This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

38982 

Vol. 83, No. 153 

Wednesday, August 8, 2018 

1The Department proposed 10 CFR part 820 (Part 

820), Procedural Rules for DOE Nuclear Activities, 

to establish the procedural requirements for 

enforcement activities in accordance with PAAA. 

On August 17, 1993, the Department issued the 

Procedural Regulations for DOE Nuclear Activities 

in final form as 10 CFR part 820 (58 FR 43680). Part 

820 establishes the procedures for DOE enforcement 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

10 CFR Part 830 

RIN 1992–AA57 

Nuclear Safety Management 

AGENCY: Office of Environment, Health, 

Safety and Security, U.S. Department of 

Energy. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

and notice of public meetings. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy 

(DOE or the Department) publishes a 

proposed rule to amend regulations 

concerning nuclear safety management. 

These regulations govern the conduct of 

DOE contractors, DOE personnel, and 

other persons conducting activities 

(including providing items and services) 

that affect, or may affect, the safety of 

DOE nuclear facilities. The proposed 

revisions reflect the experience gained 

in the implementation of the regulations 

over the past seventeen years, with 

specific improvements to the process for 

facility hazard categorization, the 

unreviewed safety question process, and 

the review and approval of safety 

documentation. The proposed revisions 

are intended to enhance operational 

efficiency while maintaining robust 

safety performance. 

DATES: Public comment on this 

proposed rule will be accepted until 

October 9, 2018. For dates and more 

information on the public meetings for 

this proposed rulemaking, see 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by RIN 1992–AA57, by any of 

the following methods: 

1. Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

2. Email: Rulemaking.830@

hq.doe.gov. Include RIN 1992–AA57 in 

the subject line of the email. Please 

include the full body of your comments 

in the text of the message or as an 

attachment. 

3. Mail: U.S. Department of Energy, 

Office of Nuclear Safety, AU–30, 1000 

Independence Avenue SW, Washington, 

DC 20585. 

Due to potential delays in DOE’s 

receipt and processing of mail sent 

through the U.S. Postal Service, we 

encourage respondents to submit 

comments electronically to ensure 

timely receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Garrett Smith, U.S. Department of 

Energy, Office of Nuclear Safety, AU– 

30, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, 

Washington, DC 20585; (301) 903–2996 

or nuclearsafety@hq.doe.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Public 

meetings for this proposed rulemaking 

will be held in: 

1. Richland, WA at the HAMMER 

Federal Training Facility, Building 

6091, Room 10, 2890 Horn Rapids Road, 

Richland, WA, on August 16th, 2018. 

2. Albuquerque, NM at the 

Albuquerque Marriott, Sandia Room, 

2101 Louisiana Blvd. NE, Albuquerque, 

NM, on September 6th, 2018. 

3. Oak Ridge, TN at the Oak Ridge 

Associated Universities, Pollard 

Technology Conference Center 

Auditorium, 210 Badger Avenue, Oak 

Ridge, TN, on September 25th, 2018. 

4. Aiken, SC at the University of 

South Carolina—Aiken, Business and 

Education Building, Room 124, 471 

University Parkway, Aiken, SC, on 

September 27th, 2018. 

All public meetings will be held from 

1 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. and from 6 p.m. to 

8:30 p.m. local time. Interested persons 

who wish to speak at the public meeting 

should telephone the Office of Nuclear 

Safety, (301) 903–2996, by 4:30 p.m. 

Eastern Time on August 13th, 2018 for 

Richland, WA, on August 31st, 2018 for 

Albuquerque, NM, on September 18th, 

2018 for Oak Ridge, TN, and on 

September 20th, 2018 for Aiken, SC. 

Each presentation is limited to 20 

minutes. 

I. Introduction and Background 

A. Introduction 

B. Procedural History of the Rule 

II. Discussion of Proposed Rule 

A. Discussion of Key Proposed Changes 

B. Proposed Changes in Order of 

Appearance 

III. Public Comment Procedures 

A. Written Comments 

B. Public Meetings 

IV. Regulatory Review 

A. Review Under Executive Order 12866 

B. Review Under Executive Orders 13771 

and 13777 

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

D. Paperwork Reduction Act 

E. National Environmental Policy Act 

F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 

G. Treasury and General Government 

Appropriations Act, 1999 

H. Executive Order 13132 

I. Executive Order 12988 

J. Treasury and General Government 

Appropriations Act, 2001 

K. Executive Order 13211 

V. Approval of the Office of the Secretary 

I. Introduction and Background 

A. Introduction 

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954, as amended (the AEA), the 

Department of Energy (DOE or the 

Department) owns and leases nuclear 

and non-nuclear facilities at various 

locations in the United States. These 

facilities are operated either by DOE or 

by contractors with DOE oversight. 

Activities at these facilities include, but 

are not limited to: Research, testing, 

production, disassembly, or transporting 

nuclear materials. DOE regulations 

governing nuclear safety at these 

facilities are set forth in the Nuclear 

Safety Management rule (10 CFR part 

830). The regulations were issued in 

response to external assessments from 

the National Academy of Sciences 

(NAS), the enactment of the PriceAnderson Amendments Act of 1988 

(PAAA), and DOE efforts to improve 

safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Aspects 

of 10 CFR part 830 were finalized and 

issued from 1994 to 2001, covering core 

safety requirements for quality 

assurance and facility safety basis. Over 

the past 17 years, DOE has gained 

considerable experience in the 

implementation of 10 CFR part 830, and 

is proposing to modify the requirements 

to incorporate that experience and help 

ensure more effective safety 

performance. 

B. Procedural History of the Rule 

On December 9, 1991, DOE published 

Procedural Rules for DOE Nuclear 

Activities (56 FR 64290) and a Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking and Public 

Hearing (1991 Notice, 56 FR 64316) to 

add Parts 820 and 830 to Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR).1 Title 


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actions and for issuing civil and criminal penalties 

for contractor, subcontractor, and supplier 

violations of DOE nuclear safety requirements. 

10 CFR part 830 was proposed to 

establish safety management 

requirements for DOE nuclear facilities. 

DOE issued, as final, the sections of 10 

CFR part 830 related to the initial 

provisions (§§ 830.1–830.7) and Subpart 

A—General Provisions, (§§ 830.100– 

830.120) on April 5, 1994 (1994 Notice, 

59 FR 15843). 

The Department issued a Notice of 

Limited Reopening of the Comment 

Periods for the remaining topics to be 

addressed in 10 CFR part 830 on August 

31, 1995, and for a second, unrelated, 

rule (Reopening Notice, 60 FR 45381). 

On October 10, 2000, the Department 

published an Interim Final Rule and 

Opportunity for Public Comment (65 FR 

60291) which amended the nuclear 

safety regulations to (1) establish and 

maintain safety bases for Hazard 

Category 1, 2, and 3 DOE nuclear 

facilities and perform work in 

accordance with safety bases, and (2) 

clarify that the quality assurance work 

process requirements apply to standards 

and controls adopted to meet regulatory 

or contract requirements that may affect 

nuclear safety (Interim Final Rule). The 

Interim Final Rule was also issued to 

provide further opportunity for public 

comment on the rule. 

Following the public comment 

period, the Department issued a Final 

Rule on January 10, 2001 (66 FR 1810). 

II. Discussion of Proposed Rule 

A. Discussion of Key Proposed Changes 

1. DOE Standard 1027—Section 

830.202 of the regulations requires that 

DOE nuclear facilities be categorized 

consistent with DOE–STD–1027–92 

(‘‘Hazard Categorization and Accident 

Analysis Techniques for compliance 

with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety 

Analysis Reports,’’ Change Notice 1, 

September 1997). The Department 

continues to believe that the 

methodology in DOE–STD–1027–92 Ch 

1 is sufficient and supports the 

categorization of DOE nuclear facilities. 

In 2001, when Subpart B of 10 CFR part 

830 was issued, not every Hazard 

Category 1, 2, and 3 DOE nuclear facility 

was categorized using a standardized 

methodology, and therefore consistent 

application of the cited reference, 

without change, was appropriate. 

DOE now proposes, after two decades 

of experience in facility categorization 

using DOE–STD–1027–92, Ch 1, to 

amend § 830.202(b)(3) by adding ‘‘or 

successor document’’. This change 

would allow the Department to revise 

the standard to include up-to-date 

research, data, and DOE experience with 

implementation. This would be 

consistent with DOE’s practice to 

periodically evaluate and revise DOE 

Technical Standards and would follow 

the development, review, and approval 

process described in DOE Order 252.1A, 

Technical Standards Program. The 

Technical Standards Program process 

requires concurrence from all affected 

Departmental elements prior to issuance 

of any standard. 

DOE also proposes to amend Section 

C, Scope, of Appendix A to remove the 

reference to the specific version of 

DOE–STD–1027, for consistency with 

the revision in § 830.202. DOE would 

also remove Table 1 of Appendix A and 

replace that table with a definition for 

Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 DOE 

nuclear facilities in § 830.3 that 

references DOE–STD–1027–92 or 

successor document. The removal of 

Table 1 would allow successor revisions 

to more clearly link the determination of 

Hazard Category 1, 2, 3, and below 

hazard category 3 to the methodology in 

the Standard. The concept that Hazard 

Category 1 will have higher potential 

consequences and Hazard Category 3 

will have lower potential consequences 

will be maintained throughout all 

successor documents of DOE–STD– 

1027. 

2. Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) 

Process—A situation or potential 

situation outside the bounds of the 

current safety analysis for a Hazard 

Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facility (as 

documented in its approved safety 

analysis) constitutes an Unreviewed 

Safety Question under the current 

regulations. Section 830.203 allows 

contractors to make changes to the 

facility, to change site or facility 

procedures, and to conduct tests and/or 

experiments without prior DOE 

approval when these activities do not 

involve an Unreviewed Safety Question 

and do not require any change to 

Technical Safety Requirements. 

The proposed change to Appendix A 

to Subpart B of 10 CFR part 830— 

General Statement of Safety Basis 

Policy, H, Unreviewed Safety Questions, 

would add the sentence, ‘‘The 

contractor is allowed to make editorial 

and format changes to its USQ 

procedure while maintaining DOE 

approval.’’ This proposal would focus 

the requirement to obtain DOE’s 

approval on changes with the potential 

to impact on the safety basis of the 

facility. 

DOE also proposes to modify § 830.3, 

Definitions, by changing the definition 

for Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). 

The current definition includes four 

situations that define a USQ: (1) The 

probability of the occurrence or the 

consequences of an accident or the 

malfunction of equipment important to 

safety previously evaluated in the 

documented safety analysis (DSA) could 

be increased; (2) The possibility of an 

accident or malfunction of a different 

type than any evaluated previously in 

the documented safety analysis could be 

created; or (3) A margin of safety could 

be reduced; or (4) The documented 

safety analysis may not be bounding or 

may be otherwise inadequate. As 

explained in the following paragraphs, 

the proposed definition would remove 

the third situation: ‘‘A margin of safety 

could be reduced’’. 

The current set of four situations that 

define an USQ in 10 CFR 830.3 reflected 

standard nuclear industry practice and 

was an adaptation of 10 CFR 50.59, 

changes, tests and experiments, used by 

the United States Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC). The NRC, in 1968, 

added to § 50.59 the concept of ‘‘margin 

of safety as defined in the basis for any 

technical specification is reduced.’’ In 

issuing 10 CFR part 830, DOE modified 

this question to simply read ‘‘A margin 

of safety could be reduced’’. In addition 

to adapting the NRC process, DOE 

included the situation of ‘‘(4) The 

documented safety analysis may not be 

bounding or may otherwise be 

inadequate.’’ 

The NRC, after 30 years of experience 

implementing § 50.59, issued an 

October 21, 1998, Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking to change the criteria 

associated with margin of safety, 

explaining that ‘‘the phrases ‘margin of 

safety’ and ‘as defined in the basis for 

any technical specification’ in the third 

criterion have been the subject of 

differing interpretations because the 

rule does not define what constitutes a 

margin of safety or a basis for any 

technical specification in the context of 

§§ 50.59 and 72.48. In addition, some 

have questioned the need for the third 

criterion on ‘margin of safety.’ ’’ The 

third criterion refers to the existence of 

two prior questions associated with 

creation, consequences, and likelihood 

of accidents and equipment 

malfunction. The revision to 10 CFR 

part 50 removing the term ‘‘margin of 

safety’’ from 10 CFR 50.59 was issued as 

a final rule on October 4, 1999. 

DOE’s experience with the margin of 

safety criteria is similar to that 

expressed by the NRC in its rulemaking, 

specifically, that the other existing 

criteria provide sufficient guidance to 

identify facility and safety basis changes 

that warrant DOE approval. Feedback 

from periodic surveys considering a 

broad-range of USQ determinations 

indicated that the ‘‘margin of safety’’ 


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2 DOE’s implementation guidance associated with 

these criteria is DOE G 424.1–1B Chg 2, 

Implementation Guide for Use in Addressing 

Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements. Based 

on the four criteria defining a situation involving 

a USQ in 10 CFR part 830, DOE G 424.1–1B Chg 

2 contains seven questions. The last question 

related to the concept of the margin of safety. If 

DOE adopts this proposal in a final rule, DOE 

would also conduct a process to consider removal 

of the question from the DOE Guide. 

criterion has not provided benefit 

independent of the criteria DOE is 

retaining in the definition of the USQ 

process. In addition, stakeholder 

feedback noted that the ‘‘margin of 

safety’’ criterion was subjectively 

interpreted and often diverted safety 

resources without a corresponding 

safety benefit. Therefore, the proposed 

removal of the criterion related to 

‘‘margin of safety’’ would enhance DOE 

and contractor operational effectiveness, 

without reducing the level of safety 

provided by the current practice. The 

current practice allows contractors to 

conduct certain specified activities 

without prior DOE approval, when these 

activities do not cause an Unreviewed 

Safety Question (and when they do not 

require Technical Safety Requirements 

changes).2

3. DOE Approval of Annual DSA 

Updates—As stated above, DOE 

currently requires the contractor, in 

§ 830.203, Unreviewed Safety Question 

process, to obtain DOE approval prior to 

taking any action determined to involve 

a USQ. Additionally, in § 830.202 Safety 

basis, DOE requires the contractor to 

annually submit to DOE either the 

updated DSA for approval or a letter 

stating that there have been no changes 

in the DSA since the prior submission. 

This effectively requires the contractor 

to submit changes to the DSA for DOE 

approval twice. Currently, DOE 

provides implementation guidance for 

this approval process in DOE–STD– 

1104–2016, Review and Approval of 

Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety 

Design Basis Documents, Section 7.1.2, 

Review of Safety Basis Changes and 

DSA Annual Updates. The guidance 

states that ‘‘Review and approval of 

revisions and annual updates are a 

matter of endorsing the incorporation of 

changes in the safety basis since the last 

approval rather than performing a new 

assessment of the previously approved 

safety basis documents.’’ While the 

guidance is clear in the intent to drive 

focus of DOE’s approval to the change 

identified in the USQ process, the 

regulations’ additional requirement for a 

second approval has led to considerable 

implementation challenges, and 

unnecessary review iterations without 

providing additional safety benefit. 

Therefore, DOE is proposing to 

change the requirement in § 830.202, 

Safety basis, to require the current DSA 

be provided to DOE annually, but not to 

require DOE approval at that time. 

Additional guidance would also be 

included in Appendix A to Subpart B of 

10 CFR part 830—General Statement of 

Safety Basis Policy, F, Documented 

Safety Analysis, to make clear that 

DOE’s review and approval of the safety 

analysis is intended to be focused on 

changes submitted through the USQ 

process, but may require DOE approval 

if DOE has reason to believe a portion 

of the safety basis has substantially 

changed. DOE would continue to have 

the authority to review the safety basis 

at any time. DOE would maintain the 

ability to direct the contractor to 

incorporate in the safety basis any 

changes, conditions, or hazard controls. 

4. Definition and Application of New 

Facilities, Major Modification, 

Preliminary Documented Safety 

Analysis, and Existing Facilities—The 

current definitions of a New DOE 

nuclear facility, Major Modification, 

Preliminary documented safety 

analysis, and Existing DOE nuclear 

facility (and applications of those 

definitions within the rule) reference 

specific dates related to the issuance of 

the rule and the need to bring DOE 

nuclear facilities into the regulatory 

framework. DOE is proposing to change 

the definitions to clearly recognize that 

all current DOE nuclear facilities are 

already within this regulatory 

framework and that new DOE nuclear 

facilities would be those that are in 

design or under construction that do not 

yet have a DOE approved safety basis. 

Additionally, the specific definition of 

an existing DOE nuclear facility is being 

proposed to be deleted. DOE proposes 

instead to rely upon a new definition of 

Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 DOE 

nuclear facilities and the specific 

endpoint of a DOE approved safety basis 

to delineate between a new facility and 

an existing facility. 

DOE also proposes to change the 

definition of a Major modification to 

remove the completion date of the 

facility. The definition would rely upon 

a criteria of a substantial change to the 

existing safety basis for the facility. This 

would link the meaning of ‘‘Major 

modification’’ to changes to existing 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear 

facilities via the existence of a safety 

basis for the facility. Furthermore, 

additional clarity is proposed within 10 

CFR part 830, subpart B, to highlight 

that the concept of ‘‘Major 

modification’’ would only apply to 

existing Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 

nuclear facilities (i.e., nuclear facilities 

with an approved safety basis). 

DOE proposes to change the 

definition of Preliminary documented 

safety analysis to maintain consistency 

with other proposed changes to the 

definitions related to nuclear facilities. 

B. Proposed Changes in Order of 

Appearance 

The specific proposed changes to 10 

CFR part 830 are summarized below in 

the order in which they appear: 

1. In proposed § 830.3 ‘‘Definitions,’’ 

the current definition for Existing DOE 

nuclear facility would be deleted, a 

definition for Hazard Category 1, 2, and 

3 DOE nuclear facilities has been 

proposed, and there would be a 

modification of the current definition of 

New Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 DOE 

nuclear facility. These changes are 

designed to improve the delineation 

between new and existing facilities. The 

definition for Major modification would 

be changed to remove the effective date 

associated with the original issuance of 

the rule. The definition for Preliminary 

documented safety analysis would be 

changed to better reflect the intent of 

preliminary documented safety analysis 

being associated with Hazard Category 

1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facilities rather 

than all DOE nuclear facilities. The 

definition for Safety management 

system would be changed to include the 

specific title of 48 CFR 970.5223–1, 

Integration of environment, safety, and 

health into work planning and 

execution. The definition for 

Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) 

would be changed by adding ‘‘or’’ to the 

end of (2), deleting ‘‘(3) A margin of 

safety could be reduced; or’’, and 

renumbering (4) as (3). 

2. In proposed § 830.201 

‘‘Performance of Work,’’ current 

§ 830.201 would be changed by adding 

‘‘DOE-approved’’ to modify safety basis 

to maintain consistency with § 830.207, 

DOE approval of safety basis. 

3. Proposed § 830.202(b)(3) would be 

changed to add ‘‘or successor 

document’’ to modify DOE–STD–1027– 

92 (‘‘Hazard Categorization and 

Accident Analysis Techniques for 

compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, 

Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports,’’ 

Change Notice 1, September 1997). This 

proposed change would allow DOE to 

modify the methodology used to 

perform hazard categorization 

consistent with DOE’s policy of 

maintaining technical standards to 

reflect updated knowledge and 

methods. Current § 830.202(c)(2) would 

be changed to read, ‘‘(2) Annually 

provide DOE the current documented 

safety analysis or a letter stating that 


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there have been no changes in the 

documented safety analysis since the 

prior submittal; and’’. These proposed 

changes reflect the removal of the 

requirement for DOE to annually 

approve the documented safety analysis, 

and are intended to focus DOE’s 

approval on the existing requirement to 

approve changes through the USQ 

process. 

4. In proposed § 830.203 ‘‘Unreviewed 

safety question process,’’ current 

§ 830.203(a) would be changed by 

adding ‘‘DOE-approved’’ as a modifier 

to USQ, and by changing the word 

‘‘process’’ to ‘‘procedure’’. These 

proposed changes are to clarify the 

connection between references to the 

DOE-approved procedure in proposed 

§ 830.203(a), § 830.203(b), and 

§ 830.203(c). Current § 830.203(b) would 

be deleted, since DOE no longer has 

existing facilities operating outside of 10 

CFR part 830. In the current 

§ 830.203(c), which is proposed to be 

redesignated as § 830.203(b), the word 

‘‘new’’ has been proposed to be moved 

to match a proposed change in the 

definition of New Hazard Category 1, 2, 

and 3 nuclear facility, and ‘‘207(d)’’ 

would be changed to ‘‘207(a)’’ to reflect 

changes to § 830.207. Current 

§ 830.203(d) would be redesignated as 

§ 830.203(c). Current § 830.203(e) would 

be redesignated as § 830.203(d). Current 

§ 830.203(f) would be redesignated as 

§ 830.203(e), ‘‘submit’’ would be 

replaced by ‘‘provide’’, and 

‘‘submissions’’ would be replaced by 

‘‘submittal’’ to better reflect that the 

document is being given to DOE for 

review, but not for approval. Current 

§ 830.203(g) would be redesignated as 

§ 830.203(f), and the text would be 

changed to read ‘‘initiated to meet 

paragraph (f)(1) of this section’’ 

consistent with citation changes in this 

section. 

5. In proposed § 830.204 

‘‘Documented safety analysis,’’ current 

§ 830.204(a) would be updated by 

changing ‘‘Table 2’’ to ‘‘Table 1’’ to 

reflect the deletion of Table 1 and renumbering of subsequent tables. 

6. In proposed § 830.206 ‘‘Preliminary 

documented safety analysis,’’ current 

§ 830.206 would be changed to read 

‘‘Prior to construction of a new Hazard 

Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility 

or a major modification to an existing 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility, the contractor responsible for 

the design and construction of the new 

facility or major modification must:’’ To 

reflect changes to the definitions in 

§ 830.3. Current § 830.206(b)(1) would 

be changed to add, ‘‘, or successor 

document’’ as a modifier to ‘‘DOE Order 

420.1, Facility Safety’’ to reflect the 

ongoing updates to the current version 

of the DOE order. 

7. In proposed § 830.207 ‘‘DOE 

approval of safety basis,’’ current 

§ 830.207(a) would be deleted, as DOE 

no longer has existing Hazard Category 

1, 2, or 3 facilities operated outside of 

10 CFR part 830. Current § 830.207(b) 

would be changed by adding ‘‘updated 

or amended’’ to modify ‘‘safety basis’’, 

moving the word ‘‘existing’’ to before 

the phrase ‘‘Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 

DOE nuclear facility’’ to better match 

the revised definition, and by deleting 

‘‘in effect on October 10, 2000, or as 

approved by DOE at a later date’’ to 

reflect that all Hazard Category 1, 2, or 

3 DOE nuclear facilities already operate 

within 10 CFR part 830. Current 

§ 830.207(c) would be deleted, as DOE 

no longer has existing Hazard Category 

1, 2, or 3 facilities operated outside of 

10 CFR part 830. Current § 830.207(d) 

would be redesignated as § 830.207(a) 

and updated to reflect the changes in 

definitions in § 830.3. As a result, the 

proposed § 830.207(a) would now read 

as: ‘‘With respect to a new Hazard 

Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility 

or a major modification to an existing 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility, a contractor may not begin 

operation of the facility or modification 

prior to the issuance of a safety 

evaluation report in which DOE 

approves the safety basis for the facility 

or modification.’’ 

8. In proposed Appendix A to Subpart 

B to 10 CFR part 830—General 

Statement of Safety Basis Policy current 

‘‘A. Introduction’’ would be modified by 

replacing a reference to an outdated 

DOE Policy with a specific statement 

that reflects current DOE policy and 

would now read as follows, ‘‘This 

Appendix does not create any new 

requirements and should be used 

consistently with DOE’s policy that 

work be conducted safely and efficiently 

and in a manner that ensures protection 

of workers, the public, and the 

environment.’’ 

9. In proposed Appendix A to Subpart 

B to 10 CFR part 830—General 

Statement of Safety Basis Policy current 

‘‘C. Scope, 1.’’ would be changed by 

replacing the reference to ‘‘DOE–STD– 

1027–92 Change Notice 1, September 

1997’’ with a general reference to DOE– 

STD–1027 to reflect the proposed 

change to allow successor versions of 

DOE–STD–1027 to be used, the 

reference to ‘‘Table 1’’ would be deleted 

to reflect the proposed deletion of Table 

1. The proposed sentences now would 

read, ‘‘A contractor must establish and 

maintain a safety basis for a Hazard 

Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility 

because these facilities have the 

potential for significant radiological 

consequences. DOE–STD–1027 sets 

forth the methodology for categorizing a 

DOE nuclear facility based on the 

inventory of radioactive materials.’’ 

Current ‘‘C. Scope, 2.’’ Would be 

changed to delete the parenthetical 

reference to ‘‘including radiological 

facilities’’, and by adding ‘‘DOE’’ to the 

reference to Hazard Category 1, 2, and 

3 nuclear facilities to match changes to 

definitions within § 830.3. Current ‘‘C. 

