NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 23a0017n.06
Case No. 2 2

- 3 411 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DUANE RAY , Plaintiff

- Appell ee ,

v. F IFTH THIRD BANK, N.A. and FIFTH THIRD BANK INSURANCE AGENCY, INC. , Defendant s - Appell ant s .

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTH ERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
OPINION

B efore : BATCHELDER , STRANCH , and DAVIS , Circuit Judge s . ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge . Duane Ray sued Foundation Risk Partners (FRP), Fifth Third Bank, N.A. (“the Bank”), and Fifth Third Insurance Agency (FTI). FRP
moved for a preliminary injunction to enforce a non

- compete agreement against Ray, but the district court denied it

. R ay v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A. , No. 1:21

- cv - 76, 2022 WL 974341 (S.D. Ohio , Mar. 31, 2022)

. FRP appealed that order (No. 22

- 3387). Neither the Bank nor FTI joined that motion or that appeal, n or did either the Bank or FTI claim any injury from Ray’s alleged
violation of the non

- compete agreement. Nonetheless, the Bank and FTI filed this separate interlocutory appeal, challenging th e denial of FRP ’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the Bank and FTI claim that “ notwithstanding that they did not seek injunctive relief ,” 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1) entitles them to an interlocutory appeal because they have “a significant stake in the judicial determination as to [their] rights under the [employment contract] and the scop e of the assets [they] sold to FRP in the [sales contract].” Reply Br. at 4. They rely22

- 3411 , Ray v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A.

2

on City of Cleveland v. Ohio , 508 F.3d 827 (6th Cir. 2007) , and Pedreira v. Sunrise Children’s Servs., Inc. , 802 F.3d 865, 869 (6th Cir. 2015) . But that reliance is m isplaced.
In Pedreira , we allowe d that “ a party to the case can appeal any final judgment

. . . that imposes ‘ some detriment ’ on the party

. ” Pedreira , 802 F.3d at 869 (emphasis added) (quoting Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland , 753 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1985) ) . But we do not have a final judgment here ; this is an interlocutory order denying a preliminary injunction. “ T he purpose of a preliminary injunction, unlike a permanent one, is to ‘ prevent any violation of the [movant]’ s rights before the district court enters a final judgment , ’ ” so appellate standing “ depends [at least in part] on whether our decision would have any ‘ practical effect ’ during that window of time ”; i.e., before the entry of final judgment. Resurrection Sch. v. Hertel , 35 F.4th 524, 528 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc) ( quoting Ohio v. EPA , 969 F.3d 306, 308 (6th Cir. 2020) ). In the order underlying this a ppeal, t he district court determined that FRP had not show n a substantial likelihood that FTI had properly assigned the employment contract to FRP in accordance with the assignment provision, but that is not a final (appealable) judgment on the merits of t hat issue. That is merely conclusive on the request for the preliminary injunction. Thus, the Bank and FTI claim, at most, a stake in the final judgment, which remains pending.
In City of Cleveland , 508 F.3d at 836

- 37 , which was

— like Pedreira

— a n appeal from a final judgment, we found appellate standing for peripheral parties w ith “ a sufficient stake in the outcome of the case ,” in contrast to cases in which a ppellants “ were not personally aggrieved by the judgment under appeal and did not seek t o protect their own interests. ” This appeal falls into that latter category; the Bank and FTI were not personally aggrieved by the denial of the preliminary injunction, which sought to protect only FRP’s interest in the non

- compete agreement. Because th e Bank and FTI lack standing to appeal, we DISMISS.