### F I LE D U. S . COURT OF AP PE ALS E LEVE NTH CI RCUI T Novem be r 15, 2005 T HOM AS K. KAHN C L E RK [ DO NO T P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 05- 12587 N on -A rgum entC al endar

________________________ D . C. D o c k e tN o . 0 3 - 0 1 9 1 5 - CV - T- 1 7 TBM J O S E P H W . O L M S T E A D , P la in tif f - A p p e lla n t, v ersu s H U M A N A , I N C ., H U M A N A H E A L T H C A R E P L A N S , f .d .b .a . H u m a n aM e d ic a l P la n , I n c ., M E N T A L H E A L T H N E T W O R K , J S A H E A L T H C A R E C O R P ., D e f e n d a n ts - A p p e lle e s .

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f orthe M i ddl e D i s tr i c tof F l or i da

_________________________ ( N ove m b e r 15, 2005) B efo re D U B IN A , H U L L an d F A Y , C i rcu i tJu d g es. P E R C U R I A M:2

Jose ph W . O l m st ea d app ea l s pro se the di stri ctcourt ’ s orderdenyi ng hi s pro s e “ ve r i f i e d a m e nde d m ot i on f

orr e l i e f f r om or de r[ de ny i ng O l m s t e a d’ s m ot i on f or a n or de rva c a t i ng hi s vol unt a ry di s m i s s a l w i thoutpr e j udi c e of hi s c i vi l a c t i on] a nd f o rap p r o p r ia te r e lie f

w ith r e s p e c t to p r o te c te d p e r s o n a l a n d h e a lth in f o rm a tio n ,” f i l e d pur s ua ntt o F e d. R . C i v. P . 60( b) ( 1) & ( 6) . O l m s t e a d a r gue s on appe a l tha tthe c our tabus e d i t s di s c r e t i on i n de ny i ng thi s a m e nde d R ul e 60( b) m ot i on. F orthe r e a s o n s s e tf

o r th mo r e f

u l l y b e l o w , w e a f

f i rm. O l m s t e a d s oughtr e c ons i de r a t i on i n the i ns t a nta m e nde d R ul e 60( b) m ot i on of the di stri ctcourt ’ s orderdenyi ng hi s m ot i on for a n o rdervaca t i ng hi s vol un t ary d is m is s a l w ith o u t p r e

ju d ic e o f h is c iv il c o m p la in t. I n O lm s te a d ’s a m e n d e d c iv il c om pl a i nt( “ O l m s t e a d I ” ) , he a s s e r t e d tha tH um a na , I nc . ( “ H um a na ” ) ; H um a na H e a lth c a r e P la n s , f

/d /b /aH u m a n aM e d ic a l P la n , I n c . ( “H M P ” ) ; M e n ta l H e a lth N etw ork (M H N et ”) ; and JS A H ea l thcar e C orp (“ JS A ”) (c ol l ec t i vel y r ef erre d t o as

“ th e d e f e n d a n t s ” ) v i o l a t e d m u l t i p l e f e d e r a l s t a tu t e s a n d F l o r i d ac o m m o n l a w, in c lu d in g th e C o m p u te rF r au d a n d A b u s e A c t, 1 8 U .S .C . § 1 0 3 0 ; th e E le c tr o n ic C o m m u n ic a tio n s P r iv a c y A c t, 1 8 U .S .C . § 2 7 0 1 , e t. s e q .; th e A m e r ic a n s W ith D i sabi l i t i es A ct(“ A D A ”) , 42 U . S . C . § 1 21 01 , etse q. , and F l ori da com m on l aw r e la tin g to in v a s io n o f

p r iv a c y a n d n e g lig e n c e . I n s uppor tof

thi s a m e nde d c om pl a i nt , O l m s t e a d a l l e ge d tha t , a f t e rhe3

e nr ol l e d i n ahe a l th m a i nt e na nc e pl a n ( “ H M O ” ) , w hi c h w a s ope r a t e d by H um a na a n d H M P , a n d a f

te rh e s e le c te d J S A a s h is p r im a ry c a r e p h y s ic ia n , J S A r e f u s e d to pr ovi de O l m s t e a d w i th author i z a t i on t o c ons ul tw i th as pe c i a l i s t . M H N e t , i n turn, c aus e d a“ f

a l s e ps y c hi a tr i c r e c or d a nd r e l a t e d da t aa nd doc um e nt s ”

— c ont a i ni ng O l m s t e a d’ s l e ga l l y pr ot e c t e d pe r s ona l i nf orm a t i on— t o be “ c r e a t e d a nd di s s e m i na t e d. ” M H N e ts ubs e que nt l y i s s ue d a“ M e m be rN ot i c e , ” on be ha l f of H M P , w i th res pectt o a “ N ot i ce of D eni al of P ay m ent . ” M oreover, O l m st ea d al l eg ed th atth i s M em b er N o t i ce u n n ecessaril y d i scl o sed t o th i rd p art i es fal se p s y c h ia tr ic - c la im in f

o rm a tio n a n d p r o te c te d p e r s o n a l a n d id e n tif y in g in f o rm a tio n . B a s e d o n th e s e a lle g a tio n s , O lm s te a d a s s e r te d th a t ( 1 ) M H N e t in te n tio n a lly e x c e e d e d le g a l a c c e s s a n d a c c e s s e d p r o te c te d p e r s o n a l in f o rm a tio n s to r e d in c om put e rs y s t e m s i n the c a r e , c us t ody , a nd c ontr ol of H um a naa nd H M P , t o obt a i n, ut i l i ze , and d i ss em i nat e O l m st ea d’ s prot ec t ed heal th i nform at i on ; (2) the po l i ci es a n d p r a c t i c e s o f

th e d e f e n d a n t s , a l o n g wi th s o m e o f th e i ra c t s , v i o l a t e d th e AD A and O l m st ea d’ s r i gh t s a s adi sabl ed pers on , thati s, a per son w i th the ph ys i ca l i m p a i rm e n to f

Hu m a n I m m u n o d e f

i c i e n c y Vi ru s Di s e a s e ( “ HI V” ) , u n d e rth e AD A; a nd ( 3) the de f

e nda nt s c om m i tt e d s t a t e c om m on l a w i nva s i on of pr i va c y a nd ne gl i ge nc e . O l m s t e a d s oughti nj unc t i ve r e l i e f , a s w e l l a s c om pe ns a t ory a nd p u n itiv e d a m a g e s .Rule 41(a) (1) provides, in releva nt part, that, subject to provisions of other rules, “a n 1 action may

be dismissed by

the plaintiff without order of cour t (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time beforeserviceby

the adverse pa

rty of an a nswer or of a motion for summar

y judgment, whichever first occurs . . . Unless other wise stated in the noticeof dismissal . . ., the dismiss al is without prejudice . . ..”See F ed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1). 4 O n N o v e m b e r2 4 , 2 0 0 3 , th e p a r tie s f ile d ajo in t c a s e m a n a g e m e n t r e p o r t, w h e r e b y th e y a g r e e d to ad is c o v e ry s c h e d u le . A f te re a c h d e f

e n d a n t m o v e d to d is m is s O lm s te a d I , O lm s te a d f ile d n o tic e s o f

v o lu n ta ry d is m is s a l o f

s o m e o f its co u n t s. M o reo v er, i n Jan u ary 2 0 0 4 , JS A an d M H N etfi l ed sep arat e n o t i ces, i nform i ng the courtthatthey had se rved prop osal s of s ett l em entup on O l m st ea d du ri ng thatsa m e m on th. O n January26 , 20 04 , O l m st ea d fi l ed a not i ce of di sm i ss al w i thoutpr e

j udi c e of O l m s t e a d I , pur s ua ntt o F e d. R . C i v. P . 41( a ) ( 1) , w i thout 1 se tt i ng forth any re as on s. O n January27 , 20 04 , the di stri ctcourtordered the cl erk o f th e c o u r t to c lo s e th e c a s e a n d to te rm in a te a ll p e n d in g m o tio n s . H ow e ve r , on M a r c h 12, 2004, O l m s t e a d f i l e d apr o s e “ m ot i on f

ore ntry of o r d e rv a c a tin g o r d e rg r a n tin g v o lu n ta ry d is m is s a l w ith o u t p r e ju d ic e .” C itin g to R u le 6 0 ( b ) , O lm s te a d , a t le a s t in d ir e c tly , a r g u e d in th is m o tio n th a t h e v o lu n ta r ily ha d di s m i s s e d O l m s t e a d I be c aus e the de f e nda nt s ha d be e n “ unc oope r a t i ve ” a nd had “ caused un nece ss ary i ncre as ed cost s and del ay s” i n res po nd i ng t o d i sc ov ery r e que s t s . O l m s t e a d a l s o f i l e d i n s uppor tal e ngthy de c l a r a t i on, out l i ni ng the p r o c e d u r a l h is to ry o f

O lm s te a d I .Rule6 8 p ro v ide s , in re lev ant p art, th at “ [i ]f

th ejudgment f

in ally o b tain e d b y [a 2 plaintiff] is notmore fa

vorablethan the off

er [made by

a def endant], the [plainti ff] must pay the costs incurre d after the makingof the off er.”See F ed.R.Civ.P. 68. 5 H u m an a a n d H M P re sp o n d ed , arg u in g th at itw as u n clea r f ro m O lm stea d ’s R ul e 60(b) w hy he w as se eki ng the vacat i on of the court ’ s di sm i ss al order, and that n o n e o f R u l e 6 0 (b )’ s g ro u n d s fo r rel i ef w as ap p l i cab l e. M H N etan d JS A al so r e s ponde d t o O l m s t e a d’ s R ul e 60( b) m ot i on i n s e pa r a t e m e m or a nda , both a r gui ng thatR ul e 60(b) rel i ef

w as no tw arrant ed because , i f O l m st ea d trul y had been di s s a t i s f i e d w i th the de f

e nda nt s ’ di s c ove ry r e s pons e s dur i ng the f i r s tm onths of di s c ove ry , he c oul d ha ve s oughtr e l i e f thr ough am ot i on t o c om pe l , i ns t e a d of f i l i ng an o tic e o f

d is m is s a l. M H N e t a n d J S A a ls o c o n te n d e d th a t O lm s te a d ’s d e c is io n to di s m i s s O l m s t e a d I , i ns t e a d, w a s a“ c a l c ul a t e d s tr a t e gi c de c i s i on, ” f ol l ow i ng M H N e t’s f

ilin g its n o tic e o f

s e ttle m e n t a g r e e m e n t. O n A pr i l 6, 2004, the di s tr i c tc our tde ni e d O l m s t e a d’ s R ul e 60( b) m ot i on, s u m m a r ily e x p la in in g th a t th e r e w a s n o f a c tu a l o rle g a l b a s is u n d e rR u le 6 0 ( b ) to g r a n t it. O n A p r il 2 0 , 2 0 0 4 , O lm s te a d f ile d am o tio n f

o rr e c o n s id e r a tio n o f

th is order, ar gu i ng thathe had n otfi l ed hi s not i ce of di sm i ss al t o avo i d any l i abi l i ty that c o u ld a tta c h to r e

je c tin g th e p r o p o s e d s e ttle m e n t a g r e e m e n ts , p u r s u a n t to F e d .R .C iv .P . 6 8 . O lm s te a d a ls o c o n te n d e d th a t th e c o u r t s h o u ld r e c o n s id e rits 2 d en i al o f h i s R u l e 6 0 (b ) m o t i o n b ecau se, (1 ) al th o u g h th e d i sm i ssal w as v o l u n t ary,Th ede fendantshavea ske d u s totakejudic ial no tic eof ple ading s a

nd ordersre latingto 3 Olmstead II . A cour

t may take judicial noticeof another cour t order, at least for thelimit ed purpose of

rec ognizi ngthe judicial ac tion taken or the subject matter of the litig ation. See Youngv. City

of Augusta, Ga. Through DeVa ney, 59 F.3d 1160, 1166 n.11 ( 11th Cir. 1995) (takingjudicial notice that the district cour t denied a motion for summar y judgment in another action). Thus, w e takejudicial notice of O lmstead II , at least to the e x tent that the district court has stayed proc eeding s pendingOlmstead’s pa y ment of costs and f

ees relatingto Olmstead I . Rule 41(d) provide s that, “[i] f a plaintiff who has onc e dismissed an action in any court 4 commence s an ac tion based upon or includingthe same c laim ag ainst the same de fenda nt, the court may make such order

for the pa

y ment of costs of the action previously dismiss ed as it may deem proper a

nd may stay the proc eeding s in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the

6 i tw a s not“ f

r e e , c a l c ul a t e d, a nd de l i be r a t e ” ; a nd, ( 2) i f the c a s e w a s r e i ns t a t e d, d is c o v e ry c o u ld b e c o m p le te d w ith o u t s ig n if ic a n t p r e ju d ic e to th e d e f

e n d a n ts . A ft erthe defendant s f

i l ed m em oranda op po si ng O l m st ea d’ s m ot i on t o rec on si der, the courtsum m ar i l y deni ed i t . A l tho ug h O l m st ea d fi l ed a t i m el y not i ce of appeal ( “N O A ” ) o f

th e c o u r t’s o r d e rd e n y in g h is R u le 6 0 ( b ) m o tio n a n d h is m o tio n to r e c o n s id e r , ( R 3 - 6 0 ) , h e s u b s e q u e n tly o b ta in e d o u rle a v e to v o lu n ta r ily d is m is s th is appe a l , pur s ua ntt o F e d. R . A pp. P . 42. A s the de f

e nda nt s not e on appe a l , s ubs e que ntt o the di s tr i c tc our tde ny i ng O l m s t e a d’ s m ot i on t o r e c ons i de r , O l m s t e a d f i l e d on S e pt e m be r24, 2004, i n the sa m e di stri ctcourt , a s ec on d ci vi l ac t i on agai nstthe sa m e def endant s ( “ O l m st ea d II ”) , w hi ch cont ai ned the sa m e c l ai m s a s s etforth i n O l m st ea d I. S ee U ni t ed S t at es D i s tr i c tC our tf

orthe M i ddl e D i s tr i c tof F l or i da , T a m paD i vi s i on, C a s e N o. 8 :0 4 e v 2 1 4 1 - T 2 7 . O n th e d e f e n d a n ts ’ ap p lic a tio n , a n d p u r s u a n t to 3 F ed. R . C i v. P . 41 (d), the courti ss ued an o rderst ay i ng the proceedi ng s i n O l m st ea d 4order .” See F ed.R.Civ.P. 41(d).

Olmstead explained in his amended Rule 60(b)motion that he amended his original 5 Rule 60(b) motion, which he f iled one day

earlier, to correct c lerical mist akes. 7 I I , u n til O lm s te a d p a id th e a tto rn e y ’s f e e s a n d c o s ts th e d e f

e n d a n ts h a d in c u rr e d in de f e ndi ng O l m s t e a d I . S e e i d. O n M a r c h 29, 2005, the c our ts truc k a l l pl e a di ngs O l m st ea d h ad att em pt ed t o fi l e i n O l m st ea d II, and rei t er at ed thatO l m st ea d II w as s ta y e d p e n d in g O lm s te a d ’s p a y m e n t o f f e e s a n d c o s ts in O lm s te a d I . S e e id . O n e w e e kla te r , o n A p r il 6 , 2 0 0 5 , O lm s te a d f ile d th e in s ta n t a m e n d e d R u le 60 (b) m ot i on , cont endi ng thathi s ori gi nal deci si on t o see k a vo l un t ary di sm i ss al

5 i n J a nua ry 2004, w a s “ ba s e d upon pe r s ona l c ons i de r a t i ons , ” tha ti s , be c aus e he (1) di d n othave enou gh t i m e t o fi l e the neces sarypaperw ork t o p rot ec thi s pri vacy i nt e r e s t s dur i ng the c our s e of the l i t i ga t i on, a nd ( 2) f

i r s tne e de d t o “ r e s ol ve the un expect ed re curr ence of an op po rtun i st i c i nfec t i on (“ O I” ) and on se tof a new O I. ” O l m s t e a d c onc e de d tha t , w he n he m a de thi s de c i s i on, he w a s a w a r e tha the m i ght b e r e q u ir e d to r e im b u r s e th e d e f e n d a n ts f o rs o m e c o s ts , b u t h e c la im e d th a t h e d id no tkn ow thatthe defendant s w ou l d b e e nt i t l ed t o see k att orney’ s f ee s. O l m st ea d further a ss ert ed that , i f he had kn ow n thathe m i gh tbe l i abl e f or att orney’ s f

ee s, he, in s te a d , w o u ld h a v e m o v e d th e c o u r t to h o ld O lm s te a d I in ab e y a n c e to a llo w h im t i m e t o p rot ec tbo th h i s hea l th and pri vacyi nt er es t s. In addi t i on , O l m st ea d cl ai m ed th a t, c o n tr a ry to th e d e f e n d a n ts ’ a r g u m e n ts , h e d id n o t d is m is s h is a c tio n to a v o id8

p o te n tia l liab ility f

r o m r e je c tin g th e p u rp o r te d o f f e r s o f ju d g m e n t, a n d h is c la im s in h is a m e n d e d c o m p la in t w e r e n o t f r iv o lo u s . B a s e d on the s e a s s e r t i ons , O l m s t e a d c onc l ude d tha t“ good c aus e ” e xi s t e d f or the c our tt o r e c ons i de ri t s A pr i l 6, 2004, or de r , de ny i ng hi s e a r l i e rR ul e 60( b) m ot i on t o v ac at e the court ’ s ordergrant i ng hi s m ot i on for avo l un t ary di sm i ss al w i thoutpr e

