* Because there are no appellees to be served in this appeal, the appeal has been

submitted without the filing of a brief by the appellees. After an examination of the

appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. 

Thus, the appeal is submitted on the brief and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 19, 2006*

Decided July 20, 2006

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

No. 06-1935

LINDA L. SHELTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

D.L. HAYES, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 05 C 6350

Charles P. Kocoras, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Dr. Linda Shelton appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to vacate

the dismissal of her complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and state law. We

affirm. 

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 06-1935 Page 2

1 The defendants are the following entities and certain of their individual

employees: Chicago Police Department, the law firm of Ruff, Weidenaar & Reidy

(counsel for Advocate Christ Hospital), Tishman Speyer Properties (manager of the

building where Ruff, Weidenaar & Reidy maintains an office), Cook County State’s

Attorney’s Office, Cook County, and the City of Chicago.

Shelton, a physician, sued more than 20 defendants1

 over a dispute that

arose when she was arrested for trespass after attempting personally to serve legal

papers in her medical malpractice lawsuit against Advocate Christ Hospital. 

Shelton alleged that she was subjected to “excessive force and brutality” by police,

was treated “negligently” by “bias[ed]” medical staff, and was denied adequate

medical care, shelter, food, and water “amount[ing] to torture” during the 24 hours

she spent in jail. At initial screening, the district court dismissed Shelton’s claims

without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because her allegations of

mistreatment “at the hands of everyone she has encountered” combined with “the

sheer volume of ailments she professes plague her every action . . . are factually

fantastic.” The court added that if Shelton did not within one month file a

complaint “firmly rooted in plausible allegations that supplies a short and plain

statement of her claim for relief,” the dismissal would become one with prejudice to

her refiling in federal court. 

Shelton, however, filed a motion to vacate the order of dismissal, arguing

generally that the dismissal was “arbitrary and unfair” but pointing to no specific

legal error. Because the motion was filed within 10 days of the entry of judgment,

the district court construed it under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The court denied the

motion because Shelton merely reiterated her prior allegations in greater detail

without remedying the deficiencies identified by the court in the dismissal order. 

On December 22, 2005, the court issued a minute order dismissing the complaint

with prejudice to Shelton’s refiling in federal court. 

Nearly three months later, Shelton filed a motion requesting that the minute

order be vacated and that she be allowed to amend her complaint. In the motion

she alleged that the district court’s order was “insulting, baseless, [and] biased,”

and that she should be allowed to proceed because her claims “are verifiable fact.” 

The district court denied the motion because relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) was

not available for mere “disagreement with the basis upon which we rendered our

decision.”

On appeal Shelton argues that the district court erred in denying her Rule

60(b) motion because it overlooked her proffered excuse that she was unable to

comply with the court’s earlier orders because at times she was either ill or

incarcerated. This argument is frivolous. While it is true that Shelton briefly refers
No. 06-1935 Page 3

to these circumstances in an 81-page exhibit attached to her motion, her motion

itself does not even mention illness or incarceration. The district court cannot be

expected to scour voluminous exhibits in search of any conceivable legal argument.

See Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 609–10 (7th

Cir. 2005). Shelton’s motion, therefore, lacked sufficient specificity to put the

district court on notice that she was asserting illness and incarceration as excusable

neglect under Rule 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (motions “shall state with

particularity the grounds therefor”); see Talano v. Northwestern Med. Faculty

Found., Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the district court did

not abuse its discretion by denying Shelton’s request to vacate the order of

dismissal. 

We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s judgment, and ORDER Shelton to

show cause within 14 days why she should not be sanctioned for filing this frivolous

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 38.