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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MELINDA

CHANTEA FISHER

(SC 20559)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,

Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crime of assault in the second degree in connection with

an incident in which she attacked the victim, causing her to suffer a

concussion and facial disfigurement, the defendant appealed, claiming,

inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction

on the ground that there was no evidence that she intended to cause

the victim serious physical injury. The defendant had been employed

as a technology assistant at a school, and the victim was her supervisor.

On the day of the incident, the defendant arrived late to work and was

informed that the victim had the key to the information technology

laboratory. When the defendant located the victim in a hallway, the

victim asked her if she just arrived at work and advised her that, if she

was having trouble getting to work on time, they could arrange a different

schedule for her. The defendant became agitated and, putting her face

directly in the victim’s face, stated that she was not ‘‘going to kill herself’’

to get to work on time. When the victim told the defendant to ‘‘get out

of [her] face,’’ the defendant called the victim a ‘‘fucking bitch,’’ punched

her in the nose, and threw a cup of coffee at her. The victim tried to

get away from the defendant, but the defendant pursued her down the

hallway and, when the defendant caught up with her, began to scratch

and punch the victim, as the victim pleaded with her to stop. When the

victim fell to the floor, the defendant grabbed her by the hair and

repeatedly slammed her head against a cinder block wall, causing the

victim to black out. The defendant then stood over the victim and

repeatedly kicked her in the side. Eventually, M, a paramedic who had

just dropped off his son at the school, was able to pull the defendant

off of the victim, after which the defendant became compliant and

cooperative. The victim was subsequently diagnosed by medical personnel with a nondisplaced fracture of the right nasal bone, a concussion,

and severe postconcussion syndrome. At trial, the defendant testified

that it was never her intention to cause the victim serious physical

injury, explaining that, on the day of the incident, she was tired and

experiencing considerable physical pain, that, when the victim, with

whom she did not get along, confronted her in the hallway about being

late, she became enraged, and that she could not recall most of what

had transpired during the incident because she had blacked out. Held:

1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of

assault in the second degree, as the jury reasonably could have found

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had intended to cause

the victim to suffer serious physical injury and, acting with such intent,

caused her to suffer two such injuries, namely, a concussion and facial

disfigurement: there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support

the jury’s finding that the defendant had intended to cause the victim

to suffer serious physical injury, as the defendant, after expressing anger

toward the victim and calling her a ‘‘fucking bitch,’’ committed numerous

acts that indicated such intent, including punching the victim in the

nose, throwing coffee at her, scratching the victim, grabbing the victim

by the hair and repeatedly slamming her head against a cinder block

wall, and kicking the victim while she was knocked down; moreover,

the jury was not required to credit the defendant’s testimony that,

although she intended to hurt the victim, she did not intend to cause

her serious physical injury, and was free to disbelieve the defendant’s

testimony that she did not recall most of what transpired after the

assault began because she blacked out or because she was seized by

uncontrollable rage.

2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly

limited defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim regarding her

pending civil action against the defendant, which arose out of the same
incident that gave rise to the defendant’s conviction, and improperly

declined to admit into evidence the complaint in that civil action:

a. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the trial court’s alleged error was

not of constitutional magnitude, as the defendant’s right to cross-examination was not unduly restricted under either the federal or state constitution: defense counsel was permitted to question the victim about the

fact that she had filed a civil action against the defendant seeking money

damages, about the allegations in the civil complaint pertaining to both

the assault and her physical injuries, and about any inconsistencies

between those allegations and her statements to the police and her

testimony at trial; accordingly, the jury was able to appropriately draw

inferences relating to the victim’s credibility and reliability as a witness,

as well as any financial interest that she may have had in the outcome

of the case; moreover, there was no merit to the defendant’s claim that

the alleged error was of constitutional magnitude insofar as the trial

court did not permit defense counsel to question the victim about the

amount of damages that she sought in her civil action, as this court and

the Appellate Court previously have sustained similar limitations on

cross-examination regarding civil actions that arose out of the same

circumstances that precipitated the criminal charges against the defendants in those cases.

b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding defense

counsel from questioning the victim more extensively about the specific

details of the victim’s civil action against the defendant, as it reasonably

could have determined that allowing defense counsel to probe the victim

regarding the specific dollar amount claimed in the civil action and to

introduce the complaint itself into evidence could have led to a more

extensive inquiry by both parties regarding the basis for the victim’s

damages claims, thereby opening the door to collateral evidence concerning the victim’s claims for past and future medical expenses, lost earnings

and earning capacity, pain and suffering, and emotional distress, the latter

a subject that the defendant herself sought to preclude the admission

of, in her prior motion in limine, due to the prejudicial nature of that

evidence; accordingly, the trial court struck an appropriate balance

between the defendant’s right to cross-examination and her own effort

to preclude evidence of the emotional impact of the assault on the victim

and her family, and defense counsel’s inquiry, taken as a whole, was

sufficient to establish the victim’s potential interest or financial motive

in testifying as she did.

3. The trial court correctly determined that M, a paramedic with ten years

of experience and special training in diagnosing concussions, was qualified to testify as an expert witness regarding signs a paramedic looks

for in evaluating a patient for a concussion: the court acted within is

discretion in concluding that M had special knowledge suitable to aiding

the jury in deciding the issue of whether the victim had sustained a

serious physical injury as a result of the defendant’s attack on her, and

the fact that M did not physically examine the victim did not render his

expert testimony inadmissible; moreover, even if the trial court had

abused its discretion in admitting M’s expert testimony, any error was

harmless, as M’s testimony was merely cumulative of the testimony of

three other expert witnesses.

Argued October 22, 2021—officially released February 10, 2022*

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

two counts of assault in the first degree, one count of

attempt to commit assault in the first degree, and three

counts of assault in the second degree, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain

and tried to the jury before Oliver, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of two counts of assault in the second

degree; thereafter, the court conditionally vacated the

conviction as to one count of assault in the second

degree, and the defendant appealed. Affirmed.

James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender,

for the appellant (defendant).
Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Brian W. Preleski, state’s

attorney, and Ronald Dearstyne, former senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The defendant, Melinda Chantea Fisher,

appeals1

from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of two counts of assault in the second

degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1).2

The defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient

evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict of guilty of assault

in the second degree,3

(2) the trial court erred in denying

the defendant’s request to cross-examine the victim

more extensively regarding her civil action against the

defendant, and (3) the trial court erred in allowing a

paramedic, testifying as a fact witness, to testify regarding symptoms of a concussion. We disagree with each

of these claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts, which

the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural

history. On April 21, 2016, the defendant had been

employed as a technology assistant for the Southington

public schools for approximately five weeks. That

morning, she was assigned to work at South End Elementary School (school). Although she was supposed

to report to work at 8 a.m., she did not arrive until

around 8:15 a.m. due to a prior work commitment and

because she was experiencing considerable dental pain.

