## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Sh elby R. , 2012 IL App (4th) 110191

Appellate Court Caption I n re : SHEL BY R., a Minor, THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Petitioner-Appellee
, v. SHEL BY R., Respondent-Appe llant.

District & N o. Four th District Docke t No. 4-11-0191

Argued Filed J uly 18, 2012 August 22, 2012

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The co mmitm ent of a minor to confine ment in the Depa rtment of J uvenile J ustice for unlawful consumption of alcohol is not authorized by the J uvenile Court Act.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Champaign County
, No. 09-JD-301; the Hon. Har ry E. Clem, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d.Counsel on

Appea l Michae l J

. Pell et i er, Kare n Munoz, and J acque line L

. Bullar d (argued), all of State Appe llate Def ender ’s Off

ice, of Springf ield, for a ppellant.

J ulia Ri etz, State’s Attorney
, of Urba na (Patrick Delfino, Robert J

. Bide rman, and Anastac ia R. Br ooks (argued), all of State’s Attorney s Appellate Prose cutor’s O ffice , of counse l), for the People.

Panel J USTI CE KNECHT delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Presiding J ustice Turner and J ustice Pope concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 In Dec ember 2009, the State filed a p et i t i o n fo r adjudi cation of war dship pursuant to section 5-520 of the J uvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Act) (705 I L CS 405/5-520 (West 2010)) ag ainst responde nt, Shelby R., born Fe bruar y 15, 19 9 5
, all eg ing on Dec ember 29, 2 0 0 9
, s h e committed two counts of domestic battery
, Class A misdemeanors (720 I L CS 5/12- 3.2(a) (1) (West 2010)) (counts I and I I ); ag grava ted assault, a Class A misdemeanor (720 I L CS 5/12-2(a) (1) (West 2010)) (count I I I ); and unlaw ful consumption of alcohol, a C lass A misdemeanor (235 I L CS 5/6-20(e) (West 2010)) (count IV). In J une 2010, responden t admitted to unlawful consumption of alcohol in exchang e for the dismiss al of the rema ining three charg es. In J uly 2010, the trial court sentenc ed responde nt to 18 months’ probation. In September 2010, the State filed a petition to rev o k e p ro b at ion, and in November 2010 responde nt admitted the alleg ations contained in the pe tition. I n Dec ember 2010, the court

rese ntence d responde nt to 364 day s’ confine ment in the Depart m en t of J uvenile J ustice (De partment). ¶ 2 Respondent appea ls, arguing the J uvenile Act (705 I L C S 405/1-1 to 7-1 (West 2010)) prohibits a minor’s incar cer ation in th e D ep a r tm e nt f o r unlawful consumption of alcohol, and the trial cour

t erre d by imposing a 364- day

incar ceration sentenc e. We agree

.

¶ 3 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 On December 30, 200 9
, af t er a hearing, the trial court placed respondent i n temporar y detention in the Champaign Co u n t y J uvenile Detention Center. On Fe bruar y 1, 2010, responde nt w as rele ased from the juvenile dete ntion center to attend residential substanceabuse treatment. On Ap ril 14, 2010, responde nt, ag ainst staff advice
, left the treatment fac ility . The re cord shows r espondent re turned to dete ntion from May 19, 2010, to J une 7, 2010. ¶ 5 At the J une 2010 plea hearing
, responden t ad m i tted unlawful consumption of alc ohol,

-2-and in exchang e the State dismiss ed the other three counts. Acc ordingto the fac tual basis,

on Dec ember 29, 2009, police responde d to responde nt’s re s i d ence for a domestic disturbance

. Respondent, then 14 year s old, was arr ested and transporte d to the Champaign County J uvenile Detention Center. S h e admitted to a police office r she consumed alcohol and she submitted to a breath-alcohol test. Her brea th-alcohol conce ntration was 0.142. At the hearing, the trial court admonished responde nt she could be committed to the Depa rtment for a period of up to one year . The trial c ourt adjudicated re spondent a de linquent minor. ¶ 6 In J uly 2010, the trial court held the initial sentenc ing hearing. The St at e i n t ro du ced a written social investigation repor t pursuant to section 5-705(1) of the J uvenile Act (405 I L CS 5-705(1) (West 2010)). Neither party prese nted additional evidenc e. Th e co u rt sentenc ed responde nt to 18 months’ probation. Probation conditions require d responde nt ref rain from consuming alcoholic beverage s or using illega l drug s and require d her to submit urine samples for te sting. ¶ 7 In September 2010, t h e S t at e fi l ed a petition to revoke probation. Acc ording to the petition, on August 18, 20 1 0
, re s p o n dent submitt ed a urine sample testing positive for marijuana and coca ine metabolites. At the November 10, 2010, petition-to-revoke hearing, responde nt admitted the alleg ations set forth in the petiti o n

