THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Eric Dale Morgan, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2018-001465 

Appeal From Spartanburg County 

Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5820 

Heard March 2, 2021 – Filed May 12, 2021 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

Lindsey Sterling Vann and Hannah Lyon Freedman, both 

of Justice 360, of Columbia, for Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy 

Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant 

Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, 

Assistant Attorney General Sherrie Butterbaugh, and 

Assistant Attorney General Michael Douglas Ross, all of 

Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of 

Spartanburg, for Respondent. 

HEWITT, J.: Eric Morgan was sentenced to death for a murder he committed 

roughly two weeks before he turned eighteen. He was resentenced and given life 

without parole (LWOP) after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the death penalty 

unconstitutional for crimes committed while the offenders were juveniles. 
 

 

This appeal arises out of Morgan's request for an additional resentencing. He 

brought that request years after his first resentencing, but shortly after our supreme 

court's decision in Aiken v. Byars invited new proceedings for certain people with 

LWOP sentences. See 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). 

The circuit court dismissed Morgan's request on the grounds the mitigating features 

of Morgan's youth had already been explored in Morgan's death penalty trial and in 

the resentencing when Morgan received LWOP; years before Aiken was decided. 

We reverse because Morgan falls within the class entitled to relief under Aiken. 

FACTS 

Morgan went to trial in March 2004 on charges for murder, armed robbery, and 

possessing an explosive device. The crime was senseless and tragic. Morgan shot 

and killed a convenience store clerk as Morgan and a friend attempted to rob the 

store. 

The jury found Morgan guilty of all charges. Based on the jury's recommendation, 

Judge J. Derham Cole sentenced Morgan to death for the murder, a consecutive 

sentence of thirty years for armed robbery, and a concurrent sentence of fifteen years 

for possessing an explosive device. 

Our supreme court vacated Morgan's death sentence in 2006 pursuant to the U.S. 

Supreme Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons because Morgan was seventeen at 

the time he committed the murder. State v. Morgan, 367 S.C. 615, 626 S.E.2d 888 

(2006); see also Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that sentencing individuals 

who were minors when they committed a crime was cruel and unusual punishment 

under the U.S. Constitution). Judge Cole held a resentencing hearing later that year 

and sentenced Morgan to LWOP. Morgan did not appeal. The transcript from the 

resentencing hearing was not preserved. 

Ten years later—in July 2016—Morgan moved for a second resentencing and 

argued he fell within Aiken's mandate because he was seventeen at the time he 

committed his crimes. The State moved to dismiss, arguing Morgan already had the 

benefit of a resentencing hearing meeting Aiken's requirements when he was 

resentenced in 2006. Morgan disagreed, arguing it was not possible for the court to 

have sufficiently considered the Aiken factors in 2006 because Aiken was not decided 

until 2014. 
The State called Judge Cole as a witness at the hearing on the State's motion to 

dismiss. This was over Morgan's objection. As already noted, Judge Cole presided 

over Morgan's capital proceedings and his 2006 resentencing. Judge Cole testified 

he considered several factors at Morgan's 2006 resentencing, including the 

circumstances of the murder, aggravating and mitigating factors, and testimony from 

Morgan's friends and family. Judge Cole testified he also considered factors related 

to youth, including Morgan's age at the time of the crimes, Morgan's maturity level, 

and other youth-related characteristics. Judge Cole additionally said: 

I didn't ignore the fact that 12 randomly chosen citizens 

thought that [Morgan] should be sentenced to death based 

upon the nature of the crime and his particular 

circumstances. That, of course, is not constitutionally 

permitted now, but it's not something that should be 

ignored upon the fact that those selected to hear the facts 

and apply the law thought he should be put to death. 

And . . . if the crime happened 16 days later, we wouldn't 

be sitting here today. 

The circuit court ruled Morgan's 2006 resentencing hearing sufficiently considered 

the factors related to Morgan's youth and therefore satisfied Aiken's requirements. 

Morgan filed a motion for reconsideration which the circuit court denied. This 

appeal followed. 

ISSUES 

Did the circuit court err by dismissing Morgan's motion for an Aiken resentencing 

hearing? 

Did the circuit court err by allowing Judge Cole to testify? 

ANALYSIS 

The arguments here are the same arguments summarized above: Morgan contends 

he falls within the class of individuals identified in Aiken and is entitled to a de novo 

sentencing hearing to consider the factors of youth the opinion identified. He claims 

his 2006 resentencing hearing did not comply with Aiken and could not have 

complied with Aiken because Aiken was not decided until 2014. 
 

The State argues the circuit court did not err because Morgan received a full 

mitigation investigation before his 2004 death penalty trial plus an individualized 

sentencing hearing when he was resentenced in 2006. The State contends Judge 

Cole's testimony demonstrates he considered Morgan's youth, satisfying Aiken's 

requirements. 

There is no question Judge Cole considered Morgan's youth when resentencing 

Morgan in 2006. Even so, we are convinced this was not sufficient to satisfy Aiken's 

requirements for the reasons given below. 

"When considering whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 

on cruel and unusual punishments, the appellate court's standard of review extends 

only to the correction of errors of law." State v. Finley, 427 S.C. 419, 423, 831 

S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ct. App. 2019). "Therefore, this court will not disturb the circuit 

court's findings absent a manifest abuse of discretion." Id. "An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the circuit court's finding is based on an error of law or grounded in 

factual conclusions without evidentiary support." Id. 

In Aiken, our supreme court held the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), applied retroactively. See Aiken, 410 S.C. at 534, 

765 S.E.2d at 572. Miller held that mandatory imposition of LWOP sentences on 

juveniles was cruel and unusual punishment. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. Aiken 

held that juvenile offenders were entitled to an individualized sentencing hearing if 

they were "convicted for homicides committed while they were juveniles" and "were 

sentenced to [LWOP] according to existing sentencing procedures, which made no 

distinction between defendants whose crimes were committed as an adult and those 

whose crimes were committed as a juvenile." 410 S.C. at 537, 765 S.E.2d at 573. 

The Aiken majority1

 explained that Miller established "an affirmative requirement 

that courts fully explore the impact of the defendant's juvenility on the sentence 

rendered." Id. at 543, 765 S.E.2d at 577. Aiken also held "any juvenile offender 

who receives a sentence of [LWOP] is entitled to the same constitutional protections 

afforded by the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual 

punishment[,]" regardless of whether it had been mandatory for the circuit court to 

impose an LWOP sentence. Id. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577. Aiken specifically 

1

 Because Justice Pleicones stated he would reach the same result as the lead opinion 

under the South Carolina Constitution, we refer to the lead opinion (authored by 

Justice Hearn) as "the majority." See Aiken, 410 S.C. at 545–46, 765 S.E.2d at 578 

(Pleicones, J., concurring). 
 

 

required South Carolina courts to consider the following factors of youth when 

sentencing juveniles: 

(1) the chronological age of the offender and the hallmark 

features of youth, including "immaturity, impetuosity, and 

failure to appreciate the risks and consequence"; (2) the 

"family and home environment" that surrounded the 

offender; (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense, 

including the extent of the offender's participation in the 

conduct and how familial and peer pressures may have 

affected him; (4) the "incompetencies associated with 

youth—for example, [the offender's] inability to deal with 

police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea 

agreement) or [the offender's] incapacity to assist his own 

attorneys"; and (5) the "possibility of rehabilitation." 

Id. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78). These factors 

"require[] the sentencing authority 'take into account how children are different, and 

how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 

prison.'" Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480). 

There have only been a few published cases in this area after Aiken. Those cases all 

involved individuals who were not similarly situated to the Aiken petitioners—none 

of those individuals received LWOP sentences. See State v. Smith, 428 S.C. 417, 

836 S.E.2d 348 (2019) (finding a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years' 

imprisonment for murder did not violate the Eighth Amendment or Miller); State v. 

Slocumb, 426 S.C. 297, 827 S.E.2d 148 (2019) (finding an eighty year aggregate 

sentence for multiple crimes committed as a juvenile did not violate the Eighth 

Amendment pursuant to Miller, Graham v. Florida,

2

 or Aiken); Finley, 427 S.C. at 

419, 831 S.E.2d at 158 (finding the defendant's mandatory sentence for life 

imprisonment but with the possibility of parole did not violate the Eighth 

Amendment and that the defendant was not entitled to resentencing). 

Morgan's case cannot be meaningfully distinguished from Aiken in that same way. 

Morgan plainly falls within the class Aiken identified: he was under the age of 

eighteen at the time he committed the murder and was sentenced to LWOP at his 

2006 resentencing hearing. See Aiken, 410 S.C. at 537, 765 S.E.2d at 573 (declaring 

juvenile offenders were entitled to an individualized sentencing hearing if they were 

2

 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
(1) convicted for homicide offenses while they were juveniles and (2) were 

sentenced to LWOP according to existing sentencing procedures that made no 

distinction between defendants whose crimes were committed as an adult and those 

whose crimes were committed as a juvenile). 

We agree with the State that the record contains evidence that Judge Cole considered 

Morgan's youth. We also acknowledge Morgan's first sentencing proceeding was a 

death penalty proceeding. Still, we cannot agree that adding these past hearings 

together produces a hearing that complied with Aiken. Aiken clearly states that even 

though some of the sentencing proceedings for the petitioners in that case "touch[ed] 

on the issues of youth," none approached the sort of hearing envisioned by Miller 

where the factors of youth were "carefully and thoughtfully considered." 410 S.C. 

at 543, 765 S.E.2d at 577. 

