[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-12833

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

Agency No. A099-886-490

ANGEL TJHANG, 

 Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(March 26, 2013)

Before CARNES, BARKETT, and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Angel Tjhang seeks review of the Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum 

Case: 12-12833 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 1 of 9 
2

pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(a), withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), 

and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. 

§ 208.16(c). For the reasons set forth below, we deny Tjhang’s petition.

I.

Tjhang, a citizen of Indonesia, entered the United States in November 2005, 

and subsequently filed an application seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and 

CAT relief. In her supplemental statement, she claimed that she was persecuted in 

Indonesia because she was Chinese and a Buddhist, rather than a Muslim. Before 

the merits hearing, Tjhang submitted a copy of the U.S. State Department Country 

Report on International Religious Freedom for 2010 (“2010 Religious Freedom 

Report”) and the U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights 

Practices in Indonesia for 2009 (“2009 County Report”).

At the merits hearing, Tjhang testified that, from her birth in 1983 until 

1995, she lived in a city that was predominately Muslim. During that time, (1) her 

uncle was beaten by a native;1 (2) she was bullied by native boys touching her 

chest and pulling down her skirt, and her teachers did not punish the boys; (3) a 

native customer at her parents’ store threatened to kill her family; and (4) her 

 1 Tjhang testified at the hearing that the term “native” referred to a Muslim. 

Case: 12-12833 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 2 of 9 
3

native classmates attacked her in the pool and taunted her on the basis of her 

Chinese ethnicity. In 1995, she and her family moved to a city in Indonesia that 

was half Chinese and half Muslim, and in that city, Muslim men pushed her off of 

her bicycle, and she injured her lips and arm, although her arm did not need 

stiches. During riots in Indonesia in 1998, a group of natives attempted to rape her 

sister, and natives attempted to burn her uncle’s store, but she and other family 

members escaped the store and stayed at a hotel. Finally, in 2005, native men

attempted to touch her while she was riding on a motorcycle with her boyfriend. 

The native men kicked her boyfriend, and one of the native men had a knife, but 

Tjhang convinced the man not to stab her boyfriend. Although she was a Buddhist 

in Indonesia, she was baptized as a Christian in 2006 in the United States. 

In an oral decision, the IJ stated that he found Tjhang’s testimony credible. 

He stated that he was denying her application for asylum because she had not 

suffered past persecution and did not have a well-founded fear of future 

persecution on the basis of either her ethnicity or her religion, regardless of 

whether she was Buddhist or Christian. The IJ also determined she had failed to 

show that she was eligible for withholding of removal or CAT relief. The BIA 

dismissed Tjhang’s appeal and agreed with the IJ’s finding that the harassment 

Tjhang had suffered did not rise to the level of past persecution. The BIA affirmed 

the IJ’s determination that Tjhang did not possess a well-founded fear of future 

Case: 12-12833 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 3 of 9 
4

persecution on the basis of her Chinese ethnicity or her Christian beliefs if she 

returned to Indonesia, and the BIA stated that the documentary evidence supported 

the IJ’s determination. Because Tjhang had not satisfied her burden with respect to 

asylum, she had not satisfied the higher burden that applied with respect to 

withholding of removal. Further, because none of the harassment Tjhang 

experienced was perpetrated by, or with the acquiescence of, a government 

official, the BIA would not disturb the IJ’s determination that she was ineligible 

for CAT relief. 

II.

On appeal, Tjhang argues that the IJ erred in denying her application for 

asylum because her testimony before the IJ concerning the acts against her and her 

family showed that she was persecuted. Further, as she is a Christian, there is a 

risk that she would be persecuted in the future, as illustrated by the 2010 Religious 

Freedom Report. Tjhang asks us to hold that a pattern and practice of persecution 

against Christians in Indonesia exists based on the evidence in the 2010 Religious 

Freedom Report. She also asks us to consider the persuasive authority of the Ninth 

Circuit concerning the disfavored-group analysis and argues that, under this 

analysis, she is eligible for asylum. She asserts that she is also eligible for 

withholding of removal on the same basis that she is entitled to asylum. She 

argues that she qualifies for CAT relief based on her status as a Chinese-Christian 

Case: 12-12833 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 4 of 9 
5

Indonesian because she was persecuted in the past, and the government is taking 

little action to stop physical attacks against Christians. 

In a petition for review of a BIA decision, we review factual determinations 

under the substantial evidence test. Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 

1350 (11th Cir. 2009). Under the substantial evidence test, we draw every 

reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of the decision, and reverse a 

finding of fact only if the record compels reversal. Id. at 1351. The fact that the 

record may support a contrary conclusion is insufficient to reverse. Id. We review

the BIA’s decision as the final judgment, unless the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s 

decision. Id. at 1350. Where the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision, we will 

review the decisions of both the BIA and the IJ. Id. 

An applicant for asylum must meet the INA’s definition of a refugee. INA 

§ 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). The INA defines a refugee as:

any person who is outside of any country of such person’s nationality 

. . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 

unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country 

because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 

social group, or political opinion.

INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 

To show eligibility for asylum, an applicant may satisfy her burden of proof 

in either of two ways. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1230-31 (11th 

Cir. 2005). First, she may show that she was persecuted in the past in her home 

Case: 12-12833 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 5 of 9 
6

country on a protected ground. Id. If the applicant demonstrates past persecution, 

there is a rebuttable presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future 

persecution. Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Second, an applicant may meet her burden by establishing that she has a 

well-founded fear that she will be persecuted in the future on account of a 

protected ground. Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231. She must demonstrate that her 

well-founded fear of future persecution is subjectively genuine and objectively 

reasonable. Id. The applicant must present specific, detailed facts that show a 

good reason to fear that she will be singled out for persecution. Id. However, the 

applicant does not need to prove that she would be singled out for persecution if 

she is a member of a group that is subjected to a pattern or practice of persecution 

in her country of nationality. See Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1354. When 

considering whether the applicant has established a pattern or practice of 

persecution in her home country, the BIA is entitled to rely heavily on the U.S. 

State Department’s Country Reports. Id. 

Persecution is an extreme concept and requires more than a few isolated 

incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation. See Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1229, 

1231 (providing that death threats to Sepulveda, her brother, and other members of 

her political group did not rise to the level of past persecution). In determining 

whether an applicant has suffered past persecution, the factfinder must consider the 

Case: 12-12833 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 6 of 9 
7

cumulative effects of any alleged incidents. See Delgado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 

F.3d 855, 861 (11th Cir. 2007). We may consider a threatening act against another 

as evidence that the applicant suffered persecution where that act concomitantly 

threatens the applicant. De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1009 n.7 

(11th Cir. 2008). 

The record demonstrates that Tjhang has failed to establish past persecution 

on account of a statutorily-protected factor. First, Tjhang’s statements and 

testimony establish that she had been subject to various assaults on the basis of her 

Chinese ethnicity. While the incidents directed at her certainly amount to 

harassment, it cannot be said that the record compels a finding that they met the 

“extreme” threshold level of persecution. See Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231. 

Rather, we have held that worse treatment than Tjhang suffered did not establish 

persecution. See, e.g., Djonda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 

2008) (holding that no persecution occurred when an alien was detained for 36 

hours after participating in a political rally, and during his detention, police officers 

beat him severely enough to warrant a 2-day hospital stay, several medications, 

and 2 weeks of rest); Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1350 (holding that an alien had not 

established past persecution when he was arrested while participating in a student 

demonstration, interrogated and beaten for five hours, detained for four days, 

subsequently monitored by Iranian authorities, and forced to appear before a 

Case: 12-12833 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 7 of 9 
8

university disciplinary committee and an Islamic court). Therefore, substantial 

evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Tjhang did not show past 

persecution. 

In addition, the record does not compel a finding that Tjhang has a 

well-founded fear of future persecution if she returns to Indonesia. Tjhang 

presented no evidence indicating that she would be singled out for persecution 

based on her Chinese-Christian status. Furthermore, there is no compelling 

evidence in the record that mandates finding a pattern and practice of persecuting 

Christians in Indonesia.2

 Tjhang points to statements in the 2010 Religious 

Freedom Report that indicated that 28 churches were closed in 2010 due to 

violence and intimidation, that there had been few convictions relating to the 

closings, that several local governments based their ordinances on Shari’a law, and 

that one province authorized Shari’a law. However, this does not compel a 

determination that there is a pattern or practice of persecution against Christians in 

Indonesia. The 2010 Religious Freedom Report also provided that the Indonesian 

Constitution provided for freedom of religion and that the Indonesian government 

generally respected religious freedom for the six officially recognized religions, 

which included Catholicism and Protestantism. Further, the ordinances based on 

Shari’a law were sporadically enforced and only applied to Muslims. The province 

 2 Tjhang does not raise any claim on appeal that a pattern or practice against ethnic 

Chinese exists in Indonesia, and thus, she has abandoned this claim. See Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 

1228 n.2. 

Case: 12-12833 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 8 of 9 
9

where Shari’a law was authorized also specifically exempted Christians, and 

enforcement had reduced since 2007. The 2009 Country Report stated that the 

Indonesian Constitution provided all persons the right to worship according to their 

own religions or beliefs, and the government generally respected that provision. 

Based on the evidence in these reports indicating that the Indonesian government 

generally respects freedom of religion, we conclude that the record does not 

compel reversal on this basis. Because we have held that the law does not permit 

weighing of an applicant’s membership in a targeted group along with his 

individualized risk of being targeted for persecution, we will not apply the 

disfavored-group analysis to evaluate Tjhang’s eligibility for asylum. See 

Mohammed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 547 F.3d 1340, 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, 

we conclude that Tjhang has failed to demonstrate that she was eligible for asylum. 

To qualify for withholding of removal and CAT relief, an applicant must 

establish standards more stringent than those for asylum eligibility. See Zheng, 

451 F.3d at 1292. Because Tjhang could not prove her entitlement to asylum 

relief, she necessarily failed to demonstrate that it was more likely than not that she 

would be persecuted or that she would be subjected to severe pain or suffering by, 

or with the acquiescence of, government officials in Indonesia. See id. 

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Tjhang’s petition.

DENY PETITION. 

Case: 12-12833 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 9 of 9