United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 14, 2021 Decided July 9, 2021

No. 19-7058

IN RE: DOMESTIC AIRLINE TRAVEL ANTITRUST LITIGATION,

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:15-mc-01404)

Anna St. John argued the cause for appellants. With her 

on the briefs was Theodore H. Frank.

Halle Edwards, Student Counsel, argued the cause as 

amicus curiae in support of jurisdiction. With her on the briefs 

were Erica Hashimoto, Director, appointed by the court, and 

Alexander Bodaken, Student Counsel.

Jeannine M. Kenney argued the cause for appellees. With 

her on the brief were Adam J. Zapala, Anton Metlitsky, 

Benjamin Bradshaw, Katrina M. Robson, Michael D. 

Hausfeld, Hilary K. Scherrer, Alden L. Atkins, Joshua S. 

Johnson, and Roberta D. Liebenberg. Ashley Robertson, 

Jonathan Hacker and Richard G. Parker entered appearances.

Before: TATEL, RAO and WALKER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALKER.
2

WALKER, Circuit Judge: Frank Bednarz and Theodore 

Frank are class action objectors in a multidistrict litigation 

proceeding that involves four airlines and millions of 

settlement class members. Bednarz and Frank have appealed 

the district court’s order approving settlements between the 

plaintiffs and two airlines. 

We hold that the court’s order is not an appealable final 

judgment or interlocutory order. We therefore dismiss for lack 

of jurisdiction. 

I

In 2015, plaintiffs in districts across the country filed class

action complaints against four airlines: Southwest, American, 

Delta, and United. Each class action alleged the airlines 

violated Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 

3, by colluding to decrease capacity and raise prices.

These lawsuits were consolidated and transferred to the 

District of Columbia for multidistrict litigation proceedings. In 

re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litigation, 140 F. Supp.

3d 1344 (J.P.M.L. 2015). By 2019, this litigation included 105 

consolidated cases on behalf of more than 100 million 

settlement class members.

1

The plaintiffs reached settlement agreements with 

Southwest and American. The district court preliminarily 

approved both settlements. In re Domestic Airline Travel 

Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2656, No. 15-1404 (CKK)

1 Settlement class members include anyone who purchased flights 

from the defendant airlines for a period after July 2011. In re 

Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2656, No. 

15-1404 (CKK) (D.D.C. May 9, 2019) (order).
3

(D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2018) (order); In re Domestic Airline Travel 

Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2656, No. 15-1404 (CKK)

(D.D.C. June 18, 2018) (order). Meanwhile, the litigation 

against Delta and United continued.

Under the proposed settlements, Southwest agreed to pay 

$15 million and American agreed to pay $45 million. The 

amount ultimately received by each settlement class member 

may increase at the close of litigation against Delta and United. 

Because the settling parties wanted to avoid piecemeal 

payments, the proposed settlements left open the question of 

how the funds should be allocated and distributed until the 

entire lawsuit concluded. See In re Domestic Airline Travel 

Antitrust Litigation, 378 F. Supp. 3d 10, 21-22 (D.D.C. 2019). 

Bednarz and Frank objected to the settlements. They 

argued the settlement notice should have detailed how the 

funds would be distributed. In particular, they objected to the 

possibility of a cy pres distribution of funds to undisclosed 

recipients.

After a fairness hearing, the district court approved the 

settlements and rejected Bednarz and Frank’s objections. Id.

at 29-30. The court dismissed Southwest and American from 

the consolidated action but declined to make the dismissal a 

final judgment subject to appeal under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b). In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust 

Litigation, MDL No. 2656, 2019 WL 5727957, at *7 (D.D.C. 

Nov. 5, 2019) (“this Court sees no reason to issue a Rule 54(b) 

judgment”).

Nevertheless, Bednarz and Frank appeal. 
4

II

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, federal circuit courts “have

jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district 

courts of the United States.” A district court’s judgment is 

“final” when it disposes of all the claims and all the parties. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 

574 U.S. 405, 409 (2015) (a final decision “ends the litigation 

on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute 

the judgment”) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 

233 (1945)). So as a general matter, when orders don’t

terminate all the claims and all the parties, we have no 

jurisdiction to review them. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) “relaxes” that 

“general practice.” Gelboim, 574 U.S. at 409 (cleaned up). 

