# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 21

, 20 20

Decided January 21 , 20 20

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK

, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN

, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER

, Circuit Ju dge

No. 1 9

- 1236

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

, Plaintiff

- Appellee

,

v

.

RONALD H. VAN DEN HEUVEL

, Defendant

- Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin

.

No. 17

- CR

- 160

William C. Griesbach

, Judge

.

O R D E R

Ronald Van Den H eu vel pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud

. See 18 U.S.C. § § 1343, 1349

. He received a sentence of 90 month s in p rison , below the recommended guidelines range of 108 to 135 months and the 20

- year statutory maximum . He also was
sentenced to three years’ supervised release and order ed to pay restitution of about $9.5 million

. In h is plea agreement
, he waive d his right to appeal both his conviction
and sentence
, but he has nonetheless appeal ed . H is appointed lawyer asserts that
Van Den Heuvel no longer wishes to pursue the appeal ; Van Den Heuvel has not

, however, submitted his consent to a voluntary dismissal. Counsel therefore mo ve s to withdraw under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that the appeal is
frivolous

. Van Den Heuvel has not responded. See C IR . R. 51(b). Because NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 1 9

- 1236 Page 2

Van Den Heuvel told counsel that he does not want his guilty plea set aside, counsel correctly forgoes discussion of possible challenges to the voluntariness of the plea or the adequacy of the plea colloquy. See United States v. Konczak , 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Kn ox , 287 F.3d 667, 670

– 71 ( 7th Cir. 2002). But counsel does
discuss whether Van Den Heuvel could challenge his sentence and whether the government breached the plea agreement . W e limit our review to these question s because counsel’s brief explains the natur e of this case and addresses the types of issues
that we would expect an appeal of this sort to involve. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir

. 2014).

Counsel first questions whether, despite the appeal waiver, Van Den Heuvel could challenge his term s of imprisonment and supervised release

, the restitution order,

o r the supervised

- release conditions . A n appeal waiver stand s or falls with the guilty plea of which the waiver is a part

. United States v. Zitt , 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7 t h Cir. 2013); United States v. Sakellarion , 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7t h Cir. 2011). We enforce a waiver where
its terms are unambiguous and the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered it

. See United States v. Jemison , 237 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Woolley

, 123 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 1997)

. As we already observed, Van Den Heuvel does not seek to undermine his guilty plea

, and his written plea agreement unambiguously
waives his right to appeal “any term of imprisonment, term of super vised release, term of probation, supervised release condition, fine, forfeiture order, and restitution order

. ”
Moreover , t he plea colloquy shows that Van Den Heuvel understood th is waiver provision and voluntarily accepted it : after the judge reviewed it with him and asked if
he understood it, he answered, “Yes, you r honor.” See F ED

. R. C RIM . P. 11 ; United States v. Davenport , 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7 th Cir. 2013). Finally, the record contains no basis for not enforcing the waiver, such as a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum or based on an impermissible factor like race

. See Keller v. United States, 657 F.3d 675

, 681 (7th Cir. 2011 ). Accordingly, the waiver would render frivolous any appellate challenge s to Van Den Heuvel’s sentence

.

Counsel a lso rightly concludes that Van Den Heuvel could not plausibly argue that the government breached the plea agreement at sentencing. T he government agreed to recommend a 90

- month term of imprisonment in the plea agreement

, and it
did not deviate from this provision at the sentencing hearing. When Van Den Heuvel

argu ed for an even lower term of imprisonment , the government responded that he
deserved a longer sentence

— of 90 months . That response was permissible, for “ [s] trong advocac y in favor of the maximum sentence contemplated by a plea agreement does not
constitute a breach .” United States v. Lewis , 842 F.3d 467, 475 ( 7th Cir. 2016). AndNo. 1 9

- 1236 Page 3

because 90 months’ imprisonment is exactly what Van Den Heuvel received, any argument that the government breached the plea agreement would be frivolous.
See United States v. Davis , 761 F.3d 713, 716 ( 7th Cir. 2014) (concluding no material breach because government advocated for

, and defendant received

, sentence recommended in plea agreement).

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.