Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 30A01-1407-DR-311 | February 11, 2015 Page 1 of 11

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Nicole A. Zelin

Pritzke & Davis, LLP.

Greenfield, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. Cooley

Dawn E. Wellman

Allen Wellman McNew Harvey, LLP

Greenfield, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Marriage of:

Michael O. Hall

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Susan M. Hall,

Appellee-Petitioner

February 11, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

30A01-1407-DR-311

Appeal from the Hancock Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Richard D. Culver, 

Judge

Case No. 30C01-1311-DR-1994

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Michael O. Hall (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s division of property upon 

the dissolution of his marriage to Susan M. Hall (“Wife”). Specifically, 

Husband challenges the trial court’s conclusion that a written agreement 

between the parties providing for certain property rights in the event of the 
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dissolution of the marriage constitutes a valid and enforceable reconciliation 

agreement. Finding no clear error, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment indicates that Husband and 

Wife married on March 2, 2004. Approximately eight months later, Husband 

became incarcerated. In December 2004, Wife sought the advice of counsel to 

pursue the dissolution of the marriage. Wife informed Husband that she 

intended to dissolve the marriage due to his untruthfulness regarding his 

finances and criminal history, and also because of the parties’ separation. 

Husband did not want the marriage to be dissolved. Wife was adamant about 

dissolving the marriage and conveyed this to Husband. Husband told Wife that 

he would do anything to make her more comfortable with him. It was 

Husband’s idea that the parties could make an agreement that would give Wife 

financial protection in the event of a future divorce. Wife agreed to no longer 

pursue a dissolution of marriage in exchange for such an agreement.

[3] Wife asked her counsel to draft the type of agreement that Husband and Wife 

had discussed. When counsel was unresponsive for several months, Wife 

decided that she would need to draft the agreement herself. Before doing so, 

however, Wife had numerous discussions with Husband about each party’s

assets and the type of information that would be included in the agreement. 

Thereafter, Wife drafted a document titled “Postnuptial Agreement” (“the 

Agreement”), dated April 3, 2005, wherein the parties agreed to a distribution 

of real and personal property in the event of dissolution. The Agreement 
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provided that the parties “agree to keep separate any properties or assets that 

either party brought to the marriage or incur during the marriage in separate 

name and/or separate business or farm names.” Appellant’s App. at 37. The 

Agreement stated that “[b]oth parties agree to keep properties and assets 

separate and lay no claim to the other[’]s property or assets in the event of 

divorce or separation or legal action against the individuals....” Id. Further, 

“[b]oth parties agree to be jointly responsible for those properties and assets 

acquired under joint names of ownership from this time forward.” Id. The 

Agreement provided an itemized list of the assets held by each party on the date 

of the Agreement.

[4] Wife mailed the Agreement to Husband for his review and signature. Husband 

reviewed the Agreement and signed it before a notary public in the Department 

of Correction on April 6, 2005. After signing the Agreement, Husband mailed 

it back to Wife. Wife signed the Agreement after receiving it from Husband. 

After the Agreement was executed, Wife no longer pursued the dissolution of 

the parties’ marriage.

[5] While Husband remained incarcerated, Wife assisted him with his financial 

affairs, retained his personal belongings at her residence, and continued to visit 

him in the Department of Correction. Husband was released from 

incarceration in June 2006 and returned to live with Wife. The parties resided 

together as a married couple from the date of Husband’s release until they

separated on October 23, 2013. Throughout that time, the parties abided by the 

terms of the Agreement by keeping their respective real and personal property
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separate and treating any properties placed in both parties’ names as a joint 

responsibility and obligation. 

[6] Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on November 5, 2013. The 

parties participated in mediation until February 2014, when Wife filed a motion 

to enforce the Agreement. Id. at 9. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial 

court entered its findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and judgment 

determining that the Agreement was a valid and enforceable reconciliation

agreement “made in contemplation of and in exchange for reconciling the 

parties’ marriage.” Id. at 49. Specifically, the trial court concluded in relevant 

part,

28. The facts establish that the parties herein were sufficiently 

separated and [Wife] was sufficiently furthering her rights to terminate 

the marriage, such that the extension of marriage as a result of the

execution of the reconciliation agreement is sufficient and adequate 

consideration to make the agreement binding.

29. Sufficient mutual intent exists and is evidenced by the parties 

operating their respective businesses and real and personal property 

interests in accordance with the terms of the reconciliation agreement

for numerous years following the document[’]s execution.

