## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas a t F ort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 22

- 00287

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 231st District Court Tarrant C ounty, Texas Trial Court No. 231

- 604940

- 16 Before Wallach, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Walker, J. Per Curiam Memorandum O pinion 

### I N THE 

### I NTEREST OF 

### S.B., A 

### C HILD2 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant J.B. , proceeding pro se, attem p ts to appeal from an “Order Denying Motion to Disqualify or Recuse T rial Court ” signed by the presiding judge of the Eighth Administrative Judicial Region. See generally Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a . We notified J.B. of our concern that we lack jurisdiction over t h is appeal because th e presiding judge ’s order did not appear to be a final judgment or appealable interlo cutory order. We c autioned him that unless he or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal, we would dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42. 3(a) , 44.3. J.B. filed a response asserting that the presiding judge ’ s order was a final judgment . H e bases this assertion on Texas Civil P rocedure Rule 18a ’ s language, which states tha t an order granting a motion to recuse “ is final and cannot be reviewe d by appeal, mandamus, or othe rwise.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a (j)(1)( B). J.B. argues that if a n order granting a recusal m otion is “ a Final Judgment ,” an order denying a recusal motion “ is al so a Final Judgment .” Rule 18a do es not support his asser tion
. Rule 18a(j) provides that an order denying a motion to recuse “ may be reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judgment. ” Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a (j) (1)(A) . An or der denying a re cusal motion is not a final ju dgment or an appealable interlocutory order
. Thayer v. Thayer , Nos. 02

- 14

- 00025

- CV, 02

- 14

- 00026

- CV, 2014 WL 982433, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Mar. 13, 2014, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) ; see also Lehmann v. Har

- Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 200 1)3 (stating that generally, a judgment is final when it either (1) actually disposes of every pending claim and party or (2) clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parti es ). An order de nyin g a motion to disqualify , on the other ha nd , “ may be reviewed by ma ndamus and may be appealed in accordance with other law. ” Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a (j) (2). H owever , there is no “other law” permitting th is interlocutory appeal of the order denying J.B. ’ s di squa lification motion. See In re D.B. , No. 02

- 21 -0 0248

- CV, 2021 WL 5028437 , at *1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Gore v. Gore , No. 05

- 13 -0 1025

- CV, 2014 WL 1018650, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Mar. 17, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ); s ee also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem . Code Ann. § 51. 01 4 ( providing for interlocutory appeal of certain orders, which do not include orders on motion s to disqualify ). This court has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments an d from interlocuto ry orders that the Texas Legislature has specifie d are immediately appeal able. Lehmann , 39 S.W.3d at 195
. The presiding judge ’ s o rder is not a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for
want o f jurisdiction. Se e T ex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

Per Curiam D elivered: September 29, 2022