alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Al Catter, Appellant.

[656 NYS2d 902]

Appeal by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Thorp, J.), rendered April 13, 1994, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and conspiracy in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, and (2), by permission, from an order of the County Court, Nassau County (Wexner, J.), entered December 4,1995, which, without a hearing, denied his motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction.

Ordered that the judgment and order are affirmed.

*527"If the undisputed evidence establishes that a witness is an accomplice, the jury must be so instructed but, if different inferences may reasonably be drawn from the proof regarding complicity * * * the question should be left to the jury for its determination” *(People v Basch,*36 NY2d 154, 157; *see, People v Sweet,*78 NY2d 263; *People v Cody,*190 AD2d 684). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, in the instant case it was appropriate for the court to instruct the jury to determine whether a prosecution witness was an accomplice. Further, there is no merit to the defendant’s contention that there was insufficient nonaccomplice evidence to support his conviction *(see, People v Daniels,*37 NY2d 624; *People v Ascheim,*144 AD2d 680).

Additionally; it was not error for the court to deny the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 without a hearing *(see, People v Satterfield,*66 NY2d 796; *People v Robinson,*211 AD2d 733).

The defendant’s remaining contentions lack merit. Sullivan, J. P., Santucci, Friedmann and McGinity, JJ., concur.
#### Henry E. COLEMAN, Appellant, v. Sylvia COLEMAN, Appellee.

No. 67-693.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Jan. 30, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1968.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                       7,767,572
<SECURITIES>                                 5,048,410
<RECEIVABLES>                               35,502,965
<ALLOWANCES>                               (1,006,479)
<INVENTORY>                                 39,996,815
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            91,745,911
<PP&E>                                      35,122,780
<DEPRECIATION>                            (16,206,883)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             123,433,720
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       49,818,664
<BONDS>                                     16,009,994
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    25,860,676
<OTHER-SE>                                  26,274,024
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               123,433,720
<SALES>                                     44,539,075
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            44,539,075
<CGS>                                       28,226,003
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               28,226,003
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            11,899,493
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (646,433)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,982,327
<INCOME-TAX>                               (1,563,774)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          2,418,553
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,418,553
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.20


</TABLE>
#### Fredric J. HODKIN, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent. Fredric J. HODKIN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 40338, 40488.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 2, 1971.

*650Fredric J. Hodkin, m pro. per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee-respondent.

PER CURIAM.

These two consolidated cases, one of which is a petition for certiorari and the other filed as an interlocutory appeal, were delineated by earlier order herein of December 16, 1970, for consideration as a “Petition for Review” in accordance with Petition of Dade County Bar Ass’n, etc., Sp. Committee, 116 So.2d 1 (Fla.1959).

Oral argument having been heard and the briefs and record considered, it now appears that neither the interlocutory appeal attempted in the second case (No. 40,488) from a denial of summary judgment, nor the petition for certiorari in the first case (No. 40,338) from a denial of Motions to Dismiss, comes within the special circumstances of Dade County Bar Ass’n, etc. Sp. Committee, *supra,*under which it was first thought the matter might be heard at this juncture. Neither does the petition qualify for review under any constitutional ground of Fla.Const. art. V, F.S.A. (1968). Any review must follow after final judgment in the usual course.

Jurisdiction is accordingly declined in both causes.

The appeal is dismissed; the petition discharged.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, DEKLE and DREW (Retired), JJ., concur.
#### Douglas Stratton et al., Appellants, v Arnold Dueppengiesser et al., Respondents.

[722 NYS2d 677]

Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 510 (3) seeking to change venue from Wyoming County to Erie County. Plaintiffs failed to establish that the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change *(see,*CPLR 510 [3]). ‘While calendar congestion is certainly a factor to be considered in deciding a motion to change venue pursuant to CPLR 510 (subd 3) * * * it is not controlling” *(A.M.I. Intl. v Pool Sales & Serv.,*94 AD2d 890). In any event, the assertion of plaintiffs’ attorney that the action could be tried more expediently in Erie County is equivocal and based on hearsay, and thus is insufficient to establish calendar congestion *(see, Ament v Church of Annunciation,*247 AD2d 843; *Schapiro & Reich v Fuchsberg,*172 AD2d 1080, 1080-1081). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Wyoming County, Notaro, J. — Venue.) Present — Pine, J. P., Wisner, Hurlbutt, Scudder and Kehoe, JJ.
EXHIBIT 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Donald Gee, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Royce Biomedical,
Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

    a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

    b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

    c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing equivalent functions):

    a) all significant deficiencies and material weakness in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

    b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: February 17, 2005                              /s/ Donald Gee
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Donald Gee, President
                                                     and Chief Executive Officer
#### Ex parte Michael B. RUSSELL.

77-512.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 30, 1978.

ALMON, Justice.

WRIT DENIED.

TORBERT, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER and EMBRY, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6796

WALLACE SPENCER DAVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus MEMBERS, Virginia Department of Corrections;RON ANGELONE; GENE JOHNSON, Department Director, Virginia Department of Corrections; DEPUTY DIRECTOR, Security, Virginia Department of Corrections; DEPUTY DIRECTOR, Treatment, Virginia Department of Corrections, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Di strict Judge. (CA-96-13-R) Submitted: March 13, 1997 Decided: March 18, 1997 Before HALL, ERVIN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Wallace Spencer Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Ralph Davis, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order dismissing his previous notice of appeal as moot, denying his motion for relieffrom the court's order denying his motions for default, and granting his motion to resume active consideration of his case. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Ben eficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appe aled is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 82 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 82

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                     February 26, 2013.
    Resolved, That the following named Members be, and are hereby, elected to 
the following standing committees of the House of Representatives:
    Committee on Agriculture: Mr. Fincher, to rank immediately after Mr. Denham.
    Committee on Appropriations: Mr. Harris.
    Committee on the Budget: Mr. Price of Georgia, to rank immediately after Mr. 
Cole; Mrs. Black, to rank immediately after Mr. Lankford; and Mr. Duffy.
    Committee on Ways and Means: Mr. Renacci.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 4722** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee ,
v. AMY FRENCH , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia , at Bluefield
. Irene C. Berger , District Judge. ( 1:09

- cr - 00118

- 1 )

Submitted : January 4, 2013 Decided: January 16, 2013

Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney, John L. File, Assistant United States Attorn ey, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM Amy French appeals the nine

- month sentence imposed upon revocation of her supervised release. On appeal, French contends that her ni ne - month sentence is plainly unreasonable. We affirm. We will affirm a sentence imposed following revocation of supervised release if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup , 461 F.3d 433, 439

- 40 (4th Cir. 2006). * In determining whether a revocation sentence is unreasonable, “we follow generally the procedural and substantive considerations” used in reviewing original sentences. Id. at 438. Only if we conclude that the sentence is proced urally or substantively unreasonable must we decide whether it is plainly so. United States v. Moulden , 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). French ’s sentence is below the statutory maximum of twenty

- four months for a Class C felony
. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583 (e)(3) (2006). Further, the sentence is procedurally reasonable because the district court considered both the Chapter 7 policy statements and the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West Supp. 2011) factors that it was permitted to consider. See

* We decline French’s invitation to revisit the “plainly unreasonable” test established by our decision in Crudup
.3 Crudup , 461 F.3d at 4 38

- 40. Finally, the sentence is substantively reasonable, because the district court sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing the sentence, emphasizing the breach of trust that French had committed by coming before the district court again after a previous violation of her supervised release and French’s apparent inability to remain in court

- mandated drug treatment. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adeq uately presented in the materials before this C ourt and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Veatch vs. Greenwood.

In ease of misjoinder of counts, the entire declaration is bad, and it is error to sustain a demurrer to some of the counts and overrule it as to others — in such cat)'.' the court should, in general, on motion, grant leave to amend by striking out.

*Appeal from Chicot Circuit Court.*

Hon. John C. Murray, Circuit Judge!

*638Hutchinson, for appellant.

Garland & Randolph, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Compton

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Assumpsit by Greenwood against Yeatch and Wardlow. Veatch demurred to the declaration for misjoinder of counts, upon the ground that some of the counts were against Yeatch and Wardlow, and others against Yeatch alone. Pending' the demurrer, the plaintiff discontinued as to Wardlow, and the court sustained the demurrer as to the third and fourth, and overruled it as to the first and second counts. Yeatch rested, final judgment was rendered against him, and he appealed.'.

The demurrer was to the whole declaration; and in refusing to sustain it to that extent, the court erred. In case of misjoinder of counts, the entire declaration is bad, and the rule is, that the plaintiff cannot, if the declaration be demurred to, aid the mistake by entering a *nolle prosequi,*so as to prevent the’ operation of the demurrer for misjoinder; though the court may, and, in general, should grant him leave to amend by striking out some of the counts on payment of costs. *Chit, on Plead., marg. p.*206; *Drummond vs. Dorant,*4 *T. Rep.*360; *Jennings vs. Newman, Ib.*347. Here, there was no motion for leave to strike out.

Let the judgment be reversed, and the cause remanded, to be proceeded in according to law,
Exhibit 32



Section 1350 Certifications of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer



In connection with the Report of Material Sciences Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K/A for the fiscal year ended
February 29, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Ronald L. Stewart, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



November 24, 2004By:

/S/    RONALD L. STEWARTRonald L. StewartPresident, Chief Executive Officer and Director




In connection with the
Report, I, Jeffrey J. Siemers, Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



November 24, 2004By:

/S/    JEFFREY J. SIEMERSJeffrey J. SiemersVice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary




1
A-1

 
**AGREEMENT**     **1 GUARANTEE**          (a) Guarantor herewith irrevocably and unconditionally as principal obligor guaranteesand undertakes to pay to Evergreen without delay on Evergreen’s first written demand without anydeduction under any and all circumstances and irrespective of all objections, exceptions ordefenses, from third parties also, the claims of Evergreen referenced in the invoices listed inExhibit A and all interest accruing as a result of late payment thereof in accordance withthe Supply Agreement. Guarantor shall remain obliged to perform payment also when Evergreen canobtain satisfaction by offsetting against Purchaser; Evergreen is not obliged to enforce claimsagainst Purchaser at first.          (b) Evergreen shall undertake not to demand payment of the claims as long as Purchaser meetsits payment obligations under the Amendment properly.     **2 TERM**          This Agreement automatically terminates with full satisfaction of all claims listed inExhibit A and interest thereon.     **3 MISCELLANEOUS**          (a) This Agreement contains the entire understanding of the parties with respect to thesubject matter thereof.          (b) This Agreement shall be exclusively governed by German law.          (c) This Agreement may be executed in several counterparts, each of which shall constitute anoriginal and all of which, when taken together, shall constitute one agreement.     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned duly authorized representatives of Evergreen and Guarantorhave executed this Agreement as of the date first referenced above.           **EVERGREEN SOLAR, INC.**   **RALOS NEW ENERGIES AG**             By: /s/ Scott J. Gish   By: /s/ Heinrich Dauscher               Print Name: Scott J. Gish     Print Name: Heinrich Dauscher    Title: Vice President     Title: CTO                   By: /s/ A. Klein                     Print Name: A. Klein          Title: CEO  
2
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report of Sierra Health Services, Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2007 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Anthony
M. Marlon, M.D., Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:





The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








/s/ Anthony M. Marlon,
M.D.


Anthony
M. Marlon, M.D.


Chief
Executive Officer


March 17,
2008