## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re An aya R. , 2012 IL App (1st) 121101

Appellate Court Caption In re ANAYA R., a Minor (Mildred M., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Vane ssa M.R., Respondent-Appellee ).

District & N o. First District, Six th Division Docke t No. 1-12-1101

Filed August 31, 2012

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The denial of a pater nal g randmother ’s petition for visitation with h er g randda ug hter was upheld wher e the evidenc e supported the trial court’s finding that the g randmother did not rebut the presumption that the child was not har

med by the re fusal of the child’s mother to allow visitation.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 11-P-3148; the Hon. J ohn P. Callahan, J r., Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Michae l K. Goldberg and Serena Naka no, both of Goldberg L aw Group, L L C, of Chicag o, for a

ppellant.

Robert H. Purcell, of Chicag o Volunteer L eg al Service s, of Palatine, for appellee

.

Panel PRES IDI NG J USTI CE GORDON delivered the j u dg ment of t he court, with opinion.
J ustices Garcia a

nd L ampkin concur

red in the judgment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 The instant case arises from petitioner Mildred M.’s app ea l o f t h e trial court’s or der denying her petition for visitation with her five-year -old g randda ug hter, Anaya R. (the chi ld). Mildred is the pater

nal g randmother of the child, and Vane ssa M.R. is the child’s mother; the child’s fathe r Mauricio, Mildred’s son, was deporte d to Ecua dor in 2008. On appea l, Mildred claims that the trial court failed to properly consider the fac tors listed in section 607(a- 5) of the I llinois Marriag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act, commonly ref err ed to as the
g randpa rent visitation statute (750 I L CS 5/607(a-5) (West 20 1 0 ))
, and that she prese nted sufficie nt evidenc e to demonstrate that a denial of visitation would harm the child. We aff irm.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On May 27, 2011, Mildred filed a petition for guardia nship of the child, stating that she

was “[t] he person having custody of the minor” and that it was in the child’s best interest that
a guar dian be appointed because “F ather is out of t he country ; Mother is unwilling to car e for child.” Consequently
, Mildred asked that she be appointed guardia n of the child’s person. On the same day
, Mildred’s application to sue as an indige nt person was g rante d, and an order for service on Vane ssa by publication was enter ed since Mildred had listed Vane ssa’s addre ss on the petition as “Unknown.” On May 31, 2011, Mildred was appointed temporar y guardia n of the c hild. ¶ 4 On J u n e 2
, 2 0 1 1
, J u d ge Ka t h l e e n M

. M cG u ry i s s u ed an o rd er fi n d i n g: “Misrepr esentations were made to Judge [Greg ory] O’B rien as an inducement for him to [1 ]
enter a Te mporary

Guardianship on 5/31/11.” The orde r suspende d the enf orce ment of the temporar y guardia nship order enter ed on May 31, order ed that the status quo be maintained until the next court date on J uly 11, 2011, and returne d the child to Vane ssa until the J uly 11

J udge O’Br ie n was th e pr evious j udge in th e c ase

. 1

-2-court date. On the same day
, the court appointed Chicag o Volunteer L eg al Service s (CVL S)

as guardia

n ad litem (GAL ) of the child, asking it to conduct an investigation of the child’s best interest a

nd to make a r ecommendation to the court. ¶ 5 On J uly 12, 2 0 1 1
, M i l dre d fi l ed a p eti tion for visitation and amende d petition for
guardia nship. In her pe tition, she st ated that she was the paternal gra ndmother of the child and that she “took car e of” Vane ssa while she was pregnant, buying her food and taking her
to doctors’ appointments. She claimed that she had been a consistent part of the child’s life since the c hild was born and pr ovided the child with food, c lothing, shelter , and medicine
, “eve n sending these items home with the child to be used for the child’s welfa re when with [Vanessa]. ” M i l dre d further claimed that she schedule d “substantially all” of the child’s doctors’ appoin t m en t s an d t ook her to the majority of them; the child neede d to visit a number of specia lists for her “many medical issues,” including a dermatologist, a respiratory thera pist, and an endoc rinolog ist. 2 ¶ 6 Mildred claimed that “the minor child’s m o t h er h as o n l y b ee n i n the child’s life sporadica lly since birth and when the child was not with [Mi ldred] the minor child was taken

car e of by her g rea

t g randmother ” and that “the minor child’s mother has left the minor child in [Mi ldred’s] car e for wee ks at a time with out [ sic ] so m u ch as p i cking up the phone to chec k on her well being .” Mildred also claimed that Vane ssa once “looked to be on drug s” when she came to pick up the child and that Va nessa “ admittedly

drinks heavily .” ¶ 7 Mildred also claimed that Vane ssa prac tices the relig ion of Santeria and that, as a re sult of her relig ious prac tices, Van essa had ref used to g ive the child medicine on sever al

occa sions and had missed doctors’ appointments; this ref usal to g ive the child medicine once resulted in a sever e urinary trac t infec tion. Mildred further claimed that Vane s s a smoked around the child despite the child’s asthma and that Vane ssa has smoked marijuana with the child prese nt in the room. Mildred claimed that “the minor child was living with [Mildred] from J une 2009 up to abo u t 6 we ek s ag o with the mother visiti ng sporadica lly [and] sometimes no visits occur red for sever al wee ks.” Mildred also claimed that she had not been permitted to visit the child fo r s ix wee ks for no rea son, which was not in the child’s best interest. ¶ 8 Mildred claimed that she had “fulfilled the child’s needs as guardia n for many year s and would like to c ontinue to do so as it is in the best interest of the minor child.” Mildred also claimed that Vane ssa had threa tened her life when she filed for guardia nship an d t hat Vane s s a h ad i n formed Mildred that she wished to kill her (Va nessa’ s) mother. Mildred further claimed that she had spent all Christmases and birthday s with the child and that she

was wi t h t h e ch i ld for her first day of school and other school events. Mildred reque sted temporar y and perma

nent guardia

nship of the child, that she be g rante d rea sonable visitation
unt i l gu ar d i an ship is decide d, including a Disney trip, and that Vane ssa be order ed to underg o drugtesting a

nd a psycholog ical eva luation. ¶ 9 On August 17, 2011, the GAL
, Robert H. Purcell of CVL S, filed a repor t with the cour

t.

Duri ng the hea ri ng on her pet it ion for visit at ion
, Mi ldr ed te st if ie d tha t the chi ld had ast hm a 2 andneu rof

ibr om at osi s.

-3-In the re port, Purcell stated that his investigation included home visits and interviews with

Mildred, Vane ssa, the ch i l d
, Va nessa’ s boy friend, and Ana C., the child’s materna l g reatg randmother

. The repor

t noted that Mildred’s claims that the child was living with Mildred from J une 2009 until approximately J une 1, 2011, and that since then, Vane ssa h ad not permitted Mildred to v i s i t the child wer e “critically important beca use the Court *** has jurisdiction to make a child custody d etermination when the proce eding is commence d by

a person other than a pare nt, but only if the minor is not in the physical custody of one of his parents ” (empha sis in orig inal), citing section 601 of the I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Mar riag e Ac t (the Ac t) (750 I L CS 5/ 601 (West 2010)). ¶ 10 Ba sed on his investiga tion, Purcell found that Vane ssa “jea lously guarde d her authority
to decide who would ca

re f or her daughter,” and her actions demonstrated that she di d not transfe r or abandon that authority

. Purcell further found that Vane ssa “re ceive d substantial help wit h child car e, but stayed in control of the proce ss.” Addit ionally
, Purcell not ed that there was a fac tual inconsistency betwee n Mildred claiming she had phy sical custody of the child and asking for visitation beca use she was not permitted to v i sit the child. The GAL

rec ommended that the pe tition for gua rdianship be de nied for w ant of jurisdiction bec ause Vane ssa had phy sical custody of the c hild. ¶ 11 I n re gar d t o the reque st for visitation, the GAL stated that Vane ssa was worried t h at Mildred would take action to harm the relationship betwee n Vane ssa and t h e ch i l d and worrie d that Mildred would attempt to take the child from Vane ssa’s car e. The GAL noted that Vane ssa rec og nized that Mildred had been an important part of the child’s life and would be in favor of supervised visitation. The GAL found that many of Vane ssa’s conce rns wer e

rea sonable and “enc ourag e[d] [Mi ldred] to seek way s to constructively addre ss them.” The GAL rec ommended that the que stion of visit ation be set for mediation. ¶ 12 On August 17, 20 1 1
, t h e co u rt en t er ed an o rd er wi t h dra wi n g the petition for
guardia nship, ordering visitation that was to be supervised by Ana C., and co n t i n u i n g the
matter. On the same day
, the court enter ed an order stating that “all parties shall participa te in mediation through the Center for C o n fl ict Resolution. Fa ilure to cooper ate with the mediation proce ss may lead to dismiss al of petition or a finding ag ainst the non-coope rating
p arty .” The rec ord contains a fax from the Center for C onflict Resolution to the c o u rt t h at stated: “I nitiator [Vanessa] did not show up to mediation. Respondent [Mi ldred] was prese nt at mediation.” ¶ 13 On October 3, 2011
, M i l dre d fi l ed a petition for rule to show cause , claimingthat Vane ssa did not attend mediation and was often late for the supervised visits order ed by the
court. Mildred reque sted an expanded visitation schedule that was no longe r supervised and asked for Vane ssa to be admonished by the court. On October 18, 2011, the court enter ed an order stating that the child should rece ive counse ling “ as soon as possible,” ordering “ [n] o visitation at this time,” and continuingthe matter until Novembe r 22, 2011. On November 22, 2011, the court order ed the child to continue in counseling
, repe ated th at t h er e was no visitation, and set the matter for hearing on January

18, 2012. ¶ 14 On the same d ay , th e GA L fi led a supplemental repor t with the court. In rec iting the history of the case , the supplemental repor t noted that “[t] he Mother fa i l ed t o att end the

-4-Mediation appointment. The Mother apolog ized and explained to the Court her failure to do

so.” The supplemental report stated t hat t he GAL reque sted The Chi cag o School Fo re n s ic Center (the Center) to c onduct a psycholog ical evalua tion of the child “for stress related to the visitations with the pater nal g randmother and the conflict betwee n her mothe r and her pater nal g randmother ” and also reque sted the counselor’ s profe ssional judgme nt about any need f or ong oing c ounseling

. ¶ 15 The repor

t stated that Vane ssa acknow ledg ed that Mildred “ has bee n an important part of [the child’s] life,” but that Vane ssa was no longe r willing to permit visit at i on beca use Mildred “ ‘ov er -s t eps her boundarie s[,] ’ ” “under mines the child’s relationship” with Vane ssa and “tries to take [t he child] aw ay ” fr o m Vane ssa. The repor t then contained six statements that appe ar to pr ovide examples of Vane ssa’s conce rns. The first stated that the orig inal petition for guardia nship was filed without notice to Vane ssa and stated that Vanessa’s wher eabouts wer e unknown, which was not true. The second stated that the orig inal petition for gua

rdianship s tated that Vane ssa was not willing to car e for t he child, which was not true. The third stated that Mildred m ad e t wo re p orts to the Depa rtment of Children and Family Service s (DCFS), which DCFS deter mined to be unfounded. The fourth stated t hat Vanessa “has felt t he need t o obtain the help of t he p o l i ce t o pick up” the child from Mildred. The fifth stated that Vane ssa believed that Mildred would tell the child things that wer e untrue an d would be confusing to her, which would undermine the child’s relationship with Vane ssa. The six th stated that Vane ssa “fe els [Mi ldred] is domineering and controlling

. [Vanes s a] fe els dealing with [Mi ldred] will continue to cause a g rea t deal of
stress that is harmful.” The GA L fo u n d that Vane ssa’s conce rns wer e rea sonable and,

acc ording ly
, Va n es s a’ s denial of visitation was not unrea sonable. There fore
, the GAL

rec ommended that the pe tition for visit ation be denie d. ¶ 16 On J anuar

y 18, 2012, the GAL filed a second supplemental repor t, which stated that the thera pist who examined the child “did not rea ch a J udgment that visitations with her pater nal
g randmother would be helpful or harmful to the [child]
, nor would the lack of visitation be helpful or harmful.” The repor t further stated that the Center rec ommended ong oing thera py for the child, and attache d the repor t issued by th e Center. The one-pa g e repor t from the Center was signe d by Kathlee n Meng es, “T h er ap i st,” and L aurie Be nton, Psy D, “Supervisor.” It stated that t he child and Vanessa ha d attended therapy sessions beg inning

on November 15, 2011, and that they had attended all schedule d sessions

. T h e repor t conclude d, “At this time, it i s rec ommended that [they ] continue.” ¶ 17 On J an u ary 18, 2012, the court held a hearing conce rning M i l dre d ’s p et i t i o n fo r visitat i o n

. T welve witnesses testified on Mildred’s behalf and two testified on Vane ssa’s

3 behalf

. The first witness to testify on Mildred’s behalf was Catherine Evans, an employee of the Guar dianship Assistance Desk for Minors in Cook County
, who testified that she assisted Mildred with filing her petition for guardia n s hip, that Mildred was unawa re of the wher eabouts of Vane ssa, and that Mildred had listed Vane ssa’s addre ss as unknown on the

T he re cor d doe s not con ta in a tr ans cr ipt o f t h e h e a r i n g but con ta ins a bysta nde r’ s re por t 3

cer ti fi ed a s a ccu ra te by the tr ia l c our t o n J une 7, 2 012.

-5-petition.

¶ 18 The next witness to testify on Mildred’s behalf was Glady s B., who testified that she was 4

a teac her at Casa Central daycar e, which the child attended. Glady s testified that in order to enroll the child in daycar e, Glady s was require d to visit the child at her home addre ss. Glady s t es tified that the addre ss on file at the daycar e cente r was Mildred’s addre ss and that s h e visited the child at that addre ss on three occa sions; Vane ssa was prese nt for two of the visits. Glady s testified that both Vane ssa and Mildred dropped off and p i ck ed up t he child from daycar e, but that “most of the time,” Mildred did so. Glady s further testified t h at M i l dre d

acc ompanied the child on field trips, at t ended pare nt meeting s, and was the only person prese nt on the child’s beha lf at the c hild’s gr aduation fr om daycar e. ¶ 19 Five of Mildred’s friends also testified on her behalf. L eidy A. testified that s he had a 5 child who attended the daycar e with Vane ssa’s child and that the two children wer e friends. L eidy further testified that she observe d Mildred picking up the child from daycar e ever y day and that she and Mildred would make plans for the children to spend time toge ther, including
g oing to the movies, McDona ld’s, and Chuck E. Cheese. L eidy also testified that the children would often have “sle epover s” at Mildred’ s home. ¶ 20 J osefa V. testified that she observe d Mildred with the child “a lot” an d t h atMildred would usually bring the child when she visited J osefa

. J osefa also testified that when Mildred visited J osefa

with the child, the child would watc h television and dra w. ¶ 21 Eliz abeth C. testified that the c h il d w as always prese nt at Mildred’s home when Elizabeth visited and that the child had her own bedroom in Mildre d’s home. Eliz abeth also testified that sometimes Mildred and the child would come to Eliz abeth’ s home and the child would play with Eliz abeth’ s children. ¶ 22 Br enda T. testified that she had known Mildred fo r more than five year s and that she observ ed M i l dred visiti ng with the child on many occa sions. Br enda further testified that when she visited Mildred’s home, the child was prese nt and that Mildred and the child would attend birthday

parties f or B renda ’s childre n. ¶ 23 Mag g ie H. testified that she knew Mildred “through business” and that she observe d the child many times with Mildred when Mildred visited Mag g ie’s home or when Mag g ie v isited Mildred’s home. ¶ 24 All of Mildred’s friends opined that the c hild was happy and saf e with Mildred. ¶ 25 Ms. C., Vane ssa’s mother, also testified o n M i l dre d ’s b ehalf

. Ms. C. testified that 6 Mildred has been supporting the child and taking car e of the child for the child’s entire life and that Mildred was “ver y involved” in the child’s life. Ms. C. testi fi ed that she had a “we ird” relationship with Vane ssa and that Vane ssa had threatened her. Ms. C. opined that Mildred dese rved to be awa rded visitation.

Gla dys te st if

ie d i n Spa nis h an d he r t est imony was tr ans la te d thro ugh an i nte rpr et er

. 4

Lei dy tes ti fi ed i n Spa nis h an d he r t est imony was tr ans la te d t hro ugh an i nte rpr et er

. 5

T he r eco rd doe s no t i ndi cat e M s. C.’ s f ir stname. 6

-6-¶ 26 Additionally
, sever al members of Mildred’s family testified on Mildred’s behalf

. Maria C., Mildred’s daughter, testified that Mildred was a g ood mother to Maria and that Mildred

was “alwa

y s there ” for the child, that the child stayed with Mildred, and that Mildred “alwa y s took car e of” the child. Maria testified that she knows Vane ssa and has known Vane ssa since she was 14 year s old. Maria testified that she witnessed Vane ssa drink and smoke while she

was pregnant with the child and that afte r the child was born, she witnessed Vane ssa “drink, smoke, and consume drug s in the prese nce of” the child. Maria opined that the child was happy when with Mildred, that Mildred “g ave the *** child a lot of love,” and that the child was saf e whe n with Mildred. ¶ 27 J ennife r M., Mildred’s niece
, testified that she had observe d the child at family reunions and when she had visited her mother’s home or Mildred’s home. J ennife r testified that since the child was born, she had alway s observe d the child with Mildred. J ennife r further testified that she had observe d Mildred with the chil d at the swimming pool and that the child and J ennife r’s son played toge ther. J ennife r opined that the child was happy and safe with Mildred. ¶ 28 Ricardo B., Mildred’s fianc é, testified that he has known Mildred for 12 to 13 year s and 7 that Mildred and the child are prese nt at hi s home five to six day s a we ek

. Ricardo further testified that when Mildred was in Ecua dor, he would baby sit for the child six to seven times while Mildred wa s g one. ¶ 29 The fir st witness to testify on Vane ssa’s beha lf was Ana C., the child’s materna l greatg randmother

. Ana testified that the court-or dere d supervised visits betwee n Mildred and the

8 child had take n place in her a partment. She fur

ther testified that the visits “did not g o well and wer e not a g ood thing.” She testified that Mildred “wa s more interested in finding fault than spendi n g time enjoying her g randda ughter” and opined that Mildred should not be
g rante d visitation because she was “ overbe aring ” and visits “would re sult in conflict.” ¶ 30 Ana testified to one specific incident in which Mildred came to Ana’ s home early in the day without notice and “bang ed” on the door, demanding that Ana and her husband open the door. Mildred then bang ed on the windows and on the back door. Ana and her husband, who is elderly and blind, did not open the door “ beca use they wer e af raid.” ¶ 31 Vane ssa also testified on her own behalf

. Vane ssa testified that the child has alway s lived with h er b u t that “she did have help” from Ana C. and Mildred in caring for the child. Vane ssa testified that she was no longe r willing to permit Mildred to visit the child “bec ause she over- steps her boundarie s.” Vane ssa testified that Mildred “tries to take her child awa y from her” and that Vane ssa “is afr aid of losing her daughter.” Vane ssa further testified that Mildred under

mined Vane ssa’s re lationship with the child and said thing s to the child that

Ric ar do t est if

ie d i n Spa nis h an d hi s t est imony was tr ans la te d t hro ugh an i nte rpr et er

. 7

Ana t est if

ie d i n Spa nis h an d he r t est imony was tr ans la te d t hro ugh an i nte rpr et er

. 8

-7-wer e not true. Vane ssa also testified that Mil dred took the child to New York without 9 permission. ¶ 32 Vane ssa also testified that Mildred took the child to the d o ct o r wi t h o u t Va n es s a’s permission. During her testimony
, Vane ss a wa s shown two forms authorizing Mildred to take the child to the doctor, and Vane ssa responde d that she “wr ot e t h o s e au thorizations beca use [Mi ldred] was taking the [child] to New York.” Vane ssa testified that she was afr aid that Mildred would take the chil d to Ecua dor and “did not know all the rules about passports.” ¶ 33 Vane ssa testified that s h e wa s u n aw are that a petition for guardia nship had been f

iled until she attempted to pick up the child from Mildred’s home and Mildred ref used, showing Vane ssa a court order g ranting Mildred temporar y guardia nship of the child. The next day
, Vane ssa went to court and the order was suspended. Vane ssa testified that she picked up the child from Mildred’ s home “with the he lp of the police.” ¶ 34 T h e fi n al witness to testify was Mildred, who testified on her own behalf . M i l dre d testified t h at s h e h as known Vane ssa for approximately seven year s, since Vane ssa beg an dating Mildred’s son. Mildred testified that during Va n essa’s pregnancy , she took car e of Vane ssa by buying her food and taking her to doctors’ appointments. Mildred testified that “she love d [Vanessa] like a daughter.” Mildred testified that she has alway s been involved in the child’s life and has provided the child with whateve r she neede d. Mildred testified that fo r approximately two year s, the child resided more with Mildred than with Vanes s a, an d Vane ssa ca

me to visit t he child. ¶ 35 Mildred testified that she filed the petition for guardia nship of the child beca

use she wa s afr aid for the child’s well-be ing. She testified that on or about Marc h 16, 2011, she trave led
to Ecua dor and, befor e leaving
, she had taken the child to be examined by a medical doctor beca use the child was having difficulty using the bathroom. The child’s doctor diagnosed the child as havinga urina

ry trac t infection and presc ribed an antibiotic me dication. Howe ver, Vane ssa never g ave the child the antibiotic. Mildred testified that Vane ssa had stated that the chil d wa s sick beca

use Vane ssa’s cowor

ker had “done a ritual cure ” on Vane ssa, which transfe rre d the illness to the child. Mildr ed t es t i fied that Vane ssa informed her that she perf ormed a clea

nsing ritual on her and the child and that the child wou l d b e “better off” without the antibiotic. ¶ 36 Mildred t es t i fi ed th at wh en she returne d from Ecua dor on April 22, 2011, the child “appe are d to be okay .” Howeve r, on May 20, 2011, Mildred took the child to the emer g ency room, wher e the c hild was diagnosed with “a very bad urina ry trac t infection.” ¶ 37 M i l dre d t estified that when she completed the petition for guardia nship
, s h e l i s t ed Vane ssa’s addre ss as unknown “bec ause she was not awa re of [Vanessa’s] exact addre ss, and

o n l y kn ew how to g et there .” Mildred testified that when the petition was completed, she

T he bysta nde r’ s r e p o r t doe s not exp la in what V ane ssa cl ai m s Mi ldr ed sai d. However, in 9 the fi rs t GAL re por t, V ane ss a t o ld the GAL tha t Mi ldr ed tol d the chi ld to cal l V ane ssa “M omm y V ane ssa ” and Mi ldr ed “mom m y.” She al so tol d the GAL th atMi ldr ed t oldth e chi ld tha t V ane ssa bel ie ved the chi ld was “ ‘ BasuraY fe a’ whi ch i n Engli sh means tr ash andugly.”

-8-located Vane ssa’s addre ss and telephone number and attache d them to the petition. Mildred

also testified t hat o n th e d ay she filed the petit ion, she called Vane ssa t o inform her of t he filing and that Vane ssa threatened Mildred; Mildred testified that, in the past, Vane ssa had threatened Mildred b y t el l i ng her that Vane ssa had friends who wer e g ang members and could hurt Mildred. ¶ 38 Mildred testified that the police “we re involved” once when Va nessa c alled the police. On that occa sion, Mildred was with the child at the zoo and Vane ssa called Mildred and told her that she wanted to se e the child. Mildred informed Vane ssa that she could see the child when they left the zoo or could come to the zoo to pick up the child. When Mildred and the child left t he z oo, it was late, and they wer e t i re d
, so she t old Vane ssa t o pick up the child at M ildred’s home. Vane ssa t hreatened to call the police, and Mildred told Vane ssa i t was not nece ssary

to call t he poli ce and t hat Vanessa could come to pick up the c hild. Vanessa

arrived at Mildred’ s home with the police. ¶ 39 Mildred testified that she took the child to the child’s primary car e doctor, as well as to specia lists. M ildred testified that the child had neurofibromatosis, which re quired Mildred
to take the child to specia lists including an endocrinologist, dermatologist, and ophthalmologist. Mildred further testified that the child has asthma and that Mildred took the child to a “pulmonary doctor” for ov er t wo y ea rs , in addition to the child’s regular appointments with the primary car e doctor

. ¶ 40 Mildred denied taking the child to New Y ork without permission and testified that she had trave led with the child on over 20 occa sions with Vane ssa’s permission, including trips
to Wis consin Dells, Florida
, and New York. Mildred testified that Vane ssa was awa re when she was trave ling with the ch i l d

. M ildred further testified that Vane ssa had signe d authorization forms in 2009 and 2010 and that Va nessa wa s “lying” about the forms be ing signe d when Mildred took the child to see the child’s fathe r in New York, beca use the fathe r had bee n deporte d in 2008. ¶ 41 After all of the witnesses had testified, the GAL g ave a closing argum en t i n which he
argued that Mildred should not be awa rded visitation beca

use Mildred had “bad intentions” when filing the initial petition for guardia nship of the child and noted that M i l dre d wa s a “ver y passionate person.” The GAL arg ued that a “cor e issue” in the case wa s wh et h er Vane ssa’s denial of visitation was rea sonable or unrea sonable, and that the denial “wa s both

rea sonable and understanda ble.” The GAL argued that Vane ssa was rea sonably worrie d that visit at i o n would result in the loss of the child and that Mildred’s knowledg e of the “ ‘sy stem’ ” would enable Mildred t o “take the baby .” The GA L ar gu ed t h at Vanessa was worrie d that Mildred’s “criticism and disapproval” would result in more unfounded repor ts to DCFS or another

authority

. ¶ 42 The GAL also arg ued that Vane ssa was conce rned that Mildred would say untrue things about Vane ssa and that Vane ssa’s mistakes would be exagg erated to enable Mildred to “take over.” The GAL argued that Vane ssa was conce rned that Mildred would harm Vane ssa’s relationship with the child and would undermine the child’s rela ti o n s h i p wi th Vane ssa by
saying untr

ue and c onfusingthings to the c hild. ¶ 43 The GAL argued that Vane ssa felt that Mildred was “domineering and controlling ” and

-9-had felt the need to obtain the help of police i n o rd er t o pick up the child from Mildred’s

home. The GAL also argued that Vane ssa felt that “dea ling with [Mi ldred] will continue to

cause a g reat deal of stress that is harmful” to Vane ssa and the child, which is why Vane ssa stopped the visitations. ¶ 44 T he GAL also argued that Mildred acte d in bad faith b y fi l i n g th e p et i t i o n fo r guardia nship without notice to Vane ssa and stating that Vane ssa’s wher eabouts were “ ‘unknown,’ ” which was not tru e. T h e GAL also argued that the orig inal petition for
guardia nship stated that Vane ssa was unwilling to car e for the child, which was untrue; the GAL noted that Mildred had made two repor ts to DCFS, both of which wer e deter mined to be unfounde d. The GA Lclaimed that Mildred “ wanted to take the child from [Vane ssa].” ¶ 45 Finally
, the GAL argued that Mildred had the burden of proof, which she did not mee t, and that the pe tition for visit ation should be denied. ¶ 46 Af

t er a b ri ef recess, the court denied Mildred’s petition for visitation, findingt h at Mildred had not met her burden of demonstrating that Vane ssa’s decision to terminate visitation was harmful to the child’s mental, phy sical, or emotional health. The court noted that Mildred “wa s her own worst enemy ,” and stated that it had observe d through Mildred’s
court appea

ranc es that she was “domineering a n d o v e r b e aring .” The court found that Mildred had helpe d with the child and had be en involved with the child, but found that insufficient
to awa rd v i sitation to Mildred. The court also took issue with the fac t that Mildred had provided her own translator for one witness, stating that Mildred “wa s attempting to manag e his courtroom.” The court found that Mildred “would cre ate conflict” betwee n the child and Vane ssa and that Vane ssa “had rea son to be conce rned” that Mildred would “purpose ly turn the *** child ag ainst her.” The court found t hat Vanessa was capa ble of making decisions

conce rning the child and the court stated that it would not g rant visitation and that the decision to permit or deny visitation “would rema in solely the persona l decision” of Vane ssa. The co u rt stated that it “highly rec ommended” that the parties come to an agree ment and stated that it “s t ro n g ly believed [Mi ldred] would interfe re with pare ntal decision making authority .” ¶ 47 On Februar

y 14, 2 0 1 2
, M i l dre d fi led a motion to rec onsider the court’s denial of her petition. The motion stated that the child’s fathe r, Mauricio, was deporte d to E cuador in or about October 2008 and that on or about August 20, 2008, Vane ssa and Mauricio executed

an “I llinois Voluntary Acknowle dg ment of Paternity .” Mildred claimed that the court had 1 0 failed to proper ly consider the fac to rs of the g randpa rent visitation statute in denying her petition for visitation. On Marc h 13, 2012, Mildred’s motion to rec onsider was denied afte r the court stated that it had considere d eac h of the fac tors in the g randpa rent visitation statute and Mildred ha d failed to mee t her burde n of proof . Mildred timely

appea led.

¶ 48 ANALYSI S ¶ 49 On appea l, Mildred claims that the trial court err ed in denying her petition for visitation

T he “ V olu nta ry Acknowle dgm entof Pat ernit y” is notin cl ude d i n t he r eco rd on appe al

. 1 0

-10-beca use she sufficie ntly demonstrated that a denial of visitation would harm the child. Under the grandpa

rent visitation statute, a grandpa rent is per mitted to file a petition for visitation “if there is an unrea sonable denial of visitation by a pare nt” and at least one of a number of conditions ex i s t s

. 750 I L CS 5/607(a-5) (1) (West 2010). In deter mining whether to g rant 1 1 such a petition, the statute provides that “ther e is a rebuttable presumption that a fit pare nt’s actions and decisions reg arding g randpa rent, g reat-grandpa

rent, or sibling visitation are not harmful to the child’s mental, phy sical, or emotional health. The burden is on the party filing

a petition under this Section to prove that t h e p ar ent’s actions and decisions reg arding visitation times are harmful to the child’s mental, phy sical, or emotional health.” 750 I L CS 5/607(a-5) (3) (West 2010)

. This pr esumption “ is the embodiment of the fundame ntal right of pare nts to make decisions conce rning the car e, custody
, and control of their children which is protected by

the fourte enth amendme nt.” Flynn v. H enke l , 227 I ll. 2d 176, 181 (2007). ¶ 50 Acc ording to o u r s up re m e co u rt , “[ a] trial court’s deter mination that a fit pare nt’s decision reg arding whether g randpa rent visitation is or is not harmful to the child’s mental, phy sical, or emotional health will not be disturbed on revie w unless it is contra ry to the manifest weight of the evidence.” Flynn
, 227 I ll. 2d at 181. The reason for t his defe rential standard is that “the trial court is in a superior position to assess the cre dibilit y of witnesses and weigh the evidenc e” tha n we a re. In re Stephe n K. , 373 I ll. App. 3d 7, 25 (2007); In re D.W

. , 386 I ll. App. 3d 124, 136 (2008) (“the trial court, having observe d the witnesses and hear d their testimony
, is in the best position to make cre dibilit y deter minations”). As a result,

we will f ind that a trial court’s decision is a g ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e only “whe re a revie w of the rec ord clea rly demonstrate s t h at the result opposite to [t he one]

rea ched by the trial court was the proper result.” In re Stephen K.
, 373 I ll. App. 3d at 25; In

re D. W

. , 386 I ll. App. 3d at 139 (a finding is ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e if it is unreasonable , arbitra ry , and not base d on the evidenc e). ¶ 51 In the case at bar, Mildred ar gu es t h at s h e prese nted sufficie nt evidenc e to rebut the

s t atut ory presumption and that the trial court’s decision to the contra ry was ag ain s t t h e manifest weight of the evidenc e. We do not find Mildred’s argument persua sive. In addition
to providing a presumption in favor of a pare nt’s decision conce rning visitation, the statute g ives guidance to a trial co u rt i n deter mining whether to grant a petition for visitation, providing : “In deter mining whe ther to grant visitation, the court shall conside r the following : (A) the pref

ere nce of the child if the child is deter mined to be of sufficie nt maturity to express a pref

ere nce; (B ) the menta l and phy sical hea lth of the child; (C) the mental and p h y s ical health of the g randpa rent, g reat-grandpa

rent, or sibling;

I n the cas e at bar
, sec ti on 607( a- 5)( 1)( E) app li es, si nce “t he chi ld is born out of wedl ock, 1 1 the par ent s ar e not li ving toget her
, the pet i ti one r is a pat ernal grandp ar ent , great

- grandp ar ent , or

s i b l ing, and the pat ernit y has bee n est abl is hed by a cou rt of compete nt j uri sdi ct ion .” 750 I L C S 5/6 07( a- 5)( 1)( E) ( We st201 0).

-11-(D) the leng th and quality of the prior rela tio n ship betwee n the child and the
g randpa rent, great-grandpa

rent, or sibling ; (E) the g ood faith of the pa rty in filing the pe tition; (F ) the g ood faith of the pe rson deny ing visitation; (G) the quantity of the visitation time reque sted and the potential adver se impact that visitation would have on the child’s c ustomary activities; (H) whether the child resided with the petitioner for at least 6 consec utive months with or without the curr ent custodian pre sent; (I ) whet h er t he petitioner had fre quent or regular contac t or visitation with the child for at least 12 consec utive months; (J) any other fac t that es t ablishes that the loss of the relationship betwee n the petitioner and the ch i l d i s likely to harm the child’s m ental, phy sical, or emotional health; and (K) whether the g randpa rent, g rea

t-grandpa rent, or sibling was a primary

car eg iver of the child for a period of not less than 6 consec utive months.” 750 I L CS 5/607(a-5) (4) ( West 2010).
In the case at bar, Mildred arg ues that based on these fac tors, the trial court err ed in denying her pe tition for visit ation beca use she ha d met her burden to re but the presumption. ¶ 52 Mildred focuse s on sever al of the fac tors that she claims weigh in her favor
, arg uing that she has a close rela

tionship with the child and that the child was happy and safe when with Mildred. She further claims that she was actively involved in the child’s life, taking the child
to doctors’ appointments, attending pare nt meeting s at school, arr ang ing playdates, and
trave ling with the child, and also argues that Vane ssa’s denial of visitation was in reta liation for Mildred’s filing of a petition for guardia nship and demonstrates Vane ssa’s bad faith. The GAL
, on the other hand, ackn o wl edges that Mildred has a “long and quality relationship” with the child, but focuse s on Mildred’s “o v erbe aring ” personality and ins tance s in which she interfe red with the relationship betwee n Vane ssa and the child. The GAL also argues that Mildred’s conduct in filing her initial petition for guardia nship, which resulted in the trial
court finding th a

t Mildred had made misrepre sentations in seeking guardia nship, her conduct in filing DCFS repor

ts that wer e unfounded, and her conduct in filing as an indige nt person all demonstrate Mildre d’s bad f aith. ¶ 53 In its denial of Mildred’s petition, the court clea rly place d the most weight on Mildred’s behavior and relationship with Vane ssa, finding that Mildred “would cre ate conflict” betwee n the child and Vane ssa and that Vane ssa “had rea son to be conce rned” that Mildred would “purpose ly turn the *** child ag ainst her.” Acc ordi n gl y , t h e trial court found that Mildred had not met her burden to demonstrate that the child would be harme d by Vane ssa’s decision t o deny visitation. We cannot find this decision t o be aga inst the m anife st weight of the evidenc e beca

use there is ample evidenc e in the rec ord supporting the trial court’s decision to deny visitation. For instance, Mildred initially petitioned for guardia nship of the child in a way that led the court to find that “Misrepr esentations wer e made to J udg e O’B rien

as an inducement for him to enter a Tempora ry Guar dianship on 5/31/11.” Evidence was also

-12-prese nted that Mildred told the child things that wer e untrue or conf using to the c hild, and attempted to interfe re in Vane ssa’s relationship with the child. Finally
, the trial court had the opportunity to observe Mildred throughout the proce eding s and found that s h e wa s “domineering and overbe aring .” As noted, “the trial court is in a superior position to assess the cre dibilit y of witnesses and weigh the evidenc e.” In re Stephen K.
, 373 I ll. App. 3d at 25. Since there is evidenc e that supports the trial co urt’s decision to deny the petition for visitation, we cannot say th at “a re v i ew of the rec ord clea rly demonstrates that the result opposite to [t he one] rea ched by the trial court was the proper result” ( In re Stephen K.
, 373 I ll. App. 3d at 25), and thus we cannot find that the t ri al co urt ’s decision was ag ainst the manifest we ight of

the evidenc e. ¶ 54 We find support for our c onclusion in the I llinois Supreme Court ca se of Flynn , which is the sole I llinois case discussing the statutory presumption and its definition of “har m.” In that case , the pater

nal g randmother of a child lear ned of the child’s birth one month afte r he was born and visited the child that night. The child’s mother pe rmitted the grandmother to visit the child, as long as she and her husband did not permit the child’s fathe r to acc ompany them on visits with the child; the fathe r had re ce n t l y been rele ased from prison and the child’s mother re fused to allow him to visit t he child. When t he father petitioned the court for visitation wi t h his son, the mother beca me angry with the g randmother and ref used to allo w h er visitation rights with the child. Eventually
, the fathe r was g rante d supervised visitation at a behavior al health-c are cente r, and the grandmother was able to visit the child at the same time. The super vised visitation was later moved to the mother ’s house, but the
g randmother did not attend vis itation there

. After the father left the s tate, the grandmother petitioned for visitation, which was permitted. At the time of the hearing on the petition for visitation, the child was almost three year s old. In permitting the g rant of visitation, the trial court stated:
“ ‘Oka y

. Ba sed on the testimony prese nted the Court finds that the petitioner has met her burden. The h arm i n this case is not something that you can put in the sense of a direc t emotional harm. I t ’s a direc t denial of an opportunity that ever y g randpa

rent

acc ordingto this st atute is entitled to.’ ” Flynn , 227 I ll. 2d at 179. The trial court then addre ssed the fa ctors listed in the statute and decide d in favor of visitation, but did n o t make any specific finding s conce rning how the g randmother had

overc ome the pre sumption. Flynn
, 227 I ll. 2d at 179. The appe llate cour t affir med the trial court’s de cision, rejec ting the mother ’s argument that the gra ndmother had failed to prove that the child would be ha rmed if visitation was denie d. The a ppellate c ourt stated:
“ ‘The harm that [the child] would suffe r if ther e we re no visitation can beinferr ed from the evidenc e. As the tria l court stated, it “is not something that you can put in the

sense of a direc t emotional harm.” Howeve r, [t he g randmother ’s] love for [t he child] is manifest in the rec ord. She tried to become involved with [t he mother] even befor e [t he child] was born and sent items for the baby

. She came to visit [t he child] the very night that she lear

ned that he had been born. As [t he g randmother ] said, “I just want to be part of [the child’s] l ife. He deser ves i t and Ideser

ve it.” If [the grandmother] were denie d visitation, [the child] would be harmed by neve r knowing a grandparent who loved him

a nd who did not undermine the child’s relationship with his mother

. There wa s n o

-13-evidenc e that the prior visitation interfe red with [t he mother’s] relationship with [t he child], and the evidenc e showed that [the g randmother ] would abide by any restric tions that the court place d on future visitation. We can find no err or in the trial court’s finding that [t he mother’s] de nial of visitation was harmful to [the child’s] menta l, phy sical, or emotional health ***.’ ” (Emphasis in orig inal.) Flynn
, 227 I ll. 2d at 180 (quoting Flynn v. He nkel , 369 I ll. App. 3d 328, 335 (2006)). ¶ 55 On appea l, the supreme court reve rsed the grant of visitation. The supreme court found that “[a]lt hough [t he g randmother ] testified that [t he child] loves her and that he hug s her and holds her when he sees her, she did not prese nt any evidenc e to show that denial of visitation with her would result in harm to [t he child’s] mental, phy sical, or emotional health. The only evidenc e perta ining to harm [t he child] would experience from the denial of visitation with his g randmother came from [t he mother], who was as k ed
, ‘D o you believe it would be harmful for [ the child] not to see [ the gra ndmother] and vis it wi th her? ’ and she answere d ‘No.’ ” Flynn , 227 I ll. 2d at 184. The supre me cour t further noted:
“It is clea r that the trial court, in its oral pronounce ment at the conclusion of the April 21 hearing and contra

ry to the appell at e court’s interpre tation of that pronounce ment, found t here was no ‘direc t emotional harm’ to [t he child] in [ the m other’s] decision t o deny visitation to [t he grandmother ]. R ather , the trial cour t clearly stated that the ha

rm i s ‘a direc t denial of an opportunity that ever y g randpa rent acc ording to this statute is entitled to.’ Neither denial of an opportunity for g randpa rent visitation, as the trial court fo u n d
, nor a child ‘neve r knowing a grandpa rent who loved him and who d i d n o t undermine the child’s relationship with his mother,’ as the appellate court held, is ‘har m’ that will r ebut the presumption stated in section 607(a- 5)(3) that a fit pare nt’s denial of

a g randpa rent’s visitation is not harmful to the child’s mental, phy s i ca l
, o r emotional health.” Flynn , 227 I ll. 2d at 184.
Acc ording ly
, the supreme court found th e trial court’s “unsupported oral pronounce ment that petitioner had met her burden of proof in overc oming the statutory presumpti on that [t he mother’s] decisions denying g randpa rent visitation was not harmful to [t he child’s] mental, phy sical or e motional health” was aga inst the m anife st weight of t he evide nce. Flynn , 227 I ll. 2d at 185. ¶ 56 In the case at bar, Mildred distinguishes her situation from that prese nt in Flynn , arguing that she “wa s signific antly more involved” in the child’s life than the grandmother in Flynn

. Mildred further argues that “beside s the overwhelming evidenc e of the close and substantial relationship bet we en the m inor child and her Gra ndmother, t he evidence of harm and/or a likelihood of harm was that Mother admitted that Gra ndmother was important to the minor child, Mother admitted that she was denying g randpa rent visitation, that the minor child was happy when she was with Gra

ndmother, and that after the denial of grandpa rent visitation, the minor child had a psycholog ical evaluation that resulted in a rec ommendation that the minor child continue in thera py sessions.” We do not find Mildred’s ar gument persua sive. ¶ 57 Whil e Mildred prese nted evidenc e that she was heavily involved in the child’s life, she did not prese nt evidenc e that the eff ect of denying visitation would be any differ ent than the ty pe of “har m” reje cted in Flynn

. We also note that the rec ord indicates that the rela tionship

-14-betwee n Mildred and Vane ssa i s ex t re m el y contentious and that the trial court “strong ly

believed [Mi ldred] would interfe re with pare ntal decision mak i ng authority ,” wher eas in Flynn
, the g randmother “ ‘did not undermine the child’s relationship wi t h his mother.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Flynn
, 227 I ll. 2d at 180 (quoting Flynn
, 369 I ll. App. 3d at 335). Thus,

even if here
, Mildred is more involved than the g randmother in Flynn
, the neg ative aspec ts of the relationship are al s o g reater, and we cannot find that Mildred’s involvement in the child’s l ife alone is s u fficient to demonstrate that the t rial court’s decision was ag ainst the manifest we ight of

the evidenc e. ¶ 58 Fi n al l y , we d o n o t fi n d the case s that Mildred cites from other jurisdictions t o b e persua sive. As noted, the I llinois Supreme Court has spoke n on the issue in Flynn , and we find this case analog ous to that one. Moreove r, the case s cited to are not helpful to Mildred,

as they impose a high standard in order to find that a pare nt’s decision conce rning visitation has harme d the child. See, e.g. , Roth v. W eston , 789 A.2d 431, 450 (Conn. 2002) (re quiring that a petiti oner “has a r elationship with the child that is sim ilar in nature to a parent-child relationship” and that denial of visitation will re s u l t i n a d egre e of harm analog ous to the child being “ ‘neg lected, uncar ed-f or or depende nt’ ”). Whil e Mildred claims that she has met this high standard by showing that she has essentially acte d as a pare nt to the child, there is evidenc e in the rec ord disputing her claim, and further evidenc e that Mildred has interfe red with the child’s relationship with her mother by attempting to poison the child’s mind. As

a result, the trial court’s decision to deny the g randmother ’s petition is not aga i n s t the manifest we ight of

the evidenc e.

¶ 59 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 60 Evidence was prese nted supporting the trial court’s deter mination that Mildred failed to rebut the presumption that Vane ssa’s denial of visitation was not harmful to the chil d. Acc ording ly
, the trial court’s decision to deny Mildred’s petition for visitation was not ag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e.

¶ 61 Affir

med.

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