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______________________________ Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909

C hief Justice Justices Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. 

# Opinion

Stephen J. Markman

FILED DECEMBER 28, 2001

In re HON. SUSAN R. CHRZANOWSKI JUDGE OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, WARREN, MICHIGAN. No. 116721

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH MARKMAN, J. The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) has recommended that

we sus pend respondent, 37th District Court Judge Susan R. Chrzanowski, for twelve months without pay for misconduct in the performance of her judicial duties. Respondent has filed

a petition to reject this recommendation. We affirm the JTC’s findings, and conclude that the JTC’s recommendation of a oneyear suspension of respondent is a reasonable one. Pursuant to MCR 9.225, we modify the recommendation of the JTC to require a six-month suspension without pay, beginningJanuary 1, 2002, in order to accord respondent partial credit for the seventeen-month interim suspension with pay that she has already served.

I. F ACTS AND P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY The bases for the JTC’s complaint concern two aspects of

re sp ondent’s conduct between April 1998 and August 1999. First, on a s ubstantial number of occasions, respondent appointed then-attorney Michael Fletcher to represent indigent defendants, and presided over suchcases, as well as presided over a criminal case in which Fletcher was retained counsel, without disclosing that she was engaged at the time in an intimate relationship withFletcher. Second, respondent made false statements to police officers investigating the August 16, 1999, murder of Leann Fletcher, Michael Fletcher’s wife. 1 Respondent and Fletcher met in 1996 and became friends in 1997. In February of 1998, Fletcher enter ed the private practice of law. Respondent began assigning him to represent indigent criminal defendants in misdemeanor cases in her court. In July of 1998, respondent and Fletcher began an inti mat e relationship. Throughout the course of their

1 In July 2000, a trial court convicted Fletcher of second-degree murder, finding that he shot a nd k illed his wife, Leann. 2subsequent relationship, betweenJuly 1, 1998, and August 15, 1999, respondent assigned Fletcher to fifty-six cases. Fiftyfiv e of these cases, without a city attorney being pres ent , resulted in guilty pleas accep ted by respondent. These appoint ment s generated in excess of $16,000 in income for Fletcher. I n addition, respondent presided over People v Donald Thomas Richards , Case No W224162, in which Fletcher was retained counsel. Respondent entered an order dismissing the

case against Fletcher’s client. Respondent failed to disclose her ongoing relationship with Fletcher in any of these cases. On August 16, 1999, Fletcher shot and killed his w ife , Leann. Som etime after committing the murder, Fletcher telephoned respondent and left her a message. In the message, Fletcher asked respondent to call him when she returned home. Respondent received this message during the pre-dawnhours of August 17. Re sponde nt then paged Fletcher, but received no response. She then left Fletcher a message, and he returned the call approximately one-half hour later. He told respondent that he could not talk, b ut t hat something “horrible” had happened. In the morning, respondent was informed by a c o-worker that Leann Fletcher had committed suicide. Respondent went home early because she was too upset to complete her docket.
3During the initial investigation of the murder, Hazel Park Police officers discovered evidence that respondent had bee nengaged in an intimate relationship with Fletcher. O n August 17, the police int erv iewed respondent at her home. The interviewing detective asked respon dent whether she had beeninvolved with Fletcher. Judge Chrzanowski responded that she had. When question ed about the length of the relationship, respondent indicated that the relationship had begun in February of 1999 and had lasted only until March of 1999. The detective also asked respondent if she had spoken to Fletcher since the death of Leann, and respondent stated that she had not. Because res pondent was emotionally distraught, the interview ceased. OnAugust 19, respondent wen t to t he Hazel Park police stationfor a second interview. At this time, respondent indicated that her relationship with Fletcher had actually begunin August of 1998 and continued sporadically until August 15, 1999. Respondent also acknowledged, contr ary to her August 17 statement, that she had spoken to Fl etche r following his wife’s death. InSeptembe r o f 1999, the JTC received a request from MacombCounty Prosecu tor Carl Marlinga for an investigation into respondent’s appointment of Fletcher during their

4relationship. Following respondent’s replies, the JTC filed Formal Complaint No. 65 on April 14, 2000. First, the complaint asserted that respondent had engaged in misconduct by appointing Fletcher to appear in cases before her without disclosing their relationship. Second, the complaint alleged that respondent made false statements to Hazel Park police officers in the August 17 interview concerning the murder of Fletcher’s wife. OnApril 26, 2000, thi s Co urt appointed former Justice Char les Levin to serve as master in this case. Meanwhile, respondent testified at the murder trial of Fletcher and indicated that she had made false state ment s during the initial police inquiry. The JTC then filed a petition for interim suspension pursuant to MCR 9.220. 2 On July 28, 2000, this Court entered an order suspending respondent with pay. In re Chrzanowski , 463 Mich 1201 (2000). II. M ASTER ’ S FINDINGS After conducting a formal hearing, the master issued his report on December 7, 2000. He found that respondent had appointed Fletcher as counsel for indigent criminal defendants in matters over which she presided, and had approved payment

2 MCR 9.220 provides that the J TC “ may petition the Supreme Court for an order suspending a judge from acting as a judge until final adjudication of a complaint.” 5of legal fees to Fletcher during the period between April 1998 and August 1999, whenshe and Fletcher had beenengaged in an i ntimate relationship. The master also found that Flet che r had received “a disproportionate number” of app oint ments in comparisonwith other attorneys who practiced before respondent. He concluded that respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by making these appointments to Fletcher. 3 He stated that a judge is enjoined by this provision from allowing social or other relationships to influence conduct or judgment, and is further prohibited from making appointments

onthe basis of considerations other thanmerit. 4 The master also found that such appointments had “the appearance of impropriety” and “erode[d] public confidence in the judiciary.” 5 Nonetheless, the master concluded that he could

3 Canon 2(C) provides: “A judge should not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.”

4 Canon 3(B)(4) provides: “All appointments shall be based upon merit.”

5 Canon 2(A) provides: Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public s crut iny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. 6not recommend discipline because the JTC “has not promulgated

a policy respecting disproportionate assignments to close personal friends of the judge, and consequently the Sup rem e Court h as n ot been called upon to enunciate a rule of law

. . . justifying a recommendation for the imposition of discipline.” Moreover, the mas ter determined that, because respondent had a subjective good-faith belief that she could impartially hear cases in whichFletcher appeared, she was not required by the Code of Judicial Conduct, or by MCR 2.003 6 to

6 MCR 2.003 provides: (A) Who May Raise. A p arty m ay raise the issue of a judge’s di squa lification by motion, or the judge may raise it. (B) Grounds. A judge is disqualified when the judge cannot impartially hear a case, including but not limited to instances in which: (1) The judge is personally biased or prejudiced for or against a party or attorney. * * * (5) The judge knows that he or she . . . has aneconomic inter est in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding. (D) Remittal of Disqualification. If it appears that there may be grounds for disqualification, the judge may ask the parties and their lawyers t o co nsider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If, following disclosure of any basis for 7disclose the relat ionship with Fletcher, or to raise on her

ownthe matter of her disqualification. The master concluded t hat he was unable to recommend disciplinary action aga ins t respondent for this conduct. Concerning allegations that respondent had made false statements to the police, the master determined that the statements were “inaccu raci es.” However, he concluded that “[t]he substance, if not the detail, of Chrzanowski’s responses was accurate” and “[v ]iew ed as a whole, the informationconveyed to the officers was accurate.” The master found “as a matter of law” that, “unless a statement by

a judge is a lie, i.e., ‘a false statement made with deliber ate intent to deceive,’ there is not misconduct or conduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice withinthe meaning of C onst 1963, art 6, § 30, justifying a

recomme ndati onof discipline.” The master concluded that respondent “did not make statements to the police with deliberate intent to deceive, and did not lie to the police.” Onthe basis of these findings, the master recommended disqualificationother than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties without participation bythe judge, all agree that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is thenwilling to participate, the judge may participate in the proceedings. The agreement shall be in writing or placed on the record. 8dismissal of the charges concerning respondent’s statements. III. J UDICIAL T ENURE C OMMISSION The JTC adopted most of the findings of fact of the master, but not his conclusions of law. 7 The J TC d isagreed withthe master’s conclusion that respo ndent did not have a duty to disclose her relationship with Fletcher when she appointed him to repres ent indigent defendants, or where he appeared b efo re her as retained counsel. Further, the JTC disagre ed wit h the master’s conclusion that “as a matter of law,” in order for the false statements to have constitute d j udic ial misconduct, they had to be what the master characterized as “lies.”

7 All eight members of the JTC panel found misconduct on the part of respondent. There was unanimity that respondent’s assignments to Fletcher and his appearances before her while the two were engaged in a sexual relationship was imp roper , and constituted mi sc onduct in office and conduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. A five-member majority recommended that respondent be suspended for one year without pay. Commissioners James Kin gsle y and Henry Baskin agreed with most of the findings and recommendation of a oneyear sus pension, but dissented from the finding that respondent had made “false statements to the police.” Commissioner Pamela Harwood wrote separately and agreed with the majority findings concerning the appointments without disclosure. However, she also dissented from the finding that respondent had made false statements to the police. Commissioner Harwood recommended that respondent be suspended f or fo rty-five to ninety days without pay, and that she be returned to active judicial service upon her reimbursement to the 37th District Court funding unit for ninety days of pay.

9After setting forth the factors promulgated by this Court in In re Brown , 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293 (1999) ( Brown I ), see also In re Brown (After Remand) , 464 Mich 135, 138; 626 NW2d 403 (2001) ( Brown II ), the JTC proceeded to find factors one throughthree, and five, relevant to respondent’s conduct. 8 Withregard to factor one, the JTC determined that

8 In Brown I and II , we stated that, in making judicial disciplinary recommendations, the JTC should consider: (1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or practice is more serious than anisolated instance of misconduct; (2) misconduct on the bench is usually more serious than the same misconduct off the bench; (3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the actual administration of justice is more serious thanmisconduc t tha t is prejudicial only to the appearance of propriety; (4) misconduct that does not implicate the actual administration of justice, or its appearance of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct that does; (5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is less serious than misconduct that is premeditated or deliberated; (6) misconduct that undermines the ability of the justice system to discover the truth of what occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the most just result in such a case, is mor e serious thanmisconduct that merely delays such discovery . . . . [ Brown I , supra at 1292-12 93; Brown II , supra at 138.] 10respondent’s fifty-six appointments to Fletcher over the

course of seventeen months while the two were engaged in an intimate relationship, and her failure to disclose that fact, constit uted a “pattern or practice” of misconduct. 9 With regard to factor two, the JTC observed that t his misconduct constituted “misconduct on the bench.” With regard to factor three, the JTC conclude d th at, although no evidence existed that respondent’s conduct resulted in any actual prejudice to the administration of justice, such conduct did have a negative effect on the appearance of propriety in judicial decisionmaking and the integrity of the judicial office in general. 10 With regard to factor five, the JTC concluded that respondent’s misconduct was “deliberate” as opposed to “spontaneous,” because she had considered whether the appointments to Fletcher were improper and had reached the

9 Respondent argu es tha t the fact that the proceedings over which she presided were “nonadversarial” in nature, i.e., that there was no prosecuting attorney present during Fletcher’s representation of the indigent defendants, somehow lessened her duty to disclose her relationship with Fletcher. We disagree with this argument because, as the JTC noted, despite respondent’s apparently fair disposition of these cases, he r conduct did have a negative effect on the appearance of propriety in judicial decision making, and the appearance of integrity of the judicial office in general.

10 The JTC acknowledged that respondent had fairly decided the issues before her in the cases in which she h ad appointed Fletcher. 11subjective conclusion that they were not. In this regard, the JTC found that respondent’s subjective conclusions about the pro priety of presiding over these cases did “not negate th e fact that the relationship existed and opposing cou nsel and others concerned with the integrity of the judiciary should have been so advised.” With respect to factor five, the JTC also determined that re spon dent’s “false statements” to the police appeared calculated to deflect any suspicion that she

was the motive beh ind Leann Fletcher’s murder. The JTC concluded that the fact that respondent corrected her

erroneous statements “within a matter of days . . . [did] not diminishthe gravity of her having made statements . . . on a material factor—the motive for the murder of Leann Fletcher.” Inaddition to these four factors, the JTC considered four ad diti onal factors. 11 First, the JTC concluded that

11 As this Court noted in Brown I , supra at 1295, the JTC “should consider [the factors specified] and other appropriate standards that it may develop” when makin g recommendations. Here, the JTC additionally considered: (1) The judge’s conduct in response to the commission’s inquiry and disciplinary proceedings. Specifically, whether the judge showed remorse and made an effort to change his or her conduct and whether the judge was candid and cooperated with the commission; (2) The judge’s discipline record and reputation;

12respon dent had reacted to the JTC investigation and the subsequent disciplinary proceedings candidly, cooperatively, and in good faith. Second, concerning the appointment procedures, the JTC found that respondent had instituted a “blind draw rotation system” subsequent to the investigation. According to the JTC, this demonstrated respondent’s ability to improve her conduct. Further, concerning her statements to the police, the JTC fo und that, except for the first interview, respondent had fully cooperated with authorities in th e p rosecution of Fletcher. The JTC also determined that respondent had no prior disciplinary record, and t hat there

was considerable evidence of her competency and good reputationin the community. Finally, the JTC found that respondent’s relatively short judicial career constituted a mitigating circumstance, and that there was no reason to believe that she would repeat the misconduct. We now address

(3) The effect the misco nduct had upon the integrity of and respect for the judiciary; (4) Years of judicial experience. [ In re Chrzanowski , Decision and Recommendation of the Judi cial Tenure Commission, April 9, 2001, at 19­ 21, citing American Judicature Society, How Judicial Conduct Commissions Work (1999), pp 15­ 16.] We find the application of each of these factors to be reasonable in the present context. 13the issues raised by respondent in her petition to reject the JTC’s recommendation. IV. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW We review the recommendations of the JTC de novo. In re Hathaway , 464 Mich672, 684; 630 NW2d 850 (2001); see also In

re Ferrara , 458 Mich 35 0, 358-59; 582 NW2d 817 (1998). We also review t he JTC’s findings of fact de novo. In re Jenkins , 437 Mich 15, 18; 465 NW2d 317 (1991); see also In re Somers , 384 Mich 320, 323; 182 NW2d 341 (1971). V. A NALYSIS Respondent first contends that the JTC’s conclusionthat her statements were false is contrary to t he master’s find ing s, and that the JTC should have deferred to such findings. Second, respondent argues t hat th e JTC’s lack of deference to the findings of the master was violative of her right to due process of law. Specifically, she contends that the JTC’s combined function as an investigatory, as well as an ad judica tory body, created an actual risk of bias in the proc eedings contrary to her entitlement to due proce ss . Third, respondent contends that the JTC’s recommended suspension of twelve months without pay is disproportionate. We will address these issues in turn. A. T HE JTC’ S D EFERENCE TO THE M ASTER ’ S F INDINGS 14We do not believ e that the JTC disputed the factual findings of the master concerning respondent’s statements to the pol ice. 12 Rather, the JTC and the master agreed that respondent had initially indicated that her relationship with Fletcher started in Febr uary 1999 and ended one month afterward, when in fact, as respondent later acknowledged, this relationship lasted from January 1998 to August 1999. Further, both t he mas ter and the JTC agreed that respondent had initially indicated that she did not speak with Fletcher

onAugust 17, 1999, following his wife’s death, when in fact, as respondent later acknowledged, she did speak with him. Nonetheless, respondent questions the JTC’s conclusions of fact concerning these statements. Specifically, respondent challen ges t he JTC’s conclusions that the statements were false in light of the ma ster’s conclusion that, because the statements were taken from a “narrative” of the police interview, rather than from a direct transcr ipt o f respondent’s statements, the “substance if not the detail” of respondent’s statements “was accurate.” 13 Respondent therefore

12 As noted in the J TC’s brief, “[The JTC] did not overrule any of the master’s findings of fact. The [JTC] did, however, accord different weight than the master did and, at times, drew different inferences and conclusions.”

13 Conc ern ing the length of respondent’s relationship withFletcher, the master stated that “[respondent] 15contends tha t th e JTC exceeded its authority in determining that the statements were false. Inresponse to this argument, the JTC ass ert s that it reviews the findings and conclusions of law of the master de novo, and that the JTC is not compelle d t o defer to the master’s findings of fact. We agree. The JTC is established by the Michigan Constitution and v ested with the responsibility of determining whether to recommend to this Court t hat a judge be disciplined for “misconduct in office

. . . or conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the administrationof justice.” Const 1963, art 6, § 30. Section 30(2) further provides that on recommendation of the JTC, the su preme court may censure, suspend with or without salary, retire or remove a judge for convictionof a felony, physical or mental disability which prevents the performance of judicial duties, misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance or conduct that is clearly prejudicial acknowledged, during the interview, when identifying papers seized at th e Fl etcher home, that her relationship with Fletch er stretched back to at least November, 1998.” With respect to the contact with Fletcher, the master stated that “[respondent] provide d th e police with the substance of the communicationfrom Fl etcher” and “[i]t was of no importance whether Fletcher had spoken directly to her or by voice mail.” Thus, according to the master, even though respondent did not speak truthfully, i.e., that the relationship had begun in 1998, and that she had in fact spoken to Fletcher, the informationshe provided implicitly acknowledged the length of the relationship and the “substance” of her conversation with Fletcher, and was therefore accurate. 16to the a dministration of justice. The supreme court shall make rules implementing this section and providing for confidentiality and privilege of proceedings. Thus, pursuant to this provision, it is the JTC’s, not the master’s conclusions and recommendations that are ultimately subject to review by this Court. Additionally, § 30 provides that the Supreme Court shall make rules implementing the JTC’s authority and procedures. Subchapter 9.200 of the Michigan Court Rules was promulgated for this purpose. As to the actual procedures in decision making, the court rules clearly ind icate that the JTC has authority to review the master’s findings de novo. MCR 9.221 governs the final decision of the JTC. In subsection (A) it provides in relevant part: The affirmative vote of 5 [JTC] members who have considered th e report of the master and objections and who were present at an oral hearing provided for in MCR 9.217 . . . is requir ed fo r a recommendation . . . . [Emphasis supplied.] Accordi ngly, all that is needed for the JTC to make a valid

recomm endationis that it consider the report of the master and objections, and that a five-member majority agree on the facts and the recommended discipline. Further, subsection (B) of that court rule outlines procedures with regard to the JTC’s recommendation itself: The commission must make written findings of fact and conclusions of law along with its

17recommendationfor action with respect to the issues of fact and law in the proceedings, but may adopt the fi ndi ngs of the master, in whole or in part, by reference. [Emphasis added.] Althoughthis provisionaddresses creation of the record, its language provides further explication of the JTC’s reviewing authority. The provision distinguishes between what the JTC must do, to wit, “make written findings of fact and conclusions of law”, and what the JTC may do, to wit, “adopt the findings of the master . . .” Court rules, like statutes,

are to be interpreted inaccordance with their plain meaning. Ke lley v Mich Public Serv Comm , 392 Mich 660, 668; 221 NW2d 29 9 (1974); see also Neal v Oakwood Hosp Corp , 226 MichAp p 701, 722; 575 NW2 d 68 (1997). Giving this court rule its plainmeaning, we conclude that the JTC is not compelled to defer to the master’s findings of fact, but rather may review the findings of fact, and the conclusions of the master, de

no vo. 14 I n so concluding, we agree with the JTC that respondent’s statements were “false” and “deliberately made,

14 While we conclude that, where a master is appointed, the JTC may exer cise de novo review of the record, it must, like all other reviewing tribunals apply the standard of proof applicable in civil proceedings: a preponderance of the evidence standard. MCR 9.211 (“the commission or the master shall proceed with a public hearing which must conform as nearly as possible to the rules of procedure and evidence governing the trial of a civil action”); see also In re Seitz , 441 Mich 590, 593; 495 NW2d 559 (1993). 18and with a f ull un derstanding of their implication,” and we disagree with the master that such statements were mere “in accuracies”, which did not rise to the level of judi cia l misconduct. B. R ESPONDENT ’ S D UE P ROCESS C LAIM Respondent further claims that the JTC’s “simultaneous” role as a prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory body is violative of her due process rights. In particular, Judge Chrzan ows ki asserts that the JTC’s failure to defer to the factual findings of the master demonstrates that it could not separate itself from the fact-finding function, and therefore, that it could not, and did not impartially recommend discipline. We conclude that, while the JTC accepted the pertinent findings of fact of the master, it nonetheless based its recommendationupo n a different characterization of the facts, to wit, that respondent’s statements to the officers

were false, rather than merely “inaccurate”. On the basis of

our review of the record, we do not disagree with this conclusion, and, for the reasons set forth below, we hold that the JTC afforded respondent due process. It is uncontroverted that judges, like all other citize ns , have protected due process interests under the MichiganConstitution, Const 1963, art 1 § 17, and the Due

19Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The scope an d m eaning of due process protections in circumstances where there is some commingling of prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory roles has beendiscussed by the United States Supreme Court in a circumstance similar to the present case. In W ith row v Larkin, 421 US 35; 95 S Ct 145 6; 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975), the United Stat es Supreme Court held that there is no broad prohibitionagainst members of an administrative agency investigating facts, instituting proceedings, and then making the necessary adjudication. The Withrow case arose in Wisconsinwhere the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board commenced an investigation to determine whether a doctor had committed certainillegal acts. The board subsequently decided to hold a hearing to determ ine wh ether the doctor had committed the alleged acts and whether to suspend the doctor’s license temporarily. Id . at 39-41. The Court held that the bo ard could adjudicate the same charges it had investigated and decided to prosecute without violating the doctor ’s d ue process rights. Id . at 47-55. The Court stated: The contention that the combination of investigat ive and adjudicative function s necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudicationhas a much more difficult bu rden of persuasion to carry. It must
20overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses s uch a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. [ Id . at 47; see also McIntyre v Santa Barbara Co Emp Ret System , 91 Cal App 4th 730; 110 Cal Rptr 2d 565, 569 (2001) (th e combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more , constitute a due process violation); Marshall v Cuomo , 192 F3d 473, 484-485 (CA 4,1999) (due process rights are not violated simply by the combinationof the investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory functions in one agency, but rather by actual bias or the high probability of bias); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge , 265 GA 843; 462 SE2d 728 (1995) (the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, per se, violate the requirements of due process). Notably, the Court further observed that, while the combinationof investigative and adjudicative functions is not, without more, a due process violation, this “does not, of course, preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unf airness is intolerably high.” Withrow, supra at 58. However, the Court found no such special facts and circumstances with regard to the professional discipline board in Withrow. This Court also has had occasion to address this due process issue espe ciallyin reference to the JTC and has

21adopted the Withrow standards. 15 InIn re Del Rio , 400 Mich 665, 690; 256 NW2d 727 (1977) , we noted that “the authority is legionin support of the p ropo sition that combining the investigative and adjudicative roles in a single agency does not necessarily violate due process in administrative adjudications such as judicial fitne ss h earings.” Id ., see also In re Moore, 464 Mich 98, 128-131; 626 NW2d 374 (2001). Further, we held in In re Mik esell, 396 Mich 517, 530; 243 NW2d 86 (1976), that “the combination of investigative and adjudicat ive functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation . . . .” Quoting from Withrow , supra at 58. Thus, in accordance with Withrow, this Court held that a court should examine the matter to see if there are “special facts and circumstances present in the c ase be fore it” that present an “intolerably high” risk of unfairness. Id.

15 In Brown I , we noted that the JTC’s application of the listed factors to judicial misconduct proceedings, by “ensur[ing] a consistent rule of law,” would assist in maintaining due process rights for JTC respondents. Brown I , supra at 1295. We re cogni zed that “[d]ue process of law is essentially the legal equivalent of procedural fairness . . . [and] a concept that ‘calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’” Id ., citing Mathews v Eldridge , 424 US 319, 333-334; 96 S Ct 893 ; 47 L Ed 2 d 18 (1976), and In re Brock , 442 Mich 101, 110-111; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). As we have indicated in this opinion, the JTC appropriately analyzed respondent’s conduct in light of th e Brownfactors, and in doing so, afforded respondent adequate due process protection. 22We find, in reliance upon Withrow and the Michi ga n authorities, tha t th e procedures followed by the JTC in

rea ching its decision conformed to the constitution and t he court rules, and afforded respondent sufficient d ue p rocess protections. We further conclude that there were no special facts or circumstances which woul d sugg est that the risk of unfairness here, if indeed there was any, was “intolerably high.” Mikesell , supra at 531. As to the procedures, first, pursuant to MCR 9.207(B)(3), the JTC conducted a preliminary investigationto determine whether respondent’s alleged conduct warranted further action. Second, after determining that sufficient evidence of misconduct existed, the JTC filed

a formal complaint pursuant to MCR 9.208. Third, a master was appointed, 16 notice was given, and a hearing was then afforded respondent under MCR 9 .210(A ) and MCR 9.211, with the JTC’s executive director serving as prosecutor-examiner under MCR 9.201(6). Fourth, after the hearing, when objections were lodged against the master’s findings, the examiner under MCR 9.216 issued such objections in writing, with a supporting brief. MCR 9.216. Finally, the JTC’s conclusion that Judge Chrza nowski should be disciplined was ultimately just a

16 Although it is not required that a master preside at a disciplinary hearing, the JTC under MCR 9.210 may reques t this Court to appoint a master, as it did in this case. 23recommendationto this Court that we are charged to review de

novo pursuant to deciding wha t discipline, if any, is appropriate. As in Withrow , the JTC’s investigative and adjudicative procedures are functionally separate; additionally, as dist inct from Withrow , in which the investigationand the decision were undertaken by the same Medical Examining Board, he re t he master, the examiner, and the JTC panel are separate entities. If the board in Withrow did not violate due process rights by investigating, and then adjud icatin g claims, it can hardly be argued that the JTC’s procedures violated due process. Further, a majority of the members of the JTC are judges, and all the members who ultimately recommend discipline are assumed to be fair and impartial. We conclude then that there was no actual bias in the JTC’s decision. It had authority to review the master’s findings de novo, and r ea sonably determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that respondent had in fact made false statements. We find these procedures adequately separated the JTC’s investigative and adjudicative functions. 17 C. T HE P ROPORTIONALITY OF THE JTC’ S R ECOMMENDATION

17 There were three levels of review in the instant case: (1) the master’s findings and conclusions issued after th e public hearing, (2) the JTC’s de novo findings and recommendations, and (3) this Court’s de novo review. 24The JTC has recommended that respondent be suspended for

one year without pay. Respondent argues that, in light of previous JTC recommendations, this sanction is disproportionate. Respondent cites several opinions written before Brown I and Brown II in which various sanctions were meted out for incidents of judicial misconduct. However, as Brown I indicated, review by this Court of previous judicial disciplinary proceedings has sometimes been “hampered because the standards by which the JTC [produced] its recommendations [were not always] apparent.” Brown I , supra at 1292. Rather thananalyze each of the cases raised by respondent in her argument challenging the proportionality of the recommended sanction, w e h ave chosen instead to examine the proportiona lityof her sanction in light of the JTC’s application of the Brownfactors. Here, as outlined in part III, the JTC set f orth its analysis in the context of these factors. We find this analysis to be reasonably done and therefore accord the recommendations of the JTC considerable deference. 18

18 Respondent argues that the inordi nate amount of publicity surrounding her case influenced the JTC to recommend a harsher sanction than deserved. We disagree. As noted in this opinion, Canon 2(A) provides that “[a] judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety,” and “[a] judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrut iny.” 25This Court assesses the proportionalit y of the JTC’s recommendations of discipline, withthe goal of “maintain[ing] the hon or a nd the integrity of the judiciary, deter[ring] similar conduct, and further[ing] the administration of justice.” In re Hocking , 451 Mich 1, 24; 546 NW2d 234 (1996). “[T]he purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish but to maintainthe integrity of the judicial process.” In re Moore , supra at 118. We conclude that the JTC’s recommendation of a one-year susp ensi on of respondent without pay was a clearly reasonable one. However, the JTC could not have known, and thus did not consider, the overall length of respondent’s interim suspension, which has continued until the issuance of this opinion. We believe that some consideration should be given to the chastening effect of respondent’s seventeen-month interim suspension from judicial duties, although such suspensionhas been with pay. In a de moc ratically elected

These provisions embody the concept that judges are particularly susceptible to public scrutiny, and that they must take appropriate account of the effects of their conduct up onthe public’s perception of the courts and the justice system. While we do not agree that the JTC’s recommendation here was unduly influenced by the media’s focus, we nevertheless observe that caution must invariably be exercised by the JTC (as well as by this Court) to ensure that the attentions of the media upon particular judicial mis cond uct are placed in an appropriate perspective. 26judicial system, such as we have in Michigan, suspension of a judge from judicial activities is itself a sanction with considerable consequences, and we believe that respondent has incurred many of those consequences. We conclude that in this unique case it is reasonable to accord respondent credit for sixmonths of her seventeen-month interim suspension. Accordingly, pursuant to MCR 9.225, 19 we modify the recommendationof the JTC only to accord respondent credit for sixmonths of the seventeen-month interim suspensionthat she has alr eadyserved. 20 Therefore, we direct the following disciplinary action in this case: This c ause having been brought to this Court by the recommendation of the Judicial Tenure Commissionand having been briefed and argued by counsel, it is ordered that Respondent Ho n. S usan

19 MCR 9.225 provides: The Supreme Court shall review the record of the proceedings and shall file a written opinion and judgment which may direct censure, removal, retirement, suspension, or other disciplinary action, or reject or modify the recommendations of the commission. [emphasis added.] See also In re Hathaway , 464 Mich 672, 685; 63 0 NW2d 85 0 (2001).

20 We concur with the JTC that respo ndent sh ould not be permanently removed from the bench. We believe that evidence of respondent’s reputationand her past conduct on the court, apart from that at issue in the present case, suggest that she possesses the ability to serve honorably upon the bench, and to fully live up the Code of Judicial Conduct. 27R. Chrzanowski shall be suspended from the discharge of all judicial and administrative duties, without pay, for a period of twelve months. However, respondent shall receive credit for six months served during the p er iod of her interim suspension. Respondent shall serve the remainder of her twelve-month suspension, six months without pay, t o begin January 1, 2002. After June 30, 2002, respondent may return to the bench of the 37 th District Court to serve the remainder of her term. Respondent’s conduct on the bench was unbecoming of the office that she holds. Her actions un derm ined public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and were prejudicial to the administration of justice. Const 1963, art 6, § 30. “As the cornerstone of our tripartite system of government, the judiciary has a public trust to both uphold and represent the rule of law.” Hocking , supra at 6. “[J]udges . . . are bound to conduct themselves withhonor and dignity.” Id . We conclude, as did the JTC, tha t respondent’s conduct

was violative o f the standards established by the constituti on, the Michigan Court Rules, and the Code of Judicial Conduct. We emphasize, moreover, that respondent is being disciplined only for her i mproper appointments of counsel, her failure to disclose those appointments, and for her false statements to the interviewing officers. VII. C ONCLUSION W e co nclude that the JTC reasonably determined that respondent’s actions in the foregoing case constituted 28judicial misconduct sufficient to subject her to the sanctions set forth in this opinion. Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), the Clerk is directed to issue the judgment order forthwith. C ORRIGAN , C.J., and C AVANAGH , W EAVER , K ELLY , T AYLOR , and Y OUNG , JJ., concurred with M ARKMAN , J.

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