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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED DECEMBER 28, 2001
 

In re HON. SUSAN R. CHRZANOWSKI
 

JUDGE OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT,


WARREN, MICHIGAN. No. 116721
 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
 

MARKMAN, J.
 

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) has recommended that
 

we suspend respondent, 37th District Court Judge Susan R.
 

Chrzanowski, for twelve months without pay for misconduct in
 

the performance of her judicial duties. Respondent has filed
 

a petition to reject this recommendation. We affirm the JTC’s
 

findings, and conclude that the JTC’s recommendation of a oneyear suspension of respondent is a reasonable one. Pursuant
 

to MCR 9.225, we modify the recommendation of the JTC to
 

require a six-month suspension without pay, beginning
 
 

January 1, 2002, in order to accord respondent partial credit
 

for the seventeen-month interim suspension with pay that she
 

has already served.
 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
 

The bases for the JTC’s complaint concern two aspects of
 

respondent’s conduct between April 1998 and August 1999.
 

First, on a substantial number of occasions, respondent
 

appointed then-attorney Michael Fletcher to represent indigent
 

defendants, and presided over such cases, as well as presided
 

over a criminal case in which Fletcher was retained counsel,
 

without disclosing that she was engaged at the time in an
 

intimate relationship with Fletcher. Second, respondent made
 

false statements to police officers investigating the August
 

16, 1999, murder of Leann Fletcher, Michael Fletcher’s wife.1
 

Respondent and Fletcher met in 1996 and became friends in
 

1997. In February of 1998, Fletcher entered the private
 

practice of law. Respondent began assigning him to represent
 

indigent criminal defendants in misdemeanor cases in her
 

court. In July of 1998, respondent and Fletcher began an
 

intimate relationship. Throughout the course of their
 

1 In July 2000, a trial court convicted Fletcher of
 

second-degree murder, finding that he shot and killed his


wife, Leann.
 

2
 
 

subsequent relationship, between July 1, 1998, and August 15,
 

1999, respondent assigned Fletcher to fifty-six cases. Fiftyfive of these cases, without a city attorney being present,
 

resulted in guilty pleas accepted by respondent. These
 

appointments generated in excess of $16,000 in income for
 

Fletcher. In addition, respondent presided over People v
 

Donald Thomas Richards, Case No W224162, in which Fletcher was
 

retained counsel. Respondent entered an order dismissing the
 

case against Fletcher’s client. Respondent failed to disclose
 

her ongoing relationship with Fletcher in any of these cases.
 

On August 16, 1999, Fletcher shot and killed his wife,
 

Leann. Sometime after committing the murder, Fletcher
 

telephoned respondent and left her a message. In the message,
 

Fletcher asked respondent to call him when she returned home.
 

Respondent received this message during the pre-dawn hours of
 

August 17. Respondent then paged Fletcher, but received no
 

response. She then left Fletcher a message, and he returned
 

the call approximately one-half hour later. He told
 

respondent that he could not talk, but that something
 

“horrible” had happened. In the morning, respondent was
 

informed by a co-worker that Leann Fletcher had committed
 

suicide. Respondent went home early because she was too upset
 

to complete her docket.
 

3
 
During the initial investigation of the murder, Hazel
 

Park Police officers discovered evidence that respondent had
 

been engaged in an intimate relationship with Fletcher. On
 

August 17, the police interviewed respondent at her home.
 

The interviewing detective asked respondent whether she had
 

been involved with Fletcher. Judge Chrzanowski responded that
 

she had. When questioned about the length of the
 

relationship, respondent indicated that the relationship had
 

begun in February of 1999 and had lasted only until March of
 

1999. The detective also asked respondent if she had spoken
 

to Fletcher since the death of Leann, and respondent stated
 

that she had not. Because respondent was emotionally
 

distraught, the interview ceased. 


On August 19, respondent went to the Hazel Park police
 

station for a second interview. At this time, respondent
 

indicated that her relationship with Fletcher had actually
 

begun in August of 1998 and continued sporadically until
 

August 15, 1999. Respondent also acknowledged, contrary to
 

her August 17 statement, that she had spoken to Fletcher
 

following his wife’s death.
 

In September of 1999, the JTC received a request from
 

Macomb County Prosecutor Carl Marlinga for an investigation
 

into respondent’s appointment of Fletcher during their
 

4
 
relationship. Following respondent’s replies, the JTC filed
 

Formal Complaint No. 65 on April 14, 2000. First, the
 

complaint asserted that respondent had engaged in misconduct
 

by appointing Fletcher to appear in cases before her without
 

disclosing their relationship. Second, the complaint alleged
 

that respondent made false statements to Hazel Park police
 

officers in the August 17 interview concerning the murder of
 

Fletcher’s wife.
 

On April 26, 2000, this Court appointed former Justice
 

Charles Levin to serve as master in this case. Meanwhile,
 

respondent testified at the murder trial of Fletcher and
 

indicated that she had made false statements during the
 

initial police inquiry. The JTC then filed a petition for
 

interim suspension pursuant to MCR 9.220.2 On July 28, 2000,
 

this Court entered an order suspending respondent with pay.
 

In re Chrzanowski, 463 Mich 1201 (2000).
 

II. MASTER’S FINDINGS
 

After conducting a formal hearing, the master issued his
 

report on December 7, 2000. He found that respondent had
 

appointed Fletcher as counsel for indigent criminal defendants
 

in matters over which she presided, and had approved payment
 

2 MCR 9.220 provides that the JTC “may petition the


Supreme Court for an order suspending a judge from acting as


a judge until final adjudication of a complaint.”
 

5
 
of legal fees to Fletcher during the period between April 1998
 

and August 1999, when she and Fletcher had been engaged in an
 

intimate relationship. The master also found that Fletcher
 

had received “a disproportionate number” of appointments in
 

comparison with other attorneys who practiced before
 

respondent. He concluded that respondent violated the Code of
 

Judicial Conduct by making these appointments to Fletcher.3
 

He stated that a judge is enjoined by this provision from
 

allowing social or other relationships to influence conduct or
 

judgment, and is further prohibited from making appointments
 

on the basis of considerations other than merit.4 The master
 

also found that such appointments had “the appearance of
 

impropriety” and “erode[d] public confidence in the
 

judiciary.”5 Nonetheless, the master concluded that he could
 

3 Canon 2(C) provides: “A judge should not allow family,


social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct


or judgment.”
 

4 Canon 3(B)(4) provides: “All appointments shall be


based upon merit.”
 

5 Canon 2(A) provides:
 

Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded


by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A
 

judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of


impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject
 

of constant public scrutiny. A judge must
 

therefore accept restrictions on conduct that might


be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and


should do so freely and willingly.
 

6
 
not recommend discipline because the JTC “has not promulgated
 

a policy respecting disproportionate assignments to close
 

personal friends of the judge, and consequently the Supreme
 

Court has not been called upon to enunciate a rule of law
 

. . . justifying a recommendation for the imposition of
 

discipline.” Moreover, the master determined that, because
 

respondent had a subjective good-faith belief that she could
 

impartially hear cases in which Fletcher appeared, she was not
 

required by the Code of Judicial Conduct, or by MCR 2.0036 to
 

6 MCR 2.003 provides:
 

(A) Who May Raise. A party may raise the


issue of a judge’s disqualification by motion, or
 

the judge may raise it.
 

(B) Grounds. A judge is disqualified when the


judge cannot impartially hear a case, including but


not limited to instances in which:
 

(1) The judge is personally biased or
 

prejudiced for or against a party or attorney.
 

* * *
 

(5) The judge knows that he or she . . . has
 

an economic interest in the subject matter in


controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has


any other more than de minimis interest that could


be substantially affected by the proceeding.
 

(D) Remittal of Disqualification. If it
 

appears that there may be grounds for
 

disqualification, the judge may ask the parties and


their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of


the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If,


following disclosure of any basis for
 

7
 
disclose the relationship with Fletcher, or to raise on her
 

own the matter of her disqualification. The master concluded
 

that he was unable to recommend disciplinary action against
 

respondent for this conduct.
 

Concerning allegations that respondent had made false
 

statements to the police, the master determined that the
 

statements were “inaccuracies.” However, he concluded that
 

“[t]he substance, if not the detail, of Chrzanowski’s
 

responses was accurate” and “[v]iewed as a whole, the
 

information conveyed to the officers was accurate.” The
 

master found “as a matter of law” that, “unless a statement by
 

a judge is a lie, i.e., ‘a false statement made with
 

deliberate intent to deceive,’ there is not misconduct or
 

conduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice
 

within the meaning of Const 1963, art 6, § 30, justifying a
 

recommendation of discipline.” The master concluded that
 

respondent “did not make statements to the police with
 

deliberate intent to deceive, and did not lie to the police.”
 

On the basis of these findings, the master recommended
 

disqualification other than personal bias or
 

prejudice concerning a party, the parties without


participation by the judge, all agree that the


judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is


then willing to participate, the judge may


participate in the proceedings. The agreement


shall be in writing or placed on the record. 


