IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Angel Rivera, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 574 M.D. 2018

 : Argued: December 10, 2019

Pennsylvania State Police and :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: January 24, 2020

Presently before the Court in our original jurisdiction is Angel Rivera’s 

(Petitioner) Application for Summary Relief (Application) on certain counts 

enumerated in his Petition for Review (Petition) against the Pennsylvania State 

Police (PSP) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Petitioner seeks mandamus 

relief or, in the alternative, declaratory or injunctive relief with regard to whether he 

is required to register as a sexual offender under the most recent enactment of the 

Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act, Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 

27 (Act 10), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.75, as amended by the Act of June 12, 

2018, P.L. 140 (Act 29) (collectively, Act 101). Petitioner contends that he is entitled 

 

1 As the parties, for simplicity, refer to the current law as “Act 10,” we will do the same. 
2

to summary relief on his claim in the nature of a writ of mandamus directing PSP to 

comply with a January 2018 order (Order) from the Court of Common Pleas of York 

County (common pleas) vacating his registration requirements. Alternatively, 

Petitioner seeks summary relief on his request for declaratory or injunctive relief, 

asserting that his registration requirements were completed prior to the enactment of 

Act 10 and, therefore, Act 10 does not apply to him.

I. Factual background

Based upon the Petition, PSP’s Answer and New Matter, and Petitioner’s 

response thereto, the facts are as follows. In 1989, Petitioner pled guilty to a charge 

of rape in New York and was sentenced to three to nine years of imprisonment. 

Petitioner relocated to Pennsylvania sometime thereafter and was subject to sexual 

offender registration requirements based upon his conviction in New York. The 

Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), former 42 Pa. C.S. 

§§ 9799.10-9799.41, became effective in December 2012, and Petitioner was 

convicted of failing to register as a sex offender under SORNA in 2013. Following 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 

1189 (Pa. 2017), in which the Supreme Court determined SORNA violated the ex 

post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, Petitioner 

filed a motion to vacate his conviction for failure to register, which common pleas

granted. Petitioner also filed a motion “to vacate his sex offender registration 

requirements [(Motion to Vacate)], again in light of Muniz,” and common pleas

“granted this motion and vacated [Petitioner’s] sex offender registration 

requirements,” in the Order. (Petition ¶ 11.) Act 10 became effective in February 
3

2018,

2 and, by letter dated May 10, 2018, PSP notified Petitioner that he was 

“obligated to register for the rest of his life pursuant to Act 10.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Petitioner 

agrees with PSP that his “underlying [] triggering conviction has not been vacated,”

but contends he is not subject to Act 10 requirements because of the Order. (Answer 

to New Matter ¶ 83.)

In Count I of his Petition, Petitioner requests a writ of mandamus compelling 

PSP to comply with the Order, which he contends terminated Petitioner’s sexual 

offender registration requirements in their entirety. Alternatively, in Count II, 

Petitioner requests declaratory and/or injunctive relief enjoining PSP from enforcing 

Act 10 against him for two reasons: first, Act 10 applies only to those who have not 

completed their registration requirements as of February 21, 2018, which Petitioner 

had by virtue of the Order; and second, Act 10 is punitive and cannot be retroactively 

applied.

After the pleadings closed, Petitioner filed the instant Application, seeking 

summary relief as to Count I in its entirety and as to Count II to the extent that he is 

entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief because Act 10 does not apply to him 

as an individual who has completed the registration requirements. Acknowledging 

 

2 Through Acts 10 and 29, the newest version of the Sexual Offender Registration and 

Notification Act was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Muniz. Section 

9799.51(b)(4) of Act 10, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.51(b)(4). The General Assembly modified subchapter 

H to address registration requirements for individuals who committed offenses on or after 

December 20, 2012, the effective date for SORNA. See Section 9799.11(c) of Act 10, 42 Pa. C.S. 

§ 9799.11(c). Through subchapter I, the General Assembly also established, in Act 10, new 

registration requirements for: (1) individuals who committed offenses between April 22, 1996,

and December 20, 2012, whose registration period had not expired; and (2) offenders who were 

required to register under a pre-SORNA statute between April 22, 1996, and December 20, 2012, 

whose registration period had not yet expired. See Section 9799.52 of Act 10, 42 Pa. C.S. 

§ 9799.52. Although the parties disagree as to whether Petitioner’s registration is complete, their 

arguments focus on subchapter I because Petitioner’s offense was committed prior to December 

20, 2012.
4

potential factual disputes between the parties on the punitive nature of Act 10, and 

the pending case before the Supreme Court regarding that issue, Commonwealth v. 

Lacombe, petition for allowance of appeal granted (Pa., No. 35 MAP 2018, filed 

Sept. 26, 2019), Petitioner does not seek summary relief on his claim that he is 

entitled to injunctive and/or declaratory relief for his averments regarding the 

punitive nature of Act 10.

II. Discussion

This Court may grant an application for summary relief under Rule 1532(b) 

of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b), only if the 

“party’s right to judgment is clear and no material issues of fact are in dispute.” 

Gregory v. Pa. State Police, 185 A.3d 1202, 1205 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). For 

summary relief purposes, the record “is the same as a record for purposes of a motion 

for summary judgment,” and includes pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and reports signed by expert witnesses. 

Summit Sch., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 108 A.3d 192, 195-96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). 

Further, “[i]t is well established that testimonial affidavits . . . , even if not 

contradicted, [are] insufficient to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact because the credibility of the testimony is a matter for the factfinder.” Dep’t of 

Transp. v. UTP Corp., 847 A.2d 801, 806 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). When ruling on an 

application for summary relief, “we review the record in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts as to the existence of disputed material 

fact against the moving party.” Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 216 

A.3d 448, 458 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). With these principles in mind, we turn to each 

of Petitioner’s bases for the requested summary relief.
5

a. Whether Petitioner is entitled to summary relief on his mandamus claim.

Petitioner asserts that there are no factual disputes and his right to mandamus 

relief is clear because the Order terminated his registration requirement. Petitioner 

argues as follows. Although the parties agree that common pleas terminated 

Petitioner’s registration requirements in the Order, PSP now seeks to impose Act 

10’s requirements. Therefore, the only question before this Court is a question of 

law regarding whether PSP can force Petitioner’s registration in light of the Order, 

which states that it grants Petitioner’s “Motion to Vacate Sex Offender Registration 

Requirements” and that Petitioner’s “sex offender registration requirements are 

vacated.” (Order, Petition, App. A.) According to Petitioner, Act 10 does not 

invalidate this Order, and PSP cannot determine otherwise. As this Court did in 

Sammons v. Pennsylvania State Police, 931 A.2d 784 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), wherein 

we determined that PSP was bound to follow an order of a trial court expunging a 

criminal record, we should direct PSP to follow the Order. Petitioner argues he has 

a clear right to relief and no other adequate legal remedy. Accordingly, Petitioner 

claims he is entitled to summary relief on the mandamus claim.3

PSP responds that Petitioner misconstrues the Order and ignores the 

underlying Motion to Vacate that prompted common pleas to enter the Order. PSP 

argues as follows. The Motion to Vacate solely referenced and relied upon SORNA 

and, therefore, the resulting Order applies only to the registration requirements of 

SORNA. Further, because the Motion to Vacate was filed and the Order entered 

before Act 10 was passed, common pleas could not have vacated Petitioner’s 

 

3 Petitioner also relies upon Commonwealth v. Cheeseboro, 91 A.3d 714, 722 (Pa. Super. 

2014), in which the Superior Court determined that PSP did not have standing to contest orders in 

which courts of common pleas accepted negotiated plea agreements that did not require the 

defendants to register under SORNA. Because there is no question regarding PSP’s standing here, 

this case is not relevant to our determination of whether Petitioner is entitled to summary relief.
6

registration requirements under a future statute. PSP contends the Order became 

moot upon the passage of Act 10. Sammons is inapposite, because there was no 

intervening act by the General Assembly to enact new law or amend existing law in 

that case, as there is here. Because the enactment of Act 10 mooted the Order and 

restored Petitioner’s registration requirements, PSP agues Petitioner has not 

established a clear right to relief.

Petitioner replies PSP is mistaken that the Motion to Vacate solely references 

SORNA, asserting instead that it sought “vacatur of [Petitioner’s] registration 

requirements under SORNA.” (Petitioner’s Reply Brief (Br.) at 2.) The premise for 

the Motion to Vacate was “that no other registration schemes” applied to Petitioner 

and, therefore, he had no requirement to register. (Id.) While common pleas could 

not have anticipated the enactment of Act 10 at the time that it entered the Order, 

Petitioner argues the Order remains valid unless and until it is modified or vacated. 

