alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-27-1998             DEC-28-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-29-1997             DEC-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-29-1998             MAR-30-1997
<CASH>                                           7,869                   3,781
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   46,150                  52,161
<ALLOWANCES>                                       500                     210
<INVENTORY>                                    103,806                 101,542
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               177,908                 185,020
<PP&E>                                       1,255,259               1,245,318
<DEPRECIATION>                                 648,004                 580,504
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 865,980                 931,881
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          112,319                 132,503
<BONDS>                                        578,294                 568,539
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                        46,068                  43,213
<OTHER-SE>                                    (59,732)                (25,628)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   865,980                 931,881
<SALES>                                        221,806                 228,641
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               221,806                 228,641
<CGS>                                          212,808                 211,477
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  212,808                 211,477
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                     254
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              16,126                  15,995
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (21,867)                (15,196)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (7,653)                 (5,562)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (14,214)                 (9,634)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (14,214)                 (9,634)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.55)                  (1.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.55)                  (1.10)
        

</TABLE>
#### Nathalie B. GROSS, Executrix of the Estate of Meyer P. Gross, Deceased, Appellant, v. DORSET HOUSE OF PALM BEACH, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee. Nathalie B. GROSS, Appellant, v. DORSET HOUSE OF PALM BEACH, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

Nos. 2269, 2270.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Sept. 22, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 22, 1969.

*824John F. Law, Jr., of Ryan, Taylor & Law, North Palm Beach, for appellant.

Gerald M. Walsh, of Walsh & Dolan, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. The court correctly granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict. See Oliva v. Baum, Fla.App.1967, 194 So.2d 319; North American Co. v. Landahl, Fla. App.1959, 113 So.2d 588; Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 417, cert. den. Fla.1960, 117 So.2d 731. The order taxing costs is not shown to be erroneous. See Cohn v. Florida National Bank at Orlando, Fla.App. 1969, 223 So.2d 767; Goldstein v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Fla.App.1962, 142 So.2d 115; 20 C.J.S. Costs § 227.

CROSS, C. J., and REED and OWEN, JJ., concur.
#### Constance O. McGuire et al., Appellants, v Margaret Laier, Respondent.

[721 NYS2d 552]

—In an action to recover *402damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Palmeri, J.), dated May 12, 2000, which, upon a jury verdict on the issue of liability and upon the denial of their oral application to set aside the verdict, is in favor of the defendant and against them dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly refused to charge that the injured plaintiff, who allegedly suffered from amnesia as a result of the subject accident, was subject to a lesser burden of proof in establishing, among other things, that the defendant was negligent *(see, Costa v Hicks,*98 AD2d 137; PJI 1:62). Before the commencement of trial, counsel for the parties agreed that the jury would not be given this instruction. In any event, no medical evidence was adduced to establish the injured plaintiffs alleged amnesia or that it was the result of the accident. It is well settled that “[a]bsent any medical proof of amnesia * * * or causation [the] plaintiffs will not be entitled to the more lenient standard of proof’ *(Costa v Hicks, supra,*at 146; *see also, Nahvi v Urban,*259 AD2d 740, 741; *Sawyer v Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co.,*67 NY2d 328).

The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs’ application to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence *(see, Cohen v Hallmark Cards,*45 NY2d 493; *Waugh v Johns,*206 AD2d 525).

The plaintiffs’ remaining contention is without merit. Santucci, J. P., Krausman, S. Miller and Smith, JJ., concur.
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1322 

To amend the Controlled Substances Act relating to controlled substance 

analogues. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 18, 2013 

Ms. KLOBUCHAR (for herself, Mr. GRAHAM, and Mrs. FEINSTEIN) introduced 

the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend the Controlled Substances Act relating to 

controlled substance analogues. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Synthetic Abuse and 

5 Labeling of Toxic Substances Act of 2013’’ or the 

6 ‘‘SALTS Act’’. 

7 SEC. 2. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALOGUES. 

8 Section 203 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 

9 U.S.C. 813) is amended— 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1322 IS

1 (1) by striking ‘‘A controlled’’ and inserting 

2 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—A controlled’’; and 

3 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

4 ‘‘(b) DETERMINATION.—In determining whether a 

5 controlled substance analogue was intended for human 

6 consumption under subsection (a), the following factors 

7 may be considered, along with any other relevant factors: 

8 ‘‘(1) The marketing, advertising, and labeling 

9 of the substance. 

10 ‘‘(2) The known efficacy or usefulness of the 

11 substance for the marketed, advertised or labeled 

12 purpose. 

13 ‘‘(3) The difference between the price at which 

14 the substance is sold and the price at which the sub15 stance it is purported to be or advertised as is nor16 mally sold. 

17 ‘‘(4) The diversion of the substance from legiti18 mate channels and the clandestine importation, man19 ufacture, or distribution of the substance. 

20 ‘‘(5) Whether the defendant knew or should 

21 have known the substance was intended to be con22 sumed by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any 

23 other immediate means. 

24 ‘‘(c) LIMITATION.—For purposes of this section, evi25 dence that a substance was not marketed, advertised, or 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 1322 IS

1 labeled for human consumption, by itself, shall not be suf2 ficient to establish that the substance was not intended 

3 for human consumption.’’. 

Æ 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Clayton JOHNSON v. STATE.

No. 38754.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 1969.

Habeas corpus denied without opinion.
##### 



EXHIBIT 4 (Pricewaterhouse LOGO)  CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS We consent to the inclusion of our report dated February 11, 2004 relating to
the consolidated financial statements of Barrick Gold Corporation in this Form
40-F. We also consent to the incorporation in the Registration Statement on
Form F-3 (File No. 333-14148) of Barrick Gold Corporation and Form F-9 (File
No. 333-106592) of Barrick Gold Corporation and Barrick Gold Inc. of our report
dated February 11, 2004, which appears in this Form 40-F.  (signed) PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP  Toronto, Ontario
May 19, 2004      PricewaterhouseCoopers refers to the Canadian firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP and the other member firms of PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited,
each of which is a separate and independent legal entity.
259 La. 903

#### FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY v. LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION et al.

No. 51794.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 21, 1971.

In re: Louisiana Tax Commission applying for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Writ denied. The judgment is not final.
#### Earl P. JONES et al., Appellants, v. The FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN FORT LAUDERDALE, Appellee.

No. 72-492.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 26, 1972.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; Stephen R. Booher, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
Exhibit 32.1

       Statement of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350

     In connection with the Annaul Report of Highlands Bankshares, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2004, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, as the chief executive officer and chief financial officer,
respectively, of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003, that:

     1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                    /s/ C.E. Porter
                                    -----------------------
                                    C. E. Porter
                                    Chief Executive Officer

Date:  March 24, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000947779
<NAME> WILLIAMS HOLDINGS OF DELAWARE, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                         156,951
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,465,840
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (39,865)
<INVENTORY>                                    426,153
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,618,573
<PP&E>                                       7,819,950
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,024,741
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,511,888
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,592,811
<BONDS>                                      2,838,546
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,088,283
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,511,888
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,517,138
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,466,665
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 9,587
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              58,885
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,561
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,505
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,056
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                      (5,600)
<NET-INCOME>                                       456
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 APRIL 30, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 08-12646

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 00-00005-CR-OC-10-GRJ

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SERVANDO FERGUSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

(April 30, 2009)

Before BLACK, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Servando Ferguson, a federal prisoner convicted of crack cocaine offenses,

appeals the district court’s denial of his counseled 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion

for reduction of sentence based on Amendment 706 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, which

lowered the base offense levels applicable to crack cocaine offenses.

Ferguson contends that he was not sentenced as a career offender pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, but instead was sentenced pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, and, for

that reason United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied

sub nom. McFadden v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 965 (2009), is inapplicable and he

is entitled to § 3582 relief. To the contrary, Ferguson was sentenced as a career

offender pursuant to § 4B1.1, instead of based on the drug quantity in § 2D1.1.

The applicable base offense level under § 4B1.1 applied because it was greater

than the § 2D1.1 base offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) (stating that the base

offense level in § 4B1.1 applies as long as it is higher than the “offense level

otherwise applicable,” such as the levels under § 2D1.1). Because Ferguson was

sentenced based on the career offender guideline section, the base offense levels

under § 2D1.1 “played no role in the calculation of [the guideline] range[ ],” and

the lowering of the § 2D1.1 levels did not lower his guideline range, the Moore

decision applies. See Moore, 541 F.3d at 1327; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt.

n.1(A) (stating that a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is not authorized where “the

2
amendment . . . is applicable to the defendant but the amendment does not have the

effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the

operation of another guideline or statutory provision”).

Ferguson also contends that United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.

Ct. 738 (2005), rendered the Guidelines advisory in the § 3582 context. That

argument is precluded by our decision in United States v. Melvin, 556 F.3d 1190

(11th Cir. 2009). Ferguson asks that we hold his case in abeyance pending the

resolution of the petition for hearing en banc in United States v. Argro, No. 08-

14591. We decline to do so because the filing of a petition for hearing en banc has

no effect on the precedential effect of any of our decisions.

AFFIRMED.

3
251 La. 747

#### William Asa SHARP v. Elsie Hatton SHARP.

No. 49051.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 2, 1968.

In re: William Asa Sharp applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First ’Circuit', Parish of East Baton Rouge. 205 So.2d 116.

Writ refused. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is correct.
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# 23. Sanciones

El Juez de lo contencioso administrativo puede sancionar a una persona, incluida cualquiera de las partes o el abogado, por incumplimiento de una orden o un procedimiento, por omitir contestar una demanda, o por cualquier otra negligencia que interfiera con el proceso rápido, ordenado o justo de la audiencia.

Content last reviewed March 28, 2016
#### Johnny Stanley KELLY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-115.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 21, 1973.

Appeal dismissed.
#### William H. TUNNICLIFFE, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

No. 8259.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 9, 1937.

H. M. Voorhis, of Orlando, Fla., for petitioner.

Howard P. Locke, J. Louis Monarch, and Sewall Key, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., Robert H. Jackson and James W. Morris, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Herman Oliphant, Gen. Counsel, Dept, of Treasury, and John E. Marshall, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Before FOSTER, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.

SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.

This petition for review involves similar facts and the same questions dealt with in the opinion this day filed in John H. Therrell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A.) 88 F.(2d) 869. For the reasons stated in that opinion the judgment is reversed, with direction to eliminate the contested tax.

Reversed. °

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge, dissents.
#### Tom FURY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-576.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 27, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Julian Leroy GIBSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 67-231.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

March 12, 1968.

Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender and Marvin J. Emory, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal by the defendant below from a conviction of robbery presents the contention that the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case, and specifically that the evidence was in*129sufficient on the issue of identification of the defendant. We hold the contention is without merit, and affirm. The issue of identity was one of fact to be determined by the trial judge, before whom the cause was tried without a jury. See Henderson v. State, 94 Fla. 318, 113 So. 689; Martin v. State, 100 Fla. 16, 129 So. 112; Wright v. State, Fla.App.1966, 182 So.2d 264.

In compliance with our function to determine whether the record contains sufficient, competent, substantial evidence which, if believed, would support the verdict (Wright v. State, supra), we conclude that the finding of the trial court on the issue of identity and the consequent holding of the guilt of the defendant are supported by competent substantial evidence, and that no reversible error has been shown.

Affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**
**Certifications required by Rule 13a-14(a) and 15d-14(a)**
          I, Dr. Lionel L. Reilly, President and Chief Executive Officer, certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Professional Veterinary Products,Ltd.;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this quarterly report;
     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, resultsof operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisquarterly report;
     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e) for the registration, and we have:
     (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
     (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this quarterly report based onsuch evaluation; and
     (c) disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s first fiscal quarter that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and
     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
     (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
     (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: March 15, 2005. /s/ Dr. Lionel L. ReillyDr. Lionel L. Reilly, President and Chief     Executive Officer
#### Gertrude R. TIBADO, Appellant, v. Jane Y. CONNELLY and Mary Ellen Edwards, as Executrices of the Estate of Josephine S. Yarnell Tibado, Deceased, Appellees.

No. 71-384.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 4, 1971.

Appeal dismissed.
257 La. 618

#### Joseph E. DUCOTE et al. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 51094.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 10, 1971.

In re: Mason Schexnayder and Allstate Insurance Company applying for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 242 So.2d 103.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.
#### John B. ODOMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-1046.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 5, 1974.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Steven Rappaport, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Lance R. Stelzer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before CARROLL, HENDRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Roker v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 284 So.2d 454.