alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# . @Pf7-+?002 -OU60-oo~p
CBI: Yes 

# $ FINAL INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT PMN: 99-0669 ENGINEER: Weil/PRH PV (kg/yr): SUBMITTER: Goldschmidt Chemical Corp. USE : c OTHER USES:

MSDS : Yes Label: ,NO General Eqp.: Respirator: Health Effects: TLV/PEL (PMNor raw materials): CRSS:Chemical Category: VP : c1E-06 torr @25OC S-HZO: dispersible MW: Phys State: NEAT Liquid (est); PROC/FORM: MANUFACTURE: NK (imported) ; END USE: Solid Consumer Use: No - SAT (concerns) : Related cases (if referenced): P95-0401,P96-0605/0606, P96-1079, P96-1503, P97- 0303, P98-0813 Ground Water: rapid Health: 1-2;Dermal, inhalation ECO: 2; All releases to water OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE RATING: 2-3



## ' 5099000Ei

### 1

### 1 /

### 1INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT PMN: 99-0669 ASSUMPTIONS:

POLLUTION PREVENTION CONSIDERATIONS: Page # 2



## - ..

## . CBI: Yes

EXPOSURE-BASEDREVIEW NoINITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT PMN: 99-0669 Page # 3

- PROC: Site/Location: 12 unknown Days/yr: e250 (CEB standard estimate) Process,Description: CBI: Yes

ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASES (Eqpt.cleaning, container residue, etc.): WATER : < 0.34 kg/site-day over e250 Days/year from: drum/pail residual (3%) and blending vessel cleaning (1%) to: on-site treatment or POTW basis: -

AIR: negligible (VP <: 0.01 torr) INCINERATION: <PV LANDFILL: not required, per SAT OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE Tot. # 

### of workers: 48 (4/siteper telecon) Days/yr: e250 (CEB standard estimate) Inhalation: negligible (VP < 0.001 torr) Dermal: contact with liquids: 1,300-3,900mg/day assume imported at 100% concentration Basis: incidental contact, 2 hands (connecting transfer line); drumming 

### of formulation will be at 1- 2%.INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT Page # 4 PMN: 99-0669 USE: 

### -- CBI: Yes

Site/Location: Days/yr : basis: ~850 (generic scenario) 170 (generic scenario) 

### .._ . 1 (generic scenario) 250 (generic scenario) - -.

.. Process Description: ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASES (Eqpt. cleaning, container residue, -
WATER : refinishing: not expected OEM: <2.7 kg/site-day 

### over 250 Days/year OR <670 kg/site-day over 1Days/year to onsite WWTP or annual sludge pit cleaning: basis : etc.) :

AIR : <23 kg/site/yr (generic scenario) INCINERATION: cPV LANDFILL: not required, per SAT1. L

INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING 

### REPORT Page # 5 CBI: Yes PMN: 99-0669 USE: (cont.) OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE 

# - *- Tot. # 

### of workers: - <2,550 (3/site,generic scenario) L.. 17 (generic scenario)
: 250 (generic scenario) Days/yr: 170 (generic scenario) Inhalation: mist ~0.19 - 0.75 mg/day over 170 days/year cO.O3-- ~0.12 mg/day over 250 days/year Basis:

Dermal : contact with liquids: 65-364mg/day 1-2% concentration Basis: routine 2-hand immersion; less exposure for connecting transfer line (incidental contact, 2 hands)
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. Flazell TROUPE, Relator, v. The Honorable Ellen MORPHONIOS, and the Honorable Paul Baker, as Judges of the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County, Florida, Respondents.

No. 72-144.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 10, 1974.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Thomas J. Morgan, Asst. Public Defender, for relator.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and William L. ^ Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and CARROLL, JJ.

ORDER ON MANDATE

PER CURIAM.

