J. S31043/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.D.D., A.N.S., 

AND T.S., JR., MINORS

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: K.D., NATURAL MOTHER : No. 219 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order, December 28, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County

Orphans’ Court Division at Nos. 2016-204 IVT,

2016-205 IVT, 2016-206 IVT

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DUBOW, J. AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 26, 2017

Appellant, K.D. (“Mother”), appeals from the order of December 28, 

2016, terminating her parental rights to the children, J.D.D., A.N.S., and 

T.S., Jr. (“the Children”). After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court, following three evidentiary hearings, made the 

following findings:

1. On March 9, 2016, Cambria County 

Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed petitions to 

terminate the parental rights of [K.D., “Mother”], 

age 23, [], and [Father], age 32, [], to their 

respective children. [Mother] is the biological 

mother of [J.D.D.], [] age 3, []; [A.N.S.], [] age 2, 

[]; and [T.S., Jr.], [] now 11 months old []. [Father] 

is the biological father of [A.N.S.] and [T.S., Jr.]. 

The biological father of [J.D.D.] is unknown. The 

grounds alleged are 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] Section 2511(a) 

Subsections (1), (2), (5), and (8).

2. Counsel was appointed for the parents and 

children, and after continuance requests granted by 

the Court evidentiary hearings were held on June 22, 
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2016; September 20, 2016; and September 29, 

2016. After transcripts of the hearings were 

prepared and reviewed by counsel, all counsel 

submitted memoranda of their respective positions.

3. In July 2014, [Mother] and [Father] moved 

to Johnstown, Cambria County, Pennsylvania from 

Onondaga County, New York where [Mother] was 

involved with the New York Department of Social 

Services as a result of issues resulting in a neglect 

petition being filed involving [J.D.D.] and then newly 

born [A.N.S.].

4. Both [Mother] and [Father] were referred 

to Dennis M. Kashurba, a licensed psychologist. 

[Mother] was evaluated by Mr. Kashurba who issued 

a report dated August 20, 2014 (Petitioner Exhibit 

11). The purpose of the evaluation was to gather 

information pertinent to ascertaining what type of 

services would be appropriate to ensure the best 

interests of [Mother]’s two children. [Mother] had a 

history of anger management and impulse control 

problems. Mr. Kashurba in his report stated in part:

“Her judgment in the session 

appeared to be good once she would 

pause and think about the answer she 

had impulsively given to a question. Her 

level of insight appeared to be at an 

early adolescent level of development 

and rather consistent with the obtained 

estimate of intellectual functioning as 

noted below.”

In his diagnostic impression, Mr. Kashurba 

wrote:

“Axis I Impulse Control Disorder, 

NOS Relational Problem NOS 

Anxiety Disorder NOS ADHD, 

Combined Type Disruptive 

Behavior Disorder, NOS, by 

history Mathematics Disorder 
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Bipolar Disorder, NOS, by 

history 

Axis II Borderline Intellectual 

Functioning Histrionic 

Personality Disorder with 

Paranoid Traits and 

Obsessive Compulsive 

Features” 

In Mr. Kashurba’s summary of the various 

tests administered to [Mother], he stated:

“All of her performances fell within 

a relatively consistent band between the 

normal late 10-year level of development 

and the normal early 12-year level of 

development.”

5. In Mr. Kashurba’s conclusion he stated:

“The total information available at 

the present time suggests that [Mother] 

has below average overall intellectual 

ability and academic skills. She also 

appears to have long-standing mental 

health issues which may adversely affect 

her ability to harness her intellectual 

skills in terms of learning and 

independently implementing appropriate 

parenting techniques with her children. 

Thus, it does appear that there will be 

the ongoing need for comprehensive, 

multimodal mental health services as 

well as a variety of social services that 

can typically be facilitated through CYS. 

[Mother] claims that she plans to 

become enrolled in parenting classes at 

some time in the future whenever an 

opening exists for a six-week class. 

However, her mental health and 

cognitive issues clearly indicate that her 

need for services is well beyond the 

scope of typical parent training classes. 
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Additionally, the mental health issues of 

her paramour ([Father]) suggests that 

there will be an ongoing need for an 

external agent of control (CYS)...”

6. On September 24, 2014, Mr. Kashurba 

penned a report based upon his evaluation of 

[Father]. The purpose of that evaluation was to 

gather information pertinent to determining the 

probability of [Father] developing the ability to 

parent his children by himself or with the assistance 

of his paramour, [Mother]. In the clinical interview 

portion of his report, Mr. Kashurba states:

“[Father] presented on time for his 

scheduled appointment. Initially, his 

affect was calm and composed. 

However, later when he was informed of 

ongoing CYS concerns that were 

inconsistent with his perspective of the 

home and family situation, he became 

somewhat irate. He then proceeded to 

engage in denial and minimize the 

circumstances documented by the CYS 

caseworker, CYS social worker, and the 

IFS [(“Independent Family Services”)] 

home management person. [Father] 

actually appeared to possess grossly 

normal intellectual potential. He 

admitted that he has been hearing 

‘voices’ for the past eight years’ time. 

These voices were described as ‘Bob’ 

who supposedly is ‘a mean son of a bitch 

and what I would be like if I was bad.’ 

The other voice, Tom, was described as 

‘my good side.’ Supposedly Tom tells 

[Father] not to listen to Bob. In addition 

to hearing these voices, [Father] 

admitted that he sometimes sees them. 

Bob was described as being ‘tall and 

built’ and being blond with blue eyes. 

Tom, on the other hand, was described 

as having dark hair and hazel eyes and 

being slim.”
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Further, Mr. Kashurba notes:

“[Father] clearly had a 

preoccupation with the overvalued idea 

regarding the status of the dogs in his 

life...[.] It was reasonably obvious that 

[Father] viewed the dogs at least as 

equals to the children in terms of status 

within the family and perhaps higher in 

status.”

In Mr. Kashurba’s summary he notes:

“[Father]’s performance on 

academic testing today found him to 

meet with frustration in basic reading 

skills at a beginning 4th grade level of 

difficulty. This performance placed him 

within the mildly mentally deficient range 

and only at the 1st percentile for his 

chronological age group.”

Mr. Kashurba concludes:

“The total information available at 

the present time suggests that [Father] 

would have adequate intellectual 

potential to learn appropriate parenting 

strategies if his mental health issues 

could be ameliorated. In his current 

‘off meds’ condition, there is little 

likelihood that he will be able to 

ameliorate his mental health difficulties, 

which are chronic and severe, to a 

degree that he will be able to harness his 

low average intellectual potential to learn 

and independently implement 

appropriate parenting strategies for the 

children. His overvalued idea regarding 

the status of the dogs (supposed service 

animals) suggests that these animals will 

continue to be a higher priority to 

[Father] than the children in the 
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household. Unfortunately, it would be 

this examiner’s opinion that the 

supposed service animals have actually 

adversely affected [Father]’s ability to 

function in society.”

7. As a result of a permanency review hearing 

held on April 20, 2015, the Juvenile Court found that 

the parents had only been minimally compliant with 

the permanency plan and that there had been 

minimal progress toward alleviating the 

circumstances necessitating the original placement.

8. Among the Juvenile Judge’s orders, both

parents were to enroll, participate, attend, and 

successfully complete parenting skill classes; comply 

with the agency social worker in addressing their 

mental health issues; no pets were permitted in the 

residence; and all pets were to be removed prior to 

any consideration of the children’s return home to 

either parent’s residence. [Father] was to have a 

psychiatric evaluation, which the Court notes he 

successfully completed on January 13, 2016 

(Respondent Exhibit 2).

9. Another permanency review hearing was 

held on September 21, 201[5]. Again the Juvenile 

Court found only minimal compliance with the 

permanency plan and only minimal progress toward 

eliminating the circumstances necessitating the 

original placement. Supervised visits were to 

continue, and both [Mother] and [Father] were 

ordered to submit to random drug screens.

