SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5011-16T3

R.D.A.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HUNTERDON CENTRAL REGIONAL

HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD

OF EDUCATION and SUPERINTENDENT

CHRISTINA STEFFNER,

Defendants-Respondents.

________________________________

Submitted May 30, 2018 – Decided June 29, 2018

Before Judges Hoffman and Gilson.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Hunterdon County, Docket No. 

L-0128-17.

Brickfield & Donahue, attorneys for appellant 

(Joseph R. Donahue, on the brief).

Comegno Law Group, PC, attorneys for 

respondents (Alicia D. Hoffmeyer, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, R.D.A., appeals from a June 27, 2017 order 

dismissing with prejudice his complaint in lieu of prerogative 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-5011-16T3

writs, which sought to vacate a decision by defendant Hunterdon 

Central Regional High School District Board of Education (Board) 

to refer tenure charges against him to the Commission of Education,

and to have those tenure charges dismissed. His complaint alleged 

that the Board held two meetings in violation of the Open Public 

Meetings Act (OPMA), N.J.S.A. 10:4-1 to -21, and failed to give 

him notice of those meetings in accordance with Rice v. Union 

County Regional High School Board of Education, 155 N.J. Super. 

64 (App. Div. 1977). We affirm because the action in lieu of 

prerogative writs was time-barred and otherwise lacks merit.

I.

Plaintiff was a tenured teacher at Hunterdon Central Regional 

High School. He began teaching at the high school in 2004, and 

was tenured in 2007. During the 2015-2016 school year, plaintiff 

taught Advanced Placement Chemistry (AP Chemistry) and College 

Prep Chemistry (CP Chemistry).

On May 6, 2016, a parent of a student taking plaintiff's AP 

Chemistry class sent an email to plaintiff's supervisor. The 

student had informed the parent that plaintiff told the class that 

he did not plan to teach for the remainder of the year because the 

class already took the AP exam. The student also informed the 

parent that plaintiff told the class that he was going to have 
3 A-5011-16T3

them watch videos and do study halls. The parent wrote to question 

that plan.

Plaintiff's supervisor forwarded the email to plaintiff 

stating:

Do you have a response to this? I'm assuming 

that you are trying to make a point. If not, 

understand that you are under contract (even 

if the new one hasn't been negotiated yet) 

until June 30th.

In response, plaintiff sent his supervisor four emails, three

of which included the expletive "f***," and two of which stated 

that he was very "angry." In his fourth email, plaintiff responded 

in more detail. Plaintiff explained his lesson plan for the 

remainder of the year, which he described as "a sort of mini-course 

of video lectures by college professors that would show the kids 

real-world & scientific research applications of the things we

learned in class." He also stated that he had some trouble with 

two students, whom he named. Thereafter, he discussed the final

grade of one of the students, and stated that he had raised her 

grade but now intended to lower her grade back down to the original 

one. He then expressed his disappointment on how his supervisor 

handled this situation and stated: "Frankly, f*** you." Plaintiff

also sent the fourth email to his wife, two school counselors, and 

the parent.
4 A-5011-16T3

The high school principal, district superintendent, and 

president of the Board were advised of the email exchange. 

Plaintiff was suspended with pay and an investigation of his 

actions was commenced.

At a May 16, 2016 meeting, the entire nine-member Board 

discussed plaintiff's suspension. Before that meeting, plaintiff 

was sent a Rice notice1 informing him that his employment would be 

discussed at the Board meeting. Plaintiff requested that the 

discussion take place in an open session. Accordingly, students 

and parents attended the May 16, 2016 Board meeting, some of whom 

spoke on plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff also spoke at the meeting.

On May 25, 2016, the Board's secretary sent all of the Board 

members an email inviting them to one of two meetings to be held 

on June 6, 2016. Specifically, that email stated:

The Department Supervisors have asked to meet 

with the Board of Education to address 

erroneous statements made during our last 

Board meeting. They are scheduled to meet 

with the Curriculum Committee on Monday, June 

6, at 6:00 p.m. and would like to meet with 

the remainder of the board at 7:00 p.m. on 

that same evening to avoid a quorum at the 

 

1 As discussed in more detail later, in Rice we noted that N.J.S.A. 

10:4-12(b)(8) authorized public bodies to discuss personnel 

matters in executive sessions "unless all the individual employees 

or appointees whose rights could be adversely affected request in 

writing that the matter or matters be discussed at a public 

meeting[.]" 155 N.J. Super. at 70. To give meaning to the right 

to have a public meeting, we held that the affected employees must 

be given advance notice. Id. at 74.
5 A-5011-16T3

Curriculum meeting. As you know, a quorum of 

the Board may not convene outside an 

advertised meeting.

Please respond to this email to let me know 

your preference of 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. on 

Monday, June 6. We have up to two open spots 

at 6:00.

Two meetings were then held on June 6, 2016. Neither the 

public nor plaintiff was given prior notice of those meetings. 

The Curriculum Committee met at 6 p.m., with four Board members 

attending. The second meeting, attended by three different Board 

members, was held at 7 p.m. Also in attendance at the meetings 

were district officials and school supervisors. At both meetings, 

plaintiff was discussed. There was not a quorum of the Board at 

either meeting, because a quorum would have involved five Board 

members.

On June 15, 2016, plaintiff was served with tenure charges 

and informed that his employment would be discussed at a non-public 

meeting of the Board. Plaintiff submitted a written response to 

the tenure charges on June 24, 2016. Thereafter, on June 30, 

2016, the Board met in executive session. At that meeting, the 

Board voted to certify the tenure charges against plaintiff to the 

Commissioner of Education (Commissioner).

The Commissioner in turn referred the charges to an 

arbitrator. Between September 2016 and March 2017, the arbitrator 
6 A-5011-16T3

heard thirteen days of testimony from twenty-eight witnesses, 

including plaintiff.

On March 30, 2017, after all of the evidence had been 

submitted to the arbitrator, but before the arbitrator had issued 

her ruling, plaintiff filed his complaint in lieu of prerogative 

writs. He alleged that the Board violated his due process rights, 

OPMA, and his right to notice under Rice. Plaintiff sought to 

enjoin the Board from continuing the tenure arbitration. He also 

sought to declare the Board's action on June 30, 2016 void and to 

enjoin the Board from filing new tenure charges against him. The 

Board responded by moving to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for 

failure to state a claim.

On June 7, 2017, the arbitrator issued her opinion and award. 

In a forty-eight-page written opinion, the arbitrator ruled that 

plaintiff had engaged in conduct unbecoming a public employee by 

threatening retaliation against a student, directing profanity at 

his supervisor, and violating the confidentiality and privacy of 

students. The arbitrator then ruled that the Board had just cause 

to terminate plaintiff's employment.

On June 12, 2017, the trial court heard oral argument on the 

Board's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Shortly 

thereafter, on June 27, 2017, the court entered an order granting 

the motion. In an oral decision rendered on June 27, 2017, the 
7 A-5011-16T3

court explained its reasons. The trial court ruled that the tenure 

charges were properly pursued in compliance with the Tenure 

Employees Hearing Law (Tenure Act), N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1. 

The court also ruled that OPMA did not apply to the meetings held 

on June 6, 2016,

2 and the Board was not required to send plaintiff 

a Rice notice of those meetings.

Plaintiff appeals from the June 27, 2017 order dismissing his 

complaint with prejudice.

II.

We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint for failure 

to state a claim. State ex rel. Campagna v. Post Integrations, 

Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 276, 279 (App. Div. 2017). "When reviewing 

a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e), we assume that the 

allegations in the pleadings are true and afford the pleader all 

reasonable inferences." Sparroween, LLC v. Twp. of W. Caldwell, 

452 N.J. Super. 329, 339 (App. Div. 2017) (citation omitted). 

"Where, however, it is clear that the complaint states no basis 

for relief and that discovery would not provide one, dismissal of 

the complaint is appropriate." Ibid. (quoting J.D. ex rel. 

Scipio-Derrick v. Davy, 415 N.J. Super. 375, 397 (App. Div. 2010)).

 

2 The trial court referenced two meetings –– the first on June 6, 

2016, and a second on June 9, 2016. Plaintiff correctly points 

out that both meetings were held on June 6, 2016.
8 A-5011-16T3

We affirm the order dismissing plaintiff's action in lieu of 

prerogative writs on two grounds. First, the action is 

time-barred. Second, there was no violation of the OPMA or the 

requirements of Rice.

A. The Statute of Limitations

The trial court did not base its ruling on the time 

limitation. Nevertheless, defendants raised that as a basis for 

dismissal in the trial court. We rely on the statute of 

limitations as an alternative grounds for affirming the order of 

dismissal. See State v. Williams, 444 N.J. Super. 603, 617 (App. 

Div. 2016) ("It is well-established that a reviewing court can 

affirm a decision on different grounds than those authorities 

offered by the court being reviewed.").

Actions taken at a meeting in violation of OPMA are to be 

challenged within forty-five days in an action in lieu of 

prerogative writs. N.J.S.A. 10:4-15(a); R. 4:69-6; see also Mason 

v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 68-69 (2008) (applying the 

forty-five-day limitation for actions brought under OPMA, to 

actions brought under OPRA). While Rule 4:69-6(c) provides that 

a "court may enlarge the period of time . . . where it is manifest 

that the interest of justice so requires[,]" no such interest 

applies here. 
9 A-5011-16T3

Plaintiff complains about two meetings that took place on 

June 6, 2016. His action in lieu of prerogative writs was filed 

on March 30, 2017. Plaintiff contends that his delay was due to 

the Board's efforts to conceal the existence of the meetings on 

June 6, 2016. The record does not support that contention. On

December 5, 2016, in response to a request for documents under the 

Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, plaintiff 

was given documents showing that there were meetings on June 6, 

2016. Plaintiff, thereafter, continued to fully participate in 

the arbitration concerning his tenure charges. Indeed, plaintiff 

raised the June 16, 2016 meetings in the arbitration and his 

counsel questioned several witnesses about those meetings. 

Plaintiff, however, waited to file his action in lieu of 

prerogative writs until after all of the evidence was submitted 

to the arbitrator –– more than nine months after the June 6, 2016 

meetings and more than 100 days after plaintiff was given documents

concerning the June 6, 2016 meetings. No manifest interest of 

justice supports an enlargement of the forty-five-day limitation 

period under these circumstances. To the contrary, the record 

here demonstrates that plaintiff was seeking to pursue both the 

arbitration and an action in lieu of prerogative writs at the same 

time. 
10 A-5011-16T3

B. OPMA and Rice

Although we hold the action time-barred, we nevertheless 

address the appeal on the merits, because that was the basis on 

which the trial court dismissed the action. Substantively, 

plaintiff makes two primary arguments on this appeal. First, he 

contends that the Board was required to give public notice of the 

meetings on June 6, 2016, and the Board's failure to do so was a 

violation of OPMA. Second, he argues that he was entitled to a 

Rice notice of the meetings on June 6, 2016, because his employment 

was discussed at those meetings. We disagree.

To place these arguments in context, we briefly summarize the 

relevant portions of OPMA, Rice notice, and the Tenure Act. We 

also point out that plaintiff has not appealed from the 

arbitrator's decision and, thus, that final, binding ruling is not 

before us. See N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1(e).

OPMA addresses the right of the public "to have adequate 

advance notice of and the right to attend all meetings of public 

bodies at which any business affecting the public is discussed or 

acted upon in any way," with certain exceptions. Times of Trenton

Publ'g Corp. v. Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp., 183 N.J. 519, 529 

(2005) (quoting N.J.S.A. 10:4-7). To protect that right, OPMA

establishes requirements for public bodies regarding adequate 

notice to the public of scheduled meetings and items to be 
11 A-5011-16T3

discussed and acted upon. N.J.S.A. 10:4-9 to -10, -18 to -19. 

OPMA also requires that meetings be open to the public, unless 

they fall within exceptions under N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b). In 

addition, the minutes of the meetings must be available to the 

public. N.J.S.A. 10:4-14.

The failure to invite a portion of the members of a public 

body to a meeting "for the purpose of circumventing" OPMA's 

provisions is prohibited. N.J.S.A. 10:4-11. Any action taken by 

a public body at a meeting that does not conform to OPMA's 

requirements is voidable in a proceeding in lieu of prerogative 

writs. N.J.S.A. 10:4-15; see Allen-Dean Corp. v. Twp. of 

Bedminster, 153 N.J. Super. 114, 120 (App. Div. 1977) (nullifying 

any action taken at a nonconforming meeting under OPMA). OPMA 

also provides for injunctive relief and establishes a penalty for 

knowing violations. N.J.S.A. 10:4-16 to -17.

The scope of OPMA is defined by the terms "public body," 

"meeting," and "public business." Here, there is no dispute that 

the Board is a public body. See N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(a).

Under OPMA, a "meeting" means

any gathering . . . which is attended by, or 

open to, all of the members of a public body, 

held with the intent, on the part of the 

members of the body present, to discuss or act 

as a unit upon the specific public business 

of that body. Meeting does not mean or include 

any such gathering (1) attended by less than 
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an effective majority of the members of a 

public body, or (2) attended by or open to all 

the members of three or more similar public 

bodies at a convention or similar gathering.

[N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(b).]

Public business is defined as "all matters which relate in any 

way, directly or indirectly, to the performance of the public 

body's functions or the conduct of its business." N.J.S.A. 

10:4-8(c).

In Rice, we construed section 12(b) of OPMA. N.J.S.A. 

10:4-12(b). That provision, in relevant part, states that a public 

body may exclude the public from a portion of a meeting at which 

the public body discusses any

matter involving the employment, appointment, 

termination of employment, terms and 

conditions of employment, evaluation of the 

performance of, promotion, or disciplining of 

any specific prospective public officer or 

employee or current public officer or employee 

employed or appointed by the public body, 

unless all the individual employees or 

appointees whose rights could be adversely 

affected request in writing that the matter 

or matters be discussed at a public meeting[.]

[N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8).]

To give meaning to the provision that affords affected public 

employees the right to a public discussion, we held that the 

employees were entitled to reasonable advance notice of the 

meeting. Rice, 155 N.J. Super. at 74.
13 A-5011-16T3

The Tenure Act establishes the grounds and procedures for 

dismissing or reducing the compensation of tenured employees. 

N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10. In terms of procedure, the Tenure Act requires:

(1) the charge be filed with the secretary of the board in writing;

(2) a written statement of evidence under oath submitted in support 

of the charge; (3) an opportunity for the employee to respond in 

writing; (4) a determination by a majority of the board that there 

is probable cause to credit the evidence in support of the charge;

(5) notification to the employee of the board's determination; and

(6) if credited, the charge to be forwarded to the Commissioner. 

N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11. The Tenure Act expressly states that a board's 

consideration and action "as to any charge shall not take place 

at a public meeting." Ibid.

If the Commissioner determines that "the charge is sufficient 

to warrant dismissal or reduction in salary . . . he [or she]

shall refer the case to an arbitrator . . . ." N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16. 

The Tenure Act then prescribes certain procedures for the 

arbitration. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1. In addition, the Tenure Act

provides: "The arbitrator's determination shall be final and 

binding and may not be appealable to the [C]ommissioner or the 

State Board of Education. The determination shall be subject to 

judicial review and enforcement as provided pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 

2A:24-7 to -10]." N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1(e).
14 A-5011-16T3

Here, plaintiff was charged with unbecoming conduct, a 

recognized grounds for dismissal under the Tenure Act. N.J.S.A. 

18A:6-10. The Board conducted an investigation and prepared 

charges supported by a written statement of evidence, certified 

to by the superintendent. Plaintiff was given a copy of the 

statement of tenure charges on June 15, 2016. He responded in 

writing on June 24, 2016. The full Board considered the tenure 

charges in a non-public meeting held on June 30, 2016. The 

majority of the Board found probable cause to credit the evidence 

supporting the charges. The Board then gave notice to plaintiff 

and certified the charges to the Commissioner. All of those 

actions and procedures were in compliance with the Tenure Act.

The meetings on June 6, 2016, did not taint the tenure charges 

against plaintiff. No action was taken by the Board at those 

meetings. While we assume that plaintiff's employment was 

discussed, no vote was taken on the tenure charges. Indeed, no 

quorum of Board members was present at either meeting. See

Gandolfi v. Town of Hammonton, 367 N.J. Super. 527, 539-40 (App. 

Div. 2004) (holding that a planning board's closed meeting did not 

violate OPMA where there was not a quorum and no action was taken). 

In addition, since there was no quorum, there was no requirement 

for a Rice notice. See N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(b) (defining meeting, in 
15 A-5011-16T3

part, as requiring "an effective majority of the members of a 

public body").

Just as importantly, following the June 6, 2016 meetings, on 

June 30, 2016, the entire Board met, considered, and voted on the 

tenure charges against plaintiff. Plaintiff was given notice of 

the June 30, 2016 Board meeting. The meeting on June 30, 2016 

complied with the Tenure Act and did not violate OPMA or Rice. 

Consequently, there is no basis to void the action taken by the 

Board on June 30, 2016. There is also no basis to enjoin or void 

the arbitration on the tenure charges.

Affirmed.