In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-18-00039-CR

JOYCE COBBINS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 276th District Court

Morris County, Texas

Trial Court No. 11,581-CR

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Joyce Cobbins of theft of property valued at less than $2,500.00, with two 

or more prior convictions. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(4)(D) (West Supp. 2017). After 

the jury found true the State’s two enhancement allegations, Cobbins was sentenced to twenty 

years’ imprisonment and was ordered to pay $400.00 in attorney fees for her court-appointed 

attorney. On appeal, Cobbins argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her 

conviction because the State failed to prove the value of the items stolen. Cobbins also argues 

that, because she was indigent, the evidence is insufficient to support the order to pay attorney 

fees. 

We find the evidence legally sufficient for the jury to find that the stolen items had a value 

of less than $2,500.00. Yet, we sustain Cobbins’ second point of error, delete the order to pay 

attorney fees from the judgment, and affirm the judgment, as modified. 

(1) The Evidence Was Legally Sufficient for the Jury to Find that the Stolen Items Had Value

In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Hartsfield 

v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d). Our rigorous legal 

sufficiency review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–

18 (Cochran, J., concurring). We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks

opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in 
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testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate 

facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

318–19); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by 

a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

The “hypothetically correct” jury charge is “one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by 

the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict 

the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the 

defendant was tried.” Id. 

 A person commits theft if she “unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive 

the owner of the property.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (West Supp. 2017). The State’s 

indictment alleged that Cobbins “unlawfully appropriate[d] by acquiring or otherwise exercising 

control over . . . packages of meat of the value of less than $2,500, from Spring Market, the owner 

thereof without the effective consent of the owner, and with intent to deprive the owner of the 

property.” The offense of theft is a state jail felony if “the value of the property stolen is less than 

$2,500 and the defendant has been previously convicted two or more times of any grade of theft.” 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(4)(D). The State’s indictment alleged, with sufficient 

specificity, that Cobbins had previously been convicted of two theft offenses. 

Evidence at trial, including the testimony of Armodo Argular, the operations manager for 

Spring Market, and the video surveillance from the store, established that Cobbins grabbed meat 
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from the market, hid it underneath her hoodie, and walked out without paying for it. Final 

judgments from Cobbins’ previous two theft offenses were admitted into evidence. 

Cobbins does not argue that the evidence is legally insufficient to demonstrate either that 

she “unlawfully appropriate[d] property with intent to deprive the owner of the property,” or that 

she had been previously convicted of two theft offenses. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a). 

Rather, Cobbins contends only that “there is simply no evidence at all in the record of the value of 

property taken in this case” and posits that, as a result, the State “failed to prove an essential 

element of the offense: that the property at issue was valued at less than $2500.00.” We disagree.

The State was merely required to prove that the stolen meat had some value. Although the 

State did not introduce evidence of the price of the meat, Argular testified that Cobbins walked out 

of the store without paying for the merchandise. “The jury may use common sense and apply 

common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life when giving 

effect to the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.” Taylor v. State, 71 

S.W.3d 792, 795 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d). The meat was stolen from a market, it 

is common knowledge that markets charge for merchandise, and Argular’s testimony established 

that Cobbins was required, but failed, to pay for the meat. Accordingly, the jury was free to 

conclude that the meat had some monetary value. Finding the evidence sufficient to prove that the 

meat stolen was valued at less than $2,500.00, we overrule Cobbins’ first point of error. 

(2) Order to Pay Attorney Fees Must Be Deleted 

Next, Cobbins argues that the trial court erred by assessing court-appointed attorney fees 

against her in the amount of $400.00. Pursuant to Article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal 
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Procedure, a trial court has the authority to order the reimbursement of court-appointed attorney 

fees as court costs only if “the judge determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable 

the defendant to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal services provided . . . including any 

expenses and costs.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2017). “[T]he 

defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay are explicit critical elements in the trial court's 

determination of the propriety of ordering reimbursement of costs and fees” of legal services 

provided. Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 765–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Mayer 

v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)).

The trial court made a finding that Cobbins was indigent and appointed her an attorney for 

purposes of trial and on appeal. Cobbins maintains that the trial court erred in including the 

$400.00 attorney fee in its judgment. The State concedes the error. Appellate courts “have the 

authority to reform judgments and affirm as modified in cases where there is non reversible error.” 

Ferguson v. State, 435 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, pet. struck) (comprehensively 

discussing appellate cases that have modified judgments). 
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We modify the trial court’s judgment by deleting the order to pay $400.00 in attorney fees 

and affirm the trial court’s judgment, as modified. 

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: July 23, 2018

Date Decided: July 24, 2018

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