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Filed 10/30/ 23 P. v. And erson CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. CHRISTPHER BLAKE ANDERSON

, Defendant and Appellant. A16 5991

( Napa County Super. Ct. No. CR7306A )

M EMORANDUM O PINION 1
Christopher Blake Anderson appeals from the denial of his petition for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 , now section 1172.6

. 2 A

1 We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.

2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

W hile this appeal was pending , s ection 1170.95 was renumbered to section 1172.6

. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10 ; see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 , 708, fn. 2 .) As such, we will refer to section 1172.6, but we will continue to refer to section 1170.95 as necessary, s ince section 1170.95 was the correct statutory designation at the time of the underlying proceedings and since the parties and the trial court below referred to that statute

.2

jury found A nderson guilty of two counts of first degree murder and two
counts of first degree robbery in 1988

. (§§ 187, 211.) The jury also found true

enhancement allegations as to all counts that Anderson personally used a
firearm and that a principal was armed with a fir earm

. (§§ 12022 , subd. (a),
12022.5.) T he court sentenced Anderson to concurrent terms of 2 5 years to

life for the murder counts , plus consecutive two

- year terms for the personal

use of firearm enhancements

. Division Two of this court affirmed his
convictions in 1991. ( People v. Anderson (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1646, 1667 .)

After Anderson filed his section 1170.95 petition, the resentencing
court appointed counsel and issued an order to show cause after the parties
stipulated to a prima facie showing

. At the hearing on the petition, the
parties did not present any new evidence, but submitted specific portions of

the trial transcript to the court to review. The parties also stipulated as
follow s : the victims were killed by gunshot s to the head on December 2, 1986
in Placer County ; Kenneth Lee, not Anderson, was the actual killer who fired
those shots; and neither victim was a peace officer. The court ultimately
denied the petition for resentencin g

. T hough the court did not find beyond a

reasonable doubt that Anderson acted with intent to kill

, the court found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson was a major participant in the
robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Anderson appealed

, and his c ounsel filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216

. Counsel set forth a statement of the case

, rais ed no issues, and request ed that we exercise our discretion to
independently review the record for erro r. Counsel and this court informed

Anderson of the opportunity to file a supplemental brief

, which he has done.

Anderson argues the court erred in denying his petition because substantial
evidence did not support the court’s conclusion that he acted with reckless3

indifference to human life. After reviewing Anderson’s arguments and the

record , we affirm.
In this case, Ander son does not dispute he was a major participant.

Thus , as Anderson indicates, the question is whether substantial evidence
supports the resentencing court ’ s conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that

he acted with reckless indifference to human life. M ind ful of the

“ ‘significant[] overlap’ ” between being a major participant and having
reckless indifference to human life ( People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522,
615), we discuss both the major participant and reckless indifference prongs

. F irst of all, amp le evidence establishes that Anderson was a major
participant in the robbery. ( People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803
( Banks ) .) Anderson participated in multiple planning meetings along with
Arthur Chen, Richard Young, Robert Novak, Kenneth Lee, and John Bailey

. Anderson was present when t he men discussed the fact that the victims sold
drugs and would have drugs and money at the home , and when Chen

indicated the victims would need to be killed

. The men knew there were

firearms in the victim s’ home. Anderson and the other men prepared their

own firearms with tape and brass catchers before the crimes

, so as to minimize the possibility that evidence would be left behind.
Apart from the above, the evidence also showed Anderson played a key

ro le as an actual perpetrator in executing the crimes

. ( Banks

, supra , 61

Cal.4th at p. 803.) H e and Lee w ere the first to enter the ho m e , and they

restrain ed the victims and had them lie on their bellies

. Anderson himself

searched the home for valuables. At one point

, Anderson moved victim

Claudia Plemmons into other rooms to conduct his search

, then he put her

back on the floor next to the other victim

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After the killings, Anderson went back inside the victims’ home to

retrieve the handcuffs from th eir bodies

. He also helped count the stolen
money and received a portion of it

. Anderson was later found in possession of

a ski mask, military

- type clothing, and a roll of duct tape that bore his
fingerprints and was used on the female v ictim.

S ubstantial evidence also supports the conclusion that Anderson acted

with reckless indifference to human life

. ( In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667,
677.) Anderson knew multiple firearms would be involved

, and he and the

others were together as they prepared their weapons with brass catchers

, tape, and silencers

. Plus he was present at planning meetings when kill ing

the victims was discussed. Bailey testified he tried to talk Anderson out of
committing the crimes but to no avail

. Young testified that, at the crime

scene, he saw Anderson try to fire Young’s weapon at the victims and heard

Anderson complain when it jammed. This aligned with Detective Jeff rey
Jensen ’s testimony that Anderson , in response to questioning, indicated he
pointed Young’s Uzi at Plemmons and pulled the trigger , but the gun
jammed.

T h us, th e totality of the circumstances amply establishes that

Anderson was subjectively aware of and willingly involved in th is violen t

home invasion robbery , and that he c onsciously disregar d ed the significant

risk of death his actions create d . ( In re Scoggins

, supra , 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)

T he risk of death was grave

, and disregard of that risk was a gross deviation

from the standard of conduct a law

- abiding person would have observed in

the situation

. ( Ibid. )

Anderson argues the perpetrators ’ actions of wiping down the casings,
equipping silencers, and taping magazi nes w ere undertaken “to scare the

househo lders into giving up their valuables by shooting their guns, not killing5

them

. ” We are not persuaded, as the argument does not negate the evidence
that lethal force was contemplated and that Anderson remained a maj or participant in the crimes after Chen indicated the victims would be killed.
Similarly unpersuasive is Anderson’s contention that his wearing a mask and
attempting to disguise himself showed he did not expect the victims would be

killed.

In sum , t he totality of the circumstances supports the resentencing

court ’ s finding that Anderson was a major participant in the robbery who

acted with reckless indifference to human life.

D ISPOSITION The order denying Anderson’s section 1170.95 petition is affirm ed

.

_________________________ Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Tucher, P.J.

_________________________ Petrou , J.

P eople v. Anderson (A1 65991 )