alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Tomie Lee MURRAY, Appellant, v. LEATHERBY INSURANCE COMPANY, an insurance company authorized to do business in the State of Florida, et al., Appellees.

No. 73-331.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 11, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1974.

Joseph Rosenkrantz and Harvey D. Friedman, Miami Beach, for appellant.

Preddy, Haddad, Kutner & Hardy, and John A. Thompson, Jr., Miami, for appel-lees.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-appellant appeals the trial court’s order awarding his insurer 100% reimbursement of the personal injury protection benefits it has paid under the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act in the sum of $1,548.15, and not allowing equitable distribution.

On February 12, 1972 the appellant, Tomie Lee Murray, received certain inju*345ries as a result of a collision of the vehicle he was driving with the vehicles operated and/or owned by the defendants. At the time, plaintiff-appellant was insured under a policy issued by the appellee, Leatherby Insurance Company. Under the personal injury protection benefits provision of this policy, without regard to fault, Tomie Murray received $1,548.15 from his insurer.

Thereafter, Tomie Murray as plaintiff filed suit against the defendants Isaac James and his wife Sara, Richard Newton and Charles Newton and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, the insurer of Mr. and Mrs. James, seeking damages in excess of $2,500. Subsequently, plaintiff and the defendants agreed upon a settlement in the amount of $3,800. The plaintiff then moved the court to determine the amount to be received by his insurer, Leatherby Insurance Company, out of the proceeds of the settlement as equitable distribution. The trial court entered its order holding that appellee-insurer should re-' cover 100% reimbursement from the proceeds of the settlement rather than reimbursement on an equitable basis.

On appeal, plaintiff-appellant contends that the trial court erred in awarding Leatherby 100% reimbursement where the equitable distribution referred to in Fla. Stat. § 627.736(3) (b), F.S.A. should be applied. We concur.

We find the case of State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hauser, Fla.App. 1973, 281 So.2d 563, which is factually similar to the case at bar (i. e. a settlement after suit was filed) to be controlling. In *Hauser,*the court determined that where there was a suit to recover as in the case sub judice, the trial courf is correct in proceeding under paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of § 627.736 rather than by granting full reimbursement under paragraph (a) thereof.

Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for a reconsideration and determination of the amount of reimbursement to be awarded to appellee-insurer on the basis of equitable distribution pursuant to F.S. § 627.736(3) (b).

It is so ordered.
#### Walker & Batson vs. Swigart.

Where no motion for a new trial has been made, and no question of law reserved at the trial, there is nothing before this court for adjudication.

The rule established in *Slate Bank vs. Conway,*13 *Ark. 344*— which *is simple, and easily understood and followed*— applies as well to cases submitted to the court as to a jury; and to oases where there is an agreed statement of facts, as where the facts are proved by witnesses.

*Appeal from Crawford Circuit Court.*

Hon. Jonas M. Tebbetts, Special Judge.

Walker for appellants.

Fowler & Stillwell, contra.

Mr. Justice Fairchild

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this action of Unlawful Detainer, brought by Batson & Walker against the appellee, the case was submitted to the court sitting as a jury, who, upon the evidence, which was an agreed statement of facts, found that the property sued for should be restored to the appellee, and that he had sustained six hundred dollars damages from being deprived of the use of the property, while the suit was pending. Judgment was entered according to the finding, and the plaintiffs appealed— They filed their bill of exceptions, but it, nor the record, makes mention of any legal proposition being submitted to the court for its opinion and application to the case, nor of any motion for new trial, for the finding of the court being against, or without evidence. There is- then, as has been ruled by this court an indefinite number of times, no case presented for review here, and the judgment is affirmed under the *State Bank vs. Conway*rule.
#### BANKS REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. 1401 FLAGLER CORPORATION et al., Appellees.

No. 73-305.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 22, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
7—224,

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#### Consumers Fuel Company *vs.*William Parmenter

Waldo.

Opinion, June 22, 1955.

*Lorimer K. Eaton,*for plaintiff.

*Christopher S. Roberts,*for defendant.

Sitting: Fellows, C. J., Williamson, Webber, Beliveau, Tapley, JJ.

Beliveau, J.

On exception. This case was heard by the presiding justice at the April Term 1954, Waldo County, by agreement of the parties, without the assistance of a jury. The right of exception was reserved by both parties as to questions of law. Verdict was for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted to the decision of the presiding justice.

There is no question about the items in the account annexed to the plaintiff’s writ or the amounts charged therefor. The controversy is whether or not these items were a charge against William Parmenter or Parmenter Poultry Co., Inc.

*84The plaintiff offered evidence to substantiate that it was a proper charge against William Parmenter, who, prior to the incorporation of the' Parmenter Poultry Co., Inc., conducted his business as an individual under the name of Parmenter Poultry Co.

This was the sole and only issue for the justice to determine on the evidence submitted to him, and he found for the plaintiff in an amount less than that declared on. The issue raised nothing more than a question of fact.

In his decision the justice accepted the plaintiff’s version. The exception does not pretend, as we read the record, to raise any question of law but is based on the contention that the evidence was not properly interpreted by the court because there is not in the case enough evidence to warrant or justify a verdict for the plaintiff. This court may not interfere when the issue is one of fact. The finding of the justice is final.

> “When a trial by jury is waived and the parties submit their cause to a single Justice, ‘this court has nothing to do with the facts as found. Its only duty is to determine whether the law has been rightly applied to those facts as found by the judicial referee.’

> *Kneeland*v. *Webb,*68 Me., 540. *Reed*v. *Reed,*70 Me., 504, 507.”

To the same effect

*Haskell*v. *Hervey,*74 Me. 192, 195; *Frank*v. *Mallett,*92 Me. 77, 79, 42 A. 238, 239; *State*v. *Intox. Liquors,*102 Me. 385, on Page 390, 67 A. 312, 314.

*Exception Overruled.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR NOONEY INCOME FUND LTD. II, L.P.
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
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<NAME>               NOONEY INCOME FUND LTD. II, L.P.

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#### B C B, INC., a Nevada corporation, Appellant, v. Margaret HAZELETT, Appellee.

No. 72-460.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 26, 1972.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Brevard County; Clarence T. Johnson, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie Ray JACKSON a/k/a Eddie Roy Jackson.

No. 61388.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 17, 1978.

In re: Eddie Ray Jackson a/k/a Eddie Roy Jackson applying for writs of certiora-ri, prohibition, mandamus. Parish of DeSo-to.

Granted.

The petition of the relator in the above entitled and numbered case having been duly considered,

It is ordered that a writ of certiorari issue herein, directing the Honorable John *1381S. Pickett, Judge of the 11th Judicial District, Court for the Parish of DeSoto, to transmit to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, on or before the 3rd day of March, 1978, the record in duplicate, or a certified copy of the record in duplicate, of the proceedings complained of by the relator herein, to the end that the validity of said proceedings may be ascertained.

It is further ordered that the aforesaid Judge of said Court and the respondent through counsel shall show cause, in this Court, on a date to be fixed by this Court, why the relief prayed for in the petition of the relator — should not be granted.
#### Walter PEAVY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. EE-471.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 26, 1977.

Michael Minerva, Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A. S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

A conviction for auto theft. Although the trial court charged the jury that each material allegation of the information must be proved, and that those allegations included the defendant’s “intent to permanently deprive or defraud the true owner of the property of the use and benefit thereof,” the court did not repeat “permanently” when defining larceny. There was no objection. There was no fundamental error. *Humphries v. State,*320 So.2d 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert, den., 333 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1976).

AFFIRMED.'

BOYER, Acting C. J., and MILLS, J., concur.
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## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Randall Greenough, Appellant

No. 06

- 18

- 00021

- CR v.
The State of Texas, Appellee Appeal from the 402nd District Court of Wood County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 22,721

- 2015 ). Memorandum Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Morriss, Justice Moseley and Justice Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court

below

. We affirm the judgment of the trial court

. We note that the appellant, Randall Greenough, has adequately indicated his inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED JULY 13, 2018 BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
#### Robert G. RADABAUGH and Patricia Radabaugh, Appellants, v. Earl W. WARE and Glenda A. Ware, Appellees.

No. 70-474.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 11, 1970.

Roger H. Harper, Boca Raton, for appellants.

Martin J. A. Yeager, of Harvey & Wad-dell, Lake Worth, for appellees.

CROSS, Chief Judge.

Appellants-plaintiffs, Robert G. Rada-baugh and Patricia Radabaugh, appeal a final judgment entered in favor of the ap-pellees-defendants, Earl W. Ware and Glenda A. Ware, in an action for damages for breach of a contract to convey real property. We affirm.

Appellants entered into a written deposit receipt contract with appellees to purchase real property which was the homestead of appellees. The contract was executed by all parties, but it did not contain the signatures of any witnesses to the execution. Subsequently appellees declined to convey the property. Appellants instituted suit for damages arising from breach of contract. The trial court determined that' the alleged contract was invalid and would not support the action. Final judgment was entered for the appellees and this appeal followed.

Section 689.01, Florida Statutes 1967, F.S.A., provides in part:

> “No estate or interest of freehold * * * shall be created, made, granted, *739transferred or released in any other manner than by instrument in writing, signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses * * * ”

On its face the statute does not require that contracts to purchase be executed with the same formality as instruments of transfer. However, an action for specific performance will not lie unless the contract has been executed with the formalities required by F.S. Section 689.01, F.S.A. Petersen v. Brotman, Fla.App.1958, 100 So.2d 821. To hold otherwise would be to effect the transfer of property by a decree of specific performance although the contract forming the basis of the transfer would have small resemblance to the formality with which it was intended that conveyances of real property should be accomplished. Zimmerman v. Diedrich, Fla.1957, 97 So.2d 120.

In the case at bar, appellants concede that the contract is not specifically enforceable, but they contend that the contract is valid for all other purposes since it embodies an agreement between the parties supported by consideration.

A contract is a legal relationship creating obligations between two or more parties enforceable at law. Kislak v. Kreedian, Fla.1957, 95 So.2d 510.

Under the deposit receipt contract here under consideration, appellees were under no legal duty to convey the homestead property which was the subject of the contract. The authorities cited above make it amply clear that an obligation does not arise unless and until the contract has been executed with the formalities required by F.S. Section 689.01, F.S.A. Therefore, without an enforceable legal obligation on the part of appellees, a valid contract could not exist and no recoverable damages were sustained.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McCAIN and OWEN, JJ., concur.
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1339 

To reauthorize the Ohio & Erie Canal National Heritage Canalway. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 23, 2013 

Mr. BROWN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To reauthorize the Ohio & Erie Canal National Heritage 

Canalway. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REAUTHORIZATION OF OHIO & ERIE CANAL NA4 TIONAL HERITAGE CANALWAY. 

5 Section 809 of the Ohio & Erie Canal National Herit6 age Corridor Act of 1996 (16 U.S.C. 461 note; Public Law 

7 104–333; 122 Stat. 826; 127 Stat. 420) is amended by 

8 striking ‘‘2013’’ and inserting ‘‘2022’’. 

Æ 


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