Filed 3/16/21 Mendez v. Stratasys Direct, Inc. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

SANDRA MENDEZ, 

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

STRATASYS DIRECT, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B292298 

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC654471)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed.

Mancini & Associates, Marcus A. Mancini, Vadim 

Yeremenko; Benedon & Serlin, Gerald M. Serlin and Melinda W. 

Ebelhar for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Steward, Jack S. 

Sholkoff and Julie A. Gladstone for Defendant and Respondent.

_________________
2

Sandra Mendez appeals the judgment entered after the 

trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mendez’s 

former employer, Stratasys Direct, Inc., in Mendez’s action for 

age and disability discrimination and wrongful termination in 

violation of public policy. Mendez contends the court erred in 

concluding she could not establish a prima facie case for 

disability discrimination and had failed to raise a triable issue of 

material fact as to whether Stratasys’s proffered business reason 

for the termination of her employment was pretext for unlawful 

discrimination. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Mendez’s Operative First Amended Complaint

Stratasys, a printing and manufacturing company, uses 

three-dimensional (3D) printing techniques to make prototypes. 

Mendez was hired in 2003 as a “finisher” and continued in that 

role throughout her employment with Stratasys.1 As a finisher, 

Mendez was tasked with sanding, filing, gluing and hammering 

3D printed models to customer specifications. Stratasys 

terminated Mendez’s employment on September 22, 2015 when 

she was 51 years old. 

Mendez sued Stratasys in March 2017. In her operative 

first amended complaint, filed May 22, 2017, Mendez asserted 

claims for actual or perceived physical disability discrimination 

and age discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and 

1

Stratasys’s predecessor, Solid Concepts, hired Mendez in 

2003. Because the parties refer to Mendez’s 12-year tenure with 

Stratasys throughout their appellate briefs, we do as well. 
3

Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.)2and wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy.3 

In support of her claims Mendez alleged she had developed 

pain in her neck, shoulders and elbows as a result of repetitive 

work activities. In August 2015 she sought medical treatment for 

her pain. In early September 2015 she retained counsel and 

made a workers’ compensation claim. Around the same time her 

supervisor, Carlos Alvarez, began telling staff he wanted to make 

changes and had begun hiring “new young employees.” On 

September 21, 2015 Alvarez removed a part from Mendez’s desk 

to show to a client before Mendez had finished working on it. The 

next day she was terminated for having ruined the part. Mendez 

alleged Stratasys’s explanation for her termination—her work 

relating to the 3D part—was pretext for unlawful disability and 

age discrimination. 

2. Stratasys’s Summary Judgment Motion

Stratasys moved for summary judgment or, in the 

alternative, summary adjudication. Stratasys asserted Mendez 

could not establish a prima facie case for actual or perceived 

disability discrimination because, by Mendez’s own admission, 

she had not disclosed her neck, shoulder and elbow injuries to her 

2

Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 

stated.

3 Mendez’s first amended complaint also alleged causes of 

action for retaliation in violation of FEHA, interference with her 

right to take a medical leave pursuant to the California Family 

Rights Act (§ 12945.2 et seq.) and violation of her “right to seek 

and obtain legal counsel” pursuant to Labor Code section 923. 

Mendez’s appeal does not challenge the court’s summary 

adjudication of those causes of action in Stratasys’s favor. 
4

supervisors or to the company’s human resources department; 

her injuries were not apparent or obvious; and none of the 

individuals involved in the termination decision knew about 

them. At her deposition, a transcript of which Stratasys included

in support of its motion, Mendez admitted she had not disclosed 

her injuries to Alvarez or to any supervisor. Mendez also 

testified she had not discussed with anyone at the company that 

she had filed a workers’ compensation claim. 

Alvarez and his supervisor, Armen Boyajyan, testified it 

was Mendez’s job as finisher to sand, paint and otherwise finish 

the printed parts according to client specifications. Before 

beginning work on a part, a finisher is required to compare the 

part with the 3D model in Stratasys’s computer program to 

ensure the same details in the model appear on the printed part. 

If there is anything missing or the measurements are “out of 

tolerance,” the finisher is required to immediately notify the lead 

finisher or supervisor so he or she can decide whether the part 

can be repaired or needs to be rebuilt. If, after performing a sixpoint inspection, the finisher determines the part is within 

tolerance, the finisher can proceed to performing his or her 

finishing duties. 

On September 21, 2015 a client with a multibillion-dollar 

project arrived unexpectedly at Stratasys’s facility some time 

between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. to view the parts for an 

architectural model Stratasys had promised would be finished 

the next day. Alvarez took a part from Mendez’s desk that she 

had been working on to show to the client. The part was missing 

a significant surface detail; other important details had been 

sanded off in finishing. The client became very upset that the 

part was not to specifications. Alvarez reported the issue to 
5

Boyajyan and to human resources partner Araceli Tarula later 

that day. According to Alvarez, had Mendez followed procedure 

and compared the part with the software program, as a finisher 

is required to do, Mendez, who had started her shift at 6:00 a.m., 

would have noticed the missing feature and alerted a supervisor 

long before 10:00 a.m. when the client arrived. She also would 

not have begun work on the part, let alone sanded down 

important details. Alvarez told Boyajyan and Tarula that 

Mendez continued to make basic errors despite several chances to 

improve and he had lost all confidence in her ability to do the job. 

Boyajyan and Tarula agreed with Alvarez that Mendez’s 

employment should be terminated. Mendez was fired the next 

day. 

Submitting Mendez’s annual employee reviews with its 

motion, Stratasys described Mendez as a mediocre employee at 

best, who had never ranked higher than “average” in overall 

performance in her 12 years of employment and, at times, 

including as recently as her penultimate performance review in 

2013, ranked “below average.” In her final 2014 review in which 

Alvarez ranked her “average” and her quality “satisfactory,” 

Alvarez also noted that Mendez “needs to focus [on] the smaller 

details that can cause a job to be reworked or delayed.” 

Stratasys also provided evidence Mendez had received 

several warnings about her failure to follow procedures. In 2010 

she received a written warning for failing to compare a part to 

the computer program as required: “There was an order that had 

critical features that she sanded off and had she checked the part 

properly on [the computer program] she could have avoided this.” 

In August 2011 Mendez was written up for failing to notify a 

supervisor when there were problems with a part and instead 
6

tried to repair the part; her repair destroyed the part and was in 

“direct violation of company policies.” In April 2012 she received 

another written warning for failing to follow procedures and was 

told “any similar problem of this nature will lead to immediate 

termination.” 

Finally, Tarula testified that from time to time, including 

in August and September 2015, the company contracted with an 

employment agency to provide temporary workers for large jobs. 

Stratasys specified the skills needed, and the agency selected and 

supplied the workers. Tarula testified Stratasys did not employ 

the temporary workers. After Mendez’s termination her duties 

were assigned to other finishers. No replacement was hired for 

Mendez’s position between September 2015 and June 2016. 

3. Mendez’s Opposition to Stratasys’s Motion

In opposing Stratasys’s motion, Mendez asserted she could 

establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination and age 

discrimination and a triable issue of material fact existed as to 

whether Stratasys’s explanation for termination was pretext for 

unlawful discrimination. 

a. Disability discrimination

Mendez contended her neck, shoulder and elbow injuries 

constituted a disability and Stratasys’s supervisors knew about 

them. Although she never disclosed her disability to Alvarez or 

any other supervisor or human resources employee at Stratasys, 

Mendez testified she had complained to Alvarez in February 2015 

that he was “giving her too much work” and she could injure 

herself. Mendez claimed she had been afraid to say anything 

more because she feared she would be fired based on past 

statements to her. To explain that decision, Mendez related that 

in 2008, after suffering a small stroke, she experienced difficulty 
7

with her eyesight and needed a magnifying glass for a time to do 

her job. In 2011 the magnifying glasses were removed from 

employee workstations, and she was forced to purchase her own 

to do her job. When Mendez spoke to Tarula regarding warnings 

Mendez had received and told her of her eyesight issues, Tarula 

told her that, if she could not give “100 percent to her job,” she 

needed to look for other employment. For Mendez, those 

incidents served as a warning that, if she reported injuries that 

affected her ability to work, she would be terminated. 

Priscilla Paiz, one of Mendez’s coworkers, stated in a 

declaration submitted with Mendez’s opposition papers, 

“[Mendez] complained to me about having pain for several years.” 

Paiz also declared, “Although many of my other co-workers also 

complained of pain, everyone was afraid to complain to 

management out of fear of losing their jobs.” Stratasys objected 

to the latter part of Paiz’s statement as irrelevant, without 

foundation and hearsay. The trial court sustained the objection 

and excluded that part of Paiz’s declaration without identifying 

the basis for its ruling. 

On September 4, 2015 Mendez’s workers’ compensation 

counsel sent a letter of representation addressed to Stratasys’s 

“Human Resources Department” and requested information 

about the company’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier. 

Tarula testified the letter would have been directed to human 

resources vice president Mark Hoffman. Tarula did not know of 

Mendez’s injuries or about any actual or potential workers’ 

compensation claim at the time Mendez was terminated. 

b. Age discrimination

Mendez testified that in July or August 2015 Alvarez told 

the finishers there were going to be changes. Soon thereafter, 
8

younger workers were hired to work in the finishing department. 

On September 4, 2015 Mendez was invited by her coworkers to 

join a group of other finishers in a meeting with human resources 

personnel. At the meeting the group spoke about some of the 

finishers’ fears of losing jobs to younger workers. 

4. The Court’s Ruling Granting Summary Judgment

The court granted Stratasys’s motion for summary 

judgment. The court ruled Mendez could not establish a prima 

facie claim of disability discrimination because she had not 

disclosed her neck, shoulder and elbow injuries to Stratasys and 

they were not apparent. The court found the evidence 

undisputed that none of the individuals who participated in the 

termination decision knew of Mendez’s injuries or about any 

potential or actual workers’ compensation claim prior to 

Mendez’s termination. 

As for age discrimination, the court found Mendez had 

satisfied her minimal burden to state a prima facie claim, but 

concluded Mendez had failed to raise a triable issue of material 

fact that the explanation offered by Stratasys for Mendez’s 

termination was pretext for age discrimination. 

The court entered judgment in favor of Stratasys. Mendez 

filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only 

when “all the papers submitted show that there is no triable 

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,

subd. (c).) We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
9

nonmoving party (Regents of University of California v. Superior 

Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618), decide independently whether 

the facts not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the 

moving party as a matter of law. (Hampton v. County of 

San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347; Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. 

(2009) 47 Cal.4th 610, 618.) 

2. Governing Law 

FEHA prohibits an employer from discriminating against 

an employee based on the employee’s age or disability. (§ 12940, 

subd. (a).) Because discriminatory animus is difficult to prove, 

the California Supreme Court has adopted the three-stage 

burden shifting test established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 (McDonnell Douglas): The plaintiff at 

trial “has the initial burden to make a prima facie case of 

discrimination by showing that it is more likely than not that the 

employer has taken an adverse employment action based on a 

prohibited criterion. A prima facie case establishes a 

presumption of discrimination. The employer may rebut the 

presumption by producing evidence that its action was taken for 

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. If the employer 

discharges this burden, the presumption of discrimination 

disappears. The plaintiff must then show that the employer’s 

proffered nondiscriminatory reason was actually a pretext for 

discrimination, and the plaintiff may offer any other evidence of 

discriminatory motive. The ultimate burden of persuasion on the 

issue of discrimination remains with the plaintiff.” (Harris v. 

City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 214-215; accord, Guz 

v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354-356 (Guz).) 

The McDonnell Douglas framework is modified in the 

context of summary judgment. An employer may move for 
10

summary judgment or summary adjudication of an employment 

discrimination cause of action by presenting evidence that one or 

more elements of the prima facie case is lacking, or the employer 

acted for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. (Guz, supra, 

24 Cal.4th at p. 355; Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2017) 

12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1181-1182.) A legitimate reason in this 

context is a reason “facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and 

which, if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination.” 

