Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A01-1508-CR-1228 | March 17, 2016 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

James A. Shoaf

Columbus, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Catina M. Caudill,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

March 17, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

03A01-1508-CR-1228

Appeal from the Bartholomew 

Superior Court

The Honorable Kathleen Tighe 

Coriden, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

03D02-1410-CM-4831 & 03D02-

1412-F6-5719

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A01-1508-CR-1228 | March 17, 2016 Page 2 of 9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] In this consolidated appeal, Appellant-Defendant, Catina M. Caudill (Caudill), 

challenges the trial court’s revocation of her probation under Cause Nos. 

03D02-1412-F6-5719 (F6-5719) and 03D02-1410-CM-4831 (CM-4831).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Caudill raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the 

trial court abused its discretion in ordering Caudill to serve the balance of her 

two previously suspended sentences. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On March 17, 2015, Caudill pled guilty to possession of heroin, a Level 6 

felony, under Cause No. F6-5719, and conversion, a Class A misdemeanor, 

under Cause No. CM-4831. Under Cause No. F6-5719, the trial court 

sentenced Caudill to two years of imprisonment, all suspended to probation,

with the first year executed at community corrections. Under Cause No. CM4831, the trial court sentenced Caudill to one year of imprisonment suspended 

to probation. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. 

[5] A month later, on April 17, 2015, the State filed petitions to revoke Caudill’s 

probation in each case, alleging that Caudill had violated her probation by 

using methamphetamine. Caudill admitted to violating her probation at a

hearing on June 1, 2015. The trial court ordered Caudill to complete the 
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Women Recovering with a Purpose (WRAP) program1 and to remain in 

community corrections for the entire term of probation. However, while on 

probation and in the substance abuse program, Caudill provided Suboxone, a 

prescription medication, to two other participants in the program. 

[6] On June 8, 2015, the State filed a Second Verified Petition to Revoke Probation 

in both cases, alleging that Caudill violated her probation by being 

unsuccessfully discharged from the WRAP program. On July 20, 2015, the 

trial court held a fact-finding hearing. At the hearing, the director of 

Residential Services for Bartholomew County Court Services, Rob Gaskill 

(Director Gaskill), testified that two individuals informed him that they used 

Suboxone, which was provided to them by Caudill. Caudill objected to 

Director Gaskill’s testimony, arguing that it constituted hearsay, but the trial 

court overruled the objection. Caudill, in turn, claimed that she did not provide 

drugs to those individuals. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

found that Caudill had violated her probation, and ordered the remaining 

balance of her two previously suspended sentences to be executed, one-and-onehalf years under Cause No. F6-5719 at the Department of Correction and one 

year under Cause No. CM-4831 at the Bartholomew County Jail, and to be 

served consecutively.

 

1 The WRAP program is a female substance abuse program administered by community corrections in 

Bartholomew County, Indiana.
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[7] Caudill now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[8] Probation is a favor granted by the State and is not a right to which a criminal 

defendant is entitled. Sparks v. State, 983 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), 

aff’d on reh’g. The decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion 

of the trial court. Id. Thus, a trial court’s decision to revoke probation and its 

subsequent sentencing decision are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

Id. A probation revocation proceeding is in the nature of a civil proceeding, 

and, therefore, the alleged violation need be established only by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Jenkins v. State, 956 N.E.2d at 146, 148 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Violation of a single condition is sufficient to 

revoke probation. Id. As with other sufficiency issues, we do not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. We look only to the evidence 

which supports the judgment and any reasonable inferences flowing 

therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the 

trial court’s decision that the probationer committed a violation, revocation 

of probation is appropriate. Id.

II. Analysis

[9] Caudill argues that she was denied her right to due process when her 

participation in the WRAP program was terminated without a written notice of 

the claimed violation. We have previously held in Gosha v. State, 931 N.E.2d 
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432, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), that a participant in a drug court program is 

entitled to due process, including an evidentiary hearing, with written notice of 

the claimed violations, disclosure of the evidence against her, an opportunity to 

be heard and to present evidence, and the right to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses. 

[10] However, it is well settled that a federal constitutional error is harmless if it is 

clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not affect the judgment. Pope v. 

State, 853 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In Pope, the defendant was 

placed in community corrections and agreed to, among other conditions, return 

to jail without going through the court if she violates any of the rules of 

community corrections. Id. at 971-72. The defendant later failed her urine 

analysis test, was arrested, and taken to jail. Id. at 972. When she appeared 

before the trial court, the defendant, who was in custody, indicated that she had 

not been informed why she had been arrested and was appearing in court. Id. 

She did not have an attorney representing her. Id. The trial court did not allow 

her to speak on her behalf, but told her that if she wanted to challenge the 

findings of community corrections, she would have to get an attorney and file a 

motion with the court. Id. The court issued an order committing her to jail. Id. 

On appeal, we held that the defendant was entitled to notice of an alleged 

violation and a hearing before her termination from a community corrections 

program. Id. at 973. We further held that the denial of those requirements 

of due process was not harmless error. Id. We observed that “Pope was 
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impeded in her defense” in that she “sought an independent drug test promptly 

after being informed of the allegations against her.” Id.

[B]ecause she received no notice of these allegations and was 

summarily returned to jail, [the defendant] was unable to get an 

independent drug screen until several weeks later. Obviously, the 

delay reduced the probative value of the drug screen, since the

fact finder could conclude that the drugs had passed from her 

system naturally by the time the independent drug screen was 

conducted. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the 

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id.

[11] In contrast, here, Caudill received sufficient notice of the nature of the alleged 

violation. On June 1, 2015, Caudill admitted to the use of methamphetamine 

while on probation and was placed in the substance abuse program. Two days 

later, on June 3, 2015, Caudill was “pulled out and [was] told that two girls had 

said that [Caudill] gave them drugs.” (Transcript p. 6). She was then 

terminated from the program. On June 8, 2015, the State filed its Second 

Verified Petition to Revoke Probation stating that the reason for the request was 

her unsuccessful discharge from the substance abuse program. At this point, 

she had sufficient notice of the alleged violation and sufficient disclosure of the 

evidence against her. Further, at an initial hearing on June 9, 2015, Caudill 

indicated that she would hire counsel, and the trial court scheduled a factfinding hearing for July 20, 2015. Therefore, unlike the defendant in Pope, 

Caudill was provided with a reasonable opportunity to investigate the 
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circumstances of her discharge from the WRAP program, consult with counsel,

and develop her defense before the fact-finding hearing. 

[12] On July 20, 2015, at the fact-finding hearing, Caudill appeared in person and 

with counsel. Director Gaskill was called to the stand and testified that “two 

other participants verbally [informed him] directly that they used Suboxone that 

they received from [Caudill] when she came into the program that day.” (Tr. p. 

3). Caudill objected based on hearsay, but the trial court properly overruled her 

objection. See Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d)(2) (the Rules of Evidence do not 

apply to probation proceedings). Director Gaskill testified that “all three of 

them [were jailed]” and Caudill was not deemed “appropriate for further 

placement in [the] program.” (Tr. p. 3). Caudill’s counsel cross-examined 

Director Gaskill and inquired whether Caudill failed her drug screen test. 

Director Gaskill replied that Caudill did not fail it, but her “instant drug screen 

[did] not test for [Suboxone].” (Tr. p. 5). When Caudill took the stand, she 

denied the allegations. Caudill neither called other witnesses to the stand nor 

provided any other evidence. Unlike Pope, where the defendant was not 

provided with an opportunity to develop her case, here, Caudill had the 

opportunity, yet all her defense amounted to was a general denial. Following 

Caudill’s testimony, the trial court held that Caudill violated the terms of her 

probation. 

[13] Under these circumstances, we conclude that it is clear beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the alleged denial of written notice and other elements of due process 

did not affect the trial court’s determination that Caudill violated the terms of 
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her probation. Caudill violated her probation twice. The first time, she 

violated her probation when she used methamphetamine; and the second time, 

two days later, when she was discharged from the substance abuse program. In 

sum, because the outcome would not have been any different, the alleged error, 

if any, was harmless. 

[14] Finally, while we agree with Caudill that the trial court should have issued a 

written statement containing the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking

her probation, we find the trial court’s failure to designate specific facts and the 

reasons for its decision to be harmless because the trial court’s order was 

sufficiently supported by the record. See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 

622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (the trial court’s order of probation revocation and the 

hearing transcript were adequate for appellate review and, when examined 

together, satisfied the writing requirement). 

[15] Accordingly, applying our standard of review, because probation is a matter of 

grace and because Caudill violated her probation twice, we hold that the trial 

court’s decision to revoke her previously suspended sentence in light of her 

behavior was well within the trial court’s sound discretion. 

CONCLUSION

[16] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly revoked 

Caudill’s probation.

[17] Affirmed.
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[18] Najam, J. and May, J. concur