J-S68030-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: R.J.F., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.D.F., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 993 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered May 25, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 166-OC-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED DECEMBER 01, 2017

J.D.F. (“Father”) appeals from the May 25, 2017 order entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County involuntarily terminating his 

parental rights to his natural daughter, R.J.F., born in May of 2013. Because 

the certified record supports the orphans’ court’s decision, we affirm.1

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 16, 2016, R.S. (“Maternal Grandfather”) and D.S. 

(“Maternal Grandmother”) (collectively, “Maternal Grandparents”) filed a 

petition for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights, a petition 

for the voluntary termination of the parental rights of C.C. (“Mother”), and a 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) has filed a brief in support of the subject 

order.
J-S68030-17

- 2 -

petition for adoption with respect to R.J.F. A hearing on the termination 

petitions occurred on March 30, 2017, during which the following witnesses 

testified: Maternal Grandfather; Mother; Father; and M.S., Father’s girlfriend 

with whom he resides and shares a then seven-month-old child.

2

In its opinion accompanying the subject order, the orphans’ court set 

forth its findings of fact, which the testimonial evidence supports. As such, 

we adopt them herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/17, at 2-5. 

By way of background, at the time of R.J.F.’s birth, Father and Mother, 

who never married, resided together in a mobile home adjacent to Maternal 

Grandparents’ home. Id. at 3, ¶ 5. Columbia County Children & Youth 

Services (“CYS”) removed R.J.F. from her natural parents’ custody 

immediately upon birth because Mother was indicated as a perpetrator of 

medical neglect as a result of the death of another one of her children at four 

and one-half months old.3 See Respondents’ Exhibit 3. CYS placed R.J.F. in 

her Maternal Grandparents’ custody when she was three days old. Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/25/17, at 3, ¶ 4; N.T., 3/30/17, at 7. 

R.J.F. was adjudicated dependent, and CYS established a permanency 

goal of reunification with the natural parents. Father was required to satisfy 

____________________________________________

2 The child of Father and M.S. is not a subject of this appeal.

3 No criminal charges were filed against Mother as a result of the death of her 

child. See Petitioners’ Exhibit 2. Further, Father is not the biological parent 

of the child who died. N.T., 3/30/17, at 47.
J-S68030-17

- 3 -

the following Family Service Plan (“FSP”) objectives: participate in weekly 

one-hour supervised visits with R.J.F. at the CYS office; participate in drug 

and alcohol counseling and anger management counseling; and participate in 

parenting classes, inter alia. N.T., 3/30/17, at 47-48, 64. 

In June of 2014, CYS closed R.J.F.’s dependency case, at which time 

Father had not satisfied the parenting class and anger management 

objectives. N.T., 3/30/17, at 62-64; Respondent’s Exhibit 4. The trial court 

found that, upon closing the dependency case, CYS “officially placed R.J.F. 

with [Maternal] Grandparents as custodians. . . .” Trial Court Opinion, 

5/25/17, at 3, ¶ 4.

Father’s and Mother’s relationship ended in late 2014, at which time 

Father continued to live in the mobile home adjacent to Maternal 

Grandparent’s home, and Mother relocated to another residence in Columbia 

County, which was not adjacent to Maternal Grandparents’ home. Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/25/17, at 3, ¶ 6; N.T., 3/30/17, at 12.

In July of 2014, Father initiated, pro se, a custody action against 

Maternal Grandparents wherein he requested primary physical custody of 

R.J.F. The case was assigned to a custody master, and the trial court adopted 

the master’s recommendations. In September of 2014, the court issued an 

interim custody order, which granted Maternal Grandparents primary physical 

custody and Father partial physical custody for an unspecified amount of time 

to be supervised by Maternal Grandfather. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 2. On 
J-S68030-17

- 4 -

December 30, 2014, following a second hearing before the master, the court 

issued an interim order, which granted the parties shared legal custody, 

Maternal Grandfather primary physical custody, and Father partial physical 

custody every Wednesday and Thursday evening for two hours to be 

supervised by Maternal Grandfather.

