2018 IL App (1st) 151307
 

No. 1-15-1307
 

Modified opinion filed May 3, 2018
 

FOURTH DIVISION 

IN THE
 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
 

FIRST DISTRICT
 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

ILLINOIS, ) of Cook County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 11 CR 15655 

) 

DARIONTE JONES, ) The Honorable 

) Michele McDowell Pitman, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Burke and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 After a bench trial, defendant Darionte Jones was found guilty of one count of 

predatory criminal sexual assault and sentenced to 10 years in the Illinois Department of 

Corrections (IDOC). The conviction stems from the sexual assault of a 12-year-old victim on 

August 30, 2011, when defendant was 17 years old. On appeal, defendant does not challenge 

the sufficiency of the evidence against him. 

¶ 2 Defendant claims (1) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 

dismiss the charges against him after the State allegedly failed to bring him to trial within the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

No. 1-15-1307 

period required by section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Speedy Trial 

Act) (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2012)); (2) that, as applied to defendant, the statute 

governing predatory criminal sexual assault is harsh and violates the cruel and unusual 

punishment clause of the eighth amendment, as well as the proportionate penalties clause; 

and (3) that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing defendant to 10 years, in light 

of the fact that he was 17 years old at the time of the offense, had only one prior juvenile 

adjudication for a nonviolent offense, and expressed remorse at sentencing. 

¶ 3 For the following reasons, we affirm his conviction and sentence. 

¶ 4 BACKGROUND 

¶ 5 On this appeal, defendant does not raise any claims concerning any of the evidence 

introduced at trial, or the sufficiency of the evidence, or any arguments made by the State 

concerning the evidence. Thus, we provide below only the facts needed to understand the 

claims before us. 

¶ 6 At trial, the State’s evidence showed that defendant, who was a school friend of the 

victim’s sister, knocked on the door of the victim’s home and the victim let him in. The 12­

year-old victim returned to her bedroom to continue watching “Sponge Bob” on television 

when defendant entered, sat down next to her on the bed, and began kissing her. After the 

victim told him to stop, he pushed her back on the bed, laid on top of her, and pulled down 

her pants and underwear. His penis then made contact with her vagina.1 When the victim 

heard the door open, she observed defendant run into the closet holding his clothes. When the 

victim’s sister walked into the bedroom, the sister observed the victim on the bed without 

1

As we note later when we describe the trial court’s factual findings, the trial court found that 

defendant’s penis made contact with the victim’s vagina but that the State had failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that it intruded into the vagina. 

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No. 1-15-1307 

pants or underwear and found defendant in the closet wearing a shirt but no pants. The sister 

told him to leave and he did. The sister then told their mother what happened, and the next 

day the mother and sister told the victim’s father who took the victim and her sister to the 

police station. Three days after the attack, a nurse examined the victim and observed, during 

the genital exam, redness, irritation, and a microabrasion, which was consistent with sexual 

assault. A sexual assault kit was performed and was negative for the presence of semen. 

¶ 7 As noted, the trial court found defendant guilty of one count of predatory criminal 

sexual assault of a child. Prior to announcing the verdict, the trial court made specific 

findings of fact, including that “the State has not presented enough evidence for proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt” (1) that “the defendant committed an intrusion of his penis into 

the vagina” of the victim, (2) that “there was any force” or threat of force “in this matter,” or 

(3) that “there was unlawful restraint.” The trial court did find that “the State has proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt that there was contact between the defendant’s penis and [the 

victim’s] vagina,” and “that the defendant knew that the victim *** was under 13 years of 

age.” As a result, the court found “there will be a finding of guilty with regards to *** 

contact between the penis and the vagina of [the victim] with her being under 13 years of 

age” 

¶ 8 Defendant filed a posttrial motion for a new trial that raised claims concerning the 

sufficiency of the evidence and the admissibility of certain pieces of evidence. However, the 

posttrial motion did not assert any of the issues raised on appeal. 

¶ 9	 At the sentencing on April 9, 2015, the trial court denied defendant’s posttrial motion 

and then heard factors in aggravation and mitigation. In mitigation, defense counsel 

observed, among other things, that defendant was then presently 20 years old and the father 

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of a 5-year-old and a 4-year-old. The factors in mitigation included the following statement 

by defendant. On appeal, defendant argues that this statement shows remorse, so we provide 

it here in full: 

“DEFENDANT: I’m here today because, you know I made some wrong actions 

down the line and I do take full responsibility of everything that has happened. I just 

ask that you have lenience because I do have two children. 

I made a mistake that should never have been made. I am sorry for what I did. 

Sorry for what other people have been through. That’s it.” 

¶ 10 After listening to defendant’s statement, the trial court sentenced him to 10 years with 

IDOC. Since defendant claims on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by 

sentencing him to 10 years instead of the six-year minimum, we provide here the trial court’s 

full statement explaining its reasons for selecting a 10-year sentence: 

“THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. 

Well, this Court having entered a judgment on the finding of guilt with regards to 

Count 1, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, that being a Class X felony 

which carries a mandatory penitentiary sentence of between 6 to 60 years of 

incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections, I have considered the facts of 

this case, all of the matters in aggravation and mitigation. 

The Court has also thoroughly read the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report noting 

that the defendant’s first contact with the law was at 13 years of age for a felony 

offense of burglary in juvenile court. That was dismissed, but that’s the defendant’s 

first contact with the law. 

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No. 1-15-1307 

Second contact was a residential burglary where [the trial court] found the 

defendant guilty—there was a finding of delinquency for a residential burglary, which 

is a Class 1 felony. He received five years juvenile probation, 150 hours of 

community service. He received some TASC as well. 

And a violation of probation was filed in June of 2008 and a sex evaluation was 

ordered. And that is State’s Exhibit No. 1, which was prepared for [the trial court] 

apparently July 28th of 2008. 

The defendant apparently did not comply further with probation and his juvenile 

court judge sent him to the Illinois Department of Corrections as a juvenile. He was 

sentenced to IYC, which is the Juvenile Illinois Department of Corrections.2 That was 

in October of 2009. 

The State comments about numerous or lengthy criminal histories. These cases 

have all been dismissed, so the only one the Court is acknowledging basically is the 

residential burglary where the defendant was found delinquent and sent to the Illinois 

Youth Department of Corrections. 

This case in which this Court found the defendant guilty of predatory criminal 

sexual assault happened in 2011. He was sent to IYC October 15th of ‘09. So a little 

less than two years after he was sentenced as a juvenile to the Department of 

Corrections, he commits this Class X felony upon a very unsuspecting 12 year old 

girl who he knew from the neighborhood, he knew her sister, and he committed an act 

of sexual contact with her. 

2

The presentence investigation report states that, when defendant was “16, he was sent to the 

Illinois Youth Center in St. Charles.” However, the report does not indicate the length of time he spent 

there. 

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The Court has read the PreSentence Investigation Report. The defendant does not 

have any adult criminal history. He has completed only two years of high school. The 

defendant has no job history. He has two children. 

The Court finds based upon the aggravation, the mitigation that this Court has 

heard, the findings that the Court made, the Court finds that the following sentence is 

appropriate in this matter. This is a Class X felony as indicated where a sentencing 

range is between 6 to 60 years. 

The Court finds that the sentence that is appropriate for this matter is a period of 

incarceration of 10 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. 

Based upon this sentencing range, based upon this Class X felony and the facts of 

this case, the Court does not find that 6 years is an appropriate sentence in this matter. 

The Court does not find that the maximum sentence is appropriate either. Ten years, 

which must be served at 85 percent, is an appropriate sentence for this offense of 

predatory criminal sexual assault.” 

We observe that 10 years, if served at 85%, is 81⁄2 years. The trial court then found that 

“[c]redit for 1,316 days will be given to the defendant.” This credit, if served at 85%, is over 

four years. The sentencing on April 9, 2015, was almost three years ago.3 

¶ 11 Defendant then filed a motion to reconsider his sentence that claimed, among other 

things, that his sentence was “excessive in view of the Defendant’s background and the 

nature of his participation in the offense.” Before the trial court, defense counsel explained 

that she was challenging only the portion of the sentence that exceeded the minimum of six 

3

An inmate search on IDOC’s website showed that defendant was still incarcerated with IDOC as 

of February 14, 2018. See Offender Search, Illinois Department of Corrections, 

https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/offender/pages/inmatesearch.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 

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No. 1-15-1307 

years. Thus, defendant did not raise before the trial court an issue that he raises on appeal, 

namely, that his conviction should be reduced to a Class A misdemeanor and that he should 

be sentenced to less than a year. 

¶ 12 With respect to the motion to reconsider sentence, the following colloquy occurred: 

“THE COURT: Do you have a motion to file, counsel? 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor. To avoid— 

THE COURT: A motion to reconsider? 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes. To avoid returning in 30 days, I’m asking the Court 

to reconsider the sentence. The same arguments that I presented in my mitigation 

regarding the excessive nature of anything greater than 6 years. 

THE COURT: State, your response? 

ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY [(ASA)]: Your Honor, the sentence is 

appropriate given the facts. 

THE COURT: I’m sorry. 

ASA: The sentence is appropriate given the facts. 

THE COURT: All right. The defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence is denied. 

The sentencing range is 6 to 60 years. The Court does not find that the 10-year 

sentence is excessive, therefore, counsel your motion is going to be denied. 

[Defendant], any questions about your sentence, sir? 

DEFENDANT: No.” 

Defendant then filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed. 

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¶ 13 ANALYSIS 

¶ 14 On appeal, defendant claims (1) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

move to dismiss the charges against him after the State allegedly failed to bring him to trial 

within the period required by the Speedy Trial Act (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2012)); (2) 

that, as applied to defendant, the statute governing predatory criminal sexual assault is harsh 

and violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment, as well as the 

proportionate penalties clause; and (3) that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing 

defendant to 10 years, in light of the fact that he was 17 years old at the time of the offense, 

had only one prior juvenile adjudication for a nonviolent offense, and expressed remorse at 

sentencing. 

¶ 15 For the following reasons, we affirm his conviction and sentence. 

¶ 16 I. Speedy Trial Act 

¶ 17 Defendant’s first claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 

dismiss the charges against him after the State allegedly failed to bring him to trial within the 

120-day period required by the Speedy Trial Act (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2012)).4 

¶ 18 To determine whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, we 

apply the well-known test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People 

v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526 (1984) (adopting the Strickland test). Under Strickland, a 

defendant must show both that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) his 

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him. People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 385 

(2006). 

4

A defendant has both a constitutional and a statutory right to a speedy trial; they are not 

coextensive. People v. Staake, 2017 IL 121755, ¶ 32; People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 385-86 (2006). 

However, in the case at bar, defendant argues only a statutory violation. 

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No. 1-15-1307 

¶ 19 However, “[t]he failure of counsel to argue a speedy-trial violation cannot satisfy 

either prong of Strickland where there is no lawful basis for arguing a speedy-trial violation.” 

Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 385; see also People v. Staake, 2017 IL 121755, ¶ 47 (“Counsel’s 

failure to assert a speedy-trial violation cannot establish either prong *** if no speedy-trial 

violation occurred.”); People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 65 (2010) (“Counsel’s failure to assert 

a speedy-trial violation cannot establish either prong *** if there is no lawful basis for raising 

a speedy-trial objection.”). 

¶ 20 Thus, we must determine, first, “whether defendant’s speedy-trial rights were violated 

before we can determine whether counsel was ineffective.” (Emphasis added.) Cordell, 223 

Ill. 2d at 385; see also Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d at 65 (“we must first determine whether 

defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated”). 

¶ 21 In the case at bar, since defendant raises the alleged speedy-trial violation for the first 

time on appeal, there are no factual findings made by the trial court for this court to review. 

In addition, the question of what the Speedy Trial Act requires is a legal question, which this 

court reviews de novo. People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 335 (2009) (whether the 

defendant’s statutory speedy-trial rights “were contravened is a pure question of law, which 

this court reviews de novo”); Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 389 (“The construction of a statute is a 

question of law reviewed de novo.”). De novo consideration means that we perform the same 

analysis that the trial court would perform. People v. Melecio, 2017 IL App (1st) 141434, 

¶ 42. 

¶ 22 The primary goal of a court in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to 

the intent of the legislature. East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. 

Louis School District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 411 (1997); 

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No. 1-15-1307 

Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96 (1990) (the “fundamental” rule 

is “to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature”). A court will first ascertain the 

intent of the legislators from the plain language of the statute itself. East St. Louis, 178 Ill. 2d 

at 411-12. We also consider “the entire Act, its nature, its object and the consequences” of 

“construing it one way or the other.” Fumarolo, 142 Ill. 2d at 96. 

¶ 23 Section 103-5 provides in relevant part: 

“Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court 

having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he [or she] was taken into custody 

unless delay is occasioned by the defendant ***. Delay shall be considered to be 

agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written 

demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) 

(West 2012). 

¶ 24 The last line quoted above, requiring a defendant to make a written or oral demand 

for trial, was added in 1999. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 386. Thus, any cases decided before 1999, 

any cases decided based on the 1999 statute, or any cases that relied primarily on pre-1999 

cases are simply not relevant to a present determination about whether a delay was agreed to 

by a defendant. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 392 (finding that a 2000 appellate court opinion was 

not relevant because it “never addressed the amended statute”). 

¶ 25 As a result of the 1999 amendment, we must consider any delay to be agreed to by a 

defendant “unless he or she object[ed] to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an 

oral demand for trial on the record.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2012). Interpreting the 1999 

amendment, our supreme court has held that it requires a defendant to make a demand for 

trial after the delay is proposed. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 391. A prior demand by defendant for 

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No. 1-15-1307 

trial is not enough to qualify as an objection. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 391. Our supreme court 

explained why: 

“As amended, section 103-5(a) places the onus on a defendant to take affirmative 

action when he becomes aware that his trial is being delayed. To allow basic requests 

for trial, made before any delay was even proposed, to qualify as objections to 

‘delays’ not yet proposed would provide defendants with another sword to use after 

the fact to overturn their convictions. This does not comport with the intent of section 

103-5(a).” Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 391-92. 

Thus, to qualify as an objection, there must be, first, a proposed delay and then a written or 

oral demand for trial by the defense. 

¶ 26 Defendant concedes that most of the time between his arrest and his trial was 

excluded from the speedy-trial clock. However, he claims that, even with most of the time 

excluded, there were still 152 days that counted and that this 152 days is far more than the 

120 days that the statute permits. 

¶ 27 In response, the State argues that there was a 36-day period, counted by defendant, 

that should be excluded because defendant acquiesced. Thus, it is only this 36-day period— 

between August 14, 2013, and September 19, 2013—that is disputed by the parties on appeal. 

¶ 28 While the amendment “does not mandate any ‘magic words’ constituting a demand 

for trial,” it does require “some affirmative statement in the record requesting a speedy trial.” 

(Emphasis omitted.) Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d at 66. “[T]he provisions of section 103-5 are to be 

liberally construed in favor of the defendant, and *** the State cannot improperly manipulate 

criminal proceedings or purposefully evade the operation of the section’s provisions.” Van 

Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d at 335. 

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No. 1-15-1307 

¶ 29 The 36-day period under dispute began to run on August 14, 2013. On July 10, 2013, 

the prior court date, a pretrial hearing was continued by agreement to August 14, 2013. The 

hearing concerned a motion filed by the State to allow certain hearsay testimony. 

¶ 30 On August 14, 2013, the State informed the court that its witnesses were still 

unavailable, and the court stated that “[t]he record is going to reflect the State’s not ready.” 

The trial court then asked defense counsel what her position was, and defense counsel 

responded, “Well, [the prosecutor] did advise me this morning as to the unavailability of the 

witnesses, so ...” The court then stated, “The matter is going to continue, motion State.” 

¶ 31 On appeal, defendant argues that the court’s ruling that the State was not ready and 

that the hearing was continued on the State’s motion show that this time was attributable to 

the State, not defendant. However, the transcript shows that the parties continued to discuss 

rescheduling the hearing for over a page and not once during this extended discussion did 

defense counsel assert a demand for trial as the amended statute explicitly requires. 

¶ 32 While no “ ‘magic words’ ” are required, “some affirmative statement” is required to 

assert a trial demand under the amended statute, and defense counsel failed to utter any 

words resembling a trial demand before the court ruled or during the subsequent discussion 

about rescheduling. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d at 66; see also 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2012) 

(requiring “a written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record”). Thus, this 

36-day period was excluded from the speedy-trial clock, and no speedy-trial violation 

occurred. 

¶ 33 In addition, defense counsel's statements after the trial court's ruling could be 

interpreted as agreeing. While we do not rest our opinion on this point, we cite it only as 

some additional support for our finding: 

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No. 1-15-1307 

"THE COURT: The matter is going to continue, motion State.
 

ASA: That's fine, Judge.
 

THE COURT: It's going to be final for [the hearing]. 

ASA: All right.
 

THE COURT: It will be the fourth hearing date.
 

ASA: We were looking at Thursday, September 5th as a possible date.
 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, just for the record with regard to that day, that's
 

my trial, that's here, the attempt— 

THE COURT: No, I have three matters set. *** I have attempt murder, home 

invasion, and murder all set[] for that day for hearing. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: The other day we talked [about] was the 19th. 

THE COURT: I'll be on a jury that week, but just in case? 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: It's a murder. 

THE COURT: Yes. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: It starts on Monday? 

THE COURT: Yes, [name of another defendant]. Aren't you on that? 

ASA: No. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yeah, the 19th? 

THE COURT: You're backup, so I'll know Monday. I'm due to pick that day. 

ASA: I understand. 

THE COURT: So that's not the best week. That has two private counsels *** and 

I'm definitely due to pick that Monday. 

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No. 1-15-1307 

ASA: I wa[s] aware of that, Judge. I'm just seeking to do it as a backup if for 

some reason it's not ready. 

THE COURT: As a backup. Counsel, do you wish that? 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes. 

THE COURT: Motion State, Thursday 9/19/2013, 11:00, setting the matter down 

for hearing on the *** motion marked final. If I'm not on jury trial—by Monday you 

will know, and you can call off your witnesses. If I'm not on Monday, then it will 

proceed on Thursday. 

ASA: All right. Thank you. 

THE COURT: So you have to be a backup if you wish that day. I do have a 

murder jury that week. 

All right. September 19th, [defendant], 11:00 is your next date." 

The reason that we do not rest our opinion on this point is that we do not want to mislead 

either trial courts or counsel on what is required. What is now required is an affirmative 

demand for trial. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2012) (requiring “a written demand for trial or 

an oral demand for trial on the record”). The whole point of the amended statute is to 

remove any need for courts to scour the record to determine whether defense counsel 

implicitly or arguably did or did not agree. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 391-92. Only an 

affirmative demand for trial, in writing or on the record, will do. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 

2012). However, the above quote does show that defense counsel stated no words 

resembling a trial demand during the ensuing discussion about scheduling and dates. 

¶ 34 Without a speedy-trial violation, there can be no ineffective assistance claim on this 

basis. As noted above, “[t]he failure of counsel to argue a speedy-trial violation cannot 

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satisfy either prong of Strickland where there is no lawful basis for arguing a speedy-trial 

violation.” Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 385. As a result, we do not find this claim persuasive. 

¶ 35 Defendant does not claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a trial 

demand on August 14, 2013, nor could he on the record before us. The speedy-trial clock 

was not about to run out on August 14, 2013, and the record provides no clue as to whether 

counsel had her own strategic reasons for not objecting to the delay. Defendant claims on 

appeal only that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss his case once the 

speedy-trial clock had already run. However, as we already explained above, this claim does 

not satisfy the statute. 

¶ 36 While this appeal was pending, defendant filed a motion to cite People v. Dalton, 

2017 IL App (3d) 150213, as additional authority, which this court granted. However, Dalton 

presents a different factual situation and a different issue than the case at bar. In Dalton, the 

State charged defendant on December 30, 2003, with aggravated criminal sexual abuse. 

Dalton, 2017 IL App (3d) 150213, ¶ 3. On May 17, 2004, which was more than 120 days 

after the original charges were filed, the State filed an amended information adding a count 

that was based on the same physical act, but that charged the greater offense of criminal 

sexual assault. Dalton, 2017 IL App (3d) 150213, ¶ 4. 

¶ 37 In Dalton, the appellate court found that the trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

move to dismiss the additional charge. The Dalton court explained that, once a defendant is 

charged, he “must be tried within 120 days not only for” the charged offense “but also for 

any other offenses that could be charged based on the same underlying act.” Dalton, 2017 IL 

App (3d) 150213, ¶ 21. “Because both counts were based on the same physical act,” the 

defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated at the very moment that “the State filed the 

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additional charge, more than 120 days after filing the original charges.” Dalton, 2017 IL App 

(3d) 150213, ¶ 23. The Dalton court found that there was “no strategic reason for trial 

counsel to fail to move to dismiss a charge” that was already in violation of the “defendant’s 

right to a speedy trial.” Dalton, 2017 IL App (3d) 150213, ¶ 28. 

¶ 38 In the case at bar, the speedy-trial clock had not expired on August 14, 2013, when 

the disputed 36-day period began or at any other time prior to trial. Thus, Dalton does not 

apply here. 

¶ 39 For all the foregoing reasons, we do not find defendant’s speedy-trial claim 

persuasive. 

¶ 40 II. Eighth Amendment and Proportionate Penalties Clause 

¶ 41 Defendant claims that (1) the registration and notification laws applicable to sex 

offenders and (2) the statutory scheme that resulted in his 10-year sentence violate the federal 

constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII), 

as well as the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 

§ 11). Defendant does not claim that these laws are facially invalid but only that they are 

invalid as applied to him. 

¶ 42 Defendant asks this court to reduce his offense from predatory criminal sexual assault 

of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a) (West 2010)) to the Class A misdemeanor of criminal 

sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.50(b), (d) (West 2010)). Predatory criminal sexual assault of 

a child has a sentencing range of 6 to 60 years (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(b)(1) (West 2010)), 

while the misdemeanor offense carries only a sentence of less than one year (720 ILCS 5/11­

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1.50(d) (West 2010)). Defendant argues that, since he has already served more than the 

maximum possible sentence for a Class A misdemeanor, no resentencing is necessary.5 

¶ 43 For the following reasons, we do not find defendant’s claim persuasive. 

¶ 44 A. As-Applied Challenge 

¶ 45 Defendant raises only an as-applied challenge. “An as-applied challenge requires a 

showing that the statute violates the constitution as it applies to the facts and circumstances 

of the challenging party.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36. “In contrast, a facial 

challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts, i.e., 

the specific facts related to the challenging party are irrelevant.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, 

¶ 36. “By definition, an as-applied constitutional challenge is dependent on the particular 

circumstances and facts of the individual defendant or petitioner. Therefore, it is paramount 

that the record be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for 

purposes of appellate review.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37. Usually, “the trial court is 

the most appropriate tribunal for the type of factual development necessary” for an as-applied 

challenge. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 38. 

¶ 46 Although defendant raises this as-applied challenge for the first time on appeal, he 

argues that he may raise an as-applied challenge to a statute at any time. In support, he cites 

the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 123 (2006). 

However, the Illinois Supreme Court in Thompson distinguished this same case when a 

defendant tried making the same argument based on it. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 40. In 

5

Defendant also asks this court to reduce his conviction pursuant to this court’s authority under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3), which permits a reviewing court to “reduce the degree of the 

offense of which the appellant was convicted.” We discuss this claim in the next section. 

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Thompson, our supreme court observed that the McCarty decision did not “even involve[ ] an 

as-applied constitutional challenge.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 40. 

¶ 47 However, the State does not claim on appeal that defendant forfeited his claim by 

failing to raise it in the court below. The State may forfeit a claim of forfeiture by failing to 

raise it. E.g., People v. Bridgeforth, 2017 IL App (1st) 143637, ¶ 46 (“The rules of waiver 

also apply to the State, and where, as here, the State fails to argue that defendant has forfeited 

the issue, it has waived the forfeiture.”). Thus, we will consider defendant’s claim. 

¶ 48 Since the trial court never addressed this claim, there is no ruling by the trial court for 

us to review, and our review is by its very nature de novo. De novo review means that we 

will perform the same analysis that a trial court would perform. Xcel Supply LLC v. 

Horowitz, 2018 IL App (1st) 162986, ¶ 38. “A statute is presumed constitutional, and the 

party challenging the statute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity.” People v. 

Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000). A court has “a duty to construe a statute in a manner 

that upholds its validity and constitutionality if it can be reasonably done.” Malchow, 193 Ill. 

2d at 418. 

¶ 49 B. Registration and Notification Laws 

¶ 50 Defendant claims first that the registration and notification laws applicable to sex 

offenders violate both the federal constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII), and the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties 

clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), as applied to him. However, as the State argues, these 

laws do not constitute punishment for constitutional purposes. “Only governmental action 

that inflicts ‘punishment’ may be restricted by the eighth amendment and the proportionate 

penalties clause.” People v. Avila-Briones, 2015 IL App (1st) 132221, ¶ 46; People v. 

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Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 70 (“the eighth amendment” and “the proportionate 

penalties clause” do “not apply unless a penalty has been imposed”). 

¶ 51 Defendant challenges, as applied to him, the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act 

(Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2010), which requires him to register as a 

sex offender with local law enforcement officials, and the Illinios Sex Offender Community 

Notification Law (Notification Law) (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2010)), which requires 

state police to maintain a sex offender database for the purpose of identifying sex offenders 

and making information about them available to persons specified in the statute and to the 

public. See generally People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 181-83 (2004) (describing the two 

statutes); Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 416-18 (describing the two statutes). 

¶ 52 However, our supreme court has found that neither of these statutes are punitive in 

nature. With respect to the Registration Act, our supreme court has stated “it is worth 

repeating that sex offender registration is not punishment.” People v. Cardona, 2013 IL 

114076, ¶ 24; People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 203 (2009) (“This court has 

repeatedly held, though, that the [Registration] Act’s requirements do not constitute 

punishment.”); Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 419 (“requiring sex offenders to register is not 

punishment”). “Rather, it is a regulatory scheme designed to foster public safety.” Cardona, 

2013 IL 114076, ¶ 24; Birkett, 233 Ill. 2d at 203 (“Rather, the [Registration] Act is a 

regulatory statute intended to foster public safety.”). “The category ‘sex offender’ is entirely 

a creature of statute, and there are several ways a person can acquire that label, only one of 

which is criminal conviction of a triggering offense.” Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 25. 

Similarly, with respect to the Notification Law, our supreme court has found that it did not 

constitute punishment. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 424 (“the Notification Law does not constitute 

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punishment”); see also Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 205 (“the primary purpose of the Registration 

Act and Notification Law is to assist law enforcement and to protect the public”). 

¶ 53 For example, in Malchow, the defendant contended “that the Registration Act and the 

Notification Law disadvantage him because they increase the punishment for previously 

committed offenses.” Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 419. Our supreme court observed that 

“[r]esolution of this contention turns on the question of whether the provisions of the 

Registration Act and the Notification Law constitute punishment.” Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 

419. The supreme court observed that neither the Registration Act nor the Notification Law 

constituted punishment for purposes of the ex post facto clause. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 419, 

424 (“the requirements of the Notification Law are nonpunitive”); see also Cornelius, 213 Ill. 

2d at 209 (the Notification Law did not violate “the ex post facto provisions of the United 

States or Illinois constitutions”). The court went on to conclude that the Registration Act and 

the Notification Law also did not violate the eighth amendment’s prohibition against cruel 

and unusual punishment because they simply were not punishment. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 

424. 

¶ 54 Thus, our supreme court has repeatedly rejected the type of claim that defendant 

makes here, and so must we. In re A.C., 2016 IL App (1st) 153047, ¶¶ 77, 79 (since our 

supreme court found “no punitive intent” behind the Registration Act and the Notification 

Law, we must “also reject [the minor] respondent’s contentions that he was subjected to cruel 

and unusual and grossly disproportionate punishment”). 

¶ 55 We observe that the Third District reached a different finding than we do today. In 

People v. Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 150243, ¶ 3, in a 2-to-1 decision, the Third District found 

that the Registration Act and Notification Law constituted punishment and that the 

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punishment was grossly disproportionate as applied to the defendant in that case. However, 

the State filed a petition for rehearing in Tetter on February 21, 2018, and that petition is still 

pending. As a result, the Third District's decision is not yet final. 

¶ 56 The Tetter opinion was based, in part, on an earlier opinion by a different panel of the 

Third District which held that the statute banning sex offenders from public parks (720 ILCS 

5/11-9.4-1 (West 2012) was facially unconstitutional. People v. Pepitone, 2017 IL App (3d) 

140627, ¶¶ 1, 3. Our supreme court granted a petition for leave to appeal in Pepitone almost 

a year ago, so guidance from our highest court should be forthcoming. 

¶ 57 Although the Third District opinion in Tetter is not yet final and we hesitate to 

discuss it for that reason, we address it here for completeness' sake only. 

¶ 58 In Tetter, the Third District observed that both the Illinois Supreme Court and the 

United States Supreme Court have found that sex offender registration and notification laws 

do not constitute punishment. Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 150243, ¶¶ 43-44. However, the 

Third District observed that our legislature subsequently passed numerous amendments 

imposing additional restrictions upon sex offenders, including restrictions on where a sex 

offender may be present, live, work or move about his community. Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 

150243, ¶ 45. Thus, the Third District found that it was faced with a "very different and 

more restrictive" set of statutes than those considered by either our supreme court or the 

United States Supreme Court previously. Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 150243, ¶ 45. 

¶ 59 The Third District concluded that, since these statutes now "stripped" offenders of 

"freedom of movement," they were now more "akin to probation or supervised release," 

which is considered punishment. Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 150243, ¶ 48. "Specifically, 'safe 

zones' surrounding schools, school bus stops, and public parks, significantly restrict 

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defendant's lawful movement within the community. These zones restrict where he may live, 

drive, work, or attend any social function for life. Although not to the same degree as prison, 

the sex offender statutes' restrictions affirmatively disable and restrain offenders such as 

defendant." Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 150243, ¶ 52. The Third District thus concluded that 

our sex offender statutes now "satisfy the traditional definition of punishment." Tetter, 2018 

IL App (3d) 150243, ¶ 56. "The traditional aims of punishment are incapacitation, retribution 

and deterrence." Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 150243, ¶ 58. The Third District found that the 

new amendments satisfy these traditional aims, since the legislature implemented them in 

order to incapacitate convicted sex offenders, as well as to deter future crimes. Tetter, 2018 

IL App (3d) 150243, ¶¶ 58-59. In conclusion, the Third District found that, given this 

defendant's "virtually zero risk of recidivism," "his lifetime subjection to the sex offender 

statutes is grossly disproportionate." Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 150243, ¶ 80. It then 

"vacate[d] defendant's subjection to the sex offender statutes' registration requirements and 

restrictions." Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 150243, ¶ 80. 

¶ 60 As far as this court is aware, the Tetter defendant is the only convicted sex offender in 

the state of Illinois who has been freed from any and all restrictions under either the 

Registration Act or Notification Law by an appellate court. Even if the Third District was 

convinced that our legislature's recent amendments were unconstitutional, the Third District 

did not explain why it chose not to apply the portions of the statutes that our supreme court 

has already found to be constitutional. If the Third District was convinced that some of the 

recent amendments were unconstitutional as applied to certain defendants, that finding would 

leave trial courts with a task, akin to picking through land mines, to decide which restrictions 

were unconstitutional as applied to which defendants. For example, is a restriction 

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concerning proximity to a school or park unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who lives 

in a rural area, miles away from any school or park? Does the Tetter opinion require an 

appellate court to make its own recidivism risk assessment of each individual defendant, as 

the Third District did in the case before it? 

¶ 61 Whether we agree or disagree with the reasoning in Tetter, we must follow our 

supreme court's precedent until and unless our supreme court dictates otherwise. Thus, we 

affirm for the reasons already stated and await further direction from our highest court. 

¶ 62 C. Not Cruel and Unusual 

¶ 63 Next, defendant claims that the statutory scheme that resulted in his 10-year sentence 

violates the federal constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. 

Const., amend. VIII) and the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 

1970, art. I, § 11) as applied to him. 

¶ 64 Specifically, defendant argues that if this offense had occurred two months earlier, 

when defendant was 16 years old, or two months later, when the victim turned 13, it would 

have been charged as criminal sexual abuse, a Class A misdemeanor with a sentence of less 

than a year rather than the Class X offense of predatory criminal sexual assault, which 

resulted in his 10-year sentence. 

¶ 65 In support of his claim that his 10-year sentence violates the cruel and unusual 

punishment clause and the proportionate penalties clause, defendant cites the Illinois 

Supreme Court case of People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 336-41 (2002) and the appellate 

court case of Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶¶ 69-78. For the following reasons, we 

find these cases distinguishable. 

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¶ 66 In Miller, a 15-year-old was charged with two counts of murder based solely upon 

accountability and transferred to the criminal division to be tried as an adult. Miller, 202 Ill. 

2d at 330. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 330. At 

sentencing, the trial court refused to impose the statutorily mandated sentence of natural life 

in prison on the ground that application of the mandatory sentence to this minor defendant 

would offend the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, 

art. I, § 11) and the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. 

VIII). Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 330, 337. On appeal, our supreme court affirmed the trial court, 

finding the statute unconstitutional as applied to this particular defendant. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 

at 341. Our supreme court observed that, although this 15-year-old acted only as a lookout 

and never handled a gun, he was being sentenced as though he was the adult shooter and, 

thus, sentenced to life with no possibility of parole. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 340-41. The court 

found that “this case presents the least culpable offender imaginable, a 15-year-old who had 

‘about a minute from the time this plan began until the act was completed by other 

persons.’ ” Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341. 

¶ 67 In Gipson, the defendant, like the defendant in Miller, was tried and sentenced as an 

adult for offenses he committed when he was 15 years old. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 

122451, ¶¶ 1, 4. After a bench trial, the Gipson defendant was found guilty of multiple 

firearm offenses including attempted first degree murder and sentenced to 52 years in prison, 

which because of multiple mandatory firearm enhancements, was the minimum available 

sentence. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶¶ 1, 76. On appeal, this court found that 

defendant’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause because it “shocks the moral 

sense of the community.” Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 73. In reaching this 

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conclusion, we stated that “we cannot ignore evidence regarding defendant’s mental state.” 

Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 74. We found “it meaningful that defendant had been 

declared unfit to stand trial before this offense occurred.” Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, 

¶ 74. We concluded that “our system failed defendant” and that “defendant’s mental health 

issues were not appropriately addressed.” Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 74. Although 

“the trial court considered defendant’s youth and mental disorders,” the “sentencing scheme 

*** did not permit the court to give those factors appropriate weight.” Gipson, 2015 IL App 

(1st) 122451, ¶ 75. We found that “the trial court’s discretion was frustrated” by the 

mandatory firearm enhancements. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 76. These 

enhancements resulted in a minimum of 52 years for a 15-year-old whose “mental health was 

questionable at best.” Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶¶ 74-75. We remanded for 

resentencing, directing the trial court “to impose, on both attempted murder counts, any 

appropriate Class X sentence ***, without regard to the mandatory enhancement.” Gipson, 

2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 78. 

¶ 68 Both Miller and Gipson are distinguishable from the case at bar. First, both cases 

involved 15-year-olds, whereas defendant was 17 years old at the time of the offense. 

Second, both cases involved natural life or approaching natural life sentences, whereas the 

sentence in the case at bar was 10 years served at 85%. Third, both Miller and Gipson 

involved either mandatory life sentences or mandatory multiple firearm enhancements, which 

frustrated the judiciary’s ability to exercise discretion, whereas in this case the trial court had 

the ability to and did, in fact, exercise discretion to select a sentence at the low end of a 

sentencing range. Fourth, unlike Gipson, there was no evidence in this case that defendant 

suffered from a mental health disability. Fifth, in Gipson, we determined that a Class X 

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sentence was appropriate, even though the Gipson defendant’s mental health was 

questionable at the time of the offense. Similarly, in the case at bar, defendant was sentenced 

to a Class X sentence, and received the very low end of the applicable range. 

¶ 69 As a result, we are not persuaded that defendant’s 10-year sentence for the predatory 

criminal sexual assault of a 12-year-old is cruel, unusual, or disproportionate. 

¶ 70 III. Abuse of Discretion 

¶ 71 Lastly, defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to 

10 years instead of to the 6-year minimum, primarily because he was only two months past 

his seventeenth birthday and the victim was only two months short of her thirteenth birthday. 

¶ 72 “A reviewing court gives substantial deference to the trial court’s sentencing decision 

because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, is in a much 

better position to consider factors such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, moral 

character, mentality, environment, habits, and age.” People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36; 

People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13 (2010). Thus, a sentence within the appropriate 

sentencing range is usually accorded great deference. People v. Anaya, 2017 IL App (1st) 

150074, ¶ 102. Although Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) grants a reviewing court the 

power to reduce a sentence or the degree of an offense, our supreme court has cautioned that 

this power should be used cautiously and sparingly. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212. As a result, 

an appellate court “may not alter a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion.” 

Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212; see also Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36 (“a reviewing court may 

not modify a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion”). Our supreme court has 

found that, with respect to a sentence, an abuse of discretion occurs when the sentence is 

greatly at variance with the spirit or purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the 

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nature of the offense. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36; Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212. A 

reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it 

would have weighed various sentencing factors differently. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213. 

¶ 73 When the legislature draws lines with respect to age, there will always be people who 

are close to the line. Defendant asks us to consider a two-month difference, which is not two 

days or even two weeks. Since there will always be a defendant close to the legislative line, 

the statute at issue provided the judiciary with the ability to exercise discretion in fashioning 

an appropriate sentence within a particular range. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(b)(1) (West 2010). 

The offense provided for “a term of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and not more than 

60 years” (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(b)(1) (West 2010)), thereby providing the court with a 54­

year range within which to sentence. In the case at bar, the trial court sentenced defendant to 

10 years, which was at the very low end of this range. With respect to defendant and victim’s 

relative maturities, the trial court found that defendant “commit[ted] this Class X felony upon 

a very unsuspecting 12 year old girl.” By contrast, defendant had already fathered two 

children by the time of the offense. 

¶ 74 The arguments that defendant makes on appeal about having an immature 17-year-old 

brain would apply equally to any 17-year-old, and the statute at issue specifically applies to 

17-year-olds. The statue states, in relevant part, that “[a] person commits predatory criminal 

sexual assault of a child if that person *** is 17 years of age or older.” 720 ILCS 5/11­

1.40(a) (West 2010). Thus, the legislature made a policy decision to apply this statute to 17­

year-olds, and defendant does not argue that this decision is facially invalid. 

¶ 75 After defendant’s sentencing in 2015, our state legislature passed a law requiring a 

sentencing court to consider additional factors in mitigation “when a person commits an 

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offense and the person is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.” 

730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2016). Although this statute did not apply on April 9, 2015, 

when defendant was sentenced, it still sheds light on appropriate factors to consider when 

fashioning a sentence for a young offender. These factors are: 

“(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense, 

including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence 

of cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any; 

(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure, 

familial pressure, or negative influences; 

(3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social background, 

including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma; 

(4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both; 

(5) the circumstances of the offense; 

(6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including 

the level of planning by the defendant before the offense; 

(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense; 

(8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and 

(9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an 

expression of remorse, if appropriate.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2016). 

¶ 76	 With respect to the above factors, we already discussed defendant’s age. Second, 

there was no evidence in the record that defendant was subjected to outside pressure in 

committing this offense. Third, the presentence report states that defendant stated that he had 

some conflict with his mother as an adolescent but that he was never abused or neglected. 

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Fourth, the trial court implicitly discussed defendant’s potential for rehabilitation while 

discussing his prior juvenile history. The trial court noted during sentencing that “there was a 

finding of delinquency for a residential burglary, which is a Class 1 felony.” Then in June 

2008, there was a violation of probation filed. The trial court observed that “[t]he defendant 

apparently did not comply further with probation and his juvenile court judge sent him” to 

IDOC as a juvenile in October 2009. The trial court commented, “So a little less than two 

years after he was sentenced as a juvenile to the Department of Corrections, he commits this 

Class X felony.” As far as the circumstances of the offense, the trial court observed that 

defendant preyed “upon a very unsuspecting 12 year old girl who he knew from the 

neighborhood.” As for defendant’s degree of participation in the offense, he was not a 

lookout or ancillary participant, but the one and only participant in the offense. As for his 

participation in his defense, there was no suggestion that he was unable to meaningfully 

participate in his own defense. The last or ninth factor includes any “expression of remorse.” 

During his statement to the trial court, defendant stated generally that he had “made some 

wrong actions” and “made a mistake,” and was “[s]orry for what other people have been 

through.” However, he still did not acknowledge specifically what he had done or even 

acknowledge the victim, referring only to “other people.” 

¶ 77 Thus, even when we consider these additional factors that were not statutorily 

mandated at the time of defendant’s sentencing, we cannot find an abuse of discretion by the 

trial court. 

¶ 78 CONCLUSION 

¶ 79 On appeal defendant claimed (1) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

move to dismiss the charges against him after the State allegedly failed to bring him to trial 

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within the period required by the Speedy Trial Act (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2012)); (2) 

that, as applied to defendant, the statutes governing predatory criminal sexual assault, 

registration, and notification were harsh and violated the cruel and unusual punishment 

clause of the eighth amendment, as well as the proportionate penalties clause; and (3) that the 

trial court abused its discretion by sentencing defendant to 10 years. 

¶ 80 For the foregoing reasons, we find (1) that trial counsel was not ineffective for not 

moving to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds when there was no speedy-trial violation, (2) that 

the statute governing predatory criminal sexual assault was not unconstitutional as applied to 

defendant, and (3) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to 

the low end of the permissible sentencing range. 

¶ 81 Thus, we do not find defendant’s claims persuasive and affirm his conviction and 

sentence. 

¶ 82 Affirmed. 

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