T e x a s S o u th R e n ta l s , I n c . i s a l s o k n o w n a s T e x a s S o u th , I n c . W e w i l l re fe r t o i t a s “T e x a s S o u th .” 1 

### NUM BER 13-06- 629- CV



## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS C O R P U S C H R IS T I - 

## EDI NBURG
T E XAS S O U T H R E N T AL S , I N C
. , A/ K/A T E XAS SOU TH IN C. A ND T HE HER TZC ORP ORA TION , A pp ellan ts,
v . JOS E M . GO M EZ, I NDIVI DUA LLY A ND ON B EHA LF OF A LL OT HER S SIMI LA RL Y SIT UA TE D PER SON S, A pp ellee.
On ap pe al f rom th e 2 14t h Dist rict C ou rt o f N ue ces Co un ty , T exas .



## O P I N I O N Be fo re Ju stice s Y añ ez, R od rigu ez, an d Be na v ide s

Opin ion b y

Ju stice B en av ide s Thi s i s a n i n t e r l o c u t o r

y a p p e a l b y

a p p e l l a n t s , t h e H e rt zC o r p o r a t i o n a n d Tex as South Ren tal s, Inc ., from an order cer ti fyi ng a c las s o f plai nti ffs a nd des ig nati ng appel lee , 1 Jos e M. Gomez , as cl ass represent ati v e. Her tzand Tex as South hav e rais ed numerousT he or der cer t i f y i ng t he cl ass i s t hi r t y - si x pages l ong, and w e hav e at t ached t he e nt i r e or der as an 2 a p p e n d i x to th i s o p i n i o n . 2 is sues ch all eng ing the cl ass -c erti ficat ion order

. F or the foll ow ing reaso ns, w e rev erse the 2 tr ia l co u rt ’s o rd e r, de ce rt if y the cla ss , a n d rem a n d to th e tri a l co u rt fo r f u rt h e r pr o ce e d in gs cons is tent w it h thi s o pin ion

. I. Back ground Hertzis a nation ally

ope rated rental car com pan y . Te x as Sou th i s an ind epe nde ntly
ow ned and operat e d H e rtzl ic ensee . As par t of thes e c ompani es’ rental ag re ements , a cus tomer

i s p re sent ed w it h three refueli ng opti ons. F irst, the companies offer a “ fuel pur chas e opt ion ” or

“ FPO .” Und er

this option, the compani es charg e the cu sto mer up- front for a full tank

of g as at a spec ified pr ic e per g all on. The cus tomer can then re tur n the ca r
w it h l ess than a full tank o f g as w it hout inc ur ri ng any addi ti onal ch arg e. Acc ordin g to Gomez , t he F PO i s ty pic all y cl ose to t he mar ketpr ic e for gas in the immediate su rroundi ng ar ea. Seco nd, a custom er ma y ref uel th e car before returnin g it to the rental loca tion. This opti on req uires the cus tomer to re tur n the ca r w it h a ful l tank of g as, and the p ri ce the
cus tomer

pai d for the g as is obv iou sl y dependent up on hi s o r her se lec ti on of a g as sta ti on. The di sput e i n thi s c ase cent ers o n the thi rd opti on. If the c ust omer does not p re pay for g as under

the FPO opti on and does not retur n the ca r w it h a ful l tank of g as, the compani es charg e a “ fuel and ser v ic e c harg e” or

“ FSC ” to refuel t he c ar . The p ri ce per g all on of g asol ine under thi s o pti on i s h ig her

than the FPO

. On J anuar

y 17, 2003, Gomezrented a c ar from Tex a s South. Atthe ti me of the renta l, these optio ns w ere explained in the rent al agreem enta nd by the custom er serv ice3

re pr esent ati v e. In f a ct , Gomez ’s rental ag re ement s tates , i n al l caps , t hat “ THE P ER GALLO N CO ST OF THE FU EL PU RC HA SE OPTION W ILL ALW AY S BE LOW ERTHAN THE F UE L AN D SERVIC E CH AR GE.” In Gomez ’s rental ag re ement, the p ri ce for th e F SC
w as $3.99 per

g all on. Gomezdi d notpurchas e the F PO a nd di d notrefuel t he c a r b efore retur nin g i t t o T e xas So u th . T e xas So u th , t h e re fo re , im p o se d an FS C o f $5 2 .0 4 . Go m e z pa id th e ch a rge and did not dis pute itw it h Tex as South. O v er a y ear l ater , G omezfil ed s uitag ain st Her tz on Febr uar

y 6, 2000. Later, on September 15, 2000, he amended hi s p lea din g s t o i ncl ude Tex as South. Gomezal leg ed c lai ms for common- law fraud, i ll eg al penal ty , unc onsc ion abi li ty , and brea ch of

co ntract

. I n orde r to e stab lish liab ility o n Hertz, Gom ez alleged several agency th e o ri e s o f

liability , includin g app aren t aut hority, agency byestop pel, ratif ication , v ice pr inc ipa l, j oin t ent er pr is e, c onspi ra cy , and par tnershi p. Gomezpl eaded c las s a ll eg ati ons and sought to ce rtif

y a cla ss a ction of

a ll T exas reside nts w ho p aid an FSC af ter Februa ry 6, 20 00. Hertzand Te x as Sou th pleade d nu me rous af f irmative def ense s, such as volunta ry pay ment, w aiv er , rati fica ti o n , estoppe l, and acc ord and sat is facti on. Addi ti onal ly , Tex as South asser

ted t hat c lai ms by

cl ass members w ho pai d an FSC before September 15, 200 0 w ould be ba rred by the four-year statute of limitation s. Gomezmov ed to ce rt ify the cl ass . After numerous f ili n gs by the par ti es and a hea ring , th e tr i al c ou rt c er ti fi ed a c l as s c on s i s ti ng o f “ [a ]l l Te x as res i de nt s w ho w ere charged an FSC in Texas af ter Febr u a ry 6, 200 0.” Appe ndix at p. 36. The trial court’s orde r fu rther clarif ied th e limits of the class de f inition a s follows:I t i s ar guabl e t hat t hi s excl usi on, by i t s t er m s, cer t i f i es t he cl ass cl ai m s onl y aga i nst H er t z and not 3 agai nst T exas Sout h. T he t r i al cour t ’ s cer t i f i cat i on o r der r ar el y m ent i ons T exas Sout h or i dent i f i es i t as a se pa r at e de f en da nt

— an i nf i r m i t y we r el y u po n f oro urh ol di ng i n Par t I V. T he t r i al c ou r t a ss um ed t ha t t he FSC was “ bor ne o ut ofand di st r i but ed by a cor por at e pol i cy , r egar dl ess of whet her t he e nt i t y i m posi ng t he ch ar ge i s a cor por at e l ocat i on o r a l i censee, ” Append i x at p. 5, and we bel i ev e t hat t he t r i al cour t di d not i nt end by t he l angua ge i n i t s or der t o excl ude T exas Sout h as a de f endan t

. T exas Sout h l i k ewi se assu m es t hat t he o r der cer t i f i es a cl ass ag ai nst i t

. W e wi l l do t he sa m e.

I n t he i nt er est o f b revi t y , we wi l l onl y di scuss t he co nt ent s of t he o r der wher e i t i s per t i nent t o ou r 4 anal y si s. 4 T his is a statewide Class only . E xc lude d f rom th e foregoing Class are re ntal s t hat c ommenced anyw here oth er than at a Her tzl ocat ion i n the Sta te o f T e xas ; the presi din g j udg e of the cour t i n w hic h thi s c ause is fil ed, a ny other j udg e assi g ned to that court or to this cause, the immedi ate famil y of such jud ge(s), Class coun sel, an d ea ch of the de fend ant s and their respe ctiv e of

f icers, directors, em ployees, agen ts, an d att orne y s. 3
Id. at pp . 35- 36. Thi s i nterlo cu to ry appeal ens ued. T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E § 4 51.014( a) (3 ) (V er non Su pp. 2 007)

. II. St and ard o f Rev iew W e rev iew

an o rd er

ce rt ify ing a c las s u nder an a buse of dis creti on s tandard. Stoneb ri dge Lif e Ins

. Co. v. Pitts, 236 S.W .3d 201 , 204 -05 (Te x . 200 7). How ever, w e mu st do so “w ithou t indu lgi ng ev erypresum ption in fa v or of the trial court's de cision.” Id. at 205 (ci ti n g Hen ry

Schei n, Inc. v. Str

om boe , 102 S.W .3d 675, 691 (Tex

. 2002) ). W e re v iew the tr ial court ’s order

to deter mine w hether

the pla int iff demonst ra ted actua l compl ian ce w it h Tex as Rul e of

Civ il Proc edure 42. Id. Compl ian ce may not be presumed, but itmustbe apparent from the re cord and the t ri al cour t’ s o rd er . See i

d. All class actions m ust sat isf y the four thre shold requireme nts set outin rule 42(a): (1) the class mu st be so n um erou s tha t joinde r of all me mb ers is imp racticab le; (2) there must be q uest ion s o f law or fact co m m o n t o the cl ass ; ( 3) the cl aims or defenses of the
re pr esent ati v e par

ti es must be ty pic al of the cl aims or defenses of the cl ass ; and (4) the5

re pr esent ati v e par

ti es must be capabl e of f air ly and adeq uatel y

protec ti ng the int er est s o f the c las s. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 42( a) ; see Sw. R e f. Co. v. Ber nal , 2 2 S

. W

. 3 d 4 2 5 , 4 3 3 (T e x. 2000)

. Add itiona lly , the class mustsatisf y at least o ne o f

the requirem ent s set forth in rule 42( b)

. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 42(b ). In this case, Go me zhas alleged th a t h e satisf ies rule 42( b) (3 ), w hic h req uires that common qu est ion s of law or factpredomin ate o v er q uest ion s aff ect ing onl y

i ndi v idu al cl ass members an d t h a t cla ss treatment is su per ior to other methods of adj udi cat ion

. Id. at R. 42( b) (3 ). The tr ial co urt i s req uired to l ook bey ond t he par ti es’ pl eadi ng s, inv est ig ate t he fac tu al a nd l eg al b as es for a l l t he c l ai ms , an d ex pl ai n i n a de ta i l ed t r i al p l an h ow t he c l ai ms
w il l proceed as a c las s. Ber nal , 22 S.W .3d at 435. In the abse nce o f such an ana ly sis, it is n e a rl y im p o s s ib le fo r a r e vie win g c o u rtt o e va lu a t e wh e t h e r t h e cl a s s re qu ir e m e n t s h a ve been s ati sfied. S ta t e Fa rm Mu t. Auto. In s. Co. v. Lopez , 1 5 6 S

. W

. 3 d 5 5 0 , 5 5 6 -5 7 (T e x. 200 4). III. Pr edominanc e Requirem ent Hertzand Te x as Sou th assa il the trial court’s find ings regarding ty picality, adequacy of represent ati on, p re domina nce of common is sues , super ior ity of t he c las s v ehi cl e, an d the trial plan requireme nt. Be ca u s e t h e p re dom inan ce requireme nt is one of the “mo st
s t r i n g e n t p r e r e q u i s i t e s t o c l a s s - a c t i o n c e rt i fi c a t i o n , ” w e b e g i n b y a d d r e s s i n g Hertzand Tex as South’ s a rg uments thatco mmon is sues w il l not p re dom in a te i n thi s c ase. Stoneb ri dge Li fe Ins. C o., 236 S.W .3d a t 205

. A c las s may

be c erti fied unde r Tex as Rul e of Ci v il Procedu re 4 2 (b )(3) w hen “ the q uest ion s o f law

or fact c ommon to the members o f the c las s p re domina te ov er any6

question s af

fecting only i ndividual me mb ers . . . .” T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 42( b) (3 ). St ated conversely , a class cann ot be certif ied un der this provision when “comp lex and div erse individual issues w ould overw helm or conf use a jury or severely com prom ise a p a rt y ’s ability to prese nt ot herwi se v iable claim s or de f e n s e s . ” Stoneb ri dge Li fe Ins. C o. , 236 S. W .3 d at20 5 (cit in g Hen ry Schei n, Inc. , 102 S.W .3d at 690 ). Predomin ance of common i ss ues, as w it h all prer eq uis it es to c erti ficat ion , mus t be ri g orousl y

ex amined by

the tr ial co urt. Henry Sche in, Inc. , 102 S. W .3d a t 694 ; Ber nal , 22 S.W .3d a t 434

. “The tes t for pr edomin ance is not w hether co mmon is sues outnumber
unco mm on issue s b ut . . . w het her com mo n or indivi dua l issues w ill be th e object of most of th e effor

ts of th e l i ti g an ts an d th e court. ” Ber nal , 2 2 S. W .3 d at43 4 (quo ti n g Cen tr al Power & L igh t C o. v

. Cit y o f Sa n J uan , 962 S.W .2d 6 02, 6 10 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or p u s C hr is ti 1998, pet. dis m’d w .o.j .) ). The t ri al cour t mus t dec id e a t the o uts et t hat a ny i ndi v idu al is sues ca n be deter mine d i n a “ manag eabl e, t ime- eff ic ien t and fair manner”; othe rw is e, cer ti ficat ion i s i mprop er . Stoneb ri dge Li fe Ins. C o. , 236 S.W .3d a t 205

. In c onduc ti ng thi s i nq uir y , t he tr ial co urt mus t i denti fy the s ubst anti v e i ss ues inv olv ed, a ss ess w hic h of thos e i ss ues w il l pr edomin ate, and dete rmi ne i f the pr edomin ati ng i ss ues ar e tho se common t o the cl ass . Id. a t 205 ; Ber nal , 22 S. W .3d a t 434 . “Ideally, ‘ a judgme nt in favor of th e class me mb ers shou ld decisively settle th e en tire cont ro v ersy , and al l that shoul d remain is for other members o f the c las s t o fil e proof of the ir cl aim .’” Exxon Mobi l Cor p. v . G il l, 221 S. W .3d 841, 85 6 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 2 0 0 7 , p e t. f ile d ) (qu o ti n g Ber nal , 22 S.W .3d a t 434 ). The tr ial co urt ana lyz ed Go mez ’s cl aims and found that there are no ind iv idu al is sues w it h respec t t o anyof the cl aims

. Appendi x

at pp. 1 6, 19 , 21, 22, 24, 2 6, 30 , 34- 35.H er t z and T exas Sout h f ur t her ar gue t hat i ndi v i dual i ssues wi l l pr edom i nat e wi t h r espect t o ag ency 5 t he or i es G om ez p l ea de d as a m ea ns t o es t ab l i sh l i ab i l i t y ag ai ns t H er t z . T ha t i ss ue i s di sc us se d i n Par t I V. 7 Thus i t found t hat c ommon i ss u e s wou ld predomin ate. Bot h H ertzand Tex as South adv ance sev er al arg uments ag ain st thi s fin ding. F irst, they arg ue th at t he c las s fraud claims de ma nd an individualiz ed inquiry into w het her the alleged misrep resen tatio ns w ere mater ial to the c las s members a n d wh e ther t he c las s members j ust ifiab ly reli ed on the all eg ed mi srepr e sent ati ons. Se cond, they arg ue th at t he c las s c lai ms are s ubj ectto the
v olun tary payme nt de fense , w hich requires an ind iv idua liz ed inquiry into the class
me mb ers’ knowl edge. T hird, the y argue tha t to the extent the class’s brea ch of contract and U .C .C . c lai ms are bas ed on uncon sc ion abi li ty , those cl aims rai se indi v idu al is sues of the c las s members’ kn ow led g e, ab il ity , e xpe ri ence, and capac ity . Fi nal ly , Tex as South
ra is es an addi ti onal arg ument, w hic h H ertzhas not a rgu e d i n i ts br iefs. Tex as South argues tha t consu me r sta tus is required for t he class claims un der the U.C.C., and th at th is inquiry w ill raise insurm oun tab le indivi dua l issues. 5 A . Fraud Cl aim The el ements of a fraud or fraudul ent conc eal ment cl aim ar e: (1 ) the s peake r made a mater ial represent ati on; ( 2) the re pr esent ati on i s fal se; ( 3) the sp e a ke r knew the
re pr esent ati on w as false or made i t reck les sl y w it hout any

kn ow led g e of the tr uth; (4 ) the speak e r ma d e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h t h e i n t e n t t h a t t h e o t h e r p a rt y a c t u p o n i t ; ( 5 ) the p a rt y a c t e d i n re li a n c e o n t h e re p re s e n t a t io n ; a n d (6 ) t h e re lyi n g p a rt y su f fe re d a n in ju ry. Se e F or m os a Pl as tic s C or p. v . Pr es idi o En g’ r s &C on tr ac to r s , In c. , 960 S.W .2d 4 1, 47 (Tex . 199 8) ; Sc h lu mbe rger Tech. C or p. v . Swans on , 959 S.W .2d 171 , 181 (Tex. 1997 ). Hertzand Te x as Sou th argue tha t Gom ez’s f raud cla ims w ill require ind iv idua liz ed inquiry8

int o w hether

the all eg ed mi srepresent ati ons w ere mater ial to the cla ss m embers a nd
w hether the cl ass members reli ed on the a ll eg ed mi srepresent ati o n s. Accordin g ly , t hey argue tha t individualiz ed issues w ill pred om inate , as the y wil l h ave to que stion e ach class member re g ardin g hi s o r her kn ow led g e and understa ndi ng of the F SC

. Gomezco unters, and t he tr ial co urt ag re ed, t hat mat eria lit y a nd reli ance can be deter mined on a cl ass -w ide bas is

. Spec ific all y , t he tr ial co urt hel d: This i s a ca se w here Pl ain ti ff ’s cl aim for fraud ule nt mi srepresent ati on, a s w il l be demons trated in the p ro posed Tri al Pl an, i s s ubj ectto Cl ass -w ide treatment, bec ause iti s b ased upon a uni form, w ri tten mis re pr esent ati on, and reli ance is ev ide nced by the actof pay ing that

ex pr ess ch arg e at the conclu sion of

the ren tal. Appendi x

at p. 19

. The tr ial cour t c it ed Hen ry

Schei n, Inc. v. Str

om boe , w here the Tex as Supreme C our

t s tated i n di cta thatcl ass -w ide proof of rel ian ce coul d be poss ibl e i n a fraud claim w here class-w ide ev iden ce existed. 102 S.W .3d at 693-94

. T he t ri a l c ourt
conc lud ed th at c las s- w ide ev ide nce ex is ted h er e because the “a ct of pay ing demons trates that [the cus tomers] ar e rely ing upon the charg e as w hat it sta tes : A charg e for fuel and for
ser v ic e.” Ap pendi x

at p. 19

. The tr ial co ur t referred to thi s a s t h e “ in voic e t h eor y of reliance .” Id. at p. 21

. The anal y si s o f these is sues nec e ss a ri ly req uires a di sc uss ion of the Tex as S u p r e me C o u rt ’ s d e c i s i o n i n S c h ein . 102 S.W .3d a t 693 -9 4. In Sche in , the trial court
cer ti fied a cl ass of cons umers w ho purchas ed c omputer so ftw ar e. Id. at 678. The purch asers alleged tha t the so f tw are com pan y

f alsely represe nte d tha t the sof tw are cou ld perform ce rtain tasks a nd was su it a b le f or the p urcha sers’ use in the ir denta l practices. Id. a t6 7 9
- 8 0

. T h e s o ftw a r e c o mp a n y a rg u e d t h a tt h e c l a s s s h o u l d n o tb e c erti fied becau se ind iv idu al re li ance is sues w oul d predomin ate. Id. at 693.T he c ou rt ad dre s s ed t he pu rch as ers ’ fr au d, bre ac h o f ex pre s s w arran t y , neg l i gentm i sr epr esent at i on, 6 p ro m i s s o ry e s to p p e l , a n d D T P A “l a u n d ry l i s t v i o l a ti o n s ,” w h i c h a l l h a d re l i a n c e a s a n e l e m e n t. H enr y Schein, I nc. v. St rom boe, 10 2 S

. W

. 3d 67 5, 69 3 (T ex . 20 02 ). 9 After noti ng thatse v er al of the purc hasers’ clai ms req uired rel ian ce as an el ement 6 of proof, t he s upreme co urt reit erated it s h old ing i n Southwes t Refi nin g Co. v

. Be rn al that the c las s v ehi cl e i s n ot s uppos ed to enhanc e or di mini sh a par

ty ’s abil ity

to pr esentthe subs tanti v e mer it s o f its ca se: [t] he c las s a cti on i s a procedu ra l dev ic e i nten ded t o adv ance jud ic ial e c o n o m y b y t ryi n g c la im s t o ge t h e r t h a tle n d t h e m s e lve s t o co ll e c t ive treat me nt. It is not me antt o alter the p arties’ burd ens o f proof , rig ht to a jury tr ial , or the subs tant iv e prer eq uis it es to recov er y under a g iv en to rt

. Procedu ra l dev ic es may“ not b e c onst ru ed to enl arg e or di mini sh any su b st a n ti ve righ ts or o b liga ti o n s o f an y pa rt ie s to a n y civil ac ti o n .” Alt h o u gh a goal of our sy stem is to resolve law suits w ith “greatex ped ition an d dispa tch and at the least expense ,” the supre me o bjective o f t he courts is “to obt ain a j ust , fair , eq uit abl e and impar ti al adj udi cat ion of the r ig hts of li ti g ants under esta blished principles of substa ntive law .” Th is m ean s that“convenience and ec onomy

musty iel d to a paramountconcer n for a fair and impar

ti al tr ial .” And basi c to the ri g ht to a fair tr ial —i ndeed, basi c t o the v er y es senc e of the adversarial process—is tha t each party have the opp ortun ity t o ad equate ly and v igorously

presen t any mate rial claims and def ense s. Id. a t 69 3 (quo ti n g Ber

nal , 22 S.W .3d a t 437 ) (inte rnal citation s omitt ed). In ot her w ords, cl ass pl ain ti ffs mus t be hel d to the s ame st andards of proof as an i ndi v idu al pla int iff. Id. How ev er , t he s upreme co urt’ s n e xt st atement is the spar k t hat i g nit ed th e i nst ant dis p u t e b e tw e e n t h e p a rt i e s i n t h i s c a s e . T h e s u p r e me c o u rtc l a r i fi e d t h a ti t was not hol din g thata fra ud c las s c oul d nev er be c e rtifie d due to i ndi v idu al re li ance is sues . Id. Rathe r, the cou rt sugg este d the p ossibility tha t a class represe nta tiv e could produ ce classw ide ev ide nce of rel ian ce, sa ti sfy ing the pr edomin ance re q uirement: T his doe s not m ean , o f c o urse, th at reliance or othe r eleme nts of their cause s of

action cann ot be proved class-w ide w ith evidence g ene rally appl ic abl e to all cla ss members; cl ass -wi de pr oof i s p oss ible when cl ass -wide ev

ide nce exi

sts

. But ev ide nce ins uff ic ien t to prov e re li ance in a10

suit by an indiv idua l does no t beco me suf f icient in a class a c t ion simp ly becau se there are more pl ain ti ffs. Ines capab ly indi v idu al differenc es canno t be c oncea led i n a throng . The procedu ra l dev ic e of a c las s a cti on el imi nates the n eces si ty

of adduc ing the same ev ide nce ov er and ov er

ag ain i n a mu ltitude of

indiv idua l actio n s ; it does n ot lesse n the q uality of ev iden ce r e q u i r e d i n an indi v idu a l a c t i o n o r re l a x s u b s t a n t i v e b u rd e n s o f p ro o f. I f a plaint if f could pro v e reliance in a n individual action w ith the same ev iden ce of fered to show cl ass-w ide reli a n c e , then the issue is one of law and fact common t o the cl ass . The q uest ion the cour t must deci de before c erti fyi ng a c las s, after ri g orous anal y si s a nd notmerely a l ic k a nd a pray er , i s w hether the plaintif

fs have dem onst rated thatthey can m eettheir burde n of proof in such a w ay tha t com mo n issues pre dom inate ov er indivi dua l ones. Id. at 693- 94 ( emphasi s a dded)

. Gomezse iz es upon t his l ang uag e and argue s that he present ed c las s- w ide evidence o f

reliance by merely showing tha t Hertza n d T e xa s S out h custo me rs w ere charg ed the FSC

. In other w ords, becau se Her tz and Tex as South mis re pr esent ed t h at the F SC w as for “ fuel and ser v ic e” and did not dis cl ose the hidde n profit ele ment, and t he class me mb ers paid for the FSC w ithou t k n o win g w hatit truly w as, th e class me mb ers nece ssarily

relied on th e misrep resen tatio n. Gom ez reaso ns, therefore, that i f reliance is esta blished as to Gom ez, i t is establishe d as to the e ntire class. W e disagree tha t this is the rar e c ase the s upreme co urt env is ion ed by i ts sta tements i n Sche in. In Sche in , t he purchas ers a rg ued t hat t hey present ed c las s- w ide e vide nce of
re li ance. Id. at 694

. T h e c o u rtlooked to the record and dete rmine d tha t altho ugh the re
w as “e v ide nce th a t Schei n wanted purchas ers t o rely

on i ts adv erti sement s a nd ot her represe nta tions a b o ut its sof tw are prod ucts,” the re w as “no evidence thatpurcha sers actual ly did rely on Sch ein’s stat em ent s so uniformly that com mo n issues of re li ance pred om inate ov er indivi dua l issues.” Id. In doi ng so , t he c our t pl aced the b urden on the pla int iff to bri ng for

w ard a re cord demonstrati ng that the tr ial co urt had co mpli ed w it h the
re q uirements for c erti fyi ng a c las s u nder r ule 42( b) (4 ). Id.I n di ct a i n Sout hw est er n B el l T el ephon e C o. v. Mar keting o n Hol d, I nc. , we sur m i sed t hat cl ass- wi de 7 e v i d e n c e o f re l i a n c e c o u l d e x i s t i n th a t c a s e . 1 7 0 S .W .3 d 8 1 4 , 8 2 7 -2 8 ( T e x . A p p .– C o rp u s C h ris ti 2 0 0 5 , p e t. gr ant ed)

. However , we di d so onl y on t he a ssum pt i on t hat r el i ance was not an e l em ent of t he ca uses o fact i on p l e a d e d i n th a t c a s e . I d. T he p ar t i es do not di sput e t hat r el i ance i s an i ssue i n t hi s case, and we ar e no t const r ai ned by ourpr i or deci si on i n S o u th w e s te r n B e ll , whi ch i s cur r ent l y under r ev i ew by t he T exas Supr em e C o u rt. 11 Fur ther more, the cour

t not ed that the reco rd actual ly suppor ted the opp osi te of the pur chas ers’ arg uments —te st im o ny appeared i n the record s how ing thatso me of the pur chas ers re li ed on re commendat ion s by col lea g ues in pur chas ing the softw a re rather than on Sc hei n’s represent ati ons. Id. Accordi n gl y , the court he ld tha t the purcha sers faile d to demonst ra te c ompli ance w it h the predomi nance req uirement i n r ule 42( b) (4 ). Id. Si nce the s uprem e c o u rt ’s deci si on i n Sche in , w e ha v e ad dres s ed c l as s c l ai ms inv olv ing reli ance ele ments on tw o s eparate o cc asi ons. I n For d Motor C o. v . O canas , we 7
re v iew ed an order

ce rt ify ing a c las s o f plai nti ffs w ho purchas ed Ford F-1 50 truc ks w it h an opt iona l tow ing package. 138 S.W .3d 447 , 449 (Tex. App .–Corp us Christi 2004 , no pe t.). T he F-15 0 w ith a towing packa ge w as ma rketed as havin g a l a rg e r radiat or than those
w it hout the t ow ing pac kag e, but due to a manufactur ing er ro r, the larg er radi ator w as not inc lud ed. Id. The c las s a ll eg ed “ lau ndr y l is t” violati ons of the Tex as Dec epti v e Tra de Pract ic es Act( “D TPA”) , w hic h req uired reli ance as an el ement of proof. Id. at 453. After summar iz ing the hol din g i n Sche in , w e focus ed par ti cul ar ly on Sche in’

s det ermin ation thatthe pla intif fs had not pro duce d any class-w ide ev iden ce tha t purcha sers act ual ly reli ed on the d efendants’ mis re pr esent ati ons in a un if o rm m a nner . Id. ( ci ti ng Henry Sche in, Inc. , 102 S.W .3d a t 693 ). For those same reas ons, w e hel d tha t t he tr ial court im prop erly

certif ied th e class of

F-150 pu rchase rs: Lik e the pl ain ti ffs i n Henry Sche in, Inc. , app ellees plead ed breach o f ex press and [implied ] w arrantie s and DT PA “laun drylist” v iolation s w hich require each cla ss m em ber to prove relian ce as a prerequisite to recovery . Further,12

alt houg h the re i s e v ide nce that appel lan t int ended for cus tomers to rely on re pr esent ati ons that F- 150s w it h a C las s I II tow ing pac kag e w oul d c ome w it h larg er radi ators, “t here i s n o ev ide nce that pur chas e rs a ct u all y di d rely ” on ap pe l l an t’ s s ta te me nt s “ s o un i for ml y t ha t c om mo n i s s ue s o f r el iance pred om inate ov er indivi dua l issues.” T h e suprem e cou rt note d tha t it is poss ibl e to cer

ti fy a c las s w here rel ian ce is a re q uired element of proof if the pla int iffs can “p ro v e reli ance in an i ndi v idu al act ion w it h the s a m e proof of fered to show cl ass-w ide reli a n c e .” H owev er, app ellee d id notmee t this burden. Id. ( ci tati ons omit ted)

. Later , i n Fi

del it y &Guara n ty

L if e Ins ur ance Co. v. Pi

na , w e rev iew ed an order
cer ti fyi ng a c onsumer

fraud cl ass . 165 S.W .3d 416, 41 8 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 2005, no pet .)

. There, the cons umers purchas ed annu it ies thatpai d a h ig h i nterestr a te on depos it s i nto t he annu it ies

. Id. The c onsumers a ll e ged t h a t the d efendant fail ed to dis cl ose that a low er int er est ra te w oul d appl y to pay ments the c onsumers made i nto t he annui ti es after the f irst y ear of ow nershi p. Id. at 419. Address ing the re li ance ele ment of the consu me rs’ D T PA an d f raud claims, w e not ed the diff iculty of esta blishing reliance in
a grou p se tt in g:
Rel ian ce is a t houg ht proces s o r one s tep i n a larg er thou g ht proces s; . . . [i t] can be s how n onl y

by demons trati ng the person’ s t houg ht proces ses i n reac hin g the deci si on. Proof o f r e lia n ce or

l ack of re li ance neces sar il y req uires an ind

iv idu ali zed deter minat ion becau se, under

al l the s ame facts and ci rc umstan ces , one person mayhav e reli ed on th e mis re present ati on i n reach ing a de ci si on w hil e anot her di d notrely

on i t i n reachi ng the same d eci si on.
Id. a t 4 2 3 (quo ti n g G r

a n t T h o r n to n , L

. L

. P

. v

. S u n t r u s t Ba nk , 1 3 3 S

. W

. 3 d 3 4 2 , 3 5 5 (T e x. Ap p .– Da lla s 2 0 0 4 , p e t. f ile d ) (e m p h a sis ad d e d )). Af te r cre d it in g S c h ein ’

s in v it ati on to est abl is h reli ance on a cl ass -w ide bas is , w e re li ed on our ear li er hol din g i n For d and held that the cons umers had not put on cl ass -w ide ev ide nce of rel ian ce. Id. a t 4 2 4 . A lt h o u gh each of the na me d plain tif

fs testif ied that they relied on the high inte rest rate ap plicable in13

the first y ear

of thei r cont ra cts , non e of the named pl ain ti ffs i ndi cat ed “ how or w hether othe r members of the c las s may hav e w eig hed t he impor tanc e of t he new

money i nterestrate in ma king their inv estm en t d e c ision.” Id. Ac cordin g ly , t he pl ain ti ffs d id not p ro duce any ev ide nce of cl ass -w ide reli ance. Id. W e not ed th at al thoug h the su pr eme co urt i n Sche in “did notentirely preclud e class act ion s i n w hic h reli ance w as an i ss ue, . . . i t di d make su ch cas es a near-i mposs ibili ty. ” Id. at 423 . W e question ed w het her g iv en th e individualiz ed n atu re of reliance, a ny class action could ever be c e rt if ia ble un der Sche in, and w e not ed th at fro m the ti me of the Sche in deci si on i n 2002 to t he ti me w e dec ide d Fidelity in 2005, no Tex as co u rt had “enco unt ered a situat ion i n w hich cl ass-w ide proof of reliance could be foun d.” Id. at 424- 25. The same sti ll hol ds tr ue—no co urt s inc e Sche in has e v er foun d evidence of cla ssw ide reli ance. Lik e the pl ain ti ffs i n Sche in, F or d Motor C o., and Fi

del it y, Gomez has faile d to poi nt
us to an y

ev ide nce in the record demons tr ati ng thatthe cl ass as a w hol e reli ed on
re pr esent ati ons by

H ertzand Tex as South that the FSC consti tuted onl y a c harg e for fuel and s er v ic e. In fact, Gomez does not p oin t t o any ev ide nce in the record demons trati ng tha t he act ually relied on a belief thatt h e F S C w as on ly for f uel an d servi ce. Moreover, und er the facts of this case, it is nothard to imagine ho w indiv idua l issues of

reliance cou ld
ar is e. There ar e numerous ci rc umstan ces i n w hic h a c ust omer mig ht c hoose the
conv eni ence of the F SC reg ardle ss of h is or her kn ow led g e of the FSC ’s co mposi ti on. Acc ordin g ly , “ [i ]t is thu s cl ear thatans w er ing the q uest ion s o f materi ali ty and re li ance as to on e pl ain ti ff

does not answ er

the same q uest ion as to ot her puta ti v e c las s members.” Peltier Enter s., Inc . v . H ilton , 51 S

. W

. 3 d 6 1 6 , 623 (Tex. App. –T y ler 2000 , pet . den ied).14

Gomezfail ed i n hi s b urden t o s how thatreli ance iss u e s will not p re domina te i n the li ti g ati on. Nev erthel ess , G omez direct s us to pre- Sche in cas es that he arg ues demonst ra te that cl a ss -wide ev ide nce ex is ts in thi s c ase due t o the mere fact that Her tzand Tex as Sou th’s custo me rs pa id the FS C. First, he cites Graeb el/Hou ston Movers, Inc. v. Chastain , 26 S. W .3d 2 4, 34 (Tex

. App.–H oust on [1s t Di st. ] 200 0, pe t. dis m’d w .o.j .)

. In Chasta in , t he p l a i n t i ffs s t o r e d t h e i r p ro p e rt y w i t h a c o mp a n y w h i l e t h e y w e r e o v e rs eas. Id. at 28. The pla int iffs’ c ontractsa id that the d efendant c ompany had pur chas ed i nsurance for th e proper ty , and the pla int iffs w er e c harg ed for the i nsurance. Id. As i t t ur ned out , t he pla int iffs w er e notnamed as ins ur eds on the poli ci es, and they broug ht a cl ass ac ti on for fraud. Id. The tr ial courtcert ified the cl ass , and the cour t of appeal s a ff ir med. Id. at 35. On appea l , th e de fen da nta rg ue d th at rel i an c e i s s ue s w ou l d pred om i na te a t tr ial. Id. at 34. The cour

t of appeal s dis ag re ed and hel d tha t c ommon i ss ues pr edomin ated, maki ng the follo w ing st atements : The predomin ant i ss ue i n thi s c ase is not w hether Graebel made mis re pr esent ati ons to ea ch ind iv idu al cl ass member ; t he pr edomin ant i ss ue is w hether

Graebel bille d a nd c oll ect ed premiums for “ sto ra g e i nsurance, ” and t hen fail ed to procure s uch a pol icy . Al thoug h s ome i ss ues, su ch as the Cha sta ins ’ cl aim for damag e to th e ir p ro per ty , w il l hav e to be l it ig ated ind iv idu all y , t he tr ia l co u rt di d notabus e i ts dis creti on i n findi ng thatthe common i ss ues re g ardin g the re fund of “i nsurance pr emiums ” pr edomin ate in thi s c ase. Id

. Addi ti onal ly , G omezci tes to Al for d Chevr ole t- Geo v. Jones , 9 1 S

. W

. 3 d 3 9 6 (T e x. App.–Tex ar kana 2002, pet. deni ed)

. In that c ase, the pla int iffs broug ht a fraud c las s a cti on against s e ve ra l c ar dea lerships tha t w ere cha rg ing w hatthey called a “v ehicle invento ry tax.” Id. at 399. R eal ly , t he ta x w as impos ed on the d eal ershi ps, not the c ust omers , butT he su pr em e cou r t den i ed r ev i ew i n Al f ord and di sm i ssed f or w an t o f j uri sdi ct i on i n C hast ain. A 8 d e n i a l o f re v i e w o r a d i s m i s s a l o f a p e ti ti o n fo r w a n t o f ju ris d i c ti o n b y th e T e x a s S u p re m e C o u rt i s n o t a com m ent on t he co r r ect ness o ft he co ur t of app eal s’ opi ni on b el ow, al t hough par t i es oft en ar gue as m uch. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 5 6 .1 (b )( 1 ), (2 ); see a lso D y l a n O . D ru m m o n d , C i t ati on W r i t Lar ge , T h e A p p e l l a te A dvo c ate, S t ate B ar of T ex as A pp el l ate S ec t i on R ep ort , V ol

. 20 N o. 2, pp . 10 3-0 5 (W i nter 20 07 ). 15 the d eal ershi ps w er e al leg edl y pas si ng the tax es throug h to the customers a nd
re pr esent ing thatthe cus tomers, not t he dealers , ow ed th e tax es. Id. The trial court
cer ti fied the fraud c las s, id. , and the deal ers a rg ued on appeal thatco mmon is sues di d not pr edomin ate. Id. at 404- 05. The Tex ar kana Cou rtof Appeal s h eld thatreli ance coul d be prov en on a cl ass -w ide basi s b y the mere fact th at t he c ust omers pai d the tax bi ll ed by the deal ershi ps: T he Dea lers also take the position thatat the least ea ch class me mb er mu st dem onst rate he or she relied on the misrep resen tatio n. T he a llegations are that the cons umers paid a tax they di d notow e bec ause they w er e bi ll ed for the t ax by the Dea lers. That al one i s a n al leg ati on of reli ance. Id. a t4 0 5

. T h e c o u rto f a p p e a l s t h e n re v i e w e d a n d re l i e d o n the Ch a sta in deci si on, conc lud ing thati n Chasta in , t he c harg e i tse lf w as suffici ent t o s a ti sfythe cer ti ficat ion
re q uirements

. Id. at 406. Al thoug h Cha sta in and Al for d a p p e a r t o h o ld t h a tp a ym e n ta lo n e su f f ic e d t o p ro ve re li ance, w e decl ine to follo w them. Fi rs t, the Cha sta in opin ion glossed over the reliance

8 and mater ial ity ele ments. Chasta in , 26 S. W .3d a t 34. I n Cha sta in, the court ide nti fied th e represe nta tion a nd th e late r charge fo r insuran ce as the “predo min ant issue,” the court did not a ctu all y

address mater ial ity

and relia n ce a n d the eff ectthos e el ements had on cer ti fyi ng the cl ass . Id. The Tex ar kana Cou rtof Appeal s i n Al for d re ad Cha sta in as hol din g thatmere pay ment by the pla int iffs show ed reli ance, but w e do n o t re a d i t as def initiv ely resolvi ng the question s of w het h e r m ate riality

and reliance issue s w ould pr edomin ate. Al

for d, 91 S.W .3d a t 406

. More over, w e ha v e locat ed n o oth er Te x as case16

that has ex pr ess ly

recog niz ed an “i nv oic e the or y ” of re li ance, as w as apparentl y adopt ed in Alford

. Mo re i mport antl y , bot h the se cas es w er e dec ide d before Sche in . Althou gh these
cas es w er e dec ide d before Sche in , Sche in did no t cite to eithe r case a s e x em plif y ing cl assw ide ev ide nce of rel ian ce. I n fact, Sche in did not ci te t o any cas es as ex amples of w hen cl ass -w ide reli a n ce had ex is ted. Henry Sche in, Inc. , 102 S.W .3d at 694 -95. Beca use the re is no evi den ce in this case of class-w ide reliance and mat eriality , the trial court abuse d i ts dis creti on i n det er mini ng thati ndi v idu al is sues w il l not p re domina te. B. Vol un ta ry

Pay men t Def

ense Her tzand Tex as South attac k t he tr ial co urt’ s ev alu ati on of the v olu ntar y pay ment defense and i ts appl ic ati on to the cl ass clai ms. Here , t he tr ial co urt c erti fied th e foll ow ing cl aims : ( 1) an u ncons ci onabi li ty cl aim, T EX
. B US
. & C O MM
. C OD E A NN
. § 2A. 108 ( Ver non 1994) ( “U .C .C . § 2A. 108") ; ( 2) an i ll eg al penal ty cl aim, id. § 2A. 504 (Vernon 199 4) (“U .C.C. § 2 A

. 5 0 4 " ) ; ( 3 ) b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t ; a n d ( 4 ) fra u d

. H e rt z a n d Te x a s S o u t h a rg ue th at t he U.C.C. a nd brea ch of

co ntractcla ims are subje ct to the v olun tary payme nt de fense , w hich bars t he recov er

y of money

vo lun tar il y

paid “ w it h full kn ow led g e of al l the fact s a nd w it hout f raud , dece ption , duress, or coercion.” BMG Direct Mktg., In c. v. Pea ke , 178 S.W .3d 7 63, 765 ( Tex . 200 5)

. Her

tzand Tex as South arg ue th at t his defense bars t he c las s c lai ms as a matt er of law or , atthe le a st , will re q uire an ind iv idu al ev alu ati on of the facts as they
re lat e to each unnamed c las s member

. In pa rt ic ula r, H ertzand Tex as South a rgu e tha t each class mem ber w ill have to be q uest ione d ab outw het her he or sh e ha d “f ull knowledge of

all the facts.”17

Gom ez, on the o the r hand , argues tha t his allegation of f raud def eat s the volunta ry pay ment defense as a mat ter of law

. He arg ues that he did not hav e full know led g e of the facts becau se the “ fuel and ser v ic e charg e” lab el is mis lea din g , alt houg h he admit s that he knew w hat t he F SC w as and how much itco st re lat iv e to his other re -fuel ing opti ons. H ertz and Tex as South re spond thatthe all eg a ti o n o f f ra ud i tse lf i nv olv es sev eral ind iv idu al is sues , i ncl udi ng mater ial ity of t he all eg ed re pr esent ati on and t he c ust omer’ s reli ance on the represent ati on. T he trial cou rt dete rmine d tha t the v olun tary payme nt rule “is not sup porte d in
re g ards to P lai nti ff ’s cl aims as as ser ted, or under controll ing authori ty .” Appendi x at p. 9. The t r i al c ou rt he l d th at th e v ol un ta r y pa y me ntd efe ns e w ou l d no t l i k el y a pp l y t o th e c l ai ms becau se Gomezal leg ed fraud and becau se Gomez did not re cei v e “ful l know led g e” of the facts unti l dis cov er

y w as compl eted. Id. at p. 10

. Fi nal ly , t h e t ria l court hel d tha t i f the defense app li ed, i t w oul d appl y to all cl ass members and c oul d be handl ed on a c las s- w ide basi s. Id. at p. 9. The t ri al pla n does not spec ific ally s ta te h o w thes e i ss ues coul d be handl ed c las s- w ide , ex cept to re it erate that the i nq uir y w oul d appl y

to the c las s a s a w hol e. Id. at pp. 3 2- 33. Hertz and T exas Sou th arg ue that ( 1) the trial court’s dete rmina tion th at th e de fense doe s not apply w as errone ous; (2) the def ense cann ot be app lied on a class-w ide ba sis; (3 ) the t ri al cour

t dep ri v ed th em of thei r abi li ty to pr esentthe defense at all by co ncl udi ng tha t the def ense can be app lied on a class-w ide ba sis; and (4 ) in d ivid ual issue s w ill pr edomin ate. Bec ause H e rt z a nd Tex as South attac k t he tr ial co ur t’ s a nal y si s o f the und erly ing l aw, w e mu st f irst ex am ine th e class claims and the cont ours of the volunta ry pay ment defense

. Exxon Mobi l Cor p., 221 S. W .3d a t 847 -4 8.18

1. UC C Ill egal Pen alty C laim T he T exas Suprem e Court recen t ly add ressed the volunta ry paymen t def ense in BM G D ir ect M ktg

. , 178 S.W .3d a t 765

. In t hat c ase, BM G’ s c ust omers w er e c harg ed l ate fees after

they fail ed to ti mely pay for c ompactdi sk s i n ac cordance w it h the ir ag re ements
w it h BM G. Id. at 765. Peak e, a BM G c ust omer, broug ht a cl ass ac ti on al leg ing thatthe lat e fees w er e i llega l p e n a lt ies thatdi d not“ re asona bly forec astBM G’ s a ctu al damag es resulting f rom c u s t om ers’ late pa y me nts.” Id. at 766 . Th e trial court certif ied a class
cons is ti ng of “a ll presentand former BM G c lub members i n Tex as w ho had pai d BM G l ate fees since May

16, 19 98. ” Id. BMG argued that the v olun tary payme nt defense app lied to ea ch custo me r’s cl aim and c aused i ndi v idu al is sues to pr edomin ate. Id. The tr ial cour t, how ev er , hel d tha t i t w as “u nli kel y ” the v olu ntar

y -p ay ment r ule w oul d appl y because the “r ule is eq uit abl e and ‘ne ed notbe ap plied where the rationa le for its ex istence doe s not exist.’” Id. Ad d it io nal ly , t he tr ial co urt hel d tha t t he defense did not ra is e i ndi v idu al is sues and coul d be deter mined on a c las s- w ide bas is

. Id. On ap peal , t he Tex as Supreme C our t ex pla ine d tha t und er

the v olu ntar

y pay ment def ense , “‘[m]o ney volunta rily p aid on a claim of

right, w ith f ull kn owl edge of a ll the facts, in the abse nce of f raud , dece ption , dure ss, or com pulsion , cann ot be recovered back merel y bec ause the party

at the time of pay ment w as ig norant of or m is took the law as to his liability .’” Id. a t 7 6 8 (quo ti n g Pennel l v. United Ins. C o. , 150 Tex . 541 , 243 S.W .2d 5 72, 576 (1951 )). Pea ke argued th at be cause BMG did notdisclose ho w the late fees were cal cul ated, he did not pay the lat e fees w it h “ full know led g e of al l the fact s” ; t herefore, the defense w as not i mpli cat ed. Id. at 773. BM G arg ued t hat b ecaus e i t di sc los ed th e l ate fee19

and the circum stan ces un der w hich t h e fees would be im pose d, th e custo me rs had “f ull know led g e of the facts” su ff ic ien t t o i mpli cat e the defense. Id. The Tex as Supreme Cou rt ag re ed w it h BM G that “k now led g e of a l ate fee’ s a mount and the circum stan ces un der w hich it w ill be im pose d is suf f icient to charge one w ith ‘f ull knowledge of

the facts’ for purpo ses of t h e vo lu n t a ry -paymen t rule’s app lication. ” Id. Acc ordin g ly , t he tria l court er re d i n det er mini ng thatthe defense l ik ely di d notappl y

to Peak e’s i ll eg al penal ty

cl aim. Id. at773- 74. W e s ee no dis ti nct ion b e tw e en BM G an d th e pres en t c as e— al th ou g h Go me zc l ai ms that Her tzand Tex as South faile d to di sc los e tha t t he F SC had a hi dden profit c omponent, Hertzand T e xa s S o u t h disclosed the FSC an d the circumsta nces u nde r w hich it w ould app ly

. T hus, Gom ez’s knowledge w as suf f icient to trig ger the def ense ’s applicat ion to his il leg al penal ty

cl aim. See i

d. Bu t t hat d oes not e nd th e i nq uir y here. Hertzand Te x as Sou th argue th at th e “f ull knowledge” requireme nt w ill involv e such an i ndi v idu ali z ed i nq uir y that common q uest ion s do not pr edomin ate. W e dis ag re e. That is not w hat BM G hel d. Id. In fact, BMG conce ded thatthe “kno w ledge” requiremen t could be establ is hed on a c las s- w ide bas is

. Id. Hertzand Te x as Sou th can inv oke th e de fense by merely prov ing thatal l thei r re ntal co ntract s cont ain ed a dis cl osure of the F SC and the ci rc umstan ces under

w hic h i t w oul d appl y . Id. The “ th or ni er ” i s s ue , as t he s up r em e cour t puti t, is w hether t he defense can be defeated by Gomez ’s al leg ati on of fraud. Id. The supreme co urt recog niz ed i n BM G tha t the tradition a l e xc e p t ions to the volunta ry pay ment defense—fraud, duress , decep ti on, and c oer ci on—s ti ll appl y . Id. at 776. In BM G, Pea k e a rg ued thatthe late fees were not a reaso nab le estim ation of the da ma ges BMG suffered as a resul t of the cus tomers’ l ate p ay ments. Id. at 77 5-76 . Th e cou rt20

ackno w ledged th at for purpo ses of the “f ull kn owl edge” requireme nt to invoke t he rule, it
wou ld no t m a ke se n se to requ ire co m p a n ie s t o di sc lo se th e m e th o d o f c a l c u l a ti n g a par ti cul ar ch arg e. Id . at 7 7 3 . Thus, t he al leg ati on of an i ll eg al penal ty al one w oul d not pr ecl ude “ full know led g e” su ff ic ien t t o i nv oke the r ule

. Id. The c our t als o hel d tha t t he il leg al penal ty

alle g ati on, byitse lf, did not ri se to the l ev el of f ra ud to defeat t he appl ic ati on of the v olu ntar

y pay ment defense

. Id. at 775. T he cour t w as careful, how ev er , to note that “t he l ate fees w er e a s et amoun t per month, and there is no all eg ati on of mi sta ke or fraud
as to the ir calculation. ” Id. Beca use the c our t c oul d notdete rmi ne on the record i n BMG
w het her Pe ake a lleged any other reaso n tha t paymen t of the cha rg e w as involunta ry , it
re man d e d t o t h e t ri al cour t t o c onsi der

how the defense affected t he abi li ty to cer ti fy the cl ass and how

the cl aims co uld be t ri ed. Id. at 778. In c ontrast , G omezhas al leg ed th at t he l abel att ached to the ch a rge i n thi s c ase, “F uel and Ser

v ic e C harge, ” w as mis lea din g and fraudul ent b ecaus e i t di d notrev eal the tr ue nat ur e of the charg e. In ot her w ords, Gomezhas al leg ed fraud as to the c alc ula ti on of the charg e. This is prec is ely the ty pe of

f ra ud all eg ati on th at BM G recogniz ed was not pr esenti n tha t c ase. Id. a t 7 7 5

. G o m e z a rg ues that by al leg ing thatH ertzand Tex as Sou th f raud ulen tly

misreprese nte d the purpo se of the FSC, w hich w as really a hidd en p rof it stream, he has defeated the appli cat ion of the v olu ntar

y pay ment defense as a mat ter of law

. The tr ial co urt ag re ed w it h thi s a rg ument. Appen dix at p. 10

. Hertza nd T exas So uth , on the o the r ha nd, argue thata me re allegation o f f raud w ill not d efeat the defense as a mat ter of law

. Theyarg ue th at t o defeat t he defense, Gomez
w il l hav e to br ing forw ard ev ide nce of f ra ud, w hic h i ncl udes prov ing thatthe pur pose for th e FSC and it s c alc ula ti on w as “mat er ial ” to t he cus tomers and that they reli ed on the a ll eg ed21

mis re present ati ons. Gom e z cites BMGto suppo rthi s a rg ument. H ow ev er , BM G did not hol d tha t t he
mere all eg ati on of fraud w il l defeat the v olu ntar y pay ment defense

. See B MGD ir ect M ktg ., Inc. , 178 S.W .3d at 775

. Rathe r, the supre me court noted tha t the re w as no al leg ati on of fraud i n BM G. Id

. Notonl y i s G ome z ’s arg ument c ontrar y to BMG , i t i g nores sev eral Tex as cas es that hav e hel d oth er w is e. T exas courts have consiste ntly h eld th at on ce the v olun tary payme nt de fense is inv oked, the pla int iff mus t ple ad and prov e one of t he ex cept ion s to t he defense to de feat it s a ppl ic ati on. See S pr ing Br anch Bank

v. Mengden, 6 2 8 S

. W

. 2 d 1 3 0 , 1 3 5 -3 7 (T e x. App.–H oust on [1 4th D is t.] 1981, w ri t ref’d n. r. e.) ; A m . C a s . &L i f e In s . C o . v

. Boy d, 394 S.W .2d 6 85, 6 89- 91 (Tex . Ci v . App.–Ty ler 1965, no w ri t) ; see als o Gaither v. Li ndsey, 37 Tex . C iv . Ap p. 14 9, 83 S.W . 225 , 226 ( Tex . C iv . Ap p. 19 04, n o w ri t)
. If the pl ain ti ff al leg es fraud, he or

sh e must

prov e mater ial ity

and re li ance as ele ments of t h e f ra ud i n order to defeat the v olu ntar

y pay ment defense

. Gaither , 83 S.W

. at 226 (“If , howev er, app ellantin any w ay represent ed himsel f to be a pract ic ing phy si ci an, w hen he w as not author iz ed to p r a c t i c e me d i c i n e , a n d a p p e l l e e w a s t h e r e b y i n d u c e d t o e mp l o y a n d p a yhi m for prof ession al serv ices, he could reco v er back th e mo ney so paid.”). Her tzand Tex as South ar e c or re ct that Gomez ’s f ra ud all eg ati on w il l re q uire him to prov e the el ements of materia li ty and re li ance in order

to defeat thei r v olu ntar y pay ment def ense . As w e he ld abo v e, f raud cann ot be dete rmine d on a c lass-w ide ba sis in this
cas e, an d i ndi v idu al is sues w il l, therefore, pr edomin ate. Accordin g ly , the tri al cour t abu sed its discretion in certif

y ing Gome z ’s U.C.C. i llegal pena lty claims.22

2. Breach o f Co nt ractC laim To re cov er

for brea ch o f co n tr a ct , a clai mant must prov e tha t: (1 ) there i s a v ali d, enforc eabl e c ontractbetw een the parti es; (2) the pla int iff performed as re q uired unde r the cont ra ct; ( 3) the defendant breache d the co ntract ; and (4) the defendant’ s b re ach caus ed the c lai mant i nju ry . Exxon Mobi l Cor p. , 2 2 1 S. W .3 d at85 3 (cit in g Vale ro Mktg

. & Sup ply C o . v . K a la ma , In t ’l , 51 S.W .3d 345 , 351 (Te x . App .–Hou ston [1st Di st.] 2001 , n o pet. )). The par ti es appare n tly

di sag re e aboutthe factual theo ry su ppor ti ng thi s c lai m. Tex as South charac te rize s this cl aim as follo w s: “ As a resul t of the FSC bei ng an i ll eg al and
une nforcea bl e p e n a lt y u nde r the T exas UC C, the sta ted dailyrental rate w as inf lated in br each of contract .” Tex as South Appel lan t’ s B ri ef at p. 8. Her tz , o n t h e o th e r hand,
ass erts that the b re ach of c ontract cl aim is ide nti cal to Gomez ’s U. C. C. unc onsc ion abi li ty cl aim. H ertzC or p. A ppel lan t’ s B ri ef at p. 7. How ev er , nei ther

of thes e i nter pr etati ons is su ppor ted b y Gomez ’s ple adi ng s. See Exxon Mobi

le Cor p. , 221 S.W .3d a t 848 -4 9 ( re jec ti ng Ex

x on’ s c haract er iz ati on of the pla int iffs’ c ontractcl aims as di sg uis ed fraud cl aims ). Rat her , t he pl eadi ng s d emonst ra te an entire ly d if

ferent factual theo ry

bas ed s ole ly

i n g eneral cont ra ct pr inc ipl es: G omez all eg es that a cus tomer cont ra cts to re nt a car at a s peci fic d ail y

rate, but w hen t he F SC is i ncl uded, the rental rate i s a ctu all y i nflated, maki ng the FSC a b reach of the dai ly rate provisi on in th e con tract. T his allegation doe s not d e pen d on w het her the FSC is a re asona ble es ti mati on of the har m suffered byHertzand Tex as South or on w hether

the charg e i s u ncons ci onabl e. Rat her , i t req uires a mere i nter pr etati on of the contra ctu al ter ms.23

In fac t, t he t r i al c ou rt r ec og ni z ed the c l ai m a s d i s ti nc t from G om ez ’ s U .C .C

. c l ai ms in it s c er

ti ficat ion order

. In t he c erti ficat ion orde r, t h e tr ial co urt found t he foll ow ing
com mo n issues: (a ) W hether

the FSC i s u ncons ci onabl e and therefore un enforc eabl e; (b ) W hether

the FSC v iol ates TX -U CC § 2A -5 04; (c ) W hether

the Defendant s b re ached thei r cont ra cts by ch arg ing the FSC; (d ) W hether

D efendants fraudul entl y mis re pr esent ed th e F SC ; and (e ) W hether

Pl ain ti ff and members of the P lai nti ff C las s a re enti tl ed to dam ages, an d if

so, w hatis the prope r mea sure of such da ma ges. App end ix

at p. 5. The trial court clearly conte mp lated th a t G o m e z’s U.C.C. claims w ere distinct f rom h is stand ard brea ch of contractclaims. This C our

t recent ly

hel d tha t t h e v olu ntar

y pay ment defense does not appl y to a si mple br each of cont ra ct act ion

. Exxon Mobi l Cor p., 221 S.W .3d a t 857 ; see a lso BMG Direct Mktg., Inc. , 178 S.W .3d a t 775 ( “I t i s t ru e that, t o the extent the s ubj ectmatte r of Pea ke’s claims is covered by the parties’ con tract, th e rule w ould not ap ply.” ). “ T he rule is a de fense to cl aims as ser ti ng unj ustenr ic hment, not t o c lai ms fo r b re ach of contract .” Exxon Mobi

l Cor p., 22 1 S. W .3 d at85 7 (cit in g BM G D ir ect M ktg

. , Inc

. 178 S.W .3d at 775 ). As th e s u p re me cou rtex pla ine d, an adeq uate leg al re medy prev ents the appl ic ati on of unj ustenr ic h m ent a nd th e v olu ntar y pay ment defense

. BMG Direct Mktg., Inc. , 178 S. W .3 d a t 7 7 0 (cit in g Fortun e Prod. Co. v. Cono co, In c. , 52 S.W .3d 6 71, 6 84 ( Tex . 200 0) for proposi ti on th at un jus t enr ic hment do es not a ppl y w hen an ex pr ess co ntractg ov er ns the d is pute)

. Acc ordin g ly , t he tr ial co urt di d notabuse its disc re ti on in deter mini ng thatthe
v olu ntar y pay ment defense w oul d notappl y to Gomez ’s breach of contractcl aim.24

C. Un con scio nab ili ty C laim Gom ez ma kes his unco nscion ability claim un der U.C.C. 2A. 108 , w hich provides, in
re lev ant p art: (a ) If the c our

t as a mat ter

of law f ind s a l ease cont ra ct or any cl ause of a l ease c o n t r a c t t o h a v e b e e n u n c o n s c i o n a b l e a t t h e t i me i t w as made, t h e c our

t may refuse to enforc e the l ease cont ra ct, or i t may enforc e the remaind e r of the l ease cont ra ct w it hout the uncon sc ion abl e c lau se, or i t may so l imi t t h e a ppl ic ati on of any uncon sc ion abl e c lau se as to av oid any unc onsc ion abl e resul t. (b ) W it h re spec t to a cons umer lea se, if the cour t as a matter of law

finds th a t a l e a s e c o n t r a c t o r a n y c l a u s e o f a l e a s e c o n t r a ct has been indu ced b y

u ncon sciona ble cond uct or t hatunco nscion able cond uct has occ ur re d i n the co ll ect ion of a c lai m ar is ing from a lea se cont ra ct, t h e c o u rtm a y

g r a n ta p p ro p r i a t e re l i e f. T EX
. B US
. & C O MM
. C OD E A NN
. § 2A. 108. Gomezal leg ed th at t he F SC i s a n uncon sc ion abl e c lau se that tak es adv antag e of the pla int iff cl ass to a g ro ss ly unfair deg re e, adopti ng the sta ndard def ini ti on of unconsc ion abi li ty

recog niz ed by

Tex as law

. See i

d. cmt. (“ Subs ect ion s ( 1) and (3 ) of this se ct ion appl y the conc ept o f uncons ci onabi li ty reflect ed in the pro v is ion s of Sect ion 2-302 to l eases .” ); id. § 2.3 02 cmt. (“Th e ba sic test is w het her, in the l ig ht of the g e n e ra l co m m er ci al back g ro und and the commer ci al needs of the particu lar trade or case , the clauses involv ed a re so one -sided as to be un conscio na b le under the ci rc umstan ces ex is ti ng at the t ime of the ma kin g o f the c ontract .” ); see a lso Gallardo v. TCI Cablevision of Tex., Inc. , N o. 13 -0 2- 460- CV , 2 0 0 4 W L 1 9 3 2 6 6 2 , a t*3 (T e x. App.–C or pus Chr is ti Aug . 31, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op. ) (d efini ng unc onsc ion abi li ty under U.C.C. as “an act or practice w hich, to a consu me r's detrime nt, ta kes ad v ant age of the lack of knowl edge, a bility , experience, or capa city of the con sum er to a grossly unfair degree.”); Peltier , 51 S.W .3d a t 623 -6 4.25

T he trial cou rt held that no individual issues w ould be involv ed in th e an alysi s of this cl aim: Pl ain tiff 's U CC and cont ra ct Cl ass cl aims are bas ed upon the sta ndard, uni form w ri tten re ntal ag re ement s ig ned by eac h C las s member

a n d the atte nda nt FSC. If plaint if f has a UCC or cont ract cause of acti o n a ga in st Her tzfor o v er

[s ic ] t he F SC , t hen ev er y member of the Cl ass does. If Her tz v iolated th e ap pl i c ab l e l aw i n c ha rg i ng i ts F SC as to on e C l as s me mb er , it v iol ated itas to all –in ex act ly t h e same manner . The fini te an d straightforw ard na ture of Plaintif f 's contractclaims t here by clearly demonst ra tes the feasibi li ty and pract ic abi li ty of submi tti ng thi s c ase to a single jury . N ot on ly

w ill com mo n issues pre do m inate [at] th e trial of this case, th e re a re n o individualiz ed quest ions left to sub mit to the trier of fact as to t he cont ra ct cl aims

. Nei ther i ndi v idu al int ent, nor

i ndi v idu al know led g e, nor indi v idua l reliance are ele me nts of , or prerequisites to, Pla intif f 's UCC and co ntractClass claims. T he sam e is true a s t o the UCC cla ims, which w ill be det er mined by

the Cou rtas se t fort h i n the Tri al Pl an. App end ix

at pp. 15-16 (citations om itted ). Her tzand Tex as South appear to arg ue th at G omez ’s unc onsc ion abi li ty cl aim under the U.C.C. is also ba rred by the v olun tary payme nt de fense , butthe y d o n ot spe cif ically b ri e f wh e t h e r t h is d e fe n s e h a s e ve r b e e n a p p li e d t o a n u n c o n s c io n a b il it y cl a im

. W e h a ve not l ocat ed any

Tex as cas es appl y ing the defense in thi s mann er . How ev er , w e need not decid e this issue becau se the unco nscion ability claim, even in the abse nce o f the volunta ry payme nt d e f e n s e , raises num erou s indiv idua l issues thatw ould cause the class
me chan ism to d issolv e into a series of mini-trials. “The pr edomin ance re q uirement prev ents cl ass ce rt ific ati on w hen c omplex and div erse indi v idu al is sues w oul d ov er w hel m or

co nfuse a j ur

y or se v er ely

co mpromi se a party's ability

to prese nt ot herwi se v iable claims or de fense s.” Stoneb ri dge Li fe Ins. C o. , 23 6 S. W .3 d at2 05

. Te x as c ou rts h av e c on s i s te nt l y h el d th atu ncon sc i on ab i l i ty c l ai ms involv e highly

indiv idua liz ed i n qu ir ie s t hatare notapp ropriate for resolutio n by a cl ass act ion

. W

all v. Par kway Che vr

ole t , Inc. , 176 S .W .3d 9 8, 10 6-08 (Tex. App. –Hou ston [1stH er t z and T exas Sout h l odge sev er al ot her ar gum ent s agai nst a pr edom i nance f i ndi ng i n t hi s case. 9 Fi r st , H er t z and T exas Sout h ar gue t hat G om ez ’ s cl ai m s under t he U

. C

. C

. ar e def ensi v e i n nat ur e and can not p ro v i d e a m e th o d fo r a ff i rm a ti v e r e l i e f a fte r a c o n tra c t h a s b e e n fu l l y p e rf o rm e d

. F u rth e rm o re , T e x a s S o u th ar gues t hat G om ez ’ s U

. C

. C

. cl ai m s re qui r e a det er m i nat i on t hat each pl ai nt i ffqual i f i es as a con sum er , r ai si ng num er ous i ndi v i dual i ssues. G i v en o ur di sposi t i on, we need not deci de t hese i ssues a nd e xpr ess no opi ni on as t o t hese ar gum ent s. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47. 1. 26 Dist.] 200 4, no pet. ) ( conclu ding thatindiv idua l issues w ould p re d o m inate beca use defendants must be abl e to inq uire w hat pur chas ers w oul d hav e done with co nceal ed i n fo r ma t i o n) ; Peltier

, 51 S.W .3d a t 623 -2 4 ( conc lud ing thati ndi v idu al q uest ion s o f know led g e, ab il ity , ex per ien ce, and capac ity w oul d predomin ate)

. As Her tzand Tex as South poi nt ou t, cus tomers hav e v ar y ing deg re es of know led g e, abi li ty , ex per ien ce, and capac ity that w oul d af

fect w hat they

knew or ca re d to know

about the F SC

. Her

tz and Tex as South hav e a due proces s ri g ht t o i nv est ig ate t hese is sues and pr esentthem at t ri al. Stoneb ri dge Li fe Ins. C o. , 236 S.W .3d a t 205 ; Ber nal , 102 S. W .3d at 43 7. Certif

y ing a class to prosecu te an unco nscion ability claim would severely compromis e thi s ri g ht and denyHertzand Tex as South thei r abi li ty to defend ag ain st the cl aim. Ac cordin g ly , t he tr ial co urt abu sed it s d is creti on i n deter mini ng that common i ss ues
w ou l d pred om i na te w i th res pe c t to t he u nc on s c i on ab i l i ty c l ai m. 9 IV. R ig or ou s A nal ysis a nd T rial Pla n T exas South and Hertzpointto several infir m it ie s in the trial plan thatthey assert
re q uire rev ersal and decer ti ficat ion . It is undisp uted that Gomezdi d notrent from a H ertz
cor porate l ocat ion

. Inste a d , h e rented from Tex as South, a H ertzl ic ensee . Her tzand Tex as South arg ue, t herefore, that in order to impos e l iab il ity

on H ertz , G omezand other
s im il a r c la s s m e m b e rs wil l h a ve t o e s t a b li s h so m e so rt o f a ge n c y o r “ vic a ri o u s li a b il it y” principa l to estab lish Hertz ’s contractu al li a b ility. Texas Sout h an d Hertz atta ck nea rly
ev er y cl ass ce rt ific ati on req uirement ba sed on the factthatGomezrented from Tex as27

South and notdi re ctl y

from H ertz

. Hertzand Te x as Sou th bot h focus the ir argume nts on w het her Gom ez’s claims are ty pic al of the c las s members’ cl aims , and Tex as South further arg ues that common i ss ues
w il l not pred ominat e due to G omez ’s uni q ue pos it ion i n rela ti on to the cl ass . Tex as South
arg ues that the t ria l p lan fail s t o adeq uatel y di sti ng uis h betw een H ertzand Tex as South and doe s not e xp la in how the claims w ill proce ed a gainst each def end ant , w hich is par ti cul ar ly eg re g iou s g iv en th e probl ems w it h Gomez ’s represent ati on of the cl ass . Tex as South further

arg ues that Gomezdid notput on any ev ide nce demonst ra ti ng thathe h as a v iable claim against T exas South beca use a ll the evid e n c e p resen ted to the trial court
re lat ed to F SC s c harg ed by H ertzco rp orate l ocat ion s. Seco nd, Tex as South arg ues that Gomez did not joi n Tex as South as a defendant unt il Septe mb er 15, 2 004 , y et th e trial c o u rtcertif ied a class of consu me rs that w ere charg ed an FSC after

F ebr uar y 6, 2000. Ac cordin g to Tex as South, the four- y ear st atute of li mita ti ons appl ic abl e to thi s cas e w oul d bar any clai ms byclas s members charg ed an FSC between Feb ruary 6, 20 00 a nd Sep tem ber 15, 2 000 . Te x as Sou th argues th at th is ti me per iod ac count s for 18.85% of al l Tex as South’ s rental s t o c las s members. Itarg ues that the t ri al cour

t di d notaddress thi s d efe n se i n i ts tr ial pl an. W e ag re e w it h bot h argume nts. A . Trial Pl an Requireme nt In Southwes ter

n R efi nin g C o. v. Ber

nal , t he Tex as Supreme C our t ex pla ine d tha t it“ is i mprop er to cer

ti fy a cl ass w it hout know ing how the cl aims ca n and w il l li kel y be t ri ed.” 22 S. W .3d a t 435

. Thus, the s upreme co urt im p o se d a “ tr ial pl an” req uirement: “A tr ial court’s certif ication order m ust ind ic ate h ow the cl aims w il l li kel y be tr ied so that28

conforma nce w ith Rule 42 ma y b e me anin gfu lly

ev alua ted .” Id. The cour t admoni shed tr ial courts not to r el y on th e me r e as s uran c es of c ou ns el th at an y prob l em s w i th r ul e 42's requireme nts can be overcome —rathe r, the trial court m ust go beyond th e plea dings, under s t a n d t h e c l a i ms a n d d e fe n s e s , r e l e v a n t fa c t s , a n d s u b s t a n t i v e l a w i n o rd er to deter mine the c erti ficat ion i ss ues. Id. B. Pro bl ems w it h Go mez ’s R epresen ta ti on o f th e C lass Beca use w e hav e hel d that ind iv idu al is sues w il l pr edomin ate w it h respec t t o Gom ez’s f raud and U.C.C. claims, the only rema ining claim is Gome z ’s breach o f contract claim. Gome zplead ed appa rent autho rity , agency by esto ppe l, ratif ication , v ice-principal, joint enterprise, consp iracy , and partn ership theories in an attem pt to esta blish a cla im against Hertz directly. Hertz and T exas Sou th arg ue that each of the se the ories w ill require an i ndi v idu al anal y si s t hat w il l subs ume the li ti g ati on. T he trial cou rt’s order doe s not an a lyze t h e specif ic eleme nts of each of these the ories. In fact, th e trial co u rt ’s d is cussion of predo min ance doe s not m ent ion th ese issues atall. In discussing ty picality, how ever, the trial court seem s to sug gest thatthese issues cou ld be ha ndle d on a class-w ide ba sis: The fact t hat P lai nti ff w il l be re q uired to est abl is h cor porate li abi li ty upon the theor ies pled doe s n ot, as Her tzarg ues, create a ‘ uni q ue hurdle ’ that imper mis si bly

di sti ng uis hes Pl ain ti ff

from t hose w ho re nted from a c or porate locatio n. T here is no conf lict between Plain tif f and the se corpo rate ren ters going to th e v er

y s ub j ec t ma tt er of th e l aw s ui t, i f th ere i s an y c on fl i c t at all. Ev er y one i n the C las s w as charg ed an FSC i n Tex as after Febr uar y 6, 2000, w hether they rented from a l ic ensee or from a cor porate l ocat ion

. App end ix a t p . 8

. T he trial cou rt’s order failed to rig orou sly ana lyz e the predo min ance re q uirement by

fail ing to address the ele ments of proof re q uired for thes e l iab il ity

theo ri es and byfailing to set out in det ail how each elem entcan be man aged ef f iciently on a class-29

w ide bas is

. Stoneb ri

dge Li fe Ins. C o. , 236 S. W .3d a t 205 ; Henry Sche in, Inc. , 102 S.W .3d at 69 4; Ber

nal , 22 S. W .3d a t 434

. For ex am pl e , a ppa rent au tho rity “may ari se eith er f rom a principal kno w ingly perm itting an agent to hold he rself o ut as ha v ing autho rity or by a principal's actio ns w hich la cksu ch ord in a ry car e as to clo t h e an age n t with th e in d ici a of au th o rit y, th u s le a d in g a re asona bly

pr udent person to be li ev e tha t t he ag ent h as the a uthor ity sh e p ur por ts to exercise.” Gi

bson v. Bo stick Roo fi

ng and Sheet Me tal

C o., 1 4 8 S

. W

. 3 d 4 8 2 , 4 9 1 (T e x. Ap p .– El Pa so 20 0 4 , n o pe t. ) (ci ti n g A m e s v . G r e a t S

. Bank , 6 7 2 S

. W

. 2 d 4 4 7 , 4 5 0 (T e x. 1984) ); see Patel

v. Kuciem ba , 82 S.W .3d 5 89, 596 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 2002, pet. deni ed)

. Apparent a uthor ity i s a n es toppel pr inc ipl e—t h a t is, i t i s b ased on a re pr esent ati on by

the pr inc ipa l that caus es jus ti fiabl e reli ance and resul ti ng har m. Bap tist Me m ’ l Hos p. S ys . v . Sa m pson , 969 S.W .2d 945 , 948 & n.2 (T ex. 1998 ); W yndha mHotel Co. v. Sel

f, 893 S.W .2d 630, 634 (Tex . App.–C or pus Chr is ti 1994, w ri t den ied ) (p ro v idi ng that par ty 's j ust ifiab le, det ri mental reli ance on represent ati on of autho ri ty i s e lementof apparent a uthor ity ); Yba nez v. Ancho r Constructo rs, Inc. , 48 9 S

. W

. 2 d 7 3 0 , 7 3 5 (T e x. Ci v. App.–C or pus Chr is ti 1972, w ri t ref’d n. r. e.) ( “The doct ri ne of ap parent a uthor ity does not app ly if th e third pe rson . . . w ho, b y d ealing w ith the a gent

. . . , w as notmislead to such
an extent that he has been ind uced to c hang e hi s p osi ti on to h is d e tr iment .” ). The t ri al
cour t did not analyz e w hether rel ian ce, under t hese ci rc umstan ces , c oul d be est abl is hed
on a class-w ide ba sis, nor did it discuss ho w such issues co uld be han dled at trial. In State F

ar mv. Lopez , the suprem e cou rt addre ssed a rg um ent s s im il a r to those advance d by Texas Sout h. 156 S.W .3d at 556 . In tha t case, a class o f S tate Farm pol icy hol ders i n Tex as w as cer ti fied to prosec ute cl aims for fraud, mali ci ous suppress ion30

of div id ends, breach of f idu ci ar y duty , and mis re pr esent ati on. Id. at 552 . Th e trial court did not inc lud e a t ri al pla n i n i ts order ce rt ify ing the cl ass , and on a p p e al, the cour t of appeal s h eld thatbec ause pr edomin ance and s uper ior ity of the c las s v ehi cl e wer e not chal len g ed, a tr ial pl an w as not req uired. Id. at 553. The Tex as Supreme C our t hel d tha t Ber

nal’s tr ial pl an req uirement w as not l imi ted t o a n a n a l y s i s o f p r e d o mi n a n c e a n d s u p e r i o r i t y . Id. a t 555. R ather , t he c our t hel d tha t “[ r] eq uir ing a certi f ica ti on order to cont ain a t ri al pla n al low s a rev iew ing co urt t o meanin g fully

ev alu ate w hether

ce rt ific ati o n o f

the cl ass co nforms w it h all Rul e 42 prerequisites.” Id. Sta te Farm argued tha t Illinois law app lied to ba r the class represe nta tiv es’ claims, and be c au s e th e c l as s rep r es en ta ti v es h ad n o v i ab l e c l ai ms , th e c l as s rep r es en tativ es’ cl aims w er e notty pic al of th e clas s. Id. State Farm also argued thatthe class
re pr esent ati v es w er e i nadequ ate t o representthe cl ass . Id. at 55 5. It re asone d tha t current p olicy hold ers, like the class repre sent atives, could po ten tially have an int erest in seek ing l ess damag es ag ain st Stat e Far m to ensure tha t funds w oul d be av ail abl e to pay pol icy cl aims , w hereas former pol icy hol ders woul d nothav e s uch an i nterest

. Id. at 556. Fur ther more, Sta te F ar m arg ued t h a t the t ri al cour t di d notco nsi der

how to protec t t he int er est s o f poli cy hol ders o uts ide of Tex as or the appl ic ati on of Il li noi s l aw . Id. at 556. The supreme co urt ag re ed and decer ti fied th e c las s. Id. It held that because the tr ial co urt di d not( 1) i denti fy the spec ificcauses of acti on to be deci ded in this ca se, or ( 2) in d ica te h o w the c lai ms w oul d be tr ied or the subs tanti v e i ss ues that w oul d c ontrol the li ti g ati on, i t c oul d notmeani ng fully ev alu ate t he chal len g ed req uirements for c erti fyi ng the cl ass . Id. at 556- 57.31

Here, the trial plan is entirely devoid of any dis c u s s io n o f

how the claims against Tex as South and H ertzw il l proceed , g iv en th a t Go mezdi d notrent d irect ly from H ertz

. W ithou t such an ana ly sis, it is dif f icult, if not im possib le, f o r u s t o d e t e rmine if th e class shoul d hav e been cer

ti fied. Id. W e can surmi se that the t ri al cour t’ s fai lure to inc lud e any dis cus si on of thes e i ss ues in the tr ial pla n is a re sul t of i ts failu re to r ig orousl y anal y z e the ag ency pr inc ipl es in li g ht of the predomin ance re q uirement, as w e hel d abov e. It maybe that sub- cl ass es shoul d be formed, a nd a cl ass represent ati v e may need t o be appoi nted to representa s ubcl ass of pla int iffs w ho rented direct ly from H ertz

. The tr ial co urt did not explore any of the se altern atives. Add itiona lly , the trial court did notana lyz e ho w it w ould han dle Te x as S ou th ’ s l i mi ta ti on s d efe ns e. Th i s ma y b e de al t w i th e as i l y

i f t he t r i al c ou rt choo ses to divide the class into sub classes. Again, th e trial court did no t consid er this opti on. The tr ial courtheld that “[b ]ec ause all i ss ues in thi s c ase ar e c ommon, th e tr ial pl an can be rela ti vely sim ple , and w oul d req uire onl y one jur y and one t ri al. ” As i s a pparent from our di sc uss ion abov e, t his hol din g w as inc or re ct, and t he l andsc ape of thi s c ase has bee n significa ntly altere d throu gh our discussion of Hertz and T exas South ’s comp laints. Acc ordin g ly , w e dec erti fy the c las s b re ach of co ntractcl aims ag ain st Her tzand Tex as South w it hout pr eju dic e. On remand, the tr ial courtm ustconsi der the is sues w e out li ned abov e and must compl ete a thoroug h tr ial p la n t h a t (1 ) ex amines the ag ency theo ri es abo v e in det ail; (2) identif ies com mo n i s sues a nd e x am ines w het her tho se issues wi ll pred om inate ; (3) ex am ines th e po ssibility of su bclasse s w ith sep arate class represe nta tiv es, or explains how Gome z , if he remain s the only class represe nta tiv e, cou ld ef f iciently prove his claims against Hertza nd T exas So uth in light of t he plea ded agency32

pr inc ipl es. V. Conclusion For all the foreg o in g re a s ons, w e de certif y the class an d rem and to the trial court for proceed ing s c onsi ste nt w it h thi s o pin ion

.

_________ _________

_________

__ GIN A M . BE NA

VID ES, J u s t i c e Opi nio n del iv er ed and filed thi s t he 17t h day

of Jul y , 200 8.