IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0677-22

LARRY JEAN HART, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS COUNTY

MCCLURE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which HERVEY, 

RICHARDSON, NEWELL, and WALKER, JJ., joined. RICHARDSON, J., filed a 

concurring opinion in which HERVEY and NEWELL, JJ., joined. KELLER, P.J., 

filed a dissenting opinion in which YEARY, KEEL and SLAUGHTER, JJ., joined. 

YEARY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which KELLER, P.J., and KEEL, J., 

joined. KEEL, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which KELLER, P.J. and YEARY,

J., joined.

O P I N I O N
HART — 2 

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting rap videos during the guilt phase 

of trial to show the defendant’s character and sophistication where their prejudice 

outweighs their proposed use? Yes. In this case, any probative value of the rap videos and 

lyrics was outweighed by the overwhelming potential for prejudice and confusing the 

issues. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the trial court for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

BACKGROUND 

On June 21, 2017, Appellant drove an acquaintance, who he claimed only knew by 

the nickname “Mondo,”1 and three other individuals2 unknown to him to an apartment 

complex in Dallas where the complainant, Michael Gardner, lived. As of the day of trial, 

the identity of the other passengers in Appellant’s vehicle were unknown. Appellant 

testified that he remained in the car with his four-way flashers on while the passengers 

robbed the complainant and shot him to death. However, surveillance video from a parking 

lot behind complainant’s apartment shows four people entering the complainant’s 

apartment. Further, a 9-1-1 caller said four people were running from the apartment. The 

State charged Appellant with capital murder while committing or attempting to commit the 

felony offense of burglary. 

According to Appellant’s statements to police and at trial, when Appellant was at 

an apartment complex visiting his godbrother, Mondo asked Appellant for the ride and told 

1 Also referred to in the record and at trial as “Little Partner,” or “Little Mon.”

2 During the interview by police, Appellant told Detective Pedro Trujillano that he only drove three people 

to the apartment. At trial, Appellant testified that he was driving, there was someone in the passenger seat 

and two people in the back. 
HART — 3

Appellant that they were going to “break in” to Mondo’s uncle’s house. Although 

Appellant was unable to explain another reason for the trip, he denied believing Mondo 

that the four were going to “break in” to the apartment. Appellant’s theory at trial largely 

comported with his initial statements to law enforcement: he gave a ride to some 

individuals as a favor but had no idea the group planned to commit a robbery or murder. 

Appellant testified at trial to this effect. When Appellant’s counsel began to ask 

whether the fact he called one of other passengers “little partner” meant he had a close 

relationship with him, Appellant answered:

A. No Sir, I just—I just use certain words like—I just have certain meanings 

for a lot of words. I mean, I don’t have—I guess the right comprehension 

skills to just—you know, referring to somebody as the right thing because 

I was always around just how I say words or just the people I’m around 

or just—it just—it rolls out of me, yes, sir.

Q. So the—so you understand that this trial is about what—what it looks like 

some people did that you gave them a ride to. Do you understand that?

A. Can you repeat that, Mr. Cox?

Q. Okay. You understand that—

The Court then excused the jury to conduct a competency evaluation. Dr. Lisa 

Clayton, who evaluated Appellant, found that Appellant was competent, but had a low IQ. 

Defense counsel requested to call Dr. Clayton as a witness before the jury, but the court 

denied the request. As a proffer of proof, however, Dr. Clayton was allowed to testify 

before the court as to the following: 

• Appellant has a below-average IQ in the range of 70–80. 

• An IQ of 55–65 is considered intellectual disability.
HART — 4

• Due to Appellant’s IQ and history, he would be more likely to seek approval 

from others. 

• Appellant’s IQ makes him naïve and unable to think abstractly about motives 

or consequences.

• When Appellant is under stress he might freeze or be unable to remember 

things.

The jury never heard Dr. Clayton’s conclusions regarding Appellant’s diminished 

IQ and Appellant continued his testimony. He told the jury that he only knew Mondo by 

his nickname, he didn’t see him very often, he couldn’t remember what he was thinking 

about giving him a ride, but he was unaware he was giving Mondo a ride to commit a 

crime. He testified that he learned a burglary and murder happened about twenty-four hours 

later and “It made [him] feel like real dumb. It made [him] feel . . . it wasn’t right.”

When Appellant’s testimony on direct examination concluded, the State moved to 

introduce “character evidence,” or evidence of his “level of sophistication” through 

YouTube rap videos “relat[ing] to his ability to understand what people are communicating 

to him and form his own opinions about things.”

The first video does not depict Appellant but is a picture of three cartoon cough 

syrup bottles affixed with cartoon faces of the three wise monkeys. The photo also depicts 

the name of the song “I.W.T.” (I Won’t Tell) and Appellant’s rap name, “Block Da Foo 

Foo.” The second rap video the State sought to introduce depicts Appellant amongst a 

crowd inside a house. The crowd is dancing and singing, and Appellant appears to be 

rapping the lyrics which make references to weapons, cough syrup, and being a “trap king.”
HART — 5

Appellant objected on grounds of relevance, that the State never proved Appellant 

wrote the lyrics, how long it took him to come up with the lyrics, or if the voice is 

Appellant’s since Appellant appears to be lip-syncing in the video. He also objected that 

“this song is a glorification of criminal activity, including guns and drugs and violence. 

And in a case like this, its prejudicial effect would be quite significant...its prejudicial 

effect significantly outweighs [its] probative value.” In response, the court noted that 

Appellant “certainly” brought his character into question based on his testimony.” The trial 

court overruled all of Appellant’s objections “because the Defendant testified as to him 

being friendly, [which] opened the door to the character witness evidence . . . in addition 

to the rest of his testimony.” Defense counsel then requested that Dr. Clayton be allowed 

to testify given that the State was putting on evidence of cognitive ability. The trial court 

never ruled on that request in the record, and the issue does not appear within the record 

again.

The State then pursued the following line of questioning to admit the videos:

Q. ...Are you a rapper, Mr. Hart?

A. I mean, I do—I do rap, but that’s—that’s just a hobby I have. It’s—it’s I 

write lyrics, that’s it. 

. . .

Q. Do you currently have two rap videos?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. And one of those is called I Won’t Tell?

A. Yes, ma’am.
HART — 6

Q. And the other one is called the Dirty Dusty; is that right?

A. No, that’s the artist. 

The trial court admitted both videos over Appellant’s objections, and the State 

continued its cross-examination:

Q. Mr. Hart, what is the meaning of I Won’t Tell? What are you referring to?

A. I mean, this song—I mean, I have no reason—no meaning to that. It’s just 

I—I like to rap. It’s—

Q. Okay. Could you possibly be referring to this case, you won’t tell?

A. No, ma’am.

Q. Okay. It’s just convenient that it matches up?

A. It’s—it’s just a song, ma’am.

As far as the second rap video, Appellant testified that the other rapper in the video 

“he totally wrote my version for me.” He denied holding cough syrup and stated they were 

empty bottles the group “wrap[ped] labels on.” Moreover, he emphasized he doesn’t own 

any guns. When asked what it means to be a “trap king,” Appellant responded, “ . . . you 

probably hear of [Gucci] Mane, Jay-Z. And I know you have heard of these guys because 

they’re [mainstream] artists. They talk about it all the time.”3

3 Urban dictionary identifies “trap king” as “an exuberant drug dealer that hones a 

legendary street stature.” See Urban Dictionary, available at 

https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=trap%20king [last accessed Jan, 10, 2024]. 

Trap king references are near-ubiquitous in southern “trap” music. See e.g. GUCCI MANE, BIG CAT 

INTRO (2007); 2 CHAINZ, EL CHAPO JR (Def Jam Recordings 2015) (“I’m the king of the trap”); 

YO GOTTI, TRAP QUEEN FREESTYLE (CMG Records 2015) (“and I’m the trap king”); TOREY 

LANEZ, BARTENDERS & SPENDERS (2017) (“Trap king getting’ to the bands though”); FREDO 

SANTANA FT. KEVIN GATES, KEEP GETTING’ MONEY (RBC Records & Savage Squad Records 

2015) (“Trap king, introduce you to my kitchen”).
HART — 7 

Appellant’s denial of owning any guns led the State to introduce additional rap lyrics

and photos, this time posted on Facebook, referencing guns.4 The court again overruled 

relevancy and prejudice objections from Appellant. Still on cross-examination, Appellant 

explained that the posts were either lyrics written by other people or slang that he didn’t 

intend to imply possessing weapons. 

The defense closed its case by calling Appellant’s mother to testify that Appellant 

spent a significant amount of time in remedial courses, that he was bullied as a child, that 

he doesn’t often understand others’ intentions, and that he is eager to please people. 

The jury returned a guilty verdict and sentenced Appellant to life without parole. 

APPEAL 

On direct appeal, Appellant argued the trial court erred when it introduced the rap 

videos, Facebook posts, his oral statement to law enforcement, and a witness’s credibility 

opinion. He further argued the trial court erred when it excluded Dr. Clayton’s testimony 

about Appellant’s intelligence. A majority of the panel upheld the trial court’s ruling on 

the evidence. Hart v. State, No. 05-19-01394-CR, 2022 WL 3754537 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

Aug. 30, 2022)(mem. op., not designated for publication). As to the rap videos specifically, 

4 “You know I draw down. You draw attention, slime.” Appellant replied that the verse 

was a Young Thug lyric. It actually comes from the Lil Wayne and Chocolate Droppa’s (Kevin 

Hart) 2016 BET Hip Hop Awards performance. LIL WAYNE & CHOCOLATE DROPPA, BET HIP HOP 

AWARDS – CYPHER 6 (2016). Appellant likely confused the lyric with Young Thug’s “Draw 

Down.” YOUNG THUG, DRAW DOWN (2015). 

“[P]ull up with them straps on me like Steve Urkel,” is a commonly-used metaphor, but 

appears verbatim in “Just Made a Play.” YOUNGBOY NEVER BROKE AGAIN, JUST MADE A PLAY

(2017). 

“The best advice I can give my lil n*****, don’t get caught.” Again, Appellant was 

adamant that the verse belongs to another rapper. It does. GUCCI MANE, STRIPPA (Paper Route 

Empire 2016). 
HART — 8

the majority held that the rap videos were relevant to guilt or innocence in that they were a 

“small nudge toward proving a fact of consequence — specifically, appellant’s ability to 

comprehend, and to form intent regarding [] [Mondo]’s plan to break into Gardner’s 

home.” Id. at *7 (quoting Stewart v. State, 129 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) 

(internal quotation marks removed)). Because Appellant put his credulity at issue in his 

testimony and offered evidence to that effect, the appellate court held, it was not error to 

admit evidence rebutting it. Id. 

The court of appeals also undertook a balancing test under Rule 403. TEX. R. EVID.

403. The court first noted that the evidence held considerable relevance as it rebutted

Appellant’s “limited communication and comprehension skills.” Id. at *8. The court of 

appeals noted Appellant’s argument that introduction of the videos encouraged the jury to 

“vilify Appellant’s character for cultural reasons,” but held the trial court could have 

concluded the State’s need for the evidence outweighed such considerations. Id. As to the 

potential for misleading the jury, the court of appeals agreed: “the evidence did have 

potential to impress the jury in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way.” Id. at *8 

(quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, it did not find the trial court’s ruling constituted 

a clear abuse of discretion. Id. 

The dissent agreed that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(a)(2)(A) as 

character evidence but should ultimately have been excluded under Rule 403. Hart, 2022 

WL 3754537 at *16 (Reichek, J., dissenting). Justice Reichek explained: 
HART — 9

Gangsta rap like that at issue in this case is characterized by ‘lyric formulas,’ 

a key one of which involved fictionalized bragging about the performer’s 

‘badness’ vis-à-vis criminal behavior . . . The genre often emphasizes 

violence in inner cities albeit not necessarily in an accurate manner.

Id. (citing Erin Lutes, et. al., When Music Takes the Stand: A Content Analysis of 

How Courts Use and Misuse Rap Lyrics in Criminal Cases, 46 AM. J. CRIM. L. 77, 84 

(2019); Nicholas Stoia, Kyle Adams & Kevin Drakulich, Rap Lyrics as Evidence: What 

Can Music Theory Tell Us?, 8 RACE & JUST. 300, 330–34 (2018). Justice Reichek also 

noted persistent bias about rap and rap artists meant that introduction of the evidence would 

have an enormous prejudicial effect and, because the State never proved Appellant 

authored the lyrics to anything introduced, the rap “shed no light on appellant’s ability to 

communicate with words, because these weren’t his words at all.” Even assuming 

Appellant wrote the lyrics to “’I Won’t Tell,’ there was no evidence of the ease with which 

he wrote these lyrics, how long it took him to write them, or whether anyone assisted him.” 

Id. at *17. Of the lyrics introduced, this song was the least sophisticated and did not 

establish a connection with any fact of consequence is the case. As a result, Justice Reichek 

wrote, any perceived probative value was vastly outweighed by the prejudicial effect. Id.

Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review echoing the appellate court’s 

dissent and arguing that court erred when it minimized the “harm, bias, and prejudice 

injected into the trial” by virtue of the rap videos and Facebook pages. We granted review 

and, for the reasons set forth below, agree with Appellant, reverse the judgment of the court 

of appeals, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HART — 10 

LAW 

Standard of Review 

We review a trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse 

of discretion. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). This Court 

will not reverse the ruling of the trial court except where there has been a clear abuse of 

discretion falling outside the “zone of reasonable disagreement.” Montgomery v. State, 810 

S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Although appellate courts offer wide deference 

to trial courts, “appellate supervision” is necessary in cases of abused discretion. Id. at 392 

(quoting 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 

5249 & 5250 (1978), at 540, 544). Moreover, “[t]he trial court has no ‘right’ to be ‘wrong’ 

if that means to admit evidence which appears to the appellate court, affording all due 

deference to the trial court’s decision, nevertheless to be substantially more prejudicial than 

probative.” Id. at 392–93. 

Rule 403 

Texas Rule of Evidence 403 is one of judicial economy. It excludes otherwise 

relevant evidence when the costs of admission outweigh its utility. It reads: “The [trial] 

court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 

danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 

the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. 

To determine whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403, Texas appellate courts will 

use the Montgomery factors: (1) the strength of the evidence’s probative value, (2) the 

potential for the evidence to “impress the jury in some irrational but nevertheless indelible 
HART — 11 

way,” (3) The amount of time required at trial to develop the evidence, and (4) the 

proponent’s need for the evidence. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389–90. 

ANALYSIS 

Appellant’s Rap Videos 

(1) Probative Value 

The initial step in using a 403 balancing test is identifying the probative value of the 

evidence. Hall v. State, No. AP-77,062, 2021 WL 5823345 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2021). 

Evidence is probative if it tends to make a fact of consequence more or less likely. TEX. R.

EVID. 401(a). Moreover, the State has a need for the evidence where it would prove some 

consequential fact unavailable from other sources. See Manning v. State, 114 S.W.3d 922, 

927–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Probative value is the first Montgomery factor. 810 

S.W.2d at 389–90. 

In the instant case, Appellant did not dispute the fact he drove three individuals to 

the apartment complex where the complainant lived, or that those same individuals 

committed a burglary of the complainant’s apartment, shot him, and left him for dead. 

Rather, Appellant contested a single fact at trial, one of great consequence to the State’s 

case: Appellant did not understand that he was driving the group to commit a robbery and 

murder. The parties’ opening and closing statements reflect this. The State emphasized: 

The Defendant knew. He had been in an apartment complex not far away 

from the victim’s apartment. He knew that he and a group of people were 

planning to commit a crime. He knew he agreed to commit that crime. He 

knew they were going to go and commit burglary. They were going to steal 

some things. And he agreed to take four people to the victim’s apartment 

complex. He agreed to sit there and wait. 
HART — 12

The State relied in part on Appellant’s statement to the police for this proposition.

In the statement, Appellant tells the officers that when he drove the group to the 

complainant’s apartment, he was told they were “breaking into [Mondo’s] uncle’s house.”

The State also pointed out inconsistencies in Appellant’s testimony: that he said there were 

only three people in the car when there were actually four; that he knew folks at his 

godbrother’s apartment complex to carry guns but didn’t see any on the night in question; 

that he was only going to wait in the parking lot for five minutes when he really waited 

eleven; and, that the other individuals didn’t have anything when they can be seen carrying 

something on surveillance. Through surveillance footage, the State also sought to prove 

that Appellant drove by the complainant’s vehicle in the parking lot to “mak[e] sure the 

victim’s car [was] there.” It further introduced evidence that following the murder and his 

own conversations with police, Appellant made internet searches on his phone for “[D]allas 

murders 2017” and “if you was driver on a murder.” The State also pointed out that 

Appellant went back to the apartments where Mondo and the other individuals spent time, 

despite his earlier claim that involvement in the crime “scared [him] to death.”5 Finally, 

the State asked Detective Trujillano:

Q. And if somebody knew that his friends had guns and chose to go along to 

commit a felony at this time of night on that particular day, looked for the 

car to make sure he’s there, would you say that that person should have 

anticipated that a capital murder would result?

Detective Trujillano: Yes. 

5 During his testimony, Appellant said that what he meant by being scared was: “It just was like a car was 

so close to me – well, it was close with cars flying that same day. Yes, sir.” 
HART — 13

After the State rested, Appellant put on his case-in-chief consisting primarily of his 

own testimony alleging he is a nice person who does favors for others such as giving them 

rides and that he did not understand the implications behind the statements and actions of 

the individuals in his car. In response, the State moved to introduce the complained-of rap 

lyrics, alleging they were relevant as “character evidence,” rebutting Appellant’s testimony 

that he is a “friendly person,” that he is not sophisticated, and that he is “not good with 

literature.” According to the State, the proffered evidence, in addition to proving Appellant 

was a “bad person,” “relate[s] to his ability to understand what people are communicating 

to him and form his own opinions about things.”

In response, Appellant objected primarily that the videos were not actually relevant 

to sophistication and comprehension because there was no evidence Appellant wrote the 

lyrics, was singing them as opposed to lip-syncing, or, if he did, “how long it took him to 

write them.” The State offered no proof Appellant wrote the lyrics introduced, and 

Appellant contested that in his testimony, alleging most of the lyrics were written for him 

or were lyrics borrowed from other rap artists. 

As outlined above, a certain piece of evidence is probative if it “tend[s] to make a 

fact more or less probable...” TEX. R. EVID. 401(a). Here, the song Appellant did not 

dispute he wrote, “I.W.T,” was probative of his comprehension skills. As Justice Reichek 

noted in her dissent, the lyrics to the song are not “profound,” but nevertheless “‘provide[] 

a small nudge toward . . . disproving some fact of consequence,’ in this case, his ability to 

comprehend what people tell him.” Hart v. State, No. 05-19-01394-CR, 2022 WL 3754537 
HART — 14 

at *15 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2022, pet. granted) (Reichek, J., dissenting) (quoting 

Stewart v. State, 129 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). 

As to the second song, “Off Days,” although Appellant disputed having written the 

lyrics, and the State produced no evidence he had, the song and video was probative in so 

far as Appellant claimed he had no prior knowledge about criminal activity in Dallas being 

different than it was where he was from in Greenville. 

The court below concluded that “evidence of appellant’s ability to rap, lip sync, or

post lyrics about crime is a ‘small nudge’ toward proving a ‘fact of consequence’—

specifically, appellant’s ability to comprehend, and to form intent regarding, little partner’s 

plan to break into Gardner’s home.” Hart, 2022 WL 3754537 at *17. Assuming this is 

correct, we must consider whether the value of this probative evidence is outweighed by 

its potential for unfair prejudice. For this, we continue to the second Montgomery factor. 

(2) Time Needed to Develop the Evidence

As a secondary inquiry, we ask how much trial time was dedicated to the 

development of the evidence such that its introduction caused undue delay. Montgomery, 

810 S.W.2d at 389–90. This factor focuses on the time needed “to develop the evidence, 

during which the jury [is] distracted from consideration of the indicted offense.” State v.

Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 

390. Because the concern is the extent to which the jury is distracted from considering the 

charged offense, we hold that the time needed to develop the character evidence necessarily 

includes any testimony introduced regarding the evidence, including cross-examination, 

redirect examination, and any rebuttal offered by the defense in response to the evidence. 
HART — 15 

Accordingly, the State developed the rap videos when Appellant took the stand in 

his own defense. The time needed to develop the rap lyric video evidence amounted to 

about six pages out of the fifteen pages of the record of Appellant’s cross-examination of 

by the State. During the cross-examination, the State played the videos. The time of each 

video was 4 minutes and 13 seconds and 3 minutes and 17 seconds; however, the State 

would periodically pause the video to discuss certain video images or specific lyrics. The 

entire re-direct examination was devoted to the rap video evidence. Appellant’s testimony 

consisted of 45 pages of the record. Eight (8) pages of the record were exclusively focused 

on the rap videos. Five (5) were exclusively focused on Appellant’s photos and rap lyrics 

from his Facebook postings. Therefore, approximately twenty-eight percent of Appellant’s 

testimony was spent on the extraneous evidence. Evidence that consumes such an 

inordinate amount of time has the potential to confuse or distract the jury from the main 

issues. See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of 

exclusion. 

(3) Prejudicial Dangers

Turning to the third Montgomery factor, we address “the potential the ‘other crimes, 

wrongs, or acts’ have to impress the jury in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way.” 

Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390. This “unfair prejudice” question asks whether the 

evidence has a “tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,” usually emotional in 

nature. Valadez v. State, 663 S.W.3d 133, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). 

While Texas has not yet addressed this issue, courts in other jurisdictions have 

recognized that the admission of rap music or rap videos is highly prejudicial due to the 
HART — 16 

nature of the lyrics that distract from the charged offense. See e.g. Baker v. State, 2024 Ga. 

LEXIS 64, 2024 WL 923100 (holding the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a 

portion of a rap music video into evidence at defendant’s trial for malice murder because 

it created a substantial danger of unfair prejudice by improperly portraying defendant as 

having a propensity for violence); United States v. Gamory, 635 F3d 480, 493 (11th Cir. 

2011) (explaining that the admission of a rap video containing explicit lyrics dealing with 

drugs, sex, profanity, degradation of women, firearms, and violence was error and “heavily 

prejudicial” ); State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496, 521 (95 A3d 236) (2014) (“Finally, the 

prejudicial effect of defendant's graphically violent rap lyrics overwhelms any probative 

value that they may have”); and, Commonwealth v. Gray, 463 Mass. 731, 756 (978 NE2d 

543) (2012) (explaining that the rap video had a prejudicial impact on the jury). 

In United States v. Bey, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that lyrics in rap 

songs often contain inflammatory material that is entirely irrelevant to the case at hand 

which risks inflaming the jurors and have no bearing whatsoever as to whether the 

defendant committed the offense charged. No. CR 16-290, 2017 WL 1547006 at *6 (E.D. 

Pa. Apr. 28, 2017)(“Rap lyrics are not necessarily autobiographical statements; rather, rap 

music is a well-recognized musical genre that often utilizes exaggeration, metaphor, and 

braggadocio for the purpose of artistic expression.”). 

But by no means is rap the exclusive genre for glorification of criminal activity.

Most song lyrics are often fictitious or exaggerations of real events. Other than Taylor 

Swift who is known to write songs based on her personal experiences, it is not reasonable 

to assume that all lyrics are autobiographical as to past or future conduct, unless there is 
HART — 17 

direct evidence to suggest otherwise. Holding song lyrics to their literal meaning would 

lead to the following conclusions: Freddie Mercury “killed a man,”6 Bob Marley “shot the 

sheriff,”7 Macy Gray “committed murder and . . . got away,”8 the band formerly known as 

The Dixie Chicks killed Earl,9

 and classically, Johnny Cash “shot a man just to watch him 

die.”10 These are conclusions we cannot accept outside of some other evidence 

demonstrating the lyrics are something more than fiction. See Smith v. Deville, 2020 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 130699 (E.D. La., Apr. 16, 2020)(admitting two rap videos but not another 

where the admissible videos specifically described the subject of the charge and the 

inadmissible video did not); United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793, 820 (11th Cir. 

2010) (finding no abuse of discretion when defendant performed the song and described 

violence and killing that was pertinent to defendant's charges under the Torture 

Act); Gamory, 635 F.3d at 485-93 (finding abuse of discretion in admitting videos 

performed by a non-defendant that corroborated the defendant’s general lifestyle but were 

cumulative of other testimony and highly prejudicial due to the violence, profanity, and 

general lawlessness); United States v. Stuckey, 253 F. App’x 468, 473-82 (6th Cir. 

2007) (unpublished) (finding no abuse of discretion in admission of rap lyrics that 

described killing snitches and Government witnesses “wrapping them in blankets” and 

6 QUEEN, “Bohemian Rhapsody” on A NIGHT AT THE OPERA (1975). 

7 BOB MARLEY AND THE WAILERS, “I Shot the Sheriff” on BURNIN’ (1973). 

8 MACY GRAY, “I’ve Committed Murder” on HOW LIFE IS (1999). 9 DIXIE CHICKS, “Goodbye Earl” on FLY (1999).

10 JOHNNY CASH, “Folsom Prison Blues” on JOHNNY CASH WITH HIS HOT AND BLUE GUITAR! (1957).
HART — 18 

“dumping their bodies in the street,” which was exactly what the Government accused the 

defendant of doing).

The videos introduced by the State were a glorification of criminal activity. The 

lyrics and videos included references to illicit drugs, criminal activity in general (“dirty 

money”), snitching, owning weapons, degrading women, and, classically, being a “trap 

king.” As discussed above, other courts have recognized that the content of these songs 

and videos can unduly prejudice the jury because music can impact a jury in an emotional 

way.11 As in many of those cases, there is no question here that the introduction of 

Appellant’s rap videos encouraged the jury to convict him on the improper basis that he is 

a criminal generally or associates with criminals generally. This is because any song that 

glorifies criminality, regardless of genre, is inherently prejudicial. The danger associated 

with playing these videos to the jury is that the jury might regard creative expression as 

proof that Appellant engaged in criminal behavior based upon his rap videos instead of 

regarding them as nothing more than creative expression. This is problematic in 

Appellant’s case for two reasons. First, Appellant lacked the inherent familiarity of a 

popular artist that provides the ability to disassociate the artist with the individual. Unlike 

an easily recognizable pop star, the listener cannot disassociate “Block Da Foo Foo” from 

the message. Second, the subject matter in the expression is itself 

inflammatory. Regardless of the genre, inflammatory lyrics create the potential that the 

11 See Jason B. Binimow, Admissibility of Rap Lyrics or Videos in Criminal Prosecutions, 43 A.L.R. 7th

Art. 1 (2019) (inventorying American caselaw excluding or admitting rap lyrics and videos on the basis of 

their prejudice relative to their probative value). 
HART — 19

jury could ascribe character assessments to the defendant based on the content of the music 

he listened to or lyrics he wrote. Said plainly, music lyrics do not prove anything about the 

character of the person who listens to the music or lip syncs to it on video.

“[W]e don’t convict people for murder simply because they have written lyrics 

about murder.” Stuckey, 253 F. Appx. at 483. To the Sixth Circuit’s point, we certainly 

wouldn’t convict a person of murder for rapping about drinking, drugs, and guns. Here, the 

State did not offer anything demonstrating that the lyrics and video were somehow 

representative of Appellant’s character in that they applied outside of the artistic rendering, 

nor did they demonstrate that, even if they had some real-world application, it was relevant 

to the charged offense. This factor therefore weighs heavily in favor of exclusion. 

(4) State’s Need

The State’s need for this evidence was weak. As discussed above, the State had 

several other available options to address Appellant’s mental state when he drove the 

individuals to the complainant’s apartment. These methods included Appellant’s statement 

that Mondo told him they were going to “break in” to his uncle’s house, inconsistencies or 

“evasiveness” in the same statement, surveillance footage of Appellant pulling the car 

around the parking lot prior to letting the other individuals out of the car, Appellant’s 

internet-search activity in the days following the murder, and the fact Appellant 

subsequently visited the apartments again despite being purportedly “scared to death” at 

the time of the shooting. This evidence tended to show Appellant was aware of the 

circumstances surrounding the trip to the complainant’s apartment. As a result, we find this 

factor weighs in favor of exclusion. 
HART — 20

Weighing the Factors

Considering the extreme danger of prejudice resulting from introduction of 

Appellant’s rap videos, admission of the videos was error under Rule 403. The videos’ 

probative value was incredibly weak, especially where the State introduced no evidence 

that Appellant authored the lyrics, or merely memorized them. Was he actually singing or 

was he lip syncing? Did he have any assistance in becoming proficient enough to perform, 

and how long did it take for him to be able to “successfully” pull off the performance? 

Without answers to these questions, using the video introduced in this trial was 

unfairly prejudicial, and proved very little about his intellectual capabilities. The videos 

did not reflect any significant amount of credulity or articulacy, and were not relevant to 

Appellant’s character, since there was no evidence outside of the lyrics themselves 

corroborating that Appellant was a violent or unfriendly person. In fact, the State conceded 

at oral argument that the mere act of lip syncing a song (regardless of the genre) does not 

make one a friendly or unfriendly person. Instead, the State seemed to focus more on the 

usage of the videos for the purpose of refuting Appellant’s claim that he was slow and not 

good with language and was oblivious to any sort of criminal activity occurring around 

him. However, the State had other evidence to demonstrate Appellant’s knowledge of 

criminal activity and potential association with that activity other than the videos and had 

the opportunity to cross-examine Appellant’s mother, who presumably would have much 

more pertinent, relevant insight into Appellant’s ability to understand language than 

rehearsed, choreographed, and inflammatory music videos would. Introduction of the 

videos was therefore unnecessary to a fair adjudication of the issues.
HART — 21

Harm

Having found error, we proceed to a harm analysis. TEX.R. APP. P. 44.1(a). Because

the error in this case was an abuse of discretion in admitting certain evidence, we review 

the record for error affecting Appellant’s “substantial rights.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). In 

doing so, we review the entirety of the record to understand the evidence in the context of 

the trial. Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). If the error had 

more than a slight influence on the verdict, Appellant is entitled to a new trial. TEX. R. APP.

P. 44.2(b).

Because Appellant did not contest whether he drove four individuals to an apartment 

complex whereupon they committed capital murder, the only issue at trial was mens rea, 

whether Appellant knew what he was doing and should have foreseen the result. The State 

focused its case on proving this mental state. In doing so, it asked law enforcement officers 

to give several negative credibility determinations of Appellant, which were admitted with 

no objection.

12

12 The State: Okay. During the course of that interview, did he tell you how 

many people he took to the victim's apartment complex?

Detective Trujillano: Eventually he said it was three people.

The State: Okay. And was that a lie?

Detective Trujillano: Yes.

...

The State: Okay. Did he say how long he was going to wait for the people 

once he dropped them off?

Detective Trujillano: He said he was only going to wait five minutes.

The State: Was that a lie?

Detective Trujillano: Yes.

...

The State: Did he say they had anything with them?

Detective Trujillano: No.

The State: Was that a lie?
HART — 22

Following the State’s case, Appellant’s case primarily consisted of his own 

testimony. He testified that he had a hard time remembering, he is a friendly person and 

believed he was just giving a ride, he doesn’t think critically about the words he uses, he 

has a hard time understanding things, and when he discovered what happened, he felt

dumb. 

In providing additional context for Appellant’s concededly “dumb” actions, 

Appellant sought to introduce testimony from his competency hearing that revealed he has 

a low IQ and potentially could not understand the underlying motives of the individuals in 

his car on June 21. The trial court did not permit this evidence, however. Had Dr. Clayton 

been allowed to testify, she would have told the jury that individuals with diminished IQ 

trust others easily, are more naïve, don’t think abstractly about the motives of others, are 

more forgetful when under stress, and are generally more susceptible to manipulation by 

others. The jury, in this sense, was not allowed to hear Appellant’s side of the story despite 

it having heard the State’s full story assisted by officers’ credibility determinations. 

Then came the rap videos. After having heard the State cast Appellant as a liar, as 

testified to by law enforcement, and being deprived of potentially helpful testimony from 

Dr. Clayton, the State introduced both rap videos to demonstrate Appellant was literate and 

Detective Trujillano: Yes.

...

The State:—is that right? Did you ask him about the victim's vehicle?

Detective Trujillano: I did.

The State: And what—did he say he knew anything about that?

Detective Trujillano: He claimed he didn't know what that was or what car

it was.

The State: And was that a lie?

Detective Trujillano: Yes.
HART — 23

articulate. As discussed above in the context of Rule 403, these rap videos did very little to 

prove that fact and instead cast Appellant and his fellow performers as criminals in general, 

untethered to the particular facts of the charged offense. Moreover, while introducing the 

videos, the State went as far as injecting its own interpretations of slang words into 

Appellant’s testimony.13

Following Appellant’s testimony, Appellant called his mother to testify to the fact 

that Appellant was in special education classes, had a hard time remembering, and required 

additional care and instruction as a child. After her testimony, Appellant rested. 

The State emphasized both Appellant’s mens rea and the “type of criminal” it 

proposed Appellant was in its closing argument:

[T]his is not Mayberry RFD and this guy is no Gomer Pyle . . . Larry Hart is 

criminally responsible for Michael Gardner’s murder because he knew—he 

should have anticipated what was going to happen . . . Larry Hart is the kind 

of criminal that sneaks around at night, breaks into people’s apartments, with 

a gun to their head and leaves them for the coroner to pick up. 

While the State argued here that Appellant acted as more than a driver, much of the 

evidence developed at trial was that Appellant served as the driver and did not enter the 

residence. Had the evidence more directly implicated Appellant as an active participant 

instead of a party, this might have been a closer case. However, we decline Appellant’s 

13 The State: And in the I Won’t Tell video, you talk about killing somebody 

over a bill, so killing somebody over cash; is that right?

Appellant: I didn’t say I killed anyone, ma’am.

. . .

The State: And you say you keep a heater. A heater is a gun, isn’t it?

Appellant: I didn’t say I keep a heater on that song.
HART — 24 

request to draw a bright-line rule that all artistic expression should always be excluded 

from a criminal proceeding unless it is a truthful narrative of the offense. 

Lastly, the jury was not given a limiting instruction to restrict their use of the rap 

videos to their stated purpose. “[W]here no limiting instruction is given . . . we must 

conclude that any prejudice resulting from introduction of the extraneous offense is 

unabated.” Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Viewed in light 

of the record as a whole, we find introduction of extraneous rap videos had more than a 

slight effect on the jury’s verdict and therefore affected Appellant’s substantial rights. 

Appellant’s Facebook Posts 

Because we found reversible error with respect to rap videos introduced by the State, 

we need not address the admissibility and harm of the complained-of Facebook posts. 

CONCLUSION 

We think Appellant stated our view on the issue at hand best when he said, “it’s just 

rap, m’am.” Because the rap videos highly prejudicial in nature in the context of a guiltinnocence proceeding, Appellant has shown reversible error. We reverse and remand to the 

trial court for a new trial. 

FILED: May 8, 2024 

PUBLISH