This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3

v. No. A-1-CA-35043 4 DANAN BERNARDO GABALDON, 5 Defendant-Appellee. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Briana H. Zamora, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellant 13 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 14 B. Douglas Wood III, Assi stant Appellate Defender 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 BOHNHOFF, Judge. 192 {1} At approximately 8:00 a.m. on March 3, 2015, and in response to a call to the 1 Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Department regarding a suspicious white van that was 2 parked in front of a house under construc tion in Bernalillo County’s South Valley, 3 Sheriff’s Officer Lee Madrid attempted toquestion Defendant Danan Gabaldon as he 4 was seated in the van. Instead of rolli ng down his window and speaking with Officer 5 Madrid, Defendant drove off. A chase ensu ed and Defendant u ltimately was arrested 6 and indicted for several crimes including aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer 7 in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-1. 1(A) (2003), and assault with intent to 8 commit a violent felony upon a peace officer in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30- 9 22-23 (1971). Defendant successfully moved to suppress statements and other 10 evidence obtained as a result of the epis ode on the grounds that the initial encounter 11 was an illegal seizure in violation of Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico 12 Constitution. The State appeals. We reverse. 13 BACKGROUND 14
{2} The exclusionary rule generally bars the State from using, in connection with 15 a criminal prosecution, eviden ce obtained as a direct resu lt of an unlawful seizure. See, 16
e.g. , State v. Portillo , 2011-NMCA-079, ¶ 25, 258 P.3d 466 (holding that “evidence 17 discovered as a result of th e exploitation of an illegal seizure must be suppressed 183 unless it has been purged of its primary taint”). Defendant’s August 20, 2015 motion 1 sought an order suppressing the State’s use of the following evidence: 2 1. Any and all controlled substances and/or drug paraphernalia 3 seized from the person or property of Defendant on or about 4 March 3, 2014 [sic]. 5 2. Any and all statements made byDefendant as the result of the 6 illegal search and seizure of hi s or her person on March 3, 2014 7 [sic]. 8 3. All other fruits of the uncons titutional and unlawful seizure or 9 search of Defendant. 10
{3} At the September 11, 2015 hearing on the mo tion to suppress, the district court 11 heard testimony from four sheriff’s deputies, including Officer Madrid. On the basis 12 of that testimony, the court made the following findings of fact, which neither the 13 State nor Defendant challenge, in its September 30, 2015 order, granting the motion 14 to suppress: 15 1. Officer Lee Madrid was dispatch ed to an address near Barcelona 16 SW in Albuquerque, New Mexico in reference to a “suspicious 17 vehicle.” 18 2. Specifically, dispatch reported that the caller referenced a 19 suspicious white van parked at a vacant residence that was under 20 construction. 21 3. According to the anonymous caller, the occupants of the van were 22 looking around the house and through the windows. 23 4. Officers Madrid and [Haworth] arrived at the residence in their 24 police uniforms in two separate marked police vehicles. 254 5. As they arrived, Officer Madrid observed a white van parked on 1 the east side of the residence. The engine on the van was still 2 running. 3 6. Officer Madrid admittedly knew nothing about the van parked 4 near the residence. He did not know whether the van possibly 5 belonged to a construction worker or the owner of the house. 6 7. Initially when Officer Madrid approached the van, there was a 7 male and female lying in the back of the van. They appeared to be 8 asleep. The driver and passenger seats of the van were empty. 9 8. Officers Madrid and [Haworth] executed a perimeter check 10 around the residence; they verifi ed no one was in or near the 11 vacant residence. 12 9. Officer Madrid completed a peri meter check before approaching 13 the van to ensure that no one would unexpectedly approach them 14 as they were questioning the occupants of the van. 15 10. No one was located at the house during the perimeter check. 16 11. After completing the perimeter check, Officers Madrid and 17 [Haworth] approached the van to determine why the occupants 18 were at the house and what they were doing there. 19 12. . . . Defendant . . . was now in th e driver’s seat and the female was 20 in the passenger’s seat. This con cerned Officer Madrid. This led 21 him to believe the occupants of the van were trying to flee. 22 13. Officer Madrid ran up to . . . the Defendant’s van. He pounded on 23 the windows of the van, telling . . . Defendant, “Sheriff's 24 Department.” Officer Madrid instructed . . . Defendant to roll 25 down his window. 26 14. Officer Madrid grabbed onto the driver’s side mirror to stabilize 27 himself as he approached . . . Defendant’s van. 285 15. Officer Madrid testified that during the initial encounter 1 with . . . Defendant, . . . Defendant was not free to leave. 2 16. . . . Defendant looked at Officer Madrid and smiled. . . . Defendant 3 put the van in gear and “took off down the road.” 4
{4} The district court concluded that this encounter was a seizure within the 5 meaning of Article II, Section 10 of th e New Mexico Constitution, which generally 6 prohibits law enforcement from seizing indi viduals without first obtaining a warrant. 7 See State v. Garcia , 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 37, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032 (holding 8 that a person is seized if, “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, 9 a reasonable person would have believed thathe was not free to leave” (internal 10 quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Rowell , 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 10, 144 11 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95 (“Any warrantless search analysis must start with the bedrock 12 principle of both federal and state constituti onal jurisprudence that searches conducted 13 outside the judicial process, without prio r approval by a judge or magistrate, are per 14 se unreasonable, subject only to well-de lineated exceptions.” (emphasis, internal 15 quotation marks, and citation omitted)). The court rejected the State’s argument that 16 the seizure was subject to the “community caretaker” exception to the warrant 17 requirement. See State v. Ryon , 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 24, 137 N.M. 174, 108 P.3d 1032 18 (holding that warrants, probable cause to arrest, and reasonable suspicion to conduct 19 an investigatory stop are not required wh en police act as community caretakers 206 unrelated to crime-solving). The court also rejected the State’ s alternative argument 1 that the initial encounter was subject to anexception for investigatory detentions that 2 are supported by reasonable suspicion. See State v. Jason L. , 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 3 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (noting that “notall seizures are unconstitutional. We 4 recognize an officer may detain a person inorder to investigate possible criminal 5 activity. Investigatory detention is permissible when there is a reasonable and 6 articulable suspicion that the law is bei ng or has been broken” (internal quotation 7 marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, the district court granted the motion. 8
{5} The State timely appealed the district court’s suppression order pursuant to 9 NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-3(B)(2) ( 1972), and Rule 12-201(A)(1)(a) NMRA. 10 DISCUSSION 11
{6} On appeal, the State does not contest th e district court’s determination that 12 Officer Madrid’s initial encounter with Defe ndant constituted a seizure. The State also 13 does not continue toargue that the seizure was permissible under the community 14 caretaker exception. However, the State maintains that O fficer Madrid had reasonable 15 suspicion to conduct an investigatory detention of Defendant. Alternatively, the State 16 advances several theories in arguing that events that occurred after Defendant drove 17 off from the house under construction effectiv ely purged any taint that resulted from 18 the illegal initial seizure, suchthat the exclusionary rule should not be applied to 197 suppress the State’s use of any of the evid ence in question. Defendant urges that the 1 State failed to raise and preserve below these alternative arguments. 2
{7} “The standard of review for suppre ssion rulings is whether the law was 3 correctly applied to the facts, viewing them in a manner most favorable to the 4 prevailing party.” Jason L. , 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and 5 citation omitted). In doing so, the appellate court “observe[s] the distinction between 6 factual determinations which are subject toa substantial evidence standard of review 7 and application of law to the facts, which is subject to de novo review.” State v. Nieto , 8 2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 19, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442 (alteration, internal quotation 9 marks, and citation omitted); see Garcia , 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 9 (“ Determinations of 10 reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo.”). 11 Investigative Detention Standards 12
{8} As stated above, “[i]nvestigatory detention is permissible when there is a 13 reasonable and articulable suspicion that the law is being or has been broken. A 14 reasonable suspicion is a particularized su spicion, based on all the circumstances that 15 a particular individual, the one detained , is breaking, or has broken, the law.” Jason 16 L. , 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. 17 Cobbs , 1985-NMCA-105, ¶ 12, 103 N.M. 623, 711 P.2d 900 (“The officer must be 188 able to base such reasonable suspicion upon specific articulable facts, together with 1 rational inferences from those facts.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2
{9} “Reasonable suspicion is judged by an objective standard[.]” State v. 3 Hernandez , 1997-NMCA-006, ¶ 20, 122 N.M. 809, 932 P.2d 499. Determining 4 whether an officer had a reasonable suspic ion is assessed considering the totality of 5 the circumstances and common-sense j udgments and inferences about human 6 behavior. See State v. Robbs , 2006-NMCA-061, ¶ 20, 139 N.M. 569, 136 P.3d 570. 7 In assessing the totality of the circumstan ces, “police officers may draw on their own 8 experience and specialized training to makeinferences from and deductions about the 9 [available] information . . . that mi ght well elude an untrained person.” State v. Neal , 10 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 21, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (internal quotation marks and 11 citation omitted). 12
