2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

12-4-2013

Asia Brown v. Hamilton Township Police Dept

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 13-3193

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Asia Brown v. Hamilton Township Police Dept" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 1556.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1556
DLD-041 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-3193

___________

ASIA NICOLE BROWN,

Appellant

v.

HAMILTON TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPT MERCER COUNTY, NEW JERSEY; 

RALPH FRASCO, JR.; DAVID DELEON; SGT MICHAEL EVERETT; 

J FARLETTO; OFFICER ANAJA; EDWARD LUGO 

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 13-cv-00260)

District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect

or for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

November 15, 2013

Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 4, 2013)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Appellant Asia Nicole Brown filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 

that her civil rights had been violated in the course of her arrest and detention for shoplifting. 

The District Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 
2

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and Brown appealed. For the reasons that follow, we will 

summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 In conducting our review, we must

liberally construe Brown’s pro se filings, see Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 

2011), and “accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences 

that can be drawn therefrom,” Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) 

(citation omitted). 

In her complaint, Brown alleged that shortly after her arrest, she requested, and 

received, two sanitary napkins. Three hours later, her repeated requests for additional feminine 

products were denied by the defendants. When Brown complained, Officer Deleon allegedly 

used a racial slur in response. Brown asserts that she reported Deleon’s behavior to his 

supervisor, defendant Everett, but that Everett and several other defendants merely mocked her 

as a result.

The District Court properly dismissed the complaint because Brown failed to state a 

claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

As the District Court noted, allegations of verbal abuse or threats, absent any injury or damage, 

are not cognizable under § 1983. See McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 n.3 (10th Cir. 

2001); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997) (verbal abuse directed at religious 

 

1

 The District Court instructed Brown that she could move to reopen her case within 30 days 

by filing an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies. Brown filed a notice of appeal 

prior to the expiration of the 30-day period, and as such, can be said to have elected to stand on 

her complaint. See Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992). 

Accordingly, we possess appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lucas v. Twp. of Bethel, 319 F.3d 

595, 600 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that an “order [was] final and appealable because plaintiffs 

have elected to stand on their complaint.”). 
3

and ethnic background does not state a cognizable constitutional violation). Brown failed to 

allege any actual injury stemming from defendants’ conduct. Furthermore, when a pretrial 

detainee, such as Brown, challenges her conditions of confinement, “we must consider whether 

there has been a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hubbard 

v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2005). In doing so, we must inquire “whether those 

conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). 

While defendants’ failure to provide needed sanitary napkins for a few hours may have 

resulted in discomfort, it was de minimis, and certainly not sufficiently serious to implicate 

Brown’s constitutional rights. Cf. id. at 542 (noting that “genuine privations and hardship over 

an extended period of time might raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause”). 

 Based on the foregoing, we conclude this appeal presents no substantial question and, 

therefore, will summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.