IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50653

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RUBEN PRIETO, 

 Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Before KING, SMITH, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

∗

PER CURIAM:

Ruben Prieto appeals his sentence following his conviction for failing to 

register or update his registration as a sex offender. Because Prieto cannot 

meet the plain-error standard, we affirm.

I.

Prieto pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to failing to register or 

update a registration as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The presentence investigation 

report (PSR) calculated a Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months. In his written 

 

∗ Carolyn Dineen King, Circuit Judge, concurs in the judgment only.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 16, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

2

objections to the PSR, Prieto argued that he was entitled to a three-level 

reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(2), for voluntarily correcting the failure to 

register. At sentencing, the district court overruled Prieto’s objection and 

adopted the PSR. 

The district court sentenced Prieto within the calculated Guidelines 

range to 15 months of imprisonment and a life term of supervised release. 

Among the special conditions of supervised release that it imposed, the district 

court ordered that Prieto “refrain from purchasing, possessing, or using any 

sexually stimulating or sexually oriented materials, including, but not limited 

to, written, audio, and visual depictions, such as pornographic books, 

magazines, photographs, films, videos, DVD’s, computer programs, or any 

other media for the portrayal of the same.” In this opinion, we refer to that 

condition as the “pornography restriction.” The district court also ordered that 

Prieto “not resid[e] or go[] to places where a minor or minors are known to 

frequent without prior approval of the probation officer.” We refer to that 

condition as the “geographic restriction.” Both of these special conditions had 

been recommended by the PSR.

At the sentencing hearing, Prieto did not object to the special conditions. 

He timely filed a notice of appeal. 

II.

On appeal, Prieto argues that the district court plainly erred by imposing 

the two special conditions described above.1 Prieto concedes that because he 

failed to object to the special conditions in the district court, review is for plain 

error. To demonstrate plain error, Prieto must make four showings:

 

1 Prieto also argued in his initial brief that the district court erred in its calculation of 

the Guidelines range by failing to apply the three-level reduction for voluntarily correcting 

the failure to register under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(2). However, several months before oral 

argument, Prieto advised us that he has been released from confinement. Therefore, as 

Prieto concedes, his challenge to the district court’s Guidelines calculation is now moot.

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

3

First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of “[d]eviation 

from a legal rule”—that has not been intentionally relinquished or 

abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, 

the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to 

reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the 

appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means 

he must demonstrate that it “affected the outcome of the district 

court proceedings.” Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs 

are satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the 

error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error 

“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.”

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (alterations in original) 

(citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–33, 734, 

736 (1993)). 

We discuss Prieto’s challenge to each special condition in turn.

III.

Prieto perceives both statutory and constitutional problems in the 

district court’s imposition of the pornography restriction. First, he argues that 

the district court did not explain its reasons for imposing the condition, and 

the reasons cannot be inferred from the record. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); United 

States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that § 3553(c) 

requires a district court “to state ‘the reasons for its imposition of the particular 

sentence’” and holding that district courts must justify special conditions with 

factual findings, and vacatur is required if the reasons for the condition cannot 

be inferred from the record). Second, Prieto argues that the pornography 

restriction is not reasonably related to any of the factors that district courts 

must consider when imposing conditions of supervised release, and that the 

pornography restriction imposes a greater deprivation of liberty than is 

reasonably necessary for the purposes of deterrence, protection of the public, 

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

4

and rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) (requiring that special 

conditions be “reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), 

(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D)”)2; see also id. § 3583(d)(2) (requiring that 

special conditions of supervised release “involve[] no greater deprivation of 

liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section

3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D)”).3 Finally, he argues that the 

pornography restriction violates the First Amendment. 

A.

In support of his argument that the district court did not explain the 

pornography restriction and that it is not reasonably related to the statutory 

supervised-release factors, Prieto primarily relies upon Salazar, which issued 

nearly four months before Prieto’s sentencing hearing. In Salazar, the 

defendant was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender under SORNA. 

