1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### ROC KWEL LINTER NATIONAL COR P

. ET AL


### . v . UNITE D STATE S ET AL


### . CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT No. 05–1 27 2. Ar g u ed D e cember5, 2006 —D ec ided M a r c h27, 2007 While employ ed a s a nengineer a tanuclea r wea p ons pla n trun b ypet i

t i oner Rockwe ll under aGo v e rnmentco nt r a ct , res p onden tS t one pre dic t ed th at R o c k w e ll’s sy stem forcr eatin gsolid “pon dc r e te” bloc ks from t o xic pond s l udge a n d cementwould notwork b e ca us e of prob

lems in piping t h e s l udge. However , Rock well s ucces s f ully ma de s uch blocks and discovered “i nsolid” ones only after Stone was laid off in 198 6. In198 9 , Ston e filed a qu i tam suit u n der the False Clai ms Act, w h i c hpr oh ibits su bmit tin gfalse orfr au dulen tpay m en t c l aims to th e United States, 31 U. S. C. §3 729( a); per m it s r e medial c i v il ac tion s to be br ou gh t byth e Attor n e yG e n e r a l, §373 0(a), orbypr iv ate in div i du

als in th e G o v e r n m en t’s n a me, §373 0(b)( 1 ); bu t eli m in ates feder a lc o u r tjur i sdic tionov er ac tion s “based u p o nth e pu blic di sc losu r e of al

leg ation s ortr an sac t ion s . . . , u n l ess th e ac tionis br ou gh t byth e At

t o rney Gene ra l or t h e pers on b r inging t h e a c t i on is a norigina ls o urce of t h e informat i on,” §37 3 0 (e)(4)(A). An “ o rigina l s o urce” “h a s direct and independent knowledgeof the inform ation on which the allega

tion s ar e base dan d h a s v o lu n tar ilypr ov i d ed th e in formationto th e Government before filing an action

. . . based on the information.” §3730(e)(4)(B). In 1996, the Gove rnment intervened , and, with Ston e, filed anamen ded c o m p lain t, w h i c hdid n o t alleg e th at S t on e’s predict e d piping-s ys t e m defectca us ed t h e ins o lid b l oc ks

. Nor wa s such defect mentioned in a statement of c l aims included in the final pret ria lorder, which ins t ea d a lleged t h att h e pondcret e fa iled b e ca us e anew forema nus ed a nins u fficientcement -t o-s l udge ra t i o. The j ury fou n dfor res p ondent s wit hrespectt o cla i ms coverin gt h e pon d c r e te alleg ation s, bu t fou n dfor Roc k well w i thr e spec t to all oth e r2 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES Sy llabu s cla i ms . The Dis t rictCourtdenied Rockwell’s pos tverdictmot i on t o dis m is s S t one’s cla i ms , finding t h a tS t on e wa s a norig ina ls o urce. The Tent h Ci rcuita ffirmed in pa rt , b u trema nded for t h e Dis t rict Courtt o det e rmine whet h e rS t one ha d dis c los e d his informa t i on to the Governme n t before filin g the acti on. The District Court found S t one’s dis c los ure ina d eq uat e , b u tt h e Tent h Circuitdis a greed a n d held t h a tS t on e wa s a norigi n a ls o urce. Held: 1. Section 3730(e)(4)’s original-sourcerequirement is jurisdictional. Thus , re ga rdles s of whet h er Rockwell conceded S t one’s origina l

source status, this Court must deci de whether Stone mee t s this juris

dic t ion a l r e qu ir emen t. Pp. 8–11.

2. Bec a u s e Sto n e does n o t meet §373 0(e)(4) ( B)’s r e qu ir emen t th at a r e latorh av e “ d ir ec t an d in depen d en t kn ow ledg e of th e in for m ationon which t h e a llega t i ons a r e b a s ed,” he is nota norigina ls o urce. Pp. 12–1 8. (a) Th e “in formation” to w h ic hsu bpar ag r a ph(B) speaks is th e in

for mationon w h i c hth e r e l ator ’ s alleg a t i on s ar e basedr ath erth an th e in for matio nonwh ic h the pu blic lydisc losed al leg atio n s th at tr ig

g e r e d th e pu blic -disc l osu r e barar e based. Th e su bpar ag r a phstan d

in gonits ow n su g g e sts th atdispos ition

. An d th ose “al l e g ation s” ar e n o t th e same as th e alleg ation s r efer r e d to insu bp ar ag r a ph(A), w h i c hbar s ac tion s basedo nth e “pu b l i c disc losu r e of alleg ation s or tr an sac t ion s ” w i thanex c e ptionforc a ses br ou gh t by“anor ig in al s o urce of t h e informa t i on.” Ha d Congres s wa nt ed t o link origina l

source status to informatio nunderl ying public disclosure it would have us ed t h eident i ca l phra s e , “ a l lega t i ons or t r a n s a ct ions .” Fur

t h ermore, iti s difficultt o unders t a n d w h y Con g res s would ca re w h e th era r e l atorkn ow s ab ou t th e in for m ationu n d er ly in ga pu blic ly dis c los e d a llega t i on when t h e rela t o r ha s directa n d independent knowledge of different in formation suppo rting the same allegation. Pp. 12–1 4. (b) Indeter m i n in gw h i ch“al leg ation s” ar e r e lev a n t , th at ter mi s n o t limited to “alleg a tion s” i nth e or i g in al c o mplain t, bu tin c l u d es th e alleg ation s as amen ded. Th e statu te spe a ks of th e r e lator ’ s “alleg a tion s,” simpliciter

. Absent some li mit atio nof §3730(e)( 4)’s require

ment to the initial compl a i n t, this Court will not infer one. Here, where t h efin a l pret ria lorder s u pers eded prior plea dings , t h is Court looks to the final pretri al order to determine or iginal-source status. Pp. 14–1 7. (c ) Ju dg ed accor d in gto th es e principles, Stone’s knowle dge falls short. The only false claims found by the jury involved i n solid pond

crete discovered after Stone left his employment

. Thu s , he did not kn owth at th e pon d c r e te h a d failed; he predicted it. And his predic

-3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s tion was a failed one, for Stone be lieved th e piping syste mwas defec

t i ve when, in fa ct , t h e pondcret e prob lem would b e ca used b ya fore

ma n’s a c t i ons a f t e r S t one had leftt h e pla n t

. S t one’s origina l -s ource s t at us wit hres p ectt o a s e pa ra t e , s p ra y-ir riga t i on cla i m did not pro

vide jurisdiction ove rall of his claims. Section 3730( e)(4) does not permitj uris d ict i on in gros s j u s tb e ca us e arela t o r is a norigina l s o urce wit hre s p ectt o s o me cla i m. Pp. 1 7

– 1 8

.

3

. The Go vern ment ’s int e rve n t i on in t h is ca s e did notprovide a n in depen d en t basi s of ju r i sdic tionw i thr e s p ec t to Ston e. Th e statu te dr aw s a sh ar p dis t in c t ionbe tw eenac tion s br ou gh t bya pr iv ate per

sonu n d er§3730(b) an d ac ti on s br ou gh t byth e Attor n e yG e n e r a l u n der§3730(b). Anac tionor igin allybr ou gh tbya pr iv ate per s on , wh ic h th e Attor n e yG e n e r a l h a s join ed, bec o mes anac tionbr ou gh t byth e Attor n e yG e ner a l on lyafterth e pr iv ate per s onh a s beenou sted. Pp. 18–2 0. 92 Fed. Appx . 708, r e v e r s ed.

S CALI A , J ., delivered t h e opinion of t h e Court , in which R OBERTS , C. J., and K ENNEDY , S OUTER , T HOMAS , and ALITO , JJ., joined. S TEVENS , J., filed a diss enting opinion, in which G IN SB U R G , J., joined. B REYER , J. , t ook no pa rtint h e cons idera t ion or decis i on of t h e ca s e ._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 27 2 

### ROC KWEL LINTER NATIONAL COR P ., ET AL 

### ., PETITION ERS v. UNI TED STAT ES ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE TENT H CIRCUIT [M ar c h27, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### delivered the opini o n of the Co urt. The False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§3729–3 733, elimi

nates feder a l-court jurisdiction ov er actions under §373 0 of the Act that are based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transacti ons “unless the action is brought by the Attorne yGeneral or the person bringing the action is an original source of th e informati o n.” §3730( e)(4)(A). We decide whether respondent James Stone was an original source. I The mixture of concrete and pon dsludge that is th e subject of this case has taken nea r ly two decades to seep, so to speak, into this Court. Giv e n the longhistory and the complexity of this litigation, it is well to describe the facts in some detail. A From 1975 through 1989, petitioner Rockwell Interna

tional Corp. was under a management and operating contract wi th the Dep a rtment of Energy ( D O E ) to run t h e Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant in Colorado. The mos t2 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### significant portion of Rockwell’s co mpensation came in the form of a semiannual “ ‘awa rd fee , ’ ” the amo unt of which depended on DOE’s evaluatio n of Rockwell’s performanc e in a number of areas, including environmental, safety, and health concerns. United S t ates ex rel. S t onev. Rock wel l Int’l, Corp., 92 Fed. Appx. 708, 714 (CA10 2004 ). From Nove mber 1980 through March 1986, Ja mes Stone worked as an engineer at the Ro cky Flats plant. In th e early 1980’s, Rockwell explored the possibility of disposing of the toxic pond sludg e that a ccu mulated in solar evapo

ration ponds at the facility, by mixing it with c e ment. The idea was to pour the mixture into large rectan g ular boxes, where it would solidify into “pondcrete” blocks that cou l d be stored onsite or transporte d to other sites for disposal. Stone reviewed a proposed manuf acturing process for pondcrete i n1982. He concluded that the proposal “would not work,” App. 175, a n d communicated that conclusion to Rockwell management in a writt en “Engineering Order.” As Stone would later explain, he believed “the suggested process would result in an unstable mixture that woul d later deteriorate and cause unwanted release of toxic wastes to t h e environment.” Ibid. H e b e l i e v e dt h i s b e cause he “f oresaw that the pi ping system” t hat extract ed sludge from the solar ponds “would not pro p erly remo ve the sludge and would lead to an inadequate mixture of sludge/wast e and cement such tha tthe ‘pond crete’ blocks would rapi dly disintegrate t hus creating additional con

tamination problems.” Id., at 290. Notwithstanding Stone’ s predictio n , Rockwell proceeded with its po ndcrete project and su ccessfully manufactured “concrete h a rd” pondc r ete duringthe period of Stone’s employmen tat Rocky Flats. It was only afte r Stone was laid off in March 198 6 that wha tthe pa rtie s have call ed “insolid” pondcrete blocks were di scovered. Accordin g t o respondents, Rockwell knew b yOctober 1986 that a sub

stantial number of pondcrete blocks were insolid, bu t3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### DOE did not become a w are of the problem un til May 198 8, when several pondcrete blocks be gan to leak, leading to the discovery of thousands of oth e r insolid block s . The media reported these discoveries, 3 Appellants’ Ap p. in Nos. 99–1351, 99–1352, 99–1353 (CA10), pp. 889–38 to 889–39; and attribute dthe malfunction to Rockwell’s reduction of the ratio of concrete to sludge in the mixture. In June 19 87, more than a year after he had left Rockwell’s employ, Stone went to the Federal Bureau of Inves

tigation (FBI) with allegation s of environmental crimes at Rocky Flats during the time of his employment. Ac cordin g to the courtbelow, Stone alleged t hat “contrar yt o public kn owledge, R o cky Flats accepted hazardous and nuclear waste from other DOE fa cili

ties; that Rockwell employees were ‘forbidden from discussing any contro versies in front of a DO E em

ployee’; that although Rocky Flats ’ fluid bed incinera

tors failed testing in 1981, the pilot incinerator re

mained on line and was used to incinerat e wastes daily since 1981, incl uding plutonium wastes which were then sent out forburial; tha tRockwell distilled and fractio nated various oils andsolvents although the wastes were geared for incineration; that Stone believed that the gro und wa ter was contaminated from previous waste burial and land application, and that hazardous waste lagoon s tended to overflow dur

ing and after ‘a good rain,’ causing hazardous wastes to be discharged without firs t being treated. ” App. to Pet. for Cer t . 4a. Stone provided the FBI with 2,300 pages of documents, buried among whichwas his 1982 engineering report predicting that the pondcre te-sy s tem design would not work. Ston e did not discuss his pondcrete allegations with4 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the FBI in their conversations. 1 

### Based in part on information allegedly learned from Stone, the Government obtained a searchwarran tf o r Rocky Flats, and on J une 6, 198 9, 75 FBI and Enviro n mental Protection Agency agents raided the f a cility. The affidavit in support of t h e warran t included allegations (1) that pondcrete blocks were insoli d “due to an inadequa te waste-concr e te mixtur e,” App. 4 29, (2) th at Roc k wel l obtained award fees based on its alleged “ ‘excellent’ ” management of Rocky Flats, id., at 98, and (3) that Rockwell made false statements and concealed material facts in violation of the Resou rce Co nservation and Recovery Ac t of 1976 (RCRA), 90 Sta t . 2811, 42 U. S. C. §6928, and 18 U. S. C. §1 001. Newspapers pub lished thes e allegation s. In March 1992, Rockwell pleaded guilty to 10 environ

mental viol ations, incl uding the knowing storage of insol i d pondcrete blocks in violation of RCRA. Rockwell agreed t o pay $18.5 million in fi nes. B In July 198 9, Stone fil e d a quitam suit und er the Fals e Claims Act. 2 

### That Act prohibits false or fraudulent claims for paymen t to the U n ited State s , 31 U. S. C. §3729(a), and author i zes civil actions to re medy suchfraud to b e brought b y the Atto rney General, §3730(a), or by priva t e individuals in the Government’s name, §373 0(b)(1). The Act provide s , however, that “[n]o c o urt shall have jurisdic

tion over an action u n der this s e ction based upon the public disclosure of allegations ortransactions .

. . from the news m e dia, unless the ac tion is brought by the Atto r ney General or the person bringing the actio nis an origi

-

——————

1 S t one cla i med t h e cont ra ry, b u tt h e Dist rictCourtfound t h a the had failed to est ab l ishth at fac t

.

2 Qui tam is short for “ q u i tam pro domino rege q u am pro se ipso in hac part e seq u i tur ,” whic hm e a n s “ who pur s ues t h is a c t i on onourLord t h e King ’s b e ha lf a s well a s his own.”5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### nal source of the infor m ation.” §3730(e)(4)(A). An “origi

nal source” is “an individual who h a s direct an d independ

ent k n owledge of the i n formation on which the all e gation s are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Govern ment before filing an action under this sectio n which is based on the i n formation.” §3730(e)(4)(B). Stone’s com p laint alleged that Roc k well was r e quired to comply wit hcertain federal and state environmental laws and regulations, including RCRA; that Rockwell commit

ted numerous violati o ns of thes e laws and regulations throughout the 1980’s 3 

### ; and that, in order t o induce the Government to ma ke p a yments orapprovals under Roc k

well’s contract, Rockwell knowingly presented false an d fraudulent claims to the Govern ment in vi olation of the False Clai ms Act, 31 U. S. C. §3729(a). As r e quired un de r the Act, Sto n e filed his complaint under seal and simulta

neously delivered to the Govern ment a confidential discl o sure statement describing “su b stantially all material evidence and information” in his possession , §3730(b)(2). The statement identified 26 environmental and safe ty issues, on ly one of which involved pondcrete. With respect to that issue, Stone explained in his statement that he had

——————

3 Th e law s an d r e g u lation s alleg e dly viola t e d included DOE Order Nos. 548 0.2 (D ec . 1982), 5483.1 a s su pe r s eded by548 3.1A (Ju n e 22, 198 3), an d 64 30.1 (D ec . 12, 198 3) (D O E Gen e r a l D e sig nCr iter ia M a n u a l); Colo. Rev

. Stat. §25– 5 –50 1 et seq
. (1 982) (Haz ar do u s Su bst a n c e s), 25– 7– 101 et se q . (198 2 an d S u pp. 1988) (Ai rQ u a lityCon t r o l Pr og r a m), 25– 7– 501 et seq
. (Asbesto s Con t r o l), 25 –15 –1 01 (Ha z ar dou s Was t e M a n a g e men tAc t, 25–8–20 1 (1982) (Wa t erQ u a lityCon t rol Ac t), 25–11

– 101 (1 98 2 an dSu pp. 1988) ( R adi ationCon t r o l), 29–2 2– 1 01 (Haz ar dou s Su bst a n c e In ciden t s), 25– 5– 503 (1 982), 2 5–8–5 06, 25– 8–6 08, 25 –15

– 308 through 25–15–310, and 29–22–108; the Occup ational Safe ty an d HealthAc t of 197 0, 29 U. S. C. §651 et se q . ; the Atomic Energy Act of 195 4, as amen ded, 42 U. S. C. §201 1 et se q . ; th e En er gy Reor g a n i zatio n Ac t of 1974, 4 2 U. S. C. §5801 et seq
. ; th e WaterPollu ti onPr ev en tion an d Con t r o l Ac t, 33 U. S. C. §125 1 et seq
. ; t h e Clean Ai r Act, 42 U. S. C. §740 1 et seq
. ; th e Safe D r i n k i n gWaterAc t, 42 U. S. C. §300f et seq
. ; and r e g u lation s promu l g ated u n d erth ese stat u t es.6 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### reviewed t h e design for the pondcrete syst em and had foreseen that the pipi ng mechanism would not properl y remove the sludge, wh ich in turn would lead to an inade

quate mixture of sludge and cement. In December 1992, Rockwell mo ved to dis m iss Stone’s action for lack of subje ct-matterj u risdiction, arguing th at the action was based on publicly disclosed al legations a n d that Stone was not an original source. The District Cour t denied the motion bec ause, inits view, “Stone had direct and independent know ledge that Rockwell’s compensation was linked to its compliance wit henvironmental, health and safety regulations and that i tallegedly concealed its deficient performance so that it would continue to receive payments.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a. The Government initially decli n ed to intervene in Stone’s action, but later revers ed course, and i nNovember 1996, the District Court gran ted the Government’s inter

vention. S e veral weeks later, at the suggestion of t h e District Co urt, the G o vernment and Stone filed a joint amended complaint. As relevant here, the amended com

plaint alleged that Ro ckwell violated RCRA by storing leaky pondcrete blocks, but did no t allege tha tany defect in the pipin gsystem (as predi cted by Stone) caused insoli d pondcrete. 4 

### Respondents clarified their allegations even further in a statement of claims which became part of the final pretri al order a n d whichs u perseded their earlier pleadings. This said that the po ndcrete’s in solidity wa s due to “an incorrect cement/sludge ratio used in pondcre te operations, as well as due to inadequate process controls and inadequate inspection proce d ures.” App. 470. It continued:

——————

4 In a ddit i on t o t h e pondcret e a llega tions , res p ondent s cha rged Rockwell wit hcon c e a ling prob lems wit h“ s alt c ret e ” (amixt ure of cementa n d salt fr om l i qu id w a ste tr eat m en t pr oc esses) an d “spr ayir r i g ation” (a meth od of disposin gof w a ste w aterg e n e rated byth e sew a g e tr eatmen t plan t at Roc k yFlats).7 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### “During the winter of 1 986, Rockwell replaced its then pondcrete foreman, Norman Fryb ack, with R o n Teel. Teel increased pondcre te produc tion rates in part b y , among other things, reducing the amount of cement added to th e blocks. Following the May 23, 1 988 spill, Rockwell acknowledge dthat this reduced ce ment-to

sludge ratio was a major contribu tor to the existence of insufficiently solid p o ndcrete blocks on the storag e pads.” Id., at 476–477. The statement of claims again did not mention the pipin g problem ass e rted by Sto n e years ea rlier. Respondents’ False Claims Act cl aims went to trial in 1999. None of the witnesses Stone had identified during discovery a s having re levant kno w ledge testified at tria l

. And none of the docu ments Stone provided to the Gov

ernment with his confidentialdisclosure statement was introduced in evidence at trial

. Nor did respondents allege at trial that the defect in the piping system predicted b y Stone caused insolid pondcrete. To the contrar y , duri ng closing arguments both Stone’s counsel and the Govern

ment’s cou n sel repeatedly expl ained to the jury that t h e pondcrete f a iled because Rock well’s new foreman used an insufficientcement-to-sludge ratio in an effor tto increase pondcrete p r oduction. The verdict form divided the False Claims Act count into several different claims corre sponding to different awardfee periods. The jury f o und in favor of respondents for the three periods coveringthe po ndcrete allegati ons (April 1, 1987, to September 30, 1988), and found for Rockwell as to the remaining periods. The jury awardeddamages of $1,390,775. 80, which the District Court trebled pursuan t to 31 U. S. C. §3729(a). Rockwell filed a postverdict motion to dismi ss Stone’ s claims under §3730(e) (4), arguing that the claims were based on publicly disclosed allegati ons and that Stone was8 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### not an original source. In respon se, Stone a c k n owledge d that his successful clai ms were ba sed on publ icly disclosed allegations, but asser t ed original-source st atus. Th e District Co urt agreedwith Stone. The United States Court of Ap peals for the Tenth Cir c uit affirmed in relevant part, but r e manded the case for the Distri ct Court t o determine whether S t one had disclosed his information to the Government before filing his qui tam action, as §3730(e)(4)( B) required. On remand, the Dis trict Court found that Stone had produc ed the 1982 engin eering orde r to the Government, but that the order was insufficient to communicate Stone’s allegations. The Distric tCourt als o found that Stone had not carried his burden of proving that he orally informed the FBI about his allegations before filin g suit. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the D i strict Cou rt’s conc lus i on and held (over the dissent of J u dge Brisco e) that the 1982 engineering order sufficed to carr y Stone ’ s burden of persuasion. 92 Fed. Appx. 708. We granted certiorari, 548 U. S. ____ (2006), to decide whether Stone was an original source. II Section 3730(e)(4)(A) provides that “[n]o court s hall have jurisdiction over an actio nunder this sectionbased uponthe public disclosure of allega

tions or tra nsactions in a crimin a l, civil, or adminis

trative hearing, in a congre ssional, administrative, or Government Accountin g Office rep o rt, hearing, audit, or investigation, or fr om the news media, unless the action is br ought by th e Attorney General or the per

son bringing the action is an origi nal source of the in

formation.” (Footnote omitted.) As discussed above, §3730(e)( 4 )(B) defines “original source” as “an individual who [1] h a s direct and independ

ent k n owledge of the i n formation on which the all e gation s9 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### are based and [2] has voluntar ily provided the information to the Government before filing a naction under this sec

tion which is based on the information.” As this case comes to the Court, it is conceded that the claims on which Stone preva iled were based upon publicly disclosed alleg a tions within the meaning of §3730(e)(4)(A). The question is whether Stone qualified under the original-source ex

ception to the public-disclosure bar. We begin with the possibility that little analysis is required in this case, for St one asserts that Rockwell conceded his original- s ource status. Rockwell respond s that it conceded no such thing an d that, e v en had it done so, the concession would have been irrelevant because §3730(e)(4) is jurisdictional. We agree with the latter proposition. It is true enoughthat the word “jurisdictio n” does not in everycont ext connote subject-ma tter ju risdic

tion. Noting that “ j u r isdiction” is “ ‘ aword of many, too many, meanings,’ ” we concluded in Steel Co. v. Ci tizens f o r Better Envi ronment, 523 U. S. 83 ( 1998), that establishin g the elemen ts of an offense was not made a jurisdictional matter mer e ly because the statute creating the cause of action was phrased as providingfor “jurisdiction” over such suits. Id., at 90 (quoting United Sta t esv. Vanness , 85 F. 3d 661, 663, n. 2 (CADC 199 6))

. Here, however, t h e issue is not whether casting the creation of a cause of action in ju risdictional te rms som e how limits the genera l grant of jurisdiction under which that cause of action would normally be brought, but rather wh ether a clear and explicit withd raw a l of jurisdiction withdr aws jurisdic

tion. It un doubtedly does s o . Ju st last Ter m we state d that, “[i]f t h e Legislature clearlystates tha ta th reshold limitation on a statute’s scope shal l count as jurisdictional, the courts and litigants will be duly instru cted and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.” Arbaughv. Y & H Corp. , 546 U. S. 500, 515–516 (2 006) (footnote omitted). Here the jurisdictional nature of the original-source re

-10 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### quirement is clear ex visce ribus verborum

. Indeed, we have already stated th at §3730(e)(4) speaks to “the powe r of a particu lar court” a s well as “the substantive rights of the parties.” Hughes Aircr aft Co. v. United Sta t es ex re l. Schumer , 5 20 U. S. 939, 951 (1997). Stone’s contrar yposition rests entirely on dicta from a single Court of Appeals decision, see United Sta t es ex re l. Fallonv. Accudyne Corp. , 97 F. 3d 937, 940–941 (CA7 1996). Accudynethought it signi f icant thatjurisdictio n over False Claims Act cases is conferred by 28 U. S. C. §§1331 and 1345 (the federal-ques t ion and United-State s as-plaintiff provisions of the J u dicial Code) and 31 U. S. C. §3 732(a) (the provision of the False Claims Act establishing federal-court ve nue and conferring federalcourt jurisdiction over relate d state-law claims), rathe r than §3730, which is the “section” referenced in §3730(e)(4). To eliminate juri sdiction, the court believed, it is those j u risdiction-conferring sections that would have to be referenced. We know of nothing in logic or authority to support this. The jurisdi ction-removing provision he re does not say “no court shall have jurisdic tionunder thi s section,” but rather “n o court shall have jurisdiction over an actionunder this section.” That is sur e ly the most natural wa y to achieve the desir e d result of eliminatin g jurisdiction over a category of False Claims Act actions

— rather tha nlisting all the conceivable provisions of the United States Code whose conferral of jurisdi ction is bei n g eliminated. (In addition to the provisions cited by the Accudyne c o urt, one might also have to mention the diver

sity-jurisdiction provis ion, 28 U. S. C. §133 2, and the supplemental-jurisdiction provision, §1367.) Accudyn e next observed that the pub lic-disclosure bar limits on ly who may speakfor the United States on a subject and who if anyone gets a financial reward, not the “categories of disputes that may be resolved (a real ‘jurisdiction al’ limit).” 97 F. 3d, at 94 1. But this is a classic begging of11 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the question, which is precisely whether th ere has been removed fr om the co urts’ juri sd iction thatcategor y of disputes consisting of False Claims Act qu it a m sui t s based on publicly disclosed alleg a tions as to which th e relator is not an original source of the inform ation. Not h

ing prevents Congress from de f i ning the “ c ategory” of excluded s u its in any manner it wishes. See, e.g. , 2 8 U. S. C. §1 500 (no jurisdiction over “any cla i m for or i n respect to which the plaintiff . .

. has pendin g in any ot her court any suit .

. . against the United Sta t es”). Lastly, Accudynea sserted tha t“the Sup r eme Court had held th at a similar reference to jurisdiction in the Norris-LaGuardi a Act, 29 U. S. C. §§101, 104, limits remedies rather than subject-matter jurisdiction.” 97 F. 3d, at 941 (citing Bu r lington NorthernR. Co

. v. Maint e nance of Way Employes , 481 U. S. 4 29, 444–446 (1987)). But the lan g uage of th e Norris-LaG uardia Ac t is in fact not similar. It provide s that “[n]o court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issu e an y res train i n g

orde r ortemporary o rpe rmanen t injunctionin any cas e involvingor growing out of a n y labor dispute .

. . .” 29 U. S. C. §104 (emphas is added). It is facially a limitation upon the relief that can be accorded, not a removal of jurisdiction over “any case involving or growing outof a labor dispute.” Here, by contr a st, the text says “[n]o court shall have ju risdiction over an a ctio n under this section.” Whether th e point wa s conced ed or not, the r efore, we may, and indeed must, decide whether Stone met the jurisdictional requirement of beingan originalsource. III We turn to the first requirement of original-source status, that the relator have “direct and independent k n owledge of the information on which the allegations a r e based.” 31 U. S. C. §3 730(e)(4)(B). Because we have not previously addressed this provision, several preliminary12 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### questions r e quire our attention. A First, does the phrase “information on which the allega

tions are based” refer to the information on which th e relat or’ sallegat i onsare based or the information on which the publicly disclosed a llega tionst hat triggere d the publicdisclosure bar are based? The parties agree it is the for

mer. See Brief for Pe titioners 26, n. 13; Bri e f for Unite d States 24, and n. 8; Brief for Respondent Stone 15, 21. But in view of our con c lusion tha t§3730(e)(4) is jurisdic

tional, we must satisfy oursel ves that the parties’ position is correct. Though the questionis hardly free from doubt, 5

### we agree that the “information” to which subparagraph(B ) speaks is the information upon which the rel a tors’ allega

tions are ba sed. To b e gin with, subparagra ph (B) standing on its own suggests that disposition. The relator mus t have “direct and independent k n owledge of the informa

tion on which the allegations are based,” and he must “provid[e] t h e information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the infor

mation.” S u rely the in formation one would e x pecta rela

tor to “pro v i de to the Govern ment before fili ng an actio n

. . . based on the information” is the information underly

ing the relator’s claims. Subparag ra ph (A) com p licates matters. As described earlier, it bars actions based on the “public disclosure of allegations or transacti ons” and provides an exception for

——————

5 The Court s of Appea l s have divi ded over the question. See United States ex rel . Laird v. Lock hee d Mar t in En g. & Sc ie nc e Servs

. Co. , 336 F. 3d 34 6, 3 53– 35 5 (CA 5 200 3) (desc r ibin gth e Co u r t s of Appe als’ divergent approaches). Onl yby demo ting the actual text of §3730(e)(4) to a footnote a n d then parap hrasingthe statute in a way that assume s his concl us ion ca n J US TI CE S TEVENS a s s e rt(wit houtf u rt her a n a l ys is ) th at th e sta t u te’s mean in gis “pla in .” See post , at 1, 2 (di ssen t i n g opinion).13 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### cases brought by “an original source of the in formation.” If the allegations refer r ed to in subparagra ph(B)’s phras e requiring “ d irect and i n dependent knowledge of the infor

mation on which the allegations a r e based,” a r e the sam e “allegations” referred t o in subparagraph (A ), then origi

nal-source status would depend on knowledge of informa

tion underlying the publicly disclosed all e gations. The principal textual difficulty with t hat interpr e tation is t hat subparagra ph (A) does not speak simply of “allegations,” but of “allegations or transactions.” Had Congress wanted to link original-source status to information underlying the public d i sclosure, it would sure ly have used the identi

cal phrase, “allegations or t r ansactions”; the r e is no co n ceivable reason to require direct and independent know l

edge of pu blicly disclosed allegations but not of publicl y disclosed transactions. The sense of the matte r offers stro ng addition al suppor t for this interpretation. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) bars actions based on p ublicly disclosed al legations wheth e r or not th e informationon which those al legations are b a s e d has been made public. It is difficult to understand why Congres s would care whether a r e lator know s about the information underlying a publicly disclosed allegation (e.g. , wha t a confidential source told a ne wspaper reporter about insolid pondcrete) when the r e lator has direct and independent knowledge of different information supporting the same allegation (e.g. , that adefective process would inevitably lead to insolid pondcrete). No t only would tha tmake littl e sense, it would raise nettleso m e procedural proble ms, placing courts in the positionof comparing the relator’s information with the often unkn owableinformation o n which the public disclosure was based. Where that latt er informationhas not been disclosed (by reason, for exam

ple, of a reporter’s desir e to protect his source), the relator would presumably be out of cou rt. To bar a relator wit h direct and i n dependent knowledge of information underly

-14 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### ing his allegations just because no one can know wha t informationunderlies the similar a llegations of some other person simply makes no sense. The contra ry conclusion of some lower cour ts rests o n the following logic: T h e term “i nformation” in subpar a graph ( B ) must be read in tandem with the term “infor ma tion” in subparagra ph(A), and t h e term “information” in subparagra ph (A) refe rs to the information on which th e publicly disclosed all e gations are based. See, e.g., United Sta t es ex r e l. Lai r dv. Lockheed MartinEn g. & Sci e n ce Serv s. Co., 336 F. 3d 346 , 354 ( CA5 2003). The maj o r premise of this reason ing seems true enough: “informa

tion” in (A) and (B) means the same thing. The minor premise, however—tha t“information” in (A) refers to th e informationunderlying the publicl ydisclosed allegations or transactions—is hi ghly questionable. T h e complete phrase at issue is “u nless .

. . t h e person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” It seem s to us more likely (in l i ght of the a nalysis set forth above) that the information inquestion i s the information under

lying the action referred to a few words earlier, to-wit, the action “based upon th e public dis c losure of a llegations o r transaction s” referred to at the beginning of the provision. On this in t e rpretation, “informati on” in subp aragraph(A ) and “information on which the allegations are based” in subparagra ph (B) are one and the same, viz. , information underlying the allegations of the r e lator’s action. B Having det e rmined that the phrase “infor mation on which the allegations are based” refers to the relator’s allegations and not the publicly disclosed al legations, we confront m o re textual ambiguity: Whichof the relator’s allegations are the relevant ones? Stone’ s allegations changed du ring the co urse of the litigation, yet he asks that we look only to his original complaint. Rockwell15 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### argues that Stone must satisfy the original-s ource excep tion through all stages of the litigation. In our view , the term “ a llegations” is not limited to the allegations of the original complaint. It includes (at a minimum) the allegati ons in the original c o mplaint as amended

. The statute speak s not of the allegations in the “original complaint” (or even the allegations in the “com

plaint”), b u t of the relator’s “allegations” simp lici t er . Absent some limitationof §3730( e) (4)’s requirement to th e relator’s initialcomplaint, we will not infer one. Such a limitation would leave the relator free to p l ead a trivi al theory of fraud for wh ich he had some direct and inde

pendent knowledge and later amend the complaint to include theories copie dfrom the public domain or from materials in the Government ’s possessi on. Even the Government concedes that new a llegations r e garding a fundamentally different fraudul ent scheme require re evaluation of the court ’ s jurisdiction. Se e Bri e f for United States 40; Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. The rule that subject

- matter jur i sdiction “depends on the state of things atthe time of the action brought,” Mollanv. Torran c e , 9 Wheat. 53 7, 539 (182 4), does n o t suggest a different interpretation. The state of things and the originally alleged state of things are not s y nonymous; demonstration that the original al l e gations were false will defeat jurisdiction. An dersonv. Wa tt , 138 U. S. 694, 7 01 (1891); Morrisv. Gilm er , 129 U. S. 315, 326(1889). S o also will th e withdrawal of those allegations, unless they are replaced by others that estab lish jurisdi ction. Thus, when a plai ntiff files a complaint in federal co urt andthe n voluntarily amends t h e complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to dete rmine jurisdiction. See Wellness Comm unity-Nat. v. Welln ess House , 70 F. 3d 46, 49 (CA7 1995); Boelensv. Redman Ho mes, Inc. , 759 F. 2d 504,16 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### 508 (CA5 1984)

. 6 

### Here, we h a ve not only an amended complaint, but a final pretrial order that superseded all prior pleadings and “controll[ed] the subsequent cour se of the action,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 16(e). See Curtisv. Loether , 415 U. S. 1 89, 190, n. 1 (1974) (where a claim was not included in the complaint, but was in cluded in t h e pretrial order, “it is irrelevant that the pleadi ngs were never formally amended” (citing Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 15(b), 16)); Wilso n v. Muckala , 303 F. 3d 1207, 1215 (CA10 2002 ) (“[C]laims, issues, defe nses, or theories of d a mages not included in the pretrial order are waived even if they appeared in the complaint and, conversely, the inc l usion of a claim in th e pretrial ord e r is deemed to amend any pre v ious pleadings which did not include that claim”); Syriev. Knoll Int ’ l , 748 F. 2d 304, 308 (CA5 1984) (“[I]ncorporation of a [n ew] claim into the pre-tri al order .

. . amends the previous pleadings to state [the new] claim”). In t h ese circum

stances, we lookto the allegations as amende d—here, the statement of claims in the final pretrial ord e r—to deter

mine origin al-source status. The Govern ment objects that this a pproach ris k s drivin g a wedge bet w een the G o vernment and relator s . It worries that futu re relators m i ght decline to “acquie s c[e]” in th e Government’s tac t ical decisionto narrow the claims in a case if that would eliminate jurisdiction with respect to the relator. Brief for United States 44. Even if this policy concern were valid, it would not induce us to determine

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6 Itis t rue t h a t , whenadef e nda n tremov e s aca s e t o federa lcourt based onth e pr esen c e of a feder al c l aim, anamen dme n t elimin at in g th e or ig in al bas is forfede r al ju r i sdic tio ng e n e r a llydoes n o t defea t jurisdiction. See Carnegi e - M ellonUniv. v. Cohill , 484 U. S. 343, 346, 357 (1 988); St. Paul Me rc ur y Inde mnity C o . v. Red Cab Co. , 303 U. S. 283, 29 3 (1 93 8). Bu t r e mov a l c a se s r a i s e for u m -man ipu l ationc o n c e r n s th at simp lyd o n o t ex istw h e nit i s th e pl aintiff who ch oos e s afederal for u man d th enpleads aw ayju r i sdic tionth r o ughamen dmen t.17 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### jurisdiction on the basis of whether the relato r is an origi

nal source of information underlying allegations that he no longer makes. IV Judged acc o rding to the principles set for t h above, Stone’ s k n o w ledge falls short. The only false claims ulti

mately found by the jury (and hence the only ones to which our jurisdictional inquiry is pertinen tto the ou t

come) involv ed false statemen ts with respect to environ

mental, saf e ty, and health compliance over a one-and- a half-year period between April 1, 1987, and September 30, 1988. As d e scribed by Stone and the Government in the final pretrial order, the only pertinent problem with re

spect to this period of time for which Ston e claimed t o have direct and independent knowledge was insolid pond

crete. Because Stone was no long er employe dby Rockwell at the time , he did not kno wtha tthe pondc r ete was in

solid; he di d not know that pondcrete storage was even subject to R CRA; he di d not know that Rockwell would fail to remedy the defect; he di d not know that the insol i d pondcrete leaked while being st ore donsite; an d, of course, he did not know tha t Rockwell made false statements to the Govern ment regar d ing pondcr ete storage. Stone’s pre d iction thatthe pondcrete would be insolid because of a flaw in th e piping system does not qualify as “direct andindependent knowledge” of the pondcrete defect. Of course a qui tam relator’s misunderstanding o f whya concealed defectoccurre d would norma lly be imma

terial as long as he kn ew the defect actually existed. B u t here Stone did not kn ow that the pondcre te failed; he predic tedi t

. Even if a prediction can qualify as direct and independent kno w ledg e in some cases (a point we need n o t address), it assuredly does not do so when its premise of cause and effect is wrong. Stone’s prediction was a failed prediction, disproved by Stone’ s own allegations. As Stone18 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### acknowledg ed, Rockwe ll was able to produce “concret e hard” pond crete using the machinery Stone said was defective. Accordin g t o respondents’ allegat i ons in the final pretrial order, th e insolidity problem was caused by a new foreman’s reductio nof the cement-to-sludge ratio i n the winter of 1986, lon gafter Stone had left Rocky Flats. Stone counters that his origina l -source status with respect to his spray-ir rigationclaim (which related to a time period different f r om that f o r his pondcrete clai m, App. 492) provided ju risdiction with respect to all of his claims. We disagree. Section 3730(e)(4) does not permit jurisdiction in gross ju st because a relator is an original source withrespect to some claim. We, along with every court to h a ve addres sed the question, conclude tha t §3730(e)(4) does not permit such claim smuggling. See United States ex r e l. Me renav. SmithKline Beecham Corp. , 205 F. 3d 97, 102 (CA3 2000); Hay sv. Hoffma n , 325 F. 3d 982, 990 (CA8 2003); Wang ex re l. UnitedS t atesv. FMC Corp. , 975 F. 2d 1412, 1415–1416, 1420 (CA9 1992). As then-Judge Alito explained, “[t]he plaintiff’s decision t o join all of h i s or her claims in a si ngle lawsuit should not rescue claims that would have been doomed by secti on (e)(4) if they had been asserted in a separate action. And likewise, this joinder should not result in the dismissal of claims that would have otherwise survived.” SmithKlin e Beech am , supra, at 10 2. Because Stone did not have direct and independent k n owledge of the information upon which his allegation s were based, we need not decide whether St one met the second requirement of original-sou rce status, that he have voluntarily provided the info rmation to the Governmen t before filinghis action. V Respondents contend that ev en if Stone failedthe origi

nal-source test as to his po ndcrete allegations, the Gov

-19 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### ernment’ s intervention in his case provided an independ

ent basis of jurisdictio n . Section3730(e)(4)(A) permits jurisdiction over an action base don publi c ly disclose d allegations or transac tions if the a ction is “br o ught byth e Attorney General.” Respondents say that an y inquiry into Stone’s orig inal-source status withrespect to amendments to the complaint was unnecessa ry because the Govern

ment had intervened, making thi s an “action brought by the Attorne yGeneral.” 7 

### Even assuming that Stone was an original source of allegations in his initial complaint, we reject respondents’ “int ervention” argument. The False Claims Act contemplates two type s of actions. First, under §3730(a), “[i]f the Attorney General finds th at a person h a s violatedor is viol ating section 3729, t h e Attorney G e neral maybring a c i vil action under this section against the pe rson.” Second, under § 3730(b), “[a ] person may bring an a ction for a violation of section 3729 for the per s on and for the Unit ed States Government.” When a priv ate person brings an action under §3730(b), the Govern ment may elect to “p r o ceed withthe ac tion,” §3730(b)(4)(A), or it ma y “declin[e] to take over the action, in which ca se the person bringing t h e action shall have the right to co nduct the a ction,” §3730(b)(4)(B). The statute thus draws a sharp distinction between actions brought b y the Attorney General under §373 0(a) and actions brought by a private person un der §3730(b). An action brought by a private person does not become one brought by the Government just because the Government intervenes and elects to “proceed with the action.” Section 3730 elsewhere refers to t h e Govern ment’s “p roceed[ing] w i th an acti on brought b y a person under subsection (b)”—w hich ma kes crystal clea r the distinction between actions brought by

——————

7 The Go vernm entincludes as i gnifica n tcavea t : In it s view, int e rve n t i on does notcure a n y pre-e xis t ing defect s in S t one’s init ia l compla int ; it only cures d efects resulting fr om amend m ents to the pleadings.20 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the Govern ment and actions brought by a relator where the Govern ment intervenes but does not oust the relator. Does this conclusion c a st into doubt the courts’ ju risdic

tion with r e spect to the Gove rnment as well? After all, §3730(e)(4)( A) bars ju risdiction over any action brought under §3730, as this o n e was, unl ess the acti on is brought (1) by the Attorney General or ( 2 ) by an original source; and we have concluded that this is broughtby neither

. Not even petitioners have suggested the bi zarre result that the Go vernment’s judgment must be set aside. It i s readily enough avoide d, as common sense su ggests it must be, by holding that an action originally brought by apri

vate person , which the At torney General has joined, be

comes an action brough t by the Attorney General once the private per s on has been determined to lack the jurisdi c tional prerequisites forsuit. The outcome would be simi

lar to tha tfrequentlyproduced in diversity

- jurisdiction cases, where the “courts of appeals .

. . have the authority to cure a jurisdictional defe ct by dismissing adispensabl e nondiverse party.” Gr upo Dataflu x v. Atlas G lobal Group , L. P. , 541 U. S. 567, 573 (2004) (citing Ne wman- Gre e n , Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain , 490 U. S. 826, 837 (1989)); see United S t a t es Steel Cor p . v. EPA , 614 F. 2d 843, 845 (CA3 1979) (“[T]here are in stances when an interv enor’s claim does not rise and fall w i th the claim of the original party” ) ; 7C C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, FederalPractice and Procedure §1920, p. 491 (2d ed. 1986) (“[A]n interveno r can proceed to decision after a dismissal of the original action .

. . if there are independent grounds for jurisdiction of the intervenor’s claim”). Wha tis cu red here, by th e jurisdictional ruling regarding Sto n e’s claim, is the char

acterization of the action as one brought by an origina l source. The elim inatio n of Stone l e aves in pla c e an action pursued only by the Attorney General, that ca n reasonabl y be regarde das being“brough t” by him forpurposes of §3730(e)(4)( A).21 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### * * * We hold that the District Court lacked juris d iction to enter judg ment in favor of Stone. We reverse the Tenth Circuit’s ju dgment to t h e contrary

. It is so orde red. J USTICE 

### B RE YE R

### took no part in the consideration or decision of t h is case._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 27 2 

### ROC KWEL LINTER NATIONAL COR P ., ET AL 

### ., PETITION ERS v. UNI TED STAT ES ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE TENT H CIRCUIT [M ar c h27, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### , wit hwhom J USTICE 

### G INSBURG

### joins , dissenting. Any p r ivat e citizen may bring anaction to enforce th e False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. § § 3729–3733 , unless the informationon which his all e gations are bas ed is already in the public domain. Even if the information is publicly available, h o wever, the citizen ma y still sue i f he was a n “original source” of th at info rmation. §3730( e)(4)(A) (“No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations o r transaction s . . . unless the action is brought by the Attor

ney General or the person bringing the actio nis an origi

nal source of the information”). Because I believe th e Court has misinterpreted these provisions to require that an “original source” in a qui tam action have k n owledge of the actual facts under lying the a llegations on whichh e may ultimately prevail, I respectfully dissent . In my view, a plain rea d ing of the statute’s provisions

— specifically, §§3730(e)(4)(A) and (B)—makes clear that it is the information underlying the publicly disclosed all e ga tions, not the information underlying the al legations in the relator’s complaint (original or amended), of which th e relator must be an ori ginal source. 1 

### Moreover, the stat

-

——————

1 Section 3730( e)(4)(A) sta t es that2 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### ute’s use of the article “an,” rather than “the,” in describ

ing the original source indicates that the relat o r need not be the solesource of the information. By cont rast , the majority’s app r oach suggests that th e relator must have kn owledge of actual fac t s supporti ng the theoryultimately proven attrial—in other word s, knowledge of the informatio n underlying th e prevailin g claims. See ante , at 17 (limiting the relevant jurisdictional inquiry to those “fals e claims u l timately found by the jury”). I disagree. Such a view is not supported by the statute, wh ich requires only thatthe relatorhave “di r ec t and independent k n o w ledge” of the information on which the publicl ydisclosed allegations are based and that the relator pro v ide such i n format ion to the Gove rnment in a timely manner. As I read the statute, the jurisdictional inquiry focuses on the facts in the public domain at th e time the ac tion is com m enced. If the process of discove r y leads to amended theories of recov e ry, amendments to the original complaint would not affect jurisdiction that was proper at the time of th e original fi ling. 2

——————

“ N o courts h a l l have j uris d ict i on over a na c t i on under t h is s e ct ion ba s e d upon t h e pub lic dis c los ure of a llega tions or t r a n s a ct ions in acrimina l, civil, or a d minis t ra t i ve hearing, inacongres s i ona l , a d minis t rat i ve, or Gover n mentAccount ing Of fice report , h e ar in g , au dit, orin v e stig atio n , orfr om th e n e w s media, u n less th e ac ti onis br ou gh t byth e Attor n ey Genera l or t h e pers on b r inging t h e a c t i on is a norigina ls o urce of t h e information.” (Footnote omitted.)

Sec t ion373 0(e )(4)(B) th enstates th a t

“ F or purpos es of t h is pa ra g r a p h, ‘ori gina l s o urce’ mea n s a nindividua l who ha s directa n d independentknow ledgeof the information on which th e alleg a tion s ar e ba sed an d h a s v o lu n tar ilypr ov ided t h e in for matio n to the Government before filing an ac tion under this section which is based on the information.”

2 The ma j o rit y ’ s a pproa ch re q u ires court s t o reeva l ua t e j uris d ict i on over a qu i ta m a c t i onb r oughtb ya norigina ls o urce every t i me t h e compla intis amended. S u c ha na pproa ch , t h e Gover n mentha s a r gue d , will interfere with its ab ilit y to ta ilo r the claim s advan c ed as i t see s a ppropria t e . By cont ra s t , undert h e a pproa ch I wo uld a d opt , t h e3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### In this case, as the Co urt points o u t, the fac t that Roc k

well was st oring thousands of insolid pondcrete blocks at the Rocky Flats facility had been publicly disclosed by th e news mediabefore Stone filed this lawsuit. Ante , at 3, 4. In my view, the rec o rd establishes that Stone was an original sou rce of the allegations p ublicly disclosed by the media in June 1989, even though he thought that the deterioration of the po ndcrete blocks would be caused by poor engineering rathe rthan a po or formula for the mix

ture. The search warrant that was executed on June 6, 1989, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) affi

davit tha t was released to the news media on June 9, 1989, were both based, in part, oninterviews with Ston e and on inf o rmation Stone had p r ovided to the Govern

ment, including the 1982 Engineering Order. With respect to earliermedi a coverage of the pondcrete leakage discovery in May 1988, however, Ston e’s status a s an original source is less obvious. Stone firstwent to th e FBI with a llegations of Rockwell’s environmental viola

tions in Ma rch 1986. App. 180. He subsequent ly met with several FBI agents over the course of several years. Id. , at 180–182. During those meetings he provided the FBI wi th thousands of pages of documents, including the Engineer

ing Order, in which he predicted that the pondcrete sys

tem design would not work. On t h e basis of that record, i t seems l i kel ythat Ston e (1) had “direct and independen t knowledge of the information on which the [publicly dis

closed] allegations [we]re based” and (2) voluntarily pro

vided such information to th e Government before filing suit. It is, however, his burden to establish th at he did so. Because there has been no findi n g as to whether Stone

—————— ju r i sdic tion al in qu ir y r e lates on lyto w h e t h erth e r e latorw a s anor ig i

na l s o urce of t h e informa t i on underl y ing t h e pub lic disclos ures , whic h ca n ea s ily b e det e rmined when a na c t i on is filed a n d need notb e r e v i sited du r i n glaterstag es of th e litig atio n .4 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### was an original source as to those public d i sclosures, I would vaca te and remand fo r a determination whether Stone was in fact an original source of the allegations publicly disclosed by the media in 1988 and 1989.