SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

Case No. S23C0133

July 5, 2023

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment. 

The following order was passed:

IN THE INTEREST OF R. J. A., a child.

The Supreme Court today denied the petition for certiorari in 

this case. 

All the Justices concur.

Court of Appeals Case No. A22A1062

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true extract from the

minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk
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PINSON, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari.

I agree that we should not grant review of the Court of Appeals’ 

decision in this case. I write separately to flag a narrow issue having 

to do with how to understand and apply the holdings of an appellate 

court, which may warrant review in an appropriate case.

The question presented in this case is whether a superior court 

or a juvenile court had jurisdiction over the underlying prosecution 

against R. J. A., a juvenile. A juvenile charged with a crime within 

the jurisdiction of the superior court “who is detained” is entitled to 

have the charge presented to the grand jury “within 180 days of the 

date of detention.” OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a). If the charge hasn’t been 

presented after 180 days of detention, the case must be transferred 

to juvenile court. Id. at § 17-7-50.1 (b). In this case, R. J. A. was 

arrested and detained on March 1, 2019, then released on bond just 

over a month later, but on the special conditions that he wear an 

ankle monitor that reported his location, and that he remain at 

home except to attend school, work, necessary legal and medical 

appointments, and one religious service per week. He was then 
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indicted on October 23, 2019, more than 180 days after he was 

arrested and initially detained. So which court has jurisdiction turns 

on whether R. J. A. was “detained” during his period of monitored 

home confinement. If so, the juvenile court should have exercised 

jurisdiction. If not, jurisdiction rested with the superior court.

In addressing this jurisdictional question, the Court of Appeals 

properly looked to our decision in State v. Coleman, 306 Ga. 529 (832 

SE2d 389) (2019). In Coleman, the juvenile defendant was likewise 

arrested and detained, and then released on bond just over a month 

later. Almost two years later, he was indicted, and the defendant 

moved to transfer his case to juvenile court under the same statute 

at issue here, OCGA § 17-7-50.1. The superior court granted the 

motion, but we reversed. We explained that this statute did not 

require transfer to juvenile court unless the defendant was detained 

for the 180-day period, and “if a child is released on bond or 

otherwise, they are no longer ‘detained’ within the meaning of the 

statute.” Coleman, 306 Ga. at 531. Applying Coleman, the Court of 

Appeals held that, “because R. J. A. was released and remained on 
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bond prior to the running of 180 days, he was not detained within 

the meaning of OCGA § 17-7-50.1.” Interest of R. J. A., 365 Ga. App. 

118, 123 (3) (b) (877 SE2d 673) (2022). So, the court held, “the case 

did not run afoul of the time limitation set by that Code section,” and 

“the superior court continued to have exclusive jurisdiction over the 

case.” Id.

I agree with all of this. But along the way to this decision—

which, by itself, seems to me a faithful and reasonable application 

of Coleman—the Court of Appeals took an extra step that gives me 

pause. In explaining why “Coleman forecloses R. J. A.’s argument,” 

the court noted, “Although that decision does not speak directly to 

the question that the Supreme Court left open in Johnson, the 

archival records of Coleman reveal that, like R. J. A., the defendant 

in that case was released from bond with conditions including home 

confinement.” Id. at 122 (3) (b) (emphasis added). In other words, 

the court looked beyond the Coleman opinion itself to the record of 

the case to determine the breadth of its holding. In explaining this 

step, the court noted that both the Court of Appeals and our Court 
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“occasionally look to archived records to distinguish authority.” See 

id. at 122 (3) (b) n.1 (citing in support Prophecy Corp. v. Charles 

Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27 (343 SE2d 680) (1986) and Little 

Ocmulgee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Lockhart, 212 Ga. App. 282 

(441 SE2d 796) (1994)).

The Court of Appeals was not wrong about that: our courts 

have sometimes looked to a case’s archival records to help determine 

the scope of a holding in past decisions. See also, e.g, Ware v. State, 

305 Ga. 457, 460 (2) (826 SE2d 56) (2019). But I have real doubts 

about whether that practice is appropriate. Speaking broadly, a 

holding in an appellate opinion is a determination on a matter of law 

that is necessary to the decision in question. See Bryan A. Garner, 

et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 44 (2016) (“A holding consists 

of the ‘court’s determination of a matter of law pivotal to its 

decision.’” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 849 (Bryan A. Garner 

ed., 10th ed. 2014))). It is not always easy to figure out what parts of 

an appellate decision make up its holding. Questions about whether 

particular facts or reasoning are important or necessary to a 
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decision, or just how necessary something must be to count as part 

of the holding, can be hard to answer. See, e.g., Mercer Univ. v. 

Stofer, 306 Ga. 191, 191-192, 200-201 (4) (830 SE2d 169) (2019) 

(explaining that the Court of Appeals was “led astray” by an “acute 

problem from our case law” arising out of language in Atlanta 

Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc. v. Hawthorne, 278 Ga. 116 (598 

SE2d 471) (2004), that was not necessary to the holding in that 

case). See also Charles W. Tyler, “The Adjudicative Model of 

Precedent,” 87 U. Chi. L.R. 1551, 1552-1553 (Sept. 2020) (noting 

that it is “highly contestable” what it means for a statement of law 

to be “necessary for the outcome” of a case). But it seems reasonably 

clear to me that the universe of things that are potentially necessary 

to an appellate court’s decision—and thus make up its holding—is 

contained within that court’s opinion. If a court does not see fit to 

mention a particular fact in its opinion and otherwise provides 

reasoning for its decision, that seems like a conclusive sign that the 

missing fact is not necessary to the decision and therefore is not part 

of the court’s holding. See Garner, supra at 81 (noting that when an 
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opinion does not lay out all the facts that went into the decision, “the 

full facts”—that is, those not in the opinion—“aren’t likely to be 

much help when the court hasn’t left any evidence that the missing 

facts played a role in its decision”). In fact, other decisions of the 

Court of Appeals are in accord with this understanding. See MOM 

Corp. v. Chattahoochee Bank, 203 Ga. App. 847, 847-848 (2) (418 

SE2d 74) (1992) (“The decisions of our appellate courts must speak 

for themselves, and the archival records are not available to litigants 

in other cases to raise questions about facts or issues not stated or 

decided in them.”); Chan v. W-East Trading Corp., 199 Ga. App. 76, 

77 (3) (403 SE2d 840) (1991) (“[I]t is the facts contained within an 

officially reported case which have legal significance when applying 

the case as precedent, not bare assertions of facts found within the 

briefs of the parties and not contained in the text of the reported 

case.”). See also Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520, 539 (652 SE2d 

501) (2007) (Carley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 

(noting that when the majority opinion explained why a prior 
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precedent did not control, one of the majority’s reasons was 

grounded in a fact that was not stated in the prior opinion). 

This conclusion makes practical sense, too. Appellate courts 

issue opinions that explain our decisions because those decisions are 

binding, and courts, litigants, and the public need to know the legal 

rules that bind them. It would be both strange and unfortunate if 

the public had to review not only our opinions, but also the archival 

records of our cases, to know what the law is.

In short, I doubt it is necessary or proper for a court to review 

the archival record of a case to determine whether the holding of an 

appellate decision in that case controls a legal question currently 

before the court. I do not think answering that question would make 

a difference in this case in light of Coleman’s clear holding, so I agree 

with the Court’s decision to deny certiorari. But we might consider 

addressing the question, if it arises again, in an appropriate case.

I am authorized to state that Justice Warren joins in this 

concurrence.