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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 11-0275 (BAH)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is the motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #47] filed by the 

sole remaining defendant in this case, Metropolitan Police Department Officer Jarlith Cady.1

 

For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted.2

I. BACKGROUND

The events giving rise to the plaintiff’s complaint began on February 19, 2006, when 

Officer Jarlith Cady (“Cady”) of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) responded to a 

911 call to plaintiff’s residence at 4452 B Street S.E., Apartment #102, in Washington, D.C.

 1 The Court granted the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of the District of Columbia and 

the Metropolitan Police Department, and dismissed Detective Kevin Tighe as a party to this 

action. See Jones v. District of Columbia, No. 11-0275, 2011 WL 2222354 (D.D.C. June 3, 

2011). Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of the United States 

Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and Janine Scott, and the Court granted their 

motion as conceded on September 1, 2011. ECF Nos. 44-45. Officer Cady is the sole remaining 

defendant.

2 In light of the Court’s ruling on Cady’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s “Motion for 

Application of Appointment of Counsel” and “Motion to Subpoena Transcrip[t]s Records,” ECF 

Nos. 49-50, will be denied as moot.

PRINCE EDWARD JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

Defendants.
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A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

The plaintiff allegedly called “911 . . . about a female person attempting to burglarize his 

apartment.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 3. While he remained 

“on the phone with [the] 911 dispatcher,” the plaintiff was told that police had arrived on the 

scene “but couldn’t enter the building [because] the front door was locked.” Id. The plaintiff 

met Cady at the door of the apartment building, id., only to find that Cady brought with him “the 

female who had attempted to break into his residence. Compl. ¶ 9. The plaintiff identified the 

burglary suspect as Patrice Taylor. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. “Instead of investigating [Patrice Taylor] 

for the Burglary-in-process call, . . . Cady allowed [her] to manipulate him to break into the 

Plaintiff[’]s residence” on her behalf and to search the premises. Id. ¶ 10. Cady “seize[d] 

Plaintiff’s house keys by force, open[ed] plaintiff[’]s front door . . . and . . . search[ed his 

apartment] without probable cause or warrant.” Id. ¶ 11. 

The plaintiff further alleges that the next day, February 20, 2006, Detective Kevin Tighe 

(“Tighe”) obtained a search warrant based on “false and fraudulent information that lacked 

probable cause” as it was based on unreliable “second hand information.” Id. ¶ 12. Cady and 

Tighe conducted a second search of the plaintiff’s apartment on that same date. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. 

According to the plaintiff, Tighe exceeded the scope of the warrant and seized items that were 

not listed in the warrant. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. As a result, the “[p]laintiff was arrested . . . and falsely 

charged” with a crime. Id. ¶ 16. On February 22, 2006, the Superior Court of the District of 

Columbia “found that there was no probable cause and dismissed all charges” against plaintiff. 

Id. ¶ 17. 
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“On or about March 16, 2006[,] The State of Maryland[,] Prince George[’]s County[,] . . 

. issued an arrest warrant for the plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 18. According to the plaintiff, Cady and Tighe 

turned over property seized from the plaintiff’s apartment to “the State of Maryland Prince 

Georges [sic] County States Attorneys [sic] Office [which] wrongfully used the illegally 

obtained property” as evidence against him. Id. “Since March 16, 2006, [p]laintiff has been 

incarcerated in the State of Maryland.” Id. ¶ 6. 

B. Defendant’s Representations

Cady’s version of events is set forth in the police report he filed on February 20, 2006:

WHILE ON ROUTINE PATROL IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT . . . 

OFFICERS CADY AND . . . CIPOLARI DURING THE 

MIDNIGHT TOUR ON 2/19/06 . . . IN FULL UNIFORM . . . 

THE SIXTH DISTRICT DISPATCHER ADVISED THAT 

THERE WAS A BURGULARY [sic] IN PROGRESS AT 4452 B 

ST[.] SE.

ONCE ON THE SCENE OFFICER CADY [and three other 

officers] WERE MET BY D-1 [plaintiff] AND C-1 [complaining 

witness Patrice Taylor] AT THE FRONT DOOR OF 4452 B ST[.] 

SE. [Patrice] STATED THAT HER SISTER, D-2 [Porsha Taylor] 

WAS INSIDE THE APARTMENT AND SHE COULD HEAR 

HER SISTER BEING CHOKED FROM OUTSIDE THE

APARTMENT[’]S BEDROOM WINDOW. [Patrice] ALSO 

STATED THAT SHE HAD SPOKE [sic] TO HER SISTER ON 

[plaintiff’s] PHONE EARLIER AND THAT SHE HAD ASKED 

HER TO COME OVER TO HER APARTMENT (4452 B ST SE 

#102).

[Plaintiff] WAS ASKED BY THE OFFICERS IN FRONT OF 

THE APARTMENT IF THEY COULD ENTER THE 

APARTMENT TO CONTINUE THE INTERVIEW AND TO 

CHECK ON THE WELFARE OF [Porsha]. [Plaintiff] STATED 

THAT “YOU CAN[’]T COME IN” (REFER[R]ING TO THE 

OFFICERS), [and plaintiff] MADE SEVERAL STATEMENTS 

THAT THE APARTMENT WAS HIS AND THAT THE 

OFFICERS HAD NO RIGHT TO ENTER THE APARTMENT. 

. . . CADY [and two other officers] ENTERED THE 

APARTMENT AND BEGAN TO SEARCH FOR [Porsha]. THE 
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MAIN LIVING AREA AND BEDROOM HAD NO LIGHTS ON, 

MAKING IT VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE. WHILE 

SEARCHING FOR [Porsha] IN THE BEDROOM . . . CADY 

BELIEVING HE HAD FOUND [HER] HIDING UNDERNEATH 

THE BLANKET ON WHAT . . . CADY BELIEVED TO BE A 

REGULAR MATTRESS ON THE FLOOR . . . CADY PUSHED 

THE MATTRESS WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE A SEMIINFLATED AIR MATTRESS WITH HIS FOOT. THE 

BLANKET AND MAT[T]RESS WERE LIGHTER THAN

EXPECTED AND MOVED SEVERAL FEET AWAY FROM A 

WALL.

. . . CADY FOUND A LOADED REVOLVER . . . ON THE 

FLOOR AND ANNOUNCED HIS FINDING TO THE OTHER 

OFFICERS. WHILE SEARCHING FOR [Porsha] . . . CADY 

FOUND A CLEAR[] PLASTIC BAG WITH 10 ROUNDS [of 

ammunition] ON A SHELF IN THE CLOSET. [Porsha] WAS 

FOUND SEVERAL MINUTES LATER HIDING . . .

UNDERNEATH THE KITCHEN SINK . . . .

WHILE [plaintiff] WAS IN THE STAIRWELL WITH [another 

officer] HE MOUTHED “IM [sic] GOING TO KILL YOU” TO 

[Patrice] WHO WAS ALSO STANDING IN THE STAIRWELL. 

[Patrice] BECAME VISABLE [sic] UPSET AND STARTED 

YELLING AT [plaintiff] . . . .

[Plaintiff] WAS PLACED UNDER ARREST AND 

TRANSPORTED TO THE SIXTH DISTRICT FOR 

PROCESSING . . . .

Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def. Officer Jarlith Cady’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem.”), Ex. 

2 (Arrest/Prosecution Report, ID No. 490929, dated February 20, 2006) at 1-2 (emphasis in 

original). Although both the plaintiff and Porsha Taylor “stated that they lived inside of the 

apartment,” neither admitted ownership of the handgun. Id., Ex. 2 (Arrest/Prosecution Report, 

ID No. 556896, dated February 20, 2006) at 1. Both were arrested and charged with carrying a 

pistol without a license (“CPWL”). Id., Ex. 2 at 2. The arrests took place at approximately 

11:49 p.m. on February 19, 2006. See id., Ex. 1 at 1 & Ex. 2 at 1.
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The following morning, Tighe applied for and obtained a warrant for the search of the 

plaintiff’s apartment. See id., Ex. 3 (Affidavit in Support of an Application for a Search Warrant

and Search Warrant). In relevant part, the warrant application read:

On Sunday, February 19, 2006, at approximately 2349 hours, 

[MPD officers] responded to 4452 B Street, S.E., #102, 

Washington, D.C. for the reported female knocking loudly at the 

front door. Once at the location the [officers] were met by the 

person that had called the police, [plaintiff], and the subject that 

had been knocking on the front door, [Patrice Taylor]. [Patrice] 

told the police that she wanted them to check on the welfare of her 

sister, [Porsha Taylor], because she believed that [plaintiff] had 

been chocking [sic] her and she had heard this from outside the 

partment. [Patrice] also provided information to the police that 

according to several other witnesses that had been at the apartment 

earlier in the day and they had observed [plaintiff] choking 

[Porsha] and striking her with a belt. [Patrice] also told the police 

that [plaintiff] had guns in the apartment. While searching for 

[Porsha] the officers uncovered a loaded .357 revolver and 

additional rounds of ammunition in the bedroom of the apartment . 

. . . [Patrice] was shown the firearm that had located in the 

apartment and stated that she had previously seen [plaintiff] with 

that weapon when he was at her house. [She] also stated that she 

had also seen [plaintiff] with a 9mm handgun, which she stated 

that [plaintiff] carries with him all the time. [She] stated that she 

knows that [plaintiff] keeps this gun in a black book bag in the 

apartment . . . . [Patrice] also stated that she believed that 

[plaintiff] also has robbed people in the past.

Id., Ex. 3 (Affidavit) at 1. The judge signed Tighe’s warrant application at 10:45 a.m. on 

February 20, 2006, and police executed the warrant at 11:50 a.m. on February 20, 2006. See

Def.’s Mem., Ex. 3. Among the items seized were a black book bag, ammunition, and cash. Id., 

Ex. 3 (Search Warrant – Return). 

Although the Superior Court found no probable cause and dismissed the CPWL charge 

against the plaintiff on February 22, 2006, additional charges were filed in the case on May 1, 
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2006. See id., Ex. 5 (Superior Court docket entries dated May 1, 2006). The plaintiff pled guilty 

to a misdemeanor, attempted threats to do bodily harm, on February 6, 2007. Id., Ex. 5at 2.

C. Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment Claims

The complaint alleges that Cady violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be 

free from unreasonable search and seizure by entering his apartment on February 19, 2006, 

without the plaintiff’s consent and without a warrant, and by seizing his gun and ammunition. 

For these alleged constitutional violations, the plaintiff demands damages of $4,000,000.00. 

Compl. ¶ 33. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that Cady violated his Fifth Amendment right to 

due process “by abuse of authority, id. ¶ 22, for which the plaintiff demands damages of 

$2,000,000.00, id. ¶ 25. Cady moves for summary judgment on the ground that qualified 

immunity protects him from suit. See Def.’s Mem. at 1. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The Court grants summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 

F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1995). To determine which facts are material, the Court looks to the 

substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). The mere existence of a factual dispute does not bar summary judgment. See id. A 

genuine dispute is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, 

therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
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To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the 

nonmoving party “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving 

party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. Id. The Court must draw all 

justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor and accept the nonmoving party’s evidence 

as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “the 

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of his position. Id. at 252. He must “do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and he cannot rely 

on conclusory assertions without any factual basis in the record to create a genuine dispute. See 

Ass’n of Flight Attendants–CWA v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 

2009).

B. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity is a defense that shields officials from suit if their conduct did not 

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.” Bame v. Dillard, 637 F.3d 380, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Ortiz v. Jordan, __ 

U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 884, 888 (2011)) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations 

omitted); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Because qualified immunity is “an 

immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, . . . it is effectively lost if a case is 

erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in 

original). Accordingly, the Court must “resolv[e] immunity questions at the earliest possible 

stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
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“Qualified immunity balances two important interests – the need to hold public officials 

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). This protection is afforded to government officials whether 

their “error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law 

and fact.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Brinegar v. United States, 

338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949) (“Because many situations which confront officers in the course of 

executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on 

their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 

their conclusions of probability.”). “[A]ll but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 

violate the law” may enjoy the protection of qualified immunity. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 

341 (1986).

“Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for 

an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the 

action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.” 

