Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

JAMES M. STUDLEY, 

Appellant, 

v. 

ALASKA PUBLIC OFFICES 

COMMISSION, 

Appellee. 

) 

) Supreme Court No. S-15757 

Superior Court No. 1JU-13-00669 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 7148 – January 27, 2017 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, First 

Judicial District, Juneau, Philip M. Pallenberg, Judge. 

Appearances: Fred W. Triem, Petersburg, for Appellant. 

Joanne M. Grace, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, 

and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for 

Appellee. 

Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Fabe, Winfree, Maassen, and 

Bolger, Justices. 

WINFREE, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A self-employed real estate broker ran as a candidate for local elective 

office. The broker sought a blanket exemption from Alaska’s financial disclosure 

requirements to avoid reporting his clients’ identities and the income earned from them. 

The Alaska Public Offices Commission denied the broker’s request and assessed a $175 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

civil penalty for his failure to comply with the candidate reporting requirements. On 

appeal the superior court upheld the Commission’s ruling. The broker now appeals the 

superior court’s decision, contending the disclosure requirements violate his duty to 

maintain client confidentiality, infringe his clients’ privacy rights under the Alaska 

Constitution, and impair several personal constitutional rights. We affirm the superior 

court’s decision upholding the Commission’s ruling. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

In 2012 James Studley, a real estate broker operating through a self-owned 

corporation, ran for a borough assembly seat. As a candidate for public office Studley 

was subject to Alaska’s financial disclosure laws, administered and enforced by the 

Alaska Public Offices Commission. He was required to file a Public Official Financial 

Disclosure Statement reporting the source of any income exceeding $1,000 earned 

during the prior calendar year and the nature of the services rendered.1 Because Studley 

owned the corporation through which he operated, he was self-employed for purposes 

of the disclosure laws and so was required to report his actual client names as the income 

“source.”2 

Studley submitted his calendar year 2011 disclosure statement in July 2012 

and amended it three times. On the line for identifying clients Studley provided no 

details, but he made notes essentially stating that he was prohibited by law from 

disclosing the information. Under a general entry he titled “Real Estate Sales” Studley 

reported “$20,000 - $50,000” in income. During this process Studley contacted the 

Commission and directed it to four real estate statutes that he said should provide “an 

1 See AS 39.50.030(b)(1)(A)-(F). 

2 See AS 39.50.200(a)(10). 

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exemption from disclosing confidential financial information.”3 Studley stated: “These 

statutes specifically prohibit release of any financial information regarding my clients or 

customers without prior written approval or at the direction of the judicial system by 

court order.” 

Campaign disclosure regulations permit a candidate to request a reporting 

exemption or a waiver.4 The Commission asked Studley to provide the required 

information for making an exemption request, including the name, mailing address, and 

email address of the person making the request; the provision under which the exemption 

was sought; the reasons for requesting the exemption; and a certification that all facts 

given were true.5

 Studley responded by providing some of the requested information, 

including his name, mailing address, email address, and a certification that the 

information was true and accurate. Citing “AS 08-4145,” he gave as the reason for his 

request that the statute does “not allow any financial disclosure or information that would 

be considered financially harmful to a client.”6 

3 The four statutes he cited were: AS 08.88.071, outlining the Alaska Real 

Estate Commission’s duties and powers and grounds for disciplinary sanctions; 

AS 08.88.081, providing, in its entirety, that “[t]he commission shall adopt regulations 

necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter”; AS 08.88.171, listing real estate 

licensee eligibility standards; and AS 08.88.685, requiring real estate brokers to adopt 

various written policies and procedures. 

4 2 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 50.821 (2012). 

5 See 2 AAC 50.821(a)(1)-(9). 

6 It was subsequently clarified that “08-4145” is not a statute number, but 

rather the designation on an Alaska Real Estate Commission pamphlet that real estate 

licensees are required to present to customers and clients outlining a licensee’s duties to 

those consumers. The pamphlet explains that a licensee will “[n]ot disclose confidential 

information, even after the relationship ends, from or about you without written 

(continued...) 

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In a subsequent exchange Studley provided the Commission a copy of the 

Alaska Real Estate Commission pamphlet he had referred to as “AS 08-4145” and stated 

that no information about a client may be disclosed without court order. Studley 

provided two hypothetical examples to illustrate how disclosing the existence or details 

of a broker-client relationship might harm a client. Studley’s first example discussed 

how a buyer might be able to infer that a couple is divorcing from client disclosures and 

use that as negotiating leverage in a purchase; his second outlined privacy concerns for 

a person selling real property while filing for bankruptcy. He did not assert that these 

were actual client situations he faced. 

Later that day Studley sent the Commission another response asserting that 

he was “not required” to file the disclosures because “I receive my money from my 

various owned companies and I have listed both of my companies that pay me my 

income.” He explained that: “all of my clients are with contracts to my companies and 

not to me personally”; “Alaska real estate law requires a court order or subpoena before 

I (a Broker) can release confidential information”; and “the legal system seems to weigh 

towards protecting the personal rights of all Alaskans[’] financial data.” 

Thefollowing week Commissionstaffdenied Studley’sexemption request. 

The Commission explained that the four statutes Studley cited “do not provide any 

statutory reason that would exempt you as a candidate[] from disclosing real estate 

transactions that provided you income.” Noting that “the value of real estate transactions 

is a public process and your involvement and [c]ommissions from this public process 

6 (...continued) 

permission, except under a subpoena or court order.” The language from this pamphlet 

mirrors that of AS 08.88.620(4), stating that real estate licensees may “not disclos[e] 

confidential information from or about the represented person without written consent, 

except under a subpoena or another court order, even after termination of the licensee’s 

relationship with the represented person.” 

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[are] ascertainable already from other sources,” the Commission concluded that the 

transactions did not “fall under a constitutionally protected zone of privacy.” The 

Commission observed that “the public’s right to know the sources of your income 

outweigh[s] any reason you may have to keep these matters private.” The denial also 

informed Studley that he could appeal the staff’s decision directly to the Commission’s 

appointed members within 30 days. 

Studley took no action to appeal. The Commission then sent him a “Notice 

of Penalty” informing him that civil penalties are assessed for filing incomplete 

disclosure statements, and that he was subject to fines accrued daily from the decision 

date until the election date. The penalty was $10 per day, for a total of $350. Studley 

was given 30 days to pay the penalty or appeal to the Commission. 

Studley appealed the penalty, requesting a hearing and stating that he was 

“not allowed” to comply with the disclosure laws “on reporting contractual agreements.” 

At the hearing the commissioners located a real estate statute defining “confidential 

information”7 and tooknoteofStudley’s arguments thattherequired disclosures violated 

his clients’ constitutional privacy rights. 

The Commission later issued a “Final Order” ruling that none of the real 

estate statutes Studley cited prohibited the required disclosures. The Commission found 

that Studley “violated the reporting statute by not filing a complete [disclosure] report,” 

but reduced his civil penalty to $175 because he was an “inexperienced filer.” The order 

informed Studley that he could request reconsideration within 15 days and that he could 

appeal to the superior court within 30 days. 

AS 08.88.695(2); see infra Section IV.B.3 (discussing applicability of 

AS 08.88.695(2)). 

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Studley requested reconsideration.8 The Commission addressed Studley’s 

request at a subsequent meeting, ultimately denying it for failure to provide a basis for 

reconsideration. 

Studley had not been represented by an attorney during his Commission 

interactions; he retained counsel and filed an appeal with the superior court after the 

Commission denied his request for reconsideration. Studley cited the real estate statute 

establishing a licensee’s duty to maintain a client’s confidential information learned 

during representation,9 and the statutory “confidential information” definition examined 

at his Commission hearing.10 Studley also asserted that the required disclosures would 

violate his clients’ constitutional privacy rights and would infringe on several of his own 

constitutional rights. 

The superior court concluded that Studley “has not shown that he was 

called upon to disclose any confidential information” and that he “never made any 

specific assertion that any particular client’s information should be kept confidential.” 

The court rejected Studley’s constitutional claims, explaining that “Studley did not 

demonstrate . . . that release of information about his clients would violate any of his 

clients’ privacy rights [or that] his rights under any of the[ ] [asserted] constitutional 

provisions were violated.” Observing that Studley “provided no basis upon which [the 

Commission] could have granted him an exemption,” the court affirmed the 

Commission’s decision. 

8 See 2 AAC 50.891(g) (“The commission may reconsider an order as 

provided in AS 44.62.540. . . . A request for reconsideration must state specific grounds 

for reconsideration.”). 

9 AS 08.88.620(4). 

10 AS 08.88.695(2). 

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Studley now appeals the superior court’s decision with two “principal 

questions” for our review. First, do “real estate regulations that require a broker not to 

release confidential client information conflict with the [Commission’s] regulations that 

demand this disclosure by a broker who runs for public office?” (Emphasis in original.) 

Second, was Studley’s “constitutional right of candidacy improperly conditioned upon 

relinquishment of his constitutional right of privacy and the rights of privacy of his 

clients[, or u]pon possible loss of his license and of his profession?” 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“When the superior court has acted as an intermediate court of appeal, we 

review the merits of the administrative agency’s decision without deference to the 

superior court’s decision.”11 “[W]e give deference to [an] agency’s interpretation of a 

statute] so long as it is reasonable, when the interpretation at issue implicates agency 

expertise or the determination of fundamental policies within the scope of the agency’s 

statutory functions.”12 But we will substitute our own judgment for questions of law 

“when the statutory interpretation does not involve agency expertise, or the agency’s 

specialized knowledge and experience would not be particularly probative.”13 “In such 

cases we ‘adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and 

11 Tolbert v. Alascom, Inc., 973 P.2d 603, 606-07 (Alaska 1999) (citing 

Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 903 (Alaska 1987)). 

12 Marathon Oil co. v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 254 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Alaska 

2011) (citing Matanuska-Susitna Borough v. Hammond, 726 P.2d 166, 175 (Alaska 

1986)). 

13 Lakloey, Inc. v. Univ. of Alaska, 141 P.3d 317, 320 (Alaska 2006) (quoting 

Gunderson v. Univ. of Alaska, Fairbanks, 922 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska 1996)). 

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policy.’ ”14 Questions of constitutional interpretation are also reviewed de novo under 

the substitution of judgment standard.15 

IV.	 DISCUSSION 

A.	 Candidates Must Report Sources And Amounts Of Income But May 

Seek An Exemption When Privacy Concerns Arise. 

1.	 Disclosure requirements 

Under Alaska law a candidate for elective office, including municipal 

office, must file a statement disclosing “income sources and business interests.”16 A 

municipal candidate must disclose this information when declaring candidacy or 

submitting other required filings.17 The statement must provide “sources of income over 

$1,000” for the preceding calendar year, including “each source of the income” and the 

corresponding “amount of income” earned from the source, which “may be stated in a 

range rather than as an exact amount.”18 A candidate is considered self-employed when 

the candidate owns a controlling interest in an income-deriving entity, such as a 

partnership or a corporation.19 A self-employed candidate’s source of income is the 

14 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227, 1231 (Alaska 2003) 

(quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979)). 

15 Brandal v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 128 P.3d 732, 735 

(Alaska 2006); see also Beeson v. City of Palmer, 370 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Alaska 2016) 

(“We review questions of constitutional law de novo.” (citing Anchorage v. Sandberg, 

861 P.2d 554, 557 (Alaska 1993))). 

16 AS 39.50.020(a). 

17 Id. 

18 AS 39.50.030(b)(1); 2 AAC 50.685(c). 

19 AS 39.50.200(10). 

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entity’s individual “client or customer.”20 Disclosure statements are available to the 

public.21 

2. Disclosure exemptions 

A candidate required to file a disclosure statement may request exemptions 

from reporting.22 Among other items, a candidate may request to keep “the name of an 

individual whowas asourceofincome”or “theamount of income” earned confidential.23 

“The person requesting any exemption has the burden of proving each fact necessary to 

show that an exemption . . . is applicable.”24 A candidate may seek an exemption under 

2 AAC 50.775(c)(1) when “prohibited by law . . . from reporting” the information, or 

under 2 AAC 50.775(c)(2) when disclosure “would violate rights of the source under 

stateor federal statutes or constitutions.”25 Although the superior courtbased its decision 

on a different provision,26 both parties relied on these two provisions and we accept them 

as the relevant authorities for this appeal. 

20 Id. 

21 AS 39.50.050(c); see also 2 AAC 50.801(a) (providing for inspection and 

copies of reports, records, and other information in Commission’s possession). 

22 2 AAC 50.775(a). 

23 Id. 

24 Id. 

25 2 AAC 50.775(c)(1), (2). 

26 See 2 AAC 50.775(e) (providing for exemption requests when “state or 

federal law or court order requires the . . . information to be kept confidential”). 

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B. Studley Did Not Demonstrate He Was Entitled To An Exemption. 

1.	 We regard Studley’s assertions as arguments for an exemption. 

Studley argues that candidate disclosure requirements “compete” with his 

statutory duty as a real estate agent to keep client information confidential, and that 

reporting the information would violate his clients’ privacy rights under the Alaska 

Constitution. Studley claims that his right to stand for elective office was conditioned 

upon the surrender of his right to practice as a real estate broker and that his equal 

protection rights were violated. He also contends he does not need to show that his 

clients’ information is confidential on a “case-by-case” basis. We consider these 

contentions together as an argument that Studley was entitled to a financial disclosure 

reporting exemption. 

2.	 Exemption requests must be supported by facts; hypothetical 

scenarios are insufficient. 

As a candidate requesting an exemption it was Studley’sburden to “prov[e] 

each fact necessary” to show that a reporting exemption applied.27 Contending that he 

“cannot know the circumstances of each client, [but] can envision or anticipate 

circumstances in which disclosure would be detrimental,” Studley offers four “possible 

examples” where disclosure could be detrimental to a client.28 Studley argues that such 

hypothetical examples should suffice for an exemption, quoting Falcon v. Alaska Public 

27 2 AAC 50.775(a). 

28 The four hypothetical clients Studley offers as examples are: (1) “a seller 

who anticipates a divorce or dissolution”; (2) “a buyer [with] a creditor who is looking 

for property on which to place a lien”; (3) “[t]he victim of a crime”; and (4) a buyer with 

an “interest in keeping the selling price . . . confidential.” 

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Offices Commission29 for the proposition that “a case-by-case determination would be 

excessively burdensome.” Studley offered the Commission no facts pertaining to his 

own situation supporting a reporting exemption. 

We conclude that Studley’s hypothetical scenarios are an insufficient basis 

for an exemption from the financial disclosure requirement.30 Under 2 AAC 50.775(a) 

“the burden of proving each fact necessary to show that an exemption . . . is applicable” 

is on the candidate seeking elective office. Hypothetical scenarios do not qualify as 

“fact[s] necessary to show that an exemption . . . is applicable.”31 

Studleywas in thebestpositiontoinvestigatehis clients’ circumstances and 

present facts showing an applicable exemption. But there is no evidence that Studley 

tried to determine whether any client’s name or commission amount could be legally 

protected from disclosure. Studley’s case is distinguishable from Falcon; that case was 

decided before an exemption process existed, and real estate transactions have fewer 

privacy considerations than healthcare.32 Because Studley offered no facts showing an 

applicable exemption with respect to any of his claims, he failed to meet his burden. 

29 570 P.2d 469, 480 (Alaska1977)(holding that absent regulationsproviding 

an exemption scheme, physicians are categorically exempt from “reporting the names of 

individual patients” in financial disclosure reports). 

30 Because the Commission has no agency expertise, specialized knowledge, 

or experience interpreting real estate confidentiality rules, we apply the substitution of 

judgment standard in making this determination. See Lakloey, Inc. v. Univ. of Alaska, 

141 P.3d 317, 320 (Alaska 2006). 

31 See 2 AAC 50.775(a). 

32 See Falcon, 570 P.2d at 479-80. 

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3.	 Studley did not demonstrate that the required information was 

uniformly confidential and that disclosure was uniformly 

prohibited by law. 

Studley contends that he is under a statutory duty not to disclose 

confidential information, including client names and derived earnings. We consider this 

to be an argument that disclosure of a self-employed real estate agent’s clients’ 

information is always prohibited by law for purposes of Alaska’s election disclosure 

regime.33 

Alaska Statute 08.88.620(4) prohibits a broker from “disclosing 

confidential information from or about [a] represented person without written consent, 

except under a subpoena or another court order, even after termination of the . . . 

relationship.”34 “[C]onfidential information” is defined in AS 08.88.695(2) as 

“information from or concerning a person” that: 

(A) the licensee acquired during the course of the 

licensee’s relationship as a licensee with the person; 

(B) the person reasonably expects to be kept 

confidential; 

(C) the person has not disclosed or authorized to be 

disclosed to a third party; 

(D) would, if disclosed, operate to the detriment of the 

person; and 

(E) the person is not obligated to disclose to the other 

party in a real estate transaction . . . .[35] 

33 See 2 AAC 50.775(a), (c)(1). 

34 AS 0.88.620(4). 

35 AS 08.88.695(2) (emphasis added). A real estate broker is considered a 

licensee in this context. See AS 08.88.695(7). 

