alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
      32.2





Certification
      of Principal Accounting Officer


Pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C §1350)





I,
      Lori
      A. Jones, of Analytical Surveys, Inc., certify, pursuant to Section 906 of
      the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
      the
      Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended September 30, 2007 (the
“Report”) which this statement accompanies fully complies with the requirements
      of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of Analytical Surveys,
      Inc.





Dated:
                January 14, 2008/s/
                  Lori A. JonesLori
                A. JonesPrincipal
                Accounting Officer
-  Conscience and Religious Freedom      -  Conscience Protections 
  -  Religious Freedom 
  -  Filing a Complaint        -  Complaint Process 
    -  File a Complaint Online 
  -  Newsroom 
  -  Office for Civil Rights Speaker Request 

                      -   
                      -   
                      -   
                      -   
                      -   

# Religious Freedom

OCR enforces the following laws as they apply to recipients of HHS federal financial assistance:
                          - Section 508 of the Social Security Act  prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, race, color, national origin, disability, sex, or religion in the Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant ( 42 USC § 708 ). 
                          - Section 533 of the Public Health Service Act  prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, race, color, national origin, disability, sex, or religion in Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness ( 42 USC § 290cc-33 ). 
                          - Section 1908 of the Public Health Service Act  prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, race, color, national origin, disability, sex, or religion in programs, services, and activities funded by Preventive Health and Health Services Block Grants ( 42 USC §300w-7 ).
                          - Section 1947 of the Public Health Service Act  prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, race, color, national origin, disability, sex, or religion in programs, services, and activities funded by Community Mental Health Services Block Grant and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grants ( 42 USC § 300x-57 ).
                          - The Family Violence Prevention and Services Act  prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, disability, sex, or religion in programs, services, and activities funded under this Act ( 42 USC § 10406 ).
                          - The Communications Act of 1934 , as amended by Equal Employment Opportunity provisions, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age, race, color, religion, national origin, or sex by federally-funded public telecommunication entities ( 47 USC § 398 ).

**Recent Actions:**
                          - State Letter to Michigan Withdrawing Exception from Non-Discrimination Requirements [November 18, 2021]
                          - State Letter to Texas Withdrawing Exception from Non-Discrimination Requirements [November 18, 2021]

**Has Your Conscience or Religious Freedom Been Violated?**

File a Conscience or Religious Freedom Complaint

Content last reviewed February 3, 2023
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                            4224
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    29410
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      32307
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 82793
<PP&E>                                           17960
<DEPRECIATION>                                    4077
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  113785
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            91360
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            25
<OTHER-SE>                                       12550
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    113785
<SALES>                                           6483
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  6483
<CGS>                                             8499
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     8499
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                1199
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (3238)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (3537)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (3537)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.14)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.14)
        

</TABLE>
#### Jack VERTULLO, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA MANAGEMENT CO. et al., Respondents.

No. 71-375.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 25, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-7772

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

CHARLES ONWUAZOMBE, a/k/a Ebele Onwuazor,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (CR91-305-JFM; CA-05-2856-1-JFM)

Submitted: March 30, 2006 Decided: April 7, 2006

Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion.

Charles Onwuazombe, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Reeves Harding,

Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

 Charles Onwuazombe, a federal prisoner, seeks to appeal

the district court’s order denying relief on his motion construed

as filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2000). We affirm the portion of the district court’s order

denying 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) relief for the reasons stated by the

district court. See United States v. Onwuazombe, Nos. CR-91-305-

JFM; CA-05-2856-1-JFM (D. Md. filed Oct. 18 & entered Oct. 19,

2005). To the extent that Onwuazombe sought to file a 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 (2000) motion, an appeal may not be taken from the final

order in a post-conviction proceeding unless a circuit justice or

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue

absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that

the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural rulings by

the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001).

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that

Onwuazombe has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal of the
- 3 -

denial of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART
#### Larry BOYD v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 46915.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 9, 1972.

John C. Ross, Jr., James E. Price, Corinth, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by John M. Kinard, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Alcorn County; Fred Wicker, Judge.

Before RODGERS, P. J., and PATTERSON, INZER, ROBERTSON and SUGG, JJ-

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Balance
Sheet, Statement of Operations, Statements of Cash Flows and Notes thereto
incorporated in Part I, Item 1. of this Form 10-QSB/A and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                           1,277
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,277
<PP&E>                                       1,248,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              11,207,788
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,287,693
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      1,794
<COMMON>                                    13,232,501
<OTHER-SE>                                 (4,314,201)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                11,207,788
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  171,947
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (171,947)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (171,947)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (171,947)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.01)


</TABLE>
#### Ernest DALLAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 68-575.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

Dec. 19, 1969.

S. Colquitt Pardee, Avon Park, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Morton J. Hanlon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

HOBSON, Chief Judge.

Appellant appeals an order denying his motion to vacate filed under CrPR 1.850, 33 F.S.A.

The appellant argues that he should not have been sentenced as a second offender under § 775.09, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., as he was not represented by counsel at the time he was sentenced on the judgment of conviction of a felony, which conviction is the basis upon which he became punishable as a second offender under § 775.09, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

Section 775.09, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., provides :

> “A person who, after having been *convicted*within this state of a felony * * commits any felony within this state is punishable upon conviction of such second offense as follows * * (Emphasis supplied)

The punishment as a second offender depends on a person being convicted previously of a felony and has nothing to do with sentencing. In Evans v. State, Fla. App.1964, 163 So.2d 520, an order denying relief from the sentences imposed where the defendant was not represented by counsel at the time of the imposition was reversed and remanded; however, the court went on to say on page 523:

> “Of course, the fact that the appellant was not represented by counsel at the time he was sentenced in said cases does not vitiate the *judgments*entered therein.”

The appellant was represented by counsel and plead guilty to the first felony involved herein and the judgment of conviction in that case is valid and is a proper conviction upon which the appellant herein was validly sentenced as a second offender under § 775.09, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

For the foregoing reasons the order appealed is affirmed.

LILES and MANN, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-6578
JEROME HONEYMAN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versusFRANK DREW, Sheriff; DR. GONZALES; NURSE HANSON; NURSE HOLCOM; NURSE PLUMMER; MAJOR SMITH; E. C. MORRIS; DAVID K. SMITH; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ZUMBRO, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Chief District Judge. (CA-95-583-R) Submitted: October 3, 1996 Decided: October 10, 1996 Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jerome Honeyman, Appellant Pro Se. David Ernest Boelzner, WRIGHT, ROBINSON, OSTHIMER & TATUM, Richmond, Virginia; Jeff Wayne Rosen, ADLER, ROSEN & PETERS, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia; Alexander Leonard Taylor, Jr., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Honeyman v. Drew , No. CA-95-583-R (W.D. Va. Mar. 26, 1996).We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
DISMISS and Opinion Filed July 16 , 2013.

In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05
- 13
- 00573
- CV RADIANT DARKSTAR PRO DUCTION, LLC , Appellant V. PHILIP B. SAUER , Appellee On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC
- 13
- 02152
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Lang, Myers, and Evans Opinion by Justice Lang This is an appeal from the trial court’s April 4, 2013 order overruling Radiant Darkstar Productions, LLC’s motion to dissolve prejudgment writs of garnishment and emergency motion to release funds deposited in the registry of the court. Because it appeared these interlocutory orders were unappealable, we directed the parties to file letter briefs addressing our jurisdiction over the appeal. See In re Tex. Am. Express, Inc. , 190 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex. App.

— 2005, orig. proceeding) (“As a general rule, writs and orders issued to aid judgment creditors in collecting

on their judgments are not appealable.”). In its letter brief, Radiant Darkstar stated it had also filed a petition for writ of mandamus and had brought the appeal “in an abundance of caution” in the event certain portions of the challenged orders were deter mined to be injunctive in nature.
See T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 51.014(a)(4) (West Supp. 2012) (allowing appeal from interlocutory order of district court granting or refusing a temporary injunction or granting– 2

–

or overruling a motion to dissolve temporary injunction). By opinion filed June 25, 2013, the Court conditionally granted Darkstar’s petition for writ of mandamus, specifically finding Darkstar has no adequate remedy at law. See In re Radiant Darkstar Prod., L.L.C. , 05

- 13

- 00586

- CV, 2013 WL 3239672 (Tex. App.

— Dallas June 25, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Because the complained of orders are unappealable interlocutory orders and in light of this
Court’s June 25 th opinion, we dismiss this appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 42.3( a ); Tex. Am

. Express , 190 S.W.3d at 727.

130573F.P05 /Douglas S. Lang/ DOUGLAS S. LANG JUSTICE– 3

– 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

RADIANT DARKSTAR PRODUCTION, LLC, Appellant
No. 05

- 13

- 00573

- CV V. PHILIP B. SAUER, Appellee On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC

- 13

- 02152. Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices Myers and Evans participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal. We ORDER that appellee Philip B. Sauer recover his costs of this appeal from appellant Radiant Darkstar Production, LLC.
Judgment entered this 16th day of July, 2013.

/Douglas S. Lang/ DOUGLAS S. LANG JUSTICE
### Page 1 of 3 **Disposition Comments Docket No:**  

### FAA - 2011 - 0445 These comments are in **Directorate ID:** 

### 2011 -NE - 14 - AD response to an SNPRM Originating Office Tracking No.: **Next Step:** FRAN SNPRM 

### N o C omments/Only

Supportive Comments Received

– If this box is checked, no signatures are required. 

### Has the reference d service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? I f ye s, list latest revision and attach a cop y. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point for guidance. Instructions: Summarize all comments **by issue** (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of each issue. **All comments relating to the sam e issue should be discussed together.**  Do not list all of the issues from one commenter togeth er. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA - IR- M - 8040.1C Chapter 9. **ISSUE 1:** Select one o

f the following : If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree with because We disagree with because

Make the following changes to the AD: If **NO** , we don’t agree because **ISSUE 2**  **:** Select one of the following :

If other, explain : Commenter(s): What change to the AD action is requested? Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Do we agree? If **YES,** we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: If **PARTIALLY AGREE** , we agree w ith because We disagree with because Make the following changes to the AD:

### Page 2 of 3

If **NO** , we don’t agree because **For additional issues, do uble**  **- click**  **here**

### Page 3 of 3 **S ignature Section**  Signature indicates concurrence with this action. Originating Office Tracking No.: 

### SP3192EN - E

**ASE** Printed Name **:** 

### Alan Strom 8/24/11 **Date**

**Branch Manager Date**
258 La. 706

#### LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. v. CONTINENTAL INSURANCE CO. and Lloyd Comeaux & Associates, Inc.

No. 51420.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 20, 1971.

In re: Continental Insurance Company and Lloyd Comeaux and Associates, Inc. applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

Writ denied. We find no abuse of the discretion accorded by law to the trial judge.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION

Each of the undersigned hereby certifies, in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in his capacity as an officer of Vitran Corporation Inc., that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly Report of Vitran Corporation Inc. on Form 10-Q for the three months
ended March 31, 2011, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operation of Vitran Corporation Inc.



|                  |  |  |  |     |  |                                      
|----------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | -------------------------------------
|                  |  |  | 
|Date: May 2, 2011 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/    RICHARD E. GAETZ              
|                  |  |  |  |     |  | Richard E. Gaetz                     
|                  |  |  |  |     |  | President and Chief Executive Officer



|  |  |  |  |     |  |                                                   
|- |  |  |  | --- |  | --------------------------------------------------
|  |  |  | 
|` |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/    SEAN P. WASHCHUK                           
|  |  |  |  |     |  | Sean P. Washchuk                                  
|  |  |  |  |     |  | Vice President Finance and Chief Financial Officer
# United States Court of Appeals **for the Fifth Circuit**

____________ No. 22-40788 Summary Calendar

____________ United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee , versus Jorge Rodriguez-Alejos, Defendant—Appellant . ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 7:22-CR-1195-1

______________________________ Before Jones, Southwick, and Ho, Circuit Judges . Per Curiam: *The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jorge RodriguezAlejos has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Rodrigue z-Alejos has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and th e relevant portions of the record

_____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 10, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 22-40788 Document: 00516853969 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/10/2023No. 22-40788

2 reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appe llate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED , counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the appeal is DISMISSED . See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. Case: 22-40788 Document: 00516853969 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/10/2023