### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ugus t 19
, 200 3 S es sio n

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . THOMAS LEN PROFIT T, ALI AS

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 74750 Richard R. Baum gartner , Judge

No. E2002-02396-CC A-R3- CD F ebruary 17, 2004

Th e de fe nd ant w a s c on vic te d o f a g g ra vate d v e hic ula

r h omi c ide , a g g ravated a ssa ult , s imp le possession, and driving on a suspende d license. The defe ndant contends on a ppeal that ( 1) there was insufficient e vidence to support the convictions for ag g ravated vehicula r homicide a

nd ag g ravated assault, (2) the trial court e rre d in allowing e vidence of inac tive marijuana metabolites found in the defe ndant’s blood af

t er the ac cident, (3) the trial cour t erre d in allowing e vidence conce rning extrapolation of the defendant’s blood a lcohol conce ntration bac k to the time of the ac cident, (4) the trial court e rre d in not allowing the de fenda nt to plead guilty

to driving on a

suspended lice nse, (5) the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a llo wi ng e vid e nc e c on c e rn inge xtra dit ion and ins tr uc tin g the jur

y on fl ig ht, and (6) the cumulative e ffe ct of the e rror s require s a new trial. The judgme nts of the trial court a re aff irmed.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t A ffirm e d

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Mark E. Stephe ns, District Publi c De fende r, and J ohn Halstea d, Assistant Publ ic Def ender , for the

a pp e lla nt, Th oma s L e n Pr of

itt , A lia s.

Pa ul G . Summe rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; B ra de n H. B ou c e k, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Randall E. Nichols, Distri ct Attorney Gene ral; and Philip Morton, Assistant Dist rict Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

The Knox County Gra

nd J ury returne d an ele ven-c ount indictment of the defe ndant, Thomas L en Profitt, Alias. He was char g ed with two alternative counts of vehic ular homicide, at least two prior convic tions for driving under the influence rende ring the homicide ag g ravated, two alter native counts of ag g ravated assault, re ckless enda ng erme nt, possession of a controlled substanc e, driving-2-

on a suspende d license, dr iving on a revoke d li ce n se, driving on a ca ncele d license, a

nd driving wi thout a lic e ns e . T he jur

y c on vic te d th e de fe nd ant o f a g g ra vate d v e hic ula

r h omi c ide (C la ss A felony ), ag g ravated assault (Class C felony ), simple possession ( Class A misdemeanor)
, and driving

o na s u s p e n d e d l i c e n s e ( C l a s s B m i s d e m e an o r )

. T h e t r i a l c o u rt s e n t e n c e d t h e d e f e n d an tt o t w e n t yfi ve y e ars fo r t

he a gg ra vate d v e hic ula

r h omi c ide c on vic tio n, six y e ars fo r t he a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult conviction, eleven m onths twenty -nine day s for the simple possession conviction, and six months for the dr iving on a

suspended lice nse convic tion. The sentences for the f elony convictions wer e order ed to be se rved c onsecutively to eac h other and concur

rently to the misdemeanor se ntence s, for a total ef fec tive sentenc e of thirty -one y ear s. This appea l timely followed.

The de fendan t contends on appeal that (1) there was insuffic ient evidenc e to support the

c on vic tio ns fo r a g g ra

vate d v e hic ula

r h omi c ide an d a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult , ( 2) the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in allowing evidenc e of ina ctive mar ijuana meta b o lites found in the defe ndant’s blood af ter the

acc ident, (3) the tr ial court e rre d in allowing evidenc e conc erningextrapolation of the def endant’ s blood alcohol concentration back to the time of the a ccide nt, (4) the tria l court er red in not allowing the def endant to plea d g uilty to dr iving on a suspended license, (5) the trial court e rre d in allowing evidenc e conc erningextradition and instructing the jury on flig ht, a nd (6) the cumulative e ffe ct of the er rors re quires a ne w trial. The judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

F acts

At around 11:00 p.m. on June 2, 2000, C h ri stopher Ry nes wa s travelingsouth towards Knoxvi lle on Hig hway

33. Ry n e s w a s dr iv in g in th e p a s s in g la n e o f th e f

o u r

- la n e hig hway . He noticed a c ar a

pproac hing that was entire ly in his lane of tra ffic. Ry

nes swer ved onto the shoulder to avoid a collision. The other vehicle did not r eac t. I t passed by Ry nes’ ve hicle “like [he] wasn’t

e ve n th e re .” He dr ov e ba c k thro ug h th e are a a bo ut t we nty min ute s late r a

nd fo un d tr a ff

ic a t a standstill. A poli ce of

fice r on the sce ne informe d Ry nes that there was a

n acc ident up ahea d. Ry

nes inf or me d th e of

fi c e r a bo ut t he c los e c a ll w iththe ve hic le e arl ie r a nd de sc ri be d the c ar t

hat a lmo st h it him . T he of

fi c e r t oo k Ry

ne s to the a c c ident scen e, and Ry ne s p os iti ve ly

ide nti fi e d th e ve hic le inv olv e d in

the a c c ide nt a s th e same on e that a lmo st h it h im e arl ie r. He le arn e d late r t hat th e ve hic le he de sc ri be d w a s b e ingdr ive n b y the de fe nd ant. Th e dis tanc e fr om wh e re Ry ne s wa s a lmo st h it t o the ac cident sce ne wa s three to f our-tenths of a

mile.

Kimberl y T ay l o r wa s driving nor th on Highw ay

33 on the nig ht of the ac cident. Ta y lor witnessed a ve hicle that wa s in front of her slowly g o over into the opposite lane s of traf fic. I t was entirely on the other side of t he roa d. The drive r of a truck that wa s betwee n her a nd the def endant’ s

ve hic le ho nk e d his ho rn a s the c ar dr if te d int o th e oth e r l ane . T he de fe nd ant’ s v e hic le did no t r e a c t. Taylor said that the vehic le stay ed in the opposite lane s for a pproxi mately

ten to fiftee n seconds. The

are a wa s a str a ig ht se c tio n of ro a d o n a do wnwa rd slo pe . Sh e the n w itn e sse d th e de fe nd ant’ s v e hic le slam into the passeng er side of a vehic le g oing in the opposite dire ction.

On J une 2, 2000, B ra dle y L e e was dr ivi ngso uth

on Hi g hw ay 33 , ju st n or

th o f K no xvill e , with his fiancee ’, Misty

Childress. The couple had bee n visiti ng L ee’ s g randmoth er and wer e on-3-

their wa y to see Childress’ mother . L ee w as driving the vehicle hit by the defendant’s vehicle. L ee h as n o m em o ry

o f t h e i mp ac t

. L ee wa s n o t s p ee d i n g, an d h e w as n o tu n d er t h e i n fl u en ce o f d ru gs

or a lc oh ol. He va g ue ly

re me mbe re d s c re a min g to t he pa ra me dic s th a t he c ou ld n ot b re a the . H e a lso

reme mbe r s a s k in g th e m if M is ty w a s a ll r ig h t. T h e y d id n o t an s w e r

. M is ty Ch il dr e s s died on impact. L ee w as extracted f rom the vehic le throug h the sunroof a nd airlifted to the hospital. He

rema ined hospitaliz ed for six months and was then tra nsfer red to a reha bilitation center. He

rema ined there for two more months unti l his insurance cover ag e ran out. He r eturne d to the hospital the following J anuar

y for a nother six weeks. He the n beca me able to wa lk ag ain. At the time of the defe ndant’s trial, ne arly

two y ear s later, L ee still had not fully rec overe d.

Trooper s Wesley

Kitts and Carl Cag le worke d the ac cident sce ne. Kit t s s t at ed that the
passeng er side of

t h e defe ndant’s vehic le collided with the passe ng er side of the victims’ vehicle. There wer e skid marks fr om the victims’ vehicle but none from the defe ndant’s vehicle. N o alcohol container s were found i n the defendant’s vehicle. The collisi on occur red in the outside lane of

the highw ay . After

leavingthe sce ne of the acc ident, Cag le went to the hospital to have blood samples

ex tra ct edfr o m b o t h dri v er s

. He i n d i ca t edt h at t h i s wa s s t an d ar d p o l i cy i nac ci d en t s i n v o l v i n g a fat a li ty

. Ca g le a dv is e d th e d e f e n d an t th a t th e r e w a s a d e a th an d th a t th e y w e r e o p e n in g an invest igat ion. T he y

we re no t a

ble to s e c ur e a

blo od sampl e fr om L e e be c a

us e of the e xten t of

his injuries. Howeve r, they

wer e able to ext rac t a sample fr om the def endant. The defe ndant was on a ventilator w hen Cag le ar rived at the hospital. He said th at h e n o t i ced the smell of alcohol

emanating f

rom the air be ing e x trac ted by the ventil ator. Cag le looked throug h the def endant’ s wallet to obtain his identification and discove red a small amount of a substance that l o o k ed like marijuana wra pped in ce llophane.

The blood sample take n from the de fenda nt and t he subst ance found in the def endant’ s wallet

wer e sent to the lab f

or testing . After

the re sults of the tests run on those substance s came back
po sit ive fo r a lc oh ol a

nd mari jua na , a wa rr ant w a s is su e d f

or the de fe nd ant. Ca g le a tte mpt e d to loc a te the de fe nd ant a

t hi s o nly kn ow n a dd

re ss, his pa

re nts ’ hou se , b ut h e wa s una ble to f ind the de fe nd a nt. The wa rra nt was issued approx imately a mont h and a half af ter the a ccide nt. The def

endant wa s later located in F lorida and e x tradited ba ck to Tenne ssee.

Celeste White and Dave Fe rg uson of the Te nnessee Bur eau of I nvestig ation (T. B . I .) tested the substanc es o b tained fr om the defe ndant. White confirmed that the substanc e found in the defe ndant’s wa llet was marijuana. Ferguson stated that the def endant’ s blood alcohol conc entration was .05%. T he def

endant’ s b l o od sample wa s taken at 2:32 a.m. The police r eport indicates that the a c c ide nt oc c ur

re d thr e e ho ur s e arl ie r a

t 11 :32 p. m. Fe rg uson testified that the T. B . I . does not do extrapolations. He said that he did not know the ne cessa ry fac tors to do an extrapolation and that he would “ha

ve to take into ac count a pe rson’s ra ce, the ir weig ht, ability to metabolize alcohol and brea k it down at which rate.” He was only g iven a blood sample a

nd no other infor

mation.

Tony a Hor

ton, also with the T. B. I ., analy zed the defe ndant’s blood sample for the pre sence of dr ug s. Th e sampl e te ste d p os iti ve fo r t he pr e se nc e of an ina c tiv e mari jua na me ta bo lit e . Sh e did not test for the a ctive metabolite, whic h rema ins in the blood for only two to fo ur hours a fter-4-

inge sti n g m ar i

j u ana. Horton testified that the inac tive metabolite could be de tected in the bloodstream for

day s after

inge stion, dep en d i n g o n t h e subj ect’ s usag e patter n. She said that the inactive meta

bolite has no eff

ect on a person. Horton was unable to deter mine when the de fenda

nt inge sted the marijuana

.

Dr. Kenneth Ferslew
, a tox icolog ist and pharmacolog ist, testified on behalf of the State. Dr

. Fe rslew testified that he is able to do extrapolations of blood alcohol concentrations using “Widmark’s hy

pothesis.” He sa id that nor mal humans eliminate alc ohol at an ave rag e rate of .017 per hour . Howeve r, he e mphasized that this was only an averag e, and the actua l rate w ould vary fr om pe rs on to pe rs on

. F or so me on e wh o ne ve r dr ank , the rate wo uld be ve ry low . F or a c hr on ic dr ink e r, the ra

te wo uld be hig h. I n any e ve nt, the e lim inatio n ra te wo uld be fr om a

low of .0 12 to a hig h of .024.

Dr. F erslew calc ulated, based on aver ag es, that the def endant’ s blood alcohol conc entration was lik el y

to be .101 at the time of the acc ident. He kne w that the def endant’ s conce ntration was

. 0 5 t h re e h o u rs af

t er t h e a c c i d e n t

. Dr

. Fe rs l ew t h en as s u m edt h at t h e d ef en d an th adan av er age elimination rate of .017. H e also a ssumed that the def endant wa s in the elimination phase during the entire thre e hours. The avera g e elimi nation rate multipl ied by three totaled .051. The leve l at the time of testing, .05, plus the amount eliminated, .051, equale d .101. Howeve r, Dr. Fer slew indicate d that he c ou ld n ot d e te rm ine the a c tua l bl oo d a lc oh ol le ve l of the de fe nd ant a t the tim e of the a c c ide nt.

Dr

. F e r s l e w s t a t e d

t h a tt h e r e w e r e t o o m an y u n kn o w nv ar i a

b l e s t o p e r f

o r m ana c c ur a te extrapolation of the actua l blood a lcohol level. He said that he would a lso like to know things like
t h e a l co h o l i n ges t i o nra t e, wh at t h e de fe n d an t dra n k
, h o w mu ch h e dr an k
, wh en h e st ar t eddri n k i n g, and whe n he stopped drinking. Dr. Fersle w t estified that without knowing the va riables involved, he c ou ld o nly

a c c ur a te ly

g ive a ra ng e of blo od a lc oh ol l e ve ls. B a se d o n th e low e st e lim inatio n r a te of .012 and the highe st rate of .024, the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration would be any wher e from .086 to .122 at the time of the acc ident. Ag ain, this was also assuming that the def endant wa s in the elimination phase for the entire three hours following the ac cident.

The doc tor conc eded tha

t he did not know f

or sure that the def

endant wa s in the elimination phase f or the e ntire three hours. Prior to the elimination phase is the absor ption pha se. A per son can

re ma in in the a

bs or pti on ph a se fo r fi ft e e n min ute s to tw o h ours a ft e r c on su min g a lc oh ol. Th e tim e depends on a

person’ s consum ption rate a nd pattern of

usag e. I f someone ha s an empty stomach, the rate wo uld

lik e ly be c los e r t o f

if te e n min ute s. I f the pe rs on ha d c on su me d a larg e me a l, t he rate would probably

be close r to two hours. Ther e is no ave rag e known r ate of absorption. I t varies f

rom pe rs on to p e rs on

. Dr

. F e rs le w state d that if the de fe nd ant we re in the po st- a bs or pti on ph a se fo r o nly two hours, then his blood alcohol leve l would be in the ra ng e of .074 to .098.

Dr. F erslew

testified about the eff

ects of ma

rijuana on huma

ns. He testified that the active marijuana metabolite ca

n only be dete cted f

or fifte en minutes to one hour a fter ing estion. He stated that a per son could stay h igh f or up to four hour s after

the ing estion of marijuana . Dr. F erslew testified that depe nding on how much a pe rso n s m o k ed
, when they smoked, and how of

ten they-5-

smo ke d, a

sin g le mari

jua na c ig a re tte c ou ld usu a lly be de te c te d f or thr e e to f ive da y s. I n a c hr on ic smoker, it could be de tected f rom day s to weeks. Dr. Fe rslew stated that from the test perf ormed on the def endant’ s blood sample, i t could not be determined when he used ma rijuana. H e also testified that marijuana

usag e ca n aff ect bot h a p er s on’s ability to operate a motor ve hicle and e y e/hand coordination and can c ause a distortion in perc eption, alteration in consciousness or attention span, and a loss of the ability

to conce ntrate.

Th e do c tor

a lso te sti fi e d a

bo ut the e ff

e c ts of a lc oh ol on a pe rs on

. At .0 2% , a pe rs on sta rt s to lose inhibit ions and an e x pansion of the pe rson’s persona lity beg ins. O nce a person g ets in the .04% to .05% ra

ng e, one w ould start seeing chang es i n judgme nt. Upon rea ching the .08% to .10%
rang e, one be g ins to see loss of motor skills, l oss of coordination, altered j u d gm ent, alteration of

a tte nti on sp an, and a los s of a

bil ity to c on c e ntr a te . A t a le ve l of .0 5% , a pe rs on wo uld have so me deg ree of i m p ai rm en t from alcohol. I t would affe ct things suc h as re action time, ey e/hand coordination, ab i l i t y t o co ncentr ate, a nd judgme nt. A person would not see double or g et blurre d vision at a .05% leve l. A ll individuals demonstrate the ef fec ts of alcohol; howeve r, the e x tent of the eff ects va ries fr om person to per son. When alcohol and ma ri j u an a ar e combined, there c an be a
sy nerg istic effe ct. The two substanc es put tog ether can ha ve a g reater e ffe ct than either w ould on its own.

Ana lys is

The de fenda

nt contends on appe al that (1) the re w as insufficie nt evidence to s u p p ort the

c on vic tio ns fo r a g g ra

vate d v e hi cul ar h omi c ide and a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult , ( 2) the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in allowing evidenc e of ina ctive mar ijuana metabolites fo u n d in the defe ndant’s blood af ter the

acc ident, (3) the tr ial court erre d in allowing e vidence conce rning extrapolation of the def endant’ s blood alcohol conc entration back to the time of the acc ident, (4) the trial court er red in not allowing the def endant to plea d g uilty to driving on a suspended license, ( 5) the trial c ourt err ed in allowing evidenc e conce rning extradition and instructing the jury on flig ht, and (6) the cumulative ef fec t of the er rors re quires a ne w trial.

I . Sufficienc y

of Evidenc e

The defe ndant contends on appea l that the evidenc e is insufficient to support the c onvictions for a g g ravated vehicula

r homicide a

nd ag g ravated assault. W h en a defe ndant cha lleng es the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence , the standar d of re view is whethe r, af ter viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favora

ble to the State, any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime bey ond a rea sonable doubt. Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13( e); J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, (1979); State v. Eva

ns, 838 S.W .2d 185, 190-91 (Te nn. 1992). On appea l, the State is entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence and all re asonable or leg itimate inf ere nces which may

be dra wn t h er ef

ro m

. S t at e v

. E l k i n s , 1 0 2 S

. W

. 3 d 5 7 8
, 5 8 1 (T en n

. 2 0 0 3 ). T h i s C o u rt wi l l n o tre we i gh the evidenc e, reeva luate the e vidence , or substitute its evidentiary infere nces f

or those re ache d by the jury

. State v. Carey
, 914 S.W .2d 93, 95 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . Fur thermore , in a cr iminal-6-

trial, g reat weig ht is given to the r esult rea ched by the jury . State v. J ohnson, 910 S.W .2d 897, 899 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.

On c e a pp ro ve d b y

the tr ia l c ourt , a

jur y ve rd ic t a c c re dit s th e wi tne sse s p re se nte d b y the Sta te and re solves all conflicts in f avor of the State. State v. Willi ams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983)

. The c redibility

of witnesses, the w eig ht to be g iven their testimony , and the r ec onciliation of conflicts in the proof

are matters entrusted e x clusively to the jury

as trier of fa ct. State v. Sheffie ld, 676 S .W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v. B rew er, 932 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). A jury ’s g uilty

verdic t r emoves the presumption of innoce nce e njoy ed by the def endant at trial and raises a presumption of g uilt. S tate v. Tug g le, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . The de fenda nt then bears t he burden of overcoming this presumption of guilt on appea l. State v. Blac k, 815 S.W .2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991)

. A. Ag g ravated Vehic ular Homicide

The de fenda

nt first argues that the e vidence is insufficient to prove that he was intox icated at the time of the acc ident. Vehicula r homicide by intox ication is “ the re ckless killing of another by the op e ratio n o f a

n a uto mob ile . . . [a s] th e pr oximate re su lt o f t he dr ive r’ s in toxic a tio n a s se t f or th in § 55-10

- 4 0 1

. ” T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 1 3 ( a ) ( 2 )

. Se c ti o n5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 1 p r o h ib it s , in p e rti n e nt part, a person f rom driving on the public roa ds and hig hway s wh i l e u n der “ the influenc e of a ny intox icant, mar ijuana, nar coti c d rug , or drugproducingstimul ating eff ects on the c entra l nervous
sy stem.” I d. § 55-10-401( a)( 1); see a lso id. § 39-13-213(a) (2) ( providing that intox ication for purposes of the vehicular homicide statute includes both alc ohol and druginto x i ca t i o n). One commits a g g ravated vehicular homicide when the defe ndant has two or mor e pre vious convictions for dr iving unde r the influenc e of a n intox icant. I d. § 39-13-218( a)( 1)(A)

.

The de fenda

nt i n ex p l i cably

drove into oncoming traff ic and struc k the victims’ vehicle, killing the passe ng er. Three hours afte r the acc ident, the def endant’ s blood alcohol conc entration was .05%. D r. F erslew

testified that the def

endant’ s blood a lcohol level at the time of the ac cident was likely

to be in the ra

ng e of .086% to .122%. Dr. F erslew testified as to the e ffe cts of alc ohol at d i f f e r e n tc o n c e n t r a t i o n s

. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t , e v e n a t

. 0 5 %
, a

p e r s o nc o u l d

b e i mp a i r e d

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, Trooper Cag le smelled the odor of alcohol ema

nating from the de fenda

nt at the hospital. A jury

c ou ld h a ve c on c lud e d th a t th e de fe nd ant w a s in toxic a te d b y a lc oh ol at th e tim e of

the a c c ide nt.

A blood sa

mple taken from the defe ndant indicated that he had use d marijuana . Howeve r, the experts could not deter mine when the ma

rijuana w as ac t u al l y i n gested. Expert testimony

reve aled that the eff

ects of marijuana can persist for up to f our hours afte r inge stion. The defe ndant possessed mar ijuana at the time of the ac cident. The jury

could have deter

mined that the pre sence of the inac tive marijuana

metabolite in the defendant’s blood, along with his possession of marijuana at the time of the accident, indi cate d that he wa s under the inf luence of marijuana

at the time of the

acc ident.-7-

Additionally , even if

the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration or the marijuana inge sted did not sufficie ntly

impair the def

endant on their

own, Dr. F erslew

testified that the sy

nerg istic effe ct of both substanc es toge ther could have cause d the defe ndant to be intox icated. V iewing the evidenc e in the light most fa

vorable to the State, the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the jury ’s deter mination that th e de fe nd ant w a s in toxic a te d at th e tim e of the a c c ide nt.

The de fenda

nt next argues that the e vidence is insufficient to prove that his int ox ication was the pr oximate c a

us e of the vic tim ’s de a th. Th e de fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t th e re are oth e r r e a so na ble explanations to explain why the defendant drove i nto oncoming traff ic. The defenda

nt submit s that he wa s possibly

aslee p or not pa

y ing attention. These explanations we re considere d by the jury and reje cted. As w e have stated above , there was sufficient evidence to conc lude that the def endant wa s int oxic a te d. I t w a s r a tio na l f or the jur y to i nf e r t hat th e de fe nd ant’ s in toxic a tio n w a s th e pr oximate

c a us e of the a c c ide nt a

nd the su bs e qu e nt d e a th. Th is a

rgume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.

B . A g g ra vate d A ssa

ult

The defe ndant argues that the evidenc e is insuff icient to suppor

t the convic t i o n for
ag g ravated assault. Specif ically , he conte nds that the State failed to es t ab l i sh that he ac ted knowing ly

or intentionally . The de fenda nt was convic ted of a g g ravated assault by intentionally or knowing ly causing bodily injury to another by use of a deadly wea pon. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-102(a )(1) (B ). The jur

y was instructe d “that a pe rson acts intentionally with respec t to the nature of the c on du c t or

to a re su lt o f t

he c on du c t w he n it is t

he pe rs on ’s c on sc iou s o bje c tiv e or de sir e to

e ng a g e in t

he c on du c t or

c a us e the re su lt. ” Se e id. § 3 9- 11 -3 02 (a ). Th e jur y wa s in str uc te d “ that a person a cts knowing ly

with respec t to the conduct or to c ircumstance s surrounding the conduc t when the per son is awar e of the nature of the c onduct or that the circ umstances exis t.” See id. at (b) . “A person acts knowing ly with respe ct t o a result of t he person’s conduct when the pe rson is awa re that the conduc t is reasona

bly cer tain to cause the re sult.” See id.

The jury reje cted the char g e of rec kless ag g ravated assault and f ound the def

endant guilty

of kn ow inga g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult . T he e vid e nc e sh ow s th a t de fe nd ant k no wi ng ly dr ov e a ve hic le wh ile int oxic a te d. F ro m the thi s e vid e nc e , the jur y c ou ld have re a so na

bly inf e rr e d that t he d efenda

nt, wh ile dr ivi ngimp a ir e d, wa s awa re that his c on du c t w a s r e a so na bly c e rt a in t o r e su lt i n s e ri ou s b od ily inj ur y . T he e vid e nc e is s uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the c on vic tio n f

or a g g ravated a ssa

ult . T his iss ue is wi tho ut m e ri t.

I I . Admission of I nactive Ma rijuana Me tabolite Evidence

Th e de fe nd ant ar g ue s tha t evi de nc e of the pr e se nc e of

the ina c tiv e mari

jua na me ta bo lit e in his blo od wa s ir re le va nt t o h is i nto xicatio n at th e tim e of the a c c ide nt. He a lso argue s th a t e ve n if rele vant, the probative value wa s subs t an t i ally outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. Re le va nt e vid e nc e is e vid e nc e that te nd s to make a ma te ri a l f

a c t mo re or

le ss p ro ba

ble . T e nn . R. Ev i d

. 4 0 1

. “ A l t h o u g h r e l e v an t , e v i d e n c e m ay b e e xc l u d e d

i f i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e i s s ub sta nti a lly outweig hed by

the dange r of unfair prejudice
, confusion of the i ssues, or misleading the jury , or by-8-

considerations of undue delay , waste of time, or nee dless prese ntation of cumulative e vidence .” I d. 403. The c rime of vehicular homicide by intox ication require s the State to prove that the de fenda nt

wa s i n t o x i ca t ed

. T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 9 -1 3 -2 1 3 (a )( 2 ). I n t o x i ca t i n g s u b s t an ce s i n cl u d e i l l ega l dru gs such as mar ijuana. I d. §§ 39-13-213( a)( 2), 55-10- 401(a) . Ex pert tes t i m o n y re veale d that the metabolite could only

be pre sent bec ause the defe ndant had used ma rijuana. A long w ith the fac t that the def endant possesse d marijuana at the time of the a ccide nt, the prese nce of the metabolite tended
to make it more probable that the defendant ha d rec ently inge sted marijuana

and wa s intox icated at the tim e of

the a c c ide nt. Th e tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr in f ind ingthat th e e vid e nc e wa s r e le va nt.

Rule 403 place s a hea

vy burden on a

party s ee k i n g t o exclude rele vant evidenc e. State v. Jame s, 81 S.W. 3d

75 1, 75 7 (Ten n. 20 02 )( c iti ngRoy v. Di a mon d, 16 S.W. 3d

78 3, 79 1 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1999)). T he exclusion of rele vant evidence “‘is an ex traordina ry reme dy that should be used sparing ly .’” I d. (quot i ng Whit e v. Va nderbilt Univ., 21 S.W .3d 215, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999))

. Th e de fe nd ant a

rgue s th a t th e pr e se nc e of th e in activ e me ta bo lit e wa s n ot p ro bativ e of his intox ication at the time of the acc ident. The e x perts testified that they could not deter

mine from the test results when the de fenda nt inge sted marijuana . Dr. Fer slew stated that ing estion could have been any wher e from a fe w minutes to weeks pr ior to the ac cident. The prese nce of the marijuana metabolite, along with the defe ndant’s possession of marijuana at t he ti me of the a ccide nt, supported

a conc lusion by the j ury that the defendant had rec ently inge sted marijuana and wa s intox icated. T he expert explained to the jury that the prese nce of the inactive meta bolite did not necessar ily

mean that the defe ndant was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the ac cident. He testified that the eff ects of ma

rijuana c ould last up to four hours fr om the time that it is inge sted. The e x pert made it c le ar t o th e jur

y that th e ina c tiv e me ta

bo lit e its e lf

wo uld have no e ff

e c t on a pe rs on . I t w a s w ith in the province of the jury

to decide what weig ht to g ive to the evidenc e. The probative value of the

ev id e n c e r e g ar d in g th e p r e s e n c e o f th e in a c ti v e ma r ij u an a me ta

b o li te w a s n o t o u tw e ig hed by the da ng e r o f u nf a ir pr e jud ic e . T his argume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.

I I I . Admission of Blood Alcohol Conce ntration Ext rapolation Evidence

The de fenda

nt contends that the trial c ourt err ed in allowing testimony by Dr. F erslew

conce rning blood alcohol level e x trapolation back to the time of the collision. The def endant a rg ues that there wer e too many

unknown var iables to consider the testimony reliable . The trial c ourt found that extrapolation is a rec og nized field in which Dr. F erslew was a qualified e x pert.

“I f scientific , technica l, or other spe cialized knowledg e will substantially assist the trier of fac t to understand the e v i d en ce o r t o deter mine a fa ct in issue, a witness qualifie d as an e x pert by knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining , or educ ation may t es t i fy i n the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Tenn. R. Evid. 702. The tria l c ourt must ex clude e x pert testimony “in the for

m of an opinion or infere nce if the underlying fac ts or data indicate lack of trustworthiness.” T enn. R. Evid. 703. Deter

minations concer

ning the admissibili ty

of expert testimony , includ i n g t h e b as is of the expert opinion, are within the discretion of the tria l court. State v. B allard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993); see St ate v. Hall, 958 S.W .2d 679, 689 (Tenn. 1997) . Howeve r, the jury deter mines the weig ht and cr edibility

of the e x pert’s te stimony . State v. Ander son, 880 S.W .2d 720, 732 (Tenn.-9-

Crim. App. 1994). The standard of revie w on appea l is whether the trial cour

t abused its discretion in admitting the expert testimony . State v. Reid, 91 S.W .3d 247, 294 (Tenn. 2002)

.

The de fenda

nt d o es n o t co n test that Dr. F erslew is a qualified e x pert. He argues that

e xtra po la tio n is sc ie nti fi c a lly

un re lia ble and did no t su bs tanti a lly a ssi st the jur

y in d e te rm ini nghis intox ication. I n deciding whether to admit expert testimony , the trial cour t must “determine whe ther the re asoning or methodolog y underlying the sc ie nti f

ic e v id ence is sufficiently

valid and re liable, and whether it can prope rly

be applied to the f

acts at issue.” McDa

niel v. CSX Transp., I nc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tenn. 1997) . The tria l co u rt must be satisfied that the expert “opinions ar e base d on rele vant scientific methods, proce sses, and data, and not upon an expert’s mere speculation.” I d. at 265.

Dr. F erslew

testified that he c ould not determi ne the de fenda nt’s actua l blood alcohol

c on c e ntr a tio n at th e tim e of the c oll isi on be c a us e of un kn ow n v ari a

ble s. He wa s a

ble to t e sti fy

to

a ra ng e of blood a lcohol levels. I t w as within the province of the jury to a cce pt or reje ct the expert’s testimony . Even without the extrapolation e vidence
, the jury could have found that the def endant was intox icated. His blood alcohol concentration three hours after the acc ident was .05%. A jury could infer

intox ication at the time of the wre ck base d on his level of .05% w hen tested. State v. McKinney , 605 S.W .2d 842, 846 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (test per formed two and a half hours af ter the acc ident). The defe ndant smelled of alcohol afte r the acc ident. Additionally
, the jury could have found that the de fenda

nt was intox icated, ba sed on his marijuana use alone . Also, even with a blood alcohol leve l below the pre sumptive level of intox ication, the sy nerg istic e ffe ct of the marijuana and

a l c o h o l c o u l d

h a v e r e n d e r e d t h e d e f

e n d an ti n t o x i c a t e d

. E v e nw i th o u tt h e e x t r a p o l a t i o nt e s t i m o n y, the evidenc e wa s sufficient to establish intox ication. There fore
, any err or in a dmitti ng the evidenc e

wo uld have be e n h arm le ss. Th is i ssu e is w ith out me ri t.