8
 
dismissal of the charges concerning respondent’s statements.
 

III. JUDICIAL TENURE COMMISSION
 

The JTC adopted most of the findings of fact of the
 

master, but not his conclusions of law.7 The JTC disagreed
 

with the master’s conclusion that respondent did not have a
 

duty to disclose her relationship with Fletcher when she
 

appointed him to represent indigent defendants, or where he
 

appeared before her as retained counsel. Further, the JTC
 

disagreed with the master’s conclusion that “as a matter of
 

law,” in order for the false statements to have constituted
 

judicial misconduct, they had to be what the master
 

characterized as “lies.”
 

7 All eight members of the JTC panel found misconduct on


the part of respondent. There was unanimity that respondent’s


assignments to Fletcher and his appearances before her while


the two were engaged in a sexual relationship was improper,


and constituted misconduct in office and conduct clearly


prejudicial to the administration of justice. A five-member
 

majority recommended that respondent be suspended for one year


without pay. Commissioners James Kingsley and Henry Baskin


agreed with most of the findings and recommendation of a oneyear suspension, but dissented from the finding that
 

respondent had made “false statements to the police.”


Commissioner Pamela Harwood wrote separately and agreed with


the majority findings concerning the appointments without


disclosure. However, she also dissented from the finding that
 

respondent had made false statements to the police.


Commissioner Harwood recommended that respondent be suspended


for forty-five to ninety days without pay, and that she be
 

returned to active judicial service upon her reimbursement to


the 37th District Court funding unit for ninety days of pay.
 

9
 
After setting forth the factors promulgated by this Court
 

in In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293 (1999) (Brown I), see
 

also In re Brown (After Remand), 464 Mich 135, 138; 626 NW2d
 

403 (2001) (Brown II), the JTC proceeded to find factors one
 

through three, and five, relevant to respondent’s conduct.8
 

With regard to factor one, the JTC determined that
 

8 In Brown I and II, we stated that, in making judicial


disciplinary recommendations, the JTC should consider:
 

(1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or


practice is more serious than an isolated instance
 

of misconduct; 


(2) misconduct on the bench is usually more


serious than the same misconduct off the bench;
 

(3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the


actual administration of justice is more serious


than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the


appearance of propriety;
 

(4) misconduct that does not implicate the


actual administration of justice, or its appearance


of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct


that does;
 

(5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is


less serious than misconduct that is premeditated


or deliberated;
 

(6) misconduct that undermines the ability of


the justice system to discover the truth of what


occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the


most just result in such a case, is more serious


than misconduct that merely delays such discovery


. . . . [Brown I, supra at 1292-1293; Brown II,
 

supra at 138.]
 

10
 
respondent’s fifty-six appointments to Fletcher over the
 

course of seventeen months while the two were engaged in an
 

intimate relationship, and her failure to disclose that fact,
 

constituted a “pattern or practice” of misconduct.9 With
 

regard to factor two, the JTC observed that this misconduct
 

constituted “misconduct on the bench.” With regard to factor
 

three, the JTC concluded that, although no evidence existed
 

that respondent’s conduct resulted in any actual prejudice to
 

the administration of justice, such conduct did have a
 

negative effect on the appearance of propriety in judicial
 

decision making and the integrity of the judicial office in
 

general.10 With regard to factor five, the JTC concluded that
 

respondent’s misconduct was “deliberate” as opposed to
 

“spontaneous,” because she had considered whether the
 

appointments to Fletcher were improper and had reached the
 

9

 Respondent argues that the fact that the proceedings


over which she presided were “nonadversarial” in nature, i.e.,


that there was no prosecuting attorney present during


Fletcher’s representation of the indigent defendants, somehow


lessened her duty to disclose her relationship with Fletcher.


We disagree with this argument because, as the JTC noted,


despite respondent’s apparently fair disposition of these


cases, her conduct did have a negative effect on the


appearance of propriety in judicial decision making, and the


appearance of integrity of the judicial office in general.
 

10
 The JTC acknowledged that respondent had fairly


decided the issues before her in the cases in which she had
 

appointed Fletcher.
 