{10} “The level of suspicion re quired for an investigatory stop is considerably less 13 than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Urioste , 2002- 14 NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964 (i nternal quotation marks and citation 15 omitted). Thus, “an officer may still form reasonable suspicion without knowing, with 16 some degree of certainty, th at a crime had occurred.” Garcia , 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 45; 17 State v. Candelaria , 2011-NMCA-001, ¶ 15, 149 N.M. 125, 245 P.3d 69 (noting that 18 “[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion has always embraced a certain degree of 199 uncertainty”). However, “[ u ] nsupported intuition and inarticulatehunches are not 1 sufficient.” Jason L. , 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20 (emphases added) (internal quotation 2 marks and citation omitted); see Garcia , 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 45 (“Mere speculation 3 that [the defendant] may have committed anunspecified crime does not satisfy the 4 constitutional requirement of reasonable suspicion.”). 5
{11} Importantly, “[a] reasonable suspicion of criminal activity can arise from 6 wholly lawful conduct.” Urioste , 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and 7 citation omitted). “In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists in a particular 8 case, the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, but 9 the degree of suspicion that attaches toparticular types of noncriminal acts.” State v. 10 Harbison , 2007-NMSC-016, ¶ 15, 141 N.M. 392, 156 P.3d 30 (internal quotation 11 marks and citation omitted). 12 Analysis 13
{12} In Cobbs , this Court articulated a useful framework for assessing the legality 14 of the investigatory detention: 15 [O]ur first inquiry is to determine what facts were available to [the 16 officer] and what inferences l ogically flowed from those facts. 17

. . . . 18 The next inquiry is whether [the officer]’s reasonable suspicion can 19 satisfy the objective test: Would the information relayed in the dispatch 20 combined with the officer’s observations . . . warrant a person of 2110 reasonable caution in believing that criminal activity was possibly afoot, 1 thus necessitating an investigatory stop? 2 1985-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 14, 16. 3
{13} What facts, and inferences reasonably flowing therefrom, were available to 4 Officer Madrid? First, reasonable susp icion may be based on an anonymous tip, 5 provided it is “suitably corroborated or exhibits[s] sufficient indicia of reliability.” 6 State v. Contreras , 2003-NMCA-129, ¶ 5, 134 N.M. 503, 79 P.3d 1111. “[A] tip is 7 more reliable if it is apparent that the informant observed the details personally.” Id. 8 ¶ 12. Officer Madrid knew that a nei ghbor had contacted the Bernalillo County 9 Sheriff’s Department to express concern th at he or she had observed a “suspicious” 10 white van parked in front of a vacant re sidence that was under construction and that 11 the occupants of the van were looking around the house and through the windows. In 12 particular, the suspicion was that the vehi cle “was casing the area and burglarizing the 13 area.” Officer Madrid inferred that th e neighbor did not recognize the van as 14 belonging to another neighbor. He alsotook into account his experience that 15 construction sites are subject to frequent burglary. 16
{14} Second, what Officer Madrid observed struck him as odd. When he arrived at 17 the location, it was approximately 8 a.m. As he approached the van, he heard the 18 engine running, yet no one was sitting in th e driver’s and passe nger seats. When he 19 looked in a van window, he saw a man and a woman lying down in the back of the 2011 van, appearing to be asleep. Officer Madridand his partner thenwalked around to see 1 if anyone else was present. They found no one, which would indicate that the man and 2 the woman lying in the van were the pe ople observed by the neighbor a few minutes 3 earlier looking into the house windows. 4
{15} Third, Officer Madrid then returnedto the van for the purpose of asking 5 Defendant and the woman why they were at the house and what they were doing. He 6 now saw Defendant and the woman in the driver’s and passenger seats, respectively, 7 of the van. Officer Madrid concluded they intended to drive off, so he ran up to the 8 driver’s door, pounded on the window, and to ld Defendant to roll down the window. 9
{16} In Officer Madrid’s words, 10 the van was running, so th e part about that that was unusual to me was 11 the van was sitting there idling, and—which tells me somebody is awake. 12 I go and don’t see anybody in the front, so I’m like, ‘[h]um, that’s 13 interesting.’ Now I’m fully expecti ng to see someone in the yard or 14 around the house, what was called in, when we double check and look 15 in the back of the van when I see two people who appear to be 16 sleeping[.] I’m thinking, ‘[h]um this is interesting,’ just one odd thing 17 after another on that. So then after we check the perimeter of the house, 18 we came back to the van, obviously they were not just sleeping because 19 it took us maybe a minute or two to walk around the house for us to 20 come back to the van which, all of a sudden, they’re ready to go in the 21 front seat. 22 While the district court noted in its decision that Officer Madrid did not knowwhether 23 the van belonged to the owner of the home or a construction worker, he nevertheless 24 reasonably could surmise that this was not behavior one would expect from an owner 2512 or a construction worker. Owners would not likely be walking around their house and 1 looking in the windows, nor would they be ly ing down in the back of a van with the 2 engine running and then a moment later be seen in the van’s front seats. Nor would 3 a construction worker. At 8:00 a.m., a cons truction worker would be expected to, if 4 anything, be either on the job or preparing to start the day, likely not sleeping in the 5 back of a van whose engine is running. Further, both owners and construction workers 6 could be expected to get out of a vehicl e and approach law en forcement officers who 7 are observed walking around their home under construction. The scene that Officer 8 Madrid encountered is reasonably described as “unusual” and “odd” and was, in any 9 event, “a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself [that] taken together 10 warranted further investigation.” Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). 11
{17} With the foregoing information received from the neighbor’s call and then his 12 own observations, together with reasonable inferences, Officer Madrid had more than 13 unsupported intuition or an inarticulate hunch. The facts of this case, therefore, are 14 distinguishable from those of Garcia , 2009-NMSC-046, and State v. Soto , 2008- 15 NMCA-032, 143 N.M. 631, 179 P.3d 1239. In Garcia , the officer knew only that he 16 was called to go to an address to a “possibl e domestic in progress” in which the caller 17 wanted a man named Joshua Garcia removed from the residence. 2009-NMSC18 046, ¶ 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). He saw an individual whom he did not 1913 know at the intersection nearest the addre ss in question and seized the individual. 1 Id . ¶¶ 2-3. Because the officer had no info rmation that a specific crime had been 2 committed or that the individual he seized was the responsible party, the seizure was 3 unlawful. Id. ¶¶ 45-46. Similarly, in Soto , police officers knew only that the defendant 4 was riding a bicycle on a road that ran pa st a horse racetrack; the officers had no 5 information that the defendant had e ngaged in any illegal activity. 2008-NMCA-032, 6 ¶¶ 2-3. Here, Officer Madrid could identify Defendant as the person who had been 7 observed by a neighbor who was walking around the home under construction, 8 peering into the windows. He also had seenDefendant engage inbehavior that, under 9 the circumstances, was questionable. O fficer Madrid reasonably could form a 10 suspicion that Defendant had been attempting to burglarize the residence under 11 construction. SeeNMSA 1978, § 30-16-3 (1971); NMSA 1978 § 30-28-1 (1963). 12
{18} The facts and holding of Cobbsprovide guidance. There, a municipal police 13 department relayed to officers in a patrolcar information received about suspicious 14 persons and a possible residential burglary in progress: two individuals, including the 15 defendant, had been observed “repeatedly ap proaching the rear door of a residence 16 and then returning to their vehicle [that] was parked behind the residence.” 1985- 17 NMCA-105, ¶ 4. When officers arrived at the residence, they“observed [the] car 18 parked behind the residence with its li ghts on and two passengers sitting in it.” Id. ¶ 5. 1914 When the car started to leave, the offi cers pulled it over and, following a patdown of 1 the defendant that revealed a firearm and drugs, arrested the defendant. Id. ¶¶ 5-10. 2 On these facts, the officer “was ampl y justified in stopping the defendant.” Id. ¶ 17. 3 The facts of this case reasonably give rise to, if anything, more suspicion of criminal 4 activity than those present in Cobbs . Officer Madrid therefore properly could 5 undertake an investigatory stop of Defendant in order to ask him why he had been 6 walking around the residence and looking in the windows, and then returning to and 7 lying in the back of the van with its engine running. 8
{19} We hold that the district court erred indetermining that Officer Madrid did not 9 have reasonable suspicion toseize and detain Defendant , for investigatory purposes, 10 when Officer Madrid observed Defendant in th e driver’s seat of the van. We decline 11 to consider, as unnecessary, the State’ s remaining arguments and Defendant’s 12 contention that those arguments were not preserved. 13 CONCLUSION 14
{20} We reverse the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress 15 evidence and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 16
{21} IT IS SO ORDERED. 17

18 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 1915 WE CONCUR: 1

2 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 3

4 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 5