Whereas, the judgment of this court was entered on March 7, 1972 (258 So.2d 528) dismissing a suggestion for writ of prohibition directed to the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, in the above styled cause; and

Whereas, on review of this court’s judgment, by certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida by its opinion and judgment filed July 5, 1973 (283 So.2d 85) and mandate now lodged in this court, quashed this court’s judgment and remanded the cause,

Now, Therefore, it is Ordered that the judgment of this court heretofore filed in this cause is vacated, the opinion and judg*376ment of the Supreme Court of Florida is herewith made the opinion and judgment of this court, the original sentences of the trial court upon the pleas of guilty of the two offenses charged are reinstated and the cause is remanded to the trial court for such appropriate proceedings as may be necessary to carry out the sentences of the court.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            62,552
<LOANS>                                        779,755
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              27,639
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<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                          6,000
        


</TABLE>
#### Deanna PRESTON, Appellant, v. David PRESTON, Appellee.

No. 70-302.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 15, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                      EXHIBIT 15


               AWARENESS LETTER OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


May 15, 2000

Union Pacific Resources Group Inc.
777 Main Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76102

We are aware that Union Pacific Resources Group Inc. has incorporated by
reference in its Registration Statements No. 333-62181 on Form S-3 and No.
333-22613 and No. 333-35641 on Form S-8 its Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
March 31, 2000, which includes our report dated April 26, 2000 covering the
unaudited interim financial information contained therein. Pursuant to
Regulation C of the Securities Act of 1933, that report is not considered a part
of the registration statement prepared or certified by our firm or a report
prepared or certified by our firm within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the
Act.

Very truly yours,



ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP
Fort Worth, Texas
;

was not contingent upon providing substantial assistance. As to Augello's

. sentence, this court will not disturb a district court's sentencing determination absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 989, 12 P.3d at 957. While Augello was sentenced to a prison term of 19 to 48 months, the maximum possible sentence, it is within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes, 

### see NRS 193.130(2)(d) (category D felony punishable by prison term of 1 to 4 years); NRS 205.690(2) (possession of a credit card without consent punishable as a category D felony), and Augello does not allege that those statutes are unconstitutional. Further, Augello has not demonstrated that the district court relied solely on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. See Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976). We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing.

In Docket No. 64779, Augello argues that the district court abused its discretion at sentencing by imposing a consecutive sentence to his sentence in Docket No. 64706. Further, Augello argues that the district court failed to make findings in support of its sentencing decision. We have consistently afforded the district court wide discretion in its sentencing decision, 

### see e.g., Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987), and it is within that discretion to impose consecutive sentences, see NRS 176.035(1). Here, the district court noted Augello's prior criminal record, his drug abuse, and his history of committing crimes to support his drug use before sentencing him to a consecutive prison term of 19 to 48 months. The sentence falls within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes, 

### see NRS 193.130(2)(d) (category D felony punishable by prison term of 1 to 4 years); NRS 205.760(1) (fraudulent use of a credit card punishable as a category D felony), and Augello does not allege that

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947AJ.

those statutes are unconstitutional or that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. See Silks, 92 Nev. at 94, 545 P.2d at 1161. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgments of conviction AFFIRMED.

J. Hardesty

scat-A-er Douglas

cc: Hon. Scott N. Freeman, District Judge Washoe County Public Defender Washoe County Alternate Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City Washoe County District Attorney Washoe District Court Clerk

SUPREME COUFtT

OF NEVADA 3
(0) I 947A
Name

(Last, First, Middle) Title Company/ Organization Street Address Phone 

Webinar Attendees: The Commercial Ice Makers Meeting

City Fax State/ Prov Zip

Meeting Date: 4/14/2014

N/A U. S Department of Energy (DOE) 1000 Independence Ave. 

SW

Abdelaziz, Omar Washington DC 20585 N/A N/AAlmblad, Jay N/A Ice‐O‐Matic N/A Denver CO N/A 303-576-2961 N/A 

Associate Attorney Earthjustice 1625 Massachusetts 

Avenue, NW,Suite 702

Ballo, Timothy Washington DC 20036 202-667-4500 202‐667‐23

Vice President of Research &

Development‐Americas

Broadbent , John Scotsman Industries 11100 E. 45th Avenue Denver CO 80239 303-576-3058 303‐371‐62Buynacek, Brian Engineer Emerson 138 Ashwood Lane Orchard Park NY 14127 937-238-1160 N/A 

N/A U.S. Department of Energy

(DOE)

Graul, Jack 950 L 'Enfant Plaza Washington DC 20024 N/A N/A Groff, Dean N/A Danfoss LLC 11655 Crossroads Circle Baltimore MD 21220‐ N/A N/A 

2863

Harding, John N/A N/A 701 W. King Street Garrett IN 46738 N/A N/A 

N/A Pacific Northwest National

Laboratory (PNNL)

Hostick, Donna 902 Battelle Boulevard Richland WA 99352 N/A N/A Howe, Mary C. President Howe Corporation 1650 N. Elston Avenue Chicago IL 60642‐ 773-235-0200 773‐235‐15

1585

Knatt, Kevin N/A N/A 1012 Port Diane Drive St. Louis MO 63146 N/A N/A Mackowiak, Jeff VP Engineering Howe Corporation 1650 N. Elston Ave Chicago IL 60642 N/A N/A 

09/10/2014 12:44:34 
Name

(Last, First, Middle) Title Company/ Organization Street Address Phone 

Webinar Attendees: The Commercial Ice Makers Meeting

City Fax State/ Prov Zip

Meeting Date: 4/14/2014

Statistician and Energy Analyst Pacific Northwest National

Laboratory (PNNL)

902 Battelle Boulevard 

P.O. Box 999, MSIN K6‐05

Morris, Scott Richland WA 99532 509-372-6454 N/AOlson, William N/A N/A 2110 S. 26 St Manitowoc WI 54220 N/A N/A 

N/A Natural Resources Defense

Council (NRDC)

Osann, Edward R 1314 Second Street Santa Monica CA 90401 310-434-2300 310‐434‐23

Energy Efficiency Advocate Natural Resources Defense

Council (NRDC)

1152 15th Street, NW 

Suite 300

Waltner, Meg Washington DC 20005 202-513-6270 202‐289‐10

Environmental Scientist New York State Office of the

Attorney General (NYS OAG)

Wilson, Linda 120 Broadway New York NY 10271 212-416-8948 212‐416‐60

Senior Research Engineer ‐ 

Energy and EngineeringDivision

Pacific Northwest NationalLaboratory (PNNL)

902 Battelle Boulevard

P.O. Box 999

MSIN K5‐08

Winiarski, David Richland WA 99337 509-375-4461 509‐375‐36

Vice President, Standards Air‐Conditioning, Heating &

Refrigeration Institute (AHRI)

2111 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 500

Woodford, Michael W. Arlington VA 22201 703-600-0328 703‐528‐38Zwigart, John N/A Kold‐Draft 1525 E lake Rd Erie PA 16511 N/A N/A 

Contacts Included: 20 

09/10/2014 12:44:42
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
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</TABLE>
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Jack LEBLANC, Jr.

No. 62770.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 22, 1978.

In re: Jack Leblanc, Jr., applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order. Parish of Lafayette.

Granted.

The petition of the relator in the above entitled and numbered case having been duly considered, it is ordered that a writ of certiorari issue herein, directing the Honorable Peter C. Piccione, Jr., Judge Ad Hoc of the Lafayette City, Court for the Parish of Lafayette, to transmit to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, on or before the 6th day of October, 1978, the record in duplicate, or a certified copy of the record in duplicate, of the proceedings complained of by the relator herein, to the end that the validity of said proceedings may be ascertained. It is further ordered that the aforesaid Judge of said Court and the respondent through counsel shall show cause, in this court, on a date to be fixed by this court at 10 o’clock A.M., why the relief prayed for in the petition of the relator should not be granted.
#### Mrs. Gladys POWELL, etc. v. LOGAN CAB COMPANY et al. Mrs. Wilhelmina COLE, etc. v. LOGAN CAB COMPANY et al.

Nos. 5341 and 5342.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

March 7, 1973.

For majority opinions see 276 So.2d 324 and 276 So.2d 325.

GULOTTA, *Judge*(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

The deposition of the cab driver clearly establishes that he violated the high degree of care required of common carriers. Ellis stated in that deposition that he was driving one and one-half or two car lengths behind the automobile, when, in his words :

> “Q. When you looked in the rear-view mirror and then turned back to look in front of you, what did you see?

> “A. The car was cutting over and the man slammed on his brakes. Well, when he hit his brakes and I turned around I slammed on mines to avoid hitting him in the back.”

Again, later in his deposition:

> “Q. Was it already braking when you first saw it ?

> “A. When I turned around, when I took my eyes off the mirror and looked back ahead of me I could see the car was stopping and I slammed on my brakes.

> “Q. It was already stopped when you turned back around ?

> “A. Right.”

And finally:

> “Q. And when you took your eyes off the road ahead of you you looked in the rear-view mirror, and when you looked ahead again he had placed — he had made a sudden stop?

> “A. No, not at that particular time. When I saw the car coming around the side of me, well I stayed in my right-hand lane driving behind him. And after the car passed me on my left side and passed him, well, I were looking— just when the car passed him, cut over in front — well, I was checking my rear mirror to see if anything else was coming to see if I could pass, but it was another car coming. I stayed behind him. So by time I turned back, the car in front of me was braking and I slammed on my brakes also.

> “Q. To avoid hitting him ?

> “A. Right.”

Ellis’s negligence was in his failure to keep a proper lookout and by not allowing a safe distance between the vehicles. Had Ellis not been intent on attempting to pass the automobile in front of him, he would have maintained a proper lookout. This failure resulted in the required sudden stop causing the injuries to plaintiffs.
256 La. 761

#### Reverend Thomas BROWN and Lezin C. Oubre, Jr. v. DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE, COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH CIRCUIT. THIRD DISTRICT et al.

No. 50749.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 21, 1970.

In re: Reverend Thomas Brown and Lezin C. Oubre, Jr. applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of St. Charles. 238 So.2d 48.

The application is denied. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal the result reached by it is correct.

BARHAM, J.,

is of the opinion the writ should be granted. Even under the facts found by the Court of Appeal the result is contrary to law. See Hall v. Godchaux, 149 La. 733, 90 So. 145; Melerine v. Dem. Exec. Comm., 164 La. 855, 114 So. 711; McIntire v. Carpenter, La.App., 202 So.2d 297. Writ denied Sept. 21, 1967.
No. 11571.

#### The Toledo & Indiana Railway Co. *v.*Raker, Admr.

Decided October 12, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court of Fulton county.

*Messrs. Files & Faxon*and *Messrs. King, Tracy, Chapman & Welles,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Handy & Wolf*and *Messrs. Bailey, Mallahan & Conway,*for defendant in error.

Judgment reversed. Grounds stated in journal entry.

It is ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said circuit court be and the same hereby is reversed for error in affirming the judgment of the court of common pleas. And this court proceeding to render, the judgment which the circuit court should have rendered, finds that said court of common pleas erred in the following portion of the charee to the jury commencing on page 107 of the printed record and continued oh page 108, to-wit: “T have said to this jury several times that this company was bound to afford Mr. Guthrie *495and his employees with a safe' place in which to perform this work; this instruction goes to the jury with this limitation — that what would be a safe place to work depends upon the nature of the work to be done and the conditions which the decedent could have anticipated as the jury might see from this testimony would exist at the place at the time when the work was to be performed. If the work necessary under all circumstances would be attended with danger, the obligation' of the company to afford a safe place to work does not go to the extent of insuring Mr. Durst absolutely from injury, but only goes to the extent of saying to him that the place in which he was to work would be kept as safe as it were possible to keep such a place, considering all the circumstances attendant at that time and place, but the company sending any person there or inviting any person by a contract to work at this place, was bound to see that all the precautions possible not inconsistent with the proper conduct of its. business should be taken by it to render this place as safe as such a place might be made.” The deceased was not an employe of the railway company but an employe of an independent contractor when injured, and the standard laid down by the charge by which to measure the duty of the railway company is too high under the facts disclosed in the record.

Summers, Spear, Davis, Shauc.k and Price, JJ., concur.
|                                      |   |          | Jurisdiction      of  |
|-------------------------------------------|--------|---------------|-----------------------|
|                                      |   |          | Incorporation      or |
| Name                                      |   |          | Organization          |
|                                      |   |          |                  |
| Greater      American Finance Group, Inc. |   | Delaware      |
| The      Berkshire Bank                   |   | New      York |
| East      39, LLC                         |   | New      York |
| Berkshire      Agency, Inc.               |   |          | New      York         |
| Berkshire      1031 Exchange, LLC         |   |          | New      York         |
| Berkshire      Capital Trust I            |   |          | Delaware              |
| Berkshire      Capital Trust II           |   |          | Delaware              |

----