In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-1725 

ROBERT DECKER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

KATHERINE SIREVELD, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 3:19-cv-00233-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 21, 2024 — DECIDED JULY 30, 2024 

____________________ 

Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Federal inmate Robert Decker 

requested that his prison law library provide electronic access 

to full, daily editions of the Federal Register. When the Bureau 

of Prisons denied his request, Decker filed this lawsuit pro se 

under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the 

denial violated his First Amendment rights to receive information and petition the government in the form of public 

comments on notices of proposed rulemaking. The district 
2 No. 23-1725 

court entered summary judgment for the BOP. Applying the 

framework established by the Supreme Court in Turner v. 

Safley, the district court concluded that the Bureau’s policy 

was “reasonably related to [its] legitimate penological 

interest[]” in conserving limited resources and so did not 

violate the First Amendment. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The 

district court also denied Decker’s motions for the recruitment of counsel, finding that he had proven himself competent to litigate his case despite the obstacles he faced while 

incarcerated. We agree with both conclusions and affirm.

I 

A 

To enable inmates to research and litigate legal claims, the 

Bureau of Prisons provides a law library at each of its facilities. Most prison libraries contain computers that have been 

disabled from accessing the internet. Instead, the computers 

link to an “electronic bulletin board”—an internal database of 

PDF documents uploaded manually by prison staff for 

inmates to consult during legal research.

BOP policy directs each prison to maintain a list of 

required texts at its library. That list currently includes the 

Supreme Court Reporter, the Federal Reporter, the U.S. Code, 

and the Code of Federal Regulations. It does not include the 

full Federal Register, the federal government’s daily 

publication of proposed rules, executive orders, and other 

administrative documents. Rather than provide complete 

editions of the Federal Register, the BOP directs law libraries 

to maintain only those “documents ... pertaining to the 

Bureau and to the U.S. Parole Commission.” Bureau Program 

Statement 1315.07 (Nov. 5, 1999). 
No. 23-1725 3

B 

In 2019 Robert Decker filed suit against several BOP 

officials under the Administrative Procedure Act. He alleged 

that the BOP’s failure to upload the full Federal Register to its 

electronic bulletin board violated his rights under the First, 

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to receive information 

and petition the government. Decker claimed that without 

electronic access to the Federal Register, he could not submit 

timely public comments on proposed rules that concerned 

him, a right generally guaranteed by the APA. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 553. 

The district court dismissed Decker’s complaint at the 

screening stage pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. We vacated and remanded, observing 

that open questions remained regarding which specific documents the BOP had provided Decker and whether its failure 

to provide the full Federal Register violated his constitutional 

rights. 

On remand the case proceeded to discovery. Decker filed 

several motions seeking recruitment of counsel, which the 

district court denied. The district court explained that Decker 

had not demonstrated a need for an attorney, given that he 

had competently represented himself throughout the case 

and could request deadline extensions as his circumstances 

required. 

In time the government moved for summary judgment. It 

contended that the BOP’s decision to provide only Bureaurelated documents published in the Federal Register did not 

violate Decker’s constitutional rights because, under Turner v. 

Safley, the policy was “reasonably related to [the BOP’s] 
4 No. 23-1725 

legitimate penological interest[]” in conserving scarce 

resources. See 482 U.S. at 89. 

The government supported its position with an affidavit 

from Sarah Qureshi, a BOP official who had been responsible 

for drafting and distributing the agency’s regulations. The 

affidavit stated that “it would be impractical and highly burdensome on limited BOP staffing resources to devote staff 

time and expense to post the entire Federal Register to the 

Electronic Bulletin Board each day.” The BOP saw Decker’s 

rights, by contrast, as only minimally burdened because he 

remained free to receive print copies of the Federal Register 

through the mail. In the end, the district court agreed with the 

government that no genuine dispute of material fact existed 

regarding whether the BOP’s policy “reasonably related” to 

its legitimate interest in saving resources. Based on that 

conclusion, the district court entered summary judgment in 

the government’s favor.

Decker filed a timely notice of appeal. We then appointed 

counsel to represent Decker. His counsel, H. Hunter Bruton 

and his colleagues, have our thanks for the diligence and skill 

they have brought to their advocacy.

II

We review the district court’s order entering summary 

judgment with a fresh set of eyes, asking whether any 

genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the constitutionality of the challenged BOP policy and, if not, whether the 

government is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 255 (1986). In conducting this inquiry, we construe the 

facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Decker as 
No. 23-1725 5

the party opposing summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 255. 

It is well-established that prisoners do not surrender all of 

their First Amendment rights upon their incarceration. See 

Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”). It is equally clear that “[l]awful incarceration brings 

about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights” given the need to achieve “valid penological 

objectives—including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of 

prisoners, and institutional security.” O'Lone v. Est. of Shabazz, 

482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (quotation omitted). Courts “accord 

substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison 

administrators” in defining and pursuing such penological 

objectives—a process which necessarily involves the curtailment of certain constitutional rights. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 

539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). 

Balancing respect for inmates’ constitutional rights with 

the harsh realities of prison administration can be a difficult 

endeavor. Recognizing the challenge, the Supreme Court has 

supplied a framework for assessing the constitutionality of 

prison regulations. The controlling standard comes from 

Turner: “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ 

constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests.” 482 U.S. at 89. 

Satisfying the standard requires the government in the first 

instance to articulate a penological interest that is both legitimate and neutral. See id. at 90; Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 

F.3d 778, 786 (7th Cir. 2011). From there the burden shifts to 

the prisoner to demonstrate that a challenged prison 
6 No. 23-1725 

regulation is not reasonably related to that interest. See 

Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. 

Turner established four factors that inform the constitutional validity of a prison regulation: (1) the existence of a 

“valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and 

the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify 

it;” (2) whether “alternative means of exercising the [inmate’s 

constitutional] right [] remain open;” (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on 

guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison 

resources generally;” and (4) the existence of “ready alternatives” to the challenged regulation. 482 U.S. at 89–90. 

The first of these factors imposes a threshold requirement 

that every regulation must meet. See id.; see also Singer v. 

Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2010). A “regulation cannot be sustained,” the Supreme Court has emphasized, 

“where the logical connection between the regulation and the 

asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or 

irrational.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. 

We address each factor in turn.

A 

Turner’s first factor concerns the closeness of the logical 

connection between the challenged prison policy and the 

asserted penological interest it advances. We have held that 

reducing administrative costs—the interest asserted by the 

BOP here—qualifies as a legitimate penological objective. See 

Jackson v. Frank, 509 F.3d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 2007); Lindell v. 

Frank, 377 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2004). The question, then, is 

whether providing federal inmates like Robert Decker only 
No. 23-1725 7

limited electronic access to the Federal Register “rational[ly] 

connect[s]” to that interest. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 

The parties stake out competing views. For its part, the 

BOP contends its policy rationally advances its budgetary 

interests by avoiding an undue financial burden. In support it 

draws upon a line from the Qureshi affidavit stating that 

electronically providing the full Federal Register would be 

“impractical and highly burdensome on limited BOP staffing 

resources.” 

Decker disagrees and claims that the affidavit submitted 

by Sarah Qureshi is too thin to dispel any reasonable factual 

dispute over how burdensome his proposed accommodation 

would be. He emphasizes that under our case law “a prison 

may not restrict a prisoner’s rights without even looking to 

see how the rights might be accommodated and estimating 

the expense entailed by doing so.” Kikumura v. Turner, 28 F.3d 

592, 599 (7th Cir. 1994). Nor may the government “avoid court 

scrutiny by reflexive, rote assertions,” Shimer v. Washington, 

100 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996), or “rely on the mere incantation of a penal interest,” Emad v. Dodge Cnty., 71 F.4th 649, 654 

(7th Cir. 2023). Decker contends that the Qureshi affidavit is 

just that—a “reflexive, rote assertion[]”summarily declaring

that the proposed accommodation would be too burdensome.

That statement alone, Decker insists, is not enough to 

eliminate any factual question as to the severity of the 

government’s burden. See Shimer, 100 F.3d at 509 (emphasizing that a “prison administration must proffer some evidence 

to support its restriction of [inmates’] constitutional rights” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Emad, 71 F.4th at 654 

(stating that, to prevail under Turner, the government must 
8 No. 23-1725 

“come forward with record evidence that substantiates that 

the interest is truly at risk”).

Decker emphasizes that, at the very least, the BOP’s 

position that it would be too burdensome to electronically 

provide the Federal Register is subject to reasonable factual 

dispute. Anyone with internet access, Decker observes, can 

download a full day’s edition in a matter of seconds by 

clicking three times on www.federalregister.gov. He sees the 

government’s proposed alternative—receiving print copies of 

the Federal Register through the U.S. mail and prison’s 

internal mail system—as far more costly, since it would 

require administrators to manually screen, process, and 

deliver documents running hundreds of pages on a regular 

basis. This reality, Decker continues, is enough for reasonable 

jurors to disagree on whether electronically supplying the 

Federal Register would be unduly burdensome, particularly 

if the government did so only on a periodic basis—say, every 

week or two.

While much of Decker’s argument is well-taken, it too 

discounts the highly deferential nature of the Turner analysis. 

The Supreme Court has repeatedly described Turner as a 

framework that affords significant weight to the professional 

views of prison officials. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 326 (2012) (describing Turner as a holding that “confirmed the importance of deference to correctional officials”); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 

499, 504 (2005) (emphasizing that Turner is a “deferential 

standard”); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 239 (2001) (same). 

Given the “inordinately difficult undertaking that is modern 

prison administration,” we owe “considerable deference to 

the determinations of prison administrators.” See Thornburgh 
No. 23-1725 9

v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407–08 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). Such deference is an essential component of both the 

Turner framework and, more broadly, our role as a court of 

general review. Right to it, we afford substantial deference to 

the BOP’s assertion that providing electronic access to the full 

Federal Register would require it to divert significant time 

and resources that could otherwise be devoted to other tasks. 

Recognize as well that, in response to the BOP’s affidavit, 

Decker did not come forward in the district court with any 

concrete evidence calling its conclusions into doubt. See 

Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 (emphasizing that under Turner, 

“[t]he burden [] is not on the State to prove the validity of 

prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it”). 

Regardless, Decker’s position also underappreciates a critical 

feature of this case that makes it unique. Nearly every published decision in which we have applied Turner involved an 

affirmative restriction on an inmate’s conduct. See, e.g., Montoya v. Jeffreys, 99 F.4th 394 (7th Cir. 2024) (reviewing a policy 

presumptively restricting sex offenders’ contact with their minor children); Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015)

(reviewing a prohibition on a request for a prisoner to marry);

Nigl v. Litscher, 940 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 2019) (same). In the First 

Amendment context, these restrictions routinely take the 

form of categorical prohibitions on the materials that an 

inmate may receive through the mail. See, e.g., Lindell, 377 

F.3d 655 (reviewing a prison’s ban on the receipt of printed 

materials from non-official publications); Jackson, 509 F.3d 389 

(reviewing a prison’s prohibition on a specific photograph); 

Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2009) (reviewing a 

prison’s decision to remove pages of a magazine containing 

gang signs); Singer, 593 F.3d 529 (reviewing the confiscation 
10 No. 23-1725 

of particular published material); Van den Bosch, 658 F.3d 778 

(same).

Here, by contrast, the BOP has placed no restriction on the 

type, source, or volume of materials that Decker seeks to 

receive. To the contrary, the Bureau has repeatedly pledged 

to allow Decker to arrange for the delivery of physical copies 

of the Federal Register through the prison mail system. The 

Qureshi affidavit confirms that the BOP has also committed 

to electronically provide Federal Register documents that 

“pertain[]” or “relate[]” to the Bureau. That, of course, is in 

addition to the full suite of criminal-law research materials 

available at BOP law libraries—the adequacy and availability 

of which Decker does not challenge.

Decker insists that this is not enough. He emphasizes that 

the BOP has deemed some regulatory subjects that directly 

affect him—inmate calling services, for instance—as not “pertaining to the Bureau” and thus not included in the electronic 

bulletin board. To ensure access to all such regulations, 

Decker asks us to impose an affirmative obligation on the 

BOP to electronically provide every daily edition of the 

Federal Register in full.

This request—not to discontinue a ban on certain publications but to proactively supply them—sets Decker’s claim 

apart. When, as here, a prisoner seeks a court mandate 

compelling the BOP to furnish particular materials at regular 

and frequent intervals across all facilities at its own cost, the 

danger of overstepping our judicial role is at its apex. 

Recognizing that “the judiciary is ‘ill equipped’ to deal with 

the difficult and delicate problems of prison management,” 

we hesitate to embrace any course of action that would lead 
No. 23-1725 11

to the micromanagement of prison administration from the 

bench. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407–08. 

Consider the alternative. If we find in favor of Decker 

today, there is a unique likelihood that this case would lead 

to a cascade of similar requests that would, in the aggregate, 

place an inordinate burden on the prison system. Such a 

burden would be particularly difficult to justify given that 

law libraries must already provide documents “pertaining to 

the Bureau.” As such, we conclude that the BOP’s denial of 

that request is reasonably related to its legitimate interest in 

saving resources.

B 

Proceeding to the next Turner factor, we assess whether 

Decker possessed “alternative means of exercising [his] 

right”—in this case the First Amendment right to petition the 

government—despite his lack of electronic access to the 

Federal Register. See 482 U.S. at 90; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 

468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (recognizing that “prisoners have the 

constitutional right to petition the Government for redress of 

their grievances”).

Decker contends that the BOP’s policy left him with no alternative means of exercising his right to petition through the 

submission of public comments on proposed regulations. He 

emphasizes that the APA allows agencies to promulgate rules 

after receiving and considering comments for only 30 days. 

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). Without regular and timely electronic 

access to the Register, Decker claims that it is impossible for 

him to meet such a 30-day deadline, given the routine and 

significant delays that accompany the delivery of prison mail.
12 No. 23-1725 

After carefully reviewing the record and drawing all 

factual inferences in favor of Decker as the nonmovant at 

summary judgment, we accept his assertion that electronic access to the Federal Register is necessary for him to reliably 

submit timely public comments. As Decker observes, in this 

litigation alone his legal mail was delayed for more than 

30 days on multiple occasions, despite the BOP prioritizing it 

above other categories of mail. The government has not denied such delays, nor has it provided any reason to conclude 

that Decker could still meet the statutory deadline for 

comments. Nor has the government contradicted Decker’s 

two additional reasons for the lack of alternative means of

exercising his right to petition—the prohibitive cost of a print 

subscription to the Federal Register and prison policies that 

would bar him from storing and consulting physical editions 

at the facility. Given these unrebutted and plausible 

objections, we conclude that a genuine factual dispute exists 

regarding whether Decker can timely comment on 

proposed regulations under existing BOP policy. For that 

reason, Turner’s second factor weighs in Decker’s favor.

That conclusion does not end our inquiry, however. 

Although “[t]he absence of any alternative [] provides some 

evidence that the regulations [a]re unreasonable,” it “is not 

conclusive of the reasonableness of the [p]olicy.” Beard v. 

Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 532 (2006) (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 

135) (internal quotation marks omitted). So we proceed to 

consider the remaining factors of the Turner framework.

C 

Any weight given to Decker’s position under the second 

Turner factor is counterbalanced by the third: “the impact 

accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have 
No. 23-1725 13

on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison 

resources generally.” 482 U.S. at 90. It is worth emphasizing 

anew the uniqueness and breadth of the accommodation that 

Decker seeks. He asks not for the removal of a prohibition on 

receipt of the Federal Register but for a judicial decree obligating the BOP to upload every day’s edition to its electronic 

bulletin board for all federal prisoners nationwide.

We also see no limiting principle to the type of relief that 

Decker seeks. If he were correct that Turner requires prison 

officials to affirmatively offer electronic access to the Federal 

Register, the same could be said of any number of other 

government publications. Prisons would potentially have to 

provide administrative records from each of the 50 states—at 

least those that can be downloaded online with equivalent 

ease as the Federal Register. With each new request for a 

different publication, administrative costs would mount and 

managerial responsibilities compound. We decline the invitation to embark on a course so inevitably destined to 

overburden and tamper with the “allocation of prison 

resources”—an outcome starkly at odds with our deferential 

role under Turner. See 482 U.S. at 90. 

To be sure, we recognize that “[t]he proper path [i]s to 

answer the narrow and specific claim advanced by [the plaintiff]” on “the narrowest possible grounds” when evaluating a 

prisoner’s claim for relief under Turner. See Miller v. Downey, 

915 F.3d 460, 464 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Hegwood v. City of Eau 

Claire, 676 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2012)). In keeping with that 

principle, we express no definitive opinion on what the 

consequences of granting Decker’s specific claim for 

accommodation would be in future similar cases where a 

prisoner seeks publications other than the Federal Register. 
14 No. 23-1725 

Our only point here is that it is appropriate to consider the 

presence or absence of a limiting principle when assessing the 

likely administrative burden on the prison of granting 

Decker’s request for accommodation. Because Decker’s claim 

creates a substantial risk of opening the door to an endless 

procession of future similar requests for accommodation

—requests that, if granted, would significantly tax the BOP’s 

limited resources—we conclude that Turner’s third factor 

strongly favors the government.

D 

That brings us to the fourth and final factor of the Turner

analysis. “[T]he absence of ready alternatives” to the challenged prison regulation “is evidence of [its] reasonableness.” 

Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. “By the same token, the existence of 

obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation 

is not reasonable, but is an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison 

concerns.” Id. “[I]f an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de 

minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may 

consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy 

the reasonable relationship standard.” Id.

We conclude that no ready alternative regulation can fully 

accommodate Decker’s rights without meaningfully compromising the prison’s interest in conserving resources. Decker’s 

only proposed alternative—providing the full Federal Register at irregular weekly or biweekly intervals—would still require an expenditure of time and resources to implement. 

And, even if there were a more ideally calibrated policy, the 

existence of that hypothetical would not render the BOP’s 

chosen policy invalid. Indeed, we have emphasized that even 

when “the DOC’s asserted penological objectives ... might 
No. 23-1725 15

very well be achieved with a narrower policy, the absence of 

an ideal policy does not render the policy that officials have 

adopted unconstitutional.” Van den Bosch, 658 F.3d at 790. 

Here, the BOP has made the reasonable managerial decision 

to save resources by electronically providing only limited administrative documents that directly impact many prisoners. 

Turner’s fourth factor requires no more.

* * *

In the final analysis, we conclude that the balance of the 

Turner factors supports the BOP’s policy of providing only 

limited electronic access to the Federal Register as “reasonably related” to its “legitimate penological interest” in conserving resources. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Although the BOP policy 

places some burden on Decker’s constitutional rights, such a 

burden is consistent with the recognition that “the constitutional rights that prisoners possess are more 

limited in scope than the constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large,” and that “[i]n the First Amendment 

context, ... some rights are simply inconsistent with the status 

of a prisoner or ‘with the legitimate penological objectives of 

the corrections system.’” Shaw, 532 U.S. at 229 (citing Pell, 417 

U.S. at 822). 

Be careful, however, not to overread our decision as 

approving a wholesale denial of electronic access to all administrative documents from the Federal Register. Recall that, 

under the BOP policy we affirm today, prison libraries must 

provide access to all “documents ... pertaining to the Bureau 

and to the U.S. Parole Commission.” See Bureau Program 

Statement 1315.07 (Nov. 5, 1999). Decker’s fourth amended 

complaint alleged that the BOP had violated this provision by 

failing to upload even Bureau-issued documents to its 
16 No. 23-1725 

electronic bulletin board. Because the BOP subsequently 

remedied this omission and Decker seeks only injunctive 

relief, this claim is no longer before us. In short, in no way 

does today’s decision foreclose a claim alleging that the 

Bureau has failed to electronically provide documents from 

other agencies that “pertain[] to” the Bureau, such as 

proposed amendments from the U.S. Sentencing 

Commission. We express no opinion on the merits of such a 

claim.

III

In addition to challenging the BOP’s policy concerning the 

Federal Register, Decker separately appeals the district 

court’s denial of his motions for the recruitment of counsel. 

He claims that the district court abused its discretion in 

declining to recruit an attorney to aid him in his lawsuit, 

stressing that he was unable to adequately litigate on his own.

A district court may, at its discretion, “request an attorney 

to represent any person unable to afford counsel” under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In evaluating a § 1915 request, the court 

ought to consider whether “the indigent plaintiff [has] made 

a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively 

precluded from doing so” and, if so, whether “given the 

difficulty of the case, ... the plaintiff appear[s] competent to 

litigate it himself.” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 

2007) (en banc). The district court found—and the BOP does 

not dispute—that Decker made reasonable and unsuccessful 

efforts to obtain counsel on his own. So the sole remaining 

question is whether the district court abused its discretion in 

concluding that Decker was competent to litigate his case 

pro se.
No. 23-1725 17

A district court does not abuse its discretion in declining 

to recruit counsel under § 1915 unless “(1) the record contains 

no evidence upon which the court could have rationally based 

its decision; (2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) the decision is based on clearly erroneous 

factual findings; or (4) the decision clearly appears arbitrary.” 

Id. at 658. None of these grounds applies in this case.

Decker contends that the district court either ignored or 

dismissed several factors that compromised his ability to represent himself, including his limited access to the law library 

while confined to the Special Housing Unit, his restrictive 

conditions of confinement pending a facility transfer, his nine 

other pending cases, and substantial delays in receiving his 

mail. While these considerations undoubtedly presented 

challenges, the district court’s determination that they did not 

necessitate counsel was not arbitrary, irrational, or based on 

erroneous legal or clearly erroneous factual conclusions. See 

id. In its § 1915 order, the district court directly addressed 

Decker’s limited access to the law library, explained why 

Decker had proven himself competent to litigate despite this 

hurdle, and explained that the court could extend discovery 

deadlines as his situation required. Informed as it was by a 

careful consideration of the circumstances that Decker faced 

in his self-representation, the district court’s order did not 

constitute an abuse of discretion.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM.