J-S58025-15

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

EDWARD STEPTOE ANDREWS

Appellant No. 660 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 19, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-18-CR-0000266-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON and PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 07, 2015

Appellant, Edward Steptoe Andrews, appeals from the order entered 

on March 19, 2015, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9141-9146. After careful review, we 

affirm.

The PCRA court briefly summarized the facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

On April 26, 2013 in South Renovo Borough, Clinton 

County, Pennsylvania, [Appellant] discharged a firearm nine 

(9) times through a door that [Appellant] knew Alma 

Antram was behind. Alma Antram was struck four (4) times 

and required medical treatment. At the same time and 

place, [Appellant] threw a twelve (12) inch fixed blade knife 

that struck Douglas Antram in the foot, causing him to 

receive medical treatment. [Appellant] had a blood alcohol 

content of .249 at the time of the aforementioned events.

[Appellant] entered pleas of nolo contendere to [c]riminal 

[a]ttempt/[h]omicide and [a]ggravated [a]ssault for [his] 
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actions against Alma Antram. [Appellant also] entered a 

plea of nolo contendere for [his] actions against Douglas 

Antram. 

* * *

[Appellant] was sentenced [to an aggregate term of 21 to 

42 years of imprisonment] on the aforementioned counts on 

November 25, 2013. On December 12, 2014, [Appellant] 

filed a PCRA petition []. [Appellant’s] petition allege[d] 

ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the plea 

negotiations and ineffective assistance of counsel during the 

plea colloquy. [...] A hearing on this matter was held on 

March 11, 2015 [wherein trial counsel and Appellant 

testified]. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/19/2015, at 1-2. The PCRA court denied relief by 

order and opinion entered on March 19, 2015. This timely appeal resulted.1

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether defense counsel’s performance was deficient 

when he did not ensure that [Appellant] understood the 

elements of the offenses to which he was pleading nolo 

contendere and whether the deficient performance 

caused prejudice because there was a reasonable 

probability that, but for the attorney incompetence, 

[Appellant] would not have pled nol[o] contendere but 

instead would have insisted on a jury trial?

2. Whether defense counsel’s performance was deficient for 

failing to advise [Appellant] that he had a defense of 

voluntary intoxication and whether there was a 

____________________________________________

1 On April 14, 2015, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On April 15, 2015, 

the PCRA court entered an order directing Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Appellant complied timely on May 4, 2015. On May 5, 2015, the PCRA court 

filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), relying upon its earlier 

decision entered on March 19, 2015.
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reasonable probability that [Appellant] would have 

insisted on a jury trial had he known of the defense?

Appellant’s Brief at 1-2 (complete capitalization omitted).2

In his first issue presented, Appellant claims that defense counsel 

provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to ensure Appellant 

understood the elements of the offense of attempted murder prior to 

entering a nolo contendere plea to that crime. Id. at 15-24. More 

specifically, Appellant contends that defense counsel was ineffective for 

failing to inform Appellant “that the charge of attempt to commit criminal 

homicide requires the element of specific intent to kill.” Id. at 13. Appellant 

avers that although he admitted to firing through a door in the direction of 

Alma Antram’s feet, a non-vital part of her body, he did not admit to 

intending her death. Id. at 19. He alleges “neither the [g]uilty [p]lea 

[s]tatement, nor the trial judge, nor defense counsel informed [Appellant] 

that the mens rea required for attempted [] murder was the same as for 

first[-]degree murder.” Id. Appellant maintains, “[d]efense counsel’s 

testimony [at the PCRA hearing] revealed that [defense counsel] was not 

aware that specific intent to kill was required to enter a nolo plea to the 

charge of attempted murder[]” and, instead, “misadvised [Appellant] that he 

could be guilty of attempted murder if he acted negligently or recklessly.” 

____________________________________________

2 On August 21, 2015, Appellant filed a motion for enlargement of time to 

file his reply brief. As we received Appellant’s reply brief in time to review it 

before rendering this decision, we grant Appellant’s motion and consider his 

reply brief to be timely filed.
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Id. at 19-20. Thus, he contends his plea was not made knowingly, 

intelligently or voluntarily. Id. at 23-24. 

Our standard of review is well-settled. “As a general proposition, we 

review a denial of PCRA relief to determine whether the findings of the PCRA 

court are supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth 

v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 830 (Pa. 2014). “Counsel is presumed 

effective, and to rebut that presumption, the PCRA petitioner must 

demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that such 

deficiency prejudiced him.” Commonwealth v. Perzel, 116 A.3d 670, 671 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (internal citation omitted). “Accordingly, to prove plea 

counsel ineffective, the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) the underlying 

legal issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked an objective 

reasonable basis; and (3) the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's act or 

omission.” Id. at 671-672. “A claim of ineffectiveness will be denied if the 

petitioner's evidence fails to satisfy any one of these prongs.” Id. at 672.

A valid plea colloquy must delve into six areas: 1) the nature of the 

charges, 2) the factual basis for the plea, 3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the 

presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea court's 

power to deviate from any recommended sentence. Commonwealth v. 

Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc) (citation 

omitted).

“Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that where the totality of 

the circumstances establishes that a defendant was aware of the nature of 
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the charges, the plea court's failure to delineate the elements of the crimes 

at the oral colloquy, standing alone, will not invalidate an otherwise knowing 

and voluntary guilty plea.” Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, this Court 

recently determined, “the trial court's failure to explain the elements of the 

offense on the record does not constitute per se prejudice[].” 

Commonwealth v. Molina, 2015 WL 6164878, at *4 (Pa. Super. 2015). In 

Molina, we determined when an appellant “acknowledged in the written 

[plea] colloquy that he discussed with plea counsel the elements of each 

charged offense, the factual basis for each charged offense, and how the 

facts in his case prove the elements of each charged offense[,]” the plea was 

knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Id. (internal quotations and brackets 

omitted). Finally, we note, “[d]efendants are obligated to respond truthfully 

to the court's inquiries during a guilty plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. 

Rogers, 483 A.2d 990, 993 (Pa. Super. 1984). “A guilty plea will not be 

withdrawn where the defendant lies during the colloquy and subsequently 

alleges that his lies were improperly induced by counsel.” Id. 

Here, Appellant signed a written colloquy prior to entering his plea, 

which stated, in pertinent part:

Admission of Guilt or No Contest and Penalties

I understand and agree that I am pleading guilty or nolo 

contendere to the crimes listed below. I understand, and 

my lawyer has explained to me, the elements of these 

crimes and the possible penalties for them. By pleading 

guilty, I agree and admit that I committed each element of 

these crimes, or by pleading nolo contendere. I do not 
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contest that I committed each element of these crimes. I 

agree that the Commonwealth can prove that I committed 

each element of these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. I 

am pleading nolo contendere to the following crimes:

A.) Count 1: Criminal Attempt-Homicide, felony of 

the first-degree, and the maximum penalty for 

this crime is 40 years in jail and a $25,000.00 

fine.

Guilty Plea Statement, 10/30/2013, at 6. In addition to signing the written 

colloquy, Appellant initialed this paragraph twice.

Moreover, Appellant initialed paragraph 32 of the written colloquy, 

which states:

I have had enough time to fully discuss my case and my 

decision to plead guilty or nolo contendere and everything 

contained in this Guilty Plea Statement with my lawyer, and 

by placing my initials on all of the lines provided, I am 

saying that I understand, agree with, and answered 

truthfully, everything contained in this Guilty Plea 

Statement.

Id. at 8. 

Upon review of the notes of testimony from the plea hearing, there is 

no dispute that neither defense counsel nor the trial court set forth the 

specific elements of attempted homicide on the record. The trial court, 

however, engaged in the following exchange at the plea hearing:

The Court: I’ve been told you’re going to plead no 

contest to three different charges. Those charges are 

attempted homicide of Alma Antram, aggravated assault of 

Alma Antram, and aggravated assault of Douglas Antram. 

Is that what your understanding is going on here today?

[Appellant:] Yes, sir.
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The Court: The first thing I need to tell you is a no 

contest plea, what you’re telling me to do is to accept the 

facts that are alleged in the charging documents as true, 

that you are not contesting them, that they suffice to find 

you guilty of the charges and that I should go ahead and 

sentence you as if you pled guilty or were found guilty. Do 

you understand that?

[Appellant:] Yes, sir. 

The Court: I also have to tell you that the information 

that you’re telling me to accept as true concerning Count 1, 

criminal attempt/homicide is that – the facts would be that 

you’re telling me to accept as true is that on Friday, 

April 26, 2013, in South Renovo Borough, Clinton 

County, Pennsylvania, you attempted to cause the 

death of Alma Antram by discharging a firearm nine 

times through the door of Antram’s residence striking 

her four times causing her to receive medical treatment. 

Do you understand they’re the facts you’re telling me to 

accept by pleading no contest?

[Appellant]: Yes, sir.

* * *

The Court: Do you have any questions about these 

facts?

[Appellant]: No, sir.

N.T., 10/28/2013, at 5-7 (emphasis added). Moreover, Appellant 

acknowledged that defense counsel explained the contents of the written 

colloquy to him and Appellant had no further questions. Id. at 9. 

Finally, the bill of criminal information filed by the Clinton County 

District Attorney, which is contained in the certified record, specifies:

Count 1: CRIMINAL ATTEMPT-HOMICIDE – (FELONY 1)
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Defendant did, with intent to commit a specific crime, 

namely Title 18 Section 2501(a), Homicide, commit any act 

which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission 

of that crime, namely defendant did attempt to cause the 

death of Alma Antram by discharging a firearm 9 times 

through the door of Antram’s residence striking Antram 4 

times causing Antram to receive medical treatment, in 

violation of 18 Pa.C.S. Section 901(a) of the Pennsylvania 

Crimes Code [].

Criminal Information, 7/2/2013, at 1.

Based upon all of the foregoing, we conclude there is no merit to 

Appellant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to inform 

Appellant of the elements of attempted homicide. Both the criminal 

information and the trial court’s oral colloquy established that Appellant was 

aware of the nature of the charges against him, despite the trial court's 

failure to delineate the elements of the crimes on the record. Appellant 

agreed to the facts of the case as recited to him and agreed that he 

attempted to cause the death of the victim. Moreover, Appellant signed a 

written colloquy in which he acknowledged that trial counsel explained the 

elements of the offense to him and he was satisfied with counsel’s 

explanation. Appellant had no further questions for the trial court before 

entering his plea. Like the defendant in Molina, Appellant acknowledged in 

the written colloquy that he discussed with counsel the elements of 

attempted homicide, the factual basis for the charge, and how those facts 

proved the elements of that offense. See Molina. Appellant clearly stated 

in the written colloquy and at the plea hearing that counsel apprised him of 
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the elements of attempted homicide. To find otherwise, we would have to 

conclude that Appellant lied at the plea hearing and counsel induced those 

lies. Appellant cannot rely upon such argument. See Rogers. Based upon 

a totality of the circumstances, including Appellant’s written 

acknowledgment that defense counsel explained the elements of the offense 

to him and our review of the plea proceeding as a whole,3 we agree there is 

no merit to Appellant’s first ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Hence, 

we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in denying Appellant relief.

Next, Appellant claims defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 

advise him that he had a defense of voluntary intoxication. Appellant’s Brief 

at 24. We disagree.

This Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Williams, 730 A.2d 507 

(Pa. Super. 1999) is directly on point. Therein, we concluded:

Our legislature has declared that a voluntarily inflicted 

drugged or intoxicated condition will not serve to exonerate 

or excuse criminal conduct. This declaration is embodied in 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 308, which provides:

§ 308. Intoxication or drugged condition

Neither voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged 

condition is a defense to a criminal charge, nor may 

evidence of such conditions be introduced to negate 

____________________________________________

3 At the hearing on Appellant’s PCRA petition, defense counsel testified he 

explained to Appellant the Commonwealth’s evidence could prove specific 

intent because Appellant left the scene to retrieve the weapons before using 

them, the bullet hole trajectories showed the shots were fired higher than 

leg level, and Appellant fled the scene thereafter. N.T., 4/11/2015, at 19-

20. For this additional reason, we find no merit to Appellant’s first claim. 
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the element of intent of the offense, except that 

evidence of such intoxication or drugged condition of 

the defendant may be offered by the defendant 

whenever it is relevant to reduce murder from 

a higher degree to a lower degree of murder.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 308 (emphasis added). Mr. Williams argues 

that since evidence of voluntary intoxication may be offered 

to negate the specific intent to kill in a first-degree murder 

prosecution it may likewise be offered in an attempted 

murder in the first-degree prosecution. We disagree.

While this novel argument has a certain logical appeal it is 

nonetheless misplaced. As § 308 clearly dictates the only 

legal significance of the voluntary consumption of alcohol is 

when it “is relevant to reduce murder from a higher degree 

to a lower degree of murder.” Id. In an attempted murder 

case the lowering of the degree is logically impossible. 

There simply is no such crime as attempted second or third 

degree murder.

In Commonwealth v. Griffin, 456 A.2d 171 (Pa. Super. 

1983) we ordered a new trial because the trial court 

improperly instructed the jury that it could find Mr. Griffin 

guilty of attempted first degree murder if it found an 

intention to commit murder of any degree. We explained 

why such crimes are impossible as follows:

The question squarely presented to us is whether 

someone can attempt to commit murder of the 

second or third degree. We think not. A person 

commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a 

specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a 

substantial step toward the commission of that 

crime. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901. Murder of the second or 

third degree occurs where the killing of the victim is 

the unintentional result of a criminal act. Thus, an 

attempt to commit second or third degree murder 

would seem to require proof that a defendant 

intended to perpetrate an unintentional killing which 

is logically impossible. While a person who only 

intends to commit a felony may be guilty of second 

degree murder if a killing results, and a person who 

only intends to inflict bodily harm may be guilty of 
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third degree murder if a killing results; it does not 

follow that those persons would be guilty of 

attempted murder if a killing did not occur. They 

would not be guilty of attempted murder because 

they did not intend to commit murder they only 

intended to commit a felony or to commit bodily 

harm.

Id. at 177.

The Griffin panel then cites to an example from the 

Handbook on Criminal Law, by LaFave and Scott, to further 

illustrate why it is necessary to prove an intent to kill in 

order to sustain the charge of attempted murder:

Some crimes, such as murder, are defined in terms 

of acts causing a particular result plus some mental 

state which need not be an intent to bring about that 

result. Thus, if A, B, and C have each taken the life 

of another, A acting with intent to kill, B with an 

intent to do serious bodily injury, and C with a 

reckless disregard of human life, all three are guilty 

of murder because the crime of murder is defined in 

such a way that any one of these mental states will 

suffice. However, if the victims do not die from their 

injuries, then only A is guilty of attempted murder; 

on a charge of attempted murder it is not sufficient 

to show that the defendant intended to do serious 

bodily harm or that he acted in reckless disregard of 

human life. Again, this is because intent is needed 

for the crime of attempt, so that attempted murder 

requires an intent to bring about that result 

described by the crime of murder (i.e., the death of 

another).

Griffin, 456 A.2d at 177; LaFave and Scott, Handbook on 

Criminal Law, § 59 at 428-29 (1972) (footnotes omitted). 

* * *

If we were to accept Mr. Williams' position that voluntary 

intoxication can serve to negate the specific intent to kill 

element of attempted murder we would be condoning the 

accused's voluntarily self-induced intoxication as a complete 

defense to a charge of attempted murder. Such a conclusion 
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is contrary to the prohibition of such defense expressed in 

§ 308. Therefore, we agree with the PCRA court that Mr. 

Williams' underlying claim has no arguable merit. 

Accordingly, trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 

failing to pursue a meritless claim.

Williams, 730 A.2d at 511-512. 

Here, the same holds true. Voluntary intoxication was not an available 

defense to attempted homicide. Thus, there is no merit to Appellant’s 

second ineffective assistance claim and we discern no error of law in the 

PCRA court’s denial of relief.

Order affirmed. Motion for enlargement of time for filing Appellant’s 

reply brief granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/7/2015