### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 21
- 00429
- CV

Greg Abbott , in his official capacity as Governor of Texas; and Ken Paxton , in his official capacity as Texas Attorney General , Appellant s

v. Harris County, Texas ; Rod ney D. Ellis , i n his official capacity as a Harris County Commissione r; and J aneana White, M.D., in her offiical capacity as Harris County Local Health Authority , Appellee s

FROM THE 345TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D
- 1
- GN
- 21
- 003896 , THE HONORABLE CATHERINE MA UZY , JUDGE PRESIDING

O P I N I O N

In this interlocutory appeal, Greg A bb ott, Governor of Texas , and Ken Pa xton , Texas Attorney General (collectively, the “ State Ap pellants ” ) , assert th at the tria l court (1) e rred in denying their plea to the j uri s d i ction and (2) abused its discretion i n issuing a temporary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs

. The primary issue in this case is whether G overno r Abbott , under his authority granted by the Leg islature in the T e xas Disaster Act, may issue an e xecutiv e

o rd er that prohibit s l ocal governm ental entities and officials in Harris County fr om req uir ing face covering s. T h e Harris C ount y offic ials view face

- covering requirements as nec essa ry to m itiga te
the effects o f COVID

- 19 an d p rotect th e public health wit h i n t heir juri s dictions ; co nv ersely, the
G overn or views the requirements as more restrictive than necessary
. B ecause we concl ude that2

the trial court has subject

- matter jurisdiction over the dispute and that it did not abuse its
discreti on in granting tem p o r ar y
- injunctive relief, w e affi rm the trial court ’ s o rders.

BA CKGROUND FACT S
On March 11 , 2020, Harris County Judge Lino Hid alg o issued a local d isaster
declaration for Harris Coun t y “ to allow [th e County] to take meas ures t o reduce the possibility of
CO VID

- 19 and promote the health and safety of Harris County residents. ” See Tex. Gov ’ t C ode § 418.108 ( a u th orizing “ the pr esiding officer of the governing body of p ol i tical subdivision [to ]
dec lare a local state of dis ast er ” )

. On March 13 , Gove rnor Ab b o t t , in his official capacity , is s u ed

a sta tewide dis aster declar ation , certifying that “ the novel co ronavirus ( COVID

- 19 ) poses an i mminent th reat of disaster for all T e xas Count i es. ” See id. § 418.014 (autho rizing go v e rnor
to “ declare a state of disaste r ” by exec utive order or pr ocl amation)

. In the month s that have
followed , both G overnor Abbott and Judge Hidalgo have continuously renewed the ir r espec tive
dis aster decla rations , and both decl arations remain in effe ct

. In addition , both t he Governor and

v a r ious Ha rris County local officials have issued ord ers designed to mitigate the threat p osed by
the COVI D

- 19 p andemic

.

On July 2 9, 2021, Go vernor Abbott issued t he executive o rder that is the subject
of this disp ute , Executi ve Order GA

- 3 8 (GA

- 38 )

. I n re l evan t p art, GA

- 3 8 states , “ N o
g overnmental e ntity, includin g a county , city , scho ol dis trict , and public health authority, and

no govern ment al official may require any person to wear a f ace covering o r to mandate tha t

anot her person we ar f

ace cov ering. ” G A

- 38 al so s tates that i t “ supers ede [ s ] any f ac e
- cover ing requireme nt imposed by a n y lo cal gove rnment al entity or official. ” I n addition , releva nt here,
GA

- 38 p urpo rts to susp end several laws to “ the extent necess ary t o e nsure that local government3

enti ti e s or of

f icials do not impose any such face

- cover ing re qu irements , ” inc luding cert ain provisions in the Texas Dis aster Act , pertaining to local o fficials ’ powe rs under the Act ; Su bchap ter E of Chap ter 8 and Chapter s 1 21 , 1 22, and 341 of the Texas Health an d Safety Code ; and “ [a]ny other statute invoked by any local governmental entity or official in support of a face

covering requirement. ” Finally, GA

- 38 provides that “ t he imposition of any such face

- covering requi rem en t by a local governmental enti ty or o f ficial cons titutes a ‘ failure to co mply with ’ this executive order that is subject to a fin e up to $1,000. ”

Both befo re and after Governor Abbott issued GA

- 38, local auth orities in Har ris County issue d orders tha t require the wea ring of face cover in gs un der c ertain circumstances

. On
Mar ch 9 and A u gu st 17, 2021, Judge Hidal go issue d orders requiring , with c ertai n except ion s , that all in d ividuals we ar face cove rings in County buildings

. O n May 25, 2021, the Harris
C ounty Comm is sioners Cou rt issued a simil ar o rde r man dating t hat Harris County employees

wear face covering s when inside Co unty building s f or any p urpos e associated with t heir offici a l duties. On August 12, the Har ris County Local Health Authority issued an order requ iring , with
certain exce pti o n s , tha t schools and licensed c hil d care centers in Hou ston and H arris County
follow “ Centers f

or Di sease Control and Pr evention (CDC) recomme nda ti ons for universal
maski ng ” by requir i ng st ud e nt s, s taff, teachers, and visitors to wear face c overin gs in scho ol
bui ldings and on school bu se s. The re is no dispute that t he se o rders violate the terms of GA

- 38 , specif ically, its ban on face

- covering m and a t es. On A ugust 1 2, 20 21 , Harris Cou nty fil ed suit ag ainst the State Appellants in
Trav is County

. Ro d ney Elli s , in his offi cial capacity a s a H arri s County Commission er , and
J aneana Wh ite, M

. D. , i n her of fic ial capacit y as the Harris County Local Hea lth A uthority (collec tively , with Harris Co unty , t he “ Ha rri s County P ar ties ” ) , later intervened as co

- plaintiffs

.4

I n the sui t, t he Harris Co unt y Par t ies s eek tem porary and perma nent injunc t ive relief to preven t
the S tate Appellants from e nforcing GA

- 38 “ a gai ns t any local governmental en tity, or em ployee

or off icial of a local government enti ty in Harri s Count y ” as well as decl a rations that the
Go ve rno r ac ted ultra vires in issuing GA

- 38 and that GA

- 38 is unc onstitutional , invalid , and

une nforceable. Acc or din g to the Harris County Parties , Governor Ab bott acted ultra vires in
iss uing GA

- 38 because his “ suspensio n o f law s exce eds h is authority u nde r the T exas Dis aster
A ct ” and because his pr ohibition on f ace
- cove ring mandates “ impermissibl y pu rports to
super sed e Harri s County Commissio ners Court ’ s broad aut hority to se t and enforce policies, rules, and regulations , o v er C ounty emplo yees. ”

In res po nse, t he State Appellants filed a g eneral denial and a plea to t he j urisdiction. In their plea , t he State App ell an ts asserted that the Harris County Partie s la c k

sta nding to challenge GA

- 38 because no credi ble threat of pr osecu ti o n to enf orce GA

- 38 has
be en all eged and because the suit is b arred by sovereign immunity. On August 13, 2021 , the t rial

cour t issue d a n o r d er granting the Ha rris County Part ies ’ ap plic ati on for a tempo rary restra ining order, and o n Augus t 27 , 2021, the court condu cted an e viden ti ary he aring on the Plaintiffs ’ request for temporary injunctive relief. T he trial cour t later signed orders g r an ti ng the Ha rris County P arties ’ request for t empo ra ry injunct i ve reli ef and den yi ng the State Appellants ’ plea to

t he jurisdiction.

On a pp eal, th e State App ellants contend that the trial court erred in denying their plea to th e jurisdiction , see Tex. Ci v
. Prac. & Rem . Code § 51.014(a)(4), an d th at i t abus ed its
discr etion in granting the Harris County Parties ’ requ es t for tempo rary injunct iv e relie f , s ee id. § 51.014(a )(8). Because i t implicates su bject

- m att er jurisdi c tion , we will begin by reviewing th e5

tria l court ’ s ruling on t he State App ella nts ’ plea to the jurisdiction befo re cons iderin g the merits
of their ch al lenge to the temporar y in ju nctio n
.

PLEA TO THE JURISDCTION
A plea to the j u risdiction is a dilatory ple a that chal lenges th e t r i al court ’ s sub ject

m atter jurisdictio n wi thou t re ga rd to whether the asserted claim s ha ve mer it

. Harris C ounty v. Sykes , 13 6 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Te x. 2 004 ) ; B land Indep. Sch . Dist. v. Bl ue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 ( Tex. 2000)

. Because w he ther a trial court has s u bj e ct

- matter juris di ction is a question of law,

we re view a trial court ’ s ruling on a ple a to the juris diction de n ovo. Te xas Dep ’ t of Parks &
Wi ld life v. Mira n da , 133 S .W. 3 d 2 1 7 , 22 5 (Tex . 20 04).

T he b urden is on the plaintiff to a ffirmatively dem ons tr ate the trial cou rt ’ s jurisdiction

. Heck

ma n v. Wil liamson C ounty , 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 ( Tex. 20 12). In reviewing a
p lea to the ju risdiction , w e b egin with t h e plaintiff ’ s live pleading s and dete rmine i f the pl aint iff
ha s alleged facts tha t affir mative ly d e monstrate the trial court ’ s ju risdiction to h ear th e cause
. Mira n da , 133 S.W. 3 d at 22 6

. In m ak ing th is assessment, we c on strue the plaintif f ’ s pleading s li b erally, tak in g all assertio ns as tr ue , and look to t he plaintiff ’ s intent. Id

. If a plea to the j urisdiction challenges the exi stence of j ur is di ctio nal fac ts , we may consider evidence and must
do so when necessary to re solve the j uris di c ti on al issues ra i se d

. Id. at 2 27; Bl and , 34 S .W.3d

at 5 5 5. That is, we review the evidence i n th e light most f a vo ra ble to the nonmovant to
de term ine whether a g enuine issue of material fact exists. Town of Shad y Shores v. Sw anson , 59 0 S.W.3d 544, 550 (T ex
. 2019) (cit ing Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 221, 227

- 28). “ O ur ultimate inquiry is whether the plaintiff ’ s pleaded an d un
- negated f acts, ta ken as tru e and liberally

con st rued with an eye to the pleader ’ s intent , would affirmatively demons tr ate a claim or cla i m s6

within th e tr i al court ’ s j u risdiction. ” Brant ley v . Texas Y outh Comm ’ n , 365 S.W.3d 89, 94 (Tex. App.

— Au stin 20 11 , no pet.).

In their p lea to the j uri sdic tion , and no w on appeal, the State Appellants ar gue that
th e tri al court lac k s sub

ject

- m att er ju r i sdiction ove r the claims made by the Harr is County Partie s for two indepen dent reasons
. First, the State Ap pe llants assert that the Harris County Parties ’
claims are barre d by s o ver eign immunity an d that the a llegations and the evide n c e fa il to
dem o ns tr at e that their suit f a lls within th e ultra vires exception

. S overei gn immunity implicates

a court ’ s subject

- matter j u risd iction and generally bars sui ts aga i nst the State o r its subdi visions ,

a bsent a clear and unamb iguous waiver of im m u ni ty by the Leg i sl at ure
. Na zari v. State , 561 S.W.3 d 495, 500 (Tex. 2018). “ I n ce rtain narrow inst an ces, a suit again st a state official can
proc eed even i n t he absence of a waiver of im m uni ty if the offi c ial ’ s actions are ultra vires. ”
Hall v . McRaven , 508 S.W.3d 232, 2 38 (Tex. 2017).

In this case, w hether the Harris Cou nty Parties ha ve sufficien tly pleaded f acts or presente d evidence that would suppor t a v alid ultra vires clai m for the purpose of dem onstra t ing subje ct

- matter jurisdictio n overlaps wi th the substant iv e issue of whethe r the Harris C ounty
Parties have established a pro bable rig ht to re lief on their u ltr a vires cl aim for the purpose o f
obta ini ng t emporary inj uncti ve relief. For the reason s more fully s et forth in that portion of our opi n io n dis cussing th e trial c ourt ’ s g rant of temporary injunctive relief, we conclude that the
Harr is County Parties me t thei r burden o f demonst rating a valid ult ra vires claim. That is, we

con clude that the Harris County Parties ’ pleadings, liberally const r ue d , and t he ev id en c e submitted by the parties , viewed in the light mo st favorable to the Harr is County Par ties , demonstrate facts s uffic ien t to show that t he Go verno r acted w ithout auth ority in issu ing GA

- 387

to the ext ent it proh ibits local governmental e nt i ties and off ic ia ls from institu ting face

- covering requirements. Second, the State Appellants argue that the t rial court erred in de n ying their plea to the ju r is diction because the Harri s Cou nty Parties lac k stan ding to bring their claims

. S ta nding is im plic i t i n t h e co nce pt of sub j ect

- matter jurisdiction, and subject

- matter jur isdictio n is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Texas Ass ’ n of B u s. v. Tex as Air Contr ol
Bd

. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 44 3 (T ex . 199 3). Standing req uires a “ conc ret e inju ry t o t h e pl ain tiff and a

re al cont roversy between the parties that will be reso lved by the court. ” H eckman , 369 S.W.3d
at 154

. Th at is, to establish s tan din g , the pla i nt iff mu st show that: (1) the plaint iff wa s personal l y injur ed, (2) the alleg ed i n j ury is “ fa ir ly traceable ” to t he defendant ’ s co nduct, and (3) th e allege d injury is “ likely to be red ressed b y the requested rel ief. ” Id. a t 154

- 55 (citing
Lu jan v
. Defen d ers of W

ildlife , 504 U .S. 555 , 560

- 61 (Tex. 1992) )

. T he State Appellants ’

sta nd in g challenge fo cu ses on the third element of st an ding , that is, whether the Harris County
Parties h a ve demonstrated that their al leged injury is likely t o be redre ss ed by the requested
rel ief

. The State Appel lan ts argue that the lawsuit wil l not r edress an y injury suf fe re d by the
Harris C ounty Parties beca use, according to the Appellants , n either the Governor nor the
Attorn ey G en eral have any power to e n f orce GA

- 38

. The State Appellants insist that only a loc al district attorn ey can prosecute a violation o f GA

- 3 8 and th at , t herefore , the y are the wrong
defendants in t h is suit to enjoin enforcement of GA

- 38.

T he Harris County Parties al lege in th e ir pet iti on tha t “ the likelihood of state

en forcement aga in st Harris County is h igh ” and t h at “ [t]he Attorn ey G ener al h as j oin ed the
Gove rn or i n stating that ‘ any lo cal government official that defies [ GA

- 38] will be taken to

c ourt

. ’ ” In additio n , a c cordin g to t he Pl aint iffs ’ allegations, “ over the past year, t h e T ex as8

Attorney General has repe a tedly sued local g o vernme nta l en tit ies that have ins tituted measures incon sistent with the Govern or ’ s executive orders. ” M oreover, public ly a vailab l e record s , in cluding r ecord s f

i led in this Court in similar cases , reveal t hat the State Appe l lants have filed

nume rous la w su i ts seekin g to prevent local gover nmen t s and school distr icts from e nforcing
l ocal or der s th at, in their view , are inva lid and une nf orceable be c a use they conf lict with emergency orders is sued by t he Governo r. See Tex. R. Ev i d. 201 ( “ The court may ju dic i al l y

n otice a fa ct that is not subje ct to reasonable dispute . . . . ” ) ; State v. City of Austi n , No. 03

- 20

- 00619

- CV, 2021 Tex. Ap p. LEXIS 2651, a t * 1 (Tex

. App.

— Aus tin Apr. 8 , 2021, no pet.) (mem.

o p.) (dismi s si ng as moot appe a l from denial of temporary i n ju n cti ve rel ie f where S tate sought t o enjoin enforcement of lo cal pan demic

- related orders and to prevent loca l off ici al s from issu ing
new order s more rest ri cti ve t han GA

- 32 ); State v. El Paso C ounty , 618 S.W

. 3 d 812, 818 (T ex.
A p p.

— E l Paso 202 0, no pe t. ) ( a p p e al f rom d en ia l of temporary injun ctive r elief in lawsui t where
State interv e ned and sought t o in val idate local pan de mic

- related order on gr ound that it

con fl ict e d wi th GA

- 32) ; see als o In re Round Roc k Ind ep. Sch. Dist

. , No. 03

- 21

- 00 472

- CV , 20 21 T ex. Ap p
. LEXI S 78 8 4 , a t * 1

- 2 (T ex. App.

— Au stin Sept. 24, 2021, orig. pr oce eding) (mem. op.) (mandamus procee ding arising from lawsuit filed by State seeking to prevent schoo l
di strict fr o m enforcing mask requirem ent on gr oun d that it violat e s GA

- 38)

. Alt hough t h o s e

s u its a r e n ot criminal

- enforcem ent proceedings , the State plaintiffs in th o se suits s eek to enfor ce the G overnor ’ s executive orders by striking dow n orders i ssued by local governmental e ntities to
the extent th e l ocal order s con f lic t with or are more re s tri ctive th an the G overnor ’ s orde rs.
In this case , t he Harris County Parties see k a decla ra tion t hat the Governor ’ s actions in issuing GA

- 38 ar e ultra vires

. Thu s, t h e Harris County Parties are not di rectly

co mpl aining a bout any thre at of enforcem en t f o r non
- com pl ia nce w ith GA

- 38 , but about the9

val idity of the execut ive or d er itself

. If the H arris County Plaintiffs are succ essful on th eir ultra
vire s claim , the decla ratory and in junctive reli e f s ough t would allow them to exercise their authority to r eq u ir e t h e w ea ri ng of face coveri ngs w ithin th eir jur is dictions and would prevent
the State Appellants from interfering w ith that authorit y
. Based on the al legations in t he Ha rris County Parties ’ pleadings , we co nc l ude that th ere is a live controver sy be t we e n the par ti es concerning the vali dity o f G A

- 38 an d th at the declarator y and i njunctive relief sought , i f successful, would resolve th is c ontrovers y. Ac cordingly, the H arris Cou nty Parties have
affi r matively demo nstrated tha t they have standing to asser t t heir ultr a v i res claim against th e State Appella nts . Having r ejected both of the State Appellants ’ jurisdictional challenges , we

co nclud e that the tria l court did not err by de nying the State Appellants ’ plea to the juri s di ction.

We n ow consider th e St a te Appe ll an ts ’ appeal from the tr ial court ’ s grant of the
Harris C ounty Parties ’ request for tempora ry injunctive relief.

TEMP ORARY INJ U NCTI VE RELIEF

“ A tempora r y inj unct ion is an extraord in ary remedy that does not i s sue as a
matter o f right. ” B utn aru v. Fo rd M oto r Co. , 84 S.W. 3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002 ) (citing Walli n g v. Metcalfe , 863 S.W. 2 d 56, 57 ( Tex. 1993 ) )

. T he purp ose of a temporary injuncti on i s to preserve

t h e st atus quo of the li tiga tion ’ s subjec t ma t ter pend ing trial on the me rits. Id. To ob t ain r el ie f,
th e party applying fo r a tempo rary inj unction “ mu st plead an d prove three spe ci fic ele ments : (1) a cause of actio n against the defendant ; (2 ) a p robable r igh t to t h e relief sought ; and (3) a probabl e im mine nt , and irreparable injury in the int e rim. ” A bb ot t v. Anti

- Defamation L eague Austin , S w. & Te x oma Region s , 610 S .W. 3d 9 11, 916 (Tex. 2 020) (quotin g Butnaru , 84 S.W.3d

at 204 )10 The decision to gr ant a tempo ra ry in junc tion lies in the sound discretion o f the
tri al court and is subject to re ve r sal only fo r a clea r abuse of that discr etion. Butnar u , 84 S.W. 3d

at 204

. A trial court ab uses its discreti on when it acts unreason abl y or i n an a rb itrary manner or wit h out r efer ence to a ny guiding r ules and p rinc iples. I d. at 211. When reviewing a te m por ar y
in ju nc tion order , we vie w the evi dence in the l ight most favorable to the order, indu l g in g every

r easonable in f

erence in its f

a vor, and “ determine w he ther the order wa s so ar bi trary that it

e xceeds the bou nds of reasonab le discretion. ” Fox v. Tr op i cal Wa re h ou se s, Inc. , 121 S. W.3d 8 53,
85 7 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 200 3, no pet.)

. “ The trial cour t do es n ot abuse its discr etion if

some e vidence r easonably sup po rt s the trial cou r t ’ s decisio n. ” Butnaru , 84 S.W.3d at 2 11.

To the extent o ur review of t he trial cou rt ’ s temporary injunction turns on statutory construction, we review th ese iss ues de novo. Cadena Com er cia l USA Corp. v. Texas
Alco holic Beverage Comm ’ n , 5 18 S.W.3d 318 , 325 (Tex. 2017)

. In construing a sta t ute, o u r pri mary objective is to de te r mine the Le gi s lature ’ s intent which, whe n possible, we discern from the pla in meaning o f the words chose n. State v . S humake , 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). In

ma king this det e r mi n ation, w e construe t h e statute as a whole , r ath er than as isolated pro vi s ions,
and w e do not give an undefined te r m a meaning t hat is out of harmony o r inconsis tent with other provisions i n the statute

. Texas Dep ’ t of Transp. v. Needham , 82 S.W.3 d 31 4 , 31 8 (Tex. 2002). On appeal , the Stat e Appella nts argue th at the trial co u rt abused i ts discretion in
gr anting tem p o rary i nju ncti ve relief because (1) t he Harris County Parties failed to est ablish that
th ey are li kely to prevail on the me ri ts of the i r ul t ra vire s claim, the sub sta ntive claim underlyin g
t heir requests fo r decl ar a tory and in ju nctive relief; (2) the Harr is County Parties failed to11

establish that they will suffer irr ep arable h a r m ; and ( 3 ) the te mpo rary in junction is not necessary
to pres erv e the statu s quo and , inst ea d, alters the statu s q u o.

Pro bable Right to R e co v ery

Whi l e g ov ern menta l immunity provid es b road prot ection to the state and its officers, it does not bar a suit against a state of ficer for acting outside his authori ty , i.e ., an ult ra vires sui t. H

o usto n B el t & Term i nal Ry

. v. City of Houston , 4 87 S .W

. 3d 154 , 1 61 ( Te x. 2016).
S uits alleging ultra vir es or unconstitutional conduct by a government official “ do no t s eek to
alter g overnme nt policy but rather to en for ce exis tin g poli c y ” by compel l ing a go vernment
offi c ial “ to c om p ly with sta tutory or con s ti t utiona l pr o v is ions. ” City of El Paso v He inrich , 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). Pl aintiffs brin g ing ultra vires claims must “ allege , a nd
ult im ately prove, t hat the off ice r acte d without legal au thor ity or failed to perfo r m a ministerial

act. ” Cree dmo o r - Maha W at e r S upply Corp. v. Texas Comm ’ n on Env ’ t Quality , 307 S.W.3d 505, 515 (Tex. App.

— 20 10, no pet.) ( quoting Heinrich , 28 4 S.W.3d a t 372)

. “ M inisterial act s ” are th ose “ w here the law prescribes an d d efi nes the duties t o b e performed with such pr e ci s ion and

ce rt ain ty as to leave nothing to the exerc ise of discretion or judgment. ” City of H ouston v.
H ou ston M un. Emps. Pension Sys. , 549 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Tex. 201 8 ) ( quot i ng S out h western Bell
Tel. v. E mmett , 459 S. W .3d 578, 58 7 (Tex. 2015) ).

The Te xas D isaster A ct

T he State Appellants a sse rt that the Harris County Parties failed to establish a probable right to re cover o n their ultra vires claim s because the Governor valid ly e xerc ised h is

a uthority under the Te xas Disas ter Act when he issue d GA

- 3 8 , m o r e sp ec if i c a lly, that portion of
GA

- 38 t hat proh ibit s local governmental en tities and offi c ials , such as Harris County Parties ,12

from “ requir [ in g] any pers on to we ar a f ace cove ring o r
. . . manda t [ ing] t hat anot her person w e ar

a f ace cov ering

. ”

C ha pter 4 1 8 o f th e Texa s Go vernment C ode, known as the Texas Disaster Act,
establish es a detailed , com pr ehensive fram ework that , in the case of a disaster, a ll oca tes power s, d utie s, an d re spon s i bili ties across va rious level s of stat e g ov ern ment and mul tiple agen ci e s
. Ec to r C n ty. Al liance of B us. v. Abb o tt , No. 11

- 20

- 00206

- CV, 2021 T ex. App LEXI S 7492 , at * 3 ( Te x. App.

— Eastland S ept. 9, 2021, no pet. ) (mem. op.); s ee Tex. Gov ’ t Code §§ 4 18.0 01

- .30 7

. Among the stated p urp oses of t he Act are to (1) clarif y and stren gt h e n the roles of the g overnor,
state agencies, the j u dicial branc h of state government, and local governments in prevent ion of,
pr ep aration for, res ponse to , and reco very from dis asters ; (2) authoriz e and pro vi de for

co ope ration i n di sa ster m i t igation , p re p a re dness, res pon s e , and re covery; a nd (3) authori ze and provide for coordination of activities relating to disaster m itigation, p reparedness, respon se, and
recovery by ag enci es a nd off icers of this state , and similar s tat e
- local, interstate , f ederal

- sta te ,

an d foreign activities in which th e state and its p olitical subdi visions may participate. Tex. Gov ’ t
Code

. § 418.002 ( “ Purposes ” ).

The Act charges the G overnor w ith m eeti ng t he “ da ngers to the s tate and pe ople
pres ent ed by di sa sters. ” I d

. § 418.011. U nd er the A c t, t he Governor may d ec lare a state o f
disaster wit hin a define d geographic area “ if the governor finds that a disa ster has occurred or
that the occurrenc e or thre a t of dis aster is imminent. ” I d. § 418.014( c) , (d)

. The declaratio n of a

state o f dis aster “ ac tivates the disaster recovery and rehabilitation aspects of the state e mergency

man agement plan applicable to the ar ea subject to the de claration. ” Id

. § 4 18.0 15 (a)

. “ Dur ing a
state of d isaster a nd the f o llo wing recovery perio d, the gov er n o r is the command er in chi ef of

sta te agencies , board s, and commissions having emergency responsibil ities

. ” Id. § 418.015 (c)

.13

A mong other powers, “ [ t ] he governor may c ontr ol i ngres s and egr ess to and from a di s aster are a

a nd the movement of person s and t h e oc cupancy of p remises in the area

. ” Id . § 418.018.

The Act also auth orize s the presiding officer s of loca l governmental entitie s , suc h as mayors and county judges , to i ssu e loc al disast er declarations

. Id

. § 418. 10 8

. “ A dec la ration
of a local disa s t er activa tes the appropriate re cove ry and rehabilit ation aspects of all emergency

man agement and furnis hing of aid and assis tance un der th e declaration

. ” Id. § 418. 10 8 (d ).
Si milar t o th at au thority granted to the G over nor , when a local dis a ster is decl ar e d the county jud ge or may or of a mu ni cipality may also “ control in gress to and egr ess from a d i s ast er area under the jurisdiction and auth ority of the county judge or mayo r a nd con trol th e movement of
person s and the occupanc y o f premises in that area. ” I d

. § 418

. 108 ( g). In a ddition, as i t relates

to the pan demic , the count y commissioners court is autho rized by the Texas Health and S afety Code to adopt orders that are “ re asonably n ecessary to p rot ect the pu blic health. ” See Tex.
H ea lt h & S afet y C ode § 1 2 1 .003.

In s ummary , the A ct empowe r s and recognizes that the G overn or may issue
statewide disaster declaration s and that cert ain local offi cials may also i ssue local disaster
dec l arations

. N oth ing in the Act , however, su ggests that th ese au t h o r ities a re m utually ex clusi ve , such t hat a dis a ster cann ot simultane ously be both a statewide disaster and a lo cal disaster.
Mor eover, it stand s to reason that even a stat ewide disaster may have disti nct a nd
d is pr oportio na te impacts in each of the S tat e ’ s 254 c ou nt i e s and that , as a result, some measu res for addressing a disaster in some counties may not be ne cessary or eve n ap pr opr iate i n other

cou ntie s. With th is statutory fram ework in mind , we cons ider the primary legal issue pres ente d
b y this ap pea l : wheth er t h e G overno r , under his authority gran ted by the Leg islature under the
T e xas Disaster Act, may prohibit lo cal gover n ment al entities and officials from i mplementing14

measures that they view as ne c ess a ry to m itiga te the effects o f a lo ca l disas t er an d to p ro te c t th e public health and that, co nv er sely, the G overn or views a s more restrictive than necessary to mitigate the disaster state wi de.

Analysis On appeal, t he State Ap pellants argue tha t th e G o vernor ’ s a uthority under t he
Texas Di s aster Act includes t he a u tho rity to prohib it local gover n men ts fro m implemen ti ng

measu res such as face

- covering mandates becau se the Act provides that o rders issued by the
G ov e rnor will preempt co ntradic tory o r der s iss ued by local government s
. 1 In suppor t of th eir

a rgument , t h e S tate Appell ants point to severa l pr ovis i o ns in th e Act that t hey conten d
demonstrate t hat the Legislature intended for such preemption to apply

. Speci fically, t he State Appellants note th at the A ct (1) designa tes the G overno r as “ c omm an d er in ch ief ” in a d dressing

stat ewide disaste r s , Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 418.015 (c) , a nd emp o wers the G ove rnor to “ c ontrol ingress and egress

. . a nd the movement of persons and the occup ancy of premises in the area , ”
id. § 418.018 (c) , which would encompas s ind o or fac e
- c ov er in g m a ndates ; (2) prov ides that

eme rge nc y
- m an agement directors, i ncluding the p residing officers of the governing body of a

c ounty, ac t as the “ governor ’ s designated agent [s] , ” id. § 418 .01 5(a), ( b) ; and (3) sta tes that

e xecu tive orders issued by t h e G ov e r no r u n de r the Act have “ the force and ef fect of l aw , ”
id

. § 418.012

.

1 In addi tio n, the State Appe lla nts argue that (1) the Texas Disa ster Act pl ace s conc ret e lim its on the Governor ’ s authority to suspend stat utes and , th us , does not v io late th e Texas Cons ti tu tion ’ s nondel egation doctri ne; and ( 2 ) county judges and c ounty c om miss ion ers c ou rts d o n ot have author ity t o violate stat e law

. The Ha rris County Pa rties have not challenged the constitut ionality of the Act , and there is no dispute that c ounty officia ls do not have the au thority to v iolate s tate law . I nstead, the pa rties ’ di sput e ce nt ers on whether GA

- 38 con s titutes a vali d exe rcise of the gove rnor ’ s authority under the Act such that it has “ the force and effect of law. ” See Tex. Gov ’ t C ode § 418.012

.15 Ba sed o n the plain la nguage of the Disaster Act , we d o not agree that t he
p rovisions desi gnating the Governor as “ commander in chi ef ” a n d emergency
- management
direct ors as the “ gover no r ’ s de s ignated a gent s ” demonstrate that t he Leg islatur e in tended to
empower the governor with broad auth ority to preempt local orders

. A s the Harris County
Parties point out , the A ct designa te s the G ove rnor as “ commander in c hief of stat e agencies , boar d s , and c ommi ssions hav ing emergency re sp on sibi lit ies , ” not count ie s , see i d

. § 418.015(c ) , and gi ves both the G overnor and count ies the same aut hority “ to con trol ingress and egress , ”

see id

. § 41 8. 018 (c ) ; Ab bot t v. Jenkins , No . 05

- 21

- 0 07 33

- CV , 2 0 21 Tex. A pp. LEX I S 9460, at

* 2 4 (Tex. A pp.

— Dallas Nov. 22, 202 1 , n o pet. h.) (mem. op.) ( “ Thus, we must conclude section 418.015(c) limits the governor ’ s authority to act as comma nder in chief only to specific s tate

ent ities

. ” ) ; Ab bott v. City of San Anton io , __S .W

. 3 d__, N o. 04

- 21

- 00342

- CV, 2021 Tex. App.
LEXIS 91 29, at * 18 n.5 (Tex . App.

— San Anto nio No v. 10, 2021, no pet. h .) ( analy zing whe ther action was valid under Section 418.016(a) and noting th at g ov e rnor faile d t o show h ow provision s designa t ing him as “ com ma n d er in chief ” and gra nting him auth ority to “ con tro l ing ress and eg re ss ” provide him with “ power to pr oh ibit local gove rnments from adopting rules to promote public health withi n their juris dicti on du rin g a disaster ” ). In addition, whil e t he Act
pro vi d es t hat “ [ a]n emer gency manag ement direct or serves a s the gov ernor ’ s de signated agent in
the adminis tration and supervision of duties , ” id. § 418.01 5(a), ( b) , nothing in this provision
limits th e a ut hor ity tha t counties and l ocal officials , inclu din g co unt y co mm iss i on ers courts, otherwise possess under th e Act in re spond ing to local di sa sters and publ ic

- health cris es , s ee Jenkins , 2021 Tex. A pp. LEXIS 9460, at * 30 (r ejecting argument that Sectio n 418 .01 5 limit s

c ounty judge ’ s role to that o f gove rno r ’ s age nt a nd ex pl aining t hat if count y judge coul d only act16

as gov ernor ’ s age nt during statewide disas ter, then “ to avoid being s urplusage, section 418.108 would need to state it does not apply in the ev en t o f a st atewide disaster , ” but it does n ot).

In additi on , we di sa gree that the use of the phrase “ force and effect of law ”
de monstra tes that the Legislature intended to g ive broad auth ority to the G o vernor to li mit the ability of local gover nmental enti tie s and official s to respon d to disa ster s
. Th e State Ap pe ll ants

ar gue that “ because the Texas Legi sl ature chose to imbue th e G ove rn or ’ s Di saster Act executive authority with the same fo rce and effe ct as state law, traditional preemption analysis appli e s. ” In effect, the S tate A ppellants co nten d t hat the Legis la t u re ha s d e legated its authority to regul at e counties t o the G over n or to create what our sister court in El Paso has charac te rized as a “ tie
breaker. ” See El Paso C ounty , 618 S.W. 3 d at 8 21

- 822 ( exp lai ning that Section 418.012 is “ a deleg at ion of power f

ro m t h e L e g isl ature to the governor ” and th at Legislature “ inserted a ti e b reaker and gave it to the gove r nor in that his or her declaratio n s un der Section 418.0 12 have
the fo rce of la w ” )

. H owe ver , in the same statute , the Leg i slature has expressly provid ed t h e G o ve rnor with a limited power to sus pend provi sions of “ regu latory statute [ s] prescribing the
pro cedures for conduct of stat e bus ine ss
. ” T ex. Gov ’ t Code § 418.016(a). T o const rue th e phrase “ fo rce and effect of law ” as br oadly as the Stat e Appella nt s s ugg e st

— as g ranting the
governor a bsolu te po wer to s uspend or p rohibit any order or regulation that, in his est imate,
is unnecessary or over ly restrictive in mitigating the disaste r

— would re nder this provision
sup erf l uous. Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Co li na s, I n c . v. Hogu e , 271 S.W. 3 d 238, 256 (Tex

. 2008 ) ( “ The Court must not interpret the s tatute i n a manner that render s any part of the st a tute

me aningless or superfluous

. ” )

. Inst ead , w e ag ree with our sister cou rt in Dallas that “ [S ] ection
418.012 d oes n ot giv e the gove rnor c art e blache to iss ue executive orders empowering him to rule
the state in any way he wishes during a disaster. ” Jenkins , 2021 Tex

. A pp. LEXIS 9460, at * 26

.17 The Disaster Ac t c o nta ins a s pecific provision to re solve conflicts be twe en o rder s issue d by county judges and mayo rs
. S ee Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 418.108(h) (p roviding that count y judge ’ s order s control over those of mayor wh en bo th use st atutory authority to man age cer tain
di sas ter

- relief activities )

. In th e absence of a sim il ar cl ea r an d e xpress provision i n the Ac t to
resolve conflicts between orders issued by the Governor and l ocal gov ernment al entities and
offi cials , we canno t c o nclude that execut ive orders issued by the G ov ernor under S ection 418.018(c) aut omatically p reem pt an y cont ra ry local orders i ss ued under S ec tion 418. 108(g)

. 2
Jenkins , 2021 Tex. A pp. LEXIS 9460, at * 2 9 ( “ To conclude th e governor owns the t iebreak i ng

a uth ority, we would have to ignore a stat ed purp ose of th e Disaster Act and provisions that
delineate th e re s pons ib ilities of the gov ernor and coun ty judges, a mong others. ” ). Consequently,

w hether GA

- 38 ’ s pr ohibition on f ace
- cover ing manda tes exceeds t he G ove rnor ’ s authority under
the A c t and con s titute s ultra vi res conduct turns on whether it f alls within th e scop e o f
suspens ion allowed under Secti on 418.016(a).

2 T he St ate Defendants als o argue t ha t “ [a] finding that GA

- 38 ca rries no pree m ptive effe ct would create m ass conf us ion and colla pse of the S tate ’ s u ni fied response to the challenges po sed by th e pandemic by turning dozens of state and loc al emergen cy or de rs into a f lurry of non
- bi nding recom mendations. ” This is not a case , how e ver , wher e the G o vernor ’ s execu tive ord er directly conflicts wit h a local order su ch that a p erson subject to t he order s could not possibly comply with both. C f. S t ate v. El Pa so C ou nty , 618 S.W.3d 812 , 822 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2020, no pet.) ( exp laining t hat t here m ust b e final decisio n
- maker b ecause “ there could b e g ood faith d iffere nces on the prop er response ” )

. Because GA

- 38 does not prohibit a person from wearin g a face

- cove ri ng, a person does not violat e GA

- 38 by compl ying with a loc al face

co ve ring mand a te. Ther efo re, the is sue before us is not w h ether there is a “ t ie bre aker ” when a n order issued by the G overnor and an order issued by a loc al governmental ent ity directly co nflict. Neve rtheless , to the extent preemption bears on the larger is sue of whet h er the G ove r nor can sus pend o r p ro hibi t local orders with w hic h h e di sagrees, we agr ee with Chief Just ice Ro drigue z , who explained , “ Laws conflict with one ano ther frequent ly , but there i s no le gal principle th at automatically elevates certai n laws ab ove o thers a s a m att er of cour se.
. . . Law s preempt other laws bec aus e c ons ti tutions and other foundation al texts create conflict

- of

- law schemes that est ablish pr iority ranks am ong different types of valid law. ” Id. at 832

- 33 (Ro d riguez, J., di sse nting)

. H e r e, n oth ing i n t he Texas C onst itution n or the A c t g ive s t he Governor ’ s executive orders preemptive eff

ect

. Id. at 8 3 3 (Rodriguez , J., dissenting ).18 Section 418 .01 6(a) of the Act provides :
The Governor may suspend th e pro vis ions of any regulatory statut e prescr ibing t he pro cedures for conduct of s tate business or the or ders or rules o f a s t a t e a g e n c y if strict comp liance with the prov isions, orders, o r ru les would in any way pre vent, hinder, or delay necessary action in cop i ng with a disa s ter

.

Tex. Go v ’ t C ode § 418. 016 (a)

. The St ate Appellants argue that pur suan t t o Section 418.016(a) , G A

- 38 valid l y su spends Section 418.10 8 of the Ac t and other s ta tu tory au thori ties pertaining to public health that the Harris Count y Par tie s relied on in issuing their resp e cti ve f ace
- co vering
mandates. Based on the pla in la n guage of the Act , we disagree

. 3

Firs t, S e ct ion 418.016 authorizes the suspe nsion of c ertain “ reg u lat ory statut e [ s ] , ”
and a lthough the term “ re gulatory ” is n ot de f i n ed in the Act, the te rm “ re gulate ” or dinar il y

m eans “ to g overn or direct according to rule. ” R egu late , Webster ’ s Th ir d New In t ’ l Dic ti onary 1913 (2 002); see also Regu late, Black ’ s Law Dic tion ary (1 0th ed.) ( “ T o control (an ac tiv ity or
p rocess) esp. thro u gh th e impl ementation of rules. ” ). Under this d efi nition , t he statutes that
the G ov e rno r p u rpo r ts to suspend are not “ re gulatory , ” b ut instead are “ gran t

- of

- au thority statute[s] giving local authorities th e leeway to act in their best independ ent jud g ment w it h in
the confi nes of thei r own jurisdi ctions

. ” El Paso C ou nty. , 6 18 S.W.3d at 839

- 4 0

. F or example , Section 418.01 8 , t h e cited ba si s for County Judge Lin a Hidalgo ’ s order re quiring face coverings,
emp ower s loca l go v ern men t off icials to declare a local sta te of d is a ster and to take certain appropriate actio n but does not direct or require th at the local official t ake an y p a rticular a ct ion.
See Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 418.108

.

3 The G ove rnor does no t contend tha t Section 41 8 .01 6(a) authorizes him to suspend the local o rders at i ssu e dir ectly , as t he r e can be no dispute t hat the o rde rs iss ued by the Harris County Parties are not “ statutes. ” See Statute , Black ’ s Law Dictionary (1 0th ed. )

.19 In add i tion , Section 418. 108 and the other statu tes t ha t GA

- 38 p urport s to suspend
under Sect ion 418 .01 6 do not pertain to “conduct of state business , ” but instead concern the authority of local govern me nt s to react to local disa sters and address local public

- health

concerns
. We agree with our sister c ourt of appe als in San Ant onio that “[ i]f the Leg islature had
intended Secti on 418.016(a) to reach the ordi nan ces a nd b u s iness of local governments, Sect io n 418.016(a) wo uld have stated an appl ication t o ‘pol itica l sub di vi sions ’ or ‘local gov ernme nta l entities, ’ which are terms d efine d in the Act

. ” City of San Antonio , 2021 Tex. A pp. LEXIS 91 29,

at * 15

- 16

. I n s ummary, w e conclude that the Gov e rnor do e s no t possess ab s ol ute auth ority
under t he T exas Disa ster A ct to pre empt orders issued by loc a l g overnmenta l enti ties or official s that contr adi c t his execut ive orders. Further, the Gov e rnor ’ s authority to sus pen d certain statutes
under Se ction 418.01 6 do es n ot include th e authority to s uspend Section 418.1 08 or other public

health s ta tut e s rel ied on by th e Harris County Parties in is su i ng t he ir resp ective f ace
- covering requirements. The trial court reasonabl y conc luded that the H arris Count y Parties have a
p ro bable right o f recovery on their ul tra vir es cl aim.

Irre p arable Harm

The Stat e App ell ant s also ar gue that the trial court a bu sed its discretion by issuing temporary injunctive relief because the Harris Count y Parties failed to establish that they wi ll
suffer irr ep ar able h a rm . Spe cifically, the Stat e Appell ants comp lain that the wi tness e s pre s ented at the temporary

- injunctio n he arin g f or the Harris County Parties could not “ tie a r ise in local
COVID

- 19 rates to GA

- 38 ’ s ban on face

- c ove r ing man dates

. ” In addition , th ey argue that the
trial court fail ed to properly “ weigh the co unter vailing interests again st Harris County ’ s re q ue st20

f or injunctive relief. ” See NMTC Corp. v. Conarroe , 99 S.W.3d 865, 868 (T ex. Ap p.

— Beaumont 2003, no pet.) ( “ An applicat io n for injunctio n is a request that a court exercise its equitable jurisdiction , and in e xer cising that power the court balances c om peti ng equi ties. ” )

. Ba sed on the evidence presented at the tempo rary
- injunct io n he aring, we disagree

.

At the hearing, t h e trial court hea r d t es timo ny from t w o witnesses

— Dr . J aneana White, Local Health Au thori ty for Harris Cou nty and m edical advisor to the Co unty , and David Berry , Harris County Administrator to th e C ommissioner s Court

. Dr. White t est ified that
C OV ID

- 19 i s a respir atory v i ru s t hat “ has bee n ca ta strophic ” acros s t he gl o be ; recen tly, the
h i gh ly con tag iou s del ta var ian t ha s contri bu ted to a “ f ou rth wave in the Harris County area, ” meaning ther e ha s b een a s ignific a nt i ncrease in the po s it ivity r at e ; an d hospi ta ls and t he
heal t h ca r e faci lit ies in Harris County ha ve b een o v er whel med due to a 3 05 % inc re ase in
h o sp i taliz ations due t o COVID in the month before th e he aring

. Dr. White also ex plained that
de spite mitigat ion effo rts such as vaccines, ph ysical dista nc in g , and handwas hin g, a s of t h e hearing d ate, there had been 479, 547 c a se s of COV I D a nd 5,2 32 deaths from C OVID in
H arr is C o unty an d th a t the po sitivity r ate was currently 21 %

. Finally, Dr . Whi t e testified tha t
ba sed on guidance f

rom the CDC and o n publis he d scien tifi c a r ti cle s , which wer e ad mitted into
evide nce at t h e hear ing , s he deter mi ned that the i mp osition of a f ace
- co ver ing mand ate w ould be
effective in mitig ating the community spread of C OVI D

- 19 and in d ecreasin g th e number of hosp i tal izations and d e at hs du e to COVID in Ha rris C ounty. Dr. White exp lai n ed that the
G o verno r o f Kans as had issu ed an executive o r der re qui rin g ma sks in p ublic spaces with the
abi lity to opt out and that studies on the effectiv eness of t hat mandate had shown that the

count ie s that opte d out saw an increase in C OVID relative to those c ounties that di d not.21 Berry testi f

i ed as to th e econo mic impact of CO VI D on the County. In part,
Be rry explained tha t as a self

- in sure r under the wor kers ’ com pensat ion s ystem , t he Count y ha s
p ai d over $3.8 mil li o n in COVI D

- related he althcare cos t s in 2 02 1 due to em ploy ees contracting
COV ID a nd th a t t he County has lost occup ancy t ax re v enue as a r esult of events bei ng cancell ed
due t o COVI D

. Be r

ry also testified about the neg ative im pact that C OV ID has h ad on c o un ty
op erati ons
. For e xample , ac c o r ding t o Be rry ’ s testimony, there was a n o u t b reak at a juvenil e dete ntion fa ci lity , w hich req uir ed the County to “ ev acuate out a large number of pers onne l
and place the se yo ung adul ts and c hild ren on a n o
- movem ent policy , ” me aning they could not

acces s t he rap y , see v i s itor s , or appear in court.

Ba sed on th e evidence presented at the h earing, viewed in the ligh t most favorable
to the trial cour t ’ s order , we conclude that the Harris County Parties s uffi ci en tly demonstrate d

t hat the use of face c overing s is an effe cti ve too l in controlling the spread of C O V ID

- 1 9 ; the ability to r equire the use of face coverings in certain sett i ngs is esp ecially he lpful ; and the uncontrolled spread of COVI D

- 19 is detriment al ly impacting the hea lth of citizens and county operat io n s
. Because GA

- 38, b y its terms, prevent s lo cal g o vern mental entities and officials like the Harris County Parties from enforcing local orders requiring the use of face covering s , it inflicts irrep ara

bl e harm on these en tities and officials

. See Texas Ass ’ n of B us. v. City of Austin , 565 S.W.3d 425, 441 (Te x. App.

— Austin 2018, pet. denied ) ( explaining that “ inability [of s tate ] to enforce its duly enact ed [laws] clearly i nflicts irreparable harm , ” quo ti ng Abbott v. Pe rez , 138 S. Ct. 2305 , 2324 n.17 ( 201 8 ) )

. Con ver sel y, the State did not prese nt any evide nce to show
how the State would be adversely impacted by th e requested tem porary in junct ion. T he trial

court re asonably determined that the Ha rris Co un ty Parties wo ul d s u ffer “ pr obable im minent ,22

and irr eparable i njur y ” if int er i m relief were not granted. See Anti

- Defamation L eague Austin , S w. & Te xoma Region s , 610 S .W. 3d at 916.

S tatu s Qu o
As pre vio usly di scussed, the purpose of a temporary injunc tio n is t o preser ve th e
sta t us q uo. Butna ru , 84 S.W .3d at 2 04. In th is con tex t, “ s ta tus quo ” means “ the last , actual,
p eaceable, non

- contested status which preceded the pending controversy

. ” Texas A ss ’ n o f Bus. , 565 S.W.3d at 4 37 ( quoting In re Newton , 146 S.W.3d 64 8, 6 51 (T ex. 200 4) (ori g. proceeding) )

. The State Appellants argue that “ th e la st, actual, pea ce able, non

- contested st atus whi ch preceded the pending controversy ” was GA

- 36 , whic h was is sued i n May 202 1 and, like GA

- 38 , p r o hibited local governmen tal e nt ities a nd offi cials from imposing face

- covering mandates. Thus, the State Appellants reaso n t hat th e status quo has existed at leas t s ince May 2021 , at
which time there was no acti ve disp u te between t he parties, an d tha t t he t emp o rary inj unc ti on sought and o bt ain ed by the H arris County Parties does not preserve the statu s qu o of the litigation ’ s pending subj ec t matter but i nstead “ upends ” it

.

We have already concluded that the trial cour t did not a bu se its discret i on by
d eterm ining that the Harris Coun ty Part ies es ta b lished a p rob able right to relie f on their claim
that the Gove r n or ’ s issuance of GA

- 38 cons ti tutes an ultra v ires act to th e extent it pr oh ibits
local governmental entities a n d offici al s f ro m issuing fa c e
- co ver ing mandate s
. “ Co ntinuatio n of illega l con d u ct cannot be ju stified as preservation of the status quo. ” In r e New ton , 146 S.W.3d

at 651

. If GA

- 38 is determi ned to be ultra vires and invalid , GA

- 3 6 wou ld be ultra vires a nd
invalid fo r the same reas on . Consequently, GA

- 36 cannot cons tit ute the “ sta tu s quo ” as a matter
of la w
. Instead, t he te mporary injunction as re ques te d and g ranted by th e trial court seeks to23

return the parties to the position t hey we re in prior to the Go ve rnor ’ s u lt ra vires acti ons
. The trial

court reasonabl y conclud ed that a te mp ora ry in junction would pres erv e the statu s quo
. Moreover, having re

jecte d th e St ate Appe ll ants ’ arguments, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its di sc retion by i mposing a tem po rary injuncti on to prevent the State Appellants from seeking t o e nf

orc e GA

- 38 pending a t rial on the merits.

C ONCLUSION
We affirm the t r ial court ’ s ord er s denying the State Appellants ’ plea to the jurisd ict ion and granting the Harris Co unty Partie s ’ r e quest for a temporary injunction.

______________ ___________________ _________ Ch a ri L . Kel ly, J ustice
Befor e Chief J ustice Byrne, J ustices T r ian a and Kelly
Affirmed
F iled: January 6, 2022