COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

August 8, 2024

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP2153-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2021CF156

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

THATCHER R. SEHRBROCK,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Dodge County: JOSEPH G. SCIASCIA, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Kloppenburg, P.J., Nashold, and Taylor, JJ.

¶1 NASHOLD, J. Thatcher Sehrbrock appeals the sentencing portion 

of a judgment of conviction for robbery with use of force as a party to a crime, and 

an order denying his postconviction motion. Specifically, Sehrbrock challenges a 

condition of probation requiring that an ignition interlock device be installed on 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

2

any motor vehicle that he owns or operates. He argues that the ignition interlock

condition should be vacated because it is unreasonable or, in the alternative, 

because its duration of seven years is harsh and excessive. We reject Sehrbrock’s 

arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The criminal complaint alleges that two masked teenagers, later 

identified as Sehrbrock and Avery Bence, entered a Beaver Dam store after 

midnight. Bence sprayed the store clerk with pepper spray and took several packs 

of cigarettes, after which a struggle ensued. When Bence called for help, 

Sehrbrock threw several canned drinks at the clerk. He and Bence then fled the 

scene on foot. Bence later told police that the plan was “to steal cigarettes and/or 

alcohol from a gas station.” 

¶3 The State charged Sehrbrock with armed robbery as a party to a 

crime. In exchange for Sehrbrock’s no-contest plea, the State amended the charge 

to robbery with use of force as a party to a crime. This amendment reduced the 

maximum penalty from 40 years of imprisonment to 15 years. The circuit court 

accepted Sehrbrock’s plea and ordered that a presentence investigation report 

(PSI) be prepared. 

¶4 The PSI was filed prior to sentencing and, as relevant here, set forth 

Sehrbrock’s version of the offense, his criminal history, and his history of 

substance abuse. Sehrbrock informed the PSI writer of the following. Sehrbrock 

participated in the robbery because he “was drunk and got peer pressured.” He 

“had been drinking heavily prior to committing the offense and he blacked out.” 

Sehrbrock first started drinking at age 12, and by ages 16 and 17, was “drinking 

approximately 1.75 liter[s] a day for a year straight.” As a result, his skin had 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

3

“turned yellow.” Starting at age 14, he used LSD “a lot,” and he also used 

amphetamines, codeine, ecstasy, mushrooms, cocaine, morphine, and nitrite 

inhalants. After the offense, Sehrbrock sought treatment and stopped drinking 

alcohol. 

¶5 Sehrbrock’s mother informed the PSI writer that Sehrbrock’s 

substance abuse started when he was in eighth grade. She reported that at the time 

of the robbery, Sehrbrock “was drinking straight vodka heavily. Not just that day, 

but every single day, all day, for months leading up to that incident.” 

¶6 The PSI notes that Sehrbrock was adjudicated in a juvenile 

proceeding for resisting an officer when he was 15 years old. Sehrbrock explained 

to the PSI writer that he “was under the influence when [he] got picked up” for 

that offense and that he “resisted arrest.” The PSI also reflects that Sehrbrock had 

two prior felony drug convictions, and a pending misdemeanor charge for criminal 

damage to property (which, by the time of sentencing, had resulted in a 

conviction). Sehrbrock told the PSI writer that his criminal record was the result 

of “[a] combination of being around [the] wrong people and poor choices because 

of alcohol and drug abuse.” 

¶7 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor discussed Sehrbrock’s

criminal history and, in addition to the offenses noted above, informed the court 

that Sehrbrock had an additional pending charge for hit and run. The prosecutor 

also discussed the seriousness of the robbery offense, stating that the central 

question was whether this was a “prison case” or a “jail case.” Although the 

prosecutor said that “it certainly would not be wrong to order a prison sentence on 

a charge this serious,” she nevertheless recommended a probationary period of six 

to eight years, with one year of conditional jail time and other conditions. The 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

4

prosecutor noted the seriousness of the offense, Sehrbrock’s “addiction issues,” his 

young age, and the efforts that Sehrbrock had made prior to sentencing to address 

his substance abuse issues. 

¶8 Defense counsel agreed with the PSI writer’s sentencing 

recommendation for a withheld sentence and five years of probation with one year 

of conditional jail time. Among other things, counsel noted Sehrbrock’s 

“addictions” and his efforts to address them, his young age, and his honesty with 

the PSI writer. 

¶9 Sehrbrock’s mother also addressed the circuit court. She said that 

Sehrbrock “has struggled with drug and alcohol addiction and as such has made 

some very poor decisions.” She asked the court not to send Sehrbrock to prison 

because it would not “address the actual root of the problem that led him here 

today.” Sehrbrock, who was 17 years old at the time of the offense and 18 years 

old at the time of sentencing, told the court: “The night at the gas station I made a 

stupid impulsive decision and I was heavily drinking at that time. Like every 

day.” 

¶10 Before imposing its sentence, the circuit court discussed Sehrbrock’s 

criminal history and his extensive abuse of alcohol and drugs. The court also 

discussed the harms that substance abuse inflicts on individuals and society, 

societal acceptance of alcohol and drug use, Sehrbrock’s young age, and

Sehrbrock’s support from his family.

¶11 The circuit court stated that Sehrbrock’s extensive criminal record 

indicated that “maybe it’s time to do some prison.” However, the court accepted 

the parties’ probation recommendation with one year of conditional jail time. The 

court withheld sentence and placed Sehrbrock on probation for seven years, with 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

5

conditions that included one year of conditional jail time with work release 

privileges; no consumption of alcohol or other intoxicants; absolute sobriety; not

going to bars, taverns, liquor stores or beer tents; and completion of AODA

(Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse) programming as determined by Sehrbrock’s 

probation agent. 

¶12 In addition, although it was not requested by either party, the circuit

court ordered the condition of probation that is at issue in this appeal: that 

Sehrbrock have an ignition interlock installed on any vehicle he owns or operates 

for the duration of his seven-year term of probation. In imposing this condition, 

the court stated, “Somebody who drinks as much as [Sehrbrock] drinks ought not 

be on the road unless he’s in a car that has ignition interlock.” The court also held 

out the opportunity of discharging Sehrbrock from probation early: “If you’re 

doing really, really well on probation your agent might say he doesn’t need seven 

years, he’s good to go and I’ll approve that.” 

¶13 Sehrbrock subsequently filed a postconviction motion requesting 

removal or modification of the ignition interlock condition. Sehrbrock argued that 

the condition is unreasonable because it is not individualized to Sehrbrock or to 

the facts of his offense, and because it does not further his rehabilitation or the 

protection of the community. Alternatively, Sehrbrock argued that the condition

should be removed or reduced because its imposition for the full seven-year

probationary period is “harsh and excessive.”

¶14 At the hearing on Sehrbrock’s postconviction motion, defense 

counsel argued that Sehrbrock had no history of offenses involving operation of a 

motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) and that the circuit court’s conditions

requiring that Sehrbrock not consume alcohol and maintain absolute sobriety 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

6

already addressed Sehrbrock’s rehabilitation and the protection of society. 

Defense counsel also argued that the seven-year period for the ignition interlock is 

longer than what could statutorily be imposed on a repeat OWI offender. In 

response, the prosecutor argued that the ignition interlock condition was 

“reasonable and appropriate,” but also said that she was “not convinced” that it 

needed to be for the full seven years of probation. 

¶15 The circuit court denied Sehrbrock’s motion. The court noted that 

alcohol was involved in the offense, that it “is a huge factor in Mr. Sehrbrock’s 

inability to stay out of trouble,” and is “directly related to his conduct.” The court 

said that Sehrbrock “got in[to] a car with a bunch of people” and “agreed to go 

into a store and rob somebody to get alcohol.” The court concluded that 

Sehrbrock’s lack of OWIs was not a reason not to order the ignition interlock 

condition, telling Sehrbrock, “Once you get to the point where you’re intoxicated, 

you have given the keys to your life to the devil. And everybody who is in contact 

with you is in danger because there’s no telling what you’re go[ing to] do.” The 

court told Sehrbrock, “[Y]ou and alcohol teamed up and [you] got yourself into a 

lot of trouble.” The court further stated, “I’m not [going to] put the public at risk,” 

that “if there’s something I can do to minimize their risk, I’m [going to] do it,” and 

that the ignition interlock “is an easy thing, common sense thing, to do to protect 

you against yourself.” 

¶16 The circuit court also noted that Sehrbrock had been disciplined for 

violating the jail’s alcohol and drug rules, saying, “[W]hat that tells me is 

substance abuse is an issue with Mr. Sehrbrock.” Specifically, jail personnel had 

informed the court that Sehrbrock reported to serve his sentence under the 

influence of controlled substances and had to be sent to the hospital by ambulance 

and had on another occasion been caught with drugs. The court stated that it 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

7

would not lift the ignition interlock condition until Sehrbrock showed the court 

that he was “successfully dealing with [his] alcohol issue and that there’s some 

good reasons that we can lift it.” The court said that if Sehrbrock returned to court 

with some proof that the condition is no longer necessary and is an unreasonable 

burden, the court would “gladly consider lifting it.” The court told Sehrbrock, 

“[Y]ou’re [going to] have to show me that you’re dealing with this. And so far 

you haven’t been able to do it.” 

¶17 This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

¶18 Sehrbrock argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 

discretion by imposing the ignition interlock requirement as a condition of 

probation. Specifically, he argues that the condition is not reasonable or 

appropriate, and, in the alternative, that the condition’s duration is harsh and 

excessive. We address, and reject, these arguments in turn. 

Reasonable and Appropriate

¶19 A sentencing court’s authority to impose conditions on a term of 

probation is derived from statute. See State v. Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 546, 554, 

350 N.W.2d 96 (1984). When a sentencing court places the defendant on 

probation, “[t]he court may impose any conditions which appear to be reasonable 

and appropriate.” WIS. STAT. § 973.09(1)(a) (2021-22).

1

 “‘Sentencing courts 

have wide discretion’” in imposing conditions of probation, State v. King, 2020 

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version.
No. 2022AP2153-CR

8

WI App 66, ¶20, 394 Wis. 2d 431, 950 N.W.2d 891 (quoted source omitted), and

“such discretion is subject only to a standard of reasonableness and 

appropriateness,” State v. B. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, ¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 

N.W.2d 47. A condition meets that standard if it is “reasonably related” to “the 

dual goals of supervision”—rehabilitation and public protection. B. Miller, 283 

Wis. 2d 465, ¶¶11, 13. 

¶20 “When a defendant seeks to have conditions of his or her supervision 

changed, the defendant bears the burden of showing cause for the modification.” 

King, 394 Wis. 2d 431, ¶24; see also State v. Hays, 173 Wis. 2d 439, 448, 496 

N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the proponent bears the burden “to 

establish by a clear preponderance of the evidence that there is cause to modify the 

terms and conditions of [supervision]”). We “‘review such conditions under the 

erroneous exercise of discretion standard.’” King, 394 Wis. 2d 431, ¶25 (quoted 

source omitted). This court must “look for reasons to sustain a circuit court’s 

discretionary decision.” State v. Muth, 2020 WI 65, ¶14, 392 Wis. 2d 578, 945 

N.W.2d 645. “The [circuit] court is presumed to have acted reasonably in 

sentencing.” State v. Ledford, 114 Wis. 2d 562, 566, 339 N.W.2d 361 (Ct. App. 

1983). A circuit court’s “[d]iscretion contemplates a process of reasoning which 

must depend on facts that are of record or that are reasonably derived by inference 

from the record.” State v. Handley, 173 Wis. 2d 838, 842-43, 496 N.W.2d 725, 

727 (Ct. App. 1993).

¶21 Sehrbrock argues that the ignition interlock condition is not 

reasonably related to his rehabilitation or the protection of the public and instead 

“reflects only the circuit court’s idiosyncrasies.” See State v. Oakley, 2001 WI 

103, ¶13, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 629 N.W.2d 200 (“[J]udges should not abuse their 

discretion by imposing probation conditions ... that reflect only their own 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

9

idiosyncrasies” but instead “should use their discretion in setting probation 

conditions to further the objective of rehabilitation and protect society and 

potential victims from future wrongdoing.”), opinion clarified on denial of 

reconsideration, 2001 WI 123, 248 Wis. 2d 654, 635 N.W.2d 760.

2

 We reject 

Sehrbrock’s arguments.

 

2

 As part of his argument that the ignition interlock condition is unreasonable, Sehrbrock 

appears to advance arguments regarding sentencing generally versus conditions of probation 

specifically. For example, he relies on State v. Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶22, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 

N.W.2d 662, for its conclusion that, in sentencing a defendant, “[t]he circuit court’s proper 

exercise of discretion includes individualizing the sentence ‘to the defendant based on the facts of 

the case.’” (Quoted source omitted.) He then focuses on the ignition interlock condition 

specifically, arguing that the condition is not individualized to him or his offense. As Sehrbrock 

acknowledges, the specific standard applicable to a condition of probation is whether the 

condition is reasonably related to the defendant’s rehabilitation and the protection of the public. 

As noted above, this is a discretionary decision and a court’s discretion “contemplates a process 

of reasoning which must depend on facts that are of record or that are reasonably derived by 

inference from the record.” State v. Handley, 173 Wis. 2d 838, 842-43, 496 N.W.2d 725 (Ct. 

App. 1993). To the extent that Sehrbrock means to separately argue that the court’s exercise of 

discretion is not individualized to Sehrbrock or not supported by the facts of record, we reject that 

argument based on the same facts of record that support our “reasonably related” conclusion, 

discussed in the text of our opinion. 

Citing State v. Gallion, 2001 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, Sehrbrock also 

appears to suggest that the circuit court failed to provide an adequate explanation for the ignition 

interlock condition. See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶¶4, 39 (judges are “required to provide a 

‘rational and explainable basis’ for the sentence.” (quoted source omitted)). It is unclear whether 

Sehrbrock intends to advance this as a separate argument. We note, for example, that the limited 

discussion on this point appears under the subheading, “The condition requiring an [ignition 

interlock] is not reasonably related to Mr. Sehrbrock’s rehabilitation or conviction.” This 

subheading does not include a suggestion that the court failed to provide an adequate explanation 

for sentencing; rather, the heading appears to inaccurately recite the standard related to a 

condition of probation: namely, that the condition be reasonably related to rehabilitation and 

protection of the public. See State v. B. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, ¶13, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 

N.W.2d 47. To the extent that Sehrbrock intends to argue that the court did not provide an 

adequate explanation, we reject that argument. As our discussion in the text of our opinion 

demonstrates, the court provided an adequate explanation for the ignition interlock condition. 

Moreover, even if the court had not provided an adequate explanation, this court must “look for 

reasons to sustain a circuit court’s discretionary decision.” State v. Muth, 2020 WI 65, ¶14, 392 

Wis. 2d 578, 945 N.W.2d 645.
No. 2022AP2153-CR

10

¶22 In imposing the ignition interlock condition, the circuit court stated,

“Somebody who drinks as much as [Sehrbrock] drinks ought not be on the road 

unless he’s in a car that has ignition interlock.” At the time it imposed the

condition, the court had been informed that Sehrbrock had a pending hit and run 

charge in another county. The court was therefore aware of the possibility that 

Sehrbrock had access to a vehicle, had operated a vehicle in the past, and had done 

so in an unlawful manner. See Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 284, 286 N.W.2d 

559 (1980) (sentencing court may consider “pending charges for which there has 

been no conviction”).

¶23 The circuit court also had before it information that alcohol and 

intoxication were involved in the robbery offense for which Sehrbrock was being 

sentenced and that Sehrbrock had an extensive history of alcohol and other 

substance abuse. This includes that Sehrbrock committed the robbery in this 

case—his third felony by the age of 17—while “heavily drinking” to the point of a 

“black out,” that he had gone to the store in a vehicle with others for the purpose 

of stealing alcohol, and that during the year prior to the robbery, while he was 16 

and 17 years old, he had been drinking approximately 1.75 liters of hard liquor 

every day. Alcohol not only played a role in the robbery offense but in past 

offenses as well. As noted, according to the PSI, Sehrbrock was adjudicated in a 

juvenile proceeding for resisting an officer when he was 15 years old. Sehrbrock 

explained to the PSI writer that he “was under the influence when [he] got picked 

up” for that offense, and that his criminal record was a result of “[a] combination 

of being around [the] wrong people and poor choices because of alcohol and drug 

abuse.”

¶24 The circuit court was well aware of the role of substance abuse in 

Sehrbrock’s criminal history and of the need to protect the public from 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

11

Sehrbrock’s conduct. The court began its sentencing remarks by telling 

Sehrbrock’s family members who were present in the courtroom that “this 

member of your family is in a lot of trouble and he needs your support.” The court 

then noted that Sehrbrock had first consumed alcohol at the age of 12, first tried 

acid and LSD at the age of 12 and marijuana at age 13, and first used cocaine at 

age 15. The court discussed Sehrbrock’s need for treatment, the seriousness of 

Sehrbrock’s offense, and Sehrbrock’s character and rehabilitative needs, noting 

that he’s a “young man” with “a lot of good qualities,” who had “people here 

coming to support him which tells me that someplace in there[,] if you dig through 

enough drugs and alcohol[,] you’ll find a good person.” 

¶25 The circuit court’s remarks at the postconviction hearing made the 

link between Sehrbrock’s use of alcohol and the offense even more explicit. As 

noted, the court told Sehrbrock, “[Y]ou and alcohol teamed up and [you] got 

yourself into a lot of trouble.” The court stated that Sehrbrock’s use of alcohol “is 

a huge factor in Mr. Sehrbrock’s inability to stay out of trouble,” and is “directly 

related to his conduct.” The court noted that Sehrbrock “got in[to] a car with a 

bunch of people” and “agreed to go into a store and rob somebody to get alcohol.” 

The court also linked the ignition interlock condition to Sehrbrock’s rehabilitation 

and the protection of the public by stating that the court was unwilling to expose 

the public to the risk of having Sehrbrock on the road without an ignition interlock 

and that this condition would also protect Sehrbrock from himself.

¶26 Significantly, this probation condition was imposed in the context of 

a case in which both the prosecutor and the circuit court expressed the belief that a 

prison sentence would have been justified. Rather than imposing a prison 

sentence, however, the court withheld sentence and granted the parties’ request for 

probation, telling Sehrbrock that he was “getting the benefit of the fact that you’re 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

12

a young person.” The court then imposed conditions, including the ignition 

interlock condition, designed to rehabilitate Sehrbrock while protecting the public. 

¶27 The legislature grants judges “broad discretion” to set probation 

conditions because “when a judge allows a convicted individual to escape a prison 

sentence and enjoy the relative freedom of probation, [the judge] must take 

reasonable judicial measures to protect society and potential victims from future 

wrongdoing.” Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d 447, ¶12. Although a circuit court must first

consider probation as an option, State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶25, 270 Wis. 2d

535, 678 N.W.2d 197, “[p]robation is not a matter of right to a defendant, but 

instead is a privilege,” State v. Heyn, 155 Wis. 2d 621, 627, 456 N.W.2d 157 

(1990).3 Our supreme court “recognize[s] that convicted felons may have trouble 

conforming their future conduct to the law,” and therefore “uphold[s] the power of 

a judge to tailor individualized probation conditions per WIS. STAT.

§ 973.09(1)(a).” Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d 447, ¶13. 

¶28 Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the ignition 

interlock condition is “reasonably related” to Sehrbrock’s rehabilitation and the 

protection of the public. This is particularly so given the circuit court’s broad 

discretion in fashioning conditions of probation, the presumption that the court’s 

sentence is reasonable, and our obligation to look for reasons in the record to 

sustain the court’s probation condition. Sehrbrock’s specific arguments to the 

contrary are unpersuasive.

 

3

 We note that granting sentencing courts substantial discretion in fashioning conditions 

of probation is also consistent with the goal of promoting probation as an alternative to a prison 

sentence. 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

13

¶29 Sehrbrock argues that although he had been drinking alcohol at the 

time of the offense, he was not driving the vehicle that brought him to the gas 

station and he has no history of OWI-related offenses. To the extent that 

Sehrbrock means to suggest that the ignition interlock condition is unreasonable as 

a matter of law because it is being imposed for a non-OWI-related offense or to a 

person without an OWI-related history, he cites no authority to support such a 

suggestion.4

¶30 To the extent that Sehrbrock means to argue that a condition of 

probation must directly relate to the crime for which a defendant is sentenced, he 

fails to cite authority for this premise, either from this jurisdiction or any other. 

Indeed, this court has rejected this argument and upheld conditions of probation 

not directly related to the offense for which the defendant is convicted if the 

conditions are otherwise valid. For example, in State v. Beiersdorf, 208 Wis. 2d

492, 503 n.9, 561 N.W.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1997), we concluded that a “condition of 

probation need not directly relate to [the] crime for which [a] defendant [was] 

placed on probation where [the] defendant needs to be rehabilitated from related 

conduct.” 

¶31 We reached the same conclusion in State v. E. Miller, 175 Wis. 2d 

204, 208-09, 499 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1993). There, the defendant was 

convicted of burglary and theft. Id. at 207. The defendant, who had been 

convicted in recent years for harassing telephone calls to women, challenged a 

 

4

 We note that although Sehrbrock refers to the ignition interlock statute, WIS. STAT.

§ 343.301, in arguing that the seven-year duration of the condition is harsh and excessive (which 

we discuss later in this opinion), he does not argue that under this statute, an ignition interlock 

may only be imposed for the OWI-related offenses expressly enumerated in that statute. 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

14

condition of his probation in the burglary and theft case that prohibited him from 

telephoning any woman without the permission of his probation officer. Id. at

207-08. We concluded that although the defendant’s past criminal conduct of 

making sexually explicit telephone calls to women was unrelated to the offenses 

for which he was convicted, the defendant needed to be rehabilitated from that 

conduct. Id. at 209-10. Because the condition was rationally related to the 

defendant’s need for rehabilitation, it was “reasonable and appropriate” as 

required by the probation statute, WIS. STAT. § 973.09. E. Miller, 175 Wis. 2d at

210; see also Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d 447, ¶1 (court properly exercised its discretion 

in imposing a condition of probation that prohibited a father of nine, who had 

intentionally refused to pay child support, from having another child until he could 

show that he could support that child and his current children). 

¶32 We have reached the same conclusion in the context of extended 

supervision. See State v. Koenig, 2003 WI App 12, ¶7 n.3, 259 Wis. 2d 833, 656 

N.W.2d 499 (“For purposes of review ... authority relating to the propriety of 

conditions of probation is applicable to conditions of extended supervision.”). For 

example, in B. Miller, 283 Wis. 2d 465, we rejected an argument by a defendant

who was convicted of OWI that the circuit court lacked authority to order him to 

fulfill his child support obligations in an unrelated paternity action from over 10 

years ago as a condition of extended supervision in the OWI case. We noted that 

the circuit court’s broad discretion in ordering conditions of extended supervision

“is subject only to a standard of reasonableness and appropriateness,” which in 

turn is “determined by how well it serves the dual goals of supervision:

rehabilitation of the defendant and the protection of a state or community interest.”

Id., ¶11; see also State v. Rowan, 2012 WI 60, ¶¶7, 10, 18, 25, 341 Wis. 2d 281, 

814 N.W.2d 854 (rejecting defendant’s challenge to a condition of extended 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

15

supervision imposed for battery conviction that permitted defendant’s person, 

residence, and vehicle to be subject to search for a firearm at any time without 

probable cause or reasonable suspicion).

¶33 Sehrbrock concedes that “a condition of probation need not be 

directly related to the crime for which the defendant was convicted.” However, 

relying on E. Miller, 175 Wis. 2d 204, and Rowan, 341 Wis. 2d 281, he argues 

that if the condition is not directly related to the crime of conviction, it must

address a specific area of past criminality in which the defendant was recently 

involved. Our review of these cases does not reveal such a requirement, and we 

reject Sehrbrock’s argument on that basis. 

¶34 Sehrbrock also argues that the ignition interlock condition was based 

solely on the circuit court’s “idiosyncrasies” or “eccentricities.” Specifically, 

Sehrbrock notes the court’s references to the societal harms of alcohol and drug 

use and the court’s comparison of addiction to the “devil.” Sehrbrock asserts that 

the court had “strong opinions about alcohol and other substances which led to” its 

imposition of the condition. He further asserts that the court imposed the 

condition “because, in its view, the fact that Mr. Sehrbrock was intoxicated at the 

time of the offense meant that he had ‘surrendered [his] decision making to the 

devil’ and there is no telling what he will do.” These assertions overstate the 

connection between the court’s comments and its imposition of the condition, and 

ignore the context in which the court’s comments were made.

¶35 The circuit court made these comments in the context of a case in 

which, due to Sehrbrock’s offense, his criminal history, his pending hit and run 

charge, and his substance abuse issues, there was risk involved in placing 

Sehrbrock on probation as requested. As the State argues, “Consistent with [the 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

16

court’s] responsibility to protect the community from a felon it was leaving out of 

prison, it used a tool at its disposal to keep him from driving [while intoxicated] 

and endangering others.” The court also referenced its experience as the “drug 

court judge” and how difficult it can be for individuals with substance abuse issues 

to stay sober. For example, the court described watching people “go to inpatient

and ... hold their breath for a year in drug court and walk out of there with a 

certificate and get arrested two days later for dealing.” It is within this context that 

the court analogized addiction to being “up against the most powerful devil in the 

world.” We agree with the State that, in context, the court’s statements reflect the 

court’s “understandable frustration at the heartbreak of addiction, and its 

understandable attempt to impress on an 18-year-old defendant how high the 

stakes are.” Sehrbrock has not shown that the condition was based on the court’s 

idiosyncrasies rather than on the dual goals of probation: Sehrbrock’s 

rehabilitation and protection of the public. 

¶36 Sehrbrock also argues that the condition was unnecessary because 

the circuit court had before it at sentencing information that Sehrbrock was no 

longer consuming alcohol and because the court’s other conditions, such as 

absolute sobriety and substance abuse treatment, “already offer protection of the 

community and facilitate Mr. Sehrbrock’s rehabilitation.” In support, he cites 

State v. Stewart, 2006 WI App 67, 291 Wis. 2d 480, 713 N.W.2d 165, in which 

this court concluded that a probation condition that banished a defendant from a 

township in order to protect several neighbors he had victimized was 

unconstitutionally overbroad. In addressing whether the aims of the condition 

could be accomplished in a way that was not unduly restrictive of the defendant’s 

liberties, we observed that “the no[-]contact condition of his probation and 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

17

supervision, a more narrowly drawn restriction on [the defendant], already offers 

protection to his victims and facilitates his rehabilitation.” Id., ¶16.

¶37 Stewart is not on point as it involves an overbreadth challenge, 

which analyzes whether the condition “is broader than necessary to accomplish 

[its] purposes.” See id. Sehrbrock points to no language in Stewart that suggests

that a condition of probation is not “reasonably related” to the goals of 

rehabilitation and protection of the public if other conditions are imposed that 

address the same purpose. Moreover, in seeking to advance Sehrbrock’s 

rehabilitation and the protection of the public, the circuit court in this case was not 

required to accept the proposition that Sehrbrock would continue to abstain from 

alcohol. 

¶38 Sehrbrock also argues that the ignition interlock condition could be 

counterproductive, rather than conducive, to his rehabilitation and to public 

protection. He states that the high cost of installing, maintaining, and removing

the ignition interlock (which he asserts is approximately $7,483) could prevent 

him from having it installed or maintained and therefore “could prevent [him] 

from obtaining and maintaining employment, or attending treatment, thus 

impeding his rehabilitation, contrary to the community interest.” However, 

Sehrbrock fails to cite any facts from the record showing that there is any 

likelihood that employment or treatment would be prevented as a result of the 

condition. He likewise fails to cite any authority for the proposition that when a 

court places a defendant on probation, it may not impose a condition that requires 

a substantial expenditure. 

¶39 In sum, we conclude that Sehrbrock has not met his burden of 

establishing that the ignition interlock condition was not “reasonably related” to 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

18

Sehrbrock’s rehabilitation or the protection of the public, or that it otherwise 

constituted an erroneous exercise of discretion.5

Harsh and Excessive

¶40 Relying on the case law quoted below, Sehrbrock argues that if we

conclude that the ignition interlock condition is reasonably related to the dual 

goals of probation, we should nevertheless vacate the condition because its 

imposition for seven years is unduly harsh and excessive. In making this 

argument, Sehrbrock notes that at the postconviction hearing the prosecutor 

expressed support for reducing the length of the requirement. 

¶41 “When a defendant argues that his or her sentence is excessive or 

unduly harsh, a court may find an erroneous exercise of sentencing discretion 

‘only where the sentence is so excessive and unusual and so disproportionate to 

the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of 

reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.’” 

State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106, ¶31, 255 Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507 

(quoting Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975)). We

review the circuit court’s determination that its sentence was not unduly harsh for 

an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Giebel, 198 Wis. 2d 207, 220, 541 

N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1995). 

 

5

 Sehrbrock states that the circuit court’s rationale for imposing the condition “could be 

applied to any defendant who committed a crime while under the influence, or who has a history 

of alcohol abuse.” However, our inquiry on appeal is to determine whether Sehrbrock has met his 

burden of establishing an erroneous exercise of the court’s discretion under the specific facts of 

this case. As explained at length above, he has not. 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

19

¶42 As a preliminary matter, we observe that the case law on which 

Sehrbrock relies addresses sentences generally, not conditions of probation 

specifically. Sehrbrock does not argue that his sentence, as a whole, is harsh and 

excessive, only that one particular condition is. Sehrbrock cites no case law in 

which our courts have applied the “harsh and excessive” framework to a single 

condition of probation, nor does he explain why such a framework applies. As 

stated, the standard for reviewing whether a circuit court properly exercised its 

discretion in imposing a condition of probation is whether the condition 

reasonably relates to the defendant’s rehabilitation and to the protection of the 

public. However, because the State does not specifically argue that the harsh and 

excessive framework may not apply to a condition of probation, we assume 

without deciding that it does, and we reject Sehrbrock’s arguments under that 

framework.

¶43 In support of this argument, Sehrbrock again relies on the cost of 

installing, maintaining and removing the ignition interlock, which he argues could 

prevent him from having the financial means to live independently, obtain and

maintain employment, or attend treatment. Again, Sehrbrock points to no facts of 

record to indicate any likelihood of such outcomes. Accordingly, he has not met 

his burden of establishing that the condition “‘is so excessive and unusual and so 

disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and violate 

the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the 

circumstances.’” Grindemann, 255 Wis. 2d 632, ¶31 (quoted source omitted).

¶44 Sehrbrock also argues that the seven-year requirement is “more than 

twice as long as the maximum [ignition interlock] requirement that could be 

imposed on a defendant convicted of operating while intoxicated third offense or 

above.” He argues that because he does not have a history of OWI offenses and 
No. 2022AP2153-CR

20

was not driving at the time of the offense, “ordering him to have an [ignition 

interlock] for longer than someone who has put the community at risk by drinking 

and driving on multiple occasions is harsh and excessive.” We cannot conclude 

under the specific facts of this case—including Sehrbrock’s significant criminal 

history, his substance abuse issues, his pending hit and run charge, the role that

alcohol played in this offense and at least one prior offense, and the circuit court’s

acknowledgement that a prison sentence would have been warranted—that the 

probation condition “shock[s] public sentiment” because it is longer than the 

maximum required in a third-or-above OWI offense.

¶45 Finally, we stress the circuit court’s stated willingness to remove the 

condition if Sehrbrock showed that he was successfully addressing his alcohol 

abuse issues. Although the court reasonably concluded at the postconviction 

hearing that Sehrbrock had not shown that removal of the condition was 

appropriate at that time, Sehrbrock is not precluded from making such a showing 

in the future.

CONCLUSION

¶46 For the reasons stated, Sehrbrock has failed to establish that the 

circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering an ignition interlock 

as a condition of Sehrbrock’s probation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 

conviction and the order denying Sehrbrock’s motion for sentence modification. 

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
No. 2022AP2153-CR(D)

¶47 TAYLOR, J. (dissenting). I conclude that under the facts of this 

case, it was an erroneous exercise of discretion for the circuit court to require the 

use of an ignition interlock device (IID) as a condition of probation.

¶48 Sehrbrock pled guilty to robbery with use of force as a party to a 

crime when, at seventeen years old, he and another teenager stole several packs of 

cigarettes from a gas station convenience store one early morning in 

November 2020. In the process of committing this crime, Sehrbrock’s codefendant sprayed the store clerk with pepper spray and Sehrbrock threw several 

canned beverages at the clerk before they fled on foot. Sehrbrock reported being 

highly intoxicated at the time of the offense. As detailed in the presentence 

investigation (PSI), Sehrbrock admitted to drinking alcohol heavily when he was 

sixteen and seventeen years old as well as using controlled substances from a 

young age.

¶49 At the time of sentencing, Sehrbrock was almost nineteen years old, 

he had voluntarily completed inpatient alcohol treatment, and he was in counseling 

with an alcohol and drug addiction therapist which Sehrbrock had initiated several 

months following this offense. There is nothing in the record at sentencing or in 

the postconviction proceedings that Sehrbrock ever drove or operated a vehicle 

while intoxicated. His criminal history consisted of three 2020 incidents when 

Sehrbrock was sixteen years old: two felony convictions for possession with 

intent to deliver less than 200 grams of THC as party to a crime and a 

misdemeanor criminal damage to property conviction which appears to have 
No. 2022AP2153-CR(D)

2

involved damaging his own television. Sehrbrock also had a juvenile adjudication 

for resisting or obstructing an officer when he was fifteen years old.

¶50 At sentencing on this case, both of the parties and the Department of 

Corrections recommended that the circuit court withhold sentence and place 

Sehrbrock on a period of probation. The parties recommended a term of probation 

ranging from five to eight years, with one year of conditional jail time as well as 

other conditions as set forth in the PSI. The circuit court withheld sentence and 

placed Sehrbrock on seven years of probation, incorporating the probation 

conditions that had been recommended by the parties and in the PSI, which 

included one year of jail, maintaining absolute sobriety and participating and 

completing all programming recommended by the Department of Corrections, 

including a cognitive-based program.

1

¶51 At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the circuit court 

questioned “[h]ow about ignition interlock? Somebody who drinks as much as he 

drinks ought not be on the road unless he’s in a car that has ignition interlock.” 

The court stated that “[a]ll these people that came to court are pulling you this way 

to keep you from falling over and the devil is pulling the other way. You got to 

side ... with either your friends and family or the devil. Bad enough they gotta 

 

1

 Additional probation conditions ordered by the circuit court included: prohibiting 

Sehrbrock from visiting the premises of any establishment whose primary business activity 

involves the sale or distribution of alcoholic beverages, including bars, taverns, liquor stores and 

beer tents; prohibiting Sehrbrock from using or possessing any controlled substances (without a 

valid prescription) or drug paraphernalia, nor be in the presence of anyone who does; requiring 

Sehrbrock’s treatment provider to report progress or lack thereof including lack of adequate effort 

or engagement to the probation agent and, if requested by the Court, to the Court; and requiring 

the treatment provider to submit at least quarterly progress reports to the probation agent and, if 

requested by the Court, to the Court. The court also warned Sehrbrock that, on probation, he 

would be periodically and randomly tested for drugs.
No. 2022AP2153-CR(D)

3

pull against the devil. If they have to pull against you, then you and the devil are 

gonna win. ... [T]he devil has his claws into you and it’s going to take a lot to pry 

them loose.”

¶52 Sehrbrock brought a postconviction motion to remove the IID 

probation condition or reduce the seven-year probationary time period for which it 

was ordered. In rejecting Sehrbrock’s motion, the circuit court recognized that 

Sehrbrock had no history of intoxicated driving, but again focused on the dangers 

of alcohol: “[o]nce you get to the point where you are intoxicated, you have given 

the keys to your life to the devil. And everybody who is in contact with you is in 

danger because there’s no telling what you’re going to do.”

¶53 Circuit courts have broad sentencing discretion, including in 

imposing all “reasonable and appropriate” conditions of probation and tailoring 

specific probation conditions to the individual defendant. See WIS. STAT.

§ 973.09(1)(a); see also State v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, ¶12, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 629 

N.W.2d 200, opinion clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2001 WI 123, 248 

Wis. 2d 654, 635 N.W.2d 760. Whether a probation condition is “reasonable and 

appropriate” is determined by how well it serves the dual goals of rehabilitating 

the defendant and protecting the public. State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, ¶11, 

283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 N.W.2d 47. Ultimately, the determination of whether a 

probation condition is “reasonable and appropriate” depends on the factual record 

or the reasonable inferences that can be derived from the factual record. See State 

v. Handley, 173 Wis. 2d 838, 842-43, 496 N.W.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1993) 

(“Discretion contemplates a process of reasoning which must depend on facts that 

are of record or that are reasonably derived by inference from the record.”). As a 

result, “this court will uphold a circuit court’s discretionary decision if the circuit 

court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and using a 
No. 2022AP2153-CR(D)

4

demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could 

reach.” State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶30, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24.

¶54 However, if the facts in the record and reasonable inferences 

therefrom do not support a circuit court’s decision to impose a condition of 

probation, this court may conclude that the court erroneously exercised its 

discretion. Handley, 173 Wis. 2d at 843-45. For instance, in Handley, the circuit 

court required the defendant to pay $1,000 in counseling costs for each of the 

victims as a condition of probation. Id. at 841. This court held that this condition 

of probation was an erroneous exercise of discretion because there was no 

evidence in the record that the victims needed psychological treatment. Id. at 843. 

This court also held that the determination of $1,000 for each victim was arbitrary 

and not supported by any facts in the record. Id. at 844; see also State v. Alpers, 

No. 2015AP1784, unpublished slip op. ¶¶16-18 (WI App Jan. 12, 2016) (in a 

decision citable only as persuasive authority, pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(2)(b), this court reversed a court’s order that the defendant install an IID

on her husband’s car, in part, because the order was not factually supported by the 

record).

¶55 In the present case, I agree with Sehrbrock that the IID condition 

was not “reasonable and appropriate” because it was not sufficiently supported by 

the facts of this case or on reasonably derived inferences. The record amply 

supports the circuit court’s findings that Sehrbrock had struggled with significant 

alcohol and substance addiction from a young age, which contributed to 

Sehrbrock’s criminal conduct. The record is nonexistent, however, when it comes 

to any history of driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Although 

Sehrbrock was intoxicated when committing this crime, it is undisputed that 

Sehrbrock did not drive or operate a vehicle as part of this offense. The record 
No. 2022AP2153-CR(D)

5

also contains no allegations or evidence that Sehrbrock had previously operated a 

vehicle while intoxicated or had any prior citations or convictions or any pending 

charges for committing a vehicular offense while intoxicated. At the time of 

sentencing, there was no discussion about nor evidence in the record regarding 

whether a vehicle was titled or registered in Sehrbrock’s name, whether he had 

access to or control over any vehicle or whether he was entitled to a reduction in 

the IID cost. The sentencing hearing transcript suggests that the IID was imposed 

as an afterthought and was rooted in rhetoric that likened Sehrbrock’s alcohol 

addiction to “the devil ha[ving] his claws into [Sehrbrock],” rather than in the 

particular facts of this case or Sehrbrock’s driving history.

¶56 This court independently reviews the record to look for reasons to 

support the circuit court’s exercise of discretion. See State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 

334, 343, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983). The only reference in the record about 

Sehrbrock’s operation of a vehicle is a single statement from the prosecutor at the 

sentencing hearing that Sehrbrock had a pending charge for a “hit and run” in 

Milwaukee County, which can be considered at sentencing. See Elias v. State, 93 

Wis. 2d 278, 284, 286 N.W.2d 559 (1980) (sentencing court can consider

“offenses which were uncharged and unproven” and “pending charges for which 

there has been no conviction”). Even so, there is no factual support in the record 

that Sehrbrock had ever driven intoxicated or even owned or had regular access to 

a vehicle. There is no similar factual scenario in any Wisconsin appellate case 

where an IID has been imposed as a condition of probation for a non-vehicular 

crime, much less when there is no history of the defendant driving or operating a 
No. 2022AP2153-CR(D)

6

vehicle while intoxicated.2 Nor does there appear to be any case law in other 

jurisdictions where an IID has been required as a condition of probation in a 

factually analogous situation not involving a vehicular crime or intoxicated 

driving. The IID probation condition in this case is simply not related to 

Sehrbrock’s rehabilitation or protecting the public because the condition pertains 

to conduct (intoxicated driving) that is absent from the facts in this case, absent 

from Sehrbrock’s criminal history, and absent from his driving history.

¶57 For these reasons, I conclude that imposing an IID as a condition of 

probation was an erroneous exercise of discretion. I would remand this case to the 

circuit court to amend the judgment of conviction to strike the IID probation 

condition.

 

2

 Sehrbrock does not raise in this appeal the issue of the circuit court’s authority to 

impose an IID as a probation condition for an offense not enumerated in WIS. STAT.

§ 343.301(1g)(a), which requires that a circuit court order an IID when a defendant: 

(1) improperly refused to take an intoxication test under WIS. STAT. § 343.305; (2) violated 

certain OWI-related statutes—WIS. STAT. §§ 346.63(1) or (2), 940.09(1), or 940.25—with a 

blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time; or (3) violated one of those OWI-related 

statutes with one or more prior OWI convictions as defined by WIS. STAT. § 343.307(1). Because 

this issue is not raised on appeal, I do not address it. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 647, 492 

N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (we may decline to address undeveloped arguments because we 

“cannot serve as both advocate and judge”).