alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Julia C. MITCHELL, Appellant, v. MORSE OPERATIONS, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 72-843.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 10, 1973.

Rehearing Denied May 7, 1973.

*249Eugene J. Howard and Herbert Seidel, Miami, for appellant.

Joseph I. Davis, Stephens, Magill, Thornton & Sevier and John P. Wieder-hold, Miami, for appellees.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a final judgment in a non-jury trial entered in favor of defendants in an action for negligence.

Plaintiff, Mrs. Mitchell, purchased from defendant Friendly Ford a new automobile which was financed through the First National Bank of Miami. The title was placed in plaintiff’s name, but both she and her husband, as required, signed the security agreement for financing. The bank required credit life insurance. Accordingly, an insurance policy was issued in the name of, and on the life of, plaintiff Mrs. Mitchell, who the record reveals upon purchase of the automobile failed to designate who the insured would be on the credit life insurance policy. Her husband died approximately six months later. Thereafter plaintiff attempted to collect on the policy, but was informed it was issued on her name only. She then filed action for damages against Morse Operations, Inc. and Cecil Holland Ford, Inc. d/b/a Friendly Ford Co., First National Bank of Miami, and Fidelity Life Association of Fulton, Illinois. Summary judgment was awarded to defendant First National Bank of Miami before trial and it is not a party to this appeal. Judgment was entered for defendants and plaintiff appealed.

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in holding that plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proving the defendants negligent.

The judgment rendered in a non-jury trial is presumed correct and the trial judge’s findings have the quality of a jury verdict. Marks v. Insurance Service Bureau, Inc., Fla.App.1972, 262 So.2d 450; Bardee Corp. v. Arnold Altex Aluminum Co., Fla.App.1961, 134 So.2d 268. Upon appeal it comes to this court clothed with a presumption of correctness and the burden rests upon the appellant to make error clearly appear. Marks, supra; Hall v. Hall, Fla.App.1961, 135 So.2d 432; Gars v. Woodard, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 385.

No reversible error having been made to appear, the judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.
256 La. 625

#### Gilbert C. MITCHELL v. HEPINSTALL STEEL CO. and Truck Service, Inc.

No. 50738.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 16, 1970.

In re: Gilbert C. Mitchell applying for writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Writs refused. The showing made is insufficient to warrant the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                      Exhibit 12
                                                                                

         PSINET INC. COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                         (In thousands of U.S. dollars)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                              1994                1995               1996               1997               1998
                                              ----                ----               ----               ----               ----
<S>                                    <C>                   <C>                 <C>                <C>                <C>
Loss before income taxes                     $(5,342)           $(53,160)          $(55,256)          $(46,078)         $(262,717)
Equity in loss of affiliate                       35                 204                807                  0                  0
Interest expense                                 731               1,964              5,025              5,362             63,914
Interest portion of rental expense               230                 692              1,200              1,359              4,183
                                             --------           --------           --------           --------          ---------
Earnings/(loss)                              $(4,346)           $(50,300)          $(48,224)          $(39,357)         $(194,620)
                                             ========           ========           ========           ========          =========
 
Interest expense                             $   731            $  1,964           $  5,025           $  5,362          $  63,914
Interest portion of rental expense               230                 692              1,200              1,359              4,183
                                             --------           --------           --------           --------          ---------

Total fixed charges                          $   961            $  2,656           $  6,225           $  6,721          $  68,097
                                             ========           ========           ========           ========          =========
 
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges                --                  --                 --                 --                 --
                                             ========           ========           ========           ========          =========
 
Deficiency of earnings to cover              
    fixed charges                            $ 5,307            $ 52,956           $ 54,449           $ 46,078          $ 262,717
                                             ========           ========           ========           ========          =========
</TABLE>
[No. 901-1.

Division One—Panel 2.

December 20, 1971.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. John Samuel Hawkins, *Appellant.*
#### James BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-203.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 16, 1973.

*454Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Bennett H. Brummer, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Linda C. Hertz, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HAVER-FIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On this appeal from his conviction of breaking and entering a building and of attempt to commit grand larceny, the appellant seeks a new trial because of certain remarks by the prosecutor in argument, to which objection by defendant was overruled.

In testifying, the defendant had admitted three prior convictions. The alleged remarks of the prosecutor included the following: “This is a guy who is desperate. He is a desperate crook, a three time loser. * * * There is absolutely no way that you can review all of this testimony in your mind fairly and objectively, because you all said you would disregard sympathy and pity. There is a reasons for that. The first reason is that when you start thinking about sympathy or pity, it clouds your mind to the evidence. *The second reason for it is that this little thief does’nt deserve yovir sympathy.”*(Italics ours.)

“Mr. Long: Objection to that phraseology, Your Honor, ‘this little thief.’

“The Court: Overruled.”

We hold that because of the prosecutor’s comments to the jury, the plaintiff’s right and opportunity to a fair trial was prejudiced, so as to require reversal, on authority of Davis v. State, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 41; Fitzgerald v. State, Fla.App.1969, 227 So.2d 45; Sherman v. State, Fla.1971, 255 So.2d 263.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for new trial.
<PAGE>   1
 
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.25
                    AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO CONSULTING AGREEMENT
 
     This amendment is made effective as of May 9, 1995, by and between NeoRx
Corporation, 410 West Harrison, Seattle, Washington 98119, and Dr. Fred Craves,
215 Laurel Grove, Kentfield, California 94904.
 
     The parties hereby agree that the Consulting Agreement effective as of July
7, 1993, shall be amended as follows:
 
2. COMPENSATION.
 
     (a) Cash Compensation.
 
     The first sentence is amended to read:
 
     "As cash compensation for any and all services which Consultant may render
to Corporation hereunder, Corporation shall pay to Consultant:
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
          QUARTER ENDING DATE                                              PAYMENT FEE
          ---------------------------------------------------------------  -----------
          <S>                                                              <C>
          6/30/95........................................................    $28,333
          9/30/95........................................................    $30,000
          12/31/95.......................................................    $30,000
          3/31/96........................................................    $30,000
          6/30/96........................................................    $30,000
</TABLE>
 
     For each calendar quarter of services provided, with payments to be made
for each quarter within 30 days of the end of each quarter."
 
     The remainder of Section 2 is unchanged.
 
6. TERM: TERMINATION.
 
     (a) Initial Term Period.
 
     "This agreement shall terminate on June 30, 1996 unless renewed by
agreement of the parties."
 
     The remainder of Section 6 is unchanged.
 
<TABLE>
<S>                                             <C>
NeoRx Corporation                               Dr. Fred Craves
By:                                             By:
--------------------------------------------    --------------------------------------------
</TABLE>
# C_2022340EN.01003401.xml

| 5.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 340/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 340/34

---

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — Tigercat International v EUIPO — Caterpillar (Tigercat)

(Case T-251/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark Tigercat - Earlier EU figurative mark CAT - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2022/C 340/46)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Tigercat International Inc. (Cambridge, Ontario, Canada) (represented by: B. Führmeyer and E. Matthes, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: P. Georgieva, D. Gája and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Caterpillar Inc. (Peoria, Illinois, United States) (represented by: A. Renck and S. Petivlasova, lawyers)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment and modification of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 25 February 2021 (Case R 16/2020-2), relating to opposition proceedings between the intervener and the applicant.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Tigercat International Inc. to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Tigercat International Inc. to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 263, 5.7.2021.

---
Exhibit 31.1



I, Michel de Rosen, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the registrant, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of ViroPharma
Incorporated.



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the consolidated financial
statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under
our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiary, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                                                                         
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Michel de Rosen                                                      
|Michel de Rosen                                                          
|President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors



November 8, 2004
# C_2023007EN.01003101.xml

| 9.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 7/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 7/31

---

Judgment of the General Court of 26 October 2022 — Gameageventures v EUIPO — (GAME TOURNAMENTS)

(Case T-776/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark GAME TOURNAMENTS - Absolute grounds for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 - No distinctive character acquired through use - Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Obligation to state reasons - Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Right to be heard - Equal treatment - Principle of sound administration)

(2023/C 7/39)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Gameageventures LLP (Folkestone, United Kingdom) (represented by: S. Santos Rodríguez, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 5 October 2021 (Case R 211/2021-5).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Gameageventures LLP to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Gameageventures LLP to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 64, 7.2.2022.

---
### MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04

- 10

- 00 791

- CR
IN RE David CEPEDA JONES Original Mandamus Proceeding 1
PER CURIAM Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: November 17, 2010
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED On October 29, 2010, relator David Cepeda Jones filed a petition for writ of mandamus, complaining of the trial court’s failure to rule on various pro se motions. However, counsel has been appointed to represent relator in the criminal proceeding pending in the trial court for which he is currently confined. A criminal defendant is not entitled to hybrid representation. See
Robinson v. State , 240 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Patrick v. State , 906 S.W.2d 481, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A tria l court has no legal duty to rule on pro se motions or petitions filed with regard to a criminal proceeding in which the defendant is represented by
counsel. See Robinson , 240 S.W.3d at 922. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 20 09

- CR

- 12902 , styled State of Te xas v. David Cepeda Jones , pending in the 227 th Judicial District Court , Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Philip Kazen presiding.04

- 10

- 00 791

- CR

- 2

- discretion by d eclining to rule on relator’s pro se motions filed in the criminal proceeding pending in the trial court. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied. T EX

. R.
A PP

. P. 52.8( a).
PER CURIAM
DO NOT PUBLISH
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. AP-75,962

EX PARTE MIGUEL RAMOS, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 2005CR4857 IN THE 290TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM BEXAR COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was charged with burglary of

habitation with intent to commit a felony in count one of the indictment and burglary of habitation

with intent to commit theft in count two of the indictment. The jury convicted him of both counts

and the trial judge assessed punishment of sixty (60) years’ confinement for each count and

restitution in the amount of $7,585.00 for count two. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed his

convictions. Ramos v. State, No AP-04-05-00543-CR, (Tex. App. — San Antonio, 2005, pet. ref’d)
RAMOS -- 2

(Not designated for publication). 

Applicant contends that his conviction for two counts of burglary of habitation against two

different complainants during one unlawful entry violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United

States Constitution. 

The trial judge thoroughly reviewed the record and concluded that Applicant’s conviction

for two counts of burglary of habitation against two different complaints violates the constitutional

prohibition against double jeopardy because there was only one unlawful entry. See Ex parte

Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The trial judge observed that when a double

jeopardy violation has occurred, the most serious offense is retained, and the less serious offense is

set aside. Id. at 337-339. The trial judge concluded that the most serious offense in this case was

the burglary of habitation with intent to commit a felony alleged in count one of the indictment as

this was a first degree felony whereas the burglary of habitation with intent to commit theft alleged

in count two of the indictment was a second degree felony. The trial judge therefore recommended

that count two of the indictment be set aside. We agree. 

We grant Applicant partial relief. We find that Applicant is entitled to relief as to count two

of the indictment only. The judgment and sentence imposed under count two of the indictment in

Cause No. 2005CR4857 from the 290th Judicial District Court of Bexar County is set aside. The

judgment, as reformed, shall reflect only one conviction for the offense of burglary of habitation as

alleged in count one of the indictment. 

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional

Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.
RAMOS -- 3

Delivered: July 2, 2008

Do Not Publish
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1093 Referred in House (RFH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1093

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             August 2, 2013

      Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
   at 130 Caldwell Drive in Hazlehurst, Mississippi, as the ``First 
     Lieutenant Alvin Chester Cockrell, Jr. Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FIRST LIEUTENANT ALVIN CHESTER COCKRELL, JR. POST OFFICE 
              BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 130 Caldwell Drive in Hazlehurst, Mississippi, shall be 
known and designated as the ``First Lieutenant Alvin Chester Cockrell, 
Jr. Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``First 
Lieutenant Alvin Chester Cockrell, Jr. Post Office Building''.

            Passed the Senate August 1, 2013.

            Attest:

                                                NANCY ERICKSON,

                                                             Secretary.
```
#### Richard Carl REX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-21.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 24, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 579 Reported in House (RH)]

                                                 House Calendar No. 249
103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 579

                          [Report No. 103-851]

Providing for the adoption of the resolution (H. Res. 578) amending the 
  Rules of the House of Representatives to apply certain laws to the 
           House of Representatives, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 7, 1994

   Mr. Moakley, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following 
resolution; which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Providing for the adoption of the resolution (H. Res. 578) amending the 
  Rules of the House of Representatives to apply certain laws to the 
           House of Representatives, and for other purposes.

    Resolved, That House Resolution 578 is hereby adopted.

                                                 House Calendar No. 249

103d CONGRESS

  2d Session

                              H. RES. 579

                          [Report No. 103-851]

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

Providing for the adoption of the resolution (H. Res. 578) amending the 
  Rules of the House of Representatives to apply certain laws to the 
           House of Representatives, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                            October 7, 1994

        Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed
```