UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

__________________________________ 

 ) 

ADRIENNE SMITH, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Civ. Action No. 14-728 (EGS) 

 ) 

WORLD BANK GROUP, and JIM YONG ) 

KIM, President, World Bank Group, ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

__________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Adrienne Smith brings this lawsuit alleging that the World 

Bank and its President, Jim Yong Kim, discriminated against her 

during the course of her employment. Ms. Smith appeared to have 

properly served the defendants in September 2014, but the 

defendants did not timely respond to the Complaint and the Clerk 

of Court entered default against them. Days later, before any 

motion for default judgment was filed, the defendants moved to 

vacate the entry of default and to dismiss this case for lack of 

jurisdiction. Upon consideration of the motions, the responses 

and replies thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record, 

the Court GRANTS the defendants’ motions, VACATES the default, 

and DISMISSES this case. 

I. Background 

Ms. Smith worked for the World Bank from 1997 to 2012. See 

Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2. Ms. Smith’s precise allegations of 
2 

discrimination are not clear from the Complaint, although she 

alleges that “World Bank senior personnel managers resorted to 

‘Gestapo,’ ‘Shang hai’ style tactics and threats against 

Plaintiff.” Id. at 10; see also id. at 14 (alleging that a 

manager, for discriminatory reasons, “targeted Plaintiff” and 

sought to have her removed from her position). Ms. Smith also 

makes more generalized allegations regarding the World Bank, 

including that its “internal conflict system . . . has failed 

miserably to provide due process to Black and African staff.” 

Id. at 6; see also id. at 7–8. 

In July 2012, Ms. Smith filed a complaint with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that the 

World Bank had discriminated against her during the course of 

her employment. See id. at 2. Ms. Smith’s complaint was 

dismissed by the EEOC for lack of jurisdiction in January 2014. 

See id.

Ms. Smith filed this lawsuit on April 25, 2014 “as the next 

step” following the denial of her EEOC Complaint. See id. at 1. 

On August 4, 2014, the Court entered an Order noting that the 

deadline for Ms. Smith to serve process on the defendants was 

approaching. See Order, ECF No. 3 at 1. The Court directed her 

to do so by August 25, 2014, or risk dismissal of the case. See 

id. On August 18, 2014, Ms. Smith filed an affidavit that 

appeared to be partly responsive to the Court’s Order. See Aff., 
3 

ECF No. 4. The Court directed Ms. Smith to provide supplemental 

materials sufficient to demonstrate that the defendants had been 

properly served by no later than September 2, 2014. See Minute 

Order of August 21, 2014. 

Ms. Smith submitted in September 2014 a document that appeared 

to show that she had served the defendants on September 8, 2014, 

which produced a deadline of September 29, 2014 for their 

response to the Complaint. See Minute Order of October 16, 2014. 

Because no response had been filed by October 16, and Ms. Smith 

had not further prosecuted her case, the Court entered a Minute 

Order directing Ms. Smith to “show cause why this case should 

not be dismissed for her failure to comply with Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 55.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 

On October 21, 2014, Ms. Smith submitted an affidavit seeking 

entry of default. See Aff. for Default, ECF No. 9. The Clerk 

entered default on October 22, 2014. See Entry of Default, ECF 

No. 10. Six days later, the defendants moved to vacate that 

entry of default and to dismiss the case for lack of 

jurisdiction. See Mot. to Vacate, ECF No. 11; Mot. to Dismiss, 

ECF No. 12. The Court then entered an Order, citing the D.C. 

Circuit’s decisions in Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507 (D.C. 

Cir. 1988) and Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1992), 

which directed Ms. Smith to respond to the motions by no later 

than November 28, 2014. See Order, ECF No. 13 at 2. Ms. Smith’s 
4 

opposition brief was timely filed, Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 15, and 

the defendants filed their reply brief on December 8, 2014. See 

Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 16. Ms. Smith subsequently moved for leave 

to file a surreply. Mot. for Leave, ECF No. 17. The Court GRANTS

that unopposed motion and considers the surreply in adjudicating 

the pending motions.1

II. Standard of Review 

A. Vacating Entry of Default 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), “[w]hen a 

party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought 

has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is 

shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the 

party’s default.” The Court may later “set aside an entry of 

default for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). Generally, a 

district court considering whether to set aside an entry of 

default must consider “whether (1) the default was willful, (2) 

a set-aside would prejudice plaintiff, and (3) the alleged 

defense was meritorious.” Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (quotation marks omitted). Where a defendant is 

immune from suit, however, “the Clerk’s subsequent entry of a 

 

1 On March 24, 2015, Ms. Smith filed a “request for emergency 

relief,” which appears to request expedited consideration of her 

claims. See Mot. for Emergency Relief, ECF No. 19. In light of 

the Court’s ruling that it lacks jurisdiction over this case, 

that motion is DENIED AS MOOT. 
5 

default . . . [is] void from the outset for lack of 

jurisdiction.” Garcia v. Sebelius, 919 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 

(D.D.C. 2013) (citing Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 141 (2d 

Cir. 2010)). “[W]ithout a valid entry of default in the first 

instance, there is nothing for the Court to vacate.” Id. 

B. Rule 12(b)(1) 

A federal district court may only hear a claim over which it 

has subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, a Rule 12(b)(1) 

motion for dismissal is a threshold challenge to a court’s 

jurisdiction. On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 

that the Court has jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). In evaluating the motion, the Court 

must accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as 

true and give the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that 

can be drawn from the facts alleged. See Thomas v. Principi, 394 

F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Court, however, is “not 

required . . . to accept inferences unsupported by the facts 

alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual 

allegations.” Cartwright Int’l Van Lines, Inc. v. Doan, 525 F. 

Supp. 2d 187, 193 (D.D.C. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). 

III. Analysis 

Although the defendants have filed separate motions for 

vacatur of the entry of default and for dismissal of this case, 
6 

the motions focus on the same issue: Whether the World Bank and 

Mr. Kim are immune from this suit. If they are, the entry of 

default would be void, Garcia, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 46, and the 

case would be subject to dismissal. See Mendaro v. World Bank, 

717 F.2d 610, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1983). If they are not immune, the 

case may proceed. 

The International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 

288a, provides that: 

International organizations, their property and their 

assets, wherever located, and by whomsoever held, shall 

enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of 

judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, 

except to the extent that such organizations may 

expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any 

proceedings or by the terms of any contract. 

Id. § 288a(b). Executive Order 9751 makes the World Bank subject 

to this immunity. See Exec. Order No. 9751, 11 Fed. Reg. 7713 

(July 13, 1946). “There are only two sources of limitation to 

the immunity: (1) the organization itself may waive its immunity 

and (2) the President may specifically limit the organization’s 

immunities when he selects the organization as one entitled to 

enjoy the [Act’s] privileges and immunities.” Dujardin v. Int’l 

Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., 9 F. App’x 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 

2001). 

The World Bank has waived its immunity narrowly, only for 

“actions relating to its external activities and contracts, and 

not the internal administration of its civil servants.” Mendaro, 
7 

717 F.2d at 621; see also Atkinson v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 

156 F.3d 1335, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (addressing a similar 

waiver: “[T]he Bank’s immunity should be construed as not waived 

unless the particular type of suit would further the Bank’s 

objectives.”) (emphasis in original). As a consequence, the 

World Bank has repeatedly been found not to have waived its 

immunity in connection with internal employment-related 

lawsuits. See, e.g., Mendaro, 717 F.2d 610 (employee’s Title VII 

claim); Dujardin, 9 F. App’x at 20 (employee’s defamation 

claim); Hudes v. Aenta Life Ins. Co., 806 F. Supp. 2d 180, 188 

(D.D.C. 2011) (wrongful-termination claim). 

Ms. Smith’s claims fall within this immunity. As another Judge 

of this Court stated in finding that a claim regarding withheld 

employee benefits could not proceed against the World Bank, 

“[n]o matter how approached, this case cannot be characterized 

as anything other than a suit arising out of the Bank’s 

relationship with its own employees.” Chiriboga v. Int’l Bank 

for Reconstruction & Dev., 616 F. Supp. 963, 967 (D.D.C. 1985) 

(quotation marks and alteration omitted). Ms. Smith’s assertion 

that she suffered discrimination in connection with her 

employment is similarly subject to no characterization but that 

of an employee-relations lawsuit. For that reason, the Court 

finds that the World Bank has not waived its immunity from Ms. 

Smith’s claims. 
8 

Nor is there any indication that the President has directed 

that the World Bank’s immunity be waived in a manner that would 

permit Ms. Smith’s claims to proceed. The Executive Order 

subjecting the World Bank to the immunity grant of 22 U.S.C. § 

288a contained no such limitation. See Exec. Order No. 9751, 11 

Fed. Reg. 7713 (July 13, 1946). Nor has Ms. Smith pointed the 

Court to any other action or legal authority that might effect 

such a waiver. Accordingly, the World Bank is immune from suit 

for Ms. Smith’s claims.2

 

2 Ms. Smith alluded in her pleadings to various legal sources, 

although she did not clearly identify those sources, and she 

appears to concede that they did not create an additional waiver 

of the World Bank’s immunity. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3 

(requesting “external due process of mediation through the 2011 

United States Appropriations Act, the Lugar/Leahy Act and the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Agreement to 

Mediate”); id. at 6 (describing the 2011 “United States 

Consolidated Appropriations Acts and the Lugar/Leahy Act” as 

“not advocat[ing] against jurisdictional immunity for 

organizations but express[ing] the clear legislative intention 

that multilateral Bank employees must be able to seek due 

process through alternative, external legal means such as 

mediation or arbitration”); Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 15 at 7 (“the 

United States Consolidated Appropriation Act [of] 2012 . . . 

requires the U.S. government to withhold approval for the Bank’s 

capital increase until it has made substantial progress in 

providing external, independent judicial access for staff. . . . 

The intent of the Lugar-Leahy Amendment is to introduce an 

independent, fair grievance resolutions system as an 

international best practice without infringing on the World 

Bank’s immunity”) (emphasis in original). To the extent that Ms. 

Smith intended to rely on these provisions as a basis for 

finding a waiver of immunity, her failure to identify the 

relevant legal provisions combined with her admission at times 

that those provisions do not affect the World Bank’s immunity, 

renders such an argument impossible to evaluate. To the extent 

Ms. Smith intended to rely on the appropriations bills and the 
9 

For similar reasons, the World Bank’s President, Mr. Kim, is 

immune from suit regarding these claims. Mr. Kim’s immunity is 

governed by 22 U.S.C. § 288d(b), which states: 

[O]fficers and employees of [international 

organizations] shall be immune from suit and legal 

process relating to acts performed by them in their 

official capacity and falling within their functions . 

. . except insofar as such immunity may be waived by the 

. . . international organization concerned. 

Ms. Smith has pointed to no basis for a finding that the World 

Bank has waived Mr. Kim’s immunity in any way that would render 

it less than the immunity reserved to the Bank. Because any 

involvement by Mr. Kim in the employment actions giving rise to 

Ms. Smith’s claims would relate to “acts performed by [him] in 

[his] official capacity and falling within [his] functions,” 

id., Mr. Kim is immune from Ms. Smith’s claims. Cf. Tuck v. Pan 

Am. Health Org., 668 F.2d 547, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (director of 

the Pan-American Health Organization was immune under 22 U.S.C. 

§ 288d “[t]o the extent that the acts alleged in the complaint 

relate to [his] functions” as director). 

IV. Conclusion 

Because the Court finds that Mr. Kim and the World Bank are 

immune from Ms. Smith’s claims, the Court must VACATE the entry 

 

“Lugar-Leahy Amendment” as supporting an independent cause of 

action entitling her to mediation or arbitration, she has failed 

to plead such a claim with any sufficient particularity, Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a), and, in any event, the bank’s immunity would 

appear to apply equally to such a cause of action. 
10 

of default in this case as void. See Garcia, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 

46. Moreover, the defendants’ immunity renders this Court 

without jurisdiction, so the case must be DISMISSED. In light of 

the Court’s lack of jurisdiction over this case, Ms. Smith’s 

motion for emergency relief is DENIED AS MOOT. An appropriate 

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 April 21, 2015