alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 24.2

POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned hereby constitutes and appoints Harris Ravine, David Kirwan and Mary Beth Wallingford the undersigned's true
and lawful attorneys-in-fact and agents, each with full power and substitution for the undersigned and in the undersigned's name, place and stead, in any and all capacities, to
sign Fischer Imaging Corporation's Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 (the "Form 10-K") and any or all amendments to the
Form 10-K, and to file the same, with all exhibits thereto and other documents in connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission, granting unto each of said
attorneys-in-fact and agents full power and authority to do and perform each and every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully to
all intents and purposes as the undersigned might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that either of said attorneys-in-fact and agents, or his substitute
or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereto.

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has caused this Power of Attorney to be executed as of this 13th day of April, 2004.

| |  | /s/GAIL S. SCHOETTLERSignature
| |  | ------------------------------
| |  | Gail S. SchoettlerPrint Name: 

---

QuickLinks
#### Sarah PATRICK, Appellant, v. Robert Eugene PATRICK, Appellee.

No. II-32.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 26, 1978.

*1185T. Michael Jones of Selby, Chesser, Win-gard & Barr, Fort Walton Beach, for appellant.

Harold F. Peek, Jr., Niceville, for appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

Wife appeals the trial court’s refusal to grant her a special equity in a grocery business owned by husband; she also appeals the court’s denial of her request for permanent alimony. Husband cross-appeals the court’s requirement that he maintain a $5,000 life insurance policy on himself with the wife as beneficiary. He contends in addition that the court erred in restricting his visitation rights with the parties’ minor child to the condition that no other person be in his home while the child is with him there. We affirm on the two points raised by wife and reverse on the points raised by husband’s cross-appeal.

A review of the record makes it clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award wife a special equity and permanent alimony. In addition to child support and rehabilitative alimony awards, she was given the parties’ mobile home free of encumbrances, a lump sum award, and attorney’s fees. There was testimony that she had recently obtained a real estate license and could with some additional education make a living in that occupation. Viewed as a whole, there was no error in the trial court’s adjustment of the equities between the parties.

There was error, however, in the requirement that husband keep a life insurance policy in force with wife as beneficiary. As this court held recently in *Watterson v. Watterson,*353 So.2d 1185, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977): “There is nothing in the record to justify an award of alimony after death, and therefore it was error to require the husband to maintain life insurance on his life for the benefit of wife to provide support for her in the event of and after the husband’s death.” See also *Todd v. Todd,*311 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) and *Putman v. Putman,*154 So.2d 717 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). This type of a requirement is particularly inappropriate where, as here, permanent alimony is not awarded in the judgment. *Roberts v. Roberts,*283 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).

Finally, we reverse the court’s restriction of husband’s visitation privileges with his child. As written the appealed provision would prohibit the child from visiting husband’s home when doctors, preachers, cousins, or even grandparents were present. The limitation is clearly overbroad and must be stricken.

The judgment is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part. Wife’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees is denied.

MILLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN and MELVIN, JJ., concur.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Miguel Zaragoza Fuentes v. Evangelina Lopez Guzman Zaragoza

Appellate case number: 01

- 16

- 00251

- CV

Trial court case number: 2014

- 30215

Trial court: 245th District Court of Harris County

Appellant Miguel Zaragoza Fuentes's unopposed motion to assign a new appellate cause
number for the appeal of the trial court's November 23, 2017 order establishing a receivership in

this case is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court sh all assign a new cause number , 01

- 17

- 00112

- CV, to the receivership appeal. The appellants shall make arrangements for the trial court clerk
and court reporter to file and certify the records in the separate cause within 15 days of the date
of this order, including copies of previously filed clerk and reporter's records in other appellate
causes that remain pending, which shall be duplicated and included in the record in the
receivership appeal without separate cost.

Unless an appellant is exempt from paying filing fees o r has been declared indigent, the appellant must pay the required $205 filing fee to prosecute the appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 5
(requiring payment of fees in civil cases unless excused) and 20.1 (listing requirements for
establishing indigence). The f iling fee must be paid within twenty (20) days of the date of this

notice.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Jane Bland

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: February 16, 2017
#### Katharine T. FULTON et al., Appellants, v. The NORTHERN TRUST COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Appellee.

No. 72-646.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 20, 1974.

Rehearing Denied March 19, 1974.

Blackwell, Walker, Gray & Powers, Miami, for appellants.

Woodrow M. Melvin, Jr., of Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwody & Cole, Miami, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See,*Fulton v. First National Bank of Fort Myers, Fla.App., 290 So.2d 498, Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

MANN, C. J., and McNULTY and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.
#### Thomas Dwyer, an Infant, by Mary Louise McGiff, Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, *v.*The Corrugated Paper Products Company, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

April, 1913.)

Statutes—codification of into' a later general law—pleading—Domestic Relations Law, § 8i.

A plea is not avoided because a statute referred to therein is, without material change, codified into a later general law.

A separate defense that, prior to the commencement of an action for personal injuries to an infant, the claim in suit was *413for a valuable consideration released by plaintiff’s mother and guardian pursuant to a statute subsequently codified in section 81 of the Domestic Relations Law, is good on demurrer.

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the City Court of the city of New York sustaining a demurrer to a separate defense.

Edward J. Walsh, for appellant.

Abraham Rickman, for respondent.

Guy, J.

Plaintiff, an infant, sues, to recover damages for personal injuries. The action was commenced on November 8, 1912.

The answer pleaded as a separate defense that on September 9, 1912, the infant, through his mother and guardian, pursuant to chapter 175 of the Laws of 1893, for a valuable consideration, executed and delivered a release of the claim in suit. Chapter 175, Laws of 1893, is repealed by the Domestic Relations Law; but its substance is now codified in section 81 of the Domestic Relations Law. Both chapter 175, Laws of 1893, and section 81 of the Domestic Relations Law relate, among other things, to testamentary guardians. A plea is not avoided because a statute referred to therein is codified, without material change, into a later general law. At common law a testamentary or general guardian has power to settle and compromise claims on behalf of his ward. Chapman v. Tibbits, 33 N. Y. 289, 290; Torrey v. Black, 58 id. 185, 189, 190; Clare v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 201 id. 492, 497, 498; 21 Cyc. 74; 14 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.), 55.

The respondent’s brief suggests that the guardian who executed the release was only a natural guardian, *414and as such would have no power to release his ward’s claim without the sanction of some tribunal. Naeglin v. DeCordoba, 171 U. S. 638, 641. The answer does not so allege,'and, if such is the fact, plaintiff’s remedy was a,motion to make the plea more definite and certain. A demurrer is not a substitute for a motion to make more definite and certain. The allegations of a pleading must be liberally construed (Code Civ. Pro. § 519), and lack of precision and certainty in a plea is no ground for holding it insufficient. Lewis v. Barton, 106 N. Y. 70, 72. Failure to move to make an answer more definite and certain results in its being construed most strongly as against plaintiff. Electrical Accessories Co. v. Mittenthal, 194 N. Y. 473, 477.

Order reversed with ten dollars costs and disbursements and demurrer overruled with ten dollars costs.

Gerard and Page, JJ., concur.

Order reversed with ten dollars costs and disbursements.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JAMES BERRY,

Petitioner

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No. 291 EAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JAMES BERRY,

Petitioner

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No. 292 EAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of April, 2023, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

GRANTED, LIMITED TO the issue set forth below. Allocatur is DENIED as to the

remaining issue. The issue, as stated by petitioner, is:

Did it not violate due process and the Sentencing Code for the trial court to 

consider Petitioner's bare arrest record as a factor in imposing a more 

severe sentence, and did not the Superior Court err in reviewing this under 

an abuse[ ]of[ ]discretion standard?
#### Ruth C. BUSH, d/b/a R. C. B. Realty, Appellant, v. George E. KILPATRICK et al., Appellees.

No. 71-826.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 8, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
### Page 1 of 3 **Disposition Comments Docket No:**  

### FAA - 201 3 - 0 299 These comments are in **Directorate ID:** 

### 201 2 -NM - 072 - AD response to an SNPRM Originating Office Tracking No.: **Next Step:** FRAN SNPRM 

### N o C omments/Only

Supportive Comments Received

– If this box is checked, no signatures are required. 

### Has the reference d service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? I f ye s, lis t latest revision and attach a cop y. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point for guidance. Instructions: Summarize all comments **by issue** (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of each issue. **All comments relating to the sam e issue should be discussed together.**  Do not list all of the issues from one commenter togeth er. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA - IR- M - 8040.1C Chapter 9. **ISSUE 1:** Select one o

f the following : If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree with because We disagree with because

Make the following changes to the AD: If **NO** , we don’t agree because **ISSUE 2**  **:** Select one of the following :

If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree w ith because We disagree with because Make the following changes to the AD:

### Page 2 of 3

If **NO** , we don’t agree because **For additional issues, do uble**  **- click**  **here**

### Page 3 of 3 **S ignature Section**  Signature indicates concurrence with this action. Originating Office Tracking No.: **ASE** Printed Name **: Date** 

**Branch Man ager**  **Date**
#### STATE of Florida DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, Appellant, v. In the Interest of S. P., a child, Appellee.

No. 74-102.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 14, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
1517 W EST F RONT S TREET  S UITE 354  TYLER , TX 75702  T EL : 903-593-8471  FAX : 903-593-2193 Serving Anderson, Angelina, Cherokee, Gregg, Henderson, Houston, Nacogdoches, Rains, Rusk, Sabine, San Augustine, Shelby, Smith, Trinity, Upshur, Van Zandt and Wood Counties www.12thcoa.courts.state.tx.us C HIEF J USTICE J AMES T. W ORTHEN J USTICES B RIAN H OYLE G REG N EELEY 

# TWELFTH 

# C OURT OF 

# A PPEALS C LERK C ATHY S. L USK C HIEF S TAFF A TTORNEY M ARGARET H USSEY 

## February 10, 2015 Ms. Reba Squyres District Clerk Angelina County P. O. Box 908 Lufkin, TX 75902-0908 * DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL * RE: Case Number: 12-14-00247-CR Trial Court Case Number: 2013-0522 Style: NitaRanae McElrath v. The State of Texas Pursuant to Rule 18.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, enclosed herewith is the Mandate issued in the above cause. When the District or County Clerk has executed the Mandate in accordance with the opinion of this Court, the Clerk is requested to fill in the information below and to return the attached copy to this office. Very truly yours, CATHY S. LUSK, CLERK By:_____________________________ Katrina McClenny, Chief Deputy Clerk C C : Mr. Albert J. CharanzaJr. (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL) Ms. Sandra Martin (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL) Mandate executed on 11THday of FEBRUARY , 2015. Brief explanation of action taken: MANDATE FILED AND ENTERED ROBIN J. CRAIN DEPUTY District Clerk
#### Henry Paul COPELAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-73.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 20, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 102 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 102

To reduce the amount of financial assistance provided to the Government 
of Mexico in response to the illegal border crossings from Mexico into 
 the United States, which serve to dissipate the political discontent 
            with the higher unemployment rate within Mexico.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

             January 23 (legislative day, January 3), 2013

  Mr. Vitter introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To reduce the amount of financial assistance provided to the Government 
of Mexico in response to the illegal border crossings from Mexico into 
 the United States, which serve to dissipate the political discontent 
            with the higher unemployment rate within Mexico.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. BORDER CROSSING ACCOUNTABILITY.

    (a) Estimation of Annual Illegal Border Crossings.--Not later than 
30 days after the end of each fiscal year, the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall estimate 
the number of illegal border crossings that occurred during such fiscal 
year along the southern land border of the United States.
    (b) Reduction of Foreign Assistance.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided under paragraph (2), 
        the Secretary of State, shall proportionately reduce the amount 
        of financial assistance provided to the Government of Mexico 
        for each fiscal year by a total of $1,000 for each illegal 
        border crossing from Mexico to the United States during the 
        previous fiscal year.
            (2) Exception.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the 
        Secretary of State may decide not to reduce the amounts 
        appropriated for the Government of Mexico from the 
        International Military Education and Training Fund, the 
        International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Fund, and 
        the fund to carry out nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, 
        demining, and related programs and activities.
                                 <all>
```
#### Lloyd ROMERO et al. v. Clyde STEPHENS et al.

No. 62534.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 3, 1978.

In re: Lloyd Romero and Glenn Cudd, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Lafayette. 359 So.2d 1061.

Writ denied.

DIXON and CALOGERO, JJ., would grant the writ.
January 13, 2012

U.S. Department of Transportation

Docket Operations, M-30

West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, DC 20590

On May 5, 2010 Duffy’s Aircraft Sales and Leasing, Inc (also doing business as Aviation on

Demand), was granted an exemption from 14 CFR §120.117(b)(2) and 14 CFR §120.225(b)(2), 

which require a commercial air tour operator to implement a drug testing program. This exemption, 

#10059, can be found in FAA docket number FAA-2010-0396. According to the text of the approval, 

this exemption will terminate on May 31, 2012, unless sooner superseded or rescinded. Our company 

is petitioning to continue operations under this exemption, given the conditions listed below.

Per the conditions and limitations set forth in the exemption, employees of Duffy’s Aircraft Sales and 

Leasing are subject to the drug and alcohol regulations at all times while conducting operations under 

part 135 or part 91. Our company continues to implement a FAA approved anti-drug and alcohol 

misuse plan through our 14 CFR 119 air carrier operation (cert. #O4DA234K). This exemption 

would allow us to provide commercial air tour service to the public, while avoiding the costs and 

administrative burden associated with implementing an entirely separate anti-drug and alcohol 

program to cover one or two employees.

It is our firm belief that granting an extension to this exemption would have no adverse effect on 

public safety, as all employees performing safety sensitive functions will be under an approved antidrug and alcohol misuse program. 

If you have any questions regarding this request, or need to contact the company for any information, 

our contact information is:

Duffy’s Aircraft Sales & Leasing, Inc. 

Harold Gaier – President

Jeff Veers – DER (Designated Employee Representative)

400 West 29th Street

Marshfield, WI 54449

(715) 387-2211

jeffveers@duffysaircraft.com

Summary:

Duffy’s Aircraft Sales & Leasing, Inc. is seeking an extension of exemption #10059, granted in FAA 

docket # FAA-2010-0396. The exemption to 14 CFR §120.117(b)(2) and 14 CFR §120.225(b)(2) 

allowed enrolling all employees conducting commercial air tours into an anti-drug and alcohol misuse 

program managed by our 14 CFR 119 air carrier operation, as opposed to maintaining two separate 

and distinct programs.
#### Thelma Lee DAVIS, a/k/a Thelma Lee Griffin v. Bryan CLEMMONS, Sheriff, East Baton Rouge, Dr. Chester Williams, Coroner, East Baton Rouge, the City of Baton Rouge and Deputy Sheriff John Doe.

No. 7218.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

Dec. 19, 1967.

*144Murphy W. Bell, Baton Rouge, for appellant.

Ed Glusman, Baton Rouge, for appellees.

Before LOTTINGER, SARTAIN and ELLIS, JJ.

LOTTINGER, Judge.

This is a suit instituted by the plaintiff, Thelma Lee Davis, also known as Thelma Lee Griffin against Bryan Clemmons, Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish, Dr. Chester Williams, Coroner of East Baton Rouge Parish, the City of Baton Rouge and a John Doe Deputy Sheriff.

Motions for summary judgment were filed on behalf of Dr. Chester Williams and Sheriff Bryan Clemmons. Judgments were orally rendered granting the motions and dismissing the suit as against these two defendants. Judgments were subsequently signed.

The City of Baton Rouge filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action. A judgment was orally rendered sustaining the exception and dismissing the suit as to the City of Baton Rouge. No judgment was ever signed as to this ruling.

The plaintiff was granted an appeal as to the sustaining of the exception filed by the City of Baton Rouge, and the dismissing of the suit as against the City of Baton Rouge. This is the only ruling from which the plaintiff has appealed.

A judgment which sustains a peremptory exception of no cause of action is a final judgment which disposes of the lawsuit, and it must be signed before it can be appealed. See: Collerton v. McCleary, 3 La. 429 (1832) ; Saloy v. Collins, 30 La. Ann. 63 (1878); Sherman v. Meyer, Gunby’s Dec. (2d Cir.1885) 11; River & Rails Terminals v. Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co., 157 La. 1085, 103 So. 331 (1925); LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2083; LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1911.

Therefore, for the above and foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed, all costs to be paid by the appellant. Appeal dismissed.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

NO. CAAP-21-0000654

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I
ZOM ZOM, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STOERMER AUTOMOTIVE, LLC and CHRISTOPHER N. STOERMER,

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

HONOLULU DIVISION (CIVIL NO. 1DRC-20-0004954)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL (By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and McCullen, JJ.) Upon review of the record, it appears that: (1) The statement of jurisdiction and opening brief were due on or before January 14, 2022, and February 14, 2022, respectively;

(2) Plaintiff-Appellant Zom Zom, Inc. (Zom Zom) failed to file either document, or request an extension of time;

(3) On February 15, 2022, the appellate clerk entered a default notice informing Zom Zom that the time for filing the statement of jurisdiction and opening brief had expired, the matter would be called to the court's attention on February 25, 2022, for appropriate action, which could include dismissal of the appeal, under Hawai i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rules 12.1(e) and 30, and Zom Zom could request relief from default by motion; and Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-21-0000654 21-APR-2022 08:01 AM Dkt. 22 ODSDNOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

(4) Zom Zom has not taken any further action in this appeal since the district court clerk docketed the appeal.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai i, April 21, 2022. /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza Chief Judge /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Associate Judge /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen Associate Judge

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