IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-0112

Filed June 17, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOSEPH MICHAEL QUEZADA SIERRA,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Patrick H. Tott, 

Judge.

The defendant challenges the imposition of a five-year prison sentence 

following his violation of the terms of his probation. AFFIRMED

Rees Conrad Douglas, Sioux City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2020).
2

POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.

In 2016, Joseph Quezada Sierra pled guilty to one count of possession with 

intent to deliver a controlled substance (marijuana), which is a class “D” felony.

1

 

He was granted a deferred judgment and placed on probation for two years. The 

State filed an application for revocation of Quezada Sierra’s probation and, later,

a supplemental violation report. 

At the January 2019 revocation hearing, Quezada Sierra admitted the 

reported violations, including that he was recently charged with and pled guilty to 

felony drug possession with intent to deliver (marijuana) in Nebraska. He was 

scheduled to be sentenced in the Nebraska case in February 2019. The district 

court revoked Quezada Sierra’s probation, entered judgment against him, and 

sentenced him to a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years.

On appeal, Quezada Sierra maintains the court abused its discretion by 

considering an improper factor when deciding his sentence. Our review of the

imposed sentence is for errors at law. State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 

(Iowa 1996). When reviewing a district court’s sentencing decision, we will not 

reverse absent either an abuse of discretion or a defect in the sentencing 

procedure, such as the consideration of inappropriate matters. See State v. 

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). 

 

1

Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2020) generally prohibits appeals from guilty 

pleas other than those for class “A” felonies or where a defendant establishes good 

cause. However, because judgment was entered against Quezada Sierra before 

July 1, 2019, when the amended code section took effect, his appeal is not 

prohibited. See State v. Gordon, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2020 WL 2090108, at *4 

(Iowa 2020) (“[T]he amendments do not apply retroactively to appeals from 

judgments entered before July 1, 2019.” (emphasis added)).
3

In imposing sentencing, the district court stated:

[I]t’s clear that the incident in [Nebraska] for which [Quezada Sierra]

has pled guilty and is awaiting sentencing was a serious matter in 

light of the quantity of marijuana that was involved, which hasn’t been 

disputed was over 114 pounds of marijuana, which was the same 

controlled substance that was involved in this case in 2016. While 

the court certainly understands the fact that youth may have played 

some role in this situation, youth tend to be impulsive, tend to make 

bad decisions going forward, so the court does give some

consideration to [Quezada Sierra’s] youth in determining this matter; 

but the fact of the matter is that the court doesn’t believe at this time 

that there’s a reasonable likelihood that [he] could be successful on 

probation here in Iowa for a variety of reasons: Those are being the 

seriousness of the nature of these offenses and the ongoing 

trafficking activity of controlled substances that [Quezada Sierra] has 

continued to engage in over the course of the last two and a half 

years; but also the likelihood of incarceration coming in a little over a 

month in the state of Nebraska would make any placement on

probation here or at the residential treatment facility ineffectual 

because there would be no opportunity to complete such sentences, 

and the court does believe that it’s highly likely that [he] will receive 

a period of incarceration in Nebraska in light of the level of the 

offense and the quantity involved and the recent history here in Iowa, 

both in Woodbury and Plymouth Counties.

Quezada Sierra maintains it was improper for the court to consider his upcoming 

sentence in Nebraska in determining the appropriate sentence.2

It is not improper for the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s ability 

to comply with terms of probation in determining whether to grant probation. The 

central issue of State v. Avalos Valdez, 934 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Iowa 2019), was 

 

2 Quezada Sierra maintains this is improper because Iowa had primary jurisdiction 

over him. We find his claims of primary jurisdiction inapposite. See Merchant v. 

State, 374 N.W.2d 245, 246 (Iowa 1985) (“When a federal court and state court 

each have jurisdiction of a person, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows the 

tribunal which first obtained jurisdiction to hold it to the exclusion of the other until 

the first tribunal’s jurisdiction is exhausted. This doctrine is merely a means for 

resolving jurisdictional disputes between the sovereigns and does not create a 

personal right in the affected individual. Petitioner has no authority to invoke the 

doctrine in the present case. No dispute exists between the sovereigns, and the 

doctrine has no application.”). 
4

whether the court could consider a defendant’s immigration status in imposing 

sentence, which is not an issue here. But in deciding the sentencing court could 

consider immigration status, our supreme court reasoned it may be relevant to 

such proper considerations as the defendant’s ability to comply with terms of 

probation, including whether the defendant was expected to remain in the 

community or whether supervision was possible. See Avalos Valdez, 934 N.W.2d 

at 594–595 (approving the court’s consideration of whether the defendant would 

be deported in denying probation, reasoning, “[W]e think the court decided against 

probation for Avalos Valdez not because he was an unauthorized alien but 

because his immigration status meant he ‘[would not] be available’ to undergo 

probation, as the court ‘underst[ood] it,’ and because of the quantity of marijuana 

involved. We do not see any constitutional defect in that ruling. The record 

indicated that Avalos Valdez would be taken into ICE custody and then deported 

as soon as he was no longer incarcerated. It is difficult to see how probation could 

have been implemented effectively for Avalos Valdez upon his deportation. 

Probation requires that the person be ‘committed to the custody, care, and 

supervision’ of ‘the judicial district department of correctional services.’ How would 

that supervision occur once Avalos Valdez had been removed to Mexico? And 

how would the conditions of probation be enforced?” (citation omitted)). 

We see no issue with the district court’s consideration of Quezada Sierra’s 

upcoming sentence for a felony drug crime, to which he had already pled guilty. 

Much like the court in Avalos Valdez, the court here expressed its understanding 

that Quezada Sierra would be unable to perform the obligations of probation as he 

was expected to be imprisoned in Nebraska and would not be in the community. 
5

The court also provided other reasons for its decision, including its belief Quezada 

Sierra would not be successful on probation.

Because Quezada Sierra has not shown the court considered an improper 

factor in determining his sentence, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.