[Cite as Painesville Mini Storage, Inc. v. Painesville, 124 Ohio St.3d 504, 2010-Ohio-920.]

PAINESVILLE MINI STORAGE, INC., APPELLANT, v. CITY OF PAINESVILLE,

APPELLEE. 

[Cite as Painesville Mini Storage, Inc. v. Painesville, 

124 Ohio St.3d 504, 2010-Ohio-920.] 

Appropriation proceedings — Claim of interference with property rights was 

barred by statute of limitations — Claimed interference was a one-time 

event, not a continuing violation — Court of appeals’ denial of writ 

affirmed.

(No. 2009-1616 — Submitted March 9, 2010 — Decided March 16, 2010.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, 

No. 2008-L-092, 2009-Ohio-3656. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals granting the motion 

of appellee, city of Painesville, for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing the 

petition of appellant, Painesville Mini Storage, Inc., for a writ of mandamus to 

compel the city to commence an appropriation proceeding for its alleged taking of 

appellant’s property. 

{¶ 2} Regardless of whether the R.C. 2305.07 six-year statute of 

limitations or the R.C. 2305.09(E) four-year statute of limitations applies to 

appellant’s takings claim, the claim is barred. See State ex rel. Nickoli v. Erie 

MetroParks, 124 Ohio St.3d 449, 2010-Ohio-606, 923 N.E.2d 588, ¶ 30; see also 

State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 98 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-6716, 780 N.E.2d 

998, ¶ 30-31 (a case decided prior to the enactment of R.C. 2305.09(E) in which 

the court held that the six-year limitation period of R.C. 2305.07 was appropriate 

for mandamus actions brought to compel appropriation proceedings). Appellant 

did not raise its takings claim in the underlying mandamus action until June 2008, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

more than six years after September 2000, when the city issued to J.B.H. 

Properties, Inc., the building permit that appellant claims constituted a taking of 

its private property. 

{¶ 3} Finally, the continuous-violation doctrine did not toll the statute of 

limitations, because the city did not perform any additional challenged actions 

after it issued the permit. Every event that occurred thereafter “was merely a 

continuation of the effects of that solitary event rather than the occurrence of new 

discrete acts.” Nickoli at ¶ 33; see also Ohio Midland, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of 

Transp. (C.A.6, 2008), 286 Fed.Appx. 905, 912, 2008 WL 2622665, quoting 

Tenenbaum v. Caldera (C.A.6, 2002), 45 Fed.Appx. 416, 419, 2002 WL 2026347 

(“ ‘the present effects of past [violations] * * * do not trigger a continuing 

violations exception’ ” to the statute of limitations). 

{¶ 4} We deny the city’s request for oral argument because the parties’ 

briefs are sufficient to resolve this case. State ex rel. Scioto Downs, Inc. v. 

Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 24, 2009-Ohio-3761, 913 N.E.2d 967, ¶ 25. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL,

LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

 PFEIFER, J., dissents and would grant a writ of mandamus. 

__________________ 

Paul V. Wolf, for appellant. 

Mazanec, Raskin, Ryder & Keller Co., L.P.A., John T. McLandrich, Frank 

H. Scialdone, and Tami Z. Hannon, for appellee. 

______________________