J-S74041-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JONATHAN RODRIGUEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 466 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 8, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0009673-2010

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 21, 2020

Appellant Jonathan Rodriguez appeals from the Order entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on February 8, 2019, denying 

his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 We 

affirm.

A prior panel of this Court reiterated the trial court’s summary of the 

relevant facts and procedural history herein as follows: 

Police Officer Kober testified that on [March] 26, 2010, at 

approximately 12:50 A.M., he went to “B” and Stella Streets in 

Philadelphia in response to a report of shots fired. When he arrived 

at the scene, he observed a male, later identified as fifteen (15) 

year old William Lyons, lying on the sidewalk at the bottom of the 

steps of a Chinese store at 3037 “B” Street. He saw that the male 

had been shot in the right side of his head. (Notes of Testimony, 

October 13, 2011, pages 58–67, 96).

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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Police Officer Ramos testified that at approximately 12:50 

A.M. on [March] 26, 2010, he was responding to a police radio call 

of shots fired. As he crossed the intersection of “B” Street and 

Elkhart Streets, he observed a black male, later identified as Perry 

Smith, lying on the sidewalk at the southwest corner of the 

intersection. Officer Ramos exited his patrol car and saw that the 

male had a gunshot wound to the chest. Officer Ramos and Police 

Officer Ginion placed Smith in their patrol car and took him to 

Temple Hospital. (N.T., id., pages 102—107). Lyons survived. 

Smith died.

While at the scene, Officer Ramos was approached by

Emmanuel Rivera. Rivera inquired as to Lyons’ condition. Rivera 

told Officer Ramos that “they shot at us.” Rivera described one (1) 

of the males involved as light skinned black male, approximately 

six (6) feet tall, wearing a black hat and black shirt. He described 

two (2) other males as being Hispanic, one of which had his hair 

in braids. He told Officer Ramos that the males ran westbound on 

Elkhart Street. Officer Ramos put out flash information to find the

three (3) males. Officer Ramos turned Rivera over to Officer 

Kober. Rivera told Officer Kober that he had been with Lyons. 

Officer Kober had Rivera transported to East Detectives. (N.T., id., 

pages 6869, 107—109, 111-112).

Meghan Macklin testified that on March 26, 2010 at

approximately 12:50 A.M., she was driving in the area of “B” and

Stella Streets with her boyfriend Robert Lombardo, looking to buy 

drugs. She saw four (4) to five (5) males standing in front of a 

Chinese store. One of the males yelled out that he had drugs to 

buy. She pulled her vehicle over on the west side of “B” Street 

across from the Chinese store and got out of her vehicle. She 

walked up to the Chinese store and told one of the males, who 

appeared to be fourteen (14) or fifteen (15) years old, (later 

identified as Emmanuel Rivera), that she wanted to buy seven (7) 

bags of heroin. Rivera ran across the street. She did not see 

exactly where he went.

As she was waiting for Rivera to return, she saw two (2)

males inside the Chinese store, (later identified as William Lyons 

and Perry Smith). Lyons came out of the store with a pack of 

cigarettes. One of the males standing in front of the store asked 

him for a cigarette. As Lyons was taking a cigarette out of the 

pack, the male who had asked him for a cigarette, pulled out a 

black handgun, held it up to Lyons’ neck and attempted to take 

the whole pack of cigarettes from Lyons. Ms. Macklin heard the 

male call out to “B” or “D” to “watch his back.” Another male that 

was standing in front of the store, pulled out a black handgun. She 
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heard at least two (2) gun shots. She saw that Lyons was bleeding 

from his head and saw him collapse in front of the Chinese store. 

Smith ran up “B” Street toward Allegheny Avenue. She heard 

more shots fired and saw Smith run ten (10) to fifteen (15) feet 

and then collapse and start to convulse. She then saw the two (2) 

males who were shooting and a third male wearing a white shirt, 

run in the opposite direction that Smith ran, down “B” Street. Ms. 

Macklin ran back to her vehicle, got into the passenger side and

drove away. After she left the scene, Mr. Lombardo called for an 

ambulance. (Notes of Testimony, October 14, 2011, pages 3–28, 

37).

Approximately ten (10) hours later, Macklin contacted the

police. She told the police that she had seen a shooting in the area 

of “B” Street and Allegheny Avenue. Macklin and Lombardo were 

taken to police headquarters and gave statements regarding the 

incident. Macklin was asked to look at photographs. She identified 

the photo of Lyons as the male that had the pack of cigarettes in 

his hand. She identified the photo of Emmanuel Rivera as the 

young male who ran across the street to get the heroin. She 

identified a photo of Smith as the male she saw collapse and 

convulse. (N.T., id., pages 37-46).

The next day at approximately 12:10 P.M., Macklin was

again interviewed by police regarding the incident. After viewing 

photo arrays, she identified all three (3) Defendants. She 

identified a photo of co-defendant Nelson Vazquez, as the male 

she saw approach Lyons with a gun. She identified a photo of codefendant Marco Sanmarco as the male that had been standing 

next to her and who had pulled out the second gun and had fired 

shots at Lyons and Smith. She identified [Appellant] as the third 

male she saw running away with Vazquez and Sanmarco. She 

testified that [Appellant], Vazquez and Sanmarco were the males 

standing together in front of the Chinese store when she pulled up 

in her vehicle and that they had been together the whole time she 

was present on the scene. (N.T., id., pages 47–66).

The Commonwealth played a video tape of the incident.

Macklin testified that the incident as portrayed in a video tape was 

an accurate depiction of what occurred on the night of the 

incident. (N.T., id., pages 191–194).

Officer Thomas Fitzpatrick testified that on March 30, 2010, 

he was assigned to serve arrest warrants for [Appellant], Nelson 

Vazquez and Marco Sanmarco. He went to 305 Indiana Avenue in 

Philadelphia to arrest [Appellant]. After breaching the door, he 

found [Appellant] hiding in a closet of the back bedroom on the 

second floor. He then went to 2937 Mutter Street to arrest Nelson 
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Vazquez. Vazquez was found sleeping in the front bedroom on the 

second floor. Officer Fitzpatrick then went to 3928 Bennington 

Street to arrest Marco Sanmarco. Sanmarco was not at that 

location. [Appellant] and Vazquez were arrested and taken to the 

Homicide Unit. (Notes of Testimony, October 17, 2011, pages 4, 

6, 10–19).

Emmanuel Rivera testified that he was thirteen (13) years

of age on the date of the incident. He testified that he was 

standing outside the Chinese store with Lyons and Smith. He saw 

[Appellant], Vazquez and Sanmarco walk up together and go into 

the Chinese store. He testified that he was “hustling” (selling 

drugs) with Lyons. He had just met Smith that same night. He 

testified that he knew “Baze” (Sanmarco) and “Boobie” 

([Appellant]), for a long time and that he knew “Moyo” (Vazquez) 

for four (4) months. (N.T., id, pages 61–62).

Rivera further testified that, a woman came up to him and

asked for six (6) bags of “dope” (heroin). He went across the 

street to an alleyway where he kept the heroin. When he was

coming back towards the Chinese store, he saw Sanmarco patting 

Smith’s pockets and Smith fighting with Sanmarco. He saw that 

[Appellant] and Vazquez both had guns in their hands. He did not 

see Sanmarco with a gun. He heard two (2) gunshots that he 

believed came from the gun that [Appellant] was holding. He ran 

up Stella Street and hid behind a truck. After a few minutes, he 

ran back down Stella Street to check on Lyons. When he got to 

the corner of “B” and Stella Streets, he saw that the police had 

arrived on the scene. He asked a policeman on the scene if Lyons 

was still there. The policeman took Rivera to the police district. 

(N.T., id., pages 62–75).

Rivera was interviewed by Detective Aitkin. Rivera testified 

that he lied at first, when he told the detective that he did not 

know who was present at the time of the shooting, because he 

was scared. (N.T., id., page 76). 

When interviewed at the Homicide Division, Rivera identified 

all three (3) defendants from photos. On the [sic] Vazquez’s photo 

he wrote “Moyo” and “shooter.” On Sanmarco’s photo, he wrote 

“Baze” and “went in Perry’s (Smith’s) pockets” and on 

[Appellant’s] photo he wrote “Boobie” and “shooter.” Rivera told 

the detectives that he was standing outside the “chino” store on 

B Street with Lyons and Smith. Boobie, Baze, and Moyo came up

to them and asked if the store sold cigarettes. They went into the 

store. At that point, a woman approached them and asked for six 

(6) bags of “dope.” He ran across the street into an alleyway to 

get the dope. When he came out of the alleyway, he saw Baze
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taking a pack of cigarettes from Perry. He saw Baze hitting Perry 

and “checking his pockets.” He saw [Appellant] shooting at Perry. 

He saw Moyo shooting in the direction of Lyons and Perry. Rivera 

was then shown a video wherein he identified himself, the woman

who approached him to buy drugs and Lyons. (N.T., id., pages 

77–92, 229-232).

Robert Lombardo testified that on March 26, 2010, he drove 

with Meg[h]an Macklin, his ex-girlfriend, to “B” and Stella Streets 

in Macklin’s mother’s SUV to buy drugs. Macklin parked the SUV 

across the street from a Chinese store. He could see five (5) males 

standing outside the Chinese store. He identified one of the males 

as Vazquez. He saw Macklin walk across the street and start 

talking to the males. He saw one of the males he described as 

being “young,” run across the street and into an alley. He saw one 

of the other males go into and then exit the Chinese store. He 

then saw Vazquez holding a silver revolver. He saw another male 

pull out a gun. He saw Vazquez shoot the gun and then saw a 

male fall on the sidewalk. He saw Vazquez fire the gun again. He 

saw Macklin run back across the street. He then saw the two (2) 

males who had fired guns and another male running away. (N.T., 

id. pages 138–147).

Macklin returned to the SUV, and jumped into the

passenger’s seat. Lombardo drove the SUV away from the scene 

and reported the shooting to the police. Later that morning, 

Lombardo called the police again. Lombardo and Macklin were 

taken to police headquarters to be interviewed. (N.T., id., pages 

149–151, 153).

Lombardo was interviewed by homicide detectives a second 

time on March 27, 2010, at approximately 12:05 P.M. At this 

interview, he was shown photographs and asked if he recognized 

anyone in the photos. He identified Vazquez as one [of] the males 

that had pulled out and had fired the gun. (N.T., id., pages 161–

163).

Police Officer Brian Stark, assigned to the crime scene unit

testified that he was called to the scene by the homicide unit. He 

recovered a 9-millimeter fired cartridge casing from the step of 

3035 “B” Street which was next door to the Chinese store. He 

observed [a] blood-like substance appearing on the sidewalk from 

the front steps of the Chinese store to the curb line. (Notes of 

Testimony, October 18, 2011, pages 38–43, 51–53).

Dr. Gary Lincoln Collins testified that he is the acting Deputy 

Chief Medical Examiner for the Philadelphia Medical Examiner’s 

Office. He reviewed the autopsy report and photos of the autopsy 

performed on Smith, a toxicology report and examined the 
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clothing Smith was wearing. He testified that the autopsy was 

done by Assistant Medical Examiner, Dr. Chase Blanchard[,] who 

is on extended family medical leave due to injuries she received 

as the result of a car accident. Dr. Collins testified that he was 

able to render an independent expert opinion as to the cause and 

manner of death of Smith. Dr. Collins opined that the cause of 

death was multiple gunshot wounds to Smith’s torso and that the 

manner of death was homicide. (N.T., id., pages 96, 101, 104–

105).

Dr. Collins testified that Smith sustained two (2) penetrating 

gunshot wounds to his abdomen or torso and that two (2) 

projectiles were recovered from his body. Dr. Collins testified that 

Smith sustained one (1) entrance wound to the right upper 

abdomen and a second entrance wound lower down his torso just 

across from his belly button. Dr. Collins opined that the weapon 

that fired the shots was positioned from six (6) inches to within 

two and one-half (2 1/2) feet away from Smith. (N.T., id., pages 

106–107).

Dr. Collins testified that both of the wounds Smith suffered

were fatal, but not instantly fatal. Dr. Collins testified that the 

toxicology report showed that Smith had PCP in his system at a 

level where he would be “high” at the time he was killed. The two 

(2) bullets recovered from Smith’s body during the autopsy were 

turned over to the police department by the medical examiner’s 

office. (N.T., id., pages 115–120, 225).

Officer Raymond Andrejcak of the Firearms Identification

Unit testified that he examined the evidence recovered in this 

case: one (1) Remington 9-millimeter luger fired cartridge casing 

was recovered from the scene and two (2) .38 caliber/9-millimeter 

bullets were recovered from Smith’s body. Officer Andrejcak 

testified that the bullets were fired from the same firearm, either 

a .38 caliber or a 9-millimeter. However, he was unable to 

determine if the firearm that ejected the fired cartridge casing was 

the same gun that fired two (2) bullets. (N.T., id., pages 227, 

230–231, 239–243).

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, No. 407 EDA 2014, unpublished 

memorandum at 1-7 (Pa.Super. filed February 21, 2014). 
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Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder, 

conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery and aggravated assault.2 On 

December 2, 2011, Appellant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment 

without the possibility of parole for the second-degree murder conviction and 

concurrent terms of incarceration of ten (10) years to twenty (20) years each 

for the conspiracy and robbery convictions. No further penalty was imposed 

for aggravated assault.

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on December 7, 2011, and the 

sentencing court denied it without a hearing on January 6, 2012. Appellant 

filed a timely notice of appeal on January 31, 2012, and this Court affirmed 

his judgment of sentence on February 21, 2014. On March 20, 2014, 

Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court, and the Court denied the same on August 21, 2014. 

On December 31, 2014, Appellant filed a petition under the PCRA pro 

se, and he later filed pro se supplemental petitions on September 23, 2016, 

and on June 20, 2018. Counsel was appointed on January 13, 2016, and filed 

an amended petition on December 20, 2016, wherein he incorporated all 

allegations set forth in the previous petitions and added an additional 

allegation pertaining to trial court’s error in failing to call an alibi witness. 

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 903(a)(1); 3701(a)(11); 2702(a), respectively.
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Counsel later filed supplemental PCRA petitions on November 16, 2017, and 

on July 17, 2018. 

On January 9, 2019, the PCRA court issued a Notice of its intent to 

dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without holding a hearing pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). In response, Appellant filed pro se a “Notice to Counsel 

of Issue to be Added to PCRA Amended Petition.” In its Order entered on

February 8, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition, and this 

timely appeal followed. 

On February 14, 2019, the PCRA court issued its Order directing 

Appellant to file a statement of the errors complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied on February 22, 2019. 

In his appellate brief, Appellant presents the following Statement of 

Questions Involved: 

I. Did [PCRA] court err in denying [A]ppellant an evidentiary 

hearing when [A]ppellant raised a material issue of fact that 

trial defense counsel was ineffective in failing to call known 

alibi witnesses? 

II. Did [PCRA] court err in denying [A]ppellant an evidentiary

hearing when [A]ppellant raised a material issue of fact that 

trial defense counsel vitiated [Appellant’s] right to testify in 

his own defense at trial?

Brief for Appellant at 2.

Both of Appellant’s issues allege trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing 

to present testimony at trial. This Court’s standard and scope of review of 

claims challenging trial counsel’s advocacy is as follows: 
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This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying 

a petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the 

PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of 

legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless 

there is no support for the findings in the certified record.

Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1051 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(citation omitted). 

We begin with a presumption that Appellant’s counsel was effective. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 227, 732 A.2d 1167, 1177 

(1999). Therefore, [t]o establish a claim of ineffectiveness, Appellant “must 

show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel

which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could 

have taken place.” Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 880 

(Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 596 Pa. 707, 940 A.2d 

365 (2007). A petitioner must establish (1) that the underlying claim has 

arguable merit; (2) that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his action or 

inaction; and (3) but for the act or omission in question, the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v. Washington, 

592 Pa. 696, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (2007). “A claim of ineffectiveness may be 

denied by a showing that the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet any of these 

prongs.” Id. (citation omitted).

In addition, we have explained:

[A] claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, 

if accurate, could establish cause for relief. See Commonwealth 
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v. Jones, 583 Pa. 130, 876 A.2d 380, 385 ( [Pa.] 2005) (“if a 

petitioner raises allegations, which, even if accepted as true, do 

not establish the underlying claim ..., he or she will have failed to 

establish the arguable merit prong related to the claim”). Whether 

the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal 

determination.

The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable 

basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel 

would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not 

chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of success. 

Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they 

effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight 

analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he 

may have taken. 

Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa.Super. 2019), 

appeal denied, 216 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2019). 

Further, a PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing on his petition. A PCRA petition may be dismissed without a hearing 

if the PCRA court “is satisfied from [its review of the petition] that there are 

no genuine issues concerning any material fact and that the [petitioner] is not 

entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose would be served 

by any further proceedings.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). However, when the PCRA 

petition raises material issues of fact, the PCRA court “shall order a hearing.” 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2). Thus, “[t]o obtain reversal of a PCRA court's decision 

to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised

a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him 

to relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a 
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hearing.” Commonwealth v. Paddy, 609 Pa. 272, 292, 15 A.3d 431, 442 

(2011) (quotations and citations omitted).

Appellant first argues his trial counsel was ineffective for declining to 

present the testimony of two alibi witnesses, namely his mother and one of 

his brothers. Brief for Appellant at 5. Appellant maintains counsel had been

aware of the witnesses as he served a notice of alibi on the Commonwealth. 

Appellant claims that he had been prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to call

known alibi witnesses because counsel provided conflicting reasons to 

“different people” for not calling the witnesses. Id. at 8. Specifically, 

Appellant asserts counsel “told the trial court that because of a language 

problem he believed that the witnesses would not hold up to cross 

examination. Counsel told [Appellant’s] family that they could not testify 

because they were family.” Id. at 9. Appellant baldly adds:

The trial court’s assertion that [Appellant] waived this issue 

because he agreed with counsel not to call the alibi witnesses is 

erroneous because it is trial defense counsel who decides and 

decided not to call these witnesses and counsel already decided 

not to call them and the record shows that [Appellant] had 

difficulty understanding English but counsel failed to request a 

Spanish interpreter for [Appellant] to conduct the colloquy. As to 

this language problem with the witnesses counsel could have 

gotten a Spanish interpreter for these witnesses and there would 

have been no language problem. As to the alibi witnesses being 

family members, there is no proscription baring [sic] family 

members from being alibi witnesses and where else are you going 

to be at 12:50 am [sic] except at home with your family. 

Id. 

When raising a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call

a potential witness, a petitioner satisfies the performance and 
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prejudice requirements of the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984),] test by establishing that: (1) the witness

existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the defense; 

(3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, the existence of 

the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for the defense; 

and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness was so 

prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial. To 

demonstrate Strickland prejudice, a petitioner “must show how 

the uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have been beneficial 

under the circumstances of the case.” Thus, counsel will not be 

found ineffective for failing to call a witness unless the petitioner 

can show that the witness’s testimony would have been helpful to 

the defense. A failure to call a witness is not per se ineffective

assistance of counsel for such decision usually involves matters of 

trial strategy.

Commonwealth v. Sneed, 616 Pa. 1, 22-23, 45 A.3d 1096, 1108–09 (Pa. 

2012) (some citations omitted). Herein, counsel’s decision not to call the 

aforementioned alibi witnesses was a matter of trial strategy. 

Where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, counsel's 

assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if he chose a 

particular course that had some reasonable basis designed to 

effectuate his client's interests. A finding that a chosen strategy 

lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted unless it can be 

concluded that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for 

success substantially greater than the course actually pursued. A 

claim of ineffectiveness generally cannot succeed through 

comparing, in hindsight, the trial strategy employed with 

alternatives not pursued. 

Sneed, at 19–20, 45 A.3d at 1107 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Following our review of the record, we find Appellant’s general 

allegations of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness fail to satisfy the aforementioned 

standard, for he has not shown that the testimony of his mother and brother 

would have been beneficial to his defense. To the contrary, as Appellant

acknowledges, see Brief for Appellant at 9, during a colloquy with the trial 
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court, Appellant heard the reasoning behind counsel’s decision not to call alibi 

witnesses on his behalf and answered “no” when asked by the court if he 

wished to present alibi evidence: 

***

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, one other thing before we get 

there, there was notice of alibi given and statements were 

provided to the District Attorney. I have made a tactical decision 

not to use either one of those alibi witnesses; as a matter of fact, 

neither one of them is here today. 

One would have been his brother who is Ricardo Rodriguez. 

Ricardo Rodriguez called me this morning. He said he was very 

ill...and the other alibi was his mother, Iris Medina, who we already 

heard by stipulation. She is not here because she could not stay. 

She went back to work. 

I chose not to use the alibi with regard to his mother, Iris Medina, 

on the basis that because of a language problem, she had a great 

deal of difficulty understanding the concept of reputation 

evidence. It would have been even more difficult getting her 

through an explanation of alibi.

THE COURT: Well, did she provide an alibi for him?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: She did provide the alibi for him but I was 

not confident that she could deal with the cross-examination and 

I did not, as I say, want to take the risk of putting her on.

A far as the brother is concerned, that was the same consideration 

and I chose not use the brother as well. Now that [Appellant] is 

testifying, it is his call. It is against my advice but it is his decision.

THE COURT: Do you want alibi evidence presented?

[APPELLANT]: No.

THE COURT: Are you sure about that?

[APPELLANT]: Yeah.

***
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N.T. Trial, 10/24/11, at 166-168.

It is axiomatic that “[a] defendant who voluntarily waives the right to 

call witnesses during a colloquy cannot later claim ineffective assistance and 

purport that he was coerced by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 762 

A.2d 753, 756 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 566 Pa. 638, 762 A.2d 753 

(2000). As Appellant expressly agreed to counsel’s strategy at the time of 

trial and has failed to show how an alternative strategy would have afforded 

him a beneficial result, this claim is meritless. 

Appellant next maintains trial counsel was ineffective for advising him 

not to testify in his own defense, because such advice prevented him from 

presenting a viable defense that he was not present at the time of the 

shooting. Brief for Appellant at 14-15. Appellant argues counsel never 

informed him he had a right to testify with the assistance of an interpreter 

and that such failure resulted in the violation of his right to effective assistance 

of counsel guaranteed under the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 13-

17. 

“[T]he appropriate standard for assessing whether a defendant was 

prejudiced by trial counsel's ineffectiveness regarding the waiver of his right 

to testify is whether the result of the waiver proceeding would have been 

different absent counsel's ineffectiveness, not whether the outcome of the trial 

itself would have been more favorable had the defendant taken the stand.” 
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Commonwealth v. Walker, 110 A.3d 1000, 1005 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(emphasis omitted), appeal denied, 633 Pa. 756, 125 A.3d 777 (2015).

The decision of whether or not to testify on one's own behalf is 

ultimately to be made by the defendant after full consultation with 

counsel. In order to sustain a claim that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to advise the appellant of his rights in this regard, the 

appellant must demonstrate either that counsel interfered with his 

right to testify, or that counsel gave specific advice so 

unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing and intelligent decision to 

testify on his own behalf.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1179 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 193 A.3d 344 (Pa. 2018). It is noteworthy that “[a]

defendant will not be afforded relief [on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim] where he voluntarily waives the right to take the stand during a 

colloquy with the court, but later claims that he was prompted by counsel to 

lie or give certain answers.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 762 A.2d 753, 756 

(Pa.Super. 2000).

During the aforementioned colloquy, the trial court repeatedly 

questioned Appellant regarding his right to testify: 

***

THE COURT: Do you understand that you have the right to choose 

not to testify and you have the right to choose to testify, that is 

your decision in the end? 

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

THE COURT: Did your attorney discuss with you the good points 

and bad points about whether or not you should testify?

[APPELLANT]: Yes, he did, ma’am. 

THE COURT: Did he give you his advice?
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[Appellant]: Yeah.

THE COURT: Did you make your own decision?

[Appellant]: I did.

THE COURT: What is that decision?

[APPELLANT]: I will take the stand.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You want to testify?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I wasn’t sure at first but now I changed 

my mind. 

THE COURT: You have the right to do whatever you want. 

... 

THE COURT: You are going to testify though?

[APPELLANT]: Yeah. 

THE COURT: If you are going to testify, we will put him up before 

the jury comes out. 

(Whereupon, a pause is taken from the proceedings) 

... 

[APPELLANT]: I don’t want to testify. 

THE COURT: You don’t want to testify? 

Mr. Rodriguez, you indicated that you wanted to testify and 

when we put you on the witness stand, you leaned over and told 

me that you didn’t want to testify; is that right? 

[APPELLANT]: Right. 

THE COURT: Did anybody force you not to testify? 

[APPELLANT]: No. It wasn’t nobody. Nobody made me. It was 

My own decision. 
J-S74041-19

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THE COURT: Did anybody say anything while you were sitting 

there, like your codefendant sitting next to you who I saw lean 

over and whisper something to you? Did he tell you not to testify? 

[APPELLANT]: No, he didn’t tell me not to testify. 

THE COURT: You are sure about that? 

[APPELLANT]: Yeah. 

THE COURT: If you claim that later on ten years from now, if you 

were found guilty—I don’t know what will happen but it is not 

going to help you because I saw him lean over and say something 

to you and then you took the stand and said you didn’t want to 

testify. So if he said anything to you, you need to say it right now. 

You need to make your own decision, not based on what he says 

to you. 

[APPELLANT]: It is my own decision, Your Honor.

The COURT: This is your life. This isn’t his life. Do you 

understand?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

THE COURT: He has his own issues. You have to take care of 

yourself. Do you understand?

[APPELLANT]: Yeah. 

THE COURT: Do you want to testify?

[APPELLANT]: No. 

THE COURT: Are you sure about that?

[APPELLANT]: Pretty sure. 

THE COURT: Did he threaten you, the Defendant sitting next to 

you?

[APPELLANT]: No.

THE COURT: Did he promise you anything?
J-S74041-19

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[APPELLANT]: No. 

THE COURT: Did he just give you his advice?

[APPELLANT]: Yeah, he told me if I am pretty sure—I’m not really 

sure, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What did he say to you? 

[APPELLANT]: He didn’t tell me nothing. 

THE COURT: You just said he just said are you sure. What did he 

say? 

[APPELLANT]: He asked me if I wanted to take the stand and I 

said I’m not sure but then I changed my mind. I wanted to take it 

but then I’m not really sure. It is my English. I understand English 

and all but sometimes the words will be confusing and I don’t 

know how to answer them. I am not trying to mess up. That’s all. 

THE COURT: So you do or you don’t want to take the stand? 

[APPELLANT]: No, I don’t want to take the stand. 

THE COURT: You are sure about that? 

[APPELLANT]: I am pretty sure, ma’am. 

THE COURT: You don’t want to present an alibi defense? 

[APPELLANT]: No. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [Appellant], just so I am clear, nobody has 

made you any promises, has made any threats to you or done 

anything whatsoever in order to influence your decision; is that 

correct? 

[APPELLANT]: Nobody did. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: This is your own decision?

[APPELLANT]: My own decision.
J-S74041-19

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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Of your own free will and choice; is that 

correct?

[APPELLANT]: Yeah.

N.T. Trial, 10/24/11, at 165-67; 169-74. 

At no time during his colloquy did Appellant assert he had difficulty 

discerning the meaning of the proceedings due to a language barrier. Rather, 

his responses to the queries of the trial court and defense counsel were clear. 

Moreover, the next day, the trial court again asked Appellant whether 

or not he would be testifying on his own behalf at which time he reiterated 

that he did not wish to testify and stated that he had made that choice 

pursuant to his own free will: 

THE COURT: [Appellant], you had all night now to think about 

whether or not you want to testify. You have the absolute right 

to choose to testify if you want. Have you made your decision? 

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

THE COURT: What is that?

[APPELLANT]: No.

THE COURT: Are you doing that of your own free will?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

THE COURT: Did anybody promise you anything?

[APPELLANT]: No.

THE COURT: Did anybody threaten you in any way to get you not 

to testify?

[APPELLANT]: No. 
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N.T. Trial, 10/25/11 at 2-3. 

 It is readily apparent from the above exchanges that the trial court 

thoroughly colloquied Appellant on his decision not to testify on his own behalf. 

Appellant clearly informed the trial court that after speaking with his counsel 

and having had an additional evening to contemplate his choice, he did not 

wish to testify; no one threatened him or forced him to make that decision, 

and he came to that conclusion of his own free will. See id.

With regard to Appellant’s instant argument that a language barrier 

presented him from testifying, the PCRA court explained the rationale behind 

its denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition at a brief hearing held on January 4, 

2019. In doing so, the court, who also served as the trial court, stressed that 

Appellant had sat through and understood every aspect of the trial and 

unequivocally concluded that “[t]his petitioner understood English.” N.T. 

Hearing, 1/4/19, at 9. The trial court continued as follows: 

This [c]ourt does not take any chances with that. I check 

at the very beginning of every case if I had any doubt that he 

wouldn’t understand anything.

This is at the end of the jury trial during defense’s case. And 

during questioning by the [c]ourt were the [c]ourt asked 

[Appellant] why he changed his mind and why he doesn’t want to 

say what the codefendant said to him is—and I can quote this, 

because I think I pulled it out of [Appellant’s statement of what 

his codefendant said to him—“He asked me if I want to take the 

stand, and I said, I’m not sure. But then I changed my mind. I 

want to take it, but then I’m not really sure. It’s my English. I 

understand English and all, but sometimes the words will be 

confused and—I don’t know. Confused. I am not trying to mess 

up. That’s all.”

There was no indication at any time that this witness could 

not understand English; therefore, that issue has no merit. 
J-S74041-19

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Id. at 9-10. 

In light of all of the foregoing and after carefully reviewing the record, 

we are satisfied that Appellant made a voluntary, knowing, intelligent waiver 

of testimony. Consequently, his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on 

this basis also fails.

Having found no merit to Appellant’s issues raised on appeal, we affirm 

the trial court’s Order denying him relief without an evidentiary hearing under 

the PCRA. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/21/20