Opinion filed July 25, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-22-00289-CR

__________

CHRISTOPHER CULLEN WEEKES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 266th District Court

Erath County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CR15656

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The jury found Appellant, Christopher Cullen Weekes, guilty of burglary of a 

habitation with intent to commit assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1)

(West 2019). The jury also found that the two prior convictions alleged by the State 

for enhancement purposes were true. The jury assessed Appellant’s punishment at 

confinement for a term of fifty-three years in the Institutional Division of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice. 
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In two issues, Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support 

the jury’s verdict and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his 

trial attorney did not request a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense. We 

affirm.

Background Facts

Erath County Deputy Taylor Tully, who was a 9-1-1 dispatcher at the time of 

the offense, testified that Janice Wood called 9-1-1 at around 9:30 p.m. on March 

31, 2021, and told her that Appellant was yelling and “trying to bust through her 

door.” Wood went into another room and told Deputy Tully that Appellant “was 

continuing to bust through doors to get to her.” Deputy Tully testified that she heard 

Appellant enter the room Wood was in and “heard the phone, what appeared to [her], 

being broken, buttons pressed, [Wood] upset, [Appellant] yelling.” Appellant can 

be heard yelling profanities on the 9-1-1 call recordings. 

In a subsequent 9-1-1 call, Wood told Deputy Tully that Appellant pushed her 

onto the bed in the room, took the phone from her, and broke it. Wood told Deputy 

Tully that she was not injured. Appellant’s mother called 9-1-1 and told Deputy 

Tully that Wood “fell back” on the bed. 

Lieutenant Tye Box with the Erath County Sheriff’s Office testified that he 

spoke with Wood shortly after the incident. Wood was “very upset” and “still 

shaking.” Wood told Lieutenant Box that Appellant was yelling about his house and 

that she and Appellant’s mother had locked themselves behind three doors. Wood 

said that Appellant kicked each door down, found the women in the bedroom, ripped 

the phone out of Wood’s hand and broke it, and “threw her down on to the bed and 

was screaming . . . at his mom.”

Photographs of the damaged doors were admitted into evidence, as well as a 

photograph of a broken phone. Lieutenant Box testified that Wood showed him the 

phone and told him that Appellant broke it. Lieutenant Box also testified that the 
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damage done to the three doors was consistent with someone forcing their way 

through a door by kicking it or “throwing your body into it.” 

Wood testified that Appellant’s mother, who had been living with Wood, went 

outside to speak to Appellant on the night of the incident. Wood called 9-1-1 

because she could hear Appellant yelling, and she was scared he would hurt his 

mother. Appellant’s mother came into the house, locked the back door, the “kitchen 

door,” and the bedroom that Wood was in. Wood said that Appellant “bust[ed] the 

doorframe[s]” in the kitchen and bedroom. Wood testified that Appellant then 

entered the bedroom and began screaming at her, forcing her to back up against the 

bed. Wood said that she sat down on the bed and then laid back on the bed while 

holding the phone. Wood testified that Appellant grabbed the phone from her hand, 

threw it, and then left. Wood testified that Appellant did not injure her and did not 

push her onto the bed. 

Wood confirmed that she wrote a statement on the night of the incident stating 

that Appellant grabbed the phone out of her hand, “shoved [her] down on the bed,” 

threw her phone, and broke it. Wood testified that she told the truth about what 

happened on the night of the incident, that she was telling the truth the “best [she]

can remember” while testifying, and that her memory of the incident was likely 

better on the night it happened than it was at trial.

Appellant was sitting on a riding lawnmower outside Wood’s house when 

responding officers arrived. Appellant was detained while officers completed their 

investigation. Appellant did not have any weapons with him. Deputy Jake Bolin, 

who worked for the Erath County Sheriff’s Office at the time of the incident, testified 

that Appellant was “pretty mad” and told officers that his house was flooding. 

Deputy Bolin went to Appellant’s home to see whether any flooding “was 

actually happening.” Deputy Bolin found a bathtub that had been “stopped up” with 

“pots and pans and all kinds of stuff” overflowing onto the bathroom floor. Deputy 
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Bolin was unable to turn the water off because “someone had ripped off the [faucet] 

knobs.” Officers had to turn off the water main with pliers to get the water to stop 

flowing. 

Analysis

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first issue, Appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s verdict because “the State presented no evidence that when 

Appellant first crossed the threshold into Wood’s house, he intended to cause 

physical contact with Wood or that Appellant knew Wood would regard the contact 

as offensive or provocative.” Appellant’s sufficiency challenge is limited to whether 

he had intent to commit assault at the time he broke into Wood’s home.1

 

We review a sufficiency of the evidence issue under the standard of review 

set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 

893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rationa 

trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010). 

When conducting a sufficiency review, we defer to the factfinder’s role as the 

sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be 

afforded. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04 (West 1979); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d 

at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the 

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts 

to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 

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Appellant concedes in his brief that he “broke through” locked doors and into Wood’s home. 
5

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When the record supports conflicting inferences, we 

presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to 

that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

It is not necessary that the evidence directly proves the defendant’s guilt; 

circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a 

defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to establish 

guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing 

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not 

point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating 

circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. 

Because evidence must be considered cumulatively, appellate courts are not 

permitted to use a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the 

evidence. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Instead, 

appellate courts must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. 

State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

We measure sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as 

defined in a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that 

“accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily 

increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of 

liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was 

tried.” Id.

As relevant to this case, a person commits a burglary if a person enters a 

habitation without the consent of the owner and with the intent to commit an assault. 

See PENAL § 30.02(a)(1). “[T]he gravamen of a burglary is the entry without the 

effective consent of the owner and with the requisite mental state.” Ex parte 

Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “The offense is complete 
6

once the unlawful entry is made, without regard to whether the intended [assault,] 

theft[,] or felony is also completed.” Id. A person commits simple assault when the 

person: (1) “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;”

(2) “intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury;” or 

(3) “intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the 

person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as 

offensive or provocative.” PENAL § 22.01(a) (West Supp. 2023). Here, the trial 

court’s charge restricted the manner and means of simple assault to that contained 

in Section 22.01(a)(3)—intentionally or knowingly causing physical contact with 

another when the person knows or reasonably should believe that the other will 

regard the contact as offensive or provocative. See id.

The factfinder may infer a defendant’s intent by his conduct. Conner v. State, 

67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Generally, intent is proven by 

circumstantial rather than direct evidence. See, e.g., Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Intent may be inferred by the acts, words, and conduct of 

the accused. Id. Further, the events of a burglary may imply the intent with which 

the burglar entered. Caballero v. State, 292 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d) (citing Coleman v. State, 832 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d)).

Appellant asserts that he “repeatedly made his intent known” when he “burst 

into Wood’s home shouting his house was flooding and he needed help.” Appellant 

further asserts that the State presented no evidence to rebut Appellant’s contention 

that he forcefully entered Wood’s home in order to get help because the State did 

not show that Appellant had any animosity toward Wood, or that he wanted to offend 

or provoke Wood by touching her. The State responds that “[b]reaking through three 

locked doors and immediately assaulting the person you claim you seek help from” 
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allowed the jury to “reject the notion that Appellant did not intend to cause harm to 

the victim at the time of entry.” 

Appellant additionally asserts that he did not possess a weapon “showing his 

intent to commit the secondary offense of assault.” We note that possession of a 

weapon is not a required element of assault. See PENAL § 22.01. Thus, while 

possession of a weapon might have been an indication that Appellant intended to 

commit assault, the fact that he was not in possession of a weapon does not preclude 

a finding that he intended to commit assault at the time of entry.

There is ample circumstantial evidence that supports the jury’s finding that 

Appellant intended to commit assault when he entered Wood’s residence. The State 

presented Wood’s testimony that (1) Appellant arrived at Wood’s house and began 

yelling at his mother; (2) Appellant’s mother came inside the house and locked three

doors; (3) Appellant broke through all three locked doors; (4) Wood called 9-1-1 

because she was afraid Appellant would hurt his mother; (5) Appellant entered the 

bedroom Wood and his mother were in; and (6) Appellant grabbed Wood’s phone, 

threw it, and broke it. The State also presented officers’ testimony that Wood said 

Appellant pushed her onto the bed after he entered the bedroom. Further, the State 

presented a 9-1-1 call that captured Appellant entering the room Wood and his 

mother were in, Appellant screaming profanities, and the sound of Wood’s phone 

breaking. Finally, the State presented a photograph of Wood’s broken phone. 

Reviewing courts are required to consider the combined force of all the 

evidence. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing 

Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence from 

which a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Appellant committed burglary with intent to commit assault. See Jackson, 443 U.S. 

at 319. We overrule Appellant’s first issue. 
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Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Appellant’s second issue, he asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to request a charge for criminal trespass which he contends is a lesserincluded offense of burglary. To establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance at trial, Appellant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that 

the result would have been different but for counsel’s errors. Thompson v. State, 9 

S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687–88 (1984)). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome of trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. There is 

a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance, and that the defendant must overcome the presumption that 

the challenged action could be considered sound trial strategy. Id. at 689.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “must be firmly founded in the 

record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” 

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1996)). Direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle to raise such a 

claim because the record is generally undeveloped. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 

390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Direct appeal is especially inadequate when 

counsel’s strategy does not appear in the record. Id. Trial counsel should ordinarily 

have an opportunity to explain his actions before an appellate court denounces 

counsel’s actions as ineffective. Id. Without this opportunity, an appellate court 

should not find deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was “so 

outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Id. (quoting 

Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim App. 2001)). 

Here, while Appellant filed a motion for new trial upon which the trial court 

conducted a hearing, the motion did not address his claim that trial counsel was 
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ineffective for failing to request a charge on a lesser-included offense. Accordingly, 

trial counsel has not had an opportunity to explain his reasoning for not requesting a 

charge on a lesser included offense. Any situation in which the evidence at trial 

entitles the defendant to a lesser-included offense instruction presents the defendant 

with the strategic choice between seeking an acquittal or a guilty verdict on the 

lesser-included offense. See Tolbert v. State, 306 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010). The defense may reasonably choose an all-or-nothing trial strategy, in which 

it seeks a verdict of acquittal. See id. at 781–82. Because an “all-or-nothing” 

approach represents a valid trial strategy, defense counsel generally cannot be 

ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense. See 

Grey v. State, 298 S.W.3d 644, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Cochran, J., 

concurring) (observing that because all-or-nothing defense is a valid strategic option, 

“defense counsel is not ineffective for declining to request a lesser-included-offense 

instruction”).

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request 

a lesser-included offense, an appellant must demonstrate he was entitled to the 

lesser-included offense. Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 392–93 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2000). In State v. Meru, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that criminal 

trespass generally is not a lesser-included offense of burglary: 

The definition of “entry” in Section 30.05(b) makes the showing of only 

a partial entry by the defendant insufficient for a conviction of criminal 

trespass. This same partial entry, however, is all that is needed to 

support a burglary conviction. In other words, a burglary can be 

complete upon only a partial intrusion onto the property, whereas the 

lesser offense would require a greater intrusion. . . . Because criminal 

trespass requires proof of greater intrusion than burglary, the divergent 

definitions of “entry” will generally prohibit criminal trespass from 

being a lesser-included offense of burglary.
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State v. Meru, 414 S.W.3d 159, 163–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The Court noted 

that criminal trespass could be a lesser-included offense of burglary “if the 

indictment alleges facts that include the full-body entry into the habitation by the 

defendant.” Id. at 164. Thus, where, as here, the indictment alleges only that the 

defendant entered a habitation without specifying full-body entry, an instruction on 

criminal trespass is prohibited. Id. at 164 n.3; see Weed v. State, No. 05-21-00430-

CR, 2022 WL 3593137, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication).

Here, the indictment alleged that Appellant “did then and there, with intent to 

commit assault, enter a habitation, without the effective consent of Janice Wood, the 

owner thereof.” Thus, the indictment did not allege facts to warrant a lesser-included 

offense instruction on criminal trespass. See Meru, 414 S.W.3d at 164. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s trial counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective 

standard of reasonableness when he did not request an instruction on the offense of 

criminal trespass because Appellant was not entitled to the instruction. See

Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 392–93; see also Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812. We overrule 

Appellant’s second issue.

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

JOHN M. BAILEY

CHIEF JUSTICE 

July 25, 2024

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.