NO.	05‐15‐00104‐CV

IN	THE	COURT	OF	APPEALS FOR	THE	FIFTH	DISTRICT	OF	TEXAS DALLAS,	TEXAS

In re TONY	R.	SAAD

FROM	254 TH DISTRICT	COURT DALLAS	COUNTY,	TEXAS HON.	JAMES	MARTIN	PRESIDING CAUSE	NO.	DF‐14‐14203

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY RELATOR TONY R. SAAD

Jeffrey	W.	Hellberg,	Jr. Texas	State	Bar	No.	00796738

jeff.hellberg@wickphillips.com Darla	J.	Gabbitas Texas	State	Bar	No.	24089458 darla.gabbitas@wickphillips.com WICK	PHILLIPS	GOULD	MARTIN,	LLP 3131	McKinney	Ave.,	Suite	100 Dallas,	Texas	75204 (214)	692‐6200	(office) (214)	692‐6255	(facsimile)

ATTORNEYS FOR RELATOR TONY R. SAAD ACCEPTED 05-15-00104-CV FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS, TEXAS 2/6/2015 10:14:43 AM

LISA MATZ CLERKi I. INDEX

I. INDEX ......................................................................................................................... ......... i

II. TABLE OF CASES ............................................................................................................. ii

III. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................................................................................... 1

IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. 2
A. The	Award	Did	Not	Make	Anderson	A	Party	of	Record. ................................................. 3

B. Equity	Cannot	Extend	A	Trial	C ourt’s	Plenary	Jurisdiction. ........................................... 5
C. Reframing	Anderson’s	Post‐Decree	Motions	Does	Not	Provide	the	R equired	Vacation of	the	Decree	Within	Thirty	Days. ..................................................................................... 7
1. It	 is	 Not	 Necessary	 to	 View	 Anderson’s	 Post‐Decree	 Motions	 as	 M otions	 To Modify	The	Judgment	Under	Rule	329b(g). .............................................................. 7
2. Regardless	of	a	Formal	Post‐Decree	Intervention,	the	Decree	Was Not	Set	Aside Within	Thirty	Days. ..................................................................................................... 8

V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 1 1

VI. PRAYER ........................................................................................................................ .... 12

VII. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................................................. 13

VIII. VERIFICATION................................................................................................................ 14

IX. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................................... 15-iiII. TABLE OF CASES

Cases Page Daniels v. Pecan Valley Ranch, Inc. , 831	S.W.2d	372,	382	(Tex.	App.—San	Antonio	1992,	writ	denied) ..................	5

First Alief Bank v. White ,	682	S.W.2d	251	(Tex.	1982)	.................................. .............	11

In re Florence ,	377	S.W.3d	837	(Tex.	App.—Da llas	2012,	orig.	proceeding)	.... ...	5

In the Interest of H.G. , 267	S.W.3d	120	(Tex.	App.—San	Antonio	2008,	pet.	denied)	..... ......................	4,5

Malone v. Hampton , 182	S.W.3d	465	(Tex.	App.—Dallas	2006,	no	pet.)	.............. ..........................	passim

Serna v. Webster ,	908	S.W.2d	487	(Tex.	App.—San	Antonio	1995)	................. ...	3,9

State and County Mut. Fire Ins. v. Kelly , 915	S.W.2d	224	(Tex.App.—Austin	1996,	no	writ)	............... ..................................	2

Texas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ledbetter ,	251	S.W.3d	31	(Tex.	2008)	................................... 8,9

Other Authorities

T EX

. F AM

. C ODE §	106.002	.................................................... ....................................................	1,3

Rules Tex.	R.	Civ.	P.	329b(d)	.......................................

