1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46640
In the Interest of: John Doe I, A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. ) ) IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE ,
Petitioner

- Respondent,

v.

JANE DOE , Respondent

- Appellant,

and
GUARDIAN AD LITEM,

Guardian Ad Litem

- Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Filed: March 13, 2019
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. James Cawthon , Magistrate

. Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed

. Anthony R. Geddes , Ada County Public Defender; Karen L. Jennings , Deputy Ada County Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John R. Shackelford , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Stoel Rives LLP; Kris J. Ormseth, Boise, for guardian ad litem.

________________________________________________ HUSKEY, Judge Jane Doe appeals from the magistrate’s judgment terminating her parental rights. Doe argues the magistrate erred when it terminated her parental rights. Because substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate’s findings that Doe abandoned and neglected her
child , we affirm the magistrate’s judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights.2 I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUN D
Doe is the mother of J. F

. , 1 who was born on December 22, 2017. J.F. tested positive for opiates and marijuana on December 23, 2017 , and p olice determined the child was in imminent danger

. T he Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department) filed a petition for hearing under the Child Protective Act on December 27, 2017. The same day , Doe was advised of her rights and she w aived her right to a shelter care hearing

. The magistrate found there was
reasonable cause to believe that J.F. came within the purview of the Child Protective Act due to neglect, and t he magistrate ordered J.F. into temporary care and custody of the Depa rtment

. Because Doe lived out of state, she filed motions to parti cipate via telephone at the

pre trial conference and the adjudicatory hearing , which were both granted. Doe failed to appear
at the pre trial conference, which was held on January 2 2 , 2018. Doe also failed to appear at the adjudicatory hearing on January 24, 2018. A case plan hearing was held on February 21, 2018, and Doe failed to appear there as well

. On March 2 2 , 2018, the magistrate granted legal custody
of J.F. to the Departme nt. Doe failed to appear at a status review hearing on April 20, 2018, and
the six

- month review hearing held on June 15, 2018. A petition for termination of the parent / child relationship was filed on August 16, 2018

. The petition alleged Doe abandoned and neglected J.F

. Doe responded on September 25, 2018, when she filed an answer to the petition for termination of the parent / child relationship. Doe denied the allegations that she abandoned and neglected her child

. A trial was held on November 26, 20 18, and Doe failed to appear. The magistrate determined there was clear and convincing evidence for grounds to terminate the parental rights of Doe to her child

. The magistrate also concluded it was in the child’s best interest to terminate the parental rights of Doe. In its decision, the magistrate
concluded that Doe abandoned and neglected J.F

. O n December 18, 2018
, the magistrate entered its final judgment to terminate the parental rights of Doe

. Doe timely appeals.

1 J.F. was formerly known as J.L.3 II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State , 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe , 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is th e philosophy that, wherever possible, family life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16

- 2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due process must be met when terminating the parent / child relationship. State v. Doe , 143 Idaho 383, 386, 146 P.3d 64 9, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent / child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id . Because a fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a

co urt may terminate a parent / child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16

- 2009; In
re Doe , 146 Idaho 759, 761

- 62, 203 P.3d 689, 691

- 92 (2009); Doe , 1 43 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at
652. On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe , 148 Idaho 243,
245

- 46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064

- 65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights
be terminated. Id

. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is requi red. Doe v.
Doe , 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably
certain. In re Doe , 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further , the magistrate’s decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe , 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d
at 600.
Idaho Code § 16

- 2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent / child relationshi p when it is in the child’s best interest and any one of the following five4 factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge paren tal responsibilities for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well

- being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe , 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at
1117.
III.
ANALYSIS Doe argues the magistrate’s decision to terminate her parental rights should be reversed. Doe claims the magistrate lacked substantial and competent evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard required to find that Doe abandoned and neglected her child. The magistrate found two grounds for termination: (1) Doe abandoned J.F. ; and (2) Doe neglected
J.F

. We will address each ground in turn.
A. The Magistrate Did No t Err When It Found Doe Abandoned Her Child In this case, the magistrate terminated Doe ’s parental rights in part on the ground of abandonment, I.C. § 16

- 2005(1)(a). Pursuant to I.C. § 16

- 2002(5), abandonment occurs when the parent has willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular personal contact. The word “or” is a disjunctive particle used to express an alternative and, thus, the willful failure to maintain a normal parental
rel ationship can be based upon either the fa ilure to pay reasonable support or the failure to have regular personal contact, or some other failure. Doe I v. Doe II , 148 Idaho 713, 715, 228 P.3d 980, 982 (2010). When a parent fails to maintain a normal pare ntal relationship without just cause for a period of one year, prima facie evidence of abandonment exists. I.C. § 16

- 2002(5). There is no universal standard for what constitutes a normal parental relationship, and whether such a relationship exists depen ds on the facts and circumstances of each case. Doe v. Doe , 150 Idaho 46, 50, 244 P.3d 190, 194 (2010). The petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the parent lacks a normal parental relationship with the child and that there is no just cause for the failure to maintain such a relationship. Id. If the petitioner is able to meet this burden, the parent then has the burden of production to present evidence of just cause. Id. If the5 magistrate finds that just cause has not been established, the petitioning party has met its burden of persuasion. Id.
T he magist rate did not err when it found D oe abandoned her child

. In December 2018,

t he magistrate found t hat Doe had not made contact with J.F. since J.F. was one day old and the
Child Protective Act case was filed . Although Doe was outside of Idaho, Doe was contacted by the Department and informed of the resources available to facilitate her visit s with J.F

. The magistrate explained that in the twelve months since J.F.’s birth, Doe never took advantage of the available resources, despite the Department’s efforts to extend services that would facilitate
visitation. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Doe tr avelled to Idaho to visi t J.F. , and the magistrate found Doe never inquired about J.F. to learn of his health or well

- being. The magistrate concluded there was no bond between Doe and her child , and thus, the magistrate held there was clear and convincing evidence of abandonment in this case. Doe argues she did not abandon J.F . Specifically, Doe claims J.F. was involuntarily
removed from her care, and as such, it was not a voluntary action for Doe to leave her child in
Idaho’s foster care system . Furthermore, Doe asserts that abandonment requires that Doe leave a child with no reasonable support
, and since J.F. was in the foster system, he was provided with reasonable support. Doe also argues the district court should have considered the fact t hat Doe
does no t have ties to Idaho or friends and family in Idaho

. We are not persuaded by Doe’s arguments on appeal. First, Doe fails to explain how the involuntary removal of a child negates a finding of abandonment. Voluntariness is not a part o f the definition of aban donment and was not part of the magistrate’s decision

. Doe’s position suggests that abandonment requires an explicit and voluntary action, such that a parent could not technically “ abandon ” a child if the child is removed against the parent’s will. Idaho courts have never adopted this interpret ation of abandonment. Furthermore, Doe did not address why she failed to contact or visit J.F. , which

were two critical factors in the magistrate’s determination that Doe abandoned J.F

. Second, whether Doe has fr iends or family in Idaho does not determine whether Doe
abandoned J.F . We focus on th e relationship between Doe and her child when we consider abandonment, and such a relationship does not depend on whether Doe has ties to the state of
Idaho. The magistr ate similarly narrowed its findings to the lack of a relationship between Doe
and J.F., and Doe fails to explain how the magistrate erred in this regard. While Doe claims the6 magistrate should not penalize Doe for the lack of ties to Idaho, there is no ev idence the magistrate did so

. Thus, the magistrate did not err when it found Doe abandoned her child

. B

. The Magistrate Did Not Err When It Found Doe Neglected Her Child
T he magistrate also terminated Doe ’s parental rights due to neglect. Idaho Code § 16

- 2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16

- 1602(31). Section 16

- 1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his or her
well

- being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. The magistrate found Doe neglected J.F

. The magistrate found that Doe fai l ed to comply
with the terms of the case plan and Doe failed to visit or contact J.F

. The magistrate explained Doe had knowledge of the ongoing Child Protective Act case, and yet, made sporadic contact with the Department. Doe did nothing to address her substance abuse issues and failed to establish stable housing or employment so as to care for the needs of her child

. For these reasons, the magistrate concluded the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Doe neglected J.F

. Regarding the magistrate’s finding of neglect, Doe responds with one sentence: “The reality of a parent’s absence and lack of ties to Idaho should not be counted against a parent and should be recognized when the court decides the issues of parental abandonment and ne glect.”
Doe ’s statement fails to analyze the magistrate’s finding of neglect. Additionally, as previously stated, t here is no evidence t he magistrate penalized Doe for the lack of ties to Idaho . Even if
Doe’s statement had merit, Doe fails to provide legal authority to explain how and to what extent the magistrate erred

. A party waives an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking. Powell v. Sellers , 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 440 (Ct. App. 1997). Thus,
because Doe’s b rief lacks legal authority on the issue of neglect, and because the magis trate did not penalize Doe for the lack of ties to Idaho, we find Doe has not persuaded this Court that the magistrate erred when it found Doe neglected J.F

.7 IV.
CONCLUSION
Because substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate’s findings that Doe
aban doned and neglected her child , we affirm the magistrate’s judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights. Judge LORELLO and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR

.