J-S22028-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

DANIEL NELSON THOMAS

Appellee No. 1730 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered September 23, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0000557-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MOULTON, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2017

The Commonwealth appeals from the September 23, 2016 order 

entered in the Adams County Court of Common Pleas granting Daniel Nelson 

Thomas’ motion to suppress blood test results.1 We affirm.

In March 2016, Thomas was charged with driving under the influence 

of alcohol (“DUI”)–general impairment and DUI–high rate.2 On July 18, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

In its notice of appeal, the Commonwealth certified that the trial 

court’s order granting Thomas’ motion to suppress terminates or 

substantially handicaps the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (permitting 

interlocutory appeal where Commonwealth certifies with its notice of appeal 

that order terminates or substantially handicaps prosecution). Thus, the 

appeal is properly before us. See Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 

244 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2016).

2 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1) and (b), respectively.
J-S22028-17

- 2 -

2016, Thomas filed a motion to suppress evidence of blood test results. In 

lieu of a hearing, the parties submitted the following stipulated facts:

1. On March 20, 2016, at approximately 1:26 a.m., 

[Thomas] was involved in a two-vehicle accident in 

Gettysburg Borough, Adams County, Pennsylvania.

2. Officer Michael Carricato arrived at the scene and 

determined that [Thomas] was the driver of one of the 

vehicles involved in the accident.

3. As a result of Officer Carricato’s observations, [Thomas] 

was placed under arrest for driving under the influence.

4. [Thomas] was transported to Gettysburg Hospital for a 

blood draw.

5. After being read the then-existing DL-26 form, 

[Thomas] consented to have his blood drawn for testing.

6. The form read to [Thomas] included language that 

[Thomas] could face enhanced criminal penalties if he 

refused to submit to a blood draw.

7. [Thomas’] blood was later tested and a result of .128 

blood alcohol content was received.

Stipulated Facts, 9/21/16. On September 23, 2016, the trial court granted 

the motion, finding that Thomas did not voluntarily consent to the blood 

draw and that the results of the blood test were inadmissible. On October 

14, 2016, the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal.

The Commonwealth raises the following issue on appeal: “Did the 

Honorable Suppression Court err in applying the exclusionary rule and 

suppressing the results of [Thomas’] blood draw when a good faith exception 

to the rule should have been applied?” Cmwlth.’s Br. at 4. The 

Commonwealth does not argue that the trial court erred in finding Thomas’s 
J-S22028-17

- 3 -

consent to the blood draw involuntary following Birchfield v. North 

Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016). Rather, it argues that this Court should 

recognize “a limited good faith exception [to the exclusionary rule] in the 

wake of Birchfield.” Cmwlth.’s Br. at 16. The Commonwealth argues that 

we should apply the good-faith exception because the exclusionary rule’s 

deterrent effect is not furthered by application in this case, noting that the 

implied-consent law relied on by the police officers had previously been 

upheld. Id. at 9-15. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the exclusionary rule 

and the good-faith exception to that rule as follows:

The established remedy for illegal seizures and searches, 

in criminal cases, is exclusion of the fruits of the illegal 

police conduct—under both the Fourth Amendment and 

under Article I, Section 8. That general rule of exclusion, 

of course, is subject to numerous exceptions. The U.S. 

Supreme Court recognized a new such exception to the 

Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule in United States v. 

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 

(1984). Leon held that, where a police officer conducts a 

search in objective good faith reliance upon a search 

warrant duly issued by a magistrate or judge, the Fourth 

Amendment does not require exclusion of evidence found 

pursuant to the warrant, even if it is later determined that 

there was no probable cause for the warrant to issue. 468 

U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The High Court considered 

that the deterrence goal of the federal exclusionary rule

based on the Fourth Amendment would not be served by 

applying it in circumstances where officers have properly 

relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Id. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 187-88 (Pa. 2014). The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has determined that Article I, 
J-S22028-17

- 4 -

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not contemplate a goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule, concluding that the Pennsylvania 

Constitution provides greater protection for individual privacy interests than 

does the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 

899, 906 (Pa. 1991); accord Commonwealth v. Myers, ___ A.3d ____, 

2017 WL 3045867, at *10 n.16 (Pa. July 19, 2017) (discussing Birchfield

and decisions from other jurisdictions, and noting that “Pennsylvania law 

does not recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule”); 

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, ___ A.3d ____, 2017 WL 2822511, at *1, 9 

(Pa. June 30, 2017) (concluding trial court properly suppressed evidence 

because there is no good-faith exception to exclusionary rule in case where 

“information contained in the affidavit in support of probable cause is later 

determined to be demonstrably untrue, despite the absence of any showing 

of police misconduct”);3Johnson, 86 A.3d at 188 (noting that Pennsylvania 

____________________________________________

3 Hopkins was decided by an evenly divided court. The opinion in 

support of affirmance based its decision to affirm the order suppressing the 

evidence “upon [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s] historical rejection of a 

‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule.” 2017 WL 2822511, at *1 

(Donohue, J., joined by Baer and Dougherty, JJ.). The opinion in support of 

reversal found the “good-faith ‘exception’ to the exclusionary rule” was not 

implicated, concluding that:

[T]he salient issue, in my view, is whether the search 

warrant was valid and, thus, whether the exclusionary rule

applies in the first instance. As I would find that the 

warrant was supported by probable cause as 

constitutionally required—and was therefore valid—I would 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S22028-17

- 5 -

Supreme Court’s rejection of good-faith exception in “Edmunds turned on a 

determination that, under Article I, Section 8, the exclusionary rule in 

Pennsylvania serves other values besides deterrence; it also vindicates an 

individual’s right to privacy”). Based on this Supreme Court precedent, we 

decline the Commonwealth’s invitation to establish a good-faith exception 

for post-Birchfield cases.

Accordingly, because Pennsylvania does not recognize the good-faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule, we conclude that the Commonwealth’s 

claim lacks merit.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/15/2017

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

conclude that the evidence should not have been 

suppressed.

Id. at *9 (Pa. Jun 30, 2017) (Saylor, C.J., joined by Todd and Mundy, JJ.).