18-2012

Singh v. Garland

BIA

Christensen, IJ

A206 029 865

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 11th 4 day of January, two thousand twenty5 two.

6

7 PRESENT:

8 GUIDO CALABRESI,

9 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

10 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

11 Circuit Judges.

12 _____________________________________

13

14 AMARJEET SINGH,

15 Petitioner,

16

17 v. 18-2012

18 NAC

19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED

20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

21 Respondent.

22 _____________________________________

23

24 FOR PETITIONER: Amarjeet Singh, pro se, Franklin 

25 Square, NY.

26

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant

28 Attorney General; M. Jocelyn Lopez 
2

1 Wright, Senior Litigation Counsel; 

2 Margot P. Kniffin, Trial Attorney, 

3 Office of Immigration Litigation, 

4 United States Department of 

5 Justice, Washington, DC.

6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

9 is DENIED.

10 Petitioner Amarjeet Singh, a native and citizen of India,

11 seeks review of a June 13, 2018, decision of the BIA affirming 

12 a June 28, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 

13 denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

14 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Amarjeet Singh, 

15 No. A206 029 865 (B.I.A. June 13, 2018), aff’g No. A206 029 

16 865 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 28, 2017). We assume the 

17 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 

18 history.

19 We have reviewed both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions. 

20 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d 

21 Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well 

22 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. 

23 Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse 

24 credibility determination for substantial evidence). 
3

1 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 

2 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

3 determination on . . . the consistency between the 

4 applicant’s . . . written and oral statements . . . , the 

5 internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the 

6 consistency of such statements with other evidence of record 

7 . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, 

8 or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or 

9 any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

10 “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination 

11 unless . . . it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could 

12 make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. 

13 Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei 

14 Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports the 

15 adverse credibility determination. 

16 As an initial matter, the agency reasonably relied on 

17 the record of Singh’s asylum interview because it was 

18 memorialized in a typewritten document listing the questions 

19 and Singh’s answers, the interviewer asked questions designed 

20 to elicit an asylum claim, and the record does not reveal 

21 that Singh had difficulty understanding the interpreter. See
4

1 Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Where 

2 the record of a credible fear interview displays the hallmarks 

3 of reliability, it appropriately can be considered in 

4 assessing an alien’s credibility.”). Accordingly, the agency 

5 reasonably relied on inconsistencies between the interview 

6 and Singh’s testimony and within Singh’s testimony regarding 

7 how many people attacked him in June 2012, whether the 

8 perpetrators of a 2013 attack were affiliated with the 

9 Congress Party, what political activities he engaged in after 

10 the attacks, and whether his father reported his own attack 

11 to the police or was threatened with arrest for trying to. 

12 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 

13 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single 

14 inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ 

15 was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies 

16 would so preclude even more forcefully.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 

17 F.3d at 167 (allowing agency to rely on cumulative effect of 

18 even minor inconsistencies); Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78–79 

19 (“In the immigration context, in assessing the probative 

20 value of the omission of certain facts, an IJ should consider 

21 whether those facts are ones that a credible petitioner would 
5

1 reasonably have been expected to disclose.”). The agency was 

2 not required to accept Singh’s explanations that he could not 

3 remember certain details. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 

4 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer 

5 a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to 

6 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact7 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal 

8 quotation marks omitted)). 

9 Moreover, Singh did not rehabilitate his credibility with 

10 reliable corroboration. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 

11 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to 

12 corroborate his . . . testimony may bear on credibility, 

13 because the absence of corroboration in general makes an 

14 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already 

15 been called into question.”). The agency reasonably gave 

16 limited weight to Singh’s brother’s testimony, letters from 

17 his father, a village leader, and a party official, and 

18 medical documents. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d 

19 Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of 

20 the weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary 

21 evidence.”). His brother’s testimony was inconsistent with 
6

1 his brother’s own asylum application, his father was an 

2 interested witness unavailable for cross examination, the 

3 village leader and party official were similarly unavailable 

4 for cross examination and their letters lacked details 

5 regarding Singh’s attacks, and the medical document also 

6 lacked detail and was not contemporaneous with the alleged 

7 treatment. Id. at 334 (upholding BIA’s decision to afford 

8 little weight to letter from applicant’s spouse in China); 

9 Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 

10 2010) (finding letters from relatives and friends did not 

11 provide substantial support for claim where authors were 

12 “interested witnesses . . . not subject to cross13 examination”), overruled on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. 

14 Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012).

15 Finally, Singh’s due process arguments fail. His

16 attorney did not object to the admission of the interview 

17 record, and Singh failed to demonstrate the requisite 

18 prejudice from the inclusion of his bond proceeding in the 

19 administrative record, particularly as neither the IJ nor the 

20 BIA referenced the bond proceedings. See Garcia-Villeda v. 

21 Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring prejudice 
7

1 to state a due process claim).

2 In sum, taken cumulatively, the inconsistencies and lack 

3 of reliable corroboration provide substantial evidence for 

4 the adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. 

5 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The 

6 adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, 

7 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three forms 

8 of relief are based on the same discredited factual predicate. 

9 See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

10 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

11 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

12 stays VACATED.

13 FOR THE COURT: 

14 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

15 Clerk of Court