alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1

Section 302 Certification

I, Stephen V. Coffey, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Diedrich Coffee, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over
financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of
internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                        |  |  |  |                                          
|----------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------
|                        |  | 
|Dated: November 5, 2007 |  |  |  | /s/ Stephen V. Coffey                    
|                        |  |  |  | Stephen V. Coffey Chief Executive
Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1159 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1159

To amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to prohibit discrimination on 
account of sexual orientation or gender identity when extending credit.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 13, 2013

  Mrs. Murray introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
    referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to prohibit discrimination on 
account of sexual orientation or gender identity when extending credit.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Freedom from Discrimination in 
Credit Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION ON ACCOUNT OF SEXUAL 
              ORIENTATION OR GENDER IDENTITY.

    Subsection (a)(1) of section 701 of the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (15 U.S.C. 1691) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``on the basis of race, color, religion, 
        national origin, sex or marital status,''; and
            (2) by inserting ``on the basis of race, color, religion, 
        national origin, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or 
        marital status,''.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    Section 702 of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. 1691a) 
is amended--
            (1) by striking subsections (f) and (g); and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new 
        subsections:
    ``(f) The term `gender identity' means the gender-related identity, 
appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of an 
individual, with or without regard to the individual's designated sex 
at birth.
    ``(g) The term `person' means a natural person, a corporation, 
government or governmental subdivision or agency, trust, estate, 
partnership, cooperative, or association.
    ``(h) The term `sexual orientation' means homosexuality, 
heterosexuality, or bisexuality.
    ``(i) Any reference to any requirement imposed under this title or 
any provision of this title shall be deemed to include a reference to 
the regulations of the Board under this title or the provision of this 
title in question.''.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2022472EN.01003701.xml

| 12.12.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 472/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.12.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 472/37

---

Judgment of the General Court of 12 October 2022 — MCO (IP) v EUIPO — C8 (C2)

(Case T-461/21) (1)

(European Union trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for European Union figurative mark C2 - Earlier national figurative mark C8 - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Interdependence of factors - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Obligation to state reasons)

(2022/C 472/42)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: MCO (IP) Holdings Ltd (Tortola, British Virgin Islands) (represented by: A. Roughton, Barrister)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Hamel and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: C8 (Issy-les-Moulineaux, France) (represented by: M. Georges-Picot and C. Cuny, lawyers)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 26 May 2021 (Case R 909/2020-2).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office of the European Union for Intellectual Property (EUIPO) of 26 May 2021 (Case R 909/2020-2) in so far as it relates to services for which only a low degree of similarity was found; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office of the European Union for Intellectual Property (EUIPO) of 26 May 2021 (Case R 909/2020-2) in so far as it relates to services for which only a low degree of similarity was found;

| 2. | Dismisses the remainder of the action; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the remainder of the action;

| 3. | Orders MCO (IP) Holdings Ltd, EUIPO and C8 to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders MCO (IP) Holdings Ltd, EUIPO and C8 to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 412, 11.10.2021.

---
#### Anthony J. DELANO and Sam Weiner, Petitioners, v. Honorable B. J. DRIVER, etc., Respondent.

No. 42309.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 19, 1972.

Certiorari dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                       1,103,846
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  345,709
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (38,811)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      20,194,192
<DEPRECIATION>                             (9,058,971)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              15,504,391
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                      1,650,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  12,793,861
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                15,504,391
<SALES>                                      3,255,378
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,395,401
<CGS>                                        1,546,939
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,608,318
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               958,008
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               126,080
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             176,018
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (473,023)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (473,023)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (473,023)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

              CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement
(Form S-8 Nos. 33-36208, 33-47891, 33-58872, 33-81994, 333-00877 and 333-05077)
pertaining to the 1988 Stock Option Plan, 1995 Stock Option Plan, 1995 Outside
Directors Stock Plan, 1996 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, certain stock option
agreements issued in connection with the acquisition of Virtual Machine Works,
Inc. and certain individual employee stock option agreements of IKOS Systems,
Inc., of our report dated October 17, 1996, with respect to the consolidated
financial statements and schedule of IKOS Systems, Inc. included in the Annual
Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended September 28, 1996.

                                                      ERNST & YOUNG LLP

San Jose, California
December 16, 1996
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

394 

CA 13-01376 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

ROY PURDY AND ELINOR PURDY, 

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, 

V ORDER

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER MEDICAL 

CENTER/STRONG MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

FITZSIMMONS, NUNN & PLUKAS, LLP, ROCHESTER (JASON E. ABBOTT OF

COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS. 

