J-S72031-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.E.E., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.S. MOTHER AND 

S.S., STEPFATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1779 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered May 17, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000997-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUSMANNO, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 08, 2018

Appellants, M.S. (“Mother”) and S.S. (“Stepfather”), file this appeal from 

the order dated May 16, 2017, and entered May 17, 2017,1in the Philadelphia 

County Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division, denying their petition 

to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of R.E. (“Father”) to his minor 

daughter with Mother, S.E.E. (“the Child”), born in October of 2011, pursuant 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The subject order was dated May 16, 2017. However, the clerk did not 

provide notice pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236(b) until May 17, 2017. Our appellate 

rules designate the date of entry of an order as “the day on which the clerk 

makes the notation in the docket that notice of entry of the order has been 

given as required by Pa.R.C.P. 236(b).” Pa.R.A.P. 108(b). Further, our 

Supreme Court has held that “an order is not appealable until it is entered on 

the docket with the required notation that appropriate notice has been given.” 

Frazier v. City of Philadelphia, 557 Pa. 618, 621, 735 A.2d 113, 115 

(1999).
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to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). After careful review, 

we reverse the trial court’s order, and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history 

as follows:

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as 

follows: Mother and Father are the biological parents of S.E.[E.]

(the “Child”). The Child was born [in October of 2011]. Father 

was involved in the Child’s life during the early period of the Child’s 

life, through visits facilitated by Mother approximately three times 

a week. During this time, Mother moved approximately two hours 

away.[2] Mother continued to facilitate visits, driving the Child to 

and from Father’s house. In 2013, Mother initiated a custody 

action; however, the matter was resolved by an informal 

arrangement between Mother and Father[] that allowed Father to 

see the Child every other weekend. . . .Mother testified that the 

arrangement was not beneficial to the Child because of behaviors 

the Child exhibited upon return from visits with Father, which 

included regressed potty-training, rashes, and frequently smelling 

of smoke.[3]

On October 10, 2014, per a custody order issued by the 

Philadelphia Family Court, it was ordered that Mother and Father 

share legal custody of the Child. It was further ordered that 

Mother was to retain primary physical custody of the Child and 

____________________________________________

2 Mother relocated to another section of Philadelphia. Notes of Testimony 

(“N.T.”), 3/28/17, at 11-12; N.T., 3/16/17, at 37; Adoption Personal Interview 

at 1.

3 Upon review of the certified record, which includes a copy of the docket of 

the relevant custody action, it appears that Mother first filed a complaint for 

custody of the Child in July 2012, which was later dismissed for lack of 

prosecution in January 2013. Mother then re-filed for custody in August 2013. 

This comports with the testimony of Mother. N.T., 3/16/17, at 38-42. We 

observe that, while custody orders dated October 10, 2014, February 24, 

2015, August 27, 2015, and August 26, 2016, were not included as part of 

the certified record as exhibits from the termination hearing, despite 

admission, N.T., 3/28/17, at 5, these orders were otherwise included as part 

of the certified record and were reviewed by this Court.
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Father was to have partial physical custody of the Child. The order 

specified that Father’s partial physical custody was to be under 

the supervision of the paternal grandmother and that visits were 

to occur two days per week for at least three hours each day. 

Father was also permitted to have partial physical custody of the 

Child as the parties agreed.

On February 24, 2015, Mother and Father appeared pro se

at a custody hearing before the Honorable Angeles Roca. At the 

hearing, Mother was awarded primary physical and legal custody 

of the Child. Father was granted supervised physical custody of 

the Child every Sunday from 10:00 am until 3:00 pm at the Family 

Court nursery. The order indicated that if Father missed two 

consecutive visits with the Child, Father’s supervised physical 

custody would be suspended. At a hearing held on August 27, 

2015, before the Honorable Peter Rogers, Mother testified that 

Father missed visits for an entire month. Consequently, Father’s 

supervised custody was temporarily suspended, and it was 

ordered that Father was to have no contact with the Child. Father 

was not present at the August 27, 2015, hearing. 

On October 19, 2015, Mother filed a petition to modify 

custody. At a custody hearing held on August 26, 2016, before 

the Honorable Diane Thompson, the [c]ourt granted Mother’s 

petition to modify custody and Mother was granted sole physical 

and sole legal custody of the Child. The [c]ourt also continued the 

suspension of Father’s supervised partial custody, emphasizing 

that Father took no affirmative steps to reconnect with the Child 

in a year. In particular, the [c]ourt reasoned that Father did not 

petition the [c]ourt to reconsider the August 27, 2015 order 

suspending Father’s supervised visits.

On October 24, 2016, petitioners filed a petition to 

involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Father.[4] Bifurcated 

hearings were held before this [c]ourt on March 16, 2017 and May 

16, 2017, respectively (collectively the “TPR [termination of 

parental rights] hearing”).[5] At the TPR hearing, Mother testified 

____________________________________________

4 Mother and Stepfather additionally filed a petition for adoption, which was 

withdrawn per order dated May 16, 2017, and entered May 17, 2017.

5 The termination hearing was also conducted on March 28, 2017. In support 

of their petition to terminate Father’s parental rights, Mother and Stepfather 
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that Father had no visitation with the Child for approximately two 

years. Furthermore, Mother claimed that Father had no contact 

with the Child for six months immediately prior to October 24, 

2016, the date petitioners filed the petition to terminate Father’s 

parental rights. Mother also indicated that there were two court 

orders indicating that Father was to have no contact with the

Child.1

Mother further testified that the Child has a close 

relationship with the Child’s paternal grandmother and paternal 

cousins. In fact, Mother stated that the Child visits her paternal 

grandmother regularly. In August 2016, the Child attended a 

family reunion hosted by [P]aternal [G]randmother, and Father 

was present at the reunion.2 Father also sent the Child clothing 

on several occasions. Mother claims that the Child has never 

asked to see Father and that the Child calls Father by his first 

name. Mother also reported that the Child is well adjusted, and 

that Father has never played a significant role in the Child’s life. 

Mother stated that Father has never filed for any custody of the 

Child or asked for visitation. When asked about the custody 

orders suspending Father’s custody-visitation, Mother testified 

that Father was not present at the August 26, 2016 custody 

hearing, at which time, Father’s partial custody was suspended.3 

Father was, however, present at all other custody hearings.[6]

According to the testimony of both petitioners, the Child and 

Stepfather have a close relationship. Stepfather is the primary 

financial supporter of the Child and supports the Child’s 

educational efforts, including the Child’s speech therapy and 

____________________________________________

each testified. Additionally, Father was present and testified on his own 

behalf. Father further presented the testimony of family friend, B.B., and his 

mother, Paternal Grandmother. The court-appointed child advocate was also 

present and participated in the proceedings.

 We additionally note that, aside from custody orders and photographs 

marked and admitted as P-1, additional photographs identified as photographs 

of Father’s residence were marked as P-2. N.T., 3/28/17, at 32. Upon review, 

P-2 was never admitted and was not included as part of the certified record. 

This omission was not necessary for and does not affect our disposition.

6 Mother admitted this testimony was incorrect. Father was not present at the 

custody hearing on August 27, 2015. He was present at all other hearings. 

N.T., 3/28/17, at 29; N.T., 3/16/16, at 48-51; N.T., 8/26/16, at 5-6.
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homeschooling. Petitioners also testified that the Child calls 

Stepfather “dad.” The Child has resided with the petitioners for 

approximately three and a half years, and the petitioners have 

another child together. The petitioners recently moved to King of 

Prussia, Pennsylvania, which is approximately a thirty minute 

drive to Philadelphia.

At the TPR hearing, [P]aternal [G]randmother testified that 

she has a very close relationship with the Child and has 

maintained a relationship with the Child for the entire duration of 

the Child’s life. Paternal [G]randmother indicated that she attends 

the Child’s school functions and brings the Child to family functions 

with the Child’s paternal family. Paternal [G]randmother has also 

picked the Child up from school when Mother was unable to. 

Paternal [G]randmother also testified that, up until December 

2016[,] when she was hospitalized for various illnesses, she would 

visit the Child in petitioners’ home approximately once a week. 

On numerous occasions, the petitioners took the Child to the 

hospital to visit with [P]aternal [G]randmother. Paternal 

[G]randmother also stated that the Child did in fact attend a family 

picnic hosted by [P]aternal [G]randmother and that[,] while at the 

picnic[,] the Child asked for Father, who was not present at the 

picnic due to stay away orders. When the Child asked for Father, 

[P]aternal [G]randmother invited Father to the picnic so that he 

may see the Child. Paternal Grandmother also testified that every 

year Father purchases clothes for the Child on her birthday. 

Consistent with Mother’s own testimony, [P]aternal 

[G]randmother testified that, in October of 2016, Father 

purchased clothes for the Child.

___

1 Mother is apparently referencing the orders issued on 

August 27, 2015 by the Honorable Peter Rogers, suspending 

Father’s visitation with the Child, and August 26, 2016, continuing 

the suspension of Father’s visitation. 

2 Mother testified that Father purchased the Child Halloween 

clothes in October of 2016. Mother also testified that sometime 

[sic] in 2016, Father purchased the Child a winter jacket.

3

It is important to note that, per the court certified 

transcripts of the August 26, 2016 hearing, Father was present 

and did in fact testify. Father failed to appeal at the August 27, 

2015 hearing, at which time his partial custody was temporarily 

suspended. 
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Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 7/10/17, at 1-5 (citations to notes of testimony 

omitted).

Father testified to early contact with the Child as facilitated by Mother. 

N.T., 3/28/17, at 11-12. He confirmed the procedural history as to the 

custody matter, which eventually resulted in an order for supervised visitation 

at the court nursery. Id. at 12-14. Father acknowledged that visitation 

ceased as he missed two visits. Id. at 17, 41, 43. He did not appear at the 

custody hearing on August 27, 2015, which resulted in an order suspending 

his visitation. Id. at 29. While testifying that he did attempt to file a challenge 

to the suspension of his visitation, he indicated that he did not do so between 

the August 27, 2015 hearing and the August 26, 2016 hearing. Id. at 27-29; 

however, Father, had no supporting documentation with him. Id. at 29. 

Father testified that he bought the Child clothes, Christmas gifts and toys, 

which have not been returned to him. Id. at 19, 26. Father further confirmed 

seeing the Child, who he indicated calls him “Papi,” at a family reunion in 

August 2016. Id. at 21-22. He described a positive interaction at the reunion. 

Id. at 23. 

By order dated May 16, 2017, and entered May 17, 2017, the trial court 

denied the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. Thereafter, on June 

5, 2017, Mother and Stepfather filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
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On appeal, Mother and Stepfather raise the following issues for our 

review:

1. Did the [c]ourt err by denying the Petition to Terminate 

Parental Rights of [F]ather pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

2511(a)(1)?

2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err by ruling that it would not be in the 

child’s best interest pursuant to § 2511(b) to terminate the 

parental rights of [F]ather?

Appellants’ Brief at 3.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [616 Pa. 309, 325, 47 

A.3d 817, 826 (2012)]. “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an 

error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” 

Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed 

merely because the record would support a different result. Id.

at [325-26, 47 A.3d at] 827. We have previously emphasized our 

deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of 

the parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [608 

Pa. 9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)].

In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). “The trial court is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free 

to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 

“[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even 
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if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis 

of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have 

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 550 Pa. 595, 601, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (1998)).

In the case sub judice, the trial court declined to terminate Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide 

as follows: 
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

We first examine Section 2511(a)(1). We have explained this Court’s 

review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

involuntary termination of a parent’s rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) as 

follows:

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(1), the moving 

party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, 

sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the 

termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish 

parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental 

duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate 

both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a 

child and refusal or failure to perform parental duties. 

Accordingly, parental rights may be terminated pursuant 
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to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or 

fails to perform parental duties.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, 

the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the 

parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the postabandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) 

consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights 

on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted).

As it relates to the crucial six-month period prior to the filing of the 

petition, this Court has instructed: 

[I]t is the six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition that is most critical to our analysis. However, the trial 

court must consider the whole history of a given case and not 

mechanically apply the six-month statutory provisions, but 

instead consider the individual circumstances of each case.

In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa.Super. 1999) (citations omitted). This 

requires the Court to “examine the individual circumstances of each case and 

consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his or her 

parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the 

circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.” In re B., N.M., 

856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 

1200 (2005) (citation omitted). 

Further, we have stated:

[t]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must 

be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the 
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psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious 

intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child 

relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and capacity 

to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish 

his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this 

question.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted). See 

also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa.Super 2008) (en 

banc).

Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has stated:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child 

needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has held 

that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in 

the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional 

needs.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (internal citations omitted).
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In the instant matter, in finding a lack of grounds for termination under 

subsection (a)(1), the trial court concluded:

Under these specific facts and circumstances, this [c]ourt 

did not abuse its discretion when it denied [the] petition to 

terminate the parental rights of Father as to the Child. The record 

supported a determination that, based upon the totality of the 

circumstances, termination was not warranted. There was 

compelling evidence that Father loved the Child and wanted to 

maintain a relationship with the Child. There was also ample 

testimony that the Child maintained an ongoing relationship with 

[P]aternal [G]randmother and had a close relationship with the 

paternal relatives. According to Mother’s own testimony, the Child 

frequently visited with [P]aternal [G]randmother. At a family

reunion hosted by [P]aternal [G]randmother, both the Child and 

Father were present. Based on the foregoing testimony, the 

[c]ourt determined that Father would have contact with the Child 

whether or not his parental rights were terminated because the 

[P]aternal [G]randmother and relatives would remain active in the 

Child’s life.

Additionally, in making its decision, this [c]ourt gave great 

weight to the custody orders suspending Father’s visitation. But 

for those orders, this [c]ourt believes that Father would have 

maintained a relationship with the Child. This [c]ourt found 

[P]aternal [G]randmother’s testimony particularly compelling. For 

example, consistent with Mother’s own testimony, [P]aternal 

[G]randmother testified that in August of 2016, the Child attended 

a family picnic with the Child’s paternal relatives. Due to the no 

contact orders, Father did not attend the picnic. It was not until 

the Child inquired into the whereabouts of Father that [P]aternal 

[G]randmother invited Father to the picnic.

Based on the foregoing reasons, and in light of the totality 

of the circumstances, this [c]ourt found that the evidence 

presented by petitioners did not warrant involuntary termination. 

In addition, this matter’s unique circumstances, particularly the 

custody orders prohibiting Father from contacting the Child, tilted 

the balance in favor of denying the [] petition to terminate 

Father’s parental rights.

T.C.O. at 8-9 (citations to the record omitted).
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Mother and Stepfather, however, argue that “[t]here is absolutely no 

compelling evidence from the testimony of [Paternal Grandmother] that 

Father loved the [C]hild and wanted to maintain a relationship with the Child

. . . . Moreover, under the totality of the circumstances[,] there is absolutely 

clear[] and convincing evidence that Father did not perform parental duties 

for a period well in excess of the six months.” Appellants’ Brief at 18. Any 

financial contribution was limited to an “infrequent gift.” Id. at 18. Mother 

and Stepfather further challenge the trial court’s finding that the custody 

orders suspending visitation and prohibiting contact presented an obstacle and 

assert that this does not “excuse Father’s complete and utter abandonment of 

the Child.” Id. at 20-21. Moreover, Mother and Stepfather contend that 

Father did nothing to further his custodial rights. Id. at 20. They state: 

Father did nothing to have any custodial rights to the 

[C]hild. The only thing the father ever did was appear in the 

adoption court when the [p]etition to [t]erminate his [p]arental 

[r]ights was scheduled. One could search the record, one could 

go through all of the transcripts. There is nothing to show an 

effort by [F]ather to have a day[-]to[-]day relationship with the 

[C]hild. . . . 

Id.

Upon our review, we find the record does not support the trial court’s 

determinations as to subsection (a)(1). While Father maintained an early 

relationship with the Child, this was largely facilitated by Mother, even after 

she moved further away from Father. N.T., 3/28/17, at 11-12; N.T., 3/16/17, 

at 35-37. Moreover, and most importantly, the evidence establishes that, 
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despite providing some birthday and Christmas gifts along with Paternal 

Grandmother and seeing the Child at a family reunion in August 2016, Father 

failed to maintain regular contact with and support the Child.7 Father did not 

exercise visitation as afforded with the Child,

8 ultimately leading to the 

suspension of visitation in August 2015. N.T., 3/28/17, at 15-17, 41; N.T. 

8/26/16 at 3-4, 13, 17-18. Although the trial court suggests that the custody 

orders suspending visitation and providing for no contact between Father and 

the Child essentially created an obstacle to Father’s ability to maintain a 

relationship with the Child, T.C.O. at 9, the court ignores that Father remained 

idle and made no legal efforts to regain custodial rights for at least one year, 

if at all. Father simply stopped attending visitation after he missed two visits, 

assuming he could not go anymore. N.T., 3/28/17, at 17, 41, 43. 

Additionally, Father failed to appear for the custody hearing on August 

27, 2015, stemming from Mother’s petition due to Father’s missed visitation 

and resulting in the temporary suspension of his visitation. N.T., 3/28/17, at 

29; N.T., 3/16/16, at 48-51; N.T., 8/26/16, at 5-6; Custody Order, 8/27/15. 

____________________________________________

7 Despite the testimony of paternal family friend, B.B., that she saw Father 

with the Child on multiple occasions, Paternal Grandmother, whom the trial 

court relies on heavily, testified that Father saw the Child “very seldom” over 

the last three years due to the court proceedings between Mother and Father. 

N.T., 5/16/17, at 7-8.

8 Father explained that he initially missed visitation due to side agreements 

with Mother, on which Mother reneged. N.T., 3/28/17, at 15-17.
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Father admittedly did not file for modification or reconsideration thereafter.9

N.T., 3/28/16, at 28-29, 47. One year later, on August 26, 2016, after a 

hearing at which Father appeared and was represented by counsel, the 

suspension was made final. N.T., 8/26/16, at 15-16; Custody Order, 8/26/16. 

Again, Father sought no reconsideration or further contest. Father testified 

he made two attempts to file documents pertaining to his visitation, but lacked

the requisite funds for filing and received no notification from the trial court 

that his filings had been rejected.

10

 Father failed to present proof to support 

this contention. N.T., 3/28/17, at 17-19, 27-29. Regardless, Father went at 

least one year without visitation and without efforts to reinstate visitation with 

the Child. Moreover, Father did not appreciate this as the reason the trial 

court made the suspension of visitation a final order. Id. at 48. Thus, the 

evidence clearly demonstrates Father’s failure to utilize all available resources 

to preserve his parental relationship with the Child and a lack of reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles in the path of maintaining this relationship. 

See In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855.

____________________________________________

9 This was a key factor in the trial court’s making this order final on August 

26, 2016. N.T., 8/26/16, at 16, 19-20. Critically, counsel for Father at the 

time admitted Father’s lack of legal efforts. Id. at 18-19.

10 It is unclear from the record what exactly Father tried to file and when 

exactly he attempted to do so. However, despite a similar assertion at the 

August 26, 2016 hearing, N.T., 8/26/16, at 15-16, at the termination hearing 

on March 28, 2016, in response to cross-examination from counsel for Mother 

and Stepfather, he clearly stated that he did not attempt to file anything 

between the two custody hearings. N.T., 3/28/17, at 28-29. Notably, the 

docket for the custody matter, which was printed in December 2016, does not 

reflect any filings by Father.
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We next review the propriety of termination under Section 2511(b). Our 

Supreme Court has stated:

if the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the 

child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such 

as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 

781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. & 

L.M. a/k/a L.C., Jr.], [533 Pa. 115, 123, 620 A.2d 481, 485 

1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs 

and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be 

paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing 

the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as 

discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an 

easy task.

In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628-29, 71 A.3d at 267. The breadth of any bond 

analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of a particular case 

especially where a bond exists to some extent. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 

762-63 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Additionally, we have stated that 

the trial court should consider the importance of continuity of relationships 

and whether any existing parent-child bond may be severed without 

detrimental effects on the child. Id. at 763.

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted). 

Moreover, 
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[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. . . . 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Further, 

[t]he mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa.

Super. 2008) (trial court's decision to terminate parents' parental

rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond

against parents' inability to serve needs of child). Rather, the 

orphans' court must examine the status of the bond to determine

whether its termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 

397 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103. See also In re C.S., 761 A.2d at 1202 (court 

must consider whether natural parental bond exists between child and parent, 

and whether termination would destroy existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship).

In the case sub judice, Mother and Stepfather argue the trial court 

abused its discretion in determining the Child would suffer irreparable 

emotional harm if Father’s parental rights were terminated. Appellants’ Brief 

at 22. They challenge the trial court’s finding that their custody orders served 
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as an obstacle to Father. Id. at 22-23. Lastly, they highlight the Child’s 

positive relationship with Stepfather. Id. at 23-25.

In concluding that termination of Father’s parental rights does not favor

the Child’s needs and welfare and is not in the Child’s best interest pursuant 

to Section 2511(b), the trial court reasoned as follows:

In the instant matter, this [c]ourt determined that the Child 

would suffer irreparable emotional harm if Father’s parental rights 

were terminated. The testimony of both Mother and [P]aternal 

[G]randmother established that the Child has a bond with the 

Child’s paternal relatives. As to the existence of a parent-child 

bond between Father and the Child, this [c]ourt considered that 

Father, based on Mother’s own testimony, was involved in the 

Child’s life during the early years of the Child’s life. In fact, prior 

to August 27, 2015, when Father’s supervised visits were 

suspended, Father maintained contact with the Child through 

visits facilitated by Mother and subsequently supervised at the 

Court Nursery. This [c]ourt also found that the orders prohibiting 

Father from visiting the Child has been an obstacle for Father to 

maintain a close relationship with the Child. Particularly 

compelling to this [c]ourt was that Father was not present at the 

custody hearing on August 27, 2015, at which time his partial 

supervised custody of the Child was suspended. Furthermore, this 

[c]ourt acknowledged that a bond does exist between the Child 

and Stepfather and emphasized that allowing the Child to maintain 

a relationship with Father would not in any way hinder the bond 

between the Child and Stepfather. In fact, based upon the 

testimony of all parties, it is clear to this [c]ourt that the Child is 

loved by all parties and that it would be in the Child’s best interest 

to have two father figures.

For the foregoing reasons, this [c]ourt properly denied [the]

petition to terminate the parental rights of Father pursuant to 

[S]ection 2511(b). Overwhelming evidence was submitted at the 

TPR hearing to support a finding that petitioners failed to show by 

clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best 

interest of Child.

T.C.O. at 11-12 (citations to the record omitted).
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We find the record fails to corroborate the trial court’s determination

that terminating Father’s parental rights was not in the Child’s best interests

pursuant to Section 2511(b). Testimony of Father’s family friend confirmed 

early contact between Father and the Child. N.T., 3/16/17, at 35-37. In 

addition, Father and Paternal Grandmother testified to the positive interaction

between Father and the Child at the family reunion in August 2016. N.T., 

5/16/17, at 9-10; N.T., 3/28/17, at 23. Likewise, Paternal Grandmother 

opined that Father and the Child miss one another and love one another. N.T., 

5/16/17, at 10. However, the record lacks evidence that in light of the minimal 

recent contact between Father and the Child that termination would have a 

detrimental impact on the Child. Indeed, as the trial court stated, the existing 

bond is with the Child’s paternal relatives. 

While the trial court emphasizes the custody orders suspending 

visitation and providing for no contact served as an obstacle to Father 

maintaining a close relationship with the Child, as indicated previously, Father 

took no legal efforts for at least one year, if at all, to regain visitation. 

Additionally, both Mother and Stepfather testified that the Child was upset and 

not herself when picked up from the paternal family reunion. N.T., 3/16/17, 

at 13-14, 57; N.T., 8/26/16, at 8-9. Mother testified that the Child does not 

ask for Father, N.T., 3/16/17, at 20, and, as confirmed by Paternal 

Grandmother, the Child now calls Father by his first name. N.T., 5/16/17, at 

10; N.T., 3/16/17, at 16. Further, Mother has facilitated and maintained a

relationship between the Child and paternal family, despite the custody 
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orders, and there is nothing to suggest this would cease. N.T., 3/16/17, at 

15. 

Moreover, and more importantly, the Child shares a close bond with 

Stepfather whom she calls “daddy” and with whom she has lived since she 

was two years old. N.T., 3/16/17, at 8-10, 55. Stepfather supports the 

Child in all aspects, including educationally, religiously and financially. Id. at 

10, 55-56.

The record confirms that the termination of Father’s parental rights 

serves the Child’s needs and welfare. Accordingly, based upon our review of 

the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

terminate Father’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). 

We, therefore, reverse the order of the trial court, and remand the matter for 

further proceedings.

Order reversed. Appeal remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 

P.J.E. Bender joins the memorandum.

Judge Musmanno files a dissenting statement. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date:1/8/18