UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4073

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JAROD A. BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior

District Judge. (2:10-cr-01096-PMD-1)

Submitted: September 13, 2012 Decided: September 26, 2012

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard N. Buchanan, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. 

Robert Nicholas Bianchi, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jarod Brown pled guilty to possessing firearms as a 

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). 

The district court sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal 

Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006), to the statutory 

mandatory minimum of fifteen years’ imprisonment. Brown 

appeals. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there 

are no meritorious issues for review but questioning whether the 

district court conducted an adequate Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 

colloquy, whether trial counsel was ineffective, and whether the 

district court erred in sentencing Brown under the ACCA. Brown 

was notified of his right to file a supplemental pro se brief 

but has not done so. We affirm.

Prior to accepting a plea, a trial court must conduct 

a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and 

determines that the defendant comprehends, the nature of the 

charges to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum 

penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the rights 

he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 

1991). The district court “must determine that there is a 

factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The 

district court also must ensure that the defendant’s plea was 
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voluntary and did not result from force or threats. Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(b)(2). Because Brown did not properly preserve any 

error in his plea proceeding or Rule 11 colloquy, we review the 

proceeding for plain error. See United States v. Massenburg, 

564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (requiring appellant to 

demonstrate error occurred, was plain, and affected his 

substantial rights). 

While the district court made two minor omissions 

during the plea colloquy, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(D), (M), 

we conclude Brown cannot establish plain error in these 

omissions. See Massenburg, 564 F.3d at 343; see also United 

States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073, 1080 (2d Cir. 1977) (addressing 

failure to advise of right to counsel). Rather, the district 

court substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 11 

and ensured that Brown’s plea was knowing and voluntary and 

supported by an adequate factual basis. See DeFusco, 949 F.3d 

at 116, 119-20. Thus, we conclude that Brown is not entitled to 

relief on this ground. 

Next, counsel questions whether trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to obtain a conditional guilty plea 

preserving appellate review of Brown’s suppression arguments or 

in failing to properly advise Brown regarding the effect of his 

guilty plea on those arguments. As counsel appropriately notes, 
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however, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel “are 

generally not cognizable on direct appeal . . . unless it 

conclusively appears from the record that defense counsel did 

not provide effective representation.” United States v. Benton, 

523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Instead, such claims are properly raised in a motion 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2012). United States 

v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Because the 

record does not conclusively establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel, we decline to consider such claims at this juncture.

Turning to Brown’s armed career criminal designation, 

we review the district court’s application of a statutory 

sentencing enhancement de novo. United States v. Carr, 592 F.3d 

636, 639 n.4 (4th Cir. 2010). A defendant may be properly 

sentenced under the ACCA if he violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

and has at least three prior convictions for violent felonies or 

serious drug offenses “committed on occasions different from one 

another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). The record 

demonstrates that Brown had three prior convictions for 

controlled substance offenses occurring on separate occasions 

and punishable by more than ten years’ imprisonment. See S.C. 

Code Ann. §§ 44-53-370, 44-53-375(B)(1) (2006) (statutory 

maximum sentences); United States v. Williams, 508 F.3d 724, 

727-31 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding convictions under Youthful 
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Offender Act acceptable ACCA predicates); United States v. 

Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing when 

predicate convictions occurred “on occasions different from one 

another” under ACCA). Thus, we conclude that the district court 

did not err in the imposition of the enhanced sentence.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Brown, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Brown requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Brown.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED