[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-15263

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-00626-MSS-TGW

JOSEPH W. CARPENTER, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(August 17, 2015)

Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Joseph Carpenter appeals the district court’s order affirming the 

Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of his application for disability 

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insurance benefits. On appeal, Carpenter argues that the ALJ erred by failing to 

(1) obtain an updated medical expert opinion in light of new evidence in the 

record, (2) set forth good cause for rejecting the opinion of one of his treating 

physicians, and (3) include all of his limitations when posing a hypothetical 

question to a vocational expert at the hearing. After careful review, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

In November 2008, Carpenter filed an application for disability insurance 

benefits with the Social Security Administration. Alleging a disability onset date 

of April 4, 2004, Carpenter represented that he suffers from herniated discs at L4-5 

and L5-S1 as a result of an injury he sustained in 2001 while working as an 

emergency medical technician and firefighter. Carpenter contended that this back 

injury causes him pain, numbness, and tightness in his left leg, which prevents him 

from working because he cannot sit or stand for long periods of time, and because 

he needs to lean on the counter or lie on his back for multiple hours a day to relieve 

the pain. As to his mental health, Carpenter asserted that he experiences memory 

loss, anxiety, irritability, and depression. 

The Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denied 

Carpenter’s application for benefits initially and upon reconsideration, on March 

20, 2009, and August 28, 2009, respectively. After the Commissioner issued her 

decisions, Carpenter requested, and received, a hearing. The hearing before an 

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ALJ occurred in October 2010, at which time both Carpenter and a vocational 

expert testified. 

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Carpenter

was not disabled for purposes of disability benefits’ eligibility. Specifically, upon 

reviewing the medical evidence of record, the ALJ found that Carpenter suffered 

from degenerative disc disease and generalized anxiety disorder, and that these 

conditions would place some limitations upon his “ability to do basic work 

activities.” But because Carpenter’s limitations did not markedly restrict his daily 

living and social functioning, caused only moderate difficulties with respect to his 

concentration, persistence, and pace, and had not resulted in an episode of 

decompensation, the ALJ determined that they did not meet or equal those

limitations “listed” in Social Security Administration regulations. The ALJ further 

determined that, given the severity of his limitations, Carpenter could perform 

light, routine work—with restrictions on activities such as climbing ropes and 

crawling—on a sustained basis with regular breaks. Based on this finding, coupled 

with the ALJ’s concurrence in the vocational expert’s opinion that a significant 

number of jobs accommodating Carpenter’s limitations existed in the national 

economy, the ALJ concluded that Carpenter was not disabled. 

In March 2013, Carpenter filed a complaint in the district court challenging 

the denial of disability benefits, which the district court referred to a magistrate 

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judge. There, Carpenter raised four challenges to the Commissioner’s 

determination. Carpenter asserted that: (1) the ALJ erred by finding that no new 

evidence had been submitted after a medical consultant reviewed his file on July 

29, 2009 and thereafter recommended that Carpenter’s limitations did not meet or 

equal those listed in Social Security Administration regulations; (2) the ALJ failed 

to articulate good cause for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Goldman, Carpenter’s 

treating psychiatrist, and (3) Dr. Kochno, who submitted a medical source 

statement regarding his physical limitations; and (4) substantial evidence does not 

support the hypothetical posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert, as it did not 

include all of Carpenter’s limitations, especially those identified by Drs. Goldman 

and Kochno. 

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation in which he 

concluded that the denial of disability benefits should be affirmed, noting that the 

ALJ reviewed the relevant “medical evidence at length” and the record supports

his conclusions. Over Carpenter’s objections, the district court adopted the report 

and recommendation and rendered judgment in favor of the Commissioner. This 

appeal followed. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

We review de novo the legal principles underlying the Commissioner’s final 

decision, but review the resulting decision only to determine whether substantial 

evidence supports it. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). 

We do not “decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our 

judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Id. In other words, “‘[e]ven if the 

evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.’” Crawford v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 

894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

B. The Process for Determining Carpenter’s Entitlement to 

Disability Insurance Benefits

The Social Security Administration regulations establish a five-step, 

sequential evaluation process by which the Commissioner determines whether a 

claimant is disabled, and thus entitled to benefits. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178; 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 404.1520a(a). The first two steps of that evaluation 

require the claimant to prove that he (1) has not engaged in substantial gainful 

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activity and that he (2) has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. 

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(ii); see Moore, 405 

F.3d at 1211 (“An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must 

prove that she is disabled.”) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a) (“In general, you have to 

prove to us that you are blind or disabled.”). If the claimant does not meet his 

burden on either inquiry, he is determined to be “not disabled” regardless of his 

age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(ii), (b)–(c). 

If the claimant does meet his burden on the previous two steps, he proceeds 

to the third, at which point he must prove that his impairment meets or equals “the 

severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments”; i.e., 

Appendix 1 to Part 404 of the Social Security Administration regulations. 

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s 

impairment is sufficiently severe under the regulations, the Commissioner 

considers him to be disabled without regard to his age, education, or work 

experience, and he is entitled to benefits; if not, the Commissioner takes those 

factors into account. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501, 404.1505(a), 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d)–

(e); see Ambers v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 1467, 1470 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[C]onsideration

of the fact that [the claimant] could return to her past work is not a relevant inquiry 

once she has met the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1.”). But if, in this third 

step, the claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal those listed in the 

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regulations, the Commissioner must determine the claimant’s residual functional 

capacity, before next proceeding to the fourth step. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(1)(4), (e), 

404.1545. A claimant’s residual functional capacity is “an assessment, based upon 

all of the relevant evidence, of a claimant’s remaining ability to do work despite 

his impairments.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), (3)–(4).

Once a claimant’s residual functional capacity has been determined, the 

disability evaluation advances to step four, where the Commissioner considers

whether “the claimant can perform any of his [] past relevant work despite the 

impairment[.]” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(1)(iv), (e)–

(f), 404.1545(a)(5)(i). If the claimant can perform his past work, he is deemed to 

be not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1)(iv), (f). But if he cannot perform his 

past work, the evaluation proceeds to step five, where the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner to demonstrate the existence of “significant numbers of jobs in the 

national economy” that the claimant cam perform and that account for his residual 

capacity, age, education, and work experience. If the Commissioner can make 

such a showing, the claimant is considered to be not disabled; if the Commissioner 

cannot make such a showing, the claimant is considered to be disabled and entitled 

to benefits. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178; Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th 

Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(1)(v), (g), 404.1545(a)(5)(ii).

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C. The Need to Obtain an Updated Medical Expert Opinion

The parties in the present appeal do not dispute the ALJ’s findings that 

Carpenter did not engage in substantial gainful activity from his alleged disability 

onset date through his last date of disability benefit insurance or that he suffers 

from the impairments of degenerative disc disease and generalized anxiety 

disorder. Accordingly, our review begins at step three of the five-step, sequential 

disability evaluation process, as Carpenter contests the ALJ’s finding that his 

impairments do not meet or equal one of the impairments listed in the Social 

Security Administration regulations. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App’x 1; 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526. 

Specifically, Carpenter argues that the ALJ erred by “failing to obtain an 

updated medical expert opinion regarding medical equivalency[,]” in light of 

additional evidence submitted after Dr. Clarence Louis, a medical consultant 

working for the Disability Determination Service (the “medical consultant”), 

reviewed his file on July 29, 2009. Carpenter argues that Social Security Ruling 

96-6p required the ALJ to obtain an updated medical expert opinion because 

additional medical evidence—the results from a December 2009 electromyography 

(“EMG”)—was received after the medical consultant gave his July 2009 opinion, 

and this opinion therefore did not otherwise incorporate all of the medical evidence 

contained within the record. Carpenter contends that this new evidence may have 

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indicated to a medical expert that one of the listed impairments was met or 

equaled. 

As noted above, at step three of the five-step sequential evaluation process,

the Commissioner considers whether a claimant suffers from a medical condition 

which meets or equals a “listed impairment.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 

(d). To prevail, a claimant must provide evidence that his impairment meets all of 

the criteria in the pertinent regulation listing. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 

(1990). Indeed, at this step of the disability inquiry, the burden of proof remains 

squarely on Carpenter, and the Commissioner’s findings as to whether he carried 

that burden are conclusive and must be affirmed if supported by substantial 

evidence, even if those findings are not supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence in the record. Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211; Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158–59;

Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529; 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a).

Social Security Ruling 96-6p clarifies the Commissioner’s policy on the 

ALJ’s “responsibility for obtaining opinions of physicians . . . regarding 

equivalence to listings in the Listing of Impairments.” SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 

374180, at *1 (July 2, 1996). It emphasizes certain “longstanding policies and 

policy interpretations,” including that “an [ALJ] must obtain an updated medical 

opinion from a medical expert . . . [w]hen additional medical evidence is received 

that in the opinion of the [ALJ] may change the State agency medical or 

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psychological consultant’s finding that the impairment(s) is not equivalent in 

severity to any impairment in the Listing of Impairments.” Id. at *1, 3–4

(emphasis added). 

The plain language of SSR 96-6p thus contradicts Carpenter’s argument that 

the ALJ was required to obtain an updated medical expert opinion merely because 

new evidence was submitted after the prior medical opinion had been rendered. 

Instead, SSR 96-6p clearly states that an updated medical opinion is only required 

when the ALJ is of the opinion that the additional medical evidence may change the 

finding that an impairment is not equivalent to any of those listed in the Social 

Security Administration regulations. See id. Here, the ALJ’s decision reflects that 

the new evidence would not have changed the expert opinion’s conclusions. 

Substantial evidence supports that decision. 

The listing from the Social Security Administration regulations that is 

relevant to Carpenter’s impairment is Listing 1.04(A). 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, 

app. 1, § 1.04(A). Listing 1.04(A) provides:

Disorders of the spine (e.g., . . . degenerative disc disease . . . ), 

resulting compromise of a nerve root (including the cauda equine) or 

the spinal cord. With: 

A. Evidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuroanatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor 

loss (atrophy with associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) 

accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and, if there is involvement of 

the lower back, positive straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine). 

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20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.04(A). 

While Carpenter undisputedly has a disorder of the spine—degenerative disc 

disease—the evidence in the record at the time the medical consultant’s opinion 

was obtained did not show that his spinal disorder was accompanied by the 

requisite nerve root compression. Carpenter’s 2001, 2002, 2004, and June 2009 

MRIs all reflect herniated discs and degenerative disc disease, but indicate that the 

nerves appeared unaffected and that there was no evidence of nerve root 

impingement. Accordingly, there was no medically acceptable imaging evidence 

that Carpenter’s condition equaled Listing 1.04(A). See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. 

P, app. 1, § 1.00(C)(1) (providing that diagnosis of musculoskeletal impairments 

should be supported by medically acceptance imaging tests, such as x-ray or MRI). 

Likewise, the evidence received after the medical consultant issued his July 

2009 opinion does not show that Carpenter’s spinal disorder was accompanied by 

the requisite nerve root compression. Carpenter’s December 2009 EMG reflects 

only mild “chronic motor fiber loss in L5 nerve root-innervated muscles below the 

knee,” and explicitly states that there was no evidence of active denervation. 

Moreover, Carpenter’s treatment notes from his pain management specialist reflect 

that this was not the result of new nerve root compression. Accordingly, 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the new evidence would 

not likely have changed the expert’s opinion, and thus, SSR 96-6p did not require 

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the ALJ to obtain an updated medical opinion regarding whether Carpenter’s 

impairment met or equaled an impairment listed in the Social Security 

Administration regulations. 

D. The Weight Accorded to the Opinion of Carpenter’s Treating 

Physician by the ALJ

Carpenter’s appeal next takes us to the intermediary stage following step 

three of the Commissioner’s disability inquiry and preceding step four, in which

the ALJ determined Carpenter’s residual functioning capacity. In conducting that 

evaluation, the ALJ was required to consider “all the relevant evidence” in 

Carpenter’s case record, including medical evidence and reports from his treating 

physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1), (3). When evaluating such reports, the 

ALJ must give “substantial weight” to the opinion of claimant’s treating physician 

“unless good cause exists for not heeding the treating physician’s diagnosis.” 

Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583 (11th Cir. 1991). We have held that good 

cause exists when the: “(1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the 

evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s 

opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” 

Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Carpenter’s case record includes a May 2009 opinion completed by Dr. 

Taras Kochno, his physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist, in which Dr. 

Kochno opined that Carpenter could not sit for more than one hour during an eightCase: 14-15263 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 Page: 12 of 16 
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hour workday; could not stand or walk for more than two to three hours; and had to 

lie down for four to five hours in order to relieve the pain arising from his 

herniated discs. Dr. Kochno further indicated that these limitations had existed 

since June 2001 and that he had reached this conclusion based on Plaintiff’s July 

2001 and March 2002 MRIs. The ALJ stated that he gave limited weight to this 

opinion because it was inconsistent with the medical treatment notes, which 

decision Carpenter now argues is erroneous and unsupported by substantial 

evidence. 

We disagree. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s articulation of good 

cause for rejecting Dr. Kochno’s opinion that Carpenter suffered from the above

extreme limitations. First, Dr. Kochno’s own treatment notes give no indication 

that Carpenter experienced the level of pain necessary to justify the limitations

articulated by Dr. Kochno as to his ability to sit, stand, or walk during the work 

day. Dr. Kochno’s notes from May 2009 reflect that Carpenter’s general 

examination was unremarkable, but that he did have limited lumbar flexibility,

with tightness in his lumbar paraspinals and lateral flexors. However, Dr. 

Kochno’s sole recommended treatment was physical therapy. Dr. Kochno’s notes 

further reflect that he had treated Carpenter from August 2003 to September 2004 

for the same issues stemming from his back injury, and that Carpenter’s past 

treatment of physical therapy, chiropractic treatment and cortical steroid injections, 

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coupled with bed rest for two months, had led his pain and motor and sensory loss 

to subside. 

Second, other evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s determination to 

give limited weight to Dr. Kochno’s opinion. The record documents no treatment 

for Carpenter’s back problems between January 2005 and October 2007. In fact, in 

October 2007, Carpenter described his health as good with only some small 

symptoms from his disc problems and stated that he was not undergoing any 

medical treatments at that time. Treatment notes from Carpenter’s pain 

management specialist reflect that in December 2009, Carpenter declined the 

recommended medication and indicated that he did not want to proceed with any 

treatment at that time. He sought no further pain management until August 2010. 

What’s more, Dr. Kochno’s opinion was somewhat at odds with Carpenter’s 

own description, in February 2009, to another physician, of his daily activities: 

that is, Carpenter stated that he cooked three times per week, cleaned two or three 

times, did laundry two or three times, went shopping once or twice, and provided 

childcare daily. Accordingly, the ALJ had good cause to discount Dr. Kuchno’s 

opinion in determining whether Carpenter was disabled. 

E. The Completeness of the Hypothetical Posed to the Vocational 

Expert

Finally, step five of the disability inquiry requires the Commissioner to 

demonstrate the existence of “significant numbers of jobs in the national economy” 

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that the claimant can perform and that account for his residual functional capacity, 

age, education, and work experience. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178; Jones, 190 F.3d 

at 1228; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(1)(v), (g), 404.1545(a)(5)(ii). To do so, an ALJ 

may rely solely on the testimony of a vocational expert to whom he poses a 

hypothetical question that comprises all of the claimant’s impairments, including 

those relating to the claimant’s concentration, persistence, and pace. Winschel, 631 

F.3d at 1180; Jones, 190 F.3d at 1229–30.

On appeal, Carpenter argues the ALJ failed to include all of his limitations 

in the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert. Specifically, Carpenter

contends that the ALJ did not include (1) Dr. Kochno’s limitation that he was 

required to rest four to five hours a day to relieve his pain or (2) the moderate 

limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace, found by the ALJ. Again, we 

disagree. 

The ALJ was not required to include Dr. Kochno’s findings in the 

hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert because the ALJ had already 

determined that those findings were unsupported by the medical evidence. See 

Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161 (holding that an ALJ is not required to include 

limitations in a hypothetical that are unsupported by the medical evidence). 

As for the concentration, persistence, or pace limitations, the ALJ found, 

based on the evidence, that Carpenter had “at most moderate difficulties with 

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regard to concentration, persistence, or pace.” The ALJ qualified that finding by 

pointing out that a psychiatrist had diagnosed Carpenter with generalized anxiety 

disorder, insomnia, and depression, and had prescribed Valium and Lexapro to 

Carpenter. The ALJ went on to conclude that Carpenter was capable of 

performing at least simple, unskilled, routine, and repetitive tasks. The ALJ then 

incorporated this limitation in his hypothetical question to the vocational expert by 

specifying that the hypothetical individual was “capable of performing at least 

simple unskilled, routine, and repetitive tasks, one- to three-step instructions.” 

We have observed that “when medical evidence demonstrates that a 

claimant can engage in simple, routine tasks or unskilled work despite limitations 

in concentration, persistence, and pace, courts have concluded that limiting the 

hypothetical to include only unskilled work sufficiently accounts for such 

limitations.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180. Accordingly, the hypothetical question

posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert adequately accounted for Carpenter’s 

mental limitations. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we conclude that the Commissioner did not err in 

denying Carpenter’s application for disability insurance benefits. 

AFFIRMED.

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