Gen. 29] 29

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES – BOARD OF LIQUOR LICENSE

COMMISSIONERS – SCOPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY

April 15, 2015

Ms. Michelle Bailey-Hedgepeth

Executive Secretary

Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City

On the recommendation of the Office of Legislative Audits, 

Mr. Douglas Paige—the former acting Executive Secretary of the 

Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City 

(“Board” or “BLLC”)—asked for our opinion on three questions 

that bear on the Board’s activities and authority. As summarized 

by us, those questions are:

1. Does Article 2B, § 10-503(d)(4), 

which gives a person who has been granted 

leave to transfer a liquor license 180 days to 

“complete” the transfer, authorize the Board 

to extend that period by an additional 180 

days, and, if not, may the Board infer that 

authority from other provisions in Article 2B?

2. May Board staff, without the prior 

approval of the Board, impose penalties for 

first-offense violations through informal 

procedures?

3. Does the Open Meetings Act apply to 

the hearings conducted by the Board and 

require the Board to adopt written minutes of 

those hearings? 

In our opinion, the answer to the first two questions is “no.” 

The Board does not have the authority to extend the 180-day 

deadline for transferring a liquor license, and Board staff may not 

exercise the Board’s power to impose sanctions. The answer to the

third question varies with the nature of the case before the Board. 

Generally speaking, the Open Meetings Act applies to the Board’s 

hearings and deliberations on whether to grant a license or permit, 

and the Board must adopt written minutes of those meetings. The 

Board’s hearings and deliberations in other matters are not subject 

to the Act if the proceeding is one for which a person could seek 
30 [100 Op. Att’y

review of the Board’s determination in circuit court, and if the 

discussion is limited to such matters.

I

Introduction

The Board, a State agency, is authorized by various provisions 

in Article 2B of the Maryland Code1to license and regulate the sale 

of alcoholic beverages in Baltimore City. See generally 91 

Opinions of the Attorney General 174, 175 (2006) and 83 Opinions 

of the Attorney General 3, 4-5 (1998) (giving brief histories of 

Maryland’s alcoholic beverages laws). In this sphere, the Board 

“has rule making, investigatory, and prosecutorial authority.” 

Board of Liquor License Comm’rs v. Hollywood Prods., 344 Md. 

2, 9 (1996) (citing Art. 2B, §§ 16-301(a) (conferring power to adopt 

rules and regulations) and 10-403(a) (providing authority to revoke 

or suspend licenses after notice and hearing)). Still, the Board must 

exercise its authority within the confines of Article 2B. See 

Sullivan v. Board of License Comm’rs, 293 Md. 113, 121 (1982) 

(“Of course, rules and regulations adopted by an administrative 

agency must be reasonable and consistent with the letter and spirit 

of the statute under which the agency acts.”). 

Article 2B declares that “the policy of the State” is to 

“regulate and control” the distribution of alcoholic beverages in 

order to “obtain respect and obedience to law” and “foster and 

promote temperance.” § 1-101(a)(1), (b)(1). Among other things, 

Article 2B limits the term of licenses to one year, see §§ 10-206, 

10-301, regulates the conditions on which liquor boards may grant 

or transfer licenses, see Title 9, provides the public with the 

opportunity to participate in the local boards’ decisions to issue, 

renew, transfer, or continue a license, see Title 10, and sets 

penalties for violations of the article, see § 16-507. 

Like most other units of State government, the Board is 

subject to “fiscal/compliance” audits by the Office of Legislative 

Audits (“OLA”) in the Department of Legislative Services. See

Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t (“SG”) § 2-1220(a)(2) (2014 Repl. 

Vol.) (stating the OLA’s duties). The Board is also subject to a 

“performance audit,” which must be conducted at least once every 

three years “to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the 

management practices of the Board and of the economy with which 

the Board uses resources.” SG § 2-1220(f)(1); 2011 Md. Laws, ch. 

 

1 All citations are to the Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 2B 

(2011 Repl. Vol. & 2014 Supp.) unless otherwise noted.
Gen. 29] 31

263. The OLA’s performance audits of the Board “focus on 

operations relating to liquor inspections, licensing, disciplinary 

procedures, and management oversight.” SG § 2-1220(f)(2). 

The OLA began its first performance audit of the Board in 

October 2011 and issued its Performance Audit Report (“OLA 

Report”) in March 2013. OLA Report at 12. In the course of the 

audit, OLA compiled a database of “licensee information, 

inspection activity, and disciplinary actions” for alcoholic beverage 

licensees during the license years covered by the audit. OLA 

Report at 11-12. The Report included three findings—Nos. 6, 17, 

and 20—that were accompanied by a recommendation that the 

Board seek our opinion on the three questions summarized above. 

II

May the Board Extend the Deadline Set By § 10-503(d)(4),

Which Requires a Successful Applicant for a Liquor License 

Transfer to “Complete” the Transfer Within 180 Days? 

(OLA Finding No. 6)

A. Background

1. The Moratorium on New Licenses

The Article 2B provisions on the transfer of liquor licenses 

are best understood in the context of the moratorium on the 

issuance of most new liquor licenses in Baltimore. Under a law 

enacted in 1968, the Board, with few exceptions, may not issue new 

licenses within the neighborhoods bounded by Guilford Avenue 

and Howard, Center, and 25th Streets. 1968 Md. Laws, ch. 765 

(adding former § 53B of Art. 2B (1969 Cum. Supp.)). A law 

enacted in 2008 further restricted the Board’s ability to issue new 

licenses in certain circumstances. 2008 Md. Laws, ch. 425 

(amending §§ 9-204.1 and 9-204.3).2 The Board has also imposed 

a moratorium by rule under its statutory authority to set “definite 

standards” that limit the number of licenses available for any 

 

2 For example, the Board may issue a new “BD-7 Beer, Wine and 

Liquor” license for liquor sales in “tennis and/or racquet clubs,” but not 

elsewhere. See Rules and Regulations for the Board of Liquor License 

Commissioners for Baltimore City, Rule 2.08(a)(3)(i) (1998) (“Board 

Rules”). Additional limitations, effective July 1, 2014, restrict the 

transfer of existing licenses into certain areas. 2014 Md. Laws, ch. 347 

(adding § 9-204.1(i)). 
32 [100 Op. Att’y

neighborhood. See Art. 2B § 9-201(a)(1). Under that moratorium, 

the Board will not issue most types of new licenses “so long as the 

number of all licensed premises is more than one (1) for each 

thousand . . . or major fraction thereof, of the residents of Baltimore 

City.” Board Rule 2.08. Because, in 2013, there were almost two

licenses per thousand people in Baltimore,3the Board will not issue 

new licenses for most types of liquor sales.

The moratorium was adopted in 1968 as a means of reducing 

the density of liquor outlets in Baltimore. See, e.g., City of 

Baltimore Council Bill 08-0031R (Resolution) (2008) (giving the 

history of the moratorium and noting studies finding that, “in and 

near neighborhoods where there is a high density of places that sell 

alcohol, there is a higher rate of violence”); Thornton, Greiner, and 

Jennings, “Alcohol Outlet Control Policy and Public Health in 

Baltimore,” at 6 (Jan. 2013).4 However, the moratorium does not 

apply to the renewal or “transfer of ownership and/or location” of 

licenses that had been issued before the rule was adopted. See

Board Rule 2.08. The effectiveness of the moratorium as an 

attrition measure thus depends on the extent to which a license that 

is associated with a closed business may be transferred. 

Liquor licenses in Maryland are hybrid in character, in that 

they are property for some purposes and not for others. Section 10-

501(a) provides generally that “licenses issued under the provisions 

of this article shall not be regarded as property or as conferring any 

property rights.” The Court of Appeals has construed this provision 

narrowly to apply only to the characterization of licenses as against 

the State. See Dodds v. Shamer, 339 Md. 540, 545 (1995) 

(explaining that the purpose of the provision was “to establish that 

the State’s plenary power to control the sale of liquor predominates 

over any ‘right’ in the liquor license that a licensee might seek to 

assert against the State or the State authorized liquor licensing 

authority”). Thus, as against the State, the holder of a liquor license 

 

3 Comptroller of Maryland, “Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Annual 

Report, Fiscal Year 2013,” at 30, available at http://

finances.marylandtaxes.com/static_files/revenue/alcoholtobacco/annual/

AnnualReportFY2013.pdf (showing a ratio of 1 license per 514 people). 

4 The use of a moratorium as a means of reducing the concentration 

of liquor licenses in a particular area is not uncommon. See, e.g., 

Marusic Liquors v. Daley, 55 F.3d 258, 261 (7th Cir. 1995) 

(“Moratorium ordinances eventually reduce the number of liquor outlets 

in a neighborhood; [the applicant] acknowledges that this is a 

permissible governmental objective, which in light of the twenty-first 

amendment no one could doubt.”). 
Gen. 29] 33

has neither an entitlement to, nor a property right in, a license; after 

all, there is no inherent right to sell alcoholic beverages in 

Maryland, and the General Assembly may alter the conditions on 

which the liquor boards may issue or renew these one-year licenses. 

See id. at 546 (“[S]elling liquor pursuant to a license in Maryland 

is a privilege, not a constitutional right, and . . . this privilege is 

terminable at will.”). 

As against non-State entities, however, what might seem to 

be an ephemeral grant of permission becomes a marketable 

commodity with real value. See, e.g., Rosedale Plaza Ltd. P’shp v. 

Lefta, Inc., 140 Md. App. 243, 251 (2001) (noting that “[o]ften a 

liquor license is a very valuable asset of a restaurant or bar 

business”); see also 76 Opinions of the Attorney General 31, 33 

(1991) (observing that “a [liquor] license unquestionably has 

commercial value”). Moreover, in Baltimore, that commodity is 

made scarce by the moratorium on most new licenses and the finite 

quantity of existing licenses available for transfer. So, while the 

purpose of the moratorium is to reduce by attrition the number of 

liquor establishments in the City, and the purpose of Article 2B is 

to “promote temperance,” the moratorium has created a financial 

incentive for most license-holders in Baltimore to keep their 

licenses alive and preserve the ability to transfer them. 

Consequently, certain licenses in Baltimore are brokered as assets 

of considerable value whether or not the premises for which they 

were issued are still in operation.5

2. Restrictions on the Continuing Validity of Liquor 

Licenses

The General Assembly has enacted three measures that are 

designed to restrict the ability of a licensee to hold a license merely 

as an investment, disassociated with any ongoing operation of a 

liquor outlet. First, licensees must apply every year to renew their 

licenses and, in Baltimore City, they must pay a renewal 

application fee. §§ 10-206(a), 10-301(a), (j)(2). The Board did not 

seek our opinion on the way in which it applies this provision.6 

 

5

See Lynn Anderson, “Subpoena demands liquor board data,” 

Baltimore Sun (Aug. 23, 2005) (describing how “a newly reconstituted 

liquor board has focused its attention on liquor license brokers who hold 

on to inactive licenses for years in hopes of selling them for a profit”).

6

In Baltimore, the renewal deadline has been applied flexibly. See 

Yim, LLC v. Tuzeer, 211 Md. App. 1, 28 (2013) (noting the Board’s 
34 [100 Op. Att’y

Second, § 10-504(d) provides that a license will expire when the 

licensed business has not operated for the sale of alcoholic 

beverages for a period of 180 days, unless the Board has granted a 

hardship extension (which may not cause the disuse to exceed 360 

days) or the licensee has applied to the Board for leave to transfer 

the license to another person. This provision is commonly referred 

to in Baltimore as “the 180-day Rule.” Finally, § 10-503 sets a 

different 180-day time limit on completing a license transfer that 

has been approved by the Board. § 10-503(d)(4). We will refer to 

this provision as the “transfer deadline.”

The OLA questioned the BLLC’s implementation of the 180-

day Rule and the transfer deadline. With respect to the 180-day 

Rule, the OLA found that the BLLC “did not monitor closed 

establishments to determine whether the alcoholic beverages 

licenses had expired in accordance with State law” and 

recommended that “the Board discontinue granting hardship 

extensions beyond that permitted by law.” OLA Report at 53-54 

(Finding 19; Recommendation 19). The Board did not ask for our 

opinion on this issue. The Board did, however, ask for our opinion 

as to the OLA’s finding with respect to the transfer deadline, 

namely, that “BLLC did not always ensure that license transfers 

were completed within 180 days of receiving Board approval.” 

OLA Report at 25 (Finding 6).

§ 10-503 – The Transfer Deadline

Section 10-503 of Article 2B contains some transfer 

provisions that are facially applicable statewide and some that 

apply only in certain jurisdictions. Section 10-503(a), which 

applies statewide, provides that a license holder may “transfer the 

holder’s place of business to some other location or sell or assign 

the license and transfer the holder’s stock in trade to another 

person” provided that, among other things, the new location or 

assignee “is approved by the board as in the case of an original 

application for such a license under [Art. 2B,] § 10-202.” § 10-

503(a)(2)(iv). By operation of this provision, an applicant for a 

transfer must “meet the same requirements as an applicant for a 

 

“longstanding practice of accepting late applications” for renewal); see 

also Art. 2B § 10-206(a) (providing that licenses expire on the April 30th 

after their issuance or renewal, “unless otherwise provided”). In the past, 

the Board has indicated that it applies the deadline in such a way as to 

preserve the value of licenses used as collateral by landlords, banks, and 

other interested parties “who may not know that a licensee has not 

renewed the license.” See H.B. 1363, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess., Fiscal and 

Policy Note at 2. 
Gen. 29] 35

new license,” including the requirement that the transfer is 

“necessary for the accommodation of the public.” Baltimore 

County Licensed Bev. Ass’n v. Kwon, 135 Md. App. 178, 187-88 

(2000). 

Section 10-503(d) applies only in Baltimore City and imposes 

additional conditions on license transfers. Only one of these additional conditions—the so-called “transfer deadline”—concerns 

us here: “A transfer of any license shall be completed not more 

than 180 days after the Board approves the transfer.” § 10-

503(d)(4). The OLA found that four of the ten license transfers that 

it reviewed had not been completed within 180 days of Board 

approval, with completion times ranging from 246 to 706 days. 

OLA Report at 25. The OLA thus questioned whether the Board 

had been complying with this part of the statute.

In its response to the OLA, the Board stated that, “[i]n the case 

of new construction, it is frequently impossible to complete the 

process for a new license or transfer within 180 days.”7 OLA 

Report, Appx., Board Response to Finding 6. Accordingly, the 

Board’s practice, as recounted by the OLA, is to give applicants 

“up to an additional 360 days to complete the transfer, after which 

the license would become inactive.” OLA Report at 25. The OLA 

indicated, however, that “this policy was not formalized” and “was 

not always followed.”8 Id. To the extent that the policy was 

followed, it appears that the Board’s practice is to extend the 

transfer deadline for 180 days in the same manner that it does for 

hardship extensions under § 10-504(d) (i.e., the so-called 180-day 

rule). The Auditor’s question therefore goes not only to whether 

§ 10-503 authorizes extensions of the transfer deadline, but also to 

whether § 10-504(d) authorizes hardship extensions for transfers. 

 

7 Even where a license is being transferred to an existing business, 

there are many other steps that the transferee must take before the 

transfer is deemed complete. Among other regulatory requirements, the 

transferee must pay all retail sales, amusement, admission, and 

withholding taxes and obtain a bulk transfer permit. See § 10-503(a)(2). 

8 The Board also stated that it had “previously sought advice from 

our legal advisor in the Attorney General’s Office.” OLA Report, Appx., 

Board Response to Finding 6. The Board’s response did not identify the 

advice to which it referred, however, and this Office has since advised 

that the transfer deadline is mandatory and lacks an exception for 

hardship. Letter from Kathryn Rowe, Assistant Attorney General, to 

Del. Brian K. McHale (June 18, 2013).
36 [100 Op. Att’y

B. Discussion

1. Whether § 10-503 Authorizes the Board to Grant 

Extensions to the Transfer Deadline

When the language in a statute is “plain and free from 

ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning,” it is 

normally not necessary to “look beyond” that language to 

determine legislative intent. Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Baltimore v. 

Dorsey, 430 Md. 100, 113 (2013) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Nor should an interpretation “add [o]r delete 

words to a clear and unambiguous statute.” Pridgeon v. Bd. of 

License Comm’rs, 406 Md. 229, 238 (2008) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, “the plain language must 

be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it 

belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature 

in enacting the statute.” Dorsey, 430 Md. at 113 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Statutory language can be 

ambiguous intrinsically, in that the words, on their face, are 

unclear, or extrinsically, when the words seem clear, but the 

application of them to particular circumstances is unclear. Mayor 

& Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enters., 372 Md. 514, 551-52 

(2002) (citations omitted). 

Section 10-503(d)(4) provides that “[a] transfer of any license 

shall be completed not more than 180 days after the Board approves 

the transfer.” The word “shall” is “ordinarily presumed to have a 

mandatory meaning.” In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 60 (2000) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It may be read as 

directory only when that reading is consistent with “the intention 

of the Legislature as gathered from the nature of the subject matter 

and the purposes to be accomplished.” Director, Patuxent Inst. v. 

Cash, 269 Md. 331, 344 (1973) (quoting Hitchens v. City of 

Cumberland, 215 Md. 315, 323 (1958)). Courts have generally 

discerned a merely directory intent in two sets of circumstances: 

Provisions that impose a time constraint on the issuance of an 

arbiter’s decision, see, e.g., In re Adoption of Jayden G., 433 Md. 

50, 80 (2013), or that fail to specify any sanction for noncompliance, see, e.g., Columbia Rd. Citizens’ Ass’n v. Montgomery 

County, 98 Md. App. 695, 701 (1994), are frequently interpreted as 

directory only. 

In our opinion, “shall” should be read in the mandatory sense 

here. First, neither circumstance that usually indicates the directory 

sense is present. The transfer deadline governs the conduct of the 

regulated parties, not the Judiciary, and while § 10-503 does not 

provide an express sanction for failure to comply with the 180-day 
Gen. 29] 37

deadline, the sanction is implied: The Board’s approval of a license 

transfer is valid for only 180 days, after which time the transfer is 

deemed invalid. 

Second, the legislative history of the transfer provision points 

to the mandatory sense. The transfer deadline was added in 2000 

to fill a gap in the existing law, which contained no deadline for 

completing a transfer that the Board had approved and thus allowed 

the licensee to keep the license alive indefinitely. See S.B. 128, 

2000 Leg., Reg. Sess., Revised Fiscal Note at 1 (describing the 

then-current law). The bill’s sponsor testified that the bill was 

introduced “to combat the practice of some license-holders of 

applying and getting approval for license transfers but not actually 

transferring the license.” See Yim, 211 Md. App. at 32 (describing 

the sponsor’s testimony before the Senate Economic and 

Environmental Affairs Committee). Indeed, the express purpose 

of the provision is restrictive; it was designed to “requir[e] in 

Baltimore City that a transfer of any alcoholic beverages license be 

completed in not more than a certain amount of time after [the 

Board] approves the transfer; . . . .” 2000 Md. Laws, ch. 56 

(purpose paragraph) (emphasis added). The bill did not address 

exceptions to the transfer deadline, and § 10-503 still does not 

contain any.

Subsequent legislative activity indicates that the General 

Assembly has acted to expedite the transfer process, not to sanction 

the prolonging of it. For example, legislation enacted in 2014 

closed what the Court of Special Appeals, in the year before, had 

characterized as a “striking” gap in the transfer provisions: The 

statute did not require the Board to “render a decision on a transfer 

application within a certain period of time” or place “any limits on 

the Board’s power to accept” amendments to such an application. 

Yim, 211 Md. App. at 38 (upholding the transfer of a license that 

had gone unused for almost two years while the transferor was 

revising and completing its transfer application). As a result, 

applicants were allowed to prolong indefinitely the time period 

between the 180-day rule and the transfer deadline. Id. The 

General Assembly responded in the next legislative session and 

placed time limits on both the Board’s evaluation of transfer 

applications and applicants’ ability to submit amendments. See

2014 Md. Laws, chs. 346 and 347 (amending § 10-202 by adding 

(a)(4)).

By contrast, in 2009, the General Assembly declined to enact 

legislation that would have extended, from 180 to 360 days, the 
38 [100 Op. Att’y

time period in which Baltimore City licensee could reopen a closed 

business, resume alcoholic beverages operations, or else file for a 

hardship extension before the license expires. S.B. 233, 2009 Leg., 

Reg. Sess. The bill also would have increased the maximum 

duration of a hardship extension from 360 to 720 days. Id. 

Although we hesitate to read too much into the failure of individual 

bills, the legislative record suggests that the General Assembly 

intended that the Board expedite the transfer process, not grant 

open-ended extensions.

Our opinion that the transfer deadline should be applied 

according to its plain meaning and its legislative history also 

comports with the overall statutory scheme. As discussed above, 

that scheme employs liquor licenses as one mechanism by which 

the State “regulates and controls” the distribution of alcohol in 

order to “obtain respect and obedience to law and to foster and 

promote temperance.” See § 1-101 (stating the policy of the State 

with regard to the distribution of alcoholic beverages). The 

purpose of the statutory scheme was not to create a market for 

licenses that can be held as “property” disassociated with any 

ongoing liquor establishment. See § 10-501 (liquor licenses are not 

“property”); see also Dodds, 339 Md. at 546 (explaining that liquor 

licenses are held as a privilege, not as a right, and are terminable at 

will). All in all, we think it clear that § 10-503 does not provide 

the Board with the authority to allow more than 180 days in which 

to complete a license transfer. We turn next to § 10-504 to see 

whether it provides such authority.

2. Whether § 10-504 (the “180-Day Rule”) Authorizes 

the Board to Grant Extensions to the Transfer 

Deadline

Like the transfer provisions of § 10-503, the provisions of 

§ 10-504—which govern the continuation of licenses after a 

business has stopped operating—vary by jurisdiction. Generally 

speaking, licenses expire 10 days after a licensee has vacated or 

stopped operating the licensed premises. See § 10-504(a); see also,

e.g., Rupinski v. Biel, 43 Md. App. 635 (1979) (holding that a 

license had expired, and could not be transferred, because the 

business had closed more than 10 days before the application to 

transfer). As to Baltimore City, however, the General Assembly

amended the statute in 1998 to provide that licenses do not expire 

until 180 days after a licensee has vacated or otherwise ceased to 
Gen. 29] 39

operate the licensed premises.9 See 1998 Md. Laws, ch. 166 

(formerly codified at Art. 2B § 10-504(d)(2)); see also Yim, 211 

Md. App. at 32-33 (discussing history of 180-day rule).

The 1998 law included a “hardship” provision that, under 

certain circumstances, allowed a licensee to prolong the life of a 

license beyond the 180 days provided by statute. Under that 

provision, a licensee could deposit the license with the Board and 

stop the 180-day clock for an additional 180 days if (1) “the 

licensee experiences a personal or financial hardship,” (2) the 

licensee had not been evicted, and (3) the premises were not being 

used for “any other business purpose.” See 1998 Md. Laws, ch. 

166. Moreover, the licensee could then extend the additional 180-

day period by applying to transfer the license under § 10-503. Or, 

if the licensee had died, the administrator of the estate could apply 

to continue the business, see id., as permitted under § 10-506. 

Because the version of § 10-503 in place in 1998 did not state 

any deadline for completing an approved transfer, the upshot of 

these provisions was that a licensee in Baltimore City could use the 

transfer procedures to keep an inactive license alive indefinitely. 

The licensee simply deposited the license with the Board on the 

grounds of a “personal or financial hardship,” filed a § 10-503 

application to transfer the license, and, in the event of the Board’s 

approval of the transfer, delayed completion of the transfer. 

Moreover, nothing prevented the licensee from withdrawing a 

transfer application and filing another one. Combined with the lack 

of a deadline for completing transfers, the ability of licensees to 

simply declare the existence of a “hardship” enabled them to keep 

licenses alive for well beyond 360 days after the discontinuance of 

the business. 

The same 2000 legislation that amended § 10-503 to impose 

a deadline for the completion of transfers also amended § 10-504 

to change the hardship extension process. See 2000 Md. Laws, ch. 

56; § 10-504(d)(2), (4); see also supra at 37. The 2000 legislation 

repealed the deposit provision that had allowed licensees to invoke 

the applicability of the hardship extension on their own; instead, 

licensees must now apply for a hardship extension, and the Board 

 

9 Baltimore County was exempted from the statewide provisions of 

§ 10-504(a) in 1979. See 1979 Md. Laws, ch. 304; see also Yim, 211 

Md. App. at 31. The provisions governing the continuation of licenses 

in Baltimore County are provided at § 10-504(e) and are similar to those 

that apply in the City.
40 [100 Op. Att’y

may only grant the application “on a finding that undue hardship 

currently exists causing the closing or cessation of business 

operations.” § 10-504(d)(4). While a licensee can still stop the 

clock by filing a § 10-503 transfer request, the clock now begins to 

run again on the date on which the transfer or continuation is 

approved or denied. § 10-504(d)(5)(ii). In addition, transfer 

applications that are later withdrawn no longer serve to stop the 

clock, see § 10-504(d)(6); upon the withdrawal of the application, 

the “expiration period begin[s] running again, cumulatively to the 

period before the application or request . . . .” § 10-504(d)(5). 

Finally, in 2014, the General Assembly imposed additional 

deadlines on the Board’s processing of transfer applications. See 

supra at 37-38.

The principles of statutory interpretation that we applied in 

the preceding section also apply here. The plain language of § 10-

504(d)(4) authorizes the Board to grant hardship extensions to the 

180-day rule only when the applicant has proven to the Board that 

“an undue hardship currently exists causing the closing or 

cessation” of the business for which the license is held. The 

provision thus looks to the circumstances that caused the existing 

business to close or cease operations. It does not apply to the 

circumstances of an approved license transferee who is 

encountering delays in opening a new business. In other words, the 

hardship exception does not authorize the Board to grant an 

extension on the basis of the hardship of the would-be licensee. 

The General Assembly’s intent to circumscribe the Board’s 

discretion with respect to the life of liquor licenses is apparent from 

a comparison of the transfer deadline, which contains no provisions 

for extensions, and the 180-day business closure rule. The fact that 

the General Assembly explicitly provided for “hardship” 

extensions in § 10-504, but chose not to include such a provision 

in § 10-503, makes clear that reading into § 10-503 the authority to 

grant hardship extensions to the transfer deadline would alter or 

add to that statute. See Insurance Comm’r of Md. v. Bankers Indep. 

Ins. Co., 326 Md. 617, 624 (1992); see also Dep’t of Motor 

Vehicles v. Greyhound Corp., 247 Md. 662, 668 (1967) 

(disapproving a proposed interpretation that would “add[] to [a 

statute], by judicial fiat, a provision which the Legislature did not 

see fit to include”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

As noted above, reading the hardship provision accordingly 

to its terms is consistent with the statutory goals of controlling 

liquor sales and promoting temperance. It is also consistent with 

the decisions of the Court of Appeals, which has been unwilling to 

infer an intention on the part of the General Assembly to authorize 
Gen. 29] 41

the Board to exercise powers other than those expressly provided. 

See Hollywood Prods., 344 Md. at 10-14 (holding that the Board 

did not have “implied authority to restrict the licensee’s hours of 

Sunday operation”). Noting that alcoholic beverages are regulated 

in Maryland by the “comprehensive statutory scheme” set forth in 

Article 2B, the Court stated that “the authority of the administering 

agencies”—the liquor boards—“necessarily is more circumscribed 

than [that of] the typical administrative body.” Id. at 13. The Court 

explained that, “[e]ven in cases where we have recognized broad 

delegations of authority, we have emphasized that agency rules and 

regulations must conform to the language and spirit of the statute 

under which the agency acts.” Id. at 10-11. “‘[T]he power . . . to 

make rules is not the power to make laws.’” Id. at 11 (quoting 

Sullivan, 293 Md. at 124); see also Insurance Comm’r v. Bankers, 

326 Md. at 624 (“[A]n agency may not take action which is 

inconsistent or out of harmony with, or which alters, adds to, 

extends or enlarges, subverts, impairs, limits, or restricts the act 

being administered.”) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

In sum, the “full power and authority” that § 16-301 grants to 

the Board to “adopt such reasonable rules and regulations as [it] 

may deem necessary to enable [it] effectively to discharge the 

duties imposed upon [it] by this article” does not include the power 

to change the deadline set by § 10-503. The 180-day rule and the 

transfer deadline reflect the General Assembly’s policy choices as 

to the periods of time for which a license may remain inactive and 

the grounds that may be invoked for extending those periods, and 

the post-1998 amendments reflect a legislative intent to close gaps 

that had led to indefinite extensions. To the extent that the Board 

deems the transfer deadline problematic for those license 

purchasers who wish to engage in a lengthy construction of new 

premises before completing their purchase of the license, one 

solution is legislative. But the Board may not extend the transfer 

deadline beyond the period set by the General Assembly, and an 

approved transferee who does not yet hold the license may not 

claim the § 10-504 hardship exception. 
42 [100 Op. Att’y

III

Whether Board Staff, Without the Prior Approval of the 

Board, May Address Violations and Infractions Through 

Procedures Other Than the Formal Hearing Process 

(OLA Finding No. 17)

A. Background – The Legislative Auditor’s Finding 

No. 17

The Legislative Auditor found that Board staff, on its own 

initiative, allowed violators to resolve their infractions informally 

by paying a fine without undergoing the public hearing process 

before the Board. Referring to agency staff as “BLLC” and the 

Board as the “Board,” Finding 17 of the OLA Report states: 

“BLLC used alternatives to the Board hearing process to address 

violations and infractions and the Board had not formally approved 

these alternatives.” OLA Report at 49. In summarizing the basis 

for Finding 17, the Report explains, 

BLLC had adopted alternatives to the Board 

hearing process to address licensee violations 

and infractions. These alternatives were 

essentially carrying out functions of the Board 

but were not officially approved by the Board. 

Furthermore, unlike Board hearings, these 

alternative processes were not open to the 

public. The legality of their use is questionable

since they were not addressed in State law 

pertaining to BLLC.

Id. at 49.

The Report also describes the different methods used by the 

staff for assessing fines without Board involvement. For example, 

Board staff allowed licensees to avoid a public hearing before the 

Board for certain “administrative” violations by paying the 

“administrative fee” that the Board would ordinarily charge to hold 

a hearing on such violations. Id. For first-time violations that did 

not qualify as “administrative,” the staff allowed licensees “to 

avoid a hearing before the Board by acknowledging that they 

committed the violation (essentially pleading ‘no contest’) and 

paying a $500 fine (the statutory maximum penalty for a first time 

offense).” Id. For repeat non-administrative offenses that did not 

involve violations for disturbing the peace, Board staff still allowed 

licensees to “avoid having their names appear in the public hearing 

docket (published on BLLC’s website)” by pleading “no contest.” 
Gen. 29] 43

While these cases “were forwarded to the Board for a 

determination of a fine,” they were conducted “without a hearing, 

and without the decision being documented in a transcript.” Id. 

And for what the staff considered “minor license infractions” or 

when staff had received “a number of community complaints,” the 

report describes how the Board staff used a process—known as an 

“in-house or compliance conference”—to discuss certain 

infractions with licensees. Id. at 49-50. Although staff “generally 

charged the licensee a $100 conference fee,” they did not assess 

any “additional penalty or fine” and, for most cases the Auditor 

reviewed, did not include documentation of the conferences within 

the files for the relevant licensees.10 Id. at 50. 

Although the OLA “could not readily determine the 

frequency of these alternative practices,” it recommended that the 

Board request an opinion from us “to determine if [Board] 

management has the legal authority to use alternative processes to 

address licensee violations and infractions,” and, if so, that the 

Board approve “policies and procedures to comply with the legal 

Opinion.” Id. The Report further recommended that staff “provide 

periodic reports of fines and fees assessed to licensees to the Board 

for informational purposes” and “document all decisions reached, 

including fines and fees assessed, and retain this documentation in 

the respective licensee files.” Id. (Recommendation 17).

B. Discussion – Whether the Board May Delegate to its Staff 

the Power to Impose Sanctions 

As summarized by the Court of Appeals, “[t]he actions that a 

Board may properly take under Article 2B to punish licensee 

misconduct include: impose a monetary fine, suspend a license, and 

revoke a license.” Board of Liquor License Comm’rs v. Fells Point 

Cafe, 344 Md. 120, 136-37 (1996); see also Paek v. Prince 

George’s County Bd. of License Comm’rs, 381 Md. 583, 599 

 

10 The Report also stated that Board staff also held “in-house 

conferences” to address uncontested applications for license transfers:

The Board also effectively delegated to BLLC the 

approval of license transfers that were limited to a 

change in ownership if the community was not 

contesting the transfer. BLLC met with the 

licensees in an in-house conference and was to 

document the meeting for the licensee file.

OLA Report at 50. The Board did not ask us to address this practice.
44 [100 Op. Att’y

(2004). Finding 17 raises the question of whether the Board has 

the power, whether express or implied, to delegate to its staff the 

authority to impose a fine and a “conference fee.” 

1. Express Power

To determine whether a governing body has the express 

power to delegate its statutory functions to particular employees, 

courts look at the statutes that assign the power. In Public Serv. 

Comm’n v. Wilson, 389 Md. 27 (2005), for example, the Court 

looked to the Public Service Commission’s governing statutes to 

determine whether its chairman had the authority to terminate an 

employee. Holding that the chairman lacked that power, the Court 

noted that, although “[l]anguage appears throughout the statute 

authorizing the Commission to ‘hire’ or ‘appoint’ all types of 

employees of the PSC,” “there is no mention in this statute, nor any 

other statute we could find, of language that outlines the 

Chairman’s authority, independent of the Commission’s, to ‘hire’ 

or ‘appoint’ employees . . . .” Id. at 52. In Board of Education of 

Montgomery County v. Montgomery County, again addressing 

whether a certain employee had the authority to fire another, the 

Court stated: “The Council . . . can not delegate to its employees 

the performance of a duty which the Legislature has specifically 

provided shall be performed by the Council itself.” 237 Md. 191, 

202 (1964).

The Court of Special Appeals has applied this same principle 

outside the personnel context to hold that other forms of agency 

decision-making must also be done by the people to whom, or 

bodies to which, the applicable law has delegated that function. In 

Carriage Hill-Cabin John, Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources 

Planning Comm’n, for example, the court noted that, by statute, 

“the Commission may delegate to a single Commissioner the 

responsibility for reviewing an application, conducting evidentiary 

hearings, and preparing a proposed decision.” 125 Md. App. 183, 

217 (1999). The court made clear, however, that “the Staff had no 

authority to issue a final opinion in the name of the Commission.” 

Id. at 219. 

As to the Board, we found no provision in Article 2B that 

either authorizes the Board’s staff to sanction licensees or permits 

the Board to delegate that power to staff. Instead, the article’s 

“enforcement and penalties” are conferred on the Board itself. 

Section 16-507(d), for instance, provides:

For any violation that is cause for suspension 

under the alcoholic beverage laws affecting 
Gen. 29] 45

Baltimore City, the Baltimore City Board of 

License Commissioners may:

(1) For a first offense, impose a fine of not 

more than $ 500 or suspend the license or 

both; or

(2) For any subsequent offense, impose a 

fine of not more than $ 3,000 or suspend the 

license or both.

Id. Section 16-410(e) pertains to the assessment of fees in 

connection with hearings, and it provides that “[t]he Board may 

charge fees for the production and service of summonses and 

hearing notices.” § 16-410(e)(2) (emphasis added).

The enforcement provisions of the statute define the term 

“Board” to “mean[] the Comptroller, the boards of license 

commissioners, or the members of the boards, as appropriate.” 

§ 16-410(a)(2). The term plainly does not include staff. Moreover, 

when the General Assembly describes the actions taken by Board 

staff, it does so expressly. See § 16-410(e)(2)(iii) (authorizing the 

Board to charge $25 for each address served if service is by “an 

employee of the Board”). In short, the enforcement provisions 

delegate to the Board, and not staff, the authority to impose 

sanctions and fees.

The provisions of Article 2B that relate to the liquor board 

staff are slightly less clear but, when read in context, likewise do 

not authorize the boards to delegate their authority to impose 

sanctions. Several provisions authorize the local boards to employ 

personnel, including a secretary, executive secretary, and 

“inspectors, clerical and other assistance as is necessary.” See 

§§ 15-109(d); 15-112(a)(2), (d)(10)(iv). Former § 15-112(d)(7), as 

it was at the time of the audit, provided that the “chairman of the 

Board . . . [i]s its administrative officer and is charged with the duty 

of enforcing the provisions of this article.” The chairman was to 

“personally supervise the activities and investigations of the 

several inspectors and other employees of the Board; . . . examine 

the location and general character of the licensees . . . ; and . . . 

make recommendations to the Board concerning . . . methods of 

enforcement, and promulgation of regulations to carry out the 

purposes of this article.” Id. Those provisions did not state that the 

Board may delegate its quasi-judicial powers to staff; rather, the 

chairman would take the lead in ensuring that the Board was 

fulfilling its statutory duties.
46 [100 Op. Att’y

These staffing provisions were altered by the 2014 legislation 

discussed above, which deleted the reference to the chairman’s 

powers and instead placed them with the Board or its “designee”: 

The Board or the Board’s designee governs, 

administers, and enforces the provisions of 

this article in Baltimore City, including 

performing such tasks as:

(i) Supervising the activities and investigations of the several inspectors and other 

employees of the Board; 

(ii) Examining the location and general 

character of the licensees in the City;

(iii) Reviewing the zoning of licenses . . . ; 

and 

(iv) Adopting regulations concerning zoning 

of licensees and methods of enforcement to 

carry out the purposes and enforcement of this 

article.

2014 Md. Laws, ch. 346 (codified at § 15-112(d)(8)). Although the 

amended provision might be read as broadly authorizing the Board 

to delegate to a staff “designee” the power to “enforce[]” the 

statute, we believe its text and legislative history suggest a more 

limited authority.

First, when read in its legislative context, we believe the term 

“designee” likely refers to a Board member, as opposed to a 

member of the Board’s staff. Prior to the amendment, the tasks 

enumerated in the statute had been the Chairman’s responsibility. 

Although the evident purpose of the amendment was to give the 

Board the flexibility to designate someone other than the Chairman 

to take on the enumerated tasks, nothing in the legislative history 

suggests that the amendment was intended to take the larger step of 

authorizing staff to exercise the Board’s powers. In fact, the 

amendment was part of a larger enactment focused on tightening 

the Board’s administration of the licensing laws in response to the 

OLA’s recommendations, many of which were focused on actions 

staff had been taking on its own. See S.B. 846, 2014 Leg., Reg. 

Sess., Revised Fiscal and Policy Note at 2-4 (explaining that bill 

provisions adopt many of OLA’s recommendations). That context 

suggests that the General Assembly, by deleting the specific 

reference to the Chairman, did not intend a broad delegation of 

authority to staff.
Gen. 29] 47

Second, interpreting the term “designee” to include the 

Board’s staff would seem to be inconsistent with the Court of 

Appeals’ instruction that Article 2B grants the Board only “specific 

delegated powers, rather than broad delegated authority.” Thanner 

Enters., 414 Md. at 279. In light of the strict construction given the 

Board’s powers, we believe it especially unlikely that the General 

Assembly intended to authorize the Board to delegate to staff the 

quasi-legislative power to “[a]dopt[] regulations.” See § 15-

112(d)(8)(iv). Again, we believe the better reading of the 2014 

amendment is to authorize the Board to designate other members 

of the Board to play the roles previously played by the Chairman.

Finally, even if we were to read the amendment as authorizing 

a broad delegation to staff, the specific actions that it enumerates 

do not include the power to impose fines and sanctions on behalf 

of the Board. Although the enumerated tasks are not exhaustive, 

they illustrate the types of actions the General Assembly intended 

to authorize the Board to delegate to its designee. See Md. Code 

Ann., Gen. Prov. (“GP”) § 1-110 (2014) (stating that the term 

“[i]ncludes” or “including,” where it appears in the Maryland 

Code, means “includes or including by way of illustration and not 

by way of limitation”). None of the enumerated tasks encompasses 

the imposition of fines and sanctions; to the extent they address 

enforcement, they are limited to developing “methods” of 

enforcement, not the actual imposition of fines and penalties. See 

State v. Sinclair, 274 Md. 646, 658 (1975) (rule of ejusdem generis 

provides that “the general words in the statute will usually be 

construed to include only those things of the same class or general 

nature as those specifically antecedently mentioned”). In sum, we 

see no indication that the Legislature intended to authorize the 

Board to delegate to staff the authority to impose fines and 

penalties.

2. Implied Power

The express assignment of a function to an agency secretary 

or governing board sometimes includes the implied authority to 

delegate that function to agency employees. Much depends on 

whether the function is discretionary or ministerial. When the duty 

includes purely ministerial tasks and the statute is silent on how 

they are to be performed, the express power to perform the duty 

carries with it the implied authority to delegate the ministerial 

tasks. Conversely, discretionary functions generally cannot be 

delegated. See 120 West Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor & City 

Council of Baltimore City, 413 Md. 309, 350 (2010) (“‘The rule is 
48 [100 Op. Att’y

plain and well established that legislative or discretionary powers 

or trust devolved by law or charter on a council or governing body 

cannot be delegated to others, but ministerial or administrative 

functions may be delegated to subordinate officials.’”) (quoting 

Baltimore v. Wollman, 123 Md. 310, 315 (1914)); see also 61 

Opinions of the Attorney General 734, 735-36 (1976) (stating that 

powers and duties “specifically conferred upon [a board] by statute 

could not be delegated to [staff]”). 

The Board’s imposition of fines and fees is generally a 

discretionary function that may not be delegated in the absence of 

specific authority. Section 16-507(d)(1) provides that the Board 

“may” take various measures in first-offense matters that are 

“cause for suspension.”11 Under that statute, the Board “may” 

impose a fine, and, if it does, it may do so in any amount that does 

not exceed $500. Id. The Board may also revoke, or instead, 

suspend the license. Id. The “Board” further “may” assess costs 

for hearings, notices, and summonses. § 16-410(e). For all of these 

actions, the General Assembly used the word “may,” a term that 

“connotes a permissive, discretionary function.” See Spencer v. 

Maryland State Bd. of Pharm., 380 Md. 515, 532 (2004). The 

General Assembly did not expressly authorize the Board’s staff to 

perform these discretionary functions, did not expressly authorize 

either the Board or its chair to delegate them, and did not empower 

staff and licensees to agree on off-the-record settlements of firstoffense violations. 

Under the general rule stated in 120 West Fayette, these types 

of discretionary functions must be exercised by the Board, as the 

body upon which the function “devolved by law.” 413 Md. at 350. 

We therefore think it unlikely that a court would infer from the 

Article 2B penalty provisions that staff may decide to omit an 

alleged violation from the Board’s docket, decide on the form and 

amount of the penalty, and assess “conference” costs—all without 

the input or ratification of the Board. 

Again, the authority of local liquor boards “is more 

circumscribed than [that of] the typical administrative body.” 

Hollywood Prods., 344 Md. at 13. Remarking on the General 

Assembly’s “close statutory control” over the alcoholic beverages 

business, the Court “has consistently held . . . that the General 

Assembly intended to grant the boards specific delegated powers, 

 

11 The Board lacks discretion as to the appropriate remedy for some 

first offenses. See § 10-401(a)(3) (providing that a license “must be 

revoked” for certain violations).
Gen. 29] 49

rather than broad delegated authority.” Thanner Enters., LLC v. 

Baltimore County, 414 Md. 265, 279 (2010); see also Baines v. 

Board of Liquor License Comm’rs, 100 Md. App. 136, 141 (1994) 

(noting that alcoholic beverage licensing boards must 

“scrupulously follow the statutory scheme that empowers them”). 

In Hollywood Productions, the Court stated that Maryland’s 

“elaborate statutory scheme” of alcoholic beverages regulation 

“suggests a specific, rather than broad, delegation of authority to 

the liquor boards and contradicts the notion that restrictions, 

penalties, and sanctions may be fashioned on an ad hoc basis.” 344 

Md. at 16. This precedent, too, works against the notion that 

sanctions and fees may be imposed by Board staff instead of the 

Board.

Furthermore, allowing staff to exercise the Board’s 

enforcement authority without the Board’s involvement would 

undermine the Board’s ability to implement other aspects of the 

statutory scheme. The Board’s major functions include issuing, 

renewing, and transferring licenses, decisions that variously require 

the Board to evaluate the fitness of the licensee, the operation of 

the premises, and the location of the premises. See §§ 10-202(a)(2) 

(licensing standards); 10-301 (b), (c), (j) (renewal standards); 10-

503 (transfer standards). In our view, an agreement by staff and a 

licensee that certain violations can be resolved without bringing 

them to the attention of the Board would frustrate the Board’s 

ability to fully address future matters to which the fitness of the 

licensee or location and operation of the premises would be 

relevant.

Similarly, Article 2B entitles members of the public to oppose 

the issuance of a license, § 10-202(a)(1)(iv), and members of the 

public in the precinct of the licensed premises may seek the 

revocation of the license. § 10-403(a). The omission of violations 

from the Board’s docket means that a person looking at a licensee’s 

records will not have complete information on the licensee and the 

establishment. In sum, we see no statutory provision that 

authorizes the Board’s staff to withhold from the Board’s records, 

and thus presumably from the public, the fact of a licensee’s “first 

offense.”

3. Actual Delegation

Finally, even if Article 2B authorized the Board to delegate to 

staff the power to impose penalties, that power may not be 

exercised in the absence of an actual delegation. See Maryland 
50 [100 Op. Att’y

State Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Phoebus, 319 Md. 710 

(1990) (noting that, although the statute authorized the agency 

secretary to delegate the personnel decision to a subordinate, the 

agency did not establish that the secretary had made the 

delegation); Eaton v. Rosewood Ctr., 86 Md. App. 366, 373 (1991) 

(noting that the department secretary was statutorily authorized to 

delegate certain hearing and final decision-making to a subordinate 

and had done so). Here, we see nothing in the OLA Audit or the 

Board’s response that would suggest that the Board has ceded to 

staff any authority to consider whether, and in what form, to impose 

sanctions on licensees. Nor do the Board’s Rules evidence any 

intent by the Board to do so. So, even if the Board had the statutory 

authority to delegate that function to the staff—which we do not 

believe is the case—it does not appear that the Board has actually 

done so.

In sum, it is our opinion that the Board does not have statutory 

authority to delegate to its staff the discretionary functions of 

deciding whether, and in what amount, to fine a first-time offender 

and whether to assess an administrative fee. Further, we have 

found no authority for the proposition that staff may decide to omit 

violations from the public record until such time as the licensee 

commits another violation. 

IV

Whether the Open Meetings Act Requires the Board to Adopt 

Written Minutes of its Hearings on the Cases Before it 

(OLA Finding 20)

The Board’s last question relates to whether the Board’s 

hearings are subject to the Open Meetings Act, and, if so, whether 

the Board has been complying with the Act’s requirement that a 

public body keep minutes of its meetings. See OLA Report at 54 

(Finding 20) (“Certain Board hearing practices may not comply 

with the Open Meetings Act.”). The OLA described the Board’s 

practices as follows:

Although all Board hearings were fully 

transcribed by an independent vendor, [staff] 

generally obtained only a certified copy of the 

decision phase of the transcript for inclusion 

in the licensee file. The Board did not prepare 

any other record of the meeting minutes; 

therefore, it did not review and approve 

transcripts from prior meetings. The Board 

generally obtained complete transcripts only 
Gen. 29] 51

for disciplinary decisions appealed to the 

Circuit Court.

* * *

In addition, each Board Commissioner did not 

state his or her individual vote for the record 

during the hearing as also required by the 

[Open Meetings] Act; rather, after discussion 

by the Commissioners off the record, the 

Board Chairman stated the overall decision of 

the Commissioners for the record.

Id. The Legislative Auditor also stated that:

Although State law governing [the Board] 

requires [the Board] to be subject to the Open 

Meetings Act, it is unclear as to whether all

actions taken at Board hearings are subject to 

the Open Meetings Act. Public Board 

hearings include actions relating to the 

approval of new licenses, the approval of 

license transfers, and disciplinary proceedings 

for licensee violations. Certain of these 

administrative actions can be appealed to the 

Circuit Court and, therefore, are considered 

quasi-judicial in nature. Quasi-judicial 

functions, by law, are generally not subject to 

the Open Meetings Act.

Id. The Auditor recommended that the Board “obtain written 

advice from the Office of the Attorney General over what Board 

hearing actions are subject to the minutes provisions of the Open 

Meetings Act.” Id. at 55.

A. Discussion

Maryland’s Open Meetings Act applies to entities that fall 

within that Act’s definition of a “public body” when they are 

meeting to perform a function to which the Act applies. See GP 

§§ 3-103 (stating the scope of the Act). When a public body meets 

to consider a matter, the Act applies to all phases of the public 

body’s deliberations, not just the phase at which the public body 

acts on the matter. See, e.g., City of New Carrollton v. Rodgers, 

287 Md. 56, 72 (1980) (explaining that the “consideration or 

transaction of public business” that a public body must conduct in 
52 [100 Op. Att’y

compliance with the Act embraces “every step of the process,” not 

simply the point at which the public body reaches a decision). 

When the Act applies to a public body’s meeting, the public 

body must keep minutes. GP § 3-306(b). The Board, as a multimember body created by State statute, unquestionably falls within 

the Act’s definition of a public body. See GP § 3-101(h)(1) 

(including in the definition of “public body” entities that consist of 

“at least 2 individuals” and are created by “State statute”); Art. 2B, 

§ 15-101(a), (d) (requiring the Governor to appoint a board of 

license commissioners for Baltimore City). Your question goes to 

whether the functions that the Board performs at its meetings are 

covered by the Act, and, if so, whether the use of partial transcripts 

to document those meetings complies with the Act’s requirements 

on the keeping of minutes.

The question of whether a public body is meeting to perform 

a function within the Act depends on what the public body 

discusses at the meeting and thus is not susceptible to a categorical 

answer. We can, however, outline the governing principles. First, 

the Act applies whenever a quorum of the members of a public 

body convenes to consider or transact public business unless the 

Act expressly provides otherwise. GP §§ 3-301 (open meeting 

requirement); 3-101(g) (definition of the word “meet”). Second, 

the Act applies when a public body is meeting “to consider . . . 

granting a license or permit.” GP § 3-103(b). Third, the verb 

“consider” includes every stage of the public body’s deliberations 

on the matter. See, e.g., Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty 

Assoc., 395 Md. 299, 331 (2006) (deliberative process of public 

body must be open to the public because “every step of the process 

comprises the consideration or transaction of public business”). 

Fourth, the Act does not apply when the public body is performing 

“quasi-judicial” functions that do not involve granting a license or 

permit. GP § 3-103(a)(1)(iii), (b). Under the Act, the term “quasijudicial function” includes the “determination of . . . a proceeding 

before an administrative agency for which Title 7, Chapter 200 of 

the Maryland Rules would govern judicial review.” GP § 3-101(i). 

Those Maryland Rules govern appeals to circuit court when 

allowed by statute. See Md. Rule 7-201(a).

As applied to the work of the Board, these provisions of the 

Act require the Board to meet openly whenever it considers 

granting a license, whether by transfer or otherwise.12 The Act thus 

 

12 Although the Open Meetings Act defers to the provisions of other 

law when they are “more stringent,” see GP § 3-105, the Act’s notice 
Gen. 29] 53

requires that the Board conduct all phases of these deliberations in 

public. As to disciplinary proceedings, where the statute provides 

for an appeal to the circuit court, the Board’s deliberations would 

likely be excluded from the Act so long as the Board’s discussions 

are confined to that matter. The determination of whether a 

particular discussion is expressly excluded from the Act thus 

depends on the nature of the matter before the Board and should be 

made on a case-by-case basis. For the meetings that are subject to 

the Act, the question then becomes whether the Board’s transcripts 

suffice as “minutes” under the Act. 

When the Act applies to a meeting, the Board must keep 

minutes, adopt them “as soon as practicable after [it] meets,” and 

then make them available for public inspection. See GP § 3-306. 

Written minutes must reflect “each item that was considered,” the 

action that the Board “took on each item,” and “each vote that was 

recorded.” GP § 3-306(c). The Board need not prepare written 

minutes if “live and archived video or audio streaming of the open 

session is available,” GP § 3-306(b)(2), and a transcript of a 

meeting could satisfy the requirement that minutes be kept. See 6 

OMCB Opinions 164, 168-69 (2009).13 Any such transcript, 

however, must include the information required by the Act and in 

“sufficient detail so that a member of the public who reviews the 

minutes can gain an appreciation of the issue under discussion.” 6 

OMCB Opinions 110, 113 (2009). If the Board wishes to use its 

transcripts as minutes, it must review and approve them, because 

the Act requires the adoption of minutes.

V

Conclusion

We conclude that: (1) the Board lacks the authority to grant 

hardship extensions to the transfer deadline set by § 10-504(d)(4); 

 

provisions appear to be more stringent than those in Article 2B. Whereas 

the notice provisions of Article 2B only require the Board to give public 

notice of its “hearings” on applications for licenses and some license 

transfers, § 10-202(a), (e)(2), the Open Meetings Act explicitly applies 

whenever a public body is “meeting” to consider granting a license. GP 

§ 3-103(b)(1). The Act’s requirements thus control here.

13 The Court of Special Appeals, while noting that Compliance Board 

opinions “are advisory only,” see GP § 3-209, has found those opinions 

“to be of some utility” when there is a “dearth of authority” on an open 

meetings issue. Dyer v. Board of Educ. of Howard County, 216 Md. 

App. 530, 537 n.4, cert. denied 439 Md. 329 (2014). 
54 [100 Op. Att’y

(2) the Board lacks the authority to delegate to its staff the 

discretionary function of imposing sanctions on licensees; and (3) 

the Board’s deliberations and actions on granting, renewing, and 

transferring licenses are subject to the Open Meetings Act, but, to 

the extent that the Board’s actions on other matters are subject to 

judicial review, the Board’s deliberations on those matters are 

likely not subject to that Act. When the Open Meetings Act 

applies, the Board must keep minutes in one of the forms required 

by the Open Meetings Act and must include the information 

required by that law.

Brian E. Frosh

Attorney General of Maryland

Ann MacNeille

Assistant Attorney General

Adam D. Snyder

Chief Counsel, Opinions & Advice