Filed 10/25/22 In re E.G. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re E.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

______________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KAREN M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B315855

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP08012B)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.

Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Timothy M. O’Crowley, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Karen M. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her daughter E.G. She

contends the court wrongly refused her offer of proof for a 

contested permanent planning hearing, failed to read and 

consider the report and assessment provided for that hearing,

and did not conduct a correct beneficial parent-child relationship 

analysis as set out in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614

(Caden C.). She urges us to reverse the order terminating

parental rights and remand the matter for a new hearing under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.

1 We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother has three children: A.L., E.G., and L.G. E.G. and 

L.G. have the same father; A.L. is their half-sibling. We discuss

A.L. and L.G. when relevant, but only the orders involving E.G. 

are at issue in this appeal.

I. Previous Dependency Proceedings

A.L. was born in 2006. In 2008, the Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) substantiated allegations

that he was exposed to drug use and was living in unsafe 

conditions in an apartment where bleach, paint, scissors, a knife, 

and methamphetamines were within his reach. A.L. was 

removed from Mother’s custody for one month before being 

released back to her over DCFS’s objection. Mother entered into 

a voluntary family maintenance contract and the petition was 

dismissed.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

E.G. was born in August 2013. In July 2014, police found 

methamphetamine in the family’s home and a digital scale in 

E.G.’s crib. E.G.’s father A.G. (Father) and Mother were arrested 

and prosecuted. The family entered into another voluntary 

family maintenance contract in September 2014, but in March 

2015, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine when L.G.

was born. Mother admitted using drugs while pregnant.

The children were detained, and DCFS filed section 300 

petitions in March 2015. As to E.G., the court sustained two

allegations under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). First, the court

sustained the allegation that Mother’s ongoing drug abuse 

interfered with her care and supervision of E.G., and that Father 

knew about her drug abuse but failed to protect E.G. Second, the

court found the parents had created a detrimental and 

endangering home environment for E.G. in that drugs and drug 

paraphernalia were found in the home and within her reach, and 

that the home environment created by the parents threatened 

her physical health and safety. Additional allegations were

sustained as to A.L. and L.G.

The children were placed with E.G. and L.G.’s paternal 

grandparents from March 2015 until they reunified with Mother 

in February 2018. The court terminated juvenile court 

jurisdiction in April 2019 with an order giving Mother legal and 

physical custody of the children.

II. Commencement of Instant Dependency Proceedings

On December 11, 2019, DCFS received a report from a 

person that four-year-old L.G. appeared malnourished and 

physically abused. Police responding to the referral found she 

had visible marks and bruises. L.G. told the police Mother hit 

her and tied her up. She said Mother tied her with tape, causing 
4

wounds to her legs and arms. L.G. appeared “in fear and 

frightened” when speaking about Mother.

E.G., age six, told the police she had seen Mother hit L.G. 

and tie her up for hours. A.L., age 13, confirmed to the police 

that Mother tied L.G. up, but he was hesitant and did not want to 

provide information. It seemed to the police that A.L. “was trying 

to defend his mom and would not articulate the events that took 

place.”

The maternal aunt told the police that when the children 

visited her that day, she noticed L.G. was thin and frail and ate

in a desperate manner, as though she had not been fed for days.

She “did not associate well with her siblings.” When the 

maternal aunt prepared to bathe L.G., she discovered open 

wounds on L.G.’s legs, contusions over her arms, back, legs, and

forehead, and a laceration on her wrist from being tied up. L.G.’s 

bones protruded from her body as if she were not being fed.

L.G. was taken to the hospital, where it was discovered she 

had multiple scabs and abrasions to her lower legs; one lesion

appeared similar to a burn mark. She had wounds on her left 

wrist and significant bruising on the back of one ear. L.G. had a 

high fever and high heart rate; she was dehydrated, extremely 

malnourished, and anemic; and she was diagnosed as failing to 

thrive. While hospitalized, L.G. was observed to be “in starvation 

mode,” eating a lot and not knowing when to stop. She was 

diagnosed with “refeeding syndrome,” a metabolic disturbance 

that occurs when food is reinstituted to people who have been 

starved, severely malnourished, or metabolically stressed due to 

severe illness. L.G. was highly anxious. She was unkempt and 

dirty. Although initially excited about a shower, she cried 

throughout it and would not explain why.
5

L.G. told hospital staff Mother hit her with a belt, tied her 

up with tape, and did not feed her. When interviewed by DCFS,

L.G. denied feeling safe at home and said she was scared of 

Mother. L.G. reported Mother “tapes both feet” and her siblings

had seen it. When asked about her other marks and bruises, L.G.

put her head down and refused to provide information. She said

Mother made her feel “sad.” L.G. later told a nurse she was 

afraid of her parents, her brother, and her sister.

L.G. did not speak during a forensic medical examination

but nodded yes when asked if she had been taped at the wrists

and ankles. The examiner reported L.G. jumped when she was

touched. She had injuries in different stages of healing on

numerous parts of her body. She probably had hair loss; there 

was a scar on her face; and she had red and purple marks on both

sides of her ear. When asked if Mother fed her, L.G. shook her 

head no. Physical abuse was highly suspected.

Multiple family members and Mother’s friend told DCFS

Mother disliked L.G. and singled her out for harsh treatment. 

The maternal aunt said Mother spoke harshly to L.G. and called 

her “a little bitch” who “eats everything.” Mother told E.G. and 

L.G.’s paternal aunt she could have L.G.

According to family members, A.L. was Mother’s favorite

child. Father was concerned that Mother lacked patience with

E.G. and L.G. and punished them more than A.L. Mother 

spanked E.G. and L.G.’s bottoms and legs and pulled their hair. 

DCFS learned from E.G. and L.G.’s paternal aunt that A.L. had 

told her Mother said L.G. was “the worst kid and she deserves it

because she is always breaking things, fighting, and stealing 

food.” The maternal aunt had heard A.L. tell L.G. she was eating

too much.
6

The maternal aunt reported to DCFS that L.G. was 

required to ask to use the bathroom and sometimes urinated and 

defecated on herself. If L.G. did not ask for food Mother would 

not feed her. L.G. told the maternal aunt Mother taped her feet 

together, and E.G. confirmed it had happened. L.G. had told the 

maternal aunt she did not want to go home with Mother.

DCFS interviewed A.L. and E.G., both of whom said they 

felt safe living with Mother, were fed regularly, took regular 

showers, and slept well at night. Both children were clean and 

had no visible marks or bruises. A.L. denied emotional, physical, 

and sexual abuse, domestic violence, and exposure to drugs or 

alcohol. He said L.G. was given meals throughout the day and 

loved to eat. Both children attributed L.G.’s marks and bruises to 

L.G. falling while wearing her shoes on the wrong feet; A.L. 

called her “clumsy.” E.G. also said L.G. had marks because she 

picked at scabs. A.L. said the dog hurt L.G. when it got on top of 

her, but E.G. denied the dog got on top of L.G. DCFS concluded 

A.L. and E.G. lacked credibility and expressed concern that 

Mother had persuaded them to recant their prior statements.

Mother told DCFS she treated her three children the same 

way. She denied abusing, physically disciplining, or using 

derogatory language to them. She denied taping any part of 

L.G.’s body and said L.G. had fallen and hurt her ankles when 

the dog pushed her on the stairs. The prior month, L.G. had

bruised her back when she fell against a fence. Mother denied 

L.G. had bruises or marks other than those on her back, ankles,

and right wrist. She said L.G. had birthmarks and that her skin 

peeled because she picked at it. Mother attributed L.G.’s 

thinness to a past case of pneumonia. She reported L.G. ate a lot 

and had eaten “six regular sliced pizzas in one sitting.”
7

The children were detained, and DCFS filed a dependency 

petition alleging the children came within the jurisdiction of the 

juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious

physical harm), (b)(1) (failure to protect), (e) (severe physical 

abuse of a child under age five); (j) (abuse of sibling). L.G. was 

initially placed with the maternal aunt, while E.G. and A.L. were

placed in foster care.

DCFS spoke with A.L. and E.G. on December 15, 2019. 

A.L. again attributed L.G.’s marks and bruises to her falling or 

being pushed by the dog. He denied Mother taped or tied L.G. at

the ankles and claimed L.G. was lying so she could return to her

grandparents. A.L. said Mother fed L.G. “all the time” and L.G.

would sneak into the kitchen for more food. E.G. also denied that 

Mother taped or wrapped anything around L.G.’s feet, and she 

said Mother did not hurt L.G. DCFS considered A.L. and E.G.’s 

statements not credible.

The court removed E.G. from her parents at the detention 

hearing in December 2019. Mother was granted monitored 

visitation with E.G. a minimum of three times per week for two 

hours per visit.

III. Investigation and Report for Initial Jurisdictional Hearing

Date

The jurisdictional hearing was set for February 2020.

When DCFS interviewed A.L. before the hearing, he said L.G.

had been scratched on the ear when they were playing outside

several months earlier. A.L. claimed he was with her when it

happened, but he did not know if she fell or was scratched by the 

dog. A.L. blamed L.G. for her injuries. He said L.G. failed to 

appreciate that their dog was “hyper” and she ran around with a 

ball, prompting the dog to jump on her and sometimes scratch 
8

her. He stated, “ ‘Another bad habit of [L.G.’s] is that she likes 

putting on her shoes backwards,[] for her, that’s normal, that’s 

how she walks in them. When she puts them on regular, she falls

down a lot, so she is always tripping and runs around a lot.’ ” 

A.L. denied seeing L.G. tied or taped up, and when asked if L.G.

had ever told him that happened, he said, “ ‘I never knew that. 

She never told me.’ ” He denied any of the children were ever hit. 

A.L. said “we” would feed L.G. a lot “ ‘but it seems like she never 

got full. She just kept eating and eating. She would never get 

full. Sometimes she would sneak food from the kitchen, but we 

would feed her every day. We never understood why she would 

eat so much. She always ate and she was always skinny. She 

would eat all the time, I would be there when she ate. We ate 

three times a day, and sometimes she would eat extra.’ ”

E.G. said Mother did not hit them and denied ever seeing 

L.G. with her hands or legs taped or tied together. She also 

denied that L.G. had ever disclosed having been taped up. E.G.

said the marks on L.G.’s body were from the dog, who bit people 

and tackled L.G. to the floor. According to E.G., L.G. had once

been hurt when the dog “hit his paw on her leg,” but that was the 

only time the dog hurt L.G. by tackling her. E.G. said L.G. “eats 

good” and did not miss meals—but if she did miss any meals, “it 

was because she didn’t feel like eating it. She eats a lot. But, we 

all eat the same amount like her, so we all eat a lot.”

During a January 2020 forensic assessment, L.G. said, “My 

mommy didn’t feed me nothing and I got these [indicating healed 

marks on the bottom of her left leg, above her ankle, and on her 

left arm], my mom did these . . . it made me sad.” L.G. also said 

that the family dog was big but not mean. She reported that the 
9

dog had once pushed her to the ground but she was not hurt. The 

dog had once scratched her ear, and it bled a little.

L.G. made disclosures about Mother during a January 2020 

examination. L.G. said she had been tied up, kicked, put in a 

closet, threatened with having her hand burned on the stove, and 

placed in a cold dark shower. She had slept in the dog bed and in 

the car. L.G. had both healed marks and open wounds that were

healing. L.G. said the marks on her ears were caused by tape.

She pointed to her neck, indicating Mother had put tape on and 

around her neck. She identified a number of healed wounds that 

had been caused by tape.

E.G. and L.G.’s paternal grandmother, with whom they had 

been placed from 2015 to 2018, said Mother had allowed her to 

see the children only twice after they reunified with Mother in

2018. The first time the paternal grandmother saw them was

soon after reunification; they looked unhappy but physically fine. 

The second time she saw the children was when she went to 

Mother’s home to ask to see the children. Mother refused, but 

E.G. spotted the paternal grandmother and cried, saying, “Why 

can’t I see my mom [meaning the paternal grandmother]?”

Mother “didn’t care, she just closed the door.”

The paternal grandmother recalled Mother telephoning her 

while incarcerated to announce she was pregnant with L.G. 

Mother called it “bad news,” and she did not want the baby.

E.G. and L.G.’s paternal grandfather said that when he 

saw the children for the first time after they were reunified with 

Mother, L.G. ate all the food he brought “with no control.” L.G.

had been thin; E.G. looked “okay.” The second time he saw the 

children, E.G. told him A.L. hit L.G. with a belt, and L.G. had 

small marks on her ear that looked like lines.
10

E.G. and L.G.’s paternal grandfather said of the two 

children, “[T]hey need us. We raised them for three years to the 

day they walked away from us to go to the mom. This is their 

house. They were born here. [L.G.] was taken away from her 

mom after she was born and brought here to us. They . . . feel

that this is their house. They ask for their stuff and they ask to 

come back home to their toys . . . to their room. They call my wife 

Mommy and I am Poppy. We were in the adoption stage with 

them in 2018. The kids were here for 3-1/2 years.” E.G and L.G.

wanted to live with their grandparents; E.G. had said, “ ‘I want to 

talk to the social worker, I want to go home.’ ”

Father, who lived with his parents, told DCFS that E.G. 

and L.G. said they did not want to be with Mother and wanted to 

come home with him because they felt safe with him.

As of February 2020, Mother had not visited the children.

E.G. told the social worker, “We don’t see [M]ommy.” A.L. had no 

contact with Mother. Mother had telephoned L.G. once but then 

stopped calling.

DCFS recommended the juvenile court take jurisdiction

over the children, remove them from their parents, deny Mother 

reunification services, and allow Mother monitored visitation 

with A.L. and E.G. DCFS recommended monitored visitation for 

Mother with L.G. when deemed appropriate by L.G.’s therapist.

IV. Amended Dependency Petitions and Further PreAdjudication Reports

In February 2020, DCFS filed a first amended petition

adding the allegation that the children came within the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, 

subdivision (i) (cruelty) based on Mother’s failure to feed L.G. In 

April 2021, DCFS filed a second amended petition in which it 
11

rephrased one of the failure to protect allegations, the cruelty 

allegation, and one of the abuse of sibling allegations to more 

thoroughly describe Mother’s abuse of L.G. The children were 

again detained, and the jurisdictional hearing was set for August 

24, 2020.

A. July 2020 Report

L.G. and E.G. were placed with their paternal 

grandparents in March 2020. Mother was arrested in May 2020

and charged with torture and willful child endangerment. DCFS 

filed a supplemental report in July 2020 advising the court 

Father had asked to terminate the reunification process so his 

mother could adopt E.G. and L.G. The paternal grandparents

were willing to adopt E.G. and L.G. The report did not document

any visitation by Mother. DCFS continued to recommend no 

reunification services for Mother, monitored visitation for Mother

with A.L. and E.G., and monitored visitation for Mother with 

L.G. when deemed appropriate by L.G.’s therapist.

B. August 2020 Last Minute Information

In late August 2020, DCFS advised the juvenile court that 

A.L.’s caregiver was willing to monitor Mother’s calls to A.L. and 

that Mother contacted A.L. twice per week. DCFS reported E.G. 

and L.G.’s paternal grandparents had agreed to monitor 

telephonic visits between Mother and E.G. The report did not 

state if Mother was contacting L.G., or if so, how frequently.

C. September 2020 Report

The jurisdictional hearing was continued, and in 

September 2020 DCFS submitted a supplemental report 

describing its interview of Mother. Mother told DCFS, “I’m not 
12

guilty. I do not starve my kids and I did not torture her.” She

said she spanked L.G. on the bottom with an open hand but did

not leave bruises or marks. Mother denied taping L.G.’s legs, 

hands, or feet together, and she said she did not know why L.G.

would believe she had been bound with tape. Mother claimed not 

to remember any injury to L.G.’s ear and said the marks on her 

legs and wrists happened when the dog caused her to fall on the 

stairs. She attributed the bruises on L.G.’s back to L.G. falling 

onto a bent fence on the side of the house. Mother had not taken 

L.G. to the doctor because she did not believe her injuries were 

serious. Instead, Mother cleaned them and applied adhesive

bandages, but L.G. removed them and peeled her scabs.

Mother said L.G. did not consider Mother to be her mother, 

probably because she had been removed from Mother’s custody at

birth. When they reunified, L.G., then age three, told Mother she 

did not want to be with her. Mother said L.G. “didn’t want to 

have nothing to do with me” and liked “being with anyone but

me.” L.G. cried and threw tantrums when she could not see her 

grandmother.

Mother said L.G. had always eaten quickly. She fed L.G.

three times per day, with two snacks. Mother said, “She would 

wake up in the middle of the night and eat. She ate a lot. Maybe 

I should have taken her to the doctor because she did have an 

obsession with food. The way she ate it. She was always eating, 

like it was going to run away from her plate. But I never thought 

nothing of it because she was always skinny.” Mother said E.G.

was not a big eater and gave L.G. her leftovers.

The report did not mention Mother visiting or contacting 

the children. DCFS continued to recommend Mother be denied 

reunification services, allowed monitored visitation with A.L. and 
13

E.G., and given monitored visitation with L.G. when L.G.’s 

therapist deemed it appropriate.

V. Jurisdictional Hearings

The jurisdictional hearing began September 24, 2020. That 

day, the court directed DCFS to facilitate telephonic contact for

Mother with E.G. and to provide Mother with a written 

telephonic visitation schedule. The hearing was then continued 

to November 2020.

In late October 2020, DCFS submitted a proposed visitation

schedule to the court that would have allowed Mother two weekly

telephonic visits with E.G. monitored by E.G.’s paternal 

grandmother. DCFS, however, recommended Mother not be 

allowed to contact the children because the court in Mother’s

criminal case had issued a protective order barring her from

personal, electronic, telephonic, or written contact with the

children until in May 2023.

The hearing was continued to December 2020 and then to 

February 2021. In the court’s December 7, 2020 order, the court 

ordered DCFS to provide Mother with a written schedule for 

telephonic contact with E.G. that including holiday contact, 

subject to the protective order.

In early April 2021, after another continuance, DCFS 

submitted a last minute information advising the court that 

Mother claimed the caregivers were not regularly making E.G. 

available for telephonic visits. E.G.’s paternal grandmother 

denied Mother’s claim. Mother, who was in custody, provided a 

telephone log from January 2021 to early March 2021 that 

indicated she had spoken with E.G. four times in that period. On 

seven occasions, Mother had been unable to call. On eight dates, 

the phone for E.G. was not answered. On six other dates, Mother 
14

noted she did not speak with E.G., but she provided no 

explanation why. DCFS submitted a March 2021 written 

schedule that stated Mother was permitted to phone E.G. twice 

per week.

As of May 2021, Mother reported she “continues to 

experience issues concerning telephone contact with [E.G.] due to 

her fluctuating inmate schedule conflicting with the written 

visitation schedule . . . . The mother did state[,] however, that 

she has been able to maintain telephone contact with” A.L. 

E.G.’s caregivers stated they were willing to be flexible and 

adjust the written visitation schedule to accommodate Mother’s 

changing schedule.

In May 2021, the juvenile court amended the second 

amended complaint by interlineation to (1) eliminate all

allegations against Father and (2) remove A.L and E.G. from the 

allegations of cruelty and severe physical abuse of a child under 

the age of five (§ 300, subds. (e) and (i)), leaving those allegations 

in place only as to L.G. The court then found true as to all three 

children the allegations that Mother engaged in physical abuse,

failure to protect, and abuse of a sibling (§ 300, subds. (a), (b)(1), 

& (j)). Additionally, for L.G., the court sustained the allegations 

of cruelty and severe physical abuse of a child under the age of 

five (§ 300, subds. (e) & (i).) The court declared the children 

dependents and set a dispositional hearing for June 10, 2021.

VI. Dispositional Hearing

On June 10, 2021, at the dispositional hearing, counsel for 

each child joined in DCFS’s recommendation that Mother be 

denied reunification services. Mother argued for reunification 

services with all the children, but especially with A.L. and E.G., 

whom she asserted were treated well and had “a close, positive 
15

relationship” with her. Mother contended she had “tried to 

maintain a healthy relationship” with A.L. and E.G. and argued 

it would be detrimental to Mother to bypass reunification 

services.

E.G.’s counsel strongly opposed reunification services for 

Mother, noting that E.G. had witnessed Mother’s torture of L.G.

and had tried to feed L.G. when she was tied up for hours at a 

time. It was E.G.’s position that “there would be absolutely no 

benefit to” her from reunification services. E.G.’s counsel 

acknowledged Mother was trying to keep up a relationship with 

E.G. by phone, but “every time Mother calls from jail, [E.G.]

doesn’t want to pick up the phone. She doesn’t want to speak to 

[Mother].” E.G. was “ready to move on.” A.L. also did not want

reunification services.

The court observed that while L.G. was the child who had 

been tortured, A.L. and E.G. were percipient witnesses who had 

tried to intercede to protect her, with limited success. They were 

put in the middle between the sibling they tried to save and the 

mother with whom they had “some degree of connection.” The 

court said, “[T]hat connection became largely frayed because they 

were drawn into this and, in fact, quite conflicted,” and noted 

that A.L. and E.G. had, at different times, both covered for 

Mother and admitted what she had done. The court gave weight 

to the children’s desire to move on with their lives without trying 

to reunify with Mother, noting that A.L. was 15 years old and 

that E.G., “although younger, appears to have suffered through 

the ravages of what [L.G.] had experienced.”

The court concluded DCFS had “more than adequately set 

forth by clear and convincing evidence the requisite elements” for 

bypassing reunification services. Mother was denied 
16

reunification services with E.G. and A.L. pursuant to section

361.5, subdivision (b)(6), which provides that reunification 

services may be denied when the child is declared a dependent as 

a result of “the infliction of severe physical harm to the child, a 

sibling, or a half sibling by a parent . . . , and the court makes a 

factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue 

reunification services with the offending parent.” Mother was 

denied reunification services with L.G. pursuant to section 361.5, 

subdivision (b)(5), which allows for bypass of reunification 

services to a parent when a child was brought within the 

jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of section 300 

because of the conduct of that parent.

A.L. wanted to maintain a relationship with Mother, so his 

counsel agreed with the case plan allowing monitored visits at 

Mother’s place of incarceration. E.G.’s counsel opposed visitation 

with Mother, and particularly objected that in-person visitation

would be “extremely detrimental” to E.G. Counsel said, “The 

focus now should be on what the permanent plan for [E.G.] 

should be. [¶] Additionally, Your Honor, the phone calls have 

been sporadic at best. At this point, as the court did point out, 

she was a percipient witness and she is trying to get over all of 

this. And the continued relationship with Mother by phone calls 

or visits or in-person visits is just going to hold back [E.G. from] 

going forward without some type of joint counseling or (inaudible) 

in a therapeutic setting[,] which is impossible at this point.

Mother asked for at least monitored phone calls with E.G., 

reminding the court that she had reported having “a phone 

conversation with [E.G.] last time.” Mother argued that 

completely precluding in-person visits for E.G. would be 

detrimental because E.G. was still a child and sometimes did 
17

want to talk with Mother. She argued E.G. might later want to 

resume in-person visits and asked for a written schedule of inperson visits so that she could visit in person if she chose.

The court orally ordered Mother would have “visits [with 

E.G.] in a therapeutic setting in person if recommended by the 

therapist consistent with the facility’s protocol as well as virtual 

visits if recommended by the therapist in a therapeutic setting, 

the Department to help facilitate the visitation schedule 

consistent with the facility’s protocol.” This order was recorded 

in the minute order as an order of monitored visitation in a 

therapeutic setting.

The permanency planning hearing for E.G. and L.G. was 

set for October 6, 2021.

VII. Travel Orders

In September 2021 the court authorized E.G. and L.G. to 

travel internationally with their paternal grandmother for one 

month (September 21, 2021 through October 21, 2021). DCFS

advised the court the children would have telephone contact with 

their parents once or twice per week while they were away.

VIII. Permanency Planning Hearing Report

DCFS submitted a report to the court containing a

permanency planning assessment for eight-year-old E.G. and sixyear-old L.G. DCFS advised the court that Mother “maintains 

regular monitored telephone contact with [E.G.] from her place of 

incarceration.” All visits had been by telephone. The report did 

not provide information about the frequency or quality of the 

telephonic visits, or the nature of the relationship between 

Mother and E.G.. Similarly, E.G.’s concurrent planning

assessment stated Mother did not have in-person visits with her.
18

Although the form asked for the number of contacts or visits with 

Mother over the prior six months, the box was left blank.

DCFS recommended a permanent plan of termination of 

parental rights and adoption for E.G. and L.G. Adoption was 

“highly likely” because the paternal grandparents were 

“extremely motivated” to adopt, and they had completed all 

adoption assessments. The grandparents loved the children and 

the children were very fond of them. In August 2021 E.G. and 

L.G. told the social worker they were very happy with their 

grandparents and wanted to live with them “forever.” They 

called their grandmother “Mami” and their grandfather “Papi.”

The children were observed to have a “healthy, positive 

attachment” to their grandparents and to be comfortable in their

care.

VIX. Permanency Planning Hearing

The permanency planning hearing for E.G. and L.G.

pursuant took place on October 6, 2021. Mother was brought to 

court from her place of incarceration. She conferred with counsel

and then elected not to be present for the hearing. Mother’s

counsel waived her appearance.

At the start of the hearing, the court stated it had conferred

with counsel before calling the case and Mother’s counsel had

requested a contested hearing on the beneficial parental 

relationship exception to the termination of parental rights.

Father declined to join Mother’s request for a contested hearing,

and he submitted on DCFS’s recommendation. “And the 

Department’s recommendation is to terminate parental rights for 

Mother and Father,” said the court.
19

The attorneys for E.G., L.G., and DCFS all requested an 

offer of proof before a contested hearing was set. Counsel for 

DCFS reminded the court of the sustained allegations of severe 

physical abuse and cruelty and the protective order barring 

Mother from contacting L.G. She said E.G. “has had minimal 

telephonic contact with [Mother] at Mother’s place of 

incarceration.” Counsel argued “visitation is a major component 

for the [beneficial parental relationship] exception. Mother has 

not had any visits with her children.”

Apparently referring to the unreported conference between 

the court and counsel before the case was called, counsel for 

DCFS noted that Mother’s counsel had raised the “issue that the 

report did not address the [beneficial parental relationship] 

exception. I would argue it’s Mother’s burden to show that that 

exception applies, and the Department would not be able to have 

any facts to put in the report because Mother has not had any 

contact with either child. So I don’t see why we would put this 

over for another report when the Department does not have any

information to indicate that there is a bond.”

The court asked Mother’s counsel for an offer of proof.

Mother’s counsel did not make an offer of proof with respect to

L.G., stating that Mother objected to the termination of parental 

rights but understood why the court would proceed. Mother’s 

counsel continued, “Regarding [E.G.], I would just ask for a 

supplemental report to at least give or provide details or to 

interview the monitors of the monitored visitation that Mother is 

having with [E.G.].” Mother’s counsel noted the permanency 

planning report merely stated Mother and E.G. had monitored 

telephone contact but included no details about the contact. 

Counsel observed that in “any other report that the court is given 
20

there are always details regarding how those visits are occurring. 

So we would just ask to proceed on that, Your Honor. I don’t 

know if I have any additional offer of proof.”

The court said its tentative decision was to deny the 

request for a contested hearing because Mother’s offer of proof 

was insufficient. It asked E.G.’s attorney to respond to Mother’s 

contention she maintained “sufficient contact that it would be 

enough for Mother to be able to present [the beneficial parental 

relationship exception].”

E.G.’s counsel submitted on the tentative but noted that 

Mother’s visitation with E.G. was supposed to be therapeutic and 

that had not occurred; there had only been “sporadic phone calls.”

The court denied the request for a contested hearing, 

explaining, “I don’t think that Mother has set forth the requisite 

showing for [the beneficial parental relationship] exception to 

apply. And, if I address it based on the information today, the 

finding would be that she has not maintained regular visitation. 

There are, in fact, impediments to that based on the previous 

orders limiting Mother’s contact with the minors which gave 

rise . . . from the sustained petition that included [counts under 

section 300, subdivisions (e) and (i)].” The court continued, “The 

court finds that Mother has not maintained visits or established

a sufficient bond under the [beneficial parental relationship]

exception and any benefit from there would be far outweighed by 

the benefits of permanence and stability through adoption.” The

court terminated parental rights to E.G. and L.G. Mother’s 

counsel asked the court to note her objection to the ruling.

Mother appeals.
21

DISCUSSION

I. Failure to Describe on the Record the Evidence Considered

At the permanency planning hearing, the court is required 

to review the report prepared for the hearing, indicate it has read 

and considered it, and receive other evidence that the parties 

may present before making its findings and orders. (§ 366.26, 

subd. (b).) Here, at the hearing, the court erred by failing to 

declare it had received, read, and considered the report, in 

violation of section 366.26, subdivision (b).

2

Mother acknowledges the order terminating parental rights 

may only be reversed if it is reasonably probable that a result 

more favorable to her would have been reached in the absence of 

this error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Mother

argues the error was not harmless. On the premise that the 

court’s failure to make a record that it had read and considered

the report means the court did not read and consider it, she 

argues reversal is required because without the court formally 

receiving evidence, and without the court stating that it read and 

considered the report, no substantial evidence supports the 

court’s ruling and it cannot be determined upon what facts the 

court based its order.

If Mother had been concerned about noncompliance with 

section 366.26, subdivision (b), she could have and should have 

raised the issue at the hearing, at which time the court could 

2 The minute order from the hearing states that the court

“has read, considered, and admits into evidence the social 

worker’s report dated 9/16/2021 and any other information

reviewed including the adoption assessment,” but the court did 

not make this statement during the hearing.
22

easily have remedied the problem she now raises on appeal. “[A]

reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a 

ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the 

trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage 

parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that 

they may be corrected.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, 

footnote omitted, superseded by statute on other grounds as 

stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) Mother 

forfeited this issue by failing to object on this ground in the 

juvenile court.

In any event, we are not persuaded reversal is required. 

The record from the hearing shows all parties and the court were 

aware of the report, its contents, and the fact that the report was 

being considered by the juvenile court at the hearing. At the 

start of the hearing, Father advised the court he did not seek a 

contested hearing and would submit on DCFS’s recommendation.

The court responded by stating DCFS’s recommendation, which 

had been contained in its report. The court’s statement indicates 

its familiarity with the report and its contents. During the 

hearing, counsel for Mother sought a supplemental report, and

counsel for DCFS argued there was no additional information to 

put in another report. To decide whether to order a supplemental 

report and to rule on the request for a contested hearing, the 

court necessarily had to review the report in question. Later in 

the hearing, the court referred to “the information today,” and

since no additional evidence was presented at the hearing, we 

understand the court to have been referring to the information in 

the report prepared for the hearing. Given that the court and the 

parties clearly were familiar with, discussed, and relied upon the 

report, we reject Mother’s argument that the court did not 
23

properly read and consider it. We conclude it is not reasonably 

probable that a result more favorable to Mother would have been 

reached if the court had fulfilled its obligation to state on the 

record at the hearing that it had read and considered it.

II. Failure to Set a Contested Hearing

Mother asked for a contested permanency planning

hearing. “[A] parent has a right to ‘due process’ at the hearing 

under section 366.26 which results in the actual termination of 

parental rights.” (In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 

816.) However, “due process does not require a court to hold a 

contested hearing if it is not convinced the parent will present 

relevant evidence on the issue he or she seeks to contest.” (In re 

Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122 (Tamika T.).)

The court may request an offer of proof to identify contested

issues so it can “determine whether a parent’s representation is 

sufficient to warrant a hearing involving presentation of evidence 

and confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses.” (Tamika 

T., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1122.) “The offer of proof must be 

specific, setting forth the actual evidence to be produced, not 

merely the facts or issues to be addressed and argued.” (Id. at 

p. 1124.) “The offer of proof must consist of ‘ “testimony, writings, 

material objects, or other things presented to the senses.” ’

[Citation.] It may not consist of simply ‘the substance of facts to 

be proved . . . , since facts do not constitute evidence.’ [Citation.] 

The material in the offer of proof must be admissible, and it 

‘ “must be specific in its indication of the purpose of the 

testimony, the name of the witness, and the content of the 

answer to be elicited.” ’ ” (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 

1006–1007.) The court’s ruling whether to grant a contested 

hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 1003.)
24

When the court requested an offer of proof, Mother’s 

counsel said, “Regarding [E.G.], I would just ask for a 

supplemental report to at least give or provide details or to 

interview the monitors of the monitored visitation that Mother is

having with [E.G.].” Mother’s counsel noted the permanency 

planning report merely stated Mother and E.G. had monitored 

telephone contact and it included no details about that contact.

Counsel observed in reports “there are always details regarding 

how those visits are occurring. So we would just ask to proceed 

on that, Your Honor. I don’t know if I have any additional offer of 

proof.” Mother’s offer of proof was simply a request for a

continuance so that an additional report could be prepared, 

without any representation of what that additional report would 

prove. She did not identify any witnesses, any actual evidence to

be produced, or any facts that would be elicited at a contested 

hearing. Mother did not assert that she had any evidence to 

support the existence of an exception to adoption, nor did she 

claim a supplemental report would have contained facts 

supporting the beneficial parental relationship exception. Under 

these circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its

discretion in denying Mother’s request for a contested hearing.

III. Permanency Planning Hearing

“A finding under subdivision (b) . . . of Section 361.5 that 

reunification services shall not be offered . . . shall constitute a 

sufficient basis for termination of parental rights.” (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1).) At a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing, 

the court determines by clear and convincing evidence whether 

the child is likely to be adopted. If the court so finds, the court is 

statutorily required to terminate parental rights unless there is a 

compelling reason to find that termination of parental rights 
25

would be detrimental under one of the six exceptions enumerated 

in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B). (In re Mary G. (2007) 

151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206–207). One of the exceptions is the 

beneficial parental relationship exception in section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which applies when a parent has 

maintained regular visitation and contact, has established a 

positive emotional bond with the child, and the child would 

benefit from continuing the relationship to such a degree that the 

child would be greatly harmed by termination. (In re S.B. (2008) 

164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297.)

Three elements must be satisfied to establish the beneficial

parental relationship exception: 1) regular visitation and contact, 

taking into account the extent of visitation permitted; 2) a 

substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the 

kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship; and 3) a showing that terminating 

the attachment would be detrimental to the child even when 

balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive 

home. (Cade C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) When the parent 

has met that burden, the parental-benefit exception applies such 

that it would not be in the best interest of the child to terminate 

parental rights. In that case the court must select a permanent 

plan other than adoption. (Id. at pp. 636–637.)

The parent has the burden to show the statutory exception 

applies. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826.) When a

parent has presented evidence to support his or her claim that 

the exception applies, we review the juvenile court’s findings 

using a hybrid approach: for the first two elements, which require 

factual findings (parental visitation and the child’s emotional 

attachment), we apply the substantial evidence standard of 
26

review; and for the court’s weighing of the relative harms and 

benefits of terminating parental rights, we use the abuse of 

discretion standard. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–

641.) However, when a party with the burden of proof did not 

carry that burden, “the question for a reviewing court becomes 

whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant

as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question 

becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted 

and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to 

leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient 

to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 

1528, disapproved of on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. 

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.)

When deciding whether to set a contested hearing, the

juvenile court indicated its tentative intent to deny Mother’s

request because the court did not believe she had made a 

“sufficient showing that the contact [between Mother and E.G.] is 

of the nature and quality that would support” the parental 

benefit exception. Ultimately, the court ruled Mother had not set 

forth “the requisite showing for [the parental benefit] exception to 

apply.”

3 The court was correct in concluding Mother had failed to 

3 Immediately after ruling that Mother had not made a 

sufficient showing that the beneficial relationship exception 

applied, the court, while making the findings preliminary to the 

termination of parental rights, also said Mother had not

maintained visits or established a sufficient bond for the parental 

benefit exception and that any benefit conferred by E.G.’s 

relationship with Mother would be far outweighed by the benefits 

of adoption. This raises the question whether to interpret the 

court’s ruling that the exception was not applicable as a 

determination that Mother had not carried her burden of proof or 
27

meet her burden to prove the exception applied, because when

Mother was given the opportunity to describe the evidence she 

would present at a contested hearing to establish the 

applicability of the exception, she was unable to do so. “A proper 

offer of proof gives the trial court an opportunity to determine if, 

in fact, there really is a contested issue of fact.” (Tamika T., 

supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124.) Here, as we have concluded

above, Mother had failed to demonstrate that there really was 

any contested issue of fact with respect to the beneficial parental 

relationship exception.

Because the court concluded Mother failed to carry her 

burden of proving the exception applied, we determine on appeal

whether the evidence compels a finding in her favor as a matter 

of law. (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) Mother 

has failed to show that the evidence below, taken as a whole, 

compelled a finding in her favor.

as the result of substantive factual findings and a weighing of the 

relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights. 

While we acknowledge the ambiguity, we understand the ruling 

to be based on Mother’s failure to carry her burden of proof

because of its context: the court had just afforded Mother the 

opportunity to make a showing of the specific information she 

believed would prove the exception; Mother did not do so; and as 

a result, the court expressly stated she had not made a showing 

sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. We find it 

implausible that the court would rule that Mother had not made 

a showing that would merit a contested evidentiary hearing, but 

then make the rulings that would be made after an evidentiary 

hearing.
28

A. Regular Visitation and Contact

On the first element, regular visitation and contact, taking 

into account the extent of visitation permitted (Caden C., supra,

11 Cal.5th at p. 636), there was scant evidence that Mother had

maintained regular contact with E.G. In December 2019, Mother

was granted monitored visitation a minimum of three times per

week for two hours per visit. As of February 2020, Mother had 

not telephoned or visited E.G. at all.

Mother claims in her opening brief that she visited E.G. 

telephonically from May 2020 to October 2021 as jail conditions 

permitted. None of the citations to the record provided by Mother

states that she visited telephonically with E.G. during 2020. No 

contact between Mother and E.G. was reported in the July 2020

report. The possibility of telephonic visitation arose in the 

August 2020 report, in which DCFS informed the court that E.G’s

paternal grandparents had agreed to monitor telephone calls 

between Mother and E.G. The report did not state that any calls 

with E.G. had yet taken place, in contrast to A.L., for whom 

DCFS reported not only that his caregiver had agreed to monitor 

calls but also that Mother and A.L. were now speaking twice

weekly.

DCFS’s report filed in September 2020 similarly did not 

mention any visitation by Mother. In September 2020, the court 

ordered DCFS to facilitate calls with E.G. and to give Mother a 

written schedule for telephone visits. In October 2020, DCFS 

advised the court that “[M]other’s proposed telephone visitation

is scheduled” for two days per week, and that E.G.’s grandmother 

“will serve” as the monitor. (In contrast to the future tense used 

to describe the monitor selected for E.G.’s calls, DCFS advised

the court in the present tense that A.L.’s caregiver “serves as the 
29

monitor” for his calls with Mother.) The report did not indicate 

that any calls between Mother and E.G. had yet occurred.

In December 2020, the court ordered Mother to be provided

with a schedule for calls with E.G., but provided that visitation 

was subject to any active criminal protective order.

While the record does not pinpoint when Mother began 

telephoning E.G., the first telephone call between Mother and 

E.G. we are able to identify in the record took place in January 

2021. As of early 2021 Mother was scheduled for two calls per 

week with E.G., but she submitted a phone log in March 2021 

showing she had spoken with E.G. only four times between 

January and March. Although Mother alleged E.G. was not 

being made available for her calls, her log showed that the 

missed telephonic visits were caused by Mother being unable to 

call almost as many times as they were caused by no one 

answering the phone at E.G.’s residence (seven times Mother 

could not call versus eight dates with no answer). Mother listed 

six other dates when she did not talk to E.G. but she offered no

reason why.

As of May 2021 Mother said she was still having issues 

with calls to E.G. because of conflicts between her schedule and

the written visitation schedule. E.G.’s grandparents agreed to 

adjust the schedule to accommodate her.

In June 2021, E.G.’s counsel acknowledged Mother was 

trying to keep up a relationship with E.G. by phone, but E.G. did 

not want to speak with Mother when she called. E.G.’s counsel 

described Mother’s calls as “sporadic at best.”

Mother’s counsel told the court in June 2021 that Mother 

“did have a phone conversation with E.G.” and E.G. was 

sometimes willing to speak with her. The court ordered virtual 
30

and in-person visits in a therapeutic setting if recommended by 

the therapist.

The children were traveling for a month starting in 

September 2021; arrangements for telephonic visits during that 

time were in place, but the record does not state whether Mother 

and E.G. had any contact.

At the October 2021 permanency planning hearing, counsel 

for DCFS and for E.G. described Mother’s telephone calls with 

E.G. as “sporadic.” There had been no in-person visits. The 

report for the permanency planning hearing stated, without 

elaboration, that Mother had maintained “regular monitored 

telephone contact” with E.G. The report did not define “regular” 

or describe the amount and nature of E.G.’s contact with Mother.

The concurrent planning report left blank the box where the 

number of E.G.’s contacts with Mother in the prior six months 

should have been entered.

While Mother is correct that the assessment should have

included a “review of the amount and nature of any contact 

between the child and the child’s parents . . . since the time of 

placement” (§ 361.5, subd. (g)(1)(B)), here, information about the 

amount and nature of E.G.’s contact with Mother was fully and 

equally available to Mother. She could easily have provided 

evidence to the juvenile court about how often she and E.G. spoke 

on the phone. Instead, she declined to attend the hearing where 

she could have offered information about contact with E.G. to the 

court; and when making an offer of proof, her counsel asked for 

DCFS to prepare an additional report about visitation rather 

than identifying any evidence Mother had engaged in regular 

contact with E.G. Based on this record, we cannot say that as a 

matter of law the record compelled a finding that Mother had
31

engaged in regular visitation and contact, taking into account the

extent of visits permitted. (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1528.)

B. Emotional Attachment to Parent

The second element of the parental benefit exception is “a 

substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the 

kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from

continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 636.) In determining whether a positive emotional 

relationship has formed, the focus is on the child’s age and

particular needs, the length of time the child has spent in 

parental custody, and the positive and negative effects of 

interactions between parent and child, as well as how the child 

speaks about, interacts with, or feels about his parents. (Id. at 

p. 632.)

The court found that Mother had not “established a 

sufficient bond” under the parental benefit exception. Here 

again, the record does not compel a finding as a matter of law 

that E.G. had a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to 

Mother. We are unable to identify anything in the record that 

suggests such an attachment. E.G. lived with Mother for 

approximately her first 20 months but was then removed from 

Mother’s custody for nearly three years.

4 Mother reunified with 

4 We are dismayed by Mother’s counsel’s misstatements of 

the time E.G. was in and out of maternal custody. In her opening 

brief, Mother’s counsel stated “Mother cared for E.G. until she 

was removed at age six years,” “Mother took care of her child for 

almost six years,” and E.G. “had lived with mother—except for a 

short time—from birth in 2013 to the fall of 2019.” In fact, E.G. 

was out of Mother’s custody for nearly half of her first six years of 
32

E.G. in 2018, but in 2019 E.G. was again removed due to 

Mother’s abuse of L.G. At the time of the permanency planning 

hearing in October 2021, E.G. was eight years old. She had been 

in Mother’s custody for only three and one-half years of her life. 

E.G., as the juvenile court found, had suffered from witnessing

the torture Mother inflicted on her younger sister. Mother’s 

conduct was so extreme that the court found that it would not 

benefit E.G. to attempt reunification with Mother. E.G. did not 

want to speak with or visit Mother.

Mother faults the assessment for not including details 

about how Mother and E.G.’s visits went, but just as with the 

visitation element of the exception, if E.G. had a substantial, 

positive attachment to Mother, Mother could have presented

evidence of that attachment in her offer of proof. Mother was 

well-situated to present evidence of her relationship with E.G., 

the nature and quality of their attachment, E.G.’s particular 

needs, and the effects on E.G. of their interactions. But Mother,

despite having been transported from jail to court for the hearing, 

absented herself before it began. And just as with the first 

element of the beneficial parental relationship, when asked for an 

offer of proof, Mother’s counsel did not identify any evidence 

life: she was removed from Mother from March 2015 to February 

2018. Mother’s counsel also misstates the duration of E.G.’s 

removal prior to this case as two years, when in fact it was just 

under three years—a significant difference when discussing a sixyear-old child. “ ‘It is the duty of an attorney’ to ‘employ, for the 

purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him or her those 

means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to 

mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false 

statement of fact or law.’ (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (d).)” 

(In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 419.)
33

Mother could present that would support a finding that E.G. had 

a substantial, positive attachment to her. The evidence does not 

compel a finding in Mother’s favor on this element as a matter of 

law.

C. Detriment from Terminating the Parental 

Relationship

If a parent establishes the first two elements of the 

beneficial parental relationship exception, the court then

proceeds to determine whether terminating the attachment 

would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the 

countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. (Caden C., supra,

11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) As Mother failed to meet her burden with 

respect to the first two elements of the exception, the detriment 

analysis could not be performed. The juvenile court implicitly 

recognized this when it described this element with a 

counterfactual conditional phrase: the court found that if there 

were any benefit to E.G. from her relationship with Mother, it 

“would be far outweighed by the benefits of permanence and 

stability through adoption.” (Italics added.) Accordingly, we 

conclude Mother has not demonstrated that the evidence 

compelled a finding in her favor on the parental benefit exception 

as a matter of law.

Finally, we note Mother claims the juvenile court 

“terminated [her] appellate rights by failing to ensure a report 

existed regarding the nature and quality of E.G.’s relationship,” 

and the court was therefore “unable to apply the careful analysis 

required by Caden C.” Mother does not explain, nor can we 

conceive, how the juvenile court could possibly have terminated

her appellate rights. To any extent Mother is arguing the court

abused its discretion in proceeding with the section 366.26 
34

hearing based on an incomplete assessment, she did not object on 

this basis below. Certainly, Mother’s counsel observed reports 

“always” include “details regarding how those visits are 

occurring,” and this one did not. But Mother asked only for a 

supplemental report; she did not object to proceeding with the 

hearing on the basis that the report submitted to the court was 

inadequate to satisfy the statutory requirements for an adoption 

assessment. (In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886; In 

re M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61, 67–68, rev. granted Oct. 12, 

2022, S276099.)

DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

HARUTUNIAN, J.



 Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California

Constitution.