United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 14-1073

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ronnie Lee Langston

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City

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 Submitted: August 3, 2015

Filed: August 6, 2015

[Published]

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Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

This court previously affirmed Ronnie Lee Langston’s sentence under the

Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). See United States v. Langston, 772

F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated

the judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court

affirms the district court and reinstates the previous opinion in part.

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Langston pled guilty to possessing a firearmin violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 

The district court sentenced him as an armed career criminal to 180 months’

imprisonment. See § 924(e)(1) (mandatory minimum of 180 months if a felon in

possession of a firearmhas three prior convictions for violent felonies orserious drug

offenses). At sentencing, the court found that four prior convictions were violent

felonies: terrorism, going armed with intent, theft, and burglary. Langston did not

dispute that the theft and burglary convictions were violent felonies. This court

affirmed, holding that the terrorism conviction is a violent felony under the ACCA’s

first clause. See § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (crime is a violent felony if it “has as an element

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of

another”). Alternatively, this court found that Langston’s going-armed-with-intent

conviction is a violent felony under the “residual clause” of the ACCA. See §

924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (crime is a violent felony if it “otherwise involves conduct that

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”). 

In Johnson, the Supreme Court struck down the residual clause as

unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (noting vagueness in

criminal statutes is prohibited by due process). In light of Johnson, Langston’s

going-armed-with-intent conviction is not a qualifying violent felony. 

However, Johnson “does not call into question application of the [ACCA] to

the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s definition of a violent

felony.” Id. at 2563. As explained by the previous opinion, Langston’s terrorism

conviction is a violent felony under the ACCA’s first clause. See 772 F.3d at 562-63. 

The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the

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Northern District of Iowa.

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Langston thus has three qualifying convictions. The district court properly sentenced

him as an armed career criminal. See § 924(e)(1) (requiring “three previous

convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense”). See also United

States v. Archuleta, 412 F.3d 1003, 1006 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing harmless error),

citing, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

The judgment is affirmed. The panel opinion is reinstated except for the two

paragraphs, 772 F.3d at 563, finding that the going-armed-with-intent conviction is

a predicate felony under the residual clause.

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