Upon arrival, the defendant went to the main office to

get the key for the information technology laboratory

(lab) but was told that her supervisor, Lura Terrace,

the victim in this case, had the key. Melanie Krupinski,

a second grade teacher at the school, saw the defendant

outside the locked lab and offered to let her leave her

things in Krupinski’s classroom while she looked for

the key to the lab. The defendant told Krupinski how

angry and upset she was that her ‘‘boss’’4 had insisted

that she come to work, despite her dental pain. While

speaking to Krupinski, the defendant appeared quite

angry and stated that ‘‘she didn’t want to see [the victim’s] face.’’

After leaving Krupinski’s classroom, the defendant

found the victim in the hallway outside of the gymnasium. The victim asked the defendant if she had just

arrived at work and advised her that, if she was having

trouble getting to work on time, they could try to figure

out a different work schedule for her. At that point,

the defendant became ‘‘agitated’’ and, putting her face

directly in the victim’s face, stated that ‘‘she wasn’t

going to kill herself’’ to get to work on time. When the

victim told the defendant to ‘‘get out of [her] face,’’ the

defendant responded by calling her a ‘‘fucking bitch’’

and punching her in the nose with her right fist. The

defendant, who until this point had been holding a cup

of coffee and a laptop in her left hand, threw the laptop

to the ground, causing it to break, and then threw the

cup of coffee at the victim. The victim tried to get

away from the defendant, but the defendant pursued
her down the hallway. When the defendant caught up

with her, she began punching and scratching the victim,

while the victim pleaded with her to stop. When the

victim fell to the floor, the defendant grabbed her by

the hair and slammed her head against a cinder block

wall, causing the victim to black out. When the victim

came to, the defendant was standing over her and

repeatedly kicking her in the side.

Erin Nattrass, the school’s principal, and Patrick J.

Myers, a parent, witnessed the attack. Nattrass testified

at trial that she was standing in a classroom doorway

talking to a teacher when she saw the defendant pursuing the victim down the hallway. The victim was walking

away from the defendant with her hands up, saying

things like ‘‘[s]top, get away from me,’’ but the defendant

kept hitting her in her face, neck, and arms. When the

victim fell to the ground, the defendant grabbed her by

the hair and slammed her head into the wall at least

twice and then started kicking her. Although Nattrass

attempted to intervene both verbally and physically,

she was unable to stop the assault.

Myers, who was a paramedic, testified that he had

just dropped off his son at preschool when he heard

the defendant and the victim yelling at one another in

the hallway and saw the defendant throw her coffee at

the victim. As Myers approached the two women, the

defendant threw the victim to the ground and started

kicking her. Myers then saw the defendant bang the

victim’s head into the wall several times. Eventually,

Myers was able to pull the defendant off the victim,

at which point the defendant became compliant and

cooperative.5 The defendant told Myers that she had

done what she had done because ‘‘[the victim] was

harassing her,’’ ‘‘she was very sick and should not have

been at work in the first place,’’ and ‘‘she [was] working

multiple jobs and [was] extremely tired.’’

After the assault, Nattrass helped the victim off the

floor and escorted her to the nurse’s office. There, Nattrass observed scratches on the victim’s neck and chest,

and blood on her ear. Nattrass then returned to where

the defendant and Myers were waiting and asked them

to accompany her to her office, which they did. When

the police and paramedics arrived, the defendant was

placed under arrest, and the victim, based on her injuries, was transported by ambulance to a hospital.

At the hospital, the victim was treated by Douglas

Whipple, the supervising emergency room physician.

Whipple’s initial triage notes indicated that the victim

was ‘‘very shaken up and . . . crying,’’ that she had

‘‘generalized achiness and facial discomfort,’’ and that

she denied loss of consciousness. Whipple ordered a

computerized tomography scan to assess if there was

bleeding or skull or facial fractures, which came back

negative. Whipple nevertheless diagnosed the victim

with a nondisplaced fracture of the right nasal bone at
the junction with the maxilla and soft tissue swelling

in the right infraorbital region. He instructed her to

return to the hospital if her headache worsened or if

she experienced vomiting or dizziness, all of which are

symptoms of a ‘‘delayed bleed’’ or concussion. He also

recommended that she follow up with a neurologist

and not return to work.

That evening, the victim woke up with severe dizziness, vomiting, and a worsened headache. The next

day, she visited her primary care physician, Pei Sun,

informing Sun of the emergency room visit and about

her symptoms, which included vomiting, dizziness,

headache, and an inability to concentrate. Sun diagnosed the victim with a brain concussion, nausea, and

a nasal fracture. When the victim returned to Sun for

a follow-up visit on May 3, 2016, she was experiencing

nausea, headaches, and new lower back pain, so Sun

referred her to Kwame O. Asante, a head injury specialist at Hartford Hospital. The victim saw Asante on May

6, 2016, and, after performing a number of tests on

her, including neurological, sensory, and cranial nerve

accommodation examinations, Asante diagnosed the

victim with severe postconcussion syndrome.

On the basis of the aforementioned events, the defendant was charged with one count of assault in the first

degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1),

one count of attempt to commit assault in the first

degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2)

and 53a-59 (a) (1), one count of assault in the first

degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (2), two counts of

assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a)

(1), and one count of assault in the second degree in

violation of § 53a-60 (a) (2). A jury trial was held before

the trial court. At the conclusion of the state’s case-inchief, the defendant filed motions for a judgment of

acquittal as to all five charges, which the court denied.

At trial, the defendant testified in her own defense

that it was never her intention to cause the victim serious physical injury. She explained that she was tired

and in a great deal of physical pain when she arrived

to work on the day in question. She further stated that,

although she had been employed by the Southington

public school district for only a brief period of time,

she and the victim had already been in prior ‘‘verbal

altercations,’’ during which the victim called her

‘‘names’’ and was ‘‘very verbally abusive.’’ The defendant also accused the victim of saying ‘‘mean things to

other people’’ about her. The defendant testified that,

when she found the victim in the hallway that morning,

another verbal altercation ensued, during which the

defendant became enraged. The defendant stated that

she could not recall all of the details of what transpired

during the altercation because she ‘‘blacked out’’ but

that she was certain it was not her intention to disfigure

the victim. Although the defendant admitted to wanting
to hurt the victim during the altercation,6

she denied

any recollection of kicking the victim or slamming her

head against a wall.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the two counts

of assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a60 (a) (1) and not guilty on the remaining counts. On

February 1, 2019, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of ten years of imprisonment, execution

suspended after two and one-half years, and five years

of probation. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there was

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict of

guilty of assault in the second degree, (2) the trial court

erred in denying the defendant’s request to cross-examine the victim more extensively regarding her civil

action against the defendant, and (3) the trial court

erred in allowing Myers, a paramedic testifying as a fact

witness, to testify regarding symptoms of a concussion.

