### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 12, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KEN CH ILDR ESS

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 02-01440 Jam es C. Beasley, Judge

No. W2004-01170-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Augu st 31, 2005

The app e ll a n t, K e n Ch il d r e s s , w a s c o n v ic te d b y a ju r y o f a tt e mp te d f

ir s t d e g r e e mu r d e r

a nd
ag g rava ted cr iminal trespass. The tria l co u rt s entenced the a ppellant to an ef

fec tive sentenc e of
tw e nty -f ive (2 5) y e ars . O n a

pp e a l, the app e lla nt ch a lle ng e s the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e a nd his
sentenc e as imprope r in light of t h e Un i t ed States Supreme Court’ s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542, U.S

. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Be cause the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the c on vic tio ns a nd the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s d e te rm inedthat B lake ly ha s n o e ff

e c t in Tenne ssee, we aff

irm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Trial Court Affi rm ed

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J.
, d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Ga rl a nd Er g ud e n, As sis ta nt P ub lic D e f e n d e r, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Ke n Ch ild re ss.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; B re nt C . Ch e rry , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and D ennis J o h n s o n , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I n F e b r u ar y o f 2 0 0 2
, th e Sh e lb y Co u n ty G r a n d Ju r y in d ic te d th e ap p e ll a n t o n c h ar g e s of attempted first de g ree murder a n d es p ec i all y ag g rava ted burg lary

as a r esult of an incide nt that

occur red on January

6, 2001.

At trial, the victim, Robert Mc Ewen, testified that at the time of the incide nt, he was living in Memphis and was e mploy ed by ADT S ecurity as a Commerc ial Alarm I nstaller and F ire Ala rm I ns pe c tor . T he vi cti m a lso so ld c lothe s th a t he g ot f ro m th e Me rc ha nd ise Ma rt in N e w Y or

k Ci ty-2-

to f ri e nd s a nd ne ig hbors fro m hi s apa rt me nt. He wa s a lso takin g c la sse s a t Ru st C oll e g e in Mississ ippi.

On the afte rnoon of J anuary 6, 2001, the appellant c ame to the a partment of the victim around noon and stay ed for ap p ro x i mately thirty (30) minutes. The vic tim was a close f riend of the appellant’ s brother, Ron Childress. At the time, t he appellant and the victim had known ea ch other for se vera l months, and the appellant had been to the vic tim’s apartment a pproxi mately

four ( 4) or five (5) times. Mr. Childress wa s at t h e apa rtment visiting with the victim when the a ppellant

arr ived. The a

ppellant and the vic tim got into an ar g ument about money

. Appar ently , the appe llant owed the vic tim money

for c lothing that the victim had g iven to the appe llant “o n cr ed i t

. ” The appellant ultimately

left the a partment “ scre aming and cur sing” at the victim.

That eve ning, the victim picked up Ron Childr es s at h is apartment a nd the two (2) w ent “running around in the stre ets” fr om about 6:00 p.m. until about 9: 30 p.m., when the two (2) men
went to a c lub called “ Be ans,” w here they share d a forty (40) ounce bee r. The vic tim claimed that he “w asn’t fe eling well” a nd thought that he was “tired from [hi s rec ent] roa d trip.” He stated that he fe lt “lighthea ded” a nd wanted to lea ve.

Th e me n le ft

the c lub aro un d 1 1:0 0 p .m. Th e vic tim dr op pe d Mr. C hil dr e ss o ff a t hi s apartment a nd went home to lie on the couch. Sometime betwe en 11:45 p.m. and 12:00 a.m., thre e (3) maske d men broke throug h the door of his a partment, de manding to know the location of the drug s and money . One of the m en was arme d with a sawe d-off shotgun. The victim testified at trial that he hit the masked ma n arme d with the shotgun a nd knocked him out. The vic tim then strugg led with the second ma n, while the third m an hit the victim in the back of the hea d with something. The vic tim the n b e g a n s trug g lin g wi th the thi rd ma n. As the vic tim fo ug ht wi th the thi rdma n, the vic tim

was a ble to pull off the mask of the assailant. The victim recog nized the man as the a ppellant. Ther e

wa s “ no do ub t” in the vic tim ’s min d a s to the ide nti ty of th e app e lla nt. At that ti me , th e vic tim claimed that the a

ppellant ra ised a gun and pointed it at t he victim

. The victim threw his hand up, the g un went off

and the bullet we nt throug h the victim’s ha nd. Acc ording to the victim, the impact of the sh ot thr e w his ha nd a g a ins t his h e a d a nd kn oc ke d h im o ut. Th e vic tim re g a ine d c on sc iou sn e ss as the a mbulance a

rrived a nd rushed him t o t h e h ospital. The victim learne d on the way to the hospital that he had a lso been shot five ( 5) times in the stomach.

The victim testified that, as a result of his injuries, he was in a coma for a pproxi mately

one (1 ) m on th. I n to ta l, the vic tim sp e nt f ou r ( 4) mon ths in the ho sp ita l a nd ha d e ig ht ( 8) su rg e ri e s to

re pa ir his inj ur ie s. Whil e in the ho sp ita l, the vic tim ide nti fi e d th e app ell ant fr om a ph oto g ra

ph ic line-up as his assa ilant.

The a ppellant offe red two ( 2) witnesses a t trial to challeng e the victim’s ide ntification of the

app e lla nt a s th e sh oo te r. Th e de fe ns e c a lle d Ro n Chi ldr e ss, the app e lla nt’ s b ro the r, a s a wi tne ss t o the eve nts on the day

leading up to the incident. Mr. Childress te stified that he and the victim went to the bar “ Be ans” tog ether , but that they left t he bar around 8:00 p.m. or 8:30 p.m. rather than 9:00 p.m. or 9:30 p.m. as the victim c laimed. Further, Mr. Childress c laimed that the two (2) men smoked-3-

marijuana that night a nd both drank more than one ( 1) forty (4 0 ) o u n ce b eer. Additionally , Mr. Childress testified that afte r the victim wa s shot, he called Mr. Childress a nd claimed that he did not

re a lly kn ow w ha t ha

pp e ne d o n th e nig ht o f the sh oo tin g . A c c or din g to M r. Chi ldr e ss, the vic tim offe red not to i dentify the appellant from a line-up i n exchang e for a pay -off of t wo t housand dollars ($2,000). The victim denied these alleg ations but admitted that he had a prior convic tion for fe lony theft of pr operty

and wa s on probation at the time of the incident.

The de fense also attempted to es t ab l i s h an alibi for the appellant throug h the testimony of Ned Jones. Mr. J ones testified that he lived and wor ked in Dy ersbur g , Tenne ssee , wh i ch he descr ibed as a being a littl e more than one (1) hour awa y from Memphis. Mr. Jones claimed that he was in the c ompany

of the appellant on J anuary 6, 2001. Mr. J ones testified that the da te stuck out in his memory

beca use it was the da te on which he bec ame se riously involved with the woman he la te r ma rr ie d

. M r

. Jo n e s r e p o r te d th a t h e n o r ma ll y w o rk e d f r o m 3 :0 0 p

. m. to 1 1 :0 0 p

. m. , b u t that he ha d g ott e n o ff

wo rk a t 7: 00 p. m. tha t e ve nin g so that he c ou ld d ri ve to h is m oth e r’ s h ome in

ne arb y Ti pto nv ill e to v isi t w ith his un c le a nd c ou sin s. Mr

. Jone s te sti fi e d that, a ft e r vis iti ng wi th h is family , he drove back to Dy ersbur g and went to Willie T olle’s house to pa y off a g ambling de bt. Mr. J ones stated that he ran into t he appellant at M r. Tolle’s house that night. Mr. Jones claimed that he

a nd the app e lla nt le ft Mr . T oll e ’s ho us e a nd we nt t o th e Am e ri c a n L e g ion , w he re the y sta y e d u nti l it closed at appr ox imately 2:30 a.m. Mr. J ones also t es t i fi ed t h at he we nt back to the a ppellant’s home the next morning be fore noon and hung out, watching football.

After hearing the evidenc e, the jury found the a ppellant g uiltyof attempted f irst deg ree murder a nd ag g rava ted criminal trespass. After a sentenc ing hearing, the trial court sente nced the appellant to twenty -five ( 25) y ear s for the attempted first deg ree murder c onviction and eleve n (11)
month s a n d tw e n ty

- n in e ( 2 9 ) d a y s f o r th e a g g r a v a te d c r im in a l tr e s p a s s c o n v ic ti o n , to be ser ved

concur rently for a n eff ective se ntence of twenty -five ( 25) y ear s as a Rang e I standard of

fende r. The appel la n t f

il e d a mo ti o n f o r n e w tria l, ar g u in g th a t th e e v id e n c e w a s in s u f f ic ie n t t o s u p p o r t the verdic t. The trial court denied the motion for ne w trial and the appellant f iled a timely

notice of
appe a l. O n ap p e a l, th e ap p e ll a n t c h a ll e n g e s th e s u f f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e a n d h is s entenc e as improper in lig ht of Bla

kely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).

An a ly sis Sufficienc y

On appea l, the appellant arg ues that the evidenc e pre sented a t trial was insuffic ient to support his convictions for attempted first deg ree murder and ag g rava ted criminal trespass. Specifica lly , the

ap p e ll a n t c o n te n d s th a t th e c o n v ic ti o n s “ r e s t s o le ly o n the u n s u p p o r te d te s ti mo n y o f [t h e v ic ti m] ”

a nd that “ wh e n pr op e rl y vie we d

. . . the e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt f or a ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t to fi nd him
g uiltybey ond a re asonable doubt of attempted fir st deg ree murder a nd ag g rava te d criminal trespa ss.” The State c ounters that the jury had “a mple evidenc e” f

rom which it could find that the a ppellant

“ br ok e int o th e apa

rt me nt, str

ug g le d with [the vic tim ], sh ot h im d ur ing the str ug g le , a nd sh ot h im five times more a fter [the victim] had fallen unconsc ious to the floor.”-4-

When a def

endant challeng es t he sufficiency of the e vidence , this Court i s oblige d to review that claim acco rdi ng to certain well-settled pr inciples. A ver dict of g uilty , rende red by a jury and

“ a pp ro ve d b y t h e t r i a l j u d g e , a c c r e d i t s t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e ” S t a t e ’ s w i t n e s s e s a n d r e s o l v e s a ll conflicts in the testimony

in favor of the S tate. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994) ; State v. Har

ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, althoug h the ac cused is orig inally cloake d with a pre sumption of innocenc e, the jury verdic t of g uiltyremove s this presumption “and re place s it with one of g uilt.” State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (T en n

. 1 9 8 2 ). He nce, on a ppeal, the burden of proof r ests with the defe ndant to demonstrate the insuff iciency of the c onvicting e vidence

. I d. Th e re le va nt q ue sti on the re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t a ns we r i s w he the r a ny ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have f ound the ac cused g uiltyof eve ry element of the offense be y ond a re asonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Ha

rris, 839 S.W.2d at 75. I n making this decision, we are to acc ord the State “ the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence as we ll as all rea sonable a nd leg itimate inf ere nces that may be dra wn there from.” See Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d at 914

. As such, this Court is precluded from reweig hing or rec onsidering the evidenc e whe n evalua ting the c onvicting pr oof. State v. Morg an, 929 S.W. 2d 38 0, 38 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); Sta te v. Ma tth e ws , 8 05 S.W. 2d 77 6, 77 9 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1990). More over, w e may not substitut e our ow n “infe renc es for those draw n by

the trier of fac t from circ umstantial evidence .” Matthew s, 805 S.W .2d at 779. Further, que stions concer ning the cr edibilityof the witnesse s and the we ight a nd value to be g iven t o evidenc e, as w ell as all fa ctual iss ue s r a ise d b y

su c h e vid e nc e , a

re re so lve d b y

the tr ie r o f f

a c t a nd no t the app e lla te c ou rt s. Sta te v. Pruett, 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990)

.

I n the ca se her ein, the appe llant was convic ted of a ttempted first deg ree mur d er a nd
ag g rava ted cr iminal trespass

. Fi rs t deg ree murder is de fined, in pertinent part, as: “( 1) A
preme ditated and int en t i o n al killing of a nother; [or] (2) A killing of a nother c ommitt ed in the
p e rp e t r a t i o n o f o r a t t e m p tt o p e rp e t r a t e a n y f i r s td e g r e e m u r d e r , a c to f

t e rr o r i s m , ar s o n , r ap e , r o b b e r y, burg lary , theft, kidnapping
, ag g rava ted child abuse, ag g rava ted child neg lect or a ircra ft pirac y ; . . . .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -2 02 . Cr imi na l a tte mpt is d e fi ne d a s:

(a ) A pe rs on c omm its c ri min a l a tte mpt wh o, a c tin g wi th the kin d o f c ulp abil ity otherwise r equire d for the of fense :

(1 ) Inte nti on a lly

e ng a g e s ina c tio n o r c a us e s a re su lt tha t wou ld co ns tit ute a n o ff e ns e if the circ umstances surrounding the conduct wer e as the pe rson believe s them to be; (2) Ac ts with int ent to cause a result that is an element of t he off ense, a nd believes the conduc t will cause the r esult without further c onduct on the per son’s part; or (3 ) A c ts w ith int e nt t o c omp le te a c ou rs e of

a c tio n o r c a us e a

resul t th at wou ld constitute the offe nse, under the circ umstances surr ounding the conduct a s the person believes the m to be, and the c ond u ct const itutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offe nse.

(b) Conduct doe s not c onstitut e a substantial step under subdivision (a)(3) unle ss the person’ s entire c ourse of

action is corr oborative of the intent to commit the offense

.-5-

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 12-101(a ) & (b). A person commits a g g rava ted criminal trespass when that person “ enter s or re mains on property when: (1) The pe rson knows the pe rson does n o t have the
property owner ’s ef

fec tive consent to do so; and (2) The person intends, knows, or is rec kless about whether such per son’s prese nce w ill cause fea r for the s afe ty of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14- 406.

Vi ewed in a li gh t mo st f a vo ra ble to the Sta te , th e e vid e nc e a t tr ia l sh ow e d th a t th e vic tim identified the a

ppellant as the person who broke into his apartment and shot him on the evening of Janu ary 6, 20 01 , in Me mph is. Th e vic tim te sti fi e d th a t th ree (3) ma sk e d me n b ro ke int o h is

apa rt me nt l oo kin g fo r d ru g s a nd mon e y be tw e e n 1 1:4 5 a nd 12 :00 a t nig ht. Th e vic tim wa s able to

un ma sk on e (1 ) o f the me n a nd ide nti fy him a s th e app e lla nt j us t be fo re the app e lla nt s ho t th e vic tim in the ha nd a nd fi ve (5 ) t ime s in the sto ma c h. Th e vic tim wa s la te r able to ide nti fy the app e lla nt i n a photo g raphic line-up. The de fense witnesses off ere d differing ve rsions of t h e events. Ron Childress testified that the victim was “hig h and drunk” on the nig ht of t h e i n ci dent and late r admitted to him that he had no idea what transpire d that night. Further, Mr. Childress c laimed that the victim offer ed to not identify the appe llant as the per

petra tor in exchang e for

two thousand dollars ($2,000). Mr . J ones testified that he was with the appellant in Dy ersbur g from ar ound 11:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. on the night of the shooting.

As noted earlier, this Court is prohibited from re-we ighing or re evalua ting the e vidence . The jury is in th e b e s t p o s it io n to w e ig h th e c r e d ib il it y o f th e w it n e s s e s a n d d e te r mi n e th e w eig ht and value to be g iven to the evidenc e. Whil e there was conflicting testimony about the even t s o n t he

e ve nin g of

the inc ide nt, we de te rm ine t ha t th e re wa s a mpl e te sti mon y fr om w hic h th e jury

c ou ld

c on vic t th e app e lla nt o f at te mpt e d f ir st d e g re e mur de r a nd a g g ra va te d c ri min a l tr e sp a ss. Se e Prue tt, 788 S.W .2d at 561. This issue is without m erit.

Sentencing

Ne x t , the appe llant contends that the trial c ourt improperly applied five (5) e nhance ment fac tors contra

ry to the decision in Bla

kely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The

app e lla nt d oe s n ot arg ue that the pr oo f did no t su pp ort the app lic a tio n o f the e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s,

mere ly that Bla kely preve nts the application of e nhance ment fac tors that are neither submitted to a jury nor admitted by t h e d ef en d an t. The State ar g ues that B lakely does not apply , and, in the alterna tive, that the trial court properly applied the e nhance ment fac tors.

Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt re c e ntl y de te rm ine d th a t B lake ly didno t a nn ou nc e a

ne w r ule of law and that “the Tenne ssee Criminal Sentenc ing Reform Act does not a uthorize a s entencing
proce dure w hich violated the Six th Amendment r i gh t t o jury trial.” State v. Gome z, 163 S .W.3d 632, 651 (Tenn. 2005) . I n Gomez, the court deter mined that despite the a bilityof trial judg es to set sentenc es above the pre sumptive sente nce ba sed on the finding of enha nceme nt fac tors neither f ound by a jury no r a dmi tte d by a de fe nd a nt, Te nn e sse e ’s se nte nc ing str uc tur e do e s no t vi olate the Sixth Amendment and doe s not conflict with the holdings of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124-6-

S.Ct . 2531 (2004), United States v. B ooker, ___ U .S. ___, 125 S.C t. 738 (2005), or United States v. Fa nFa n, the ca se consolidated w ith Booker , beca use “[t] he Reform Ac t [ of Tenne ssee] authorizes a discre tionary , non-manda tory sentenc ing pr o ce d u re a nd require s trial judge s to consider the principles of se n te n c in g a n d to e ng ag e in a qua litative analy sis of enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors

. . . a ll o f w hic h s e rv e to g uid e tr ial ju dg e s in e xer c isi ng the ir dis c re tio n to se le c t a n a

pp ro pr ia te sentenc e within the ra ng e set by the L eg is l at u re .” Gomez, 163 S.W.3d at 661. As a result of the decision in Gomez, the appe llant’s issue is without m erit.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE