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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ALONZO GARWOOD

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 977 EDA 2019 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 14, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 51

- CR

- 0608053

- 1979

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JULY 01, 2020 Alonzo Garwood appeals pro se from the denial of his fourth petition for relief under the Post

- Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541

- 9546. He claims that the PCRA court erred when it dismissed his petition as untimely. However, Garwood filed his petition more than one year after his judgment of sentence became final and he has not plead ed and proven any of the three exceptions to the PCRA time

- bar. Accordingly, we affirm. In 1980, a jury convicted Garwood of three counts of second

- degree murde r 1 and other related offenses , arising from his gang related firebombing of an occupied house in Philadelphia. The trial court sentenced Garwood to three terms of life imprisonment. This Court affirmed Garwood ’s judgment of

_________________ __________ ______ ___ _ _______ 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b).J

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sentence on January 14, 1987 , and our Supreme Court denied Garwood’s petition for allowance of appeal on September 15, 1987. Garwood’s first, counseled, petition for collateral relief 2 was denied in 1989, after which this Court affirmed the denial and our Supreme Court denied the petition for allowance of appeal. This Court affirmed the dismissal of Garwood’s second and third petitions in 2008 and 2017 respectively. Garwood filed the instant petition, his fourth, on February 5, 2018. 3 The
P CRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss his petition pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure 907(1), and dismissed the petition as untimely on March 14, 2019. This timely appeal followed. Garwood asserts four issues on appeal. The first and fourth relate to the Court of Common Pleas’ conclusion that the subject PCRA petition was untimely; the remaining issues go to the merits of the petition. We address only the first and fourth issues beca use we agree with the lower court that Garwood’s petition was untimely. See Commonwealth v. Miller , 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014). Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of the underlying petition. Thus, we must first deter mine whether the instant PCRA petition was timely filed. The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in

_________________ __________ ______ ___ _ _______ 2 Garwood’s first petition for relief was filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”).

3 We conclude that the PCRA court properly treated Garwood’s “Petition for Writ Habeas Corpus/PCRA/Rule 5505” as a subsequent PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (PCRA encompasses all other remedies including habeas corpus ).J

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nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition. The question of whether a petiti on is timely raises a question of law. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary. A PCRA petition is timely if it is “filed within one year of the date the judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment [of sentence] becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). . . . Commonwealth v. Brown , 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa.Super. 2016) (case citations and some quotation marks omitted). Garwood’s judgment of sentence became final on Novemb er 1 5 , 1987, 6 0 days 4 after our Sup reme Court denied allowance of appeal and Garwood did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certi ora ri

. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review .

. . or at the expiration of time for seeking the review”)

. The instant petition, filed over 30 years later, is patently untimely. Therefore the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review Garwood’s petition unless he successfully pleaded and proved one of the statutory exceptions to th e PCRA ’s time

- bar. The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar: (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the

_________________ __________ ______ ___ _ _______ 4 When Garwood’s judgment of sentence was entered, in 1987, an appellant had 60 days within which to file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See Former U.S. Supreme Court Rule 20.1

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claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitu tional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)

- (iii).
A PC RA petitioner must plead any claimed exception to the time

- bar in the petition, and may not raise an exception for the first time on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Burton , 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa.Super. 2007). “[Our Supreme] Court has repeatedly stated it is th e appellant ’ s burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins , 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted). Further, [ A ] lthough this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if an ap pellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Commonwealth v. Lyons , 833 A.2d 245, 251

– 52 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citations omitted). Even liberally construed, Garwood has failed to plead and prove that his claims constitute a valid exception to the PCRA time

- bar. In his petition, Garwood does not assert any new information that would establish applicability of any of the exceptions to the PCRA time

- bar. Rather, he re

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a rgues Brady 5 claims that he had previously raised in earlier petitions , and baldly asserts that he act ed with due diligence at the time of raising those claims

. See Petition, 2/05/18, at 11

- 13; see also Commonwealth v. Garwood , No. 2752 EDA 2016, at *4, 7

- 8 (Pa.Super. filed Apr. 19, 2017) (unpublished memorandum). He further maintains that as an incarcerated person, his means to investigate matters related to his claims are very limited. See Garwood Br. at 5, 7

- 8. In order to obtain relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must prove that the allegation of error has not been previously litigated. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (requiring petitioners to prove that allegations of error have not been previously litigated or waived, in order to be eligible for relief under PCRA)

. Here, because Garwood previously litigated his Brady claim in his third PCRA, he is unable to prove that the allegation of error underlying his claim to a governmental interference exception has not been previously litigated. To the extent he claims the new

- facts exception, because he previously raised his Brady claim in 2010, the “facts” giving rise to the claim are not “new.” Therefore, we agree with the determination of the PCRA court that Garwood’ s petition was not timely filed, and he failed to plead and prove any of the time

bar exceptions. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying relief. Order affirmed.

_________________ __________ ______ ___ _ _______ 5 Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963).J

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 7/1/20