#### The Village of Oakwood *v.*Stoecklein.

*Assessment of corner lots*— Municipal *code of October 22, 1902*— . *Repeals Section 2264, Revised Statutes*— And *annuls former rule of frontage*— Entire *lengthwise .frontage now assessed.*

Since the municipal code passed October 22, 1902, (96 Ohio Laws, 20), repealed Section 2264, Revised Statutes and defined the following mode of assessing the costs and expenses of street improvements, “by the foot frontage of the property bounding and abutting upon the improvement,” the rule of assessment laid down in *Haviland et al.*v. *City of Columbus et al.,*SO Ohio St., 471, is abrogated, and municipalities are authorized to assess upon an entire lengthwise frontage of a lot abutting upon the improvement.

(No.12005

Decided January 18, 1910.)

Error to the Circuit Court of Montgomery county.

*333Mrs. Stoecklein brought suit in the court of common pleas against the village of Oakwood alleging that she is the owner of a lot located at the southwest corner of South avenue and Oakwood avenue in said village, its dimensions being 66.36 feet on South avenue and 133.20 feet on Oakwood avenue; that on July 20, 1908, the council of said village passed a resolution declaring it necessary to improve Oakwood avenue by paving with bricks along the lot of the plaintiff, the expense thereof to be assessed by the foot frontage of lots and lands bounding and abutting on the portion of the street so to be improved; that said improvement having been made said council passed another resolution making such assessment and assessing her lot for its entire lengthwise frontage upon said improvement, plaintiff claiming that in so far as said assessment exceeded the breadthwise frontage of the lot on South avenue it was excessive, and as to such excess she prayed that the collecting of the assessment be enjoined. A demurrer to this petition was overruled and an injunction granted in accordance with its prayer. On petition in error the circuit court affirmed the judgment.

*Messrs. Rozve, Shuey, Matthews & James*and *Mr. W. M.. Matthews,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Murphy, Elliff &*Emanuel, for defendant in error.

Shauck, J.

It is said that the conclusion reached by the courts below was thought to be justified by the decision of this court in *Haviland*
      *334
      *et al.*v. *City of Columbus et al.,*50 Ohio St., 471. That case was decided June 20, 1893. It involved an interpretation of Section 2264, Revised Statutes, as it was then in force. The third mode of assessing the costs and expenses of a street improvement which it defined was: “By the foot front of the property bounding and abutting upon the improvement.” That mode of assessing had been adopted by the city council in the case then under consideration. The view taken of the phrase quoted was, as-expressed in the second proposition of the syllabus: “If a lot abuts lengthwise on the improvement, but fronts breadthwise on another street and not on the improvement, the lot should be deemed as fronting breadthwise on the improvement, and be assessed for the number of feet on the improvement that it would have in such case and no more.”

Whatever may have been thought of the decision in that case as an interpretation of the statute, and however general may have been the belief that it imposed upon interior lots burdens which in justice should be borne by corner lots, the case was reconsidered and adhered to in the *City of Toledo*v. *Sheill,*53 Ohio St., 447. In one of the opinions in that case it was suggested that the rule should be regarded as established so far as judicial decisions were concerned, and that if it was thought to operate unjustly it should be changed by the general assembly by an act operating prospectively. Accordingly by the uniform municipal code enacted October 22, 1902 (96 Ohio Laws, 20), Section 2264, Revised Statutes, was repealed and by Section 50 of that act, the third mode of assess*335ing the costs and expenses of street improvements was defined as follows: “By the foot frontage of the property bounding and abutting upon the improvement.” Since the general assembly under the circumstances changed the phraseology of the clause and employed language in making the change which indicates very clearly the purpose of the legislature to act upon the suggestion referred to and to change the rule established in the case which appears to have controlled the judgments under review, the judgment must be regarded as erroneous. The entire frontage abutting on the improvement is now, by the clear terms of the statute, the subject of assessment.

Judgments of the circuit and common pleas courts reversed and the original petition dismissed.

*Judgments reversed.*

Summers, C. J., Crew, Spear and Davis, JJ., concur.