UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4584

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RICARDO LOPEZ-VERA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:09-cr-00226-TDS-1)

Submitted: May 17, 2011 Decided: May 27, 2011

Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Milton B. Shoaf, Jr., ADDISON & SHOAF, Salisbury, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

In 2003, Ricardo Lopez-Vera pleaded guilty to 

illegally reentering the United States after having been 

deported following a conviction for an aggravated felony, in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a), (b)(2) (2006). The district 

court sentenced Lopez-Vera to a term of imprisonment followed by 

supervised release. Subsequently, Lopez-Vera pleaded guilty to 

illegal reentry and to violating the terms of his supervised 

release. The district court sentenced Lopez-Vera to 

eighty-seven months of imprisonment for the illegal reentry 

conviction and eighteen months of imprisonment for the 

supervised release revocation, to be served consecutively. 

Lopez-Vera now appeals and appellate counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

questioning whether the district court erred in imposing 

consecutive terms of imprisonment. Lopez-Vera was informed of 

his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done 

so. Finding no error, we affirm. 

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an 

abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 

335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 290 (2009). In so 

doing, we first examine the sentence for “significant procedural 

error,” including “failing to calculate (or improperly 
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calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 

mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) 

[(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 

sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. When “multiple terms of 

imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, . . . 

the terms may run concurrently or consecutively,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3584(a) (2006), and the district court must take into account 

the § 3553(a) factors in making that decision. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3584(b) (2006). Finally, we then “‘consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence imposed.’” United States v. 

Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. 

at 51). This court presumes on appeal that a sentence within a 

properly calculated advisory Guidelines range is reasonable. 

United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-56 (2007) (upholding 

presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence). 

Moreover, this court reviews a sentence imposed as a 

result of a supervised release violation to determine whether 

the sentence was plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 

461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). The first step in this 

analysis is a determination of whether the sentence was 

unreasonable. Id. at 438. This court, in determining 

reasonableness, follows generally the procedural and substantive 
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considerations employed in reviewing original sentences. Id. 

On review, we will assume a deferential appellate posture 

concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion. Id.

at 439. 

Although a district court must consider the policy 

statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines along 

with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006) and 

§ 3553(a), “‘the court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke 

its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to 

the statutory maximum.’” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (quoting 

United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2005)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). If a sentence imposed after 

a revocation is not unreasonable, we will not proceed to the 

second prong of the analysis — whether the sentence was plainly 

unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. We have thoroughly 

reviewed the record and conclude that the sentences imposed by 

the district court are reasonable, and the court did not err in 

imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment. We therefore need 

not determine whether the revocation sentence was plainly 

unreasonable. 

We have examined the entire record in accordance with 

the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues 

for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. This court requires that counsel inform Lopez-Vera, in 
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writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Lopez-Vera requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Lopez-Vera. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED