[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 147 (Tuesday, July 31, 2018)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 36727-36741]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-16242]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 40

[Docket No. RM18-2-000; Order No. 848]


Cyber Security Incident Reporting Reliability Standards

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) directs 
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop 
and submit modifications to the NERC Reliability Standards to augment 
the mandatory reporting of Cyber Security Incidents, including 
incidents that might facilitate subsequent efforts to harm the reliable 
operation of the bulk electric system (BES).

DATES: This rule will become effective October 1, 2018.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
    Margaret Steiner (Technical Information), Office of Electric 
Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6704, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5419352633352631207a0720313d3a312614323126377a333b22"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="e2af83908583908796ccb196878b8c8790a284879081cc858d94">[email protected]</span></a>.
    Kevin Ryan (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, 
DC 20426, (202) 502-6840, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e4af81928d8acab69d858aa482819687ca838b92"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="662d03100f0848341f0708260003140548010910">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Order No. 848--Final Rule (Issued July 19, 2018)

    1. Pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 
the Commission directs the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) to develop and submit modifications to

[[Page 36728]]

the NERC Reliability Standards to augment the mandatory reporting of 
Cyber Security Incidents, including incidents that might facilitate 
subsequent efforts to harm the reliable operation of the BES.\1\ The 
Commission directs NERC to develop and submit modifications to the 
Reliability Standards to require the reporting of Cyber Security 
Incidents that compromise, or attempt to compromise, a responsible 
entity's Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP) or associated Electronic 
Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS).\2\
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5). The NERC Glossary of Terms Used in 
NERC Reliability Standards (June 12, 2018) (NERC Glossary) defines a 
Cyber Security Incident as ``A malicious act or suspicious event 
that: Compromises, or was an attempt to compromise, the Electronic 
Security Perimeter or Physical Security Perimeter or, Disrupts, or 
was an attempt to disrupt, the operation of a BES Cyber System.''
    \2\ The NERC Glossary defines ``ESP'' as ``[t]he logical border 
surrounding a network to which BES Cyber Systems are connected using 
a routable protocol.'' The NERC Glossary defines ``EACMS'' as 
``Cyber Assets that perform electronic access control or electronic 
access monitoring of the Electronic Security Perimeter(s) or BES 
Cyber Systems. This includes Intermediate Systems.''
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    2. In the NOPR, the Commission observed that Cyber Security 
Incidents are presently reported by responsible entities in accordance 
with Reliability Standard CIP-008-5 (Cyber Security--Incident Reporting 
and Response Planning).\3\ However, under the definition of Reportable 
Cyber Security Incident in Reliability Standard CIP-008-5, responsible 
entities must only report Cyber Security Incidents if they have 
``compromised or disrupted one or more reliability tasks.'' The 
Commission explained that the current reporting threshold may 
understate the true scope of cyber-related threats facing the Bulk-
Power System, particularly given the lack of any reportable incidents 
in 2015 and 2016. To improve awareness of existing and future cyber 
security threats and potential vulnerabilities, the Commission proposed 
to direct that NERC develop and submit modifications to the existing 
Reliability Standards to augment the reporting of Cyber Security 
Incidents, including incidents that might facilitate subsequent efforts 
to harm the reliable operation of the BES.
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    \3\ Cyber Security Incident Reporting Reliability Standards, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 82 FR 61499 (Dec. 28, 2017), 161 FERC 
] 61,291, P 1 (2017) (NOPR).
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    3. As discussed in detail below, the Commission adopts the NOPR 
proposal. The Commission's directive in this Final Rule consists of 
four elements intended to augment the current Cyber Security Incident 
reporting requirement: (1) Responsible entities must report Cyber 
Security Incidents that compromise, or attempt to compromise, a 
responsible entity's ESP or associated EACMS; (2) required information 
in Cyber Security Incident reports should include certain minimum 
information to improve the quality of reporting and allow for ease of 
comparison by ensuring that each report includes specified fields of 
information; (3) filing deadlines for Cyber Security Incident reports 
should be established once a compromise or disruption to reliable BES 
operation, or an attempted compromise or disruption, is identified by a 
responsible entity; and (4) Cyber Security Incident reports should 
continue to be sent to the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (E-ISAC), rather than the Commission, but the reports should 
also be sent to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Industrial 
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT). Further, NERC 
must file an annual, public, and anonymized summary of the reports with 
the Commission.
    4. As discussed below, after considering the comments submitted in 
response to the NOPR, we conclude that the proposed directive to 
augment the current reporting requirement for Cyber Security Incidents 
is appropriate to carry out FPA section 215. As NERC recognizes in its 
NOPR comments, ``[b]roadening the mandatory reporting of Cyber Security 
Incidents would help enhance awareness of cyber security risks facing 
entities[,] . . . would create a more extensive baseline understanding 
of the nature of cyber security threats and vulnerabilities[,] . . . 
[and] is consistent with recommendations in NERC's 2017 State of 
Reliability Report.'' \4\ Our directive is intended to result in a 
measured broadening of the existing reporting requirement in 
Reliability Standard CIP-008-5, consistent with NERC's recommendation, 
rather than a wholesale change in cyber incident reporting that 
supplants or otherwise chills voluntary reporting, as some commenters 
maintain. Indeed, as NERC contends, we believe that the new ``baseline 
understanding, coupled with the additional context from voluntary 
reports received by the E-ISAC, [will] allow NERC and the E-ISAC to 
share that information broadly through the electric industry to better 
prepare entities to protect their critical infrastructure.'' \5\
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    \4\ NERC Comments at 4.
    \5\ Id.
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    5. We address in the discussion below concerns raised by commenters 
regarding elements of the Commission's directive and the burdens the 
directive might impose if NERC develops requirements that are overly 
broad. At the outset, we agree with NERC that ``because certain 
requirements in the CIP Reliability Standards already require entities 
to track data on compromises or attempts to compromise the ESP or 
EACMS, the additional burden to report that data appears reasonable.'' 
\6\ And we do not believe that complying with the augmented reporting 
requirements that we direct here would be any more burdensome to 
industry than the alternative, responding to a perpetual data or 
information request to collect the same information pursuant to Section 
1600 of the NERC Rules of Procedure. To ensure that the burden is 
reasonable with respect to including EACMS in the augmented reporting 
requirement, NERC should develop requirements based on the function of 
the EACMS and the nature of the attempted compromise or successful 
intrusion. Similarly, as discussed below, NERC should develop reporting 
timelines for Cyber Security Incidents that are commensurate with the 
adverse or attempted adverse impact to the BES that loss, compromise, 
or misuse of those BES Cyber Systems could have on the reliable 
operation of the BES.\7\ Prioritizing incident reporting will allow 
responsible entities to devote resources to reporting the most 
significant Cyber Security Incidents faster than less significant 
events. With this guidance, we believe that the standard drafting team, 
in the first instance, is in the best position to develop the specific 
elements of the directed Reliability Standard requirements.
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    \6\ Id. at 8 (citing Reliability Standard CIP-005-5 (Cyber 
Security--Electronic Security Perimeter(s)) and Reliability Standard 
CIP-007-6 (Cyber Security--System Security Management)).
    \7\ The NERC Glossary defines BES Cyber System as ``[o]ne or 
more BES Cyber Assets logically grouped by a responsible entity to 
perform one or more reliability tasks for a functional entity.'' 
Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards (NERC 
Glossary). Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1a (Cyber Security System 
Categorization) provides a ``tiered'' approach to cybersecurity 
requirements, based on classifications of high, medium and low 
impact BES Cyber Systems.
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    6. We have considered comments submitted by NERC and others 
recommending that broadened Cyber Security Incident reporting should be 
implemented through a request for information or data pursuant to 
Section 1600 of the NERC Rules of Procedure instead of through 
Reliability Standard requirements. However, on balance, we

[[Page 36729]]

believe that broadened mandatory reporting pursuant to Reliability 
Standard requirements as opposed to a standing data request is more 
aligned with the seriousness and magnitude of the current threat 
environment, and more likely to improve awareness of existing and 
future cyber security threats and potential vulnerabilities. Four main 
reasons inform our decision. First, a new or modified Reliability 
Standard will ensure that the desired goals of our directive are met 
because the Commission will have the ability to review and ultimately 
approve the standard, as opposed to the opportunity for informal review 
that the Commission would have of a data request under ROP Section 
1600. Second, the Commission has well-defined authority and processes 
under section 215(e) of the FPA to audit and enforce compliance with a 
Reliability Standard. Third, we do not anticipate that there will be a 
need to change the parameters of the Cyber Security Incident report for 
EACMS because the parameters that we direct below are based on five 
static functions of EACMS and are not technology specific, so the 
potential flexibility provided by a Section 1600 data request may not 
be significantly beneficial. Finally, collecting data through a 
Reliability Standard is consistent with existing practices; responsible 
entities are currently required to maintain the types of information 
that would lead to a reportable Cyber Security Incident pursuant to 
Reliability Standard CIP-007-6, Requirement R4.1. Nonetheless, should 
future events require an expedited change in data collection or should 
NERC desire to collect data outside the scope of the proposed 
Reliability Standard, NERC could then use the Section 1600 process to 
supplement information reported under a mandatory Reliability Standard.
    7. Accordingly, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, we adopt 
the NOPR proposal and direct NERC to develop modifications to the 
Reliability Standards to include the mandatory reporting of Cyber 
Security Incidents that compromise, or attempt to compromise, a 
responsible entity's ESP or associated EACMS, as well as modifications 
to specify the required information in Cyber Security Incident reports, 
their dissemination, and deadlines for filing reports. We direct NERC 
to submit the directed modifications within six-months of the effective 
date of this Final Rule.

