alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert Cleveland MALONE, Appellee.

No. 69-76.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Nov. 12, 1969.

Richard E. Gerstein, State’s Atty., and Roy S. Wood, Sr., Asst. State’s Atty., for appellant.

Richard G. Taylor, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The State seeks review of an order quashing the information filed in the criminal court, on the grounds of former jeopardy. From the record, it appears that on March 17, 1967 the appellee was *897arrested by officers of the City of Miami and charged with violation of City Ordinance Ch. 2702, § 19-3, prohibiting operation of a gambling room. The appellee was tried by the Municipal Court in and for the City of Miami, and acquitted. Thereafter, on April 7, 1967, an information charging appellee with maintaining a gambling room in violation of § 849.01, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., was filed. This information was based on the same set of facts and circumstances giving rise to the arrest of March 17, 1967, and the prosecution in the municipal court. Thereafter, the defendant pleaded former jeopardy. The trial court quashed the information, finding that the filing of same constituted double jeopardy in light of the proceedings in the municipal court. We reverse.

The mere fact that the same set of facts will support a charge under a municipal ordinance, as well as a charge of violation of a State statute, does not constitute double jeopardy. State ex rel. Wilson v. Quigg, 154 Fla. 348, 17 So.2d 697; Waller v. State, Fla.App.1968, 213 So.2d 623; Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, Fla. 1968, 213 So.2d 689. Neither does the fact that the City of Miami had adopted, by ordinance, the State criminal statute and prosecuted for a violation of the ordinance. Orr v. Quigg, 135 Fla. 653, 185 So. 726; Cooper v. City of Miami, 160 Fla. 656, 36 So.2d 195; State ex rel. McFarland v. Roberts, Fla.1954, 74 So.2d 88; § 165.191, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., 9 Fla.Jur., Criminal Law, § 216; 23 Fla.Jur., Municipal Corporations, §§ 84, 94, 110.

The appellee’s point, that because this court previously dismissed an appeal from an oral ruling of the trial court precludes review of the order in the instant action, is without merit. The dismissal of the earlier appeal was on the ground that there was no jurisdiction in this court. State v. Shedaker, Fla.App.1966, 190 So.2d 429; State v. Malone, Fla.App.1968, 215 So.2d 892; Jenkins v. Lyles, Fla.1969, 223 So.2d 740. The effect of this ruling was to leave the matter still pending in the trial court until such time as a formal written order was duty entered.

Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the order here under review be and the same is hereby reversed, with directions to reinstate the information against the ap-pellee.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.
#### People, Respondent, v Gary A. Shaw, Appellant.

[654 NYS2d 886]

Motion to withdraw as assigned counsel granted; cross motion to dismiss appeal granted. Memorandum: Dismissal of a criminal appeal is appropriate where, upon release from custody, a defendant is deported and "his whereabouts are unknown” *(People v Jimenez,*97 AD2d 799). Present— Green, J. P., Lawton, Callahan, Doerr and Fallon, JJ.
<TABLE>

                          STATEMENT RE COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE (1)
                                               HPR INC.

<CAPTION>
<S>                                                                                               <C>            <C>

Type of security
For the quarter ended September 30,                                                                 1996             1995
  Common stock outstanding, beginning of period................................................   15,012,000      7,680,000
  Weighted average cheap stock outstanding during the period (2)...............................                     716,000
  Weighted average common stock issued during the period.......................................       63,000        561,000
  Conversion of Series A Convertible Preferred Stock to Common Stock upon the
  Initial Public Offering (3)..................................................................           --      5,525,000
  Assumed exercise of common share options.....................................................    1,340,000        772,000
  Purchase of common stock under the treasury stock method.....................................    (317,000)       (16,000)
                                                                                                  ----------     ----------
  Weighted average number of common shares and common equivalent shares outstanding............   16,098,000     15,238,000
                                                                                                  ==========     ==========
<FN>

(1)  All common and common  equivalent  shares  have been  restated to reflect a
     2-for-1  capital stock split  effected in the form of a 100% stock dividend
     to all shareholders of record on April 26, 1996, a 2.5-for-1  capital stock
     split in 1995 and a 10-for-1 capital stock split in 1993. 

(2)  In accordancewith  the Securities and Exchange  Commission Staff Accounting
     Bulletin No. 83, issuances of common stock and equivalents  within one year
     prior to the initial filing date of the  registration  statement,  at share
     prices less than the mid-point of the  estimated  initial  public  offering
     price for which this  registration  statement  was  prepared.  Accordingly,
     these are shown as equity issued and outstanding,  using the treasury stock
     method, for all periods presented prior to the initial public offering.

(3)  Series  A  Convertible  Preferred  Stock  was  considered  a  common  stock
     equivalent prior to the initial public offering.

</FN>
</TABLE>


                                       15
<PAGE>
February 19, 1953

Hon. Arthur H. Van Slyke Opinion No. S-08 .' County Attorney Fort Bend County Re: Authority of the commisRichmond, Texas sioners' court to fix an additional compensationor expense allowance from funds of Fort Bend County Drainage District for added duties -thecommissioners perform:ondrainage Dear Sir: districtsmatters.

Your requestfor:,;an opinion of this office reads in part as follows:

"TheHonorable Commissioners'Court of Fort Bend County, :Texas,has asked this office to requestan,opin,ionof your office
as to whether or not'the Fort Bend County Drainage District may pay~amonthly s'um,to be fixed by said Co~unty Commissioners'Court to said Co,unty

Commissioners either as a salary or as travel allowance and expense to said Commissioners for dutie,s performed on said drainage district matters."

The Texas co,urts

have repeatedly held that the commissioners' court is a court of limited jurisdiction and has only such powers as are conferredupon it, either by express terms or by necessary implication,by the statutes and Constitution of Texas. Childress Co. v. State, 127,Tex. 343, 92 S.W.2d 1011 (193 ti.Lovett, 173 S.W. 508 (Tex.Civ.App. ,,geggg+yy Roper v. Hall, 280 S.W. 289 (Tex.civ.App.1925).

In 34 Texas Jurisprudence531, Public Officers, Section 11.6,it is stated:

'An officer is not entitled to any compensation in addition,‘to that'which.~has'been fixed by law for the performanceof the duties of his office, even tho,ughthe compensation so fixed is unreasonablenorinade-Hon. Arthur H. Van Slyke, page 2 (s-08)

quate. He may be required by law to perform specific services or discharge additional d,uties

for which no compensation is provided. The obligation to perform s'uch services is imposed as an incident to the office, and the officer by his accentance thereof is deemed to have en aged to perform them without compensation.!*'
Chapter,303,Acts ,51s't Legislature,Regular Session, 1949, page.550, created the Fort Bend County Drainage District, and,the commissioners'courtwas required to assume administrativepowers and control
over the district. We find no provision in the act creating this district that would authorize the commist sioners court ,tofix an additional compensationor expense al;owance from the ,fundsof Fort Bend County Drainage~District for added duties the commissioners perform on drainage districtmatters. Therefore,your question~is answered in the negative.

The commissioners'court has no authority to fix an additional compensationor expense allowance from funds of Fort Bend Co,unty

Drainage District for added duties the commissionersperform on drainage,dls' trict matters.

Your,s very truly,

APPROVED:

J. C. Davis, Jr. Co,unty.'Affairs

Division JOHNBEN SHEPPERD Attorney General

C. K. Richards Reviewer,

Robert S. Trottl First Assistant

BDD:am B. Duncan Davis As'sistant
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 99.1

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the filing of the Professional Veterinary Products, Ltd. Form
10-Q (the "Report") for the period ended January 31, 2003, each of the
undersigned hereby certifies that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Professional
Veterinary Products, Ltd.

/s/ Dr. Lionel L. Reilly
---------------------------------
Dr. Lionel L. Reilly
President/Chief Executive Officer


/s/ Neal B. Soderquist
---------------------------------
Neal B. Soderquist
Chief Financial Officer
#### Edward Lee CURRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. GG-149.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 25, 1977.

Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, and Theodore E. Mack, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Michael H. Davidson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This case is REMANDED for entry of a judgment conforming to the verdict. The trial court is authorized to impose a different sentence or to confirm the sentence already pronounced. Defendant need not be present.

BOYER, Acting C. J., and MILLS and SMITH, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned hereby certifies, in his capacity as an officer of Diedrich Coffee, Inc. (the Company), for purposes of 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:



| |  |  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended September 22, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | - |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
| | - |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                          |  |  |  |                                                     
|------------------------- |  |  |  | ----------------------------------------------------
|                          |  | 
|Dated: September 27, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/ Martin A. Lynch                                 
|                          |  |  |  | Martin A. Lynch                                     
|                          |  |  |  | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer



Note: A signed original of this
written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Diedrich Coffee, Inc. and will be retained by Diedrich Coffee, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### CRAVER *v.*CRAVER

[No. 15,

September Term, 1962.]

*Decided October 15, 1962.*

The cause was submitted to the full Court.

Submitted on brief by *Arthur A. Anderson, Jr.,*for the appellant.

*458Submitted on brief by *Theodore G. Bloom*and *Albert J. Goodman*for the appellee.

Per Curiam.

Pauline A. Craver sued her husband for divorce in 1956. The chancellor denied the divorce but awarded her custody of the children and on April 23, 1957, ordered James F. Craver to pay $45.00 per week for their support. However, the husband failed to keep up the payments. On December 5, 1958, he filed a bill for divorce. The wife filed an answer and cross-bill. On August 3, 1959, the chancellor dismissed the husband’s bill, granted a divorce to the wife, and ordered the husband to pay $30.00 per week for the children’s support, accounting from the date of the decree. On June 14, 1960, Mrs. Craver filed a petition in the original proceeding asking for a monetary decree in the amount of $2,545.00 representing the arrearage accrued between April 23, 1957, to August 3, 1959. This appeal is from a decree, entered for that sum.

The appellant does not dispute the amount of the arrearage but contends- that the decree of August 3, 1959, adjudicated all of the rights of the parties arising out of the marital relation, and effectively terminated the liability for payments in default under the prior decree. We do not agree. The proceeding to convert overdue installments into a lump sum is not a new bill or a supplementary bill based upon new matter. *Leberstein v. Deberstein,*186 Md. 25, 26. The original decree had “the effect of an adjudication of liabilities thereafter maturing at stated periods”. *Marshall v.*Marshall, 164 Md. 107, 116. See also *Bradford v. Futrell,*225 Md. 512, 524. It is generally held that an award of support is not superseded by a subsequent decree of divorce in another court, so as to terminate liability for amounts overdue. See *Schimek v. Schimek,*157 A. 649 (N. J.); *Bowers v. Bowers,*28 A. 2d 515 (N. J.); 2 Nelson, *Divorce and Annulment,*(2d ed. 1961 rev. vol.) § 16.31; Note 146 A.L.R. 1153, 1160. *Rethorst v. Rethorst,*214 Md. 1, is distinguishable on the facts. There is no question of laches or acquiescence in the instant case.

*Decree affirmed, with costs.*
#### Theresa Vera ANDERSON, a/k/a Terry Anderson, Appellant, v. Robert ANDERSON, Appellee.

Nos. 1128, 1129.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Feb. 20, 1968.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

November 29, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 131729 & (11) Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 131729 COA: 270843 Wayne CC: 81-002294-01 RICHARD EUGENE GRAY, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appe al the June 29, 2006 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). The motion to remand is
DENIED.

d1120 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 29, 2006

Clerk
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1
 
                                  UROCOR, INC.
 
                 STATEMENT RE COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
 
                                  (UNAUDITED)
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                 THREE MONTHS ENDED
                                                                                      MARCH 31,
                                                                             ---------------------------
                                                                                 1997           1996
                                                                             -------------  ------------
<S>                                                                          <C>            <C>
Net income (loss)..........................................................  $   1,201,084  $    230,639
                                                                             -------------  ------------
Divided by;
  Weighted average shares outstanding (1)..................................     11,131,532     7,160,873
  Plus:
  Supplemental shares (2)..................................................       --             362,073
                                                                             -------------  ------------
Total weighted average shares outstanding..................................     11,131,532     7,522,946
                                                                             -------------  ------------
Earnings per share.........................................................  $         .11  $        .03
                                                                             -------------  ------------
                                                                             -------------  ------------
</TABLE>
 
------------------------
 
(1) Convertible Preferred Stock, Class A Stock and Class B Stock are reflected
    on an "as if converted" basis for periods prior to the Company's initial
    public offering. Common Stock issuable upon exercise of outstanding options
    and warrants is reflected using the treasury stock method.
 
(2) Reflects common and common stock equivalent shares issued in the 12 months
    prior to the Company's initial public offering at an exercise price below
    the public offering price of $11.00 per share. After the first three months
    of 1996, such common stock equivalent shares are included in the calculation
    of the "weighted average shares outstanding" above.
 
                                       15
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 143 (Wednesday, July 25, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 35287]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-15910]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration


Notice of a Change in Status of an Extended Benefit (EB) Period 
for the United States Virgin Islands

AGENCY: Employment and Training Administration, Labor.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice announces a change in benefit period eligibility 
under the EB program for the Virgin Islands.
    The following change has occurred since the publication of the last 
notice regarding the Virgin Islands' EB status:
    <bullet> The Virgin Islands' 13-week insured unemployment rate for 
the week ending June 2, 2018, was below the 5.00 percent threshold. 
Therefore, the EB period for the Virgin Islands will end on June 23, 
2018. The State will remain in an ``off'' period for a minimum of 13 
weeks.

Information for Claimants

    The duration of benefits payable in the EB Program, and the terms 
and conditions on which they are payable, are governed by the Federal-
State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, as amended, and 
the operating instructions issued to the states by the U.S. Department 
of Labor. In the case of a state ending an EB period, the State 
Workforce Agency will furnish a written notice to each individual who 
is currently filing claims for EB of the forthcoming termination of the 
EB period and its effect on the individual's right to EB (20 CFR 615.13 
(c)).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment 
and Training Administration, Office of Unemployment Insurance, Room S-
4524, Attn: Anatoli Sznoluch, 200 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, 
DC 20210, telephone number (202) 693-3176 (this is not a toll-free 
number) or by email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#bcefc6d2d3d0c9dfd492fdd2ddc8d3d0d5fcd8d3d092dbd3ca"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="2f7c554140435a4c47016e414e5b4043466f4b404301484059">[email protected]</span></a>.

Rosemary Lahasky,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Employment and Training, Labor.
[FR Doc. 2018-15910 Filed 7-24-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4510-FT-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### McDONOUGH *v.*DIRECTOR OF PATUXENT INSTITUTION

[App. No. 21,

September Term, 1962.]

*Decided October 11, 1962.*

Before Bruñe, C. J., and Henderson, Hammond, Prescott, Horney, Marbury and SyberT, JJ.

Per Curiam.

For the reasons stated by Judge Raine in the lower court, the application of William L. McDonough for leave to appeal from the order denying him post conviction relief from his imprisonment for assault and battery is hereby denied.

*Application denied.*
#### LION COUNTRY SAFARI and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, Petitioners, v. Douglas P. NELSON and Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.

No. 42959.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 22, 1973.

Certiorari denied.

CARLTON, C. J, and ERVIN, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 4.1


 


 


THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON


NEW YORK’S FIRST BANK-FOUNDED 1784 BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON


 


 


240 Greenwich
Street, 22W Floor, New York, NY 10286


 


 


 


March 25, 2021


 


Hennion & Walsh, Inc.


2001 Route 46, Waterview Plaza


Parsippany, New Jersey 07054


 


SmartTrust 513 (the “Fund”)


 


Dear Sirs:


The Bank of New York
Mellon is acting as trustee for the Fund, consisting of the unit investment trusts (the “Trusts”) included in
the Registration Statement relating to the Fund. We enclosed a list of the securities to be deposited in the Trusts on the date
hereof. The prices indicated therein reflect our evaluation of such securities as of close of business on March 24, 2021, in accordance
with the valuation method set forth in the applicable Standard Terms and Conditions of Trust and Trust Agreements. We consent to
the reference to The Bank of New York Mellon as the party performing the evaluations of the Trust securities in the Registration
Statement (No. 333-251369) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to the registration of the sale of the
Units of the Trusts and to the filing of this consent as an exhibit thereto.


 


	 	Very truly yours,
	 	 
	 	/s/ GERARDO CIPRIANO
	 	Gerardo Cipriano
	 	Vice President
<PAGE>   1

                                  EXHIBIT 23.1


                              CONSENT OF KPMG LLP 


The Board of Directors
Habersham Bancorp:


We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos.
33-64149, 33-61587, 33-61589, 333-48507 on Forms S-8 and Registration Statement
No. 333-18023 on Form S-3 of Habersham Bancorp of our report dated February 5,
1999 with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Habersham Bancorp and
subsidiaries as of December 31, 1998 and 1997, and the related consolidated
statements of income, shareholders' equity and comprehensive income, and cash
flows for the years then ended, which report appears in the December 31, 1998
annual report on Form 10-K of Habersham Bancorp.


                                             /s/ KPMG LLP
                                             ------------
                                             KPMG LLP


Atlanta, Georgia
March 30, 1999