IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

CITY OF HENDERSON, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 

CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE 

TREVOR L. ATKIN, DISTRICT JUDGE, 

Respondents, 

and 

STEVEN CULLEN, 

Real Party in Interest. 

No. 81714 

FILED 

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ORDER DENYING PETITION 

This original petition for a writ of certiorari challenges a district 

court order granting a petition for a writ of mandamus and ordering a jury 

trial in municipal court. The City of Henderson (the City) charged real 

party in interest Steven Cullen with misdemeanor battery constituting 

domestic violence under NRS 200.485 in Henderson Municipal Court. 

Cullen demanded a jury trial, relying on Andersen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court, 135 Nev. 321, 322-24, 448 P.3d 1120, 1122-23, 1124 (2019), which 

held that misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence under NRS 

200.485(1)(a) is a "serious offense that entitles the accused to a jury trial. 

The City then amended the complaint to charge Cullen under newly enacted 

municipal code provision that is basically identical to NRS 200.485. Cullen 

unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint. He then challenged the 

municipal court's decision in an original petition for a writ of mandamus 

filed in the district court, asserting that charging him under the municipal 

code provision violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and that the municipal 

code provision was preempted by NRS 202.360(1)(a) and NRS 266.321. The 

imsget 

• t,',• -• ;•. • 
district court granted the petition with instructions to the municipal court 

to conduct a jury trial. The City filed the instant petition to challenge the 

district court's decision. 

During the pendency of this petition, the Legislature passed, 

and the governor signed, A.B. 42, which expressly authorizes municipal 

courts to hold jury trials for "any mattee within its jurisdiction, which 

includes misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence. 2021 Nev. 

Stat., ch. 253, § 8, at 1314; see also NRS 5.050(2). The Legislature also 

amended NRS 202.360(1)(a) so that it no longer relies on federal law to 

define what constitutes the crime of domestic violence. 2021 Nev. Stat., ch. 

253, § 13, at 1320. The amended version restricts the right to possess a 

firearm when a person "Has been convicted of the crime of battery which 

constitutes domestic violence pursuant to NRS 200.485, or a law of any 

other jurisdiction that prohibits the same or substantially similar conduct, 

committed against or upon" certain persons in a domestic relationship with 

the perpetrator. Id. The bill became effective on January 1, 2022, and 

applies to offenses committed before that date if they are "pending or 

otherwise unresolved on January 1, 2022." Id. § 17, at 1324. Because the 

case against Cullen remains pending in municipal court, the 2021 

amendments apply and afford him the right to a jury trial and the municipal 

court authority to conduct that trial. 

Given A.B. 42, we decline to exercise our discretion to intervene 

in this matter. See Zarnarripa v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 103 Nev. 638, 

'We note that the City could have appealed the district court's order 

granting mandamus relief, see NRS 2.090(2) (providing a right to appeal 

from order granting mandamus relief), and a writ of certiorari generally will 

not issue if the petitioner has "any plain, speedy and adequate remedy." 

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640, 747 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1987) (A writ of certiorari is an extraordinary 

remedy and the decision to entertain a petition for a writ of certiorari lies 

within the discretion of this court."). The passage of A.B. 42 rendered most 

of the City's contentions moot. See Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 

602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010) (holding that later events may render a oncelive controversy moot). The district court's conclusion that municipal courts 

may conduct jury trials is correct under current law, and the firearm 

prohibition, which was the basis for its conclusion that the ordinance 

conflicted with state law, now applies equally to convictions under 

municipal or state law. 

The district court arguably erred in concluding that prosecuting 

Cullen under the municipal ordinance violated the Ex Post Facto Clause 

because Cullen's alleged conduct was already proscribed by NRS 200.485, 

and the ordinance did not increase the potential punishment. See State v. 

Nakata, 878 P.2d 699, 715 (Haw. 1994) (finding no ex post facto violation 

when defendants were prosecuted under a statute amended after the 

charged conduct that reduced the penalty for DUI and eliminated right to 

jury trial for the offense); see also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) 

(explaining that a law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it 

retroactively punishes conduct that occurred before its enactment or 

disadvantages the offender). However, this error is not, in and of itself, 

sufficient to warrant our intervention. The amendments contained in A.B. 

42, which permit municipal courts to conduct jury trials and impose the 

firearm prohibition for convictions under both the statute and ordinance, 

NRS 34.020(2); Ashokan v. State, Dep't. of Ins., 109 Nev. 662, 665, 856 P.2d 

244, 246 (1993) (This court has generally declined to entertain petitions for 

review of a district court decision where that decision was appealable."). 

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render any split in the lower courts over whether individuals can be 

prosecuted under the ordinance for conduct occurring before its enactment 

unlikely to persist.2 Cf. State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Epperson), 120 

Nev. 254, 258, 89 P.3d 663, 665-66 (2004) (entertaining writ petition to 

clarify important issue of law); City of Las Vegas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court (Charles), 118 Nev. 859, 861 & n.4, 59 P.3d 477, 479 & n.4 (2002) 

(entertaining writ petition to resolve split among lower courts), abrogated 

on other grounds by State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 245 P.3d 550 (2010). 

For these reasons, we 

ORDER the p on DENIED.3 

cc: Chief Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court 

Department 8, Eighth Judicial District Court 

Henderson City Attorney 

The Pariente Law Firm, P.C. 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2Contrary to the argument in Cullen's opposition to the City's notice 

of supplemental authorities, the municipal code provision says nothing 

about whether a person convicted under it retains the right to possess a 

firearm. That question is only addressed by NRS 202.360(1)(a), which now 

encompasses convictions under the municipal code provision. 

3The motion and amended motion to strike the reply brief and 

appendix are denied. 

The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

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