alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         436,808
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                       1,049,523
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 98,914,806
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                      35,838,456
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                        35,148,900
<LOANS>                                     90,383,322
<ALLOWANCE>                                  (345,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             235,264,057
<DEPOSITS>                                 120,028,662
<SHORT-TERM>                                23,000,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          1,872,662
<LONG-TERM>                                 35,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        39,675
<OTHER-SE>                                  53,790,758
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             235,264,057
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              1,874,077
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            2,282,669
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             4,156,746
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           1,531,170
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,442,299
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        1,714,447
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    4,618
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              1,291,775
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                455,221
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     392,341
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   392,341
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .11
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.02
<LOANS-NON>                                    363,000
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               345,000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    4,618
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              345,000
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           345,000
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule  contains summary financial  information  extracted from Form 10-K
the year ended  December  31,  1996 for May  Limited  Partnership  1984-2 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such Form 10-K.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000757385
<NAME>                        May Limited Partnership 1984-2
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Dec-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   Dec-31-1996
<CASH>                                         352
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  466
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               818
<PP&E>                                         10,369
<DEPRECIATION>                                 10,369
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 818
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          12
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     806
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   818
<SALES>                                        1,996
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               2,010
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  158
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               10
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                1,796
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            1,796
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   1,796
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  142.13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  142.13
        


</TABLE>
Attachment L:

Endorser Registration Form
#### Elaine REVELLINO, Appellant, v. AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, INC., a Delaware corporation licensed to do business in the State of Florida, and Rose Kotler, Appellees.

No. 69-366.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Dec. 16, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 1970.

Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, Miami Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Dube, Louis K. Lesperance, Jeanne Heyward, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an automobile accident case, in which there was a rear-end collision. The appellant, who was driving the rear automobile, sued the driver and the owner of the other vehicle for personal injuries and property damage, alleging the collision was caused by negligence of the defendant driver. The defendants answered, denying negligence and pleading contributory negligence. Thereafter, with leave of court, the defendant driver joined by her husband filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff, alleging that the negligence of the latter was the cause of the collision.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. In ruling thereon in favor of the defendants, the court ordered “that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability be and the same is hereby granted,” and the court then ordered that the plaintiff take nothing by the action and that the defendants go hence without day. That amounted to a final judgment adverse to the plaintiff on the plaintiff’s case, and a partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant-coun-terclaimants, on the issue of liability. The plaintiff appealed from the adverse summary judgment. We find error, and reverse.

At the time of the hearing on the motion of the defendants for summary judgment, the trial court had before it for consideration certain statements of counsel, answers to interrogatories and a deposition of the plaintiff. The facts thereby disclosed, viewed in a light favorable to the party moved against as they were required to be on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, showed the two automobiles were *897proceeding in the same direction at a speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour (within the speed limit), with an interval of three or four car lengths between them, in a lane provided for through traffic, and that the defendant driver made a sudden stop at a place where no such stop was reasonably to be expected.

In the circumstances presented the issues of negligence and contributory negligence could not properly be resolved by the trial court on motion for summary, judgment. See Mansell v. Eidge, Fla.App. 1965, 179 So.2d 624, 627; Pagan v. Holman, Fla.App. 1967, 195 So.2d 606. Cf. Jeskey v. Yellow Cab Company, Inc., Fla.App.1962, 136 So.2d 376.

Accordingly, the summary judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, July 15, 2015. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, July 15, 2015 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A15I0236. STEVE MARION v. THE STATE.
Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
LC NUMBERS: 12CR1028
July 3, 1996

(Except Note 12 as to which the date is July 29, 1996)

Independent Auditors' Report

The Board of Directors
Systems Technology Associates, Inc.
Sterling, Virginia


We have audited the accompanying balance sheets of 
Systems Technology Associates, Inc. as of May 31,
1996 and 1995, and the related statements of income, 
stockholders' equity (deficit), and cash flows for the 
years ended May 31, 1996, 1995 and 1994. These 
financial statements are the responsibility of the 
Corporation's management. Our responsibility is to 
express an opinion on these financial statements 
based on our audits.

We conducted our audits in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards. Those standards require 
that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether the financial 
statements are free of material misstatement. An audit 
includes examining, on a test basis, evidence 
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial 
statements. An audit also includes assessing the 
accounting principles used and significant estimates 
made by management, as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation. We believe 
that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinion.

In our opinion, the financial statements referred to 
above present fairly, in all material respects, the
financial position of Systems Technology Associates, 
Inc. as of May 31, 1996 and 1995, and the results of its
operations and its cash flows for the years then ended 
in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles.

The accompanying financial statements have been 
prepared assuming that the Corporation will continue 
as a going concern. As discussed in Note 2 to the 
financial statements, prior to 1994, the Corporation 
suffered substantial recurring losses from operations 
which resulted in a large net capital deficiency. The 
capital deficiency has not been eliminated, and total 
stockholders' equity remains insufficient in comparison 
to outstanding debt, which raises substantial doubt 
about the Corporation's ability to continue as a going 
concern. Management's plans regarding those matters 
also are described in Note 2. The financial statements 
do not include any adjustments that might result from 
the outcome of this uncertainty.




						
	Certified Public Accountants
Exhibit
32.1





Certification
pursuant to 18 U.S.C., Section 1350


as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002








In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, filed pursuant
to  Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, of  The First Bancshares, Inc. (the "Company") for the period
ended June 30,  2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David E. Johnson, the Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:
  1)
              the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
    and





2)
            the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





/s/
      David E. JohnsonName:
                David
      E. JohnsonTitle:
                Chief
      Executive OfficerDate:
                August
      12, 2009





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or  other
document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting
the  signature that appears in typed form within the electronic
version of this  written statement required by Section 906, has been
provided to The First  Bancshares, Inc., and will be retained by The
First Bancshares, Inc., and  furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon  request.
#### STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Isaac WILLIAMS, Jr., Appellant.

No. 60149.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 19, 1977.

*1296Paul A. Bonin, New Orleans, for appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Vincent Paciera, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

TATE, Justice.

The defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of distribution of heroin, La. R.S. 40:966, and sentenced to concurrent life sentences at hard labor. On his appeal, we find merit to his Assignment of Error No. 2. We therefore reverse.

The defendant was convicted of distributions (sales) occurring on November 1 and November 2. By Assignment 2, the defendant correctly contends that over his objection the trial court improperly admitted irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of two other offenses of November 8 and 13.

These extraneous offenses were admitted on the state’s contention that they were admissible to prove intent, guilty knowledge, or system. La.R.S. 15:445, 446. However, reversible error resulted from the prejudice occasioned by evidence of them, since the offenses were not admissible for any of the purposes sought:

(1) The distribution offense is a crime requiring only general criminal intent. Such intent is established by mere proof of voluntary distribution. La.R.S. 40:966. The extraneous crimes were inadmissible to prove intent. *State v. Clark,*338 So.2d 690 (La.1976).

(2) No defense is raised that the act was done without knowledge of the illegality of the substance. Therefore, “guilty knowledge” is not a genuine matter at issue in this prosecution, and the prejudicial evidence of the extraneous offenses was inadmissible for such purpose. *State*v. *Frederick,*340 So.2d 1353 (La.1976).

(3) The extraneous offenses were not admissible to prove system: In the first place, even if proof of system was relevant to any issue in the present prosecution, these only-somewhat similar other drug offenses were not so peculiarly distinctive as to indicate they were the work of the same person. *State v. Frederick,*340 So.2d 1353 (La. 1976); *State v. Lee,*340 So.2d 1339 (La. 1976). More important, however, they were inadmissible because system was not relevant to prove any fact of consequence (e. g., identity) to the accused’s present innocence or guilt (i. e., independent of the inadmissible purpose to infer that the accused committed the present crimes because he had committed the other ones). *State v. Jackson,*352 So.2d 195 (La.1977) and many decisions therein cited.

Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and sentences, and we remand for new triads) in accordance with law.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SANDERS, C. J., and SUMMERS and MARCUS, JJ., dissent.
#### Charlton H. FUTCH, Jr., Relator, v. Honorable A. J. HOSEMANN, Jr., Judge, Court of Record, Brevard County, Florida, and Jerrold A. BROSS, County Solicitor, Brevard County, Florida, Respondents.

No. 71-161.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 9, 1971.

Prohibition denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1432 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1432

 To direct the Secretary of the Interior to study the suitability and 
 feasibility of designating portions of the Ka'u Coast in the State of 
             Hawaii as a unit of the National Park System.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             August 1, 2013

  Ms. Hirono introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To direct the Secretary of the Interior to study the suitability and 
 feasibility of designating portions of the Ka'u Coast in the State of 
             Hawaii as a unit of the National Park System.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Ka'u Coast Preservation Act''.

SEC. 2. KA'U COAST STUDY AND REPORT.

    (a) Study.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of the Interior (referred to 
        in this Act as the ``Secretary'') shall complete a study to 
        determine the suitability and feasibility of designating land 
        along the Ka'u Coast in the State of Hawaii as a unit of the 
        National Park System.
            (2) Study area.--The area to be studied under paragraph (1) 
        shall consist of--
                    (A) the area extending from Kapaoo Point to Kahuku 
                Point, Hawaii;
                    (B) the Kahuku Coastal Property (TMK (3) 9-2-
                001:075); and
                    (C) the Nani Kahuku Aina Property, including Pohue 
                Bay (TMK (3) 9-2-001:072).
            (3) Applicable law.--The study under paragraph (1) shall be 
        conducted in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 
        8(c) of the National Park System General Authorities Act (16 
        U.S.C. 1a-5(c)).
    (b) Report.--On completion of the study under subsection (a), the 
Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Natural Resources of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources of the Senate a report containing the results of the study.
                                 <all>
```
251 La. 746

#### Robert W. HINEGARDNER et ux. v. DICKEY’S POTATO CHIP COMPANY, Inc., et al.

No. 49048.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 2, 1968.

In re: Robert W. Hinegardner et ux. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court-of-Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 205 So.2d 157.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, we find no error of law in the judgment.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE>               5
<MULTIPLIER>            1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-02-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-04-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-02-1999
<CASH>                                           7,664
<SECURITIES>                                     2,870
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,350
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (801)
<INVENTORY>                                      3,455
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                24,973
<PP&E>                                          16,894
<DEPRECIATION>                                (11,832)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  31,790
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           16,695
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            88
<OTHER-SE>                                      14,943
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    31,790
<SALES>                                         41,258
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                56,333
<CGS>                                            9,578
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   13,778
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                39,944
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,106
<INCOME-TAX>                                       650
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,456
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,456
<EPS-BASIC>                                      $0.27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    $0.30


</TABLE>
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NORMA LIZETH LOPEZ OYUELA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 09-73724

Agency No. A072-776-004

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 9, 2010 ** 

Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Norma Lizeth Lopez-Oyuela, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions pro

se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of her appeal from

the immigration judge’s denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.

FILED

MAR 15 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-73724

Lopez-Oyuela contends that the BIA erred in denying her applications for

relief because she suffered past persecution, and she fears future persecution, due

to her political opinions in support of a minority political party in Honduras. 

Lopez-Oyuela failed to raise her claim of persecution based on her political

opinion before the BIA, and therefore she has failed to administratively exhaust the

only claim that she raises before this court. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674,

677-78 (9th Cir. 2004).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.