alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1433 

To require that members of the Armed Forces who were killed or wounded 

in the attack that occurred at a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 2009, are treated in the same manner as members 

who are killed or wounded in a combat zone. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

AUGUST 1, 2013 

Mr. BOOZMAN (for himself and Mr. PRYOR) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To require that members of the Armed Forces who were 

killed or wounded in the attack that occurred at a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 

2009, are treated in the same manner as members who 

are killed or wounded in a combat zone. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Honoring Ezeagwula 

5 and Long Act’’ or the ‘‘HEAL Act’’. 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1433 IS

1 SEC. 2. EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE 

2 ARMED FORCES KILLED OR WOUNDED IN 

3 LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, RECRUITING STA4 TION ATTACK. 

5 For purposes of all applicable Federal laws, regula6 tions, and policies, the members of the Armed Forces who 

7 were killed or wounded in the attack that occurred at a 

8 recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 

9 2009, shall be deemed to have been killed or wounded in 

10 a combat zone as the result of an act of an enemy of the 

11 United States. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Order entered January 18, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05
- 12
- 00985
- CR
TRACY LYNN SIMS JR., Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F09
- 71267
- H 

### O RDER
The Court ORDERS the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine why appellant’s brief has not been filed. In this regard, the trial court shall make appropriate findings and recommendations and determine whether ap pellant desires to prosecute the appeal, whether appellant is indigent, or if not indigent, whether retained counsel has abandoned the appeal. See
T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.8( b ). If the trial court cannot obtain appellant’s presence at the hearing, the trial co urt shall conduct the hearing in appellant’s absence. See Meza v. State , 742 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.

– Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (per curiam). If appellant is indigent, the trial court is ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effect ive representation, which may include appointment of new counsel.We ORDER the trial court to transmit a record of the proceedings, which shall include written findings and recommendations, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order. This appeal is ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with the above order. The appeal shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the findings are received, whichever is earlier.

/s/ DAVID EVANS JUSTICE
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. John J. WILCOX, Relator, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 71-898.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 16, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Mandamus dismissed.
#### Albert PALMIERI et al. v. FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 53539.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 11, 1973.

In re: Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Tammany, 275 So.2d 214.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.
EXHIBIT 99.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I,  Gabriel Battista, Chief Executive Officer of Talk America Holdings, Inc.(the
"Company"),  have  reviewed  the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
quarterly  period ended June 30, 2002 and, based on the inquiries I have made or
caused  to  be  made  in  the  fulfillment  of  my responsibilities as the Chief
Executive  Officer  of  Talk  America  Holdings,  Inc.,  I  hereby certify that:

     (i)  the  Talk America Holdings, Inc. Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
     quarterly  period  ended June 30, 2002 fully complies with the requirements
     of  Section  13(a)  of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
     (ii)  the  information  contained  in  such  Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of Talk
     America  Holdings,  Inc.

This  certificate  is  being made for the exclusive purpose of compliance by the
Chief  Executive Officer of Talk America Holdings, Inc. with the requirements of
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and may not be used for any other
purposes.

/s/  Gabrial  Battista
----------------------
Gabriel  Battista
Chief  Executive  Officer
August  13,  2002
#### Joseph N. BAGWELL, Appellant, v. MURTY BROS. AGENCY, INC., Appellee.

No. 72-62.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 27, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### LIGHTHOUSE POINT BANK, a Florida banking corporation, Appellant, v. Armand F. ARCHER and Martha J. Archer, Appellees.

No. 71-761.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 6, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Roy Winnen BRIDGES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 66-943.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Sept. 12, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1967.

Engel & Pollack, Miami, and Philip S. Goldin, Miami, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Barry N. Semet, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., BARKDULL, J., and LOPEZ, ACQUILI-NO, Jr., Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was tried before a jury on an information charging him with attempting to break and enter a building with intent to commit a felony, to-wit, grand larceny, and possession of burglary tools. The jury found the appellant guilty and sentenced him to eight years in the state penitentiary. On appeal, he contends, (1) that the court erred in not granting the appellant’s motion for mistrial when the State Attorney in his argument to the jury stated that the appellant did not take the stand in his own defense; (2) that the trial court erred in not granting the appellant’s motion for mistrial when the State Attorney in his opening argument and on direct examination inferred that the appellant had a bad character and criminal history by references to pictures posted in a police station.

A review of the record convinces us that the remarks of the State Attorney do not lend themselves to the connotation given by the appellant under any reasonable view of the circumstances. Therefore reversal is denied on the two contentions. See Hand v. State, 188 So.2d 364-367 (Fla.App.1966).

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               FEB-29-2000
<CASH>                                       1,754,353
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,401,311
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,155,664
<PP&E>                                       3,681,228
<DEPRECIATION>                                 143,065
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,090,415
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,422,384
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  4,000,000
<COMMON>                                        37,250
<OTHER-SE>                                   (382,686)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,090,415
<SALES>                                      3,631,166
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,631,166
<CGS>                                        1,756,342
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,339,167
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             114,853
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,822,853)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,822,853)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                            (3,100,087)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (4,922,940)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.13)


</TABLE>
CHARLES J. EATO

,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS

,

Respondent. ___________________________/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF F ILED

CASE NO. 1D 14

- 5657

Opinion filed June 2, 2015.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

-- Original Jurisdiction

.

Charles J. Eato, pro se , Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Matthew F. Vitale, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee

, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits

.

WOLF, WETHERELL, and BILBREY, JJ.

, CONCUR.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.1


The Board of Directors and Stockholders
TransMontaigne Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No.
333-23691) on Form S-3 and the registration statements (Nos. 333-04405, 333-
15055 and 333-34579) on Form S-8 of TransMontaigne Inc. of our report dated
September 19, 2001 relating to the consolidated balance sheets of TransMontaigne
Inc. and subsidiaries as of June 30, 2001 and 2000, and the related consolidated
statements of operations, stockholders' equity, and cash flows for each of the
years in the three-year period ended June 30, 2001, which report appears in the
June 30, 2001 annual report on Form 10-K of TransMontaigne Inc.




                                                         KPMG LLP

Denver, Colorado
September 21, 2001
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42800

STATE OF IDAHO
,

Plaintiff

- Respondent ,

v.

JAMES LEMAR PARTON
,

Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 720

Filed: November 17, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bonner County. Hon. Barbara A. Buchanan , District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of twenty years, with a minimum term of confinement of ten years, for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen,
affirmed

.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth A. Allred , Deputy Appellate Public De fender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________
Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; GRATTON, Judge;

and HUSKEY, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

James Lemar Parton was found guilty of lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen

, Idaho Code § 18

- 1508 . The district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with a

minimum term of confinement of ten years

. Parton appeals, conte nding that his sentence is

excessive.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and

need not be repeated he re. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 114, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014

-2

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 447, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App.

1984); State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed t he record

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Parton ’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 17, 2022

No. 04

- 20

- 00267

- CV

Joe Jesse PONCE III, Appellant

v.

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE

,

Appellee

From the 285th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018

- CI

- 04768 Mary C. Brown , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Sitting: R ebeca C. Martine z, Chief Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, J ustice

On May 25, 2022, we issued a memorandum opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment that, among other things, disbarred appellant. Since then, we have granted appellant five extensions of time to file a motion for rehearing. The last extension fixed a d eadline of November 4, 2022. In our order granting appellant a fifth extension of time, we cautioned that “no further extensions of time for this filing will be entertained. ” On November 7, 2022, appellant filed a letter stating that he became ill the pr evious week and stating : “I’m also having issues with my computer. I will try to use Fed X [ sic ] to electronically send my Motion for Rehearing.” We construe appellant’s letter as his sixth motion for extension of time. Appellant’s sixth motion for exte nsion of time to file a motion for rehearing is hereby DENIED

.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief JusticeIN WI TNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 17th day of November, 2022

.

_________________________________ M ichael A. C ruz
, Clerk of Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE UNION
PACIFIC RESOURCES GROUP INC. CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
POSITION AT MARCH 31, 2000, AND THE RELATED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF
INCOME FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2000, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                              66
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      335
<ALLOWANCES>                                         8
<INVENTORY>                                         53
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   470
<PP&E>                                          11,084
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,671
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   6,060
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              550
<BONDS>                                          2,606
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                       1,021
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     6,060
<SALES>                                            517
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   522
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      334
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  49
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    125
<INCOME-TAX>                                        32
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 93
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      3
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        96
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.38
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.38


</TABLE>
Exhibit 11



THE BOSTON BANCORP

Computation of Primary and Fully Diluted Earnings Per Share


                                       Year Ended October 31
                                 ------------------------------------
                                 1995          1994              1993
                                 ----          ----              ----



Net Income. . . . . . . . . . $28,345,931   $24,577,986       $35,320,240
                              ===========   ===========       ===========

Primary earnings per share:

Weighted average number of
common shares outstanding
including common stock
equivalents . . . . . . . . .   5,303,797    5,444,982          6,079,216
                                =========   ==========        ===========

Earnings per share. . . . . .       $5.34        $4.51              $5.81
                                    =====        =====              =====

Fully diluted earnings per share:

Weighted average number of
common shares outstanding
including common stock
equivalents . . . . . . . . .  $5,318,326    $5,444,982        $6,140,108
                               ==========   ===========       ===========

Earnings per share. . . . . .       $5.33         $4.51             $5.75
                                    =====         =====             =====
#### Alexander SEPE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-1237.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 17, 1974.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Criminal Justice Division, Orange County; Maurice M. Paul, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
Filed 5/8/18 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2018 ND 105

In the Interest of A.H.

Carissa Cowley, L.S.W., Petitioner and Appellee

v.

A.H., a child, A.H., father,

Lisa Borseth, Guardian ad Litem,

Christopher D. Jones, the Executive

Director of the North Dakota Department

of Human Services, Respondents

        and

L.B., mother,                                                                         Respondent and Appellant

No. 20180107

Appeal from the Juvenile Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, the Honorable Scott A. Griffeth, Judicial Referee.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Constance L. Cleveland, Assistant State’s Attorney, Fargo, ND, for petitioner and appellee; submitted on brief.

Jay R. Greenwood, Fargo, ND, for respondent and appellant; submitted on brief.

Interest of A.H.

No. 20180107

Per Curiam.

[¶1]L.B. appealed from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to A.H. The juvenile court found the child is deprived, the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue, and the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious harm in the future. On appeal, the mother argues there was not clear and convincing evidence to support a termination of her parental rights. We conclude the juvenile court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence and are not clearly erroneous. We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).

[¶2]Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

Jerod E. Tufte

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jon J. Jensen
Exhibit 32.1

906 CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350 as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|(1) |  | The accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period
ended November 30, 2006, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and
|--- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|(2) |  | The information contained in the accompanying Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





Date:  January 12, 2007
        /s/   David H. RochePresident andChief Executive Officer/s/   Steven M. CaspersExecutive Vice President andChief Financial Officer


---
#### MILLER v. SAFETY HARBOR SPA, INC.

No. 36674.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 1967.

Certiorari dismissed without opinion. 200 So.2d 276.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 144 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 144

 To amend the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to authorize 
         additional funding for the pregnancy assistance fund.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

             January 24 (legislative day, January 3), 2013

   Mr. Casey introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
  referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to authorize 
         additional funding for the pregnancy assistance fund.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Pregnancy Assistance Fund Expansion 
Act''.

SEC. 2. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR THE PREGNANCY ASSISTANCE FUND.

    Section 10214 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (42 
U.S.C. 18204) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``In 
addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated in the previous 
sentence, there are authorized to be appropriated to carry out section 
10210, an additional $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2014 through 
2019.''.
                                 <all>
```