Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1705-CR-1150 | October 2, 2017 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Earl McCoy

McCoy Law Office

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Amy Morinskey,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 2, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A04-1705-CR-1150

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Circuit Court

The Honorable Thomas H. Busch, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79C01-1510-F5-24

Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Amy Morinskey appeals her convictions for possession of methamphetamine, 

as a Level 5 felony, and false informing, as a Class A misdemeanor, following

her guilty pleas. Morinskey presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

sentenced her.

2. Whether her sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offenses and her character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] This court previously stated the relevant facts and procedural history as 

follows:1

In January 2012, the State charged Morinskey, under Cause 

79C01-1201-FA-2 (“Cause FA-2”), with Count I, Class A felony 

dealing in methamphetamine; Count II, Class C felony 

possession of methamphetamine; and Count III, Class A 

misdemeanor, possession of paraphernalia. In May 2012, 

Morinskey pled guilty to an amended Count I, Class B felony 

dealing in methamphetamine in exchange for the dismissal of the 

remaining counts. Thereafter, in June 2012, the trial court 

sentenced Morinskey to twelve (12) years, with eight (8) years 

executed in the Department of Correction and four (4) years 

suspended to probation. One year of Morinskey’s probation was 

 

1

 Morinskey had previously filed a notice of appeal in a related cause, but we dismissed that appeal as 

untimely. We subsequently granted Morinskey leave to file a belated notice of appeal in this cause.
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to be served on community corrections. The trial court also 

recommended that Morinskey be placed in the Purposeful 

Incarceration Program.

* * *

On September 8, 2015, the State filed a Motion to Commit, in 

which it sought to revoke Morinskey’s community corrections 

placement. In the motion, the State alleged that Morinskey had 

failed to follow the trial court’s order to report to the Tippecanoe 

County Community Corrections to serve her executed sentence 

and had failed to pay the balance owed to them. The State also 

noted that Morinskey was not incarcerated in the Department of 

Correction or in the county jail. The trial court then issued a 

warrant for Morinskey’s arrest.

On October 18, 2015, officers from the Lafayette Police 

Department initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle in which 

Morinskey was a passenger. When questioned by the officers, 

Morinskey identified herself with a false name, attempting to 

avoid the arrest warrant issued for her. During a search of the 

vehicle, the officers found methamphetamine and drug 

paraphernalia. The officers ultimately figured out Morinskey’s 

true identity and arrested her. When the police booked 

Morinskey into the jail, they discovered a bag of 

methamphetamine on her person.

Subsequently, the State charged Morinskey, under Cause 79C01-

1510-F5-24 (“Cause F5-24”), with the following: Count I, Level 

6 felony possession of methamphetamine; Count II, Class C 

misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia; Count III, Class A 

misdemeanor false informing; and Count IV, Level 5 possession 

of methamphetamine (while having a prior dealing in 

methamphetamine conviction).
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On October 29, 2015, the State filed, in Cause FA-2, a petition to 

revoke Morinskey’s probation. On November 10, 2015, the trial 

court held an initial hearing on the probation revocation petition.

On December 29, 2015, Morinskey entered into a plea agreement 

that addressed Cause F5-24 and Cause FA-2. In regard to F5-24, 

Morinskey agreed to plead guilty to Count III, Class A 

misdemeanor false informing, and Count IV, Level 5 possession 

of methamphetamine, in exchange for the dismissal of the 

remaining two charges. As for Cause FA-2, Morinskey agreed to 

admit to the allegation contained in the State’s Motion to 

Commit in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the petition to 

revoke her probation in its entirety. Additionally, she agreed that 

sentencing would be open to the trial court’s discretion.

On February 19, 2016, the trial court held a combined hearing to 

address sentencing in Cause F5-24 and the Motion to Commit 

and probation revocation petition in Cause FA-2. . . . For Cause 

F5-24, the trial court imposed a four (4) year sentence for her 

Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine conviction and a 

224 day sentence for her Class A misdemeanor false informing 

conviction. The trial court ordered these two counts to be served 

consecutively to each other and to the executed term in Cause 

FA-2. . . . 

Morinskey v. State, No. 79A04-1604-CR-981, 2017 WL 218149, at *1-2 (Ind. Ct. 

App. January 19, 2017). This belated appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[4] Morinskey first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

sentenced her. Generally, sentencing decisions are left to the sound discretion 

of the trial court, and we review its decision only for an abuse of that discretion. 
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Singh v. State, 40 N.E.3d 981, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. “An abuse 

of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before the trial court.” Id.

One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing 

to enter a sentencing statement at all. Other examples include 

entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for 

imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and 

mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the 

reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are 

clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, 

or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law. Under 

those circumstances, remand for resentencing may be the 

appropriate remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the 

trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly 

considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007) (“Anglemyer I”) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 

(“Anglemyer II”).

[5] In its sentencing statement, the trial court identified as aggravating factors: 

Morinskey’s criminal history; her recent violations of both community 

corrections and probation; and her attempt to “avoid detection” by police. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 18. The court identified as mitigating factors: 

Morinskey’s guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility for the offenses; her 

mental illness; her remorse; and her difficult childhood. The trial court found 

that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and imposed an aggregate fouryear sentence.
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[6] Morinskey contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it “failed to 

consider the hardship Morinskey’s incarceration would have on her children.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 13. An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find 

a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating 

evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer I, 

868 N.E.2d at 493. Further, “‘[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a 

mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not 

obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.’” Id.

(quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)).

[7] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[m]any persons convicted of serious 

crimes have one or more children and, absent special circumstances, trial courts 

are not required to find that imprisonment will result in an undue hardship.” 

Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999). On appeal, Morinskey 

does not direct us to evidence of special circumstances in her case to support 

her contention. To the contrary, Morinskey points out that she “did not have 

custody of her children at the time of sentencing[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 13-14. 

Morinskey states only that she “maintained regular contact and visitation with 

her children” and that she was not a “‘bad’ role model for her children.” Id. at 

14. Morinskey has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

declined to find as a mitigating factor that her incarceration would be a 

hardship on her children.

[8] Morinskey also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it

“improperly considered [her] act of lying to police about her identity” as an 
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aggravating factor when it cited her attempt to avoid detection by police. 

Appellant’s Br. at 12. Morinskey maintains that, because her attempt to avoid 

detection by police was an element of the offense of false reporting, the trial 

court improperly considered that aggravator. In support of that contention, 

Morinskey cites to Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 852 (Ind. 2014), where our 

Supreme Court held that, “[w]here a trial court’s reason for imposing a 

sentence greater than the advisory sentence includes material elements of the 

offense, absent something unique about the circumstances that would justify 

deviating from the advisory sentence, that reason is ‘improper as a matter of 

law.’” (Quoting Anglemyer I, 868 N.E.2d at 491).

[9] However, even if the trial court’s consideration of Morinskey’s attempt to avoid 

detection were improper, “‘when a trial court improperly applies an aggravator 

but other valid aggravating circumstances exist, a sentence enhancement may 

still be upheld.’” Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) 

(quoting Hackett v. State, 716 N.E.2d 1273, 1278 (Ind. 1999) (internal citations 

omitted)). Morinskey does not challenge the other aggravators identified by the 

trial court in support of her four-year sentence, which is only one year more 

than the advisory sentence for a Level 5 felony. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b)

(2017). Again, the trial court also identified as aggravating: Morinskey’s 

criminal history, which includes two felony convictions, one of which is for 

dealing in methamphetamine, as a Class B felony, and six misdemeanor 

convictions; and her violations of community corrections and probation. 

Indeed, Morinskey was on probation and had a warrant out for her arrest when 
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she committed the instant offenses. We are confident that, had the trial court 

considered only those proper aggravators, it would have sentenced Morinskey

to four years executed. See Anglemyer I, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (holding remand for 

resentencing appropriate if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court 

would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that 

enjoy support in the record). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it sentenced Morinskey.

Issue Two: Appellate Rule 7(B)

[10] Morinskey also contends that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offenses and her character. As we have explained:

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an Indiana appellate court 

to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and 

the character of the offender.” We assess the trial court’s 

recognition or nonrecognition of aggravators and mitigators as an 

initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was 

inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2006). The principal role of appellate review is to “leaven 

the outliers.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 

2008). A defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or 

her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review. 

Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

Robinson v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1226, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[11] Morinskey maintains that “the facts and circumstances set forth in this case are 

mild compared to the fact patterns set forth in many methamphetamine or false 
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informing offense cases.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. She states that “[t]here were 

no victims.” Id. And she asserts that her failure to give officers her true name 

did not “significantly impact[]” their investigation into the offenses. Id. But the 

State characterizes Morinskey’s offenses as “notably egregious in the magnitude 

of resistance and disregard for authority.” Appellee’s Br. at 21. We do not 

agree with either Morinskey’s or the State’s description of the nature of the 

offenses. Rather, we simply note that Morinskey never voluntarily revealed her 

identity to police officers. Morinskey only admitted to her identity after an

investigating officer discovered her name by searching a database and finding a 

photograph and description of her unique tattoos. We cannot say that 

Morinskey’s four-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offenses.

[12] Morinskey also maintains that her sentence is inappropriate in light of her

character. In support, Morinskey merely states that her “criminal actions are 

directly related to her addictions to controlled substances” and she would like to 

seek substance abuse counseling. Appellant’s Br. at 14. But Morinskey’s 

substance abuse has spanned several years, and she failed to comply with 

community corrections following her 2012 conviction for Class B felony dealing 

in methamphetamine. Not only is Morinskey’s criminal history significant, but 

this is her second felony conviction related to methamphetamine. And, again, 

she was on probation and had a warrant out for her arrest at the time of the 

instant offenses. We cannot say that Morinskey’s sentence is inappropriate in 

light of her character.
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[13] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.