alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### James B. Griffin, Defendant in Error, *vs.*Lewis Van Meter, Plaintiff in Error.

1. *Justice courts*— Voluntary *appearance*— Waiver *of notice.*— The voluntary appearance of parties in a justice’s court waives aU defects in process, as e. g. notice of suit less than fifteen days before trial.

*Error to Harrison Circuit Court.*

*T. J.*Dent, for Plaintiff in Error,

cited: Stone vs. Corbett, 20 Mo., 3o0 ; Williams vs. Bower, 26 Mo., 601.

*John C.*Howell, for Defendant in Error.

I. Whatever may have been the defects in the summons or *431its service, the appearance of defendant cured such defects, (Barnett vs. Lynch, 3 Mo., 369 ; Davis vs. Wood, 7 Mo., 162; Bartlett vs. McDaniel, 3 Mo., 55 ; Schalter vs. Hunt, 1 Mo., 651; Whiting vs. Budd, 5 Mo., 443; Griffin vs. Samuel, 6 Mo., 50; McNair vs. Biddle, 8 Mo., 257; Whittlesey’s Mo. Prae., 195-6; W. S., (2nd Ed.) 815, § 16 and note.)

Sherwood, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Griffin brought suit against Yan Meter before a justice of the peace, to recover possession of a certain bay colt, alleged in the complaint to be worth $35.00.

The writ was issued on the 23d, served on the 24th, and made returnable on the 30th, of Octobei’. The transcript of the justice shows, that on the return day the parties appeared and' “ agreed to go into trial of said right of property.” This trial resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff) from which the defendant appealed to the Circuit Court, and a like result attended the trial there.

The defendant filed his motion in that court (but whether prior or subsequent to the trial last mentioned, does not appear) to dismiss the suit on the ground, that as the process had not been served on him fifteen days before the day of the trial of the cause, the justice had no jurisdiction.

This motion was overruled and exceptions saved.'

The motion to dismiss the cause was properly overruled. The justice had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, and the parties voluntarily appeared and went into the trial; and this waived any and every defect in the process. 2 Wagn. Stat., 813, Art. 2, § 4, provides, that “ Suits may be instituted before a justice either by the voluntary appearance of the parties or by process.” It is true that consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction — -that is, such consent could not give a court the right or authority to adjudicate a matter over which the law had not given such court contro.l. For instance, the agreement of the parties could not confer authority on a justice of the peace to try a case involving the title to real estate, or to take cognizance of an action for *432slander. But when a case comes within the scope of the authority conferred by law upon a justice of the peace, it is entirely immaterial, whether the suit be brought by summons or by voluntary appearance; and if the. latter, the validity of the proceedings would not be affected, because a void process had been previously issued in the cause.

Judgment affirmed.

Judges Napton and 'Wagner absent-; the other Judges concur.
#### Rufus Danforth, Respondent, *vs.*William Lowe, Appellant.

1. *Judgment*— Reinstatement *of cause after lapse of term.*— After the term at which final judgment in a cause is rendered, has elapsed, the court has no power to reinstate the cause upon the docket, or to take any further steps. And motions for new trial and in arrest filed for the first time at the subsequent term, are *coram non*judice, and must be disregarded, notwithstanding such reinstatement. [W. S., 1059, *\\*6, 11.]

*Appeal from Johnson Court of Common Pleas.*

*Elliot*<§• Blodgett, for Appellant.

*Crittenden and*Cockrell, for Eespondent,

cited, 11 Mo., 117; 1 Clark, (Iowa,) 571.

Wagner, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action commenced on an open account.

A trial was had at the regular September Term of the court,' 1871, which resulted in a verdict for plaintiff, upon which judgment was rendered in his favor. At that term no motion was filed for a new trial, no bill of exceptions was *218made out, and no efforts were made to appeal tlie ease. At the next succeeding term, the appellant moved the court to reinstate the case on the docket, which motion was sustained. A motion was then filed for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment, both of which being overruled, the appellant then presented his bill of exceptions, and took an aj>peal.

The action of the court was irregular and unauthorized. After the term had elapsed, at which final judgment was taken, the court possessed no further control or jurisdiction *over*the case. It then had no power to reinstate the cause on the docket, or to take any further proceedings.

The statute requires that all motions for re-hearing and in arrest, shall be filed within four days after the trial, if the teim shall so long continue; and if not, then before the end of the term; and it further provides, that no appeal shall be allowed, unless made during the term at which the judgment or decision appealed from, was given. *(W. S., 1059,*§ *6-11.)*There was no attempt made to comply with the law at the trial term, as regards taking the appeal.

When the cause was reinstated, there was no new trial, but it seems to have been again placed on the docket, solely *for*the benefit of the appellant, to enable him to supply an omission, and do what he neglected to do, when the case was properly before the court.

The reinstating the cause, the filing of the motion for a new trial, and granting the appeal, were all acts done, *coram non*judice, and must be disregarded.

Wherefore the judgment must be affirmed.

Judges Tories and Sherwood concur; Judges Adams and Napton not sitting.
#### EMPLOYERS FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY and Henry G. Crowder, Inc., d/b/a Gulf Lane Motel, Appellants, v. Richard E. BLANCHARD, Jr., a minor, by his next friend and father, Dr. Richard E. Blanchard, Sr., and Dr. Richard E. Blanchard, Sr., individually, Appellees.

No. 71-136.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 16, 1971.

Appeal dismissed.
<PAGE>
 
                   [LETTERHEAD OF COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.]

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1


                      CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements of 
Cupertino National Bancorp and Subsidiary on Forms S-8 (File No. 33-17368, No. 
33-17369, No. 33-62429 and No. 33-31193) of our report dated January 26, 1996, 
on our audits of the consolidated financial statements of Cupertino National 
Bancorp and Subsidiary as of December 31, 1995 and 1994 and for the years then 
ended which report is incorporated by reference in this Annual Report on Form 
10-K.

                                       Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P.

San Francisco, California
March 25, 1996
May 22, 2015 

Mr. Gavin Shouppe 

4K Aerial Imaging 

4336 Lakewood Dr 

Marianna, FL 32448 

Dear Mr. Gavin Shouppe: 

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It 

explains why we can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days. 

Why We Can Not Process Your Request 

We entered your April 10, 2015, exemption request on behalf into the public docket 

(No. FAA-2015-0972), but we are unable to process your request any further. The 

information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For 

us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following: 

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the 

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief. 

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole. 

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption 

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you 

seek an exemption. 

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request. 

What You Should Do 

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 
2 

If We Do Not Hear From You 

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Brenda Robeson 

Program Analyst, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
#### The State, ex rel. Osborne, City Solicitor, *v.*Williams, Director of Finance.

*Municipal corporations*— Assessments—Home-rule *charter provisions yield to state statutes.*

(No. 18788

Decided December 2, 1924.)

In Mandamus.

*Mr. William E. Lewis,*for relator.

*Mr. Ralph R. Miller,*for defendant.

By the Court.

This cause coining on to be heard upon the pleadings and the admitted facts, the court finds upon the issues for the defendant upon the authority of the case of *Berry*v. *City of Columbus,*104 Ohio St., 607, 136 N. E., 824, and finds that the relator is not entitled to a writ of mandamus against defendant.

*Writ denied.*

Marshall, O. J., Robinson, Jones, Matthias, Day, Allen, and Conn, JJ., concur.