A writ of mandamus is issued “to compel official performance of a ministerial 

act or mandatory duty,” but “cannot issue to compel performance of a discretionary 

act or to govern the manner of performing” a required act. Fagan v. Smith, 41 A.3d 

816, 818 (Pa. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A writ of mandamus can be 

issued only where the petitioner has “a clear legal right, the responding public 

official has a corresponding duty, and no other adequate and appropriate remedy at 

law exists.” Id. “[T]he purpose of mandamus is not to establish legal rights, but to 

enforce those rights which are already established.” Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 

159 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

Relying upon this Court’s decision in Sammons, Petitioner contends that he is 

entitled to mandamus to compel PSP to follow a valid court order vacating his 

registration requirements. In that case, the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus 
7

ordering PSP to execute a trial court order granting the petitioner’s expungement 

petition filed pursuant to the Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA).4 

The petitioner served PSP with a certified copy of the trial court order granting the 

expungement petition, but PSP declined to expunge the record, citing its statutory 

duty under CHRIA to maintain records for persons convicted of crimes. The 

petitioner wrote PSP again, asserting PSP had a ministerial duty to comply with the 

trial court order. PSP disagreed, arguing that CHRIA provided PSP, not trial courts, 

the discretion to expunge records for individuals over 70 years old like the petitioner. 

The petitioner then sought mandamus relief in our original jurisdiction. PSP filed 

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, and the petitioner sought 

summary relief to enter judgment in his favor.

Finding no factual disputes and the petitioner’s right to relief being clear, we 

overruled PSP’s preliminary objections and granted summary relief to the petitioner. 

Sammons, 931 A.2d at 789. We interpreted the relevant sections of CHRIA and 

determined that there was no support for PSP’s position that it alone had discretion 

to expunge records for individuals over 70 years old; thus, courts could expunge 

these records under CHRIA as well. We concluded PSP had a ministerial duty to 

expunge the record pursuant to the trial court order, the petitioner had a clear legal 

right to relief, and there was no remaining alternative for the petitioner to receive the

relief he requested. Id. Therefore, we held mandamus was warranted to compel PSP 

to comply with the trial court order. Id.

Although Petitioner, here, asserts that the question before us is simply a 

question of law involving the enforcement of an order, such as that presented in 

Sammons, we disagree. In Sammons, the parties agreed that the trial court had 

 

4

18 Pa. C.S. §§ 9101-9183.
8

granted the expungement petition, but disagreed as to the trial court’s authority to 

do so. Therefore, in Sammons, the only dispute before us on the claim for summary 

relief was purely legal, involving statutory interpretation. Here, however, the parties 

do not agree on the factual circumstances surrounding the Motion to Vacate and the 

Order. Petitioner relies upon the plain language of the Order, which states common 

pleas “hereby GRANTS the [Petitioner’s] Motion to Vacate Sex Offender 

Registration Requirements. Accordingly, the [Petitioner’s] sex offender registration 

requirements are vacated.” (Order, Petition, App. A.) Based on this, Petitioner

argues that his registration requirements under any sexual offender registration 

statute are, and remain, vacated. PSP denies that the Order vacated Petitioner’s 

sexual offender registration requirements in perpetuity or that the Order extended to 

future enactments of SORNA. To support this, PSP relies upon the Motion to 

Vacate, which it attached to its brief, wherein Petitioner asserted, inter alia, that 

SORNA was not legally binding on Petitioner in light of Muniz and retroactive 

application of SORNA would be ex post facto. PSP further notes that Petitioner’s

Motion to Vacate was filed on October 26, 2017, approximately three months after 

the Supreme Court decided Muniz, and the Order was issued in January 2018, 

approximately one month prior to the enactment of Act 10. Thus, PSP contends that

the Order is limited to SORNA.

PSP’s arguments and attachments to its brief create a genuine issue of material 

fact that preclude Petitioner’s request for summary relief. Whether Petitioner is 

entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel PSP to comply with the Order depends 

upon resolution of the dispute regarding to what extent the Order vacated Petitioner’s 

registration requirements and whether Act 10 restored Petitioner’s registration 

requirements. Regardless of whether PSP has a mandatory duty to enforce a valid 
9

court order, we cannot decide whether PSP must enforce the Order while the parties 

disagree about what the Order provides and the effect of Act 10. Until it is 

determined whether common pleas’ Order applied, or could apply, only to 

Petitioner’s registration requirements under SORNA and the effect on his 

registration requirements under Act 10, this Court cannot determine that Petitioner 

has a clear right to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s Application 

on this point. 

b. Whether Petitioner is entitled to summary relief on his claims for declaratory 

and/or injunctive relief.

Petitioner argues as follows. Subchapter I of Act 10 cannot be imposed upon 

him because his registration requirements were terminated by the Order. As set forth 

in Section 9799.54(a)(4) of Act 10, subchapter I applies to registrants, such as 

Petitioner, who committed the triggering offense outside of the Commonwealth, and 

“as of February 21, 2018, ha[ve] not completed registration requirements.” 

(Application at 7 (quoting 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.54(a)(4)) (alteration added).)

Petitioner completed his registration requirements before February 21, 2018, by 

virtue of the Order in January 2018, and subchapter I does not allow for the revival 

of completed registration requirements. As a matter of statutory construction, 

Section 9799.54(a)(4) is not ambiguous. The term “completed,” by its meaning in 

ordinary usage, means concluded. Thus, through the Order, Petitioner’s registration 

obligations were “completed” before Act 10 was enacted. Even if this provision is 

viewed as ambiguous, any such ambiguity should be construed against the 

Commonwealth and in favor of Petitioner, pursuant to the rule of lenity. Therefore, 

Petitioner asks this Court to grant his Application on this claim.
10

PSP disagrees, maintaining that Act 10 applies to Petitioner because the Order 

only vacated Petitioner’s registration requirements under SORNA. PSP further 

argues as follows. Section 9799.54(a) of Act 10 divides registrants into two 

categories – those who committed sexual offenses in the Commonwealth and those 

who committed sexual offenses outside the Commonwealth. Petitioner, who 

committed the triggering offense outside the Commonwealth, is subject to 

registration so long as he “has not completed registration requirements.” 42 Pa. C.S. 

§ 9799.54(a)(4). Reading the phrase “not completed” in the context of Section 

9799.54 as a whole, subsection (a)(4) refers to registration requirements in the 

jurisdiction in which the triggering offense was committed. This is demonstrated by 

Section 9799.54(a)(1), which provides that individuals who committed a sexually 

violent offense within the Commonwealth are required to register if their period of 

registration, “as of February 21, 2018, has not expired.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.54(a)(1). 

In contrast, Section 9799.54(a)(4) makes no reference to Pennsylvania, but refers 

only to registration requirements of other jurisdictions. Accordingly, Section 

9799.54(a)(4) refers to individuals who have “not completed” their registration in 

the jurisdiction where they were convicted. Petitioner pled guilty to rape, an offense 

which required his lifetime registration in New York, and, therefore, his registration 

is not complete and he is still subject to registration requirements pursuant to Act 

10.

Petitioner responds that he had no registration requirements in the months 

preceding the enactment of Act 10, which PSP acknowledged by removing him from 

the registry following the Order. Petitioner further argues that PSP’s statutory 

interpretation of Section 9799.54(a)(4) is contrary to the plain text of the statute, 

which is silent as to whether the phrase “has not completed registration 
11

requirements” refers to the registration requirements of another jurisdiction. 42 Pa. 

C.S. § 9799.54(a)(4). Moreover, Petitioner asserts, upon a registrant’s relocation, 

the registration requirements of another jurisdiction cease and, accordingly, 

Petitioner was subject only to registration requirements in Pennsylvania, which were 

vacated by the Order. Citing to the attachments to PSP’s brief, such as Petitioner’s 

completed out-of-state sexual offender registration questionnaires, Petitioner notes 

that New York no longer includes Petitioner on its sexual offender registry and 

asserts “it is at best debatable whether [Petitioner] had any existing registration 

obligations anywhere when Act 10 went into effect.” (Petitioner’s Reply Br. at 9.) 

PSP’s attempt to impose new registration requirements on Petitioner now based 

upon “vestigial requirements that may have existed” when Act 10 was enacted is 

contrary to the plain language of Act 10 and contrary to the rule of lenity, which 

requires that ambiguous provisions be construed against the government. (Id.)

Section 9799.54(a)(4) of Act 10, which governs applicability of the 

registration provisions, states:

(a) Registration.-- The following individuals shall register with the 

[PSP] as provided in this subchapter: 

. . . .

(4) An individual who was convicted of an offense similar to an offense 

set forth in section 9799.55 under the laws of the United States or one 

of its territories or possessions, [or] another state . . . who, as of 

February 21, 2018, has not completed registration requirements. The 

period of registration shall be as set forth in section 9799.56(b)(4) 

(relating to registration procedures and applicability) less any credit for 

time spent on a sexual offender registry of the United States or one of 

its territories or possessions, another state, the District of Columbia, the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a foreign nation or with the 

Pennsylvania State Police prior to February 21, 2018.
12

42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.54(a)(4).

Petitioner argues that the Order vacated his registration requirements in their 

entirety in January 2018 and, therefore, he “completed registration requirements” by 

February 21, 2018, and is entitled to summary relief. Id. We cannot agree for the 

same reasons as set forth above. In short, there remains a dispute regarding what 

Petitioner sought in the Motion to Vacate and what common pleas granted in the 

Order, which precludes summary relief.

However, PSP argues that Act 10 applies to Petitioner because Section 

9799.54(a)(4) applies to registrants who have “not completed registration 

requirements” in the jurisdiction in which they committed the triggering offense. Id.

Regardless of whether PSP’s interpretation of Section 9799.54(a)(4) is correct, there 

are factual disputes regarding Petitioner’s obligation to register in any other 

jurisdiction. PSP asserts Petitioner was a lifetime registrant in New York given the 

nature of his offense. For this, PSP relies upon the sworn declaration of Trooper 

Matthew Webb (Webb Declaration) of PSP’s Megan’s Law Section, in which 

Trooper Webb states that his review of Petitioner’s file demonstrates that Petitioner 

was required to register for life in New York and this lifetime registration 

requirement applied under Megan’s Law III5 at the time of Petitioner’s relocation to 

Pennsylvania.

6

 However, Petitioner disagrees, relying upon two attachments to the 

 

5 Former 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9791-9799.9. Megan’s Law III was found unconstitutional by the 

Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013).

6 Trooper Webb asserts that the lifetime registration requirement at the time of Petitioner’s 

relocation to Pennsylvania was pursuant to Megan’s Law III, which was the law in effect in 2007. 

However, Petitioner avers in his Petition that he relocated in 1998 and was subject to registration 

requirements under Megan’s Law I, Act of October 24, 1995, P.L. 1079 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), former 

42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9791-9799.6, which was subsequently found unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999). (Petition ¶¶ 5, 6.) As a result, it is also unclear at this stage 

when Petitioner relocated and what his registration requirements may have been at that time.
13

Webb Declaration. These attachments are completed questionnaires entitled “outof-state registration questions,” dated 2007 and 2012, which detail information 

regarding Petitioner’s convictions and accompanying registration requirements in 

New York. On the bottom of one questionnaire is a handwritten notation “[n]ot on 

NY or nat[iona]l registry.” (PSP’s Br., Ex. A, Attachment A.) Therefore, the parties 

disagree not only as to whether Petitioner is required to register in Pennsylvania 

under Act 10 but also as to whether he is still subject to registration requirements in 

New York, which could affect his requirement to register in Pennsylvania. We 

cannot address PSP’s and Petitioner’s arguments regarding the statutory 

construction of Section 9799.54 given these disputed facts. Accordingly, we deny 

Petitioner’s Application with regard to his claim for declaratory and/or injunctive 

relief that Act 10 does not apply to him by its terms.

c. Whether the Commonwealth is a proper party to this action.

Finally, PSP raises in its brief in opposition to the Application that the 

Commonwealth is not a proper party because it is entitled to sovereign immunity on 

these claims where Petitioner’s claims are in the nature of equitable and injunctive 

relief. Petitioner responds that he has no objection to the dismissal of the 

Commonwealth as a party. Petitioner asserts that he named the Commonwealth as 

a party “in an abundance of caution,” but if the Commonwealth is not a proper party, 

Petitioner does not object to the Commonwealth’s dismissal. (Petitioner’s Reply Br. 

at 10.) Because Petitioner does not object and the Commonwealth has not 

participated, we dismiss the Commonwealth as a party.
14

III. Conclusion

There remain factual disputes between the parties as to the Order that 

Petitioner relies upon as his basis for mandamus and declaratory and/or injunctive 

relief regarding his registration requirements in Pennsylvania, as well as whether 

Petitioner is still subject to registration requirements in New York. Because there 

are material issues of fact remaining, Petitioner’s right to relief is not clear and

summary relief is not appropriate at this time. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s 

Application. Further, because the parties agree that the Commonwealth is not a 

proper party, we dismiss the Commonwealth as a party.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Angel Rivera, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 574 M.D. 2018

 : 

Pennsylvania State Police and :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Respondents :

O R D E R

NOW, January 24, 2020, Angel Rivera’s (Petitioner) Application for 

Summary Relief is hereby DENIED. Because Respondent Pennsylvania State 

Police asserts that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) is not a 

proper party and Petitioner has no objection to the Commonwealth’s dismissal, this 

action is DISMISSED as to the Commonwealth.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge