1

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office 

of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor 

approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

State v. Nazier D. Goldsmith (A-77-20) (085636)

Argued January 18, 2022 -- Decided July 5, 2022

PIERRE-LOUIS, J., writing for the Court.

In this case, the Court must determine whether reasonable and articulable 

suspicion existed when a police officer conducted an investigatory stop of defendant 

Nazier Goldsmith on a walkway adjacent to a vacant house.

On the evening of January 15, 2019, Officer Joseph Goonan and another 

officer were on patrol in Camden in what they believed to be a “high-crime area” 

known for shootings and drug dealing. While approaching the vacant house, the 

officers observed two individuals standing in front of it. When the officers exited 

their vehicle, the two individuals walked away. At the same time, a third person, 

defendant, exited the walkway that leads to the rear of the house.

Based on his training, 20 years of experience, and his belief that the vacant 

house was used for the sale of drugs and weapons, Officer Goonan found it 

suspicious that defendant was on the walkway next to the vacant house and believed 

defendant was engaged in drug dealing activity. The officers approached defendant, 

blocked his path at the end of the walkway, and began questioning him, asking for 

his name and for an explanation of his presence on that walkway. 

According to Officer Goonan, defendant became nervous and looked up and 

down the street; he started sweating, and his hands began to shake. Defendant 

provided a name and informed officers that his identification was in his jacket 

pocket. Because defendant’s demeanor made him nervous, Officer Goonan told 

defendant that he would retrieve the identification from defendant’s pocket. At that 

point, defendant stated, “I appreciate if you guys didn’t pat me down,” arousing 

Officer Goonan’s suspicions even further. 

Officer Goonan conducted a pat down for weapons. The officer felt a weapon 

in defendant’s jacket pocket and retrieved a handgun. Defendant was arrested, and 

police later recovered currency and drugs from defendant’s person. A search of the 

walkway revealed drugs in baggies that were the same color as the baggies of drugs 

found in defendant’s pockets. 
2

Defendant was charged with weapons and drug offenses. Defendant moved to 

suppress the gun and drugs, arguing that both the stop and frisk were unlawful. The 

trial court granted the motion, finding the stop lawful but the frisk unlawful. The 

Appellate Division reversed. Without addressing the initial stop, the appellate court 

found that the frisk of defendant was objectively reasonable. The Court granted 

leave to appeal. 248 N.J. 3 (2021). 

HELD: The information the officers possessed at the time of the stop did not 

amount to specific and particularized suspicion that defendant was engaged in 

criminal activity. Therefore, the officers did not have reasonable and articulable 

suspicion to initiate an investigatory detention of defendant, and the evidence seized 

must be suppressed.

1. An investigative or Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), is a 

relatively brief detention by police during which a person’s movement is restricted. 

Such a stop does not offend the Federal or State Constitution, and no warrant is 

needed, if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 

rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity. Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable 

cause, it cannot be based on inarticulate hunches or an arresting officer’s subjective 

good faith. Whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an investigatory 

stop is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of the totality of 

circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State’s 

interest in effective law enforcement against the individual’s right to be protected 

from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions. The inquiry considers

numerous factors, including officer experience and knowledge. It is well-settled that 

seemingly furtive movements by the suspect, without more, are insufficient to 

constitute reasonable and articulable suspicion. And although the reputation of an 

area may be relevant to the analysis, just because a location to which police officers 

are dispatched is a high-crime area does not mean that the residents in that area have 

lesser constitutional protection from random stops. (pp. 17-20)

2. To determine whether reasonable and articulable suspicion existed here, the 

Court first considers when the investigatory stop commenced. Although officers did 

not tell defendant to “stop” when he exited the walkway, they blocked his path, and 

Officer Goonan acknowledged that defendant could not have moved forward freely 

at that point. No reasonably prudent person would have felt free to leave when 

officers stepped into the only path of egress and began asking questions, leaving 

defendant no place to go but backwards. The moment officers impeded defendant’s

forward progress and began the questioning, the encounter became an investigatory 

detention or stop. (pp. 20-22)
3

3. Turning to whether officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop 

defendant at that point in time, the Court stresses that Officer Goonan unequivocally 

testified that he did not witness defendant interact with or engage in a hand-to-hand 

transaction with the two men that left the scene, contrary to the trial court’s finding 

that the two men were with defendant. As for defendant’s presence in a high-crime 

area, the Court continues to view the impact of previous crimes in the same area as a 

police encounter as a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances 

when determining whether a stop was based on reasonable suspicion. However, the 

State must do more than simply invoke the buzz words “high-crime area” in a 

conclusory manner to justify investigative stops. Here, Officer Goonan’s vague 

testimony fell short of providing factual support for his conclusory statement that 

the area was high crime. The State must provide at least some evidence to support 

the assertion that a neighborhood should be considered as “high-crime.” (pp. 22-26)

4. Here, even if Officer Goonan had provided more information regarding the 

prevalence of crime in the area, that would have been insufficient to justify the stop 

because the other factors on which the officers relied were also insufficient -- even 

when taken together -- to form a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant 

was engaged in criminal activity. The only information the officers possessed prior 

to the stop was information that could be used to justify the stop of virtually anyone, 

on any day, and at any time, based simply on their presence on that street. Officer 

Goonan had a hunch that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. That hunch, 

however, did not amount to objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion for an 

investigatory stop. Because the stop here was unlawful, the Court does not reach the 

lawfulness of the frisk. (pp. 26-28)

REVERSED. REMANDED for REINSTATEMENT of the suppression 

order.

JUSTICE SOLOMON, dissenting, would defer to the trial court’s 

conclusion as to the point at which defendant’s encounter with the police became an

investigative detention. Justice Solomon notes that the trial court had before it a key 

piece of evidence -- a photograph of the walkway next to the vacant house -- that is 

missing from the record on appeal. In Justice Solomon’s view, the majority’s 

conclusion that the officers blocked defendant’s path forward is not supported by the 

record, and the trial court’s conclusion that the seizure began when the officers 

asked defendant for identification was not so clearly mistaken that the interests of 

justice demand intervention and correction through appellate review.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICE ALBIN; and JUDGE FUENTES 

(temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS’s opinion. JUSTICE 

SOLOMON filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE PATTERSON joins.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-77 September Term 2020

085636

State of New Jersey,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Nazier D. Goldsmith,

Defendant-Appellant.

On appeal from the Superior Court,

Appellate Division.

Argued

January 18, 2022

Decided

July 5, 2022

Ashley Brooks, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender; attorney; Ashley Brooks, of counsel and on the 

briefs).

Rachel M. Lamb, Special Deputy Attorney 

General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for 

respondent (Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Rachel M. Lamb, of counsel and on 

the briefs).

Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae 

American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American 

Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, 

attorneys; Alexander Shalom, Jeanne LoCicero, and 

Karen Thompson, on the brief).
2

Jennifer B. Condon submitted a brief on behalf of amicus 

curiae Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, PhD (Seton Hall Law School, 

Center for Social Justice, attorneys; Jennifer B. Condon, 

on the brief).

JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we must determine whether reasonable and articulable 

suspicion existed when a police officer conducted an investigatory stop of 

defendant Nazier Goldsmith on a walkway adjacent to a vacant house. Two 

police officers were on patrol in Camden in what they believed to be a “highcrime area” known for shootings and drug dealing. While approaching the

vacant house, the officers observed two individuals standing in front of it. 

When the officers exited their vehicle, the two individuals walked away. At 

the same time, a third person, defendant, exited the walkway that leads to the 

rear of the house.

Based on his training, 20 years of experience, and his belief that the 

vacant house was used for the sale of drugs and weapons, Officer Joseph 

Goonan found it suspicious that defendant was on the walkway next to the

vacant house and believed defendant was engaged in drug dealing activity. So 

the officers approached defendant, blocked his path at the end of the walkway, 

and began questioning him, asking for his name and for an explanation of his

presence on that walkway. 
3

According to Officer Goonan, defendant became nervous and looked up 

and down the street; he started sweating, and his hands began to shake. 

Defendant provided a name and informed officers that his identification was in 

his jacket pocket. Because defendant’s demeanor made him nervous, Officer 

Goonan told defendant that he would retrieve the identification from 

defendant’s pocket. At that point, defendant stated, “I appreciate if you guys 

didn’t pat me down,” arousing Officer Goonan’s suspicions even further. 

Officer Goonan conducted a pat down for weapons. The officer felt a 

weapon in defendant’s jacket pocket and retrieved a handgun. Defendant was 

arrested, and police later recovered currency and drugs from defendant’s 

person. A search of the walkway revealed drugs in baggies that were the same 

color as the baggies of drugs found in defendant’s pockets. 

Defendant was charged with weapons and drug offenses. Defendant 

moved to suppress the gun and drugs, arguing that both the stop and frisk were 

unlawful because they were not based on reasonable suspicion. 

The trial court granted the motion, finding the stop lawful but the frisk 

unlawful. Because the trial court held the frisk to be unlawful, all the seized 

evidence (the gun, ammunition, drugs, and money) was suppressed as fruit of 

the poisonous tree.
4

The Appellate Division reversed. The Appellate Division did not 

address the initial stop of defendant, analyzing instead only whether the frisk 

was objectively reasonable. The Appellate Division found that based on the 

totality of the circumstances -- including defendant’s presence in a high-crime 

area and his behavior and body language -- the officer’s frisk of defendant was 

objectively reasonable. 

We granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal regarding whether

officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop and frisk him. We 

find that the information the officers possessed at the time of the stop did not 

amount to specific and particularized suspicion that defendant was engaged in 

criminal activity. Therefore, the officers did not have reasonable and 

articulable suspicion to initiate an investigatory detention of defendant. We 

reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstate the trial court’s 

suppression order. Because the initial stop was unlawful, we need not reach 

the issue of the frisk of defendant. 

I.

We rely on the testimony from the suppression hearing for the following 

summary. 

Officer Goonan was the only witness to testify at the hearing. Officer 

Goonan testified that as part of his role in the Special Investigations Bureau, 
5

he patrolled high-crime areas to look for drugs and weapons, and when he saw 

a possible fugitive, he would ask the person for identification. He stated that 

in his 20 years of experience, he had witnessed hundreds of drug transactions, 

which he described as a buyer walking up to another person and exchanging 

currency for small objects. Officer Goonan said that in his experience, drugs 

are often stashed in alleyways. He further testified that he had recovered over 

50 firearms and that, in his experience, firearms are commonly present at drug 

transactions.

Officer Goonan explained that on the evening of January 15, 2019, at 

approximately 6:00 p.m., he and another officer from the Camden County 

Sheriff’s Office were on patrol in Camden. Officer Goonan testified that they 

were patrolling the 1600 block of Holcaine Street, which Officer Goonan 

identified as a “high-crime area” known for shootings and open-air drug 

transactions. The officers approached a vacant house, where they believed 

drugs were sold and weapons stored.

1

 According to Officer Goonan’s 

testimony, the officers observed two individuals standing in front of the vacant 

1

 Officer Goonan did not testify as to how the officers knew the vacant house 

was a location where drugs and weapons are sold, except for testifying that 

after observing defendant in the walkway, he suspected “somebody was 

dealing drugs . . . because of the numerous reports [he had] been having in the 

area.”
6

house who walked away when the officers exited their vehicle. Although the 

officers were not in uniform, they were wearing tactical vests marked with the 

word “police” on the front and back. Officer Goonan stated that the officers 

did not attempt to stop the two individuals, but that he “radioed to . . . another 

car in the area the description of the two males that walked off.” 

The following is an excerpt from Officer Goonan’s testimony regarding 

his observations and conclusions:

PROSECUTOR: And can you describe what you saw 

around 6 p.m. that day?

OFFICER GOONAN: Yeah. I was riding with my partner 

at the time to come around the corner and observed two 

males standing out front of the property, what’s known 

where the drugs are usually sold. As we made our approach 

we exited our vehicles. They walked away and at the same 

time I observed a male coming out of the alleyway, I’m not 

sure of the house address --

PROSECUTOR: Okay.

OFFICER GOONAN: -- but it was -- it’s a vacant house, 

but it was an alley between -- along the side of it.

PROSECUTOR: So it was an abandoned house with an 

alleyway beside it?

OFFICER GOONAN: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: And what did you think when you 

observed that? Based on your training and experience, what 

was --
7

OFFICER GOONAN: The two -- the two men that were 

standing out front were there to purchase drugs.

PROSECUTOR: And did those two males see you?

OFFICER GOONAN: As we -- when we exited our vehicle. 

We drive unmarked vehicles.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. So can you describe the actual 

approach then?

OFFICER GOONAN: Came up to -- came up the street, like 

I said. It’s only -- it’s not even a full -- full block. It’s, 

maybe, one block. We came up, we exited the vehicle, and 

at the same time [they] walked off and we observed a male 

come out of the alleyway.

. . . .

PROSECUTOR: And you said -- so you got out of your car 

and you’re about to walk up to the male?

OFFICER GOONAN: Yeah. We were -- we were -- we 

pulled up. Like I said, they didn’t recognize our car, the two 

guys standing on the street. So we were, basically, only a 

few feet from them.

PROSECUTOR: From -- from --

OFFICER GOONAN: The two males out front that walked 

off. And then the male, [defendant], who came out of the 

alleyway.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. And did you approach him?

OFFICER GOONAN: I did.

PROSECUTOR: And why is that?
8

OFFICER GOONAN: To ask him why he was coming out 

of the alleyway. It was vacant property.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. And why did you -- based on your 

training and experience, why did you think that was suspect?

OFFICER GOONAN: That’s a known drug area, and I 

observed a male coming out -- I call it an alleyway. It’s 

really not. It’s like a walkway, I guess, up against the side 

of a house.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. And --

OFFICER GOONAN: To me that was suspicion somebody 

was dealing drugs.

PROSECUTOR: And why was that suspicious?

OFFICER GOONAN: Only because of the numerous 

reports I’ve been having in the area.

On cross-examination, Officer Goonan confirmed that the walkway on 

the side of the house led to a backyard. Officer Goonan did not know whether 

multiple homes were accessible via that walkway and backyard or whether all 

the other surrounding properties were fenced in. Officer Goonan further 

expressly confirmed that he did not witness a hand-to-hand transaction 

between defendant and the two men who walked away.

Upon approaching defendant, Officer Goonan did not recall the officers 

telling defendant to “stop” in order to initiate questioning him, but Officer 

Goonan testified that when defendant “came out of the alleyway, we were two 

-- two officers standing there.” Given where the officers were standing in 
9

front of the walkway, they blocked defendant’s path forward. According to

Officer Goonan, defendant could not have moved forward freely, but “could 

run back up that walkway,” essentially away from the officers. 

The officers approached defendant and began questioning him. The 

officers asked for his name, where he was from, whether he lived in the area,

whether he had identification on him, and for an explanation of his presence on 

the walkway. According to Officer Goonan, defendant became nervous, 

looked up and down the street, started sweating, and his hands began to shake. 

Officer Goonan believed defendant’s behavior meant that defendant was 

“doing something he shouldn’t be doing.” Officer Goonan maintained that

when the officers approached defendant, he was “free to leave” and neither 

detained nor under arrest.

Defendant provided a name and informed officers that his identification 

was in his jacket pocket. Because defendant’s demeanor made him nervous, 

Officer Goonan told defendant that he would retrieve the identification from 

defendant’s pocket. At that point, defendant stated, “I appreciate if you guys 

didn’t pat me down.” Officer Goonan testified that defendant’s statement, in 

addition to defendant’s nervous behavior, aroused Officer Goonan’s suspicions 

even further. Officer Goonan testified that during the entire interaction with 
10

the officers, defendant never reached for anything, was respectful, and did not 

threaten the officers.

Officer Goonan proceeded to conduct a pat down for weapons due to the 

officers’ belief that defendant was engaged in drug activity and the nervous 

behavior he exhibited. During the pat down, Officer Goonan felt a weapon in 

defendant’s jacket pocket and retrieved a handgun. Defendant was arrested,

and police later recovered currency and drugs from defendant’s pockets. A 

search of the walkway uncovered several other baggies of drugs that matched 

the color of the baggies found on defendant’s person. 

II.

A.

In October 2019, a Camden County grand jury charged defendant in a 

multiple-count indictment with second-degree unlawful possession of a 

weapon, fourth-degree possession of weapon or device, and third-degree 

possession of a controlled dangerous substance.

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized as the fruit of an 

unlawful stop and frisk. After a hearing, the trial court first held that the 

officers’ stop of defendant was lawful. The court found that once the officers 

asked defendant for his identification, “what started as a field inquiry quickly 

escalated to an investigatory stop” that “must have been supported by 
11

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” The court held that based on the 

totality of the circumstances, defendant’s detention was supported by 

reasonable suspicion. The court made the following findings:

At the point where the encounter became an 

investigatory stop, Officer Goonan knew that defendant 

had been speaking with two other people after emerging 

from a walkway,

[2]

and those two people walked away 

upon seeing the officers. This information had 

significant weight in arousing the officer’s suspicion 

because he was in a high crime neighborhood. Coupled 

with the fact that the officers observed defendant 

looking furtively, saw his hands shaking, and despite 

being early evening in January, noticed he was 

sweating profusely, established a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that defendant was engaging in a 

drug offense.

The court recognized that although presence in a “high crime, high violence” 

neighborhood “by itself is not sufficient to justify either a stop or frisk, it is 

often cited as a suspicion factor when combined with other more 

individualized suspicious circumstances.” The court concluded that 

[d]efendant’s nervousness, after emerging from the 

walkway and coming in contact with two other 

individuals,[3] bolsters the suspicion that he was 

2

 Officer Goonan did not testify that he observed defendant speaking to the 

two individuals.

3 Despite the trial court’s findings, Officer Goonan did not testify that 

defendant came in contact with the two individuals after emerging from the 

walkway. Officer Goonan testified that the two individuals “walked away and 

at the same time [he] observed a male coming out of the alleyway.” Based on 

Officer Goonan’s testimony at the hearing, it seems the two men walked off 
12

engaged in some form of wrongdoing, such as a drug 

offense, consistent with the officer’s experience with 

respect to persons who come out of walkways in this 

high crime neighborhood.

The court then explained that simply because a stop is lawful, a lawful 

frisk does not always follow. The court held that officers did not have an 

objective basis to believe that defendant was armed and dangerous; the court 

also found that a belief a person possesses drugs cannot alone be a basis for the 

frisk. The trial court noted that the officers did not observe a bulge; the 

alleged drug-related crime was not a weapons-related offense; and defendant 

made no threatening movement. Noting that the officers had no prior contact 

with defendant and had no reason to believe he was dangerous, the court found

defendant’s nervous behavior insufficient to warrant a frisk. The court also 

stated that 

the fact that defendant asserted his right to be free from 

a frisk does not create the basis to believe defendant 

possessed a weapon. If the assertion of a right became 

a basis to establish the constitutionality of a search, 

then there would be no need for the Fourth 

Amendment’s warrant requirement.

 

and then defendant emerged from the walkway. Thus, the officers did not see 

defendant interact or approach the two men at all since they were gone by the 

time defendant emerged.
13

Based on the finding that the frisk was unlawful, the court suppressed all the 

evidence seized, including the gun, ammunition, drugs, and money.

B.

The State filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s order

suppressing the evidence. In the State’s view, the court misapplied the 

investigatory frisk standard by failing to accept that the same reasonable 

suspicion underlying a lawful stop can also be the basis for a frisk. The State 

argued that it presented sufficient evidence of reasonable suspicion to frisk 

defendant. 

In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the trial 

court’s order granting defendant’s suppression motion. The Appellate 

Division found that based on the totality of the circumstances, including

defendant’s presence in a high-crime area, “defendant’s behavior and body 

language,” and the officers’ belief that drugs had just been sold, the officers’

frisk of defendant was objectively reasonable. The court also noted that drug 

dealers are known to frequently carry weapons. The Appellate Division stated

that if officers lawfully stop an individual, they may frisk the individual if they 

have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person is armed and 

dangerous. The Appellate Division relied on Officer Goonan’s experience and 

training to conclude that, based on the circumstances, it was reasonable for 
14

officers to believe they might be in danger and therefore it was proper to 

conduct the frisk. The Appellate Division did not address the initial stop of 

defendant because the trial court found the stop reasonable and the issue was 

not raised in the State’s appeal.4 

We granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal challenging the 

legality of both the stop and the frisk of defendant. 248 N.J. 3 (2021). We 

also granted leave to appear as amici curiae to the American Civil Liberties 

Union of New Jersey (ACLU) and Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., through counsel 

Jennifer Condon of Seton Hall University (Dr. Fagan). 

III.

Defendant argues that the Appellate Division erroneously reversed the 

trial court’s suppression order. According to defendant, the appellate court 

found reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop defendant merely because 

he was a black man in a police-designated and targeted “high-crime area.” 

Citing New Jersey’s alarming racial disparities in policing, defendant insists 

that “police designate communities of color high-crime areas” based on 

4

 In finding that the frisk was lawful, the Appellate Division noted that “the 

officer believed he had just witnessed a drug sale between defendant and the 

two unidentified men who quickly left the area.” Officer Goonan testified that 

he suspected “somebody was dealing drugs,” and that he thought the two men 

standing in front of the house were there to purchase drugs. Officer Goonan’s 

testimony made clear that he did not witness a drug transaction, let alone any

interaction between defendant and the two men. 
15

“entrenched stereotypes and racial bias against people of color.” Defendant 

further argues that officers did not have articulable suspicion that defendant 

was armed and dangerous. Defendant contends that the Appellate Division 

erroneously substituted its own judgment for that of the trial court, that the 

Appellate Division ignored New Jersey precedent that reasonable suspicion of 

a drug offense does not warrant a frisk, and that a suspect’s reacting nervously 

to police interrogation cannot provide a basis for reasonable suspicion.

Amici Curiae, the ACLU and Dr. Fagan, echo defendant’s arguments. 

Dr. Fagan emphasizes that research has shown that the characterization of a 

“high-crime area” is often linked to racial composition rather than crime rate. 

Dr. Fagan argues that the resulting over-policing of “high-crime areas” based 

on inaccurate data should not be a determinant of whether reasonable suspicion 

exists. The ACLU adds that the police seized defendant before they asked for 

his identification, arguing that the seizure took place for constitutional 

purposes when the officers blocked defendant’s egress and began to ask him 

questions. 

The State argues that there was sufficient evidence to justify the stop and 

frisk. The State contends that Officer Goonan had reasonable suspicion to stop 

defendant, even without evidence that defendant was in a high-crime area. 

Furthermore, the State argues that even without any direct interaction between 
16

defendant and the two unidentified individuals, Officer Goonan’s belief that 

defendant was about to engage in criminal activity suffices to support a finding 

of reasonable and articulable suspicion in this case. The State again argues 

that the trial court misapplied the frisk standard in focusing on the threat of a 

gun rather than whether officers reasonably believed that the individual posed 

a threat to officer safety. 

IV.

A.

Our standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential -- we 

“must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision so long 

as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.” 

State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 

224, 243 (2007)). This Court defers to those findings in recognition of the trial 

court’s “opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the 

case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.” Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting 

State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We ordinarily will not disturb the 

trial court’s factual findings unless they are “so clearly mistaken ‘that the 

interests of justice demand intervention and correction.’” State v. Gamble, 218 

N.J. 412, 425 (2014) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). A trial court’s legal 

conclusions, however, and its view of “the consequences that flow from 
17

established facts” are reviewed de novo. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 

(2015).

B.

Under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, “searches and seizures 

conducted without warrants issued upon probable cause are presumptively 

unreasonable and therefore invalid.” Elders, 192 N.J. at 246. “People, 

generally, are free to go on their way without interference from the 

government. That is, after all, the essence of the Fourth Amendment -- the 

police may not randomly stop and detain persons without particularized 

suspicion.” State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 409-10 (2012) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 9, 27 (1968)). Consequently, “the State bears the burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] warrantless search or 

seizure ‘[fell] within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 

requirement.’” Ibid. (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20 (2004)).

The exception at issue in this case is an investigative stop, also known as 

a Terry stop,5 which is a procedure that involves a relatively brief detention by 

police during which a person’s movement is restricted. See State v. Rosario, 

229 N.J. 263, 272 (2017) (describing an investigative stop as a police 

5

 Terry, 392 U.S. at 1.
18

encounter during which an objectively reasonable person would not feel free to 

leave). An investigative stop or detention does not offend the Federal or State 

Constitution, and no warrant is needed, “if it is based on ‘specific and 

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 

facts,’ give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. 

Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).

Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than 

probable cause, “[n]either ‘inarticulate hunches’ nor an arresting officer’s 

subjective good faith can justify infringement of a citizen’s constitutionally 

guaranteed rights.” State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 372 (2002) (Coleman, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 

7-8 (1997)); accord State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 518 (2020). Determining 

whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an investigatory stop is 

a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of “‘the totality of 

circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State’s 

interest in effective law enforcement against the individual’s right to be 

protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.’” State v. 

Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010) (quoting State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 

(1986)). “An investigative detention that is premised on less than reasonable 

and articulable suspicion is an ‘unlawful seizure,’ and evidence discovered 
19

during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the 

exclusionary rule.” Elders, 192 N.J. at 247.

The inquiry is based on the totality of the circumstances and takes into 

consideration numerous factors, including officer experience and knowledge. 

Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 22. Our jurisprudence is well-settled that seemingly 

furtive movements by the suspect, without more, are insufficient to constitute 

reasonable and articulable suspicion. See Rosario, 229 N.J. at 277 

(“Nervousness and excited movements are common responses to unanticipated 

encounters with police officers on the road . . . .”); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 

47 (1990) (“‘[M]ere furtive gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not 

give rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity.’” (quoting 

State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989))).

With regard to presence in an area where criminal activity is prevalent,

although the reputation of an area may be relevant to the analysis, this Court 

has held that “[j]ust because a location to which police officers are dispatched 

is a high-crime area does not mean that the residents in that area have lesser 

constitutional protection from random stops.” State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 

549 (2019) (quoting Shaw, 213 N.J. at 420); see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 

119, 124 (2000) (“An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal 

activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized 
20

suspicion that the person is committing a crime.”); see also Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 

31 (Albin, J., concurring) (“The words ‘high crime area’ should not be invoked 

talismanically by police officers to justify a Terry stop that would not pass 

constitutional muster in any other location.”). In Wardlow, the United States 

Supreme Court explained that officers need not ignore the relevant 

characteristics of a neighborhood, but that more is required to find reasonable 

suspicion. 528 U.S. at 124. 

In sum, the totality of the circumstances of the encounter must be 

considered in a very fact-sensitive analysis to determine whether officers 

objectively possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct an 

investigatory stop. Gamble, 218 N.J. at 431; Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 22.

V.

Applying those principles to the present case, we find that the 

information officers possessed at the moment they detained defendant did not 

constitute reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in 

unlawful activity. 

A.

As a threshold matter, we must first determine when the investigatory 

stop commenced. Although officers did not tell defendant to “stop” when he 

exited the walkway, the two officers blocked his path, and Officer Goonan 
21

acknowledged that defendant could not have moved forward freely at that 

point. Officer Goonan testified that when defendant “came out of the 

alleyway, we were two -- two officers standing there.” In other words, there 

was no need for the officers to tell defendant to “stop,” because the two 

officers standing at the end of the walkway sufficiently exerted their authority 

such that an objectively reasonable person would understand the need to stop 

and direct attention to the officers. The officers then began asking defendant a 

series of questions about who he was and where he was coming from. 

The trial court held that when the officers asked for defendant’s 

identification, defendant was no longer free to go, and the encounter became 

an investigatory stop because defendant reasonably believed he could not walk 

away at that point. But even before asking defendant for identification, armed 

officers wearing tactical vests with “police” written on the front blocked the 

walkway as defendant emerged, preventing defendant from making forward 

progress, and began asking him questions about why he was there and from 

where he was coming. A reasonable person would not have felt free to leave 

at that point. 

Officer Goonan testified that defendant was free to leave and could have 

turned around and “run back up that walkway.” In reality, had defendant 

attempted such a maneuver after officers asserted their presence and authority 
22

and began asking him questions, such action would likely be viewed as flight. 

In any event, no reasonably prudent person would have felt free to leave when

officers stepped into the only path of egress from that walkway and began 

asking questions, leaving defendant no place to go but backwards. The

moment officers impeded his forward progress and began the questioning, the 

encounter became an investigatory detention or stop. See Rosario, 229 N.J. at 

272. We now turn to whether officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion 

to stop defendant at that point in time.

B.

Prior to approaching defendant, officers observed two men in front of a

vacant house on the 1600 block of Holcaine Street. According to Officer 

Goonan, those men took off as soon as they saw the officers step out of their 

unmarked police car wearing tactical vests labeled “police.” At the same time, 

defendant emerged from the walkway. Officer Goonan unequivocally testified 

that he did not witness defendant interact with or engage in a hand-to-hand 

transaction with the two men that left the scene. 

Notwithstanding that testimony, the trial court upheld the investigative 

stop’s validity, in part, based on its finding that “Officer Goonan knew that 

defendant had been speaking to two other people after emerging from the 

walkway,” and stated that this “information had significant weight in arousing 
23

the officer’s suspicion because he was in a high crime neighborhood.” The 

trial court further found that “Officer Goonan observed defendant exit a 

walkway and approach two individuals” and that the officer “observed the two 

unidentified individuals with defendant look at him and then walk away.” 

(emphasis added). 

Officer Goonan testified, however, that the two men walked away and

defendant emerged from the walkway afterwards or simultaneously. No 

testimony was elicited that defendant interacted or came in contact with the 

men. Even the State conceded in its brief, and later at oral argument, that 

“Officer Goonan did not testify that defendant approached or spoke with the 

individuals in front of the property.” In short, the trial court’s findings -- to 

which the court attributed significant weight in its determination that the 

officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop defendant -- did not 

accurately reflect the evidence presented by the State through Officer 

Goonan’s testimony. Those findings were not based on credible evidence in 

the record and are therefore not entitled to deference. Based on the evidence 

presented, we give no weight, let alone significant weight, to the trial court’s 

finding that defendant interacted with the two individuals. 6

6

 We do not suggest that even if Officer Goonan had seen defendant interact 

with the two men that such interaction would have tipped the scales toward a

finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Three 
24

As for defendant’s presence in a high-crime area, we decline defendant’s

and amici’s request that the Court abandon presence in a high-crime area as a 

factor in determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists. We 

continue to view the impact of previous crimes in the same area as a police

encounter as a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances when

determining whether a stop was based on reasonable suspicion.

But, as we have held, just because crime is prevalent in a particular area 

“does not mean that residents in those areas have lesser constitutional 

protection from random stops.” See Shaw, 213 N.J. at 420. Law-abiding 

citizens who live and work in high-crime areas undoubtedly want law 

enforcement to be able to fully execute their duties and protect their 

communities; at the same time, however, those individuals likely do not want 

the necessary policing of their neighborhoods to occur at the expense of their 

own constitutional rights of privacy and freedom. There is, to be sure, a 

“narrow line that must be drawn to protect a citizen’s privacy and freedom of 

movement and yet allow proper law-enforcement activities.” Davis, 104 N.J.

at 504-05. 

people standing on the street interacting with each other, whether in a highcrime neighborhood or not, is not suggestive of criminal activity without more.
25

The State must do more than simply invoke the buzz words “high-crime 

area” in a conclusory manner to justify investigative stops. Here, Officer 

Goonan’s vague testimony fell short of providing factual support for his 

conclusory statement that the area was high crime. 

Officer Goonan testified in very general terms that the 1600 block of 

Holcaine is “a high-crime area.” The following is a portion of his testimony 

on this issue:

OFFICER GOONAN: 1600 block of Holcaine is the 

block we were on, and that’s a -- it’s a high crime area.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. And when you say high crime 

area, what does that mean?

OFFICER GOONAN: Very well-known for -- for 

weapons. In the past there’s been shootings and it’s an 

open air drug -- drug sale.

. . . .

PROSECUTOR: And you said you worked in [the 1600 

block of Holcaine] before?

OFFICER GOONAN: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: Have you arrested fug[i]tives in that 

area?

OFFICER GOONAN: I have.

PROSECUTOR: And have you seen drug transactions 

in that area before?

OFFICER GOONAN: I have.
26

PROSECUTOR: Approximately how many?

OFFICER GOONAN: Five to ten.

Officer Goonan’s testimony provided nothing more than a general 

description of a high-crime neighborhood, noting it is well known for 

weapons, shootings, and drug sales. He noted that he had seen five to ten drug 

sales on that block, presumably over the course of his 20 years as an officer, 

but that testimony is unclear because the officer did not provide a timeline or 

context for the drug sales he had witnessed. Furthermore, Officer Goonan 

stated that he previously arrested fugitives in that neighborhood, but did not 

indicate the approximate number of fugitives or a timeline during which those 

arrests occurred. Again, as our caselaw has held, the character and prevalence 

of crime in an area -- although insufficient on its own to support particularized 

suspicion -- can be one factor in determining whether reasonable suspicion 

existed. The State, however, must provide at least some evidence to support 

the assertion that a neighborhood should be considered as “high-crime.”

In the present case, even if Officer Goonan had provided more 

information regarding the prevalence of crime in the area, that would have 

been insufficient to justify the stop because the other factors on which the 

officers relied were also insufficient -- even when taken together -- to form a 
27

reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal 

activity. 

Officer Goonan supported his suspicion of defendant by claiming that 

defendant was “coming out of a walkway between a vacant property which is 

known for the sales of [drugs] and weapons” after the two unidentified 

individuals walked away. Officer Goonan testified that he was suspicious of 

defendant based on his training and experience that drugs and guns are often 

stored in walkways, because of general “reports [he had] been having in the 

area,” and because of his belief that criminal activity was taking place at the 

vacant house.

7

 None of those non-specific, non-individualized factors, 

however, “meet the constitutional threshold of individualized reasonable 

suspicion” that this particular defendant was engaged in criminal activity. See

State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 532 (2022). Aside from defendant’s presence

on that walkway, none of those factors are specific to defendant engaging in 

behavior indicative of criminal activity. The only information the officers 

7

 Officer Goonan further testified that after officers began questioning 

defendant, he became nervous, looked up and down the street, started 

sweating, and his hands began to shake. Having determined that the 

investigatory stop commenced at the moment the officers blocked defendant’s 

path and began the questioning, the observations of defendant’s nervous 

behavior do not factor into a determination of whether officers possessed 

reasonable and articulable suspicion before stopping defendant. Conduct 

exhibited or “[i]nformation acquired after a stop cannot retroactively serve as a 

basis for the stop.” State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 532 (2022). 
28

possessed prior to the stop was information that could be used to justify the 

stop of virtually anyone, on any day, and at any time, based simply on their 

presence on that street. 

An investigative detention “may not be based on arbitrary police 

practices, the officer’s subjective good faith, or a mere hunch.” State v. Coles, 

218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014). Officer Goonan had a hunch that defendant was 

engaged in criminal activity. That hunch, however, did not amount to 

objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop.

 Because we hold that the officers’ investigatory detention of defendant 

was unlawful, we do not reach the issue regarding whether officers had 

reasonable and articulable suspicion to frisk defendant.

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Appellate Division is 

reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to reinstate the 

suppression order consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICE ALBIN; and JUDGE FUENTES 

(temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS’s opinion. JUSTICE 

SOLOMON filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE PATTERSON joins.
1

State of New Jersey,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Nazier D. Goldsmith,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUSTICE SOLOMON, dissenting.

Our jurisprudence recognizes that trial courts have a significant 

advantage over appellate courts: the ability to see the witnesses and evidence 

and get a “‘feel’ of the case.” State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) 

(quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). Accordingly, we 

routinely defer to them even when we might have a different view of the facts. 

In this matter, the trial court’s advantage is especially significant 

because a key piece of evidence -- evidence I view as critical to the 

determination of defendant’s suppression motion -- was before the trial court 

but is missing from the record on appeal. That misstep should serve as a vital

reminder of the importance of preserving the record to facilitate proper 

appellate review. 

In this case, the trial court had that evidence before it when it decided 

the point at which defendant’s encounter with the police became an
2

investigative detention. Accordingly, I would defer to the trial court’s 

conclusion. Instead, the majority considers its review of a handful of lines 

from a transcript to be a more accurate interpretation of the record. Thus, I 

respectfully dissent.

I.

I add the following facts, collected from the record of the suppression 

hearing. During defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Goonan, 

counsel questioned Goonan on the officers’ positions during their encounter 

with defendant in front of 1608 Holcaine Street in Camden. Holcaine Street is 

narrow, such that “one car has to be coming one way.” Officer Goonan and 

his partner parked right in front of 1608 Holcaine. 1608 Holcaine was -- in 

Goonan’s words -- a “vacant” house bounded from behind by other houses. 

After establishing that defendant was walking down the “alleyway” or 

“walkway” next to 1608 Holcaine Street, which had other houses behind it, 

defense counsel submitted into evidence a photograph of the walkway at 1608 

Holcaine that, for reasons unknown to us, was not included in the record on 

appeal. Goonan agreed that the photograph was an accurate representation of 

the layout of 1608 Holcaine and the walkway adjoining it on the day of issue. 

The trial court admitted the photograph without objection from the State. 
3

Goonan explained that he and his partner exited the vehicle and began to 

approach defendant, although neither told defendant to stop. Then the 

following exchange occurred:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: So there was nowhere else he 

could go but towards you guys at that point.

OFFICER GOONAN: He could run back up that 

walkway.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right. But other than the 

direction of which he’s going you are blocking his way 

from going any further. Correct? You’re right at the 

alley -- walkway. Correct?

OFFICER GOONAN: We -- out front of the house. He 

came out of the walkway.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right. And you two are right 

there in front of the house outside of the -- right in front 

of the walkway. Correct?

OFFICER GOONAN: Yes. See -- you have the 

picture, Ma’am?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I can just --

OFFICER GOONAN: The concrete slab that’s out 

front, it’s all concrete it’s not grass. We were on there 

that’s where we pulled up to. He walked out of that 

walkway.

Defense counsel then asked Goonan to circle the exact area in which he 

and his partner were standing and then had Goonan initial the exhibit. 

Soon after, the following exchange occurred:
4

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now you said that when you 

approached you were within a few feet of Mr. 

Goldsmith. Correct?

OFFICER GOONAN: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You were within an arm’s 

reach of Mr. Goldsmith?

PROSECUTOR: Objection. He never stated

that.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: It’s a question. He said a few

feet, but -- 

THE COURT: Okay. So you want to know whether --

he’s characterizing it as arm’s length?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s what I’m asking.

THE COURT: Okay.

OFFICER GOONAN: No. It wasn’t an arm’s length.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. So can you point to 

somewhere in the room how far you were from Mr. 

Goldsmith?

OFFICER GOONAN: Um, maybe that chair.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. And you’re pointing to 

the second chair away from you. Correct?

OFFICER GOONAN: I am.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I would like that 

to reflect two feet, two and a half feet.

PROSECUTOR: I don’t -- I object to that

characterization.
5

THE COURT: I mean, I can’t -- I can’t characterize --

I can’t accept, without testimony from him, how far it 

is, other than to say that it wasn’t arm’s length and it’s 

two chairs.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Based on the jury box, 

you want me to get a measuring tape, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, you could give him a 

measuring tape, ask him to measure it and ask him --

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.

THE COURT: -- what the distance is.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right, Judge. I don’t have

one on me. 

THE COURT: Okay.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I don’t know if there’s one 

here, but, all right.

THE COURT: I see that it’s two chair lengths away.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.

II.

At the outset, I note that our standard of review is a deferential one. An 

appellate court “should give deference to those findings of the trial judge 

which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the 

witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot 

enjoy.” Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 161). That “feel”
6

of the case is why “[a]n appellate court should not disturb the trial court’s 

findings merely because ‘it might have reached a different conclusion were it 

the trial tribunal’ or because ‘the trial court decided all evidence or inference 

conflicts in favor of one side’ in a close case.” Ibid. (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. 

at 162)). Regarding suppression motions, we have stated:

Our system of justice assigns to the trial court the role 

of factfinder in matters not relegated to the jury. Trial 

judges in our Criminal Part routinely hear and decide 

suppression motions in which defendants seek to 

exclude evidence based on alleged violations of the 

Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution and corollary provisions of our State 

Constitution and common law. Our trial judges have 

ongoing experience and expertise in fulfilling the role 

of factfinder.

[State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 380 (2017).]

Thus in S.S. we concluded our standard of review is deferential when a 

trial court makes “fact findings based solely on video or documentary 

evidence.” Id. at 379; see also Elders, 192 N.J. at 244-45. 

Accordingly, “[a] trial court’s findings should be disturbed only if they 

are so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice demand intervention and 

correction.’ In those circumstances solely should an appellate court ‘appraise 

the record as if it were deciding the matter at inception and make its own 

findings and conclusions.’” Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. 

at 162).
7

III.

A.

I agree with the majority that the threshold question in this appeal turns 

on the exact moment the officers initiated a Terry1stop. I also agree that the 

appropriate standard for that inquiry is whether “‘an objectively reasonable 

person’ would feel ‘that his or her right to move has been restricted.’” State v. 

Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 545 (2019) (quoting State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 272 

(2017)). “The encounter is measured from a defendant’s perspective.” 

Rosario, 229 N.J. at 273. 

Our case law recognizes that when a police officer blocks an 

individual’s path, the officer has placed that individual under investigative 

detention, or a Terry stop, because an individual in such circumstances would 

not feel free to leave. See, e.g., id. at 276; State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 166 

(1994). But determining exactly when a police officer has “blocked” an 

individual’s path -- thereby beginning a Terry stop -- is a fact-sensitive inquiry

that depends on many factors, including the distance between the officers and 

the individual, their relative positioning, the officers’ demeanor and use or 

nonuse of weapons, and the general circumstances and environment 

1

 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8

surrounding the encounter. See, e.g., Rosario, 229 N.J. at 273-74; United 

States v. De Castro, 905 F.3d 676, 679 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Cloud, 

994 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 2021); State v. Lewis, 217 A.3d 576, 588 (Conn. 

2019); Bailey v. State, 987 A.2d 72, 82 (Md. 2010). None of these factors are 

determinative. Instead, we consider the totality of the circumstances. See

Rosario, 229 N.J. at 273.

Here, the trial court did not come to an explicit finding that the officers 

blocked defendant’s path. Nor did the court find that the officers brandished 

or drew their weapons or acted in way that was disrespectful to defendant prior 

to asking him for identification. That moment, in the trial court’s view, was 

the moment the seizure began. 

The majority concludes that the trial judge’s finding that defendant had 

interacted with the two other individuals is not supported by the record and 

that Goonan’s nonspecific testimony about the area of the encounter is 

insufficient to support a finding that defendant was in a high-crime area. See

ante at ___ (slip op. at 23-27). I agree. But those facts have little relevance to 

when the investigative stop began. The most important facts to that 

determination are the exact locations of the officers, of defendant, the distance 

between them, and the surrounding environment. See Rosario, 229 N.J. at 

273-74. The trial court concluded that the Terry stop began when the officers 
9

asked for defendant’s identification -- an act that we have previously held is 

consistent with an investigative detention. See id. at 273 (“Here, the officer 

immediately asked for defendant’s identification. Although not determinative, 

that fact only reinforces that this was an investigative detention.”).

Yet the majority asserts that “[g]iven where the officers were standing in 

front of the walkway, they blocked defendant’s path forward. According to 

Officer Goonan, defendant could not have moved forward freely, but ‘could 

run back up that walkway,’ essentially away from the officers,” which would 

likely be considered flight. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 9). The majority later 

claims that “Officer Goonan acknowledged that defendant could not have 

moved forward freely at that point. Officer Goonan testified that when 

defendant ‘came out of the alleyway, we were two -- two officers standing 

there.’” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 20-21). Thus, in the majority’s view, “the two 

officers standing at the end of the walkway sufficiently exerted their authority 

such that an objectively reasonable person would understand the need to stop 

and direct attention to the officers.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 21).

The record does not support the majority’s conclusion. Goonan’s 

suggestion that defendant could have run back up the walkway and his 

statement that he was standing there when defendant came out the alleyway do

not lead to the conclusion that defendant could not move forward freely or that 

------
10

the officer was blocking defendant from leaving the area. Those statements do

little to explain Goonan’s exact location, defendant’s exact location, their 

relative positions, or the general geography of the encounter, a problem we 

have long confronted in our function as an appellate tribunal reviewing a 

record consisting solely of transcripts. See S.S., 229 N.J. at 374-81; Elders, 

192 N.J. 243-44. 

Perhaps cognizant that Goonan’s confusing testimony might frustrate 

future appellate review, defense counsel attempted to clarify the officers’ 

position using a photograph of 1608 Holcaine. She suggested in a question 

that the officers “were blocking [defendant’s] way from going any further” and

Goonan responded that he and his partner “were out front of the house.” That

answer suggests that the officers were not in defendant’s path but in front of 

the house that adjoins the walkway. He then marks his exact location on the 

photograph, which was in evidence at the time.

Responding to further questioning, Goonan denied being within arm’s 

reach of defendant. From the discussion following that question, we know that 

the distance between defendant and the officers was somewhere between an 

arm’s length and “two chair lengths,” a distance that likely varies by the 

courtroom, and by the chair. 
11

From the above, it cannot be ascertained that the officers blocked the 

defendant’s escape. Even assuming that they did, it cannot be determined at 

what point in time they began to do so.

From those vague facts, the majority believes it understands this 

encounter better than the trial judge who saw (1) an accurate representation of 

the layout of 1608 Holcaine and possibly the properties immediately 

surrounding it; (2) Goonan’s recollection of the exact location of the officers

marked on that photograph; and (3) Goonan’s recollection of the exact distance

between himself and defendant demonstrated in the courtroom. “Permitting 

appellate courts to substitute their factual findings for equally plausible trial 

court findings is likely to ‘undermine the legitimacy of the [trial] courts in the 

eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some 

factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority.’” S.S., 229 N.J. at

380-81 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory 

committee’s note to 1985 amendment). 

A fact-sensitive inquiry does not entail ignoring facts before the trial 

court, even when they are not readily apparent from the record on appeal. 

That is the very essence of the “feel of the case.” 

---
12

B.

We have long acknowledged that law enforcement officers face 

substantial, sometimes lethal, danger. See, e.g., State in Int. of H.B., 75 N.J. 

243, 246 (1977) (“This volatile mixture, of violence and the surfeit of 

handguns . . . , presents . . . a particular threat to the uniformed law 

enforcement community . . . which cannot be ignored in considering the 

constitutionality of the police conduct here involved.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (“[W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law 

enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of 

violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest.”); 

State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536, 545 (1994) (“As the front line against 

violence, law-enforcement officers are particularly vulnerable to violence 

often becoming its victims.”); State v. Radel, 249 N.J. 469, 505-06 (2022) 

(describing situation officers faced as “dynamic and uncertain” and how the 

officers in that case “faced unexpected and fast-evolving circumstances that 

signaled danger and the need for prompt action to safeguard their lives”). 

Such dangers continue to face law enforcement today. See Press 

Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Releases 2021 Statistics on Law 

Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of Duty (May 9, 2022) (noting that 73 
13

officers were feloniously killed in the United States in 2021, an increase from 

46 in 2020).

Small distances -- like small measures of time -- can be of great 

constitutional significance in assessing police-citizen encounters. See Radel, 

249 N.J. at 506; State v. Bard, 445 N.J. Super. 145, 158-59 (App. Div. 2016). 

Thus, there are consequences attached to the way we, as appellate judges, 

assess the facts. Keeping that in mind, we have held that “[t]he reasonableness 

of police conduct is assessed with regard to circumstances facing the officers, 

who must make split second decisions in a fluid situation.” Bard, 445 N.J. 

Super. at 157. In “those more murky and difficult situations . . . lawenforcement officers must make instantaneous decisions about whether a 

frisk,” a stop, or some other act is justifiable. Valentine, 134 N.J. at 545. 

Such encounters are not the most amenable to appellate review of cold, paper 

records. 

C.

It is unfortunate that we do not have the photograph before us, but we 

have long acknowledged that we, as appellate judges, will not have the 

perspective the trial court did. Based on that perspective, the trial court below

did not find that the officers blocked defendant’s path such that a reasonable 

person would not feel free to leave. Yet the majority finds that the officers 
14

blocked the defendant’s path based on even less evidence than the trial court 

had.

This sparse and vague record does not support the majority’s conclusion 

that the officers blocked defendant’s “only path of egress from that walkway 

and began asking questions, leaving defendant no place to go but backwards.” 

Ante at ___ (slip op. at 22).

“A disagreement with how the motion judge weighed the evidence in a 

close case is not a sufficient basis for an appellate court to substitute its own 

factual findings to decide the matter.” Elders, 192 N.J. at 245. The trial court 

here was not “so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice demand [our] 

intervention and correction.’” Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting Johnson, 42 

N.J. at 161). Rather than follow longstanding principles of appellate review, 

the majority here, once again, decides that it understands the facts better than 

the factfinder.

Accordingly, I dissent. Because the majority does not address the frisk, 

or whether it was justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion at that 

moment, I do not either.