1 ... T he H o no rable D avi d A
. B erchel m ann, Jr. , presi d ed ove r t he m o t i o n f o r s um m ary jud gm ent heari ng. T he H o n o ra b le K a re n P o z z a sign e d the fi n a l ju d g m e n t. i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 82 0- CV MR. W F IREWORKS, INC. ,

Appellant

v . Mariana OZUN A , Arthur Ma rtinez, St anley

Rone, Alamo F irewor

ks, I nc., and AA M H old ing s, L L C, Appellee s Fr om the 45th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2008-CI -05098 Honora ble Kar en Pozz a, Judge Pre siding 1 Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini, J ustice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: October 28, 2009 AFF I RMED On August 26, 2009, we issued an opini on aff irming the trial court’ s judgme nt. See M r. W Fireworks, Inc. v . Ozuna , No
. 0 4 -0 8 -0 0 8 2 0 -C V, 2 0 0 9 W L 2 6 1 6 5 0 7 (T ex . Ap p . — S an An t o n i o Au g. 26, 2009). Appe llant Mr. W Firewor ks, I nc. then f

iled a motion for re hear ing. We de ny the motion04

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2 ... U n l i k e i t s l ea s es w i t h M ar t i n ez a n d O zu na, M r . W ’ s l ea s e wi t h Rone di d n ot i n cl u de a t en - y ea r pe r i od d u rin g w h ic h R o n e c o u ld n o t le a se to a c o m p e tit o r. In ste a d , M r. W ’s le a se w ith R o n e sta te s, “L e sso r( s) a g re e no t t o se ll or l ea s e an y pa r t of

s ai d pr oper t y i n cl u di n g a n y a dj oi n i n g , a dj ac en t , or c on t i guo us p rop er t y t o a n y pe r s on ( s ) or corpora t i on f

or t he pur po s e of

s el l i ng f i r ewor ks i n c om pet i t i on t o t he Les s ee dur i ng t he t er m o f t hi s l eas e a n d a

f t er lea se i s t er m i na t ed .” (e m p h a sis a d d e d ). F o r p u rp o se s o f o u r a n a lysis, it d o e s n o t m a tt e r th a t R o n e ’s lea se d id no t sp e c ify a p eri o d of t i m e d uri ng whi ch R o ne co ul d not l ease t o a co m p et i t o r.

- 2- for r ehea ring ; howeve r, t o corr ect a fac tual misstatement and clar ify our opinion, we withdra

w our prior opinion and judg ment, and substitute this opi nion and judg ment in their place

. Mr
. W F ir e wo rk s, I nc ., a

pp e a ls f ro m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt. On

a pp e a l, Mr . W argue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt inc or re c tly int e rp re te d th e c on tr a c t at is su e . We a ff ir m. B ACKG ROUND M r . W o w n s an d

o p e r a t e s r e t a i l f

i r e w o r k s s t an d s l o c a t e d

o nl e a s e d p r e m i s e s i nB e x ar

C o u n t y, Texas. I n a contract dated September 12, 2002, Mr. W contra cted with Arthur Ma rtinez to lease an
are a of Ma

rtinez’s proper

ty for the pur

pose of se lling fire works. In a contr act dated September 26, 2002, Mr. W contrac ted with Mariana Ozuna for the pur

pos e o f l ea sing a

portion of Ozuna’s pr op e rt y to s e ll f ir e wo rk s. I n a

c on tr a c t dat e d Fe br

ua ry 6, 20 03 , Mr. W and Sta

nle y Ron e e nte re d in to a lea se for

the purpose of

Mr. W selling fire works on a por tion of Rone’s land. All three c ontrac ts contained the f ollowing languag e: L e sse e [Mr . W] is le a sin g thi s p ro pe rt y fo r t he purp os e of

se lli ngfi re wo rk s f

ro m sa id location, and sha ll remove same from the proper ty upon the termination of this lease

. L e sse e sh a ll a lso have the ex clu si ve pri vil e g e to s e ll f ir e wo rk s o n s ub

je c t pr op e rt

y during the per iod of t his lease and the term g rante d. In the e vent the saleof fireworks on the afo re me nti on e d pro pe rty is or sha ll be c om e un law ful du rin g th e pe rio d o

f th is le as e an d the te rm gran te d, thi s lea se sh all be c om e v oid an d a ny un us e d p ay me nt i

s returned. L es s o r( s ) a gre e n o tt o s el l o r l ea s e a n y p ar to f s ai d

p ro p er t y i n cl u d i n g an y

ad j o i n i n g, adjac ent, or c ontiguous prope rty to any person( s ) or cor

poration for

the purpose of selling f irewor ks in competition to t he L essee during the term of this lea se, and f or a per iod of ten y ear s after lease is terminated. 204

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- 00 82 0- CV

- 3- (empha sis added). Chapter 11 of

the C i ty of San Antonio Fire Code prohibits the sale and posse ssion of firew orks, at any

time, within the Ci ty

of San Antonio’s incorpor ated city limit s and within 5,000 fee t of the city

limit s. Be fore J anuar

y 5, 2003, all three proper ties, owned by

Rone, Ozuna, and Martinez respe ctively , wer e outside the c ity limit s. On J an u ar y

5, 2003, the Rone Proper ty was
ann e xed fo r l imi te d p ur

po se by the City of San A nto nio , a

nd the Oz un a P rop ert y

be c a me wi thi n 5,000 fee t of the city

limit s as a r esult of said anne x ation. Thus, as of J anuar y 5, 2003, it was leg al t o s e l l f i r e w o r k s o nt h e M art i n e z P r o p e rt y, b u tn o to nt h e R o n e P r o p e rt y o r t h e O z u n a

P r o p e rt y. On May 29 , 2 00 3, the City

of San Ant on io am e nd e d Cha pte r 11 of the City of San A nto nio F ir e Cod e to a llo w the sa le of fi re wo rk s duri ng the F ir e wo rk s Se a so ns wi thi n lim ite d purp os e c ity limit s until J anuar

y 5, 2006, but only

at locations at which firew orks were leg ally offe red f or sale on J uly 1, 2002. Pursuant to this amended city ordinanc e, Mr. W leg all y s o l d fi re works on the Rone Property and the Ozuna Prope rty

until J anuar

y 5, 2006. On August 1, 2004, the Martinez Property was a nnexed for limited purpose by the City of S anA n t o n i o . T h u s , o nA u g u s t1 , 2 0 0 4 , i t b e c a m e i l l e g a l t o s e l l f i r e w o r k s o nt h e M art i n e z P r o p e rt y,
and be c a us e fi re wo rk s w e re no t so ld fr om the Ma rt ine z Pr op e rt

y on July 1, 20 02 , fir e wo rk s c ou ld
no t be le g a lly so ld on the Mart ine z Pr op e rt y purs ua nt t o th e a me nd e d c ity

or din anc e . A nd , b e c a

us e it wa s now ill e g a l to se ll fir e wo rk s on th e Ma rt ine z Pro pe rt

y , th e le a se be c a me “ vo id” purs ua nt t o the terms of the lease

. Al so pu rs ua

nt t o th e a me nd e d c ity

or din anc e , o n Jan

ua ry 6, 20 06 , it

be c a me ill e g a l to se ll firew orks on Rone’s and Ozuna’s proper ties. There fore , pursuant to the terms of the Rone a nd Ozuna lease s, on J anuar

y 6, 2006, the Rone and O zuna leases be came “void.”04

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- 4- On Fe bruar

y 2, 2006, Martinez and Mr. W ag ain entered int o a contract for the purpose of Mr . W se lli ng fi re wo rk s on Mart ine z’s pr op e rt y . Th e langua g e of thi s c on tr a c t wa s e xac tly the same as the 2002 c ontrac t, and also conta ined a provision that “ [i ]n t he eve nt the sale of f irewor ks on the afor ementioned pr operty

is or shall become unlawful duringthe per iod of the lea s e an d t he ter m g rante d, this lease shall bec ome void and any unused pay

ment be re turned.” On Marc h 1, 2008, the City of San Antonio disannexed Martinez’s and Rone’ s proper ty , and Ozun a ’ s p r o p e rty

