[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 13

- 15683 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:13

- cr - 20383

- KMW

- 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus TIMOTHY SMITH, Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ (January 5, 2015) Before WILLIAM PRYOR , JORDAN and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:

Case: 13-15683 Date Filed: 01/05/2015 Page: 1 of 52 Timo thy Smith appeals his sentence of 180 months of imprisonment following his plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition

. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) . Smith challenges the enhance ment of his sentence under the A rmed C areer C riminal A ct

. S ee id

. § 924(e)(1) . We affirm. Smith argues that his prior conviction in a Florida court for possessing with intent to deliver cocaine does not qualify as a “ serious drug offense ” under the Act , but we disagree. The Act defines a “serious drug offense” broadly as “ an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U .S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law .” Id. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii); see United States v. James , 430 F.3d 1150 , 1155 ( 11 th Cir

. 2005 )

. Smith ’s prior conviction falls squarely within that definition. Smith violated a Florida law that makes it unlawful “to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance , ” Fla. Stat. § § 893.13(1)(a) 1. , 893.03(2)(a)4., and for which he faced a maximum sentence of 15 years of imprisonment, id. § 775.082(3)(d). Smith contends that his prior conviction does
not qualify as a predicate offense because it does not require proof that an offender know of the illicit nature of the substance in his possession , but proof of that

Case: 13-15683 Date Filed: 01/05/2015 Page: 2 of 53 knowledge is not required f or a drug offense under state law t o qualify as a

“ serious drug offense. ” Smith argues that the district court was required to compare his state offense to a generic offense under the categorical approach that we applie d in Donawa v. United States Attorney General , 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013) , but we disagree.
I n Donawa , we held that an alien’ s conviction for possessing with intent to deliver marijuana, see Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) 2., failed t o qualif y as an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act

– that is, the state offense did not fit the definition of a “ drug trafficking crime , ” see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2)

. Donawa , 735 F.3d at 1280

– 81. We concluded that the Florida statute did not “categorically fit[] within the generic federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony ” because the federal analogue to the Florida statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), required proof t hat the defe ndant had knowledge of the nature of the substance in his possession , but the Florida statute did not. Id. Unlike the defendant
in Donawa , Smith was sentenced under the Armed Career Act, which include s as a “serious drug offense” a prior state conviction for possessin g with intent to distribute a controlled drug. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The Armed Career
Act does not require t he district court to compare an offense under state law to a generic offense

.

Case: 13-15683 Date Filed: 01/05/2015 Page: 3 of 54 Smith , for the first time on appeal, argues that Staples v. Unite d States , 511 U.S. 600, 114 S. Ct. 1793 ( 1994 ), required the district court to presume that his drug offense required proof that he knew of the illicit nature of the substance in his possession , but th e district court did not pl ainly err . In Staples , the Supreme Court held that there is a scient e r requirement implicit in the offense of p ossessing an unregistered automatic firearm , see 18 U.S.C. § 5861(d)

. Staples , 511 U.S. at 618

– 19, 114 S. Ct. at 180 3

– 0 4. “An error is ‘plain’ [only] if controlling precedent from the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit establishes that an error has occurred.” United States v. Ramirez

– Flores , 743 F.3d 816, 822 (11th Cir. 2014)

. The district court did not plainly err in failing to apply Staples , which did not address the Armed Career Act . In Staples , the Supreme Court also “emphasize[d] that [its] holding [was] a narrow one . ” 511 U.S. at 619 , 114 S. Ct. at 1804

. Staples does not establish that an error occurred in sentencing Smith. Smith also argues that the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151(2013), requires that the government prove his prior conviction s to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but we disagree. The Supreme Court in Alley ne refused to revisit its holding in Almendarez

– Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), that the fact of a prior conviction is not an element of an offense that needs to be proven beyond a

Case: 13-15683 Date Filed: 01/05/2015 Page: 4 of 55 reasonable doubt, id. at 239

– 47, 118 S. Ct. at 122 8

– 32. Alleyne , 133 S. Ct. at 2160
n.1.
We AFFIRM Smith’s sentence.

Case: 13-15683 Date Filed: 01/05/2015 Page: 5 of 5