. T h e t rial court admonished responde nt she could be incar cer ated in the Depa rtment for one year and order ed an updated written social investig ation repor t. ¶ 8 At the Dec ember 2010 rese ntencing hear i n g, t h e S t at e introduced an updated written social investig ation repor t. The re port showed respondent was pregnant and due to deliver in J une 2011. Ne i t h er party introduced additional evidenc e. Assistant State’s Attorney Stephanie Weber argued the responde nt neede d to g o to the Depa rtment of J uvenile J ustice wher e s h e wo u l d not have acc ess to drug s and alcohol and she would rec eive neede d
structure , discipline, and treatment to the benef it of herse lf and he r unborn c hild. ¶ 9 Respondent’s attorney , Assistant Public Def ender Melinda L icca

rdello, re com mended

a community -base d sentenc e. L icca rdello arg ued responde nt participated in community

based service s such as Parenting Wit h L ove & L imits and ang er- manag ement and substanceabuse tre atment. ¶ 10 Respondent exercised her right to make a statement and stated she chang ed her friends,

no longe r “hang s out” wit h the s ame people, and alcohol and drug s are not allowed where

s h e resides. In ref

ere nce to her pregnancy , she stated, “I ’m not just thinking of my self no more; I ’m also thinking of my baby ’s life.” ¶ 11 The trial court pursuant to section 5-750(1) (a) of the J uven i l e Ac t (7 0 5 I L CS 405/ 5- 750(1)( a) (W es t 2010)) found responde nt’s pare nts wer e unfit or unable, for some rea son other than financ ial circ umstances alone, to car e for, protec t, train, or discipline her, or wer e unwilling to do so, and the best interests of the public would not be serve d by an alterna tive place ment under sect i o n 5-740 (705 I L CS 405/5-740 (West 2010)). The trial court

rese ntence d resp o n d ent to an indeterminate term of 364 day s in the Depa rtment or upon attaining 21 year s of ag e, whicheve r comes first. The court order ed cre dit for 55 day s serve d in detention. The court explained its decision, in part, by noting responde nt’s bad decisions,
repe ated substance abuse, and her pregnancy

. Both the assistant State’s Attorney and the trial

-3-judge believed responde nt a nd her child had their best chanc e at a g ood outcome through a term of inca

rce ration. ¶ 12 In Dec ember 2010, responde nt filed a moti on to rec onsider, alleg ing, among other thing s,

a sentenc e to the Depa

rtment for unlawful consumption of alcohol is barr ed under the J uvenile Act. After a heari n g, the trial court denied responde nt’s motion. This appea l followed.

¶ 13 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 14 Responden t ap peals, arguing the J uvenile Act (705 I L CS 405/1-1 to 7-1 (West 2010))
p r o h ib it s a minor’s incar cer ation in the Depa rtment for unlawful consumption of alc o h o l, a n d the trial court err ed by imposing a 364-day inca r c e r a ti o n s e n ten c e

. Respondent acknow ledg es she serve d her sentenc e and has “bee n discharg ed from parole .” The State contends this case is moot and respondent fa iled to show any exception to the mootness doctrine applies. We find an e x ception to the mootness doctrine applies and a gree with respondent.

¶ 15 A. Mootness ¶ 16 An issue on appea l becomes moot whe re e vents occ urringafte r the filingof the a ppeal rende r it impossibl e to g rant eff ectua l relief to the complaining party

. In re Christ opher K.
, 217 I ll. 2d 348, 358-59, 841 N.E.2d 945, 952 (2005) ( quoting People v

. Roberson
, 212 I ll. 2d 430, 435, 819 N.E.2d 761, 764 (2004))

. Gene rally
, wher e the relief soug ht is to set aside

a sentenc e, the question of the validity of its imposit ion is moot when the sentenc e has been

serve d. In re Jabari C.
, 2011 I L App (4th) 100295, ¶ 19, 962 N.E.2d 8 (quoting In re Napier
, 83 I l l

. Ap p

. 3 d 503, 505, 404 N.E.2d 423, 425 (1980))

. Respondent solely challeng es her
sentenc e and ha s completed he r sentenc e. This appe al is moot. ¶ 17 Re s p o n d e nt main tains both the collater al-c onsequenc es exception and the public-intere st exception apply

. We agree the public-intere st exception applies, and need not addre ss the collater al-c onsequenc es exception. ¶ 18 T h e p ub l i c- i n t er es t ex ce p t i on require s (1) the exis tence of a question of p ub l i c importance ; (2) the desirability of an authoritative deter mination for the purpose of guiding public office rs in the perf

ormanc e of their duties; and (3) the likelihood that the question will

reoc cur

. In re J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d 338, 350, 851 N.E.2d 1, 8 (2006). These criteria must be clearly satisfied. Id. The public-intere st exception considers potential rec urre nces to any person, not only the complaining party

. Holly v. Montes
, 231 I ll

. 2 d 1 5 3
, 1 5 8, 896 N.E.2d 267, 271 (2008). ¶ 19 The first element is satisfied. Respondent’s appea l involves the question of how long a minor should be incarcer ated, undeniably prese nting a question of public importance ( J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d at 350-51, 851 N.E.2d at 8; In re B.L.S.
, 202 I ll. 2d 510, 519, 782 N.E.2d 217, 223 (2002) ( an inca

rce rate d juvenile’s liberty is restraine d just a s eff

ectively as that of a

n adult offe nder) ). The third element is also satisfied beca use this issue is likely to rec ur when public officia ls believe committing a minor to the Depa rtment for unlawful consumption of alcohol is statutorily authorized. This issue will continue to evade revie w as the short sentenc e, 364

-4-day s’ confine ment, will likely cause any fully litigated appea l on this issue to be moot, a nd it will not a

rrive befor e an a

ppellate c ourt as a live c ontroversy . See Turner v. Rogers , 557 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2515 (2011) (no t i n g prior United States Supreme Court
prec edent make s clea

r 12 months is a short duration for mootness pur poses). ¶ 20 The second element, desirabili t y o f an authoritative deter mination, is contested by the State. Respondent asser

ts th e is s ue of whether the J uvenile Act authorizes such commitments is a matter of first impression and has not been addressed in a repor ted I llinois case