Even if a decision is not final, a district court may still “direct 

entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, 

claims or parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). But Rule 54(b) has 

limits: A district court “may direct entry of a final judgment”

for “fewer than all[] claims or parties only if the court expressly 

determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Id.

Here, the district court’s settlement approval order wasn’t

final under § 1291 because it dismissed claims against only two 

of the four defendants in the consolidated action. And the court 

expressly declined to enter a Rule 54(b) final judgment because

it found “just reason for delay.” In re Domestic Airline Travel 

Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2656, 2019 WL 5727957, at *7 

(D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2019) (cleaned up). Specifically, the court 

sought to “prevent[] a fragmented appeal with regard to issues 

that have been determined by this Court to be obviously 

premature.” Id.
5

Bednarz and Frank argue that Gelboim v. Bank of America

supports an additional appellate route unique to multidistrict 

litigation. There, antitrust plaintiffs filed a class action against 

banks. 574 U.S. at 408. Their antitrust class action was 

consolidated in multidistrict litigation with other cases alleging 

additional claims against those banks. Id. The district court 

later dismissed the antitrust plaintiffs’ sole claim, which ended 

the entire lawsuit filed by the antitrust plaintiffs. Id. Because 

of the other parties’ cases, the multidistrict litigation continued. 

Id.

The Supreme Court held that the dismissal order in 

Gelboim was final and appealable under § 1291 because it 

dismissed the plaintiffs’ individual case “in its entirety.” Id. at

413. Since “[c]ases consolidated for [multidistrict litigation] 

pretrial proceedings ordinarily retain their separate identities,” 

id., the order dismissing the plaintiffs’ only claim ended the 

case “on the merits,” id. at 414. And because the antitrust 

plaintiffs’ entire suit was dismissed, no other orders in the 

proceedings would “qualify as the dispositive ruling [plaintiffs

sought] to overturn on appeal.” Id. at 415.

By clarifying that the ordinary requirements of finality 

apply to appeals from multidistrict litigation, Gelboim provides 

no support for Bednarz and Frank’s argument. In fact, Gelboim

undermines it. Here, unlike in Gelboim, later orders by the 

multidistrict litigation court or originating courts will relate to 

the plaintiffs’ claims. That’s because the order dismissed only 

two of the four defendant airlines. Because that order did not

dispose of the consolidated action or any of the individual cases 

in their entirety, Bednarz and Frank may not appeal the court’s 

settlement approval at this time.2

2 Cf. Gelboim, 574 U.S. at 413 n.4 (“We express no opinion on

whether an order deciding one of multiple cases combined in an all-
6

The court-appointed amicus alternatively argues that the 

settlement approval order is an appealable interlocutory order 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). That provision allows appellate 

courts to review “injunctions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). It also 

narrowly applies to certain interlocutory orders that have the 

“practical effect” of granting or refusing an injunction. Carson 

v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981). An appellant 

can appeal such an order “only if it affects predominately all of 

the merits” or “might have a serious, perhaps irreparable, 

consequence, and . . . can be effectually challenged only by 

immediate appeal.” Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of 

Columbia, 671 F.3d 1258, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up); 

cf. id. at 1261 (“we must take care not to turn the barrier against 

piecemeal appeals into Swiss cheese”). 

This case is unlike Carson. There, “prospective relief was 

at the very core” of the interlocutory order. Carson, 450 U.S. 

at 84; see also Salazar, 671 F.3d at 1260, 1262. Here, the gist 

of the settlement agreements was the large amount of money 

the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs. And although the 

agreements require the settling defendants to cooperate with 

the plaintiffs during the ongoing litigation, that requirement is

not at the agreements’ “very core.” Carson, 450 U.S. at 84. 

Further, the court’s approval order didn’t anticipate enjoining

any party after distribution of the settlement funds. Cf. In re 

Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litigation, 378 F. Supp. 3d 

10, 26 (D.D.C. 2019) (approving the settlements “despite the 

lack of injunctive relief”). We therefore do not have 

jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1). 

purpose consolidation qualifies under § 1291 as a final decision 

appealable of right.”).
7

* * *

The appealed order is not a final judgment. We therefore 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.