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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46640

In the Interest of: John Doe I, A Child 

Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age.

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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 

AND WELFARE,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

JANE DOE,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

GUARDIAN AD LITEM,

Guardian Ad Litem-Respondent.

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Filed: March 13, 2019

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 

District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. James Cawthon, Magistrate. 

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Anthony R. Geddes, Ada County Public Defender; Karen L. Jennings, Deputy 

Ada County Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John R. Shackelford, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

Stoel Rives LLP; Kris J. Ormseth, Boise, for guardian ad litem.

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HUSKEY, Judge

Jane Doe appeals from the magistrate’s judgment terminating her parental rights. Doe 

argues the magistrate erred when it terminated her parental rights. Because substantial and 

competent evidence supports the magistrate’s findings that Doe abandoned and neglected her 

child, we affirm the magistrate’s judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights.
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Doe is the mother of J.F.,

1 who was born on December 22, 2017. J.F. tested positive for

opiates and marijuana on December 23, 2017, and police determined the child was in imminent 

danger. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department) filed a petition for hearing 

under the Child Protective Act on December 27, 2017. The same day, Doe was advised of her 

rights and she waived her right to a shelter care hearing. The magistrate found there was 

reasonable cause to believe that J.F. came within the purview of the Child Protective Act due to 

neglect, and the magistrate ordered J.F. into temporary care and custody of the Department. 

Because Doe lived out of state, she filed motions to participate via telephone at the 

pretrial conference and the adjudicatory hearing, which were both granted. Doe failed to appear 

at the pretrial conference, which was held on January 22, 2018. Doe also failed to appear at the 

adjudicatory hearing on January 24, 2018. A case plan hearing was held on February 21, 2018, 

and Doe failed to appear there as well. On March 22, 2018, the magistrate granted legal custody 

of J.F. to the Department. Doe failed to appear at a status review hearing on April 20, 2018, and 

the six-month review hearing held on June 15, 2018. 

A petition for termination of the parent/child relationship was filed on August 16, 2018.

The petition alleged Doe abandoned and neglected J.F. Doe responded on September 25, 2018, 

when she filed an answer to the petition for termination of the parent/child relationship. Doe 

denied the allegations that she abandoned and neglected her child. A trial was held on 

November 26, 2018, and Doe failed to appear. 

The magistrate determined there was clear and convincing evidence for grounds to 

terminate the parental rights of Doe to her child. The magistrate also concluded it was in the 

child’s best interest to terminate the parental rights of Doe. In its decision, the magistrate 

concluded that Doe abandoned and neglected J.F. On December 18, 2018, the magistrate entered 

its final judgment to terminate the parental rights of Doe. Doe timely appeals. 

 1 J.F. was formerly known as J.L.
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her 

child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 

341, 343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the 

Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, 

family life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of 

due process must be met when terminating the parent/child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 

383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a 

parent/child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a 

fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a 

court may terminate a parent/child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; In 

re Doe, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 

652. 

On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the 

decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 

245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable 

inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights 

be terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test 

requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported 

by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. Doe v. 

Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally 

understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably 

certain. In re Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate’s 

decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d 

at 600.

Idaho Code § 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the 

parent/child relationship when it is in the child’s best interest and any one of the following five 
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factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between 

the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities 

for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or 

(e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each 

statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 

1117. 

III.

ANALYSIS

Doe argues the magistrate’s decision to terminate her parental rights should be reversed. 

Doe claims the magistrate lacked substantial and competent evidence to meet the clear and 

convincing standard required to find that Doe abandoned and neglected her child. The 

magistrate found two grounds for termination: (1) Doe abandoned J.F.; and (2) Doe neglected 

J.F. We will address each ground in turn.

A. The Magistrate Did Not Err When It Found Doe Abandoned Her Child

In this case, the magistrate terminated Doe’s parental rights in part on the ground of 

abandonment, I.C. § 16-2005(1)(a). Pursuant to I.C. § 16-2002(5), abandonment occurs when 

the parent has willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship including, but not 

limited to, reasonable support or regular personal contact. The word “or” is a disjunctive particle 

used to express an alternative and, thus, the willful failure to maintain a normal parental 

relationship can be based upon either the failure to pay reasonable support or the failure to have 

regular personal contact, or some other failure. Doe I v. Doe II, 148 Idaho 713, 715, 228 P.3d 

980, 982 (2010). 

When a parent fails to maintain a normal parental relationship without just cause for a 

period of one year, prima facie evidence of abandonment exists. I.C. § 16-2002(5). There is no 

universal standard for what constitutes a normal parental relationship, and whether such a 

relationship exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 

46, 50, 244 P.3d 190, 194 (2010). The petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to demonstrate 

that the parent lacks a normal parental relationship with the child and that there is no just cause 

for the failure to maintain such a relationship. Id. If the petitioner is able to meet this burden, 

the parent then has the burden of production to present evidence of just cause. Id. If the 
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magistrate finds that just cause has not been established, the petitioning party has met its burden 

of persuasion. Id.

The magistrate did not err when it found Doe abandoned her child. In December 2018, 

the magistrate found that Doe had not made contact with J.F. since J.F. was one day old and the 

Child Protective Act case was filed. Although Doe was outside of Idaho, Doe was contacted by 

the Department and informed of the resources available to facilitate her visits with J.F. The 

magistrate explained that in the twelve months since J.F.’s birth, Doe never took advantage of 

the available resources, despite the Department’s efforts to extend services that would facilitate 

visitation. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Doe travelled to Idaho to visit J.F., and the 

magistrate found Doe never inquired about J.F. to learn of his health or well-being. The 

magistrate concluded there was no bond between Doe and her child, and thus, the magistrate 

held there was clear and convincing evidence of abandonment in this case.

Doe argues she did not abandon J.F. Specifically, Doe claims J.F. was involuntarily 

removed from her care, and as such, it was not a voluntary action for Doe to leave her child in 

Idaho’s foster care system. Furthermore, Doe asserts that abandonment requires that Doe leave a

child with no reasonable support, and since J.F. was in the foster system, he was provided with 

reasonable support. Doe also argues the district court should have considered the fact that Doe 

does not have ties to Idaho or friends and family in Idaho. We are not persuaded by Doe’s 

arguments on appeal. 

First, Doe fails to explain how the involuntary removal of a child negates a finding of 

abandonment. Voluntariness is not a part of the definition of abandonment and was not part of 

the magistrate’s decision. Doe’s position suggests that abandonment requires an explicit and 

voluntary action, such that a parent could not technically “abandon” a child if the child is 

removed against the parent’s will. Idaho courts have never adopted this interpretation of 

abandonment. Furthermore, Doe did not address why she failed to contact or visit J.F., which

were two critical factors in the magistrate’s determination that Doe abandoned J.F. 

Second, whether Doe has friends or family in Idaho does not determine whether Doe 

abandoned J.F. We focus on the relationship between Doe and her child when we consider 

abandonment, and such a relationship does not depend on whether Doe has ties to the state of 

Idaho. The magistrate similarly narrowed its findings to the lack of a relationship between Doe 

and J.F., and Doe fails to explain how the magistrate erred in this regard. While Doe claims the 
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magistrate should not penalize Doe for the lack of ties to Idaho, there is no evidence the 

magistrate did so. Thus, the magistrate did not err when it found Doe abandoned her child.

B. The Magistrate Did Not Err When It Found Doe Neglected Her Child

The magistrate also terminated Doe’s parental rights due to neglect. Idaho Code § 16-

2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-1602(31). Section 16-

1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child is without proper 

parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his or her 

well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian 

or their neglect or refusal to provide them. 

The magistrate found Doe neglected J.F. The magistrate found that Doe failed to comply 

with the terms of the case plan and Doe failed to visit or contact J.F. The magistrate explained 

Doe had knowledge of the ongoing Child Protective Act case, and yet, made sporadic contact 

with the Department. Doe did nothing to address her substance abuse issues and failed to 

establish stable housing or employment so as to care for the needs of her child. For these 

reasons, the magistrate concluded the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that 

Doe neglected J.F. 

Regarding the magistrate’s finding of neglect, Doe responds with one sentence: “The 

reality of a parent’s absence and lack of ties to Idaho should not be counted against a parent and 

should be recognized when the court decides the issues of parental abandonment and neglect.” 

Doe’s statement fails to analyze the magistrate’s finding of neglect. Additionally, as previously 

stated, there is no evidence the magistrate penalized Doe for the lack of ties to Idaho. Even if 

Doe’s statement had merit, Doe fails to provide legal authority to explain how and to what extent 

the magistrate erred. A party waives an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is 

lacking. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 440 (Ct. App. 1997). Thus, 

because Doe’s brief lacks legal authority on the issue of neglect, and because the magistrate did 

not penalize Doe for the lack of ties to Idaho, we find Doe has not persuaded this Court that the 

magistrate erred when it found Doe neglected J.F.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Because substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate’s findings that Doe 

abandoned and neglected her child, we affirm the magistrate’s judgment terminating Doe’s 

parental rights.

Judge LORELLO and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.