FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-5122

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LASALLE BANK, N.A. as Trustee 

for WAMU Mortgage PassThrough Certificates Series 

2007-HYO5 Trust,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVID L. GRIFFIN; TERRELL K.

JOHNSON; and LINDA JOHNSON;

et al.,

Respondents.

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Petition for Writ of Prohibition—Original Jurisdiction.

April 30, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner LaSalle Bank, N.A., seeks a writ of prohibition to 

prevent the circuit court from considering a motion for damages 

due to betterment that a third party purchaser filed against 

Petitioner after the circuit court entered a final judgment of 

foreclosure in Petitioner’s favor. Agreeing that the circuit court 

lacks jurisdiction to consider the motion, we grant the writ.
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The circuit court entered a final judgment of foreclosure in 

March of 2010. Before the foreclosure sale, the defendant 

property owners, with Petitioner’s approval, entered into a short 

sale agreement with a third party, John Warren, and negotiated 

a sale price of $900,000. However, due to an error, the law firm 

representing Petitioner at the time did not file a motion to cancel

the sale. The property was sold at a foreclosure sale to 

Respondent David Griffin for $75,000.

Three days after a certificate of title was issued to Griffin, 

Petitioner moved to vacate the sale and title. In December of 

2011, the circuit court granted the motion and entered an order 

vacating sale. The circuit court found that Griffin was the 

brother-in-law of John Warren, appeared at the sale at the 

request of John Warren, and purchased the property pursuant to 

the instructions of John Warren and using funds provided by 

John Warren. The court found that the foreclosure bid was 

grossly inadequate, and that while there was no misconduct, 

Griffin knowingly capitalized on Petitioner’s law firm’s failure to 

cancel the sale and his bid could not be characterized as a good 

faith bid. Griffin had objected to the motion to vacate, claiming

that he had spent approximately $160,000 related to the repair of 

the property.

Griffin moved for rehearing of the order vacating sale, 

arguing that the order failed to order the return of his purchase 

funds to him and had not reserved jurisdiction to determine the 

amount of money he was owed for his improvements to the 

property. Thereafter, on June 21, 2012, the circuit court entered 

an amended order vacating sale. The sale remained vacated, but

the amended order provided that Griffin was entitled to a return 

of his foreclosure sale purchase price. The circuit court also

“reserve[d] jurisdiction to consider whether or not Mr. Griffin is 

entitled to damages and or other relief for the value added to the 

Property for the repairs and improvements made by Mr. Griffin 

to the Property. Mr. Griffin shall have twenty (20) days from the 

date of this Amended Order Vacating sale to file an appropriate 

pleading with this Court seeking damages or such other relief as 

the Court deems just.”
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On July 11, 2012, Griffin filed a motion for damages due to 

betterment. He sought the value of the improvements he had 

made to the property, in the amount of $368,000. The motion 

remained pending for over four years, as a subsequent foreclosure 

sale was vacated and the foreclosure sale was rescheduled two 

more times. In October of 2016, the circuit court granted Griffin’s 

motion to refer his motion for damages to mediation. No 

agreement was reached at mediation, and, at a foreclosure sale in 

May of 2017, the property was sold to U.S. Bank in its capacity as 

Successor Trustee. In August of 2017, Griffin noticed his motion 

for damages for hearing, and the circuit court again referred the 

matter to mediation.

At that point, Petitioner moved to strike the order referring 

the case to mediation, arguing the circuit court was without 

jurisdiction to order it to mediate the motion for damages more 

than seven years after the foreclosure judgment had become

final. The circuit court denied this motion, finding it had 

jurisdiction to order the parties to mediation.

We agree with Petitioner that the circuit court did not have 

jurisdiction to entertain Griffin’s third-party motion for damages 

after it rendered the final judgment of foreclosure in 2010. “‘The 

rule is firmly established in this State that the trial Court loses 

jurisdiction of a cause after a judgment or final decree has been 

entered and the time for filing petition for rehearing or motion for 

new trial has expired or same has been denied.’” Travelers Cas. 

& Surety Co. of Am. v. Culbreath Isles Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 

103 So. 3d 896, 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (quoting Liberty Ins. 

Corp. v. Milne, 98 So. 3d 613, 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). In 

Travelers, a homeowners’ association filed a complaint against 

property owners alleging violation of deed restrictions, and the 

circuit court entered final summary judgment in favor of the 

property owners. The parties later settled all claims, including 

attorney’s fees. After the settlement, the association served a 

motion to file a supplemental complaint to pursue a third-party 

indemnification claim against Travelers. The Second District 

found, relying on the rule quoted above, that a “circuit court 

therefore exceeds its jurisdiction by allowing the filing of a thirdparty complaint after the case has proceeded to this point of 

finality.” Id. The Second District rejected the association’s 
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argument that the circuit court had jurisdiction to proceed under 

its inherent continuing jurisdiction to enforce the final judgment, 

finding the third-party complaint was not an enforcement action, 

but sought relief from a third party that was not joined in the 

proceedings below, based on its obligations under an insurance 

contract that was not at issue in the proceedings. Id. See also 

Central Mortg. Co. v. Callahan, 155 So. 3d 373, 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2014) (“[A] court ‘does not have the power to impose upon a party 

a new duty not previously adjudicated.’ Superior Uniforms, Inc. v. 

Brown, 221 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).”).

Here, the circuit court reserved jurisdiction to consider a 

claim that was not related to its ability to enforce the final 

judgment of foreclosure. Instead, Griffin’s motion for damages 

raised a new claim that was not part of the previous foreclosure 

litigation. Accordingly, the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction 

by proceeding on the motion.

Finally, even though Petitioner participated in one 

mediation on the pending motion for damages and waited five 

years to raise this jurisdictional argument, Petitioner has not 

waived the jurisdictional defect. See 14302 Marina San Pablo 

Place SPE, LLC v. VCP-San Pablo, Ltd., 92 So. 3d 320, 321 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2012) (Ray, J., concurring) (explaining “case 

jurisdiction” and citing cases establishing that under precedent 

from this Court, lack of case jurisdiction cannot be waived).

Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition and 

quash the order denying Petitioner’s motion to strike the order 

referring the case to mediation. The circuit court does not have 

jurisdiction to consider Griffin’s motion for damages.

ROBERTS, KELSEY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Allison Morat of Pearson Bitman LLP, Maitland, for Petitioner.

Michael S. Burke and Eric A. Krebs of Burke Blue Hutchison 

Walters & Smith, P.A., Panama City, for Respondent David L. 

Griffin.