alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SERVED JUNE 23, 2010 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

IN THE MATTER OF 

EVERGREEN HELICOPTERS OF ALASKA 

FAA DOCKET No. CP09AL0010 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

DMS No. FAA-2009-0841 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

Complainant Federal Aviation Administration (hereinafter "Complainant") filed a 

Complaint on August 27, 2009. On August 25, 2009, Respondent Evergreen 

Helicopters of Alaska, Inc. (hereinafter "Respondent') had filed a Request for 

Hearing. On June 22, 2010, Complainant moved to terminate the proceedings, 

citing settlement. 

14 C.F.R. § 13.215 states: "At any time before or during a hearing, an agency 

attorney may withdraw a complaint or party may withdraw a request for a 

hearing without the consent of the administrative law judge. If an agency 

attorney withdraws the complaint or a party withdraws the request for a 

hearing and the answer, the administrative law judge shall dismiss the 

proceedings under this subpart with prejudice." 

WHEREFORE, the within filed Request to Withdraw Complaint having been read and 

considered, it is ORDERED as follows: 

1. Complainant's Request to Withdraw Complaint be and is hereby granted; 

2. The hearing, set to begin on June 23, 2010, in Anchorage, AK, is cancelled, and 

3. This proceeding be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
SO ORDERED. 

Attachment - Service List 

Richard C. Goodwin ^ ^ " 

Administrative Law Judge 
FAA Docket No. CP09AL0010 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

SERVICE LIST 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430, 

Wilbur Wright Building—Suite 2W1000' 

ONE COPY 

Marc G. Wilhelm, Respondent's Counsel 

Richmond & Quinn PC 

Attorneys at Law 

360 K Street, Suite 200 

Anchorage, AK 99501-2038 

TEL: 907-276-5727 

FAX: 907-276-2953 

Glenn H. Brown, Complainant's Counsel 

Senior Attorney, Office of the Regional Counsel, AAL-7 

Alaskan Region 

Federal Aviation Administration 

222 West 7* Avenue, #14 

Anchorage, AK 99513-7587 

TEL: 907-271-5269 

FAX: 907-271-2800 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin, Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

East Building Ground Floor, Room El2-320 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: Attorney-Advisor 202-366-2139 

Legal Assistant 202-366-5121 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

' Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building—Suite 2W1000, Washington, 

DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.
1 From:

Monday, June 29, 2015 12:44 PM

To: RedHill

Subject: Protect our Water from Jet Fuel

Follow Up Flag: Follow up

Flag Status: Flagged

Aloha,

It is alarming to me that my drinking water is unsafe ! We the public have been `mislead & deceived' in thinking that our

water is clean ! This is unacceptable !!!!

I am writing to express my extreme concern for the quality of our drinking water threatened by the jet fuel leaking from

Navy storage tanks in Red Hill.

Please ensur e this jet fuel is completely cleaned up immediately. Twenty

‐ five years is too long to wait before acting to

save our most precious resource. If the leaks cannot be immediately fixed, then the tanks must be emptied.

I also ask tha t the public comment period on the negotiated agreement between the U.S. Navy, Environmental

Protection Agency, and Hawaii Department of Health be extended to allow the public meaningful opportunity to

understand and weigh

‐ in on this important issue.

Please continue to keep me informed in this decision

‐ making process.

Thank you.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 2, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 05-40034

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MIGUEL ANGEL GONZALEZ-VARGAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:04-CR-1519-ALL 

--------------------

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Miguel Angel Gonzalez-Vargas appeals his sentence from a

guilty-plea conviction for reentry of a deported alien. See 8

U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1). Gonzalez-Vargas argues that his sentence

should be vacated and remanded because the district court sentenced

him under a mandatory Guideline scheme held unconstitutional in

United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).

As the Government concedes, Gonzalez-Vargas’s “Fanfan” claim

is reviewed for harmless error. See United States v. Walters, 418
No. 05-40034

-2-

F.3d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 2005). The instant record fails to provide

clear commentary from the district court regarding whether it would

have imposed the same sentence under a post-Booker environment.

See id. Accordingly, the district court’s “Fanfan” error was not

harmless on the instant record. See id.

Gonzalez-Vargas also challenges the constitutionality of 8

U.S.C. § 1326(b). His constitutional challenge is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998).

Although Gonzalez-Vargas contends that Almendarez-Torres was

incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would

overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the

basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v.

Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

298 (2005). Gonzalez-Vargas properly concedes that his argument is

foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but

he raises it here to preserve it for further review. 

We VACATE Gonzalez-Vargas’s sentence and REMAND for

resentencing.
#### Charles F. BRYAN, Appellant, v. Jack JUSTICE, Appellee.

No. 72-1517.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 27, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1974.

*332Bolles, Goodwin, Ryskamp & Welcher, Miami, for appellant.

Marvin M. Green and Gary Katz, Miami Beach, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, HENDRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-appellant appeals a $9,375 judgment entered in favor of plaintiff-ap-pellee as a brokerage commission.

This cause being before this court for a second time, a recitation of the facts is not necessary. See Bryan v. Justice, Fla.App. 1971, 247 So.2d 340.

Upon remand, the trial judge held further proceedings in accordance with our opinion in Bryan v. Justice, supra, and after having heard the testimony of the parties and their witnesses found that (1) the broker and the salesman did not have knowledge of the seller’s inability to deliver good title because of his wife’s refusal to join in the employment listing, and (2) the purchaser who signed the deposit receipt agreement was able to purchase the property. Thereupon, the trial judge awarded the sum of $9,357 to the plaintiff, plus interest and costs. The defendant appealed therefrom and alleges that the court erred in its findings.

In essence, appellant simply is attempting to reverse the trial judge on his findings of fact. Where there is ample evidence as in the case sub judice to support the findings of the trial court, this court will not disturb them. See 2 Fla.Jur. Appeals § 346 (1963) and cases cited therein.

Accordingly, the judgment must be and hereby is affirmed.

Affirmed.
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Pedro De La Rosa and * From the 441st District Court

Angelina De La Rosa, of Midland County,

Trial Court No. CV52579.

Vs. No. 11-19-00123-CV * April 8, 2021

Basic Energy Services, L.P., * Memorandum Opinion by Trotter, J.

by and through its General (Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Partner, Basic Energy Services Trotter, J., and Williams, J.)

GP, LLC,

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is 

error in the order below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, we 

reverse the trial court’s order and remand the cause to the trial court for further 

proceedings. The costs incurred by reason of this appeal are taxed against Basic 

Energy Services, L.P., by and through its General Partner, Basic Energy Services 

GP, LLC.
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 104 

To provide for congressional approval of national monuments and restrictions 

on the use of national monuments. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 23 (legislative day, JANUARY 3), 2013 

Mr. VITTER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To provide for congressional approval of national monuments 

and restrictions on the use of national monuments. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘National Monuments 

5 Act of 2011’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DESIGNATION OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS. 

7 The Act of June 8, 1906 (16 U.S.C. 431 et seq.), 

8 is amended— 

9 (1) in section 2 (16 U.S.C. 431), by striking 

10 ‘‘SEC. 2. That the’’ and inserting the following: 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with 
2 

•S 104 IS

1 ‘‘SEC. 2. DESIGNATION OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS. 

2 ‘‘After obtaining congressional approval of the pro3 posed national monument and certifying compliance with 

4 the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 

5 4321 et seq.) with respect to the proposed national monu6 ment, the’’; and 

7 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

8 ‘‘SEC. 5. RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLIC USE. 

9 ‘‘The Secretary of the Interior shall not implement 

10 any restrictions on the public use of a national monument 

11 until the expiration of an appropriate review period (as 

12 determined by the Secretary of the Interior) providing for 

13 public input and congressional approval.’’. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with
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#### CITY OF HIALEAH, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. CAMA CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation, Appellee.

No. 77-2265.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 25, 1978.

*1156Ralph P. Miles, Hialeah, for appellant.

Allen Kornblum, Hialeah, for appellee.

Before HAVERFIELD, C. J., and PEARSON and KEHOE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The City of Hialeah appeals an order directing it to rezone plaintiff’s property from R-l (single family residence) to a classification no more restrictive than R-3-5 (high density multiple family dwelling).

Plaintiff, Cama Corporation, purchased real property located on the northeast corner of 50th Street and Fourth Avenue in the City of Hialeah. Cama applied to the Hialeah Planning and Zoning Board and thereafter to the City Council to rezone the property from R-l to B-l (restricted retail commercial). The application was denied and Cama filed the instant complaint seeking to require the City to rezone the property. After final hearing, the trial judge made the following findings:

> “7. The character of the neighborhood where the property is located has substantially changed since the R-l zoning classification was imposed by the Defendant. The property fronts on á heavily travelled four-lane thoroughfare serving some 15,000 vehicles per day. The property directly to the West of the subject property has been zoned for high density multiple family dwelling (R-3-5) and a 34 unit apartment building has been constructed on that site. The property to the South, both on the East side and West side of East 4th Avenue, is zoned C-l (restricted commercial) and several commercial establishments are in operation on both sides of the street. Directly to the South of the subject property is a late-hour or all-night convenience store.”

and based thereon concluded that the present R-l zoning classification was confiscatory and ordered the City to rezone the property no more restrictive than R-3-5. The City appeals therefrom.

The record amply supports the judge’s conclusion that the R-l classification is confiscatory and no longer fairly debatable. See e.g. *Dugan*v. *City of Jacksonville,*343 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

Order affirmed.
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#### Roger MENSING, Appellant, v. Dennis KASIANOWICZ, Appellee.

No. 69-437.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Dec. 16, 1969.

*882Yates & Fann, Miami Shores, for appellant.

George C. Vogelsang, Miami, for appel-lee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Roger Mansing, appeals from a final judgment rendered on a jury verdict for the plaintiff, Dennis Kasianowicz. Plaintiff sued for damages allegedly resulting from breach of a contract for the sale of an airplane and defendant counterclaimed for an alleged abuse of process and damages done to the plane by plaintiff.

Defendant seeks reversal of the final judgment and argues that there was insufficient competent evidence to support the jury verdict. A careful review of the record reveals sufficient, competent and substantial evidence to support the jury verdict.

Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in directing a verdict for the plaintiff on that portion of his counterclaim which sought damages from plaintiff for having unlawfully obtained a temporary injunction against the defendant, without notice or bond. We find no error in this regard. See Concord Shopping Center, Inc. v. Litowitz, Fla. App.1966, 183 So.2d 562 and Rule 1.610(b), “RCP”, 31 F.S.A.

We considered defendant’s other point for reversal and find it to be without merit. Also considered is the cross-assignment of error argued by the plaintiff. We find that there was no proof of this element of damage offered before the jury and that there was no request for a jury instruction on this matter.

For these reasons the final judgment herein appealed is

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-7400

DONALD M. COGDILL, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus DAVID M. BEASLEY, Governor of South Carolina; MICHAEL MOORE, Commissioner of SCDC; SOUTH CAROLINA PROBATION AND PAROLE BOARD, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofSouth Carolina, at Greenville. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-96-3270-6) Submitted: April 13, 2000 Decided: April 19, 2000 Before WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Donald M. Cogdill, Appellant Pro Se. Carl Norman Lundberg, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE & PARDON SERVICES, Columbia, South Carolina; Larry Cleveland Batson, Robert Eric Petersen, William Ansel Collins, Jr., SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Donald M. Cogdill appeals from the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 motion to reconsider the order dismissing his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1999) action. Although Cogdill did not timely receive the district court’s September 1997 order, the district court was without authority to reopen the appeal period as to that order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). Further, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration because the change from annual to biannual parole consideration did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499, 505-14 (1995); Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co. , 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the motion for reconsideration.We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Leo S. GANTER, III, Appellant, v. Marion H. GANTER, Appellee.

No. 70-656.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 9, 1970.

John T. Christiansen, of Law Offices of Ronald Sales, Palm Beach, for appellant.

Gustave T. Broberg, Jr., of Coe, Bro-berg & Reid, Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

It appearing that the trial court operated within the proper limits of its discretion and the appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the order appealed is

Affirmed.

WALDEN, REED and OWEN, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 23

                        Consent of Arthur Andersen LLP


                                      38
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

                   CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation by
reference of our reports dated April 19, 2000, included in or incorporated by
reference in this Form 10-K, into the Company's previously filed Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (No. 33-00067, 33-40610, 33-41310, 33-57648, 33-81064,
333-15679, 333-15677, 333-33885, 333-33897 and 333-88387).


                                       /s/  ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

                                            ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP


Chicago, Illinois
May 24, 2000

                                      39
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