1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s GLOBALC R OSSIN G TELE COM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v . METR OP HONE S TE L ECOMM U N ICATION S , INC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 05–7 05. Ar g u ed Oc tober10, 2006— D e c i ded Apr il 17, 200 7 Un derau th or i t yof th e Com m u n i c ation s Ac t of 1934, th e Feder a l Com

mu n i c ation s Commi ssion( F CC) r e g u lates in ter s ta te te leph on e c o m mu n i c ation s u s in ga tr aditi o n a l r e g u latorysy stem simi larto w h at ot her commis s ions have a p plied when regu la t i ng ot her common ca r riers

. Indeed, Congres s la rgely copied la ngua ge f r om t h e ea rlier In

ter s ta te Com m er c eAc t, w h ic hau th or ized feder al r a ilr o a d r e g u lation , w h e nit w r o te Commu n i c ati on s Ac t §§201 (b) an d 20 7, th e pr ov ision s at is su e. BothAc ts au th or ize th eirr e spec tiv ec o mmissio n s to dec l ar e a n y ca r r ier “ c ha rge,” “ r e g ul a t i on,” or “ p ra ct ice” in co nne ct ion wit ht h e ca rrier’s s e rv ices t o b e“ unj us tor un rea s onab l e” ; declare a n“ u n r ea son able,” e.g. , “ cha rge” t ob e“ unla w ful” ; a u t h orize a nin j ured pers on to r e c o v e r“da m ag es” foran“u n l aw fu l” c h ar g eorpr ac ti c e ; an d stat e th at, to do so, th e per s on maybr in g su it ina “c our t” “of th e Un ited Sta t es.” In te r s tate Co mme r c eAc t §§1, 8, 9; Commu n i c ation s Ac t §§201(b), 2 06, 207. Th e u n d er ly in gr e g u lator ypr oblem h e r e ar ises a t t h e int e rs ect i on of t r a d itiona l regula t i on a n d newer, more compet i

t ively orient ed a pproa ches

. Legis l a t ion in 1 9 9 0 req u ired pa yphone oper ator s to al lowpay p h o n eu s er s to ob tai n“fr e e” ac c e ss to th e lon g dis t a nce ca rri er of t h ei r c h o i ce, i.e., a cces s wit h outdepos i t i ng coins

. Butrecog n izing t h e “f ree” ca ll would impos eacos tupon t h e pa yph on e oper ator , Con gr e ss r e qu ir ed th e FCC to pr omu l g ate r e g u la

tion s to pr ov ide c o mpen sati onto su c hoper ator s . Usin gtr adition a l ra t e ma king met h ods , t h e FCC ordered ca rriers t oreimb urs e t h e op er ator s in a s p ec ified amou n tu n l ess ac a r r i eran d ano p e r atorag r e ed to a different amount. The FCC su bse q uently determined that a car

rier’s refus a l t opa y s uch co mpens a tion wa s a n“ unrea s onab l e pra c tic e ” an d th u s u n l aw fu l u n d er§201(b). R e spon den tpay p h o n eoper a -2 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Sy llabu s torbr ou gh t a feder al law s u i t, c l aimin gth at pet i tion erl o n g -distan c e carrier (herei nafter Global Crossi ng) had violated §20 1 (b) by failing to payc o mpen sationan d t h at §207 au th or ized r e spon den tto su e in federa lcourt

. The Dis t rictCourt ag r e ed th at G l ob al C r ossin g ’s r e fusal to p a y violated § 2 01(b), ther eb y per m it ting res p ondentt os u e u n d er§207. Th e Nin t hCir c u i t affir m ed. Held: Th e FC C’s applic a t io nof §201(b) t oth e c a r r i er’s r e fu sal to pa y

c o mpen sationis law f u l ; an d, giv e nth e linkag ew i th§207, §207 au

th or izes th is feder al-c ou r tlaw s u i t. Pp. 7–19.

(a) Th e lan g uag eof §§201(b ) , 206, an d 2 0 7 an d th ose se c t ion s ’ h i s tor y , in c l u d ingth at of th ei rpr edec essor s , In ter s tate C o mmer c eAc t §§8 an d 9, ma ke c l earth at § 207’s pu r p ose is to al lowper s on s in ju r e d by§201(b) v i ol ation s to br in gfeder al-c ou r t damag e s ac tio n s. Th e dif

fic u l t qu estionis w h e th erth e FCC r e g u l ationat is su e law f u llyim

plements §201(b)’s “unreasonable pr actice” prohibition. Pp. 7–9.

(b) The FCC’s §201(b) “unreasonabl e practice” determination is rea

s o nab l e, a n d thus la wful. S e e Chevro n U. S. A

. In c. v. Natural Re

sour ce s Def ens e Council, Inc

. , 467 U. S. 8 37, 84 3– 84 4. It eas ilyfit s w i th inth e lan g u a g e of th e s tatu tor yph r a s e . M o r e ov er, th e u n d er ly

in gr e g u lated ac tiv i tyat i s s u e r e sembles ac tiv i tylon greg u lated by bothtr an spor tationan d c o mmu n i c ation s a g en c i es. Tr adition a lly , th e FCC, exercis i ng it s ra t e-s ett i ng a u t h orit y, ha s divided r e venues f r om a c a ll a m on gpr ov ider s of seg m en ts of th e c a ll. Tr an spor tationag en cies have s i mila rly divided revenues fro ma la rger t r a n s p ort a t ion service among providers of segments of the service. T h e payphone opera t o r a n d long-dis t a nce c a rrier res e mb le t h os e j o intproviders of a c o mmu n i c ationort r an spor tationserv ic e. D i ffer e n c e s betw eenth e pres ent“ unre a s onab le pra c t i ce” cla s sificat i on a n d more t r a d it ional regulatory subject matter do not require a different out c ome. Whe n Con g r e ss r e v i sed th e telec o mmu n i c ation s law s in1996 to en h a nc e t h e role of compet ition, cre a t i ng as y st em t h a trelies in pa rtupon compet it ion and in pa rtupon t h e role of ta riffs in regula t o ry s u pervi

sion , it left §201(b) inplac e. In ligh tof th e absen c e of an yc o n gr e s sional prohib it ion, and the s i milarit i es w i t htr adition a l r e g u lator yac tion , th e Cou r t fin d s n o th in gu n r e ason abl e abou tth e FCC’s §20 1 (b) deter m in ation

. Unit ed Sta t esv. Mead C o rp. , 533 U. S. 218, 22 9. Pp. 9–12.

(c ) Addition al ar g u men t s m a de byG l o balCr ossin g , it s su ppor t in g amici an d th e dissen t s—th a t§207 doe s n o t au th or ize ac tion s forv i o lation s of r e g u lation s pr om u l g ated to c a r r you t statu tor yobjec t iv es; th at n o §20 7 ac tionlies f o rv i olation s of su bst a n t iv e r e g u lation s pr omu l g ated b yth e FCC; th at §§ 201( a) an d (b) c o n c e r non lypr ac tic e s t h a tha rm ca rrier cus t o mers , notca r r iers u ppliers ; t h a tt h e FCC’s
“ unrea s onab l e pra c t i ce” determina t i on is unla w ful b e ca us e it is in

-3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s adequ ate lyr e ason ed; an d t h at §2 76 pr oh ibit s th e F CC’ s §2 01(b) c l as sific ation—ar e u l timate lyu n per s u a siv e . Pp. 12–1 9. 423 F. 3d 10 56 , affir m ed.

B REYER , J., delivered the o p inion of the Court, in which R OBERTS , C. J., and S TEVENS , K ENNEDY , S OUTER , G IN SB U R G , a n d ALITO , JJ., joined. S CALIA , J., andT HOMA S , J., filed dissenting opinions._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–7 05 GLOBALC R OSSIN G TELE COM M UNICATIONS, IN C., PETITION ER v. ME TR O P HO N E S T E LE

COMMU NI CATIONS, INC. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Apr il 17, 20 0 7 ] J USTICE B RE YE Rdelivered the opinion of the C o urt. The Federal Communi cations Commission ( C ommission or FCC) ha s establish e d rules that require long-distance (and certain other) communications carriers to compen

sate a payphone operat or when a caller uses a payphone to obtain free access to th e carrier’s lines (by dialing, e.g. , a 1–800 number or otheraccess code). The Commissionhas added that a carrier’s r e fusal to pay the compe n sation is a “practice .

. . that is u n just or unreasonable” within the terms of the Communications Act of 1934, §201(b), 48 Stat. 1070, 47 U. S. C. §201(b). Communications Act language li nks §201(b) to §207, which authorizes any person “damaged” by a violation of §201(b) to bring a lawsuit to r e cover dam a ges in federal court. And we mu st here decide whether thi s linke d section, §207, authorizes a payphone operator to b r ing a federal-court lawsuit against a recalcitra nt car r ier t hat refuses to pay the c o mpensation that the Co mmission’ s order says it owes. In our view, the FCC’ s application of §20 1 (b) to the carrier’s re fusal to p a y compensation is areasonabl e2 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Opinion of t h eCourt interpretati on of the st atute; henc e it is lawfu l

. See Ch ev ron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re s o urces D e fe nse Counci l, Inc. , 467 U. S. 837, 843–844, and n. 11 (1984). And, gi ve n the linkage with §207, we also conclude that §207 author

izes this federal-court lawsuit. I A Because regulatory h i story helps to illuminate the proper interpretation and application of §§20 1 (b) and 20 7, we begin with that his t ory. Whe nCongress enacted th e Communications Act of 1934, it granted the FCC broa d authority t o regulate inte rstate telephone communica

tions. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’nv. FCC, 476 U. S. 355, 360 (1 986). The Commission, during the first several decades of its history, used this authority to develop a traditional regulatory system muc hlike the systems othe r commissions had applied when regulating ra ilroads, pub

lic utilities, and other common carriers. A u t ility or car

rier would f ile with a commission a tariff cont aining rates, and perhap s other prac tices, classifications, or regulations in connection with its provision of communications ser

vices. The commission would examine the rates, etc., and, after appropriate proceedings, approve them, set the m aside, or, sometimes, set fortha substitute rate schedule or list of approved ch arges, classifications, or practice s that the ca rrier or utility must follow. In doing so, the commissionmight determine the utility’s or carrier’s overall cost s (including a reason ab le profit), a llocate cost s to particula r services, examine whether, and how, individ

ual rates would generate revenu e that would help cove r those costs, and, if ne cessary, provide for a division of revenues among several carriers that together provided a single servi c e. See 47 U. S. C. §§201(b), 203, 205(a); Mis

souri ex r e l

. Southw es tern Bell T e lephone Co . v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Mo. , 262 U. S. 276, 29 1–295 (1923)3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt (Brandeis, J., concurri ng in judgment) (telecommunica

tions); Veri zon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U. S. 467, 478 (2 002) (same); Chica go & North W e s t ern R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. , 387 U. S. 326, 331 (1967) (railroads); Permian Ba sin Area Ra te Ca se s , 390 U. S. 747, 761–765, 80 6–808 (1968) (natural gas field production). In authorizing this tra ditional form of regula tion, Con

gress copied into the 1934 Communications Act langu a ge from the earlier Interstate Commerce Act of 1 887, 24 Sta t

. 379, which (as amended) authorized federal railroad regu

lation. See American Tele phone & Tele gra p hCo. v. Cen

tral Office Telephone, Inc. , 524 U. S. 214, 222 (1998). Indeed, Congress largely copied §§1, 8, and 9 of the Inter

state Commerce Act when it wrote the lan guage of Com

munications Act §§20 1 (b) and 2 07, the sec t ions at is s u e here. The relevant sections (in both statute s ) authorize the commission to dec l are any carrier “char ge,” “regula

tion,” or “pr a ctice” in connectionwith the carri er’s services to be “unjust or unreasonable”; they declare an “unreason

able,” e.g. , “charge” to be “unlawful”; they a u thorize an injured per s on to recover “d ama g es” for an“unlawful” charge or practice; and they state that, to do so, the person may bring suit in a “c ourt” “of th e United St ates.” Inter

state Commerce Act §§1, 8, 9, 2 4Stat. 379, 382; Commu

nications Act §§201(b), 206, 207, 47 U. S. C. § § 201(b), 206, 207. Historicallyspeaking, the Inter s tate Commerce Ac t sections changed early, preregul atory com m on-law ratesupervision procedures. The com m on law originally per

mitted a freight shipper to ask a courtt o determine whether a railroad rate was unreasonably high and to award the shipper damages in t h e form of “reparation s.” The “new” regulatorylaw, howe ver, made clear that a commission, not a cour t, would determine a r a te’s reason

ableness. At the sam e time, that “new” la wpermitted a shipper injured by an unreasonab le rate to bring a federal4 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Opinion of t h eCourt lawsuit to c o llect damages. Inters tate Comm erce Ac t §§1, 8–9; Arizona Groc ery Co . v. Atchiso n, T. & S. F. R. Co. , 284 U. S. 370, 383–386 (1932); Texas & Pa cific R. Co. v. Ab i

lene Co ttonOil Co. , 204 U. S. 42 6, 436, 440–441 (1907); Keoghv. Ch icago & N o rthw esternR. Co. , 260 U. S. 156 , 162 (1922); Louisville & Nashvil l eR. Co. v. Ohio Valley Tie Co. , 24 2 U. S. 288, 290–291 (1916); J. El y, Railroads and American Law 71– 72, 226–227 (2001); A. Hoogenboom & O. Hoogenboom, A History of the ICC 61 (1976). Th e similar lan guage of Communications Act §§201(b) and 207 indicates a roughly similar sharing of agency authorit y with federa l courts. Beginning in the 1970’s, the FCC came to b e lieve that communications markets migh t efficiently support mor e than one fi rm and that competition might supplement (or provide a substitute for) tra ditional regulation. See MCI Tele communications Co rp. v. American Te lep h one & Tele

graph Co. , 512 U. S. 218, 220–22 1 (1994). The Commi s sion facilitated entry o f new telecommunications carriers into long-distance markets. And in the 1990’s, Congres s amended the 1934 Act while also enacting new telecom

munications statutes, in order to encourage (and some

times to m andate) new competiti o n. See Te lecommunica

tions Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, 47 U. S. C. §609 et se q. Neither Congress nor the Co mmission, however, tota lly abandoned traditional regulatory requiremen t s. And th e new statutes and amendments left many traditional re

quirements and related statutory provisions, includin g §§201(b) an d 207, in place. E.g. , National Ca ble & Tele

communica tions Assn. v. Brand X Internet Servi ces , 5 45 U. S. 967, 975 (2005). B The regulatory p r oblem that un derlies this lawsuit arises at the intersection of traditional regulation and newer, mor e competitively or iented approaches. Compet

-5 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt ing long-distance carriers seek th e business of individual local caller s , including those who wish to make a longdistance call from a local payphone. A payphone operator, however, controls what is sometimes a necess ary channel for the caller to reach t h e long-distance carrier

. And prior to 1990, a payphone operator, exploiting this control, might require a caller to use a long-distance carrier tha t the operator favored w h ile blocking access to the caller’s preferred c a rrier. Suc ha practic e substituted the oper a tor’s choice of carrier for the caller’s, and it potentially placed disfavored carriers at a competitive disadvantage. In 1990, Congress enacted speci a l legislati o n requiring payphone operators to allow a payphone user to obtain “free” acces s to the car r ier of his or her choice , i.e. , access from the p a yphone wi thout depo siting coins. Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 986, codifiedat 47 U. S. C. §226. (For ease of exposition, we often use familia r terms su ch as “long distance” and “free” calls in steadof more p r ecise terms such as “interexchan ge” and “coinless” or“dial-around” calls.) At the same time, Congress recognized that the “free” call would impose a cos tupon the payphone operator; and it consequently required the F CC t o “prescribe regulations that .

. . est ablish a per call comp ensation plan to ensure that all pa yphone service providers are fairly compensated for each a n d everyc o mpleted intrastate a n d intersta te call.” §276(b)(1)(A) of the Communications Act of 1934, as added by §151 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 106, codified at 47 U. S. C. §276(b)(1)(A). The FCC then consid ered the compensatio nproblem. Using tradi t ional ratemaking me thods, it fo und that the (fixed and i n cremental) costs of a“free” call from a pay

phone to, say, a long-distance c a rrier wa rr anted reim

bursement of (at the ti me relevant to this litigation) $0.24 per call. The FCC ord e red carrier s to reimburse the pay

-6 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Opinion of t h eCourt phone operators in this amount unless a carrier and an operator a greed upo na different amount. 47 CFR §64.1300(d) (2005). At the same time, it left the carriers free to pass the cost along to their customers, the pay

phone callers. Thus, i na ty pical“free” call, the car r ier will billth e caller an d then mus tshare the revenue t h e carrier rece ives—to th e tune of $0.24 per ca ll—with th e payphone operator tha thas, together with the carrier, furnished a communications service to the caller. The FCC subsequently determined that a carrie r ’s refusal to pay the compensation ordered amounts to an “unreason

able practice” within th e terms of § 201(b). (W e shall refer to these regulations as the Comp ensation Order and th e 2003 Payphone Orde r , respecti vely. See Appendix A, infra, forf u ll citations.) See gen e rally P. H uber, M. Ke l

logg, & J. Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law §8.6.3, pp. 710–713 (2d ed. 199 9) (hereinafter Huber). That determination, itbelieve d, would permit a payphon e operator to bring a federal-court lawsuit under §207, to collect the compensation owed. 2003 Payphon e Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 1 9975, 19990 , ¶32. C In 2003, respondent, Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., a pa yphone operator, brought this federal-court lawsuit aga i nst Global Crossing Te lecommunications, Inc., a long-distance carrie r . Metrophones sought compensa

tion that it said GlobalCro ssing owed it under the FCC’s Compensation Order, 1 4FCC Rcd. 2545 (1999). Insofar as is relevant here, Metrophones clai med that Global Cross

ing’s refusal to pay amounted to a violation of §201(b ) , thereby per m itting Me trophones t o sue in federal court, under §207, for the compensation owed. The District Court a gre ed. 423 F. 3d 1056, 1061 (CA9 2005). The Ninth Circ uit affirmed the Distri ct Court ’ s d e termination. Ibid. We granted cer t iorari to d e termine whether §207Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) 7 Opinion of t h eCourt authorizes the lawsuit. II A Section 207 says that “[a]ny person claiming to be dam

aged by any common carrier .

. . may bring suit” against the carrier “in any dist rict cour t of the United States” for “recovery of the damages for whic h such common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this chapter.” 47 U. S. C. §2 07 (emphasis added). This language makes clear that t h e lawsuit is proper if the FCC co uld properly hold that a carrier’s failure to pay compensation is an “unreasonable practice” deemed “unlawful” under §201(b )

. That is because the immediately preceding section, §20 6 , says that acommon c a rrier is “ li able” for “ da ma ge ssus tained in c o nsequence of” the carrier’s doing “ any act, matt er, o r t h ing in thi s chap terpro h ibited or declar ed to be unlawful .” And §201(b) declares “ unlawful” a n y commoncarrier “ c ha rge, practice , classification, or reg u lation that is unjust or unreasonab le .” (See Appendix B, infra , for fu ll text; empha s is added throughout). The history of these sections—including that of their predecessors, §§8 and 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act

— simply reinforces the language, making clear the purpose of §207 i s to allow per s ons injured by §201(b) violations to bring federal-court damages actions. See, e.g. , Arizona Groce ry Co. , 284 U. S., at 384–38 5 (Interstate Commerce Act §§8–9); Part I–A, supra . Histo r y also makes clear tha t the FCC ha s long implemented §201(b) through the issu

ance of rules and regulations. This is obviously so when the rules take the form of FCC ap p r oval or pre s cription for the future of rates tha texclusively are “reasonable.” See 47 U. S. C. §205 (authorizing the FCC to prescribe reason

able rates and practice s in order to preclude r a tes or prac

tices that violate §201(b)); 5 U. S. C. §551(4) (“ ‘ r ule’

. . . includes the approval or prescription for the future of8 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Opinion of t h eCourt rates . . . or practices”). It is also so when the FCC has se t forth rules that, for ex ample, require certain accounting methods or insist upon certain carr ier practice s, while (as here) prohibiting others as unjust or unreasonable under §201(b). S ee, e.g. (to name a few), VerizonTel. Cos. v. FCC, 453 F. 3d 487, 49 4 (CADC 20 06) (rates u n reasonabl e (and hence unlawful) if not adjusted pursuant to account

ing rules ordered in FCC regulati ons); Cable & W i re less P. L. C. v. FC C, 166 F. 3d 1224, 12 31 (CADC 1999) (failure to follow Commission-ordered settlement practices unrea

sonable); MCI Tel ecom m unication s Corp. v. FC C, 59 F. 3 d 1407, 1414 (CADC 19 95) (violati on of rate-of-return pre

scription unlawful); In re NO S Communica tions, Inc. , 16 FCC Rcd. 8 133, 8136, ¶6 (2001) (deceptive marketing an unreasonab le practice); In re Promot ion of Compet it ive Networks i nLocal Tel ecommunic a tions Mar k ets , 15 FCC Rcd. 22983 , 23000, ¶35 (2000) (entering into exclusive contracts w i th commercial buildin g owners an unreason able practice). Insofar as t h e statute’s language is concerned, to violate a regulation that lawfully implements §201(b)’s require

ments is to violate the statute. See, e.g. , MCI Telecommu

nications Co rp. , 59 F. 3d, at 141 4 (“We have repeatedly held that a rate-of-retu r n prescript ion has the force of law and that the Commissi on may therefore treat a violati o n of the prescription as a per s eviolation of the r e quirement of the Communications Act that a common carrier main

tain ‘just and reasonable’ rates, see47 U. S. C. §201(b)”); cf. Alexand e r v. Sandoval , 532 U. S. 275, 284 (2001) (it is “meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the regulations apart from the statute”). That is why private litigants h a ve long assumed that they may, a s the statute says, bring an action u n der §207 f o r violation of a rule orregulationthat lawfully implements §201(b). See, e.g. , Oh v. AT&T Corp. , 76 F. Supp. 2d 551, 556 (NJ 1999) (assuming validity of §207 suit alleging violation of9 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt §201(b) in carrier’s fa ilure to provide services listed i n FCC-ap pro v ed tariff); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Allnet Communica tions Serv s., Inc. , 789 F. Supp. 30 2, 304–306 (ED Mo. 19 92) (assuming validity of §207 suit to enforce FCC’s dete rmination of reason able practic e s related to payment of access char ges by long- d istance ca rrier to loca l exchange carrier); cf., e.g. , Chic ago & North W e s t er n Tran sp. Co. v. Atch ison , T. & S. F. R. Co ., 609 F. 2d 1221, 1224–1225 (CA7 197 9) (same i nrespect to Interstate Commerce Act equival e nts of §§20 1 (b), 207). The difficult question, then, is notwhether §207 covers actions that complain of a violati o n of §201(b ) as lawfull y implemented by an FCC regulati on. It plai nly does. It remains for us to decide wheth e r the par t icular F C C regulation before us l a wfully implements §201(b)’s “unreasonable practice” prohibition. We now turn to tha t question. B In our view the FCC’s §201(b) “unreasonab le practice” determination is a reasonable on e; hence it is lawful. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. , 467 U. S., at 843–844

. The deter

mination easily fits within the language of the statutory phrase. That is to say, in ordinary English, one can call a refusal to pay Commi ssion-order ed compensation despite having rece ived a benefit from the payphone operator a “prac t ic[e] .

. . in connection with [furnishing a] communi

cation service .

. . that is .

. . unreasonable.” The service that the payphone operator provi d es constitutes an int e gral part of the total long-distanc e service the payphone operator and the long- d istance carrier togeth er provide to the caller, with respect to th e carriage of his or her par

ticular call. The carrier’s refu sal to divide the revenues it receives from the caller with its collaborator, the payphone operator, despite the FCC’ s regulation requi ring it to do so, can rea s onably be called a “practice” “i n connection10 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Opinion of t h eCourt with” the provision of that se rvice that is “unreasonable. ” Cf. post , at 1–5 (T HOMAS , J., dissenting). Moreover, the underlying regul a ted activi ty at issue here resem blesacti vit ythat bothtransporta tion and com

munications agencies have longregulated. Here the agency has determined thro ughtraditional regulatory methods the cost of carrying a portion (the payphone portion) of a call that begins witha caller a n d proceed s through th e payphone, attached wires, local communic a tions loops, and long-distance lines to a distant call recipi

ent. The agency allocates costs among the joint provider s of the communications service and requires downstrea m carriers, in effect, to pa y an ap prop riate share of revenues to upstream payphone operat ors. Traditionally, the FCC has determined costs of some segments of a call while requiring providers of other segments to divide related revenues. See, e.g. , Smi t hv. Illinois BellTelephone Co. , 282 U. S. 133, 148–151 (1930) (communications). And traditionally, transportation agencies have determined costs of providing some segments of a larger transporta

tion service (for example, the cost of providing the San Francisco– O gden segment of a San Fran cisco–New Yo rk shipment) while requi ring providers of othersegments to divide revenues. See, e.g. , N ew England Di visions Ca s e , 261 U. S. 1 84 (1923); Chica go & North We stern R. Co. , 387 U. S. 326; cf. Cable& W i re le ssP. L. C. , supra , at 1231. In all instances an agenc yallocates costs and provides for a related sharing of revenues. In these more traditional inst ances, transportation carriers an d communications firms entitled to revenu es under rate divisions orcost allocations might bring law

suits under §207, or t h e equival e nt sections of the Inter

state Commerce Act, and obtain compensation or dam

ages. See, e.g. , Allnet Commu nication Serv., Inc. v. National E xch. Carrie rAssn. , Inc., 965 F. 2d1118, 1122 (CADC 199 2) (§207); Sout hw es t ern Be ll T e l. Co. , supra , at11 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 305 (same); Chica go & North W e s t ernTr ansp . Co. , supr a , at 1224–1225 (Interstate Commerce Act e quivalent of §207). Again, the simi larities sup p ort the re asonablen ess of an agency’s bringin gabout a similar result here. We do not sugges tthatthe FCC is r e quired to find car r iers’ failures to d i vide revenues to be §2 01(b) violati o ns in every instance. Cf. U. S. Telepacific Corp

. v. Tel

-Ame r ica of Sal t Lake City, Inc. , 19 FCC Rcd. 245 52, 24555–24556, and n. 27 (2004) (c iting cases). Nor do we suggest that every violation of FCC re gulations is a nunjust and unreason

able practic e . Here there is an ex plicit statutory scheme, and compensation of payphone operators is necessary to the proper implementa tion of that scheme. Under these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the FC C’s fi ndi n g tha tthe fai l ure to follo w the or de r is an unre a sonable p r a c ti ce is wel lwit h in it s authori t y. There are, of course, differences between the present “unreasonable practice” classification and the similar mor e traditional regulatorysubje ct m a tter we h a ve just d e scribed. For one thing, the connection between payphone operators and long-distance carriers is not a tradition al “through ro ute” between carriers. See §201( a). For an

other, as Global Crossing’s ami c ipoint ou t, the wor d “practice” i n§201(b) has traditionally applied to a carrier practice that (unlik e the present one) is the subject of a carrier tari ff— i.e. , a carrier agency filing th at sets forth the carrier’s rates, classifications, and practic e s. Brief for AT&T et al. as Amici C u riae8–11. We conced e the diff er ences. Indeed, traditionally, the filing of tar i ffs was “the centerpiece” of the “[ Communications] Act’s regulatory scheme.” MCI Tel eco mmunicatio n s Corp., 5 12 U. S., a t 220. But we do not concede that these differences requi r e a different outcome. S t atutory ch anges enha ncing the role of competition have ra dically redu ced the role that tariffs play in regulatory supervision of what is now a mixed communications system—a system that relies in part upon12 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Opinion of t h eCourt competition and in par tupon more traditional regulation. Yet when Congress rewrote th e law to bring about these changes, it nonethel es s left § 201(b) in place. That fact indicates that the statute perm its, indeed it su ggests that Congress likely expected, the FCC to pour new substan

tive wine into its old regula tory bottles. See Policy an d Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Market

place, 12 FCC Rcd. 15 014, 15057, ¶77 (1997) (despite the absence of tariffs, FCC’s §201 enforcement obligations have not di minished); Boomerv. AT&T Corp. , 309 F. 3 d 404, 422 ( CA7 2002) (same). An d this circumstance, by indicating that Congre ss did not forbid the ag ency to appl y §201(b) differently in the changed regulatory environment, is sufficient to convince us that the FCC ’ s dete rmination is lawful. That is bec ause we have made cl ear that where “Con

gress wouldexpect the agency to b e able to speak with th e force of lawwhen it ad dresses am biguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law,” a court “is obliged to accept the agency’s po sition if Congress has not previously spoken to the point atissue and the agency’s interpreta

tion” (or the manner i nwhich it fills the “gap”) is “reason

able.” United Sta t esv. Mead Corp. , 533 U. S. 218, 22 9 (2001); National Cable& Tel ecom m unication s Assn. , 54 5 U. S., at 98 0; Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 467 U. S., at 843–844

. Congress, in §201(b), delegated to the agency authority to “fill” a “gap,” i.e. , to a pply §201 through regulations an d orders withthe force of law. Nati onal Cable & Tele com munication s Assn., sup ra, at 980– 981. The ci rcumstance s mentioned above make clear the absence of any relevant congressional prohibition. And, in light of the tradi

tional regulatory similarities that we have d i scussed, we can find nothing unreasonabl e about the FCC’s §201 (b) determination.13 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt C Global Crossing, its su pporting ami c i , and the dissents make several additional but u l timately unpersuasive arguments. First, Global Crossing claims th at §207 au

thorizes onl yactions “seek ing damages for stat ut ory viola

tions” and not for “violations mer e ly of regulations pro m ulgated to carr y outstatutoryobjectives.” Brief f o r Petitioner 12 (emphasis in origin al). The la wsuit before us, however, “seek[s] da mages for [ a ] stat ut ory violatio[n],” namely, a violation of §201(b)’s prohibition of an “unrea

sonable practice.” As we have pointed out, supra , at 8, §201(b)’s prohibitions h a ve long been thought to extend to rates that diverge from FCC prescr iptions, as well as rates or practices that are “unreasonab le” in light of their fail

ure to reflect rules embodied inan agency regulation. We have found no limitat ion of the kind Global Crossing suggests. Global Crossing seeks to draw su pport from Alexander v. Sandoval , 532 U. S. 275 (2001), and Adams Fruit Co. v. Barr ett , 494 U. S. 638 ( 1990), which, Global C r ossing says, hold that a nagency cannot determine throu gh regulation when a private part y may bring a federal court action. Those cases do involve private actions, but they do not support Gl obal Crossi ng. The cases involv e different statutes and different regulations, and the Court ma de clear in each of those c a ses that its holding relied on th e specific statute before i t

. In Sand oval , supra , at 288–289, the Court f o und that a nimplied right of ac tion to enforc e one statutory provision, 42 U. S. C. §2000d, di d not extend to regulations implementing another, §2000d–1. In con

trast, here we are addressing the FCC’s reasonable inter

pretation of ambiguous language in a substantive statu

tory provi s ion, 47 U. S. C. §201(b), which Congress expressly link e d to the right of action provided in §20 7

. Nothing in Sandoval r e quires us t o limit our deference to the FCC’s reasonable interpreta tion of §201(b); to th e14 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Opinion of t h eCourt contrar y , a s we notedin Sandoval , it is “m eaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the regula

tions apart from the statute. A Congress that intends the statute to be enforced through aprivate ca use of action intends the authoritative interpre tation of the statute to be so enforced as well.” 532 U. S., at 284. In Adams Fruit Co., supra, at 646–647, we rejecte d an a g ency interpreta

tion of the worker- p rot e ction statute at issue as contrar y to “the plain meaning of the statute’s langu a ge.” Give n the differences in statu t ory langua ge, context, and history, those two cases are simply beside the point. Our analys is does not change inthis case simply be

cause the practice deemed unreasonabl e (and hence unlawful) i nthe 2003 Payphone Order is violation of a n FCC regulation adopted under authority of a separate statutory s e ction, §27 6

. The FCC here, acti ng under the authority of §276, has prescribed a particula r rate (and a division of revenues) applicable to a portion of a l o ngdistance service, and i thas ordered carriers to reimburse payphone operators for the relevant portion o f the service they jointlyprovide. B u t the conclusion that it is “unrea

sonable” to fail so to reimburse is not a §276 conclusion; it is a §201(b) conclusion. And co urts have treated a ca r rier’s failure to foll ow closely anal ogous agency rate and rate-division determinations as we treat t h e matter at issue here. That is to say, the FCC properly implements §201(b) when it reasonably finds that the fai l ure to follow a Commission, e.g. , rate or rate-division determination made under a different statutory provision is unjust or unreasonab le under §2 01(b). See, e.g. , MCI Telecommuni

cations Cor p . , 59 F. 3d, at 1414 (f ailure to f o llow a rate promulgated under §205 properly considered unreasonabl e under §201(b)); see als o Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Alabama Gre at Southern R. Co. , 506 F. 2d 1265, 1270 (CADC 1974 ) (statutory o b ligation to provide reasonable rate divisions is “implemented by orders of the ICC” issued pursuant to a15 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt sepa ratestatutory pro vision). M o reover, inresting ou r conclusion upon the analogy with rate setting and ra te divisions, t h e traditional, historical subject matter of §201(b), we avoid authorizing th e FCC to turn §§201(b) and 207 in to a back-door remedy for violation of FCC regulations. Second, J U S TICE S CALI A , dissenting, says that the “only serious issue presented by this case [is] whether a practic e that is not in and of it self unjust or unreasonable can b e rendered such (and thus rendered in violation of the Act itself) beca use it viola t es a subst antive regulation of th e Commission.” Post , at 2–3. He answers this questi o n “no,” because, in his view, a “vi o lation of a substantive regulation promulgated by th e Commission i s not a viol a tion of the Act, an d th us does not give rise t o a privat e cause of action. ” Post , at 3. We cannot accept either J USTICE S CALIA’ s statement of the “serious i ssue” or hi s answer. We do n o t accept his statement of the iss u e because whether the practice is “in and of itself” unr easonabl e i s irrelevant. The FCC has authoritatively rul e d that ca rri

ers must compensate payphone operators. The only prac

tice before us, then, and the only one we consider, is the carrier’s vi olation of t hat FCC regulation r e quiring the carrier to pay the payphone operator a fair portion of the total cost of carryin g a call that th ey jointly c a rried—eac h supplying a partial portion of the total carria g e. A prac

tice of violating the FCC’s order to pay a fair share would seem fairly characterized in ordi nary English as an “u n just practi c e ,” so why should the FCC not call it the same under §201(b)? Nor can w e agree with J USTICE S CALI A’s cl aim that a “violation of a subs tan t ive re gulationpromulgated by th e Commission is n o t a vi olationof” §201(b) of the Act when, as here, the Commiss ion has explicitly and reasonably ruled that t h e particular regulatory violation doesviolate16 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Opinion of t h eCourt §201(b). (Emphasis added.) An d what has the substan

tive/interpretive distinction that J USTICE S CALIA empha

sizes, post , at 3, to do with the m a tter? The r e is certai n ly no reference to this dis t inction in §201(b); the text does no t suggest that, of all violations of regulations, only viola

tions of interpr e tiv eregulations can amountto unjust or unreasonab le practices. Why believe that Con gress, which scarcely kn ew of this distinction a century a g o before the blossoming of administ rative law, would care which kin d of regulation was at issue? And even if this distinction were relevant, the FC C has longset forth what we n o w would call “ s ubstantive” (or “legislative”) rule s under §20 5

. Cf. 1 R. Pi erce, Admi nistrative Law Treatise §6.4, p. 325 (4th ed. 2002); post , at 4. And violations of th ose substan

tive §205 regulations have clearly been deemed violations of §201(b). E.g ., MCI T e lecommuni cations Cor p . , 59 F. 3d, at 1414. Conversely, we have fo un d no case at allin whic h a private p l aintiff was keptout o f federal court because the §201(b) violation it challenged took the form of a “sub

stantive re gulation” r a ther thanan “interp r etive regul a tion.” Insofar as J UST I CE S CAL IA uses adjectives such as “traditional” or “ t extu ally based” to describ e his distinc

tions, post , at 4, and “novel” or “absurd” to describe our s , post , at 5, 2 , we would simply note our disagreement. We concede that J USTI CE S CAL IA cites three sources in support of his theory. See post , at 3. But, in our view, those sources offer him no suppo rt. None of those sources involved an FCC application of, or an FCC interpretati on of, the secti on at issu e here, namel y §201(b). Nor did any involve a regulation—substantive or interpretive

— promulgated subsequent to the authority of §201(b). Thus none is rel e vant to th e case at hand. See APCC Serv s. , Inc. v. Spri nt Communications Co . , 418 F. 3 d1238, 1247 (CADC 200 5) (per curi am)(“There was no a u thoritative interpretati on of §201(b) in this case”); G reenev. Sp rin t Communica tions Co. , 340 F. 3d 1047, 1052 (CA9 2003)17 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt (violation of substantive regulati on does not violate §276; silent as to §201(b)). The single judge who thought th at the FCC h a d authorit a tively interpreted §20 1 (b) (as ha s occurred inthe case before us) would have reached th e same conclusion that we do. APCC Se rvs., Inc. , supra , at 1254. (D. H. Ginsburg, C. J., dissenting) (finding a pri v ate cause of action, becau s e there was“clearly an authorita

tive interpretation of §201(b)” that deemed the practice i n question u n lawful). See also Huber §3.14. 3, p. 317 (n o discussion of §201(b)). Third, J US TICE T HOMA S(who also does n o t adopt J USTICE S CALIA’ s arguments) disagrees with the FCC’ s interpretati on of the term “pra c t ice.” He, along with Global Crossing, clai ms insteadthat §§20 1 (a) and (b) concern only pra ctices that ha rm carrier cu stomers, no t carrier sup p liers

. Post , at 2–4 (dissenting opinion); Brief for Petitioner 37–38. But tha tis not what those sections say. Nor does hi story offer this position sign ificant sup

port. A vi olation of a regula tion or order dividing rate s among railroads, for example, would lik ely have harmed another carrier, not a shipper. See, e.g. , Chicago & North W

e st er n T r ans p . Co., 609 F. 2d, at 1225–1226 (“Act .

. . provides for the regulation of int e r-carrier r e lations as a part of its general rate policy”). Once one takes account of this fact, it seems reas onable, not u n reasonabl e, to includ e as a §201(b) (and §207 ) beneficiary a firm th at performs services roughly analogous to the transportation of on e segment of a longer cal l

. We are not here dealing with a firm that supplies offi ce supplies or manuallabor. Cf. , e.g. , Missouri Pa cific R. Co. v. Norwood , 283 U. S

. 249, 257 (1931) (“practice” in §1 of the Interstate Co mmerce Act does not e n compass employmen tdecisions)

. The lon g distance carrier ordered by the FCC to compensate the payphone operator is so ordered in its role as a provider of communications services, not as a consumer of office sup

plies or the like. Itis precisely because the carrier and the18 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Opinion of t h eCourt payphone operator jointlyprov ide a com m unications service to t h e caller that the car r ier is ordered to shar e with the payphone operator the revenue that only the carrier is p e rmitted to demand f r om the caller. C f

. Ca b le & W i re lessP. L. C. , 16 6 F. 3d, at 1 231 (fin din gtha t§20 1 (b ) enables theCom m issio ntore gul a t enot“o nly the te rms o n whi c h U. S. ca rrie r s of fe r tele comm unic a tio nservices to th e publi c , ”bu talso “the pri c es U. S. ca rrie r s pa y” to fo rei gn ca rrie r s pro vid in g the f o rei gn se g m ent o f an inte rna tion a l call). Fourth, Gl obal Crossi ng argues that the FCC’s “unrea

sonable practice” determination is unlawful because it is inadequatel y reasoned. We co ncede that the FCC’s initial opinion simply states that th e car r ier’s prac ti ce is unrea

sonable un der §201(b). But the context and cros s referenced opinions, 2 003 Pa yphone Order, 18 FCC Rcd., at 19990, ¶32 (citing American Public Communicatio n s Council v. FCC, 215 F. 3d 51, 56 (CADC 2000 )), make th e FCC’ s rationale obviou s, namely, that in light of the his

tory that w e set forth supra , at 7 –9, it is unr easonabl e f o r a carrier to violate the FCC’s man d ate that it pay compen sation. Se e also In re APCC Se rvs., Inc. v. NetworkIP , LLC, 21 FCC Rcd. 10 488, 10493–10495, ¶¶ 13–16 (2006) (Order) (spe lling out the reasoning)

. Fifth Globa lCrossing argues that a different statutor y provision, §276, see supra , a t 5, prohibits the FCC’s §201(b) classification. Brief for Petitioner 26–28. But §276 simpl yrequires the FCC to “ta ke all actions neces

sary . . . to prescribe regulations that .

. . establish a per call compensation plan to ensure” t hat pay p hone operator s “are fairly compensated.” 47 U. S. C. §276(b)(1). It no

where forbids the FCC to rely on §201(b). Rather, by helping to secure enfor c ement of t h e mandated regulations the FCC furthers basic §276 purposes. Finally, Global Crossing seeks to rest its claim of a §276 prohibition upon the fact that §2 76 requires regulations19 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt that secure compensationfor “every completed intras ta te ,” as well as every “ in ters ta te” payphone-related call, while §201(b) (referring to §201(a)) extends only to “ inters ta te o r foreign” co mmunication. B r ief f o r Petitioner 37. Bu t Global Crossing mak e s too much of too l i ttle. We can assume (for argumen t ’s sake) that §201(b) may conse

quently apply only to a portion of the Compensation Or

der’s requirements. But cf., e.g . , Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n , 4 76 U. S., a t375, n. 4 (suggestin g approval of FCC authority where it is “ notp o ssible to separate the interstate and the int r astate components”). But even if that is so (and we repeat t hat we do not deci de this ques

tion), the FCC’s classification will help to ac hieve a sub

stantial portion of its §276 compensatory mission. And we cannot imagine why Congress would have (i mplicitly in this §276 l anguage) wished to forb id the FCC from con

cluding tha tan interstate half loaf is better than none. For these reasons, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is affirmed. It is so orde red.20 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Appendix B t oopinion of t h eCourt AP P E N D IXE S TO O P IN IO N O FTH E CO UR T A In re Imple m enta tion of the P a

y Te lephone Rec lassifi catio n and Compe n sation Provisions of the Tel ecom m unication s Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd. 2545, 2631–263 2, ¶¶190–1 91 (1999) (CompensationOrder). In re the P a

y Telepho n e Reclas sification an d Compens a tion Provisions of the Telecommunications A c t of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd. 19975, 199 90, ¶32 (2003) (2003 Payphone Or

der). B Communications Act §201: “(a) It shall be the duty of every common carrier en

gaged ininterstate or foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish suc hcommunication servi c e upon reasonable request therefor; and, in accordan ce with the orders of the Commission, in cases where the Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such action necessary or de sirable in the public interest, to establish physical connections with other carriers, to establish through ro utes and charges applicable thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to es

tablish and provide facilities and r e gulations f o r oper ating such through routes. “(b) All cha r ges, prac tices, classifications, and regu

lations for and in connection with such communica

tion service, shallbe j u st and reasonable, a n d any such charge , practice, c l assification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is decla r ed to be u n lawful: Provided , That communications by wire or radio sub

-21 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Appendix B t oopinion of t h eCourt ject to this chapter ma y be cl assified into day, night , repeated, unrepeated, lette r, commercial, press, Gov

ernment, and such other classes as the Commission may decide to be justand reasonable, and different charges ma y be made for the different classes of com

munications: Provided further , That nothing in this chapter or in any other provision of law shall be con

strued to p r event a common carr ier subjectto this chapter fro m entering into or operating under any contractwi th anycom m on carriernot subjectto this chapter, for the exchange of th eir services , if the Commission is of the opinion that such contra ct is not contrar yto the public interest: Pro v ided furth e r , Tha t nothing in this chapte r or in any other provision of law shall prevent a common carrier subject to this chapter fro m furnishing repo rts of positions of ships at sea to newspapers of general circulation, eit h er at a nominal ch arge or without charge , provided the name of such common carrier is displayed along with suc h ship position reports. The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be neces s a r y in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this chap

ter.” 47 U. S. C. §201. Communications Act §206: “In case any common carrier shall do, or cause or permit to be done, an y act, matt er, or thing in this chapter pro h ibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do a n y ac t, mat t er, or thing in this ch apter re

quired to be done, such common carrier shall be liabl e to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained inconsequen c e of any such violation of the provisions of this cha p ter, to

gether wi tha reasonable counsel or attorne y ’s fee, to be fixed by the court in ev ery case of recovery, which attorney’s f ee shall be taxed andcollected as part o f22 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Appendix B t oopinion of t h eCourt the costs in the case.” 47 U. S. C. §206. Communications Act §207: “Any person claiming to be damaged by any com

mon carrier subject to the provisions of this chapte r may either make complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit for the re

covery of th e damages for which s u ch common carrie r may be liab l e under the provision s of this chapter, in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person shall not have the right to pursue both such remedies.” 47U. S. C. §207._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) S CALIA , J., dissenting 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–7 05 GLOBALC R OSSIN G TELE COM M UNICATIONS, IN C., PETITION ER v. ME TR O P HO N E S T E LE

COMMU NI CATIONS, INC. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Apr il 17, 20 0 7 ] J USTICE S CALIA , dissenting. Section 276(b)(1)(A) of the Communications Act of 1934 , as added by the Telecommunication Act of 1996, i n structed th e Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to issu e regulations establish i ng a plan to compensate payphone operators, leaving it u p to the FCC to prescribe who should pay and how much. Pursuant to that authority, the FCC promulga ted a substantive regu

lation that required carriers to compensate payphon e operators at a rate of 24 cents per call (the payphone

compensation regulation). The FCC subsequently de

clared a ca rrier’s failure to comp ly with the payphone

compensation regulation to be unlawful under §201(b) of the Act (wh i ch prohibits certain “u njust or un reasonable” practices) a n d privatel y actionable under §206 of the Act (which establishes aprivate cause of action f o r violation s of the Act). Today’s judgment can be defended only by accepting e i ther of two propos itions with res p ect to thes e laws: (1) t hat a car r ier’s failure to pay th e prescribed compensation, in and of itself and apart from the Commis

sion’s payphone-compensation regulation, is an unjust o r unreasonab le practice i nviolation of §201(b); or (2) that a carrier’s fai l ure to pay the pr escribed compensation is an “unjust or u n reasonabl e” practice under §201(b) because i t2 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. S CALIA , J., dissenting violates the Comm ission’s payphone-co m pensatio n regula tion. The Court coyly avoid s rejecting the first p r oposition. But make no mistake: that propo s ition is utterly implau

sible, which is perhaps why it is nowhere to be found in the FCC’s opinion. The unjustness or unreasonableness i n this case, if any, consists precisely of violati n g the FCC ’ s payphone-compensation regulation. 1 Absent that regula

tion, it wo uld be neither unjust nor unreasonable for a carrier to d e cline to ac t as collection agent for payphon e companies. The personusing the s e rvices of t h e payphone company to obtain acc e ss to the carrier’s ne twor kis not the carrierbut the caller. It is absurd to suggest some natural obligation on the partof the car r ier to identif y payphone use, bi ll its customer forthat use, a n d forward the proceeds to the payphone company. As a regulatory command, that makes sense (t hou gh the free -rider prob

lem might have been solved in s o me other f a shion); bu t, absent the Commission’s substantive regulation, it woul d be in no wa y unjust or unreasonable for the carrier to do nothing. Indeed, if a carrier’s f a ilure to pay pay p hone compensation had been unjust or unreasonable in its own right, the Commission’s paypho ne-compensation regula

tion would have been unnecess ary, and the payphone

——————

1 See In ret h e Pay Telep h oneReclas sificat i o n and CompensationPro

visions of t h eTelecommuni cations Act of 1 9 9 6, 1 8FC C Rc d. 19 975 , 199 90, ¶3 2 ( 2 003) (“[F]ai l u r eto p a yinac c o r d an c ew i th th e Com m is

s i on’s pa yphone rules , s u c ha s t h e rules expres s l y req u iring s u c h pay m en t .

. . c o n s titu tes .

. . anun ju st an d u n r e ason able pr ac tic ei n v i olationof se c t ion201(b)”); In re APCC Se rvs. , Inc. v. NetworkIP, LLC, 21 F CC Rc d. 10 48 8, 10 49 3, ¶15 (20 06) (“[F]ai l u r eto paypay p h o n e compens a t i onris e s t o t h e level of b e ing ‘unj us ta n d unrea s onab l e’ ” b e ca us e itis “ adirectviola t i on of Commis s i on rules ” ) ; id. , at 1049 3 , ¶15, an d n

. 4 6(“Th e fac tth at a failu r eto paypay p h o n ec o mpen sation direct ly viola t e s Commis sion rules s p ecifically requiring such payment distin g u ish e s th is si tu ation fr om oth e rsitu ation s w h e r eth e Commi s sionh a s r e peatedlydec lin ed to en ter tain‘collec t ionac tio n s’ ”).3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) S CALIA , J., dissenting companies could have s u ed directly for violation of §201(b)

. The only serious issue presented by this case relates to the second proposition: whether a practice th at is notin and of itself unjust or unreaso nab le can be rendered such (and thus rendered in violation of the Act itself) because i t violates asubstantive regulation of the Commissi on. Today’s opi n ion seems to answer that question in the affirmative, at least with re spect t o the particular regula

tion at issue here. That concl u sion, however, conflicts with the Co mmunications Act ’ s ca r e fully delineated reme

dial scheme. The Act draws a clear distinction between private actions to en force inter p re tive re gulat i ons (b y which I me an regulations that re asonably and authorita

tively construe the statute itself) and private actions to enforce substan t ive re g u lations (b y whichI mean regula

tions promulgated pu rsuant to a nexpress delegation of authority to impose fr eestanding legal obliga t ions beyon d those created by the statute itself). Section 206 of the Act establishes a private cause of action for violations of the Act itself— and violation of an FCC regulati on authorita

tively inter p reting the Act isa vi olation of t h e Act itself. (As the Court explains, when it c o mes to regulations that “reasonabl[y] [and] a u thoritative l y construe the statute itself,” Alexanderv. Sandoval , 532 U. S. 275, 284 (2001), “it is ‘meaningless to talk abouta separate c ause of action to enforce the regulations apart from the statute.’ ” An te , at 8 (quoting Sandoval, supra , at 284).) On the other hand, violation of a sub s tantive regulation promulgated by the Commis s ion is not a violation of the Act, and thus does not give rise to a private cause of action under §206. See, e.g., APCC Serv s., Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co. , 418 F. 3d 1238, 1247 (CADC 2005) (per curiam), c e rt. pending, No. 05–766 ; Green ev. Sprint Co mmunicatio n s Co. , 340 F. 3d 1047, 1052 (CA9 2003), cert. denied, 5 41 U. S. 988 (2004); P. Huber, M. Kellogg, & J. Thorne, Federal Tele

-4 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. S CALIA , J., dissenting communications Law §3.14.3 (2d ed. 1999). 2 T h a ti s w h y Congress has separately created private righ ts of action for violation of ce rtainsubstantive regulations. See, e. g. , 47 U. S. C. §227(b)(3) (violation of substantive regulations prescribed under §227(b) (2000 ed. and Supp. III)); §227(c)(5) (violation of substantive regulations prescrib e d under §227(c)). These do notinclude the payphone

compensation regulation authorized by §276(b). There is no doubt that interpretive rules can be issued pursuant to §201(b)—that is, ru les which specify tha t certain p r a ctices are i nand of th emselves “unjust or u n reasonable. ” Orders issued under §205 of t h e Act, see ante , at 14, which auth o rizes the F CC, upon finding that a practice will be unjust and unreasonable, t o order the carrier to a d opt a just and reasonable practice in its place, similarly i m plement the statute ’ s proscription against unjust or u n reasonabl e practi ces. But, as explained above, the paypho ne-compensation regulation does not imple

ment §201(b) and is not predicated on a finding of wh at would be unjust and unreasonabl e absent the regulation

. The Court naively describes the question posed by this case as follows: Since “[a] pra ctic e of violating the FC C’s order to pa y a fair sha r e would seem fairly c haracterize d in ordinary English as an ‘unjust practice,’ . . . why shoul d the FCC no t call it the same under §201(b)?” Ante, at 15

. There are at least three reasons w h y it is not as simple a s that. (1) There has been no FCC “order” in the ordinary

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2 The Court asserts that “[n]one of th[ese] [cases] involved an FCC applic a t ionof, oranFCC in t e r p r e tationof, th e r e lev a n ts e c t ion , n a mely §201(b)[,] n o rdid an yin v o lv e a r e g u lati on—su b stan t i v e orin ter p r e tiv e—pr o mu lg ated su bse q u e n tto th e au th or ityof §20 1 (b ).” Ante , at 1 6

. I agree. The yinvolved thepayphone-co mpensation re gulation , wh ich wa s notpromulga t e d purs ua ntt o§2 01 (b ), b u tpurs ua ntt o§2 76

. The r e lev a n tpoin t is th at v i ol ation s of su b s tan tiv er e g u lation s ar e not dir e c t lyac tion able u n d er§206.5 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) S CALIA , J., dissenting sense, see 5 U. S. C. §551(6), but o n ly an FCC regulation. 3 That is to say, the F CC has ne ver determi n ed that pe ti

tioner is in violation of its regulati on and ordered compli

ance. Rather, respondent has all e ged such a violation an d has brought that allegationdirectly to Dis trict Cour t without pri o r agency adjudicatio n . (2) The “practice of violating” virtually any FCC regul a tion can b e character

ized (“in ordinary En glish”) as an “unjust pr actice”—or if not that, then an “unreasonable practice”—so that all FC C regulations become subject to p r ivate dam a ge actions. Thus, the traditional (and textually based) distincti on between private enfor c eability of interpretive rules, and private non e nforceabili ty of substa ntive rules is effectively destroyed. And (3) it i s not up to the FCC t o “call it” an unjust prac tice or not. If it were, agency disc retion might limit the regulations av ailable forharassing litigation by telecommunications competitors. In fact, however, t h e practice of violating on e or an othe r substantive rule e i ther is or is not an unjus t or unreasonable pr actice unde r §201(b). T h e Commis s ion i s entit l ed to Chevron deference with respect to that determ ination at the margins, see Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natu ral R esource s Defense Coun

cil, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), but it will always remai n within the power of private parti es to go directly to cour t, asserting that a pa rti cular violation of a substantive rule is (“in ordi nary Englis h”) “ unjust” or “unreasonable” an d hence provides the basi s for suit under §201(b). The Court asks (more naively still) “what has the sub

stantive/interpretive distinction that [this dissent] empha

sizes to do with the m a tter? The r e is certainly no refer

-

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3 The Court ’s depa rt ure from ordina ry us a g e is ma de pos s i b l e b yt h e fa ctt h a t “ t h e FCC commonly a d opt s rules in opinions ca lled ‘orders

. ’ ” New Englan d Tel. &Tel

. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Me. , 742 F. 2d 1, 8–9 (CA 1 1 9 8 4) (Br e y e r , J.). If th er e h a d beenv i ola t i o nof anFCC or derinth is c a se, a pr iv a t eac tionw o u l d h av ebeen av ailable u n d er §407 of th e Ac t.6 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. S CALIA , J., dissenting ence to this distinction in §201(b )

. . . . Why believe th at Congress, which scarc e ly knew of this distinction a cen

turyago b e fore the blossoming of administrative la w, would care which kindof regulati on was at i ssue?” Ante , at 15–16 (citation omitted). The an swer to these question s is obvious. Section 206 (which was enacted at the same time as §20 1 (b), see 48 Stat. 1070, 1072) does not explicitl y refer to the distinction betw een interpretive and substan

tive regulat i ons. And yet the Court ackno w ledges that, while a viol ation of an inter p re tiveregulation is actionabl e under §206 (as a violation of the statute itself), a violation of a substantiveregula tion is not. (Were this not true, th e Court’s len gthy discu ssion of §2 01(b) would be wholl y unnecessary because violation of the payphon e compensation regulation wo uld be directly actionable under §206.) The Court eviden tly believes th at Congress went out of its wa y to exclude from §206 private action s that did not charge vi olation of t h e Act itself (or regula

tions that authoritatively interpr e t the Act) but was pe r fectly willing to ha ve those very same pri v ate action s brought in through the back door of §201(b) as an “inte r pretation” o f “unjust or unreaso nable practice.” It does not take familiarity with “the blossoming of administrative law” to perc eive that th is would be nonsensical

. 4 Seemingly aware that it is in da nger of rendering the limitation u p on §206 a nullity, the Court seeks to limit its novel approval of priva t e actions for violation of substan

-

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4 Th e Cour t furth e rasser t s t h at th e “th e FCC h a s lon gset for thwh at w en o wc a ll ‘su b stan tiv e ’ (or‘legislativ e ’) r u l es u n d er§205,” “v iol ation s of [which] .

. . have clearly b eendeemed violations of §201(b),” ante , at 1 6

. The §2 05 orders t owhich t h e Court refers a r e nots u b s ta nt ive in t h e releva nts e ns e b e ca us e th e yin ter p r e t §201( b)’s prohibitionagainst unjus t and un reaso nab le rates or practi ces . See ante , at7 (§ 20 5 “ a u th or iz[es] th e FCC to pr esc r ibe r e ason ab le r ates an d pr a c tic e s inor der to pr ec lu de rates orpr ac tic e s th at v i ola t e §201(b)”). Th e pay p h o n e c o mpen sation r e g u lation , byc o n t r a st, does n o t in ter p r e t §201(b) oran y oth e rstatu tor ypr ov ision

.7 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) S CALIA , J., dissenting tive rules to substantive rules th at are “ an a log[ous] wi th rate-se ttin g

and r a te divisions, the traditio nal, histo r i c al subject m a tter of §201(b) ,” ante , at 14–1 5 (emphasis added). There is absolutely no basis in the statute for this distinction (nor is it anywh ere to be found in the FCC’s opinion). As I have descri bed earlier, interpretiv e regulations are privately enforce able becau s e to viola t e them is to violate the Act, wi thin the meaning of the pri

vate-suit provision of §206. That a substantive regulation is analogousto tra ditional interpr e tive regulations, in the sense of dealing with subjects that those regulations hav e traditionally address e d, is supremely irrelevant to whether violation of th e substantive regulation is a viola

tion of the Act—whichis the only pertinent inquiry. The only thing to be said for the Court’s inventive distinction i s that it ena b les its holding to sta n d without massive dam

age to the statutory s c heme. Better an irrational limita

tion, I suppose, than n o limitationat all; eventhough it is unclear how restricti ve that limit ation will t u rn out to be. What other substantive regulations are ou t there, one wonders, that can be regarded as “analogous” to actions the Commission has traditionally taken throu gh interpre

tive regulations under §201(b)? It is difficult to comp rehend what public good the Cou r t thinks it is achieving by its introduction of an unprinci

pled exception into wh at has hitherto been a clearly un

derstood statutory sch e me. Even without th e availability of private remedies, t h e payphone-compensation regula

tion would hardly go unenforced. The Commission is authorized to impose civil forfeit u re penalties of up t o $100,000 per violation (or per day, for conti nuing viola

tions) against common carriers that “willfully or repea t

edly fai[l] to comply wi th .

. . any rule, regulation, or order issued by th e Commissi on.” 47 U. S. C. §503(b )(1)(B). An d the Commission can even place enforcement in private hands by is suing a pri v ately enforceable order forbiddin g8 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. S CALIA , J., dissenting continued violation. See §§154(i), 276(b)(1)(A), 407. Such an order, however, would re quir e a prior Commission adjudicatio nthat the regulation had been violated, thus leaving tha tdetermin ation in th e hands of the agency rather thana court, and preventin gthe unjustified privat e suits that today’s decision all o ws. I would hold that a private actio nto enforce an FCC regulation under §§20 1 (b) and 206 does not l i e unless th e regulated practice is “unjust or u n reasonabl e” in its own right and a p art from the fact that a substantiv e regulation of the Co mmission has prohibi t ed it. As the practice regulated b ythe pa yp hone-com pensation regulation does not plausibly fit thatdescription, I would reverse t h e judgment of the Court of Appeals._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007)
T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–7 05 GLOBALC R OSSIN G TELE COM M UNICATIONS, IN C., PETITION ER v. ME TR O P HO N E S T E LE

COMMU NI CATIONS, INC. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Apr il 17, 20 0 7 ] J USTICE T HOMA S , dissenting. The Court holds that failure to pay a pa ypho ne operato r for coinless calls is an “unjust or unreasonable” “prac t ic e” under 47 U. S. C. §201(b). Properly understood, however, §201 does n o t reach the conduct at issue h e re. Failing t o pay is not a “practice” under §201 because that section regulates t h e activities of telecommunications firms in their role as providers of telecommunications services. As such, §201(b) does n o t reach the behavior of t e lecommuni

cation firms in other aspects of their business. I respec t

fully dissen t

. I The meani ng of §201(b) of the Communications Act o f 1934 becomes clear when read, as it should be, as a part of the entirety of §201. S ubsection (a) sets out the duties and broad discr e tionary powers of a common carrier: “It shall be the dut yof every comm on carrier e n gaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or ra

dio to furnish such co mmunication service u p on rea sonable req u est therefor; and .

. . to establish physical connections with othercarriers, t o establish through routes and charges a pplicable thereto and the divi

sions of suc hcharges, and to establish and p r ovide fa

-2 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g cilities andregulations for opera t ing such through routes.” Immediatel y following that description of duties and powers, subsection (b) requires: “All char ges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such communication ser

vice, shallbe just a n d reasonab le, and a n y such charge, pr actice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable i s declared to be unlawful . . . .” The “charg e s, practices, classifications, and regulations” referred to in subsection (b) are t h ose “establish[ed]” un

der subsection (a). Havinggiven common carriers discr e tionary power to set charges and establish regulations in subsection (a), Congres s required i nsubsection (b) tha tt h e exercise of this powe r be “just and reasonable.” Thus, unless fai l i n g to pay a payphone operator arises from o n e of the duties under subsection (a), it is not a “pra ctic e ” within the meaning of subsection (b). Subsection (a) prescr ibes a car r ier’s dutyto render service either to customers (“furn ish[ing] .

. . communica

tion service”) or to other carri ers ( e.g. , “establish[in g] physical co nnections”); it does not set out duti es related t o the receipt of service fr om supplier s . Consequently, given the relation ship between subsecti ons (a) and(b), subs ec tion (b) cov e rs only those “practic e s” connected with th e provisionof service to customers or other ca rriers. Th e Court embraced this critical limita t ion in Missouri Pacifi c R. Co. v. Norwood , 283 U. S. 249 (1931), wh ich held th a t the term “practice” means a “ ‘pra ctice’ in connection with the fixing of rates to be charged and prescribing of service to be rendered by the carriers.” Id., at 257. In Norwood , the Court i n terpreted language fr om the Interstate Co m merce Act (as amended by the Mann-Elki ns Act) th at Congress ju st three years later copied into th e Communi

-3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007)
T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g cations Act. Ante , at 3; see §7 of t h e Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 546. In passing th e Communications Act, Congress may “be presumed to have had k n owledge” and to have app r oved of the Court’s int e rpretation in Norwood. See Lorillardv. Pons , 434 U. S. 575, 581 (1 978). As a result, the Supreme C o urt’s conte m poraneous interpret a tion of “practice” should bear heavily on our analysis. Other term s in §201 support using Norwood’s restrictiv e interpretati on of “prac t ice.” A w o rd “is kno w n by the company itkeeps,” and one should not “ascrib[e] to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsis tent with its accompanyi n g words. ” Gus t afsonv. Alloyd Co. , 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1 995). Of th e quartet “charges, pra ctices, class i

fications, and regulati ons,” the terms “char g e s,” “classifi

cations,” and “regulati ons” could apply only to the part y “furnish[ing]” service. “ [ C]harges” refers to the charges for physical connections and through routes. 47 U. S. C. §§201(a), 2 02(b). “[R]egulations” relates to the operation of through routes. §201(a). “[C]lassification s” refers to different sorts of co mmunications that ca rry different charges. §2 01(b). Thes e three ter m s involve either setti ng rules for the provision of service or setting rates for that provision. In k eeping with the meaning of these terms, the term “practices” m u st refe r to only those practices “i n connection with the fi x i ng of rates to be char ged and pr e scribing of service to be rendered by the carr iers.” Nor

wood , supra, at 257. The statutory provisions surrounding §201 confirm this interpretati on. Section 203 re quires that “[e]very commo n carrier .

. . shall .

. . file with the Commission .

. . sched

ules showing all charges for itself and its connecting carri

ers . . . and showingthe classifications, practices, a n d regulations affecting s u ch charge s.” See als o §§204–20 5 (also using the ph rase “char ge , cl assification, regulation, or prac tice” in the tari ff context). The “cha r g e s” referred to are those related to a carrier’s own services. §2034 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g (“char ges for itself and its connecting car r iers”). The “classifications, practic e s, and regulations” are also limit e d to a carrier’s own services. Ibid. (applying only to prac

tices “affect ing such ch arges”). In this context , “pra ctices” must mean only those “in connection with the fixing of rates to be charged.” Norwood , 283 U. S., at 257. Secti on 202—outside of the tariff context—also supports th is limitation. It forbids di scrimination “in cha r g e s, practice s, classifications, regulations, facilit ies, or s e rvices.” Dis

crimination occurs wit hrespect to a carrier’s provision of service—not its purcha s ing of services from others. I am unaware of any context in which §§202–205 were applied to conduct relating to the service that anothe rpar t y pro vided to a t e lecommunications carr ier. In this case, Global Crossing has not provided any ser

vice to Metrophones. Rather, Global Crossing has failed t o pay for a s e rvice that Metrophones supplied. The failure to pay a su pplier is not in any sense a “ ‘pra ctice’ in co n nection wit hthe fixingof rates to be charged and prescri b

ing of service to be rendered by the carriers.” Id., at 257. Accordin gly , Global Crossing has not engaged in a practice under subsection (b) because the failure to pay has not come in connection with its provision of service or settin g of rates wi thin the m e aning of subsection (a). Onthi s understanding of §201 , Global Crossing’s failure to pay Metrophones is not astatutory violation. All t hat remains is a regulatory violation, which does not pr ovide Metrophones a private right of action under §207. 1

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1 Ot her enfo rce mentmecha nis m s exis t t or e dres s Globa lCros s i ng’s fa ilure t opa y . The Federa l Communica tions Commission (FCC) ha s th e pow e rto i m pose fin e s u n der47 U. S. C. §§50 3(b)(1) ( B) an d (2)( B)

. Inaddition , th e FCC mayh av eth e au thor ityto c r e ate anadmin i str a tiv er i gh t of a c tionu n d er §276(b)( 1 ) (giv ingth e FCC pow e rto “take a l l ac tion s n e c e ssar y” to “est ab lisha perc a ll c o mpen sat i onplan” th at ens ures “ a ll pa yphone s e rvi c e prov ide r s are fairly compensated”).5 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007)
T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g II The majori ty suggests that deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natura l Resources Defens eCo uncil, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), compels its conclusionthat a car

rier’s refusal to pay a payphone operator is unreasonabl e. But “unjus t or unreasonable” is a statutory term, §201(b), and a court may not, in the name of deference, abdicate its responsibility to in terp ret a statu t e. Under Chevron , a n agency is due no defer e nce until the court a nalyzes the statute and determines that Congress did n o t speak di

rectly to the issue under considerat ion: “The judicia r y is the fin a l authority on issues of statu

tory const r uction and must rejectadministrative con

structions which are contrar yto clear congressional intent. .

. . If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory c o nstruction, ascertains that Cong ress had an intention on the precise questi o n at issue, that in

tention is the law andmust be given effect.” Id., at 843, n. 9. The majority spends one short paragraph analyzing the relevant pr ovisions of the Communications Act to dete r mine whether a refusal to pay is an “ ‘unjust or unreason

able’ ” “ ‘pra ctice.’ ” An te , at 7. Its entire statu t ory analysi s is ess e ntial l y encompassed ina s i ngle sentence in that paragra p h: “That is to say, in ordinary English, one ca n call a refusal to pay Commission-ordered c o mpensation despite having received a benefit from the payphone op

erator a ‘practice .

. . in connect ion with [furnishing a] communication service .

. . that is .

. . unreasonable.’ ” Ibid. (omi s s ions and modifications in original). Thi s analysis ignores the interaction between §201(a) an d §201(b), supra, at 1–2; it ignores the three terms su r rounding th e word “pra ctice” andt h e context those terms provide, su pra, at 3–4; it ignores the use of th e term “pra c tice” in nearby statutory provisions, such a s §§202–20 5,6 GLOBAL CROSSING TEL ECOM M UNICATIONS, IN C. v. METROPHONES TELE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g supra, at 4; and it ignores the understanding of the term “prac t ice” a tthe time Congress enacted the Communica

tions Act, supra, at 2– 3. After breezing by the text of the s t atutory provisions at issue, the majority cit e s lowe r court cases to claim that “the underlying regulated activityat issue here resembl e s activity th at both transpo rtation and communications agencies have long regulated.” An te , at 7–8 (citing Allnet Communica tion Ser v ., Inc. v. National Exch. Ca rrier Assn., Inc. , 965 F. 2d 1118 (CADC 1992), and Southwest

ern Bell Tel

. Co. v. Allnet Commun i cations Se r v ., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 30 2 (ED Mo. 1992)). It argues that these cases demonstrate that “ c ommunicati ons firms entitled to reve

nues under rate divisi ons or cost allocations might brin g lawsuits under §207 .

. . and obtai ncompensation or dam

ages.” An te , at 8. But in both cas e s, the only issue before the court was wheth e r the lawsuit should be dismissed because the FCC had primary jurisdiction; and in bo th cases, the answer was yes. Allnet , sup ra , at 1120–1123; Southwestern Bell , su pra , at 304–306. The Court’s reli

ance on th ese cases i s thus entirely misplaced because both courts found they l a cked jurisdiction; the cases do not address §201 at all—th e interpreta tion of which is the sole question inthis case; and bothcases ass u me withou t deciding that §207 ap plies, thus not grappling with th e point for w h ich the majority claim s their support. 2 III Finally, independent of the FCC’s interpretati on of the

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2 Th e major i ty ’s c i tationto Chicago & No rth W est er n T r ansp. Co

. v. Atchi son , T. & S. F. R. Co. , 609 F. 2d 1 221 ( CA7 19 7 9 ), is s i mil a r l y mispl a c e d. Th er e, th e Cou r t of Appeals i n ter p r e ted th e mean in gof th e statutory requirement to “ ‘estab lish ju s t , r e ason ab le, an d equ i tabl e div i sion s’ ” u n d erth e In tersta te Com m er c eAc t. Id., at 1 224. It i s difficult to understand why the Se venth Circuit’s interpretation of different statu tory langua ge is relevantto the question we face in thi s ca s e .7 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007)
T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g language “unjust or u n reasonabl e” “practice,” the FCC’s interpretati on is unreasonable b e cause it regulates both interstate and int r astate ca lls. The unjust-a n d

unreasonab le requirement of §201(b) applies only to “prac

tices .

. . in connection with such communication service,” and the term “such communicati on service” refers to “ in

ters ta teor foreign communication by wire or radio” in §201(a) (emphasis added). Disregarding this limitation, the FCC ha s applied its rule to both interstat e and intra

state calls. 47 CFR §6 4.1300 (200 5). Inlightof the fact that the statute explicitly limits “unjust or unreasonabl e” “prac t ices” to those involvin g “interstate or foreign com

munication,” the FCC’s application of §201(b) t o intrastate calls is pl ainly an u n reasonabl e interpretation of t h e statute. To make matters worse , the FCC has not even bothered toexplain its clear mis i nterpretation. Se e Inre Pay Tel e ph one Reclassification an d Compensation Provi

sions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd. 19975 (2003). The majority avoids directly addr essing this argumen t by stating there is no reason “to forbid the FCC from concluding that an i n terstate half loaf is better than none.” Ante , at 13. But if the FCC’s rule is unreasonab le, Metrophones should not be abl e to recover for intrastate calls in a suit under §2 07. Becaus e intrastate calls cannot be the subject of an “unjust or unreasonab le” practice under §201, there is n o private right of action to recover for them, a n d the Cour t should cutoff that hal f of the loaf. By sidestep ping this issue, the majority gi ves the lower court no gu idance about how to ha ndle intrastate calls on remand. IV Because the majority allows the FCC to interpret the Communications Act ina way that contradicts the unam

biguous text, I respectfully dissent.