alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 99.1

In connection with the Quarterly Report of BostonFed Bancorp, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I David F. Holland, Chief Executive Officer of the company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my
knowledge and belief:



|1. |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                                                              
|-- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  
|2. |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by the
Report.



| | /s/ David F. Holland

Chief Executive Officer
November 14, 2002
| | ---------------------------------------------------------------
#### Pierre Turner, Respondent, v City of New York, Respondent, and Jordan Construction Products Corp. et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[735 NYS2d 551]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan Madden, J.), entered January 18, 2000, which, to the extent appealed from, denied the separate motions of defendants Jordan Construction Products Corp. and Outdoor Designs, Inc. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motions granted and the action severed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants-appellants dismissing the complaint as against them.

Plaintiff allegedly was injured when he herniated a disc while attempting to open a window recently installed by defendant Jordan Construction and its subcontractor defendant Outdoor Designs.

The motion court’s finding that the window was operable, despite appearances to the contrary, is belied by the record. There is undisputed testimony that a ventilation duct ran through the upper frame of the window; that the lower frame had been rendered inoperable specifically to prevent the lower window from being opened; and, that, in any event, the duct was several inches above the top of the lower frame, thus preventing the window from being opened more than a few inches.

Although plaintiff disputes the testimony of defendants’ witnesses that he had been told that the window in question was inoperable and was not supposed to be opened because of the ventilation duct, it is well settled that there is no duty to warn against a condition which is readily observable. Plaintiff’s own actions, not the installation or the condition of the window, were the sole proximate cause of his injury. Plaintiff testified that on the couple of occasions that he tried to open the window he had “[difficulty * * * but not great difficult/’ in opening it and that he and his clerk had made numerous complaints about their problems in opening the window. On the day in question, plaintiff made several unsuccessful attempts to open the window. On his third or fourth attempt, he felt a pinch in his back and stopped. By then the damage had already been done. Concur — Nardelli, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Sullivan and Rubin, JJ.
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1630 

To prohibit the conditioning of any permit, lease, or other use agreement 

on the transfer, relinquishment, or other impairment of any water right 

to the United States by the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 31, 2013 

Mr. BARRASSO (for himself, Mr. ENZI, Mr. LEE, Mr. HELLER, Mr. HATCH, 

Mr. CRAPO, and Mr. FLAKE) introduced the following bill; which was 

read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To prohibit the conditioning of any permit, lease, or other 

use agreement on the transfer, relinquishment, or other 

impairment of any water right to the United States 

by the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Water Rights Protec5 tion Act’’. 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1630 IS

1 SEC. 2. TREATMENT OF WATER RIGHTS. 

2 The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of 

3 Agriculture— 

4 (1) shall not condition the issuance, renewal, 

5 amendment, or extension of any permit, approval, li6 cense, lease, allotment, easement, right-of-way, or 

7 other land use or occupancy agreement on the trans8 fer or relinquishment of any water right directly to 

9 the United States, in whole or in part, granted 

10 under State law, by Federal or State adjudication, 

11 decree, or other judgment, or pursuant to any inter12 state water compact and the Secretary of the Inte13 rior and the Secretary of Agriculture; and 

14 (2) shall not require any water user to apply for 

15 a water right in the name of the United States 

16 under State law as a condition of the issuance, re17 newal, amendment, or extension of any permit, ap18 proval, license, lease, allotment, easement, right-of19 way, or other land use or occupancy agreement. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. James E. CASEY, Relator, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections for the State of Florida, Respondent.

No. 71-286.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 24, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Habeas corpus denied.
#### Freemon COLLINS et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF OPA-LOCKA, a municipal corporation, and Hester Dozer, as City Clerk of the City of Opa-Locka, Appellees.

No. 70-1281.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 3, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 1971.

Irma Robbins Feder, Miami, and Richard Yale Feder, Coral Gables, for appellants.

Albert L. Weintraub, City Atty., for ap-pellees.

Before SWANN, C. J., and HENDRY and BARKDULL, JJ.

*710PER CURIAM.

Appellants seek review of a decree for injunction which enjoined the city clerk from instituting further proceedings based on recall affidavits against Opa-Locka City Commissioners Anderson and Heacock, parties below for alleged discrimination against Blacks. The decree was entered after hearing testimony.

The complaint sought a declaratory decree as to the sufficiency, under the city charter, of the grounds stated in the affidavits for two recall petitions and injunc-tive relief against holding any special recall election. Plaintiffs were the city and the city clerk; defendants were the two city commissioners and the signers of the recall affidavits.

The language of the affidavits is at issue in this case, but it would serve no useful purpose to reproduce it here.

The charter and ordinance provisions, certified copies of which are included in the record, require that the affidavit contain “a statement of grounds for removal,” and “This affidavit must state that the charges are true and are made subject to the laws of perjury as defined in Florida Statutes, Chapter 837.” Opa-Locka Code, § 144 (Charter, Art. XI).

As to both commissioners, the grounds for recall must have some real foundation or relation to the performance of the duties of a commissioner. Joyner v. Shuman, Fla.App.1959, 116 So.2d 472; Richard v. Tomlinson, Fla.1951, 49 So.2d 798; and see Sproat v. Arnau, Fla.1968, 213 So.2d 692. The allegations herein do not meet that standard. Furthermore, we note that certain of the allegations' of misconduct are ambiguous. Therefore, the judgment appealed is affirmed.

Affirmed.
#### FLORIDA PALLET CORPORATION, Appellant, v. T. J. BEAUCHAMP et al., Appellees.

No. 73-1087.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 17, 1974.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Seminole County; David U. Strawn, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Oneida O. WIETZ, Petitioner, v. PUBLIX SUPERMARKET, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, and the Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.

No. 37347.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 26, 1968.

L. C. Schowe, St. Petersburg, for petitioner.

Glenn M. Woodworth, St. Petersburg, Patrick H. Mears, Tallahassee, and J. Franklin Garner, Lakeland, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

By petition for a writ of certiorari we have for review an order of the Florida Industrial Commission bearing date February 26, 1968.

We find that oral argument would serve no useful purpose and it is therefore dispensed with pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule 3.10, subd. e, 32 F.S.A.

Our consideration of the petition, the record and briefs leads us to conclude that *6there has been no deviation from the essential requirements of law.

The petition is, therefore, denied.

Petitioner’s application for attorney’s fees is also denied.

CALDWELL, C. J., and ROBERTS, THORNAL, ERVIN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
#### DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF the State of Florida, Appellant, v. DADE UTILITIES, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 71-1369.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 12, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Susan C. POORMAN, Appellant, v. John H. POORMAN, Appellee.

No. 70-193.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 27, 1970.

Charles J. Bodner, Miami, for appellant.

Daniel G. Satin, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and'CHARLES CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order modifying a final judgment of divorce by allowing the husband to substitute a less expensive insurance policy for the one provided in the final judgment. The final judgment was based upon an agreement between the parties.

On this appeal appellant wife argues that the court based its decision upon improperly admitted evidence which was in violation of the parole evidence rule. The post-decretal order is affirmed upon the authority of the rule stated in Royal American Rlty., Inc. v. Bank of Palm Beach & Tr. Co., Fla.App.1968, 215 So.2d 336.

An additional point presented is directed to the denial of the wife’s petition for an increase in child support. We find no abuse of discretion demonstrated. Ludacer v. Ludacer, Fla.App.1968, 211 So.2d 64.

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-2486

JOHN J. JOSWICK, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA98-3041-PJM) Submitted: February 10, 2000 Decided: February 15, 2000 Before WIDENER and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John J. Joswick, Appellant Pro Se. Valerie Floyd Portner, Patrick A. Birck, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, Laurel, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* The proceedings in this action were conducted by a magistrate judge pursuant to the consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994). 2 PER CURIAM: John L. Joswick appeals the magistrate judge’s order grantingsummary judgment to his former employer in his employment discrimination action filed under the Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). * We have reviewed the record and the magistrate judge’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the magistrate judge. See Joswick v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab., No. CA-98-3041-PJM (D. Md. Sept. 30, 1999). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Alfonso James BANKS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 66-1013.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

March 19, 1968.

Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender and Nicholas F. Tsamoutales, Special Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before HENDRY and SWANN, JJ., and NATHAN, RAYMOND G., Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See State ex rel. Fox v. Cochran, Fla.1961, 126 So.2d 883; Simpson v. State, Fla.App.1964, 164 So.2d 224; Johnson v. State, Fla.App.1966, 181 So.2d 667.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1312 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1312

  To amend title 5, United States Code, to limit the circumstances in 
         which official time may be used by a Federal employee.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 17, 2013

  Mr. Coburn (for himself, Mr. Alexander, Mr. Barrasso, Mr. Burr, Mr. 
 Cornyn, Mr. Enzi, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Isakson, Mr. Lee, Mr. Portman, Mr. 
Risch, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Thune, Mr. Vitter, and Mr. Johnson of Wisconsin) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title 5, United States Code, to limit the circumstances in 
         which official time may be used by a Federal employee.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Employee Accountability Act 
of 2013''.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS RELATING TO OFFICIAL TIME.

    Section 7131 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking subsections (a) and (c);
            (2) by redesignating subsections (b) and (d) as subsections 
        (a) and (b), respectively; and
            (3) in subsection (b) (as so redesignated by paragraph 
        (2)), by striking ``Except as provided in the preceding 
        subsections of this section--'' and inserting ``Except as 
        provided in subsection (a)--''.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          871899
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               6730018
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 2561582
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 5040335
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           136273
<BONDS>                                         960248
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     3943814<F1>
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   5040335
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               1015632
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   884097
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               94246
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     91612
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .987<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>REFERS TO GENERAL PARTNERS + LIMITED PARTNERS CAPITAL.
<F2>97% LIMITED PARTNERS - INTEREST OUTSTANDING = 9004.15
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### In re ESTATE of Katie PRUNCUTZ, Deceased. Eli Jerry PRUNCUTZ, et al., Appellants, v. Lina PUTIN, as Executrix of the Estate of Katie Pruncutz, Appellee.

No. 70-783.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 28, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Leo C. SARDELLA, Petitioner, v. CHAMPION MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., et al., Respondents.

No. 42630.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 31, 1973.

Rehearing Denied March 12, 1973.

Gerald Shapiro, Miami, for petitioner.

Melvin Wolfe, of Whitman & Wolfe, Miami and Kenneth H. Hart, Jr., Tallahassee, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

In this workmen’s compensation case the Judge of Industrial Claims awarded a joint attorney’s fee of $9,700 for the services of the claimant, Leo C. Sardella’s, attorneys, Irving J. Whitman and Gerald Shapiro. Whitman represented claimant originally, but was replaced by Shapiro. There is a dispute between Whitman and Shapiro as to their respective shares, if any, in the awarded fee of $9,700. At one point in the cause the Industrial Relations Commission, by its order of February 12, 1971, remanded the cause for a determination by the Judge of Industrial Claims of the value of the respective legal services rendered by the two attorneys in the case. The joint award of $9,700 followed, but without a determination of the respective shares of the two attorneys, if any.

The essential question posed in this case is a determination of the value of the respective shares of the two attorneys in the awarded fee since there is an irreconcilable dispute as to the division, and whether the issue should be resolved by the Judge of Industrial Claims, subject to review by the Industrial Relations Commission, or by the Circuit Court.

We have just recently, in the case of Lopez, et al., v. Airlift International Incorporated, et al., Fla., 270 So.2d 1, 1972, agreed with the Industrial Relations Commission that the case of Waldrop v. Miller Moderns, Fla.1961, 136 So.2d 227, should be receded from and disputed issues regarding division of attorneys’ fees in cases of this kind should be resolved in the administrative forum of the workmen’s compensation act.

From a practical standpoint the Industrial Relations Commission and its Judges of Industrial Claims have first-hand knowledge and expertise gained from the flow of litigation in compensation cases as to the value of attorneys’ fees and are in a better position to settle disputes of this kind expeditiously and with less expense than can the Circuit Court in new litigation to resolve the same.

Therefore, the orders below are reversed and the cause is remanded for further *370proceedmgs in accord with the rationale of Lopez, et al., v. Airlift International Incorporated, et ah, supra.

It is so ordered.

CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN, ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### Charles James WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-111.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 5, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>


                                                                      Exhibit 21


                     CONE MILLS CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                                  Percentage
                                                                            State or                of Voting
                                                                         Jurisdiction of           Securities
Name                                           Address                    Incorporation              Owned
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<S>                                         <C>                        <C>                            <C>
Cone Mills (Mexico), S.A. de C.V.           Mexico City                Mexico, D.F.                   100%
Distribuidora CMUSA S.A. de C.V.            Mexico City                Mexico, D.F.                   100
Cone Mills (Europe) S.A.                    Zavantem, Belgium          Brussels, Belgium              100
Cone Singapore, PTE., Ltd.                  Singapore                  Republic of Singapore          100
Cone Foreign Sales Corporation              Greensboro, NC             Barbados                       100
Cone Mills International
  Corporation                               Greensboro, NC             North Carolina                 100
CIPCO, S.C., Inc.                           Carlisle, SC               Delaware                       100
Cornwallis Development Co.                  Greensboro, NC             North Carolina                 100
Boelas Pipeline Corporation                 Greensboro, NC             North Carolina                 100
Cliffside Railroad Company                  Cliffside, NC              North Carolina                  98
House "N Home Fabrics and
  Draperies, Inc.                           New York, NY               New York                       100
Cone Receivables, LLC                       Greensboro, NC             Delaware                       100
Cone Foreign Trading LLC                    Greensboro, NC             North Carolina                 100

</TABLE>