NOT YET SCHEDULED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 05-1097 (and consolidated cases) COMPLEX

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

 Respondent.

On Petition for Review of Final Rules of The

United States Environmental Protection Agency

INITIAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

MATTHEW J. McKEOWN

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Environment and Natural Resources Division

JOHN C. CRUDEN

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

ERIC G. HOSTETLER

JON L. LIPSHULTZ

MATTHEW R. OAKES

Environmental Defense Section

United States Department of Justice

P.O. Box 23986

Washington, D.C. 20026-3986 Of Counsel: (202) 305-2326

CAROL S. HOLMES

SUSMITA DUBEY

HOWARD J. HOFFMAN

RICHARD H. VETTER

United States Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20460

May 4, 2007
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

____________________________________

)

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., )

Petitioners, )

)

v. ) No. 05-1097, and consolidated

) cases

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL )

PROTECTION AGENCY, )

)

Respondent. )

___________________________________ )

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), the undersigned counsel for Respondent

United States Environmental Protection Agency submits this certificate as to

parties, rulings and related cases.

A. Parties and Amici:

All parties and amici are listed in the brief of Government Petitioners State

of New Jersey et al., except for Intervenors State of Maryland, WEST Associates

and National Mining Association.

B. Rulings Under Review:

References to the at issue appear in the brief of Government Petitioners.

C. Related Cases:

EPA is not aware of any related case pending in this or any other Court.

-iTABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

JURISDICTION ............................................................1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ................................................. 1

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

I. NATURE OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND .................................3

A. Regulation of Air Pollutants Under CAA Section 111 . . . . . . . . . . . 3

B. Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under CAA Section 112 . . 5

C. Regulation of Air Pollutants Under CAA Section 110 . . . . . . . . . . . 7

III. REGULATORY BACKGROUND ................................8

A. The Section 112(n) Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

B. CAMR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

C. The Reconsideration Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

D. CAIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
-iiI. CONGRESS DIRECTED EPA TO REGULATE HAZARDOUS AIR

POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM POWER PLANTS UNDER CAA

SECTION 112 ONLY WHERE SUCH REGULATION IS BOTH

APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

A. CAA Section 112(n)(1)(A) Imposes Special Conditions on EPA’s

Regulation of Power Plants Under Section 112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

B. EPA Has Authority to Revise a Section 112(n)(1)(A) Finding

Without Applying The Delisting Criteria in Section 112(c)(9) . . . . 21

1. EPA has implied authority to revise a section 112(n)(1)(A)

determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2. EPA may revise a section 112(n)(1)(A) determination without

applying the delisting criteria in section 112(c)(9) . . . . . . . . 24

II. EPA HAS ADOPTED REASONABLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE

TERMS USED IN CAA SECTION 112(n)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

A. EPA Reasonably Interprets the Term “Appropriate.” . . . . . . . . . . . 34

B. EPA Reasonably Interprets the Term “Necessary.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

C. EPA Reasonably Interprets The Term “As a Result”. . . . . . . . . . . . 35

III. EPA REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT IT IS NEITHER

APPROPRIATE NOR NECESSARY TO REGULATE MERCURY

EMISSIONS FROM POWER PLANTS UNDER SECTION 112 . . . . . . 40

A. EPA Appropriately Determined That its December 2000 Finding

Lacked Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

B. EPA Reasonably Determined That it is Not Appropriate to Regulate

Power Plant Mercury Emissions Under Section 112 Because Hazards

to Public Health are Not Reasonably Anticipated to Occur As a

Result of Power Plant Mercury Emissions Following Implementation
-iiiof Act Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

1. Overview of EPA’s Hazard Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

a. EPA projected mercury deposition from power plants

after implementation of CAIR and CAMR . . . . . . . . . 46

b. EPA projected concentrations of utility-attributable

methylmercury in fish tissue after implementation of

CAIR, or independently, CAMR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

c. EPA estimated fish consumption rates . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

d. EPA compared exposure to the methylmercury

Reference Dose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

2. EPA exercised reasonable judgment in concluding that

power plant mercury emissions will not pose a hazard to public

health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

C. Petitioners’ Challenges to EPA’s Health Hazard Findings Lack

Merit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

1. EPA reasonably considered mercury reductions that will be

achieved by other requirements of the Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

a. EPA reasonably calculated mercury reductions that will

be achieved by CAIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

b. EPA’s health hazard findings are supported by CAIR

reductions alone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

2. EPA adequately considered risks posed by local mercury

deposition in its health hazard analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

a. Overview of EPA’s utility hotspot analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 63

b. EPA’s air quality modeling did not underestimate local

mercury deposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
-iv3. EPA reasonably assessed health hazards relating to

consumption of fish at subsistence levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

a. EPA reasonably estimated subsistence fish consumption

rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

b. Tribal Petitioners have waived any challenge to EPA’s

use of Census Bureau data to identify areas where

subsistence populations are likely to reside . . . . . . . . . 76

4. EPA assessed marine, estuarine, and commercial fish exposure

pathways in its hazard analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

D. Alternatively, EPA Reasonably Determined That It is Not

Appropriate to Regulate Mercury Emissions Because the Costs of

Reducing Mercury Emissions Under Section 112 Far Exceed the

Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

E. EPA Reasonably Determined That it is Not Necessary to Regulate

Mercury Emissions From Power Plants Under Section 112 . . . . . . 85

IV. EPA PROPERLY CONSIDERED TRIBAL TREATIES IN THE SECTION

112(N) RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

A. EPA Adequately Considered Health Effects on Subsistence

Fishers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

B. EPA Appropriately Did Not Consider Fishing Habitats In Its Section

112(n)(1)(A) Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

1. Congress directed EPA to consider health effects in CAA

section 112(n)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

2. No treaty right to habitat protection has been established . . . 89

3. Congress’ specific direction in section 112(n)(1)(A) that

EPA should consider health effects trumps undefined treaty

rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
-v4. EPA lacked a sufficient record to properly determine whether a

treaty-based habitat right to protection of tribal fisheries right

exists, much less to consider the effect of that determination on

the Section 112(n) Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

V. EPA HAS AUTHORITY UNDER CAA SECTION 111 TO ESTABLISH

STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR MERCURY EMISSIONS

FROM POWER PLANTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

B. EPA’s Approach Harmonizes the Conflicting Amendments to

Section 111(d) and Reflects A Reasonable Interpretation of the

Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

1. EPA reasonably read the text of the House and Senate

amendments to section 111(d) to conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

2. Pertinent legislative history supports EPA’s conclusion

that the House and Senate amendments to section 111(d)

conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

3. EPA’s construction of section 111(d) represents a reasonable

harmonization of the House and Senate amendments . . . . . 112

VI. EPA ESTABLISHED APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF

PERFORMANCE FOR MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM POWER

PLANTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

A. A Cap-and-Trade System Is An Appropriate “Standard of

Performance” For Existing Sources Under the Act . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

B. Environmental and Government Petitioners’ Record-Based

Challenges to CAMR are Meritless . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

1. The fact that some localized emission increases may be 
-viallowed under CAMR does not make it an arbitrary national

performance standard, since the rule as a whole will achieve

dramatic and cost-effective reductions in mercury emissions

throughout the country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

2. CAMR’s subcategorization is appropriate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

C. CAMR Appropriately Gives States Flexibility to Allocate Emission

Allowances And/Or To Opt Out of EPA’s Recommended Emission

Trading Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

D. EPA Reasonably Allocated Mercury Emissions for Alaska Within

the Section 111(d) Trading Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

1. EPA, through the mercury emissions allocation process,

appropriately calculated state emissions budgets . . . . . . . . 153

2. Development Authority unreasonably assumes that the 

CAMR cap-and-trade system will fail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

E. EPA Applied Appropriate Adjustment Factors for Coal Ranks . . 160

1. EPA’s adjustment factors are reasonable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

2. EPA’s CAMR adjustment factors account for factors not at

issue in CAIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

3. EPA has adequately responded to Bituminous Petitioners’

concern regarding CAMR’s Phase II adjustment factors . . 167

F. EPA Established Appropriate Mercury Limitations for Coal-RefuseFired Utility Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

1. ARIPPA cites to the incorrect definition of “coal refuse.” . 170

2. EPA properly considered available data when calculating the

heat content of coal refuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
-viiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1997) . . . 74, 168

American Methyl Corp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,

387 U.S. 397 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . . . . . . . . . 126, 131, 132, 133

Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . . 90

Chemical Manufacturers Association v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985) . . . . . . . . 15

*Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC , 467 U.S. 837 (1984) . . . . . . . 15, 27, 39, 89, 133

*Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) . . . . . . 14, 134

*Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844

(D.C. Cir. 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102, 103

Cleveland National Air Show, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Transportation,

430 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Collinsworth v. AIG Life Insurance Co., 404 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Tex. 2005) 36

____________________

*Cases chiefly relied upon are marked with an asterisk.
-viiiConfederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander,

440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . 74

Donnelly v. FAA, 411 F.3d 267 (D.C. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Dun & Bradstreet Corp. Foundation v. United States Postal Service,

946 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Engine Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996) . . . . 27

Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District,

541 U.S. 246 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . 25

Five Flags Pipe Line Co. v. DOT, 854 F.2d 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . 100

Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957) . . . . . . . 129

Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204 (1932) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Hls America, Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir.1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

International Fabricare Institute v. EPA, 972 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir.1992) . . . . . . 165

Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Lodge 1858, American Federation of Government Employees v. Webb,

580 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . 103

Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 129, 151
-ixMorongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998) . . . . . 90

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Mossville Environmental Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232

(D.C. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79, 154, 171

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 164

Mountain States Telegraph & Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 

472 U.S. 237 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash. 1988) . . . . . 91

Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. FERC, 965 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . 33

NRDC v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 51, 52

NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

National Cable & Telecomms. Association v. Brand X Internet Services,

575 U.S. 967 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

National Lime Association v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980) . . . . . . . . . 159

Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d at 1150 (similar) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994) . . . . . . 93

Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Authority v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936

(D.C. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
-x931 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . 23

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

*Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . 140, 144, 147

Sierra Club v. EPA, 325 F.3d 374 (D.C. Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 410 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 2005),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1025 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506

(D.C. Cir. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Texas Municipal Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1996) . . . . . . 168

Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir.1984) .................. 168, 174

Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

UARG v. EPA, 471 F.3d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

UARG v. EPA, No. 01-1074, 2001 WL. 936363 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2001) . . 8, 32

United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

United States v. Washington, 135 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1998), superceded by

157 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd.,
-xi520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) . . . . . . 96

United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (D.C. Wash. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . 94

United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . 93, 94

United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . 93, 94

Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997), modified on other grounds,

116 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ............................. 129, 151

Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,

443 U.S. 658 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Williams Gas Processing Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 475 F.3d 319

(D.C. Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

STATUTES:

1 U.S.C. § 204 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

1 U.S.C. § 204 notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

1 U.S.C. § 204(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 - 1387:

Section 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 - 7671q . ..............................3

Section 101, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Section 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Sections 108-109, 42 U.S.C. § 7408-7409 . ..............................7
-xiiSection 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 120

Section 110(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 13, 38, 53

Section 110(k)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Section 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 54, 98, 137, 150

Section 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) .............................. 121, 146

Section 111(a)(1)&(7), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1)&(7) (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Section 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) . . 4, 127, 134, 136, 140, 147, 151, 168

Section 111(a)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(C) (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Section 111(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Section 111(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) .........................4

Section 111(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) ..........................4

Section 111(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Section 111(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Section 111(c) 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c), 7411(d)(2)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

Section 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 120, 126, 128

Section 111(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . 99, 115, 126, 151

Section 111(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 121, 154

Section 111(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Section 111(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
-xiiiSection 111(j), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Section 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137, 146

Section 112(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Section 112(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Section 112(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52, 115

Section 112(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A) (1988) . . . . . . . . . . 99, 104, 109

Section 112(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Section 112(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Section 112(b)(3)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3)(D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Section 112(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 54, 116

Section 112(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Section 112(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Section 112(c)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Section 112(c)(9)(A), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(c)(9)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Section 112(c)(9)(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(c)(9)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Section 112(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Section 112(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 89

Section 112(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Section 112(d)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
-xivSection 112(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Section 112(e)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 32

Section 112(k)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(k)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Section 112(k)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(k)(3)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Section 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) . . 6, 8, 16, 20, 34, 36, 52-55, 75

 85, 87-89, 108, 110, 111,

116

Section 112(n)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Section 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121, 150

Section 129(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7429(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Section 169A, 42 U.S.C. § 7491(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Section 211(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Section 211(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Section 302, 42 U.S.C. § 7602 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Section 302(k), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Section 302(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(l) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126, 130

Section 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Section 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Section 307(d)(6)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(6)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Section 307(d)(7)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 98
-xvSection 307(d)(7)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . 30, 65, 79, 154, 171

Section 307(d)(9)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Title IV-A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55, 165

Section 402(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7651a(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

Section 403(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a)(1) ........................ 131, 166

Section 404(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131, 166

Section 405, 42 U.S.C. § 7651d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) ........... 100, 101, 104, 106, 109

REGULATIONS:

40 C.F.R. Part 31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

40 C.F.R. Part 60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

40 C.F.R. § 60.23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

40 C.F.R. § 60.23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150, 151

40 C.F.R. § 60.24(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120, 150

40 C.F.R. § 60.24(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121, 150, 152

40 C.F.R. § 60.24(h) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

40 C.F.R. § 60.27(e)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

40 C.F.R. Part 60, Subpart Da . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
-xvi40 C.F.R. § 60.40Da . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

40 C.F.R. § 60.40b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

40 C.F.R. § 60.41Da . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

40 C.F.R. § 60.41b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

40 C.F.R. Part 60, Subpart HHHH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

FEDERAL REGISTERS:

57 Fed. Reg. 31,576, 31,584 (July 16, 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

65 Fed. Reg. 79,825 (Dec. 20, 2000) ...................................8

65 Fed. Reg. 79,827 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

65 Fed. Reg. 79,831 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

67 Fed. Reg. 6521, 6522 (Feb. 12, 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

69 Fed. Reg. 394, 403 (Jan. 5, 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

69 Fed. Reg. 4652, 4689 (Jan. 30, 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

69 Fed. Reg. 4652 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

69 Fed. Reg. 4684 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

69 Fed. Reg. 4688-89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

69 Fed. Reg. 4701-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9
-xvii70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

70 Fed. Reg. 16,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

70 Fed. Reg. 16,001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

70 Fed. Reg. 16,002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

70 Fed. Reg. 16,002-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

70 Fed. Reg. 16,003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 43

70 Fed. Reg. 16,004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 42, 43

70 Fed. Reg. 16,005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 85

70 Fed. Reg. 16,006-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

70 Fed. Reg. 16,009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

70 Fed. Reg. 16,010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 57, 58

70 Fed. Reg. 16,011-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

70 Fed. Reg. 16,011-16,029 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

70 Fed. Reg. 16,011-27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

70 Fed. Reg. 16,012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

70 Fed. Reg. 16,013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

70 Fed. Reg. 16,014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

70 Fed. Reg. 16,015-16, 16,019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

70 Fed. Reg. 16,015-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
-xviii70 Fed. Reg. 16,015-21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47, 48

70 Fed. Reg. 16,016-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

70 Fed. Reg. 16,019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47, 48, 67

70 Fed. Reg. 16,021-22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

70 Fed. Reg. 16,022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 72, 87

70 Fed. Reg. 16,023-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

70 Fed. Reg. 16,024-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51, 78

70 Fed. Reg. 16,024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49, 50, 51, 62, 77

70 Fed. Reg. 16,025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

70 Fed. Reg. 16,025- 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62, 63

70 Fed. Reg. 16,026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 64, 67

70 Fed. Reg. 16,027-28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

70 Fed. Reg. 16,028 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45, 47

70 Fed. Reg. 16,029 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 83, 99

70 Fed. Reg. 16,030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99, 100, 111

70 Fed. Reg. 16,031 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103, 104-106, 109, 111-115, 117, 118

70 Fed. Reg. 16,032 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103, 113

70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (“CAIR”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 13

70 Fed. Reg. 25,167 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
-xix70 Fed. Reg. 25,215-16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 56

70 Fed. Reg. 25,223-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

70 Fed. Reg. 25,218-19 ........................................ 137, 138

70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005) (“CAMR”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 10, 119

70 Fed. Reg. 28,612 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 143, 144

70 Fed. Reg. 28,613 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143, 145

70 Fed. Reg. 28,612-13 .................................... 144, 160, 167

70 Fed. Reg. 28,615 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 169, 171

70 Fed. Reg. 28,614-15 ........................................ 137, 138

70 Fed. Reg. 28,616 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 121, 122, 123, 136

70 Fed. Reg. 28,617 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123, 126, 12, 130, 132, 156

70 Fed. Reg. 28,617-21 ........................................ 124, 135

70 Fed. Reg. 28,618 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 139

70 Fed. Reg. 28,619 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 135, 158, 159, 160

70 Fed. Reg. 28,620-21 .................................... 135, 139, 140

70 Fed. Reg. 28,621 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 123, 135, 139, 141

70 Fed. Reg. 28,622 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123, 139, 141, 153, 160, 161, 164

70 Fed. Reg. 28,623 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

70 Fed. Reg. 28,623-30 ........................................ 123, 160
-xx70 Fed. Reg. 28,624 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123, 124, 147

70 Fed. Reg. 28,627 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148, 151, 159, 160

70 Fed. Reg. 28,628 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

70 Fed. Reg. 28,629 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 148

70 Fed. Reg. 28,627-29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

70 Fed. Reg. 28,627-30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

70 Fed. Reg. 28,631 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123, 142

70 Fed. Reg. 28,632 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 124

70 Fed. Reg. 28,640 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

70 Fed. Reg. 28,657 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

70 Fed. Reg. 62,200 (Oct. 28, 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

70 Fed. Reg. 62,208-09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82, 83

70 Fed. Reg. 62,209 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

70 Fed. Reg. 62,213 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

70 Fed. Reg. 62,216 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

71 Fed. Reg. 33,388 (June 9, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

71 Fed. Reg. 33,388-89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

71 Fed. Reg. 33,391 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35, 65

71 Fed. Reg. 33,392 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 66, 77, 78
-xxi71 Fed. Reg. 33,392-93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66, 80, 81

71 Fed. Reg. 33,393 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

71 Fed. Reg. 33,394 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 82-84

71 Fed. Reg. 33,394-95 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-564 (1977), reprinted in 3 A Legislative

 History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 ................ 127, 150

H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 (1977), reprinted in 4 A Legislative History

 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 ....................... 127, 150

H.R. Rep. No. 101-490 (1990), reprinted in 2 A Legislative History

 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 ............... 106, 108, 109, 111

136 Cong. Rec. H12911, 12,934 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990), reprinted in 1

 A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 . . . . . . . . 113

S. 1630, 101 Cong. (1989), reprinted in 5 A Legislative History of the st

 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 .................... 108, 109, 110, 111

H.R. 3030, 101 Cong. § 108(d)(1989), reprinted in 2 A Legislative st

 History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 . . . 107, 108, 110, 111, 117

MISCELLANEOUS:

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1967) ................ 114, 126

Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Cohen’s Handbook of Indian Law 1140

(Nell Jessup Newton et al., 3d ed. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
-xxiiGLOSSARY

ASTM American Society of Testing and Materials

BART best available retrofit technology

BDT best demonstrated technology

CAA or the Act Clean Air Act

CAIR Clean Air Interstate Rule

CAMR Clean Air Mercury Rule

CAMR RTC Response to Significant Public Comments on CAMR

CMAQ Community Multi-Scale Air Quality

CRITFC Study Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission Study” or

EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency

GLIFWC Study Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Commission Study

HCCP Healy Clean Coal Project facility

HUCs hydrological units codes

ICR Information Collection Request

IDI index of daily intake

IGCC integrated gasification combined cycle

IPM Integrated Planning Model

MACT Maximum achievable control technology
-xxiiiNAAQS national ambient air quality standards

NOx nitrogen oxides

NSPS new source performance standards

SO sulfur dioxide 2

SIPs State implementation plans

TSD Technical Support Document

USGS United States Geological Survey

UARG Petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group
JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to review the rules at issue under section

307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA” or “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. Whether EPA may correct an erroneous CAA section 112(n)(1)(A)

determination without applying the criteria set forth in CAA section 112(c)(9)?

2. Whether EPA reasonably determined pursuant to CAA section

112(n)(1)(A), that it is neither “appropriate” nor “necessary” to regulate hazardous

air pollutant emissions from coal-fired electric utility steam generating units

(“power plants”) under CAA section 112?

3. Whether EPA reasonably considered Tribal Petitioners’ treaty rights

in determining that it is neither appropriate nor necessary to regulate power plant

hazardous air pollutant emissions under CAA section 112?

4. Whether EPA has authority under CAA section 111,

42 U.S.C. § 7411, to establish standards of performance for hazardous air

pollutant emissions from power plants?

5. Whether EPA in the Clean Air Mercury Rule established appropriate

standards of performance under CAA section 111 for mercury emissions from

power plants?
2

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Pertinent statutory and regulatory provisions are set forth in the addendum

to the brief of State of New Jersey et al. (“Government Petitioners”), and to the

extent not therein, are set forth in the addendum to this brief. Cited legislative

history is in the addendum to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

These consolidated cases involve challenges to EPA’s regulatory program

for controlling mercury emissions from power plants. The rules under review

include (1) the “Clean Air Mercury Rule” (“CAMR”), 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May

18, 2005), which establishes standards of performance limiting mercury emissions

from new and existing power plants, and (2) a final EPA action (“the Section

112(n) Rule”), 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005), that reverses an initial

December 2000 finding that it is “appropriate” and “necessary” to regulate power

plants under CAA section 112.

CAMR is the first CAA rule ever specifically directed at emissions of

mercury from power plants, and when fully implemented, will secure substantial

and cost-effective reductions in such emissions. It sets requirements for States to

significantly reduce mercury emissions from power plants in two phases and
3

creates a market-based cap-and-trade program that States can use to meet these

requirements. New power plants have to meet stringent new source performance

standards (“NSPS”) in addition to being subject to fixed caps. When fully

implemented, CAMR will reduce power plant emissions of mercury from the 1999

level of 48 tons a year to 15 tons a year, a reduction of nearly 70 percent.

The Section 112(n) Rule contains EPA’s final determination that it is

neither “appropriate” nor “necessary” to regulate power plant emissions under

section 112. In making this determination, EPA took into consideration the

substantial reductions in mercury emissions from power plants that can and will be

obtained under other requirements of the Act, including reductions that will be

achieved under CAMR and under EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (“CAIR”), 70

Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005).

II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

The CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, sets up a comprehensive and detailed

program for control of air pollution through a system of shared federal and state

responsibility.

A. Regulation of Air Pollutants Under CAA Section 111

Section 111 creates a program for the establishment of “standards of

performance.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411. A “standard of performance” is “a standard for
4

emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation

achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction,”

which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any non-air

quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the EPA

Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.” Id. § 7411(a)(1).

For new sources, EPA must establish a list of stationary source categories

that the Administrator has determined “cause[], or contribute[] significantly to, air

pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or

welfare.” Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A). EPA must set federal standards of performance for

new sources within each listed source category. Id. § (b)(1)(B). Section 111(b)

standards for new sources apply nationally and are effective upon promulgation.

Id.

For certain pollutants, section 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d), requires EPA to

promulgate regulations requiring States to establish standards of performance for

existing sources that States must adopt through a process that requires state

rulemaking action followed by review and approval of state plans by EPA. Id. If

a State does not adopt an approvable plan, EPA is required to promulgate a federal

plan implementing standards of performance for that State. 42 U.S.C. §

7411(d)(2).
 Hazardous air pollutants are “pollutants which present, or may present, . . . a 1

threat of adverse human health effects . . . or adverse environmental effects

whether through ambient concentrations, bioaccumulation, deposition, or

otherwise.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2).

 A “major source” is any stationary source or group of stationary sources at a 2

single location and under common control that emits or has the potential to emit

ten tons per year or more of any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or

more of any combination of hazardous air pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1).

5

B. Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under CAA Section 112

In the 1990 Amendments to the CAA, Congress substantially modified

CAA section 112, which addresses hazardous air pollutants. Section 112 1

provides, among other things, that EPA shall (1) list categories of “major sources”2

of hazardous air pollutants, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1), and (2) subsequently establish

pursuant to section 112(d) national emission standards for such sources that

“require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air

pollutants subject to this section” that the Administrator determines is achievable,

taking into account certain factors such as cost, energy requirements, and other

impacts. Id. § 7412(d)(2). Section 112 further specifies the minimum degree of

emissions reductions sources must achieve. Id. § 7412(d)(3). Section 112

emission standards are commonly referred to as “maximum achievable control

technology” or “MACT” standards.

Although Congress, in amending the Act in 1990, generally mandated that
6

major sources of hazardous air pollutants be regulated under the regulatory

program set forth in section 112(d), Congress did not mandate that power plants

be subject to this same program. In particular, in CAA section 112(n)(1)(A), 42

U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A), Congress directed EPA not to regulate power plants under

section 112 unless EPA first determined that regulation of power plants under

section 112 was both “appropriate” and “necessary” after considering public

health risks reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of power plants emissions

following imposition of other requirements of the Act, such as the standard of

performance requirements in section 111. Section 112(n)(1)(A) provides in full as

follows:

The Administrator shall perform a study of the

hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur

as a result of emissions by electric utility steam

generating units of pollutants listed under subsection (b)

of this section after imposition of the requirements of

this chapter. The Administrator shall report the results

of this study to the Congress within 3 years after

November 15, 1990. The Administrator shall develop

and describe in the Administrator’s report to Congress

alternative control strategies for emissions which may

warrant regulation under this section. The Administrator

shall regulate electric utility steam generating units under

this section, if the Administrator finds such regulation is

appropriate and necessary after considering the results of

the study required by this subparagraph.

42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
7

C. Regulation of Air Pollutants Under CAA Section 110

Pursuant to CAA sections 108 and 109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409, EPA has

established national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”) for certain common

air pollutants, including ozone and particulate matter. The NAAQS establish

permissible concentrations of these pollutants in the “ambient,” or outside, air.

Pursuant to CAA section 110, States must then establish “State implementation

plans” (“SIPs”), which impose controls on individual sources of air pollution as

necessary to attain and maintain the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7410. Section 110

require state rulemaking action followed by review and approval of state plans by

EPA at the federal level. If the EPA Administrator finds that an approved SIP is

“substantially inadequate” to attain or maintain the NAAQS, mitigate adequately

interstate pollutant transport, or otherwise comply with the Act, he is authorized to

“require the State to revise the plan as necessary to correct such inadequacies” (a

“SIP Call”). Id. § 7410(k)(5). CAA section 110(a)(2)(D) requires that SIPs

contain provisions prohibiting “any source or other type of emissions activity

within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . .

contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any

other State with respect to any [NAAQS].” 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D).
8

III. REGULATORY BACKGROUND

A. The Section 112(n) Rule

Following passage of the 1990 Amendments, EPA conducted a study,

pursuant to section 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A), to evaluate what

hazards to public health, if any, would reasonably be anticipated to occur as a

result of emissions of hazardous air pollutants from power plants after imposition

of the requirements of the CAA. EPA completed this study on February 24, 1998,

and submitted a report to Congress summarizing its results. Docket No. A92-55,

Item No. I-A-90 (“the Utility Study”) (JA xxx-xxx). After some additional data

collection – and without providing an opportunity for notice and comment – EPA

made a finding, on December 20, 2000, under section 112(n)(1)(A) that regulation

of power plants under section 112 was “appropriate and necessary.” 65 Fed. Reg.

79,825 (Dec. 20, 2000) (“the December 2000 Finding”). Based on this finding,

EPA added power plants to the CAA section 112(c) list of source categories to be

regulated under section 112. Id. at 79,831. Petitioner Utility Air Regulatory

Group (“UARG”) challenged the finding. Applying CAA section 112(e)(4), 42

U.S.C. § 7412(e)(4), this Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the

December 2000 Finding and that challenges to that finding could be heard only

after EPA issued section 112(d) emission standards for power plants. UARG v.
9

EPA, No. 01-1074, 2001 WL 936363 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2001).

On January 30, 2004, EPA issued a proposed rule that included two primary

alternative regulatory approaches to address mercury emissions from power plants.

69 Fed. Reg. 4652. Under the first approach, EPA proposed retaining its

December 2000 Finding and the associated section 112(c) listing of power plants

and issuing final emission standards for power plants under section 112(d). Under

the second approach, EPA proposed revising the December 2000 Finding,

removing power plants from the section 112(c) list, and issuing standards of

performance under section 111.

On March 15, 2005, EPA signed the final Section 112(n) Rule revising the

December 2000 Finding based on its final determination that it was, in fact,

neither appropriate nor necessary to regulate power plants under CAA section 112.

70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005). Before taking this final action, EPA

received and responded to thousands of public comments and documents, and

conducted additional robust air quality modeling and analyses. EPA concluded

that it was not “appropriate” to regulate power plants under section 112 because

(1) the level of emissions of hazardous air pollutants from power plants remaining

after imposition of other requirements of the Act are not reasonably anticipated to

cause hazards to public health, and (2) if EPA were to regulate mercury emissions
10

from power plants under section 112, the costs would be extreme and the health

benefits would be nominal, as total domestic power plant emissions are

responsible for only a very small fraction of overall mercury levels. 70 Fed. Reg.

16,022/3; 70 Fed. Reg. 16,029/1. In addition, EPA concluded it was not

“necessary” to regulate power plants under section 112 because there are other

available authorities under the Act that, if implemented, would administrativelyand cost-effectively address hazardous air pollutant emissions from power plants.

70 Fed. Reg. 16,005. Based on its revised section 112(n)(1)(A) finding, EPA in

the Section 112(n) Rule removed power plants from the section 112(c) list. 70

Fed. Reg. 15,994/2.

On July 8, 2005, environmental group petitioners moved for a stay of the

Section 112(n) Rule pending judicial review. On August 4, 2005, this Court

denied Petitioners’ request.

B. CAMR

On the same date that he signed the Section 112(n) Rule, the EPA

Administrator signed CAMR. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005). CAMR

establishes “standards of performance” pursuant to CAA sections 111(b) and (d)

limiting mercury emissions from new and existing power plants.

CAMR creates a standard of performance for existing sources that, when
11

fully implemented, will reduce nationwide annual power plant emissions of

mercury from a 1999 baseline of 48 tons to 15 tons. CAMR takes a two-phase

approach to achieving mercury reduction. A first phase nation-wide emissions cap

of 38 tons per year becomes effective in 2010, and a second phase cap of 15 tons

per year becomes effective in 2018. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,618-19. CAMR sets

emission reduction requirements by apportioning emission budgets among the 50

States, two Tribes, and the District of Columbia. Id. at 28,623. CAMR further

provides States and Tribes with the option of either joining a nationwide emissions

cap-and-trade program as a means of implementing required reductions, or

achieving required reductions through another method. Id. at 28,621.

States that elect to participate in the national cap-and-trade program may

allocate emission allowances to individual plants as they deem appropriate as long

as the total allocated does not exceed a State’s emission budget. Id. at 28,632.

Under the national cap-and-trade program, individual plants must hold allowances

equal to their annual mercury emissions each year. Id. at 28,616. Those with

allowances in excess of their emissions may sell the excess to other plants or bank

the allowances for future use. Id. at 28,616, 28,629.

Pursuant to CAA section 111(b), CAMR further requires all new power

plants to meet NSPS. CAMR establishes NSPS for five subcategories of power
12

plants: (1) bituminous coal plants, (2) subbituminous coal plants, (3) lignite coal

plants, (4) coal-refuse plants, and (5) integrated gasification combined cycle

plants. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,612. For subbituminous coal plants, EPA further

subcategorized on the basis of water availability. Id. at 28,615.

C. The Reconsideration Rule

Following publication of the Section 112(n) Rule and CAMR, EPA received

numerous petitions requesting reconsideration of many aspects of the final rules.

On October 28, 2005, EPA granted reconsideration on certain issues. 70 Fed. Reg.

62,200; 70 Fed. Reg. 62,213. EPA published its final decision on reconsideration

on June 9, 2006. 71 Fed. Reg. 33,388. EPA made two substantive changes to

CAMR involving revisions to the state mercury allocations and to the NSPS.

EPA reaffirmed its determination that it is neither appropriate nor necessary to

regulate power plants under section 112. Id. at 33,388-89. EPA conducted a costeffectiveness analysis on reconsideration that showed that even assuming a hazard

to public health existed from the global pool of mercury emissions, the cost of

further reducing mercury emissions under section 112 beyond reductions that will

be achieved through other statutory requirements far exceed the health benefits

associated with the additional reductions. Id. at 33,394.
CAIR was signed on March 15, 2005. 3

13

D. CAIR

Prior to promulgating the Section 112(n) Rule and CAMR, EPA

promulgated CAIR, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005), pursuant to its authority

under CAA section 110(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D). CAIR is intended 3

to address the interstate transport of pollutants that significantly contribute to

nonattainment and interfere with maintenance of the ozone and fine particulate

matter NAAQS in the eastern United States. In brief, EPA determined that 24

jurisdictions contribute significantly to downwind States’ nonattainment of the

2 fine particulate matter standard through emissions of sulfur dioxide (“SO ”) and

nitrogen oxides (“NO ”) and that 26 jurisdictions contribute significantly to x

downwind States’ nonattainment of the ozone standard through emissions of NO .x

70 Fed. Reg. 25,167. The CAIR emission reduction requirements are based on

controls that EPA determined to be highly cost effective for power plants. 70 Fed.

Reg. 16,004. CAIR also defines power plant emission budgets for each State that

apply if the State chooses to control only power plants. 70 Fed. Reg. 25,167.

The required reductions of SO and NO will be implemented in two phases. 2 x

The first phase of NO reductions begins in 2009 and the first phase of SO x 2

2 x reductions begins in 2010. The second phase for both SO and NO begins in
14

2015. Id. at 25,215-16. Although States may independently determine which

emissions sources to control and which control measures to adopt, EPA predicted

that most States will regulate power plants and that power plants will comply by

installing currently available controls that will reduce mercury emissions as well

as NO and SO emissions. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,009-10. EPA established guidelines x 2

and a model rule for a cap-and-trade program for CAIR in which States may

choose to participate. 70 Fed. Reg. 25,223-25. This program would allow

emission credits to be traded by power plants within and between States as a way

to reduce the cost of compliance and to provide compliance flexibility.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Challenged provisions of EPA’s rules must be upheld unless they are

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with

law.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A). The “arbitrary or capricious” standard is a

narrow, deferential standard under which the Court may not substitute its

judgment for that of the agency. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). The central issues under this standard are

whether the decision “was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and

whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” Citizens to Preserve Overton

Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task
15

Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 520-21 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Questions of statutory interpretation are governed by the two-step test set

forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC (“Chevron”), 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).

The reviewing court must first determine “whether Congress has directly spoken

to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If the congressional

intent is clear from the statutory language, the inquiry ends. Id. at 842-43. If the

statute is silent or ambiguous, the reviewing court must determine whether the

agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at

843. The Court need not find that EPA’s reading is the sole permissible

construction, or even that it is the reading the Court would have reached on its

own. EPA’s interpretation must be upheld as long as it is a reasonable reading of

the statute. Id. at 843 n.11; Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125

(1985).

Deference is particularly appropriate where, as in this case, the challenged

EPA determinations involve complex scientific and technical issues within the

special expertise of the agency. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462

U.S. 87, 103 (1983); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 801-02 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (“Our analysis is guided by the deference traditionally given to agency

expertise, particularly when dealing with a statutory scheme as unwieldy and
16

science-driven as the Clean Air Act.”).

In reviewing EPA judgments regarding acceptable levels of risk, “EPA, not

the court, has the technical expertise to decide what inferences may be drawn from

the characteristics of . . . substances and to formulate policy with respect to what

risks are acceptable.” NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). This Court “will not second-guess a

determination based on that expertise.” Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the 1990 CAA Amendments, Congress treated power plants differently

from all other sources of hazardous air pollutants. Congress directed EPA to study

the hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur from emissions of

hazardous air pollutants from power plants after imposition of the requirements of

the Act, and then to regulate such emissions under CAA section 112 only if EPA

determined that such regulation was both “appropriate and necessary” after

considering the results of the study. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). Under CAA

section 112(n)(1)(A), EPA has broad discretion to determine whether regulation of

power plants under section 112 is “appropriate and necessary” and may consider

information beyond that in the required study.

In the challenged Section 112(n) Rule, EPA reasonably determined that it is
17

neither appropriate nor necessary to regulate power plants under section 112.

First, EPA determined that regulation of power plants under section 112 is not

appropriate because either of two other rulemakings promulgated by EPA – CAIR,

and independently CAMR – will reduce mercury emissions from power plants to

levels that are not reasonably anticipated to cause hazards to public health. EPA’s

findings in this regard are amply supported by sophisticated air modeling and

analyses. EPA further concluded that it would not be appropriate to regulate

mercury emissions under section 112 because the cost of reducing mercury

emissions under section 112 beyond the level that will be achieved by CAIR

greatly exceeds the benefits associated with achieving those reductions. EPA

additionally determined that regulation of power plants under section 112 is not

necessary because other authorities under the Act, if implemented, would address

any hazards to public health posed by power plant emissions.

EPA’s Section 112(n) Rule revises EPA’s initial erroneous December 2000

“appropriate and necessary” finding. EPA has authority to reverse its erroneous

December 2000 Finding, and can do so without applying the criteria set forth in

section 112(c)(9) for removing other source categories from the list of categories

to be regulated under section 112. Section 112(n)(1)(A) specifically addresses the

circumstances under which power plants are to be regulated under section 112.
18

The specific threshold criteria set forth in section 112(n)(1)(A) for regulating

power plants under section 112 trump the general source category delisting

criteria.

EPA properly considered tribal treaties in the Section 112(n) Rule. To the

extent Tribal Petitioners argue that fishing rights granted to Tribes through treaties

encompass a right to environmental protection of fish habitats, such a right has not

been established, and Congress specifically directed EPA in section 112(n)(1)(A)

to focus its determination on a study of public health hazards, not consideration of

environmental effects.

EPA has authority under CAA section 111 to establish standards of

performance for emissions of mercury from new and existing sources. Indeed, no

party in this case has challenged EPA’s authority to adopt such standards for new

sources. With regard to existing sources, EPA reasonably harmonized conflicting

provisions in the 1990 Amendments to the Act to allow for the adoption of section

111 standards of performance for emissions of hazardous air pollutants from

sources in a source category not regulated under CAA section 112.

The standards of performance adopted by EPA in CAMR are consistent

with the statute and are amply supported by the administrative record. CAMR is

the first CAA rule ever specifically directed at emissions of mercury from power
19

plants, and when fully implemented, it will secure significant and cost-effective

reductions in such emissions. Contrary to the claims of the Environmental

Petitioners (Natural Resources Defense Council et al.), CAMR’s cap-and-trade

system is an appropriate “standard of performance” under the Act and is consistent

with the terms of the statute and applicable judicial precedent. Furthermore,

Petitioners’ record-based challenges to CAMR are meritless because local and

regional variations are an inherent aspect of any standard of performance, and the

subcategorization scheme reflected in CAMR was reasonable. Petitioner UARG’s

claim that CAMR gives States too much discretion has no basis in the statute, and

is largely contradicted by applicable precedent of this Court.

Additionally, EPA’s mercury emissions allocation to the State of Alaska is

supported by the record and consistent with EPA’s allocation methodology

nationwide. EPA’s adjustment factors by coal rank are likewise supported by the

record. EPA also correctly calculated the heat content of coal refuse. Petitioner

ARIPPA’s challenge to EPA’s calculation is based on partial data and improper

application of EPA’s methodology.

Accordingly, all of the petitions challenging the Section 112(n) Rule and

CAMR should be denied.
20

ARGUMENT

I. CONGRESS DIRECTED EPA TO REGULATE HAZARDOUS AIR

POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM POWER PLANTS UNDER CAA

SECTION 112 ONLY WHERE SUCH REGULATION IS BOTH

APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY

A. CAA Section 112(n)(1)(A) Imposes Special Conditions on EPA’s

Regulation of Power Plants Under Section 112.

Congress in the 1990 CAA Amendments treated power plants differently

from all other sources of hazardous air pollutants. Although Congress generally

mandated that large sources of hazardous air pollutants be regulated under section

112, Congress expressed reservations about subjecting power plants to the section

112 regulatory program. In particular, Congress imposed special threshold

conditions on any EPA regulation of power plants under section 112 that it did not

apply to any other source category. These special conditions are set forth in

section 112(n)(1)(A). 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).

In section 112(n)(1)(A), Congress directed EPA to first study hazards to

public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of power plant emissions

after implementation of other requirements of the Act. Congress then instructed

EPA to consider the results of such study and to regulate power plants under

section 112 only where such regulation is, in EPA’s judgment, both “appropriate

and necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (emphases added).
21

In the Section 112(n) Rule under review, EPA revised its initial December

2000 Finding and concluded that it is neither appropriate nor necessary to regulate

power plants under section 112. In doing so, EPA found that the December 2000

Finding lacked foundation and that new information before the Agency supported

reversing that finding. Based on EPA’s final determination that it is neither

appropriate nor necessary to regulate power plants under section 112, EPA

removed power plants from the list of source categories to be regulated under

section 112.

B. EPA Has Authority to Revise a Section 112(n)(1)(A) Finding

Without Applying The Delisting Criteria in Section 112(c)(9).

1. EPA has implied authority to revise a section 112(n)(1)(A)

determination.

Congress granted EPA authority in CAA section 112(n)(1)(A) to determine

whether regulation of power plant emissions under section 112 is “appropriate and

necessary.” Pursuant to section 112(n)(1)(A), EPA cannot regulate power plants

under section 112 unless such regulation is, in EPA’s judgment, both “appropriate

and necessary,” applying the criteria set forth in that subsection. As Government

Petitioners put it, section 112(n) plays a “threshold role” with respect to the

regulation of power plants. See Government Br. at 16.

While recognizing that section 112(n) plays a “threshold role” with respect
22

to power plant regulation, Government Petitioners take the position that EPA only

has the authority to make a section 112(n)(1)(A) determination once, and that if

the determination is wrong or no longer valid, EPA is powerless to correct its

error, no matter how wrong and flawed it may be. See Government Br. at 12-14.

This position is supported neither by the statutory text nor by principles of

administrative law.

In the first place, it is a fundamental principle of administrative law that an

agency has inherent authority to reverse an earlier administrative determination or

ruling where an agency has a principled basis for doing so. As the Supreme Court

stated in American Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 387 U.S.

397, 416 (1967), an agency “faced with new developments or in light of

reconsideration of the relevant facts and its mandate, may alter its past

interpretation and overturn past administrative rulings and practice.” “[T]his kind

of flexibility and adaptability . . . is an essential part of the office of a regulatory

agency.” Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court more recently observed:

“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved

in stone. On the contrary, the agency . . . must consider

varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a

continuing basis,” Chevron, supra at 863-64, for

example, in response to changed factual circumstances,

or a change in administrations.
23

National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 575 U.S. 967,

981 (2005). Likewise, this Court has stated that:

[A]n agency is free to discard precedents or practices it

no longer believes correct. Indeed, we expect that an []

agency may well change its past practices with advances

in knowledge in its given field or as its relevant

experience and expertise expands.

Williams Gas Processing Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 475 F.3d 319, 326. (D.C. Cir.

2006) (quoting Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1296 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (per curiam)).

Government Petitioners argue that EPA lacks authority to revise a section

112(n)(1)(A) determination inasmuch as Congress failed to mandate periodic

review by EPA of a section 112(n)(1)(A) determination, whereas Congress did

mandate periodic review of certain other determinations under the Act. See

Government Br. at 13. Government Petitioners fail to recognize that there is a

clear distinction between language that mandates periodic EPA review of some

determination, and language that precludes review of such a determination. In the

absence of any preclusive language, EPA retains its inherent administrative

authority to revise a section 112(n)(1)(A) determination where it has a principled

basis for doing so. See Dun & Bradstreet Corp. Found. v. United States Postal

Service, 946 F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1991) (“It is widely accepted that an agency
24

may, on its own initiative, reconsider its interim or even its final decisions,

regardless of whether the applicable statute and agency regulations expressly

provide for such review.”) (citation omitted).

2. EPA may revise a section 112(n)(1)(A) determination

without applying the delisting criteria in section 112(c)(9).

In section 112(n)(1)(A), Congress directed EPA to regulate power plant

emissions under section 112 only where it is both appropriate and necessary to do

so. Thus, an affirmative section 112(n)(1)(A) determination is a prerequisite to

any regulation of power plants under section 112. EPA’s express authority in

section 112(n)(1)(A) to determine whether power plants should be regulated at all

under section 112 necessarily encompasses the authority to remove power plants

from the section 112(c) list of source categories to be regulated under section 112

where EPA determines that it has erred in concluding that regulation of power

plants is appropriate and necessary or finds that new information has undermined

the validity of a previous determination.

Government and Environmental Petitioners take the position that even if

EPA is correct that it is, in fact, neither “appropriate” nor “necessary” to regulate

power plants under section 112, EPA must nonetheless, as a result of an initial

erroneous 112(n)(1)(A) determination, retain power plants on the section 112 list
25

and regulate power plants under section 112. See Government Br. at 15-19;

Environmental Br. at 14-17. Petitioners contend that EPA can only avoid

inappropriate or unnecessary regulation of power plants under section 112 if it

makes a different set of findings than set forth in section 112(n)(1)(A) – namely,

the findings set forth in section 112(c)(9) required for removing ordinary source

categories from the section 112(c) list of categories to be regulated. But this

argument ignores the threshold nature of the section 112(n)(1)(A) criteria and

stands the statutory framework on its head.

Petitioners contend that their statutory interpretation must be adopted under

step one of a Chevron analysis. See Environmental Br. at 15. Under step one of a

Chevron analysis, the statute must be construed in its entirety, and the Court

cannot confine itself to reading a particular statutory provision in isolation. See,

e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“In

determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, a

reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory

provision in isolation. The meaning – or ambiguity of – certain words or phrases

may only become evident when placed in context.”); Northeast Maryland Waste

Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As the Supreme

Court has instructed, ‘the words of a statute must be read in their context and with
26

a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’”) (citation omitted).

Reading section 112 in its entirety, it is simply not the case that Congress

has unambiguously expressed an intent to compel unnecessary and inappropriate

regulation of power plants. Logically, if EPA makes a determination under

section 112(n)(1)(A) that power plants should not be regulated at all under section

112 because it is neither appropriate nor necessary to do so, this determination

ipso facto must result in removal of power plants from the section 112(c) list of

source categories to be regulated under section 112. To the extent that the section

112(n)(1)(A) criteria and the section 112(c)(9) delisting criteria may be deemed to

conflict, the section 112(n)(1)(A) language takes precedence through application

of the fundamental rule of statutory construction that “[s]pecific terms prevail over

the general in the same . . . statute which might otherwise be controlling.”

Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932). Section 112(n)(1)(A)

focuses specifically on power plants. Section 112(c)(9) does not.

In short, the intent of Congress is not clear with respect to the applicability

of the section 112(c)(9) delisting criteria to power plants. Accordingly, this case

cannot be decided under step one of the Chevron test, and the Court must proceed
Accordingly, the gloss on the Chevron step one standard set forth by this 4

Court in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and

cited by Petitioners does not apply. See Government Br. at 16; Environmental Br.

at 15-16. However, even if Engine Manufacturers Ass’n were applied, EPA can

make the showing set forth in that case to avoid application of Chevron step one.

“[A]s a matter of logic and statutory structure,” applying section 112(c)(9) to

power plants does not make sense. See 88 F.3d at 1089. To do so would

undermine Congress’ specific instructions regarding the regulation of power

plants set forth in section 112(n)(1)(A).

27

to step two of that test. Under Chevron step two, to uphold EPA’s construction, 4

“[t]he court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it

permissibly could have adopted . . . or even the reading the court would have

reached . . . .” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.

EPA’s construction of the statute as allowing EPA to correct or revise a

section 112(n)(1)(A) determination and to remove power plants from the section

112(c) list without applying section 112(c)(9) delisting criteria is reasonable and

entitled to deference under step two of Chevron.

Petitioners’ argument that EPA’s interpretation somehow frustrates the

general framework set forth by Congress in section 112 does not withstand

scrutiny. See Government Br. at 13-14; Environmental Br. at 19. While

Petitioners correctly observe that Congress generally established a framework in

section 112 that promoted rapid regulation of hazardous air pollutants, Petitioners

overlook that Congress singled out power plants for different treatment and made
28

clear that it did not want to subject power plants to the framework it established

for other source categories. Instead, Congress granted EPA considerable

discretion to determine whether it is appropriate and necessary to regulate power

plants at all under section 112, and then set no deadline for making such a

determination. In short, there is no reason to conclude based on the general rigid

framework applicable to other source categories that Congress intended to prevent

EPA from revising a section 112(n)(1)(A) determination.

Petitioners’ argument that EPA is obligated to apply section 112(c)(9)

criteria because EPA previously applied various other section 112 requirements to

power plants based on the December 2000 Finding is also misplaced. See

Environmental Br. at 17-18. Although it is correct that between the time of the

December 2000 Finding and the Section 112(n) Rule EPA applied certain other

section 112 requirements to power plants, EPA did so during this period based on

the fact that it had made a positive “appropriate and necessary” finding that was

still in place. EPA has now reversed that finding.

Petitioners’ reliance on language in CAA sections 112(c)(6) and 112(c)(3)

likewise is misplaced. See Government Br. at 16; Environmental Br. at 18-19.

Congress directed EPA in section 112(c)(6) to list by November 1995 sources

accounting for 90 percent of the aggregate emissions of certain hazardous air
29

pollutants, including mercury, and to establish standards for such sources by

November 2000. But, in doing so, Congress made clear that this provision “shall

not be construed to require [EPA] to promulgate standards” for power plants. 42

U.S.C. § 7412(c)(6). Accordingly, section 112(c)(6) further underscores that

Congress had reservations about regulating power plants under section 112

notwithstanding its recognition that power plants may be a significant source of

mercury.

Section 112(c)(3) addresses EPA’s listing of “area sources” to be regulated

under section 112. Area sources are defined as stationary sources of hazardous air

pollutants that are not “major sources.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(2). Environmental

Petitioners argue that EPA’s interpretation of section 112(n)(1)(A) as allowing it

to correct a section 112(n)(1)(A) “appropriate and necessary” determination

relating to power plants would also enable EPA to revise section 112(c)(3) area

source listing determinations without applying section 112(c)(9) delisting criteria

– a result they contend would be “absurd.” Environmental Br. at 18. Petitioners

are mistaken. Section 112(c)(3) is distinguishable from section 112(n)(1)(A), and

the “absurd results” Petitioners contemplate do not actually exist. Congress

expressly applied section 112(c)(9) delisting criteria to area sources, but not to

power plants. Moreover, Petitioners’ section 112(c)(3) argument has been waived
30

because Petitioners failed to raise any concern regarding section 112(c)(3) during

the period for public comment. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (providing that

“[o]nly an objection to a rule or procedure which was raised with reasonable

specificity during the period for public comment . . . may be raised during judicial

review.”).

This Court’s decision in American Methyl Corp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 826

(D.C. Cir. 1984), which is cited by Petitioners (see Environmental Br. at 18), is

also distinguishable. In American Methyl, this Court held that EPA could not

reconsider a waiver granted under CAA section 211(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(f),

allowing the sale of a new fuel additive, but had to instead take action under CAA

section 211(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c), to prohibit the sale of the fuel additive. CAA

sections 211(c) and section 211(f) are not analogous to CAA sections 112(c)(9)

and 112(n)(1)(A). First, the Court in American Methyl relied heavily on

legislative history that expressly set forth Congress’ intent that having granted a

waiver for a fuel additive under section 211(f), EPA must act to subsequently

restrict the sale of such fuel additives through proceedings under section 211(c).

See 749 F.2d at 834-35. There is no comparable legislative history here indicating

Congress intended to preclude EPA from exercising its inherent authority to

reconsider a section 112(n)(1)(A) determination. Second, CAA sections 211(c)
31

and 211(f) address precisely the same thing – fuel additives. By contrast, CAA

section 112(n)(1)(A) alone specifically addresses power plants. Third, in section

211(f) Congress placed an express time limitation within which EPA must make a

waiver determination, whereas here, Congress did not place any time limitation on

making a section 112(n)(1)(A) determination.

Where EPA has determined, as it did here, that it erred in adding power

plants to the section 112(c) list in the first place, it is even more apparent that EPA

has the authority to correct that initial error and remove power plants from the list

of source categories to be regulated without applying the section 112(c)(9)

delisting criteria. Indeed, EPA has always interpreted the section 112(c)(9)

criteria as inapplicable where the original listing of a source category was

inconsistent with statutory listing criteria. See 69 Fed. Reg. 4652, 4689 (Jan. 30,

2004) (citing examples where EPA removed a source category from the section

112(c) list without following the criteria in section 112(c)(9) due to an error at the

time of listing). For example, in 1992, EPA listed asphalt concrete manufacturers

as a major source category under section 112(c)(1), and then in 2002, delisted that

source category without following the criteria in section 112(c)(9) because it

determined that the initial criteria for listing had not been met. Id. See 67 Fed.
Contrary to Petitioners’ suggestion (see Environmental Br. at 16), EPA did 5

not adopt any different interpretation of the Act in a 1991 Federal Register notice.

The 1991 notice is nothing more than a notice of availability of a preliminary draft

list of source categories to be regulated under section 112, and a request for

information and comment on issues and proposed positions. The notice does not

represent or set forth any final EPA position on any issue. After consideration of

comments, consistent with its action in the instant rule, EPA concluded in 1991

that it had no authority to regulate power plants if the requirements of section

112(n)(1)(A) had not been met. 57 Fed. Reg. 31,576, 31,584 (July 16, 1992). As

to the statement in the 1991 notice concerning section 112(c)(9) and power plants,

that statement was made in conjunction with a proposed regulatory option (a

proposal to list power plants absent any section 112(n)(1)(A) findings) that EPA

did not pursue and that was contrary to the plain language of section 112(n)(1)(A).

EPA’s final interpretation concerning the relationship of section 112(n)(1)(A) to

section 112(c)(9) has been set forth in the Section 112(n) Rule after notice-andcomment rulemaking.

See UARG v. EPA, No. 01-1074, 2001 WL 936363 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 6

2001) (finding Court lacked jurisdiction to review EPA’s initial December 2000

Finding based on 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(4)).

32

Reg. 6521, 6522 (Feb. 12, 2002).5

Furthermore, the merits of EPA’s initial finding have never been subject to

judicial review. If EPA cannot correct its own mistake and remove power plants 6

from the section 112(c) list based on its revised section 112(n)(1)(A) finding, this

would lead to an anomalous result: that power plants challenging EPA’s initial

December 2000 determination (when such determination became ripe for review)

could obtain relief from this Court – namely, vacatur of the initial section

112(n)(1)(A) determination upon a finding of error – that they could not obtain
33

from EPA, even where the error is conceded by the Agency. EPA should not have

to await an adverse ruling from the Court to correct its own mistake. Cf. Natural

Gas Clearinghouse v. FERC, 965 F.2d 1066, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[A]n agency,

like a court, can undo what is wrongfully done by virtue of its [prior] order.”)

(citation and quotation marks omitted); Cleveland Nat’l Air Show, Inc. v. United

States Dep’t of Transp., 430 F.3d 757, 765 (6th Cir. 2005) (“A government

agency, like a judge, may correct a mistake, and no principle of administrative law

consigns the agency to repeating the mistake into perpetuity.”).

In short, EPA has reasonably concluded that the specific “appropriate” and

“necessary” criteria of section 112(n)(1)(A) alone govern whether power plants

shall be regulated under section 112, and that the delisting criteria at section

112(c)(9) do not apply to EPA action under section 112(n)(1)(A).

II. EPA HAS ADOPTED REASONABLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE

TERMS USED IN CAA SECTION 112(n)(1)(A)

As discussed above, the condition precedent for regulating power plants

under section 112 is a determination by EPA that such regulation is both

“appropriate” and “necessary.” The terms “appropriate” and “necessary” are not

defined in section 112(n)(1)(A). In the absence of any statutory definition, EPA
Webster’s dictionary defines the term “appropriate” to mean “especially 7

suitable or compatible.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983) at 98.

It defines the term “necessary” to mean “absolutely needed.” Id. at 790.

34

has reasonably interpreted these terms consistent with their plain meaning. We 7

set forth EPA’s reasonable interpretation of these terms below.

A. EPA Reasonably Interprets the Term “Appropriate.”

The only guidance in section 112(n)(1)(A) about the substance of EPA’s

“appropriate” inquiry is that EPA must consider the results of a study identifying

“hazards to public health” that are “reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of

emissions” of hazardous air pollutants by power plants “after imposition of the

requirements of the Act.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).

In view of what Congress directed EPA to consider in the required study,

EPA reasonably considers, as a threshold matter, in evaluating whether regulation

of power plants under section 112 is “appropriate,” whether “hazards to public

health” are “reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions” by power

plants “after imposition of the requirements of the [Act].” If such hazards are not

reasonably anticipated to occur, EPA reasonably concludes that it is not

“appropriate” to regulate power plants under section 112. But even if such

hazards are reasonably anticipated to occur, EPA reasonably believes other factors

may still make regulation of power plants under section 112 inappropriate. For
35

example, regulation of power plants under section 112 may not be “appropriate”

where the cost of regulation far outweighs the health benefits.

B. EPA Reasonably Interprets the Term “Necessary.”

Congress required EPA to determine that it was both appropriate and

necessary to regulate power plants under section 112. To give Congress’ direction

full effect, EPA’s inquiry into whether it is “necessary” to regulate power plants

under section 112 must be distinct from EPA’s inquiry into whether it is

“appropriate” to do so. Thus, even if EPA determines that it is “appropriate” to

regulate power plants under section 112, EPA must also specifically conclude that

it is “necessary” to do so.

 EPA reasonably concludes that regulation of power plants under section

112 is not “necessary” where there are other authorities under the Act beyond

section 112 authorities that, if implemented, would address any hazards to public

health posed by power plant hazardous air pollutant emissions in a cost-effective

and administratively-effective manner. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,001/2; 71 Fed. Reg.

33,391.

C. EPA Reasonably Interprets The Term “As a Result.”

Section 112(n)(1)(A) directs EPA to study “hazards to public health

reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions” of hazardous air
36

pollutants by power plants. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). Without considering the

context of section 112(n)(1)(A), the “as a result of” phrase might reasonably be

read to refer alternatively to either (a) hazards resulting solely from emissions by

power plants, or (b) hazards resulting from all sources, including power plants.

Cf. Collinsworth v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 2d 911, 920 (N.D. Tex. 2005)

(finding phrase “as a result of” appearing in insurance policy was ambiguous and

could be read to refer either to actions that are the sole cause of a loss or to actions

that are a contributing cause). However, considering the specific context of

section 112(n)(1)(A), EPA reasonably construes this phrase as referring to hazards

arising solely from power plant emissions.

In section 112(n)(1)(A), Congress distinguished power plants from all other

major and area sources of hazardous air pollutants and signaled its reluctance to

have power plants automatically subjected to the same stringent regulatory

framework as other sources. Congress directed EPA to regulate other major

sources of mercury under section 112, but, in sharp contrast, instructed EPA to

regulate power plants under that section only if EPA deemed such regulation to be

“appropriate and necessary” after studying “hazards to public health reasonably

anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by [power plants].” 42 U.S.C. §

7412(n)(1)(A). Congress’ unique treatment of power plants provides a strong
37

indication that Congress intended EPA to focus its study under section

112(n)(1)(A) on effects of mercury emissions caused by power plants alone.

Indeed, if Congress had intended to mandate that EPA evaluate all sources

of mercury under section 112(n)(1)(A), and that EPA regulate power plants where

power plants made some non-zero contribution to the global pool of mercury,

Congress could have simply required regulation of power plants under the same

scheme as other sources. Congress already knew at the time of the 1990

Amendments that power plants were a major source of hazardous air pollutants.

Congress further already knew that mercury in the environment generally

presented a potential hazard to public health, as reflected by Congress’ decision to

include mercury on a list of “hazardous air pollutants” and Congress’ direction to

EPA to establish mercury emission standards under section 112 for all major

sources of hazardous air pollutants (but not power plants). Interpreting section

112(n)(1)(A) as requiring analysis of whether the total amount of mercury in the

environment presents some potential health hazard to which power plants make

some non-zero contribution renders the section 112(n)(1)(A) inquiry meaningless.

See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249

(1985) (noting that it is an “‘elementary canon of construction that a statute should

be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative’”) (citation omitted).
38

Furthermore, if Congress had intended EPA to focus its analysis on whether

power plants, in combination with mercury emissions from all other sources,

contributes to a hazard to public health, it could have easily made this clear. For

example, Congress could have used language similar to that in section

112(n)(1)(B). In section 112(n)(1)(B), Congress required EPA to study the health

effects of mercury emissions from power plants “and other sources.”

42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(B). Congress, however, did not use such language in

section 112(n)(1)(A) and did not direct EPA to consider the section 112(n)(1)(B)

study in making a section 112(n)(1)(A) determination.

Congress could also have used language similar to that used in CAA section

110(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D). In section 110(a)(2)(D), Congress

required that each SIP contain adequate provisions “prohibiting . . . any source or

other type of emissions activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in

amounts” that will “contribute significantly to nonattainment” of the NAAQS. 

This language reflects that Congress knew how to specify regulation of emissions

of air pollutants even where such pollutants only “contribute” to a problem in

combination with other sources. Congress did not use such “contribution”

language in section 112(n)(1)(A), and EPA’s interpretation of the “as a result of”

language in section 112(n)(1)(A) so as to avoid making section 112(n)(1)(A)
Government Petitioners cite to Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 8

2000) (see Government Br. at 25), but that case involved EPA action under CAA

section 110(a)(2)(D), which directs EPA to focus on pollutants that only

“contribute” to a problem. In Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 346

(D.C. Cir. 2002), cited by Government Petitioners, the implementing regulations

for the National Environmental Policy Act specifically required the FAA to

consider cumulatively significant impacts of actions with individually

insignificant impacts. CAA section 112(n)(1)(A) does not contain similar

language.

39

superfluous is reasonable. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 & n.11 (holding that

where statutory language is ambiguous, EPA's interpretation must be upheld as

long as it is a reasonable reading of the statute, and the Court need not find that

EPA’s reading is the sole permissible construction, or even that it is the reading

the Court would have reached on its own).8

Environmental Petitioners argue that EPA’s interpretation of the phrase “as

a result of” cannot be reconciled with EPA’s interpretation of the same phrase as it

appears in section 112(k)(3)(B). See Environmental Br. at 32. This argument is

misplaced because the phrase appears in section 112(k)(3)(B) in an entirely

different context. In section 112(k), which addresses regulation of area sources,

Congress made a specific finding that emissions of hazardous air pollutants from

area sources may “individually, or in the aggregate, present significant risks to

human health in urban areas.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(k)(1) (emphasis added).

Congress then directed EPA to prepare a comprehensive strategy to reduce
40

aggregate emissions of hazardous air pollutants from area sources in urban areas,

including reducing emissions of the 30 pollutants that “as a result of emissions

from area sources” present the greatest threat to public health.

42 U.S.C. § 7412(k)(3)(B). Thus, in section 112(k)(3) Congress made clear that it

intended for EPA to prepare a strategy to reduce aggregate emissions from many

area sources in urban areas. In sharp contrast, in section 112(n)(1)(A), Congress

directed EPA to engage in a very different inquiry – namely, to determine whether

it is appropriate and necessary for a particular source category (power plants) to be

regulated under section 112 after regulation of power plants under other

requirements of the Act. Nothing in section 112(k)(3) makes it unreasonable for

EPA to focus on power plant emissions exclusively in the context of making a

section 112(n)(1)(A) determination. Section 112(n)(1)(A) calls for a different

analysis and bears little resemblance to section 112(k)(3).

In short, EPA reasonably focused its “appropriate” analysis on hazards to

public health arising solely from power plants.

III. EPA REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT IT IS NEITHER

APPROPRIATE NOR NECESSARY TO REGULATE MERCURY

EMISSIONS FROM POWER PLANTS UNDER SECTION 112

In the Section 112(n) Rule, EPA reasonably determined that it is neither

“appropriate” nor “necessary” to regulate power plants under section 112. We
41

discuss the analyses and reasoning underlying these determinations below.

A. EPA Appropriately Determined That its December 2000 Finding

Lacked Foundation.

In the Section 112(n) Rule, EPA found, as an initial matter, that its

December 2000 Finding was without foundation. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,002-4. In its

December 2000 Finding, EPA failed to fully consider the mercury reductions that

would result after imposition of requirements of the Act. EPA’s failure to

consider these reductions resulted in an overestimate of power plant mercury

emissions remaining after imposition of Act requirements. Specifically, EPA

explained that it erred in December 2000 by not accounting for the power plant

mercury emission reductions that it should have reasonably anticipated would

result from implementation of certain other provisions of CAA Title I. 70 Fed.

Reg. 16,003/3. First, EPA did not consider mercury reductions that would result

from implementation of the revised NAAQS for particulate matter and ozone that

EPA issued in July 1997. EPA had recognized in the Utility Study that the revised

NAAQS would result in approximately a 16 percent reduction in mercury

emissions, primarily due to the fact that to attain the new particulate matter

NAAQS power plants would need to install controls that would also control

mercury. Id.; Utility Study at 1-2 to 1-3; ES-25, 3-14 (JA xxx-xxx, xxx, xxx).
EPA also explained that its December 2000 Finding was defective to the 9

extent that it relied in part on environmental effects of power plant mercury

emissions. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,002/3. Section 112(n)(1)(A) requires EPA to analyze

the “hazards to public health” resulting from power plant emissions.

42

However, EPA did not consider these reductions in its December 2000 Finding.

Second, EPA did not account in December 2000 for reductions in mercury

emissions that would result from two rules controlling NO issued pursuant to x

CAA Title I: (1) a rule (“the NSPS Boiler Rule”) setting NSPS under section

111(b) for NO emitted from power plants and industrial boilers, and (2) a rule x

x (“the NO SIP call rule”) promulgated under CAA section 110(a)(2)(D) requiring

22 States and the District of Columbia to revise their SIPs to mitigate the interstate

transport of ozone. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,004/1. Both of these rules were premised on

use of a NO control technology called selective catalytic reduction. At the time x

of the December 2000 Finding, EPA had data that confirmed that use of this

technology would also result in reductions in power plant mercury emissions, but

EPA did not consider these reductions in making its section 112(n)(1)(A) finding.

Id.9

In short, EPA did not take into account in its December 2000 Finding

significant reductions in mercury that would result from implementation of Act

requirements. Had EPA taken these reductions into account, it believes it would
Nothing in section 112(n)(1)(A) precludes EPA from considering factors in 10

addition to the section 112(n)(1)(A) study in making an “appropriate and

necessary” determination. The statute provides that EPA must consider the study

but does not limit EPA to relying exclusively upon the study. Cf. Sierra Club v.

EPA, 325 F.3d 374, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that statute requiring EPA to

promulgate rule “based upon” a required study did not require EPA to premise rule

(continued...)

43

have reached a different conclusion in December 2000. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,003/1.

Moreover, as discussed below, new information before the Agency at the time of

the Section 112(n) Rule confirmed that EPA had erred.

B. EPA Reasonably Determined That it is Not Appropriate to

Regulate Power Plant Mercury Emissions Under Section 112

Because Hazards to Public Health are Not Reasonably

Anticipated to Occur As a Result of Power Plant Mercury

Emissions Following Implementation of Act Requirements.

Between the time of its December 2000 Finding and promulgation of the

Section 112(n) Rule in March 2005, EPA obtained new information concerning

mercury emissions from power plants following implementation of Act

requirements, and utilizing this new information, conducted sophisticated public

health analyses. Based on all of the information before EPA at the time of the

Section 112(n) Rule, EPA concluded that the level of mercury remaining after

implementation of the requirements of the Act is not reasonably anticipated to

pose a hazard to public health, and therefore, it is not appropriate to regulate

power plants under section 112. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,004. Accordingly, EPA 10
(...continued) 10

exclusively upon results of that study).

Once deposited onto land or water, the chemical form of mercury can 11

change into methylmercury, and nearly all of the mercury that accumulates in fish

is methylmercury. 65 Fed. Reg. 79,827/1.

44

concluded that its December 2000 Finding should be revised.

In the Section 112(n) Rule EPA considered, among other things, emission

reductions that would result from two rulemakings implementing requirements of

the Act that had been promulgated subsequent to December 2000: CAIR and

CAMR. EPA conducted sophisticated air quality modeling to analyze the nature

of mercury emissions from power plants that would remain after implementation

of CAIR, and independently, after implementation of CAMR. These analyses

demonstrated that the implementation of either CAIR or CAMR alone would

result in a level of mercury emissions from power plants that would not cause

hazards to public health. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,011-27.

1. Overview of EPA’s Hazard Analysis.

In assessing potential hazards to public health from power plant emissions

of mercury following implementation of CAIR or CAMR, EPA concluded as a

threshold matter that the predominant pathway of mercury exposure to humans is

through the consumption of methylmercury in fish. Domestic power plants 11
EPA concluded that freshwater fish (e.g., fish from rivers and lakes) on 12

average has greater concentrations of utility-attributable methylmercury than fish

from other sources (e.g., fish from oceans or estuaries), and concluded that

individuals who substitute other sources of fish for freshwater fish in their diet can

be expected to reduce their exposure to utility-attributable mercury. EPA-HQOAR-2002-0056-6303, (“Reconsideration TSD”) at 26 (JA xxx); EPA-HQ-OAR2002-0056-6722, (“Reconsideration RTC”) at 63, 131 (JA xxx, xxx). With

respect to commercial fish, EPA concluded among other things, that (1) the vast

majority of commercial fish consumed is not from freshwater sources, (2) the

amount of commercial freshwater fish consumed is much smaller than the amount

of noncommercial freshwater fish consumed, so including the commercial

freshwater pathway in an exposure model would result in a relatively small change

in a population level exposure estimate; and (3) it is highly unlikely that the group

that consumes the most freshwater fish, subsistence fishers, consumes any

(continued...)

45

emissions contribute to methylmercury in fish, but in virtually all instances, utilityattributable methylmercury levels are a very small fraction of overall

methylmercury levels. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,028/2. EPA assessed the risk of

methylmercury exposure to individuals resulting from fish consumption and

attributable to power plants by considering the concentration of methylmercury in

fish that is attributable to power plants (i.e., the “utility-attributable”

methylmercury concentration), and the quantity of fish consumed by individuals.

 EPA determined that the greatest potential health risk from exposure to

utility-attributable mercury is posed to the subpopulation of women of childbearing age who eat self-caught (i.e., noncommercial) freshwater fish. 70 Fed.

Reg. 16,011-12. EPA then rigorously assessed the degree of risk to individuals 12
(...continued) 12

significant amount of commercial fish. Reconsideration TSD at 25-26 (JA xxxxxx); EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0056-6186 (“Effectiveness TSD”) at 34-35 (JA xxxxxx).

46

within this subpopulation employing the following analytical steps. First, EPA

used sophisticated modeling to project the location and quantity of mercury

deposition from power plants after implementation of CAIR, or independently,

CAMR. Second, EPA combined deposition projections with actual freshwater fish

tissue data to estimate expected concentrations of utility-attributable

methylmercury in fish tissue in particular locations after implementation of CAIR,

or independently, CAMR. Third, EPA estimated noncommercial freshwater fish

consumption rates. Fourth, EPA compared the degree of exposure to utilityattributable methylmercury from consuming noncommercial freshwater fish to a

health-based standard. We summarize each of these analytical steps further below.

a. EPA projected mercury deposition from power plants

after implementation of CAIR and CAMR.

EPA used sophisticated state-of-the art air quality modeling platforms to

assess mercury deposition, including deposition attributable to power plants, in

particular locations within the contiguous 48 States. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,015-19.

EPA’s modeling assessed mercury deposition in the baseline year of 2001, and

after (a) implementation of CAIR (in 2020), and independently (b) implementation
EPA found that about one percent of total mercury emissions globally are 13

attributable to domestic power plant emissions. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,028/2.

47

of CAMR (in 2020). Id.

EPA applied the Integrated Planning Model (“IPM”) to project changes in

the quantity of future mercury emissions from individual power plants following

implementation of CAIR or CAMR in 2020. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,016-17. EPA then

applied the Community Multi-Scale Air Quality (“CMAQ”) model, which

accounts for atmospheric chemistry and meteorology, to assess the amount and

location of mercury deposition within the contiguous 48 States after

implementation of CAIR or CAMR. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,015-16, 16,019. EPA’s air

quality modeling generally showed that total mercury deposition is not highly

impacted by power plants. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,019/3.13

b. EPA projected concentrations of utility-attributable

methylmercury in fish tissue after implementation of

CAIR, or independently, CAMR.

EPA created the largest existing database of actual fish tissue mercury

concentrations to measure baseline mercury concentrations in fish tissue in various

locations throughout the United States. EPA then combined this fish tissue data

with its modeled mercury deposition projections to estimate the concentrations of

utility-attributable methylmercury in fish tissue both in the baseline year of 2001,
To project methylmercury concentrations in fish tissue following 14

implementation of CAIR or CAMR, EPA assumed that a particular reduction in air

deposition of mercury in a particular geographic location would result in a

proportional reduction in the methylmercury concentration in fish in the same

general geographic location. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,019/2.

A Reference Dose is an estimate of a daily oral exposure that is likely to be 15

(continued...)

48

and after implementation of CAIR or CAMR in 2020. Effectiveness TSD at 19-32

(JA xxx-xxx); 70 Fed. Reg. 16,015-21.14

c. EPA estimated fish consumption rates.

EPA estimated noncommercial freshwater fish consumption rates for two

broad subpopulations: (1) recreational fishers generally, and (2) individuals,

including certain Native Americans, who through choice, socio-cultural practices

or necessity consume larger amounts of freshwater fish (“subsistence fishers”). 70

Fed. Reg. 16,021-22; Effectiveness TSD at 33-39 (JA xxx-xxx). For each of these

subpopulations, EPA calculated a range of consumption rates expressed in terms

of percentiles. Id.

d. EPA compared exposure to the methylmercury

Reference Dose.

As the final step, EPA compared the projected exposure to utilityattributable methylmercury to the “Reference Dose” for methylmercury. 70 Fed.

Reg. 16,012-13, 16,023-25; Effectiveness TSD at 40-54 (JA xxx-xxx). In order 15
(...continued) 15

without an appreciable risk of deleterious health effects during a lifetime. 70 Fed.

Reg. 16,012/3. Exposure above a Reference Dose, however, does not necessarily

imply unacceptable risk or that adverse health effects are expected. 70 Fed. Reg.

16,013. EPA has established a Reference Dose for methylmercury of 0.1

micrograms of methylmercury per day for each kilogram of a person’s body

weight. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,024/3.

49

to make the comparison easy to understand, EPA developed the concept of an

index of daily intake (“IDI”). EPA defined the IDI so that where the IDI was less

than one, the incremental exposure to methylmercury due to power plants

emissions would be less than the Reference Dose, and where the IDI was greater

than one, the incremental exposure to methylmercury due to power plants would

be greater than the Reference Dose. Effectiveness TSD at 44 (JA xxx). By

comparing a range of fish tissue methylmercury concentration percentiles (e.g., the

50th percentile fish tissue methylmercury concentration, the 99th percentile fish

tissue methylmercury concentration . . . ) and fish consumption rate percentiles,

EPA was able to estimate the general size of the population of freshwater fish

consumers that might be exposed to various IDI values. Id.

2. EPA exercised reasonable judgment in concluding that

power plant mercury emissions will not pose a hazard to

public health.

For the general population of recreational fishers, EPA determined that the

chance of experiencing an IDI value above one after implementation of CAIR
50

would be exceedingly small – a person eating at the 99th percentile consumption

rate would have to eat exclusively fish with utility-attributable methylmercury

concentrations at or above the 98.7th percentile for the person’s IDI value to be

above one. Effectiveness TSD at 46 (JA xxx); 70 Fed. Reg. 16,024/1. Even under

the highly unlikely scenario where a recreational fisher consumed at the 99th

percentile rate and consumed solely fish with utility-attributable methylmercury

concentrations at the 99th percentile, the fisher’s exposure would exceed the

Reference Dose by only 10 percent. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,024/1. The possibility of

exceeding the IDI would be even smaller after implementation of CAMR. Id.

With respect to the smaller population of subsistence fishers (who generally

eat much more fish than recreational fishers), EPA determined that such fishers

could experience an IDI value above one after implementation of CAIR or CAMR

if persons both (1) consumed fish at very high subsistence consumption rates, and

(2) consumed fish exclusively from waterbodies with very high utility-attributable

methylmercury fish-tissue concentrations. Effectiveness TSD at 50-53 (JA xxxxxx); 70 Fed. Reg. 16,024; Reconsideration RTC at 34, 73 (JA xxx, xxx). EPA,

however, determined that the possibility of both of these factors converging for

subsistence fishers was extremely small based on its finding that the

overwhelming majority of subsistence fishers live outside of the areas most
51

impacted by utility-attributable mercury deposition. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,024.

In sum, EPA determined that the overwhelming majority of the population

will not be exposed to utility-attributable methylmercury above the Reference

Dose following implementation of CAIR, and that exposure to utility-attributable

methylmercury will be even lower following implementation of CAMR. 70 Fed.

Reg. 16,024-25; 71 Fed. Reg. 33,393/3. EPA further determined that there was

significant uncertainty as to whether any group of persons, including subsistence

fishers, would be exposed to levels of utility-attributable methylmercury above the

Reference Dose following implementation of CAIR and/or CAMR, and significant

uncertainty as well as to whether any level of exposure above the Reference Dose

would cause adverse effects. Id.; see also Reconsideration RTC at 36 (JA at xxx) 

Based on these determinations, EPA made a reasonable science-informed

policy judgment that power plant mercury emissions, following implementation of

CAIR, and to an even greater degree following implementation of CAMR, are not

reasonably anticipated to cause hazards to public health. EPA’s policy judgment

is entitled to considerable deference. This Court has recognized that EPA, in

making regulatory determinations concerning protection of public health, need not

find that “safe” means “risk-free.” NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1164 (D.C. Cir.
The NRDC decision addressed an EPA determination under the pre-1990 16

version of CAA section 112, which applied an even more stringent standard than

that set forth in section 112(n)(1)(A). The pre-1990 law required EPA to evaluate

what level of emission reduction was needed to “provide an ample margin of

safety.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1988). Section 112(n)(1)(A) does not require

evaluation of the level of emissions needed to “provide an ample margin of

safety.”

52

1987). Instead, EPA must make a judgment as to “what risks are acceptable in 16

the world in which we live.” Id. at 1165. This Court has further recognized that

“‘EPA, not the Court, has the technical expertise to . . . formulate policy with

respect to what risks are acceptable,’” and stated that it will “not second-guess a

determination based on that expertise.” Id. at 1163 (citation omitted).

C. Petitioners’ Challenges to EPA’s Health Hazard Findings Lack

Merit.

Government, Environmental, and Tribal Petitioners make various attacks on

EPA’s determination that power plant mercury emissions are not reasonably

anticipated to cause “hazards to public health” following implementation of Act

requirements. These arguments all lack merit and are addressed below.

1. EPA reasonably considered mercury reductions that will be

achieved by other requirements of the Act.

First, EPA did not err in considering the substantial mercury emission

reductions that will be achieved by CAIR and CAMR. See Government Br. at 22-

24; Environmental Br. at 30-36. CAA section 112(n)(1)(A) plainly requires that
53

EPA examine hazards to public health “after imposition of the requirements of

[the Act].” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (emphasis added). That is, Congress

expressly directed EPA to project what power plant emissions will be in the future,

once requirements of the Act are implemented, and then determine whether

emission levels at that time may reasonably be anticipated to result in hazards to

public health. Congress’ direction to EPA to consider reductions that will be

achieved by other CAA requirements reflects Congress’ recognition that power

plants are subject to numerous CAA provisions beyond section 112 and its desire

to avoid subjecting power plants to duplicative and unnecessary regulation. 70

Fed. Reg. 16,000/2.

Government Petitioners argue that EPA must disregard the substantial

mercury emission reductions that will be achieved by CAIR and CAMR because

these regulations were promulgated subsequent to enactment of the 1990

Amendments. See Government Br. at 19. Nothing in the statute, however,

precludes EPA from taking into account reductions that will be achieved by

regulations promulgated after enactment of the Amendments. Moreover, CAIR

and CAMR are regulations authorized by statutory provisions that were in place at

the time of the 1990 Amendments. CAIR is authorized by CAA section

110(a)(2)(D) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D). CAMR is authorized by
54

CAA section 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411.

Furthermore, EPA’s consideration of reductions that will be achieved by

CAIR does not undermine any “timeline” established in the 1990 Amendments for

regulating hazardous air pollutants from power plants. See Environmental Br. at

30-31; Government Br. at 19-20. In the 1990 Amendments, Congress did not

establish any deadline at all by which EPA must make a section 112(n)(1)(A)

determination, much less establish any deadline by which any regulation of power

plants must be fully implemented. To be sure, Congress set a deadline for EPA to

complete a study of power plant emissions, but a deadline to complete a study is

quite different from a deadline to make a regulatory determination. Indeed, the

terms of section 112(n)(1)(A) indicate that Congress had reasons for setting a

study deadline beyond insuring prompt regulation of power plant emissions under

section 112 if appropriate and necessary. In particular, it is noteworthy that

Congress directed that EPA include in the study and report to Congress on

“alternative control strategies for emissions which may warrant regulation under

this section.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). This indicates that the study deadline

may have been intended in part to facilitate Congress’ ability to enact some

alternative control program for power plant emissions (in place of the section 112

program to which Congress clearly had reservations about subjecting power
Petitioners’ position that language in 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1) and 42 U.S.C. 17

§ 7412(e)(1) creates a deadline applicable to power plants is misplaced. See

Environmental Br. at 30. These two provisions do not govern power plants, which

are subject to unique treatment as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).

Likewise, there is nothing in 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(5) that obligates EPA to issue

section 112 standards for power plants, much less issue such standards by the end

of 2002. See Environmental Br. at 30, n.43.

The Acid Rain Program requires major reductions of SO and NO emissions 2 x 

18

2 from power plants. The SO program sets a permanent cap on the total amount of

SO that may be emitted by electric power plants. The program is phased in, with 2

2 the 2010 SO cap set at about one-half of the 1980 emissions from the power

sector. 42 U.S.C. § 7651d. Controls used to meet Acid Rain program

(continued...)

55

plants).

In any event, if Congress had intended to set a firm deadline by which EPA

must implement any regulation of hazardous air pollutants from power plants, it

could have set one. It did not, and Petitioners attempt to read a timeframe into the

Act that is not there.17

Furthermore, the 1990 Amendments reflect Congress’ recognition generally

that Act requirements would take decades to implement and that EPA might need

to project emission levels far into the future in making a section 112(n)(1)(A)

regulatory determination. For example, Congress enacted the Acid Rain program

as part of the 1990 CAA Amendments and provided that this program not be fully

implemented until about 2010 – 20 years after enactment of the Amendments. 42

U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o. The 15-year time horizon EPA modeled in the instant 18
(...continued) 18

requirements also reduce hazardous air pollutants. Utility Study at 2-31 to 2-33,

3-12 to 3-14 (JA xxx-xxx, xxx-xxx).

Although EPA modeled utility-attributable methylmercury concentrations in 19

2020 in its hazard analysis, most mercury reductions that will be achieved by

CAIR and CAMR will actually be achieved well before 2020. The compliance

date for the first phase of NO reductions required by CAIR is 2009 and for the x

2 first phase of SO reductions required by CAIR is 2010. 70 Fed. Reg. 25,215-16.

Most of the relevant mercury reductions resulting from CAIR implementation will

occur by 2010. See Reconsideration RTC at 51 (JA xxx); EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-

0056-6130 (“Air Quality Modeling TSD”), Section V. B. (JA xxx).

56

Section 112(n) Rule is five years shorter than the 20-year interval between the

1990 Amendments and full implementation of the Acid Rain program. Thus,

EPA’s consideration of mercury emission reductions that will be achieved by

CAIR and CAMR over a 15-year timeframe was consistent with the statutory

framework.19

a. EPA reasonably calculated mercury reductions that

will be achieved by CAIR.

Petitioners additionally contend that EPA should not have relied on

reductions in mercury emissions that will be achieved by CAIR because CAIR

x 2 requires reductions of NO and SO but does not specifically require regulation of

mercury emissions from power plants. See Environmental Br. at 30; Government

Br. at 23 -24. Although States do have discretion under CAIR to independently

determine which sources to control to meet CAIR requirements, this does not
57

mean that EPA is unable to reasonably project how States will control emissions to

meet CAIR’s requirements. In the final rule preamble and in response to

comments, EPA provided a number of compelling reasons as to why it reasonably

expects States to implement CAIR by regulating power plant emissions. 70 Fed.

Reg. 16,010; Reconsideration RTC at 49 (JA xxx). First, the power sector

2 x represents the majority of national SO and NO emissions, and EPA analysis

2 x found that the most efficient method for States to achieve CAIR SO and NO

emission reduction targets would be through adoption of controls on the power

sector. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,010/2. Second, EPA concluded it is likely that States will

choose to implement CAIR in much the same way they chose to implement

x requirements under a previous similar rulemaking, the “NO SIP Call” rulemaking,

63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998). Id. Under that rulemaking, EPA gave States

ozone NO reduction requirements, and each State subject to the rulemaking chose x

x to control emissions from power plants to meet NO reduction requirements. Id.

Petitioners further contend that EPA should not have relied on reductions in

mercury emissions that will be achieved by CAIR, because CAIR does not specify

2 the nature of control measures that power plants might adopt to control SO and

NO emissions, so there is no guarantee that plants would use controls for these x

pollutants that also reduce mercury. See Government Br. at 40; Environmental Br.
58

at 51. EPA’s projection, based on its expertise that controls imposed to reduce

SO and NO will also reduce mercury, is sound. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,010/3. EPA 2 x

modeling projected that most reductions in SO and NO required by CAIR would 2 x

come from power plants installing proven technologies: flue gas desulfurization

2 (“scrubber”) control technology to reduce SO and “selective catalytic reduction”

control technology to reduce NO . Id. These technologies are the most cost- x

effective control technologies available and have been demonstrated to reduce

mercury. Id. 

Petitioners’ speculation that power plants might install some brand new

2 x technology to reduce SO or NO that will not reduce mercury is unsupported by

any record evidence. As EPA noted in response to Petitioners’ comments:

[T]he tight timeline for meeting the CAIR emission

reductions makes it . . . unlikely that some fantastical

new control option that does not reduce [mercury] at all

will come available in time – power plant control options

do not evolve that quickly.

Reconsideration RTC at 50 (JA xxx). In short, Petitioners have offered no

compelling reason for this Court to second-guess EPA’s technical expertise and

judgment and conclude that CAIR will not result in reductions of mercury as

projected.

Government and Environmental Petitioners additionally contend that EPA
59

should not have taken into account mercury reductions that will be achieved by

CAIR inasmuch as CAIR requires emission reductions by only 28 States in the

eastern portion of the country and the District of Columbia. See Government Br.

at 23; Environmental Br. at 33. The relevant inquiry, however, is not whether

CAIR applies nationwide, but whether mercury emissions from power plants after

implementation of CAIR will be at levels not reasonably anticipated to result in

hazards to public health. Reconsideration RTC at 50 (JA xxx). The fact that

CAIR is not expected to result in reductions at every power plant nationwide does

not mean that EPA erred in considering the significant reductions in mercury

emissions that will be achieved as a result of CAIR and concluding that remaining

emissions will not pose a public health hazard.

Similarly, Petitioners’ focus on the fact that technology-based regulation of

mercury under section 112 could potentially result in even greater mercury

reductions than will be achieved through CAIR is not the relevant inquiry. See

Environmental Br. at 33; Government Br. at 22. The relevant inquiry is whether,

after implementation of CAIR, mercury emissions from power plants will be

below levels reasonably anticipated to result in hazards to public health.

We further note that Petitioners’ assertions regarding the degree of emission

reduction that would be achieved under section 112 as compared to under CAIR
60

(or CAMR) are entirely speculative. The actual degree of reduction that might be

obtained if power plants were regulated under section 112 would depend on

various factors. For example, the degree of reduction would depend in part on

how the industry was subcategorized for purposes of regulation. See

42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1) (providing that the Administrator may distinguish among

classes, types and sizes of sources within a category or subcategory in establishing

standards). The degree of reduction would further depend on the number of new

sources that were built between now and 2020. A significant advantage of a capand-trade approach to regulation, such as that established in CAMR or CAIR, is

that it limits the overall amount of emissions from the industry, regardless of how

many new sources are built, whereas a section 112 approach would just limit

emissions from particular sources and would not preclude overall emissions from

increasing beyond a cap as new sources went into operation.

Finally, we note that Environmental Petitioners’ reliance (see

Environmental Br. at 34-36) on this Court’s recent decision in UARG v. EPA, 471

F.3d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2006), is misplaced. That decision addressed a CAA

regulatory program related to visibility protection in national parks and wilderness

areas. The statutory provision at issue in that case, CAA section 169A, requires

States to include provisions in SIPs as necessary to make “reasonable progress”
61

towards remedying visibility impairment in parks and wilderness areas. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7491(b). The Court held that EPA could reasonably allow States to meet

obligations under CAA section 169A by participating in CAIR instead of requiring

sources to install best available retrofit technology (“BART”). 471 F.3d at 1339-

41. The CAA provision at issue here, section 112(n)(1)(A), is completely different

than section 169A. Nothing in section 112(n)(1)(A) requires EPA, in making a

section 112(n)(1)(A) determination, to ignore mercury reductions that will be

achieved by other Act requirements such as CAIR on grounds that not all States

are obligated to take actions under CAIR. Unlike section 169A, section

112(n)(1)(A) does not impose any obligation on States to impose requirements. It

simply requires EPA to determine whether regulation of power plants under

section 112 is “appropriate and necessary.”

b. EPA’s health hazard findings are supported by CAIR

reductions alone.

Petitioners additionally contend that EPA should not have considered

reductions in mercury emissions that will be achieved by CAMR because, in their

view, EPA lacks authority to regulate mercury emissions from power plants under

CAA section 111. See Environmental Br. at 20-29; Government Br. at 26-35.

Petitioners are mistaken, and we address Petitioners’ arguments related to EPA’s
62

authority to promulgate CAMR in section V below. However, Petitioners’

argument is immaterial with respect to the Section 112(n) Rule because regardless

of whether EPA has authority to promulgate CAMR, EPA’s health hazard

determination would still be sound, based on EPA’s projection that utilityattributable mercury emissions that will remain after CAIR alone do not pose a

hazard to public health. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,024/3.

2. EPA adequately considered risks posed by local mercury

deposition in its health hazard analysis.

While most power plant mercury emissions are deposited far from plants,

some mercury emissions are deposited locally (i.e., within 25 kilometers). 70 Fed.

Reg. 16,025; Utility Study at ES-18 (JA xx). The CMAQ model used by EPA in

its IDI health hazard analysis described above (see generally, supra, at 44-52)

captured elevated localized deposition from power plants. Reconsideration RTC

108 (JA xxx). Moreover, in addition to its IDI analysis, EPA conducted an

additional assessment to specifically address whether local deposition of mercury

from power plants following CAIR or CAMR would result in “utility hotspots.”

See generally 70 Fed. Reg. 16,025-28. Contrary to Petitioners’ arguments (see

Environmental Br. at 33-34, Intervenor Physicians’ for Social Responsibility

(“Physicians’”) Br. at 11-14), EPA appropriately assessed local deposition both in
63

its IDI and hotspot analyses and reasonably concluded local deposition would not

result in hazards to public health.

a. Overview of EPA’s utility hotspot analysis.

In its additional hotspot analysis, EPA considered whether any freshwater

waterbodies containing consumable fish would, following CAIR or CAMR,

contain utility-attributable methylmercury fish tissue concentrations in excess of

EPA’s recommended methylmercury water quality criterion. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,025-

28. By way of background, section 303(c)(2)(A) of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A), and EPA’s regulations implementing that Act, 40 C.F.R.

Part 31, specify requirements for adoption by States and Tribal governments of

water quality criteria for toxic pollutants that protect designated uses of

waterbodies. For the States’ and Tribes’ use in setting water quality standards,

EPA has recommended a water quality criterion for methylmercury that is

designed to protect human health. The criterion, which is set as a fish tissue level,

is 0.3 milligrams of methylmercury per kilogram (i.e., 0.3 mg/kg) of wet-weight

fish tissue. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,014/2.

 EPA collected, as part of its air quality modeling analysis, fish tissue data

to determine methylmercury fish tissue concentrations for numerous sample sites

throughout the country. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,026/2. EPA then used CMAQ and
After implementation of CAIR, levels at the 50th, 90th, and 99th percentiles 20

and maximum value sample sites were predicted to be 0.01, 0.03, 0.10 and 0.25

mg/kg respectively. Id. After CAMR, levels at the 50th, 90th, and 99th

percentiles and maximum value sites were predicted to be 0.01, 0.03, 0.09, and

0.19 mg/kg respectively. Id. 

64

Mercury Maps models to predict what utility-attributable deposition and

methylmercury fish tissue concentrations would be at each of those sample sites

after implementation of CAIR, and independently, CAMR. Id. These analyses

demonstrated that utility-attributable methylmercury in fish tissue would not

exceed the water quality criterion of 0.3 mg/kg at any of the sample sites after

implementation of either rule. Id. Accordingly, EPA concluded that power plant 20

mercury emissions, following implementation of either CAIR or, independently,

CAMR, will not result in utility hotspots that would result in hazards to public

health.

b. EPA’s air quality modeling did not underestimate

local mercury deposition.

Environmental Petitioners and Physician Intervenors attempt to cast doubt

on EPA’s hotspot analysis and on EPA’s use of the CMAQ model more generally

by asserting that the CMAQ model does not adequately predict local deposition.

See Environmental Br. at 34, Physicians’ Br. at 13-14. These arguments are

misplaced.
The final version of the Steubenville Study that is attached as Appendix B 21

to the declaration of William Auberle in the addendum to Environmental

Petitioners’ brief was published after EPA’s action on reconsideration. As this

version is outside of the record, it should not be considered by this Court. See 42

U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(A) & (B). The declaration of William Auberle itself should

also not be considered because it constitutes extra-record expert evidence. Mr.

Auberle, among other things, purports to provide his expert interpretation of

recent studies that were not before EPA at the time of its decision. Moreover, to

the extent that Mr. Auberle’s declaration can be construed as offering argument

relating to material already in the record, his declaration should not be considered

because it presents argument in excess of Petitioners’ word limit.

65

Petitioners rely principally on an EPA-sponsored study of mercury

deposition at a site in eastern Ohio (“the Steubenville Study”). The Steubenville 21

Study cannot be compared directly to the results predicted by the CMAQ model,

but even to the extent it provides a loose basis for comparison, the results of the

Steubenville Study are consistent with the results predicted by EPA’s CMAQ

model. See generally 71 Fed. Reg. 33,391-92; Reconsideration RTC at 81-82 (JA

xxx-xxx).

As an initial matter, the Steubenville Study cannot be directly compared to

the CMAQ model because (1) the Steubenville Study measured mercury

deposition from all sources of coal-combustion in the region, whereas EPA used

the CMAQ model to predict deposition from power plants alone, (2) the

Steubenville Study measured deposition at a single point, whereas the CMAQ

model estimated average deposition over a 36-kilometer grid cell, and (3) the
66

Steubenville Study measured deposition in 2003, and EPA’s CMAQ model did not

project deposition for that year. 71 Fed. Reg. 33,392-93. The latter is significant

because deposition can change significantly from year to year based on both

climatological and meterological differences. Reconsideration RTC at 144 (JA

xxx).

Bearing the above considerations in mind, even using the Steubenville

Study as an indirect basis for comparison, the results of the Steubenville Study are

consistent with the CMAQ model projections. The Steubenville Study found that

approximately 67 percent of mercury depositing at a single hilltop monitor in

Steubenville, Ohio, in 2003 was from some form of coal combustion, including

power plants. 71 Fed. Reg. 33,392. The CMAQ model similarly predicts for 2001

that power plant coal combustion alone constitutes 44 percent of mercury

deposition in the 36-kilometer grid cell including the Steubenville monitoring site.

Id. One grid cell to the north and three grid cells to the east of the Steubenville

monitoring site, the CMAQ model predicts 57 percent and 71 percent deposition

from power plant combustion alone respectively. Id. Thus, the CMAQ model

predicts power plant deposition for the Steubenville area for a different year

roughly in the same range as the 67 percent figure measured at the Steubenville

monitor from all forms of coal-combustion.
67

Petitioners further make an invalid comparison (see Environmental Br. at

34; Physicians’ Br. at 13) when they attempt to compare the Steubenville data to

EPA’s projections of deposition percentages into entire watersheds using CMAQ

36-kilometer grid cell results and other data. By way of background, in its IDI

analysis generally, EPA used the CMAQ model, combined with United States

Geological Survey (“USGS”) information, to estimate average deposition from

power plants at the watershed level. Specifically, EPA used 8-digit hydrological

units codes (“HUCs”) developed by USGS to identify watersheds. There are

2,108 distinct 8-digit HUCs in the lower 48 United States, that average

approximately 1,631 square miles in size. EPA averaged 36-kilometer CMAQ

grid cells within each HUC to generate deposition estimates at the HUC level. 70

Fed. Reg. 16,019/1. It was in the context of assessing power plant mercury

deposition percentages in watersheds (i.e., 8-digit HUCs) that EPA noted that,

within the watershed with the 99th percentile highest total mercury deposition

(from all sources, not just power plants), eliminating power plant emissions would

reduce total mercury deposition by 16 percent. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,019/1.

To the extent Petitioners are indirectly contesting EPA’s decision to

evaluate deposition impacts at the watershed level as part of its IDI analysis, EPA

provided sound reasons for doing so. See 70 Fed. Reg. 16,026/1-2; Effectiveness
EPA in response to comments also addressed the “NOAA” Study referenced 22

by Physician Intervenors. See Physicians’ Br. at 13-14; Reconsideration RTC at

143. EPA noted that the NOAA Study was based on use of a different air quality

model, which was not used by EPA because it was a less stable modeling platform

than CMAQ and did not account for global sources of mercury or for atmospheric

chemistry. EPA additionally noted that, in any event, the level of power plant

mercury deposition into the Great Lakes predicted in the NOAA Study and by the

CMAQ model used by EPA were similar.

68

TSD at 5 (JA xxx). First, much of the mercury emitted by power plants does not

deposit directly into surface waters, but enters waterbodies indirectly through

groundwater inflow and runoff at various times of the year. A comprehensive

watershed-level analysis better accounts for these entry pathways. Id. Second, in

larger waterbodies where there is substantial fishing activity, the fish species

consumed by humans are likely migratory, and the accumulation of methylmercury

in these fish will come from deposition over a large area. Id. Third, many anglers

catch fish from a variety of waterbodies in a watershed, and a watershed level

analysis better accounts for this fishing pattern. Effectiveness TSD at 5 (JA

xxx).22

3. EPA reasonably assessed health hazards relating to

consumption of fish at subsistence levels.

Tribal Petitioners contend that EPA’s freshwater health hazard assessment

is defective because EPA allegedly (1) underestimated tribal fish consumption

rates and (2) erred in determining that tribal subsistence fishers are unlikely to
69

reside in the areas that will be most significantly impacted by utility-attributable

deposition. See Tribal Br. at 31-42. Tribal Petitioners are wrong on both counts.

a. EPA reasonably estimated subsistence fish

consumption rates.

As discussed above, EPA performed a sophisticated modeling analysis to

assess exposure to utility-attributable methylmercury through consumption of

noncommercial freshwater fish following implementation of CAIR and also of

CAMR. EPA recognized in performing this analysis that tribal subsistence fishing

populations tend to consume higher levels of freshwater fish than the general

population of recreational fishers. EPA therefore distinguished subsistence fishers

from the general population, independently assessed subsistence consumption

rates, and incorporated different consumption rates for subsistence fishers into its

analysis. See Effectiveness TSD at 33-39 (JA xxx-xxx); Reconsideration RTC at

70-77 (JA xxx-xxx).

The consumption rates EPA applied for subsistence fishers in its modeling

analysis were vastly greater than the consumption rates EPA applied for the

general population of recreational fishers. Specifically, EPA applied a mean rate

of 60 grams of fish per day for subsistence fishers, as opposed to a rate of 8 grams

per day for the general population, a 95th percentile rate of 170 grams per day for
In response to comments on reconsideration, EPA applied a 389-grams per 23

day rate for the 99th percentile, after initially applying a 295-grams per day rate.

Reconsideration RTC at 71, 73 (JA xxx, xxx). The revised rate did not change

EPA’s conclusions. Reconsideration RTC at 71 (JA xxx).

70

subsistence fishers, as opposed to a 95th percentile rate of 25 grams per day for the

general population, and a 99th percentile rate of 389 grams per day for subsistence

fishers, as opposed to a 99th percentile rate of 47 grams per day for the general

population.23

In estimating subsistence freshwater fish consumption rates for purposes of

its analysis, EPA relied upon data from a peer-reviewed study of four Native

American tribes located along the Columbia River in Washington, Oregon and

Idaho (“the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission Study” or “CRITFC

Study”). See Reconsideration RTC at 72 (JA xxx); CRITFC Study, Legacy

Docket No. A-92-55, I-H-458 (JA xxx). Tribal Petitioners argue that the CRITFC

Study data understates subsistence consumption rates and that EPA should have

utilized data from other studies, including data from: (1) a study of Tribes located

in the Great Lakes region (the “Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Commission

Study,”or “the GLIFWC Study”), (2) a study of Tribes in Alaska (“The Alaska

Study”) (EPA-HQ-OAR 2002-0056-6498.2) (JA xxx), and (3) a study of the

Suquamish Tribe in Washington State (“the Suquamish Study”) (EPA-HQ-OAR-
71

2002-0056-6498.11) (JA xxx). See Tribal Br. at 33. As discussed below, EPA

considered these studies and made a sound decision that the data therein were less

suitable for purposes of its modeling analysis than the CRITFC study data.

Reconsideration RTC at 72, 191 (JA xxx, xxx).

EPA explained that to be suitable for use in its analysis, fish consumption

data needed to meet, among other things, the following three criteria: (1) the data

needed to reflect daily consumption rates over an annual period, as opposed to

short-term consumption rates, such as a seasonal consumption rate, because the

Reference Dose is based on long-term exposure, (2) the data needed to reflect

freshwater-sourced fish consumption rates; and (3) the data needed to report

consumption rates for identifiable population percentiles (e.g., average 50th

percentile consumption rates, and high-end 95th and 99th percentile consumption

rates). Effectiveness TSD at 39 (JA xxx); Reconsideration RTC at 72 (JA xxx).

EPA explained that data needed to reflect long-term annual average daily

consumption rates because EPA’s modeling analysis was premised on assessing

long-term exposure to utility-attributable methylmercury and then comparing this

long-term exposure to the Reference Dose for methylmercury. See supra, at 48-

49. The Reference Dose for methylmercury is based on chronic long-term

exposure. Accordingly, long-term annual-average consumption data are more
72

relevant and suitable for use than short-term data in a modeling analysis that is

intended to compare individuals’ exposure to the Reference Dose. Effectiveness

TSD at 33 (JA xxx).

EPA further explained that the data needed to reflect freshwater-sourced

fish consumption (i.e., fish caught and consumed from rivers and lakes as opposed

to estuaries or oceans) because the freshwater fish pathway is the pathway of

greatest concern with respect to utility-attributable mercury exposure, and because

there is considerable uncertainty associated with extrapolating freshwater fish

consumption rates from marine fish consumption rates. Effectiveness TSD at 37

(JA xxx); Reconsideration RTC at 72 (JA xxx).

EPA additionally explained that consumption data needed to include

consumption rates for identifiable population percentiles (e.g., average

consumption rates and high-end 95th and 99th percentile consumption rates) so

that EPA could consider in making a public health hazard assessment the relative

number of individuals exposed at particular levels, as opposed to considering only

the degree of risk posed to some potentially maximally exposed individual.

Effectiveness TSD at 37-38 (JA xxx-xxx); 70 Fed. Reg. 16,022/3.

Applying the three criteria outlined above, EPA reasonably relied upon the

data from the CRITFC Study and not the other studies cited by Petitioners. The
73

CRITFC Study was the optimal dataset before EPA, as it was the only source of

data before EPA that met all three required criteria (i.e., it was the only dataset that

included annual-average, freshwater fish consumption data for identifiable

population percentiles). The GLIFWC Study data did not reflect annual-average

consumption rates, and the seasonal consumption rate data within the GLIFWC

Study could not be translated into annual-averaged consumption rates without

making a number of highly uncertain and speculative assumptions. Effectiveness

TSD at 38-39 (JA xxx). In addition, the GLIFWC Study did not link consumption

data to identifiable population percentiles. Id. at 39. The Alaska and Suquamish

Studies reported consumption data for coastal tribes that obtained fish from

saltwater sources and was not representative of consumption behavior of inland

populations. Reconsideration RTC at 72 (JA xxx).

Tribal Petitioners contend that even if the CRITFC Study data is probative,

the dataset should not have been exclusively relied upon, inasmuch as there is

some uncertainty associated with relying on regional data in a nationwide

modeling analysis. See Tribal Br. at 33-34. The CRITFC Study data, however,

comprised the optimal dataset before EPA for use in modeling annualized

subsistence consumption rates, and the degree of uncertainty associated with the

CRITFC Study dataset was less than the degree of uncertainty associated with
Tribal Petitioners note that the CRITFC Study included consumption rates 24

of individuals who did not consume fish. See Tribal Br. at 34, n.6. As EPA noted

in response to comments, just seven percent of total study participants did not

consume fish, and, therefore, inclusion of non-consumers in the study did not

significantly impact overall consumption rates. Reconsideration RTC at 71 (JA

xxx).

74

alternative datasets available to EPA (i.e., there was less uncertainty associated

with using regional data to estimate subsistence consumption rates than with

extrapolating annual consumption rates from reported seasonal or saltwater

consumption rates). Reconsideration RTC at 72 (JA xxx).24

Contrary to Petitioners’ suggestion (see Tribal Br. at 35), EPA need not

invest the resources to conduct a perfect study of subsistence fishing rates. It is a

well-established principle of administrative law that where imperfect scientific

information is before an agency, the agency may proceed on the basis of imperfect

information so long as the agency has a rational basis for doing so. American Iron

& Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Here, the CRITFC

Study presented a rigorous peer-reviewed study of annualized freshwater

consumption rates by inland subsistence populations and was the optimal dataset

before EPA for use in EPA’s modeling analysis. EPA has met its minimal burden

of demonstrating a rational basis for relying upon the CRITFC Study data in its

modeling analysis. Cf. Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1524
75

(9th Cir. 1995) (holding EPA reasonably set limitation on amount of dioxin that

could be released into water basin based on projected consumption rate of 6.5

grams per day, notwithstanding evidence before EPA that certain human

subpopulations consumed at much greater rates); NRDC v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395,

1403 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding EPA’s approval of State water quality standard

for dioxin based on projected consumption rate of 6.5 grams per day,

notwithstanding evidence before EPA that tribal subpopulations consumed at

greater rates).

Tribal Petitioners additionally contend that EPA should have endeavored to

incorporate historical consumption rates into its modeling analysis. See Tribal Br.

at 36-37. As a practical matter, Tribal Petitioners do not point to any peerreviewed historical data in the record that met the required criteria for EPA’s

modeling analysis described above. But even if such data were to have been in the

record, it would still have been reasonable for EPA to rely upon recent data for use

in its modeling analysis. Section 112(n)(1)(A) directs EPA to study “hazards to

public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions” by power

plants following implementation of Act requirements and to then make a

determination as to whether regulation of power plants under section 112 is

“appropriate and necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). Even if historical data
The cited tables present the expected IDI (see supra, at 48-49) at various 25

distributions of fish consumption rates and percentiles of utility-attributable

methylmercury concentrations, following implementation of CAIR and CAMR.

For example, the table indicates that a subsistence fisher consuming at an average

(mean) subsistence rate, and consuming exclusively fish from a location with 95th

percentile utility-attributable methylmercury concentrations, would have an

(continued...)

76

meeting the required criteria were to have been in the record, EPA could still have

reasonably concluded that recent data presents a more accurate picture of hazards

reasonably anticipated to occur than older and possibly outdated historical data.

b. Tribal Petitioners have waived any challenge to

EPA’s use of Census Bureau data to identify areas

where subsistence populations are likely to reside.

In its freshwater pathway modeling analysis, EPA determined that it is

possible that, under certain circumstances, high-end subsistence subpopulations

could be exposed to utility-attributable methylmercury concentrations in excess of

the Reference Dose following implementation of CAIR and CAMR. In particular,

EPA’s modeling reflected that, if a subsistence fish consumer were to eat at both a

very high subsistence consumption rate and eat solely fish with very high utilityattributable methylmercury concentrations, that person could be exposed to utilityattributable methylmercury concentrations above the Reference Dose. See

Reconsideration RTC at Table 2 (JA xxx); Effectiveness TSD at Table 6.4 (JA

xxx). EPA concluded, however, that the overwhelming majority of tribal 25
(...continued) 25

expected IDI of 0.66.

77

populations live outside of areas most impacted by utility-attributable mercury

deposition, and therefore, it was unlikely that a subsistence fish consumer would

both eat at a relatively high consumption rate and eat solely fish with relatively

high utility-attributable methylmercury concentrations. 71 Fed. Reg. 33,392/3; 70

Fed. Reg. 16,024/1. EPA further explained that at exposures above the Reference

Dose, adverse health effects are possible but such exposures do not necessarily

mean that adverse effects will occur. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,024/3.

To get a sense of the location of tribal subsistence populations in relation to

high utility-attributable deposition, EPA utilized 2000 Census Bureau data.

Specifically, EPA mapped the locations of “Tribal Census Tracts,” which are

defined by the Census Bureau as “relatively permanent statistical subdivisions of a

federally recognized American Indian reservation and/or off-reservation Trust

land.” Effectiveness TSD at 51 (JA xxx). EPA overlaid the locations of Tribal

Census Tracts on maps identifying the location of the areas most impacted by

utility-attributable mercury deposition following implementation of CAIR. See

Effectiveness TSD at 52 Figure 6.1 (JA xxx). Visual inspection of the resulting

overlay map showed that the overwhelming majority of Tribal Census Tracts
78

would not be within areas most impacted by utility-attributable mercury

deposition. Id. at 51 (JA xxx).

EPA concluded, based on its comparison of the location of Tribal Census

Tracts with the location of areas most impacted by utility-attributable mercury

deposition, that “the likelihood that factors will converge such that a [Native

American subsistence fisher] would both eat at a high consumption rate and eat

solely freshwater fish with high utility-attributable [methylmercury]

concentrations is small.” 71 Fed. Reg. 33,392. EPA further concluded that

although the possibility exists that a very small group of Native American

subsistence fishers may be exposed to utility-attributable methylmercury above the

Reference Dose, “significant uncertainties exist with respect to the existence and

actual size of such a group.” 70 Fed. Reg. 16,024-25.

Tribal Petitioners contend for the first time in their brief that EPA erred in

using Census Bureau data to identify the general location of tribal subsistence

populations. See Tribal Br. at 40-42. The contention that EPA erred in using

Census Bureau data was not brought to EPA’s attention during the rulemaking.

See, e.g., EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0056-6498.1, National Congress of American

Indians Comment Letter (JA xxx-xxx) (failing to raise any concern with use of

Census Bureau data). Accordingly, any argument based on EPA’s use of Census
79

Bureau data has been waived. The CAA judicial review provision,

42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B), specifically provides that “[o]nly an objection to a rule

or procedure which was raised with reasonable specificity during the period for

public comment . . . may be raised during judicial review,” and this Court has

“‘strictly’ enforce[d]” this statutory requirement. Mossville Envtl. Action Now v.

EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Even if Tribal Petitioners’ new argument regarding EPA’s use of Census

Bureau data could be considered, EPA’s use of these data was reasonable. EPA

appropriately used these data to approximately identify the location of most

subsistence tribal populations. It was not EPA’s intent to identify the residence of

every Native American in the United States. EPA recognized that subsistence

tribal populations are a subset of the general Native American population. Several

studies have shown that although Native American anglers generally consume fish

at somewhat higher rates than the general population of recreational anglers, they

consume fish at rates far lower than rates for Native American subsistence

populations. EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0056-5815, Exposure Factors Handbook at 10-

27 (JA xxx-xxx); Reconsideration RTC at 191 (JA xxx). In using Tribal Census

Tract data, EPA made a reasonable assumption that significant concentrations of

tribal subsistence fishing populations reside within Tribal Census Tracts. To the
80

extent that Tribal Petitioners now contend that significant subsistence populations

are located outside of formal reservations or trust lands and can be identified

through data other than Census Bureau data, they should have brought these

concerns to EPA during the public comment period so that EPA could have

evaluated these concerns and, if appropriate, incorporated additional information

into its analysis, or further explained its decision to continue to rely on Census

Bureau data.

4. EPA assessed marine, estuarine, and commercial fish

exposure pathways in its hazard analysis.

Although EPA focused its analysis on risks posed by consumption of fish

containing the highest levels of utility-attributable mercury (i.e., noncommercial

freshwater fish), EPA’s analysis was not limited to this exposure pathway. EPA

assessed through additional quantitative and qualitative analyses the degree of risk

associated with consuming other kinds of fish, including marine fish, fish caught

in estuaries such as the Chesapeake Bay, and commercially-caught freshwater fish.

See generally 71 Fed. Reg. 33,392-93; Reconsideration TSD at 2-27 (JA xxx-xxx).

Accordingly, Government Petitioners’ assertion (see Government Br. at 25-26)

that EPA did not consider these other pathways is simply wrong.

With respect to marine fish, EPA undertook a thorough and sophisticated
Environmental Petitioners’ argument (see Environmental Br. at 34) that 26

EPA failed to assess non-mercury hazardous air pollutants emitted by power plants

is also incorrect. In the Section 112(n) Rule, EPA squarely considered and

determined that it was not appropriate and necessary to regulate power plants on

(continued...)

81

quantitative analysis during reconsideration that was similar in depth and scope to

the analysis undertaken for the noncommercial freshwater pathway. 71 Fed. Reg.

33,392-93; Reconsideration TSD at 11-16 (JA xxx-xxx). That analysis, which

likely overstated the utility-attributable methylmercury levels in marine fish,

showed that the incremental exposure to methylmercury due to power plant

emissions from eating marine fish would be less than the Reference Dose, even for

a person consuming at the 99.9th percentile rate and consuming exclusively

marine fish with high utility-attributable methylmercury concentrations. 71 Fed.

Reg. 33,392-93.

Although scientific uncertainties and a lack of data made similar

quantitative modeling analyses for other pathways (e.g., commercial freshwater,

estuarine, aquaculture) not possible, EPA did engage in detailed qualitative

analyses with respect to these pathways. See Reconsideration TSD at 16-27 (JA

xxx-xxx). These qualitative analyses showed that exposure to utility-attributable

mercury through these pathways would be low, and in all cases less than exposure

through the noncommercial freshwater pathway.26
(...continued) 26

the basis of non-mercury emissions. See 69 Fed. Reg. 4688-89; 70 Fed. Reg.

62,209/2; 70 Fed. Reg. 16,006-07; EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0056-6193, Responses to

Significant Public Comments at 13-21 (JA xxx-xxx). Environmental Petitioners

do not point to any error in EPA’s analysis of non-mercury pollutants.

82

D. Alternatively, EPA Reasonably Determined That It is Not

Appropriate to Regulate Mercury Emissions Because the Costs of

Reducing Mercury Emissions Under Section 112 Far Exceed the

Benefits.

Beyond finding that regulation of power plants under section 112 is not

“appropriate” because hazards to public health are not reasonably anticipated to

occur as a result of remaining power plant mercury emissions, EPA concluded

alternatively that it is not “appropriate” to regulate power plants under section 112

because the costs of regulating beyond the level that will be achieved by CAIR far

exceed the benefits. See generally, 70 Fed. Reg. 62,208-09; 71 Fed. Reg. 33,394-

95; Reconsideration TSD at 27-38 (JA xxx-xxx).

For purposes of assessing whether it is cost-effective to regulate mercury

emissions under section 112 beyond the level that will be achieved by CAIR, EPA

very conservatively assumed a hazard to public health existed resulting from the

total “global pool” of mercury emissions. 71 Fed. Reg. 33,394/1; Reconsideration

TSD at 29-30 (JA xxx-xxx). EPA then calculated the upper-bound neurological

benefits that would occur from completely eliminating domestic mercury
EPA estimated the upper-bound monetized value of neurological 27

improvements by quantifying intelligence quotient improvements associated with

elimination of all domestic power plant mercury emissions, assuming all persons

are exposed above the Reference Dose. Reconsideration TSD at 27-37 (JA xxxxxx)

EPA explained that regulating mercury emissions under the command-and- 28

control approach set forth in section 112 would be at least as costly as regulating

under the market-based cap-and-trade approach of CAMR, and the annualized cost

of CAMR was estimated to be approximately $750 million. 70 Fed. Reg. 62,208-

09; Reconsideration TSD at 37 (JA xxx). Use of a cap-and-trade program such as

that within CAMR to achieve a given level of emission reductions will be

predictably less costly than a command-and-control approach to achieve the same

level of reductions because economic theory has shown that a marketable permit

scheme will produce a least-cost solution for any level of pollution abatement.

See Reconsideration RTC at 167 (JA xxx).

83

emissions from power plants. Reconsideration TSD at 27-37 (JA xxx-xxx).27

EPA concluded that the annualized aggregate upper bound benefit from

eliminating mercury emissions from domestic power plants beyond the level that

will be achieved by CAIR would be about $210 million. 71 Fed. Reg. 33,394. In

contrast, EPA determined that the annualized cost of regulating under section 112

would be at least $750 million. Id. EPA’s air quality modeling further showed 28

that even if EPA were to prohibit all mercury emissions from domestic power

plants, such regulation would result in only a very small improvement in

methylmercury levels in waterbodies that exceed the water quality criterion. 70

Fed. Reg. 16,029.
Although Environmental Petitioners do not contest EPA’s cost-effectiveness 29

determination, they cite in the background section of their brief to a 2005 study

which estimated that economic benefits from a 70 percent cut in power plant

mercury emissions would range from $86 million to $4.9 billion. See

Environmental Br. at 4 & n.9-10 (citing to G. Rice & J.K. Hammitt, “Economic

Valuation of Human Health Benefits of Controlling Mercury Emissions From U.S.

Power Plants, (“Harvard Study”). EPA addressed the estimates set forth in the

Harvard Study in the rulemaking and explained why EPA’s own estimates differed

and were superior. See Reconsideration TSD at 38-40 (JA xxx-xxx); 71 Fed. Reg.

33,394/2; Reconsideration RTC at 112, 153, 162, 173 (JA xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx);

EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0056-6289, Stephen Johnson Letter (JA xxx). Among other

things, the high-end benefit estimates in the Harvard Study largely reflected

projected benefits from reduced cardiovascular risk, whereas EPA concluded that

substantial uncertainties in available scientific information did not provide a

(continued...)

84

In short, EPA found that the costs of regulation under section 112 far

exceed any health benefits that would be obtained. Accordingly, EPA reasonably

concluded that it is not “appropriate” to regulate power plant emissions under

section 112, even if public health hazards were reasonably anticipated to occur as

a result of power plant emissions.

Significantly, no Petitioners have challenged EPA’s determination that it is

not “appropriate” to regulate power plants under section 112 because to do so

would not be cost-effective. Accordingly, even if any of Petitioners’ attacks on

EPA’s public health hazard findings were deemed to have merit, EPA’s

“appropriate” finding should still be upheld based on EPA’s alternative costeffectiveness rationale.29
(...continued) 29

sufficient basis for quantification of possible cardiovascular benefits. EPA-HQOAR-2002-0056-5747, Arthur Marin Letter (Feb. 22, 2005) at 3-4 (JA xxx-xxx);

Reconsideration RTC at 112 (JA xxx).

85

E. EPA Reasonably Determined That it is Not Necessary to Regulate

Mercury Emissions From Power Plants Under Section 112.

In section 112(n)(1)(A), Congress called on EPA to make a finding as to

whether regulation of power plants under section 112 was not only “appropriate,”

but also “necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Beyond

determining that regulation of power plant emissions under section 112 is not

“appropriate,” EPA also reasonably concluded that such regulation is not

“necessary.”

Specifically, in the Section 112(n) Rule, EPA identified two alternative

statutory authorities under the Act that, if implemented, would cost-effectively and

administratively-effectively address any hazards to public health posed by power

plant emissions. These two alternative statutory authorities are CAA section

110(a)(2)(D) and CAA section 111.

EPA explained that controlling mercury emissions through a cap-and-trade

system, whether through direct regulation under section 111 or indirect regulation

through section 110(a)(2)(D), is a more efficient means of regulating power plants

than regulation under section 112. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,005/1. Under a cap-and-trade
86

program, mercury reductions are obtained from plants that are the most costeffective to control, and power plants have the flexibility to pursue a least-cost

compliance option to achieve required emission reductions. This is not the case

under a section 112 regime.

IV. EPA PROPERLY CONSIDERED TRIBAL TREATIES IN THE

SECTION 112(N) RULE

Tribal Petitioners argue, based on treaties with the United States, that

certain Tribes are entitled to a greater degree of environmental protection than

United States citizens generally, and claim that EPA failed to consider these

additional treaty rights when making its section 112(n)(1)(A) determination. To

the extent Tribal Petitioners are arguing that EPA is required to consider hazards

to the health of tribal members resulting from power plant emissions in making its

section 112(n)(1)(A) determination, EPA did so. EPA extensively addressed

potential hazards to tribal subsistence fishers and recreational fishers generally

using sophisticated modeling analyses. See supra, at 44-52, 68-80. See also 70

Fed. Reg. 16,011-29 (summarizing EPA’s analysis of the health effects of the

Section 112(n) Rule). To the extent Tribal Petitioners argue that fishing rights

granted to numerous Tribes through treaties encompass a right to environmental

protection of fish habitats, such a right has not been established. Moreover,
87

Congress specifically directed EPA in section 112(n)(1)(A) to focus its

determination on whether to regulate power plants under section 112 on a study of

health hazards arising from power plant emissions, not consideration of

environmental effects. In sum, EPA has properly addressed Tribal Petitioners’

issues within the context of Congress’ direction in Section 112(n)(1)(A).

A. EPA Adequately Considered Health Effects on Subsistence

Fishers.

EPA recognizes that some subpopulations in the United States, including

tribal subsistence fishers, consume high levels of fish. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,022.

Sophisticated modeling was conducted specifically to analyze the impact of

remaining power plant mercury emissions on these subpopulations, and EPA

determined that power plant mercury emissions remaining after imposition of the

requirements of the Act do not result in a hazard to public health. Id. We address

EPA’s public health analysis, and Tribal Petitioners’ criticisms of this analysis, in

section III.C.3, above.

B. EPA Appropriately Did Not Consider Fishing Habitats In Its

Section 112(n)(1)(A) Analysis.

EPA based its determination that it is not appropriate to regulate power

plants under section 112 on its finding that power plant emissions will not result in

hazards to public health after implementation of Act requirements. In making this
EPA reasonably interprets section 112(n)(1)(A) to preclude the 30

consideration of environmental effects unless EPA first finds that hazards to

public health are reasonably anticipated to result from utility-attributable

emissions remaining after imposition of the requirements of the Act. EPA did not

find any hazard to public health here. Reconsideration RTC at 39 (JA xxx).

88

finding, EPA expressly did not consider hazards to the environment generally,

including potential impacts on fish habitats where Tribal Petitioners fish. As

discussed below, this approach follows Congress’ direction and does not violate

any established treaty right.

1. Congress directed EPA to consider health effects in CAA

section 112(n)(1)(A).

Pursuant to CAA section 112(n)(1)(A), EPA is required to perform “a study

of the hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of

emissions by electric utility steam generating units of pollutants listed under

subsection (b) of this section.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

Furthermore, EPA is required to “regulate electric utility steam generating units

under this section, if the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and

necessary after considering the results of the study required by this subparagraph.”

Id. Thus, when making its “appropriate and necessary” determination, EPA was

expressly directed by Congress to consider a study that is limited to public health

hazards, not environmental effects. In contrast to section 112(n)(1)(A), other 30
89

provisions of section 112 expressly require EPA to consider environmental effects.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)(2), 7412(f). The Supreme Court has recognized

that “‘[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but

omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress

acts intentionally . . . in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” Russello v. United

States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citation omitted).

Tribal Petitioners make a Chevron step one argument, claiming that EPA’s

decision not to consider environmental effects insofar as they relate to the United

States’ treaty obligations disregarded the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress. Tribal Br. at 23-24. Congress, however, did not unambiguously require

EPA to consider any environmental effects at all in section 112(n)(1)(A). Instead,

Congress required EPA to consider a study that was limited to the health effects of

power plant emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). In short, Chevron step one

does not require EPA to consider potential treaty rights of Tribal Petitioners

insofar as they relate to environmental effects. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.

2. No treaty right to habitat protection has been established.

EPA reasonably declined to premise its section 112(n)(1)(A) determination

on consideration of environmental effects, including potential treaty rights of

Tribal Petitioners insofar as they are alleged to encompass a right to habitat
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protection.

As an initial matter, it is undisputed that there is a “general trust relationship

between the United States and the Indian people.” United States v. Mitchell, 463

U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (“Mitchell II”). Nonetheless, this “general trust relationship”

between the United States and the Tribes does not, by itself, give rise to a

“fiduciary” duty upon which a particular suit can be based. See United States v.

Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980). The precise scope of the United States’

fiduciary obligations is defined not by reference to general principles, but by

examining specific treaties and/or legislation. In other words, the statute creating

the trust obligations “define[s] the contours of the United States’ fiduciary

responsibilities.” Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224.

Courts examine whether a specific congressional pronouncement, whether it

be a statute, treaty, executive order or regulation, imposes a fiduciary duty on the

United States. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224 (considering whether 25 U.S.C. §

406(a) and DOI regulations create a fiduciary duty); Nevada v. United States, 463

U.S. 110, 127 (1983). The specific trust obligations set forth by the congressional

pronouncement receive only “buttress[ing]” from the general trust obligation.

Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989).

Moreover, as another court recognized in Morongo Band of Mission Indians v.
91

FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1998), “although the United States does owe a

general trust responsibility to Indian tribes, unless there is a specific duty that has

been placed on the government with respect to Indians, this responsibility is

discharged by the agency's compliance with general regulations and statutes not

specifically aimed at protecting Indian tribes.” 

The Tribal Petitioners cite Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. United States Army

Corps of Engineers, 931 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Muckleshoot Indian

Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash. 1988); and Confederated Tribes of

the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977), for

the proposition that the United States must take tribal treaty rights into account

when taking action that potentially affects them. Tribal Br. at 26. None of these

decisions, however, expressly recognizes a treaty-based right to habitat protection,

much less one that would extend to an EPA determination under CAA section

112(n)(1)(A). Thus, although the United States owes a general trust responsibility

to Tribal Petitioners, that duty has been discharged by EPA’s compliance with

Congress’ direction in section 112(n)(1)(A) to consider hazards to public health

anticipated to occur as a result of power plant emissions. Section 112(n)(1)(A)

does not entitle Tribal Petitioners to a greater degree of environmental protection

than Congress provided to citizens generally.
92

Moreover, Tribal Petitioners’ argument assumes that at least some of their

member Tribes, through various treaties with the United States, have both a right

to fish and a right to habitat protection for certain fisheries. Tribal Petitioners,

however, fail to demonstrate that any such right to habitat protection for certain

fisheries has either been expressly provided for in the treaties they cite, or has

been recognized in case law. The treaties are not facially clear on this issue, and

the United States is unaware of any federal or state court decisions currently

recognizing tribal rights to habitat protection.

In general, tribal fishing rights entitle tribes to “take a fair share of the

available fish.” Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing

Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 684-85 (1979) (“Fishing Vessel”). According to the

Supreme Court’s interpretation of a series of treaties protecting tribal fishing

rights in western Washington, a “fair share” allows Indians to secure as much as

50 percent of a fishing harvest, “but no more than is necessary to provide the

Indians with a livelihood – that is to say, a moderate living.” Id. at 686. Thus,

Fishing Vessel and other cases cited by Tribal Petitioners support the proposition

that treaties do create an enforceable right for protected tribes to take fish

throughout their fishing areas. The cited case does not, however, create a right to

habitat protection.
93

The United States is not aware of any decision that currently acknowledges

a right to habitat protection stemming from tribal treaty rights. See Skokomish

Indian Tribe v. United States, 410 F.3d 506, 522, n.2 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that

the Ninth Circuit, in a subsequently vacated decision, once addressed the

“challenging question . . . whether the Tribe's off-reservation fishing rights give

rise to a cause of action for limiting the numbers of fish that formerly inhabited the

streams and rivers in which the Tribe traditionally fished, or whether, instead, the

Treaty preserves only a right to take a given proportion of such fish as remain

extant.”) (Berzon, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1025 (2006);

United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982), on en banc reh'g, 759

F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1985) (failing to determine whether “the right to take

fish necessarily includes the right to have those fish protected from man-made

despoliation”); Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791, 810 (D.

Idaho 1994) (holding that a Northwest Indian treaty “does not provide a guarantee

that there will be no decline in the amount of fish available to take”); Cohen’s

Handbook of Federal Indian Law 1140 (Nell Jessup Newton et al., 3d ed. 2005)

(“Courts have not yet definitively determined whether off-reservation reserved

rights include the right to habitat protection for the species subject to the rights.”).

The “habitat protection” question was extensively briefed during the decades-long
94

history of the United States v. Washington series of cases. In United States v.

Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 202-03 (D.C. Wash. 1980), a district court found

that a right to “habitat protection” exists. This decision was initially affirmed on

other grounds, United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1381 (9th Cir. 1982),

but ultimately was overturned after en banc review, United States v. Washington,

759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (finding that legal standards

governing the interpretation of the treaty rights are factually dependent, the

consequences of making the “habitat rights” determination were unknown, and

announcing imprecise legal rules through the declaratory judgment procedure was

inappropriate).

3. Congress’ specific direction in section 112(n)(1)(A) that

EPA should consider health effects trumps undefined treaty

rights.

Where there is no clear intention to the contrary, a specific statute will not

be controlled or nullified by a general one. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,

550-51 (1974). This rule of construction applies equally when determining

whether a specific statutory regime trumps the general concepts set forth in a

treaty, as treaties are in full parity with Acts of Congress. See Reid v. Covert, 354

U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194

(1888) (“By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of
95

like obligation, with an act of legislation.”). As discussed above, the treaties

relied upon by Tribal Petitioners do not expressly create a right to habitat

protection, and such a right has not been judicially articulated. By contrast,

section 112(n)(1)(A) specifically addresses how EPA should go about determining

whether to regulate hazardous air pollutant emissions from power plants under

section 112. Consistent with Congress’ specific direction in section 112(n)(1)(A),

EPA appropriately focused on public health effects in making its “appropriate and

necessary” determination, and not on environmental effects.

4. EPA lacked a sufficient record to properly determine

whether a treaty-based habitat right to protection of tribal

fisheries right exists, much less to consider the effect of that

determination on the Section 112(n) Rule.

Given that treaties do not facially provide a right to habitat protection and

such a right has not been judicially established, it would have been inappropriate

for EPA to itself opine on the existence of, and extend its CAA analysis to

consider, such an ill-defined, controversial, and complex “right.” Instead, EPA

appropriately addressed Tribal Petitioners’ concerns by complying with Congress’

direction in CAA section 112(n)(1)(A).

Indeed, taken to its logical extension, Tribal Petitioners’ position would

require EPA to have determined in the first instance, upon making a section
96

112(n)(1)(A) determination, whether any right to “habitat protection” was

conveyed along with fishing rights when the United States entered into hundreds

of treaties with numerous Tribes in the course of the history of this Nation. EPA

would further have had to consider the extent of any such right to habitat

protection. EPA does not have the expertise to make such complex

determinations. Nor did EPA have the record before it to make such

determinations.

Unlike statutory interpretation, where one party’s (Congress’) intent is

expressed in congressional reports, floor debate, and other legislative history,

interpretation of tribal treaties must take place in a complex historical framework,

frequently requiring the aid of extensive factual evidence. See United States v.

Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 348, 350 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (reviewing

statements of “nearly 50 witnesses, whose testimony was reported in 4,600 pages

of trial transcript, more than 350 exhibits, pre-trial briefs, final oral argument

12/9-10/73 and post trial briefs” to determine both the Tribes’ “usual and

accustomed” fishing places and to interpret relevant treaty language), aff’d, 520

F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976)). Tribal treaties must

be construed as they were understood by the Tribes at the time they were

negotiated. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899). Although analysis of treaties
97

begins with the text of the treaty, it does not necessarily end there: “[t]reaties are

construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning

we may look beyond written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations,

and the practical construction adopted by the parties.” United States v.

Washington, 135 F.2d 618, 630 (9th Cir. 1998), superceded by 157 F.3d 630, 642-

43 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).

Here, Tribal Petitioners, whose comments obliquely claimed treaty rights,

did not proffer expert opinion for EPA's review or submit any of the extensive

documentation typically presented to district courts in treaty cases. By neglecting

any examination of the United States’ intent going into the referenced treaties and

the United States' understanding of their terms, as well as any comprehensive and

necessary examination of the intent and understanding of the Tribes, Tribal

Petitioners ask EPA and this Court to reach sweeping and unprecedented

conclusions in the absence of an adequate record. The fact that the United States

v. Washington litigation is continuing after more than two decades, and that the

alleged tribal rights to “habitat protection” have not yet been resolved for the

narrow set of treaties involved in those cases, underscores the complexity

underlying the “habitat protection” question.

In short, in the absence of an adequate record and expertise on issues of
98

treaty interpretation, it would have been inappropriate for EPA to have based its

Section 112(n)(1)(A) determination on the Tribes’ conclusory and sweeping

assertions that a treaty-based right to habitat protection exists. In the absence of

an adequate record, it would be equally inappropriate for this Court to address on

judicial review whether any treaty-based right to habitat protection exists. See

CAA section 307(d)(7)(A) (limiting judicial review to record before agency).

The issue of habitat protection is very complex, has tremendous potential

consequences, and, not surprisingly, has resulted in considerable litigation,

including lawsuits involving numerous tribes, States, and other parties that have

been pending for years. Eventually, in a proper setting in which the many nuances

of treaty language and construction can be examined, one or more sufficiently

clear judicial determinations as to whether such a right exists and, if so, how it can

or should be applied, will emerge. This, however, is neither the right time nor the

right place for such a complex issue to be resolved.

V. EPA HAS AUTHORITY UNDER CAA SECTION 111 TO

ESTABLISH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR MERCURY

EMISSIONS FROM POWER PLANTS

A. Introduction

CAA section 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411, the section under which EPA

promulgated CAMR, calls for EPA to establish, subject to certain limitations,
See 70 Fed. Reg. 16,030; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (1988) 31

(precluding standards for existing sources for any air pollutant that, inter alia, is

“included on a list published under section . . . 7412(b)(1)(A) of this title”); id. §

7412(b)(1)(A) (1988) (“The Administrator shall . . . publish . . . a list which

includes each hazardous air pollutant for which he intends to establish an emission

standard under this section.”).

99

standards of performance for new and existing sources of air pollution that may

reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. The first question

EPA had to answer in adopting CAMR was whether any of the limitations in

section 111 precluded the Agency from establishing standards of performance for

mercury emissions from power plants. As EPA noted, nothing in the statute bars

the adoption of section 111 standards of performance for new sources of

hazardous air pollutants, see 70 Fed. Reg. 16,029, and Petitioners do not contend

otherwise. However, EPA also acknowledged that this question is more

complicated as it pertains to existing sources.

As EPA explained in the Federal Register notice announcing the revised

section 112 finding, prior to 1990 CAA section 111(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1),

expressly barred existing source standards of performance for any hazardous air

pollutant listed pursuant to the process set forth in then-existing CAA section

112(b)(1)(A). However, when Congress extensively revised the hazardous air 31

pollutant provisions in section 112 in 1990 (which included the elimination of
Unless enacted into positive law, the United States Code constitutes only 32

prima facie evidence of the laws of the United States while the Statutes at Large

constitute legal evidence of the laws. Accordingly, in the event of conflict, the

language of the Statutes at Large controls over language of the United States Code

that has not been enacted into positive law. See 1 U.S.C. § 204(a); see also, e.g.,

Five Flags Pipe Line Co. v. DOT, 854 F.2d 1438, 1440 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Because

Title 42 of the United States Code has not been enacted into positive law, see 

notes following 1 U.S.C. § 204, the Statutes at Large control in this case. See

generally 70 Fed. Reg. 16,030.

100

former section 112(b)(1)(A) and the addition of section 112(n)(1)(A)), it also

made corresponding changes to this portion of section 111(d). Apparently as a

result of the rush toward final passage of the amendments, the version signed into

law by the President actually contained two different amendments to section

111(d) – one version from the Senate bill and one version from the House bill –

that were never reconciled in conference. Although the House version of this

provision is the one that is set forth in the United States Code, both versions were

included in the Statutes at Large (Public Law No. 101-549), and in the

circumstances presented here, it is the Statutes at Large that controls.32

Section 302(a) of Public Law No. 101-549 contained the Senate’s

amendment to CAA Section 111(d), and it simply provided that the former crossreference to the list of hazardous air pollutants in section “112(b)(1)(A)” be

changed to section “112(b).” See Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2574

(1990). In contrast, section 108(g) of Public Law No. 101-549, which contained
101

the House amendment, provided that section 111(d)’s reference to section

“112(b)(1)(A)” be replaced with the phrase “or emitted from a source category

which is regulated under section 112.” See Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 108(g), 104

Stat. 2467 (1990). Putting all this together, then, after the 1990 Amendments, the

pertinent portion of CAA section 111(d) provided for the establishment of

standards of performance for existing sources for any air pollutant which (under

the Senate version) is “not included on a list published under section . . . 112(b),”

or which (under the House version) is not “emitted from a source category which

is regulated under section 112.”

Both the Environmental and Government Petitioners generally argue that

any differences between the House and Senate amendments to section 111(d) are

insignificant, that neither House of Congress intended to make any substantive

change to section 111(d) in 1990, and that EPA, therefore, still may not regulate

under section 111 emissions of any hazardous air pollutant listed under section

112. See Environmental Br. at 20-24; Government Br. at 27-29. EPA disagrees.

The 1990 Amendments to section 111(d) presented EPA with the difficult and

unique situation of interpreting two conflicting versions of the same statutory

provision. In light of this difficulty, EPA reasonably concluded that the 1990

Amendments to section 111(d) allowed the Agency to establish existing source
102

standards of performance for emissions of any hazardous air pollutant from a

source category that is not regulated under section 112. As will be explained

below, the Agency’s interpretation represents a reasonable harmonization of the

conflicting House and Senate provisions that should be upheld under Chevron and

other applicable judicial guidance.

B. EPA’s Approach Harmonizes the Conflicting Amendments to

Section 111(d) and Reflects A Reasonable Interpretation of the

Statute.

This Court confronted a similar statutory issue in Citizens to Save Spencer

County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a case considering conflicting

provisions in the 1977 Amendments to the Act. One of these provisions appeared

to bar certain new construction until EPA issued new regulations under the 1977

Amendments while another provision appeared to allow such construction

pursuant to the requirements of EPA’s prior regulations until the new regulations

came out. Id. at 853-54. The Court considered and rejected a variety of arguments

posited by environmental and industry petitioners in support of conflicting all-ornothing interpretations of these provisions, id. at 860-72, and instead endorsed

EPA’s attempt to “devise a middle course between inconsistent statutes so as to

give maximum possible effect to both.” Id. at 872. In denying the petitions for

review, the Court concluded that although “[o]ther, equally reasonable
There is no merit to the Petitioners’ attempt to invoke a competing canon 33

stating that in the event of conflict between different provisions in the same Act,

“the last provision in point of arrangement must control.” Environmental Br. at 24

(citing Lodge 1858, American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496,

510 & n.31 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978)). As EPA correctly

explained, this canon is inapplicable here, as it applies to discrete sections of the

same Act, not competing amendments to the same section of an Act, as is the case

here. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,031-32.

103

accommodations of the above competing interests can be imagined,” it would

defer to EPA’s “attempt to bring harmony and efficiency to a regulatory scheme

that in its original statutory conception was badly flawed.” Id. at 890.

The Court’s guidance in Spencer County is pertinent here, both because of

the factual similarity between that case and this and because the Court’s

deferential approach to agency constructions of statutes they are charged with

implementing has since been strongly reinforced by the Supreme Court’s decisions

in Chevron, Mead, and related cases. As will be discussed below, a careful 33

review of the statute shows that there is a real and meaningful conflict between the

text of the House and Senate amendments to section 111(d), that the foundation

for this conflict is evidenced in the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments,

and that EPA’s interpretation represents a reasonable attempt to harmonize these

conflicting provisions.
Prior to 1990, section 111(d) cross-referenced the list of hazardous air 34

pollutants established pursuant to the then-existing administrative process

described in section 112(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A) (1988). In the 1990

amendments to section 112, however, Congress overhauled the listing process for

hazardous air pollutants, eliminating section 112(b)(1)(A) and replacing it with an

initial statutory list of hazardous air pollutants (new section 112(b)(1)) and other

provisions (sections 112(b)(2) and 112(b)(3)) that created a process for revisions

and modification to the initial list.

104

1. EPA reasonably read the text of the House and Senate

amendments to section 111(d) to conflict.

EPA began its statutory analysis with the text of the two amendments to

section 111(d). Given the simplicity of the Senate amendment and its congruence

with the numbering changes to the listing provisions of section 112, EPA saw 34

little reason to doubt that this provision was meant simply to replace the obsolete

reference to section 112(b)(1)(A) with a reference to the new set of listing

provisions in section 112(b). 70 Fed. Reg. 16,031. In fact, as EPA noted, the

Senate amendment was labeled a “conforming amendment” in the Statutes at

Large. See 104 Stat. 2574 (1990). For these reasons, EPA agreed that the Senate

amendment “reflects the Senate’s attempt to retain the pre-1990 approach of

precluding regulation under CAA section 111(d) of any [hazardous air pollutant]

listed under section 112(b).” 70 Fed. Reg. 16,031.

EPA explained that interpreting the text of the House amendment was,

however, a somewhat more complex task. Because the House provision
105

authorizes section 111 standards of performance for “for any air pollutant . . .

which is not . . . emitted from a source category which is regulated under [section

112],” a literal reading of this provision could bar section 111 standards for any

pollutant, hazardous or not, emitted from a source category that is regulated under

section 112. See 70 Fed. Reg. 16,031. The Agency acknowledged comments

arguing (as the Government and Environmental Petitioners do here) that the House

amendment could be read to bar section 111 standards for any hazardous air

pollutant for all source categories once section 112 standards have been set for

that pollutant in any single source category. Id. EPA responded, however, that it

did not believe that such an interpretation squared with the literal text of the House

provision, as it “changes the terms ‘any pollutant’ to ‘[hazardous air pollutant],’

and . . . changes the phrase ‘a source category’ to ‘any source category’ . . . .” Id.

On the latter point, the Agency noted that the House provision referred to “a”

source category, in contrast to the pre-existing term “any” air pollutant, which at

least suggests that this part of the House provision could permissibly be

interpreted as EPA did, i.e., to refer to one rather than many source categories. Id.

Petitioners further argue that the textual conflict perceived by EPA between

these two amendments is illusory and that both were intended simply to preserve

the pre-1990 “status quo” and “were plainly for housekeeping purposes.”
As EPA explained, also unlike the corresponding Senate provision, the 35

House version was not described as a “Conforming Amendment,” but instead was

included with a variety of substantive provisions in a section entitled

“Miscellaneous Guidance.” See 70 Fed. Reg. 16,031 & n.62; 104 Stat. 2465-69

(1990). Petitioners incorrectly describe these “miscellaneous” provisions as

“purely ministerial.” Environmental Br. at 23. For example, among other things,

this section of Public Law No. 101-549 authorized preparation and dissemination

of a variety of substantive guidance, reports and data (sections 108(a)-(d)),

amended certain deadlines and other substantive criteria pertaining to

promulgation of section 111 standards (sections 108(e)(1)&(2)), set forth a variety

of new and amended definitions (section 108(j)), amended the stated findings in

section 101 of the Act addressing pollution prevention, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (section

108(k)), and added certain new public participation requirements to section 307 of

the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (section 108(p)). See 104 Stat. 2465-69. Perhaps

notably, other sections of the House bill were designated “conforming” or

“technical” amendments, and these generally were more ministerial in nature. See

2 A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 3087, 3101

(“1990 Legis. Hist.”).

106

Environmental Br. at 23; see also Government Br. at 27-29. However, as

discussed in the next section, the pertinent legislative history clearly indicates that

the House amendment, unlike the Senate amendment, in fact reflects a legislative

intent to give EPA authority to regulate, under section 111, hazardous emissions

from certain source categories not regulated under section 112.35

2. Pertinent legislative history supports EPA’s conclusion that

the House and Senate amendments to section 111(d)

conflict.

The legislative history of the 1990 Amendments indicates that the shift in

focus to “source categories” in the House amendment to section 111(d) was no
See H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., at 121, § 108(d) (1989), reprinted in 2 1990 36

Legis. Hist., at 3857 (1993).

107

accident. Instead, it originated as a component of a bill (H.R. 3030) that would

have given EPA relatively greater discretion to determine which source categories

of hazardous air emissions warranted regulation under section 112, and would

have established special rules for power plants that are virtually identical to those

that ultimately were enacted in the 1990 Amendments. By contrast, the Senate

version of the amendment to section 111(d) had its origins in a bill that generally

would have required EPA to establish source categories, and corresponding

emission standards, for “all” sources of hazardous emissions, including power

plants.

The text of the House’s amendment to section 111(d) first appeared as

section 108(d) of H.R. 3030, which was introduced on July 27, 1989. As 36

introduced, H.R. 3030 contained a proposed new section 112(c)(3) providing

generally that “[t]he Administrator may decide not to list a source category or

subcategory because its emissions into the air are, in his judgment, already

adequately controlled under this Act or any other Federal statute or regulation.”

2 1990 Legis. Hist., at 3932-33. Proposed section 112(c)(6) would have given the

Administrator broad discretion to withdraw source categories that he deemed to
See H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, at 82 (proposed CAA section 112(c)(5)), 37

reprinted in 2 1990 Legis. Hist., at 3106; see also id. at 2131-32 (comparable

provision in S. 1630, as passed by the House).

2 1990 Legis. Hist., at 3070; see also id. at 1979 (comparable provision in 38

House-passed version of S. 1630).

2 1990 Legis. Hist., at 3110-11; see also id. at 2148-49 (comparable 39

(continued...)

108

present a “negligible risk to public health.” Id. at 3933. The bill also contained a

proposed section 112(m), which was similar to today’s section 112(n)(1)(A),

making any regulation of power plants contingent on a determination by EPA of

whether such regulation is “appropriate and necessary” following a study of health

hazards from such sources “after imposition of the requirements of this Act.” Id.

at 3945-46.

Although the final version of H.R. 3030 differed somewhat from the version

introduced in July 1989, it still contained provisions authorizing EPA to decline to

add source categories, or to delete source categories already listed, based on

certain health-related findings. It also retained the proposed amendment to 37

section 111(d). And, most significantly, it retained (as new proposed section 38

112(l)) the special provision for power plants included in the original version of

the bill, with wording nearly identical to the provision ultimately enacted as

today’s section 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).39
(...continued) 39

provision in House-passed version of S. 1630).

It also bears emphasizing that the entire concept of “source categories” in 40

section 112 was new in 1990. Prior to 1990, section 112 simply directed EPA to

develop a list of hazardous air pollutants and then to establish corresponding

emission standards for these pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A), (B)

(1988).

109

This history indicates that the House version of the amendment to section

111(d) was first introduced in conjunction with proposed changes to section 112

that would have given EPA broad discretion to add and withdraw source

categories of hazardous air pollutant emissions from regulation under section 112,

in significant part based on the extent to which such emissions already were

adequately controlled under other regulatory provisions. See 70 Fed. Reg.

16,031. This discretion was particularly explicit with respect to power plants, for 40

which section 112 regulation was expressly deemed contingent on the outcome of

a study considering the effects of these emissions after imposition of other

requirements of the Act. As EPA aptly concluded, this history suggests that “the

House sought to change the focus of section 111(d) by seeking to preclude

regulation of those pollutants that are emitted from a particular source category

that is actually regulated under section 112.” Id. at 16,031.

For its part, the Senate amendment to section 111(d) had its roots in the
110

version of S. 1630 reported on December 20, 1989. See S. 1630, 101st Cong.

(1989), reprinted in 5 1990 Legis. Hist., at 7906. As in the final version of the

1990 Amendments, this version of the Senate bill simply proposed to change the

reference to “112(b)(1)(A)” in section 111(d) to section “112(b),” and labeled this

proposed change a “conforming amendment.” Compare 5 1990 Legis. Hist., at

8153 (section 305(a)), with Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2574 (1990).

In contrast to H.R. 3030, the Senate bill extended far less flexibility to EPA in

deciding what source categories of hazardous air pollutant emissions to add or

delete from section 112. For example, while proposed section 112(c)(3) in the

original version of H.R. 3030 would have allowed EPA to decide not to list a

source category it believed to be already adequately regulated under other

provisions, see 2 1990 Legis. Hist., at 3932-33, proposed section 112(c) of the

Senate bill generally directed EPA to establish a list of “all” source categories and

subcategories of hazardous air emissions and did not contain any express

provision addressing EPA’s discretion to delete source categories. See 5 1990

Legis. Hist. at 8077-79.

 Perhaps most significantly, H.R. 3030's special provision for power plants

(today’s section 112(n)(1)(A)), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A)), was ultimately
The differences between proposed section 112(m) from the original version 41

of H.R. 3030 and present section 112(n)(1)(A) are minor and are not pertinent

here. The most significant difference is that the last sentence of this provision in

the House bill prohibited EPA from regulating power plants under section 112

unless the Agency made an “appropriate and necessary” finding, while the final

language of this provision allows such regulation upon such a finding. Compare 2

1990 Legis. Hist., at 3945-46, with 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).

111

enacted in the 1990 Amendments very nearly as initially proposed. By contrast, 41

the December 1989 version of S. 1630 (the version of the Senate bill in which the

Senate’s proposed change to section 111(d) first appeared) did not contain any

similar provision. The Senate proposed a power plant subsection in a later version

of S. 1630, but this proposal was markedly different from the House bill and was

rejected in conference. See 70 Fed. Reg. 16,030-31. Although the Senate

proposal would have required a study of hazardous air emissions from power

plants, it still would have required EPA to promulgate emission standards for

“hazardous air pollutants which are particulates and mercury emissions” from

power plants in five years, simply requiring the Agency to “consider” the studies

in developing the rulemaking. See 3 1990 Legis. Hist., at 4431-34 (proposed

section 112(e)(5)). And, as EPA stressed, the Senate’s provision did not call for

an examination of the other requirements of the Act prior to regulation of power

plants. See 70 Fed. Reg. 16,031.

None of this necessarily indicates that the House version of the amendment
112

to section 111(d) should completely trump the Senate version, or vice-versa. It

does, however, at the very least reinforce EPA’s view that the differing text of the

two amendments reflects a genuine substantive conflict rather than an

inconsequential linguistic difference, as the Petitioners here suggest.

3. EPA’s construction of section 111(d) represents a

reasonable harmonization of the House and Senate

amendments.

To reconcile the conflict between the House and Senate amendments to

section 111(d), EPA construed that provision to provide that “[w]here a source

category is being regulated under section 112, a section 111(d) standard of

performance cannot be established to address any [hazardous air pollutant] listed

under section 112(b) that may be emitted from that particular source category.” 70

Fed. Reg. 16,031. Thus, this interpretation would allow regulation of hazardous

air pollutant emissions under section 111(d) from source categories that are not

regulated under section 112.

As the Agency explained, this construction of the statute is reasonable

because it gives some effect to both the House and Senate provisions. It gives

effect to the Senate provision by making clear that where it applies, the section

111(d) exclusion only extends to regulation of hazardous air pollutants, not

hazardous and non-hazardous air pollutants, as a literal reading of the House
In support of this latter point, EPA aptly cited the statement of Congressman 42

Oxley explaining that “[t]he conferees agreed to the House provisions because of

the logic of basing any decision to regulate on the results of scientific study and

because of the emission reductions that will be achieved and the extremely high

costs that electric utilities will face under other provisions of the new Clean Air

Act amendments.” 136 Cong. Rec. H12911, 12,934 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990),

reprinted in 1 1990 Legis. Hist., at 1416.

113

amendment appears to require. 70 Fed. Reg. 16,032. By the same token, “it gives

effect to the House’s desire to increase the scope of EPA’s authority under section

111(d) and to avoid duplicative regulation of [hazardous air pollutants] for a

particular source category.” Id.42

For their part, Petitioners argue that the phrase “a source category” in the

House amendment should be read to mean “any source category;” if construed in

this way, they argue, there would be no practical conflict between the House and

Senate versions of section 111(d), because section 111 regulation would be barred

for any hazardous air pollutant whose emissions from any source category are

regulated under section 112. Environmental Br. at 22; Government Br. at 27-28.

Without citing any support for this proposition, the Environmental Petitioners

simply assert that the “plain meaning of “a” is “any,” and that this allegedly plain

meaning should be given effect. Environmental Br. at 22. EPA reasonably

rejected this statutory argument.

As EPA recognized, see 70 Fed. Reg. 16,031, from a purely semantic
See also, e.g., United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 388-90 (8th Cir. 43

1991) (criminal statute allowing prosecution for using or carrying “a” firearm in

“any” violent or drug-related crime unambiguously authorizes separate units of

prosecution for each firearm possessed).

114

perspective, without considering legislative history or context, the usage of the

word “a” in the House amendment to section 111(d) is ambiguous. The dictionary

explains that the indefinite article “a” is used “as a function word before most

singular nouns . . . when the individual in question is undetermined, unidentified,

or unspecified . . . .” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 1 (1967)

(emphasis added) (giving, as an example, the phrase “there was a tree in the

field”). This suggests that the term was intended as a reference to a particular 43

but unspecified source category, just as EPA construed it. See 70 Fed. Reg.

16,031. On the other hand, the dictionary recognizes that “a” can have an

alternative meaning of “any” when it is followed by a restrictive modifier (such as

in the phrase “a man guilty of kidnaping wins scant sympathy”). Webster’s at 1. 

This alternative meaning arguably could apply here, because the term “a source

category” in the House amendment is immediately followed by the phrase “which

is regulated under section 112 of this title.”

Given the existence of this ambiguity, the Court should defer to EPA’s

reasonable construction of the provision, which is strongly supported by other
In this regard we also note that in other parts of the statute Congress 44

generally used the term “a source category” to refer to particular but unspecified

source categories, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(c)(9)(A), (e)(4), and where it intended to

refer more generally to “any source category” it did so expressly. Id. §§

7412(b)(3)(D), (c)(9)(B).

115

persuasive indicia of legislative intent. To begin with, as noted above, since the

pre-1990 version of section 111(d) already referred to “any existing source for any

air pollutant,” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (1988) (emphasis added), EPA reasonably

presumed that the House intentionally distinguished the selected term “a source

category” from the possible alternative “any source category.” See 70 Fed. Reg.

16,031 (noting that the House amendment referring to “a source category” was

inserted directly after the pre-1990 language “any air pollutant”). Perhaps more 44

significantly, EPA’s construction of the term is consistent with the legislative

history of the House provision which, as discussed above, clearly reflects both a

general intent “to expand EPA’s authority under section 111(d) for regulating

pollutants emitted from particular source categories that are not being regulated

under section 112" as well as a more specific intent to avoid “subject[ing] Utility

Units to duplicative or overlapping regulation.” 70 Fed. Reg. 16,031.

Moreover, the Petitioners’ preferred approach for harmonizing the House

and Senate provisions is flawed because it gives insufficient practical meaning to

the House’s shift in focus to regulated source categories, as opposed to the pre-
116

1990 focus on listed pollutants. See, e.g., Donnelly v. FAA, 411 F.3d 267, 271

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (statutes should not be construed to render certain provisions

“mere surplusage”). Under CAA section 112(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1), EPA

is generally directed, among other things, to list “all” major source categories of

emissions of hazardous air pollutants listed pursuant to section 112(b),

42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). Therefore, to construe the House’s amendment to section

111(d) to authorize section 111 standards only for those hazardous air pollutants

that are not emitted from any source category listed under section 112 comes close

to rewriting the House amendment to simply prohibit section 111 standards for

emissions of any pollutant listed under section 112(b). Presumably, however, if

the House had intended to proceed in this fashion, it could have adopted a type of

simple conforming amendment like the Senate did, rather than inserting a wholly

new phrase focusing on source categories into section 111(d).

Nor is it accurate to suggest, as Petitioners do, that interpreting the House

amendment in the manner they favor is acceptable because it is consistent with

what Petitioners perceive to be Congress’ overall intent to continue the pre-1990

bar on section 111(d) regulation of any hazardous pollutants listed under section

112. As detailed above, it is indisputable that the House version of the

amendment to section 111(d) was born as part of a proposed regulatory scheme
117

that would have given EPA broad authority to decline to regulate under section

112 those source categories of hazardous air emissions that could be adequately

controlled through other regulatory provisions of the Act. This was a

fundamentally different approach than that which existed prior to 1990. Although

many of the provisions of the 1990 Amendments ultimately enacted differed from

those initially introduced as part of H.R. 3030, many did not, and with particular

relevance here, the current CAA section 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(n)(1)(A),

is virtually identical to the power plant provision first introduced as part of H.R.

3030, and is materially different than the corresponding utility provision

developed as part of the Senate bill. For this reason, EPA was correct in observing

that – at least as applied to power plants – it is the House amendment to section

111(d), not the Senate amendment, that is more appropriately described as

consistent with the overall intent of the final 1990 amendments on this point. See

70 Fed. Reg. 16,031.

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that power plants are certainly not

the only source categories of hazardous air emissions that might not be regulated

under the as-enacted version of section 112 (and which therefore could reasonably

have been intended to be candidates for regulation under the House version of

Section 111(d)). In other words, the focus on “source categories” in the House
118

amendment to section 111(d) has potentially real effect outside the power plant

context as well. For example, as EPA noted, relatively smaller “area” sources of

hazardous air emissions are not regulated under section 112 unless they meet the

statutory criteria set forth in section 112(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(3). See 70

Fed. Reg. 16,031. As another example, Petitioners themselves recognize that

CAA section 129 specifies that solid waste incineration units are required to be

regulated under section 111(d) rather than section 112. See 42 U.S.C. § 7429(a);

Environmental Br. at 22. Finally, and more generally, CAA section 112(d)(7), 42

U.S.C. § 7412(d)(7), expressly recognizes that nothing in section 112

“diminish[es] or replace[s] the requirements of a more stringent emission

limitation or other applicable requirement established pursuant to section 7411 of

this title.” See 69 Fed. Reg. 4684 (noting that this provision, along with sections

112(c)(6) and 112(n)(1)(A), “supports the conclusion that [hazardous air pollutant]

emissions could be regulated under other provisions of the CAA”).

For all the foregoing reasons, EPA reasonably construed CAA section

111(d), in light of the conflicting House and Senate amendments, to allow the

promulgation of section 111 standards of performance for existing sources that

emit hazardous air pollutants but are not included in a source category regulated

under section 112.
Under the rule, a new source must meet the applicable emission limitation 45

and must also hold allowances to cover its emissions. See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,628.

119

VI. EPA ESTABLISHED APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF

PERFORMANCE FOR MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM POWER

PLANTS

Once EPA determined that it had the authority to establish standards of

performance under section 111 for hazardous emissions from power plants, its

next task was to determine how best to implement such standards. In the CAMR

final rule, EPA adopted unit-specific mercury emission limits for new coal-fired

power plants and a mercury emission cap-and-trade system based on unit-specific

mercury emission allocations for existing power plants. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May

18, 2005). In this action, Environmental Petitioners argue that the cap-and-trade 45

system for existing sources does not, as a matter of law, qualify as a “standard of

performance,” and further argue -- joined by the Government Petitioners -- that

CAMR is insufficiently stringent as a factual matter. See Environmental Br. at 25-

29; Government Br. at 29-35. Petitioner UARG argues, on the other hand, that

CAMR is flawed insofar as it allows States to submit for EPA approval plans that

either do not involve participation in the federal CAMR trading program at all, or

that deviate from certain aspects of the federal program. UARG Br. at 7-9.

Petitioner Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority (“Development
120

Authority”) argues, on several grounds, that EPA did not allocate an appropriate

number of annual mercury allowances in establishing the budget for the State of

Alaska. The Bituminous Petitioners argue that EPA's adjustment factors for coal

ranks are inappropriate. Finally, Petitioner ARIPPA argues that EPA used an

incorrect heat content number for coal refuse when calculating emissions limits

under CAMR. As will be explained below, however, none of these challenges has

merit.

A. A Cap-and-Trade System Is An Appropriate “Standard of

Performance” For Existing Sources Under the Act.

In contrast to section 111 standards for new sources, where EPA

promulgates standards of performance directly, CAA section 111(d), 42 U.S.C. §

7411(d), directs EPA to establish a procedure similar to the SIP process under

CAA section 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410, by which States adopt standards of

performance for existing sources pursuant to EPA criteria and oversight. Pursuant

to these provisions, EPA promulgates national “emission guidelines” for certain

air pollutants from existing sources, see 40 C.F.R. § 60.23, and States then submit

plans that “establish[] standards of performance” and “provide[] for the

implementation and enforcement of such standards of performance.” 42 U.S.C. §

7411(d). EPA retains specified oversight and enforcement authority to assure
121

these state plans are properly developed and implemented. Id. § 7411(d)(2).

Pursuant to EPA’s regulations, standards of performance adopted by States are,

inter alia, to be no less stringent than the national “emission guidelines”

established by EPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.24(g); see also id. § 60.24(c). In addition,

CAA section 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416, authorizes States to adopt section 111

standards that are more stringent than the corresponding minimum federal

emission guideline. In this case, EPA promulgated 40 C.F.R. § 60.24(h), which

creates the pertinent emission guidelines for power plants, and subpart HHHH of

40 C.F.R. Part 60, which establishes a model trading rule States can adopt as a

means of implementing these guidelines. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,657.

The term “standard of performance” is defined in section 111 as “a standard

for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation

achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which

(taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality

health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator

determines has been adequately demonstrated.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a). In this case,

EPA reasonably construed this provision of the Act to permit state participation in

a cap-and-trade system, pursuant to corresponding federal emission guidelines, as

a standard of performance under section 111. See generally EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-
122

0056-6214, Response to Significant Public Comments on CAMR (“CAMR RTC”)

at 9-268 to 9-273 (JA xxx-xxx).

EPA explained that a cap-and-trade program like that adopted in CAMR

“reduces the overall amount of emissions by requiring sources to hold allowances

to cover their emissions on a one-for-one basis; by limiting overall allowances so

that they cannot exceed specified levels (the ‘cap’); and by reducing the cap to less

than the amount of emissions actually emitted, or allowed to be emitted, at the

start of the program.” 70 Fed. Reg. 28,616/3. By authorizing trading of

allowances, the program “maximizes the cost-effectiveness of the emissions

reductions in accordance with market forces.” Id. This is because sources that can

cost-effectively reduce emissions below their allowed level will have an incentive

to do so since they can sell excess allowances (or avoid having to buy additional

allowances). Conversely, sources that cannot do so will likely want to purchase

allowances, thereby supporting the creation of an efficient market. Id.

EPA reasonably viewed this approach as entirely consistent with the statute

because it satisfies the three substantive components of the section 111(a)(1)

definition of “standard of performance”: (1) a “standard for emissions of air

pollutants;” (2) “which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable;” (3)

“through the application of the best system of emission reduction.” 70 Fed. Reg.
123

28,616.

First, the phrase a “standard for emissions of air pollutants” is reasonably

construed to include a cap-and-trade system such as the one adopted in CAMR.

As the Supreme Court has recently noted in another CAA case, a “standard” is

simply “that which ‘is established by authority, custom, or general consent, as a

model or example; criterion; test.’” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air

Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252-53 (2004) (quoting Webster’s Second

International Dictionary, at 2455 (1945)); see also CAMR RTC at 9-269 (JA xxx)

(discussing similar dictionary definition). CAMR’s cap-and-trade system clearly

constitutes such a “model” or “criterion” for emissions “established by authority.”

The rule assigns a definitive mercury “budget” to each State that is

determined by summing calculated (not actual) mercury allocations for each power

plant located in the State. See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,621-22. The State in turn allocates

the overall budget to individual sources through allowances. See id. at 28,623-30.

No source subject to the rule can emit any amount of mercury without possessing

allowances sufficient to cover such emissions. Id. at 28,617; see also CAMR RTC

at 269 (JA xxx). Sources are required to monitor their emissions and either meet

their emission allowance or buy excess allowances from other sources to

compensate. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,624, 28,631. Although States are permitted some
124

flexibility in choosing an allocation methodology, id. at 28,624, 28,632, this does

not make the system any less of a “standard” since each State must remain within

its state budget regardless of how it allocates allowances to specific sources, and

each source still must possess allowances sufficient to cover its emissions. See

Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 253-54 (distinguishing “standards” from “means of

enforcing standards”).

Second, a properly designed cap-and-trade system “reflects the degree of

emission limitation achievable” since it is based on EPA’s assessment of the

overall degree of emission reduction achievable by power plants. EPA determined

the overall level of emissions from all power plants in the nation after

implementation of controls or other means that EPA determined were achievable.

See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,617-21. This level of emissions constitutes the nationwide

cap, which is reflected in the state budgets and in the allowance allocations to the

individual sources. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,624, 28,627-30; see also State and Indian

Country Emissions Budgets Technical Support Document (EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-

0056-6154) (“State Budgets TSD”) (JA xxx-xxx). Although Petitioners raise

some challenges to the stringency of the nationwide cap and the state budgets

established by the rule, see, e.g., Environmental Br. at 26-28, this at most pertains

to the factual question of whether these technical decisions have ample support in
125

the record (an issue we discuss below). It is simply irrelevant, however, to the

legal question of whether a properly designed cap-and-trade system (such as that

established in CAMR) can ever be a system that “reflects the degree of emission

reduction achievable” within the meaning of the statute. Third, for similar

reasons, there is no reason why a properly designed cap-and-trade system cannot

constitute “the best system of emission reduction.” See CAMR RTC at 9-270 (JA

xxx). The dictionary defines “system” to mean, inter alia, “a complex unity

formed of many often diverse parts subject to a common plan or serving a common

purpose.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 2322 (1967).

CAMR’s cap-and-trade system surely constitutes a “common plan” bringing a

“complex unity” to the “often diverse” aspects of “emission reduction” from

power plants. Of course, that does not in itself answer the question of whether

CAMR is the “best” such system, but that question again goes to whether EPA’s

technical judgments in this particular case have ample support in the record, not

the statutory issue of whether a cap-and-trade system, in general, can constitute a

“system of emission reduction.” See CAMR RTC at 9-270 (JA xxx) (noting that

the statute gives EPA discretion in considering the factors referenced in section

111(a) and does not “provide any other explicit constraints in determining the

‘best system.’”).
126

For these reasons, it was at the very least “permissible” for EPA to construe

the statutory definition of “standard of performance” in section 111 to allow the

type of cap-and-trade system reflected in CAMR. Nonetheless, Environmental

Petitioners raise a multi-faceted legal challenge to this conclusion, arguing that

EPA was required to establish source-specific, and generally more stringent,

emission limits. As legal support for this conclusion Petitioners rely on: (1) the

reference to “any existing source” in section 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d); (2) a

different CAA definition of “standard of performance” in CAA section 302(l), 42

U.S.C. § 7602(l); and (3) this Court’s decision in Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d

319 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See Environmental Br. at 25-28. These arguments are

mistaken.

Petitioners are correct that section 111(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1), directs

that standards of performance for existing sources be applied to “any existing

source.” Environmental Br. at 27. However, this is precisely what CAMR does,

because any existing source is subject to the existing source standard and meets

this obligation by holding sufficient emission credits to cover all its mercury

emissions. See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,617. Nothing in the statutory directive that

existing source standards of performance apply to “any existing source” mandates

that this requirement be technological, as Petitioners suggest.
See 3 A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 46

(“1977 Legis. Hist.”), at 509 (Conference Report explaining that these provisions

were largely based on the House bill, which intended that section 111(d) standards

for existing sources would be based on the “best available means of emission

control (not necessarily technological) . . . .”); 4 1977 Legis. Hist. at 2662 (similar

discussion in House Report).

Indeed, CAA section 111(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(5), now expressly 47

(continued...)

127

In fact, the history of section 111 suggests just the opposite. The 1977 CAA

Amendments had required new source standards of performance to reflect “the

best technological system of continuous emission reduction,” a term that was

defined to apply on a source-specific basis. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1)&(7)

(1988). However, for existing sources the Act as amended in 1977 did not require

a standard of performance to be “technological.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(C)

(1982) (providing, inter alia, that existing source standards should “reflect[] the

degree of emission reduction achievable through the best system of continuous

emission reduction . . . .”). In fact, the absence of a technological requirement for

existing source standards of performance was noted in the Conference and House

Committee Reports on the 1977 Amendments. And when the Act was amended 46

in 1990, Congress adopted the present definition, which applies both to new and

existing sources, and does not require a standard of performance to be either

“continuous” or “technological.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). This history therefore 47
(...continued) 47

states that, except as otherwise provided for in section 111(h), 42 U.S.C. §

7411(h), which addresses work practice standards and other alternative standards,

“nothing in this section shall be construed to require, or to authorize the

Administrator to require, any new or modified source to install and operate any

particular technological system of continuous emission reduction to comply with

any new standard of performance.” However, under CAA section 111(j), 42

U.S.C. § 7411(j), new sources may seek a waiver of an otherwise applicable

standard “to encourage the use of an innovative technological system or systems

of continuous emission reduction.”

128

suggests that Congress’ decision not to include the terms “technological” and

“continuous” in the post-1990 section 111(a) definition of standard of

performance was at least to some extent deliberate.

Moreover, Petitioners’ argument overlooks that, as discussed above, CAA

section 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d), directs that existing source standards of

performance be established through “a procedure similar to that provided by

section 7410 of this title [CAA section 110] under which each State shall submit

to the Administrator a plan . . . .” This procedural cross-reference to section 110

certainly does not supersede the substantive criteria set forth in section 111(a)(1)

and the remainder of section 111(d). However, where, as here, a proposed capand-trade system meets those criteria (e.g., that it is a “standard” applicable to “any

existing source” because it requires each source to cover its emissions with

allowances), it is an additional sign of the reasonableness of CAMR that it is
As this Court has stressed, CAA section 110 generally leaves to States the 48

choice of which controls are to be applied to particular sources, subject only to an

EPA determination of whether the overall state plan maintains or leads to

attainment of the NAAQS. See, e.g., Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1408-10

(D.C. Cir. 1997), modified on other grounds, 116 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, this Court has upheld the use of cap-and-trade systems similar to that

used in CAMR in cases considering federalism-based challenges to rules

addressing multi-state pollution problems under CAA section 110. See Michigan

v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 685-88.

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structured in a manner similar to that used successfully in rules adopted pursuant

to section 110 (as well as other CAA authorities). See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,617;

CAMR RTC at 9-271 to 9-272 (JA xxx-xxx).48

Petitioners’ reliance on the definition of “standard of performance” in

section 302(l) of the Act’s general definitions, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(l), is also

misplaced. While section 302's definitions do apply to the “chapter” (i.e., the Act)

as a whole, 42 U.S.C. § 7602, they are still subject to the well-settled canon of

statutory construction that “[h]owever inclusive may be the general language of a

statute, it will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another

part of the same enactment.” Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353

U.S. 222, 228 (1957) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Therefore,

“[s]pecific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which

otherwise might be controlling.” Id. at 228-29 (citation and quotation marks

omitted). In this case, while the definitions in section 302 ordinarily apply to the
130

“chapter” as a whole, the definitions in section 111(a) apply only to “this section,”

and therefore the section 111(a) definitions are more specific and control here.

See CAMR RTC at 9-270 (JA xxx).

In any event, as EPA explained, even if the section 302 definition of

“standard of performance” had some relevance here, it too is reasonably construed

to allow the adoption of a cap-and-trade system. See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,617. That

provision defines a “standard of performance” to mean a “requirement of

continuous emission reduction, including any requirement relating to the operation

or maintenance of a source to assure continuous emission reduction.”

42 U.S.C. § 7602(l). Environmental Petitioners challenge EPA’s interpretation of

this provision by contending that it requires “each source subject to this standard

to demonstrate ‘continuous emission reduction,’” and that this requirement is not

met by a cap-and-trade system that may allow some sources to purchase extra

allowances instead of reducing actual emissions. Environmental Br. at 26.

However, EPA reasonably viewed CAMR’s cap-and-trade system as satisfying

section 302(1), since the overall cap is set below current emission levels (and

hence is a “requirement of . . . emission reduction”) and is “continuous” insofar as

“there is never a time when sources may emit without needing allowances to cover

those emissions.” 70 Fed. Reg. 28,617; CAMR RTC at 9-270 to 9-271 (JA xxx-
131

xxx). This understanding of “continuous” is consistent with the usage of that term

elsewhere in the Act. For example, CAA section 302(k), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k),

defines the term “emission limitation” to include the concept of “continuous”

reductions, and in CAA Title IV-A (Acid Deposition Control), Congress used the

term “emission limitation” to include a cap-and-trade program. See

42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b(a)(1), 7651c(a)(1).

In addition, as we will discuss in more detail below, see infra, Section

VI.B.1., the fact that a cap-and-trade system might allow some particular sources

to increase emissions is an inherent aspect of any standard of performance for

existing sources, since such standards will always have to be set at some degree

below the level of performance achieved by the best-performing sources. Stated

another way, under any national standard of performance, sources that were

already among the better performers will often be able to meet the standard even if

their emissions increase to some extent. A cap-and-trade system actually

represents an improvement on this type of situation, since better-performing

sources will have an economic incentive to keep their emissions low and sell their

excess allowances, rather than increasing their emissions.

Finally, the Environmental Petitioners also err in premising much of their

argument on these issues on Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
In fact, EPA noted that on one prior occasion it had authorized emission 49

trading under section 111(d). See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,617.

132

See Environmental Br. at 28-29. In fact, Asarco is irrelevant to the issues

presented here. Asarco did not construe the definition of “standard of

performance” nor did it address the regulation of existing sources under CAA

sections 111(a)(1)&(d), which are the statutory bases for the cap-and-trade system

in CAMR. Rather, Asarco concerned only new (or modified) sources and the

definition of “source.” Specifically, in Asarco, this Court held only that the statute

precluded EPA from allowing a facility to avoid application of the new source

standard of performance as a result of a “modification” by employing the so-called

“bubble concept,” i.e., an approach that “treat[s] a combination of facilities as a

single source” thereby “allow[ing] a facility whose emissions are increased by

alterations to avoid complying with the applicable NSPS as long as emission

decreases from other facilities within the same ‘source’ cancel out the increase

from the altered facility.” Asarco, 578 F.2d at 326. Asarco did not address

whether the term “standard of performance” could include a cap-and-trade

program that applies to each source and that allows emissions trading among

sources (as opposed to netting of emissions among individual units within a source

to avoid application of a standard of performance). Thus, even if Asarco is taken 49
It is worth noting that at least some aspects of Asarco may be questionable 50

in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Chevron, and Petitioners

never even attempt to reconcile these two cases in their brief. In Chevron, the

Supreme Court reversed this Court’s decision in NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718

(D.C. Cir. 1982), which had relied on Asarco and related D.C. Circuit precedent to

vacate EPA regulations that had employed the bubble concept for new source

review in nonattainment areas. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841-42 & n.6. As

explained in NRDC, 685 F.2d at 720, 725-27, this Court’s cases had construed the

Act to make the bubble concept mandatory for CAA programs designed to

maintain air quality but impermissible in programs designed to improve air

quality. In Chevron, the Supreme Court found that this Court’s distinction was

improperly based on its perception of the best reading of the statute, not one that

“Congress ever articulated itself.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864; see also id. at 865-

66.

Indeed, consistent with Asarco, if an individual existing unit were to 51

undertake a physical change that resulted in an increase in its emission rate it

would trigger the new source NSPS, even though it would also be required to hold

CAMR allowances covering that increase.

133

on its own terms, CAMR is fully consistent with that case since, as discussed 50

above, it sets a standard of performance that applies to each source through the

requirement that each source cover its emissions with allowances.51

For all the foregoing reasons, EPA reasonably construed the statute as

authorizing the adoption of a cap-and-trade system as a “standard of performance”

for existing sources under CAA section 111(d).

B. Environmental and Government Petitioners’ Record-Based

Challenges to CAMR are Meritless.

Environmental and Government Petitioners also posit a handful of primarily
134

record-based challenges to CAMR, apparently in an attempt to demonstrate that

the rule does not represent the “best system of emission reduction” or that it did

not adequately account for “nonair quality health and environmental impact[s]”

within the meaning of CAA section 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). See

Government Br. at 29-35; Environmental Br. at 26-28. On each of these points,

however, the Petitioners’ challenge fails because the Agency clearly considered

the relevant factors and made reasonable judgments based on the record. See, e.g.,

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). This is

particularly true given the considerable discretion that EPA has in applying the

various factors reflected in section 111. See Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198

F.3d 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Because section 111 does not set forth the weight

that should be assigned to each of these factors, we have granted the agency a

great degree of discretion in balancing them.”); see also, e.g., New York v. Reilly,

969 F.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (similar).

1. The fact that some localized emission increases may be

allowed under CAMR does not make it an arbitrary

national performance standard, since the rule as a whole

will achieve dramatic and cost-effective reductions in

mercury emissions throughout the country.

CAMR is the first national rule ever adopted by EPA specifically intended

to reduce mercury emissions from power plants. Under CAMR’s cap-and-trade
135

system, nationwide mercury emissions are capped at 38 tons in 2010, then the cap

is further reduced to 15 tons in 2018. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,619. EPA’s modeling

projects that, as compared to a 1999 baseline, this system will result in a 35

percent mercury emission reduction in 2010, a 42 percent reduction in 2015, and a

50 percent reduction in 2020. Id.

EPA explained that because the first phase cap is set at the level of expected

co-benefits from the CAIR rule (which is targeted at control of emissions of NOx

and SO , but which also incidentally controls mercury emissions), it will be both 2

cost-effective and technologically feasible, since it will make use of the same

demonstrated technologies that power plants already will be installing to meet

their CAIR obligations. Id. at 28,617-21, 28,640. The second phase cap, which is

set substantially lower, is expected to require power plants to make use of a

combination of CAIR co-benefits and mercury-specific controls, id. at 28,620-21,

but is timed so that “new technologies can be developed, installed, demonstrated

and commercially deployed with little impact to the stability of the power grid.” 

Id. at 26,621; see also id. at 28,619.

Given these facts, EPA undoubtedly had a solid basis in the record for

concluding that CAMR’s cap-and-trade system satisfied the pertinent criteria set

forth in section 111, i.e., that it reflects the “best system of emission reduction”
136

that “the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated,” taking into

account “the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality heath and

environmental impact and energy requirements.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). As the

Agency explained, the hard caps, which are based on calculated mercury

emissions from each power plant in the country, assure that the rule will achieve

real and meaningful nationwide emission reductions, while the trading system

helps make sure that these results are achieved in as cost-effective a manner as is

possible. See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,616; see also Reconsideration RTC at 302 (JA xxx).

The Environmental and Government Petitioners do not appear to assert any

direct challenge to the adequacy of either of the two hard caps reflected in CAMR,

nor do they posit any specific challenge to the methodology EPA employed in

deciding the state-by-state allocations to meet those caps. They nonetheless argue

that CAMR is inadequate because, in their view, some sources could make greater

emission reductions than CAMR requires, Government Br. at 30, the rule will

allow mercury emissions by some sources and in some States in total to increase,

see Government Br. at 31-32; Environmental Br. at 26-27, and that the rule

allegedly will not do enough to address so-called “hotspots” of local mercury

emissions. Government Br. at 32-35. None of these claims has merit.

First, and most generally, the fact that certain individual “best performing
To the extent Government Petitioners are attempting to argue that the 52

analytical methodology required under section 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, should

somehow inform the selection of a standard of performance under section 111, 42

U.S.C. § 7411, this suggestion is completely inapposite given that Congress

established distinct criteria in these two sections. See generally Reconsideration

RTC at 283-84, 304 (JA xxx, xxx).

137

power plants,” Government Br. at 30, might be able to achieve greater emission

reductions than is required by CAMR is (as will be discussed in more detail

below) irrelevant to CAMR’s reasonableness as a national standard of

performance for all power plants. See Reconsideration RTC at 284 (JA xxx).52

CAMR’s new source performance standards and Phase I and Phase II caps were

based on a rigorous analysis of currently available controls and the extent to which

power plants could feasibly implement these controls. See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,614-15

(summarizing record data and analyses on these issues). This record shows that

EPA’s consideration of these issues was thorough and reasonable, and

Government Petitioners have failed to identify any specific flaw in this analysis.

On a more general level, Government Petitioners do vaguely suggest that

the Phase I cap is somehow overly lax because EPA did not explain why it set that

cap at 38 tons rather than 31 tons. Government Br. at 30. To begin with, it does

not appear Petitioners raised this specific concern to EPA in comments, so they

may not raise it here. In any event, EPA clearly explained that it set the Phase I
138

cap at the level of modeled co-benefits (38 tons) expected under the CAIR rule by

2010. 70 Fed. Reg. 25,218-19; see also infra Section VI.D (response to

Development Authority’s challenge). EPA also noted that its modeling indicated

that early adoption of the more stringent (and mercury-specific) controls by some

sources to meet CAMR’s Phase II cap might result in actual mercury emission

levels as low as 31 tons in 2010. 70 Fed. Reg. 25,218-19. However, the Agency

also reasonably explained why it believed nationwide adoption of mercuryspecific controls would not be adequately demonstrated prior to the Phase II cap.

See generally 70 Fed. Reg. 28,614-15. In addition, the Agency explained that “the

existence of a hard cap in 2010 will create the incentive for additional reductions

beyond [CAIR] cobenefits, so that sources can bank allowances for future use.”

Reconsideration RTC at 207 (JA xxx); see also RIA at 7-3 (JA xxx).

EPA also fully considered and responded to the allegation that the mercury

budgets for some individual States may be higher than their current level of

mercury emissions, even though significant reductions in nationwide emissions are

reflected in CAMR’s overall emissions cap. See Reconsideration RTC at 300-02

(JA xxx-xxx). While EPA did not dispute that such instances indeed exist, it

explained that this is simply the result of the methodology used to allocate in a fair

and supportable manner each State’s share of the overall cap – a methodology that
Mercury emission budgets for each State were developed by EPA as 53

follows: EPA used modeling to calculate the amount of mercury emissions from

all power plants in the nation, assuming that power plants applied achievable

emissions limitations by the 2010 (Phase I cap) and 2018 (Phase II cap) dates. See

70 Fed. Reg. 28,621-22. EPA hypothetically allocated a portion of each cap -- that

is, an amount of allowances -- to each unit by dividing each unit’s “heat input” by

the total “heat input” of all units. (“Heat input” is essentially a measure of the

amount of energy used by the facility to generate a given amount of electricity. Id.

at 28,622.) For each State, EPA then summed the amount of hypothetically

allocated allowances to determine that State’s budget for Phase 1 and Phase 2. Id.

at 28,621. Given the differing characteristics of various ranks of coal, certain

adjustment factors were then applied to this formula based on which subcategory

(e.g.. bituminous, subbituminous, lignite) the particular power plant was in. Id. 

Certain specific aspects of this methodology, irrelevant to the discussion here, are

discussed in more detail below, in our response to the briefs filed by the

Development Authority, the Bituminous Petitioners, and ARIPPA.

139

is not challenged by the Government and Environmental Petitioners in this case.

Id. at 302. In addition, the great majority of these instances occur prior to the 53

second phase of CAMR, and are related to EPA’s determination that nationwide

adoption of mercury-specific technology will not be adequately demonstrated prior

to the second phase of CAMR. See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,618, 28,620-21.

Far from indicating that CAMR is arbitrary, such variations are an inherent

and completely proper facet of any national standard of performance, whether

based on a cap-and-trade system or not. Id. A standard of performance –

particularly for existing sources, as is the case here – will always be set at some

level lower than the capability of the best-performing sources, since the standard
We note that the Court’s 1981 decision in Sierra Club was considering the 54

1977 version of the Act as it applied to new rather than existing sources.

However, these differences, if anything, make this decision even more persuasive

precedent on these points, since standards of performance for existing sources,

which will have to retrofit their facilities to meet new requirements, necessarily

need to be more flexible than standards for new sources, which can be designed to

meet new requirements from the outset. In addition, as discussed above, the

textual changes Congress made to the section 111(a) definition of “standard of

performance” in 1990 further reinforce the conclusion that the reasonableness of

standards under this section should be gauged on a national as opposed to sourcespecific basis.

140

must be achievable and must take into account costs and the remaining useful life

of the subject facilities. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1), 7411(d)(2). As this

Court observed in considering such issues over 25 years ago, “[t]he language of

section 111 . . . gives EPA authority when determining the best technological

system to weigh cost, energy, and environmental impacts in the broadest sense at

the national and regional levels and over time as opposed to simply at the plant

level in the immediate present.” Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 330 (D.C.

Cir. 1981). As standards of performance for existing sources are not set at the 54

level of performance achieved by the single best performing source, there will

always be sources, and, therefore, potentially States, where emissions from

existing sources can increase consistent with the existing source standard of

performance.

In this case, because individual state mercury emission budgets are, in
We note that Petitioners have not provided any evidence that any unit can or 55

will increase its emissions. Further, Petitioners have not provided any evidence

that any units currently assumed to be below the cap level are in fact operating

below the cap, because emissions data are not available for all units in the United

States.

141

effect, based on a combination of the assessment of average projected emission

limitations achievable by power plants on a nationwide basis, and the ratio of the

heat input of individual sources in particular subcategories within the State to the

national total, see 70 Fed. Reg. 28,621-22, to the extent that some particular

sources are, in practice, limiting mercury emissions to a greater extent than on

average, that State may well have a higher mercury budget than the amount of

mercury currently being emitted by its contingent of generally above-average

performers. See Reconsideration RTC at 302 (JA xxx). None of this means,

however, that once the State allocates allowances to these better-performing

sources these sources will increase their actual emissions up to the amount of their

allocation. To the contrary, the trading system provides these sources with an 55

economic incentive to keep their emissions low so that they can sell their excess

allowances. Id. And most importantly, “by placing a hard cap on [mercury]

emissions and accounting for each individual ounce of [mercury] emitted,

[CAMR] guarantees that significant reductions in nationwide [mercury] emissions

will be achieved.” Id.
See supra, at 62-68; see also, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg. 28,631 (explaining that the 56

Agency does not believe that utility hotspots will be an issue after implementation

of CAIR, and independently after implementation of CAMR); Reconsideration

RTC at 147 (JAxxx) (noting that the “concern that a facility could simply buy

[mercury] credits and the hotspot remain reflects a misunderstanding of the capand-trade approach” because “[a] facility can buy allowances only if another has

reduced emissions . . . .”).

142

Petitioners’ challenge to CAMR based on its alleged failure to address local

“hotspots” of mercury pollution is meritless for similar reasons. To begin with, as

discussed elsewhere in this brief, Petitioners’ assertions regarding the existence of

hotspots attributable to mercury emissions from power plants following

implementation of CAMR are refuted by EPA’s utility hotspot analysis.56

Furthermore, as EPA explained, the Agency intends to keep reviewing CAMR’s

standards of performance. Reconsideration RTC at 290-91 (JA xxx-xxx). Should

additional information be developed in the future concerning the existence of such

hotspots, EPA would consider this information in the course of its review of these

standards. Id.; 70 Fed. Reg. 16,027-28.

For all of these reasons, Petitioners’ claims regarding potential local and

regional emission increases or hotspots simply do not render CAMR an improper

national standard under section 111.

2. CAMR’s subcategorization is appropriate.

Nor is CAMR undercut by Government Petitioners’ vaguely-articulated
The five subcategories are: bituminous coal, subbituminous coal, lignite 57

coal, coal refuse, and integrated gasification combined cycle, or “IGCC.” 70 Fed.

Reg. 28,612. The subcategories for different coal rank are based on a

classification system developed by the American Society of Testing and Materials

(“ASTM”). Id. As EPA explained, the ASTM system “is structured on a

continuum based on a number of characteristics (e.g., heat content or Btu value,

fixed carbon, volatile matter, agglomerating versus non-agglomerating) and

provides basic information regarding combustion characteristics.” Id. at 28,613.

143

claims regarding subcategorization. See Government Br. at 31. By way of

background, under CAA section 111(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(2), EPA is

authorized to “distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within categories of new

sources for the purpose of establishing [section 111 new source] standards.” In

CAMR, EPA subcategorized sources primarily by the type of coal they use (“coal

rank”). 70 Fed. Reg. 28,612. In general, this subcategorization results in 57

somewhat different emission limitations for new sources in different

subcategories, and it also affects the calculation of state mercury budgets for

existing sources, which depends to some extent on the mix of different types of

facilities in each State.

As EPA explained, it historically has taken a similar approach in setting

2 x section 111 standards of performance for SO and NO emissions from power

plants, with such subcategorization reflecting “the differences in the relative

ability of the respective control technologies to effect emissions reductions on the
144

various coal ranks.” Id. at 28,612. This type of approach was thoroughly

considered and upheld by this Court in the 1981 Sierra Club decision. EPA

further explained that while advances in emission control technology have led the

Agency to more recently reevaluate certain aspects of this approach for emissions

of SO and NO , coal rank still materially affects the ability of control technology 2 x

to reduce mercury emissions, so the Agency therefore viewed it as reasonable to

subcategorize standards of performance for mercury emissions in this manner. 70

Fed. Reg. 28,612-13; see also infra, Section VI.E (discussing these issues as they

apply to the arguments raised by the Bituminous Petitioners).

Government Petitioners do not present any direct challenge to the

subcategories reflected in CAMR, but they do vaguely charge that

subcategorization “further diluted” the standards set in CAMR, which Petitioners

characterize as already “weak” for other reasons. Government Br. at 31. To the

extent this claim is understood as a challenge to the appropriateness of ever

subcategorizing by coal rank in setting standards of performance for power plants,

it would appear to be foreclosed by this Court’s 1981 decision in Sierra Club,

supra, a case which Petitioners do not even mention. To the extent this claim is

intended as a factual challenge to particular aspects of the CAMR

subcategorization scheme, it is refuted by the record.
145

One factual claim made by Petitioners is that CAMR’s subcategorization

scheme “fails to reflect that ‘a number of Utility Units co-fire different ranks of

coal.’” Government Br. at 31 (citation omitted). However, EPA fully considered

this issue and explained that “[b]oilers designed to burn one fuel (e.g., lignite)

cannot randomly or arbitrarily change fuels without extensive testing and tuning of

both the boiler and the control device.” 70 Fed. Reg. 28,613. Because of

engineering and design constraints, even where utilities do burn different ranks of

coal, “the practice is only done with ranks that have similar characteristics to those

for which the boiler was originally designed.” Id. Therefore, any fuel switching

among different ranks of coal is relatively limited and does not “negate the overall

differences in the ranks that preclude universal coal rank switching.” Id. For

these reasons, EPA reasonably concluded that, notwithstanding the fact that some

power plants co-fire different ranks of coal, fuel rank “is most suitable for use as a

basis for subcategorization.” Id. Petitioners do not mention, let alone rebut,

EPA’s discussion of this issue.

Government Petitioners also charge that EPA impermissibly subcategorized

power plants based on the type of emission control technology they use.

Government Br. at 31. Contrary to Government Petitioners’ assertion, EPA made

clear on reconsideration that it had subcategorized on the basis of water
See 70 Fed. Reg. 62,216 (“It was not our intent, however, to subcategorize 58

on the basis of control technology. Rather, our intent was to recognize that new

units located in some areas will have access to an adequate supply of water while

units in other areas will not have such access.”); see also Reconsideration RTC at

251-52 (JA xxx-xxx).

In their brief, Government Petitioners do not contest EPA’s factual 59

conclusion that wet systems are generally not an option for facilities located in

relatively dry areas, nor do they explain why they believe EPA was required to

deem wet systems to be a “demonstrated” technology within the meaning of CAA

section 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a), for all facilities in the subbituminous new

source category. Instead, they simply cite an EPA preamble to a rule under CAA

section 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, as support for the general proposition that

subcategorization by control technology “leads to situations where floors are

established based on performance of sources that are not the best performing.”

Government Br. at 31 (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. 394, 403 (Jan. 5, 2004)). As noted

above, however, this is not what EPA did here.

146

availability, not control technology. As a result of this legitimate and essentially 58

unchallenged “nonair quality environmental” basis for subcategorizing, 59

EPA ended up setting one emission standard for those units in relatively wet areas

based upon the use of wet flue gas desulfurization systems, and another

(somewhat less stringent) standard for those units in the West and other dry areas,

based on the use of dry flue gas desulfurization systems. EPA’s rationale on this

point was clearly explained and entirely appropriate. Cf. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at

330 (approving a variable performance standard for new sources based in part on

the relative capabilities of wet and dry systems and recognizing that wet systems

might be “‘best’ in the East where water is plentiful, but environmentally
Although the Petitioners do not raise this issue, EPA considered and fully 60

responded to comments identifying specific instances where facilities in “dry”

areas were currently using “wet” systems. See Reconsideration RTC at 251 (JA

xxx). The Agency explained, among other things, that regardless of these isolated

existing source examples, given the escalating demand on Western water supplies,

it will be increasingly more difficult for new sources in such areas (which are the

sources to which this variable standard applies) to obtain sufficient water supplies

to facilitate use of wet systems. Id.

147

disastrous in the water-scarce West”).60

C. CAMR Appropriately Gives States Flexibility to Allocate

Emission Allowances And/Or To Opt Out of EPA’s

Recommended Emission Trading Program.

As noted above, while CAMR requires that each State adopt plans to meet

the mercury emission reductions reflected in its budget, the rule generally leaves

States discretion to determine how best to allocate emission allowances to

particular sources in the State, to allocate fewer than all the allowances, and even

to opt out of the trading system. See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,624, 28,627-29; see also

CAMR RTC at 5-200 to 5-201 (JA xxx-xxx). Petitioner UARG argues that giving

States this degree of flexibility is improper, as it believes such an approach

undermines EPA’s judgment as to the features of the “best” system of emission

reduction within the meaning of section 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). See

UARG Br. at 7-9.

UARG’s challenge is meritless. There is no basis for the contention that a
148

State’s choice to allocate allowances in a manner different than would result from

EPA’s suggested methodology somehow undermines EPA’s rationale in adopting

the rule. Quite to the contrary, EPA expressly stated that “EPA maintains that the

choice of allocation methodology does not affect the achievement of the specific

environmental goals of the CAMR program.” 70 Fed. Reg. 28,627, 28,629. EPA

further explained that it believes economic forces will generally serve to create

“environmentally similar outcomes regardless of the manner in which allowances

are initially distributed.” Id. at 28,627.

The same conclusions hold true with regard to the possibility that some

States may opt out of CAMR’s trading program. EPA has clearly shown that the

States that would remain in the CAMR trading program would not be

disadvantaged were other States to opt out. Specifically, EPA determined that

CAMR met the requirements for a standard of performance for existing sources

based on per ton marginal costs, as determined by use of the Integrated Planning

Model (“IPM”). See EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0056-6304, Cost and Energy Impacts –

Technical Support Document (“Cost TSD”) at 7 (noting marginal costs of $23,200

in 2010, $30,100 in 2015, and $39,000 in 2020) (JA xxx). Some States submitted

comments stating that they would opt out of the cap-and-trade program, and EPA

recognized that “[t]he cost-effectiveness of a cap-and-trade program under CAMR
149

could be reduced if States that are projected to be net sellers of allowances opted

not to participate in the cap-and-trade program, as this would effectively increase

the stringency of the cap for States that did choose to participate . . . .” Id. at 28

(JA xxx).

To determine the extent of any change in marginal costs, EPA re-ran its

model assuming non-participation in the cap-and-trade program by the net-seller

States who had indicated in the record that they may take such a course

(California, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania),

and the resulting data indicated that “the potential decision of the States named

above not to participate in the CAMR trading program would not significantly

affect marginal costs within the program.” Id. at 29 (JAxxx); see also id., Table 34

(showing modeling results) (JA xxx). Specifically, such marginal costs would

only increase by about one-tenth of one percent in 2010, and by one-fifth of one

percent in 2020. In its brief, UARG nowhere mentions, much less refutes, this

analysis, nor does UARG posit any reason to believe that the assumptions

underlying EPA’s opt-out analysis were flawed or unreasonable. For this reason,

there is no basis on this record for UARG’s suggestion that the possibility that

some States may opt out of the trading program will make CAMR unreasonably

costly for sources in those States that will participate in the trading program.
See 3 1977 Legis. Hist., at 509 (Conference Committee Report noting 61

States’ authority to “decide[] to be more stringent” in adopting section 111(d)

standards); id., 4 1977 Legis. Hist. at 2662 (House Committee Report similarly

noting that States may “decide[] to adopt and enforce more stringent standards”).

150

Nor is UARG correct in asserting that CAMR is undermined for the States

that impose more stringent controls on sources within their own borders than

would be strictly necessary to meet the minimum requirements of the CAMR

trading program (either by allocating fewer allowances or by choosing not to

participate in the trading program). Although a “standard of performance” under

section 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(1) must be based on the “best system,” that

provision clearly allows States to establish standards of performance more

stringent than EPA’s guidelines. Indeed, this was expressly noted in Committee

reports for the 1977 Amendments. In addition, CAA section 116, 61

42 U.S.C. § 7416, allows States to adopt standards that are more stringent than the

minimum federal requirement specified pursuant to section 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411.

Similarly, EPA’s regulations have provided for decades that States can adopt more

stringent standards of performance than the standards EPA promulgates under

section 111(d). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.24(c), 60.24(g). Together, these authorities

mean that state rules that are more stringent than the EPA-promulgated guidelines

are, by definition, part of the “best” system of emission reduction within the
To the extent particular sources object to the stringency or fairness of a 62

State’s proposed plan, they may raise those concerns to the State during the plan

development process. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.23 (requirements for public notice and

hearings on state plans). However, the fact that a State chooses to submit a plan to

EPA that allocates relatively fewer allowances, and therefore results in lower

mercury emissions than is required by CAMR, is not a basis for disapproval of the

plan by EPA. See Reconsideration RTC at 205 (JA xxx) (noting, inter alia, that

States “have the option of implementing more stringent [mercury] emission

reduction requirements under CAMR”).

151

meaning of CAA section 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).62

More broadly, as EPA noted, giving States flexibility in determining

allocations helps “maintain[] the principle of federalism.” 70 Fed. Reg. 28,627.

This observation was entirely appropriate since, as discussed above, CAA section

111(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1), calls on EPA to establish emissions guidelines

for existing sources using “a procedure similar to that provided by section 7410"

of the Act. See supra at 127-28. EPA rules under section 110 (like the NO SIP x

Call) typically provide States with latitude of this sort, as required by this Court’s

precedents. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 685-88; Virginia v. EPA, 108

F.3d at 1408-10; see generally 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (congressional finding that

“air pollution prevention . . . and air pollution control at its source is the primary

responsibility of States and local governments”); Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 79

& n.16 (1975) (generally stressing primary role of States in establishing sourcespecific emission limitations).
152

Finally, there also is no merit to UARG’s wholly unsupported conclusion

that where a State chooses to submit a plan that reflects more stringent emission

reductions than the minimum required by CAMR, such additional limitations may

not be federally enforceable. UARG Br. at 9. This conclusion appears to be based

on the premise that the plan cannot qualify as a standard of performance under

CAMR, a premise that is incorrect for all the reasons discussed above. Thus, any

standards adopted by a State under a section 111 plan approved by EPA are fully

enforceable by the State and by EPA pursuant to the statutory authorities outlined

in the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c), 7411(d)(2)(B); 40 C.F.R. § 60.24(g).

For all the foregoing reasons, UARG’s challenges to CAMR should be

denied.

D. EPA Reasonably Allocated Mercury Emissions for Alaska Within

the Section 111(d) Trading Program.

Petitioner Development Authority argues that, under CAMR, the State of

Alaska was not given a sufficient per-year mercury emissions allocation. This

argument is based on the Development Authority’s contentions that (1) EPA

cannot establish state caps based on an estimate of present emissions of all

existing units in the State, after application of controls, but instead must consider

and allow for expectations for future emissions growth from these same units; and
153

(2) that EPA has failed to adequately demonstrate that the performance standard

for existing sources can be achieved and has failed to properly balance the costs

and benefits of that standard.

As discussed in detail above, CAMR sets out state-specific emissions

budgets based upon a summing of hypothetical unit allocations, which EPA

derived from heat input and coal rank. Supra § VI (A). Development Authority

does not challenge the general framework but instead argues that EPA should have

granted Alaska a bigger budget because one of the two units in the State expects to

increase its capacity, and hence its emissions, in the future. Development

Authority’s arguments disregard the overall purpose and structure of CAMR and

misconstrue the emissions trading program authorized by the rule.

1. EPA, through the mercury emissions allocation process,

appropriately calculated state emissions budgets.

EPA reasonably construed CAA section 111(d) in deciding to use available

data on heat input and then imposing a state emissions budget that reflected that

heat input coupled with the achievable emissions limitations on which the rule

was based. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,622. Contrary to Development Authority’s

contentions, nothing in section 111(d) requires EPA to set state budgets that make
 Additionally, Development Authority did not raise its CAA section 111(d) 63

argument in its comments, thus this argument has been waived. See 42 U.S.C. §

7607(d)(7)(B); Mossville Environmental Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232,

1238 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (strictly interpreting the waiver requirement).

154

allowances for expected growth in emissions at a power plant. Moreover, 63

Development Authority’s arguments fails to acknowledge the primary goal of

CAMR to reduce the overall quantity of mercury emissions nationwide.

First, Development Authority’s reliance on CAA section 111(d)(2), which

requires EPA to consider, in promulgating a standard of performance under a plan

issued pursuant to its authority under that section, “among other factors, remaining

useful lives of the sources in the category of sources to which such standards

apply,” is misplaced. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2). Based on the plain language used,

the consideration is only relevant in the context of promulgating an

implementation plan, and not in establishing the emission guidelines represented

by CAMR. Further, EPA reasonably interprets this provision as requiring EPA to

consider whether a unit is going to remain in operation long enough to justify the

cost of compliance, not as requiring EPA to provide a relatively new power plant

with a less stringent level of control relevant to its current emissions simply

because it may increase its emissions in the future. See, e.g.,

40 C.F.R. § 60.27(e)(2).
155

Development Authority further argues that it is disadvantaged because the

Healy Clean Coal Project facility (“HCCP”), one of only two facilities in the State

of Alaska that is eligible to be regulated under CAMR, is caught between being a

“new” and “existing source.” Development Authority Br. at 6. If HCCP had been

considered a “new” source, however, its heat input would not have been included

in calculating Alaska’s budget; HCCP would have been allocated no allowances

under the model rule and would have been required to meet the new source

emission limit. See 42 U.S.C. § 111(f). By considering HCCP’s emission data

and, thus, treating it as an existing source, EPA’s approach allowed Alaska a

higher emissions cap.

Development Authority further claims that EPA should have considered

HCCP’s potential capacity because the term “modification” in an entirely different

regulatory context has been interpreted by the Seventh Circuit to be a contingent

on the capacity of a stationary source. Development Authority Br. at 7. This

argument takes the defined term “modification” out of context. Development

Authority refers to a definition of “modification” set out in section 111(a)(4). This

definition sets out when a physical change in a stationary source subjects the

stationary source to regulation as a new source. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (defining

“modification” as “any physical change in, or change in the method of operation
156

of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by

such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously

emitted”). While the definition of “modification” is relevant when determining

whether a source should be considered a “new” source or an “existing” source, it

is irrelevant to determining “the best system of emissions reduction,” and

Development Authority fails to cite any relevant case or statutory authority in

support of its position.

Development Authority also argues that Alaska cannot reduce mercury

emissions to its budgeted level for three reasons: (1) Alaska is not a CAIR State;

(2) state-of-the-art controls are already installed at the HCCP; and, (3) further

control devices are technologically infeasible. Development Authority Br. at 8-12.

These arguments misconstrue the function of EPA’s Phase 1 cap. EPA set its

national Phase 1 cap at a level that could be achieved as a “co-benefit” of control

technology that would be necessitated by CAIR. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,617. It is not

necessary, however, for every power plant to be subject to CAIR for the system to

work effectively. Each participating State makes individual unit allocations and

power plants are able to purchase emission allowances on the market if they wish

to do so. EPA never assumed that every power plant would install controls to

comply with CAIR. Nor did EPA assume that every plant that did install controls
157

would be able to operate consistent with their yearly unit allocation based on

CAIR co-benefits alone. The fact that HCCP anticipates that it will have to

purchase allowances is, therefore, consistent with EPA’s chosen approach and,

contrary to Development Authority’s assertion, does not undermine EPA’s system

of calculating state emission budgets.

Development Authority seems to claim a right to emissions allowances that

would allow for increased emissions without requiring the application of new

control technology or the purchase of emissions allowances in the marketplace.

Nationwide application of such a methodology would defeat the purpose of

CAMR by establishing nationwide emissions limits that are higher than mercury

emission levels estimated in 1999 – i.e., there would be no overall reduction in

mercury emissions from existing sources.

Instead of adopting Development Authority’s preferred approach, EPA

consistently applied an approach of establishing a baseline heat input estimate

based on the actual historical heat input data (or, in some cases, actual historical

fuel use and heat content data) for coal-fired units. EPA apportioned the national

cap on a consistent basis among the 50 States, two Tribes, and the District of

Columbia. To use a different approach solely for the State of Alaska would be

unreasonable. State Budgets TSD (JA xxx, xxx). Furthermore, each State has
158

authority to allocate emissions allowances as it deems appropriate as long as the

total allocated does not exceed the State’s total budget. If the State of Alaska

chooses to do so, it could allocate its entire emissions budget to HCCP, part of its

budget to HCCP, or even none of its budget to HCCP. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,627.

In short, EPA reasonably calculated an emissions budget for the State of

Alaska.

2. Development Authority unreasonably assumes that the

CAMR cap-and-trade system will fail.

There is nothing unique about Alaska with regard to the cap-and-trade

system. Development Authority expressed fear that interstate trading of mercury

allowances was unlikely because States might choose not to participate in the capand-trade program. Development Authority Br. at 10-12; Reconsideration RTC at

240-41 (JA xxx, xxx). EPA, however, reasonably concluded that there will be a

viable allowance market based on IPM analysis. See supra § VI(C);

Reconsideration RTC at 243 (JA xxx, xxx); 70 Fed. Reg. 28,619. Using

sophisticated IPM modeling, EPA analyzed the impact on projected marginal costs

of certain States, even a significant number of States, not participating in the

CAMR trading program and concluded that the potential decision of certain States

not to participate in the trading program would not significantly affect marginal
Development Authority also argues that by relying on actual data, as 64

opposed to projected emissions data, EPA failed to meet the strictures of section

111 and instead effectively imposed a section 112 standard because it failed to

consider costs. Nothing in section 111 requires that EPA consider cost to an

individual unit in establishing an overall section 111 standard and, in setting this

standard EPA clearly took cost into account.

159

mercury control costs within the program. Supra § VI(C); Cost TSD at 28, (JA

xxx, xxx); EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0056-6449, (JA xxx, xxx). This factual support 64

underlying the CAMR mercury trading program is in stark contrast to National

Lime, cited by Development Authority, in which this Court found that the

administrative record failed to support the “achievability” of the standards set for

lime manufacturing plants. National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 431 (D.C.

Cir. 1980). EPA’s IPM analysis demonstrates that the standard is achievable by

all affected power plants through the use of one or more available compliance

approaches.

Furthermore, a cap-and-trade program assures that reductions will be

achieved with the least cost. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,619. The benefits of the cap-andtrade system are numerous: among other things, it grants a high degree of

flexibility for the regulated community without resorting to waivers, exemptions

and other forms of administrative relief. EPA, therefore, reasonably concluded

that these benefits will motivate States to adopt the cap-and-trade system even
160

though they are not required to do so. Id. at 28,619, 28,627; 69 Fed. Reg. 4701-

03. Accordingly, EPA adequately demonstrated the viability of the mercury

trading program.

E. EPA Applied Appropriate Adjustment Factors for Coal Ranks.

As previously discussed, supra § VI(A), a particular State’s emission budget

is determined by summing hypothetical mercury allocations (based on a calculated

adjusted historical baseline heat input), derived using a specified formula, to

power plant units located in the State. The State in turn allocates the overall

budget to individual sources through allowances. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,623-30. Each

power plant’s baseline heat input is adjusted to reflect ranks of coal burned. 70

Fed. Reg. 28,612-13. Adjustment factors of 1 for bituminous, 1.25 for

subbituminous, and 3 for lignite coals were applied by EPA in determining

hypothetical mercury allocations for power plants. Id. at 28,622. Application of

these adjustment factors in determining hypothetical allocations and ultimately

state emission budgets results in a power plant that burns bituminous coal being

credited with its actual heat input, whereas a power plant that burns lignite coal

would, for purposes of determining state emissions budgets, be credited with three

times its actual heat input. Contrary to Petitioners’ suggestion, in CAMR EPA

only used these adjustment factors to establish state budgets. It did not establish
 This is contrary to EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis that projects continued 65

growth of bituminous coal use under CAMR. Reconsideration RTC at 25 (JA

xxx).

161

actual allocations for individual facilities. Such unit-specific allocations are in the

purview of the State to determine.

“Bituminous Petitioners” are a collection of industry associations involved

in the production of bituminous coal, and these associations have a business

interest in minimizing costs associated with burning bituminous coal.

Accordingly, the Bituminous Petitioners have a strong market incentive to make

bituminous coal an attractive fuel for electricity generation, and have attacked

EPA’s adjustment factors for coal ranks by arguing that those adjustment factors

are arbitrary, and unfairly allocate mercury emission allowances to subbituminous

and lignite coal burning facilities to the detriment of facilities that burn bituminous

coal.65

Bituminous Petitioners argue that EPA has not provided adequate support

for its coal rank adjustment factors. This is not the case. The record clearly

supports EPA’s reasonable adjustment factors for coal ranks.

1. EPA’s adjustment factors are reasonable.

In the final rule EPA retained adjustment factors previously used in

determining state emission budgets. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,622. The adjustment factors
162

are supported by the State Budgets TSD. Id. (citing State Budgets TSD). The

adjustment factors are “based on the expectation that, for different coal ranks,

mercury reacts differently to NOx and SO2 control equipment.” State Budgets

TSD at 2 (JA xxx). EPA examined data in the 1999 power plant Information

Collection Request (“ICR”), including data on mercury capture by control

figuration and coal rank, data on coal characteristics impacting mercury capture,

and mercury emissions and capacity by coal rank, and found that the data

supported the adjustment factors. Id. at 2-4 (JA xxx). The data related to mercury

removal rates measured for various coal ranks and control configurations reveal a

significant range of mercury capture, and mercury capture rates for bituminous

coal are, on average, significantly better than the capture rates measured for

subbituminous and lignite coals. Id. at 3 (JA xxx). The ICR data related to

mercury emissions and capacity by coal rank reveal that emissions for bituminous

coal are estimated to be 0.25 pounds of mercury per megawatt of power generated.

Id. at 4 (JA xxx). Power plants using subbituminous coals emit an estimated 0.37

pounds of mercury per megawatt, and plants using lignite coal emit about 0.65

pounds of mercury per megawatt. Id. These numbers support the chosen

allocation adjustment because the 0.65 pounds of emissions per megawatt for

lignite coal is close to three times the emissions per megawatt for bituminous coal,
163

and the 0.37 pounds of emissions per megawatt for subbituminous coal is greater

than 1.25 times that of bituminous coal. Id.

Bituminous Petitioners also argue that EPA’s allocation methodology must

be flawed because lignite- and subbituminous-burning power plants are more

likely to receive an allocation that exceeds their actual mercury emissions.

Petitioners’ position disregards the relative ease with which bituminous-burning

power plants can capture their mercury emissions. See Reconsideration RTC at

225, (JA xxx) Based on the ICR data, higher levels of mercury capture are

expected for bituminous coal-fired power plants than for power plants that burn

subbituminous or lignite coals. State Budgets TSD at 3 (JA xxx). EPA conducted

an analysis comparing state mercury emission budgets developed using adjusted

heat input and state budgets developed using pure (unadjusted) heat input to

projected mercury emissions by State and found that, when state budgets are

compared to projected emission levels in 2010, when the CAMR Phase I cap is

effective, EPA’s methodology more closely tracks actual projected emissions

levels than Bituminous Petitioners’ proposed method. Reconsideration RTC at

234-235 (JA xxx).

The fact that the data continues to support EPA’s adjustment factors is

unsurprising, given that EPA is not seeking to achieve a precise allocation for each
164

power plant but is instead attempting to create an adjustment factor that is

“directionally correct,” leaving it to the States to determine precise allocations.

State Budgets TSD at 2 (JA xxx); 70 Fed. Reg. 28,622. Though final allocations

are made by individual States, the rule anticipates that some power plants may

control to an emission level below their allocated amounts of allowances and

allows those plants to either bank the excess emissions allowances, or sell them on

the market. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,622. Similarly, power plants may choose to purchase

allowances on the market rather than controlling emissions.

As discussed above, in CAMR the Agency did not allocate any mercury

allowances. Supra § VI(D). EPA’s choice of adjustment factors has no direct

impact on the allocation of mercury allowances to CAMR units for purposes of

compliance with the program and a State has full flexibility to allocate allowances

as it sees fit. Thus, the Bituminous Petitioners’ complaint that EPA’s adjustment

factors unfairly allocate mercury emission allowances is unfounded.

The Court’s standard of review under the arbitrary-and-capricious test is one

of reasonableness, not perfection. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43. Additionally, the Court gives “an extreme

degree of deference” to any agency “‘evaluating scientific data within its technical

expertise.’” Hüls Am., Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
165

(quoting Int’l Fabricare Inst. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).

Especially given the complex technical issues at play when determining an

appropriate adjustment factor, the exercise of appropriate deference dictates that

the Court deny Bituminous Petitioners’ petition for review.

2. EPA’s CAMR adjustment factors account for factors not at

issue in CAIR.

Bituminous Petitioners argue that because EPA, when determining SO2

allowances for CAIR, rejected allowance allocations by coal rank, EPA should not

apply such allowance allocations under CAMR. This argument compares apples

to oranges. EPA has developed a sufficient record to justify its decision to apply

an adjustment factor when calculating hypothetical allowance allocations under

CAMR, as described above. Supra § VI(D)(1).

Bituminous Petitioners, when discussing EPA’s rationale for declining to

employ allowance allocations by coal rank under CAIR, fail to provide the context

in which that decision was made. When regulating SO2 under CAIR, EPA was

faced not only with a different pollutant, it was dealing with an entirely different

regulatory background that is significantly influenced by Title IV-A of the Act.

Title IV-A of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-51o, is a statutory attempt to control acid

x rain. This program controls emissions of SO2 and NO and creates a system of
166

SO2 emission allowances that can be freely traded. Title IV-A, by statute, creates

allowances for individual energy producing units. 42 U.S.C. § 7651a (3). These

allowances are calculated pursuant to a scheme designed by Congress and do not

include adjustment factors of the type used in CAMR. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a)(1).

EPA, when regulating the same pollutant under CAIR, reasonably considered

statutory and regulatory controls that power plants were already subject to with

respect to SO2, and attempted to preserve the title IV-A allowance allocation

approach under CAIR. Reconsideration RTC at 226 (JA xxx, xxx). Mercury

emitted from coal-fired power plants, by contrast, is not subject to a previously

existing cap-and-trade scheme, much less a scheme designed by Congress rather

than the Agency. Accordingly, EPA has broad flexibility when considering the

appropriate way in which to regulate emissions of mercury.

Additionally, mercury is an entirely different pollutant that reacts differently

to control technology. Power plants that burn bituminous coal are better able to

capture their mercury emissions than are power plants that burn either

subbituminous or lignite coals. Legacy Docket A-92-55, II-I-1 (disk 1, attach. 1)

(JA xxx, xxx). When burned, bituminous coals emit less mercury per megawatt of

energy generated, based on the 1999 Hg ICR data. See supra § VI(E)(1). Because

bituminous coals emit less mercury to begin with, and because their mercury
167

emissions are more readily controlled, EPA reasonably granted bituminous coalburning power plants a proportionately lower hypothetical allocation when

determining state emission budgets. Sulfur dioxide does not react to control

technology in the same way, and coal rank does not reflect the same disparity in

either emissions or application of control technology. See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,612-

13. Accordingly, EPA was reasonable in regulating SO2 emissions differently.

3. EPA has adequately responded to Bituminous Petitioners’

concern regarding CAMR’s Phase 2 adjustment factors.

Bituminous Petitioners argue that EPA’s decision to retain adjustment

factors under Phase 2 of CAMR must be reversed because EPA has failed to

respond “meaningfully” to their comments. This is not the case. A subset of

Bituminous Petitioners did argue that adjustment factors were not necessary in

Phase 2 of CAMR. CAMR RTC at 9-26 and 9-108 (JA xxx, xxx). In response,

EPA incorporated its discussion that justified its decision to finalize the allocation

adjustment factors, CAMR RTC at 5-95 - 5-114 (EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0056-6209

at 5-95 - 5-114) (JA xxx, xxx), and also referenced the preamble to the final

CAMR rule and the State Budgets TSD.

The referenced documents discuss EPA’s support for the adjustment factors,

and satisfy the requirement set out in 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(6)(B). The data
168

reviewed by EPA suggests that mercury emissions from power plants that burn

bituminous coal are more easily captured by existing controls, and that bituminous

coal-fired plants emits less mercury per megawatt of power generated. See supra §

VI(D)(1). This fundamental fact is not altered when Phase 2 of CAMR begins.

“The failure to respond to comments is significant only insofar as it demonstrates

that the agency’s decision was not based on a consideration of the relevant

factors.” Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); accord American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA,

115 F.3d at 1005 (finding comment response sufficient if it “demonstrates that the

agency considered the ‘relevant factors’ raised by the suggested alternatives”);

Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1996). EPA’s

explanation makes it evident that EPA did consider the relevant factors.

F. EPA Established Appropriate Mercury Limitations for CoalRefuse-Fired Power Plants.

Under CAA section 111, EPA must establish NSPS based on the best

system of emission reductions which has been adequately demonstrated. 42

U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). On this basis, in CAMR EPA set out separate emissions

limitations for new, modified, and reconstructed power plants fired with

bituminous, subbituminous, and lignite coals, and coal refuse that reflect the use of
169

best demonstrated technology (“BDT”). 70 Fed. Reg. 28,615; EPA-HQ-OAR2002-0056-6721, Revised New Source Performance Standard Statistical Analysis

for Mercury Emissions (“NSPS Memo”) at 1 (JA xxx, xxx). For CAMR, the

emissions limitation for all coal ranks was based on the 90th percentile mercury

reduction (i.e., the control efficiency that the BDT is estimated to achieve 90

percent of the time). 70 Fed. Reg. 28,615; NSPS Memo at 3 (JA xxx). In order to

calculate the 90th percentile mercury reduction, EPA relied on an equation that

incorporates the 90th percentile average heat content of the coal burned. NSPS

Memo at 6 (JA xxx).

Petitioner ARIPPA, a trade association comprised of coal-refuse-fired

power plants, argues that EPA used an incorrect heat content of 11,376 Btu/lb for

coal refuse when calculating mercury emission limitations under CAMR. Though

ARIPPA does not challenge EPA’s decision to base the emissions limitation on

the 90th percentile mercury reduction, ARIPPA claims that EPA failed to consider

relevant data, failed to explain the basis for the application of a 11,376 BTU/lb

heat content value to coal refuse, and disregarded the definition of “coal refuse.”

As discussed below, EPA considered available data, and properly applied a heat

content of 11,376 Btu/lb to coal refuse.
170

1. ARIPPA cites to the incorrect definition of “coal refuse.”

ARIPPA, when discussing previous regulatory definitions of the term “coal

refuse,” cites to a definition set out in 40 C.F.R. § 60.41b. This definition is for

industrial boilers. See Standards of Performance for Steam Generating Units, 40

C.F.R. § 60.40b. CAMR does not apply to industrial boilers, CAMR applies to

electric utility steam generating units. Thus, the applicable “coal refuse”

definition is found in 40 C.F.R. Part 60, subpart Da. See Standards of

Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units for Which Construction is

Commenced After September 18, 1978, 40 C.F.R. § 60.40Da. The definition of

“coal refuse” in subpart Da is based on the process by which the coal refuse is

produced rather than being based on constituents or parameters of the material.

The distinction is important because, although in 40 C.F.R. § 60.41b EPA does

establish a maximum heat content value of 6,000 Btu/lb for coal refuse used in

industrial boilers, that universe of “coal refuse” is not the same as the universe of

“coal refuse” defined in subpart Da. As defined in subpart Da, “coal refuse”

includes “waste products of coal mining, physical coal cleaning, and coal

preparation operations . . . containing coal, matrix material, clay, and other organic

and inorganic material.” 40 C.F.R. § 60.41Da. Because this definition is based on

the “production” process rather than the parameters, it includes coal refuse that
171

burns with a maximum heat content value of greater than 6,000 Btu/lb. As

demonstrated by data in the CAMR docket, coal reported as being “coal refuse” by

the applicable power plants had maximum heat content values that exceeded 6,000

Btu/lb. See Legacy docket A-92-55, II-I-8 (JA xxx). Accordingly, the heat

content used by EPA for coal refuse under CAMR is not inconsistent with the

applicable definition.

The differences between definitions are relevant to the respective industry

sectors addressed and are, therefore, appropriate. Further, the issue of any

definitional differences between various subparts was not raised during the public

comment period, and has, thus, been waived. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B);

Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d at 1238 (strictly interpreting the

waiver requirement).

2. EPA properly considered available data when calculating

the heat content of coal refuse.

EPA calculated the appropriate achievable mercury emission level for each

coal rank, including coal refuse, through statistical analysis. 70 Fed. Reg. 28,615.

The heat content value of the fuel input is one of several relevant factors in

calculating the control efficiency-based limitation. ARIPPA argues that EPA’s

calculated heat content for coal refuse is too high, ultimately subjecting its
 Although EPA does not have actual coal refuse emissions data in the requisite 66

format (i.e., output-based, lb/MWh), input-based (i.e., lb/TBtu) emissions data

provided by ARIPPA are consistent with the lb/TBtu value EPA used in

establishing the output-based NSPS value. See

EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0056-6698.1, .2, .4, .5, .7, .8., and .9; NSPS Memo at 10 (JA

xxx).

172

members to a substantially more stringent mercury emission limitation. ARIPPA

Br. at 4. Emissions data supplied by ARIPPA, however, are consistent with the

performance standard established by EPA.66

When EPA calculated its 90th percentile Btu/lb values for coal refuse, it

consistently calculated the value where 90 percent of the Btu/lb values in its

sample data would be less than the indicated value. EPA used this approach with

all coal ranks (bituminous, subbituminous, lignite, and coal refuse).

Reconsideration RTC at 273 (JA xxx, xxx). ARIPPA has apparently

misunderstood EPA’s analysis, and has provided the Court with a heat content

value for coal refuse of 4,336 Btu/lb based on a calculation where 90 percent of

the Btu/lb values would be greater than the indicated value. See ARIPPA

December 19, 2005 Comment at 13 (EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0056-6529.1 at 13) (JA

xxx, xxx); ARIPPA Br. at 3, 5. This goes a long way toward explaining the

difference between the 90th percentile value calculated by ARIPPA and the

significantly higher value calculated by EPA.
173

Additionally, ARIPPA calculated its heat content value of 4,336 Btu/lb by

considering “an analysis of information compiled by ARIPPA’s members.”

ARIPPA Br. at 3. ARIPPA members are coal-refuse-fired electrical generating

units in Pennsylvania. ARIPPA’s April 7, 2006 Comment (EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-

0056-6698) (JA xxx, xxx). In other words, ARIPPA’s calculations are based on a

limited subset of the available data. EPA’s determination that the 90th percentile

heat content value of coal refuse (11,376 Btu/lb) is based on nationwide data

collected in the ICR. NSPS Memo at 6-7. The ICR consists of data submitted to

EPA by power plants nationwide under the authority of CAA section 114,

including ARIPPA member data.

ARIPPA additionally argues that EPA failed to properly consider data

compiled by ARIPPA members and submitted during reconsideration. ARIPPA

Br. at 5. In fact, EPA did review the additional emissions data submitted by

ARIPPA. EPA specifically excluded some data for reasons stated on the record,

and EPA, where appropriate, incorporated the newly provided data into its

analysis to determine the NSPS for coal refuse. Reconsideration RTC at 272-73

(JA xxx, xxx); NSPS Memo at 3, 11-13 (JA xxx, xxx-xxx). Specifically, EPA

incorporated 23 of 31 additional test runs provided by ARIPPA. NSPS Memo at

12.

175

Of Counsel:

CAROL S. HOLMES

SUSMITA DUBEY

HOWARD J. HOFFMAN

RICHARD H. VETTER

United States Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20460

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on May 4, 2007, true and correct copies of the foregoing Initial Brief

for Respondent EPA was served by first-class U.S. mail on the following counsel:

James S. Pew

Earthjustice

1625 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Suite 702

Washington, D.C. 20036-2212

For Environmental Defense, National Wildlife Federation, and Sierra Club

Jon Devine

Natural Resources Defense Council

1200 New York Avenue, NW

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20005

For the Natural Resources Defense Council

Ann Brewster Weeks

Jonathan F. Lewis

Clean Air Task Force

18 Tremont Street, Suite 530

Boston, MA 02108

For the Natural Resources Council of Maine, the Ohio Environmental Council,

and the United States Public Interest Research Group

Scott Edwards

Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc.

50 South Buckout Street

Irvington, NY 10533

Jon A. Mueller

Director of Litigation

Chesapeake Bay Foundation

6 Herndon Ave.

Annapolis, MD 21403 

Bradford Kuster

Conservation Law Foundation

New Hampshire Advocacy Center

27 North Main Street

Concord, NH 03301-4930

For Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Conservation Law Foundation, and

Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc.
2

Susan Durbin

Deputy Attorney General

California Department of Justice

1300 I Street

P.O. Box 944255

Sacramento, California 94244-2550

For the State of California

Jean P. Reilly

Christopher D. Ball

Jung W. Kim

Amy C. Donlon

Deputy Attorneys General

R.J. Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Street

P.O. Box 093

Trenton, NJ 08625

For the State of New Jersey

Matthew Levine

Assistant Attorney General

P.O. Box 120

55 Elm Street

Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0120

For the State of Connecticut

Valerie Csizmadia

820 N. French Street

Carvel State Building

Wilmington, DE 19801

For the State of Delaware

Ann Alexander

Attorney General’s Office of State of Illinois

188 West Randolph Street

20 Floor th

Chicago, IL 60601-2901

For the State of Illinois

Gerald Reid

Assistant Attorney General

Department of the Attorney General

State House Station # 6

Augusta, Maine 04333-0006

For the State of Maine
3

Kathy M. Kinsey

Judah Prero

Assistant Attorneys General

Maryland Department of the Environment

1800 Washington Blvd., Suite 6048

Baltimore, MD 21230

For the State of Maryland

William L. Pardee

Assistant Attorney General

Environmental Protection Division

1 Ashburton Place – Suite 1813

Boston, Massachusetts 02108

For the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Maureen D. Smith

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

33 Capitol Street

Concord, New Hampshire 03301-6397

For the State of New Hampshire

Christopher D. Coppin

Stephen R. Farris

Karen Fisher

David M. Pato

Assistant Attorneys General

New Mexico Attorney General’s Office

P.O. Drawer 1508

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504

For the State of New Mexico

Peter Lehner

Jared Snyder

Jacob Hollinger

Assistant Attorneys General

Environmental Protection Bureau

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

For the State of New York

Robert A. Reiley

Assistant Counsel

The Rachel Carson State Office Bldg.

P.O. Box 8464

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105

For the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
4

Kevin O. Leske

Assistant Attorneys General

Office of the Attorney General

109 State Street

Montpelier, Vermont 05609-1001

For the State of Vermont

Charles D. Hoornstra

Thomas J. Dawson

Assistant Attorneys General

Wisconsin Department of Justice

17 West Main Street

P.O. Box 7857

Madison, Wisconsin 53707-7857

For the State of Wisconsin

Alan C. Williams

Attorney General

Attorney General’s Office of State of Minnesota

445 Minnesota Avenue

Suite 900

Saint Paul, MN 55101-2127

For the State of Minnesota

Alan F. Hoffman

Assistant Attorney General’s Office of the State of Michigan

Environment, Natural Resources & Agriculture Division

PO Box 30755

Lansing, MI 48909

For the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality

Ralph S. Tyler, City Solicitor

Shari T. Wilson

Dawn S. Lettman

Joshua N. Auerbach

Baltimore City Department of Law

100 Holliday Street

Suite 101 – City Hall

Baltimore, MD 21202

For the City of Baltimore

Terence J. Tierney

Special Assistant Attorney General

Attorney General’s Office of State of Rhode Island

150 South Main St.

Providence, RI 02903

For the State of Rhode Island
5

Leah W. Casey

Office and P.O. Address

20 Corporate Woods Boulevard

Albany, New York 12211-2362

For the Adirondack Mountain Club

Douglas J. Luckmerman

Law Office of Douglas J. Luckerman

20 Outlook Drive

Lexington, MA 02421 

For Aroostook Band of Micmac Indians, Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians,

the Penobscot Indian Tribe, the Passamaquoddy Tribe, at Pleasant Point, and

the Passamaquodddy Tribe at Indian Township

Riyaz A. Kanjji

Kanji & Katzen, PLLC

101 North Main Street

Suite 555

Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104

Vanya S. Hogen

Colette Routel

Sara I. Wheelock

Faegre & Benson LLP

2200 Wells Fargo Center

90 South Seventh Street

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

For the National Congress of American Indians et al.

John Suttles

200 W. Franklin Street, Suite 330

Chapel Hill, NC 27516-2559

For the Physicians for Social Responsibility, the American Nurses Association,

the American Public Health Association, and the American Academy of

Pediatrics

Neal John Cabral

McGuireWoods

1050 Connecticut Avenue

12th Floor,

Washington, D.C. 20036-5317
6

Scott C. Oostdyk

E.E. Mathews III

Stewart Todd Leeth

McGuireWoods

One James Center, 901 East Cary Street

Richmond, VA 23219-4030

For American Coal for Balanced Mercury Regulation, Alabama Coal

Association, Coal Operators & Associates, Inc., Maryland Coal Association,

Ohio Coal Association, and Pennsylvania Coal Association

Carol A. Fitzpatrick

Bart E. Cassidy

Manko, Gold & Katcher

40 City Avenue

Suite 500

Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004

For ARIPPA

Charles H. Knauss

Robert V. Zener

Bingham McCutchen LLP

3000 Street, NW

Suite 300

Washington, DC 20007-5116

For the Producers of Electric Reliability

Henry V. Nickel

Lee B. Zeugin

David G. Scott III

Hunton & Williams

1900 K Street, NW

Washington, DC 20006

For the Utility Air Regulatory Group

Judith Ellen Rivlin

Grant F. Crandall

United Mine Workers of America

8315 Lee Highway

Fairfax, VA 22301-2215

For United Mine Workers of America

James B. Vasile

Brian Randel Gish

Davis Wright Termaine LLP

1500 K Street, NW

Suite 450

Washington DC 20005=1272

For Alaska Development and Export Authority
7

Kevin C. Newsom

Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General

Alabama State House

11 South Union Street, 3 Floor rd

Montgomery, Alabama 36130

For the State of Alabama

Steve Carter

Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

Indiana Government Center South – 5 Floor th

302 West Washington St.

Indianapolis, IN 46204

For the State of Indiana

Phil Kline

Attorney General

David W. Davies, III

Office of the Attorney General

120 S.W. 10 Avenue th

Topeka, KS 66612

For the State of Kansas

Jon Bruning

Attorney General

Jodi M. Fenner

Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

State Capitol

P.O. Box 98920

Lincoln, NE 68509-8920

For the State of Nebraska

Paul M. Seby

McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP

1875 Lawrence Street, Suite 200

Denver, CO 80202

Wayne Stenehjem

Attorney General

Lyle Witham

Office of the Attorney General

State Capitol

600 E. Boulevard Ave.,

Bismarck, ND 58505-0040

For the State of North Dakota
8

Roxanne Giedd

Deputy Attorney General

South Dakota Attorney General’s Office

500 East Capitol

Pierre, SD 57501-5070

For the State of South Dakota

Vicci M. Colgan

Senior Assistant Attorney General

State of Wyoming

123 Capitol Building

Cheyenne, WY 82002

For the State of Wyoming

William M. Bumpers

Debra J. Jezouit

Baker Botts, L.L.P.

1299 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004-2400

For PPL Corporation, PSEG Fossil LLC, NRG Energy, Inc., and Florida

Power & Light Company

Peter H. Wyckoff

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP

2300 N Street, NW

Washington DC 20037

For Duke Energy Indiana, Inc., Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.; and Duke

Energy Ohio,

Henri D. Bartholomot

Edison Electric Institute

701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20004

For Edison Electric Institute

Harold Patrick Quinn, Jr.

National Mining Association

101 Constitution Ave., NW

Suite 500 East

Washington, DC 20001-2133

Peter S. Glaser

Troutman Sanders

401 9 Street, NW th

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004-2134

For National Mining Association