alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NUMBER 13-23-00448-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF MANUEL PEÑA AND 

ROXANNE ALVARADO PEÑA AND IN THE INTEREST OF M.P.J., 

A.E.P., AND M.R.P.

 

On appeal from the 444th District Court

of Cameron County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Longoria, Silva, and Peña

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

On October 17, 2023, appellant Manuel Peña filed a pro se notice of appeal from 

a final decree of divorce and order for conservatorship. On October 23, 2023, the Clerk 

of this Court requested appellant to pay the $205.00 filing fee for the notice of appeal 

within ten days. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5 (“A party who is not excused by statute or these 

rules from paying costs must pay—at the time an item is presented for filing—whatever 

fees are required by statute or Supreme Court order. The appellate court may enforce 
2

this rule by any order that is just.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 51.207 (delineating the 

required fees and costs in an appellate court). The Clerk also advised appellant that the 

notice of appeal failed to comply with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.5(e), 

25.1(d)(2), and 25.1(d)(4), and requested correction of these defects. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

9.5(e), 25.1(d)(2), 25.1(d)(4); see also id. R. 37.1.

On November 15, 2023, the Clerk notified appellant that he was delinquent in 

submitting the filing fee for the notice of appeal and informed him that the appeal would 

be dismissed if the filing fee was not paid. See id. R. 42.3(b), (c). On December 14, 2023, 

the Clerk again advised appellant that the notice of appeal was defective, requested 

correction of the defects, and advised appellant that the appeal would be dismissed if the 

defects were not corrected. See id.

To date, appellant has neither paid the filing fee for the notice of appeal nor filed a 

corrected notice of appeal. This Court has the authority to dismiss an appeal because the 

appellant has failed to comply with a requirement of the appellate rules, a court order, or 

a notice from the clerk requiring a response or other action within a specified time. See 

id. R. 42.3(b), (c); Smith v. DC Civil Constr., LLC, 521 S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2017, no pet.). Here, appellant has not paid the appellate filing fee and has not 

filed a corrected notice of appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 42.3(b), (c).

NORA L. LONGORIA

Justice

Delivered and filed on the

29th day of February, 2024.
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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-6598

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

KENNETH AVERY WATSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,

District Judge. (CR-98-66, CA-00-184-5-1-V)

Submitted: June 12, 2003 Decided: June 20, 2003

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kenneth Avery Watson, Appellant Pro Se. Gretchen C.F. Shappert,

Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Kenneth Avery Watson seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2255

proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate

of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).

A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable

jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and

that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are

also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct.

1029, 1040 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);

Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S.

941 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude

that Watson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
#### Elsie CHRZANOWSKI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 4067 A.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Jan. 29, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Mar. 7, 1973.

Armentor and Wattigny, by Gerard B. Wattigny, Milton LeBlanc, Jr., and Henry A. Bernard, Jr., New Iberia, Broussard, Broussard & Moresi, by Paul G. Moresi, Jr., Thompson & Sellers, by Roger C. Sellers, Abbeville, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Davidson, Meaux, Onebane and Donohoe by John G. Torian, II, Lafayette, Scofield, Bcrgstedt and Gerard by Thomas M. Berg-stedt, Lake Charles, for defendants-appel-lces.

Before FRUGÉ, HOOD and DOMEN-GEAUX, JJ.

DOMENGEAUX, Judge.

For the reasons assigned in the case of Trahan, et al. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company et al., La.App., 273 So.2d 331, the judgment of the district court is affirmed at the costs of plaintiffs-appellants.

Affirmed.
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#### Robert CAIVANO, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 43843.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 7, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 24, 1973.

Certiorari denied. 276 So.2d 245.

CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.

ERVIN and McCAIN, JJ., dissent.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 22, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-51099

Conference Calendar

 

LLOYD GEORGE BOWERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BENNY BOYKIN; KENNETH HULLUM; CEDRIC CADDELL,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. W-02-CV-214

--------------------

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Lloyd George Bowers, Texas prisoner # 1019169, seeks to

appeal in forma pauperis (IFP) the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

He argues that the letter he wrote to internal affairs regarding

his assault was tantamount to filing Step 1 and Step 2 grievances

for exhaustion purposes. The merits of Bowers’s appeal are

“inextricably intertwined with the certification decision,” and,

therefore, we also entertain the issue whether the appeal should
No. 02-51099

-2-

2 Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 180 (5th Cir. 1985).

be dismissed. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir.

1997). 

Bowers conceded that he did not file either a Step 1 or Step

2 grievance. See Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir.

1998). If it is assumed arguendo that Bowers could also exhaust

his administrative remedies by opening a case with the internal

affairs division, the Spears2 testimony nevertheless confirmed

that the investigation was incomplete and that his grievance was

thus unresolved at the administrative level. The magistrate

judge therefore did not err in determining that he had failed to

exhaust administrative remedies and in dismissing his civil

rights complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Richardson v.

Spurlock, 260 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Bowers’s allegations of retaliation are raised for the first

time on appeal and are therefore not considered. See Leverette

v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999).

Bowers has not established that an appeal would not involve

nonfrivolous issues. We therefore deny his motions for IFP

status and for appointment of counsel and dismiss the appeal as

frivolous in the interest of judicial efficiency. See 5TH CIR. R.

42.2; Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). 

Bowers is cautioned that the dismissal of this appeal as

frivolous counts as a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 385-87 (5th
No. 02-51099

-3-

Cir. 1996). Bowers is further cautioned that if he accumulates

three “strikes” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he may not

proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is

incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g). 

IFP MOTION DENIED; MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL DENIED;

THREE-STRIKES WARNING ISSUED; APPEAL DISMISSED.
#### Cornell STATEN, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 41573.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 22, 1971.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Alan S. Becker, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner in the above cause has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ; it is ordered that said Petition be and the same is hereby denied. See Jones v. Wainwright, 252 So.2d 570, Supreme Court Opinion filed September 8, 1971.

ROBERTS, C. J., and CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
'J'lul .....;,. of nay ~D wllo• ...,..J 

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* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determin ed that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 95-40739 Summary Calendar

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SUSAN ANN LINDSEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

(6:90-CR-71-2)

_________________________________________________________________
March 21, 1996 Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Susan Ann Lindsey, pro se , appeals the denial of her motion

for a reduction of sentence. We AFFIRM

.

I.

After pleading guilty to possession of a listed chemical with

intent to manufacture a controlled substance, and possession of a

firearm during a drug-trafficking crime, Lindsey was sentenced in

May 1991 to ten years imprisonment for possession, and a

con secutive five-year term for the firearm offense. Her offense- 2 -

level for the possession offense was calcul ated pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, based on the amount of methamphetamine that could

have been manufactured with the precursor chemicals.

In 1995, Lindsey moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a

sentence reduction pursuant to § 2D1.11, which became effective in

November 1991, and established a base offense level for possession

of precursor chemicals. The district court denied the motion,

accepting the magistrate judge's finding (objected to by Lindsey)

that, because Lindsey's offense involved the attempt to manufacture

methamphetamine, retroactive application of § 2D1.11 would not

change the sentence, because § 2D1.11(c) provides that, if the

offense involved, inter alia , attempting to manufacture a

controlled substance, § 2D1.1 (the provis ion under which Lindsey

was sentenced) is applicable.

II.

A refusal to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed

only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Shaw , 30 F.3d 26,

28-29 (5th Cir. 1994). Based upon our review of the record, the

finding that Lindsey's offense involved the attempt to manufacture

methamphetamine was not clearly erron eous. S ee United States v.

Mimms

, 43 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, because the

sentence under § 2D1.11(c) would be the same as that imposed, the

district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reduce

it.- 3 - III.

For the foregoing reasons, the denial of Lindsey's motion to

reduce sentence is

AFFIRMED

.
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 148 (Wednesday, August 1, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37569-37570]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-16425]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-83721; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2018-038]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; 
Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rule Change To Amend Rule 4702(b)(14) 
To Establish a Price Improvement Only Variation on the Midpoint 
Extended Life Order

July 26, 2018.
    On May 4, 2018, The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (``Nasdaq'' or 
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``Commission''), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ a 
proposed rule change to establish a price improvement only variation on 
the Midpoint Extended Life Order. The proposed rule change was 
published for comment in the Federal Register on May 23, 2018.\3\ On 
July 5, 2018, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act,\4\ the 
Commission designated a longer period within which to approve the 
proposed rule change, disapprove the proposed rule change, or institute 
proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove the proposed 
rule change.\5\ The Commission received one comment letter on the 
proposed rule change \6\ and one response letter from the Exchange.\7\ 
On July 23, 2018, the Exchange withdrew

[[Page 37570]]

the proposed rule change (SR-NASDAQ-2018-038).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 83272 (May 17, 
2018), 83 FR 23978.
    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
    \5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 83595, 83 FR 32158 
(July 11, 2018). The Commission designated August 21, 2018 as the 
date by which the Commission shall approve or disapprove, or 
institute proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove, 
the proposed rule change.
    \6\ See Letter to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Commission, from 
Sal Arnuk and Joe Saluzzi, Partners, Co-Founders, and Co-Heads of 
Equity Trading, Themis Trading LLC, dated June 12, 2018.
    \7\ See Letter to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Commission, from 
Brett M. Kitt, Senior Associate General Counsel, Nasdaq, dated July 
10, 2018.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\8\
Robert W. Errett,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-16425 Filed 7-31-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
| | 
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|Exhibit 31.2                                                                                
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                                            
|Certification of Chief Financial Officer under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
|                                                                                            
|CERTIFICATIONS                                                                              
|I, Lawrence A. Heilbronner, certify that:                                                   
|                                                                                            
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|February 8, 2006 |  | /s/ Lawrence A. Heilbronner                     
|---------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------
|Date             |  | Lawrence A. Heilbronner, Principal Financial and
|                 |  | Accounting Officer
#### Deniene SNOW, etc., et al., Appellants, v. SHELBY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., and Companía Dominicana de Aviacion, etc., et al., Appellees.

No. 71-258.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 23, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 31, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Howard P. BERRIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-873.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 17, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.