546, 550, 188 P.3d 51, 54 (2008). We review questions of statutory 

interpretation and issues involving constitutional challenges de novo. See 

State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. „ 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011); West v. 

State, 119 Nev. 410, 419, 75 P.3d 808, 814 (2003). 

Sufficiency of the indictment 

The State argues that the indictment sufficiently put Thomas 

on notice of the specific conduct alleged to constitute theft and misconduct 

of a public officer because the indictment alleged that Thomas used funds 

entrusted to him for improper purposes. The State further argues that the 

indictment provided more notice than is required by due process because 

the facts underlying the charges were pleaded in detail and discussed at 

length in the grand jury transcript. 

Under NRS 173.075(1), an indictment "must be a plain, 

concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting 

the offense charged." "[The indictment] must be definite enough to 

prevent the prosecutor from changing the theory of the case, and it must 

inform the accused of the charge he is required to meet." Husney v. 

O'Donnell, 95 Nev. 467, 469, 596 P.2d 230, 231 (1979). To provide 

sufficient notice, "the indictment standing alone must contain the 

elements of the offense intended to be charged and must be sufficient to 

apprise the accused of the nature of the offense so that he may adequately 

prepare a defense." Laney v. State, 86 Nev. 173, 178, 466 P.2d 666, 669 

(1970) (internal quotations omitted); see Logan v. Warden, 86 Nev. 511, 

514, 471 P.2d 249, 251 (1970) (stating that "the combined information 

provided by the charging instrument and the [grand jury] transcript" 

would sufficiently apprise a defendant of the offense charged in order to 

mount a proper defense). However, an indictment "which alleges the 

commission of the offense solely in the conclusory language of the statute 

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is insufficient." Sheriff v. Levinson, 95 Nev. 436, 437, 596 P.2d 232, 233 

(1979). 

Theft, counts one to five 

NRS 205.0832(1)(b) provides that 

a person commits theft if, without lawful 

authority, the person knowingly. . . [c]onverts, 

makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, 

or without authorization[,] . . . uses the services or 

property of another person entrusted to him or her 

or placed in his or her possession for a limited, 

authorized period of determined or prescribed 

duration or for a limited use. 

(Emphasis added). In all five of the theft counts in the indictment, it is 

alleged that Thomas used county funds in an unauthorized manner and 

exceeded the county's entrustment for "limited use[s]" by distributing said 

funds to his personal friends or associates under the guise of legitimate 

contracts that were "grossly unfavorable" to the county, "unnecessary," 

and/or "us[ed] the services or property [of UMC] for another use." 

Specifically, the State explained to the grand jury that it was presenting 

an embezzlement-type theory of theft, which entails "taking money that is 

entrusted to you for a particular purpose and using it for other purposes 

outside that entrustment." 

Count one of the indictment specifically references a contract 

between UMC and Superior Consulting or ACS Company (collectively, 

ACS) where some, albeit very limited, debt collection work was to be 

performed. The contract called for the completion of debt collection work 

that was already being performed by another entity and it is alleged the 

work was performed poorly by ACS, leading to a decrease in overall debt 

collection. While count one of the indictment included the relevant dates, 

the parties, and the factual accounts of the contract entered with ACS, it 

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failed to allege how Thomas's conduct was unlawfully authorized or how 

his use of payments to ACS articulate the intended, unlawful purpose 

when actual work had been performed under the contract. We conclude 

that the indictment and grand jury transcript failed to provide Thomas 

with sufficient notice of all the elements of the criminal acts charged in 

count one in order to prepare his defense. See Laney, 86 Nev. at 178, 466 

P.2d at 669. 

With regard to theft counts two to five, in the indictment and 

before the grand jury, Thomas is alleged to have entered into contracts on 

behalf of UMS with Frasier Systems Group, TBL Construction, Premier 

Alliance Management, LLC, and Crystal Communications, LLC. These 

companies allegedly provided consulting and supervisory services in the 

areas of information technology, utilities, landscaping, and 

telecommunications. However, the State explicitly stated that they never 

performed any work or delivered a final work-product under the terms of 

these contracts. Because the State alleged in the indictment and before 

the grand jury how Thomas engaged in conduct that was unlawfully 

authorized (i.e. there was no work performed or final work-product 

provided), we conclude that Thomas was sufficiently put on notice of the 

criminal acts charged in counts two to five. Accordingly, we reverse the 

district court's dismissal as to counts two to five; however, we affirm the 

dismissal of count one. 

Misconduct of a public official, counts six to ten 

NRS 197.110(2) provides that "[e]very public officer 

who. . . [e]mploys or uses any person, money or property under the public 

officer's official control or direction, or in the public officer's official 

custody, for the private benefit or gain of the public officer or another, is 

guilty of a . . . felony." In counts six to ten of the indictment, the State 

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alleges that Thomas, while acting as Chief Executive Officer of UMC, 

"use [d} money under his official control or direction. . . for the private 

benefit or gain of himself or another." Despite the fact that each count 

failed to provide a detailed narrative of the facts as they related to each 

charge, each count incorporated by reference the facts set forth in theft 

counts one to five, respectively. And, counts one to five included 

allegations that Thomas entered into contracts with his longtime friends 

or associates that were "grossly unfavorable" to UMC. Thus, we conclude 

that the elements of the offense of misconduct of a public officer as set 

forth in counts six to ten of the indictment, when considered together with 

the facts as alleged in counts one to five and the grand jury testimony, put 

Thomas on sufficient notice of the crimes charged in counts six to ten so 

that he could mount an adequate defense. See Logan, 86 Nev. at 513, 471 

P.2d at 251 (establishing that the information in the charging instrument 

and the grand jury transcript may be sufficient notice). Accordingly, we 

reverse the district court's dismissal as to counts six to ten. 

Amendment to count one is not warranted 

The State contends that the appropriate remedy for 

inadequate notice in a charging document is amendment, not dismissal. 

Given our reversal of the district court's order dismissing counts two to 

ten, the State's request for amendment only applies to count one. NRS 

173.095(1) states that "[t]he court may permit an indictment or 

information to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if no 

additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the 

defendant are not prejudiced." Whether an indictment may be amended is 

"a determination [wholly] within the district court's discretion." Viray v. 

State, 121 Nev. 159, 162, 111 P.3d 1079, 1081 (2005). 

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5 
Gibbons 

%-l2A-ZL\ 

'esty 

C.J. 

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying the State the right to amend the indictment as to count one 

because the indictment and grand jury transcript failed to put Thomas on 

sufficient notice of the charged crime, and the State has failed to show 

that it can cure the defective allegation. Thus, permitting the State to 

amend count one would prejudicially affect Thomas's substantial rights. 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we ORDER the 

judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN 

PART AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings 

consistent with this order.' 

Saitta 

'The Honorable Michael Douglas, Justice, voluntarily recused 

himself from participation in the decision of this matter. 

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cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Daniel J. Albregts, Ltd. 

Franny A. Forsman 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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