FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT MAY 2, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1513 6

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 03-00156 -CR- 1-1 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us CHARLES CRAWFORD JR., Defen da nt -Ap pe ll ee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ ( May 2, 200 5) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, MA RC U S an d P RY O R, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PRY OR, Circuit Judge: T his appe al pr es en ts tw o is sue s r eg ar din g th e ap pli catio n of the S en te nc ing Guidelines: (1) w hether the district court clear ly err ed when it found that Charles2

Craw ford Jr. did no t engage in m ore than m inim al planning when he participated in a five y ear schem e that defra uded the go vernm ent of $434 ,032 and invo lved over a hundred separate tr ansactions; and(2) whether the district court err ed when it granted a downward departure based on Crawf ord’ s restitution and rem orse, lack of c ri m ina l so phi sti catio n, and s ubst an tia l a ssi stanc e to the gov er nm en t, and be cau se th e lo ss to th e g ov ern m en t al le ge dl y ov ers ta te d C rawfo rd ’s cri m in al it y . Beca use both the large num

ber of transactions and the deliberate steps Craw ford too k to c om

ple te tho se tr an sa ct ion s c om pe l a f ind ing that C raw fo rd

did not m er el y take a dvanta ge of

asud de n op portun ity , w e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt c le ar ly erre d wh en itfou nd th atCrawfo rddi d n ot en ga ge in m or e th an m in im al pl an ni ng . W e furthe r co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a ppl y the c or re ct le ga l st an dard s re g ar d i n g s ev er al o f t h e g ro u n d s re l i ed up o n fo r d ep ar tu re . We v ac at e C ra wf o rd ’s se nte nc e an d r em an d th is c as e fo r re se nte nc ing in a m an ne r co nsi ste nt w iththe Guidelines both as interpreted in this opin ion and th e advisory m anner explicated in United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. —, 125 S. Ct. 738 (200 5). I. BACKG ROUND Craw ford owned and operated a food sto re in A tlanta, G eorgia, called “ Mr. Wi c k , J r . ” Al a r g e v o l u me o f C r a w f o r d ’s b u s i n e s s c a me f

r o m l o w - i n c o me cu sto m er s w ho p ai d f

or the ir f ood w ithvou ch er s f

ro m the G eo rg iaW om en ,3

I n f a n t s , an dC h i l d r e n ( WI C ) s up p l e me n t a l f o o dp r o g r a m. T h e WI C p r o g r a m, whi ch is ad m in is te redby stat e ag en ci es th atrece iv e fed eral gra nt s, as si st s l owin co m e p aren ts an d e xp ect an t m ot he rs in ob ta in in g n ut rit io n fo r th ei r ch il dr en . Participants in W IC r eceive vouchers that allow the bearer to purchase food in an am ount up to th e fa ce value of the voucher, and W IC vendors ty pically redee m vouchers for an am ount less than their face value. Cr aw fo rd w as appr oa ch ed

in 1996 by

E dw in K el le y , w ho o ff

er ed to se ll to Cr aw fo rd W IC vou ch er s th at

K el le y ha d purc ha se d f

ro m r es ide nts of

pub lic hous ing projects in A tlanta. C raw ford and Ke lley agree d that Craw ford would pay K el le y f or the vou ch er s inan am ount c los e to the f

ac e va lue of

the vou ch er s, Cr aw fo rd w oul d th enr ed ee m

the vou ch er s, and K el le y w oul d ke ep 60 p er ce nt o f the profits and giv e Cr aw ford 40 percent. Crawf ord and Kelley

engaged in over 100 tr an sa ct ion s ov er

af ive y ear pe ri od i nvol vin g vo uc he rs w ithatot al f ac e va lue of $43 4, 032. T he e xa ct

num be r of vou ch er s th at

Mr . W ic k, Jr . r ed ee m ed

f ro m the G eo rg iaW IC pr ogr am

is unkn ow n. In June 200 0, an anonym ous in form ant notified the Georgia W IC program of K el le y ’ s a ct ivi tie s. A n un de rc ove r inv es tig at ionle d to Cr aw fo rd ’ s arr es t i n Oc tober 2002 . In a w ritten plea agree m ent, Cr aw ford pleaded guiltyto an inf orm at ionthat c harg ed

that he , “ ai de d and a

be tte d by oth er s di d un law fu lly4

rece ive, c onceal and retain to his own use . . . vouchers with a value of m ore than One H undred ($100 .00) D ollars, knowing said assets and prop erty to have been willfully m isapplied and obtained byfra ud.” Cr aw ford agree d to forfeit an au tom obi le and $ 146, 092 in a Bank o f A m er ic a bank a cc ount and m ak e re sti tut ion to the Georgia W IC program in an am ount to be determ ined later. T he pr oba tio n of

fi ce r w ho p re pare d C raw fo rd ’ s P re se nte nc e In ve sti ga tio n Report (PS I) deter

m ined that the los s to the Georgia W IC program totaled $434 , 032 an d r ec om

m en de d r es tit

uti on t o th at

a ge nc y . C raw fo rd

did not dis put e th es e as pe ct s o f th e PSI. Th e PSI a ls o re co m m en de d t ha t Cr awfo rdrece iv e a t wo level enhancem ent in his o ffense le vel for “ m ore than m inim al planning ,” under U nit ed S ta te s S en te nc ing G uid el ine se ct ion2F 1. 1( b) (2 )( A ) & ( B) . A t the se nte nc ing he ar ing , Cr aw fo rd obj ec te d to the m or e than m ini m al planni ng enhancem ent and contendedthat, on eac h occasion, he took advantage of a sudd en oppo rtunity

when K elley

offer ed to sell him

W IC vouchers. Crawf

ord also m oved fo r a dow nw ar d de part

ur e ba se d onse ve ra l f

ac tor s, inc lud ing the e xte nt o f his re sti tut ionand h is a lle ge d la ck of c ri m ina l so phi sti catio n. T he dis tr ic t c ourt r ef

use d to appl y

the m or e than m ini m al planni ng enhancem ent. T he district court found th at, in each of the m ore than one hund red tr an sa ct ion s w ithK el le y , Cr aw fo rd “ too k a dvanta ge of

asit ua tio n and the5

oppo rt uni ty pr es en te d. ” Cr aw fo rd

“ ne ve r tr ie d to c onc ea l the of fe nse , nor w as he the one to start [the] schem e . . . . ” In a dditi on, the district court granted Cr aw fo rd ’ s m oti on f

or adownw ar d de part

ur e an d r ed

uc ed Cr aw fo rd ’ s of

fe nse level by four. In its order granting the downwar d departure, the district court stated that Craw ford’ s case f ell “ outsi de the heartland of other such cases” and that

“ all of the grounds taken as a whole war rant downward departure. ” T he district co urt the n se nte nc ed

Cr aw fo rd

to 60 m onths’ pr oba tio n and o rd er ed Cr aw fo rd

to m ak e $434 , 032 in r es tit

uti on t o th e G eo rg iaW IC pr ogr am . T he gov er nm en t ap pe al s bo th the de nia l of the m or e than m ini m al planni ng e nhanc em en t and the downwar d departure. II. ST AN DA RD OF RE VIEW T he r es olu tio n of

thi s a ppe al r equir es the appl ic at ionof tw o st an dard s of re vie w . F ir st, af

ind ing by adis tr ic t c ourt of

no m ini m al planni ng i s aque sti on o f fa ct that w e re vie wf

or c le ar e rr or . U nit ed

S ta te s v. W ar d, 222 F . 3d 9 09, 910 ( 11th Cir. 2000 ). W e cannot find clear error unless “ we are left w ith a definite and firm co nvi ct ionthat a

m ist ak e ha s be enc om

m itt ed . ” G la ssr othv. Mo or e, 335 F . 3d 1282 , 129 2 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ( ci ta tio n and quot at ionm ar ks o m itt ed ). A lth oughthe cl ear er ro r standard

is “ pur pose fu lly de fe re nti al to the dis tr ic t c ourt, w e ar e not required to rubber stam

p the district court’s f

indin gs sim

ply because they

we re6

entered. ” McL ennan v. A m . E urocopter Corp., Inc. , 245 F. 3d 40 3, 409 (5th Cir. 2001 ). Reviewfor cle ar e rror “ does not m ean no review .” U nited States v. P ace, 898 F.2d 121 8, 1227 (7th Cir. 1990), c ert. denied sub nom . C ialoni v. United St at es , 49 7 U.S. 1 03 0, 1 10 S. Ct. 3 28 6 (1 99 0) . T he se co nd s tandard

of r ev ie wis not

de fe re nti al . “ W e re vie wque sti ons of lawari sin g un de r the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s de nov o. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. Bu sh, 126 F. 3d 1 298, 129 9 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ( pe r curi am). Whe the r a fa ct or is a pe rm iss ibl e gr ound f or adownw ar d de part

ur e fr om the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s is aque sti on o f law. U nited States v. K im , 364 F. 3d 12 35, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2004). T his appe al doe s no t r ai se any iss ue of avio la tio n of