11
 
subjective conclusion that they were not. In this regard, the
 

JTC found that respondent’s subjective conclusions about the
 

propriety of presiding over these cases did “not negate the
 

fact that the relationship existed and opposing counsel and
 

others concerned with the integrity of the judiciary should
 

have been so advised.” With respect to factor five, the JTC
 

also determined that respondent’s “false statements” to the
 

police appeared calculated to deflect any suspicion that she
 

was the motive behind Leann Fletcher’s murder. The JTC
 

concluded that the fact that respondent corrected her
 

erroneous statements “within a matter of days . . . [did] not
 

diminish the gravity of her having made statements . . . on a
 

material factor—the motive for the murder of Leann Fletcher.”
 

In addition to these four factors, the JTC considered
 

four additional factors.11 First, the JTC concluded that
 

11 As this Court noted in Brown I, supra at 1295, the JTC


“should consider [the factors specified] and other appropriate


standards that it may develop” when making recommendations.


Here, the JTC additionally considered:
 

(1) The judge’s conduct in response to the


commission’s inquiry and disciplinary proceedings.


Specifically, whether the judge showed remorse and


made an effort to change his or her conduct and


whether the judge was candid and cooperated with


the commission;
 

(2) The judge’s discipline record and
 

reputation;
 

12
 
respondent had reacted to the JTC investigation and the
 

subsequent disciplinary proceedings candidly, cooperatively,
 

and in good faith. Second, concerning the appointment
 

procedures, the JTC found that respondent had instituted a
 

“blind draw rotation system” subsequent to the investigation.
 

According to the JTC, this demonstrated respondent’s ability
 

to improve her conduct. Further, concerning her statements to
 

the police, the JTC found that, except for the first
 

interview, respondent had fully cooperated with authorities in
 

the prosecution of Fletcher. The JTC also determined that
 

respondent had no prior disciplinary record, and that there
 

was considerable evidence of her competency and good
 

reputation in the community. Finally, the JTC found that
 

respondent’s relatively short judicial career constituted a
 

mitigating circumstance, and that there was no reason to
 

believe that she would repeat the misconduct. We now address
 

(3) The effect the misconduct had upon the


integrity of and respect for the judiciary;
 

(4) Years of judicial experience. [In re
 

Chrzanowski, Decision and Recommendation of the


Judicial Tenure Commission, April 9, 2001, at 19­

21, citing American Judicature Society, How
 

Judicial Conduct Commissions Work (1999), pp 15­

16.]
 

We find the application of each of these factors to be


reasonable in the present context. 


13
 
 

 

the issues raised by respondent in her petition to reject the
 

JTC’s recommendation.
 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
 

We review the recommendations of the JTC de novo. In re
 

Hathaway, 464 Mich 672, 684; 630 NW2d 850 (2001); see also In
 

re Ferrara, 458 Mich 350, 358-59; 582 NW2d 817 (1998). We
 

also review the JTC’s findings of fact de novo. In re
 

Jenkins, 437 Mich 15, 18; 465 NW2d 317 (1991); see also In re
 

Somers, 384 Mich 320, 323; 182 NW2d 341 (1971).
 

V. ANALYSIS
 

Respondent first contends that the JTC’s conclusion that
 

her statements were false is contrary to the master’s
 

findings, and that the JTC should have deferred to such
 

findings. Second, respondent argues that the JTC’s lack of
 

deference to the findings of the master was violative of her
 

right to due process of law. Specifically, she contends that
 

the JTC’s combined function as an investigatory, as well as an
 

adjudicatory body, created an actual risk of bias in the
 

proceedings contrary to her entitlement to due process.
 

Third, respondent contends that the JTC’s recommended
 

suspension of twelve months without pay is disproportionate.
 

We will address these issues in turn.
 

A. THE JTC’S DEFERENCE TO THE MASTER’S FINDINGS
 

14
 
 

We do not believe that the JTC disputed the factual
 

findings of the master concerning respondent’s statements to
 

the police.12 Rather, the JTC and the master agreed that
 

respondent had initially indicated that her relationship with
 

Fletcher started in February 1999 and ended one month
 

afterward, when in fact, as respondent later acknowledged,
 

this relationship lasted from January 1998 to August 1999.
 

Further, both the master and the JTC agreed that respondent
 

had initially indicated that she did not speak with Fletcher
 

on August 17, 1999, following his wife’s death, when in fact,
 

as respondent later acknowledged, she did speak with him.
 

Nonetheless, respondent questions the JTC’s conclusions
 

of fact concerning these statements. Specifically, respondent
 

challenges the JTC’s conclusions that the statements were
 

false in light of the master’s conclusion that, because the
 

statements were taken from a “narrative” of the police
 

interview, rather than from a direct transcript of
 

respondent’s statements, the “substance if not the detail” of
 

respondent’s statements “was accurate.”13 Respondent therefore
 

12 As noted in the JTC’s brief, “[The JTC] did not


overrule any of the master’s findings of fact. The [JTC] did,


however, accord different weight than the master did and, at


times, drew different inferences and conclusions.” 


13 Concerning the length of respondent’s relationship
 

with Fletcher, the master stated that “[respondent]
 

15
 
contends that the JTC exceeded its authority in determining
 

that the statements were false.
 

In response to this argument, the JTC asserts that it
 

reviews the findings and conclusions of law of the master de
 

novo, and that the JTC is not compelled to defer to the
 

master’s findings of fact. We agree. The JTC is established
 

by the Michigan Constitution and vested with the
 

responsibility of determining whether to recommend to this
 

Court that a judge be disciplined for “misconduct in office
 

. . . or conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the
 

administration of justice.” Const 1963, art 6, § 30. Section
 

30(2) further provides that on recommendation of the JTC,
 

the supreme court may censure, suspend with or


without salary, retire or remove a judge for


conviction of a felony, physical or mental
 

disability which prevents the performance of
 

judicial duties, misconduct in office, persistent


failure to perform his duties, habitual
 

intemperance or conduct that is clearly prejudicial
 

acknowledged, during the interview, when identifying papers


seized at the Fletcher home, that her relationship with


Fletcher stretched back to at least November, 1998.” With
 

respect to the contact with Fletcher, the master stated that


“[respondent] provided the police with the substance of the


communication from Fletcher” and “[i]t was of no importance


whether Fletcher had spoken directly to her or by voice mail.”


Thus, according to the master, even though respondent did not


speak truthfully, i.e., that the relationship had begun in


1998, and that she had in fact spoken to Fletcher, the


information she provided implicitly acknowledged the length of


the relationship and the “substance” of her conversation with


Fletcher, and was therefore accurate.
 

16
 
to the administration of justice. The supreme


court shall make rules implementing this section


and providing for confidentiality and privilege of


proceedings.
 

Thus, pursuant to this provision, it is the JTC’s, not the
 

master’s conclusions and recommendations that are ultimately
 

subject to review by this Court. Additionally, § 30 provides
 

that the Supreme Court shall make rules implementing the JTC’s
 

authority and procedures. Subchapter 9.200 of the Michigan
 

Court Rules was promulgated for this purpose. As to the
 

actual procedures in decision making, the court rules clearly
 

indicate that the JTC has authority to review the master’s
 

findings de novo. MCR 9.221 governs the final decision of the
 

JTC. In subsection (A) it provides in relevant part:
 

The affirmative vote of 5 [JTC] members who
 

have considered the report of the master and
 

objections and who were present at an oral hearing


provided for in MCR 9.217 . . . is required for a


recommendation . . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
 

Accordingly, all that is needed for the JTC to make a valid
 

recommendation is that it consider the report of the master
 

and objections, and that a five-member majority agree on the
 

facts and the recommended discipline. Further, subsection (B)
 

of that court rule outlines procedures with regard to the
 

JTC’s recommendation itself:
 

The commission must make written findings of


fact and conclusions of law along with its
 

17
 
recommendation for action with respect to the


issues of fact and law in the proceedings, but may
 

adopt the findings of the master, in whole or in


part, by reference. [Emphasis added.]
 

Although this provision addresses creation of the record, its
 

language provides further explication of the JTC’s reviewing
 

authority. The provision distinguishes between what the JTC
 

must do, to wit, “make written findings of fact and
 

conclusions of law”, and what the JTC may do, to wit, “adopt
 

the findings of the master . . .” Court rules, like statutes,
 

are to be interpreted in accordance with their plain meaning.
 

Kelley v Mich Public Serv Comm, 392 Mich 660, 668; 221 NW2d
 

299 (1974); see also Neal v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 226 Mich App
 

701, 722; 575 NW2d 68 (1997). Giving this court rule its
 

plain meaning, we conclude that the JTC is not compelled to
 

defer to the master’s findings of fact, but rather may review
 

the findings of fact, and the conclusions of the master, de
 

novo.14 In so concluding, we agree with the JTC that
 

respondent’s statements were “false” and “deliberately made,
 

14 While we conclude that, where a master is appointed,


the JTC may exercise de novo review of the record, it must,


like all other reviewing tribunals apply the standard of proof


applicable in civil proceedings: a preponderance of the


evidence standard. MCR 9.211 (“the commission or the master


shall proceed with a public hearing which must conform as


nearly as possible to the rules of procedure and evidence


governing the trial of a civil action”); see also In re Seitz,


441 Mich 590, 593; 495 NW2d 559 (1993). 


18
 
 

and with a full understanding of their implication,” and we
 

disagree with the master that such statements were mere
 

“inaccuracies”, which did not rise to the level of judicial
 

misconduct.
 

