alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Independent Bridge Co. et al. *v.*Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., Appellant.

Argued April 19, 1934.

Before Trexler, P. J., Keller, Baudrige, Stadteeld, Parker and James, JJ.

*415
      *E. C. Higbee,*and with him *Edwin W. Smith, John G. Bane, Jr., Eigbee, Matthews é Lewellyn,*and *Beed, Smith, Shaw é McClay,*for appellant.

*T. L. Morgan,*for appellees.

October 3, 1934:

Opinion by

James, J.,

The present case involves a suit for materials furnished by the plaintiffs to H. B. Mish Company, a subcontractor, in the erection of the substructure and bridge approaches under the same contract and surety bond which are involved in the suit of Independent Bridge Co. to use of R. E. Jackson, against the present appellant, in which case an opinion has this day been filed.

At the trial it was not disputed by the defendant that the items claimed had been furnished to- the contractor and that the charges were proper but contended none of the items except for sewer pipe and hauling could be recovered. The court below directed a verdict for the full amount claimed, less rental for a concrete mixer, and subsequently denied motions for a new trial and judgment n. o. v. From the judgment entered on the verdict, this appeal was taken and appellant raises the same question as in the Jackson case.

The materials were delivered from May 22, 1925 to January 1, 1926 and consisted largely of roofing, sheeting, plank, nails, windows, sash, doors, etc. The testimony submitted by plaintiff relating to the use that was made of these materials in the construction of the contract was vague and indefinite; in fact, plaintiff made no effort, to establish definite proof of their use, apparently relying upon the broad ground that the surety was liable for any material delivered on the ground to the contractor. The most specific testimony was that the lumber was used for forms, what forms does not appear; that windows, door, sash *416and hardware were used in a shanty used as an office; and sewer pipe used .some place about the bridge. Other items were mentioned but not definitely enough to establish their use in the construction of the contract.

In construing the same provision of the bond in the Jackson case, supra, we held that the surety was liable if the materials were furnished in the performance of the work specifically called for under the contract. In the present case the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently establish that all the materials were used in performing the work as called for under the terms of the contract.

We shall not attempt to separate those items that may have been sufficiently established and in view of the fact that the case was tried on an improper theory we believe the interest of all parties will be best served by the granting of a new trial, where plaintiff may be afforded an opportunity to produce the proof which we believe to be necessary under the terms of the bond.

The judgment is reversed with a venire facias de novo.
State of California 

AIR RESOURCES BOARD 

EXECUTIVE ORDER R-10-002 

Relating to the Adoption of the Amendments to New Passenger Motor Vehicle 

Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards 

WHEREAS, on September 24, 2009, the Air Resources Board (ARB or Board) 

conducted a public hearing to consider proposed amendments to new passenger motor 

vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards, as set forth in the Initial Statement of 

Reasons, which was released to the public on August 6, 2009; 

WHEREAS, following the public hearing on September 24, 2009, the Board adopted 

Resolution 09-53, in which the Board approved of the proposed amendments to 

California Code of Regulations (CCR), title 13, sections 1961 and 1961.1, and to the 

“California Exhaust Emission Standards and Test Procedures for 2001 and Subsequent 

Model Passenger Cars, Light-Duty Trucks, and Medium-Duty Vehicles” incorporated by 

reference in CCR, title 13, section 1961(d) (as last amended May 2, 2008), as set forth 

in Attachments A and B, and modified by Attachments C and D thereto; 

WHEREAS, Resolution 09-53 directed the Executive Officer to take final action to adopt 

the regulatory amendments set forth in Attachments A, B, C, and D to 

Resolution 09-53, with such other conforming modifications as may be appropriate, to 

make the modified regulatory language and any additional supporting documents and 

information available to the public for a period of at least 15 days, to consider such 

written comments as may be submitted during this period, and to make such 

modifications as may be appropriate in light of the comments received, or to present the 

regulatory amendments to the Board for further consideration if he determines that this 

is warranted after review of the comments; 

 

WHEREAS, on November 24, 2009, the modified regulations, reflecting the 

amendments approved by the Board and other changes made to best reflect the intent 

of the Board at the hearing, and additional document, were made available for public 

comment for a period of at least 15 days, with the changes to the originally proposed 

text clearly indicated, in accordance with the provisions of title 1, California Code of 

Regulations, section 44; and 

WHEREAS, a number of written comments were received during the supplemental 

15-day comment period and those comments, as well as the comments received during 

the initial 45-day comment period, have been considered by the Executive Officer. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the recitals and findings contained in 

Resolution 09-53 and the Final Statement of Reasons are incorporated by reference 

herein. 
Executive Order R-10-002 -2- 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that sections 1961 and 1961.1, title 13, CCR, are hereby 

amended as set forth in Attachment 1 hereto, and the California Exhaust Emission 

Standards and Test Procedures for 2001 and Subsequent Model Passenger Cars, 

Light-Duty Trucks, and Medium-Duty Vehicles are hereby amended as set forth in 

Attachment 2 hereto. 

Executed this 22 day of February, 2010, at Sacramento, California. 

 /s/ 

_____________________

James N. Goldstene 

Executive Officer 

Attachment
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1310 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1310

 To require Senate confirmation of Inspector General of the Bureau of 
         Consumer Financial Protection, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                July 16 (legislative day, July 15), 2013

  Mr. Portman (for himself, Ms. Collins, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Johanns, Mr. 
Heller, Mr. Vitter, Ms. Ayotte, Mr. Blunt, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Enzi, and 
  Mr. Corker) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
    referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To require Senate confirmation of Inspector General of the Bureau of 
         Consumer Financial Protection, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection-Inspector General Reform Act of 2013'', or the ``CFPB-IG Act 
of 2013''.

SEC. 2. APPOINTMENT OF INSPECTOR GENERAL.

    The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
            (1) in section 8G--
                    (A) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``and the 
                Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection'';
                    (B) in subsection (c), by striking ``For the 
                purposes of implementing this section'' and all that 
                follows through the end of the subsection; and
                    (C) in subsection (g)(3), by striking ``and the 
                Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection''; and
            (2) in section 12--
                    (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the Director 
                of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection;'' after 
                ``the President of the Import-Export Bank;''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the Bureau of 
                Consumer Financial Protection,'' after ``the Import-
                Export Bank,''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Merl W. RICHMAN, Appellant, v. GROFF INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellee.

No. 71-544.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. 1, 1971.

Appeal dismissed.
(March 15, 2001)

#### Corinne Rosen et al., Respondents, v New York Zoological Society, Appellant.

[722 NYS2d 31]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Yvonne Gonzalez, J.), entered October 24, 1999, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, defendant’s motion granted and the complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant-appellant dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff, a volunteer worker, should have been aware that she might have “sunk in and slipped” while attempting to negotiate the steep-sloped, muddy riverbank on foot, especially given the fact that defendant had fenced off the area and had refused to allow child volunteers into it. Plaintiff’s contention that her injury was caused by a latent or concealed condition and that defendant thus breached its duty to take reasonable measures to neutralize that condition *(see, Walter v State of New York,*185 AD2d 536, 538) is without merit. Such terrain is a natural geographical phenomenon that would foreseeably have soft or uneven spots and, therefore, would not engender such duty on the part of defendant *(see, Coote v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,*234 AD2d 907, 909). Where the natural condition of the terrain is plainly and obviously dangerous, a defendant landowner owes no duty to warn of or to prevent *239such danger *(see, Tarricone v State of New York,*175 AD2d 308, 309, *lv denied*78 NY2d 862; *Rolfe v Galt,*102 AD2d 983, 984, *lv denied sub nom. Rolfe v Hollenbeck,*63 NY2d 604; *Diven v Village of Hastings-On-Hudson,*156 AD2d 538, 539). Concur — Sullivan, P. J., Nardelli, Williams, Tom and Friedman, JJ.
#### *Robert*GORDON and Lola Jacobson d/b/a the Virginia House Apartments, Appellants, v. Judy RUSSO and Sue Curtis, Appellees.

No. 73-337.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 9, 1973.

Shutts & Bowen, Miami, for appellants.

Martin S. Forman, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

*448PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on the authority of Section 865.09 Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Cor-Gal Builders, Inc. v. Southard, Fla.App.1962, 136 So.2d 244; Chaikin v. Skolnick, Fla.App.1967, 201 So.2d 588.
1 

# Memo

To: Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799 From: Joseph McDonald CC: Ed Nam, U.S. EPA-OTAQ-ASD Date: Tuesday, November 29, 2011 Re: Cruff et al 2010 citation
A hard copy of the following citation: Cruff, L., Kaiser, M., Krause, S., Harr is, R., Krueger, U., Williams, M., 2010, “EBDI® - A pplication of a Fully Flexible High Bmep Downsi zed Spark Ignited Engine.” SAE Tec hnical Paper Series No. 2010-01- 0587. is available within EPA’s Docket Center. This document has been copyrighted and is not available in the electronic docket. Parties that wish to view a hard copy of this document can do so at the at the EPA Docket Center: Air and Radiation Docket and Information Center, EPA/DC, EPA We st, Room 3334, 1301 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington DC. The Public Reading Room is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding legal holidays. The telephone number for the Public Reading Room is (202) 566- 1744, and the telephone number for the Air Docket is (202) 566-1742.
#### Annie M. HAMMOND v. Robert E. HAMMOND, Jr.

No. 61550.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 14, 1978.

In re: Robert E. Hammond, Jr., applying for supervisory writs. Parish of Jefferson.

Writ denied. On the showing made the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction is not warranted at this time.
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1



         CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT


                                                                 August 16, 2002



Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of WebLink Wireless, Inc. (the
"company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), pursuant
to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, N. Ross Buckenham,
Chief Executive Officer of WebLink Wireless, Inc., certify that, to the best of
my knowledge:

         1.   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
              or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
              material respects, the financial condition and results of
              operations of the company.




                              /s/ N. ROSS BUCKENHAM
                              -------------------------------------------------
                              N. Ross Buckenham
                              President and Chief Executive Officer and Director
                              August 16, 2002
#### Murray M. JACOBS, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Goodyear Rubber Products, Inc. and Michigan Mutual Liability Company, Respondents.

No. 36619.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 11, 1967.

Joseph S. Rodriguez and Masterson, Lloyd, Sundberg & Rogers, St. Petersburg, for petitioner.

George H. Brown, III, St. Petersburg, Patrick H. Mears, Tallahassee, and J. Franklin Garner, Lakeland, for respondents.

*157PER CURIAM.

By petition for a writ of certiorari we have for review an order of the Florida Industrial Commission bearing date June 22, 1967.

We find that oral argument would serve no useful purpose and it is therefore dispensed with pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule 3.10, subd. e, 32 F.S.A.

Our consideration of the petition, the record and briefs leads us to conclude that there has been no deviation from the essential requirements of law.

The petition is therefore denied.

The petitioner’s application for an attorney’s fee here is also denied.

It is so ordered.

CALDWELL, C. J., and THOMAS, ROBERTS, THORNAL and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
Order entered September 12, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-00463-CR

No. 05-16-00464-CR

JESUS ANTONIO PONCE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F12-70299-J & F14-33407-J

ORDER

The Court REINSTATES these appeals.

On September 9, 2016, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding why the 

reporter’s record had not been filed. On September 12, 2016, we received volumes 1 through 5 

of the reporter’s record. Because findings are no longer necessary, we VACATE the September 

9, 2016 order.

We ORDER the reporter’s record filed as of the date of this order. 

Appellant’s brief is due THIRTY DAYS from the date of this order. 

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
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#### Winifred CLARK, Appellant, v. SUNCOAST PEACH CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 71-802.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 16, 1972.

*248Richard H. Wilson, Tampa, for appellant.

Frank McClung, Brooksville, for appel-lee.

LILES, Acting Chief Judge.

Suncoast Peach Corporation brought an action in ejectment against Winifred Clark. After appellant Clark filed her amended answer and counterclaim issue was joined. The trial judge then set the cause for pretrial conference. Prior to the date of the pre-trial conference, appellant fired her then attorney and the pre-trial conference-was continued until September 7, 1971. Prior to this pre-trial conference, the appellant again discharged her latest attorney. The pre-trial conference was set for 9:00 A.M., and her attorney was present; but since she had orally fired him on September 3, 1971, the trial judge allowed him to withdraw without going forth in representing the defendant at the September 7 pre-trial conference. Defendant herself showed up at 10:00 A.M. on September 7, thinking the pre-trial conference was to be held at that hour. The trial judge then entered his order striking defendant’s answer and entered a summary judgment in favor of appellee. Appellant then filed a motion for rehearing which motion was denied. This appeal ensued.

Appellant urges that the trial court erred in dismissing appellant’s defenses and granting a summary judgment on the pleadings in favor of appellee for the reason that appellant failed twice to show up for the pre-trial conference. We reverse on the authority of Tsavaris v. Tsavaris, Fla.App.1971, 244 So.2d 450.

 We hasten to point out that we do not condone a party’s ignoring or disobey-in a trial court’s order. We do not believe that appellant arbitrarily disobeyed the court’s order in this instance. The use of the procedure followed here penalizes litigants in such a way as to deny them their right to trial. The judge could have cited the appellant for contempt; or he could have assessed the costs of the pre-trial conference against her. Suffice it to say, he had several remedies; and the one he chose was an abuse of his discretion.

In passing, we also add that appellee may indeed be entitled to summary judgment; but the reason for granting the summary judgment in this instance is incorrect.

We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MANN and McNULTY, JJ., concur.
### Regulatory Evaluation

Docket No. FAA

- Directorate Identifier:

- AD

If you make changes to the values in the table below, you must ensure the totals update accordingly. If they do not, click (or Tab) into and then ou t of the changed cell

.

**Estimated Costs:**

Action (e.g., Inspection, replacement) Do not include on

condition costs here Costs per **Product** (e.g., aircraft, engine,

propeller, appliance) Work

- hours (include access, testing, and close

- up) Labor

cost (@$8 5 / h our) Parts Cost Total Costs (labor + parts) Number of

**U.S. Registered**  **Products** Total Cost

for U.S. Fleet



### Inspection 1.0 $ 85.00 $ 

### 0 $ 85.00 

### 7 $ 595.00 $ 0.00 $ 0 .00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00



### The known number of products in compliance: 

### 0 Total Costs of compliance for U.S. fleet: $ 595 

### Costs covered under warranty ( if known ) $ 

### 0

**On**

**- Condition Costs:** 

Action (e.g., Inspection, replacement) Work

- hours

(include access, testing, and close

up) Labor cost

(@$85/hour) Parts Cost Cost per Product



### Corrective Action 39.0 $ 3,315.00 $0 $ 3,315.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00



### Special considerations for Economic Analysis ( Use this field to explain anything in the Estimated Costs table that was assumed or might not be obvious. This field can also be used to explai n warranty costs) 

### :

### Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES * NO

* Explanation: **DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:**

Is the AD significant?

YES * NO

* Explanation: **Regulatory Flexibility Act:**
Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? E xplain for

either a Yes or No answer.

YES NO Explanation:

**Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:**
This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific requireme nts for aircraft operated in Alaska where aviation might be the only mode of transportation?

YES * NO



### * Explanation 

### :