10. [Father] was again evaluated by 

Mr. Kashurba resulting in reports of November 5 and 

November 12, 2015. Mr. Kashurba noted in his 

report:

“It would be this examiner’s 

impression that the prognosis for 

significant improvement in the parenting 

domain would not be substantially 

improved and in all likelihood would not 
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make positive contribution to the 

children. Thus, this examiner has no 

choice but to concur with the opinion of 

the CYS and home management staff 

that permanency through adoption would 

be in the children’s best interests.”

11. The results of the January 27, 2016 

permanency review hearing are significant in that 

the parties again had made only minimal compliance 

with the permanency plan, but the Court further 

found that the children had been in placement for 15 

of the last 22 months, neither parent was a 

placement option for the children, and that the 

parents had refused to allow the agency to inspect 

and photograph any residence since October of that 

year. In addition, even with attending mental health 

services both parents continued [to] display 

significant mental health instability. Both parents 

have cognitive limitations that are not likely to 

change in a reasonable period of time. The children 

need a permanent, consistent environment, and the 

goal was changed to adoption.

12. This Court further reviewed in detail 

Petitioner’s Exhibit 13, which were court summaries 

given to the Juvenile Court in October 2014, April 

2015, September 2015, and January 2016.

In the April 13, 2015 court summary it was 

noted that the home was found to be in a deplorable 

condition, including but not limited to garbage, food, 

clothes, dog feces and dog urine on the[] floor and 

furniture. Due to the ongoing nature of the house 

and the parents’ aggressive conversation with the 

social worker, all social worker visits were moved to 

the [CYS] Office.

In the September 21, 2015 report, it was 

noted that the parents now lived separately from 

each other. [Mother] still required constant 

redirection to focus on the skills that she was being 

taught. The social worker continued to observe 

positive progress in her ability to control her 
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impulses and aggressive outbursts however. The 

social [worker] noted that neither parent appeared 

to be able to multitask and supervise and interact 

with both children at the same time. When the 

social worker addressed making good decisions, 

[Father] and [Mother] became very angry and 

defensive and verbalized their belief they are fine 

because they do not have their children so they are 

doing nothing wrong. The parents were not open[] 

to changing their lifestyle to demonstrate stability for 

their children to return home.

In the final report to the Court dated 

January 22, 2016, the social worker noted:

“This social worker continues to 

have numerous concerns regarding 

[Mother]’s ability to provide for her 

children’s basic needs, safety, and 

well-being due to her parenting deficit, 

cognitive limitations, and mental health. 

[Mother] has demonstrated that she is 

unable to adequately parent her children 

during a two-hour visitation, as well as 

maintain a stable lifestyle. It is this 

social worker’s opinion [that] due to 

[Mother]’s cognitive limitations, her 

resistance to participate in parenting 

instruction, and her mental health it is 

not likely she can remedy these concerns 

in a timely manner.

Regarding [Father], he has shown 

consistency when parenting one child; 

however, he is resistant to social work 

services. This social worker has serious 

concerns regarding his mental health 

stability and his need for changing his 

daily functioning. It is this social 

worker’s opinion that [because of] 

[Father]’s mental health, cognitive 

limitations, and unwillingness to change 

his daily functioning [] it is also unlikely 
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he could alleviate the concerns in a 

timely manner.”

13. This Court is well aware that the 

termination of parental rights is one of the most 

serious and severe steps a court can take. As to 

[Father], this Court admits to struggling between 

separating the concept of “reasonable doubt” versus 

a civil case, clear and convincing evidence. This 

Court has examined the individual circumstances of 

this case and considered all explanations and 

accomplishments as to the [F]ather and the lack of 

explanations as to the [M]other on the issues before 

the Court.

14. Addressing the best interests of the 

children, the Court may rely on the testimony of the 

caseworkers and/or social workers. In the report 

(Petitioner Exhibit 10), the caseworker and 

caseworker supervisor note that:

“[Father] and [Mother] have the 

barrier of their mental health and 

cognitive limitations that prevent them 

from making the necessary significant 

changes to provide for their children’s 

safety and well-being in a reasonable 

period of time. In addition, they lie, 

attempt to manipulate, and refuse to 

take responsibility for their actions.

[Father] and [Mother] do love the 

children. There is no bond between both 

parents and [T.S., Jr.] as they have only 

seen him three times since his placement 

from the hospital on January 15, 2016. 

[Mother] has demonstrated minimal 

bonding with [A.N.S.] and [J.D.D.] and 

with that it was not a true parent-child 

bond with either due to her mental 

health and cognitive limitations. For the 

brief period of time [Father] visited with 

[A.N.S.] alone a parent-child bond was 

present. Once the visits resumed 
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together again both parents paid less 

attention and time with [A.N.S.]. The 

most significant bond was the bond 

between [J.D.D.] and [Father] though 

[Father] is not [J.D.D.]’s biological 

father.

[J.D.D.] and [A.N.S.] have a 

genuine bond with their foster family and 

[T.S., Jr.] is bonding with his foster 

family which demonstrates that they will 

be able to build a healthy bond with an 

adoptive family.”

. . . .

16. This Court has found that there does not 

presently exist a strong bond between [Mother] and 

her three children. In terminating the parental rights 

of [Mother], this Court has found that this will best 

meet the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the children.

17. In regard to [Father], the Court has found 

that any bond that exists is minimal. Further, that in 

terminating the rights of [Father] to his two children, 

this Court has found that this will best meet the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of those children.

Order, 12/28/16 at 1-11.

By order entered December 28, 2016, the trial court terminated the 

parental rights of both Mother and Father. The trial court determined that 

CYS established a basis for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), & (8). (Id. at 11-12.) The trial court also found that termination 

best met the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of 

the Children under Section 2511(b). (Id. at 10-11.) This timely appeal 
J. S31043/17

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followed. In response to Mother’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, the trial court relied on its Opinion and 

Order of December 28, 2016. (Order, 2/14/17 at 1; docket #18.)1

Mother has raised the following issue for this court’s review on appeal: 

“Whether the Court either abused its discretion or committed an error of law 

when it granted the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 

thereby terminating the parental rights of [Mother] to [the Children][?]” 

(Mother’s brief at 2.)

When considering appeals such as the one presently 

before us, we are guided by the following:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree 

terminating parental rights, we are 

limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by 

competent evidence. Absent an abuse of 

discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where 

a trial court has granted a petition to 

involuntarily terminate parental rights, 

this Court must accord the hearing 

judge’s decision the same deference that 

we would give to a jury verdict.

In re: Involuntary Termination of C.W.S.M. and 

K.A.L.M., 839 A.2d 410, 414 (Pa.Super. 2003). We 

are also aware that:

In a proceeding to involuntarily 

terminate parental rights, the burden of 

proof is upon the party seeking 

termination to establish by “clear and 

 

1

Father filed a separate appeal at No. 218 WDA 2017, assigned to this same 

panel. 
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convincing” evidence the existence of 

grounds for doing so. The standard of 

“clear and convincing” evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so clear, 

direct, weighty, and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the 

truth of the precise facts in issue.

In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 336 (Pa.Super. 2002) 

(quoting In re Adoption of Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 

650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1994)).

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1003-1104 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).

Moreover, an abuse of discretion occurs “when the 

course pursued represents not merely an error of 

judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly 

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or 

where the record shows that the action is a result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. Generally,

[o]ur case law has made clear that under 

Section 2511, the court must engage in a 

bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. In re D.W., 856 A.2d 

1231, 1234 (Pa.Super. 2004). Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent. 

The party seeking termination must 

prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). In re 

B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013-14 

(Pa.Super. 2001). Only after 

determining that the parent’s conduct 

warrants termination of his or her 

parental rights must the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis: 

determination of the needs and welfare 

of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child. C.M.S., supra, 

[884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa.Super. 

2005)]; A.C.H., supra, [803 A.2d 224, 
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229 (Pa.Super. 2002)]; B.L.L., supra. 

Although a needs and welfare analysis is 

mandated by the statute, it is distinct 

from and not relevant to a determination 

of whether the parent’s conduct justifies 

termination of parental rights under the 

statute. One major aspect of the needs 

and welfare analysis concerns the nature 

and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 508 

(Pa.Super. 2006).

Id. at 1004 (brackets in original).

We need only agree with the orphans’ court as to 

any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 

(2004). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to 

terminate under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which 

provide as follows.

(a) General Rule.--The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after 

a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be 

without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.
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* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall 

give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. The 

rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental 

factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of 

the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) 

or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are 

first initiated subsequent to the giving of 

notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1215-1216 (Pa.Super. 2015).

In order to terminate parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), 

the following three elements must be 

met: (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control 

or subsistence necessary for his physical 

or mental well-being; and (3) the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 

(Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). “The grounds 

for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may 

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 
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perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 

326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations omitted).

Id. at 1216.

The case was first initiated in August 2014 for lack of mental health 

treatment, parenting skills, and budgeting skills. (Notes of testimony, 

9/20/16 at 128-129.) In October 2014, the Children were ordered to be 

removed. (Id. at 133.) CYS received a report that Mother was beating 

J.D.D. and that A.N.S. was soiled and extremely dirty. (Id. at 134; notes of 

testimony, 6/22/16 at 79.) A hearing was held on October 20, 2014, and 

reunification was the original goal. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 27-28.) 

The juvenile court ordered Mother and Father to, inter alia: keep all 

appointments with mental health providers and follow through with any 

recommendations; complete parenting classes; follow through with the 

Independent Family Services (“IFS”) home management program; maintain 

a safe, clean, and adequately furnished residence for at least six months; 

pay rent, utilities, and other bills on time; permit caseworkers to enter, 

inspect, and photograph the home; remove all pets from the residence; and 

complete psychiatric evaluations. (Id. at 28.)

The record indicates that Mother failed to comply with the court’s 

directives. For example, Mother and Father refused to get rid of the Pitbull 

dogs, which was a condition of having the Children returned. At one time, 

there were as many as 10 dogs in the residence, including 7 puppies. 

(Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 37.) The residence was covered in dog 
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feces and smelled of ammonia due to the presence of dog urine. (Id. at 

169.) The Pitbull dogs were aggressive, overly protective, and 

malnourished, leading to a fear that they would attack the Children. (Notes 

of testimony, 9/20/16 at 131, 152-153.) Mr. Lonnie Maldet, a CYS 

caseworker, testified that Mother and Father asked for money for dog food 

and baby formula. (Id. at 131.) He was concerned that a hungry Pitbull 

dog could turn on one of the Children. (Id.) Sabrina Uebel, another CYS 

caseworker, testified that there was one cup of dog food for three large 

Pitbulls, including one that was pregnant. (Id. at 152.) The baby slept on 

the floor with the hungry Pitbulls. (Id.) Ms. Uebel testified that the dogs 

were large and aggressive and had to be put in the room upstairs during 

CYS visits. (Id. at 152-153.)

The condition of the family’s residence was described as deplorable 

and unsanitary. The house was littered with garbage and dog waste. (Notes 

of testimony, 6/22/16 at 169.) There was clutter and dried vomit 

throughout the house. (Id. at 21-22, 33.) Ashley Shaffer, a licensed social 

worker for CYS, testified that the smell made her physically ill. (Id. at 169.) 

The kitchen was covered in trash, empty beer bottles, and dirty dishes. 

(Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 33.) Louann Gustkey-Patterson, the 

parents’ landlord at 482 Rear First Street, testified that the house smelled 

like dogs. (Id. at 86, 100.) There was trash in and around the home and 

cockroaches. (Id.) Sometimes she was afraid to enter the property. (Id.
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at 99-100.) In addition, the residence was not child-proofed and was 

unsafe, with knives lying around within reach of the Children. (Id. at 31, 

101, 142.) Mr. Maldet testified that there were pocket knives, hunting 

knives, and kitchen knives strewn about, as well as cigarette butts and 

lighters. (Id. at 136, 142.) There was evidence of drug and alcohol abuse 

at the home. (Id. at 87-90; notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 194-195.) 

Mother and Father never complied with the court’s directive to maintain a 

consistently safe and clean home.2

Regarding the deplorable conditions, while they would show some 

measurable improvement over short periods of time, they would always 

return to the status quo. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 16.) 

Ms. Kathy Scaife from IFS testified that some months the house looked okay 

and then other months it was terrible. (Id.) The conditions were not 

consistently acceptable. (Id. at 17-18.) Ms. Scaife described clothing, 

papers, empty food containers, and food wrappers spread throughout the 

home. (Id. at 30-31.) She testified that the clutter was a tripping hazard 

 

2 Mother and Father lived at 482 Rear First Street until June 2015, when 

they moved to 1122 Ridge Avenue. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 31-33, 

59.) At some point in May 2015, Mother moved her belongings to an 

apartment at Solomon Homes; however, she continued to reside with

Father. (Id. at 32-33.) Barbara Brzana, a caseworker for CYS, 

characterized it as a ruse so that Mother could get the Children back while 

Father kept the dogs. (Id. at 38.) Ms. Brzana never saw the inside of the 

Solomon Homes apartment since Mother was rarely there, and pursuant to 

Johnstown Police Department policy, CYS cannot enter Solomon Homes 

without a police escort due to safety concerns. (Id. at 59-60, 62.) 
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for the Children. (Id.) According to Ms. Shaffer, in April 2015 she had to 

move visits off-site due to poor housekeeping. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 

at 169.) She described dog feces and garbage strewn about the floor, as 

well as the odor of urine and marijuana smoke. (Id.) This testimony was 

corroborated by Ms. Brzana who described a house full of fecal matter, dried 

vomit, clutter, and garbage. (Id. at 33.) On each of three occasions she 

visited the home from January 2015 to March 2015, the conditions were the 

same. (Id.; notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 36.)

Ms. Brzana testified that she still has not seen the inside of their 

current residence because Mother and Father refused entry, in violation of 

the juvenile court order. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 33-36.) Mother 

and Father gave numerous excuses for refusing entry. (Id.) Mother also 

failed to comply with mental health treatment. (Id. at 36.) She started the 

Alternative Community Resource Program (“ACRP”) in February 2015 but 

was discharged in September for missing appointments. (Id.)

Ms. Brzana testified that Mother’s parenting skills were very limited. 

(Id. at 39.) She had difficulty initiating and maintaining play with the 

Children. (Id.) Mother would complain of being tired and direct either 

Father or J.D.D. to get things for her. (Id.) Mother and Father would arrive 

late and unprepared for supervised visits. (Id. at 39-40.)

Ms. Brzana testified to safety concerns as well. She testified that 

A.N.S. was “kind of forgotten” during supervised visits. (Id. at 40.) CYS 
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caseworkers would warn Mother and Father of potential injuries to the 

Children but they would not react until injuries had already occurred. (Id. at 

40-41.) When J.D.D. hit his head and was crying, Mother told him, “Come 

over here.” (Id. at 41.) She would not go to him to pick him up and soothe 

him. (Id.) According to Ms. Brzana, neither Mother nor Father made 

significant progress. (Id. at 42.)

Ms. Brzana also testified regarding ongoing financial pressures. 

Mother and Father relied on Father’s social security disability and Mother did 

not work. (Id. at 46-47.) Mother was employed for one month from 

October 2015 until November 2015 but was terminated for failure to perform 

her job duties. (Id. at 47.) Mother did work at the soup kitchen but that 

was unpaid; she was required to do community service in order to collect 

cash assistance. (Id. at 60.) The parents’ monthly expenses exceeded their 

meager income and they were behind on their bills. (Id. at 46-48.)

Mr. Kashurba characterized Mother’s intelligence as between the 

normal late 10-year level of development and the early 12-year level of 

development. (Id. at 96-97.) Academically, Mother functioned at a 

7

th grade level. (Id. at 97-98.) Mr. Kashurba observed Mother with the 

Children on several occasions. (Id. at 105.) He noted bickering between 

Mother and Father during the visitations as well as lack of preparation. (Id.) 

His impression was of two teenagers “playing family” while babysitting 

someone else’s children. (Id. at 106.) Mr. Kashurba testified that there 
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were a variety of tripping hazards left on the floor. (Id.) Mother spent 

much of the visit talking to the social worker who was supervising the visit. 

(Id.) Mr. Kashurba’s opinion was that Mother would not be able to 

adequately parent the Children within a reasonable amount of time. (Id. at 

106-107.) Therefore, Mr. Kashurba supported a goal change to permanency 

through adoption. (Id. at 108.)

Ms. Shaffer testified that she began working with Mother and Father in 

August 2014. (Id. at 166-167.) With regard to Mother, she canceled 

6 sessions and failed to show up for 11 sessions. (Id. at 168-169.) Mother 

did keep 44 sessions, and Ms. Shaffer also supervised 24 visitations with 

Mother. (Id. at 168.) Ms. Shaffer testified that in April 2015, they had to 

move the sessions out of the home because of deplorable housekeeping and 

also because Mother had threatened the CYS caseworker. (Id. at 169.) 

According to Ms. Shaffer, Mother becomes easily overwhelmed during 

visitations, has an explosive temper, and poor impulse control. (Id. at 170.) 

Ms. Shaffer testified that Mother lacks motivation to parent the Children and 

has to be prompted to get up and play with them. (Id.) Mother would 

spend most of the time during visitation sitting in a chair either eating or 

trying to converse with Ms. Shaffer. (Id.)

Ms. Shaffer did testify that Mother showed some improvement with 

regard to her temper. (Id. at 171.) In the beginning, she would yell at 

J.D.D. and grab him by the arm. (Id.) Later, she was utilizing the 
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“time out” method and was able to better control her anger. (Id.) 

However, in other areas, the parents showed limited or no improvement. 

(Id.) For example, CYS attempted to work with them on nutrition and 

providing healthy lunches for the Children instead of just potato chips and 

juice boxes. (Id. at 171-172.) Mother commented that she was too lazy to 

walk to the grocery store to buy fruit. (Id. at 172.) On one occasion, they 

brought whole, unpeeled carrots for A.N.S. to eat, who had just turned one 

year old. (Id.) They did not understand how that could be a choking hazard 

for a one-year-old baby. (Id.)

Ms. Shaffer testified that Mother was very defensive and would dismiss 

any concerns or suggestions. (Id. at 173.) Mother maintained that she 

knew how to parent the Children and did not need CYS’s help. (Id.) Mother 

felt that the parenting classes she received in New York State were 

sufficient. (Id.)

Similarly, Candice Mishler, a social worker for CYS, testified that 

Mother took an inactive role during supervised visits. (Notes of testimony, 

9/20/16 at 41.) She described Mother’s approach as “aloof.” (Id. at 42.) 

After about 40 minutes, Mother would become overwhelmed and frustrated 

and snap at the Children for minor transgressions. (Id. at 42-43.) Mother 

struggled with multitasking and had difficulty interacting with both J.D.D. 

and A.N.S. simultaneously. (Id. at 45.) This testimony was corroborated by 

Ms. Brzana who testified that Mother and Father could not clean up the room 
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and dress the Children at the same time. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 

73.) Mother and Father were unable to adequately supervise the Children 

due to their problems multitasking. (Id.) In addition, Ms. Mishler testified 

that neither Mother nor Father had appropriate insight into the needs of the 

Children or their own mental health needs. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 

43.) They denied or refused the need for services. (Id.)

Mother claims that these issues were de minimus and that the 

Children were never in any form of danger. (Mother’s brief at 6.) Mother 

argues that there were no allegations that the Children were suffering due to 

her shortcomings or that the pets posed any legitimate risk. (Id. at 7.) As 

set forth at length supra, the Children were in physical and psychological 

danger. They were living in filth. Besides the hungry Pitbulls and hunting 

knives lying around, there was testimony of ongoing drug use and domestic 

violence. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 44, 194-195.) It was readily 

apparent to the trial court that despite 15 months of intensive services, 

Mother was unable or unwilling to remedy the conditions which led to the 

Children’s placement, and they would continue to be at risk if returned to 

her care. Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that 

Mother is incapable of parenting the Children and that her parental 

incapacity has left the Children without essential parental care or control. 

Additionally, it was reasonable for the court to determine that Mother will 

not, or cannot, remedy this incapacity.
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Next, we consider whether termination was proper 

under Section 2511(b). Section 2511(b) “focuses on 

whether termination of parental rights would best 

serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of 

J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010). As this 

Court has explained, “Section 2511(b) does not 

explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term

‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional 

bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to 

be considered” as part of our analysis. In re 

K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008). 

“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her 

child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) 

best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of 

many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.” 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) 

(citing K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 533-36).

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the 

trial court can equally emphasize the 

safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the 

child might have with the foster parent. 

Additionally, this Court stated that the 

trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships 

and whether any existing parent-child 

bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

Id. (quoting In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 

(Pa.Super. 2010)); see also In re T.D., 949 A.2d 

910, 920-23 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 601 

Pa. 684, 970 A.2d 1148 (2009) (affirming the 

termination of parental rights where “obvious 

emotional ties exist between T.D. and Parents, but 

Parents are either unwilling or unable to satisfy the 

irreducible minimum requirements of parenthood,” 

and where preserving the Parents’ rights would 
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prevent T.D. from being adopted and attaining 

permanency).

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219.

Ms. Brzana testified that at the time of the last hearing on 

September 29, 2016, J.D.D. was 42 months old and had spent 27 of those 

months in out-of-home placement, including 4 months in New York. (Notes 

of testimony, 9/29/16 at 38.) A.N.S. was 27 months old and spent only 

2 months at home prior to placement with CYS. (Id. at 38-39.) T.S., Jr., 

was 8 months old and had been in CYS’s care since his birth. (Id. at 39.) 

Ms. Brzana testified that any bond between J.D.D. and Mother was not a 

parent/child bond. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 43-44.) J.D.D. enjoyed 

seeing Mother but did not look at her as a mother figure. (Id. at 44.) 

Regarding A.N.S., Ms. Brzana did not see any bond with Mother. (Id.

at 44.) Ms. Brzana testified that, “[A.N.S.] is left to her own devices a lot 

during the visits.” (Id.) T.S., Jr., was placed directly from the hospital and 

because his permanency goal was changed immediately, Mother and Father 

had only monthly visits. (Id.) Ms. Brzana testified that there is no bond 

between T.S., Jr., and his parents. (Id.)

Ms. Brzana testified that in her professional opinion, it is in the 

Children’s best interests for the goal to be changed to adoption. (Id. at 45.) 

J.D.D. has had four different placements in 42 months and needs stability. 

(Id.) A.N.S. has thrived in foster care and feels safe and stable. (Id.) 

Ms. Brzana testified that A.N.S. connects with her foster parents as though 
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they are her mom and dad. (Id.) Regarding T.S., Jr., Ms. Brzana opined 

that delaying the adoption process “would be like just holding off the 

inevitable.” (Id. at 45-46.) CYS provided both parents with services for 

15 months without significant progress. (Id. at 46.)

Ms. Brzana sees the foster parents once a month in their home and 

also follows up with e-mail or phone calls at least twice a month. (Id. at 

60.) Ms. Brzana has had no issues with the foster parents and has no 

concerns about their ability to care for the Children. (Id. at 60-61.) The 

trial court found that the Children are successfully bonding with their foster 

family, indicating that they will be able to build a healthy bond with an 

adoptive family. (Order, 12/28/16 at 10 ¶14.) 

The evidence supports the trial court’s determination that it would be 

in the Children’s best interests if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. 

Clearly, it would not be in the Children’s best interests for their lives to 

remain on hold indefinitely in hopes that Mother will one day fulfill her 

obligations and be able to act as their parent. See In re Adoption of 

C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1220, quoting M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1276 (“A child’s life 

simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the 

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” (citations omitted)). 

Mother is not entitled to relief.
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Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), we affirm the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2017