alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Warren T. BETHEL, Appellant, v. The CITY OF KEY WEST, a Municipal Corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-453.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 31, 1972.

John J. Quinn, Key West, for appellant.

Michael H. Cates, Key West, for appel-lee.

Before PEARSON, CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant is a former police lieutenant under the civil service system of the City of Key West. He appeals an order dismissing with prejudice his petition for alternative writ of mandamus. Petitioner was discharged after a full evidentiary hearing before the Civil Service Board. More than two years later he wrote a letter to the Civil Service Board requesting reinstatement. The Board concurred in his request; the City Commission did not.

The trial judge properly found that the allegations of the petition tested against the Charter of the City of Key West affirmatively established that the Civil Service Board had no jurisdiction to reinstate appellant upon a simple letter from his attorney without notice to the City Commission of Key West.1

The order dismissing appellant’s petition for alternative writ of mandamus with prejudice is affirmed.

1

. Chapter H, Article I, Section 23, Charter of the City of Key West, Chapter 23374, Laws of Florida, 1945:

> * * * * * “Any officer or employee of said City, who may claim to have been removed, suspended, demoted, reduced, fined or discharged by the said City or any officer, Board or Commission thereof without full compliance with the provisions of this Article, shall have the right to file a sworn petition before the said Civil Service Board setting up the facts upon which such complaint is based, and upon the filing thereof, the said Board shall cause a copy thereof to be served upon the City Commission and give reasonable notice of a hearing to be conducted before the said Board in a similar manner, to investigate the charges made in said petition, and in the event that upon such hearing it shall be found that such petitioner was improperly removed, suspended, demoted, reduced, fined or discharged, the said Board shall certify its findings to the City Commission of said City, and said petitioner shall be immediately reinstated and shall receive full compensation for all the time for which he has not been heretofore compensated.”
#### BANDAG INCORPORATED, an Iowa corporation, Petitioner, v. Joseph ABELOW, doing business as Bandag of Miami, a sole proprietorship, Respondent.

No. 67-1046.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Feb. 7, 1968.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari denied.
#### Leroy WALKER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-107.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 8, 1970.

Bruce S. Rogow, Miami, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Harold Mendelow, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and BARK-DULL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Upon appeal the judgment was ultimately affirmed. See State v. Francois and Walker, Fla.1967, 197 So.2d 492. Subsequently certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. See 390 U.S. 982, 88 S.Ct. 1102, 19 L.Ed.2d 1279. Thereafter relief was sought in the U.S. District Court. The District Court retained jurisdiction but directed appellant to proceed for relief in the Florida State Courts. A motion pursuant to Criminal Rule of Procedure 1.850 was filed in the Circuit Court and upon denial of the motion, this appeal followed.

Appellant presents two points upon appeal. The first point argues that appellant’s confession was involuntary under the “totality of circumstances doctrine”. The issue of the voluntariness of appellant’s confession has been decided adversely to him by the Supreme Court of Florida. See State v. Francois and Walker, Fla.1967, 197 So.2d 492. Therefore appellant’s contention that his confession was involuntary should not be reconsidered by this court.

Appellant’s second point urges that he was denied his constitutional right of confrontation and cross-examination because his own confession was given upon confrontation with the confession of a co-defendant and the co-defendant was later found mentally incompetent to stand trial. The facts in the record not only show that appellant voluntarily confessed that he was a participant in the crime but that he agreed to the truth of the facts stated in his co-defendant’s confession. Under these circumstances appellant may *520not successfully urge that he was deprived of the right to confront his co-defendant at trial.

The admissability of the statement of the co-defendant did not rest upon the truth and veracity of the co-defendant but rested upon appellant’s adoption and agreement with the facts' recited. No issue of confrontation arose upon the adoption of the co-defendant’s statement. Cf. State v. Greer (Kan.1968) 202 Kan. 212, 447 P.2d 837. See also Roulette v. State, Mo.1970, reported in 451 S.W.2d 336.

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-3217
KARON ANN PARHAM, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus PEPSICO, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, District Judge. (CA-95-307-5-BR) Submitted: May 16, 1996 Decided: May 28, 1996 Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Karon Ann Parham, Appellant Pro Se. Louis B. Meyer, III, POYNER & SPRUILL, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order dismissing her trademark and copyright infringement claims and state lawclaims. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Parham v. Pepsico, Inc. , No. CA95-307-5-BR (E. D.N.C. Nov. 28, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>   1

                                                      Exhibit 10.20.1






January 20, 1999


Gary L. Bond
40 Downs Lake Circle
Dallas, Texas 75230

Dear Gary:

         I would like to report to you that the Compensation Committee has made
a determination and approved the following actions relative to the severance
provisions contained in your employment letter agreement.

         The Committee approved an amendment to the severance provisions
contained in your employment letter agreement (the "Agreement"). Hereinafter,
your Agreement shall be amended so as to delete the severance provision
contained therein, and it shall be replaced in its entirety with the following:

         "In the event that you are involuntarily terminated for any reason
other than for Cause, you shall receive as severance pay, the sum of (i) your
then current bi-weekly base salary for a period of twelve (12) consecutive
months following the date of such termination ("Severance Period"), and (ii)
fifty (50) percent of the Annual Target Bonus otherwise payable to you for the
year in which the termination occurs, which bonus amount shall be paid in
substantially equal bi-weekly installments over the Severance Period, For the
purpose of this Agreement, Cause shall be defined as and be limited to
conviction of a felony or willful misconduct or gross negligence in the
performance of duties which results in material harm to PictureTel."

         Thank you for hard work and dedication. Your continued efforts will be
a key factor in our future success and I look forward to working with you to
build a great PictureTel.


Sincerely,



-------------------------
Bruce R. Bond
Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-7527

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

MARK E. PHILLIPS, a/k/a Mark L. Aaron,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District 

Judge. (1:05-cr-00165-JFM-1)

Submitted: February 10, 2011 Decided: February 23, 2011

Before WILKINSON and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark E. Phillips, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Charles Kay, Allen 

F. Loucks, Paul M. Tiao, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Mark E. Phillips seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying his motion to recuse and denying his motion for 

assignment of the chief judge or another district court judge to 

adjudicate recusal. This court may exercise jurisdiction only 

over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain 

interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 

337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order Phillips seeks to appeal is

neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or 

collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack 

of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
254 La. 129

#### Powell CRICHTON, Jr., et al. v. SUCCESSION OF Kate Crichton GREDLER.

No. 49822.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 9, 1969.

In re: Thomas Crichton, Jr., Thomas Crichton III and John H. Crichton applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Webster. 220 So.2d 714.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.
#### Donald G. NICHOLS, and all other citizens of the City of Jacksonville, and all other persons similarly situated, Appellant, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a municipal corporation, and City of Jacksonville Beach, known as Second Urban Services, District of the City of Jacksonville, Appellees.

No. P-406.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 23, 1972.

W. Shannon Linning, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Stephen Stratford, Jacksonville, for ap-pellees.

Joseph M. Glickstein, Jr., Jacksonville, for City of Neptune Beach, amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant brought this action for declaratory relief pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 87, F.S. He sought a judicial declaration holding Ordinance 6674 adopted by appellee City of Jacksonville Beach on March 1, 1971, to be unconstitutional and void. From a final judgment holding the ordinance in question to be a valid exercise of the authority vested in appellee under its corporate charter, this appeal is taken.

We have reviewed and carefully considered the theories and supporting authorities on which appellant relies for reversal. From such review we are not convinced that the trial court applied erroneous principles of law in arriving at its ultimate conclusion that the ordinance in question constituted a reasonable exercise of police power by appellee city in light of the evidence adduced at the trial.

The judgment appealed is affirmed.

SPECTOR, C. J„ and RAWLS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
#### Thomas David McGOWAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. M-302.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 21, 1970.

Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, Gerald Sohn, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Horace A. Knowlton, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

SPECTOR, Judge.

Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment of conviction for manslaughter for which he was sentenced to a term of six months to twenty years which was entered after a jury trial. The information on which the trial was had charged appellant with murder in the second degree.

The homicide occurred during the course of an altercation outside a saloon in Jacksonville about two o’clock in the morning. Appellant and his girlfriend had earlier visited several watering places and before calling it a night, they drove back to Dell’s Monsoon Lounge. As they pulled into the parking lot, appellant observed his estranged wife in an embrace with the victim, one Frank Próctor.

