First, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to adequately investigate and prepare for trial. Specifically, 

appellant claims that counsel should have presented expert testimony 

about appellant's broken hip and physical limitations, which would have 

established that he did not have the physical capacity to commit the 

sexual offenses. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. 

Many of the victim's allegations of sexual abuse predated appellant's 

injuries, and appellant and several other defense witnesses testified in 

depth about appellant's injuries and physical limitations. Thus, appellant 

failed to demonstrate that an expert's testimony would have had a 

reasonable probability of changing the outcome of the trial.' 

Second, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file a pretrial motion requesting a psychiatric examination of the 

victims. Appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was 

deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant did not demonstrate that a 

psychological evaluation of the victims would have been appropriate, as he 

did not show that the State benefited from a psychological expert or that 

there was a reasonable basis for believing that the female victims' mental 

'Appellant also claims that counsel failed to properly secure the 

attendance of expert witness Dr. Esplin at trial. Appellant failed to 

explain how counsel was deficient or what counsel should have done 

differently. Appellant also failed to provide this court with the transcripts 

that he cites to for this claim. See Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 43 & n.4, 

83 P.3d 818, 822 & n.4 (2004) (appellant is ultimately responsible for 

providing this court with portions of the record necessary to resolve his 

claims on appeal); Greene v. State, 96 Nev. 555, 558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 

(1980) ("The burden to make a proper appellate record rests on 

appellant."). Thus, he has failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. 

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or emotional state may have affected their veracity. See Koerschner v. 

State, 116 Nev. 1111, 1116, 13 P.3d 451, 455 (2000) (holding that a 

defendant must demonstrate a compelling need exists for the 

examination); see also Abbott v. State, 122 Nev. 715, 728, 138 P.3d 462, 

471 (2006) (reaffirming the test set forth in Koerschner). Thus, appellant 

did not demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome at 

trial had counsel sought a psychological evaluation of the female victims. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying this claim without 

conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Third, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to ensure that all bench conferences and discussions were recorded. 

We conclude that appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced, 

as he has not identified any issue that this court was unable to 

meaningfully review due to the failure to record bench conferences. See 

Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225 (holding that "bare" or "naked" 

claims are insufficient to grant relief). To the extent that he claims that 

appellate review of jury selection was not possible, this claim is belied by 

the record, as this court concluded on direct appeal that appellant was not 

prejudiced by the unrecorded bench conferences during the jury selection 

process. 2 Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 207-08, 163 P.3d 408, 417 (2007). 

Furthermore, a review of the record shows that most of the unrecorded 

bench conferences during trial were explained on the record or pertained 

2We also note that appellant failed to provide this court with the 

transcripts for jury selection, and thus failed to show prejudice. See 

Thomas, 120 Nev. at 43 & n.4, 83 P.3d at 822 & n.4; Greene, 96 Nev. at 

558, 612 P.2d at 688. 
to housekeeping matters. Therefore, we conclude that the district court 

did not err in denying this claim. 

Fourth, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

delivering an inadequate opening statement. Appellant argues that 

counsel's opening statement was ineffective because it was not clear or 

organized, it was composed of clichés and generalities, it did not 

specifically refer to the evidence that would be presented through defense 

witnesses, and counsel informed the district court earlier that his opening 

statement would be inadequate. Appellant failed to demonstrate that 

counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Counsel's 

opening statement set forth the theory of defense and addressed evidence 

that would be presented at trial. Appellant has failed to specify what 

additional information counsel should have included in the opening 

statement, nor has he shown a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Thus, 

we conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Fifth, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to move to recuse Judge Jackie Glass for bias toward the defense. 

Appellant specifically contends that Judge Glass was biased because she 

excluded evidence offered to support appellant's theory that the victims 

had fabricated the allegations, denied his motion for a continuance, 

conducted unrecorded bench conferences, reprimanded defense counsel for 

asking leading questions of appellant, and made inappropriate statements 

at sentencing. We conclude that appellant failed to demonstrate that trial 

counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Adverse rulings "during 

the course of official judicial proceedings do not establish legally 

cognizable grounds for disqualification." In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 

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104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988). Moreover, this court 

concluded on direct appeal that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in excluding the evidence of fabricated allegations. Rose, 123 

Nev. at 205 n.18, 163 P.3d at 415 n.18. Thus, a motion to recuse on this 

basis would have been futile. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 

P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). As for the other challenged conduct and 

statements, appellant failed to demonstrate that Judge Glass closed her 

mind to the presentation of evidence, see Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 

1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998), or displayed "'a deep-seated favoritism 

or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible," Kirksey v. 

State, 112 Nev. 980, 1007, 923 P.2d 1102, 1119 (1996) (quoting Liteky v. 

United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Thus, we conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Sixth, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to adequately select or prepare character witness T. Quaadman. 

Appellant asserts that Quaadman's testimony harmed the defense because 

she stated on cross-examination that her opinion of appellant might 

change if she knew that he had admitted touching the victim's vagina. 

Appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient 

or that he was prejudiced. On redirect examination, counsel elicited 

favorable testimony from Quaadman. Furthermore, counsel called at least 

five other witnesses who gave favorable testimony as to appellant's 

character and reputation. Thus, appellant did not show a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would 

have been different. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did 

not err in denying this claim. 

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Seventh, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to effectively prevent and cure a reference by State witness G. 

Moore to prejudicial polygraph evidence. Appellant failed to demonstrate 

that trial counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Trial counsel 

objected and requested a mistrial when Moore mentioned the word 

"polygraph" in describing his training and experience. On direct appeal, 

this court concluded that the district court's admonishment to the jury 

cured any prejudice from this single "polygraph" reference and that a 

mistrial was not warranted. Rose, 123 Nev. at 206-07, 163 P.3d at 416-17. 

Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Eighth, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to timely object to prosecutorial misconduct during closing 

argument. Specifically, he contends that the prosecutor improperly 

referred to him as a "predator," stated that defense counsel used "smoke 

screens and flat-out deception" and "is trying to fool you," and commented 

that the victims were "old enough to be believed, to be remembered, and to 

be given justice." Appellant challenged these comments on direct appeal 

and this court concluded that the comments were not prejudicial and thus 

did not amount to plain error. Id. at 208-11, 163 P.3d at 417-19. Although 

appellant appears to contend that his appellate rights were forfeited by 

counsel's failure to object, he offers no cogent argument as to how a 

different standard of review on appeal would have affected the outcome of 

either the trial or the appeal. Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 

P.2d 3, 6 (1987). Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Finally, appellant argues that the cumulative effect of 

counsel's deficiencies warrants relief. We conclude that, because he failed 

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to demonstrate multiple deficiencies, he failed to demonstrate cumulative 

error. Thus, the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge 

Terrence M. Jackson 

Jeff N. Rose 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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