October 26, 1979

79-78 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE U.S.

ATTORNEY, DISTRICT OF WYOMING

Conflict of Interest—18 U.S.C. § 207—

Applicability to Former Assistant U.S. Attorneys

This responds to your inquiry whether Messrs. Steven Munsinger, 

Harold Stuckey, or any member of their firm may lawfully represent the 

defendant in a Federal criminal matter pending in your district.

Your memorandum discloses that Mr. Munsinger was Chief of the 

Criminal Division and Mr. Stuckey the First Assistant U.S. Attorney in 

the office of the U.S. Attorney, District of Colorado, until May 4, 1979, 

when they resigned to form their law firm. Your question stems from the 

visit of a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent to the U.S. Attorney’s office in Denver on June 26, 1978, to report to Assistant U.S. Attorney Rodney Snow allegedly false statements made by one Mr. A in 

order to obtain loans from banks in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah. It appears that Munsinger, who was Snow’s immediate supervisor, was present 

at the conference between the agent and Snow but did not participate in 

the discussion, during which Snow decided that a prosecution could better 

be handled in the District of Wyoming. Supplementary information you 

furnished us by telephone on October 25, 1979, is to the effect that the FBI 

investigation of A had not been conducted at the instance or with the 

knowledge of the U.S. Attorney’s office in Denver and that the investigation was unknown to Snow and Munsinger, or to Stuckey, who supervised 

both, before the appearance of the agent.

Because Stuckey and Munsinger resigned on May 4 of this year, the 

response to your inquiry is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1976), as it existed before the amendments to it enacted by the Government in Ethics 

Act of 1978 came into force on July 1, 1979. More particularly, the provisions of former § 207 relevant here are subsections (a) and (b).

For convenience I will discuss § 207(b) first. In general it precludes a 

former Government employee for one year after leaving office from 

representing anyone else in a particular matter, including a criminal

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investigation or prosecution, that was within the area of his official 

responsibility, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 202 (1976), at any time during the 

last year of his Government service. Since the agent’s appearance in 

Snow’s office occurred within a year before the resignations of Stuckey 

and Munsinger, the questions under § 207(b) is whether the investigative 

results the agent brought to Snow constituted a “ particular matter

* * * which was under [the] official responsibility” of either Munsinger 

or Stuckey.

As described in your memorandum, the agent’s presentation covered 

three separate though apparently related matters—that is, it covered a 

series of alleged criminal violations in Colorado, another series in Wyoming, and a third in Utah. To the extent the agent supplied Snow with 

evidence of criminal activity by A in Colorado, he submitted for Snow’s 

consideration a particular matter potentially within the jurisdiction of the 

U.S. Attorney in Denver. If Snow had pondered this matter for several 

days before making his decision not to prosecute in Denver, there can be 

no question that “ official responsibility” on the part of Munsinger and of 

Stuckey would have arisen. Since, however, there is nothing in the statute 

to condition official responsibility on a passage of time, it is clear that it 

arose when the agent presented his information to Snow even though the 

latter made his negative decision immediately. Nevertheless, this conclusion does not dispose of the matter, because the presently pending case jn 

Wyoming, although it may possibly involve some facts that would have 

been useful in a prosecution in Colorado, is a different matter—that is, it 

entails separate alleged violations occurring in Wyoming. Whatever officials may have had responsibility for the investigation there during the 

year preceding May 4, 1979, Stuckey and Munsinger were obviously not 

among them. Thus, they are not forbidden by § 207(b) to represent A in 

the District of Wyoming.

The remaining question is whether either Stuckey or Munsinger is 

barred from representing the defendant by § 207(a), which permanently 

prohibits postemployment representation of another by a former Government employee in a matter in which he had “ participated personally and 

substantially” while holding his Government position. Stuckey is not subject to this prohibition since he was not present at the meeting between the 

agent and Snow. We are of the opinion that Munsinger is also free of the 

prohibition. His silence during the meeting is, of course, not in itself controlling because the tacit decision of a superior not to overrule a subordinate might in some circumstances constitute substantial participation in 

a matter. Here, however, even the role of Snow, the subordinate, did not 

amount to personal and substantia] participation. We have previously 

concluded that merely acquiring preliminary knowledge of a matter but 

not thereafter taking part in the work of the Government relating to it 

does not constitute the degree of participation contemplated by the 

statute. Because Snow is beyond the thrust of § 207(a), it cannot reach 

Munsinger.

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In sum, we are of the opinion that 18 U.S.C. § 207 is not an impediment 

to the representation of the defendant by Stuckey, Munsinger, or other 

members of their firm.

Le o n U lm a n

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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