[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 20-12512

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00282-SPC-MRM

JOSEPH DENNIS GILBERTI, JR., 

P.E., an individual and licensed professional engineer, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, 

THE MOSAIC COMPANY, 

MOSAIC FERTILIZER, LLC, 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 

SARASOTA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 

DESOTO COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY STATE ATTORNEYS OFFICE, 

SARASOTA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 

PEACE RIVER MANASOTA WATER SUPPLY AUTHORITY, 

SOUTHWEST FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 

72 PARTNERS, LLC, 

LUIS E. RIVERA, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

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________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(November 19, 2020)

Before MARTIN, JORDAN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Joseph D. Gilberti, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The appellees 

jointly move this Court for summary affirmance of the district court’s order, 

arguing the court did not err in dismissing Gilberti’s complaint. Appellees also 

argue that the district court did not err in denying Gilberti’s subsequent motion to 

vacate the district court’s order and judgment. We grant their motion for summary 

affirmance of the district court’s order.

I.

 Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of one of the 

parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial 

question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the 

appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th 

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Cir. 1969).1 We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 

See Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). We may affirm the 

district court’s judgment on any ground that appears in the record, whether or not 

that ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below. Thomas v. 

Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

II.

This Court has recognized that “jurisdiction is not defeated by the possibility 

that the averments [in a complaint] might fail to state a cause of action on which 

[the plaintiff] could actually recover,” because it is “well settled that the failure to 

state a proper cause of action on which relief can be granted is a question of law” 

that must be decided after—and not before—the court has assumed jurisdiction 

over the controversy. Barnett v. Bailey, 956 F.2d 1036, 1040–41 (11th Cir. 1992) 

(alterations adopted) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S. Ct. 773, 776 

(1946)). However, there are two exceptions to that rule: where (1) “the alleged 

claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial 

and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction,” or (2) “a claim is 

1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as 

binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981. 

Id. at 1209.

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wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” the suit may be dismissed for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. Bell, 327 U.S. at 682–83, 66 S. Ct. at 776.

Gilberti’s claim falls within the latter exception. Gilberti brought claims 

against the appellees for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. He alleged that the 

appellees purposely “hid[] Critical US underground Alkaline spring water rivers . . 

. to increase Cancer rates, home foreclosures, land foreclosures, selective funding 

to developers, infrastructure projects with unsafe designs, Medicaid fraud billings, 

higher utility bills and medicine sales through a pattern of racketeering activity.” 

The theory of Gilberti’s case seems to be that the appellees were killing children 

and hiding “endless cancer preventing cleaner drinking water resources” for their 

own profit, to the detriment of the public, who, he alleges, were being forced to 

drink polluted, cancer-causing water. Gilberti sought, among other things, to have 

the district court report the appellees to the President of the United States and 

contact the Federal Reserve to “send $10,000,000,000” to build a pipeline “so 

millions of Americans and Floridians have [access to] this unique Alkaline spring 

water.” These allegations are “patently without merit.” Bell, 327 U.S. at 683, 66 

S. Ct. at 776; see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537–38, 94 S. Ct. 1372, 1378–

79 (1974) (claims that are “essentially fictitious” and “wholly insubstantial” are 

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due to be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (quotation marks 

omitted)).

Indeed, the allegations in this case are similar—if not identical—to those in 

a case this Court has already decided were wholly insubstantial. See Gilberti v. 

Adrurra Grp., Inc., 810 F. App’x 806, 809 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) 

(unpublished). In Adrurra Group, a panel of this Court recognized that Gilberti 

“failed to establish that the appellees, all of whom are Florida entities, conspired 

together to keep the aquifer’s existence a secret, such that a RICO claim may have 

been sufficiently alleged.” Id. That panel pointed to Gilberti’s allegations that the 

Adrurra Group defendants increased cancer rates, raised water bills, and 

encouraged the opioid epidemic, and held that Gilberti “offered no evidence or 

factual support for his incredulous accusations that the appellees worked together” 

to accomplish those goals. Id. Gilberti’s complaint in the instant case fares no 

better.

Gilberti’s argument to the contrary is not persuasive. He claims the district 

court had subject matter jurisdiction because the question of jurisdiction and the 

merits of his case are intertwined as described in Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 

F.3d 920 (11th Cir. 2003). See id. at 925 (“We have cautioned, however, that the 

district court should only rely on Rule 12(b)(1) if the facts necessary to sustain 

jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of plaintiff’s cause of action.” (quotation 

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marks omitted) (alteration adopted)). Jurisdiction becomes intertwined with the 

merits of a cause of action “when a statute provides the basis for both the subject 

matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff’s substantive claim for 

relief.” Id. at 926 (quotation marks omitted). As this Court recognized in Adrurra 

Group, the RICO statute does not provide the district court with a basis for subject 

matter jurisdiction—it provides only a basis for Gilberti’s claim for relief. Adrurra 

Grp., Inc., 810 F. App’x at 809; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(a).2

Gilberti also argues the district court should have allowed the parties to 

conduct discovery, which would have allowed the court to conclude his complaint 

stated a claim. But a district court has broad discretion over discovery. And where 

the facts alleged by Gilberti called the jurisdiction of the court into question, the 

court did not err by first determining whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. 

See Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 859 F.3d 1337, 1340

(11th Cir. 2017). Moreover, it was Gilberti’s burden to plead facts in his complaint 

sufficient to establish that the district court had jurisdiction. St. Paul Mercury 

Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 287 n.10, 58 S. Ct. 586, 589 n.10 

(1938). Gilberti failed to do so. 

2 Section 1964(a) says that a district court “shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain 

violations of section 1962,” but this is related to “whether a legislatively conferred cause of 

action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim,” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 

Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014), not whether a court has 

subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.

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For these reasons, the district court correctly determined that Gilberti’s 

complaint warranted dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) because his claims were 

“wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Bell, 327 U.S. at 682–83, 66 S. Ct. at 776. 

Therefore, because there is no substantial question that the district court correctly 

dismissed Gilberti’s complaint, we GRANT the appellees’ motion for summary 

affirmance.3

 See Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162. 

3 We need not address whether the district court properly denied Gilberti’s motion for 

reconsideration because he failed to plainly and prominently raise it in his opening brief. See

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A party fails to 

adequately brief a claim when he does not plainly and prominently raise it.” (quotation marks 

omitted)).

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