Scope’’ Table 1 is proposed for deletion 

for consistency with the proposal to 

allow use of subsequent versions of 

DOE–STD–1027, since Table 1 

references the specific content of DOE– 

STD–1027–92, Change Notice 1, 

September 1997. 

10. In proposed Appendix A to 

Subpart B to 10 CFR part 830—General 

Statement of Safety Basis Policy, current 

‘‘E. Enforcement of Safety Basis 

Requirements, 4.’’ would be changed by 

deleting the word ‘‘however’’ to 

improve clarity. 

11. In proposed Appendix A to 

Subpart B to 10 CFR part 830—General 

Statement of Safety Basis Policy current 

‘‘F. Documented Safety Analysis, 3.’’ 

would be changed by adding ‘‘as: (1) 

part of the initial submittal; (2) when 

revisions are submitted as part of a 

positive USQ or major modification; (3) 

if DOE has reason to believe a portion 

of the safety basis to be inadequate, or; 

(4) if DOE has reason to believe a 

portion of the safety basis has 

substantially changed. DOE will review 

the DSA’’ to better define when and 

why DOE would review a DSA. This 

change is proposed to be consistent with 

proposed changes to DOE’s requirement 

to annually approve the DSA. Current 

‘‘F. Documented Safety Analysis, 3.’’ 

would also be changed by adding ‘‘in 

the Safety Evaluation Report’’ to the end 

of the last sentence in that section, 

which currently reads, ‘‘A documented 

safety analysis must contain any 

conditions or changes required by 

DOE.’’ This change is proposed to 

clarify how DOE directs conditions and 

changes required by DOE. Additionally, 

Current ‘‘F. Documented Safety 

Analysis, 3.’’ would be changed by 

adding the following sentences, 

‘‘Generally, DOE’s review of the annual 

submittal may be limited to ensuring 

that the results of USQs have been 

adequately incorporated into the DSA. If 

additional changes are proposed by the 

contractor and included in the annual 

update that have not been previously 

approved by DOE or have not been 

evaluated as a part of the USQ process, 

DOE must review and approve these 

changes. DOE has the authority to 

review the safety basis at any time.’’ 


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This proposed change is in support of 

focusing DOE’s approval of changes in 

the DSA to the incorporation of USQ’s 

or as DOE determines are necessary to 

maintain safe operations, rather than the 

previous annual process. Current ‘‘F. 

Documented Safety Analysis, 4.’’ would 

be changed by renumbering the 

reference to ‘‘Table 2’’ to ‘‘Table 1’’ to 

reflect the deletion of Table 1. Current 

‘‘F. Documented Safety Analysis’’ 

would be changed by changing the title 

of ‘‘Table 2’’ to ‘‘Table 1’’ to reflect the 

deletion of Table 1. Current ‘‘F. 

Documented Safety Analysis, 5.’’ would 

be changed by renumbering the 

reference to ‘‘Table 2’’ to ‘‘Table 1’’ to 

reflect the deletion of Table 1, by 

changing the reference to the definition 

of nuclear facility to re-state the existing 

definition within § 830.3 instead of 

paraphrasing the definition, by 

renumbering the reference to ‘‘Table 3’’ 

to ‘‘Table 2’’ to reflect the deletion of 

Table 1, and by replacing ‘‘specific 

nuclear facilities’’ with ‘‘terms’’ in 

reference to the content within Table 1. 

Current ‘‘F. Documented Safety 

Analysis’’ would be changed by 

renumbering the title of ‘‘Table 3’’ to 

‘‘Table 2’’ to reflect the proposed 

deletion of Table 1 and changing the 

reference to ‘‘Table 2’’ to ‘‘Table 1’’ to 

reflect the proposed deletion of Table 1. 

Current ‘‘F. Documented Safety 

Analysis, 6.’’ would be changed to 

delete the phrase ‘‘If construction begins 

after December 11, 2000’’ and by adding 

‘‘or successor document’’ as a modifier 

to ‘‘DOE Order 420.1, Facility Safety’’ to 

reflect the ongoing updates to the 

current version of the DOE order. 

12. In proposed Appendix A to 

Subpart B to 10 CFR part 830—General 

Statement of Safety Basis Policy current 

‘‘G. Hazard Controls, 2.’’ would be 

changed to add ‘‘or successor 

document’’ as a modifier to ‘‘DOE Order 

420.1, Facility Safety’’ to reflect the 

ongoing updates to the current version 

of the DOE order. Current ‘‘G. Hazard 

Controls, 4.’’ would be changed to 

update the reference to DOE Guide 

423.1–1B and by adding, ‘‘or successor 

document’’ to reflect the ongoing 

updates to the current version of the 

DOE guide. Current ‘‘G. Hazard 

Controls, 4.’’ would be changed by 

changing the reference to ‘‘Table 4’’ to 

‘‘Table 3’’ to reflect the proposed 

deletion of Table 1. Current ‘‘G. Hazard 

Controls’’ would be changed by 

changing the title of the table from 

‘‘Table 4’’ to ‘‘Table 3’’ to reflect the 

proposed deletion of Table 1. 

13. In proposed Appendix A to 

Subpart B to 10 CFR part 830—General 

Statement of Safety Basis Policy current 

‘‘H. Unreviewed Safety Questions, 3.’’ 

Would be changed to update the 

reference to DOE Guide 424.1–1B Chg 2, 

to update the title of the referenced 

guide to ‘‘Implementation Guide for Use 

in Addressing Unreviewed Safety 

Question Requirements,’’ to add ‘‘or 

successor document’’ to reflect the 

ongoing updates to the current version 

of the DOE guide, and by adding the 

sentence, ‘‘The contractor is allowed to 

make editorial and format changes to its 

USQ procedure while maintaining DOE 

approval.’’ The additional sentence 

wold be provided to better delineate 

those aspects of the USQ process on 

which DOE approval focuses. 

14. Throughout 10 CFR part 830, the 

term ‘‘Hazard Category’’ would be 

capitalized to improve consistency with 

the usage within the DOE regulatory 

structure. 

III. Public Comment Procedures 

A. Written Comments 

Interested persons are invited to 

participate in this proceeding by 

submitting data, views, or arguments. 

Written comments should be submitted 

to the address, and in the form, 

indicated in the ADDRESSES section of 

this notice of proposed rulemaking. To 

help DOE review the comments, 

interested persons are asked to refer to 

specific proposed rule provisions, if 

possible. 

If you submit information that you 

believe to be exempt by law from public 

disclosure, you should submit one 

complete copy, as well as one copy from 

which the information claimed to be 

exempt by law from public disclosure 

has been deleted. DOE is responsible for 

the final determination with regard to 

disclosure or nondisclosure of the 

information and for treating it 

accordingly under the DOE Freedom of 

Information regulations at 10 CFR 

1004.11. 

B. Public Meetings 

Public meetings will be held at the 

times, dates, and places indicated at the 

start of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

section of this notice of proposed 

rulemaking. Any person who is 

interested in making an oral 

presentation should make a phone 

request to the person and telephone 

number in the SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION section by 4:30 p.m. on the 

date specified for making such requests. 

The person should provide a daytime 

phone number where he or she can be 

reached. Each oral presentation will be 

limited to 20 minutes. Persons making 

an oral presentation are requested to 

bring 3 copies of their prepared 

statement to the meeting and submit 

them to the registration desk prior to the 

meeting. 

IV. Regulatory Review 

A. Review Under Executive Order 12866 

This notice of proposed rulemaking 

has been determined not to be a 

significant regulatory action under 

Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory 

Planning and Review,’’ 58 FR 51735 

(Oct. 4, 1993). Accordingly, this notice 

of proposed rulemaking was not subject 

to review by the Office of Information 

and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of 

Management and Budget. 

B. Review Under Executive Orders 

13771 and 13777 

On January 30, 2017, the President 

issued Executive Order 13771, 

‘‘Reducing Regulation and Controlling 

Regulatory Costs.’’ That Order stated the 

policy of the executive branch is to be 

prudent and financially responsible in 

the expenditure of funds, from both 

public and private sources. The Order 

stated it is essential to manage the costs 

associated with the governmental 

imposition of private expenditures 

required to comply with Federal 

regulations. This proposed rule is 

expected to be an E.O. 13771 

deregulatory action. 

Additionally, on February 24, 2017, 

the President issued Executive Order 

13777, ‘‘Enforcing the Regulatory 

Reform Agenda.’’ The Order required 

the head of each agency designate an 

agency official as its Regulatory Reform 

Officer (RRO). Each RRO oversees the 

implementation of regulatory reform 

initiatives and policies to ensure that 

agencies effectively carry out regulatory 

reforms, consistent with applicable law. 

Further, E.O. 13777 requires the 

establishment of a regulatory task force 

at each agency. The regulatory task force 

is required to make recommendations to 

the agency head regarding the repeal, 

replacement, or modification of existing 

regulations, consistent with applicable 

law. At a minimum, each regulatory 

reform task force must attempt to 

identify regulations that: 

(i) Eliminate jobs, or inhibit job 

creation; 

(ii) Are outdated, unnecessary, or 

ineffective; 

(iii) Impose costs that exceed benefits; 

(iv) Create a serious inconsistency or 

otherwise interfere with regulatory 

reform initiatives and policies; 

(v) Are inconsistent with the 

requirements of Information Quality 

Act, or the guidance issued pursuant to 

that Act, in particular those regulations 

that rely in whole or in part on data, 

information, or methods that are not 


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publicly available or that are 

insufficiently transparent to meet the 

standard for reproducibility; or 

(vi) Derive from or implement 

Executive Orders or other Presidential 

directives that have been subsequently 

rescinded or substantially modified. 

DOE concludes that this final rule is 

consistent with the directives set forth 

in these executive orders. This 

provisions in this proposed rule are 

intended, as described in section II, to 

enhance operational efficiency while 

maintaining robust safety performance 

at DOE nuclear facilities. 

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 

U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires preparation 

of an initial regulatory flexibility 

analysis for any rule that by law must 

be proposed for public comment, unless 

the agency certifies that the rule, if 

promulgated, will not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. As required by 

Executive Order 13272, ‘‘Proper 

Consideration of Small Entities in 

Agency Rulemaking,’’ 67 FR 53461 

(Aug. 16, 2002), DOE published 

procedures and policies on February 19, 

2003, to ensure that the potential 

impacts of its rules on small entities are 

properly considered during the 

rulemaking process. 68 FR 7990. DOE 

has made its procedures and policies 

available on the Office of the General 

Counsel’s website (http://energy.gov/gc/ 

office-general-counsel). 

DOE has reviewed this proposed rule 

under the provisions of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act and the procedures and 

policies published on February 19, 

2003. The proposed rule would 

incorporate the experience of more than 

a decade of implementation to improve 

the effectiveness of the DOE nuclear 

safety regulatory framework while 

maintaining safety performance. 

Requirements that are considered 

duplicative or of little value have been 

proposed to be removed. DOE is 

proposing four key changes in this 

proposed rule, as described in II. 

Discussion of Proposed Rule, A. 

Discussion of Key Proposed Changes. 

The changes in this proposed rule are 

all expected to reduce burden on 

affected DOE contractors. On this basis, 

DOE certifies that this proposed rule 

would not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. Accordingly, DOE has not 

prepared a regulatory flexibility analysis 

for this rulemaking. DOE’s certification 

and supporting statement of factual 

basis will be provided to the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration pursuant to 5 

U.S.C. 605(b). 

D. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The information collection necessary 

to administer DOE’s nuclear safety 

program under 10 CFR part 830 is 

subject to OMB approval under the 

Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 

3501 et seq. The information collection 

provisions of this rule are not 

substantially different from those 

contained in DOE contracts with DOE 

prime contractors covered by this rule 

and were previously approved by the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) and under OMB Control No. 

1910–0300. Public reporting burden for 

the certification is estimated to average 

1.91 hours per response, including the 

time for reviewing instructions, 

searching existing data sources, 

gathering and maintaining the data 

needed, and completing and reviewing 

the collection of information. 

Notwithstanding any other provision 

of the law, no person is required to 

respond to, nor shall any person be 

subject to a penalty for failure to comply 

with, a collection of information subject 

to the requirements of the PRA, unless 

that collection of information displays a 

currently valid OMB Control Number. 

E. National Environmental Policy Act 

DOE has determined that this 

proposed rule is covered under the 

Categorical Exclusion in DOE’s National 

Environmental Policy Act regulations at 

paragraph A.5 of Appendix A to Subpart 

D, 10 CFR part 1021, which applies to 

rulemaking that interprets or amends an 

existing rule or regulation without 

changing the environmental effect of the 

rule or regulation that is being amended. 

The proposed rule would amend DOE’s 

regulations by removing duplicative 

approval requirements, updating 

definitions, and increasing the 

efficiency of internal processes. These 

proposed amendments are primarily 

procedural and would not change the 

environmental effect of 10 CFR part 830. 

Accordingly, neither an environmental 

assessment nor an environmental 

impact statement is required. 

F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 

1995 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) requires 

each Federal agency to assess the effects 

of Federal regulatory actions on State, 

local, and Tribal governments and the 

private sector. Public Law 104–4, sec. 

201 (codified at 2 U.S.C. 1531). For 

regulatory actions likely to result in a 

rule that may cause the expenditure by 

State, local, and Tribal governments, in 

the aggregate, or by the private sector of 

$100 million or more in any one year 

(adjusted annually for inflation), section 

202 of UMRA requires a Federal agency 

to publish a written statement that 

estimates the resulting costs, benefits, 

and other effects on the national 

economy. (2 U.S.C. 1532(a), (b)) UMRA 

also requires a Federal agency to 

develop an effective process to permit 

timely input by elected officers of State, 

local, and Tribal governments on a 

‘‘significant intergovernmental 

mandate,’’ and requires an agency plan 

for giving notice and opportunity for 

timely input to potentially affected 

small governments before establishing 

any requirements that might 

significantly or uniquely affect them. On 

March 18, 1997, DOE published a 

statement of policy on its process for 

intergovernmental consultation under 

UMRA. 62 FR 12820. (This policy is 

also available at http://energy.gov/gc/ 

office-general-counsel.) DOE examined 

this proposed rule according to UMRA 

and its statement of policy and has 

tentatively determined that the rule 

contains neither an intergovernmental 

mandate, nor a mandate that may result 

in the expenditure by State, local, and 

Tribal government, in the aggregate, or 

by the private sector, of $100 million or 

more in any year. Accordingly, no 

further assessment or analysis is 

required under UMRA. 

G. Treasury and General Government 

Appropriations Act, 1999 

Section 654 of the Treasury and 

General Government Appropriations 

Act, 1999, 5 U.S.C. 601 note, requires 

Federal agencies to issue a Family 

Policymaking Assessment for any 

proposed rule that may affect family 

wellbeing. While this proposed rule 

would apply to individuals who may be 

members of a family, the rule would not 

have any impact on the autonomy or 

integrity of the family as an institution. 

Accordingly, DOE has concluded that it 

is not necessary to prepare a Family 

Policymaking Assessment. 

H. Executive Order 13132 

Executive Order 13132, ‘‘Federalism,’’ 

64 FR 43255 (Aug. 4, 1999), imposes 

certain requirements on agencies 

formulating and implementing policies 

or regulations that preempt State law or 

that have federalism implications. 

Agencies are required to examine the 

constitutional and statutory authority 

supporting any action that would limit 

the policymaking discretion of the 

States and carefully assess the necessity 

for such actions. DOE has examined this 

proposed rule and has determined that 

it would not preempt State law and 


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would not have a substantial direct 

effect on the States, on the relationship 

between the national government and 

the States, or on the distribution of 

power and responsibilities among the 

various levels of government. No further 

action is required by Executive Order 

13132. 

I. Executive Order 12988 

With respect to the review of existing 

regulations and the promulgation of 

new regulations, section 3(a) of 

Executive Order 12988, ‘‘Civil Justice 

Reform,’’ 61 FR 4729 (Feb. 7, 1996), 

imposes on Executive agencies the 

general duty to adhere to the following 

requirements: (1) Eliminate drafting 

errors and ambiguity; (2) write 

regulations to minimize litigation; and 

(3) provide a clear legal standard for 

affected conduct rather than a general 

standard and promote simplification 

and burden reduction. With regard to 

the review required by section 3(a), 

section 3(b) of Executive Order 12988 

specifically requires that Executive 

agencies make every reasonable effort to 

ensure that the regulation: (1) Clearly 

specifies the preemptive effect, if any; 

(2) clearly specifies any effect on 

existing Federal law or regulation; (3) 

provides a clear legal standard for 

affected conduct while promoting 

simplification and burden reduction; (4) 

specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) 

adequately defines key terms; and (6) 

addresses other important issues 

affecting clarity and general 

draftsmanship under any guidelines 

issued by the Attorney General. Section 

3(c) of Executive Order 12988 requires 

Executive agencies to review regulations 

in light of applicable standards in 

section 3(a) and section 3(b) to 

determine whether they are met or it is 

unreasonable to meet one or more of 

them. DOE has completed the required 

review and determined that, to the 

extent permitted by law, this proposed 

rule meets the relevant standards of 

Executive Order 12988. 

J. Treasury and General Government 

Appropriations Act, 2001 

The Treasury and General 

Government Appropriations Act, 2001, 

44 U.S.C. 3516 note, provides for 

agencies to review most disseminations 

of information to the public under 

guidelines established by each agency 

pursuant to general guidelines issued by 

OMB. OMB’s guidelines were published 

at 67 FR 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002), and 

DOE’s guidelines were published at 67 

FR 62446 (Oct. 7, 2002). DOE has 

reviewed this proposed rule under the 

OMB and DOE guidelines and has 

concluded that it is consistent with 

applicable policies in those guidelines. 

K. Executive Order 13211 

Executive Order 13211, ‘‘Actions 

Concerning Regulations That 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use,’’ 66 FR 28355 (May 

22, 2001), requires Federal agencies to 

prepare and submit to the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs 

(OIRA) a Statement of Energy Effects for 

any proposed significant energy action. 

A ‘‘significant energy action’’ is defined 

as any action by an agency that 

promulgated or is expected to lead to 

promulgation of a final rule, and that: 

(1) Is a significant regulatory action 

under Executive Order 12866, or any 

successor order; and (2) is likely to have 

a significant adverse effect on the 

supply, distribution, or use of energy, or 

(3) is designated by the Administrator of 

OIRA as a significant energy action. For 

any proposed significant energy action, 

the agency must give a detailed 

statement of any adverse effects on 

energy supply, distribution, or use 

should the proposal be implemented, 

and of reasonable alternatives to the 

action and their expected benefits on 

energy supply, distribution, and use. 

This regulatory action has been 

determined to not be a significant 

regulatory action, and it would not have 

an adverse effect on the supply, 

distribution, or use of energy. Thus, this 

action is not a significant energy action. 

Accordingly, DOE has not prepared a 

Statement of Energy Effects. 

V. Approval of the Office of the 

Secretary 

The Secretary of Energy has approved 

the publication of this proposed rule. 

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 830 

Administrative practice and 

procedure, DOE contracts, Environment, 

Federal buildings and facilities, 

Government contracts, Nuclear 

materials, Nuclear power plants and 

reactors, Nuclear safety, Penalties, 

Public health, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, and Safety. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on August 1, 

2018. 

Dan Brouillette, 

Deputy Secretary of Energy. 

For the reasons stated in the 

preamble, DOE proposes to revise 10 

CFR part 830 to read as follows: 

PART 830—NUCLEAR SAFETY 

MANAGEMENT 

Sec. 

830.1 Scope. 

830.2 Exclusions. 

830.3 Definitions. 

830.4 General requirements. 

830.5 Enforcement. 

830.6 Recordkeeping. 

830.7 Graded approach. 

Subpart A—Quality Assurance 

Requirements 

830.120 Scope. 

830.121 Quality Assurance Program (QAP). 

830.122 Quality assurance criteria. 

Subpart B—Safety Basis Requirements 

830.200 Scope. 

830.201 Performance of work. 

830.202 Safety basis. 

830.203 Unreviewed safety question 

process. 

830.204 Documented safety analysis. 

830.205 Technical safety requirements. 

830.206 Preliminary documented safety 

analysis. 

830.207 DOE approval of safety basis. 

Appendix A to Subpart B to Part 830— 

General Statement of Safety Basis Policy 

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 2201; 42 U.S.C. 7101 

et seq.; and 50 U.S.C. 2401 et seq. 

§ 830.1 Scope. 

This part governs the conduct of DOE 

contractors, DOE personnel, and other 

persons conducting activities (including 

providing items and services) that affect, 

or may affect, the safety of DOE nuclear 

facilities. 

§ 830.2 Exclusions. 

This part does not apply to: 

(a) Activities that are regulated 

through a license by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) or a State 

under an Agreement with the NRC, 

including activities certified by the NRC 

under section 1701 of the Atomic 

Energy Act (Act); 

(b) Activities conducted under the 

authority of the Director, Naval Nuclear 

Propulsion, pursuant to Executive Order 

12344, as set forth in Public Law 106– 

65; 

(c) Transportation activities which are 

regulated by the Department of 

Transportation; 

(d) Activities conducted under the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as 

amended, and any facility identified 

under section 202(5) of the Energy 

Reorganization Act of 1974, as 

amended; and 

(e) Activities related to the launch 

approval and actual launch of nuclear 

energy systems into space. 

§ 830.3 Definitions. 

(a) The following definitions apply to 

this part: 

Administrative controls means the 

provisions relating to organization and 

management, procedures, 

recordkeeping, assessment, and 

reporting necessary to ensure safe 

operation of a facility. 


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Bases appendix means an appendix 

that describes the basis of the limits and 

other requirements in technical safety 

requirements. 

Critical assembly means special 

nuclear devices designed and used to 

sustain nuclear reactions, which may be 

subject to frequent core and lattice 

configuration change and which 

frequently may be used as mockups of 

reactor configurations. 

Criticality means the condition in 

which a nuclear fission chain reaction 

becomes self-sustaining. 

Design features means the design 

features of a nuclear facility specified in 

the technical safety requirements that, if 

altered or modified, would have a 

significant effect on safe operation. 

Document means recorded 

information that describes, specifies, 

reports, certifies, requires, or provides 

data or results. 

Documented safety analysis means a 

documented analysis of the extent to 

which a nuclear facility can be operated 

safely with respect to workers, the 

public, and the environment, including 

a description of the conditions, safe 

boundaries, and hazard controls that 

provide the basis for ensuring safety. 

Environmental restoration activities 

means the process(es) by which 

contaminated sites and facilities are 

identified and characterized and by 

which contamination is contained, 

treated, or removed and disposed. 

Fissionable materials means a nuclide 

capable of sustaining a neutron-induced 

chain reaction (e.g., uranium-233, 

uranium-235, plutonium-238, 

plutonium-239, plutonium-241, 

neptunium-237, americium-241, and 

curium-244). 

Graded approach means the process 

of ensuring that the level of analysis, 

documentation, and actions used to 

comply with a requirement in this part 

are commensurate with: 

(i) The relative importance to safety, 

safeguards, and security; 

(ii) The magnitude of any hazard 

involved; 

(iii) The life cycle stage of a facility; 

(iv) The programmatic mission of a 

facility; 

(v) The particular characteristics of a 

facility; 

(vi) The relative importance of 

radiological and nonradiological 

hazards; and 

(vii) Any other relevant factor. 

Hazard means a source of danger (i.e., 

material, energy source, or operation) 

with the potential to cause illness, 

injury, or death to a person or damage 

to a facility or to the environment 

(without regard to the likelihood or 

credibility of accident scenarios or 

consequence mitigation). 

Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 DOE 

nuclear facilities means nuclear 

facilities that meet the criteria for their 

respective hazard category consistent 

with the provisions of DOE–STD–1027– 

92, Change Notice 1, or successor 

document. Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 

DOE nuclear facilities are required to 

have safety bases established in 

accordance with Subpart B of this part. 

Hazard categories are based on their 

radioactive material inventories and the 

potential consequences to the public, 

workers, and the environment. Hazard 

Category 1 represents the highest 

potential consequence and Hazard 

Category 3 represents the lowest 

potential consequence of the facilities 

required to establish safety bases. 

Hazard controls means measures to 

eliminate, limit, or mitigate hazards to 

workers, the public, or the environment, 

including 

(i) Physical, design, structural, and 

engineering features; 

(ii) Safety structures, systems, and 

components; 

(iii) Safety management programs; 

(iv) Technical safety requirements; 

and 

(v) Other controls necessary to 

provide adequate protection from 

hazards. 

Item is an all-inclusive term used in 

place of any of the following: 

Appurtenance, assembly, component, 

equipment, material, module, part, 

product, structure, subassembly, 

subsystem, system, unit, or support 

systems. 

Limiting conditions for operation 

means the limits that represent the 

lowest functional capability or 

performance level of safety structures, 

systems, and components required for 

safe operations. 

Limiting control settings means the 

settings on safety systems that control 

process variables to prevent exceeding a 

safety limit. 

Low-level residual fixed radioactivity 

means the remaining radioactivity 

following reasonable efforts to remove 

radioactive systems, components, and 

stored materials. The remaining 

radioactivity is composed of surface 

contamination that is fixed following 

chemical cleaning or some similar 

process; a component of surface 

contamination that can be picked up by 

smears; or activated materials within 

structures. The radioactivity can be 

characterized as low-level if the 

smearable radioactivity is less than the 

values defined for removable 

contamination by 10 CFR part 835, 

Appendix D, Surface Contamination 

Values, and the hazard analysis results 

show that no credible accident scenario 

or work practices would release the 

remaining fixed radioactivity or 

activation components at levels that 

would prudently require the use of 

active safety systems, structures, or 

components to prevent or mitigate a 

release of radioactive materials. 

Major modification means a 

modification to a DOE nuclear facility 

that substantially changes the existing 

safety basis for the facility. 

New Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 DOE 

nuclear facility means a Hazard 

Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility 

that is in design or under construction 

that does not yet have a DOE approved 

safety basis. 

Nonreactor nuclear facility means 

those facilities, activities or operations 

that involve, or will involve, radioactive 

and/or fissionable materials in such 

form and quantity that a nuclear or a 

nuclear explosive hazard potentially 

exists to workers, the public, or the 

environment, but does not include 

accelerators and their operations and 

does not include activities involving 

only incidental use and generation of 

radioactive materials or radiation such 

as check and calibration sources, use of 

radioactive sources in research and 

experimental and analytical laboratory 

activities, electron microscopes, and Xray machines. 

Nuclear facility means a reactor or a 

nonreactor nuclear facility where an 

activity is conducted for or on behalf of 

DOE and includes any related area, 

structure, facility, or activity to the 

extent necessary to ensure proper 

implementation of the requirements 

established by this Part. 

Operating limits means those limits 

required to ensure the safe operation of 

a nuclear facility, including limiting 

control settings and limiting conditions 

for operation. 

Preliminary documented safety 

analysis means documentation prepared 

in connection with the design and 

construction of a new Hazard Category 

1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility or a major 

modification to an existing Hazard 

Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility 

that provides a reasonable basis for the 

preliminary conclusion that the nuclear 

facility can be operated safely through 

the consideration of factors such as: 

(i) The nuclear safety design criteria 

to be satisfied; 

(ii) A safety analysis that derives 

aspects of design that are necessary to 

satisfy the nuclear safety design criteria; 

and 

(iii) An initial listing of the safety 

management programs that must be 

developed to address operational safety 

considerations. 


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Process means a series of actions that 

achieves an end or result. 

Quality means the condition achieved 

when an item, service, or process meets 

or exceeds the user’s requirements and 

expectations. 

Quality assurance means all those 

actions that provide confidence that 

quality is achieved. 

Quality Assurance Program (QAP) 

means the overall program or 

management system established to 

assign responsibilities and authorities, 

define policies and requirements, and 

provide for the performance and 

assessment of work. 

Reactor means any apparatus that is 

designed or used to sustain nuclear 

chain reactions in a controlled manner 

such as research, test, and power 

reactors, and critical and pulsed 

assemblies and any assembly that is 

designed to perform subcritical 

experiments that could potentially reach 

criticality; and, unless modified by 

words such as containment, vessel, or 

core, refers to the entire facility, 

including the housing, equipment and 

associated areas devoted to the 

operation and maintenance of one or 

more reactor cores. 

Record means a completed document 

or other media that provides objective 

evidence of an item, service, or process. 

Safety basis means the documented 

safety analysis and hazard controls that 

provide reasonable assurance that a 

DOE nuclear facility can be operated 

safely in a manner that adequately 

protects workers, the public, and the 

environment. 

Safety class structures, systems, and 

components means the structures, 

systems, or components, including 

portions of process systems, whose 

preventive or mitigative function is 

necessary to limit radioactive hazardous 

material exposure to the public, as 

determined from safety analyses. 

Safety evaluation report means the 

report prepared by DOE to document: 

(i) The sufficiency of the documented 

safety analysis for a Hazard Category 1, 

2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility; 

(ii) The extent to which a contractor 

has satisfied the requirements of 

Subpart B of this part; and 

(iii) The basis for approval by DOE of 

the safety basis for the facility, 

including any conditions for approval. 

Safety limits means the limits on 

process variables associated with those 

safety class physical barriers, generally 

passive, that are necessary for the 

intended facility function and that are 

required to guard against the 

uncontrolled release of radioactive 

materials. 

Safety management program means a 

program designed to ensure a facility is 

operated in a manner that adequately 

protects workers, the public, and the 

environment by covering a topic such 

as: Quality assurance; maintenance of 

safety systems; personnel training; 

conduct of operations; inadvertent 

criticality protection; emergency 

preparedness; fire protection; waste 

management; or radiological protection 

of workers, the public, and the 

environment. 

Safety management system means an 

integrated safety management system 

established consistent with 48 CFR 

970.5223–1, Integration of environment, 

safety, and health into work planning 

and execution. 

Safety significant structures, systems, 

and components means the structures, 

systems, and components which are not 

designated as safety class structures, 

systems, and components, but whose 

preventive or mitigative function is a 

major contributor to defense in depth 

and/or worker safety as determined 

from safety analyses. 

Safety structures, systems, and 

components means both safety class 

structures, systems, and components 

and safety significant structures, 

systems, and components. 

Service means the performance of 

work, such as design, manufacturing, 

construction, fabrication, assembly, 

decontamination, environmental 

restoration, waste management, 

laboratory sample analyses, inspection, 

nondestructive examination/testing, 

environmental qualification, equipment 

qualification, repair, installation, or the 

like. 

Surveillance requirements means 

requirements relating to test, calibration, 

or inspection to ensure that the 

necessary operability and quality of 

safety structures, systems, and 

components and their support systems 

required for safe operations are 

maintained, that facility operation is 

within safety limits, and that limiting 

control settings and limiting conditions 

for operation are met. 

Technical safety requirements (TSRs) 

means the limits, controls, and related 

actions that establish the specific 

parameters and requisite actions for the 

safe operation of a nuclear facility and 

include, as appropriate for the work and 

the hazards identified in the 

documented safety analysis for the 

facility: Safety limits, operating limits, 

surveillance requirements, 

administrative and management 

controls, use and application 

provisions, and design features, as well 

as a bases appendix. 

Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) 

means a situation where: 

(i) The probability of the occurrence 

or the consequences of an accident or 

the malfunction of equipment important 

to safety previously evaluated in the 

documented safety analysis could be 

increased; 

(ii) The possibility of an accident or 

malfunction of a different type than any 

evaluated previously in the documented 

safety analysis could be created; or 

(iii) The documented safety analysis 

may not be bounding or may be 

otherwise inadequate. 

Unreviewed Safety Question process 

means the mechanism for keeping a 

safety basis current by reviewing 

potential unreviewed safety questions, 

reporting unreviewed safety questions 

to DOE, and obtaining approval from 

DOE prior to taking any action that 

involves an unreviewed safety question. 

Use and application provisions means 

the basic instructions for applying 

technical safety requirements. 

(b) Terms defined in the Act or in 10 

CFR part 820 and not defined in this 

section of the rule are to be used 

consistent with the meanings given in 

the Act or in 10 CFR part 820. 

§ 830.4 General requirements. 

(a) No person may take or cause to be 

taken any action inconsistent with the 

requirements of this part. 

(b) A contractor responsible for a 

nuclear facility must ensure 

implementation of, and compliance 

with, the requirements of this part. 

(c) The requirements of this part must 

be implemented in a manner that 

provides reasonable assurance of 

adequate protection of workers, the 

public, and the environment from 

adverse consequences, taking into 

account the work to be performed and 

the associated hazards. 

(d) If there is no contractor for a DOE 

nuclear facility, DOE must ensure 

implementation of, and compliance 

with, the requirements of this part. 

§ 830.5 Enforcement. 

The requirements in this part are DOE 

Nuclear Safety Requirements and are 

subject to enforcement by all 

appropriate means, including the 

imposition of civil and criminal 

penalties in accordance with the 

provisions of 10 CFR part 820. 

§ 830.6 Recordkeeping. 

A contractor must maintain complete 

and accurate records as necessary to 

substantiate compliance with the 

requirements of this part. 


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§ 830.7 Graded approach. 

Where appropriate, a contractor must 

use a graded approach to implement the 

requirements of this part, document the 

basis of the graded approach used, and 

submit that documentation to DOE. The 

graded approach may not be used in 

implementing the unreviewed safety 

question (USQ) process or in 

implementing technical safety 

requirements. 

Subpart A—Quality Assurance 

Requirements 

§ 830.120 Scope. 

This subpart establishes quality 

assurance requirements for contractors 

conducting activities, including 

providing items or services that affect, 

or may affect, nuclear safety of DOE 

nuclear facilities. 

§ 830.121 Quality Assurance Program 

(QAP). 

(a) Contractors conducting activities, 

including providing items or services, 

that affect, or may affect, the nuclear 

safety of DOE nuclear facilities must 

conduct work in accordance with the 

Quality Assurance criteria in § 830.122. 

(b) The contractor responsible for a 

DOE nuclear facility must: 

(1) Submit a QAP to DOE for approval 

and regard the QAP as approved 90 days 

after submittal, unless it is approved or 

rejected by DOE at an earlier date. 

(2) Modify the QAP as directed by 

DOE. 

(3) Annually submit any changes to 

the DOE-approved QAP to DOE for 

approval. Justify in the submittal why 

the changes continue to satisfy the 

quality assurance requirements. 

(4) Conduct work in accordance with 

the QAP. 

(c) The QAP must: 

(1) Describe how the quality 

assurance criteria of § 830.122 are 

satisfied. 

(2) Integrate the quality assurance 

criteria with the Safety Management 

System, or describe how the quality 

assurance criteria apply to the Safety 

Management System. 

(3) Use voluntary consensus standards 

in its development and implementation, 

where practicable and consistent with 

contractual and regulatory 

requirements, and identify the standards 

used. 

(4) Describe how the contractor 

responsible for the nuclear facility 

ensures that subcontractors and 

suppliers satisfy the criteria of 

§ 830.122. 

§ 830.122 Quality assurance criteria. 

The QAP must address the following 

management, performance, and 

assessment criteria: 

(a) Criterion 1—Management/ 

Program. (1) Establish an organizational 

structure, functional responsibilities, 

levels of authority, and interfaces for 

those managing, performing, and 

assessing the work. 

(2) Establish management processes, 

including planning, scheduling, and 

providing resources for the work. 

(b) Criterion 2—Management/ 

Personnel Training and Qualification. 

(1) Train and qualify personnel to be 

capable of performing their assigned 

work. 

(2) Provide continuing training to 

personnel to maintain their job 

proficiency. 

(c) Criterion 3—Management/Quality 

Improvement. (1) Establish and 

implement processes to detect and 

prevent quality problems. 

(2) Identify, control, and correct 

items, services, and processes that do 

not meet established requirements. 

(3) Identify the causes of problems 

and work to prevent recurrence as a part 

of correcting the problem. 

(4) Review item characteristics, 

process implementation, and other 

quality-related information to identify 

items, services, and processes needing 

improvement. 

(d) Criterion 4—Management/ 

Documents and Records. (1) Prepare, 

review, approve, issue, use, and revise 

documents to prescribe processes, 

specify requirements, or establish 

design. 

(2) Specify, prepare, review, approve, 

and maintain records. 

(e) Criterion 5—Performance/Work 

Processes. (1) Perform work consistent 

with technical standards, administrative 

controls, and other hazard controls 

adopted to meet regulatory or contract 

requirements, using approved 

instructions, procedures, or other 

appropriate means. 

(2) Identify and control items to 

ensure their proper use. 

(3) Maintain items to prevent their 

damage, loss, or deterioration. 

(4) Calibrate and maintain equipment 

used for process monitoring or data 

collection. 

(f) Criterion 6—Performance/Design. 

(1) Design items and processes using 

sound engineering/scientific principles 

and appropriate standards. 

(2) Incorporate applicable 

requirements and design bases in design 

work and design changes. 

(3) Identify and control design 

interfaces. 

(4) Verify or validate the adequacy of 

design products using individuals or 

groups other than those who performed 

the work. 

(5) Verify or validate work before 

approval and implementation of the 

design. 

(g) Criterion 7—Performance/ 

Procurement. (1) Procure items and 

services that meet established 

requirements and perform as specified. 

(2) Evaluate and select prospective 

suppliers on the basis of specified 

criteria. 