30. In furtherance of public policy of this State, the amicable 

settlement by written agreement of the property rights of those citizens 

whose marriage is being dissolved should be strictly enforced to the full 

extent of the agreement; therefore, the [Agreement] in this case should 

be strictly enforced and neither party shall claim a right or interest in 

the other parties[sic] assets which are titled or deeded in his or her 

name, solely.

Id. at 48-49 (internal citation omitted).
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[7] Husband filed a motion to certify the order for interlocutory appeal, which was 

denied by the trial court. A final dissolution hearing was held on June 16, 

2014, and a decree of dissolution was entered on June 24, 2014. Among other 

things, the dissolution decree provided for the division of property in 

accordance with the Agreement. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Husband asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that the Agreement is a 

valid and enforceable reconciliation agreement. In making its decision, the trial 

court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial 

Rule 52(A). Our two-tiered standard of review is well settled:

[F]irst we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and 

second, whether the findings support the judgment. In deference to 

the trial court’s proximity to the issues, we disturb the judgment only 

where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail 

to support the judgment. We do not reweigh the evidence, but 

consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment. 

Those appealing the trial court’s judgment must establish that the 

findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly erroneous when a 

review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been 

made. We do not defer to conclusions of law, however, and evaluate 

them de novo.

Mysliwy v. Mysliwy, 953 N.E.2d 1072, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citations 

omitted), trans. denied.

[9] Other panels of this Court have recognized that “public policy favors the 

amicable settlement by written agreement of the property rights of citizens 

whose marriage is being dissolved.” Gaskell v. Gaskell, 900 N.E.2d 13, 17 (Ind. 
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Ct. App. 2009) (citing Flansburg v. Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1991), trans. denied (1992)). It has long been held that antenuptial 

agreements are valid and binding “so long as they are entered into freely and 

without fraud, duress, or misrepresentation and are not, under the particular 

circumstances of the case, unconscionable[,]” In re Marriage of Boren, 475 

N.E.2d 690, 693 (Ind. 1985), and we have concluded that the same should 

apply to reconciliation agreements made between parties in order to preserve 

the marriage. Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d at 436. As Husband challenges the 

validity of the Agreement here on several grounds, we will address each 

challenge in turn.

Section 1 – The Agreement was supported by adequate 

consideration.

[10] Husband first argues that the Agreement is not a valid reconciliation agreement

because it lacked adequate consideration. We have stated that “the extension 

of a marriage that would have otherwise been dissolved but for the execution of 

an agreement to reconcile has been deemed adequate consideration” to support 

a reconciliation agreement. Id. at 434.

[11] Both Husband and Wife testified that, although Wife had sought counsel and 

was adamant about pursuing the dissolution of the parties’ marriage, she 

decided not to pursue the dissolution only after and because the parties

executed the Agreement. Indeed, the evidence indicates that the Agreement 

was originally Husband’s idea and that both parties fully intended and accepted 

that the purpose of the Agreement was to preserve a marriage that otherwise 
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would be dissolved. The parties remained married for an additional eight years 

after execution of the Agreement and abided by the terms of the Agreement 

during that time. This evidence supports the trial court’s findings and 

conclusion that the Agreement constituted a reconciliation agreement 

supported by adequate consideration. 

[12] Husband maintains that “[a]t no time did the parties, in any legal sense, 

separate or move to dissolve the marriage,” and therefore the record does not 

support a conclusion that the marriage would have been dissolved but for the 

Agreement. Appellant’s Br. at 8. Husband points to language used by this 

Court in our prior opinions and argues that a valid reconciliation agreement 

may only be made between parties who have legally “separated or filed for 

dissolution.” See Gaskell, 900 N.E.2d at 17 (quoting Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d at 

436). Husband claims that Wife’s mere contemplation of dissolving the 

marriage was not sufficient. 

[13] We acknowledge the language used in Gaskell and Flansburg and recognize that, 

most often, the initiation of dissolution proceedings will in fact precede the 

execution of a reconciliation agreement as it did in those cases. Nevertheless, 

we disagree with Husband that such is a condition precedent to a valid and 

enforceable reconciliation agreement. The proper inquiry is whether the 

agreement was executed in order to preserve and extend a marriage that 

otherwise would have been dissolved but for the execution of the agreement, see 

Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d at 434, regardless of whether formal separation has 

already occurred or legal proceedings initiated. Based upon the evidence 
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referenced above, the trial court concluded that “the parties herein were 

sufficiently separated” and Wife was “sufficiently furthering her rights to 

terminate the marriage, such that the extension of marriage as a result of the 

execution of the [Agreement] is sufficient and adequate consideration to make 

the agreement binding.” Appellant’s App. at 49. This conclusion is supported 

by the trial court’s findings of fact and, under the circumstances presented,

Husband has not convinced us that a mistake has been made.

Section 2 – Husband was not under duress when he signed the 

Agreement.

[14] Husband next asserts that the Agreement is unenforceable because he signed 

the document under duress. On this issue, the trial court specifically found that 

“[n]either party was under duress or undue influence prior to or during the 

signing” of the Agreement. Id. at 47. Husband maintains that he was under 

duress because he was incarcerated, without access to legal counsel, and 

because Wife threatened to divorce him if he did not sign the Agreement.

[15] “‘In order to avoid a contract on the basis of duress, there must be an actual or 

threatened violence [or] restraint of a man’s person contrary to law, to compel 

him to enter into a contract or discharge one.’” Youngblood v. Jefferson Cnty. Div.

of Family & Children, 838 N.E.2d 1164, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting 

Carrasco v. Grubb, 824 N.E.2d 705, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied), trans. 

denied (2006). “In deciding whether a person signed a document under duress, 

‘the ultimate fact to be determined is whether or not the purported victim was 

deprived of the free exercise of his own will.’” Id. (quoting Raymundo v. 
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Hammond Clinic Ass’n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 283 (Ind. 1983)). There is no evidence 

in the record that Husband was deprived of the free exercise of his own will 

regarding the execution of the Agreement. Husband’s reliance on the mere fact 

of his incarceration as clear evidence of duress is unpersuasive. Husband’s 

further argument that he was under duress because Wife was threatening to 

divorce him if he did not sign the Agreement is similarly unpersuasive and begs 

the question of the entire purpose of any reconciliation agreement. The trial 

court’s finding on this issue is not clearly erroneous.

Section 3 – A meeting of the minds occurred.

[16] Husband maintains that the Agreement is unenforceable because, although 

both parties signed the document, Wife’s signature was neither notarized nor 

dated, and therefore there is insufficient evidence that a “meeting of the minds” 

occurred. “A meeting of the minds of the contracting parties, having the same 

intent, is essential to the formation of a contract.” Zimmerman v. McColley, 826 

N.E.2d 71, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The intent of the parties to a contract is a 

factual matter to be determined from all the circumstances. Id. Husband 

directs us to no authority, because there is none, that a notarized and dated 

signature is required to effectuate a meeting of the minds of the contracting 

parties. Significantly, the trial court made numerous findings of fact regarding 

the authenticity of the parties’ signatures and their mutual intent in contracting,

and Husband makes no argument that any of those findings are unsupported by 

the evidence. Husband essentially requests us to reweigh the evidence in his 

favor, which we may not do. We find no error.
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Section 4 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

admitted parole evidence.

[17] Finally, Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion when, 

during the hearing on Wife’s motion to enforce the Agreement, it admitted

parole evidence regarding Wife’s “intent behind the creation of the 

[Agreement].” Appellant’s Br. at 10. We disagree. 

[18] We review the admission or exclusion of evidence only for an abuse of 

discretion. Reed v. Bethel, 2 N.E.3d 98, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). It is well 

settled that parole evidence “may be considered if it is not being offered to vary 

the terms of the written contract[.]” Goodrich Quality Theaters, Inc. v. Fostcorp 

Heating & Cooling, Inc., 16 N.E.3d 426, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation 

omitted). Among other reasons, parole evidence may be considered to “show 

the nature of the consideration supporting a contract” and “to shed light upon 

the circumstances under which the parties entered into the written contract.” 

Id. Our review of the record reveals that these are precisely the reasons that the 

trial court admitted Wife’s testimony and her testimony was in no way offered 

to vary the terms of the Agreement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in admitting Wife’s testimony.

Conclusion

[19] In sum, the trial court’s conclusion that the Agreement is a valid and 

enforceable reconciliation agreement is not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the 
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trial court did not err in distributing the marital estate in accordance with the 

Agreement. As our supreme court has eloquently observed,

The truth is, it is exceedingly difficult to imagine why, in any case 

where there is no fraud, courts should displace the judgment of 

contracting parties and substitute their own. No persons in the world 

can so well and so justly judge as the contracting parties themselves, 

and it is only in the strongest and clearest cases that courts should 

disregard their judgment, and never where there is neither positive 

wrong nor fraud.

Boren, 475 N.E.2d at 694. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

[20] Affirmed.

Friedlander, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.