I

We begin with the defendant’s claim that there was

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict of

guilty of assault in the second degree. See footnote 3

of this opinion. The defendant contends that, although

the evidence supported a finding that she caused the

victim serious physical injury, there was no evidence—

circumstantial or direct—that she intended to cause

her serious physical injury, as required by § 53a-60 (a)

(1). The defendant argues that, in fact, there was uncontroverted direct evidence—the defendant’s own testimony—that she did not intend to cause such injury.

The state responds that the evidence was more than

sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction, arguing

that ‘‘[t]he jury could reasonably have inferred that the

defendant intended to cause [the victim] serious physical injury when she punched [the victim] in the face,

pushed her to the ground, and repeatedly banged her

head into a cinder block wall.’’ We agree with the state.

‘‘When a criminal conviction is reviewed for the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply a well established [two

part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light

most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we

determine whether upon the facts so construed and

the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury]

reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative

force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. James E., 327 Conn. 212, 218, 173 A.3d 380 (2017).

As we previously have explained, ‘‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible

doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt

require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence

posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible

by the [finder of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a
reasonable view of the evidence that would support a

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead,

whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that

supports the [fact finder’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taupier, 330 Conn.

149, 187, 193 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied, U.S. ,

139 S. Ct. 1188, 203 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2019).

To convict the defendant of assault in the second

degree under § 53a-60 (a) (1), the state was required to

prove that (1) the defendant intended to cause serious

physical injury to another person, and (2) acting with

such intent, the defendant caused serious physical

injury to that person. For purposes of that statute, ‘‘serious physical injury’’ means ‘‘physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious

disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious

loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (4). A person acts with

the requisite intent under § 53a-60 (a) (1) when that

person’s ‘‘conscious objective’’ is to cause serious physical injury. General Statutes § 53a-3 (11). ‘‘[T]he state

of mind of one accused of a crime is often the most

significant and, at the same time, the most elusive element of the crime charged. . . . Because it is practically impossible to know what someone is thinking or

intending at any given moment, [in the absence of] an

outright declaration of intent, a person’s state of mind

is usually [proven] by circumstantial evidence . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bonilla,

317 Conn. 758, 766, 120 A.3d 481 (2015). We previously

have explained that a defendant’s state of mind may be

proven by, for example, ‘‘his conduct before, during

and after [an assault]’’ because ‘‘[s]uch conduct yields

facts and inferences that demonstrate a pattern of

behavior and attitude toward the victim by the defendant that is probative of the defendant’s mental state.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bennett,

307 Conn. 758, 766, 59 A.3d 221 (2013). Indeed, ‘‘[i]ntent

may be, and usually is, inferred from the defendant’s

verbal or physical conduct. . . . Intent may also be

inferred from the surrounding circumstances. . . . The

use of inferences based on circumstantial evidence is

necessary because direct evidence of the accused’s

state of mind is rarely available. . . . Furthermore, it

is a permissible, albeit not a necessary or mandatory,

inference that a defendant intended the natural consequences of his voluntary conduct.’’ (Emphasis omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lamantia,

336 Conn. 747, 756–57, 250 A.3d 648 (2020).

The defendant concedes that, if the jury credited the

medical evidence and testimony indicating that the victim suffered a severe concussion and facial disfigurement as a result of the assault, then it reasonably could

have found that the defendant caused serious physical

injury to the victim. She contends, however, that the

jury could not reasonably have found that she intended
to cause such injury. Specifically, she contends that,

‘‘[w]hile the evidence shows [that she] and the victim

engaged in a fracas, [her] actions were clearly not the

result of calculated planning but, rather, a spontaneous

outburst of anger and loss of control . . . [that] constitute[s] ‘recklessly’ causing serious physical injury

(assault in the third degree), not intentionally causing

it (assault in the second degree).’’ In support of this

contention, the defendant relies primarily on her own

testimony concerning her physical exhaustion and the

extreme pain that she was in on the morning in question,

factors that she contends combined to provoke ‘‘an

extreme reaction’’ when the victim, with whom she

did not get along, confronted her in the hallway about

being late.

Notwithstanding the defendant’s contentions, the

jury was not required to credit her testimony regarding

her state of mind on the morning in question. See, e.g.,

State v. Ayala, 333 Conn. 225, 237, 215 A.3d 116 (2019)

(‘‘[i]t is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to

weigh conflicting testimony and [to] make determinations of credibility, crediting some, all or none of any

given witness’ testimony’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)). In particular, the jury was not required to

credit her testimony that, although she intended to hurt

the victim, she did not intend to cause her serious physical injury. The jury also was free to disbelieve the defendant’s testimony that she did not recall most of what

transpired after the assault began, either because she

‘‘blacked out’’ or because she was seized by uncontrollable rage. Certainly, it is quite likely that the jury did

believe that the defendant flew into an unanticipated

and uncontrolled rage when confronted by the victim.

The fact that the defendant became so enraged, however, did not preclude a finding that the defendant

intended to inflict serious physical injury on the victim.

To the contrary, uncontrolled rage precedes or gives

rise to many assaults of this nature, with the rage precipitating the intent. Our courts previously have held that

evidence of a defendant’s anger or rage toward a victim—which the defendant admitted was significant in

this case—supported the jury’s finding that a defendant

intended to inflict serious physical injury on the victim.

See, e.g., State v. Perugini, 153 Conn. App. 773, 782–83,

107 A.3d 435 (2014) (evidence of intent was sufficient

to support defendant’s conviction of assault in second

degree when record reflected that defendant ‘‘ ‘wasn’t

happy’ ’’ about victim’s statements to defendant’s fiance ́e, sped to bar where victim was working, threw beer

bottle at wall near victim, slammed victim into table,

punched and choked victim, hit victim with mop handle,

and left without summoning medical assistance), cert.

denied, 315 Conn. 911, 106 A.3d 305 (2015); State v.