B. RESPONDENT’S DUE PROCESS CLAIM
 

Respondent further claims that the JTC’s “simultaneous”
 

role as a prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory body
 

is violative of her due process rights. In particular, Judge
 

Chrzanowski asserts that the JTC’s failure to defer to the
 

factual findings of the master demonstrates that it could not
 

separate itself from the fact-finding function, and therefore,
 

that it could not, and did not impartially recommend
 

discipline. We conclude that, while the JTC accepted the
 

pertinent findings of fact of the master, it nonetheless based
 

its recommendation upon a different characterization of the
 

facts, to wit, that respondent’s statements to the officers
 

were false, rather than merely “inaccurate”. On the basis of
 

our review of the record, we do not disagree with this
 

conclusion, and, for the reasons set forth below, we hold that
 

the JTC afforded respondent due process.
 

It is uncontroverted that judges, like all other
 

citizens, have protected due process interests under the
 

Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1 § 17, and the Due
 

19
 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
 

States Constitution. The scope and meaning of due process
 

protections in circumstances where there is some commingling
 

of prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory roles has
 

been discussed by the United States Supreme Court in a
 

circumstance similar to the present case. In Withrow v
 

Larkin, 421 US 35; 95 S Ct 1456; 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975), the
 

United States Supreme Court held that there is no broad
 

prohibition against members of an administrative agency
 

investigating facts, instituting proceedings, and then making
 

the necessary adjudication. The Withrow case arose in
 

Wisconsin where the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board
 

commenced an investigation to determine whether a doctor had
 

committed certain illegal acts. The board subsequently decided
 

to hold a hearing to determine whether the doctor had
 

committed the alleged acts and whether to suspend the doctor’s
 

license temporarily. Id. at 39-41. The Court held that the
 

board could adjudicate the same charges it had investigated
 

and decided to prosecute without violating the doctor’s due
 

process rights. Id. at 47-55. The Court stated:
 

The contention that the combination of
 

investigative and adjudicative functions
 

necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of


bias in administrative adjudication has a much more


difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must
 

20
 
overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in


those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince


that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological


tendencies and human weakness, conferring


investigative and adjudicative powers on the same


individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or


prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if


the guarantee of due process is to be adequately


implemented. [Id. at 47; see also McIntyre v Santa
 

Barbara Co Emp Ret System, 91 Cal App 4th 730; 110


Cal Rptr 2d 565, 569 (2001) (the combination of


investigative and adjudicative functions does not,


without more, constitute a due process violation);


Marshall v Cuomo, 192 F3d 473, 484-485 (CA 4,1999)


(due process rights are not violated simply by the


combination of the investigatory, prosecutorial,


and adjudicatory functions in one agency, but


rather by actual bias or the high probability of


bias); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 265 GA


843; 462 SE2d 728 (1995) (the combination of


investigative and adjudicative functions does not,


per se, violate the requirements of due process).
 

Notably, the Court further observed that, while the
 

combination of investigative and adjudicative functions is
 

not, without more, a due process violation, this “does not, of
 

course, preclude a court from determining from the special
 

facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the
 

risk of unfairness is intolerably high.” Withrow, supra at
 

58. However, the Court found no such special facts and
 

circumstances with regard to the professional discipline board
 

in Withrow.
 

This Court also has had occasion to address this due
 

process issue especially in reference to the JTC and has
 

21
 
adopted the Withrow standards.15 In In re Del Rio, 400 Mich
 

665, 690; 256 NW2d 727 (1977), we noted that “the authority is
 

legion in support of the proposition that combining the
 

investigative and adjudicative roles in a single agency does
 

not necessarily violate due process in administrative
 

adjudications such as judicial fitness hearings.” Id., see
 

also In re Moore, 464 Mich 98, 128-131; 626 NW2d 374 (2001).
 

Further, we held in In re Mikesell, 396 Mich 517, 530; 243
 

NW2d 86 (1976), that “the combination of investigative and
 

adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a
 

due process violation . . . .” Quoting from Withrow, supra at
 

58. Thus, in accordance with Withrow, this Court held that a
 

court should examine the matter to see if there are “special
 

facts and circumstances present in the case before it” that
 

present an “intolerably high” risk of unfairness. Id.
 

15 In Brown I, we noted that the JTC’s application of the


listed factors to judicial misconduct proceedings, by


“ensur[ing] a consistent rule of law,” would assist in


maintaining due process rights for JTC respondents. Brown I,
 

supra at 1295. We recognized that “[d]ue process of law is


essentially the legal equivalent of procedural fairness . . .


[and] a concept that ‘calls for such procedural protections as


the particular situation demands.’” Id., citing Mathews v
 

Eldridge, 424 US 319, 333-334; 96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18


(1976), and In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 110-111; 499 NW2d 752


(1993). As we have indicated in this opinion, the JTC


appropriately analyzed respondent’s conduct in light of the


Brown factors, and in doing so, afforded respondent adequate


due process protection.
 

22
 
 

We find, in reliance upon Withrow and the Michigan
 

authorities, that the procedures followed by the JTC in
 

reaching its decision conformed to the constitution and the
 

court rules, and afforded respondent sufficient due process
 

protections. We further conclude that there were no special
 

facts or circumstances which would suggest that the risk of
 

unfairness here, if indeed there was any, was “intolerably
 

high.” Mikesell, supra at 531. As to the procedures, first,
 

pursuant to MCR 9.207(B)(3), the JTC conducted a preliminary
 

investigation to determine whether respondent’s alleged
 

conduct warranted further action. Second, after determining
 

that sufficient evidence of misconduct existed, the JTC filed
 

a formal complaint pursuant to MCR 9.208. Third, a master was
 

appointed,16 notice was given, and a hearing was then afforded
 

respondent under MCR 9.210(A) and MCR 9.211, with the JTC’s
 

executive director serving as prosecutor-examiner under MCR
 

9.201(6). Fourth, after the hearing, when objections were
 

lodged against the master’s findings, the examiner under MCR
 

9.216 issued such objections in writing, with a supporting
 

brief. MCR 9.216. Finally, the JTC’s conclusion that Judge
 

Chrzanowski should be disciplined was ultimately just a
 

16 Although it is not required that a master preside at


a disciplinary hearing, the JTC under MCR 9.210 may request


this Court to appoint a master, as it did in this case.
 

23
 
 

recommendation to this Court that we are charged to review de
 

novo pursuant to deciding what discipline, if any, is
 

appropriate. As in Withrow, the JTC’s investigative and
 

adjudicative procedures are functionally separate;
 

additionally, as distinct from Withrow, in which the
 

investigation and the decision were undertaken by the same
 

Medical Examining Board, here the master, the examiner, and
 

the JTC panel are separate entities. If the board in Withrow
 

did not violate due process rights by investigating, and then
 

adjudicating claims, it can hardly be argued that the JTC’s
 

procedures violated due process. Further, a majority of the
 

members of the JTC are judges, and all the members who
 

ultimately recommend discipline are assumed to be fair and
 

impartial. We conclude then that there was no actual bias in
 

the JTC’s decision. It had authority to review the master’s
 

findings de novo, and reasonably determined, by a
 

preponderance of the evidence, that respondent had in fact
 

made false statements. We find these procedures adequately
 

separated the JTC’s investigative and adjudicative functions.17
 

C. THE PROPORTIONALITY OF THE JTC’S RECOMMENDATION
 

17 There were three levels of review in the instant case:
 

(1) the master’s findings and conclusions issued after the


public hearing, (2) the JTC’s de novo findings and
 

recommendations, and (3) this Court’s de novo review.
 

24
 
 

The JTC has recommended that respondent be suspended for
 

one year without pay. Respondent argues that, in light of
 

previous JTC recommendations, this sanction is
 

disproportionate. Respondent cites several opinions written
 

before Brown I and Brown II in which various sanctions were
 

meted out for incidents of judicial misconduct. However, as
 

Brown I indicated, review by this Court of previous judicial
 

disciplinary proceedings has sometimes been “hampered because
 

the standards by which the JTC [produced] its recommendations
 

[were not always] apparent.” Brown I, supra at 1292. Rather
 

than analyze each of the cases raised by respondent in her
 

argument challenging the proportionality of the recommended
 

sanction, we have chosen instead to examine the
 

proportionality of her sanction in light of the JTC’s
 

application of the Brown factors. Here, as outlined in part
 

III, the JTC set forth its analysis in the context of these
 

factors. We find this analysis to be reasonably done and
 

therefore accord the recommendations of the JTC considerable
 

deference.18
 

18 Respondent argues that the inordinate amount of
 

publicity surrounding her case influenced the JTC to recommend


a harsher sanction than deserved. We disagree. As noted in
 

this opinion, Canon 2(A) provides that “[a] judge must avoid


all impropriety and appearance of impropriety,” and “[a] judge


must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny.”
 

25
 
 

This Court assesses the proportionality of the JTC’s
 

recommendations of discipline, with the goal of “maintain[ing]
 

the honor and the integrity of the judiciary, deter[ring]
 

similar conduct, and further[ing] the administration of
 

justice.” In re Hocking, 451 Mich 1, 24; 546 NW2d 234 (1996).
 

“[T]he purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish but to
 

maintain the integrity of the judicial process.” In re Moore,
 

supra at 118. We conclude that the JTC’s recommendation of a
 

one-year suspension of respondent without pay was a clearly
 

reasonable one.
 

However, the JTC could not have known, and thus did not
 

consider, the overall length of respondent’s interim
 

suspension, which has continued until the issuance of this
 

opinion. We believe that some consideration should be given
 

to the chastening effect of respondent’s seventeen-month
 

interim suspension from judicial duties, although such
 

suspension has been with pay. In a democratically elected
 

These provisions embody the concept that judges are
 

particularly susceptible to public scrutiny, and that they


must take appropriate account of the effects of their conduct


upon the public’s perception of the courts and the justice


system. While we do not agree that the JTC’s recommendation


here was unduly influenced by the media’s focus, we
 

nevertheless observe that caution must invariably be exercised


by the JTC (as well as by this Court) to ensure that the


attentions of the media upon particular judicial misconduct


are placed in an appropriate perspective. 


26
 
judicial system, such as we have in Michigan, suspension of a
 

judge from judicial activities is itself a sanction with
 

considerable consequences, and we believe that respondent has
 

incurred many of those consequences. We conclude that in this
 

unique case it is reasonable to accord respondent credit for
 

six months of her seventeen-month interim suspension.
 

Accordingly, pursuant to MCR 9.225,19 we modify the
 

recommendation of the JTC only to accord respondent credit for
 

six months of the seventeen-month interim suspension that she
 

has already served.20 Therefore, we direct the following
 

disciplinary action in this case:
 

This cause having been brought to this Court
 

by the recommendation of the Judicial Tenure
 

Commission and having been briefed and argued by


counsel, it is ordered that Respondent Hon. Susan
 

19 MCR 9.225 provides:
 

The Supreme Court shall review the record of


the proceedings and shall file a written opinion


and judgment which may direct censure, removal,


retirement, suspension, or other disciplinary


action, or reject or modify the recommendations of
 

the commission. [emphasis added.]
 

See also In re Hathaway, 464 Mich 672, 685; 630 NW2d 850
 

(2001).
 

20 We concur with the JTC that respondent should not be


permanently removed from the bench. We believe that evidence
 

of respondent’s reputation and her past conduct on the court,


apart from that at issue in the present case, suggest that she


possesses the ability to serve honorably upon the bench, and


to fully live up the Code of Judicial Conduct. 


27
 
 

 

R. Chrzanowski shall be suspended from the
 

discharge of all judicial and administrative
 

duties, without pay, for a period of twelve months.


However, respondent shall receive credit for six


months served during the period of her interim


suspension. Respondent shall serve the remainder


of her twelve-month suspension, six months without


pay, to begin January 1, 2002. After June 30,


2002, respondent may return to the bench of the 37th
 

District Court to serve the remainder of her term.
 

Respondent’s conduct on the bench was unbecoming of the
 

office that she holds. Her actions undermined public
 

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
 

and were prejudicial to the administration of justice. Const
 

1963, art 6, § 30. “As the cornerstone of our tripartite
 

system of government, the judiciary has a public trust to both
 

uphold and represent the rule of law.” Hocking, supra at 6.
 

“[J]udges . . . are bound to conduct themselves with honor and
 

dignity.” Id.
 

We conclude, as did the JTC, that respondent’s conduct
 

was violative of the standards established by the
 

constitution, the Michigan Court Rules, and the Code of
 

Judicial Conduct. We emphasize, moreover, that respondent is
 

being disciplined only for her improper appointments of
 

counsel, her failure to disclose those appointments, and for
 

her false statements to the interviewing officers. 


VII. CONCLUSION


 We conclude that the JTC reasonably determined that
 

respondent’s actions in the foregoing case constituted
 

28
 
judicial misconduct sufficient to subject her to the sanctions
 

set forth in this opinion. Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), the
 

Clerk is directed to issue the judgment order forthwith.
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, and YOUNG,
 

JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.
 

29