First, there is a problem of timing. Miller—the key U.S. Supreme Court case that 

led to Aiken—was not decided until 2012. Aiken was not decided until 2014. We 

do not doubt the sentencing judge diligently considered Morgan's age and other 

factors associated with youth. Still, it was not possible for the court in 2006 to fully 

consider the factors identified in Miller and Aiken. Those cases did not exist yet. 

Second, there is no getting around the fact that Aiken added new things for the 

sentencing court to consider. Some of the Aiken and Miller factors have a degree of 

overlap with the statutory mitigating factors that would have been the focus of 

Morgan's capital sentencing proceeding. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b) 

(2015) (listing age, mentality, and being under eighteen as mitigating 

circumstances). Yet, there is plainly a difference between those factors and the more 

extensive ones identified in Aiken that are specifically targeted at youth. For 

example, although the sentencing court was free to consider the possibility of 

rehabilitation prior to Aiken, it did so without the analytical framework from Aiken. 

And nothing before Aiken put extra weight on the opposite side of the scale from 

LWOP—Aiken requires the sentencing court to consider how the differences 

between youth and adults counsel against an irrevocable lifetime sentence. Even if 

we pretended these differences did not exist, a sentencing hearing where youth is but 

one of many considerations is different than conducting a sentencing proceeding 

where youth is a special consideration and where specific factors related to youth 

are mandatory guideposts. 

Finally, our decision is driven by our reading of the Aiken dissent. The dissent noted 

South Carolina's discretionary sentencing scheme already allowed courts to consider 

the hallmark features of youth in sentencing. Id. at 547, 765 S.E.2d at 579 (Toal, 
 

C.J., dissenting). Of particular note, the dissent analyzed one of the Aiken 

petitioners—Angelo Ham—who received an LWOP sentence after a lengthy 

sentencing hearing in which many factors were considered, including factors related 

to youth. Id. at 547–52, 765 S.E.2d at 579–81. In applauding the sentencing court's 

diligent work in conducting the hearing, the dissenters wrote it was "absurd that the 

majority orders resentencing for all petitioners without considering the adequacy of 

the original hearings." Id. at 552, 765 S.E.2d at 581–82. 

The majority did not let the point go unanswered. The lead opinion explained that 

"although some of the hearings touch[ed] on the issues of youth, none of them 

approach[ed] the sort of hearing envisioned by Miller where the factors of youth 

[were] carefully and thoughtfully considered." Id. at 543, 765 S.E.2d at 577. The 

majority directly addressed the dissent's criticisms, explaining: 

The dissent's discussion of the individual sentencing 

hearings—in particular its recitation of Angelo Ham's— 

does not dissuade us of the accuracy of this statement. 

Instead it highlights the distinction between its reading of 

Miller and ours—we recognize and give credence to the 

decision's command that courts afford youth and its 

attendant characteristics constitutional meaning. The 

dissent would simply continue to treat the characteristics 

of youth as any other fact. 

We are likewise unfazed by the dissent's criticism that we 

have failed to pinpoint an abuse of discretion; that 

admonition appears to arise from a fundamental 

misunderstanding of our holding. We have determined 

that the sentencing hearings in these cases suffer from a 

constitutional defect—the failure to examine the youth of 

the offender through the lens mandated by Miller. We 

decline to denominate the error an abuse of discretion 

because the sentencing courts in these instances did not 

have the benefit of Miller to shape their inquiries. Those 

courts will have the opportunity on resentencing to 

exercise their discretion within the proper framework as 

outlined by the United States Supreme Court. 

Id. at 543 n.8, 765 S.E.2d at 577 n.8. 
 

We believe Morgan's case is not meaningfully different from Angelo Ham's and that 

we are bound by the Aiken majority's reasoning that the degree to which youth was 

considered in this case could not satisfy the requirements of Miller or Aiken because 

the "constitutional meaning" afforded to youth and its attendant characteristics 

require a sentencing hearing tailored to those characteristics. 

In reaching this conclusion, we note that we are not expanding any constitutional 

protections, but rather are finding Morgan falls within the protections prescribed 

under Miller and Aiken. See Slocumb, 426 S.C. at 306, 827 S.E.2d at 153 (stating 

both federal and South Carolina "precedent prohibits us from extending federal 

constitutional protections beyond the boundaries the Supreme Court itself has set"). 

Because this issue is dispositive, we decline to address Morgan's remaining issue. 

See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 

591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address remaining issues when 

resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 

CONCLUSION 

We reverse the circuit court's order denying Morgan's request for an Aiken 

resentencing hearing and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF, J., concur.