............................................................... ...........	21 III. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT It	is	undisputed	that	Anderson 1 did	not	file	a	Motion	to	Intervene	prior to	October	2,	2014,	and	the	trial court	did	not	set	aside	the	F inal	Decree	before November	 2,	 2014.	 	 Therefore,	 Anderson’s	 Motion	 for	 New	 Trial	 d id	 not extend	the	trial	court’s	plenary	jurisdiction,	and	the	trial	co urt’s	ruling	on	his Motion	for	New	Trial	is	void.		Anderson	does	not	dispute	the	pl ain	meaning	of

the	law	and	does	not	address	the	seminal Malone decision.		Instead,	Anderson suggests	that	he	did	not	need	to	intervene	because	the	pre‐Decr ee	attorneys’

fees	award 2 made	him	a	party.		This	argument	is	not	supported	by	Tex.	Fam. Code	 section	 106.002.	 	 Alternatively,	 Anderson	 contends	 Tony	 in vited	 the error	and	is	estopped	from	raising	the	failure	to	intervene.	An derson	is	wrong because	 equity	 does	 not	 extend	 plenary	 jurisdiction.	 	 Anderson’ s	 remaining arguments	 that	 his	 post‐Decree	 pleadings 3 are	 sufficient	 to	 extend	 plenary jurisdiction	 fail	because	 the	 trial	court	did	not	set	aside	 the judgment	within thirty	days.

1 Unless	 otherwise	 noted,	 terms	 have	 the	 same	 meaning	 defined	 in the	 Petition	 for Writ	of	Mandamus	by	Relator,	Tony	Saad	(“Writ”).

2 See Associate	Judge’s	Report	(Divorc e),	Response	at	Appendix	3.

3 See Motion	 to	Render	 Judgment	on	Attorney’s	Fees,	Response	at	Appe ndix	9;	First Amended	Motion	 to	Render	 Judgment	 on	Attorney’s	 Fees,	Response at	Appendix	 10;	and Motion	for	Severance,	Re sponse	at	Appendix	11.-2- IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES A	 party’s	 motion	 for	 new	 trial	 extends	 a	 trial	 court’s	 plenary jurisdiction,	while	a	non‐party’s	Motion	for	New	Trial	does	not

. 4 Moreover,	a post‐decree	 intervention	 alone	 is	 insufficient	 to	 extend	 plenar y	 jurisdiction. The	 trial	 court	must	 also	 set	 aside	 the	 judgment	 within	 thirty days. 5 These rules	apply	to	the	facts	in	this	case. Anderson’s	 Response	 to	 Relator’s	 Petition	 for	 Writ	 of	 Mandamus (“Response”)	ignores	 the	law	and	 fails	 to	raise	a	dispositive	i ssue	 for	at	least three	 reasons:	 	 1)	 the	 Associate	 Judge’s	 temporary	 award	 of	 She reen’s attorneys’	 fees	 (“Award”) 6 did	 not	make	Anderson	 a	 party;	 2)	 equity	 cannot extend	plenary	jurisdiction;	and	3)	Anderson	did	not	have	 the	 t rial	court	set aside	 the	 Final	 Decree	 within	 thirty	 days.	 	 Accordingly,	 Anders on’s	 post‐ Decree,	 non‐party	 Motion	 for	New	 Trial	 did	 not	 extend	 plenary	 j urisdiction, and	the	trial	court’s	grant	of	that	motion	more	than	ninety	day s	after	entry	of

the	Final	Decree	is	void.

4 See Tex.	 R.	 Civ.	 P.	 329b(d); Malone v. Hampton ,	 182	 S.W.3d	 465,	 46	 (Tex.	 App.— Dallas	 2006,	 no	 pet.); State and County Mut. Fire Ins. v. Kelly ,	 915	 S.W.2d	 224,	 227 (Tex.App.—Austin	1996,	no	writ).

5 See Malone ,	182	S.W.3d	at	468.

6 See Associate	Judge’s	Report	(Divorc e),	Response	at	Appendix	3.-3- A. The Award Did Not Make Anderson A Party of Record. The	Award,	rendered	in	default,	temporarily	ordered	the	“Father to	pay Mother’s	attorney’s	fees	.	.	.	directly	to	Mother’s	attorneys.” 7 While	Texas	law authorizes	an	attorney	to	enforce	an	award	of	attorneys’	fees	i n	his	own	name, such	 enforcement	 does	 not	 make	 the	 attorney	 a	 party	 or	 a de facto

intervenor. 8 Anderson	became	Tony’s	creditor	by	statutory	privilege,	but	h e remained	 a	 non‐party	 to	 the	 litigation	 dissolving	 the	 Saads’	 ma rriage	 and addressing	 the	 interests	 of	 their	 children. 9 Anderson’s	 suggestion	 that	 he became	a	party	litigant,	and	 thus	all	domestic	law	attorneys	wi th	interim	 fee awards	 become	 party	 litigants,	 does	 not	 logically	 follow	 the	 cl ear	 statutory language.	 	 Indeed,	 such	 a	 result	 would	 create	 conflicts	 of	 inte rest	 in	 some

cases. An	 intervention	 is	 the	 preferred	 method	 for	 attorneys	 to	 collec t	 their fees, 10 however,	Anderson’s	proposed	re ading	of	the	statute	would	not require

7 See Response	at	Appendix	3.

8 See T EX

. F AM

. C ODE §	 106.002	 (“(a)	 In	 a	 suit	 under	 this	 title,	 the	 court	may	 rend er judgment	 for	 reasonable	 attorney's	 fees	 and	 expenses	 and	 order the	 judgment	 and	 post judgment	interest	to	be	paid	directly	to	an	attorney.		(b)	A	ju dgment	for	attorney's	fees	and expenses	 may	 be	 enforced	 in	 the	 attorney's	 name	 by	 any	 means	 av ailable	 for	 the enforcement	of	a	judgment	for	debt.”).

9 See id.

10 See Serna v. Webster ,	908	S.W.2d	487,	491	(Tex.	App.—San	Antonio	1995)	(“A	plea in	 intervention	 in	 the	 principle	 suit	 is	 an	 appropriate	 vehicle by	 which	 a	 discharged attorney	may	recover	fees	for	services	rendered.”)-4- any	 attorney	 with	 a	 fee	 award	 to	 file	 an	 intervention.	 	 Had	 the legislature

intended	 to	 create	 instant	 confl icts	 of	 interest	 between	 lawyer s	 and	 their clients	and	obviate	 the	need	 for	attorneys	 to	intervene,	 the	st atute	would	be clearly	worded	to	express	such	intentions. Anderson’s	 contention	 that	 he	 did	 not	 need	 to	 file	 a	 petition	 f or intervention	 is	 supported	 by	 one	 case, In the Interest of H.G. , 11 a	 case	 that neither	 holds	 that	 an	 attorney	 becomes	 a	 party	 following	 an	 awa rd	 of attorneys’	 fees	nor	holds	 that	Anderson	did	not	need	 to	interve ne	under	 the present	facts. 12 In the Interest of H.G. rejected	a	set	of	grandparents’	attempts to	 intervene	 and	 modify	 the	 adjudicated	 parent‐child	 relationsh ip	 of	 their biological	 grandchildren	 with	 the	 adoptive	 parents. 13 The	 case	 does	 not address	 an	 attorney’s	 fee	 award	 and,	 importantly,	 the	 grandpare nts	 filed	 a petition	to	intervene	as	the	procedural	vehicle	through	which	t hey	attempted to	 secure	 their	 alleged	 rights. 14 The	 case	 is	 inapposite	 to	 the	 propositions Anderson	cited	it	to	support.		Without	support,	Anderson’s	clai ms	that	his	fee award	“[is]	better	than	a	mere	motion	for	intervention”	should be	rejected. 15

11 See In the Interest of H.G. ,	 267	 S.W.3d	 120	 (Tex.	 App.—San	 Antonio	 2008,	 pet. denied).

12 See id .	at	126.

13 See id .	at	122‐23.

14 See id

. 15 See Response	at	p.	1.-5- B. Equity Cannot Extend A Trial Court’s Plenary Jurisdiction.

In the Interest of H.G. also	addresses	equity	and	equitable	estoppel,	and holds	 that	equity	cannot	confer	jurisdiction	where	it	does	not exist. 16 A	 trial court’s	 orders	 issued	 without	 subject	 matter	 jurisdiction	 are	 v oid. 17 Thus, Anderson’s	argument	that	Tony	invited	the	error	and	cannot	asse rt	the	court’s lack	of	plenary	jurisdiction	is	incorrect. Factually,	Tony	did	not	invite	any	error.		First,	Tony	did	not request	the court	 make	 rulings	 following	 the	 termination	 of	 its	 plenary	 jur isdiction; therefore,	 Anderson’s	 reliance	 on Daniels is	 misguided. 18 In Daniels ,	 the plaintiff	 moved	 for	 a	 new	 trial,	 and	 then,	 on	 appeal,	 the	 same plaintiff complained	 of	 the	Court’s	error	in	granting	 the	 requested	new	 t rial. 19 Here, Tony	did	not	submit	any	post‐trial	motions,	thus,	he	never	invi ted	the	Court	to exceed	its	plenary	jurisdiction. 20

16 See In the Interest of H.G. ,	 267	 S.W.3d	 at	 124‐25	 (addressing	 standing	 as	 a component	 of	 subject	matter	jurisdiction	 the	 court	 said,	 “while equity	may	estop	a	 party from	relying	on	a	mere	statutory	bar	to	recovery,	it	cannot	con fer	jurisdiction	where	none exists.”).

17 See In re Florence ,	377	S.W.3d	837,	839	(Tex.	App.—Dallas	2012,	orig.	proceeding)

. 18 See Daniels v. Pecan Valley Ranch, Inc. ,	831	S.W.2d	372,	382	(Tex.	App.—San	Antonio 1992,	writ	denied).

19 See id.

20 Daniels does	 not	 hold	 that	 the	 doctrine	 of	invited	error	 restores	a	 Co urt’s	 plenary power	after	it	has	been	di vested	of	jurisdiction. Id.-6- In	 addition,	 Tony	 has	 clean	 hands	 and	 equity	 favors	 him.	 	 Ande rson invented	 Tony’s	 involvement	 in	 a	 “secret”	 conspiracy. 21 Anderson’s complaints	about	his	client’s	lack	of	communication	are	irrelev ant	to	Tony,	an adverse	 party.	 	 Despite	 the	 claim	 of	 secrecy,	 Anderson’s	 attorn ey‐client communication	dated	October	2,	2014,	indicates	 that	his	 firm	 kn ew	Shereen had	a	new	attorney,	 knew	 the	new	attorney	had	drafted	a	 Final	D ecree,	and knew	 that	Shereen	might	have	 the	Final	Decree	entered. 22 Anderson	 further claims	not	to	have	withdrawn	 from	the	litigation, 23 but	he	attached	a	copy	of the	Order	allowing	him	to	withdr aw	signed	on	October	22,	nine	d ays	before	he

filed	 his	 Motion	 for	 New	 Trial. 24 Anderson’s	 claims	 of	 a	 “secret”	 divorce mischaracterize	his	actual	knowledge.		There	is	not	a	scintilla of	evidence	that Tony	 “secretly	obtained	a	divorce.”		Anderson’s	issues	with	She reen	and	her new	 counsel	were	 addressed	 by	 the	 trial	 court. 25 Tony	 was	 not	involved	in these	issues.		Thus,	Anderson’s	allegations	are	insufficient	 to create	an	issue where	none	actually	exists.

21 See Response	at	p.	7.

22 See Response	at	Appendix	7.

23 See Response	at	p.	8.

24 See Response	at	Appendix	15.

25 See Response	at	Appendix	13,	p.	2.-7- Accordingly,	even	if	equity	could	extend	jurisdiction—which	it cannot—
an	extension	is	not	warranted	in	this	case.

C. Reframing Anderson’s Post

‐ Decree Motions Does Not Provide the Required Vacation of the Decree Within Thirty Days. Anderson’s	 final	 two	 arguments	 are	 that	 his	 post‐Decree	 motions :	 	 1) sought	a	substantive	change	and	were	motions	to	modify	the	judg ment;	and	2) should	 be	 viewed	 as	 interventions.	 	 Both	 arguments	 fail	 in	 ligh t	 of	 the requirement	 that	 the	 trial	court	set	aside	 the	judgment	within the	 thirty‐day window	of	its	plenary	power. 26

1. It is Not Necessary to View Anderson’s Post

‐ Decree Motions as Motions To Modify The Judgment Under Rule 329b(g). Anderson	 asks	 the	 Court	 to	 view	 his	 post‐Decree	 Motions	 under	 R ule 329b(g)	as	proper	attempts	to	modify	the	Judgment,	thus,	extend ing	the	trial court’s	plenary	jurisdiction.		However,	the	argument	is	unneces sary	in	light	of Anderson’s	 Motion	 for	New	 Trial.	 	 If	 Anderson	 were	 a	 party,	 his Motion	 for New	Trial	would	have	extended	 the	 trial	court’s	plenary	jurisdi ction	without reframing	 his	 other	 post‐Decree	 Motions.	 	 Anderson	 provides	 no authority that	 a	 non‐party’s	 329b(g)	 motion	 would	 extend	 plenary	 jurisdic tion. Fundamentally,	the	argument	does	not	change	the	issue—Anderson was	not	a

26 See Malone v. Hampton ,	182	S.W.3d	465,	46	(Tex.	App.—Dallas	2006,	no	pet.).-8- party,	 and	 neither	 his	 Motion	 for	 New	 Trial	 nor	 his	 post‐Decree Motions extended	the	court’s	jurisdiction.

2. Regardless of a Formal Post

‐ Decree Intervention, the Decree Was Not Set Aside Within Thirty Days.

i. Anderson Is Not Shereen’s Subrogee. Anderson’s	 suggestion	 that	 he	 should	 be	 treated	 as	 if	 he	 were	 a subrogee	 of	 his	 client	 is	 in	 error. 27 Anderson	 did	 not	 assert	 a	 subrogation interest	and	no	statute	provides	him	with	a	subrogated	interest in	his	client’s recovery;	therefore, Ledbetter ’s	holding	that	a	statutory	subrogee	had	a	right to	intervene	in	a	worker’s	litigation	does	not	support	Anderson ’s	argument. 28

In Ledbetter ,	 initially	 the	 issue	 was	 one	 of	 timing;	 the	 subrogee	 moved	 to intervene	 after	 the	 plaintiff,	who	 had	 previously	 represented	 t he	 subrogee’s interest,	filed	a	non‐suit	and	asked	the	court	to	award	the	sub rogee	nothing. 29 The	 timing	 issue	 was	 withdrawn	 before	 appeal. 30 The	 rule	 in	 the	 case, however,	 provided	 that	 the	 subrogee,	 whose	 interests	 were	 adequ ately represented	and	then	suddenly	abandoned,	could	still	intervene after	showing

27 See Malone ,	182	S.W.3d	at	468	(“[A]	plea	in	intervention	comes	too	late	i f	filed	after judgment	and	may	not	be	considered	unless	and	until	 the	judgmen t	has	been	set	aside.”) (Citation	omitted); see also Response	at	p.	9.

28 See Texas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ledbetter ,	251	S.W.3d	31	(Tex.	2008).

29 See Ledbetter ,	251	S.W.	3d	at	36.

30 See id. at	37.-9- that	there	is	neither	unnecessary	delay	nor	prejudice	to	existi ng	parties. 31 The rule	 is	 narrowly	 tailored	 to	 subrogees. 32 Neither Ledbetter nor	 cases	 citing

Ledbetter have	 extended	 the	 holding	 beyond	 that	 context.	 Four	 important points	prevent	applying	this	rule	to	this	case:		1)	Anderson	wa s	a	creditor,	not a	 subrogee	 to	 his	 client’s	 recovery;	 2)	 he	 did	 not	 intervene	 po st‐trial,	 but instead	 he	 filed	 other	 motions	 and	 withdrew	 as	 counsel;	 3)	 he	 f ailed	 to demonstrate	that	his	actions	would	not	cause	unnecessary	delay or	prejudice; and	4)	regardless	of	a	post‐Decree	intervention,	the	Decree	was not	set	aside within	thirty	days	of	its	issuance.

ii. Anderson’s post ‐ Decree Pleadings are not Interventions. Serna does	 not	 cure	 Anderson’s	 fa ilure	 to	 properly	intervene. 33 Serna addressed	pre‐judgment	pleadings	in	a	personal	injury	case	and interpreted	a Notice	of	Lawyer’s	Lien	as	an	intervention. 34 Serna	does	not	hold	that,	outside the	 contingent	 fee	 situation,	 post‐Decree	 pleadings	 can	 be	 re‐i nterpreted	 to create	plenary	jurisdiction	where	none	exists.

31 See id. at	36.

32 See id. (“But	when	a	subrogee's	interest	has	been	adequately	represent ed	and	then suddenly	abandoned	by	someone	else,	it	can	intervene	.	.	.”); id. (“a	party	has	an	absolute right	to	nonsuit	their	own	claim s,	but	not	someone	else’s	claim they	are	trying	to	avoid.”).

33 See Serna v. Webster ,	 908	 S.W.2d	 487,	 491	 (Tex.	 App.—San	 Antonio	 1995)	 (“[A]n intervention	must	be	timely	file d;	in	any	case,	before	the	judg ment.”).

34 See id.-10- iii. There is no Exception to the Requirement That the Court Set Aside the Final Decree Within Thirty Days. Anderson	 suggests	 that	 this	 case	 fits	 into	 numerous	 exceptions; however,	none	of	his	citations	to	non‐domestic	decisions	square ly	address	the issue	currently	before	 this	Court. Malone 35 squarely	addresses	 the	 facts,	and there	is	 no	 factual	 dispute	 the	Saad’s	Decree	was	 not	 set	aside within	 thirty days	of	its	issuance.

Malone addressed	 an	 attorney’s	 fee	 dispute	 in	 domestic	 litigation. 36 Malone	 represented	 a	 party	 but	moved	 to	 withdraw	 after	 his	 clie nt	 entered into	 an	 agreement	 with	 her	 former	 spouse	 without	 Malone’s	 knowl edge. 37 Malone	withdrew,	intervened	after	the	 final	judgment,	and	 filed a	motion	 for

new	 trial. 38 The	 former	 spouse	 of	 Malone’s	 client	 sought	 sanctions	 for

Malone’s	Motion	 for	New	Trial. 39 Those	 sanctions	were	awarded	more	 than thirty	 days	 after	 the	 final	 judgment. 40 The	 appellate	 court	 overturned	 the sanction	award	because	the	trial	court	lacked	plenary	jurisdict ion	at	the	time

35 See Malone ,	182	S.W.3d	465.

36 See Malone ,	182	S.W.3d	at	467‐68.

37 See id.

38 See id.

39 See id.

40 See id.-11- of	the	award. 41 The Malone court	applied	Texas	Supreme	Court	law	and	held that	a	non‐party	may	intervene	post	judgment,	but	only	where	 th e	Decree	is set	aside	within	 the	 first	 thirty	days. 42 Therefore,	Malone’s	intervention	and Motion	 for	New	 Trial	 had	 not	 extended	 the	 trial	 court’s	 plenary jurisdiction

because	the	Decree	had	not	been set	aside	within	thirty	days. 43 Here,	Anderson,	a	non‐party	just	like Malone ,	complains	 that	his	client acted	to	conclude	the	litigation	without	him.		After	the	Final Decree,	Anderson

withdrew	as	counsel	and	 filed	a	Motion	 for	New	Trial.		The Malone and	Saad facts	 are	 almost	 identical;	 the	 cases	 should	 have	 an	 identical outcome. Anderson’s	 attempt	 to	 extend	 the	 trial	 court’s	 plenary	 jurisdic tion	 was unsuccessful	because	he	did	not	intervene	(before	or)	after	the Decree	and	did not	have	 the	Decree	set	aside	within	 thirty	days.		Therefore,	 t he	 trial	court’s rulings	that	followed	the	expiration	of	its	plenary	jurisdictio n	are	void.

V. CONCLUSION Anderson’s	 arguments	 ask	 the	 Court	 to	 layer	 unsupported	 excepti on upon	 unsupported	 exception,	 and	 require	 the	 Court	 to	 ignore	 bot h	 the	 long standing	 principle	 that	 intervention	 is	 not	 permitted	 after	 a	 f inal	 judgment,

41 See id. at	468.

42 See id. (citing First Alief Bank v. White ,	682	S.W.2d	251,	252	(Tex.	1982)	(“[a]	plea	in intervention	comes	 too	late	if	 filed	after	judgment	and	may	not be	considered	unless	and until	the	judgment	has	been	set aside.”)	(emphasis	added).

43 See id. at	470.-12- and	that	a	Decree	cannot	be	set	aside	after	thirty	days,	certai nly	not	by	a	non‐ party	or	as	a	matter	of	equity.		A nderson’s	challenge	is	withou t	merit.

VI. PRAYER For	 the	 foregoing	reasons,	and	 those	contained	in	 the	Petition for	Writ of	Mandamus,	 Tony	 R.	 Saad	 prays	 that	 this	 Court	issue	 a	writ	 of mandamus directing	 the	 Hon.	 James	 Martin	 to	 vacate	 the	 Rendition	 dated	 J anuary	 11, 2015,	and	the	Order	Granting	a	New	Trial	dated	 January	15,	2015 ,	and	grant him	such	other	and	further	relief	in	law	and	in	equity	to	which he	may	show himself	to	be	justly	entitled.

Respectfully	submitted, /s/ Darla J. Gabbitas Jeffrey	W.	Hellberg,	Jr. Texas	State	Bar	No.	00796738 jeff.hellberg@wickphillips.com Darla	J.	Gabbitas Texas	State	Bar	No.	24089458 darla.gabbitas@wickphillips.com WICK	PHILLIPS	GOULD	MARTIN,	LLP 3131	McKinney	Ave.,	Suite	100 Dallas,	Texas	75204 (214)	692‐6200	(office) (214)	692‐6255	(facsimile)

ATTORNEYS	FOR	RELATOR TONY	R.	SAAD-13- VII. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant	 to	 Texas	 Rules	 of	 Appellate	 Procedure	 9.4,	 I	 hereby	 ce rtify that,	absent	 the	caption,	identity	of	parties	and	counsel,	stat ement	regarding oral	 argument,	 table	 of	 contents,	index	 of	 authorities,	 stateme nt	 of	 the	 case, statement	 of	 issues	 presented,	 statement	 of	 jurisdiction,	 state ment	 of procedural	 history,	 signature,	 proof	 of	 service,	 certification, certificate	 of compliance,	 and	 appendices,	 the	 computer	 program	 used	 to	 prepar e	 this document	prior	to	its	conversion	to	portable	document	 format	ca lculates	the number	of	words	in	the	foreg oing	reply	brief	as	2,530.

/s/ Darla J. Gabbitas

_ Darla	J.	GabbitasVII. VERIFICATION

STATE OF TEXAS § § COUNTY OF DALLAS §

Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Darla 

## J. Gabbitas, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed hereto, and who, being first duly sworn, upon oath stated that she is the attorney for Tony R. Saad, that she has reviewed the foregoing Reply In Support Of Petition For Writ Of Mandamus By Relator Tony R. Saad and concluded that every factual statement in the reply is supported by competent evidence.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on February k_ , 2015.

FRANCES WHISLER Notary Public in and for the State of Texas

-14--15- IX. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A	 true	 copy	 of	 the	 foregoing	 Reply	 In	 Support	 Of	 Petition	 For	W rit	 Of Mandamus	By	Relator	Tony	R.	Saad	has	been	served	the	following persons	by EFS,	on	February	6,	2015:

Elizabeth	Hunter ehunter@qslwm.com Cynthia	Dunn cdunn@qslwm.com Quilling	Selander	Lownds Winslett	&	Moser,	P.C. 2001	Bryan	Street,	Suite	1800 Dallas,	Texas	75201 Counsel	for	Tony	R.	Saad

Sam	Almasri sam@theamlawgroup.com 9330	LBJ	Freeway,	Suite	900 Dallas,	Texas	75243

Counsel	for	Shereen	Yasin	Saad James	Bell Jbell@fflawoffice.com Friedman	Feiger,	LLP. 5301	Spring	Valley	Road,	Suite	200 Dallas,	Texas	75254 Former	Counsel	for	Tony	R.	Saad Jeffrey	O.	Anderson jeff@ondafamilylaw.com Orsinger,	Nelson, Downing	&	Anderson,	LLP. 5950	Sherry	Lane,	Suite	800 Dallas,	Texas	75225

Former	 Counsel	 for	 Shereen	 Yasin Saad	and	Real	Party	in	Interest And	by	hand‐delivery	on	the	Respondent: The	Honorable	James	Martin 254th	Judicial	District	Court 600	Commerce,	Third	Floor Dallas,	Texas	75202

RESPONDENT

/s/ Darla J. Gabbitas Darla	J.	Gabbitas