16-3936 

Liu v. Whitaker 

BIA 

Loprest, IJ 

A206 053 323

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 24th 4 day of January, two thousand nineteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 PINGPING LIU, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 16-3936 

17 NAC 

18 MATTHEW WHITAKER, ACTING 

19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Theodore N. Cox, Esq., New York, NY. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

26 Attorney General; Derek C. Julius, 

27 Assistant Director; Anthony O. 

28 Pottinger, Trial Attorney, Office 

29 of Immigration Litigation, United 

30 States Department of Justice, 

31 Washington, DC. 
2 

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

4 is DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Pingping Liu, a native and citizen of the 

6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 7, 

7 2016, decision of the BIA affirming an April 14, 2016, 

8 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, 

9 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

10 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Pingping Liu, No. A206 053 

11 323 (B.I.A. Nov. 7, 2016), aff’g No. A206 053 323 (Immig. Ct. 

12 N.Y. City Apr. 14, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity 

13 with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

14 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

15 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of 

16 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 448 

17 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of 

18 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 

19 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 

20 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 

21 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

22 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of 
3 

1 the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the 

2 applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the 

3 applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , 

4 and the internal consistency of each such statement . . . 

5 without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or 

6 falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 

7 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d 

8 at 163-64. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s 

9 determination that Liu was not credible as to her claim that 

10 family planning officials forcibly terminated her pregnancy. 

11 The agency reasonably relied in part on Liu’s demeanor. 

12 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 

13 F.3d 77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing that particular 

14 deference is given to the trier of fact’s assessment of 

15 demeanor). That finding is supported by the record, which 

16 reflects that Liu became hesitant and less responsive on 

17 cross-examination thus giving the impression that she sought 

18 time to formulate answers rather than testified from memory. 

19 The demeanor finding and the overall credibility 

20 determination are bolstered by record inconsistencies. See 

21 Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d 

22 Cir. 2006). The agency reasonably found that Liu’s 
4 

1 testimony that she was hospitalized for three days and 

2 homebound for one month after suffering a uterine infection 

3 as a result of her abortion was inconsistent with 

4 statements from her mother and husband who did not mention 

5 that Liu was hospitalized or homebound despite describing 

6 in detail her other post-abortion issues. See 8 U.S.C. 

7 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 

8 891 F.3d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he probative value of a 

9 witness’s . . . silence on particular facts depends on 

10 whether those facts are ones the witness would reasonably 

11 have been expected to disclose.”). The agency also 

12 reasonably found that Liu changed her description of the 

13 nature of her family planning violation from serious to 

14 less serious depending on the nature of the questions posed 

15 in an effort to bolster her claim. See 8 U.S.C. 

16 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

17 There is no merit to Liu’s argument that the IJ failed 

18 to make her sufficiently aware of the inconsistencies in the 

19 record or the potential credibility issues in her case, given 

20 that the Government questioned Liu about the different 

21 descriptions of her post-abortion medical treatment and the 

22 IJ repeatedly noted the Government’s issues with her 
5 

1 credibility. Further, she has not proffered any explanations 

2 for the record inconsistencies. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80 

3 (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation 

4 for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must 

5 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

6 to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks 

7 omitted)). 

8 The agency also reasonably found Liu’s credibility as to 

9 the involuntary nature of her abortion undermined by her 

10 submission of an abortion certificate and a family planning 

11 decision ordering her punished with an abortion and fine. We 

12 have held that the agency does not err in determining that 

13 the submission of an “abortion certificate” from China 

14 undermines credibility about an assertedly involuntary 

15 abortion because the State Department has reported that China 

16 issues “abortion certificates” for voluntary abortions, not 

17 forced abortions, so that the individuals who have undergone 

18 voluntary abortions may obtain leave from work. See Xiao 

19 Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2007); Tu Lin 

20 v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 2006). Similarly, 

21 given that country conditions evidence in the record suggests 

22 that the use of force is prohibited under the family planning 
6 

1 policy and that government officials deny using involuntary 

2 abortions as a punishment under the policy, the agency did 

3 not err in finding it implausible that the Chinese government 

4 would issue a decision ordering Liu punished with an abortion. 

5 Her submission of such a document therefore impugned her 

6 credibility. See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66-

7 68 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that adverse credibility 

8 determination may be based on inherent implausibility in 

9 applicant’s story if the “finding is tethered to record 

10 evidence” or based on common sense). 

11 Having questioned Liu’s credibility, the agency 

12 reasonably relied further on her failure to rehabilitate 

13 her testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An 

14 applicant’s failure to corroborate . . . her testimony may 

15 bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration 

16 in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate 

17 testimony that has already been called into question.” 

18 Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). 

19 The IJ reasonably declined to afford weight to the unsworn 

20 letter from Liu’s mother in China. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 

21 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to agency’s 

22 decision to afford little weight to husband’s letter 
7 

1 because it was unsworn and from an interested witness). 

2 And, as discussed above, Liu’s abortion certificate and 

3 punishment decision impugned rather than rehabilitated her 

4 claim of an involuntary abortion. Although the parties 

5 stipulated that Liu’s husband would testify in conformity 

6 with his affidavit and letter, the agency was not compelled 

7 to conclude that his statements alone would be sufficient 

8 to rehabilitate Liu’s claim that she was forced to have an 

9 abortion given that he was not a first-hand witness and, as 

10 discussed above, his letter omitted that Liu was 

11 hospitalized and homebound from a post-abortion infection. 

12 See Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. 

13 Given the demeanor, inconsistency, implausibility, and 

14 corroboration findings, the agency’s adverse credibility 

15 determination is supported by substantial evidence and is 

16 dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT 

17 relief.* See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d 

18 Cir. 2006). 

 

* Contrary to the BIA’s conclusion, Liu did not waive his 

claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief. The IJ 

denied those claims because Liu failed to testify credibly; 

thus Liu’s challenge to the adverse credibility determination 

on appeal to the BIA necessarily included a challenge to the 

denial of withholding and CAT relief. 
8 

1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

2 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

3 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

4 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

5 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

6 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

7 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

8 34.1(b). 

9 FOR THE COURT: 

10 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 

11 Clerk of Court