Messerschmidt v. Millender, __ U.S. __, __, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012) (brackets, internal 

quotation marks, and citation omitted). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme 

Court set forth a two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity 

claims. First, the court decides “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out 

a violation of a constitutional right.” Id. at 201. If the plaintiff satisfies this first step, the court 

then decides whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s 

alleged misconduct. Id. The sequence of this analysis no longer is mandatory, and now the court 

may “exercise [its] sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 
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immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at 

hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 

In this case, the Court opts “first [to] determine whether the facts, construed in the light 

most favorable to [the plaintiff] show that [Cady] violated a constitutional right, and second, 

whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident. If the answer 

to either of these questions is no, then the defense motion for summary judgment must be 

granted because [Cady is] entitled to qualified immunity.” Wesby v. District of Columbia, 841 F. 

Supp. 2d 20, 36 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Barham v. Salazar, 556 F.3d 844, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).

C. Qualified Immunity Protects Cady from Suit

In order to establish a claim against Cady under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must 

demonstrate that Cady, acting under color of the law of the District of Columbia, deprived him of 

“rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitutions and laws” of the United States. 

Id. This discussion begins with the proposition that, ordinarily, a search of a person’s home and 

seizure of his property by police without a warrant violate that person’s Fourth Amendment right 

to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Arizona v. Gant, 

556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 

approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject 

only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”). Cady argues that his 

“entry was lawful pursuant to the emergency exception” to the warrantless entry rule. See Def.’s 

Mem. at 6. 

Exigent circumstances are present when the police have “an urgent need or an immediate 

major crisis in the performance of duty affording neither time nor opportunity to apply to a 
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magistrate” for a warrant. United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 

(brackets, internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For example, police “may make a 

warrantless entry onto private property . . . to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence . . . 

or to engage in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 

403 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Another “exigency obviating the 

requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened 

with such injury.” Id.; see In re Sealed Case 96-3167, 153 F.3d 759, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

(finding that officers’ belief that defendant was burglarizing a house with the intent either to steal 

property or to injure occupants was objectively reasonable and “constitutes exigent 

circumstances sufficient to permit warrantless entry”). The police officer must have had a 

reasonable belief that exigent circumstances existed. See United States v. Goree, 365 F.3d 1086, 

1090 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “And the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the 

course of their legitimate emergency activities.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) 

(citations omitted).

There is no genuine issue in dispute as to the material facts of this case. The plaintiff 

states that he made a 911 call to police about a burglary in progress. Cady represents, see Def.’s 

Mem., Ex. 2, and the plaintiff concedes, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 4, that Patrice Taylor heard her sister 

being choked inside the apartment, that other people had seen plaintiff choking and striking 

Porsha Taylor with a belt earlier in the day, that the plaintiff kept guns in his apartment, and that 

the plaintiff refused Cady’s requests for his consent to enter the apartment. Cady and the other 

officers entered the plaintiff’s apartment without a warrant, searched the apartment, found Porsha 

Taylor hiding under the kitchen sink, found a handgun and ammunition in plain view, seized the 

handgun and ammunition, and arrested the plaintiff and Porsha Taylor. 
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Based on these facts, the Court concludes that Cady had an objectively reasonable belief 

that exigent circumstances existed, namely that Porsha Taylor had been injured or was at risk of 

injury. These circumstances justified Cady’s warrantless entry into the plaintiff’s apartment and 

his limited search for Porsha Taylor in places where an adult could have been hiding. Although 

Cady had not secured a warrant prior to his initial entry into the plaintiff’s apartment, exigent 

circumstances obviated the need for a warrant at that time. Cady’s search of the apartment on 

the following day also is justified – the search and seizure of the plaintiff’s property took place 

pursuant to a warrant issued by a Superior Court judge. “Where the alleged Fourth Amendment 

violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has 

issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable 

manner.” Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1245.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Cady is protected by qualified immunity. Accordingly, his 

motion for summary judgment will be granted. An Order accompanies this Memorandum 

Opinion.

 /s/ Beryl A. Howell

BERYL A. HOWELL

United States District Judge

DATE: September 21, 2012