[Cite as Williams v. Bur. of Workers' Comp., 2014-Ohio-1889.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

PREBLE COUNTY 

ANTHONY T. WILLIAMS, : 

 CASE NO. CA2013-09-006 

 Appellant, : 

 O P I N I O N 

 : 5/5/2014 

 - vs - 

 : 

ADMINISTRATOR, OHIO BUREAU : 

OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, et al., 

 : 

 Appellees. 

 : 

CIVIL APPEAL FROM PREBLE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. 11CV28987 

Skilken & Skilken, Thomas E. Skilken, 1100 Key Bank Tower, 10 West Second Street, Suite 

1100, Dayton, Ohio 45402-3701, for appellant 

Steven Fixler, 1600 Carew Tower, 441 Vine Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for appellee, 

Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation 

Beirne & Wirthlin Co., L.P.A., Michael Schutte, 1745 Madison Road, Cincinnati, Ohio 45206, 

for appellee, Parker-Hannifin Corporation 

 

 S. POWELL, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Anthony T. Williams, appeals from the decision of the Preble County 

Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Parker-Hannifin 

Corporation, his former employer, in a claim seeking workers' compensation benefits. For 
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the reasons outlined below, we affirm. 

{¶ 2} The stipulated facts are as follows. On August 1, 2000, Williams injured his 

lower back while working at Parker-Hannifin, a self-insured employer under Ohio's workers' 

compensation laws. The injury occurred when Williams attempted to move a heavy drill 

cabinet that had tipped over and trapped a co-worker's foot. The following day, Williams 

went to the Preble County Urgent Care Center where he was diagnosed with having 

sustained an acute lumbar strain to his lower back. Nevertheless, Williams was cleared to 

return to work, albeit limited to light duty for a period of two days. It is undisputed that 

Williams received medical benefits as a result of his injury and that the medical bills were last 

paid through workers' compensation on November 22, 2000. It is also undisputed that 

Williams stopped working for Parker-Hannifin on December 3, 2001. 

{¶ 3} On December 9, 2002, Williams submitted a C-84 application to the Ohio 

Bureau of Workers' Compensation (OBWC) requesting temporary total disability resulting 

from his lower back injury. Thereafter, on December 30, 2002, Williams submitted a C-86 

motion to the OBWC requesting the same. The OBWC referred the matters to the Industrial 

Commission of Ohio (Industrial Commission) for a hearing on the matter. A hearing was then 

scheduled for March 27, 2003. However, on March 12, 2003, Williams withdrew his request 

for temporary total disability benefits and the hearing was cancelled. 

{¶ 4} Over three years later, on July 19, 2006, Williams submitted another C-86 

motion, wherein he requested allowance for an "additional condition of Recurrent Herniated 

Disc at L4-L5 by aggravation of a pre-existing condition." Other than his newly filed C-86 

motion, Williams did not submit any other application or requests to the OBWC or Industrial 

Commission. The Industrial Commission subsequently denied Williams' motion after finding 

the request for the additional condition was not causally related to his low back injury he 

sustained on August 1, 2000. As part of this decision, the Industrial Commission did not 
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make any findings in regards to a request for temporary total disability benefits. 

{¶ 5} On December 28, 2006, Williams filed an appeal from the Industrial 

Commission's findings to the Preble County Court of Common Pleas. After some delay, the 

matter proceeded to a two-day jury trial. Following trial, Williams was found to be entitled to 

participate in workers' compensation for the requested additional condition of a herniated disc 

at L4-L5. This court later affirmed that decision in Williams v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 188 

Ohio App.3d 715, 2010-Ohio-1719 (12th Dist.). 

{¶ 6} On November 10, 2009, Williams submitted a C-92 application to the OBWC 

requesting the determination of percentage of permanent partial impairment. Thereafter, on 

January 28, 2010, the OBWC issued a tentative order awarding Williams 8 percent whole 

person impairment that entitled him to receive 16 weeks of compensation pursuant to R.C. 

4123.57. Both Williams and Parker-Hannifin filed appeals from the tentative order, only to 

later dismiss their appeals on March 5, 2010. 

{¶ 7} Approximately one year later, on March 3, 2011, Parker-Hannifin filed its own 

C-86 motion with the Industrial Commission requesting it to exercise its continuing jurisdiction 

and vacate the tentative order previously issued by the OBWC on January 28, 2010. In 

support of this motion, Parker-Hannifin claimed the OBWC did not have jurisdiction or 

authority to enter that order as the six-year time limitation found in R.C. 4123.52 had expired 

since no medical benefits had been paid to Williams since November 22, 2000. The 

Industrial Commission agreed with Parker-Hannifin and vacated the tentative order in a 

decision issued on April 1, 2011. Williams then appealed the Industrial Commission's 

decision to the Preble County Court of Common Pleas. 

{¶ 8} While that matter was pending, on May 5, 2011, Williams filed another C-86 

motion requesting the payment of temporary total disability benefits. After holding two 

separate hearings on the matter, the Industrial Commission ultimately denied Williams' 
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request by finding it no longer had jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to the six-year time 

limitation found in R.C. 4123.52. In so holding, the Industrial Commission explicitly stated: 

[Williams] argues that his request is not statutorily barred 

because his C-86 Motion filed on [07/19/2006] to amend the 

claim included an 'implicit' request for payment of a concomitant 

period of unspecified temporary total disability compensation 

benefits. The District Hearing Officers finds that [Williams] did 

not seek payment of temporary total disability compensation 

benefits by this motion, but simply sought amendment of the 

claim. The District Hearing Officer further finds that [William's] C86 Motion filed on 12/30/2002 requesting payment of temporary 

total disability compensation was withdrawn by [Williams] and 

dismissed pursuant to an ex parte order of the Industrial 

Commission, date mailed 03/18/2003. The District Hearing 

Officer finds that the filing of a separate motion for temporary 

total disability compensation benefits, that was subsequently 

withdrawn, demonstrates that the motion filed on [07/19/2006] 

was solely filed to seek amendment of the claim, and not to seek 

an award of temporary total disability compensation benefits, 

either explicitly or implicitly. 

Williams also appealed from this decision to the Preble County Court of Common Pleas. 

Both of Williams' appeals were then consolidated by the common pleas court in an entry filed 

on August 20, 2012. 

{¶ 9} After Williams' appeals were consolidated, the parties entered into a joint 

stipulation of fact and submitted a number of joint exhibits to the common pleas court. The 

parties then filed competing motions for summary judgment. On August 13, 2013, the court 

issued a decision granting Parker-Hannifin's motion for summary judgment in its entirety. As 

part of that decision, the common pleas court specifically found "medical benefits were paid 

(last payment November 22, 2000), but no compensation was paid, so the six year limitation 

period would run on November 22, 2006." 

{¶ 10} Williams now appeals from the decision granting summary judgment to ParkerHannifin, raising two assignments of error for review. 

{¶ 11} Assignment of Error No. 1: 
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{¶ 12} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTED THE EMPLOYER'S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE SIX-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD APPLIED TO 

THE WORKER'S CLAIM. 

{¶ 13} In his first assignment of error, Williams argues the lower court erred by 

granting Parker-Hannifin's motion for summary judgment. We disagree. 

{¶ 14} Summary judgment is a procedural device used to terminate litigation when 

there are no issues in a case requiring a formal trial. Roberts v. RMB Ents., Inc., 197 Ohio 

App.3d 435, 2011-Ohio-6223, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.). On appeal, a trial court's decision granting 

summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Moody v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., L.L.C., 12th Dist. Butler 

No. CA2011-07-141, 2012-Ohio-1478, ¶ 7, citing Burgess v. Tackas, 125 Ohio App.3d 294, 

296 (8th Dist.1998). In applying the de novo standard, the appellate court is required to 

"us[e] the same standard that the trial court should have used, and * * * examine the 

evidence to determine whether as a matter of law no genuine issues exist for trial." Bravard 

v. Curran, 155 Ohio App.3d 713, 2004-Ohio-181, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.), quoting Brewer v. 

Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 383 (8th Dist.1997). 

{¶ 15} "R.C. 4123.52 governs the continuing jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission 

of Ohio and essentially places a statute of limitations on workers' compensation claims." 

Perez v. Univ. Hosp. Health Sys., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98427, 2012-Ohio-5896, ¶ 12, 

citing Sechler v. Krouse, 56 Ohio St.2d 185 (1978). For purposes of this appeal, the relevant 

version of R.C. 4123.52 provided, in pertinent part, the following: 

The jurisdiction of the industrial commission and the authority of 

the administrator of workers' compensation over each case is 

continuing, and the commission may make such modification or 

change with respect to former findings or orders with respect 

thereto, as, in its opinion is justified. 

R.C. 4123.52 then continued by providing: 
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No modification or change nor any finding or award in respect of 

any claim shall be made with respect to disability, compensation, 

dependency, or benefits, after six years from the date of injury in 

the absence of the payment of medical benefits under this 

chapter, in which event the modification, change, finding, or 

award shall be made within six years after the payment of 

medical benefits, or in the absence of payment of compensation 

under section 4123.57, 4123.58, or division (A) or (B) of section 

4123.56 of the Revised Code or wages in lieu of compensation in 

a manner so as to satisfy the requirements of section 4123.84 of 

the Revised Code, in which event the modification, change, 

finding, or award shall be made within ten years from the date of 

the last payment of compensation or from the date of death, nor 

unless written notice of claim for the specific part or parts of the 

body injured or disabled has been given as provided in section 

4123.84 or 4123.85 of the Revised Code, and the commission 

shall not make any modification, change, finding, or award which 

shall award compensation for a back period in excess of two 

years prior to the date of filing application therefor. 

In other words, if medical benefits have been paid, but there has not been a payment of 

compensation for temporary, partial or total disability under R.C. 4123.56, 4123.57 or 

4123.58 (or wages in lieu thereof), the claim expires "six years after the payment of medical 

benefits." Cocherl v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-1100, 2007-Ohio3225, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 16} Here, Williams claims the common pleas court erred by finding the Industrial 

Commission lacked jurisdiction to award benefits because the six-year limitation period found 

in R.C. 4123.52 had expired. However, based on the parties' joint stipulation of fact, as well 

as the joint exhibits submitted to the lower court, it is clear that Williams was only paid 

medical benefits, not compensation under R.C. 4123.56, 4123.57 or 4123.58 for temporary, 

partial or total disability. Moreover, just as the lower court found, it is undisputed that the last 

of these medical benefits were paid on November 22, 2000, thereby establishing a six-year 

limitation period that expired on November 22, 2006. Once the applicable six-year period 

under R.C. 4123.52 expired, the Industrial Commission was without jurisdiction to make any 
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further findings, awards, or orders, and Williams' claim was deemed to have lapsed. The 

common pleas court, therefore, did not err in its decision granting summary judgment to 

Parker-Hannifin. 

{¶ 17} Despite this, Williams argues he "tolled" the six-year limitation period by the 

filing of his C-84 application for temporary total disability on December 9, 2002, as well as by 

the filling of his C-86 motion on December 30, 2002. Yet, the stipulated record establishes 

that Williams later withdrew this request before the Industrial Commission could even hold a 

hearing on the matter. Again, it is undisputed that Williams was only plaid medical benefits, 

not compensation. We fail to see how a withdrawn motion for temporary total disability could 

impact the six-year limitation period clearly established by R.C. 4123.52 when no 

compensation was ever paid out. Williams' argument to the contrary is without merit and 

overruled. 

{¶ 18} Williams also argues he "tolled" the six-year limitation period by the filing of his 

C-86 motion on July 19, 2006, wherein he requested the additional condition of a herniated 

disc at L4-L-5. According to Williams, although not expressly requesting compensation as 

part of this motion, the motion should nevertheless be construed as an application for 

compensation, thereby falling within the six-year limitation period found in R.C. 4123.52. In 

support of this claim, Williams relies on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. 

General Refractories Co. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 44 Ohio St.3d 82 (1989), which found a 

request for additional condition can, under certain circumstances, also constitute a request 

for compensation. 

