* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The Honorable Kevin T. Duffy, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIA LOURDES MACIEL, Petitioner,
v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 05-74047 Agency No. A75 307 200
MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted November 4, 2009 San Francisco, California Before: NOONAN, W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and DUFFY ** , District Judge. Maria Lourdes Maciel petitions for review of a final decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming without opinion an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying her application fo r cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The IJ found that Maciel was ineligible for cancellation of removal 

# FILED
JAN 13 2010 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 because she gave false testimony and so, as a matter of law, could not show good moral character. We affirm. This court reviews the BIA’s findings of statutory ineligibility for cancellation of removal for substantial evidence. See Bernal v. Imm. & Nat. Svc. , 154 F.3d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998). Where, as here, the BIA affirms without opinion, this court reviews the immigration judge’s opinion as the final agency determination. Lanza v. Ashcroft , 389 F.3d 917, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). The Attorney General, through an IJ or the BIA, may grant cancellation of removal to an otherwise deportable nonres ident alien where that alien’s removal would cause significant hardship to the a lien’s spouse, parent, or child who is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). However, the Attorney General may onl y grant such a cancellation of removal where the alien has met certain requirement s, including that she has been a person of good moral character during a period of ten years or more during which she was continuously present in the United States. Id. The ten year period must immediately precede the final agency d ecision on her application for cancellation of removal. Matter of Ortega-Cabrera , 23 I. & N. Dec. 793, 796-98 (BIA 2005). By statute, “no person shall be regardedas, or found to be, a person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be3 established . . . has given false testimony for the purposes of obtaining any benefits under [the United States immigration laws].” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6); Kungys v. United States , 485 U.S. 759, 780 (1988). It is undisputed that Maciel gave false testimony in her immigration hearing on September 18, 2003, that those statements were her own, and that she gave that testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. She recanted in her subsequent testimony on September 30, 2003. In Llanos-Senarillos v. United States , we held that “If the witness withdraws the false testimony of his own volition and without delay, the false stat ement and its withdrawal may be found to constitute one inseparable incident out of which an intention to deceive cannot rightly be drawn.” 177 F.2d 164, 165 (9th Cir. 1949). The IJ here found that Maciel’s recanting was neither timely nor voluntary, and that he was barred from finding that Maciel had good moral character . A recantation is insufficient where “The withdrawal . . . followed only af ter [petitioner] knew his false testimony would not deceive.” Id. at 165-66
. The IJ noted, accurately, that “It was only after DHS stated its intention to call the asylum officer,” whose testimony would have exposed inconsistencies in Maciel’s story, that she recanted. The IJ’s decision that Maciel was within the statutory bar was thus supported by substantial evidence. The petition is DENIED and the decision of the BIA is AFFIRMED.