United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-50922

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Ronnie Jackson, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for Western District of Texas

USDC NO. 6:18-CR-354-1

Before Jones, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Ronnie Jackson appeals various written conditions of his supervised 

release, contending that the written judgment should be amended to match 

the orally pronounced judgment. The district court sentenced Jackson in 

October 2020. We agree in part. We VACATE in part Jackson’s sentence 

and REMAND for amendment of the judgment consistent herewith.

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 11, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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BACKGROUND

Ronnie Jackson pleaded guilty to four counts of interference with 

commerce by robbery and aiding and abetting, as well as one count of 

brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The district court

sentenced Jackson within the advisory guidelines range to 46 months of 

imprisonment for each robbery conviction, to be served concurrently, and 96 

consecutive months for the firearm conviction; five years of supervised 

release; a $500 special assessment; a $5,000 fine; and $1,578 in restitution. 

Jackson timely appealed.

At sentencing, the district court orally noted several special conditions 

of supervised release tailored to Jackson’s case, but the court failed to 

pronounce or reference a number of additional conditions that the written 

judgment contained. Jackson did not object to the conditions at that time.

On appeal, Jackson challenges only the enforceability of the judgment 

of unpronounced conditions of supervised release. The parties initially 

dispute our standard of review.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to a defendant’s due process right to be present at 

sentencing, the district court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence controls 

over the subsequent written judgment, including with respect to conditions 

of supervised release. United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 556–57 (5th Cir. 

2020) (en banc) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 825 (2020). In 

Diggles, the en banc court abandoned the “byzantine distinctions” between 

standard, mandatory, and special conditions of supervised release, id. at 559, 

and “established a new framework for determining which conditions of 

supervised release require oral pronouncement and what counts as notice to 

the defendant.” United States v. Gomez, 960 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 2020)

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(citation omitted); see also Diggles, 957 F.3d at 563 (summarizing the 

clarification of the law governing supervised release conditions).

Under the new framework, a district court must pronounce any 

condition of supervised release that does not fall within the mandatory 

conditions enunciated in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Diggles, 957 F.3d at 559. A 

district court satisfies the pronouncement requirement by notifying the 

defendant at sentencing what conditions are being imposed. Id. at 560. The 

court may orally state the conditions or specifically adopt a list of 

recommended supervised release conditions from a court-wide or judgespecific standing order, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), or some 

other document. Id. at 560–63 & n.5 (citations omitted). However, “the 

mere existence of such a document is not enough for pronouncement.” Id. 

at 561 n.5. The district court must ensure that the defendant had a chance to 

read and review that list with counsel and must orally adopt that list when the 

defendant is in court and can object. Id. at 560–63 & n.5 (citations omitted). 

“The pronouncement requirement is not a meaningless formality.” Id. at 

560. It provides the defendant notice of the sentence and a chance to object. 

Id.

This court recently applied Diggles, holding that if the defendant 

objects to a condition of supervised release for the first time on appeal, “the 

standard of review depends on whether he had an opportunity to object 

before the district court.” United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th 

Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “If he had that chance but failed to do so, [this 

court] review[s] for plain error. If he did not have the opportunity, [this 

court] review[s] for abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

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In the instant case, the district court did not orally pronounce 

“mandatory”1 conditions 1 through 9 or “standard conditions” 1 through 17 

as denominated in the written judgment. The court did, however articulate 

several special conditions that had been recommended in the PSR. While the 

court failed to orally adopt the PSR, the PSR’s generic reference simply 

stated, “[i]n addition to the mandatory and standard conditions of 

supervision adopted by the [district c]ourt,” several other special conditions 

might be appropriate in this case. The PSR neither listed the mandatory and 

standard conditions adopted by the district court, nor expressly referred to 

the standing order of the Western District of Texas2

, nor included the 

standing order in an attachment or appendix. Finally, the district court did 

not ask Jackson whether he had reviewed the PSR with his counsel, nor did 

it refer to the standing order or the mandatory and standard conditions or ask 

Jackson and his counsel whether they had reviewed the standing order. 

Compare United States v. Martinez, 15 F.4th 1179, 1180–81 (5th Cir. 2021)

(citations omitted) (holding that if a PSR gives notice that standard 

conditions are recommended, and the district court pronounces that it is 

imposing the standard conditions, the pronouncement requirement is 

fulfilled where a standing order governs the district’s standard supervised 

release conditions).

Under these circumstances, the district court did not adequately 

notify Jackson that the conditions listed in the standing order were being 

1 These terms derive from the judgment below and are not to be confused with the 

terminology described by Diggles. That is, these terms in the judgment, other than those 

required by § 3583(d), would be considered “discretionary” according to Diggles. These 

conditions are also different from the special conditions that the court did articulate when 

pronouncing Jackson’s sentence.

2 United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Conditions of 

Probation and Supervised Release, https://bit.ly/3ouyWtb (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).

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imposed, and Jackson had no opportunity to object to those conditions. See 

Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560–61 & n.5. Consequently, we must review the 

challenge to the conditions for an abuse of discretion. See Grogan, 977 F.3d 

at 352 (citations omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs if the court makes 

an error of law. In re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d 986, 999 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(citation omitted).

If the district court fails to mention at sentencing a condition of 

supervised release that must be pronounced, its inclusion in the written 

judgment can create a conflict. United States v. Vega, 332 F.3d 849, 852–53 

(5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citation omitted). In the event of a conflict, 

which constitutes legal error, the oral pronouncement controls, and the 

written judgment must be amended to conform with the oral 

pronouncement. Id.; Diggles, 957 F.3d at 557–58. When conditions identified 

in the written judgment conflict with the sentence as orally pronounced, 

those conditions must be deleted from the judgment. See United States v. 

Fields, 977 F.3d 358, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted) (vacating in 

part and remanding for amendment of written judgment to remove 

unpronounced special condition requiring mental health treatment).

Here, because the first seven mandatory conditions of supervised 

release parallel requirements set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), pronouncement 

was not required. We consider the remaining mandatory and standard 

conditions in three categories. But it is necessary to emphasize, as this court 

has done in United States v. Chavez, that “in certain circumstances the 

district court may later modify and enlarge the conditions of supervised 

release.” No. 20-50550, slip op. (5th Cir. Mar. __, 2022) (citing 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)). Such an option should preserve the 

court’s ability to effectuate the purposes of supervised release according to 

the Western District’s standing order.

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I. Conditions related to Jackson’s finances

The district court orally ordered Jackson to pay a $500 special 

assessment, a $5,000 fine, and $1,578 in restitution. The written judgment 

included several conditions that were also related to Jackson’s finances, 

including mandatory conditions 8 and 9 and standard conditions 14, 15, and 

16.

Mandatory condition 8 required Jackson to pay the special assessment 

imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3013. This provision was consistent with the 

judgment imposing a special assessment, the statute which made the special 

assessment mandatory, and the district court’s intent that Jackson be 

required to pay the special assessment as required by statute. Therefore, this 

condition was consistent with the district court’s oral pronouncement.

Standard condition 14 provided that if the judgment imposed other 

criminal monetary penalties, Jackson must pay such penalties in accord with 

the schedule of payments in the judgment. This provision is consistent with 

the statutory requirement that a defendant must pay restitution imposed by 

the district court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). It is also consistent with the oral 

pronouncement.

Standard conditions 15 and 16 provide that, if the judgment imposes 

any monetary penalties, Jackson must provide the probation officer access to 

any requested financial information, and he may not incur any new credit 

charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of his 

probation officer unless he is in compliance with the payment schedule. As 

the government correctly notes, these conditions are substantially similar to 

the special conditions that were pronounced by the district court at the 

sentencing hearing. Accordingly, they do not conflict with the district 

court’s oral pronouncement.

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Mandatory condition 9 requires Jackson to notify the court of any 

material change in his economic circumstances that might affect his ability to 

pay restitution, fines, or special assessments. Although this condition is 

somewhat consistent with the district court’s oral pronouncement of 

monetary penalties, its additional obligation to notify the court of changes in 

Jackson’s economic circumstances is more burdensome, and thus conflicts 

with the district court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence.

II. Condition regarding illegal activity

Standard condition 10 provides that Jackson “shall not own, possess 

or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous 

weapon (i.e. anything that was designed, or was modified, for the specific 

purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as 

nunchakus or tasers).” This condition is partially consistent with the 

statutorily required condition that the defendant shall not commit another 

federal, state, or local offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Federal law prohibits 

persons who have been convicted of a felony from possessing firearms, 

ammunition, and destructive device. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); see also

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (defining firearm to include “any destructive device”). 

However, to the extent this condition broadens the statutory restriction by 

prohibiting the possession of other dangerous weapons, it conflicts with the 

district court’s oral pronouncement and must be stricken in part.

III. Conditions concerning the defendant’s obligations during 

supervision

Standard conditions 1 to 9, 11 to 13, and 17 all concern Jackson’s 

general obligations during supervised release and were not orally pronounced 

at sentencing. Although they are included in the Western District’s standing 

order, the district court did not refer to or orally adopt the standing order at 

sentencing. Taken together, these unpronounced, unincorporated, and unCase: 20-50922 Document: 00516235636 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/11/2022
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referenced conditions found only in Jackson’s written judgment, although 

critical to effectuating the purposes of supervised release, are required to be 

excised according to our existing precedent.

CONCLUSION

Mandatory condition 9 and standard conditions 1 to 9, 11 to 13, and 17 

conflict with the oral pronouncement and should be excised from the written 

judgment. Standard condition 10 must be excised in part from the written 

judgment. For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE in part Jackson’s 

sentence and REMAND for the district court to amend its written judgment 

in accordance herewith.

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