### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 181 -CR

Ri c har d Eug e ne P igg , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 6018 2 , HO NORAB LE JO E CARROLL , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Towar d the end of

2006, the appellant, Ri char d Eug ene Pig g , was indicted f or the crime of eng ag ing in org anized criminal activity , specific ally insurance fra

ud. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. §§ 35.02(a) , (b) ( specify ing e lements of insuranc e fr aud), 71.02( a) ( 10) (spe cify ing that person is guil ty of or g anize d c ri min a l a c tiv ity if he “ c omm its or c on sp ir e s to c omm it” ins ur anc e fr a ud “ wi th the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a c ombination or in the profits of a c ombination or
a s a me mbe r o f a

c rimi nal stre e t g ang ” ) ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 6) . A lth ou g h th e c ha rg e d o ff e ns e is
n o rm ally a third-de g ree felony , see id. § § 7 1
. 0 2 ( b ) ( s p e c i f yi n g t h a t o f

f e n s e l e v e l f

o r e n g a g i n g in org anized criminal ac tivity is one categ ory

highe r than unde rlying of fense ), 35.02(c ) (statingthat insurance fra

ud is state jail felony

if value of

cl ai m i s b etwee n $1,500 and $20,000) (West Supp. 2006), the indictment also contained a n enhanc ement to the cha rg ed o ff ense. The enhanc ement provide d that Pigghad pre viously been c onvicted of a p ri o r felony offe nse, which2

elevated t he overall offe nse l evel to a se cond-de g ree felony
. See id. § 12.42(a) (3) ( West S upp. 2006) (s tatin g that if

it i s sh ow n th a t de fe nd ant i n tr ia l f or thi rd -d e g re e fe lony

ha s b e e n p re vio us ly convicted of

felony offe nse, off

ense le vel in curr ent trial is elevated to second- deg ree felony ). With out e nte ri nga

ple a agre e me nt, Pig g sig ne d a jud ic ia l c on fe ssi on

in F e b r u ar y 2 0 0 7 , a dm i t t i n g t h a t h e w a s g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e a l l e g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t , e ng a g e d in org anized criminal ac tivity while committing insuranc e fr aud, and was a repe at felony offe nder. H e also pleaded gu i l t y t o t h e off ense a nd enhanc ement. In addition, he executed a jury waiver and
a g re e me nt t o s tip ulate up on a ple a of g uil ty , w hic h s tated th at he a g re e d to a llo w the State to introduce te stimony , aff

idavits, and other doc umentary evidenc e. The dist rict court conclude d that the evidence wa s sufficient to convic t Pigg . After hear i n g ar gu m en t from both par ties during the punishment phase of the trial, the district cour t sentenc ed P i gg t o six y ear s’ imprisonment and orde red him to pay $10,845.18 in restitution. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 37.07, § 3(d) (West 2006) (spec ifying that after hear ing e vidence rele vant to defe ndant’s punishment, tria l court must announce defe ndant’s punishment). Piggnow appea ls the judgme nt of the district court.
DI SCU SSIO N I n one is sue on appea l, Pigg argues t hat t he dis trict court e rre d by order ing him to pay $10,845.18 in restitution. He argues t hat t he dis trict court’s r estitution order violated his fe dera l and state due- proce ss rig hts beca use it deprived him of his property even thoug h there was leg ally and fac tually insufficient evidenc e to support the amount of re stitut ion ordere d. See U.S. Const. amend. I V; Tex. Cons t. art. I , § 19. I n light of the prec eding , he asks this Court to remand the case at issue3

to the district court to conduc t an evidentiar y hea ri n g an d t o deter

mine the prope r amount of
r e s t i tu t i o n , i f

an y, t h a th e s h o u l d

b e r e qu i r e d

t o p ay. We w ill no t r e ve rs e a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s re sti tut ion

or de r un les s th e c ourt

a bu se d it s discretion when issuing its order. Car twr igh t v . S tate , 605 S.W .2d 287, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). A tri a l c ourt

a bu se s it s d isc re tio n if

its de c isi on

lie s o uts ide th e z on e of

re a so na ble dis a g re e me nt. Cas e yv . S tate , 21 5 S .W .3 d 870, 87 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ). B e c a us e of the du e -p ro c e ss considerations inherent in order ing a n individual to pay

restitution, the amount of the re s t i t u t ion order ed must be “just.” Se e Cam pb e ll v . S tate , 5 S.W .3d 693, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). I n other words, the amount ordere d must have a f actua l basis. Id. ; Cartw right , 605 S.W .2d at 289. Al tho ug h Pi g g argue s th a t th e e vid e nc e is ins uf fi c ie nt, we c on c lud e that th e re wa s a fac tual basis to support the district court’s restitution order
. Be fore the district court de termined that Piggwas guilty

of insuranc e fr aud, he sig ned a judi ci al confe ssion admitti ng that he def raude d insurance companies f

or an a mount between $1,500 and $20,000. F urther, the amount of re stitut ion complained of

was spec ifically

listed in a repor

t pr epar ed at the reque st of the district court. Prior to assessing punishment, the district court re q u es t ed that a pre sentenc e-inve stigation report be prepa red. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 3 7. 07 , § 3( d) (a

uth or izin g c ourt

to r e qu e st, pr ior

to punishment determination, pre para tion o f pre sentenc e-inve stigation report). This ty pe of r eport contai n s , am o n g other thing s, a desc ription of the offe nse cha rg ed, “the amount of re stitut ion
nece ssary to adequately compensa

te a victim of t he offense,” and the de fenda nt’s criminal and soc ial history
. Id. ar t
. 4 2
. 12, § 9 (West 2006); Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 35.02(e) (West Supp 2006)4

(re quiring trial court t o o rd er defe ndant convicte d of insuranc e fr aud to pay restitution to affe cted insure r).

Although the repor

t was not forma lly

admitted into evidence as an e x h i b i t , no provisio nin

th e c o d e o f

c r im in a l p r o c e d

u r e r e qu ir e s th a t t

h is ty p e o f r e p o rt b e f

o r ma ll y a dmi tted befor e a c ourt may

utiliz e the r eport fo r t h e purposes of assessingpunishment, Ma y fie ld v . S tate , 757 S.W .2d 871, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1988, pet. re f’ d ), and the releva nt statutes obviously contemplate “ that the cour t will consider the pre sentenc e re port” for the purposes of assessing punishment, Bu sb yv . S tate , 951 S.W .2d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Aus t i n 1997), aff’d , 98 4 S. W.2 d 6 27 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 )) ; see Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. arts. 37.07, § 3(d) , 42.12, § 9. Consequently , the district court c ould consider the c ontents of the re port reg ardle ss of whethe r the re port was f

ormally admitted into evidence
. Busby , 951 S.W .2d at 931. The re port contains var ious sections, inc l u d i n g one entitled “V ictim Restit ution Summa ry .” The summary specifie s that Piggand two other individuals eng ag ed in org anized criminal ac tivity

and “c onspired to file a fra udulent t h ef

t cl ai m on a 2000 Ha

rley Davidson motorcy cle.” The re port furthe r spec ifies that as a result of the fraud, Fa

rmers I nsuranc e Gr oup and National Insurance C ri m e Bureau w ere entitled to restitution in t he amounts of $5,774.71 a nd $5,070.47, respe ctively . The total amount of r estitution l isted was $10,845.18. This report along with Pigg ’s judicial conf

ession constituted a suffic ient fac tual basis for the re stitut ion awar d. See Da v is v . S

tate , 757 S.W .2d 386, 389 (Tex. App.—Dalla s 1 9 8 8, no pet.) (holdingthat mother’s testimony that she incurre d $3,373.10 in f unera l expenses constituted sufficient basis for restitution
or de r) ; Ha rri

so n v . S tate , 713 S.W .2d 760, 764 (Tex. App.— Houst on [14t h Dist.] 1986, pet. re f’d)5

(holding that list of ex penses in presentenc e-inve stigation report, which w as not objecte d to, pr ov ide d f

a c tua l ba sis to su

pp or t r e sti tut ion

or de r) ; Bu e hle r v . S

tate , 709 S.W .2d 49, 52-53 (Tex. App.—Housto n [ 1st Dist.] 1986, pet. re f’d) (conc luding that vouc her de tailing e x tradition expenses, which wa s not objected to, provided suf ficient ba sis to s u p p ort trial cour t’s restitution order)
.

Moreove r, we also note t hat i f P igg disag ree d with any portion of t he report, i t was his obligation to object. Se e Ma y fie ld v . S

ta te , 757 S.W .2d 871, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Di st. ] 198 8, pe t. r ef’d); se e als o G ar c ia v . S tate , 930 S.W .2d 621, 623-24 (Te x . App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.) (notingthat defe ndant bea rs burde n of provingthat information in prese ntence
investigation report wa s inacc urate ). Afte r the re port was pr epar ed, the district cour t a scer tained that both parties had be en g iven a c opy of the repor t; however , Piggfailed to e ither objec t to the district
c ourt ’s de c isi on

to c on sid e r t

he re po rt or int ro du c e e vid e nc e dis putin g the a c c uracy of th e re po rt
. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. ar t. 42.12, § 9(e) ( providing that court must allow def endant to comment on prese ntence -investig ation repor t a nd may allow def endant to introduce evidenc e showingrepor t is inaccur ate)
. Fur

thermore , althoug h the restitution por tion of the repor

t ma y have be en compose d of hea rsay evidenc e, Pigg ’s failure to obje ct on this g round waived any rig ht to c omplain of this fact on appea l. See Te x. R. Ap p. P. 33 .1 (s pe c if yingre qu ir e me nts fo r p re se rv inge rr or on a pp e a l) ; Briggs

v . S tate , 789 S.W .2d 918, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (noting that even c onstitut ional err ors ca n be
w a i v e d b y f a i l i n gt o o b

j e c t ) ; s ee also Tex. R. Evi d. 802 (“I nadmissible hear say

admitted without objection shall not be denie d probative va lue mere ly beca use it is hearsa

y .”).6 F or t h e s e r e a s on s, we c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re sti tut ion or de r d id n ot v iol a te Pigg ’s due-pr ocess r ights a nd further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre tion by order ing Pig g to pay

$10,845.18 in restitution. Acc ording ly , we overrule Pigg ’s issue on appe al and
a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: August 31, 2007 Do No t Pu

bli sh