IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-112

No. 37A21

Filed 24 September 2021

IN THE MATTER OF: M.R.J.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 30

September 2020 by Judge Monica Bousman in District Court, Wake County. This 

matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 August 2021 but 

determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Mary Boyce Wells for petitioner-appellee Wake County Human Services.

Michelle FormyDuval Lynch for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Christopher M. Watford for respondent-appellant mother.

MORGAN, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her

parental rights to “Mike,”

1 a minor child born in April 2018. Because we conclude that

the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and did not abuse its discretion 

in determining Mike’s best interests, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

 

1 We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of some of the individuals discussed in 

this opinion and for ease of reading. We note that the trial court’s order also terminated the 

parental rights of Mike’s father, whose identity is unknown. 
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¶ 2 In April 2018, Vance County Child Protective Services (VCCPS) received a 

report that Mike and his twin brother had tested positive for methadone and 

marijuana at birth. While VCCPS was assessing the family on 10 June 2018, the 

agency received a second report on the family that Mike’s twin brother had died in 

respondent-mother’s home. Respondent-mother stated that she had placed both 

children on a bed and later found the deceased child unresponsive. 

¶ 3 On 10 June 2018, VCCPS placed Mike with Theresa R., an approved safety 

resource who lived in Wake County. The family was found to be in need of services, 

and the case was transferred from VCCPS to Wake County Human Services (WCHS) 

in August 2018. 

¶ 4 A WCHS social worker scheduled a home visit with respondent-mother and 

Theresa R. for the afternoon of 15 October 2018. When the social worker arrived at 

the residence, Theresa R. reported that respondent-mother had removed Mike from 

the home on the previous day of 14 October 2018, claiming that respondent-mother

was taking Mike to live with his maternal grandmother in South Carolina. 

Respondent-mother confirmed to the social worker on 15 October 2018 that she “sent” 

Mike to South Carolina to live with his maternal grandmother. 

¶ 5 On 31 October 2018, the WCHS social worker visited respondent-mother at the 

Wake County Detention Center where respondent-mother was being held for 

violating her probation. Respondent-mother agreed to contact the social worker after 
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her release from jail but failed to do so. 

¶ 6 WCHS was unaware of respondent-mother’s whereabouts after her release 

from incarceration until 2 January 2019, when the social worker learned that 

respondent-mother was hospitalized at UNC Hospital with an infection. WCHS 

contacted respondent-mother and established a safety plan for Mike, pursuant to 

which he would continue to reside with the maternal grandmother in South Carolina.

On the following day of 3 January 2019, respondent-mother gave the name of a friend 

of hers in Vance County to the social worker and asked for the friend to be considered 

as a placement for Mike. VCCPS conducted a home study of respondent-mother’s 

recommended friend on behalf of WCHS but did not approve the friend as a 

placement. 

¶ 7 On 16 January 2019, a safety assessment was performed on the maternal 

grandmother’s home by Fairfield County, South Carolina, CPS. The grandmother’s 

residence was approved for Mike’s placement. Respondent-mother identified for 

WCHS another friend, Donna W., as a potential placement option for respondentmother’s children. On 30 January 2019, WCHS approved Donna W.’s home as a 

placement for Mike’s older half-brother. 

¶ 8 Respondent-mother was released from UNC Hospital on 1 February 2019, but 

she failed to respond to repeated telephone calls from WCHS social workers. On 8 

February 2019, the maternal grandmother brought Mike to Wake County to visit 
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respondent-mother, after obtaining the approval of WCHS for Mike to stay overnight 

in Donna W.’s home. WCHS informed Donna W. and the maternal grandmother that 

Mike was to return to South Carolina on 10 February 2019.

¶ 9 The maternal grandmother reported that respondent-mother was incoherent 

and falling asleep during a supervised visit with Mike on 10 February 2019. On the 

next day of 11 February 2019, respondent-mother contacted law enforcement in Wake 

County and reported that Mike was with the maternal grandmother and that the 

maternal grandmother had been drinking alcohol. Multiple police units and a 

helicopter responded to the call. Officers detained the maternal grandmother and 

contacted WCHS, which confirmed that Mike was legally placed with the maternal 

grandmother and that she had not been drinking. Respondent-mother then sent 

numerous text messages to the WCHS social worker on 11 February 2019, 

threatening to remove Mike from his placement with the maternal grandmother and 

reminding the social worker that respondent-mother still had legal custody of the 

child. 

¶ 10 On 13 February 2019, WCHS filed a juvenile petition alleging that Mike was

neglected. The petition stated that respondent-mother “is reportedly still actively 

using heroin and is without stable housing” and that she “has not been compliant 

with any recommended services” or treatment to address her substance abuse and 

mental health issues. WCHS further alleged that respondent-mother “continues to 
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sabotage” Mike’s placement with the maternal grandmother, “has not been willing to 

allow [Mike] to remain in a stable placement[,]” and “has a history of becoming upset 

with kinship providers/temporary safety providers and immediately removing the

children from the home.” 

¶ 11 Based on the petition’s verified allegations, the trial court granted nonsecure 

custody of Mike to WCHS on 13 February 2019. On 14 February 2019, Mike joined 

his older half-brother in a fictive kinship placement with Donna W. in Wake County. 

¶ 12 The trial court conducted a hearing on the petition on 9 May 2019. Based on a 

written stipulation of facts signed by the parties, the trial court adjudicated Mike to 

be a neglected juvenile in that he “do[es] not receive proper care and supervision from 

[his] parents and live[s] in an environment injurious to [his] welfare.” See N.C.G.S. § 

7B-101(15) (2019). The trial court kept Mike in WCHS custody and awarded weekly 

supervised visitation with the child to respondent-mother. Mike remained in his 

placement with Donna W.

¶ 13 In addition to the aforementioned facts, the trial court found as follows:

30. The mother submitted to a substance abuse 

assessment and [was] diagnosed with Opiate Use Disorder 

Severe and given specific recommendations. She is using 

amounts of Heroin that are life threatening and needs to 

go into drug detoxification immediately . . . . 

31. The mother is not in[ ]compliance with the terms 

and conditions of her probation and has stated that she is 

not visiting [Mike] because she is afraid of being arrested

. . . . 
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32. The mother reports diagnoses of Bi-Polar Disorder 

and Personality Disorder . . . .

The trial court ordered respondent-mother to comply with her Out-of-Home Family 

Services Agreement (OHFSA) by immediately entering drug detoxification; 

participating in intensive outpatient drug treatment; refraining from the use of 

impairing substances; submitting to random drug screens; obtaining a psychiatric 

evaluation; obtaining a psychological evaluation and following any recommendations; 

refraining from criminal activity and complying with the conditions of her probation; 

participating in parenting classes and demonstrating learned parenting skills; 

obtaining and maintaining stable and appropriate housing and income; maintaining 

regular contact with the WCHS social worker; and regularly attending visitations. 

¶ 14 The trial court held a permanency planning hearing on 5 August 2019 and 

entered an order on 19 September 2019 establishing a primary permanent plan of 

reunification with a secondary plan of adoption. The trial court found that 

respondent-mother had not maintained regular contact with the social worker or 

documented respondent-mother’s completion of any court-ordered services. 

Respondent-mother had been incarcerated in the Vance County Jail through midJuly 2019, had additional pending charges in Wake and Franklin Counties, and had 

not visited with Mike since March 2019. The trial court concluded that respondentmother “continues to act in a manner inconsistent with her [c]onstitutionally 

protected status as a parent . . . .”
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¶ 15 At the next permanency planning hearing, in an order entered on 9 March 

2020, the trial court changed Mike’s primary permanent plan to adoption with a 

secondary plan of reunification. With regard to the requirements of her OHFSA, the 

trial court found that respondent-mother had failed to respond to the social worker’s 

telephone calls, text messages, emails, or letters; was jailed in Vance County in 

January 2020 for violating her probation and resisting a public officer; had failed to

comply with the recommendations of her substance abuse assessment; had failed to

submit to any requested drug screens; had failed to attend a scheduled psychological 

evaluation or to reschedule the appointment; was discharged by her parenting coach 

for lack of communication and general noncompliance; and had failed to attend any 

visitations with Mike. The trial court determined that further efforts to reunify Mike 

with respondent-mother “clearly would be unsuccessful or inconsistent with [his] 

health or safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable time.” See 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b) (2019). 

¶ 16 On 12 March 2020, WCHS filed a motion to terminate respondent-mother’s

parental rights to Mike. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on 10 July and 

3 August 2020 and entered its “Order Terminating Parental Rights” on 30 September 

2020. As grounds for termination, the trial court established that respondent-mother 

previously neglected Mike and was likely to subject him to further neglect if he was 

returned to her care, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2019), and that respondent-mother
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willfully left Mike in an out-of-home placement for more than twelve months without 

making reasonable progress to correct the conditions leading to his removal, see 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). The trial court concluded that it was in Mike’s best interests 

for the parental rights of respondent-mother to be terminated. See N.C.G.S. § 7B1110(a) (2019).

¶ 17 Respondent-mother filed timely notice of appeal from the order terminating 

her parental rights. 

II. Respondent-Mother’s Arguments on Appeal

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶ 18 Respondent-mother first claims that the trial court was without jurisdiction to 

enter the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights because WCHS 

lacked standing to initiate the termination proceeding under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)

(2019). 

¶ 19 “Whether or not a trial court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction is a question 

of law that is reviewed de novo. Challenges to a trial court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of proceedings, including for the first time 

before this Court.” In re A.L.L., 376 N.C. 99, 101 (2020) (extraneity omitted). 

However, “[t]his Court presumes the trial court has properly exercised jurisdiction 

unless the party challenging jurisdiction meets its burden of showing otherwise.” 

In re L.T., 374 N.C. 567, 569 (2020).
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¶ 20 The statute that confers subject matter jurisdiction over termination of 

parental rights proceedings provides as follows:

The court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear 

and determine any petition or motion relating to 

termination of parental rights to any juvenile who resides 

in, is found in, or is in the legal or actual custody of a county 

department of social services or licensed child-placing 

agency in the district at the time of filing of the petition or 

motion. . . . Provided, that before exercising jurisdiction 

under this Article, the court shall find that it has 

jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination under 

the provisions of G.S. 50A-201, 50A-203, or 50A-204.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (2019). The Juvenile Code defines “[c]ourt” as “[t]he district court 

division of the General Court of Justice.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(6) (2019).

¶ 21 Respondent-mother does not claim that the District Court, Wake County failed

to meet the general jurisdictional requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101; she instead 

contends that WCHS lacked standing under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(a) to initiate the 

termination proceeding in this case. Respondent-mother’s argument is well

summarized by the Court of Appeals opinion in In re E.X.J.: 

Under N.C.[G.S.] § 7B-1103(a)(3) (20[19]), a petition or 

motion to terminate the parental rights of a parent may be 

filed by a “county department of social services . . . to whom 

custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of 

competent jurisdiction.” If DSS does not lawfully have 

custody of the children, then it lacks standing to file a 

petition or motion to terminate parental rights, and the 

trial court, as a result, lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 

In re E.X.J., 191 N.C. App. 34, 39 (2008) (ellipsis in original), aff’d per curiam, 363 
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N.C. 9 (2009).

¶ 22 Respondent-mother contends that WCHS was not “a proper party” authorized 

to file the petition which alleged that Mike was neglected in February 2019. She 

opines that Mike was a resident of South Carolina when the petition was filed and 

when the District Court, Wake County purported to grant nonsecure custody of the 

child to WCHS on 13 February 2019. Respondent-mother also contends that the 

petition filed by WCHS “fail[ed] to establish that [her] legal residence was in Wake 

County.” As a result, “because the [WCHS] director had no authority over a child 

whose legal residence was in South Carolina, the petition was void for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction[,]” and “the initial order granting nonsecure [custody] was 

invalid[.]” Respondent-mother consequently reasons that the District Court, Wake 

County was not “a court of competent jurisdiction” when it awarded WCHS custody 

of Mike, and WCHS “lacked standing to move for the termination of [respondentmother’s] parental rights” under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)(3). 

¶ 23 “North Carolina district courts have ‘exclusive, original [subject matter] 

jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be abused, neglected, 

or dependent.’ ” In re E.X.J., 191 N.C. App. at 47 (alteration in original) (quoting 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-200 (2005)). “A trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over all stages 

of a juvenile case is established when the action is initiated with the filing of a 

properly verified petition.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 593 (2006). Under N.C.G.S. 
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§ 7B-401.1(a), “[o]nly a county director of social services or the director’s authorized 

representative may file a petition alleging that a juvenile is abused, neglected, or 

dependent.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-401.1(a) (2019).

¶ 24 In interpreting N.C.G.S. § 7B-401.1(a), respondent-mother notes that N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-101(10) defines “Director” as “the director of the department of social services in 

the county in which the juvenile resides or is found, or the director’s representative 

. . . .” She then points to N.C.G.S. § 153A-257(a) (2019), which allocates the 

responsibility for providing social services among the state’s local social services 

agencies based on the recipient’s county of residence. “Read in paria materi [sic],” 

respondent-mother argues that “both of these statutes are meant to identify the 

director, if any, who is responsible for providing a service, such as filing a juvenile 

petition, and both unquestionably tie that identification to location.”

¶ 25 Based on her reading of the statutes, respondent-mother asserts that 

[t]he director of Wake County, and by extension, any 

authorized representative, was without statutory 

authority to file the juvenile petition in this matter. It is 

undisputed that [Mike] resided in South Carolina with his 

grandmother for 131 days including the day of the filing of 

the Petition. It is undisputed that [respondent-mother’s] 

actual location was unknown and that Wake County made 

no representation as to where they believed her to reside. 

No document indicates that the child “was found in” Wake 

County prior to anytime before the filing of the petition. 

Thus, under both G.S. § 7B-101 and G.S. § 153A-247, Wake 

County has no authority over Mike at the time of filing.

¶ 26 Respondent-mother’s positions are inconsistent with the factual record before 
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this Court. Moreover, her legal arguments appear to address the issue of venue and 

thus do not implicate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to place Mike in 

WCHS custody.

¶ 27 We have previously considered and rejected the claim that the definition of 

“Director” found in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(10) imposes a geographical limit on which 

“county director” may invoke the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction by filing a 

juvenile petition under N.C.G.S. § 7B-401.1(a). Regarding this circumstance, this 

Court has stated:

Because the language of section 7B-401.1(a) identifies ‘‘a 

county director of social services’’ as the proper petitioner 

in a juvenile adjudication action rather than ‘‘the director’’

(importing the definition from N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(10)) or 

similar language singling out particular directors, we hold 

that the legislature did not intend to limit the class of 

parties who may invoke the court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction in juvenile adjudication actions to only 

directors of county departments of social services in the 

county where the juvenile at issue resides or is found. 

In re A.P., 371 N.C. 14, 20 (2018). Nor does N.C.G.S. § 153A-257(a) purport to limit 

the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction in juvenile abuse, neglect, and dependency 

cases.2

 

2 Respondent-mother attempts to replace the requirement of the trial court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction with a novel concept of a petitioner’s subject matter jurisdiction, arguing 

that “because the [WCHS] director had no authority over a child whose legal residence was 

in South Carolina, the petition was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” (Emphasis 

added). 
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¶ 28 The question of which county director of social services is sanctioned to file a 

juvenile petition is answered by the venue statute N.C.G.S. § 7B-400, which provides: 

A proceeding in which a juvenile is alleged to be abused, 

neglected, or dependent may be commenced in the judicial 

district in which the juvenile resides or is present at the 

time the petition is filed. . . . Notwithstanding G.S. 153A257, the absence of a juvenile from the juvenile’s home 

pursuant to a protection plan during an assessment or the 

provision of case management services by a department of 

social services shall not change the original venue if it 

subsequently becomes necessary to file a juvenile petition.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-400(a) (2019).

¶ 29 “Improper venue is not jurisdictional, and it is subject to waiver.” Stokes v. 

Stokes, 371 N.C. 770, 773 (2018) (emphasis added). Unlike the issue of subject matter 

jurisdiction, which may be raised at any time, an objection to improper venue is 

waived if not “taken in apt time” in the trial court. McMinn v. Hamilton, 77 N.C. 300, 

301 (1877); see also N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(h)(1) (“A defense of . . . improper venue 

. . . is waived (i) if omitted from a motion [made under Rule 12], or (ii) if it is neither 

made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an 

amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of course.”). 

Because respondent-mother made no claim of improper venue at any time in the trial 

court while this matter was pending in the lower forum, the issue of venue is waived 

and therefore is not properly before this Court. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). 

¶ 30 Moreover, contrary to respondent-mother’s characterization, the record 
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demonstrates that Wake County is a proper venue for the juvenile proceeding 

initiated on 13 February 2019. The verified petition filed by WCHS expressly alleged 

that Mike “resides in the district at the address shown below, was found in the district 

as alleged herein, or venue exists pursuant to G.S. 7B-400(a) or (b).” Although the

petition did not list respondent-mother’s street address, it identified her as “a citizen 

and resident of Wake County, North Carolina[.]”3 The petition further averred—and 

respondent-mother subsequently stipulated—that Mike was living in South Carolina 

with his maternal grandmother pursuant to a safety plan that WCHS established 

with respondent-mother on 2 January 2019. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-400(a) (“[T]he absence 

of a juvenile from the juvenile’s home pursuant to a protection plan during an 

assessment or the provision of case management services by a department of social 

services shall not change the original venue if it subsequently becomes necessary to 

file a juvenile petition.”). Finally, the petition’s allegations—and the parties’ signed 

stipulations entered on 8 May 2019—indicated that Mike was visiting Wake County 

with his grandmother and was therefore “present” in the county at the time that 

 

3 Respondent-mother later stipulated that she was “a citizen and resident of 

Henderson, North Carolina[.]” Although Henderson is located in Vance County rather than 

Wake County, North Carolina, this potential discrepancy had no effect on the trial court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction. See generally In re A.P., 371 N.C. at 20 (“hold[ing] that the 

legislature did not intend to limit the class of parties who may invoke the court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction in juvenile adjudication actions to only directors of county departments 

of social services in the county where the juvenile at issue resides or is found.”). Moreover, 

since it is unclear from the record here, there is the prospect that respondent-mother was a 

Wake County resident when WCHS filed its petition in February 2019 yet was a Vance 

County resident when she signed the stipulation in March or May of 2019.
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WCHS filed the petition on 13 February 2019.4 N.C.G.S. § 7B-400(a) (allowing 

proceeding to “be commenced in the judicial district in which the juvenile resides or 

is present at the time the petition is filed”). 

¶ 31 Respondent-mother also frames her challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction 

in terms of the statutory requirement that a juvenile petition be verified pursuant to 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-403(a) by the “county director of social services or the director’s 

authorized representative[.]” N.C.G.S. § 7B-401.1(a); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-403(a) 

(“[T]he petition shall be drawn by the director, verified before an official authorized 

to administer oaths, and filed by the clerk . . . .” (emphasis added)). In doing so, 

respondent-mother quotes our opinion in In re T.R.P. for the principle that “[a] trial 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction over all stages of a juvenile case is established 

when the action is initiated with the filing of a properly verified petition.” In re T.R.P., 

360 N.C. at 593 (emphasis added). She goes on to contend that, in the present case,

“[t]he initial juvenile petition seeking custody of Mike was improperly verified and 

thus did not grant the court subject matter jurisdiction to issue the initial non-secure 

 

4 The petition and the parties’ stipulations describe the maternal grandmother’s 

attainment of WCHS’s approval to visit Wake County with Mike on 8 February 2019 and “to 

stay overnight at the home of Mrs. Donna W[.] during [the] visit.” Although Mike and his 

grandmother “were to return to South Carolina . . . on Sunday, February 10, 2019[,]” they 

remained in Wake County at least through 11 February 2019, when respondent-mother 

called the police and reported that Mike was with his maternal grandmother who had been 

drinking. “Wake County police . . . responded and detained [the maternal grandmother] until 

they got in contact with [WCHS] After [H]ours who assisted with ensuring that [Mike was] 

legally placed in the care of [the grandmother] and [she] had not been drinking[.]” 
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custody order on 13 February 2019.” (Emphasis added).

¶ 32 In In re T.R.P., this Court held that the Wilkes County Department of Social 

Services’ “failure to verify [its] juvenile petition is a fatal defect” depriving the trial 

court of subject matter jurisdiction. 360 N.C. at 598. We noted that, “[a]lthough the 

juvenile petition setting forth these allegations [of neglect] was notarized, it was 

neither signed nor verified by the Director of WCDSS or any authorized 

representative thereof.” Id. at 589. Other cases cited by respondent-mother likewise 

involved a petitioner’s failure to verify its petition in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 7B403(a). See In re S.E.P., 184 N.C. App. 481, 487 (2007) (“Neither the 26 September 

2002 adjudication petition nor the 8 April 2004 amended petition conferred subject 

matter jurisdiction upon the trial court” because (1) “the alleged signature which 

appears on the [original] petition was not in fact the director’s signature[,]” and (2) 

“[t]he verification section of the amended petition shows no signature in the 

‘Signature of Petitioner’ space.”); In re A.J.H-R., 184 N.C. App. 177, 180 (2007) 

(concluding that the trial court “lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this 

matter” where the juvenile neglect petitions were “neither signed nor verified” by the 

agency’s director or his authorized representative). 

¶ 33 In the instant case, the petition filed by WCHS was properly verified before a 

notary by social worker Martheia Capel, acting as the authorized representative of 

WCHS Director Regina Petteway, thereby satisfying the verification requirement in 
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-403(a). Given this obvious distinction, respondent-mother’s reliance on 

In re T.R.P. and similar cases is misplaced and unavailing. See In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 

at 589 (“Although the juvenile petition . . . was notarized, it was neither signed nor 

verified by the Director of WCDSS or any authorized representative thereof.”).

¶ 34 Having addressed respondent-mother’s arguments challenging the trial court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction, we next consider whether the trial court properly 

exercised its recognized jurisdiction in light of the fact that Mike was living in South 

Carolina with his maternal grandmother at the time that the petition was filed. We 

conclude that the trial court had such jurisdiction. 

¶ 35 In North Carolina, the issue of whether the courts of a particular state have 

jurisdiction over a proceeding which affects child custody is governed by the Uniform 

Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), specifically the 

provisions of Article 2, Part 2 as codified in N.C.G.S. §§ 50A-201 through -210 (2019). 

See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (“[B]efore exercising jurisdiction under this Article, the 

court shall find that it has jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination under 

the provisions of G.S. 50A-201, 50A-203, or 50A-204.”). “The trial court must comply 

with the UCCJEA in order to have subject matter jurisdiction over juvenile abuse, 

neglect, and dependency cases and termination of parental rights cases.” In re L.T., 

374 N.C. at 569. Although respondent-mother makes no mention of these statutes, 

nonetheless the scope of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction here, and the 
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extent to which it is impacted—if at all—by the availability of the courts of South 

Carolina, is properly determined by consulting the applicable provisions of this

enactment. 

¶ 36 Under the UCCJEA, 

[g]enerally, North Carolina courts have jurisdiction to 

make a child custody determination if North Carolina is 

the home state of the child. N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(1). 

“ ‘Home state’ means the state in which a child lived with 

a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six 

consecutive months immediately before the 

commencement of a child-custody proceeding.” N.C.G.S. 

§ 50A-102(7) (2017). If a court of another state has home 

state jurisdiction, North Carolina courts do not have 

jurisdiction unless one of several statutory exceptions 

applies. 

In re S.E., 373 N.C. 360, 364 (2020).

¶ 37 Respondent-mother observes that “[i]t is undisputed that [Mike] resided in 

South Carolina with his grandmother for 131 days including the day of the filing of 

the Petition” on 13 February 2019. Because 131 days is less than the six consecutive 

months required by N.C.G.S. § 50A-102(7) for home state recognition, South Carolina 

is not Mike’s home state for jurisdictional purposes under the UCCJEA. Furthermore, 

as the guardian ad litem correctly notes, Mike was born in late April of 2018 and 

therefore had not been alive for a full six months at the time that he left North 

Carolina to live with his maternal grandmother in South Carolina on 15 October 

2018. We agree with the contention that Mike had no home state under the UCCJEA, 
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because (1) Mike had not lived in any state for at least six consecutive months prior 

to the petition being filed, and (2) although Mike was less than six months of age, he 

had not lived from birth in any one state with a parent or person acting as a parent. 

N.C.G.S. § 50A-102(7).

¶ 38 Also, the UCCJEA provides, due to North Carolina’s adoption of it, that “a 

court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination” in 

the following circumstances:

a. The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least 

one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant 

connection with this State other than mere physical 

presence; and

b. Substantial evidence is available in this State 

concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and 

personal relationships[.]

N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(2) (2019). “The trial court is not required to make specific 

findings of fact demonstrating its jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, but the record 

must reflect that the jurisdictional prerequisites in the Act were satisfied when the 

court exercised jurisdiction.” In re L.T., 374 N.C. at 569.

¶ 39 The record in the case sub judice illustrates that both Mike and respondentmother had a significant connection with North Carolina beyond their mere presence 

in the state at the time WCHS filed its petition on 13 February 2019. See N.C.G.S. 

§ 50A-201(a)(2)(a). Respondent-mother had been a North Carolina resident at least 

since Mike’s birth and had a CPS history in both Vance and Wake Counties. M.T., 
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one of respondent-mother’s older children, and two of respondent-mother’s safety 

resources, Theresa R. and Donna W., were also North Carolina residents.

Respondent-mother was also on probation in North Carolina and had additional 

criminal charges pending. Mike was born in North Carolina and lived in the state

before he was taken to South Carolina to live with his maternal grandmother on 15 

October 2018. Mike’s mother and an older sibling continued to reside in North 

Carolina at the time that the petition was filed. 

¶ 40 The record further reflects that substantial evidence was available in North 

Carolina regarding Mike’s care and family history at the time that the petition was 

filed. See N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(2)(b). Respondent-mother, Theresa R., and Donna W. 

were all located in North Carolina, and so were (1) the hospital where Mike was born 

and where Mike tested positive for methadone and marijuana, (2) two child protective 

services agencies that investigated, and consistently provided services to, the family 

since Mike’s birth, and (3) the police department that responded to respondentmother’s false report of Mike’s abduction by his maternal grandmother on 11 

February 2019. Therefore, the District Court, Wake County properly exercised 

“significant connection” jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. 

¶ 41 We conclude that the trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the 

juvenile petition filed by WCHS on 13 February 2019. The trial court thereupon

entered its orders placing Mike in WCHS custody in the trial court’s capacity as “a 
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court of competent jurisdiction.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)(3). Accordingly, WCHS had 

standing under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)(3) to file its motion to terminate respondentmother’s parental rights on 12 March 2020 and the trial court had jurisdiction to 

issue the termination of parental rights order. 

B. Best Interests Determination

¶ 42 Respondent-mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion at the 

dispositional stage of the proceeding by determining that it was in Mike’s best 

interests to terminate her parental rights. Respondent-mother argues that the trial 

court did not need to terminate her parental rights because respondent-mother had 

already executed a conditional relinquishment or “specific relinquishment” of her 

rights authorizing Mike to be adopted by her sister and brother-in-law (the 

Petersons).

5 Respondent-mother asserts that the trial court mistakenly believed that 

terminating her parental rights was necessary to provide Mike with legal protections 

beyond those which were conferred by her relinquishment.

¶ 43 Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), if the trial court adjudicates the existence of one 

or more statutory grounds for terminating a respondent-parent’s rights,

it proceeds to the dispositional stage where it must 

“determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in 

 

5 Although respondent-mother posits that the termination order effectively 

“terminated parental rights of a parent that did not exist[,]” she asserts that her appeal is 

not moot because the order may result in adverse collateral consequences to her “including[,] 

but not limited to, a potential termination of parental rights to future children under 

[N.C.]G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9) [(2019)].” 
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the juvenile’s best interest” based on the following factors:

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental 

rights will aid in the accomplishment of the 

permanent plan for the juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the 

parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between 

the juvenile and the proposed adoptive 

parent, guardian, custodian, or other 

permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787, 791 (2020) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)).

¶ 44 The trial court’s determination of a juvenile’s best interests under N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1110(a) is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. In re B.E., 375 N.C. 730, 745 

(2020). “Under this standard, we defer to the trial court’s decision unless it is 

‘manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the 

result of a reasoned decision.’ ” Id. at 745 (quoting In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. at 791). An 

abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court bases its best interests determination 

on a misunderstanding of the relevant law. Id.

¶ 45 Although she did not produce such a document in court, respondent-mother 

adduced testimony at the dispositional hearing that she executed a relinquishment 
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of her parental rights to Mike on 10 July 2020, conditioned upon his adoption by the 

Petersons. See N.C.G.S. § 48-3-704 (2019). The trial court made the following findings 

of fact related to the dispositional criteria in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a):

32. The primary permanent plan for the child is 

adoption and termination of the parents’ parental rights 

will aid in the accomplishment of the primary permanent 

[plan].

33. The child is 2 years of age. He is young and healthy 

and has no developmental issues that are likely to be a 

barrier to adoption.

34. . . . The child has been out of the care of the mother 

since he was approximately 38 days old. He has had limited 

and inconsistent contact with the mother since that time. 

He does not have a substantial parent-child relationship 

with the mother.

35. The child was placed in the home of [Donna W. and 

her husband] as requested by the mother when he came 

into foster care. He has remained in that home since that 

time. His needs are being met in the home and they are 

willing to adopt the child. He has developed a strong, 

appropriate parent-child bond with them. He is happy and 

healthy. He looks to them for comfort, and accepts 

discipline from them.

36. The mother has a sister and brother in law (“the 

[Petersons]”) in South Carolina [who] submitted to an 

ICPC home study for possible placement of the child. They 

would also be willing to adopt the child. The ICPC home 

study was positive. The [Petersons] and the child have had 

a few visits since February, 2020. The child does not have 

a parental bond with the [Petersons] at the present time 

but he has the ability to . . . bond with caregivers and could 

bond with them if they are chosen to adopt him.

37. The child’s young age and availability of at least two 
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families that are committed to adopting him indicates 

[there] is a high probability that this child will be adopted. 

He is in need of a permanent plan of care at the earliest 

possible age which can be obtained only by the severing of 

the relationship between the child and his parents by 

termination of the parental rights of the parents.

As respondent-mother does not contest these findings, they are binding on appeal. In 

re A.M.O., 375 N.C. 717, 720 (2020).

¶ 46 In support of her claim that the trial court acted under a misapprehension of 

law, respondent-mother points to the trial court’s statement in open court which 

expressed concern that Mike might be left without a permanent placement for an 

extended period of time if the trial court did not elect to terminate respondentmother’s parental rights and the Petersons were subsequently unable to adopt the 

child:

[Counsel for respondent-mother] makes a very valid point 

that if I did not find [terminating respondent-mother’s 

parental rights] was in [Mike’s] best interest that the 

mother’s already signed relinquishments and that the 

[Petersons] could -- could just then adopt him. We all know 

that things happen that none of us plan. Something may 

happen in the future that even if the [Petersons] were 

chosen to be the adoptive parents, it could be that 

something would happen to them. And I am not wishing 

anybody any bad luck. Believe me. But -- but things 

happen. 

Af -- after presiding in this courtroom for seventeen and a 

half years, I am very well aware of things that happened 

that interrupt the adoption process. And that is not in 

[Mike’s] best interest. And then we would be right back 

where we would -- where -- where we are right now a year 
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from now, two years from now, or something like that, and 

[Mike] still would not have permanence if the [Petersons] 

were unable to adopt him and if I found that it wasn’t in 

his best interest.

¶ 47 Respondent-mother asserts that “it is very possible that Mike can find 

permanence through adoption with the [Petersons],” and that, even if the Petersons 

were ultimately granted guardianship of Mike in lieu of adoption, “that too is a 

permanency outcome which does not mandate the termination of [her] parental 

rights.” She notes that the trial court made no findings explaining “what conditions 

might be encountered that would interrupt the [Petersons’] adoption process, or 

somehow stall permanence for Mike.” Moreover, notwithstanding the trial court’s 

articulated concerns, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in believing 

that it was necessary to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights in order to 

provide permanency for Mike. She suggests that the trial court could have “held open 

a decision as to [her parental rights] to see if Mike actually found permanence with 

the [Petersons].”

¶ 48 Respondent-mother’s argument is unpersuasive. Assuming that respondentmother did, in fact, execute a valid specific relinquishment of her parental rights to 

Mike expressly to facilitate Mike’s adoption by the Petersons, the adoption statutes 

permit her to revoke her relinquishment if, for whatever reason, the Petersons did 
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not adopt Mike.

6 See N.C.G.S. §§ 48-3-704, -707(b) (2019). Irrespective of the 

Petersons’ willingness or ability to adopt the child, respondent-mother was also free

to challenge the relinquishment at any time prior to entry of the adoption decree on 

the ground that the relinquishment was “obtained by fraud or duress.” N.C.G.S. § 48-

3-707(a)(1) (2019). In either case, Mike would be needlessly denied permanence for 

some period of time. See N.C.G.S. § 48-3-707(c). The trial court’s recognition of 

potential hindrances, whether general or specific, to the realization of Mike’s primary 

permanent plan of adoption does not reflect either a misapprehension of the law or 

an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s contemplation here of the juvenile’s best 

interests.

¶ 49 By terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights, the trial court facilitated 

Mike’s adoption by the Petersons, by Donna W. and her husband—who had already 

developed “a strong, appropriate parent-child bond” with the child—and by any other 

adoptive parents identified and approved by WCHS. Respondent-mother does not 

offer an explanation as to why it is in Mike’s best interests to limit his options for 

adoption to a single family such as the Petersons, to the exclusion of his current 

 

6 Respondent-mother’s observation that the Petersons could be granted guardianship 

of Mike without terminating her parental rights is true, with or without her execution of the 

specific relinquishment. While guardianship provides some measure of permanence for the 

ward, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-600(b) (2019), it does not ensure the same degree of finality as 

adoption. Compare N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-600(b)–(b1), -1000 (2019) (authorizing review and 

termination of guardianship) with N.C.G.S. § 48-1-106 (2019) (describing legal effect of 

adoption and rights of adoptee).
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caretakers or other potential adoptive families. 

¶ 50 The trial court’s written findings reflect its due consideration of the factors in 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and provide a reasoned basis for the trial court’s conclusion 

that the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights would further Mike’s 

best interests by providing the juvenile with “a permanent plan of care at the earliest 

possible age.” See In re B.E., 375 N.C. at 750. We therefore hold that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in terminating the parental rights of respondent-mother

and, consequently, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s 

parental rights. 

III. Conclusion

¶ 51 WCHS had standing to file a motion to terminate the parental rights of 

respondent-mother pursuant to N.C.G.S. 7B-1103(a)(3) because the juvenile Mike 

was placed in the custody of WCHS in February 2019 by a trial court of competent 

jurisdiction. Therefore, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the 

order which terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights.

¶ 52 The trial court did not base its determination of Mike’s best interests upon a 

misapprehension of the law pertaining to the legal effect of respondent-mother’s 

specific relinquishment of her parental rights, nor did the trial court abuse its 

discretion in evaluating its considerations and reaching its conclusions regarding the 

juvenile’s best interests. The trial court properly considered the dispositional factors 
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in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) in concluding that the termination of the parental rights of 

respondent-mother was in the juvenile’s best interests. Accordingly, the trial court’s 

order is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.