. She
states “a decision by this Court is needed t o p ro vide critica l, timely guidance to public officia ls on the limit s which the leg islature has place d on the imprisonment of minors who

consume alcohol.” The State “disputes res p o n d en t’s claim that an issue of appar ent first impression can meet the require ment that an ‘authoritative deter mination’ is ‘ nece ssary ’ to guide public offic ers in future case s.” The State’ s contention war rants discussion. ¶ 21 The State cites In r e Co mm i tme n t of Hernande z , 239 I ll. 2d 195, 202-03, 940 N.E.2d 1082, 1087 (2010), for the State’s proposition “ [w] here no prec edent exis ts on an issue, no authoritative resolution is neede d,” and an appellate court must decline to consider an issue of first impression in an otherwise moot case

. Fur ther, the State maintains the supreme court “has rec og nized that the lack of prior prec edent addressing a specific argument ‘mere ly further confirms that, as yet, there is n o n ee d fo r an authoritative pronounce ment.’ See [ Christ opher K

. , 217 I ll. 2d at 362, 841 N.E.2d at 954].” The S tate argues a m o o t i s sue of first impression cannot meet the public-intere st e x ception’s second element even wher e an authoritative deter

mination is nece ssary to provide guidance to pu b li c o f f ic e r s in f uture case s. We find the State’s argument unpersua sive. ¶ 22 The State rea ds Hernandez t o o b ro ad l y

. In Hernande z , the primary issue befor e the
supreme court was whether the appellate court ha d jurisdiction over the State’s appea l in a sexually violent person’ s case when the State filed its notice of appea l afte r the circ uit court appro v ed Hernandez for conditional rele ase but befor e the court approve d a conditionalrele ase plan. Hernande

z , 239 I ll. 2 d at 1 9 7
, 940 N.E.2d at 1084. The appeal became moot when Her nandez returne d to the Depa rtm ent of Human Service s’ (DHS) custody

. Id. The
supreme court stated, “To deter mine if an authoritative deter mination of a questi o n is neede d, this court looks to whether the law is in disarra y or there is conflicting prec edent.” (Emphasis added.) Hernande

z , 239 I ll. 2d at 202, 940 N.E

. 2 d at 1 087. The supreme court noted the appellate court’s de cision was ba sed on a w ell-settled rule of finality of judg ments and the State did not cite any

conflict or disa

rra y in the law. Hernande

z , 239 I ll. 2d at 202-03, 940 N.E.2d at 1087. The supreme court found the case moot and vacated the appellate co urt’s judgme nt. Hernande

z , 239 I ll. 2d at 203, 940 N.E.2d at 1087. ¶ 23 Hernande

z involved application of a well-settled rule of law and beca me purely advisory when the State rec eived the relief it sought, Herna ndez’s return to DH S custody

. See In re Luis R.
, 239 I ll. 2d 295, 301, 941 N.E.2d 136, 140 (2010) (“G ener ally speaking
, a ‘justiciable matter’ is ‘a controve rsy appropr i at e fo r revie w by the court, in that it is definite and

concr ete, as opposed to hy pothetical or moot, touching upon the leg al relations o f p arties having adver se leg al i n t er es ts.’ ” (quoting Bellev ille Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
, 199 I ll. 2d 325, 335, 770 N.E.2d 177, 184 (2002)) ). Our case involves the interpre tation of a statute conce rning important juvenile liberty interests that no I llinois court

-5-has decide d and will aff ect juveniles in the future. Her nandez does not require ap p el l a t e courts to look to whether the law is in disarra y to deter

mine whether an authorit ative deter mination is require d. Instead, the supreme court looks for disarra y in the law in deter mining whe ther to exercise its discretion in conclusively resolvingan issue. ¶ 24 T h e S t at e’ s ad d i t i onal authority is equally distingu i s h ab l e as b o t h i n v o l v ed a constitutional challeng e to an adoption statute consistently reje cted b y t he appellate court. In re Adoption of W

algreen , 186 I ll. 2d 362, 364, 710 N.E.2d 1226, 1226-27 (1999); In re J.B.
, 204 I ll. 2d 382, 384, 789 N.E.2d 1259, 1260 (2003). W algreen and J.B. do not involve

a novel question of statutory interpre tation involving important liberty interests. They do not stand for the proposition the appellate court must consider disarra y in the law in deter

mining whether an author itative deter

mination is necessar

y to provide guidance

. ¶ 25 The exis tence of conflicting prec edent is not an element of the public-intere st e x ception. C h r is topher K.
, 217 I ll. 2d at 385 n.3, 841 N.E.2d at 967 n.3 (F ree man, J
., specia l l y

concur ring ). L a n g u ag e conce rning disarra

y in the law and conflicting prec edent in the publicinterest exception addre sses the structura l and prec edential differ ence betwee n the appellate
court and the I llinois Supreme Court. See People v. Artis
, 232 I ll. 2d 156, 164, 902 N.E.2d 677, 682 (2009) (“The appellate court lacks authority to overr ule decisions of [the supreme court], which are binding on all lower courts.”) ; People v. Canulli
, 341 I ll. App. 3d 361, 370, 792 N.E.2d 438, 444 (2003) (“Courts are not bound to follow decisions of equal or inferior courts.”) ; see also I ll. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (ef f. Oct. 15, 2007) (providing whether a petition for leave to appea l “will be g rante d is a matter of sound judicial discretion,” and the supreme court considers “the exis tence of a conflict betwee n the decision soug ht to be revie wed and

a decision *** of another division of the Appellate Court” in revie wing a petition for leave to appea l). I f the supreme c ourt intended to cur tail the public-intere st ex ception as use d by the appellate court, we conclude it would have done so with more clarity than in Hernande z

. ¶ 26 Additionally
, we find unpersua sive the State’s treatment of Hernande z and Christ opher K. in arguing ho w a case is one of first impression. The State asser ts “an issue of first impression exis ted in the Supreme C o u rt o f I l linois once the moot appellate ruling was

vacated in Hernande

z .” (Emphasis in orig inal.) The State further asser ts the Christopher K. appellate opinion cre ated prec edent and as such “the issue was no longe r o n e o f fi rs t impression once it rea ched the Supreme Court o f I l l inois.” Vac ating an appellate court decision where t h e s upreme court finds the case m oot befor e the appellate court is a longstanding prac tice. In re Randall M.
, 231 I ll. 2d 122, 133-34, 896 N.E.2d 309, 315 (2008); In

re Marriage of Peters-F

arrell
, 216 I ll. 2d 287, 293, 83 5 N. E

. 2 d 7 9 7
, 800 (2005); In re Tekela
, 202 I ll. 2d 282, 297, 780 N.E.2d 304, 313 (2002); W algreen
, 186 I ll. 2d at 366, 710 N.E.2d at 1228. As in Hernande z , rathe r than cre ating a case of first impression, this prac tice

cre ates a nonjusticiable case without a live controve rsy , beca use it is moot, and without a prior appellate decision, beca use it is vacated, befor e the supreme court. Hernande z , 239 I ll. 2d at 203, 940 N.E.2d at 1087 (whe re appella t e co u rt’s judgme nt vacated, “ no prec edent exis ts,” and a decision by the supreme court would be “a purely advis ory opinion on a question that has y et t o be decided” (emphasis i n orig inal)). Bl ac k ’s define s a case of first impression as a “ca se that prese nts the court with an issue of law that has not previously been decide d by any controlling leg al authority in that jurisdiction.” Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 228

-6-(8th ed. 2004). The I llinois Supreme Court is the court of last resor t in I llinois

. It establishes controlling prec edent in this state and is under no obliga tion to follow the appellate court’s decision. See In re K.E.F.
, 235 I ll. 2d 530, 541, 922 N.E.2d 322, 328 (2009) (noting the
supreme court is “not bound by the appellate court’s rea soning in any event and may aff irm for any basis prese nted in the rec ord”)

. Fur ther, when a question of law has been deliberately

ex am i n ed and decide d by the supreme court, it should be considere d closed to further
argument. People v. Hernande z , 231 I ll. 2d 134, 144, 896 N.E.2d 297, 304 (2008). A case of first impression befor e an I llinois court is one in wh i ch n o prior controlling prec edent exis ts, and the issue is only settled once the I llinois Supreme Court dec ides the issue. ¶ 27 Otherw ise moot case s involving an issue of first impression have b e e n p r e v io u s ly r e a c h e d by the supreme court and the appellate court. S ee Sandholm v. Kueck er , 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 63, 962 N.E.2d 418 (addr essing attorney fee s under the Citi zen Participation Act, although the supreme court reve rsed the appellate court’s judgme nt, causing the issue t o be moot beca use it did not aff

ect the parties) ; People v. Horsman
, 406 I ll. App. 3d 984, 986-87, 943 N.E.2d 139, 141-42 (2011) (addr essing whether elec tronic home monitoring was a form of i mp ri s o nment); In re Charles K.
, 405 I ll. App. 3d 1152, 1162, 943 N.E.2d 1, 9-10 (2 0 1 0 ) (addr essin g is s u e o f f

ir s t im p re ssion conce rning jury instructions in involuntary-commitment

case s); In re Robert F.
, 396 I ll. App. 3d 304, 311, 917 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (2009) (addr essing
proce dural r e q

u ire ments for involuntary commitment wher e the statute at issue had only been discussed in one other decision); In re Atul R.
, 382 I ll. App. 3d 1164, 1167-68, 890 N.E.2d 6 9 5, 698-99 (2008) (addr essing issue involving statutory proce dures for invol u n t ary commitment); Christ opher K.
, 217 I ll. 2d at 361, 841 N.E.2d at 953 (“the appellate court’s decision in this case [did] not directly conflict with prior c ase la w”)

. ¶ 28 The State’s argument distorts the public-intere st exception by eff ectively prec luding its

use to r eview c ases of

first impression. Following the State’s circ ular logic
, since the issue befor e us will alway s be moot and has not yet been resolved, no appellate court can issue an opinion or it would be first to do so in a moot case

. Since no appellate district could issue an opini o n , n o co nflict betwee n the districts would potentially develop to cre ate the need for supreme court review. As a re sult, the I llinois Supreme Court would not be called upon to conclusively resolve the issue as the appellate co u rt co uld not consider the issue, thus eff ectively stifling development of the law. We do not beli ev e we are prec luded from considering an entire cl ass of case s and will revie w a matter of first impression wher e the

case meets a mootness exception, such as wher e the issue is of public importance and public officia ls a re in ne ed of guidance

. Christ opher K. , 217 I ll. 2d at 361, 841 N.E.2d at 953-54; People ex rel. Departme nt of Corrections v. Mi llard
, 335 I ll. App. 3d 1066, 1070, 782 N.E.2d 966, 969 (2003). This matter of first impression conce rns statutory i n t er pretation aff ecting commitment of juveniles. We find the public-intere st exception applies beca use a resolution will provide nee ded guidanceto public officials.

¶ 29 B. Me rits ¶ 30 On the merits, responde nt argues the J uvenile Act prohibits a minor’s commitment to the Depa rtment for unlawful consumption of alcohol, and the trial court err ed in sentenc ing her

-7-to 364 day s’ commitment in the Depa rtment. Respondent contends beca use “[a]dult s, i.e. [,] individuals over the ag e of 21[,] cannot be found guilty of, much less incarcer ated for, illega l consumption of alcohol,” the J uvenile Act prohibits commitment of m i n o rs adjudicate d delinquent for unla

wful consumption of alc ohol. We agree

.

¶ 31 1. Standard of Review ¶ 32 Re s p o n dent’s challeng e require s this court to construe statutory languag e, and our re view is de novo

. In re Rodney S.
, 402 I ll. App. 3d 272, 285, 932 N.E.2d 588, 600 (2010). The primary objective in construing a s t atut e is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the leg islative intent, and the most reliable indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the

s tatutory languag e itself. People v. Chapman
, 2012 I L 111896, ¶ 23, 965 N. E

. 2 d 1 1 1 9

. Courts of revie w deter

mine leg islative intent by rea ding t h e s t at u t e as a whole and considering all rele vant parts and not by considering words or phrases in isolation. People v. Vil la
, 2011 I L 110777, ¶ 35, 959 N.E.2d 634. This court will “not depart from the plain languag e of the statute by rea ding into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that c onflict with the ex presse d intent” (People v. Perry
, 224 I ll. 2 d 3 1 2
, 323-24, 864 N.E.2d 196, 204 (2007)) and construes the languag e of a penal statute in favor of the acc used ( Rodney S.
, 402 I ll. App. 3d at 286, 932 N.E.2d at 601). When nece ssary , the statute should be considere d in its entirety in light of the subject it addre sses and the leg islature’s objective in enac ting it. In re Je rome S. , 2012 I L

App (4th) 100862, ¶

10, 968 N.E.2d 769.

¶ 33 2. Juve nile Act and Liquor Control Act ¶ 34 Our revie w require s us to construe sever al provisions of the J uvenile Act and the L iquor C o n trol Act of 1934 (L iquor Act) (235 I L CS 5/1-1 to 12-4 (West 2010)) toge th er t o deter mine whether a minor’s commitment to the Depa rtment, upon probation revoc ation, is permitted for unlawful c onsumption of alcohol. Under the doctrine of in pari materia
, two statutes, or two parts of one statute conce rning the same subject, must be considere d toge ther in order to produce a “ ‘har monious whole.’ ” People v. Rinehart
, 2012 I L 111719, ¶ 26, 962 N.E.2d 444 (quoting Sulse r v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.
, 147 I ll. 2d 548, 555, 591 N.E.2d 427, 429 (1992) ). ¶ 35 We beg in with secti o n 6 -2 0 (e ) o f the L iquor Act, which states, “The consumption of alcoholic liquor by any person under 21 year s of ag e is forbidden.” 235 I L CS 5/6-20(e) (West 2010). Violation of section 6-20 (e ) i s a Class A misdemeanor (235 I L CS 5/6-20(f) (West 2010)), and a Class A misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment up to one year (730 I L CS 5/5-4.5-55 (West 2010)). ¶ 36 Turning next to the J uvenile Act, unlawful consumption of alcohol by a minor under the
ag e of 18 falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of article V of the J uvenile Act. 705 I L CS 405/5-120 (West 2010). The J uvenile Act define s an “adult” as “a person 21 year s of ag e or older” (705 I L CS 405/1-3(2) (West 2010) ), and a “minor” as “a person under the ag e of 21
year s subject to this Act” (705 I L CS 405/ 1-3(10) , 5-105(10) (West 2010)). ¶ 37 Severa l J uvenile Act provisions work toge ther in limit ing a minor’s commitment to the Depa rtment. Section 5-750(1) (a) of the J uvenile Act states a minor, adjudg ed a war d of the

-8-court, may be committed to the Depa rtment if the trial court finds, as it did here
, the minor’s
pare nts are unfit or unable, for some rea son other than financ ial circ umstances alone, to car e for, protec t, train, or discipline the minor, or are unwilling to do so, and the best interests of the minor and the p ub l i c wo uld not be serve d by place ment under section 5-740 of the J uvenile Act. 705 I L CS 405/5-750(1)( a) (West 2010). Rece nt amendments have added seven individualiz ed fac tors a court must revie w befor e making a finding that secur e confine ment i s nece ssary and commit ting a minor to the Department. P ub. Act 97-362, § 5 (ef f. J an

. 1
, 2012) (a mending705 I L CS 405/ 5-750(1) (A)- (G) ( West S upp. 2011)). ¶ 38 Respondent was committed afte r probation revoc ation, so we turn to section 5-720 of the J uvenile Ac t. Under se ction 5-720, whe re the trial court finds a minor violated a probation condition, the court may revoke probation “and impose any other sentenc e that was available under Section 5-710 at the time of the initial sentenc e.” 705 I L CS 405/5-720(4) (West 2010). Under section 5-710(1) (b) of the Juvenile Act, a Depa rtment commitment under section 5- 750 “shall be made only if a term of incarce ration is permitted by law for adults found guilty ofthe offense for which the minor was adjudicate d delinquent.” (Emphasis added.) 705 I L CS 405/5-710(1)(b) (West 2010). Fur ther, section 5-710(7) provides, “In no event shall a guilty minor be committed to the Depa rtment of Juvenile J ustice for a period of time in excess of that period for which an adult could be committed for the same act .” (Emphasis added.) 705 I L CS 405/ 5-710(7) (West 2010).

¶ 39 3. The Parties’ Arguments ¶ 40 Respondent contends the J uvenile Act “uniformly prohibits the incar cer ation of minors who have been charg ed or adjudicated d el i n quent” for unlawful consumption of alcohol. Respondent’s argument can be broken down into four component parts: (1) the J uvenile Act limit s terms of incarce ra t i o n in the Depa rtment by ref

ere nce to those terms authorized for adults found guilty of the same offe nse for which the minor was adjudicate d delinquent; (2) unlawful c onsumption of alcohol, by operation of law, ca

nnot be committed by an adult, a
person over 21 year s of ag e, the lawfu l ag e of consumption; (3) an adult cannot be incar cer ated for unlawful consumption of alcohol; there fore
, (4) under section 5-710 a minor
cannot be s entenced to incar cer ation in the Depa rtment for unlawful consumption. As a result, the trial court err ed in sentenc ing her to 364 day s in the Depa rtment for unlawful consumption. ¶ 41 The State responds res p o n d en t i gn o res the “valid court order ” exception (705 IL CS 405/1-4.1, 5-401(3) (West 2 0 1 0 )) permitting the incar cer ation of j uvenile st atus offe nders who violate probation orders. ¶ 42 We agree with respondent. ¶ 43 Respondent initially cites section 5-401(3) of t h e J u v en i l e Ac t i n s up p o rt o f her
argument. That sec tion provides: “Except for minors ac cused of violation of an orde r of the c ourt, any minor acc used of
any act under fede ral or State law, or a municipal or county ordinanc e that would not be illega l if committed by an adult, cannot be place d in a jail, municipa l loc kup, detention
cente r, or secur e corr ectional fac ility

. Juveniles accuse d with undera g e consumption and

-9-undera g e possession of al co h o l cannot be place d in a jail, municipal lockup, detention
cente r, or corr ectional fac ility .” (Emphasis added.) 705 I L CS 405/5-401(3) (West 2010). Respondent acknow ledg es section 5-401(3) expressly conce rns prea djudicatory p r o c e eding s under article V, part 4, of the J uvenile Act (705 I L CS 405/5-401 to 5-415 (West 2010)) but further asser

ts nothing limit s its scope from applying to sentenc ing proce eding s under article V, par t 7 (705 I L CS 405/ 5-701 to 5-755 (West 2010)). Howeve r, j ust as nothing e x pressly limit s section 5-401(3) ’s applica bility to prea djudicatory

proce eding s, nothing sug g ests its restric tions during the arr est and custody phase must be rea d into the sentenc ing phase. See Randall M.
, 231 I ll. 2d at 129, 896 N.E.2d at 313 (noting article V, part 4, of the Juvenile Act “does not g overn or even speak to the trial court at the detention hear ing” as g overne d in article V, part 5). Section 5-401(3) speaks only to the arr est and cust o dy phase, and we decline the opportunity to rea d its restric tions into the article V, part 7, sentenc ing provisions. ¶ 44 The State asser ts the J uven il e Act contains a “valid court order ” exception, which per mits incar cer ation of j uvenile probation violators. T h e State argues circuit courts shoul d not be limit ed in “ invoking their inhere nt contempt power s to impose incar cer ation upon juvenile
status offe nders who violate probation order s.” For support, the State cites sections 1-4.1 and 5-401(3) . Section 1-4.1 provides, in pe rtinent part:

“Exc ept for m inors ac cused of v iolation of an order of the court , any minor accuse d of
any act unde r fede ral or State law, or a municipal ordinanc e that would not be illega l if committed by an adult, cannot be place d in a jail, municipal lockup, detention cente r or

secur e corr ectional fac ility

. Confinement in a county jail of a minor accused of a violation of an order of the co u rt , or of a minor for whom there is rea sonable cause to believe that the minor is a [delinquent minor], shall be in acc ordanc e with the restric tions
set forth in Sections 5-410 and 5-501 of this Act.” (Emphase s added.) 705 I L CS 405/1- 4.1 (West 2010).
J ust as responde nt, the State seeks to extend a provision expressly l imited to the part 4
prea djudicatory stag e to the part 7 sentenc ing stag e. We ref use to apply provisions expressly limit ed to the arr est and custody stag e in deter mining wheth er a minor found guilty of unlawful c onsumption of alcohol may be sente nced to the D epar tment. ¶ 45 Fur

ther, the State cites t he federa l J uvenile J ustice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (De linquency Act) (42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (11)( A)(ii) (2006)) for the proposition the valid
court order exception permits incar cerati on for unlawful consumption. Howeve r, section 223(a) (23) of the fede ral Delinquenc y Act provid es for proce dural safe guards wher e “a juvenile is taken into custody for violating a valid court order issued for committing a status offe nse.” 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (23) (2006); see also 705 I L CS 405/5-401(3) (West 2010) (same)

. The State has not pr esente d a state or fede ral statute that addre sses the “valid court order ” exception outside of the prea djudicatory stag e or that app l i es t o sentenc ing upon probation re vocation. ¶ 46 The proce dural nature of the probation re v o ca t i o n p ro ce ed i n g s below is fata l to the State’s “valid court order” exception ar gu m en t

. Her e, the State filed a petition to revoke responde nt’s probation, not a rule to show cause for contempt for her conduct. In light of the
supr e me c o u

r t’ s curta ilment of imprisonment for contempt in City of Urbana v. Andrew N.B.
,

-10-211 I ll. 2d 456, 813 N.E.2d 132 (2004), we question the State’s sug g estion a minor ca n be inca rce rate d in the Depa

rtment for contempt. See id. at 476, 813 N.E.2d at 144 (“It defie s

rea son that municipal ordinanc e code violations prosec uted outside the [J uvenile] Act which themselves are not punishable by imprisonment become punishable by imprisonment simply becau s e the trial court order ed minors to abide by conditions unrelated to the initial violations.”). We need not further comment on the State’s contempt argument. Where a trial
court initially imposed probation, the proper proce ss is a petition to revoke probation under section 5-720 and, upon revoc ation, rese ntencing the responde nt on the orig inal offe nse, the
proce ss followed her e. ¶ 47 Section 5-720(4) provides up o n p robation revoc ation the trial court may “impose any other sentenc e that was available under section 5-710 at the time of the initial sentenc e” (705 I L CS 405/5-720(4) (West 2010)). In this case , this specific provision conce rning probation

revoc ation controls over statutory provisions conce rning arr est and custody
, pretria l detention, or contempt proce eding s. See Moore v. Gree n , 219 I ll. 2d 470, 480, 848 N.E.2d 1015, 1021 (2006) (“Where a g ener al statu t o ry p ro v ision and a more specific statutory provision relate to the same subject, we will presume that the leg islature intended the more specific provision to g overn.” ). We note section 5-720 does not contain a “valid court order ” exception. Howeve r, even assuming arguendo a “valid court order ” exception exis ts in part 7, under section 5-720(4) we must deter mine whether incar cer ati on upon probation

revoc ation is permitted as an initial sentenc e under section 5-710.

¶ 48 4. Incarc eration for Unlawf ul Consumption ¶ 49 Under section 5-710 of the J u v en i l e Ac t , a trial court cannot sentenc e a minor to the Depa rtment for a period in excess of the maxi mum imprisonment term for an adult convicted of the same offe nse, and any excess sentenc e is void. In re Jesus R.
, 326 I ll. App. 3d 1070, 1072, 762 N.E.2d 717, 718 (2002); see also In re K.S.
, 354 I ll. App. 3d 862, 864, 822 N.E.2d 526, 528 (2004) (F ifth District, rema nding wher e minor sentenc ed in excess of 364 day s on Class A misdemeanor)

. Ordinarily
, an adult would be imprisoned in a county fac ility for a
sentenc e of less than one year

. 730 I L CS 5/5-8-6(b) (West 2010). W h i le not expli cit, the J uvenile Act permits commitment to th e De p artment, a state fac ility
, for a misdemeanor offe nse, wher eas an adult would be imprisoned in a county fac ility

. See Jabari C.
, 2011 I L App (4th) 100295, ¶ 2, 962 N.E.2d 8 (minor adjudicate d delinquent for unlawful possession of cannabis on school g rou n d s , a C l ass A m isdemeanor
, committed to the Department for 364 day s). The fac t the trial court comm itted responde nt to the Depa rtment rathe r than a county detention ce nter doe s not affe ct our inquiry

. ¶ 50 The parties asser t and our rese arc h confirms no previous opinion has considere d section 5-710(1) (b)’ s limit s in an unlawful-c onsumption case under the J uvenile Act. Often section 5-710 has arisen wher e the minor was committed to the Depa rtment until ag e 21, exceeding the deter minate term for a particula r offe nse. See In re Jesus R.
, 326 I ll. App. 3d at 1072, 762 N.E.2d at 718 (Class 3 felony ag grava ted battery); In re C.L .P.
, 332 I ll. App. 3d 640, 644, 773 N.E.2d 188, 190 (2002) (Class 3 felony ag grava ted batter y ). ¶ 51 We conclude the languag e of section 5-710 is clea r and unambiguous with reg ard to the

-11-question at issue. The statute simply provides a term of incar cer ation under section 5-750 is

permitted “only if a term of incar cer ation is permitted by law for adults found guilty

of the offe nse for which the minor was adjudicate d delinquent.” 705 I L CS 405/5-710(1)(b) (West 2010). The term “adult” as defined i n the J uvenile Act is a p er s o n over the ag e of 21 (705 I L CS 405/1-3(2) (West 2010)). Whil e the g ener al concept of an adult, a person over the ag e of 18, would include “minors” (as de fined by the Juvenile Act), these persons over the ag e of 18 would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the J uvenile Act if he or she committed the
act afte r his or

her e ighte enth birthday (705 I L CS 405/5-120 (West 2010) ). The fac t a n 18-
year -old could p o t en t ially be subject to imprisonment for unlawful consumption does not aff ect our analy sis a s we need look no further than the J uvenile Act itself for the de finition of “adult” as used in sections 5-710(1) (b) and 5-710(7)
, and we will construe section 5-710 using this define d term. See Gruchow v. W hite
, 375 I ll. App. 3d 480, 485, 874 N.E.2d 921, 925 (2007) (“ ‘It is well established that when a statute define s the term it uses, those terms must be construed acc ording to the definitions c ontained in the act.’ ” (quoting State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Unive rsal Underwriters Group
, 182 I ll. 2d 240, 244, 695 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1998) )). ¶ 52 I t i s a leg al impossibi lity for an adult, as define d by the J uvenile Act, to commit this

o ff en s e–as there is no “same offe nse” for an adult. It is leg ally impossibl e for an adult, as define d in the J uvenile Act, to be incar cer ated for unlaw ful consumption of alcohol. As a n adult cannot leg ally be incar cer ated for unlawful consumption, it logic ally follows in acc ord with section 5-710’ s p l ai n languag e, incar cer ation of a juvenile in the Depa rtment for the same off ense is not authorized. See 720 IL CS 5/2-12 (West 2010) (an “ offe nse” is def ined in the Unified Code of Correc tions as “a violation of any penal statute of this State”). Article I I I of the Juvenile Act addr esses ty pical status of

fense s such as truanc y , running awa y , and incorrig ibility , but not unlawful consumption of alcohol. 705 I L CS 405/3-1 to 3-33.5 (West 2010); see also Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 1112 (8th ed. 2004) (def ining “status offe nse” as “[a] minor’s violation of the juvenile code by doing some act that would not be considere d illega l if an adult did it”). Be cause unlawful consumption o f al co h ol is a misdemeanor, it is an example of a status offe nse falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of article V of the J uvenile Act, and not article I I I

. Howeve r, section 5-710(1) (b) expressly limit s a trial court’s
sentenc ing disposition under a rticle V. ¶ 53 A holding permitting incar cer ation for unlawful consumption, a Class A misdemeanor, would require us to rea d the word “cla ss” prec eding the word “off ense,” or to rea d a differ ent definition of “adult” into the s tatute. W e will not do so. Our int erpr etation i s supported by subsection 5-710(7)
, which provides, “In no event shall a guilty minor be committed to the Depa rtment of J uvenile Justice for a period of time in excess of that period for which an ad u lt could be committed for the same act .” (Emphasis added.) 705 I L CS 405/5-710 (7 ) (West 2010). Both sections 5-710(1)(b) and 5-710(7) ’s us ag e of “off ense” and “same act” require s us to reje ct a rea ding adding to the s tatutory l an gu age providing for incarc eration of the same class offe nse, rathe r than, as the statute s t at es , t h e s ame offe nse, i.e.
, same violation of a penal statute. For further support, we note that juveniles acc used of undera g e

co n s u mp t ion of alcohol “ca nnot be placed in a jail, municipal lockup, detention cente r, or

secur e corr ectional fac ility ” (705 I L CS 405/5-401(3) (West 2010)). T h is section supports our

-12-interpre tation that the leg islature intended unlawful consumption to be treated differ ently for

Depa rtment commitments. ¶ 54 Under ag e drinking laws provide minors with the incentive to ref rain from c o nsuming a

ny amount of alc ohol (

Arvia v. M

adigan , 209 I ll. 2d 520, 539, 809 N.E.2d 88, 100-01 (2004);

see also 625 I L CS 5/11-501.8 (West 2010) (authorizing summary suspension of the driver’ s license o f a p er son under 21 year s of ag e on a finding of driving under the influence of alcohol))
, and the L iquor Act’s g oal is to provide for the safe t y an d t em p era nce in the consumption of alcohol and demonstrates the Gene ral Assembly ’s belief that people under the ag e of 21 are g ener ally incapa ble of appre ciating the risks of alcohol consumption ( People v . Finkenbinde r , 2011 I LApp (2d) 100901, ¶ 13, 963 N.E.2d 1069). ¶ 55 Howeve r, the J uvenile Act does not permit a trial court to adjudicate a minor delinquent for unlawful consumption and then commit her to the Depa rtment for a year

. This does nothing to further the J uvenile Act’s policy of reha bilitation in light of available substanceabuse tr ea t m en t s and alternative place ments. Our holding does not preve nt the State from enfor cing unlawful consump t i o n l aw s through authorized channe ls such as the following : order a delinquent minor to perf orm community service
, order a delinquent minor to underg o

a substance- abuse assessment and tre a tm e nt, o rd e r a delinquent minor partially or completely

emanc ipated, suspend a delinquent minor’s driver’ s license, place a delinquent mi n o r on probation or conditional dischar ge, or place a delinquent minor under ag e 13 in the
guardia nship o f the Depa

rtment of Children and Family Service s. 705 I L CS 405/5-710 (West 2010). ¶ 56 The rec ord befor e us sug g ests both the assistant State’s At t o rn ey an d t h e t ri al court
argued for and chose incar ceration beca use of their experience wi t h t h e minor, their knowledg e of her behavior, and their concern f or her health and the unborn child’s health. Howeve r, this placeme nt was unauthorized. ¶ 57 Section 5-710, as written, absent leg islative clarification, d o e s n o t a u thorize commitm ent to the Depa

rtment for unlawful consumption, a crime that is leg ally impossibl e for an adult
to commit. The trial court improperl y rese ntence d responde nt under section 5-720(4) to a sentenc e unauthorized by section 5-710 at the time of the initial sentenc ing hearing, namely
, 364 day s in the Depa

rtment.

¶ 58 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 59 We reve rse the tr ial court’s judgment.

¶ 60 Reverse d.

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