Present: All the Justices 

AAA DISPOSAL SERVICES, INC., ET AL. 

v. Record No. 030465 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 March 5, 2004 

JAMES R. ECKERT 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Stanley P. Klein, Judge 

 The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a 

confession of judgment for the amount specified in an ad 

damnum clause is valid and binding in the absence of a 

plaintiff’s willingness to accept that amount of principal 

and interest. We conclude that such a confession of 

judgment is not valid in light of the plain terms of Code 

§ 8.01-431 requiring that a plaintiff be willing to accept 

a judgment for the principal and interest contained in a 

confession of judgment. Therefore, the circuit court did 

not err in granting the plaintiff’s motion to nonsuit this 

action. 

 James R. Eckert filed a motion for judgment against 

AAA Disposal Services, Inc., and Miguel A. Aragon-Campos 

(collectively, “the defendants”), alleging personal injury 

as a result of an automobile accident and seeking damages 
in the amount of $60,000.1

 More than two months before a 

scheduled trial date, Eckert moved the court for leave to 

increase the ad damnum in his motion for judgment to 

$350,000. Eckert claimed that, instead of sustaining 

merely soft tissue injuries, he had suffered a herniated 

disc as a result of the accident and would require surgery 

to correct that condition. A few days later, the 

defendants moved the court for leave to amend their 

responsive pleadings by admitting liability. At a 

subsequent hearing, the circuit court denied Eckert’s 

motion to increase the ad damnum because the motion came 

too close to the trial date, but the court granted the 

defendants’ motion to admit liability. 

The defendants then filed a confession of judgment, 

stating that they, “jointly and severally, [are] justly 

indebted to and do hereby confess judgment in favor of 

JAMES R. ECKERT in the total sum of Sixty Thousand Dollars 

($60,000.00), which is the amount sued for in the ad damnum

of the plaintiff’s motion for judgment, as well as the 

plaintiff’s costs and interest as allowed by law as pled in 

the original motion for judgment.” Aragon-Campos executed 

the confession of judgment in his own behalf, and Steven A. 

 1

 Several automobiles were involved in the accident, 

one of which was a truck owned by AAA Disposal Services and 

driven by its employee, Aragon-Campos.

2
Smith, Assistant General Manager, signed the document on 

behalf of Republic Services of Virginia, L.L.C., the 

successor in interest to AAA Disposal Services. However, 

the acknowledgement by the notary public stated that Tim 

Hayes executed the confession of judgment for AAA Disposal 

Services. 

The circuit court clerk’s office accepted the 

confession of judgment for filing on December 4, 2002. The 

next day, Eckert filed a motion to nonsuit his case. At 

that time, no entry of judgment had been docketed, nor had 

a final order been entered in the case. Eckert had not 

consented to entry of a judgment by confession for the 

amount for which he had sued. 

The circuit court subsequently heard oral argument on 

Eckert’s motion for a nonsuit. Eckert asserted that a 

confession of judgment was not a submission to the court 

for a decision within the meaning of Code § 8.01-380 and 

that, therefore, he was entitled to a nonsuit as a matter 

of right. The defendants argued that a confession of 

judgment for the amount requested by Eckert in the ad

damnum clause of his motion for judgment effectively ended 

the case and that a nonsuit could not be taken after a case 

is concluded. 

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In a letter opinion, the circuit court first reasoned 

that the confession of judgment was “ineffective” because 

the person recited as confessing judgment for AAA Disposal 

Services was not the person who actually did so. The court 

further explained that, pursuant to the provisions of Code 

§ 8.01-432, judgment may be confessed “for only such 

principal and interest as [the] creditor may be willing to 

accept a judgment for.” This language, in the court’s 

view, implied that a creditor must be willing to accept the 

confessed judgment before it is final and that Eckert had 

not done so.2

 For these reasons, the circuit court 

concluded that the case had not been submitted to the court 

for a decision within the meaning of Code § 8.01-380(A) and 

that Eckert therefore was entitled to a nonsuit. The court 

entered an order nonsuiting the case without prejudice. 

The defendants appeal from that judgment, and Eckert 

assigns cross-error to the circuit court’s refusal to allow 

him to amend the motion for judgment by increasing the 

amount of the ad damnum. 

The dispositive inquiry in this appeal is whether the 

confession of judgment was valid and binding on Eckert in 

 2

 The circuit court cited Code § 8.01-432, but the 

defendants confessed judgment pursuant to the provisions of 

Code § 8.01-431. However, Code § 8.01-431 contains 

language similar to that quoted by the court. 

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the absence of his willingness to accept the amount of 

principal and interest specified in that judgment. We 

conclude that it was not. 

As previously noted, the defendants confessed judgment 

in this case pursuant to Code § 8.01-431. In relevant 

part, that statute allows a defendant in any suit to 

“confess a judgment in the clerk’s office for so much 

principal and interest as the plaintiff may be willing to

accept a judgment or decree for.” (Emphasis added.) The 

underscored language is clear and unambiguous. Hence, we 

construe such language according to its plain meaning 

without resort to rules of statutory interpretation. 

Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 598, 587 S.E.2d 

561, 564 (2003); Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 

S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985); see also Industrial Dev. Auth. v.

Board of Supervisors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 

(2002). 

The plain terms of Code § 8.01-431 require that a 

plaintiff be willing to accept the amount of principal and 

interest for which a defendant is confessing judgment. See

Beazley v. Sims, 81 Va. 644, 647 (1886) (“[i]f a creditor 

accepts and ratifies a confession of judgment in his favor, 

it becomes, from the moment of its acceptance, valid”). 

Such acceptance is absent in this case. The written 

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statement of facts filed pursuant to Rule 5:11(c) specifies 

that Eckert “had not consented to entry of a judgment by 

confession for the amount sued for.” Furthermore, the 

defendants confessed judgment for “interest as allowed by 

law as pled in the original motion for judgment.” The 

record on this appeal is silent as to whether the amount of 

interest confessed included pre-judgment interest under 

Code § 8.01-382, and if it did not, whether Eckert would 

have accepted a judgment that did not include such 

interest. 

Relying on the principle that a plaintiff cannot 

recover more than the amount sued for, see Town & Country

Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, 249 Va. 387, 400, 457 S.E.2d 

356, 365 (1995), the defendants, nevertheless, assert that 

Eckert’s acceptance in this case was implied because they 

confessed judgment for the full amount of the ad damnum

requested in the motion for judgment. The defendants argue 

that, upon confessing judgment for that amount, the case 

was ended and could not thereafter be nonsuited. 

We agree that a plaintiff cannot recover more than the 

amount sued for, but that principle does not allow this 

Court to ignore the plain words of Code § 8.01-431 

requiring a plaintiff’s acceptance of the amount of a 

confessed judgment. Notably, a prior version of this 

6
statute provided that a defendant “may confess a judgment 

in the clerk’s office . . for the whole amount of the 

plaintiff’s demand in his writ or declaration set forth, 

and costs, or such part thereof as the plaintiff may be 

willing to accept a judgment for.” 2 Virginia Revised Code 

app. VI c. 1, p. 585 (1819). The General Assembly deleted 

the reference to the “whole amount of the plaintiff’s 

demand” in the 1849 version of the statute, Code (1849) 

tit. 51 c. 171, § 41, and has not included that language in 

the current statute, Code § 8.01-431. Thus, the General 

Assembly obviously knows how to allow a defendant to 

confess judgment for the amount sued for without a 

plaintiff’s consent when it wishes to do so. We assume 

that the General Assembly’s change in a statute is 

“purposeful and not unnecessary or vain.” Cape Henry

Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 600, 331 

S.E.2d 476, 479 (1985); accord Virginia-American Water Co.

v. Prince William County Serv. Auth., 246 Va. 509, 517, 436 

S.E.2d 618, 623 (1993). 

In the absence of Eckert’s willingness to accept the 

amount of the principal and interest contained in the 

confession of judgment, we conclude that it was not valid 

and binding on him. See Beazley’s Adm’r, 81 Va. at 647. 

Thus, this action had not ended, nor had anything been 

7
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submitted to the circuit court for decision. Under the 

provisions of Code § 8.01-380, Eckert was therefore 

entitled to take a nonsuit. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 

circuit court.3

Affirmed. 

 3

 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 

address Eckert’s assignment of cross-error.