I V. Sever ance of Off

enses

Th e de fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in re fu sin g to a llo w him to p le a d guil ty to driving on a suspended license. The defe ndant wanted to ple ad g uilty to the char g e prior to tria l and exclude from the jury

any evidenc e that his lice nse was suspended. Essentially
, the defe ndant ar g ues that the suspended license char g e should have been se vere d from the r emaining char g es prior to trial beca use of unf

air pre judice. He contends that the jury was fr ee to spe cul at e t h at the def endant’ s license w as suspende d beca use of a prior driving under the i n fl u ence conviction. Rule 14(b)( 2)
state s th a t of

fe ns e s joi ne d un de r Rul e 8( a ) may be se ve re d be fo re tr ia l, i f i t is de e me d n e c e ssa ry , to promote or achie ve a fair deter mination of the defe ndant’s g uilt or innocenc e of eac h offe nse. Tenn. R. Crim. P . 14(b)( 2)(i). This Court will not rever se a tria l court’s de cision conce rning sever ance of offe nses, pursuant to Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Proc edure 8 and 14, abse nt an abuse of discre tion. State v. Thompson, 88 S.W.3d 611, 613 ( Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) ( citations omitt ed). The defe ndant has fa iled to affir

matively show that he wa s prejudice d by the trial cour

t’s re fu s al t o s ev er the offe nses. The trial court did not abuse its discr etion in refusingto sever the driving on a suspende d lic e ns e c ha

rg e . T his argume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.-10-

V. Evidenc e of F light and E x tradition

The de fenda

nt contends that the trial c ourt err ed in allowing the Sta t e t o introduce a do c ume nt s ho wi ng

tha t the de fe nd ant wa s extr a dit e d fr om F lor ida and ins tr uc tin g the jur

y on fl ig ht. The de fenda

nt argues that he did not “immediately ” leave the “ scene of the c rime.” The ref ore, the evide n ce did not warra

nt an instruction on flig ht. Contrary to the defe ndant’s ar g ument, it is not

nece ssary that the leavingbe immediate or from the sc ene of

the crime

.

“ Th e law ma ke s no nic e or re fi ne d dist inc tio n as t o th e mann e r o r m e tho d o f a fl ig ht; it ma y b e o p e n , o r it ma

y b e a h u r

r ie d o r c o n c e a le d d e p artu r e , o r it ma

y b e a

conce alment within the jurisdiction. How ever , it take s both le aving the sce ne of the d i f f i c u l t y an d a s u b s e q u e n t h i d i n g o u t , e v a s i o n , o r c o n c e a l m e n ti nt h e c o m m u n i t y, or a le aving of the c ommunity for pa rts unknown, to constitute flight.” State v. Whit t en m eir, 725 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (quoting Roge rs v. State, 2 Tenn. Crim. App. 491, 502, 455 S.W.2d 182, 187 (1970)). I t is proper for the trial court to instruct the jury on flig ht w hen the issue has been raised by the proof. See State v. Kendr icks, 947 S.W .2d 875, 885-86 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1996) (jury instruction on flight is prope r statement of the law)

.

Tr oo pe r C a g le inf

or me d th e de fe ndant th at an inve sti g a tio n w a s b e ingc on du c te d b e c a us e

someone wa s killed. The def endant kne w that he ha d been dr inking pr ior to the collision and that he po sse sse d ma

ri jua na a t th e tim e of

the c oll isi on . T ro op e r C a g le a tte mpt e d to ser ve an a rr e st

war rant on the de fenda

nt 55 d ay s af

t er t h e event occurr ed. The police we re not a ble to locate the defe ndant at his pare nts’ house, his only known address. He was subsequently located in F lorida and extradited back to Te nnessee . The evidence at t rial sufficiently raised the issue of flight. The trial court did not err

in instructing the jur

y on flig ht. Consequently , since the evidenc e ra ised the issue of fl ig ht, the do c ume nt c on c e rn ing ex tr adi tion w a s r e le va nt a nd a dmi ssi ble . T his argume nt i s wi tho ut m e ri t.

VI . Cumulative Effec t of Error s

Th e de fe nd ant co nte nd s tha t the c umu la tiv e e ff e c t of the e rr or s ra ise d on ap pe a l w arr a nts a new tria l. We recog nize that while i n d i v i d u al err ors may not require relief

, the combination of multipl e er

rors may nece ssitate the reve rsal of a conviction. See State v. Z immerman, 823 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. As we have dis cussed above, we find all of t he issues ra ised by the de fe nd ant t o b e wi tho ut m e ri t. T he re fo re , th e de fe nd ant i s n ot e nti tle d to a ne w tri a l.

Conclusion

Ba sed on the for eg oing a nd t h e re co rd as a whole, the judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI L L I AMS, J UDGE