J-S07044-20

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

NOEL L. BROWN,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 No. 2388 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 1, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-64-CR-0000258-2016

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2020

Noel L. Brown (Appellant) appeals pro se from the July 1, 2019 order 

dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we dismiss this appeal 

based on Appellant’s deficient brief.

A prior panel of this Court provided the following background.

[O]n June 29, 2016, A.C., the fifteen-year-old victim in 

this case, was reported as a runaway. A.C. had answered an 

online advertisement seeking escorts and strippers. On that 

day, A.C. left her mother’s house with Appellant. By tracking 

A.C.’s cellular telephone, Pennsylvania State Police were able to 

locate A.C. at a local motel. When the police arrived, they 

noticed that A.C. appeared intoxicated; A.C. stated that 

Appellant had given her vodka. The troopers transported A.C. to 

the State Police barracks and questioned her regarding the 

events of the prior evening. A.C. told the troopers that she had 

answered an online advertisement for escorts, and Appellant 

picked her up and drove her to the motel. At the motel, 

Appellant provided A.C. with liquor and A.C. fell asleep. Police 

discovered that after A.C. fell asleep, Appellant undressed A.C., 
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exposed her breasts, took a photograph of the minor’s breasts, 

and placed the photograph online in an effort to utilize A.C. as a 

prostitute. Police also recovered a document signed by A.C. 

wherein she agreed to work for Appellant, and Appellant would 

act as her pimp.

Police arrested Appellant and charged him with numerous 

crimes in connection with the aforementioned events. [Prior to 

trial, Appellant indicated that he wanted to proceed pro se. 

Accordingly], there was a colloquy consistent with 

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998),1 and 

a thorough discussion of the factors outlined in Pa.R.Crim.P. 

121(A)(2) concerning pro se representation. ... The trial court 

ultimately permitted Appellant to proceed pro se, but the trial 

court appointed standby counsel. Following a jury trial, 

Appellant was found guilty of interference with custody of 

children, dissemination of photos of child sex acts, corruption of 

minors, furnishing liquor to minors, and trafficking in minors. 

______

1 In []Grazier, [] the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held 

that when a defendant wishes to waive counsel, an on-therecord determination should be made that said waiver is 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

On February 3, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 

an aggregate term of 180 to 384 months of incarceration. 

Appellant filed post[-]sentence motions that were denied, and on 

February 9, 2017, Appellant filed a timely appeal. Throughout 

the proceedings Appellant remained pro se. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 179 A.3d 590 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished 

memorandum at 2-3) (citations to the record and some footnotes omitted). 

On direct appeal to this Court, we were “constrained to conclude that 

none of the issues [raised by Appellant was] supported by cogent legal 

argument or citation to relevant authority; rather, Appellant’s argument 

[was] a nonsensical invective on the proceedings in the trial court.” Id.

(unpublished memorandum at 4). Accordingly, due to the “overwhelming 
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deficiencies in Appellant’s brief,” this Court concluded that Appellant had 

waived all issues on appeal and affirmed his judgment of sentence. Id. 

(unpublished memorandum at 4-5). Appellant untimely filed petitions for 

allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court, which were denied.

On October 25, 2018, Appellant timely filed the instant PCRA petition. 

Counsel was appointed and, following investigation of Appellant’s numerous 

claims, counsel filed a no-merit letter and motion to withdraw pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On May 1, 2019, the 

PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without 

a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and granted counsel’s motion to 

withdraw. Appellant pro se filed a response, and the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s PCRA petition on July 1, 2019. Appellant filed a motion for 

reconsideration, which the PCRA court denied on July 17, 2019. Appellant

pro se filed the instant notice of appeal on August 16, 2019.1 

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether we have 

jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. A notice of appeal shall be filed within 

 

1 On September 13, 2019, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to why 

the appeal should not be quashed as interlocutory. In his pro se response, 

Appellant stated that he was appealing from the July 1, 2019 dismissal of his 

PCRA petition. See Appellant[’s] Show of Cause for Granting Appeal of 

PCRA Petition, 9/23/2019. Accordingly, this Court discharged the rule to 

show cause and deferred consideration to this panel. We are satisfied that 

this appeal is not interlocutory and need not address this issue further.
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30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken. 

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).

The timeliness of an appeal and compliance with the statutory 

provisions granting the right to appeal implicate an appellate 

court’s jurisdiction and its competency to act. Absent 

extraordinary circumstances, an appellate court lacks the power 

to enlarge or extend the time provided by statute for taking an

appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 105. Thus, an appellant’s failure to

appeal timely an order generally divests the appellate court of its

jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 587 (Pa. 2014) (some internal 

citations omitted). “[T]he prisoner mailbox rule provides that a pro se 

prisoner’s document is deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison 

authorities for mailing.” Commonwealth v. DiClaudio, 210 A.3d 1070, 

1074 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Instantly, for Appellant’s notice of appeal to be considered timely, he

had to file it within 30 days of the July 1, 2019 order dismissing his PCRA 

petition, namely by July 31, 2019. As such, Appellant’s August 16, 2019 

notice of appeal is facially untimely. 

On October 1, 2019, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to why 

the instant appeal should not be quashed as untimely filed. In his pro se 

response, Appellant alleged that he timely filed a notice of appeal 

immediately after the PCRA court denied his motion for reconsideration. 

Appellant further averred that he filed a second notice of appeal, the August 

notice of appeal that was received by this Court, when he did not receive a 

response from the PCRA court. See Appellant[’]s Show of Cause in Favor of 
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Appeal, 10/9/2019. According to Appellant, he believed that “the second 

copy of his notice of appeal ha[d superseded] the first, or the first notice of 

appeal was some[]how disc[a]rded.” Id. at 1 (unnumbered). 

This Court ordered Appellant to file proof of the date that Appellant 

mailed the first notice of appeal. Per Curiam Order, 10/11/2019. In 

response, Appellant submitted copies of two postage cash slips to support 

his contention that he filed the first notice of appeal on July 23, 2019, and 

the second notice of appeal on August 13, 2019. Letter from Appellant, 

10/21/2019 (Exhibits 1 & 2). The July postage cash slip is hand-dated “07-

22-19,” but the date stamp of when it was received is illegible. See id.

(Exhibit 1). This Court discharged the rule to show cause and referred the 

issue to this panel. 

Upon review, this Court is unable to verify an exact date of when the 

postage cash slip in Exhibit 1 was received. Nonetheless, we are able to 

conclude from the faint outline of “JUL” that it was received in July. Because 

Appellant’s notice of appeal had to have been filed by July 31, 2019, the last 

day in July, in order to be considered timely, we are satisfied that this notice 

of appeal mailed in the month of July was timely filed. Insofar as the July

notice of appeal failed to reach this Court, we deem this a breakdown in the 

operation of the courts and accept Appellant’s August 2019 notice of appeal 

as if timely-filed. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 624 

(Pa. Super. 2016). 
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Before reaching the merits of any purportedly-raised claims, however,

we observe that “[a]ppellate briefs must conform materially to the 

requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this 

Court may [] dismiss an appeal if the defect in the brief is substantial.” 

Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citation omitted). “Although this Court is willing to construe liberally 

materials filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special 

benefit. Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural rules 

set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.” Id. (citation omitted).

[I]t is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are 

sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the 

claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record 

and with citations to legal authorities. This Court will not act as 

counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an 

appellant. If a deficient brief hinders this Court’s ability to 

address any issue on review, we shall consider the issue waived.

Commonwealth v. Adams-Smith, 209 A.3d 1011, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant fails to comply with multiple rules of appellate 

procedure. Compare generally Appellant’s Brief with Pa.R.A.P. Chapter 21 

(relating to briefs and reproduced records); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2111 

(requiring appellant’s brief to contain, inter alia, a separate and distinct 

statement of jurisdiction; order in question; statement of scope and 

standard of review; statement of questions involved; statement of the case; 

summary of the argument; argument; and conclusion with relief sought); 
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Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (requiring a statement of questions involved that states 

concisely the issues to be resolved); Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (requiring the argument 

section to be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be 

argued). Moreover, Appellant has failed to develop any issue in any 

meaningful fashion capable of review. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/24/2020