IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 3-1256 / 13-0981

Filed July 16, 2014

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHAD JAY ROUSE,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Christopher L. 

McDonald, Judge.

A defendant appeals his judgment and sentence for serious injury by 

vehicle by reckless driving and operating a motor vehicle while under the 

influence. He claims the district court erred in finding that it had no discretion to 

suspend his sentence. AFFIRMED.

Timothy McCarthy II of McCarthy & Hamrock, P.C., West Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney 

General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Kevin Bell, Assistant County 

Attorney, for appellee.

Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Mullins, J., and Miller, S.J.* McDonald, J., 

takes no part.

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013).
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VAITHESWARAN, P.J.

We must decide whether the district court had authority to suspend a 

sentence.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The State charged Chad Rouse with (1) serious injury by vehicle and 

(2) operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OWI). Rouse entered an 

Alford1plea to both charges, which the district court accepted.

The court proceeded to address a motion to adjudicate law points filed by 

Rouse on whether the court had authority to suspend the judgment or sentence 

on the serious-injury-by-vehicle count. The court found it had no authority to 

suspend the sentence. 

The court adjudged Rouse guilty and sentenced him to a prison term not 

exceeding five years on the first count and one year on the second count, with 

the terms to be served concurrently. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

A. Statutory Analysis

Rouse contends the district court had discretion to suspend his sentence 

on the serious-injury-by-vehicle count and the court’s interpretation of the 

pertinent statute raises constitutional concerns. Rouse’s contention requires a 

close examination of the provisions under which Rouse was charged and 

sentenced. 

 

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding “express admission of 

guilt . . . is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of [a] criminal penalty”).
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Rouse was charged under Iowa Code section 707.6A(4) (2013), which 

states: “A person commits a class ‘D’ felony when the person unintentionally 

causes a serious injury, as defined in section 321J.1, by any of the means 

described in subsection 1 or 2.” The means described in subsection 1 require 

the operation of “a motor vehicle while intoxicated.” Iowa Code § 707.6A(1). The 

means described in subsection 2 do not contain this element. The State relied 

on the means described in subsection 2 and, specifically, the means set forth in 

subsection 2(a): “driving a motor vehicle in a reckless manner with willful or 

wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” Iowa Code 

§ 707.6A(2)(a). 

Rouse’s sentence was governed, in part, by section 707.6A(7), which 

states:

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 901.5 and 907.3, 

the court shall not defer judgment or sentencing, or suspend 

execution of any part of the sentence applicable to the defendant 

for a violation of subsection 1, or for a violation of subsection 4 

involving the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

Iowa Code § 707.6A(7) (emphasis added). The district court relied on this 

provision in declining to suspend his sentence for serious injury by vehicle.

Rouse focuses on the italicized language of section 707.6A(7). He 

concedes he entered an Alford plea to a violation of subsection 4 but argues, 

because the means by which he committed the violation does not include the

element of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the court possessed the 

authority to suspend his sentence. 

The plain language of section 707.6A(7) undercuts Rouse’s reading. See 

State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 2006) (“We determine legislative 
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intent from the words chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have 

said.”). The provision disallows suspension of a sentence for a violation of 

subsection 4 “involving” operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The term 

“involving” is broad, variously meaning “to relate,” “to connect,” and “to entail.” 

Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 604 (1981); See Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d at 

541 (“Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law, words in 

the statute are given their ordinary and common meaning by considering the 

context within which they are used.”). Had the legislature intended to prohibit 

suspension of a sentence only where the means of committing serious injury by 

vehicle contained the element of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the 

legislature could have worded section 707.6A(7) as follows: “the court shall not 

defer judgment or sentencing, or suspend execution of any part of the sentence 

applicable to the defendant . . . for a violation of subsection 4 by the means 

described in subsection 1.” See Iowa Code § 707.6A(7). The legislature’s 

choice of broader language leads us to conclude that the prohibition of 

suspension contained in section 707.6A(7) is not limited to the means set forth in 

subsection 1.

Turning to the record, there is no question Rouse’s crime of serious injury 

by vehicle “involved” operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. First, Rouse

was charged with OWI in connection with the same incident as the serious-injuryby-vehicle count. Second, he entered an Alford plea to OWI at the same time 

and in the same proceeding as his plea to serious injury by vehicle. Because his 

crime “involved” the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the district 

court lacked authority to suspend his sentence for serious injury by vehicle. 
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B. Constitutional Analysis

In the alternative, Rouse argues that Iowa Code section 707.6A(7) 

“violates his right to equal protection as applied.” This constitutional challenge 

was not raised in the district court. However, the Iowa Supreme Court has held 

that challenges to illegal sentences may be raised at any time and those 

challenges may include constitutional arguments asserting inherent flaws in the 

sentence. See State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 871 (Iowa 2009) (“[A]

challenge to an illegal sentence includes claims that the court lacked the power 

to impose the sentence or that the sentence itself is somehow inherently legally 

flawed, including claims that the sentence is outside the statutory bounds or that 

the sentence itself is unconstitutional.”). While the court noted that sentencing 

challenges grounded in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments might require 

error preservation, the court simultaneously overruled its prior opinion holding 

that an equal protection challenge to a sentence was governed by our normal 

error preservation rules. Id. (overruling State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 195 

(Iowa 1998)). In light of Breugger, we conclude error preservation is not a 

concern. We proceed to the merits of Rouse’s challenge.

“The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 

I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution provide individuals equal protection under the 

law. This principle requires that ‘similarly situated persons be treated alike under 

the law.’” State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Iowa 2008) (citation omitted). 

Rouse contends section 707.6A(7) violates the equal protection clauses 

because a person found guilty of death by reckless driving under section 

707.6A(2)(a) may have the sentence suspended, whereas a person convicted of 
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serious injury by reckless driving under section 707.6A(4) may not, despite the 

fact that death by reckless driving is a higher level crime. As appealing as this 

argument may appear, the Iowa Supreme Court has cautioned against focusing 

on the criminal classification of an offense in analyzing equal protection claims. 

Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 625. The court has insisted that the nature of the offense

is controlling. Id. 

In State v. Kolbet, 638 N.W.2d 653, 661 (Iowa 2001), the court addressed 

an equal protection challenge to the offenses delineated in section 707.6A. 

There, the defendant asserted that section 707.6A unconstitutionally 

discriminated “between perpetrators of different acts of homicide embraced with 

the statute.” Kolbet, 638 N.W.2d at 661. The court disagreed, citing a Colorado 

opinion that pointed to the heightened public safety risk of driving while drunk 

versus reckless driving Id. (citing People v. Loeser, 981 P.2d 197, 199 (Colo. 

App. 1998)). To the extent Kolbet unequivocally rejected an equal protection 

challenge to the entirety of section 707.6, it is controlling. Based on Kolbet, we 

conclude section 707.6A(7) does not violate the equal protection clauses of the 

federal and state constitutions.

III. Disposition

We affirm the district court’s judgment and sentence. 

AFFIRMED.