(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP. ET AL. v. 

UNITED STATES ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 05–1272. Argued December 5, 2006—Decided March 27, 2007 

While employed as an engineer at a nuclear weapons plant run by petitioner Rockwell under a Government contract, respondent Stone predicted that Rockwell’s system for creating solid “pondcrete” blocks

from toxic pond sludge and cement would not work because of problems in piping the sludge. However, Rockwell successfully made such 

blocks and discovered “insolid” ones only after Stone was laid off in 

1986. In 1989, Stone filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act, 

which prohibits submitting false or fraudulent payment claims to the

United States, 31 U. S. C. §3729(a); permits remedial civil actions to

be brought by the Attorney General, §3730(a), or by private individuals in the Government’s name, §3730(b)(1); but eliminates federalcourt jurisdiction over actions “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions . . . , unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source 

of the information,” §3730(e)(4)(A). An “original source” “has direct 

and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the

Government before filing an action . . . based on the information.” 

§3730(e)(4)(B). In 1996, the Government intervened, and, with 

Stone, filed an amended complaint, which did not allege that Stone’s 

predicted piping-system defect caused the insolid blocks. Nor was 

such defect mentioned in a statement of claims included in the final 

pretrial order, which instead alleged that the pondcrete failed because a new foreman used an insufficient cement-to-sludge ratio. 

The jury found for respondents with respect to claims covering the 

pondcrete allegations, but found for Rockwell with respect to all other 
2 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

claims. The District Court denied Rockwell’s postverdict motion to

dismiss Stone’s claims, finding that Stone was an original source. 

The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, but remanded for the District

Court to determine whether Stone had disclosed his information to 

the Government before filing the action. The District Court found 

Stone’s disclosure inadequate, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed and 

held that Stone was an original source. 

Held: 

1. Section 3730(e)(4)’s original-source requirement is jurisdictional.

Thus, regardless of whether Rockwell conceded Stone’s originalsource status, this Court must decide whether Stone meets this jurisdictional requirement. Pp. 8–11.

2. Because Stone does not meet §3730(e)(4)(B)’s requirement that a

relator have “direct and independent knowledge of the information on

which the allegations are based,” he is not an original source. 

Pp. 12–18. 

(a) The “information” to which subparagraph (B) speaks is the information on which the relator’s allegations are based rather than 

the information on which the publicly disclosed allegations that triggered the public-disclosure bar are based. The subparagraph standing on its own suggests that disposition. And those “allegations” are

not the same as the allegations referred to in subparagraph (A), 

which bars actions based on the “public disclosure of allegations or

transactions” with an exception for cases brought by “an original

source of the information.” Had Congress wanted to link originalsource status to information underlying public disclosure it would

have used the identical phrase, “allegations or transactions.” Furthermore, it is difficult to understand why Congress would care 

whether a relator knows about the information underlying a publicly

disclosed allegation when the relator has direct and independent 

knowledge of different information supporting the same allegation. 

Pp. 12–14. 

(b) In determining which “allegations” are relevant, that term is

not limited to “allegations” in the original complaint, but includes the 

allegations as amended. The statute speaks of the relator’s “allegations,” simpliciter. Absent some limitation of §3730(e)(4)’s requirement to the initial complaint, this Court will not infer one. Here, 

where the final pretrial order superseded prior pleadings, this Court

looks to the final pretrial order to determine original-source status.

Pp. 14–17. 

(c) Judged according to these principles, Stone’s knowledge falls 

short. The only false claims found by the jury involved insolid pondcrete discovered after Stone left his employment. Thus, he did not 

know that the pondcrete had failed; he predicted it. And his predic-
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

Syllabus 

tion was a failed one, for Stone believed the piping system was defective when, in fact, the pondcrete problem would be caused by a foreman’s actions after Stone had left the plant. Stone’s original-source 

status with respect to a separate, spray-irrigation claim did not provide jurisdiction over all of his claims. Section 3730(e)(4) does not 

permit jurisdiction in gross just because a relator is an original 

source with respect to some claim. Pp. 17–18.

3. The Government’s intervention in this case did not provide an

independent basis of jurisdiction with respect to Stone. The statute 

draws a sharp distinction between actions brought by a private person under §3730(b) and actions brought by the Attorney General under §3730(b). An action originally brought by a private person, which

the Attorney General has joined, becomes an action brought by the 

Attorney General only after the private person has been ousted. 

Pp. 18–20. 

92 Fed. Appx. 708, reversed. 

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS, 

J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. BREYER, J., 

took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–1272 

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP., ET AL., 

PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[March 27, 2007] 

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§3729–3733, eliminates federal-court jurisdiction over actions under §3730 

of the Act that are based upon the public disclosure of 

allegations or transactions “unless the action is brought by

the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is 

an original source of the information.” §3730(e)(4)(A). We 

decide whether respondent James Stone was an original 

source. 

I 

The mixture of concrete and pond sludge that is the

subject of this case has taken nearly two decades to seep, 

so to speak, into this Court. Given the long history and

the complexity of this litigation, it is well to describe the 

facts in some detail. 

A 

From 1975 through 1989, petitioner Rockwell International Corp. was under a management and operating

contract with the Department of Energy (DOE) to run the 

Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant in Colorado. The most 
2 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

significant portion of Rockwell’s compensation came in the 

form of a semiannual “‘award fee,’” the amount of which 

depended on DOE’s evaluation of Rockwell’s performance

in a number of areas, including environmental, safety, and

health concerns. United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell 

Int’l, Corp., 92 Fed. Appx. 708, 714 (CA10 2004). 

From November 1980 through March 1986, James Stone

worked as an engineer at the Rocky Flats plant. In the 

early 1980’s, Rockwell explored the possibility of disposing

of the toxic pond sludge that accumulated in solar evaporation ponds at the facility, by mixing it with cement. The 

idea was to pour the mixture into large rectangular boxes, 

where it would solidify into “pondcrete” blocks that could

be stored onsite or transported to other sites for disposal. 

Stone reviewed a proposed manufacturing process for 

pondcrete in 1982. He concluded that the proposal “would 

not work,” App. 175, and communicated that conclusion to

Rockwell management in a written “Engineering Order.” 

As Stone would later explain, he believed “the suggested 

process would result in an unstable mixture that would 

later deteriorate and cause unwanted release of toxic 

wastes to the environment.” Ibid. He believed this because he “foresaw that the piping system” that extracted 

sludge from the solar ponds “would not properly remove

the sludge and would lead to an inadequate mixture of 

sludge/waste and cement such that the ‘pond crete’ blocks

would rapidly disintegrate thus creating additional contamination problems.” Id., at 290. 

Notwithstanding Stone’s prediction, Rockwell proceeded 

with its pondcrete project and successfully manufactured 

“concrete hard” pondcrete during the period of Stone’s 

employment at Rocky Flats. It was only after Stone was 

laid off in March 1986 that what the parties have called 

“insolid” pondcrete blocks were discovered. According to

respondents, Rockwell knew by October 1986 that a substantial number of pondcrete blocks were insolid, but 
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

DOE did not become aware of the problem until May 1988, 

when several pondcrete blocks began to leak, leading to

the discovery of thousands of other insolid blocks. The 

media reported these discoveries, 3 Appellants’ App. in 

Nos. 99–1351, 99–1352, 99–1353 (CA10), pp. 889–38 to

889–39; and attributed the malfunction to Rockwell’s 

reduction of the ratio of concrete to sludge in the mixture.

In June 1987, more than a year after he had left Rockwell’s employ, Stone went to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with allegations of environmental crimes at

Rocky Flats during the time of his employment. According 

to the court below, Stone alleged that 

“contrary to public knowledge, Rocky Flats accepted

hazardous and nuclear waste from other DOE facilities; that Rockwell employees were ‘forbidden from 

discussing any controversies in front of a DOE employee’; that although Rocky Flats’ fluid bed incinerators failed testing in 1981, the pilot incinerator remained on line and was used to incinerate wastes 

daily since 1981, including plutonium wastes which

were then sent out for burial; that Rockwell distilled 

and fractionated various oils and solvents although 

the wastes were geared for incineration; that Stone

believed that the ground water was contaminated

from previous waste burial and land application, and 

that hazardous waste lagoons tended to overflow during and after ‘a good rain,’ causing hazardous wastes

to be discharged without first being treated.” App. to 

Pet. for Cert. 4a. 

Stone provided the FBI with 2,300 pages of documents, 

buried among which was his 1982 engineering report 

predicting that the pondcrete-system design would not 

work. Stone did not discuss his pondcrete allegations with 
4 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

the FBI in their conversations.1 

Based in part on information allegedly learned from

Stone, the Government obtained a search warrant for 

Rocky Flats, and on June 6, 1989, 75 FBI and Environmental Protection Agency agents raided the facility. The 

affidavit in support of the warrant included allegations (1) 

that pondcrete blocks were insolid “due to an inadequate

waste-concrete mixture,” App. 429, (2) that Rockwell

obtained award fees based on its alleged “‘excellent’” 

management of Rocky Flats, id., at 98, and (3) that Rockwell made false statements and concealed material facts in 

violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

of 1976 (RCRA), 90 Stat. 2811, 42 U. S. C. §6928, and 18 

U. S. C. §1001. Newspapers published these allegations. 

In March 1992, Rockwell pleaded guilty to 10 environmental violations, including the knowing storage of insolid

pondcrete blocks in violation of RCRA. Rockwell agreed to 

pay $18.5 million in fines. 

B 

In July 1989, Stone filed a qui tam suit under the False 

Claims Act.2 That Act prohibits false or fraudulent claims

for payment to the United States, 31 U. S. C. §3729(a), 

and authorizes civil actions to remedy such fraud to be

brought by the Attorney General, §3730(a), or by private 

individuals in the Government’s name, §3730(b)(1). The 

Act provides, however, that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the

public disclosure of allegations or transactions . . . from

the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an origi-

—————— 

1Stone claimed the contrary, but the District Court found that he had 

failed to establish that fact. 2 Qui tam is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in 

hac parte sequitur,” which means “who pursues this action on our Lord

the King’s behalf as well as his own.” 
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

nal source of the information.” §3730(e)(4)(A). An “original source” is “an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations 

are based and has voluntarily provided the information to 

the Government before filing an action under this section

which is based on the information.” §3730(e)(4)(B).

Stone’s complaint alleged that Rockwell was required to 

comply with certain federal and state environmental laws

and regulations, including RCRA; that Rockwell committed numerous violations of these laws and regulations 

throughout the 1980’s3; and that, in order to induce the 

Government to make payments or approvals under Rockwell’s contract, Rockwell knowingly presented false and 

fraudulent claims to the Government in violation of the 

False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §3729(a). As required under 

the Act, Stone filed his complaint under seal and simultaneously delivered to the Government a confidential disclosure statement describing “substantially all material 

evidence and information” in his possession, §3730(b)(2). 

The statement identified 26 environmental and safety 

issues, only one of which involved pondcrete. With respect

to that issue, Stone explained in his statement that he had 

—————— 

3The laws and regulations allegedly violated included DOE Order

Nos. 5480.2 (Dec. 1982), 5483.1 as superseded by 5483.1A (June 22, 

1983), and 6430.1 (Dec. 12, 1983) (DOE General Design Criteria Manual); Colo. Rev. Stat. §25–5–501 et seq. (1982) (Hazardous Substances), 

25–7–101 et seq. (1982 and Supp. 1988) (Air Quality Control Program), 

25–7–501 et seq. (Asbestos Control), 25–15–101 (Hazardous Waste 

Management Act, 25–8–201 (1982) (Water Quality Control Act), 25–11–

101 (1982 and Supp. 1988) (Radiation Control), 29–22–101 (Hazardous

Substance Incidents), 25–5–503 (1982), 25–8–506, 25–8–608, 25–15–

308 through 25–15–310, and 29–22–108; the Occupational Safety and 

Health Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. §651 et seq.; the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2011 et seq.; the Energy Reorganization 

Act of 1974, 42 U. S. C. §5801 et seq.; the Water Pollution Prevention 

and Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §1251 et seq.; the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. 

§7401 et seq.; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U. S. C. §300f et seq.; and 

regulations promulgated under these statutes. 
6 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

reviewed the design for the pondcrete system and had

foreseen that the piping mechanism would not properly

remove the sludge, which in turn would lead to an inadequate mixture of sludge and cement.

In December 1992, Rockwell moved to dismiss Stone’s 

action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that 

the action was based on publicly disclosed allegations and 

that Stone was not an original source. The District Court 

denied the motion because, in its view, “Stone had direct 

and independent knowledge that Rockwell’s compensation 

was linked to its compliance with environmental, health

and safety regulations and that it allegedly concealed its

deficient performance so that it would continue to receive 

payments.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a.

The Government initially declined to intervene in 

Stone’s action, but later reversed course, and in November 

1996, the District Court granted the Government’s intervention. Several weeks later, at the suggestion of the

District Court, the Government and Stone filed a joint

amended complaint. As relevant here, the amended complaint alleged that Rockwell violated RCRA by storing 

leaky pondcrete blocks, but did not allege that any defect 

in the piping system (as predicted by Stone) caused insolid 

pondcrete.4 Respondents clarified their allegations even

further in a statement of claims which became part of the 

final pretrial order and which superseded their earlier 

pleadings. This said that the pondcrete’s insolidity was 

due to “an incorrect cement/sludge ratio used in pondcrete

operations, as well as due to inadequate process controls 

and inadequate inspection procedures.” App. 470. It 

continued: 

—————— 

4 In addition to the pondcrete allegations, respondents charged Rockwell with concealing problems with “saltcrete” (a mixture of cement and 

salt from liquid waste treatment processes) and “spray irrigation” (a

method of disposing of waste water generated by the sewage treatment

plant at Rocky Flats). 
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

“During the winter of 1986, Rockwell replaced its then

pondcrete foreman, Norman Fryback, with Ron Teel. 

Teel increased pondcrete production rates in part by,

among other things, reducing the amount of cement 

added to the blocks. Following the May 23, 1988 spill, 

Rockwell acknowledged that this reduced cement-tosludge ratio was a major contributor to the existence 

of insufficiently solid pondcrete blocks on the storage

pads.” Id., at 476–477. 

The statement of claims again did not mention the piping

problem asserted by Stone years earlier. 

Respondents’ False Claims Act claims went to trial in 

1999. None of the witnesses Stone had identified during

discovery as having relevant knowledge testified at trial.

And none of the documents Stone provided to the Government with his confidential disclosure statement was 

introduced in evidence at trial. Nor did respondents allege

at trial that the defect in the piping system predicted by

Stone caused insolid pondcrete. To the contrary, during

closing arguments both Stone’s counsel and the Government’s counsel repeatedly explained to the jury that the 

pondcrete failed because Rockwell’s new foreman used an

insufficient cement-to-sludge ratio in an effort to increase 

pondcrete production. 

The verdict form divided the False Claims Act count into 

several different claims corresponding to different awardfee periods. The jury found in favor of respondents for the

three periods covering the pondcrete allegations (April 1,

1987, to September 30, 1988), and found for Rockwell as to

the remaining periods. The jury awarded damages of 

$1,390,775.80, which the District Court trebled pursuant 

to 31 U. S. C. §3729(a).

Rockwell filed a postverdict motion to dismiss Stone’s 

claims under §3730(e)(4), arguing that the claims were

based on publicly disclosed allegations and that Stone was 
8 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

not an original source. In response, Stone acknowledged

that his successful claims were based on publicly disclosed 

allegations, but asserted original-source status. The 

District Court agreed with Stone. The United States 

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in relevant

part, but remanded the case for the District Court to 

determine whether Stone had disclosed his information to 

the Government before filing his qui tam action, as 

§3730(e)(4)(B) required. On remand, the District Court 

found that Stone had produced the 1982 engineering order 

to the Government, but that the order was insufficient to 

communicate Stone’s allegations. The District Court also 

found that Stone had not carried his burden of proving 

that he orally informed the FBI about his allegations

before filing suit. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed 

with the District Court’s conclusion and held (over the 

dissent of Judge Briscoe) that the 1982 engineering order 

sufficed to carry Stone’s burden of persuasion. 92 Fed. 

Appx. 708. We granted certiorari, 548 U. S. ____ (2006), to 

decide whether Stone was an original source. 

II 

Section 3730(e)(4)(A) provides that 

“[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under 

this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or 

Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit,

or investigation, or from the news media, unless the 

action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” (Footnote omitted.) 

As discussed above, §3730(e)(4)(B) defines “original

source” as “an individual who [1] has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations 
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

are based and [2] has voluntarily provided the information 

to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information.” As this case 

comes to the Court, it is conceded that the claims on which 

Stone prevailed were based upon publicly disclosed allegations within the meaning of §3730(e)(4)(A). The question

is whether Stone qualified under the original-source exception to the public-disclosure bar.

We begin with the possibility that little analysis is 

required in this case, for Stone asserts that Rockwell

conceded his original-source status. Rockwell responds

that it conceded no such thing and that, even had it done 

so, the concession would have been irrelevant because 

§3730(e)(4) is jurisdictional. We agree with the latter

proposition. It is true enough that the word “jurisdiction”

does not in every context connote subject-matter jurisdiction. Noting that “jurisdiction” is “‘a word of many, too 

many, meanings,’” we concluded in Steel Co. v. Citizens for 

Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83 (1998), that establishing

the elements of an offense was not made a jurisdictional 

matter merely because the statute creating the cause of

action was phrased as providing for “jurisdiction” over

such suits. Id., at 90 (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 

F. 3d 661, 663, n. 2 (CADC 1996)). Here, however, the 

issue is not whether casting the creation of a cause of 

action in jurisdictional terms somehow limits the general 

grant of jurisdiction under which that cause of action 

would normally be brought, but rather whether a clear 

and explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction withdraws jurisdiction. It undoubtedly does so. Just last Term we stated 

that, “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold 

limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional,

the courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will

not be left to wrestle with the issue.” Arbaugh v. Y & H 

Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515–516 (2006) (footnote omitted). 

Here the jurisdictional nature of the original-source re-
10 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

quirement is clear ex visceribus verborum. Indeed, we 

have already stated that §3730(e)(4) speaks to “the power 

of a particular court” as well as “the substantive rights of 

the parties.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. 

Schumer, 520 U. S. 939, 951 (1997). 

Stone’s contrary position rests entirely on dicta from a

single Court of Appeals decision, see United States ex rel. 

Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 97 F. 3d 937, 940–941 (CA7 

1996). Accudyne thought it significant that jurisdiction

over False Claims Act cases is conferred by 28 U. S. C. 

§§1331 and 1345 (the federal-question and United-Statesas-plaintiff provisions of the Judicial Code) and 31 

U. S. C. §3732(a) (the provision of the False Claims Act 

establishing federal-court venue and conferring federalcourt jurisdiction over related state-law claims), rather

than §3730, which is the “section” referenced in 

§3730(e)(4). To eliminate jurisdiction, the court believed, 

it is those jurisdiction-conferring sections that would have

to be referenced. We know of nothing in logic or authority 

to support this. The jurisdiction-removing provision here 

does not say “no court shall have jurisdiction under this 

section,” but rather “no court shall have jurisdiction over 

an action under this section.” That is surely the most

natural way to achieve the desired result of eliminating 

jurisdiction over a category of False Claims Act actions—

rather than listing all the conceivable provisions of the

United States Code whose conferral of jurisdiction is being 

eliminated. (In addition to the provisions cited by the 

Accudyne court, one might also have to mention the diversity-jurisdiction provision, 28 U. S. C. §1332, and the

supplemental-jurisdiction provision, §1367.) Accudyne

next observed that the public-disclosure bar limits only 

who may speak for the United States on a subject and who 

if anyone gets a financial reward, not the “categories of

disputes that may be resolved (a real ‘jurisdictional’ 

limit).” 97 F. 3d, at 941. But this is a classic begging of 
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

the question, which is precisely whether there has been

removed from the courts’ jurisdiction that category of 

disputes consisting of False Claims Act qui tam suits 

based on publicly disclosed allegations as to which the 

relator is not an original source of the information. Nothing prevents Congress from defining the “category” of 

excluded suits in any manner it wishes. See, e.g., 28 

U. S. C. §1500 (no jurisdiction over “any claim for or in

respect to which the plaintiff . . . has pending in any other 

court any suit . . . against the United States”). Lastly, 

Accudyne asserted that “the Supreme Court had held that 

a similar reference to jurisdiction in the Norris-LaGuardia

Act, 29 U. S. C. §§101, 104, limits remedies rather than

subject-matter jurisdiction.” 97 F. 3d, at 941 (citing Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes, 

481 U. S. 429, 444–446 (1987)). But the language of the 

Norris-LaGuardia Act is in fact not similar. It provides

that “[n]o court of the United States shall have jurisdiction 

to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent 

injunction in any case involving or growing out of any 

labor dispute . . . .” 29 U. S. C. §104 (emphasis added). It 

is facially a limitation upon the relief that can be accorded,

not a removal of jurisdiction over “any case involving or

growing out of a labor dispute.” Here, by contrast, the text

says “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action

under this section.” 

Whether the point was conceded or not, therefore, we

may, and indeed must, decide whether Stone met the

jurisdictional requirement of being an original source. 

III 

We turn to the first requirement of original-source

status, that the relator have “direct and independent

knowledge of the information on which the allegations are 

based.” 31 U. S. C. §3730(e)(4)(B). Because we have not 

previously addressed this provision, several preliminary 
12 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

questions require our attention. 

A 

First, does the phrase “information on which the allegations are based” refer to the information on which the 

relator’s allegations are based or the information on which 

the publicly disclosed allegations that triggered the publicdisclosure bar are based? The parties agree it is the former. See Brief for Petitioners 26, n. 13; Brief for United 

States 24, and n. 8; Brief for Respondent Stone 15, 21. 

But in view of our conclusion that §3730(e)(4) is jurisdictional, we must satisfy ourselves that the parties’ position 

is correct. 

Though the question is hardly free from doubt,5 we 

agree that the “information” to which subparagraph (B) 

speaks is the information upon which the relators’ allegations are based. To begin with, subparagraph (B) standing 

on its own suggests that disposition. The relator must 

have “direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based,” and he must

“provid[e] the information to the Government before filing

an action under this section which is based on the information.” Surely the information one would expect a relator to “provide to the Government before filing an action

. . . based on the information” is the information underlying the relator’s claims.

Subparagraph (A) complicates matters. As described 

earlier, it bars actions based on the “public disclosure of 

allegations or transactions” and provides an exception for 

—————— 

5The Courts of Appeals have divided over the question. See United 

States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng. & Science Servs. Co., 336 

F. 3d 346, 353–355 (CA5 2003) (describing the Courts of Appeals’ 

divergent approaches). Only by demoting the actual text of §3730(e)(4) 

to a footnote and then paraphrasing the statute in a way that assumes

his conclusion can JUSTICE STEVENS assert (without further analysis) 

that the statute’s meaning is “plain.” See post, at 1, 2 (dissenting 

opinion). 
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

cases brought by “an original source of the information.” 

If the allegations referred to in subparagraph (B)’s phrase

requiring “direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based,” are the same

“allegations” referred to in subparagraph (A), then original-source status would depend on knowledge of information underlying the publicly disclosed allegations. The 

principal textual difficulty with that interpretation is that

subparagraph (A) does not speak simply of “allegations,” 

but of “allegations or transactions.” Had Congress wanted

to link original-source status to information underlying

the public disclosure, it would surely have used the identical phrase, “allegations or transactions”; there is no conceivable reason to require direct and independent knowledge of publicly disclosed allegations but not of publicly

disclosed transactions. 

The sense of the matter offers strong additional support

for this interpretation. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) bars actions

based on publicly disclosed allegations whether or not the 

information on which those allegations are based has been 

made public. It is difficult to understand why Congress

would care whether a relator knows about the information 

underlying a publicly disclosed allegation (e.g., what a 

confidential source told a newspaper reporter about insolid

pondcrete) when the relator has direct and independent

knowledge of different information supporting the same

allegation (e.g., that a defective process would inevitably 

lead to insolid pondcrete). Not only would that make little 

sense, it would raise nettlesome procedural problems, 

placing courts in the position of comparing the relator’s

information with the often unknowable information on 

which the public disclosure was based. Where that latter 

information has not been disclosed (by reason, for example, of a reporter’s desire to protect his source), the relator

would presumably be out of court. To bar a relator with 

direct and independent knowledge of information underly-
14 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

ing his allegations just because no one can know what

information underlies the similar allegations of some other 

person simply makes no sense.

The contrary conclusion of some lower courts rests on

the following logic: The term “information” in subparagraph (B) must be read in tandem with the term “information” in subparagraph (A), and the term “information” in 

subparagraph (A) refers to the information on which the 

publicly disclosed allegations are based. See, e.g., United 

States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng. & Science 

Servs. Co., 336 F. 3d 346, 354 (CA5 2003). The major 

premise of this reasoning seems true enough: “information” in (A) and (B) means the same thing. The minor 

premise, however—that “information” in (A) refers to the 

information underlying the publicly disclosed allegations 

or transactions—is highly questionable. The complete

phrase at issue is “unless . . . the person bringing the 

action is an original source of the information.” It seems 

to us more likely (in light of the analysis set forth above) 

that the information in question is the information underlying the action referred to a few words earlier, to-wit, the 

action “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or

transactions” referred to at the beginning of the provision. 

On this interpretation, “information” in subparagraph (A) 

and “information on which the allegations are based” in 

subparagraph (B) are one and the same, viz., information

underlying the allegations of the relator’s action. 

B 

Having determined that the phrase “information on

which the allegations are based” refers to the relator’s

allegations and not the publicly disclosed allegations, we 

confront more textual ambiguity: Which of the relator’s 

allegations are the relevant ones? Stone’s allegations 

changed during the course of the litigation, yet he asks 

that we look only to his original complaint. Rockwell 
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

argues that Stone must satisfy the original-source exception through all stages of the litigation. 

In our view, the term “allegations” is not limited to the

allegations of the original complaint. It includes (at a

minimum) the allegations in the original complaint as 

amended. The statute speaks not of the allegations in the

“original complaint” (or even the allegations in the “complaint”), but of the relator’s “allegations” simpliciter. 

Absent some limitation of §3730(e)(4)’s requirement to the

relator’s initial complaint, we will not infer one. Such a 

limitation would leave the relator free to plead a trivial 

theory of fraud for which he had some direct and independent knowledge and later amend the complaint to

include theories copied from the public domain or from 

materials in the Government’s possession. Even the 

Government concedes that new allegations regarding a

fundamentally different fraudulent scheme require reevaluation of the court’s jurisdiction. See Brief for United 

States 40; Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.

The rule that subject-matter jurisdiction “depends on 

the state of things at the time of the action brought,” 

Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539 (1824), does not 

suggest a different interpretation. The state of things and

the originally alleged state of things are not synonymous; 

demonstration that the original allegations were false will 

defeat jurisdiction. Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694, 701 

(1891); Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 326 (1889). So 

also will the withdrawal of those allegations, unless they 

are replaced by others that establish jurisdiction. Thus, 

when a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then

voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the

amended complaint to determine jurisdiction. See Wellness Community-Nat. v. Wellness House, 70 F. 3d 46, 49 

(CA7 1995); Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F. 2d 504, 
16 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

508 (CA5 1984).6 

Here, we have not only an amended complaint, but a

final pretrial order that superseded all prior pleadings and

“controll[ed] the subsequent course of the action,” Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 16(e). See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 

190, n. 1 (1974) (where a claim was not included in the

complaint, but was included in the pretrial order, “it is

irrelevant that the pleadings were never formally

amended” (citing Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 15(b), 16)); Wilson 

v. Muckala, 303 F. 3d 1207, 1215 (CA10 2002) (“[C]laims, 

issues, defenses, or theories of damages not included in

the pretrial order are waived even if they appeared in the

complaint and, conversely, the inclusion of a claim in the 

pretrial order is deemed to amend any previous pleadings

which did not include that claim”); Syrie v. Knoll Int’l, 748 

F. 2d 304, 308 (CA5 1984) (“[I]ncorporation of a [new] 

claim into the pre-trial order . . . amends the previous

pleadings to state [the new] claim”). In these circumstances, we look to the allegations as amended—here, the 

statement of claims in the final pretrial order—to determine original-source status. 

The Government objects that this approach risks driving

a wedge between the Government and relators. It worries 

that future relators might decline to “acquiesc[e]” in the 

Government’s tactical decision to narrow the claims in a 

case if that would eliminate jurisdiction with respect to

the relator. Brief for United States 44. Even if this policy

concern were valid, it would not induce us to determine 

—————— 

6 It is true that, when a defendant removes a case to federal court 

based on the presence of a federal claim, an amendment eliminating

the original basis for federal jurisdiction generally does not defeat 

jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 346, 

357 (1988); St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 

283, 293 (1938). But removal cases raise forum-manipulation concerns

that simply do not exist when it is the plaintiff who chooses a federal 

forum and then pleads away jurisdiction through amendment. 
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

jurisdiction on the basis of whether the relator is an original source of information underlying allegations that he 

no longer makes. 

IV 

Judged according to the principles set forth above,

Stone’s knowledge falls short. The only false claims ultimately found by the jury (and hence the only ones to 

which our jurisdictional inquiry is pertinent to the outcome) involved false statements with respect to environmental, safety, and health compliance over a one-and-ahalf-year period between April 1, 1987, and September 30,

1988. As described by Stone and the Government in the

final pretrial order, the only pertinent problem with respect to this period of time for which Stone claimed to

have direct and independent knowledge was insolid pondcrete. Because Stone was no longer employed by Rockwell 

at the time, he did not know that the pondcrete was insolid; he did not know that pondcrete storage was even 

subject to RCRA; he did not know that Rockwell would fail

to remedy the defect; he did not know that the insolid

pondcrete leaked while being stored onsite; and, of course, 

he did not know that Rockwell made false statements to 

the Government regarding pondcrete storage. 

Stone’s prediction that the pondcrete would be insolid 

because of a flaw in the piping system does not qualify as 

“direct and independent knowledge” of the pondcrete

defect. Of course a qui tam relator’s misunderstanding of 

why a concealed defect occurred would normally be immaterial as long as he knew the defect actually existed. But 

here Stone did not know that the pondcrete failed; he 

predicted it. Even if a prediction can qualify as direct and

independent knowledge in some cases (a point we need not 

address), it assuredly does not do so when its premise of 

cause and effect is wrong. Stone’s prediction was a failed

prediction, disproved by Stone’s own allegations. As Stone 
18 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

acknowledged, Rockwell was able to produce “concrete

hard” pondcrete using the machinery Stone said was

defective. According to respondents’ allegations in the 

final pretrial order, the insolidity problem was caused by a

new foreman’s reduction of the cement-to-sludge ratio in

the winter of 1986, long after Stone had left Rocky Flats. 

Stone counters that his original-source status with

respect to his spray-irrigation claim (which related to a

time period different from that for his pondcrete claim,

App. 492) provided jurisdiction with respect to all of his 

claims. We disagree. Section 3730(e)(4) does not permit 

jurisdiction in gross just because a relator is an original

source with respect to some claim. We, along with every

court to have addressed the question, conclude that

§3730(e)(4) does not permit such claim smuggling. See 

United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 

205 F. 3d 97, 102 (CA3 2000); Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F. 3d 

982, 990 (CA8 2003); Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC 

Corp., 975 F. 2d 1412, 1415–1416, 1420 (CA9 1992). As 

then-Judge Alito explained, “[t]he plaintiff’s decision to

join all of his or her claims in a single lawsuit should not 

rescue claims that would have been doomed by section 

(e)(4) if they had been asserted in a separate action. And 

likewise, this joinder should not result in the dismissal of

claims that would have otherwise survived.” SmithKline 

Beecham, supra, at 102. 

Because Stone did not have direct and independent

knowledge of the information upon which his allegations 

were based, we need not decide whether Stone met the 

second requirement of original-source status, that he have 

voluntarily provided the information to the Government

before filing his action. 

V 

Respondents contend that even if Stone failed the original-source test as to his pondcrete allegations, the Gov-
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

ernment’s intervention in his case provided an independent basis of jurisdiction. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) permits

jurisdiction over an action based on publicly disclosed 

allegations or transactions if the action is “brought by the 

Attorney General.” Respondents say that any inquiry into 

Stone’s original-source status with respect to amendments 

to the complaint was unnecessary because the Government had intervened, making this an “action brought by 

the Attorney General.”7 Even assuming that Stone was an

original source of allegations in his initial complaint, we

reject respondents’ “intervention” argument. 

The False Claims Act contemplates two types of actions. 

First, under §3730(a), “[i]f the Attorney General finds that 

a person has violated or is violating section 3729, the

Attorney General may bring a civil action under this

section against the person.” Second, under §3730(b), “[a]

person may bring an action for a violation of section 3729

for the person and for the United States Government.”

When a private person brings an action under §3730(b), 

the Government may elect to “proceed with the action,”

§3730(b)(4)(A), or it may “declin[e] to take over the action, 

in which case the person bringing the action shall have the 

right to conduct the action,” §3730(b)(4)(B). The statute 

thus draws a sharp distinction between actions brought by

the Attorney General under §3730(a) and actions brought 

by a private person under §3730(b). An action brought by

a private person does not become one brought by the

Government just because the Government intervenes and

elects to “proceed with the action.” Section 3730 elsewhere 

refers to the Government’s “proceed[ing] with an action 

brought by a person under subsection (b)”—which makes 

crystal clear the distinction between actions brought by 

—————— 

7The Government includes a significant caveat: In its view, intervention does not cure any pre-existing defects in Stone’s initial complaint;

it only cures defects resulting from amendments to the pleadings. 
20 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

the Government and actions brought by a relator where

the Government intervenes but does not oust the relator. 

Does this conclusion cast into doubt the courts’ jurisdiction with respect to the Government as well? After all, 

§3730(e)(4)(A) bars jurisdiction over any action brought

under §3730, as this one was, unless the action is brought 

(1) by the Attorney General or (2) by an original source; 

and we have concluded that this is brought by neither.

Not even petitioners have suggested the bizarre result 

that the Government’s judgment must be set aside. It is 

readily enough avoided, as common sense suggests it must 

be, by holding that an action originally brought by a private person, which the Attorney General has joined, becomes an action brought by the Attorney General once the 

private person has been determined to lack the jurisdictional prerequisites for suit. The outcome would be similar to that frequently produced in diversity-jurisdiction 

cases, where the “courts of appeals . . . have the authority

to cure a jurisdictional defect by dismissing a dispensable 

nondiverse party.” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 

L. P., 541 U. S. 567, 573 (2004) (citing Newman-Green, 

Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 837 (1989)); see 

United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F. 2d 843, 845 (CA3 

1979) (“[T]here are instances when an intervenor’s claim

does not rise and fall with the claim of the original party”);

7C C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and 

Procedure §1920, p. 491 (2d ed. 1986) (“[A]n intervenor

can proceed to decision after a dismissal of the original

action . . . if there are independent grounds for jurisdiction

of the intervenor’s claim”). What is cured here, by the

jurisdictional ruling regarding Stone’s claim, is the characterization of the action as one brought by an original 

source. The elimination of Stone leaves in place an action 

pursued only by the Attorney General, that can reasonably 

be regarded as being “brought” by him for purposes of 

§3730(e)(4)(A). 
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 21 

Opinion of the Court 

* * * 

We hold that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to 

enter judgment in favor of Stone. We reverse the Tenth 

Circuit’s judgment to the contrary. 

It is so ordered. 

JUSTICE BREYER took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 1 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–1272 

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP., ET AL., 

PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[March 27, 2007] 

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, 

dissenting. 

Any private citizen may bring an action to enforce the

False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§3729–3733, unless the 

information on which his allegations are based is already 

in the public domain. Even if the information is publicly 

available, however, the citizen may still sue if he was an

“original source” of that information. §3730(e)(4)(A) (“No

court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this

section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or

transactions . . . unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information”). Because I believe the 

Court has misinterpreted these provisions to require that 

an “original source” in a qui tam action have knowledge of 

the actual facts underlying the allegations on which he

may ultimately prevail, I respectfully dissent. 

In my view, a plain reading of the statute’s provisions—

specifically, §§3730(e)(4)(A) and (B)—makes clear that it is

the information underlying the publicly disclosed allegations, not the information underlying the allegations in 

the relator’s complaint (original or amended), of which the

relator must be an original source.1 Moreover, the stat-

—————— 

1Section 3730(e)(4)(A) states that 
2 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

ute’s use of the article “an,” rather than “the,” in describing the original source indicates that the relator need not

be the sole source of the information. 

By contrast, the majority’s approach suggests that the

relator must have knowledge of actual facts supporting

the theory ultimately proven at trial—in other words, 

knowledge of the information underlying the prevailing 

claims. See ante, at 17 (limiting the relevant jurisdictional

inquiry to those “false claims ultimately found by the 

jury”). I disagree. Such a view is not supported by the

statute, which requires only that the relator have “direct

and independent knowledge” of the information on which 

the publicly disclosed allegations are based and that the

relator provide such information to the Government in a 

timely manner. As I read the statute, the jurisdictional 

inquiry focuses on the facts in the public domain at the 

time the action is commenced. If the process of discovery 

leads to amended theories of recovery, amendments to the

original complaint would not affect jurisdiction that was

proper at the time of the original filing.2 

—————— 

“No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based 

upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal,

civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or 

Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, 

or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney 

General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the 

information.” (Footnote omitted.)

Section 3730(e)(4)(B) then states that 

“For purposes of this paragraph, ‘original source’ means an individual

who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which 

the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information

to the Government before filing an action under this section which is 

based on the information.” 2The majority’s approach requires courts to reevaluate jurisdiction 

over a qui tam action brought by an original source every time the 

complaint is amended. Such an approach, the Government has argued,

will interfere with its ability to tailor the claims advanced as it sees

appropriate. By contrast, under the approach I would adopt, the 
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

In this case, as the Court points out, the fact that Rockwell was storing thousands of insolid pondcrete blocks at

the Rocky Flats facility had been publicly disclosed by the 

news media before Stone filed this lawsuit. Ante, at 3, 4. 

In my view, the record establishes that Stone was an 

original source of the allegations publicly disclosed by the 

media in June 1989, even though he thought that the

deterioration of the pondcrete blocks would be caused by 

poor engineering rather than a poor formula for the mixture. The search warrant that was executed on June 6, 

1989, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) affidavit that was released to the news media on June 9, 

1989, were both based, in part, on interviews with Stone

and on information Stone had provided to the Government, including the 1982 Engineering Order.

With respect to earlier media coverage of the pondcrete

leakage discovery in May 1988, however, Stone’s status as

an original source is less obvious. Stone first went to the 

FBI with allegations of Rockwell’s environmental violations in March 1986. App. 180. He subsequently met with

several FBI agents over the course of several years. Id., at 

180–182. During those meetings he provided the FBI with

thousands of pages of documents, including the Engineering Order, in which he predicted that the pondcrete system design would not work. On the basis of that record, it 

seems likely that Stone (1) had “direct and independent 

knowledge of the information on which the [publicly disclosed] allegations [we]re based” and (2) voluntarily provided such information to the Government before filing

suit. It is, however, his burden to establish that he did so. 

Because there has been no finding as to whether Stone 

—————— 

jurisdictional inquiry relates only to whether the relator was an original source of the information underlying the public disclosures, which

can easily be determined when an action is filed and need not be

revisited during later stages of the litigation. 
4 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

was an original source as to those public disclosures, I 

would vacate and remand for a determination whether 

Stone was in fact an original source of the allegations

publicly disclosed by the media in 1988 and 1989.