[Cite as State v. Hollowell, 2015-Ohio-5261.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 102782

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

MARQUIS HOLLOWELL

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-13-575538-A 

BEFORE: Stewart, J., Jones, P.J., and Kilbane, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 17, 2015 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Thomas A. Rein 

700 West St. Clair, Suite 212 

Cleveland, OH 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

Glen Ramdhan 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, OH 44113 
MELODY J. STEWART, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Marquis Hollowell appeals the trial court’s imposition of 

consecutive sentences. He argues that the trial court failed to make the statutory 

findings required to impose a consecutive sentence. Finding no merit to Hollowell’s 

sole assigned error, we affirm. 

{¶2} On September 24, 2013, Hollowell pleaded guilty to a single count of 

felonious assault. Upon convicting Hollowell, the trial court imposed a three-year 

prison sentence to be served consecutive to another prison sentence previously imposed 

for which Hollowell was serving a four-year prison term at the time of the sentencing. 

On direct appeal from the conviction and sentence, Hollowell argued that the trial court 

failed to properly inform him during the plea colloquy and also that the trial court erred 

by imposing consecutive sentences. We reversed the conviction finding that the trial 

court had indeed failed to inform Hollowell that the state must prove his guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt as mandated by Crim.R. 11(C)(2) and remanded the case to the trial 

court. State v. Hollowell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100674, 2014-Ohio-2407. As the 

resolution of the first assigned error was dispositive of the appeal, this court did not 

consider Hollowell’s argument that his consecutive sentences were improper. Id. at ¶ 2. 

{¶3} On remand, Hollowell once again pleaded guilty on March 13, 2015, and the 

court sentenced him to serve two years in prison, instead of the previously imposed three 

years, to run consecutive to the prison sentence he was then serving. This sentence on 

remand forms the basis of the current appeal. 
{¶4} In this appeal, Hollowell again assigns as error that the imposition of 

consecutive sentences is contrary to law because the court failed to make all the findings 

required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). 

{¶5} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a sentencing judge to make the following 

findings before imposing consecutive sentences: first, that consecutive sentences are 

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender; second, that 

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public; and third, that either (a) the 

offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting 

trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to R.C. section 2929.16, 

2929.17, or 2929.18, or was under postrelease control for a prior offense, (b) at least two 

of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and 

the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or 

unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any 

courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct, or (c) the 

offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are 

necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. 

{¶6} Hollowell argues that the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences failed 

to conform to the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). To comply with the statute, a 

trial court must make certain findings at the sentencing hearing, and “‘must note that it 

engaged in the analysis’ and that it ‘has considered the statutory criteria and specifie[d] 
which of the given bases warrants its decision.’” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 

2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 

326, 715 N.E.2d 131 (1999). 

{¶7} The record reflects that the court made the first and second findings. It 

stated, “I think it’s necessary to punish Mr. Hollowell to protect the public from future 

crime and it’s not disproportionate to the conduct of the danger imposed upon him.” Tr. 

58. Hollowell complains that this statement does not reflect the second finding’s 

requirement of “danger the offender poses to the public.” We disagree. Although the 

court did not use the exact phrase “danger the offender poses to the public,” it did not 

have to use the verbatim terms of the statute. State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891, 992 

N.E.2d 453, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). Consecutive sentences will be upheld if “the reviewing 

court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis.” Bonnell at ¶ 29. 

{¶8} We view the court’s statement as sufficient to satisfy the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) 

findings that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from Hollowell’s 

future crime and to punish him, and are not disproportionate to Hollowell’s conduct and 

the danger he poses to the public. Although the trial court did not state the second 

finding in exact terms, we can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis 

when it considered a consecutive sentence in relation to the danger Hollowell’s conduct 

poses to the public. 

{¶9} We next consider whether the court made the third required finding. 
{¶10} The court made the finding that two of Hollowell’s multiple offenses were 

committed as part of one course of conduct and the harm caused by his multiple offenses 

was so great that no single prison term adequately reflects the seriousness of his conduct. 

 The court told Hollowell, “Your criminal history demonstrates that consecutive 

sentences is [sic] necessary, and it also appears to be a course of conduct with your prior 

sentence * * * and is considered a course of conduct.” Tr. 57-58. The court also 

explained, “A single term would not adequately reflect the seriousness of your conduct.” 

Tr. 58. 

{¶11} Additionally, the court’s statements reflect the finding that Hollowell’s 

history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to 

protect the public from his future crime. In addition to the above statement indicating 

Hollowell’s criminal history, the court stated, “I think it’s necessary to punish Hollowell 

to protect the public from future crime.” Tr. 58. 

{¶12} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the court to make at least one finding under the 

third requirement. Here, the court has clearly made two. 

{¶13} Finally, Hollowell also complains that the sentencing entry does not reflect 

what the trial court said in open court at the sentencing hearing. Bonnell requires that the 

trial court not only make the required findings at the sentencing hearing, so as to “afford[] 

notice to the offender and to defense counsel,” but also incorporate the findings into the 

sentencing entry, “because a court speaks through its journal.” Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 

209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 29, citing State v. Brooke, 113 Ohio St.3d 199, 
2007-Ohio-1533, 863 N.E.2d 1024, ¶ 47. Our review of the journal shows that the court 

incorporated its findings in the March 17, 2015 journal entry. 

{¶14} Judgment affirmed. 

 It is ordered that appellee recover of said appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

______________________________________________ 

MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR