AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed November 2, 2023

In the

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-22-00965-CR

Ex Parte ZOHAIB MUHAMMAD IMRAN

On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. WX22-90074-Q

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Molberg, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle

Opinion by Justice Carlyle

Zohaib Muhammad Imran appeals from the denial of his application for a writ 

of habeas corpus. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

Mr. Imran is a lawful resident who moved to the United States when he was 

four years old. In 2016, the grand jury indicted him for sexual assault under penal 

code section 22.011(a)(1). Two attorneys represented Mr. Imran in connection with 

the charges. Bilal Khaleeq primarily handled the immigration aspects of the 

representation, while Jake Jenkins primarily handled the criminal aspects. According 

to Mr. Imran, Mr. Khaleeq advised him that if he could negotiate “a plea deal for 
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under five years’ probation,” Mr. Khaleeq “would be able to work with immigration” 

after Mr. Imran completed that probation.

In 2017, on advice of counsel, Mr. Imran pleaded nolo contendere and 

received a sentence of four years and six months of deferred-adjudication probation. 

After Mr. Imran entered his plea, federal authorities charged Mr. Khaleeq with 

conspiring to commit marriage fraud. Mr. Khaleeq pleaded guilty to those charges 

in 2018 and was disbarred by the Texas Board of Disciplinary Appeals in 2019.

Approximately two years later, the State moved to adjudicate Mr. Imran’s 

guilt on the sexual assault charge after police in Tarrant County arrested him for 

marijuana possession. While the State’s motion was pending, Mr. Imran applied for 

a writ of habeas corpus under code of criminal procedure article 11.072, challenging 

his plea on grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his 

plea was involuntary. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, after which it issued 

an order denying relief along with written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

On appeal, Mr. Imran first contends the trial court erred by denying his 

application because his attorneys were constitutionally ineffective for failing to 

inform him that a nolo contendere plea would make deportation “presumptively 

mandatory.” See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (counsel’s performance 

constitutionally deficient for failing to sufficiently inform criminal defendant about 

deportation consequences of a guilty plea).
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A habeas applicant has the burden to establish entitlement to relief by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006). We review the habeas court’s decision on the application for abuse of 

discretion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. 

Id. When, as here, the applicant seeks relief under code of criminal procedure article 

11.072, the trial court is the sole finder of fact. Ex parte Garcia, 353 S.W.3d 785, 

788 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Thus, we give almost total deference to factual findings 

supported by the record. See id. (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1997)).

In Padilla, the Supreme Court considered whether a lawful permanentresident defendant could establish an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland1

based on counsel’s failure to inform him that pleading guilty to transporting “a large 

amount of marijuana” would make deportation “presumptively mandatory” under 

federal law. 559 U.S. at 359, 369. According to Mr. Padilla, his counsel told him he 

“did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so 

long.” Id. at 359. But the relevant immigration statute stated:

Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a 

violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation 

of a State, the United States or a foreign country relating to a controlled 

substance . . . , other than a single offense involving possession for 

one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

 

1 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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The Supreme Court acknowledged that “[i]mmigration law can be complex, 

and it is a legal specialty of its own.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. Thus, there will 

“undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a 

particular plea are unclear or uncertain” to a criminal defense attorney. Id. “When 

the law is not succinct and straightforward, a criminal defense attorney need do no 

more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk 

of adverse immigration consequences.” Id. “But when the deportation consequence 

is truly clear, . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.” Id.

With respect to Mr. Padilla, the Supreme Court concluded his “counsel could 

have easily determined that his plea would make him eligible for deportation simply 

from reading the text of the statute,” which “specifically commands removal for all 

controlled substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession 

offenses.” Id. at 368. But Mr. Padilla’s counsel instead “provided him false assurance 

that his conviction would not result in removal from this country.” Id. Thus, 

according to the Court, Mr. Padilla sufficiently alleged deficient performance under 

Strickland’s first prong. Id. at 369.

Here, Mr. Imran likewise contends he established deficient performance 

because his counsel did not inform him that deportation was a “presumptively 

mandatory” consequence of his plea. The trial court found that Mr. Imran’s attorneys 

advised him there could be adverse immigration consequences to his plea. And 
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because that finding is supported by the record, we must defer to it. Ex parte Garcia, 

353 S.W.3d at 788. Thus, to establish a Padilla claim for deficient performance, Mr. 

Imran must show his counsel nevertheless failed to specifically inform him of a 

deportation consequence that was “truly clear” under law that was “succinct” and 

“straightforward.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. Mr. Imran has not met that burden.

We first address Mr. Imran’s assertion that it was clear his plea would result 

in deportation because sexual assault is a crime of moral turpitude. According to Mr. 

Imran’s habeas application, he has been a lawful permanent resident since 2002. Yet, 

the sexual assault to which he pleaded nolo contendere occurred in 2015. Thus, he 

did not establish he was deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) because his 

conviction for a crime of moral turpitude did not come within ten years of his 

admission to the United States. And because the sexual assault offense was his first 

and only conviction involving a crime of moral turpitude, he was not deportable

under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), which requires two or more such convictions. 

The sexual assault conviction also did not render him deportable as “inadmissible” 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(II), as he was not inadmissible at the time of 

entry or status adjustment. Id. § 1227(a)(1)(A).2 Because Mr. Imran has not 

 

2 Mr. Imran posits in his reply brief that “inadmissibility” could prevent him from reentering the country

or have other consequences “depending on the circumstances in which [he] could come into contact with 

immigration authorities.” But Padilla established a duty for criminal defense counsel to warn of “truly 

clear” deportation consequences; it does not require a criminal defense attorney to provide advice

concerning all potential adverse immigration consequences that might result from a plea—especially those 

based on hypothetical circumstances such as whether the defendant might choose to leave the country and 

seek re-entry in the future.
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established he was subject to deportation as a consequence of pleading nolo 

contendere to a crime of moral turpitude, his counsel was not deficient for failing to 

inform him of such a consequence.

Mr. Imran also contends it was clear his plea would result in deportation 

because his conviction qualified as an “aggravated felony” for purposes of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). As relevant to Mr. Imran’s arguments, “aggravated felony” is 

defined to include “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(43)(A). Mr. Imran contends that any “reasonably competent attorney 

would advise their client that ‘sexual assault’” under section 22.011(a)(1) of the 

Texas Penal Code “is just the legal-term used in Texas for ‘rape,’ and that ‘rape’ is a 

deportable aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). The terms “sexual 

assault” and “rape,” however, are not necessarily synonymous. See Sexual Assault, 

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “sexual assault” to include 

“[o]ffensive sexual contact with another person, exclusive of rape”). Indeed, the 

aggravated felony statute itself distinguishes between “rape” and “sexual abuse.” We 

therefore cannot agree with Mr. Imran’s assertion that any reasonably competent 

defense counsel would necessarily equate “sexual assault” with “rape.”

Moreover, the law governing whether a conviction for “sexual assault” under 

section 22.011(a)(1) qualifies as aggravated felony “rape” for federal immigration 

purposes is neither “succinct” nor “straightforward.” See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.

To analyze the issue, one must employ a “categorical approach” that considers the 
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statute of conviction, rather than the facts of the offense as committed, to determine 

whether the statutory offense necessarily meets the generic definition of the federal 

aggravated felony. See Rodriguez v. Holder, 705 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2013). If the 

statute defines multiple offenses, at least one of which does not qualify as an 

aggravated felony, the analysis further requires a “modified categorical approach”

that seeks to determine from a limited class of documents in the record “whether the 

guilty plea ‘necessarily’ fell under a particular subsection of the statute that meets 

the aggravated felony criterion.” Id. at 210–11. Documents subject to consideration

include the “charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, 

and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” 

Id. at 211 (quoting Larin-Ulloa v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 2006)). “If 

these documents are insufficient to establish that the alien was necessarily convicted 

of an aggravated felony, the conviction” does not provide a basis for deportation. Id.

Consistent with its common law definition, the Fifth Circuit defines the 

generic federal offense of “rape” as “‘unlawful sexual intercourse committed by a 

man with a woman not his wife through force and against her will’ where there was 

‘at least a slight penetration of the penis into the vagina.’” Perez-Gonzalez v. Holder, 

667 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 

2009)).

3 Section 22.011(a)(1) of the penal code, however, requires neither 

 

3 Mr. Imran cites to United States v. Canales-Bonilla, 735 F. App’x 154, 155 (5th Cir. 2018), in which 

the court partially quoted the definition provided in Perez-Gonzalez, omitting the penetration requirement. 
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penetration nor force to complete an offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 22.011(a)(1)(C) (“A person commits an offense if . . . the person intentionally or 

knowingly . . . causes the sexual organ of another person, without that person’s 

consent, to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, 

including the actor . . . .); id. § 22.011(b) (enumerating various manners and means, 

other than “physical force,” by which an offense may be committed “without the 

consent of the other person”). Thus, conviction for “sexual assault” under the Texas 

statute does not necessarily establish “rape” under the aggravated felony statute. See 

Perez-Gonzalez. See 667 F.3d at 626 (defining “rape” for federal immigration 

purposes); cf. Rodriguez v. Holder, 705 F.3d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding a 

sexual assault conviction under section 22.011 is not categorically an aggravatedfelony “crime of violence” because section 22.011(b) enumerates at least some 

circumstances under which an offense can be committed without force or “a 

substantial risk of force being used”).

And although Mr. Imran has not provided us with a complete record of the 

proceedings in his sexual assault case, we note that the indictment charged him with

“intentionally and knowingly caus[ing] the contact or penetration of the FEMALE 

 

But the issue in Canales-Bonilla was whether the defendant’s conviction for spousal rape necessarily 

required an offense against “a woman not [the] defendant’s wife”—the degree of penetration was irrelevant 

to that issue. See id. It is clear from context that the court in Canales-Bonilla did not intend to depart from 

the definition provided in Perez-Gonzalez, and Canales-Bonilla is non-precedential in any event. See FED.

R. APP. P. 32.1(a); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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SEXUAL ORGAN of [complainant] by any means, to-wit: DEFENDANT’S 

SEXUAL ORGAN, without the consent of the complainant.” Even if we assume it 

would have been appropriate to employ a modified-categorical approach here,4the 

record does not establish that Mr. Imran’s conviction necessarily involved 

penetration or force as required to meet the generic federal definition of “rape.” See 

Perez-Gonzalez, 667 F.3d at 626. Regardless, we need not decide whether Mr. Imran 

was in fact deportable for pleading nolo contendere to an aggravated felony because, 

at a minimum, deportability on that basis was not a “truly clear” consequence of his 

plea. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.

We also reject Mr. Imran’s argument that, even if deportation was not clear, 

his counsel was constitutionally ineffective under Padilla for failing to presume 

“sexual assault” was a deportable aggravated felony and advise him based on such 

a presumption. Padilla established a duty to inform a client of a plea’s 

“presumptively mandatory” deportation consequences when those consequences are 

“truly clear” to any reasonably effective counsel reading the statute. See Padilla, 559 

U.S. at 369. Padilla does not require that counsel presume deportability any time a 

reasonable reading of the relevant statutes might suggest a basis for deportation. 

 

4 The Fifth Circuit decided after Mr. Imran entered his plea that the modified-categorical approach does 

not allow a court to look to the record to determine which subsection of section 22.011(b) might apply to a 

sexual assault conviction for purposes of determining whether the offense qualifies as an aggravated felony, 

because section 22.011(b) is indivisible and addresses alternative manners and means by which an offense 

can be completed without the victim’s consent under section 22.011(a). See United States v. RodriguezFlores, 25 F.4th 385, 389 (5th Cir. 2022).
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Imposing such a duty could result—and perhaps would have resulted in this case—

in erroneous advice that causes defendants to reject favorable plea offers against 

their best interests.

Where, as here, the deportation consequences of a plea are unclear or 

uncertain, Padilla requires only that a criminal defense attorney advise a client that 

their plea could result in adverse immigration consequences. See id. Mr. Imran’s 

counsel did so, and his ineffective assistance claim thus fails.

Mr. Imran also contends his plea was unknowing and involuntary because his 

attorneys misrepresented or failed to advise him of his plea’s immigration 

consequences. A defendant who waives his rights by entering a plea must do so 

voluntarily, with “‘sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 

consequences’ such that his plea is a knowing, intelligent act.” Ex parte Barnaby, 

475 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 

U.S. 742, (1970)).

Mr. Imran signed a written plea agreement in which the trial court admonished 

him of his rights and informed him that his plea “may, and under current Federal 

Immigration rules is almost certain to, result in [his] deportation, exclusion from 

admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization.” Mr. Imran further 

acknowledged:

I understand the nature of the accusation made against me, the range of 

punishment for such offense, and the consequences of a plea of guilty 

or nolo contendere. I understand that I have an absolute right to a jury 
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trial, that I have the right to remain silent, that anything I say can and 

will be used against me, that I have the right to confront and crossexamine the witness[es] against me. . . . I understand that if I am not a 

United States citizen, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere will probably 

result in my deportation from the United States, exclusion from 

admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization under Federal 

law.

At the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Imran’s application, Mr. Imran testified that 

he understood the plea papers when he signed them. He further testified that he 

“understood that [he] may or may not be subject to deportation at the time of [his] 

plea.” Mr. Jenkins testified that he reviewed the plea agreement with Mr. Imran and 

that Mr. Imran understood its terms. He also testified it was his impression that Mr. 

Imran decided to accept the plea in order to avoid the risk of trial and that Mr. Imran 

was willing to risk his immigration status. The trial court found Mr. Jenkins’s 

testimony credible and worthy of belief, while finding that Mr. Imran’s claim that 

he would not have entered his plea if he had known about its immigration

consequences—asserted only after the State moved to revoke his probation based on 

a subsequent offense—was not credible. On this record, viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we discern no abuse of discretion in 

concluding that Mr. Imran knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea.

Finally, Mr. Imran contends he is entitled to a new trial because Mr. Khaleeq’s 

“mere involvement” in the case threatens the integrity of the judicial system, violates

due process, and demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel, given his conviction 

for federal marriage fraud. Mr. Imran did not preserve this issue by timely raising it 
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in the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Ex parte Perez, 536 S.W.3d 877, 880 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (appellate court’s habeas review 

limited to issues raised and decided in trial court habeas proceedings). Regardless, 

Mr. Imran’s argument lacks merit. Mr. Khaleeq’s subsequent fraud conviction in an 

unrelated case has little, if any, relevance to whether Mr. Imran received due process

or effective assistance of counsel.

We affirm the trial court’s order denying Mr. Imran’s application for habeas 

corpus.

220965f.p05

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

EX PARTE ZOHAIB 

MUHAMMAD IMRAN

No. 05-22-00965-CR

On Appeal from the 204th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. WX22-90074-

Q.

/Cory L. Carlyle/

CORY L. CARLYLE

JUSTICE
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Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. 

Justices Molberg and Partida-Kipness 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 2

nd day of November, 2023.