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*********************************************** 
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE

v. JACQUELYN N. CRAWFORD ET AL.

(SC 19903)

Palmer, McDonald, Robinson, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.*

Syllabus

The plaintiff in error, E, who had been appointed by the trial court as the

committee to conduct a foreclosure sale in the underlying foreclosure

action brought by the defendant in error bank, U Co., against the defendant in error property owner, C, filed a writ of error, claiming, inter

alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to recover fees

and expenses from U Co. U Co. had sought to foreclose a mortgage

on certain of C’s real property. The trial court rendered judgment of

foreclosure by sale, and U Co. was the successful bidder. Before the

sale could be completed, C filed a bankruptcy petition under chapter

13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy

Court, which automatically stayed the foreclosure proceedings pursuant

to the automatic stay provision (11 U.S.C. § 362 [a] [2012]) of the code.

Thereafter, pursuant to statute (§ 49-25), E filed a motion seeking to

recover from U Co. the fees and expenses that he had incurred in

preparing for the sale. The trial court denied E’s motion for fees and

expenses on the ground that, pursuant to the Appellate Court’s decision

in Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers (150 Conn. App. 745), the motion automatically was stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) and the court was barred from

acting on the motion during the duration of the stay. In connection with

his writ of error, E claimed, inter alia, that this court should overrule

Shivers because state courts lack jurisdiction to extend the automatic

stay provision to motions for fees and expenses filed by committees

for sale seeking expenses from nondebtor plaintiffs in foreclosure

actions. Held:

1. This court could review E’s writ of error because, although the trial court’s

order denying E’s motion for fees and expenses was an interlocutory

order, it constituted an appealable final judgment under the second

prong of the test for determining the appealability of interlocutory orders

set forth in State v. Curcio (191 Conn. 27), as the denial of the motion

so substantially resolved the rights of the parties that further proceedings

could not affect them: E, who was not a party to the underlying foreclosure action, had an undisputed right to recover the fees and expenses

that he had incurred in preparing for the sale immediately upon the

filing of a proper and timely motion, that right was separate from and

collateral to the rights being asserted in the foreclosure action, and

there was no possibility that his claim could be raised on direct appeal

from the trial court’s judgment in the foreclosure action without first

being rendered moot; moreover, the claim E asserted in his writ of error,

which already has arisen on numerous occasions in the courts of this

state, involved a matter of public importance, as committees for sale,

whice are appointed by and act as representatives of the court, may be

reluctant to accept appointment if they are unable to promptly recover

the fees and expenses they incur in that capacity, and allowing review

of the trial court’s ruling in the present case would entirely dispose of

the issue presented, would not open the floodgates to additional writs

of error raising the same issue, and would avoid the bizarre result of

allowing Shivers, which is inconsistent with the majority of federal

bankruptcy decisions, to continue to bind this state’s trial courts.

(Three justices dissenting in one opinion)

2. Although E’s writ of error was rendered moot because the automatic

stay terminated when, during the pendency of the writ of error, C’s

bankruptcy petition was dismissed, E’s claim was reviewable under the

capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness

doctrine; because of the limited duration of chapter 13 bankruptcy

proceedings, which, on average in the federal bankruptcy court in Connecticut, span approximately ten months, there existed a strong likelihood that the majority of cases challenging a denial of a motion for
committee fees and expenses would be moot before appellate litigation

could be completed, the issue presented by E’s writ of error, which

already has arisen on numerous occasions in the courts of this state,

was likely to recur, and resolution of that issue was of public importance.

3. This court having determined that a state court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to extend the automatic bankruptcy stay to proceedings

against nondebtors, it overruled the Appellate Court’s decision in Shivers, and, because the trial court relied exclusively on Shivers in denying

E’s motion for fees and expenses, this court granted E’s writ of error

and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to vacate the

order denying E’s motion and to consider the motion on the merits;

Connecticut and federal case law indicated that the stay provision set

forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a), which operates to benefit the debtor and

bankruptcy trustee only, does not apply automatically to claims against

nondebtors, and that, although state courts have jurisdiction to interpret

the provisions of the bankruptcy code and orders of the bankruptcy

court to determine whether, under their plain terms, the automatic stay

provision applies in a state court proceeding, the bankruptcy court has

exclusive jurisdiction to modify a stay by extending it to proceedings

to which it does not automatically apply or by barring it in proceedings

to which it does automatically apply, and, therefore, a state court lacks

jurisdiction to extend the automatic stay provision to the motion of a

committee for sale to recover fees and expenses from a nondebtor.

Submitted on briefs April 2, 2018—officially released November 26, 2019

Procedural History

Writ of error from the decision of the Superior Court

in the judicial district of Hartford, Robaina, J., denying

the motion to award interim foreclosure committee fees

and expenses filed by the plaintiff in error. Writ of error

granted; remanded with direction.

C. Donald Neville and Gregory W. Piecuch filed a

brief for the plaintiff in error (Douglas M. Evans).

Robert A. White, Proloy K. Das, Sarah Gruber, Irve

Goldman, Thomas J. Sansone and Charles A. Maglieri

filed a brief for the Connecticut Bar Association as

amicus curiae.
Opinion

ROBINSON, J. The primary issue raised by this writ

of error is whether the automatic stay provision of

the federal bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1),1

precludes a committee for sale from recovering fees

and expenses from a plaintiff in a foreclosure action

that has been stayed because the defendant has filed

for bankruptcy. The plaintiff, the U.S. Bank National

Association, brought the underlying foreclosure action

against the defendant Jacquelyn N. Crawford.2 The trial

court ultimately ordered a foreclosure by sale and

appointed the plaintiff in error, Douglas M. Evans, as the

committee for sale. Before the sale could be completed,

however, Crawford declared bankruptcy, and the foreclosure action was stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362

(a) (1). Thereafter, the plaintiff in error filed a motion

pursuant to General Statutes § 49-25,3

seeking to

recover, from the bank, the fees and expenses that he

had incurred in preparing for the sale. Relying on an

Appellate Court decision; see Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 150 Conn. App. 745, 755, 93 A.3d 1167 (2014) (when

defendant in foreclosure action has declared bankruptcy, automatic stay provision applies to motions for

fees and expenses by committee for sale against nondebtor plaintiff); the trial court concluded that the plaintiff in error’s motion for fees and expenses was stayed

and issued an order denying the motion on that ground.

This writ of error was then filed pursuant to General

Statutes § 51-199 (b) (10)4 and Practice Book § 72-1.5

Specifically, the plaintiff in error contends that this

court should overrule Shivers because the Appellate

Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to extend the

automatic stay provision to motions to recover fees

and expenses from nondebtor plaintiffs in foreclosure

actions. In the alternative, the plaintiff in error contends

that we should overrule Shivers on the merits because

it is in conflict with the decisions of federal bankruptcy

courts addressing this issue. We conclude that state

courts lack jurisdiction to extend the automatic stay

provision to proceedings against nondebtors and that

Shivers must be overruled on that ground. Accordingly,

we grant the writ of error and remand the case to the

trial court with direction to vacate the order denying

the plaintiff in error’s motion for fees and expenses and

to entertain the motion.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts

and procedural history. Crawford executed a promissory note in favor of the bank that was secured by a

mortgage on property located at 36-38 Baltic Street in

the city of Hartford. After Crawford defaulted on the

note, the bank commenced a foreclosure action against

her. The trial court ultimately rendered a judgment of

foreclosure by sale and appointed the plaintiff in error

as the committee for sale. The sale was scheduled for

February 4, 2017, and the bank was the successful bid-
der. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff in error filed his

report, in which he listed expenses totaling $2419.29.

He also submitted an affidavit in which he averred that

the legal fees incurred in connection with the sale were

expected to be $3420.

Before the sale could be completed, however, Crawford filed for bankruptcy pursuant to chapter 13 of the

United States Bankruptcy Code. Because the automatic

stay provision applied to the foreclosure action, the

sale of the property could not be completed. Accordingly, the plaintiff in error filed a motion to recover his

fees and expenses from the bank pursuant to § 49-25.

See footnote 3 of this opinion. The plaintiff in error

contended in the motion that the trial court should not

follow the Appellate Court’s decision in Equity One,

Inc. v. Shivers, supra, 150 Conn. App. 755, holding that

the bankruptcy stay provision applies to such motions

because it was in conflict with the decisions of several

federal courts. The trial court concluded that it was

bound by Shivers and denied the plaintiff in error’s

motion solely on that ground.

In the present case, the plaintiff in error contends that

this court should overrule Shivers on two alternative

grounds. First, he contends that the Appellate Court in

Shivers lacked jurisdiction to extend the automatic stay

provision to motions by committees for sale to recover

fees and expenses from nondebtors. Second, the plaintiff in error contends that, if we conclude that the Appellate Court had such jurisdiction in Shivers, that court

incorrectly concluded that the automatic stay provision

should be extended to such motions. After the writ of

error was filed, this court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to address in their appellate briefs the following

two issues: (1) whether the plaintiff in error is aggrieved

by a final judgment of the Superior Court such that he

has standing to bring the writ of error, and (2) whether

the controversy will be rendered moot if the bankruptcy

stay terminates during the pendency of the writ of error.

We note that the automatic stay terminated on July 27,

2017. The bank has filed no appellate brief.6

We conclude that the plaintiff in error has standing

to bring the writ of error. We further conclude that,

although his claim is moot, it is nonetheless reviewable

under the capable of repetition, yet evading review

exception to the mootness doctrine. Addressing the

merits of the plaintiff in error’s claim, we conclude that

state courts lack jurisdiction to extend the automatic

stay provision to motions by committees for sale to

recover fees and expenses from nondebtor foreclosure

plaintiffs and, therefore, that Shivers must be overruled.

I

Because it implicates this court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we first address the issue of whether the plaintiff in error is aggrieved by a final judgment and, there-
fore, has standing to bring this writ of error. See State

v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983)

(‘‘[b]ecause our jurisdiction over appeals . . . is prescribed by statute, we must always determine the

threshold question of whether the appeal is taken from

a final judgment before considering the merits of the

claim’’). The plaintiff in error contends that, because

his motion seeking payment by the bank of his fees and

expenses was essentially a separate third-party claim,

and because it was denied in full, the order denying

the motion is not interlocutory in nature but, rather,

constitutes an appealable final judgment. We disagree.

Although the trial court denied the motion, it is clear

that the denial was without prejudice to the plaintiff in

error’s right to renew the motion after the automatic

stay terminated. See Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, supra,

150 Conn. App. 755 and n.6 (although order granting

committee for sale’s motion for fees was void because

automatic stay was in place when order was issued,

because stay had since terminated, parties could

‘‘revisit the question of payment for committee fees on

remand’’). Accordingly, we conclude that that order

is interlocutory.

The plaintiff in error also claims, however, that, if

the trial court’s order denying his motion for fees and

expenses is interlocutory, it is reviewable under State

v. Curcio, supra, 191 Conn. 31. In that case, we stated

that, ‘‘[i]n both criminal and civil cases . . . we have

determined certain interlocutory orders and rulings of

the Superior Court to be final judgments for purposes

of appeal. An otherwise interlocutory order is appealable in two circumstances: (1) where the order or action

terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2)

where the order or action so concludes the rights of the

parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.’’ Id.

We acknowledge at the outset of our analysis that

this court’s Curcio jurisprudence is hardly a model of

clarity or consistency. We further acknowledge that, as

a result of this doctrinal confusion, it is possible to

identify both cases that provide support for the conclusion that the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff in error’s

motion for fees and expenses is immediately reviewable

under Curcio and cases that arguably undermine that

conclusion. For the following reasons, however, we

ultimately are persuaded that the trial court’s denial

of the motion for fees and expenses is immediately

reviewable under the second prong of Curcio.

First, immediate review of the trial court’s ruling will

in no way offend the primary public policy considerations that underlie the final judgment rule. We previously have recognized that the rule’s primary policy

rationale is ‘‘to discourage piecemeal appeals and to

facilitate the speedy and orderly disposition of cases

at the trial court level.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazurek v. Great American Ins. Co., 284 Conn.
16, 33, 930 A.2d 682 (2007). In the present case,

reviewing the denial of the motion for fees and expenses

will have no adverse effect on the speedy and orderly

disposition of the underlying foreclosure action

because the plaintiff in error is not a party to that

action and the issue that he raises in this writ of error

implicates a right that is separable from, and collateral

to, the rights being asserted in the foreclosure action.

See Melia v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 202 Conn. 252,

256, 520 A.2d 605 (1987) (observing with approval that,

under federal law, review of interlocutory orders is

available for claims involving a ‘‘right separable from,

and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too

important to be denied review and too independent of

the cause itself to require that appellate consideration

be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Niro v. Niro,

314 Conn. 62, 71–72, 100 A.3d 801 (2014) (distinguishing

situation in which order was reviewable under Curcio

because plaintiff in error was not involved in, and challenged order was not intertwined with, underlying litigation, from situation in which Curcio did not apply

because plaintiff in error was party to, and challenged

order was intertwined with, underlying litigation).

Moreover, the policy of discouraging piecemeal

appeals carries little weight under the circumstances

present in this case, in which there is no possibility

that the plaintiff in error’s claim could be raised in a

direct appeal from the judgment in the foreclosure

action. See Lougee v. Grinnell, 216 Conn. 483, 487, 582

A.2d 456 (1990) (interlocutory ruling was reviewable

when underlying proceeding would not result in later

judgment from which appellant could appeal). Rather,

if we decline to review the trial court’s denial of the

plaintiff in error’s motion for fees and expenses under

Curcio, the issue of whether the Appellate Court’s decision in Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, supra, 150 Conn.

App. 755, holding that the bankruptcy stay provision

applies to such motions—which was the sole basis for

the trial court’s ruling—may forever evade appellate

review. This is so because, if a committee for sale is

required to wait until the stay is lifted and the motion

for fees and expenses is granted to challenge the initial

denial of the motion pursuant to Shivers, the claim will

be moot, and the committee for sale will no longer be

aggrieved. Accordingly, this court would lack jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff in error’s claim. See, e.g.,

Soracco v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 91,

971 A.2d 1 (2009) (‘‘[i]f a party is found to lack

[aggrievement], the court is without subject matter

jurisdiction to determine the cause’’ [internal quotation

marks omitted]); Bornemann v. Connecticut Siting

Council, 287 Conn. 177, 181, 947 A.2d 302 (2008) (‘‘it

is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot

questions, disconnected from the granting of actual

relief or from the determination of which no practical
relief can follow’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]);

see also Practice Book § 72-1 (a) (‘‘[w]rits of error for

errors in matters of law . . . may be brought [only]

from a final judgment of the Superior Court to the

Supreme Court in the following cases . . . a decision

binding on an aggrieved nonparty’’ [emphasis added]).

The dissent suggests, however, that the initial ruling

denying the motion for fees and expenses could be

reviewed after the stay is lifted and the motion is

granted under the capable of repetition, yet evading

review exception to the mootness doctrine. We have

some doubt as to whether that is the case in light of

this court’s suggestion in In re Emma F., 315 Conn.

414, 428 n.12, 107 A.3d 947 (2015), that cases in which

an appellant is no longer aggrieved by the judgment of

the Superior Court because the judgment is no longer

in effect—as distinct from cases in which the judgment

is technically still in effect but intervening factual circumstances have rendered the appeal moot by depriving

the judgment of any practical significance—are not subject to the ‘‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’’

exception to the mootness doctrine. See id., 428–29 n.12

(‘‘[G]iven the trial court’s vacatur of the judgment at

issue . . . query whether the [appellant] is still an

‘aggrieved’ party, as is required by General Statutes

§ 52-263. If we were to hear this appeal on its merits,

there does not appear anything left for us to reverse

should the [appellant] prevail—even pyrrhically under

the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception—insofar as the [appellant] has now received all

of the relief it would have obtained by a successful

appeal.’’). Even if we were to assume that the exception

would apply, however, we still can perceive no reason

why we should decline to apply an exception to the

rule requiring a final judgment for appellate jurisdiction

now merely because, at some later time, when the right

that the plaintiff in error seeks to vindicate—namely,

the right to recover his fees and expenses from the

bank while the automatic stay provision is in effect—

will be forever lost, we might be able to apply an exception to the mootness doctrine, which also implicates

our appellate jurisdiction.7

Second, and relatedly, the trial court’s ruling threatens to abrogate a right that the plaintiff in error now

holds. See State v. Longo, 192 Conn. 85, 91, 469 A.2d

1220 (1984) (party seeking review of interlocutory order

‘‘must show that that decision threatens to abrogate a

right that he or she then holds’’ [emphasis in original]).8

There is no dispute in the present case that a committee

for sale ordinarily is entitled to recover fees and

expenses immediately upon filing a proper and timely

motion for fees. The sole reason that the plaintiff in

error’s motion for fees and expenses was denied was

that the trial court had ruled that, under Shivers, the

motion was subject to the automatic stay provision.

Thus, if Shivers was wrongly decided, the plaintiff in
error is now being unlawfully deprived of an existing

right to reimbursement.

Third, the plaintiff in error’s claim involves a question

of some public importance. See, e.g., Abreu v. Leone,

291 Conn. 332, 347–48, 968 A.2d 385 (2009) (interlocutory discovery order is reviewable if case involves counterbalancing public policy factor that weighs against

policies underlying final judgment rule); Melia v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra, 202 Conn. 256 (review of

interlocutory orders is available for claims involving

right ‘‘too important to be denied review’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). ‘‘A committee [for] sale functions as an arm of the court in a judicial sale. The

committee conducting a sale is an agent or representative of the court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Burgos, 227 Conn. 116, 123,

629 A.2d 410 (1993). Under the Appellate Court’s decision in Shivers, attorneys may be more reluctant to

serve the courts in this capacity when, through no fault

of their own, they are rendered unable to recover their

fees and expenses promptly in foreclosure actions in

which a defendant has declared bankruptcy, and then

must either wait for an indefinite period of time until the

stay terminates or seek a judgment from the bankruptcy

court declaring that the stay does not bar such recovery,

thereby incurring additional fees and expenses for

which the committee ultimately may not be compensated.9 We further note that this issue has arisen with

some frequency in this state.10 Accordingly, it is

important to know whether the decision in Shivers

was correct.

The dissent points out that, in Melia, this court stated

that it ‘‘has no discretionary jurisdiction comparable to

that given the federal courts by [28 U.S.C.] § 1292 (b)

to entertain appeals from interlocutory orders, except

as provided in General Statutes § 52-265a.’’ Melia v.

Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra, 202 Conn. 256. Although

it is true that this court has no statutory authority other

than § 52-265a to entertain interlocutory appeals, it does

have the authority to treat appeals that are otherwise

interlocutory in character as appeals from final judgments if they satisfy Curcio, and our reading of Melia

satisfies us that we consider federal court decisions to

be persuasive when we are considering the scope of

that authority. Indeed, in Melia, we dismissed the defendant’s interlocutory appeal pursuant to Curcio for the

same reason the Chief Justice previously had denied

the defendant’s petition pursuant to § 52-265a, namely,

that there were ‘‘no significant ramifications affecting

the public interest or entailing injustice from delay that

cannot be substantially redressed by appellate review

of the final judgment after completion of the trial.’’ Id.,

257. It would appear, therefore, that, if the interlocutory

appeal in Melia had involved a matter of significant

public interest or the denial of review had entailed

injustice that could not be redressed by belated appel-
late review of the final judgment, we would have taken

those considerations into account under Curcio. To the

extent that Melia suggests that § 52-265a provides the

exclusive mechanism for bringing an interlocutory

appeal that involves a substantial public interest, we

note that the plaintiff in error in the present case could

not have sought recourse pursuant to § 52-265a because

he is not a party to the action and, therefore, could not

file an appeal. See State v. Gault, 304 Conn. 330, 348,

39 A.3d 1105 (2012) (‘‘statutory authorization to bring

[an appeal pursuant to § 52-265a] is extended only to

‘any party to an action’ ’’). We conclude that, when

a nonparty seeks interlocutory review of a decision

pursuant to Curcio, and the matter satisfies the substantial public interest standard of § 52-265a and also

involves a right that is separable from and collateral to

the rights being asserted in the underlying action, Curcio is capacious enough for us to entertain the writ

of error.

Fourth, unlike, for example, a broad rule that a particular class of interlocutory discovery rulings, such as

those involving privileged communications, are immediately appealable, which would allow a myriad of

appeals from many types of rulings, if we review the

ruling at issue here, our decision will dispose of that

issue once and for all and will not open the floodgates

to additional writs of error raising the same issue. Cf.

Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 288 Conn. 646,

655–56 n.6, 954 A.2d 816 (2008) (declining to treat denial

of motion for summary judgment as final appealable

judgment because doing so ‘‘would open the floodgates

to appeals brought from interlocutory orders’’).

Finally, we think it is significant that our appellate

court system created for itself the predicament that it

now finds itself in. It would be bizarre to conclude that,

once the Appellate Court decided in Shivers that a

committee for sale must await the lifting of the automatic stay provision to obtain payment for its fees and

expenses, our trial courts became forever bound by that

decision, even though the issue involves the interpretation of the federal bankruptcy code and most of the

decisions by bankruptcy courts in this jurisdiction have

disagreed with Shivers; see In re Tasillo, United States

Bankruptcy Court, Docket No. 14-21683 (ASD) (D.

Conn. January 6, 2015); In re VMC Real Estate, LLC,

United States Bankruptcy Court, Docket No. 11-20452

(ASD) (D. Conn. March 9, 2012); In re Rubenstein, 105

B.R. 198 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); see also United States

Bank Assn. v. Barber, Superior Court, judicial district

of New Haven, Docket No. CV-13-6037544-S (May 20,

2015) (noting that ‘‘[t]he only certainty is that Shivers

currently remains binding on trial judges in Connecticut,’’ and expressing ‘‘sympath[y] to the plight of the

committee, who, through no fault of her own, finds

herself temporarily uncompensated for her labor and

unreimbursed for her out-of-pocket expenses’’); United
States Bank Assn. v. Barber, supra (recognizing that

‘‘bankruptcy judges are known as first-rate jurists [and

presumably have far greater experience with technical

issues of bankruptcy law]’’ than nonbankruptcy judges);

and even though a committee for sale acts on the court’s

behalf. See, e.g., Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Burgos,

supra, 227 Conn. 123. Contrary to the dissent’s contention, our conclusion that the trial court’s ruling pursuant to Shivers is reviewable does not further ‘‘muddy

our final judgment jurisprudence’’ but merely provides

a pragmatic solution to a problem of the courts’ own

creation that would otherwise remain forever unresolved.

We conclude, therefore, that we may review the plaintiff in error’s claim under the second prong of Curcio,

applicable to an order that ‘‘so concludes the rights of

the parties that further proceedings cannot affect

them.’’ State v. Curcio, supra, 191 Conn. 31.

II

We next consider whether the plaintiff in error’s claim

is moot because the automatic stay has terminated. We

conclude that the claim is moot but is reviewable under

the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception

to the mootness doctrine.

We begin with a review of the governing legal principles. ‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must

be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. . . . [A]n

actual controversy must exist not only at the time the

appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of

the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an

appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate

court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wendy

V. v. Santiago, 319 Conn. 540, 544–45, 125 A.3d 983

(2015).

In the present case, the automatic stay terminated

when Crawford’s bankruptcy claim was dismissed on

July 27, 2017, during the pendency of this writ of error.

Because the automatic stay provision no longer bars the

plaintiff in error from recovering his fees and expenses

from the bank pursuant to § 49-25, our decision in this

case can have no practical effect on his right to recover,

and his claim that the automatic stay provision does

not apply to motions for fees and expenses is, therefore, moot.11

An otherwise moot question, however, may qualify

for appellate review under the capable of repetition,

yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine.

See id., 545. To qualify for this exception, ‘‘three requirements must be met. First, the challenged action, or the

effect of the challenged action, by its very nature must

be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likeli-
hood that the substantial majority of cases raising a

question about its validity will become moot before

appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there

must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future,

and that it will affect either the same complaining party

or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party

can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question

must have some public importance. Unless all three

requirements are met, the appeal must be dismissed as

moot.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 545–46.

We explained in part I of this opinion that the issue

raised by the plaintiff in error has some public importance and that it already has been raised in numerous

cases in this state. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that committees for sale who find themselves in

the same position as the plaintiff in error will likely

continue to raise the issue. We conclude, therefore, that

the second and third prongs of the capable of repetition,

yet evading review exception are met.

With respect to the first prong, the plaintiff in error

has provided information showing that, in 2016, the

median time interval between the filing and the closing

of an individual debtor’s chapter 13 bankruptcy case

in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District

of Connecticut was 248 days. See U.S. Bankruptcy

Courts, BAPCPA Table 3 (December 31, 2016), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files

/data_tables/bapcpa_3_1231.2016.pdf (last visited

November 18, 2019). We note that more recent statistics from the same source indicate that this interval

has increased to 303 days. See U.S. Bankruptcy Courts,

BAPCPA Table 3 (December 31, 2017), available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables

/bapcpa_3_1231.2017.pdf (last visited November 18,

2019). In Sweeney v. Sweeney, 271 Conn. 193, 202–203,

856 A.2d 997 (2004), this court concluded that, when

the challenged action was likely to have a duration of

twenty-three months, the first prong of the capable of

repetition, but evading review exception was satisfied.

See id. (‘‘the record in the present case reveals that

this dissolution action was litigated vigorously by both

parties, resulting in a span of twenty-three months

between the commencement of the action and the final

judgment of dissolution; such a time frame demonstrates the unlikelihood that appellate resolution

regarding a pendente lite order entered during the

course of such proceedings could be achieved before

the order is superseded’’). We conclude, therefore, that

the average duration of an individual debtor’s chapter

13 bankruptcy proceeding—303 days, or slightly less

than ten months—is sufficiently limited to satisfy the

first prong of the capable of repetition, yet evading

review exception to the mootness doctrine.

Because we conclude that the plaintiff in error’s claim
satisfies all three requirements of the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine, the claim is reviewable.

III

We turn, therefore, to the plaintiff in error’s contention that we should overrule the decision of the

Appellate Court in Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, supra,

150 Conn. App. 755, holding that the automatic stay

provision operates to bar committees for sale from

recovering fees and expenses from nondebtor plaintiffs

in foreclosure actions that are subject to the stay. As

we indicated, the plaintiff in error contends that Shivers

should be overruled on two alternative grounds. First,

he contends that the Appellate Court in Shivers lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to extend the automatic stay

provision to motions to recover fees and expenses from

nondebtor plaintiffs in mortgage foreclosure actions

because the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction

to determine the scope of the automatic stay. Second, he

contends that, if the Appellate Court had such subject

matter jurisdiction, it incorrectly determined that the

automatic stay provision applied to such motions. We

conclude that state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to extend the automatic stay provision to proceedings against nondebtors and, therefore, that Shivers

must be overruled on that ground. Accordingly, we need

not consider whether Shivers was correct on the merits.

Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction to

entertain a claim is a question of law subject to plenary

review. See, e.g., Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v.

New London, 282 Conn. 791, 802, 925 A.2d 292 (2007).

In making our determination as to whether the courts

of this state have subject matter jurisdiction to extend

the automatic stay provision to proceedings against

nondebtors in the present case, we do not write on a

blank slate. The Appellate Court considered this issue

in Metro Bulletins Corp. v. Soboleski, 30 Conn. App.

493, 496–97, 620 A.2d 1314, cert. granted, 225 Conn.

923, 625 A.2d 823 (1993) (appeal withdrawn June 4,

1993), and concluded that any request to extend the

automatic stay provision to proceedings against a nondebtor must be made in bankruptcy court.12 The Appellate Court in Soboleski noted that, although the automatic stay provision ordinarily ‘‘does not enjoin

litigation against nondebtors,’’ there is ‘‘limited authority for extending the stay to a nondebtor in special

circumstances.’’ Id., 496; see also 11 U.S.C. § 105 (a)

(2012).13 The court also noted, however, that ‘‘the weight

of the case law indicates that a nondebtor, seeking to

extend the stay beyond the debtor, must move for the

extension in the bankruptcy court.’’14 Metro Bulletins

Corp. v. Soboleski, supra, 497. The Appellate Court

found this case law persuasive ‘‘because [i]t is fundamental under federal bankruptcy law that the automatic

stay operates for the benefit of the debtor and trustee
only, and gives other parties interested in property

affected by the automatic stay no substantive or procedural rights. . . . Only the bankruptcy court has the

entire picture before it. It would be difficult, if not

impossible, for a state trial court, which has only the

immediate case before it, to determine the best interests

of the bankruptcy estate.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 498. Because the defendant in Soboleski, a nondebtor who was seeking the

protection of the automatic stay provision, had not

applied for an extension of the automatic stay in the

bankruptcy court, the Appellate Court concluded that

the trial court properly had denied his motion for a

stay. Id. Thus, although the court in Soboleski did not

expressly conclude that the state trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the defendant’s

motion for a stay, it did suggest that the bankruptcy

court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain requests

to extend the automatic stay to proceedings against

nondebtors.

For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Appellate Court’s decision in Soboleski. Specifically, we conclude that, although the courts of this state have jurisdiction to determine whether the automatic stay

provision, by its own terms, applies to a proceeding in

state court, they do not have jurisdiction to modify the

application of the automatic stay provision pursuant to

11 U.S.C. § 105 (a) or 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)15 by extending

its application to proceedings to which it does not, by

its own terms, automatically apply or by barring its

application to proceedings to which it does automatically apply.

This issue of whether state courts have jurisdiction

to modify the reach of the automatic stay provision was

discussed at length by the United States Circuit Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Gruntz, 202

F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2000). In that case, the bankruptcy

debtor, Robert Gruntz, was charged in state court with

the criminal offense of failing to support his dependent

children. Id., 1077. After he was convicted, Gruntz filed

an appeal, claiming that the criminal prosecution was

barred by the automatic stay provision. See generally

People v. Gruntz, 29 Cal. App. 4th 412, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d

55 (1994). The California Court of Appeal concluded

that the automatic stay did not apply to criminal prosecutions and affirmed the conviction. See id., 421. Gruntz

ultimately filed an ‘‘adversary proceeding’’ in the bankruptcy court, requesting that that court declare the criminal proceedings void because they violated the automatic stay provision. See In re Gruntz, supra, 1077.

The bankruptcy court dismissed the proceeding on the

ground that it was collaterally estopped by the judgment

of the state court that the automatic stay provision did

not apply. See id. On appeal, the United States District

Court concluded that the bankruptcy court was bound

by the state court’s judgment that the automatic stay
provision did not apply pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.16 See id., 1077–78. The defendant then

appealed to the Ninth Circuit, claiming that a state court

ruling on the extent of the automatic stay does not bind

the bankruptcy court. Id., 1078.

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by noting that

‘‘[t]he automatic stay is self-executing, effective upon

the filing of the bankruptcy petition.’’ Id., 1081. It further

noted that ‘‘[t]he automatic stay is an injunction issuing

from the authority of the bankruptcy court, and bankruptcy court orders are not subject to collateral attack

in other courts. See Celotex Corp. [v. Edwards, 514 U.S.

300, 306–13, 115 S. Ct. 1493, 131 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1995)].

That is so not only because of the comprehensive jurisdiction vested in the bankruptcy courts . . . but also

because persons subject to an injunctive order issued

by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that

decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they

have proper grounds to object to the order.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Gruntz, supra, 202 F.3d 1082.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that ‘‘[a]ny state court

modification of the automatic stay would constitute an

unauthorized infringement upon the bankruptcy court’s

jurisdiction to enforce the stay. While Congress has

seen fit to authorize courts of the United States to

restrain [state court] proceedings in some special circumstances, such as the automatic stay, it has in no

way relaxed the old and [well established] judicially

declared rule that state courts are completely without

power to restrain [federal court] proceedings in in personam actions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

‘‘In sum, by virtue of the power vested in them by

Congress, the federal courts have the final authority to

determine the scope and applicability of the automatic

stay. The [s]tates cannot, in the exercise of control over

local laws and practice, vest [s]tate courts with power

to violate the supreme law of the land. . . . Thus, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not implicated by collateral

challenges to the automatic stay in bankruptcy. A bankruptcy court simply does not conduct an improper

appellate review of a state court when it enforces an

automatic stay that issues from its own federal statutory

authority. In fact, a reverse Rooker-Feldman situation

is presented when state courts decide to proceed in

derogation of the stay, because it is the state court

which is attempting impermissibly to modify the federal

court’s injunction.’’ (Citation omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 1083; see

also id., 1084 (‘‘modifying the automatic stay is not the

act of a state court merely interpreting federal law; it

is an intervention in the operation of an ongoing federal

bankruptcy case, the administration of which is vested

exclusively in the bankruptcy court’’).17 The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded, however, that, because crimi-
nal proceedings against a debtor are expressly excepted

from the automatic stay provision pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

§ 362 (b) (1), no modification of the stay was required

for California to prosecute Gruntz, and, therefore, there

was no need for the California court to seek the

approval of the bankruptcy court before allowing the

prosecution to go forward. Id., 1087.

We recognize that some cases addressing this issue

may be interpreted as holding that, although the federal

bankruptcy courts have the final say on whether the

automatic stay provision should be modified, they do

not have exclusive jurisdiction to make that determination. Rather, the state court may make that determination in the first instance, subject to later review by the

bankruptcy court. See Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398

F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005) (state courts ‘‘have the

power to decide whether the automatic stay applies to

its proceedings,’’ but if bankruptcy court ‘‘later decides

that the state court was incorrect, the state court proceedings in violation of the stay are void’’); Chao v.

Hospital Staffing Services, Inc., 270 F.3d 374, 384 (6th

Cir. 2001) (‘‘[i]f . . . the suit before the [nonbankruptcy] court may proceed because an exception to the

automatic stay authorizes prosecution of the suit, [that]

court may enter needful orders not themselves inconsistent with the automatic stay,’’ but if nonbankruptcy

court’s determination is erroneous, bankruptcy court

can later declare entire action void). We think the better

interpretation of these cases, however, is that a state

court has jurisdiction to determine whether, under its

plain terms, the automatic stay provision applies to the

proceeding before it, not that the court has jurisdiction

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105 (a) or 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)

to modify the automatic stay. Indeed, in both Lockyer

and Chao, the issue before the court was whether the

proceeding before the nonbankruptcy court came

within the statutory exception to the automatic stay

provision for proceedings to enforce the government’s

‘‘police or regulatory power’’ under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)

(4); Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., supra, 1107; Chao v. Hospital Staffing Services, Inc., supra, 385; not whether

the court should extend the application of the automatic

stay or bar its enforcement pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105

(a) or 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d).

We conclude, therefore, that, although state courts

have jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the bankruptcy code and orders of the bankruptcy court to determine whether, under their plain terms, the automatic

stay provision applies to a state court proceeding—

which interpretations are subject to correction by the

bankruptcy court—state courts do not have jurisdiction

to change the status quo by modifying the reach of the

automatic stay provision either by extending the stay

to proceedings to which it does not automatically apply

or by granting relief from the stay in proceedings to

which it does automatically apply. Rather, any modifica-
tion of the stay must be sought in bankruptcy court.

In Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, supra, 150 Conn. App.

745, the Appellate Court noted that ‘‘[c]ourts have

extended the application of the automatic stay to nondebtors in unusual circumstances where doing so would

further the purpose behind the stay.’’ Id., 753. The court

ultimately concluded that such unusual circumstances

existed because the bankrupt defendant would be

required to indemnify the nondebtor bank for any payments that the bank made to the committee for sale.

Id., 754–55. In each case cited by the Appellate Court

to support its conclusion, however, the court had

implicitly recognized that the stay provision did not

apply automatically to claims against nondebtors. See

id., 753–54.18 Indeed, several courts have expressly held

to that effect. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hospital Trust

National Bank v. Dube, 136 F.R.D. 37, 39 (D.R.I. 1990)

(automatic stay provision ‘‘does not apply automatically

. . . to actions against a debtor’s principals, partners,

officers, employees, guarantors, or sureties’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]); In re Richard B. Vance &

Co., 289 B.R. 692, 697 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (‘‘extension

of the stay to nonbankrupt parties is not automatic and

must be requested affirmatively by the debtor’’); In re

Bidermann Industries U.S.A., Inc., 200 B.R. 779, 782

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (automatic stay provision ‘‘does

not apply automatically to stay actions against [nondebtors]’’); In re All Seasons Resorts, Inc., 79 B.R. 901,

904 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (‘‘the automatic stay does

not automatically encompass [codefendants]’’ [emphasis in original]); Alvarez v. Bateson, 176 Md. App. 136,

148, 932 A.2d 815 (2007) (automatic stay provision

‘‘applies automatically to debtors, but not to [nonbankrupt codefendants]’’). We agree with these courts. When

the stay provision does not apply automatically to a

proceeding, action by the bankruptcy court is required

to extend the application of the stay. See In re Richard

B. Vance & Co., supra, 697 (extension of stay to nonbankrupt parties ‘‘must be requested affirmatively by

the debtor’’); In re Bidermann Industries U.S.A., Inc.,

supra, 782 (to stay action against nondebtor, ‘‘[t]he

debtor must obtain a stay order from the bankruptcy

court’’); In re All Seasons Resorts, Inc., supra, 903

(extension of automatic stay provision to nondebtors

‘‘requires the filing of an appropriate adversary proceeding under [11 U.S.C. § 105 (a) and 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)]

to achieve the desired result’’); W.W. Gay Mechanical

Contractor, Inc. v. Wharfside Two, Ltd., 545 So. 2d

1348, 1350 (Fla. 1989) (nondebtor codefendant ‘‘must

apply to and obtain [stay] from the bankruptcy court’’);

Alvarez v. Bateson, supra, 148 (‘‘[A] court must make

a determination as to whether the automatic stay

extends to cover a [nonbankrupt] codefendant of the

debtor. It follows that each determination should be

made by the bankruptcy court supervising the debtor’s

estate upon request of the debtor, because it is the
debtor’s interests that are being protected by the stay.’’).

As we explained, the bankruptcy court has exclusive

jurisdiction to extend the stay to proceedings to which

it does not automatically apply. We conclude, therefore,

that the Appellate Court in Shivers lacked jurisdiction

to extend the stay provision to motions to recover a

committee for sale’s fees and expenses from a nondebtor bank. Accordingly, we conclude that Shivers

must be overruled.

In the present case, the trial court relied exclusively

on Shivers when it denied the plaintiff in error’s motion

for fees and expenses. We conclude, therefore, that the

case must be remanded to the trial court so that it may

vacate the order denying the plaintiff in error’s motion

and entertain that motion on the merits.

The writ of error is granted and the case is remanded

with direction to vacate the order denying the plaintiff

in error’s motion for fees and expenses, and to conduct

further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion PALMER, D’AURIA and ECKER,

Js., concurred.

* The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

This case was originally argued before a panel of this court consisting of

Justices Palmer, McDonald, Robinson, D’Auria, Mullins and Kahn. Thereafter, Justice Ecker was added to the panel and has read the briefs and

appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision.

1 Title 11 of the 2012 edition of the United States Code, § 362 (a), provides

in relevant part that a bankruptcy petition ‘‘operates as a stay, applicable

to all entities, of . . . (1) the commencement or continuation . . . of a

judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor

that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the

case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose

before the commencement of the case under this title . . . .’’

2 We note that these parties in the underlying foreclosure action are defendants in error in the present proceeding. For the sake of simplicity, we refer

to U.S. Bank National Association as the bank and to Crawford by name.

We also note that, although the city of Hartford, the Department of Social

Services, and the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development

were also named as defendants in the underlying foreclosure action, they

are not involved in the present proceeding.

