alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-28-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-28-1995
<CASH>                                         312,164
<SECURITIES>                                 1,009,067
<RECEIVABLES>                                  470,437
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (74,857)
<INVENTORY>                                     23,025
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,925,182
<PP&E>                                         683,522
<DEPRECIATION>                               (293,070)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,416,830
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          460,945
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           37,157
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,901,105
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,416,830
<SALES>                                      2,041,174
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,041,174
<CGS>                                          489,333
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  489,333
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,099,732
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                508,729
<INCOME-TAX>                                   170,424
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            338,305
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   338,305
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .90
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .90
        

</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED February 18, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-50947 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ALFONSO LOPEZ-HUERTA, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. EP-03-CR-445-ALL-PRM

-------------------- Before HIGGINBOTHAM, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Alfonso Lopez-Huerta appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Lopez-Huerta contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been alleged in his indictment. Lopez-Huerta maintains that heNo. 03-50947 -2- pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for that offense.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. Lopez-Huerta acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres , but asserts that the decision has been cast into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit , 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 152 (Tuesday, August 7, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 38765]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-16808]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS


Change in Burden of Proof

AGENCY: Department of Veterans Affairs.

ACTION: Notice with request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice announces that the burden of proof for 
disciplinary and major adverse actions imposed against certain 
employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs has been changed from 
preponderance of evidence to substantial evidence.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before September 6, 2018. The 
proposed effective date of these amendments is 30 days after 
publication of this notice.

ADDRESSES: Written comments may be directed to: Elizabeth A. Hill, Team 
Lead, Employee Relations & Performance Management Service, Office of 
Human Resources Management, Department of Veterans Affairs, 810 Vermont 
Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20420. Comments may also be faxed to (202) 
495-5200.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elizabeth A. Hill, Team Lead, (706) 
504-3988, or by email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#cb8ea7a2b1aaa9aebfa3e583a2a7a78bbdaae5aca4bd"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="94d1f8fdeef5f6f1e0fcbadcfdf8f8d4e2f5baf3fbe2">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 203 of the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Health Care Personnel Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-40), dated May 
7, 1991, revised the disciplinary grievance and appeal procedures for 
employees appointed under 38 United States Code (U.S.C.) 7401(1). 38 
U.S.C. 7461(e) requires that whenever the Secretary proposes to 
prescribe regulations under 38 U.S.C., Part V, Chapter 74, Subchapter 
V, ``the Secretary shall publish the proposed regulations in the 
Federal Register for notice-and-comment not less than 30 days before 
the day on which they take effect.''

Signing Authority

    The Secretary of Veterans Affairs, or designee, approved this 
document and authorized the undersigned to sign and submit the document 
to the Office of the Federal Register for publication electronically as 
an official document of the Department of Veterans Affairs. Jacquelyn 
Hayes-Byrd, Acting Chief of Staff, Department of Veterans Affairs, 
approved this document on July 30, 2018, for publication.

    Dated: July 30, 2018.
Luvenia Potts,
Program Specialist, Office of Regulation Policy & Management, Office of 
the Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs.
[FR Doc. 2018-16808 Filed 8-6-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8320-01-P


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# C_2013018EN.01000102.xml

| 22.1.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 18/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.1.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 18/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.6805 — Apollo/Aurum Holdings)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 18/02

On 15 January 2013, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6805. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6805. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

---
#### Edith Nira BROWN, Petitioner, v. CITY OF MIAMI, etc., et al., Respondents.

No. 44170.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 30, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1973.

Certiorari denied.

CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.

McCAIN, J., dissents.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

12 

KA 10-01772 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, CARNI, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TIMOTHY WOOD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (DAVID R. JUERGENS OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NICOLE M. FANTIGROSSI OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County

(Joseph D. Valentino, J.), rendered February 16, 2010. The judgment

convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of assault in the second

degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his

plea of guilty of assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05

[3]), defendant contends that Supreme Court violated CPL 530.13

(former [4] [a]) by issuing an order of protection in favor of a

person who was neither a victim of nor a witness to the crime of which

he was convicted. Defendant failed to preserve his contention for our

review (see People v Nieves, 2 NY3d 310, 316-317; People v Brown, 96

AD3d 1561, 1563, lv denied 19 NY3d 1024; People v Kulyeshie, 71 AD3d

1478, 1479, lv denied 14 NY3d 889), and we decline to exercise our

power to review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of

justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). Contrary to defendant’s further

contention, this case does not fall within the “ ‘narrow exception to

the preservation rule’ . . . where a court exceeds its powers and

imposes a sentence that is illegal in a respect that is readily

discernible from the trial record” (Nieves, 2 NY3d at 315). 

Entered: February 7, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
<PAGE>
<PAGE> 66

                                                                    Exhibit 23








                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS




We consent  to the incorporation by  reference in  the Registration Statements
(Form  S-3  Numbers  33-57910  and  33-55803)  of   American  General  Finance
Corporation and in the  related Prospectuses of our  report dated February 12,
1996,  with  respect  to the  consolidated  financial  statements of  American
General  Finance Corporation and  subsidiaries included  in this Annual Report
(Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 1995.


                                                   ERNST & YOUNG LLP


Indianapolis, Indiana
March 20, 1996
<PAGE>
#### Sidney J. TILLMAN, Jr., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 44617.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 9, 1973.

Certiorari dismissed. 287 So.2d 693.
#### Reginald San Clemente, Appellant, v Hercules NY Advertising, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[735 NYS2d 767]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton Tingling, J.), entered May 10, 2001, which denied plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, unless defendants pay plaintiff $100 within 30 days of service of a copy of this order with notice of entry, in which event the order is affirmed, without costs.

A default judgment is unwarranted in view of the lack of prejudice to plaintiff, defendants’ showing of a meritorious defense and the short delay in serving an answer. However, we impose a penalty of $100 in view of defendants’ weak showing with respect to the cause of delay. Concur — Nardelli, J.P., Andidas, Saxe, Sullivan and Rubin, JJ.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, Kirk A. Waldron,Interim President of SMTEK International, Inc., certify that:

1.     I havereviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the annual report on Form 10-K/Aof SMTEK International, Inc.;

2.     Based on my knowledge, this report does notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;
| Date: October 22, 2004 |
|-----------------------------|
| By:                         | /s/ Kirk A. Waldron |   |
|                        | Kirk A. Waldron |
|                        | *Interim President* |
|                        | *(principal executive officer)* |
|                        | SMTEK International, Inc. |

 

15

----
#### Wallace C. E. LEVEILLE, Appellant, v. Clifton H. SINK et al., Appellees.

No. 72-375.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 29, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME (LOSS) ON
PAGES F-2 THROUGH F-5 OF THE COMPANY'S ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           4,299
<SECURITIES>                                       673
<RECEIVABLES>                                        3
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                           3,729
<DEPRECIATION>                                     477
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  14,037
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          5
<COMMON>                                         3,900
<OTHER-SE>                                       5,591
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    14,037
<SALES>                                          7,146
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 8,398
<CGS>                                            6,658
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    7,274
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,754
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  (94)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (201)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (418)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (53)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (471)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (875)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.14)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.14)
        

</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-50956

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSE ROBERTO ORTIZ-HERNANDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-01-CR-500-ALL

--------------------

April 10, 2002

Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Jose Roberto Ortiz-Hernandez appeals the 46-month term of

imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea conviction of

being found in the United States after deportation in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Ortiz-Hernandez complains that his sentence

was improperly enhanced pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) based

on his prior deportation following an aggravated felony

conviction. Ortiz-Hernandez argues that the sentencing provision

violates the Due Process Clause because it permitted the

sentencing judge to find, under a preponderance of the evidence
No. 01-50956 

-2-

standard, a fact which increased the statutory maximum sentence

to which he otherwise would have been exposed. Ortiz-Hernandez

thus contends that his sentence is invalid and argues that it

should not exceed the two-year maximum term of imprisonment

prescribed in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). 

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Ortiz-Hernandez waived

the right to appeal his sentence. Ortiz-Hernandez does not

challenge the validity of the waiver provision, and we are

satisfied that the waiver of appeal was voluntarily, knowingly,

and intelligently made. Ortiz-Hernandez’s argument that his

waiver should not be enforced due to public policy concerns is

without merit. Therefore, to the extent Ortiz-Hernandez’s

argument challenges his sentence, the appeal is DISMISSED.

To the extent Ortiz-Hernandez’s argument may be construed as

challenging the validity of his conviction, it is not waived. 

However, Ortiz-Hernandez acknowledges that his argument is

foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224

(1998). He seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review

in light of the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000). Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d

979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1202 (2001). 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that the judgment of the district court be affirmed and that an

appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 
No. 01-50956 

-3-

DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; MOTION GRANTED.
# C_2012345EN.01000202.xml

| 13.11.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 345/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.11.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 345/2

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.6710 — CD&R/Wilsonart)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2012/C 345/04

On 23 October 2012, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32012M6710. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32012M6710. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

---
No. 11226.

#### The City of Bellaire *v.*McGregor.

Decided November 16, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court of Belmont county.

*Mr. C. E. Timberlake*and *Mr. Cook Danford,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Charles J. Lynch*and *Mr. D. W. Cooper,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Crew, C. J., Summers, Spear, Davis and Shauck, JJ., concur.
#### Leonard D. HARDY, as Chairman of the Orange County Board of Visitors, Relator, v. Honorable J. C. KERR, Judge of the Juvenile Court in and for Orange County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 71-500.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 15, 1971.

Prohibition dismissed.
#### Claude KIRK, as Governor of the State of Florida, et al., Appellants, v. Mae WIGGIN, Incompetent, and Dr. John J. Holland, Guardian of Mae Wiggin, Incompetent, Appellees.

No. 70-311.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 5, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1971.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Gus Ef-thimiou, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Lane, French, Primm, Lane & Carrier and L. G. Nichols, Miami, for appellees.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, BARK-DULL and SWANN, JJ.

*726BARKDULL, Judge.

The appellants seek review of a final order dismissing their complaint with prejudice. The action sought to claim care and maintenance charges against the appellees, pursuant to § 394.22(13), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

Appellee Mae Wiggin was committed to the State hospital on March 31, 1936, pursuant to a lunacy decree which ordered her guardianship estate to pay $10.00 per month toward her care and maintenance. Said amount has been paid and is still being paid. Effective August 1, 1955, the State Legislature enacted § 394.22(13), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., permitting reasonable charges on expenses for care of incompetents to be charged against an incompetent’s estate. Pursuant to § 394.22(13), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., the appellants filed the instant suit seeking to charge Mae Wig-gin’s estate for the reasonable charges for her care from August 1, 1955 to date of the suit. The appellees answered and moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. After hearing, the trial court found the statute upon which the complaint was based was not in effect when Mae Wiggin was admitted to the hospital and, therefore, is not applicable. Based on that finding, the trial court entered the order appealed herein.

At the time the incompetent was committed, there was no statute providing that the State could recover reasonable costs for care and maintenance. Without such being in effect on the date of the adjudication of incompetency, there is no cause of action by the State pursuant to a statute enacted after the party [who is committed] whose estate is to be charged was declared incompetent. See: Heidt v. Caldwell, Fla.1949, 41 So.2d 303; Warren v. Pope, Fla.1953, 64 So.2d 564; Warren v. Rhea, Fla.1953, 64 So.2d 567.

Therefore, the order here under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.