses as agreed by the parties on December 7, 

2010.” Both Mother and Father filed exceptions to the order in 

July 2012, and this Court held a hearing on support on 

September 9, 2013.

During that hearing, this Court was asked to decide if 

there was sufficient reason to modify the agreed order of 

December 7, 2010, made under Judge Carluccio. Mother argued 

that she had requested modification for years because her 

alimony stopped and Father had a dramatic increase in salary. 

Father explained that Judge Carluccio’s order was an attempt to 

solve the “back-and-forth” because it was “a nightmare between 

these parties” to allocate the costs proportionally according to 

income. Father proposed to “leave it at the $1,500 that was 

agreed in front of Judge Carluccio until today. And going 

forward, it can be proportionate to income, like every other 

case.”

____________________________________________

3

 PASCDU is the acronym for Pennsylvania’s State Collection and 

Disbursement Unit.
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The undersigned issued an order October 22, 2013, 

denying Mother’s request to modify the agreed order and 

maintaining Father’s $1,500 per month additional support. This 

Court’s order calculated support for the periods of October 17, 

2011 through December 31, 2011, January 1, 2012 through May 

31, 2012, June 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012, January 1, 

2013 through August 8, 2013, and “August 9, 2013 – Forward.” 

It also erroneously ordered Father to reimburse Mother for his 

percentage share of some of her additional expenses.

Father filed a motion for reconsideration on November 1, 

2013, requesting that this Court recalculate support and “enter 

an order either 1) Allocating all unreimbursed medical, 

extraordinary, and child care expenses proportionate to income; 

or 2) Add[ing] $1,500 per month to Father’s child support 

obligation to account for those expenses.” Mother also filed a 

motion for reconsideration on November 12, 2013, arguing that 

it was an error for this Court to uphold the December 15, 2010 

agreed order, that there was an incorrect calculation of Father’s 

income, and requesting modification of child support.

Father’s motion for reconsideration was granted, and on 

January 28, 2014, this Court issued a new order, stating that 

“The additional $1,500 awarded to [Mother] based on the Court’s 

December 15, 2010, Order includes expenses for child care, 

extracurricular and summer activities, and unreimbursed medical 

expenses.” The order specifically excluded the costs of tuition as 

covered under the $1,500 monthly payment, and maintained 

that Father shall therefore only reimburse [M]other for his 

percentage share of tuition costs.

On February 3, 2014, Father appealed, claiming that this 

Court failed to appropriately apply the support guidelines, and 

that this Court erred when it “require[ed] Father to contribute to 

Mother’s share of the children’s additional expenses.” On 

February 14, 2014, Father filed a petition for credits, arguing 

that under the order of January 28, 2014, “Father pays Mother 

an additional $1,500 for all child care and extra[-]curricular 

activity expenses, thereby requiring Mother to pay 100% of 

those expenses without reimbursement from Father,” and that 

Father is owed retroactive credits for expenses paid by Father 

“which should have been paid by Mother,” such as orthodontist 

visits, therapy, tuition, and extra-curricular activities. On 

February 25, 2014, Mother cross-appealed, claiming that this 
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Court miscalculated Father’s income and failed to account for 

Father’s various employment bonuses. Furthermore, Mother 

asserted that the $1,500 stipend was unfair because it led to her 

paying a disproportionate share of expenses, and filed a motion 

to dismiss [F]ather’s petition for credit. Father’s petition for 

credit was stayed until the decision of the Superior Court.

On January 7, 2015, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 

issued its opinion, affirming in part, reversing in part, and 

remanding. On the issue of Father’s income, the Superior Court 

of Pennsylvania remanded for “recalculation of Father’s income 

and subsequent determination of his support obligation.” Yurk 

v. Huffman, 647 EDA 2014 at 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. January 7, 

2015). Regarding Father’s claim that Father paid Mother’s share 

of expenses, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that it “was 

not clear whether the trial court concluded that Father should 

bear a disproportionate share of these expenses or merely 

misconstrued the record.” Id. at 10. This Court was instructed 

to either “set the amounts owed based upon the recalculated 

income percentages or clarify that it intends to vary the 

allocation based upon the circumstances of this case.” Id. at 11. 

Regarding Father’s $1,500 per month additional expense, the 

Superior Court concluded that “the record demonstrates that 

both parents paid extra expenses for the children. Therefore, it 

was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude that 

the $1,500 per month increase was sufficient to allocate these 

expenses equitably.” Id. at 13. This Court was also allowed, at 

its discretion, [to] take additional evidence to effectuate [the 

remand issues.]” Id. at 15.

This Court consolidated the remand issues with Father’s 

credit issue at a hearing on April 3, 2015. During the remand 

hearing, Father submitted additional expenses for recalculation, 

and various expenses submitted by Father were conceded or 

found to be erroneous. Father also argued that he should not 

pay for extracurricular activities above $1,500 per month, and 

thus should be entitled to a 100% credit against his obligations 

for whatever Father paid for extracurricular expenses. During 

the remand hearing, both Father and Mother contested historical 

and current payments made by the opposite party. This Court 

noted during the remand hearing that there was a substantial 

increase in Father’s income.5 
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5

 For example, Father’s monthly net income for 2015 was 

found to be $46,691, nearly double his income in 2010. 

On May 7, 2015, this Court issued its order recalculating 

Father’s income for the time periods of October 17, 2011 

through December 31, 2011, January 1, 2012 through May 31, 

2012, June 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012, January 1, 

2013 through August 8, 2013, August 9, 2013 through 

December 31, 2013, January 1, 2014 through December 31, 

2014, and January 1, 2015, forward. The Court contemplated all 

of Father’s income sources and recalculated the parties’ support 

obligations accordingly. The Court also clarified that neither 

Mother nor Father were liable to reimburse each other for any 

costs of child care, unreimbursed medical expenses, extracurricular, or extraordinary expenses voluntarily assumed during 

the relevant time period. Father was to reimburse Mother for his 

percentage share of tuition costs only.

The Court also modified support for the time period of 

January 1, 2015, forward, by vacating the agreed order which 

mandated Father to pay $1,500 for certain expenses in lieu of 

allocating these expenses between the parties in proportion to 

their incomes. Father filed a timely motion for reconsideration 

on May 14, 2015, which was denied on June 1, 2015. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/2015, at 1-6 (record citations omitted).

Father subsequently filed a notice of appeal on June 5, 2015. This 

Court heard oral argument on March 9, 2016. Following oral argument, the 

court entered the following order and stipulation, which was agreed upon by 

both parties:

1. Effective May 1, 2016, the parties agree that Judge Page’s 

Support Order dated May 7, 2015 is amended to increase 

[Father]’s support by $1,500 per month on a monthly basis. In 

light of the increase, [Father] is not responsible for any 

additional expenditures for child care, unreimbursed medical 

expenses, extracurricular, or extraordinary expenses incurred for 

the parties’ minor children as said $1,500 payment encompasses 

[Father]’s entire obligation relative to said costs. Anything 

contained in the May 7, 2015 Order to the contrary to this 
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Stipulation and Order shall be deemed to be null and void. This 

Stipulation shall be submitted to Domestic Relations to 

implement the additional $1,500 per month payment.

2. [Father] shall make the following lump sum payments to 

[Mother]:

a. $4,500 simultaneous with the execution of this 

Stipulation;

b. $4,500 on or before May 15, 2016;

c. $4,500 on or before June 15, 2016.

3. This stipulation resolves the issues raised in [Father]’s appeal 

at Argument Section A (noted at VII(A) in [Father]’s Brief) 

docketed at 1714 EDA 2015 and [Father] shall take all steps 

necessary to withdraw that issue from his pending appeal. The 

remaining Argument at Section B (noted at VII(B) in [Father]’s 

Brief) shall be adjudicated by the Superior Court.

4. This stipulation also resolves [Mother]’s Emergency Petition 

for Modification of Support Order filed on February 29, 2016, and 

said Petition shall be deemed to be withdrawn and/or resolved.

Stipulation and Order, 4/1/2016, at unnumbered 1-2.4

In his sole remaining argument on appeal, Father claims the “trial 

court erred in failing to credit Father for those payments which were 

Mother’s responsibility under the trial court’s support order.” Father’s Brief 

at 38. Father notes, “Pa.R.C.P. 1910-16-6 specifically allows a trial court to 

determine the appropriate amount of additional expenses due on account of 

____________________________________________

4

 On April 19, 2016, counsel for Father filed an application for leave to file a 

post-submission communication (specifically, the order and stipulation) 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2501(a). As indicated above, we grant Father’s 

application and as he requests, we will withdraw the issue raised in 

Argument Section A (pages 28-38).
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child care, unreimbursed medical expenses and summer camp, and it 

permits the trial court to add that amount to an obligor’s support payment.” 

Id. Father states that in his February 14, 2014, petition for credits, he 

indicated that “he was paying extra-normal expenses for the children, when 

Mother was 100% responsible for those expenses.” Id. at 39. Father 

argues he submitted documentation and testimony regarding certain 

expenses, including summer activities, extra-curricular activities, and 

unreimbursed medical expenses, that he paid but were Mother’s 

responsibility. Id. He states:

On cross-examination, Father acknowledged that some of the 

medical expenses may be subject to up to a 30% 

reimbursement, but in the interest of resolving the matter, he 

agreed to reduce all of the medical expenses by 50% to account 

for the potential reimbursement. In addition, he voluntarily 

absorbed some of the other expenses for which Mother would 

have been responsible.

Id. at 39-40. Moreover, Father also states he has expended $15,493.10 in 

all for the children’s expenses, which he alleges were Mother’s sole 

responsibility “as Mother was being paid $1,500 to account for Father’s 

share of these expenses.” Id. at 40. Lastly, Father claims Mother is fully 

responsible for the children’s unreimbursed medical expenses as Father’s 

share is subsumed in the additional $1,500 per month support payment. Id. 

Therefore, he states he is entitled to a reimbursement amount of 

$20,152.22 for payments he made regarding “unreimbursed medical 
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expenses over the retroactivity period in addition to paying the $1,500 per 

month.” Id. at 40-41.

Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse 

the trial court’s determination where the order cannot be 

sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the 

broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the 

discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. 

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in 

reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, 

or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either 

manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill will, discretion has been abused. In addition, we note 

that the duty to support one’s child is absolute, and the purpose 

of child support is to promote the child’s best interests.

Kimock v. Jones, 47 A.3d 850, 853-854 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting 

Brickus v. Dent, 5 A.3d 1281, 1284 (Pa. Super. 2010).

The support guidelines provide the allocation of additional expenses 

between parties, in relevant part, as follows:

Rule 1910.16-6. Support Guidelines. Adjustments to the 

Basic Support Obligations. Allocation of Additional 

Expenses

Additional expenses permitted pursuant to this Rule 1910.16-6 

may be allocated between the parties even if the parties’ 

incomes do not justify an order of basic support.

...

(c) Unreimbursed Medical Expenses. Unreimbursed medical 

expenses of the obligee or the children shall be allocated 

between the parties in proportion to their respective net 

incomes. Notwithstanding the prior sentence, there shall be no 

apportionment of unreimbursed medical expenses incurred by a 

party who is not owed a statutory duty of support by the other 

party. The court may direct that obligor’s share be added to his 
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or her basic support obligation, or paid directly to the obligee or 

to the health care provider.

...

(d) Private School Tuition. Summer Camp. Other Needs. The 

support schedule does not take into consideration expenditures 

for private school tuition or other needs of a child which are not 

specifically addressed by the guidelines. If the court determines 

that one or more such needs are reasonable, the expense 

thereof shall be allocated between the parties in proportion to 

their net incomes. The obligor’s share may be added to his or 

her basic support obligation.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(c-d).

Moreover, “this Court [has] held that ‘[i]t is within [the court’s] 

discretion to give only such credit to the father for the contributions made in 

excess of the order as it deems proper.’” Rich v. Rich, 967 A.2d 400, 408 

(Pa. Super. 2009), quoting Silverman v. Silverman, 117 A.2d 801, 803 

(Pa. Super. 1956).

Here, the trial court found the following:

Father complains that the undersigned did not grant him 

credit for payments made on behalf of his children, for which 

Father believes Mother is 100% responsible. On December 1[5], 

201[0],[5]an order was entered as a result of an agreement 

between the parties, that

1) [Father]’s child support order shall be increased by 

$1,500 per month effective March 1, 2011. This 

specifically includes child care and unreimbursed medical 

____________________________________________

5

 The trial court references the order as entered on December 10, 2012. It 

is evident this was scrivener’s error, because the court was actually referring 

to the December 15, 2010, order. Further, it merits mention the July 3, 

2012, support order maintained the same agreement set forth in the 

December 15, 2010, order.
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and extraordinary expenses. It shall be paid through 

PASCOU.

2) There will be no further payments by either side for 

unreimbursed out of pocket extraordinary expenses.

This Court interpreted the agreed order to state that no 

payments will be made by either party to each other for these 

expenses, not that neither party could assume such 

expenditures.

The Court compared the plain language of the agreed 

order to the recommended order of August 10, 2010, which 

specifically states that Father’s share of childcare will be limited 

to $1,500 per month, and any costs above that will be Mother’s 

responsibility. The agreed order, in contrast, contains no such 

limiting language, but rather states that the $1,500 will be an 

increase to Father’s support order. Furthermore, in 2010, an 

order limiting Father’s contribution to childcare made sense 

because Mother had primary custody of the children and was the 

only party spending money on childcare. The [December 15, 

2010] order, in contrast, was broader in the costs it covers (child

care, unreimbursed medical and extraordinary expense – that is, 

all the major additional expenses, except for tuition), including 

expenditures made by both parties.

The goal of the $1,500 per month additional support was 

to allow Mother to pay for these activities while the children were 

under her care without having to submit receipts to Father and 

expect reimbursement, since “it was a nightmare between these 

parties to do it that way.” The intent of the order was to provide 

sufficient support to Mother, regardless of what Father pays for 

out-of-pocket, as both Mother and Father have historically 

voluntarily covered the costs of myriad additional expenses for 

their children.9

9

 The Superior Court noted that “the record demonstrates 

that both parents paid extra expenses for the children,” 

and most significantly that Father paid assumed 

responsibility for the high costs of M.H.’s therapy. Yurk v. 

Huffman, 647 EDA 2014 at 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. January 7, 

2015).
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To interpret the order as Father desires, as authorizing a 

$1,500 cap on Father’s contribution to these expenses, would 

adversely affect the children and provide an inequitable result. 

For example, should Father have voluntarily assumed an 

expense exceeding $1,500 in any given month, he would be due 

credit from Mother, making Father’s contribution capped at 

$1,500, but making Mother infinitely responsible for any costs 

above that, even those costs incurred by Father.

Therefore, in this Court’s order of January 28, 2014, which 

was upheld on appeal, the Court only granted Mother credit for 

Father’s share of the tuition payments (as tuition was not 

included in the $1,500 stipend), and in its Order of May 7, 2015, 

currently under appeal, the Court granted Father credit for his 

tuition payments only. Any other out-of-pocket expenditures 

voluntarily assumed by either party for the time period covered 

by the agreed order should therefore not be reimbursed through 

credit.10

10

 The Order of May 7, 2015 proscribes that effective 

January 1, 2015, these costs will [be] allocated between 

the parties proportionally according to income; therefore, 

either party may submit a petition for credit for 

expenditures made after this date.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/2015, at 10-12 (record citations omitted).

We agree with the trial court’s rationale. Father appears to 

misconstrue the December 15, 2010, order, in which it is clear from the 

plain language of the agreement that both parties agreed the $1,500 

additional monthly support would be an increase to the support Father was 

already directed to provide. Furthermore, it is evident the additional support 

would apply to child care and unreimbursed medical and extraordinary 

expenses. Lastly, the order provided that there would be no further 

payments by either side for unreimbursed out of pocket extraordinary 

expenses. Contrary to Father’s argument, there was no $1,500 maximum 
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limit with respect to Father’s total share. There was only a “no further 

payment” directive as to the unreimbursed, extraordinary expenses. 

Nevertheless, that also applied to Mother as she, too, was not required to 

reimburse Father.

In any event, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

failing to award Father credit for any contributions he made. See Rich, 

supra. As the court noted, both parties have a lengthy history of voluntarily 

assuming certain expenses. Accordingly, Father’s argument fails.

Order affirmed. Father’s application for a post-submission 

communication granted.

President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins in this memorandum.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2016