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determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion 

in considering and applying the relevant factors as well as any 

applicable legal principles in determining the sentence to be 

imposed.35 The sentences imposed in this case were within the 

statutory limits, and there was no abuse of discretion by the 

trial court.

[13] Dixon also argues that the robbery sentence should 

have been ordered to be served concurrently to the sexual 

assault sentence, for the reasons that both relied on the same 

fact pattern and the robbery was ancillary to the sexual assault 

because the items stolen were taken to conceal the sexual 

assault offense. It is within the discretion of the trial court 

to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences for 

separate crimes.36 The crimes arose from the same incident, but 

they were completely different crimes with different elements. 

There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order of 

consecutive sentences.

V. CONCLUSION

Finding no merit in any of Dixon’s assignments of error, we 

affirm the judgment of the district court.

Affirmed.

Cassel, J., not participating.

35 State v. Erickson, supra note 3.

36 State v. Start, 239 Neb. 571, 477 N.W.2d 20 (1991).

Ladd D. Krings, appellee, v. Garfield County Board of

Equalization, appellee, and Douglas A. Ewald, Tax

Commissioner, and Ruth A. Sorensen, Property

Tax Administrator, appellants.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed July 26, 2013. No. S-12-623.

1. Taxation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Appellate courts review decisions 

rendered by the Tax Equalization and Review Commission for errors appearing 

on the record.
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2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing 

on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms to 

the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, 

nor unreasonable.

3. Constitutional Law. Constitutional interpretation presents a question of law.

4. Taxation: Appeal and Error. Questions of law arising during appellate review 

of the Tax Equalization and Review Commission decisions are reviewed de novo 

on the record.

5. Taxation: Valuation: Words and Phrases. Equalization is the process of ensuring that all taxable property is placed on the assessment rolls at a uniform percentage of its actual value.

6. Taxation: Valuation. The purpose of equalization of assessments is to bring the 

assessment of different parts of a taxing district to the same relative standard, 

so that no one of the parts may be compelled to pay a disproportionate part of 

the tax.

7. Constitutional Law: Taxation: Appeal and Error. The need for equalization 

by a county board of equalization, and by the Tax Equalization and Review 

Commission when reviewing the decision of a county board of equalization, 

stems from the constitutional requirement of uniformity contained in Neb. Const. 

art. VIII, § 1.

8. Constitutional Law: Taxation: Valuation: Property: Agriculture. Because 

Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1(4), allows for agricultural and horticultural property 

to be valued in a way that is not uniform and proportionate with all other real 

property and because statutes have been enacted effectuating this difference, it is 

unnecessary and improper to equalize the value of nonagricultural, nonhorticultural property with the value of agricultural and horticultural property.

Appeal from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission. 

Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and remanded with 

directions.

Jonathan D. Cannon, Special Assistant Attorney General, 

and Mihdi Vahedi, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellants.

No appearance for appellees.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Stephan, McCormack, and

Cassel, JJ.

Per Curiam.

NATURE OF CASE

Douglas A. Ewald, Tax Commissioner, and Ruth A. 

Sorensen, Property Tax Administrator, of the Department of 

Revenue (collectively the Department), appeal a decision of 

the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). TERC 
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concluded that the Garfield County Board of Equalization (the 

Board) correctly determined that land owned by taxpayer Ladd 

D. Krings was not agricultural or horticultural land. TERC 

further concluded, however, that the value of Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural property should be equalized with the 

value of agricultural and horticultural land and, because TERC 

viewed the assessor’s assessments of agricultural and horticultural land to be impermissibly low, equalized Krings’ property 

by reducing its assessed value.

The Department agrees with TERC’s conclusion that Krings’ 

land was not agricultural or horticultural, but disagrees with 

TERC’s conclusions that (1) the assessed value of Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land should be equalized with the 

assessed value of agricultural and horticultural land and (2) the 

county assessor’s assessments of agricultural and horticultural 

land were improper.

There is no challenge before us relative to the finding 

that Krings’ property is nonagricultural and nonhorticultural, 

and we affirm that decision. There is no challenge before us 

relative to a small portion of property deemed agricultural and 

horticultural, and we do not consider this decision by TERC. 

We conclude that when TERC determined that it needed to 

equalize the value of Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural 

land with the value of agricultural and horticultural land in the 

county, such decision did not conform to the law. We therefore 

reverse that portion of the order wherein TERC performed such 

equalization. Because of this disposition, we need not consider 

whether the county assessor properly assessed agricultural and 

horticultural land.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Krings owns two contiguous parcels of land in Garfield 

County, Nebraska, which total 480 acres. One parcel is 

improved with a single-family dwelling. A combined 448.21 

acres of the two parcels is subject to a warranty easement deed 

that Krings granted to the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation 

as part of the Wetlands Reserve Program. In exchange for 

a one-time payment of $242,034, Krings granted the easement which placed restrictions on the use of the land for the 
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purpose of preserving the land as wetlands and a wildlife habitat. Krings was allowed certain compatible uses of the land, 

including managed timber harvesting and occasional haying 

or grazing.

The parcels were assessed for property tax purposes for the 

2010 tax assessment year at $39,895 and $258,845. Krings 

protested such valuations to the Garfield County assessor and 

requested values of $18,000 and $152,320. The assessor recommended no changes, and the Board adopted the assessor’s 

recommendations and original valuations. Krings appealed the 

Board’s determinations regarding the parcels to TERC.

Krings asserted to TERC that the nonresidential portion 

of the parcels should have been assessed as agricultural or 

horticultural land as defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1359 

(Reissue 2009). If considered agricultural or horticultural 

land, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-201(2) (Reissue 2009), 

the land would be assessed at 75 percent of its actual value. 

After a hearing, TERC concluded that the land was primarily 

used for the conservation purposes of the Wetlands Reserve 

Program, rather than for agricultural or horticultural purposes, 

that it therefore was not agricultural or horticultural land 

under § 77-1359, and that it therefore should be assessed at 

its actual value.

However, TERC went on to consider whether the assessed 

value of Krings’ land should have been equalized with other 

property in Garfield County. TERC determined that for the 

2010 tax assessment year at issue, the Garfield County assessor had improperly valued agricultural and horticultural land 

in the county at 70 percent of its actual value rather than 75 

percent as provided in § 77-201(2). TERC concluded that in 

order for Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land to be 

equalized with the agricultural and horticultural land in the 

county, it must be assessed at 93.33 percent (70 percent divided 

by 75 percent) of its actual value. TERC therefore ordered 

lower equalized values for Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural property.

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-701(4) (Cum. Supp. 2012), 

“[t]he Tax Commissioner or Property Tax Administrator may 

appeal any final decision of [TERC] relating to the granting 
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or denying of an exemption of real or personal property or 

relating to the valuation or equalization of real property.” The 

Department has appealed TERC’s decision in this case.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The Department claims that TERC erred when it (1) concluded that the value of Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land must be equalized with the value of agricultural 

and horticultural land in the county and (2) concluded that the 

Garfield County assessor improperly assessed agricultural and 

horticultural land at 70 percent of its actual value.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

[1,2] Appellate courts review decisions rendered by TERC 

for errors appearing on the record. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 77-5019(5) (Cum. Supp. 2012); Republic Bank v. Lincoln 

Cty. Bd. of Equal., 283 Neb. 721, 811 N.W.2d 682 (2012). 

When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, 

an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms 

to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Republic Bank v. 

Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Equal., supra.

[3,4] Constitutional interpretation presents a question of law.

City of North Platte v. Tilgner, 282 Neb. 328, 803 N.W.2d 469 

(2011). Questions of law arising during appellate review of 

TERC decisions are reviewed de novo on the record. Republic 

Bank v. Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Equal., supra.

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, we note that the Department agrees 

with TERC’s determination that Krings’ property was not 

agricultural or horticultural land. We further note that Krings 

did not appeal from TERC’s decision and does not challenge 

TERC’s decision that his land was not agricultural or horticultural land. Although the Department devotes a section of 

its brief supporting TERC’s conclusion that Krings’ land was 

not agricultural or horticultural land, the issue whether Krings’ 

property is agricultural or horticultural land was not assigned 

as error and is not reviewed by this court in this appeal. 
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TERC’s determination that Krings’ property is nonagricultural 

and nonhorticultural is therefore affirmed. For completeness, 

we note that we are aware that TERC found a small portion 

of Krings’ property to be properly characterized as agricultural 

and horticultural, and the Department does not challenge this 

determination, or that it was appropriate to equalize the value 

of this property with the value of other agricultural and horticultural land in the county. There is not an explicit assignment 

of error regarding this parcel, and we therefore do not discuss 

the correctness of its equalized value.

The Department first contends that TERC erred when it 

concluded that the value of Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land must be equalized with the value of agricultural and horticultural land in the county. We agree with the 

Department’s argument that the Nebraska Constitution allows 

agricultural and horticultural land to be assessed at values that 

are not uniform with other types of land and that therefore, 

it was improper for TERC to equalize the value of Krings’ 

nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land with the value of agricultural and horticultural land in the county.

[5-7] At issue in this case is Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1, as it 

relates to the valuation of real property for purposes of taxation. Article VIII, § 1(1), provides in relevant part that “[t]axes 

shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately 

upon all real property . . . except as otherwise provided in or 

permitted by this Constitution.” Our prior case law indicates 

that the need for equalization stems from the constitutional 

requirement that real property be taxed using uniform and 

proportionate valuations. See Brenner v. Banner Cty. Bd. of 

Equal., 276 Neb. 275, 753 N.W.2d 802 (2008). In Brenner, we 

noted the constitutional requirement of uniform and proportionate valuation and stated:

Equalization is the process of ensuring that all taxable 

property is placed on the assessment rolls at a uniform 

percentage of its actual value. The purpose of equalization of assessments is to bring the assessment of different 

parts of a taxing district to the same relative standard, so 

that no one of the parts may be compelled to pay a disproportionate part of the tax.
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276 Neb. at 294, 753 N.W.2d at 818. We further tied the 

process of equalization to the constitutional requirement of 

uniformity when we stated that in carrying out its “duty to 

correct and equalize individual discrepancies and inequalities 

in assessments within the county,” a county board of equalization “must give effect to the constitutional requirement that 

taxes be levied uniformly and proportionately upon all taxable 

property in the county.” Bartlett v. Dawes Cty. Bd. of Equal., 

259 Neb. 954, 965, 613 N.W.2d 810, 818 (2000). The need for 

equalization by a county board, and by TERC when reviewing 

the decision of a county board of equalization, stems from the 

constitutional requirement of uniformity contained in article 

VIII, § 1.

However, while article VIII, § 1(1), requires uniform valuation of real property, as noted, such requirement is qualified 

by the phrase “except as otherwise provided in or permitted by 

this Constitution.” Additional constitutional language pertaining to agricultural and horticultural land is relevant to the present case. Article VIII, § 1(4), provides as follows:

[T]he Legislature may provide that agricultural land and 

horticultural land, as defined by the Legislature, shall 

constitute a separate and distinct class of property for purposes of taxation and may provide for a different method 

of taxing agricultural land and horticultural land which 

results in values that are not uniform and proportionate with all other real property and franchises but which 

results in values that are uniform and proportionate upon 

all property within the class of agricultural and horticultural land[.]

Acting on the authority of article VIII, § 1(4), the Legislature 

enacted § 77-1359, which defines “agricultural land and horticultural land” and which states in part:

The Legislature finds and declares that agricultural 

land and horticultural land shall be a separate and distinct class of real property for purposes of assessment. 

The assessed value of agricultural land and horticultural 

land shall not be uniform and proportionate with all other 

real property, but the assessed value shall be uniform and 
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proportionate within the class of agricultural land and 

horticultural land.

The Legislature also enacted § 77-201(2), which currently 

provides, “Agricultural land and horticultural land as defined 

in section 77-1359 shall constitute a separate and distinct class 

of property for purposes of property taxation, shall be subject to taxation, unless expressly exempt from taxation, and 

shall be valued at seventy-five percent of its actual value.” 

Thus, the framework for deciding this case is embodied in 

article VIII, § 1(1) and 1(4), of the Nebraska Constitution, 

as informed by the enabling legislation found at §§ 77-1359 

and 77-201(2).

[8] The Department argues, and we agree, that because 

article VIII, § 1(4), allows for agricultural and horticultural 

property to be valued in a way that is not uniform and proportionate with all other real property and because statutes 

have been enacted effectuating this difference, it was unnecessary and improper for TERC to equalize the value of Krings’ 

nonagricultural, nonhorticultural property with the value of 

agricultural and horticultural property in the county. Upon 

our appellate review, we conclude that the decision of TERC 

in this regard did not conform to the law. See Republic Bank 

v. Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Equal., 283 Neb. 721, 811 N.W.2d 

682 (2012).

In reaching its decision, TERC relied in part on Kearney 

Convention Center v. Board of Equal., 216 Neb. 292, 344 

N.W.2d 620 (1984), and determined that the value of Krings’ 

nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land needed to be equalized 

with the value of agricultural and horticultural land in the 

county. TERC’s reliance on Kearney Convention Center was 

misplaced. In Kearney Convention Center, this court concluded 

that for the year 1981, a taxpayer’s improved nonagricultural, 

nonhorticultural real property referred to as an “urban convention center” “was not assessed uniformly and proportionately 

with other property, to wit, farmland” and that the assessment 

of the taxpayer’s property should be reduced to equalize its 

value with such other property. 216 Neb. at 303, 344 N.W.2d at 

626. We note, however, that when Kearney Convention Center
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was decided on January 27, 1984, article VIII, § 1, did not contain the provisions quoted above relating to agricultural land 

and horticultural land and that article VIII, § 1, was amended 

twice after Kearney Convention Center was decided in order 

to include the language presently contained in article VIII, 

§ 1(4), pertaining to the different treatment of agricultural and 

horticultural land.

The first of the two amendments was described by this court 

as follows:

In 1984 the Legislature proposed an amendment to 

Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1. This amendment . . . was 

adopted by the voters at the November 6, 1984, election. . 

. . The proposition on the ballot stated, “A constitutional 

amendment authorizing the Legislature to separately classify agricultural and horticultural land.” L. Res. 7, 88th 

Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (1984). The amendment added the 

following language to art. VIII, § 1: “The Legislature 

may provide that agricultural land and horticultural land 

used solely for agricultural or horticultural purposes shall 

constitute a separate and distinct class of property for 

purposes of taxation.”

Banner County v. State Bd. of Equal., 226 Neb. 236, 244, 411 

N.W.2d 35, 41 (1987). This court noted in Banner County

that the 1984 amendment did not repeal the uniformity clause 

of article VIII, § 1. This court therefore read the amendment 

in connection with the uniformity clause and concluded that 

“the Legislature can divide the class of tangible property into 

different classifications, but these classifications remain subdivisions of the overall class of ‘all tangible property,’ and 

there must be a correlation between them to show uniformity.” 

Banner County v. State Bd. of Equal., 226 Neb. at 254, 411 

N.W.2d at 46.

After this court filed the decision in Banner County, the 

Legislature in 1989 proposed another amendment to Neb. 

Const. art. VIII, § 1. See 1989 Neb. Laws, L.R. 2. The 

amendment was approved by voters in 1990. This second 

amendment did not repeal the uniformity clause but added 

language now found at article VIII, § 1(4), stating that in 

addition to providing that agricultural land and horticultural 
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land constitute a separate and distinct class of property, 

the Legislature

may provide for a different method of taxing agricultural 

land and horticultural land which results in values that are 

not uniform and proportionate with all other real property 

and franchises but which results in values that are uniform and proportionate upon all property within the class 

of agricultural land and horticultural land.

The Introducer’s Statement of Intent for L.R. 2 stated that it 

was a response to “the doubt the Nebraska Supreme Court has 

cast on the validity of” the 1984 amendment and legislation 

enacted pursuant thereto and that the intent was “to resolve 

this legal uncertainty by providing a clear exception to the 

uniformity requirement of the Nebraska Constitution for agricultural land.” Revenue Committee, 91st Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 

2, 1989).

The amendment proposed by the Legislature in 1989 

addressed this court’s decision in Banner County. The amendment clearly provided that although values of agricultural and 

horticultural land were to be uniform and proportionate within 

the class, they were not required to be uniform and proportionate with the value of other real property. Because the language 

of this provision, article VIII, § 1(4), is clear, it is not open to 

construction. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale, 273 Neb. 889, 

734 N.W.2d 290 (2007).

As discussed above, the equalization process has the purpose of giving effect to the constitutional requirement of 

uniformity. However, after the amendments to article VIII, 

§ 1, and the enactment of statutes pursuant to such authority 

providing for a different method of taxing agricultural and 

horticultural land, the constitution does not require uniformity 

between the class of agricultural and horticultural land and 

other types of real estate. Therefore, it is no longer required 

or proper to equalize the value of nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land with the value of agricultural and horticultural 

land. Equalization is still required within the class of agricultural and horticultural land, because the constitution still 

requires uniformity within that class. Therefore, when TERC 

undertook the task of equalizing the portion of Krings’ land 
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which is agricultural and horticultural with agricultural and 

horticultural land in the county, the approach was authorized. 

Equalization is also required to give effect to the uniformity 

clause with respect to property generally, except to the extent 

that article VIII, § 1, makes certain exceptions to the uniformity requirement, including the exception for agricultural and 

horticultural land.

We conclude that TERC erred in this case when it endeavored to equalize the value of Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural property with the value of agricultural and horticultural land in the county. There is no longer a constitutional 

requirement for the value of agricultural and horticultural land 

to be uniform and proportionate with the value of other real 

property; therefore, the equalization between Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land and the agricultural and 

horticultural land in the county was improper. We therefore 

reverse the portion of TERC’s order in paragraph 2 in which 

it equalized the value of Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural property with the value of agricultural and horticultural 

property. We further reverse that portion of TERC’s order 

in paragraph 1 in which it vacated and reversed the value 

of nonagricultural, nonhorticultural property as decided by 

the Board.

The Department also assigns error to TERC’s determination and discussion regarding the assessor’s assessment of 

agricultural and horticultural land at 70 percent rather than 75 

percent of its actual value. Krings’ land is nonagricultural and 

nonhorticultural, and, as we have determined, there was no 

basis for equalization of Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land with agricultural and horticultural land in the county. 

TERC’s comments regarding the assessor’s actions exceeded 

the proper scope of the appeal before TERC. It was unnecessary in this case for TERC to consider or to explore whether 

the assessment of agricultural and horticultural land had been 

appropriately performed, and regardless of the substance of 

its analysis, we need not consider whether TERC erred in its 

conclusions regarding the assessment of agricultural and horticultural land.
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CONCLUSION

Because no error was assigned to TERC’s determination 

that Krings’ land was nonagricultural and nonhorticultural, we 

affirm that portion of TERC’s order in which it so concluded. 

There is also no challenge to the correctness of the determination that a small portion of the property was agricultural and 

horticultural and that it was subject to equalization with other 

agricultural and horticultural land in the county, and we enter 

no order affecting this decision. We conclude that TERC erred 

when it equalized the value of Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land with the value of agricultural and horticultural 

land in the county. TERC’s decision to equalize in this fashion 

did not conform to the law. We therefore reverse those portions 

of the order in which TERC reversed the Board’s valuation 

regarding Krings’ nonagricultural, nonhorticultural property 

and performed such equalization. We remand the cause to 

TERC with directions to enter an order ruling on the Board’s 

determinations, consistent with this opinion.

 Affirmed in part, and in part reversed

and remanded with directions.

Connolly and Miller-Lerman, JJ., participating on briefs.

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Matthew L. Pangborn, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed July 26, 2013. No. S-12-941.

1. Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. The admission of demonstrative evidence 

is within the discretion of the trial court, and a judgment will not be reversed on 

account of the admission or rejection of such evidence unless there has been a 

clear abuse of discretion.

2. Trial: Juries: Evidence. Demonstrative exhibits are defined by the purpose for 

which they are offered at trial—to aid or assist the jury in understanding the evidence or issues in a case.

3. Trial: Evidence. Exhibits admitted only for demonstrative purposes do not constitute substantive evidence.

4. Rules of Evidence. Where a Nebraska Evidence Rule is substantially similar to 

a corresponding federal rule of evidence, Nebraska courts will look to federal