17-994-ag Hamer v. Sessions BIA Videla, IJ A036 358 692 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROC EDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMEN T FILED WITH THIS CO URT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATA BASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPR ESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Fole y Square, in the City of New York, on the 25 th day of May, two thousand eighteen.

PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ O RRIN S. H AMER , AKA O RIN H AMER , AKA O RIN S. H AMER , Petitioner , v. 17-994-ag

J EFFERSON B. S ESSIONS III, U NITED S TATES A TTORNEY G ENERAL , Respondent

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_____________________________________ For Petitioner: C RAIG R ELLES , Law Office of Craig Relles, White Plains, New York. For Respondent: K ATHARINE E. C LARK (Nancy K. Canter, on the brief ), for Shelley R. Goad, Assist ant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Washington, District of Columbia.2 Petition for review of a Marc h 9, 2017 Board of Immigra tion Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing Petitioner’s appeal of a December 11, 2015 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Petitioner’s motion to terminate rem oval proceedings and ordering his removal.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a BIA decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED

. Petitioner Orrin S. Hamer, a native and citizen of Guyana, seeks review of a March 9, 2017 decision of the BIA dismissing Hamer’s appeal of a December 11, 2015 decision of an IJ denying Hamer’s motion to terminate removal pro ceedings and ordering his removal. In re Orrin S.

Hamer , No. A 036 358 692 (B.I.A. Mar. 9, 2017), aff’g No. A 036 358 692 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 11, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiar ity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, a nd the issues on appeal.

We have reviewed the decisions of both the IJ and BIA “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review de novo Hamer’s legal challenge to the agency’s denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings. See Perriello v. Napolitano , 579 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2009). Hamer’s petition is denied because his arguments are foreclosed by our decision in Perriello . Hamer relies on 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f), which provides: An immigration judge may terminate rem oval proceedings to permit the alien to proceed to a final hearing on a pending a pplication or petitio n for naturalization when the alien has established prima faci e eligibility for naturalization and the matter involves exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors; in every other case, the removal hearing shall be completed as promptly as possible notwithstanding the pendency of an applic ation for naturaliza tion during any state of the proceedings.

But Perriello is explicit that changes made in 1990 to the statutor y framework governing removal3 and naturalization proceedings abro gated this regulation, at least in part, and preclude an alien from doing what Hamer has done here: “apply for naturalization after rem oval proceedings have

commenced and then move for termination of removal proceedings.” 579 F.3d at 141; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (providing that “no application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against th e applicant a removal proceeding”). Because 8 U.S.C. § 1429 prohibits the agency from consider ing an alien’s naturali zation application during the pendency of a removal proceeding, it is “impo ssible for an alien to establish prima facie eligibility for naturalization” by applying fo r naturalization during removal proceedings.

Perriello , 579 F.3d at 141. In sum, the agency cannot terminate removal proceedings for an alien, such as Hamer, on the basis of the alien’s application for naturalization when that application was made after the commencement of such removal proceedings. See id . at 141–42. We have considered all of Hamer’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, Hamer’s petition for review is DENIED

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FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court