alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
-  HIPAA for Professionals 
-  Regulatory Initiatives 
-  Privacy      -  Summary of the Privacy Rule 
  -  Guidance 
  -  Combined Text of All Rules 
  -  HIPAA Related Links 
-  Security      -  Summary of the Security Rule 
  -  Security Guidance  
  -  Cyber Security Guidance 
-  Breach Notification      -  Breach Reporting 
  -  Guidance 
  -  Reports to Congress 
  -  Regulation History 
-  Compliance & Enforcement      -  Enforcement Rule 
  -  Enforcement Process 
  -  Enforcement Data 
  -  Resolution Agreements 
  -  Case Examples 
  -  Audit 
  -  Reports to Congress 
  -  State Attorneys General 
-  Special Topics      -  HIPAA and Part 2 
  -  Change Healthcare Cybersecurity Incident FAQs 
  -  HIPAA and COVID-19 
  -  HIPAA and Reproductive Health        -  HIPAA and Final Rule Notice 
  -  HIPAA and Telehealth 
  -  HIPAA and FERPA 
  -  Research 
  -  Public Health 
  -  Emergency Response 
  -  Health Information Technology 
  -  Health Apps 
-  Patient Safety      -  Statute & Rule        -  PSQIA Statute 
    -  Patient Safety Rule 
  -  Enforcement 
  -  Guidance 
-  Covered Entities & Business Associates      -  Business Associate Contracts 
  -  Business Associates 
-  Training & Resources 
-  FAQs for Professionals 
-  Other Administrative Simplification Rules 

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                      -   
                      -   
                      -   
                      -   

# Numbers at a Glance - December 2022

(As of December 31, 2022)

**Topics on this page:**
                          - Status of All Privacy Rule Complaints
                          - Total Investigated Resolutions
                          - Investigated Resolutions

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** Referrals to DOJ - 1,640*

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This bar graph shows a comparison of the complaints that OCR has investigated and resolved by calendar year according to the type of closure, and includes a bar reflecting the total closures.  The first bar in the group of three per year represents the complaints closed in which there was no violation, the second in which there was corrective action, and the third reflects the total closures.

 

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Content last reviewed February 13, 2023
#### Dr. Eugene DABEZIES v. Honorable Baron B. BOURG, Judge Seventeenth Judicial District Court. Paul MICHEL, Sr. v. Edison CHOUEST et al.

No. 53432.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 17, 1973.

In re: Eugene Dabezies applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of Terrebonne. 273 So.2d 622.

Writ denied. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal there is no error of law in the judgment.

CALOGERO, J., dissents, would grant the writ.

MARCUS, J., dissents, would grant writ.
#### William V. BOREN, Petitioner, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO. et al., Respondents.

No. 37265.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 26, 1968.

John A. Chilldon, Tampa, for petitioner.

E. O. Palermo, of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, Tampa, Patrick H. *9Mears, Tallahassee, and J. Franklin Garner, Lakeland, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Petition for writ of certiorari in this case seeks review of an order of the Commission vacating an award of 10% permanent partial disability compensation and directing dismissal of the claim for lack of evidence of sufficient probative value.

We conclude that the findings of fact contained in the compensation order are wholly inadequate for an intelligent review. The petition should accordingly be granted, the order vacated, and the cause remanded by the Commission with directions for entry of an order in compliance with the requirements of the act and decisions thereunder.1

It is so ordered.

CALDWELL, C. J., and DREW, THORNAL, ERVIN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

1

. Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 503; Ball *v.*Mann, Fla.1954, 75 So.2d 758.
#### Florence L. SLOANE, Appellant, v. Marc SLOANE, Appellee.

No. 71-1077.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 25, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
### The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge 1 

### for the Northern District of Iowa. ___________ No. 96-1281

___________ Claudette Carr; Charles A. * Dearborn, * * Appellants, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Northern District of Iowa. Woodbury County Juvenile * [UNPUBLISHED] Detention Center; Woodbury * County, a Municipality and * Governmental Agency, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: August 22, 1996 Filed: September 3, 1996

___________ Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
Cla udette Carr and Charles Dearborn appeal the district court's 1 order denying their motion for a new trial in their employmen t discri mination action. Having carefully reviewed the record and th e par ties' briefs, we conclude that no error of law appears and that a n extended opinion is unwarranted.
Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

### -2- Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 91 Agreed to House (ATH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 91

 Electing Representatives Petri, Boehlert, and Saxton to the Committee 
                   on Post Office and Civil Service.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 18, 1993

Mr. Michel submitted the following resolution; which was considered and 
                               agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Electing Representatives Petri, Boehlert, and Saxton to the Committee 
                   on Post Office and Civil Service.

    Resolved, That the following named Members be, and they are hereby, 
elected to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service: Thomas E. 
Petri, Wisconsin; Sherwood L. Boehlert, New York; and Jim Saxton, New 
Jersey.

                                 <all>
```
#### Alvin Willie FULLARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. FF-351.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Dec. 20, 1977.

Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, and Margaret Good, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Prospect, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of burglary of a structure, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress inculpatory statements. He contends the statements were obtained through a promise that he would not be prosecuted. We agree.

Appellant admitted his guilt after a detective investigating the theft of a lawn mower told appellant “if I get the lawn mower back there won’t be any problem.” This statement at least implied that if appellant confessed he would not be charged. The confession is therefore inadmissible. *Frazier v. State,*107 So.2d 16 (Fla.1958); *Lawton v. State,*152 Fla. 821, 13 So.2d 211 (1943); *M. D. B. v. State,*311 So.2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), cert. den., 321 So.2d 555 (Fla.1975); *State v. Chorpenning,*294 So.2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).

This case is significantly different from *Miles v. State,*303 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). In *Miles,*the defendant was convicted on a jury verdict which the court found was supported by sufficient evidence other than the confession. Here appellant pleaded nolo contendere, and while other evidence adduced at the suppression hearing might support a jury verdict of guilty, it would also support a jury verdict of not guilty.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

BOYER, Acting C. J., and MILLS, J., concur.
256 La. 620

#### GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY v. L. Barbee PONDER, Jr.

No. 50701.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 29, 1970.

In re: L. B. Ponder, Jr. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of Tangi-pahoa. 234 So.2d 786.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             Nov-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                  Nov-30-1997
<CASH>                        133,958
<SECURITIES>                  000
<RECEIVABLES>                 106,351
<ALLOWANCES>                  000
<INVENTORY>                   000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              000
<PP&E>                        21,032,005
<DEPRECIATION>                (9,208,423)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                13,234,849
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         000
<BONDS>                       2,503,108
<COMMON>                      000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         000
<PREFERRED>                   000
<OTHER-SE>                    7,946,750
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  13,234,849
<SALES>                       2,779,607
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              2,851,824
<CGS>                         000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 1,371,457
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              1,732,022
<LOSS-PROVISION>              000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            401,254
<INCOME-PRETAX>               (251,655)
<INCOME-TAX>                  000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           (251,655)
<DISCONTINUED>                000
<EXTRAORDINARY>               000
<CHANGES>                     000
<NET-INCOME>                  (251,655)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                 (4.55)
<EPS-DILUTED>                 (4.55)
        

</TABLE>
251 La. 740

#### Selina BREAUX v. G. H. LEIDENHEIMER CO., Ltd., and Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans.

No. 49029.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 2, 1968.

In re: Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans applying for certiorari or writ of review, fo the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 204 So.2d 59.

The application is denied. Applicant is not adversely affected by the decree.

YARRUT, J., recused.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Cutter & Buck Inc. (“theCompany”) on Form 10-Q for the first quarter of fiscal year 2006, as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 9, 2005 (“theReport”), I, Ernest R. Johnson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief,that:

 

(1) TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respectsthe financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|   | /s/ ERNEST R. JOHNSON                        |   |
|--------|----------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Ernest R. Johnson                            |
|   | Chief Financial Officer                      |
|   | (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) |

 

----
From: Raymond, Gabrielle [ mailto:graymond@rti.org ]

Sent: Thursday, March 03, 2016 1:04 PM

To: Rosenthal, Steven < rosenthal.steven@epa.gov >; Munoz, Breda < breda@rti.org >

Cc: D'Agostino, Kathleen < dagostino.kathleen@epa.gov >; Liljegren, Jennifer < Liljegren.Jennifer@epa.gov >; Parker,

Barrett < Parker.Barrett@epa.gov >; Mulrine, Phil < Mulrine.Phil@epa.gov >

Subject: RE: taconite petitions for review; UPL equations

Hello,

The consensus between Barrett, Breda, and I is that:

‐ They should use the 720

‐ average values to set the non

‐ parametric limit if they are using 720

‐ average values to meet

compliance.

‐ The data format to set a limit should match the data format for compliance.

‐ We also do not agree with their statement about removing high values.

“By contrast, if the non

‐ parametric equation uses individual hourly data to set the standard, the highest 5% are the

peaks in the hourly data set. The limit is established by excluding the highest 5% of those hourly peaks.”

They are truncating the distribution to remove the high values.

Gabrielle Raymond

RTI International

3040 Cornwallis Road

P.O. Box 12194

Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

Phone: (919) 541

‐ 7015
#### THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. William H. GREEN, Respondent.

No. 41243.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 12, 1971.

Norman A. Faulkner, Tallahassee, for The Florida Bar, complainant.

Leon F. Stewart, of Coble, Stewart & Tiller, Daytona Beach, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to Article 11, Rule 11.08 of the Integration Rule of The Florida Bar, 32 F.S.A., respondent has filed with this Court a petition for leave to resign from The Florida Bar without leave to apply for read'mission. In its response thereto, the Bar supports the resignation petition, having found after investigation “that the public interest will not be adversely affected by the granting of the petition for leave to resign and that allowing the petitioner to resign will not affect the purity of the Courts, nor hinder the administration of justice, nor the confidence of the public in the legal profession.”

Wherefore, upon consideration of the foregoing, the respondent, William H. Green, hereby is given leave to resign from The Florida Bar effective immediately.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
#### George POWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. N-361.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 2, 1971.

Thomas M. Baumer, of Mahoney, Had-low, Chambers & Adams, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Nelson E. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks reversal of an order denying his motion for post-conviction relief brought pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 1.850, 33 F.S.A. By this proceeding appellant seeks to have set aside a judgment of conviction and sentence based upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of rape, with a recommendation of mercy.

By his motion for relief appellant contends, among other things, that he was afforded inadequate representation by counsel appointed by the court to defend him against the charge for which he was indicted. This court judicially knows that the attorney appointed by the court to represent appellant is one of the most experienced and highly respected practitioners in the field of criminal law in Duval County. Whether he called as many witnesses as appellant thought he should, or engaged in as extensive an examination and cross-examination of witnesses as appellant felt he should, are all matters of trial tactics to be employed in accordance with the discretion and judgment of the attorney. The record does not sustain appellant’s contention that the representation he received was inadequate or deprived him of a fair and impartial trial.

Appellant further contends that the in-court identification made of him by the State’s witnesses was tainted and should have been held inadmissible because his attorney was not notified or permitted to be present when a pretrial photographic identification was made of him by the State’s witnesses. This is a matter which, if erroneous, should have been and presumably was challenged on appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence. Appellant’s appeal was affirmed by this court, thereby laying at rest all alleged errors which were assigned or could have been assigned in an attack on the original judgment of conviction. Such matters are not grounds for collateral attack in post-conviction proceedings.

*747Careful consideration has been’given to the remaining points of appellant hut after full consideration we find that he has failed to demonstrate reversible error. The judgment of the lower court is accordingly affirmed.

WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K, and RAWLS, JJ., concur.
#### MT. SINAI HOSPITAL OF GREATER MIAMI, INC., Appellant, v. Elsie Mae HUBBARD, Appellee.

No. 73-950.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 2, 1974.

Dixon, Dixon, Lane & Mitchell and J. James Donnellan, III, Miami, for appellant.

Horton & Perse, Alfred D. Bieley, Miami, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and CARROLL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See: H. I. Holding Company v. Dade County, Fla.App.1961, 129 So.2d 693; Board of Public Instruction of Dade County v. McQuiston, Fla.App.1970, 233 So.2d 168; Holman v. Ford Motor Company, Fla.App.1970, 239 So.2d 40; Hoffman v. Jones, Fla. 1973, 280 So.2d 431; § 59.041, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.; Turk v. H. C. Prange Co., 18 Wis.2d 547, 119 N.W.2d 365.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gilbert Rivera-Lopez, Appellant.

[721 NYS2d 769]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Beeler, J.), rendered September 10, 1996, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of 25 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s challenge to the court’s jury instructions concerning the caution it must exercise in its evaluation of an unavailable eyewitness’s exculpatory hearsay statement (see, *People v Robinson,*89 NY2d 648) is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. Were we to review this claim, we would find that to the extent that the court’s generally appropriate instructions may have contained language that conveyed a skeptical view of the force of this evidence, any such error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, which included a detailed confession and audiotapes wherein defendant clearly admitted he was the victim’s murderer. Concur — Nardelli, J. P., Ellerin, Wallach, Buckley and Friedman, JJ.
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Nelson AVERY v. Matthew S. BRANIFF, Judge Criminal District Court, Orleans Parish.

No. 62805.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 22, 1978.

In re: Nelson Avery, applying for writ of mandamus. Parish of Orleans.

Denied. Moot.
#### In re Janet Rose HNAT, Petitioner.

No. 40289.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 8, 1971.

Leonard Lubin, St. Petersburg, for petitioner.

McCAIN, Justice.

Petitioner seeks conflict certiorari to the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision reported at 238 So.2d 701, which “Per Curiam Affirmed” an order of the *891County Judge’s Court for Pinellas County adjudicating the petitioner incompetent. Conflict has been demonstrated and we have jurisdiction. In re Guardianship of Swain, 199 So.2d 736, (Fla.App. 1st, 1967).

The salient events pertinent to this cause are: Petitioner was served on September 19, with notice of an incompetency hearing scheduled for September 24, to be held in the County Judge’s chambers; the hearing was held on the scheduled date but in the psychiatric ward in one of the local hospitals; the proceedings at the hearing were not reported; no witnesses were present and none testified; petitioner was not represented by counsel; the adjudication of incompetency was based upon the judge’s observations, the initial affidavit of petitioner’s mother regarding her incompetency and the unsworn written report of an examining committee; and, finally, the order of incompetency also determined the petitioner to be indigent and insolvent.

In addition to the serious questions raised concerning adequate notice of hearing, opportunity to present evidence and testimony, due process and sufficiency of the evidence, this case must also fall because of a violation of that portion of Fla.Stat. § 394.22(4), F.S.A., reading:

> “An opportunity to be represented by counsel shall be afforded to every proposed patient, and if neither he nor others provide counsel, the court may appoint counsel.”

 On the issue of legal representation, the record establishes that the notice of hearing stated, “ * * * you may be heard, either in person or by counsel Counsel for petitioner, if any, was not present and the record fails to disclose whether, in fact, she had representation. More importantly, the record is silent on whether the court even considered appointing counsel, a factor which the statute clearly contemplates. Certainly, the statute is not mandatory, and is permissive only, however, implicit from the wording of the statute is the admonition that in the absence of counsel the court must determine whether representation should be afforded, a circumstance which cannot be garnered from a silent record on this point. If the court had considered this issue and determined that counsel was not required, it would have been a simple matter to set forth such finding. No attempt was made to satisfy this criterion, and herein lies the essential error.

For this reason, certiorari is granted, the decision of the District Court of Appeal is quashed and this cause is remanded to it with instructions to reverse the order of incompetency of the County Judge’s Court, without prejudice to that court to process and conduct a proper hearing on the issue of the petitioner’s competency.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent

v. JOSEPH L. OLLIE, Petitioner : : : : : : : : : : : No. 147 WAL 2015 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 19th day of August, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED
.