1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SHRAVAN KUMAR KONDAPALLY, Plaintiff,

v. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES , et al. , Defendants. Civil Action No. 20-920 (BAH) Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Shravan Kumar Kondapally seeks review of a decision by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCI S”) revoking, some thirteen y ears after its approval, the petition granting him an immigrant work visa, due to deficiencies in the petition found long after the fact. According to plainti ff, USCIS lacked authority to take this action because a “job portability” provision of the rele vant statute, combined with a change in employer in the intervening span of years, served to immuni ze the petition from disc retionary revocation by USCIS. Before the Court now are cross-moti ons for summary judgmen t on the two remaining live claims in this case. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 21; Defs.’ Cross-Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 24. Upon consideration of the part ies’ briefing, plai ntiff’s motion is DENIED, and defendants’ motion is GRANTED for the reasons set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) cr eates a three-step process for noncitizens to obtain permanent employment in the United St ates in certain prof essional or skilled occupations. First, the employer applies for a labor certification from the U.S. Department of2 Labor confirming that “there ar e not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and available at the time of applica tion for a visa and admission to th e United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or uns killed labor,” and “the em ployment of such alien will not adversely affect the wa ges and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i)(I), (II). Second, once the Department of Labor grants certification, the employer submits the certification with an Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140) to USCIS on beha lf of the noncitizen worker, known as the “beneficiary” of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a), ( l)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(C). Along with its I-140 petition, the employer mu st submit additional documentation, including “letters from trainers or empl oyers” demonstrating that the be neficiary has satisfied “[a]ny requirements of training or experience” or other requirements set forth in the labor certification, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5( l )(3)(ii)(A), and “evidence that the prospe ctive . . . employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage . . . until the benefi ciary obtains lawful permanent residence,” id. § 204.5(g)(2). Even if USCIS approves the I- 140 petition, however, “[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him und er [8 U.S.C. § 1154].” 8 U.S.C. § 1155. Section 1154, in turn, directs the Attorney Ge neral to approve certain immigration petitions, including Form I-140 petitions, “if he determines that the facts stat ed in the petition are true and that the alien . . . is eligible fo r [employment-based] preference.” Id. § 1154(b). Thus, I-140 petitions approved by USCIS and the AttorneyGeneral may nonetheless be revoked under §
1155. Upon USCIS’s approval of the I-140 petiti on, the beneficiary ma y apply for lawful permanent resident status by s ubmitting an Application to Regi ster Permanent Residence or3 Adjust Status (Form I-485). See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(3)(ii). USCIS cannot approve the I-485 application unless th e underlying I-140 petition is approved. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (noting that a status adju stment may only be granted if “t he alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa”). Under USCIS regulations, a noncitizen worker seeking to become a lawful permanent resident must have a valid offer of employment when th e I-485 is filed and adjudicated. 8 C.F.R. § 245.25(a). To ensure “job flexibility for long delayed applicants for adjustment of status to permanent residence,” in 2000, Congress added to the INA a portabilityprovision. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-313, § 106(c), 114 Stat. 1251, 1254 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j) ). Under the portability provision, if a beneficiary’s I-485 application ha s been pending for 180 days or l onger, the beneficiary’s related I-140 petition “shall remain valid with respect to a new job if the indivi dual changes jobs or employers if the new job is in the same or a similar occupational classi fication as the job for which the [I-140] petition was filed.” 8 U. S.C. § 1154(j). A noncit izen worker filing a standalone employment-based I-485 applicati on with a pending or approved I-140 may be required to establish that the original offer of employment detailed in th e I-140 is continuing or to confirm the existence of a ne w bona fide job offer under the portability provision. 8 C.F.R. § 245.25(a). This information is provided on Form I-485 Supple ment J (“Supplement J”). Id. During the pendency of the I-485 applicati on, USCIS regulations allow the noncitizen worker to file an Application for Employm ent Authorization (For m I-765). 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9). The approval of an I-765 applic ation is committed to “the discretion of USCIS,” id. § 274a.13(a)(1), though the process is me ntioned nowhere in the INA. “[N]o appeal” is available to challenge th e denial of an I-765 application. Id. § 274a.13(c). If the4 application is granted, the noncit izen worker is issued a Form I-766 employment authorization document (“EAD”), which is valid for a “specific period” of time, id. § 274a.13(b), and ordinarily terminates at the end of that period, id. § 274a.14(a)(1)(i). If the noncitizen worker submits an application to renew the EAD before its expiration, the validity period of the initial authorization is automati cally extended for 180 days or until the renewal application is denied, whichever is earlier. See id. § 274a.13(d)(1), (3). USCIS ma y also revoke an EAD before its expiration date if the I-485 applicati on on which it is based is denied. See id. § 274a.14(b)(1)(i).
B. Factual Background Plaintiff has resided in the United States since 1988, when he immigrated from India on a student visa. Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”), Ex. A, Aff. of Shravan Kumar Kondapally (“Kondapally Aff. ”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 21-2. 1 Since 1988, he has made two attempts to secure legal permanent resident status. First, in 2000, plaintif f’s then-employer, Baan USA Inc. (“Baan”), sponsored plaintiff for a Form I-140 petition and employ ment-based permanent residenc y. The Department of Labor granted a labor certification, see Admin. Record (“AR”) at 1115–21, ECF No. 29-29, and USCIS approved the I-140 petition in September 2000, see id. at 1111, ECF No. 29-28. 2 Plaintiff subsequently filed, in May 2001, a Form I- 485 application for pe rmanent residency, see id. at 1026, ECF No. 29-26, but Baan laid him off about a month later, see id. at 201–03, ECF No. 29- 10, and withdrew the I-140, see id. at 988, ECF No. 29-25; id. at 1106, ECF No. 29-27. In

1 Although the Court has reviewed each exhibit and submission from th e parties in support of and in opposition to the pending motions, only those exhibits n ecessary to provide context fo r resolution of the pending motions are cited herein.

2 In compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(n)(1), defe ndants submitted a certified list of the contents of the administrative record, see Certified List of Contents of Admin. Reco rd, ECF No. 20, and the parties separately docketed the portions of the administrative record cite d or otherwise relied upon in the parties’ briefing, see Notice of Filing App’x to Admin. Record, ECF No. 29.5 January 2005, USCIS denied pl aintiff’s I-485 application. Id. at 990, ECF No. 29-25. Nearly thirteen years after Baan w ithdrew its I-140 petition, in April 2014, the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office affirmed the deni al of plaintiff’s I-485 applicat ion because it had been pending for less than 180 days when the I-140 petition was withdrawn. Id. at 987–91; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j).
1. I-140 Approval During the intervening decade, while his Baan–sponsored application languished, plaintiff made a second attempt to become a legal permanent resident. In 2006, plaintiff’s new employer, Arwano Inc. (“Arwano”), filed a Fo rm I-140 on his behalf, AR at 766, ECF No. 29- 21, which USCIS approved in September 2006, id. at 80, ECF No. 29-4. The I-140 indicated that plaintiff was “[a] professional (at a min imum, possessing a bachelor’s degree or a foreign degree equivalent to a U.S. bachel or’s degree) or a skilled worker (requiring at least two years of specialized training or experience).” Id. at 766, ECF No. 29-21. In support of its petition, Arwano informed USCIS that plaintiff was to be employed “as a Software Consultant,” id. at 788, a role “requiring the skills of a professional with any comb ination of programs/education from any institutions determined equivalent to a U.S. Bachelor’s Degree in Computer Science, Engineering (any), Math or rela ted and 24 months of experience in the job offered or as a Computer Software Professional,” id. at 789. Arwano was willing to “accept any suitable combination of education, training or experience,” and noted that the De partment of Labor had “classified this job opportunity . . . as ‘professional.’” Id. The company contended that plaintiff had satisfied the requirement for education “equivalent” to a B.S. in comput er science through his acquisition of a Master of Science degree from Jackson State University, id. at 777; see also id. at 795–800, and, though he lacked the6 requisite 24 months of experien ce, “possess[ed] [an] alternate combinati on of education and experience” as well as sufficient “expe rience in an alternate occupation,” id. at 777. The petition indicated that plaintiff had worked for Arwano as a Software Consultant since September 2005, id. , and was previously employed by several firms as a Computer Software Professional over several periods dating back to April 1996, id. at 777–79, 782–84, including employment with Baan from January 1999 to June 2003, id. at 782, in addition to earlier work experience, see id. at 782–83. As evidence of this experience, Arwano submitted a letter from SSA Global, a company that had “acquired” Baan in July 2003. Id. at 806. The letter stat ed that plaintiff “was a full time permanent employee at Baan. . . from 01/01/1999 to 06/08/2001” and listed his job title as “Technical Consultant.” Id. To comply with the regulato ry requirement that a petition “be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage,” 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the appli cation also included a 2005 federal income tax return for Arwano a nd plaintiff’s pay stubs, see AR at 807–16, ECF No. 29-21. USCIS approved the I-140 petition on September 14, 2006, see id. at 560, ECF No. 29- 17, without requesting any additi onal evidence from plaintiff or Arwano before issuing its decision. The approval notice indi cated that it was issued pu rsuant to either 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i) (“Skilled Worker”) or 8 U. S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii) (“Professional”). See AR at 560, ECF No. 29-17.
2. I-485 Application In August 2007, plaintiff filed a second I-485 application to become a lawful permanent resident. Id. at 498–502, ECF No. 29-14. This applicati on remained pending until its denial by USCIS in March 2020. See id. at 263–64, ECF No. 29-11. Meanwhile, when USCIS affirmed7 its denial of plaintiff’s first I-485 application in 2014, the agency “noted,” without any apparent objection, the 2006 approval of the Arwano I-140. Id. at 989 n.1, ECF No. 29-25. Plaintiff remained with Arwano until A ugust 2016, when he began employment with Verizon Network Business Services (“Verizon” ). AR at 590–91, ECF No. 29-18. He did not advise USCIS of his change in employment or fo rmally request job portability at that time. See Pl.’s Mem. at 19, ECF No. 21-1.
3. I-140 Revocation About three years after plai ntiff became employed by Veri zon, USCIS issued, on July 1, 2019, a Notice of Intent to Revoke the Arwano I-140 petition. AR at 633–41, ECF No. 29-20. In this notice, USCIS stated four grounds for revo cation. First, the agencydetermined that the Software Consultant position held by plaintiff at Arwano did not qua lify as “professional,” which classification requires “evidence showing that the minimum of a baccalaureate degree is required for entry into the occupation,” 8 C.F.R. § 204.5( l)(3)(ii)(C). Arwano’s representation that it would accept any combination of programs and edu cation equivalent to a Bachelor of Science degree, in USCIS’s view, “allo w[ed] for education less than a United States baccalaureate degree” and the position was therefore “not professional.” AR at 635. Second, USCIS noted that Arwano had submi tted only one letter, from SSA Global, showing plaintiff’s experience and thus “the letter from [SSA Global] form[ed] the basis of [plaintiff’s] eligibility.” Id. at 637. USCIS determined, how ever, that “other documents submitted by [plaintiff] call[ed] into question the reliability and credibility of the letter.” Id. Inconsistencies led USCIS to conclude that th e I-140 petition was not supported by “credible evidence” allowing USCIS to “determin[e] whether [plaintiff] possessed the experience listed on8 the labor certification.” Id. at 638. As a result, the petition “did not establish that [plaintiff] met the minimum requirements” to be “consid ered ‘qualified’ for the position.” Id. Relatedly, USCIS concluded that “it appear [ed] that [plaintiff] misrepresented his experience” when completing the required forms. Id. at 639. In this regard, the agency noted that plaintiff had signed a secti on of the labor certif ication form declari ng “under penalty of perjury” that the characterization of his work experience was “true and correct,” id. at 640, yet stated, in tension with his later representations and USCIS records, that he worked for Baan until June 2003, not June 2001. Id. USCIS viewed this inconsistency as a willful “false representation” by plaintiff. Id. Since the only letter of experi ence supporting the I-140 petition was related to plaintiff’s Baan employment, the misrepresentation was “material to whether [plaintiff] m[et] the