alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

 Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss.1350)

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.  ss.1350),
the undersigned, Michael E. DeDomenico, Chief Executive Officer of NuCO2 Inc., a
Florida  corporation  (the  "Company"),  does hereby certify,  to his knowledge,
that:

The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2006
of the Company (the "Report")  fully complies with the  requirements  of section
13(a) or 15(d)  of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934,  and the  information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

                                                /s/ Michael E. DeDomenico
                                                -------------------------
                                                Michael E. DeDomenico
                                                Chief Executive Officer
                                                February 9, 2007
```
#### AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, INC., Appellant, v. DIVERSIFIED EQUIPMENT LEASING CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 72-1461.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 26, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Herman DOUGLAS v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 61360.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 17, 1978.

In re: Herman Douglas applying for writ of habeas corpus and certiorari. Caddo Parish.

Writ granted. Evidentiary hearing ordered.

SANDERS, C. J„ and SUMMERS, J., dissent from the writ grant.
NO. 07-05-0332-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL C

MAY 2, 2007

_______________________________

CHRISTIAN BJORGAARD,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Appellee

_________________________________

FROM THE 69 DISTRICT COURT OF DALLAM COUNTY; TH

NO. 3868; HON. RON ENNS, PRESIDING

________________________________

On Motion for Rehearing

________________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

Pending before the court is the State’s motion for rehearing. Its content leads us

to the same end encountered after reading the State’s initial brief. Despite the absence

of facts surrounding the manner or means underlying appellant’s prior conviction, the State

seeks to use it for little more than providing the jurors basis from which to infer that

because appellant did it before, he must have done it again. Though one’s past acts may

be indicators of future conduct, evidence used simply to show that the accused acted in
2

line with his character is inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence. Whether the latter

should be reconsidered is not within our prerogative. Accordingly, we overrule the motion

before us.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

PHILLIP TAVARRIS COPELAND,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-1311

[April 6, 2023]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Howard K. Coates, Jr., 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2015-CF-007782-AXXX-MB.

Robert David Malove of The Law Office of Robert David Malove, P.A., 

Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CIKLIN, GERBER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                            1125
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      144
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  3100
<PP&E>                                           73062
<DEPRECIATION>                                   26138
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   51039
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            13512
<BONDS>                                          53469
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                       17150
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     51039
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 13108
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     6283
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  2590
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                5714
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (1479)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (1479)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (1479)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (17.45)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (17.45)
        

</TABLE>
---

EXHIBIT 23.1

June 22, 2011

The Board of Directors China Nutrifruit Group Limited
5th Floor, Chuangye Building, Chuangye Plaza, Industrial Zone
3,Daqing Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone, Daqing, Heilongjiang
163316 The Peoples Republic of China

Dear Sirs,

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting
Firm

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration
Statements on Form S-3 (No. 333-162916) of China Nutrifruit Group Limited (the
Company) and its subsidiaries of our report dated June 22, 2011 relating to
the consolidated financial statements of the Company, which appears in Annual
Report on Form10-K of the Company for the year ended March 31, 2011.

Yours faithfully,

/s/ HLB Hodgson Impley ChengHLB Hodgson Impley
Cheng

---
#### ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellant, v. BEE LINE HEAVY HAULERS, INC., a/k/a B. E. M. Enterprises, Inc., Appellees.

No. 71-552.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 7, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Ray T. WOODALL, Jr.

No. 61243.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 20, 1978.

In re: Ray T. Woodall, Jr., applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans.

Writ denied.
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-12-00336- CV

Mark P helps an d Jul ia P helps, Ap pellants

v. Russell Par ker; K

P K V entures, Ltd., and KP KM , Inc., Appellees

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 368 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT

NO. 10- 1028 -C36 8, H ONO RAB LE B URT CARNES, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Mark Phelps and J ulia Phelps have failed to prosec ute this appea l. Appellants’ brief

was due on J uly 5, 2012. On J uly 31, 2012 this Court’s cler k sent appellants a notice informing them that their brief was overdue and cautioned that the appea l could be dismiss ed for want of prosec ution unless they filed a response rea sonably explaining their failure to file a brief. Appellants responde d indicating a misunderstan d i n g re garding the due date for the brief, but did not file a brief. On September 10, 2012, thi s C o u rt ’s cler k sent appellants a second notice informing them that their brief, which was due on J uly 5, was overdue and ag ain cautioned that the appea l could be dismiss ed for want of prosec ution unless they filed a response rea sonably explaining the failure to file a brief. That response was due by September 20, 2012. Appellants have not responde d to the noti ce, nor have they filed a brief. Acc ording ly , we dismiss the appea l for want of pro s ecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b), (c )._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Rose and Goodw in Dismissed for Want of Prosecution Filed: Nove mber 9, 2012

2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       2,315,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                8,678,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   749,000
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            10,570,000
<PP&E>                                      10,494,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,298,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             154,288,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,158,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            6,000
<PREFERRED>                                      6,000
<COMMON>                                        49,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  59,432,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               154,288,000
<SALES>                                     25,513,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            22,996,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               18,710,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,860,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (554,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (554,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              (958,000)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (5,642,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.16)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.16)
        


</TABLE>
#### Leonard H. RUBIN, Individually and as father and next friend of Deborah Rose Rubin, an infant, and as members of Classes, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY et al., Appellees.

No. 73-819.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 11, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1974.

Sinclair, Louis & Siegel, Miami, for appellant.

Stuart Simon, County Atty., Joseph D. Komansky and Robert Crawchek, Asst. County Attys., Tobias Simon and Elizabeth duFresne, Frank A. Howard, Jr., Miami, for appellees.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed upon authority of Kittel v. Kittel, Fla.1968, 210 So.2d 1.
#### Curtis Fern COOPER, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.

No. S-123.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 7, 1972.

Jeffrey H. Barker, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.

Robert L. Shevm, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

By a petition for writ of habeas corpus Cooper alleges that he is entitled to a delayed appeal because he was financially unable to hire counsel to prosecute his appeal. Petitioner further alleges he was advised by the trial court of his right to appointed counsel to prosecute the appeal but counsel was not appointed.

In a prior appellate proceeding in this Court, Petitioner in Cooper v. State1 asserted in his assignments of error that counsel for defense2 stated in open court that he would appeal and that he was relying on the statement made by his attorney that an appeal would be taken. Thus, the record reflects without contradiction that Petitioner has not been deprived of an appeal by State action.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.

SPECTOR, C. J., and RAWLS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.

1

. Cooper v. State, 258 So.2d 464 (1 Fla. App.1972).

2

. Privately-employed counsel.
#### Roger DAVIDSON v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 46891.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 9, 1972.

*315J. W. Kellum, Sumner, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Timmie Hancock, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

SMITH, Justice:

Roger Davidson was convicted of grand larceny in the Circuit Court of Quitman County and sentenced to serve a term of four and one-half years in the penitentiary. He has appealed.

The only ground assigned for reversal is that appellant was entitled to a directed verdict of not guilty because, it is argued, the evidence showed that when he committed the acts which constituted the offense he did not know right from wrong or appreciate the nature and consequences of his acts.

A thorough study of the record reveals, however, that Davidson’s sanity was established by clear and convincing evidence which fully justified the conclusion reached by the jury that he was sane and well knew that what he was doing was wrong. The countervailing evidence offered, in the light of the established facts, was not convincing and it is difficult to see how the jury could have returned any other verdict than that of guilty. At most, the evidence offered by appellant on the issue of sanity, which was the only issue, did no more than create a question of fact and the trial 'court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for a directed verdict or in submitting the question to the jury.

The judgment appealed from must be affirmed.

Affirmed,

RODGERS, P. J., and PATTERSON, INZER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 19

- 00539

- CV
In the Interest of A.B., G.B., L.B., S.B., and K.B., Children

On a ppeal from the County Court at Law of Aransas County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. A

- 18

- 7155

- FL

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS , havi ng considered this cause on appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed

. The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED

. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appellant s , although they are exempt from pay m e nt due to their affidavit s of inability to pay co sts

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. February 27 , 2020
#### Amelia BECK v. William LOVELL, M. D., et al.

No. 62833.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 22, 1978.

In re: Dr. William C. Lovell and St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 361 So.2d 245.

Writ denied.
**Exhibit 10.29**

 

**2008 Bonus Plan**

 

On December 7,2007, the Compensation Committee recommended that the Board of Directorsapprove a new Bonus Plan (the “Bonus Plan”) for the fiscal year ending September 30,2008.  The Bonus Plan was approved by the Board of Directors on the samedate.  Under the Bonus Plan, bonuses may be awarded to the Company’semployees, including the Company’s executive officers, upon the satisfaction ofcertain goals based on a percentage of annual base salaries.  The goalsinclude attaining measured results for some or all of the following categories:cash flow, capital and research and development budgets, revenues, research anddevelopment and operations performance, renew and obtain new contracts, andsafety.

 

Underthe terms of the Bonus Plan, the Company’s employees, including its executiveofficers, may receive a bonus calculated based on a percentage of their annualbase salary.  The ultimate percentage of annual base salary used tocalculate bonuses, if any bonuses are paid, will be at the sole discretion ofthe Compensation Committee.  The target percentage and the high percentageof base salary set by the Compensation Committee to be used for purposes ofcalculating bonuses to the Company’s employees, including its executive officers,are as follows:

 
| ** **                                                    | ** ** | **Target Percentage** | ** ** | **High Percentage** | ** ** |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------------|------------|--------------------------|------------|
| Staff (Operations,  Accounting & Administrative)     |       | 10                         | %          | 20                       | %          |
| Manager                                                       |       | 15                         | %          | 30                       | %          |
| Senior Manager                                                |       | 25                         | %          | 40                       | %          |
| Executive (other than  President and Chief Executive Officer) |       | 40                         | %          | 80                       | %          |
| President and Chief  Executive Officer                        |       | 50                         | %          | 100                      | %          |

 

 

 

 

----
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. William J. GUSTE, Jr., Attorney General and Representatives R. Harmon Drew and B. F. O’Neal v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, the Honorable Moon Landrieu, Terrence R. Duvernay and Henry G. Simmons.

No. 61339.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 27, 1978.

In re: State of Louisiana, ex reí. Guste, Attorney General and Representatives R. Harmon Drew and B. F. O’Neal applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 353 So.2d 1117.

Not considered. Although the judgment below appears to be incorrect, it has become final because no application for rehearing was filed in the court of appeal.

SUMMERS and TATE, JJ.,

concur. Due to the failure of the plaintiffs to apply for rehearing in the court of appeal, by statute the judgment in favor of the defendants has become final, although in our view it is erroneous. However, while the judgment may be res judicata as to the *parties*as to *past*payments, it is not res judicata as to persons not parties to these proceedings, *Louisiana Civil Service League v. Forbes,*258 La. 390, 246 So.2d 800 (1971), and as to parties it is arguably not res judicata as to future payments, see *State v. American Sugar Ref. Co.,*108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902), and the recent Firefighters decisions.

CALOGERO and MARCUS, JJ.,

concur. The judgment herein became final before application for writs was filed in this court.
#### Frederick B. HENNESSY, Appellant, v. Gayle P. HENNESSY, Appellee.

No. 73-1103.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 10, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert BENVENISTE, Appellee.

No. 73-64.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 26, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Clarence MACKEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-1176.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 22, 1971.

Rehearing Denied July 30, 1971.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Alan S. Becker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and J. Robert Olian, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and SWANN, J., and ADAMS, ALTO, Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This is the second appearance of this defendant upon conviction of this charge of robbery. See Mackey v. State, Fla.App. 1970, 234 So.2d 418.

Upon remand, appellant waived trial by jury and was tried before the court without jury. He was found guilty, adjudicated and sentenced to twenty-five years in the state prison. On this appeal he questions the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of guilt. We hold that the evidence is sufficient, see Prather v. State, Fla.App. 1966, 182 So.2d 273; compare People v. Lincoln, 89 Cal.App.2d 795, 201 P.2d 846 (1949).

Appellant’s second point urges error upon the ruling of the trial court which excluded testimony taken in another case. The ruling of the trial court is correct under the test set forth in Blackwell v. State, 79 Fla. 709, 86 So. 224 (1920).

Affirmed.
#### Thomas M. BROWN v. STATE.

No. 36016.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 1967.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 191 So.2d 612.
262 La. 1075

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Herman SMITH v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 52642.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 18, 1972.

In re: Herman Smith applying for writ of mandamus and habeas corpus.

Writ refused. Considering the trial judge’s return that he has ruled upon the application, this application for mandamus is now moot.
#### Edward J. KEPP, Appellant, v. Margaret Anne (Kepp) STREET, Appellee.

No. 71-853.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 27, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Albert GARY, Petitioner, v. CONCRETE STRUCTURES, INC., Aetna Casualty & Surety Company and the Florida Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.

No. 42807.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 23, 1973.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.

ERVIN, J., dissents.
#### Alfred A. COSENTINO and David B. Gam, d/b/a Cosentino and Gam, Engineers, Appellants, v. Jerome ELSON and Heiman and Crary, P.A., Appellees.

No. 72-41.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 20, 1972.

Robert J. Ramer, Coral Gables, for appellants.

*254Heiman & Crary and Charles L. Neu-stein, Miami, for appellees.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The order of the trial court, here under review, be and the same is hereby affirmed. Funds in escrow are not subject to garnishment [see: 6 Am.Jur.2d, Attachment and Garnishment, § 125; 28 Am.Jur.2d, Escrow, § 10; 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 77c(l); Anno. 10 A.L.R. 741] except where all conditions of the escrow had been completed and the funds without dispute are due to a judgment debtor.

Affirmed.
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Winston JONES v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 54106.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 30, 1973.

In re: Winston Jones applying for writ of habeas corpus.

Denied. The showing made does not warrant the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.

BARHAM, J.,

is of the opinion that the uncontroverted allegation of incompetent counsel requires an order for an eviden-tiary hearing on that issue.

CALOGERO, J., dissents from refusal to grant.

DIXON, J., recused.
#### L. D. GUILLORY v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 54042.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 28, 1973.

In re: L. D. Guillory applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Calcasieu, 282 So.2d 600.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.
#### Wallace L. MINTO, Appellant, v. Samuel W. HEISCHMAN, Appellee.

No. 73-974.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 6, 1974.

Daryl J. Brown of Rosin, Abel & Band, Sarasota, for appellant.

Gerald B. Keane, of Wilson, Wilson & O’Connell, Sarasota, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on authority of Gordon v. John Deere Company, Fla.1972, 264 So.2d 419.

BOARDMAN, A. C. J., GRIMES, J. and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur.