alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-147154 and 333-147153),
Form S-4 (Nos. 333-143243 and 333-157724) and Form S-8 (Nos. 333-145741, 333-138839, 333-96967, 333-55082, 333-48226, 333-31120, 333-69381, 333-37371, 333-37369 and 33-58991) of Exar Corporation of our report dated June 10, 2010
relating to the financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in this Form 10-K.



|                                 
|---------------------------------
|/s/    PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
|PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP       
|San Jose, California             
|June 10, 2010
#### In the Matter of Cindy Suarez, Respondent. WFS Services Inc., Appellant. John E. Sweeney, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[655 NYS2d 179]

Spain, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed November 14, 1995, which ruled that claimant was entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits.

Claimant was employed as a supervisor of the customer service bureau at a receivables management corporation. During her employment, claimant had been warned about her excessive absences. On November 2, 1993, claimant was discharged from her position for misconduct after reporting to work late on October 29, 1993. After a hearing, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined that the final incident responsible for claimant’s termination was tardiness. The *843Board further determined that such tardiness did not constitute disqualifying misconduct and, therefore, claimant was entitled to receive benefits. The employer now appeals.

Claimant failed to appear at the initial hearing which resulted in a default decision disqualifying her from receiving benefits. Claimant later testified that, at the time the first hearing was scheduled, she was in the process of relocating to Florida. Claimant noted that after receiving the hearing notice, she called and wrote to the Board to inform it that she would be unable to attend. Under these circumstances, we find that the Board did not abuse its discretion in reopening the case (see, *Matter of Huber [Sweeney],*228 AD2d 841; *Matter of Levine [Sweeney],*212 AD2d 848).

We further find that there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that claimant was not guilty of disqualifying misconduct. Claimant testified that she was authorized to work flexible hours and was therefore not late for work on October 29, 1993. The employer’s contention to the contrary merely raised questions of credibility which were for the Board to resolve *(see, Matter of Zatarga [Kreisel*Co.— *Sweeney],*231 AD2d 776; *Matter of Mahanger [Cellular*One— *Sweeney],*223 AD2d 908). We find the employer’s contention that the Board erred in considering only claimant’s tardiness and not her absenteeism to be without merit. The Board’s decision clearly acknowledges that it was aware of and considered claimant’s absenteeism. We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s finding that the incidents that led to claimant’s discharge did not rise to the level of disqualifying misconduct.

Mikoll, J. P., White, Casey and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
#### Willie FARISH et al. v. Anna Farish SLAUGHTER.

No. 46647.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

April 25, 1972.

W. E. Gore, Jr., L. Breland Hilburn, Jackson, for appellants.

Morse & Morse, Jackson, for appellee.

BRADY, Justice:

This is an appeal from the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi. A decree dismissed with prejudice the bill of complaint and amended bill of complaint of John Farish, Willie Farish, Walter Farish, Jr., Ella Farish Jackson, and Enoch Farish, the complainants below. These appellants are some of the heirs at law of Eliza Farish Pillars, who died intestate on June 15, 1970. From that adverse decree the appellants prosecute this .appeal.

The issues in this case are purely factual. The chancellor found properly that Eliza Farish Pillars was mentally competent at the time she executed the warranty deed, as testified to by the doctor, who had known her for sixty years. The chancellor was likewise correct in finding that the appellee did not exert undue influence upon her sister, the deceased grant- or. Since Anna Farish Slaughter was not the dominant force in obtaining the warranty deed and was not in a position of trust and confidence, there is no presumption of undue influence. We therefore hold that the chancellor was correct in his findings of fact in favor of the appellee.

Affirmed.

RODGERS, P. J., and JONES, INZER and SUGG, JJ., concur.
#### Martin vs. Jackson, as ad.

An appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court — without motion for a new trial, or exception taken to any ruling or decision of the court — presents no question for the adjudication of this court.

*Appeal from, Phillips Circuit Court.*

Watkins & Gallagher, for appellant.

Fowler & Stillwell, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Compton,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a proceeding, in the Probate Court, by John Martin, for the allowance and classification of a claim against the estate of Turner W. Goswick, deceased.

From the judgment of the Probate Court allowing the claim, the administrator appealed to the Circuit Court, wher.e on inspection of the record, the allowance was adjudged erroneous, and a trial *de novo*awarded.

Neither party desiring a jury, the cause was submitted to the court'for trial, and the finding and judgment were for the administrator.

Martin appealed.

The questions discussed by counsel, touching the merits of this controversy, are not before us. There was no motion for a new trial in the court below, nor was exception taken to any ruling or decision of the court, whereby the appellant put his finger upon, or pointed out any alleged error of law. The case therefore, falls clearly within the rule laid down in *State Bank vs.*Conway, 13 *Ark.*344; which has been repeatedly recognized as the settled practice of this court. *Lefils Christian*
      *287
      *vs. Suggs,*15 *Ark.*137; *Jones vs. Gatlin*16 *Ark.*35; *Kinny & Goodrich vs. Heald,*17 *Ark.*397. So far from observing this rule the appellant did not even except to the decision of the court in rendering final judgment. The record presents nothing for our consideration, and the judgment must be affirmed. .
IV 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 731 

Expressing support for designation of the week of September 15, 2014, 

through September 21, 2014, as ‘‘Balance Awareness Week’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 17, 2014 

Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas submitted the following resolution; 

which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing support for designation of the week of September 

15, 2014, through September 21, 2014, as ‘‘Balance 

Awareness Week’’. 

Whereas vestibular (inner-ear-balance) disorders are underdiagnosed and undertreated; 

Whereas as many as 35 percent of adults 40 years of age and 

older in the United States—approximately 69 million 

Americans—have experienced some form of vestibular 

dysfunction; 

Whereas 80 percent of people 65 years of age and older have 

experienced dizziness; 

Whereas vestibular disorder patients may consult 4 or more 

physicians and spend 50 months or more in their search 

for a diagnosis; 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HRES 731 IH 

Whereas the Vestibular Disorders Association celebrates 

‘‘Balance Awareness Week’’ to reduce the time it takes 

to diagnose a vestibular disorder by helping patients recognize their symptoms and encouraging them to seek 

help from a qualified vestibular specialist; and 

Whereas the week of September 15, 2014, through September 21, 2014, would be an appropriate week to designate as ‘‘Balance Awareness Week’’: Now, therefore, be 

it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 

2 (1) supports the designation of ‘‘Balance 

3 Awareness Week’’; and 

4 (2) recognizes the importance of raising public 

5 awareness about vestibular disorders. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.2

Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C., Section 1350

as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, filed pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, of The First
Bancshares, Inc. (the Company) for the period ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Dee Dee Lowery, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Dee Dee LoweryName:

Dee Dee LoweryTitle:

Executive Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:

November 14, 2008


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to The First Bancshares, Inc., and will be retained by The First
Bancshares, Inc., and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-16-00466-CV

Joshua S. Coffee, Appellant

v.

Kelly Lynn Coffee, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-FM-13-006963, HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On June 24, 2016, Joshua S. Coffee attempted an appeal from the district court’s

“Order on Motion to Clarify Divorce Decree” and “Order in Suit for Modification of Support Order

and to Confirm Support Arrearage,” both signed on March 29, 2016.

In response to our letter questioning jurisdiction over this appeal, Coffee contends

that “by his calculations” the filing of his motion for new trial extended his appellate timetable. See

Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a) (providing that certain timely filed postjudgment motions extend time for

filing notice of appeal). Motions for new trial are timely if filed within 30 days after the complainedof judgment or orderis signed. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a). Under this rule, Coffee’s deadline for filing

his motion for new trial was April 28, 2016. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 4.1; Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a).

However, as Coffee acknowledges in his response and the record confirms, he did not file his
motion for new trial until April 29, 2016. That untimely motion for new trial did not extend the 1

filing deadline for Coffee’s notice of appeal, and the time to seek an extension for filing the

notice of appeal has expired. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1, 26.3; Gilani v. Kaempfe, 331 S.W.3d 879,

879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction after concluding

that appellant’s motion for new trial filed 31 days after signing of judgment was untimely and failed

to extend appellate timetable); see also Aziz v. Waris, No. 01-15-00175-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS

9068, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal

for want of jurisdiction after concluding that appellant’s motion for new trial was filed day after

deadline). Once the time for filing a notice of appeal and seeking an extension of time to file the

notice of appeal have expired, a party cannot invoke an appellate court’s jurisdiction. See Verburgt

v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997).

Coffee’s June 24, 2016 notice of appeal from the orders signed on March 29, 2016

is untimely, and we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for

want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

 

Jeff Rose, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Bourland

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: August 11, 2016

The district court need not have considered the untimely motion for new trial and no order 1

on the motion appears in the clerk’s record.

2
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of State

          - [Public Notice: 10462]

# SUMMARY:

                        Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: I hereby determine that certain objects to be included in the exhibition “Delacroix,” imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are imported pursuant to loan agreements with the foreign owners or custodians. I also determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, New York, from on or about September 17, 2018, until on or about January 6, 2019, and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in the national interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of these determinations be published in the                         **Federal Register**                        .                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Julie Simpson, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-632-6471; email:                         *section2459@state.gov*). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, L/PD, SA-5, Suite 5H03, Washington, DC 20522-0505.                    

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The foregoing determinations were made pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), E.O. 12047 of March 27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681,                     *et seq.;*22 U.S.C. 6501 note,                     *et seq.*), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236-3 of August 28, 2000, and Delegation of Authority No. 236-10 of July 6, 2018.                

 Jennifer Z. Galt,

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

[FR Doc. 2018-15025 Filed 7-12-18; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
## State of N ew York Su p reme Cou rt, A p p ellate Division Third J u dicial Dep artment Decided and Entered: February 5, 2015 5 19459

________________________________ In the Matter of the Claim of MILTON C. DAVIS, Appellant. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER COMMISSIONER OF LABOR, Respondent.

________________________________ Calendar Date: December 2, 2014 Before: Peters, P.J., Garry, Lynch and Devine, JJ.

__________ Milton C. Davis, Stone Mountain, Georgia, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City (Bessie Bazile of counsel), for respondent.

__________ Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed February 13, 2014, which ruled, among other things, that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily left his employment without good cause. Substantial evidence supports the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board finding that claimant resigned from his employment as a counselor with a nonprofit agency for personal and noncompelling reasons. The record establishes that although continuing work was available, claimant resigned from his job because he was nervous that a lack of a signed contract between the employer and the federal government for the funding of the services provided by the employer would result in his loss of employment. Inasmuch as resigning from a job in anticipation of being discharged has been held not to constitute good cause for leaving employment (see Matter of-2- 519459

Carcaterra [Association for Computing Mach., Inc.-Commissioner of Labor], 90 AD3d 1389, 1390 [2011]; Matter of Dixon-Weaver [Commissioner of Labor], 67 AD3d 1243, 1244 [2009]), we find no reason to disturb the Board's decision that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits under the circumstances herein. Furthermore, because claimant indicated on his application for unemployment insurance benefits that his separation from employment was due to lack of work, the Board's finding that he made a willful false statement to obtain benefits will not be disturbed (see Matter of Ferreira [Commissioner of Labor], 84 AD3d 1609, 1610-1611 [2011]; Matter of DeGennaro [Commissioner of Labor], 68 AD3d 1274, 1275 [2009]). Peters, P.J., Garry, Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the decision is affirmed, without costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger Clerk of the Court
EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Golden  Enterprises,  Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the third quarter ended February 29, 2004 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Mark W. McCutcheon, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

Dated:   August 26, 2004



/s/ Mark W. McCutcheon
----------------------
Mark W. McCutcheon
President and Chief Executive Officer

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to Golden Enterprises, Inc. and will be retained by Golden Enterprises,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its staff upon
request.








                                       23
Exhibit 32.2







SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

(Chief Financial Officer)





I, Patrick E. Delaney, Chief Financial Officer of Clacendix, Inc. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



1.

The Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A (Amendment No. 1) of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2007 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.78m or 78o(d)); and



2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





_/s/ Patrick E. Delaney_________

Dated: May 30, 2008

Patrick E. Delaney

Chief Financial Officer









This certification is being furnished to the SEC with this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of  2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by  such  Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section.







1
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7771

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.JUAN BAUTISTA ALOMIA-TORRES, a/k/a John, a/k/a Juan BaustistaAlomia, a/k/a Luis Antonio Torres, a/k/a Edward Martinez, a/k/a Luis Alfredo Martinez, a/k/a John the Jamaican, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (3:97-cr-00040-RLV-2) Submitted: July 31, 2008 Decided: August 4, 2008 Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Juan Bautista Alomia-Torres, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Jack Higdon, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.* In accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1) and Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988), a prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed “filed” when it is deposited into the institution’s mail system. Alomia-Torres’ notice of appeal is dated October 22, 2007, and we conclude that this was the earliest date it could have been filed. - 2 - PER CURIAM: Juan Bautista Alomia-Torres seeks to appeal the district court’s order construing his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion and dismissing it without prejudice. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4 (a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s order was entered on the docket on April 20, 2006. The notice of appeal was filed, at the earliest, on October 22, 2007. *Because Alomia-Torres failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately- 3 - presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED