NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________ No. 16-3940

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. BARRY POWELL , Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-11-cr-00603-001) District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb

________________ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 12, 2017 Before: MCKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: July 25, 2017)

OPINION *

AMBRO, Circuit Judge Barry Powell contends that the District Court abused its discretion in sentencing him to ten months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release after his counsel

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precede nt.2 and the Government agreed to request a ten

- month sentence that did not include supervised release. He argues that the Court’s sentencing order conflicted with its finding s of fact, was undu ly punitive , and was substantively unreasonable. We disagree and thus affirm. In September 2011, Powell pled guilty to distributing crack c ocaine and was sentenced to thirty

- three months in prison and three years of supervised release. After his release from prison , he abided by the terms of his supervised release until August 2015, when he tested positive for marijuana. Powell was reprima nded by his probation officer, who required him to attend behavioral therapy, but the District Court took no further action. Shortly there after, Powell committed a string of further violations, including failing to attend required behavioral therapy and an outpatient addiction

- treatment
progr am, faili ng to attend probation meetings and calls , and failing to notify his probation officer after changing his address

. Powell was arrested for these violations in March 2016 and released on bail. H e did not appear at his bail re vocation hearing in April and was rearrested. At the subsequent bail revocation hearing in May 2016 , the District Court revoked Powell’s supervised release for failing to attend treatment, but departed downward 1 and imposed a sentence of two months in prison followed by two years of supervised release

. Upon release from prison, Powell again failed to c omply with the terms of his supervised release by not returning to the residential reentry center where he was required to live for four months. He pled guilty to this violation at his second revocation hearing

1 The Court departed downward from the four

- ten month G uideline range.3 in September 2016

. In an effort to avoid a term of supervised release, Powell’s defense

co unsel asked for a sentence of ten months, at the top of the Guidelines range regarding terms of imprisonment , with no additional term of supervision. The Government agreed to this request , though it recognize d that ten months ’ imprisonment was “a lengthy period of time for someone to go to jail for thi s ty p e of violation,” but acquiesced because
Pow ell was “ unwilling or unable to compl y with s upervised release.” Appellant App. at
45

. The District Court did n ot accept this recommendation. Instead it imposed a

sentence of ten months ’ imprisonment and two years supervised release. This sentence

was near the top of the advisory G uid eline range, but far from the statutory maximum it could have imposed. 2 In the case of some one like Powell, who initially committed a Class C felony, § 841 authorizes any amount of s upervised release greater than three
years when the sentence also includes imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). The District Court thus had the a uth ority under § 841 to sentence Powell to two years ’ incarceration and a potentially life term of supervised release, but inst ead stayed within the advisory G uid elines for someone with Powell’s criminal history

. 3

2 While it’s true that § 3583(b) limits the terms of supervised release to no mo re than three years, we have rejected that § 3583 “ever limits the term of supervised release in case s under § 841. ” United States v. Sanchez

- Gonzalez , 294 F.3d 563 , 566 (3d Cir. 2002). 3 Powell’s criminal history category was II and he pled guilty to a Grade C viol ation; therefore the advisory sentence for imprisonment under the Guidelines was 4

- 10 mo nths. Because he initially committed a Class C felony , the recommended G uideline range under § 3583(b) was 0

- 3 year s minus any time incarcerated, but could be any time more than three years.4 Powell argues that District Court abused its discr etion because the sentence the Court imposed was punitive and ineffective in light of the facts prese nted at his revocation hearing that indicated he would be unlikely to comply with a term of
supe rvised release. He argues that no reasonable court , after applying the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors, would have imposed the same sentence , especially in light of the District Court’s own doubt that supervision would provide successful treatment. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sente nce for abuse of discretion

. Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “ An estimation of the outer bounds of what is reasonable under a given set of circumstances may not always be beyond debate, but the abuse

- of

- discretion standard by which that es timation must be judged limits the debate and gives district courts broad latitude in sentencing. ” United States v. Tomko , 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) ( en banc ) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Levinson , 543 F

. 3d 190, 195 ( 3d Cir. 2008)). When it revokes supervised release and sentences the defendant to a new term of imprisonment, t he Court may include a new te rm of supervised release . 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). “[Al]though subsection (h) does not specify a procedure for reim position of supervised release . . . [,] sentencing courts [should] consider those § 3553(a) factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c), the provision governing imposition of the initial term of supervised release.” United States v. Clark , 726 F.3d 496, 501 (3 d Cir. 2013). To determine whether the sentence imposed was substantively unreasonable, we examine “whether the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the re levant5 factors.” United States v. Doe , 617 F.3d 766, 770 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)

. “ [R]easonableness is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S .C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Grier , 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) ( en banc ) ( internal quotation
marks omitted). When a Court imposes a revocation senten ce, its primary consideration must be “the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into accou nt, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.” United States v. Dees , 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006 ) ( internal quotation marks omitted)

. Here, Powell committed multiple flagrant breaches of the Court’ s t rust , and his sentence reflects t hat

. The District Court explained why an in

- G uideline s sentence reflected the
seri ousness of the offense, promoted resp ect for the law, justly punished the defendant, promoted general deterrence, and prote cted the public from further crimes by Powell. These are all fa ctors under § 3553(a) that a c ourt consider s when imposing a sentence. Specifically, the Court stated it was “firmly convinced” that Powell “should remain on supervised release because it spec ifically ad dresses the purpose of Section 3553(a)[](2)(D), ” Appellant App. at 48 , which aims to provide the individual with
necessary educational and voca tional training, medical care and other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. The Cou rt di sagreed with the parties’ contention that it would be a waste of its and the Probation O ffice’s resources and time to supervise Powell further. It found that , even though Powell had been unwilling to comply with the6 terms of supervised release, he st ill had potential to benefit from the supervised release term, which it hoped would help him become a more produc tive member of society

. Powell argues that sentencing him to further super vised release is ineffective when the Court itself doubted he would comply with the terms of any additional supervised release. How ever, the Supreme Court has stated that “[a] violation of the terms of supervised release tends to confirm the judgment that help was necessary, and if any prisoner might profit from the deco mpression stage of supervised release, no prisoner needs it more than one who has already tried liberty and failed. ” Johnson v. United
States , 529 U.S. 694 , 709 (2000). Moreover, Powell is not incapable of comply ing with the terms of supervised release

. He completed over half of his initial term of supervised release without issue and presented a detailed plan to succeed after his release during his first revocation hearing at which the Court granted a downward departure

. It was not unreasonable for the District
Court to find that supervised release could be an effective means of correcting Powell’s behavior and providing him with the means to succeed. 4 Even if we might reasonably

4 District c ourts regularly impose revocation sentences including further terms of supervised release in cases involving consecutive violations of supervised rele ase, and multiple panels of our Court have affirmed similar sentences that include supervised release notwithstanding the defendant’s prior failure to abide by the terms of release

. See Doe , 617 F.3d at 774

- 75 (two y ears ’ imprisonment followed by twelve months ’ supervised release); see also United States v. Tor r u ella

- Torres , 622 F. App’x 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2015) ( twenty

- four months ’ imprisonment followed by sixt y months ’ supervised release; detailed discussion of § 3553(a) factors not required if record makes clear they were meaningfully considered); see also United States v

. Jones , 628 F. App’x 149, 153 (3d Cir. 2015) (substantive reasonableness challenge to a w ithin

- Gui delines revocation sentence of nine m onths ’ imprisonment followed by three years ’ supervised release for7 have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate (we don’t), that would still be insufficient to justify reversa l of the District Court. Tomko , 562 F.3d at 560

. Powell contends that because the District Court did not follow the sentencing recommendations made jointly by his defense cou nsel and the Government, it acted unreasonably

. A sentencing c ourt is not bound by the parties ’ agreement, but should make its own decision based on reasoned, meaningful consideration of the relevant § 3553 factors. See United States v. Maurer , 639 F. 3d 72, 81 (3d Cir. 2011). It is well settled that a District Court’s failure to give a defense counsel’s arguments the weight the defendant contends they deserve does not render the sentence unreasonable. United
States v. Bungar , 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court here advised Pow ell that it was not obligated to follow the agreement made by the parties. See Fed . R. Crim. P.
11. It considered the sentencing factors and applied them to the specific context of the case and found that supervised release was warranted.
Our review is f or abuse of discretion. Because the record shows that the District Court conducted a complete application of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the se ntence it imposed of two years’ supervised release following ten months ’ imprisonment

— which is within the r ange suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines

— was not substantively unreasonable and thus no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.

Grade C violation had no arguable merit; defendant’s unwillingness to comply with supervised release conditions supports sentence).