alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

  Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss.1350)

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.  ss.1350),
the  undersigned,  Robert R. Galvin,  Chief  Financial  Officer of NuCO2 Inc., a
Florida  corporation  (the  "Company"),  does hereby certify,  to his knowledge,
that:

The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2005
of the Company (the "Report")  fully complies with the  requirements  of section
13(a) or 15(d)  of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934,  and the  information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

                                                   /s/ Robert R. Galvin
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                   Robert R. Galvin
                                                   Chief Financial Officer
                                                   February 9, 2006
```
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1116 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to equalize the exclusion 

from gross income of parking and transportation fringe benefits and 

to provide for a common cost-of-living adjustment, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 7, 2013 

Mr. SCHUMER (for himself, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. CARPER, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. 

COONS, and Mrs. GILLIBRAND) introduced the following bill; which was 

read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to equalize 

the exclusion from gross income of parking and transportation fringe benefits and to provide for a common costof-living adjustment, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Commuter Benefits 

5 Equity Act of 2013’’. 


TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1116 IS

1 SEC. 2. UNIFORM DOLLAR LIMITATION FOR ALL TYPES OF 

2 TRANSPORTATION FRINGE BENEFITS. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 132(f)(2) of the Internal 

4 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended— 

5 (1) by striking ‘‘$100’’ in subparagraph (A) 

6 and inserting ‘‘$245’’, 

7 (2) by striking ‘‘$175’’ in subparagraph (B) 

8 and inserting ‘‘$245’’, and 

9 (3) by striking the last sentence. 

10 (b) INFLATION ADJUSTMENT CONFORMING AMEND11 MENTS.—Subparagraph (A) of section 132(f)(6) of the In12 ternal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended— 

13 (1) by striking the last sentence, 

14 (2) by striking ‘‘1999’’ and inserting ‘‘2013’’, 

15 and 

16 (3) by striking ‘‘1998’’ and inserting ‘‘2012’’. 

17 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

18 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

19 December 31, 2013. 

20 SEC. 3. CLARIFICATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEE BENEFITS. 

21 Section 7905 of title 5, United States Code, is 

22 amended— 

23 (1) in subsection (a)— 

24 (A) in paragraph (2)(C) by inserting 

25 ‘‘and’’ after the semicolon; 


TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 1116 IS

1 (B) in paragraph (3) by striking ‘‘; and’’ 

2 and inserting a period; and 

3 (C) by striking paragraph (4); and 

4 (2) in subsection (b)(2)(A) by amending sub5 paragraph (A) to read as follows: 

6 ‘‘(A) a qualified transportation fringe as 

7 defined in section 132(f)(1) of the Internal Rev8 enue Code of 1986;’’. 

Æ 


TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 99.1


                        INDEX TO EXHIBITS

10.1   Form of Performance Stock Memorandum dated March 12, 1999,
       regarding conditional opportunity to acquire Company stock
       granted to eight executive officers, respectively.

15.1   Letter of Independent Accountants regarding Awareness of
       Incorporation by Reference.

27.1   Financial Data Schedule.  (Exhibit 27.1 is being submitted
       as an exhibit only in the electronic format of this
       Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q being submitted to the
       Securities and Exchange Commission.  Exhibit 27.1 shall
       not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 11 of the
       Securities Act of 1933, Section 18 of the Securities
       Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 323 of the Trust Indenture
       Act, or otherwise be subject to the liabilities of such
       sections, nor shall it be deemed a part of any
       registration statement to which it relates.)
#### Howard WATERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-432.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Nov. 18, 1969.

Howard Waters, in pro. per.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This court, proceeding in the manner outlined and recommended by the Supreme Court of the United State in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, having deferred ruling on a motion of the public defender to withdraw as counsel for the indigent defendant-appellant, and having furnished appellant with a copy of the public defender’s memorandum brief, and having allowed the appellant a reasonable specified time within which to raise any points that he chose in support of his appeal, and the appellant having filed his response thereto, on consideration thereof upon full examination of the proceedings we conclude that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Whereupon, the public defender’s said motion to withdraw is granted, and the order or judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.
#### Ronald D. SCHOONMAKER, Appellant, v. Winston JAMES, Chief of Police, Key West, Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-921.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 6, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Herbert S. ADDISON, Jr., et ux., et al. v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 53946.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 12, 1973.

In re: Herbert S. Addison, Jr., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of Tangipahoa. 281 So.2d 805.

Application denied. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in its opinion.
#### Robert BRAUN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-128.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 21, 1973.

Appeal dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000             DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-27-2000             DEC-27-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-25-2000             JUN-25-2000
<CASH>                                             208                       0
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   72,305                       0
<ALLOWANCES>                                       400                       0
<INVENTORY>                                     73,033                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               160,573                       0
<PP&E>                                         859,575                       0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 523,930                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 574,769                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          740,730                       0
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                        48,560                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                   (345,022)                       0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   574,769                       0
<SALES>                                        153,134                 312,835
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               153,134                 312,835
<CGS>                                          155,934                 314,588
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  165,820                 334,878
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,194                   6,903
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,089                  25,380
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (24,969)                (54,326)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       250                     396
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (25,219)                (54,722)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (25,219)                (54,722)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (2.39)                  (5.19)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.39)                  (5.19)


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-2000
<CASH>                                         259,756
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               15,857,419
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                 43,924,586
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            60,041,761
<PP&E>                                       8,733,026
<DEPRECIATION>                                 660,525
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              68,469,720
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       58,288,343
<BONDS>                                      5,073,296
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,254
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,106,827
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                68,469,720
<SALES>                                     79,927,706
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            81,511,282
<CGS>                                       74,000,255
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               74,000,255
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             6,612,342
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             286,667
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                717,342
<INCOME-TAX>                                   260,485
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            456,857
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   456,857
<EPS-BASIC>                                     364.32
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   364.32


</TABLE>
# C_2021382EN.01001801.xml

| 20.9.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 382/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.9.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 382/18

---

Appeal brought on 16 July 2021 by Ryanair DAC against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 19 May 2021 in Case T-628/20, Ryanair v Commission (Spain; Covid-19)

(Case C-441/21 P)

(2021/C 382/24)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Ryanair DAC (represented by: V. Blanc, E. Vahida and F.-C. Laprévote, avocats, S. Rating, abogado, and I. G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, dikigoros)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of Spain, French Republic

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgment under appeal; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment under appeal;

| — | declare in accordance with Articles 263 TFEU and 264 TFEU that Commission Decision C(2020) 5414 final of 31 July 2020 on State Aid SA.57659 (2020/N) — Spain — COVID-19 — Recapitalisation fund is void; and |
| --- | --- |

—

declare in accordance with Articles 263 TFEU and 264 TFEU that Commission Decision C(2020) 5414 final of 31 July 2020 on State Aid SA.57659 (2020/N) — Spain — COVID-19 — Recapitalisation fund is void; and

| — | order the Commission to bear its own costs and pay those incurrent by Ryanair, and order the interveners at first instance and in this appeal (if any) to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to bear its own costs and pay those incurrent by Ryanair, and order the interveners at first instance and in this appeal (if any) to bear their own costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the appellant relies on six pleas in law.

First plea in law: the General Court erred in law in rejecting the appellant’s claim that the non-discrimination principle has been unjustifiably violated.

Second plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts regarding the appellant’s claim on the infringement of the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services.

Third plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts in rejecting the appellant’s plea concerning the misapplication of the balancing test.

Fourth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and committed a manifest error of assessment in the classification of the aid as an aid scheme.

Fifth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts regarding the Commission’s failure to open a formal investigation procedure.

Sixth plea in law: the General Court erred in law and manifestly distorted the facts regarding the Commission’s failure to state reasons.

---
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

October 27, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

136871 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Stephen J. Markman, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, Justices 

v SC: 136871 

 COA: 285018 

Jackson CC: 06-003599-FH 

JOHN WILLIAM RODGERS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 27, 2008 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

KELLY, J., would grant leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in her dissenting 

statement in People v Conway, 474 Mich 1140 (2006). 

p1020 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 27, 2008 

 Clerk
#### Eliga MOORE, Individually, and as parent and Administrator of the Estate of his minor child, David Ray Moore v. DIXIE DONUT, INC., and Casualty Reciprocal Exchange.

No. 53441.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 17, 1973.

In re: Casualty Reciprocal Exchange and Dixie Do-Nut, Inc. applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 273 So.2d 627.

Application denied. There is no error of law in the Court of Appeal opinion.
# C_2022418EN.01003001.xml

| 31.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 418/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 418/30

---

Judgment of the General Court of 7 September 2022 — Migadakis v ENISA

(Case T-507/21) (1)

(Civil service - Members of the temporary staff - Recruitment - Call for expressions of interest - Video examination - Minimum points threshold - Equality of treatment - Whether marking was objective)

(2022/C 418/39)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Ioannis Migadakis (represented by: K. Bicard, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (represented by: I. Taurina, G. Pappa and C. Chalanouli, acting as Agents, and by B. Wägenbauer, lawyer)

Re:

By his action pursuant to Article 270 TFEU, the applicant seeks to have set aside the decision of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) of 30 October 2020 not to accept his application.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mr. Ioannis Migadakis is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr. Ioannis Migadakis is ordered to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 422, 18.10.2021.

---
Exhibit 31.2

Section 302 Certification

I, Sean M. McCarthy, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Diedrich Coffee, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over
financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of
internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                        |  |  |  |                                         
|----------------------- |  |  |  | ----------------------------------------
|                        |  | 
|Dated: November 5, 2007 |  |  |  | /s/ Sean M. McCarthy                    
|                        |  |  |  | Sean M. McCarthy Chief Financial
Officer
#### Wiggins vs. Fisher.

In a suit by an assignee of a bond, it is sufficient, in stating the cause of action, to negative the payment to the assignor before the transfer of the bond, without negativing the payment to him in the concluding breach of the declaration.

Where the bond, as described in the declaration and as given on oyer, is for the same amount — though by an endorsement on the bond, it appears that the amount actually due is less than the face of the bond — there is no variance.

*Appeal from Ashley Circuit Court.*

Hon. John C. Murray, Circuit Judge.

Garland & Randolph, for the appellant.

*522There is no such denial of payment to Kirkpatrick as the law requires. The negative is limited to the plaintiff, and it is evident that the breach is insufficient. 13 *Ark.*326; 1 *Ch. Pl.*278, 291, 392.

The bond granted on oyer is entirely different from the one set out in the declaration — shows a different cause of action. The variance, therefore, is fatal. 1 *Ch. PL*338, *et seq.*

Winter, for the appellee.

. The non-payment of the bond sued on to the assignor, before it was transferred to the defendant, being sufficiently averred in the body of the declaration, the fact need not be again negatived in the breach. 1 *Ch. Pl.*320; 2 *lb.*124.

Mr. Justice Compton

delivered the opinion of the court.

The action in this case was brought by Fisher, as internal improvement commissioner, against Wiggins and others, on a penal bond, conditioned for the payment of seven hundred dollars, payable to Kirkpatrick, who was the plaintiff’s predecessor in office.

In the Circuit Court a demurrer to the declaration was overruled, and the. defendants saying nothing further, final judgment was rendered against them.

The first cause of demurrer assigned is, that the breach in the declaration is too narrow, inasmuch as it does not negative the payment oí the money to Kirkpatrick. It is true that the declaration concludes with a breach negativing the payment of the money to the plaintiff only, but then in that part of the declaration which contains a statement of the cause of action, the payment oí the money to Kirkpatrick, before he transferred the bond to plaintiff as his successor in office, is expressly and distinctly negatived. This, according to the most approved precedents, was sufficient.

The second and only remaining cause of demurrer assigned, is an alleged variance.

The bond, as described in the declaration, is conditioned for *523the payment of seven hundred dollars, and as read on oyer, is conditioned for the payment of the same amount, with a credit endorsed thereon, as follows:

> “ Received on the within note one hundred dollars, there not being but six hundred dollars in my hands to loan. January, 1st, 1856. J. W. M. KIRKPATRICK.”

Although this endorsement would be evidence in ascertaining the amount recoverable on the bond, yet in legal contemplation it wa3 no part of the bond, and the pleader properly disregarded it as such.

Let the. judgment be affirmed with ten per cent, damages and costs.
Exhibit 99.1

Financial statement scheduleRule 12-09.

Valuation and qualifying accounts.

YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2003

|                                |  |   |           | Column CAdditions |   |         |  |  
|------------------------------- |  | - | --------- | ------------------ | - | ------- |  | -
|
|
|Allowance for doubtful accounts |  | $ | 1,250,000 |                    | $ | 672,000 |  | $

YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2004

|                                |  |   |           | Column CAdditions |   |         |  |  
|------------------------------- |  | - | --------- | ------------------ | - | ------- |  | -
|
|
|Allowance for doubtful accounts |  | $ | 1,922,000 |                    | $ | 125,000 |  | $

YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2005

|                                |  |   |         | Column CAdditions |   |  |  |  
|------------------------------- |  | - | ------- | ------------------ | - |  |  | -
|
|
|Allowance for doubtful accounts |  | $ | 591,000 |                    | $ |  |  | $

---



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