COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

December 22, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP446-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF1331

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

DANIEL J. LEWER,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Waukesha County: MICHAEL P. MAXWELL, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Reilly, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or 

authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2020AP446-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Daniel Lewer appeals from a judgment convicting 

him of operating while intoxicated (7th, 8th or 9th offense) and from a circuit 

court order denying his postconviction motion alleging plain error relating to the 

jury instruction for “operating” and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.1 We 

affirm.

¶2 At trial, Lewer conceded that he was intoxicated, but he denied that 

he operated his motorcycle within the meaning of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) 

(2017-18)2 because he walked or pushed his motorcycle from the bar to the 

location where the police found him with his toppled motorcycle. Using the 

standard jury instruction, the circuit court instructed the jury about the meaning of 

“operate:” 

Section 346.63(1)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes is violated 

by one who operates a motor vehicle on a highway while 

under the influence of an intoxicant. Before you may find 

the defendant guilty of this offense, the State must prove by 

evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the following two elements were present: 

One, the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a highway. 

“Operate” means the physical manipulation or activation of 

any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to set it in 

motion. Two, the defendant was under the influence of an 

intoxicant at the time the defendant operated a motor 

vehicle. 

¶3 At trial, a police officer testified that he responded to a call about a 

man (Lewer) slumped over his motorcycle on the side of the road. The 

 

1

 Lewer’s counsel informed this court that Lewer has passed away. The appeal 

continues. State v. McDonald, 144 Wis. 2d 531, 536-37, 424 N.W.2d 411 (1988) (right to appeal 

continues despite defendant’s death).

2

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted. 
No. 2020AP446-CR

3

motorcycle’s kickstand was not down, and the approximately 731-pound

motorcycle was tipped over on its right side with Lewer still on it. The 

motorcycle’s engine was not running and its lights were not on. The ignition was 

in the unlocked position, and no key was found at the scene or on Lewer’s person. 

Lewer was unclear about his prior movements and where he was heading. The 

officer detected the odor of intoxicants and other indicia of intoxication, including 

unsteadiness when standing. Lewer refused testing and failed field sobriety tests. 

After being arrested, Lewer told the officer, “I didn’t refuse. I know what it is. I 

know I’m going away.” The officer testified that while Lewer was at the hospital 

for a blood draw, he essentially stated “he knows he was wrong. He messed up. 

His blood is going to be taken and he is going to go away for a long time.”3 At the 

jail, Lewer said “all I did was go for drinks and ride home and you pulled me 

over.” The officer testified on cross-examination that Lewer nodded his head in 

the affirmative when asked if he drove the motorcycle and stated that he “dumped 

my [ride or Harley].” Lewer did not tell the officer that he walked the motorcycle 

from the bar to the place where the officer found him.

¶4 The bartender testified that after Lewer stumbled out of the bar, he 

heard a motorcycle start. Various videos from the night of Lewer’s arrest show 

that Lewer had difficulty coordinating his movements. About four minutes after 

Lewer left the bar, a homeowner noticed him slumped on his motorcycle outside 

her property and called police. Although she did not hear a motorcycle arrive 

outside her house, the homeowner testified, “[t]he traffic is white noise after 

awhile.” The police chief of the municipality where Lewer was arrested testified 

 

3

 Lewer’s blood alcohol concentration was .324, well in excess of lawful levels given his 

prior operating while intoxicated convictions. 
No. 2020AP446-CR

4

that in his experience as a motorcycle rider, a motorcycle like Lewer’s could be 

started without a key if the ignition was in the “on” position.

¶5 Lewer testified that he was intoxicated when the police officer found 

him and his level of intoxication caused him to have memory problems about the 

events culminating in his arrest. As best as he could recall, he left his keys at his 

mother’s house and rode his motorcycle from his mother’s house to the bar. When 

he left the bar, he straddled the motorcycle and walked it away from the bar to 

where he was found. Lewer attributed to his inebriation any statements he made 

to the police that suggested he drove rather than walked the motorcycle. 

¶6 Lewer’s private investigator walked the motorcycle from the bar to 

the place where Lewer was found. The investigator was not intoxicated when he 

made the trip. The investigator’s walking trip took five minutes and fifteen 

seconds. Based on the bartender’s testimony about the time Lewer left the bar and 

when the bartender heard the motorcycle start and the time the homeowner noticed 

Lewer outside her property, Lewer’s trip on the night of his arrest took 

approximately four minutes. 

¶7 Lewer’s plain error claim originates in two questions the jury 

submitted. During deliberation, the jury asked: (1) “Does ‘putting in reverse’ or 

‘raising the kickstand’ qualify as ‘physical manipulation of controls’”? and 

(2) “Does ‘putting in motion’ necessitate that its machine generated motion or can 

it be human generated?” The court discussed the questions with counsel, and both 

lawyers agreed that the operating instruction should stand as given, and the jurors 

should be directed to read the instruction again. As to both questions, the court 

instructed the jury to “[c]onsider the instruction as written based upon your

common sense and experience.” The jury convicted Lewer.
No. 2020AP446-CR

5

¶8 Postconviction, Lewer argued that the circuit court committed plain 

error when it failed to clarify the meaning of operate for what he contends was a 

confused jury. Lewer further argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 

objecting to the circuit court’s refusal to clarify the jury instruction. 

¶9 In rejecting Lewer’s plain error4claim after a hearing, the circuit 

court noted that as with the initial jury instructions, the “necessity for, the extent 

of, and the form of re-instruction” in response to inquiries from the jury is within 

the circuit court’s discretion. State v. Simplot, 180 Wis. 2d 383, 404, 509 N.W.2d 

338 (Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). The circuit court concluded that the 

operating jury instruction accurately stated the law and it was not error to direct 

the jury to re-read the instruction.

¶10 Whether plain error occurred presents a question of law we review 

independently. State v. Bell, 2018 WI 28, ¶8, 380 Wis. 2d 616, 909 N.W.2d 750. 

¶11 As noted, the circuit court gave the standard jury instruction defining 

“operate.” Lewer relies upon Milwaukee County v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 291 

N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980), and Village of Cross Plains v. Haanstad, 2006 WI 

16, 288 Wis. 2d 573, 709 N.W.2d 447, to argue that “operate” requires a running 

engine. Therefore, Lewer argues, in response to the jury’s questions about 

“putting in reverse” or “raising the kickstand” and human generated motion, the 

circuit court should have given a clarifying instruction emphasizing the need for a 

running engine. 

 

4

 Lewer must allege plain error affecting a substantial right because his counsel 

acquiesced in the circuit court’s decision to direct the jury to the previously provided instruction. 

See State v. Paulson, 106 Wis. 2d 96, 104-05, 315 N.W.2d 350 (1982) (a plain error claim may 

be lodged in the absence of a proper objection). 
No. 2020AP446-CR

6

¶12 Lewer reads Proegler and Haanstad too broadly. By its terms, the 

definition of operating in WIS. STAT. § 346.63(3)(b) is not restricted to a running 

engine. Operating requires “physical manipulation or activation of any of the 

controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.” WIS. STAT.

§ 346.63(3)(b). Lewer has not provided any authority for the proposition that 

lifting a motorcycle’s kickstand,

5 putting the motorcycle in reverse or moving it 

without a running engine does not constitute operating such that the standard jury 

instruction should have been modified in response to the jury’s questions. We

agree with the State that a reasonable jury could conclude that lifting a 

motorcycle’s kickstand constituted “physical manipulation” of a control necessary 

to put the motorcycle in motion. Furthermore, using its common sense and 

experience, the jury could have disbelieved Lewer’s claim that he walked the 

engine-off motorcycle in favor of finding more credible the evidence that he 

started the engine and drove the motorcycle until it toppled (the bartender’s 

testimony about hearing the motorcycle start, Lewer’s intoxicated state, memory 

and coordination problems, Lewer’s statements and responses to law enforcement 

from which it could be reasonably inferred that he started and drove the 

motorcycle, and the amount of time that elapsed between Lewer’s departure from 

the bar and being found with the toppled motorcycle versus Lewer’s private 

investigator’s reconstruction of the motorcycle’s journey). We conclude that the 

circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it referred the jury to the 

operating instruction previously given. The record does not show plain error. 

Simplot, 180 Wis. 2d at 405. 

 

5

 When the officer found Lewer on his topped motorcycle, the kickstand was up, not 

down.
No. 2020AP446-CR

7

¶13 Because the circuit court did not commit plain error, we need not 

address Lewer’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for not advocating for 

something other than directing the jury’s attention to the previously given 

instruction. We decide cases “on the narrowest possible ground.” State v. 

Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989) (we do not reach 

issues we need not reach if other issues dispose of the appeal).

¶14 Postconviction, Lewer lodged another ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim: during closing argument trial counsel disclosed that Lewer was a 

felon, a fact previously unknown by the jury. In his closing, trial counsel said:

Well, as pointed out multiple times Mr. Lewer is a 

convicted felony [sic] with nine convictions on his record. 

He has had some contact with the police. Do you think that 

might have an effect on how willingly he is able to 

communicate with the police and offer what really 

happened. 

¶15 At the evidentiary hearing on Lewer’s postconviction motion, trial 

counsel testified that his observation of the jurors led him to worry that they did 

not believe Lewer’s testimony that he walked his motorcycle. Counsel wanted to 

help the jury understand why Lewer did not tell the officer on the night of his 

arrest the same information he provided to the jury: he walked the motorcycle 

from the bar to where he was found. In an attempt to place Lewer’s night of arrest 

conduct in another context, counsel asked the jury to consider that Lewer’s 

significant prior criminal history and his status as a felon may have motivated him 

“to not want to talk to the cops.” 

¶16 In urging the circuit court to conclude that his trial counsel was 

ineffective, Lewer argued that revealing that he was a felon was substantially more 

prejudicial than the evidence before the jury of his nine unspecified prior 
No. 2020AP446-CR

8

convictions. The State countered that trial counsel’s revelation was not 

significantly more prejudicial than the evidence of Lewer’s nine prior convictions, 

trial counsel made a strategic decision to try to shape the jury’s assessment of 

Lewer’s testimony, and even if trial counsel erred, it was not reasonably probable 

the result of the trial would have been different had trial counsel refrained from 

revealing Lewer’s status as a felon. 

¶17 The circuit court rejected Lewer’s ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim. Relying upon trial counsel’s testimony about why he revealed 

Lewer’s status as a felon, the circuit court found that counsel made a strategic 

decision to do so. We uphold the circuit court’s factual finding because it is not 

clearly erroneous. State v. Jeannie M.P., 2005 WI App 183, ¶6, 286 Wis. 2d 721, 

703 N.W.2d 694. 

¶18 Ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing of deficient 

performance and prejudice. Id. We determine both de novo. See id. We are not 

persuaded by Lewer’s appellate argument that trial counsel’s strategy was 

unreasonable under all of the circumstances of the trial. A “strategic decision ... 

founded on rationality of fact and law” is not deficient performance. See State v. 

Brewer, 195 Wis. 2d 295, 300, 536 N.W.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1995). Furthermore, 

considering the evidence we have previously discussed, we see no prejudice 

because it is not reasonably probable that the outcome would have been different 

had trial counsel refrained from describing Lewer as a felon. See State v. Reed, 

2002 WI App 209, ¶17, 256 Wis. 2d 1019, 650 N.W.2d 885. The jury knew that 

Lewer had numerous prior convictions and as discussed elsewhere in this opinion, 

the jury had the right to rely upon evidence before it that Lewer left the bar and 

started and drove his motorcycle. The inability to show prejudice dooms Lewer’s 
No. 2020AP446-CR

9

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 74, 101, 

457 N.W.2d 299 (1990). 

¶19 Because we have rejected Lewer’s challenges to his conviction, we 

also reject his request for a new trial in the interest of justice. 

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.