3 General Statutes § 49-25 provides in relevant part: ‘‘[I]f for any reason

the sale does not take place, the expense of the sale and appraisal or

appraisals shall be paid by the plaintiff and be taxed with the costs of the

case. . . .’’

4 General Statutes § 51-199 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The following

matters shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court . . . (10) writs of

error . . . .’’

5 Practice Book § 72-1 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Writs of error for

errors in matters of law only may be brought from a final judgment of the

Superior Court to the Supreme Court in the following cases: (1) a decision

binding on an aggrieved nonparty . . . .’’

6 This court also, sua sponte, invited the Litigation Section and the Commercial Law and Bankruptcy Section of the Connecticut Bar Association to

file an amicus curiae brief addressing the following question: ‘‘Should this

court overrule Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, [supra, 150 Conn. App. 745],

insofar as that case required the trial court to deny the committee’s motion

for an interim award of fees and expenses during the automatic bankruptcy

stay?’’ The Commercial Law and Bankruptcy Section, acting on behalf of

the Connecticut Bar Association as a whole, accepted our invitation and

submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiff in error’s position

that this court should overrule Shivers. We thank the Commercial Law and

Bankruptcy Section for its comprehensive brief.
7 The dissent also suggests that the plaintiff in error could have filed a

declaratory judgment action in state court to obtain the relief that he seeks.

As the dissent recognizes, however, the plaintiff in error could not have

brought such an action after the trial court ruled on his motion for fees and

expenses in the present case because a party may not bring an action in

the Superior Court effectively asking that court to review a ruling of another

trial court in another case. See Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, 294 Conn. 534, 543–44, 985 A.2d 1052 (2010) (‘‘[o]ur jurisprudence

concerning the trial court’s authority to overturn or to modify a ruling in a

particular case assumes, as a proposition so basic that it requires no citation

of authority, that any such action will be taken only by the trial court with

continuing jurisdiction over the case, and that the only court with continuing

jurisdiction is the court that originally rendered the ruling’’). With respect

to the dissent’s contention that the plaintiff in error could have brought

such an action before filing his motion for fees and expenses, we are aware

of no authority for the proposition that a court may issue an advisory,

declaratory ruling on an issue that will arise in ongoing litigation in another

case. In our view, the question of whether a committee for sale is entitled

to immediate payment properly can be entertained only by the trial court

in which such payment can be sought, which is the court in which the

foreclosure action is pending. In any event, we fail to see how requiring the

plaintiff in error to jump through these procedural hoops would be preferable

as a matter of judicial policy to entertaining the writ of error in the present case.

8 Again, we acknowledge that it is difficult to discern a clear and consistent

pattern in this court’s application of this principle. Compare State v. Longo,

supra, 192 Conn. 91 (‘‘[W]here a defendant plausibly demonstrates that a

trial court order threatens his or her double jeopardy right not to be tried

twice for the same offense, the appeal is within our jurisdiction. State v.

Moeller, 178 Conn. 67, 420 A.2d 1153, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950, 100 S. Ct.

423, 62 L. Ed. 2d 320 [1979]. That order is appealable because, at the time

of the appeal, the defendant already has an unqualified right to be free from

double jeopardy.’’), with Melia v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra, 202 Conn.

257 (‘‘It is true that a remand for a new trial resulting from an erroneous

order to disclose information protected by the [attorney-client] privilege

cannot wholly undo the consequences of its violation . . . . Vindication at

the appellate level can seldom regain all that has been lost by an erroneous

determination of a cause in the trial court.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); see also State v. Longo, supra, 92–93 (ruling denying youthful offender

status is not reviewable under Curcio even though denial may deprive

defendant irretrievably of right to privacy conferred by youthful offender

statute); State v. Longo, supra, 98 (Healy, J., dissenting) (court’s ‘‘focal

concern for irreparable harm in the final judgment rule is indeed lessened

by today’s ruling’’). It is hard to understand why the constitutional right to

be free from double jeopardy is any more ‘‘unqualified’’ at the time of an

interlocutory appeal than the common-law right to invoke the attorneyclient privilege against disclosure (assuming that the communications at

issue are, in fact, privileged) or the statutory right to youthful offender

status (assuming that the defendant does, in fact, satisfy the criteria for

such status). We recognize that, in Longo, the court emphasized that, unlike

the right to double jeopardy protection, defendants were, at that time,

required to apply for youthful offender status pursuant to General Statutes

(Rev. to 1983) § 54-76c, and the granting of the application was within the

discretion of the trial court. See State v. Longo, supra, 92. Discretion can

be abused, however, and, when it is, an existing right is violated. Cf. Giaimo

v. New Haven, 257 Conn. 481, 509, 778 A.2d 33 (2001) (applicant for statutory

benefit ‘‘has a protected property interest in the benefit when, under the

governing statute, the decision-making body would have no discretion to

deny the application if the applicant could establish at a hearing that it met

the statutory criteria’’). It would appear, therefore, that the real driving force

in these cases is this court’s judgment regarding the importance of the right

at issue, not the ontological status of the right at the time the appeal is filed.

See, e.g., Melia v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra, 256 (review of interlocutory

orders is available for claims involving right ‘‘too important to be denied

review’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). In any event, in the present

case, all of the relevant considerations weigh in favor of immediate review,

including the public importance of the right that the plaintiff in error is

attempting to vindicate.

9

Indeed, this is precisely what happened in CT Tax Liens 2, LLC v.

Tasillo, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-12-
6035369-S (October 1, 2014). After the trial court in that case denied the

committee for sale’s motion for fees and expenses on the ground that the

motion was subject to the automatic stay, the committee filed a motion in

the bankruptcy court seeking a declaratory judgment that the automatic

stay did not apply. See In re Tasillo, United States Bankruptcy Court, Docket

No. 14-21683 (ASD) (D. Conn. January 6, 2015). The bankruptcy court agreed

with the committee and rendered a judgment declaring that the automatic

stay did not bar the committee from seeking fees and expenses from the

nondebtor plaintiff. Id. The committee then returned to the Superior Court

and renewed its motion for fees and expenses, seeking an additional $1000

in attorney’s fees and a filing fee of $176 in connection with the bankruptcy

court proceeding. See CT Tax Liens 2, LLC v. Tasillo, Superior Court,

judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-12-6035369-S (January 29, 2015).

The trial court granted the motion in part but denied the fees and expenses

associated with the bankruptcy court proceeding. Id.

We note that the decision of a federal bankruptcy court in a particular

case is not binding on our trial courts in other cases. Thus, as the dissent

recognizes, if we do not review the plaintiff in error’s claim, our trial courts

will continue to be bound by the Appellate Court’s decision in Shivers,

despite our shared ‘‘concern about the viability of Shivers going forward’’

in light of Tasillo.

10 See, e.g., In re Hooker, United States Bankruptcy Court, Docket No. 18-

20504 (JJT) (D. Conn. June 27, 2018); In re Tasillo, United States Bankruptcy

Court, Docket No. 14-21683 (ASD) (D. Conn. January 6, 2015); In re VMC

Real Estate, LLC, United States Bankruptcy Court, Docket No. 11-20452

(ASD) (D. Conn. March 9, 2012); In re Rubenstein, 105 B.R. 198, 201–204

(Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, supra, 150 Conn. App.

749–56; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Schmidt, Superior Court, judicial district

of New Britain, Docket No. CV-14-6024891-S (February 25, 2016); United

States Bank Assn. v. Barber, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven,

Docket No. CV-13-6037544-S (May 20, 2015); Citimortgage, Inc. v. Sheehan,

Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-08-5020865-

S (February 27, 2015); CT Tax Liens 2, LLC v. Tasillo, Superior Court,

judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-12-6035369-S (October 1, 2014);

Citimortgage, Inc. v. Hilton, Superior Court, judicial district of AnsoniaMilford, Docket No. CV-14-6015156-S (August 25, 2014).

11 The plaintiff in error has not renewed his motion to recover the fees

and expenses that he sought in his original motion for fees and expenses.

Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling on that motion is still in effect, and the

plaintiff in error is still technically aggrieved. See footnote 5 of this opinion.

12 We note that the court in Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, supra, 150 Conn.

App. 745, did not cite the decision in Soboleski.

13 Title 11 of the 2012 edition of the United States Code, § 105 (a), provides:

‘‘The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or

appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this

title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be

construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or

making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement

court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.’’

14 The Appellate Court followed this proposition with citations to several

cases. Metro Bulletins Corp. v. Soboleski, supra, 30 Conn. App. 497; see

Ingersoll-Rand Financial Corp. v. Miller Mining Co., 817 F.2d 1424, 1427

(9th Cir. 1987) (although bankruptcy court may lift stay upon request of

party pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 [d], stay was in effect because bankruptcy

court had ordered no such relief and no statutory exception to stay provision

applied); Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Stiles, 700 F. Supp. 1060, 1063

(D. Mont. 1988) (‘‘[a]lthough 11 U.S.C. § 105 [a] has been held to authorize

a stay order as to a [codefendant],’’ no stay was in effect because bankruptcy

court had not ordered one); B & B Associates v. Fonner, 700 F. Supp. 7, 9

(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (‘‘[a]lthough a [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt may extend the protection of an automatic stay to a [nondebtor] in some circumstances,’’ no stay

was in effect because bankruptcy court had not ordered one); see also

Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Dube, 136 F.R.D. 37, 39

(D.R.I. 1990); In re Codfish Corp., 97 B.R. 132, 135 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1988); In

re All Seasons Resorts, Inc., 79 B.R. 901, 903 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987); In re

MacDonald/Associates, Inc., 54 B.R. 865, 867 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985); In re

Precision Colors, Inc., 36 B.R. 429, 431 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); W.W. Gay

Mechanical Contractor, Inc. v. Wharfside Two, Ltd., 545 So. 2d 1348, 1350

(Fla. 1989); Collier v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 86 Md. App. 38, 48, 585

A.2d 256, cert. denied sub nom. Corhart Refractories Co. v. Collier, 323 Md.
33, 591 A.2d 249 (1991).

We note that most of these cases do not directly support the Appellate

Court’s conclusion in Soboleski that a motion to extend the automatic stay

provision to a proceeding against a nondebtor must be brought in bankruptcy

court. In Collier v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., supra, 86 Md. App. 49–50,

the state court’s jurisdiction to extend the stay was not directly at issue,

and the court appears to have assumed that it had such jurisdiction, although

it ultimately considered and denied a nondebtor’s motion for a stay. In In

re Codfish Corp., supra, 97 B.R. 135, In re All Seasons Resorts, Inc., supra,

79 B.R. 903, In re MacDonald/Associates, Inc., supra, 54 B.R. 867–68, and

In re Precision Colors, Inc., supra, 36 B.R. 431, the respective bankruptcy

courts held only that they had jurisdiction to extend the stay to a proceeding

against a nondebtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105 (a), not that state courts

lacked such jurisdiction. In Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v.

Dube, supra, 136 F.R.D. 39, the court held only that the automatic stay

provision does not apply automatically to nondebtors, and did not address

the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to extend the stay.

15 Title 11 of the 2012 edition of the United States Code, § 362 (d), provides

in relevant part: ‘‘On request of a party in interest and after notice and a

hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection

(a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay . . . .’’

16 ‘‘[This] doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263

U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983).

Rooker held that federal statutory jurisdiction over direct appeals from state

courts lies exclusively in the Supreme Court and is beyond the original

jurisdiction of federal district courts. See [Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

supra, 415–16]. Feldman held that this jurisdictional bar extends to particular

claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with those a state court has already

decided. See [District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, supra,

486–87].’’ In re Gruntz, supra, 202 F.3d 1078 n.1.

17 See also In re Raboin, 135 B.R. 682, 684 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991) (‘‘this

court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the extent and effect of the

stay, and the state court’s ruling to the contrary does not bar the debtor’s

present motion’’); In re Sermersheim, 97 B.R. 885, 888 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio

1989) (‘‘[i]t is the bankruptcy court alone that has the exclusive jurisdiction

to determine questions involving the automatic stay’’ [emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted]).

18 See Queenie, Ltd. v. Nygard International, 321 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir.

2003) (‘‘[t]he automatic stay can apply to [nondebtors], but normally does

so only when a claim against the [nondebtor] will have an immediate adverse

economic consequence for the debtor’s estate’’);A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin,

788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir.) (‘‘there are cases . . . [in which] a bankruptcy

court may properly stay the proceedings against [nonbankrupt codefendants] but . . . in order for relief for such [nonbankrupt] defendants to be

available . . . there must be unusual circumstances and certainly [s]omething more than the mere fact that one of the parties to the lawsuit has

filed a [c]hapter 11 bankruptcy must be shown in order that proceedings

be stayed against [nonbankrupt] parties’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876, 107 S. Ct. 251, 93 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1986); In

re Jefferson County, 491 B.R. 277, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2013) (‘‘[g]enerally,

the automatic stay . . . applies only to certain actions taken or not taken

with respect to a debtor, and not with respect to such action or inaction

affecting other parties’’); In re North Star Contracting Corp., 125 B.R. 368,

370 (S.D.N.Y 1991) (automatic ‘‘stay generally applies only to bar proceedings

against the debtor’’); In re Metal Center, 31 B.R. 458, 462 (Bankr. D. Conn.

1983) (‘‘[g]enerally, the automatic stay does not apply to proceedings

against nondebtors’’).