NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0520n.06 No. 09-1895 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON, P etitioner -Appellee,
v. HUGH WOLF ENBARGER, Respondent-Appellan t. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COU R T F OR

TH E EAST ERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN O P I N I O N

BEFORE: COLE an d McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges; and MAYS, District Judge.* McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge. De fe nd ant C hr ist op he r Joh ns on wa s c on v i c t e d o f f o u r c o un ts of fi rs t- de g re e c ri min a l se xua l c on du c t f oll ow inga

be nc h tr ia l in

Way ne Cou nty Cir c uit Court
. J ohnson had wa ived his r ight to a jury trial afte r he was bound over on f our counts of third- deg ree criminal sexual conduct. Subsequently , J o h n s on’s information wa s amende d and the or igina l
c ha rg e s of fi rs t- de g re e c ri min a l se xua l c on du c t w e re re ins ta te d. Se ve ra l w e e ks pa sse d a ft e r t he fi rs tdeg ree char g es we re r einstated, but J ohnson did not seek to withdraw his waiver of

jury trial. Nor did he object to the e nsuing be nch trial—until after he wa s found g uilt y an d sentenc ed to four
concur rent prison ter

ms of eig hteen to fifty

y ear s. The convic tion was aff irmed on appe al.

_________________________ *Honorab l e Samuel H. Ma y s, J r., United States District Judge f or the Western D istrict of Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation.No. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

- 2 - I n habea s, the district court conc luded that J ohnson did not eff ectively waive his rig ht to a jury trial on the first-de g ree char g es and i s en t i t l ed to a new trial. Warden H ug h Wolfenbarg er argues on appea l that J ohnson’s claim is proce durally defa ulted, and that Johnson has failed to show
cause and pre

judice excusing his de fault. Fur ther, the Warden contends, even if the cour t rea ches the merits of pe titioner’s claim, habe as re lief is inappropriate bec ause the Michig an Court of Appea ls’ aff

irmance o f t h e convic tion has not been shown to be a n unrea sonable a

pplication of
c le arl y e sta bli sh e d f e de ra l la w. Th e War de n is ri g ht in bo th re sp e c ts. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g wi ll there fore be re verse d. I The fa cts established by the trial proof s, which ar e not in dispute for pre sent purposes, a re summarized in the Michiga n Court of Appea ls’ opinion. People v . Johnson , 2005 W L 6 0 2543 at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). The details nee d not be reiter ated. I n short, defe ndant J ohnson was shown to h a ve us e d f

or c e and thr e a ts o f f

or c e duri ng a tw o- da

y e pis od e in O c tob e r 2 00 3 a s h e re pe a te dly br uta lize d th e wo man w ith wh om he wa s the n co ha bit ing

. John so n wa s initi a lly c ha rg e d with six counts of first-de g ree criminal sex ual conduct in state cour t. Following a pre liminary examination, the state dist rict court dismiss ed two of t he counts and reduce d the re maining c harg es to third-deg ree criminal sexual conduct. Johnson was bound over on the se cha rg es and a n amende d information was filed on Nove mber 5, 2003, to re flec t the third-deg ree char g es. At a Nove mber 14, 2003 doc keting confe renc e, Johnson waived his rig ht to a jury trial and

a sk e d th a t a ll pr e -t

ri a l mot ion s be de c ide d by an a lte rn a te jud g e . T he c ourt g ra nte d Joh ns on ’s re qu e st for r efe rra l of all pre- trial motions to an alternate judge

. The court also questioned Johns on underNo. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

- 3 - oath and a scer

tained that he unde rstood his right to a jur y tri al an d t h at h e wa s not promised any specia l result or ver dict in exchang e for g iving up his rig ht to a jury trial. R. 9, ex. 3, docketing c onf. tr. pp. 4-5. Johns on signe d a wr itten waiver

. Id. Subsequently , the alternate judg e hea rd and g rante d the pr os e c uti on ’s mot ion

to a me nd the inf or ma tio n s o a s to re in st ate th e orig ina l c ha rg e s o f f ir stdeg r e e c r im in a l s e xu a l c o n d u c t. A s e c o n d a me n d e d in f o r mati o n w a s p r e p ar e d to r e f le ct the
re ins ta te d c ha

rg e s. Th re e we e ks pa sse d b e fo re the e ns uin g tr ia l. A t no tim e di d J oh ns on se e k to wi thd

ra w h is jur y tr ia l w a ive r. Th e state c ourt fa ile d to e lic it fr om John so n an e xpre ss a c kn ow le dg me nt t hat hi s jury trial waive r extended to the first-de g ree char g es. Yet, J ohnson did not assert his rig ht to a jury trial and st at ed n o o b

j ection to proc eedingwith the bench tr ial. J ohnson was convic ted of four counts of first-de g ree criminal sexual conduct under M.C .L
. § 750.520b(1)( f) and sentenc ed to four
consec utive terms of e ighte en to fifty y ear s’ imprisonment. J ohnson appea led, cha lleng ing f or the fir st tim e the validity of his jury trial waive r. Johnson , 2005 WL 602543 at *4. Specific ally , J ohnson contende d that h i s conviction must be reve rsed beca use his jury

trial waive r did not ex t en d t o the first-de g ree char g es. The Mic higa n Court of Ap pe a ls r e vie we d th is c la im fo r pla in e rr or , be c a us e no ob je c tio n ha d be e n a sse rt e d in the tr ia l c ourt
. Th e c ourt fo un d th a t John so n w a s awa re of the a lle g a tio ns a g a ins t him a t a ll t ime s and he ld t hat hi s waiver was va lid. The c ourt held that bec ause Johnson neither moved to withdraw his waive r nor objected to the be nch trial, no plain err or occurre d. Fur ther, the court observed that Johnson had not
c arr ie d h is b ur de n of sh ow ing pr e jud ic e re su lti ng fr om any e rr or and ha d no t sh ow n th a t th e fa ir ne ss,No. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

- 4 - integ rity or public reputation of the proce eding s had been adver sely aff ecte d. Id. at * 4 -5
. The Mic hig an Su

pr e me Court

de nie d le a ve to a

pp e a l. J ohnson filed a pe tition for writ of habea s corpus in the Easter n District of Michig an. The district cou rt conclude d that J ohnson’s claim wa s proce durally defa ulted, but nonetheless g rante d the petition. The district court he ld that the Michig an Court of Appe als’ holding that J ohnson had eff ectively waived his rig h t t o a j u ry trial on the first-de g ree char g es conta ined in the sec ond amende d information re prese nted an unr easona ble a p p li c a ti o n o f c le a r ly e s ta b li s h ed fe dera l law. The Warden c halleng es these c oncl u s i o n s, contending that the district court improper ly merg ed the proce dural de fault ca

use-a n d -p re j u d i ce a naly sis with the merits of the ca se; that J ohnson did not demonstrate c ause f

or his failure to object to the benc h trial; and that Johns on’s jury trial waive r
e ff e c tiv e ly a pp lie d, in v ie w o f h is n on -o bje c tio n, to t he re ins ta te d f

ir st- de g re e c ha

rg e s. II We review the d istri c t c ourt ’s le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo and its fac tual finding s for c lear
err or. Fl e mi ng

v . M e tri sh , 556 F.3d 520, 524 ( 6th Cir. 2009). J ohnson’s habe as petition is evaluated under the limit ed st andar d of review prescribe d in the Antiterror ism and Effe ctive De ath Penalty Act (“A EDPA”), 28 U .S.C. § 2254(d). See F leming 556 F.3d at 524. Under A EDPA, a federal c ourt
may no t g ra nt h a be a s r e lie f f

ro m a state c on vic tio n unle ss t

he state -c ourt

a dju dic a tio n “ re su lte d in a dec ision that was contra ry to, or involved an unre asonable application of, clear ly established Fe dera l law, as de termined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A s ta te c ourt

a dju dic a tio n is c on tr ary

to clearl y est a

bli sh e d f e de ra l la w i f i t arr ive s at a
c on c lus ion

op po sit e to t

hat of the Sup re me Cou

rt on a qu e sti on of law or

de c ide s a c a se dif fe re ntl yNo. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

- 5 - on a set of materially

indisti ng u i s h able facts. W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). Alternatively , an unre asonable application of Supre me Court pre ce d en t occur s if the state c ourt ide nti fi e s th e c or

re c t g ov e rn ingle g a l pr inc ipl e bu t unre a so na bly a pp lie s th a t pr inci pl e to the fa c ts of the c ase. W

igg ins v . S

mi th , 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). A state -cour t adjudication must be ob je c tiv e ly un re a so na

ble to w arr ant r e lie f; it is not suf fi c ie nt that th e re vie wi ngc ourt fi nd s th e state court’s de cision err oneous or incor rec t. Id. at 520-21. A. P r oc e dur al D e fault Fe dera l habea s relief

may be pre cluded on claims that a petitioner has not presente d to the state cour ts in accor dance with the state’s proc edura l rules. W ainwright v. Syk es , 433 U.S. 72, 85-87 (1977). Such a

“proc edura l defa

ult” occur s when a petitioner fails to comply with a state proc edura l rule, th e r u le is a c tu a ll y r e li e d u

p o n b y th e s tate c o u rts , an d th e p r o c e d u r a l r u le is “ a d equate and independe nt.” W

hit e v . M itc he ll , 431 F.3d 517, 5 2 4 (6th Cir. 2005). Proce dural de fault may be excused wher e the pe titioner demonstrates c ause an d p rejudice for his fa ilure to comply with the state pr oc e dura l r

ule , o r wh e n a p e tit ion e r e sta bli sh e s th a t f

a ili ngto r e vie w the c la im w ou ld r e su lt in a fundamental miscarr iag e of justice. Coleman v. Thompson , 50 1 U .S. 72 2, 75 0 ( 19 91 ); Combs

v . Co y le , 205 F.3d 269, 274 ( 6th Cir. 2000). To demonstrate that a “f undamental mi s carriag e of jus tic e ” wo uld

oc c ur a bs e nt r e vie w o f a

pe tit ion e r’ s c la im, the pe tit ion e r m us t a sse rt a c re dib le c la im of actua l innoc ence that is suppor ted by reliable evidenc e that wa s not presente d at trial. Schlup v. De lo , 513 U.S. 298, 315-16 (1995). The district cour

t corre ctly

deter mined that J ohnson’s claim wa s proce durally defa ulted by vir tue of his havin g fa ile d to ob

je c t to the be nc h tr ia l in

the tr ia l c ourt , w hic h f

a ilure re su lte d inNo. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

- 6 - appellate revie w only

under the more restrictive “plain err or” standard of review

. See J ohnson , 2005 WL 602543 at *3. I t is now well-established that the Mic higa n Court of Appea ls’ application of plain-er ror r eview c onstitut es the invocation of an indepe ndent and adequate proce dural rule that b ar s f e d e r a l r e v ie w o f th e me r it s o f h is c la im a b s e n t a s h o w in g o f “ c a

u s e an d p r e

judic e.” See Fleming , 556 F.3d at 530. Ye t, t he dis tr ic t c ourt

sid e -s te pp e d th e c a

us e -a nd -p re jud ic e re qu ir e me nt, ob se rv ingsim ply

and wi tho ut a

uth or ity that th e ana ly sis “ me rg e d” wi th t he ana ly sis of

the me ri ts of

the c a se . T his de c isi on to i g no re the c a

us e -a nd -p re jud ic e re qu ir e me nt is dir e c tly c on tr ary to c on tr oll ingpr e c e de nt. I t is well-established that either cause and pre

judice or actua l innoc ence must be established in orde r to excuse proce dural de fault. See Murray v . Carrier , 4 77 U. S. 4 78 , 4 88 (1 98 6) ; Mu rp hy v . O hio , 551 F.3d 485, 501- 02 (6th Cir. 2009); H a y l i m v . M i t c h e ll , 4 9 2 F. 3 d 6 80, 690-91 (6th Cir. 2007). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis re g ard of the c a us e -a nd -p re jud ic e re qu ir e me nt

w a s i n e r ro r, fo r i t is a

bund a ntl y clea r that Johns on has shown neither cause nor pre

judice to excuse his proce dural de fault. I n o rd e r t o e sta

bli sh“ c a us e ,” a pe tit ion e r mus t showthat “ so me ob je c tiv e fa c tor

e xter na l to the defe nse impeded counsel’s eff orts to c omply with the State’s proc edura l rule.” Ha y lim , 492 F.3d at 6 9 0 -9 1 (q u oting Murray , 477 U.S. at 488). “Pre judice,” me anwhile, “ require s a showing that
err ors at trial ‘worke d to [the petitioner’s] a ctual and substantial disa dvantag e, infec ting his entire trial with err or of c onstitut ional dimensions.’” Ha y lim , 4 9 2 F. 3 d

at 6 9 0 -9 1 (q u o t i n g United States v. Frady , 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982)). J ohnson has not established ca use bec ause he has not shown that any ob je c ti v e fa ctor e x terna l to the defe nse impeded him f rom withdrawing his w aiver or objecting to the bench trial. J ohnsonNo. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

- 7 - addr e s s e s th e is s u e o f c a u s e o n ly s u mm ar il y , a ll e g in g th a t th e p r o s e c u ti o n d e li b e r a te ly and de c e pti ve ly

wa ite d unti l he ha d wa ive d his ri g ht to a jur y tr ia l be fo re mov ing to r e ins ta te the fi rs tdeg ree char g es. Ye t, J ohnson had sev er al wee ks betwee n the time the first-de g ree char g es we re reinstated a

nd the trial beg an. He ch o se not to withdraw the w aiver and the r ecor d is devoid of evidenc e sug g esting that he was preve nted from withdrawing his w aiver . J ohnson’s bald alleg ation tha t t h e p r o s e c u ti o nd e li b e r a te ly an d d e c e p ti v e ly

w a it e d u n ti l a f te r h e e n te r e d

h is w a iv e r

b e f o re moving to re instate the first-de g ree char g es is to no avail. Eve n if true, the pr osecution’s “ ploy ” had no eff ect on Johnson’s ample opportunity to withdraw his waive r—an oppor tunity he simply

failed to use. Clearly , J ohnson has fa llen far short of showing cause excusing his proc edura l defa ult. Be cause J ohnson has not established cause , the court need not addre ss the issue of pre judice. See McClesk

ey v . Zant , 49 9 U. S. 46 7, 50 2 (1 99 1)

. Ye t, e ve n if John so n h a d e sta

bli sh e d c a us e , h is showing of pre

judice would fall short. J ohnson contends he w as pre judiced in that he wa s denied his constituti onal rig ht to a jury trial. Howe ver, the rec ord af fords no support for

the not ion that he
wa s denied a n y

t h i n g ; o n l y

t h a th e f r e e l y an d k n o w i n g l y d e c i d e d t o w a i v e h i s r i g h tt o a

j u r y t ri a l. J ohnson took the aff

irmative step of e x ecutinga sig ned wa iver. The state cour t confir m ed on the
rec ord that he did so voluntarily and knowing ly

. A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known r ight. See U nited States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). J ohnson acknow ledg es that his w ritten waive r wa s valid when e x ecute d, i.e., when he was facing the t hird-deg ree char g es. This written waiver, as the di strict court re cog nized, g ive s r ise to a

pr e su mpt ion

that J oh ns on ’s jur

y tr ia l wa ive r wa s volunta ry , k no wi ngand

int e lli g e nt. Spytma v. H

owes , 313 F.3d 363, 371 (6th Cir. 2002)

. J ohnson insists , howeve r, th at i t wa s notNo. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

The Michig an Court of Appe als reje cted this a rg ument, observing that Michig an law doe s 1 not “re quire the tria l court to reope n the inquiry of a va lid jury

waiver based on subsequent developments in the case ,” but doe s allow a defe ndant to move to w ithdraw a valid waiver

. Pe op le v. Johnson , 2005 WL 602543 at *5. - 8 - eff ective to wa ive his rig ht to jury trial on the subseque ntly

reinstated f

irst-deg ree char g es. I n view
o f th is c h an g e o f c ir c u ms ta n c e s , Jo h n s o n c o n te n d s th e tr ia l c o urt had a sua sponte duty to make inquiry and con fi rm t h at h e int ended to wa ive jury on the re instated cha

rg es. Johns on cites no authority for this proposition. I n fac t, the notion that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to confirm 1 that J ohnson still wished to abide by the jury waiver

—that he, with a dvice of counsel, ha d reque sted
wee ks ear lier—runs directly contra ry to the t eac hing of Adams v. United States , 317 U.S. 269, 281 (1942). In Adams , the C ourt place d square ly on the s houlders of the one cha lleng ing his jury trial waiver the burde n of “pla inly

showing ” that the wa iver wa s “not freely and int ellige ntly made” and that he sustained “ essential unfa irness”—“ not as mat te r o f s p e c u la ti on but as a de monstrable re ality .” Id. ; see also Filiaggi v. Bagley , 4 45 F .3 d 8 51 , 8 55 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; S o w el l v. Bradshaw , 372 F.3d 821, 832 (6th Cir. 2004). J ohn s o n h as n o t ca rried this burde n. There is no evidence sug g esting other than that he intended his jury

trial waive r to apply to the reinstated first-deg ree char g es. Ther e is no evidenc e that J ohnson sought or

even de sired to withdrawhis w aiver and y et was de nied such re lief. Johns on has
no t id e nti fi e d in

the re c or d e ve n an ink lin g of an ob je c tio n to the be nc h tr ia l th a t e ns ue d. B e c a us e the re cord shows that Johnson a cted aff irmatively and intentionally to w aive his r ight to a jury trial and expressed no de sire or intent to re voke or w ithdraw the waiver afte r t he charg es were amended, the re c or d a ff

or ds no su pp or t f or the c on c lus ion

that he wa s denied any ri g ht; on ly that he v olu nta ri lyNo. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

- 9 - re lin qu ish e d it

. J oh ns on ha s n ot s ho wn

that th e tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure to e xpre ssl y c on fi rm his continuing intent to wa ive jury “infe cted his entire trial with err or of c onstitut ional dimensions.” See Ha y lim , 4 92 F .3 d at 69 0- 91 . H e ha s n ot t he re fo re sh ow n th e re qu isi te pr e jud ic e to e xcu se his proce dural de fault. Finally , J ohnson’s proce dural defa ult is not e x cused beca

use he has not e stablished, nor eve n
c la ime d, a c tua l inno c e nc e . Eve n w he re c a us e and pr e jud ic e are no t e sta

bli sh e d, pr oc e dura l de fa

ult may be excused if a

fundame ntal miscarr iag e of justice would otherwise result. See Sc hlup , 5 13 U. S. at 315-16. I n order to demonstrate a fundamental miscarr iag e of justice, a federa l habea s petitioner must present re liable new e vidence of ac tual innocenc e so stron gthat the cour t cannot have
c o n f id e n c e in th e o u tc o me o f th e trial. Id. J ohnson does not claim ac tual innocenc e, nor doe s he contend that a

ny new e vidence war

rants a r ever sal of his conviction. I t f o l l ow s th a t John so n’ s p ro c e dura l de fa ult e ff e c tiv e ly ba rs fe de ra l c ourt

re vie w o f t

he me ri ts of his cla i m i n h ab ea s . Henc e, the ha beas pe tition s hould have be en denie d. The district cour t’s contra ry conclusion is err oneous and must be r ever sed. B. Mer its The district court conclude d that even thoug h J ohnson’s claim wa s proce durally defa ulted, he is entitled to habea s relief . The c ourt conc luded that J ohnson’s jury trial waive r wa s not valid as to t he re ins ta te d fir st- de g re e c ha rg e s bec a us e the re wa s no indi c a tio n th a t he e xpre ssl y wa ive d h is rig ht in relation to the more se rious first-deg ree char g es. Also, the district c o urt found that the waiver di d n o tap p l y t o t h e f i rs t -d egr ee ch ar ges b ec au s e t h i rd -d egr ee ch ar ges an d fi rs t -d egr ee ch arg es
car ry differ ent pena lties and have differ ent eleme nts. As such, the district cour t found that J ohnson’sNo. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

- 10 - w a i v e r w a s n o t“ v o l u n t ar

y, kn o w i n g , an d

i n t e l l i g e n t , ” a s r e qu i r e d

b y L o t t v . C o y le , 2 6 1 F.3d 594, 615 (6th Cir. 2001). Lot t se ts f or th t he stand ard

de fi nin g the le ve l of

“ kn ow le dg e ” a

de fe nd ant m

us t ha ve to
va lid ly wa ive his ri g ht t o a

jur y tr ia l: A waive r may be voluntary , knowing , and intelligent if the defe ndant has a minimum a mou nt o f k no wl e dg e c on c e rn ing his jur y tr ia l r ig ht a

nd the me nta l c a

pa c ity to understand the implications of the wa iver of that rig ht. See [ Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin , 704 F.2d 267, 273 ( 6th Cir. 1983)]. Although a defe ndant need not ha ve a de tailed, technica l knowledg e of this rig ht, “ [a] defe ndant is [deemed] sufficiently informed to make an intellig ent waive r if he w as aw are that a jury is c omposed of 12 member s of the c ommunity , [t hat] he may participate in the selec tion of the jurors, [t hat] the verdic t of the jury

must be unanimous, and that a judg e alone will decide guilt or innocenc e should he wa ive his jury trial rig ht.” Id. at 2 73. We did not, however, a do pt a mand a tor

y rul e requ ir ingtr ia l c ourt s to int e rr og a te de fe nd ants pr ior to a c c e pti nga

jur y tr ia l w a ive r, bu t in ste a d, of fe re d a “ su g g e sti on ” that dis tr ic t c ourt s persona lly inform defe ndants of the “bene fits a nd burdens of

jury trials on the re cord prior to ac ceptinga prof

fer ed wa iver.” Id. at 274. Lot t , 261 F.3d at 615. Thus, a def endant ne ed not have a “deta iled, technica l know ledg e” befor e he
can va lidly

waive his rig ht to a jury

trial. I nstead, he only needs to understand the “implications” of his waiver a s well as the “ benef its and burdens” of choosinga benc h trial over a jury trial. J ohnson’s waive r mee ts this s tandar d—even in relation to the first-de g ree char g es. F irst, as indicated above, J ohnson’s signe d written waiver is presumptively valid. Spytma , 313 F.3d at 371. John so n atte mpt s to re bu t this pr e su mpt ion ba se d on the re ins ta te me nt of the fi rs t de g re e c ha rg e s. Yet, Johnson was a wa re of the nature of the fir st-deg ree char g es at the time they wer e re instated beca use he w as initially

char g ed with first-deg ree criminal sex ual conduct. There was no surprise; John so n h a d k

no wn of the se ve ri ty

of the f ir st- de g re e c ha

rg e s f ro m th e ou tse t. I

nd e e d, the fi rs tde g re e c ha

rg e s w e re ba se d o n th e ve ry same a lle g a tio ns a s th e thi rd -d e g re e c ha rg e s. I n othe r w or ds ,No. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

The facts i n this case are sexually expli cit and offensive. I t is li kely that J ohnson pref

err ed 2 not to have such f

acts pre sented to and judg ed by a jury he re asona b l y ap p re h en d ed would not be sy mpathetic with his leg al def ense. - 11 - there is no manifest rea son why the reinstatement of t he original charg es shoul d be deemed to have

a lte re d th e c a lc ulu s b e hin d Joh ns on ’s e arl ie r d e c isi on to w a ive his ri g ht t o a jur y tr ia l. Th a t he did 2

no t se e k to wi thd

ra w h is w a ive r a

nd di d no t obje c t to the e ns uin g be nc h tr ia l w a s th e natur a l,
e xpe c te d c ours e of

e ve nts
. Th e me re fa c t th a t the tr ia l c ourt ne g le c te d to c on fi rm

that John so n s til l intended his ea

rlier sig ned w ai v er t o apply to the reinstated c harg es does not sug g est that he wa s “denie d” his rig ht to withdraw it wher e the rec ord establishes only that he under stood his waiver a nd kn ow ing ly

re fr a ine d f

ro m w ith dr awi ngit. Second, while the trial court never questioned J ohnson about his intention to waive his right to a jury trial afte r the fir st-deg ree char g es we re r einstated, Johnson appears to have known how the
wa ive r w or

ke d as we ll as the imp lic a tio ns of c ho os ing a be nc h tri a l ove r a jur y tr ia l. T he re c or d is devoid of a

ny i n d i ca t i o n t h at J ohnson ever soug ht to question his waiver or withdra w it after the orig inal, first-deg ree char g es we re reinstated. J ohnson had three weeks i n which to rec onsider and withdraw his wa iver, but he instea d chose to g o forwa rd with the bench trial. I f he understood the implications of opting for a benc h trial in relation to the third-de g ree char g es, he sur ely understood those same implications in relation to the first-de g ree char g es. Stil l, the district court conc luded t hat t he int erve ntion of t he reinstated first-deg ree char g es invalidated his ea

rlier wa iver. The court de emed Johnson’s sit uation compar able to ca ses wher e a de fe nd ant’ s jury tr ia l wa ive r wa s hel d not to exte nd to a re tr ia l bec a us e a wa ive r doe s not n e c e ssa ri lyNo. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

- 12 - rema in va lid irr espec tive of later developments. See, e .g. , Un ite d S tat es v . G ro th , 682 F .2 d 578 (6 th Cir. 1982). The district cour t also compare d J ohnson’s situation to case s wher e a de fenda nt waived his rig ht to a jury

trial befor e a pa

rticular judg e, and later soug ht to withdraw that wa iver whe n a differ ent ju d ge was a ssigne d to the case

. See F itzgerald v. W

ithrow , 292 F.3d 500, 505 ( 6th Cir. 20 02 ); Sin is ta

j v. Bu rt , 860 F.Supp. 1209, 1215 (E.D. Mic h. 1994), rev’d , 66 F.3d 804 ( 6th Cir. 1995). The district c ourt emphasized that althoug h a defe ndant “is not entitled to make a limited or conditional waiver

of his rig ht to a jury

trial,” he “re tains any

portion of the jury

trial rig ht that he h as n o tv al i d l y

wa i v ed

. ” O p i n i o np . 1 2 (q u o t i n g Fi tzge ra ld , 292 F.3d at 503). Henc e, the district
c ourt reas one d th a t th e re ins ta te d f ir st- de g re e c ha

rg e s, no t in

pla c e wh e n Joh ns on

e xec ute d h is wai v e r , r e p r e s e n te d an in te r v e n in g c h an g e in c ir c u ms ta n c e s n o t w it

h in th e c o n te mp lati o n o f the waiver , rende ring the waiver not “ voluntary , knowing , and intelligent” in relation to the cha rg es on wh ic h Joh ns on

ult imate ly

we nt t o tr ia l. I ndeed, a defe ndant is g ener ally

entitled to withdraw or r evoke his wa iver of a jury trial upon a showing that the waive r wa s not fre ely and intellige ntly

made. Adams , 3 17 U. S. at 28 1; Filiaggi , 44 5 F .3 d at 85 5. I f t

he c ir c ums tanc e s und e r wh ic h John so n ini tia lly e xec ute d h is w a ive r m a te ri a lly
c h an g e d , t h e na

qu e s t i o nw o u l d

ar i s e a s t o w h e t h e r

h e “ v o l u n t ar i l y, kn o w i n g l y an d i n t e l l i g e n t l y” wished to maintain or withdra w the wa iver. Ye t, despite having ample opportunit y to do so, there is no evidence that J ohnson ever questioned the wi sd om of his wa ive r, muc h les s tha t he sou g ht t o withdraw it. The c ases r elied on by the di strict court are in this respe ct re adily distinguishable f

rom the instant case

.No. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

J ohnson’s actua l signe d written waiver, refer red to on the record in the November 14, 2003 3 docketingconfe renc e, has not be en made part of the habea s rec ord. Nor has either party quoted the ter ms of th e writte n w a ive r. John so n h a s n ot a rgue d, ho we ve r, and

the re c or d g ive s n o r e a so n to be lie ve that th e wa ive r wa s tie d sp e c if ic a lly and e xclu siv e ly

to t he the n- pe nd ingc ha

rg e s a g a ins t hi m. - 13 - I n Gr oth , for instanc e, the Six th Circuit held that the waiver of a j u ry t ri al d i d n ot bar a demand fo r a jur y tr ia l on re tr ia l of the same c a se wh e n th e origin al w a ive r d id n ot e xplic itl y contemplate a

retria l. Gr oth , 682 F.2d at 580. Her e in contra st, J ohnson never soug ht to withdraw h i s wa i v er p ri o r t o t ri al , n ev er o b j ec t ed t o t h e be n ch t ri al , an d n ev er d em an d ed a ju r y t r i a l

. If J ohnson had soug ht to withdraw his jury trial waive r befor e trial beg an, he ma y very well have been entitled to do so. Bec ause he did not, Gr oth is inapposite. Simi larly , the district c ourt’s relianc e o n Fi tzge ra ld is mispl ace d. I n Fi tzge ra ld , th e Sixth Circuit reve rsed the d i s t ri ct cour t’s awa rd of ha beas r elief a

nd enfor ced the broad te rms of the defe ndant’s wr itten waiver —despite some evide nce sug g esting that the def endant wished to waive his right to a jur

y trial only in order to consent to a bench t rial before the then assig ned judg e. When

a dif fe re nt j ud g e wa s a ssi g ne d to c on du c t th e tr ia l a t th e la st m inute , th e de fe nd ant’ s r e qu e st t o withdraw his wa iver wa s denied. The Six th C i rc u i t upheld this denial as not violative of the def en d an t ’s right bec ause the written wa iver wa s not ex pressly limit ed to a pa

rticular judg e eve n though the defe ndant’s conduc t evidence d his knowledg e that substitut ion of a diff ere nt judge was a possibility

. Fi tzge ra ld , 292 F.3d at 504-05. I n compar ison, J ohnson’s ca se is even wea k er beca use his written wa iver a

ppear s to have been no less broad and he did not even move to w ithdraw his w aiver , indicating that he under stood his waiver a

pplied to the reinstated first-deg ree char g es and did not object. Despite having se vera l 3No. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

- 14 - we e ks to w ith dr aw h is w a ive r, John so n ma int a ine d h is d e c isi on to p rocee d w itha

be nc h tr ia l. J ohnson’s conduc t tends to show he was f ully awa re of the impli cations of his decision and made a strate g ic choice not to withdraw his waiver . Her e, too, as in Fi tzge ra ld , J ohnson did not “retain”

any po rt ion of his ri g ht t o a

jur y tr ia l on c e he wa ive d it . Joh ns on did no t e vid e nc e an in te nt t o li mit his wa ive r t o a

ny pa rt ic ula r c ha rg e s— e ith e r i n th e wr iti ngits e lf or in h is a c tio ns . Not hin g in Fi tzge ra ld

s u g g e s t s t h a tJ o h n s o n ’ s w r i t t e nw a i v e r s h o u l d b e c o n s t r u e d a s l i m i t e d o r

c o n d i t i o n a l

. In fac t, inasmuch as the Fitzgerald court re verse d the district court’s a war d of habe as re lief, the Fi tzge ra ld

opinion actually

aff ords strong er suppor

t for the Warde n’s position than J ohnson’s. The district cour

t’s relianc e on Sinistaj is a lso mis pla c e d. Th e ru lin g of the dis tr ic t c ourt in Sinistaj was e x pressly

overturne d by

the Six th Circuit on the very point for which the di strict court
re lie d o n it , i. e ., the ho ldi ng that a de fe nd ant wh o wa ive s his ri g ht t o a jur y tr ia l is la te r e nti tle d to withdraw that waiver if his case is assig ned to a diffe rent judg e. See Sinsitaj , 860 F. Supp. at 1215. The S ix th C ir c uit

e xpre ssl y

he ld t hat th is c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s is no t so me thi ngthat w a rr a nts allowing a defenda

nt to withdraw his jury

trial waive r. See Sinistaj , 66 F.3d at 808-09. Ag ain, as in Fi tzge ra ld , the Sinstaj court uphe ld the broad terms of defendant’ s written wa iver a nd reve rsed the di strict court’s gr ant of ha beas r elief. A nd ag ain, as with Fi tzge ra ld , the Sixth C ir c uit ’s Sinstaj ruling clea

rly lends g reater support to the Warde n’s position than J ohnson’s. Finally , the district c ourt held that J ohnson’s waive r wa s invalid as to the first-deg ree char g es beca use the re instated cha

rg es re quired proof

of diffe rent e lements and c arr ied the possibility of harshe r pena lties than the th ird-deg ree char g es. Specific ally , the district court c oncluded that in orde r for Johnson’s waiver to be valid, he should have been a pprised of the evidenc e that would be usedNo. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

See M. C.L . § 75 0. 52 0b (1 )( f)

. A p e rs on is guil ty of fi rs t- de g re e c ri min a l se xua l c on du c t if 4 “[t] he ac tor ca

uses per sonal injury to the victim a nd forc e or c oerc ion is used to accomplish sexual penetr ation.” See also M.C.L
. § 750.520d(1)( b). A pe rson is g uilty of third-de g ree criminal sexual co n d u ct i f “[ f] orce or coe rcion is used to ac complish the sexual penetration. F orce or coe rcion includes, but is not lim ited to any of the c ircumstance s listed in section 520b(1)(f ) . . .” - 15 - ag ainst him; ot herw ise, J ohnson’s waiver was not i nformed e noug h to be “knowingand intellige nt.” I n support, the district court re lied on Brown v. Burns , 996 F.2d 219, 221 ( 9th Cir. 1993). Th is a na ly sis is fla

we d for tw o re a so ns . F ir st, a s the War de n poin ts out , the us e of fo rc e to
acc omplish sex ual penetr ation is a n essential element of both f irst a nd third deg ree criminal sexual
c on du c t c harges un der Mich ig a n la w. I t is the a mou

nt o f f or c e us e d a

nd wh e the r i t r e su lte d in 4 persona l injury

that distinguishes the off enses. Johnson was awa

re of the elements of the crimes at issue and knew

that both the first- and third- deg ree char g es we re ba sed o n t h e i d enti cal f actua l alleg ati o n s and would be pr osecute d based on the very same e vidence . The c ircumstance s that J ohnson fac ed whe n the orig inal char g es we re r einstated we re not ne w t o him. The int erve ntion of the re instat ed ch ar ges is not such a mate rial cha ng e of c ircumstance s as would tend to under mine the validity

of Johns on’s waive r. This fac t, coupled with J ohnson’s failure to withdraw his waive r
or ex press any objection t o the bench trial, supports the conclusion that J ohnson continued to desire to waive his rig ht to a jury trial on the first-de g ree char g es. Th e se c on d f

law i n th e c ourt ’s re a so nin g is that B r own i n v o l v ed a defe ndant who wa s confuse d about the diffe renc e betwe en a j u ry t rial and a bench tr ial. Se e Br own , 996 F.2d at 219. The re cord is devoid of

any indication that J ohnson was eve r conf used in this way

. Br own is thus inapposite, bec ause there is no question that J ohnson understood his rig ht to a jury trial as we ll asNo. 09-1895

Johnson v. W

olfenbarger

- 16 - the implications of choosing a benc h trial. See J ohnson , 2005 WL 602543 at *4. J ohnson has not identified any rea son to conclude other than that he had the requisite knowledg e and that his decision to waive jury

trial was “ voluntary , intelligent , an d k n o wi ng ,” eve n as applied to the f irst-deg ree char g es. The c ourts are not obliged to save def endants from their own strate g ic choice s that later prove to be unfortunate

. See Fi tzge ra ld , 292 F.3d at 505. I n s umm ary , th e c a se law on whic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt re lie d h a vin g be e n d ist inguis he d, its
c on c lus ion

that the Mic hig an Court of Ap pe a ls’ ru lin g wa s a

n unr e a so na

ble a pp lic a tio n o f c le a rl y
es t ab l i s h edfe d er al l aw i s l ef tu n s u p p o rt ed

. J o h n s o nh as n o tca rr i ed h i s b u rd en o f “ p l ai n l y s h o wi n g” that his jury

trial waive r wa s “not fre ely an d i n t el lige ntly made” and that he, a s a matter of “demonstra

ble re ality ,” sustained “ essential unfa irness.” Adams , 3 1 7 U
. S
. a t2 8 1
. A c c o r d i n g l y, even if we we re to rea ch the merits of J ohnson’s claim, despit e his proce dural de fault, it is clear that habea s relief

would be denie d and the district cour t’s ruling would be re verse d. IV Ba sed on the for eg oing r easoning , we c onclude that ha beas r elief must be de nied bec ause the claim asser

ted was procedur ally defa ulted. Even if we wer e to addr ess the mer its, notwit hstanding John so n’ s p ro c e dura l de fa ult , the c la im w ou ld b e de nie d b e c a us e the Mic hig an Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls’ ruling has not bee n shown to be contra ry to or an unre asonab l e ap p l i cation of clear ly established fe de ra l law. Ac c or din g ly , the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r g ra nti ng ha be a s re lie f i s RE VE RSE D . The c a se is RE M AN DE D to the district court for entry of an or der de ny ing the petition fo r writ of habe as
c or pu s.