United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 21, 2020

Decided January 21, 2020

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1236

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RONALD H. VAN DEN HEUVEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 17-CR-160

William C. Griesbach,

Judge.

O R D E R

Ronald Van Den Heuvel pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1343, 1349. He received a sentence of 90 months in prison, below the recommended 

guidelines range of 108 to 135 months and the 20-year statutory maximum. He also was 

sentenced to three years’ supervised release and ordered to pay restitution of about 

$9.5 million. In his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal both his conviction 

and sentence, but he has nonetheless appealed. His appointed lawyer asserts that 

Van Den Heuvel no longer wishes to pursue the appeal; Van Den Heuvel has not, 

however, submitted his consent to a voluntary dismissal. Counsel therefore moves to 

withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that the appeal is 

frivolous. Van Den Heuvel has not responded. See CIR. R. 51(b). Because 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19-1236 Page 2

Van Den Heuvel told counsel that he does not want his guilty plea set aside, counsel 

correctly forgoes discussion of possible challenges to the voluntariness of the plea or the 

adequacy of the plea colloquy. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 

2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). But counsel does 

discuss whether Van Den Heuvel could challenge his sentence and whether the 

government breached the plea agreement. We limit our review to these questions

because counsel’s brief explains the nature of this case and addresses the types of issues 

that we would expect an appeal of this sort to involve. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 

774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

Counsel first questions whether, despite the appeal waiver, Van Den Heuvel

could challenge his terms of imprisonment and supervised release, the restitution order,

or the supervised-release conditions. An appeal waiver stands or falls with the guilty 

plea of which the waiver is a part. United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); 

United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2011). We enforce a waiver where 

its terms are unambiguous and the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered it. 

See United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Woolley, 

123 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 1997). As we already observed, Van Den Heuvel does not 

seek to undermine his guilty plea, and his written plea agreement unambiguously 

waives his right to appeal “any term of imprisonment, term of supervised release, term 

of probation, supervised release condition, fine, forfeiture order, and restitution order.”

Moreover, the plea colloquy shows that Van Den Heuvel understood this waiver 

provision and voluntarily accepted it: after the judge reviewed it with him and asked if 

he understood it, he answered, “Yes, your honor.” See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; United States 

v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). Finally, the record contains no basis for 

not enforcing the waiver, such as a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum or 

based on an impermissible factor like race. See Keller v. United States, 657 F.3d 675, 681

(7th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the waiver would render frivolous any appellate 

challenges to Van Den Heuvel’s sentence. 

Counsel also rightly concludes that Van Den Heuvel could not plausibly argue 

that the government breached the plea agreement at sentencing. The government

agreed to recommend a 90-month term of imprisonment in the plea agreement, and it 

did not deviate from this provision at the sentencing hearing. When Van Den Heuvel 

argued for an even lower term of imprisonment, the government responded that he 

deserved a longer sentence—of 90 months. That response was permissible, for “[s]trong 

advocacy in favor of the maximum sentence contemplated by a plea agreement does not 

constitute a breach.” United States v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 475 (7th Cir. 2016). And 
No. 19-1236 Page 3

because 90 months’ imprisonment is exactly what Van Den Heuvel received, any 

argument that the government breached the plea agreement would be frivolous. 

See United States v. Davis, 761 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2014) (concluding no material

breach because government advocated for, and defendant received, sentence 

recommended in plea agreement). 

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.