(3) Establish and implement processes 

to ensure that approved suppliers 

continue to provide acceptable items 

and services. 

(h) Criterion 8—Performance/ 

Inspection and Acceptance Testing. (1) 

Inspect and test specified items, 

services, and processes using 

established acceptance and performance 

criteria. 

(2) Calibrate and maintain equipment 

used for inspections and tests. 

(i) Criterion 9—Assessment/ 

Management Assessment. Ensure 

managers assess their management 

processes and identify and correct 

problems that hinder the organization 

from achieving its objectives. 

(j) Criterion 10—Assessment/ 

Independent Assessment. (1) Plan and 

conduct independent assessments to 

measure item and service quality, to 

measure the adequacy of work 

performance, and to promote 

improvement. 

(2) Establish sufficient authority, and 

freedom from line management, for the 

group performing independent 

assessments. 

(3) Ensure persons who perform 

independent assessments are 

technically qualified and knowledgeable 

in the areas to be assessed. 

Subpart B—Safety Basis Requirements 

§ 830.200 Scope. 

This Subpart establishes safety basis 

requirements for Hazard Category 1, 2, 

and 3 DOE nuclear facilities. 

§ 830.201 Performance of work. 

A contractor must perform work in 

accordance with the DOE-approved 

safety basis for a Hazard Category 1, 2, 

or 3 DOE nuclear facility and, in 

particular, with the hazard controls that 

ensure adequate protection of workers, 

the public, and the environment. 

§ 830.202 Safety basis. 

(a) The contractor responsible for a 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility must establish and maintain the 

safety basis for the facility. 

(b) In establishing the safety basis for 

a Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 


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nuclear facility, the contractor 

responsible for the facility must: 

(1) Define the scope of the work to be 

performed; 

(2) Identify and analyze the hazards 

associated with the work; 

(3) Categorize the facility consistent 

with DOE–STD–1027–92 (‘‘Hazard 

Categorization and Accident Analysis 

Techniques for compliance with DOE 

Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis 

Reports,’’ Change Notice 1, September 

1997), or successor document; 

(4) Prepare a documented safety 

analysis for the facility; and 

(5) Establish the hazard controls upon 

which the contractor will rely to ensure 

adequate protection of workers, the 

public, and the environment. 

(c) In maintaining the safety basis for 

a Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 

nuclear facility, the contractor 

responsible for the facility must: 

(1) Update the safety basis to keep it 

current and to reflect changes in the 

facility, the work and the hazards as 

they are analyzed in the documented 

safety analysis; 

(2) Annually provide DOE the current 

documented safety analysis or a letter 

stating that there have been no changes 

in the documented safety analysis since 

the prior submittal; and 

(3) Incorporate in the safety basis any 

changes, conditions, or hazard controls 

directed by DOE. 

§ 830.203 Unreviewed safety question 

process. 

(a) The contractor responsible for a 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility must establish, implement, and 

take actions consistent with a DOEapproved USQ procedure that meets the 

requirements of this section. 

(b) The contractor responsible for a 

new Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 

nuclear facility must submit for DOE 

approval a procedure for its USQ 

process on a schedule that allows DOE 

approval in a safety evaluation report 

issued pursuant to section 207(a) of this 

Part. 

(c) The contractor responsible for a 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility must implement the DOEapproved USQ procedure in situations 

where there is a: 

(1) Temporary or permanent change 

in the facility as described in the 

existing documented safety analysis; 

(2) Temporary or permanent change 

in the procedures as described in the 

existing documented safety analysis; 

(3) Test or experiment not described 

in the existing documented safety 

analysis; or 

(4) Potential inadequacy of the 

documented safety analysis because the 

analysis potentially may not be 

bounding or may be otherwise 

inadequate. 

(d) A contractor responsible for a 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility must obtain DOE approval prior 

to taking any action determined to 

involve a USQ. 

(e) The contractor responsible for a 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility must annually provide to DOE a 

summary of the USQ determinations 

performed since the prior submittal. 

(f) If a contractor responsible for a 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility discovers or is made aware of a 

potential inadequacy of the documented 

safety analysis, it must: 

(1) Take action, as appropriate, to 

place or maintain the facility in a safe 

condition until an evaluation of the 

safety of the situation is completed; 

(2) Notify DOE of the situation; 

(3) Perform a USQ determination and 

notify DOE promptly of the results; and 

(4) Submit the evaluation of the safety 

of the situation to DOE prior to 

removing any operational restrictions 

initiated to meet paragraph (f)(1) of this 

section. 

§ 830.204 Documented safety analysis. 

(a) The contractor responsible for a 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility must obtain approval from DOE 

for the methodology used to prepare the 

documented safety analysis for the 

facility unless the contractor uses a 

methodology set forth in Table 1 of 

Appendix A to this Part. 

(b) The documented safety analysis 

for a Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 

nuclear facility must, as appropriate for 

the complexities and hazards associated 

with the facility: 

(1) Describe the facility (including the 

design of safety structures, systems and 

components) and the work to be 

performed; 

(2) Provide a systematic identification 

of both natural and man-made hazards 

associated with the facility; 

(3) Evaluate normal, abnormal, and 

accident conditions, including 

consideration of natural and man-made 

external events, identification of energy 

sources or processes that might 

contribute to the generation or 

uncontrolled release of radioactive and 

other hazardous materials, and 

consideration of the need for analysis of 

accidents which may be beyond the 

design basis of the facility; 

(4) Derive the hazard controls 

necessary to ensure adequate protection 

of workers, the public, and the 

environment, demonstrate the adequacy 

of these controls to eliminate, limit, or 

mitigate identified hazards, and define 

the process for maintaining the hazard 

controls current at all times and 

controlling their use; 

(5) Define the characteristics of the 

safety management programs necessary 

to ensure the safe operation of the 

facility, including (where applicable) 

quality assurance, procedures, 

maintenance, personnel training, 

conduct of operations, emergency 

preparedness, fire protection, waste 

management, and radiation protection; 

and 

(6) With respect to a nonreactor 

nuclear facility with fissionable material 

in a form and amount sufficient to pose 

a potential for criticality, define a 

criticality safety program that: 

(i) Ensures that operations with 

fissionable material remain subcritical 

under all normal and credible abnormal 

conditions; 

(ii) Identifies applicable nuclear 

criticality safety standards; and 

(iii) Describes how the program meets 

applicable nuclear criticality safety 

standards. 

§ 830.205 Technical safety requirements. 

(a) A contractor responsible for a 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility must: 

(1) Develop technical safety 

requirements that are derived from the 

documented safety analysis; 

(2) Prior to use, obtain DOE approval 

of technical safety requirements and any 

change to technical safety requirements; 

and 

(3) Notify DOE of any violation of a 

technical safety requirement. 

(b) A contractor may take emergency 

actions that depart from an approved 

technical safety requirement when no 

actions consistent with the technical 

safety requirement are immediately 

apparent, and when these actions are 

needed to protect workers, the public or 

the environment from imminent and 

significant harm. Such actions must be 

approved by a certified operator for a 

reactor or by a person in authority as 

designated in the technical safety 

requirements for nonreactor nuclear 

facilities. The contractor must report the 

emergency actions to DOE as soon as 

practicable. 

(c) A contractor for an environmental 

restoration activity may follow the 

provisions of 29 CFR 1910.120 or 

1926.65 to develop the appropriate 

hazard controls (rather than the 

provisions for technical safety 

requirements in paragraph (a) of this 

section), provided the activity involves 

either: 

(1) Work not done within a permanent 

structure, or 


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(2) The decommissioning of a facility 

with only low-level residual fixed 

radioactivity. 

§ 830.206 Preliminary documented safety 

analysis. 

Prior to construction of a new Hazard 

Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility 

or a major modification to an existing 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility, the contractor responsible for 

the design and construction of the new 

facility or major modification must: 

(a) Prepare a preliminary documented 

safety analysis for the facility, and 

(b) Obtain DOE approval of: 

(1) The nuclear safety design criteria 

to be used in preparing the preliminary 

documented safety analysis unless the 

contractor uses the design criteria in 

DOE Order 420.1, Facility Safety, or 

successor document; and 

(2) The preliminary documented 

safety analysis before the contractor can 

procure materials or components or 

begin construction; provided that DOE 

may authorize the contractor to perform 

limited procurement and construction 

activities without approval of a 

preliminary documented safety analysis 

if DOE determines that the activities are 

not detrimental to public health and 

safety and are in the best interests of 

DOE. 

§ 830.207 DOE approval of safety basis. 

(a) With respect to a new Hazard 

Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility 

or a major modification to an existing 

Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 

facility, a contractor may not begin 

operation of the facility or modification 

prior to the issuance of a safety 

evaluation report in which DOE 

approves the safety basis for the facility 

or modification. 

(b) Pending issuance of a safety 

evaluation report in which DOE 

approves an updated or amended safety 

basis for an existing Hazard Category 1, 

2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility, the 

contractor responsible for the facility 

must continue to perform work in 

accordance with the DOE-approved 

safety basis for the facility and maintain 

the existing safety basis consistent with 

the requirements of this Subpart. 

Appendix A to Subpart B to Part 830— 

General Statement of Safety Basis 

Policy 

A. Introduction 

This appendix describes DOE’s 

expectations for the safety basis requirements 

of 10 CFR part 830, acceptable methods for 

implementing these requirements, and 

criteria DOE will use to evaluate compliance 

with these requirements. This Appendix does 

not create any new requirements and should 

be used consistently with DOE’s policy that 

work be conducted safely and efficiently and 

in a manner that ensures protection of 

workers, the public, and the environment. 

B. Purpose 

1. The safety basis requirements of part 830 

require the contractor responsible for a DOE 

nuclear facility to analyze the facility, the 

work to be performed, and the associated 

hazards and to identify the conditions, safe 

boundaries, and hazard controls necessary to 

protect workers, the public and the 

environment from adverse consequences. 

These analyses and hazard controls 

constitute the safety basis upon which the 

contractor and DOE rely to conclude that the 

facility can be operated safely. Performing 

work consistent with the safety basis 

provides reasonable assurance of adequate 

protection of workers, the public, and the 

environment. 

2. The safety basis requirements are 

intended to further the objective of making 

safety an integral part of how work is 

performed throughout the DOE complex. 

Developing a thorough understanding of a 

nuclear facility, the work to be performed, 

the associated hazards and the needed hazard 

controls is essential to integrating safety into 

management and work at all levels. 

Performing work in accordance with the 

safety basis for a nuclear facility is the 

realization of that objective. 

C. Scope 

1. A contractor must establish and 

maintain a safety basis for a Hazard Category 

1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility because these 

facilities have the potential for significant 

radiological consequences. DOE–STD–1027 

sets forth the methodology for categorizing a 

DOE nuclear facility based on the inventory 

of radioactive materials. 

2. Unlike the quality assurance 

requirements of part 830 that apply to all 

DOE nuclear facilities the safety basis 

requirements only apply to Hazard Category 

1, 2, and 3 DOE nuclear facilities and do not 

apply to nuclear facilities below Hazard 

Category 3. 

D. Integrated Safety Management 

1. The safety basis requirements are 

consistent with integrated safety 

management. DOE expects that, if a 

contractor complies with the Department of 

Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) clause 

on integration of environment, safety, and 

health into work planning and execution (48 

CFR 970.5223–1, Integration of Environment, 

Safety and Health into Work Planning and 

Execution) and the DEAR clause on laws, 

regulations, and DOE directives (48 CFR 

970.5204–2, Laws, Regulations and DOE 

Directives), the contractor will have 

established the foundation to meet the safety 

basis requirements. 

2. The processes embedded in a safety 

management system should lead to a 

contractor establishing adequate safety bases 

and safety management programs that will 

meet the safety basis requirements of this 

Subpart. Consequently, the DOE expects if a 

contractor has adequately implemented 

integrated safety management, few additional 

requirements will stem from this Subpart 

and, in such cases, the existing safety basis 

prepared in accordance with integrated safety 

management provisions, including existing 

DOE safety requirements in contracts, should 

meet the requirements of this Subpart. 

3. DOE does not expect there to be any 

conflict between contractual requirements 

and regulatory requirements. In fact, DOE 

expects that contract provisions will be used 

to provide more detail on implementation of 

safety basis requirements such as preparing 

a documented safety analysis, developing 

technical safety requirements, and 

implementing a USQ process. 

E. Enforcement of Safety Basis Requirements 

1. Enforcement of the safety basis 

requirements will be performance oriented. 

That is, DOE will focus its enforcement 

efforts on whether a contractor operates a 

nuclear facility consistent with the safety 

basis for the facility and, in particular, 

whether work is performed in accordance 

with the safety basis. 

2. As part of the approval process, DOE 

will review the content and quality of the 

safety basis documentation. DOE intends to 

use the approval process to assess the 

adequacy of a safety basis developed by a 

contractor to ensure that workers, the public, 

and the environment are provided reasonable 

assurance of adequate protection from 

identified hazards. Once approved by DOE, 

the safety basis documentation will not be 

subject to regulatory enforcement actions 

unless DOE determines that the information 

which supports the documentation is not 

complete and accurate in all material 

respects, as required by 10 CFR 820.11. This 

is consistent with the DOE enforcement 

provisions and policy in 10 CFR part 820. 

3. DOE does not intend the adoption of the 

safety basis requirements to affect the 

existing quality assurance requirements or 

the existing obligation of contractors to 

comply with the quality assurance 

requirements. In particular, in conjunction 

with the adoption of the safety basis 

requirements, DOE revised the language in 10 

CFR 830.122(e)(1) to make clear that hazard 

controls are part of the work processes to 

which a contractor and other persons must 

adhere when performing work. This 

obligation to perform work consistent with 

hazard controls adopted to meet regulatory or 

contract requirements existed prior to the 

adoption of the safety basis requirements and 

is both consistent with and independent of 

the safety basis requirements. 

4. A documented safety analysis must 

address all hazards (that is, both radiological 

and nonradiological hazards) and the 

controls necessary to provide adequate 

protection to the public, workers, and the 

environment from these hazards. Section 

234A of the Atomic Energy Act only 

authorizes DOE to issue civil penalties for 

violations of requirements related to nuclear 

safety. Therefore, DOE will impose civil 

penalties for violations of the safety basis 

requirements (including hazard controls) 

only if they are related to nuclear safety. 

F. Documented Safety Analysis 

1. A documented safety analysis must 

demonstrate the extent to which a nuclear 

facility can be operated safely with respect to 

workers, the public, and the environment. 


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2. DOE expects a contractor to use a graded 

approach to develop a documented safety 

analysis and describe how the graded 

approach was applied. The level of detail, 

analysis, and documentation will reflect the 

complexity and hazards associated with a 

particular facility. Thus, the documented 

safety analysis for a simple, low hazard 

facility may be relatively short and 

qualitative in nature, while the documented 

safety analysis for a complex, high hazard 

facility may be quite elaborate and more 

quantitative. DOE will work with its 

contractors to ensure a documented safety 

analysis is appropriate for the facility for 

which it is being developed. 

3. Because DOE has ultimate responsibility 

for the safety of its facilities, DOE will review 

each documented safety analysis as: (1) Part 

of the initial submittal; (2) when revisions are 

submitted as part of a positive USQ or major 

modification; (3) if DOE has reason to believe 

a portion of the safety basis to be inadequate, 

or; (4) if DOE has reason to believe a portion 

of the safety basis has substantially changed. 

DOE will review the DSA to determine 

whether the rigor and detail of the 

documented safety analysis are appropriate 

for the complexity and hazards expected at 

the nuclear facility. In particular, DOE will 

evaluate the documented safety analysis by 

considering the extent to which the 

documented safety analysis (1) satisfies the 

provisions of the methodology used to 

prepare the documented safety analysis and 

(2) adequately addresses the criteria set forth 

in 10 CFR 830.204(b). DOE will prepare a 

Safety Evaluation Report to document the 

results of its review of the documented safety 

analysis. A documented safety analysis must 

contain any conditions or changes required 

by DOE in the Safety Evaluation Report. 

Generally, DOE’s review of the annual 

submittal may be limited to ensuring that the 

results of USQs have been adequately 

incorporated into the DSA. If additional 

changes are proposed by the contractor and 

included in the annual update that have not 

been previously approved by DOE or have 

not been evaluated as a part of the USQ 

process, DOE must review and approve these 

changes. DOE has the authority to review the 

safety basis at any time. 

4. In most cases, the contract will provide 

the framework for specifying the 

methodology and schedule for developing a 

documented safety analysis. Table 1 sets 

forth acceptable methodologies for preparing 

a documented safety analysis. 

TABLE 1 

The contractor responsible for: May prepare its document safety analysis by: 

(1) A DOE reactor ............................................... Using the method in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.70, Standard 

Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, or successor document. 

(2) A DOE nonreactor nuclear facility ................ Using the method in DOE–STD–3009, Change Notice No. 1, January 2000, Preparation Guide 

for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, July 

1994, or successor document. 

(3) A DOE nuclear facility with a limited operational life.Using the method in either: 

(1) DOE–STD–3009–, Change Notice No. 1, January 2000, or successor document, or 

(2) DOE–STD–3011–94, Guidance for Preparation of DOE 5480.22 (TSR) and DOE 5480.23 

(SAR) Implementation Plans, November 1994, or successor document. 

(4) The deactivation or the transition surveillance and maintenance of a DOE nuclear facility.Using the method in either: 

(1) DOE–STD–3009, Change Notice No. 1, January 2000, or successor document, or 

(2) DOE–STD–3011–94 or successor document. 

(5) The decommissioning of a DOE nuclear facility.(1) Using the method in DOE–STD–1120–98, Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health 

into Facility Disposition Activities, May 1998, or successor document; 

(2) Using the provisions in 29 CFR 1910.120 (or 29 CFR 1926.65 for construction activities) 

for developing Safety and Health Programs, Work Plans, Health and Safety Plans, and 

Emergency Response Plans to address public safety, as well as worker safety; and 

(3) Deriving hazard controls based on the Safety and Health Programs, the Work Plans, the 

Health and Safety Plans, and the Emergency Response Plans. 

(6) A DOE environmental restoration activity 

that involves either work not done within a 

permanent structure or the decommissioning 

of a facility with only low-level residual fixed 

radioactivity.

(1) Using the method in DOE–STD–1120–98 or successor document, and 

(2) Using the provisions in 29 CFR 1910.120 (or 29 CFR 1926.65 for construction activities) 

for developing a Safety and Health Program and a site-specific Health and Safety Plan (including elements for Emergency Response Plans, conduct of operations, training and qualifications, and maintenance management). 

(7) A DOE nuclear explosive facility and the nuclear explosive operations conducted therein..Developing its documented safety analysis in two pieces: 

(1) A Safety Analysis Report for the nuclear facility that considers the generic nuclear explosive operations and is prepared in accordance with DOE–STD–3009, Change Notice No. 1, 

January 2000, or successor document, and 

(2) A Hazard Analysis Report for the specific nuclear explosive operations prepared in accordance with DOE–STD–3016–99, Hazards Analysis Reports for Nuclear Explosive Operations, 

February 1999, or successor document. 

(8) A DOE Hazard Category 3 nonreactor nuclear facility.Using the methods in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 of DOE–STD–3009, Change Notice No. 1, January 2000, or successor document to ad- dress in a simplified fashion: 

(1) The basic description of the facility/activity and its operations, including safety structures, 

systems, and components; 

(2) A qualitative hazards analysis; and 

(3) The hazard controls (consisting primarily of inventory limits and safety management programs) and their bases. 

(9) Transportation activities ................................ (1) Preparing a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging in accordance with DOE–O–460.1A, 

Packaging and Transportation Safety, October 2, 1996, or successor document and 

(2) Preparing a Transportation Safety Document in accordance with DOE–G–460.1–1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A, Packaging and Transportation Safety, June 5, 

1997, or successor document. 

(10) Transportation and onsite transfer of nuclear explosives, nuclear components, Navel 

nuclear fuel elements, Category I and Category II special nuclear materials, special assemblies, and other materials of national security.

(1) Preparing a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging in accordance with DOE–O–461.1, 

Packaging and Transportation of Materials of National Security Interest, September 29, 

2000, or successor document and 

(2) Preparing a Transportation Safety Document in accordance with DOE–M–461.1–1, Packaging and Transfer of Materials of National Security Interest Manual, September 29, 2000, 

or successor document. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 153 / Wednesday, August 8, 2018 / Proposed Rules 38995 

5. Table 1 refers to specific types of nuclear 

facilities. These references are not intended 

to constitute an exhaustive list of the specific 

types of nuclear facilities. Part 830 defines 

nuclear facility broadly to include reactor or 

a nonreactor nuclear facilities where an 

activity is conducted for or on behalf of DOE 

and includes any related area, structure, 

facility, or activity to the extent necessary to 

ensure proper implementation of the 

requirements established by this Part. The 

only exceptions are those facilities 

specifically excluded such as accelerators. 

Table 2 defines the terms referenced in Table 

1 that are not defined in 10 CFR 830.3. 

TABLE 2 

For purposes of Table 1: Means: 

(1) Deactivation ................................................... The process of placing a facility in a stable and known condition, including the removal of hazardous and radioactive materials. 

(2) Decontamination ........................................... The removal or reduction of residual radioactive and hazardous materials by mechanical, 

chemical, or other techniques to achieve a stated objective or end condition. 

(3) Decommissioning .......................................... Those actions taking place after deactivation of a nuclear facility to retire it from service and 

includes surveillance and maintenance, decontamination, and/or dismantlement. 

(4) Environmental restoration activities .............. The process by which contaminated sites and facilities are identified and characterized and by 

which existing contamination is contained, or removed and disposed. 

(5) Generic nuclear explosive operation ............ A characterization that considers the collective attributes (such as special facility system requirements, physical weapon characteristics, or quantities and chemical/physical forms of 

hazardous materials) for all projected nuclear explosive operations to be conducted at a facility. 

(6) Nuclear explosive facility ............................... A nuclear facility at which nuclear operations and activities involving a nuclear explosive may 

be conducted. 

(7) Nuclear explosive operation .......................... Any activity involving a nuclear explosive, including activities in which main-charge, high-explosive parts and pits are collocated. 

(8) Nuclear facility with a limited operational life A nuclear facility for which there is a short remaining operational period before ending the facility’s mission and initiating deactivation and decommissioning and for which there are no 

intended additional missions other than cleanup. 

(9) Specific nuclear explosive operation ............ A specific nuclear explosive subjected to the stipulated steps of an individual operation, such 

as assembly or disassembly. 

(10) Transition surveillance and maintenance 

activities.

Activities conducted when a facility is not operating or during deactivation, decontamination, 

and decommissioning operations when surveillance and maintenance are the predominant 

activities being conducted at the facility. These activities are necessary for satisfactory containment of hazardous materials and protection of workers, the public, and the environment. 

These activities include providing periodic inspections, maintenance of structures, systems, 

and components, and actions to prevent the alteration of hazardous materials to an unsafe 

state. 

6. The contractor responsible for the design 

and construction of a new Hazard Category 

1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility or a major 

modification to an existing Hazard Category 

1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must prepare 

a preliminary documented safety analysis. A 

preliminary documented safety analysis can 

ensure that substantial costs and time are not 

wasted in constructing a nuclear facility that 

will not be acceptable to DOE. If a contractor 

is required to prepare a preliminary 

documented safety analysis, the contractor 

must obtain DOE approval of the preliminary 

documented safety analysis prior to 

procuring materials or components or 

beginning construction. DOE, however, may 

authorize the contractor to perform limited 

procurement and construction activities 

without approval of a preliminary 

documented safety analysis if DOE 

determines that the activities are not 

detrimental to public health and safety and 

are in the best interests of DOE. DOE Order 

420.1, or successor document, sets forth 

acceptable nuclear safety design criteria for 

use in preparing a preliminary documented 

safety analysis. As a general matter, DOE 

does not expect preliminary documented 

safety analyses to be needed for activities that 

do not involve significant construction such 

as environmental restoration activities, 

decontamination and decommissioning 

activities, specific nuclear explosive 

operations, or transition surveillance and 

maintenance activities. 

G. Hazard Controls 

1. Hazard controls are measures to 

eliminate, limit, or mitigate hazards to 

workers, the public, or the environment. 

They include: (1) Physical, design, structural, 

and engineering features; (2) safety 

structures, systems, and components; (3) 

safety management programs; (4) technical 

safety requirements; and (5) other controls 

necessary to provide adequate protection 

from hazards. 

2. The types and specific characteristics of 

the safety management programs necessary 

for a DOE nuclear facility will be dependent 

on the complexity and hazards associated 

with the nuclear facility and the work being 

performed. In most cases, however, a 

contractor should consider safety 

management programs covering topics such 

as quality assurance, procedures, 

maintenance, personnel training, conduct of 

operations, criticality safety, emergency 

preparedness, fire protection, waste 

management, and radiation protection. In 

general, DOE Orders set forth DOE’s 

expectations concerning specific topics. For 

example, DOE Order 420.1, or successor 

document provides DOE’s expectations with 

respect to fire protection and criticality 

safety. 