the S ixth A m en dm en t, as e xpl ic at ed

in Bo oke r, nor

doe s e ith er

party r ai se any iss ue of the appl ic at ionof the G uid el ine s inam an da tor y , r athe r than a dvi sor

y , f as hio n. B ec au se of

the fundam en ta l c hange in se nte nc ing appe al s e ff ec te d by Bo oke r, w e m

ust de te rm ine w he the r our

pr e- Bo oke r standard s f

or r ev ie w ing appl ic at ionof the S en te nc ing Guidelines still app ly . W e agre e w ith the Fifth Circuit that Booker does not alter ou r rev ie w of t he ap pl ic at io n o f th e Gui de li ne s. See Uni te d S ta te s v . Vil le ga s, — F. 3d —, 2005 W L 627963 at *4-5 (5th Cir. Mar. 17, 2005). A lthou gh Book er es ta bli she d a“ re as ona

ble ne ss” standard

f or the se nte nc e fi na lly

im pose d ona de fe ndant, 543 U . S. a t — , 125 S . Ct . a t 76 5, the S upr em e Co urt c onc lud ed in7

Bo oke r that di str ic t c ourts m ust sti ll co nsi de r the G uid el ine s inde te rm ini ng a de fe ndant’ s se nte nc e. I d. a t — , 125 S . Ct . a t 76 4- 65. N oth ing in Bo oke r sugg es ts that a r ea sona ble ne ss s tandard

sho uld gov er n r ev ie wof

the int er pr et at ionand ap pli catio n a s a dvi sor

y of the G uid el ine s by

adis tr ic t c ourt. S ee V ill eg as , — F . 3d at —, 2005 W L 627963 at *4. Booker did no t affe ct 18 U. S. C. section 374 2(f), w hic h m an da te s r em an d of any c as e in whic h th e se nte nc e “ w as im pose d a s a re sul t of an in co rr ec t a

ppl ic at ionof

the se nte nc ing gui de lin es . . . . ” I d. a t — , 200 5 W L 62 79 63 at * 5. Although under Booker, the S entencing Guidelines are an advisory rather than am an da tor

y r eg im e, the dis tr ic t c our

t r em ai ns o bli ge d to “ co nsul t” and “ take int o a cc ount ” the G uid el ine s inse nte nc ing : W ithou t the “ m andatory ” provision , the A ct n onetheless requires j udges to take ac co unt of the G uid el ine s to ge the r w ithoth er se nte nc ing goa ls. See 18 U. S. C.A . § 3553 (a) (Supp. 2004 ). The Ac t noneth eless requires jud ge s t o c on si de r th e Gui de li ne s “ se nt en ci ng ran ge est ab li sh edf o r . .

. the ap pli ca

ble cate gor

y of of fe nse co m

m itt ed by the applic ab le cate gor y of de fe ndant, ” § 35 53( a) (4 ), th e per tin en t S en te nc ing Com m issio n poli cy s t at em ents, the need to avoid unwarranted se nte nc ing dis pari tie s, an d th e ne ed to pr ovi de r es tit

uti on t o vi ct im s, §§ 3553 (a)( 1), ( 3), ( 5)-(7) (m ain ed. and Supp . 2004). And the A ct none the le ss r equir es j udge s to im pose s en te nc es that r ef le ct the se ri ousn es s of

the of fe nse , pr om ote r es pe ct

f or the law , pr ov id e j ust puni shm en t, a ff

or d ade qua te de te rr en ce , pr ote ct the pub lic , and effe ctively

provide the defendant w ith nee ded educational or vocation al training and m edical car e. § 3553 (a)( 2) (m ain ed. and Supp . 2004).8

Booker, 543 U. S. at —, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65. In short, a fter B ooker, “ [t] he district courts, w hile not b ound to apply the Guidelines, m

ust cons ult tho se Guidelines an d take the m

int o a cc ount

w he n se nte nc ing . ” I d. a t — , 125 S . Ct . a t 76 7. T his c onsu ltatio n r equir em en t, a t a m ini m um , obl ige s th e dis tr ic t c ourt t o ca lc ulate c or

re ct ly the se nte nc ing r an ge pr es cr ibe d by the G uid el ine s: Af ter Booker, the Feder al Sentenc i n g Guidelines rem ain an essential co nsi de ratio n inthe im

posi tio n of

f ed er al se nte nc es , a lbe it al ong w ith the f ac tor s in § 35 53( a) . Ase nte nc ing c ourt un de r Bo oke r sti ll m ust co nsi de r the G uid el ine s, and, suc h c o n s i d e r at ionne ce ssari ly r equir es the se nte nc ing c ourt t o c al cu la te the G uid el ine s se nte nc ing r an ge in the sa m e m an ne r as be fo re Bo ok er. United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1332 n.9 (11th Cir. 2005 ). In other w or ds, a s w as the c as e be fo re Bo oke r, the dis tr ic t c ourt m ust c al cu la te the Guidelines range acc urately . A m isinterpretation of the Guidelines bya district co urt “ ef fe ct ive ly m ea ns tha t [ the dis tr ic t c ourt] ha s no t pr ope rl y c onsu lte d th e Guidelines . . . .” U nited States v. H azelw ood, 398 F.3d 792 , 801 (6th Cir. 2005 ); accord V illegas, — F. 3d at —, 2005 W L 627963 at *7 (“ Although the district co urt onr em an d is not

bound b y

the G uid el ine s, it

m ust c onsi de r the m , and i n do in g s o, i t o rd in ari ly is re qu ire d t o c al cu la te th e p ro pe r Gui de li ne s ra ng e.”). A ft er it ha s m ad e thi s c al cu la tio n, the dis tr ic t c ourt m ay im pose am or e se ve re or m ore lenient sentence as long as the sentence is reasonable, see Booker, 543 U.S .9

at —, 125 S . Ct . a t 76 7 ( “ T he c ourts o f ap pe al s r ev ie wse nte nc ing de ci sio ns f or un reas on ab le ne ss .”), b ut th e req ui rem en t o f co ns ul ta ti on it se lf i s i ne sc ap ab le . III. D ISCU SSION Bo th o f the se nte nc ing de ci sio ns o f the dis tr ic t c ourt w er e er ro ne ous. T he dis tr ic t c ourt i gnor ed

the start lin g nu m

be r of tr an sa ct ion s be tw ee n C raw fo rd and K e l l e y o v e r

af i v e - ye a r p e r i o dan dC r a w f

o r d ’s a c t i o n s i n ma i n t a i n i n g th e s c h e me w he n it r ef use d to appl y

the m or e than m ini m al planni ng e nhanc em en t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso m isa

ppl ie d th e Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s w he n it gr an te d th e dow nw ar d de part

ur e. W e ad dr es s e ac h se nte nc ing e rr or in tur n. A . M ore tha n M

ini m al P lan nin g Se ct ion2F 1. 1( b) (2 )( A ) of the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s ( 2000 e dit ion ) m andates a tw o-level increase in the offense level for a defendant who has en ga ge d in“ m or e than m ini m al planni ng” f or the c om m iss ionof

the of fe nse . T he co m m en tary to the appl ic at ionins tr

uc tio ns i n se ct ion1B 1. 1 e xpl ai ns tha t this en hanc em en t i nvol ve s se ri al be ha vio r es pe ci al ly in fi nanc ia l c ri m es :

“ Mor e than m ini m al planni ng” m eans m or e planni ng than is ty pic al f or co m m issio n of the offense in a sim ple form . “ More than m inim al planni ng” a ls o ex is ts i f sig nif ic an t a ff irm at ive ste ps w er e take n to co nc eal th e o ffen se . . . .

“ Mor e than m ini m al planni ng” is dee m ed pr es en t i n any c as e inv olv ing repeate d acts over a per iod of tim e, unless it is clear that each instance10

w as pur el y

opp ortun e. C onse que ntl y , t his ad j ustm en t w ill appl y es pe ci al ly f re que ntl y in pr ope rty

of fe nse s. In a theft, going to a secluded area of a store to conceal the stolen item in o ne ’ s po ck et

w oul d no t a lon e co nst itu te m or e than m ini m al planni ng. H ow ev er , re pe at ed ins tanc es of suc h thef ts on seve ra l occ as ion s w oul d co ns ti tu te m or e th an m in im al pl an ni ng . . . . In an em bezzlem ent, a

single taking accom

plish ed by a false bookentry w oul d c onst itu te onl y

m ini m al planni ng. O n th e oth er ha nd, c re at ing pur ch as e or de rs to, and i nvoi ce s f ro m , adum

m y c or por at ionf

or m erchandise that wa s never deli v er ed would constitu te m ore than m inim al planning , a s would several instances of taking m oney , e ach ac co m panie d by f al se e ntr ie s. U. S. S. G. § 1B1.1 cm

t. n. 1(f). “ [C] omm entary in the Guidelines Manual that int er pr et s or e xpl ai ns a

gui de lin e is a

uth or itativ e unl es s it

vio la te s th e Co nst itu tio n or a fe deral statute, or is inconsi stent with, or a plainly err oneous rea ding of, that gui de lin e. ” S tin son v. U nit ed S ta te s, 508 U . S. 36, 38, 113 S . Ct . 191 3, 191 5 (1 99 3) . T he inquir

y f or m or e than m ini m al planni ng i s no t l im ite d to the e le m en ts o f a particular offense or the c om pletion of the offe nse itself. Aseries of a cts “ that tog ethe r co nst itu te asin gle of fe nse und er

apart ic ular cr im ina l st at ute doe s no t the re by c ea se to be ase ri es of

a ct s un de r the ‘ m or e than m ini m al planni ng’ gui de lin e . . . ; su chr ep eate d a ct s in dic at e gr eate r cu lpa bil ity and are in fa ct

the targ et of the ‘ m or e than m ini m al planni ng’ e nhanc em en t. ” Bu sh, 126 F . 3d at 13 0011

n. 1. W e ha ve , f

or e xa m ple , r ej ec te d an arg um en t tha t “ thr ee se parate ins tanc es of em bezzlem ent shou ld be deem ed to be a single act for purposes of the ‘ m ore than m ini m al planni ng’ gui de lin e, be ca use the se parate ins tanc es of e m be zz le m en t co nst itu te one ‘ of

fe nse . ’ ” I d. T he e nhanc em en t r eq uir es “ a m or e hol ist ic vie w ” of the de fe ndant’ s c ondu ct

“ in l igh t of

the e nti re sc he m e . . . e nga ge d inby [ the de fe ndant] in or de r to c om m it the of fe nse . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. D uc los , 214 F . 3d 2 7, 32 (1st Cir. 2000). If the governm ent proves that an offense involv ed repeate d acts over a pe rio d o f ti m e, m or e th an m in im al pl an ni ng is “ de em edpre se nt .” U.S.S.G. § 1B 1. 1 c m t. n. 1( f) . P ut anothe r w ay , apr es um pti on o f m or e than m ini m al planni ng ar ise s w he ne ve r re pe at ed a ct s ov er ape ri od o f tim e ar e pr ove d. T ha t pr es um pti on can be re butted, however, if it is clear that each instance w as “purely oppo rtune.” If , f or e xa m ple , se ve ra l f

ra udul en t transa ct ion s oc cur ove r a pe ri od o f tw o y ears , m or e than m ini m al planni ng w ill be de em ed pr es en t un le ss i t i s c le ar

that e ac h on e of the se ve ra l transa ct ion s w as pur el y opp ortun e. C f. U nit ed

S ta te s v. Mc Co y , 242 F.3 d 3 99 , 40 5 n .10 (D.C. Cir . 20 01 ). T he e nhanc em en t f

or m or e than m ini m al planni ng i s an a cknow le dgm en t that “ purpos eful crim inal condu ct dem ands greater punishm ent” than conduct unde rt ak enw ith out

“ the opp ortun ity

to co nsi de r the c ri m ina lity of [ the ] a ct and i ts12

consequences.” U nited States v. S croggins, 880 F.2d 120 4, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989 ). Pl an nin g f

or apart ic ular of

fe nse or e nga gin g ina ct s to c onc ea l the of fe nse ev ide nc es an aw ar en es s th at the a ct ion s are c ri m ina l and a dis re gard

f or the harm ful consequences of thos e actions. T he presum ption of m ore than m inim al plannin g for re peated acts is a r eflec tion o f com m on sense. Se rial behavior of a crim inal evidences his delib eration despite a lack of direc t evidence of his m ental op erat io ns . See Bu sh , 12 6 F .3dat 1 30 0. T he e xc ep tio n to thi s r

ule is narr ow . “ Pure ly

opp ortun e” m eans “ spur of the m om en t” c ondu ct , in re spon se “ to a sud de n, f ortui tou s op por

tun ity of w hic h th e de fe ndant t ook advanta ge w ith out de lib er at ion . ” Mc Co y , 242 F . 3d at 40 5 (citations om itted); see also United State s v. Rust, 976 F.2d 55, 57 (1st Cir. 1992); U nit ed S ta te s v. Mo na co , 23 F . 3d 7 93, 797 -9 8 ( 3d C ir . 199 4) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. L utz , 154 F . 3d 5 81, 590 ( 6thCi r. 199 8) . T he e xc ep tio n of pur el y opp ortun e conduct from

the m ore than m inim al planning enhancem ent refle cts the lesser cu lpa bil ity of de fe ndants w ho h av e not kno w ing ly

c onsi de re d th e co nse que nc es of th ei r act io ns . Cf. Bu sh , 12 6 F .3dat 1 30 0 n .1. T he e xc ep tio n a lso r equir es ac los e te m por al r el at ionbe tw ee n af ortui tou s oppo rtunity

and an act that takes advantage of the opportuni ty . A delay betwee n the oppo rtunity

and the act m akes it unlik ely that the conduct was im

pulsi ve,13

be ca use de lay a llo w s ti m e fo r tho ught ; de lib er at e ac tio n is “ slo w , unhur ri ed , and steady as though allowing tim e for dec ision on each individ ual action invo lved.” Merr iam -W ebster’ s Collegiate Dictionary 304 (10th ed. 2001 ). D irect e vidence that the de fe ndant d el ibe rate d a bout or planne d hi s a ct ion s be fo re he too k advanta ge of

an op portun ity

w ill a lso ne ga te the inf

er en ce . S ee Mc Co y , 242 F . 3d at 405. T he exception for purely oppo rtune conduct will not app ly unless each re pe at ed a ct w as und er

take n im pul siv el y and w ith out

de lib er at ion . The district court f

ound that each of the over 100 in stances in which Cr aw fo rd bou ght vou ch er s f

ro m K el le y w as pur el y

opp ortun e. T ha t de te rm inatio n w as c le ar ly

e rr one ous. T he she er

num be r of tr an sa ct ion s a lon e m ak es it hig hly unl ike ly that e ac h tr an sa ct ionw as pur el y opp ortun e. C raw fo rd

w ro te 184 c he ck s to Kell ey be twee n Ap ril 12 , 19 96 , and Marc h 2 2, 2 00 1, t ot al in g $ 43 4,0 32 . C r a w f o r d ’s c o u n s e l a s s e rt e da tth e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g th a t “e a c h an de v e ry t i me [K el le y sol d W IC vou ch er s to Cr aw fo rd ] Mr . Cr aw fo rd tho ught it w as the la st ti m e,” bu t t ha t as se rti on , alt ho ug h i nc red ib le , m is se s t he po in t. O ve r ne ar ly

f ive y ears , Cr aw fo rd

ha d m an y

opp ortun iti es to co nsi de r the co nse que nc es of

his a ct ion s, y et

he did not vol unt ar ily

c ea se his part ic ipatio n in the schem e. O n 184 occasions, Crawf ord wrote K elley

checks for the W IC vouchers. A fter he cashed or deposited th e checks, Ke lley returned to the store14

with the 40 percent share he owed Cr aw ford. That delay in the rece ipt of his sh are ga ve Cr aw fo rd

ti m e to c onsi de r his a ct ion s. C ra w fo rd a lso ha d th e oppo rt

uni ty to deliberate w hether to redeem the W IC vouchers. That delay presented y et another op po rtu ni ty for Cra wfo rdto co ns id er t he si gn ifi can ce an d i ll eg al it y of h is co nd uc t. Cr aw fo rd ’ s r ec ei pt, c onc ea lm en t, and r et en tio n f or his ow n us e of

f ra udul en tly obtained WI C vouchers to defraud the W IC program of $434,032 canno t be called

“ spur of the m om en t c ondu ct , in re spon se to a sudd en , f ortui tou s op portun ity

of w hic h [ Cr aw fo rd ] too k a dvanta ge w ith out de lib er at ion . ” Mc Co y , 242 F . 3d at 40 5 (citations om itted). T he district court clearly err ed when it deter

m ined that Crawf or d d idno t en ga ge in m or e th an m in im al pl an ni ng .

B . D ow nw ard D ep arture At his sentencing hearing, Crawf ord asserted severa l ground s for a dow nw ar d de part

ur e fr om his appl ic ab le gui de lin e range . C raw fo rd f ir st contended th at although he m ade $140,000 from the voucher schem e, he turned ov er ro ug hl y

$2 00 ,00 0 p lu s t he pro ceed s o f th e sa le of h is st or e to th e g ov ern m en t. Craw ford argued that he w as thus eligi ble for a depar ture based on extraordinary ac ce ptanc e of

r es pons ibi lity

and e xtr ao rd inary

r em or se . C raw fo rd

a lso sou ght

a de part ur e on thr ee oth er

gr ound s: ( 1) la ck

of c ri m ina l so phi sti catio n, be ca use he pa id K el le y

by e as ily -tra ce d c he ck s in ste ad of c as h; ( 2) a ssi stanc e to the15

governm ent, e ven thou gh the go vernm ent did no t file a substantial assistance m oti on; and ( 3) that the a m ount of los s ov er state d C raw fo rd ’ s c ri m ina lity and t ook his c as e out sid e the he ar

tland o f sim ilar ca se s. C raw fo rd arg ue d th at

a ll of the se factors, along with the extraordinary rem orse fac tor, c ouldbe com bined to j ustify anof fe nse le ve l tha t w oul d a llo wpr oba tio n. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d adownw ar d de part ur e an d he ld tha t “ al l of

the gr ound s take n a s aw hol e w ar rant a downw ar d de part

ur e” be ca use the c as e fe ll

“ out sid e the he ar

tland o f oth er

suc h c as es . ” T he dis tr ic t c ourt ba se d it s de ci sio n on “ac om

bin at ionof

f ac tor s” but

e m pha siz ed Cr aw fo rd ’ s te sti m ony

a t the se nte nc ing he ar ing and C raw fo rd ’ s do na tio n to the gov er nm en t of the pr oc ee ds fr om the sa le of

his bus ine ss. A ft er

the downw ar d de part

ur e, Cr aw fo rd ’ s gu ide lin e range w as 0- 6 m onths, and the dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc ed Cr aw fo rd

to 60 m onths’ pr oba tio n and o rd er ed

him to pay $43 4, 032 in r es tit

uti on. Se ve ra l of

the gr ound s r el ie d up on b y the dis tr ic t c ourt w er e im pe rm iss ibl e gr ound s f or ade part ur e in c al cu la tin g th e advis or y gui de lin e range . E ac h of tho se error s rested on a m isund erstanding of the law. Bec ause the district court relied upona“ co m

bin at ionof

f ac tor s” to j ust if

y the downw ar d de part

ur e, w e cannot pr es um e that the dis tr ic t c ourt w oul d have gr an te d th e dow nw ar d de part ur e in the ab se nc e of

tho se e rr or s. T o gu ide the dis tr ic t c ourt onr em an d init s c al cu la tio n of16

ana dvi sor

y gui de lin e range , w e ad dr es s e ac h f ac tor in tur n. 1. E xtr ao rd inary

Re m or se and R es tit

uti on W e ha ve r ec en tly

he ld tha t e xtr ao rd inary

r em or se and r es tit

uti on i s a dis co ur ag ed

but not pr ohi bit ed

gr ound f or adownw ar d de part

ur e. K im , 364 F . 3d at 124 0- 41. I n K im , w e re

j ec te d th e int er

pr et at ionpr opos ed

by the gov er

nm en t that w oul d have de em ed

r es tit uti on i nvol unt ar

y if it is not don e be fo re the ini tiatio n of

c ri m ina l pr oc ee din gs. I d. a t 12 42 n . 9, 124 3. W e ins te ad a dopt ed a te st tha t c onsi de rs the de gr ee of vol unt ar ine ss, the le ngths t o w hic h th e de fe ndant w en t t o m ak e re sti tut ion , the pe rc en ta ge of f unds r es tor ed , the ti m ing of the re sti tut ion , and whe the r the de fe ndant’ s m oti ve sho w ed sin ce re r em or se and ac ce ptanc e of

r es pons ibi lity . I d. a t 12 44- 45. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t have the be ne fi t of the K im de ci sio n w he n it

m ad e its ruling that granted the downwar d departure. A lthou gh the dis trict court w as pe rm itt ed to ap ply ade part ur e fo r ex tr ao rd inary

r em or se in som e ci rc um stanc es , the r ec or d do es not

a llo wus t o sp ec ulate a s to howthe dis tr ic t c ourt w oul d have w ei ghe d a ll of

the K im f ac tor s. O n r em an d, the dis tr ic t c ourt m ust appl y the K im te st whe n it

c onsi de rs , in its c al cu la tio n of an a dvi sor

y gui de lin e range , w he the r to apply a downw ard departure based on th is factor.

2. L ac k of

Cr im ina l S ophi sti catio n17

Section 2F1.1 of the Guidelin es contains a two-level specific offense level charac teristic for off

enses com

m itted usin g extraordinary m eans. That en hanc em en t pe na liz es the use of sop his tic at ed

m eans, not

the use of unso phi sti cate d m eans. S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. S ch la en , 300 F . 3d 1 313, 131 9 ( 11th Ci r. 200 2) , c er

t. de nie d, 540 U . S. 853 , 124 S . Ct . 140 ( 2003 ). Ade fe ndant who use s un soph ist ic at ed

m eans i s no t t o be r ew ar de d f or la ck of im ag inatio n, but ins te ad a voi ds the e nhanc em en t. I d. L ac k of c ri m ina l so phi sti catio n is not a pe rm iss ibl e gr ound

f or adownw ar d de part

ur e in c al cu la tin g an a dvi sor y gui de lin e range. 3. S ubst an tia l A ssi stanc e to the G ove rn m en t T he G uid el ine s a llo wf

or adownw ar d de part

ur e “ [u ] pon m oti on o f the go ve rn m en t” if t he de fen da nt pro vi de d s ub st an ti al ass is ta nc e to th e g ov ern m en t. U . S. S. G . § 5K 1. 1. Ase nte nc ing c ourt c an not de part f ro m an a dvi sor

y gui de lin e range abse nt a

m oti on f ro m the gov er

nm en t. U nit ed

S ta te s v. F or

ne y , 9 F . 3d 1 492, 1499 (11th Cir. 1993). Beca use the gov ernm ent did no t file a substantial as sis tanc e m oti on, any

a ssi stanc e Cr aw fo rd

m igh t have pr ovi de d th e gove rn m en t wa s not a perm issib le ground for a downward departure in ca lculating an advi sory guid eline range. 4. L oss A m ount O ve rs ta te d C ri m ina lity18

T he c om m en tary to the G uid el ine s pr ovi de s th at , in a fe wins tanc es , the am ount of los s c al cu la te d un de r the G uid el ine s m ay ove rs ta te the se ri ousn es s of the of fe nse . U . S. S. G . § 2F 1. 1 c m t. n. 11. I f so, adownw ar d de part ur e can be ap pli ed . I d. T he e xa m

ple giv enis w he n ade fe ndant atte m pts to pa ss a

ne got ia ble ins tr um en t so obv iou sly

f ra udul en t tha t no one w oul d se ri ousl y c onsi de r hono ri ng it. I d. T he exam

ple sugg ests that this departure ty pically applies in cases wher e the re is no m eanin gf

ul c hanc e that the a tte m

pte d c ri m e w oul d have suc ce ed ed to the e xte nt i ndi cate d by

the state d lo ss. S ee , e . g. , U nit ed S ta te s v. L eR ose , 219 F. 3d 33 5, 339 (4th Cir. 2000). U nli ke the oth er

f ac tor s r el ie d up on b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt t o j ust if y the dow nw ar d de part

ur e, the r el ianc e on this f ac tor by the dis tr ic t c ourt w as not ne ces sa ril y

leg al ly erron eo us . This fact orcan be , in so m e ci rcu m st an ces , a perm issib le ground for a downward departure. Bec ause the other downward de part ur e er ro rs r equir e us t o va cate Cr aw fo rd ’ s se nte nc e, w e do n ot d ec ide whether the district court justifiably relied on this factor. W e note, howe ver, that the a m ount

of los s a ppe ar s pr opor

tio na te to the c ri m ina l a ct s c om m itt ed by Cr aw fo rd . C f. id. 5. S umm ary T he dis tr ic t c ourt c om

m itt ed se ve ra l l eg al e rr or s init s de ci sio n th at a19

dow nw ar d de part

ur e w as w ar

rante d. W e cannot

pr es um e that, in the abse nc e of those errors, the district court would have decided that a downwar d departure w as w ar rante d inc al cu la tin g an a dvi sor y gui de lin e range . W e re m an d th is c as e to allow the district court to revisit the downwar d departure issue under the correc t le ga l st an dard s. IV. C ONC LUS ION The district court cle arly

err ed when it re fused to applythe m ore than m ini m al planni ng e nhanc em en t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso m ad e se ve ra l e rr or s init s int er pr et at ionof

the G uid el ine s th at

le d to the downw ar d de part ur e. B ec au se dis tr ic t c ourts are r equir ed und er Bo oke r to c onsu lt the G uid el ine s, and b ec au se tr ue c onsu ltatio n c an not

be ba se d onan e rr one ous unde rs tandi ng o f the Gui de li ne s, t he di st ric t co ur t erredin fai li ng to co ns ul t p ro pe rly the Gui de li ne s. W e, therefor e, vacate C raw ford’ s sentence and rem and this case to the dis trict court for re sentencing. On r em and, the district court m ust calculate an advisory gui de lin e range that i nc lud es the m or e than m ini m al planni ng e nhanc em en t and co nsi de rs w he the r to g rant a downw ar d de part

ur e fr om that a dvi sor

y gui de lin e ran ge co ns is te nt wit h t hi s o pi ni on . VACATED AND REMANDED.20

E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, c onc ur s inthe r es ult that the se nte nc e shou ld be va cate d and the c as e re m an de d f or r es en te nc ing .