alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[No. 762-1.

Division One—Panel 1.

December 6, 1971.]

#### Alexander D. Matthews *et al., Appellants,*v. Jobs Ruddy *et al., Respondents.*

*Murray & Holmes*and *Joseph D. Holmes,*for appellants.

*Robert V. Brown,*for respondents.

Williams, J.

Plaintiffs, Alexander D. Matthews and Diana Sue Matthews, his wife, instituted this' action to recover for personal injuries which they sustained when a *880wheel came off a truck owned by defendants Jobs Ruddy and wife and operated by defendant William C. Mutschler. The wheel struck the vehicle in which plaintiffs were riding. They appeal from a summary judgment dismissing defendants Jobs Ruddy and wife from the action.

In their complaint, appellants alleged that the respondents, Jobs Ruddy and wife, were owners of the truck and that defendant Mutschler, the operator, was an agent and employee of respondents. Respondents’ answer to the complaint admitted ownership of the truck, but denied that defendant Mutschler was their agent or employee.

In the affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment, respondents stated that at the time of the accident defendant Mutschler was employed by Stores Delivery Service, a corporation. Appellants’ two contravening affidavits, each signed by their attorney, asserted that respondents had admitted ownership of the truck, the corporation was small and closely held by respondents as a family, respondents had signed a loan application as officers of the corporation and individually, and that the records of the Secretary of State of the State of Washington listed respondents as president and secretary of Stores Delivery Service, a corporation.

The order granting the summary judgment must be upheld for two reasons: The first is that appellants’ affidavits, filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, were not made on the personal knowledge of their affiant, and so were of no effect. CR 56. The second reason is that even if the statements contained in the affidavits are considered to be true, there is still no material issue of fact. It remains undisputed that the operator of the truck was working for Stores Delivery Service, a corporation, and not for respondents. Even if respondents were owners of the corporation and served as its principal officers, they would not, without more, be subject to personal responsibility for defendant Mutschler’s operation of the truck. RCW 23A.08.210, *Christensen v. Skagit County,*66 Wn.2d 95, 401 P.2d 335 (1965).

*881Appellant advances the rule that respondents’ ownership of the truck created a presumption that the operator was their agent. This presumption is correct, *Callen v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc.,*50 Wn.2d 180, 310 P.2d 236 (1957), but was overcome by the. uncontradicted statement in respondents’ affidavit that the operator was the agent and employee of Stores Delivery Service.

The judgment is affirmed.

Horowitz, C.J., and Utter, J., concur.
#### Archie Orice BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-233.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 2, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
# C_2022198EN.01001601.xml

| 16.5.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 198/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 198/16

---

Appeal brought on 2 December 2021 by Henry Cotton's Brand Management Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 22 September 2021 in Case T-173/20, Henry Cotton's Brand Management v EUIPO — Industries Sportswear

(Case C-744/21 P)

(2022/C 198/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Henry Cotton's Brand Management Co. Ltd (represented by: A. von Mühlendahl, C. Eckhartt, P. Böhner, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Industries Sportswear Co. Srl

By order of 31/03/2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Henry Cotton's Brand Management Co. Ltd should bear its own costs.

---
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

In the Interest of K.D., C.D., and C.F., III, 

Children

No. 06-17-00068-CV

Appeal from the 115th District Court of 

Marion County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 16-

00038). Memorandum Opinion delivered by 

Chief Justice Morriss, Justice Moseley and 

Justice Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant has adequately indicated her inability to pay costs of appeal. 

Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED NOVEMBER 17, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                       5
<LEGEND>
The schedule  contains summary  financial  information  extracted from the NuCo2
Inc. Consolidated  Financial Statements as of March 31, 1998 and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such Consolidated Financial Statements.
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</TABLE>
# U ni te d S ta te s Co ur t of A pp ea ls For the Eig hth Circu it

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ No. 1 7- 19 48

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ Edwar d Th urm an ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Pla in ti

ff - App el la nt

v. Que en , Serg ean t, NCU; Down in g, Li eu te na nt , NCU; Sp ur lo ck , Serg ean t, NCU; St ep he n Wil li am s, Warde n, NCU; Bil ly Inm an , Depu ty W ard en , NCU; Kei th Day , Bu il di ng Mayor; Dext er Pa yne , Depu ty D ire ct or , ADC; Ba rb ara Wil li am s, In m at e

Grie va nc e Supe rv is or , ADC; J oh n Do e, Co rp or al , NCU
ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Defe nd

an ts - App el le es

__ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co urt fo r th e Eas te rnDis tri ctof Ark an sa s - B at es vi ll e

__ __ __ __ __ __ Subm it te d: Decem

be r 21 , 20 17 Fi le d: Jan ua ry

5, 2 01 8 [Unpubl is he d]

__ __ __ __ __ __ Befo re GRUENDER, MURPHY, an d S HEPHERD, Circ ui t J ud ge s.

__ __ __ __ __ __ PER CURI AM.I n th is 42 U.S.C. § 19 83 act io n, Ark an sa s Dep artm en t of Co rrec ti on in mat e

Edwar d Thu rm an ap pe al s a f t e r t h e di st ric t co urt adve rs el y di sp os ed of al l of hi s 1 cl ai m s, in cl ud in g di sm is si ng so m e of hi s cl ai m s wit h o ut pr ejud ic e fo r fai lu re to
ex haus t adm in is tra ti ve rem ed ie s. Als o b efo re the pa ne l are Thu rm an ’s m ot io ns fo r ap po in tm en t o f co un se l an d fo r ad m is si on an d p ro du ct io n o f do cu m en ts

.
Afte r care fu l rev ie w, we co nc lu de th at th e di st ric t co urt ap pr op ria te ly di sp os ed
o f Thu rm an ’s cl ai m s. Se e, e.g ., Ki ng v. Io wa Dep ’t of Co rr
. , 59 8 F.3 d 10 51 , 1 0 5 2 (8 th Ci r. 20 10 ) (rev ie win g de no vo di sm is sa l fo r fai lu r e t o ex haus t adm in is tra ti ve rem ed ie s)

. Acco rd in gl y , we affi rm
. Se e 8t h Cir. R. 47 B. W e al so de ny Thu rm an ’s pe nd in g m ot io ns as m oo t.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

The Hon or ab le D. P. Mar sh al l Jr ., Uni te d St at es Dis tri ct Ju dg e fo r th e East ern 1 Dis tri ct of Ark an sa s, ad op ti ng th e rep ort an d reco m m en da tio ns of th e Hon or ab le Bet h Deere , Uni te d S ta te s M ag is tra te Ju dg e fo r th e Eas te rnDis tri ctof Ark an sa s. -2

-
##### 



Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
      (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;(b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and(c)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and
    Dated: November 14, 2007
    By:
    /s/ James T. EngenJames T. EngenChairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
#### Richard Norris BRYANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. EE-202.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Sept. 30, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 14, 1977.

Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and Louis G. Carres, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Patti Englander, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

MILLS and SMITH, JJ., concur.

RAWLS, Acting C. J., dissents.

RAWLS, Acting Chief Judge

(dissenting).

I dissent. The sole evidence adduced by the state, upon which the jury returned a verdict that appellant was guilty of burglary, was that of latent fingerprints taken from the tile edge inside the window of Room 128 at the Greenbrier Motel located in Duval County, Florida.1

The jury began deliberating at 4:24 p. m., and at 5:43 p. m. the following colloquy took place:

> “(Jury present)

> THE COURT: Mr. Foreman, the bailiff advises me that you are not able to arrive at a verdict. Is that correct?

> FOREMAN BURGESS: That is correct.

> THE COURT: Mr. Foreman, in your opinion, are you hopelessly deadlocked?

> FOREMAN BURGESS: I would believe so.

> THE COURT: You do or do not?

> FOREMAN BURGESS: I would believe that we are.

> THE COURT: All right, I’m going to read you a charge and then I want you to go back and deliberate further.”

At this time, the trial judge gave the “Allen” charge to which the appellant took exception. The jury retired at 5:50 p. m., and at 6:03 p. m. they returned a verdict of guilty as charged.

As pointed out by appellant, the jury was not given a reasonable period of time within which to reconcile the contradictory testimony in this case. The trial judge made no reference whatsoever to allowing the jury to break for dinner, and, instead, gave them the “Blockbuster” charge and sent them back to deliberate. *Lee*v. *State,*239 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).

In my opinion, under these circumstances, the giving of the Allen charge was error. Appellant was entitled to the jury’s careful and unhurried deliberation. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

1

. Appellant testified in his own behalf and stated that he did not leave any fingerprints on the ledge of the window; did not know where the Greenbrier Motel was located; and did not take a TV from the motel room nor was a TV found in his custody or control.
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 99.8

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Barrick Gold Corporation (the Company) is filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, its annual report on
Form 40-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013 (the Report).

I, Jamie C. Sokalsky, President and Chief Executive Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as enacted pursuant to section 906 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | a) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | b) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: March 31, 2014



|                      |  |                                      
|--------------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|/s/ Jamie C. Sokalsky
|Name:                 |  | Jamie C. Sokalsky                    
|Title:                |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1100 

To amend the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 to repeal 

a provision prohibiting Federal agencies from procuring alternative fuels. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 6, 2013 

Mr. BARRASSO (for himself, Mr. MANCHIN, Mr. COATS, Ms. HEITKAMP, Mr. 

ENZI, Mr. INHOFE, and Mr. HOEVEN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To amend the Energy Independence and Security Act of 

2007 to repeal a provision prohibiting Federal agencies 

from procuring alternative fuels. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘North American Alter5 native Fuels Act’’. 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1100 IS

1 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION OF THE PROCUREMENT 

2 AND ACQUISITION OF ALTERNATIVE FUELS. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 526 of the Energy Inde4 pendence and Security Act of 2007 (Public Law 110–140; 

5 42 U.S.C. 17142) is repealed. 

6 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 30310 of 

7 title 51, United States Code, is repealed. 

Æ 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Order entered May 3, 2021

In The 

### Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05
- 20
- 01088
- CV
VIVIAN O. TAYLOR , Appellant
V.
CHARLES E. TAYLOR , Appellee On Appeal from the 330th Judicia l District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF
- 19
- 21619
O RDER The reporter’ record is past due. By post card notice dated April 14, 2021, we instructed Francheska Duffey, Official Court Reporter for the 330th Judicial District Court, to file the reporter’s record within thirty days. Before the Court is appellant’s April 30, 2021 letter informing the Court that Ms. Duffey will not file the reporter’s record without payment. Appellant filed a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Co urt Costs or an Appeal Bond in the tria l court on December 15, 2020. Because nothing in the record reflects appellant has been ordered to paycosts , appellant is allowed to proceed without payment of costs. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 145( a). Accordingly, w e OR DER Ms. Duffey to file the reporter’s record on or before June 2, 2021

. On the Court’s own motion, we DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to send appellant a paper copy of the (1) corrected clerk’s record filed on January 4, 2021, (2) supplemental clerk’s recor d filed on December 22, 2020, and (3) reporter’s record when it is filed.
We DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to send a copy of this order to Ms. Duffey and all parties. /s/ KEN MOLBERG JUSTICE
#### Frank Philip TAGLIARINI, Appellant, v. Evelyn Frances TAGLIARINI, Appellee.

No. 67-334.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

July 31, 1968.

Sam Bucklew of Bucklew, Ramsey & Stichter, Tampa, for appellant.

Russell K. Peavyhouse, of Trinkle, Red-man, Clawson & Peavyhouse, Brandon, for appellee.

HOBSON, Judge.

The appellant takes an interlocutory appeal from an order of the chancellor below denying his motion for change of custody.

The parties hereto are the parents of two minor sons whose custody was granted to the appellee in a final decree of divorce entered on January 29, 1965.

The chancellor below, on the appellant’s motion for change of custody, held two days of hearings which consists of some 312 pages of testimony.

While we might not have ruled the same as the chancellor had we been in his position, we nevertheless must affirm his order because the record-on-appeal contains substantial competent. evidence to support the chancellor’s order herein appealed.

In Bennett v. Bennett, Fla.App.1962, 146 So.2d 588, this court, in following a long line of authority, on pages 589-590, stated as follows:

> “The decision of the chancellor carries with it the presumption of correctness on appellate review where, as here, the evidence and the witnesses were before him. Joyner v. Andrews, Fla.App.1962, 137 So.2d 870, 872. It is incumbent upon the appellant to demonstrate that the decree appealed was clearly erroneous. Cowen v. Cowen, Fla.1957, 95 So.2d 584; Tyler v. Tyler, Fla.App.1959, 108 So.2d 312; Cole v. Cole, Fla.App.1961, 130 So. 2d 126. If the record contains substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s *11decree, we must uphold it even though we might have decided differently had we been in the chancellor’s position. Bruggisser v. Bruggisser, Fla.App.1961, 133 So.2d 654; Brenner v. Smullian, Fla. 1956, 84 So.2d 44,49.”

In view of the fact that the appellant has not demonstrated that the chancellor’s order is clearly erroneous and further that the record-on-appeal contains competent substantial evidence to support such order, we must affirm.

Affirmed.

LILES, C. J., and ALLEN, J., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Ronald W. Guire, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to
my knowledge, the Annual Report of Exar Corporation on Form 10-K for the period ended March 31, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in
such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Exar Corporation.



|                                                  
|--------------------------------------------------
|/s/    RONALD W. GUIRE                            
|Ronald W. Guire                                   
|Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer,
|Assistant Secretary and Director                  
|(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
#### Gary W. WILLIS v. Kenneth G. EVERETT et al.

No. 62827.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 22, 1978.

In re: Kenneth W. Everett and Government Employees Insurance Company, applying for certiorari. Parish of Beauregard. 359 So.2d 1080.

Writ denied.