alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6650

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

KENYATA AUDREEN ROBY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Rebecca B. Smith, District

Judge. (CR-99-46, CA-02-7-4)

Submitted: July 25, 2002 Decided: August 1, 2002

Before WILKINS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kenyata Audreen Roby, Appellant Pro Se. Fernando Groene, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Kenyata Audreen Roby appeals the district court’s order

denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.

2002). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate

of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the

district court. See United States v. Roby, Nos. CR-99-46; CA-02-7-

4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 5, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### George W. REILAND, Petitioner, v. Benjamin FRIEDMAN and Solitron Devices, Inc., Respondents.

No. 43906.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 28, 1973.

Certiorari denied. 276 So.2d 253.

CARLTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              28,480
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WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
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                              World Airways FDS 6/30/99
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<CIK>                         0000949240
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#### Michael GUARNERI and Joseph Keith Bartley, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-1022.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 16, 1971.

Appeal from Criminal Court of Record, Palm Beach County; James M. Reasbeck, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### KEARNEY v. BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF VOLUSIA COUNTY.

No. 36237.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1967.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 18, 1967.

Appeal dismissed without opinion.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AT JUNE 30, 1998 (UNAUDITED) AND THE
STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 1998 (UNAUDITED)
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000025657
<NAME> CRESTED CORP.
       
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<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Central Parking Corporation (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the three months ending June 30, 2004 as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on August 13, 2004 (the  "Report"),  I,
Monroe J.  Carell,  Jr.,  Chairman and Chief  Executive  Officer of the Company,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

          (1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (b)  The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
               material  respects,   the  financial  condition  and  results  of
               operations of the Company.

                                           /s/ MONROE J. CARELL, JR.
                                           ------------------------------------
                                           Monroe J. Carell, Jr.
                                           Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

     A SIGNED  ORIGINAL OF THIS  WRITTEN  STATEMENT  REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 HAS
BEEN  PROVIDED TO CENTRAL  PARKING  CORPORATION  AND WILL BE RETAINED BY CENTRAL
PARKING  CORPORATION AND FURNISHED TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE  COMMISSION OR
ITS STAFF UPON REQUEST.

     The  foregoing  certification  is being  furnished  solely to accompany the
Report  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, and is not being filed for purposes
of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,  and is not to
be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before
or after the date hereof,  regardless of any general  incorporation  language in
such filing. This certification is executed as of August 13, 2004.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-20-00506-CV

C. V., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 274TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY

NO. 19-1044, THE HONORABLE DAVID JUNKIN, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

C.V. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights 

to her children, H.E.N. Jr., J.V., and F.V.N.

1 See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. Following a de 

novo hearing, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for 

terminating her parental rights existed and that termination was in the children’s best interest. 

See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2).

On appeal, Mother’s court-appointed attorney has filed a brief concluding that the 

appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); 

Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—

1 We refer to appellant by her initials or as Mother and to the children by their initials. 

See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. In this Court’s cause number 03-20-

00507-CV, Mother appeals from the trial court’s order in suit affecting the parent-child 

relationship concerning her child C.G.
2

Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying Anders procedure in appeal from termination of parental 

rights). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of 

the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 

U.S. at 744; Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 646–47. Mother’s counsel has certified to this Court that she 

provided Mother with a copy of the Anders brief and informed her of her right to examine the 

appellate record and to file a pro se brief. To date, Mother has not filed a pro se brief. 

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the 

proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 

80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record, including the Anders brief submitted on 

Mother’s behalf, and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. Our review 

included the trial court’s endangerment findings, see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), 

and we have found no issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to those findings, see In 

re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019). We agree that the appeal is frivolous and without 

merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights.2

__________________________________________

Melissa Goodwin, Justice

Before Justices Goodwin, Triana, and Kelly

Affirmed

Filed: March 4, 2021

2 We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney of record. See In re P.M., 520 

S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). If Mother, after consulting with counsel, desires to file 

a petition for review, counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for 

review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27–28.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT

TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Sara Lee Corporation
(the Company) for the fiscal year ended July 3, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, L.M. (Theo) de Kool, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                                                    
|----------------------------------------------------
|Dated: September 3, 2004                            
|                                                    
|/s/ L.M. (Theo) de Kool,                            
|Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
# C_2012129EN.01000801.xml

| 4.5.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 129/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.5.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 129/8

---

Call for competition for the selection of the T2S Board non-central bank members and the creation of a reserve list

Ref. 21016/T2S/2011

2012/C 129/04

With this call for competition, the European Central Bank (ECB) is launching the process for the selection of the T2S Board non-central bank members and the creation of a reserve list.

1.   Background information

Background information

In line with the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, the Eurosystem will offer its T2S services to CSDs in Europe. The overall objective of T2S is to facilitate post-trading integration by supporting core, borderless and neutral pan-European cash and securities settlement in central bank money so that CSDs can provide their customers with harmonised and commoditised settlement services in an integrated technical environment with cross-border capabilities.

It is foreseen that the T2S Board will include members who will provide the perspective of the clients/users of T2S services without being associated to any specific client/user (i.e. non-central bank members). These members will not have a voting right.

The European Central Bank (ECB) organises this call for competition to appoint non-central bank members for the T2S Board and create a reserve list for replacement.

2.   Place of execution/performance of the works

Place of execution/performance of the works

The place of provision of services is mainly at the ECB premises, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, and involves travel to other European locations.

3.   Type of procedure: call for competition

Type of procedure: call for competition

The ECB invites applications with a view to selecting two candidates as members of the T2S Board and to create a reserve list for replacement. The selection is solely based on the quality of the offers received.

The procedure shall be governed by Annex IV to Decision ECB/2012/6 of 29 March 2012 on the establishment of the TARGET2-Securities Board and repealing Decision ECB/2009/6.

4.   Complete documentation

Complete documentation

The complete documentation (in English version) laying down, inter alia, the criteria for the inclusion on the list and the conditions for submission of applications can be downloaded from the ECB website under the following link:

http://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/about/spotlight/html/t2s_spotlight_061.en.html

---
#### Paul RUSSAK, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 72-1279.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 24, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1973.

*542Hastings, Elias, Goldman & Baumberger and Stephen J. Schultz, Miami, for appellant.

Martin P. Shachat, North Miami Beach, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PEARSON, Judge.

The appellant, Paul Russak, was insured by the appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, under an automobile liability policy which included collision coverage. Janice Russak, the appellant’s wife, was involved in an automobile collision with one Alan Telisman while she was operating an automobile owned by her husband. As a result of the collision, the appellant’s automobile was damaged and Janice Russak sustained personal injuries. Thereafter, appellant made a claim under the coilision coverage with State Farm for the damage to his automobile. The claim in the amount of $1,250 was paid, and the company received from appellant a sub-rogation receipt in the usual form which specifically provided that “ . . .no such settlement will be made nor release given by the undersigned without the written consent of the said insurer and the undersigned covenants and agrees to cooperate fully with said insurer in the prosecution of such claims . . . ”.

Thereafter, appellant and his wife filed suit for personal injuries to the wife. Upon the settlement of the suit for personal injuries, appellant and his wife executed a general release specifically including property damage. Then, the appellee, without knowledge of the general release, filed suit to enforce its subrogation rights. Upon the presentation of the general release, however, the appellee insurance company’s suit was voluntarily dismissed. The present suit was then filed by the appellee insurance company against the appellant alleging breach of the subrogation agreement. After the filing of answer and discovery proceedings, an affidavit was filed, and the trial court entered a summary judgment upon the motion of the appellee.

On this appeal, no claim is made that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, each of appellant’s points urge that the summary judgment was improperly entered as a matter of law.

In Titus v. Emmco Insurance Company, Fla.App.1959, 109 So.2d 781, the insured received a satisfaction of a judgment in a suit which effectively barred an insurance company from proceeding under its sub-rogation rights. This court held that the insurance company had a right to recover from the insured. In so holding, we stated:

> 

> “As to the insurance company, he [the insured] occupied a fiduciary relationship and owed to his beneficiary the usual duties of diligence, competence and good faith owed by a trustee. Hayward v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 212 Minn. 500, 4 N.W.2d 316, 140 A.L.R. 1236.”

> 

We think that the case at bar is governed by this holding. See also the reasoning of the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Clark v. American Casualty Company, 96 Ga.App. 328, 99 S.E.2d 897 (1957).

Affirmed.
260 La. 123

#### Barney E. KING, Jr. v. Evie Stewart KING.

No. 51958.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 13, 1971.

In re: Barney E. King, Jr. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Tammany. 253 So.2d 660.

Writ denied. There is no error of law in the judgment under the assignment of errors.
#### Redman Wright MORRIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-802.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Nov. 10, 1969.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.