THE WOLFORD LAW FIRM LLP, ROCHESTER (JAMES S. WOLFORD OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme

Court, Monroe County (Evelyn Frazee, J.), entered May 22, 2013. The

order and judgment granted the motion of defendant for summary

judgment dismissing the complaint. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order and judgment so appealed from

is unanimously affirmed without costs. 

Entered: May 2, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 12, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-30176

Summary Calendar

 

RAY WORTHY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GENERAL LONGSHOREMEN’S WORKERS INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMANS

ASSOCIATION, LOCAL NO. 3000; JAMES CAMPBELL; GREGORY LEE; 

MARK ELLIS; RALPH WALKER; JOHN BOWERS; INTERNATIONAL

LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, SOUTHERN DISTRICT; BENNY HOLLAND;

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 01-CV-3683-R

--------------------

Before JONES, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ray Worthy appeals the district court’s denial of his

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(5) motion to extend his time for appeal.

Because Worthy filed his motion to extend time for appeal within

the thirty days after the expiration of the time for appeal,

the district court could grant the motion only upon a finding

of excusable neglect. See Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. 03-30176

-2-

987 F.2d 1199, 1202 (5th Cir. 1993). Because FED. R. APP. P. 26

unambiguously provides for the exclusion of legal holidays

in the computation of time only when the period is less than

eleven days, the district court did not abuse its discretion

in finding that Worthy had failed to demonstrate excusable neglect.

See Midwest Employers Cas. Co. v. Williams, 161 F.3d 877, 882 (5th

Cir. 1998); Latham, 987 F.2d at 1202.

Worthy also appeals the district court’s denial of his

motion to review the clerk’s assessment of costs against him.

Worthy has not shown that the district court abused its discretion

in finding that there was no reason to reduce the award of $75.00

in summons and subpoena fees, $727.65 in copying fees, and $39.22

in postage fees. See Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir.

2000). By failing to contest the clerk’s award of $1,346.50 in

court reporter fees, Worthy has waived any challenge to that award.

See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

Worthy argues on appeal that the district court erred in

granting the defendants’ summary judgment motion and dismissing his

claim. Because Worthy failed to file a timely notice of appeal

from that judgment, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of

his argument. See Dison v. Whitley, 20 F.3d 185, 186 (5th Cir.

1994).

AFFIRMED.
#### DuBois *v.*Thomas.

(Division A.

June 10, 1935.)

[161 So. 868.

No. 27833.]

*698R. H. and J. H. Thompson, of Jackson, for appellant.

*700J. A. Lauderdale, Assistant Attorney-General, for Supreme Court Clerk.

Smith, Cl J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The judgment of the court below was reversed at the March, 1929, term of this court, and costs on appeal were adjudged against the appellee. 154 Miss. 286, 122 So. 495. He declined to pay the same, and execution against him therefor was returned nulla bona. The costs were then paid by the appellant. No mandate returning the case to the court below has been issued under rule of this court, No. 29, which is as follows:

> “When costs are awarded in this Court against the appellee, and there shall have been a return of nulla bona to an execution against him, and the costs shall be paid by appellant, no mandate shall issue upon the application of the appellee, until he shall pay into the Court, for the use of appellant, the costs paid by him.”

The appellant has filed three motions herein. One is for an order to the clerk of this court, directing him to file a motion for the dismissal of the cause under sec. 667, Code of 1930; one for the dismissal thereof without the intervention of the clerk; and one for an order directing the clerk to- refuse payment of the costs if tendered him by the appellee, and to decline to issue a man*701date returning the cause to the court below. The grounds of these motions are that the appellee is guilty of laches in delaying to pay the costs and procure a mandate, and that the appellant has been prejudiced thereby, setting forth facts in support thereof.

Section 667, Code of 1930', applies only to pending cases, i. e., cases not yet decided, and this case has been decided, and final judgment disposing of the appeal has been rendered. No statute or rule of court grants the relief here sought, and whether the doctrine of laches applies to the appellee’s delay in prosecuting the case will be for the determination of the court below on . the return of the cause thereto. Cf. Tucker v. Wilson, 68 Miss. 693, 9 So. 898.

Motions overruled.
#### Harold H. GORDON and Harry L. Haulman, Appellants, v. COVE REALTY INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

Nos. 72-1137, 72-1154.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 25, 1974.

Sidney A. Stubbs, Jr., and John R. Bera-nek, of Jones, Paine & Foster, West Palm Beach, for appellants.

Richard M. Gale and G. A. Haddad, of Preddy, Haddad, Kutner & Hardy, Miami, and J. Reid Heuer, of Heuer & Albury, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants appeal a jury award of $78,000 as compensation for plaintiff’s services as a real estate broker. We have examined the appellate points and considered the presentations of counsel concerning them. It is our opinion that, except for the excessiveness of damages reflected in the verdict and judgment, no reversible error has been demonstrated.

