Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 212 

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISION IV 

No. CR-16-860

EDWARD LAMAR CAVE

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered: April 5, 2017

APPEAL FROM THE GRANT

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 

[NO. 27CR-16-3] 

HONORABLE CHRIS E WILLIAMS, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

A Grant County jury convicted appellant Edward Cave of delivery of 

methamphetamine, delivery of oxycodone, and maintaining a drug premises. On appeal, 

Cave contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We affirm. 

Cave’s charges came about as a result of a “controlled buy” operation conducted 

through a confidential informant, Suzen Cooper. In February 2015, Cooper began working 

as a paid confidential informant for Group Six, a multicounty drug task force. Generally, 

she contacted Eddie Keathley, the supervisor of Group Six, and told him that she had some 

people from whom she thought she could buy drugs. On this particular occasion, Cooper 

observed Cave, her neighbor, outside his house and felt that he had drugs she could buy. 

She testified that he appeared to be high because it was cool weather, but he did not have a 

shirt on, and he “was beating the crap out of a truck in the middle of the day.” She 

approached him and asked if he knew where she could get any “ice,” and he said that he 
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2 

did. She asked what else he could get, and Cave told her that he could get pills. At that 

point, Cooper said she needed to go inside her house and see how much money she had. 

She returned to her house, contacted Agent Keathley, and told him that Cave would sell 

her some methamphetamine and pills. Keathley told her to set up the buy.

A short time later, Keathley met Cooper at her house, and she told him that she had 

arranged to buy from Cave a one-half gram of methamphetamine for $50 and six pills for 

$10 each, totaling $110. Keathley parked his truck out of sight of Cave’s house and 

thoroughly searched Cooper before giving her the $110 in drug-buy money. Cooper then 

went next door and made contact with Cave as he came out of his residence. According to 

Cooper, she first gave Cave money for the methamphetamine because he had that in his 

possession, and he gave the methamphetamine to her. Then a truck pulled up, and Cooper 

gave Cave the money for the pills; Cave walked to the truck and gave the money to the

man in the truck.1 Cave then came back and handed Cooper the pills. Cooper walked 

directly back to meet Agent Keathley on the other side of her home and handed him the 

drugs. According to Keathley, the entire transaction between Cooper and Cave lasted only 

forty seconds to a minute.

Agent Keathley testified that, although he briefly lost sight of Cooper while moving 

his truck and Cooper’s back was to him during the transaction, he observed her talk to 

Cave, and then a truck pulled up. He explained that he saw Cave walk over to the truck 

and then go back to Cooper. Cooper then turned around, walked away, and went

immediately back to where he was standing. She handed him a plastic bag with a crystal 

 1

The man in the truck, Asmon West, was prosecuted as a codefendant at Cave’s trial.
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substance inside, along with a plastic wrapper with six pills in it.2 Keathley testified that 

Cooper had made “a number of” buys for him, that she had never stolen any money or 

drugs, and that he had never had any trouble with her.

On appeal, Cave argues that the circuit court erred in not granting his motion for 

directed verdict on all of the charged offenses. Specifically, Cave claims that the State failed 

to present substantial evidence of the offenses because Agent Keathley did not actually 

observe the deliveries, and he challenges Cooper’s credibility due to her criminal history. 

On appeal, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence. See Reynolds v. State, 2016 Ark. 214, at 3, 492 S.W.3d 491, 494. This court 

views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and affirms if there is substantial 

evidence to support the verdict. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force 

and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the 

other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. This court does not weigh the 

evidence presented at trial or assess the credibility of the witnesses, because those are matters 

for the fact-finder. Id. The trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony 

and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Id. 

Cave’s first argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for delivery of methamphetamine. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-64-

422(a) (Repl. 2016) makes it unlawful for a person to deliver methamphetamine. 

“Delivery” is defined as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to 

 2

These substances were later determined to be .4490 grams of methamphetamine and 

six oxycodone tablets.
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another of a controlled substance . . . in exchange for money[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-

101(6). In Childers v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 371, at 4, 498 S.W.3d 742, 744, the appellant 

argued that the State failed to introduce substantial evidence to support a delivery-ofmethamphetamine conviction when the State relied solely on the testimony of a woman 

who had multiple felony convictions and who was working in exchange for her recent drug 

charges being dropped. We affirmed the circuit court’s verdict, holding that substantial 

evidence supported the conviction because there was testimony that the confidential 

informant was searched by the police officer before entering the house where she and 

appellant exchanged drugs for money, and testimony revealed that the confidential 

informant exchanged $60 for a baggie containing drugs that had been weighed and packaged 

by the appellant. Id. There, we held that the appellant’s testimony alone was enough and 

that there was no requirement that her testimony be corroborated. See id.; see also Talley v. 

State, 312 Ark. 271, 849 S.W.2d 493 (1993) (holding that corroboration of informant’s 

testimony was not required in absence of evidence indicating that informant was 

accomplice). 

We conclude that there was substantial evidence to support Cave’s conviction for 

delivery of methamphetamine. Although Keathley testified that Cooper’s back was to him 

and he could not tell what was going on between Cooper and Cave, Cooper testified about

the exchange, explaining that she first transferred the money for the methamphetamine to 

Cave and that he then gave her the drug. Cooper’s testimony alone is sufficient and did not 

need to be corroborated by Agent Keathley. We have previously explained that we have no 

authority to disregard the testimony of a witness after the jury has given it full credence, at 
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least where it cannot be said with assurance that it was inherently improbable, physically 

impossible, or so clearly unbelievable that reasonable minds could not differ thereon. Brunson 

v. State, 45 Ark. App. 161, 163, 873 S.W.2d 562, 564 (1994) (confidential informant’s 

testimony that he purchased marijuana from appellant during two controlled drug purchases 

was sufficient to convict because it was not inherently unbelievable). Notably, Cooper was 

not working as a confidential informant as part of a negotiated deal to drop drug charges, 

she was doing it for personal reasons and to try to better her community. She had previously 

been arrested for drug-related felonies, as well as misdemeanor hot-check and theft charges, 

but she had no felony convictions. Furthermore, the jury was aware of Cooper’s background 

and took it into consideration in its credibility determination. Lastly, Keathley testified that 

Cooper has been very productive since joining Group Six and that he thoroughly searched 

her before and after the buy. Therefore, the State’s proof sufficiently established that Cave 

knowingly delivered methamphetamine.

Cave next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 

delivery of oxycodone. Oxycodone is a Schedule II controlled substance, and Arkansas 

Code Annotated section 5-64-426 makes it unlawful for a person to deliver a Schedule II 

substance. Ark. Dept. of Health, List of Controlled Substances for the State of Arkansas, 

(2015), http://www.healthy.arkansas.gov/aboutADH/RulesRegs/controlled_substances_

list.pdf. 

The analysis previously applied to Cave’s first argument also applies here. There was 

sufficient testimony and evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Cave

knowingly delivered oxycodone.
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Cave’s remaining argument is that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction of maintaining a drug premises. Cave again challenges Cooper’s credibility. 

Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-64-402(a)(2) provides that it is unlawful for any person 

“knowingly to keep or maintain any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling, building, or other 

structure or place or premise that is resorted to by a person for the purpose of using or 

obtaining a controlled substance in violation of this chapter or that is used for keeping a 

controlled substance in violation of this chapter.” In Curtis v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 167, 

457 S.W.3d 700, we held that evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for 

maintaining a drug premises where the confidential informant testified that the appellant 

lived in the trailer, that the informant gave the appellant money in the living room of the 

trailer, and that the appellant then went to a bedroom and removed methamphetamine from 

a larger bag and placed it into a smaller bag and gave it to the informant. 

Similarly, Cooper unequivocally testified that Cave was living in the residence next 

door to her and that the drug buy happened directly in front of Cave’s house. Although

West brought Cave the oxycodone pills to sell to Cooper from an outside location, Cave 

emerged from his house with the methamphetamine in his possession to sell to her. The

transaction took place in front of Cave’s house before West arrived. Overall, the testimony 

established that Cave resided at the residence and knew drugs were distributed from the 

premises. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports Cave’s conviction for maintaining a 

drug premises. 

Affirmed. 
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GLADWIN and HARRISON, JJ., agree.

Philip C. Wilson, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Kathryn Henry, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.