Filed 10/1/13 Keller v. Keller CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

RONALD D. KELLER,

Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and

 Appellant,

v.

LYLE R. KELLER,

Defendant, Cross-complainant and

 Respondent.

 B241757

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. GC041220)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jan A. 

Pluim, Judge. Reversed with directions.

Law Offices of Lowell John Dosch and Lowell John Dosch for Plaintiff, Crossdefendant and Appellant.

Law Offices of Mark J. Warfel and Mark J. Warfel for Defendant, Crosscomplainant and Respondent.

_______________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff and cross-defendant Ronald D. Keller appeals from a judgment in favor 

of defendant and cross-complainant Lyle R. Keller. We reverse with directions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Keller Brothers and Their Dispute1

Lyle R. Keller (Lyle) and Ronald D. Keller (Ron) are two of the five sons of 

George Keller (George).2 In the 1980‟s Lyle and Ron were roommates. Lyle was a real 

estate broker and invested in real estate with Ron and on his own. Lyle provided the 

financing and Ron worked on the properties. Ron relied on Lyle‟s expertise as a broker 

in making the real estate investments.

In late December 1986 and early 1987 Lyle completed the purchase of real 

property on Merced Avenue in Baldwin Park from George. Lyle gave his father a 

promissory note and a deed of trust, which were recorded. On February 17, 1987 Lyle 

executed a quitclaim deed transferring the property to Ron. Handwriting on the deed 

stated: “This is a [b]onafide [sic] gift and the grantor received nothing in return. R&T 

11911.” Lyle, however, continued to manage the property, leasing it and paying 

insurance and property taxes on it. Lyle also became executor of George‟s estate after 

George died in 1991.

 

1 The facts are taken from this court‟s unpublished opinion in the prior appeal in this 

matter, Keller v. Keller (June 16, 2009, B208405), a prior appeal in a probate matter, 

Estate of Keller (April 10, 2002, B152254) [nonpub. opn.], and the parties‟ stipulated 

facts submitted in this action on June 10, 2011. (See People v. Therrian (2003) 113 

Cal.App.4th 609, 611, fn. 4.)

2 Because Lyle, Ron, and George “share the same last name, we refer to them by 

their first names for convenience and clarity” (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 

Cal.App.4th 1187, 1191, fn. 1) and “not out of disrespect” (Cruz v. Superior Court (2004) 

120 Cal.App.4th 175, 188, fn. 13).
3

Ron did not record the quitclaim deed when he received it from his brother in 

1987 because Lyle asked Ron not to record it. Instead, Ron lost it. Ron erroneously 

thought Lyle had taken the quitclaim deed when Lyle moved out of Ron‟s home. When 

Ron told Lyle in 1987 or 1988 he could not find the quitclaim deed, Lyle told Ron that 

without the deed, Ron had nothing. Ron did not find the quitclaim deed until March 24, 

2006, at which time he promptly recorded it. Ironically, Ron only found the lost deed 

because Lyle served Ron with written discovery in probate litigation between the two 

brothers over the estate of their father, which caused Ron to look through old documents 

and eventually locate the long-lost deed.

B. Ron v. Lyle I (the Probate Actions)

There were two probate actions, one to probate George‟s estate and one to 

administer George‟s trust. In the course of this litigation, Ron successfully removed Lyle 

as executor of their father‟s estate and initiated foreclosure proceedings on the Merced 

Avenue property to collect on the promissory note Lyle had given their father. Ron also 

successfully set aside an assignment Lyle had made of the promissory note to another 

brother, George Eugene Keller (known as Gene), also a beneficiary of the estate. In 

response to Ron‟s attempt to foreclose, Lyle filed a civil action for declaratory relief and 

to enjoin the foreclosure, and a petition in the probate action for declaratory relief, 

injunctive relief, and an accounting. Lyle was able to pay off the note, and on March 11, 

2006 the probate court canceled the deed of trust.

C. Lyle v. Ron I

In August 2006 Lyle filed a civil action against Ron, Los Angeles Superior Court 

case No. BC356629, alleging that Ron had obtained the quitclaim deed from him in 1987 

by fraud. Lyle sought cancellation of the quitclaim deed, quiet title as of February 18, 

1987 (the date of the quitclaim deed), and injunctive relief to enjoin Ron from interfering 

with Lyle‟s ownership, management, and control of the Merced Avenue property. In one 

of his trial briefs, Lyle argued that at the time of the deed he “was involved in [a] divorce 
4

battle since 1981 until several years [sic]. To protect his interest from [his] ex-spouse, 

Lyle executed [the] Quit Claim- [sic] in favor of his brother, Ronald, to be kept for his 

benefit.” Lyle argued that the quitclaim deed “was never intended for the purposes of 

conveying title of the property from Lyle to Ronald.”

In May 2008 the case went to trial, and Lyle lost. The trial court in that action 

found that Lyle had failed to prove that Ron procured or obtained the quitclaim deed by 

fraud. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Ron on all of Lyle‟s causes of action. 

Lyle then moved for a new trial and to reopen the case to add a fourth cause of action for 

adverse possession. The trial court denied the motion. This court, in an unpublished 

decision, affirmed, holding among other things that Lyle‟s postjudgment request for leave 

to amend his complaint to add a cause of action for adverse possession was untimely. 

(See Keller v. Keller, supra, B208405.)

D. Ron v. Lyle II (This Action)

On July 28, 2008 Ron filed this action to gain possession of the Merced Avenue 

property, to obtain information about the property and its tenants, and to recover rents 

Lyle had collected since March 25, 2006, the day after Ron recorded the quitclaim deed. 

Ron alleged causes of action for declaratory relief, money damages, constructive trust, a 

common count for money, an accounting, and injunctive relief. Lyle filed a crosscomplaint that apparently included a cause of action for quiet title by adverse 

possession.3

Lyle lost again. On April 9, 2010, after a bench trial, the trial court issued a 

decision in favor of Ron and against Lyle. The court found that “subsequent to March 

24th, 2006 and to the date of October 23, 2008, Lyle has failed to pay all of the property 

 

3 The record on appeal provided by the parties includes Lyle‟s opposition to Ron‟s 

demurrer to Lyle‟s cross-complaint (but not Ron‟s demurrer), the trial court‟s order 

overruling Ron‟s demurrer, Ron‟s answer to Lyle‟s cross-complaint, Ron‟s motion for 

judgment on the pleadings as to Lyle‟s cross-complaint (and Lyle‟s opposition), and 

Lyle‟s first amended cross-complaint, but not Lyle‟s original cross-complaint.
5

taxes, thus he fails on this issue.” The court also found that Ron “did not have a recorded 

title to the property until March the 24th, 2006, thus Lyle did not have an adverse claim 

until some five year period after March the 24th, 2006.” The court did not address Ron‟s 

argument that Lyle‟s cause of action for adverse possession was barred by res judicata 

because it could have been litigated in the prior civil action between the brothers. The 

court indicated it would enter judgment in favor of Ron on Lyle‟s cross-complaint and 

instructed counsel for Ron to prepare a judgment.

Before the trial court entered a formal judgment, Lyle filed a motion to vacate the 

judgment and substitute a different judgment. On May 20, 2010 the court entered 

judgment awarding Ron $15,000 plus interest and awarding Lyle nothing on his crosscomplaint. On June 4, 2010 the trial court entered the judgment again, correcting a 

typographical error.

The trial court heard Lyle‟s motion to vacate the judgment on June 10, 2010. The 

court vacated the judgment and ordered a new trial on Lyle‟s cross-complaint only. The 

trial court explained that it had been “under the impression at the first trial that the law 

required that the person that is seeking title by adverse possession had to show the terms 

of adverse possession for the five years prior to the filing of the complaint—in this case 

the cross-complaint—which was on October 23rd, 2008. . . . Cases have been brought to 

the court‟s attention now . . . that the court may have been wrong,” and that “the five-year 

period could be any five-year period prior to the filing of the complaint as long as it‟s a 

continuous period of that five years.” The court stated: “I must say I—it strikes me as 

odd that that, in fact, is the law, but that may very well be the law, that the person that is 

seeking title by adverse possession ought to file it at the first date that they can in order to 

put on notice all parties that they are seeking title by adverse possession and not wait 

until 2008 and then come back before the court and say, well, we‟re talking about some 

period of five years [beginning] in „86.” The court did not address Ron‟s argument in 

opposition to the motion that the adverse possession cause of action was barred by res 

judicata and the primary rights doctrine.
6

On October 4, 2010, the trial date, counsel for the parties appeared and conferred 

with the trial court in chambers. The minute order states: “Counsel stipulate to a new 

trial. Stipulation shall be placed in writing.”4 Lyle also filed a motion to amend the 

cross-complaint, in part based on the trial court‟s invitation after the first trial to clarify 

the dates on which Lyle based his claim of adverse possession. The court granted Lyle‟s 

request for leave to file a first amended cross-complaint, which Lyle promptly filed.

Lyle‟s first amended cross-complaint alleged causes of action for quiet title and an 

accounting by Ron of rents received and expenses incurred on the property from October 

2008 through the date of trial. Lyle alleged that he had satisfied all of the requirements 

for adverse possession of the property for a period of more than five years, specifically, 

from December 26, 1986 through May 1, 2008. He alleged that he perfected title by 

adverse possession as of February 18, 1992 or, alternatively, on each day thereafter until 

December 31, 2007. Lyle alleged that during this time period he “was the record owner 

with the County Recorder [and] was listed on the property tax rolls as the record owner 

responsible for paying the property taxes . . . .” Lyle further alleged that he occupied the 

property “under a claim of right, and, alternatively, under color of title based on his belief 

that he remained the true owner under the Grant Deed recorded on or about December 26, 

1986.”

On June 20, 2011 the parties filed a document entitled “Joint Stipulation of Facts 

for Submittal of Case for Decision.” Among the 23 stipulated facts were the following:

“7. The property in question[] was purchased by Lyle from Lyle and Ron‟s 

Father, on or about December 26, 1986, and was recorded on December 31, 1986 in the 

office of the Recorder of Los Angeles County.”

“3. On February 17, 1987 Lyle executed a deed . . . transferring [the] property 

. . . to Ron.”

 

4 The record does not include a reporter‟s transcript of these proceedings.
7

“8. At or some time near the time of the execution of the deed, Lyle asked Ron 

not to record it.”

“11. Ron was unable to find the deed after the separation [of the brothers in 

1987], and erroneously assumed that Lyle had taken the deed.

“12. In 1987 or early 1988, Ron told Lyle that he, Ron[,] could not find the 

deed, and Lyle replied that without the deed, Ron had nothing.”

“10. On or about July 1988, Lyle sued Ron to stop the foreclosure on certain 

notes due from Lyle to the Estate of George Keller (deceased), secured by real property, 

including the subject property, in connection with Ron‟s role as administrator of George 

Keller‟s estate.”5

“13. The deed was discovered by Ron, in his home, in 2006 and promptly 

recorded on March 24, 2006.

“14. Lyle exercised exclusive possession, hostile, open, and notorious, in control 

over the property, including renting the property, collecting rents and paying all the 

property taxes [except to license fees imposed on rental operations in Baldwin Park, if 

determined by the court to be taxes, were not completely paid], continuously from the 

date he purchased the property from his Father, prior to execution of the deed to Ron on 

February 17, 1987, until the date the deed was recorded by Ron on March 24, 2006.

“15. After recordation of the deed in 2006, Lyle and Ron fought over the issue, 

and Lyle filed a litigation seeking relief, and thereafter the two were in conflict and 

exclusivity of control ceased.

“16. From the date Lyle acquired title from his Father, until the date Ron 

recorded the deed, title to the property [„record title‟], on the books of the County 

Recorder of Los Angeles County, remained in the name of Lyle.”

 

5 The parties stipulated to this fact even though George did not die until 1991.
8

“20. Ron attempted to take possession of the property on or about March 24, 

2006, and thereafter a dispute arose between Ron and Lyle over collection of rents and 

the control, and management, of the property.

“21. Lyle did not pay any property taxes after the December 10, 2007 property 

tax payment on the property.

“22. At all times prior to the recordation of the deed on March 24, 2006, Lyle 

held title to the property insofar as he was concerned, and exercised exclusive control, 

including payment of the property taxes and exercise of exclusive control. However, 

Lyle did not pay all the license fees imposed by the City of Baldwin Park on the owners 

of rental property in connection with their renting of said property.”

The stipulation included a provision that Ron would receive $15,000 in damages if 

the court ruled in his favor, and a provision that reserved jurisdiction for the court to 

determine what damages Lyle would receive if the court ruled in his favor.

After giving the parties an opportunity to brief the legal issues based on the 

stipulated facts, the trial court issued a tentative decision on July 21, 2011. This time 

Lyle won. The court set a hearing for August 12, 2011. Ron filed objections, including 

that Lyle‟s cross-complaint was barred by res judicata and the primary rights doctrine.

After the hearing, the trial court on August 18, 2012 issued its statement of 

decision. The court ruled that Lyle was the owner of the property by adverse possession 

and quieted title in favor of Lyle as of October 23, 2008. The court ruled that the first

action was “one involving the primary right of having a clear title to the property when it 

is alleged that the title was obtained by fraud,” whereas this action involved “the right of 

possession, ownership, and title by a new prescriptive title,” and “therefore res judicata or 

the splitting of cause of action does not apply.” Citing McNulty v. Copp (1954) 125 

Cal.App.2d 697 and Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 327, the 

trial court ruled: “Clearing title by fraud and seeking title by adverse possession do not 

involve the same primary rights and thus this lawsuit is not precluded by the theory 

against splitting causes of action.”
9

On the merits of Lyle‟s adverse possession claim, the trial court ruled: “By reason 

of stipulated facts numbered 12, 13, and 22 all five [of the elements required to obtain 

title by adverse possession] have been met by Lyle. Thus from early 1988 . . . on Ron 

was put on notice that by not having the deed he essentially had no rights to the property 

at issue and that Lyle was asserting ownership over it. Also, by reason of stipulated fact 

10 Ron recognized Lyle as the owner of the property. Lyle continued thereafter to 

exercise all dominion and control over the property until March 24, 2006. The Court 

therefore concludes that by some time in early 1993 and each day thereafter Lyle owned 

the property by adverse possession, having obtained a prescriptive title. The Court finds 

this to be true even though Lyle continued to be the record title holder until March 24, 

2006. It should be noted that Ron was the title holder but not the record title holder 

during said period.” The trial court ruled that Lyle “is the legal and equitable owner of 

the Property as of October 28, 2008, as result of [Lyle‟s] adverse possession,” and 

ordered Ron to provide Lyle with a financial accounting of all rents collected and 

expenses incurred during Ron‟s possession and use of the property from May 2008 to 

August 2011. On September 16, 2011 the trial court granted Lyle immediate possession 

of the Property.

The parties stipulated to refer Lyle‟s claim for an accounting of the income and 

expenses during the time Ron had possession of the property to retired Judge Gabriel 

Gutierrez. On March 26, 2012 Judge Gutierrez submitted his report to the trial court. 

After a hearing, the trial court adopted the report and ordered Ron to pay Lyle $55,576.

On May 3, 2012 the trial court entered judgment in favor of Lyle. Ron filed a 

timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Ron contends that the judgment in the prior action, case No. BC356629, on Lyle‟s 

complaint for cancellation, quiet title, and injunctive relief, is res judicata and bars Lyle‟s 

claim in this action for quiet title based on adverse possession for the property. Ron 
10

asserts that Lyle‟s cause of action to quiet title based on cancellation of the quitclaim 

deed in the prior action involved the same primary right as Lyle‟s cause of action to quiet 

title based on adverse possession. Lyle argues that the doctrine of res judicata does not 

apply because his two actions did not involve the same primary right. We agree with 

Ron that the two actions involved the same primary right: title to and ownership of the 

property. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata bars Lyle‟s cross-complaint, and the trial

court erred by ruling that Lyle obtained title to the property by adverse possession. (See 

Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681; Amin v. Khazindar (2003) 112 

Cal.App.4th 582, 589.)6

“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a valid, final judgment on the merits is a bar to 

a subsequent action by parties or their privies on the same cause of action. [Citation.]” 

(Amin v. Khazindar, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.) “[R]es judicata bars relitigation 

of the same cause of action by the same parties and . . . the definition of a cause of action 

for this purpose depends, not on the legal theory or label used, but on the primary right 

sought to be protected in the two actions.” (Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 

Cal.App.4th 1497, 1517, fn. 17.) Whether causes of action in two lawsuits are the same 

for purposes of res judicata depends on whether they involve the same “primary right.” 

(Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 681; see Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.

(2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 797 [“[t]o determine whether two proceedings involve identical 

causes of action for purposes of claim preclusion, California courts have „consistently 

applied the “primary rights” theory‟”]; Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 

Cal.4th 888, 904 [“California‟s res judicata doctrine is based upon the primary right 

theory”]; Le Parc Community Assn. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2003) 110 

 

6 “The application of the doctrine of res judicata is a question of law we review de 

novo.” (State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2013) 218 

Cal.App.4th 258, 268, fn. 4; see Happy Nails & Spa of Fashion Valley, L.P. v. Su (2013) 

217 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1469 [whether collateral estoppel applies is a question of law 

reviewed de novo].)
11

Cal.App.4th 1161, 1170 [“California law defines a „cause of action‟ for purposes of the 

res judicata doctrine by analyzing the primary right at stake”].)

“[T]he primary right theory provides that a cause of action consists of (1) a 

primary right possessed by the plaintiff, (2) a corresponding duty devolving upon the 

defendant, and (3) a delict or wrong done by the defendant which consists of a breach of 

the primary right. [Citation.]” (Amin v. Khazindar, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.) 

“The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of 

a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action. [Citation.] A pleading 

that states the violation of one primary right in two causes of action contravenes the rule 

against „splitting‟ a cause of action. [Citation.]” (Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th 

at p. 681.) There may be many legal theories that allege liability based on a violation of a 

single primary right and many remedies for the violation. (Id. at pp. 681-682.) “[T]he 

primary right is simply the plaintiff‟s right to be free from the particular injury suffered.” 

(Id. at p. 681; see Olsen v. Breeze, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 608, 625 [“[e]xamples of 

primary rights include the right to be free from personal injury [citation], the right to 

possession of real property [citation], the right to possession of personal property 

[citation], and the right to performance of a contractual obligation”].) A “„cause of 

action‟ is based upon the harm suffered, as opposed to the particular theory asserted by 

the litigant.” (Slater v. Blackwood (1975) 15 Cal.3d 791, 795; see Boeken v. Philip 

Morris USA, Inc., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 798 [“under the primary rights theory, the 

determinative factor is the harm suffered”].)

Here, the judgment in the prior action adjudicated Lyle‟s ownership rights and 

interest in the property. In his complaint in the prior action and his cross-complaint in 

this action, Lyle “asserted a single primary right”: his right to own and possess the 

property, free of Ron‟s claims. (Wade v. Ports America Management Corp. (2013) 218 

Cal.App.4th 648, 657.) The harm Lyle claims he suffered in both actions is the same: 

loss of his rights in the property. In the prior action, Lyle sought a judgment that he was 

“the owner in fee simple of the property” and that Ron had “no interest in the property 

adverse to [Lyle].” Similarly, in this action, Lyle sought a judgment that he was “the 
12

legal and equitable owner of the property . . . .” It is true, as the trial court stated, that 

Lyle‟s claim in the first action sought to obtain “clear title to the property” by alleging 

(falsely, as it turned out) that Ron had obtained title to the property by fraud, and that 

Lyle‟s claim in this action sought to obtain “prescriptive title.” But both actions involved 

the same primary right: title to the property. (See Blackmore v. Powell (2007) 150 

Cal.App.4th 1593, 1601 [“successful claimant by adverse possession . . . gains title to 

[the] property”].) In both actions, Lyle‟s “true interest,” ownership and possession of the 

property, “remain[ed] unchanged, as [did] the existence of the impediment [to Lyle‟s] 

desires,” Ron‟s claim of ownership and possession of the property. (Weikel v. TCW 

Realty Fund II Holding Co. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1249.)7

The only difference between Lyle‟s prior action and this action was his theory of 

recovery. In the prior action Lyle sought to recover title by canceling the February 17, 

1987 deed on the ground Ron obtained it by fraud, and in this action Lyle sought to 

recover title by claiming adverse possession against Ron. Differences in theories of 

recovery on the same primary right, however, do not avoid the bar of res judicata. (See 

Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 642 [“cases have invoked 

the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res 

judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same 

injury”]; Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 [“numerous cases hold that 

when there is only one primary right an adverse judgment in the first suit is a bar even 

though the second suit is based on a different theory [citation] or seeks a different 

remedy”]; Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 595 [“„“if two 

actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then 

the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different 

 

7 Although “the question of whether a cause of action is identical for purposes of res 

judicata depends not on the legal theory or label used, but on the „primary right‟ sought to 

be protected in the two actions” (Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc. (1984) 157 

Cal.App.3d 427, 432), Lyle even gave his causes of action in both cases the same label of 

“quiet title.”
13

theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting 

recovery”‟”].) And Lyle‟s theories in the two actions were not even all that different. In 

the prior action, Lyle sought to quiet title against Ron‟s claim to the property, despite the 

fact that Ron “claim[ed] some right, title, estate, lien or interest in and to the lands of 

[Lyle] . . . based on the” February 17, 1987 quitclaim deed. In this action, Lyle alleged 

that he was “seek[ing] to quiet title” by adverse possession against Ron‟s claim to the 

property “based on a quitclaim deed from [Lyle] signed on or about February 17, 1987, 

and recorded on or about March 24, 2006,” and a determination that Ron had “no right, 

title, estate, lien, or interest in the Property, or any part of it.”

McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co. (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 551 applied res judicata 

to bar a subsequent claim based on adverse possession after prior litigation between the 

same parties to cancel a deed and to quiet title regarding the same property. In the first 

action, McKenna claimed ownership under a deed and obtained a default judgment 

against Sipe for quiet title. (Id. at p. 553.) In the second action, filed two years later, 

Sipe sought to quiet title in his favor based on a recorded deed of trust and a showing that 

McKenna had fraudulently obtained the deed under which she claimed title in the first 

action. The trial court entered judgment for Sipe and vacated the previous judgment 

quieting title in McKenna. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment (and 

imposed monetary damages on McKenna for prosecuting a frivolous appeal). (See Sipe 

v. McKenna (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 373, 375; Sipe v. McKenna (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 

1001, 1006.)

Three years later McKenna filed a third action seeking to quiet title based on 

adverse possession. The court ruled that res judicata barred the third action. (See 

McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co., supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at pp. 552-553, 554-555.) The 

court stated that McKenna “could not have acquired a title by adverse possession 

subsequent to the entry of the judgments in the actions in which her claims were 

rejected. . . . [McKenna‟s] claims were adjudicated in these two actions, and her present 

suit, to be successful, must be based upon a title acquired subsequent to such 

adjudications. She failed in her first amended complaint to show such a title. Her present 
14

arguments, like her arguments in the court below, constitute no more than an attempt to 

relitigate matters which have been settled by judgment.” (Id. at p. 554.)

McKenna claimed title based on a deed. She lost. Lyle claimed title based on a 

deed and a challenge to another deed. He lost.8 McKenna subsequently tried to claim 

title based on adverse possession. Res judicata judicata barred her claim. Lyle also 

subsequently tried to claim title based on adverse possession. Res judicata bars his claim 

too. 

McNulty v. Copp, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d 697 applied res judicata in a similar 

situation. McNulty involved two sisters, Anita and Olive, fighting over real property 

owned by their father. Hours after their father died, Anita recorded a deed giving the 

property to her, but the deed had the wrong lot numbers on it. Anita filed an action to 

reform the deed to recite the correct lot numbers, and Olive filed a cross-complaint for 

cancellation of the deed and for quiet title, alleging that Anita had fraudulently obtained 

the deed from their nearly blind and dependent father. (Id. at p. 700.) Olive won the first 

lawsuit. Olive then filed a second lawsuit to recover damages caused by Anita‟s 

wrongful possession of the property. The court held that the two actions involved the 

same primary right, Anita‟s “wrongful possession of the real property,” and res judicata 

applied to bar the second action. (Id. at pp. 703, 704.) The court stated: “The same 

wrongful act—the possession under a false claim of right—gave rise to both the original 

action and the [second] action. To allow the subsequent . . . action to be prosecuted is to 

allow [Olive] to split the same cause of action.” (Id. at p. 705.) Thus, McNulty, cited by 

the trial court in its statement of decision in favor of Lyle, actually supports Ron‟s 

contention that the two civil actions brought by Lyle against Ron involved the same 

primary right.

 

8 The only difference is that McKenna obtained the deed that gave her title by fraud, 

whereas Lyle tried unsuccessfully to prove that the deed that gave title to someone else 

was obtained by fraud.
15

Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th 327, which the trial 

court found “fully support[ed]” its decision, is readily distinguishable. In Branson, a 

corporate agent unsuccessfully sued for indemnification under Corporations Code 

section 317, and then sued for breach of a contract for indemnity. (Branson, supra, at 

p. 343.) The court concluded that the agent‟s two claims involved different primary 

rights, one a statutory right giving “agents of corporations the right to seek authorization 

for indemnity against adverse judgments . . . against them for their reasonable and good 

faith acts on behalf of the corporation,” and the other a “[c]ontractual . . . right to 

indemnity pursuant to the terms of the contract.” (Ibid.) The court also noted that 

Corporations Code section 317, subdivision (g), did not apply to contractual 

indemnification rights because the statute states “it has no preclusive effect on any other 

legal right [the agent] may have for indemnity,” and that the agent could not have 

recovered on his contractual claims in the context of the limited section 317 proceeding. 

(Branson, supra, at p. 345; see Le Parc Community Assn. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals 

Bd., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1170 [“exception to general res judicata (and collateral 

estoppel) principles applies when the Legislature has specified exactly what preclusive 

effect a judicial determination has”].) In contrast, Lyle‟s two attempts to obtain title to 

the property did not involve different primary rights with separate statutory and nonstatutory bases, there is no legislative expression of a limitation on the application of res 

judicata to the kind of claims brought by Lyle, and nothing prevented Lyle from bringing 

his adverse possession claim in the first action. Indeed, Lyle belatedly recognized as 

much when he sought, after entry of judgment in the prior action, to reopen the case and 

add a cause of action for adverse possession.

Cases from other jurisdictions, like McKenna and McNulty, have held that a 

judgment in a quiet title action alleging title by deed or similar document is res judicata in 

a subsequent action to obtain title by adverse possession, where, as here, the claimant and 

the property are the same. For example, in Blance v. Alley (Me. 1997) 697 A.2d 828, the 

claimant unsuccessfully tried twice to quiet title by deed, but was unable to prove her 

title. (Id. at p. 829.) Several years later she filed a third action seeking to establish title 
16

in the same parcel, this time by adverse possession. The court rejected her argument that 

her adverse possession claim was different from her claims in the two prior actions and 

held that her third action was barred by res judicata. (Id. at p. 830.) In Bagley v. Moxley

(1990) 407 Mass. 633 [555 N.E.2d 229], the plaintiffs failed to quiet title based on a 

certificate of title. In a second action, the plaintiffs claimed title by adverse possession. 

(Id., 555 N.E.2d at pp. 230-231.) The court stated: “The gravamen of the plaintiffs‟ 

complaint in both [lawsuits] was the same; the plaintiffs claimed ownership of the 

disputed land. . . . [T]his was the primary issue in dispute . . . . The plaintiffs were not 

entitled to pursue their claim of ownership through piecemeal litigation . . . .” (Id. at 

p. 232.) The court held that the plaintiffs could have and should have asserted the 

adverse possession claim in the first action, and therefore were barred from litigating 

their claim in the second action. (Ibid.; see also Lewis v. Matteo (Conn.App. 1996) 679 

A.2d 366, 367 [plaintiff‟s first unsuccessful action to quiet title by claiming title by deed 

barred second action claiming title by adverse possession on res judicata grounds]; 

Hangman v. Bruening (1995) 247 Neb. 769, 772 [530 N.W.2d 247, 249] [“present quiet 

title action, although based upon the theory of adverse possession, involved the same 

rights between the same parties as did the [prior] quiet title action,” and because the 

“theory of adverse possession could have been raised in the earlier quiet title litigation,” 

all “matters which could have been litigated in the earlier proceedings are barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata”]; American Estate Mgmt. Corp. v. International Inv. & Dev. 

Corp. (Utah App. 1999) 986 P.2d 765, 776-778 [plaintiff‟s first unsuccessful action to 

establish ownership of parking lot by contract barred second action for adverse 

possession of the same parking lot because “both its prior and present actions assert one 

claim—a claim of title to the parking lot parcel—albeit under two different legal 

theories”].)

The fact that, when Lyle finally sought leave to amend his complaint in the prior 

action to add a specific cause of action for quiet title by adverse possession it was too 

late, does not preclude res judicata from barring Lyle‟s cross-complaint in this action. 

“„“If the matter was within the scope of the [prior] action, related to the subject matter 
17

and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on 

it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged. . . . The 

reason for this is manifest. A party cannot by negligence or design withhold issues and 

litigate them in consecutive actions. Hence the rule is that the prior judgment is res 

judicata on matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or 

litigable. [Citations.]” [Citation.]‟ [Citation.]” (Amin v. Khazindar, supra, 112 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 589-590, italics omitted; see Sutphin v. Speik (1940) 15 Cal.2d 195, 

202 [same]; Burdette v. Carrier Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1668, 1674-1675 [“[r]es 

judicata bars the relitigation not only of claims that were conclusively determined in the 

first action, but also matter that was within the scope of the action, related to the subject 

matter, and relevant to the issues so that it could have been raised”].) For purposes of res 

judicata, “it is of no moment whether the identical causes of action were in fact litigated 

in [the prior action]; all that is required is that [the plaintiff] have had the opportunity to 

litigate them in” the prior action. (Weikel v. TCW Realty Fund II Holding Co., supra, 55 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1245; see McNulty v. Copp, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d at p. 704 [in a quiet 

title action, the court can “and should dispose of all claims relating to” the property].) 

Lyle had the opportunity to litigate his adverse possession claim in the prior action, and 

that is enough for purposes of res judicata.

Moreover, not only could Lyle have raised the issue of adverse possession in the 

prior action, Lyle actually did raise the issue, before the trial court in that action issued its 

statement of decision and entered judgment. Lyle argued in one of his trial briefs in the 

prior action that he was “the owner by Adverse Possession of the Merced Property due to 

continuous possession for [the] last 19 years.” Lyle contended that he had obtained 

ownership “under [the] Adverse Possession statutes” because during those 19 years he 

“never left ownership and control, possession and management of the Merced property 

even after execution of the [quitclaim deed]. . . . He paid all secured debts upon [the] 

property, [h]e paid taxes, made repairs, leased the property, managed tenants [sic] affairs, 

[and] vigorously defended his property rights when Ronald attempted to foreclose . . . .” 

Lyle asked the court in the prior action “to find in his favor . . . and issue [an] order for
18

cancellation of [the quitclaim deed Ron] recorded on March 25, 2006 either by reason of 

Adverse Possession . . . or [because the quitclaim deed] was never intended to be 

delivered” to Ron. Although the trial court in the prior action did not reach the issue of 

adverse possession in its statement of decision, Lyle‟s advocacy on the issue confirms 

that his claim of title based on adverse possession involved the same primary right as his 

claim of title based on the deed from his father (and the invalidity of Ron‟s deed), and 

that litigation of the issue belonged in the prior action.

Finally, Lyle argues that because Code of Civil Procedure section 761.020, 

subdivision (d), requires that a quiet title plaintiff state the date as of which the plaintiff 

seeks to quiet title, each time the plaintiff files a quiet title action with a different date the 

plaintiff is litigating a different primary right.9 Under this theory, when Lyle filed a 

cross-complaint in this action to quiet title as of October 23, 2008, Lyle was seeking to 

enforce a different primary right from the one he sought to enforce in the prior action 

when he sought to quiet title as of February 17, 1987. Lyle contends that if Ron had 

wanted to litigate in the prior action the primary right of who had title to the property on a 

different date, Ron would have had to have filed a cross-complaint pursuant to Code of 

 

9 Code of Civil Procedure section 761.020 provides:

“The complaint shall be verified and shall include all of the following:

“(a) A description of the property that is the subject of the action. In the case of 

tangible personal property, the description shall include its usual location. In the case of 

real property, the description shall include both its legal description and its street address 

or common designation, if any.

“(b) The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is 

sought and the basis of the title. If the title is based upon adverse possession, the 

complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession.

“(c) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination 

is sought.

“(d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is 

sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a 

statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.

“(e) A prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse 

claims.”
19

Civil Procedure section 761.040.10 Lyle asserts that Ron‟s primary rights argument 

“request[s] that this court nullify the Legislature‟s clear intention to permit two suits to 

quiet title, based on two different dates,” and that the court in the prior action “had no 

jurisdiction to award Ronald title to the property on any [other] date after February 17, 

1987.” 

Code of Civil Procedure section 761.020 lists the requirements, in addition to 

verification, of a complaint for quiet title: (a) a description of the property, (b) title of the 

plaintiff and the basis for that title, (c) the adverse claims to the plaintiff‟s title, (d) the 

date as of which the determination is sought, and (e) a prayer for the determination of 

plaintiff‟s title against the adverse claims. Failure to allege any of these elements may 

subject a quiet title complaint to demurrer. But nothing in the statute suggests that 

alleging different dates pursuant to subdivision (d) for the same property creates different 

primary rights. Nor has Lyle cited any authority for his assertion that the statutory 

requirement of stating the “date as of which the determination is sought” has any effect 

on the primary rights analysis for res judicata purposes, or that by filing successive quiet 

title actions for the same property with different “as of” dates a plaintiff is seeking to 

vindicate different primary rights. As noted above, Lyle sought the same relief against 

Ron in this action that he sought in the prior action: ownership of the property.

Moreover, the sole authority cited by Lyle, California Real Property Remedies and 

Damages (Cont.Ed.Bar. 2d ed. 2002) section 7.34, “Effective Date of Plaintiff‟s Title,” 

does not support Lyle‟s position. The passage from this treatise quoted by Lyle states: 

“The legislative intent behind this section (not apparent from its language) is to enable 

the plaintiff to obtain a judgment establishing the plaintiff‟s title that is effective on a date 

earlier than the filing date of the complaint but that does not permit the plaintiff to quiet 

 

10 Code of Civil Procedure section 761.040 provides:

“(a) The defendant may by cross-complaint seek affirmative relief in the action.

“(b) If the defendant seeks a determination of title as of a date other than the date 

specified in the complaint, the cross-complaint shall include the date and a statement of 

the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.”
20

title to after-acquired property (i.e., the date alleged in the complaint limits the court‟s 

jurisdiction in that any interest plaintiff acquires after that date, whether under color of 

title, adverse possession, or other means, cannot be litigated and should not be pleaded in 

the underlying action). See 15 Cal L Rev‟n Comm‟n Reports 1198 (1980).” Such an 

intent, however, is not only “not apparent” from the language of the statute, it is not 

apparent from the legislative history. The Law Revision Commission Report for Code of 

Civil Procedure section 761.020, subdivision (d), which the CEB treatise cites, states only 

that “[s]ubdivision (d) is intended to permit a title determination as of a date prior to the 

date of the action.” (15 Cal. L. Revision Comm‟n Reports (1980) p. 1198.)11 It does not 

state that the “intent behind” subdivision (d) was to “limit the court‟s jurisdiction” to 

determine what can be pleaded and litigated in a quiet title action. The Law Revision 

Commission Report states that subdivision (d) “implements suggestions in L. Simes & C. 

Taylor, The Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation xxii (1960), and Willemsen, 

Improving California’s Quiet Title Laws, 21 Hastings L.J. 835, 853 (1970).” (Ibid.) And 

neither of these secondary sources says anything about limiting what parties can litigate 

in a quiet title action, nor about the effect of a quite title judgment in the future.

To the contrary, these authorities suggest that the Legislature‟s purpose in enacting 

Code of Civil Procedure section 761.020, subdivision (d), was to solve a problem about 

the past: How far back must a quiet title plaintiff trace through recording documents to 

find potential claimants. The Simes and Taylor treatise proposes: “It should . . . be 

possible not only to quiet title as of the present time but to secure a decree establishing 

the title to a tract of land as of any selected prior date. Thus, if a large number of city lots 

were held by a single owner fifteen years prior to the filing of suit, it should be possible 

 

11 See Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 

148 [“the official comments of the California Law Revision Commission „are declarative 

of the intent not only of the draftsman of the code but also of the legislators who 

subsequently enacted it‟”]; Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 542 

[“„[e]xplanatory comments by a law revision commission are persuasive evidence of the 

intent of the Legislature in subsequently enacting its recommendations into law‟”].
21

to have a single decree declaring the state of the title in the entire tract as of fifteen years 

back. From then on, no investigation would be necessary as to the records prior to this 

decree.” (Simes & Taylor, The Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation, supra, at 

p. xxii.) In his law review article, Willemsen states: “How far back must a plaintiff trace 

a perfect record title in order to prove a cause of action under our proposed 

legislation?[12] I suggest the plaintiff be allowed to specify the operative date in his 

complaint. If he can show perfect record title from 1910, he so pleads and proves and 

should receive a decree quieting title against any claims of record arising after 1910.” 

(Willemsen, Improving California’s Quiet Title Laws, supra, 21 Hastings L.J. at p. 853.)

 

12 Willemsen‟s proposed legislation, which included four suggested changes to 

California‟s quiet title laws, was “[t]o permit an in rem quiet title action based upon 

record title from a date antecedent to all claims at issue.” (Willemsen, Improving 

California’s Quiet Title Laws, supra, 21 Hastings L.J. at p. 838.) The proposal was 

designed to address “the immense difficulties of proving good title, which for example, 

might require proving the terms of an unrecorded and subsequently lost deed, or that an 

1880 survey was in error, or that an 1892 deed incorrectly expressed the parties‟ 

intentions.” (Id. at p. 837.)
22

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with 

directions to enter judgment in favor of Ron on Lyle‟s first amended cross-complaint, to 

enter judgment in favor of Ron on Ron‟s complaint for an accounting and for monetary 

damages in the amount of $15,000, and to issue an order granting Ron immediate 

possession of the property. Ron is to recover his costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J.*

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J. 

WOODS, J.

 

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.