Filed 11/10/21 In re S.P. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re S.P., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

G.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D079365

 (Super. Ct. No. NJ15676 )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Michael Imhoff, Judge. Affirmed. 

Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Lisa M. Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

G.P. (Father) appeals dispositional orders entered in juvenile 

dependency proceedings declaring his son, S.P., a dependent pursuant to 

Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361, subdivision (d) and ordering 

family maintenance services. The San Diego County Health and Human 

Services Agency (the Agency) initiated the proceedings when S.P. was three 

weeks old, based upon M.P. (Mother)2 and Father’s failure to provide 

adequate nutrition to S.P.’s older sibling, T.P.

On appeal, Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by 

denying his request for voluntary services pursuant to section 360, 

subdivision (b). We reject Father’s claims and affirm the orders. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Dependency Proceedings Involving S.P.’s Older Sibling, T.P.

The Agency removed T.P. from the parents’ care in October 2020 after 

the child was diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive and required a 

15-day hospitalization. T.P. was 21 months old at the time and was unable to 

sit by herself, hold anything in her hands, walk, or crawl. Despite having

normal growth for the first two months of her life, T.P. had essentially no 

weight gain between six and 21 months. 

Medical professionals coached the parents on proper nutrition and 

feeding guidelines during T.P.’s hospitalization, but the parents were 

observed physically and verbally restricting T.P.’s food. Father referred to

T.P.’s hunger cues as “irresponsible eating” and “binging behavior,” while 

Mother described normal feeding of T.P. as “force feeding” and high calorie 

food recommendations “unhealthy.” Once medical staff took over T.P.’s 

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Mother is not a party to this appeal. 
3

feedings, the child gained weight, demonstrated appropriate feeding cues, 

and ate a wide variety of food that the parents were not offering her because 

they claimed she was allergic. A multidisciplinary team concluded that 

underlying mental health issues were contributing to the parents’ inability to 

feed T.P. appropriately. 

At T.P.’s six-month review hearing on May 20, 2021, reunification 

services were extended for an additional six months. In the Agency’s view, 

the parents had failed to address their respective underlying mental health 

problems and lacked insight into the seriousness the nutritional neglect had 

on T.P.’s health. Mother had been diagnosed with R/O Factitious Disorder 

Imposed on Another (by Proxy), R/O Anorexia Nervosa, and ObsessiveCompulsive Personality Disorder and it was recommended that she receive 

therapeutic services and monitoring. However, she had yet to begin 

therapeutic services and had not received a formal eating disorder 

assessment. Father was also diagnosed with R/O Dependent Personality 

Disorder, and the Agency recommended he receive therapeutic services as 

well as complete nutritional counseling to reinforce T.P.’s nutritional needs. 

At the time of the six-month review hearing, both parents continued to 

claim T.P. suffered from a genetic disorder, and on the advice of their 

attorneys in related criminal matters3, refused to acknowledge their role in 

T.P.’s malnourishment. Yet once removed from the parents’ care and placed

with the paternal grandparents, T.P. had demonstrated improvement in both 

physical therapy and occupational therapy, continued to gain weight, was 

able to walk independently, ate regularly, and had new hair growth. T.P.’s 

12-month review hearing was set for November 18, 2021. 

3 Both parents were charged with child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a) based 

upon T.P.’s malnourishment, and those charges remain pending. 
4

2. S.P.’s Dependency Proceedings4

S.P. was born in May 2021. Mother hid the pregnancy from the Agency 

until April 2021. Then despite advising the parents to contact the Agency 

once the child was born, the Agency only found out about the birth through 

second-hand information. 

On June 10, 2021, the Agency filed a petition pursuant to section 300, 

subdivision (j), alleging S.P. was at substantial risk of abuse or neglect as 

suffered by T.P. According to the Agency’s detention report, a child abuse 

pediatrician found “significant concerns for the health and well-being of [S.P.] 

if he were to remain in the care of parents who have demonstrated previous 

starvation of a child that began in infancy; who have not received the 

recommended mental health treatment regarding disordered food dynamics; 

and who have not been able to recognize their role in their child’s severe 

malnutrition. Caregivers who are unwilling/unable to acknowledge that their 

child has been the victim of abuse/neglect are unlikely to modify their 

behavior or to recognize future abusive events and respond to them 

appropriately.” 

The social worker assigned to the case also expressed concerns about 

the parents’ ability to properly care for S.P. absent Agency intervention. The

parents had not yet taken responsibility for T.P.’s condition, instead blaming

the paternal grandparents for T.P.’s dependency case because the paternal 

grandmother had raised concerns about T.P.’s condition to Kaiser. 

Additionally, the parents’ support system was reaffirming their belief that 

T.P.’s malnourishment was caused by a genetic condition, which had been 

ruled out. The parents underlying mental health issues were also of concern 

4 Pursuant to COVID-19 emergency measures, all proceedings in this 

matter were conducted remotely. 
5

to the social worker, as Mother had yet to complete a formal assessment for 

an eating disorder, and Father was “passive when it comes to the mother.” 

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court detained S.P. in the care of 

his parents on the condition that they allow health care providers access to 

the child, engage in nutritional education, participate in the services ordered 

in T.P.’s case, and allow the Agency and S.P.’s counsel reasonable access to 

the child. Mother was to maintain a feeding journal that Father monitored. 

The court allowed the maternal grandmother to check on S.P. and authorized 

an eating disorder assessment for Mother. 

On July 8, 2021, the social worker recommended S.P. be declared a 

dependent while remaining in the care of the parents with family 

maintenance services. Although the parents had followed the juvenile court’s 

orders thus far, the social worker believed the parents had not yet shown 

they could provide S.P. with a safe, healthy, and stable environment without

the Agency’s involvement. The social worker noted that the parents had only 

shown progress after the Agency intervened, and they were continuing to 

deny responsibility for T.P.’s malnourishment. Given S.P.’s young age and 

the lasting consequences inadequate nutrition would have on his 

development, the Agency believed it was necessary to remain involved. In 

the addendum report, the Agency reiterated its recommendation that, despite 

the parents’ progress in services and compliance with court orders, S.P. 

should be declared a dependent and family maintenance services should be 

ordered to ensure the child’s safety. 

The contested hearing was held on August 16, 2021. To support the 

petition, the Agency provided the court with the Agency’s reports and 

attachments. The social worker assigned to T.P. and S.P.’s dependency cases

also testified at the hearing, repeating her opinion that court-ordered 
6

monitoring in S.P.’s case was necessary to ensure the child’s safety. Although

both parents had been compliant with the court’s orders in S.P.’s case, they 

had made limited progress in the recommended services. The social worker 

indicated that Father’s mental health issue was codependency, but he had 

not been referred to services to address that issue, and he had completed 

fewer than half of his child abuse classes. Father also continued to attribute 

T.P.’s condition to growth hormones and was not accepting responsibility for 

the child’s neglect. As for Mother, she was in the early stages of treatment, 

and her therapist told the social worker that she was still not understanding 

her role in T.P.’s malnourishment. The social worker further noted that even 

though S.P. was currently doing well at two months old, T.P.’s condition did 

not begin to deteriorate until she was four months, and the social worker

believed S.P. was “highly vulnerable” due to his young age and the severity of 

his sibling’s neglect. Lastly, in response to questioning by the court and 

Father’s counsel, the social worker clarified that a voluntary plan would last 

about six months. 

At the conclusion of the Agency’s presentation of evidence, the parents, 

through counsel, did not offer any affirmative evidence. Father’s counsel 

contended during closing arguments that S.P.’s petition should be dismissed 

because there was no evidence that S.P. was at risk due to the same factors

that led to T.P.’s dependency case. Counsel requested that even if the court 

made a true finding on the petition, the court should order the provision of a 

voluntary plan. Counsel noted that under a voluntary plan, a social worker 

would meet with the family twice a month and not just once a month, and the

family would continue to receive the same services. Counsel emphasized that 

in the event the voluntary plan was unsuccessful, the Agency retained the 

option to renew its request for family maintenance. 
7

After closing arguments, the juvenile court made true findings by clear 

and convincing evidence on the petition’s allegations under section 300, 

subdivision (j), denied the request for a voluntary case plan, declared S.P. a 

dependent, and placed him with the parents under a family maintenance 

plan. In rejecting the voluntary case plan, the court cited section 360 and 

concluded that a voluntary plan was not in S.P.’s best interests, since the 

parents’ failure to take responsibility for T.P.’s malnourishment indicated 

that they did not fully understand the risk that S.P. would suffer similar 

harm. The court set a 6-month review hearing for February 14, 2022, and set 

an interim review hearing for November 18, 2021.5

DISCUSSION

Father’s sole contention in this appeal is that the juvenile court abused 

its discretion by refusing his request for a voluntary case plan. He asserts 

that a voluntary plan of informal supervision was more beneficial to S.P. 

than a declaration of dependency and presented no risk to the child’s wellbeing. He further contends that the court’s rejection of informal supervision

was based upon a misunderstanding of the relevant statutory authority. 

1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review

After the juvenile court finds jurisdiction under section 300, it must 

determine the appropriate disposition for the child. (§§ 360, subd. (d), 361, 

362; In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169 (N.M.).) The court has broad 

discretion in selecting the disposition that serves the child’s best interests. 

(In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179.) “Under section 360, 

subdivision (b), if appropriate, the court may, without adjudicating the child 

5 Because the juvenile court’s written order identified November 18, 2021 

as the date for S.P.’s interim review hearing, and November 18 coincides with 

the date for T.P.’s 12-month review hearing, it appears the court misstated in 

its oral ruling that S.P.’s interim review hearing was set for November 16. 
8

a dependent, order that services be provided to keep the family together 

under the informal supervision of [the Agency].” (N.M., at p. 171 [citing 

§§ 301, 360, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(a)(2)].) Once informal 

supervision is ordered pursuant to section 360, subdivision (b), the court 

relinquishes its authority to oversee the services or the family unless the 

matter is brought back before the court pursuant to section 360, subdivision 

(c). (In re Adam D. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259 (Adam D.).) 

Whether to exercise the option for informal services is left to the sound 

discretion of the juvenile court. (N.M., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 171.) 

Such a discretionary determination “should not be disturbed on appeal unless 

an abuse of discretion is clearly established.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 

Cal.4th 295, 318.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether 

the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences 

can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no 

authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court. [Citations.]” ’ ” 

(Id. at pp. 318-319.) 

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Father’s 

Request for Voluntary Services

Father has not shown an abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion. 

Although the parents were complying with the court’s orders and S.P. was 

physically healthy at the time of the contested adjudication, undisputed 

evidence in the record demonstrated that S.P. could be vulnerable to harm 

absent oversight from the Agency. Prior to the Agency initiating S.P.’s 

dependency proceedings, the parents hid Mother’s pregnancy with S.P. from 

the Agency, and then failed to inform the Agency of S.P.’s birth. Additionally, 

S.P. had not yet aged into the window when his sibling began showing signs 
9

of neglect, as T.P.’s health did not begin to deteriorate until four months old,

and S.P. was still only two months old. 

The evidence also supports the juvenile court’s finding that the parents 

had failed to demonstrate insight and accept responsibility for the 

circumstances that led to T.P.’s malnourishment. From the beginning of 

T.P.’s dependency case in October 2020 and continuing through S.P.’s 

contested adjudication in May 2021, both parents consistently denied their

conduct had contributed to T.P.’s malnourishment. Father specifically

blamed growth hormones for T.P.’s emaciation, even though there was no 

evidence that such condition existed. (See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203

Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“[o]ne cannot correct a problem one fails to 

acknowledge”].) 

Father contends that a voluntary services plan should have been 

offered, because it would have increased the checks by the social worker from 

once to twice a month. He also notes that an informal supervision plan would 

have simply duplicated the services already in place for T.P.’s proceedings. 

Although Father suggests that these factors weigh in favor of an order for 

informal supervision, this court is not at liberty to reweigh the evidence. 

(People v. Overstock.Com, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1088 [under the 

abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court may not “ ‘ “reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our notions of fairness for the trial court’s.” ’ ”].) In 

this case, despite the severity of the malnourishment suffered by S.P.’s 

sibling, the juvenile court maintained S.P. under the care of his parents but 

determined that it was not appropriate to order the provision of voluntary 

services. Given S.P.’s status as an infant and complete reliance on his 

parents for nourishment, the lasting consequences improper nutrition would 

have on his development, and the parents’ lack of insight into T.P.’s 
10

nutritional neglect, the court was well within its discretion to deny Father 

the option of informal supervision. 

Father relies on Adam D. and N.M. to support his argument that the

juvenile court abused its discretion by denying his request for voluntary 

services. His reliance on these cases is misplaced. In Adam D., the appellate 

court affirmed the juvenile court’s order for informal supervision under 

section 360, subdivision (b). (Adam D., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262.) 

Thus, Adam D. involved the juvenile court’s approval of informal supervision, 

and did not address the challenge Father raises in this appeal to a denial of 

informal supervision. Father’s reliance on N.M. is also unpersuasive. There, 

a panel from this court determined that, although the father “was largely 

cooperative and had started services before the joint jurisdictional and 

dispositional hearing,” the juvenile court was within its discretion to deny 

informal supervision to ensure the children’s physical and emotional wellbeing. (N.M., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 171.) Similarly, in this case, the 

record amply supported the juvenile court’s denial of voluntary services, and 

such a determination “is a discretionary call for the juvenile court to make; it 

may opt to [offer voluntary services], but it need not.” (Ibid.) 

We reject Father’s remaining contention that the juvenile court 

misapplied the law in declining to order informal supervision. The court 

referred to the relevant statutory provisions in its oral and written decisions, 

and the court’s focus on the parents’ lack of insight and acceptance of 

responsibility for T.P.’s malnourishment was appropriately aimed at

evaluating whether S.P. remained at risk and whether the option of informal 

services was in the child’s best interests. Contrary to Father’s assertion, the 

social worker correctly represented to the court that a voluntary services plan 
11

would last six months (§16507.3(a)),6 and that absent court-ordered 

supervision, nothing would compel the parents to cooperate with the Agency

in S.P.’s case. Thus, there is no indication in the record that the court 

misconstrued the law when it addressed Father’s request for voluntary 

services. 

A child’s best interests is the paramount concern at the dispositional

stage. (In re Carl H. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1019, 1037.) In this case, the 

juvenile court acted well within its discretion when it determined that formal 

oversight through a family maintenance plan was necessary to protect S.P.’s 

best interests. 

6 To the extent Father argues an extension of a voluntary case plan 

beyond six months is authorized by section 16507.3, subdivision (a), such an 

extension is only available for families who have a parent in residential 

substance abuse treatment or a child who requires treatment in a residential 

treatment facility. Those circumstances are not applicable to these

proceedings.
12

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. 

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

DO, J.