y 

McBreen & Kopko 

500 North Broadway, Suite 129 

Jericho, NY 11753 

Bobbee J. Musgrave 

Stephen D. Rynerson 

Bryan Cave LLP 

1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100 

Denver, CO 80203-4541 

Carolyn Clawson 

County Attorney 

County of Montrose, Colorado 

161 S. Townsend Avenue 

Montrose, Colorado 81401 

Re: Jet Center Partners, LLC v. County of Montrose, Colorado 

FAA Docket No. 16-15-11 

Ladies and Gentlemen: 

Enclosed is a copy of the Order of the Director issued in the above~captioned matter under 14 CFR 

Part 16. 

The complaint is dismissed, and the reasons for the dismissal are set forth in the enclosed Order. 

Sincerely, 

Randall S. Fiertz 

Director 

Office of Airport Compliance and Management Analysis 

Enclosure 
Order addressed to: 

Counsel for Complainant 

Leonard D. Kirsch 

Shelley A. Ewalt 

McBreen & Kopko 

500 North Broadway, Suite 129 

Jericho, NY 11753 

Counsel for Respondent 

Bobbee J. Musgrave 

Stephen D. Rynerson 

Bryan Cave LLP 

1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100 

Denver, CO 80203-4541 

Carolyn Clawson 

County Attorney 

County of Montrose, Colorado 

161 S. Townsend Avenue 

Montrose, Colorado 81401 

Hand-Delivered to: 

FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket (AGC-600) 

FAA Office of Airport Compliance and Management Analysis (AC0-100) 

~v4s0 

Claudia Roberts 

Office of Airport Compliance and 

Management Analysis 
) 

v. ) 

) 

COUNTY OF MONTROSE, CO ) 

Respondent ) 

FAA Docket No.16-15-ll 

ORDER OF DIRECTOR 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This matter is before the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), based on the formal complaint 

filed in accordance with the FAA Rules of Practice for Federally Assisted Airport Enforcement 

Proceedings (FAA Rules of Practice), Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 16, and 

on the motion for summary judgment also filed in accordance with the FAA Rules of Practice. 

Jet Center Partners, LLC, (JCP or Complainant) d/b/a Black Canyon Jet Center filed a formal 

Complaint pursuant to 14 CFR Part 16 against the County of Montrose, Colorado 

(County/Respondent/Sponsor), which owns and operates the Montrose Regional Airport 

(Airport) in Montrose County, Colorado. The Complaint contains six allegations labeled as 

causes of action,' in which JCP contended that the Respondent violated 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a) by 

providing more favorable treatment and terms to MTJ FBO Partners, LLC (MTJ), the new 

entrant FBO, 1 thereby unjustly discriminating against JCP, the incumbent FBO. JCP also alleged that Respondent violated 49 U .S.C. § 471 07(a)(13) by its financial agreement with MTJ and the 

associated Ground Lease with Telluride Venture Partners, LLC (TVP), thereby failing to 

maintain a self-sufficient fee and rental structure at the Airport. JCP further claimed that 

Respondent's actions would lead to a violation of 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e) by weakening it, the 

incumbent FBO, and creating the possibility of a prohibited exclusive right for MTJ. 

More specifically, JCP alleged that the Respondent's FBO Agreement with MTJ and associated 

Ground Lease (agreements) violated Federal grant assurances 5, Preserving Rights and Powers; 

22, Economic Nondiscrimination; 23, Exclusive Rights; and 24, Fee and Rental Structure, that it 

unjustly discriminated against JCP, potentially granted a prohibited exclusive right to MTJ, and 

operated to deprive the Sponsor of its rights and powers over airport development and its grant 

assurances. [FAA Exhibit !,Item I pp. 35-54) 

1 A 

fixed~base operator (FBO) is an individual or firm operating at an airpmt and providing general aircraft services such as maintenance, storage, and ground, and flight instruction. [FAA Order 5190.68, Airport Compliance Requirements, Sept. 30, 2009, Appendix Z] 

I 
p

,

y 

g

c

of JCP

s causes of action 

should fail as not ripe, moot, or both. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, pp. 2, 5, 9, 12, 14, 16, and 

20] 

JCP filed an Answer to the County's Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking the Director's 

denial ofthe motion "with respect to all of JCP's causes of action." [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 

6, p. 6] JCP included a Statement of Additional Material Facts. In its Answer, JCP argued that 

its Complaint was ripe when filed, its claims should not be considered moot, and, "in any event, 

guidance from the FAA remains necessary given the ongoing nature of the violations and the 

strong likelihood the County will repeat the challenged conduct" [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6, 

p. 6] JCP also attempted to raise doubts about the status of the County's termination of the 

agreements in question, by, among other things, including correspondence between MTJ and the 

County, in which MTJ contested the termination. (See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6, exhibit 41] 

On October 30, 2015, the County filed a Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Summary 

Judgment and Reply, stating that "After the County filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on 

September 16, 2015, it received two additional pieces of evidence that have a bearing on the 

arguments made by JCP in its Answer. First, the County received on September 17, 2015 a letter 

from Telluride Venture Partners stating that, because the County had terminated the Montrose 

Regional Airport Ground Lease (TVP Lease) on September 1, 2015, TVP also considers the 

Option to Purchase Land that accompanied the TVP Lease to be terminated as well. Second, the 

County received on October 28, 2015 a letter from counsel for Lawrence Danielle, formerly one 

of the co-owners ofMTJ FBO Partners, LLC, advising that Mr. Danielle, Majestic Skies, LLC, 

and Four D's Montrose LLC, three of the co-owners ofMTJ, had assigned their ownership 

interest in MTJ itself and the MTJ FBO Agreement to TVP and an entity called TSG Asset 

Holdings, LLC as part of a settlement agreement." [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 7, p. 2-3] 

The County argues that the termination of the MTJ FBO Agreement and the TVP Ground Lease 

should be sufficient in and of themselves to cure the alleged grant assurance violations regardless 

of whether MTJ and TVP 'actively contest' the termination of those agreements, TVP's 

acknowledgment that the option agreement accompanying the TVP Lease has been terminated as 

well further undercuts the foundations of JCP's complaint. The County additionally argues that 

(1) JCP cites no FAA-related authority for the proposition that the 'capable of repetition but 

evading review' standard has any applicability to Part 16 proceedings, and (2) JCP ignores basic 

principles of contract law with regard to the alleged failure to 'completely terminate the 

agreements with MTJ and TVP. [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 7] 

On November 3, 2015, JCP's counsel filed a brief e-mail reply to the County's Motion for Leave 

to File Reply in Support of Summary Judgment stating: 

2 
g

, 

, 

p

p

cy, the Director 

will consider and treat the County's Motion for Summary Judgment as a Motion to Dismiss. The 

Director considers the County's arguments that JCP's claims are not ripe and are moot, as 

assertions properly made pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss, rather than a Motion for Summary 

Judgment. Similarly, JCP's responses as to ripeness, mootness, also derive from the factors that 

may be pertinent to a Motion to Dismiss, as opposed to a Motion for Summary Judgment. 

The Director may take this action under his power and authority to regulate the course of a Part 

16 docket. See § 16.ll(a). Pursuant to Part 16, the Director has the ability "to take ... actions as 

are necessary to fulfill the purposes of this part." Here, the Director believes it is necessary to 

act on the substance of both the Motion and Answer, which requires that the County's Motion be 

considered a Motion to Dismiss and JCP's answer be considered an Answer to the Motion to 

Dismiss, despite the manner in which they presently are styled. 2 

Accordingly, as set forth more fully herein the Director finds that the Cmmty's Motion for 

Dismissal should be granted and the Complaint should be dismissed. 

II. PARTIES 

A. Airport 

Montrose Regional Airport (Airport) is a public-use airport owned by Montrose County and 

operated by the Montrose Board of County Commissioners (BOCC), Montrose County, 

Colorado. The Airport is a primary commercial service airport located in southwest Colorado in 

the City of Montrose, approximately 65 miles from the Telluride Ski Resort and the City of 

Grand Junction, Colorado, respectively. The Airport site is approximately 1,100 acres. [See 

FAA EXHIBIT I, Item I, pp. 8-9 and Item 1. exhibit 8, p. 5) 

FAA records indicate the planning and development of the Airport has been financed with funds 

provided by the FAA under the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) authorized by the Airport 

and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, as amended, 49 U.S. C.§ 47101, et seq. [See FAA 

EXHIBIT I. Item I, exhibit 7] 

2 A motion to dismiss is more apropos to the situation in this case, and our disposition of such a motion analyzes 

both the ripeness and mootness issues, we believe that our course of action and construction of the pleadings are 

proper. 

3 
, pp

, 

, 

]

III. BACKGROUND 

The County and JCP negotiated the terms of an FBO Agreement for JCP which was signed 

December 5, 2005, effective January 4, 2006, for an initial term of20 years and an option to 

extend for an additional ten year period. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item I, exhibit 9, p. 3]3 

The County, under the JCP Agreement, committed to make certain improvements to the fuel 

farm and to demolish the old tenninal and two hangars. JCP was obligated to make other 

improvements to the fuel fann, contribute $10,000 towards the demolition costs, and buy out the 

balance on the County's lease-purchase of the MTJ Air Services building that JCP would use. 

[See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 1, exhibit 8, p. 15; Item 10] 

In August, 2013, in response to inquiries from a Majestic Skies member about operating a 

second FBO on the Airport, the Airport Director issued an RFP for a second FBO to operate onAirport. The RFP required the FBO to: 

• provide services in accordance with the Airport's Minim tun Standards, 

• pay a guaranteed minimum annual payment of $350,000 for rental payment and fuel 

flowage fees, 

• not use off-Airport or "through the fence" property not located within the Airport 

property as shown on the Airpmt Layout Plan, and 

• construct an FBO terminal and hangar improvements that revert to the County at the 

end of the Agreement. 

[See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 1, exhibit 2] 

In October, 2013, two proposals were submitted, one from Telski Aviation (Telski) and one fi·om 

Majestic Skies, LLC (Majestic). Telski's proposal stated it was a new entity to be managed by 

TSG Asset Holdings, LLC, ovvned by the Telluride Ski & Golf Resort ownership group. Telski 

would enter into an agreement with Cutter Aviation under which Cutter would manage and 

operate the FBO on the off-Airport property known as One Creative Place, LLC (OCP) and used 

by JetAway Aviation, LLC (JetAway) a related company. On Januruy 21, 2014, the County 

determined that Telski's proposal did not comply with the RFP because that proposal required 

3 In connection with the JCP FBO agreement, on December 5, 2005, the County amended the 2003 Minimum 

Standards to conform to the FBO agreement negotiated with JCP, namely increasing the minimum leasehold area to 

350,000 (from 125,000) square feet, decreasing the hangar door height to 28 (from 30) feet, and allowing the FBO a 

"reasonable amount of time" to construct the required improvements duri11g which the FBO would provide 

uninterrupted services at the Airport. [See FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 1, exhibit 9, p. 14; Item I, exhibit 2, Att. D, 

p.17] 

4 
,

q

p 

p

, 

uct those facilities in 

Phase One,

 and require the 

County to reimburse the total cost through rent credits over time. Phase One would also include 

building one hangar and the FBO office. Phase Two would include an additional 200,000 square 

foot of ramp, T hangars as necessary, and a second 27,000 square foot hangar. [See FAA 

EXHIBIT I, Item I, exhibit 20] 

Majestic further stated that it would meet the $350,000 annual minimwn guarantee by paying: 

• $95,920 rent at $0.08 per square foot for the 508,000 square feet land and $1.00 per 

square foot for the 60,000 square foot facility it would construct; and 

• $67,500 in fuel flowage fees based on $0.09 per gallon at a projected 750,000 gallons 

of fuel volume. [See FAA EXHIBIT I, Item I, exhibit 20] 

On May 13, 2014, JCP counsel advised the County of its concerns that Majestic's financial 

proposal and other arrangements would unjustly discriminate against JCP and create an unlawful 

exclusive right on the part of Majestic. JCP counsel pointed out that the County has spent 

$800,000 on JCP's infrastructure, whereas Majestic proposed that the County provide $5 million 

in credits. [See FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 1, exhibit 22, pp.1-7] 

In July, 2014, after soliciting interest in additional FBOs at the Airport through a Request for 

Proposals (RFP) process, the County entered into an FBO Agreement with Majestic Skies, LLC 

(Majestic) under which Majestic would develop a general aviation te1minal, hangar facilities, a 

ramp and a fuel fann on land leased from the Airport. The te1ms of the Majestic FBO Agreement 

provided that, during an approximately three-year "start-up" period, Majestic would receive up to a 

$5,000,000 rent credit from the County for its costs to develop the ramp and fuel farm 

infrastructure. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 1, exhibit 3] 

In October, 2014, litigation was initiated in Colorado State Court as to whether the County's 

decision to bind future taxpayers to the costs of the financial incentives in the Majestic FBO 

without submitting the question to a vote violated the Taxpayer Bill of Rights amendment 

(TABOR lawsuit). [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 1, exhibit 4] 

On February 17, 2015, upon the request of Majestic and associated parties, the County assigned 

the Majestic FBO Agreement to MTJ FBO Partners, LLC (MTJ). During the period of its FBO 

Agreement with the County, Majestic had not provided FBO services at the Airport and did not 

receive any payments from the County. {See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, p. 2] 

The MTJ FBO Agreement (Agreement) provided: 

5 
The Agreement required MTJ, at its sole expense, to develop the following in Phase One: 

• at least one hangar facility totaling a minimum of 25,000 square feet of hangar and shop 

space, with at least one hangar being capable of storing one Gulfstream V or larger 

aircraft, and 

• ground vehicle parking. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, 11em 1, exhibit 5] 

The Agreement obligated the County to construct: 

• an access road from Highway 50 to the Exhibit B premises and 

• a connector taxiway to the Exhibit B premises, within 36 months. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, 

Item I, exhibit 5] 

The Agreement obligated MTJ to pay: 

• fuel flowage fees of$0.12/gallon, subject to $0.01 increases in 2017 and at subsequent 

four year intervals; 

• minimum annual fuel flowage payment guarantee of either the fuel flowage fee or 

$250,000 yearly; 

• annual hangar concession fee of$1.00 per square foot for the existing 40,000 square 

feet of hangar storage area on Exhibit C premises and for any proposed hangar storage 

area; 

• base rent of Parcel 1 premises of $0.1831 per square foot per year (su~ject to credit by 

County for actual cost to develop ramp and fuel fann infrastructure); 

• base rent ofParcel2 premises of$0.05 per square foot per year (subject to credit by 

County for actual cost to develop ramp and fuel farm infrastructure); 

• annual base rent for of$0.1831 per square foot of Exhibit C premises and $0.05 per 

square foot for the 337,292 square feet unimproved land, and 

• minimum annual guarantee of $350,000/year, commencing on the date MTJ 

completed Phase I, has full occupancy of Phase II and is conducting FBO operations 

on those properties; MTJ may not use the credit to offset the minimum annual 

guarantee in the event until January 1, 2019, in the event MTJ becomes the sole FBO 

at the Airport. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 1, exhibit 5] 

At the same period in time, the County entered into a Ground Lease with TVP, with option to 

purchase, the "JetAway site" adjacent to the Airport. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 1, exhibit 6] 

That site contained a restrictive covenant that prohibited the sale of aviation fuel encumbering 

6 
]

e

o

y, however, in a July 7, 2015, letter to MTJ, the County raised several 

questions and concerns. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6, exhibit 36] More specifically, the 

County requested additional infonnation on the ownership ofMTJ FBO Partners, TVP, and 

associated entities and any contractual or similar adverse actions taken against them by the 

federal government. The County also expressed concern about an impending lien on the Ground 

Lease property. Additionally, the County noted that FBO construction activity had ceased and 

directed MTJ to recommence construction. On July 24, 2015, the County sent a follow-up letter 

for MTJ to comply with certain contractual obligations and to recommence construction. [See 

FAA EXHIBIT 1, ltem 6, exhibit 37] On July 31, 20I 5, MTJ requested an opportunity to cure 

the alleged defaults. [See FAA EXHIIT 1, Item 6, exhibit 38] 

Shmtly thereafter, on August 7, 2015, the County sought MTJ's acknowledgement that the FBO 

Agreement "is no longer a viable agreement; and therefore, it is tem1inated," stating that the 

periods for cure of certain breaches had expired, that other breaches were grounds for rescission 

and termination, that the MTJ o-wnership needed County approval, and there had been no 

construction activity since May. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6, exhibit 39] MTJ, on August 13, 

2015, responded to the County's termination notice, claiming it was in compliance with certain 

disputed contractual obligations, that it had right to cure any deficiencies in any event, and that it 

faced "unanticipated delays that have temporarily suspended construction" but was in 

compliance with its construction obligations. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6, exhibit 40]. 

The County, on August 19,2015, notified MTJ that its FBO Agreement was terminated. [See 

FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 2, exhibit 2 and exhibil3] 

MTJ, on August 21,2015, responded to the County by objecting to the termination and 

committing to resolving the outstanding issues with the County. [See FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 6, 

exhibit 41 ]. On August 24, 2015, the County alerted MTJ and TVP that the impending removal 

of perimeter fencing at the TVP property (due to MTJ's failure to pay vendors) constituted an 

"emergency situation" with security and safety consequences and demanded that the vendors be 

paid. The County also required MTJ and/or TVP to perfonn needed work to reopen certain 

taxiways, and to pay other vendors. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6, exhibit42] 

During the period of the Agreement with the County, MTJ did not provide FBO services at the 

Airport and did not receive any payments from the County. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, 

exhibit I] 

4 See, JetAway Aviation LLC v. Board of County Commissioners. Montrose County. Colorado, FAA Docket No. 

16-08-01, p. 8 (July 2, 2009) (JetAway II), stating, in reference to the off-airport site in question, "Jetaway can selffuel aircraft but cannot fuel any other aircraft." 

7 
JCP alleged that disparate financial tenns in the respective agreements unfairly favored MTJ and 

tmjustly discriminated against JCP through unequal treatment in FBO rental rates (1 0.6 

cents/square foot charged to MTJ vs. 20 cents/square foot charged to JCP), location and siting of 

leased FBO properties (MTJ leases two parcels of 1,070,967 square foot, each contiguous, 

exclusive and highly visible vs. JCP's multiple, non-contiguous parcels totaling 434,162 square 

feet much of which is non-exclusive), rent credits ($5 million to MTJ vs. none to JCP), abatement 

of property taxes on the Ground Lease ($1 00,000+ for MTJ vs. none for JCP), commitments to 

build infTastructure (private off-Airport access road and connector taxiway to MTJ FBO site vs. 

none for JCP), FBO construction obligations (MTJ may use an existing building for a general 

aviation terminal and hangar vs. JCP was required to build at its own expense and general aviation 

terminal and a high cube hangar); and ownership of FBO facilities at lease termination (MTJ and 

partners retain ownership of primary FBO facility vs. JCP's facility improvements revert to 

County). 

JCP argued that the allegedly unfair and discriminatory financial terms would uneven the playing 

field and favor MTJ to the ultimate detriment ofFBO competition at the Airport. 

Second Cause o{Action-The County's Disparate Application of Minimum Standards Constitutes 

an Independent Violation of Grant Assurance 22. Economic Nondiscrimination. 

JCP alleged that the County unfairly waived MTJ's obligation to comply with the Airport 

Minimum Standards, by allowing MTJ to use a hangar of insufficient door height and by failing to 

evaluate the expertise and qualifications of Majestic and ofMTJ personnel involved in the FBO 

operations. In contrast, the County investigated the background of JCP's personnel during the 

2005 RFP process. 

Third Cause o{Action-The Countv 's Failure to Follow its Own RFP Process Violated Grant 

Assurances 22. Economic Nondiscrimination and 24. Fee and Rental Structure 

JCP claimed that the County improperly found Majestic's proposal to comply with the RFP, 

despite the fact that Majestic's proposal did not include the $350,000 minimum ammal 

guaranteed payment and demanded a $5 million credit to offset the minimum annual guarantee 

payment. The County, according to JCP,jeopardized its self-sustainability by agreeing to 

provide the rent credit. Additionally, JCP maintained that the County should have conducted 

another RFP before entering into an amended Agreement with MTJ on the JetAway site, which 

previously was considered nonresponsive to the 2013 RFP. JCP further asserted that these 

actions demonstrated that the County did not maintain reasonable, consistent, and transparent 

processes supporting its rental structure, and did not treat commercial aeronautical service 

8 
e County failed to consider prior expert opinion of insufficient demand at the 

Airport to support two FBO's, and that one of the FBO's could be driven out of business if two 

FBO's operated at the Airport. Further, JCP argued that the financial incentives would 

materially worsen the Airport's finances, cause potential FBO providers to demand the same 

financial incentives, jeopardize Respondent's financial control of the Airport, and cause 

Respondent wmecessary litigation expense and exposure. 

Fifth Cause o(Action-The County's Reversal o(Position in Approving the Off:Airport JetAway 

Site fOr FBO Operations Violated Grant Assurance 5, Preserving Rights and Powers. 

JCP contended that the County acted imprudently, in terms of operating the Airport in a safe and 

fiscally responsible manner, by the lease and lease-back arrangement under which MTJ would 

operate as an FBO on the JetAway site. JCP claimed that the County improperly reversed the 

positions it advocated regarding the site in JetAway II. 

Sixth Cause of Action The County's Lease-Leaseback o(Encumbered, O{f:Airport Land But 

Not the Improvements Jeopardizes the County's Control ofthe Airport in Violation of Grant 

Assurance 5, Preserving Rights and Powers and 24. Fee and Rental Structw-e. 

JCP asserted that the County's Ground Lease and lease~back to MTJ of the JetAway site----that 

was subject to a restrictive covenant prohibiting aviation fuel sales~jeopardized the County's 

control of, and rights and powers over, the Airport. JCP claimed the transaction required the 

County to abate the real estate taxes paid by TVP and to pay rent on land that was incapable of 

generating income from FBO operations or aviation fuel sales. JCP also argued that the terms of 

the Ground Lease limited the County's ability to address safety issues that may arise from 

structures and operations on the property; that any improvements made to the building on the 

JetAway site would not revert to the County~unless the County exercised its option to purchase 

the property, for an amount to be detennined; and that if the mortgagee of the site forecloses on 

the property, the County would lose its control over the land. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 1] 

On September 1, 2015, the County notified TVP and MTJ that it had tenninated the TVP Ground 

Lease and the property reverted to TVP. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, exhibit 1] During the 

period of the Ground Lease, the County did not pay rent or other consideration to TVP. [See 

FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, exhibit 1] On September 9, 2015, the County terminated tl1e MTJ 

Hangar Ground Lease. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6, exhibit 43] 

On September 17, 2015, the County filed a Motion for Sununary Judgment. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, 

Item 2] 

9 
, 

6] 

On November 2, 2015, the County filed a Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of 

Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Summary Judgment. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 7] 

On November 3 2015, JCP filed via email, a position in opposition to the County's Motion for 

Leave. [FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 8] 

IV. APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW AND FAA POLICY 

The Federal role in civil aviation has been augmented by various legislative actions that 

authorize programs for providing Federal funds to local communities for the development of 

airport facilities. In each such program, the airport sponsor assumes certain obligations to 

maintain and operate its airport facilities safely and efficiently and in accordance with specified 

conditions. Commitments assumed by airport sponsors in grant agreements are important factors 

in maintaining a high degree of safety and efficiency in airpmt design, construction, operation 

and maintenance, as well as ensuring the public reasonable aeronautical access. 

Title 49 U.S.C. §471 01, et seq., provides for Federal airport financial assistance for the 

development of public-use airports under the Airport Improvement Program (AlP) established by 

the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, as amended. Title 49 U.S.C. § 47107, ef seq., 

sets forth assurances to which an airport sponsor agrees as a condition of receiving Federal 

financial assistance. Upon acceptance of an AlP grant, the assurances become a binding 

contractual obligation between the airport sponsor and the Federal government. The assurances 

made by airport sponsors in AlP grant agreements are important factors in maintaining a viable 

national airport system. 

Airport Sponsor Assurances 

As a condition precedent to providing airport development assistance under the Airpmt 

Improvement Program, 49 U.S.C. § 47107, et seq., the Secretary of Transportation and, by 

extension, the FAA must receive certain assurances from the airport sponsor. Title 49 U.S.C. § 

47107(a) sets forth the statutory sponsorship requirements to which an airport sponsor receiving 

Federal financial assistance must agree. 

IO 
assurances are relevant to this Complaint: 

Grant Assurance 5, Preserving Rights and Powers 

Grant Assurance 5, Preserving Rights and Powers, implements the provisions of Title 49 U.S.C. 

§ 47107, and requires, in pertinent part, that the sponsor of a Federally-obligated airport: 

... will not take or permit any action which would operate to deprive it of any of 

the rights and powers necessary to perform any or all of the terms, conditions, 

and assurances in the grant agreement without the written approval of the 

Secretary, and will act promptly to acquire, exlinguish or modify any outstanding 

rights or claims o.f"right of others which would inteJfere with such pe1jormance by 

the sponsor. This shall be done in a manner acceptable to the Secretwy. 

[Assurance 5, Order 5I90.6B, Appendix A][ 

The Order describes the responsibilities under Grant Assurance 5 assumed by the owners or 

operators of public-use airports developed with Federal assistance. [See FAA Order 5190.6B, 

Chapter 6] 

Grant Assurance 22, Economic Nondiscrimination 

The owner or operator of an airport developed with Federal grant assistance is required to 

operate the airport for the use and benefit of the public. Federal grant assurance 22, Economic 

Nondiscrimination, (Assurance 22) deals with both the reasonableness of airport access and the 

prohibition of adopting unjustly discriminatory conditions. Assurance 22 implements the 

provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 47I 07(a)(I) through (6), and requires, in pertinent part: 

{The airport owner or sponsor] will make the airport available as an airport for public 

use on reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination to all types, kinds and classes 

of aeronautical activities, including commercial aeronautical activities offering services 

to the public at the airport. [Assurance 22(a), FAA Order 5I90.6B, Appendix A] 

Each fixed-based operator at the airport shall be subject to the same rates, fees, rentals, 

and other charges as are uniformly applicable to all other fixed-base operators making 

the same or similar uses of such abport and utilizing the same or similar facilities. 

[Assurance 22(c)] 

5 See, e.g., the Federal Aviation Act of !958, as amended and recodified, Title 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101,40113, 

40114, 46101, 46104, 46105, 46106, 46110; and the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, as amended 

and recodified, Title 49 U.S.C. §§ 47105(d), 47106{d), 47107(k), 47107(1), 47111(d), 47122. 

II 
Subsection (h) qualifies subsection (a), and subsection (i) represents an exception to subsection 

(a) to permit the sponsor to exercise control of the airport sufficient to preclude unsafe and 

inefficient conditions that would be detrimental to the civil aviation needs of the public. 

In all cases involving restrictions on airport use imposed by airport owners or operators for 

safety and efficiency reasons, the FAA will make the final determination on the reasonableness 

of such restrictions when those restrictions deny or limit access to, or use of, the airport. [FAA 

Order 5190.6B, Chapter 14] 

Grant Assurance 23, Exclusive Rights 

Federal grant assurance 23, Exclusive Rights, (Assurance 23) implements the provisions of 49 

U.S.C. §§ 401 03(e) and 471 07(a)( 4), and requires, in pertinent part, that the owner or operator of 

a Federally obligated airport: 

... will permit not exclusive right for the use oft he airport by any persons providing, or 

intending to provide aeronautical services to the public .... It further agrees that it will 

not, either directly or indirectly grant or permit any person, firm, or COJ]JOration, the 

exclusive right a/the airport to conduct any aeronautical activities. [Assurance 23, FAA 

Order 5!90.6B, Appendix A] 

While public-use airports may impose qualifications and minimum standards upon those who 

engage in aeronautical activities, FAA has taken the position that the application of any 

unreasonable requirement or any standard that is applied in an unjustly discriminatory manner 

may constitute the constructive grant of an exclusive right. Courts have found the grant of an 

exclusive right where a significant burden has been placed on one competitor that is not placed 

on another. [See e.g., Pompano Beach v. FAA, 774 F.2d 1529 (II <h Cir, 1985)] See also, FAA 

Advisory Circular 150/5190-6 Exclusive Rights at Federally-Obligated Airports, January 4, 

2007J An owner or operator is under no obligation, however, to permit aircraft owners to 

introduce onto the airport equipment, personnel, or practices which would be unsafe, detrimental 

to the public welfare, or which would affect the efficient use of airport facilities. [FAA Order 

5190.6B, Chapter 8] 

Grant Assurance 24, Fee and Rental Structure 

Grant assurance 24, Fee and Rental Structure, addresses fees the owner or operator charges 

airport users in exchange for the facilities or services the airport provides. 

12 
structure that will make the airport as self

sustaining as possible under the circumstances existing 

at the particular airport, taking into account such factors as the volume of traffic and economy of 

collection. Such sponsor will maintain a fee and rental structure consistent with assurances 22, 

Economic Nondiscrimination, and 23, Exclusive Rights. The intent of the assurance is that the 

airport owner or operator to charge fees for aeronautical use that are sufficient to cover as much 

of the airport's costs as are feasible and to charge market-based fees for non-aeronautical use. 

[FAA Order 5190.6B, Chapter 17] 

The FAA Airport Compliance Program 

The FAA discharges its responsibilities for ensuring each airport owner's compliance with its 

federal obligations through the FAA Airport Compliance Program. The FAA's airport 

compliance efforts are based on the contractual obligations an airport owner accepts when 

receiving federal grant funds or the transfer of federal property for airport purposes. These 

obligations are incorporated in grant agreements and instruments of conveyance in order to 

protect the public's interest in civil aviation and to ensure compliance with federal laws. 

The Airport Compliance Program is designed to ensure the availability of a national system of 

safe and properly maintained public-use airports operated in a manner consistent with each 

airport owner's federal obligations and the public's investment in civil aviation. 

The Airport Compliance Program does not control or direct the operation of airports. Rather, it 

monitors the administration of the valuable rights pledged by airport sponsors to the people of 

the United States in exchange for monetary grants and donations of federal property to ensure 

that the public interest is being served. FAA Order 5190.6B sets forth policies and procedures 

for the FAA Airport Compliance Program. The Order is not regulatory and is not controlling 

with regard to airport sponsor conduct. Rather, it establishes the policies and procedures to be 

followed by FAA personnel in canying out the FAA's responsibilities for ensuring airport 

compliance. It provides basic guidance for FAA personnel in interpreting and administering the 

various continuing commitments made to the United States by airport owners as a condition of 

receiving a grant of federal funds or the conveyance of federal property for airport purposes. 

The Order analyzes the various obligations set forth in the standard airport sponsor assurances in 

the operation of public-use airports, and facilitates interpretation of the assurances by FAA 

personnel. 

The FAA Compliance Program is designed to achieve voluntary compliance with Federal 

obligations accepted by owners and/or operators of public-use airports developed with FAAadministered assistance. Therefore, in addressing allegations of noncompliance, the FAA will 

make a determination as to whether an airport sponsor is currently in compliance with the 

13 
Practice for Federally assisted Airport Enforcement Proceedings (14 CFR Part 16) 1l1ese 

enforcement procedures were published in the Federal Register (61 FR 53998, Oct. 16, 1996), 

effective Dec. 16, 1996. Amendments to the Rules of Practice also were published in the Federal 

Register (78 FR 56148 (Sept. 12, 2013), effective November 12,2013. 

The Complaint, Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment, and Appeal Process 

Pursuantto 14 CFR, Part 16, § 16.23, a person directly and substantially affected by any alleged 

noncompliance may file a complaint with the FAA. The complaint shall provide a concise but 

complete statement of the facts relied upon to substantiate each allegation. The complaint shall 

also describe how the complainant was directly and substantially affected by the things done or 

omitted by the respondent. See§ 16.23(b)(4). 

Part 16 further provides that the burden of proof is on the complainant to show noncompliance 

with a statute, regulation, order, agreement, or document of conveyance. § 16.23(1<)(1 ). The 

proponent of a motion (including a motion to dismiss, or for summary judgment), request, or order 

has the burden of proof. See § 16.23(k)(2). Additionally, a party who has asserted an affirmative 

defense has the burden of proving the affirmative defense. See §16.23(k)(3). This standard 

burden of proof is consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Federal case law. 

The APA provision states, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or 

order has the burden of proof." [5 U.S.C. § 556(d)] See also, Director, Office of Worker's 

Compensation Programs, Dept, of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 US 267,272 (1994); Air Canada v. Dept ofTransp., 148 F.3d 1142, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

Pursuant to 14 CFR, Part 16, § 16.26(a), a respondent may file, in lieu of an answer to a complaint, 

a motion to dismiss the complaint or a motion for summary judgment on the complaint. 

A motion to dismiss a complaint must state the reasons for seeking dismissal of either the entire 

complaint or of specified claims in the complaint. To prevail, the respondent must show either 

(1) the complaint, on its face, is outside the FAA's jurisdiction; (2) the complaint, on its face, 

does not state a claim that warrants an investigation or further FAA action; or (3) the 

complainant lacks standing, under §§ 16.3 and 16.23, to file a complaint. The respondent is 

expected to file a supporting memorandum of points and authorities. § 16.26(b)(1 ), (2). 

The complainant may file an answer to the motion to dismiss within 10 days of the date of 

service, or such other period as set by the Director. The complainant is expected to include a 

statement of reasons opposing dismissal and may also include affidavits and other documentary 

evidence. The Director may issue an order disposing of the motion, within 30 days of the date 

that an answer to a motion is due. Should the Director deny the motion to dismiss in whole or in 

14 
genuine issue o

ate

a

act 

o

a

t 

6 adjud

cat

o

a

d t

at t

e co

p

a

t, w

e

v

ewed 

t

e 

light most favorable to the complainant, should be summarily adjudicated in respondenfs favor 

as a matter a flaw. The respondent is expected to file a statement of the material facts as to 

which respondent contends there is no genuine issue of material fact, and may include affidavits 

and documentary evidence.§ 16.26(c)(l), (2). 

The complainant may file an answer to the motion for summary judgment within 10 days of the 

date of service, or such other period as set by the Director. The complainant is expected to 

include a statement of facts as to which the complainant claims there is a genuine issue and may 

also include affidavits and other documentary evidence. The Director may issue an order 

disposing of the motion, within 30 days of the date that an answer to a motion is due. Should the 

Director deny the motion in whole or in part or grant the motion in part, the respondent shall file 

an answer to the complaint within 20 days of service of the order. Further, should the Director 

not act on the motion for summary judgment within 30 days of the date an answer to the motion 

is due, the respondent shall file an answer to the complaint within the next 20 days.§ 16.26 

(c)(3)-(5). 

Part 16 further provides that a party adversely affected by a Director's Detennination, including 

an order on a motion to dismiss, or for summary judgment, may file in accordance with § 16.13 

and serve in accordance with § 16.15 a simultaneous Notice of Appeal and Brief, within 30 days 

after service of the initial determination. The Associate Administrator will issue a final decision 

and order within 60 days after the due date of the reply, per § 16.33(g). Additionally, in 

accordance with 14 CPR§ 16.33(h), if no appeal is filed within the time period, the Director's 

Determination becomes the final decision and order of the FAA without further action. A 

Director's Determination that becomes final, because of no administrative appeal, is not 

judicially reviewable. 

On appeal, the Associate Administrator will consider the issues addressed in any order on a 

motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment and any issues accepted in the Director's 

Determination using the following analysis: 

(I) Are the findings of fact each supported by a preponderance of reliable probative, and 

substantial evidence contained in the record? 

(2) Are conclusions made in accordance with law, precedent, and policy? 

(3) Are questions on appeal substantial? 

(4) Have any prejudicial errors occurred? See 14 CFR § 16.33(e) 

15 
compliance

 with the grant assurances, and therefore JCP

s complaint warranted dismissal 

because, on its face, it was not ripe and was moot. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, p. 4 et seq.] 

JCP filed an answer containing reasons opposing dismissal of its complaint as not ripe and moot. 

[See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6, pp. 6, 11. 17. and 22. JCP also filed supporting docwnents and 

affidavits] JCP sought to have its causes of action resolved by a Director's Determination or 

guidance. as appropriate. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6. pp. 23-24] 

As described above, the Director has the authority to take actions as are necessary to conduct Part 

16 processes in the public interest. § 16.11. That authority includes actions to improve the 

efficiency of managing the docket. See FAA Amendment to Rules of Praclice, 77 FR 56135, 

56136, 56140. After careful consideration of the facts, pleadings, and applicable law and policy, 

the Director has determined that neither party would be prejudiced by considering the County's 

motion as a motion to dismiss under § 16.26(b ). 

As explained below, the Director finds the claims raised in the Complaint not ripe, because JCP 

has not been harmed or adversely affected by the alleged grant violations on the part of the 

County, and the claims are moot due to the County's termination of the agreements at issue. 

We will discuss the ripeness issue first, and the mootness issue in context with the issue of current 

compliance. 

Ripeness Discussion of County's Arguments 

The County posited that, to be ripe, a Complainant must show harm and be adversely affected by 

the Respondent's actions. Because JCP showed no harm and was not adversely affected by the 

agreements, the County claimed JCP's Complaint was not ripe. The County relied on Drake 

Aerial Entemrises v. City of Cleveland, FAA Docket No. 16-09-02 (Feb. 22. 201 0) for the 

principle that "the Director crumot investigate allegations of an airport sponsor's grant assurance 

violations if the Complainant has not yet been harmed" and that an "issue is not ripe for review 

until the Complainant is adversely affected by it." (!d. at 20). The County also depended on 

Northwest Airlines. Inc. v. Indianapolis Aimort Authority, FAA Docket No. 16~07-04 (Aug. 18, 

2008) (Director's Determination) to support its argument that a claim is not ripe if the airport 

sponsor had not yet taken an action that adversely affected the complainant. The County 

proceeded to argue that none of JCP's causes of action were ripe: 

16 
a factual basis. The County cited to Northwest Airlines and to Ashton v. City of Concord, FAA 

Docket No. 16-02-01, Aug. 22,2003 (Director's Determination at 32-33) and Final Decision and 

Order (Feb. 27, 2004) in support of its arguments. It distinguished Aircraft Management Services. 

Inc. v Santa Rosa County. Florida, FAA Docket 16-12-02 (Director's Determination) (Mar. 27, 

2015) from the current case by pointing out that the competing FBO was actually operated at the 

airport and that the complainant had suffered a negative impact. 

The County further contended that JCP has not shown that MTJ actually has provided, or is 

providing, FBO services at the Airport; and that JCP has not demonstrated any harm from the MTJ 

FBO Agreement. Further, even if the disputed agreements were currently in effect, JCP had not 

shown any adverse effects. 

Second Cause of Action-Application of Minimum Standards 

The County moved that this cause of action be dismissed as not ripe because JCP did not show that 

either Majestic or MTJ actually provided FBO services at the subject hangar or with the disputed 

personnel, or that JCP has been harmed. The County also relied on Northwest Airlines and Ashton 

for its contentions. 

Third Cause of Action-RFP Process 

The County stated that JCP did not claim that the County's action disadvantaged JCP. It also 

moved that JCP's claims should be dismissed on ripeness grounds because .TCP did not allege that 

MTJ actually provides FBO services or that .TCP had been harn1ed by the RFP processes. The 

County characterized JCP's allegations that MTJ might compete with it in the future as 

"unfounded." In this regard, it relied on .Timsair Aviation Services. Inc. v. San Diego County Reg'l 

Aimort Autb., FAA Docket No. 16-06-08 (Final Decision and Order) (Aug. 9, 2007) for tbe holding that a complainant's concern about a future airport policy is not ripe where the 

complainant has shown no present harm or direct grant violation. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, p. 

11]. 

Fourth Cause of Action-Control and Financial Sustainability of Airport 

The County moved that JCP's claims of potential harms to the Airport be dismissed as not ripe; 

that JCP had not shown that the Airport has incurred losses as a result of the Agreements; and 

that JCP merely hypothesized that the County would incur new costs in the event a new FBO 

provided services under the terms of the Agreement. The County also relied on Jimsair Aviation 

to support its arguments. 

17 
Sixth Cause of Action

Lease

Leaseback 

The Cotmty also moved for dismissal of this claim as not ripe. With respect to its allegedly 

improper change in position regarding the feasibility of leasing the JetAway site, the County 

claimed that the Ground Lease should not be considered "a presumptive violation of Grant 

Assurance 5" because that "would be an exceptionally aggressive application of the doctrine of 

offensive collateral estoppel." [See FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 2, pp. 16-17] Moreover, the County 

argued that JCP's concerns about a restrictive covenant prohibiting sale of aviation fuel from this 

property were not ripe, due to the fact that no FBO is currently operating on the property. 

Further, the County stated that JCP's concerns regarding litigation over the covenant also were 

not ripe, due to a recent Colorado State Court opinion that JCP may not enforce the restrictive 

covenant on the JetAway site. [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, p. 17] As to the County's ability 

to enforce safety standards on the site, the County replied that the "mere possibility that a term in 

a lease agreement would, if enforced, violate a grant assurance does not give rise to a present 

claim under Part 16." [See FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 2, p. 18] 

The County also stated that its option to purchase the JetAway site is not a grant violation and 

that JCP's concerns are premature. Additionally, the County stated that JCP's concerns about 

future control of the site in the event of any default by the mortgagor are premature because J CP 

has not shown that there is any risk of default on the mortgage note. In support of its motion, the 

County cited to Jimsair Aviation, Northwest Airlines, and Drake Aerial. 

Ripeness Discussion of JCP's Arguments 

In its Answer, JCP stated that its Part 16 complaint was ripe when filed. It pointed to the facts 

that the County executed Agreements with MTJ, that MTJ and the County held a groundbreaking 

ceremony in May, 2015, and that MTJ incurred expenses in preparatory work for operating its 

business. According to JCP, if the language of the subject Agreements clearly allow for an 

understanding of the grant assurance violations and if they are framed to enable meaningful FAA 

review, the issues are ripe for an FAA decision. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6, p.9] 

JCP also posited that a claim is ripe when the parties' interests are adverse and when a judgment 

would be conclusive and of practical help, such as providing guidance for voluntary compliance. 

JCP stated that Aircraft Management Services, at 18-19, refuted the County's proposition that a 

Complaint is premature if no damages have been suffered, because the FAA found the pleadings 

presented a "structured argument concerning the alleged grant assurance violations which are 

clearly articulated and referenced." [See FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 6, p. 6] JCP stated that because 

it presented a clear argument of grant assurance violations based on the agreements, its 

Complaint is ripe. JCP also cited Northwest Airlines, pp. 16-17, for the proposition that a claim 

18 
JCP claimed this cause of action was ripe because MTJ and TVP may contest the termination of 

the Agreements. JCP referred to MTJ correspondence to the County asserting the right to cure 

defaults, contesting the validity of the County's termination of the FBO Agreement, and 

mentioning possible litigation. JCP averred that the County must demonstrate acquiescence by 

MTJ in the te1mination. 

Second Cause of Action-Application of Minimum Standards 

JCP argued that this cause of action is ripe due to the MTJ groundbreaking ceremony and MTJ's 

assertion that the County's declaration of termination is invalid and it is entitled to operate on the 

JetAway site; it reiterated its claim that the County did not investigate MTJ owners and operators 

thereby abdicating its minimum standards and grant assurance obligations. 

Third Cause of Action-RFP Process 

JCP claimed that the cause of action is ripe due to the County's litigation expenses in the 

TABOR lawsuit; JCP appealed the State Cowt decision on standing to enforce the restrictive 

covenant; and the County is incurring expenses to remediate the property that had been leased to 

MTJ. 

Fourth Cause of Action-Control and Financial Sustainability o.f Airport 

JCP stated that the County agreed to undertake financial incentives on behalf of the second FBO, 

which damaged the County and resulted in litigation expenses. 

F(fih Cause o.f Action-Reversal of Position on JetAway Site 

JCP said the County's reversal of position on the JetAway site has caused or threatens to cause 

unnecessary litigation and grant assurance violations. 

Sixth Cause of Action-Lease-Leaseback 

JCP reiterated its claims that the lease-leaseback arrangement raised grant assurance violations. 

19 
the fees could be increased over time, the City

s banner towing fees were unreasonable and 

excessive. The FAA found that claim to be premature and not ripe, explaining as follows: 

Additionally, the Complainant's argument here prematurely implies a violation of the 

Respondent's Federal obligations. Under 14 CFR Part 16, the Director cannot investigate 

allegations of an airport sponsor's grant assurance violations if the Complainant has not 

yet been harmed. [See 14 CFR Part 16.23] The Respondent may contemplate a future 

action which alters its fee schedule. But the issue is not ripe for review until the 

Complainant is adversely affected by it. [See Northwest Airlines v. Indianapolis Airport 

Authority, FAA Docket No 16-07-04 (Aug. 18, 2008) (Director's Determination) at 28 

and 37] Drake Aerial, p. 20. 

The Northwest Airlines determination also relied on the test ofhann and adverse effects for 

purposes of analyzing whether a claim should be dismissed on the grounds that it was not ripe. 

There, the FAA granted the airport authority's motion to dismiss, finding the issues raised by the 

airlines (that the FedEx rent credit agreement was unreasonable and unjustly discriminatory to 

the complainants) to be "not yet ripe for review" because the rent credit had not yet been applied 

and the complaining airlines had not been harmed. That complaint concerned a "potential future 

event" that was "uncertain" and that had not "harmed" the complainant. [Northwest Airlines, 

(Director's Determination) pp. 28-29; Final Decision and Order (Oct. 27, 2009)] Similarly, 

JCP's claims as to harm are posited on future events, at best, and any adverse effects are 

extremely remote, speculative, and uncertain. 

The Director disagrees with JCP's assertion that the finding in Northwest Airlines about a 

"sufficient record to proceed with the Part 16 proceeding" (pp. 16-1 7) constituted a finding that 

the complaining airlines' claim was ripe. Rather, that finding pertained to the standing of the 

airlines who were paying landing fees at the airport, not to the ripeness of the airlines' claim for 

review. 

Also, the requirement for ripeness-that a complainant needs to show that it was adversely 

affected by an airport sponsor's action-was discussed in Ashton v. City of Concord, FAA 

Docket No. 16~02-01, Aug. 22, 2003 (Director's Determination at 32~33) and Final Decision and 

Order (Feb. 27, 2004). There, the FAA held that the complaint by the small aircraft owners that 

the airport sponsor granted an exclusive right to another small aircraft owner for aircraft storage, 

was not ripe. The small aircraft owner complainants were not tenants at the airport and were not 

on the waiting list themselves. Therefore the owners were not directly and substantially affected 

by the claimed noncompliance of the airport, under section 16.23(a). 

20 
sufficient evidence in the record for FAA to have concluded that AMS is directly and 

substantially affected by the alleged actions [of the airport sponsor.]" ld at 18-10 and 9-10. 

The Director has considered JCP's request for guidance on grant assurance compliance here, but 

declines to hold a Part 16 proceeding for purposes of providing that guidance. The Director did 

provide guidance in Northwest Airlines, because there was evidence that the airport authority 

would impose the challenged fee in the near future, at the near-term expiration of the landing fee 

agreement See Northwest Airlines (Final Decision and Order), p. 16. In contrast, there is no 

evidence here that the County is undertaking to enter into the same or similar FBO agreements at 

issue, and JCP's concerns appear to be purely speculative. (See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, exhibit 

1, p. 2] Also, a Part 16 adjudication in this situation would not be conclusive or of practical 

assistance to the parties, because it would not be an efficient use of either the FAA's or the 

parties' time to adjudicate claims of alleged violations of grant assurances based on past 

agreements or on theoretical, speculative concerns that the County may use similar terms in 

future FBO agreements. 

More specifically, the Director finds JCP's causes of action not ripe, as follows: 

As to the first cause of action, Financial Inducements, the Director finds that JCP has not met the 

FAA's test for ripeness-that is, it has not shown that it was harmed, or adversely affected, by 

the tenns of the Agreements. JCP was not harmed, for example, by any operation ofFBO 

services by either Majestic or MTJ. Neither FBO operator provided services at the Airport JCP, 

accordingly, was unable to and did not provide evidence demonstrating any adverse impacts to its fuel sales, profit margins, or lease agreements by virtue of operation of the MTJ FBO 

Agreements or Ground Lease. [See, in contrast, The Aviation Center. Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 

Michigan, FAA Docket No. 16R05-01 (Dec. 16, 2005) (Director's Determination), in which the 

complainant alleged it suffered the loss of aT -hangar and was denied the right to construct a 

self-fueling facility] 

Nor has JCP has shown that the existence of the agreements by themselves caused it harmed: 

there was no evidence that the County, as a result of the MTJ agreements, changed any terms of 

JCP's agreements leading to an adverse effect on JCP or that the County interpreted JCP's 

agreements in an adverse way to JCP due to the MTJ agreements. JCP's predictions that the 

County may reinstate the Agreements due to potential litigation or interest by another FBO are 

speculative, uncertain, and theoretical and, in any event, do not demonstrate that the County's 

actions have harmed or otherwise adversely affected JCP. 

With respect to JCP's second cause of action, Applicalion of Minimum Standards, JCP did not 

show that it was harmed by the allegedly disparate application of minimmn standards to MTJ's 

21 
noncompliance with the grant assurances. 

Concerning the fourth cause of action, Control of Airport and Financial Sustainability, JCP 

again did not demonstrate that it was harmed or adversely affected by the County's subsidy of 

Majestic and/or MTJ. 

As regards the fifth cause of action, Reversal of Position on JetAway Site, JCP has not 

demonstrated that the threat oflitigation or damage to the County harmed JCP itself. 

Respecting the sixth cause of action, Lease-Leaseback, the Director again finds that JCP has not 

shown that it was harmed or otherwise adversely affected by the arrangement for the .letA way 

site. 

Mootness and Current Compliance-Discussion of County's Arguments and JCP's 

Answer 

The County moved for dismissal on the grounds of mootness, asserting that, due to its tennination 

of the Agreements, it is in current compliance with the grant assurances. It cited Drake Aerial for 

the proposition that the doctrine of current compliance includes "mootness, i.e., alleged past 

violations that have been cured prior to action by the Director, and ripeness, i.e., alleged future or 

contingent violations that have not taken place yet." [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, p. 5] 

The County further argued there is no basis for the FAA to enforce any alleged grant assurance 

violations deriving from the Agreements. In support of this contention, and in support of its 

motion to dismiss JCP's causes of action, the County cited to Aero Ways. Inc. v. Delaware River 

& Bay Authority, FAA Docket No l6-09-I2 (Director's Determination) (Aug. 30, 20IO) and to 

U.S. Aerospace. Inc. v. Millington Municipal Airport Authority, FAA Docket No. 16-98-06 

(Oct. IS, 1998), and Drake Aerial. [FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 2, pp. 8, II, and 13] 

JCP, in contrast, maintained that the "mootness doctrine does not bar [its] cause of action because 

there has been no cure." [See FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 6, p. 11] JCP contended that an affirmative 

action on the part of the airport sponsor to recognize and cure an alleged grant assurance-not 

merely a termination of a disputed agreement 'for cause'-would suffice to warrant dismissal 

under the current compliance doctrine. In support of this proposition, JCP cited Northwest 

Airlines, Drake Aerial, Jimsair Aviation, and Boston Air Charter v. Norwood Airport Comm'n, 

FAA Docket No I6-07-03 (Aug. I4, 2008). [See FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 6, p. IO] Further, JCP stated that, because of the presumed likelihood that the County will repeat the alleged 

grant assurance violations; the FAA should decide the case, based on the "capable of repetition yet 

22 
between JCP, on the one hand, and Majestic or MTJ. Additionally, no other FBO agreement is in 

effect. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, pp. 8-9] JCP, in contrast, argued that the County has not shovm 

that it has cured its alleged grant violations and the FAA should provide appropriate guidance to 

the County. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6, pp. 11-12] 

Regarding JCP's second cause of action, Application of Minimum Standards, the County 

contended it was moot, due to the termination of both Majestic's and MTJ's rights to provide FBO 

services at the Airport, and no FBO aside from JCP operates at the Airport. JCP argued that the 

County has not shown that it cured its failure to investigate the MTJ persom1el. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, 

Item 6, pp. 9-1 0] 

Concerning JCP's third cause of action, RFP Process, the County claimed mootness due to the fact 

that neither Majestic nor MTJ ever provided FBO services at the Airport, the agreements are 

terminated, and there is no open RFP for FBO services. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, pp. 11-12] 

JCP, in response, claimed the County may plan a similar subsidy for another FBO and has not 

cured its alleged violation. See FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6]. 

With respect to JCP's fourth cause of action, Control and Financial Sustainability of Airport, the 

County asserted mootness because the causes of the litigation "have been cured" by the 

termination of the agreements or by court dismissals. [See FAA EXHIBIT I, Item 2, p. 13] The 

County further stated that "the mere persistence of litigation that arose from the alleged violation 

should not be considered as a basis for a cause of action under Part 16." [See FAA EXHIBIT 1, 

Item 2, p. 14] JCP disputed that the County cured this cause of action, because the County has not 

admitted that the subsidies would affect the financial sustainability of the Airport. See FAA 

EXHIBIT 1, Item 6] 

On the fifth cause of action, Reversal of Position on JetAway Site, the County argued the cause of 

action was moot. It referred to the termination of the Ground Lease and to the fact that it had not 

made payments under that lease to TVP. The County stated that it had cured any violation and 

there is no basis for such a claim. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 2, pp. 14, 15, and 16] JCP disagreed 

that the cause of action is moot, alleging that the County had believes the JetAway site no longer is 

subject to a restrictive covenant. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6,] 

As to the sixth cause of action, Lease-Leaseback, the County stated that, since both the Agreement 

and TVP Ground Lease have been terminated, the cause of action is moot. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, 

Item 2, p. 20] JCP responded that the County has not cured the alleged grant assurance violation 

nor has it voluntarily complied with the grant assurances. [FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 6] 

23 
to Part 16 proceedings, and (2) JCP ignores basic principles of contract law with regard to the 

alleged failure to 'completely terminate the agreements with MTJ and TVP. [FAA Exhibit 1, 

Item 7] 

JCP in its opposition to the County's Reply argues that "the Respondent County's proposed reply 

does not address the question as to whether FAA guidance is required on the County's publiclyexpressed position that it was compelled by grant assurances to provide the financial incentives 

that led to this Part 16 Complaint." FAA EXHIBIT 1, Item 8] 

Current Compliance and Mootncss-Analysis and Decision 

The Director finds that JCP's claims are moot and therefore should be dismissed. Additionally, 

the Director finds that to be in current compliance the County need not affirmatively 

acknowledge that the agreements at issue raised any grant assurance violations before taking a 

cure. The termination of the agreements, regardless of the County's motive, suffices to remove 

the concerns m1d to return the County to a status quo position for purposes of grant assurance 

compliance. 

As explained above, the FAA Compliance Program is designed to achieve voluntary compliance 

with federal obligations accepted by owners and/or operators of public-use airports developed 

with federal funds and/or conveyances of federal property for airport purposes. FAA will make a 

determination as to whether the airport sponsor is currently in compliance with the applicable 

federal obligations. Consequently, the FAA will consider the successful action by the airport to 

cme any alleged or potential past violation of applicable federal obligation to be grounds for 

dismissal of such allegations. [See e.g .. g. Aircraft Management Services, pp. 15-16; Drake 

Aerial, pp. 11-13; Northwest Airlines (Director's Determination), pp. 12-13] 

The FAA doctrine of current compliance extends to situations where an airport sponsor rectified 

the complained-of practice---even without admitting or recognizing any grant violations. Such a 

circumstance occurred in U.S. Aerospace, in which the airport authority terminated an FBO 

agreement allegedly granting a prohibited exclusive right, and the termination occurred because 

that FBO violated the lease and minimwn standards, not because the airport was motivated to 

"cme" any possible grant violations. Even though the airport authority's motivation in evicting 

the other FBO was not expressly to bring itself into compliance with the grant assurances, the 

Director found the airport authority to be in current compliance and dismissed the FBO's 

complaint, stating: 

24 
MAS. !d., p. 9. 

The County, similar to the airport authority in U.S. Aerospace, terminated the complained-of 

agreements due to breach by the second FBO, not due to any recognition or admission that the 

terms ofthe agreement may have violated the grant assurances. Nonetheless, the FAA 

determined the airport authority was in current compliance and dismissed the complaint. The 

FAA's role in Part 16 is not to penalize airport sponsors for past infractions. This is not to say 

that the MTJ Agreements or TVP Ground Lease contained terms or conditions that violated the 

grant assurances; rather, JCP raised concerns regarding these agreements, and we find that their 

tennination effectively satisfies the Director that such concerns are mooted. 

In sum, current compliance need not involve an airport sponsor undertaking a corrective action 

program; acting pursuant to FAA supervision; or requesting FAA consent for leases and 

agreements. It is not necessary, for example, for an airport sponsor to recognize alleged grant 

violations and to attempt to "cure" them by bringing itself into compliance. Rather, the fact of 

compliance, not the motivation, is the important factor for the FAA to find as a matter of law that 

an airport is currently in compliance with the grant assurances. 

The FAA has found an airport sponsor to be in "current compliance," in an array of situations 

involving an airport sponsor's act of discontinuing a practice, policy, or agreement that allegedly 

violates grant assurances. As briefly described below, such acts have mooted complainants' 

claims and have been causes for dismissal of the complaints or for findings in favor of the airport 

sponsor respondent. Accordingly, they support the Director's findings that JCP's causes of 

action are moot and should be dismissed. 

In the Northwest Airlines proceeding, the airport authority postponed its plans to take an 

allegedly unjustly discriminatory action by not applying the complained-of rent credit and had frozen the Airlines' landing fees. Consequently the FAA determined there was no current 

noncompliance in terms oflmjust discrimination. In the case at bar, the County terminated-not 

postponed-the disputed agreements, thereby rendering the complainants' concerns moot 

In a situation where an airport sponsor has terminated an undertaking that violated the grant 

assurances, the FAA dismissed the complainant's action. The FAA detennined that the airport 

sponsor "is not currently in violation of grant assurance 23 ... , as a result of having entered into a 

past agreement offering various exclusive rights that have since been rescinded." SeeM. Daniel 

Carey and Cliff Davenport v. Afton-Lincoln County Municipal Airport Joint Powers Board, 

FAA Docket No. 16-06-06 (Jan. 19, 2007), pp. 22-23. Similarly, by terminating the agreements 

in dispute, the County is not currently in violation of grant assurances 5, 22, 23, or 24, and JCP's 

claims should be dismissed. 

25 
Similarly, the FAA dismissed a complaint where the airport sponsor was negotiating a modified 

agreement that would address the disputed issues of reversion of improvements and selfsustainability of rental rates. See Rudy J. Clarke v. City of Alamogordo, NM, FAA Docket No. 

16-05-19, pp. 18-19 (Sept. 20, 2006), stating: 

Regardless of past poor management controls, FAA is interested in current compliance. 

The goal of the Part 16 [program] is to return the airport sponsor to a state of compliance 

with its grant assurances. As a result, it is against FAA policy to enforce retroactively the 

grant assurances for past violations (assuming there are such violations) that have been 

cured. 

See also Roadhouse Aviation v. City of Tulsa, FAA Docket No. 16-05w08 (Director's 

Determination), p. 31 (issued Dec. 14, 2006), and noting "Part 16 is not a punitive process for 

past violations." Again, the FAA does not seek to punish any past nonwcompliance in cases 

where an airport sponsor has corrected any such grant assurance violations. 

Based on the above standards, the Director finds the fact that the agreements at issue are 

terminated is sufficient to consider the complaint and causes of action moot The "capable of 

repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine, as raised by JCP, appears to be 

a judicial exception applied to a situation in which a complainant was "adversely affected" and that 

"there was a reasonable expectation" that the complainant would be "subjected to the same action 

again." Weinstein, 412 U.S. 148w49. The Director will not apply the exception here. As discussed 

at length in the ripeness section, J CP has not shown that it was adversely affected by the 

agreements at issue; additionally, the assumption that the County would implement the subsidy 

program again with another FBO, lease the JetAway site, or enter into agreements to which JCP 

has raised concerns, is remote and speculative, not demonstrated by the evidence. As to JCP's first cause of action, Financial inducements, the Director finds that the County's 

termination of the agreements mooted any alleged grant assurance violations; moreover, no other 

FBO agreement containing the same or similar terms is in effect. The Director finds that the 

County's actions effectively cured its alleged grant violations, and this cause of action should be 

dismissed. 

Regarding JCP's second cause of action, Application of Minimum Standards, the Director finds 

that the County's termination of both Majestic's and MTJ's rights to provide FBO services at the 

Airport mooted any alleged grant assurance violations; additionally, no FBO aside from JCP 

operates at the Airport, and the MTJ personnel at issue are not operating at the Airport. The 

Director finds that the County's actions effectively cured its alleged grant violations, and this cause 

of action should be dismissed. 

26 
Director finds that this cause of action should be dismissed. 

With respect to JCP's fourth cause of action, Control and Financial Sustainability of Airport, the 

Director finds mootness due to the tennination of the agreements. The FAA does not insist that for 

purposes of a finding of current compliance an airport sponsor must admit to a possible grant 

violation. The act of curing any past violation-regardless of the sponsor's motivation-is 

sufficient. Therefore, this cause of action should be dismissed. 

On the fifth cause of action, Reversal of Position on JetAway Site, the Director finds mootness, due 

to the County's termination of the Ground Lease and to the fact that County had not made 

payments under that lease to TVP. JCP's concerns about any potential use of that site are merely 

conjecture and too remote to be considered in this proceeding. Therefore, this cause of action 

should be dismissed. 

As to the sixth cause of action, Lease-Leaseback, the Director finds mootness, due to the facts that 

both the Agreement and TVP Ground Lease have been terminated. The FAA does not insist that, 

for purposes of a finding of current compliance, an airport sponsor must admit to a possible grant 

violation. The act of curing any past violation-regardless of the sponsor's motivation--is 

sufficient. Therefore, this cause of action should be dismissed. 

VI. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

The Director recognizes that JCP expended time, effmt and expense in its Complaint about the 

alleged grant violations at the Airport, and that this occurred at the same period in which the 

County was engaged in tenninating the agreements in issue. 

The Director finds, as detailed above, that JCP's claims that the County is in violation of grant 

assurances 5, Preserving Rights and Powers, 22, Economic Nondiscrimination, 23, Exclusive 

Rights, or 24, Fee and Rental Structure, are not ripe, are moot, and that the claims should be 

dismissed. 

ORDER 

Accordingly, it is ordered that: 

1. Respondent's Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Summary Judgment is 

granted; 

27 
constitute a final agency decision and order subject to judicial review. [14 CFR § 16.247(b)] A 

party to this proceeding adversely affected by the Director's Order may appeal the initial 

determination to the FAA Associate Administrator for Airports pursuant to 14 CFR § 16.33(c) 

within thirty (30) days after service of the Director's Order. 

Randall S. Fiertz 

Director, Office of Airport Compliance 

and Management Analysis 

Date: /hJ;. I'( ? c.V .r 

28 
Item 1-Jet Center Partners, LLC (JCP) Prut 16 Complaint docketed August 26, 2015, 

including appendices containing the following documents: 

• 

• • • • • 

• 

• • 

• 

Exhibit 1 -Overview of Airport FBO Parcels and the Montrose County Regional 

Airport's (Airport) Airport Layout Plan (ALP) 

Exhibit 2- Request for Proposals (RFP) for a Fixed Base Operator (FBO) on 

Airport, (Aug. 2013) 

• Att. A- Airport Operations (Jan. 2006-July 2014) 

• Art. B- Airport Fuel Sales (Jan. 2001-July 2013) 

• Att. C- Airport Passenger Enplanements and Deplanements (Jan. 

2001-July 2013) 

• Art. D- Minimum Standards for the Provision of Commercial 

Aeronautical Services at the Airport, adopted Aug. 4, 2003; revised 

Dec. 5, 2005 

Exhibit 3- Airport-Majestic Skies, LLC FBO Agreement (July 2, 2014) 

Exhibit 4-Newspaper article, May 10, 2015 G. Davis, Shedding some light on a 

controversial airport issue and Initial Disclosures of MTJ FBO Partners, LLC 

and Telluride Venture Partners, LLC, Cossick v. Board of County 

Commissioners, Montrose County, et al, Case No. 2014CV30191 (Colo. Dist. 

Ct.) (June 26, 2015) 

Exhibit 5- Airport-MTJ FBO Partners, LLC, Amended FBO Agreement, (Feb . 

17, 2015) 

Exhibit 6- Airport-Telluride Venture Partners, LLC (TVP), Ground Lease, (Feb . 

17, 2015) 

• Item 1 Description and Depiction ofTVP Property 

• Item 2 of Montrose, CO Option to Purchase Land {TVP 

Property), (Feb. 17, 2015) 

Exhibit 7- Airport Grant History Report, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

Office of Airports, Report Date 04/17/2015 

Exhibit 8- Montrose County Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion fOr 

Summary Judgment, Jetaway Aviation. LLC v. Board of County Commissioners, 

Montrose County. eta!, (D. Colo., No. 1:07 cv-02563-RPM, Aug. 31, 2011) 

Exhibit 9- Airport-Jet Center Partners, LLC (JCP), FBO Agreement (Dec. 5, 

2005) Exhibit I 0-Airport- JCP FBO Transition Agreement (Dec. 5, 2005) and AirportJCP FBO Amendment to Transition Agreement (undated) 

I 
 Exhibit 14

Letter from Daniel S. Reimer, Esq. to Randall Fiertz, Director, Office 

of Airport Compliance and Management Analysis, FAA (May 30, 2012) 

• Exhibit 15 - Expert Report of Philip B. Nelson, Ph.D. (excerpts from), Jetaway 

Aviation, LLC v. Board of County Commissioners, Montrose County, et al, (D. 

Colo., No. 1:07 cv-02563-RPM (I 0/11/11) and Supplemental/Rebuttal Expert 

Report of Philip B. Nelson, Ph.D. (excerpts from), Jetaway Aviation. LLC v. 

Board of County Commissioners, Montrose County, eta/, (D. Colo., No. 1 :07 cv02563-RPM, 10/11111) and Preliminary Draft, Expert Report ofDr. Gary J. 

Dorman (Aug. 15, 2011) 

• Exhibit 16 -Tel Ski Aviation FBO Proposal to Montrose County in Response to 

RFP (2013) 

• Exhibit 17 - Proceedings of the Board of Montrose County Commissioners (Jan. 

21 , 2014) 

• Exhibit 18 - Montrose County Depictions ofFBO Proposed Site #1 (Sept. 2013) 

and Montrose County Depictions ofFBO Proposed Site #2 (Sept. 2013) 

• Exhibit 19 - Majestic Skies, LLC Proposal to Montrose County in Response to 

RFP (Oct. 25, 2013) 

• Exhibit 20 - Letter from Matt Franzak, Majestic Skies, LLC to Lloyd Arnold, 

Director of Aviation, Montrose, CO (Jan. 3, 2014) and Letter from Michael 

Manes, P.A. to Lloyd Arnold (Jan. 15, 2014) 

• Exhibit 21 - Montrose Daily Press, Jan. 22, 2014, K. Heidelberg, County to 

Negotiate for Second FBO, pp. A 1, A3 

• Exhibit 22 - Letter from J. Michael Morgan, Esq, to Montrose County 

Commission (May 13, 2014) and Letter from Kevin P. Egan, Manager, JCP, to 

Montrose County Commission (undated) and Letter from Ken Watson, General 

Manager, Black Canyon Jet Center, to Montrose County Commissioners (Jan 8, 

20 14) and Economic Analysis of the Proposed Majestic Skies FBO Agreement for 

Montrose County, by Maxfield & Peterson, P.C. (undated) 

• Exhibit 23 -Montrose Regional Airport Advisory Board Meeting (Mar. 24, 20 15) 

and Letter from Teresa S. Williams Montrose County Attorney to Ken Watson, 

JCP (March 11 , 2015) 

• Exhibit 23(A)- Extracts from Majestic Skies Proposal to Montrose RFP. pages 17-

18, and Jackson County, IL Case Information, The Hill, Feb. 23, 2010, S. 

Crabtree, Sentencing in Defense Contractor's Trial, and 

http://www.thehill.com/homenews/house/83243-sentencing-in-kickback-trial and 

The Washington Post, July 8, 2009, C. Leonnig, Ex-Head of Defense Firm With 

Murtha Ties Will Plead Guilty to Bribery, http: //www ~a hingt n post.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/07 and Federal Bureau oflnvestigation Press Release, 

Kuchera Brothers Plead Guilty to Fraud Against the Government and Conspiracy 

2 
LLC, http://W\\>w.sos.state.co.uslbidBusinessEntit} Detail (8/4/20 15) 

• Exhibit 26 - Colorado Secretary of State- Summary, TelSki Aviation, LLC, 

http://WW\\ .sos.state.co.uslbidBusinessbntityDetail (8/4/20 15) 

• Exhibit 27 - Colorado Secretary of State- Summary, MTJ FBO Partners, LLC, 

http://wW\\ .sos.statc.co.us/biz/BusincssEntityDetail (8/4/20 15) 

• Exhibit 28- June 15, 2011 Deed of Trust and Assignment by One Creative Place, 

LLC to The Public Trustee of the County of Montrose, CO, for the benefit of 

Wells Fargo Bank, containing Exh. A, Description of Property 

• Item !--Warranty Deed between One Creative Place, LLC and 

TVP (Jan. 21 2015) 

• Item 2 - First Modification of Deed of Trust and Assigrunent of 

Rents and Leases (Dec. 15, 2014) 

• Item 3 - Second Modification of Deed of Trust and Assignment of 

Rents and Leases (May 15, 2015) 

• Item 4 - Montrose County Parcel Map, One Creative Place LLC 

• Item 5- Property Profile, Jetaway Minor Subdivison Lot 1, 2015 

Tax Assessment 

• Item 6 -Property Profile, Jetaway Minor Subdivision Lot 2, 2015 

Tax Assessment 

• Item 7- Property Profile, Jetaway Minor Subdivision Lot 3, 2015 

Tax Assessment 

• Exhibit 29 - TVP-County of Montrose, CO Option to Purchase Land (Feb. 17, 

2015) 

• Exhibit 30 - MTJ FBO Partners, LLC (MTJ)-Montrose County, CO Ground 

Lease (Apr. 2015), and MJT Additional Leased Property 

• Exhibit 31 - Montrose Regional Airport Minimum Standards, Adopted Aug. 4, 

2003, Revised Dec. 5, 2005 

Item lA-FAA Notice of Docketing, dated August 27,201 5. 

Item 2- Montrose County's Motion for Summary Judgment, received September 17, 2015, 

including appendices containing the following documents: 

• Exhibit !-Affidavit of Lloyd Arnold (Sept. 16, 20 15) 

• Exhibit 2- Letter from Bobbee J. Musgrave, Esq., to Michael B. Manes, Thomas J. 

Byrne and MTJ FBO Partners, LLC (MTJ) (Aug. 19, 2015) 

• Exhibit 3- Letter from Bob bee J. Musgrave to Thomas J. Byrne and MTJ (Sept. 1, 

2015) 

3 
Item 5-FAA Order on Motion to Extend Deadline to Reply (Oct.!, 2015) 

Item 6--JCP's Answer to the County's Motion for Summary Judgment (Oct. 9, 2015), 

including appendices containing the following documents: 

• Exhibit 32-Egan Affidavit (Aug. 5, 20 15) 

• Exhibit 33-Montrose Daily Press News (Sept 4, 2015), K. Heidelgerg, Majestic 

alleges_fraud 

• Exhibit 34-Ver!fied Complaint, Majestic Skies et al v. TVP et al, (Colo. Dist. Ct.) 

(Sept. 1, 2015) 

• Exhibit 35-Montrose Daily Press News (Sept. 4, 2015), K. Heidelgerg, County 

scratches second FBO contract, Montrose Daily Press News (Oct. 2, 2015), K. 

Heidelgerg, Majestic bounces FBO suit 

• Exhibit 36-Letter from Bobbee J. Musgrave, Esq., to Michael B. Manes, Esq. and 

Thomas J. Byrne, Esq. (July 7, 2015) and Letter from Michael B. Manes, Esq. to 

Lloyd Arnold (Aug. 20 14) 

• Exhibit 37-Letter from Bobbee J. Musgrave, Esq., to Michael B. Manes, Esq., 

Thomas J. Byrne, Esq. and MTJ (July 24, 2015) 

• Exhibit 38-Letter from Thomas .T. Byrne, Esq. and Michael B. Manes, Esq. to 

Bobbee J. Musgrave, Esq. (July 31, 2015) 

• Exhibit 39-Letter from Bobbee J. Musgrave, Esq., to Michael B. Manes, Esq., 

Thomas J. Byrne, Esq. and MTJ (Aug. 7, 2015) 

• Exhibit 40-----Letter from Thomas J. Byme, Esq. and Michael B. Manes, Esq. to 

Bobbee J. Musgrave, Esq. (Aug. 13, 2015) 

• Exhibit 41-Letter fi·om Thomas J. Byrne, Esq. and Michael B. Manes, Esq. to 

Bobbee J. Musgrave, Esq. (Aug. 21, 2015) 

• Exhibit 42-Letter from Bobbee J. Musgrave, Esq., to Michael B. Manes, Esq., 

Thomas J. Byrne, Esq. and MTJ (Aug. 24, 2015) 

• Exhibit 43-Letter from Bobbee J. Musgrave, Esq., to Michael B. Manes, Esq., 

Thomas J. Byrne, Esq. and MTJ (Sept. 9, 2015) 

• Exhibit 44-Plaint([f's Partially Unopposed Motion to Dismiss, Cossick v. Board of 

County Commissioners, Montrose County, et al, Case No. 2014CV30191, Div 5 

(Colo. Dist. Ct.) (Oct. 5, 2015) 

• Exhibit 45-Notice of Appeal, JCP v. MTJ eta/., (Colo. Ct. of Appeals) (Aug. 28, 

2015) 

Item 7-County of Montrose Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Summary Judgment 

(Oct. 30, 2015), and Reply in Support of Summary Judgment (Oct.30, 2015), including 

appendices containing the following documents: 

4 
Item 9- FAA Order to extend date of considemtion of Motions before the Agency to 

November 20, 2015. 

5