UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 00-4050

CHAD WILLIAM CARLTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville.

Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge.

(CR-98-340, CR-99-14)

Submitted: October 12, 2000

Decided: October 19, 2000

Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion. 

COUNSEL

Anthony Lynch, LYNCH & TAYLOR, P.A., Marion, North Carolina,

for Appellant. Mark T. Calloway, United States Attorney, Thomas R.

Ascik, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina,

for Appellee. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Chad William Carlton appeals his convictions and sentence for

eleven counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(a)

(West Supp. 2000). Carlton’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising the issue of

whether the district court erred in enhancing Carlton’s sentence pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

("USSG"). Counsel concedes, however, that there are no meritorious

issues for appeal. Carlton filed a pro se supplemental brief, raising

four additional issues: (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing; (2) he was denied effective assistance of appellate

counsel; (3) the Government committed prosecutorial misconduct by

suborning perjury; and (4) the district court failed to make written

factual findings regarding objections to the presentence report as

required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1). Finding no reversible error, we

affirm. 

First, we have reviewed Carlton’s plea agreement and the Rule 11

colloquy and find that Carlton knowingly and intelligently waived his

right to appeal. See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143,

1146 (4th Cir. 1995). We therefore find that Carlton waived his right

to appeal his sentencing enhancement pursuant to USSG

§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to

dismiss this claim. 

Second, our review of the record reveals that the two ineffective

assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable on direct appeal.

These claims are only cognizable on direct appeal where the record

conclusively establishes ineffective assistance. See United States v.

King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997). Rather, to allow for adequate

development of the record, Carlton must bring these claims in a

motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2000). See United

States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1994). 

2 UNITED STATES v. CARLTON
Third, we find that Carlton’s claim that the Government committed

prosecutorial misconduct is without merit as Carlton fails to submit

any evidence to support this claim. 

Finally, we find that the district court satisfied the requirements of

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) by expressly adopting the findings of the

PSR. See United States v. Walker, 29 F.3d 908, 911 (4th Cir. 1994).

As required by Anders, we have examined the entire record and

find no other meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm

Carlton’s convictions and sentence. This court requires that counsel

inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court

of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw

from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART

UNITED STATES v. CARLTON 3