IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

ERIC FORBES, ALEX HELGESON, SABINA 

ZEMBAS, DREAMGIRLS OF TACOMA 

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, a 

Washington Limited Liability Corporation,

ASHLEY RICHARDSON, and HEATHER 

BLAKEWAY,

No. 51548-2-II

Appellants,

vs. PUBLISHED OPINION

PIERCE COUNTY, a Washington Municipal 

Corporation, JULIE ANDERSON, Pierce 

County Auditor, and STEPHEN K. 

CAUSSEAUX, Pierce County Hearing 

Examiner,

Respondents.

MAXA, C.J. – Eric Forbes, Ashley Richardson, and Heather Blakeway (collectively, 

appellants) challenge the constitutionality of certain sanction provisions in the Pierce County 

Code (PCC) chapter regulating erotic dance studios. PCC 5.14.230 allows the County to 

suspend or revoke the licenses issued to erotic dance studio operators, managers, and dancers if 

they violate or permit the violation of erotic dance studio regulations. PCC 5.14.250 provides 

criminal penalties for violating erotic dance studio regulations and states that managers on duty 

and erotic dance studio operators are strictly liable for violations of substantive regulations in 

chapter 5.14 PCC. The appellants do not challenge those substantive regulations, which

primarily are contained in PCC 5.14.180 and .190.

The appellants argue that the sanction provisions constitute an unconstitutional prior 

restraint of erotic dance, which is protected expression, because the provisions impose strict 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

September 18, 2018
No. 51548-2-II

2

liability for violations. They also argue that the sanction provisions violate due process for the 

same reason. Pierce County argues that Forbes and Richardson do not have standing to

challenge PCC 5.14.230 and that none of the appellants have standing to challenge PCC 

5.14.250.

We hold that (1) the appellants have standing to challenge PCC 5.14.230, but they do not 

have standing to challenge PCC 5.14.250 because no criminal penalties were imposed or 

threatened; (2) PCC 5.14.230 operates as a prior restraint of protected erotic dance but is not 

unconstitutional under article I, section 5 of the Washington Constitution because it does not 

allow the imposition of sanctions based on strict liability; (3) PCC 5.14.230 is not 

unconstitutional under a First Amendment analysis for time, place, or manner restrictions; and 

(4) PCC 5.14.230 does not violate due process because it does not allow the imposition of 

sanctions based on strict liability. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment 

order dismissing the appellants’ complaints.

FACTS

At the relevant times, each of the appellants held licenses issued under chapter 5.14 PCC. 

Forbes, doing business as Dreamgirls of Tacoma, LLC, is the licensee and operator of an erotic 

dance studio known as Dreamgirls at Fox’s (Fox’s). Ashley Richardson is a licensed manager at 

Fox’s and Heather Blakeway is a licensed dancer at Fox’s.

Violations and Hearing Examiner Rulings

Between April and August 2014, the County conducted several licensing inspections and 

compliance checks at Fox’s. The inspections revealed multiple violations of regulations in 

chapter 5.14 PCC. In August 2014, the auditor’s office sent Forbes a notice and order to correct, 
No. 51548-2-II

3

which identified violations of PCC 5.14.110, .180, and .190 and explained how to correct them. 

The notice stated, 

Failure of the establishment to comply with this order may result in further 

enforcement action being taken. Examples of enforcement may include: 

suspension of establishment license, revocation of establishment license, fines. 

Failure to comply with the compliance instructions contained in this order will 

constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or revocation of the license.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 318. The notice did not at that time suspend Forbes’s license to operate 

an erotic dance studio, impose any civil sanction for the violations, or impose or threaten a 

criminal penalty.

Forbes appealed the notice and order to a county hearing examiner, who conducted a 

formal hearing and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. After reviewing the 

allegations in detail, the hearing examiner found that the County proved the alleged violations by 

a preponderance of the evidence and denied Forbes’s appeal.

Subsequently, the auditor’s office conducted additional site visits at Fox’s and observed 

violations of chapter 5.14 PCC. In response to these alleged violations, the auditor’s office sent 

both Richardson and Blakeway a notice and order of suspension. The notices stated that 

Blakeway was dancing off the platform, that a patron was seated too close to Blakeway while 

she was dancing on the platform, and that Richardson was present while those violations 

occurred. Richardson, as the manager at the time, was required to ensure compliance. The 

notices stated that both of their licenses would be suspended for 30 days, with the suspension 

effective immediately unless it was appealed. Neither notice imposed a criminal penalty.

