Supreme Court

No. 2018-32-Appeal.

No. 2018-248-Appeal. 

(P 14-2875)

Terry Ann Smith :

v. :

Andrew Smith. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before 

publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to 

notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 

250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at (401) 222-

3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that 

corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

May 16, 2019
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 Supreme Court

No. 2018-32-Appeal.

No. 2018-248-Appeal. 

(P 14-2875)

Terry Ann Smith :

v. :

Andrew Smith. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. The pro se defendant, Andrew Smith, appeals from 

decisions of the Family Court granting an absolute divorce to defendant and his former wife, 

Terry Ann Smith, the plaintiff, and ordering an equitable distribution of their marital assets. This 

case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on March 5, 2019, pursuant to an order 

directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be 

summarily decided. After a close review of the record and careful consideration of the parties’ 

written and oral arguments, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and proceed to decide 

the appeal at this time. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decisions of the Family

Court. 

Facts and Travel

This contentious litigation began on November 11, 2014, when plaintiff filed a complaint 

for divorce from defendant and the case was assigned to the Family Court general magistrate. 

The defendant, who was represented by counsel at the time, filed an answer and counterclaim for 
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divorce on December 23, 2014.1 Both parties cited irreconcilable differences that led to the 

irremediable breakdown of the marriage as the grounds for divorce. 

Soon thereafter, on January 16, 2015, the parties were heard on their motions for 

temporary allowances and, pursuant to a consent order, agreed, inter alia, to sell four parcels of 

real estate. However, defendant’s obstructive and bad-faith interference with the efforts to sell

the real estate led the general magistrate to appoint a commissioner to effectuate the transactions. 

Nevertheless, defendant—determined to prevent the sales—filed several disingenuous motions 

seeking to block the sales and remove the real estate commissioner; filed mechanic’s liens on 

two parcels; and, most egregiously, purportedly conveyed one of the properties to a third party 

for the consideration of one cent. 

The record also reflects that defendant deliberately sought to deceive the court, refused to 

comply with discovery requests, and engaged in vexatious litigation practices by filing a 

multitude of frivolous motions and appealing nearly every decision by the general magistrate.2 

The plaintiff appropriately sought sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Family Court Rules of 

Procedure for Domestic Relations, claiming that defendant’s motions were meritless and 

designed to harass and cause unnecessary delay, thereby needlessly increasing the costs of 

litigation. Given defendant’s numerous pending appeals and frivolous motions, this case was 

ultimately reassigned to a justice of the Family Court. 

On December 18, 2017, three years after the initial complaint was filed and after 

testimony spanning five months, the trial justice granted both parties an absolute divorce and 

 

1 On April 13, 2015, defendant’s attorney withdrew as counsel; defendant proceeded pro se. 

2 The Family Court justice noted that, between April 2015 and June 2016, defendant filed fiftythree motions in this case, which she deemed “part of his stall tactics,” given his concession in 

open court that he would “make sure that [p]laintiff * * * did not get a penny.” 
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issued a ninety-five-page written decision. The trial justice made 113 findings of fact as to the 

procedural history of the case. Next, the trial justice reviewed the testimony and set forth the 

various assets and debts of the parties. After reviewing the parties’ circumstances and conduct 

during the marriage, the trial justice then proceeded to an equitable distribution of the marital 

property in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.1. Notably, when addressing “either party’s 

wasteful dissipation of assets[,]” the trial justice recounted defendant’s “egregious behaviors in 

this case[,]” as well as his unwavering efforts to prevent the Family Court from granting a 

divorce, all while depleting the marital assets. 

The trial justice addressed defendant’s request for alimony, which, after examining the 

statutory factors set forth in § 15-5-16 and reincorporating her previous findings, she denied. 

The trial justice then considered plaintiff’s complaint for protection from abuse. She found that 

defendant had placed plaintiff in fear of imminent physical harm, and, thus, granted the relief. 

Finally, the trial justice addressed plaintiff’s request for Rule 11 sanctions against defendant and 

concluded that, given “[d]efendant’s vexatious filing of baseless [m]otions” for the “sole purpose 

and intent to harass the [p]laintiff and dissipate the marital assets[,]” defendant had violated Rule 

11, and, thus, ordered him to pay plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. 

Lastly, the trial justice made ninety-seven additional findings of fact. Notably, she found 

that, in light of defendant’s willful depletion of marital assets and interference with plaintiff’s 

efforts to preserve the value of the marital assets, it was equitable to award plaintiff a 

disproportionate amount of the marital assets. She awarded plaintiff 70 percent of various sums 

that defendant had withdrawn or withheld from the joint marital account. She further awarded 

plaintiff $30,394.81, which represented 70 percent of the “marital assets which were depleted 

from the marital estate solely due to [d]efendant’s misdeeds[,]” as well as $82,550, which 
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represented plaintiff’s 50 percent share of the value of the property that defendant had conveyed 

for the consideration of one cent. Upon granting the parties’ prayers for divorce, the trial justice 

proceeded to divide the marital estate. From this decision, defendant appealed. Thereafter, on 

June 19, 2018, on remand from that appeal, the Family Court entered a decision pending entry of 

final judgment that memorialized the conclusions contained in the December 2017 decision. The 

defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from that decision, and we consolidated the appeals for 

briefing and argument. 

Analysis

Before this Court, defendant contends that the Family Court did not have jurisdiction to 

grant plaintiff’s complaint for divorce, as well as his counterclaim for divorce, because doing so 

would violate his religious right to the sacrament of marriage. This argument is without merit. 

At the outset, we note that defendant makes this argument in the face of his own 

counterclaim seeking an absolute divorce from his union with plaintiff. It is undisputed that the 

Family Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to grant a petition for divorce. The General 

Assembly, by enacting G.L. 1956 § 8-10-3, specifically granted the Family Court the authority to 

“hear and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage[.]” See § 8-10-3(a); see 

also Rogers v. Rogers, 18 A.3d 491, 493 (R.I. 2011) (recognizing that the Family Court clearly 

has subject-matter jurisdiction with respect to petitions for divorce). Thus, contrary to 

defendant’s assertions, the Family Court is vested with statutorily-conferred authority to oversee 

proceedings stemming from divorce actions, which includes the authority to grant an absolute 

divorce to the faithful among us whose religious beliefs repudiate divorce.3 See Ditson v. Ditson,

 

3 General Laws 1956 § 8-10-3(a) provides, in relevant part, that the Family Court has the power 

to “hear and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage[,] * * * all motions for 

allowance, alimony, support and custody of children, allowance of counsel and witness fees, and 
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4 R.I. 87, 105-06 (1856) (recognizing that marriage, as a contractual relationship, affects the 

parties’ status, and that the state thereby has the sovereign authority to fix or alter the status of its 

citizens); see also Crow v. Crow, 41 R.I. 258, 259, 103 A. 739, 739 (1918) (holding that 

jurisdiction over divorce is statutory). 

The defendant also argues that the Family Court justice erred in the equitable distribution 

of the parties’ marital assets, pursuant to § 15-5-16.1. However, our review of the record 

convinces us that the Family Court justice did not abuse her discretion in disproportionately 

distributing the marital assets. 

It is well established that “[t]he equitable distribution of marital assets is left to the sound 

discretion of the Family Court justice who is obligated to consider the factors prescribed by the 

Legislature in G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.1.” Andreozzi v. Andreozzi, 813 A.2d 78, 81 (R.I. 2003)

(brackets omitted) (quoting Viti v. Viti, 773 A.2d 893, 895 (R.I. 2001)). In deciding the issue of 

equitable distribution, the Family Court justice considered the relevant statutory factors, 

including: (1) the length of the marriage; (2) the conduct of the parties during the marriage; (3) 

each party’s contributions towards the acquisition, preservation, and appreciation of assets; (4) 

each party’s homemaking contributions; (5) the health and age of the parties; (6) the amount and 

sources of income of the parties; (7) the occupation and employability of the parties; (8) each 

party’s opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets and income; (9) the lack of dependent 

children; (10) defendant’s wasteful dissipation of marital assets; and (11) defendant’s bad-faith 

conduct. See § 15-5-16.1.

The record establishes that the trial justice issued a meticulous ninety-five-page written 

decision that sets forth the extensive travel of the case and includes findings on credibility and 

 

other matters arising out of petitions and motions relative to real and personal property in aid 

thereof[.]”
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the numerous issues raised in this three-year divorce proceeding. Her conclusions are 

memorialized in a fifteen-page decision pending entry of final judgment. When distributing the 

marital assets, the trial justice carefully considered the factors enumerated in § 15-5-16.1, taking 

into account the conduct of both parties, including defendant’s misconduct and shocking 

dissipation of the parties’ marital assets. We thus hold that the Family Court justice did not err,

nor did she abuse her discretion in any way. Because the trial justice “scrupulously considered” 

all the requisite statutory elements and applied those factors to her well-supported findings of 

fact, we will not disturb her decisions. See Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558, 560 (R.I. 1984). 

Additionally, the defendant challenges the Family Court justice’s imposition of Rule 11 

sanctions, thereby requiring him to pay the plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees. Under Rule 11, 

trial courts have “broad authority to impose sanctions * * * for advancing claims without proper 

foundation[.]” Michalopoulos v. C & D Restaurant, Inc., 847 A.2d 294, 300 (R.I. 2004). As 

such, “a trial justice has discretionary authority to formulate what he or she considers to be an 

appropriate sanction, but must do so in accordance with the articulated purpose of the rule: ‘to 

deter repetition of the harm, and to remedy the harm caused.’” Pleasant Management, LLC v. 

Carrasco, 918 A.2d 213, 217 (R.I. 2007) (quoting Michalopoulos, 847 A.2d at 300). “[T]his 

Court will not reverse a trial justice’s imposition of sanctions for a litigant’s misconduct unless 

‘the trial court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Michalopoulos, 847 A.2d at 300). Based on the 

record before us, which clearly establishes that the defendant acted in bad faith with the purpose 

and intent to harass the plaintiff and filed numerous frivolous motions that forced the plaintiff to 

incur additional legal fees, we see no abuse of discretion in imposing the sanction. If ever there 

was a case in which this sanction was warranted, the facts of this case cry out for such a remedy. 
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Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decisions of the Family Court. The record 

shall be remanded to the Family Court.
SU‐CMS‐02A (revised June 2016)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE 

OPINION COVER SHEET 

Title of Case Terry Ann Smith v. Andrew Smith.

Case Number 

No. 2018-32-Appeal. 

No. 2018-248-Appeal. 

(P 14-2875)

Date Opinion Filed May 16, 2019 

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and 

Indeglia JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg 

Source of Appeal Providence County Family Court 

Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Patricia K. Asquith 

Attorney(s) on Appeal 

For Plaintiff: 

Jesse Nason, Esq.

For Defendant: 

Andrew Smith, Pro Se