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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

**C O U R T O F A P P E A L S**

UNPUBLISHED

In re OBILLE, Minors. July 12, 2018

No. 341821

Oakland Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2016

- 844054

- NA

Before: O’B RIEN

, P .J., and M ETER and R IORDAN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Respondent mother appeals as of right the trial court ’s order terminating her parental

rights to the three minor child ren

— FEO, TDO, and CBO

— pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(f).

We affirm.

Petitioner s are the maternal grandparents of the minor child ren . They were appointed

as the legal guardian s of FEO on November 9, 2005

, when she was one year old , and of TDO and

CBO on June 3, 2009

, when TDO was two years old and CBO was one year old

. Petitioner s

filed this termination petition in July 2016

. After a termination hearing

, which began in April

2017

, and a best

- interest hearing

, which concluded on October 3, 2017

, the trial court

terminated respondent ’ s parental rights. 1 Respondent now argues that the trial court ’ s decision

is clearly erroneous and contrary to the child ren ’ s best interests.

In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the

statutory grounds listed in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and convincing

evidence. In re BZ

, 264 Mich App 286, 296; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). If the court finds that

a statutory ground for termination exists and that termination of parental rights is in the

child ren ’ s best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5).

This court reviews for clear error a trial court ’ s findings regarding both the existence of a

statutory ground for termination and the child ren ’ s best interests. In re Trejo

, 462 Mich 341,

356

- 357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); see also MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly erroneous

if

, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Miller

, 433 Mich

1 The parental rights of the children’s father were also terminated, but he has not appealed.- 2

- 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989)

. This Court gives deference to a trial court ’ s special

opportunity to observe and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id

.

The trial court terminated respondent ’ s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(f),

which provides that the court may terminate parental rights when a child has a legal guardian

and both of the following have occurred :

( i ) The parent, having the ability to support or assist in supporting the

minor, has failed or neglected, without good cause, to provide regular an d

substantial support for the minor for a period of 2 years or more before the filing

of the petition or, if a support order has been entered, has failed to substantially

comply with the order for a period of 2 years or more before the filing of the

petition.

( ii ) The parent, having the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with

the minor, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected, without good cause,

to do so for a period of 2 years or more before the filing of the petition.

The petitioner must prove both subsections ( i ) and ( ii ) by clear and convincing evidence before

termination can be ordered. In re ALZ

, 247 Mich App 264, 272; 636 NW2d 284 (2001); In

re Hill

, 221 Mich App 683, 691; 562 NW2d 254 (1997).

MCL 712A. 19b(3)(f)( i ) addresses two independent situations: (1) whether the respondent

provided regular and substantial support when able to do so, and (2) whether the respondent

substantially complied with a support order if one had been entered. See In re Newton

, 238 Mich

Ap p 486, 490

- 491; 606 NW2d 34 (1999). Here, the record shows that respondent did not

provide regular and substantial support for the children from July 1, 2014

, through July 1, 2016.

Although she blamed petitioner s for turning down her offers of money, the record shows that

respondent never paid f or gas when the petitioner

- grandmother asked

, even though the

grandmother was driving respondent to and from work. Moreover, while the record reflects that

respondent occasionally gave the children Christmas toy s

, school supplies

, and some items of

clothing, these gifts were sporadic and inconsistent, and they did not constitute regular and

substantial support. As the trial court correctly found, respondent was employed while the

children were with petitioners, ye t she admitted to not providing support for the children.

Therefore, the trial court did no t clearly err in finding that MCL 712A. 19b(3)(f)( i ) was proven by

clear and convincing evidence.

MCL 712A. 19b(3)(f)( ii ) considers whether the respondent maintained a relationship with

the child by visiting, contacting, or otherwise communicating

, if respondent had the ability to do

so. Because the statute phrases “ visit, contact, or communicate ” in the disjunctive, petitioner s

w ere not required to prove that respon dent had the ability to perform all three acts , but rather that

she had the ability to perform one of the acts and failed or neglected to regularly and

substantially do so, without good cause, for two or more years preceding the filing of the

petition. See In re Hill , 221 Mich App at 694.

S ince July 2014, respondent ha d lived a few miles from petitioners and the children.

Respondent testified she had three cars she could utilize to visit her children. Contrary to- 3

- respondent ’ s claim that petitioner s re fused to allow respondent to visit the children, t he record

shows that respondent only initiated four contacts with the children in an effort to see them. T he

trial court properly found that these encounters were random

, and not regular or frequent. The

court aptly noted that petitioners

— not respondent

— initiated most of the contact. Respondent

cannot claim she has been i n “ regular and substantial ” contact with her children as contemplated by MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) when p etitioners were the ones creating the

circumstances for the sporadic contact between respondent and her children. Regardless of

respondent ’ s reason for not visiting the children

, the trial court appropriately found i t

unreasonable for respondent to try to defeat this p etition because she “ tri ed ” to visit with the

children and was prevented from doing so . The evidence at trial demonstrated that

petitioners declined respondent’s requests to see the children in two instances, but on both

occasions respondent’s requests were last minute and the c hildren were unavailable.

Moreover, and somewhat telling, respondent never attempted to reschedule the visits at a

time that could accommodate the children’s, petitioners, and respondent’s schedules.

Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that res pondent failed to prove that she was

“denied” access to visiting her children in those instances. Further, no evidence was

presented to show that respondent regularly called or made any other effort to regularly

communicate with the children. Accordingly , the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §

19b(3)(f)( ii ) was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

The trial court also did not err in its determination that t ermination of parental rights was

in the best interests of the children. “[T]he focus at the best

- interest stage” is on the child, not

the parent. In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 87; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court should

weigh all the evidence available to it in determining the child’s best interests, In re Trejo , 462

Mich at 364, and may consider such factors as the child’s need for permanency, stability, and

finality, the advantages of the current placement over the parent’s home, and the child’s bond

with the parent. In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 41

- 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).

The record shows that the child ren do not, and never have had, any kind of relationship

with respondent. The psychological evaluation of the children showed they had concerns and

anxieties surrounding the possibility of a change in p lacement or unsupervised contact with

respondent. The children did not view their parents , including respondent, as central figures in

their lives . They felt r ejected by respondent and had few positive emotions toward their

biological parents in general

.

The psychological evaluation of the children also indicated that t he children were in need

of permanence . The psychological evaluator opined that, if termination of parental rights could

facilitate permanence, it was in the best interests of the childre n. R espondent now claim s that

she can provide stab ility and permanence. But c ontrary to respondent ’ s claim, as the trial court

aptly noted, given that another court found respondent unfit to care for animals

, 2 the trial court

2 Respondent admitted that criminal charges of animal neglect had been filed against her and she

was on probation relating to those charges.- 4

- would be remiss to believe r espond ent had the capacity, insight, or ability to care for three more

children.

In contrast, no issues have been identified with the children’s placement with petitioners.

Petitioners have been able to provide for all three children, without the assistance of their

parents, since the children were very young. The trial court specifi cally recognized that the

children were in a relative placement, stating that the children ’ s guardians were their maternal

grandparents who were pursuing adoption. The trial court also found that the children had only

known petitioners as their care provi ders and role models and that the children had never looked

to anyone else but petitioners to provide care, comfort, parental necessities

, and support.

Respondent does not contest these findings on appeal. In sum , the trial court did not clearly err

in f inding that termination of respondent ’ s parental rights was in the children ’ s best

interests.

Affirmed

.

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien

/s/ Patrick M. Meter

/s/ Michael J. Riordan