Both Richardson and Blakeway appealed to the hearing examiner, who conducted formal 

hearings and entered findings and conclusions on both appeals. The hearing examiner found that 
No. 51548-2-II

4

the County proved the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence, but modified the 

period of suspension to 15 days for Richardson and 10 days for Blakeway.

Petition for Writ of Review and Complaint

Forbes, Richardson, and Blakeway all filed petitions for writs of review and complaints 

for injunction and declaratory relief against the County in superior court. Each petition alleged 

that substantial evidence did not support the hearing examiner’s decision, that the hearing 

examiner made a legal error regarding application of strict liability, and that PCC 5.14.180, .190, 

.230, and .250 violated the Washington Constitution. The cases subsequently were consolidated.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court entered an 

order granting the County’s motion and denying the appellants’ motion. The court first 

considered the appellants’ constitutional arguments and ruled, “None of the challenged sections 

of Chapter 5.14 PCC, nor Chapter 5.14 PCC as a whole, violate the free speech or due process 

clauses of the Washington State Constitution.” CP at 827. Regarding the appellants’ petition for 

a writ of review, the court ruled that substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner’s 

decisions. On that basis, the court affirmed the hearing examiner’s decisions regarding Forbes, 

Richardson, and Blakeway.

The appellants sought direct review in the Supreme Court of the summary judgment 

order. The Supreme Court ordered that the case be transferred to this court.

ANALYSIS

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

1. Standard of Review

We review the superior court’s summary judgment order de novo. Keck v. Collins, 184 

Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). On summary judgment, we construe all evidence and 
No. 51548-2-II

5

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate 

when the record shows “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56(c); see Keck, 184 Wn.2d at 370.

Here, the superior court issued a summary judgment order with numbered paragraphs 

setting forth its detailed analysis of the appellant’s constitutional claim. Because our review is 

de novo, we do not rely on or give deference to the superior court’s reasoning.

2. Chapter 5.14 PCC

The appellants each held licenses issued pursuant to chapter 5.14 PCC, which relates to 

the licensing and regulation of the adult entertainment industry in Pierce County. Chapter 5.14 

PCC applies a licensing scheme to “erotic dance studios” and imposes substantive requirements 

on erotic dance studio operator, studio manager, and dancer licensees. The chapter outlines the 

process for persons to apply for and receive an erotic dance studio license, PCC 5.14.030-.090, 

and requires all managers and dancers to obtain licenses. PCC 5.14.100, .110.

PCC 5.14.180 imposes requirements on managers, and states that “[t]he manager shall be 

responsible for ensuring” that both the studio and the dancers comply with restrictions in PCC 

5.14.190. PCC 5.14.180(D), (E). PCC 5.14.190 designates a number of unlawful acts, including 

any dancing other than on an 18-inch platform that is 10 feet from the nearest patron, PCC 

5.14.190(H), touching between patrons and dancers, PCC 5.14.190(I), (J), and dancers exposing 

themselves except on the platform. PCC 5.14.190(H), (I), (J), (M).

PCC 5.14.230(A) allows the county auditor to revoke or suspend the license of an erotic 

dance studio operator if the licensee has “violated or permitted violation” of any of the chapter’s 

provisions. PCC 5.14.230(B) applies the same provision to managers and dancers. In addition, 

PCC 5.14.250 states that a person, firm, or corporation that violates any of the chapter’s 
No. 51548-2-II

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provisions is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by up to a $1,000 fine or 90 days

imprisonment. PCC 5.14.250 states that the manager on duty or erotic dance studio operator 

“shall be held strictly liable for any violation of the requirements set forth in PCC 5.14.180 

and/or 5.14.190.”

The process for appealing a decision by the auditor is set out in PCC 5.02.120. A 

licensee has the right to appeal a decision by submitting a written notice of appeal and paying a 

fee within 10 days of the decision. PCC 5.02.120(A). The appeal must be heard within 90 days 

by a hearing examiner. PCC 5.02.120(B). On appeal, the County bears the burden of proof to 

show by a preponderance of the evidence that the standards for suspending or revoking a license 

have been met. PCC 5.02.120(E). Filing a timely notice of appeal stays the auditor’s decision 

until a final decision by the hearing examiner. PCC 5.02.120(C). The hearing examiner’s 

decision is final unless a writ of review is filed in the superior court within 20 days from the 

decision. PCC 5.02.120(J). 

This court upheld several challenged portions of chapter 5.14 PCC in DCR, Inc. v. Pierce 

County, 92 Wn. App. 660, 964 P.2d 380 (1998). The primary focus of the court’s opinion was 

the 10-foot distance restriction, which this court held was a valid regulation of the time, place, 

and manner of protected expression. Id. at 683. The court also upheld the chapter 5.14 PCC 

provisions on issuing licenses and appealing adverse licensing decisions. Id. at 686-89.

B. APPELLANTS’ STANDING

As an initial matter, the County challenges the appellants’ standing.1 First, the County 

argues that Forbes and Richardson lack standing to challenge PCC 5.14.230 because, unlike 

 

1 The County did not argue in the superior court that the appellants did not have standing to 

challenge the constitutionality of PCC 5.14.230 or .250. As a result, Forbes argues that the 

County cannot raise this issue on appeal. However, because a party’s standing goes to this 
No. 51548-2-II

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Blakeway, they were not personally engaged in protected expression. Second, the County 

suggests that the appellants lack standing to challenge PCC 5.14.250 because no criminal penalty 

was assessed against them under that provision. We hold that Forbes and Richardson have 

standing to challenge PCC 5.14.230, but that the appellants lack standing to challenge PCC 

5.14.250.

1. Legal Background

Standing refers to a party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a 

right. Friends of N. Spokane County Parks v. Spokane County, 184 Wn. App. 105, 115, 336 P.3d 

632 (2014). A litigant cannot assert the legal rights of another person and must have a real 

interest before bringing a cause of action. Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 18-19, 18 P.3d 523 

(2001). The rule is that a person who is not adversely affected by a statute may not challenge the 

statute’s validity. Id. at 18. For that reason, to challenge a statute’s constitutionality, a party 

must demonstrate that the statute has operated to the party’s prejudice. Postema v. Snohomish 

County, 83 Wn. App. 574, 579, 922 P.2d 176 (1996).

2. Standing to Challenge PCC 5.14.230

Here, Richardson has standing to challenge PCC 5.14.230(B) because her license was 

suspended under that provision. The statute has adversely affected her and she has a real interest 

in challenging its validity. Dean, 143 Wn.2d at 18-19.

Similarly, the suspension of Richardson’s and Blakeway’s licenses under PCC 

5.14.230(B) adversely affected Forbes because his employees were not available to manage and 

dance at his erotic dance studio. The Ninth Circuit addressed the same issue in Clark v. City of

 

court’s jurisdiction, it can be raised either for the first time on appeal or by this court sua 

sponte. Jevne v. The Pass, LLC, 3 Wn. App. 2d 561, 565, 416 P.3d 1257 (2018); see RAP 2.5(a).
No. 51548-2-II

8

Lakewood, and held that the owner of an adult cabaret suffered an injury in fact regarding a 

regulation placing limitations on issuing licenses for his employees. 259 F.3d 996, 1010-11 

(2001). The court stated that the owner could not operate his business without licensed 

employees, and therefore he would be unable to engage in expressive activity if the City did not 

license his employees. Id. at 1011.2 For the same reason, Forbes has standing to challenge the

suspensions of his employees’ licenses under PCC 5.14.230(B).

A different analysis applies for Forbes’s challenge to PCC 5.14.230(A), which allows 

sanctions to be imposed against him as the licensee of the erotic dance studio. Unlike 

Richardson, Forbes’s license has not been revoked or suspended under PCC 5.14.230(A). The 

County’s notice and order to correct listed only a series of violations identified at Fox’s, but did 

not impose any sanction. The record does not show that a sanction was imposed at a later time.

However, the County’s notice and order describes observed violations of PCC 5.14.180 

and .190 and directs that Forbes correct those violations. The order further states that Forbes’s 

failure to comply with the order may result in further enforcement action being taken, including 

suspension or revocation of his license. And the order states that failure to comply will 

constitute sufficient grounds for license suspension or revocation. Although the order does not 

reference PCC 5.14.230(A), that provision provides the only authority for the County to impose 

those sanctions. As a result, under the specific facts of this case PCC 5.14.230(A) adversely 

affected Forbes.

 

2 Federal standing doctrine, although distinct, can be instructive. See Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 

Local 1789 v. Spokane Airports, 146 Wn.2d 207, 212-17, 45 P.3d 186 (2002).
No. 51548-2-II

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We hold that both Forbes and Richardson have standing to challenge the constitutionality 

of PCC 5.14.230(B) and that Forbes has standing to challenge the constitutionality of PCC 

5.14.230(A).

3. Standing to Challenge PCC 5.14.250

The County suggests that the appellants do not have standing to challenge PCC 

5.14.250.3 We agree.

Here, no criminal penalties were assessed under PCC 5.14.250 against any of the 

appellants. Therefore, PCC 5.14.250 has not adversely affected them.. The appellants do not 

argue otherwise.

Instead, the appellants argue that they have standing to challenge PCC 5.14.250 because 

they intend to engage in constitutionally protected conduct in the future and there is a credible 

threat of prosecution. They cite two Supreme Court cases: Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 

___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 189 L. Ed. 2d 246 (2014), and Babbitt v. United Farm Workers

Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 60 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1979). These cases recognize that 

“[w]hen an individual is subject to such a threat [of enforcement of a law], an actual arrest, 

prosecution, or other enforcement action is not a prerequisite to challenging the law.” Susan B. 

Anthony List, 132 S. Ct. at 2342. The Court explained that a plaintiff may bring a preenforcement challenge if he or she alleges “‘an intention to engage in a course of conduct’” 

arguably protected by the Constitution, but proscribed by statute, when there has been a credible 

threat of prosecution. Id. (quoting United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. at 298).

 

3 The County only vaguely makes this argument, and it did not raise the issue in the trial court. 

However, as noted above, we can raise standing sua sponte even if the parties do not argue 

standing. Jevne, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 565. And the appellants do discuss standing to challenge 

PCC 5.14.250 in their reply brief. Therefore, we address standing regarding PCC 5.14.250.
No. 51548-2-II

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The appellants’ situation does not fit these requirements because they have not 

adequately demonstrated a threat of enforcement. First, the appellants have not demonstrated a 

current threat to impose a criminal penalty. Forbes’s notice and order to correct states that 

failure to comply may result in further enforcement action, but concludes only that “[f]ailure to 

comply with the compliance instructions . . . will constitute sufficient grounds for the suspension 

or revocation of the license.” CP at 318 (emphasis added). The letter references a fine as an 

example of enforcement, but does not indicate any intent to impose criminal penalties. The 

notice and order of suspension sent to Richardson and Blakeway do not threaten a future 

criminal penalty in any form.

Second, the appellants have not shown a risk of future, potential criminal enforcement 

based on their anticipated conduct. The United States Supreme Court has granted standing to 

parties that allege an intent to engage in conduct they assert is protected. Susan B. Anthony List, 

134 S. Ct. at 2343-44; United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. at 301-03 (recognizing standing to 

challenge substantive restriction and penalty provision). By showing that they intended to 

engage in future conduct, the plaintiffs demonstrated that “fear of criminal prosecution . . . is not 

imaginary or wholly speculative.” United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. at 302.

Because there is not a current threat of criminal penalty, the appellants’ standing to 

challenge PCC 5.14.250 must be based on future violations. But they have not made any 

allegation that they intend to engage in conduct prohibited by chapter 5.14 PCC in the future. 

Therefore, whether any violation of chapter 5.14 PCC will occur and whether the appellants will 

be subject to criminal sanction at that point is speculative. If any of the appellants violates 

chapter 5.14 PCC in the future and is subject to a criminal penalty under PCC 5.14.250, he or she 

can challenge the statute’s constitutionality at that time.
No. 51548-2-II

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Accordingly, we hold that the appellants lack standing to challenge PCC 5.14.250.

C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PCC 5.14.230 UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 5

The appellants argue that PCC 5.14.230’s license suspension provisions are 

unconstitutional prior restraints that violate article I, section 5 of the Washington Constitution. 

Specifically, the appellants argue that (1) article I, section 5 provides greater protection for erotic 

dancing than the First Amendment, and (2) PCC 5.14.230 allows for the suspension of erotic 

dance licenses based on strict liability, in violation of those article I, section 5 protections.

We agree that under settled law the suspension of erotic dance licenses constitutes a prior 

restraint and article I, section 5 provides greater protection for erotic dancing than the First 

Amendment. But we disagree that PCC 5.14.230 allows the suspension of erotic dance licenses 

based on strict liability, and therefore we reject the appellants’ article I, section 5 challenge. 

1. Legal Background

 a. Constitutional Protection of Sexually Explicit Dancing

Nude or sexually explicit dancing has expressive value that is protected under both the 

First Amendment and article I, section 5. JJR Inc. v. City of Seattle, 126 Wn.2d 1, 6, 8-9, 891 

P.2d 720 (1995). However, sexually explicit dancing “remains far from the core of protected 

expression” and “clings to the edge of protected expression.” Id. at 9. As a result, sexually 

explicit dancing does not receive the full protection of article I, section 5. Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of 

Bellevue, 132 Wn.2d 103, 116, 937 P.2d 154 (1997); see DCR, 92 Wn. App. at 671. And other 

types of conduct that may be associated with sexually explicit dance are entirely unprotected. 

O’Day v. King County 109 Wn.2d 796, 803, 749 P.2d 142 (1988); DCR, 92 Wn. App. at 672.
No. 51548-2-II

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 b. License Suspension/Revocation as a Prior Restraint of Speech

The appellants argue that license suspension and revocation provisions of PCC 5.14.230 

constitute a prior restraint on sexually explicit dancing. We agree.

A prior restraint attempts to prohibit future speech or other expression rather than punish 

past expression. Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg’l Library Dist., 168 Wn.2d 789, 802, 231 P.3d 166 

(2010). A prior restraint acts as an official restriction on expression before the expression 

occurs. Id. at 802. More specifically, a prior restraint is any government action that tends to 

suppress or interfere with protected expression before it is ultimately punished through civil or 

criminal sanctions in a court of law. State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 111 Wn.2d 764, 776, 765 P.2d 

281 (1988).

The government imposes a prior restraint when it suspends or revokes a sexually explicit 

dance license because rescinding a license prevents individuals from “performing protected nude 

expression, and establishments from showcasing nude dance.” JJR, 126 Wn.2d at 8. For 

example, in JJR the Supreme Court addressed an ordinance similar to PCC 5.14.230 that allowed 

for the suspension or revocation of establishment and dancer licenses for violation of adult 

entertainment regulations. Id. at 4. The court held that such a license suspension or revocation 

would prevent a person from performing nude dance in the future, and the future suppression of 

constitutionally protected speech constitutes a prior restraint. Id. at 5-8. 

The court in JJR expressly rejected the argument that license revocation and suspension 

merely represented post-publication sanctions. Id. The court emphasized that “a licensee may 

not engage in future performances of nude dance . . . with a revoked or suspended license.” Id.

at 8. The court concluded, “Under [article 1, section 5], when a municipality prevents 
No. 51548-2-II

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individuals from performing protected nude expression, and establishments from showcasing 

nude dance, this amounts to a prior restraint of protected expression.” Id.

The court in JJR did not distinguish between the suspension or revocation of an 

operator’s license and a dancer’s license in its analysis of prior restraint. Id. at 5; see also Ino 

Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 119. Similarly, the court in Ino Ino held that a delay in issuing a manager’s 

license constituted a prior restraint. Id. at 123.

Accordingly, the suspension or revocation of an operator’s, a manager’s, and a dancer’s 

license under PCC 5.14.230 constitutes a prior restraint of sexually explicit dancing, a form of 

constitutionally protected expression. 

 c. Protection Against Prior Restraints Under Article I, Section 5

The appellants argue that article I, section 5 provides greater protection for prior restraint 

of sexually explicit dancing than the First Amendment. We agree.

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 

of speech.” This provision applies to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Rentz v. 

Werner, 156 Wn. App. 423, 433 n.5, 232 P.3d 1169 (2010). In addition, article I, section 5 

states, “Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for 

the abuse of that right.”

In general, the Washington Constitution provides greater protection against prior 

restraints on speech than the United States Constitution. O’Day, 109 Wn.2d at 802, 804. Under 

the First Amendment, not all prior restraints are prohibited. State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 372-

73, 679 P.2d 353 (1984). Unlike the First Amendment, the Washington Constitution 

“categorically rules out prior restraints on constitutionally protected speech.” O’Day, 109 Wn.2d 

at 804. The text of article I, section 5 “seems to rule out prior restraints under any
No. 51548-2-II

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circumstances, leaving the State with only post-publication sanctions to punish abuse of free 

speech rights.” Coe, 101 Wn.2d at 374. 

The Supreme Court in JJR recognized the general rule that the prior restraint of protected 

expression is unconstitutional. 126 Wn.2d at 8. However, because sexually explicit dancing 

“remains far from the core of protected expression,” the court declined to “categorically 

invalidate an administrative scheme that revokes or suspends an adult entertainment license.” Id.

at 9. The court in Ino Ino subsequently stated that in JJR it had “declined to extend the full 

protection of art. I, §5 to licensure of nude dancing.” 132 Wn.2d at 116.

Because sexually explicit dancing receives only limited protection under article I, section 

5, the court in Ino Ino applied a Gunwall4analysis to determine whether sexually explicit 

dancing is afforded greater protection under the Washington Constitution than under the United 

States Constitution.5 Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 116-22. The court concluded that article I, section 5 

does not provide more protection in the context of restrictions on the time, place, or manner of 

sexually explicit dance. Id. at 122. However, the court held that there is enhanced protection 

under article I, section 5 “in the context of adult entertainment regulations that impose prior 

restraints.” Id.

 

4

State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). Gunwall requires an analysis of six 

factors: “(1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) 

preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local 

concern.” Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 115.

5 Forbes argues that this court must conduct a new Gunwall analysis because the court in Ino Ino

did not address what Forbes argues is the specific question at issue here. But the court’s analysis 

in Ino Ino is directly applicable. The rights at issue here are the same – “whether nude or 

sexually explicit dancing is to be afforded greater protection under the state constitution than 

under its federal counterpart,” specifically in the area of prior restraints. Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 

116. This court need not undertake the same analysis again.
No. 51548-2-II

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Accordingly, article I, section 5 provides greater protection than the First Amendment for 

prior restraints imposed by the suspension of an operator’s, a manager’s, and a dancer’s licenses 

under PCC 5.14.230.

 d. Extent of Protection Under Article I, Section 5

The Supreme Court has established that protection for sexually explicit dancing under 

article I, section 5 is less than the categorical prohibition of prior restraints applicable to most 

protected speech, but greater than the protection provided by the First Amendment. Ino Ino, 132 

Wn.2d at 116, 122; JJR, 126 Wn.2d at 9. But the court has not identified the precise extent of 

the protection for sexually explicit dancing under article I, section 5.

JJR and Ino Ino provide some guidance regarding the extent of protection under article I, 

section 5 in the context of suspension of erotic dance licenses. First, in applying article I, section 

5, the court in JJR stated that laws regarding the licensing of adult entertainment must contain 

“sufficient procedural safeguards” because they allow the possibility of unwarranted censorship. 

126 Wn.2d at 9. Specifically, the court stated,

Because we must be exacting in safeguarding protected expression, we find that a 

stay of adult entertainment license revocation and suspension pending judicial 

review is the minimum constitutionally permissible safeguard.

Id. The court further clarified that such a stay must be mandatory. Id. at 9-10. Because the 

licensing law in that case did not require a mandatory stay of a license suspension or revocation 

pending judicial review, the court held that the law was unconstitutional. Id. at 10-11.

JJR establishes that a stay of a license suspension or revocation pending judicial review is 

the “minimum” requirement under article I, section 5. Id. at 9. But the court did not state that a 

stay provision was the only constitutional protection required. Ino Ino addressed one area where 
No. 51548-2-II

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a stay would be insufficient, holding that a law providing a 14-day waiting period for issuing 

licenses would be unconstitutional even with a stay provision. 132 Wn.2d at 123.

Here, the Pierce County Code provides for a stay of a license suspension under PCC 

5.14.230 pending judicial review as required in JJR. Filing a timely notice of appeal stays the 

auditor’s decision until a final decision by the hearing examiner. PCC 5.02.120(C). And the 

hearing examiner’s decision is not final if a licensee files a timely writ of review in the superior 

court. See PCC 5.02.120(J). The appellants do not challenge PCC 5.14.230 based on the stay 

procedure.

Second, Ino Ino identifies a narrow area in which article I, section 5 provides greater 

protection than the First Amendment. The court noted that under federal law, laws affecting an 

operator’s license rather than a dancer’s license may not constitute prior restraint under article I, 

section 5. Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 118-19. But laws affecting an operator’s license do constitute 

prior restraint under article I, section 5. Id. at 121-22. In addition, laws affecting a manager’s 

license constitute prior restraints under article I, section 5. Id. at 123.

Here, the County suggests that article I, section 5 does not protect erotic dance studio 

operators and managers because they do not engage in the expressive conduct themselves. 

However, Ino Ino makes it clear that the suspension of operator and manager licenses implicates 

article I, section 5.

Beyond these specific requirements, the extent of protection under article I, section 5 of 

erotic dance in the context of suspension of erotic dance licenses must be developed on a caseby-case basis. We need not address the parameters of this protection here because the appellants 

argue only that the suspension of licenses based on strict liability violates article I, section 5.
No. 51548-2-II

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2. No Strict Liability Under PCC 5.14.230

The appellants argue that (1) PCC 5.14.230 allows the County to suspend the licenses of 

erotic dance studio operators and managers based on strict liability, and (2) article I, section 5 

prohibits suspending erotic dance licenses on the basis of strict liability. We hold that PCC 

5.14.230 does not allow the County to suspend the licenses of erotic dance studio operators, 

managers, and dancers based on strict liability. Therefore, PCC 5.14.230 does not violate article 

I, section 5 on that basis.

 a. Principles of Interpretation

Interpretation of PCC 5.14.230 is a question of law that we review de novo. Jametsky v. 

Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756, 761, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014). Our primary goal is to give effect to 

legislative intent. Id. at 762. In determining legislative intent, we first look to a statute or 

ordinance’s plain language. Id. When evaluating an ordinance’s language, we consider the 

language of the provision in question, the context of the ordinance in which the provision is 

found, and related ordinances. Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver USA, 189 Wn. App. 

800, 810, 357 P.3d 710 (2015). To determine the plain meaning of undefined language, we give 

words their usual and ordinary meaning and interpret them in the context of the ordinance in 

which they appear. AllianceOne Receivables Mgmt., Inc. v. Lewis, 180 Wn.2d 389, 395-96, 325 

P.3d 904 (2014). In the context of a constitutional challenge, we have an obligation to construe 

an ordinance in a manner that upholds its constitutionality. DCR, 92 Wn. App. at 686.

 b. Strict Liability Analysis

PCC 5.14.230(A) applies to erotic dance studio operators and provides:

The Auditor shall revoke or suspend, for a specified period of not more than one 

year, any erotic dance studio license if he/she determines that the licensee or 

applicant has: made a materially false statement in the application for a license 
No. 51548-2-II

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which the applicant knows to be false; or violated or permitted violation of any 

provisions of this Chapter.

(Emphasis added). PCC 5.14.230(B) provides the same revocation or suspension sanction to 

managers and dancers:

The Auditor shall revoke or suspend, for a specified period of not more than one 

year, any dancer/manager license if he/she determines that the licensee or applicant 

has: made a materially false statement in the application for a license which the 

applicant knows to be false; or violated or permitted violation of any provisions of 

this Chapter.

(Emphasis added).

The appellants argue that these provisions allow for suspension of an erotic dance studio 

operator’s or manager’s license arising from a dancer’s violation of PCC 5.14.190 based on strict 

liability, even in the absence of some fault by the operator or manager. The appellants claim that 

in the absence of a requirement that the operator or manager knew or should have known of the 

violation, PCC 5.14.230 constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint.

A manager can violate PCC 5.14.180(D) and (E) and be subject to sanctions under PCC 

5.14.230 by not “ensuring” that the studio or the dancers comply with the restrictions in PCC 

5.14.190. This provision does not involve strict liability. A failure to ensure compliance 

necessarily involves some fault by the manager.

We also interpret PCC 5.14.230 as requiring some fault before an erotic dance studio 

operator or manager can be sanctioned. Under PCC 5.14.230, an operator or a manager can be 

subject to sanctions by “permitting” a violation of one of the erotic dance studio regulations. But 

“permitting” does not involve strict liability. One dictionary definition of “permit” is to “consent 

to expressly or formally.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1683 (2002). 

Under this definition, an operator or manager can permit – consent to – an activity when he or 

she knows that the activity is occurring and fails to take steps to stop that activity.
No. 51548-2-II

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Another dictionary definition of “permit” is to “make possible” or to “give an 

opportunity.” WEBSTER’S at 1683. Under this definition, an operator or manager can permit –

make possible – an activity by not taking steps before the activity occurs to prevent that activity.

Under either definition, operators and managers can be subject to sanctions under PCC 

5.14.230 only if their conduct involves some fault. As a result, we hold that PCC 5.14.230 does 

not allow the imposition of sanctions in the absence of a finding of fault. 

The same analysis applies with respect to dancers’ liability for patrons’ actions. PCC 

5.14.190 specifically prohibits certain unlawful actions by patrons. For example, a patron cannot 

pay or give any gratuity directly to any dancer. PCC 5.14.190(K). A dancer’s license could be 

revoked or suspended based on this provision only if the dancer permitted the violation to occur, 

requiring the dancer to have some fault regarding the actions of patrons. Therefore, as with 

operators and managers, dancers are not strictly liable for the prohibited actions of patrons.

Because PCC 5.14.230 does not allow for the suspension of a license based on strict 

liability, we hold that PCC 5.14.230 does not violate article I, section 5 on that basis. Because 

the appellants’ prior restraint claim is based only on its argument that PCC 5.14.230 imposes 

strict liability, we reject the appellants’ challenge to PCC 5.14.230 based on article I, section 5.

D. INAPPLICABILITY OF TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS ANALYSIS

The appellants argue that PCC 5.14.230 is unconstitutional under the First Amendment 

analysis used to determine the constitutionality of time, place, and manner restrictions on 

protected expression. Appellants apparently concede that PCC 5.14.230 is not a time, place, and 

manner restriction, but suggest that we apply the time, place, and manner analysis to the prior 

restraint imposed under PCC 5.14.230. We decline to apply this analysis to PCC 5.14.230.
No. 51548-2-II

20

A time, place, or manner restriction on speech or expression is one that does not prohibit 

expression but imposes temporal or geographic limitations. Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 126. 

Restrictions on the time, place, and manner of sexually explicit dance receive no greater 

protection under article I, section 5 than the First Amendment. Id. at 122. Therefore, we analyze 

challenges to time, place, and manner restrictions under the First Amendment. Id.

Here, PCC 5.14.230 is not a restriction on the time, place, or manner of expression. The 

provision does not place any substantive limits on how a license holder may engage in any form 

of expression. Instead, PCC 5.14.230 provides for the sanctions the County may impose if an 

operator, manager, or dancer violates requirements contained in other sections.6 

The appellants provide no compelling reason to apply the time, place, or manner analysis 

in a prior restraint context. And neither JJR, Ino Ino, nor any other case has applied this analysis 

to evaluate a prior restraint. Accordingly, we hold that the analysis for time, place, and manner 

restrictions under the First Amendment is inapplicable to PCC 5.14.230.

E. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PCC 5.14.230 – DUE PROCESS

Forbes argues that PCC 5.14.230 violates article I, section 3, the due process provision of 

the Washington Constitution, because it imposes strict liability on erotic dance studio operators,

managers, and dancers for violations of erotic dance studio regulations. As discussed above, 

PCC 5.14.230 does not allow the imposition of sanctions based on strict liability. Therefore, we 

reject the appellants’ due process challenge on this basis.

 

6 PCC 5.14.190 does impose time, place, and manner restrictions on sexually explicit dance, and 

violation of that section subjects a license holder to sanctions under PCC 5.14.230. However, 

the appellants emphasize that they are not challenging the constitutionality of PCC 5.14.190.
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CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment order dismissing the appellants’ 

complaints.

MAXA, C.J.

We concur:

SUTTON, J.

PRICE, J. PRO TEM