(Guz, at p. 358, italics omitted; accord, Serri v. Santa Clara 

University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 861.) 

The plaintiff may defeat summary judgment by producing 

“‘substantial responsive evidence’” demonstrating the existence of 

a “material triable controversy as to pretext or discriminatory 

animus on the part of the employer.” (Serri v. Santa Clara 

University, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.) “[A]n employer is 

entitled to summary judgment if, considering the employer’s 

innocent explanation for its actions, the evidence as a whole is 

insufficient to permit a rational inference that the employer’s 

actual motive was discriminatory.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 

p. 361; accord, Serri, at p. 862.)

3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motion as 

to Mendez’s FEHA Claims for Disability and Age 

Discrimination

a. Disability discrimination 

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability 

discrimination by providing evidence he or she (1) was disabled or 

was perceived by his or her employer to be disabled; (2) was 

capable of performing the essential duties of the job with or 

without reasonable accommodations; and (3) was subjected to an 

adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived 
11

disability. (Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 

159-160; Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 236.)4 

In granting summary judgment for Stratasys, the trial 

court ruled Mendez could not carry her burden to state a prima 

facie claim for disability discrimination because the undisputed 

evidence established that she did not disclose, and her employer 

did not know, of her neck and shoulder and elbow injuries, and 

they were not obvious. Accordingly, the court ruled, Mendez 

could not establish she was fired because of them. 

“‘[A]n employer “knows an employee has a disability when 

the employee tells the employer about his condition, or when the 

employer otherwise becomes aware of the condition, such as 

through a third party or by observation. The employer need only 

know the underlying facts, not the legal significance of those 

facts.”’ [Citation.] ‘While knowledge of the disability can be 

inferred from the circumstances, knowledge will only be imputed 

to the employer when the fact of disability is the only reasonable 

interpretation of the known facts. “Vague or conclusory 

statements revealing an unspecified incapacity are not sufficient 

to put an employer on notice of its obligations.”’” (Soria v. 

Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 592; 

see Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 313 

4 A physical disability under FEHA includes “[h]aving any 

physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, 

or anatomical loss that” both affects one or more of the body’s 

major systems and “[l]imits a major life activity.” (§ 12926, 

subd. (m)(1).) Major life activity is “broadly construed” and 

includes working. (§§ 12926, subd. (m)(1)(B)(iii), 12926.1, 

subd. (c).) For purposes of its motion for summary judgment, 

Stratasys conceded Mendez could establish her neck, shoulder 

and elbow injuries constituted a disability under FEHA.
12

[employee who used a cane and spoke with speech impediment 

demonstrated prima facie case that employer knew of disability 

to defeat summary judgment].) 

Mendez asserts she raised a triable issue of material fact as 

to Stratasys’s knowledge of her disability, citing evidence she had 

told Alvarez in February 2015 that he was giving her too much 

work and she was concerned she would injure herself. Mendez 

argues a trier of fact could infer from that disclosure she was 

experiencing existing physical problems due to too much work 

and needed an accommodation for a disability. As the trial court 

found, however, Mendez’s stated fear of some unspecified 

potential injury was far too vague to impute to Alvarez 

knowledge that Mendez was suffering from a disability. 

(Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group 

(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1167 [vague assertions about 

unspecified injury are insufficient; “‘[p]ut simply, unless there is 

some evidence that an employer knows an employee is suffering 

from a disability, it is impossible for an employee to claim he or 

she was discharged because of it’”]; Avila v. Continental Airlines, 

Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1249 [same].) 

Taking out of context language in Justice Werdegar’s 

concurring and dissenting opinion in Roby v. McKesson Corp. 

(2009) 47 Cal.4th 686 (Roby), Mendez alternatively argues 

Stratasys had perfected a culture of discouraging employees from 

reporting disabilities, thereby allowing Stratasys managers to 

remain “willfully blind” to them. (See id. at p. 772 (conc. & dis. 

opn. of Werdegar, J.) [evidence employer knew employee suffered 

from a medical condition yet refused to accommodate it or, at the 

very least, engaged in a “pattern of willful blindness to the 

likelihood she was entitled to accommodation” suggested a level 
13

of culpability that supported a greater punitive damages award 

than the Court found constitutionally permissible].) 

We do not disagree with Justice Werdegar’s argument an 

employer’s deliberate ignorance of a disabled employee’s need for 

accommodations (in Roby it was with respect to the employer’s 

rigid adherence to its attendance policy) is relevant to an 

assessment of the employer’s culpability for discrimination. But 

that says nothing about imputing knowledge of the employee’s 

disability to the employer, an issue not addressed by either 

Justice Werdegar or the Roby Court: Application of a corporate 

policy to an employee with a known disability, as occurred in 

Roby, is a far cry from imposing liability on an employer who does 

not know about an employee’s disability. Moreover, Mendez 

adduced no admissible evidence to support the existence of such a 

culture at Stratasys. To be sure, in her declaration in support of 

Mendez’s opposition papers, Paiz stated, “[E]veryone was afraid 

to complain to management out of fear of losing their jobs.” But 

the trial court properly excluded that part of Paiz’s statement as 

inadmissible hearsay.

5

 Moreover, without some evidence that the 

5

In her opening brief’s factual narrative, but not as a 

separate point under a separate heading or subheading as 

required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), Mendez 

asserts the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining 

Stratasys’s objection to Paiz’s statement. She contends, in part, 

although unquestionably hearsay, the statement was admissible 

under Evidence Code section 1250 as evidence of a statement of 

the declarant’s then existing state of mind “offered to prove the 

declarant’s state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that 

time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the action.” 

That argument is misplaced. The statement excluded by the trial 

court did not concern Paiz’s state of mind, but that of “everyone” 
14

purported fear of reporting was due to Stratasys’s actions or 

statements, Paiz’s claim of a workforce-wide fear of disclosing 

disabilities does not provide any basis to impute knowledge of 

Mendez’s disability to Stratasys. Significantly, there was no 

evidence that anyone had in fact been terminated or suffered any 

adverse employment circumstance for disclosing a disability, 

including Mendez, who stated she disclosed her eyesight 

disability in 2008.6

Mendez argues her testimony alone is sufficient to 

establish Stratasys’s calculated strategy of discouraging 

employees from reporting disabilities. In connection with 

meetings she had with Tarula regarding warnings she received 

for poor work performance, Mendez asserts she mentioned to 

Tarula in 2011 she still had some eyesight difficulties and Tarula 

told her she needed to give “100 percent” or look for another job. 

Mendez also cites Stratasys’s removal of magnifying glasses from 

all employee workstations in 2011 as evidence of its indifference 

to her health issues. (Mendez acknowledged Stratasys had 

allowed her to use her own magnifying glass until her vision 

healed.) But once again, even interpreting the evidence in the 

at the company. Even if an adequate foundation had been 

proffered for Paiz’s purported knowledge of other individuals’ 

collective state of mind, her description of it is far outside the 

ambit of section 1250.

6

The court also found none of the decision makers knew that 

Mendez had filed a workers’ compensation claim. (See Morgan v. 

Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 74 

[summary judgment proper where no evidence that decision

makers knew employee had previously filed a grievance].) 

Mendez has not challenged that finding. 
15

light most favorable to Mendez, Stratasys’s alleged indifference 

to Mendez’s eyesight injury in 2011 fails to make a prima facie 

case of the company’s knowledge of her neck, shoulder and elbow 

injuries in 2015 or suggest Stratasys precluded, even indirectly, 

Mendez from reporting those injuries. The court did not err in 

concluding Mendez could not state a prima facie claim for 

disability discrimination.

b. Age discrimination 

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of age 

discrimination by providing evidence he or she (1) was a member 

of a protected class, that is, a person over 40 years of age (Cal. 

Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11074); (2) was qualified for the position he or 

she sought or was performing competently in the position he or 

she held; (3) suffered an adverse employment action, such as 

termination or demotion; and (4) some other circumstance 

suggesting a discriminatory motive, which can include being 

replaced by a significantly younger person. (Guz, supra, 

24 Cal.4th at p. 355; Dinslage v. City and County of 

San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 378.) 

The trial court ruled that, while Mendez satisfied her 

minimal burden to establish a prima facie case for age 

discrimination, she had not raised a triable issue of material fact 

that the termination was motivated by age-related animus. 

Mendez contends she raised a triable issue of pretext by 

providing evidence her managers had lied about the reason she 

was fired. (See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 384 [employer’s false 

explanation for termination decision may be evidence explanation 

was pretext for unlawful discrimination]; see also Reeves v. 

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (2000) 530 U.S. 133, 147 

[“[i]n appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably 
16

infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is 

dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose”].) Mendez 

states she was told in her termination meeting she had ruined a 

part. However, the undisputed evidence established the part was 

defective when printed, before she began working on it. When 

Stratasys was faced with this evidence in this litigation, Mendez 

asserts, it changed its justification and insisted it fired Mendez 

for working on the defective part and not alerting her supervisor 

about the defect. These shifting explanations, Mendez argues, 

raised the specter of pretext sufficiently to defeat summary 

judgment. 

Mendez’s testimony that Alvarez told her she had ruined a 

part is fully consistent with Stratasys’s explanation in its moving 

papers that Mendez had both failed to alert her supervisor to the 

defect in the part and then further damaged it by working on it. 

Accordingly, there is no evidence of incompatible explanations to 

support an inference of pretext and intentional discrimination. 

(See Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 

72 Cal.App.4th 798, 815 [“[r]easons given by employer for 

termination are ‘not incompatible, and therefore not properly 

described as “shifting reasons,”’” when they involve the same 

central theme; “[i]t is the substance of the reason provided, not 

the word choice, which is critical”]; Nidds v. Schindler Elevator 

Corp. (9th Cir. 1996) 113 F.3d. 912, 918 [“‘[l]ack of work’” and 

“lack of seniority and poorer performance relative to other 

mechanics” are not incompatible and are insufficient to raise a 

genuine issue of fact as to whether employer’s reasons for layoff 

were pretextual]; cf. Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2008) 

165 Cal.App.4th 686, 716 [ample evidence of pretext to defeat 

summary judgment when employer “never rested on a single 
17

coherent explanation for its firing of [employee] and [when] 

several if not all of its explanations were, to put it mildly, 

questionable”].) 

Mendez’s suggestion her continuous salary increases over 

the years and “satisfactory” employment reviews raise a triable 

issue of material fact that her work performance was not the 

motivating factor for her termination (see Flait v. North 

American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 479 [pretext 

may be inferred from the terminated employee’s job performance 

prior to termination]) is also without merit. If anything, those 

reviews support Stratasys’s explanation that Mendez was 

terminated for making a significant error after having been given 

several chances to improve. Nothing about those reviews 

remotely suggests Stratasys was lying about its termination 

decision, let alone that its explanation was pretext for age-based 

disability discrimination. 

In sum, apart from an observation that temporary 

employees hired to manage workload were younger than she, 

Mendez provided no evidence to suggest Stratasys’s explanation 

for the employment decision was pretext for age-related animus. 

The court did not err in summarily adjudicating this claim. 

(See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 362 [summary judgment for the 

employer is appropriate where, “given the strength of the 

employer’s showing of innocent reasons, any countervailing 

circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive, even if it may 

technically constitute a prima facie case, is too weak to raise a 

rational inference that discrimination occurred”]; Arnold v. 

Dignity Health (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 426 [same].)
18

4. The Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motion as to 

Mendez’s Claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation 

of Public Policy

Because Mendez’s FEHA claims fail, so too does her claim

for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, which was 

based on FEHA violations.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Stratasys is to recover its costs 

on appeal. 

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J. 

McCORMICK, J.*

*

Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.