I. Background

A. Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards

    8. Section 215 of the FPA requires a Commission-certified Electric 
Reliability Organization (ERO) to develop mandatory and enforceable 
Reliability Standards, subject to Commission review and approval. 
Reliability Standards may be enforced by the ERO, subject to Commission 
oversight, or by the Commission independently.\8\ Pursuant to section 
215 of the FPA, the Commission established a process to select and 
certify an ERO,\9\ and subsequently certified NERC.\10\
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    \8\ Id.
    \9\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability 
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and 
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,212 (2006).
    \10\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 
61,062, order on reh'g and compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), 
aff'd sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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B. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    9. On December 21, 2017, the Commission issued a NOPR proposing to 
direct that NERC develop enhanced Cyber Security Incident reporting 
requirements. Specifically, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, 
the NOPR proposed to direct NERC to develop modifications to the 
Reliability Standards to require the reporting of Cyber Security 
Incidents that compromise, or attempt to compromise, a responsible 
entity's ESP or associated EACMS. The proposed directive was based in 
part on a lack of Reportable Cyber Security Incidents in 2015 and 2016, 
and NERC's assessment in the 2017 State of Reliability Report that 
``[w]hile there were no reportable cyber security incidents during 2016 
and therefore none that caused a loss of load, this does not 
necessarily suggest that the risk of a cyber security incident is 
low.'' \11\ In addition, the NOPR stated that it agreed with the 
recommendation by NERC in the 2017 State of Reliability Report to 
``redefine reportable incidents to be more granular and include zero-
consequence incidents that might be precursors to something more 
serious.'' \12\
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    \11\ NOPR, 161 FERC ] 61,291 at P 28 (citing 2017 NERC State of 
Reliability Report at 4).
    \12\ Id. P 29 (citing 2017 NERC State of Reliability Report at 
4).
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    10. In justifying the proposed inclusion of ESPs and associated 
EACMS within the scope of the enhanced Cyber Security Incident 
requirement, the NOPR stated that the purpose of an ESP is to manage 
electronic access to BES Cyber Systems to support the protection of the 
BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or 
instability in the BES.\13\ In addition, the NOPR explained that EACMS, 
which include, for example, firewalls, authentication servers, security 
event monitoring systems, intrusion detection systems and alerting 
systems, control electronic access into the ESP and play a significant 
role in the protection of high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems.\14\ 
The NOPR indicated further that, once an EACMS is compromised, an 
attacker could more easily enter the ESP and effectively control the 
BES Cyber System or Protected Cyber Asset.
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    \13\ See id. P 33 (citing Reliability Standard CIP-005-5 (Cyber 
Security--Electronic Security Perimeter(s)).
    \14\ See id. (citing Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1 (Cyber 
Security--BES Cyber System Categorization), Background at 6; 
Reliability Standard CIP-007-6 (Cyber Security--System Security 
Management), Background at 4).
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    11. The NOPR discussed the scope of the present Cyber Security 
Incident reporting requirement. The NOPR observed that Reliability 
Standard CIP-008-5, Requirement R1.2 currently requires that each 
responsible entity shall document one or more Cyber Security Incident 
Plan(s) with one or more processes to determine if an identified Cyber 
Security Incident is a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. And where a 
Cyber Security Incident is determined to qualify as a Reportable Cyber 
Security Incident, the NOPR explained that responsible entities are 
required to notify the E-ISAC with initial notification within one hour 
from the determination of a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. The 
NOPR stated, however, that the NERC Glossary defines a Reportable Cyber 
Security Incident as ``[a] Cyber Security Incident that has compromised 
or disrupted one or more reliability tasks of a functional entity.'' 
The NOPR indicated that the definition of Reportable Cyber Security 
Incident, insofar as it excludes unsuccessful attempts to compromise or 
disrupt a responsible entity's core activities, is thus more narrow 
than the definition of ``cybersecurity incident'' in FPA section 
215(a)(8), which encompasses ``a malicious act or suspicious event that 
disrupts, or was an attempt to disrupt, the operation of those 
programmable electronic devices and communication networks including 
hardware, software and data that are essential to the reliable 
operation of the bulk power system.'' \15\
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    \15\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(a)(8).
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    12. The NOPR stated that altering the Cyber Security Incident 
reporting

[[Page 36730]]

threshold to require reporting of attempts to compromise, instead of 
only successful compromises, is consistent with information already 
logged by registered entities pursuant to current monitoring 
requirements in the Reliability Standards. The NOPR explained that 
Reliability Standard CIP-007-6, Requirement R4.1, mandates logging of 
detected successful login attempts, detected failed access attempts, 
and failed login attempts, and the Guidelines and Technical Basis for 
Requirement R4.1 states that events should be logged even if access 
attempts were blocked or otherwise unsuccessful.\16\
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    \16\ See Reliability Standard CIP-007-6 (Cyber Security--Systems 
Security Management), Requirement R4.1.
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    13. In addition to modifying the reporting threshold, the NOPR 
proposed to direct NERC to modify the Reliability Standards to specify 
the required information in Cyber Security Incident reports to improve 
the quality of reporting and allow for ease of comparison by ensuring 
that each report includes specified fields of information, as well as 
the deadlines for submitting a report. Specifically, the NOPR proposed 
that the minimum set of attributes to be reported should include: (1) 
The functional impact, where possible, that the Cyber Security Incident 
achieved or attempted to achieve; (2) the attack vector used to achieve 
or attempt to achieve the Cyber Security Incident; and (3) the level of 
intrusion achieved or attempted by the Cyber Security Incident. The 
NOPR explained that knowledge of these attributes regarding a specific 
Cyber Security Incident will improve awareness of cyber threats to BES 
reliability. The NOPR also noted that the proposed attributes are the 
same as attributes already used by DHS for its multi-sector reporting 
and summarized by DHS in an annual report.\17\
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    \17\ NOPR, 161 FERC ] 61,291 at P 38 (citing 2016 ICS-CERT Year 
in Review, https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Year-Review-2016).
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    14. The NOPR also proposed to continue to require that Cyber 
Security Incident reports be sent to the E-ISAC instead of the 
Commission, but the NOPR proposed to require that such reports also be 
sent to ICS-CERT and that NERC file with the Commission an annual, 
public, and anonymized summary of such reports.
    15. Finally, the NOPR sought comment on potential alternatives to 
modifying the mandatory reporting requirements in the NERC Reliability 
Standards. Specifically, the NOPR sought comment on whether a request 
for data or information pursuant to Section 1600 of the NERC Rules of 
Procedure would effectively address the reporting gap and current lack 
of awareness of cyber-related incidents among NERC, responsible 
entities and the Commission, and satisfy the goals of the proposed 
directive.

II. Discussion

    16. Pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, we adopt the NOPR 
proposal and direct NERC to develop and submit modifications to the 
NERC Reliability Standards to augment current mandatory reporting of 
Cyber Security Incidents, including incidents that might facilitate 
subsequent efforts to harm the reliable operation of the BES. We direct 
NERC, subject to the discussion below, to develop and submit 
Reliability Standard requirements that: (1) Require responsible 
entities to report Cyber Security Incidents that compromise, or attempt 
to compromise, a responsible entity's ESP or associated EACMS; (2) 
specify the required information in Cyber Security Incident reports; 
(3) establish deadlines for filing Cyber Security Incident reports that 
are commensurate with incident severity; and (4) require that Cyber 
Security Incident reports be sent to ICS-CERT, in addition to E-ISAC, 
and that NERC file with the Commission an annual, public, and 
anonymized summary of such reports.
    17. Below, we discuss the following matters: (A) The need for 
broadened mandatory Cyber Security Incident reporting; (B) the 
threshold for a reportable Cyber Security Incident; (C) the appropriate 
procedural approach to augment Cyber Security Incident reporting, i.e., 
new or modified Reliability Standards versus a NERC data request to 
applicable entities; (D) the content and timing of Cyber Security 
Incident reports; and (E) other issues.

A. Need for Broadened Mandatory Cyber Security Incident Reporting

1. NOPR
    18. In the NOPR, the Commission indicated that cyber-related event 
reporting is currently addressed in Reliability Standard CIP-008-5, 
Requirement R1.2, which requires that each responsible entity shall 
document one or more Cyber Security Incident Plan(s) with one or more 
processes to determine if an identified Cyber Security Incident is a 
Reportable Cyber Security Incident. The NOPR noted that a Cyber 
Security Incident is defined in the NERC Glossary as: ``A malicious act 
or suspicious event that: (1) compromises, or was an attempt to 
compromise, the Electronic Security Perimeter or Physical Security 
Perimeter or (2) disrupts, or was an attempt to disrupt, the operation 
of a BES Cyber System.''
    19. The Commission further explained that where a cyber-related 
event is determined to qualify as a Reportable Cyber Security Incident, 
responsible entities are required to notify the E-ISAC with initial 
notification to be made within one hour from the determination of a 
Reportable Cyber Security Incident.\18\ However, the NOPR observed that 
a Reportable Cyber Security Incident is defined more narrowly in the 
NERC Glossary than a Cyber Security Incident because the former 
requires that the incident result in the compromise or disruption of 
one or more reliability tasks of a functional entity. As the Commission 
explained, in order for a cyber-related event to be considered 
reportable under the existing CIP Reliability Standards, it must 
compromise or disrupt a core activity (e.g., reliability task) of a 
responsible entity that is intended to maintain BES reliability.\19\ 
Therefore, under these definitions, unsuccessful attempts to compromise 
or disrupt a responsible entity's core activities are not subject to 
the current reporting requirements in Reliability Standard CIP-008-5 or 
elsewhere in the CIP Reliability Standards.
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    \18\ See Reliability Standard CIP-008-5 (Cyber Security--
Incident Reporting and Response Planning), Requirement R1, Part 1.2. 
This requirement pertains to high impact BES Cyber Systems and 
medium impact BES Cyber Systems.
    \19\ The NERC Functional Model ``describes a set of Functions 
that are performed to ensure the reliability of the Bulk Electric 
System. Each Function consists of a set of related reliability 
Tasks. The Model assigns each Function to a functional entity, that 
is, the entity that performs the function. The Model also describes 
the interrelationships between that functional entity and other 
functional entities (that perform other Functions).'' NERC, 
Reliability Functional Model: Function Definitions and Functional 
Entities, Version 5 at 7 (November 2009), http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Functional%20Model%20Archive%201/Functional_Model_V5_Final_2009Dec1.pdf.
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    20. The NOPR explained that recent NERC State of Reliability 
Reports indicate that there were no Reportable Cyber Security Incidents 
in 2015 and 2016. The NOPR also highlighted NERC's conclusion that 
``[w]hile there were no reportable cyber security incidents during 2016 
and therefore none that caused a loss of load, this does not 
necessarily suggest that the risk of a cyber security incident is 
low.'' \20\ The NOPR contrasted the results reported in the NERC 
reports with the 2016 annual summary of the Department of Energy's 
(DOE) Electric

[[Page 36731]]

Disturbance Reporting Form OE-417, which contained four cybersecurity 
incidents reported in 2016; two suspected cyber attacks and two actual 
cyber attacks.\21\ Moreover, the NOPR noted that ICS-CERT responded to 
fifty-nine cybersecurity incidents within the Energy Sector in 
2016.\22\
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    \20\ 2017 NERC State of Reliability Report at 4.
    \21\ 2016 DOE Electric Disturbance Events (OE-417) Annual 
Summary Archives, https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/OE417_annual_summary.aspx.
    \22\ ICS-CERT cybersecurity incident statistics for the Energy 
Sector combine statistics from the electric subsector and the oil 
and natural gas subsector. ICS-CERT does not break out the 
cybersecurity incidents that only impact the electric subsector. 
2016 ICS-CERT Year in Review, https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Year-Review-2016.
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    21. Based on the comparison of information reported by NERC, DOE, 
and ICS-CERT, the NOPR concluded that the current reporting threshold 
in Reliability Standard CIP-008-5 may not reflect the true scope and 
scale of cyber-related threats facing responsible entities. In 
particular, the NOPR raised a concern that the disparity in the 
reporting of cyber-related incidents under existing reporting 
requirements, in particular the lack of any incidents reported to NERC 
in 2015 and 2016, suggests a gap in the current reporting requirements. 
The NOPR highlighted the fact that this concern is echoed in the 2017 
NERC State of Reliability Report, which includes a recommendation that 
NERC and industry should ``redefine reportable incidents to be more 
granular and include zero-consequence incidents that might be 
precursors to something more serious.'' \23\ Agreeing with NERC's 
recommendation in the 2017 State of Reliability report, the NOPR 
proposed to direct NERC to address the apparent gap in cyber incident 
reporting.
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    \23\ 2017 NERC State of Reliability Report at 4.
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2. Comments
    22. NERC supports improving the reporting of Cyber Security 
Incidents, stating that ``[b]roadening the mandatory reporting of Cyber 
Security Incidents would help enhance awareness of cyber security risks 
facing entities.'' \24\ NERC maintains that enhanced reporting ``would 
create a more extensive baseline understanding of the nature of cyber 
security threats and vulnerabilities.'' \25\ NERC notes that broadening 
the scope of Cyber Security Incident reporting ``is consistent with 
recommendations in NERC's 2017 State of Reliability Report.'' \26\ 
While NERC recognizes the need for enhanced Cyber Security Incident 
reporting, as discussed in the following sections, NERC does not 
support all aspects of the NOPR, including requiring enhanced cyber 
incident reporting through a modified Reliability Standard.
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    \24\ NERC Comments at 4.
    \25\ Id. at 4.
    \26\ Id. at 4.
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    23. BPA, ITC, IRC, NYPSC, and NRG also support the NOPR proposal to 
direct NERC to address the gap in reporting Cyber Security Incidents. 
As noted by BPA, the current definition of Reportable Cyber Security 
Incident only addresses successful attempts to compromise or disrupt 
operations and, therefore, ``a broader definition of a Reportable Cyber 
Security incident is warranted'' because ``information about certain 
attempts to compromise will likely better assist the industry in 
preventing successful cyber attacks.'' \27\ BPA, ITC, and IRC raise 
concerns, however, regarding the risk of over-reporting. IRC states 
that the proposed requirement to report all attempts to compromise an 
ESP or associated EACMS ``needs further clarification.'' \28\ BPA 
states that any new reporting requirement ``must ensure that the 
information reported is useful and does not result in under and over 
reporting of information.'' \29\ NRG recommends that the term 
``attempt'' should be clarified (i.e., as a more serious risk than a 
port scan) and ``should be provided in technical guidance or glossary 
definition relating to the context of [the] existing NERC glossary 
term: Cyber Security Incident.'' \30\
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    \27\ BPA Comments at 3.
    \28\ IRC Comments at 1.
    \29\ BPA Comments at 3.
    \30\ NRG Comments at 3.
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    24. EEI/NRECA, Trade Associations, APS, Chamber, EnergySec, 
Eversource, Idaho Power, and LPPC do not support the NOPR proposal to 
direct NERC to address the gap in reporting Cyber Security Incidents. 
EEI/NRECA, Trade Associations, and Chamber suggest that the Commission 
support existing voluntary reporting practices as opposed to mandating 
the reporting of Cyber Security Incidents through the CIP Reliability 
Standards. EEI/NRECA state that ``[s]ignificant resources from 
responsible entities and government are engaged in [. . .] 
partnerships'' to share threat and vulnerability information.\31\ EEI/
NRECA argue that ``[m]andating such sharing will overlap with these 
voluntary efforts and may harm the partnerships and ability of the 
programs to enhance cybersecurity for the electric grid.'' \32\ In 
addition, EEI/NRECA state that mandating Cyber Security Incident 
reporting ``may weaken the ability of electric companies to participate 
in these [voluntary reporting] programs by shifting their focus to 
compliance activity.'' \33\ Eversource states that the NOPR proposal 
would ``introduce new technical and administrative challenges that will 
likely impact responsible entities' ability to participate in existing 
voluntary threat information sharing programs.'' \34\ LPPC states that 
whatever action the Commission takes on Cyber Security Incident 
reporting, it ``must be done with an eye towards causing as little 
disruption to existing information sharing programs as possible.'' \35\
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    \31\ EEI/NRECA Comments at 12.
    \32\ Id. at 12.
    \33\ Id. at 14-15.
    \34\ Eversource Comments at 5.
    \35\ LPPC Comments at 4.
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    25. Trade Associations state that while improving Cyber Security 
Incident reporting is an appropriate objective, ``directing new or 
revised mandatory reliability standards is not the only tool that NERC 
and the Commission have for achieving that reliability objective.'' 
\36\ Trade Associations contend that, in light of the constantly 
evolving state of cyber security, ``the Commission should consider and 
utilize the most flexible tools to achieve its reliability goals 
without imposing undue burden on registered entities.'' \37\
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    \36\ APPA, et al. Comments at 3-4.
    \37\ Id. at 4.
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    26. APS states that while it ``supports the Commission's objectives 
expressed in the NOPR,'' it does not agree that modifying the CIP 
Reliability Standards is the appropriate solution.\38\ APS asserts that 
``the reporting requirements that already exist under Form OE-417 meet 
the same objectives as the Commission is attempting to satisfy by 
requiring additional reporting under the CIP Standards as proposed in 
the NOPR.'' \39\ APS instead suggests that ``the Commission . . . 
direct NERC to modify the CIP Standards to include a requirement for 
Responsible Entities to submit copies of its Form OE-417 to the E-ISAC 
and ICS-CERT.'' \40\
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    \38\ APS Comments at 5.
    \39\ Id. at 7.
    \40\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    27. EnergySec states that it is ``generally in agreement with the 
Commission's goal of increasing the frequency and detail of incident 
reporting,'' but raises concerns with the specifics of the NOPR 
proposal.\41\ EnergySec maintains that ```compromise' as used in the 
definition of Reportable Cybersecurity Incident does not necessarily 
imply harm.'' \42\ Therefore, EnergySec argues that ``an incident 
should be considered a `compromise' if an attacker has obtained

[[Page 36732]]

the ability to disrupt, even if no disruption occurs.'' \43\ EnergySec 
states further that it believes ``that a clarified understanding of the 
current definition of Reportable Cybersecurity Incident can 
sufficiently address the Commission's concerns'' since it ``can be 
construed to include certain non-impactful incidents, as well as 
incidents affecting [ESPs] and [EACMS].'' \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ EnergySec Comments at 2.
    \42\ Id. at 2.
    \43\ Id. at 2.
    \44\ Id. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    28. EnergySec also raises a concern that the NOPR proposal is too 
broad. EnergySec argues that determining incidents that might 
facilitate future cyber incidents ``would be highly subjective and 
could easily be construed to include systems and networks that are 
outside the scope of the Commission's authority.'' \45\ EnergySec notes 
that most failed login or access attempts are benign in nature and 
``the volume of such events is orders of magnitude larger than what 
would be an appropriate volume for mandatory reporting.'' \46\ 
EnergySec states further that while it agrees that successful attacks 
against ESPs and EACMS should be reported, it does not support 
including attempted compromise in the reporting requirements since the 
``[d]etermination of attempted compromise is highly subjective and it 
would therefore be difficult at best to clearly define within the 
standards a basis for such determinations.'' \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Id. at 3.
    \46\ Id. at 3.
    \47\ Id. at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    29. Eversource and Idaho Power do not support the NOPR proposal due 
to the anticipated increased burden that could result from increased 
mandatory reporting. Eversource states that ``expanding the amount of 
required information to be reported and increasing the number of 
recipients of the reports will create undue administrative burdens.'' 
\48\ In addition, Eversource contends that ``the meaning of an 
attempted compromise is currently undefined and may impose significant 
burdens on responsible entities to identify such attempts.'' \49\ Idaho 
Power states that even though ``additional reporting can provide some 
visibility into the types of threats that entities face, additional 
administrative burdens such as reporting requirements reduce the finite 
resources that entities have to monitor and defend their critical 
infrastructure.'' \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Eversource Comments at 1.
    \49\ Id. at 6.
    \50\ Idaho Power Comments at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    30. LPPC asserts that the NOPR proposal ``may yield a substantial 
quantity of unhelpful information and confusing analysis, while 
needlessly burdening Registered Entities.'' \51\ LPPC states that it 
supports NERC's request for flexibility in addressing enhanced Cyber 
Security Incident reporting and concludes that ``a technical conference 
may productively explore the nature and scope of the various programs 
that currently exist for information sharing regarding threats and the 
incremental value of any new requirements.'' \52\ Resilient Societies 
states that ``the modifications proposed to improve the reporting of 
cybersecurity incidents are unlikely to have any significant positive 
effect.'' \53\ Specifically, Resilient Societies states that the 
proposed reporting parameters are not broad enough because ``reporting 
of malware infection is not necessarily within thresholds set on other 
criteria, such as `compromise,' `breach,' `impact,' or `disruption.' '' 
\54\ Resilient Societies also suggests that the Commission convene a 
public technical conference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ LPPC Comments at 1.
    \52\ Id. at 5-6.
    \53\ Resilient Societies Comments at 12.
    \54\ Id. at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    31. We adopt the NOPR proposal and, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) 
of the FPA, direct NERC to develop and submit modifications to the 
Reliability Standards to augment the mandatory reporting of Cyber 
Security Incidents, including incidents that might facilitate 
subsequent efforts to harm the reliable operation of the BES. Comments 
submitted by NERC and others support our determination that enhanced 
reporting of Cyber Security Incidents will address an existing gap in 
Cyber Security Incident reporting and will provide useful information 
on existing and future cyber security risks, as well as provide 
entities with better visibility into malicious activity prior to an 
event occurring. As noted in NERC's comments, ``[b]roadening the 
mandatory reporting of Cyber Security Incidents would help enhance 
awareness of cyber security risks facing entities.'' \55\ Similarly, 
BPA agrees with the directive to include attempted compromises in an 
enhanced reporting regime, stating that ``information about certain 
attempts to compromise will likely better assist the industry in 
preventing successful cyber attacks.'' \56\ Moreover, while the record 
reflects differing views on whether broadened Cyber Security Incident 
reporting should be mandatory or voluntary, there is general agreement 
that improved reporting is an appropriate objective.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ NERC Comments at 4.
    \56\ BPA Comments at 3.
    \57\ See NERC Comments at 4, Trade Associations Comments at 3, 
APS Comments at 1, BPA Comments at 3, EnergySec Comments at 1, Idaho 
Power Comments at 2, ITC Comments at 5, IRC Comments at 1, NRG 
Comments at 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    32. Some commenters contend that the directive to require mandatory 
reporting of Cyber Security Incidents that compromise, or attempt to 
compromise, a responsible entity's ESP or associated EACMS is vague and 
requires clarification. Recognizing this concern, NERC states that 
``[t]he challenge is to scope any additional mandatory reporting 
requirements in a manner that collects meaningful data about security 
risks without creating an unduly burdensome reporting requirement.'' 
\58\ While we address the threshold for a broadened reporting 
requirement issue in the next section, as a general matter, we agree 
with NERC that the scope of any new reporting requirement should be 
tailored to provide better information on cyber security threats and 
vulnerabilities without imposing an undue burden on responsible 
entities. Indeed, the NOPR proposal was not intended to be prescriptive 
or overly broad, but rather support NERC's efforts to enhance the 
reporting of Cyber Security Incidents as outlined in NERC's 2017 State 
of Reliability Report through the standards development process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ NERC Comments at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. Some commenters assert that a broadened reporting requirement 
will overlap, duplicate or otherwise chill voluntary reporting 
programs, potentially diverting resources away from such programs. 
Other commenters, however, assert that voluntary reporting does not 
adequately address the gap identified in the NOPR because voluntary 
reporting and mandatory reporting under currently-effective Reliability 
Standard CIP-008-5 have not resulted in adequate reporting of 
cybersecurity threats to the BES.\59\ As Appelbaum notes, ``[w]ithout 
mandatory reporting scheme a degraded threat image will result.'' \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ See id. at 4-5.
    \60\ Appelbaum Comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    34. Based on the record, we are not persuaded that our directive to 
augment current mandatory reporting requirements will adversely impact 
existing voluntary information sharing efforts. Instead, we agree with 
NERC's comment that the new ``baseline understanding [resulting from 
broadened mandatory reporting], coupled with the additional context 
from voluntary reports received by the E-ISAC, [will] allow NERC and 
the E-

[[Page 36733]]

ISAC to share that information broadly through the electric industry to 
better prepare entities to protect their critical infrastructure.'' 
\61\ Moreover, we do not anticipate that the incremental burden of the 
directed modifications will divert significant resources from other 
information sharing programs since responsible entities are already 
required to monitor and log successful login attempts, detected failed 
access attempts, and failed login attempts under Reliability Standard 
CIP-007-6, Requirement R4.1. Nor do we anticipate that the incremental 
burden of complying with the directed Reliability Standards 
modifications would be significantly more than the burden of responding 
to a standing data or information request under Section 1600. We also 
do not believe that broadened mandatory reporting is at cross-purposes 
with voluntary cybersecurity-related programs offered by DHS and other 
government agencies. We believe that voluntary programs that focus on 
cyber response and sharing of cyber threat information across industry 
are important initiatives that should be supported. However, the 
comments do not provide a compelling explanation why the broadening of 
mandatory reporting will supplant or inhibit voluntary programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ NERC Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    35. While we agree with EnergySec that revisions to the current 
definition of Reportable Cyber Security Incident could address some 
aspects of our directive, a modified definition alone would not address 
the need to specify the required information in Cyber Security Incident 
reports to improve the quality of reporting and allow for ease of 
comparison, or establish deadlines for submitting a report to 
facilitate timely information sharing. Therefore, while we believe that 
a modified definition of Reportable Cyber Security Incident could 
address part of the Commission's concerns, additional modifications 
would be necessary to meet the full scope of our directive.
    36. In addition, we do not agree with Resilient Societies that the 
detection of malware infecting a responsible entity's ESP or associated 
EACMS would fall outside the new reporting requirement. While Resilient 
Societies asserts that a malware infection would not meet the threshold 
of a compromise, breach, impact, or disruption, we believe that it 
would fall within the parameters of an attempted compromise. As 
discussed in the next section, however, we believe that it is 
appropriate for NERC to address the reporting threshold through the 
standards development process in order to weigh the diverse technical 
opinions on how to identify the appropriate assets and the level of 
attempted compromise that warrants reporting. Accordingly, we are not 
persuaded to convene a technical conference. Rather, persons interested 
in the development of appropriate detailed parameters of the augmented 
reporting requirements should participate in the NERC standards 
development process.
    37. In sum, we conclude that the record supports our determination 
that directing NERC to develop and submit modifications to the 
Reliability Standards to require the reporting of Cyber Security 
Incidents that compromise, or attempt to compromise, a responsible 
entity's ESP, as well as associated EACMS, is appropriate to carry out 
FPA section 215. Therefore, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5), we 
direct NERC to develop and submit modifications to the Reliability 
Standards to include the mandatory reporting of Cyber Security 
Incidents that compromise, or attempt to compromise, a responsible 
entity's ESP or associated EACMS. As noted above, we direct NERC to 
submit the directed modifications within six-months of the effective 
date of this Final Rule.

B. Threshold for a Reportable Cyber Security Incident

1. NOPR
    38. The NOPR proposed to direct NERC to modify the Reliability 
Standards to include the mandatory reporting of Cyber Security 
Incidents that compromise, or attempt to compromise, a responsible 
entity's ESP or associated EACMS. The NOPR explained that reporting 
attempts to compromise, instead of only successful compromises, is 
consistent with current monitoring requirements in Reliability Standard 
CIP-007-6, Requirement R4.1, which mandates logging of detected 
successful login attempts, detected failed access attempts and failed 
login attempts.\62\ In addition, the NOPR identified other reporting 
regimes that include attempts within the general definition of a 
``cyber incident.'' Specifically, DHS defines a ``cyber incident'' as 
``attempts (either failed or successful) to gain unauthorized access to 
a system or its data. . . .'' \63\ The E-ISAC defines a ``cyber 
incident'' as including unauthorized access through the electronic 
perimeter as well as ``a detected effort . . . without obvious 
success.'' \64\ And ICS-CERT defines a ``cyber incident'' as an 
``occurrence that actually or potentially results in adverse 
consequences. . . .'' \65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See Reliability Standard CIP-007-6 (Cyber Security--Systems 
Security Management), Requirement R4.1.
    \63\ See United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT) Incident Definition: https://www.us-cert.gov/government-users/compliance-and-reporting/incident-definition.
    \64\ See E-ISAC Incident Reporting Fact Sheet document: http://www.nerc.com/files/Incident-Reporting.pdf.
    \65\ See ICS-CERT Published ``Common Cyber Security Language'' 
document: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Common%20Cyber%20Language_S508C.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    39. As noted above, an ESP is defined in the NERC Glossary as the 
``logical border surrounding a network to which BES Cyber Systems are 
connected using a routable protocol.'' The purpose of an ESP is to 
manage electronic access to BES Cyber Systems to support the protection 
of the BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to 
misoperation or instability in the BES. The NOPR explained that since 
an ESP is intended to protect BES Cyber Systems, it is reasonable to 
establish the compromise of, or attempt to compromise, an ESP as the 
minimum reporting threshold.
    40. In addition, the NOPR identified an ESP's associated EACMS as 
another threshold for a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. As 
explained in the NOPR, EACMS are defined in the NERC Glossary as 
``Cyber Assets that perform electronic access control or electronic 
access monitoring of the Electronic Security Perimeter(s) or BES Cyber 
Systems. This includes Intermediate Systems.'' More specifically, EACMS 
include, for example, firewalls, authentication servers, security event 
monitoring systems, intrusion detection systems and alerting systems.
    41. While the Commission proposed to include EACMS within the scope 
of the proposed directive, the Commission also sought comment on the 
possibility of excluding EACMS from the scope of the proposed 
directive.
2. Comments
    42. NERC supports the NOPR proposal to limit the scope of Cyber 
Security Incident reporting to incidents that compromise or attempt to 
compromise a responsible entity's ESP or associated EACMS. NERC 
explains that any new reporting requirements ``need to be scoped in a 
manner that provides for meaningful reporting of cyber security risks 
but does not unduly burden entities.'' \66\ Specifically, NERC states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ NERC Comments at 6.

    Because the ESP protects some of the most important Cyber Assets 
and the EACMS control or monitor access to those Cyber

[[Page 36734]]

Assets, NERC agrees that reporting on attempts to compromise these 
security measures would provide valuable data while also imposing a 
reasonable burden on entities given the limited traffic they should 
experience.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ Id. at 7.

    NERC notes that some EACMS devices ``may provide important early 
indicators of future compromise'' and, therefore, NERC states that it 
``supports including EACMS in the reporting threshold in addition to 
the ESP and notes that logging attempts to compromise the ESP and some 
EACMS devices does not impose an unreasonable burden on entities.'' 
\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ Id. at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    43. While NERC supports adopting the compromise or attempt to 
compromise a responsible entity's ESP or an EACMS associated with an 
ESP as a threshold for Cyber Security Incident reporting, NERC explains 
that ``there is still a need to refine the scope of the proposed 
directive to ensure that it would provide meaningful data without 
overburdening entities.'' \69\ Specifically, NERC states that there is 
a need to ``outline the parameters of an `attempt to compromise' in 
order to issue a precise data request.'' \70\ In particular, NERC 
states that it ``would consider the common understanding of adverse 
activities that are early indicators of compromise, such as campaigns 
against industrial control systems, to help refine the parameters.'' 
\71\ In addition, NERC notes that EACMS, as defined in the NERC 
Glossary, include a wide variety of devices that perform control and 
monitoring functions. NERC states further that it ``needs to consider 
whether to define the reporting threshold to differentiate between the 
various types of EACMS for reporting purposes.'' \72\ Therefore, NERC 
requests that the Commission provide flexibility in refining the 
threshold for Cyber Security Incident reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Id. at 9.
    \70\ Id. at 9.
    \71\ Id. at 9.
    \72\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    44. Trade Associations, APS, BPA, EnergySec, Resilient Societies, 
IRC, ITC, and NYPSC generally support the reporting threshold proposed 
in the NOPR, but caution that any new or modified requirements should 
be properly scoped. Trade Associations state that the NOPR proposal 
``is potentially overbroad and could result in unduly burdensome 
reporting requirements that reduce awareness of significant cyber 
threats.'' \73\ Trade Associations also contend that a new or revised 
Reliability Standard ``should not include the proposed generic 
threshold of reporting any incidents that compromise or attempt to 
compromise an ESP or EACMS.'' \74\ Instead, Trade Associations 
recommend that the Commission ``give NERC sufficient flexibility to 
define appropriate reporting thresholds for attempted compromises of an 
ESP or EACMS.'' \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ APPA, et al. Comments at 5 (emphasis in original).
    \74\ Id. (emphasis in original).
    \75\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    45. APS asserts that, given the differences among EACMS, it does 
not support the inclusion of all EACMS or the exclusion of all EACMS 
from an enhanced reporting requirement. APS states that while it 
``concurs that the incidents impacting the ESP should certainly be in 
scope of reporting, it is concerned that the exclusion of EACMS (which 
includes [Electronic Access Points (EAP)]) results in a likely 
compromise scenario going unreported.'' \76\ Specifically, APS notes 
that ``a user's credentials to an Intermediate System, which includes/
can be classified as an EAP(s) and/or EACMS, could be compromised.'' 
\77\ APS contends that such a compromise would not implicate the ESP, 
but could impact or attempt to impact a BES Cyber Asset or System. APS 
states, however, that ``there are numerous EACMS for which a compromise 
scenario would not be critical or allow potential access to an ESP.'' 
\78\ Therefore, APS maintains that an evaluation of the functions of 
various EACMS is needed before they can be included in any reporting 
requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ APS Comments at 9.
    \77\ Id.
    \78\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    46. BPA states that a broader definition of a Reportable Cyber 
Security Incident is necessary since the current definition only 
addresses actual compromises. BPA avers that ``information about 
certain attempts to compromise will likely better assist the industry 
in preventing successful cyber attacks.'' \79\ BPA states that the 
current definition of a Cyber Security Incident is a good starting 
point for a revision since it includes attempts to compromise or 
disrupt. BPA cautions, however, that the current definition of Cyber 
Security Incident ``may be too broad and result in overreporting of 
information.'' \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ BPA Comments at 3.
    \80\ Id. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    47. EnergySec states that it ``generally agree[s] that successful 
attacks against ESPs and EACMS should be within the scope of reporting; 
[but] disagree[s] with the proposal to include attempted compromise in 
the reporting requirements.'' \81\ In addition, EnergySec suggests that 
monitoring-only systems be excluded from any reporting requirement, 
stating that ``[a]lthough compromise of monitoring systems could assist 
an attack, such a compromise would not directly permit access.'' \82\ 
Resilient Societies states that ``[e]xcluding [EACMS] from the 
Commission directive could exempt reporting of attempted compromises.'' 
\83\ IRC states that ``adding EACMS to the requirement for mandatory 
reporting would be beneficial, not only because of their role as a 
boundary point, but also because EACMS perform other roles that support 
the BES Cyber Systems.'' \84\ IRC cautions, however, that ``[w]ithout 
providing further definitions or criteria, the NOPR's proposal to 
require reporting of all `attempts to compromise' the ESP or EACMS is 
unclear and potentially unachievable.'' \85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ EnergySec Comments at 3-4.
    \82\ Id. at 4.
    \83\ Resilient Societies Comments at 14.
    \84\ IRC Comments at 5.
    \85\ Id. at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    48. While ITC generally supports the NOPR proposal, ITC ``requests 
that the Commission refrain from including unsuccessful attempts to 
compromise an ESP-associated EACMS in the revised definition of a Cyber 
Security Incident.'' \86\ ITC notes that responsible entity systems 
with publicly-visible IP addresses ``sustain a regular stream of denial 
of service attempts, phishing emails, attempted firewall breaches, 
untargeted and targeted malware, and other common cybersecurity threats 
for which countermeasures are well-established and which pose a 
miniscule chance of success.'' \87\ ITC states that including 
``attempted compromises of ESP-associated EACMS would appear to require 
reporting for a sizeable number of these common events.'' \88\ 
Therefore, ITC states that while it ``supports expanding the definition 
of Reportable Cyber Incidents to include incidents that compromise, or 
attempt to compromise, a responsible entity's ESP, ITC would urge the 
Commission to direct NERC to include only actual breaches of a 
responsible entity's ESP-associated EACMS, and not attempted-but-
unsuccessful compromises.'' \89\ NYPSC notes that ``[f]ailed cyber 
attacks occur on a continuous basis, all the time. . .'' and, 
therefore, ``[a] reporting requirement of every attempted security

[[Page 36735]]

attack may be overly burdensome for reporting entities.'' \90\ NYPSC 
``suggests FERC consider developing clear criteria of the required 
reporting based on its review of the comments and recommendations from 
reporting entities.'' \91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ ITC Comments at 5.
    \87\ Id. at 5.
    \88\ Id. at 5.
    \89\ Id. at 5.
    \90\ NYPSC Comments at 5-6.
    \91\ Id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    49. Idaho Power states that ``additional reporting requirements do 
not increase cyber security.'' \92\ Idaho Power contends that 
``additional administrative burdens such as reporting requirements 
reduce the finite resources that entities have to monitor and defend 
their critical infrastructure.'' \93\ In addition, Idaho Power states 
that EACMS ``should be excluded from any additional requirements and 
only BES Cyber Systems and associated devices should be included in any 
further reporting requirements.'' \94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ Idaho Power Comments at 2.
    \93\ Id.
    \94\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    50. Other commenters support expanding the enhanced reporting 
requirement beyond what was proposed in the NOPR. NRG supports the NOPR 
proposal to direct NERC to develop modifications to the CIP Reliability 
Standards to improve the reporting of Cyber Security Incidents. NRG 
also supports including EACMS as a threshold for reporting. In 
addition, NRG ``recommends that the scope of the NOPR avoid limiting 
the requirement to High and Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems.'' \95\ 
Specifically, NRG notes that the NOPR proposal ``would limit the 
requirement to High and Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems as ESPs and 
EACMS are not required establishments at Low Impact BES Cyber 
Systems.'' \96\ Therefore, NRG states that ``any modification to the 
referenced CIP Reliability Standards should be applicable to all BES 
Cyber Systems with External Routable Communications.'' \97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ NRG Comments at 5.
    \96\ Id. at 2.
    \97\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    51. Appelbaum supports the NOPR proposal to include the attempted 
or actual compromise of an ESP or EACMS in the mandatory reporting 
requirement. However, Appelbaum ``propose[s] the Commission consider 
adding Physical Security Perimeters and Physical Access Control Systems 
(PACS) as well.''\98\ Simon supports the NOPR proposal, but encourages 
the Commission to broaden the directive to include low impact BES Cyber 
Systems. Specifically, Simon states that ``[o]mission of mandatory 
reporting for the disruption, or an attempt to disrupt, the operation 
of electronic access controls for BES assets with low impact BES Cyber 
Systems leaves a large blind spot in the Commission's effort to learn 
of efforts to harm the reliable operation of the bulk electric 
system.'' \99\ Isologic does not support limiting Cyber Security 
Incident reporting to situations involving an entity's ESP or 
associated EACMS. Isologic states that ``there are few CIP standards 
for `secure perimeters' and for the mass of BES Low Impact Facilities, 
(substations), security is at the fence line, not in ESPs.'' \100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ Appelbaum Comments at 7.
    \99\ Simon Comments at 4.
    \100\ Isologic Comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    52. The record in this proceeding supports establishing the 
compromise or attempted compromise of an ESP as the appropriate 
threshold for a Reportable Cyber Security incident. In addition, with 
exceptions, the comments support including EACMS associated with an ESP 
as part of the reporting threshold. As NERC notes, an ``ESP protects 
some of the most important Cyber Assets and the EACMS control or 
monitor access to those Cyber Assets.'' \101\ While we believe that 
ESPs and EACMS should be within the scope of a broadened reporting 
requirement, the comments, correctly in our view, point to the need to 
establish an appropriate scope for reporting. As NERC states, ``there 
is still a need to refine the scope of the proposed directive to ensure 
that it would provide meaningful data without overburdening entities.'' 
\102\ This concern is reflected in a number of comments, pointing to 
the need to identify the appropriate assets to monitor (for example, 
only EACMS associated with an ESP) and to clearly define an ``attempt 
to compromise.'' \103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ NERC Comments at 7.
    \102\ Id. at 9.
    \103\ See NERC Comments at 9, APPA, et al. Comments at 5, APS 
Comments at 9, BPA Comments at 3, EnergySec Comments at 3, IRC 
Comments at 3-4, ITC Comments at 5, NYPSC Comments at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    53. The comments generally support the view that NERC should have 
the flexibility to establish an appropriate reporting threshold. We 
recognize the need for a certain level of flexibility and believe that 
it is appropriate for NERC to address the specific reporting threshold 
through the standards development process. However, as discussed 
further below, we provide guidance on certain aspects of how NERC 
should identify EACMS for reporting purposes and what types of 
attempted compromise must be reported.
    54. With regard to identifying EACMS for reporting purposes, NERC's 
reporting threshold should encompass the functions that various 
electronic access control and monitoring technologies provide. Those 
functions must include, at a minimum: (1) Authentication; (2) 
monitoring and logging; (3) access control; (4) interactive remote 
access; and (5) alerting.\104\ Reporting a malicious act or suspicious 
event that has compromised, or attempted to compromise, a responsible 
entity's EACMS that perform any of these five functions would meet the 
intended scope of the directive by improving awareness of existing and 
future cyber security threats and potential vulnerabilities. Since 
responsible entities are already required to monitor and log system 
activity under Reliability Standard CIP-007-6, the incremental burden 
of reporting of the compromise or attempted compromise of an EACMS that 
performs the identified functions should be limited, especially when 
compared to the benefit of the enhanced situational awareness that such 
reporting will provide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ See NERC Glossary of Terms definition of EACMS. See also 
Reliability Standard CIP-006-6, Requirement R1.5 (Physical Security 
Plan) at 10 (``[i]ssue an alarm or alert in response to detected 
unauthorized access'' to certain High and Medium Impact BES Cyber 
Systems and associated EACMS); Reliability Standard CIP-007-6, 
Requirement R4.2 (Security Event Monitoring) at 16; and Reliability 
Standard CIP-007-6, Requirement R5.7 (System Access Control) at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    55. With regard to the definition of ``attempted compromise'' for 
reporting purposes, we consider attempted compromise to include an 
unauthorized access attempt or other confirmed suspicious activity. ITC 
raises a concern that including unsuccessful attempts to compromise an 
EACMS associated with an ESP would require reporting a significant 
number of events. We note, however, that limiting the reporting 
threshold to only EACMS that are associated with an ESP should limit 
the reporting burden since these assets should be located apart from 
the responsible entity's broader business IT networks. Moreover, as 
discussed in the next section, we also believe that a flexible 
reporting timeline that reflects the severity of a Cyber Security 
Incident could also help address the potential burden of reporting 
attempted compromises.
    56. With regard to BPA's suggestion that a revised definition of 
Reportable Cyber Security Incident is necessary, as discussed above, 
revisions to the current definition of Reportable Cyber Security

[[Page 36736]]

Incident could address certain aspects of the NOPR proposal, although a 
modified definition alone would not address the need to specify the 
required information in cyber security incident reports to improve the 
quality of reporting and allow for ease of comparison, or establish 
deadlines for submitting a report to facilitate timely information 
sharing. Therefore, although we believe that a modified definition of 
Reportable Cyber Security Incident could address part of the 
Commission's concerns, additional modifications to the Reliability 
Standards would be necessary to meet the security objective of the 
directives discussed herein.
    57. A number of commenters request that we expand the directive to 
include a broader scope of assets, including low impact BES Cyber 
Systems. However, we decline to expand the scope of Cyber Security 
Incident reporting beyond the ESP and associated EACMS at this time. 
The focus on ESPs and associated EACMS is intended to provide threat 
information on BES Cyber Systems that have the greatest impact on BES 
reliability while imposing a reasonable reporting burden on responsible 
entities. Nevertheless, the Commission could revisit this issue if 
there is demonstrated need for expanded Cyber Security Incident 
reporting.
    58. Therefore, we adopt the NOPR proposal and conclude that the 
compromise, or attempt to compromise, a responsible entity's ESP or 
associated EACMS is a reasonable threshold for augmented Cyber Security 
Incident reporting.

C. Appropriate Procedural Approach To Augment Cyber Security Incident 
Reporting

1. NOPR
    59. The NOPR proposed to direct NERC to modify the CIP Reliability 
Standards to augment the mandatory reporting of Cyber Security 
Incidents, while also seeking comment on whether a request for data or 
information pursuant to Section 1600 of the NERC Rules of Procedure 
would effectively address the reporting gap.
2. Comments
    60. While NERC supports broadened mandatory Cyber Security Incident 
reporting, NERC does not support the NOPR proposal to direct a 
modification to the Reliability Standards. Instead, NERC requests 
flexibility to determine the appropriate reporting procedure. 
Specifically, NERC proposes to ``use the [Rules of Procedure] Section 
1600 process for gathering data used for system performance.'' \105\ 
NERC maintains that it has ``successfully shifted to using Section 1600 
for other data collection efforts, such as the collection of reports on 
Protection System Misoperation.'' \106\ NERC explains further that the 
Section 1600 process would be used to ``supplement the existing 
voluntary reporting of cyber security threats to E-ISAC.'' \107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ NERC Comments at 10.
    \106\ Id.
    \107\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    61. NERC states that the Section 1600 process ``provides many of 
the same benefits as Reliability Standards,'' such as stakeholder and 
Commission staff input.\108\ NERC also states that, similar to 
Reliability Standards, compliance with Section 1600 is mandatory. NERC 
explains that if a responsible entity does not respond to a Section 
1600 data request, ``NERC has the authority under the [Rules of 
Procedure] to take such action as NERC deems appropriate to address a 
situation where a Rule of Procedure cannot practically be complied with 
or has been violated.'' \109\ NERC explains that the Section 1600 data 
request process provides the flexibility to revise or update the data 
request, if necessary, as well as ``the flexibility to determine the 
appropriate timeline for submitting the data.'' \110\ NERC states that 
while it may continue to use the Reliability Standards for data 
collection for evidence of compliance or to facilitate sharing of 
information between entities for BES operations, it ``has found the 
[Rules of Procedure] Section 1600 process to be effective for data 
collection to assess system performance.'' \111\ NERC cites a standing 
Section 1600 data request for entities to submit quarterly data on 
Protection System Misoperations as an example.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ Id.
    \109\ Id. at 11.
    \110\ Id. at 12-13.
    \111\ Id. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    62. LPPC supports the use of the Section 1600 process to facilitate 
enhanced Cyber Security Incident reporting. LPPC states that it 
``supports a more flexible approach to collection of actionable 
information through the data request process outlined in NERC ROP 
Section 1600.'' \112\ LPPC asserts that the data request approach 
offers flexibility that the standards development process does not. 
Specifically, LPPC states that ``compliance with a NERC data request is 
mandatory for applicable entities, while the data request procedures 
specified under [Rules of Procedure] Section 1600 also provide a more 
efficient process to update or revise a data request as needed to 
respond to rapidly-changing security threats.'' \113\ Finally, LPPC 
opines that ``it seems appropriate to remove the data collection 
process from the enforcement process associated with mandatory 
Reliability Standards.'' \114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ LPPC Comments at 6-7.
    \113\ Id. at 7.
    \114\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    63. APS, BPA, Resilient Societies, IRC, and NRG oppose the use of 
the Section 1600 process to facilitate enhanced Cyber Security Incident 
reporting. APS asserts that a request for data pursuant to Section 1600 
would not effectively address the reporting gap and current lack of 
awareness of cyber-related incidents. Specifically, APS argues that a 
data request would create an independent, redundant reporting 
obligation to NERC or a regional entity and would subject the 
provisions of reported information to the confidentiality and data 
sharing processes set forth in Rules of Procedure Section 1500, 
unnecessarily delaying sharing and distribution of information.\115\ 
APS states further that the Section 1600 process ``adds significant 
additional administrative burden for all involved entities, which is 
inefficient and unnecessary and presents a potential obstacle to the 
very sharing and distribution that is a critical part of the 
Commission's objectives set forth in the NOPR.'' \116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ APS Comments at 16.
    \116\ Id. at 16-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    64. BPA comments that a data request is not an effective means of 
obtaining information about cyber security incidents. BPA explains that 
Section 1600 data requests ``are one time requests for existing data, 
and [. . .] not the appropriate vehicle for ensuring ongoing reporting 
necessary to make data about Cyber Security Incidents effective.'' 
\117\ Resilient Societies states that ``[e]xamination of NERC Rules of 
Procedure Section 1600 shows the intent of [the] rule is to facilitate 
one-time requests for data.'' \118\ Therefore, Resilient Societies 
asserts that the Section 1600 reporting procedures ``would be a poor 
fit for a standing order for data on cybersecurity incidents that occur 
continually.'' \119\ NRG opposes the use of the Section 1600 data 
request process asserting that a request for data or information would 
neither address the current lack of awareness of cyber-related 
incidents, nor satisfy the goals of the proposed directive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ BPA Comments at 4.
    \118\ Resilient Societies Comments at 15.
    \119\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    65. APS, as discussed above, suggests adopting the DOE Electric 
Disturbance

[[Page 36737]]

Events, Form OE-417 as the primary reporting tool for Cyber Security 
Events. EnergySec, for its part, suggests that the Commission could 
direct NERC to require entities to develop and implement an information 
sharing plan.\120\ According to EnergySec, such an approach should 
provide broad discretion to entities and ensure that compliance 
oversight efforts cannot result in second-guessing of decisions 
regarding which information to share, when, or with whom. IRC suggests, 
alternatively, that the Commission allow entities to comply with the 
reporting requirements by participating in the Cyber Risk Information 
Sharing program. IRC explains that the program allows entities to 
automatically report information to E-ISAC for analysis against 
classified information. IRC states that responsible entities that 
``automatically report indicators of compromise through these systems 
will share information at machine speed, and this should be considered 
superior to manual reporting, which requires much slower decision-
making.'' \121\
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    \120\ EnergySec Comments at 6.
    \121\ IRC Comments at 7.
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3. Commission Determination
    66. As discussed above, we adopt the NOPR proposal and direct NERC 
to develop modifications to the NERC Reliability Standards to improve 
mandatory reporting of Cyber Security Incidents, including incidents 
that might facilitate subsequent efforts to harm the reliable operation 
of the BES. We have considered the arguments raised in the comments for 
using Reliability Standards, Section 1600 information and data 
requests, and other vehicles to implement augmented Cyber Security 
Incident reporting. On balance, we conclude that broadened mandatory 
reporting pursuant to Reliability Standard requirements is more aligned 
with the seriousness and magnitude of the current threat environment 
and the more effective approach to improve awareness of existing and 
future cyber security threats and potential vulnerabilities.
    67. First, the development of a Reliability Standard provides the 
Commission with an opportunity to review and ultimately approve a new 
or modified Reliability Standard, ensuring that the desired goals of 
the directive are met. Moreover, the Reliability Standards development 
process allows for the collaboration of industry experts in developing 
a draft standard and also gives interested entities broader opportunity 
to participate and comment on any proposal that is developed. In 
contrast, NERC's process for developing a Section 1600 data request 
provides for less stakeholder input and only informal review of a draft 
data request by Commission staff. Thus, in this circumstance, the 
standards development process is preferable for the development of 
augmented cyber incident reporting requirements that satisfy the scope 
of the Commission's directive.
    68. Second, the development of a Reliability Standard provides 
better assurance of accurate, complete, and verifiable reporting of 
cyber security incidents. The Commission has well-defined authority and 
processes under section 215(e) of the FPA to audit and enforce 
compliance with a Reliability Standard. While NERC notes that a 
responsible entity must respond to a NERC Section 1600 data request, 
NERC cannot impose sanctions on registered entities who fail to respond 
to such data requests. Rather, a failure to comply would be a violation 
of the Commission's regulations,\122\ requiring a referral to the 
Commission for action. Such a process would be a departure from the 
clearly defined processes used to enforce compliance with the 
Reliability Standards. Moreover, it is unclear how NERC would even 
learn of such a failure since, unlike mandatory Reliability Standards, 
compliance with Section 1600 data requests are not subject to regular 
audit. Accordingly, given the importance of accurate, complete, and 
verifiable cyber security incident reporting, we find that the more 
robust and well-established compliance and enforcement processes 
associated with mandatory Reliability Standards are desirable in this 
instance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ 18 CFR 39.2(b) (2017) (``All entities subject to the 
Commission's reliability jurisdiction . . . shall comply with 
applicable Reliability Standards, the Commission's regulations, and 
applicable Electric Reliability Organization and Regional Entity 
Rules made effective under this part.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    69. Third, we are not persuaded by NERC's assertion that a Section 
1600 data request is preferable in this instance because it allows for 
flexibility and faster modification should a need arise for future 
revisions to the collection of cyber incident reporting data. We do not 
anticipate that there would be a need to change the parameters of the 
event report, given that the anticipated reporting requirements should 
not be technology-specific, but rather, broad enough to capture basic 
data even as the nature of cyber security incidents evolve. 
Specifically, the NOPR proposed that the minimum set of attributes to 
be reported should include: (1) The functional impact, where possible 
to determine, that the Cyber Security Incident achieved or attempted to 
achieve; (2) the attack vector that was used to achieve or attempted to 
achieve the Cyber Security Incident; and (3) the level of intrusion 
that was achieved or attempted as a result of the Cyber Security 
Incident. Since these attributes are general in nature and not 
technology specific, they would not need to be refined as the 
underlying cyber threats evolve, nor would they need to be refined 
quickly.
    70. In a similar vein, the assets (i.e., EACMS) subject to the 
enhanced reporting requirements should be identified based on function, 
as opposed to a specific technology that could require a modification 
in the reporting requirements should the underlying technology change. 
As discussed above, those functions must include, at a minimum: (1) 
Authentication; (2) monitoring and logging; (3) access control; (4) 
interactive remote access; and (5) alerting. Finally, since the level 
of attempted compromise that warrants reporting should reflect 
unauthorized access attempts and other confirmed suspicious activity, 
we do not anticipate that a modification would be required in the 
future. Nevertheless, should the situation demand a more timely change 
in data collection or should NERC desire to collect additional 
information that is outside the scope of the proposed Reliability 
Standard, NERC could use the Section 1600 data request process to 
supplement information reported under a mandatory Reliability Standard.
    71. Finally, requiring a data collection in a Reliability Standard 
is consistent with existing practices since responsible entities are 
currently required to maintain the types of information that would lead 
to a reportable Cyber Security Incident pursuant to Reliability 
Standard CIP-007-6, Requirement R4.1.
    72. While we recognize that NERC could likely develop a Section 
1600 data request more quickly than a mandatory Reliability Standard, 
given the potential complexity of considering reporting requirements 
for the various EACMS, we believe that the technical depth of a 
standard development process is more appropriate for this case. 
Although NERC states that it has successfully used ROP Section 1600 to 
collect data on system performance, in this circumstance the 
information being reported relates to threats and potential compromises 
that may require immediate or near-term action as opposed to 
retrospective reporting on Misoperations, as Section 1600 has been 
used.
    73. We also do not support adopting the DOE Form OE-417 as the 
primary

[[Page 36738]]

reporting tool for reporting Cyber Security Incidents, as suggested by 
some commenters. The reporting criteria in our directive are 
distinguishable and more aligned with a risk management approach than 
the information requested in the DOE Form OE-417. Specifically, the DOE 
Form OE-417 has twelve generic criteria for filing a report to the DOE, 
of which only two reflect the criteria outlined in the NOPR proposal, 
which are discussed in the following section. The DOE Form OE-417 does 
not address factors such as attack vector, functional impact and level 
of intrusion. In addition, the definition of a ``Cyber Event'' in the 
DOE Form OE-417 filing instructions does not align with the definition 
of Cyber Security Incident in the NERC Glossary of Terms, let alone a 
Reportable Cyber Security Incident.\123\ Nor does the DOE Form OE-417 
require reporting to E-ISAC or ICS-CERT as our directive requires.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ See Department of Energy Electric Emergency Incident and 
Disturbance Report--Form OE 417. Form OE-417 defines a Cyber Event 
as a disruption on the electrical system and/or communication 
system(s) caused by unauthorized access to computer software and 
communications systems or networks including hardware, software, and 
data. https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/oe417.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    74. In sum, we conclude that modifications to the NERC Reliability 
Standards to improve mandatory reporting of Cyber Security Incidents, 
including incidents that might facilitate subsequent efforts to harm 
the reliable operation of the BES, is the appropriate approach to 
improve Cyber Security Incident reporting.

D. Content and Timing of a Cyber Security Incident Report

1. NOPR
    75. The NOPR proposed to direct that NERC modify the CIP 
Reliability Standards to specify the required content in a Cyber 
Security Incident report. Specifically, the NOPR proposed that the 
minimum set of attributes to be reported should include: (1) The 
functional impact, where possible, that the Cyber Security Incident 
achieved or attempted to achieve; (2) the attack vector that was used 
to achieve or attempt to achieve the Cyber Security Incident; and (3) 
the level of intrusion that was achieved or attempted as a result of 
the Cyber Security Incident. The NOPR noted that the proposed 
attributes are the same as attributes already used by DHS for its 
multi-sector reporting and summarized by DHS in an annual report. The 
NOPR stated that specifying the required content should improve the 
quality of reporting by ensuring that basic information is provided; 
and allowing for ease of comparison across reports by ensuring that 
each report includes specified fields of information. The NOPR sought 
comment on the proposed attributes and, more generally, the appropriate 
content for Cyber Security Incident reporting to improve awareness of 
existing and future cyber security threats and potential 
vulnerabilities.
    76. In addition, the NOPR proposed to direct NERC to establish 
requirements outlining deadlines for filing a report once a compromise 
or disruption to reliable BES operation, or an attempted compromise or 
disruption, is identified by a responsible entity. The NOPR stated that 
the reporting timeline should reflect the actual or potential threat to 
reliability, with more serious incidents reported in a more timely 
fashion. The NOPR explained that a reporting timeline that takes into 
consideration the severity of a Cyber Security Incident should minimize 
potential burdens on responsible entities.
    77. The NOPR also proposed that the reports submitted under the 
enhanced mandatory reporting requirements would be provided to E-ISAC, 
similar to the current reporting scheme under Reliability Standard CIP-
008-5, as well as ICS-CERT or any successor organization. While the 
NOPR stated that the detailed incident report would not be submitted to 
the Commission, the NOPR proposed to direct NERC to file publicly an 
annual report reflecting the Cyber Security Incidents reported to NERC 
during the previous year. Specifically, the NOPR proposed to direct 
NERC to file annually an anonymized report providing an aggregated 
summary of the reported information, similar to the ICS-CERT annual 
report.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ NOPR, 161 FERC ] 61,291 at 42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    78. NERC supports the minimum set of reporting attributes proposed 
in the NOPR, stating that ``this level of detail regarding each 
reported Cyber Security Incident will not only help NERC understand the 
specific threat but also help NERC understand trends in threats over 
time.'' \125\ NERC also does not oppose either filing an annual, 
anonymized summary of the reports with the Commission, or submitting 
the reports of U.S.-based entities to the ICS-CERT in addition to E-
ISAC. Finally, while NERC supports the concept of imposing a deadline 
for entities to submit full reports of Cyber Security Incidents, NERC 
requests flexibility to determine the appropriate timeframe. 
Specifically, NERC states that it ``will determine an appropriate 
deadline for reports so that NERC can use the data for awareness and 
early indicators of potential compromise but also consider whether 
reporting for historical analysis can provide insight to the trends and 
effectiveness of industry's security controls.'' \126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ NERC Comments at 14.
    \126\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    79. ITC, IRC, and NRG support the minimum set of reporting 
attributes proposed in the NOPR. ITC states that the NOPR proposal 
reflects ``a reasonable set of baseline requirements for reporting.'' 
\127\ While ITC raises a concern that the collective information in a 
report could potentially lead to the identification of the reporting 
entity, ITC states that it ``will work within the NERC stakeholder and 
standards development process to ensure that the Standards submitted in 
response to the Commission's final rule are structured to preserve 
anonymity to the maximum extent practicable.'' \128\ IRC asserts that 
``it will be beneficial for responsible entities to report indicators 
of compromise that are detected in potential cyberattacks against their 
systems in standard form.'' \129\ NRG recommends that mandatory 
reporting include: ``content Date, Time, Duration of Incident, 
Origination of the attack, threat vector, targeted system (or OS), 
vulnerability exploited, [and] method used to stop/prevent the 
attack.'' \130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ ITC Comments at 6.
    \128\ Id.
    \129\ IRC Comments at 7.
    \130\ NRG Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    80. Appelbaum, APS, EnergySec, Resilient Societies, and Idaho Power 
raise concerns with the minimum set of reporting attributes proposed in 
the NOPR. According to Appelbaum, a count by category of asset, attack 
vector, and impact is sufficient for the mandatory reporting. APS 
contends that ``because each entity's network topology, architecture, 
applications, and other characteristics are different, any requirement 
to provide the functional impact and level of intrusion as part of 
reporting is of very low value and should not be included as mandatory 
attributes of reporting.'' \131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ APS Comments at 11-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    81. APS, however, ``agrees that information regarding attack 
vectors could be more relevant, actionable information to be shared.'' 
\132\ EnergySec expresses concern that including the proposed set of 
reporting attributes as a requirement could be construed to require 
significant forensic and analysis efforts. Resilient Societies suggests 
that

[[Page 36739]]

the Commission leverage prior work done by the federal government as 
opposed to establishing new report content. Specifically, Resilient 
Societies suggests that the Commission adopt the US-CERT ``Federal 
Incident Notification Guidelines.'' Idaho Power states that a 
``description of the event and the system(s) affected along with a fact 
pattern describing the situation and known information at the time the 
report is submitted should be sufficient.'' \133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ Id. at 12.
    \133\ Idaho Power Comments at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    82. With regard to the timing of reports, ITC questions whether an 
initial report of a Cyber Security Incident would have to be submitted 
to ICS-CERT as well as E-ISAC. ITC opines that ``the existing one-hour 
reporting requirement poses a significant compliance challenge, and 
that requiring that the initial report also be provided to ICS-CERT 
would be unworkable under that timeframe.'' \134\ IRC states that 
``[t]he timeframe for completing a full report depends on the scale and 
scope of the investigation [and] FERC should consider requiring that 
reports be updated at a certain frequency until the full report is 
complete.'' \135\ IRC recommends a 90-day update requirement until a 
report is finalized. NRG recommends that Cyber Security Incident 
reports should be submitted after existing industry processes have been 
followed relating to Incident Reporting and Response Plans. In 
addition, NRG recommends that the Commission consider directing NERC to 
file a quarterly report in addition to the annual report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ ITC Comments at 7.
    \135\ IRC Comments at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    83. APS recommends aligning the timing of any mandatory reporting 
obligations with the timing dictated in Form OE-417. APS contends that 
reporting events that ``could, but didn't, cause harm to the BES and/or 
facilitate subsequent efforts to harm . . . should be far enough 
removed from the incident to not divert resources from incident 
response and to ensure that enough details are known about the incident 
to provide an accurate, thorough report.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ APS Comments at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    84. EnergySec agrees that clear timelines should be included in any 
new mandatory Cyber Security Incident requirements. EnergySec further 
comments that the timelines should factor in the severity of the 
incident and the level of effort required to complete an investigation. 
Resilient Societies offers that ``[i]n an ideal world, reporting of 
cybersecurity incidents would take place at machine speed'' and 
suggests that the Commission ``allow and preferably require automated 
reporting, at least for an initial report.'' \137\ Idaho Power states 
that, should the Commission require timelines for reporting, it should 
ensure that an entity has adequate time to analyze each event before 
the reporting deadline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ Resilient Societies Comments at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    85. Lasky supports entities being required to report Cyber Security 
Incidents to both E-ISAC and ICS-CERT, and states that ``it would be 
prudent to report all incidents to the United States Cyber Emergency 
Response Team (US-CERT)'' as well.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ Lasky Comments at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    86. As discussed below, we adopt the NOPR proposal on minimum 
reporting attributes and timing, in response to the commenters' 
concerns, but we also leave discretion to NERC to develop the reporting 
timelines in the standards development process by considering several 
factors so that the timelines provide for notice based upon the 
severity of the event and the risk to BES reliability, with updates to 
follow initial reports.
    87. The comments generally support the proposed minimum set of 
reporting attributes. For example, NERC supports the proposed content 
for a Cyber Security Incident report, while requesting flexibility to 
determine the appropriate reporting timeframe. As noted by ITC, the 
NOPR proposal reflects ``a reasonable set of baseline requirements for 
reporting.'' \139\ Certain comments do raise concerns with the proposed 
reporting attributes, especially in the case of attempts versus actual 
compromises.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ ITC Comments at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    88. In our view, a new or revised Cyber Security Incident report 
should include, at a minimum, the information outlined in the NOPR 
proposal, where available. Specifically, the minimum set of attributes 
to be reported should include: (1) The functional impact, where 
possible, that the Cyber Security Incident achieved or attempted to 
achieve; (2) the attack vector that was used to achieve or attempted to 
achieve the Cyber Security Incident; and (3) the level of intrusion 
that was achieved or attempted or as a result of the Cyber Security 
Incident. In addition, we agree that any reporting requirement should 
not take away from efforts to mitigate a potential compromise.
    89. With regard to timing, we conclude that NERC should establish 
reporting timelines for when the responsible entity must submit Cyber 
Security Incident reports to the E-ISAC and ICS-CERT based on a risk 
impact assessment and incident prioritization approach to incident 
reporting.\140\ This approach would establish reporting timelines that 
are commensurate with the adverse impact to the BES that loss, 
compromise, or misuse of those BES Cyber Systems could have on the 
reliable operation of the BES. Higher risk incidents, such as detecting 
malware within the ESP and associated EACMS or an incident that 
disrupted one or more reliability tasks, could trigger the report to be 
submitted to the E-ISAC and ICS-CERT within a more urgent timeframe, 
such as within one hour, similar to the current reporting deadline in 
Reliability Standard CIP-008-5.\141\ For lower risk incidents, such as 
the detection of attempts at unauthorized access to the responsible 
entity's ESP or associated EACMS, an initial reporting timeframe 
between eight and twenty-four hours would provide an early indication 
of potential cyber attacks.\142\ For situations where a responsible 
entity identifies other suspicious activity associated with an ESP or 
associated EACMS, a monthly report could, as NERC states, assist in the 
analysis of trends in activity over time.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ Similar to the Cyber Incident Severity Schema in DHS's 
National Cyber Incident Response Plan, Annex D (Reporting Incidents 
to the Federal Government) at 41 (2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ncirp/National_Cyber_Incident_Response_Plan.pdf.
    \141\ An example of incident categories is the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, Cyber Incident Handling Program, 
Enclosure B, Appendix A to Enclosure B (Cyber Incident and 
Reportable Cyber Event Categorization) (2012), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/m651001.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-175710-897.
    \142\ See Department of Energy Electric Emergency Incident and 
Disturbance Report, Form OE-417 (six-hour reporting deadline for 
cyber events that could potentially impact electric power system 
reliability) found at: https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/OE417_Form_05312021.pdf; Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory 
Guide 5.71 (four-hour reporting deadline for cyber events that could 
have caused an adverse impact) found at: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0903/ML090340159.pdf; see also Reliability Standard EOP-004-3 
(Event Reporting), Requirement R2 (requiring a report within twenty-
four hours for an events that impact or may impact BES reliability).
    \143\ See NERC Comments at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    90. With regard to the appropriate recipients for Cyber Security 
Incident reports, we determine that the reports should be provided to 
E-ISAC, similar to the current reporting scheme under Reliability 
Standard CIP-008-5, as well as ICS-CERT or its successor.\144\

[[Page 36740]]

Reporting directly to E-ISAC and ICS-CERT will result in cyber threat 
information being provided to the organizations best suited to analyze 
and, to the extent necessary, timely inform responsible entities of 
cyber threats. In addition, reporting directly to E-ISAC and ICS-CERT 
addresses the concerns discussed above regarding the confidentiality of 
reported Cyber Security Incident information. We also find that it is 
reasonable for NERC to file annually an anonymized report providing an 
aggregated summary of the reported information, similar to the ICS-CERT 
annual report. The annual report will provide the Commission, NERC, and 
the public a better understanding of any Cyber Security Incidents that 
occurred during the prior year without releasing information on 
specific responsible entities or Cyber Security Events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ The DHS ICS-CERT is undergoing a reorganization and 
rebranding effort. In the event that ICS-CERT no longer exists, its 
successor will assume the role as incident report recipient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    91. Therefore, we conclude that the minimum set of attributes to be 
reported should include: (1) The functional impact, where possible, 
that the Cyber Security Incident achieved or attempted to achieve; (2) 
the attack vector that was used to achieve or attempted to achieve the 
Cyber Security Incident; and (3) the level of intrusion that was 
achieved or attempted or as a result of the Cyber Security Incident. 
NERC may augment the list should it determine that additional 
information would benefit situational awareness of cyber threats. As 
discussed above, we also conclude that NERC should establish a 
reporting timeline that provides for notice based upon the severity of 
the event and the risk to BES reliability, with updates to follow 
initial reports. We also support the adoption of an online reporting 
tool to streamline reporting and reduce burdens on responsible entities 
to the extent the option is available.\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ An online reporting tool will streamline the effort and 
allow for direct input into a database for a faster turnaround to 
those that may need to know about the information. For example, see 
https://www.us-cert.gov/forms/report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Other Issues

1. Comments
    92. NYPSC supports the NOPR proposal, but notes that if the 
Commission adopts the NOPR proposal, ``the only additional information 
that state entities would gain is an annual compilation of incidents 
reported to federal entities.'' \146\ NYPSC claims that an annual 
report would not provide states with sufficient information on a timely 
basis so that they can ensure that corrective actions can be taken. 
Therefore, NYPSC argues that appropriate state entities should also be 
provided with the cyber reporting information when it is filed with the 
``federal authorities.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ NYPSC Comments at 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    93. Microsoft raises a concern that the NOPR proposal is not clear 
as to whether the modified CIP Reliability Standards would apply to 
responsible entities that use a commercial cloud service to operate 
cloud-based BES Cyber Systems. Specifically, Microsoft requests that 
the Commission ``confirm that cloud service providers that provide 
services to Registered Entities are not required to register with NERC 
based on their provision of [cloud-based] services, and . . . are not 
responsible for compliance with the CIP Reliability Standards.'' \147\ 
Microsoft asserts that clarifying the status of cloud service providers 
is important to foster technical innovation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ Microsoft Comments at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commission Determination
    94. While we appreciate NYPSC's interest in receiving Cyber 
Security Incident reports when reported to E-ISAC and ICS-CERT, state 
entities will have access to the same information that is reported to 
the Commission (i.e., the annual, anonymized summary). Should a state 
entity determine that it requires additional information from a 
responsible entity under its jurisdiction, the state entity can work 
within its own jurisdiction to procure additional information. Our 
directive is intended to enhance the quality of information received by 
E-ISAC and ICS-CERT, and directing additional sharing with state 
entities is outside the scope of this proceeding.
    95. We decline to grant Microsoft's requested clarification 
regarding the potential registration status of cloud service providers 
because it is outside the scope of this proceeding. Specifically, 
Microsoft's requested clarification addresses a question regarding 
registration of cloud service providers under the NERC functional 
model, as opposed to the specifics of enhanced Cyber Security Incident 
reporting. The purpose of this proceeding is not to make a 
determination regarding the registration status of cloud service 
providers and we have not received input from other interested 
entities.

III. Information Collection Statement

    96. The FERC-725 information collection requirements contained in 
this Final Rule are subject to review by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995.\148\ OMB's regulations require approval of certain information 
collection requirements imposed by agency rules.\149\ Upon approval of 
a collection of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and 
expiration date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of this 
rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to these collections 
of information unless the collections of information display a valid 
OMB control number. The Commission solicits comments on the 
Commission's need for this information, whether the information will 
have practical utility, the accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to 
enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be 
collected or retained, and any suggested methods for minimizing 
respondents' burden, including the use of automated information 
techniques.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) (2012).
    \149\ 5 CFR 1320.11 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    97. The Commission will submit these proposed reporting 
requirements to OMB for its review and approval under section 3507(d) 
of the PRA because the Final Rule results in nonsubstantive/non-
material changes in paperwork burden. The Final Rule directs NERC to 
make Cyber Security reporting changes across all applicable Reliability 
Standards. These proposed changes will be covered by the FERC-725 
information collection (Certification of Electric Reliability 
Organization; Procedures for Electric Reliability Standards) [OMB 
Control No. 1902-0225]). FERC-725 includes the ERO's overall 
responsibility for developing Reliability Standards to include any 
Reliability Standards that relate to Cyber Security Incident reporting. 
There will be no change to the Public Reporting Burden as it affects 
the FERC-725 information collection.
    98. Comments are solicited on the Commission's need for the 
information proposed to be reported, whether the information will have 
practical utility, ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of 
the information to be collected, and any suggested methods for 
minimizing the respondent's burden, including the use of automated 
information techniques.
    99. Internal review: The Commission has reviewed the approved 
changes and has determined that the changes are necessary to ensure the 
reliability and integrity of the Nation's Bulk-Power System.
    100. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting 
requirements by contacting the

[[Page 36741]]

following: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive 
Director, email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5c183d283d1f30393d2e3d323f391c3a392e3f723b332a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5f1b3e2b3e1c333a3e2d3e313c3a1f393a2d3c71383029">[email protected]</span></a>, phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: 
(202) 273-0873].
    101. For submitting comments concerning the collection(s) of 
information and the associated burden estimate(s), please send your 
comments to the Commission, and to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 725 17th Street NW, 
Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, phone: (202) 395-8528, fax: (202) 395-7285]. For 
security reasons, comments to OMB should be submitted by email to: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#87e8eef5e6d8f4f2e5eaeef4f4eee8e9c7e8eae5a9e2e8f7a9e0e8f1"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="81eee8f3e0def2f4e3ece8f2f2e8eeefc1eeece3afe4eef1afe6eef7">[email protected]</span></a>. Comments submitted to OMB should include 
Docket Number RM18-2-000 and OMB Control Number 1902-0225.

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    102. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \150\ generally 
requires a description and analysis of final rules that will have 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
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    103. By only proposing to direct NERC, the Commission-certified 
ERO, to develop modified Reliability Standards for Cyber Security 
Incident reporting, this Final Rule will not have a significant or 
substantial impact on entities other than NERC. Therefore, the 
Commission certifies that this Final Rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
    104. Any Reliability Standards proposed by NERC in compliance with 
this rulemaking will be considered by the Commission in future 
proceedings. As part of any future proceedings, the Commission will 
make determinations pertaining to the Regulatory Flexibility Act based 
on the content of the Reliability Standards proposed by NERC.

V. Environmental Analysis

    105. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental 
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may 
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\151\ The 
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this 
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human 
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying, 
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the 
effect of the regulations being amended.\152\ The actions proposed 
herein to augment current reporting requirements fall within this 
categorical exclusion in the Commission's regulations.
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    \151\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, Order No. 486, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 (1987).
    \152\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii) (2017).
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VI. Document Availability

    106. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in 
the Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and 
in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours 
(8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A, 
Washington, DC 20426.
    107. From the Commission's Home Page on the internet, this 
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is 
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, 
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type 
the docket number of this document, excluding the last three digits, in 
the docket number field. User assistance is available for eLibrary and 
the Commission's website during normal business hours from the 
Commission's Online Support at (202) 502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-
3676) or email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ef898a9d8c80818386818a9c9a9f9f809d9baf898a9d8cc1888099"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="01676473626e6f6d686f64727471716e737541676473622f666e77">[email protected]</span></a>, or the Public Reference 
Room at (202) 502-8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. Email the Public Reference 
Room at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#6b1b1e0907020845190e0d0e190e05080e190404062b0d0e1908450c041d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="95e5e0f7f9fcf6bbe7f0f3f0e7f0fbf6f0e7fafaf8d5f3f0e7f6bbf2fae3">[email protected]</span></a>.

VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification

    108. The Final Rule is effective October 1, 2018. The Commission 
has determined that this Final Rule imposes no substantial effect upon 
either NERC or NERC registered entities \153\ and, with the concurrence 
of the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a ``major rule'' as defined in 
section 351 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 
of 1996. This Final Rule is being submitted to the Senate, House, and 
Government Accountability Office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \153\ 5 U.S.C 804(3)c.

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    By the Commission.

    Issued: July 19, 2018.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.

    Note: The following appendix will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

Appendix Commenters

Jonathan Appelbaum (Appelbaum)
American Public Power Association, Electricity Consumers Resource 
Council, and Transmission Access Policy Study Group (Trade 
Associations)
Applied Control Solutions (ACS)
Arizona Public Service Company (APS)
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)
Edison Electric Institute and National Rural Electric Cooperative 
Association (EEI/NRECA)
Douglas E. Ellsworth (Ellsworth)
Energy Sector Security Consortium (EnergySec)
Eversource Energy Service Company (Eversource)
Foundation for Resilient Societies (Resilient Societies)
Frank Gaffney (Gaffney)
Idaho Power Company (Idaho Power)
International Transmission Company (ITC)
ISO/RTO Council (IRC)
Isologic LLC (Isologic)
Jerry Ladd (Ladd)
Large Public Power Council (LPPC)
Mary D. Lasky (Lasky)
Michael Mabee (Mabee)
Garland T. McCoy (McCoy)
Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft)
New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC)
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
NRG Energy (NRG)
Fred Reitman (Reitman)
Preston L. Schleinkofer (Schleinkofer)
Mark S. Simon (Simon)
Karen Testerman (Testerman)
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Chamber)

[FR Doc. 2018-16242 Filed 7-30-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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