Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 54A05-1411-PL-527 | September 11, 2015 Page 1 of 16

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

James E. Ayers

Wernle, Ristine & Ayers

Crawfordsville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

W. Brent Threlkeld

Kelly A. Roth

Threlkeld & Associates

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Sheila Sasso and Mary Sasso,

Appellants-Defendants,

v.

State Farm Mutual Automobile 

Insurance Company,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 11, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

54A05-1411-PL-527

Appeal from the Montgomery 

Superior Court

The Honorable David A. Ault, Judge

Case No. 54D01-1308-PL-637

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Sheila Sasso appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) on State Farm’s 

complaint for declaratory judgment. Sheila presents several issues for our 

review, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:
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1. Whether Indiana’s Guest Statute, Indiana Code Section 

34-30-11-1 (2014),1 prohibits Sheila’s negligence claim against her 

mother, Mary Sasso, for Sheila’s injuries arising from an 

automobile accident in Mary’s car while Mary was driving. 

2. Whether the Guest Statute violates the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution2 or Article 1, 

Sections 12 and 23 of the Indiana Constitution.3

[2] We affirm.4

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In October of 2010, Sheila, an Illinois resident, called her mother, Mary,

5

to 

determine whether she would be interested in visiting the Parke County, 

Indiana, covered bridge festival. Sheila hoped to “meet vendors” for her online 

business, which was “similar to e[B]ay” but “not [an] auction.” Appellant’s 

App. at 126. Mary, a resident of Crawfordsville, Indiana, agreed.

 

1

 In 1998, the Guest Statute was recodified and amended to no longer refer broadly to all “guests” of an 

automobile’s operator. Nonetheless, the current version of the statute is still referred to as “the Indiana Guest 

Statute.” See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 971 N.E.2d 58, 60 (Ind. 2012).

2

 Specifically, Sheila asserts that the Guest Statute violates her right under the Fourteenth Amendment to not 

be denied equal protection of the laws. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.

3

 Article 1, Section 12 provides: “All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his 

person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, 

and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.” And Article 1, Section 

23 states: “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, 

which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”

4

 Because we dispose of this appeal under Indiana’s Guest Statute, we need not address the parties’ 

alternative arguments regarding whether Sheila was excluded from coverage under the terms of Mary’s 

policy with State Farm.

5

 Mary is a named defendant in the trial court but she does not participate in this appeal.
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[4] Sheila met up with Mary on October 14, and, the next day, Mary drove Sheila 

in Mary’s car to the festival. Sheila paid Mary $50 for gas and bought Mary 

lunch. Later, while Mary was driving to another location at the festival, her 

vehicle was involved in an accident, and Sheila was severely injured. Mary has 

an automobile insurance policy with State Farm.

[5] On October 15, 2012, Sheila filed a negligence claim against Mary. Thereafter, 

State Farm, under a different cause number, filed a complaint for declaratory 

judgment against Sheila and Mary. On August 4, 2014, State Farm moved for 

summary judgment on its complaint. Following a hearing, the trial court 

entered judgment in favor of State Farm. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision 

Standard of Review

[6] Our standard of review for summary judgment appeals is well established. As 

our supreme court has stated:

We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of . . . the non-moving parties, summary judgment is 

appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Williams v. 

Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). “A 

fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the 

case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to 

resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the 

undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable 

inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to 

“demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a 

determinative issue,” at which point the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “come forward with contrary evidence” showing an 

issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks 

and substitution omitted). And “[a]lthough the non-moving 

party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of 

summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial 

court’s decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his 

day in court.” McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 

916 N.E.2d 906, 909-10 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (alterations original to 

Hughley).

[7] Summary judgment is a “high bar” for the moving party to clear in Indiana. Id.

at 1004. “In particular, while federal practice permits the moving party to 

merely show that the party carrying the burden of proof [at trial] lacks evidence 

on a necessary element, we impose a more onerous burden: to affirmatively 

‘negate an opponent's claim.’” Id. at 1003 (quoting Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. 

Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994)). Further:

Summary judgment is a desirable tool to allow the trial court to 

dispose of cases where only legal issues exist. But it is also a 

“blunt . . . instrument” by which the non-prevailing party is 

prevented from having his day in court. We have therefore 

cautioned that summary judgment is not a summary trial and the 

Court of Appeals has often rightly observed that it is not 

appropriate merely because the non-movant appears unlikely to 

prevail at trial. In essence, Indiana consciously errs on the side 
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of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather 

than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.

Id. at 1003-04 (citations and some quotations omitted; omission original to 

Hughley). Thus, for the trial court to grant summary judgment, the movant 

must have made a prima facie showing that its designated evidence negated an 

element of the nonmovant’s claims, and, in response, the nonmovant must have 

failed to designate evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See 

Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ind. 2009).

Issue One: Applicability of Indiana’s Guest Statute

[8] We first address whether Sheila’s negligence claim against Mary is prohibited 

by Indiana’s Guest Statute, Indiana Code Section 34-30-11-1. That statute 

provides as follows:

The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a 

motor vehicle is not liable for loss or damage arising from injuries 

to or the death of:

(1) the person’s parent;

(2) the person’s spouse;

(3) the person’s child or stepchild;

(4) the person’s brother;

(5) the person’s sister; or

(6) a hitchhiker;

resulting from the operation of the motor vehicle while the 

parent, spouse, child or stepchild, brother, sister, or hitchhiker 

was being transported without payment in or upon the motor 

vehicle unless the injuries or death are caused by the wanton or 
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willful misconduct of the operator, owner, or person responsible 

for the operation of the motor vehicle.

(Emphasis added.)

[9] According to Sheila, the Guest Statute does not prohibit her claim against Mary 

because “Sheila did pay for gas. That ‘payment’ is sufficient to remove her 

from” the purview of the Guest Statute.6 Appellant’s Br. at 5. That is, Sheila 

asserts that she is not within the scope of the Guest Statute because she was not 

“transported without payment.” See I.C. § 34-30-11-1.

[10] Sheila is mistaken. This provision of the Guest Statute has long been 

interpreted to require that the motor-vehicle operator be “directly 

compensated . . . in a substantial and material or business sense[,] as 

distinguished from [a] mere social benefit or nominal or incidental contribution 

to expenses[] of the trip.” Allison v. Ely, 241 Ind. 248, 254, 170 N.E.2d 371, 374 

(1960). As this court has added, “[t]o exclude from the Guest Statute cases of 

this nature where groups of friends or relatives make arrangements or travel 

together, consideration must be given by the guest in excess of expenses 

incidental to the trip.” Knuckles v. Elliott, 141 Ind. App. 232, 239, 227 N.E.2d 

179, 183 (1967). In Allison, our supreme court held that, as a matter of law,

“[t]he purchase of a few gallons of gasoline . . . d[oes] not constitute ‘payment’” 

under the Guest Statute. 170 N.E.2d at 377. And, in Knuckles, we held—again, 

 

6

 Sheila has not alleged that her injuries were the result of wanton or willful misconduct on the part of Mary.
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as a matter of law—that paying “for some of the gasoline on the trip and . . . for 

food” also does not constitute a payment under the Guest Statute. 227 N.E.2d 

at 180.

[11] Sheila’s argument on appeal is contrary to our long-standing interpretation of 

this statutory language. And while the Guest Statute has been amended since 

Allison and Knuckles, the provision that there is no liability when the guest is 

“transported without payment” has remained intact. See Allison, 170 N.E.2d at 

373 (quoting the version of the Guest Statute then in effect). Accordingly, as a 

matter of law Sheila’s contribution of gas and food is equivalent to being 

“transported without payment,” and Mary is not liable to Sheila.

Issue Two: Constitutionality of Indiana’s Guest Statute

[12] Sheila also asserts that the Guest Statute violates the United States and Indiana 

Constitutions. Specifically, Sheila asserts that the Guest Statute violates her 

federal right to equal protection of the laws, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; her state 

right to open courts, Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12; and her state right to equal 

privileges and immunities, Ind. Const. art. 1, § 23. We address each argument 

in turn. We then consider other, more general arguments Sheila raises on 

appeal.

A. Fourteenth Amendment

[13] We first consider Sheila’s federal argument. Despite misgivings about the 

validity of the prior version of Indiana’s Guest Statute under the Equal 
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Protection Clause, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

has explained:

Nevertheless a recent [U.S.] Supreme Court decision requires us 

to reach a contrary result. In Cannon v. Oviatt . . . the Supreme 

Court of Utah rejected an equal protection challenge to a guest 

statute virtually identical to Indiana’s. The appeal to the United 

States Supreme Court presented the question whether the guest 

statute violated the equal protection clause because it barred 

recovery for ordinary negligence. See 43 L.W. 3103. The Court 

dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question.[7] 

Cannon v. Oviatt, 419 U.S. 810, 95 S. Ct. 24, 42 L. Ed. 2d 37. 

Although that ruling is not a plenary consideration of this 

significant current topic in tort law, it is an adjudication on the 

merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-345, 95 S. Ct. 2281, 

2289-90, 45 L. Ed. 2d 223, 236. Therefore, despite our 

doubts . . . we are obligated to affirm. Hicks v. Miranda, supra, 

422 U.S. at 345, 95 S. Ct. at 2290, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 236.

Sidle v. Majors, 536 F.2d 1156, 1159-60 (7th Cir. 1976).8 Accordingly, as 

explained by the Seventh Circuit, we are obliged to follow the United States 

Supreme Court and to reject Sheila’s argument under the Fourteenth 

Amendment.

 

7

 This is not to be confused with dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin, 

Insubstantial Questions and Federal Jurisdiction: A Footnote to the Term-Limits Debate, 2 Nev. L.J. 608, 

629 (2002); see also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975) (holding that dismissal for want of a 

substantial federal question is a determination “on the merits” that lower courts “are not free to disregard”).

8

 Sheila states that “the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Indiana guest statute . . . violated the Fourteenth 

Amendment . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 14. This is obviously incorrect.
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B. Article 1, Section 12

[14] Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court has rejected a challenge to the previous

version of Indiana’s Guest Statute under Article 1, Section 12, the open courts 

provision of the Indiana Constitution. In an opinion on a certified question in 

the same Sidle case then before the Seventh Circuit, our supreme court stated:

We are drawn to Gallegher v. Davis et al., (1936), Del. Super., 7 

W.W. Harr. 380, 183 A. 620, as a logical disposition of the [Art. 

1, § 12] arguments. In that case, the court was concerned with a 

constitutional provision almost identical to our own. And a 

guest statute containing the saving provision, [“]unless such 

accidents shall have been intentional on the part of such owner or 

operator or caused by his wilful [sic] or wanton disregard of the 

rights of others.[”] . . . The following quotations from the 

Gallegher case are expressive of our viewpoint of the restraints 

imposed by our constitutional Article 1, § 12.

Generally, we think, the provision is inserted in 

Constitutions to secure the citizen against 

unreasonable and arbitrary deprivation of rights 

whether relating to life, liberty, property, or 

fundamental rights of action relating to person or 

property; and that it applies as well to the judicial 

branch of government, as to the legislative and 

executive branches. It embraces the principle of 

natural justice that in a free government every man 

should have an adequate legal remedy for injury 

done him by another.

The inquiry, in every case, must be directed to the 

nature of the right alleged to have been infringed 

upon. Undoubtedly, arbitrary and unreasonable 

abolishment of a right of action to redress injury to 

the essential rights of person or property is 
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prohibited. Certainly, the legislature may not 

declare to be right that which is essentially wrong, 

nor say that which is a definite, substantial injury to 

fundamental rights to be no injury, nor abolish a 

remedy given by the common law to essential rights 

without affording another remedy substantially 

adequate. But no one has a vested interest in any 

rule of the common law. Rights of property which 

have been created by the common law cannot be 

taken away without due process; but the law itself, 

as a rule of conduct, within constitutional limits, 

may be changed at the will of the legislature. The 

great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the 

common law as they develop, and to adopt it to the 

change of time and circumstance. Negligence is 

merely the disregard of some duty imposed by law; 

and the nature and extent of the duty may be 

modified by legislation, with a corresponding 

change in the test of negligence . . . .

* * *

We cannot say that existing conditions did not 

present a manifest evil affecting the general welfare 

and public morals necessitating the imposition of a 

degree of restraint upon a certain class of suitors, 

nor can we say that the means adopted by the 

legislature do not bear a reasonable relation to the 

end sought to be accomplished.

The provision of the Constitution does not, either 

expressly or by necessary implication, forbid the 

legislature to measure the degree of care to be 

accorded by an owner or operator of an automobile 

to a gratuitous passenger; for it does not constitute 

the common law a straight jacket about the 

legislature body rendering it powerless reasonably to 
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regulate social relations in accordance with 

changing conditions. 183 A. 624-26.

Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 221-24, 341 N.E.2d 763, 773-75 (1976) (citations, 

footnote, and quotation marks omitted) (some omissions original). The court 

then held that “[t]he Indiana guest statute . . . does not contravene . . . [Section] 

12 . . . of Article 1 of the Constitution of Indiana.” Id. at 775. Accordingly, we 

reject Sheila’s argument under Article 1, Section 12. 

C. Article 1, Section 23

[15] We next turn to Sheila’s argument that Indiana’s Guest Statute, as currently 

written, violates her right under the Indiana Constitution to equal privileges and

immunities. For background, we again turn to the Indiana Supreme Court’s 

opinion in Sidle, which addressed an Article 1, Section 23 argument against the 

previous version of the Guest Statute as follows:

Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have 

upheld the right of states to abolish or modify the common 

law. . . .

Within the context of these cases, at least, we see no differences in 

the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions. 

Both are designed to prevent the distribution of extraordinary 

benefits or burdens to any group. However, the power to 

establish legislative classifications of persons has not been 

categorically denied but only severely limited. Rather, our courts 

have required only that such classifications meet certain tests. If 

neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is 

involved, the standard of review is that the classification not be 

arbitrary or unreasonable[,] Dandridge v. Williams, (1970) 397 
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U.S. 471, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491, and that a [“]fair and 

substantial[”] relationship exist between the classification and the 

purpose of the legislation creating it[,] Johnson v. Robison, (1974) 

415 U.S. 361, 94 S. Ct. 1160, 39 L. Ed. 2d 389 . . . .

Our guest statute precludes a guest passenger from recovering 

damages for personal injuries sustained merely by the negligence 

of the owner or operator. Being inoperative as to passengers who 

were not guests, the statute creates two classifications of 

passengers—guests and non-guests, who are treated vastly 

differently under circumstances that are otherwise identical. The 

inequity is patent. The issues are whether or not the 

classification is reasonable and bears a fair and substantial 

relation to the legitimate purpose of the statute. The 

presumptions are that it is and does, and the burden is upon the 

plaintiff to show the contrary.

* * *

Purposes traditionally attributed to such statutes have been the fostering 

of hospitality by insulating generous drivers from lawsuits instituted by 

ungrateful guests and the elimination of [the] possibility of collusive 

lawsuits. . . .

341 N.E.2d at 767-68 (emphases added; some citations omitted). The Indiana 

Supreme Court agreed with those rationales for Indiana’s Guest Statute and, as 

such, concluded that the statute did not violate Article 1, Section 23. Id. at 775.

[16] While Sheila does not address Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. 1994), in 

that case our supreme court abrogated its Sidle opinion insofar as it had 

conflated the analyses under Article 1, Section 23 and the Fourteenth 

Amendment. As the court stated in Collins: “there is no settled body of Indiana 

law that compels application of a federal equal protection analytical 
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methodology to claims alleging special privileges or immunities under Indiana 

Section 23.” Id. Rather, “Section 23 should be given independent 

interpretation and application.” Id. The Collins court then concluded:

Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution imposes two 

requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or 

immunities to differing classes of persons. First, the disparate 

treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related 

to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally 

treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be 

uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons 

similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute 

complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise 

substantial deference to legislative discretion.

Id. at 80.

[17] Applying the proper analytical framework under Collins does not yield a result 

different from the one reached by the Indiana Supreme Court in Sidle. The 

current Guest Statute, as applied here, distinguishes close family members of 

the motor vehicle operator from all other guests in or upon the vehicle. See I.C. 

§ 34-30-11-1. The statute then prohibits the motor vehicle operator from being 

held liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or the death of those close 

family members as a result of ordinary negligence by the motor vehicle operator 

in the operation of the vehicle. See id.

[18] Giving this legislative classification the substantial deference that we must, 

Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80, we conclude that the classification easily passes the 

test of Article 1, Section 23. As noted by our supreme court in Sidle, one of the 
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policies underlying the Guest Statue is to preempt potentially collusive lawsuits. 

341 N.E.2d at 768. The disparate treatment the Guest Statute creates for close 

family members of the motor vehicle operator is reasonably related to the 

inherent differences between the distinguished classes; that is, it is reasonable 

for our legislature to suppose that close family members of a motor vehicle 

operator are more likely to engage in collusive lawsuits than persons more 

attenuated in their relationships to the motor vehicle operator. And this 

treatment is uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly 

situated. As such, under Collins, Indiana’s Guest Statute does not violate 

Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution.

D. Sheila’s Remaining Arguments

[19] Finally, we address Sheila’s two remaining arguments, in which she attempts to 

avoid both Sidle opinions altogether by suggesting that subsequent events render 

those opinions no longer good law (aside from Collins v. Day, which, again 

Sheila does not argue on appeal). First, Sheila asserts that “[t]he Indiana 

Legislature in 1998 repealed the ‘guest’ statute.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. But that 

did not happen. In 1998 the General Assembly recodified the statute and 

amended it. See P.L. 1-1998 § 26. As amended, the statute no longer applies 

broadly to all “guests” of a driver but narrowly only to hitchhikers and the

driver’s close family members. See I.C. § 34-30-11-1. Sheila presents no cogent 

reasoning to support her assertion that a more narrowly tailored classification is 

less valid than the previous, broad classification. See Ind. Appellate Rule 

46(A)(8)(a). As such, we reject this attempt to distinguish the Sidle opinions.
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[20] Second, Sheila contends that the Indiana Supreme Court disavowed its Sidle

opinion in Clark v. Clark, 971 N.E.2d 58, 61 n.1 (Ind. 2012). But, in Clark, our 

supreme court discussed Sidle as follows:

The plaintiffs do not assert, and thus we do not address, any 

claim that the [current version of the] statute violates Article 1, 

Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, which declares in part 

that “every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, 

or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” Such a 

claim was previously presented and rejected with respect to a 

former version of the Guest Statute in Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 

206, 341 N.E.2d 763 (1976). While not reanalyzing this 

constitutional issue in the present case, we take this opportunity 

to disapprove certain unfortunate language in Sidle which we find 

to undermine and misstate well-established important values and 

principles of Indiana and American jurisprudence. The Sidle

opinion speculated with approval that “a very likely legislative 

policy” [for the statutory classification] may have been 

“protection against the ‘benevolent thumb syndrome’” and “the 

‘Robin Hood’ proclivity of juries.” Id. at 218-20, 341 N.E.2d at 

771-72. Such language improperly mischaracterizes the 

conscientious, insightful, and reliable efforts of those who serve 

as jurors. It has no proper place in our jurisprudence.

Id.9 While Clark criticized part of the rationale in Sidle, it did not overrule 

Sidle’s holding under Article 1, Section 12, and it is not this court’s place to 

ignore those parts of Sidle that remain good law. See Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 

 

9

 While the Clark footnote is framed in the context of Article 1, Section 12, the language criticized is with 

respect to the Sidle court’s analysis of Article 1, Section 23. See Sidle, 341 N.E.2d at 767-68, 771-72. As 

explained above, that analysis was abrogated by Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 75.
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N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly, we reject Sheila’s 

remaining arguments.

Conclusion

[21] In sum, under the plain text of Indiana’s Guest Statute, Mary is not liable to 

Sheila for the injuries Sheila incurred as a result of an automobile accident in 

which she was a guest in Mary’s vehicle. Further, under controlling law the 

Guest Statute does not violate either the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution or Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. And 

we hold that the Guest Statute does not violate Article 1, Section 23 of the 

Indiana Constitution. As such, State Farm was entitled to summary judgment 

on its declaratory judgment action, and we affirm the trial court.

[22] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.