[Cite as Wightman v. Darty, 2023-Ohio-3748.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

FAYETTE COUNTY

PATRICIA J. WIGHTMAN nka 

STUBBLEFIELD,

Appellant,

 - vs -

ANDREW PHILLIP DARTY,

Appellee.

:

:

:

:

:

:

CASE NO. CA2023-03-003

O P I N I O N

10/16/2023

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUVENILE DIVISION

Case No. AD20160467

Patricia J. Wightman nka Stubblefield, pro se.

Andrea M. VanFossen, for appellee, Fayette County Child Support Enforcement Agency.

PIPER, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Patricia Wightman-Stubblefield (Stubblefield), appeals a decision 

from the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating child 

support and ordering her to return overpaid child support to the obligor, Andrew Darty. 

Stubblefield, appearing pro se, argues that she should not be required to return the overpaid 

child support. 
Fayette CA2023-03-003

- 2 -

Background

{¶ 2} Stubblefield and Darty are the biological parents of E.W., a child born in May 

of 2016.1 Following the establishment of paternity, Darty was ordered to pay Stubblefield 

child support. This order was in effect for several years with some modifications. It is 

undisputed that E.W. was adopted by Stubblefield's husband on December 17, 2021. 

{¶ 3} The record shows that Darty continued to pay child support even after the 

adoption. The Fayette County Child Support Enforcement Agency ("CSEA") estimated that 

Darty overpaid child support to Stubblefield in the amount of $1,472.84.2

Motion to Terminate Child Support

{¶ 4} On December 15, 2022, CSEA moved to terminate child support alleging it 

received information about an adoption. CSEA stated that it had been unable to confirm 

that a final adoption order had been issued because Stubblefield failed to provide any 

documentation. The trial court set the matter for a hearing. 

{¶ 5} The agency began the hearing by stating that ordinarily this matter would have 

been handled administratively but it had been unable to obtain the necessary information 

from Stubblefield. Stubblefield made a brief opening statement expressing her 

dissatisfaction with the agency. She said her prior legal counsel told her that she did not 

have to move forward with terminating child support and that it was Darty's responsibility. 

She also claimed the agency did not attempt to contact her or attempt to obtain the 

necessary information until recently. 

1. Darty has not been involved in this appeal. An appellee's brief on behalf of CSEA was filed by Andrea 

VanFossen as the Title IV-D attorney. The responsibilities of a Title IV-D attorney include ensuring the 

correctness of administrative review numbers, writing motions, and submitting judgment entries regarding 

child support. Randal S. O. v. Tammy M. R., 6th Dist. Huron No. H-04-011, 2004-Ohio-6469, ¶ 2.

2. The CSEA case manager explained the overpayment figure was only an estimate because Stubblefield 

did not inform the agency of the date of adoption until a hearing was held on the motion to terminate. At the 

oral argument in this appeal, Stubblefield stated the figure was approximately $1,600 in overpaid child support. 
Fayette CA2023-03-003

- 3 -

{¶ 6} CSEA presented testimony about contacts it had with Stubblefield regarding 

an adoption or possible adoption. A case manager testified that Stubblefield first left a 

voicemail with the agency on March 25, 2022, inquiring about the collection of arrears 

following an adoption. The case manager testified that the agency returned Stubblefield's 

call and explained the process over the phone. The call ended with the agency advising 

Stubblefield to keep the agency updated. 

{¶ 7} The case manager testified that on April 12, 2022, Stubblefield informed the 

agency that E.W. had been adopted by Stubblefield's husband in December of 2021. CSEA 

informed Stubblefield that she needed to provide the agency with the adoption order. 

Stubblefield responded by telling the agency that she had not yet received the paperwork. 

Two days later Stubblefield informed the agency that she had the adoption order. The 

agency reminded Stubblefield she needed to provide the adoption order to make any 

changes to the case. It is undisputed that Stubblefield did not provide the adoption order 

until the day of the hearing. 

{¶ 8} The case manager testified that Darty continued paying child support, which 

went to Stubblefield, until around September 2022. Around that time, Darty contacted 

CSEA and provided CSEA with a copy of his signed consent to the adoption. Although 

Darty provided the agency with his consent to the adoption, he was apparently unable to 

provide the adoption order. Following the communication with Darty, CSEA placed a hold 

on the account due to possible adoption. The case manager testified the agency made one 

last attempt to obtain the adoption order from Stubblefield but was unsuccessful. During 

the last attempt, Stubblefield told CSEA that she had done all she needed to do and that it 

was not her responsibility to provide the adoption order to the agency. She then told the 

agency that Darty should have to provide the adoption order to CSEA. 

{¶ 9} Stubblefield produced the final decree of adoption during the hearing. 
Fayette CA2023-03-003

- 4 -

Stubblefield testified that she felt like she had gone through every possible channel to have 

a proper adoption finalized. Stubblefield said she was informed by legal counsel that it was 

not her responsibility to turn in paperwork. She blamed the agency for placing this burden 

on her, instead of Darty. Stubblefield said she was "not opposed to the child support case 

being closed." However, Stubblefield testified that she did not think she should be 

responsible for returning the overpaid child support. 

{¶ 10} On February 1, 2023, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Darty's 

child support obligation effective the date of the adoption. The juvenile court also 

determined that Stubblefield failed to provide the agency with the necessary adoption order, 

which resulted in overpaid child support. Therefore, the juvenile court stated that "CSEA 

shall determine funds that have been overpaid" by Darty and that Stubblefield "shall be 

ordered to pay on the funds she was overpaid at a rate of $50.00 per month until the 

overpayment has been paid in full." Stubblefield timely appealed, raising four assignments 

of error for review. 

Appeal

{¶ 11} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶ 12} THE FAYETTE COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT AGENCY FAILED TO 

PROPERLY INVESTIGATE THE TERMINATION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER.3 

{¶ 13} In her first assignment of error, Stubblefield argues CSEA failed to conduct a 

proper investigation to terminate the support order in accordance with "R.C. 5101:12-60-

50.1." She claims that had the CSEA taken proper action on the account and been "in 

3. The assignment of error listed in the body of Stubblefield’s brief is not consistent with the assignment of 

error listed in the table of contents, thereby violating this court’s Local Rule 11(B)(3). In the table of contents, 

Stubblefield wrote "THE TRIAL COURT AND THE FAYETTE COUNTY CSEA ERRED BY FAILING TO 

INVESTIGATE THE TERMINATION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER IN A TIMELY MANNER." It is not 

clear how the trial court would be engaged in such an investigation and Stubblefield offers no explanation in 

support. 
Fayette CA2023-03-003

- 5 -

compliance with R.C. Rule 5101:12-60-50 [sic], there would not have been any erroneous 

payments collected on the account." 

{¶ 14} A juvenile court has wide discretion regarding child support obligations, and 

the decision of the juvenile court will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Blair 

v. Adkins, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2020-10-018, 2021-Ohio-2292, ¶ 15. An abuse of

discretion is more than an error of law; it implies that the trial court acted unreasonably, 

arbitrarily, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

{¶ 15} Pursuant to R.C. 3119.88, a child support order should terminate upon the

child's adoption. R.C. 3119.87 requires the obligee of a child support order to immediately 

notify the agency of any reason why child support should be terminated. Boone v. Brown, 

3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-06-14, 2006-Ohio-5967, ¶ 5. The failure to do so is contempt of 

court. Id. The obligor may notify the agency but is not mandated to do so. Id.

{¶ 16} Stubblefield cites "R.C. 5101:12-60-50.1" for the proposition that the CSEA 

had a duty to conduct an investigation to either terminate the support order or take some 

action to prevent the overpayment of child support. We presume that Stubblefield refers to 

Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12-60-50.1, which states that CSEA "shall complete an 

administrative termination investigation and issue findings and recommendations regarding 

whether the child support order should terminate within twenty days of the date the CSEA 

is notified by either the obligee or obligor or becomes aware" of a required administrative 

termination reason. 

{¶ 17} The juvenile court did not address this issue because it was never raised 

below. Stubblefield did not once mention Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12-60-50.1 or argue she 

should be permitted to retain overpaid child support because the agency failed to complete 

an investigation in twenty days. Though she expressed dissatisfaction with the agency and 

the process, her argument below was that Darty should have been responsible for providing 
Fayette CA2023-03-003

- 6 -

the agency with the adoption order. She also suggested CSEA should have obtained the 

documents "through other individuals who had more responsibility in this case." It is well 

established that a party may not raise new issues or legal theories for the first time on 

appeal. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Washington, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-10-214, 2015-

Ohio-2988, ¶ 17; BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mullins, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2013-

12-015, 2014-Ohio-4761, ¶ 33 ("it is axiomatic that a party cannot raise new issues or legal 

theories for the first time on appeal and failure to raise an issue before the trial court results 

in waiver of that issue for appellate purposes"). 

{¶ 18} We are mindful that Stubblefield has represented herself throughout this 

process. However, pro se litigants are held to the same standard as litigants who are 

represented by counsel. Havens v. Havens, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2022-01-002, 2022-

Ohio-3103, ¶ 18. As a result, pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law 

and correct legal procedures so that they remain subject to the same rules and procedures 

to which represented litigants are bound. Sparks v. Sparks, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-

10-095, 2016-Ohio-2896, ¶ 6. In other words, "[p]ro se litigants are not to be accorded 

greater rights and must accept the results of their own mistakes and errors, including those 

related to correct legal procedure." Cox v. Zimmerman, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2011-

03-022, 2012-Ohio-226, ¶ 21. 

{¶ 19} However, even if Stubblefield had raised this argument below, the result 

would remain the same. Assuming Stubblefield's oral representations were sufficient to put 

the agency on notice of the adoption, no statute or administrative rule specifies the 

consequences if the agency fails to complete an investigation within twenty days. The 

agency's inability to timely complete an investigation was primarily due to the lack of 

cooperation received from Stubblefield. Furthermore, the failure to complete an 

investigation within twenty days does not result in a windfall for an obligee. There is simply 
Fayette CA2023-03-003

- 7 -

no support for Stubblefield's argument that she should be entitled to retain overpaid child 

support paid by an obligor when the agency fails to complete an investigation within twenty 

days. 

{¶ 20} It is clear that in the proceedings below, and continuing throughout this 

appeal, Stubblefield places much of the blame for this situation on Darty. She maintains 

that Darty should have been the one responsible for providing notice of the adoption and 

argues that CSEA has not held Darty to the "same standard" as her suggesting that she 

has been treated unfairly. However, Stubblefield, as the obligee, had the mandatory duty 

to notify CSEA of any reason child support should terminate. R.C. 3119.87. The statute 

only states that the obligor, in this case, Darty, may notify the child support enforcement 

agency administering the child support order. Id. When used in a statute, the word "shall"

generally renders the provision in which it is contained mandatory, while the word "may"

generally renders a provision optional, permissive, or discretionary. Dorrian v. Scioto 

Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 107 (1971). 

{¶ 21} Moreover, Stubblefield may be operating under the misconception that these 

adoption records were easily obtainable. Adoption records are expressly cloaked in 

confidentiality by statute. R.C. 3107.17; Wood Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Serv. v. Pete F., 

6th Dist. Wood No. WD-05-023, 2005-Ohio-6006, ¶ 12-13. Darty was able to provide CSEA 

with his consent to adopt, but apparently not the final adoption order. Until Stubblefield 

presented the order at the hearing, it is undisputed that no one at CSEA had seen a final 

order confirming the adoption. 

{¶ 22} We are not unsympathetic to what clearly seems to be an issue with 

miscommunication. It is unfortunate that a hold could not have been placed on the account 

sooner. As noted earlier, the agency placed a hold on the account in September after Darty 

informed CSEA of the adoption but not in April when Stubblefield did. The agency explained 
Fayette CA2023-03-003

- 8 -

that Darty provided a document showing his consent to the adoption, thus justifying the 

issuance of the hold, while Stubblefield had been less than clear in her representations. 

The agency reiterated that Stubblefield never provided it with a date the adoption was 

completed and failed to timely provide the necessary documents. Both sides clearly assign 

fault to one another. While there may have been a miscommunication, the simple fact 

remains that Stubblefield was aware that once the adoption was completed, she no longer 

was entitled to receive any child support payments. It does not seem unfair or unjustified 

for the juvenile court to order the return of overpaid child support payments, nor do we find 

that such an order amounts to an abuse of discretion. 

{¶ 23} In summary, the issue raised with regard to CSEA's duty to investigate earlier 

pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12-60-50.1 was not raised in the juvenile court below and 

cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. However, it was ultimately Stubblefield,

not Darty, who had the responsibility to notify CSEA of the adoption. We fail to understand 

why Stubblefield believes she should be able to retain the overpaid child support. For those 

reasons, we decline to find the juvenile court's decision amounts to an abuse of discretion. 

{¶ 24} Assignment of Error No. 2:

{¶ 25} THE TRIAL COURT AND FAYETTE COUNTY CSEA DISREGARDED THE 

PROCESS FOR TERMINATING A SUPPORT ORDER AND IGNORED OHIO REVISED 

CODE 3119.

{¶ 26} In her second assignment of error, Stubblefield argues that CSEA did not 

have the authority to file for judicial review of a child support obligation in the absence of a 

request for a hearing by either the obligor or obligee. She therefore states that the juvenile 

court did not have authority to conduct a hearing on the motion to terminate. However, this 

argument is clearly without merit as R.C. 3119.88(B) states that a "child support order may 

be terminated by the court or child support enforcement agency for any reasons listed in 
Fayette CA2023-03-003

- 9 -

division (A) of this section." Adoption is one of the reasons listed. R.C. 3119.88(A)(10). 

Where a child support overpayment is found, the trial court has discretion in ordering 

repayment. Dietrich v. Dietrich, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93786, 2010-Ohio-3608, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 27} The cases cited by Stubblefield, Hayslip v. Hanshaw, 4th Dist. Highland No. 

15CA20, 2016-Ohio-3339, and Sotock v. Kebe, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99450, 2013-Ohio4494, are both factually and legally distinguishable from the case at bar.4

 The juvenile court 

clearly had the authority to hold a hearing, terminate the support order, and order the return 

of the overpaid child support. Stubblefield's second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 28} Assignment of Error No. 3: 

{¶ 29} THE CSEA IGNORED THE LANGUAGE IN RULE 5101:12 OF THE OHIO 

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE REGARDING THE RECOUPMENT PROCESS. 

{¶ 30} In her third assignment of error, Stubblefield argues CSEA was not permitted 

to use the recoupment process when an erroneous payment is made as a result of a remitter 

error. She points to Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12-80-05.6(C), which states:

When an erroneous payment is the result of a remitter error, the 

remitter is responsible for resolving the error. When the CSEA 

elects to assist a remitter, via the recoupment process, in 

recovering a payment issued as a result of a remitter error, the 

CSEA shall cover the fiscal impact of the remitter error.

"Remitter" means any entity or individual (e.g., obligor, obligee, employer, financial 

institution, third party) that submits a payment to CSPC or a CSEA. Ohio Adm.Code 

5101:12-80-05(C)(10). "Remitter error" means any factual misstatement in the submission 

of a support payment and includes, but is not limited to: an incorrect posting identifier, 

payment amount, or payment distribution calculation contained within the payment or 

4. Hayslip involved a case that had gone through the administrative review process of CSEA. Where neither 

party objected to the administrative determination, the Fourth District held that the trial court was required to 

issue a revised court order rather than invoke its own inherent authority to review the agency's child support 

calculation. Id. at ¶ 26. Sotock involved a case where the obligor did not receive a copy of the CSEA's 

recommendation prior to the trial court's adoption of that recommendation. Id. at ¶ 7. 
Fayette CA2023-03-003

- 10 -

associated remittance documentation. Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12-80-05(C)(11). 

{¶ 31} Despite her arguments to the contrary, the funds the juvenile court ordered 

Stubblefield to return are not remitter error payments. Stubblefield was ordered to return 

overpaid child support payments. Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12-80-05.6(A)(2) specifically 

allows for the recoupment process to be used to refund overpaid child support payments 

upon termination of a support order and the juvenile court had discretion in ordering 

repayment. See Dietrich, 2010-Ohio-3608 at ¶ 10. In this case, the juvenile court 

determined that Darty continued making child support payments even after E.W.'s adoption 

and ordered Stubblefield to return the overpaid child support to Darty. There was no error

below. Stubblefield's third assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 32} Assignment of Error No. 4:

{¶ 33} THE ACTIONS BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE ISSUED JUDGEMENT 

[sic] ENTRY IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY THE 

TRIAL COURT. 

{¶ 34} In her final assignment of error, Stubblefield argues that the juvenile court's 

decision ordering her to return the overpaid child support obligation was an abuse of 

discretion and also a denial of due process. This argument reiterates her previous 

arguments that the CSEA did not act diligently to investigate whether there was a reason 

to terminate child support. She also argues that CSEA's motion to terminate was defective 

for not complying with the Fayette County Domestic Relations Court's Local Rule 2.04, as 

it did not include the grounds authorizing it to file the motion. However, the local rule cited 

by Stubblefield was inapplicable to this proceeding, as it was in the juvenile court, not the 

domestic relations court. We likewise find that Stubblefield was not deprived of due process 

of law, as she had notice and the opportunity to be heard. Lemasters v. Lemasters, 12th 

Dist. Madison No. CA2018-06-018, 2019-Ohio-4395, ¶ 35. Stubblefield had the opportunity 
Fayette CA2023-03-003

- 11 -

to present her case and the juvenile court's decision appropriately ordered her to return the 

overpaid child support to which she was not entitled. There was no abuse of discretion or 

denial of due process. Stubblefield's fourth assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶ 35} Following review of the record, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion terminating the child support order and ordering Stubblefield to return the 

overpaid child support to Darty. Accordingly, we find Stubblefield's four assignments of 

error are without merit and are hereby overruled.

{¶ 36} Judgment affirmed. 

S. POWELL, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.