Filed 2/23/24 P. v. Sanchez CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VICTOR LOPEZ SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D083028

 (Super. Ct. No. RIF1600163)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, 

John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed.

Jeanine Grimmond Strong for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Victor Lopez Sanchez appeals from an order denying his petition for 

resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His appellate counsel filed a 

brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and 

Sanchez filed a supplemental brief. We grant counsel’s request to take 

judicial notice of our decision in appeal No. D073727 and the jury 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless indicated 

otherwise.
2

instructions and the verdict forms from Sanchez’s record of conviction. (Evid. 

Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.) Based on our independent review of the record, 

we find no reasonably arguable appellate issues and affirm the judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2016, a jury found Sanchez guilty of inflicting corporal injury upon a 

spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2); assault by means of force likely to 

produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 3); attempted voluntary 

manslaughter, as a lesser included offense of attempted murder (§§ 192, 

subd. (a), 664; count 4); assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 5); 

discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle (§ 246; count 6); using force or 

threat of force to dissuade a witness from reporting a suspected crime to law 

enforcement (§ 136.1, subds. (b) & (c); counts 7 & 9); making criminal threats 

(§ 422; counts 8 & 10); discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; 

count 11); intentionally and knowingly violating a court-issued domestic 

violence protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); count 12); possessing a controlled 

substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 13); and possessing 

controlled substance paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364; count 14).

As to counts 1 and 2, the jury found true allegations Sanchez personally 

inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.7, subd. (e)). As to 

counts 4, 6, and 11, the jury found true allegations he personally used a 

firearm (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8); 12022.53, subd. (c).) Sanchez separately 

admitted allegations he had two prior convictions, which qualified as both 

prior serious felony convictions and prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. 

(a), (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A).) He also admitted he was released 

on bail when he committed the offense of discharging a firearm at an 

inhabited dwelling (§ 12022.1). 
3

Sanchez was sentenced to a total prison term of 38 years four months

for the felony counts, and a total consecutive jail term of two years six months 

for the misdemeanor counts. 

In the direct appeal, this court reversed the judgment as to his 

conviction for discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling, remanded the 

matter for further proceedings, but affirmed the judgment in all other 

respects. (People v. Sanchez (Aug. 28, 2018, D073727) [nonpub. opn.].)

On remand, Sanchez was resentenced to a total prison term of 35 years six 

months. 

On September 26, 2022, Sanchez filed a petition for resentencing under 

former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.2 Counsel was appointed and 

filed a brief in support of resentencing. In response, the People filed a 

“Request for Judicial Notice of Materials Re Latent Defects in Penal Code 

§ 1172.6 Petition for Resentencing”, requesting the court take judicial notice 

of the jury instructions, the opinion in the direct appeal, and the entire court 

file from the original case. Counsel for Sanchez filed a reply, contending the 

absence of jury instructions at Sanchez’s trial on the felony murder rule or 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine should not preclude him from 

section 1172.6 relief at the prima facie stage. 

After a hearing, the superior court found Sanchez failed to state a 

prima facie case for relief and denied the petition. Based on the record of 

conviction, including the jury instructions, the court concluded there was “no 

instruction that could have allowed an improper conclusion of guilt[.]” 

2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered to

section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
4

DISCUSSION

Sanchez’s appellate counsel has filed a brief raising no issues and 

requesting this court proceed pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. 

In its brief, counsel identifies the following issue to assist the court in its 

search of the record for error: Although section 1172.6, subdivision (a) limits 

resentencing relief to convictions for murder, attempted murder, and 

manslaughter, should the statute be interpreted to include attempted 

manslaughter?

In his supplemental brief, Sanchez contends he is eligible for 

resentencing because his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter

shows he did not act with the requisite malice.

We conclude Sanchez is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 

as a matter of law and no prima facie showing can be made, because Sanchez 

was not convicted of a crime enumerated in section 1172.6, subdivision (a). 

The amendments enacted by Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.) 

limited resentencing to petitioners convicted after trial of murder, attempted 

murder, and voluntary manslaughter, subject to certain express 

requirements. The Legislature did not include attempted manslaughter 

within those provisions. “ ‘[I]nsert[ing]’ additional language into a statute 

‘violate[s] the cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must not add 

provisions to statutes.’ ” (People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 587.) 

“Where, as here, the Legislature makes express statutory distinctions, ‘we 

must presume it did so deliberately, giving effect to the distinctions, unless 

the whole scheme reveals the distinction is unintended . . . [W]e presume the 

Legislature intended everything in a statutory scheme, and we should not 

read statutes to omit expressed language or include omitted language.’ ” 

(People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 691.)
5

Even if Sanchez’s conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter was 

within the provisions of section 1172.6, he would still be ineligible for 

resentencing. During his trial, the jury was not instructed on the felonymurder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, principals and 

accomplices, aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or any theory of imputed 

malice. Instead, the jury was instructed under CALCRIM No’s. 600 and 603, 

which required the jury to find he acted with the intent to kill. Sanchez is 

thus ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, because the 

jury was not instructed on any theory of liability for attempted voluntary 

manslaughter in which malice could be imputed solely based on his

participation in a crime. (See People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52; 

People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599; People v. Cortes (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 198, 205.)

Accordingly, based on our independent review of the record, we have 

not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

KELETY, J.