Filed 2/2/21 Roussos v. Roussos CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

HARRY ROUSSOS et al.,

Plaintiffs and 

Respondents,

v.

THEODOSIOS ROUSSOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B293356

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BS165997)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Gregory W. Alarcon, Judge. Affirmed.

Nossaman, Jennifer L. Meeker and Maya G. Hamouie for 

Defendant and Appellant.

RMO, Scott E. Rahn, Sean D. Muntz and David G. Greco 

for Theocharis Roussos as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant 

and Apellant.

Kesselman Brantly Stockinger, S.V. Stuart Johnson and 

Ryan Davis for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
2

Theodosios (Ted) Roussos appeals from a judgment 

confirming two arbitration awards. In the first award (the 

partition award), the arbitrator granted Harry and Christine 

Roussos’s request for partition by sale of six properties owned by 

two limited partnerships and a corporation, which in turn were 

owned by Ted and Harry1 as cotrustees of two trusts.2 Ted

contends the arbitrator exceeded his powers because the

properties were the assets of the trusts, and the trusts were 

expressly excluded from the arbitration agreement; Christine 

lacked standing to seek partition based on her status as a 

beneficiary of the trusts; Harry and Christine failed to join 

indispensable parties to the partition action; and the arbitrator 

erred in ordering partition because the provisions in the 

applicable partnership agreements prohibited the partners from 

seeking partition.3 However, Ted’s petition to vacate the awards

was untimely and deficient. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Trusts and Roussos Entities

Harry and Ted are brothers and cotrustees of the S.M.B. 

Investor Associates Irrevocable Trust (SMB Trust) and the O.F. 

Management Irrevocable Trust (OF Trust; collectively, the 

1 Because the Roussos family members share the same last 

name, we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.

2 On appeal Ted only challenges the first award, not the later 

award of attorneys’ fees.

3 Amicus curiae Theocharis (Harris) Roussos joins in Ted’s 

substantive arguments.
3

Trusts). Harry’s wife Christine and Ted’s wife Paula Roussos, 

along with their respective children, were beneficiaries of the 

Trusts.4

Harry and Ted had management roles and financial 

interests in multiple interrelated companies. As cotrustees of the 

SMB Trust, Harry and Ted were the sole shareholders of Dazum 

Limited (Dazum), which in turn was the sole shareholder of 

Velnor Overseas Ltd. (Velnor), which was the sole shareholder of 

S.M.B. Management, Inc. (SMB Management). SMB 

Management owned a 1 percent interest as the general partner in 

S.M.B. Associates, L.P. (SMB LP). The other 99 percent was 

owned by Harry and Ted as cotrustees of OF Trust.

As cotrustees of OF Trust, Harry and Ted were the sole 

shareholders of Fenbe, Ltd. (Fenbe), which in turn was the sole

shareholder of Kelroad International, Inc. (Kelroad), which was 

the sole shareholder of Liro, Inc. (Liro). Liro owned a 1 percent

interest as the general partner of O.F. Enterprises Ltd., L.P. (OF 

LP). The other 99 percent of OF LP was owned by Harry and Ted 

as cotrustees of OF Trust.

SMB LP, OF LP, and Liro owned six properties, including

five apartment buildings and a vacant lot in Southern California

(the properties). SMB LP owned an apartment building at 153

San Vicente Boulevard, Santa Monica. OF LP owned three 

apartment buildings: 2727 Abbot Kinney Boulevard, Venice; 39 

Paloma Avenue, Venice; and 580 West E Street, Colton. Liro 

4 By their own terms, the Trusts terminated on March 31, 

2019, with the Trust assets to be divided equally among 

Christine, Harry and Christine’s children, Paula, and Ted and 

Paula’s children.
4

owned a vacant lot at 2721 Abbot Kinney Boulevard, Venice and 

an apartment building at 2209 Ocean Front Walk, Venice.

5

SMB LP and OF LP were governed by similar limited 

partnership agreements. Paragraphs 7.3.2 and 8.7.9.2 of each 

partnership agreement specified the limited partners did not 

have the right to “bring an action for partition against the 

Partnership.”

B. The Arbitration Agreement

As a result of significant disagreements between Ted and 

Harry on management and operation of the family businesses, in

December 2012 Ted, Paula, Harry, and Christine stipulated to 

binding arbitration. Ted and Harry signed the arbitration 

agreement on behalf of themselves, OF LP, and SMB LP. Two 

other individuals signed the agreement on behalf of Liro, SMB 

Management, Velnor, Kelroad, Fenbe, and Dazum. The 

arbitration agreement provides in part, “1. The parties stipulate 

and agree not to contest that Judge John P. Shook will arbitrate 

all issues with binding authority over Harry Roussos, Christine

Roussos, Theodosios Roussos, Paula Roussos, S.M.B. Investor 

5 According to Ted, the 153 San Vicente Boulevard and 2727 

Abbot Kinney Boulevard properties were sold after the 

arbitration. Ted also asserts 2209 Ocean Front Walk, LLC (OFW 

LLC), which was not a party to the arbitration agreement or 

arbitration, owns 2209 Ocean Front Walk and possibly 2721 

Abbot Kinney Boulevard. However, in Liro, Inc. v. 2209 Ocean 

Front Walk (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2011, No. SC108947), the 

trial court on January 7, 2011 entered judgment quieting title to 

the two properties. The court ruled Liro had been the sole owner 

of 2721 Abbot Kinney Boulevard and 2209 Ocean Front Walk 

since 1995, and OFW LLC never owned the two properties.
5

Associates, LP; O.F. Enterprises Ltd[.], L.P[.]; Liro, Inc[.]; S.M.B. 

Management, Inc.; Velnor Overseas Ltd[.]; Kelroad International, 

Inc.; Fenbe Ltd[.]; [and] Dazum Limited. [¶] . . . [¶] 4. Nothing 

in this agreement shall be construed as submitting S.M.B.

Investor Associates Irrevocable Trust or O.F. Management 

Irrevocable Trust to this arbitration; the parties reserve all rights 

as to any arguments regarding the arbitrability of issues or 

claims arising out of or relating to the above-mentioned trusts. 

[¶] 5. The prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all 

litigation costs, including attorney fees, and expert fees. [¶] 6. 

The arbitration costs shall be born[e] jointly by Liro, Inc. and 

S.M.B. Management, Inc. Upon request of a prevailing party, 

Judge Shook has the discretion to order any party to reimburse 

said arbitration costs to Liro, Inc. and/or S.M.B. Management, 

Inc.”

C. The Partition Award

As part of the arbitration, Harry and Christine sought

partition by sale of the six properties; Ted and Paula sought 

partition by appraisal. The arbitrator (Retired Judge Shook) also 

resolved competing claims asserted by the parties, including for 

fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, accounting, 

conversion, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress. Harry and Christine named Ted and Paula as 

respondents in the arbitration, as well as OF LP, SMB LP, SMB 

Management, Liro, Velnor, Kelroad, Fenbe, and Dazum

(collectively the Roussos Entities), and OFW LLC. However, only 

Harry, Christine, Ted, and Paula were present with their counsel 

at the arbitration. No appearances were made by or on behalf of 
6

the Roussos Entities.

6 The arbitrator held he had binding 

authority and unlimited jurisdiction over the parties to the 

arbitration agreement.

On July 29, 2016 the arbitrator issued his statement of 

decision and judgment (partition award). On September 14, 2016 

the arbitrator served the partition award on Harry, Christine, 

Ted, and Paula though their respective counsel by mail and email. The arbitrator found Christine had an equitable interest in 

the Roussos Entities and their properties as a beneficiary of the 

Trusts and on this basis had standing to bring the claim and seek 

partition of the properties. The arbitrator concluded, “Here, 

partition by sale is the appropriate solution. First, the Properties 

cannot be divided in sub-parcels due to their nature as fully 

developed rental properties. Second, partition by sale will 

permanently end Harry Roussos and Ted Roussos[’s] disputes 

related to the Properties. Third, and perhaps most importantly, 

it will allow the parties to seize upon the tremendous once-in-alifetime gains the Properties have realized in the current 

unprecedented real estate market. Additionally, equally dividing 

the Properties in kind between the Limited Partnerships [(SMB 

LP and OF LP)] would not resolve the disputes here. This is 

because Harry Rousso[s] and Ted Rousso[s] cannot effectively 

manage the Properties when they must agree with each other.” 

(Underscoring omitted.) The arbitrator found the limited 

partnership agreements contained waivers of the right to 

partition, but he exercised his equitable powers to strike the 

provisions.

6 The record does not reflect whether the Roussos Entities 

were properly served with notices of the arbitration, but Ted does 

not assert they were not.
7

The arbitrator rejected Ted’s request for partition by 

appraisal, explaining, “[T]his is not legally possible as a forced 

sale, because this Arbitrator does not have jurisdiction over the

trusts,” and he could not force the Trusts to sell their assets. The 

arbitrator ordered OF LP, SMB LP, and Liro to sell the 

properties and to maximize the value for the trust beneficiaries. 

The arbitrator further ordered the parties to bear their own costs 

of suit, arbitration fees, and attorneys’ fees.

D. The Parties’ Competing Petitions in the Trial Court

On October 21, 2016 Harry and Christine filed a “petition 

to confirm arbitration award,” which sought to confirm the 

partition award (case No. BS165997). After a further arbitration 

held on November 16, 2016, on November 19 the arbitrator 

issued a separate attorneys’ fees award (fee award), ordering 

SMB Management and Liro to pay the attorneys’ fees incurred by 

Harry, Christine, Ted, and Paula in the arbitration based on an

indemnification provision in both corporations’ bylaws.7 The 

arbitrator noted that Harry, Christine, Ted, and Paula had no 

objection to entry of the fee award. On December 14, 2016 Harry 

and Christine filed a first amended petition to confirm the 

partition and fee awards.

7 We grant Ted’s September 27, 2019 request for judicial 

notice as to exhibits 1 (petition to vacate arbitration award, with 

attached attorneys’ fees award), 5 (opposition to motion to vacate 

arbitration award), and 6 (declaration in support of petition to 

confirm arbitration award) pursuant to Evidence Code sections 

452, subdivision (d), and 459. We deny Ted’s request as to the 

other exhibits and his February 20, 2020 request for judicial 

notice as not necessary to our decision.
8

Ted did not respond to Harry and Christine’s first amended 

petition. Instead, on February 24, 2017 Ted and Paula’s estate8

filed a “petition to vacate contractual arbitration award” in a 

separate action (case No. BS168231).9 The petition named as 

respondents Harry and Christine, the owners of the six 

properties (SMB LP, OF LP, and Liro), and SMB LP’s general 

partner, SMB Management. The petition attached the 

arbitration agreement and the fee award, but not the partition 

award. The petition acknowledged Ted and his counsel received 

the fee award on November 22, 2016.

On May 22, 2017 Harry and Christine filed a second 

amended petition and a motion to confirm the partition and fee 

awards. The petition and motion named Ted, Sophia, SMB LP, 

SMB Management, OF LP, Liro, Velnor, Kelroad, Fenbe, and 

Dazum as respondents.

On June 21, 2017 Ted and Sophia filed an opposition to the

second amended petition and motion. They contended Ted’s and 

Harry’s “Chapter 7” bankruptcies automatically stayed all 

litigation; Harry and Christine did not obtain relief from the 

automatic stay; and the bankruptcy court sold the San Vicente 

Boulevard property at auction. Ted and Sophia also argued the 

arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over assets that were outside 

the scope of the arbitration agreement; Harry and Christine had 

no standing to seek partition of the properties; Harry waived his 

8 Paula passed away in November 2016. Her daughter 

Sophia Roussos was later appointed the special administrator of 

Paula’s estate.

9 On May 11, 2017 Harry and Christine filed a notice of 

related case stating that case No. BS168231 was related to case 

No. BS165997. The trial court later related the two cases.
9

right to seek partition under the terms of the partnership 

agreements for SMB LP and OF LP; and the properties could not 

be partitioned until the Trusts terminated on March 31, 2019, at 

which time the assets would be equally divided among the 

beneficiaries. On December 28, 2017 Ted filed an opposition to 

the motion to confirm the awards in which he repeated his 

jurisdictional and standing arguments. He also argued Harry 

and Christine failed to authenticate the arbitration agreement

and to join indispensable parties. In their reply brief, Harry and 

Christine objected to Ted’s petition to vacate as untimely because 

it was served more than 105 days after mailing of the fee award

(including five days for mailing), was not served on all parties, 

and failed to state the grounds for the petition. Harry and 

Christine also addressed Ted’s substantive arguments.

Counsel for Ted, Harry, Christine, OF LP, and SMB LP

appeared at the January 11, 2018 hearing on Harry and 

Christine’s motion to confirm the partition and fee awards. The 

parties addressed the timeliness as well as the substantive 

arguments. On January 12 the trial court granted the motion, 

and on November 19, 2018 the court entered judgment 

confirming the two awards. On November 21, 2018 Harry and 

Christine served notice of entry of judgment on Ted, Sophia, SMB 

LP, SMB Management, OF LP, Liro, Dazum, Kelroad, Fenbe, and 

Velnor. Ted timely appealed from the judgment.
10

DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards

Code of Civil Procedure section 128510 provides that “[a]ny 

party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may 

petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award.” An 

arbitration award “is not subject to judicial review except on the 

grounds set forth in sections 1286.2 (to vacate) and 1286.6 (for 

correction).” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 33; 

accord, Soni v. SimpleLayers, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1071,

1086 (Soni).)

11

“A petition to vacate an award or to correct an award shall 

be served and filed not later than 100 days after the date of the 

service of a signed copy of the award on the petitioner.” (§ 1288.) 

“The filing and service deadline for a petition to vacate is 

jurisdictional; noncompliance deprives a court of the power to 

vacate an award unless the party has timely requested vacation 

in response to a petition to confirm.” (Santa Monica College 

Faculty Assn. v. Santa Monica Community College Dist. (2015) 

243 Cal.App.4th 538, 544-545 (Santa Monica College); accord, 

Abers v. Rohrs (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1211 [“The trial 

court’s power to vacate an arbitration award is governed by 

statute, and the deadline for seeking such relief is mandatory.”].) 

10 All further references are to the Code of Civil Procedure 

unless otherwise indicated.

11 Section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), authorizes the court to 

vacate an arbitration award on enumerated grounds including if 

“[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be 

corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the 

controversy submitted.”
11

Further, “‘“[a]n appeal of the judgment confirming the award 

may not be used to circumvent the prescribed time allowed to 

petition for vacation or correction of the award.”’” (Soni, supra, 

42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1093; accord, Louise Gardens of Encino 

Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (2000) 

82 Cal.App.4th 648, 659.)

In reviewing the ruling on a petition under section 1285, 

“[w]e apply the substantial evidence test to the trial court’s

determination of disputed factual issues.” (Soni, supra, 

42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1087; accord, EHM Productions, Inc. v. 

Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1058, 

1063.) But “‘[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and the 

application of that interpretation to a set of undisputed facts are 

questions of law subject to independent review by this court.’” 

(Soni, at p. 1087; accord, Loeb v. Record (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 

431, 441.)

B. Ted’s Petition To Vacate the Arbitration Awards Was 

Untimely and Deficient

Under section 1288, Ted was required to file and serve his 

petition to vacate the arbitration awards by March 6, 2017—100 

days after the date of the service of the November 19, 2016 fee 

award (which concluded the arbitration), plus five days for 

service by mail (§ 1013, subd. (a)).

12 But Ted only served Harry 

12 Because the arbitrator served the arbitration awards by 

mail, section 1013, subdivision (a), extended Ted’s time to file and 

serve the petition to vacate the award by five days to 105 days 

from the date of service. (Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. v. 

Bernard (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 60, 65 [§ 1013, subd. (c), 

extended by two days the 10-day deadline for appellant to seek 
12

and Christine on March 6, 2017. He served SMB Management, 

Liro, SMB LP, and OF LP—all parties to the arbitration and 

named in Ted’s petition—on March 9, 2017.

13 Because Ted did 

not serve his petition on SBM Management, Liro, SBM LP, and 

OF LP until March 9, 2017, his petition was untimely. (Santa 

Monica College, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 545 [trial court 

lacked jurisdiction to vacate arbitration award where petition to 

vacate was served 108 days after service of award]; Eternity 

Investments, Inc. v. Brown (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 739, 745 [“‘If 

[the party who lost in the arbitration does] not serve and file a 

petition to vacate or a response to [a] petition to confirm within 

the 100-day period from the date of service of the award . . . , the 

award must be treated as final.’”])

Further, section 1286.4, subdivision (b), provides the court 

may not vacate an award unless “(1) All petitioners and 

respondents are before the court; or [¶] (2) All petitioners and 

respondents have been given reasonable notice that the court will 

be requested at the hearing to vacate the award . . . .” Ted’s 

petition to vacate the awards failed to name as respondents or 

vacation of the arbitration award in response to the petition to 

confirm the award under § 1290.6]; see Camper v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeals Bd. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 679, 685 [“‘[W]here a 

prescribed time period is triggered by the term “service” of a 

notice, document or request then section 1013 will extend the 

period.’”].)

13 We grant Harry and Christine’s January 31, 2020 request 

for judicial notice of exhibit 3 (proofs of service of Ted’s petition to 

vacate arbitration awards) under Evidence Code sections 452, 

subdivision (d), and 459. We deny Harry and Christine’s request 

for judicial notice of other documents as not necessary to our 

decision.
13

give notice to the other parties to the arbitration—Dazum, Fenbe, 

Kelroad and Velnor, and they were not represented in the trial 

court proceedings.

Likewise, Ted and Sophia’s June 21, 2017 filing of an 

opposition to Harry and Christine’s motion to confirm the 

partition and fee awards was filed and served more than 100 

days after service of the fee award. Thus, Ted’s opposition was 

not a timely response to Harry and Christine’s petition to confirm 

the partition award or first amended petition to confirm the 

partition and fee awards. (Soni, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1093 

[appellant “was barred from asserting that the arbitrator 

exceeded his powers as grounds to prevent confirmation of the 

petition” where his “response to the petition to confirm the award 

was filed more than 100 days after service of the award”];

Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 376, 384-385 

[“‘[a] response to a petition’ to confirm an award ‘may request the 

court to . . . vacate the award’ (§ 1285.2), but a response 

containing such a request is only timely if it is ‘served and filed 

not later than 100 days’ after the responding party was served 

with a signed copy of the award (§ 1288.2)”].)

Moreover, section 1285.8 requires a petition to vacate an 

award “set forth the grounds on which the request for such relief 

is based.” Ted’s petition did not state any grounds to vacate the 

arbitration awards, nor did it include a copy of the July 29, 2016 

partition award, instead attaching only the November 19, 2016 

fee award. Although the petition stated “[t]he facts supporting 

the grounds for vacating the award” were contained in 

attachment 10c(2), the attachment did not specify any grounds

for vacatur. The attachment only argued the 100-day 

requirement was tolled because Paula’s death on November 29, 
14

2016 made it impracticable to proceed with the petition by the 

deadline because the probate court had not yet appointed a 

representative for Paula’s estate. But Paula’s death would not 

have prevented Ted from timely filing and serving a petition to 

vacate the arbitration awards that properly set forth the grounds 

for relief.

14

Ted relies on Shepherd v. Greene (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 

989, 993, for the proposition the 100-day deadline is tolled during 

the period it is “impossible or impracticable” to proceed with a 

petition. Ted reads the holding in Shepherd too broadly. The 

court there held the 100-day deadline for filing a petition to 

correct and confirm an arbitration award (a State Bar arbitration 

award as to disputed attorneys’ fees) was tolled by the filing of a 

civil complaint to recover the fees. (Ibid.) The court concluded it 

would be impractical and futile for the aggrieved party to seek to 

vacate an arbitration award because the arbitration award would 

only become binding if 30 days passed after mailing of the award

14 In attachment 10c(2), Robert Clarkson and Clarkson Riley 

Rubin LLP, who represented Ted and Paula in the arbitration, 

stated Ted had not yet retained the law firm to represent him in 

any challenge to the arbitration awards. Further, Clarkson Riley 

Rubin LLP indicated even if both Ted and Paula’s estate decided 

to retain the law firm, it would not represent either party “even 

with an informed written waiver of this actual conflict interest.” 

But Ted could have retained another law firm or attorney to file 

and serve the petition to vacate the arbitration award or a 

response to Harry and Christine’s petition to confirm within 105 

days of service of the fee award. Or he could have signed a 

conflict waiver to allow his current attorney to continue to 

represent him. But filing a form petition stating no grounds for 

relief and not attaching the partition award at issue was the 

equivalent of not filing a petition at all.
15

and none of the parties sought a trial after arbitration. (Ibid., 

citing Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6203, subd. (b).) Further, only after 

the aggrieved party is denied relief in the civil action would the

arbitration award be subject to correction and confirmation. 

(Shepherd, at p. 993.) The Shepherd court did not address an 

impracticality defense beyond the unique facts of a nonbinding 

State Bar arbitration award.

Ted also relies on DeMello v. Souza (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 

79, 84, in which the Court of Appeal discussed the trial court’s 

equitable powers to relieve a party of the 100-day deadline. The 

DeMello court noted the court had narrow equitable powers, 

including granting relief under section 473 based on mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect where relief is 

requested at most six months from entry of the judgment or 

order, or using the court’s inherent equitable power where a 

party was deprived of his or her ability to participate in the 

arbitration due to extrinsic fraud or mistake. (DeMello, at p. 84.) 

But as the Court of Appeal explained in Abers v. Rohrs in 

declining to follow DeMello, extending section 473 relief “would 

be an effective nullification of the statutory 100-day limitation on 

filing and serving a petition to vacate” (Abers v. Rohrs, supra, 

217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1212). Moreover, Ted did not file a motion 

under section 473 (timely or otherwise) or ask the trial court to 

exercise its equitable power, nor was he deprived of an 

opportunity to participate in the arbitration.

Finally, Ted contends any failure properly to petition to 

vacate the arbitration awards does not affect his right to 

challenge the arbitrator’s power to make the award, citing United 

Firefighters of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (1991)

231 Cal.App.3d 1576, 1581-1582. Ted’s reliance is misplaced. 
16

There, the court determined the 100-day deadline in section

1288.2 did not apply because the appellants were not challenging

the correctness of the award, but rather, the trial court’s 

jurisdiction to compel arbitration in the first place. (United 

Firefighters of Los Angeles, at p. 1581.) Here, Ted consented to 

the arbitrator’s subject matter jurisdiction by signing the 

arbitration agreement and agreeing to binding arbitration. 

(Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 385

[“the subject matter jurisdiction of an arbitrator is purely a 

product of contract [citation], which by definition turns on the 

parties’ mutual consent”].)

We need not reach whether the filing and service of a 

petition to vacate an arbitration award with a minor deviation 

from the filing and service requirements (for example, service of 

the petition three days late) constituted substantial compliance 

with section 1288 because here Ted’s failure timely to serve the 

Roussos entities that owned the properties, the failure to join 

other Roussos entities, and the failure to state the grounds for 

relief or attach the partition award constituted a clear violation of 

sections 1285.8 and 1288 and deprived the trial court of 

jurisdiction.15

15 Although we do not reach the merits of Ted’s appeal, we 

note the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the properties, which 

were owned by SMB LP, OF LP, and Liro, each of which was a 

party to the arbitration agreement. Thus, the arbitrator did not 

exceed his powers by resolving a dispute over the properties. 

(See § 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).) As to the other grounds raised by 

Ted, our review is limited to the grounds set forth in section 

1286.2. “Generally, courts cannot review arbitration awards for 

errors of fact or law, even when those errors appear on the face of 
17

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Harry and Christine Roussos 

are entitled to their costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

the award or cause substantial injustice to the parties.” (Richey 

v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 916; accord, Moncharsh 

v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 11, 33.)