It is manifest from the proofs that the plaintiff earned and is entitled to payment of a real estate commission from the defendant purchasers, Harold H. Gordon and Harry L. • Haulman, and this was indeed corroborated by the jury verdict in the sum of $78,000. It is equally manifest that the record reveals support for a verdict of $51,800 only, and for no larger sum, based upon the oral agreement between the broker and the purchasers. Searching for the basis for the jury figure, we find it undoubtedly stemmed from their misunderstanding of counsel’s discussion of a confusing paragraph in an unsigned, and thereby irrelevant, contract between the parties. Thus, we believe there to be a clear legal basis from the record for correcting the erroneous computation and allowing opportunity to make the verdict align with the almost uncontroverted proofs. Thus, the appealed judgment is affirmed as to liability and damages on condition that, within thirty days after issuance and filing of our mandate, the plaintiff files in this cause in the trial court a voluntary remittitur of $26,200 of the amount of the judgment, so that in sum and substance the judgment will stand corrected so’ as to read in the amount of *536$51,800; otherwise, the judgment shall stand reversed for a new trial as to the amount of damages. Butler v. Williams, Fla.App.1961, 133 So.2d 109; Great American Ins. Co. v. Suarez, 1932, 107 Fla. 705, 146 So. 644; Aylesworth v. London, Fla.App.1960, 119 So.2d 816; South Florida Farms Co. v. Stevenson, 1922, 84 Fla. 235, 93 So. 247.

It is so ordered.

WALDEN and CROSS, JJ., and POUL-TON, TIMOTHY, Associate Judge, concur.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.4

                             WEBLINK WIRELESS, INC.
                    COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS (LOSS)

<Table>
<Caption>
                                                                  THREE MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 2000
                                                       ------------------------------------------------------
                                                           NUMBER             PERCENT            EQUIVALENT
                                                         OF SHARES          OUTSTANDING            SHARES
                                                       --------------      --------------      --------------
<S>                                                    <C>                 <C>                <C>
COMMON STOCK
   From Founders' Stock                                     2,300,000              100.00%          2,300,000
   Stock Options Exercised                                  2,446,387               99.64%          2,437,686
   Preferred Stock Converted to Common Stock               15,310,943              100.00%         15,310,943
   1994 Common Stock Offerings                             11,242,857              100.00%         11,242,857
   1995 Common Stock Offerings                              4,323,874              100.00%          4,323,874
   1996 Common Stock Offering                               6,000,000              100.00%          6,000,000
   1999 Treasury Stock Transaction                             (6,588)             100.00%             (6,588)
   March 2000 Debt Swap                                     3,789,715              100.00%          3,789,715
   Canadian Transaction                                       714,286              100.00%            714,286
   Employee Stock Purchase Plan Shares Issued                 157,605               92.55%            145,867
   Warrants Exercised                                         132,539               98.52%            130,580
                                                       --------------                          --------------
                                                           46,411,618                              46,389,220

WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING                                                                46,389,220

NET LOSS                                                                                          (25,316,000)

NET LOSS PER SHARE                                                                             $        (0.55)
                                                                                               ==============
</Table>
No. 00-1158.

#### Decker *v.*James et al.

Ct. Civ. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.
#### SOUTHEAST CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC. et al., Appellants, v. CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK OF HOLLYWOOD, a national banking association, Appellee.

No. 71-350.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 3, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1265

To amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 to extend indefinitely

the current provisions governing the export of certain domestically produced crude oil.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 20 (legislative day, JUNE 30), 1993

Mrs. MURRAY (for herself and Mr. HATFIELD) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

A BILL

To amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 to extend

indefinitely the current provisions governing the export

of certain domestically produced crude oil.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF RESTRICTIONS ON OIL EX4 PORTS.

5 Section 7(d) of the Export Administration Act of

6 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2406(d)) is amended by adding at

7 the end the following new paragraph:

8 ‘‘(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 20 or

9 any other provision of law, this subsection shall remain
2

•S 1265 IS

1 in effect until expressly repealed. During any period dur2 ing which this subsection is in effect (without regard to

3 the application of the termination provision in section

4 20)—

5 ‘‘(A) all authorities under this Act may be exer6 cised to the extent necessary to assure compliance

7 with this subsection; and

8 ‘‘(B) the provisions of section 11 shall apply to

9 violations under this subsection.’’.

10 SEC. 2. CONFORMING AMENDMENT.

11 Section 20 of the Export Administration Act of 1979

12 (50 U.S.C. App. 2419) is amended by striking ‘‘The’’ and

13 inserting ‘‘Except as provided in section 7(d)(4), the’’.

Æ