Opinion issued May 14, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

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NO. 01-13-01060-CV

———————————

LINDA J. STAFFORD, Appellant

V.

CHARLES RAY STAFFORD, Appellee

On Appeal from the 309th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2000-13812

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Linda J. Stafford appeals the trial court’s order granting Appellee 

Charles Ray Stafford’s motion to modify or clarify the couple’s final divorce 

decree. In one issue, Linda contends that the trial court abused its discretion in

ordering that Linda was not entitled to the benefit of Charles’s post-divorce salary 
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adjustments in calculating her share of his federal employee retirement plan

benefits. We conclude that the order improperly modified the divorce decree and 

therefore reverse and remand.

Background

Linda and Charles married in 1980 and had one child. In 2000, Linda filed 

for divorce, and the trial court entered a Final Decree of Divorce on September 15, 

2000. During the parties’ marriage and after, Charles was employed by the federal

government and participated in a plan under the United States Civil Service 

Retirement System providing retirement benefits. 

Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the trial court awarded Linda 50 percent 

of Charles’s federal employee retirement benefits. The decree states that its 

provisions concerning the retirement benefits are governed by the standard 

conventions in Part 838 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The 

relevant portions of the decree state: 

Federal Employees’ Retirement Benefits

The Court has considered the requirements and standard 

terminology provided in part 838 of Title 5, Code of Federal 

[R]egulations. The terminology used in the provisions of this order 

that concern benefits under the Federal Employees Retirement System 

are governed by the standard conventions established in that part.

Retirement Benefits

CHARLES R. STAFFORD will be eligible for retirement 

benefits under the Federal Employees Retirement System based on 
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employment with the United States Government. It is ORDERED that 

LINDA J. STAFFORD is entitled to fifty (50) percent of CHARLES 

R. STAFFORD’S gross monthly annuity under the Federal 

Employees [R]etirement System. It is further ORDERED that the 

United States Office of Personnel Management is directed to pay 50% 

of CHARLES R. STAFFORD’S share directly to LINDA J. 

STAFFORD. The United States Office of Personnel [M]anagement is 

directed not to pay CHARLES R. STAFFORD a refund of employee 

contributions.

Survivor Annuity

Under Section 8445 of Title 5, United States Code, LINDA J. 

STAFFORD is awarded a former spouse survivor annuity under the 

Federal Employee [R]etirement System. It is ORDERED that the 

amount of the former spouse survivor annuity will be equal to fifty 

(50) percent of CHARLES R. STAFFORD’S employee annuity. The 

United States Office of Personnel Management is directed not to pay 

CHARLES R. STAFFORD a refund of employee contributions. 

Thirteen years later, in September 2013, Charles filed a motion “to Modify 

and/or Clarification of Divorce Decree.” In his motion, Charles complained that 

the portion of the decree related to his federal employee retirement benefits was

not “specific enough for the USPS Office of Personnel Management regarding the 

division of property and retirement language” and argued that the order awarded a 

“disproportionate share of benefits to [Linda] in contrast to the intent of the parties 

and the Court.” He requested that the trial court “clarify” the order to “allow for 

retirement benefits to be distributed properly.” Charles requested that the trial 

court limit Linda’s share of his federal employee retirement benefits such that she 

would not benefit from his post-divorce salary increases. 
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Following a bench trial, the trial court made the following findings:

• The Court makes a finding that Linda Stafford is not entitled to 

retirement benefit(s) through Charles R. Stafford’s employment 

after the date of divorce which is September 15, 2000.

• With the finding that Linda Stafford is not entitled to retirement 

benefit(s) through Charles R. Stafford’s employment after the 

date of divorce, the Court requests that the parties submit the 

finding to the plan administrator for the FERS to recalculate the 

numerator and denominator for awarding Linda Stafford’s 

portion of the retirement benefit(s).

• The Court also requests that the parties make inquiry as to the 

language the plan administrator needs to clarify the Final 

Decree of Divorce, in awarding the retirement benefit(s).

A month later, the trial court entered an order titled “Order on Motion to 

Modify or Clarification of Divorce Decree.” The order stated that Linda “is 

entitled to an amount equal to 50% of CHARLES R. STAFFORD’s ‘gross’ 

monthly annuity under the Federal Employee Retirement System which shall be 

computed effective September 15, 2000, as though CHARLES R. STAFFORD had 

separated from a position in the United States Government on such date. In 

computing such amount of LINDA J. STAFFORD’s share of CHARLES R. 

STAFFORD’s employee annuity, the United States Office of Personnel 

Management is hereby specifically instructed to limit the computation of 

CHARLES R. STAFFORD’s employee annuity to only services performed from 

the date of marriage through September 15, 2000, and not to apply any salary 

adjustments occurring after September 15, 2000.” 
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Discussion

In her sole issue on appeal, Linda contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion in entering its 2013 order that “modified and/or clarified” the 2000 

divorce decree because it contradicted “the plain language of the Final Decree of 

Divorce and Part 838 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations.” 

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

An agreed final decree of divorce is a consent judgment and treated as a 

contract between the parties. See McKnight v. Trogdon–McKnight, 132 S.W.3d 

126, 130–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Zeolla v. Zeolla, 15 

S.W.3d 239, 242 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). After a 

trial court enters the decree, the court has continuing jurisdiction to issue orders “to 

assist in the implementation of or to clarify the prior order.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 9.007(a) (West 2006). However, such an order may not “amend, modify, alter, 

or change the division of property made or approved in the decree of divorce.” Id.; 

see id. § 9.007(b) (order that “amends, alters, or changes the actual, substantive 

division of property made or approved in a final decree of divorce” is 

unenforceable). 

An order clarifying the decree may be necessary if the decree is ambiguous 

so that the division of property is not specific enough to be enforceable by 

contempt. See McKnight, 132 S.W.3d at 130 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
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§ 9.008(b) (West 2006)). But, if the decree read as a whole is unambiguous as to 

the property’s disposition, the trial court has no authority to enter an order altering 

or modifying the original distribution of property. Shanks v. Treadway, 110 

S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. 2003). Rather, it must effectuate the order in light of the 

literal language used. Id. at 447.

Whether a decree is ambiguous is a question of law that we decide de novo. 

Id. We review a trial court’s ruling on a post-divorce motion for clarification of 

the divorce decree for an abuse of discretion. Gainous v. Gainous, 219 S.W.3d 97, 

103 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). 

B. Analysis

On appeal, Linda contends that the trial court’s 2013 order impermissibly 

changed the divorce decree’s division of property. In contrast, Charles contends 

that the trial court did not err in entering the 2013 order because the order merely 

clarified the decree. We agree with Linda. 

We conclude that the divorce decree’s division of Charles’s federal 

employee retirement benefits was not ambiguous and therefore the trial court was 

without authority to modify the decree to provide that Linda’s percentage of 

Charles’s benefits should be calculated from the date of divorce. The decree states 

that “benefits under the Federal Employees Retirement System are governed by the 

standard conventions established in Part 838 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal 
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Regulations.” Part 838 provides that a court order awarding a former spouse a 

percentage of an employee’s retirement benefits entitles the former spouse to 

salary adjustments unless the decree directly and unambiguously states otherwise. 

See 5 C.F.R. § 838.622(b)(1) (“Unless the court order directly and unequivocally 

orders otherwise, a court order that awards a former spouse a portion of an 

employee annuity on a percentage basis . . . provides that the former spouse’s share 

of the employee annuity will be adjusted to maintain the same percentage or 

fraction whenever the employee annuity changes as a result of salary adjustments 

occurring after the date of the decree and before the employee retires . . . .”). Even 

“a court order that contains a general instruction to calculate the former spouse’s 

share effective at the time of divorce or separation entitles the former spouse to the 

benefit of salary adjustments occurring after the specified date to the same extent 

as the employee,” unless “the court order directly and unequivocally orders 

otherwise” or awards a former spouse a specific dollar amount. Id.

§ 838.622(c)(1)(i). Nothing in the decree directly or unambiguously states that this 

default rule shall not apply. Therefore, the default rule articulated in Part 838 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations governs, and the decree entitled Linda to 50 

percent of Charles’s annuity, including 50 percent of the benefit of salary 

adjustments occurring after the date of the decree. See id. § 838.622(b)(1).
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Contrary to the unambiguous terms of the decree, the 2013 order declared 

that Linda is not entitled to 50 percent of the benefit of post-divorce salary 

adjustments. We conclude that the effect of the 2013 order was not merely a 

clarification of the decree and that it substantially altered the decree’s division of 

property. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in entering 

the 2013 order. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007(b) (order altering or changing 

the substantive division of property in final divorce decree is “beyond the power of 

the divorce court and is unenforceable”); Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 449 (same); 

Hernandez v. Hernandez, No. 04-97-00025-CV, 1998 WL 466096, at *3–4 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio Aug. 12, 1998, pet. denied) (opin., not designated for 

publication) (trial court abused its discretion in modifying decree to calculate 

former wife’s percentage of retirement benefits from date of divorce because

unambiguous decree did not limit her share of retirement benefits to value that 

accrued at time of divorce); cf. Cox v. Carter, 145 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2004, no pet.) (clarification order did not impermissibly modify property 

division where decree provided former wife’s share of federal employee retirement 

benefits to be “calculated as of the date of divorce” because decree 

“unambiguously provides by its plain language that [former wife’s] share is to be 

calculated as of the date of the divorce” where decree did not incorporate federal 

regulations). 
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We sustain Linda’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand to the trial court for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Rebeca Huddle

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.