w a s n o lo n g e r

w it h in 5 , 0 0 0 f e e t f r o m S anA n to n io ’ s c it

y li mi ts
. T h u s , a ll thr ee pr op e rt ie s w ere no lo ng e r s ub je c t to Cha

pte r 1 1 o f t

he City of San A nto nio ’s F ir e Cod e , a nd it beca me leg al once ag ain to sell firew orks on all three proper ties. All three pr operty

owner s (AAM Holdings, L L C, had boug ht Martinez’s proper ty) ente red into new lease s with Mr. W’s competitor, Alamo Fir ewor

ks, I nc., for

the purpose of

selling f irewor ks on their prope rties. On Marc h 3 1, 20 08 , M r. W sou g ht i nju nc tiv e re lie f a

nd bro ught sui t a g a ins t th e pr op e rt y
ow ne rs fo r b re a c h of c on tr a c t, a lle g ing that the pr op e rt y ow ne rs ha d b re a c he d th e pr ov isi on in t he ir
re sp e c tiv e le a se s r e qu ir ingtha t th e y no t lea se to a co mpe tit or of Mr . W f or te n y e ars a ft e r t

he le a se terminated. Mr . W also sued Alamo for tortious i nterfe renc e with contra cts. I n response , on Se pte mbe r

3 0 , 2 0 0 8 , O z u n a , R o n e , an d A l a m o f i l e d a t r a d i t i o n a l m o t i o nf

o r s u m m ar y j u d g me nt, arguing that the lease s had not been br eac hed. The y emphasized that pursuant to the amendment of the city ordinanc e, it had bec ome illeg al to sell firew orks on the prope rties at issue. Thus, pursua nt to t he te rm s o f t

he le a se s, the le a se s ha d be c ome “ vo id. ” Th e re fo re , the y argue d th a t Mr . W c ou ld not e stablish that there is a valid, enfor cea ble contra ct. AAM Holdings, L L C, the n filed i t s o wn mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, a lso arguing that Mr . W c ou ld n ot p ro ve a va lid , e nf

or c e a ble contra ct. In response , Mr. W filed i ts own m otion for partial summary judgme nt, reque sting that the04

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- 00 82 0- CV

3 ... O n a p p e a l, M r. W c la im s tha t we m u st d isre g a rd this sti p u la tio n a b o u t t h e O z u n a P ro p e rty c o m ing w ithin 5, 00 0 f eet of t he C i t y of

San A nt oni o ci t y l i mi t s , becau s e i t i s not r eal l y a s t i pul at i on of “ f act , ” but i s a c oncl us i on of l aw, a n d thu s o f no e ff

e c t. W e d isa g re e . W h e the r th e p ro p e rty is w ithin 5 ,0 0 0 fee t f ro m the c ity lim its i s a n issu e o f f a c t.

- 5- tr ia l c ourt fi nd tha t O zun a , Ron e , and AA M Ho ldi ng s, L L C, ha d br e a c he d th e ir re sp e c tiv e c on tr a c ts with Mr. W by

leasingto Alamo and that Al am o wa s l i ab l e for tortiously

interfe ring with the contra cts. At the trial court, the parties filed a document entitled “Stipulated Fa cts. ” T h at document states, I

n o rd e r t o s i m p l i f y th e p r es e n ta t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n o f th is c as e , t he par

ties su bmi t th e fo llo wi ngse t of

sti pu late d f

a c ts: 1. Mr. W Firew orks, Inc. (“ Mr. W”) and Alamo F irewor ks, I nc. (“ Al a mo” ) a

re e a c h in the bu sin e ss o f s e lli ngfi re wo rk s. 2. Mr . W and

Al a mo e a c h re g ula

rl y le a se pr op e rt

y up on wh ic h to se ll fi re wo rk s. 3. Cha

pte r 11 of the City

of San A nto nio F ir e Cod e pr oh ibi ts the sa le and possession of fireworks, at any time, within the Ci ty

of San An ton io’ s in c or

po rate d c ity

lim its and

wi thi n 5 ,0 00 fe e t of

the City of San A nto nio ’s inc or

po rate d c ity

lim its

. 4. Applicable state statutes allow the sale of fire works only during the period be g inning June 24 and ending at midnight on Jul y 4, and the p e r i o d b e g i n n i n g D e c e mb e r

2 0 an d e n d i n g a t m i dn i g h t o nJ anu ar y 1 of the followingy ear

(the “ Fire works Seasons” ).

* * * 1 6
. The Rone Pr o p e rty w a s an n e xe d

f o r li mi te d p u r p o s e b y th e Ci ty of San A nto nio on

Janu ary 5, 20 03 , a

nd the Ozu na

Pr op e rt y be c a me wi thi n 5 ,0 00 fe e t of

the c ity lim its of San A nto nio a s a

re su lt o f s a id ann e xati on . Th e Ma

rt ine z Pro pe rt

y wa s ann e xed

fo r l imi te d p ur

po se by the City of San Antonio on Aug ust 1, 2004. 3 17. On or a

bout May 29, 2003, the City of San Antonio amende d Chapter 11 of the City

of San Antonio Fire Code to allow the sale of firew orks04

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- 6- duri ngthe F ir e wo rk s Se a so ns wi thi n limit e d pur po se c ity lim its un til Janu ary 5, 20 06 , b ut o nly

a t lo c a tio ns a t w hic h f

ir e wo rk s w e re le g a lly offe red f or sale on July

1, 2002. 18. Pursuant to the above- ref ere nced a mendment of city

ordinanc e, Mr. W le g a ll y

s o ld f ir e w o r k s o nth e Ro n e Pr o p e rty an d th e Ozuna Property within the li m i t ed p urpose c orporate limits of the City of San Antonio during the Fir ewor ks Seasons until J anuar

y 5, 2006. 1 9
. T h e s a le o f

f ir e w o r k s f r o m t h e M arti n e z P r operty and th e D ia zRang e l Pr op e rt

y duri ngthe F ir e wo rk s Se a so ns be c a me ill egal a s to the entire ty

of ea ch tra ct following the l imited purpose a nnexation of said proper

ties by the City

of San Antonio bec ause f

irewor ks were not so ld f ro m e ith e r t

he Ma rt ine z P rop e rt

y or the Di a z-R ang e l Pr op e rt

y on J uly 1, 2002. 20
. Th e Mart ine z Pro pe rt y , Ro ne Pr op e rt

y , a nd Di a z-R ang e l Pr op e rt

y wer e disanne x ed by the City of San Antonio on Marc h 1, 2008, and the Ozuna Property

beca me ou t s i de 5,000 fe et of the City of San Antonio city l i m i t s , at which point the Subject Proper ties were no l o n ger s ubject to re g ulation by the City of San Antonio including, without reser

vation, Chapter 11 of the C ity of San Antonio Fire Code. (empha sis added). G iven these stipulations, the trial court, in de termining the merits of the summar y j u d g ment motions, was left with merely interpre ting the la

ng uag e of the lease s. I t interprete d the lease s in favor of

the property owner s and Alamo, g ranting their m otions for summary judgme nt and
re nd e ri ngjud g me nt t

hat Mr . W ta

ke no thi ng . M r. W no w a pp e a ls. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW We reviewthe trial cour

t’s summary

judgme nt de novo. Va le nc e Op e ra tin g Co. v . D or se tt , 164 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). I n revie wing a summary judgme nt, we take as true a ll evidence favor able to the responde nt, a nd indulge ever

y rea sonable infe renc e and r esolve a ny doubts in favor of the re spondent. Id. Fur

ther, whe n both parties move f or summary

judgme nt on the s ame issue a nd the trial cour

t gr ants one motion and denies the ot her, as here , we c onsider the summary judgme nt04

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- 7- evidenc e pre sented by

both sides, deter

mine all questions presente d, and if we deter mine that the trial court e rre d, rende r the judg ment that the trial cour t should have re ndere d. Id. D I S CUS S I ON At iss ue are the fo llo wi ngtw o p ro vis ion s c on ta ine d w ith in t he re sp e c tiv e le a se s: L e sse e sh a ll a lso have the e xclu siv e pr ivi le g e to s e ll fi rewo rks o n s ub je c t pr op e rt

y during the period of t his lease and the ter m gr anted. In the e vent the saleof fireworks on theafo re me nti on e d pr op e rty is or sh all be c om e un law ful du rin g th e pe rio d o

f th is le as e an d th e te rm gran te d, thi s le as e sh all be c om e v oid an d an y un us e d pa

y me nt i s returned. L es s o r( s ) a gre e n o tt o s el l o r l ea s e a n y p ar to f s ai d

p ro p er t y i n cl u d i n g an y

ad j o i n i n g, adjac ent, or c ontiguous prope rty to any person (s ) or corporation for the purpose of selling f irewor ks in competition to the L essee during the term of this lea se, and for a period of ten ye ars after lease is terminated. (empha sis added). Thus, pur suant to the l ease , if the sale of firew orks “is or sha ll become unlaw ful during the per iod” of the le ase a nd the term g rante d, the lease shall become “void.” A. W as the sale of fireworks unlawf ul, or did it

becom e unlawful to sell f

ireworks during thepe rio d o

f th e re sp e c tiv e le as es? We must first determine whe ther the sa le of firew orks was illega l or beca me illega l during the per iod of the re spective le ases, whic h in turn made the le ases, pur suant to its own terms, “void.” Wit h respe ct to the Martinez Property , the sale of firew orks bec ame illegal o n Au gu s t 1, 2004. The fir st contrac t betwe en Martinez and Mr. W states that Mr. W. shall lease Ma rtinez’s proper ty “for a per iod of one y ear

with eig ht consec utive one y ear options from September 20, 2002.” The contra ct furthe r states that re nt is due on the twentieth day of ever y J une and D ece mber and that “[e]ach y ear

shall be consider ed opti oned providing t he rent is paid on or bef ore the abovesp e c if ie d d a te s. ” I f M r. W did

no t e xer c ise i ts op ti on to exte nd the pe ri od

of the le a se , th e le a se would have e x pired on Septembe r 20, 2003. Howe ver, the u n controve rted summary judgme nt04

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- 8- evidenc e shows that Mr. W paid re nt to Martinez for “se vera l y ear s . ” And, because pa ying r ent
a uto ma tic a lly

inv ok e d M r. W’s op tio n to exte nd the te rm of the le a se , Mr. W’s pa y me nt o f r e nt t o Mart ine z fo r “ se ve ra l y e ars ” de no te s th a t Mr. W e xer c ise d its opti on to e xten d th e pe ri od of the le a se bey ond Aug ust 1, 2004. Thus, the sale of firew orks bec ame illeg al duringthe per iod of Martinez’s f ir s t l e a s e w it

h M r . W. Wi th

r e s p e c t t o th e F e b r

u ar y 2 , 2 0 0 6 , c o n tr a c t b e tw e e n M arti n e z an d M r . W, at the time the par

ties entere d into the co n t ra ct , i t wa s unlawful to sell fire works on the Ma rtinez Property . I t did not become lawful unti l Marc h 1, 2008, when the Martinez Property was disanne x ed b y t h e c i t y. On J anuar

y 6, 2006, it became i l l eg al to sell firew orks on both the Ozuna and Rone Properties. The contra ct for le ase b et we en Mr. W and Ozuna states that the lea se shall be “ for a period of one y ear with four consecutive one y ear options from September 26, 2002.” The contra ct for lea se betwe en Mr. W and R one st ates that the l ease shall be “for a period of one y ear with five
consec utive one y ear

options from Fe bruar

y 19, 2003.” B oth contrac ts further state that re nt will be due on the twe ntieth day of eve ry J une and D ece mber a

nd that “[e]ach y ear

shall be consider ed optioned provi d i n g t he re nt is paid on or befor e the a bove-spe cified dates.” The parties stipulated that Mr. W made seven pay ments to Ozuna pursuant to the t erms of lease , “up to and includingthe pa y me nt d ue on De c e mbe r 20, 20 05 .” Th e pa rt ie s als o stip ulate d that Mr. W ma de fo ur pa y me nts to Rone pursuant to the terms of the lease , “u p t o an d including pa y ment due on De cembe r 20, 20 05 .” Thus , b y

makin g the re nt p ay

me nts to O zun a and Ron e , Mr. W autom a tic a lly e xer c ise d it s options to ex tend the lease t erms of both lease s bey ond J anuar y 6, 2006. There fore , it became illega l to sell firewor

ks on the Ozuna and Rone Prope rties duringthe lease period.04

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- 9- B. W ha t do es th e te rm “v oid ” me an in t hele as es? Mr. W ar gues that “[u] pon the illega liz ation of firew orks sales, at the e lection of Mr. W, the tenanc y ended, thus re lieving the parties of their re spective f

uture pe rfo rm an ce for rent and possession obligations. B ut the end of the tenanc y also trig g ere d the restrictive covena nts for which [Mr . W] pa id a

nd Ap pe lle e s ac c e pte d co ns ide ratio n. ” Th e pr op e rt y ow ne rs and Al a mo dis a g re e wi th Mr. W’s interpretation of the provisions, arguing that when the c ity ordinanc e m ad e t h e s ale of firew orks illeg al on the subj ect properties, the leases be came “void,” r esulting in the pr operty owner s and Mr. W no longe r h aving an e nforc eable ag ree ment. We ag ree with the proper ty owner s’ and Al a mo’ s in te rp re tatio n o f t he le a se s. We interpret a

n unambig uo u s contract as a matter of law

. Universal He alth Servs., Inc . v. RenaissanceW

omen’ s Group, P.A. , 121 S.W .3d 742, 746 (Tex. 200 3 ) ( q u o ta ti ons omitt ed). Whether

a c on tr a c t is a mbi g uo us is a qu est ion of law t hat mu st b e de c ide d b y

e xami nin g the c on tr a c t a s a whole in light of the circ umstances prese nt when the contra ct was e ntere d. Id. I f c o n t ra ct l an gu age can be g iven a c erta in or definite mea ning, the n it is not ambig uous. Id. “Lack o f clarity does not
cre ate a n ambigu i t y , an d n ot ever y differ ence in the interpre tation of a c ontrac t amounts to an ambig uity .” Id. (q

uo tatio ns omi tte d) . “ Ra the r, a mbi g uit y ari se s whe n ana g re e me nt i s su sc e pti ble to more than one rea sonable mea ning a fter a

pplication of established r ules of construc tion.” Id. Established rules of c onstruction require that we as ce rt ain the intent of the pa rties to the ag ree ment. J.M. D avidson, Inc. v . W ebster , 128 S.W .3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003). The languag e used in the ag ree ment is the prim ar y ev i d en ce of that intent. See id. “To a chieve this objective, [we] should ex amine and c onsider the e ntire writing in an eff ort to harmonize and g ive ef fec t to all the provisions of the contra ct so that none will be re ndere d meaning less.” Valence , 164 S.W .3d at 662.04

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- 10- “Contrac t terms are g iven their plain, ordinary , and g ener ally acc epted mea

nings unle ss the contra ct itself shows them to be used in a te chnica l or diffe rent sense .” Id. I n it s b ri e f, Mr . W argue s th a t th e pa rt ie s d id n ot i nte nd the ph ra se , “ thi s le a se sh a ll b e c ome void,” to mean that the contract would actua lly become “void.” Mr. W claims that the pa rties instead int e nd e d “ vo id” to m e an “ te rm ina ble ,” thu s trig g e ri ng the pr ov isi on that the pr op e rt y ow ne rs c ou ld not lease the ir respe ctive prope rties to a compe titor. Mr. W arg ues the followingin its brief: Th e te rm “ vo id” is “o ft e n use d in st a tut e s and le g a l do c ume nts , s uc h a s d e e ds , le a se s, bonds, mortga g es , an d o t hers, in the se nse of voidable mere ly , that is, capa ble of b e i n g a v o i d e d , an d

n o ta s m e an i n g t h a t t h e a c t o r t r an s a c t i o ni s a b s o l u t e l y a

nu l l i t y, as if it had neve r existed, capable of g iving r ise to any rig hts or obligations under any circ umstances.” Ewell v. Daggs , 1 08 U. S. 1 43 , 1 48 -4 9 ( 18 83 ). Ap pe lle e s’ argume nts ignor e this time-honorable principle of la w.

“ Th e te rm

‘v oid ’ a s a

ppli cabl e to c on ve y anc e s o r o the r a g re e me nts ha s n ot at a ll times b ee n u s ed with technic al pre cision, nor re stricted to its peculiar a nd limit ed sense . . . .” Downs v. Blount , 170 F . 15, 22 (5 th Cir . 190 9) . “T he tr uth is– and it i s a conclusion that cannot be denied–the term ‘void,’ when we speak wit h t ec h nical acc urac y , can only

be applied to those contrac ts that are of no effect whatsoeve r , mere nu lli tie s, su c h, fo r e xamp le , a s are a g a ins t th e law, ill e g a l, o r c ri min a l, o r i n contravention of that which the l aw r equire s, and inca pable of confirmation or ratifica tion.” Id. at 23. That e ffe ct is not at all applicable to the lease s here

. (empha sis in original). A ccor ding to Mr. W’s re ply brief, “ Texas la

w and c ommon sense dictate that the term ‘void’ be re ad to mean ‘ voidable.’” Thus, Mr. W arg ues that the phra se “sha ll become void”
wa s a “ c o n t i n g e n tl i m i t at i o n ” t h a tc r e a t e d “ a v o i d a b l e a g r e e m e n t , w h i c h t h e r e s t r i c t i v e c o v e n an ts survive.” The proble m w ith Mr. W’s inter pretation is that it a

rg ues that“void” rea lly

means “ voidable,” wh ile a t th e same tim e arguing th at the p ro vis ion re str ic tin g the pr op e rt

y ow ne rs fr om l e a sin g to
c omp e tit or s surv ive d the a g re e me nt. Th is is inc on sis te nt wi th t he me anin g of

“ vo ida ble ” c on tr a c ts. For example, when a minor e nters into a contr act, that c ontrac t is not voi d, but i s v o i d able at the04

- 08

- 00 82 0- CV

- 11- elec tion of the minor. Diaryland County Mut. Ins. Co. v . Roman , 498 S.W .2d 154, 158 (Tex. 1973). “This means that the minor may set aside the entire c ontract at his option, but he is n ot e nti tle d to enforce portions that

are favorable to him and at the sametime disaffirm other provisions t hat he fi n d s b u rd e n some . ” Id. (empha sis added). “ He is not permitted to re tain the bene fits of a c ontrac t while re pudiating its oblig ations.” Id. He re , wh ile Mr . W is arguin g that th e ill e g a lizatio n o f t he sa le of firew orks on the respe ctive proper ties made the c ontrac t “voidable,” it is st ill seeking to enforc e the provision of the c ontrac t prohibiting the pro p e rty owner s from lea sing to c ompetitors. We decline to adopt such an inter

pretation. Fur ther, we note that the lease s include a variation of the word “ter minate” no less than three differ ent times. We must assume that beca use t he parties used t he word “ter minate” three other times in t he le a se s, bu t in ste a d c ho se to u se the wo rd “ vo id” wh e n disc us sin g the ill e g a lizatio n o f t he sa le of fi re wo rk s, the pa

rt ie s me ant “ vo id” to me an so me thi ngdif fe re nt f ro m “ te rm inate .” As c on tr a c ts requiring an il leg al ac t are void, see Villanuev a v. Gonzalez , 123 S.W .3d 461, 464 (Tex. App.—San A n to n io 2 0 0 3 , n o pet.), it is l og ical that the pa rties would use the w ord “void” to describe the possibili ty

of the sale of fire works bec oming illega l. T hus, we conclude that “void” a s used in the contra cts here in rea lly

does mea n “void.” W e, therefor e, hold t hat the illeg alization of the sale of the firew orks on the re spective pr operties did n o t t ri g g er the provision in the leases pr ohibiting the proper ty owner s from lea sing to c ompetitors of Mr. W. C ONCL US I ON We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice