J-S09031-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RE: ESTATE OF IRENE OLICK 

BUNGARDY, DECEASED

APPEAL OF: THOMAS W. OLICK

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1307 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree August 9, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 35-16-00957

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 20, 2018

Appellant, Thomas W. Olick, appeals from the decree entered in the 

Lackawanna County Orphans’ court, following its decision on Appellant’s 

petition for removal of Appellee, Marguerite Dippel, as Co-Executor of the 

Estate of Irene Olick Bungardy, deceased, and related estate claims, and his 

motion to compel the Register of Wills to file and docket documents 

Appellant maintains have been refused. We affirm the decree and quash the 

appeal in part. 

The Orphans’ court decision and decree sets forth the relevant facts of 

this case. Therefore we have no reason to restate them. The court held a 

hearing on Appellant’s petition on April 21, 2017, after which the parties 

continued to debate certain estate issues. On August 9, 2017, the court 

denied Appellant’s claims for relief and granted in part Appellee’s motion to 

sell decedent’s residence. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on August 18, 

2017. No concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, per 
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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was ordered or filed. 

Appellant raises these issues on appeal:

[WHETHER THE ORPHANS’ COURT ERRED WHEN IT: 

(1) OVERRULED APPELANT’S OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEE 

DIPPEL’S INVENTORY OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE;

(2) DENIED APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; 

(3) DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION TO REMOVE APPELLEE 

DIPPEL AS CO-EXECUTOR; 

(4) DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL APPELLEE 

CLERK OF ORPHANS’ COURT TO ACCEPT APPELLANT’S 

FILINGS; AND

(5) GRANTED APPELLEE DIPPEL’S MOTION TO SELL

DECEDENT’S RESIDENCE AT A PRIVATE SALE?] 

(Appellant’s Brief at 2). 

Principally, Appellant complains that the court should have removed 

Appellee as Co-Executor of the Estate of Irene Olick Bungardy, deceased, 

because Appellee failed to protect the estate’s assets and abused her 

position as Co-Executor for personal gain, which is prima facie evidence of 

fraud. Appellant’s claim for sanctions relates to Appellee’s alleged failure to 

protect the estate and her alleged non-compliance with various court orders

to produce pertinent documents. Additionally, Appellant contends Appellee 

improperly included assets in the estate inventory, while also clandestinely 

excluding assets for her personal enrichment. Appellant also claims the 

clerk of Orphans’ court exceeded his authority when he wrongfully rejected 

the submission of documents directly related to the estate. Appellant 
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concludes the Orphans’ court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of 

law in its decision, which must be reversed. We cannot agree. 

Our standard of review of the findings of an [O]rphans’ 

court is deferential.

When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans’ 

[c]ourt, this Court must determine whether the 

record is free from legal error and the court’s factual 

findings are supported by the evidence. Because the 

Orphans’ [c]ourt sits as the fact-finder, it determines 

the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we 

will not reverse its credibility determinations absent 

an abuse of that discretion.

However, we are not constrained to give the same 

deference to any resulting legal conclusions.

[T]he Orphans’ court decision will not be reversed unless 

there has been an abuse of discretion or a fundamental 

error in applying the correct principles of law.

In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 206-07 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 620 Pa. 724, 69 A.3d 603 (2013) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted). “[T]he Orphans’ Court decision will not be reversed unless 

there has been an abuse of discretion or a fundamental error in applying the 

correct principles of law.” In re Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 951 

(Pa.Super. 2003). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of 

judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the 

law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either 

manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, 

discretion has been abused.” Silver v. Pinskey, 981 A.2d 284, 291 

(Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Mencer v. Ruch, 928 A.2d 294, 297 
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(Pa.Super. 2007)). “Our scope of review is also limited: we determine only 

whether the court’s findings are based on competent and credible evidence 

of record. In re Estate of Karschner, 919 A.2d 252, 255-56 (Pa.Super. 

2007) (quoting In re Estate of Westin, 874 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa.Super. 

2005)). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Thomas J. 

Munley, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The Orphans’ court 

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. (See Orphans’ Court Decision and Decree, dated August 9, 

2017, at 2-5) (finding: evidence did not show Appellee Dippel performed 

tasks and responsibilities of estate administration in any way harmful to 

Decedent’s estate; evidence also failed to show Appellee Dippel acted 

dishonestly, neglectfully, or without care; rather, testimony at April 21, 2017

hearing indicated Appellee Dippel timely met her responsibilities as coexecutor; Appellee Dippel’s administration of estate did not warrant 

sanctions; evidence demonstrated bank accounts at issue were multipleparty joint accounts in names of both Decedent and Appellee Dippel, with 

right of survivorship; inclusion of these joint bank accounts in Decedent’s 

will does not negate right of survivorship; similarly, savings bonds Decedent 

bought during her lifetime were co-owned by Decedent and Appellee Dippel; 

during her lifetime, Decedent gave Appellee Dippel jewelry that Appellant 
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claimed was missing from inventory; evidence indicated Appellee Dippel has 

complied with court’s orders regarding production of documents concerning 

estate matters, assets, and administration; bank accounts and savings 

bonds were not estate assets, because they were co-owned by Decedent and 

Appellee Dippel upon Decedent’s death; when Decedent died, Appellee 

Dipple became owner of bank accounts and savings bonds via right of 

survivorship; assets passing outside estate are not part of Decedent’s estate 

and are excluded from estate accounting and inventory; clerk of Orphans’ 

court rejected Appellant’s filing of two civil suits, raising tort claims against 

Appellee Dippel and Appellee Dippel’s counsel; office staff of clerk of 

Orphans’ court informed Appellant that documents regarding civil lawsuits 

must be filed in proper filing office, Clerk of Judicial Records; Appellant’s

attempt to file civil complaint for money damages in estate litigation was 

incorrect; clerk of Orphans’ court correctly directed Appellant to file his civil 

suits in proper manner).1 The record supports the Orphans’ court’s decision 

____________________________________________

1 With respect to the claim regarding the court’s order allowing the sale of 

Decedent’s real estate, the court ordered the estate to list for sale the 

residence on the open market, because hiring a realtor is the proper way to 

dispose of the residence as an estate asset. Appellant requested an arm’slength transaction, which the court granted. Appellant prevailed on this 

issue, so neither he nor the estate is technically “aggrieved,” so he cannot 

appeal that decision. See Pa.R.A.P. 501 (stating only aggrieved party can 

appeal decision). Significantly, under Pa.R.A.P. 342, Appellant cannot 

appeal from an order allowing executors to market realty in the estate; 

Appellant can appeal only from the order confirming the sale of the estate 

realty. See In re Estate of Krasinski, ___ A.3d ___, ___, 2018 PA Super 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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and we have no reason to disturb it. Accordingly, as to all of Appellant’s 

issues, except his claim regarding the court’s order allowing Appellee to list 

Decedent’s real estate for sale, we affirm based on the Orphan’s court’s 

decision and decree. 

Decree affirmed; appeal quashed in part. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 07/20/2018

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

130 *7 (filed May 15, 2018) (en banc) (holding court order permitting sale 

of realty is not immediately appealable; order approving final sale of realty is 

immediately appealable because that is order which “determines an interest 

in real...property”) (quoting Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(6)). Thus, we quash 

Appellant’s appeal of his claim regarding the court’s order allowing Appellee 

to list Decedent’s real estate for sale. 
Circulated 06/28/2018 02:56 M 

IN THE COURT 

OF COMMON PLEAS 

OF LACKAWANNA COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 

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Before the Court are the filed Motions of Petitioner Thomas Olick (hereiiiafter 

"Olick'1 regarding the Estate of Irene Glick Bungardy. Chiefly, Olick seeks the 

removal of Co-Executor Marguerite Dippel, maintaining that Marguerite Dippel 

(hereinafter "Dlppel") is unsuitable to continue in her role administering the 

Estate, and should be removed by this Court. Click also has raised an Objection 

to Inventory, a Motion for Sanctions, and an Objection to a proposed agreement 

for the sale of the Decedent's home. Glick also filed a Motion to Compel the 

Register of Wills to file and docket documents he maintains have beerμ-efused. 

The Motions of Petitioner regarding the Estate Administration are opp�cB;y �;a 

Dippel, and the Register of Wills opposes the Motion to Compel. :::n.: ;: ��

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Irene Olick Bungardy died in August of 2016, leaving a Will executed ij 201;5. fti;x 

Olick and Dippel were granted Letters Testamentary, and according tj:th� �::,. 

evidence offered at hearing, Glick and Dippel do not have a cooperatffie �rk� - 

relationship. Glick maintains that Dippel has been both uncommunic�ive=wit�:;; 

him and neglectful with respect to her responsibilities regarding Esta; � en�

Administration. In Court, Glick stated that Dippel has also been wasting the - 

Estate assets, converting Estate assets for her own benefit, and has engaged in 

misconduct regarding this Estate, while being assisted by Attorney Eugene 

Lucas. Olick maintains that the actions of Dippel with respect to the Estate are 

improper and sanctionable, which brings the Court to the first and' most 

significant issue in this matter, the Petition for Removal of Dippel from her 

position of authority with respect to this Estate. 

At the hearing, at which Olick represented himself, Olick testified that Dippel, 

along with Attorney Lucas, have not been forthcoming with his questions 

regarding Estate financial assets, the contents of a safe deposit box supposedly 

maintained by the Decedent, pieces of personal property such as Decedent's 

jewelry, and the proposed sale of Decedent's real estate. Coupled with the 

1 

DECISION and DECREE 

Re: Estate of Irene Olick Bungardy, 

Deceased 
alleged communication problems between the two Co-Executors, Olick asserted 

that the issues he raised regarding Dippel's abilities and trustworthiness with 

respect to their late mother's assets call for removal of Dippel, at the minimum. 

Dippel testified at the hearing as well, and she indicated that she has thus far 

executed her responsibilities as Co-Executor in a competent manner, despite 

what she believed was a lack of assistance and cooperation from Co-Executor 

Olick. Dippel indicated that she caused the Will to be probated, obtained the 

necessary short certificates and federal tax identification number, opened an 

Estate bank account into which Estate assets were deposited, and used her 

personal funds to pay a significant inheritance tax bill in a manner which would 

allow the Estate to obtain a discount on that tax for early filing. She has been 

working to sell the Decedent's Lackawanna County real estate, which was 

appraised within weeks of the death of Bungardy, but her testimony was that 

Olick refused to agree to secure the services of a realtor to get the property sold. 

Regarding the safety deposit box, Dippel testified that she was concerried that 

Olick had removed four bonds from the box for potential personal use, so she 

took the remaining bonds from the Decedent's safety deposit box and placed 

them in her own safety deposit box; copies of those savings bonds were 

produced for Thomas Olick. Regarding jewelry owned by Decedent, Dippel 

stated that her mother had given her what jewelry she owned years prior to her 

death. Any communications problems, according to Dippel, are attributable to 

her Co-Executor. 

The standard ofcare to which a fiduciary is held in Pennsylvania is that of such 

common skill, judgment and caution as persons of ordinary prudence, discretion, 

and intelligence under similar circumstances, would exercise in the management 

of their own estate. In re Estate of Lerch, 159 A.2d 506 (Pa. 1960). The 

honest exercise of discretionary power produces no liability absent "supine 

negligence or willful default.'' In re Estate of Lohm, 269 A.2d 451 (Pa. 

1970). A Court may order removal in instances where it is alleged and shown 

that the fiduciary in question is wasting or mismanaging the assets of the Estate, 

or jeopardizing the interests and assets of the Estate which he or she is 

administering. In re Shahan, 631 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Super. 1993). Factual 

evidence regarding waste and mismanagement, rather than supposition, must be 

presented. In the matter before this Court, the evidence did not show that 

Dippel had performed the tasks and responsibilities of Estate administration in a 

way that that harmed the Estate, and it did not show that she acted dishonestly, 

neglectfully, or without care. Rather, as indicated through the testimony offered, 

Dippel met her responsibilities thus far in a timely manner, marshaling assets, 

hiring counsel, attempting to list the house for sale, and even paying inheritance 

tax from her own funds to allow the Estate to secure a discount on that tax. · 

Olick did not show in any factually-supported way that the actions of Dippel as 

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Co-Executor were improper or harmful to the Estate, and for these reasons we 

will not grant Olick's Petition to Remove Co-Executor. 

Olick's next Objection was to the completeness and accuracy of the Inventory 

Dippel provided. He stated that the Decedent possessed savings bonds, one or 

more--bank=accotJnts,::and:jewelry that were not containecJ·--:ifftt-re--:Inventa�and-- 

he offered the possibility that those Estate assets may have remained ln the 

private possession of Dippel. However, the evidence given at the hearing 

showed that the bank accounts in question were multiple party accounts in the 

names of the Decedent and Dippel, with right of survivorship to Dippel. 

Regardless of their inclusion in the Will, the circumstance of the accounts being 

named in a Will as an Estate asset does not defeat the survivorship right created 

by joint accounts merely because the Will would distribute a decedent's property 

in a different matter. In re Estate of Cella, 12 A.3d 374 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Similarly, the savings bonds bought by Decedent during her lifetime were coowned by Dippel and the Decedent. According to 31 C.F.R. §315.70, should 

"one of the co-owners named on a bond die, the surviving co-owner will be 

recognized as its sole and absolute owner, and payment and reissue will be 

made as though the bond were registered in the name of the survivor alone." 

The jewelry which Olick claimed was missing from the Inventory was shown to 

have been given during Decedent's lifetime to Dippel, her only daughter. We 

overrule the Objection to Inventory as being without merit. 

Similarly, we deny Olick's Motion for Sanctions against Co-Executor. Said Motion 

· puts forth that Dippel did not produce documents for Olick's review in a complete 

and timely manner, yet the evidence showed that Respondent has, to this point, 

complied with Court Orders regarding the production of documents regarding 

Estate matters, assets, and administration. Again, the bank accounts and 

savings bonds were not Estate assets, as they were in the names of Decedent 

and Dippel and co-owned by both at the time of Decedent's passing, and right of 

survivorship made Dippel the owner of said assets. Assets passing outside of the 

Estate are not part of a Decedent's Estate and do not need to be included in any 

Estate Accounting and Inventory. · 

The sale of the Decedent's home is also an issue with which Olick takes issue. 

He asserted that Dippel: 

"has failed to permit the hiring of a realtor to dispose of Decedent's 

former residence. She keeps insisting that it can only be sold to her 

brother, Andrew Olick. She has failed to present to the Court and/or the 

Petitioner any valid sales agreement of the residence to Andrew and has 

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failed to justify why it should be sold to him at a prlce substantially less 

than the amount stated in the appraisal she obtained. "

1 

Our review of the transcript indicated that, within weeks of Decedent's passing, 

Dippel obtained an appraisal on the Decedent's home, and was in contact with 

----�1-1--the::otber--=bei�t0=tbis:Estate,-Andrew-e1·tck,::whQ-maGfe::knGwn=his=wisl:i=t0---- : -=--- · ---- - . --ii-- 

purchase the property. The testimony of Dippel was that Andrew Olick offered 

less than the appraised amount, given that the Estate could avoid a realtor's fees 

and also that Andrew Olick was an heir, so that it would be appropriate to reduce 

the purchase price by one-third. Given that Co-Executor Olick apparently 

believes that a more arm's length transaction would be appropriate, and, despite 

the house's current state of disrepair, that hiring a realtor and seeking to sell the 

home on the open market is the proper way to dispose of this Estate asset, we 

will direct that a realtor be retained and paid with respect to selling the home, 

even though this may result in less, not more, money going to the heirs. CoExecutor's position to challenge the proposed sale of the house to Andrew Olick 

at a discount may prove unwise, as a guaranteed sale seems like an option 

Estate administrators would seize upon, yet Olick is a Co-Executor and he cannot 

be shut out of any administrative tasks, such as the selling of assets. Andrew 

Olick may purchase the property, should he so choose, through the realtor 

chosen by the Co-Executors. 

Finally, Olick raised the issue that the Register of Wills of Lackawanna County 

(hereinafter "the Register'') had refused to accept certain documents for filing, 

and that, regarding Olick's status as being allowed to proceed in forma peupens, 

that the Register was "refusing to recognize that, and they want to charge me."

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The document or documents at issue that the Register reportedly refused to file 

were one or more civil Complaints naming Olick as Plaintiff and Dippel and 

Attorney Eugene Lucas as Defendants. According to Olick: 

If I want to file a Complaint against Marguerite Dippel and Eugene Lucas, 

I have the right to do that. It's not up to her (the Register) to make a 

decision where venue and jurisdiction is. 

So if, in fact, it's the case that I've got to get her permission before I 

come to you and ask if I can file something in Motions Court, that's fine; 

but that's what she's doing. She's saying she's the gatekeeper. Nobody 

can file anything unless she says it's there, and that's wrong. I want to be 

able to file those Complaints. 

In her testimony, the Register explained as so: 

1 P�st Hearing Brief of Thomas w. Olick, filed May 31, 2017. 

2 Notes ofTestimony of 4/21/17 hearing, p. 60. 

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! �1::39 
"(the filings presented by Olick have) been accepted except for filings that 

are a civil matter. If it (a Complaint) has a tort in it where he (Olick) is 

suing someone or it has information in that, all it does is compound 

confusion for the Court. 

-- - - -- - -- - �---�¥0s=l"lave=-te=ffte=pr-ap-er-ly,- - -and=--J=urrderstan"EJ=tl1ere=ts=f-r-11Str-attem==eiq::::l"fis-- ---- 

beh a If. We were trying to inform him so that he would file it correctly. 

We do not accept this filing. It has civil information in it. It had 

something to do with some civil matter he had filed with the Clerk of 

Judicial Records. 

You can't just file in any office that you want because you presented it to 

us. We were trying to direct Mr. Olick in the correct manner. It doesn't 

belong with us. · 

So from an office perspective and an Orphans' Court perspective, anything 

that belongs to the Orphans' Court is filed with us. Any civil matter that 

pertains to a civil suit belongs in the Clerk of Judicial Records. It's as 

simple as that. 

The Register is correct. Her office accepted for filing the Petition for Removal of 

Co-Executor, which is an estate matter under the jurisdiction of the Orphans' 

Court division of this Court. Her office rejected filings regarding two civil suits 

alleging a number of torts filed by Olick against his sister, Marguerite Dippel, and 

Attorney Lucas, and staff of the Register of Wills informed him that documents 

regarding civil lawsuits must be filed in the proper filing office, which for civil 

actions is the Clerk of Judicial Records. Olick's act of attempting to file a civil 

complaint for money damages under a Decedent's Estate caption with the 

Register of Wills was incorrect, and the Register was correct in directing Olick to 

file his civil complaint in the correct manner. Olick's issue with this action and 

direction of the Register is entirely without merit, as is his Motion to Compel. A 

litigant cannot choose to file an action in any division of the Court which he or 

she chooses, and circumstances such as proceeding pro se, and in forma 

peupetts: do not change that rule. - 

_ _ fl/) DECREE . 

AND NOW, this b day of August, 2017, this Court HEREBY DENIES the 

Petition to Remove Co-Executor Dippel, DENIES the Objections presented by CoExecutor Olick regarding the administrative actions of Dippel, and DENIES the 

Motion to Compel aimed at forcing the Register of Wills to accept for filing 

pleadings belong to civil matters. We GRANT his Objection with respect to 

DippeVs proposed sale of the property and we DIRECT the Co-Executors to 

5 

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secure the services of a Realtor and allow the Decedent's home to be sold on an 

open market. 

�:i;11-···-- 

_________ , J. 

Hon. Thomas J. Munley, Judge 

Copies of this Decision were sent, via First Class U.S. Mail, 

Attorney Edwin Abrahamsen and Register of Wills' Solicitor 

Gallagher, and Thomas Olick, prose. 

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