13-1943

Lin v. Holder

BIA

A087 481 027

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,

on the 14th 4 day of April, two thousand fourteen.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

8 GERARD E. LYNCH,

9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 CHANG DONG LIN,

14 Petitioner, 

15

16 v. 13-1943

17 NAC 

18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent.

21 _______________________________________

22

23 FOR PETITIONER: Sandra Cheng, New York, NY.

24

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney

26 General; Leslie McKay, Assistant

27 Director; Kelly J. Walls, Trial

28 Attorney, Office of Immigration

29 Litigation, United States Department

30 of Justice, Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

4 is DENIED.

5 Petitioner Chang Dong Lin, a native and citizen of

6 China, seeks review of an April 30, 2013, decision of the

7 BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. 

8 In re Chang Dong Lin, No. A087 481 027 (B.I.A. Apr. 30,

9 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

10 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

11 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for

12 abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517

13 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An alien seeking to reopen

14 proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later

15 than 90 days after the date on which the final

16 administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. 

17 § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no

18 dispute that Lin’s motion to reopen, filed in 2013, was

19 untimely because his order of removal became final in 2011. 

20 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(I). Lin contends, however,

21 that his conversion to Christianity in the United States and

22 the Chinese government’s awareness of his mailing of

23 materials relating to Christianity to his wife’s underground

2
1 church in China constitute materially changed country

2 conditions excusing his motion from the applicable time

3 limitation. 

4 We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in

5 denying Lin’s motion for failure to demonstrate his prima

6 facie eligibility for relief. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,

7 546 F.3d 138, 168 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that an

8 alien’s “ability to secure reopening depends on a

9 demonstration of prima facie eligibility for [relief], which

10 means she must show a ‘realistic chance’ that she will be

11 able to obtain such relief” (citations omitted)). The BIA

12 reasonably relied on the country conditions evidence

13 indicating that China currently allows the practice of

14 Christianity, notwithstanding isolated reports of harassment

15 of some underground church members, a finding that Lin does

16 not specifically challenge on appeal. See Jian Xing Huang

17 v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that

18 absent solid support in the record for the petitioner’s

19 assertion that he would be persecuted, his fear was

20 “speculative at best”). While Lin does challenge the BIA’s

21 consideration of the statements from his wife and her fellow

22 underground church members, the BIA did not err in according

3
1 this evidence diminished weight because it was from

2 interested witnesses not subject to cross-examination and

3 was not supported by any independent evidence. See Matter

4 of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010)

5 (rejecting letters from applicant’s relatives and friends

6 because they were “interested witnesses not subject to

7 cross-examination”), overruled in part on other grounds by

8 Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012); see

9 also Xiao Ji Chen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 471

10 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the weight

11 accorded to evidence lies largely within the agency’s

12 discretion). 

13 Because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying

14 Lin’s motion for failure to demonstrate his prima facie

15 eligibility for relief, we decline to consider his challenge

16 to the agency’s alternative finding that country conditions

17 had not materially changed. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S.

18 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are

19 not required to make findings on issues the decision of

20 which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). 

21

22 

4
1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion

3 for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.

4 FOR THE COURT: 

5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

6

7

5