[Cite as Capital One Bank, N.A. v. Coleman, 2019-Ohio-3700.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. Court of Appeals No. L-18-1173 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CVF-17-16020 

v. 

Desiree L. Coleman DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: September 13, 2019 

* * * * * 

 Jackson T. Moyer and Thomas R. Myers, for appellee. 

 Desiree L. Coleman, pro se. 

* * * * * 

PIETRYKOWSKI, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Desiree Coleman, appeals the judgment of the Toledo Municipal 

Court, which awarded $2,435.93 to appellee, Capital One Bank, for appellant’s failure to 

pay her credit card bill. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. 

 
2.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On October 11, 2017, appellee filed a complaint in the Toledo Municipal 

Court alleging that appellant had failed in her obligation to pay the balance of $2,435.93 

owed on her credit card account. Attached to the complaint was a copy of appellant’s 

credit card statement from the July 2016 billing cycle, indicating that the $2,435.93 

balance at that time was past due. 

{¶ 3} Service was attempted by certified mail to appellant’s address listed on the 

credit card statement, which was on West Village Dr. The certified mail was returned 

with a label stating “Unclaimed. Unable to Forward.” However, a handwritten notation 

on the return receipt provided a different delivery address located on Wenz Rd. 

{¶ 4} Thereafter, appellee again attempted service by certified mail to the West 

Village Dr. address. As before, the certified mail was returned with a label stating 

“Unclaimed. Unable to Forward.” This time, affixed to the return receipt was a label 

notifying the sender of a new address, and providing appellant’s address on Wenz Rd. 

{¶ 5} Appellee then directed the clerk to serve appellant by ordinary mail at the 

West Village Dr. address. That mail was not returned. 

{¶ 6} On June 11, 2018, appellee moved for default judgment. The trial court 

granted appellee’s motion on June 28, 2018, and awarded judgment to appellee in the 

amount of $2,435.93. 

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 7} Appellant has appealed the trial court’s June 28, 2018 judgment, and now 

assigns four errors for our review: 
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1. Trial court erred when it ruled it had jurisdiction to rule against 

appellant. 

2. Trial court erred when it granted default judgment in favor of the 

appellee despite the fact that the appellant was never notified of the claim. 

3. Trial court erred when it granted default judgment in favor of 

appellee despite the fact that there was no proof of consideration. 

4. Trial court erred when it granted default judgment in favor of 

appellee despite the fact that there was never any agreement submitted. 

III. Analysis 

{¶ 8} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 1925.02(A)(2)(a)(ii), which provides, in 

relevant part, that “A small claims division does not have jurisdiction in * * * (ii) Actions 

on any claim brought by an assignee or agent.” However, the docket does not reflect that 

the action was filed in the small claims division. Thus, R.C. 1925.02(A)(2)(a)(ii) is 

inapplicable. Midland Funding LLC v. Coleman, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1095, 2019-

Ohio-432, ¶ 11. Furthermore, R.C. 1925.02(A)(2)(a)(ii) does not apply because appellee 

is the original lender, not an assignee. 

{¶ 9} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit, and is not 

well-taken. 

{¶ 10} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred 

in granting default judgment because she never received notice of the complaint. 

 
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Appellee counters that it properly followed the civil rules regarding service, and that 

appellant has not filed an affidavit or provided any evidence to rebut the presumption of 

proper service. 

{¶ 11} “Service of process is required to notify any interested parties of the 

pendency of an action and to afford them an opportunity to respond.” Griffin v. Braswell, 

187 Ohio App.3d 281, 2010-Ohio-1597, 931 N.E.2d 1131, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.). “It is the 

plaintiff’s duty to accomplish proper service on a defendant.” Id. “If a plaintiff follows 

the civil rules in a given case, it is presumed that ‘service was proper unless the defendant 

rebuts the presumption with sufficient evidence of nonservice.’” Id., quoting Calvary 

Invests., L.L.C. v. Clevenger, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1103, 2005-Ohio-7003, ¶ 10. 

“When service of process is not properly made pursuant to Civ.R. 4 et seq., a trial court 

lacks the jurisdiction to consider the complaint, and its judgment with regard to that 

complaint is void ab initio.” Id.

{¶ 12} “Due process requires that service of process be accomplished in a manner 

‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 

pendency of the action’ and to give them an opportunity to appear.” United Home Fed. v. 

Rhonehouse, 76 Ohio App.3d 115, 123, 601 N.E.2d 138 (6th Dist.1991), quoting Samson 

Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 66 Ohio St.2d 290, 293, 421 N.E.2d 522 (1981). “Service 

need not be made to the party’s actual address so long as it is made to an address where 

there is a reasonable expectation that service will be delivered to the party. Id. at 124, 

citing Grant v. Ivy, 69 Ohio App.2d 40, 42, 429 N.E.2d 1188 (10th Dist.1980). Based 
5.

upon the facts of this case, we hold that ordinary mail service to the West Village Dr. 

address was not reasonably calculated to apprise appellant of the pendency of the action. 

{¶ 13} In Grant v. Ivy, the Tenth District explained: 

While ordinary mail service following unsuccessful certified mail 

service is sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court pursuant to Civ.R. 

4.6(D) where the ordinary mail envelope is not returned indicating failure 

of delivery, there is an exception to this general rule. In other words, there 

is a presumption of proper service under such circumstances, but such 

presumption is rebuttable by sufficient evidence. To be valid service, the 

ordinary mail service following an unsuccessful attempt at certified mail 

service must have been sent to the address of the defendant or at least an 

address where there is a reasonable expectation that it will be delivered to 

the defendant. Although Civ.R. 4.1. and 4.6 require the clerk to send the 

ordinary or certified mail envelope addressed to the defendant at the 

address set forth in the caption of the complaint or set forth by special 

instructions given in writing to the clerk, plaintiff must use, in such caption 

or instructions, an address for defendant at which it could reasonably be 

expected [she] would receive mail addressed to [her]. 

Grant at 42-43. 

{¶ 14} Here, while the initial attempt at service by certified mail was unsuccessful, 

it was nonetheless reasonable to expect that appellant would receive the mail as it was 

sent to her address listed on her credit card statement. However, once the certified mail 
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was returned with the post office providing a different address for appellant, and certainly 

after the second certified mail attempt when the post office attached a label notifying the 

sender of appellant’s new address, it was unreasonable to expect that ordinary mail sent 

to the former address would be received by appellant. Therefore, we hold that appellant 

was not properly served with the complaint, and thus the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

enter a default judgment against her. 

{¶ 15} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is well-taken. 

{¶ 16} As a result of our holding above, appellant’s third and fourth assignments 

of error, which challenge the merits of the judgment against her, are not well-taken as 

moot. 

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we find that substantial justice has not been done 

the party complaining, and the judgment of the Toledo Municipal Court is reversed and 

vacated. Appellee is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment reversed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

_______________________________ 

Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 
7.

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.