3. Safety structures, systems, and 

components require formal definition of 

minimum acceptable performance in the 

documented safety analysis. This is 

accomplished by first defining a safety 

function, then describing the structure, 

systems, and components, placing functional 

requirements on those portions of the 

structures, systems, and components 

required for the safety function, and 

identifying performance criteria that will 

ensure functional requirements are met. 

Technical safety requirements are developed 

to ensure the operability of the safety 

structures, systems, and components and 

define actions to be taken if a safety 

structure, system, or component is not 

operable. 

4. Technical safety requirements establish 

limits, controls, and related actions necessary 

for the safe operation of a nuclear facility. 

The exact form and contents of technical 

safety requirements will depend on the 

circumstances of a particular nuclear facility 

as defined in the documented safety analysis 

for the nuclear facility. As appropriate, 

technical safety requirements may have 

sections on: (1) Safety limits; (2) operating 

limits; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) 

administrative controls; (5) use and 

application; and (6) design features. It may 

also have an appendix on the bases for the 

limits and requirements. DOE Guide 423.1– 

1B, Implementation Guide for Use in 

Developing Technical Safety Requirements, 

or successor document, provides a complete 

description of what technical safety 

requirements should contain and how they 

should be developed and maintained. 


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38996 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 153 / Wednesday, August 8, 2018 / Proposed Rules 

5. DOE will examine and approve the 

technical safety requirements as part of 

preparing the safety evaluation report and 

reviewing updates to the safety basis. As with 

all hazard controls, technical safety 

requirements must be kept current and reflect 

changes in the facility, the work and the 

hazards as they are analyzed in the 

documented safety analysis. In addition, DOE 

expects a contractor to maintain technical 

safety requirements, and other hazard 

controls as appropriate, as controlled 

documents with an authorized users list. 

6. Table 3 sets forth DOE’s expectations 

concerning acceptable technical safety 

requirements. 

TABLE 3 

As appropriate for a particular DOE nuclear 

facility, the section of the technical safety 

requirements on: 

Will provide information on: 

(1) Safety limits ................................................... The limits on process variables associated with those safety class physical barriers, generally 

passive, that are necessary for the intended facility function and that are required to guard 

against the uncontrolled release of radioactive materials. The safety limit section describes, 

as precisely as possible, the parameters being limited, states the limit in measurable units 

(pressure, temperature, flow, etc.), and indicates the applicability of the limit. The safety limit 

section also describes the actions to be taken in the event that the safety limit is exceeded. 

These actions should first place the facility in the safe, stable condition attainable, including 

total shutdown (except where such action might reduce the margin of safety) or should 

verify that the facility already is safe and stable and will remain so. The technical safety requirement should state that the contractor must obtain DOE authorization to restart the nuclear facility following a violation of a safety limit. The safety limit section also establishes 

the steps and time limits to correct the out-of-specification condition. 

(2) Operating limits ............................................. Those limits which are required to ensure the safe operation of a nuclear facility. The operating limits section may include subsections on limiting control settings and limiting conditions for operation. 

(3) Limiting control settings ................................ The settings on safety systems that control process variables to prevent exceeding a safety 

limit. The limited control settings section normally contains the settings for automatic alarms 

and for the automatic or non-automatic initiation of protective actions related to those variables associated with the function of safety class structures, systems, or components if the 

safety analysis shows that they are relied upon to mitigate or prevent an accident. The limited control settings section also identifies the protective actions to be taken at the specific 

settings chosen in order to correct a situation automatically or manually such that the related 

safety limit is not exceeded. Protective actions may include maintaining the variables within 

the requirements and repairing the automatic device promptly or shutting down the affected 

part of the process and, if required, the entire facility. 

(4) Limiting conditions for operations ................. The limits that represent the lowest functional capability or performance level of safety structures, systems, and components required to perform an activity safely. The limiting conditions for operation section describes, as precisely as possible, the lowest functional capability or performance level of equipment required for continued safe operation of the facility. 

The limiting conditions for operation section also states the action to be taken to address a 

condition not meeting the limiting conditions for operation section. Normally this simply provides for the adverse condition being corrected in a certain time frame and for further action 

if this is impossible. 

(5) Surveillance requirements ............................. Requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary operability 

and quality of safety structures, systems, and components is maintained; that facility operation is within safety limits; and that limiting control settings and limiting conditions for operation are met. If a required surveillance is not successfully completed, the contractor is expected to assume the systems or components involved are inoperable and take the actions 

defined by the technical safety requirement until the systems or components can be shown 

to be operable. If, however, a required surveillance is not performed within its required frequency, the contractor is allowed to perform the surveillance within 24 hours or the original 

frequency, whichever is smaller, and confirm operability. 

(6) Administrative controls .................................. Organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, assessment, and reporting necessary to ensure safe operation of a facility consistent with the technical safety requirement. 

In general, the administrative controls section addresses (1) the requirements associated 

with administrative controls, (including those for reporting violations of the technical safety 

requirement); (2) the staffing requirements for facility positions important to safe conduct of 

the facility; and (3) the commitments to the safety management programs identified in the 

documented safety analysis as necessary components of the safety basis for the facility. 

(7) Use and application provisions ..................... The basic instructions for applying the safety restrictions contained in a technical safety requirement. The use and application section includes definitions of terms, operating modes, 

logical connectors, completion times, and frequency notations. 

(8) Design features ............................................. Design features of the facility that, if altered or modified, would have a significant effect on 

safe operation. 

(9) Bases appendix ............................................. The reasons for the safety limits, operating limits, and associated surveillance requirements in 

the technical safety requirements. The statements for each limit or requirement shows how 

the numeric value, the condition, or the surveillance fulfills the purpose derived from the 

safety documentation. The primary purpose for describing the basis of each limit or requirement is to ensure that any future changes to the limit or requirement is done with full knowledge of the original intent or purpose of the limit or requirement. 


amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 153 / Wednesday, August 8, 2018 / Proposed Rules 38997 

1As of December 31, 2017, within the nine states 

that allow privately insured credit unions, 

approximately 116 state-chartered credit unions are 

privately insured and are not subject to the NCUA’s 

regulation and oversight. 

2Based on December 31, 2017 Call Report Data. 

3 80 FR 66625 (Oct. 29, 2015). 

H. Unreviewed Safety Questions 

1. The USQ process is an important tool to 

evaluate whether changes affect the safety 

basis. A contractor must use the USQ process 

to ensure that the safety basis for a DOE 

nuclear facility is not undermined by 

changes in the facility, the work performed, 

the associated hazards, or other factors that 

support the adequacy of the safety basis. 

2. The USQ process permits a contractor to 

make physical and procedural changes to a 

nuclear facility and to conduct tests and 

experiments without prior approval, 

provided these changes do not cause a USQ. 

The USQ process provides a contractor with 

the flexibility needed to conduct day-to-day 

operations by requiring only those changes 

and tests with a potential to impact the safety 

basis (and therefore the safety of the nuclear 

facility) be approved by DOE. This allows 

DOE to focus its review on those changes 

significant to safety. The USQ process helps 

keep the safety basis current by ensuring 

appropriate review of and response to 

situations that might adversely affect the 

safety basis. 

3. DOE Guide 424.1–1B Chg 2, 

Implementation Guide for Use in Addressing 

Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements, 

or successor document provides DOE’s 

expectations for a USQ process. The 

contractor must obtain DOE approval of its 

procedure used to implement the USQ 

process. The contractor is allowed to make 

editorial and format changes to its USQ 

procedure while maintaining DOE approval. 

I. Functions and Responsibilities 

1. The DOE Management Official for a DOE 

nuclear facility (that is, the Assistant 

Secretary, the Assistant Administrator, or the 

Office Director who is primarily responsible 

for the management of the facility) has 

primary responsibility within DOE for 

ensuring that the safety basis for the facility 

is adequate and complies with the safety 

basis requirements of Part 830. The DOE 

Management Official is responsible for 

ensuring the timely and proper (1) review of 

all safety basis documents submitted to DOE 

and (2) preparation of a safety evaluation 

report concerning the safety basis for a 

facility. 

2. DOE will maintain a public list on the 

internet that provides the status of the safety 

basis for each Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 

nuclear facility and, to the extent practicable, 

provides information on how to obtain a 

copy of the safety basis and related 

documents for a facility. 

[FR Doc. 2018–16863 Filed 8–7–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 

NATIONAL CREDIT UNION 

ADMINISTRATION 

12 CFR Part 702 

RIN 3133–AE90 

Risk-Based Capital—Supplemental 

Rule 

AGENCY: National Credit Union 

Administration (NCUA). 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The NCUA Board (Board) is 

seeking comment on a proposed rule 

that would amend the NCUA’s 

previously revised regulations regarding 

prompt corrective action (PCA). The 

proposal would delay the effective date 

of the NCUA’s October 29, 2015 final 

rule regarding risk-based capital (2015 

Final Rule) for one year, moving the 

effective date from January 1, 2019 to 

January 1, 2020. During the extended 

delay period, the NCUA’s current PCA 

requirements would remain in effect. 

The proposal would also amend the 

definition of a ‘‘complex’’ credit union 

adopted in the 2015 Final Rule for riskbased capital purposes by increasing the 

threshold level for coverage from $100 

million to $500 million. These proposed 

changes would provide covered credit 

unions and the NCUA with additional 

time to prepare for the rule’s 

implementation, and would exempt an 

additional 1,026 credit unions from the 

rule without subjecting the National 

Credit Union Share Insurance Fund 

(NCUSIF) to undue risk. 

DATES: Comments must be received by 

September 7, 2018. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit written 

comments, identified by RIN 3133– 

AE90, by any of the following methods 

(Please send comments by one method 

only): 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• NCUA website: http://

www.ncua.gov/Legal/Regs/Pages/ 

PropRegs.aspx. Follow the instructions 

for submitting comments. 

• Email: Address to regcomments@

ncua.gov. Include ‘‘[Your name]— 

Comments on Proposed Rule: RiskBased Capital—Supplemental Proposal’’ 

in the email subject line. 

• Fax: (703) 518–6319. Use the 

subject line described above for email. 

• Mail: Address to Gerard Poliquin, 

Secretary of the Board, National Credit 

Union Administration, 1775 Duke 

Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314– 

3428. 

• Hand Delivery/Courier: Same as 

mail address. 

You can view all public comments on 

the NCUA’s website at http://

www.ncua.gov/Legal/Regs/Pages/ 

PropRegs.aspx as submitted, except for 

those we cannot post for technical 

reasons. The NCUA will not edit or 

remove any identifying or contact 

information from the public comments 

submitted. You may inspect paper 

copies of comments in the NCUA’s law 

library at 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, 

Virginia 22314, by appointment 

weekdays between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. To 

make an appointment, call (703) 518– 

6546, or send an email to OGCMail@

ncua.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Policy and Analysis: Julie Cayse, 

Director, Division of Risk Management, 

Office of Examination and Insurance, at 

(703) 518–6360; Kathryn Metzker, Loss/ 

Risk Analyst, Division of Risk 

Management, Office of Examination and 

Insurance, at (703) 548–2456; Julie 

Decker, Loss/Risk Analyst, Division of 

Risk Management, Office of 

Examination and Insurance, at (703) 

518–3684; Aaron Langley, Risk 

Management Officer, Division of 

Analytics and Surveillance, Office of 

Examination and Insurance, at (703) 

518–6387; Legal: John Brolin, Staff 

Attorney, Office of General Counsel, at 

(703) 518–6540; or by mail at National 

Credit Union Administration, 1775 

Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 22314. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The NCUA’s primary mission is to 

ensure the safety and soundness of 

federally insured credit unions. The 

agency performs this function by 

examining and supervising all federal 

credit unions, participating in the 

examination and supervision of 

federally insured, state-chartered credit 

unions in coordination with state 

regulators, and insuring members’ 

accounts at federally insured credit 

unions.1 In its role as administrator of 

the NCUSIF, the NCUA insures and 

regulates approximately 5,573 federally 

insured credit unions, holding total 

assets exceeding $1.4 trillion and 

representing approximately 111 million 

members.2

At its October 2015 meeting, the 

Board issued the 2015 Final Rule to 

amend Part 702 of the NCUA’s PCA 

regulations to require that credit unions 

taking certain risks hold capital 

commensurate with those risks.3 The 

risk-based capital provisions of the 2015 

Final Rule apply only to federally 

insured, natural-person credit unions 

with quarter-end total assets exceeding 

$100 million. The overarching intent of 

the 2015 Final Rule is to reduce the 

likelihood that a relatively small 

number of high-risk outlier credit 

unions would exhaust their capital and 

cause large losses to the NCUSIF. Under 


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