NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

SADE MONE,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2018-2208

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:17-cv-01819-PEC, Judge Patricia E. CampbellSmith.

______________________

Decided: March 26, 2019

______________________

SADE MONE, Savannah, GA, pro se. 

 TANYA KOENIG, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

JOSEPH H. HUNT, TARA K. HOGAN, ROBERT EDWARD 

KIRSCHMAN, JR. 

 ______________________

Before LOURIE, O’MALLEY, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
2 MONE v. UNITED STATES

PER CURIAM.

Sade Mone appeals from a decision of the United States 

Court of Federal Claims (the “Claims Court”) dismissing 

her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and declining to transfer the case to district court. Mone v. United 

States, 138 Fed. Cl. 279 (2018). Because the Claims Court 

did not err in its dismissal and because any error in its 

analysis of the transferee court’s jurisdiction was harmless, 

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Sade Mone, formerly known as Tabitha Robinson, filed 

a complaint in the Claims Court alleging that she was subjected to illegal housing conditions and illegal eviction proceedings by the Housing Authority of the City of 

Charleston (“CHA”) while she was a resident at one of the 

city’s housing projects. See id. at 280. CHA is a public 

housing agency created under state law. See S.C. Code 

Ann. § 31-3-310. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) is a federal agency 

that provides annual contributions to help the public housing agencies maintain and operate low-income housing projects. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq. 

Mone’s complaint details the distressing living situation she experienced including (1) construction resulting in 

water damage; (2) the manager distributing “the master 

key to [her] unit so that random people could enter without 

[her] prior knowledge or consent”; (3) CHA employees giving “tenants permission to impose themselves, their 

friends, children, other relatives, companions, etc. upon 

[her]”; (4) offensive behaviors such as loitering, profanity, 

drug use and dealing, alcohol, loud music, and vandalism;

(5) CHA instructing the police “not to file a police or incident report whenever a call came in” from her address;

(6) CHA harassing her with “meritless” ejection proceedings that were unsuccessful; and (7) HUD’s annual inspections in 2009, 2010, and 2011 resulting in a pass even 
MONE v. UNITED STATES 3

though there was “black mold” throughout the house and 

CHA’s own inspection detailed that there was “mold covering every room of the unit including walls, windows, and 

attic.” Complaint ¶ 4, Mone v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 

279 (2018) (No. 17-1819C), ECF No. 1; J.A. 9–11 (“Complaint”).

Because of these conditions, Mone sent a letter to 

HUD’s Columbia Field Office on June 19, 2010 complaining 

about the conditions and CHA. See Plaintiff’s Motion of 

Opposition, Ex. 2, Mone v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 279 

(2018) (No. 17-1819C), ECF No. 12. According to Mone, she 

received no response. See Complaint ¶ 4. On November 

16, 2011, Mone was evicted. Mone was then homeless for 

the next two years and her health declined. She had to be 

hospitalized multiple times and was diagnosed with several illnesses. During this time, she sent another letter on 

September 13, 2012—this time to HUD’s Atlanta Regional 

Office—but again, she states that she received no response. 

Id.; see Plaintiff’s Motion of Opposition, Ex. 3, Mone v. 

United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 279 (2018) (No. 17-1819C), ECF 

No. 12. On November 17, 2017, Mone filed her complaint 

at the Claims Court alleging that the “gross negligence of 

HUD employees who refused to respond to [her] complaints 

and falsified inspections” resulted in her “permanent 

health problems.” Complaint ¶ 4. Mone requested $13.5 

million in damages. Id. ¶ 5.

The Claims Court granted the government’s motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Mone’s claims sounded in tort, which is expressly 

excluded from the court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker 

Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491. The court then declined to 

transfer the case to another district court because it determined that Mone’s tort claims were time-barred. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2401(b). The court determined that her claim accrued on her eviction date of November 16, 2011. According to the court, the statute of limitations thus expired on 
4 MONE v. UNITED STATES

November 16, 2013 based on the two-year statute of limitations in § 2401(b). Her complaint was not filed at the 

court until November 17, 2017, which was at least four 

years too late. See Mone, 138 Fed. Cl. at 282. Because her 

claims were time-barred, the court held that no district 

court could exercise jurisdiction and the case could not be 

properly transferred. See id. The Claims Court thus dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Id.

Mone timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review de novo dismissals by the Claims Court for 

lack of jurisdiction. Frazer v. United States, 288 F.3d 1347, 

1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We review for abuse of discretion a

decision by the Claims Court concerning whether to dismiss or transfer a case to another court. See Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008). “The underlying determination of whether the 

transferee court has jurisdiction over the claim is a question of law,” which we review de novo. Id. at 1342–43.

I

Mone argues that the Claims Court erred by failing to 

address HUD’s violation of its own regulations as well as 

her constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of 

the Fifth Amendment, which states that no one shall be 

“deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 

law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. According to Mone, while 

CHA’s actions “were of tort, the actions of HUD were not.” 

Appellant’s Br. 1. She contends that the court erred by not 

addressing the implied contract she had with HUD through 

HUD regulations as defined in HUD’s Title VIII “Fair 

Housing Complaint Process.” Id.

The government responds that the Claims Court did 

not fail to take into account any relevant facts. The government contends that the court properly reviewed the 
MONE v. UNITED STATES 5

facts alleged in her complaint and found that all the claims 

sounded in tort, which that court lacks jurisdiction to consider. To the extent that Mone alleged a constitutional violation, the government also argues that the Claims Court 

lacks jurisdiction to hear claims under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. While the Claims Court did 

not address her implied contract claim, Mone never raised 

it before the court, and the government argues it is waived 

on appeal. Thus, according to the government, the court 

properly dismissed her complaint.

We agree with the government that the Claims Court 

properly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear 

Mone’s claims. The Tucker Act grants the Claims Court 

jurisdiction over claims against the United States “founded 

either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any 

regulation of an executive department, or upon any express 

or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in 

tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Tucker 

Act is “only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any 

substantive right enforceable against the United States for 

money damages.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 

398 (1976). “Instead, to invoke jurisdiction under the 

Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a contractual relationship, constitutional provision, statute, or regulation that 

provides a substantive right to money damages.” Khan v. 

United States, 201 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Mone’s allegations against HUD are based on its asserted negligence in failing to address her housing problems and falsified inspections. Both the negligence and 

fraud claims sound in tort, which the Claims Court does 

not have jurisdiction to hear. See § 1491(a)(1). Mone’s 

claims may be read to arise under the Federal Tort Claims 

Act (“FTCA”), see Mone, 138 Fed. Cl. at 281, and Congress 

has provided that “the district courts” have “exclusive jurisdiction” over those claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The 

Claims Court also lacks jurisdiction to hear claims alleging 
6 MONE v. UNITED STATES

a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it does not mandate payment of money by the 

government. See LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025,

1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995). We therefore agree that the Claims 

Court correctly determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mone’s claims.

II

We also conclude that the Claims Court did not abuse 

its discretion in deciding not to transfer the case to a district court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631,

[w]henever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and 

that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, 

the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, 

transfer such action or appeal to any other such 

court . . . in which the action or appeal could have 

been brought at the time it was filed or noticed . . . .

Id. We have interpreted § 1631 to require satisfaction by a 

transferring court that a “transferee court has jurisdiction 

to hear the case” before transferring it. See Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

(quoting Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds & Ins. Agency, Inc. v. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 490 F.3d 940, 944 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 

The Claims Court purported to do so here and determined 

that there was no court in which the claims could have been 

filed because the FTCA claims were time-barred under 28 

U.S.C. § 2401(b),1 and, based on that finding, decided not 

to transfer the case. Cf. Robleto v. United States, 634 F. 

App’x 306, 308 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding that because 

 

1 We note the Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations for complaints filed in the Claims Court 

under § 2501 is jurisdictional; however, the time limits of 

§ 2401(b) are not. Compare John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008), with United 

States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632–34 (2015).
MONE v. UNITED STATES 7

the claim was time-barred, dismissal instead of transfer of 

case was proper even though § 2401(b) is not jurisdictional).

Under § 2401(b),

[a] tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the 

appropriate Federal agency within two years after 

such claim accrues or unless action is begun within 

six months after the date of mailing, by certified or 

registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim 

by the agency to which it was presented.

Id. (emphases added). Although written using the disjunctive, this provision, as interpreted by several of our sister 

courts of appeals, requires that the claimant both present

the claim to the appropriate agency within two years after 

accrual of the claim and file a complaint in district court 

within six months after the agency finally denies the 

claim.2 The Claims Court thus erred in interpreting

 

2 See, e.g., Sconiers v. United States, 896 F.3d 595, 

599 (3d Cir. 2018) (collecting cases); Sanchez v. United 

States, 740 F.3d 47, 50 n.6 (1st Cir. 2014) (“We read this 

disjunctive language [of § 2401(b)] as setting out two deadlines, both (not just either) of which must be satisfied.”); 

Ellison v. United States, 531 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 2008)

(holding that both deadlines must be satisfied); Phillips v. 

United States, 260 F.3d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001) (“It is 

undisputed that under section 2401(b), a tort claim must 

be presented to the appropriate federal agency within two 

years after the claim accrues and the lawsuit must be commenced within six months after the receipt of a final agency 

decision.”); Houston v. U.S. Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 896, 902 

(5th Cir. 1987) (“Though phrased in the disjunctive, this 

statute requires a claimant to file an administrative claim 
8 MONE v. UNITED STATES

§ 2401(b) to require filing a complaint within two years after such claim accrues; the statute, as generally interpreted, requires presentment to an agency “within two 

years after such claim accrues” and filing a complaint 

“within six months after . . . final denial of the claim by the 

agency to which it was presented.” § 2401(b).

Applying that interpretation of § 2401(b), and assuming arguendo that the Claims Court properly found that 

the date of accrual was the eviction date of November 16, 

2011, the statute requires Mone to have presented her 

claim to the appropriate agency by November 16, 2013. 

Mone alleged that she “sent two letters intended to serve 

as formal complaints to HUD” dated June 19, 2010 and 

September 13, 2012. Mone, 138 Fed. Cl. at 282. It is unclear from the current record that HUD ever received these 

letters or that the letters otherwise constitute proper presentment of Mone’s claims to HUD. If it were clear that

Mone properly presented her claims, then she may have 

satisfied the first requirement under § 2401(b), because 

 

within two years and file suit within six months of its denial.”); Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 485 (9th 

Cir. 1984) (“Under the Federal Tort Claims Act a claim 

must be filed with the appropriate federal agency within 

two years of its accrual and suit must be commenced within 

six months of the agency’s denial of the claim.”) (Kennedy, 

J.); Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608, 612–13 (2d Cir. 

1983) (considering the legislative history and concluding 

that § 2401(b) requires that both deadlines must be met); 

Schuler v. United States, 628 F.2d 199, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 

(en banc) (per curiam) (“Though the section is not happily 

drafted, common sense and the legislative history tell us 

that it requires the claimant both to file the claim with the 

agency within two years after accrual of the claim and then 

to file a complaint in the District Court within six months 

after the agency denies the claim.”).
MONE v. UNITED STATES 9

Mone sent the letters before the two-year statute of limitations expired on November 16, 2013.

She also may have satisfied the second requirement 

under § 2401(b). After receiving a final denial from the 

agency, a claimant has six months to file a complaint in 

district court. See § 2401(b). Mone alleges that she never 

received a response from the agency regarding her claims. 

See Complaint ¶ 4. The FTCA provides that “[t]he failure 

of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six 

months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant 

any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim 

for purposes of this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis 

added). This provision requires that Mone have waited at 

least six months after presentment before she may deem 

her claim denied and file a complaint, if she so chose. See 

id. Mone did wait the requisite six months, and, in fact, 

waited more than five years after she sent her second letter 

before filing her complaint at the Claims Court. Thus, assuming that Mone met the jurisdictional requirements of 

the FTCA, which we discuss next, her claim may not have 

been time-barred under § 2401(b).

III

While § 2401(b) governs the timing for filing an FTCA 

claim, § 2675(a) provides the jurisdictional requirement 

that claimants must exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing an FTCA claim. See McNeil v. United 

States, 508 U.S. 106, 111 (1993); see also see Canuto v. 

United States, 615 F. App’x 951, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Under § 2675(a), tort claims against the United States “shall 

not be instituted . . . for money damages . . . unless the 

claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally 

denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.” § 2675(a) (emphases added). Congress has 

thus prescribed two requirements for a claimant to exhaust 
10 MONE v. UNITED STATES

her administrative remedies. First, the claimant must present a claim for money damages to the appropriate agency 

(the “presentment requirement”). Id. Second, the claimant 

must receive a final denial from the agency (the “final denial requirement”). Id. Because Mone alleges that she 

never received a response from HUD, she had the option to 

treat the lack of response as a deemed denial, as we have 

previously discussed. See supra at 9. Therefore, Mone may 

have met the second requirement—the final denial requirement.

To satisfy the first requirement, though, the presentment requirement, the action against the government must 

be “for money damages” that the claimant shall “have first 

presented . . . to the appropriate Federal agency.” 

§ 2675(a). That requires the claimant to notify the agency 

of the claim and request money damages, usually in a sum 

certain.3 But, as noted above, the current record is inadequate. There is no evidence supporting a finding that Mone 

 

3 See Barber v. United States, 642 F. App’x 411, 414 

(5th Cir. 2016); White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 

453, 457–58 (3d Cir. 2010); Medina v. City of Phila., 219 F. 

App’x 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2007); Dalrymple v. United States, 

460 F.3d 1318, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2006); Blair v. IRS, 304 

F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 24 C.F.R. § 17.2(a) 

(“[A] claim shall be deemed to have been presented when 

the Department receives . . . an executed Claim for Damages or Injury, Standard Form 95, or other written notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money 

damages in a sum certain for injury to or loss of property, 

for personal injury, or for death alleged to have occurred by 

reason of the incident.”); 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (“A claim shall 

be deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency 

receives from a claimant . . . written notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum 

certain . . . .”).
MONE v. UNITED STATES 11

requested money damages, nor is there evidence showing 

that HUD received the letters she sent. Section 1631 requires satisfaction by a transferring court that a transferee 

court has jurisdiction to hear a case before transferring it. 

See Jan’s Helicopter Serv., 525 F.3d at 1304. Because the 

current record does not contain sufficient facts supporting 

presentment, we cannot be satisfied that the transferee 

court would have jurisdiction under § 2675(a) and that her 

FTCA action was timely under § 2401(b). Therefore, the 

Claims Court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to 

transfer the case.

As a result, although the Claims Court erred in its use 

and interpretation of § 2401(b), the error was harmless.

Moreover, because the Claims Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, Mone is not left without recourse. 

Mone may bring suit on the same issues in district court. 

Indeed, a district court would be well-equipped to assess its 

own jurisdiction. It could, for instance, order jurisdictional 

discovery to determine if Mone satisfied the presentment 

requirement under § 2675(a). If jurisdictional discovery reveals that the letters constitute proper presentment, then 

the district court may find that Mone satisfied the two-year 

statute of limitations under § 2401(b). The district court 

may also confirm through additional discovery that because Mone never received a response from HUD, she had 

the option of treating the lack of response as a deemed denial and timely filed her complaint within the six-month 

statute of limitations under § 2401(b). Even if it disagrees, 

the district court may equitably toll the requirements because § 2401(b) is not jurisdictional. Thus, the Claims 

Court’s error in its use and interpretation of § 2401(b) did 

not “affect the substantial rights” of Mone and was therefore harmless error. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111.

IV

Lastly, Mone argues that the Claims Court failed to 

consider her claim that HUD breached an implied contract. 
12 MONE v. UNITED STATES

Mone argues that she alleged an implied contract claim in 

her complaint. See Appellant’s Br. 1. The government responds that Mone waived this argument for not raising it 

before the Claims Court. We hold pro se litigants to “less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). However, even with the leniency afforded to pro se litigants, 

issues not raised before the Claims Court are waived on 

appeal. See Soliman v. United States, 724 F. App’x 936, 

941 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Maxberry v. United States, 722 F. 

App’x 997, 999–1000 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Kenyon v. United 

States, 683 F. App’x 945, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also San 

Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1354–

55 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that arguments not raised before the Claims Court are “waived on appeal”). Because 

Mone did not raise the implied contract claim before the 

Claims Court, that argument is waived.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Mone’s remaining arguments and 

find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Claims Court’s decision dismissing Mone’s complaint and declining to transfer the case to district court.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.