alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Richard L. Leza, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to
my knowledge, the Annual Report of Exar Corporation on Form 10-K for the period ended March 31, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in
such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Exar Corporation.

Date:
June 12, 2007



|                                                                          
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/    RICHARD L. LEZA                                                    
|Richard L. Leza                                                           
|Chief Executive Officer and President (Interim), and Chairman of the Board
|(Principal Executive Officer)
Giving Blood
        -  Why donate? 
        -  What is the process? 
        -  What are the donation types? 
        -  Can I donate? 
        -  What if I have concerns? 
        -  Who benefits? 
        -  Where can I donate? 

# Why Blood Donation is So Critical

## Why do people donate?

Everyone has their own reasons for donating blood, but a few common ones include:
                - Donating is a generous thing to do. It helps people in need, and it helps people in your community.  When you give, others live.
                - Donors, especially those who donate regularly, keep our nation’s blood supply stable. Although many people donate blood after disasters, blood is needed every day of the year.
                - There is no substitute for blood. Donors provide the only supply of life-saving blood for those in need.
                - Donating is simple, fast, and convenient. The donation process can take as little as 45 minutes of your time, but can make a lifelong difference for someone else.

Learn more about who benefits from blood donation.

## How is my blood used?

If you donate blood, it will be given to someone who needs it through a transfusion. Transfusions help replace blood that is lost due to surgery or injury. Transfusions also help people with disorders that prevent them from making blood correctly. Blood transfusions are one of the most common procedures in U.S. hospitals.

There are different kinds of blood donation. Each one is used for a variety of life-saving procedures and treatments.
                - Red blood cells are given to people who have blood disorders, such as sickle cell disease or chronic anemia caused by kidney failure or bleeding in the stomach. They are also given to people who have acute blood loss from trauma. Sometimes babies born very early need a transfusion to increase the number of red blood cells in their bodies.
                - Platelets are most often used to treat cancer. They are also given to patients who have open-heart surgery and organ transplants.
                - Plasma transfusions are used for patients with liver failure, bad infections, and serious burns.
                - “Whole blood” is usually given to people who have life-threatening injuries or people in surgery.

September 27, 2022

## Find a Donation Center

Association for the Advancement of Blood & Biotherapies (AABB)  provides a location service for blood centers across the U.S. Find a donation center near you and make an appointment to save lives today.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Thomas Hart, Appellant.

[655 NYS2d 393]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Orgera, J.), rendered August 9, 1995, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict on the ground of juror misconduct. Absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right, proof of juror misconduct does not entitle a defendant to a new trial *(see, People v Irizarry,*83 NY2d 557, 561; *People v Clark,*81 NY2d 913, 914). Here, although a juror failed to disclose during voir dire that her husband had been accused of a crime, the record establishes that this did not preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict. Accordingly, the defendant was not prejudiced by the juror’s misconduct.

We also find that a missing witness charge was unnecessary under the circumstances *(see, People v Macana,*84 NY2d 173; *People v Doros,*217 AD2d 415), and that the trial court’s identification charge was proper *(see, People v Knight,*87 NY2d 873; *People v Whalen,*59 NY2d 273).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. O’Brien, J. P., Thompson, Joy and Florio, JJ., concur.
#### Wilder Morris BLITCH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 66-94.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Jan. 17, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1967.

Ellis S. Rubin, Sheldon M. Yavitz, Miami Beach, for appellant.

*2Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Arden M. Siegendorf, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before HENDRY, C. J., and PEARSON and CARROLL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

An information was filed against the defendant for committing the felony of mayhem. The information recites that “said defendant did cut, slit and mutilate the nose of one John Whitney Nixon, Jr., with a broken porcelain beer mug.” The defendant entered a plea of not guilty and waived jury trial.

At the conclusion of the state’s case in chief, the trial court reduced the charge to aggravated assault on defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault and sentenced to eighteen months in the state penitentiary.

The defendant contends that a charge of mayhem that fails to allege the use of a deadly weapon does not include the lesser offense of aggravated assault. Defendant also contends that the beer mug should not have been admitted into evidence without the establishment of an unbroken chain of possession from the time of the alleged assault or recovery of the beer mug to the time of its presentation in court.

 To include the lesser offense of aggravated assault, a charge must allege that the assault was made with a deadly weapon. Lindsey v. State, 53 Fla. 56, 43 So. 87 (1907). Our Supreme Court has defined a deadly weapon as “one likely to produce death or great bodily injury”, and stated that “[wjhether or not the weapon involved is to be classed as ‘deadly’ is a factual question to be resolved by the jury under appropriate instructions.” Goswick v. State, Fla.1962, 143 So.2d 817, 820.

The charge of mayhem alleged that the injury was caused by a broken porcelain beer mug. The trial judge, as trier of facts, found that the beer mug was a deadly weapon. Therefore, the charge of mayhem did include the lesser offense of aggravated assault. •

The victim testified that during the altercation in the back seat of his car with the defendant he saw something white up in the air' which was followed by a sharp blow on the side of his head. The victim . stated that the sharp blow was caused by something a lot harder than a fist, “like it could have been the beer mug hitting the side of my face, and then the handle breaking and cutting my nose”. The victim drove home and found the body of the beer mug without its handle in his car a short time after the incident. Approximately twenty minutes after the incident he returned to the scene of the incident and found the handle of the mug. A police officer testified that the victim gave him the beer mug and handle and that he retained custody of them until they were presented to the court.

' The testimony of the victim and of the police officer sufficiently identified and established continuity of possession to admit the beer mug and handle into evidence.

Therefore, the judgment appealed is affirmed.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>   1

                                   EXHIBIT 11

                           STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE




<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                              Three Months Ended     Nine Months Ended
                                                June 30, 1997          June 30, 1997  
                                              ------------------     -----------------
<S>                                           <C>                      <C>
Net Income                                      $   291,504              1,242,137
                                                  =========              =========

Weighted average shares outstanding               3,246,720              3,595,652

Reduction for common shares not yet
 released by Employee Stock Ownership Plan         (265,660)              (270,950)

Common stock equivalents due to dilutive
 effect of stock options                             72,174                 54,048
                                                  ---------              ---------

Total weighted average common shares and
 equivalents outstanding for primary
 computation                                      3,053,234              3,378,750
                                                  =========              =========

Primary earnings per share                      $       .10                    .37
                                                        ===                    ===

Total weighted average common shares and
 equivalents outstanding for primary
 computation                                      3,053,234              3,378,750

Additional dilutive shares using the end
 of period market value versus the average
 market value when applying the treasury
 stock method*                                            -                  6,658
                                                  ---------              ---------

Total weighted average common shares and
 equivalents outstanding for fully diluted
 computation                                      3,053,234              3,385,408
                                                  =========              =========

Fully diluted earnings per share                $       .10                    .37
                                                        ===                    ===
</TABLE>


*  Note:  If the average share price is greater than the ending price, use
          average price for both primary and fully diluted calculation.





                                      -18-
**Exhibit 23.2**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We have issued our report dated February 17, 2005, accompanying the December 31, 2004 consolidated financialstatements included in the Annual Report of Unitil Corporation and subsidiaries on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in the Registration Statements of UnitilCorporation and subsidiaries on Form S-8 (File No. 333-114978 effective April 29, 2004), Form S-3 (File No. 333-42264 effective July 26, 2000) and on Form S-8 (File No. 333-42266 effective July 26, 2000.) 

 

/s/ GRANT THORNTON, LLP 

 

Boston, Massachusetts 

February 20, 2007
Exhibit 23

Independent Auditors' Consent

The
Board of Directors
NeoRx Corporation:

We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos. 333-65862, 333-35442, 333-43712, and 333-45398) on
Form S-3 and in the registration statements (Nos. 333-89476, 333-71368, 33-43860, 33-46317, 33-87108,
333-32583 and 333-41764) on Form S-8 of NeoRx Corporation of our report dated January 24, 2002, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of
NeoRx Corporation and subsidiary as of December 31, 2002 and 2001, and the related consolidated statements of operations, shareholders' equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the
three-year period ended December 31, 2002, which report appears in the December 31, 2002, annual report on Form 10-K of NeoRx Corporation.

/s/
KPMG LLP

Seattle,
Washington
March 28, 2003

---

QuickLinks
251 La. 734

#### Joy Reeves MANLEY v. L. B. MANLEY.

No. 49020.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 2, 1968.

In re: L. B. Manley applying for certorari, or writ of review, to -the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Caddo. 203 So.2d 832.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, we find no error of law in the judgment complained of.
# Official Journal L 280/2019

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 280 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6231 October 2019 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 280

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6231 October 2019

---

| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1776 of 9 October 2019 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff | 1 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1776 of 9 October 2019 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.
#### Ricketts, Appellant, *v.*Capwell.

*Equity*— Demurrer—Prior *opinion of Supreme Court.*

A demurrer to a bill in equity is properly sustained where the complaint of the bill is that the action of the court in dismissing’ complainant’s original bill was manifestly erroneous though such action had been affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Argued April 14, 1913.

Appeal, No. 362, Jan. T., 1912, by plaintiff, from decree of C. P. Luzerne Co., in equity, Jan. T., 1912, No. 362, sustaining demurrer to bill in equity in case of Agib Ricketts v. R. U. Capwell and Benton Coleman, Executors of Isaac B. Felts, deceased.

Before Brown, Mestrezat, Potter, Elkin and Moschzisker, JJ.

Affirmed.

Bill in equity for conveyance of property.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

*Error assigned*was the decree of the court.

*Alexander Ricketts,*with Mm *William, 8. McLean,*for appellant.

*John McGahren,*with him *J. M. Walker,*for appellee.

May 19, 1913:

Per Curiam,

In the opinion of the court below, sustaining the demurrer to the appellant’s bill, his proceeding is not inaptly termed “unique, if not anomalous.” His complaint is that the action of the court in dismissing his original bill was “manifestly erroneous,” though affirmed by this court; and his prayer is that the court below correct our error, as well as its own, by reversing the decree made three years ago: Ricketts v. Capwell, 228 Pa. 268. Even if the demurrer is fairly open to criticism as a “speaking” one, there is sufficient in it to *139constitute it a good one, calling for tlie dismissal of the bill. On its face the complainant shows no right to what he prays for.

Appeal dismissed at appellant’s costs.
Exhibit 32



<PAGE>



      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Royce Biomedical Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), Kathy Jiang, the President
and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to the best of her knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects the financial condition and results of the Company.



                                       Royce Biomedical Inc.



June 2, 2004                           By: /s/ Kathy Jiang
                                           -------------------------------
                                           Kathy Jiang, President and Principal
                                           Financial Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 119 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 119

    To prohibit the application of certain restrictive eligibility 
 requirements to foreign nongovernmental organizations with respect to 
the provision of assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act 
                                of 1961.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

             January 23 (legislative day, January 3), 2013

  Mrs. Boxer introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To prohibit the application of certain restrictive eligibility 
 requirements to foreign nongovernmental organizations with respect to 
the provision of assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act 
                                of 1961.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Global Democracy Promotion Act''.

SEC. 2. ASSISTANCE FOR FOREIGN NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS UNDER PART 
              I OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, regulation, or policy, 
in determining eligibility for assistance authorized under part I of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), foreign 
nongovernmental organizations--
            (1) shall not be ineligible for such assistance solely on 
        the basis of health or medical services, including counseling 
        and referral services, provided by such organizations with non-
        United States Government funds if such services do not violate 
        the laws of the country in which they are being provided and 
        would not violate United States Federal law if provided in the 
        United States; and
            (2) shall not be subject to requirements relating to the 
        use of non-United States Government funds for advocacy and 
        lobbying activities other than those that apply to United 
        States nongovernmental organizations receiving assistance under 
        part I of such Act.
                                 <all>
```
NUMBER 13-91-00028-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

______________________________________________________________

TALMAGE M. GUY AND SOL B. WEIL, III, Appellants,

v.

DAMSON OIL CORPORATION, ET AL., Appellees.

_____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 23rd District Court of Wharton County, Texas.

______________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez, and Benavides

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

The last activity in this appeal occurred on May 7, 2001, when appellants filed a

motion to return the case to the Wharton County District Court for final determination.

Since May 7, 2001, there has been no activity in this appeal. On March 19, 2009, the

Court ordered the parties to file an advisory regarding the status of the appeal and, if

applicable, a motion to reinstate the appeal or a motion to dismiss the appeal. 
2

The parties have responded to the order by informing the Court that they no longer

desire to prosecute their appeal and do not oppose dismissing the case. Accordingly, we

reinstate and dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b).

Other pending motions, if any, are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this the 30th day of April, 2009.
NUMBER 13-10-00022-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

JOSE RAMOS, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 94th District Court 

of Nueces County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, Jose Ramos, was convicted of assault. On January 13, 2010, 

appellant filed a notice of appeal by and through his attorney. Counsel for appellant 

subsequently informed this Court that appellant did not intend to prosecute his appeal. 

Counsel filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, but the motion was denied because it did not 

contain appellant’s signature. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2 (a). 
2

On April 29, 2011, this Court abated the appeal because of counsel=s failure to file 

a brief and ordered the trial court to determine whether appellant desired to prosecute this 

appeal. Following the trial court hearing, the trial court issued an order that the appeal 

be dismissed. 

Although no written motion has been filed in compliance with Rule 42.2(a) of the 

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, based upon the order issued by the trial court we 

conclude that appellant does not want to continue his appeal and that good cause exists 

to suspend the operation of Rule 42.2(a) in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 2. 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Delivered and filed the

4th day of August, 2011.
#### Joe SCOTT, Appelant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-395.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 28, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Philadelphia District Attorney’s :

Office, :

Appellant :

: No. 1952 C.D. 2016

v. :

:

Gregory Stover :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 8

th day of December, 2017, it is ORDERED that the 

above-captioned opinion filed September 12, 2017, shall be designated OPINION 

rather than MEMORANDUM OPINION, and it shall be reported.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge