alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Ernest R. Johnson, Chief Financial Officer of Cutter & Buck Inc., certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this Quarterly Report of Cutter & Buck Inc.;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



Dated:
September 9, 2004

| |  | /s/ERNEST R. JOHNSONErnest R. Johnson Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
| |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

22

---



QuickLinks
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1432 

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to study the suitability and feasibility 

of designating portions of the Ka’u Coast in the State of Hawaii as 

a unit of the National Park System. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

AUGUST 1, 2013 

Ms. HIRONO introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to study the suitability 

and feasibility of designating portions of the Ka’u Coast 

in the State of Hawaii as a unit of the National Park 

System. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ka’u Coast Preserva5 tion Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. KA’U COAST STUDY AND REPORT. 

7 (a) STUDY.— 


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2 

•S 1432 IS

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Inte2 rior (referred to in this Act as the ‘‘Secretary’’) shall 

3 complete a study to determine the suitability and 

4 feasibility of designating land along the Ka’u Coast 

5 in the State of Hawaii as a unit of the National 

6 Park System. 

7 (2) STUDY AREA.—The area to be studied 

8 under paragraph (1) shall consist of— 

9 (A) the area extending from Kapaoo Point 

10 to Kahuku Point, Hawaii; 

11 (B) the Kahuku Coastal Property (TMK 

12 (3) 9–2–001:075); and 

13 (C) the Nani Kahuku Aina Property, in14 cluding Pohue Bay (TMK (3) 9–2–001:072). 

15 (3) APPLICABLE LAW.—The study under para16 graph (1) shall be conducted in accordance with 

17 paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 8(c) of the Na18 tional Park System General Authorities Act (16 

19 U.S.C. 1a–5(c)). 

20 (b) REPORT.—On completion of the study under sub21 section (a), the Secretary shall submit to the Committee 

22 on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives and 

23 the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the 

24 Senate a report containing the results of the study. 

Æ 


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```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1162 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1162

To authorize the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
   Administration to provide certain funds to eligible entities for 
activities undertaken to address the marine debris impacts of the March 
 2011 Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 13, 2013

Mr. Merkley (for himself, Mr. Wyden, and Mrs. Feinstein) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                 Commerce, Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To authorize the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
   Administration to provide certain funds to eligible entities for 
activities undertaken to address the marine debris impacts of the March 
 2011 Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE FUNDS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
may provide funds to an eligible entity impacted by the covered marine 
debris event to assist such entity with the costs of any activity 
previously carried out, being carried out, or to be carried out to 
address the effects of such event.
    (b) Funding.--The Administrator may provide funds under subsection 
(a) using any funds provided by the Government of Japan for activities 
to address the effects of the covered marine debris event.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section, the following definitions apply:
            (1) Covered marine debris event.--The term ``covered marine 
        debris event'' means the events, including marine debris, 
        resulting from the March 2011 Tohoku earthquake and subsequent 
        tsunami.
            (2) Eligible entity.--The term ``eligible entity'' means 
        any State, local, or tribal government.
                                 <all>
```
#### Patricia Jarvis von DAMECK et al. v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INS. CO.

No. 62854.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 22, 1978.

In re: Patricia Jarvis von Dameck, Cedric Wayne Jarvis, John T. Jarvis, Sammie Sis-trunk Jarvis and Cedric Scott Jarvis, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of E. Baton Rouge. 361 So.2d 283.

Writ denied.
#### Raymond LeMoin HAYS, Appellant, v. Emma Louise MILLER and George L. Miller, Appellees.

No. P-435.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Jan. 16, 1973.

Robert P. Gaines, of Beggs, Lane, Daniel, Gaines & Davis, Pensacola, for appellant.

R. P. Warfield, of Levin, Warfield, Graff, Mabie & Rosenbloum, and Robert D. Bell, of Fisher, Hertz & Bell, Pensacola, for appellees.

*480PER CURIAM.

This cause having been orally argued before the Court, the briefs and record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and the appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court appealed from herein is affirmed.

SPECTOR, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., and RAWLS, JJ., concur.
257 La. 457

#### Dudley HOFFPAUIR v. CITY OF CROWLEY.

No. 51057.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 18, 1971.

In re: City of Crowley, Louisiana applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Acadia. 241 So.2d 67.

Writ denied. No error of law.
#### Kenneth Lee BRUNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-869.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 9, 1970.

Walter N. Colbath, Jr., Public Defender, and Norman J. Kapner, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Chavigny v. State, Fla.App.1959, 112 So.2d 910, 915 (cert, den., Fla.1959, 114 So.2d 6; cert. den. 362 U.S. 922, 80 S.Ct. 676, 4 L.Ed.2d 742).

McCAIN, REED and OWEN, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

                           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Birner Dental Management
Services, Inc., a Colorado corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Report"), the undersigned, who are the Chief Executive Officer
and the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, respectively, do each hereby
certify, pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss.
1350), that to his knowledge:


1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.

                                            Date:      November 12, 2004.


                                              By:      /s/ Frederic W.J. Birner
                                                         -----------------------
                                            Name:      Frederic W.J. Birner
                                           Title:      Chief Executive Officer


                                              By:      /s/ Dennis N. Genty
                                                       -------------------------
                                            Name:      Dennis N. Genty
                                           Title:      Chief Financial Officer
#### GEORGE KELLETT & SONS, INC. v. CONSUMERS LUMBER AND SUPPLY CO., INC., et al.

No. 5333.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

March 7, 1973.

*454Rhodes J. Spedale, Jr., of Dodge & Friend, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appel-lee.

Leroy J. Falgout, Metairie, for defendants-appellants.

Before REDMANN, LEMMON and GULOTTA, JJ.

REDMANN, Judge.

An Orleans parish court rendered a default judgment based on R.S. 9:4812 which cast Jefferson parish homeowners for $1,621.61 (in solido with their contractor) for materials supplied by plaintiff and recognized a materialmen’s lien on their Jefferson parish home. The homeowners sued to nullify the judgment, C.C.P. art. 2002 subd. (3), on the ground that R.S. 9:4812 places jurisdiction exclusively in Jefferson. From judgment rejecting their nullity demand, the homeowners appeal. We affirm.

Prior to the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure, a court’s competence to enforce R.S. 9:4812 privileges was treated as a question of jurisdiction *rationae*materiae; Rathborne Lbr. & S. Co. v. Falgout, 218 La. 629, 50 So.2d 295 (1950). But today the question is treated as one of venue by C. C.P. art. 80 subd. (1), which places venue for “an action to assert * * * a right in, to, or against immovable property m the immovable’s parish (with exceptions not pertinent).

The general rule is that objections to venue may be waived and are waived by failure to plead them, art. 44, prior to default, art. 928; Foster v. Breaux, 263 La. 1112, 270 So.2d 526 (1972). The exceptions to waivability are listed by article numbers in art. 44; and those excepted articles might arguably state a venue equivalent to jurisdiction for purposes of art. 2002 subd. (3). But art. 80 is not listed as nonwaivable.

 We hold that R.S. 9:4812’s provision that its privilege “may be enforced * * * in any court of competent jurisdiction in the parish in which the land is situated” declares waivable venue and not jurisdiction. (And if, as appellants contend, the quoted language also affects the personal action against the owners — see Rathborne, *supra*— it at best would state venue and not jurisdiction as to them.)

The judgment is affirmed.
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1435 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to provide certain port authorities, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

AUGUST 1, 2013 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND (for herself and Mr. MENENDEZ) introduced the following 

bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation 

A BILL 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to provide certain 

port authorities, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Clean Ports Act of 

5 2013’’. 

6 SEC. 2. APPLICABILITY TO PORT FACILITIES. 

7 Section 14501(c) of title 49, United States Code, is 

8 amended— 

9 (1) in paragraph (2)(A)— 


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•S 1435 IS

1 (A) by striking ‘‘restrict the safety regu2 latory authority’’ and inserting ‘‘restrict— 

3 ‘‘(i) the safety regulatory authority’’; 

4 (B) by striking ‘‘vehicles, the authority’’ 

5 and inserting ‘‘vehicles; 

6 ‘‘(ii) the authority’’; 

7 (C) by striking ‘‘cargo, or the authority’’ 

8 and inserting ‘‘cargo; 

9 ‘‘(iii) the authority’’; 

10 (D) in clause (iii) (as designated by sub11 paragraph (C)), by inserting ‘‘or’’ after ‘‘self-in12 surance authorization;’’; and 

13 (E) by adding at the end the following: 

14 ‘‘(iv) the authority of a State, political 

15 subdivision of a State, or political author16 ity of 2 or more States to adopt require17 ments for motor carriers and commercial 

18 motor vehicles providing services at port 

19 facilities that are reasonably related to the 

20 reduction of environmental pollution, traf21 fic congestion, the improvement of highway 

22 safety, or the efficient use of port facilities, 

23 if adoption or enforcement of the require24 ments does not conflict with any other apVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:24 Aug 07, 2013 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1435.IS S1435

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3 

•S 1435 IS

1 plicable Federal law (including regula2 tions);’’ and 

3 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

4 ‘‘(6) PORT FACILITIES.— 

5 ‘‘(A) DEFINITION OF PORT FACILITIES.— 

6 In paragraph (2)(A), the term ‘port facilities’ 

7 means all port facilities for coastwise, inter8 coastal, inland waterways, and Great Lakes 

9 shipping and overseas shipping, including 

10 wharves, piers, sheds, warehouses, terminals, 

11 yards, docks, control towers, container equip12 ment, maintenance buildings, container freight 

13 stations, and port equipment, including harbor 

14 craft, cranes, and straddle carriers. 

15 ‘‘(B) APPLICABILITY OF CLEAN AIR ACT.— 

16 Nothing in paragraph (1) limits the rights re17 served to any State or political subdivision of a 

18 State under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 

19 et seq.).’’. 

Æ 


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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-2294

THERESA FORD, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus RIDGEDEN SUCCESS, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee, and DENNY’S, INCORPORATED; SUCCESS EMPLOYEE GROUP, INCORPORATED, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort. Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge. (CA-04-1968-9) Submitted: April 20, 2006 Decided: April 24, 2006 Before MICHAEL, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Theresa Ford, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Yager Jenkins, Stephanie E. Lewis, NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.- 2 - Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 3 - PER CURIAM: Theresa Ford seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying her claims of employment discrimination and wrongful termination. We grant the Appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr. , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s order was entered on the docket on August 31, 2005. The notice of appeal was filed on October 25, 2005. Because Ford failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Blanche C. Rockwell, Administratrix of the Estate of Darlin Simpson, Deceased, et al., Plaintiffs, *v.*Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and Jacob Kassab, Secretary of Transportation, Defendants.

*58Argued June 6, 1975,

June 26, 1975:

before Judges Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer and Rogers, sitting as panel of three.

*William Goldstein,*with him *Goldstein & Goldstein,*for plaintiffs.

*Stuart J. Moskovitz,*Assistant Attorney General, with him *Robert W. Cunliffe,*Deputy Attorney General, and *Robert P. Kane,*Attorney General, for defendant, Department of Transportation.

*Michael M. Westerman,*with him *Edivin L. Scherlis,*for defendant, Kassab.

Opinion by

Judge Wilkinson,

This is a suit to recover damages from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Secretary of Transportation. The damages are alleged to have been suffered by reason of an accident alleged to have been caused by defendants’ negligent construction of Interstate Route 80. A tractor-trailer in which plaintiffs were riding was traveling west. It crossed the medial strip and struck head-on another tractor-trailer traveling east.

Able counsel for plaintiffs recognize that unless they can distinguish this case from our very current Supreme *59Court of Pennsylvania decisions in *Brown v. Commonwealth, 45*3 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973), and *Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board,*454 Pa. 179, 301 A.2d 849 (1973), they must fail in their efforts to sue the Commonwealth. The same holds true with regard to the claim against the Secretary of Transportation unless this case can be distinguished from this Court’s decision in *DuBree v. Commonwealth,*8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 567, 303 A.2d 530 (1973). Since we are not persuaded that the instant case can be distinguished from any of the above cases, we must sustain the preliminary objections and dismiss the complaint.

The only real basis asserted for distinguishing this case from those above is that this accident occurred on a highway that was built by the Commonwealth as part of the Interstate System. Plaintiffs assert that the Legislature gave its consent to be sued for accidents alleged to have been caused by negligent construction when it accepted the benefit of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. §101, et seq.'We think not and do not consider Mr. Justice Douglas’ dissenting opinion in *Meyers v. Pennsylvania,*416 U.S. 946, 40 L. Ed. 2d 298, 94 S. Ct. 1956 (1974), as persuasive as the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court of the United States in that case who, in denying certiorari, obviously felt otherwise.

A much stronger case was made for legislative consent by implication to be sued for tort liability in *Biello, supra,*and was rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Accordingly, we enter the following

Order

Now, June 26, 1975, the preliminary objections filed in the above case are sustained and the complaint dismissed.
<PAGE>

                     EXHIBIT 32.2- CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Evergreen Solar, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard
G. Chleboski, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Richard G. Chleboski

---------------------------------------

Richard G. Chleboski
Chief Financial Officer
November 12, 2004
#### Gail Cathy GRABOVETZ, Petitioner, v. Mark P. SACHS and Abby Sachs, his wife, Respondents.

No. 42590.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 27, 1972.

Certiorari denied. 262 So.2d 703.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>
                              
<ARTICLE>                          5
<LEGEND>                        
     This schedule  contains summary  financial  information  extracted from the
Partnership's  audited  financial  statements for the year ended August 31, 1996
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>                       
<MULTIPLIER>                            1,000
                                    
<S>                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      AUG-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                           AUG-31-1996
<CASH>                                  2,060
<SECURITIES>                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                           7,359
<ALLOWANCES>                                0
<INVENTORY>                                 0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                        2,134
<PP&E>                                 13,215
<DEPRECIATION>                              0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         22,801
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                     304
<BONDS>                                     0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       0
<PREFERRED>                                 0
<COMMON>                                    0
<OTHER-SE>                             22,497
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>           22,801
<SALES>                                     0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        3,699
<CGS>                                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                             619
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                       (1,372)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                         4,452
<INCOME-TAX>                                0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                     4,452
<DISCONTINUED>                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                             0
<CHANGES>                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                            4,452
<EPS-PRIMARY>                            4.91
<EPS-DILUTED>                            4.91
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

Certificationof Annual Report

 

 

I, Gerald McMahon, Chairman and ChiefExecutive Officer, of NeoRx Corporation (the “Company”), certify, pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

 

1.               the Annual Reporton Form 10-K for the Company for the year ended December 31, 2004, (the “Report”)fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 (12 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

 

2.               the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date:  March 28, 2005 | By:    |  

 

/s/ GERALD MCMAHON |
|----------------------------|--------|------------------------------------|
|                       |   | Gerald McMahon                     |

 

----