Supreme Court
N o. 2013

- 254

- C.A. ( P2/09

- 51A )

State :

v. : Robert Beaudoin :

NOTICE : This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Sup reme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 2 22

- 3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.- 1

- Supreme Court
N o. 2013

- 254

- C.A. ( P2/09

- 51A )

State :

v. : Robert Beaudoin :

Pre sent: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia , JJ. O P I N I O N Justice Goldberg , for the Court. General Laws 1956 § 12

- 19

- 18 was amende d by the General Assembly in 2010, see P.L. 2010, ch. 311 , § 1 , to provide that a sentence of imprisonment after a finding of probation violation shall be quashed, and the imprisonment terminated, in certain circumstances occurring after a judgment of prob ation violation is entered by a justice of the Superior Court

. See § 12

- 19

- 18(b). 1 In this appeal, we are called upon to

1 General Laws 1956 § 12

- 19

- 18 , as amended by P.L. 2010, ch. 311, § 1, provides , in pertinent part, that: “(b) Whenever any person, after an evidentiary hearing, has been sentenced to imprisonment for violation of a suspended sentence or probationary period by reason of the alleged commission of a f elony or misdemeanor said sentence of imprisonment shall, on a motion made to the court on behalf of the person so sentenced, be quashed, and imprisonment shall be terminated when any of the following occur on the charge which was specifically alleged to h ave constituted the violation:

“ (1) After trial [the] person is found ‘not guilty’ or a motion for judgment of acquittal or to dismiss is made and granted pursuant to Superior or District Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 29;

“ (2) After hearing evidence, a ‘no true bill’ is returned by the grand jury;- 2

-

d etermine whether this case

— in which a trial justice imposed a suspended sentence and probationary term on the defendant, Robert Beau doin, following a plea of nolo contendere entered before the 2010 amendment but who was adjudged to be a probation violator, imprisoned as a result, and then acquitted by a jury on the underlying charges after the statute was amended

— involves retroactive a pplication or prospective application of § 12

- 19

- 18(b). For the following reasons, we conclude that this case entails prospective, not retroactive, application of the statute . Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court. 2
Facts and Travel
In 2009, defendant

— no stranger to the criminal justice system

— entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of felony assault, which involved stabbing his victim in the throat with a

r azor blade or knife ; he was sentenced to fifteen years at the Adult Corre ctional Institutions (ACI), five months to serve and the remaining 175 months suspended with probation. 3 The

“ (3) After consideration by an assistant or special assistant designa ted by the attorney general, a ‘no information’ based upon a lack of probable cause is returned;

“ (4) A motion to dismiss is made and gra nte d pursuant to the Rhode Island [G]eneral [L] aws [1956] § 12

- 12

- 1.7 and/or Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.1; or

“ (5) The charge fails to proceed in District or Superior Court under circumstances where the state is indicating a lack of proba ble cause, or circumstances where the state or its agents believe there is doubt about the culpability of the accused.”

2 We acknowledge the amicus curiae brief submitted by the Rhode Island Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

3 The record is silent as to the reasons why this brutal stabbing warranted onl y f ive months of imprisonment when a fifteen

- year prison sentence was imposed

.- 3

-

General Assembly amended § 12

- 19

- 18 and added subsections (b) and (c) 4 on June 25 , 2010

. See P.L. 2010, ch. 311 , § 1 . Thereafter, in May 2012, d efendant was arrested and charged with one count of second

- degree sexual assault, see G.L. 1956 § 11

- 37

- 4, and one count of robbery,

see G.L. 1956 § 11

- 39

- 1. Additionally, the state filed, pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Pro cedure, a notice of probation violation in this case based on the conduct giving rise to these charges. After a n evidentiary hearing, a trial justice declared defendant to be a probation violator, removed two years of the suspended sentence, and ordered d efendant to serve two year s at the ACI

. 5 The defendant then proceeded to a jury trial in Superior Court on the underlying charges 6 and was acquitted on both counts on April 26, 2013

. On the heels of his acquittal, defendant filed a motion to terminat e his imprisonment under § 12

- 19

- 18(b). Pursuant to an administrative order of the presiding justice of the Superior Court, all motions seeking relief under § 12

- 19

- 18(b) we re assigned to a single Superior Court trial justice. Accordingly, before hearing this case , the trial justice decided a motion in a case with a similar chronology to that of defendant’s case: where the judgment of conviction was entered before the effective date of § 12

- 19

- 18(b), and the defendant was adjudicated to be a probation vio lator after the 2010 amendment

. See State v. Ford , No. P2/05

- 83A, 2012 WL

4 Section 12

- 19

- 18(c) provides that : “This section shall apply to all individuals sentenced to imprisonment for viola tion of a suspended sentence or probationary period by reason of the alleged commission of a felony or misdemeanor and shall not alter the ability of the court to revoke a suspended sentence or probationary period for an allegation of conduct that does not rise to the level of criminal conduct.”

5 A description of the conduct giving rise to the probation vi olation hearing is unnecessary to this appeal but is set forth in our opinion affirming the trial justice’s adjudication of probation violation

. See St ate v. Beaudoin , No. 20 12

- 325

- C.A. (R.I. , filed April 26, 2016).

6 The robbery count was evidently amended before defendant’s trial in Superior Court to a charge of larceny from the person, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11

- 41

- 7.- 4

-

3638916, at *1

- 2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012). The defendant in that case ( Ford ) was then ordered to be incarcerated on the previo usly imposed suspended sentence and subsequent ly acquitted by a jury after a trial on the underlying charges. Id. at * 2. In light of this identity of issues , the trial just ice permitted defendant to incorporate the arguments made by the defendant
in Ford

. Similarl y, the state in this case incorpora ted the arguments it made in Ford

. The state’s arguments i n Ford rested on its position that the word “sentence” in § 12

- 19

- 18(b) refers to the imposition of the suspended sentence

— which, in Ford’s case, predated the 2010 amendment

— and not the execution o f that previously imposed sentence following the adjudication of probation violation. From this premise, the state argued that § 12

- 19

- 18(b) was not available to Ford because the statute could not be applied retroactively

. Finally, the state contended th at “ the retroactive application of * * * § 12

- 19

- 18(b) would not pass constitutional muster” under separation

- of

- powers principles because it would vacate or modify a prior court judgment

— the original judgment of conviction that included the suspended sent ence

— th at was entered before the 2010 a mendment

. (Emphasis added.) In making this constitutional argument in Ford , the

s tate did not argue that, if this case involved prospective, and not retroactive, application of the statute, § 12

- 19

- 18(b) was unconsti tutional

. In this case, a lthough the trial justice determined that defendant met the prerequisites for relief under § 12

- 19

- 18(b), 7 he nonetheless denied defendant’s motion for two reasons. First, the trial justice concluded that application of § 12

- 19

- 18(b) in this case required retroactive application of the 2010 amendment, and he was of the opinion that the statute could not be applied retroactively. To support this conclusion, he expressly adopted his reasoning in Ford , in

7 At oral argument before this Court, the state conceded that, because it failed to argue below that defendant had not satisfied the requirements of the statute, it was not challenging this determination of the trial justice. Accordingly, we express no opinion on this issue.- 5

-

which the trial justice, relying on this Court’s opinion in State v. Garnetto , 75 R.I. 86, 63 A.2d 777 (1949), determined that, because a probation violation hearing is but “ a continuation of the original prosecution, ” a defendant who was given a suspended sentence before the 2010 amendment could not be granted relief under the statute without retroactive application

. Ford , 2012 WL 3638916, at *8 (quoting State v. Gautier , 871 A.2d 347, 359 (R.I. 2005))

. The trial justice went on to conclude that, notwithstanding the infirmity o f retroactive application, defendant’s motion also should be denied fo r an independent reason: that, even if applied prospectively, § 12

- 19

- 18(b) constituted an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power by the General Assembly. As he did for his conclus ion on the retroactivity issue, the trial justice expressly incorporated the constitutional analysis that he laid out in Ford . Th e trial justice reasoned that § 12

- 19

- 18(b) improperly disturbed the judgment embodying the probation violation adjudication a nd the incarcerative term ordered as a result of that adjudication. He declared: “[T]he General Assembly is without authority to affect a

judgment

-- such as a finding of violation along with the particular imposition of sentence

-- that was previously ente red by this [c] ourt. Such a ction usurps the authority of [ th e Superior] Court and its ability to determine if a defendant has failed to keep the peace [and be] of good behavior. “* * * [T]he General Assembly exceeds its power when it passes legislatio n that affects, or otherwise encroaches on judgmen ts and verdicts entered by the [c] ourts. “* * * Any attempt by the Legislature to disturb a finding of a violation and the resultant imposition of a sentence by the hearing justice is an encroachment on or an attempt to subvert the power of the judiciary.” Ford , 2012 WL 3638916, at *14 (emphases added)

. See also id. at *19 (“[Section 12

- 19

- 18(b)] usurp s a core judicial function of [ th e Superior]
Court. Consequently, § 12

- 19

- 18(b) cannot stand as writt en and must be deemed- 6

-

unconstitutional as it encroaches on the judiciary’s power.”). The trial justice also found it problematic that “the statute provides for no discretion to the members of [ th e Superior] Court; instead, the statute mandates that the se ntence must be quashed.” Ford , 2012 WL 3638916,
at * 15. In addition, the trial justice concluded that § 12

- 19

- 18(b) unconstitutionally “attempts to impose a rule of decision on a judgment of the Superior Court in the instant case at a time subsequent to the entry of that judgment.” Ford , 2012 WL 3638916, at *15

. F inally, the trial justice expressed his belief that “the better practice would be to allow a defendant to obtain a reconsideration of a judgment of the Superior Court finding a violation.” Id. at *19. The defendant timely appealed. 8
Standard of Review The question of whether a statute’s application in a particular case is retroactive or prospective is legal in nature ; accordingly, we review it de novo . See Arevalo v. Ashcroft , 344 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Jaghoori v. Holder , 772 F.3d 764, 769 (4th Cir. 2014); Faiz

Mohammad v. Ashcroft , 39 5 F.3d 799, 801 (7th Cir. 2005)

. Analysis Retroactivity A law is applied retroactively when “ it changes the legal consequences of acts complet ed before its effective date.” State v. Desjarlais , 731 A.2d 716, 718 (R.I. 1999) (quoting Miller v. Florida , 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987), abrogated in part on other grounds by California Department of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499, 506

- 07 n.3 (1995))

. However, “ [a] statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating

8 Me anwhile, the trial justice granted defendant’s motion to be released on bail pending his appeal.- 7

-

the statute’s enactment * * * or upsets expectations based in prior law.” Land graf v. USI Film Products , 511 U.S. 244, 269 ( 1994)

. The critical first step in the retroactivity inquiry is identifying the conduct or event that triggers the statute’s application. See Rhode Island Insurers’ Insolvency Fund v. Leviton Manufacturing Co. , 716 A.2d 730, 735 (R.I. 1998) ( Leviton ) . On ce properly identified, the triggering event guides the analysis. See id. (“ The determination of whether a statute’s application in a particular situation is prospective or retroactive depends upon whether the conduct that allegedly triggers the statute’s application occurs before or after the law’s effective date.” (quoting McAndrews v. Fleet Bank of Massachusetts, N.A. , 989 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1993) )). On the one hand, in a case where the triggering event occurs before the statute’s enactment, the sta tute applies retroactively

. See id. (“Only when the adverse effects of the

statute are activated by events that occurred before the effective date of its enactment will the statute’s reach be declared retrospective.” (emphasis added)). On the other, when a statute’s application is triggered by an event that occurs after the statute’s effective date, it operates prospectively, not retroactively. See McAndrews , 989 F.2d at 16 (“ [A] statute’ s application is usually deemed prospective when it implicates cond uct occurring on or after the effective date.

* * * E ven when the later

- occurring circumstance depends upon the existence of a prior fact, that interdependence, without more, will not transform an otherwise prospective application into a retroactive one. ”)

. In the last analysis, the retroactivity inquiry “demands a commonsense, functional judgment,” Martin v. Hadix , 527 U.S. 343, 357 (1999), and “[t]he key lies in how t he law interacts with the facts , ” McAndrews , 989 F.2d at 16.- 8

-

In this case, we turn to the statutory text to divine the triggering events. Section 12

- 19

- 18(b) provides:

“ Whenever any person, after an evidentiary hearing, has been sentenced to imprisonment for violation of a suspended sentence or probationary period by reason of the alleged commission of a felony or misdemeanor said sentence of imprisonment shall, on a motion made to the court on behalf of the person so sentenced, be quashed, and imprisonment shall be terminated when any of the following occur on the charge which was specific ally alleged to have constituted the violation:

“ ( 1) After trial [the] person is found ‘not guilty’ or a motion for judgment of acquittal or to dismiss is made and granted pursuant to Superior or District Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 29; “(2) After h earing evidence, a ‘no true bill’ is returned by the grand jury;

“ (3) After consideration by an assistant or special assistant designa ted by the attorney general, a ‘no information’ based upon a lack of probable cause is returned;

“ (4) A motion to dismis s is made and granted pursuant to the Rhode Island [G]eneral [L] aws [1956] § 12

- 12

- 1.7 and/or Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.1; or

“ (5) The charge fails to proceed in District or Superior Court under circumstances where the state is indicatin g a lack of probable cause, or circumstances where the state or its agents believe there is doubt about the culpability of the accused. ” Our close examination of the statute convinces us that there are three events that trigger application of § 12

- 19

- 1 8(b): (1) there is an evidentiary hearing; (2) a defendant is declared a violator and is “sentenced to imprisonment for violation of a suspended sentence or probation ary- 9

-

period , ” id. ; and (3 ) the subsequent occurrence of one of the five events specified in subsection (b)(1)

- (5) of § 12

- 19

- 18

. 9
In this ca se, there is no dispute that two of the triggering events

— namely, an evidentiary hearing and an acquittal on the underlying charges, see § 12

- 19

- 18(b) (1)

— occurred well after the 2010 amendment. With respec t to the other triggering event, the state argued before the trial justice that the term “sentence” in § 12

- 19

- 18(b) refers to the imposition of the suspended
sentence , which , in this case , occurred in 2009. We reject this interpretation of the statute. Under the plain language of § 12

- 19

- 18(b), the phrase “sentence of imprisonment” clearly refers to imprisonment that results from the adjudication of probation violation and the execution of some or all of the previously imposed suspended sentence. See § 12

- 19

- 18(b) (“ Whenever any person, after an evidentiary hearing, has been sentenced to imprisonment for violation of a suspended sentence or probationary period * * * said sentence of imprisonment shall * * * be quashed, and imprisonment shall be terminat ed * * *. ” (emphasis added) )

. In this case, defendant’s motion seeks to terminate the imprisonment that was ordered as a result of the 2012 probation violation adjudication. The judgment reflecting that adjudication and the trial

9 The statute imposes certain requirements that need not concern us in this case. For instance, the violation adjudication must be based on “the alleged commi ssion of a felony or misdemeanor , ” and the subsequent occurrence of one of the five events specified in subsection (b)(1)

- (5) of § 12

- 19

- 18 must relate to “the charge which was specifically alleged to have constituted the violation.” Section 12

- 19

- 18(b). We note that the statute does not apply to other misconduct by the probationer “that does not rise to the level of criminal conduct.” Section 12

- 19

- 18(c). Therefore, violation proceedings that arise from non criminal conduct that transgresses the terms an d conditions of probation

— such as refusal to comply with special condition s of probation; failure to comply with sex

- offender registration laws , where the violation adjudication is not predicated on a knowing failure to register , see G.L. 1956 § 1 1

- 37 .1

- 10 (providing for criminal penalties for those who “knowingly” violate the registration laws); or failing to notify authorities after witnessing a murder, see State v. Gautier , 774 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2001)

— do not come within § 12

- 19

- 18(b). In this case, t h e state does not challenge , nor do we consider, whether the additional requirements of § 12

- 19

- 18(b) have been met. See supra note 7

.- 10

-

justice’s decision to e xecute a portion of the previously imposed suspended sentence is the “sentence of imprisonment” envisioned by § 12

- 19

- 18(b). Therefore, b ecause all three triggering events occurred a fter the 2010 amendment to § 12

- 19

- 18, the statute operates prospectively, not retroactively, in this case. 10 The state, in arguing to the contrary, insists that this case involves retroactive application o f § 12

- 19

- 18(b) because the statute “would alter the legal consequences of the probationary sentence that the Superior Court imposed in 2009.” We disagree with this assertion. Application of § 12

- 19

- 18(b) in this case in no way modifies or amends the judgment that i mposed the suspended sentence: T he length of the suspended sentence remains unaffected; the terms and conditions of defendant’s probation have similarly not changed; and, contrary to the state’s assertion, the 2010 amendment had no effect on the burden of proof employed at a probation violation hearing. 11 Undeterred, the state presses on, arguing that this case inv olves retroactive application of § 12

- 19

- 18(b) because it would “undermine the intent of the trial justice who imposed ” the suspended sentence. Once again, we are unpersuaded. “ A statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment * * * or upsets expectations based in prior law .” Land graf , 511 U.S. at 269

10 In his reply brief, defendant appears to assert that the only event that needs to postdate the 2010 amendment for § 12

- 19

- 18(b) to apply prospectively is the occurrence of one of the events set forth in subsection (b)(1)

- (5) of § 12

- 19

- 18

. Because we need not do so to decide this case, we express no opinion on the issue of whether a case where the defendant is determ ined to be a probation violator and imprisoned pursuant to the execution of a previously imposed sentence before the 2010 amendment , but an event delineated in subsection (b)(1)

- (5) of § 12

- 19

- 18 occurs after the amendment , involves retroactive or prospect ive application of § 12

- 19

- 18(b).

11 At most, § 12

- 19

- 18(b) , by providing for termination of imprisonment, mandates the modification of the incarcerative component of the judgment of conviction and commitment that was entered after defendant was adjudicat ed to be a probation violator. However, because that judgment was entered in 2012, after the effective date of the 2010 amendment to § 12

- 19

- 18, this circumstance does not present a retroactivity problem in this case

.- 11

-

(emphasis added) ; cf. McAndrews , 989 F.2d at 16 (“[A] statute may modify the legal effect of a present status or alt er a preexisting relationship without running up against the retroactivity hurdle.”) . Our decision in Leviton is instructive on this point. In that case , Leviton purchased workers’ compensation insurance policies from American Mutual Life Insurance Comp any (American Mutual), at a time when the Rhode Island Insurers’ Insolvency Fund Act (Insolvency Act) provided that “the fund shall have no cause of action against the insured of the insolvent insurer for any sums it has paid out.” Leviton , 716 A.2d at 73 2 (quoting P.L. 1970, ch. 166) ; see also id. at 735

. In 1988, one year before American Mutual became insolvent and two years after Leviton’s insurance contract expired, the General Assembly repealed the Insolvency Act in its entirety , see P.L. 1988, ch. 4 07, § 1, and replaced it with a new Insolvency Act , see P.L. 1988, ch. 407, § 2, that included a provision that “ permitted the fund to recover all amounts paid on behalf of an insured with a net worth in excess of $50 million. ” Leviton , 716 A.2d at 732. In 1993, the fund sued Leviton for a full refund of payments the fund made to Leviton, which h ad a net worth in excess of $50 million. Id. at 733. Leviton demurred, asserting, among other things, that the application of the refund provision of the new In solvency Act to its situation constituted retroactive application. See id. This Court rejected Leviton’s retroactivity argument. See Leviton , 716 A.2d at 735

- 36. While acknowledging that Leviton purchased the policies at a time when state law barred t he fund from seeking recovery and that “Leviton may have relied upon the then

- existing law at the inception of the contracts,” the Court explained that :

“[N]one of these factors triggered the fund’s right of recovery. Rather the triggering factor was the subsequent insolvency of American Mutual in March 1989, an event that occurred well after the enactment of [the refund provision of the new Insolvency Act]. * * * [M]erely entering into contracts for insurance to discharge one’s potential workers’ compen sation liability does not in itself- 12

- implicate the recoupment provision of the act. Rather it is the subsequent insolvency of the insurer and the concomitant obligation to pay the statutorily mandated claims that triggered the statute.” Id. at 735.
See a lso id. at 736 (“[I]n the context of a retrospective analysis, the date the insurer becomes insolvent is the controlling criterion and not the date that gives rise to the claim.”). The Court thus concluded that the new Insolvency Act was not operating ret roactively. See id. Similarly, in this case, the mere fact that application of § 12

- 19

- 18(b) might f rustrate the intent of the trial justice who imposed defendant’s suspended sentence in 2009 does not mean that the statute is being applied retroactively in this case. As was true for the purchase of the policies in Leviton , the trial justice’s imposition of the suspended sentence in 2009 is not the event that triggers application of § 12

- 19

- 18(b)

. 12 For these reasons, we hold that this case involve s prospective , not retroactive, application of § 12

- 19

- 18(b). See Desjarlais , 731 A.2d at 718; Leviton , 716 A.2d at 735. Constitutionality There is one loose end. The trial justice did not base his denial of defendant’s motion solely on the ground that this case involved retroactive application of § 12

- 19

- 18(b); instead, he concluded that, even disregarding the retroactivity issue, § 12

- 19

- 18(b) constituted an unconstitutional legislative exercise of judicial power because th e statute purports to affect a judgment of the Superior Court embodying the adjudication of probation violation and the

12 Additionally, we pause to note that our decision in State v. Garnetto , 75 R.I. 86, 63 A.2d 777 (1949)

— on which the trial justice relied for h is conclusion that a case such as this one involved retroactive application of § 12

- 19

- 18(b), see State v. Ford , No. P2/05

- 83A, 2012 WL 3638916, at *8 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012)

— is distinguishable. To be sure, in Garnetto , 75 R.I. at 87

- 88, 63 A.2d at 77 7

- 7 8, as in this case, the suspended sentence was imposed prior to the effective date of the relevant statute. Critically, however, the defendant in Garnetto was, unlike in this case, adjudged to be a violator

— and the trial justice executed his suspended sentence and incarcerated him

— prior to the statute’s enactment. See id. at 87

- 88 , 63 A.2d at 778. Therefore, u nlike in this case, the triggering events in Garnetto predated the statute.- 13

-

execution of all or a portion of a previously imposed suspended sentence. See Ford , 2012 WL 3638916, at *14, *19. Because this conclusion is not tethered to a case involving retroactive application, it effectively declares the statute unconstitutional in all cases involving prospective application: where , as here, th e three triggering events occur a fter the 2010 amendment to § 12 19

- 18

. The trial justice reached th is conclusion sua sponte

. After scouring the record, we are convinced that the question of whether § 12

- 19

- 18(b) is constitutional when applied prospectively was not raised by either party below. To be sure, the state argued that, if applied retroactively , the statute would be unconstitutional under separation

of

- powers principles. That argument, however , was founded on the premise that the application of the statute modified the 2009 judgment embodying the imposition of the suspended
sentence

— a premise t hat we reject. The state did not argue that, if this case involved prospective, and not retroactive, application of the statute, § 12

- 19

- 18(b) was unconstitutional

. In sum, the state argued that this case involved a retroactive application of § 12

- 19

- 18 (b) and, for that reason , resulted in an unconstitutional application of the statute, but the trial justice not only agreed that this case concerned a retroactive application of the statute, but went on to conclude that the statute was unconstitutional eve n when applied prospectively. The distinction between the state’s argument below and the tr ial justice’s decision may be
subtle , but it is of critical importance to the responsibility of this Court

. When, as in this case, this Court faces a fork in the ro ad, with one turn that will require it to slog through the thicket of a constitutional issue and the other offering a journey through more hospitable terrain , we routinely elect to take the path of least resistance. See In re Brown , 903 A.2d 147, 151 (R.I

. 2006) (“ Neither this Court nor the Superior Court should decide constitutional issues unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. ”); Caron v. Town of North Smithfield , 885 A.2d 1163, 1165 (R.I.- 14

-

2005) (mem.) (“[T] his Court has on many occasions held that it will not decide a case on constitutional grounds if it otherwise can be decided. ”) . Such a route exists in this case. The trial justice was without authority to raise and decide, sua sponte , a constitutional issue that was not squarely placed before hi m by the parties. See In re Brown , 903 A.2d at 151;
Devane v. Devane , 581 A.2d 264, 264 (R.I. 1990) (“[A] trial justice has no standing sua sponte to attack the constitutionality of a statute when neither party to the litigation has lodged a constitutiona l challenge.”); see also Butti v. Rossi , 617 A.2d 881, 883 (R.I. 1992); Outlet Communications, Inc. v. State , 588 A.2d 1050, 1052 (R.I. 1991); Easton’s Point Association v. Coastal Resources Management Council , 522 A.2d 199, 202 (R.I. 1987)

. As this Court explained in Devane , 581 A.2d at 265, “[I] t is clear and imperative that a trial justice, in the exercise of his or her judicial authority, not resolve a constitutional issue unless and until such issue is actually raised by the parties to the controversy and a necessity for such a decision is clear and imperative.” Therefore, we must vacate the trial justice ’s decision on this point, see In
re Brown , 903 A.2d at 151; in doing so, we necessarily express no opinio n on the constitutionality of § 12

- 19

- 18(b) when applied prospectively. Conclusion For the reaso ns articulated above, we vacate the trial justic e’s denial of the defendant’s § 12

- 19

- 18(b) motion and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

### R HODE 

### I SLAND 

### S UPREME 

### C OURT 

### C LERK 

### ’ S 

### O FFICE 

### Clerk’s Office Order/O pinion Cover Sheet

TITLE OF CASE: State v . Robert Beaudoin. CASE NO : No. 20 1 3

- 254

- C.A

. ( P2/ 09

- 51 A ) COURT: Supreme Court DATE OPINION FILED: April 26 , 2016 JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, J J. WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT : Associate Justice William E. Carnes, Jr. ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL : For State : Christopher R. Bush Department of Attorney General
For D efendant : Kara J. Maguire Office of the Public Defender