### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y 18, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. TER RY LY NN BY INGTO N

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty

No. S46479 P hylli s H. Miller, Judge

No. E2003-02316-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Jul y 19, 2004

Th e de fe nd a nt, Te rry

Ly nn By in gton, wa s c on vic te d o f D UI , f ou rth o ff e ns e , a ndse nte nc e d a s a Rang e I I , multipl e off

ender to three y ear s i n t he De partment of Corr ection, with 150 day s to be

serve d day -for -day . On appe al, the def endant a rg ues that (1) the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support his c on vic tio n; ( 2) his se nte nc e is e xce ssi ve ; ( 3) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in a llo wi ng the State to i n tro d u ce ev i d en ce o f a p ri o r co n v i ct i o n wh i ch wa s m o re t h an t en y ea rs o l d ; an d (4 ) t h e t ri al j u d ge
e rr e d inno t r e c us ing he rs e lf . A ft e r r e vie w, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and J O E G. R I L EY , J ., joined.

Geor g e Todd Ea st, Kingsport, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Terry

Ly nn Byington.

Paul G

. Sum me rs , Attorne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Re ne e W. T urne r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; H. Gre eley

Wells, J r., District Attorney Gene ral; and William B. Har per, II , As sistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

Offic er Jason McClain of t he Kingsport P olice Department testified that on Dec ember 20, 20 01 , at app ro xima te ly

1:0 0 a .m. , h e ob se rv e d th e de fe nd a nt l e a vin g a nig htc lub in King sp ort. McClain followed the de fendant as he tra veled down Sullivan Street a nd observe d him cross over the ce nter line seve ral times. He stopped the defendant after following him about a half of a mile. As he a pproac hed the de fendant’s vehicle on the driver’ s side, he smelled a strong odor of a lcohol coming from the ve hicle and notice d the def endant’ s ey es w er e b l o o dshot. McClain asked the defe ndant to exit his vehicle a nd walk to the ar ea be hind his vehicle and in fr ont of the patrol c ar. McClain smelled a strong odor of alcohol about the defe ndant’s person a nd noticed that his speec h-2-

was slurre d. The de fendant admitted that he dra nk three beer s while at t he nig htclub, without sp e c if y ing the tim e pe ri odwi thi n w hic h h e c on su me d th e m.

Offic er McClain then asked the defe ndant to pe rform thr ee field sobriety tests. As to the onele g g e d s ta ndte st, McCl ain sai d th e de fe nd a nt “ didno t ke e p h is a rm s d ow n to his sid e , h e ha d h is arms out to the side, swaying to ke ep his ba lance and he put his foot down sever al times.” During the AB C’ s te st, the de fe nd a nt j umb le d his le tte rs a nd sa id, “ I ’m no t dru nk , I ’m no t dr un k, I ’m jus t g oing to Chuck’ s with myg irlfriend.” The witness c o u ld not reca ll whether the defe ndant eve r
c omp le te d th a t te st. As to the fi ng e r c ou nt t e st, the de fe nd a nt “ did n’ t to uc h th e c or re c t f ing e rs to his thumbs.”

Of fi c e r M c Cla in t e sti fi e d th a t he ha d ma de sev en or eig ht h un dr e d D UI arr e sts du ri ng his

n i n e- y ea r c ar ee r, an d
, b as ed o n t h i s ex p er i en ce an d h i s o b s er v at i o n s o f t h e d ef en d an tt h at m o rn i n g, he believe d the def

endant wa s unable to saf

ely operate a motor ve hicle. He arr ested the de fendant and tra nsported him to the King sport City J ail wher e he explained the implied c onsent law a nd the fa c t th a t he c ou ld n ot f

or c e him to t ake a

br e a tha ly zer

te st. Th e de fe nd a nt r e fu se d to take a br e a th test and re fused to si gn t h e im plied consent form. McClain said he could not re member if the defe ndant had sa id that he went to the nig htclub to pick up his passenger , who was a rre sted for public drunkenne ss.

Th e fo rty -f

ive -y e ar- old

de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t he wa s e mpl oy e d a s a sh e e t me ta l me c ha nic and wa s a divorce d fathe r of three. He said that on Dec ember 20, 2001, around 8:00 p.m., he dr ove his friend, Nancy

Dovec k, to “Five Po ints to t he Pub.” Af ter dropping her of

f at the pub, the de fe nd a nt r e turne d h ome a ndwe nt t o b e d b e tw e e n 1 0:0 0 a nd10 :30 p. m. A ro un d 1 2:0 0 a .m. , M s. Dovec k called him to come pick her up at t he pub. He arrived there around 12:30 a .m. As he and Ms. Doveck were leaving
, he noti ced a pol ice cruiser sitt ing to his left. The de fendant backe d out of the pa rking lot and heade d toward Chuck’ s Drive- I n. The de fendant said that he may have c rossed the y ellow line while driving beca use he was watching the police office r who was following him and beca use Sullivan St ree t was not in g ood shape. After seeing the offic er’ s blue lights, the de fendant pulled into the parking lot of a furniture outlet. Be cause his window was wire d shut, he opene d the door to talk to the offic er. The office r asked him how m uch he had had to drink, and the def endant replied, “ [N] othing.” The off icer told him t hat some che wing g um wa s s t u ck o n h is teeth. The defe ndant pulled out his partial de nture to show the c ourtroom wher e the g um had stuck to his tooth. Th e de fe nd a nt s a id the pa rt ia l c aus e d h im t o “ wh ist le a lot” whe n h e ta lke d b ut d e nie d th a t hi s sp e e c h h a d b e e n s lur

re d th e mornin g of

his arr e st.

The de fendant testified that he could no t p er fo rm the one- leg g ed stand test bec ause of problems with his back a nd the ner ves in his le ft leg
, explaining that he had three blown discs and

a seve red ne rve on his lef t side. As t o the AB C’s test, the defe ndant explained that he cannot say t h e a l p h ab etwi t h o u ts t ar t i n g att h e b egi n n i n g.

Th e de fe nd a nt s a id h e re fu se d to take a brea thal y zer te st w ith ou t ta

kin g a blo odte st f

ir st beca use “I was g oing to jail for

something I

didn’t, didn’t do and I

wanted an i n depende nt test onB y o r der of t hi s co ur t o n Jun e 4, 200 4, t he defendan t ’ s mo t i on t o wai ve t he t i mel y f i l i ng of hi s not i ce of

appeal 1

wa s g r an t ed.

-3- it that w a s f

or su re .” Th e de fe nd a nt d e nie d th a t he ha d b e e n u nd e r the inf lue nc e of a ny int oxic a nts or alc ohol in the ear ly

morning hours of De cembe r 20, 2001.

AN AL YSI S

I. Waiver

The State a

rg ues that the de fendant waived consideration of his issues on appea l be cause he untimely filed his motion for a n ew tria l and his notice of a ppeal. Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal

1 Pr oc e du re 33 (b ) p ro vid e s th a t “ a mot ionfo r n e w t

ri a l sh a ll b e ma de in w ri tin g , o r i f m a de or a lly in open court shall be reduc ed to writing within thirty day s of the date the orde r of se ntence is entere d.” This provision is m andatory , and the time for filing cannot be extended. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 45(b);

se e a lso State v. Ma

rt in, 94 0 S. W.2 d 5 67 , 5 69 (T e nn . 1 99 7) . T he thi rt y -day pr ov isi on is jurisdictional, an d an u n t imely motion is a nullity . State v. Dodson, 780 S.W .2d 778, 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). Failure to file a w ritten motion for new t rial within the requir ed thirty day s not only results in the defe ndant losing the rig ht to have a hearing on the motion, but it also deprive s the defe ndant of the opportunity to arg ue on appea l any issues that wer e or should have be en pre sented in the motion for new tria l. Martin, 940 S.W .2d at 569. The only i s s u es av ai l ab le to a def endant wh o u n t i m el y

fi l es ar e s u ff

i ci en cyo f t h e e v i d en ce an d s en t en ci n g.

I n the pre sent ca se, the judg ment was filed on June 27, 2003. The defenda nt filed hi s motion for a new trial on Aug ust 7, 2003, which was bey ond the thirty -day require ment. As a re s u l t , the defe ndant ca n only raise issues which ar e re lated to suffic iency of the e vidence or sentenc ing. T he defe ndant, there fore , has wa ived the issues of whether the trial court committed r ever sible err or by allowing the State to introduc e evidenc e of the defe ndant’s conviction for perjury that was more than ten y ear s old and by

denying his motion for the tria l judge to rec u s e h er s elf due to her ha ving previously

prosec uted the def

endant in anothe r ca se. We will consider the r emaining issues of the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence and the se tting of the defe ndant’s sente nce.

II. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence

T h e d e f e n d a n t ar g u e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t h i s c o n v i c t i o n f o r D U I, fourth off ense. In cons i d er ing this issue, we apply the fa miliar rule that whe re suf ficienc y of the convi c ti n g e v id e n c e is c h a ll e n g e d
, th e r e le v a n t q u e s ti o n o f th e r e v ie w in g c o u r t is “ w h e th e r , afte r viewing the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the pr osecution, any ra tio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have found the essential ele ments of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt.” J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. C t. 2781, 2789, 61 L . Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979); see also Tenn. R. App. P . 13(e) (“F indings of g uilt in criminal actions whether by the trial c o u rt o r j ury

shall be set aside if the

e vid e nc e i s i n s u f

f i c i e n tt o s u p p o r tt h e f

i n d i n g s b y

t h e tr i e r o f f a c to f g u i l tb e y o n d a

r e a s o n a ble doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W .2d 185, 190-92 (Te nn. 1992); State v. Ander son, 835 S.W .2d 600,-4-

604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

. All que stions involving the cre dibilit y of witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be g iven the evide nce, and all fac tual issues are resolved by the trier of

fac t. See State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A g uiltyverdic t by the jury , approve d by the trial judg e, ac cre dits the testimonyof the witnesse s for the State a nd resolves a ll conflicts in favor of the theory

of the State.” State v. Gra ce, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973) . Our supre me court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settl ed rule rests on a sound f oundation. The trial judge and the jury see the witnesses fa ce to f ace , hear their testimony and observe their de meanor on the stand. Thus the tri al judge and jury are the primary

instrumentality of justice to determine the weig ht and cr edibilityto be g iven to the testimony of witnesses. I n the trial forum alone is there human atmosphere a nd the totality of the

e vid e nc e c a nn ot b e re pr od uc e d w ith a writt e n r e c or d inthi s Co urt.

Bolin v. State, 219 Tenn. 4, 11, 405 S.W .2d 768, 771 (1966) ( citing Ca rroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W .2d 523 (1963)) . A jury conviction re moves the p re s umption of innocence with which a defe ndant is initi ally

cloake d and rep lace s it with one of g uilt, so t hat on appe al, a c onvicted defe ndant has the bur den of de monstrating that the evidenc e is insufficient. See State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

.
Offic er Mc Clain testified that he stopped the defe ndant’s vehicle afte r observing it c ross over the c e nte r l ine se ve ra l tim e s. He te sti fi e d that th e re wa s a str on g od or

of a lc oh ol o n th e de fe nd a nt, his sp e e c h w a s sl ur

re d, a ndhis e y e s w e re blo od sh ot. Th e de fe nd a nt p e rf orme d p oo rl y

on the fi e ld

s o b r ie ty te s ts a n d
, in th e o p in io n o f O f f ic e r M c Cl a in w h o p r e v io u s ly h a d ma d e seven to e ight hundred D UI

arr ests, was una

ble to safe ly operate a motor vehicle. As was it s rig ht, the jury cre dited this te s ti mo n y

r a th e r th a n th a t o f

th e d e f e n d a n t. A c c o r d in g ly
, w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e e v id e n c e was sufficie nt to sustain the defendant’s conviction.

III . Se nt e nc ing

The de fendant arg ues that his sentenc e is excessive b ec au s e t he trial c ourt misapplied enhanc ement fac tors and failed to a pply mitigating fac tors and that the tria l court er red in de ny ing alternative sentenc ing or

probation.

A. Standard of Review

When an accused challeng es t he length and manner of service of a sentence, it is the dut y of th is c o u r t to c o n d uct a de novo revie w on the re cord w ith a presumption that “the de terminations made by t h e court from which the a ppeal is take n are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d)

. This presumption is “conditioned upon the af firmative showing i n t h e re cord that the trial court considere d the sentenc ing principles and all rele vant fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . The pre sumption d o es not apply to the leg al conc lusions reac hed-5-

by the trial court in sentencing the ac cused or to the determinations made by the t rial court which ar e predic ated upon unc o n troverte d fac ts. St ate v. B utler, 900 S.W.2d 305, 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 94 ); State v. Smith, 89 1 S. W.2 d 9 22 , 9 29 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 94 ). Ho we ver, th is co urt is

re q u i re d t o gi v e gr ea twe i gh tt o t h e t ri al co u rt ’s d et er m i n at i o n o f c o n tro v er t ed fa ct s as t h e t ri al co u rt 's determination of these fa cts is predica t ed upon the witnesses’ de meanor and appe arance w hen t es t i fy i n g.

I n conducting a de novo revie w of a s en t en ce, this court must consider (a) any evidenc e
rec eived at the trial and/or se ntencing hearing, ( b) the pre sentenc e re port, (c) th e p ri nciples of sentenc ing, ( d) the a

rg uments of counse l relative to sentencing alternatives, (e) the nature and char acte ristics of t he offense, (f) any mitigating or enhance ment fac tors, (g ) any statements made by the acc used in his own behalf
, and (h) the acc used' s potential or lack of potential for r ehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-103, -210; State v. Scott, 735 S.W .2d 825, 829 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).

The pa rty challeng ing the sentenc e imposed by the trial court has t he burden of esta blishing that the sentenc e is err oneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sente ncing Commi ssion Cm ts.; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. I n this case, the de fendant has the burde n o f i l l ustrating the sentenc e imposed by

the trial court is errone ous.
B. App lication of

Enh ancem ent and Mitigating Fac tors

I n sentenc ing the defe ndant, the trial c ourt first applied e nhance ment fac tor (2), the de f e n d a n t h a s a p r e v i o u s h i s t o r y o f c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n s o r c r i m i n a l b e h a v i o r i n a d d i t i o n to tho se
ne c e ssa ry to es ta bli sh the app ro pria te rang e . See Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 14 (2 ). Ac c or din g to the def endant’ s prese ntence report, his prior criminal re cord inc ludes two DUI convictions in 1979, DUI in 1986, driving on a

revoke d license and DUI in 1989, perjury

in 1990, driving on a

revoke d license, second offe nse, in 1992, leaving the scene of an acc ident in 1992, r eckle ss driving in 1992, driv in g o n a

r e v o k e d li c e n s e in1 9 9 3
, D U I in1 9 9 7
, a n d D U I

in1 9 9 8

. I n ap p lyin g e n h a n c e me nt fac tor (2), the court stated:

The DU I convictions made him a 4 offe nder if I g o back to the one s th in, let’s see, ‘ 97, ‘89 and ‘9 8 . Okay , but he has other convictions be sid e s th os e . I re a lly

wo n’ t e ve n c on sid e r the on e s th a t ma de him a 4 offe nder, but I

g ive enha nceme nt fac tor number [two] gre at weig ht th and of c ourse y ou have the conviction in Dec ember 2002.

The de fendant has a leng thy rec ord of offe nses simil ar to those which re sulted in the prese nt appea l. We cannot conc lude that the trial c ourt err ed in applying this fa ctor o r i n gi v i n g i t g reat weig ht. As to application of this fac tor, we note that apply ing the holding of Blake ly v. Washington,

__ U. S. _
_, 12 4 S. Ct. 25 31 (Jun e 24 , 2 00 4) , w hic h w a s d e c ide d a ft e r the or a l arg ume nts in this

ma tte r, wo uldno t a lte r the po we r of th e tria l c ou rt to u til ize the de fe nd a nt’ s p ri or c on vic tio ns in incre asing his senten ce from the minimum. See id., __ U.S. at __, 124 S. C t. at 2536 (citing-6-

Appre nd i v

. Ne w J ersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. C t. 2348, 147 L . Ed. 2d 435 (2000)) (prior conviction may

be utiliz ed by

trial court f

or sentenc e enhanceme nt without subm ission to a jury ).

The c ourt also applied e nhance ment fa ct o r (11), the defe ndant had no he sitation about committing a c rime when the risk to huma n life wa s high. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(11). The court re asoned that since the de fendant “cr ossed t he center line severa l times on S ullivan Street” a nd

“ e sp e c ia lly

sin c e he had a pass e ng e r i n th e c ar andwa s d ri vin g on a pu bli c ro a d o bv iou sly intox icated,” this factor a

pplied. The State did not prese nt pr oof that the defe ndant enda ng ere d other motorists or his passeng er by nearly striking other vehicles, or even that other vehicles were on the

ro a d h e was tr avel ing . G ive n th e op ini on of the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt in B lake ly , it

is qu e sti on able wh e the r this fa c tor ma y be uti lize d in se tti ng the se nte nc e in the pr e se nt a pp e a l. Howeve r, g iven the substantial weig ht affor ded fa ctor (2) , the def endant ’s p ri o r convic tions, the inapplicability

of this fac tor would not alter the de fendant’s sentenc e.

The de fendant arg ues that m itigating fac tors exis ted which should have be en applied by the court, including the pre sence of close family members and a minor son living in the ar ea, his wor k history as a she et metal mec hanic, a nd his vetera n status. The def endant a rg ues t h at h i s “social history and cur rent socia l context ” m u s t be conside red a s well. Fina lly , the def endant a rg ues that he ha s a lw a y s c omp lie d w ithpr ob a tio n o rd e rs a nd“ pr e vio us ly re sp on de d we ll to t

re a tme nt w ith Ant[a] buse.” The trial court a ddresse d the work history fac tor:

E xc e l l e n t w o rk h i s t o r y , h e d o e s w o rk
, a c c o r d i n g to h is testimonyat trial, but I

don’t think I can find he has an excellent work history . . . . [A] fax was re ceive d from CHC Mechanical stating the defe ndant worke d as a te mporary employ ee f

or a brief peri od from Ap ri l 10 th 20 00 to June 8th
, 20 01

. . . . She e t me ta l me c ha nic , w ou ld

no t r e hir e du e to e xce ssi ve abs e nte e ism

.

Th e c ou rt

a lso a dd re sse d h is m ili tary re c or d: “ Ho no ra

ble dis c ha

rg e , n o. Di sc ha

rg e d d ue to misconduct, fre quent involvement of a dis-cre dible nature with civil or mili tary authorities. So that do e sn ’t app ly .” Th e tr ia l c ou rt

c on c lud e d, “ Re a lly , th e re ’s no thi ng , n o mi tig a tion t o r e du c e his

se nte nc e .” I t is app are nt that th e c ou rt c on sid e re d w he the r s e ve ra l mit ig a tin g fa c tor s w e re app lic able but determined the y wer e not. We cannot conclude that the t rial court erre d in this decision or, g iven the str on g we ig ht a ff

or de d e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor (2 ), the de c isi on to s e nte nc e him to thr e e y e ars a s a Rang e I I , multipl e off

ender

.
C. De nia l of A lt e r nat iveSe nt e nc ing

The de fendant argues that the court e rre d in not gr anting alterna tive sentenc ing. T he Tenne ssee Crimi nal S entenc ing Reform Act of 1989, enac ted to “promote justice,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102, pr ovides that the sente n ce i m p o s ed upon an offende r should be the “ least seve re
measure nece ssary

to achieve the purposes for which the s entenc e is imposed,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103( 4). Thus, trial judg es ar e “e ncoura g ed” to use “alternatives to incar cer ation that include-7-

require ments of re paration, victim compensation and/or community service .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103( 6). An e specia lly mitigated or standard offe nder convicted of a Class C, D, or E felony is presumed to be a

favor able c andidate for alternative sentencing in the absenc e of e vidence to the contra ry . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-102(6)

.
Evidence sufficie nt to overcome the pre sumption i n favor of alternative sente ncing includes evidenc e showing that “[c]onfinement is ne cessa ry to protect socie ty

by restraining a

defe ndant who has a long history

of criminal conduct,” “ [c] onfinement is nec essary to avoid depre ciating the

se ri ou sn e ss o f the of

fe ns e or c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to pro vid e a n ef fe c tiv e de te rr e nc e to others likely

to commit si milar offe nses,” or “[m] easu re s l es s restric tive than conf inement have fre qu en tly

or re cently

been a pplied unsucce ssfully

to the defe ndant.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(1)( A)-( C); see Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

Ho we ve r, we no te in this c a se that th e de fe nd a nt i s n ot pr e su me d to bea fa vo ra ble c a nd idate for a lternative se ntencing . I n order to be pre sumed to be a f avorab l e ca n d i date f

or alternative sentenc ing, one must be an “espe cially mitigated or standard offe nder.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 102(6). The defe ndant is a “multiple offe nder” and does not mee t this criterion.

The trial c ourt addre ssed the issue of a lternative se ntencing , stating, “ On this case y ou’re not presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentenc ing.” The c ourt explained its decision:

I find that n u m b er one , y ou’ve not e stablished that full probation

wou l d s erve the ends of

justice, y ourself or

the community . I

find that all forms of sentenc ing have been tried previously

. You’ve had treatment for alc ohol problems that’s really not chang ed y our life. You’ve had split confinement. You’ve had, well mainly y ou’ve ha d of fe n s e s t h a t r e q u i r e d m i n i m u m j a i l t i m e , s o i t s b e e n b a s i c a l l y sp lit confine ment from serving y our sentenc es and they ’ve not , not served to deter y ou from committing more crimes. I also find that . . . y our crime w as the re sult of intentional c o n d uct. I also find that y ou pr e vio us ly

e ng a g e d inc ri min a l c on du ct of th e sa me ty pe . So alternative sentenc ing is de nied.

Given the de fendant’s substantial rec ord of c onvictions simi lar to that which resulted in the prese nt ap p ea l
, we ca n n o tco n cl u d e t h att h e t ri al co u rt erre d i n d en y i n g al t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g.

CO NC LU SION

B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g auth oriti e s a ndre a so nin g , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE