alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### ANTHONY SPENCER, free negro. *vs.*JACOB D. DUTTON, Administrator, &c.

If a plea in abatement conclude in bar, the plff, may treat it as a plea in bar, and the judgment will be final.

Plea in abatement. Demurrer and joinder.

The declaration was in trespass *quare clausum fregit*against Jo- 1 seph Dutton. His death was suggested and Jacob Dutton, his administrator, admitted a party deft. Plea in abatement and general demurrer.

Mr. *Frame*for plff.

The act of assembly, *(Fig.*224,) saves the abatement of the suit. All personal actions except assault and battery, &c., survive. The conclusion of this plea in abatement is a prayer of general judgment; consequently, if the action don’t abate the judgment on that plea must be general, *quad recuperet*and not of *respondeat ouster.*If a plea in abatement conclude in bar, it is a plea in bar, and the judgment shall be general. 1 *Ch. P.*446; 1 *Sell. Pr.*274.

Mr. *Layton,*contra.

This is not a general plea in abatement,' but of matter arising since the last continuance. If the cause of action survive, the judgment can only be one of respondeat ouster. For injuries to real property the action don’t survive. I *Ch. PI.*83.

*Frame*for plff. *Layton*for deft.

*By the Court.*

—The rule is that if a plea in abatement conclude in bar, the other side may treat it as a plea in bar; and, if he do so, the judgment will be final, *quad recuperet. Gould's PI. 299.*In this case the demurrer concludes with a prayer of judgment respondeat ouster, thus treating it as a plea in abatement only: the judgment therefore, in this case, will be that the defendant answer over. There is no doubt about the surviving of the action under our act of assembly.

Judgment, *quad respondeat ouster.*
[No. 769-1.

Division One—Panel 2.

June 14, 1971.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Alvin Bernard Williams, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 54177, Robert A. Hannan, J., entered August 21, 1970. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
NUMBER 13-18-00019-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

HUMBERTO SOTO, JR., Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 36th District Court 

of San Patricio County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez, Contreras, and Hinojosa

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa

Appellant, Humberto Soto Jr., attempts to appeal his conviction for aggravated 

sexual assault. The trial court has certified that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the 

defendant has NO right of appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2).
2

On January 10, 2018, this Court notified appellant’s counsel of the trial court’s 

certification and ordered counsel to: (1) review the record; (2) determine whether 

appellant has a right to appeal; and (3) forward to this Court, by letter, counsel’s findings 

as to whether appellant has a right to appeal, or, alternatively, advise this Court as to the 

existence of any amended certification.

On May 16, 2018, counsel filed a letter brief with this Court. Counsel’s response 

does not establish that the certification currently on file with this Court is incorrect or that 

appellant otherwise has a right to appeal. 

The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an appeal must be dismissed 

if the trial court’s certification does not show that the defendant has the right of appeal. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); see TEX. R. APP. P. 37.1, 44.3, 44.4. Accordingly, this appeal is 

DISMISSED. 

LETICIA HINOJOSA

Justice

Do not publish. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

24th day of May, 2018.
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS Appeal of

-- ) ) Northrop Grumman Corporation ) ASBCA No. 61771 ) Under ContractNo. F04701-02-C-0009 et al. ) APPEARANCES FORTHE APPELLANT: Stephen J. McBrady, Esq. Charles Baek, Esq.

Crowell & Moring LLP Washington, DC APPEARANCES FORTHE GOVERNMENT: Arthur M. Taylor, Esq. DCMA ChiefTrial Attorney Carol Matsunaga, Esq.

Senior Trial Attorney Defense Contract ManagementAgency Carson, CA OPINION BYADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE THRASHER By letter dated June 19, 2018, a contracting officer issued a final decision, asserting a government claim against appellant. Appellant filed a timely notice ofappeal on August 27, 2018. Subsequently, the partiesjointly requested the appeal be dismissed, asserting that the contracting officer's final decision had been rescinded. Where a contracting officer unequivocally rescinds a final decision asserting a government claim, there is no longer any claim before the Boardto adjudicate, andthe Boardhas dismissed the appeal as moot. URS Federal Support Servs., Inc., ASBCA No. 60364, 17-1BCA136,587 at 178,204; CombatSupportAssocs., ASBCA Nos. 58945, 58946, 16-1BCA136,288 at 176,974. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as moot. Dated: September 27, 2019

(Signatures continued) ministrative Judge hairman Armed Services Board ofContract AppealsI concur

J.REIDPUTY Administrative Judge Vice Chairman Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals OWEN C. WILSON Administrative Judge Vice Chairman Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy ofthe Opinion and Decision ofthe Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals in ASBCA No. 61771, Appeal ofNorthrop Grumman Corporation, rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. Dated:

2 PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS Recorder, Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information from the unaudited
Statements of Financial Condition at December 31, 1996 and unaudited Statements
of Operations for the three-months ended December 31, 1996, which are contained
in the body of the accompaning Form 10-Q and is qualified in its entirety
by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                 3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                             JUN-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                  DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                                  0
<SECURITIES>                                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      31,705
<ALLOWANCES>                                            0
<INVENTORY>                                             0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                        0
<PP&E>                                                  0
<DEPRECIATION>                                          0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    140,045
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                   0
<BONDS>                                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                   0
<PREFERRED>                                             0
<COMMON>                                            1,000
<OTHER-SE>                                       (17,506)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      140,045
<SALES>                                                 0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                        0
<CGS>                                                   0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                           0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      932
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                      0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     (932)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        (407)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 (525)
<DISCONTINUED>                                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                         0
<CHANGES>                                               0
<NET-INCOME>                                        (525)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                           0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                           0

        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.2

                             WEBLINK WIRELESS, INC.
                    COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS (LOSS)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                            THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2000
                                                    ------------------------------------------------
                                                       NUMBER           PERCENT         EQUIVALENT
                                                      OF SHARES       OUTSTANDING         SHARES
                                                    --------------   --------------   --------------
<S>                                                      <C>             <C>            <C>
COMMON STOCK
   From Founders' Stock                                  2,300,000        100.00%          2,300,000
   Stock Options Exercised                               2,428,622         77.80%          1,889,467
   Preferred Stock Converted to Common Stock            15,310,943        100.00%         15,310,943
   1994 Common Stock Offerings                          11,242,857        100.00%         11,242,857
   1995 Common Stock Offerings                           4,323,874        100.00%          4,323,874
   1996 Common Stock Offering                            6,000,000        100.00%          6,000,000
   1999 Treasury Stock Transaction                          (6,588)       100.00%             (6,588)
   March 2000 Debt Swap                                  3,789,715         24.18%            916,195
   Canadian Transaction                                    714,286         65.93%            470,958
   Employee Stock Purchase Plan Shares Issued              145,737        100.00%            145,737
   Warrants Exercised                                      130,513         37.89%             49,450
                                                    --------------                    --------------
                                                        46,379,959                        42,642,893

WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING                                                       42,642,893

NET LOSS                                                                                 (20,067,000)


NET LOSS PER SHARE                                                                    $        (0.47)
                                                                                      ==============
</TABLE>
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 22, 2014

No. 04-14-00705-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF E.A.T.,

From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013-PA-02779

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

ORDER

This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court’s final order terminating appellant’s 

parental rights. Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief and motion to 

withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts there are no 

meritorious issues to raise on appeal. See In re RR, No. 04-03-00096-CV, 2003 WL 21157944 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio, May 21, 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply to 

appeals from orders terminating parental rights), disp. on merits, 2003 WL 22080522 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio, Sept. 10, 2003, no pet.)(mem. op.). Counsel states he has provided copies of 

the brief and motion to withdraw to appellant and informed appellant of her right to review the 

record and file her own brief. See id.; Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d 83, 85-86 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio, July 23, 1997, no pet.); Bruns v. State, 924 S.W.2d 176, 177 n.1 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 1996, no pet.). In addition, counsel has provided appellant a form motion to use to 

request access to the record. Appellant has not requested the record.

If appellant desires to file a pro se brief, we order that she do so by January 12, 2015.

If appellant files a timely pro se brief, appellee may file a responsive brief no later than twenty 

days after appellant’s pro se brief is filed in this court. Alternatively, if appellant does not file a 

timely pro se brief, appellee may file a brief in response to counsel’s brief no later than 

February 2, 2015. We further order the motion to withdraw filed by appellant’s counsel is held 

in abeyance pending further order of the court.

We further order the clerk of this court to serve a copy of this order on appellant and all 

counsel.

_________________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 22nd day of December, 2014.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Linda Jean CURTIS and Gwendolyn Oliver, Petitioners, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. GG-253.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Oct. 24, 1977.

Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, Louis G. Carres, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioners.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., George R. Georgieff and Richard W. Prospect, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners filed their petition for certio-rari alleging the lower court’s order denying their petition for writ of habeas corpus was a departure from the essential requirements of law.- They argue the lower court, although declaring them insolvent, erred in refusing to grant their motion for an order directing the court reporter to transcribe notes. In its order denying the motion, the lower court observed the majority rule is that the payment of a fine renders a case moot so as to preclude any review of an attack upon such a conviction, relying upon Annot., 9 A.L.R.3rd 476-477 (1966).

*1143Having reviewed the record and briefs of counsel, we find there has been no departure from the essential requirements of law. The petition for writ of certiorari is

DENIED.

BOYER, Acting C. J., and MILLS and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Day International Group,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Thomas J. Koenig, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial position and results of operations of the
Company.

         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.

/s/ Thomas J. Koenig
------------------------------
Thomas J. Koenig
Chief Financial Officer
November 4, 2003
#### Jimmy Lee DAVIS v. STATE.

No. 38686.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1969.

Mandamus denied without opinion.
<PAGE>

BARRISTER GLOBAL SERVICES NETWORK, INC.


EXHIBIT NO. 23

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


The Board of Directors
Barrister Global Services Network, Inc.

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Nos. 33-8749 and 333-89947) of Barrister Global Services Network, Inc. on Form
S-8 of our report dated May 24, 2002, appearing in and incorporated by reference
in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Barrister Global Services Network, Inc. for
the years ended March 31, 2002 and 2001.


DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP
Buffalo, New York
June 24, 2002





                                       28
#### Morgan *versus*Weir.

This Court will not reverse a judgment for error in an immaterial matter, and the party complaining must show, not only that an error has been committed, but that he has been injured by it.

Error to the District Gourt of *Allegheny county.*

*Rogers*and Burke, for plaintiff in error.

*Penney*and *Sterrett,*for defendant in error.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Lewis, J.

It may be that, where a bond is given as collateral security for the payment of a negotiable promissory note, “ to whoever maybe the holder” of it, no defence’can be made against the bond which could not be made against the note in the hands of the holder. The Court below, in expressing a different opinion, may have fallen into an error; but we should fall into a greater one, if we reversed the judgment without seeing that the error was material, and injured the plaintiff in error. We cannot reverse for an error in an immaterial matter. We have no way to guard against such a mockery of justice, but by requiring the party complaining to show, not only that an error has been committed, but that he has been injured by it. We do not see how this can be done, without spreading the evidence before us, duly authenticated by the Court below. If the case is not worth this trouble, it is not worth while to take a writ of error at all.

So far as we can form a conjecture respecting the defence relied on, it was as available against the note in the hands of the holder as against the bond. If so, the error of the Court did the plaintiff in error no harm. If, under our duty to presume everything in favour of the judgment, we have been mistaken in regard to the nature of the defence, the consequences of the mistake have fallen where they belong. We are also asked to reverse this judgment because the Court told the jury that, “ if they believed the testimony of *Oassiday,*the plaintiffs cannot recover.” And the testi*120mony of Cassiday, on which the whole question depends, is not furnished to us in the paper-book of the plaintiff in error. We do not understand how his counsel preserves the gravity of his countenance while preferring such a request.

Judgment affirmed.
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1077

To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to authorize

appropriations for fiscal years 1994 and 1995.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 7, 1993

Mr. PELL (by request) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and

referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to

authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1994 and 1995.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That section 49(a)(1) (22 U.S.C. 2589 (a)(1)) is amended

4 to read as follows:

5 ‘‘(1) $62,500,000 for fiscal year 1994, and such

6 sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1995; and’’

Æ
#### INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITIONS, INC., d/b/a Greater Miami International Auto Show, Appellant, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Florida, and the Greater Miami Automobile Dealers Association d/b/a Greater Miami International Auto Show, Appellees.

No. 72-334.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 26, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Ruvel SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-1083.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 2, 1974.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Kathleen Gallagher, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Stephen V. Rosin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

*401Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on the authority of Richardson v. State, Fla.1971, 246 So.2d 771; Williams y. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446; Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401; United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L. Ed.2d 619.
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1059 

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to deem any person who 

has received an award from the Armed Forces of the United States 

for engagement in active combat or active participation in combat to 

have satisfied certain requirements for naturalization. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 23, 2013 

Mr. KIRK introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to 

the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to deem 

any person who has received an award from the Armed 

Forces of the United States for engagement in active 

combat or active participation in combat to have satisfied 

certain requirements for naturalization. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1059 IS

1 SECTION 1. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PERSONS AS HAVING 

2 SATISFIED ENGLISH AND CIVICS, GOOD 

3 MORAL CHARACTER, AND HONORABLE SERV4 ICE AND DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS FOR 

5 NATURALIZATION. 

6 (a) IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.—The Im7 migration and Nationality Act is amended by inserting 

8 after section 329A (8 U.S.C. 1440–1) the following new 

9 section: 

10 ‘‘SEC. 329B. PERSONS WHO HAVE RECEIVED AN AWARD FOR 

11 ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVE COMBAT OR ACTIVE 

12 PARTICIPATION IN COMBAT. 

13 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of naturalization 

14 and continuing citizenship under the following provisions 

15 of law, a person who has received an award described in 

16 subsection (b) shall be treated— 

17 ‘‘(1) as having satisfied the requirements in 

18 sections 312(a), 316(a)(3), and subsections (b)(3), 

19 (c), and (e) of section 328; and 

20 ‘‘(2) under sections 328 and 329, as having 

21 served honorably in the Armed Forces for (in the 

22 case of section 328) a period or periods aggregating 

23 one year, and, if separated from such service, as 

24 having been separated under honorable conditions. 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 1059 IS

1 ‘‘(b) APPLICATION.—This section shall apply with re2 spect to the following awards from the Armed Forces of 

3 the United States: 

4 ‘‘(1) The Combat Infantryman Badge from the 

5 Army. 

6 ‘‘(2) The Combat Medical Badge from the 

7 Army. 

8 ‘‘(3) The Combat Action Badge from the Army. 

9 ‘‘(4) The Combat Action Ribbon from the 

10 Navy, the Marine Corps, or the Coast Guard. 

11 ‘‘(5) The Air Force Combat Action Medal. 

12 ‘‘(6) Any other award that the Secretary of De13 fense determines to be an equivalent award for en14 gagement in active combat or active participation in 

15 combat.’’. 

16 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents 

17 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) is amended by insert18 ing after the item relating to section 329A the following: 

‘‘Sec. 329B. Persons who have received an award for engagement in active 

combat or active participation in combat.’’. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit
32.1







CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002






In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Preferred Voice, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mary G. Merritt,
Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.






/s/ Mary G.
Merritt




Mary G.
Merritt


Principal
Executive Officer


Principal
Financial Officer


November
11, 2008