J-S26007-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RAYNARD TAYLOR, 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1944 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 13, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0706561-2006

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2019

Raynard Taylor appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

We briefly recount the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. 

On February 19, 2006, at approximately 12:55 p.m., [A]ppellant 

shot the victim, Rath Chamroeun, in the stomach. The victim 

refused to identify [A]ppellant at trial despite having identified him 

as the perpetrator in prior statements to police and in a 

photographic line-up. Thus, the victim’s prior out-of-court 

statements were admitted at trial as substantive evidence of 

[A]ppellant’s guilt. On March 25, 2008, following a non-jury trial 

before the Honorable M. Harold Kane, [A]ppellant was found guilty 

of aggravated assault, criminal attempt to commit murder, 

possession of an instrument of a crime, and two firearms 

violations.[1]. . . 

____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 901(a), 907(a), 6106(a), and 6108.
J-S26007-19

- 2 -

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2821 EDA 2008, 1-2 (Pa. Super., filed Jan. 31, 

2011) (unpublished memorandum). 

On September 11, 2008, the trial court sentenced Appellant to not less 

than fifteen nor more than thirty years of incarceration for the attempted 

murder conviction, and imposed a consecutive sentence of ten years of 

probation for aggravated assault. The court imposed no sentence on the 

remaining counts.

Appellant filed a direct appeal on October 9, 2008, which this Court 

dismissed for failure to file a brief. On December 1, 2009, after finding that 

Appellant’s counsel had abandoned him, this Court granted Appellant’s 

request to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc, and appointed new counsel. On 

January 31, 2011, this Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence. 

See Taylor. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for 

allowance of appeal on July 31, 2012.

Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his first, on December 14, 

2012. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition on 

March 2, 2015. The PCRA court granted the petition, in part, agreeing that 

the sentences for aggravated assault and attempted murder should have 

merged, and denied Appellant’s other claims for relief.2 This timely appeal 

followed. 

____________________________________________

2 The PCRA court vacated the ten-year probation sentence for aggravated 

assault, and merged the sentences for aggravated assault and attempted 

murder. 
J-S26007-19

- 3 -

Appellant raises one question on appeal.

1. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred by denying [Appellant] postconviction relief because trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to file a post-sentence motion and preserve the claim that the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence[?]

Appellant’s Brief, at 2.

Our scope and standard of review is as follows. 

We review the denial of PCRA relief for a determination of 

whether the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and 

free of legal error. A petitioner is eligible for PCRA relief only when 

he proves by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction 

or sentence resulted from one or more of the circumstances 

delineated in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2).

To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, an appellant must 

prove that his conviction resulted from one of several enumerated 

events, including the ineffective assistance of counsel. 

It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have 

provided effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner 

pleads and proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal 

claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked 

any objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s 

interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s 

error. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 

973, 975-76 (1987); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The PCRA court may 

deny an ineffectiveness claim if “the petitioner’s evidence fails to 

meet a single one of these prongs.” Commonwealth v. 

Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (2000). . . . 

Because courts must presume that counsel was effective, it is the 

petitioner’s burden to prove otherwise. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1113–14 (Pa. Super. 2018), 

appeal denied, 197 A.3d 1174 (Pa. 2018) (some citations and formatting 

omitted). 
J-S26007-19

- 4 -

Here, Appellant claims that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence because the victim testified that he did not see and could not identify 

who shot him, and the Commonwealth’s eyewitness testified that he could 

neither see the shooter’s face, nor describe the shooter. See Appellant’s Brief, 

at 10. Therefore, Appellant argues that the credibility of the Commonwealth’s 

witnesses is in question, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

post sentence motion preserving his claim that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. We disagree.

“It is well-settled that a weight of the evidence claim must be preserved 

in a motion before the trial court, and that this Court will only review the trial 

court’s exercise of discretion in considering whether a new trial is necessary.” 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1186 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal 

denied, 193 A.3d 344 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted).

[O]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new 

trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not 

against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be 

granted in the interest of justice. A new trial is warranted in this 

context only when the verdict is so contrary to the evidence that 

it shocks one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is 

imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to 

prevail.

Id. at 1187 (brackets in original; citation omitted).

Here, the PCRA court rejected Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Specifically, it found that the victim “knew the Appellant, was able 

to identify him, and recanted out of fear of retaliation.” PCRA Court Opinion, 

11/29/18, at 7. Therefore, it held that because the verdict did not shock the 
J-S26007-19

- 5 -

conscience, the underlying claim lacked merit, and Appellant failed to meet 

the first prong of the Pierce test. 

Upon review, we conclude that the PCRA court’s findings are supported 

by the record. Appellant did not meet his burden to prove ineffective 

assistance of counsel because he failed to show that his underlying weight 

claim had arguable merit. See Smith, supra at 1186. Accordingly, we hold 

that the PCRA court did not err by denying Appellant relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/9/19