IN CLERKS OFFICE 

This op_Jr)lon w. 

at i/·ilo· I •k on 4/-;;;,.,ii,J~~n FILE 

-..REM!! C: ·.:-.T, GTATE OF WASHINGTON 

[,I,C.'; .~ JAN 2 3 Z014 

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of 

JONATHAN LEE GENTRY, 

Petitioner. 

NO. 86585-0 

ENBANC 

Filed JAN 2 3 2014 

STEPHENS, J.-Jonathan Lee Gentry was convicted in 1991 of the 

aggravated first degree murder of 12-year-old Cassie Holden and sentenced to 

death by a jury. Gentry is African American and Holden was white. Gentry's 

direct appeal before this court was unsuccessful. State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 

888 P.2d 1105 (1995). One of the issues he raised there was a claim that the 

decision to pursue a capital case against him, and the trial that ensued, was unfairly 

tainted by the specter of racial bias on the part of the prosecution. !d. at 609. We 

rejected that contention, concluding in part that Gentry had not shown prejudice 

resulting from any misconduct. Our recent decision in State v. Monday, 171 

Wn.2d 667, 257 P.3d 551 (20 11 ), makes it clear, however, that when a party shows 

prosecutorial misconduct based on racial bias, it is the State's burden to show 
In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Gentry brings this personal restraint 

petition in light of Monday. 

While we believe the rule in Monday is critically important to our justice 

system, we conclude it does not qualify as a "watershed" rule that can be applied 

retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 

334 (1989). Nevertheless, because of the gravity of the punishment and the claims 

here, we wish to stress that even if Gentry's claims were not procedurally barred, 

they would still fail under the standard imposed by Monday because Gentry cannot 

demonstrate prejudice to merit relief on collateral review. We therefore dismiss 

his personal restraint petition. 1 

FACTS 

The facts of this case are well known and were summarized in this court's 

decision on Gentry's direct appeal. 

In early June 1988, the 12-year-old victim lived with her father and 

stepmother in Pocatello, Idaho. On June 11, 1988, she traveled to Kitsap 

County, Washington, to spend the summer with her mother at her mother's 

home near Bremerton. On June 13, 1988, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the 

young victim went for a walk. She was expected home at 6 p.m. for dinner, 

but never returned. 

Her body was found early June 15, 1988, behind a large log at the 

bottom of a path running from a trail through a wooded area adjacent to 

Rolling Hills Golf Course, near Bremerton, Washington. The victim's 

eyeglasses, earring and a bouquet of flowers were found approximately 148 

feet up the footpath on and near the main trail. 

The victim appeared to have been sexually assaulted, as her jeans 

and underpants were pulled down and her T -shirt and bra pulled up. Her 

blue sweatshirt had been removed from one arm and pulled up, partially 

1 In addition to his personal restraint petition, Gentry filed a motion to reconsider 

pursuant to RAP 2.5( c )(2). The motion is more aptly described as a motion to recall the 

mandate and is based on the same grounds as Gentry's petition. 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

covering her face. She had been struck in the head approximately 8 to 15 

times, suffering 10 "significant" injuries. 

Kitsap County sheriff deputies investigated the murder scene and 

determined that a trail of blood was splattered from the main trail, down the 

footpath about 148 feet to where the body was found. They found a 2.2-

pound rock that had blue fibers crushed into it. The fibers matched the 

fibers in the victim's sweatshirt. The rock also had red spots on it that 

appeared to be blood. The rock was believed to be the murder weapon. 

The autopsy showed that the victim had been killed by one of the 

blows to her head. The results of the autopsy could not show the order in 

which the blows were received or which blow actually killed the victim. 

The autopsy did not conclusively show that the young victim had been 

raped. 

During the autopsy several loose hairs were removed from the 

victim's body. An examination of the hairs showed that most of them were 

consistent with the victim's own hairs. Two of the hair fragments were 

recovered from her T-shirt and were Negroid hairs. A coarse brown hair, 

believed to be a pubic hair from a Caucasian, was found on the victim's left 

thigh and a red pigmented hair was found on one of her shoes. The Negroid 

hair was later determined to be genetically consistent with the Defendant's 

brother's arm hair. Defendant's brother was not in Kitsap County at the 

time of the murder. Evidence was produced to show that the Defendant, 

who lived with his brother's family, wore his brother's clothes on occasion. 

There was no identification connected with the Caucasian hair. 

The investigation eventually focused on the Defendant. A search of 

his residence was conducted and clothing samples, including a pair of 

shoes, were seized. Examination of the shoes indicated that blood had been 

wiped from the shoes. Spots of blood were found on the shoelaces and 

those bloodstains were the subject of a number of scientific tests. These 

[tests matched the blood to Holden's type; 0.18% percent of the population 

would have this type .... ] [T]esting was also conducted on a hair found in 

the victim's T-shirt which yielded a PCR [(polymerase chain reaction)] 

type of 1.2, 1.2, which is not the same as the Defendant's type, but does 

match his brother's type. 

A [State v.] Frye[, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923)] hearing 

was conducted over the course of 6 weeks. The trial court concluded that 

the scientific evidence was reliable and should be admitted. 

Other evidence linking Defendant to the murder included the 

testimony of three persons who reported seeing a man matching 

Defendant's description near the place of the murder and around the time of 

the murder, and three former jailmates of the Defendant who testified that 

the Defendant admitted to them he had killed someone. The testimony of 

these witnesses was essentially as follows. 

Witness E.S. and her daughter, K.T. testified that they had seen an 

African American man walking past B.S.'s home toward Rolling Hills Golf 

Course between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m. on June 13, 1988. The man was wearing 

a cap, a sports jacket and slacks. His clothing was described as scruffy and 

of a light color. E.S. later identified the individual as the Defendant, 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

Jonathan Gentry. At the time of the murder, the Defendant was residing in 

the home of his brother and sister-in-law a short distance from B.S.'s home 

and the Rolling Hills Golf Course. 

Witness F.B. was a bicyclist who had ridden the trails in the wooded 

area near Rolling Hills Golf Course a number of times. On June 13, 1988, 

the day of the homicide, he and a friend went to the area after work and 

rode the main trail from Riddell Road, south of the golf course, to the golf 

course and back. F.B. then traveled from Riddell Road, along the main trail 

to Me Williams Road. During this last time across the path, at 

approximately 5:30 p.m., he saw an African American man standing just 

off the main trail. F.B.'s description of the man was consistent with that 

given by E.S. 

Witness B.D. had been incarcerated in the Kitsap County Jail with 

the Defendant in the summer of 1988. He testified that he and the 

Defendant were playing cards when detectives arrived to take samples of 

Defendant's hair in connection with the investigation of the victim's 

murder. B.D. testified that when the Defendant returned to the card game, 

Defendant said, "They found my hair on the bitch." When B.D. asked the 

Defendant whether he had killed the young girl, he said that he had but that 

they could not prove it. 

Witness T .H. had been incarcerated with the Defendant at the 

Washington State Correctional Center at Shelton in December 1989 and 

January 1990. He testified that the Defendant told him that he had killed a 

10-year-old girl who lived across the street from his brother's house 

because he thought she was leading him on. This statement was made, 

according to T.H., during a card game and others, including inmate L.S., 

were present. 

L.S. testified that the Defendant told him that he had killed his 

girlfriend and disposed of her body. 

The jury found the Defendant guilty of premeditated first degree 

murder and of felony murder. The jury additionally found that the murder 

was committed to conceal the identity of a person committing a crime, thus 

finding an aggravating circumstance which subjected Defendant to the 

possibility of a death sentence. 

Gentry, 125 Wn.2d at 579-82. This court affirmed Gentry's conviction and 

remanded for issuance of a death warrant. !d. at 658. The court also rejected a 

subsequent personal restraint petition. In re Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 137 Wn.2d 

378, 972 P.2d 1250 (1999). 

Gentry filed this personal restraint petition in October 2011. On October 10, 

2012, Gentry filed a motion to ask that this court set oral argument or alternatively 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

remand for supplementation of the record or reference hearing in light of State v. 

Davis, 175 Wn.2d 287, 362-73, 290 P.3d 43 (2012). We denied Gentry's motion 

to supplement or remand in light of Davis and struck the portions of his briefing 

dealing with Davis.2 We granted his request for oral argument. Amici curiae 

American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Washington 

(hereinafter ACLU), and NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc. filed 

briefs in support of Gentry. 3 

ANALYSIS 

Gentry claims the prosecution engaged in race-based misconduct tainting his 

conviction in the following ways: (1) by making an out-of-court racially offensive 

2 The dissent is concerned that our decision to deny Gentry a remand for a 

reference hearing in light of Davis means we have sidesteped our duty under RCW 

10.95.130(2)(b) to conduct a proportionality review in every capital case. Dissent at 1. 

But Gentry received his proportionality review on his direct appeal. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 

at 654-58. Nothing in RCW 10.95.130(2)(b) requires this court to consider 

proportionality anew each time an inmate on death row files a personal restraint petition. 

It certainly does not allow us to circumvent the one year time bar on personal restraint 

petitions and engage in a proportionality review premised on an otherwise untimely 

petition. 

3 In his response to the briefs of amici, Gentry appended a letter from the 

Department of Justice that was sent to a district attorney's office in Mississippi. The 

letter included assertions about the scientific validity of microscopic hair comparison 

analysis. The State moved to strike the appendix, arguing that the letter falls outside the 

scope of the record and has little relevance. We passed the motion to strike to the merits, 

and grant it now. The State is correct that the appendix is an improper addition to the 

record on review. Having granted the State's motion, we need not consider a later 

motion filed by the State seeking to supplement the record with postconviction DNA 

(deoxyribonucleic acid) evidence, which it claims rebuts the letter. 

Likewise, in the course of rendering this opinion, we also do not consider any 

statistical-based claims made by the parties or amici about the efficacy of the death 

penalty. Those claims fall outside the scope of the only claim that can overcome the oneyear time bar on collateral attack, namely Gentry's claim of race-based prosecutorial 

conduct premised on our Monday decision. See infra 28-29. 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

comment to Gentry's African American counsel; (2) by offering the testimony of a 

white witness who used the word "nigger" several times and made other racially 

inflammatory remarks; (3) by offering the testimony of white witnesses who stated 

that Gentry had referred to the victim as a "bitch," a word that was then repeated 

several times by the prosecutor in closing; ( 4) by making numerous statements that 

focused on physical evidence described as having "Negroid characteristics;" and 

( 5) by suggesting, through argument and the presentation of evidence, that the 

killer was black and that Gentry was therefore the killer because he is black. 

Gentry emphasizes that these instances of misconduct must be considered against 

the backdrop of the crime at issue-a racially inflammatory scenario in which an 

African American man is accused of murdering a white girl. He also argues that 

these instances must be viewed in light of the circumstances under which Gentry 

was charged and tried: Gentry was sentenced by an all-white jury in a courtroom 

presided over by a white judge; as an African American, Gentry is the only 

defendant from Kitsap County who is on death row for aggravated murder; and 

African Americans constitute a disproportionate number of inmates on 

Washington's death row. 

Gentry's arguments implicate our holding in Monday. There, the prosecutor 

made a number of racially charged remarks throughout the trial of Kevin L. 

Monday on charges of first degree murder and assault. Monday and most of the 

lay witnesses called were African American. Among other things, the prosecutor 

suggested that the African American witnesses could not be believed because of a 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

'"code"' on the street that "'black folk don't testify against black folk."' Monday, 

171 Wn.2d at 674 (quoting Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 29-30). He 

also mimicked African American witnesses, saying "'po-leese"' during 

questioning and audibly expressing his disbelief at a witness's answer. Id. at 671-

72. We held that the defendant met his burden of proving the prosecutor's actions 

were improper. Id. at 678. But we departed at that point from our previous 

requirement that the defendant also show prejudice stemming from the 

prosecutorial misconduct. Once the showing of misconduct is made, we held in 

Monday, the burden shifted to the State to show the race-based misconduct was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the conduct did not affect the jury's verdict. Id. at 680. In Monday, the evidence 

that the defendant had committed the crime at issue was quite strong.4 But, the 

prosecutor's misconduct was so pervasive that nearly every witness's testimony 

was tainted by it. Under those circumstances, we held that the State could not 

make the harmlessness showing. Id. at 681. Despite the strong evidence of 

Monday's guilt, the taint of the improper conduct pervaded the trial, making it 

impossible to say whether the jury could have come to a conclusion not influenced 

by racial bias. 

In light of Monday, Gentry maintains that his allegations of racial bias 

should be reviewed anew. We must therefore first address whether Gentry can 

4 The defendant told police during questioning that he had not meant to kill the 

victim, and there was a videotape of the event showing the defendant to be the shooter. 

Monday, 171 Wn.2d at 670, 680 n.4. 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

benefit from the rule in Monday. This requires consideration of whether Monday 

qualifies as a change in the law that justifies Gentry's late-filed petition and 

whether the rule of Monday may be applied retroactively. 

1. Is Gentry's personal restraint petition procedurally barred? 

Because Gentry's judgment and sentence became final several years ago, he 

is outside the one-year period for collaterally attacking a conviction. This court 

may review an untimely filed petition only if one of the exceptions to the time bar 

set forth in RCW 10.73.100 is present. Here, Gentry argues that his petition falls 

under RCW 10.73.100(6), which excuses late filings where 

[(1)] [t]here has been a significant change in the law, whether substantive or 

procedural, which is [(2)] material to the conviction, sentence, or other 

order entered in a criminal or civil proceeding instituted by the state or local 

government, and [(3)] either the legislature has expressly provided that the 

change in the law is to be applied retroactively, or a court, in interpreting a 

change in the law that lacks express legislative intent regarding retroactive 

application, determines that sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive 

application of the changed legal standard. 

RCW 10.73.100(6); Pers. Restraint Pet. at 18-20. 

a. Does the rule in Monday present a significant, material change in the law 

satisfying RCW 10.73.090? 

The State argues that Monday cannot be applied retroactively, relying on the 

retroactivity analysis set forth in Teague, 489 U.S. 288. Resp. to Pers. Restraint 

Pet. and Mot. to Reconsider Appeal (Response) at 46. Gentry asserts that Teague's 

retroactivity analysis need not dictate how RCW 10.73.100 is interpreted and 

applied. Gentry claims that "post conviction review may be available under state 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

law where it would not be under federal law." Pet'r/Appellant's Reply Br. (Reply) 

at 2. 

The State and Gentry at times conflate the two-fold nature of this question. 

RCW 10.73.100(6) sets forth three conditions that must be met before a petitioner 

can overcome the one-year time bar: (1) a substantial change in the law (2) that is 

material and (3) that applies retroactively. Gentry is likely correct that Monday 

constitutes a significant change in the law, material to his conviction, thus excusing 

the late-filed petition under RCW 10.73.100(6). The State does not seriously 

debate that point. See Response at 4 7 (conceding that Monday announces a new 

rule); see also Monday, 171 Wn.2d at 680 (explaining that the decision was 

charting a new course in the endeavor to prevent prosecutorial misconduct because 

"past efforts to address prosecutorial misconduct have proved insufficient to deter 

such conduct").5 But retroactivity is a distinct question. See In re Pers. Restraint 

of Vandervlugt, 120 Wn.2d 427, 435-36, 842 P.2d 950 (1992) (recognizing 

separate inquiries as to whether a rule is a change in the law and whether it may be 

applied retroactively); In re Pers. Restraint of Taylor, 105 Wn.2d 683, 689, 717 

P.2d 755 (1986) (noting that a recent case constituted a change in the law, leaving 

the remaining issue as to whether the case could be applied retroactively). Because 

Gentry's petition, insofar as the State responds to it, thus far satisfies RCW 

10.73.100(6), we proceed to the retroactivity inquiry. 

5 In the absence of any debate from the parties on this point, we save for another 

day the question of what constitutes a "material" change in the law for purposes of the 

statute. 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

b. May this court apply the rule in Monday retroactively to Gentry's case? 

A material change in the law does not necessarily mean a defendant whose 

judgment was final at the time the change was announced gets the benefit of that 

change. That is what a retroactivity analysis seeks to address. We have generally 

adhered to the test announced in Teague to determine questions of retroactivity. 

As we explain below, the rule in Monday does not meet the Teague test. But given 

the grave nature of the punishment at stake here, Gentry's claim that this court 

need not be bound by Teague deserves careful consideration, and we begin with 

that discussion. 

( 1) Is the court bound by the Teague analysis? 

There is some support for Gentry's assertion that this court need not be 

bound by Teague. The United States Supreme Court has suggested as much. In 

Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 169 L. Ed. 2d 859 (2008), 

the court explained: 

It is thus abundantly clear that the Teague rule of nonretroactivity 

was fashioned to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing 

federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings. It was intended to limit the 

authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions-not to limit a state 

court's authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional 

law when reviewing its own State's convictions. 

I d. at 280-81; see Reply at 6 (citing Danforth). 

Gentry appears to advocate for an analysis that looks to whether the "ends of 

justice" are served by allowing retroactive application of a new rule. See Reply at 

2 (citing Vandervlugt, 120 Wn.2d 427). However, Vandervlugt does not set forth a 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

clear alternative to Teague. There, this court considered whether an intervening 

change in the law qualified as a material change. Deciding that it was material, 

and therefore overcame one of the hurdles in RCW 10.73.100, the court then 

considered whether the new rule had retroactive effect. At that point, however, the 

court determined the rule in question was not "new" because it flowed from a 

decision interpreting the meaning of a statute, which is '"what the statute has 

meant since its enactment."' Vandervlugt, 120 Wn.2d at 436 (emphasis omitted) 

(quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Moore, 116 Wn.2d 30, 37, 803 P.2d 300 (1991)). 

In other words, a rule may be a material change in the law, but still not be a "new" 

rule for the purposes of Teague. Vandervlugt thus declined to apply any 

retroactivity test, Teague or otherwise. 

Gentry also relies on Taylor, 105 Wn.2d 683, which Vandervlugt cites. 

Taylor does use a different test than the one advanced in Teague. Taylor, 105 

Wn.2d. at 690-92. But it also predates Teague by several years, so it cannot, alone, 

be viewed as providing an alternative to Teague. There is still no published 

Washington case that departs from Teague in light of Danforth, and Gentry's 

briefing does not provide such an analysis. We therefore analyze the retroactivity 

question presented in this case under the Teague analysis we have relied on to date. 

(2) Under Teague, is the rule in Monday retroactive? 

We first adopted the Teague test in In re Personal Restraint of St. Pierre, 

118 Wn.2d 321, 327, 823 P.2d 492 (1992). Since St. Pierre, we have often looked 

to Teague to guide us in determining whether a new rule may be applied 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

retroactively. See In re Pers. Restraint of Jackson, 175 Wn.2d 155, 283 P.3d 1089 

(2012); In re Pers. Restraint of Scott, 173 Wn.2d 911, 271 P.3d 218 (2012); State 

v. Kilgore, 167 Wn.2d 28, 216 P.3d 393 (2009); In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton, 

152 Wn.2d 853, 100 P.3d 801 (2004). 

Under Teague, if a rule is new, as it is agreed that the rule from Monday is, 

then it will have retroactive application in one of two instances. It must either be a 

substantive rule that places certain behavior "'beyond the power of the criminal 

law-making authority to proscribe'" or a watershed rule of criminal procedure 

'"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-93, 

91 S. Ct. 1160, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1971)). Recognition of such procedural rules is 

limited to "those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate 

conviction is seriously diminished." I d. at 313. 

Teague presents a very high hurdle to overcome. In announcing watershed 

rules, courts have been sparing to the point of unwillingness. See In re Pers. 

Restraint of Markel, 154 Wn.2d 262, 269 n.2, 111 P.3d 249 (2005) (noting that in 

review of 11 claimed watershed rules, the United States Supreme Court had yet to 

declare any a watershed rule triggering retroactivity). The United States Supreme 

Court has cited the rule announced in Gideon v. Wainwright,6 guaranteeing the 

right to counsel for criminal defendants, as an example of a watershed rule of 

criminal procedure, though the decision in Gideon predated Teague by several 

6 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). 

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years. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415 

(1990). But the United States Supreme Court has stopped short of recognizing any 

other instance of the type of rule it discussed in Teague. Likewise, we have yet to 

announce such a rule, though we have several times concluded a rule does not meet 

the Teague requirements. See Markel, 154 Wn.2d at 273 (holding the rule 

announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 

2d 177 (2004), is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure); State v. Evans, 154 

Wn.2d 438, 447-48, 114 P.3d 627 (2005) (same with regard to Apprendf and 

Blakely8 rules). 

On the other hand, federal lower courts have found some rules to apply 

retroactively .. Notably, in Hall v. J(elso, 892 F.2d 1541, 1543 n.l (11th Cir. 1990), 

the Eleventh Circuit explained that 

a burden-shifting error would be subject to retroactive correction on habeas 

review because not only is it a "bedrock, 'axiomatic and elementary' 

[constitutional] principle," Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 108 S. Ct. 534, 

536, 98 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1988) (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 

105 S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1985) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 

358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970))), but it is also an error that 

diminishes the "likelihood of an accurate conviction." Teague, [ 489] U.S. at 

[290], 109 S. Ct. at 1077 (plurality). 

Monday does announce a new burden-shifting rule, though this rule speaks 

to the harmless error analysis and does not involve a burden going to an element of 

a crime, as Hall considered. See Hall, 892 F.2d at 1542. But there is no doubt that 

7 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 

(2000). 

8 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

the Monday court considered the possible taint of racial bias in a criminal trial to 

be of extremely grave concern affecting the legitimacy of the jury's verdict. 

The notion that the State's representative in a criminal trial, the 

prosecutor, should seek to achieve a conviction by resorting to racist 

arguments is so fundamentally opposed to our founding principles, values, 

and fabric of our justice system that it should not need to be explained. 

[Intentional appeals to racial bias by the prosecution are] so repugnant to 

the concept of an impartial trial that its very existence demands that 

appellate courts set appropriate standards to deter such conduct. 

Monday, 171 Wn.2d at 680. Such language underscores the importance of the rule 

announced in Monday to our criminal justice system. Other states have similarly 

indicated that the specter of race-based prosecutorial misconduct shakes the very 

foundation of a fair system of justice, suggesting that a rule such as we announced 

in Monday may qualify as a watershed rule. See, e.g., Samaniego v. State, 679 

N.E.2d 944, 949-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that race-based prosecutorial 

misconduct may amount to a fundamental error depriving the defendant of a fair 

trial); Commonwealth v. Tirado, 473 Pa. 468, 473, 375 A.2d 336, (1977) (noting 

that "[a ]ppeals to racial or religious prejudice are especially incompatible with the 

concept of a fair trial because of the likelihood that reason will be dethroned and 

that bias and emotion will reign"); State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Minn. 

2005) (observing that prosecutor's race-based misconduct undermined prosecutor's 

obligation to ensure that the defendant received a fair trial). 

Nonetheless, we cannot avoid the fact that the Teague analysis almost never 

results in retroactive application of a rule of criminal procedure. We have not 

found, nor has Gentry presented, any case that retroactively applies a close enough 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

analog to the rule in Monday. Teague itself involved claims of racial bias under 

Batson v. J(entucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), and the 

court recognized the Batson rule did not apply retroactively. Teague, 489 U.S. at 

295-96 (citing Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 106 S. Ct. 2878, 92 L. Ed. 2d 199 

(1986) and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 

(1965)). Following Teague, we cannot conclude that the rule announced in 

Monday applies retroactively. 

While this conclusion answers the central question in this case, it is 

important to recognize that Gentry's claim arises on collateral review. We are 

mindful that a retroactive application of the Monday rule in the context of a 

personal restraint petition would still require the petitioner to demonstrate actual 

and substantial prejudice arising from race-based misconduct at trial. In re Pers. 

Restraint of Hagler, 97 Wn.2d 818, 825-27, 650 P.2d 1103 (1982). As an 

institution firmly committed to justice in substance, not merely name, we feel it is 

important to further consider whether the misconduct at Gentry's trial resulted in 

actual and substantial prejudice. Such an inquiry fulfills our constitutional duty to 

ensure that a sentence of death is not the result of improper racial prejudice. 

2. Has Gentry shown actual and substantial prejudice entitling him to relief 

on this personal restraint petition? 

As noted, proof of reversible error under this court's decision in Monday 

requires a finding of race-based misconduct and a finding that such misconduct 

was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 171 Wn.2d at 680. We first consider 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

whether Gentry has established race-based misconduct and then consider whether 

he has shown prejudice, viz., the absence of harmless error. 

a. Has Gentry shown improper race-based conduct on the part of the 

prosecutor? · 

Misconduct occurs when the State's action is both improper and prejudicial. 

State v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d 727, 747, 202 P.3d 937 (2009); State v. McKenzie, 157 

Wn.2d 44, 52, 57, 134 P.3d 221 (2006). We do not review allegations of 

misconduct in isolation, but in the context of the trial as a whole. McKenzie, 157 

Wn.2d at 52. Gentry alleges several specific instances of misconduct, most of 

which were considered by the court in Gentry's direct appeal. We now examine 

the conduct through the lens of Monday. 

( 1) Out-of-court comment by prosecutor to Gentry's counsel 

The events surrounding this alleged instance of prosecutorial misconduct are 

detailed in an oral ruling from Judge Karen Strombom, who was appointed to 

decide a motion Gentry brought to disqualify the Kitsap County Prosecuting 

Attorney's Office in the wake of the comment. Judge Strombom first noted that 

"[b]y the end of February 27th, 1991, there was an extremely tense atmosphere in 

the courtroom, particularly between the attorneys." Suppl. VRP at 424-25 (Decl. 

of Timothy K. Ford, Ex. 16). The lead attorneys involved were Gentry's counsel, 

Jeffrey Robinson, and Kitsap County Prosecutor C. Danny Clem. Prior to 

February 27, allegations of unethical behavior had been made against the State. Id. 

at 425. As Judge Strombom explained, on February 27, 1991, the third day of a 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

contentious Frye9 hearing was winding down. After proceedings ended for the 

day, Robinson approached Clem to inquire about the witness list for the next day. 

Id. Clem refused to disclose the witnesses and a verbal altercation ensued, though 

the exact language of the argument was disputed. It is undisputed, however, that as 

Robinson walked away from Clem, Clem called after Robinson, "Where did you 

learn your ethics? In Harlem?" !d. at 425-26. 

The "Harlem comment" forms the basis of one of Gentry's claims of racebased prosecutorial misconduct. This court has already concluded that the 

comment was "racially offensive" and "totally inappropriate." Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 

at 610. 

(2) Use of race-based language 

Gentry claims the capital proceeding against him was "steeped in race." 

Pers. Restraint Pet. at 12. He argues that racially charged language was used in an 

attempt to evoke race-based prejudices on the part of the jury. He takes issue with 

the use of the word "nigger" by a witness and the use of the word "Negroid" by 

prosecutors. 

(a) Use ofthe word "nigger" 

One of the witnesses who testified against Gentry was jailhouse informant 

Brian Dyste. As he does now, Gentry took issue with Dyste's testimony on direct 

appeal before this court. 

9 Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923). 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

The jailhouse informant in question had told police that he and the 

Defendant were incarcerated at the Kitsap County Jail and were playing a 

"nigger" card game when the Defendant left the room to provide hair 

samples to police investigators. When he returned to the card game, the 

Defendant allegedly said, "They found my hairs on the bitch". During 

direct examination, the prosecuting attorney questioned the informant about 

his use of the word "nigger" and about his attitude toward African 

Americans. 

Gentry, 125 Wn.2d at 611. Gentry points to this testimony, and the prosecutor's 

handling of it, to support his assertion that the prosecution's case was "steeped in 

race," to his detriment. Pers. Restraint Pet. at 12. But we have already concluded 

that in this instance, the prosecutor's conduct was not improper. 

The State's questioning of the informant appears to have been a strategic 

attempt to soften the impact of apparent racist attitudes by bringing them 

out on direct examination, rather than waiting for defense counsel to expose 

them on cross examination. That is an accepted trial tactic. The questions 

do not appear to have been asked in order to evoke racial prejudices in the 

jury .... If anything, the State's examination of this witness appears to have 

made him a less credible witness. 

Gentry, 125 Wn.2d at 611. Nothing in Monday compels us to retreat from this 

conclusion, and Gentry offers no additional evidence that alters it. As we 

concluded in 1995, while anyone's use of the word "nigger" is repugnant, there 

was nothing improper about the State's presentation ofDyste's testimony. 

(b) Use of the word "Negroid" 

At certain places in his briefing, Gentry also appears to bolster his assertions 

of racially based prosecutorial misconduct by citing to the prosecution's use of the 

word "Negroid." See Pers. Restraint Pet. at 12 (noting 254 explicit references to 

race in the trial transcript with use of the words "black," "nigger," or "Negroid"). 

At trial, the State frequently referred to some forensic evidence as having 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

"Negroid" characteristics, such as hair samples. The State points out that 

'"Negroid"' is not a racist term but a term of art used in the forensic hair analysis 

community." Response at 64. The prosecution's use of the word does not in any 

way appear to be an appeal to race-based prejudices, and we reject the claim that it 

was improper. 10 Gentry has not shown an improper use of race-based or pejorative 

language at trial by the State. 

(3) Prosecutor's closing argument 

Aside from Dyste, another jailhouse informant testified that Gentry had 

referred to the victim as "a bitch." Response at 34. The prosecutor repeated this 

phrasing several times in closing during the penalty phase, attributing it to Gentry. 

Gentry argues that "[i]In the late 1980s, the word 'bitch' was strongly associated 

with negative stereotypes of African American men and 'gangsta rap."' Pers. 

Restraint Pet. at 14-15. Thus, he argues, the prosecution's repeated use of the 

word "bitch" in closing is the type of '"careful word[] here and there [that] can 

trigger racial bias"' we found so repugnant in Monday. Id. at 24 (quoting Monday, 

171 Wn.2d at 678). 

10 The brief of amicus curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund Inc. 

(NAACP) (Br. of NAACP) argues that the scientific evidence suggesting hair can come 

from a particular racial group has been debunked. Br. of NAACP at 16 n.22. Gentry 

adopts this argument. Pet'r's Resp. to Amicus Curiae Brs. of NAACP and ACLU (Resp. 

to Amici) at 1-2. If Gentry's conviction was based on faulty science, this is of course 

troubling. But Gentry's argument in this petition concerns race-based prosecutorial 

misconduct, not new or insufficient evidence. At the time of the trial, there was no 

challenge to the science describing the hair as "Negroid," and thus it is difficult to see 

how it was improper, let alone indicative of racial bias, for the prosecution to rely on it. 

See Gentry, 125 Wn.2d at 581 (explaining that the trial court found, following a Frye 

hearing, that the science was reliable). 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

The State responds that there is nothing in the prosecutor's use of the word 

"bitch" that is meant to evoke race-based prejudices. Instead it was used to 

"highlight Gentry's callousness and misogyny." Response at 69. 

We cannot conclude that the prosecutor's use of the word "bitch" on several 

occasions was used for the purpose of triggering race-based bias. In Monday, we 

found improper conduct when a white prosecutor repeatedly pronounced "police" 

as "po-leese" while questioning African American witnesses, employed an 

incredulous tone during questioning, and suggested in his closing argument that 

African American people are liars. 171 Wn.2d at 679. It was clear from the record 

there that the prosecution's strategy rested, in part, on discrediting black witnesses 

on the basis of their race. Here, the evidence suggested Gentry had referred to 

Holden as a bitch. Acknowledging that term's association with African American 

urban culture in the late 1980s, it was not improper for the prosecutor to highlight 

the defendant's use of a derogatory term about his victim, regardless of their 

respective races. The record does not suggest that the prosecutor's decision to 

bring that point to the jury's attention on repeated occasions reflected racial bias. 

We need not consider whether such behavior amounted to prosecutorial 

misconduct under Monday because it was not improper. 

In closing on the penalty phase, the prosecutor also made reference to the 

Biblical story of David and Goliath. As he did on direct review, Gentry argues that 

this was improper race-based argument. He renews his argument on the ground 

that under direct review, this court rejected his claim after erroneously imposing 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

the burden of prejudice on him. But on direct review, this court concluded that the 

prosecutor's remarks about David and Goliath were neither improper nor 

prejudicial. 

The Defendant argues that the State's reference to the Biblical story 

of David and Goliath was intended to evoke racist feelings. The Defendant 

claims that the use of the David and Goliath analogy evokes an image of 

the outsider from another tribe killing a member of the "children of Israel". 

In our view, this is a tortured interpretation of the use of this Biblical story. 

Instead, the rebuttal here was invited or provoked by defense 

counsel's extensive use of Biblical stories during his own closing argument. 

In any event, if the remark was prejudicial at all, it was not so prejudicial 

that it could not have been cured with a cautionary explanation to the jury, 

had one been requested. 

Gentry, 125 Wn.2d at 644 (emphasis added). As noted, Monday does not disturb 

our conclusion regarding the propriety of the conduct. As we did in 1995, we 

conclude that there was nothing improper in the prosecution's reference to the 

David and Goliath story. 

( 4) Presentation of evidence and focus on Gentry as the killer 

Gentry also argues that the prosecution's presentation of the evidence 

showed an improper focus on race. Pers. Restraint Pet. at 22-24. This argument is 

closely related to Gentry's contention that race drove law enforcement's suspicion 

of Gentry, i.e., that the evidence did not point to Gentry so much as to an African 

American man. As in Monday, claims Gentry, the prosecution "resorted to 

'generalizations about racial ... groups in order to obtain [a] conviction[]."' Pers. 

Restraint Pet. at 23 (citing Monday, 171 Wn.2d at 683 (Madsen, C.J., concurring)). 

These two arguments require consideration of the evidence against Gentry, most of 

which was discussed in Gentry's direct appeal. 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

First, three witnesses placed Gentry in the immediate vicinity of the murder. 

See Gentry, 125 Wn.2d at 581. Fred Buxton had been mountain biking around the 

time of the murder in the area Holden was killed. After reading about her death in 

the newspaper three days after it happened, he recalled seeing an individual on the 

trail who had seemed out of place. The individual was oddly dressed for the 

weather, in a long coat or shirt open at the front, and wearing a distinctive hat. It 

turned out Buxton had seen this person about 40 yards from where Holden was 

killed, possibly minutes after the murder. He called police and provided a 

composite sketch. He later identified Gentry out of a photomontage. Eilene 

Starzman contacted police after she saw the composite sketch of the suspect. She 

and her daughter recalled seeing a similar-looking man near the scene of the crime 

around the time the murder was believed to have taken place. Her description of 

the person's clothing was similar to Buxton's description, including the distinctive 

hat. After talking with police and believing the suspect might live in her 

neighborhood, Starzman began talking with neighbors and eventually located 

Gentry's home. Police subsequently apprehended him. 

In addition to eyewitness accounts placing Gentry near the scene of the 

crime, the State recovered several hair strands from the body. A pubic hair that 

likely came from a Caucasian individual was found on Holden's left thigh. 

Another hair, red-pigmented and likely of Caucasian origin, was found on her 

shoe. Finally, two hairs containing Negroid characteristics were found on 

Holden's t-shirt, which she had been wearing at the time of her murder under a 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

sweatshirt; the hairs were tucked between the sweatshirt and the t-shirt. When 

tested, both hairs were a type match for the hair of Gentry's brother, Edward. 

Approximately six percent of the black population would have hair of that type. 

Gentry's brother was at sea at the time of the murder and was not a suspect. But, 

the State also presented evidence that Gentry had been wearing clothing borrowed 

from his brother at the time of the murder. And, Holden and Gentry did not know 

each other, nor did she know Gentry's family. 

Finally, a pair of Gentry's shoes were found to have been spattered with 

blood, and then cleaned. The blood spatter testing revealed that the blood matched 

Holden and could have come from only 0.18 percent of Caucasians. Gentry, 125 

Wn.2d at 581. 

It is true that the State made many references to race in the trial. But these 

were legitimately tied to the physical and circumstantial evidence pointing to 

Gentry as the killer. For example, the State's repeated references to racial 

characteristics during testimony concerning the hair samples were appropriate. It 

is true that the State offered no explanation for the Caucasian pubic hair. But a 

hair matching hair from Gentry's brother was found on Holden's body. Given that 

Gentry was seen in the area at the time of the murder, and that blood matching 

Holden's was found on Gentry's shoes, it hardly seems improper for the State to 

have discussed the racial characteristics of the hair samples when the prime suspect 

was African American. And given that the sample would have matched only six 

percent of the African American population, it hardly seems improper for the State 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

to ask questions designed to exclude other sources of the hair, especially because 

individuals easily shed and pass on hair strands. See Response at 39 (discussing 

questions at trial that detailed the lack of viable sources for the hair other than 

Gentry, i.e., that Holden's family did not utilize laundromats, that Holden had not 

played with any African American children since arriving from Pocatello, Idaho, 

two days before her murder, and that no one who had contact with Holden's body 

after it was discovered was African American). 11 

Gentry takes issue with the State's attempt to narrow the umverse of 

Holden's association with persons of color to Gentry. He asserts that the State's 

belief "that a black man committed the crime is based on its factually 

unsupportable claim that Cassie and her family did not associate with black 

people." Reply at 11. Gentry points to the State's questioning regarding Holden's 

contacts with black children in the days before her murder, asserting that the State 

incorrectly suggested Holden had no association with black playmates before she 

died. On this point, it appears Gentry may be correct. 

The State concedes its presentation suggested that Holden had no association 

with persons of color in the days before her death. Response at 39 (citing 52 VRP 

3665, 3693-94, 3703, 3714). But in fact, police records reveal that Holden had a 

brief conversation with an African American child, her brother's friend Tyler, in 

the outdoor common area of their apartment complex the night before her murder, 

11 Samples were taken from Holden's mother and her brother Jamie to test against 

hairs found at the crime scene. 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

where a number of children were gathered. Decl. of Timothy K. Ford, Ex. 9 (Decl. 

of Jennifer Davis, Ex. B, June 14, 1988 Interview with Jamie Holden at 3). And, it 

is true that police records also reveal Holden's brother, Jamie, invited African 

American children besides Tyler into the Holden home in the hours after Holden 

went missing, though nothing in the record indicated if those children had ever 

been in the Holden house before. Decl. of Timothy K. Ford, Ex. 9 (Decl. of 

Jennifer Davis, Ex. B, June 15, 1988 Interview with Jamie Holden at 7). 12 Hair 

from these various children was not tested, and it is within the realm of possibility 

that the African American hair fragments recovered could have come from them. 

But the fact that hair from these children was not tested does not show bias 

or improper conduct on the part of the State. The hair matched a family member of 

Gentry. Gentry was seen by two eyewitnesses in the area. 13 Blood on Gentry's 

shoes matched Holden's. These facts indicate the State pursued a legitimate 

prosecution against a man who is African American, not against a man because he 

12 Exhibit 9 consists of separate interviews with the Holden family, including two 

different interviews with Jamie. 

13 The NAACP argues that these witnesses demonstrate the State sought to use 

Gentry's "race as a proxy for guilt throughout the trial." Br. of NAACP at 10. It claims 

that the testimony of two witnesses in particular "inappropriately suggested that a Black 

man would only be in a White neighborhood to commit a crime'' and "legitimized the 

idea that White people had reason to fear African Americans in general and Mr. Gentry in 

particular." !d. The entirety of the testimony in question does not bear out this assertion. 

In context, the witnesses' statements about Gentry being out of place went to his clothing, 

not his race. It was a hot day, and all the eyewitnesses testified that he was overdressed 

for the weather. See 56 VRP 126-28; 57 VRP 145-46, 195-96; see also State v. Allen, 

176 Wn.2d 611, 624-26, 294 P.3d 679 (2013) (holding that trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in refusing to give a cautionary cross-racial identification jury instruction 

where the white eyewitness based his identification mostly on the African American 

defendant's clothing and accessories, rather than on the defendant's race). 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

is African American. In light of the foregoing discussion, we conclude that there 

was nothing improper in the State's focus on Gentry during the investigation phase 

or in the presentation of the evidence against him. 

( 5) Overall conduct 

Even when viewed against the backdrop of the systemic racism Gentry 

posits (e.g., the all-white jury, the history of charging decisions), it is difficult to 

come to the conclusion that most of the conduct complained of was improperly 

race-based. That is not to say that Gentry is incorrect when he complains that the 

criminal justice system and the death penalty process in particular is plagued by 

race-based inequities. See, e.g., BRYAN C. EDELMAN, RACIAL PREJUDICE, JUROR 

EMPATHY, AND SENTENCING IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2006). But the broader 

inequities do not mean the prosecution here engaged in improper conduct within 

the contemplation of our decision in Monday. To the contrary, a careful review of 

the evidence and its presentation does not support Gentry's assertions of racebased misconduct, other than the prosecutor's statement to defense counsel. 

Because the prosecutor's statement was clearly improper, we must further consider 

whether it was prejudicial. 

b. Does the "Harlem" comment demonstrate prejudice entitling Gentry to 

relief on this personal restraint petition? 

Initially, it must be observed that Prosecutor Clem's "Harlem" comment, 

while extremely offensive, does not present the same sort of prejudice to fair trial 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

rights as evident in Monday.l 4 The comment was made outside of the jury's 

presence, and in no way affected the presentation the jury heard. Thus, the conduct 

was not an intentional appeal to racial bias that could have "undermine[ d] the 

defendant's credibility or the presumption of innocence" and affected the jury's 

verdict. Monday, 171 Wn.2d at 680. As far as its impact on Gentry's trial is 

concerned, therefore, we conclude that the comment did not result in actual and 

substantial prejudice to Gentry. 

Departing from the analysis in Monday, Gentry appears to argue that we 

must consider whether the cumulative effect of all instances of race-based conduct, 

in concert with the racially charged nature of the crime and the absence at trial of 

persons of color other than Gentry and his counsel, constitute prosecutorial 

misconduct. But the hearings following the motion to disqualify Clem after his 

remark to Robinson fully explored whether there was racial bias tainting the 

proceedings against Gentry. Judge Strombom noted in her oral ruling that the 

"testimony [on the motion to disqualify] is quite clear, and is uncontradicted, that 

no discretionary decision has been made because of a racial bias or motivation." 

Suppl. VRP at 429 (Decl. of Timothy K. Ford, Ex. 16). "All of the evidence 

presented suggests there is no indication or hint that anything was done in this case 

that was done for a racially biased purpose." Id. at 430. Judge Strombom's 

conclusions, made after a searching inquiry into serious allegations of unethical 

14 Amici curiae ACLU argue that in a capital case, this court should hold that a 

finding of race-based prosecutorial misconduct should result in automatic reversal. Br. of 

ACLU at 5. No party has advanced this argument and we decline to consider it. 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

behavior, assure us that Gentry did not suffer the sort of prejudice that we 

confronted in Monday. 

Finally, Gentry argues that the evidence against him was thin at best, so thin 

that racial bias had to have motivated the conviction. Likewise, he claims the 

evidence of the aggravators that made him death-eligible was so thin that racial 

bias must have contributed to that jury finding. But unless the prosecution team 

appealed to racial bias, which has not been shown, an argument about the 

sufficiency of the evidence is not related to prosecutorial misconduct but is more 

akin to arguments already made and rejected on direct appeal. See Gentry, 125 

Wn.2d at 585 (challenging the science matching the blood on Gentry's shoes to 

Holden's type). 

Applying the Monday standard, we conclude that the "Harlem" remark does 

not rise to the level of reversible prosecutorial misconduct. The remark was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury did not know of it and thus it 

could have had no effect on the jury's verdict. In this personal restraint context, 

the result is that Gentry cannot demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice to 

support his claim for relief. 

CONCLUSION 

Gentry cannot receive the benefit of the new rule announced in Monday. 

The burden-shifting rule announced in Monday is not retroactive under Teague, 

and we decline in this case to apply a different retroactivity analysis. Even when 

this case is viewed through the lens of Monday, Gentry cannot demonstrate 

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In re Pers. Restraint of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

prejudice. The one clear instance of race-based improper conduct on the part of 

the prosecution occurred outside the knowledge of the jury and could not have 

affected the outcome at trial. Recognizing the limited nature of the court's 

collateral review, we dismiss Gentry's personal restraint petition. 

-29-
In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

WE CONCUR: 

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In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Jonathan L. Gentry, 86585-0 

No. 86585-0 

WIGGINS, J. (dissenting in part) - Jonathan Lee Gentry filed a motion to 

remand for supplementation of the record or a reference hearing in light of our 

decision in State v. Davis, 175 Wn.2d 287, 290 P.3d 43 (2012). I believe a reference 

hearing is necessary to examine pertinent statistics that would enable us to assess 

whether Washington's death penalty is imposed in a racially discriminatory manner. 

Because the majority declines to grant a reference hearing, I dissent. In all other 

respects, I agree with the majority. 

We are required to conduct proportionality review in every capital case. RCW 

1 0.95.130(2)(b). The inquiry we engage in is whether the death penalty is "excessive 

or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the 

crime and the defendant." /d. One of the primary goals of proportionality review is to 

ensure that the death penalty is not imposed disproportionately on the basis of race. 

State v. Cross, 156 Wn.2d, 580, 630, 132 P.3d 80 (2006); State v. Elledge, 144 

Wn.2d 62, 80, 26 P.3d 271 (2001 ); State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 655, 888 P.2d 

1105 (1995). Since Gentry's sentencing, new data has developed concerning race 

and the imposition of the death penalty in Washington. This data merits a new 

proportionality review. 
No. 86585-0 (Wiggins, J., dissenting in part) 

Only one other African American had received the death penalty when Gentry 

was sentenced. In that case, the victim and defendant were of the same race and 

ethnicity. Since Gentry's sentencing, five additional African American men have been 

sentenced similarly (Sammie Luvene, Dwayne Woods, Cecil Davis, Covell Thomas, 

and Allen Gregory). Of the seven African American men sentenced to death, six 

received the death penalty for killing a person of a different race. 1 This statistic hints 

that race impacts the imposition of the death penalty and illustrates the need for a 

new proportionality review. 

In Davis, I urged the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on similar 

grounds. 175 Wn.2d at 389 (Wiggins, J., concurring in dissent). The majority there 

felt "constrained to note that the issue was not raised by the defendant." !d. at 362. 

In contrast to Davis, Gentry specifically requests a reference hearing to determine 

"whether [racial] disparities are statistically significant." Mot. to Set Oral Arg. or to 

Remand for Supplementation of the R. or a Reference Hr'g in Light of State v. Davis, 

175 Wn.2d 287, 290 P.3d 43 (Sept. 20, 2012) at 6. Thus, we do not face the 

constraints the majority felt in Davis. This court- should accordingly take this 

opportunity to remand Gentry's petition for an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether, statistically speaking, the imposition of Washington's death penalty is 

skewed on the impermissible basis of race. The cost of any burden on the court 

system associated with conducting this reference hearing is negligible compared to 

the assurance that Washington fairly and proportionately imposes the death penalty. 

' Only Caucasians (one of which is categorized as Caucasian-Native American) have 

received the death penalty for killing someone of the same race since Gentry was 

sentenced. 

2 
No. 86585-0 (Wiggins, J., dissenting in part) 

I dissent in part. 

3