## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Prough v. Madison Coun ty, Illin ois , 2013 IL App (5th) 110146

Appellate Court Caption DAVI D K. PROU G H
, Independe nt Administrator of the Estate of Dennis K. Proug h, Dec ease d, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M AD I SON COUNTY, I L L I NOI S, MADI SON COUNTY SHERI FF ’S DEP ARTMENT, MADI SON COUNTY SHERI FF ROBERT HERTZ
, L I EUTENA NT DAVI D J OSEPH, an d DI SPATCHER TERRENCE CHARL ESTON, Def endants-A

ppellees.

District & N o. Fifth District Docke t No. 5-11-0146

Filed Fe bruar y 25, 2013

Held (N ote : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by t h e Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In an action arising from the murder of plaintiff’s dece dent by dece dent’s

son afte r the son was re l ease d from custody by defe ndant sheriff ’s deputies, the dismiss al of plaintiff’s complaint was upheld on the g round that defe ndants wer e immune from liability under the Tort Immunity Act, since sections 4-102 and 4 -1 0 7 of the Act provide absolute immunit y from liability for the failure s alleg ed, despite plaintiff’s attempt to frame h is claim i n terms of failing to execute a valid order to detain t h e k i l l er and pre sent him for a me ntal health examination.

Dec ision Under
Review App ea l fr om the Circuit Court of Madison County
, No. 10-L -697; the Hon. Dennis R. Ruth, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Allison S. L orton, of Wit tman & L orton, P.C., of J erse y v i l l e, for appellant.

Wil liam P. Har dy
, of Hin s h aw & Culbertson L L P, of Springf ield, and Heidi L

. Ecke rt, of Hinshaw & Culb er t son L L P, of Be lleville, for appellee s.

Panel J USTI CE WEXSTTEN delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Welch and Goldenher sh concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 The plaintiff, David K. Proug h, as the independe nt administrator of the estate of De nnis K. P roug h, dece ased, filed suit ag ainst t h e d efe ndants, Madison County
, I llinois
, Madison County sheriff

’s depar tment, Madison County Sheri ff R o b ert Her tz, L ieutenant David J oseph, and Dispatche r Terr ence Charleston, seeking damag es for the death of the dece dent, who was killed by his son, Mark Proug h, afte r Mark was rele ased from cu s t o d y b y t h e Madison County sheriff ’s depar tment. T h e circuit court dismiss ed the plaintiff’s first amende d complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (the Code) (735 I L CS 5/ 2-615, 2-619 ( West 2010)). ¶ 2 On appea l, the plaintiff argues that the circ uit court improperly d i s m i s s ed his action beca use the defe ndants owed and violated a duty to the plaintiff’s dece dent, the defe ndants

wer e not immune from liability p u rs u an t to the L ocal Gover nmental and Gover

nmental Employ ees Tort Immunity Act (the Tort Immunity Act) (745 I L CS 10/1-101 to 10-101 (West 20 1 0 ))
, an d the defe ndant Madison County was liable for the conduct of the defe ndants Madison County sheriff

’s depar tment , S h eriff Her

tz, L ieutenant J oseph, and Dispatche r Charleston, pursuant to the s tatutory indemnification provisi ons of t he Tort Immuni t y Act (745 I L CS 10/ 9-102 (West 2010) ). For the followingrea sons, we af firm the cir cuit court’s dismiss al.

¶ 3 BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 In his first amende d complaint filed on Dec ember 22, 2010, the plaintiff alleg ed that on May 18, 2009, in the J erse y County circ uit court, Bre nda L ort o n , the decedent’ s daug hter, petitioned for an order of protec tion ag ainst Mark and petitioned the court to order his involuntary detention for the purpose of having him underg o a psy cholog ical ev aluation pursuant to the Menta l Hea lth and Deve lopmental Disabilities Code (405 I L CS 5/ 1-100 to

-2-6 -1 07 (West 2010)). On the same date, the circ uit court of J erse y County enter ed th e

emer g ency order of protec tion and enter ed two fill-in-the-blank “orde r[s] for detention, examination, diag nostic evaluation” (see 405 I L CS 5/3-704(a) (West 2008)). In one order for detention, the circ uit court order ed Mark, who was “asse rt ed t o b e a person subject to involuntary admission,” to submit to an examination “any time” on May 18, 2009, at Memorial Hospital, Springf ield, I llinois
, and order ed the cler k to “is s ue a writ direc ting a peac e office r to take custody of Mark *** and to take him *** to Memorial Hosp[it al] on May 18, 2009, for detention and examination.” In the second order for detention, the circ uit

co u rt o rdered Mark to submit to examination at “any time” on May 18, 2009, at Map l e Summi t Road, J ersey

ville, I llinois and order ed the cler k to “issue a writ direc ting a peac e office r to take custody of Mark *** and to take him *** to J erse y Comm[ unity ] Hospital on May 18, 2009, for de tention and examination.” ¶ 5 Acc ording ly
, on the same dat e, t h e J er s ey C o u n t y circuit court issued a “Writ for Detention, Examination, and Appea ranc e B efor e Court,” also ref err ed to in the re cord a s a mental health war

rant, direc ting “the peac e office r” to “take custody of Mark” and take him
to Memorial Hospital, Springf ield, I llinois
, or J erse y Communi ty Hospital, J erse y v i l le, I llinois , on May

18, 2009, for de tention and examination. ¶ 6 L aw e nforc ement off icials in J erse y

County wer e unable to execute the orde rs or ser ve the writ beca

use Mark fled to Ozark, Missouri, sometime afte r the order s and war rant wer e issued. On J uly 14, 2009, Ashl ey P roug h, Mark’ s daug hter, spotted Mark in Godfre y , Madison County
, and she called the Madison County sheriff ’s depar tment, stating that Mark

was walking on Godfre y Road and had multipl e war rants for his arr est. The Madison County sheriff ’s depar tment dispatcher advised Ashley that there wer e no active war rants in the law enfor ceme nt ag encie s’ d at a sy stem to require Mark’ s arr est. After Ashley notified the dispatcher that Mark was wanted in J erse y County
, I llinois
, and Miller County
, Missouri, for death and violent crimes investigat i o n s , M adison County sheriff ’s deputy Robert Weller
trave led to Mark’ s location and confr onted him for questioning at 8:30 p .m. Upon questioning by Deputy Weller, Mark provided Deputy Weller with a fals e n ame and birth date. Deputy Weller arr ested Mark for obstructing a peac e office r and transporte d him to the Madison County jail in Edwar dsville, I llinois

. In his repor t, Deputy Weller stated that a

rec ords chec k o f M a

r k ’s history reve aled multipl e order s of protec tion but no active war rants. Mark wa s booked into the Madison County jail at 10:31 p.m. ¶ 7 L i eu t enant J oseph of the Madison County sheriff ’s depar tment contac ted the Ci t y o f J erse y ville police department and advised it that Mark had been detained and arr ested and

wa s i n t h e custody of the Madison County sheriff ’s depar tment. The City of J erse y ville police depar

tment advised L ieutenant J oseph that the J erse y County circ uit court had issued the order s for Mark’ s detention and examination by a mental health fac ility
, along with the mental health war

rant, and fa x ed co p i es of the order s and war rant to the Madison County sheriff ’s depar tment. L ieutenant J oseph a d v is e d th e Ci ty o f J erse y

ville police depar

tment that the Madison County jail would not hold Mark based on the J erse y County order s and mental health wa rra nt. ¶ 8 T h e C i t y o f J er sey ville police depar

tment advised the Madison Co u n t y s h er i ff’s depar tment dispatcher
, Debor ah Thompson, that in addition to the detention order s, the City

-3-of J erse y ville police depar

tment soug ht to question Mark reg arding a death investigation in J erse y County and reque sted that the Madison County sheriff ’s depar tment not rele ase Mark until a repr esentative of the City of J erse y ville police depar

tment or the J erse y County sheriff could take Mark into c ustody

. Thompson advised the City of J erse y ville police depar

tment dispatcher

that the Madison County sheriff ’s depa rtment would not relea se Mar k. ¶ 9 Howeve r, on J uly 15, 2009, the Madison County sheriff ’s depar tment rele ased Mark on

a rec ognizance bond of $5,000. Dispatche r Charleston advised the City of J erse y ville police depar tment that the Madison County sheriff ’s depar tment would not comply with the order s for detention or the mental health war rant and would not consider said order s a hold on Mark. Dispatche r Charleston advised the City of J erse y ville police depar

tment that Mark had been r elea sed ea

rlier that morning

. ¶ 10 On J uly 20, 2009, Mark trave led to the home of his fathe r, the dece dent, and shot him in the chest, causing his death. Mar k there afte r starte d a fire in the dece dent’s home. On J uly 29, 2009, Mark wa s appre hended a nd char g ed with the dec edent’ s murder. ¶ 11 On J une 30, 2010, the plaintiff filed his o ri gi n al t h re e- count complaint ag ainst the defe ndants alleg ing liability pursuant to the I llinois Wrongf ul Death Act (740 I L CS 180/0.1
to 2.2 (West 2010)), the I llinois Survival Act (755 I L CS 5/27-6 (West 2010)), and, as to the defe ndant Madison County
, I llinois
, the statutory indemnificatio n p ro visions of the Tort Immunity Act (745 I L CS 10/9-102 (West 2010)). On Dec ember 22, 2010, the plaintiff filed his first amende d complaint restating the cause s of action ag ainst the defe ndants, seeking to

rec over damag es sustained as a result of the dece dent’s death. In this first am ended
comp l aint, the plaintiff alleg ed that the defe ndants’ knowing
, delibera te, and intentional failure to serve, e x ecute , and return the orde rs for de tention and mental hea lth warra nt and their knowing
, deli b er at e, and intentional ref usal to detain or hold Mark pursuant to the order s for detention and mental health war rant constituted a re ck l ess disreg ard for the dece dent’s safe ty

. The plaintiff alleg ed that as a result of the defe ndants’ acts and omissions
, the dec edent e ndured suf

fer ing be fore his death and se rious injuries resultingin his death. ¶ 12 On Fe bruar

y 7, 2011, pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code (735 I L CS 5/ 2- 615, 2-619 (West 2010)), the defe n d an t s fi led a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s first amende d complaint. In their m otion, the defendants argued, inter alia
, t h at t he defenda nts did not owe a duty to the dece dent, that the defe ndants wer e immune from liability pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act, and that Madison County was not liable for a cts or omissions of a sher iff or his employees. ¶ 13 On Fe bruar

y 22, 2011, the plaintiff filed a response to the defe ndants’ motion to dismiss. In his response, the pla intiff argued that the de fenda nts ow ed a statutory duty to “ return all

war rants, proce sses, order s and judgme nts” pursuant to section 3-6019 of the Counties Code (55 I L CS 5/3-6019 (West 2010)), that the Tort Immunity Act did not protec t the defe ndants from l i ability beca

use their conduct amounted to willful and wanton misconduct, and that Madison County was a proper party because state law require d it to pay damag es in a suit
ag ainst a sher iff and his e mploy ees. ¶ 14 On Marc h 11, 2011, afte r hear ing arguments, the ci rc u i t court g rante d the def endants’ motion to dismiss

. The circ uit court deter mined that the defe ndants owed no duty to protec t

-4-the dece dent from Mark’ s criminal act, that beca use the order
, dated May 18, 2009, neede d interpre tation, the sheriff ’s deputy exercised discretion and the defe ndants wer e there fore immun e u n d er t h e Tort Immunity Act, and that the defe ndants wer e immune pursuant to section 4-107 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 I L CS 10/4-107 ( We s t 2 0 1 0 ) ), which specific ally applies to the failure to make an arr est or the rele ase of a perso n i n cu s t o d y

