alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Report of Evergreen
Solar, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended April 2, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Donald W. Reilly, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

May 12, 2011



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Donald W. Reilly   
|Donald W. Reilly       
|Chief Financial Officer

This certification accompanies the
Form 10-Q to which it relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony MAYO.

No. 60822.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 10, 1978.

Thomas J. Ford, Jr., Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation
by reference in the following Registration Statements:



| |  |  | Registration Statements (Form S-3 Nos. 333-159253, 333-134480 and 333-123672) of Poniard Pharmaceuticals, Inc.;
| | - |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | Registration Statements (Form S-8 Nos. 333-143965, 333-135861, 333-126209, 333-115729, and 333-89476) pertaining to the Amended and Restated 2004
Incentive Compensation Plan; and
| | - |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | Registration Statements (Form S-8 Nos. 333-41764, 333-32583, 33-43860, 33-46317 and 33-87108) pertaining to the Restated 1994 Stock Option Plan of
Poniard Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
| | - |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

of our report dated March 30, 2011, with respect to the consolidated financial
statements of Poniard Pharmaceuticals, Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2010.

/s/
Ernst & Young LLP

Palo Alto, California

March 30, 2011
Exhibit 32.1
CERTIFICATION
(Not filed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)
     Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, the undersigned, Larry C. Oldham, the President and Chief Executive Officer ofParallel Petroleum Corporation (“Parallel”), hereby certifies that the Annual Report on Form 10-Kof Parallel for the year ended December 31, 2004 fully complies with the periodic reportingrequirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information contained inthat Form 10-K Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of Parallel.
Dated: March 15, 2005         /s/ Larry C. Oldham   Larry C. Oldham,   President and Chief Executive Officer   
     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided toParallel Petroleum Corporation and will be retained by Parallel Petroleum Corporation and furnishedto the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Leevy Carlton MEARS, Jr., Appellee.

No. 71-596.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 4, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 1972.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Richard E. Gerstein, State’s Atty. and Joseph Durant, Asst. State’s Atty., for appellant.

Jack R. Nageley, and Harvey S. Swickle, Miami Beach, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellee-petitioner moved, under Rule 3.850 CrPR, 33 F.S.A. to vacate a judgment and sentence earlier entered. The state seeks review of an order granting the motion and awarding a new trial; the order was entered after an evidentiary hearing.

The underlying conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Kish v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So.2d 315, and a denial of motion under Rule 1.850 CrPR (now renumbered 3.850) was affirmed in Mears v. State, Fla.App.1970, 232 So.2d 749, which indicates appellee has sought other relief.

The instant (second) petition for relief alleged that the trial court deprived him of due process by failing to order the prosecution to produce the results of a line-up in which a key witness for the State had failed to identify him. Attached to the petition was an order entered by U.S. District- Judge Joe Eaton directing the trial court to determine whether the prosecutor had knowledge of that line-up at the time of trial.

After he was booked in 1965, the police began holding a series of line-ups. In one, Murray was unable to identify Mears, although he did identify Kish.

Petitioner moved for disclosure of all favorable evidence, and the results of the line-ups. The court denied the motion without making a determination that favorable evidence existed. The prosecution at the trial stated: “We only intend to use that line-up in which the Murrays identified these people.” At the trial, the state did not adduce testimony concerning the line-ups viewed by the Murray family. Mr. Murray identified Mears as being a robber.

*218We express the view that the petitioner-appellee did not make a showing that the prosecution made a knowing use of the allegedly perjured testimony. We further express the view that there was such overwhelming competent substantial evidence of guilt, that the alleged error of the trial court was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.

Our disposition of the instant cause renders unnecessary any resolution of the state’s arguments that the doctrines of res judicata or waiver apply.

The principle is well-settled in Florida that knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution at the time of trial must be shown to warrant relief under Rule 3.850. E. g., Cash v. State, Fla.App.1968, 207 So.2d 18; Barber v. State, Fla.App.1971, 257 So.2d 581.

For the reasons stated the order appealed is reversed.

Reversed.
Exhibit 31.1
                     GE GLOBAL INSURANCE HOLDING CORPORATION
                          AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Ronald R. Pressman, certify that:

1. I have reviewed  this  quarterly  report on Form 10-Q of GE Global  Insurance
Holding Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial  condition,  results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.  The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers  and  I are  responsible  for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure  controls and procedures,  or caused such disclosure
controls and  procedures to be designed  under our  supervision,  to ensure that
material  information  relating to the  registrant,  including its  consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,  particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated  the  effectiveness  of the  registrant's  disclosure  controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions  about the effectiveness
of the disclosure  controls and procedures,  as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial  reporting that occurred  during the  registrant's  most recent fiscal
quarter that has  materially  affected,  or is  reasonably  likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent  evaluation of internal  control over  financial  reporting,  to the
registrant's  auditors  and the audit  committee  of the  registrant's  board of
directors:

a) All  significant  deficiencies  and  material  weaknesses  in the  design  or
operation of internal  control over  financial  reporting  which are  reasonably
likely  to  adversely  affect  the  registrant's  ability  to  record,  process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any  fraud,  whether  or not  material,  that  involves  management  or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's  internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: August 1, 2003

/s/ Ronald R. Pressman
Ronald R. Pressman, Chief Executive Officer
# C_2023329EN.01000201.xml

| 18.9.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 329/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 329/2

---

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 13 July 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Szegedi Törvényszék — Hungary) — Napfény-Toll Kft v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

(Case C-615/21, (1) Napfény-Toll)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Value added tax (VAT) - National legislation providing for the possibility of suspending, without any temporal limit, the limitation period for action by the tax authorities in the event of court proceedings - Repeated tax procedures - Regulation No 2988/95 - Scope - Principles of legal certainty and effectiveness of EU law)

(2023/C 329/02)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Szegedi Törvényszék

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Napfény-Toll Kft

Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

Operative part of the judgment

The principles of legal certainty and effectiveness of EU law must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State or the related administrative practice, under which, in relation to value added tax, the limitation period in respect of the right of the tax authorities to assess that tax is suspended for the whole duration of judicial review, regardless of the number of times the administrative tax procedure has had to be repeated following those reviews and with no ceiling on the cumulative duration of the suspensions of that period, including in cases where the court ruling on a decision of the tax authority concerned taken as part of a repeat procedure, following on from an earlier court decision, finds that that tax authority failed to comply with the guidance contained in that court decision.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 11, 10.1.2022.

---
# United States Court of Appeals **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________
February 10 , 2021

ERRATA

______________________

Appeal No. 2020

- 1 611

IN RE: KENTON ABEL
, Appellant

Decided: January 7, 2021 Non

- Precedential Opinion

______________________
Please make the following change:

On page 8 , line 2 8 , change “ undermine” to “undermines” Case: 20-1611 Document: 34 Page: 1 Filed: 02/10/2021
#### Hattie BAKER, a single woman, Appellant, v. J. L. JOHNSON and Violet Allee et al., Appellees.

No. 71-686.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 12, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### WFTL BROADCASTING CO. v. NEWMAN.

No. 38915.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 1969.

Certiorari dismissed without opinion. 224 So.2d 359.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

WILLIAM BURROWS,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Appellee.

§

§ 

§ No. 99, 2022

§

§ Court Below: Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ Cr. I.D. No. 1507008924 (N)

§ 

§

Submitted: April 26, 2022

Decided: May 5, 2022

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.

O R D E R

After consideration of the notice to show cause and the appellant’s response,

it appears to the Court that:

(1) On March 21, 2022, the Court received a letter from the appellant, 

Williams Burrows, expressing his desire to appeal from a Superior Court order dated 

February 7, 2022, and docketed on February 8, 2022, that denied his motion for 

reduction or modification of sentence. The Senior Court Clerk deemed the letter to 

be a notice of appeal and issued a notice directing Burrows to show cause why the

appeal should not be dismissed as untimely filed. Under Supreme Court Rules 6 and 

11, a timely notice of appeal should have been filed on or before March 10, 2022. 
2

(2) In response to the notice to show cause, Burrows states that he sent a 

notice of appeal on April 3, 2022—later than the letter that was deemed to be his 

notice of appeal—and indicates that he believed the deadline to appeal to be April 

5, 2022. A notice of appeal must be timely filed to invoke the Court’s appellate 

jurisdiction.1 A notice of appeal must be received by the Court within the applicable 

time period to be effective.2 Unless an appellant can demonstrate that the failure to 

file a timely notice of appeal is attributable to court-related personnel, an untimely 

appeal cannot be considered.3 An appellant's pro se, incarcerated status does not 

excuse a failure to comply strictly with the jurisdictional requirements of Supreme 

Court Rule 6.

4 The failure to file a timely appeal in this case is not attributable to 

court-related personnel. Therefore, the appeal must be dismissed.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rule 29(b), 

that the appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice 

1 Carr v. State, 554 A.2d 778, 779 (Del. 1989).

2 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 10(a).

3 Bey v. State, 402 A.2d 362, 363 (Del. 1979).

4 Hughes v. State, 2019 WL 1723098 (Del. Apr. 15, 2019).
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, November 18, 2015.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of

the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, November 18, 2015

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A16D0109. IN THE INTEREST OF: J. N. W., A CHILD (MOTHER) .

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be

hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this

order. The Clerk of Juvenile Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record

transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

LC NUMBERS:

1500208
#### STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Ronald Neil PENN v. C. Murray HENDERSON,, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 53183.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Mar. 1, 1973.

In re: Ronald Neil Penn applying for writ of habeas corpus.

Writ denied. The record reflects that the guilty plea was free and voluntary.

BARHAM, J.,

dissents. The defendant’s plea, even under the evidentiary hearing was without the Boykin requirements. Boykin v. Ala., 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274.

CALOGERO, J., dissents.
#### MONSANTO COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Petitioner, v. AMERICAN FOODS, INC., etc., Respondent.

No. 42143.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 24, 1972.

Certiorari denied. 257 So.2d 921.

ERVIN, Acting C. J., and CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
[No. 308-41667-3.

Division Three.

July 19, 1971.]

#### Wenatchee Federal Savings and Loan Association, *Respondent,*v. Elroy A. Sundberg *et al., Appellants.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Kittitas County, No. 17114, W. R. Cole, J., entered October 14, 1969. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
-82 -80 -78 -76 -74 -72

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05/30

NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL

 Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 30 May 07

 EDAS Meteorological Data

Source

★ at 39.06 N 76.88 W Meters AGL
Exhibit 10.2


 


AGREEMENT TO COMPROMISE DEBT


 


This Agreement to Compromise Debt (the "Agreement")
is made and effective the December 1st 2020


 


	BETWEEN:	DKG CAPITAL INC (A NEVADA STATE COMPANY)
	 	 
	AND:	EMRY CAPITAL GROUP (A FLORIDA COMPANY)




 


In consideration of the terms and covenants of this
agreement, and other valuable consideration, the parties agree as follows:


 


FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the Creditor being a creditor
of the Company hereby enters into an agreement to compromise and reduce the indebtedness due the undersigned on the following terms
and conditions:


 


		1.	The Company and the Creditor acknowledge that the present debt based on current and future filings
due is $168,909



 


	2.	The parties agree that the undersigned shall accept the sum of $168,909 as full and total payment
on said debt and in complete discharge of all monies presently due, provided the sum herein shall be punctually paid in the manner
following:
	 	 
	 	The debt owed to Tesheb Casimir
has been forgiven and reduced to nil. Tesheb Casimir forever relinquishes irrevocably all future claims to any sums that may be
due to him his agents and or any affiliates by the debtor.



 


	3.	This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit
of the parties, their successors, assigns and personal representatives.




 


This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit
of the parties, their successors, assigns and personal representatives.


 


 


Signed under seal this December 1st 2020


 


 


 


/s/ Tesheb Casimir                                             


Creditor, Tesheb Casimir


 


 


 


/s/ Tesheb Casimir                                             


Company, DKG Capital Inc
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Harry O. CRAMER.

No. 62879.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 22, 1978.

In re: Harry 0. Cramer, applying for remedial writ. Parish of Orleans.

*797Writ not considered. Did not apply to trial court.
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER





Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350)








Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350), the
undersigned, Robert R. Galvin, Chief Financial Officer of NuCO2 Inc., a Florida
corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to his knowledge,
that:





The
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31,
2008 of the Company (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











/s/
      Robert R. GalvinRobert
      R. GalvinChief
      Financial OfficerMay
      12, 2008
#### WALL PLASTERING COMPANY, etc., and the Home Insurance Company, etc., Petitioners, v. Clyde F. LAY and the Florida Department of Commerce, Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.

No. 42521.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 30, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 1973.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-51181

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MIGUEL VALENZUELA-GONZALEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-00-CR-1165-ALL-H

- - - - - - - - - -

June 15, 2001

Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Miguel Valenzuela-Gonzalez appeals his sentence following

his guilty plea conviction for illegal re-entry after deportation

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Valenzuela argues that his

sentence should not have exceeded the two-year maximum sentence

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Valenzuela acknowledges that his

argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523

U.S. 224 (1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme
No. 00-51181

- 2 -

Court review in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000). 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1214 (2001). 

Valenzuela’s argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres, 523

U.S. at 235. 

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that the judgment of the district court be affirmed and that an

appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is granted.

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.