alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1487 

To limit the availability of tax credits and reductions in cost-sharing under 

the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to individuals who receive 

health insurance coverage pursuant to the provisions of a Taft-Hartley 

plan. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 

Mr. THUNE (for himself, Mr. ENZI, Mr. BARRASSO, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. 

RUBIO, Mr. ISAKSON, Mr. SCOTT, and Mr. MCCONNELL) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To limit the availability of tax credits and reductions in 

cost-sharing under the Patient Protection and Affordable 

Care Act to individuals who receive health insurance 

coverage pursuant to the provisions of a Taft-Hartley 

plan. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Union Bailout Preven5 tion Act of 2013’’. 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1487 IS

1 SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON SUBSIDIES FOR INDIVIDUALS IN 

2 TAFT-HARTLEY PLANS. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi4 sion of law, no premium tax credits shall be permitted 

5 under section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 

6 and no reductions in cost-sharing shall be permitted under 

7 section 1402 of the Patient Protection and Affordable 

8 Care Act (42 U.S.C. 18071) with respect to an individual 

9 for health insurance coverage provided pursuant to the 

10 terms of a collective bargaining agreement involving one 

11 or more employers. 

12 (b) QUALIFIED PLANS.—Section 1301(a) of the Pa13 tient Protection and Affordable Care Act (42 U.S.C. 

14 18021(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: 

15 ‘‘(5) TAFT-HARTLEY PLANS.—The term ‘quali16 fied health plan’ shall not include health insurance 

17 coverage provided pursuant to the terms of a collec18 tive bargaining agreement involving one or more em19 ployers.’’. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
254 La. 130

#### Nelson ROMERO v. SOUTH LOUISIANA CONTRACTORS, INC.

No. 49796.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 9, 1969.

In re: Nelson Romero applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Lafayette. 219 So.2d 577.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal the result reached by it is correct.
#### Robert Lee SIMMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. Q-180.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 23, 1972.

Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

The briefs and the record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and the appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and RAWLS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
*After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.

34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and

judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of

orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the

terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

JUN 16 2004

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

JASON PRESLEY, also known as

Ernie Young; CARYN CADMAN; R.

BEN ANDERSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ELVIS A. PRESLEY; JANET

MOFFIT, JO ANNE B. BARNHART;

SCOTT JOHANSEN, (DCFS),

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04-4014

(D.C. No. 2:03-CV-64-PGC)

(Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

Jason Presley, a.k.a., Ernie Young appeals the district court’s dismissal of

his civil suit. The ultimate relief sought by Mr. Presley is difficult to discern. 
-2-

Having reviewed Mr. Presley’s appellate brief and the record of his extensive

proceedings in the district court, we find no meritorious claims and affirm.

Like the district court, we read the materials submitted by Mr. Presley to

constitute a request that the federal courts order investigation and prosecution of

various people for various crimes. Aplt. Br. at 3-8. And like the district court,

we hold that such an order would improperly intrude upon the separation of

powers. “Broad [prosecutorial] discretion rests largely on the recognition that the

decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.” Wayte v.

United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).

Mr. Presley’s remaining allegations fail to state any cognizable federal

claim that we can determine. While we will liberally construe the pleadings of a

pro se claimant, this liberality cannot transform “vague and conclusory

arguments” into valid claims for relief. Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452,

455 (10th Cir. 1994).

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Stephanie K. Seymour

Circuit Judge
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<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                           2,939
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   69,083
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (59,083)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                12,939
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 167,939
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,129,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       579,197
<OTHER-SE>                                 (4,540,258)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   167,939
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            13,360,921
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             1,165,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              16,743
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (14,542,664)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (14,542,664)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (14,542,664)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.37)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.37)


</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

MARK V. TRANQUILLI,

Petitioner

v.

JUDICIAL CONDUCT BOARD OF 

PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 83 EM 2020

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 13th day of November, 2020, The “Petition for Expedited 

Allowance of Subpoena Pursuant to Pa.R.J.A. 1701” is DENIED. 

To the extent the petition seeks permission to subpoena the Honorable Edward J. 

Borkowski to appear as a fact witness at Petitioner’s trial before the Court of Judicial 

Discipline, it is noted that Rule of Judicial Administration 1701 does not require an 

individual to seek this Court’s permission to subpoena a judge to appear as a fact witness. 

See Pa.R.J.A. 1701(B) (“No subpoena to compel a judge or magisterial district judge to 

testify as a character witness shall be issued or enforced unless the issuance of the 

subpoena shall have been specially allowed by the Supreme Court pursuant to this rule.”).
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#### Randy L. FLEENOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-585.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 7, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
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#### Mrs. Theresa Oglesby, wife of/and Carlos OGLESBY v. DONALD M. CLEMENTS CONTRACTOR, INC., et al.

No. 9759.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

July 31, 1978.

*1199James S. Quinlivan, Jr., Jefferson, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Adams & Reese, Harold A. Thomas, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.

Before SAMUEL, SCHOTT and GARRISON, JJ.

ON MOTION TO DISMISS

SAMUEL, Judge.

This matter is before us solely on a motion filed by the two appellees to dismiss a suspensive appeal taken by Donald M. Clements Contractor, Inc., one of two appellants. The motion is based on the contention that the appeal bond does not purport to be a bond for Clements and the surety, Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, guarantees payment by Bituminous Casualty Corporation, apparently (due to the fact that the record has not been lodged in this court and the matter is before us only on the briefs filed) the liability insurer of Clements, who is the other appellant but who was not a named party defendant and was not cast in the judgment appealed from.

In pertinent part Code of Civil Procedure Article 2088(5) provides that following the granting of the order of appeal and the timely filing of the appeal bond the trial court still retains jurisdiction to:

> “Test the solvency of the surety on the appeal bond as of the date of its filing or subsequently, consider objections to the form, substance, and sufficiency of the appeal bond, and permit the curing thereof, as provided in Articles 5123, 5124, and 5126;” LSA-C.C.P.Art. 2088(5).

Movers rely on the case of *Guilliot*v. *City of Kenner,*La., 326 So.2d 359, which holds that, despite the above quoted provision of Article 2088, the Court of Appeal does have jurisdiction in a case where the defects of the alleged bond are so glaring and so numerous that it forms no bond at all and thus prevents acquisition of jurisdiction by the appellate court because no bond has been filed timely.

A copy of the suspensive appeal bond filed in this case is attached to movers’ brief. We have read that bond carefully and we find, quite clearly, that the alleged defects are not so glaring or numerous that it forms no bond at all. In fact, from our reading of the bond’s provisions, particularly the provision complained of, quite the contrary appears to be true.

Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction to consider the objections to the bond; the trial court alone has that jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure Articles 2088(5), 5123, 5124 and 5126.

For the reasons assigned, the motion to dismiss is denied.

*MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.*
Exhibit
10.13





Amendment
No. 4 To Employment Agreement





Amendment No. 4, dated as of November
10, 2009, by and between The Berkshire Bank, a New York banking corporation
("Employer"), and Moses Krausz ("Employee"), to the Agreement, dated as of May
1, 1999, between Employer and Employee
(the "Employment Agreement").





WITNESSETH:





WHEREAS, Employer and Employee entered
into the Employment Agreement; and





WHEREAS, Employer and Employee wish the
amend the terms of the Employment Agreement with respect to the term
thereof.





NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the
covenants herein contained, the parties hereto hereby agree as
follows:





1.           Paragraph
3 of the Employment Agreement shall be amended to read in its entirety as
follows:





"3.
            Term
      of Employment.  The employment by Employer of Employee pursuant
      hereto shall commence as of the date hereof and, subject to the provisions
      of paragraph 4 hereof, shall terminate on April 30, 2012; provided,
      however, that Employee's employment hereunder shall be automatically
      renewed for up to three additional periods of one year each unless
      Employee or Employer notifies the other, not less than 60 days nor more
      than 90 days prior to the expiration of Employee's then current employment
      period, that he or it elects not to extend Employee's employment hereunder
      beyond the expiration date of the then current employment
      period."





2. The increases in Employee's base
salary set forth in Section 2.1 of the Employment Agreement shall be applicable
for the periods of employment May 1, 2010 to April 30, 2011 and May 1, 2011 to
April 30, 2012, respectively, and, if the Employee's employment is extended
beyond April 30, 2012 as set forth in the amended Paragraph 3, for each year
thereafter.





3. Except as otherwise amended hereby,
the Employment Agreement shall continue in full force and effect unamended from
and after the date hereof.





IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment No.
4 has been executed and delivered by the parties hereto as of the date first
above written.





THE
      BERKSHIRE BANKBy:
              /s/ Moses MarxMoses
      MarxChairman
      of the Board/s/ Moses KrauszMOSES
      KRAUSZ
##### 



EXHIBIT 8 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 Barrick Gold Corporation (the Company) is filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof, its annual report on Form 40-F for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 (the Report). I, Jamie C. Sokalsky, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as enacted pursuant
to section 906 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge:  a)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; andb)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company. Date: May 19, 2004
    /s/ Jamie C. SokalskyName:
    Jamie C. SokalskyTitle:
    Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Jeff GOYNES.

No. 53244.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 1, 1973.

In re: Jeff Goynes applying for writs of certiorari, review, prohibition and mandamus.

Writs refused. The showing made does not warrant the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.

BARHAM, J.,

dissents from the refusal of the writ application. Relator was previously convicted and sentenced to jail for operating a motor vehicle while under influence of alcoholic beverages, without counsel or waiver of counsel. He has now been convicted and sentenced as a *second offender*and the first conviction has enhanced his sentence. Under the holding of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) no person may be sentenced to imprisonment unless represented by counsel or he waives counsel. This *sentence*— 2nd *offense enhancement*is based in part on a conviction and sentence without counsel. It is immaterial whether Argersinger is retroactive in this case since the *sentence to imprisonment*is based in part on a *non counsel conviction and sentence.*

CALOGERO, J., dissents.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                                         <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                         1,558
<SECURITIES>                                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  1,504
<ALLOWANCES>                                       0
<INVENTORY>                                    6,583
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               9,880
<PP&E>                                         1,198
<DEPRECIATION>                                     0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                11,807
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          2,433
<BONDS>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                        0
<COMMON>                                          12
<OTHER-SE>                                     4,750
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  11,807
<SALES>                                        7,076
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               7,076
<CGS>                                          4,828
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  5,388
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               1,458
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,458
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (4,632)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (4,632)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (4,632)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (0.39)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.39)


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1470 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1470

 To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act with respect to the 
 guidelines for specification of certain disposal sites for dredged or 
                             fill material.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             August 1, 2013

 Mr. Kaine (for himself and Mr. Warner) introduced the following bill; 
 which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and 
                              Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act with respect to the 
 guidelines for specification of certain disposal sites for dredged or 
                             fill material.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Commonsense Permitting for Job 
Creation Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. GUIDELINES FOR SPECIFICATION OF CERTAIN DISPOSAL SITES.

    Section 404(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 
U.S.C. 1344(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``The 
guidelines described in this subsection shall not prohibit the 
specification of a site due to the lack of a final site plan resulting 
from the lack of an identified end-user or industry or industrial 
classification for the site in determining whether there exists a 
practicable alternative to a proposed discharge that would result in 
less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem.''.
                                 <all>
```
262 La. 1087

#### Vardamon CASTON v. WOMAN’S HOSPITAL FOUNDATION.

No. 52615.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 19, 1972.

In re: The Woman’s Hospital Foundation applying for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 262 So.2d 62.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the court of appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.
#### In the Interest of BRIDGES, Pamela Helene Bridges, Kimberly Rosmond, Dependent Children.

No. 69-832.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Jan. 12, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 30, 2022

No. 04-22-00542-CR

Kerwin Bernard BRYANT,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CR12429

Honorable Raymond Angelini, Judge Presiding

ORDER

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK 

OF JURISDICTION. 

It is so ORDERED on November 30, 2022.

_____________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 30th day of November, 2022.

_____________________________

Michael A. Cruz, Clerk of Court