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The legislature’s conjunctiveuse of the word“and”indicates that allfiveconditions must 

be satisfied to meet the “confidential information” definition.36 Here Studley failed to 

make the required showing.37 

Studley argues that a real estate broker’s clients reasonably expect their 

names and the broker-client relationship to be kept confidential because Alaska is a 

“non-disclosure state” and the information “is not part of the public record.” He further 

contends that a candidate for elected office cannot be expected to determine whether 

clients disclosed his representation to third parties, which would render the information 

non-confidential under AS 08.88.695(2)(C). 

But client names and real estate broker commissions are frequently 

disclosed to third parties. The Commission observes that disclosure of a client’s identity 

“is generally necessary to enter into a purchase contract of sale, execute a deed, and close 

the transaction.” And during the January 2013 Commission meeting Studley admitted 

that he reveals his commission amount directly to counter parties in real estate 

transactions. Such disclosures are commonplace in land sale contracts, which generally 

include “the identity of the buyer and seller, the price to be paid, the time and manner of 

36 SeeEmp’t Sec. Comm’n v. Wilson, 461P.2d 425, 428 (Alaska1969) (“[W]e 

may assume that the legislature knew and understood the rules of grammar,” and are 

“justified in relying on such rules in the interpretation of [Alaska] laws.” (citing 

AS 01.10.040)). 

37 We do not address all five elements of the definition because once we 

determine that one element is lacking, Studley’s claim fails. See AS 08.88.695(2). 

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payment, and the property to be transferred.”38 Much of this information is also 

disclosed to third parties when real estate transactions are recorded.39 

We do not suggest there can never be a transaction where a client’s identity 

or the amount of the broker’s commission is intended to be confidential. But we will not 

assume that all real estate broker’s commissions and clients’ identities must be and are 

always confidential. And because Studley has not shown that any of his clients’ names 

or his derived income were previously undisclosed to third parties, weaffirmthesuperior 

court’s decision that he was not “prohibited by law . . . from reporting” this information 

to the Commission.40 

Studley also argues that the “crux of the problem is that a broker cannot 

know for certain what information is detrimental to a client, or whether the release of 

information will not work a detriment to a client in the future.” He lists four 

“circumstances” in which he “can envision or anticipate” disclosures could be 

detrimental.41 But as noted earlier hypothetical scenarios do not show that disclosure 

would be detrimental to a real estate broker’s actual clients. Alaska Statute 08.88.695(2) 

38 Hall v. Add-Ventures,Ltd.,695P.2d1081, 1086 n.6 (Alaska1985) (quoting 

Custis v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Phx., 375 P.2d 558, 561 (Ariz. 1962)). 

39 See AS 40.17.040 (establishing that a district recorder shall maintain an 

index system for instruments “so the public may find documents by location and by 

names of grantors and grantees”). Studley contends that “no Alaska statute or regulation 

requires a property owner to record a transaction.” But he does not suggest that his 

clients do not in fact do so. 

40 2 AAC 50.775(c)(1); see AS 08.88.695(2)(C). 

41 See supra note 27 (outlining Studley’s four hypothetical scenarios). 

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plainly requires that a disclosure actually be detrimental for the information to be 

confidential.42 The mere possibility of theoretical harm does not mean a harm exists. 

Studley relies on Falcon to argue that his clients’ “sensitive personal 

information” should be protected “from public disclosure.”43 In Falcon we held that 

physicians did not need to “report[] the names of individual patients” because of the 

“significant privacyinterest”atstakein many physician-clientrelationships.44 But unlike 

Falcon where“[e]ven visits toageneralpractitioner may causeparticular embarrassment 

or opprobrium,” we do not conclude that the disclosure of buyers and sellers of real 

estate will be similarly detrimental.45 In this case there is no indication of broad classes 

of clients who must uniformly be protected from election disclosure laws, and 

AS 08.88.695(2) already provides a mechanism for protecting confidential information 

in individual circumstances. Because Studley has failed to show that disclosure would 

actually be detrimental to any of his clients, we affirm the superior court’s decision that 

Studley was not asked “to disclose any confidential information.”46 

42 See AS 08.88.695(2)(D) (requiring that the confidential information 

“would, if disclosed, operate to the detriment of the person” (emphasis added)); see also 

Heller v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 74 (Alaska 2013) (“The plainer the 

meaning of the statute, the more persuasive any legislative history to the contrary must 

be.” (quoting City of Dillingham v. CH2M Hill Nw., Inc., 873 P.2d 1271, 1276 (Alaska 

1994))); cf. id. (“We give unambiguous statutory language its ordinary and common 

meaning . . . .” (citing City of Dillingham, 873 P.2d at 1276)). 

43 Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 570 P.2d 469, 480 (Alaska 1977). 

44 Id. 

45 Id. at 479-80. 

46 See AS 08.88.695(2)(D). 

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4.	 Studley has not demonstrated that the disclosures would violate 

his clients’ constitutional privacy rights. 

In addition to his statutory argument Studley contends that disclosing his 

clients’ names and derived income would violate his clients’ constitutional privacy 

rights.47 Studley again relies on Falcon to argue that his clients’ personal information 

should be kept confidential.48 

But just as with Studley’s statutory argument, his constitutional privacy 

argument fails because he relies solely on generalized hypotheticals. If Studley had any 

specific client relationships where a constitutional right of privacy was a concern, it was 

his obligation to bring the facts of those relationships to the Commission’s attention and 

request an exemption. But Studley brought no specific requests. 

We held in Falcon that disclosing the identities of physicians’ patients 

could not be required until the Commission promulgated regulations “provid[ing] a 

method for exempting certain classes of patients . . . or for determining whether certain 

patients fall within special or sensitive classes.”49 But the broker-client relationship is 

not like the physician-client relationship we addressed in Falcon, where because of 

“specialized practice[s], the disclosure of the patient’s identity also reveals the nature of 

the treatment, and the particular type of treatment is one which patients would normally 

47 See Alaska Const. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is 

recognized and shall not be infringed.”); 2 AAC 50.775(c)(2) (permitting candidates to 

seek an exemption when a disclosure “would violate rights of the source under [the] state 

. . . constitution[]”). 

48 See Falcon, 570 P.2d at 479-80. 

49 Id. at 480. 

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seek to keep private.”50 Studley does not present “classes of clients” who might have a 

common interest in privacy; he instead presents four unique circumstances that do not 

lend themselves to ready classification and are best dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 

And the Commission’s regulations provide Studley with a method of preserving his 

clients’ confidentiality.51 Because no blanket exemption exists, we affirm the superior 

court’s rejection of Studley’s clients’ constitutional claims. 

C. Studley’s Remaining Personal Constitutional Claims Fail. 

Studley also argues that his own constitutional right to privacy would be 

infringed by the required candidacy financial disclosures. But the required disclosures 

are neither “personal” nor “intimate,” and Studley, at least with respect to potential 

conflicts of interest, has “waived his right to privacy by ‘voluntarily entering the public 

arena.’ ”52 

Studley also asserts that he has been “whipsawed” by “dueling” 

requirements, arguing that his statutory duty of confidentiality irreconcilably competes 

with the candidate disclosure laws, setting an “unconstitutional condition” that impairs 

his constitutional right of candidacy. He contends that his right to stand for election is 

infringed because abiding by the disclosure requirements could subjecthimto discipline, 

suspension, or loss of his broker’s license. Studley argues that this violates his equal 

protection and substantive due process rights and acts as a barrier to his candidacy. 

But the constitutional rights of self-employed real estate brokers like 

Studley who run for public office are protected. A broker may stand for elective office 

50 Id. 

51 See 2 AAC 50.775. 

52 Falcon, 570 P.2d at 474 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 

(1964)). 

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by either making the required disclosures or proving an exemption applies.53 And 

Studley’s right of candidacy was not impaired; he stood for election to the borough 

assembly and could have avoided any penalty by following the Commission’s 

procedures. Studley’s remaining personal constitutional argumentsareall without merit. 

We affirm the superior court’s decision on those issues. 

V. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the superior court’s decision affirming the Commission’s 

final order and civil penalty. 

2 AAC 50.775(a). 

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