4

 Id. On March 26, 2015, the court 

issued an interim custody order which directed as follows:

Father may seek additional periods of physical custody, or 

unsupervised physical custody after securing a residence to 

receive unsupervised contact. Father must provide the Master 

with correspondence evidencing that he is capable of 

unsupervised contact without endangering the child. The 

testimony must be issued from his counselor or psychiatrist and 

must be in writing or by telephone at the next conference.

Respondent’s Exhibit 1.

Soon thereafter, in April of 2015, Maternal Grandfather filed a Protection 

from Abuse (“PFA”) petition against Father. Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/17, at 

4, ¶ 8. In addition, at a time unspecified in the record, Mother filed a PFA

petition against Father. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the 

petitions on May 27, 2015, during which Father participated pro se. See

Respondent’s Exhibits 2, 7. 

On May 29, 2015, the court issued two separate PFA orders against 

Father, both of which had a two-year expiration period. The first PFA order 

directed that Father refrain from contact with Mother. The second PFA order 

directed that Father refrain from contact with Maternal Grandparents and 

____________________________________________

4 The interim order also granted Mother partial physical custody as agreed 

upon by her and Maternal Grandfather. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 2. 
J-S68030-17

- 5 -

R.J.F. Further, the second PFA order awarded Maternal Grandfather 

temporary exclusive custody of the child. See Respondent’s Exhibit 2. The 

order provided, in relevant part:

5. . . . 

THIS ORDER SUPERSEDES ANY PRIOR ORDER RELATING 

TO CHILD CUSTODY.

Custody provisions of paragraph 5 of this order are 

temporary. Either party may initiate custody proceedings 

pursuant to the custody statute act 23 Pa.C.S. § 5321 et 

seq. Any valid custody order entered after the final 

Protection from Abuse order supersedes the custody 

provisions of this order.

Id. at ¶ 5. It is important to note that the first PFA order regarding Mother

did not include this custody provision. See Respondent’s Exhibit 7. 

Father’s last contact with R.J.F. was in April of 2015, when the PFA 

petitions were filed. Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/17, at 4, ¶ 12. The orphans’ 

court found that Father “thought that the PFA [order] prohibited him from 

seeing the child for two years. He thought that if he tried to see the child, he 

would be in violation of the order. He said he intended to start seeing the 

child in May 2017.” Id. at ¶ 13. 

By order dated May 25, 2017, and entered on May 26, 2017, the 

orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 
J-S68030-17

- 6 -

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).5 Father timely filed a notice of appeal and a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).6 The orphans’ court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on 

July 13, 2017.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:

A. Did the [orphans’] [c]ourt commit an error of law and abuse of 

discretion when it determined the burden of clear and 

convincing evidence was met in terminating the parental rights 

of [Father] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 et[] seq.?

B. Did the [orphans’] [c]ourt commit an abuse of discretion and 

an error of law when it determined that Father displayed a 

settled purpose to relinquish his rights as Father for a period of 

six (6) months pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 et[] seq.?

C. Did the [orphans’] [c]ourt commit an error of law in failing to 

consider the fact that Father never received the [PFA] [o]rder 

that included the minor child and important language that 

explained his rights regarding custody, resulting in his 

extended time away from minor child?

D. Did the [orphans’] [c]ourt commit an error of law in failing to 

consider case law that calls for careful scrutiny when analyzing 

____________________________________________

5

In its opinion accompanying the subject order, the orphans’ court set forth 

Section 2511(a)(1) and (2) as potential grounds for termination. Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/25/17, 6. However, we observe that the Maternal Grandparents’ 

petition requested termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1) and not (a)(2). In any event, the court involuntarily terminated 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b) only.

6 By order dated May 25, 2017, and entered on July 13, 2017, the orphans’ 

court voluntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to R.J.F. Mother did not 

file a notice of appeal nor is she a party to this appeal.
J-S68030-17

- 7 -

[p]arental [t]ermination [p]etitions that include a [p]ro [s]e 

litigant with a [PFA] [o]rder that includes the minor child?

E. Did the [orphans’] [c]ourt commit an error of law and abuse of 

discretion when it determined that Father never attempted to 

economically benefit the minor child?

F. Did the [orphans’] [c]ourt err by failing to take into 

consideration that Mother’s [s]tipulation to [t]erminate her 

parental rights is a misapplication of case law, specifically, In 

re: Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117 (Pa. 2016)?

Father’s brief at 4-5.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

We consider Father’s issues according to the following standard.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 
J-S68030-17

- 8 -

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Instantly, orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provides as follows.

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

 . . .

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.
J-S68030-17

- 9 -

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).7 

This Court has explained:

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving 

party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, 

sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the 

termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish 

parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental 

duties. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. Super. 

2006). In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights 

may be terminated pursuant to [s]ection 2511(a)(1) 

if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of

relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to 

perform parental duties.

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 550 Pa. 595, 708 A.2d 88, 

91 (Pa. 1998).

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform 

parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental rights, the court must engage in three lines 

of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect 

of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant 

to Section 2511(b).

Id. at 92 (citation omitted). 

____________________________________________

7 Father did not challenge the termination of his parental rights pursuant to 

subsection 2511(b) in his concise statement, nor does he include such a 

challenge in his statement of questions involved, or in the argument section 

of his brief. Therefore, we conclude that any challenge to Section 2511(b) is 

waived. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(holding that the appellant waived her challenge to Section 2511(b) by failing 

to include it in her concise statement and statement of question involved). 
J-S68030-17

- 10 -

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

This Court has defined parental duty as follows:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child 

needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has held 

that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with

the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in 

the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional 

needs.

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

Instantly, Father’s first, second, and third issues on appeal are 

interrelated, and so we review them together. Father asserts that he was 

served with the first PFA order regarding Mother, but that he was not served 

with the second PFA order regarding Maternal Grandparents and R.J.F. 
J-S68030-17

- 11 -

However, Father asserts that he presumed the first PFA order was applicable 

to the Maternal Grandparents and R.J.F. as well as to Mother since both PFA 

petitions were consolidated in the May 27, 2015 evidentiary hearing. Because 

he alleges not being served with the second PFA order, Father argues he was 

unaware of the provision setting forth that he may seek reinstatement of his 

physical custody of R.J.F. See Respondent’s Exhibit 2, ¶ 5.

Father argues that his lack of contact with R.J.F. since April of 2015, 

was a result of following the prohibitions set forth in the first PFA order and 

not because he had a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental rights. In 

support of his argument, Father references testimony by him and his 

girlfriend, M.S., that he purchased gifts for R.J.F. since April of 2015, which 

he plans to give her upon the expiration of the PFA order, and that he set up 

a bedroom for R.J.F. in his home because he plans to seek custody upon the 

expiration of the PFA order. See N.T., 3/30/17, at 54-55, 88-89. For these 

reasons, Father argues that the orphans’ court abused its discretion in 

terminating his parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).

In its opinion accompanying the subject order, the orphans’ court found 

that “Father’s explanation for his lack of contact [with R.J.F.] for the last two 

years is not rational and is very questionable.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/17, 

5, ¶ 19. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court explained as follows.

[Father] alleges that he did not receive the second [PFA] order 

but thought that the first order prohibited him from contacting the 

child. That makes no sense since the first order did not mention 
J-S68030-17

- 12 -

the child[,] and [Father] knew that the child was in the custody of 

the [M]aternal [G]randparents.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/13/17, at 4. As such, the court concluded that “Father 

has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental claim to R.J.F. 

He has refused and, particularly, failed to perform parental duties.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/25/17, at 9 (emphasis in original). 

The testimonial evidence supports the court’s credibility determination 

against Father in this regard as follows. The first PFA order shows Father’s 

mailing address at Bloomsburg Hospital, where he had been involuntarily 

committed in March or April of 2015. Respondent’s Exhibit 7; Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/25/17, at 3, ¶ 7; N.T. 3/30/17, at 73. Father testified, “I had a 

nervous breakdown and I was actually out [of Bloomsburg Hospital] the next 

day.” N.T., 3/30/17, at 74. The second PFA order shows Father’s mailing 

address at a location in Berwick, Pennsylvania, where Father acknowledged

he was residing on the date of the second PFA order. Respondent’s Exhibit 2; 

N.T., 3/30/17, at 84. On cross-examination by Maternal Grandparents’ 

counsel, Father testified as follows:

Q. [T]he weird thing about this is that you . . . claim you got the 

PFA [order] listed as Bloomsburg Hospital even though you 

weren’t living there and you didn’t get the one at your address 

even though you were living there, is that correct?

A. Yes. 

N.T., 3/30/17, at 84-85. 
J-S68030-17

- 13 -

Based on the foregoing, to the extent the court’s termination of Father’s

parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) was based on its credibility 

determination against Father regarding service of the second PFA order, we 

will not disturb it. See In re T.S.M., supra (stating that appellate courts are 

required to accept the credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record). Indeed, by failing to initiate another custody 

proceeding as set forth in the second PFA order, Father did not exercise 

reasonable firmness in resisting the obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining his parent-child relationship with R.J.F. See In re B.,N.M., 

supra. As such, Father’s first, second, and third issues fail.

In his fourth issue, Father relies upon In re S.S.W., 125 A.3d 413 (Pa. 

Super. 2014), in support of his contention that the orphans’ court erred in 

failing to consider that Father defended himself without counsel in the PFA 

actions. In that case, we affirmed an order denying the petition for the 

involuntary termination of the father’s parental rights to his children filed by 

the mother and stepfather. The orphans’ court found that, as a result of 

incompetent counsel, the father in that case had “legitimately believed that 

he was bound by the PFA order and its contempt power to avoid any contact” 

with his children. Id. at 417 (citation omitted). This Court explained that the 

orphans’ court found the father had “reached a low point in his life and 

attempted to fight his way out of it. To that end, [the f]ather sought 

psychiatric and spiritual counseling,” and obtained job training and a steady 
J-S68030-17

- 14 -

new job. He has been steady in paying his $400.00 per month support 

obligation.” Id. at 417-418. 

Likewise, in this case, Father argues that he legitimately believed the 

first PFA order prohibited him from contacting R.J.F. until it expired on May 

29, 2017. Further, he argues that he exercised reasonable firmness to 

overcome the obstacles in maintaining his parent-child relationship with R.J.F. 

by complying with the March of 2015 interim custody order in obtaining a 

residence8 and providing a mental health professional’s opinion that his 

unsupervised physical contact with R.J.F. would not endanger her. 

Specifically, during the hearing, Father introduced into evidence a letter 

written by Jay M. Johnson, LCSW, from the Department of Psychiatry, 

Geisinger Health Systems, which stated that he met periodically with Father 

from January of 2014, through May of 2015. The letter continued as follows, 

in relevant part:

I have not seen [Father] since his last therapy appointment in 

2015. While it is true that [Father] had significant anger & impulse 

control issues, which have resulted in multiple inpatient 

admissions[,] I did not experience [Father] as a physically 

threatening or intimidating individual. . . . To my knowledge 

there were no incidents during the time that I was seeing [Father]

that I suspected inappropriate or the potential for inappropriate 

interaction directed toward [R.J.F.] either verbally or behaviorally. 

His primary focus was to follow the conditions set forth by [CYS] 

so that he can fulfill his obligations/responsibilities of being a 

father. Again, let me be clear that I have had no contact with 

____________________________________________

8 Father testified that he entered into a lease for his current residence in 

February of 2015, and that he “just renewed my lease to go another year.” 

N.T., 3/30/17, at 56.
J-S68030-17

- 15 -

[Father] since May of 2015. The above remarks are based on my 

experience with [Father] during the above stated time[]frame.

Respondent’s Exhibit 5. Based on Mr. Johnson’s letter, we reject Father’s 

contention that he attempted to comply with the last interim custody order in 

March of 2015. Indeed, on cross-examination, Father acknowledged that he 

had not seen Mr. Johnson in almost two years. N.T., 3/30/17, at 61. As such, 

we discern no abuse of discretion by the court to the extent it gave no weight 

to Mr. Johnson’s letter in its termination decision.

Further, in contrast to In re S.S.W., supra, there is no record evidence 

that Father “attempted to fight his way out of” the circumstances that gave 

rise to his limited custody award set forth in the September and December of 

2014, and March of 2015, interim custody orders. Father neither continued 

therapy with Mr. Johnson nor received treatment from any other mental health 

professional after May of 2015, despite suffering a nervous breakdown in 

March or April of 2015, for which he was hospitalized. N.T., 3/30/17, at 73-

74. In addition, Father testified that his only income is from Social Security 

disability.9 Id. at 75. On cross-examination by the GAL, Father testified as 

follows:

____________________________________________

9 Maternal Grandfather testified that he filed a child support action against 

Father, but his request was denied because Father receives Social Security 

disability. N.T., 3/30/17, at 30. Further, Maternal Grandfather testified that 

he and Maternal Grandmother “provide everything for the child. . .”, and that 

Father has never made any financial contribution to him for R.J.F.’s care. Id.

at 16. 
J-S68030-17

- 16 -

Q. [Y]ou said you get disability, what’s the nature of your 

disability?

A. I am bipolar, I am ADHD, I have severe anxiety.

Q. But you don’t take any medication for it?

A. No.

Id. at 74-75. On inquiry by the orphans’ court, Father continued:

Q. Are you still seeing a doctor or do you check in with the doctor 

periodically?

A. No, sir.

Q. When is the last time you saw one?

A. Actually, the last time I s[aw] a doctor was when I was 

involuntarily committed.

Id. at 74-75. Because Father’s mental health was an impediment to his 

custody of R.J.F., and he has not received treatment sine May of 2015, we 

conclude that Father’s reliance upon In re S.S.W., supra, is misplaced. 

Father’s fourth issue fails.

In his fifth issue, Father argues that the orphans’ court erred and abused 

its discretion when it determined that Father never attempted to benefit 

benefit R.J.F. economically. Specifically, Father argues that he “cannot be 

penalized for the . . . support determination” made by the Domestic Relations 

Office in denying Maternal Grandfather’s request for child support. Father’s 

brief at 31. Father’s claim is without merit.

The orphans’ court found that Father “paid no support for the child. He 

provided no economic benefit to the child. He deferred to [Maternal] 
J-S68030-17

- 17 -

Grandparents to raise the child. . . .” Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/17, at 7. Upon 

review, the court’s finding in this regard was not a determinative factor in its 

conclusion that Father refused or failed to perform his parental duties far in 

excess of the statutory six-month period. Rather, the court explained in its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion as follows.

The court found that [Father] is not credible or reasonable for his 

failure to make any attempt to have contact with this child or 

provide any nurture to the child. In the [second] PFA order 

regarding the child, it was clearly stated in bold print that [F]ather 

could seek custody through the custody legal processes. . . .

Trial Court Opinion, 7/13/17, at 5. As discussed above, the orphans’ court

found Father not credible with respect to his testimony that he did not receive 

the second PFA order. Therefore, the court found that his lack of contact with 

R.J.F. since April of 2015, was not reasonable. As such, Father’s fifth issue 

fails.

In his final issue, Father, without providing any relevant legal authority,

argues that the orphans’ court erred in terminating his parental rights because 

the trial court failed to consider that even though Mother voluntarily 

relinquished her parental rights to R.J.F, Mother “will continue to have regular 

access to” R.J.F. Father’s Brief at 33. Father relies on In re Adoption of 

M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117 (Pa. 2016), to support this claim of error. Such 

reliance is misplaced. 

M.R.D. involved the interpretation of Section 2901 of the Adoption Act, 

which provides that “[u]nless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, 
J-S68030-17

- 18 -

no decree of adoption shall be entered unless . . . parental rights have been 

terminated.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901. M.R.D. does not address or even discuss

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a), which sets forth requirements for a petition to terminate 

parental rights. Since we are reviewing the disposition of Father’s petition to 

terminate his parental rights, and not a petition for adoption, M.R.D. is 

irrelevant to our review of whether the trial court properly granted the 

termination petition.

Father bases this argument on the injustice he feels because he believes 

that, notwithstanding the voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights,

Mother will still have contact with R.J.F. Father had the opportunity and 

responsibility to parent R.J.F. Father chose not do so. Father cannot now 

deprive R.J.F. of permanency because he believes that Mother will have 

contact with the Child. There is simply no legal basis for such a position. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the order involuntarily terminating Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/1/2017