Aviles, 107 Conn. App. 209, 218–19, 944 A.2d 994 (evidence of intent was sufficient to support defendant’s

conviction of murder when record reflected that defen-
dant was angry at victim for taking his money and

refusing to give him marijuana, and for swearing at

defendant’s girlfriend and slamming door in her face),

cert. denied, 287 Conn. 922, 951 A.2d 570 (2008); State

v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 269, 277–79, 794 A.2d 565

(evidence of intent was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of manslaughter in first degree when

record reflected that defendant was angry at victim for

telling defendant’s girlfriend to ‘‘shut up,’’ was initial

aggressor, approached victim in threatening manner

with his hands in fists, knocked victim to ground, kicked

and punched victim, and subsequently renewed his

attack while victim was unsteady on his feet and not

making any effort to struggle or resist attack), cert.

denied, 260 Conn. 935, 802 A.2d 88 (2002).

In every such case, it is the role of the jury to determine whether the state has proven beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant both intended to and did cause

serious or deadly physical injury to the victim. Our only

task on appeal is to determine whether, on the basis

of the record before us, the jury reasonably could have

found as it did. See, e.g., State v. Taupier, supra, 330

Conn. 187. Performing that task here, we conclude that

the jury reasonably could have found that, after expressing anger toward the victim and calling her a ‘‘fucking

bitch,’’ the defendant committed numerous acts that

further indicated her intent to cause the victim serious

physical injury. Specifically, after she punched the victim in the nose and threw coffee at her, the defendant

chased the victim down the hallway, punched and

scratched the victim repeatedly, and, most significantly,

grabbed the victim by the hair, slammed her head

repeatedly into a cinder block wall, and kicked the

victim while she was knocked down, all while ignoring

the victim’s pleas to stop and Nattrass’ attempts to

intervene. These acts provide sufficient circumstantial

evidence to support the jury’s finding that the defendant

intended the natural consequence of those actions,

namely, the victim’s two serious physical injuries.

II

The defendant also claims that the trial court erred

in limiting defense counsel’s cross-examination of the

victim regarding her pending civil action against the

defendant arising out of the same incident and in precluding admission of the complaint in that action. Specifically, the defendant claims that she was prevented

from adducing evidence regarding the amount of damages sought in the civil action and the fact that the

complaint included claims for pain and suffering and

for punitive damages. The defendant contends that the

absence of this evidence impaired her ability to demonstrate that the victim had a significant financial motive

to exaggerate the extent of her injuries to her treating

physicians, who relied on her reported symptoms to

diagnose her concussion, and to the jury in her testi-
mony at the criminal trial. Because the issue of whether

the victim sustained serious physical injury was an

essential element in dispute in the case, the defendant

contends that the trial court’s ruling was not only an

abuse of discretion but an error of constitutional magnitude. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

review of this claim. Prior to trial, the defendant filed

a motion in limine to preclude evidence from the victim

pertaining to the emotional impact of the assault on

her and her family, arguing that such evidence was

unduly prejudicial and would outweigh any probative

value. The trial court granted the motion in part, agreeing with the defendant that testimony relating to the

emotional impact of the assault would be unduly prejudicial but clarifying that it would still allow testimony

from the victim and her husband relating to the impact

of the victim’s injuries on her ability to do certain things

because such evidence was relevant and ‘‘an essential

element . . . in dispute.’’

After trial began, and before the victim took the witness stand, the prosecutor sought a ruling from the trial

court precluding the defendant from cross-examining

the victim regarding a civil action she had filed against

the defendant pertaining to the same incident underlying the criminal case, or at least limiting the inquiry to

the sole question of whether there was a civil action

pending. Defense counsel argued that he should be permitted to expose any inconsistencies between the statements made in the victim’s civil complaint and other

statements made in connection with the criminal proceedings, that the civil action was a proper basis for

cross-examination with respect to bias, and that the

complaint itself should be allowed into evidence as

a ‘‘judicial pleading.’’7 The court agreed with defense

counsel that the existence of the civil action was a

proper subject for cross-examination, as it would tend

to expose any potential bias;8 however, it reserved judgment on specific questions until they arose.

During the victim’s ensuing testimony, she admitted

on cross-examination that she had filed a civil action

against the defendant and had hired an attorney to

represent her in that action. Defense counsel thereafter

asked the court to take judicial notice of the complaint

filed in that action. The prosecutor objected, and the

court excused the jury to hear argument on the issue.

Defense counsel argued that the entirety of the civil

complaint should be made an exhibit because it was a

proper area of cross-examination as to bias and it also

contained some inconsistent statements. He further

argued that the specific fact that the victim was seeking

damages from the defendant in excess of $15,000 was

relevant because it demonstrated the victim’s bias in

the form of a financial interest. Defense counsel

asserted that ‘‘the jury has the right to know that there
is a [civil action] pending in this case, that [the victim]

is suing [the defendant] for a large sum of money, and

that she has an interest in her testimony today showing

that her injuries are quite significant because she has

a financial interest in that with regard to a civil [action].’’

In response, the prosecutor acknowledged that the

court could allow the defendant to ask some follow-up

questions regarding the action but contended that it

would not be appropriate to question the victim extensively about it or to enter the complaint itself into evidence. The prosecutor pointed out that, because the

complaint asserted a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, its admission would conflict with

the court’s earlier ruling granting the defendant’s

motion in limine to preclude testimony regarding the

emotional impact of the assault on the victim and her

family on the ground that such evidence would be

unduly prejudicial.

The trial court then ruled that defense counsel could

ask the victim certain questions regarding the contents

of the civil complaint but that it would not allow the

complaint itself to come into evidence. Specifically, the

court permitted defense counsel to ask the victim about

(1) the fact that she filed a civil action against the

defendant for money damages, (2) allegations in the

complaint pertaining to both the assault and the victim’s

injuries, and (3) any inconsistencies between her testimony at the criminal trial, her statements to the police,

and the allegations in her civil complaint. The court

made clear, however, that defense counsel could inquire

only about the claim for money damages, not the fact

that the victim was seeking compensatory and punitive

damages in excess of $15,000. The court further cautioned that defense counsel could address the allegations of pain and suffering but that doing so would

‘‘open the door’’ to matters that the court had precluded

in its ruling on the defendant’s motion in limine.

When the victim returned to the witness stand, she

again acknowledged that she had filed a civil action

against the defendant seeking money damages. She

acknowledged that the complaint alleged that she lost

consciousness and sustained scars on her face and lips,

and that the defendant threw hot coffee on her face

and body. The victim further admitted that, although

she believed that she told the police that she thought

she had lost consciousness or blacked out during the

incident, no such statement was reflected in her written

statement to the police. In closing argument, defense

counsel conceded that the victim had been injured but

argued that there was a reasonable doubt that the head

injury she sustained resulted in a condition sufficient

to support the criminal charges, given her financial

interest in the civil action and the fact that the severity

of her symptoms ‘‘seem[ed] to increase over time

. . . .’’
Our analysis of the defendant’s claim is guided by

the following well settled legal principles. ‘‘[A] defendant has the right to confront witnesses against him as

guaranteed by the confrontation clauses of both our

federal and state constitutions.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Cecil J., 291 Conn. 813, 821,

970 A.2d 710 (2009); see also U.S. Const., amends. VI

and XIV; Conn. Const., art. I, § 8. ‘‘Cross-examination

[to elicit facts tending to show] motive, bias, interest

and prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly

restricted.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Milum, 197

Conn. 602, 609, 500 A.2d 555 (1985). Notwithstanding

this important right, however, ‘‘the right to confront

and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate

interests in the criminal trial process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cecil J., supra, 822. ‘‘[T]rial

judges retain wide latitude insofar as the [c]onfrontation [c]lause is concerned to impose reasonable limits

on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about,

among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion

of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that

is repetitive or only marginally relevant. . . . [T]he

[c]onfrontation [c]lause guarantees an opportunity for

effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that

is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent,

the defense might wish.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Bermudez, 341 Conn. 233, 271,

A.3d (2021).

In reviewing claims of this nature, ‘‘[t]he general rule

is that restrictions on the scope of cross-examination

are within the sound discretion of the trial judge . . .

but this discretion comes into play only after the defendant has been permitted cross-examination sufficient

to satisfy the sixth amendment. . . . The constitutional

standard is met when defense counsel is permitted to

expose to the jury the facts from which [the] jurors, as

the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the

witness. . . . Therefore, a claim that the trial court

unduly restricted cross-examination generally involves

a two-pronged analysis: whether the aforementioned

constitutional standard has been met, and, if so,

whether the court nonetheless abused its discretion

. . . in which case, in order to prevail on appeal, the

defendant must show that the restrictions imposed [on]

the cross-examination were clearly prejudicial.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Clark, 260 Conn. 813, 826–27, 801 A.2d 718 (2002).

Specifically, in determining whether a restriction on

cross-examination violates the constitutional protection of the confrontation clause, we look at a number

of factors, including ‘‘the nature of the excluded inquiry,

whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered

by other questions that were allowed, and the overall

quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to
the issues actually litigated at trial.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 828. If this constitutional standard

has been met, the defendant must, in order to prevail

on appeal, ‘‘show that the restrictions imposed by the

trial court were harmful. . . . In order to do so, the

defendant must establish that the impropriety was so

prejudicial as to undermine confidence in the fairness

of the verdict . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 830. Alternatively, if the constitutional standard is not met, and ‘‘an [evidentiary]

impropriety is of constitutional proportions, the state

bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Edwards, 334 Conn. 688, 706, 224

A.3d 504 (2020).

A

As a general rule, ‘‘cross-examination of the prosecuting witness should be allowed to show the pendency,

existence and status of [a] civil action . . . arising out

of the same set of circumstances as those [that] served

as the basis for the criminal prosecution.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Milum, supra, 197

Conn. 610; see State v. Arline, 223 Conn. 52, 61, 612

A.2d 755 (1992); see also State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231,

250–51, 630 A.2d 577 (1993). Such evidence provides

the jury with ‘‘significant information to aid in assessing

the bias, motive, interest and prejudice of the victim

for testifying as she did.’’ State v. Milum, supra, 609.

In the present case, defense counsel was permitted

to adduce not only all of this essential information but

also to probe the particulars of the allegations made

in the pending civil action as to the victim’s claims

concerning physical injuries, all of which were probative of the credibility and reliability of the victim’s testimony. See State v. Clark, supra, 260 Conn. 827. Defense

counsel, through cross-examination, was allowed to

question the victim to establish that the victim’s civil

action sought money damages for her alleged injuries.

He was also permitted to ask the victim about the allegations in her complaint and any inconsistencies between

those allegations and her statements regarding the incident to the police and in court. On the basis of these

facts, and taking into account all relevant considerations; see id., 828; we cannot conclude that the defendant’s right to cross-examination was unduly restricted

under either the United States constitution or the Connecticut constitution. From the inquiries allowed, it is

clear that the jury was able to appropriately draw inferences relating to the victim’s credibility and reliability

as a witness, as well as any financial interest she may

have had in the outcome of the case.

Conceding that ‘‘[t]his case does not involve a complete bar of evidence concerning the civil [action],’’ the

defendant nevertheless argues that the claimed error

is of constitutional magnitude because the trial court
‘‘declined to allow the defense to question the victim

concerning the amount of damages sought . . . .’’

(Emphasis added.) In particular, the defendant contends that the scope of examination permitted defense

counsel to inquire into the civil action as evidence of

the victim’s bias or animosity toward the defendant,

but not as evidence of the victim’s financial motivation

for portraying her symptoms as severely as possible.

We are not persuaded.

Our appellate courts previously have sustained similar limitations on cross-examination regarding civil

actions that arose out of the same circumstances that

precipitated the criminal case against the defendant. In

State v. Ballas, 180 Conn. 662, 433 A.2d 989 (1980), this

court held that the defendant was adequately ‘‘permitted to impugn the credibility and [to] explore the bias

of the [prosecuting] witnesses when the [trial] court

permitted [one of them] to testify on cross-examination

that a civil action was pending’’; id., 676–77; despite the

trial court’s refusal to permit cross-examination of him

with regard to the specific amount sought in damages

in the civil action against the defendant. Id., 676. In

State v. Reis, 33 Conn. App. 521, 636 A.2d 872, cert.

denied, 229 Conn. 901, 640 A.2d 118 (1994), the Appellate Court deemed cross-examination constitutionally

adequate when the trial court permitted the defendant

to cross-examine the victim regarding the fact that the

victim had retained a lawyer to bring an action against

the defendant ‘‘to get his [medical] bills paid and to be

compensated for his pain and suffering,’’ but did not

allow the defendant ‘‘to expose the extent of [the victim’s] pecuniary interest by cross-examination concerning the amount of damages [he] was seeking.’’ Id., 524.

The Appellate Court determined that the limitation did

not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights because

‘‘the issue of the victim’s [interest] arising from his civil

[action] against the defendant was adequately covered

by other questions allowed by the [trial] court.’’ Id., 526.

The defendant attempts to distinguish Reis and Ballas by arguing that evidence of the civil actions in those

cases was only relevant to show bias against the defendants, not to show a financial interest, in part because

the extent of the victims’ injuries was not in dispute.

We disagree. This court previously has acknowledged

that ‘‘[a] pending civil [action], or even a contemplated

[action], arising out of the same incident that gave rise

to the criminal charges is almost always relevant to

the credibility of a prosecuting witness because it gives

her a financial interest in the outcome of the criminal

prosecution. Such evidence has great probative value

because it shows that the state’s prosecuting witness

may have been actuated by personal considerations

instead of [by] altruistic interest generated solely from

motives in the public interest to bring a criminal to

justice.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Milum, supra, 197 Conn. 611–12. That
the extent of the prosecuting witness’ injuries was not

a contested issue in Reis and Ballas was not, in our

view, outcome determinative for the courts in deciding

these cases. Rather, the courts in both cases considered

the defendants to have had a right to cross-examine

the witnesses regarding financial interest, which they

adequately were permitted to do, just as the defendant

was adequately able to do in the present case.

The defendant also argues that, ‘‘to the degree that

this court should hold that [Reis or Ballas] stands for

the proposition that the admission of a complaint or

an inquiry into the exact amount or type of damages

sought in a civil [action] is always precluded, the defendant would respectfully request that that case be overruled.’’ We do not read either case to stand for any

such proposition. Rather, in each case, the court merely

concluded that the cross-examination permitted was

constitutionally sufficient in light of the circumstances

of the case. See State v. Ballas, supra, 180 Conn. 676–77;

State v. Reis, supra, 33 Conn. App. 524–26. It could

very well be that, in certain circumstances and cases

to come, the allegations in a civil complaint regarding

the nature, extent, or amount of damages, or other

allegations, could be sufficiently extreme, incongruous,

or inconsistent that it would be an abuse of discretion

or an error of constitutional magnitude not to permit

cross-examination as to those issues. This simply is not

such a case.

The defendant also cites three cases for the proposition that the right to confront prosecuting witnesses

includes the right to put into evidence the amount of

damages sought in the civil action or the complaint. In

none of these cases did the court conclude that excluding evidence of the amount of damages was itself reversible error, and, in two of the cases, the defendant was

not permitted any cross-examination on the subject of

the victim’s pending action. See United States v. Cohen,

163 F.2d 667, 668–69 (3d Cir. 1947); Maslin v. State,

124 Md. App. 535, 541–42, 723 A.2d 490, cert. denied,

354 Md. 115, 729 A.2d 406 (1999). The third case, State

v. Murdick, 23 Conn. App. 692, 583 A.2d 1318, cert.

denied, 217 Conn. 809, 585 A.2d 1233 (1991), is entirely

distinguishable. In that case, the Appellate Court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing

evidence of a civil action—filed before the conduct that

led to the criminal charges and not arising out of the

same circumstances as the criminal case—to be introduced because ‘‘[e]vidence of motive is a highly relevant

factor for assessing the guilt or innocence of a defendant.’’ Id., 696. Because the civil action did not arise

from the same circumstances as the criminal proceedings, and because the evidence was admitted to show

the defendant’s motive for committing the crime, not

the victim’s motive to lie or exaggerate injuries for

financial gain, we find Murdick wholly inapposite.
Finally, the defendant cites State v. Tiernan, 941 A.2d

129 (R.I. 2008), for the proposition that other jurisdictions ‘‘have acknowledged that a financial interest will

justify an inquiry into the details, including the amount

at issue, in the civil [action].’’ In that case, however,

the trial court had allowed defense counsel to ask only

a single question regarding the victim’s action against

the defendant, namely, ‘‘whether or not he had filed or

intended to file a civil [action] as a result of the events

that occurred . . . .’’ Id., 132. On appeal, the Rhode

Island Supreme Court held that ‘‘the scope of crossexamination that the trial [court] allowed—just one

question—was so limited as to be insufficient under

both the [s]ixth [a]mendment to the United States [c]onstitution and [the confrontation clause] of the Rhode

Island [c]onstitution. A defendant in a situation such

as this must be provided as a matter of right the opportunity to engage in not just some minimal cross-examination, but rather sufficient cross-examination.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 137. In the present

case, however, as we explained, the defendant was not

limited to a single question about the existence of the

civil action but, rather, was permitted to ask the victim

a number of questions regarding the action, as well

as to probe her for any inconsistencies between her

testimony and her civil complaint. Therefore, Tiernan

is inapposite.

B

Having determined that the trial court’s exclusion of

the evidence was not of constitutional proportions, we

must now determine whether the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion by precluding defense counsel

from questioning the victim more extensively regarding

her civil action against the defendant. We conclude that

the trial court did not.

Section 6-5 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides that ‘‘[t]he credibility of a witness may be

impeached by evidence showing bias for, prejudice

against, or interest in any person or matter that might

cause the witness to testify falsely.’’ The commentary

to § 6-5, however, further provides in relevant part that,

‘‘[w]hile a party’s inquiry into facts tending to establish

a witness’ bias, prejudice or interest is generally a matter of right, the scope of examination and extent of

proof on these matters are subject to judicial discretion.

. . .’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 6-5, commentary. It is well

established that ‘‘otherwise [r]elevant evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice or surprise, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of

undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation

of cumulative evidence.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 273 Conn.

330, 342, 869 A.2d 1224 (2005).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by precluding defense counsel from questioning the victim more extensively about the specific

details of her pending civil action against the defendant.

As we explained, our trial courts have wide discretion

in limiting a defendant’s cross-examination, as long as

the defendant has been permitted sufficient crossexamination to satisfy constitutional requirements. See,

e.g., State v. Clark, supra, 260 Conn. 826. Here, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in

restricting the scope of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim. The trial court, acting under the

specific circumstances present in this case, reasonably

could have determined that allowing defense counsel

to probe the victim regarding the specific dollar amount

claimed in the civil action9 and to introduce the complaint itself into evidence could have led to a more

extensive inquiry by both parties regarding the basis

for the victim’s damages claims, thereby opening the

door to collateral evidence concerning the claims in the

action for, inter alia, past and future medical expenses,

lost earnings and earning capacity, pain and suffering,

and emotional distress—the latter a subject the defendant herself sought to preclude in her motion in limine

due to the prejudicial nature of that evidence. In light

of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court, in

limiting defense counsel’s inquiry into the particulars of

the victim’s civil action, struck an appropriate balance

between the defendant’s right to cross-examination and

her own effort to exclude evidence of the emotional

impact of the assault on the victim and her family. In

sum, and as we previously explained, defense counsel’s

inquiry, taken as a whole, was sufficient to show the

victim’s potential interest or financial motive in testifying as she did.

III

Finally, we turn to the defendant’s claim that the trial

court erred in allowing Myers, a paramedic testifying

as a fact witness, to testify concerning the signs a paramedic looks for in determining whether a patient might

have a concussion. The defendant contends that, because

Myers did not personally examine the victim following

the assault, he should not have been permitted to testify

in his capacity as a paramedic regarding the general

symptoms of a concussion.10 We find no merit in this

contention.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

review of this claim. Prior to Myers’ taking the witness

stand, the trial court indicated that it understood that

Myers might testify regarding not only what he had

witnessed, but also about concussion symptoms as they

relate to his duties as a paramedic. The court further

stated that, before any such questions were asked, the

prosecutor must lay the factual foundation for Myers’

expert testimony, at which time the court would take
up any objection from the defense.

After his initial testimony regarding his observation

of the altercation, Myers testified on direct examination

that he had been employed in emergency medical services for fourteen years, the first four as an emergency

medical technician (EMT) and the last ten as a paramedic. Myers testified that a paramedic has much more

training than an EMT. To become an EMT, he had to

undergo a six month training program. Then, he had to

respond to a certain number of calls as an EMT before

he could apply to paramedic school. Once accepted

into paramedic school, he underwent a one year long

program, which included ‘‘in excess of 200 hours’’ of

clinical rotations at Saint Francis Hospital and Medical

Center. Myers further testified that, as part of his continuing medical education, he was required to complete

thirty-six hours of training each year and that he had

to maintain certifications in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, advanced cardiovascular life support, and pediatric advanced life support. Myers then testified that, in

responding to calls involving motor vehicle accidents

or falls, he deals with the possibility of concussions on

‘‘a regular basis.’’ He also indicated that, during paramedic school, he was trained in the signs and symptoms

of concussions.

At this point, the prosecutor asked Myers what signs

he would look for if he were to respond to a scene where

the patient may have suffered a concussion. Defense

counsel objected to the line of questioning, arguing that

Myers was not ‘‘in a position to opine on the symptoms

and diagnoses of a concussion.’’ The prosecutor, in

response, argued that he was not attempting to ask

Myers whether the victim sustained a concussion, but,

rather, he only intended to ask him about concussion

symptoms generally. The court overruled defense counsel’s objection and allowed Myers to continue testifying.

Myers then testified that, although the signs and

symptoms vary, typically, someone with a concussion

would experience nausea, headache, and dizziness. He

also testified that there can be other symptoms in addition to those and that symptoms can sometimes manifest later on instead of immediately. Finally, Myers testified that he did not assess or treat the victim in any

way on the day in question. He did not opine as to

whether the victim sustained a concussion or exhibited

any symptoms of one. He stated that, in fact, he did

not ‘‘notice anything about the victim at all physically’’

and had no contact with her after separating her from

the defendant.

‘‘We review a trial court’s decision to preclude [or

admit] expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. . . .

We afford our trial courts wide discretion in determining whether to admit expert testimony and, unless the

trial court’s decision is unreasonable, made on untenable grounds . . . or involves a clear misconception of
the law, we will not disturb its decision. . . . Even [i]f

we determine that a court acted improperly with respect

to the admissibility of expert testimony, we will reverse

the trial court’s judgment and grant a new trial only if the

impropriety was harmful to the appealing party. . . .

‘‘The standards for admitting expert testimony are

well established. Expert testimony should be admitted

when: (1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge

directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or

knowledge is not common to the average person, and

(3) the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury

in considering the issues. . . . [T]o render an expert

opinion the witness must be qualified to do so and there

must be a factual basis for the opinion. . . . [See]

Conn. Code Evid. § 7-2 ([a] witness qualified as an

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, education or otherwise may testify in the form of an opinion

or otherwise concerning scientific, technical or other

specialized knowledge, if the testimony will assist the

trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue).’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 317 Conn. 691,

701–702, 119 A.3d 1194 (2015). ‘‘[T]he true test of the

admissibility of [expert] testimony is not whether the

subject matter is common or uncommon, or whether

many persons or few have some knowledge of the matter; but it is whether the witnesses offered as experts

have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to the world, which renders their opinions founded

on such knowledge or experience any aid to the court

or the jury in determining the questions at issue. . . .

Implicit in this standard is the requirement . . . that

the expert’s knowledge or experience . . . be directly

applicable to the matter specifically in issue.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn.

218, 230, 49 A.3d 705 (2012).

Applying these principles to the present case, we have

no difficulty concluding that the trial court correctly

determined that Myers, a paramedic with ten years of

experience and special training in diagnosing concussions, was qualified to testify as an expert witness

regarding signs a paramedic looks for in evaluating a

patient for a concussion. We cannot perceive, and the

defendant does not explain, why the fact that Myers

did not physically examine the victim following the

assault renders his expert testimony on the symptoms

of a concussion inadmissible. One issue before the jury

was whether the victim sustained a serious physical

injury—to wit, a concussion—as a result of the defendant’s assault on her. The trial court acted well within

its discretion in concluding that Myers had special

knowledge suitable to aiding the jury in deciding that

issue.11

Even if the trial court had abused its discretion in

admitting Myers’ testimony regarding the symptoms he
looks for when evaluating a patient for a concussion,

the error was entirely harmless. Myers’ testimony was

merely cumulative of the testimony of three other witnesses—Whipple, Sun, and Asante—all of whom testified similarly on the general presenting symptoms of a

concussion. In addition, Sun and Asante, both of whom

examined the victim following the assault, testified that,

in their expert opinions, the victim sustained a concussion as a result of the assault. In light of the foregoing,

the defendant cannot prevail on her claim that the trial

court’s admission of Myers’ expert testimony entitles

her to a new trial.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* February 10, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the

appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice

Book § 65-1.

2 General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is

guilty of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious

physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such

person or to a third person . . . .’’

3 Count four of the operative information alleged that the defendant committed assault in the second degree when, with the intent to cause serious

physical injury to another person, she caused the victim to suffer a concussion, and count five alleged that the defendant committed assault in the

second degree when, with the intent to cause serious physical injury to

another person, she caused the victim’s face to be disfigured. The trial court

vacated the conviction as to count five pursuant to State v. Polanco, 308

Conn. 242, 61 A.3d 1084 (2013), ‘‘subject to being reinstated should count

four be overturned on appeal,’’ and sentenced the defendant on only count

four. Nevertheless, the defendant argues that, because count five also

required the state to prove that she intended to cause serious physical

injury, and because reversal of her conviction on count four would require

reinstatement of count five, the sufficiency of the evidence argument applies

to both counts.

4 Krupinski testified that she was not sure who the defendant’s boss was

at the time. The victim, however, who had worked for the Southington

public school district for sixteen years, testified that she supervised only

one employee at the time, and that was the defendant. Moreover, the school’s

principal at the time, Erin Nattrass, testified that the victim was responsible

for supervising the school’s technology assistants and that, on the date in

question, the defendant was the school’s technology assistant.

5 Myers testified that, as he removed the defendant from the victim, she

turned and saw his paramedic uniform, ‘‘stopped . . . what she was doing

. . . [and became] compliant with [him].’’ Myers indicated that it ‘‘is not

uncommon’’ for this to occur when he is in uniform.

6 On cross-examination, the following exchange took place between the

prosecutor and the defendant:

‘‘Q. Okay. Did you pursue [the victim] down the hallway when she tried

to get away?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Yes, you went after her. Is that correct?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. And when you went at her, were you still swinging your arms at her?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. You were very angry, yes or no?

‘‘A. At that point, yes.

‘‘Q. Yes. And you wanted to hurt her, did you not? You just punched her

in the nose, she was trying to get away, you continued to go at her with

your arms swinging at her, so, were you trying to hurt her, yes or no?

‘‘A. Yes.’’

7 The defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to take

‘‘judicial notice’’ of the civil complaint but provides no analysis of that issue

independent of her claim that the court improperly precluded admission of
the complaint. Accordingly, we view the former to be subsumed in the latter.

8 At trial, the trial court and the parties used the terms ‘‘bias’’ and ‘‘interest’’

interchangeably to refer to the victim’s alleged motivation to exaggerate

her injuries during her testimony in this case. The parties also use the terms

interchangeably in their briefs to this court in referring to the victim’s alleged

motive to testify falsely regarding the extent of her injuries. Although the

terms have been used interchangeably, we note that they have slightly

different meanings and that, in the present context, any motivation the

victim may have had to exaggerate her testimony or to testify falsely for

financial gain would, in our view, be indicative of her interest, not her bias.

See Conn. Code Evid. § 6-5 (‘‘[t]he credibility of a witness may be impeached

by evidence showing bias for, prejudice against, or interest in any person

or matter that might cause the witness to testify falsely); Conn. Code Evid.

§ 6-5, commentary (‘‘[a] witness may be biased by having a friendly feeling

toward a person or by favoring a certain position based [on] a familial or

employment relationship . . . [or a] witness may have an interest in the

outcome of the case independent of any bias or prejudice when, for example,

he or she has a financial stake in its outcome’’ (citations omitted)).

9 We note that the amount claimed in the civil action—$15,000 or more—

merely conformed to the jurisdictional pleading requirements set forth in

General Statutes § 52-91, and, therefore, there is no indication that the victim

was seeking a particular amount of money.

10 The defendant also appears to argue that Myers could not properly have

testified as both a fact witness and an expert witness. To the extent that

this is the defendant’s contention, it is wholly lacking in merit. See, e.g.,

State v. Tomlinson, 340 Conn. 533, 553 n.7, 264 A.3d 950 (2021) (noting that

expert witnesses often testify in dual capacity as both expert and fact

witness); see also, e.g., State v. Dawson, 340 Conn. 136, 141 nn.7 and 8, 263

A.3d 779 (2021) (police officer who testified as fact witness regarding what

he observed also testified as expert on criminal behavior generally); State

v. Collins, 206 Conn. App. 438, 443–44, 260 A.3d 507 (police officer who

testified as fact witness regarding his execution of search warrant also

testified as expert witness about items that crack cocaine and heroin dealers

usually have in their homes), cert. denied, 339 Conn. 914, 262 A.3d 135 (2021).

Moreover, § 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence does not ‘‘require an

explicit offer and acceptance of a witness as an expert in order for the

witness to be treated as an expert witness’’; Nicholson v. Commissioner of

Correction, 186 Conn. App. 398, 421, 199 A.3d 573 (2018), cert. denied, 330

Conn. 961, 199 A.3d 19, cert. denied sub nom. Nicholson v. Cook, U.S.

, 140 S. Ct. 70, 205 L. Ed. 2d 76 (2019); and, therefore, the trial court did

not err in treating Myers as an expert witness—notwithstanding the fact

that he was originally testifying as a fact witness—once his qualifications

were established on the record. We note, finally, that the defendant does

not claim that the state failed to provide her adequate notice of its intent

to call Myers as an expert witness. Pursuant to Practice Book § 40-11 (a)

(3), upon written request by the defendant, the state is required to disclose

‘‘[a]ny reports or statements of experts made in connection with the offense

charged including results of . . . scientific tests, experiments or comparisons which are material to the preparation of the defense or are intended

for use by the prosecuting authority as evidence in chief at the trial . . . .’’

See also State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 812, 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (it was

abuse of discretion for trial court to allow state’s late disclosed expert

witness to testify without first granting defendant reasonable continuance

to obtain his own expert). The record before us discloses that the defendant

did not file any written discovery request under Practice Book § 40-11 (a)

(3) for the reports or statements of the state’s experts; nor did she raise an

issue of lack of notice before the trial court or anytime thereafter.

11 The defendant cites Kairon v. Burnham, 120 Conn. App. 291, 991 A.2d

675, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 906, 995 A.2d 634 (2010), and State v. Pjura,

68 Conn. App. 119, 789 A.2d 1124 (2002), in support of his claim that the

trial court’s decision to admit Myers’ testimony was error. We disagree that

either case supports the defendant’s claim. Kairon and Pjura both dealt

with experts who were called on to opine on the ultimate issue in the

case, namely, whether the defendant had committed medical malpractice

in Kairon; see Kairon v. Burnham, supra, 295–96; and whether the defendant was intoxicated in Pjura. See State v. Pjura, supra, 121. In the present

case, Myers was not asked to and did not testify as to an ultimate issue,

namely, whether the victim had sustained a serious physical injury—a concussion. He simply testified regarding the common symptoms of a concussion, on the basis of his ten years of experience as an EMT and a paramedic.
Kairon and Pjura therefore have no bearing on the outcome of this case.