UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4617

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

TRAVIS D. FLOWERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior

District Judge. (3:01-cr-00361-RLW-2)

Submitted: July 11, 2007 Decided: July 30, 2007

Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James M. Nachman, NACHMAN & SQUIRES, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia,

for Appellant. Peter Sinclair Duffey, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
1

Counsel asserts we should vacate the district court’s

revocation order if Flowers’ firearm conviction is reversed on

appeal. However, we recently affirmed Flowers’ conviction and

sentence in that case. See United States v. Flowers, No. 06-4618,

2007 WL 1533068 (4th Cir. May 24, 2007) (unpublished).

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PER CURIAM:

Travis Flowers pled guilty to possession with intent to

distribute cocaine base and was sentenced to thirty-seven months’

imprisonment with a five-year term of supervised release. While on

supervised release, Flowers was charged with possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon. A jury convicted Flowers on this

charge, and the conviction served as the basis for the district

court’s revocation of supervised release. The district court

sentenced Flowers to six months’ imprisonment on revocation, to be

served consecutively to Flowers’ fifty-one month sentence on the

firearm conviction. Flowers timely appealed.

Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), contending there are no

meritorious issues for appeal but requesting this Court review

whether the district court erroneously imposed a consecutive sixmonth sentence after finding Flowers’ violated the terms of his

supervised release.1 Flowers did not file a pro se supplemental

brief, despite being notified of his right to do so. The

Government declined to file a responding brief. Finding no error,

we affirm.
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We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of

supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory range

and not plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Crudup, 461

F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1813 (2007). In

making this determination, we first consider whether the sentence

is procedurally or substantively unreasonable, and if so, whether

it is “plainly” unreasonable. Id. While the district court must

consider the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) Chapter 7

policy statements and statutory requirements and factors applicable

to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583 (West

2000 & Supp. 2006), the district court ultimately has broad

discretion to revoke the previous sentence and impose a term of

imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.

Flowers’ underlying cocaine distribution conviction was

punishable by a statutory maximum of forty years’ imprisonment.

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2000). The underlying conviction was

therefore a Class B felony, see 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(2) (2000), for

which Flowers could have been sentenced upon revocation of his

supervised release to a statutory maximum of three years’

imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 2000 & Supp.

2006). Based on Flowers’ Grade B violation of supervised release,

see § 7B1.1(a)(2), and criminal history category of I, the district

court properly found Flowers’ range of imprisonment upon revocation

was four to ten months. See USSG § 781.4(a) (revocation table).
- 4 -

The district court’s imposition of a six-month sentence was well

within both the statutory maximum and the sentencing guidelines

range. Further, the district court properly imposed the revocation

sentence to run consecutively to Flowers’ sentence on the firearm

conviction. See USSG § 7B1.3(f). We therefore conclude Flowers’

revocation sentence was reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in

this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We

therefore affirm the revocation of Flowers’ supervised release and

the sentence imposed by the district court. This court requires

that counsel inform Flowers, in writing, of the right to petition

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If

Flowers requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in

this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Flowers.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED