IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2017-IA-00300-SCT PURDUE PHARMA L.P., PURDUE PHARMA, INC., THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY , INC., TEV

A PHARMACEUTICALS, USA, INC., CEPHALON, INC., JOHNSON & JOHNSON,JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., ORTHOMcNEIL-JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. n/k/a JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, INC., n/k/a JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., ENDO HEALTH SOLUTIONS INC., ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., WATSON LABORATORIES, INC. n/k/a ACTAV I S LABORATORIES UT, INC., ACTAV IS LLC AND ACTAV IS PHARMA, INC. f/k/a WATSON PHARMA, INC.

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/13/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DENISE OW ENS TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: GEORGE W . NEVILLE JACQUELINE H. RAY JENNIFER F. CONNOLLY JOE N. TATUM JOHN LEE DAVIDSON STEPHEN L. THOMAS CHRISTOPHER A. SHAPLEY JOSEPH ANTHONY SCLAFANI STEVEN A. REED CHAD ROBERTS HUTCHINSON DAVID F. MARON JAMES W ILLIAM MATTHEW S STEPHANIE M. RIPPEE STEVE W . BERMANR. DAVID KAUFMAN BRIAN M. ERCOLE J. GORDON COONEY, JR. TINOS DIAMANTATOS ALAN W . PERRY SIMON TURNER BAILEY CAROLYN J. KUBOTA CHAD ROBERTS HUTCHINSON CHARLES C. LIFLAND IVANA CINGEL J. CARTER THOMPSON, JR. JOSHUA M. DAVIS SAMUEL DEUCALION GREGORY JASON LIRAN DRORI KATY ELLEN KOSKI PAUL STEPHENSON PATRICK J. FITZGERALD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT JOSEPH ANTHONY SCLAFANI R. DAVID KAUFMAN CHRISTOPHER A. SHAPLEY SHEILA BIRNBAUM MARK S. CHEFFO HAYDEN A. COLEMAN STEPHEN L. THOMAS ALAN W . PERRY SIMON TURNER BAILEY JOSHUA M. DAVIS BRIAN M. ERCOLE J. GORDON COONEY, JR. TINOS DIAMANTATOS STEVEN A. REED CHAD ROBERTS HUTCHINSON CHRISTY D. JONES ADAM JULIUS SPICER CHARLES C. LIFLAND IVANA CINGAL CAROLYN J. KUBOTA

2J. CARTER THOMPSON, JR. DAVID F. MARON SAMUEL DEUCALION GREGORY ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: GEORGE W . NEVILLE JACQUELINE H. RAY GORDON GARLAND LYELL, III GEOFFREY C. MORGAN SAMUEL MARTIN MILLETTE JOHN LEE DAVIDSON JOE N. TATUM STEVE W . BERMAN JENNIFER F. CONNOLLY JAMES L. W ARD, JR. ROBERT S. W OOD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED -10/18/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE KITCHENS, P.J., KING AND BEAM, JJ. KING, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In this interlocutor y a p p e a l , t h e C ourt m u st determ ine w hether the location of a f oreign corporation’s registered a gent i s relevant when determ ining the appropriate venue f or an a c tion. W e f

ind t h a t t h e a d option of the Registered Agents Act ( “RAA”) m ade the location of

a corporation’s registered agent irrelevant f or purposes of

venue. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On Decem

ber 15, 2015, the State of Mississippi f iled a com plaint in the Hinds County Chancery Court against f i f teen pha r m aceutical m anuf acturers a nd their af

f iliates (“Def endants”). According to the com plaint, opioids originally were designed t o treat “short3term p ost-surgical and traum a-related pain, and f or palliative (end-of

- lif e) care.” However, in an ef f ort to increase prof

its, the State alleged that Def endants em

ploy ed a wide variety of deceptive and m isleading practices designed to enter a nd conquer the chronic-pain m arket. The State alleged that Def endants, despite know l e d g e o f the addictive nature of opioids, engaged in a m arketing cam p aign “to create a prof

ound transf

o rm ation in m edical and public perception that would perm it the use of opioids not o nly f or a cute and palliative care, but also f or long periods of t im e to treat m ore com m on aches and pains, like lower back pain, arthritis, and headaches.” ¶3. As a result, opioids m oved f rom a niche category of drugs to the m ost prescribed class of drugs in Am e rica. The State averred that, i n an opioid study , two-thirds of patients who

consum ed opioids f

or m ore than nine t y day s still w ere taking opioids approxim ately f ive
y ears later. 1 The State also alleged that in 2012, prescription opioid u se contributed to 16,007 deaths n ationally

. Specif

i c to M ississippi, i n 2 012, ninety percent of drug-overdose deaths

were c aused by prescription drugs; m ost of the deaths were accidental. The com plaint stated, Def endants’ deceptive m a rketing cam p aign deprived Mississippi patients and th e i r d o c t ors of the ability to m a ke inf orm ed m edical decisions and, instead, caused im p ortant, s om e tim es lif

e-or-death d ecisions to be m ade based n ot on science, but on hy

pe. Def endants deprived patients, their d octors, and health care pay ers of

the chance to exercise inf o rm e d judgm ent and subjected them to enorm ous costs and suf f ering. ¶4. T h e S t a t e a l leged f

our com m on-law claim s (f raud, negligent m isrepresent a t i o n , u n j u s t

1 h ttp s ://w w w .n cb i.n lm .n ih .g o v /p m c/articles/P M C 3 2 3 5 6 0 3 / (las t v isited O cto b er 1 6 , 2 0 1 8 ). 4enrichm ent, and public nuisance), and a claim pursuant to the Mississippi C o n sum er

Protection Act (“MCPA”), Mississippi C ode Section 75-24-9. T he com plaint stated that the Hinds County Chancery Court “has su bject m a tter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-9, b ecause the State br i n g s t h i s action, i n p art, t o r estrain by
perm anent injunction the use of a m ethod, a ct, or practice prohibited by MISS. CODE ANN. § 7 5-24-5.” In addition, the com plaint s tated that venue w a s proper pursuant to Mississippi
C o d e S e c t i o n s 11-11-3, 11-5-1, 75-24-9, and 9-5-81; and A rticle 6 , Section 159, of the Mississippi Constitution. 2 ¶5. T h e p a r t ies do not dispute that each def endant’s principal p lace of b us i n e s s w a s located outside the S tate of Mississippi. On March 3, 2016, Def endants f iled a joint m otion

to transf er f or im proper venue and t o dism iss the com plaint f or f ailure to state a claim

. Def endants m oved the trial court to transf er the action f

rom the Hinds County C h a n c ery Court t o the Rankin County Chancery Court pursuant t o Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and 82(d). 3 Attached t o the m otion was the af f idavit of Stephan i e M

. Rippee,

2 The State’s com

p laint contains allegations of v iolations of Mississippi’s Medicaid Fraud Control Act, Mississippi Code Sections 43-1 3

- 201 to -607 ( Rev. 2015). Pursuant to the Medicaid Fraud Control A ct, actions “m ay b e f iled i n the c i rcuit court of the First Judicial District of Hinds C ounty

. . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-13-223 ( Rev. 2 015). T h e S tate o f f ered n o arg u m en t a

b o u t w h y th e M ississip p i M ed icaid F rau d C o n tro l A ct d id n o t co n tro l v en u e. U n lik e th e M P C A , n o co n sen t is n eed ed u n d er th e M ed icaid F rau d C o n tro l A ct f o r v en u e to b e p r o p er in H in d s C o u n ty

.

3 M ississip p i Ru l e o f

C iv i l P ro c ed u re 8 2 ( d ) p ro v id es, W h en an action is f

i led lay i ng venue in the wrong county , the action shall not be dism isse d , but the c ourt, on tim ely m otion, s h all transf er the action to the 5attorney of record f or Def endants. Although each of Def endants’ principal places of business

were located outside the S tate of Mississippi, Rippee stated that, according to the Mississippi Secretary of State’s website, A ctavis Pharm a had appointed as its registered agent in Mississ i p p i CT C orporation S y s tem , which was located at 645 Lakeland East D r ive, Suite 101, F lowood, R a n k in County

. In addition, Cephalon, I nc., had appointed as its registered
age n t C orporate Creations Network, I nc., located at 232 Market Street, Flowood, Rankin County

. 4 ¶6. The State a rgued i n o p p o s i tion that the Mississippi Legislature passed the RAA to elim inate the relevance of registered a gents to the question of venue. The trial court agreed, f inding that the passage o f the RAA m ade the location of a f oreign corporation’s registered agent irrelevant to venue analy sis. According l y , the trial c ourt held that, because Mississippi’s general chancery -court venue statute, M ississippi Code Section 11-5-1, stated

court in which it m i ght properly have been f iled and the c ase shall proceed as though originally f

i led therein. The expenses of the transf e r shall be borne by the plaintif

f

. The plaintif

f shall have the right t o select the court t o which the action shall be transf

e r r e d i n the e vent the action m ight properly have been f iled in m ore than one court. M.R.C.P. 82(d).

4 C ep h alo n h as sin ce w ith d raw n its au th o rity to tran sact b u s i n e s s i n th e S tate o f M ississip p i an d h as ap p o in t ed th e M ississip p i S ecretary o f S t ate as its ag en t f

o r serv ice o f p ro cess. T h e S tate arg u es th at if th e R A A d id n o t m ak e th e lo catio n o f a reg istered ag en t irrelev an t f

o r v en u e p u r

p o ses, C ep h alo n w o u ld n o w b e co n sid ered a res i d e n t o f H in d s C o u n ty f o r v en u e p u rp o ses. H o w ev er, b ecau se p ro p er v e n u e i s d eterm in ed at th e tim e th e law su it o rig in ally is f

i led , th is co n ten t io n is w ith o u t m erit. S ee C ren sh a w v. R o m a n , 9 4 2 S o . 2 d 8 0 6 (M iss. 2 0 0 6 ). 6that all case s n o t specif ically provided f

o r m ay be brought in the county in which the d e f e n dant m ay reside o r be f ound, and because no def endant resided or could be f o u n d i n Mississippi, Section 11-5-1 also was inapplicable to the action. ¶7. The trial court continued that Mississippi’s general venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 1 1 -11

- 3 , w a s t h e only state v enue statute that identif ied criteria other than the loc a t ion o f a registered a gent. Pursuant to Section 11-11-3, “a civil a ction against a nonresident m a y be com me n c e d in the county where the plaintif f resides or is dom iciled.” Miss. Code Ann. § 1 1 -11-3 ( Rev. 2004). Because the State’s Medicaid agency is l ocated in Hinds C o u nty along w ith m ost state agencies, the trial court f ound venue to be proper in Hinds County

. ¶8. Def

endants now appeal a n d a r g u e t h a t t h e trial court erred i n f i nding that Hinds County was the appropriate venue f or this action.
ANALYSIS ¶9. Def

endants argue that the trial court erred in deny ing the m otio n t o transf er venue f rom Hinds County

. “The decision to gran t or deny a m otion f o r a change o f v enue lies within the discretion of the trial court and w ill not be disturbed unless the trial court abuses its d iscretion.” Penn Nat’l Gam ing, Inc. v. Ratliff , 954 So. 2d 427, 433 (Miss. 2007). “[ T]he plaintif f selects am ong the perm issible venues, and his c hoice m ust be sustained unless in the end there is no credible evidence supporting the f actual basis f

or the c laim of venue.”
Wilkerson v. Goss , 113 So. 3 d 544, 548 (Miss. 2013) (quoting Hedgepeth v. J ohnson , 975

7So. 2d 235, 238 (Miss. 2008).

A. Mississippi Consum er Protection Act ¶10. Def

endants f irst argue that venue is im proper in Hinds County pursuant t o the venue statute of the Mississippi Consum er Protection Act (“MCPA”). T he MCPA m andates that actions “shall be brought in the chancery or c ounty court of the county in which such person resides or has his principal place o f business, o r, with c onsent of the parties, m ay be brought in the chancery o r c o unty court of the c ounty in which the State Capitol is located.” Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-9 (Rev. 2016). Def endants contend that because no def e ndant r esides or has its principal place of business in Hinds County and because no def

endant consented to venue in Hinds County , venue in Hinds County is not proper. ¶11. This Court previously has held that, in cases i nvolving a f oreign corporation with its principal p lace of business outside the state, “the only place where it can be s aid t o reside in this state is where an agent f o r service o f process m ay be f ound.” Ratliff

, 9 54 So. 2 d at 434. However, s u b s e q u e nt to the R atliff decision, the Legislature passed the RAA. The RAA provides that The a ppointm ent o r m aintenance i n this s t ate of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis f

or personal j urisdiction o ver the represented entity in t h i s s t a t e . The address of the agent does n ot determ ine venue in an a ction o r proceeding involving the entity

. Miss. Code Ann. § 79-35-15 (Rev. 2013). ¶12. Def

endants a rgue that the statute’s language does not wholly bar consideration of

a registered agent’s location f o r venue purposes. Instead, Def endants contend that the location
8of a registered agent does n ot, by itself , ultim a t ely determ i ne venue but is still relevant in the venue analy sis. Theref

ore, because each Def

endant’s principal place of business i s outside the s tate, the location of two Def e ndants’ registered a gents is the closest available proxy f or residence. Because two D e fe n d a nt s m a i n t a i n r e gistered agents in Rankin County , Def endants
argue that Rankin County is the proper location f or the i nstant action. Def

e ndants also argue that the trial court’s interpretation of the RAA incorrectly overruled longstanding p recedent holding that f

oreign co rp o r a t i o n s are subject to venue where their r egistered agents are located. ¶13. W e f

ind that the trial court co r r e c t l y determ ined that the R AA ef f ectively m ade the l o c a tion of a corporation’s registered agent irrelevant to the v enue analy sis. The plai n language of the statute c learly states that “ the address of the agent does n ot d eterm ine venue in an action or proceeding involving the entity

. ” Miss. Code Ann. § 7 9-35-15. A s the State
argues, the only g r ound supporting the transf er to Rankin County is that two D ef endants had registered agents located in Rankin County . W e disagree with the dissent’s contention that the language contained in S e c t i o n 7 5

- 2 4-9 regarding the “consent o f the parties” bars this action f rom being brought in Hinds County

. It is clear that the consent language contained in the s tatute applies only to Mississippi d ef endants. Sect i o n 7 5-24-9 provides that “the action shall be brought in the chancery or county court of the county in which such person resides o r has his p rincipal place o f business , or, with consent of the parties, m ay b e brought in the chancery o r c ounty court of the county in which the State Capit o l i s located.” Miss.

9Code Ann. § 75-24-9 (Rev. 2016) (em phasis added). Thus, b ecause no person resides or has

a principal place of business in Mississippi in this case, the consent language c ontain e d i n the statute also does not apply and the statute as a whole f ails to provide a v enue option f or f oreign corporations. ¶14. Because the R

AA excluded consideration of the location o f a c orporation’s registered agent f r om the question of venue, the MCPA’s venue statute p rovides no choice of venue f or f oreign corporations. Thus, this Court m ust look t o t h e g eneral venue statute f or chancery court actions.
B. Chancery
- Court Venue Statute ¶15. Def

endants a rgue that if this Court determ i nes that the MCPA’s venue statute is not applicable, this Court should apply the general venue statute f or chancery courts, Mississippi Code Section 11-5-1, to determ ine that venue is appropriate in Rankin C ounty

. Section 11-5- 1 states in relevant part, [ A]ll cases not otherwise p r ovided m ay be brought in the chancery court of any county where the def

endant, or any

necessary

party def endant, m ay

reside or be f o u n d ; a nd in a ll cases process m ay issue to any county to bring in def endants and to enf

orce all orders and decrees of the court. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-5-1 (Rev. 2014). The State again argues that, because the location of

a f o reign corporation’s registered agent is irrelevant to determ ine venue, this statute also d oes not apply . W e agree. ¶16. This Court f

i nds that the RAA overruled Ratliff and its holdi n g t h a t a non-resident def endant “res i d e s ” i n the county where its agent f or service of process is located. As the
1 0statute p rovides, the address of a registered agent does not determ ine v e nue. As f urther support, this Court, in Sm i th v. Kansas City Southern Railway Com pany , 214 So. 3d 272 (Miss. 2017), r ejected the c ontention that “a f oreign corporation could be f ound in any county in which it had an agent upon whom process could be served” and stated in f ootnote two that
KCS has a registered agent in Rankin County , Mississippi. However, Mississippi Code Section 79-35-15 now s pecif ically states that “the address of the agent does not d eterm ine venu e i n a n action or p roceeding involving the entity .” Miss. Code Ann. § 79-35-15 (Rev. 2013).
Sm ith v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. , 214 So. 3d 272, 2 74 n.2 ( Miss. 2017). Accordingly , because the g eneral venue statute f or chancery courts a lso provides no venue f or f oreign corporations,

we m ust turn to the general venue statute f or civil actions, Mississippi Code S ection 11-11-3.
C. General Venue Statute ¶17. Because n e ither of the above stat u t e s applied to this case, the trial court f ound that Mississippi Code Section 1 1-11-3, Mississippi’s general venue statute, determ ined venue in this case. The general venue statute states, (1)(a)(i) Civil actions of which the c i rcuit c o urt has original j urisdiction shall be com m enced in the county where the d ef endant resides, o r, if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of business, or in the c o u n t y where a substantial alleged a ct o r om ission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury

occurred. (ii) Civil actions alleging a def ective product m ay also be com m enced in the county where the plaintif

f obtained the product. (b) If venue in a civil a ction against a nonresident def endant cannot be asserted under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), a civil a ction against a nonresident m ay be com m enced in the county where the plaintif

f resides or is dom iciled.

1 1Miss. Code A nn. § 11-11-3 (Rev. 2004). Because the statute addresses civil actions of which

the circuit court has origina l jurisdiction, Def endants contend that this venue statute is inapplicable to actions brought in the chancery court. 5 The statute’s f

irst section, however, pertains to “civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction,” not exclusive juris d i c t i on. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (em phasis added). Original jurisdiction m ay be shared with other courts. Moreover, only subsection 11-11-3( 1 ) ( a)(i) specif ies venue in “circuit c ourt.” Every other subsection ref ers to “ any c i v i l a c tions.” Section 11-11-3, theref ore, is applicable t o civil a c t i ons i n “all courts.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-1 (Rev. 2004). ¶18. Accordingly , because the general venue statute f or c h ancery c ourt does not apply in this case and because Mississippi’s general v enue statute provides criteria that do not rely on the location of

a registered agent, we f

ind that the trial court’s reliance on Section 11-11-3

was appropriate. See H

olm es v . M c M i l l an , 21 So. 3d 6 14, 623 (Miss. 2009) ( apply ing

5 The State p o i n t s o u t that its com plaint also contains f

our c om m on-law causes of action under which venue is p roper in the circuit court. The State argues that M i s s issippi Rule of Civil Procedure 82(c) clearly a llows a suit to be brought in any county in which any one of the claim s could have been brought. Rule 82(c) provides,
W h ere several claim s o r parties have been properly joined, the suit m ay be brought in a ny county i n which any one of the claim s could properly have been b r o u g h t

. W henever an action has been com m enced in a proper county , additional claim s and parties m ay be j oined, pursuant to Rules 13, 14, 22 and 24, as a ncillary thereto, without regard to whe t h e r that county w ould be a proper venue f

or a n independent action on such c l aim s o r against s uch parties.
M.R.C.P. 82(c). As the State argues, the above claim s are allowed to be tried in circuit court. 1 2Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 to a case initiated i n county court). This interpretation of

the s tatute is logical and avoids i nterpreting the MCPA to s uggest that a f o reign corporation

m ay not be sued unless it consents to suit i n Hinds County

. W hile norm ally the s pecif ic term s of Mississippi Code Section 11-5-1 would prevail over the general term s of Section 11-11-3, because the s p e c i f

i c term s of the general chancery -court venue statute f ail to provide an appropriate venue f

or this action, the general term s of Section 11-11-3 a pply here. Guice v. Miss. Life Ins. C

o. , 836 So. 2d 756, 759 (Miss. 2 003). A c c o r d i n g ly , because the State’s Medicaid agency i s located in H inds County along with m ost state agencies, venue in Hinds County was appropriate pursuant to Section 11-11-3(b). ¶19. Def

endants a lso argue that no real conf lict exists between the RAA and Section 75-
2 4 -9. As discussed above, w e disagree and af f irm the trial court’s denial of De f e n d a n t s ’

m otion to transf

e r venue to Rankin County

.

CONCLUSION ¶20. B e c a u s e t h e clear language of the R AA m akes the locati o n o f a c o rp o r a t i o n ’ s registered agent irrelevant f or the purposes of v e n u e , t h e trial c ourt in this case correctly denied Def

endants’ joint m otion to transf er venue to R ankin C ounty

. Theref ore, we af f irm the Hinds County C hancery C ourt’s order deny ing a venue transf e r , and we rem and this case to that court f

or f urther proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶21. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
R A N D O L P H A N D K

I T C H E N S , P . J J . , M A X

W E L L A N D B E A M , J J . , C O N C U R . WALLER, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE W R ITTEN OPINION JOINED IN
1 3PART BY C OLEMAN AND CHAMBERLIN, J J. COLEMAN, J ., DISSENTS WITH

SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOIN E D BY C HAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ.; WALLER, C.J., JOINS IN PART. WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶22. Because Mississippi C ode Section 11-11-3(1)(b) (Rev. 2004) applies only to venue f or a c tions f

iled in circuit court a nd because the specif ic language o f Mississippi Section 75- 24-9 bars actions f

iled in Hinds County without the consent o f t h e p arties, I respectf ully dissent. ¶23. The State chose to bring this action pursuant to the Mississippi Consum er Protection Act (“MCPA”). That act states in pertinent part, The action shall be brought in the chancery o r county court of the county in which such person resides or has hi s p r incipal place of b usiness, or, w ith consent of the parties , m ay be brought in the chancery or county

court of the county in which the State Capitol is located. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-9 (Rev. 2016) (em phasis added). ¶24. W h ile the State contends that Hinds County i s proper—because the State’s Medicaid Agency is located there—the language of Section 75-24-9 specif ically states that, without the

consent of the parties, the action is precluded f rom b e i n g brought in Hinds County

. And nothing in the plain language of the statute lim its i ts application to Mississippi def endants except the expanded def

inition of f ered by the m ajority opinion. It is abundantly clear that the def endants in this action are authorized to do business in Mississippi and d id not consent to the action’s being f

iled in Hinds County

. ¶25. The State contends that v enue should be determ ined by S e c t i o n 1 1

- 1 1

- 3 ( 1 ), not
1 4Section 7 5

- 2 4

- 9 , because the State brought claim s f or m onetary dam a ges and sought injunctive and o ther relief

. I agree with the analy sis, but I disagree with the result. Had this action been f

i led in circuit court, Section 11-11-3(1) would control. A legal basis certainly exists f or the circuit court to have subject m atter jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction would then lie f or claim s associated under the MCPA. See S tate v. Walgreen Co. , 250 So. 3d 465, 476 (M i s s . 2 0 1 8) (“W hile the equitable issues pleaded are relevant and not to be ignored, the legal issues which f

lowed f rom [ def endant]s’ alleged inf

lated reim

b u r s em ent requests predom inate the State’s claim s and requests f or r elief

. As a result, jurisdiction properly lies in the circuit court.”). ¶26. This Court has repeatedly h eld that a v enue provision under a specif ic cause of action

cannot be abrogated by a general venue statute. See G uice v . Miss. Life Ins. Co. , 836 So. 2d 756, 759 (Miss. 2003) (citing Green v. Winona Elevator Co. , 319 So. 2d 224, 2 2 6 ( M i s s . 1975)). Sim ilarly , this Court has held that [ h]ad the Legislature intended f or each statute to have equal f ooting or equal f orce then b o th statutes should have had the m andatory “shall” language

. . . Accordingly , we f

ind that m andatory language, “shall,” in the general venue statute

. . . controls in this case over the perm issive language, “m ay ” f ound in [ another venue statute].
Crenshaw v. R om an , 942 So. 2d 806, 8 11 (Mis s . 2 0 0 6 ) ( q u oting Capital City Ins. Co. v G.B. “Boots” S

m ith Corp. , 8 8 9 So. 2d 505, 5 15 (Miss. 2004)). Further, when a statute “creates a cause of action which has not previously existed, the conditions upon which such right o f action m ay be pursued are a n i n t e g r a l part of the right g ranted a nd m ust be

1 5f

ollowed.” R oss v. Ross , 208 S o. 2d 194, 196 (Miss. 1968) (citing Price v. Price , 202 Miss.
2 6 8 , 32 So. 2d 1 24 (1947), superseded by s tatute on other g rounds as stated in L e w i s v . Pagel , 2 33 So. 3d 740, 7 47-48 (Miss. 2017)). A general statute is not applicable “to a special

statute which not only creates a right unknown to the com m on law, but also prescribes the

m eans a n d course of p rocedure, including venue, by which the r ight is t o be asserted.” Ross , 208 So. 2d at 196. ¶27. W h e n “ a s tatute i s clear and unam biguous,” this Court has f ound that “ no f

urther statutory construction is necessary and the statute should be given its plain m e aning.” Guice , 836 So. 2d at 759. I n addition, the language f ound in Section 75-24-9, that the action “shall be brought” in one of

these specif

ied venues, is m andatory

. See Pitalo v. GPCH-GP, Inc. , 933 S o. 2d 927, 929 (Miss. 2006); see also A m . Hom e Prods. Corp. v. Sum l in , 942 So. 2d 766, 769-70 (Miss. 2006) ( holding that “shall” is m andatory , while “m ay ” is discretionary ); Capital City Ins. Co. , 889 So. 2d at 516-17. ¶28. It is a legal im

possibility , however, f

or this case to proceed as f iled. First, the action

was brought in the chancery court—not in the circuit court—and the State plainly asserts in its com plaint that the suit was f

iled in chance r y court pursuant to Section 75-24-9. By its

unam biguous term s , Section 11-11-3(1) applies only t o “[ c]ivil actions of which the circuit

court has original jurisdiction[ .]” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) (em phasis added). The specif ic s ubsection c ited by the m ajority to o btain venue i s Section 1 1-11-3(1)(b) which states,

1 6I f v enue in a civil action against a nonresident def e ndant cannot be as s e r t e d under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) [ civil a ctions of which the circuit court has original j u r i s d i c tion], a civil action a gainst a nonresident m ay be com m enced in the county where the plaintif

f resides or is dom iciled. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(b) (em phasis added). ¶29. The m ajority relies on Wilkerson v. G oss , 113 So. 3d 544 (Miss. 2013), to conclude that venue f

or a suit brought under the MCPA could be established pursuant to Section 11-
11-3. Wilkerson , however, does not support this c onclusion. The plaintif f in Wilkerson had been give n a check f

or $65,000 to settle a workers’ com pensation claim

. Id. at 546. The check did not clear , a n d t h e plaintif f thereaf t er s ued W ilkerson f

or f raud and f

raudulent inducem ent in the Sm ith County Chancery Court. Id. W i lkerson sought interlocutory relief f rom the ref

u sal of the trial judge to transf er the case to the Scott County circuit c o urt. Id. at 546-47. This C ourt r eversed and rem anded f inding the trial court “ erred in i ts interpretation of M ississippi Code Section 11-11-3 and in d eny i ng [ d]ef endants’ m otion to transf

er venue [ to Scott County Circuit Court ].” Id. at 550 (em phasis added). ¶30. Wr i t i n g f

o r t h e m ajority in Wilkerson , Justice Lam ar wrote, “w e f i n d t h a t t h e allegations [ of Goss] would n o t support a f i nding of venue i n [ S mi th County ] even if properly supported by cognizable, credible evidence.” Id. a t 549. S im ilarly , th e State’s allegations here against P urdue m ake venue im p ossible in H inds C ounty because of the plain and unam biguous term s of M ississippi Code Section 75-24-9. Section 75-24-9 prohibits Hinds County a s a perm issible venue, unless it was chosen with “the consent of the parties.” ¶31. Second, this Court has recognized the pendent jurisdiction of circuit courts f or claim s
1 7f

iled under Section 75-24-9. Walgreen , 250 So. 3d at 474. I n Walgreen , the State brought

an action under the MCPA in DeSoto County Chancery C ourt against W algreen’s, CVS, and Fred’s Pharm acies f

or deceptive trade practices and f raudulent reporting of “inf lated and

custom ary prices” in t h e i r r eim bursem ent requests to the Mississippi Departm ent of Medicaid. Id. a t 468. The State also sought injunctive relief under Section 75-24-9. Id. The

act i o n w a s o r iginally f

iled in the DeSoto County Chancery Court. However, the chancery

court f ound that, because of the State’s law claim s and the def endants’ request f

or a jury trial, the circuit court was better equipped to preside over the action. I d. T his Court af

f irm ed the decision of

the trial court. Id. at 477. ¶32. A l e g a l b asis certainly supports the circuit c o urt’s e x e r c i s e o f s u b j e c t

- ma t t e r jurisdiction of the action. Wh e n an action includes b oth legal a nd equitable claim s, as these

cases do, this C ourt h as re p e a t e d l y held that the circuit court is the appropriate f orum . See
ERA Fra n c h i

s e Sys., I n c. v . Mathis , 931 So. 2 d 1278, 1283 ( Miss. 2006) (holding that
“cases i nvolving q

uestions of both law and equity

. . . are m ore appropriately brought bef ore a circuit court when they

are connected to a contractual relationship or other claim s tied to questions of law”); Union Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby , 870 So. 2d 1175, 1181 (Miss. 2004) (holding that cases w hi c h i n volved questions o f both l aw and equity “ leads us to the conclusion that this is a lawsuit that should be f iled i n circuit court, not chancery court”); S.
Leisure Hom es, Inc. v. Hardin , 742 S o . 2d 1088, 1090 (Miss. 1999) (“[ I] t i s mo r e appropriate f

or a circuit cou rt to hear equity claim s than it is f or a chancery court to hear

1 8actions at law s i n c e circuit courts have general jurisdiction but c hancery courts enjoy only

lim ited jurisdiction.”). ¶33. Theref

ore, if p endent jurisdiction exists f or c laim s o f a violation of the MCPA, these claim s s h o u ld be brought in c ircuit court. See Walgreen , 250 So. 3d at 474 (“W hile the equitable issues pleaded are relevant and n ot to b e ignored, the legal issues w h i c h f lowed f rom [ def endant]s’ alleged inf

lated reim bursem ent requests p redom inate the State’s claim s and r equests f

or relief . As a result, jurisdiction properly lies in the circuit court.”); Crosby , 870 S o. 2d at 1180 (holding that m ultiple claim s based both in law and i n equity , including a claim f iled under the MCPA, “m ay be brought in the circuit court”). ¶34. Because of

our precedent in Walgreen , I believe the p roper course is to reverse and

rem and this case to the C hancery Co u r t o f Hinds County and to direct that the action be transf erred to a circuit court o f the State’s choice s o that it m ay properly invoke i ts choice of venue under Section 11-11-3(1). ¶35. For these reasons, I respectf ully dissent. COLEMAN AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART. COLEMAN, JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶36. Venue is a f

unction o f statute, or so we have written in several o p i n i o n s o v er the decades. See, e .g. , S

tate v. Walgreen C

o. , 250 So. 3 d 465, 474 (¶ 27) (Miss. 2018); Forrest Gen. Hosp. v. Upton , 240 So. 3d 410, 415 ( ¶ 2 1 ) ( M i s s . 2 018); Park on Lakeland Drive, Inc. v. Spence , 941 So. 2d 203, 206 (¶ 8) ( Miss. 2006); Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley , 608

1 9So. 2d 1 149, 1155 (Miss. 1992). T he Court’s job w hen interpreting a statute is to honor the

intent of th e Legislature. City of Jackson v . Allen , 242 So. 3d 8, 15 (¶ 2 8) (Miss. 2018). Despite the axiom atic nature o f t h e p r e ceding two principles, today the m ajority runs roughshod over a cry s tal-clear expression by the L e gislature of its intent that venue of a civil actio n s o u n d i ng under Mississippi’s Consum er Protection Act cannot lie in Hinds County absent the consent of

the parties. Accordingly and with respect, I m

ust dissent.
I. The m ajority fails to ex plain w hy the prohibition against venue in Hinds County , found in Section 75-24-9, continues to apply to non-Mississippi defendants. ¶37. In his opinion, which I join to the extent that it establishes the ef f ect of Section 75-24-
9 as a specif

ic venue statute, 6 the Chief Justice has well explained why , as a m ore specif ic

venue s tatute, the v enue requirem ents o f t h e C o nsum e r Protection Act govern over the general venue statute and prohibit venue in Hinds County

. The m ajority of f ers precious little
response to the established authority upon w hich the Chief Jus tice relies, a nd I write to explain why , in my

opinion, what little resistence is of f ered f a i ls. ¶38. In dism issing the application of Section 75-24-9, the m ajority takes the novel position that the s tatute only applies to M i ssissippi def endants; two f

a tal problem s f

ace the m ajority ’s reasoning. ¶39. First, as e xplained b y the m ajority , i t is a n a me n d m e n t t o t he Registered Agent Act

6 A s m o re f

u lly ex p lain ed b elo w , I d o n o t j o in th e C h ief Ju stice’s d issen t to th e ex t en t th at h e w o u ld h o ld th at th e g e n eral v en u e s tatu te, S ectio n 1 1 -1 1 -3 , o n ly ap p lies to cases f i led in circu it co u rt. 2 0f

orbidding the use of a registered agent’s address in determ ining venue that spawns today ’s dif f iculty

. Prior to the am endm ent, nobody w ould dispute that Section 75-24-9’s prohibition against v e n u e in H inds County absent consent would apply to non-Mississippi def endants

or, put dif

f erently , that the Legislature inten d e d that n on-Mississippi def endants could not be sued in Hinds C ounty without agreeing to it. Indeed, pursuant to the m a jority ’s reasoning,

a non-Mississippi def

endant who nevertheless m a i ntains a pri n c i p a l p l ace of business in Mississippi would f

all w i t h i n the statute. A change to another statute that renders one disjunctive clause o f three inapplicable t o only part of a class of d ef endants does not suf

f ice

to indicate that the Legislature intended all of the provisions of Section 7 5

- 2 4

- 9 t o cease having any

ef f ect as to the rem aining part of the class of

def e n dants in question. ¶40. Second, if the m a

jority m eans what it writes when i t holds that Section 75-24-9, in its entirety , no l onger applies to non-Mississippi def e ndants, then the m ajority m ust explain why the L egislature’s d ecision to e xclude non-Mississippi def endants f rom its scope does not lead

to the inexorable conclusion that the Legislature intended to create a venue gap and exclude non-Mississippi def

endants f r om suit anywh e r e i n Mississippi p ursuant to the Consum er Protection Act. It i s one thing to render part of Section 75-24-9 inapplicable to certain nonM i s s issippi def

endants (who m aintain no principal place of b usiness i n Mississippi); it i s quite another to h o ld that the Legislature has expressed a positive intent to exclude all out-of

state def endants f r om the specif

ic venue statute.
II. Although Section 75-24-9 continues to apply to non-Mississippi defendants, the m ajority c orrectly holds that Section 11-11-3 appli e s t o the instant c hancery
2 1court case.

¶41. Although, as explained above, the prohibition against venue in Hinds County absent

consent of the parties applies, I agree with the m ajority in the f ollowing respects. First, the

venue provision of the Mississ i p p i C o n sum er Protection Act f a ils to set venue f

or the underly ing c ivil action. Second, the Registered Agents Act h as abrogated our caselaw that allows the Court to use the addres s o f a c orporate entity ’s registered a g ent f or service of
process to determ ine its principal place of busi ness within Mississippi f or the purpose of setting venue. Third, the chancery court venue statute, Section 11-5-1, does not provide an appropriate venue f

or the above-sty led case. Furtherm ore , I a g ree that the circuit court general venue statute, Section 11-11-3, does provide the appropriate v enue. Accordingly I part way s with the Chief Justice’s opinion here, as he would hold that Section 1 1

- 11-3 applies only to cases f

iled in circuit court. A s explained b elow, we h a v e a l r e a d y held that Section 11-11-3 applies to cases f iled in courts other than circuit court. ¶42. Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 provides, in pertinent part, as f o llows: (1)(a)(i) C ivil actions of which the circuit court h as o riginal jurisdiction shall be com m enced in the county where the d ef endant resides, o r, if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of b u s i n e ss, o r i n the c ounty where a substantial alleged a ct o r om ission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury

occurred. (ii) Civil actions alleging a def ective p roduct m a y a l so be com m enced in the county where the plaintif

f obtained the product. (b) If venue in a civil action against a nonresident def endant cannot be asserted under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), a civil action against a nonresident m ay be com m enced in the county where the plaintif f resides or is dom iciled.
2 2Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (Rev. 2004) (em phasis added). ¶43. Although the S tate c hose t o f ile the above-sty led case in chancery court, it is a case

over which the circuit court enjoy s original subject-m atter jurisdiction. S e e State v. Walgreen Co. , 250 So. 3d 4 6 5, (Miss. 2018). I n H olm es v. McMillan , 21 So. 3d 614 (Miss. 2009), the Court acknowledged that Section 11-11-3 applies to det erm ine venue in county
court because county and c ircuit c ourts have concurrent jurisdiction as l ong a s the statutory requirem ents f

or c o u n t y c o u r t j u risdiction are m et. Id. at 618 n.2 (¶ 11). As it can with county court, a circuit court can s hare concurrent jurisdic t i o n w i th a chancery court. KD Hattiesburg 1128, Inc. v. Turtle C reek Crossing, LLC

, 2 37 So. 3d 157, 162-163 (¶¶21-24) ( M i s s. 2018). Pursuant to the h olding in Walgreen , such is the case today

. Be c a u s e
concurrent jurisdiction existed between the c ircuit and chancery court in the c ase s u b judice , and because we have a

pplied Section 11-11-3 to county courts in relia n c e u p o n t h e

com bination of c oncurrent jurisdiction w i t h t he circuit court’s and S ection 1 1-11-3’s language extending its scope to “actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction,” I agree with the m ajority

that Section 11-11-3 applies. However, a s set f orth above and in the Chief Justice’s dissent, Section 75-24-9 excludes Hinds County as a perm issible venue. Accordingly , the chancery court’s order should be r eversed, and the case should be rem anded f or the parties to attem

p t to f ind another perm issible venue.
CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE , JJ., JOIN T HIS OPINION. WALLER, C.J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.

2 3