#28933-a-SRJ

2020 S.D. 47

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA,

THE SOUTH DAKOTA PETROLEUM

RELEASE COMPENSATION FUND, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BP plc, BP AMERICA, INC.,

BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA,

INC., BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS,

LLC and its predecessor companies and

subsidiaries, Defendants and Appellees.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

HUGHES COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

THE HONORABLE PATRICIA DEVANEY

Judge

* * * *

JUDITH K. ZEIGLER WEHRKAMP

Special-Appointed Assistant

 Attorney General

Harrisburg, South Dakota

MATTHEW J. HERMAN

ROBERT M. FOOTE of

Foote, Mielke, Chavez &

 O’Neil, LLC

Geneva, Illinois

* * * *

ARGUED ON

JANUARY 14, 2020

OPINION FILED 08/12/20
MICHAEL L. MURPHY of

Bailey & Glasser LLP

Washington, D.C. Attorneys for plaintiff and 

appellant.

JEFFERY D. COLLINS

THOMAS G. FRITZ of

Lynn Jackson Shultz & Lebrun P.C.

Rapid City, South Dakota

DAVID ZOTT

MARTIN L. ROTH

DANIEL L. SIEGFRIED of

Kirkland & Ellis LLP

Chicago, Illinois Attorneys for defendants and 

appellees.
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JENSEN, Justice

[¶1.] The State of South Dakota and the South Dakota Petroleum Release 

Compensation Fund (Fund) sought to recover payments made to the predecessor 

and subsidiary companies of BP plc (hereafter jointly referred to as “BP”) for the 

costs of cleaning up environmental contamination from underground petroleum 

storage tanks (UST) at 27 BP sites in South Dakota.1 The Fund also sought to 

recover payments made to third parties for cleanup costs at 19 other UST sites in 

South Dakota. The Fund referred to these latter claims as “indirect claims,” 

alleging that BP was responsible for cleanup costs because it had previously owned 

or operated the USTs at the 19 sites.

[¶2.] The circuit court initially granted BP’s motion for summary judgment 

on all but one of the 19 indirect claims, determining the claims were time-barred by 

the applicable statute of limitations. Later, the circuit court granted BP’s motion 

for summary judgment on the Fund’s remaining claims against BP. The Fund 

appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred in dismissing its claims. The Fund also 

argues the circuit court abused its discretion in denying its motion for discovery 

sanctions. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶3.] In 1988, the South Dakota Legislature created the Fund, administered 

by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The Fund was 

 

1. The 27 UST sites were all previously owned by Amoco Corporation and its 

predecessor companies. British Petroleum Company plc merged with Amoco 

Corporation in 1998 and became known as BP Amoco. In 2000, BP Amoco’s 

name was changed to BP plc.
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designed to assist eligible UST owners and operators with environmental cleanup 

costs for spills or leaks of petroleum products from USTs. The Fund provides 

reimbursement of up to $1 million, less a $10,000 deductible, for cleanup costs at 

eligible UST sites. Revenue for the Fund is generated by a two-cent per gallon fee 

paid by bulk gasoline marketers and importers, such as BP.

[¶4.] To receive reimbursement for environmental cleanup costs, a UST 

owner or operator must submit an application to the Fund, disclose any available 

insurance coverage for the contamination, and execute a subrogation assignment 

that transfers to the Fund the applicant’s rights of action and claims which the 

applicant may have against any party, including insurers, who may be liable to 

indemnify any remediation costs at a UST site. The UST owner or operator must 

also certify that no settlement or release has been or will be made with any party 

responsible for the cleanup costs without the written consent of the Fund.

[¶5.] Between 1990 and 2002, BP submitted applications and received 

approximately $3.1 million in total payments from the Fund for cleanup costs at 27 

eligible UST sites in South Dakota. The contamination at the 27 sites was reported 

to have occurred between 1987 and 1998. The largest single reimbursement paid to 

BP for cleanup costs at any of the 27 sites was $677,800. The individual 

reimbursements at other sites were less than $500,000. BP’s applications claimed 

there was no insurance coverage to indemnify the cleanup costs. BP also submitted 

letters with the applications representing it was self-insured for the UST 

contamination events for which BP sought reimbursement. In a 1992 cover letter 

forwarding an application to the Fund that sought reimbursement for seven sites, 
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BP stated the liability insurance “does not provide coverage for the referenced sites 

as, inter alia, remediation expenses do not exceed the [policy] deductible.” The 

Fund reimbursed BP without further inquiry or investigation into possible 

insurance coverage.

[¶6.] Starting in the 1950s, BP purchased comprehensive general liability 

(CGL) insurance for liabilities arising from its operations. The CGL policies 

purchased by BP were high deductible plans. The earliest policies had a selfinsured retention (SIR) of $500,000 per occurrence and provided no indemnity to BP 

for claims that did not exceed the SIR. In 1971, the SIR for BP’s CGL policies was 

increased to $2.5 million per occurrence. In 1972, BP increased the SIR for its CGL 

policies to $5 million per occurrence and maintained the SIR at that level 

thereafter.

[¶7.] By at least 1973, the CGL polices purchased by BP also contained 

pollution exclusions for liability arising from gradual releases of pollutants. 

Coverage was only afforded under these exclusions if the occurrence was “sudden 

and accidental.” In 1985, the CGL polices purchased by BP included “absolute” 

pollution exclusions that barred coverage for liability arising from any pollution 

claim, including UST cleanup costs. The policies also contained “owned property 

exclusions” that precluded coverage for damage due to an occurrence on BP’s 

property, and limited liability coverage to property damage owned by third parties.
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[¶8.] In the 1990s, London Market2 and other CGL insurers became 

increasingly concerned about contingent liabilities under previously issued CGL 

policies for large-dollar environmental pollution claims at industrial sites, such as 

refineries. Insurers began filing coverage lawsuits against petroleum companies, 

such as BP, to quantify and reduce their exposure under these policies. In 1993, BP 

filed a lawsuit against London Market and other CGL insurers seeking a 

declaration of coverage for pollution costs at 23 large industrial sites, under CGL 

policies issued by the insurers to BP between 1959 and 1985. The estimated 

liabilities at each site ranged from $23 million to $220 million. None of the sites 

involved USTs or gas stations, nor were any of the sites located in South Dakota.

[¶9.] Several years after BP filed suit, BP and its insurers began settlement 

negotiations. To achieve finality, the insurers conditioned settlement of the 23 

large-dollar claims on a buyback by the insurers of all estimated liabilities under 

the CGL insurance policies purchased by BP during this time. To facilitate these 

discussions, BP retained a team of consultants to prepare a Settlement Report to 

quantify BP’s total environmental contamination exposure before absolute pollution 

exclusions were introduced into the CGL policies on June 1, 1985.

[¶10.] The Settlement Report primarily discussed the liabilities at the 23 

industrial sites that were the subject of the litigation. The Settlement Report 

included a chapter discussing the potential environmental contamination at BP’s 

gas stations, terminals, and bulk plants, which BP referred to as its “marketing 

 

2. London Market, also known as Lloyd’s of London, acts as an intermediary 

between clients, brokers, underwriters and insurance syndicates to buy and 

sell insurance.
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system.” Because the cleanup costs for USTs at these sites generally did not exceed 

the SIRs in BP’s policies, the report discussed a “single occurrence theory” in an 

effort to aggregate the cleanup costs for all USTs into a single occurrence. This 

theory posited that the single occurrence was BP’s decision in 1917 to sell refined 

petroleum products at retail by storing and selling these products from companyowned above ground tanks and USTs. BP calculated the potential cleanup costs for 

thousands of retail outlets, over many decades, by estimating a per-station figure 

and multiplying it by the total number of BP gas stations, so that the total cleanup 

costs for USTs owned and operated by BP exceeded the SIRs. These calculations 

only included pollution at UST sites that occurred prior to the introduction of the 

absolute pollution exclusions in the CGL polices on June 1, 1985.

[¶11.] The individuals involved in settlement negotiations testified that the 

insurers rejected BP’s “single occurrence theory” for the USTs. However, between 

September 1997 and April 1998, BP entered into settlement agreements with the 

insurers for as much as $205 million for the 23 large-dollar industrial sites that 

were the subject of the litigation. The settlements were significantly less than the 

total cost of $2.7 billion calculated by BP to clean up these industrial sites. The 

settlement agreements provided that the payments did not include any amounts BP 

had received or might receive in the future from state or federal UST

reimbursement funds.

[¶12.] In 2010, the Fund filed suit against BP, seeking to recover $3.1 million 

previously paid by the Fund to BP for the cleanup costs at 27 UST sites in South 

Dakota. The Fund alleged that settlements between BP and its insurers were made 
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in violation of the Fund’s subrogation rights and that BP engaged in fraud by failing 

to disclose the coverage lawsuits and settlements. The Fund alleged several 

theories of liability and rights to reimbursement from BP: Count I (violations of 

SDCL Ch. 34A-13 and ARSD 74:32:01, et. seq. for failure to disclose and 

misrepresentation of certain information required to be provided by statute); Count 

II (alleging statutory and other subrogation rights against settlement monies 

received from insurers); Count III (unjust enrichment); Count IV (fraudulent 

concealment and fraudulent misrepresentation); Count V (fraud).

[¶13.] The Fund filed an amended complaint on July 7, 2015, alleging an 

additional claim for strict liability (Count VI). The Fund alleged in these “indirect 

claims” that it had reimbursed third parties for cleanup cost at 19 UST sites in 

South Dakota, and that BP was strictly liable for these costs under SDCL 34A-2-96 

because BP had previously owned or operated the sites. Finally, in Count VII of the 

complaint, the State sought recovery of litigation costs pursuant to SDCL 34A-13-

9.2.

[¶14.] BP initially moved for summary judgment arguing that the Fund’s 

claims were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The circuit court 

entered an oral ruling on April 16, 2018, determining as to the indirect claims in 

Count VI, that the statute of limitations barred the Fund’s claims for 18 of the 19 

UST sites that were reported to the Fund prior to July 2, 2004. The circuit court 

concluded genuine issues of material fact existed concerning the timeliness of the 

action for one indirect claim, site 6197, and the claims for the 27 UST sites.
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[¶15.] The Fund filed a motion for sanctions on March 16, 2018, alleging that 

a BP employee Tammy Brendel, who was designated by BP as a 30(b)(6) witness, 

had destroyed a document that contained a list of gas stations owned by BP in 

South Dakota where USTs were located, after a “litigation hold” had been placed on 

all such documents. The circuit court denied the Fund’s motion for sanctions at a 

hearing on April 16, 2018, determining that the list was destroyed after the 

“litigation hold” was in place, but the destruction was unintentional. The court 

further found that BP had provided a complete list of USTs it had owned in South 

Dakota, and the court could not envision how the Fund had been prejudiced or 

harmed by the destruction of the list.

[¶16.] On July 27, 2018, BP moved for summary judgment on the remaining 

claims. BP argued as to Counts I through V that the State could not present a 

genuine issue of material fact showing that any of the CGL liability policies 

provided coverage for the cleanup costs at the 27 UST sites, or that BP received any 

settlement proceeds from insurers for these sites. BP also argued that summary 

judgment was appropriate for the indirect claim at site 6197 because there was no 

evidence showing that BP was statutorily responsible for cleanup costs at the site 

and the DENR had already determined that a party other than BP was responsible 

for the cleanup costs. The circuit court granted BP’s motion for summary judgment 

on the remaining claims in a memorandum decision issued on January 23, 2019, 

determining that there was no insurance coverage or insurance proceeds received 

by BP to indemnify it for cleanup costs at the 27 sites.

[¶17.] The State appeals, raising several issues which we restate as follows:
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1. Whether the circuit court erred in granting summary 

judgment on the Fund’s claims for recovery of monies paid 

to BP for cleanup costs at 27 UST sites.

2. Whether the circuit court erred in granting summary 

judgment on the 19 indirect claims against BP.

3. Whether the circuit court erred in denying the Fund’s 

motion for sanctions.

Standard of Review

[¶18.] We review grants of summary judgment under the de novo standard of 

review. Heitmann v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 S.D. 51, ¶ 8, 883 N.W.2d 506, 

508-09. “[W]e decide whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the 

law was correctly applied.” Id. “We will affirm a circuit court’s decision so long as 

there is a legal basis to support its decision.” Id. “The interpretation of an 

insurance policy is a question of law, reviewed de novo.” Swenson v. Auto Owners 

Ins. Co., 2013 S.D. 38, ¶ 13, 831 N.W.2d 402, 407. Finally, a circuit court’s decision 

on a motion for discovery sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Krueger 

v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 2018 S.D. 87, ¶ 12, 921 N.W.2d 689, 693.

Analysis and Decision

1. Whether the circuit court erred in granting summary 

judgment on the Fund’s claims for recovery of monies paid 

to BP for cleanup costs at 27 UST sites.

[¶19.] The Fund’s subrogation claims, whether statutory, contractual, or 

equitable, involve a substitution of BP’s rights under its CGL policies to the Fund. 

See Schuldt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 89 S.D. 687, 690–91, 238 N.W.2d 270, 

271–72 (1975). The Fund’s statutory right of subrogation under SDCL 34A-13-9.2 is 

predicated on the availability of insurance coverage for environmental cleanup 
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costs, providing that “[t]he fund has the right to recover, under any pollution 

liability insurance contract available to a covered party . . . .” Moreover, “[A] 

subrogated insurer stands in [the] shoes of an insured, and has no greater rights 

than the insured, for one cannot acquire by subrogation what another, whose rights 

he or she claims, did not have.” Definition and Nature of Subrogation, 16 Couch on 

Ins. § 222:5 (2020). Therefore, the Fund can only prevail on its subrogation claims 

if BP had a right of recovery, or actually recovered from the insurers for the cleanup 

costs at any of the 27 UST sites at issue.

[¶20.] Similarly, the Fund’s other theories of liability seek damages caused by 

BP’s alleged failure to disclose insurance coverage, or for receipt of insurance 

settlements to indemnify BP for cleanup costs at the 27 UST sites. See N. Am. 

Truck & Trailer, Inc. v. M.C.I. Commc’n Servs., Inc., 2008 S.D. 45, ¶ 8, 751 N.W.2d 

710, 713 (a party alleging fraud must prove injury or damage caused by the 

fraudulent conduct); Guthmiller v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 2005 S.D. 77, ¶ 14, 699 

N.W.2d 493, 498 (a party alleging breach of contract must prove an enforceable 

promise, a breach, and resulting damages); Dowling Family P’ship v. Midland 

Farms, 2015 S.D. 50, ¶ 19, 865 N.W.2d 854, 862 (unjust enrichment requires a 

showing that a party has accepted or acquiesced in benefits to which he or she is not 

entitled). Absent a showing that insurance coverage existed, or that BP has been 

indemnified under its CGL policies for cleanup costs at any of the 27 UST sites, the 

Fund cannot as a matter of law establish damages caused by BP’s alleged wrongful 

conduct.
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[¶21.] The Fund claims that fact questions exist concerning the availability of 

insurance coverage under BP’s CGL policies. The Fund frames the question as 

whether “there was insurance coverage, or the potential for coverage, based upon 

the law in 1993-1998 when [BP] sued its insurers and began negotiating a release of 

all claims despite previously subrogating such rights to [the Fund].” If there was 

potential for insurance coverage for the cleanup at any of the 27 UST sites, the 

Fund argues that questions of fact exist on whether the settlement proceeds 

received by BP from its insurers indemnified BP for these events. The Fund also 

claims it is BP’s burden to establish the proceeds were not received for 

indemnification of these cleanup costs.

[¶22.] “The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law.” 

Swenson, 2013 S.D. 38, ¶ 13, 831 N.W.2d at 407. “The existence of the rights and 

obligations of parties to an insurance contract are determined by the language of 

the contract, which must be construed according to the plain meaning of its terms.” 

W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gateway Bldg. Sys., Inc., 2016 S.D. 85, ¶ 8, 887 N.W.2d 887, 

890. “[I]nsurance policies must be subject to a reasonable interpretation and not 

one that amounts to an absurdity.” Ass Kickin Ranch, LLC v. North Star Mut. Ins. 

Co., 2012 S.D. 73, ¶ 10, 822 N.W.2d 724, 727 (quoting Prokop v. North Star Mut. 

Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 862, 864 (S.D. 1990)).

[¶23.] As the non-moving party, the Fund has the burden under SDCL 15-6-

56(c) to show that coverage existed under a CGL policy purchased by BP for cleanup 

costs at the 27 UST sites. However, the Fund has failed to identify any CGL policy 
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that would have indemnified BP for cleanup costs at any of these sites.3 “Entry of 

summary judgment is mandated against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and 

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 

v. Barton Solvents Inc., 2014 S.D. 70, ¶ 10, 855 N.W.2d 145, 149 (citations omitted).

[¶24.] Further, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that the earliest 

CGL policies purchased by BP had a SIR of at least $500,000. By 1971, the SIRs for 

BP’s liability policies increased to $2.5 million, and a year later the SIRs increased 

to $5 million for all BP-issued CGL policies. The circuit court correctly observed 

that the Fund had an “insurmountable math problem” as the earliest reported 

contamination at any of the 27 UST sites occurred in 1987, and none of the 

reimbursements paid by the Fund to BP came close to the $5 million SIR in place 

during the time of the reported contamination leaks.4

[¶25.] The Fund attempts to overcome the SIR hurdle by arguing that the 

single occurrence theory BP presented to its insurers during the earlier coverage 

litigation suggests the possibility of coverage under the CGL policies. However, the 

 

3. The Fund references Traveler’s Insurance policies purchased by BP for three 

years in the 1970s that may have contained more favorable exclusions for 

environmental contamination. However, there is no evidence that any of the 

leaks or spills at these 27 UST sites occurred during policy periods, or that 

SIRs for these policies did not exceed the amount of any of these claims.

4. The record reflects only one site where the reimbursement the Fund paid to 

BP exceeded $500,000, the lowest SIR for any CGL policy held by BP. 

However, the $500,000 SIRs existed prior to 1971. The UST contamination 

at this specific site was reported to have occurred in 1987, some 15 years 

after the $5 million SIR was in place in BP’s policies. The Fund failed to 

present any competent evidence that the USTs at this site leaked prior to 

1971.
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Fund has failed to identify language in a CGL policy purchased by BP that would 

have permitted BP to aggregate the UST claims that occurred over several decades, 

at multiple locations, into a single occurrence.5 Moreover, BP’s single occurrence 

theory was presented only for UST contaminations that occurred prior to 1985, 

before the absolute pollution exclusions were in place. The Fund’s reliance upon the 

single occurrence theory does not create a question of fact or law, as the record does 

not support either a possibility or actuality of coverage within BP’s policies for any 

occurrences at the 27 UST sites.

[¶26.] The circuit court also discussed the pollution and owned property 

exclusions as alternative grounds for granting summary judgment on the question 

of whether insurance coverage was available to indemnify BP for cleanup costs at 

any of the 27 UST sites at issue. BP presents compelling arguments on appeal in 

support of affirming the circuit court’s decision on these additional grounds. 

However, it is unnecessary to address these additional grounds because the Fund 

has failed to identify any BP CGL policies that would have indemnified BP for these 

events, and the record affirmatively demonstrates that BP was self-insured for 

these claims.

[¶27.] Finally, the Fund argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in 

concluding that evidence of settlement discussions and negotiations (Settlement 

 

5. For instance, one policy identified in the record describes an occurrence as 

“an accident or a happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure 

[resulting] in personal injury, property damage . . . during the policy period. 

All such exposure to substantially the same general conditions existing at or 

emanating from one premises location shall be deemed one occurrence.” 

(Emphasis added.) The policies referenced by the Fund’s expert contain 

similar definitions of an “occurrence”.
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Evidence) between BP and its CGL insurers during the coverage litigation was 

inadmissible under SDCL 19-19-408. The Fund contends this evidence generates a 

question of fact whether BP received payment or indemnity for cleanup costs at the 

27 UST sites.

[¶28.] The circuit court initially determined that the Settlement Evidence 

was inadmissible as an offer, compromise, or settlement under SDCL 19-19-408. 

Nonetheless, after determining the documents were inadmissible, the circuit court 

considered the Settlement Evidence to determine whether a genuine issue of 

material fact existed for summary judgment purposes. In ruling on the summary 

judgment motion, the court stated that it had reviewed and considered all the 

Settlement Evidence, including the “[s]ettlement Report and Demands, testimony of 

negotiators, related correspondence, and the Settlement agreements in considering 

the summary judgment motion.” After doing so, the circuit court concluded that the 

Fund “failed to point to any specific facts from which it can be reasonably inferred 

that the settlement monies received by [BP] included value for the costs of cleanup 

from UST leaks at gas stations in general, much less at the 27 sites at issue here.”

[¶29.] We review a circuit court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. 

State v. Scott, 2019 S.D. 25, ¶ 11, 927 N.W.2d 120, 125. “Not only must this Court 

find that the [circuit] court abused its discretion . . . , but it must find that the 

[judge’s] consideration of the erroneously excluded evidence might and probably 

would have resulted in a different finding by the jury in order to warrant a reversal 

of the [circuit] court.” O’Day v. Nanton, 2017 S.D. 90, ¶ 17, 905 N.W.2d 568, 572. 

Here, the Fund has failed to show prejudice from the circuit court’s determination 
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under SDCL 19-19-408 because the circuit court did not exclude this evidence from 

its consideration in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Further, the 

circuit court’s disposition of the issue does not leave a justiciable controversy for 

this Court as to the evidentiary ruling. See Franklin v. Forever Venture, Inc., 2005 

S.D. 53, ¶ 10, 696 N.W.2d 545, 549. Therefore, we decline to consider the merits of 

the circuit court’s evidentiary ruling under SDCL 19-19-408.

[¶30.] However, we conclude from our independent review of the evidence in 

the record, including the Settlement Evidence, that questions of fact do not exist as 

to whether the settlement proceeds received by BP in the coverage litigation 

included payment for the 27 UST sites in South Dakota. As discussed above, BP’s 

CGL polices did not afford coverage for cleanup costs at the 27 sites. Further, the 

coverage litigation did not involve any USTs owned by BP and the insurance 

settlements paid only a fraction of BP’s claims for the industrial sites at issue in the 

litigation. Although BP’s Settlement Report included a discussion of a single 

occurrence theory for UST leaks at BP-owned sites, these were for sites where 

contamination was reported prior to 1985. The contamination at the 27 sites at 

issue were all reported in 1987 or later. Finally, the unrefuted testimony from 

insurers’ negotiators in the coverage litigation shows that the insurers placed no 

settlement value on USTs or the single occurrence theory.6 The Fund has failed to 

 

6. Citing decisions from other courts, the Fund argues that BP is prohibited 

from allocating the settlement proceeds from its insurers to frustrate the 

Fund’s subrogation rights. Wright v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 110 F.3d 762, 764 

(11th Cir. 1997); Dimick by Dimick v. Lewis, 497 A.2d 1221, 1224 (N.H. 

1985); Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. J. Lamb, Inc., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2002). However, these decisions have no application in the context of this 

(continued . . .)
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“substantiate [its] allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit 

a finding in [its] favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” 

Quinn v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2014 S.D. 14, ¶ 20, 844 N.W.2d 619, 624–25.

[¶31.] The circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Counts I 

through V of the Fund’s complaint seeking recovery for the 27 UST sites.

2. Whether the circuit court erred in granting summary 

judgment on the 19 indirect claims against BP.

[¶32.] The Fund commenced this action against BP on July 2, 2010. The 

Fund does not dispute that the indirect claims were subject to a six-year statute of 

limitations, or that the contamination at all the indirect sites, except site 6197, were 

reported to the Fund prior to July 2, 2004. Nevertheless, the Fund claims questions 

of fact exist as to the date the limitations period began to accrue.

[¶33.] The Fund argues the statute of limitations did not begin to run until it 

knew or should have known that BP was the actual party responsible for the 

contamination. It claims the date the limitations period began to accrue is a factbound question that can only be resolved at trial. BP responds that the statute of 

limitations began to run when the contamination at each site was reported and the 

Fund became aware of the UST leaks at each of these sites. We agree with BP. 

“[S]tatutes of limitations begin to run when plaintiffs first become aware of facts 

________________________

(. . . continued)

case. Unlike the facts before us, the cited cases involve a discussion of 

subrogation rights where the subrogor had an actual legal right to collect 

monies that the subrogee had paid, and the subrogor had made a claim for 

such monies.
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prompting a reasonably prudent person to seek information about the problem and 

its cause.” Gades v. Meyer Modernizing Co., 2015 S.D. 42, ¶ 9, 865 N.W.2d 155, 159.

[¶34.] There is no dispute that prior to July 2, 2004, the Fund was on notice 

that the USTs at 18 of the indirect sites had leaked and that it may have a claim 

against a responsible party for reimbursement of the cleanup costs. These facts 

were sufficient to start the six-year statute of limitations. The circuit court properly 

concluded that the Fund’s indirect claims against BP at these 18 sites were timebarred by the six-year statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-13.

[¶35.] The Fund also argues that the circuit court improperly granted 

summary judgment on the remaining indirect claim at site 6197. BP owned the gas 

station and four USTs at site 6197 until they were purchased in 1985 by Kertzman. 

Prior to 1985, Kertzman had operated the gas station since the 1960s under a lease 

with BP. After Kertzman’s purchase, he removed the four USTs and installed three 

new USTs in 1986.

[¶36.] The circuit court determined BP had no responsibility for the cleanup 

costs at this site because BP owned the site prior to 1985, and there were no 

reported UST leaks at site 6197 until approximately 2004. The circuit court 

concluded that the undisputed facts showed BP was not a responsible party, and the 

Fund had failed to provide a legal or statutory basis to assert a claim against BP. 

The circuit court alternatively held that the DENR had determined Kertzman was 

the responsible party and the circuit court was without authority to overturn this 

decision because the administrative remedies had not been exhausted at the time.
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[¶37.] The Fund claims questions of fact exist as to whether BP was a 

responsible party and points to its expert’s statement in his report that the UST 

contamination at site 6197 may have occurred in 2004, or sometime before the 

installation of the new USTs in 1986. The Fund claims the circuit court improperly 

resolved this fact question on summary judgment.

[¶38.] The undisputed facts in this record show that there was no reported 

contamination in 1986 when Kertzman removed the USTs previously owned by BP 

and installed new USTs. It was not until 18 years later that soil contamination was 

first discovered and reported at site 6197. At that time, the DENR made the 

determination that the pipe above the three new USTs had leaked causing the soil 

contamination. There was no evidence that any other environmental contamination 

existed at the site. The DENR then determined that Kertzman was the responsible 

party. The Fund does not dispute any of this evidence. Instead, the Fund relies 

upon its expert report speculating that Kertzman may have installed new tanks in 

1986 because the prior USTs owned by BP may have been leaking. This 

assumption by the Fund’s expert is not supported by any evidence in the record. 

“The party resisting summary judgment is required to show that they will be able to 

place sufficient evidence in the record at trial to support findings on all the 

elements on which they have the burden of proof.” Tolle v. Lev, 2011 S.D. 65, ¶ 22, 

804 N.W.2d 440, 446 (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence of expert 

speculation is insufficient to create a question of fact for a jury. See Karst v. ShurCo., 2016 S.D. 35, ¶ 20, 878 N.W.2d 604, 614-15. The Fund failed to present any 

competent evidence to show that the USTs at site 6197 leaked prior to 1985.
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3. Whether the circuit court erred in denying the Fund’s 

motion for sanctions.

[¶39.] The Fund claims the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to 

grant the motion for sanctions after Brendel improperly destroyed a 1990 document 

containing a list of UST sites owned by BP in South Dakota. The Fund served 

interrogatories and other discovery requests upon BP prior to 2015 requesting a 

complete list of USTs BP had ever owned in South Dakota. The purpose of the 

request was to determine whether there may be other indirect claims against BP for 

cleanup costs of USTs that the Fund had reimbursed to third parties. In response 

to this request, BP produced a list of 509 UST sites in South Dakota that BP had 

owned at some point in time.

[¶40.] BP was unaware of the 1990 list held by Brendel and did not produce 

the specific list. Brendel testified that she received the list in 1990 when she began 

working for BP, and the list was a “snapshot” in time of 25 to 30 UST sites owned 

by BP in South Dakota. Brendel kept the list throughout the time she worked for 

BP, but it became obsolete as BP’s records became electronic. Brendel testified she 

only kept the list because she was a “pack rat,” even though she could have 

destroyed it years earlier under BP’s records retention policy. Brendel also 

confirmed that the list of 509 sites that BP compiled during discovery included 

those 25 to 30 sites described in the 1990 document. While Brendel was aware of 

the “litigation hold” relating to the South Dakota litigation, she did not consider the 

list to be part of the litigation hold because all the pertinent records were electronic 

and had been produced.
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[¶41.] Circuit courts have discretion in considering a motion for sanctions, as 

well as the appropriate sanction to impose. Pearson v. O’Neal-Letcher, 2007 S.D. 92, 

¶ 10, 738 N.W.2d 914, 917. “SDCL 15-6-37 gives the trial judge broad latitude in 

penalizing the party who has failed to comply with discovery orders, however such 

latitude is not limitless.” Krueger v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 2018 S.D. 87, ¶ 

12, 921 N.W.2d 689, 693-94. The record supports the circuit court’s determination 

that BP fully responded to the discovery requests from the Fund and that BP had 

provided a complete list of all UST sites it had owned in South Dakota. Further, 

the circuit court appropriately recognized that even if the document’s destruction 

may have been a possible violation of the discovery rules by BP, it was inadvertent 

and not designed to impede the Fund’s access to discoverable information. The 

circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for sanctions.

Conclusion

[¶42.] We affirm the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment on Counts I 

through VI of the complaint seeking recovery for the 27 UST sites and 19 indirect 

sites. We also affirm the dismissal of Count VII seeking litigation costs under 

SDCL 34A-13-9.2 because the Fund was not entitled to recovery on any of its 

statutory claims. Finally, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of the Fund’s motion 

for sanctions.

[¶43.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KERN, and SALTER, Justices, and 

SABERS, Circuit Court Judge, concur.

[¶44.] SABERS, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for DEVANEY, Justice, 

disqualified.