requ ired experience on the labor certification” and thus to whether the I-140 petition should have been approved. Id. Accordingly, USCIS “intend[ed] to enter a finding of willful misrepresentation of a material fact” and to “invalidat e the labor certification.” Id. Finally, USCIS determined that Arwano “did not establish that it ha[d] the ability to pay the proffered wage,” as required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), because the 2005 federal income tax return it submitted with the I- 140 petition did not demonstrate Arwano’s “ability to pay as of” the petition’s filing in June 2006. AR at 639, EC F No. 29-20. Arwano was therefore required to submit “annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements,” 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), for the 2006 fiscal year, AR at 639. Arwano was given thirty days to submit (1) “evidence” that plaintiff’s position with Ar wano “require[d] at least a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent de gree”; (2) “independent objective evidence to reconcile the inconsistencies” in plaintiff’ s dates of employment and job titles and to demonstrate that he had “24 m onths of experience a[s] a Computer Software Professional”;9 (3) “a full and complete copy of its 2006 annual report, federal ta x return, or audited financial statement”; and (4) “preexisti ng and object[ive] documentary ev idence to overcome [plaintiff’s] willful misrepresentation of a material fact.” Id. at 641. A few weeks after the notice of intent to revoke was i ssued, in July 2019, Arwano responded, see id. at 642–754, even though by this time plai ntiff had left the company. The response explained that the I-140 petition had ch aracterized plaintiff’s position as a skilled worker, rather than professiona l, obviating the need for a bacc alaureate degree or equivalent, id. at 646–47, and that, in any event, plaintiff had an advanced degree in computer science and “experience as a computer software pr ofessional in excess of two years,” id. at 647. As to the alleged misrepresentation of plaintiff’s Baan employment, Arwano stated that the inconsistencies were “due to the various acceptable options to define entities when there is a successor-ininterest transaction, and simp le typographical errors.” Id. at 648. As to its ability to pay the proffered wage, Arwano submitted its 2006 federal tax return, showing net income in excess of plaintiff’s salary. Id. at 651, 748–52. Soon after, on August 8, 2019, plaintiff filed Supplement J, requesting portability of hi s I-485 application to his new jo b with Verizon, under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j) and 8 C.F.R. § 245.25, which USCIS denied. Id. at 588–95, ECF No. 29-18. During the pendency of his I-485 application, plaintiff periodically applied for and received employment authorizations through I-765 petitions. With his most recent employment authorization scheduled to expi re, plaintiff filed a new Form I-765 on November 7, 2019 seeking to renew his employment authorization, Pl.’s Me m., Ex. C, Declaration of James McLaughlin III, ECF No. 21-4, which triggered an automatic exte nsion of his employment authorization until the earlier of September 1, 2020 or the denial of his renewal application, see 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d)(1), (3).10 Several days later, on November 12, 2019, USCI S revoked its prior approval of the I-140 submitted by Arwano in 2006. AR at 600–31, ECF No. 29-19. The Notice of Revocation cited the same reasons for revocation given in the No tice of Intent to Revoke , and found the additional evidence submitted by Arwano insuffi cient to show that plaintiff had been hired as a skilled worker rather than a professional, see id. at 624–26, to reconcile the alleged inconsistencies in plaintiff’s documentation, see id. at 626–29, and to show Arwano’s ability to pay, see id. at 629– 30. As a result, USCIS found that the I-140 had not in fact qualified for approval when it was filed with the agency in 2006. Id. at 601. Plaintiff filed an ad ministrative motion to reopen and reconsider the revocation of the petition on December 11, 2019, id. at 353–489, ECF No. 29-13, which was denied on April 17, 2020, id. at 335–48, ECF No. 29-12. Plaintiff then filed an administrative appeal of the revocation on April 29, 2020, id. at 44–74, ECF No. 29-3, which is still pending.
4. I-485 Denial On March 10, 2020, in light of the I-140 re vocation, USCIS denied plaintiff’s I-485 application and Supplement J on th e grounds that without a valid I-140 visa petition, plaintiff was no longer eligible for adjustment of status. Id. at 263-64, ECF No. 29-11; id. at 584–87, ECF No. 29-18. Plaintiff filed anadministrativ e motion to reopen or reconsider the denial of the I-485 petition on April 8, 2020, id. at 255–73, which was denied on August 19, 2020, id. at 253–
54.
5. I-765 Denial Soon after the denial of his I-485 application, in March 2020, plaintiff “re quest[ed] the adjudication of his . . . I-765 [a]pplication pursuantto . . . 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c),” Pl.’s Mem. at 21, which regulation allows USCIS “in its discreti on” to “establish a speci fic validity period for11 an employment authorization document, which may include any period wh en an administrative appeal or judicial review of an application or petition is pending,” 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c). In plaintiff’s view, his pending moti on to reopen and reconsider the revocation of the I-140 petition should have qualified his I-765 application for treatment under this regulation. On April 28, 2020, USCIS denied plaintiff’s I-765 applicatio n filed November 7, 2019 because he no longer had a pending I-485 petition, a prerequisite for work authorization. AR at 1233, ECF No. 29-30. Plaintiff refiled his Form I-765 on May 8, 2020, noting ongoing administr ative and judicial review. AR at 3–4, 10–16, ECF No. 29-2. On May 27, 2020, USCIS reopened plaintiff’s I-485 application and Supplement J, id. at 240, ECF No. 29-10, but only weeks later, on June 11, 2020, issued a notice of intent to deny, see id. at 240–42, and issued a fi nal denial on August 19, 2020, see id. at 253–54. On that same day, USCIS al so denied plaintiff’s I-765 application. Id. at 1–2.
C. Procedural Background On April 7, 2020, plaintiff initiated this li tigation challenging the denial of his Supplement J and the invalidation of the labor certification applica tion submitted by Arwano.
See Compl., ECF No. 1. He filed an amende d complaint on August 18, 2020, asserting new claims challenging the invalidation of the I- 140 petition (Count I), Am. Compl. ¶¶ 118–37, ECF No. 14, and the denial of his Novemb er 7, 2019 I-765 application (Count V), id. at 34–35 ¶¶ 150–61, 3 as having violated the Administrative Pro cedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et
seq. 4 Concurrently with his ame nded complaint, plaintiff file d a motion for relief pending review, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705, or, in the alternative, a preliminary injunction, requesting,

3 The numbering of paragraphs in plaintiff’s amende d complaint restarts from 150 at Count V. See Am. Compl. at 34. To avoid confusion, the Court cites to the page and paragraph number when referring to paragraphs in the amended complaint whos e numbers are duplicated.

4 The parties agree that Counts II, III, IV , and VI of the Amended Complaint are moot. See Pl.’s Mem. at 23 n.6, 41 n.9; Defs.’ Opp’n at 4. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed.12 based on Count V of his amended co mplaint, that the Court delay the effective date of USCIS’s April 28, 2020 denial of his November 7, 2019 I-765 application and deem the requested authorization approved during th e pendency of this case, retr oactive to May 26, 2020. Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. for Relief Pendi ng Review Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705 or in the Alternative a Prelim. Inj. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, ECF No. 13-1. The Court denied that motion on August 27, 2020. Kondapally v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. , No. 20-cv-920 (BAH), 2020 WL 5061735, at *1, *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2020). The parties subsequently filed and briefe d cross-motions for summary judgment, and defendants compiled the administrative record, see Certified List of Contents of Admin. Record, ECF No. 20; Notice of Filing App’x to Admin. R ecord, ECF No. 29. After the D.C. Circuit’s decision in iTech U.S., Inc. v. Renaud , No. 20-5235, 2021 WL 3043302 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2021), the Court ordered, see Min. Order (July 20, 2021), the parties to submit supplemental briefing addressing the impact of the Circuit holding that “courts lack jurisdiction to consider visa revocations made under section 1155,” iTech , 2021 WL 3043302, at *7, on the pending cross-motions for summary judgment. The par ties completed supplementa l briefing on July 26, 2021, and the pending motions are now ripe for resolution.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Administrative Procedure Act The APA provides for judicial review of any “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C. § 70 4, and “instructs a reviewing court to set aside agency action found to be ‘arbit rary, capricious, an abuse of di scretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,’” Cigar Ass’n of Am. v. FDA , 964 F.3d 56, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). This stan dard “‘requires agencies to e ngage in reasoned decisionmaking,’13 and . . . to reasonably explain to reviewing courts the bases for the actions they take and the conclusions they reach.” Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v. Fed. R.R. Admin. , 972 F.3d 83, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (“ Regents ”), 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020)). Judicial review of agency action is limited to “‘the grounds that the agency invoke d when it took the action,’” Regents , 140 S. Ct. at 1907 (quoting Michigan v. EPA , 576 U.S. 743, 758 (2015)), and the agenc y, too, “must defend its actions based on the reasons it gave when it acted,” id. at 1909.
B. Summary Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce dure 56, “[a] party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material fact a nd judgment in the m ovant’s favor is proper as a matter of law.” Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC , 888 F.3d 1261, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’ l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. , 452 F.3d 798, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In APA cases such as this one, involving crossmotions for summary judgment, “the district judge sits as an appell ate tribunal. The ‘entire case’ on review is a question of law.” Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson , 269 F.3d 1077, 1083–84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted ) (collecting cases). Thus, a court need not and ought not engage in fact finding, since “[g] enerally speaking, district courts reviewing agency action under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard do not resolve factual issues, but operate instead as appellate courts resolv ing legal questions.” James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig , 82 F.3d 1085, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Lacson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 726 F.3d 170, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting, in an APA case, that “determining the facts is generally the agency’s responsibility, not [the court’s]”). Judicial review, when availabl e, is typically limited to the administrative record, since “[i]t is black-lette r administrative law that in an [APA] case, a14 reviewing court should have befo re it neither more nor less info rmation than did the agency when it made its decision.” CTS Corp. v. EPA , 759 F.3d 52, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff contends that hi s I-140 petition was “unlawfullyinvalidated” and his I-765 application was unlawfully denied because “[t]he facts and evidence were improperly weighed” by USCIS “against materially err oneous standards of law.” Pl.’s Mem. at 23. He seeks to have these agency actions set aside on the grounds that they were “arbitrary, ca pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac cordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), in violation of the APA. Pl.’s Mem. at 23. As the D.C. Circuit has recently made clear, however, a revocation decision, under 8 U.S.C. § 1155, for a petition ap proved, under 8 U.S.C. § 1154, is committed to the “unreviewable discretion” of the executive branch, iTech , 2021 WL 3043302, at *1, and courts consequently “lack juri sdiction to consider visa revocations made under section 1155,” id. at *7. Similarly, as previously found in de nying plaintiff’s motion fo r preliminary relief, “employment authorization for nonc itizen workers is committed to the discretion of USCIS and therefore unreviewable under the APA.” Kondapally , 2020 WL 5061735, at *4. As explained below, summary judgment as to the remaini ng Counts I and V of the Amended Complaint therefore must be granted for USCIS, and pl aintiff’s motion for summ ary judgment must be denied.
A. Revocation of I-140 Petition (Count I) Count I of the Amended Complaint challenge s USCIS’s invalidation of the I-140 petition filed by Arwano on his behalf in 2006. Am. Comp l. ¶¶ 118–37. Plaintiff contends that USCIS “erroneously denied [his] I-485 Supplement J an d unlawfully invalidated his I-140 Petition” by15 applying “the incorrect legal standard.” Pl.’s Mem. at 25. Sp ecifically, he argues that USCIS failed to account for language in the INA’s por tability provisi on stating that an I-140 petition pending for more than 180 days “shall remain valid.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j). The operative directive in this phrase, inplaintiff’s view, “affected”— indeed, eliminated—defendants’ authority, under id. § 1155, to revoke petitions for whic h the portability provision had been activated. Pl.’s Mem. at 28; see also id. at 26–33; Pl.’s Reply Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n Defs.’ Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 2–13, ECF No. 26. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (providing that “[t]he Secretary of Homeland Securi ty may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under [8 U.S.C. §] 1154”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(a) (allowing a USCIS offi cer to revoke the approval of an I140 immigrant visa petition “when the necessity for the revocation comes to [their] attention”). Resolution of this claim therefore turns on two questions: (1) whether USCIS’s exercise of § 1155 revocation authority is re viewable by this Court; and (2) whether USCI S is stripped of that revocation authority with re spect to a previously approved pe tition that “remain[s] valid” by operation of § 1154(j). The answer to both is no, and thus no judici al relief is available with respect to the I-140 revocation.
1. Revocation Actions Under § 1155 Are Unreviewable Under iTech The D.C. Circuit recently decided in iTech that § 1155 confers on USCIS unreviewable discretion to revoke immigrant visa petitions granted pursuant to § 1154. iTech , 2021 WL 3043302, at *7. The iTech Court reached this conclusion on fact s similar to this case, albeit without a portabilitycomponent. In iTech , the sponsoring employer filed an I-140 petition on behalf of a noncitizen worker, accompanied by “evidence of its ab ility to pay the proffered wage and evidence that [the worker] had obtained a bachelor’s degree,” wh ich petition was approved16 by USCIS. Id. at *2. More than a year later, “USCIS issued a notice of intent to revoke the approved petition.” Id. USCIS “grounded its revocation in th e ‘realization that [the] immigrant visa petition was approved in error’ and identi fied ‘inconsistencies in the record calling into question whether the beneficiary me ets the educational requirements of the labor certification’ and whether [the employer] ‘continues to demonstr ate the ability to pay the proffered wage.’” Id. (citation omitted) (first alteration in or iginal). The employer “provided additional documentation in response to th e notice to revoke, but USCIS u ltimately decided to revoke its approval of the I-140 petition on th e basis that [the employer] misre presented [the beneficiary’s] degree-conferring institution and employment qualifications” and fa iled to “establish its ability to pay the proffered wage.” Id. In considering the district court’s jurisdic tion to review USCIS’s revocation decision, the Circuit reviewed the relationship between § 1155 and another INA provision providing, in relevant part, that “no co urt shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secret ary of Homeland Security the au thority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney Genera l or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” iTech , 2021 WL 3043302, at *3 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)). 5 Determining that revocation of an I-140 petiti on was a “decision or actio n” within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), iTech , 2021 WL 3043302, at *3–5, *8, the Circuit concluded that “section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of all decisi ons the authority for which is specified under Title 8, Chapter 2, Subchapter II to be within the Secr etary’s discretion,”

5 “This subchapter” refers to Title 8, Chapter 12, Subchapter II (“Immigration”) of the U.S. Code, and includes, as relevant here, sections 1154, 1155, and 1252.17 including “the decision to revoke an I-140 im migrant visa petition under section 1155.” Id. at *8. The Circuit’s holding in iTech controls the outcome here. Plaintiff’s employment-based I-140 petition was approved under § 1154 and s ubsequently revoked under § 1155, just as was the petition of the iTech beneficiary. The conclusion that § 1252 precludes judi cial review of such revocations thus deprives this Court of jurisdiction over Count I, rendering unnecessary further consideration of the parties’ extens ive arguments about defendants’ substantive decisionmaking, treatment of evidence, or adequacy of refo rmation opportunities with respect to plaintiff’s I- 140 petition. See Pl.’s Mem. at 28–30, 34–41; Defs .’ Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 17–24, ECF N o. 24-1; Pl.’s Opp’n at 13–22; Defs.’ Reply Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 7–13, ECF No. 28. In supplemental briefing reque sted by the Court after iTech , plaintiff essentially concedes the unreviewability of § 1155 revocation—as he must. See generally Pl.’s Suppl. Br., ECF No. 30. As a last resort, plaintiff nextcontends that the disputed action is not a § 1155 revocation at all.
2. Portability Does Not Strip the S ecretary of Revocation Authority Plaintiff asserts that he “is not challenging a decision made under 8 U.S.C. § 1155. Instead Plaintiff is challenging a decision made under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j).” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6; see also Pl.’s Suppl. Br. at 1. In other words, plaintif f seeks to invoke the portability provision in § 1154(j) to preserve the validity of his I-140 petition, on grounds that the addition of § 1154(j) limited the scope of the unlim ited revocation authority ot herwise conferred by § 1155. See Pl.’s Mem. at 26–32; Pl.’s Opp’n at 7–13. While clever, this argume nt does not withstand scrutiny18 nor alter the conclusion dictated by binding precedent that defendants’ decision to revoke that petition is unreviewable by this Court. As an initial matter, plaintiff’s position is di fficult to square with the statutory text. Plaintiff’s eligibility for a chan ce to receive a visa stems from th e employment-based preferences set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3 )(A). Arwano’s authorization to petition for that classification on plaintiff’s behalf is set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(F). The agency’s duty to investigate the petition and, if appropriate, gr ant approval arises from 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). Given the multiple subsections of § 1154 implicated by the I-140 process, by any r easonable reading, the Arwano I140 was a “petition approved . . . under section 1154,” a category of petitions over which § 1155 expressly gives the Secretary di scretionary revocation authority. 6 While § 1154(j) allows a petition to “remain valid with respect to ne w job” under certain condi tions, an I-140 approved under § 1154(b) (thus subject to § 1155 revoca tion) on which the porta bility provision is subsequently invoked remains anI-140 approved under § 1154(b). 7 Plaintiff offers no rebuttal to this basic logic. The parties dispute the impact, if any, of § 1154(j) on § 1155 revocation authority with a focus on a Ninth Circuit case, Herrera v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services , 571 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2009), which held that “the Portabilit y Provision does not affect the agency’s revocation

6 Section 1154(b) authorizes “the Attorney General” to “approve the petition,” while § 1155 confers revocation authority on “[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security” with respect to “any petition approved by [the Secretary] under section 1154.” This seems to be a distinction without a difference. In iTech , the Circuit quotes the language “approved by [the Secretary] under section 1154,” 2021 WL 3043302, at *6, with an associated footnote acknowledging that § 1154 “directs the Attorn ey General” to approve I-140 petitions, id. at *6 n.5, but ultimately takes no issue with this apparent textual discon nect, allowing a revocatio n to proceed regardless, id. at *8. See also Las Ams. Immigrant Advoc. Ctr. v. Wolf , 507 F. Supp. 3d. 1, 11 n.4 (D.D.C. 2020) (K.B. Jackson, J.) (discussing the transfer of most immigration enfo rcement functions from “the Attorn ey General” to the Secretary).

7 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j) provides, in pertinent part: “A petition . . . for an individual whose application for adjustment of status pursuant to section 1255 of this title has been filed and remained unadjudicated for 180 days or more shall remain valid with respect to a new job if the indi vidual changes jobs or employers if the new job is in the same or a similar occupational classification as the job for which the petition was filed.”19 authority,” id. at 889. See Pl.’s Mem. at 25–32; Defs. Opp’n at 8–15. USCIS cited Herrera in its letter denying plaintiff’s Supplement J. AR at 141, ECF No. 29-9. Plaintiffs confront
Herrera head-on, arguing that the case was wrongly decided and an improper basis for revocation. Pl.’s Mem. at 25–26. In Herrera , as here, USCIS revoked an I-140 after an employee had changed jobs , citing defects in the original petition, 571 F.3d at 883–84, rejecting the argument, as asserted by plai ntiff here, that the “shall remain vali d” language of § 1154(j) stripped the agency of au thority to revoke the I-140, id. at 886–87. The court focused on the qualifying language in § 1154(j) as applying to an I-140 “ with respect to [the] new job ,” viewing a USCIS-revoked petition as never having been “va lid” and thus not “remain[ing]” so in a new job. Id. at 887 (first alteration in orig inal) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j)). 8 This approach is entirely consistent with the “basic logic” discussed above. The distinction between two causes of I-140 revocation—agency reassessment of the original petition or withdraw al by the sponsoring employer—bears directly on what “job portability” is meant to accomplish. 9 If an employee stops working for someone who once filed an I-140 petition sponsoring the employee, withdraw al of that petition by a former employer is unsurprising. Section 1154(j) prevents a revocation prompted by the former employer’s

8 Plaintiff further protests that Herrera “runs directly against” a decision issued in Mawalla v. Chertoff , 468 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2007), Pl.’s Mem. at 32, but this is incorrect. As defendants correctly explain, Mawalla “concerned a question about the retroactive effect of a revocation based on a withdrawn petition .” Defs.’ Opp’n at 14–15 (emphasis added). In Mawalla , the court held that an I-140 revo ked because of withdrawal by the employer should, for the purposes of § 1154(j), not be deemed void ab initio

. See Mawalla , 468 F. Supp. 2d at 182-83. Here, however, defendants’ discretionary decision to rev oke plaintiff’s I-140 under § 1155 was based on a determination that the petition was never validly approved at the outset. Contrary to plainti ff’s reading, the protection offered by Mawalla to employees losing a former employer’s sponsorship on account to a job change only undermines plaintiff’s argument that defendants’ position “transforms 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j) into a nullity.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 7 (capitalization altered).

9 Plaintiff also cites repeatedly to certain agency memoranda discussing the implementation of § 1154(j) for essentially the same proposition as that found in Mawalla

. See Pl.’s Mem. at 26–27, 29–30 (identifying the “2003 Yates Memo,” “2005 Yates Memo,” and “2005 Aytes Memo”); Pl.’s Opp’n at 8–11. The memoranda are inapposite for the same reason Mawalla is: by plaintiff’s own description, the cited portions of the memoranda concern circumstances where an employer withdraws an I-140 petition.20 withdrawal—a natural incident of a job change —from being fatal to anemployee’s long-pending I-485 application. Revocation due to agency rea ssessment of the first em ployer’s petition is a different matter entirely. Plaintif f’s strained reading fails to rec ognize this textual distinction and misunderstands the purpose of the statute.
3. Reliance Finally, plaintiff appeals to a “reliance inte rest” of I-140 beneficiar ies with long-pending I-485 applications, created by US CIS’s approval of their I-140 petitions years ago and their reasonable expectations of eventual I-485 approval. See Pl.’s Mem. at 8, 30–31; Pl.’s Opp’n at 20. The troubling central facts of this case make plai ntiff’s point painfully obvious. Defendants approved, in 2006, an I-140 petition filed by Arwano for plaintiff, Pl.’s Mem. at 18; Defs.’ Opp’n at 3, and almost 13 years later and after pl aintiff had built a life in this country, USCIS revoked that same I-140 due to purported deficiencies in th e information pr ovided in 2006— deficiencies unchallenged at th e time—on which USCIS had based its approval, Pl.’s Mem. at 19–20; Defs.’ Opp’n at 3. In the intervening years, plaintiff and hi s family continued to thrive in the United States, Kondapally Aff. ¶ 15, presumab ly based at least in part on an understanding that the approved I-140 would provi de continuing permission to live and work here. USCIS’s sua sponte reassessment of its own appr oval more than a decade afte r the fact is, at a minimum, disquieting and likely both alar ming and distressing to the ma ny long-term I-140 beneficiaries contributing productively to American society. Unfortunately, this cannot change the result in this case. First, if a reliance interest is cognizable here, that interest derives from the initial I-140 appr oval itself rather than from any understanding of the portab ility provision. In this case, plai ntiff worked for Arwano for nearly ten years and then for Verizon for nearly three ye ars before he learned of defendants’ intent to21 revoke his I-140. See Pl.’s Mem. at 18–19. The common deno minator on which plaintiff relied during all thirteen of those years was not the operation of § 1154(j), but rather his reasonable belief in the validity of USCIS’s 2006 appr oval of the Arwano I-140. Second, and more importantly, no substantive dispute with a § 1155 revocation, no matter how compelling, can overcome the D.C. Circuit’s bar to reviewability set forth in iTech

. B. Denial of I-765 Application (Count V) Count V of the Amended Complaint challenge s the April 28, 2020 deni al of pl aintiff’s November 7, 2019 Form I-765 application for rene wed employment authorization. Am. Compl. at 34–35 ¶¶ 150–61. Plaintiff argues that this denial was arb itrary and capricious because defendants failed to consider plai ntiff’s eligibility fo r continued employment authorization under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c) while he seeks judicial and administrative review of the denial and revocation of his immigration bene fits. Pl.’s Mem. at 41; Pl.’ s Opp’n at 22. Indeed, USCIS’s April 28, 2020 decision denying plai ntiff’s I-765 application makes no reference to the relevant provision of 8 C.F. R. § 274a.12(c). See AR at 1233, ECF No. 29-30. This omission is the only specific argument plaintiff advances to show that the denial of the I-765 application was arbitrary and capricious, but, as previously found, “even if he proffered more detailed reasoning,” his claim would fail “because employment authorizat ion for noncitizen workers is committed to the discretion of USCIS and therefor e unreviewable under the APA.” Kondapally , 2020 WL 5061735, at *4. Plaintiff brings his challenge to the April 28, 2020 denial un der the APA, which generally allows a court to set aside a final agency action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Review under the APA is not available, however, where “agency ac tion is committed to agen cy discretion by law.”22 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. New York , 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2567 (2019); Oryszak v. Sullivan , 576 F.3d 522, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Because the APA does not apply to agency action committed to agency discretion by law, a plaintiff who challenges such an action cannot state a claim under the APA.”). Agency ac tion is committed to ag ency discretion by law “where the relevant statute [or regulation] is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion,” Dep’t of Commerce , 139 S. Ct. at 2568 (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. , 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018)), and there is consequently no “law to apply,” Heckler v. Chaney , 470 U.S. 821, 834 (1985); see also Make the Road N.Y. v. Wolf , 962 F.3d 612, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2020). To determine whether this narr ow exception to reviewability, see Make the Road , 962 F.3d at 631, applies, courts conduct a “careful examination of the statute on which the claim of agency illegality is based” to assess the scope of the discre tion Congress has conferred on the
agency, Webster v. Doe , 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988). Aside from banning the “hir[ing] . . . for employment in the United States an alien knowin g the alien is an unauthorized alien,” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A), and an oblique reference to aliens “authorized to be . . . employed . . . by this chapter or by the Attorney General,” id. § 1324a(h)(3), Congress has ne ither directly addressed nor mandated the issuance of empl oyment authorization documents to noncitizen workers. Rather, employment authorizati on for aliens is “purely [a] creature[] of regulation.” Perales v. Casillas , 903 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990). Statut ory law therefore does not provide a standard to apply to pl aintiff’s challenge. Judicially manageable standards supporting review also “may be found in formal and informal policy statem ents and regulations,” Physicians for Soc. Resp. v. Wheeler , 956 F.3d 634, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Steenholdt v. FAA , 314 F.3d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2003)), because23 “[i]t is well settled that an ag ency, even one that enjoys br oad discretion, must adhere to voluntarily adopted, bi nding policies that limit its discretion,” Padula v. Webster , 822 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Vitarelli v. Seaton , 359 U.S. 535, 539 (1959)). In this case, the underlying regulations do not set out any such standards. As a noncitizen seeking work authorization during the pe ndency of an I-485 application, 8 C.F. R. § 274a.12(c)(9), plaintiff is a member of a class of noncitizen workers who “must apply for work authorization,” id. § 274a.12(c). Under the regulati ons, approval or denial of hi s application “i s within the discretion of USCIS,” 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(a)(1), without any textua l limitation on that discretion. The regulations do not enumerate any standards by which a court may assess the merits of a denial of an I-765 application. Cf. Dickson v. Sec’y of Def. , 68 F.3d 1396, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding judicially manageable standards in a statut e stating that an agency “may excuse a failure to file . . . if it finds it to be in the interest of justice”). Further, the specific regulatory provision to which plaintiff poi nts does not list any standards by which a court could measure the su fficiency of the validityperiod, and in fact expressly reserves such deter minations for USCIS. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c) (allowing for USCIS

“ in its discretion , [to] establish a specific validity period for an employment authorization document, which may include any period when an administrativ e appeal or judici al review of an application or petition is pending” (emphasis added)). Consequen tly, courts have routinely held that approving or denying the I-765 application, establishing the length of the EAD period, and deciding whether to extend the EAD period to encompass the pendency of any review, are decisions committed to USCIS’s discretion and outside the purv iew of judicial review. See, e.g., Guevara v. Holder , 649 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he authorization for . . . employment [under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9)] is not mandated.”); Suarez v. Cowan , No. 1:19-cv-24 124, 2019 WL 7494391, at *6-7 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2019), report and recommendation adopted , No. 1:19-cv-124, 2020 WL 80641 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2020) (“ [Plaintiff] a sserts that this Court can review the denial of her I- 765 application, i.e. her employm ent authorization application, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure[] Act. Despite her argument to the contrary, the APA bars review of this claim.”); Villafranca v. Cowan, No. B-18-39, 2018 WL 8665002, at *9 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2018), report and recommendation adopted , No. 1:18-cv-39, 2018 WL 8665000 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2018) (“USCIS has unfettered di scretion to grant or deny EADs to aliens who have filed a petition to become a legal permanent resident.”); Rosario v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. , No. C15-0813JLR, 2017 WL 3034447, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 18, 2017) (“[T]he regulations have confer red discretion on USCIS to approve or deny EAD applications unless they are filed by an applicant for asylum.”); Kaddoura v. Gonzales , No. C06-1402RSL, 2007 WL 1521218, at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 21, 2007) (“[T]h is Court lacks authority to grant an order compelling USCIS to grant plaintiff an EAD valid . . . until he has exhausted administrative and judicial review of the denial of his . . . ad justment of status application because USCIS retains discretionary aut hority over issuance of EADs.”). Despite this consistent author ity that approval or denial of applications for employment authorization is committed to USCIS’s discretion , plaintiff nonetheless insists that judicial review is available because “the evidence refl ects that no discretion wa s exercised” in denying his I-765 application, since that application “was denied only b ecause his I-485 Application was denied.” Pl.’s Mem. at 42. Perhaps true, butirrelevant. The unreviewability of decisions “committed to agency discretion” do es not turn on the particular rationale cited by the agency in the course of issuing its discre tionary decision. Rather, unreviewa bility results from “the nature of the administrative action at i ssue” and the absence of statutory or regulatory standards for25 carrying out the action in question. Sierra Club v. Jackson , 648 F.3d 848, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Sec’y of Lab. v. Twentymile Coal Co. , 456 F.3d 151, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Thus, while USCIS may have determined that, as a matter of internal policy, I-765 applications as to which the underlying I-485 application is denied must also be denied, that policy determination was in the first instance an exercise of agency disc retion, outside the scope of judicial review. 10 Finally, plaintiff contends that , even if review pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) is unavailable, he may still seek relief under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D ), which requires a reviewing court to set aside agency acti on undertaken “without observance of procedure required by law.” Pl.’s Mem. at 43–44. This argument misconstr ues the boundaries of th e limitation on review under the APA imposed by 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The entire “chapter” of the APA governing judicial review of agency action “applies . . . except to the exte nt that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is commi tted to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). When either of these exceptions app lies, judicial review under § 706 is unavailable, regardless of which subsection of § 706 a plaintiff invokes. See, e.g. , Dep’t of Commerce , 139 S. Ct. at 2568 (noting that “[r]eview is not available . . . ‘to the extent that’ . . . the agency action is ‘committed to agency discretion by la w’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2))); Shawnee Tribe v. Mnuchin , 984 F.3d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (same). The conclusion that issuance of employment

10 Plaintiff relies on Ravulapalli v. Napolitano , 773 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2011), and Mawalla v. Chertoff , 468 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2007), for the proposition that the denial of his I-765 presents a reviewable question of law rather than an unreviewable exercise of discretion. See Pl.’s Mem. at 42. Those cases, however, distinguish “a pure question of law” from an “exercise of discretion,” noting that 8 U.S.C. § 1255 “bars only review of discretionary decisions” and permits judicial review of agency actions related to statutory eligibility for the immigration benefits outlined in § 1255. Ravulapalli , 773 F. Supp. 3d at 51; see also Mawalla , 468 F. Supp. 2d at 181. As to the statutory criteria to r eceive such benefits, § 1255 itself provid es judicially manageable standards. The employment authorization benefit plaintiff seeks, in contrast, is a creature of regulations that do not themselves impose any judicially manageable standards. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9). Thus, even under the logic of Ravulapalli and Mawalla , denial of plaintiff’s I-765 application is an unreviewable exercise of agency discretion.26 authorization documents to noncitizen workers is committed to USCIS’ s discretion therefore forecloses judicial review , whether under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) or § 706(2)(D).
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, both the revocation of plaintiff’s I-140 petition and the denial of plaintiff’s I-765 application for employment authorization are committed to the discretion of USCIS by law. Accordingly, plainti ff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED

. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously. Date: August 16, 2021

__________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL Chief Judge