### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 12, 200 5 S es sio n

CHARLENE S INO R v. TI MOTH Y BARR

Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 46-91-89 Be tty Adam s Gr een, Judge

No. M2004- 02168-COA-R 3-JV - F iled Fe bruary 7, 2006

Charlene Sinor (“Petitioner”) filed a pe tition for contempt seeking , in part, to h av e T i m o thy Ba rr (“Responde nt”) found in c riminal contempt for his fa ilure to pay child support as order ed. After a trial, the Trial Court held Respondent in criminal conte mpt finding six vi olations of the Trial Court’s order s. Respondent appe als to this C ourt claiming that his co n v iction of criminal conte mpt was based upon a n improper e videntiary presumption and insuffic ient evidenc e. We re verse

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Juv e nileCo ur t R e ve r se d; Case Re m anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., joined.

Mike J . Urquha

rt, Nashville, Te nnessee for the A ppellant, Timothy Ba rr.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r a ndWar re n Jas pe r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, Nashville, Tenne ssee f

or the Appe llee, Charle ne Sinor.-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

Petitioner is the mother of a c hild (“T.R.S.”) born on April 29, 1988. Respondent wa s held to be the fathe r of T.R.S. in an Orde r of Paternity enter ed May 4, 1989. By order enter ed May 23, 1989, Respondent was or dere d, int e r a lia , to pay wee kly child support payments of $60.00, and to pay $5,366.03 in child support dating ba ck to the date of birth of T.R.S.
Petitioner filed a pe tition for contempt in October of 1989, re questing that Respondent be he l d i n co n t em p t of court for his failure to pay child support as orde red. A n attachme nt was entered on this petition, but appar ently no further action wa s taken. Petitioner filed
a sec ond petition for contempt in Fe bruary of 2001. The c ase w as hea rd by a re fer ee and an order enter ed on Aug ust 2, 2001, finding a nd holding, int e r a lia , that Respondent was g uiltyof thirteen violations of orders of

the court for his failure to pay child su p p o rt

. S en tencing on the Aug ust 2, 2001 order

was de lay ed pending potential compliance , and ult imately Respondent was found to be in compliance and the sentenc e wa s deeme d serve d.

On June 15 , 20 04 , Pe tit ion e r fi le d a no the r pe tit ion fo r c on te mpt se e kin g , in p art , to ha ve Re sp on de nt h e ld i n c ri min a l con te mpt fo r his failu re to pa y c hil d sup po rt a s ord e re d. Th e c a se was he ard be fore a re fer ee on A ug ust 30, 2004. A t the hea ring , Petitioner testified reg arding her contac ts with Respondent du ri ng the two plus y ear s prior to the hea ring . She testified that Respondent ca lled her in De cember o f 2 001, and aske d to see T.R.S. Petiti oner te stified that she then told Respondent t o call child support service s. Petitioner admitted that during that telephone
conver sation, she and Responde nt did not talk about child support. Petitioner testified t hat s he ca lled Re sp on de nt o nc e in M a y

or June of 20 03 , “ wh e n I tol d him

his so n n e e de d to c ome a ndstay wi th him for a while, I thought. I was having a lot of problems with him at the time. He said that now is not a g ood time.” Petitioner testified th at she a nd Respondent did not talk about child support du ri ng that te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio n e ith e r. Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d that sh e had no c on ta c t w ith Respondent af

ter Septembe r of 2003.

Petitioner admitted she has no e videncethat Respondent i s curr ently able- bodied and capa ble of pursuing employ ment. She testified: “I did bring in pic tures whe n I came to court in 2001 of the sig ns that [R espondent] had on the side of the street f or custom painting , house painting and stuff like t h at , ....” Howe ver, Petitioner testified that she does not know whe re Responde nt has worke d since De cembe r of 2001.T h e tra n sc rip t p ro v id e d in the re c o rd o n a p p e a l i s m issin g p a g e 1 4 . W h ile th e te stim o n y o n p a g e 1 5 su g g e sts 1
tha t P e tit io n e r g a v e so m e tes tim o n y re g a rd ing R e sp o n d e n t’s re a l p ro p e rty o n tha t m issin g p a g e , w e a re un a b le to
as cer t ai n t he s ubs t anc e of t he mi s s i ng t es t i mo ny

. P et i t i oner as s er t s i n her bri ef on appeal t hat t he propert y upon wh i ch sh e ho ld s a li e n ha s b e e n us e d a s re n ta l p ro p e rty. H o w e v e r, the re c o rd is d e v o id o f ev id e n c e sh o w ing tha t t h e p ro p e rty is re n ta l p ro p e rty, tha t i t cu rr e n tly is i n c o m e p ro d u c ing , o r h o w m u c h , i f an y, i n c o m e R e sp o n d e n t re c e ive s fro m this

so u rc e . O u r a ttem p ts to ha v e a c o p y o f th e m issin g p a g e 1 4 fo u n d a n d in c lud e d in the re c o rd w e re un su c c e ssfu l. W e
ca n r el y on l y u pon t h e pr oof i n t h e r ec or d bef

or e u s

. T h e par t i es h av e t h e bu r den of pr ov i di n g a n a dequ at e r ec or d on

a p p e a l an d m u st su ff

e r th e c o n se q u e n c e s if the y fail to d o so

. -3- Petitioner also testified that she ha s a lien on a pie ce of rea l p ro p er t yowned by Re sp on de nt. Pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d that sh e c a lle d the Re g ist e r of De e ds a ndc on fi rm e d th a t sh e sti ll

1 has the lien. Petitioner testified that he r lien has not bee n satisfied.

On September

13, 2004, the ref

ere e enter ed an order holding Respondent in criminal
c on te mpt fo r s ix vio la tio ns of

or de rs to pay c hil d su pp ort. S pe c if ic a lly , Re sp on de nt w a s f

ou ndin contempt for not ma

king his c hild support pay ments in O ctober , November , and De cembe r of 2003, and in J anuary , Fe bruary , and Mar ch of 2004. The S eptember 13 order made the f

inding of contempt “a f inal order subject to appe al , ” but suspended the sentenc e pending potential compliance . The September 13 or der inc orporated byref ere nce the ref

ere e’s Supplemental F indings a nd Orde r on Contempt wh i ch we re en tere d September 15, 2004. AConfirmation Order was e ntere d by

the J uvenile Court (“ Trial Court”) confirming the finding s of the ref ere e and making the re fer ee’ s order s the final orde rs of the Trial Court. The supplemental f indings e ntere d September 15, state d:
The proof

prese nted at trial wa s very sparse . The e ssence of the he aring primarily perta ined to the pay

rec ords. During the hea ring the only

witness called was [Petiti oner], the petitioner a nd cus todial pare nt. The only phy sical evide nce prese nted was the pay

rec ords. T h e petitioner testified that she ha d no additional inform a ti o n r e g ar d in g th e r e s p o n d e n t’ s ab il it y to w o rk o r a c tu a l w o rk he has perf ormed since the 2001 contempt hea ring . During her testimonyshe re fer red ba ck to e xhibi ts e nte re d at th e Au g us t 1, 20 01 hear ing . Sp e c if ic a lly sh e re fe rr e d to Exhi bit s 1 a nd 2 ind ic a tin g that the re sp on de nt wa s se lf e mpl oy e d in the h ome painting busine ss. That evidenc e wa s the b asis for the f indings of c ontempt at the prior hea ring . The pe tit i o n er testified that she c ontacted the responde nt in May or J une of 2003 seeking help in r aising their child. She was ha ving dif ficulties with the
c hil d a nd re qu e ste d that the re sp on de nt t ake the c hil d f or a pe ri odof tim e . Sh e sa id that the re spondent ref

used her reque st. She testified that she neve r conta cted the responde nt when payments stopped in Septe mber of 2003 and ha d not (sic) c ontact with him through the f

iling of the petition. From September of 2003 until March of 2004 there was no spec ific evide nce that t h e re s p o ndent could or c ould not make the se pa y me nts . T he re wa s no pro of pr e se nte d for thi s period . T he re sp on de nt c ho se not to testify

in this proceeding as he invoke d his 5 amendment privilege . Counsel th for the r espondent a

rg ues that the pe titioner has the burden o f putting on sp e c ifi c proof that the re spondent had the a bilityto work and pay

during the 6 months during which no payments were made. Counsel for the [P etitioner] a rg ues that the court c an-4-

rely on its prior findings of the responde nt’s ability to pay and that no spec ific proof for this period of time is require d. For the rea sons f urther elabor ated the court ag ree s w ith th e c o u n s e l f

o r [P e ti ti o n e r ].

A ca se of c rimina l contempt diffe rs from other criminal proc eeding s....A
c ri min a l pr oc e e din g sta

rt s wi th no thi ng a nd the c a se ha s to be e sta bli sh e d fa c t by

fa c t. A criminal contempt proce eding start s wi th a court history involving finding s and
o r d e r s t h a th a v e n o t b e e n c h a l l e n g e d

. T h e r e f o r e , t h e s t ar t i n g p o i n ti s d i f f e r e n t

. It would be a ridiculous proposition t o sug g est that the court turn a blind ey e to its prior finding s in assessing the issue of contempt. So, for example, as mentioned be fore , the mere ref

ere nce to the prior order

is ge nera lly

sufficie nt to prove knowledg e of the order . The pe titioni ng party does not have to ree stablish service of proce ss, presenc e of t he respondent, or rec eipt of t he prior court order byextrinsi c evide nce. A s noted be fo re , th e re is, if

y ou wi ll, a

“ pr e su mpt ion ” that on e wh o is pr e se nt i n c ou rt wh o is g iven or mailed a

copy of an or der, ha s knowledg e of the contents of the order. That “pre sumption” then s hifts the burden to the responde nt to put on proof that he or she didno t hav e kn ow le dg e of the or de r. On c e su ff

ic ie nt p ro of

is t ake n th a t w ou ld c re a te
a re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e re sp on de nt had kn owled g e of the or de r the pe tit ion is defe ated.

L ikewise, the c ourt ca n rely on the prior f

indings of a

bilityto ear n . I n the prior conte mpt procee dings, on Aug ust 1, 2001, the court re iterate d the finding s from 1989, that the re spondent was a ble to pay support of $260 per month. This amount of support translates on the g uidelines to aro u n d $ 8

. 40 per hour . The e vidence of p ay m en t s d u ri n g h i s 1 3 0 d ayp ro b at i o n ar y p er i o d fu rt h ers u p p o rt s t h i s fi n d i n g. Ad dit ion a lly , a ft e r that c a se c on c lud e d the re sp on de nt c on tin ue d makin g pay me nts in l ine wi th tho se prior

fi nd ing s. I t w a s n ot u nti l Sept e mbe r 200 3 th a t th e pa y me nts
cea sed abr

uptly and complete ly

with no payments being made during the following 6 months. This finding re mains unchalleng ed to this day . The respondent has ne ver filed a pe tition t o modify his support. No evidenc e was pre sented at trial indicating that th e re sp on de nt w a s u na ble to m ake the pay me nts

. Th e pe tit ion e r h a d n o s pe c if ic evidenc e as to a ny

employ ment or income a s the respond en t h as t raditionally been
se lf e mpl oy e d a s a

ho us e pa int e r. Th e re sp on de nt c ho se no t to te sti fy in this p ro ce ed i n g as h e i n v o k ed h i s 5 am en d m en tp ri v i l ege

. T h er ef o re , t h e p ri o r f

i n d i n gs th

rema in unchalleng ed and unc ontroverte d.

Re sp on de nt a

pp e a ls t o th is C ou rt

. Discussion Although not s t ated ex actly as such, Responde nt raises two issues on appe al: 1) whether the Trial Court er

red by utiliz ing an evidentiary

presumption that shifted the burde n of proof-5-

to Respondent; and, 2) whe ther the c onviction of criminal conte mpt was bas ed upon ins ufficie nt evidenc e.
As t h i s C o u rt re ce n t l y o b s er v ed in Barber v. Chapman , No. M2003-00378-COA- R3- CV, 2004 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. Fe b. 23, 2004), no appl. perm appeal filed :

I n a criminal contempt case , the g uilt of the acc used must be established bey ond a re asonable doubt. Black v. Blount , 938 S.W .2d 3 9 4 at 3 9 8 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Robinson v. Air Draul ics Engineering Co. , 214 Tenn. 30, 377 S .W.2d 908, 912 (Tenn. 1964). How ever , on app e a l, i nd ivi du a ls c on victe d o f c ri min a l c on te mpt los e the ir presumption of innocen ce and must overc ome the pre sumption of g uilt. "Appellate courts do not review the e vidence in a light favor abl e t o the ac cused and will rever se criminal contempt convictions only

when the e vidence is i n s u ff icient to support the trier- of-f ac t 's finding of conte mpt bey ond a re asonable doubt." Thigpen v. Thigpen , 874 S.W .2d 51, 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (c iting Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) ). F urthermor e, appellate courts re view a trial court' s decision of whe ther to impose contempt sanc tions us ing the
more re laxed abuse of discr etion standard of revie w. Ha wk

v . H awk , 855 S.W .2d 573, 583 (Tenn. 1993)

. Barber , 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 111, at *8. Ac c or

d , Freem an v. Freeman , No. M2002-02558- COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 660, at * 22 (Ten n

. C t

. App. Sept. 16, 2003), appl. perm. appeal denied M

arch 22, 2004 (s ta tin g : “ Ap pe llate Cou rt s r e vie w a tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to i mpo se contempt sanc tions using the more rela x ed ‘a buse of discr etion’ st an d ar d of re view.... The court of appe als has ‘a

ppellate jurisdiction over

civil or criminal conte mpt arising out of a civil matter.’ See T.C.A. § 16-4-108( b)...” ( citations omitt ed))

.

The Trial Court found a nd held Respondent in criminal contempt under Te nn. Code An n. § 2 9- 9- 10 2, wh ic h p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art : 29-9-102. Scope of P ower – Th e po we r o f the se ve ra l c ou rt s to iss ue a tta c hme nts , a ndinf lic t pun is hm ent s for

c on te mpt s o f c ou rt , s ha ll n ot b e c on str ue d to e xten d to
a ny e xce pt the fo llo wi ng c a se s:

* * *
(3 ) T he wi ll fu l di so be die nc e or re sis te nc e of

a ny of fi c e r o f the su c h c ou rt s, par ty , ju r o r , w it n e s s , o r a n y o th e r p e r s o n , to a n y la w f u l w r it , p r o c e s s , o r d e r , rule, de c re e , o r c omm a ndof

su c h c ou rt s;T he T r i al Co ur t found t hat Respondent was awa r e of t he cour t order t o pay ch i l d s uppo r t

. T he evi dence 2

su p p o rts th is fi n d ing a n d R e sp o n d e n t co n c e d e s o n a p p e a l t h a t t h is fac t i s n o t i n d isp u te

. -6- Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102( 3) (2000). “Thus, to f ind c ontempt unde r this statute, a court must find the misbehavior, disobedience , resistenc e, or interf ere nce to be wilful.” Ah e rn v . A he rn , 15 S.W .3d 73, 79 (Tenn. 2000). To be able to ma ke a determination a

bout w hether Respondent’s failure to pay
wa s w ilf ul, the Tria l Co urt ha d to de te rm ine if Re sp on de nt h a d th e abil ity to pa y wh e n the pay me nts
wer e due. Se e id

.

We first addre ss whether

th eT ria l C o u r t er r e d b y utiliz ing an evidentiary

presumption that shifted the burde n of proof to Respondent. I n essenc e, Respondent a rg ues that the Trial Court presumed that Respondent had the ab i l i t y to earn based upon the prior Tria l Court orders a nd i m p r o p e r l y s h i f

t e d t h e b u r d e n o f

p r o o f t o R e s p o n d e n tt o p r o v e t h a th e d i d n o t h a v e t h e ab i l i t y t o p a y. Petitioner, howeve r, ar g ues that the Trial Court did not apply any presumption but simply took the fac ts that had bee n established in the pre vio u s co n t em pt proce eding s and consider ed them as
e sta bli sh e d f a c ts. Spe c if

ic a lly , th e Tria l Co urt st a te d that it “ c a n re ly on the prior fi nd ing s of abil ity to e arn .” We a g re e that th e Tria l Co urt c a n r e ly onits prior

fi nd ings of 20 01 , re le va nt t o R es p o n d en t ’s ab i l i t y

t o ea rn

. Ho we v er , t h at re l i an ce h as a li m i t an d t h at l i m i ti s t h at t h o s e f i n d i n gs are no more than Responde nt had the ability to earn as of the date re levant in the 2001 hea ring

.
Ev e n if Pe tit ion e r i s c or

re c t a nd the Tria l Court app lie d no pre su mpt ion bu t me re ly considere d established fa cts, we still must decide whe ther the e vidence is sufficient to support the Trial Court’s finding of contempt bey ond a reasonable doubt. This bring s us to Respondent’s second issue, whether

the conviction of c riminal contempt was ba sed upon insufficie nt evidence

. Respondent ar g ues, in part, that Plaintiff fa iled to prove be y ond a re asonable doubt that Respondent had the a bilityto pay

and wilfully

failed to pay

. We ag ree

.

2

As n o t ed in t he supplementa l findings e ntere d on September 15, “ [t ]he proof prese nted at trial wa s very sparse .” Our

revie w of the r ecor d shows the re co rd i s even le ss than sp ars e a ndins te a d is de vo id of e vid e nc e sh ow ing that Resp on de nt cu rr e ntl y is wo rking or is c apa ble of working , or curr ently has any income whatsoeve r. I nstead, Petitioner relied solely upon evidenc e pr e se nte d d uring the pr e vio us c on te mpt pr oc e e din g s a ndthe fa c ts a s f ou ndby the Tria l Co urt in 2001. Petitioner admitted that she does not know wher e Respondent has worke d since De cembe r of 2001. During the pre vious contempt proce eding s in 2001, Petit ioner produc ed proof in the form of Respondent’s business c ard a nd a photog raph of the business si gn used by Respondent at that time. Petiti oner attempted to rely o n t h i s s am e evide nce in he r testimony in the instant case. Ho we ve r, Pe tit ion e r a dmi tte d that sh e ha d no e vid e nc e sh ow ing that Re sp on de nt e ve n c ur re ntl y is capa ble of wor

king. Petitioner did not introduce any business car d or business sig n used by Respondent any

time after the 2001 hearing. In addition, although Petitioner c laims that Respondent has income f

rom renta l pr o p er t y , as we discusse d above, no e vidence of this was produc ed. Petitioner simplyput o n no proof r eg arding Respondent’s cur rent situation. The Trial Court’s finding s of fa ct spec ifically stated that “[f]rom September of 2003 until Marc h of 2004 there was no specific evidenc e that the r espondent c ould or could not make the se payments.”-7- Petitioner prese nted no proof to the T rial C ourt of Respondent’ s abilityto pay other than the esta

blished fac t that he had such abili ty on Aug ust 1, 2001. The fa ct that Respondent wa s employ ed and had income over two plus y ear s ag o, standing alone, is insufficient to prove c riminal contempt bey ond a reasonable doubt. The passag e of time betwee n the prior contempt hea ring and this contempt hearing simply was too long to a ssume that Respondent’s situation has not chang ed. I f the pr e vio us ly

e sta bli sh e d e vid e nc e sh ow e d th a t Re sp on de nt w a s emp lo y able a ndha d in c ome perha ps just two we eks befor e the r eleva nt time now at issue, then the evide nce w ould car ry more we ig ht. Ho we ve r, muc h c a n h app e n in tw o p lus y e ars . We ho ld that th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o support the Trial Court' s finding of contempt bey ond a re asonable doubt. As such, we reve rse the
c on vic tio n o f c ri min a l c on te mpt

. Conclusion

The judg ment of the Trial Court is reve rsed, and this cause is re manded to the Trial Court for collec tion of the costs below. The costs on appea l are as s es s ed aga i nst the Appellee , Charlene Sinor.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE