alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document

EXHIBIT 10.42

SUMMARY OF ATHERSYS, INC.
2021 CASH BONUS INCENTIVE PLAN


On February 11, 2021, the Board of Directors of Athersys, Inc. (“the Company”), based upon the recommendation of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of the Company, approved a cash bonus incentive plan (the “Plan”) for the year ending December 31, 2021 for the named executive officers of the Company. The Plan provides that each participant is eligible to earn a bonus during the award term of January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021. The Plan provides for the following target bonus percentages of the named executive officer’s salary during the award term, weighted as set forth below on the achievement of specified corporate goals, with the remainder based on individual/functional performance. The corporate goals include advancing the Company’s clinical programs for MultiStem and manufacturing process development initiatives, executing against the established operating plan and capital acquisition objectives. There is no formally adopted plan document for the Plan.															
	Title		Target
Bonus		Weighting on
Corporate Goals
	Interim Chief Executive Officer, President & Chief Operating Officer		60 	%		100 	%
	Executive Vice President & Chief Scientific Officer		45 	%		80 	%
	Chief Financial Officer		40 	%		80 	%
	Senior Vice President of Finance		35 	%		60 	%
#### COOK PAINT AND VARNISH COMPANY, Appellant, v. James P. SANCHEZ et al., Appellees.

No. 73-486.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

August 3, 1973.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Harold COX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. N-497.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 11, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Leon K. BAKER, Appellant, v. 7-11 FOOD STORES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Appellee.

No. 73-120.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 14, 1973.

Laurence J. Altman, of Russell & Altman, Boca Raton, for appellant.

Thomas A. Hoadley, of Howell, Kirby, Montgomery, D’Aiuto, Dean & Hallowes, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Schubowsky v. Hearn Food Store, Inc., Fla.App.1971, 247 So.2d 484, aff’d. Fla.1972, 261 So.2d 162.

OWEN, C. J., and WALDEN and CROSS, JJ., concur.
#### Harold Birmingham *vs.*Sears, Roebuck & Company

Aroostook.

Opinion, February 8, 1956.

*James P. Archibald,*for plaintiff.

*Beck and Beck,*

*Scott Brown,*for defendant.

Sitting: Fellows, C. J., Williamson, Webber, Beliveau, Tapley, Clarke, JJ.

*461Williamson, J.

This tort action is before us on motion for a new trial after verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff seeks to recover damages suffered through negligence in the installation of automatically controlled ventilating equipment in the basement of a barn used for the storage of approximately 12,000 barrels of potatoes.

The purpose of the equipment was not to heat the storage space, but to remove excess heat and moisture. The defendant installed a fan in a basement wall with a humidity control nearby and a temperature control placed on the outer wall of the storage space in a room near the entrance to the basement.

The negligence complained of is that the defendant placed the only temperature control in the room which would be the warmest part of the basement when artificial heat was used and no other controls in the storage area to stop the fan when the temperature there reached a dangerous and near freezing level.

The equipment was installed and the control adjusted and fixed to a certain temperature by the defendant. The plaintiff had reason to rely on the skill and judgment of the defendant in the work performed by it.

In operation the fan was designed to expel air from, and of course to draw air from elsewhere into, the storage space. In the winter of 1949-50 it seems clear that the agreed loss of 1036 barrels from freezing resulted from cold air drawn into the storage space from the continued and excessive operation of the fan.

The difficulty with the plaintiff’s case is that he used a salamander or oil stove for a considerable period in the winter in the room where the temperature control was located, thus raising the temperature above the point set in the control. The fan was then called into operation.

*462On two grounds the jury could have found the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. First, he negligently interfered with the effective operation of the automatic controls installed by the defendant. Second, he negligently failed to observe that the fan operated for long periods, thus introducing cold air into the storage area to a dangerous degree, and to remedy the condition created by his own act.

The case was fully and completely tried. The issue is not whether we agree with the verdict, but whether the decision of the jury was clearly wrong. We find nothing to indicate that the jury reached the verdict through bias, prejudice, or mistake of law or fact. *First Nat’l Bank*v. *Morong et al.,*146 Me. 430, 82 A. (2nd) 98 (1951).

The entry will be

*Motion denied.*
Exhibit 10.1
  FIRST
    AMENDMENT
    TO
    EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
  th
          th Section 1.409A-1(d)).
    Section 1.409A-1(n)
  st




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Section 1.409A-1(n)
                Voluntary Termination
 2




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Involuntary Termination.
          2007-78, 2007-86
   3




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Regulation Section 1.409A-1(h)).
  Regulation Section 1.409A-1(n)).
        AXS-ONE INC.
  By
    /s/  Joseph
    P. Dwyer     /s/  William
    P. Lyons   4
#### Cecile CURRINGTON v. GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 53923.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 12, 1973.

In re: Cecile Currington applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of La Salle. 281 So.2d 150.

Writ denied. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal there is no error of law in the judgment complained of.
#### Elias Berbery et al., Appellants, v Yin Kuen Yeung, Respondent.

[735 NYS2d 775]

Order, Supreme Court, New York *294County (Richard Lowe, III, J.), entered October 20, 2000, which, upon reargument, granted defendant’s previously denied motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that neither plaintiff had sustained “serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The properly certified and affirmed medical affirmations submitted by defendant, noting the absence of any objective basis for plaintiffs’ subjective complaints, were sufficient to meet defendant movant’s initial burden to make a prima facie showing that plaintiffs’ injuries were not serious within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see, Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955). By contrast, the medical affirmations submitted by plaintiffs in opposition to defendant’s motion were insufficient to rebut defendant’s showing. Apart from their formal deficiencies, such affirmations were substantively inadequate for, inter alia, their failure to indicate whether objective tests were performed to confirm plaintiffs’ subjective complaints of pain, or to quantify the severity of the limitations of motion purportedly found upon examination *(see, Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*284 AD2d 271). Concur — Andrias, J.P., Rosenberger, Lerner, Buckley and Marlow, JJ.
-  HHS Family of Agencies      -  HHS Agencies & Offices 
  -  Regional Offices 
  -  Advisory Committees, Task Forces & Initiatives 
  -  Organizational Chart 
-  Leadership 
-  Budget & Performance      -  FY 2025 Budget in Brief 
  -  FY 2025 Annual Performance Plan and Report 
  -  FY 2024 Contingency Staffing Plan 
  -  FY 2024 Budget in Brief 
  -  FY 2024 Annual Performance Plan and Report 
  -  FY 2023 Contingency Staffing Plan 
  -  FY 2023 Budget in Brief 
  -  FY 2023 Annual Performance Plan and Report 
  -  FY 2022 Contingency Staffing Plan 
  -  FY 2022 Budget in Brief 
  -  FY 2022 Annual Performance Plan and Report 
  -  FY 2021 Contingency Staffing Plan 
  -  FY 2021 Budget in Brief 
  -  FY 2021 Annual Performance Plan and Report 
  -  FY 2020 Contingency Staffing Plan 
  -  FY 2020 Budget in Brief 
  -  FY 2020 Annual Performance Report 
  -  FY 2019 Contingency Staffing Plan 
  -  FY 2019 Annual Performance Report 
-  Strategic Plan FY 2022 - 2026      -  Message from the Secretary 
  -  Introduction: About HHS 
  -  Overview: Strategic Plan FY 2022 - 2026 
  -  Strategic Goal 1: Protect and Strengthen Equitable Access to High Quality and Affordable Healthcare 
  -  Strategic Goal 2: Safeguard and Improve National and Global Health Conditions and Outcomes 
  -  Strategic Goal 3: Strengthen Social Well-Being, Equity, and Economic Resilience 
  -  Strategic Goal 4: Restore Trust and Accelerate Advancements in Science and Research for All 
  -  Strategic Goal 5: Advance Strategic Management to Build Trust, Transparency, and Accountability 
  -  Appendix: Plan Updates 
-  News 
-  I Am HHS 
-  Careers 

                      -   
                      -   
                      -   
                      -   
                      -   

#             Lisa Molyneux          

Acting Assistant Secretary for Financial Resources & Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Financial Resources (ASFR)

Lisa Molyneux serves as the Acting Assistant Secretary for Financial Resources & Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Financial Resources (ASFR).

Content last reviewed April 2, 2024
No. 11037.

#### Haskell *v.*The Columbus Savings & Trust Co.

Decided October 5, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court of Franklin county.

*Messrs. Doyle & Lewis*and *Mr. B. L. Bar gar,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Cyrus Huling*and *Mr. Barton Griffith,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Crew, C. J., Summers, Spear, Davis, Spiauck and Price, JJ., concur.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The Honorable Ralph R. Beistline, Chief United States District Judge for **

the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

1

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH FORD PROCTOR,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 12-50054

D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00025-GHK-1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. King, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 7, 2013

Pasadena, California

Before: HURWITZ, THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and BEISTLINE, Chief District **

Judge.

Joseph Proctor appeals a sentence on convictions for two counts of

subscribing to a false tax return, 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), arguing that the district court

FILED

MAR 21 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

miscalculated the Sentencing Guidelines’ advisory range of incarceration before

imposing a sixty-month sentence. Adopting the tax-loss determination suggested

by the probation office, the court found that the tax loss caused by Proctor’s

offenses exceeded $400,000.00. Despite not objecting at trial, Proctor now argues

that the record does not support a tax-loss finding of more than $400,000.00, and

the correct advisory range should have been forty-one to fifty-one months. 

The parties now agree that Proctor’s domicile was in California during the

2002 and 2003 tax years. Because the parties disagree concerning the impact the

domicile determination should have on Proctor’s sentence, this matter is

VACATED and REMANDED for resentencing so that the district court may

consider this issue in the first instance. 

Additionally, Proctor’s Motion to Take Judicial Notice filed July 30,2012, is

hereby GRANTED.
#### Frank C. WHITE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-743.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 9, 1971.

*628Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Lewis S. Kimler, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Alan M. Medof, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, who is the appellant here, was duly informed against, tried before the court without jury, and found guilty of murder in the second degree. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. This appeal is from the judgment and sentence.

There is no substantial issue as to the guilt of the appellant. Upon this appeal the point presented urges that the appellant should be granted a new trial because the state used a witness whose name was not furnished to the defendant pursuant to CrPR 1.220, 33 F.S.A. The witness, Lowell Draper, was allowed to testify over the objection of the defendant. Lowell Draper identified a photograph of the victim as a photograph of his former wife Doris Draper.

There was evidence before the trial court that the attorney for the defendant was allowed to examine and copy everything in the state prosecutor’s file on the case. But, even if by mistake the witness’ name was not included, there was no prejudicial error. There was no controversy as to the identity of the deceased. See Buttler v. State, 238 So.2d 313 (Fla.App. 1970), where this court held:

> Rule 1.220(e) is not an end in itself but has the purpose of furnishing a defendand with information that will enable him to better prepare his defense; it eliminates surprise and affords a defendant time to interview witnesses. * * * An error in procedure under Rule 1.220(e) does not entitle a defendant to a reversal for new trial where it can be affirmatively determined that no prejudice resulted.” at 314.

As to the trial court’s discretion in the circumstances here presented see Rhome v. State, 222 So.2d 431 (Fla.App.1969).

Having determined that no error has been made to appear and that the proof of the guilt of the appellant was fully established, the judgment and sentence are affirmed.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
STATEMENT OF NET ASSETS IN LIQUIDATION AT JUNE 30, 1999 (UNAUDITED) AND THE
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN NET ASSETS IN LIQUIDATION FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED
JUNE 30, 1999 (UNAUDITED) AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000948547
<NAME> PHYSICIAN HEALTHCARE PLAN OF NEW JERSEY, INC.
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                         299,320
<SECURITIES>                                 4,718,281
<RECEIVABLES>                                   61,362
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,078,963
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          318,151
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,760,812
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,078,963
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (123,719)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (123,719)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (123,719)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (27)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (27)


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF FIRST AMERICAN CLOCK CO. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                             162
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   442
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  34,429
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            8,877
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           908
<OTHER-SE>                                      45,573
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    34,429
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  66
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,823)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,823)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,823)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Morton D. KRAMER, Appellant, v. DICK BOND ASSOCIATES, INC., a Florida corporation, and Richard Bond, a/k/a Dick Bond, individually, Appellee.

No. 73-501.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 30, 1974.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Orange County; Frederick T. Pfeiffer, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE DI STRI CT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________ ) J OHNNYRAY CHANDL ER, SR ., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 06-0664 ) CHARL ES J AMES, et al. , ) ) Def endants. ) __________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON AND ORDER On May 4, 2011, the Court issued an Opinion and Or der in whic h, among other things, it instructed plaintiff Johnny Ray Chandler, Sr., that by

J une 17, 2011 he w as either to (1) e ffe ct prope r ser

vice on de fenda

nts Phy llis Brodie, Char les J ames, a nd L inwood A. Will iams, and file pr oof of that se rvice with the Court, or (2) show c ause w hy his claims ag ainst those defe ndants should not be dismiss ed for lack of service . The Court also informe d the par ties that counsel would be appointed for Mr. Chandler a

t a later date be cause Mr. Chandler’ s “one potentially

meritorious claim” mig ht pose a diff icult constituti onal question. See Chandler v. J ames, Civil Action No. 06-0664, 2011 WL1678421, at *9 (D.D .C. May 4, 2011). On J une 2, 2011, Mr. Chandle r filed a motion in which he stated that he w ould ask his appointed counse l to effe ct servic e on Ms. B rodie, Mr. James, and Mr. Williams. S ince no counsel ha d y et bee n appointed for him, he asked f

or an e x tension of the time in which ser vice might be ma de to J uly

15, 2011. The Court’s May 4, 2011 Orde r, howe ver, ma de cle ar that counsel’s r ole was to litigate a diff icult constituti onal question, and in no wa y indicated that Mr. Chandler would be permitted to wait until counsel had be en appointed be fore servingproce ss onthe three named individual def endants. Mr. Chandle r wa s instructed either to effe ct servic e by the spec ified date , or to explain why he had f ailed to do so. He ha s done neither . Be cause this

case has bee n pending for r oug hly five y ear s, and bec ause Mr . Chandler is a ve tera n pro se litigant, see Chandler v. James, 2011 WL 1678421, at *1-*2, the Court will not exercise its discretion to af

ford him y et more time to ef fec t service , espec ially

since it is unlikely

that Mr. Chandler ha s any

valid claims ag ainst the defe ndants in question. See id. at *9. Mr. Chandler ’s claims ag ainst Ms. Brodie , Mr. J ames, a nd Mr. Will iams theref

ore w ill be dismi ssed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e. His cla ims ag ainst the individual members of the U nited States Parole Commissi on, see Chandle r v. James, 2011 W L 1678421, at *6, re main to be litigate d. Acc ording ly , it is hereby

ORDERED that the plaintiff’ s claims ag ainst defe ndants Phy llis Brodie, Char les J ames, a nd L inwood A. Will iams are DI SMI SSED without prejudice

. SO ORDERED. /s/_______________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN United States District J udg e DATE: June 20, 2011

2