Marshall, C. J.,

concurring. The legal question involved in this controversy is not a new one in this court. The same general principle has been involved in several cases, but the identical principle was involved in the case of *Berry*v. *City of Columbus,*104 Ohio St., 607, 136 N. E., 824. That case was disposed of upon a journal entry, in which five members of this court concurred. There have been three changes in the personnel of this court since that decision was rendered on *401February 14, 1922, and at this time, after three changes in the court, six members concur in upholding the principles of the *Berry case,,*resulting in a denial of the writ of mandamus in the instant case. While I did not agree with the majority view in the *Berry case,*and do not yet feel convinced of the soundness of the conclusions reached, it seems that the principle involved has become settled by repeated decisions, and should not only remain settled, but be accepted by all the members of this court, as it must be accepted by the bench and bar of Ohio generally. In the instant case there is a clear conflict between certain provisions of the charter of the city of Youngstown, relating to the procedure for improvement of streets, and the provisions of the General Code, relating to the same subject. It was decided in the *Berry case*that the charter provisions must yield to the statutes. In the interest of greater stability, and feeling that it is of the utmost importance that this question should be definitely settled, so that municipalities may no longer entertain any doubt concerning the same, I have decided to concur with the majority in this ease, thereby mating the decision unanimous, and shall concur upon similar principles in future cases. If this unanimous judgment is contrary to the wishes of the people, another constitutional amendment will now be in order, whereby their wishes may be more clearly expressed.
Exhibit 32.1

                           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

     In connection with the amended Quarterly Report of Birner Dental Management
Services, Inc., a Colorado corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-Q/A for the
quarter ended September 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Report"), the undersigned, who are the Chief Executive Officer
and the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, respectively, do each hereby
certify, pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss.
1350), that to his knowledge:


         1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.

                                 Date: December 22, 2005


                                   By:    /s/ Frederic W.J. Birner
                                          ------------------------
                                 Name:    Frederic W.J. Birner
                                Title:    Chief Executive Officer


                                   By:    /s/ Dennis N. Genty
                                          ------------------------
                                 Name:    Dennis N. Genty
                                Title:    Chief Financial Officer
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Roger L. DOUGET v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 53993.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 30, 1973.

In re: Roger L. Douget applying for remedial writs and/or habeas corpus.

Writ granted — Evidentiary hearing ordered. See Order.

ORDER

Ordered that a hearing be held by the district court on whether relator is entitled to a speedy trial.
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1564 

Making continuing appropriations for veterans benefits and services in the 

event of a Government shutdown. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 

Mr. SANDERS (for himself, Ms. HIRONO, Mr. BEGICH, Mr. TESTER, and Mr. 

BLUMENTHAL) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Appropriations 

A BILL 

Making continuing appropriations for veterans benefits and 

services in the event of a Government shutdown. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protecting Those Who 

5 Protected Us Act of 2013’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS FOR VETERANS 

7 BENEFITS AND SERVICES. 

8 There are hereby appropriated for fiscal year 2014, 

9 out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appro10 priated, for any period during which interim or full-year 


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•S 1564 IS

1 appropriations for fiscal year 2014 are not in effect, such 

2 sums as are necessary to administer and provide benefits 

3 and services to veterans, dependents, and survivors pro4 vided under chapters 11, 13, 15, 18, 21, 23, 30, 31, 33, 

5 35, and 39 of title 38, United States Code. 

6 SEC. 3. TERMINATION. 

7 Appropriations and funds made available and author8 ity granted pursuant to this Act shall be available until 

9 whichever of the following first occurs: 

10 (1) The enactment into law of an appropriation 

11 (including a continuing appropriation) for any pur12 pose for which amounts are made available in sec13 tion 2. 

14 (2) The enactment into law of the applicable 

15 regular or continuing appropriations resolution or 

16 other Act without any appropriation for such pur17 pose. 

18 (3) January 1, 2015. 

Æ 


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#### PAN-NATIONAL FENCE MFG. CO., Appellant, v. SOUTHERN METAL PRODUCTS, INC., and George P. Coyle & Sons, Inc., Appellees.

No. 68-1058.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Oct. 7, 1969.

Swink & Swink, Miami, for appellant.

Sandler & Sandler, Cristol & Rose, Miami, for appellees.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, BARK-DULL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See: Smith v. Burdines, Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223, 131 A.L.R. 115; Lambert v. Sistrunk, Fla.1952, 58 So.2d 434; McNeill v. Jack, Fla. 1955, 83 So.2d 704; Vander Car v. Pitts, Fla.App.1964, 166 So.2d 837; C & H Contractors, Inc. v. McKee, Fla.App.1965, 177 So.2d 851; Watts v. Mantooth, Fla.App.1967, 196 So.2d 230; 46 Am.Jur., Sales, § 746; Rule 1.270(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A.
#### Cesare PINTO, Appellant, v. Dorothy C. KESTEN, Appellee.

No. 70-788.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 22, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
# C_2022418EN.01002202.xml

| 31.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 418/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 418/22

---

Judgment of the General Court of 21 September 2022 — Portugal v Commission (Madeira Free Zone)

(Case T-95/21) (1)

(State aid - Madeira Free Zone - Aid scheme implemented by Portugal - Decision finding that the scheme does not comply with Decisions C(2007) 3037 final and C(2013) 4043 final, declaring it to be incompatible with the internal market, and ordering the recovery of aid paid under that scheme - Concept of State aid - Existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b)(i) and (ii) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 - Recovery - Legitimate expectations - Legal certainty - Principle of sound administration - Absolute impossibility of implementation - Limitation - Article 17 of Regulation 2015/1589)

(2022/C 418/28)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Applicant: Portuguese Republic (represented by: P. Barros da Costa, A. Soares de Freitas and L. Borrego, acting as Agents, and by M. Gorjão-Henriques and A. Saavedra, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: I. Barcew and G. Braga da Cruz, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the Portuguese Republic seeks the annulment of Articles 1, 4, 5 and 6 of Decision C(2020) 8550 final of the European Commission of 4 December 2020 on aid scheme SA.21259 (2018/C) (ex 2018/NN) implemented by Portugal in favour of the Madeira Free Zone (MFZ) — Regime III.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs, including those relating to the proceedings for interim relief. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs, including those relating to the proceedings for interim relief.

---

(1)  OJ C 138, 19.4.2021.

---
#### Leonard MUNDWITZ et al., Appellants, v. HOME-AID CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 73-1209.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 14, 1974.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; Eugene Fischer, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
Exhibit 99.6

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form F-3 (File No. 333-14148), on
Form F-9 (File Nos. 333-120133 and 333-106592) and on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-121500,
333-131715 and 333-135769) of Barrick Gold Corporation (the Corporation) and the Registration Statements on Form F-9 of Barrick Gold Finance
Company (File No. 333-120133-01) and on Form F-9 of Barrick Gold Inc. (File Nos. 333-120133-02
and 333-106592-01) of our report dated February 20, 2008 relating to the Corporation's consolidated financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control
over financial reporting which appears in the Corporation's Annual Report on Form 40-F.

/s/
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Chartered
Accountants, Licensed Public Accountants
Toronto, Ontario
March 27, 2008

---



QuickLinks
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Michael Steven PISANITCH, Appellee.

Nos. 70-104, 70-105.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 11, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
1

The Honorable David Gregory Kays, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-2166

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Jerry Goodman, Jr., *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: August 25, 2011

Filed: August 29, 2011

___________

Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Jerry Goodman, Jr., was charged with failing to register as a sex offender, 18

U.S.C. § 2250(a). Goodman pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement,

which contained an appeal waiver. The District Court1

 sentenced Goodman to sixty

months in prison, below the statutory maximum but above the undisputed advisory

Sentencing Guidelines range of thirty to thirty-seven months. On appeal, counsel has

filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), seeking to withdraw and

questioning the reasonableness of the sentence. 
-2-

We will enforce the appeal waiver in this case because Goodman’s appeal falls

within the scope of the waiver, the record shows the requisite knowledge and

voluntariness, and enforcing the appeal waiver would not result in a miscarriage of

justice. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–92 (8th Cir.) (en banc)

(describing the circumstances under which the appellate court should enforce an

appeal waiver and dismiss the appeal), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 997 (2003); see also

United States v. Estrada-Bahena, 201 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)

(enforcing an appeal waiver in an Anders case). 

We have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), and find no nonfrivolous issues not covered by the waiver. We grant

counsel leave to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. 

______________________________
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