j udi c e , a nd t o or de rthe de f e ndant s t o abs t a i n f

r om di s c l os i ng O l m st ea d’ s per sonal heal th i nform at i on w i tho utfi rs tappl yi ng t o the courtfor a qu al i fi ed prot ec t i ve order. O l m st ea d al so st at ed, w i tho utexpl ai ni ng , thathe w as r e l y i ng on R ul e 60( b) ( 1) a nd ( 6) . O ne da y l a t e r , w i thoutw a i t i ng f orr e s pons e s , the c o u r t s u m m a r ily d e n ie d O lm s te a d ’s a m e n d e d R u le 6 0 ( b ) m o tio n . O lm s te a d a r g u e s o n ap p e a l th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u r t ab u s e d its d is c r e tio n in denyi ng the i nst antam ended R ul e 60(b) m ot i on because O l m st ea d sub m i tt ed

“ suff i ci enti nform at i on ” t o d em on stra t e “ go od cause f or re l i ef t o b e gra nt ed. ” C i t i ng t o non- bi ndi ng c a s e l a w , O l m s t e a d ge ne r a l l y a s s e r t s tha tac om bi na t i on of heal th, pri vacy , and fi nanci al consi dera t i on s w as suff i ci entt o p erm i tre l i ef

un der R u le 6 0 ( b ) ( 6 ) . O lm s te a d a ls o c o n te n d s th a t, to th e e x te n t th e d e f e n d a n ts a r g u e d in r e s p o n s e to h is f

ir s t R u le 6 0 ( b ) m o tio n th a t h e h a d v o lu n ta r ily d is m is s e d h is c iv il a c t i on f orthe i m pr ope rpurpos e of a voi di ng the pot e nt i a l e f f e c t s of the i rof f e r s of j udgm e nt , the s e of

f e r s w e r e notr e

j e c t e d orf

i l e d i n a c c or da nc e w i th R ul e 68, a nd,Olmstead also re quests in his appeal brie f per mission t o supplement the re cord on 6 appeal, expl ainingthat he took “dilig ent g ood faith ef forts with respe ct to supplementation of the rec ord on appe al,” a

nd outlining re lated cor

respondence between himself a nd the def

endants. Olmstead, however, ha s failed e ither to identify in his brief the documents or evidenc e that he wishes to add to the appe llate re cord, or to expl ain why

such supplementation is war rante d. Thus , tothee xtent O lms te ad isse ekingto supplement t here c ord o n a

pp e al, w edeny

thi s re qu e st. Se eSha

ha r v . B ow ers , 1 20F .3 d 2 11 , 2 12(1 1th Cir . 1 99 7) (en b anc ) ( e xplainingthat, although we ha

ve “inherent e quitable power” to supplement the re cord with information not reviewed by

the district court, “ such authority is rare ly exercised.”(internal citation and marks omitted)). Rule 4(a) (6) provides that the district court “may reopen the time to file an a ppeal f or a 7 period of 14 da

ys after the date when its order

to reopen is entere d,” if c ertain conditions are met. See F ed.R.App.P. 4(a) (6). 9 th u s, sh o u l d n o th av e resu l t ed i n O l m st ead b ei n g l i ab l e fo r ad d i t i o n al co st s. 6 A s aprel i m i narym att er , abse ntthe fi l i ng of a t i m el y N O A , w e l ac k j ur i s di c t i on ove ra n appe a l . W oode n v. B oa r d of R e ge nt s of

U ni ve r s i ty S y s t e m of G eorgi a, 24 7 F . 3d 12 62 , 12 72 (11th C i r. 20 01 ). T hu s, as a f eder al courtof l i m i t ed j uri sdi ct i on , w e m ustdet erm i ne sua s po nt e w hether w e have j uri sdi ct i on . Id. at 1 2 7 1 . T o th e e x te n t O lm s te a d f ile d th e in s ta n t a m e n d e d R u le 6 0 ( b ) m o tio n to ext end the t i m e he had for appeal i ng the di stri ctcourt ’ s A pri l 6, 20 04 , order de ny i ng hi s f

i r s tR ul e 60( b) m ot i on, he vol unt a r i l y di s m i s s e d hi s f i r s tappe a l of

the A p ri l 2 0 0 4 , o rd er. In ad d i t i o n , th e i n st an tap p eal fal l s w el l o u t si d e th e 3 0 d ays p e rm itte d to f

ile a n ap p e a l in ac iv il a c tio n . S e e F e d .R .A p p .P . 4 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( atim e ly N O A i n ac i vi l c a s e w he r e the U ni t e d S t a t e s i s notapa r ty m us tbe f i l e d w i thi n 30 d a y s a f te rth e ju d g m e n t o ro r d e rap p e a le d f r o m is e n te r e d ) . W e a l s o ha ve c onc l ude d tha t , be c aus e F e d. R . A pp. P . 4( a ) ( 6) i s the e xc l us i ve 710

m e a ns f ore xt e ndi ng the t i m e t o appe a l , R ul e 60( b) c a nnotbe us e d t o c i r c um ve nt a n unt i m e l y f

i l i ng of a n appe a l . S e e V e nc orH os pi t a l s , I nc . v. S t a nda r d L i f e a nd A c c id e n t I n s . C o ., 2 7 9 F .3 d 1 3 0 6 , 1 3 1 1 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 2 ) . M o r e o v e r , w h e n aR u le 60 (b) m ot i on i s f

i l ed m ore than t en ca l endar days af t erthe entryof j ud gm ent

— as i n thi s c a s e — tha tm ot i on ne i the ra f f e c t s the f i na l i ty of the unde r l y i ng j udgm e ntnor t ol l s the t i m e f

orappe a l i ng tha tde c i s i on. S e e A m e r i c a n B anke r s I ns . C o. of F l a . v. N or thw e s t e rn N a t . I ns . C o. , 198 F . 3d 1332, 1338 ( 11th C i r . 1999) . I nde e d, “ the la w is c le a rth a t R u le 6 0 ( b ) m a y n o t b e u s e d to c h a lle n g e m is ta k e s o f la w [ th a t] coul d h ave been ra i se d o n d i re ctappeal . ” S ee i d. T hu s, ou r j uri sdi ct i on t o revi ew O lm s te a d ’s ap p e a l o f

th e in s ta n t a m e n d e d R u le 6 0 ( b ) m o tio n is lim ite d in s c o p e to th e d e n ia l o f

th a t m o tio n . W e r e vi e w adi s tr i c tc our t ’ s or de rde ny i ng r e l i e f unde rR ul e 60( b) onl y f or abus e of di s c r e t i on. W a dde l l v. H e ndry C ounty S he r i f f’ s O f f i c e , 329 F . 3d 1300, 1309 ( 11th C i r . 2003) . O l m s t e a d, w i thoute xpl a i ni ng, c i t e d i n s uppor tof the i ns t a nt m ot i on t o R ul e 60(b)(1) and R ul e 60(b)(6). U nd erR ul e 60(b)(1), a c ou rtm ay vaca t e afi nal j ud gm entor order upo n a show i ng of “ m i st ake, i nadv ert ence , s urpr i s e , ore xc us abl e ne gl e c t . ” F e d. R . C i v. P . 60( b) ( 1) . A s e xpl i c i t l y s t a t e d i n the rul e , how e ve r , R ul e 60( b) ( 1) m ot i ons m us tbe f i l e d, i f a ta l l , w i thi n ay e a rof

the order bei ng ent er ed. T urner v. S ec . of A i r F orce , 94 4 F . 2d 80 4, 80 7 (11 th C i r.11

1991) . H e r e , the di s tr i c tc our te nt e r e d i t s or de rdi s m i s s i ng O l m s t e a d’ s c i vi l a c t i on o n J a n u a ry 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 . O lm s te a d , h o w e v e r , d id n o t f ile th e in s ta n t a m e n d e d R u le 60 (b) m ot i on un t i l A pri l 6, 20 05 . T hu s, re gardl es s of w hether O l m st ea d p roved “m is ta k e , in a d v e r te n c e , s u rp r is e , o re x c u s ab le n e g le c t,” h is m o tio n w a s u n tim e ly to th e e x te n t h e w a s r e ly in g o n R u le 6 0 ( b ) ( 1 ) , a n d th e c o u rt d id n o t ab u s e its d is c r e tio n in d e n y in g it. S e e T u rn e r , 9 4 4 F .2 d a t 8 0 7 . T o th e e x te n t O lm s te a d a ls o w a s r e ly in g o n R u le 6 0 ( b ) ( 6 ) , th is “c a tc h a ll” s ubs e c t i on pr ovi de s tha tthe c our tm a y r e l i e ve apa r ty f r om af i na l or de rba s e d on

“ any other r ea son j ust i fy i ng re l i ef fr om the op er at i on of the j ud gm ent . ” F e d. R . C i v. P . 60( b) ( 6) . A m ova ntne e d notf i l e aR ul e 60( b) ( 6) m ot i on w i thi n a y e a rof the e ntry of

the j udgm e nt , a s l ong a s the m ot i on i s f i l e d w i thi n a “r e a s o n ab le tim e .” I d .; s e e a ls o D a m ia n o v . F .D .I .C ., 1 0 4 F .3 d3 2 8 , 3 3 2 n .4 ( 1 1 th C ir . 1 9 9 7 ) ( R u le 6 0 ( b ) ( 6 ) “h a s n o s tr ic t tim e lim ita tio n o f aju r is d ic tio n a l n a tu r e ” ) . T h is r e m e d y , h o w e v e r , is in te n d e d “o n ly f o re x tr a o r d in a ry c ir c u m s ta n c e s .” T o o le v. B a xt e rH e a l thc a r e C orp. , 235 F . 3d 1307, 1316 ( 11th C i r . 2000) . T hus , “ [ the m ov ant ] m ustdo m ore than sho w thata gra ntof i t s m ot i on m i gh thave been w a rr a nt e d. [ T he m ova nt ] m us tde m ons tr a t e aj us t i f i c a t i on f orr e l i e f s o c om pe l l i ng th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u r t w a s r e q u ir e d to g r an t [ th e ] m o tio n .” R ic e v . F o r d M o to rC o ., 8 8 F .3 d 9 1 4 , 9 1 9 ( 1 1 th C ir . 1 9 9 6 ) ( e m p h a s is in o r ig in a l) .12

A s s um i ng tha tO l m s t e a d f i l e d hi s a m e nde d R ul e 60( b) m ot i on w i thi n a

“ r e a s onabl e t i m e , ” the de f e nda nt s a r e a r gui ng tha tR ul e 60( b) ( 6) r e l i e f w a s not ju s tif ie d b e c au s e O lm s te a d d e c id e d to f ile an o tic e o f

v o lu n ta ry d is m is s a l o f

h is ci vi l ac t i on t o avo i d the po ss i bl e r eper cuss i on s of hi s r ej ec t i ng se tt l em entoffe rs m a de by the de f

e nda nt s . M or e ove r , the y ha ve c i t e d a s pr oof of thi s i nt e ntt o the fa ctthatO l m st ea d fi l ed the i nst antR ul e 60(b) act i on w i thi n a w ee k o f the di stri ct court ’ s e ntryof i t s orderre st at i ng thatthe proceedi ng s i n O l m st ea d II w er e s t ay ed pend i ng the paym entof fe es and cost s O l m st ea d i ncurred by di sm i ss i ng O l m st ea d I . I nde e d, w e c onc l ude d i n W a dde l l tha tadi s tr i c tc our tdi d notabus e i t s di s c r e t i on b y d en yi n g rel i ef u n d er R u l e 6 0 (b )(3 ), w h en i tw as th e p l ai n t i ffs’ t act i cal d eci si o n s, i ns t e a d of

de f e nda nt ’ s f

r aud, tha tha d pr e ve nt e d the pl a i nt i f f s f r om f ul l y pr e s e nt i ng th e irc a s e . S e e W a d d e ll, 3 2 9 F .3 d a t 1 3 1 0 . N everthel es s, w e nee d n otdet erm i ne w hether O l m st ea d’ s vol un t ary d ism issa l w as m o ti v ated b y th is p u rp o se . E v en as su m in g as tru e O lm stea d ’s a r gum e nttha the a c t e d ba s e d on “ pe r s ona l c ons i de r a t i ons , ” tha ti s , he ( 1) di d not h a v e e n o u g h tim e to f

ile th e n e c e s s a ry p ap e rw o rkto p r o te c t h is p r iv a c y in te r e s ts du ri ng the course of the l i t i gat i on , and (2) fi rs tneeded t o “ re sol ve the un expect ed r e c u rr e n c e o f

a n o p p o r tu n is tic in f

e c tio n ( “O I ” ) a n d o n s e t o f an e w O I ,” h e f

a ile d to pr e s e nte vi de nc e s how i ng, ore ve n t o e xpl a i n, w hy he c oul d not , i ns t e a d, ha veTo the extent Olmstead’s appe al ca n be construe d as ag ain arguing that relief under 8 Rule 60(b) wa s warranted be causethe def endants were unc ooperative in respondingto discovery re qu e sts , his reme dy

wa s tofi lea

motion whileOlmste ad I

wa s p ending , s e e kingan o rder to c omp e l or to impo sesanc tio ns . Se eDeva ney v. Contin ental Ins . Co ., 98 9 F .2 d 1 15 4, 11 59 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (explaining that Rule 37(b) (2) a uthorizes a court to impose sanc tions upon a party or an attorney

for f ailure to obey

a cour t order to provide or permit discovery ). Olmste ad h a s c ite d toRandall v . M errillLy nch, 82 0 F .2 d 1 31 7 (D. C. C ir . 1 98 7) , in 9 support of his argument that a combination of his health and financ ial considerations were sufficient to just ifying Rule 60(b) re lief. However, in addition to consti tuting non-binding authority, the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Randall involved a challeng e to a district cour t’s grant of Rule 60(b) re lief, instead of an appe al of a

denial of such relief

. See Randall, 820 F.2d at 1321. Indeed, theD.C. Circuit explained in Randall that “a trial court enjoys a larg e mea sure of discretion in dec iding whether to grant or deny a F ed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion.” See id. at 1320. 13 m o v ed fo r a st ay i n th e p ro ceed i n g s. O l m st ead , th u s, fai l ed t o sh o w th atth ese 8 c i r c um s t a nc e s w e r e “ e xtr a or di na ry . ” S e e T ool e , 235 F . 3d a t1316. 9 I n a d d itio n , to th e e x te n t O lm s te a d h a s a r g u e d th a t th e c o u r t ab u s e d its di s c r e t i on i n de ny i ng hi s R ul e 60( b) m ot i on be c aus e he w a s pr oc e e di ng w i thout co u n sel , a d efen d an t ’ s p ro se st atu s i n ci v i l l i t i g at i o n g en eral l y w i l l n o tex cu se m i s t a ke s he m a ke s r e ga r di ng pr oc e dur a l rul e s . S e e M c N e i l v. U ni t e d S t a t e s , 508 U . S . 106, 113, 113 S . C t . 1980, 1984, 124 L . E d. 2d 21 ( 1993) ( e xpl a i ni ng tha tthe C our t“ ne ve r[ ha d] s ugge s t e d tha tpr oc e dur a l rul e s i n or di na ry c i vi l l i t i ga t i on s houl d be i nt e rpr e t e d s o a s t o e xc us e m i s t a ke s by thos e w ho pr oc e e d w i thout coun se l , ” bec ause “ experi ence t ea ches thatstri ctadherence t o the procedural re qu i re m ent s s peci fi ed by the l egi sl ature i s the bestgu ar ant ee of evenhand ed a d m in is tr a tio n o f

th e la w ” ) ; s e e a ls o W a y n e v . J a rv is , 1 9 7 F .3 d1 0 9 8 , 1 1 0 4 ( 1 1 th C i r. 1 9 9 9 ) (h o l d i n g th atl i b eral co n stru ct i o n o f th e p l ead i n g req u i rem en t s fo r p ro se14

l i t i ga nt s doe s note qua t e w i th l i be r a l de a dl i ne s ) . M or e ove r , r e l i e f c a nnotbe g r a n te d u n d e rR u le 6 0 ( b ) ( 6 ) if it c o u ld h a v e b e e n o b ta in e d u n d e rR u le 6 0 ( b ) ( 1 ) . S ee Ja ckson v . S eabo ar d C oastL i ne R . C o. , 67 8 F . 2d 99 2, 10 20 n. 38 (11th C i r. 1 9 8 2 ). O l m st ead , th erefo re, fai l ed t o ci t e t o a j u st i fi cat i o n fo r rel i ef th atw as “ so c om pe l l i ng tha tthe di s tr i c tc our tw a s r e qui r e d t o gr a nt[ the ] m ot i on, ” a nd the di stri ctcourtdi d abu se i t s di sc re t i on i n d enyi ng re l i ef un der R ul e 60(b)(6). S ee R ic e , 8 8 F .3 d a t 9 1 9 . A c c or di ngl y , w e c onc l ude tha tno ba s i s f orR ul e 60( b) r e l i e f

e xi s t e d, a nd thatthe di stri ctcourtdi d n otabuse i t s di sc re t i on i n d enyi ng O l m st ea d’ s a m ended Ru l e 6 0 ( b ) mo t i o n . W e , th e r e f o r e , a f f i rm. AF F IRMED.