J-S44038-15 

2015 PA Super 200 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF G.L.L., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY 

OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND 

FAMILIES 

 No. 359 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order February 9, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): TPR 077 of 2014 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and JENKINS, J. 

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2015 

 Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) appeals 

from the trial court’s order denying CYF’s petition to involuntarily terminate 

the parental rights of S.L.L. (Mother) to her minor child, G.L.L. (Child) (born 

6/2008).1 The trial court concluded that termination would not serve the 

needs and welfare of G.L.L. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).2 After careful 

review, we affirm. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 G.L.L., through his Guardian ad litem (GAL), took the position at trial that 

Mother’s rights should be terminated and filed its own appeal. However, 

the GAL has since withdrawn that appeal, finding that the trial court’s 

decision to deny CYF’s petition because termination would not serve the 

needs and welfare of G.L.L. is supported by the record and was not an abuse 

of discretion. See GAL’s Brief, at 9. 

2

 The trial court’s order denies CYF’s petition solely on the grounds that 

“[t]he Court finds that terminating the rights of the parent does not serve 

the needs and welfare of the child.[]” Trial Court Order, 2/9/2015, at 1. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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 CYF first became involved with G.L.L. in June 2011 when Mother was 

in a psychiatric hospital and could not care for him. In August 2011, CYF 

opened a case as a result of deplorable conditions in Mother’s home, 

including animal feces and bugs throughout the home. CYF provided Mother 

with family group decision-making services,3 which eventually transitioned to 

in-home services, from September 2011 through December 2011. 

Ultimately, G.L.L. was removed from his home on February 15, 2012, but 

was returned to Mother’s care on February 28, 2102; Mother was provided 

crisis in-home services. G.L.L. was adjudicated dependent one month later, 

on March 27, 2012. G.L.L. was removed from the family home for a second 

time, on April 16, 2012, after CYF received a report of physical abuse 

perpetrated by Mother. He has not returned to Mother’s care. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

However, the court makes no determination with regard to findings on 

section 2511(a). We remind the trial court that in termination matters, it 

must engage in a bifurcated analysis, see In re D. W., 856 A.2d 1231, 

1234 (Pa. Super. 2004), that initially focuses on the conduct of the parent 

and whether the party seeking termination has proven by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination under section 2511(a). Only after determining that the 

parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights under 

section 2511(a) must the court engage in the second part of the analysis, 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child, under section 2511(b). 

C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

3

 Family Group Decision Making services describes a variety of practices 

aimed at working with and engaging children, youth, and families in safety 

and service planning and decisions. These services are often provided to 

families where safety concerns exist and prior to children being removed 

from their homes. 
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 CYF created a family service plan (FSP) for Mother with the following 

goals: stabilizing her mental health; getting G.L.L. needed preventative 

health and dental care; obtaining appropriate housing; and maintaining 

contact and cooperation with family, friends and relatives as support 

resources for G.L.L. To assist her in completing these goals, CYF provided 

Mother with parenting classes, referrals for drug and alcohol assessments 

and providers, and transportation assistance. 

 On April 29, 2014, CYF filed the instant petition for involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to G.L.L., citing 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 

2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) as the grounds for termination. 

The trial court held a termination hearing on January 23, 2015, and denied 

CYF’s petition, ultimately concluding that CYF did not prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that terminating Mother’s parental rights would serve 

the needs and welfare of G.L.L. under section 2511(b). CYF filed this 

appeal, raising the following issue for our consideration: 

Did the Orphan’s Court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion in failing to conclude that CYF met its burden of 

proving that termination of Birth Mother’s parental rights would 

serve the needs and welfare of the Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b) by clear and convincing evidence? 

 We note that: 

In a proceeding to terminate parental rights involuntarily, the 

burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish 

by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for 

doing so. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 
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issue." It is well established that a court must examine the 

individual circumstances of each and every case and consider all 

explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence 

in light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants 

termination. 

In re Adoption of S.M., 816 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). We review a trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate 

parental rights for an abuse of discretion or error of law. In re A.R., 837 

A.2d 560, 563 (Pa. Super. 2003). Our scope of review is limited to 

determining whether the trial court’s order is supported by competent 

evidence. Id. 

 CYF asserts that it proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would serve the needs and welfare of 

G.L.L. under section 2511(b). To support its position, CYF argues that: 

Mother has made minimal progress with regard to maintaining sobriety and 

obtaining stable housing since G.L.L. has been out of her care; termination 

of G.L.L.’s relationship with foster parents would be detrimental to G.L.L.; 

and that an open adoption would meet the needs and welfare of G.L.L. 

 Section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act4 states: 

(b) Other considerations. --The court in terminating the rights of 

a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

____________________________________________ 

4 See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. 
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housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found 

to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any 

petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court 

shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent 

to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) (emphasis added). Moreover, in In re K.J., 936 A.2d 

1128 (Pa. Super. 2007), our Court found that before granting a petition to 

terminate under section 2511(b), a court must: 

[C]arefully consider the intangible dimension of the needs and 

welfare of a child--the love, comfort, security, and closeness--

entailed in a parent-child relationship, as well as the tangible 

dimension. Continuity of relationships is also important to a 

child, for whom severance of close parental ties is usually 

extremely painful. The trial court, in considering what situation 

would best serve the children's needs and welfare, must 

examine the status of the natural parental bond to 

consider whether terminating the natural parents' rights 

would destroy something in existence that is necessary 

and beneficial. 

Id. at 1134 (emphasis added). 

 CYF’s claim that Mother’s minimal progress with regard to maintaining 

sobriety and obtaining stable housing since G.L.L. has been out of her care 

justifies termination under section 2511(b) is misplaced. A determination of 

whether the parent's conduct justifies termination of parental rights under 

section 2511(a) is distinct from and not relevant to a needs and welfare 

analysis under section 2511(b). In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

508 (Pa. Super. 2006). However, the record establishes that Mother 

obtained her own housing prior to the termination proceedings and, although 

Mother’s mental health and drug use has caused instability in her life, she 
J-S44038-15 

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has managed to consistently visit with G.L.L. and has not let these issues 

affect her interactions with him. N.T. Termination Hearing, 1/23/15, at 31-

32. Moreover, Dr. Neil Rosenblum concluded in his report “that Mother has 

made significant strides and improvement in her overall adjustment . . . 

[and] no longer presents as being severely depressed[, . . .] has reinitiated 

mental health treatment . . . and has become much more functional and 

productive in her behavior and personal adjustment.” Psychological 

Evaluation by Neil D. Rosenblum, Ph.D., 2/5/14, at 13. 

 Next, CYF claims that termination of Mother’s parental rights is 

supported by the fact that ending G.L.L.’s relationship with foster parents 

would be detrimental to him. While the security that G.L.L. may have with 

his foster parents is a factor to be considered under section 2511(b), see In 

re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011), one cannot discount the fact 

that a major aspect of a section 2511(b) analysis is the status of the parentchild bond and the effect that severance of that bond would have on the 

child. Here, all parties acknowledge that there is a demonstrated bond 

between Mother and G.L.L. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 1/23/15, at 86 

(CYF attorney states “[c]learly there’s a bond between [Mother] and 

[G.L.L.]”); id. at 29 (expert psychologist testifies that Mother and G.L.L.’s 

relationship is “meaningful” and she has been a “constant” for him). Dr. 

Rosenblum, psychologist who conducted several evaluations of G.L.L. and 

Mother, testified that not only is there a meaningful relationship between 

Mother and G.L.L., but that G.L.L. “certainly would be harmed” were that 
J-S44038-15 

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relationship terminated. Id. at 29. Specifically, Dr. Rosenblum testified that

G.L.L. would feel a loss if Mother’s rights were terminated due to the number 

of years that he lived with her before he was removed from the home and 

the fact that Mother visits with him twice a week. Id. at 30. 

 On February 5, 2014, Dr. Rosenblum conducted individual evaluations 

of G.L.L. and Mother, as well as an interactional evaluation of G.L.L. with 

Mother. Dr. Rosenblum’s report indicates that G.L.L. stated Mother (as 

opposed to foster mother) is his favorite mom because he used to live with 

her, that he misses Mother, and that he likes seeing her. Psychological 

Evaluation by Neil D. Rosenblum, Ph.D., 2/5/14, at 4. With regard to his 

evaluation of Mother, Dr. Rosenblum found that Mother clearly loves her 

son, visits him on a fairly regular and consistent basis, had made significant 

changes in her life over the past few months, which included moving into a 

new home and obtaining a job, and meets with a therapist on a weekly basis 

to stay calm and positive and effectively deal with her depression. Id. at 5. 

 Dr. Rosenblum made the following observations following his 

interactional evaluation with G.L.L. and Mother: G.L.L. was pleased to see 

Mother; Mother was very appropriate in her interactions with G.L.L.; Mother 

was patient and attentive to G.L.L.; Mother has a nice rapport with G.L.L.; 

Mother was nurturing with G.L.L.; and G.L.L. wanted to stay longer with 

Mother at the end of the session. Id. at 7. 

 Dr. Rosenblum opined that termination of Mother’s rights would have a 

negative impact on G.L.L. due to his close attachment to her. While he did 
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not recommend reunification, he did recommend continuing G.L.L.’s 

relationship with Mother through open adoption under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2731.5 

However, before the parties could effectuate an open adoption, Mother’s 

parental rights would have to be terminated. Instantly, there is no 

guarantee that Mother and G.L.L. would continue to have contact posttermination. Open adoption is a purely voluntary arrangement requiring the 

consent of the adoptive parents in order to enter into an agreement with 

birth relatives for ongoing communication or contact that is in the best 

interest of the child. See In re K.H.B., 107 A.3d 175, 184 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (open adoption statute by its plain language makes agreement 

optional, and such agreement is plainly not required by section 2511); see 

____________________________________________ 

5

 The purpose of section 2731 is: 

[T]o provide an option for adoptive parents and birth relatives to 

enter into a voluntary agreement for ongoing communication or 

contact that: 

(1) is in the best interest of the child; 

(2) recognizes the parties' interests and desires for 

ongoing communication or contact; 

(3) is appropriate given the role of the parties in the child's 

life; and 

(4) is subject to approval by the courts. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2731. An agreement under Act 101 "shall be filed with the 

court that finalizes the adoption of the child[,]" 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2735(a), 

[and] “[t]he agreement shall not be legally enforceable unless approved by 

the court, which the court shall approve when the statutory conditions are 

satisfied.” Id. at §§ 2735(b), (c). 
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also N.T. Termination Hearing, 1/23/15, at 93 (guardian ad litem admits 

that “you can’t hold it against the foster parents if they decide that they do 

not want to have contact . . . with [M]other” through an open adoption). 

Therefore, we do not find that the uncertainty of an open adoption is 

appropriate or relevant in a termination analysis under section 2511(b). 

 We note that as an appellate court we cannot re-weigh the evidence or 

the credibility assessments made by the trial court. Rather, 

[e]ven where the facts could support an opposite result, as is 

often the case in . . . termination cases, an appellate court must 

resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its 

own credibility determinations and judgment; instead it must 

defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are 

supported by the record and the trial court's legal conclusions 

are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

In the Interest of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012). 

 Here, the trial court appropriately gave primary consideration to the 

“developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of [G.L.L.],” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), and concluded that “the testimony was not so clear and 

convincing as to persuade the Court to come to a clear conviction in the 

matter.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/15, at 9. The court found that the 

negative impact of keeping G.L.L. in foster care was outweighed by the 

permanent damage he would sustain were Mother’s parental rights 

terminated. Compare In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(termination under section 2511(b) upheld on appeal where parent-child 

bond could be severed without detrimental effects on child). See In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (court must 
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consider whether natural parental bond exists between child and parent, and 

whether termination would destroy existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship). 

 Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that termination under section 2511(b) was not in the best 

interests of G.L.L., In re A.R., supra, where “the utmost attention should 

be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). We, 

therefore, affirm the trial court’s order denying CYF’s petition to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/21/2015