### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 5, 200 5 S es sio n CATHERI NE LAYMAN v. VANGUARD CONTRACTORS, I NC., ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. 50000014 Ross H. Hicks, Ju dge

No. M2004- 01918-SC-R3- CV - F iled Janu ary 18, 2006
The plaintiff soug ht worker s’ compensation benef its for both cog nitive impairment and a disfig uring sc ar r e su lti ng fr om a wo rk -r e late d a c c ide nt. We c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th e tria l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ionthat th e plaint if f d id n ot s uf

fe r c og nit ive imp a irme nt as a re su lt o f th e a c c id e n t. Wi thr e g ar d to th e b e n e f it s f o r d is f ig u r e me n t, th e tria l c o u rt e rr e d inc a lc u lating benef its as an awa

rd to the bod y as a w hole pursuant to Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-207( 3)(F ) (1999 ). I n juries for disfig ureme nt are instead g overne d by Tenne ssee Code An no tate d s e c tio n 5 0- 6- 20 7( 3) (E ) ( 19 99 ), wh ic h limit s th e be ne fi ts f or dis fi g ur e me nt t o 2 00 we e ks

. Be cause the plaintiff’s disfig ureme nt may not be classifie d as an injury to the body as a whole, the tria l c ou rt e rr e d inli mi tin g thea wa rdto t wo a ndon e -h a lf

tim e s th e imp a irme nt r a tin g a s se t f orth in T en n es s ee Code Annotated sec tion 50-6-241(a )(1) (1999). Af ter a n independe nt review of the evidenc e, we conclude that t h e ev i d en ce supports a vocational disabilit y of 20% due to the dis fi g ur e me nt. Ac c or din g ly , th e tria l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt i s aff irme d a s mo dif

ie d, a ndthec a se is rema nded to the trial c ourt for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.
Te nn. C odeAnn . 5 0- 6- 22 5( e )( 3) ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t A ffirm e d as M odi fie d; Rem anded
J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., and C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J J ., joined.
Wil liam L amar

Aldred, Jr., Clarksville, Tennesse e, for the Plaintiff-Appe llant, Catherine L ayman. Richard Charles Mang elsdorf, J r., Na shville, Tennessee , for the D efe ndants-Appe llants, Vang uard Contractors, Inc. and L

umberman’ s Underw riting A lliance.

OP IN ION On Novembe r 19, 1999, the pl aintiff, C atherine L ayman (“L ayman”) , was employ ed bythe defe ndant, Vang uard Contractors (“Vang uard” ), as a laborer in its concr ete divis ion. L ayman was us ing a c or e drill to drill a ho le int o a c on c re te sla b w he n th e drill c aug ht o n a n u nid e nti fi e d o bje c t.T he cu rren t d efi nitio n o f “i nju ry” o r “p erso na l i nju ry” un d er the W o rke rs’ C o m p en sati o n A ct i nc l ud es “a 1 ment al i nj ur y ar i s i ng out of an d i n t he co urse o f

e m p l o ym ent

. ” T enn . Co de Ann. § 50

- 6- 10 2(13) ( 20 05 )

. A “ ment al i nj ur y ” i s def

i ned a s
a lo ss o f

m en t al f ac ult i es o r a m en t al o r b eh av i o ral d i so rd er w he re the p ro xim a te c a u se i s a co m p ensable phys i cal i njury res ul t i ng i n a pe rma nent d i sabil i t y , o r an i d ent i f i ab l e wo rk- rel at ed event r es ul t i ng i n a su dd en or unu s ual m ent al st i mul us . A ment al i nj ur y s hal l not i ncl ude a ps y chol ogi cal o r p sychiatri c re sp o nse d ue t o t he l o ss o f em p l o ym en t o r em p l o ym en t o p p o rtunit i es.
Id. at (16 ). -2- As L ayman re ache d down to turn off the drill, the back of t he drill lifted up, striking he r on the he ad and knocking her to the g round. The r esulting la cer ation require d fifty -five stitche s. L ayman now has a sc ar on the left side of he r hea d extending fr om her e y ebrow into her hairline.
F oll ow ing thea c c ide nt, L a y ma n d id n ot r e turn to wo rk fo r thre e day s. She the n r e turne d to work with re strictions and was release d to full duty on Dec ember 6, 1999. On Fe bruary 25, 2000, L ayman submitted to a drug tes t, which was positive for marijuana . Consist ent with Vang uard’ s policy , L ayman was suspe nded and g iven thirty day s to pass another dr

ug test. L ayman did not take a sec ond drug test, and her employ ment with Vang uard w as terminate d.
L ayman soug ht worke rs’ compensation benef its based upon cog nitive impairment due to a “close d head injury ” and disfigur ement. The trial court found that L ayman failed to e stablish that she suffe red a

closed he ad injury

or cog nitive impairment as a result of the acc ident. The trial court conclude d, howeve r, that L ayman sustained permanent disfig ureme nt as a re s ult of her injury and ass igned an i mp air men t rat in g o f 4% to th e bo dy as a who le. S ee Ten n. Co de A nn . § 50 -6- 20 7(F) (1999). F inding that L ayman had madea meaningf ul return t o wo rk , t he trial c ourt awa rded the maxi mum benefit o f t wo and one -half times L ayman’s impairment rating, a ssigning L ayman a vocational disability

of 10% to the body

as a w hole. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 241(a) (1) ( 1999). The trial c ourt awa

rded L ayman permanent partial disabilit y benef its based upon forty

wee ks at her stipulated compensation rate of $314.55 pe r we ek. Both pa rties appe aled, and the ap p ea l was re fer red to the Spec ial Workers’ Compensation Appea ls Pane l p u r s u an t t o T e n n e s s e eCo de Annotate d section 50-6- 225(e) (3) ( 2005). F ollowing or al arg ument befor e the Pane l, this case wa s transfe rre d to the full Court for re view. AN AL YSI S A. Co gni ti ve Im pai r m e nt We first addre ss wh et her the trial court e rre d in concluding that L ayman did not suffer cog nitive impairment as a r esult of the Nove mber 19, 1 9 9 9 ac cident. An employ ee w ho suffe rs ment al i m p ai rm ent re sulting fr om phy sical trauma to the brain may

be compe nsated unde r the Workers’ Compensation Ac t. I vey v. Trans G lobal Gas & Oil, 3 S.W .3d 441, 447 (Tenn. 1999)

. 1-3-

The trial c ourt based its ruling up o n the deposition testimonyof Dr. Par esh Sheth and Dr

. Ri ch ar d R u binowicz. Dr. Sheth, a neur ologist, examined L ayman on J anuary 14, 2000, approximately

two months following the a ccide nt. Dr. Sheth t es t i fi ed that L ayman complained primarily of hea dache s and nec k pain. She di d not complain of memory loss or ot her sy mptoms of cog nitive impairment. Dr. Sheth did not find evidenc e of c og nitive defe cts during his ex amination, and the MRI

order ed by

Dr. Sheth wa s normal. Dr. Sheth found that L ayman had not suff ered pe rm a ne nt i mpairme nt w ithre g ardto h e r m e nta l f a c ult ie s. Dr. Rubinowicz, a neur ologist, examined L ayman on J u l y 16, 2003, afte r L ayman was ref err ed by Vang uard’ s counsel for an independe nt me dical evaluation. I n evaluating L ayman, Dr. Rubinowicz reviewed r ecor ds from Dr. Sheth, a neuropsy cholog ical prof ile develope d by

Dr. James Hebda over three testing sessions , and re cords f rom Dr. B laise F err ara ccio r eg arding his November 7, 2002 examination of L ayman. Dr. Rubinowicz conduc ted a c omplete neur ologic examination on L a y ma n a ndarr a ng e d a n e xami natio n b y a ne ur op sy c ho log ist

. Ba sed upon L ayman’s injury , evaluations o f o t h er p hy sicians, and his eva luation, Dr. Ru b in o w ic z t e s ti f

ie d th a t h e o b s e r v e d n o e v id e n c e s u g g e s ti n g th a t L a y man s u f f e r e d c o g n it ive impairment as a r esult of the ac cident that occ urre d on November 19, 1999. Dr. Rubinowicz explained that memory loss oc curs immediately afte r a c losed hea d injury and is permanent. L ayman did not demonstrate sy mptoms of cog nitive dy sfunction when Dr. Sheth e x amined her two months afte r her acc ident. The initial sy mptoms of m emory dy sfunction wer e identified morethan two y ear s a ft e r the a c c ide nt w he n L a y ma n w a s e va luate d b y Dr . H e bd a . D r. Rub ino wi c z fu rthe r state d that a manifestatio n o f cog nitive defe cts afte r such a period of time is inconsistent with a closed he ad injury . Ba sed upon the AMA G uides, Dr. Rubinowicz op i n ed t h at L ay man did not suffer a perma nent impairment due to any mental di sorder connec ted t o the accident. He did not assign any perma nent re strictions as to L ayman’s phy sical or wor k activitie s. Dr. Rubinowicz further stated that if L ayman were s uffe ring from a c og nitive impairment, such impairment wa s cause d by her depre ssion.
The trial c ourt also ac cre dited the testimo n y o f t wo lay witnesses, Andre w Fle ming (“ Fl em i n g”) an d P au l P h i t z er(“ P h i t z er ”)

. Fl em i n g i s t h e pr es i d en t o f Fl em i n g T ra n s fe r a n d S t o ra ge Company , wher e L ayman was e mploy ed on a periodic basis from April 2001 unti l Dece mber 2002. Fleming testified he wa s unawa re L ayman suffe red f

rom memory

loss and never

observe d L ayman exhibi ting pe rsonality

problems during her te rm of employment. He de scribed L ayman as a g ood, org aniz ed , an d loy al employ ee w hom he would be willing to rehire . Phitz er w as the for eman of Vang uard’ s concr ete cre w at the time of L ayman’s acc ident in 1999. Phit zer testified that he did not observe any phy sical l imitations , memory problems, or chang es i n L ayman’s personality when she re turne d to fu ll d uty

fo llo wi ng thea c c ide nt.
L ayman contends that the trial court e rre d in failing to give g reater we ight to the de position testimonyof Dr. B laise F err ara ccio, a neurolog ist who conducted an independe nt medical e xami natio n of L a y ma n on Nov e mbe r 7 , 2 00 2, a t th e re qu e st o f L a y ma n’ s c ou ns e l. D r. F e rr ara c c io-4-

opined that the cog nitive impairment found by Dr. He bda’s testing was c ausally related to the hea d injury that L ayman sustained on Nove mber 19, 1999.
L ayman also subm its that the testimonyof her lay witnesses, Cy nthia Case (“ Case”) and De b b i e O’ Bry an (“ O’B ry an”) , should have be en ac cre dited by the trial court. Case and O’ Bry an have know n L ayman for mor e than f ifteen y ear s. They testified that L ayman was ha ppy , ener g etic, and outg oing and did not ex perie nce any memory prob l em s p ri or to the ac cident. F ollowing the acc ident, they reported that L ayman experience d mood sw ings, problems with he r memory , and an inabilityto sleep. L ayman also complaine d of hea dache s and inner ear pain. L ayman maintains that the testimony

of Case and O’B ry an cor

roborates her te stimonyconce rning her m e mo r y p roblems and oth e r m e nta l de fi c ie nc ie s f oll ow ing thea c c ide nt.
I n a wor kers’ compensation case, our standard of revie w of que stions of law is de novo without a presumption of cor rec tness as to the t rial court’s finding s. Perrin v. Gay lord Entm’t Co., 120 S.W .3d 823, 825 (Tenn. 2003) . We review fac tual issues de novo upon the rec ord of the trial court, accompa nied by a presumption of correc tness of t he trial court’s factua l finding s, unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225( e)( 2) (2005) . When the tria l c ou rt ha s o bs e rv e d th e wi tne sse s a ndhe ardthe ir te sti mon y , e sp e c ia lly

w h e r ei s s ue s o f c re dib ili ty and the we ight of

testimony

are involved, we must extend considera ble def ere nce to the trial court’s finding s reg arding that testimony . Whirl p o o l C o rp. v. Nakhoneinh, 69 S.W .3d 164, 167 (Tenn. 2002). Ther efor e, the tria l court’s de cision to a ccr edit the testimony of F leming and Phitz er ove r the te sti mon y of Ca se a ndO’ B ry a n is e nti tle d to c on sid e ra blede fe re nc e on app e a l.
I n revie wi ng documentary evidenc e, such a s expert medical testimony prese nted by deposition, we extend no defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s finding s. I d. Ultimately , we must conduc t a n in de pe nd e nt re vie w o f the e vid e nc e to d e te rm inewh e rethepr e po nd e ranc e of thee vid e nc e lie s. Se e T e n n . Co d e A n n . § 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 5 ( e ) ( 2 ) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; Cl e e k v . Wa l- M art St o r e s , I n c . , 1 9 S. W. 3 d 770, 773-74 (Te nn. 2000). Our r eview of the re cord le ads us to conclude that the trial court did not err in acc rediting the deposition testimonyof Dr. Sheth and Dr. Rubinowicz over the de position testimonyof Dr. F err ara ccio. Although L ayman complained of depre ssio n an d heada ches in Nove mber of 2000 and rec eived treatment f

or her complaints from Dr. Sheth, L ayman did not assert that she ha d sustained a closed head injury until her attorney ref err ed her for psy cholog ical testi ng almost three y ear s after the ac cident. The trial court a ccr edited the testimony of Dr. Sheth and Dr. Rubinowicz and found “a hug e void” in the medical evidenc e betwee n the time that L ayman re ceive d treatment from Dr. Sheth and the time that L ayman was refe rre d for psy cholog ical testing . We hold that the evidence does not p r e p o n d e r a te a g a in s t th e tria l c o u rt’ s f in d in g th a t L a yman f

a il e d to e s ta

b li s h th a t she s u f f e r e d a c l o s e d h e a d i n

j u r y o r t h a ts h e s u f

f e r e d a c o g n i t i v e i m p a i r m e n ta s a r e s u l to f t h e i n j u r y.A t t h e ti m e o f L a ym a n ’s inj u r y, an e m p lo ye e ’s p e rm a n e n t p a rtia l d isa b ili ty b e n e fit s u n d e r c e rta in 2 ci rcum st ances were l i m i t ed t o t wo and one - hal f t i m es t he m ed i cal imp ai rme nt rat i ng if the em p l o y ee m ad e a m eani ngf ul ret urn t o wo rk and si x t i m es t he i m p ai rme nt rat i ng i f t he em p l o y ee d i d no t m a k e a m e a n ing ful ret urn t o wo rk. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 4 1 (a)( 1 ), (b) ( 1 9 9 9 ); Lay v. Sco t t C o unt y Sheri f f ’ s D ep ’ t , 10 9 S.W

. 3 d 2 9 3 , 2 9 7 (T enn. 20 0 3 ). T he (c o n tinu e d ...) -5- B. D isfig ur e m e nt
We next turn to the trial court’s awa rd re g arding L ayman’s disfig uring scar . Tenne ssee Code An no tate d s e c tio n 5 0- 6- 20 7( 3) (F ) ( 19 99 ), up on wh ic h th e tria l c ou rt ba se d it s a wa

rd , s tate s in pertinent pa

rt that [ a ] l l o t h e r

c a s e s o f p e r m a n e n t p a rt i a l d i s ab i l i t y not above e numerated shall be apportioned to the body

as a whole, which shall have a value of four hundr ed (400) wee ks, and thereshall be paid c ompensation to the injured employ ee for the p r o p o rt i o n a t e l o s s o f

u s e o f t h e b o d y a s a

w h o l e r e s u l t i n g f

r o mt h e i n

j u r y. (Emphasis adde d). Permane nt partial disability benef it s for injury

to the body

as a w hole ar e available under this sec tion onlywhen the injury is to a portion of the body not statutorilyschedule d, aff ects a particula r combination of membe rs not statutorily provided for , or causes permanent injury to an unsche duled portion of the body

. Dotson v. Rice-Chry sler-Ply mouth-Dodg e, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn. 2005) ; Thompson v. L eon Russell Enters., 834 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1992). Disfig ureme nt to the head, f ace , o r h an d s is a statutorily enumer ated injury

for whic h perma nent partial disabilit y benef its are a vailable pur suant to Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 50-6-207( 3)(E) (1999). See Atchley v. Life Car e Ctr. of Cl ev el and, 906 S .W.2d 428, 431 (Tenn. 1995) (c lassify ing se ction 50-6-207( 3)(E) as a schedule d member injury ). Section 50-6-207( 3)(E) provides that permanent partial disabilit y benef its may be aw arde d for serious disfig ureme nt to the head, f aceor hands, not re sulting fr om the l o s s of a member or

other injury

specific ally

compensated, so alterin g th e per sonal appe arance of theinj ur e d e mpl oy e e a s to mate ri a lly a ff e c t su c h in jur e d e mpl oy e e ’s e mpl oy abil ity in the employ ment in which such injured employ ee w as injured or other e mploy ment for whic h such injured e mploy ee is then qualified, s ix ty -six and two-thirds pe rce nt (66 2/3%) of

the ave rag e we ekly

wag es for

such per son as the court may determine, not exc eeding two hundred ( 200) week s . (Emphasis adde d).
Be cause the awa

rd for disfigur ement is statutorily enumer ated, L ayman’s permanent partial disabilitybenef

its are not limited by

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 50-6-241(a )(1) (1999). Section 50-6-241 limit s an employ ee’ s rec overy of benef its de pending upon the employ ee’ s return to work with t h e p re -injury employ er at a wag e equa l to or g reater than the employ ee’ s pre- injury wa g e . Th is l imi tatio n a

pp lie s o nly

to p e rm a ne nt p art ia l di sa bil ity be ne fits a wa

rd e d “ pu rs ua nt t o 2(

. . . con t i n u ed) 2 G eneral A ss em b l y has am end ed t he st at ut e t o reduce t he t wo a n d o ne- hal f m ul t i p l i er t o one and one - hal f t i m es t he m ed i cal i m p ai rme nt rat i ng fo r i njuri es occurri ng o n o r af t er Jul y 1, 20 0 4

. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 4 1 (d)(1)(A ) ( 2 0 0 5 ). A l t ho ugh t he p art i es di sput e whet her Layman m ad e a m e ani ngf ul ret urn t o wo rk, our d eci si o n do es not requi re det er mi nat i on of

t hi s i s s ue.
T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d s e c tio n 5 0 -6 -2 0 7 (3 )( A )( i) (1 9 9 9 ) a llo w s p a rtia lly d isa b le d e m p lo ye e s to o b ta in 3 t em p o rary t o t al dis ab i l i t y be nef i t s i n ad d i t i o n t o p erm anent p art i al dis ab i l i t y be nef i t s t hat are pro vi d ed el sewhere i n t he s t at u t e. Se e At ch l ey , 906 S. W

. 2d a t 430.

U n d e r th e a m e n d e d ve rs io n o f T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d se c ti o n 5 0 -6 -2 4 1 , t h e m u lti p lier s n o w a p p ly t o 4 “ca ses in wh i ch an i nju red em p l o yee i s eli gib l e t o rec eive an y p erm an en t p arti al d i sab i l i t y be ne f i t s eit he r fo r b o d y as a who l e o r f

o r s ched ul e m em b er i njuri es, excep t s ched ul e m em b er i njuri es s p eci f i ed i n § 5 0

- 6

- 2 0 7 (3)(A )( ii)(a)

- (l ), (n) , ( q), an d (r )

. ” See T enn . C od e A nn . § 5 0- 6- 24 1(d) ( 1)( A ) , (d)( 2)( A ) ( 20 05 )

. W e e xpr es s no opi ni on r ega r di ng wh et her this am end ed s t at ut e p erm i t s ap p l i cat i o n of t he m ul t i p l i ers t o pe rma nent pa rt i al dis ab i l i t y award s fo r di sf i gurem ent p urs uant t o T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 50

- 6

- 2 0 7 (3)(E ). -6- § 5 0 -6 -2 0 7 (3 )( A) (i )a n d (F ). ” T en n . C o d e A n n . § 5 0 -6 -2 4 1 (a )( 1 ), (b ) ( 1 9 9 9 ). T h e p l ai n l an gu age 3 of sec tion 50-6-241 does not limit permanent partial disabilit y benef its a war ded for

disfigur ement under se ction 50-6-207( 3)(E)

. See Davis v. Reag an, 951 S.W .2d 766, 769 (Tenn. 1997) (holding 4 that the limitations in section 50 -6 -2 4 1 do not apply to awar ds of permanent total disability ); Atchley , 906 S.W .2d at 431 (c oncluding that pursuant to the plain lang uag e o f t h e statute, the multipl iers do not apply to injurie s involving schedule d members unde r sec tion 50-6-207(3)( A)(ii))

. An employ ee se eking worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits due to disfigur ement bea rs the burde n of proving that she sus tained a serious di sfig ureme nt, that the disfig ureme nt materially aff ects the employ ment, that the condition is p er m an ent, and that a work-r elated injury cause d the disfigur ement. Wil kes v. Res. Auth. of S umner Count y , Tenn., 932 S.W .2d 458, 462 (Tenn. 1996)

. Iti s c l e ar f r o mt h e r e c o r d t h a tL a ym a n ’ s s c ar i s a s e r i o u s d i s f

i g u r e m e n t

. T h e i n

j u r y r e q u i r e d f

i f t yfive stitches and resulted in a sc ar e x tending from L ayman’s ey ebrow to her ha irline. The pe rm a ne nc y

of L a y ma n’ s d isf

ig ur e me nt h a s b e e n e sta bli sh e d b y

me dic a l tes ti mo ny , a ndit i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a tt h e d i s f

i g u r e m e n tw a s c au s e d b y a w o rk

- r e l a t e d i n

j u r y. Th e e xten t of

thepe rm a ne nt p art ia l di sa bil ity be ne fi ts a va ila

bleto L a y man f

or d i sf ig ur e me nt, there fore , is de pendent upon whether her scar has materia lly aff ecte d her e mploy ability . I d. at 463. As used in Tenne ssee code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(E ), “employ ability ” is “the phy sical and mental ability

to obtain and maintain employ ment, as we ll as the phy sical and mental abilities that thejob de ma nd s. ” I d. Th is de fi nit ion of “ e mpl oy abil ity ” re c og nize s n ot o nly theph y sic a l a sp e c ts but also the mental, emotional, and c ommunicative aspe cts of obtaining and maintaining employ ment. I d.T h is fo rm w a s inc lud e d in the tec h n ic a l re c o rd a n d r e lied u p o n b y th e tr ia l c o u rt in its r u ling . W e ha v e he ld 5 tha t a tria l co u rt’s re lian c e up o n a d o c u m e n t c o n ta ine d in t h e te c h n ic a l re c o rd m a y b e su ff ic ie n t to p la c e the re c o rd into evi d ence. See Stat e v. B o b ad i l l a,

_ _ S.W

. 3 d

_ _ (T enn. 2 0 0 5 ). T he b et t er p ract i ce, ho wever, i s t o m ark t he d o cum ent a s a trial e x h ib it. -7- L ayman was forty -one y ear s old at the time of trial and ha s neither a high sc hool diploma nor a GE D. Th e tria l co urt accr e dit e d th e un re fu te d C- 32 fo rm of Dr . H arry

Cr e e kmo re , a

pla sti c 5 surg eon who assig ned an impairment rating of 4% to the body as a whole due to disfig ureme nt. T he prese nce of

the sca r caused L ayman to become so self-c onscious that she st y les her hair t o hide her scar . See id. (c onsidering the employ ee’ s self-c onsciousness and attempts t o conce al the disfigur ement in determin i n g v ocational disability ). Some of L ayman’s co- worke rs at Vang uard re fe rr e d to he r a s “ sc ar fa c e .” L a y ma n’ s sc ar a lso a ff e c te d h e r a

bil ity to c omf orta bly we ar a ha rdhat. The saf ety reg ulations at Vang uard ma ndated the use of a ha rd hat. The hat irritated L ayman’s sca r, a ndsh e wa s u na

bleto o btain r e lie f u nle ss s he re mov e d th e ha rdhat. Th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot d e mon str a te that L a y ma n’ s sc ar a ff e c te d h e r a

bi li ty to obt a in employ ment in industries that do not require the continuous use of a hard hat. Fol lowing he r te rm inatio n at V a ng ua

rd , L a y ma n w or

ke d a s a ba rt e nd e r, a pa c ke r fo r a

mov ing c omp a ny , a

ho us e cleaner, a n el ec trician’s aid, and a r estorer of items damag ed by

fire or water . Fleming , who employ ed L ayman as a packe r, testified that L ayman’s sca r did not aff

ect his dec ision to hi re L ayman or L a y ma n ’ s ab i l i t y

t o p e r f o r mh e r d u t i e s o f e m p l o y m e n t

. T h e s e j o b s , h o w e v e r , a l l c o m p e ns a te L ayman at a r ate signific antly less than she wa s able to ea rn at Vang uard and at similar employ ment re qu iring thec on tin uo us us e of a ha rdhat. Af te r c arefu l consid e ratio n o f the re c or d, we c on c lud e that th is e vid e nc e su pp orts a vocational disability

rating of 20% due to L ayman’s disfig ureme nt. Ap p l y ing this vocational disabilityrating to the 200-we ek benef it limitation f

or disfigur ement in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated se c tio n 5 0- 6- 20 7( 3) (E ) ( 19 99 ), w ea w a r d L aym anf o r ty w e ek s o f p e rma ne nt p art ia l di sa

bil ity be ne fi ts at the stipulated rate of $314.55 pe r we ek. CO NC LU SION
The e v id e n c e d o e s n o t p r e p o n d e r a te a g a in s t th e tria l c o u rt’ s f in d in g th a t L a y man did not suffe r a c og nitive impairment as a r esult of the acc ident. We c onclude, howeve r, that the trial court err ed in ca lculating the bene fits for disfig ureme nt as an a ward t o t h e b o d y as a w hole and that benef its should be awar ded base d up o nd is f ig u r e me n t p u r s u ant to Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-207( 3)(E) (1999). Our independe nt review of the e vidence supports an aw ard of 20% vocational disability

for the di s fi gu re ment. Apply ing the 200-we ek bene fit limi tation for dis fi g ur e me nt i n T e nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d 5 0- 6- 20 7( 3) (E ) ( 19 99 ), e nti tle s M s. L ay ma n to fo rty wee ks of compensation at he r stipulated compensation r ate. Acc ording ly , the trial court’s judgme nt is a ffirme d as modified, and the case is r emande d to the trial court for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.-8-

Costs of appeal a

re divided e qually b et we en the appellant, Catherine L ayman, and the app e lle e s, Vang ua

rd Contr a c tor s, I nc . a ndLumb e rm a n’ s U nd e rw ri tin g Al lianc e , a ndthepa rt ie s’ s u r e t i e s , f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

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JANI CE M . H OLDE R, JUS TI CE