O ral argum ent was heard i n t hi s case on O ct o b er 8, 2 0 0 4 , i n Frankl i n, W i l l i am son C o unt y , T enness ee, as p art 1

o f t h is C o u rt' s S .C .A .L .E .S . ( S upr eme C o u rt A d vanci ng L e g a l E d ucat i o n fo r S tud e n ts) p ro je c t.



### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON H E A R D A T FR A N K L IN 1 

### O ct obe r 8, 200 4 S es sio n
AMY BUTTERW ORTH , ET AL 

### . v. J OHN BUT TERW ORTH , ET AL 

### .

App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Appe als Circuit Court

for Dyer C ounty No. 02-02 R. LeeMoore , Jr., Judge

No. W2003-00983-SC- R11-CV - F iled Janu ary 20, 2005

We gr anted this appe al to determine whether the doctrine of par ental immunit y bars r ecove ry

when a son is injured at his f

ather ’s place of employ ment. We conclude that the Court of Appea ls erre d in cre ating a brig ht-line rule pr ohibiting the application of the doctrine of par ental immunitywhen the inj ury re su lte d fr om e mpl oyme nt- re la te d a c tiv iti e s. Vi e wi ng the e vid e nc e in the light most fa vo ra ble to the no n- mov ing pa

rty , w e ho ld that the mot ion fo r su mma ry jud g me nt wa s impr op e rl y g rante d by

the trial court. Thus, we affirm the judgme nt of t he C ourt of Appeals in this respe ct and
rema nd this case to the tria l court for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e nt of t he Co ur t o f Appe als Affir m e d in P art and Modif

ied; Case Re m anded to Trial Cou rt

J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., and A L L EN W. W A LL A CE , S P .J . joined.

Allan B . Thorp, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe ll an ts , Jo h nB u tt e rw orth and Chic Transportation, LL C.

Marvin A. B ienvenu, Me mphis, Tennessee , for the A ppellee, A my Butter worth.

OP IN ION

On Ma y 5 , 2 0 0 1 , s e v e n t e e n

- y e ar

- o l d S t e p h e n B u t t e r w o r t h ( “ S t e p h e n ” ) a c c o m p a n i e d h is fathe r, John Butterworth (“ Butter worth”) , to Butterw orth’s plac e of e mploy ment, a repair shop
ow ned byCh ic T rans po rt ati on , L L C ( “C hi c”). But ter wor th , a m echan ic, in st ruct e d St e ph e n to g re a se-2-

the fittings unde rneath a semi-truc k that was e levated by hy draulic ja cks. While St eph en was g re a sin g the fi tti ng s, the truc k f e ll f ro m th e ja c ks on to h is f

oo t, r e su lti ng in i nju ri e s.
Ste ph e n’ s p are nts are div or c e d, a nd Ste ph e n liv e s wi th his mothe r, Am y B utt e rw orth ( “ Mr s. Butter worth”)

. Following the incident, Mrs. B utterworth br oug ht a lawsuit ag ainst Butter worth and Chi c on be ha lf

of Ste ph e n. Th e c omp la int a lle g e d th at B utt e rw orth andChi c we re ne g lig e nt i n faili ng to ma int a in the sa fe ty of the ir e qu ipm e nt, in f a ili ng to p ro pe rl y

pla c e ja c k s ta nd s u nd e rn e a th the truck, and in failing to properly post signs and to keep non-e mploy ees out of the work a rea . The defe ndants filed a joint motion for summary judgme nt claiming that the doctrine of pare ntal immunit y barr ed re covery . The trial c ourt g rante d the def endants’ motion.

Th e Cou rt of Ap pe a ls re ve rs e d the tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt, ho ldi ng that th e pa re nta l im mun ity do c tr ine is n ot a

pp lic able wh e n in

jurie s to a c hil d re su lt fr om the pa re nt’ s e mpl oyme nt o r b us ine ssrelated ac tiviti es. We g rante d revie w.
AN AL YSI S

A. The Doctr ine of

P arental Im m uni ty
Prior to 1994, the doctrine of pare ntal immunit y

barr ed all ac t i o n s in this s tate for injuries to a minor child resulting from a pa rent’s ne g lige nce. See Ba rra nco v. Jackson, 690 S.W .2d 221, 222 (Tenn. 1985) , overruled by Br oadwe ll ex rel. B roadw ell v. Holmes, 871 S.W .2d 471, 477 (Tenn. 1994); McKe lvey v. McKe lvey , 77 S.W

. 664 (Tenn. 1903) , overruled by Br oadwe ll, 871 S.W .2d at 47 7. Ho we ve r, in 19 94 thi s Cou rt re c on sid e re d the app lic abil ity of the do c tr ine of

pa re nta l im mun ity and held that a

child may

rec over f or injuries caused by pare ntal conduct that f alls outside the scope of t he parent-c hild relationship. Br oadwe ll, 871 S.W .2d at 473. This Court limi ted the doctrine of pare ntal immunit y

in Tennesse e “to c onduct that constitutes the exercise of pare ntal authority , the perf ormanc e of pa

renta l supervision, and the provision of pa renta l car e and custody .” I d. at 476-77. We f urthe r not e d tha t the app lic a tio n of p are nta l im mun ity de pe nd s u po n b oththe natur e of the a c ts and the c ontext in which the par ent per formed the acts. I d. at 476 n.2.

I n the pre sent ca se, the Court of Appe als held that “in Ten n es see, a pare nt is not i mmune from liability

wher e the alleg ed neglig ence is in the performance of employ ment-re lated ac tiviti es.” Thus, the Court of Appeals cre ated a brig ht-line exception to the doctrine of parental immunityfor neg lige nce involving employ ment-re lated ac tiviti es without exam i n ing the circ umstances unde r which those a ctivities were conducted. Be cause Br oadwe ll requires a n examination of both the nature of the a cts and the c ontext in which the parent performed the acts, the Court of Appe als err ed. See id. We hold that determining whether pare ntal imm u n i t y ap plies to employ ment-re lated
a c tiv iti e s r e qu ir e s a c a se -b y -c a se a na ly sis of the natur e of

the a c ts p e rf

orme d a ndof

the c on te xt in wh ic h th e y

we re pe rf

orme d. Con se qu e ntl y , w e mus t e xami ne the fa c ts a lle ged to de te rm ine if summary judgme nt was appr opriately g rante d.-3- B. Su m m ar y J udgm e nt

The standa

rd for revie wing a grant of sum mary judgme nt by a trial c ourt is de novo without
a presumption that the trial court’s conclusions are corr ect. See Mooney v. Sneed, 30 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tenn. 2000)

. Summary judgme nt is a ppropriate only

when the moving party

demonstrates that no g enuine issues of material fac t e x ist a nd that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of la w. See Te nn. R. Civ. P

. 56.04; By rd v. Hall, 847 S.W .2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993) . The primary issues underlying a motion for summ ary judgme nt are “(1) whether a fa ctual dispute exists ; (2) whe ther the dis pu te d fact is mat eria l to the ou tc ome of the c a se ; and(3 ) w he the r the dis pu te d f a c t c re a te s a g enuine issue f

or trial.” B yrd, 847 S.W.2d at 214.

Be cause the application of pare ntal immunit y depends upon the context in which the pare nt pe rf orms the a c ts i n q ue sti on , th e sc op e a ndpu rp os e of B utt e rw orth’ s ac tiv iti e s a re ma te ri a l f

a c ts. Se e B ro a dw e ll, 87 1 S. W.2 d at 47 6 n .2 . It is un dis pu te d th a t Ste ph e n li ve d w ith his mothe r a ft e r h is pare nts divorced a nd beg an helping his father at Chic’s re pair shop during the summer of 2000. Stephen helped B utterworth on we ekday s during the summer and on S at u rday s during the school y ear . Butter worth taug ht Stephen to chang e the oil and tires, t o perf orm lubrications, and to service the trucks. B utterworth wa s the only person who g ave Stephe n instructions while at the re pair shop.

As to the manner in w hich Stephen was paid, howeve r, the e vidence is less clear . Acc ording to Step h en ’s d ep osition t estimony , Butter worth paid Stephen “ just a litt le money

here and ther e” rathe r than providing Stephen with a re g ular sala ry . Howeve r, B utterwort

h ’ s s ta te me n t o f u n d is p uted fac ts states that Butter worth “paid S tephen f or his work.” Whil e the f ormer me thod of payment tends to support Butter worth’s position t hat Stephen’s pr esenc e at Chic wa s to allow him to spend time with Butterworth, Butterw orth’s statement plac es S t ep h en in a position sim ilar to that of an employ ee.

T h e e v i d en ce as t o t h e r ea s o n fo r S t ep h en ’s wo rkat C h i c i s s i m i l ar l y co n fl i ct i n g. Butter worth’s a ffidavit states that he reque sted Stephen to he lp him at Chi c’s r epair shop so that they could “do something toge ther” and Stephen c ould learn “something about working and about truc k maintenanc e.” Stephe n stated that he be lieved the pur pose of his pre sence at the r epair shop was “[j] ust to help” Butter worth. Stephen testified that he is not i n t er est ed in bec oming a truck mecha nic. B utterworth’ s statement is consistent with his posi tion that h e was e x erc ising pa renta l supervision in teac hing his son a tr ade. While S tephen’ s testimony is not completely inconsistent with Butt erw orth’s asse rtion, it is equally consistent with the theory that Stephen’s role was a s an assistant, without reg ard to his status as child.

I n assessing evidenc e for

purposes of summary

judgme nt, courts must ex amine the e vidence in the light most favor able to the nonmoving party while drawing all rea sonable infe renc es in the nonmoving party ’s favor

. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 19 9 5 ). Furthermore , “[c]ourts shoul d g rant a

summary judgme nt only

when both the f

acts and the i nfer ence s to be dra wn from the f acts pe rmit a rea sonable pe rson to rea ch only one conc lusion.” Staples v. CBL & A ssocs., I nc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000); see Shadrick v. Coker , 963 S.W .2d 726, 737 (Tenn. 1998)

.M r s

. B ut t er wort h f ur t her mai nt ai ns t hat t he do ct r i ne of p ar ent al i mm un i t y sh oul d not be i mp ut ed t o C hi c a s 2
B u tter w o rth ’s em p lo ye r. H o w e v e r, b e c a u se w e ha v e c o n c lud e d tha t the tria l c o u rt e rr e d in gr a n ting su m m a ry j u d g m e n t,
we n eed n ot r eac h t hi s i s s ue.
-4- I n vi ew i ng the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to Mrs. Butter worth, the nonmoving party , the fa cts es t ablish that Stephen aided B utterworth on a consistent basis in fulfilling B utt e rw orth’ s o wn e mpl oyme nt d uti e s a ndthat Ste ph e n r e c e ive d mo ne tary c ompens a tio n f

or his
e ff orts. Dr a wi ng a ll r e a so na ble inf e re nc e s in fa vo r o f M rs . B utt e rw orth’ s po sit ion , St e ph e n’ s r ole was no diff

ere nt than any

other pa id assistant to whom Butter worth owned a duty to maintain a saf e working environment. Stated diff ere ntly , the u n d i s p u t ed fac ts do not permit the gr anting of de fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n f

or su mma ry jud g me nt. 2

CO NC LU SION

We conclude that the Court of Appea ls erre d i n cr ea t i n g a brig ht-line rule pr ohibiting the application of pare n t al immunitywher e the a lleg ed neg lige nce oc curr ed in the performanc e of employ ment-re lated ac tiviti es. Rather , courts must determine whether pare ntal immunit y

applies ba se d u p o n t h e f

a c t s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f e a c h p ar t i c u l ar c a s e

. V i e w i n g t h e f a c t s i n alig ht m os t favor able to the nonmoving party , we conclude that summary judgme nt was improper ly g rante d. Acc ording ly , we aff

irm the judgme nt of the Court of Appea ls r ever sing the trial court’s gra n t of summary judgme n t b u t d o s o on other g rounds. We rema nd this case to the tria l court for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

Cos ts o f a

pp e a l a re ta xedequal ly

to the app e lla nts , Joh n B utt e rw orth andChi c Transportation, Inc., and their sure ties, and to the appe llee, Amy Butter worth, and he r sure ties, for
w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________

JANI CE M . H OLDE R, JUS TI CE