alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6249

ROSS ALLEN BERRYMAN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

SUPERINTENDENT RANDY LEE,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Graham C. Mullen,

Senior District Judge. (5:00-cv-00058-GCM)

Submitted: April 24, 2008 Decided: April 30, 2008

Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ross Allen Berryman, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
*For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date

appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could

have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the

court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988).

- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Ross Allen Berryman seeks to appeal the district court’s

order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. We dismiss

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal

was not timely filed. 

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the

district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal

period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period

under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory

and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S.

257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220,

229 (1960)). 

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on

October 30, 2000. The notice of appeal was filed on January 8,

2008.* Because Berryman failed to file a timely notice of appeal

or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
- 3 -

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Unitil Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2009 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned Robert G. Schoenberger, Chief Executive Officer and President, Mark H. Collin, Chief Financial Officer and Laurence M. Brock, Chief
Accounting Officer, certifies, to the best knowledge and belief of the signatory, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                  |  |                                       |  |                   |  |  |  | 
|------------------------------------------------- |  | ------------------------------------- |  | ----------------- |  |  |  | 
|Signature                                         |  | Capacity                              |  | Date             
|                                                  |  |                                      
|/s/ Robert G. Schoenberger Robert G. Schoenberger |  | Chief Executive Officer and President |  | February 10, 2010
|                                                  |  |                                      
|/s/ Mark H. Collin Mark H. Collin                 |  | Chief Financial Officer               |  | February 10, 2010
|                                                  |  |                                      
|/s/ Laurence M. Brock Laurence M. Brock           |  | Chief Accounting Officer              |  | February 10, 2010
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 26, 2018

No. 04-18-00682-CV

IN RE Reina S.C.

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

ORDER

Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

After relator filed her petition for writ of mandamus, this court ordered that the real 

parties in interest could file a response in this court on or before October 25, 2018. The attorney 

ad litem for the children, who are real parties in interest, has filed a motion for extension of time, 

asking for an additional fourteen days in which to file a response. After review, we GRANT the 

motion for extension of time and ORDER the attorney ad litem for the children to file a 

response, if any, on or before November 8, 2018.

 We order the clerk of this court to serve a copy of this order on all counsel.

PER CURIAM

It is so ORDERED on October, 2018.

 ATTESTED TO: ________________________________

 KEITH E. HOTTLE,

 Clerk of Court

 

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2018-PA-01865, styled In the Interest of J.J.R.S. and L.J.R.S., Children, 

pending in the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas. The Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, 

Associate Judge, signed the order at issue in this original proceeding.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Alberto Marte, Appellant.

[721 NYS2d 532]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Micki Scherer, J., at hearing; Charles Solomon, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered May 5, 1998, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 9 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s contentions regarding suppression and the receipt of evidence are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find that the precinct identification was confirmatory since two days after the incident the police officer independently identified defendant from a series of photographs *(see, People v Martindale,*202 AD2d 158, *lv denied*83 NY2d 912); that the negative identification evidence was relevant to issues raised at trial *(see, People v Wilder,*93 NY2d 352); and that the evidence challenged as hearsay was not offered for its truth and was properly admitted as part of the narrative leading to defendant’s arrest *(People v Rivera,*234 AD2d 148, *lv denied*89 NY2d 946), which was necessary to prevent speculation by the jury *(see, People v Browning,*225 AD2d 340, *lv denied*88 NY2d 934).

Upon our review of the record, we find that defendant received meaningful representation *(see, People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 713-714). Concur — Sullivan, P. J., Rosenberger, Williams, Mazzarelli and Friedman, JJ.
VI

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1258

For the relief of the estate of Irwin Rutman.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 20 (legislative day, JUNE 30), 1993

Mr. D’AMATO introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

For the relief of the estate of Irwin Rutman.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER DESIGNATION.

4 For purposes of part L of title I of the Omnibus

5 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C.

6 3796 et seq.), relating to benefits for survivors of public

7 safety officers, Irwin Rutman of Staten Island, New York,

8 shall be deemed to have been a public safety officer on

9 October 29, 1990, and his family shall be entitled to death

10 benefits under such part.
2

S 1258 IS

1 SEC. 2. LIMITATION OF ATTORNEYS’ AND AGENTS’ FEES.

2 No amount exceeding 10 percent of a payment made

3 under section 1 may be paid to or received by any attorney

4 or agent for services rendered in connection with the pay5 ment. Any person who violates the provisions of this sec6 tion shall be guilty of an infraction and shall be subject

7 to a fine in the amount provided under title 18, United

8 States Code.

9 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.

10 The provisions of section 1 shall take effect on the

11 date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
# C_2021431EN.01000702.xml

| 25.10.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 431/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.10.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 431/7

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht (Germany) lodged on 7 July 2021 — Landkreis A.-F. v J. Sch. Omnibusunternehmen and K. Reisen GmbH

(Case C-416/21)

(2021/C 431/05)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Landkreis A.-F.

Respondents: J. Sch. Omnibusunternehmen, K. Reisen GmbH

Intervener: E. GmbH & Co. KG

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 57(4)(d) of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the contracting authority must have sufficiently plausible indications to conclude that the economic operator has infringed Article 101 TFEU? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 57(4)(d) of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the contracting authority must have sufficiently plausible indications to conclude that the economic operator has infringed Article 101 TFEU?

| 2. | Is Article 57(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU to be interpreted as exhaustively regulating the optional grounds for exclusion in the sense that the principle of equal treatment (Article 18(1) of that directive) cannot preclude the award of a contract where tenders are submitted that are neither independent nor autonomous? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Is Article 57(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU to be interpreted as exhaustively regulating the optional grounds for exclusion in the sense that the principle of equal treatment (Article 18(1) of that directive) cannot preclude the award of a contract where tenders are submitted that are neither independent nor autonomous?

| 3. | Is Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU to be interpreted as precluding the award of a contract to undertakings which constitute an economic unit and have each submitted a tender? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Is Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU to be interpreted as precluding the award of a contract to undertakings which constitute an economic unit and have each submitted a tender?

---

(1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).

---
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1044 

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to install in the area of the World 

War II Memorial in the District of Columbia a suitable plaque or an 

inscription with the words that President Franklin D. Roosevelt prayed 

with the United States on D-Day, June 6, 1944. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 23, 2013 

Mr. PORTMAN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to install in the 

area of the World War II Memorial in the District of 

Columbia a suitable plaque or an inscription with the 

words that President Franklin D. Roosevelt prayed with 

the United States on D-Day, June 6, 1944. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘World War II Memo5 rial Prayer Act of 2013’’. 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1044 IS

1 SEC. 2. PLACEMENT OF PLAQUE OR INSCRIPTION AT 

2 WORLD WAR II MEMORIAL. 

3 The Secretary of the Interior— 

4 (1) shall install in the area of the World War 

5 II Memorial in the District of Columbia a suitable 

6 plaque or an inscription with the words that Presi7 dent Franklin D. Roosevelt prayed with the United 

8 States on June 6, 1944, the morning of D-Day; 

9 (2) shall design, procure, prepare, and install 

10 the plaque or inscription referred to in paragraph 

11 (1); and 

12 (3) may not use Federal funds to prepare or in13 stall the plaque or inscription referred to in para14 graph (1), but may accept and expend private con15 tributions for this purpose. 

16 SEC. 3. COMMEMORATIVE WORKS ACT. 

17 Chapter 89 of title 40, United States Code (com18 monly known as the ‘‘Commemorative Works Act’’), shall 

19 apply to the design and placement of the plaque within 

20 the area of the World War II Memorial. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 12, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-51548

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JON MARK WHITAKER,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:06-CR-60-ALL

--------------------

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jon Mark Whitaker appeals his conviction for mail fraud and

the resulting order to pay restitution in the amount of

$450,028.29. Whitaker argues that the Government failed to

establish federal jurisdiction because the mailing of

insufficient funds checks to suppliers and subcontractors did not

further his scheme to defraud. He also contends that the

district court erred in ordering restitution at an amount higher

than the statutory maximum fine. The Government responds by
No. 06-51548

-2-

seeking to enforce Whitaker’s appeal waiver and contends that his

challenge to the amount of restitution is barred from review.

Whitaker’s argument that the Government failed to establish

federal jurisdiction is without merit. The Government alleged

that Whitaker knowingly mailed insufficient funds checks to

suppliers and subcontractors defrauding them of their services

and delaying the discontinuation of their work so as to continue

to perpetrate fraud on the home buyers. The mailings were

integral to the fraud and without them Whitaker’s scheme “would

have come to an abrupt halt.” Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S.

705, 712 (1989). 

Whitaker’s appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary, and

therefore, the waiver is enforced. See United States v.

Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1992). As such, we do

not address the merits of Whitaker’s challenge to the amount of

restitution. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### SHANK *v.*LIPPMAN. *In re*DEWEY.

Appeal and Error — Eight to Appeal Without Leave — Garnishment — Court Eules — Statutes.

Eight to appeal "without leave of court from order dismissing garnishment proceeding is not controlled by amount involved in principal suit, but by amount of liability of garnishee defendant to principal defendant (Court Eule No. 60; 3 Comp. Laws 1929, §15491).

Appeal from Wayne; Smith (Guy E.), J., presiding.

Submitted January 5, 1932.

(Docket No. 34, Calendar No. 36,075.)

Decided April 4, 1932.

Action by Mary Shank against Harry J. Lippman resulted in judgment for plaintiff. Fred G. Dewey, attorney for plaintiff, filed a claim and obtained order for lien upon the judgment for services rendered. Garnishment by lien claimant against Peoples Wayne County Bank. From order dismissing garnishment proceedings, lien claimant appeals.

Appeal dismissed.

*Sempliner, Deivey, Stanton & Bushnell,*for lien claimant.

*J. Leon Katz,*for defendant.

*Henry F. Massnick,*for garnishee defendant.

North, J.

Fred G. Dewey, as attorney for the plaintiff in the above-entitled cause, by order of the circuit court, was given an attorney’s lien in the *226amount of $1,460.66 upon the judgment of $3,350 obtained against the principal defendant. See *Shank*v. *Lippman,*253 Mich. 451. Thereafter Mr. Dewey garnisheed the account of the defendant at the Peoples Wayne County Bank, which disclosed an indebtedness to the principal defendant in the amount of $4.74. Upon motion of the principal defendant the circuit judge dismissed the garnishment proceeding upon the ground that “the said lien claimant did have no just cause to be apprehensive of the loss of such claim.” See 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14857.

Without obtaining leave of this court, an appeal has been taken from the order dismissing the garnishment proceeding. Appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it appears from the record the amount involved is not in excess of $500, and under both the rule (Court Rule No. 60) and the statute (3 Comp. Laws, 1929, § 15491) permission to appeal was necessary. Clearly the motion is well founded. See *Hermesmeyer*v. *Northwestern Investment Co.,*254 Mich. 384. In the matter now before the court, the right to appeal without leave is not controlled by the amount involved in the principal suit, but rather by the amount of the liability of the garnishee defendant to the principal defendant. There is no showing that this is in excess of $500. The appeal is dismissed, with costs.

Clark, C. J., and McDonald, Potter, Sharpe, Pead, Wiest, and Btjtzel, JJ., concurred.
IC 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 1214 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

September 17, 2014 

Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

AN ACT 

To require the purchase of domestically made flags of the 

United States of America for use by the Federal Government. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

S 1214 RFH 

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘All-American Flag 

3 Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT FOR PURCHASE OF DOMESTICALLY 

5 MADE UNITED STATES FLAGS FOR USE BY 

6 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under sub8 section (b), only such flags of the United States of Amer9 ica, regardless of size, that are 100 percent manufactured 

10 in the United States, from articles, materials, or supplies 

11 100 percent of which are grown, produced, or manufac12 tured in the United States, may be acquired for use by 

13 the Federal Government. 

14 (b) WAIVER.—The head of an executive agency may 

15 waive the requirement under subsection (a) on a case-by16 case basis upon a determination that— 

17 (1) the application of the limitation would cause 

18 unreasonable costs or delays to be incurred; or 

19 (2) application of the limitation would adversely 

20 affect a United States company. 

21 (c) AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGU22 LATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 

23 enactment of this Act, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory 

24 Council established under section 1302 of title 41, United 

25 States Code, shall amend the Federal Acquisition Regula26 tion to implement this section. 


asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

S 1214 RFH 

1 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

2 (1) EXECUTIVE AGENCY.—The term ‘‘executive 

3 agency’’ has the meaning given the term in section 

4 133 of title 41, United States Code. 

5 (2) FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.—The 

6 term ‘‘Federal Acquisition Regulation’’ has the 

7 meaning given the term in section 106 of title 41, 

8 United States Code. 

9 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

10 Section 2 shall apply to purchases of flags made on 

11 or after 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 

12 Act. 

13 SEC. 4. CONSISTENCY WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREE14 MENTS. 

15 This Act shall be applied in a manner consistent with 

16 United States obligations under international agreements. 

Passed the Senate September 16, 2014. 

Attest: NANCY ERICKSON, 

Secretary. 


asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32



Section 1350 Certifications of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer



In connection with the Report of Material Sciences Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended
February 29, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Ronald L. Stewart, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



May 14, 2004By:

/S/    RONALD L. STEWARTRonald L. StewartPresident, Chief Executive Officer and Director




In connection with the
Report, I, James J. Waclawik, Sr., Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



May 14, 2004By:

/S/    JAMES J. WACLAWIK, SR.James J. Waclawik, Sr.Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary




1
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. IRVING TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee In Bankruptcy of Delaware Cosmetics, Inc., Formerly Known as Marinello Company, a Delaware Corporation, Bankrupt, Appellant.

No. 222.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. ’

Feb. 15, 1937.

Krause, Hirsch & Levin, of New York City (Sydney Krause and Sidney Gross, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Lamar Plardy, U. S. Atty., of New York City (Richard Delafieldj Asst. U. S. Atty., and Robert L. Werner, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty., both of New York City, of counsel), for the United States.

Before MANTON, AUGUSTUS N. HAND, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Decree affirmed on opinion below.*

*

 No opinion for publication.