If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

October 04, 2024

8:41 AM

In re O. JACKSON, Minor.

No. 370272

Midland Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 21-005327-NA

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and MURRAY and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her 

minor child, OJ, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue

to exist), (c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), 

and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent).1 On appeal, respondent argues that 

the trial court erred by finding that statutory grounds existed to support termination and that 

termination of her parental rights was not in OJ’s best interests. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In December 2021, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition 

to remove OJ from respondent’s care, and, later filed an amended petition. DHHS alleged that it 

had received reports that 21-month-old OJ was hospitalized for severe facial trauma and treated 

for suspected physical abuse. OJ was also unresponsive, severely dehydrated, and malnourished. 

He had a severe diaper rash that indicated no one had changed his diaper for several days and he 

tested positive for cocaine. In fact, when OJ was born in March of 2020, he tested positive for 

cocaine and respondent admitted using cocaine throughout her pregnancy.

Weeks before OJ’s hospitalization, the local Sheriff’s Department had responded to OJ’s 

parents’ home to treat father for a drug overdose. Despite this, respondent left OJ in father’s care 

 

1 The child’s father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and he is not a party to this appeal.
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for three days while looking for a job in Saginaw. Respondent further admitted to using crack 

cocaine while she was away, and, when OJ was found, his father appeared to be intoxicated.

During a search of OJ’s home, law enforcement found deplorable conditions. More 

specifically, the home was filled with dog feces, mouse droppings, dirty clothing, and items 

indicative of illicit drug use. Furthermore, OJ’s pack-and-play was soaked in urine.

After OJ was removed, respondent admitted to DHHS’s allegations regarding father’s prior 

substance abuse, the condition of the home, and OJ’s injuries. The trial court found that one or 

more of the grounds alleged in DHHS’s petition were established and exercised jurisdiction over 

OJ. The court ordered respondent to participate in and benefit from substance-abuse treatment, 

random drug screens, parenting classes, and homemaker services. The court also ordered 

respondent to complete a psychological evaluation and follow recommendations, sign all 

necessary releases for her services, obtain appropriate housing and a legal source of income, and 

remain in contact with DHHS.

Respondent maintained sobriety and employment for over a year, but her compliance with 

her remaining services was inconsistent at best. And although respondent initially engaged in 

parenting time with OJ, her parenting time was suspended because she was frequently late and

only partially engaged with OJ during visits, resulting in negative emotional responses and 

behaviors.

In October 2023, DHHS petitioned the court to terminate respondent’s parental rights. At 

the termination hearing, respondent’s caseworker, therapist, and homemaker services provider 

testified that respondent had not made progress or benefited from services. They further testified 

that the barriers to reunification that existed at the outset of the case continued to exist at the time 

of the termination hearing. Respondent also committed retail fraud and was on probation from 

which she was unsuccessfully discharged. Respondent tested positive for marijuana, kratom, and 

alcohol. She failed to submit to drug tests and forged her signature on recovery meeting sheets.

Moreover, respondent was involved in relationship with a new partner who died from a drug 

overdose and was dishonest with DHHS about it. The court found that DHHS established by clear 

and convincing evidence that termination of respondent’s parental rights was appropriate under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j), and that termination was in the child’s best interest. 

This appeal followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review for clear error a trial court’s finding that a statutory ground for termination of 

parental rights has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich

App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A finding is clearly erroneous if “although there is evidence 

to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 41 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We give deference 

to “the special ability of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” In re Medina, 317 

Mich App 219, 227; 894 NW2d 653 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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III. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding the statutory grounds 

supporting termination of her parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.

“To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory 

grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.” 

In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 472; 951 NW2d 704 (2020) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). A court may terminate parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) if it finds 

clear and convincing evidence of the following:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 

182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, 

and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds . . . the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.

Termination pursuant to subdivision (c)(i) is appropriate when “the totality of the evidence” 

supports a finding that the parent “had not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions” 

that led to the court taking jurisdiction over the minor child. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 

272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). In this case, the record supports the trial court’s findings that the 182-

day requirement was satisfied, the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist, and 

there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time 

considering OJ’s age.

The conditions that led to adjudication were primarily respondent’s substance use, 

parenting skills, and ability to maintain a clean and safe home. Respondent’s lack of employment 

and financial stability were also concerns. DHHS offered respondent numerous services to help 

her reunite with OJ; however, she failed to consistently participate or fully benefit from them.

After respondent completed a psychological evaluation, it indicated that she lacked insight 

into how her substance abuse affected her parenting. And although respondent attended most of 

her individual therapy appointments, her therapist testified that respondent only made “surfacelevel” progress and could not provide OJ with safety and protection.

Respondent participated in inpatient and outpatient substance-abuse treatment. She tested 

positive for prohibited substances, including cocaine and methamphetamine as well as alcohol. 

After respondent relapsed, she entered inpatient treatment for the second time. Respondent also 

missed drug screens. Further, it was discovered that respondent forged signatures on her recovery 

group sign-in sheets, causing DHHS to question respondent’s actual attendance. Indeed, 

respondent’s dishonesty with DHHS personnel and service providers continued throughout the 

proceedings. For example, in August 2023, respondent began a relationship with a man, who later 

died of an overdose. Respondent lied to DHHS about the man’s identity and her relationship with 

him. As a result, respondent’s caseworker believed that respondent had not truly benefited from 

substance-abuse treatment and was at a high risk for relapse.
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Respondent also participated in one parenting program, but she failed to complete the 

necessary tests in order to fully comply with the services, even after DHHS reminded her several 

times. Two other parenting programs stopped offering respondent services because she frequently 

missed meetings or arrived late. Respondent did not have an opportunity to demonstrate her 

parenting skills after the trial court suspended her parenting time, but respondent’s therapist 

testified that respondent did not appear to have developed new parenting skills that DHHS was 

unaware of.

Respondent was employed part-time at a restaurant. She then obtained another job for 

about a month before taking her latest job as a care provider for a family member. Despite being 

employed, respondent lacked propane to heat her home and water, and she misrepresented the 

source of the problem. During the termination hearing, respondent finally presented evidence that 

she had propane after caseworkers filed for emergency relief on respondent’s behalf. Moreover, 

at times, respondent had minimal food in her home and DHHS was concerned about her lack of 

food for her pets. In fact, a large food assistance card dissipated in a short timeframe and 

respondent allowed others to use it. Respondent also did not work with DHHS to create a budget 

and obtain financial independence; instead, she remained financially dependent on her parents 

throughout the case. Likewise, respondent did not participate in or benefit from homemaker 

services. DHHS stopped providing respondent with homemaker services because she failed to 

make regular appointments with her service provider and she did not demonstrate consistent 

improvement in her ability to keep her home clean.

Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that the conditions that led to 

jurisdiction continue to exist and that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would 

rectify them within a reasonable time. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Because only one statutory 

ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental 

rights, we need not address respondent’s arguments regarding the remaining statutory grounds. 

See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).

IV. BEST-INTERESTS DETERMINATION

Respondent also argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of her 

parental rights was in OJ’s best interests. We disagree.

“If the court determines that one or more statutory grounds for termination exist and that 

termination is in the child’s best interests, the court must enter an order terminating the 

respondent’s parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification not be made.” In re 

Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 16; 934 NW2d 610 (2019), citing MCL 712A.19b(5). “[W]hether 

termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance 

of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). “[T]he focus at the 

best-interest stage has always been on the child, not the parent.” Id. at 87. In making a bestinterests determination, the court may consider factors such as “the child’s bond to the parent, the 

parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the 

advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home . . . .” Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 

(citations omitted). “The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the 

parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, 
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the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re White, 303 Mich 

App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

Respondent argues that termination was inappropriate in her case because she had a bond 

with OJ and because OJ loved her. While the record supports that respondent had a bond with OJ, 

the record also reflects that interaction with respondent was not beneficial to OJ’s emotional wellbeing. Before parenting time was suspended, respondent often paid more attention to her oldest 

child and struggled to check if OJ’s diaper had to be changed. After visits, OJ began to exhibit 

signs of emotional distress. OJ became more physically aggressive toward other children, he had 

difficulty sleeping, he had night terrors, he would wake up screaming, and he struggled with 

emotional regulation around visits with respondent. OJ also began negatively responding to the 

worker associated with respondent’s parenting time. In addition to these behaviors, respondent’s 

caseworker testified that he believed respondent’s bond with OJ was weakened before the trial 

court suspended parenting time as a result of respondent’s lack of effort to bond with OJ. To the 

extent that respondent had a bond with OJ at the time of termination, the record indicates that the 

bond was not necessarily emotionally healthy for OJ. See In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 196-197; 

646 NW2d 506 (2002), overruled on other grounds by In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394 (2014) (holding 

that the fact that there was a “serious dispute on the record concerning whether [the respondent] 

had a healthy bond of any sort with her children” supported the conclusion that termination of her 

parental rights was in the children’s best interests).

The parent-child bond between respondent and OJ was only one factor considered by the 

trial court. See Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41. The trial court considered OJ’s young age and 

the length of time he had been in foster care. The court also considered that OJ’s chances of being 

adopted were very good. Further, the court considered respondent’s failure to comply with and 

benefit from her service plan. The court found that OJ needed permanency and stability during an 

important developmental stage in his life, which respondent could not offer him. The record 

reflects that OJ’s foster family supported OJ, provided him with healthy relationships, and allowed 

OJ to thrive. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in OJ’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

/s/ Christopher M. Murray

/s/ Anica Letica