Appellant said it was self-defense. But the jury obviously believed that the altercation which ensued after appellant’s arrival at the scene was precipitated by the latter’s aggressiveness. Appellant had a .22 caliber pistol under the front seat of his car. The defense was that when Frank Proctor and two companions came at the appellant, he defended himself by striking decedent in the head with the pistol which accidentally went off. However, the State’s evidence presented a different version, including testimony that as one of the witnesses approached the scene after Proctor had been shot, appellant told him to stop, saying “I shot one and I’ll shoot another”. It is manifest from the verdict that the jury rejected the appellant’s version and accepted the State’s.

The points raised by appellant as grounds for reversal relate primarily to the correctness of the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence as to the ease with which the trigger on the pistol could be pulled and whether the pistol had a hair trigger so as to be easily discharged when jarred. We have examined the evidence in this regard and have considered appellant’s argumentation in support of these issues and find them substantially without merit.

Appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, it is incumbent upon us to affirm the judgment appealed. Burton v. State, 128 So.2d 765 (Fla.App.1961).

Affirmed.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.
#### Corry JACOBS, et al. v. COMMERCIAL BANK OF GAINESVILLE.

No. 38724.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 221 So.2d 439.
Exhibit 31.1

Section 302 Certification

I, Stephen V. Coffey, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Diedrich Coffee, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over
financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of
internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                        |  |  |  |                        
|----------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Dated: January 25, 2007 |  |  |  | /s/ Stephen V. Coffey  
|                        |  |  |  | Stephen V. Coffey      
|                        |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer
# C_2023179EN.01007602.xml

| 22.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 179/76 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 179/76

---

Order of the General Court of 28 March 2023 — Félix v Commission

(Case T-784/21) (1)

(2023/C 179/106)

Language of the case: French

The President of the Fifth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 73, 14.2.2022.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                           5
<LEGEND>

This schedule  contains  summary  financial  information  extracted from McCombs
Realty  Partners 1999 Fourth  Quarter 10-KSB and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such 10-KSB filing.

</LEGEND>

<CIK>                               0000759198
<NAME>                              McCombs Realty Partners
<MULTIPLIER>                               1,000


<S>                                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                       12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                      JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                        DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                       593
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                114
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0 <F1>
<PP&E>                                     6,199
<DEPRECIATION>                             3,723
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             3,524
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          0 <F1>
<BONDS>                                    5,606
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                (2,403)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               3,524
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           1,501
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           1,472
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           475
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                  54
<EPS-BASIC>                                 3.08 <F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
<FN>

<F1> Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet. <F2> Multiplier is 1.

</FN>


</TABLE>
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# Aetna Pays $1,000,000 to Settle Three HIPAA Breaches

Aetna Life Insurance Company and affiliated covered entity (Aetna) has agreed to pay $1,000,000 to the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and to adopt a corrective action plan to settle potential violations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy and Security Rules. Aetna is an American managed health care company that sells traditional and consumer - directed health insurance and related services.
                          - Read the HHS Press Release
                          - Read the Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan *

* People using assistive technology may not be able to fully access information in this file. For assistance, contact the HHS Office for Civil Rights at (800) 368-1019, TDD toll-free: (800) 537-7697, or by emailing OCRMail@hhs.gov.

Content last reviewed October 28, 2020
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-08-00402-CV

JOHN BENJAMIN CLOPTON AND 

BARBARA ANN CLOPTON,

Appellants

v.

STEPHEN LYNN BRADFORD AND 

RAYMOND JAMES MASSEY,

Appellees

From the 40th District Court

Ellis County, Texas

Trial Court No. 76632

MEMORANDUM OPINION

John Benjamin Clopton and Barbara Ann Clopton filed a notice of appeal from 

the trial court’s order denying the Cloptons’ motion to strike the Intervenor’s plea in 

intervention. The Clerk of this Court notified the Cloptons by letter that the appeal was 

subject to dismissal because it appeared there was no right of interlocutory appeal. The 

Cloptons were also notified that the appeal would be dismissed unless, within 21 days 

from the date of the letter, a response was filed showing grounds for continuing the 

appeal.
Clopton v. Bradford Page 2

The Cloptons faxed a response but it does not show grounds for continuing the 

appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3, 44.3.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Reyna

(Justice Vance dissenting)

Appeal dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed December 23, 2008

[CV06]