J-S26020-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ERIC DESHANN D. FLOYD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 31 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 9, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0005974-2008, 

CP-51-CR-0005976-2008, CP-51-CR-0005981-2008

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2018

Eric Deshann Floyd appeals from the denial of his PCRA petition. We 

affirm.

We previously set forth the facts underlying Appellant’s convictions in 

our memorandum affirming his judgment of sentence, which we adopt herein.

In the spring of 2008, co-conspirator Howard Cain developed a 

plan to rob a Bank of America branch located inside a Philadelphia 

supermarket. Mr. Cain recruited Appellant and others to carry out 

the plan, which began with a series of separate robberies to obtain 

weapons and a getaway vehicle. 

On March 31, 2008, Appellant, Mr. Cain, and two others 

committed a home invasion robbery at the residence of Anthony 

Brown. During the robbery, the bandits tied up Mr. Brown and his 

family. The bandits also wore “Muslim apparel,” including a burqa 

that fully covered one of the unidentified robbers’ faces. Appellant 

and Mr. Cain did not cover their faces, and Mr. Brown later 

identified them. Significantly, the proceeds of the robbery 

included an SKS assault rifle. 
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On May 2, 2008, Appellant, Mr. Cain, and Mr. Cain’s uncle 

committed the gunpoint carjacking of Aaron Savage. At the time, 

Mr. Savage was operating an unlicensed taxicab in North 

Philadelphia. Mr. Cain’s uncle approached Mr. Savage and 

requested a ride for himself and “two Muslim sisters.” In reality, 

the sisters were Appellant and Mr. Cain, who had disguised 

themselves in burqas. Mr. Savage accepted the passengers and 

began to drive them to their stated destination. After traveling 

for less than a block, Mr. Cain brandished a handgun, demanded 

that Mr. Savage pull over near some abandoned houses, and 

ordered Mr. Savage out of the vehicle. Fearing for his life, Mr. 

Savage fled on foot. Appellant, Mr. Cain, and Mr. Cain’s uncle 

drove off in Mr. Savage’s vehicle, a blue Jeep Liberty.

On the morning of May 3, 2008, Appellant and Mr. Cain met with 

codefendant Levon Warner to consummate the planned bank 

robbery. Prior to departing for the bank, Appellant and Mr. Cain 

again disguised themselves in burqas. Mr. Warner wore a wig, 

glasses, and a dust mask to obscure his face. Appellant drove the 

men to the supermarket in the stolen Jeep. Upon arriving at the 

supermarket parking lot, Appellant parked the vehicle, picked out 

a shopping cart, and placed a box inside the cart. The box 

contained the stolen assault rifle. When the co-conspirators 

entered the supermarket, Appellant stood with the shopping cart 

near the door to the bank. 

With Appellant serving as a lookout, Mr. Cain and Mr. Warner 

entered the bank, stood in the back, and watched a bank manager 

unlock the gate to the teller area. With the gate unlocked, Mr. 

Cain rushed toward the manager, grabbed her, dragged her into 

the teller area, brandished a handgun, and demanded that the 

tellers place money into a bag he was carrying. Armed with a 

handgun, Mr. Warner paced in front of the teller windows as the 

tellers complied with Mr. Cain’s demands. The tellers placed 

approximately $50,000.00 into Mr. Cain’s bag, along with a GPS 

tracking device. The tracking device activated at 11:27 a.m., 

when the thieves exited the bank. 

After the robbery, Appellant, Mr. Cain, and Mr. Warner returned 

to the Jeep. Appellant served as the getaway driver. Within 

minutes, calls went out over police radio relaying information 

about the robbery and the suspects. Philadelphia Police Sergeant 

Stephen Liczbinski received the call, spotted the getaway car, and 

commenced a pursuit. During the chase, someone in the Jeep 
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said, “Bang him.” At that point, Mr. Cain asked Mr. Warner for 

the assault rifle, which Mr. Warner handed to him. Appellant 

stopped the Jeep, and Mr. Cain exited with the assault rifle. 

Sergeant Liczbinski stopped his vehicle behind the Jeep, exited, 

and approached the Jeep. Before Sergeant Liczbinski could draw 

his service weapon, Mr. Cain opened fire with the assault rifle and 

killed the sergeant. 

After the shooting, Mr. Cain reentered the Jeep; and Appellant 

drove to a second getaway vehicle, a minivan, parked nearby. Mr. 

Warner drove the minivan a short distance before Mr. Cain 

ordered him to pull over. Mr. Warner pulled over, and the 

suspects exited and split up. Later that day, Mr. Cain died during 

a shootout with police. Police subsequently arrested Mr. Warner, 

and he provided a statement detailing his participation in the 

robbery. Police did not arrest Appellant until May 7, 2008, when 

a tipster led them to the abandoned house where Appellant was 

hiding. On May 8, 2008, Appellant provided an inculpatory 

statement regarding his own participation in the bank robbery.

Commonwealth v. Floyd, 2013 WL 11299434 at *1-2 (Pa.Super. 2013).

Appellant was charged at three separate dockets with various crimes, 

including robbery, robbery of a vehicle, conspiracy to commit homicide, 

homicide, and related offenses. Appellant was convicted of, inter alia,

first-degree murder. We affirmed, id., and Appellant filed a petition for 

allowance of appeal, which was denied on July 25, 2013. Commonwealth v. 

Floyd, 70 A.3d 809 (Pa. 2013).

Appellant thereafter filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on May 9, 2014. 

Counsel was appointed, who filed an amended PCRA petition on April 7, 2016, 

followed by a supplemental petition on April 20, 2016. Each petition raised 

one claim:

[Appellant]’s appellant [sic] defense counsel was ineffective on on 

[sic] allocatur was ineffective [sic] because he failed to raise all 
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the issues addresse[d] by the Superior Court on appeal. Five 

issues were addressed by the Superior Court and counsel only 

raised two of these issues on allocatur to the State Supreme 

[Court]. As a result of this fai[l]ure by counsel the defendant was 

denied his right to effective assistance of counsel on allocatur to 

the State Supreme Court. This issue has not been waived because 

it is the first time that [Appellant] can raise it. 

Amended PCRA Petition, 4/7/16, at 2.

[Appellant] was denied his rights under the 6th Amendment of the 

U.S. Constitution and Art. I sec. 9 of the State Constitution when 

the Commonwealth introduced the redacted confession of the codefendant, Levan Warner[,] who did not testify at trial because he 

asserted his right to remain silent. Form [sic] this redacted 

confession the jury was able to reasonably infer that it was the 

defendant who said “Bang Him” before the victim was shot and 

killed and therefore the jury could reasonably infer that the 

defendant had specific intent to kill. To the extent that trial 

defense counsel did not object to this prejudicial unconstitutional 

evidence, counsel was ineffective and the defendant is entitled to 

a new trial. This issue has not been waived because it is the first 

time that [Appellant] can raise it.

Supplemental Amended PCRA Petition, 4/20/16, at 2.

On November 4, 2016, the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to 

dismiss. Appellant did not respond, and the PCRA court thereafter dismissed 

the petition. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the PCRA court 

prepared a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion responding to the two claims in lieu of 

requiring a concise statement. Appellant presents the following three issues.

I. Was trial defense counsel ineffective in failing to object to the 

redacted statement of the co-defendant that was introduced at 

trial which inferred that the appellant told a third co-conspirator 

to kill the victim because this evidence violated appellant’s State 

and Federal Constitutional right to confront evidence against him?

II. Is the appellant is [sic] entitled to a reinstatement of his right 

to file allocat[u]r to the State Supreme Court nunc pro tunc from 
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the judgment of the Superior Court affirming the judgment of

sentence in the trial court because appellant [sic] counsel was 

ineffective in presenting only two of the five issues that were 

presented in the Superior Court to the State Supreme Court on 

allocat[u]r?

III. Was trial defense counsel ineffective in not objecting to the 

trial court’s instruction of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 

because the charge allowed the jury to convict appellant on a 

burden of proof less that beyond a reasonable doubt thereby 

den[y]ing appellant of Due Process?

Appellant’s brief at 2.

Appellant’s first issue concerns the introduction of co-defendant 

Warner’s statement at their joint trial. The content of this statement was set 

forth in our direct appeal memorandum. 

After we had all the money we exited the bank. Then we got into 

the Jeep and fled to the next car that we parked a few blocks 

away. On the way to the next car a Police car was coming down 

the same street that we were on. The Police car started to slow 

down as he drove past us and then it looked like he was making 

a U-turn so the boy drove away real fast. That’s when the Officer 

started following us with his lights and sirens on. That lasted for 

a few blocks and then the young boy almost flipped the Jeep over 

and the officer had caught up to us and was right on the side of 

our Jeep. The boy that was driving the car started yelling, “Bang 

him.” Then [Mr. Cain] told me, “Give me the gun.” I handed [Mr. 

Cain] the rifle I was holding and the boy slowed down and stopped 

the car. That’s when [Mr. Cain] got out and started shooting at 

the cop. After the shooting stopped [Mr. Cain] got back in the car 

and the boy pulled off.

Floyd, 2013 WL 11299434 at *7 (alterations in original, footnote omitted). 

The statements referencing the driver did not facially refer to Appellant; 

however, Appellant’s own statement, which was introduced at trial, inculpated 

him as the driver. Id. at *6 (“In his statement, Appellant admitted driving 
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the Jeep to the bank . . . and driving the Jeep away from the premises after 

the bank robbery.”). Thus, Warner’s statement inferentially established 

Appellant as the man who said, “Bang him.”

That linkage prompted trial counsel to file a motion to sever Appellant’s 

trial. “Prior to trial, Appellant insisted that the court should sever his case 

from Mr. Warner’s, because ‘the jury [would] conclude that the words and 

actions attributed to ‘the boy’ in Mr. Warner’s statement will be attributed to 

[Appellant].’” Id. at *7 (citation omitted). The trial court denied the motion, 

but redacted Warner’s statement as follows.

After we had all the money, we exited the bank. Then we got into 

the jeep and fled to the next car that we parked a few blocks 

away.

On the way to the next car, a police car was coming down the 

same street that we were on. The police car started to slow down 

as he drove past us, then it looked like he was making a U-turn. 

So the other guy drove away real fast. That's when the officer 

started following us with the lights on and sirens on. That lasted 

for a few blocks and then the other guy almost flipped the jeep 

over and the officer had caught up to us and was right on the side 

of our jeep. Someone started yelling bang him, then [Mr. 

Cain] told me give me the gun. I handed [Mr. Cain] the rifle I 

was holding and the other guy slowed down and stopped the car. 

That's when [Mr. Cain] got out and started shooting at the cop.

Id. (emphasis in original).

Trial counsel did not object to the introduction of this statement at trial. 

On direct appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erroneously denied his 

severance motion. Appellant’s argument invoked Bruton v. United States,

391 U.S. 123 (1968), and its progeny, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 
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(1987), and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), which generically 

concern the introduction of a co-defendant’s statement against another 

defendant. We quote our analysis of that claim.

“Under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, a 

criminal defendant has a right to confront witnesses against him.”

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 565 Pa. 289, 299, 773 A.2d 131, 137 

(2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 955, 122 S.Ct. 1360, 152 L.Ed.2d 

355 (2002). A defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment 

rights when his non-testifying co-defendant’s facially incriminating 

confession is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is 

instructed that the confession can be considered only against the 

confessing co-defendant. Id. Nevertheless, “[i]f a confession can 

be edited so that it retains its narrative integrity and yet in no way 

refers to [the non-confessing] defendant, then use of it does not 

violate the principles of Bruton.” Commonwealth v. Travers,

564 Pa. 362, 368, 768 A.2d 845, 848 (2001) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 474 Pa. 410, 412, 378 A.2d 859, 

860 (1977)).

In Travers, our Supreme Court held that the redaction of a nontestifying co-defendant’s confession in a joint trial, which replaced 

any direct reference to the non-confessing co-defendant with a 

neutral pronoun, when accompanied by an appropriate cautionary 

charge, sufficiently protected the non-confessing defendant’s 

Sixth Amendment rights. Travers, supra at 372–73, 768 A.2d 

at 851. The Travers Court observed Pennsylvania law is now 

clear that redacted statements trigger confrontation clause 

concerns under Bruton only if the redacted statement on its face

ties the defendant to the crime, but not if the incrimination arises 

from linkage to other evidence in the case. Id. at 372 n. 2, 768 

A.2d at 850 n. 2 (citing Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 

S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998)).

Floyd, 2013 WL 11299434 at *6 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).

Thus, we held that the redacted statement did not violate Bruton as 

interpreted by our Supreme Court in Travers. Appellant maintains that trial 
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counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of this 

statement, despite our ruling on the motion to sever.

The PCRA court and the Commonwealth assert that the issue is 

unreviewable as it has been previously litigated. The PCRA statute states that 

a petitioner is eligible for relief only if, inter alia, “the allegation of error has 

not been previously litigated or waived.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). In turn, 

an issue is deemed “previously litigated” if “the highest appellate court in 

which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on 

the merits of the issue[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(a)(2). In Commonwealth v. 

Collins, 888 A.2d 564 (Pa. 2005), our Supreme Court examined the meaning 

of the word “issue,” and concluded that “a Sixth Amendment claim of 

ineffectiveness raises a distinct legal ground for purposes of state PCRA review 

under § 9544(a)(2).” Id. at 573.

The instant facts are largely identical to the situation examined in 

Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455 (Pa. 2004). Gribble and his codefendant, his girlfriend Kelly O’Donnell, killed and dismembered Eleftherios 

Eleftheriou. Each defendant confessed and took sole responsibility for the 

crimes. According to Gribble, he saw Mr. Eleftheriou groping O’Donnell, which 

enraged Gribble and prompted him to beat the victim to death with a hammer. 

O’Donnell, on the other hand, said that she killed the victim with the hammer 

because he was “slimy” and had previously rubbed his penis on her. Id. at 
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458 n.1. Trial counsel filed a motion to sever, but withdrew it. Gribble and 

O’Donnell were jointly tried non-jury, and both statements were introduced. 

Gribble received the death penalty, and on direct review to our Supreme 

Court he argued that the admission of his co-defendant’s confession violated 

his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him pursuant to 

Bruton. The Court concluded that the statement did not violate Bruton, 

because the co-defendant’s statement did not inculpate Gribble, but actually 

exonerated him.

During collateral proceedings, Gribble alleged that trial counsel 

ineffectively withdrew the motion to sever, on the grounds that O’Donnell’s 

statement was antagonistic to his “heat of passion” defense. Id. at 461. The 

Gribble Court concluded that the claim had been previously litigated. 

The allegation of error underlying appellant’s current 

ineffectiveness claim is very similar to the Bruton claim he 

litigated on direct appeal. Where appellant there complained of a 

confrontation clause issue arising from the admission of 

O’Donnell’s confession at the joint trial, he now alleges that 

counsel should have preempted the problem entirely by seeking 

severance. Severance (along with redaction of the confession, 

exclusion of the confession, limiting charges, etc.) is one of 

several theoretical ways in which the underlying confrontation/ 

Bruton style issue may be addressed or remedied. Though the 

specific remedial precaution differs, the trial issue sought to be 

avoided is the same: i.e., the potential for spillover prejudice 

arising from admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s 

confession in a joint trial. Thus, appellant’s litigation of the 

confrontation claim on direct appeal necessarily involved an issue 

that is also at the heart of appellant’s current underlying 

severance argument-i.e., that the admission of O’Donnell’s 

confession against her inculpated and thereby prejudiced 

appellant. . . . Since our finding on direct appeal was based upon 

an assessment of the effect of O’Donnell’s statement, and the 
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present claim of counsel ineffectiveness could only succeed if we 

reached a contrary determination that the statement was, in fact, 

prejudicial to appellant, the PCRA court did not err in finding this 

claim to be previously litigated.

Id. at 461–62. 

The same logic applies herein. The present claim of ineffectiveness can

succeed only if we hold that the introduction of the statement did, in fact, 

violate Bruton, since the Bruton violation supplied the necessary basis to 

object. Finding that the statement violates Bruton is precisely what our prior 

memorandum precludes. Applying Gribble, this claim has been previously 

litigated.

However, post-Gribble law as cited supra requires viewing this claim

distinctly, since the underlying Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claim has its 

own standards and governing law.1 Additionally, Gribble applied an 

alternative analysis: “In any event, even if it is assumed that the instant claim, 

which sounds in counsel ineffectiveness rather than in 

evidentiary/confrontation clause restrictions, is sufficiently distinct to escape 

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1 Notwithstanding Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564 (Pa. 2005), the 

present claim may in fact be previously litigated. This is not a situation where 

Appellant’s current claim implicates a broader set of considerations or legal 

argument. Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 477 (Pa. 2004)

(“Although one aspect of the disposition of Appellant’s present claim certainly 

involves consideration of the Court’s holding on direct appeal, the majority’s 

alternative merits analysis demonstrates that the claim implicates a broader 

inquiry into the character of the defenses at issue.”) (Saylor, J., concurring). 

The inquiry herein is not broader; it is exactly the same. 
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the effect of the statutory previous litigation bar, the claim fails on the merits.” 

Id. at 462. Therefore, we will treat the claim as a distinct claim of 

ineffectiveness.

Appellant recognizes the distinct nature of the ineffectiveness claim, but 

fails to explain how he is entitled to relief in light of our direct appeal holding. 

Per Collins, the complaint that counsel should have objected to the admission 

of Warner’s statement during the trial is indeed distinct from the claim 

addressed on direct appeal, which considered only the propriety of trying 

Warner and Appellant together. However, it is obvious that the core claim is 

exactly the same in both situations, i.e., that Bruton does not permit the 

introduction of Warner’s statement against Appellant. Issues involving 

Bruton can arise in a variety of contexts, including severance, Gray, supra

at 188 (“The trial judge, after denying Gray’s motion for a separate trial

. . .”), and as evidentiary objections, Marsh, supra at 203 (“[T]he State 

introduced (over respondent's objection) a confession given by Williams to the 

police shortly after his arrest.”). Regardless of the particular context, it is 

plain that the underlying issue involves Bruton. As Collins explained, the 

resolution of that legal issue dooms the current ineffectiveness claim:

Appellant now forwards his claim of ineffectiveness by relying on 

the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. By 

Appellant’s own admission, however, the factors to 

consider in assessing a due process claim when offenses 

have been joined is similar to the test we employed on 

direct appeal. See id. In fact, according to Appellant, in applying 

the federal, due process test, the court must consider the same 

three factors that we considered on direct appeal in addition to 
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whether the trial court gave an adequate limiting instruction. 

Appellant’s Brief at 55. As we made clear in our discussion of 

“previously litigated” claims, although we will analyze a distinct 

claim of ineffectiveness that is based on the underlying issue that 

was litigated on direct appeal, in many cases, those claims will fail 

for the same reasons as they failed on direct appeal.

Collins, supra at 574–75 (emphasis added).

Herein, the test for whether any objection to the introduction of the 

statement would succeed is precisely the same as whether severance was 

required: Does Burton permit the introduction of Warner’s statement? Our 

prior memorandum holds that the answer is no. The PCRA court properly 

denied relief based on this claim.

Appellant’s second issue claims that appellate counsel ineffectively failed 

to include, within his petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, all five issues decided on direct appeal to this Court. The PCRA 

court properly denied this claim, as Appellant failed to establish appellate 

counsel’s ineffectiveness.

In Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080 (Pa.Super. 2014), we

summarized the law pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

concerning petitions of allowance of appeals as follows: 

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that where 

appellate counsel informs his client that he will file a petition for 

allowance of appeal, but fails to do so in timely fashion, a 

cognizable claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness exists. The 

Court further held that, in such an instance, a petitioner is not 

required to prove that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 

have granted the petition. Subsequent decisions by the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court have confirmed that counsel is per 

se ineffective for failing to file a requested petition for allowance
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of appeal. Commonwealth v. Reed, 601 Pa. 257, 971 A.2d 

1216, 1225 (2009); Commonwealth v. Reaves, 592 Pa. 134, 

923 A.2d 1119, 1129 (2007).

Id. at 1087.

Appellate counsel filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which our 

Supreme Court denied. Thus, this is not a case where counsel can be deemed 

per se ineffective, as counsel sought review with our Supreme Court.

Appellant asks us to adopt a heretofore unknown principle that appellate 

counsel must seek review of all possible issues. Appellant’s brief at 9 (“There 

was no reasonable basis for trial defense counsel [sic] to waive three of the 5 

appellate issues that were raised in the Superior Court by not raising them in 

the allocat[u]r petition to the State Supreme Court.”). Contrary to Appellant’s 

argument, the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy is selecting those 

issues which pose the greatest chance of success.

While criminal defendants often believe that the best way to 

pursue their appeals is by raising the greatest number of issues, 

actually, the opposite is true: selecting the few most important 

issues succinctly stated presents the greatest likelihood of 

success. We concur with the view of an eminent appellate jurist, 

Judge Ruggero Aldisert, that the number of claims raised in an 

appeal is usually in inverse proportion to their merit and that a 

large number of claims raises the presumption that all are invalid. 

Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Pa. 1993).

Herein, Appellant has failed to even discuss the issues counsel pursued 

to the exclusion of others, and his theory that counsel is obligated to present 

every single issue to our Supreme Court finds no support in the law. Counsel 

sought review of two issues, and therefore presumptive prejudice does not 
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apply. See Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 801 (Pa. 2005) (“The 

difference in degree between failures that completely foreclose appellate 

review, and those which may result in narrowing its ambit, justifies application 

of the presumption in the more extreme instance.”). No relief is due.

Appellant’s final issue is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to a flawed reasonable doubt instruction. This claim was not raised in 

the PCRA petition, and was presented for the first time on appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa. 2004) (claims not 

raised in a PCRA petition cannot be raised for first time on appeal). We 

therefore decline to consider it. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/11/18