THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Tammy C. Richardson, Respondent,

v.

Halcyon Real Estate Services, LLP and McCabe, Trotter 

& Beverly, P.C., Defendants,

of which McCabe, Trotter & Beverly, P.C. is the 

Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000671

Appeal From Dorchester County

Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5981

Heard June 8, 2022 – Filed April 19, 2023

DISMISSED

M. Dawes Cooke, Jr., John William Fletcher, and Justin 

Paul Novak, all of Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms, 

LLC, of Charleston; Robert P. Wood, of Rogers 

Townsend LLC, of Columbia; and Joshua Robert Hinson, 

of Wolfe, Campbell, Gunst & Hinson, PLLC, of 

Charlotte, North Carolina, all for Appellant.

Mary Leigh Arnold, of Mary Leigh Arnold, PA, of 

Mount Pleasant; and Justin S. Kahn, of Kahn Law Firm, 

LLP, of Charleston, both for Respondent.
VINSON, J.: McCabe, Trotter & Beverly, P.C. (MTB) appeals the circuit court's 

order (the Sanctions Order) imposing sanctions on MTB for deposition 

misconduct. MTB argues (1) the Sanctions Order is immediately appealable and 

(2) the circuit court erred by imposing sanctions when MTB's counsel did not 

violate Rule 30(j)(8), SCRCP,

1 and had legitimate reasons for ending one of the 

depositions. MTB requests this court reverse the Sanctions Order and order 

Tammy C. Richardson to return the money MTB paid as a sanction. We dismiss 

MTB's appeal because the Sanctions Order is not immediately appealable.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of a foreclosure action brought by Southern Magnolia 

Homeowners' Association (Southern Magnolia) against Richardson for unpaid 

homeowners' association (HOA) dues. Richardson filed a third-party complaint 

against MTB—the firm Southern Magnolia retained to pursue collection of 

Richardson's unpaid HOA dues—and Halcyon Real Estate Services, LLC 

(Halcyon)—Southern Magnolia's property management company. The circuit 

court severed Richardson's third-party action from the pending foreclosure action. 

This appeal concerns Richardson's action against MTB.

During discovery, Richardson deposed an MTB employee and a former MTB 

employee (collectively, Deponents). Following the depositions, Richardson filed a 

motion for sanctions against MTB pursuant to Rule 37, SCRCP, for improper 

deposition conduct. Relying primarily on In re Anonymous Member of the South 

Carolina Bar, 346 S.C. 177, 552 S.E.2d 10 (2001), Richardson alleged MTB's 

counsel discussed previously produced documents presented during depositions 

with Deponents in violation of Rule 30(j)(8) and engaged in witness coaching. 

Richardson further alleged MTB's counsel improperly instructed one of Deponents

 

1 Rule 30(j)(8) provides, "Deposing counsel shall provide to opposing counsel a 

copy of all documents shown to the witness during the deposition, either before the 

deposition begins or contemporaneously with the showing of each document to the 

witness. If the documents are provided (or otherwise identified) at least two 

business days before the deposition, then the witness and the witness' counsel do 

not have the right to discuss the documents privately before the witness answers 

questions about them. If the documents have not been so provided or identified, 

then counsel and the witness may have a reasonable amount of time to privately 

discuss the documents before the witness answers questions concerning the 

document."
to leave her deposition early. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted 

Richardson's motion for sanctions.

 

The circuit court ordered the parties to reconvene Deponents' depositions and that 

Deponents answer questions concerning the matters they discussed off the record 

with MTB's counsel and Stephanie Trotter, an MTB attorney, in the prior 

depositions. The court prohibited MTB's counsel from instructing Deponents not 

to respond to questions regarding these off-the-record conferences and ordered that 

MTB's counsel cease and desist from the prohibited behavior discussed in the 

order. In addition, the court ordered that Trotter be deposed and instructed her to 

answer questions about the off-the-record conferences. Finally, the circuit court 

ordered MTB to pay for the costs of Deponents' reconvened depositions and of 

Trotter's deposition and for the attorney's fees and costs associated with Deponents'

prior depositions. MTB filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court 

denied. This appeal followed.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In a case raising a novel question of law, the appellate court is free to decide the 

question with no particular deference to the lower court." Hagood v. Sommerville, 

362 S.C. 191, 194, 607 S.E.2d 707, 708 (2005).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

MTB argues the monetary sanctions imposed under the Sanctions Order are 

immediately appealable. We disagree.

The determination of whether an award of attorney's fees and costs as a discovery 

sanction under Rule 37(b)(2), SCRCP, is immediately appealable is a matter of 

first impression in South Carolina. 

Rule 30(j)(9), SCRCP, provides any violation of Rule 30(j), SCRCP, for deposition 

misconduct may subject the violator to sanctions under Rule 37, SCRCP.

In South Carolina, our judges have broad discretion in 

addressing misbehavior during depositions. See Rule 37, 

SCRCP. In addition to their traditional contempt 

powers, judges may issue orders as a sanction for 

improper deposition conduct: (1) specifying that 

designated facts be taken as established for purposes of 
the action; (2) precluding the introduction of certain 

evidence at trial; (3) striking out pleadings or parts 

thereof; (4) staying further proceedings pending the 

compliance with an order that has not been followed; (5) 

dismissing the action in full or in part; (6) entering 

default judgment on some or all the claims; or (7) an 

award of reasonable expenses, including attorney fees. 

Id. Among the costs a judge may deem appropriate could 

be those incurred for future judicial monitoring of 

depositions or payment for the retaking of depositions. 

In re Anonymous, 346 S.C. at 194, 552 S.E.2d at 18; see Rule 37(b)(2), SCRCP.2

 

"The determination of whether a party may immediately appeal an order issued 

before or during trial is governed primarily by [section 14-3-330 of the South 

Carolina Code (2017)]." Ex parte Cap. U-Drive-It, Inc., 369 S.C. 1, 6, 630 S.E.2d 

464, 467 (2006). Section 14-3-330 provides that only final judgments and certain 

interlocutory orders are immediately appealable. "If there is some further act 

which must be done by the court prior to a determination of the rights of the 

parties, then the order is interlocutory." Mid-State Distribs, Inc. v. Century Imps., 

Inc., 310 S.C. 330, 335, 426 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1993). "An interlocutory order is 

not immediately appealable unless it involves the merits of the case or affects a 

substantial right." Burkey v. Noce, 398 S.C. 35, 37, 726 S.E.2d 229, 230 (Ct. App. 

2012). "An order which does not finally end a case or prevent a final judgment 

from which a party may seek appellate review usually is considered an 

interlocutory order from which no immediate appeal is allowed." Hagood, 362 

S.C. at 195, 607 S.E.2d at 709. 

As established by existing South Carolina case law, the portion of the Sanctions 

Order directing the parties to reconvene depositions is interlocutory and not 

immediately appealable under section 14-3-330. See Ex parte Whetstone, 289 S.C. 

580, 580, 347 S.E.2d 881, 881 (1986) ("An order directing a party to participate in 

discovery is interlocutory and not directly appealable under [section 14-3-330]."); 

see also Davis v. Parkview Apartments, 409 S.C. 266, 280, 762 S.E.2d 535, 543 

(2014) ("[T]o challenge the specific rulings of . . . discovery orders, the normal 

course is to refuse to comply, suffer contempt, and appeal from the contempt 

finding."). 

 

2 "Rule 37[, SCRCP, uses] the language of the Federal Rule with minor changes." 

Rule 37, SCRCP, note. The differences are not relevant to this issue.
Similarly, we find the award of attorney's fees and costs under Rule 37(b)(2) is 

interlocutory and not immediately appealable.3

 Although the circuit court set the 

amount of the monetary sanctions, the Sanctions Order did not constitute a final 

judgment. Cf. Kriti Ripley, LLC v. Emerald Invs., LLC, 404 S.C. 367, 379, 746 

S.E.2d 26, 32 (2013) ("A final judgment is an order that 'dispose[s] of the 

cause, . . . reserving no further questions or directions for future determination. It 

must finally dispose of the whole subject-matter or be a termination of the 

particular proceedings or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by 

execution what has been determined.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Good v. 

Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 201 S.C. 32, 41-42, 21 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1942))). 

For an interlocutory order to be immediately appealable, it must "involve[] the 

merits of the case or affect[] a substantial right." Burkey, 398 S.C. at 37, 726 

S.E.2d at 230. We conclude the award of attorney's fees and costs as a Rule 

37(b)(2) discovery sanction neither involves the merits of the case nor affects a 

substantial right and is therefore not immediately appealable. Cf. Watson v. 

Underwood, 407 S.C. 443, 458, 756 S.E.2d 155, 163 (Ct. App. 2014) ("An order 

'involves the merits,' as that term is used in [s]ection 14-3-330(1)[,] and is 

immediately appealable when it finally determines some substantial matter forming 

the whole or part of some cause of action or defense." (alterations in original)

(quoting Ex. Parte Capital U-Drive-It, Inc., 369 S.C. at 7, 630 S.E.2d at 467-68));

Hagood, 362 S.C. at 195, 607 S.E.2d at 709 (holding an "order affects a substantial

right and is immediately appealable when it '(a) in effect determines the action and 

 

3 While no cases in South Carolina's jurisprudence address the specific issue of the 

appealability of monetary sanctions under Rule 37(b), federal courts have 

determined that orders imposing attorney's fees and costs on a party under Rule 

37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are interlocutory and not 

immediately appealable. See, e.g., David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 416 n.6

(9th Cir. 1977) ("Normally, the imposition of the [Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure] Rule 37(b)(2) sanction of attorney's fees and expenses upon a 

non-complying party is considered to be interlocutory."); E. Maico Distribs., Inc. 

v. Maico-Fahrzeugfabrik, G.m.b.H., 658 F.2d 944, 947 (3d Cir. 1981)

("[S]anctions for violation of discovery orders are usually considered interlocutory 

and not immediately appealable."); see also 15B Charles Alan Wright et al., 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914.23 (2d ed. 1992) ("Sanctions imposed for 

violation of discovery orders might seem plausible candidates for appeal on the 

theory that the sanction is severable from the continuing proceedings. The 

opportunities for appeal, however, have generally been limited to sanctions that 

conclude the proceeding or that involve nonparties."). 
prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken or discontinues the 

action, (b) grants or refuses a new trial or (c) strikes out an answer or any part 

thereof or any pleading in any action'" (quoting § 14-3-330(2))). Based on the 

foregoing, we find the award of attorney's fees and costs under Rule 37(b)(2) is 

interlocutory and not immediately appealable. 

Moreover, as our supreme court stated in In re Anonymous, "Actions taken in a 

deposition designed to prevent justice, delay the process, or drive up costs are 

improper and warrant sanctions." 346 S.C. at 194, 552 S.E.2d at 18. Allowing a 

party to immediately appeal an interlocutory order imposing sanctions under Rule 

37(b) for deposition misconduct would further delay the process and drive up 

costs. 

 

We further find MTB's argument that the Sanctions Order is immediately 

appealable because the circuit court's prohibition on conduct in violation of Rule 

30(j)(8) was in the nature of an injunction is without merit. Cf. Richland County v. 

Kaiser, 351 S.C. 89, 94, 567 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ct. App. 2002) ("An injunction is an 

equitable remedy that may be used to require a party to perform an action."). The 

circuit court found MTB's counsel's deposition conduct violated the discovery 

rules. If MTB's counsel engaged in the same conduct in Deponents' reconvened 

depositions, it is logical to conclude the circuit court would have imposed 

additional discovery sanctions on MTB.

Accordingly, we hold the Sanctions Order is not immediately appealable.4

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is 

DISMISSED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS, J., concur.

 

4 In light of our disposition of the appeal, we decline to address MTB's remaining 

arguments. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 

613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing that an appellate court need not 

address remaining issues when resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).