{¶ 19} That decision, however, dealt exclusively with how far back retroactively, under 

a two-year statutory period, the Industrial Commission could award benefits. See State ex 

rel. Drone v. Indus. Comm., 93 Ohio St.3d 151, 153 (stating the issue in General Refractories 

was "the date to which – based on the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 4123.52 – 
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temporary total disability compensation could be backdated"). This is an entirely different 

provision of R.C. 4123.52 than at issue here. As noted above, this case deals exclusively 

with the six-year time limitation where medical benefits are paid, but not compensation. The 

Ohio Supreme Court's decision in General Refractories is simply not applicable to the case at 

bar. 

{¶ 20} Regardless, even if we were to find the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in 

General Refractories was applicable, which we do not, there is simply nothing in the record to 

suggest Williams was seeking compensation as part of his C-86 motion filed on July 19, 

2006. When considering whether a request for an additional condition may also be 

considered a request for temporary total disability compensation, we are guided by the 

following factors: "(1) the document's contents, (2) the nature of relief sought, (3) how the 

parties treated the document, and (4) the liberal construction mandate of R.C. 4123.95." 

Drone, 93 Ohio St.3d at 153, citing General Refractories, 44 Ohio St.3d 82. 

{¶ 21} In this case, however, Parker-Hannifin did not respond to the motion indicating 

it treated the motion as a request for compensation, nor did the Industrial Commission 

construe the motion as a request for compensation when acknowledging William's 

withdrawal. In addition, the motion, which was filed over five years after Williams had 

stopped working at Parker-Hannifin, was not supported by any evidence of disability related 

to the requested additional condition. 

{¶ 22} When considering Williams' motion in light of these factors outlined by the Ohio 

Supreme Court in Drone and General Refractories, we find Williams' motion for an additional 

condition simply cannot be construed as a request for compensation. See, e.g., State ex rel. 

Ford Motor Co. v. Indus. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 17 (1992) (finding a similar application for 

additional condition could not be construed as a request for compensation). Just as the 

Industrial Commission found, "the filing of a separate motion for temporary total disability 
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compensation benefits, that was subsequently withdrawn, demonstrates that the motion filed 

on [07/19/2006] was solely filed to seek amendment of the claim, and not to seek an award 

of temporary total disability compensation benefits, either explicitly or implicitly." 

{¶ 23} It is well-settled that a workers' compensation claimant like Williams is 

responsible for preventing the running of the statute of limitations. Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 62410, 1993 WL 215390, *6 (June 17, 1993). "Failure to file an 

application for modification of an award within the prescribed time period results in the loss of 

the substantive right for additional benefits." Sechler, 56 Ohio St.2d at 190, citing State ex 

rel. Hammond v. Indus. Comm., 144 Ohio St. 477, 480 (1945). Merely because Williams now 

"says that [he] intended [his] initial motion to be an application for compensation does not, 

under these facts, make it one." Id. at 21. Therefore, because we find no merit to either of 

the arguments advanced by Williams challenging the lower court's decision granting ParkerHannifin's motion for summary judgment, Williams' first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 24} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶ 25} THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RULE ON THE ISSUED RAISED BY THE 

PLAINTIFF APPELLANT'S SECOND CASE (11CV029182) IN WHICH THE INJURED 

WORKER HAD REQUESTED A HEARING ON HIS C-84 REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY 

TOTAL DISABILITY FROM 2002 WHICH TOLLED THE RUNNING OF THE SIX-YEAR 

LIMITATION PERIOD. 

{¶ 26} In his second assignment of error, Williams argues the common pleas court 

erred by failing to rule on his C-86 motion filed on May 5, 2011, which sought a hearing on 

his request for payment of temporary total disability benefits. However, as part of its decision 

and entry granting Parker-Hannifin's motion for summary judgment, the lower court 

specifically stated that both cases had been consolidated for purposes of issuing its decision 

on appeal from the Industrial Commission's findings. Williams even acknowledges this fact 
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as part of his appellate brief before this court. The common pleas court's decision finding the 

Industrial Commission and the OBWC lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the six-year time 

limitation found in R.C. 4123.52 effectively denied all of Williams' claims. As noted above, 

we find no error in the court's decision granting Parker-Hannifin's motion for summary 

judgment. Accordingly, Williams' second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 27} Judgment affirmed. 

 PIPER and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.