### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE Fe br ua ry 3, 200 4 S es sio n

JE NNIFER LYNN WO LERY BRANHAM v . JEFFERY W AYNE BRANHAM

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Ham blen Coun ty No. 2001-636 Hon. Thomas R. F rier son, II., Ju dge

F ILED APR IL 2, 2004

No. E2003-01253-COA- R3-CV

Mother petitioned the Court to re locate to Ke ntucky with the parties c hil d, which the Trial Court g rante d. On appe al, we a ffirm.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , J

. delivere d the opi nion of the c ourt, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.

De nis e Te rry

Sta ple ton , M or

ri sto wn , T e nn e sse e , f

or Ap pe lla nt.

J ack W. B ower s and Jama L . McMurray , Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, f or Appe llee.

OP IN ION

This action is post-divorce involving the custody of t he parties’ m inor child and the mother’s re location to Middlesboro, Kentuc ky . The pa rties wer e divor ced on F ebrua ry 19, 2002, and their Mar ital Dissoluti on Ag ree ment was i n co rp orate d into the Final De cre e. The Parenting Plan provides for

the ca re of Anna, bor n Marc h 16, 1994, and states the mothe r will be re sponsible for Anna e x cept f

o r F r id a y a t 5 p

. m. to Su n d a y a t 9 p

. m. e v e r y o th e r w e e k
, w h e n s h e w il l b e in the fathe r’ s c are . The pla n als o state s tha t th e fathe r w ill ha ve An na e ve ry Wed ne sd a y

fr om 3 p. m. u nti l Th ur sd a y a t 8 a .m. , p lus 10 a dd iti on a l ho ur s p e r w e e k as de te rm ine d by the pa re nts

. Th e pa

re nts a lso alterna ted h o li d a y s , s c h o o l b r e a k s , a n d b irth d a y s w ith th e c h il d

. T h e mo th e r w a s d e s ig n a te d as

caring f or Anna during the summer, but the fa ther wa s g iven two wee ks out of every month during-2-

the summer as w ell.

The plan f

urther sta t es t hat the mother a nd fathe r will alterna te transportation for

wee kend visits, a n d t h at t h e father will “pr ovide transportation for we ekday s to and from school during the school term.” Under the hea ding “L ong Distance Transportation Costs: [I f Applica ble]:”, the plan states that mother will pay half and fathe r wil l pay half. All dec ision-making w ith reg ard
to the c hil d w a s d e sig nate d to be join t, an d th e fathe r w a s d e sig na te d to pa y $2 00 .0 0 p e r m on th i n child support.

The pa rties also ag ree d that any

disag ree ments reg arding the plan would be submitted to a Rule 31 mediator.

On Octobe r 8, 2002, the fathe r filed a Petition for Contempt and to ModifyShared Parenting Time, and st ated that there had been a material cha ng e in circ umstances since the divorce
, and that he was concerned about the child’s safe ty and we ll-being while with the mother due to the
mothe r’ s b oy frie nd ’s be ha vio r. Th e fathe r a sk e d th a t th e Co urt f indthat a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in circ umstances ha d occu rre d which would wa rra nt a cha ng e of primary residential pa

renting from mother to fathe r.

The Tr ial Court then enter ed an O rder to Mediate pursua nt to Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 31. The wife filed an Answer and Counter-Petition to Modify Shared Parenting Time, and a dmitted that

a ma te ri a l cha ng e of c ir c ums ta nc e s had oc c ur re d sinc e the div or c e , b ut d e nie d th a t th e fathe r s ho uld be desig nated primary

residential pa

rent. She a dmitted that she resided w ith Mr. L awton, as he was h erh u s b an d
, an d gen er al l y d en i ed t h e f

at h er ’s al l ega t i o n s as t o L aw t o n

. S h e a l l ege d t h at t h e c h an ge of circ umstances ha d occur red w hen she ma

rried Mr . L awton, and tha t Mr

. L awton had pur chase d

a ho me in K e ntu c ky . Sh e fu rthe r sta te d th a t sh e ha d a dv ise d th e fathe r tha t sh e wa nte d to mov e to Kentucky beca use that wa s where L awton lived, and tha t is where he r job was, a nd that s h e had

ma ile d a c e rt if ie d le tte r t o th e fathe r w hic h c on ta ine d h e r no tic e of int e nt to mov e

. Th e fathe r d id not file a re sponse to the notice within 30 day s as re quired by Tenn. Code Ann. §36- 6-108.

Th e mothe r pr op os e d th a t th e Pare nti ng Pla n b e mod if ie d s uc h th a t th e fathe r w ou ld

rec eive pa

renting time every

other we ekend, a nd two wee ks in J une an d J uly . She proposed that since she spent a gre ater

amount of par enting time with the child, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §36- 6-108, she should be pe rmitted to reloca te to Kentucky with the child.

After other mot ions and responses were filed, the C ourt held a he aring in the case on Marc h 10, 2003 at which the te stimonyof seve ral witnesse s were offe red.

The Court ente red Judgment on May 19, 2003 and found that the fa ther’s a lleg ations reg arding Mr. L awton and his be havior we re not pro v en , an d t hat “the e vidence does not preponde rate in favor of

a finding that Mr. L awton’s temper has eff ecte d a deleterious i mpact upon minor children r esiding in his home.” The Court also found tha t Mr. L awton’s phone conver sations with the fathe r had not a dverse ly impacted Anna , but he did direct that a ll future ar rang ements be-3-

handled be tween mother and father without Mr. L awton’s pa rticipation. The Court conc luded that

ne ith e r p are nt h a d e stab lis he d a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s w hic h w ou ld w arr a nt a modification in the primary residential status of the mother. Howe ver, the court said that “ the manifest best intere sts of Anna Bra nham warrante d an alteration in pare nting sc hedules a s defined by the Permane nt Parenting Plan.”

The Court then de termined that the mother should be allowed to re locate to Ke ntucky wi th A nn a , a ndor de re d a dju stm e nts in the pa re nti ng tim e s a ndsc he du le s.

Wit h reg ard to re locat i o n , the Court found that Tenn. Code Ann. §36-6-108 controlled, a nd that the fa ther ha d failed to prove his allegation that the relocation posed a threat of sp e c if ic a ndse ri ou s h arm

to the c hil d.

. Th e Cou rt

fo un d th a t th e re loc a tio n h a d a re a so na ble pu rp os e and wa s not for a vindictive motive or i ntended to defe at or de ter the visitation rig hts of the fa ther.

The Tr ial Court held that Tenn. Code Ann.§36- 6-108(d) was applicable whic h states in p e rt ine nt p art :

I f the pa rents ar e not actually spending substantially equal intervals of t ime with the

c hil d a nd the pa

re nt s pe nd ing the g re a te r a mou nt o f t ime wi th the c hil d p ro po se s to reloc ate with the c hild . . .

The father insists that Tenn. Cod e Ann.§36- 6-108(c ) is applicable , beca use he a rg ues the par ents wer e “a ctually spending substantially

equal inter vals of time with the child”. The undisputed proof shows that the c hild spent approxim ately 35% of the time w ith the father . Taking into acc ount the di sputed proof of visitation, for not being allowed to visit bythe mother, a s claimed b y t h e f a t h e r , t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t i m e w i t h t h e f a t h e r w o u l d b e ap p r o x i m a t e l y 4 0 %

. In W

oolman v. W oolman , 2001 WL

1660714 (Tenn. Ct. App. De cembe r 28, 2001), the T rial Court found that Section (c) applied bec ause the parties in that ca se “sha red joint leg al and phy s i ca l cu s t ody of the children, a nd they

both testified that “t h ey s p ent s ubstantially equal a mounts of time with the children” . I n Monroe v. Robinson
, 2003 WL 132463 (Tenn. Ct. App. J anuary 16, 2003), the Court held t hat where the marital dissolution agr eeme nt require d the par ents to share joint custodyof the children, tha t the Court r easone d that a 57% time w ith one pare nt and 43% with the other under the joint custody ag ree ment, was substantially equal. The se ca ses ar e distinguishable from the c ase a t ba r. I n th is c a se , un de r the pa re nti ng pla n, the mothe r i s c le arl y a wa rd e d mo re tim e wi th the c hil d

a ndre sp on sib ili tie s fo r “ the c are ” du ri ng that tim e

. We c on c lud e that th e a na ly sis a ndfi nd ing s in Cor ne ll v . Co rn e ll
, 2000 WL 122204 (Tenn. Ct. App. J anuary 25, 2000), is a pplicable. I n Cor

ne ll
, J udg e Susano explained:

Af t er the A aby decision [924 S.W .2d 634 Tenn. 1996] the L eg islature ena cted Chapter 910 of

the P u b lic Acts of 1998, whic h was c odified at T.C.A. §36-6- 108. Th is s ta tut e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

(c ) I f the pa

re nts are a c tually

sp e nd ing su bs ta nti a lly

e qu a l in te rv a ls o f t ime-4- with the child and the r eloca ting pa rent see ks to m o v e wi th the child, the other pa rent may , with i n t h i rt y

(30) da y s of re ceipt of notice , file a pe tition in o pp os iti on to r e mov a l of the c hil d. No pr e su mpt ion in f a vo r o f o r a g a ins t the re quest to relocate with the child shall arise

. T h e co u rt shall determine wh e the r o r no t to pe rm it re loc a tio n o f the c hil d b a se d u po n th e be st i nte re sts of the c hild.

. . . (d) I f the pa

rents ar e not ac tually

spending su bstantially

equal inter vals of tim e wi th the c hil d a ndthe pa re nt s pe nd ing the g re a te r a mou nt o f t ime wi th the child proposes to re locate w ith the child, the other pare nt ma y , within the thi rt y (3 0) d ay s o f r e c e ipt

of the no tic e , f

ile a pe tit ion in o pp os iti on to

remova l of the child. The other pare nt ma y not attempt to relocate with the ch i l d u n l es s ex p re s s l y

au t h o ri z ed t o d o s o b y

t h e co u rt p u rs u an t t o a c h an ge of cus t o d y o r primary

custodial responsibility . The pa rent spending the g reater amount of time w ith the child shall be permitted to relocate with the

c hil d u nle ss the c ou rt

fi nd s:

. . .

. . . T he mos t si g nif

ic a nt c ha ng e in the la w o f r e mov a l of c hil dr e n in a

c us tod y c a se is the introduction of the distinction between pa rents who spe nd “substantially equal intervals of time” with their children a nd those who do not. I n case s of par ents who spend substantially

equal time with their c hildren, a c ourt simply applies the fa miliar be st i nte re st a na ly sis to d e te rm ine wh e the r a pa re nt m a y re mov e the c hil d. I f the tim e spent is not substantiallyequal, one of th e fo l l o wi n g g rounds must be established be fo re a c ou rt e ng a g e d in a bes t inte re st an a ly sis : (1) the re is no r e a so na ble pu rp os e for the r eloca tion; (2) the re location p o s es a thre at of spec ific, ser ious harm to the

c hil d; o r ( 3) the pa

re nt’ s mo tiv e fo r the re loc a tio n is vin dic tiv e , a s t hat con c e pt i s de fi ne d i n th e sta tut e . I f n on e of the g ro un ds is f

ou nd , th e c us tod ia l pa

re nt i s permitted to move with the childre n.

The trial c ourt relied on the new statute and the Aa by case in determining that Mother should be pe rmitted to reloca te with the childre n. Whil e F at h er does not dispute the applica

bil i t y of the statute, he contends that the tria l court er red in the

c ri tic a l th re sh oldde te rm inatio n o f w ha t pa rt of the statut e app lie s to th e fa c ts o f this

case . Specifica lly , he ar g ues that t he trial court erre d in finding that the time spent by the pa rt ie s w it h th e c hil dr e n w a s n ot s ub sta nti a lly e qu a l. F a the r a sse rt s th a t hi s vis ita tio n wi th the c hil dr e n ha s c on sis te ntl y be e n mor e tha n 40 % a nd that by the tim e of the he aring on Mother’s motion for permission to move , he wa s with the children

ne arl y 50 % o f the tim e . M oth e r d isa g re e s w ith the fathe r’ s ca lc ulatio ns of his tim e sp e nt w ith the c hil dr e n a nd a sse rt s tha t Fa the r ne ve r re c e ive d an y mor e vis ita tio n, in-5- g ross, than that spec ified in the divorce judgme nt. I f this be the c as e, it is obvious from the language o f t h e divorc e judg ment that the time with the children is not

su bs ta nti a lly

e qu a l.

The Con ne ll

Court the n held that the par ents wer e not spending substantially equal intervals of time with the c hildren.

We affir m the finding s of the Tria l Court that s u b s ec t i o n (d) a pplies to this case, Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We lik ew i s e af fi rm the Tria l Court’s finding tha t none of the statutory fac tors wer e prove n to deny the mother’s r eloca tion.

Both pa rents cla im that material cha ng e in circ umstances ha s occur red since the div or c e . T he Tr ia l Co urt f ou nd that nei the r pare nt ha d sho wn a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s,

a ndthat a c ha ng e of

c us tod ia l a

rr a ng e me nt w a s n ot wa

rr a nte d. Th e e vid e nc e do e s no t pr e po nd e rate ag ainst this finding, Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)

.

Whil e the r eloca tion is not a g reat distance fr om the fathe r, the Tr ial Court modified visitation. The Trial Court allowed the fathe r more pare nting time in the summer to c ompensate f or ha vin g le ss d ur ing th e sch oo l y e ar, bu t th e mothe r a rg ue s th is i s u nf

a ir to h e r b e c a us e it w ill on ly leave her one wee k during the summer with the child. At trial, she indicate d this arra ng ement wa s satisfac tory , and we find no basis to alter the T rial Court’s visitation schedule.

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns w e a f fi rm the Judg me nt o f the Tr ia l Co urt a ndre ma nd , w ith the c os t of

the app e a l a sse sse d to Jef fe ry Wayne B ra nh a m.

_________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , J.