743 F.3d at 447. The district court sentenced Salazar to time served plus 

fifteen years of supervised release. Id. When Salazar violated conditions of 

that release by committing a crime of family assault, failing to notify his 

probation officer of his arrest, and failing to meet with a sex-offender counselor, 

the district court revoked that supervised-release term and sentenced Salazar 

to twelve months of imprisonment, to be followed by a new fourteen-year term 

of supervised release. Id. at 447–48. As a special condition of supervised 

release, the district court required Salazar to “refrain from purchasing, 

 

2 In other words, special conditions must reasonably relate to “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” and “the 

need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect 

the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed 

educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 

effective manner.” § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D).

3 These purposes are: adequate deterrence, protection of the public, and—as relevant 

here—providing correctional treatment in the most effective manner. See § 3553(a)(2)(B), 

(a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D).

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

5

possessing, or using any sexually stimulating or sexually oriented materials 

including but not limited to written, audio and visual depictions, such as, 

pornographic books, magazines, photographs, films, videos, DVDs, computer 

programs, or any other media for portrayal of the same.” Id. at 448.

Because Salazar had preserved his objection to the special condition, we

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 450. We began by noting that previous 

decisions upholding similar pornography restrictions did not control because 

they had been decided on plain-error review. Id. We then concluded that the 

district court abused its discretion by failing to explain how the pornography 

restriction was reasonably related to the statutory factors, and furthermore, 

that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the restriction 

was thus related. Id. at 451. 

The pornography restriction was not reasonably related to Salazar’s 

history and characteristics or the nature and circumstances of the offense, we

reasoned, because:

Nothing in Salazar’s history suggests that sexually stimulating 

materials fueled his past crimes. Further, the district court below 

did not explain why this restriction is necessary for Salazar. There 

does not appear to be any evidence that Salazar is a repeat offender 

of sex crimes or that access to pornographic materials contributed 

to his original offense. In fact, there has been no evidence 

presented that Salazar ever used pornography. . . . [T]here is little 

indication that Salazar has an abnormal potential for recidivism 

or any proclivity for sexual behavior. There is no evidence of 

predatory sexual behavior beyond his singular and now-remote 

sexual offense. To be sure, Salazar failed to register as a sex 

offender and failed to meet with his sex offender counselor as 

ordered. But these violations alone, though significant, do not on 

their face appear to justify the imposition of this restriction. 

Additionally, the arrest that prompted this revocation does not

appear to be sex related. There is “no suggestion in the PSR or at 

sentencing that appellant had abused or even possessed 

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

6

pornography in the past, much less that it contributed to his 

offense or would be likely to do so in the future.” 

Id. at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 

Perazza–Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 76 (5th Cir. 2009)). 

The pornography restriction was not reasonably related to protecting the 

public and adequately deterring the defendant from future criminal conduct, 

we held, because: 

[T]here is little indication that Salazar has a high potential for 

committing future sexual crimes. It is hard to imagine how 

preventing Salazar from accessing sexually stimulating materials 

would prevent future criminal conduct when there is no indication 

in the record that Salazar has an unhealthy relationship with such 

materials or that such materials contributed to his underlying 

crimes or other violations.

 

Id. 

Finally, the pornography restriction did not reasonably relate to 

Salazar’s effective correctional treatment because “there was no evidence 

presented that sexually stimulating materials contributed to Salazar’s crimes 

or that sexually stimulating materials otherwise negatively impact Salazar’s 

life in a way that would benefit from ‘correctional treatment.’” Id. at 453. 

Because the district court abused its discretion in failing to provide reasons for 

imposing the pornography restriction, and because the record did not disclose 

any reasonable relationship between the restriction and the statutory factors, 

we vacated the pornography restriction and remanded the case for the district 

court to reconsider the appropriateness of the pornography restriction. Id. We

did not reach the alternative questions of whether the pornography restriction 

was a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary or whether it 

violated the First Amendment. Id. at 451.

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

7

Prieto’s case is very similar to Salazar. As in Salazar, the district court 

did not provide any explanation for imposing the pornography ban on Prieto, 

and the reasons are not apparent from the record. “Nothing in [Prieto’s] 

history suggests that sexually stimulating materials fueled his past crimes.” 

Salazar, 743 F.3d at 452. And the record contains no evidence that Prieto “is 

a repeat offender of sex crimes or that access to pornographic materials 

contributed to his original offense.” Id. As in Salazar, there is no record 

evidence that Prieto has ever even used pornography. Id. Moreover, nothing 

in the record suggests that Prieto “has an abnormal potential for recidivism” 

or “a high potential for committing future sexual crimes,” much less that 

pornography would be likely to contribute to future criminal conduct. Id. 

Finally, there is no evidence in the record that pornography use contributed to 

Prieto’s past crimes or “otherwise negatively impact[s] [Prieto’s] life in a way 

that would benefit from ‘correctional treatment.’” Id. at 453.

The government observes that on abuse-of-discretion review, we have

previously upheld pornography bans imposed as supervised-release conditions, 

but the two cases upon which it relies are inapposite. In United States v. Ellis, 

we upheld a lifetime pornography ban for a defendant who had been convicted 

of possessing child pornography and who, according to testimony at sentencing, 

had sexually molested numerous male family members during their childhood. 

720 F.3d 220, 227 (5th Cir. 2013). We reasoned that “[b]ecause Ellis’s [offense 

of conviction] was sexual in nature it was reasonable for the district court to 

restrict Ellis’s access to sexually stimulating material more broadly in an effort 

to prevent future crimes or aid in his rehabilitation.” Id. In United States v. 

McGee, we upheld a lifetime pornography ban for a defendant who had been 

convicted for failure to register and who had a “significant criminal history” of 

repeated sexual offenses. 559 F. App’x 323, 330 n.33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 

135 S. Ct. 130 (2014). Even though nothing in the record suggested that McGee 

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

8

had accessed child pornography or that such material had contributed to his 

past crimes, the district court had imposed the restriction as “a precaution.” 

Id. at 330. McGee upheld the restriction, concluding that “[i]n light of McGee’s 

very troubling, sexually deviant criminal history,” the special condition “will 

tend to protect the public from further crimes.” Id. McGee distinguished 

Salazar by noting “McGee’s significant criminal history involving several 

sexual assaults and his pattern for quickly reoffending following release.” Id.

at 330 n.33. 

In contrast to the defendant in Ellis, Prieto’s offense of conviction—

failure to register—was not sexual in nature and did not involve sexually 

stimulating materials. See United States v. Segura, 747 F.3d 323, 327–30 (5th 

Cir. 2014) (holding that failure to register under SORNA is not a “sex offense” 

under the supervised-release guideline, U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2). And unlike the 

defendant in McGee, Prieto does not have an extensive history of repeated 

sexual offenses that might justify a pornography ban; his only sexual offense 

is his 2003 conviction for two counts of child molestation. In sum, the cases 

that the government cites in its brief are simply not analogous to Prieto’s case, 

and Salazar provides a much closer analogue. 

The only material difference between Salazar and Prieto’s case is that 

the error had been preserved in Salazar, whereas Prieto’s challenge is 

reviewed merely for plain error. Based on the foregoing analysis, Prieto has 

shown that the district court erred by imposing the pornography special 

condition because it was unexplained and not reasonably related to the 

statutory factors, and this error is plain because Salazar does not leave it open 

to reasonable dispute. As to the third prong of the plain-error standard, Prieto 

argues that his substantial rights are affected because he “is prohibited from 

viewing materials any other adult is constitutionally guaranteed the right to 

view,” and he contends that the panel should exercise its discretion to correct 

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

9

the error because of “the breadth of the special conditions and the substantial 

deprivation of liberty they entail.” The government counters that Prieto’s 

substantial rights were not affected because he can ask the district court to 

modify the condition at any time, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) (allowing district 

courts to “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at 

any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised 

release”), and he can also seek guidance from his probation officer on what 

materials are prohibited.

We reject the government’s third-prong argument because the relevant 

inquiry is whether an error “affected the outcome of the district court 

proceedings,” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135, not whether an altered outcome can be 

fixed after-the-fact. Indeed, the government’s argument would preclude us 

from ever vacating a special condition of supervised release on plain-error 

review. However, we previously have vacated plainly erroneous special 

conditions that did not reasonably relate to the statutory factors. See, e.g.,

United States v. Flores–Guzman, 121 F. App’x 557, 558 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding 

reversible plain error where a district court imposed a special condition 

prohibiting the defendant from drinking or using addictive substances because 

the condition was not reasonably related to the statutory factors); United 

States v. Baez–Leon, 112 F. App’x 321, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2004) (vacating special 

condition prohibiting tobacco use where the defendant was convicted of illegal 

reentry). 

We easily conclude that the district court’s error affected Prieto’s 

substantial rights. Had the error not occurred, Prieto would not have been 

subjected to the unwarranted special condition because no record evidence 

reveals any justification for the condition. Cf. United States v. Nelson, 594 F. 

App’x 246, 247 (5th Cir. 2015) (substantial rights not affected where “nothing 

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

10

in the record suggest[ed] that the outcome would have been different if the 

court had provided more extensive reasons”).

Therefore, the fourth prong of plain error is determinative here. In 

analyzing the fourth prong, “we look to ‘the degree of the error and the 

particular facts of the case’ to determine whether to exercise our discretion.” 

United States v. Avalos–Martinez, 700 F.3d 148, 154 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

United States v. Davis, 602 F.3d 643, 651 (5th Cir. 2010)). We have declined 

to specify “a ‘test’ or ‘factors’ that should be applied in every application of the 

fourth prong of plain-error review when sentencing error is present because we 

are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition in Puckett that ‘[t]he fourth 

prong is meant to be applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive basis.’” 

United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 286 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Puckett, 556 

U.S. at 142)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “emphasized that a per 

se approach to plain-error review is flawed.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

We decline to exercise our discretion to correct the error in this case. 

While the modifiable nature of supervised-release conditions does not insulate 

them from third-prong scrutiny, it weighs heavily in our consideration of the 

fourth prong. As we have recently observed, “a modifiable condition . . . works 

a less significant deprivation of liberty than one which cannot be altered.” 

United States v. Fields, 777 F.3d 799, 806 (5th Cir. 2015). Indeed, the Seventh 

Circuit has relied on the modifiable nature of supervised-release conditions to 

decline the exercise of its fourth-prong discretion. See United States v. 

Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 2008). Although the modifiable nature of 

a special condition is not dispositive, a defendant faces an uphill battle when 

he seeks to convince us that a modifiable condition “seriously affect[s] the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Puckett, 556 

U.S. at 135 (alteration in original) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736). Prieto is 

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

11

in an especially difficult position given his criminal history; at 62 years old, he 

molested a three-year-old girl and a five-year-old girl. Moreover, we note that 

the district court’s imposition of the pornography restriction came as little 

surprise to Prieto; the PSR had recommended the condition, and Prieto had 

been given an opportunity to file written objections to the PSR before 

sentencing.

On these facts, we cannot say that the district court’s imposition of the 

pornography restriction so seriously threatens the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the court system that we must correct it. The pornography 

restriction was not justified by the statutory factors (at least on the record 

before us). However, we do not think that the public would perceive any grave 

injustice when a district court imposes a modifiable condition prohibiting a 

defendant with a prior child-molestation conviction from purchasing, 

possessing, or using sexually stimulating or sexually oriented materials, the 

defendant’s PSR recommended the condition, and the defendant forwent not 

one but two opportunities to object to the condition (both in his response to the 

PSR and at sentencing). Therefore, because Prieto has not met his burden to 

persuade us that the error resulted in a serious injustice, we decline to exercise 

our discretion to correct the error. See United States v. Andaverde–Tinoco, 741 

F.3d 509, 523 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Importantly, the burden is on the defendant to 

demonstrate that the error affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings.”); United States v. Escalante–Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 425 

(5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“[W]e do not view the fourth prong as automatic if 

the other three prongs are met.”); United States v. Bohuchot, 625 F.3d 892, 900 

(5th Cir. 2010) (declining to exercise discretion, in part, because the defendants 

were not surprised by the error); United States v. Smith, 203 F.3d 884, 890 (5th 

Cir. 2000) (declining to exercise fourth-prong discretion); United States v. 

Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 686 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); see also Henderson v. United 

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

12

States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1130 (2013) (noting that the third and fourth prongs 

are “screening criteria” designed to prevent the opening of “plain error 

floodgates,” and that when courts apply prongs three and four 

of plain error review, “the fact that a defendant did not object . . . may well 

count against the grant of Rule 52(b) relief”); Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (“Meeting 

all four prongs is difficult, as it should be.”).4 

B.

Prieto also challenges the pornography restriction on First-Amendment 

grounds. However, as outlined above, Prieto cannot meet the fourth prong of 

the plain-error standard. Moreover, his First-Amendment challenge fails for 

an additional reason: Prieto cannot show that any constitutional error was 

plain. 

We have previously upheld—on plain-error review—special conditions 

nearly identical to Prieto’s, citing the lack of existing law that would make any 

First Amendment error obvious. See United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 136 

(5th Cir. 2011) (“Because our law is unsettled, and the law of our sister circuits 

is not uniformly in the defendant’s favor, plain error is not demonstrated.”); 

United States v. Simington, 484 F. App’x 860, 864 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Given the 

lack of clear direction regarding the First Amendment implications of the 

challenged condition, Simington has not carried his burden of showing that the 

district court’s putative error was plain.”); United States v. Hilliker, 469 F. 

App’x 386, 389 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause the law is unsettled regarding First 

Amendment overbreadth challenges, Hilliker cannot demonstrate error that is 

 

4 Because we conclude that the district court’s imposition of the pornography 

restriction does not warrant correction under the fourth prong of plain-error review, it is 

unnecessary for us to consider Prieto’s additional argument that the restriction is a greater 

deprivation of liberty than that reasonably necessary to deter, protect the public, or 

rehabilitate Prieto.

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

13

plain because such an error must be clear under existing law.”). Therefore, 

even assuming there was error, any such error could not be plain.

IV.

Prieto also challenges the geographic restriction. However, he cannot 

show plain error because we recently rejected a plain-error challenge to an 

identical condition in Fields, 777 F.3d 799. Indeed, Prieto noted in his initial 

brief that “[t]his condition has been challenged in a case currently before the 

Court, United States v. Fields, No. 13-51060.”

In Fields, the defendant’s criminal history involved only “a single, remote 

sexual offense.” Id. at 804. Distinguishing Salazar, we noted that this single 

offense—a sexual assault of a child—bore “some relationship to the special 

condition limiting access to places frequented by children” because “access to 

children was a necessary predicate to Fields’s original sexual assault offense,” 

whereas in Salazar, “there was no evidence that pornography had anything to 

do with the underlying sex crime.” Id. We also took into account the 

defendant’s refusal to register, holding that:

Fields’s restrictions can be justified either because his history of 

noncompliance with punitive restrictions requires a harsher 

response, the second statutory consideration, or because the 

defendant, who has shown an unwillingness to comply with a 

provision designed to protect the general populace, poses a greater 

risk to the public, the third statutory consideration.

Id. We also held that the restriction was not a greater deprivation of the 

defendant’s liberty than reasonably necessary, distinguishing United States v. 

Windless, 719 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2013)—the precedent upon which Prieto 

relies—on the ground that Fields’s restriction was less severe and more welldefined than the one invalidated in Windless, which prohibited even “indirect 

contact” with minors such as visiting a grocery store. Id. at 806.

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/16/2015
No. 14-50653

14

The geographic restriction that Prieto challenges is identical to the one 

upheld in Fields. Moreover, like the defendant in Fields, Prieto has committed 

child molestation in the past, and his failure to register suggests a need for 

deterrence and protection of the public. Therefore, Fields forecloses his plainerror challenge to the geographic restriction.

We note, however, that Fields found the geographic restriction to be no 

greater a deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary only after giving it 

a limiting construction. In Fields, we observed that by confining its reach to 

“places where a minor or minors are known to frequent,” the geographic 

restriction banned the supervisee from “locations . . . that children ‘visit often’ 

or ‘associate with, be in, or resort to often or habitually.’” 777 F.3d at 806 

(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary 909 (3d ed. 1981)). We further 

observed that “‘places where minors are known to frequent’ is an objective 

standard that can be determined in advance, especially through consultation 

with [the] probation officer.” Id. We specifically clarified that “places like 

schools and playgrounds” are included in the ban, but “grocery stores, places 

of worship, transportation hubs, and most stores” are not. Id. We construe 

Prieto’s geographic restriction in the same way. Because Prieto’s geographic 

restriction is tailored to “places where a minor or minors are known to 

frequent,” the restriction on his liberty is not as severe as the one at issue in 

Windless, and in light of Fields, Prieto cannot demonstrate plain error.

V.

Based on the foregoing discussion, we AFFIRM.

 Case: 14-50653 Document: 00513195881 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/16/2015