alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IV 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 761 

Recognizing the benefits of charitable giving and expressing support for the 

designation of December 2, 2014, as Giving Tuesday. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 20, 2014 

Ms. GABBARD (for herself, Mr. SCHOCK, Mr. VARGAS, Mrs. BUSTOS, Mr. 

YOUNG of Indiana, and Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform 

RESOLUTION 

Recognizing the benefits of charitable giving and expressing 

support for the designation of December 2, 2014, as 

Giving Tuesday. 

Whereas the Tuesday following Thanksgiving, Black Friday, 

and Cyber Monday kicks off the holiday giving season 

with a global day dedicated to charitable giving known as 

Giving Tuesday; 

Whereas Giving Tuesday is in its third year and has become 

a worldwide movement that celebrates the power of giving 

in all its forms; 

Whereas this movement was launched by a concerned and 

passionate group of people who want to help celebrate the 

power of giving to enact positive change, conceptualized 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS

2 

•HRES 761 IH 

by a group of innovators led by New York’s 92nd Street 

Y, first launched in partnership with the UN Foundation 

in 2012; 

Whereas Giving Tuesday brought together more than 2,500 

organizations from all 50 States in its first year; 

Whereas Giving Tuesday continued to gain momentum in its 

second year, with 10,000 partners in the United States 

and 46 countries around the world, increasing online donations 270 percent since the Tuesday after Thanksgiving in 2011 (before Giving Tuesday began); 

Whereas the United States is a country with a great and generous philanthropic history and a new generation of 

young leaders are carrying the torch to show that giving 

back is something that all parties can agree on, transcending any differences of political ideologies and uniting people across boundaries; 

Whereas according to the 2014 Millennial Impact Report 87 

percent of millennials gave back to charity in 2013; 

Whereas giving and philanthropy is something that transcends party lines; 

Whereas Giving Tuesday is a special call to action to create 

a national day of giving that moves beyond the annual 

shopping and spending moments to inspire more, smarter, better and greater giving in the United States and 

around the world every day; and 

Whereas Giving Tuesday is an opportune time for people in 

the United States and the world to come together and 

show how powerful humanity can be when we unite to 

give to promote causes that promote peace, progress and 

prosperity for a better world: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS

3 

•HRES 761 IH 

1 (1) recognizes the lasting impact of Giving 

2 Tuesday; and 

3 (2) supports the designation of Giving Tuesday. 

Æ 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### WILKES *v.*STATE

[No. 340,

September Term, 1961.]

*Decided July 6, 1962.*

The cause was argued before Bruñe, C. J., and Henderson, Hammond, Prescott and Sybert, JJ.

*Stanley J. Schapiro,*with whom was *Michael P. Preedman*on the brief, for appellant.

*Robert S. Bourbon, Assistant Attorney General,*with whom were *Thomas B. Pinan, Attorney General, Saul A. Harris*and *James W. McAllister, State’s Attorney*and *Assistant State’s Attorney,*respectively, for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellee.

*260P£r Curiam.

The appellant was convicted in a non-jury trial of attempting to rob a taxicab driver with a deadly weapon and sentenced to a term in the Maryland Penitentiary.

We find no merit in appellant’s contention here that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the finding of guilt. The cab driver testified that when appellant was asked to pay his fare he replied, “I ain’t going to pay you nothing, this is a holdup”, at which time the driver noted the blade of a knife sticking out of appellant’s hand. The driver stated that a struggle ensued during which appellant threw the knife at the driver, but missed his mark, whereupon the driver pinned appellant to the ground. A policeman, called by another driver who had come upon the scene, testified that when he arrived the cab driver was holding the appellant on the ground and that both were “breathless as though a struggle had happened.” The officer found the knife some 75 feet away from the scene after being informed by the driver of the direction in which it had been thrown. At the trial the appellant denied owning the penknife and denied that the cab driver had touched him or that any struggle had taken place. His version was that the driver called the police when he offered to get money to pay the fare in a nearby house and that he was standing beside the cab when the policeman arrived.

The credibility of the witnesses was a matter for the trier of fact to determine, and the trial judge was under no obligation to believe the appellant’s story. *Knuckles v. State,*228 Md. 318 (1962). The evidence was ample to support the charge.

Appellant’s only other contention is that the trial court erred in admitting the penknife into evidence without sufficient identification of it as belonging to the appellant. The knife was identified by both the police officer and the cab driver 'as the weapon found at the scene of the crime after a search by the officer of the area where the thrown knife would have landed. We have consistently held that a probability of connection of proffered evidence with a crime is enough to malee It admissible, its weight being for the trier of fact to evaluate. *261
      *Spriggs v. State,*226 Md. 50 (1961). We find no error in the admission of the knife.

*Judgment affirmed.*
<PAGE>
                                                                      EXHIBIT 12


                    GE GLOBAL INSURANCE HOLDING CORPORATION
                                AND SUBSIDIARIES

                Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges

                         Six months ended June 28, 1997

                                   (Unaudited)



(In millions)

Earnings:
   Earnings before income taxes                                   $451
   Fixed charges:
     Minority interest in net earnings of
       consolidated subsidiaries (1)                                42
     Interest expense                                               23
                                                                  ----
                                                                  $516
                                                                  ====

Fixed charges:
   Minority interest in net earnings of
     consolidated subsidiaries (2)                                $ 60
   Interest expense                                                 23
                                                                  ----
                                                                  $ 83
                                                                  ====

Ratio of earnings to fixed charges                                6.22
                                                                  ====


(1)  Minority  interest in net earnings of  consolidated  subsidiaries  includes
     dividends on subsidiary's preferred stock.

(2)  The  fixed  charges  amount  for  minority  interest  in  net  earnings  of
     consolidated subsidiaries represents the pretax earnings amount which would
     be required to cover such fixed charges as calculated below:


                Subsidiary's Preferred Stock Dividend Requirement
                -------------------------------------------------
                             100% - Income Tax Rate

     The  income  tax rate is based on the  relationship  of the  provision  for
     income taxes to earnings before income taxes for the respective period.


                                        7
# C_2022138EN.01000901.xml

| 28.3.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 138/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.3.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/9

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden (Germany) lodged on 14 December 2021 — TR v Land Hessen

(Case C-768/21)

(2022/C 138/09)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: TR

Defendant: Land Hessen

Question referred

Are Article 57(1)(a) and (f) and Article 58(2)(a) to (j) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (1) read in combination with Article 77(1) thereof, to be understood as meaning that, where the supervisory authority finds that data processing has infringed the data subject’s rights, the supervisory authority must always take action in accordance with Article 58(2) of that regulation?

---

(1)  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1).

---
#### William W. PENKAVA, Appellant, v. George M. ZAJACK, Appellee.

No. 69-496.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

Jan. 9, 1970.

Kaleel, Kaleel & Kaleel, St. Petersburg, for appellant.

Myron J. Mensh, of Mensh & Mensh, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Cloud v. Fallís, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 669.

HOBSON, C. J., and LILES and Mc-NULTY, JJ., concur.
#### Irvine K. DOUGLAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 77-799, 77-800.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 20, 1978.

Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, Stephen O. Rushing, Asst. Public Defender, and William Murphy, Legal Intern, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard G. Pippinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, but this case is remanded for resentencing of the appellant. The present sentence does not specifically set forth the period of credit time to be allowed, as required by Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1975). *Smith*v. *State,*310 So.2d 770 (Fla.2d DCA 1975). Moreover, the phrase “at hard labor” in the sentence is improper. *Speller v. State,*305 So.2d 231 (Fla.2d DCA 1974). Appellant need not be present for this purpose.

HOBSON, Acting C. J., and GRIMES and OTT, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM (A) DAY
INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.'S QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED
JUNE 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH (B) FORM
10-Q.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                           4,453
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   19,260
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     20,500
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                47,746
<PP&E>                                          45,148
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 242,336
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           29,763
<BONDS>                                        249,135
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           34,290
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                    (87,705)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   242,336
<SALES>                                         86,050
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                86,050
<CGS>                                           53,841
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   88,179
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   180
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              13,971
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (16,280)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (3,428)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (12,852)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  3,552
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (16,404)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### The STATE of Florida ex rel. Roy L. LAWSON, Relator, v. Honorable Ralph B. FERGUSON, Jr., Circuit Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Dade County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 74-375.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 14, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Prohibition dismissed.
#### HAMMOND *v.*DIRECTOR OF PATUXENT INSTITUTION

[App. No. 25,

September Term, 1962.]

*Decided October 11, 1962.*

Before Bruñe, C. J., and Henderson, Hammond, Prescott, Horney, Marbury and Sybert, JJ.

PER Curiam.

This is an application for leave to appeal from an order of *644the Criminal Court of Baltimore, dated June 4, 1962, finding the applicant to be a defective delinquent, after a hearing before Judge Byrnes, sitting without a jury, and committing him to the Patuxent Institution as a defective delinquent. This application is filed under the provisions of Code (1962 Cum. Supp.), Article 31B, § 11.

In his application he makes the following contentions: 1, that the State suppressed or withheld material evidence; 2, that his representation by counsel, before, during and after his trial, was utterly inadequate; 3, that evidence which had been illegally seized was used against him at his trial; and 4, that counsel was not appointed to represent him at his arraignment.

It is clear that the four contentions made by the applicant in his application for leave to appeal have reference solely to the trial under three indictments in which he was convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on June 26, 1961, of larceny, disturbing the peace, drunk on a public street, disturbance of the peace, assault, and assault upon a police officer.

He assigns no error at the hearing in which he was found to be a defective delinquent and from which he now seeks to appeal. The question of the applicant’s guilt or innocence of the criminal charges for which he was convicted is not at issue in a hearing for determination of defective delinquency. The sole issue is whether the person is a defective delinquent. *Simmons v. Director,*227 Md. 661, 177 A. 2d 409; *Blizzard v. State,*218 Md. 384, 147 A. 2d 227. There is, therefore, nothing before this court to review on appeal.

*Application denied.*
<PAGE>
 

EXHIBIT 11. Statement re computation of per share earnings.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                 Year         Year         Year
                                                 Ended        Ended        Ended
                                                7-31-96      7-31-95      7-31-94
                                             ------------  -----------  -----------
<S>                                          <C>           <C>          <C>
Loss from continuing operations               $ 8,420,401  $ 2,491,246  $   423,341
Preferred stock dividends                         570,621      132,800            0
                                              -----------  -----------  -----------

                                              $ 8,991,022  $ 2,624,046  $   423,341
                                              -----------  -----------  -----------
Weighted average shares outstanding            18,011,826   17,661,428   17,434,159

Loss per share from continuing operations           $ .50        $ .15        $ .02
                                              ===========  ===========   ==========

Net loss                                      $10,230,783  $ 2,491,342  $   423,341
Preferred stock dividends                         570,621      132,800            0
                                              -----------  -----------  -----------
                                              $10,801,404   $2,624,142  $   423,341
                                              -----------   ----------  -----------
Weighted average shares outstanding            18,011,826   17,661,428   17,434,159

Loss per share for common shareholders              $  60        $ .15        $ .02
                                               ==========    =========   ========== 
</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       2,944,509
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             2,039,916
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 27,732,369
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                       1,104,254
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                         1,069,757
<LOANS>                                     63,313,811
<ALLOWANCE>                                    864,726
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             102,066,944
<DEPOSITS>                                  92,643,212
<SHORT-TERM>                                 1,692,073
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            879,214
<LONG-TERM>                                  2,790,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         5,390
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,057,055
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             102,066,944
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              2,907,396
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              842,935
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                76,378
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             3,826,709
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           1,948,505
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,092,388
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        1,734,321
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  120,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                              40,747
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              1,319,476
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                498,757
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     333,523
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   333,523
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.62
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.62
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    8.20
<LOANS-NON>                                     20,000
<LOANS-PAST>                                   337,000
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               810,563
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                   67,347
<RECOVERIES>                                     1,510
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              864,726
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           864,726
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
# C_2023035EN.01005401.xml

| 30.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 35/54 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 35/54

---

Judgment of the General Court of 30 November 2022 — Mendes v EUIPO — Actial Farmaceutica (VSL3TOTAL)

(Case T-678/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU word mark VSL3TOTAL - Earlier EU word mark VSL#3 - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Similarity of the signs - Similarity of the goods - Article 8(1)(b) and Article 53(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2023/C 35/64)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Mendes SA (Lugano, Switzerland) (represented by: M. Cavattoni, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Actial Farmaceutica Srl (Rome, Italy) (represented by: M. Mostardini, F. Mellucci and F. Rombolà, lawyers)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 17 August 2021 (Case R 1568/2020-2).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mendes SA to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mendes SA to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 502, 13.12.2021.

---
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the accompanying Form 10-Q of Golden West Financial Corporation for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2006, each of the undersigned, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | such Form 10-Q of Golden West Financial Corporation for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | the information contained in such Form 10-Q of Golden West Financial Corporation for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2006 fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Golden West Financial Corporation.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|               |  |  |  |                                                  
|-------------- |  |  |  | -------------------------------------------------
|               |  | 
|August 3, 2006 |  |  |  | /s/ Herbert M. Sandler                           
|Date           |  |  |  | Herbert M. Sandler                               
|               |  |  |  | Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
|               |  |  |  | Golden West Financial Corporation                
|               |  | 
|August 3, 2006 |  |  |  | /s/ Marion O. Sandler                            
|Date           |  |  |  | Marion O. Sandler                                
|               |  |  |  | Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
|               |  |  |  | Golden West Financial Corporation                
|               |  | 
|August 3, 2006 |  |  |  | /s/ Russell W. Kettell                           
|Date           |  |  |  | Russell W. Kettell                               
|               |  |  |  | President and Chief Financial Officer            
|               |  |  |  | Golden West Financial Corporation