If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

September 12, 2024

v No. 369309

Monroe Circuit Court

JROC INC, doing business as SAND BAR GRILLE, 

SHM TOLEDO BEACH LLC, SAFE HARBOR 

MARINAS LLC, and ESTATE OF JILL 

PARRINELLO,

LC No. 2022-145487-CK

Defendants-Appellees,

and

TOLEDO BEACH DOCKOMINIUM ASN,

Defendant.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and CAVANAGH and M. J. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiff, Auto-Owners, appeals as of right the trial 

court order granting summary disposition to defendants Safe Harbor Marinas, LLC and SHM 

Toledo Beach, LLC under MCR 2.116(C)(10). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS

On August 16, 2019, after 11:00 p.m., Jill Parrinello and Darrin Gabbard arrived at the 

Sand Bar Grille, which is located on the premises of the Safe Harbor Marina in LaSalle, Michigan. 

The two sat at the bar and were served 2-3 beers each. They left a little after 1:00 a.m. Thereafter, 

they both went missing. Approximately one week after their disappearance, the police discovered 

Parrinello’s vehicle at the bottom of the waterway channel. Parrinello and Gabbard, both of whom 

had been trapped in the vehicle after it entered the water, were pronounced dead at the scene.
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Parrinello’s estate filed a premises liability claim against JROC, Inc, doing business as the 

Sand Bar Grille, SHM Toledo Beach LLC, and Safe Harbor Marinas LLC. Thereafter, defendants 

SHM Toledo Beach LLC and Safe Harbor Marinas (collectively the Marina defendants) filed a 

cross claim against JROC, alleging breach of a commercial lease agreement and seeking 

indemnification for any damages arising from the failure to comply with the terms of the lease 

agreement. As relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, Auto-Owners, JROC’s insurer, filed a 

complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that the Marina defendants were not 

covered by the insurance policy that it had issued to JROC. Following discovery, the Marina 

defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), alleging that they qualified 

as additional insureds under JROC’s policy because Parrinello’s death arose out of the use of the 

portion of the premises leased to JROC given that Parrinello’s sole purpose for being at the marina 

was to patronize the Sand Bar Grille. Auto-Owners argued in response that the Marina defendants 

were not additional insureds because the underlying litigation did not relate to the ownership, 

maintenance, or use of any part of the premises that had been leased to JROC. And given the lack 

of additional insured status, Auto-Owners requested that the trial court grant it summary 

disposition against the Marina defendants. Following oral argument on the motions, the trial court 

entered an order granting summary disposition to the Marina defendants. This appeal follows.

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Auto-Owners argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to Safe 

Harbor Marinas and SHM Toledo Beach under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and by denying its motion for 

summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2). We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a 

motion for summary disposition. Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 

285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)

is warranted “if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rose v Nat'l Auction Group, Inc, 466 Mich 453, 461; 646 

NW2d 455 (2002). When reviewing the motion, the trial court considers “the affidavits, pleadings, 

depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Id. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the 

record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” El-Khalil v Oakwood 

Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Questions of statutory interpretation 

are reviewed do novo. 21st Century Premier Ins Co v Zufelt, 315 Mich App 437, 443; 889 NW2d 

759 (2016). Likewise, this Court reviews de novo questions regarding the interpretation of an 

insurance policy. DeFrain v State Farm Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 366-367; 817 NW2d 504 

(2012).

B. ANALYSIS

Resolution of the issue raised on appeal requires consideration of the interplay between 

JROC’s insurance policy that was issued by Auto-Owners and the commercial lease agreement 

that JROC entered into with the Marina defendants. Under the terms of the lease, JROC was 

required to name the Marina defendants as additional insureds. The tailored protection insurance 

policy issued to JROC listed only JROC as a named insured. However, in the commercial general 

liability plus coverage endorsement, the policy provided:
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9. BLANKET ADDITIONAL INSURED—MANAGERS OR LESSORS OR

PREMISES

a. SECTION II—WHO IS AN INSURED is amended to include as an additional 

insured any person or organization with who you have agreed:

(1) In a written contract or agreement, executed prior to loss, to name as an 

additional insured . . . but only with respect to liability arising out of the ownership, 

maintenance, or use of that part of the premises leased to you.

As relevant to the issue raised on appeal, coverage under the insurance policy exists for 

“bodily injury” caused by an “occurrence” that occurs in the coverage territory and during the 

policy period. “Bodily injury” is defined to include death and “occurrence” is defined to include 

“an accident.” Thus, it is clear that Parrinello’s death as a result of becoming trapped in a 

submerged vehicle is a bodily injury caused by an occurrence, as those terms are defined by the 

insurance policy. The question, therefore, is whether the Marina defendants are afforded coverage 

as additional insureds under Section 9(a)(1) of the commercial general liability plus coverage 

endorsement to the insurance policy.

When interpreting an insurance contract, this Court must “determine what the agreement 

was and effectuate the intent of the parties.” Hunt v Drielick, 496 Mich 366, 372–373; 852 NW2d 

562 (2014). The policy must be construed “so as to give effect to every word, clause and phrase . 

. . .” Royal Prop Group, LLC v Prime Ins Syndicate, Inc, 267 Mich App 708, 715; 706 NW2d 426 

(2005). The policy must be read as a whole, and the terms of the policy must be “accorded their 

plain and ordinary meaning.” Hastings Mut Ins Co v Safety King, Inc, 286 Mich App 287, 292; 

778 NW2d 275 (2009). Here, the Marina defendants entered into a written lease agreement with 

JROC and, under the terms of that agreement, JROC was required to name the Marina defendants 

as additional insureds. Therefore, the first requirement of Section 9(a)(1) of the commercial 

general liability plus coverage endorsement to the insurance policy is satisfied. The dispute instead 

turns on whether there is “liability arising out of the . . . use of that part of the premises leased to” 

JROC.

As recognized by Auto-Owners on appeal, the phrase “arising out of” as used in insurance 

contracts has “a broad, comprehensive, and general meaning synonymous with the phrase ‘grows 

out of,’ as well as the phrases ‘originating from,’ ‘having its origin in,’ or ‘flowing from.’ ” People 

v Warren, 462 Mich 415, 428 n 23; 615 NW2d 691 (2000) (citations omitted). Moreover, the 

Marina defendants point out that:

Insurance policies often employ such language as “arising out of” and “resulting 

from” relative to describing the coverage provided by the policy. These phrases 

are frequently given a broader and more comprehensive meaning than that 

encompassed by proximate cause. The phrases are generally considered to mean 

“flowing from” or “having its origin in.” Accordingly, use of these phrases does 

not require a direct proximate causal connection but instead merely requires some 

causal relation or connection. [Couch on Insurance, 3d ed, § 101:52]
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See also Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich. 643, 659, 391 N.W.2d 320 (1986) (holding that an 

injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle “where the causal connection 

between the injury and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle is more than incidental, 

fortuitous, or ‘but for’ ”). Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that, as used in the insurance 

policy at issue in this case, the phrase “liability arising out of the . . . use of that portion of the 

premises leased to” JROC, requires a causal connection between Parrinello’s death and the use of 

the Sand Bar Grille that is more than incidental, fortuitous, or “but for.”

Auto-Owners argues that there is only an incidental, “but for” causal connection between 

Parrinello’s use of the bar and her death. That is, but for her decision to patronize the Sand Bar 

Grille, she would not have died when leaving the parking lot. In support, Auto-Owners directs 

this Court to Continental Ins Co v May Dep’t Stores Co, 138 F Appx 763 (CA 6, 2005). The 

decisions of lower federal courts are not binding, but they may be considered persuasive. Abela v 

Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 606–607; 677 NW2d 325 (2004). We do not find Continental 

Ins Co to be persuasive. In that case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether a death 

that occurred in a parking lot covered by an insurance policy that provided coverage only for areas 

owned by the department store. Continental Ins Co, 138 F Appx at 764-765. The Court concluded 

that, because the parking lot where the death occurred was not owned by the department store, the 

death did not arise out of the ownership of an area that was leased to the department store. Id. at 

765-766, 768. The May Court did not consider, however, whether the death arose out of the use 

of the building that was leased to the department store. See generally, id. Accordingly, it is not 

instructive as to the resolution of the issue raised in this appeal.

Regardless, Auto-Owners asserts that the Marina defendants can show nothing more than 

an incidental connection between the operation of the Sand Bar Grille and Parrinello’s death. In 

support, it notes that the reason why the vehicle was driven off the boat launch and into the water 

was unclear; that there is no evidence as to how much time passed between Parrinello and Gabbard 

leaving the bar and when the vehicle was driven off the boat launch; and that what they did in the 

time between their departure and when the vehicle entered the water is, likewise, unknown. 

Indeed, it contends that the Marina defendants only speculate as to the reason why Parrinello was 

at the marina. Speculation is “an explanation consistent with known facts or conditions, but not 

deducible from them as a reasonable inference.” Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 164; 516 

NW2d 475 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The record reflects that Parrinello arrived after 11:00 p.m. on August 16, 2019, and was at 

the bar until sometime after 1:00 a.m. on August 17, 2019. During that time, she drank beer and 

sat at the bar. The Marina was not open to the public during that timeframe, and Parrinello was 

not one of the Marina’s tenants. Indeed, the general manager for SHM Toledo testified that, at the 

time that Parrinello’s phone was “pinging” in the area of the Marina, the only purpose for her being 

on the premises would be to patronize the Sand Bar Grille. Moreover, the record reflects that it is 

likely that there was a gate attendant, who would have required Parrinello to state that she was 

going to the Sand Bar Grille before she was admitted into the parking area. Based upon the 

foregoing, the Marina defendants presented more than mere speculation in support of their 

contention that Parrinello’s sole purpose for being at the Marina was to patronize the Sand Bar 

Grille. Auto-Owners did not come forward with any evidence to refute that evidence. Thus, there 

was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Parrinello’s purpose for being at the marina. 

And, given that her sole purpose for being at the Marina was to patronize the Sand Bar Grille, the 
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Marina defendants have shown that there is a sufficient causal nexus between her death and her 

use of the bar.

Next, Auto-Owners suggests that the phrase “arising out of . . . the use of that portion of 

the premises leased to” JROC limits liability to incidents that occur in the interior portion of the 

building that was leased to JROC. In support, it notes that the commercial lease defines the leased 

premises as “[a]pproximately 3,000 square feet comprised of 11840 Toledo Beach Road (the 

“Building”). The floor plan of the Premises is shown on the attached Exhibit A.” Further, the 

lease also provided that “[u]nless otherwise expressly granted by another provision of this Lease,” 

JROC “shall have no right to access or make use of any space beyond the interior of the Premises, 

including the exterior walls or roof of any structure in the Marina.” Yet, the lease also expressly 

provided that JROC and its guests, visitors, and business invitees shall only have a “non-exclusive, 

revocable license AT THEIR OWN RISK” to use the common areas, which were described as “the 

shared access, parking areas, and driveways serving the Marina.” Accordingly, the leased portion 

of the premises expressly permitted both JROC’s employees and patrons to use the marina’s 

parking lot. Moreover, the lease also provided that the leased premises could be used for both the 

specified purpose of the operation of a bar and restaurant and for “any uses incidental” to that use. 

Considering the plain terms of the commercial lease, it is clear that the use of the leased portion of 

the premises is not limited solely to the use of the interior portion of the premises. Rather, it 

encompasses uses that are incidental to the operation of the bar and the restaurant, including the 

use of the parking lot by the bar’s patrons. As a result, we conclude that § 9(A)(1) of the 

commercial general liability plus coverage endorsement does not preclude coverage simply 

because Parrinello’s death occurred outside of the leased building.

In conclusion, there was a sufficient causal connection between Parrinello’s death and her 

use of the Sand Bar Grille. Additionally, considering the language of the insurance policy and the 

commercial lease, it is clear that the Marina defendants are additional insureds because JROC 

entered into a written lease that required JROC to name them as additional insureds and because 

Parrinello’s death arose out of her use of the part of the premises that were leased to JROC. The 

trial court, therefore, did not err by granting summary disposition to JROC and denying AutoOwners’ motion for summary disposition.

Affirmed. The Marina defendants may tax costs as the prevailing parties. MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Michael J. Kelly