Filed 1/9/14 In re Rafael S. CA5 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re RAFAEL S., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law. 

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

RAFAEL S., 

Defendant and Appellant. 

F067280 

(Super. Ct. No. JJD065389) 

OPINION

THE COURT

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Juliet L. 

Boccone, Judge. 

 Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and 

Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

-ooOoo- 

 

 Before Gomes, Acting P.J., Poochigian, J., and Franson, J. 
2 

 At a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true allegations that 

appellant, Rafael S., a minor, committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 

212.5, subd. (c)), and that in doing so he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, 

viz., a knife (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). At the subsequent disposition hearing, 

the juvenile court continued appellant as a ward of the court and ordered him committed 

to the Tulare County Correctional Center Unit for a period of 240 to 365 days. 

 On appeal, appellant’s sole contention is that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the instant adjudication. We affirm. 

FACTS 

Jurisdiction Hearing Testimony 

 Richard Z. (Richard), age 15, testified that on January 18, 2013, he was walking 

home from school when two males approached him.1 One of them, who Richard 

identified at the jurisdiction hearing as appellant, pressed a pocket knife against Richard’s 

stomach and demanded that Richard give him “everything [he] had.” Richard “g[a]ve 

him [his] property.” 

 Richard did not know appellant and the other person, but he had seen them before. 

“[T]hey were bugging [Richard] for the last two months, asking [him] if [he] banged a 

certain color.” 

 On January 22, 2013, Richard was called to the principal’s office at his school “to 

look at pictures and give a statement about what happened.” He was shown photographs, 

but he determined the person who robbed him was not among those whose photographs 

he was shown. “A couple of hours later,” Richard went back to the principal’s office, 

looked at more photographs, and saw a photograph of the person who robbed him. At 

 

1 Except as otherwise indicated, all information in this section is taken from 

Richard’s testimony. 
3 

that point, Richard asked the police officer on campus, Officer Jones, if he (Richard) 

could “have some time” so he could “see that person one more time to be certain.” 

Richard “wanted more time to see a face, to see his face in public and be sure of it.” 

Richard was “able to do that,” and he “told [the officer] it was him.” 

 On cross-examination, Richard reiterated he was approached by two people but he 

admitted he “remember[ed] telling [someone] else that there may have been more people 

there[.]” Richard has “a disease” called “Bipolar” that “makes [him] hallucinate and hear 

things that other people cannot hear or see.” He testified, “I think that was the cause” of 

his previously stating there were more than two people at the scene. On redirect 

examination, Richard was asked if his in-court identification of appellant as the person 

who robbed him was “real” or “something [his] mind made up,” Richard answered, “No 

that was real.” 

 Richard provided a description of the robber and the other person who approached 

him to an investigating police officer. The robber was “bald” and was wearing a white 

shirt, black shorts and black shoes. The robber’s companion “was also wearing black” 

and “his hair was almost a high-end, tight with a flat top.” 

 Visalia Police Officer Matt Jones testified to the following: He was on duty on 

January 22, 2013, as a youth services officer at Golden West High School when a student 

advised him he had been robbed at knife-point. The student stated he had viewed some 

photographs but was unable to “recognize anyone.” Later that day, the student told the 

officer he had previously seen the person who robbed him on campus, but he “wasn’t 

totally sure” and “wanted to see them again.” Officer Jones conducted a search of 

appellant’s house, but did not find any of the property taken from Richard. 

 Frank D. (Frank) testified to the following: He attends Charter Alternative 

Academy. On January 18, 2013, Frank had a knife with him “at school,” appellant was 

also “at school,” and Frank gave the knife to appellant. When asked how he gave the 
4 

knife to appellant, Frank replied that “at lunch,” while there were “a lot of other people 

there,” he “put the knife on the lunch table.” He did not see “what happened to the knife” 

after he put it on the table. At his school, Frank is required to stay on campus “during 

lunch.” 

Additional Background 

 At a hearing prior to the jurisdiction hearing, appellant’s counsel told the court the 

following: According to the police report, the two persons who accosted Richard ran off, 

but appellant “has a breathing problem,” as a result of which “[h]e can’t run.” In 

addition, at the time of the instant offense, appellant was on the electronic monitoring 

program and although the monitor was not working, appellant was not aware of that. 

DISCUSSION 

 There is no dispute the evidence was sufficient to establish someone robbed 

Richard. Appellant’s claim on appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to establish he

was the robber. 

Legal Background

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding in a juvenile 

court proceeding, the reviewing court is bound by the same principles as to the 

sufficiency and substantiality of the evidence which govern the review of criminal 

convictions generally. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.) Those principles 

include the following: “[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction,” we determine “‘whether from the evidence, including all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of 

each element of the offense charged.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 

Cal.4th 83, 139, fn. 13.) Substantial evidence is that evidence which is “reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “‘[W]hile 

substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be “a product of 
5 

logic and reason” and “must rest on the evidence” [citation]; inferences that are the result 

of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding [citations].’” (In re Savannah 

M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393-1394, italics omitted.) “Evidence which merely 

raises a strong suspicion of the defendant’s guilt is not sufficient to support a conviction.” 

(People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) 

An appellate court must “presume[] in support of the judgment the existence of 

every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 

23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “[A] reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor 

evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the 

testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the 

testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single 

witness is sufficient to support a conviction.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 

1181.) These principles are applicable regardless of whether the prosecution relies 

primarily on direct or on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 

1107, 1125.) 

Analysis 

 Appellant bases his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

adjudication chiefly on People v. Carvalho (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 482 (Carvalho). In 

that case, the appellate court reversed the defendant’s conviction of kidnapping his 

estranged wife while armed. (Id. at p. 493.) Although the alleged victim testified she 

was in fear of the defendant, the court noted that “[n]either during the time the 

complainant was with appellant nor in the month thereafter did her actions and conduct 

reflect any fear of him.” (Id. at p. 490.) The complainant had numerous opportunities to 

leave, but chose not to. And she testified that while she was with the defendant at his 

rooming house, purportedly against her will, they “commenced ‘making love,’ which was 

consummated by an act of sexual intercourse between them. [Then,] he went down the 
6 

hall to the bathroom while the prosecutrix remained in the bedroom where the weapon 

was allegedly reposing on the dresser or in a drawer, and she waited for him to return. 

Appellant then shaved, removed his clothing and proceeded to take a bath. With all this 

opportunity to leave she proceeded into the bathroom and washed his back, neck and 

arms for him.” (Ibid.) Later, the couple went to a café, and “[w]hile enroute to dinner 

she stopped her automobile, alighted therefrom, went into a public telephone booth and 

called her son. She did not advise her son of her claimed predicament, nor did she 

telephone the police. [¶] When appellant finally left her, saying he would take a streetcar 

to his home, she made no complaint to the police.” (Ibid.) The Carvalho court held that 

“the verdict rendered” was not “‘reasonably’ justified by the facts and circumstances 

disclosed by the evidence” because the complainant’s testimony was “putting it mildly,” 

“fantastic.” (Id. at p. 489.) “[T]he circumstances testified to by the complainant are 

more than unusual. They do violence to reason, challenge credulity, and in the light of 

human experience, emasculate every known propensity and passion of people under the 

conditions testified to by the prosecutrix.” (Ibid.) 

It appears that appellant likens the instant case to Carvalho in four respects. First, 

he asserts that Frank could not have even been at Golden West High School at lunch on 

the day of the robbery because he was not allowed to leave his own school at lunch time, 

and therefore Frank’s testimony that he made a knife available to appellant provides no 

support for the prosecution case. We disagree. The proposition that a high school 

student could and would sneak off campus hardly presents a “challenge to credulity” 

(Carvalho, supra, 112 Cal.App.2d at p. 489) on the order of that presented by the 

testimony of the complainant in Carvalho. 

Second, appellant argues it is similarly “unbelievable” that he, believing his 

movements were being electronically monitored, would have committed a crime. There 

was however, no evidence adduced at the hearing regarding appellant’s participation in, 
7 

or beliefs about, the electronic monitoring program, and our review of the instant 

adjudication is limited to evidence before the court at the jurisdiction hearing. Therefore 

this point cannot be considered on appeal. (Cf. In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 

1022 [in juvenile dependency proceedings “‘Proof ... must be adduced to support a 

finding that the minor is a person described by Section 300’ at the jurisdiction hearing” 

(italics added)]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1644, fn. 5 [review of 

denial of Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression motion is limited to evidence before the 

court at the suppression motion hearing].) But even assuming for the sake of argument 

that we may view the record as containing evidence that appellant thought he was being 

electronically monitored, Carvalho is nonetheless distinguishable. Unfortunately, 

spectacularly bad judgment does not run counter to human nature, as did the claimed 

conduct of the complaining witness in Carvalho. 

Third, appellant suggests it is impossible that he committed the instant offense 

because it is undisputed the robber “took off” after the robbery, and appellant suffers 

from breathing problems that render him unable to run and therefore, Richard’s 

testimony, like the testimony of the complaining witness in Carvalho, cannot constitute 

substantial evidence. However, there was no evidence adduced at the hearing regarding 

appellant’s physical limitations and/or his ability to run and therefore, as with the 

contention discussed above, this point also may not be considered on appeal. And in any 

event, assuming for the sake of argument that appellant did present evidence on this 

point, appellant’s argument is based on a false premise, viz., that the person who robbed 

him ran away. As indicated above, Richard did not testify that appellant ran away, only 

that he “took off,” i.e., left the scene. 

Fourth, appellant argues the instant case “bears [a] resemblance[]” to Carvalho

because, he asserts, the following factors render Richard’s identification of appellant as 

the robber “weak and unreliable”: (1) Richard suffers from a mental disorder that causes 
8 

him to hallucinate, and (2) even after seeing a photograph of appellant in the principal’s 

office a few days after the robbery, he “was a little unsure of his assailant’s identity and 

wanted to see appellant in person before making the identification.” 

These factors, however, do no more than militate in favor of a conclusion contrary 

to that reached by the juvenile court. They do not compel a contrary finding. 

Notwithstanding that Richard had, on occasions, experienced hallucinations and that he 

needed additional time to be sure of his identification of appellant from a photograph, it 

cannot be said that it was physically impossible or inherently improbable that, as Richard 

testified, appellant robbed him. Appellant’s argument, in essence, asks us to reweigh the 

evidence, and this we cannot, and will not do. As indicated above, we resolve conflicts in 

the evidence, and the inferences drawn from the evidence, in favor of the judgment, and 

the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish guilt unless such testimony is 

physically impossible or inherently improbable. Richard’s identification of appellant was 

neither. 

Finally, appellant argues that the following factors support his position: 

(1) Although Richard provided a description of the robber and the robber’s companion, 

the prosecution did not offer evidence of what appellant was wearing on the day of the 

robbery or the color of his hair, and (2) no knife was found in appellant’s possession or in 

his residence. But these factors too, at most, support an inference contrary to the 

conclusion reached by the juvenile court and, under the principles of judicial review 

summarized above, we resolve such conflicts in favor of the judgment. On this record 

substantial evidence supports the instant adjudication. Therefore, appellant’s challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that adjudication fails. 

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed.