alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-30167

Summary Calendar

ROBERT LEROY MCCOY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CRAIG STOKES; LARRY C. DEAN; ROBERT PARKER; DANIEL TALLEY;

SHERIFF’S OFFICE BOSSIER PARISH,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:08-CV-1918

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Robert McCoy, Louisiana inmate # 55949, moves this court for leave to apUnited States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 30, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 10-30167 Document: 00511159936 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/30/2010
No. 10-30167

peal in forma pauperis (“IFP”) following the entry of summary judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint. By moving for leave to appeal IFP, McCoy has

challenged the district court’s determination that the appeal is not taken in good

faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

This court’s inquiry into whether the appeal is taken in good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves ‘legal points arguable on their merits (and

therefore not frivolous).’” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983)

(citation omitted). If we uphold the district court’s certification that the appeal

is not taken in good faith, McCoy must pay the appellate filing fee, or the appeal

will be dismissed for want of prosecution. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202. If the appeal is frivolous, we may dismiss it sua sponte under 5th Cir. R. 42.2. Id. at 202

n.24.

McCoy has waived the issue whether the appeal is taken in good faith by

failing to challenge any aspect of the district court’s determination that McCoy

did not allege a constitutional violation by any named defendant. See Hughes

v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 613 (5th Cir. 1999). Moreover, the record reveals no

error in the dismissal.

Because the appeal does not present any legal points arguable on their

merits, the motion for leave to proceed IFP is denied, and the appeal is dismissed

as frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n. 24. The dismissal counts as a

strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387-

88 (5th Cir. 1996). McCoy is cautioned that if he accumulates three strikes, he

will not be allowed to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is

detained or incarcerated in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of

serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).

IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.

2

Case: 10-30167 Document: 00511159936 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/30/2010
No. 13718 IN THE SUPREbE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

IN RE: THE MATTER OF HERBERT MILLER.

Appeal from: District Court of the Third Judicial District, Honorable Robert Boyd, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: James Dorr Johnson argued, Warm Springs, Montana Steven Bunch, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Mark P.Sullivan argued, Butte, Montana Nick A. Rotering, Helena, Montana

~iled:

## DEC

## 22

## 1977 Submitted: November 28, 1977 

### ?cr

## 2~

.

## - Decided: -iu 

## .Mr. JusticeJohn Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal results from proceedings pursuant to section 38-1312, R.C.M. 1947. The district court, Deer Lodge County, the Hon. Robert Boyd presiding, found Herbert Miller tobe seriously mentally ill and ordered an extension of his commitment period atWarm Springs StateHospital for sixadditional months. Miller was firstcommitted toWarm Springs in 1956. The

. reason for admissionwas given as acharge of homicide. Miller
was lastcommitted toWarm Springs by court order on January 9, 1957.Section 38-1312, R.C.M. 1947, requires that any person who, by reason of a judicial decree, was adjudged mentally ill prior to the enactment of Title 38, Chapter 13, shall, within
one year following the effectivedate of the actbe released, unless a petition for an extended detention order 

### is filed. The required petition was filedby Warm Springs staff psychologist Katherine Gallagher on June 29, 1976. Miller had been under the care and supervision of psychologist Gallagher prior to the filing of the petition. The petition was accompanied by a written report and evaluation of hismental and physical condition asrequired by section 38-1306(6) (now 38- 1306(3), by 1977 amendment), R.C.M. 1947, compiled by psychologist Gallagher. Upon application of counsel forMiller, Judge Boyd appointed 

### Dr. Ben Peters, a psychiatrist fromAnaconda, Montana, to independently evaluate him. The hearing pursuant tothe petition washeld on December 3, 1976. Psychologist Gallagherwas the sole witness to testify. Atthebeginning of the hearing, counsel forMiller moved to strike the psychologist' report from the court fileon the grounds it constitutedhearsay evidence. The District Court denied the motion. Counsel additionally asserted the psychologist/patient privilege under section 66-3212, R.C.M. 1947, as a bar to the testimony of psychologist Gallagher. That motion was likewise denied. Atthe conclusion of the hearing, the District Court concluded Miller was "seriously mentally ill"and ordered his detention atWarm Springs be extended for an additional six months, Miller appeals. \ The issues raised and arguments advanced 

### on appeal by Miller are identical to those considered inthe companion case In the Matter of Curtis Sonsteng (this Court's No. 13719, decided December
, 

## , 1977), and reference 

### ismade thereto. Wefindno need to repeat our prior holdings and discussion of the relevant procedures and legalprinciples as found inSonsteng. The order of the District Court 

### is affirmed.

We Concur:

Justices.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
PARTNERSHIP'S STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS AND BALANCE SHEETS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               449,193
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               312,107
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             360,093
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,907,637
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          2,907,637
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,907,637
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>
 
                                                                  EXHIBIT 11.1


SUMMIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.
Computation of Earnings Per Share
(Unaudited)

<TABLE> 
<CAPTION> 


                                          Three Months Ended        Nine Months Ended
                                             September 30,            September 30,
                                           1997        1996         1997          1996
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<S>                                     <C>          <C>           <C>          <C> 
PRIMARY EARNINGS PER SHARE:

  Weighted average shares outstanding   10,343,790   10,226,856    10,350,129    9,088,043 
  Net effect of dilutive stock options                                                     
   --based on the treasury stock method          -            -             -            - 
                                       ------------------------   ------------------------ 
                                        10,343,790   10,226,856    10,350,129    9,088,043 
                                       ========================   ========================
                                                                                           
  Net loss                             $(4,563,831) $(1,713,562) $(15,370,945) $(2,187,176)
                                       ========================   ========================
                                                                                           
  Net loss per share                   $   (0.44)     $ (0.17)       $(1.49)       $(0.24)  
                                       ========================   ========================
                                                                                          
FULLY DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE:                                                         
                                                                                          
  Weighted average shares outstanding   10,343,790   10,226,856    10,350,129    9,088,043 
  Net effect of dilutive stock options                                                     
   --based on the treasury stock method          -            -             -            - 
                                       ------------------------   ------------------------ 
                                        10,343,790   10,226,856    10,350,129    9,088,043 
                                       ========================   ========================
                                                                                           
  Net loss                             $(4,563,831) $(1,713,562) $(15,370,945) $(2,187,176)
                                       ========================   ========================
                                                                                           
  Net loss per share                   $   (0.44)     $ (0.17)       $(1.49)       $(0.24)  
                                       ========================   ========================

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE> 3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-2001
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-2000
<CASH>                                           2,532
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,725,707
<ALLOWANCES>                                    69,000
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,659,239
<PP&E>                                       7,256,945
<DEPRECIATION>                                 697,458
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,546,376
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       19,005,683
<BONDS>                                      2,734,377
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          4
<COMMON>                                        28,088
<OTHER-SE>                                (13,221,776)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,546,376
<SALES>                                      3,639,195
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,639,195
<CGS>                                        2,942,916
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,942,916
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,898,191
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              77,274
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,279,186)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,279,186)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,279,186)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.06)


</TABLE>
262 La. 1096

#### Mary A. ELLEDGE, individually and in her capacity as natural tutrix of the minor, Murray Jay Elledge v. Earl F. WARREN et al.

No. 52655.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 19, 1972.

In re: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Lafayette. 263 So.2d 912.

Writ refused. The judgment is not final.
#### STATE ex rel. Josie KOONTZ v. Claude R. KIRK et al.

No. 38637.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 1969.

Mandamus denied without opinion.
#### James E. McDONALD v. STATE.

No. 38561.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 221 So.2d 36.
Exhibit 31.1

Certification Under Section 302

of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





I, Peter W. Knitt, certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of PSB Holdings, Inc. (the registrant);



2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations, and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.

The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:



(a)

designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b)

evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c)

disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5.

The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a)

all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial information; and



(b)

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.





Date:  August 10, 2007

PETER W. KNITT

Peter W. Knitt

President and Chief Executive Officer
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1538 

To enhance consumer rights relating to consumer report disputes by requiring 

provision of documentation provided by consumers. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 

Ms. KLOBUCHAR (for herself, Mr. BEGICH, and Mr. NELSON) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

A BILL 

To enhance consumer rights relating to consumer report 

disputes by requiring provision of documentation provided by consumers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘FIX Credit Reporting 

5 Errors Act’’, or the ‘‘FIX Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. PROVISION OF DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED BY 

7 CONSUMERS. 

8 Section 611 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 

9 U.S.C. 1681i) is amended— 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1538 IS

1 (1) in subsection (a)— 

2 (A) in paragraph (2)— 

3 (i) in subparagraph (A), by inserting 

4 ‘‘, including documentation provided by the 

5 consumer,’’ after ‘‘relevant information’’; 

6 and 

7 (ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting 

8 ‘‘, including documentation provided by the 

9 consumer,’’ after ‘‘relevant information’’; 

10 and 

11 (B) in paragraph (4), by inserting ‘‘, in12 cluding documentation,’’ after ‘‘relevant infor13 mation’’; and 

14 (2) in subsection (f)(2)(B)(ii), by inserting ‘‘, 

15 including documentation,’’ after ‘‘relevant informa16 tion’’. 

Æ 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Juan Antonio Deleon, Jr., * From the 42nd District Court

of Taylor County,

Trial Court No. 29231-A.

Vs. No. 11-22-00113-CR * February 23, 2023

The State of Texas, * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

(Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is no 

error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, 

the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
#### Russell MOISE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Pierre LeBLANC, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 4227.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

June 29, 1973.

J. Barry Mouton, Lafayette, for plaintiffs-appellants.

John Rixie Mouton and J. Minos Simon, Lafayette, for defendant-appellee.

Before SAVOY, HOOD and CULPEP-PER, JJ.

SAVOY, Judge.

This is a possessory action. Plaintiffs allege they and their ancestors in title had possessed the property for many years, and that in about 1970 their possession was disturbed by defendant erecting a fence across a portion thereof. Essentially, the defense is that plaintiffs failed to prove the requisite possession for one year preceding the alleged disturbance. After a trial, the district judge sustained this defense and dismissed plaintiffs’ suit. Plaintiffs appealed.

The decisive issue is whether plaintiffs proved possession for more than a year immediately prior to the alleged disturbance in 1970.

At the trial, plaintiffs introduced evidence in an attempt to show they had civil or corporeal possession of this property up until defendant built his fence in 1970 across the eastern portion thereof. For the purpose of showing the extent of this possession, they introduced evidence of their record title to the parent tract in question. On the other hand, defendant introduced evidence which shows by a clear preponderance that the fence, although repaired from time to time, has been in its present location since prior to 1938, and that defendant and his ancestors in title have had corporeal possession to the fence line down to the present time.

LSA-C.C.P. Article 3658 states the requisites of the possessory action as follows:

> “To maintain the possessory action the possessor must allege and prove that:

> “(1) He had possession of the immovable property or real right at the time the disturbance occurred;

> “(2) He and his ancestors in title had such possession quietly and without inter*619ruption for more than a year immediately prior to the disturbance, unless evicted by force or fraud;

> “(3) The disturbance was one in fact or in law, as defined in Article 3659; and “(4) The possessory action was instituted within a year of the disturbance.”

In the present case, plaintiffs have failed to prove they possessed the property in dispute for more than a year immediately prior to the alleged disturbance in 1970. Their suit must therefore be dismissed.

Since title is not at issue, it is unnecessary for us to discuss arguments made by counsel under LSA-C.C. Article 852, and the district court judgment must be amended insofar as it maintains the plea of prescription acquirendi causa under that article.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is amended so as to delete therefrom the maintenance of the plea of prescription under LSA-C.C. Article 852. Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs-appellants.

Amended and affirmed.