. On April 5, 2011, the plaintiff timely

filed a notice of appe al. ¶ 15 Concurre nt with these proce eding s, the plaintiff filed a simil ar action ag ainst the Gre ene County s h er i ff’ s depar

tment, Ricky Gra

ham, Ker ry Pag e, and Gre ene County
, I llinois
, for their failure to serve , execute, and return the mental health war rant and detain Mark. The circ uit court of Gre ene County dismiss ed the plaintiff’s action, and o n appeal, the Four th District Appellate Court aff irmed the dismiss al, finding that beca use the May 18, 2009, date of perf ormanc e had passed, the writ was moot and impossibl e to perf orm and that the failure
to perf orm the writ was not the proxi mate or leg al cause of Mark’ s murder of the dece dent. Prough v. Gre ene County She riff’s Department , 2012 I LApp (4th) 110368- U.

¶ 16 ANALYSI S ¶ 17 The plai n t i ff ar gu es that the defe ndants had a statutory and nondiscretionar y duty to execute the detention order s and that the defe ndants wer e not immune pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act. The defe ndants counter that they owed no duty to the plaintiff’s dece dent and that they wer e immune pursuant to sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 I L CS 10/ 4-102, 4-107 ( West 2010)). ¶ 18 I t is the court’s p re ro gat i v e t o forg o the deter mination of issues unnece ssary to the
outcome of a case

. DeSme t v. County ofRock Island
, 219 I ll. 2d 497, 509 (2006); Callow ay

v. Kinkelaar
, 16 8 I l l

. 2 d 312, 326-27 (1995). J ust as the court “may reje ct an ineffe ctive assistance of counsel claim in a criminal cas e on the basis of lack of prejudice
, assuming counsel’s defic ient perf

ormanc e, arguendo
, for purposes of analy tical expedience [citation]
, so may [t he court] assume a d ef en d an t o we s a duty
, for the sake of analy sis, in order to expedite the resolution of an immunity issue.” DeSme t , 219 I ll. 2d at 509. ¶ 19 Section 2-619(a )(9) of the Code permits involuntary dismiss al wher e “the claim asser ted
ag ainst defe ndant is barred by other aff irmative matter avoiding the leg al eff ect of or defe ating the claim.” 735 I L CS 5/2-619(a) (9) (West 2010). “The purpose of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is to dispose of issues of law and easily proved issues of fac t at the outset of litigation.” Van Mete r v. Darien Park District
, 207 I ll. 2d 359, 367 (2003). In moving for

a section 2-619 dismiss al, the defe ndant admits th e l ega l sufficie ncy of the complaint but

asser ts an aff irmative defe nse or other matter to defe at the plaintiff’s claim. Van Mete r , 207 I ll. 2d at 367. When ruling on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss
, the court must interpre t the pleading s and supporting documents in the light mo s t fa vorable to the nonmoving party

. DeSme t , 219 I ll. 2d at 504; Van Mete r , 207 I ll. 2d at 367-68. “Our revie w of a section 2-619 dismiss al is de novo .” DeSme t , 219 I ll. 2d at 504. ¶ 20 I m m u n i t y from suit under the Tort Immunity Act is an “af firmative matter” proper ly raised under section 2-619(a )(9) of the Code. DeSme t , 219 I ll. 2d at 504; Van Mete r , 207 I ll. 2d at 366-67; 735 I L CS 5/2-619(a) (9) (West 2010). “Bec au s e t he immunit ies aff orded to

-5-g overnme ntal entities operate as an aff irmative defe nse, those ent i t i es bear the burden of
proper ly raisingand proving their immunit y under the Act.” Van Mete r , 207 I ll. 2d at 370; DeSme t , 219 I ll. 2d at 504. “It is only when the g overnme ntal entities have met this burde n that a plaintiff’ s rig ht to recove ry is barre d.” Van Mete r , 207 I ll. 2d at 370. ¶ 21 Under the common law in I llinois
, a g overnme ntal body was absolutely immune from all
tort liability

. “The orig inal basis of [t his] i m m u n i t y ru le has been called a ‘survival of the medieval idea that the sovere ign can do no wrong ,’ or that ‘the King can do no wrong .’ (38 Am. J ur., Mun. Corps., sec. 573, p. 266.)” Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302
, 18 I ll. 2d 11, 20 (1959). I n Molitor , the I llinois Supreme Court a bolished the doctrine of sovere i gn i m m u n i ty

. Molitor
, 18 I ll. 2d at 21-22. In response to Molitor
, howeve r, the leg islature passed the Tort Immunity Act in 1965 (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 85, ¶¶ 1-101 to 10- 101 (now 745 I L CS 10/1-101 to 10-101 (West 2010)))
, and the Tort Immunity Act restore d immunit y fo r g overnme ntal entities in cer tain circ umstances. Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie
, 183 I ll. 2d 30, 4 3 (1998). After the passage of t he Tort Immunity Act, article XI I I
, section 4, of the I llinois Constit ution of 1970 (I ll. Const. 1970, art. XI I I
, § 4) also abolished

sovere ign immunit y and made the leg islature the ultimate authority to deter mine under what circ umstances units of local g overnme nt would be immune from tort liability

. DeSme t , 219 I ll. 2d at 506. ¶ 22 Acc ording ly
, since the abo l i s h m en t o f s o v ereig n immunit y in I llinois
, a unit of loca l
g overnme nt is liable in tort to the same extent as a private party unless an immunit y established by the leg islature in the Tort Immunity Act applies. Van Mete r , 207 I ll. 2d at 368- 69. The Tort Immunity Act does not establish any new duties for g overnme ntal entities but “mer ely codifies those duties exis ting at common law, to which the subsequently delineate d immunit ies apply .” Barnett v. Zion Park District
, 171 I ll. 2d 378, 386 (1996). “[T] he purpose of the [Tort Immunity ] Act is to protec t local public entities and public em p l o y ees from liability arising from the operation of g overnme nt.” DeSme t , 219 I ll. 2d at 505. By enac ting immunit y provisions, the leg islature soug ht to preve nt the diversion of public funds from their intended purpose to the pay ment of damag e claims. Id. Be cause the Tort Immunity Act “wa s enac ted i n der o gation of t he common law, it must be st rictly construed.” Van Mete r , 207 I ll. 2d at 368. ¶ 23 Section 4-102 of the T ort Immunity Act provide s as follows:
“Ne ither a local public entity nor a public employ ee is liable for failure t o es t ab l i sh a police depar

tment or otherwise provide police protec tion service or, if police protec tion service is provided, for failure to provide ade quate police protec tion or service, failure
to p reve nt the commission of crimes, failure to detec t or solve crimes, and failure to identify or appr ehend c riminals.” 745 I L CS 10/ 4-102 (West 2010). “[S] ection 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act codifies the separ ate common law rule that municipalities or their employ ees are not liable for failure to supply police or fire protec tion.” Aikens v. Morris
, 145 I ll. 2d 273, 278 n.1 (1991); see al s o DeSme t , 219 I ll. 2d at 508-09 (supre me court’s comments in Aikens sug g est that the public dut y rule, wherein the police d ep2artment’s duty to prese rve the well-be ing of the community is owed to the pub l i c at larg e, rathe r than specific individuals, has been incorporated into the Tort Immunity Act as

-6-an immunit y ). This section provides absolute immunit y , and “whe n th e a p p lic able provisions of the Tort Immunity Act provide absolute immunit y , the plaintiff’s claim is barr ed.” Moore v. Gre en , 219 I ll. 2d 470, 478 (2006). ¶ 24 L ikewise, sec tion 4-107 of the Tort Immunity Act provide s as follows:
“Ne ither a local public entity nor a public employ ee is liable for an injury cause d by the failure to make an arr est or by rele asing a person in custody .” 745 I L CS 10/4-107 (West 2010). This section also provides a bsolute immuni ty

. Moore , 219 I ll. 2d at 478. ¶ 25 In DeSme t , the supreme court made clea r that when a provision of the Tort Immunity Act

co n t ai n s n o exception for willful and wanton misconduct, one must not be rea d into th e provision. DeSme t , 219 I ll. 2d at 514; see also Ries v. City of Chicago
, 242 I ll. 2d 205, 227- 28 (2011) (sec tion 2-202 does not provide a willful and wanton exception to any of the other sections of the Tort Immunity Act). I n DeSme t , the police f

ailed to re spond to a repor t that

a car had driven off of a highw ay and into a ditch, and the motorist wa s found dead next to her vehicle three day s later. DeSme t , 219 I ll. 2d at 500-02. The supre me court held that the defe ndants wer e immune under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act ( id. at 505) and that the plaintiffs could not avoid this immunit y by pleadingwillful and wanton misconduct: “When the plain languag e of an immunit y provision in the Tort Immunity Act contains no exception for willful and wanton misconduct, we have reasoned that the leg islature ‘ “i n t ended to immuniz e liability for both neg lige nce and willful and wanton misconduct.” ’ Village of

Bloomingdale [ v

. CDG Enterprises, Inc. ], 196 I ll. 2d [484,] 491 [(2001)], quot ing Barnett , 171 I ll. 2d at 391-92. ***
Section 4-102 of the Act is compre hensive in the brea dth of its rea ch, addre ssing situations wher e no police protec tion is provided to the g ener al public and those in which inadequate prot ec tion is provided. Moreove r, section 4-102 contains no exception for willful and wanton misconduct. We hold, g iven the fac ts of this case , that section 4-102 immuniz es defe ndants ag ainst both neg lige nce and willful and wanton miscon du ct.” DeSme t , 219 I ll. 2d at 514-15. ¶ 26 In this case , the plaintiff seeks to hold the defe ndants liable fo r fa i l i n g t o p ro vide adequate police prot ec t i on by reta ining Mark in their custody
, for failing to preve nt the commission of Mark’ s crime, and/or for rele asing Mark from their custo d y

. The plain languag e of sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 I L CS 10/4-102, 4-107 (West 2010)) clea

rly apply here t o immuniz e the defe ndants for these alleg ed failure s. Sections 4-102 and 4-107 are specific provisio n s an d co n tain no exception for willful and
wanton misconduct. See Ries
, 242 I ll. 2d at 221 (eve n if section 2-202 applied, it could not preva il over section 4-106(b)
, which applies more specific ally and contains no exception for willful and wanton misconduct) . Acc ording ly , the plaintiff’s suit fails. ¶ 27 The plaintiff a rgues that the defe ndants are not immune from liability beca use sec tions 4-102 and 4-107 of the Tort Immunity Act are inapplicable. The plaintiff argues that he does
not seek t o i m p o s e liability on the defe ndants for failing to provide adequate police protec tion service s, for failing to appre hend Mark, or for rele asing Mark from their custody

. The plaintiff argues that he seeks to hold the defe ndants liable for failing to comply with the

-7-valid detention orde rs and f or violatingtheir statutory duty to serve a

nd execute all order s. 55 I L CS 5/3-6019 (West 2010) (“Sher iffs s h al l s er ve and execute, within their respe ctive counties, and return all war rants, proce ss, order s and judgme nts of ever y descr iption that may be leg ally direc ted or de livered to them.” ). ¶ 28 Courts have reje cted simil ar attempts to avoid application of the Tort Immunity Act. F or example, in Ries
, the plaintiffs wer e injured when a person i n custody manag ed to g ain control of the police vehic l e an d d ri v e off. Ries
, 242 I ll. 2d at 218. Other police office rs initiated a pursuit of the driver, who ultimately cra shed into the plaintiffs’ vehicle. Id. at 207. The plaintiffs attempted to a void a pplication of sec tion 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 I L CS 10/4-106(b) (West 2008) ), immuniz ing a public entity for injury

inflicted by

an

esca ping prisoner, by arguing that section 4-106(b) did not cover the police office rs’ conduct in f ailing to pr operly restra in the person in custody initially and then in r eckle ssly pursuing him throug h the streets of Chicag o. Ries
, 242 I ll. 2d at 219. The supreme court held that this
argument was “mer e semantics desig ned to avoid a clea rly ap p l i cable immunit y” and that

acc epting such a position could rende r section 4-106(b) a nullity

. Id. (“Plaintiffs’ injuries

wer e i n fl i ct ed by an esca ping prisoner, and [pl aintiffs] cannot avoid section 4-106(b) by
arguing that their ca se wa s rea lly about somethingelse.” ). ¶ 29 Her e, the plaintiff seeks to avoi d t h e ap p l i ca b l e immunit y provisions by framing his action in t erms of the defe ndants’ fa ilure to execute the de tention orders a nd prese nt Mark for examination or their failure to hold Mark pursuant to the detention order s. Yet, his action seeks to hold the def

endants liable f

or fa iling to provide a dequate police ser vice, f ailing to
preve nt Mark’ s crime, and/or releasing him from their custody
, actions specific ally barr ed by the Tort Immunity Act. 745 I L CS 10/ 4 -1 0 2
, 4 -1 0 7 (West 2010). The plaintiff cannot avoid sec tions 4-102 and 4-107 of t he Tort Immunity Act by arguing that his case is re ally about somethingelse. See Ries , 242 I ll. 2d at 219. ¶ 30 Mischara cteriz i n g t h e d et en t i o n order s as involuntary admission order s, the plaintiff
argues that the defe ndants are to be held liable for their failure to obey the command of the valid order s and hold Mark pur suant there to. ¶ 31 In Mallder v. Rasmussen
, 145 I ll. App. 3d 80 9
, 8 1 0 (1 9 8 6), the court addre ssed the defe ndant’s alleg ed li ability
, predic ated on the neglig ent or willful and wanton fa ilure of a deputy sh er i ff to arr est a driver pursuant to a valid outstanding war rant. When the deputy

came into direc t contac t with the driver about six hours befor e a fata l collision, he was awa re of the outstanding arr est war rant for the driver and knew him to be an alcoholic with a prior

rec ord for driving under the influence

. Id. at 810-11. The deputy saw the driver consuming alcohol at a residenc e but did n o t see him operate a motor vehicle. Id. at 811. The deputy notified the driver about the war rant, and the driver ag ree d to repor t to the sheriff

’s office the followingMonday

morning

. Id. ¶ 32 The plaintiff in Mallder urg ed the court to find that sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the Tort Immu n i t y Act did not apply beca use a war rant had been issued. Id. at 813. Howeve r, the court in Mallder ref

used t o draw a d i s t inction based upon the ex istence of the warrant. Id. The court declined “to limit the protec tion of g overnme ntal immunit y to war rantless-a rre st situations in t he abse nce of express leg islative authority .” Id.

-8-¶ 33 L ikewise, we decline to limit the protec tion of g overnme ntal immunit y wher e a mental

health war

rant and order s for detention, examination, and diag nostic mental evaluation (405 I L CS 5/3-701(a) (West 2008)) have been issued. We ref use to draw a distinction based upon the exis tence of the war

rant and order s to avoid the applications of sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the Tort Immunity Act, protec ting the defe ndants from liability for failing to preve nt the commission of crimes, for fa i l ing to make an arr est, and for rele asing a person from their custody

. Mallder
, 145 I ll. App. 3d at 813. The plain languag e of these sections reve als the leg islature’s intent to immuniz e liabilit y fo r both neg lige nce and willful and wanton misconduct. Acc ordi n gl y , t h e plaintiff’s suit fails. Whil e our conclusions lead to a harsh result for the plaintiff, we are bound by the leg islature, whose plain languag e is the ultimate authority in deter

mining a public entity ’s immunit y from liability

. S ee V illage of Bloomingdale
, 196 I ll. 2 d at 4 99. Be cause we conclude that the defe ndants have absolute immunit y from the plaintiff’ s suit, we need not a ddress the pa rties’ re maining a

rguments.

¶ 34 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 35 For the fore g oing rea sons, we aff irm t h e order of the circ uit court of Madison County dismiss ing the plaintiff’s ac tion.

¶ 36 Affir

med.

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