alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
John M cH ug h i s s ub st i tut ed for hi s pre dece ss or, F ranci s J . H arvey, as * S ec re t ary of the A rm y, pu rs uantt o F ed. R . A pp . P . 43 (c )( 2).

T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt ** e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on *** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. A c c o r d in g lyD a v e n p o rt’s r e q u e s t f o ro r a l ar g u m e n t is de ni e d. I L/ R es ear ch 07- 55803 NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T ROBE RT DA VENPORT, P la in tif

f - A p p e llan t, v. JO H N M cH U G H , S ecret ary o f th e A rm y; * e t a l., D e f

e n d a n ts - A p p e lle e s . N o. 07- 55803 D. C . No . C V- 0 6 - 0 2 6 6 9 - H- C AB ME MOR AN DU M **

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e S o u th e rn D is tr ic t o f C a lif o rn ia M a r i l y n L . H uf

f , D i s tr i c tJudge , P r e s i di ng S ubm i tt e d M ar c h 16, 2010 ** * B efo re: S C H R O E D E R , P R E G E R S O N , an dR A W L IN S O N , C i rcu i tJu d g es. 

# FI LED MA R 31 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALSI L/ R es ear ch 07- 55803 2 R o b er t D av en p o rt, an atto rn ey , ap p ea ls p ro se fr o m th e d istrict co u rt’s j u d g me n td i s mi s s i n g h i s a c t i o n s e e k i n g r e l i e f u n d e rth e Pr i v a c yA c t , 5 U . S. C. § 5 5 2 a , in c o n n e c tio n w ith th e D e p artm e n t o f D e f e n s e ’s r e f

u s a l to c h an g e c e rta in f a c tu a l f in d in g s s e t f

o rth in ad e c is io n to r e v o k e D a v e n p o rt’s s e c u r ityc le ar an c e . W e ha ve j ur i s di c t i on pur s ua ntt o 28 U . S . C . § 1291. W e r e vi e w de novo a d is m is s a l f

o rla c ko f

s ub je c t m a tte rju r is d ic tio n , D o r f m o n t v . Br o wn , 913 F . 2d 1399, 1400- 01 ( 9th C i r . 1990) , a nd w e a f f i rm i n part , va c a t e i n parta nd r e m and. T he di stri ctcourtprop er l y di sm i ss ed D avenpo rt ’ s a ct i on because i tl ac ked s ub je c t m a tte rju r is d ic tio n to r e v ie w th e f a c tu a l f in d in g s u n d e r ly in g ad e c is io n to re vo ke a s ec uri ty c l earance. Se e i d. a t1401- 02. B ec au se th e d istrict co u rt lack ed su b ject m atter ju risd icti o n , D av en p o rt’s a c tio n s h o u ldh a v e b e e n d is m is s e dw ith o u t p r e ju d ic e . Se e Ke l l

yv . Fle e tw ood E nte rs . , I

nc . , 377 F . 3d 1034, 1036 ( 9th C i r . 2004) . A c c or di ngl yw e va c a t e the j udgm e nta nd r e m a nd f orthe l i m i t e d purpos e of e ntryof j udgm e ntdi s m i s s i ng the ac t i on w i tho utprej ud i ce . W e grantdefe nd ant s’ re qu es t s t o stri ke se tforth i n thei r answ er i ng bri ef . T h e p a rtie s s h a ll b e a rth e iro w n c o s ts o n ap p e a l. A F F IR M E D i n p art, V A C A T E D i n p art an d R E M A N D E D w i th i n stru cti o n s.
----

----

| 1.   | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |                     |                               |
|--------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|
|   |  Date:    | November      13, 2008             |   |
|   |                     |                               |   |
|   |                     |                               |   |
|   | By:                 | /s/ Frederic      W.J. Birner |   |
|   |  Name:         |  Frederic      W.J. Birner    |   |
|   |  Title:   | Chief      Executive Officer       |   |
|   |                     |                               |   |

|   |                          |                          |
|--------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
|   |                     |                          |   |
|        | By:                 | /s/ Dennis      N. Genty |   |
|   |  Name:    |  Dennis      N. Genty    |   |
|   |  Title:   | Chief      Financial Officer  |   |
|   |                     |                          |   |

----

----
EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, David H. Roche, certify that:

1.
        I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Minn Dak Farmers Cooperative;


2.
        Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;


3.
        Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;


4.
        The Companys other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and Rule 15d-15(e)) for the Company and have:


a)
        designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;


b)
        evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation.


c)
        disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Companys most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Companys internal control over financial reporting; and


5.
        The Companys other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Companys auditors and the audit committee of the Companys board of directors:


a)
        all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and


b)
        any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Companys internal control over financial reporting.


Date:
        November 27, 2006
        
        
        /s/   David H. RochePresident and Chief Executive Officer


---
‘* 

i OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

&JQaoeblo c. uoodmw ldepadilip 

qou@y Attorney 

Jj.& walls county 

A&&o*, texml 

glrlrturo, waharired thm supa on praotioe uld pouedur* la 

The opaatmont ale0 pmrldod 

t b* ttme it iLla the fulee, tho 

llfile uiththo Beorotmqo? 

11 8rtieles or eeationr of the 

ou~ral uws OS the state or ~9~9, aa part8 0t 

ut10lo* 8nd sootlon8 of ruoh qwmral xawa, wbleh, 

in itr judpmnt, are ropoalqd ba 8ootlon of thim 

Jut. Such llrt giving the ooaetruotlon aS the 

8uprme Qourt am to the *nom& L8wr u14 pta of 

lawm repe*led by !3oat&oa Z #hUl bebatitute, an& 

hove the 8mm weight m.4 effect, 8s l n7 Other daoleloa of the Supreme Cuurt.a 
gonorable C. Woodrow Laughlin, page 2 

By Senate Eill 206, the 44th L*gISlatu?a passed what 

is known as Article 7336,1, Vernon*6 Revised Civil Stattat4m, 

ad Seotion 6 thereof pmrldes a form for aitat$oas in tar 

l uits. 

The s~pr4B4 COUt Or TaXaS aoioplisd With Section 3 

of Eiousa Bill 108, supra, end tiled with the ;earetary of Stats 

a &fat of all artiolas and sections of the General Laws whlah 

wm in its judgamnt repealed by the Rules of Praotloe aad Pro- 

..duN in Civil Imtions. An sxamlaatlon OS the list does not 

ulaa$ose that Artiole 7328.1, was tansldsred by the Supreme Court 

as belkxg repealed. The list war, filed bl the Suprmse Court on 

wteber 29, 1940, and /,rtiolr 732&l, uas a part of the General 

L&W at that time. %e are therafore of the oppinlon ,that Rule Eio. 

101 of the &lg+s of Practios and Proaedure In Civil hations doeu 

uot~mplaoe Ar%ials 7326.1, 

You are theretore~adrlsed that fn our oplnlon a oltation in a tax suit is riot suff,iaient wile86 it is substantlallp 

In the fork pTe%eribed by said hrticla 9ZWl.l. 

IQ answer to yOUr SSOOnd pWStien .yQu are adtlaad that 

Artlola 73138.1 has not been rspaaled for the seasons above 

etated, and that the folpl presaribsd therein is the proper fors~ 

fbl: use in tax suits, 

Your attention Is se&lad to the faot that ths Suprssm 

Coart has amended Eule No. 8 of the Ruler of Praotloe and Proemlure in Cftil Aotlons, effeotlre Daoember 81, 1941, expressly 

aontlnulng the rules zoverniq procedure Fn Tax suits whicrh were 

effwtlre faumbdiately prior to Saptstribar 1, 1941. 

Trusting thet tha toregoIn(~ fully asmwers your Inquiry, we are 

Tours very truly
#### Jack M. HEIM and Paul J. Heim, Appellants, v. Robert A. WILSON, Appellee.

No. 70-187.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Sept. 25, 1970.

Arnold D. Levine of Levine & Freedman, P. A., Tampa, for appellants.

Earnest W. Dean, Jr., of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on authority of Cooper v. Fulton, Fla.App.1960, 117 So.2d 33; Fryd Construction Corporation v. Freeman, Fla.App.1966, 191 So.2d 487; and Hollywood Beach Hotel and Golf Club v. Gilliland, 1939, 140 Fla. 24, 191 So. 30.

HOBSON, C. J., and PIERCE and McNULTY, JJ., concur.
#### Charles BLACKLEDGE v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 50070.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 14, 1977.

Bullard & Gee, Robert W. Gee, Vicksburg, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Pete J. Cajoleas, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Warren County; Ben Guider, Judge.

Before PATTERSON, C. J., and SUGG and WALKER, JJ.

AFFIRMED.
#### TITLE & TRUST COMPANY OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. Harold T. MOORE and wife, Mary R. Moore, Appellees.

No. P-354.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 9, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         233,664
<SECURITIES>                                    51,468
<RECEIVABLES>                                  121,131
<ALLOWANCES>                                     5,000
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               409,448
<PP&E>                                         307,742
<DEPRECIATION>                                 253,921
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 466,358
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          634,569
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        96,247
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,252,543
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   466,358
<SALES>                                        878,515
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               878,515
<CGS>                                          250,376
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  618,815
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              18,397
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                255,023
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            255,023
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   255,023
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ROMERO ORTIZ,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-3508

[June 21, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; William W. Haury, Jr., Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 09-16915 

CF10A and 09-19435 CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Peggy Natale, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

MAY, CIKLIN and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Willie SOLOMON, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 71-989.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 3, 1971.

Habeas corpus denied.
#### Robert Rowan Derrick VON COOLEY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-977.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 17, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
254 La. 83

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lawrence Ratcliff BASS.

No. 49522.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 5, 1969.

*866Ford E. Stinson, Benton, for appellant.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., William P. Schuler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Billy R. Robinson, City Atty., for appellee.

SANDERS, Justice.

Lawrence Ratcliff Bass is charged with driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating beverages on June 2, 1968, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:9s.1 The affidavit in the City Court of Bossier City contained the notation “Second Offense.” After trial, he was convicted and sentenced, as a second offender, to nine months imprisonment in the parish jail. He has appealed.

The defendant reserved no bills of exceptions in the trial court. Hence, our review is limited to “error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings.” LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 920; State v. Welch, 252 La. 679, 212 So.2d 426; State v. Watson, 252 La. 649, 212 So.2d 415; State v. Smith, 250 La. 647, 198 So.2d 114.

We have reviewed the record for such errors. The State properly concedes that the notation “Second Offense” in the affidavit is insufficient to charge a prior conviction.

Article 483, LSA-C.Cr.P. provides:

> “If it is necessary to allege a prior conviction in an indictment, it is sufficient to allege the name or nature of the offense and the fact, date, and court of the conviction. * * * ”

The affidavit fails to legally charge defendant as a second offender. State v. Montgomery, 250 La. 326, 195 So.2d 285. The sentence imposed exceeds that for a first offense. LSA-R.S. 14:98.2 Hence, the sentence is illegal and must be set aside. The case will be remanded for a proper sentence for a first conviction. State v. Montgomery, supra.

For the reasons assigned, the sentence is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the City Court of Bossier City for a sentence according to law and the views herein expressed.

1

. LSA-R.S. 14:98 was amended by Acts 279 and 647 of 1968. Since defendant was tried and sentenced on June 24, 1968, prior to the effective date of these amendments, we have considered only the original statutory text.

2

. At the time of trial and sentence, LSA-R.S. 14:98 authorized a maximum imprisonment of eight months for a first offense.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of CFO Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of SkyTerra
Communications, Inc. (the Company) for the period ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), Scott Macleod, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company



/s/ Scott MacleodName:

Scott MacleodTitle:

Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer


April 27, 2007
#### Bernard E. WYNN, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 71-411.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 3, 1971.

Habeas corpus denied.
#### Young *v.*McCamant, Appellant.

*Real estate*— Purchaser *at sheriff’s sale*— Recovery *of possession —Act of April 20, 1905, P. L. 289*— Defenses.

In an action by tbe purchaser of land at a sheriff’s sale under the Act of April 20, 1905, P. L. 239, to recover possession from defendants in the execution, it appeared that possession was resisted by virtue of a parol agreement made at or about the time of the sale, by which the plaintiff in the execution who became the purchaser at the sale, gave the defendants the privilege of redeeming the land by payment to him of his liens against it within sixty days. The option had expired and nearly a year elapsed before defendants sought to avail themselves of the privilege so granted. *Held,*judgment was properly entered for the plaintiff.

Argued April 21, 1913.

Appeals, Nos. 69 and 341, *233Jan. T., 1912, by respondents, from judgments of C. P. Blair Co., as of Oct. T., 1910, No. 327, Oct. T., 1911, No. 67, in favor of petitioner in cases of Blair B. Young v. John G. McCamant and Blair B. Young v. John G. MeCamant and Andrew H. McCamant.

Before Fell, C. J., Brown, Mestrezat, Stewart and Moschzisker, JJ.

Affirmed.

Action under the Act of April 20, 1905, P. L. 239, to recover real estate purchased at sheriff’s sale. Before Baldridge, P. J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

The court made a decree in favor of the petitioner. Respondents appealed.

*Error ' assigned,*among others, was the decree of the court.

*Wm. L. Paseoe,*of *¡Stevens é Pascoe,*with him *Andrew M. MeCamant,*for appellants.

*B. F. Warfel*and *Marion D. Patterson,*for appellee.

May 22, 1913:

Per Curiam,

Appeal No. 341 is from a judgment entered in a proceeding by a purchaser of land at a sheriff’s sale to recover possession from the defendants in the execution. Possession was resisted by virtue of a parol agreement made at or about the time of the sale by which the plaintiff in the execution, who became the purchaser at the sale, gave the defendants the privilege of redeeming the land by payment to him of his liens against it within sixty days. It was claimed by the defendants that the agreement made the plaintiff a mortgagee with no right of possession. The court found that on the defendants’ own showing the agreement, even if valid, was merely an option to purchase, and that it had expired and *234nearly a year had elapsed without the defendants availing themselves of the privilege granted.

The judgment is affirmed.

Appeal No. 69 involves the same facts and it is dismissed.
251 La. 755

#### Laurier HEBERT v. NORTH BRITISH AND MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Ltd., et al.

No. 49070.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 2, 1968.

In re: Laurier Hebert applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of St. Martin. 204 So.2d 655.

Writ refused. On the facts found' by the Court of Appeal, we find no error of law in its judgment.
#### Hutchins *v.*Plymouth Township, Appellant.

*Negligence*— Townships—Highways—Evidence—Case *for jury.*

While driving in a sleigh over a road in defendant township, plaintiff ran against a stone which projected about seven inches above the bed of the highway, resulting in an accident causing him personal injuries. Several witnesses for plaintiff testified that the obstruction in the road had existed for two or three years. He testified that he had no knowledge of the existence of the stone; that only an inch and a half of it protruded above the snow; that as he approached it there were teams on either side of the road, and it was necessary to be on the lookout to avoid collision with them. *Held,*the questions of the negligence of the defendant and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff were for the jury.

Argued April 15, 1913.

Appeal, No. 123, Jan. T., 1913, by the Township of Plymouth, from judgment of C. P. Luzerne Co., March T., 1909, No. 623, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Morgan Hutchins v. The Township of Plymouth and Larksville Borough.

Before Brown, Mestrezat, Potter, Elkin and Moschzisker, JJ.

Affirmed.

Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before Garman, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict for plaintiff for $2,000 and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed.

*Error assigned,*among others, was the refusal of the court to direct a verdict for defendant, and to enter judgment for defendant n. o. v.

*John McGahren,*with him *M. J. Mulhall*and *D. P. Reese,*for appellant.

*Arthur H. James,*with him *Frank A. McGuigan,*for appellee.

*142May 19, 1913:

Per Curiam,

While driving in a sleigh over a road in the Township of Plymouth, the appellee ran against a stone which projected about seven inches above the bed of the highway, and this appeal by the township is from the judgment he recovered for the injuries he sustained. The negligence of the township was clearly for the jury, for several witnesses testified that the obstruction in the road had existed for two or three years. The main defense was the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, but this could not have been taken from the jury. He testified that he had no knowledge of the existence of the stone, and only about one inch and a half of it protruded above the snow. As he approached it there were teams on either side of the road, and it was necessary for him to be on the lookout to avoid collision with them. But for this, he might have seen the projecting stone; but whether he was bound to see it under the circumstances, was a question for the jury. The complaint of the inadequacy of the charge is without merit, especially as the learned trial judge, at the conclusion of it, asked whether either side desired further instructions.

The assignments are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-22-00162-CV

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

Appellant

v.

Martha Theresa ZABROKY,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law, Kerr County, Texas

Trial Court No. 21716C

Honorable Susan Harris, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ALVAREZ, JUSTICE CHAPA, AND JUSTICE VALENZUELA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the county court’s February 15, 2022 

Order that reversed the administrative decision is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED 

affirming the December 16, 2021 Administrative Decision authorizing suspension of Martha 

Theresa Zabroky’s driving privileges. Costs of appeal are assessed against appellee.

SIGNED January 11, 2023.

_____________________________

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
#### MISSISSIPPI STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION v. Frances N. DUNLAP et al.

No. 44739.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 12, 1968.

Dennis M.,Baker, Batesville, William E. Corr, Jr., Sardis, for appellant.

McClure, Fant & McClure, Sardis, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.